03 006000 4200000074 CH2 FLS RPT 000005 NB
03 006000 4200000074 CH2 FLS RPT 000005 NB
UTILITY TUNNEL
SEPTEMBER 2024
Document History
Document Approval
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. 7
1.1 Project Understanding ...................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Project Location ............................................................................................................... 7
1.3 Jacobs Scope of Work.................................................................................................... 10
1.4 Purpose of this Document .............................................................................................. 10
2. OVERVIEW OF THE DRY AND WET UTILITY TUNNELS AND MEP ROOMS .............. 11
2.1 General Characteristics .................................................................................................. 11
2.2 Dry Utility Cable Tunnels ................................................................................................ 14
2.3 Wet Utility Tunnel ........................................................................................................... 16
3. LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND GUIDANCE .......................................................... 19
3.1 List of Relevant Reports ................................................................................................. 19
4. FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 21
4.1 MEP Rooms ................................................................................................................... 21
4.2 Dry Tunnels Risk ............................................................................................................ 21
4.3 Wet Tunnel Risk ............................................................................................................. 25
4.4 Occupant Load ............................................................................................................... 25
4.5 Categorisation ................................................................................................................ 25
5. MEANS OF EGRESS..................................................................................................... 26
5.1 Prescriptive Guidance .................................................................................................... 26
5.2 Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) ............................................................................... 26
5.3 Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) ............................................................................... 29
5.3.1 CFD Modelling of ASET ................................................................................................. 29
5.3.2 ASET Assessment Criteria ............................................................................................. 29
5.3.3 CFD Model Setup........................................................................................................... 30
5.3.4 Dry Tunnel Fire .............................................................................................................. 31
5.3.5 Wet Tunnel Fire.............................................................................................................. 33
5.3.6 Overview of CFD Results ............................................................................................... 35
5.4 RSET vs ASET............................................................................................................... 36
5.5 Exit Discharge ................................................................................................................ 39
5.6 MEP Rooms ................................................................................................................... 39
5.7 Dry Tunnels.................................................................................................................... 39
5.8 Wet Tunnels ................................................................................................................... 40
5.9 Horizontal Egress ........................................................................................................... 41
5.10 Vertical Egress ............................................................................................................... 42
5.11 Staircase ........................................................................................................................ 42
6. CONSTRUCTION CLASSIFICATION ............................................................................ 44
6.1 Structural Fire Resistance .............................................................................................. 44
6.2 Compartmentation .......................................................................................................... 45
6.3 Fire Barrier Walls ........................................................................................................... 46
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6.4 Penetration and Opening Protection ............................................................................... 47
7. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ..................................................................................... 49
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 49
7.2 Systems Response ........................................................................................................ 49
7.3 Sprinklers ....................................................................................................................... 51
7.4 Fire Extinguishers........................................................................................................... 51
7.5 Standpipe System .......................................................................................................... 51
8. DETECTION AND ALARM ............................................................................................ 52
8.1 MEP Rooms ................................................................................................................... 52
8.2 Linear Heat Detectors..................................................................................................... 52
8.3 Aspirating Smoke Detectors ........................................................................................... 53
8.4 Manual Call Points ......................................................................................................... 53
8.5 Fire Alarm Annunciation Devices .................................................................................... 54
9. LIGHTING AND SIGNAGE ............................................................................................ 56
9.1 Emergency Lighting........................................................................................................ 56
9.1.1 Illumination Required ...................................................................................................... 56
9.1.2 Emergency Power Illumination ....................................................................................... 56
9.2 Exit Signs ....................................................................................................................... 57
10. EMERGENCY COMMS AND BACKUP POWER ........................................................... 58
10.1 Emergency Power .......................................................................................................... 58
11. SMOKE CONTROL AND PRESSURISATION ............................................................... 59
11.1 Smoke Control - Tunnels ................................................................................................ 59
12. FIRE SERVICE FEATURES........................................................................................... 60
12.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 60
12.2 Fire Station Locations ..................................................................................................... 60
12.3 Fire Apparatus Access Roads ........................................................................................ 60
12.4 Dead End and Turning Arrangements............................................................................. 61
12.5 Gates and Signs............................................................................................................. 62
12.6 Fire Department Connections (Breeching Inlets) ............................................................. 62
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 64
A. APPENDIX A – TUNNEL LAYOUT ................................................................................ 65
B. APPENDIX B – COMPARTMENTATION LAYOUT ........................................................ 66
C. APPENDIX C – CFD MODELLING ................................................................................ 67
List of Tables
Table 2-1: Dry Utility Tunnel Dimensions ......................................................................................... 14
Table 2-2: Wet Utility Tunnel Dimensions ......................................................................................... 17
Table 3-1 List of relevant reports...................................................................................................... 19
Table 4-1: Heat Release Rate Calculations in MV Tunnel 1 ............................................................. 22
Table 4-2: Heat Release Rate Calculations in MV Tunnel 2 ............................................................. 24
Table 5-1: Prescriptive Guidance on Travel Distances ..................................................................... 26
Table 5-2: Egress Time Calculations................................................................................................ 28
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Table 5-3: RSET Results ................................................................................................................. 28
Table 5-4 Modelling Properties used for Dry Tunnel Fires ................................................................ 33
Table 5-5 Modelling Properties used for Wet Tunnel Fires ............................................................... 35
Table 5-6: ASET Results ................................................................................................................. 36
Table 6-1: Construction Classification and Occupancy of Buildings .................................................. 44
Table 6-2: Structural Fire Resistance ............................................................................................... 44
Table 6-3: Fire Resistance Rating .................................................................................................... 44
Table 6-4: Compartmentation .......................................................................................................... 45
Table 12-1: Fire Access Vehicles Requirements .............................................................................. 61
List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Project Location (Ref. DMP Update Report, WSP, Feb 2022)............................................ 7
Figure 1-2: Oxagon Port Illustrative Masterplan (Ref. DMP Updates, WSP, July 2022) ....................... 8
Figure 1-3: Oxagon Village Illustrative Masterplan.............................................................................. 9
Figure 2-1: Dry and Wet Utility Tunnel Layout .................................................................................. 12
Figure 2-2: Overview of the Utility Tunnels showing MEP rooms, Pressurised Egress Shafts and
Ladders and distances between MEP Rooms .................................................................................. 13
Figure 2-3: Dry Utility Tunnel Typical Cross Section ......................................................................... 14
Figure 2-4: Overview of Dry Tunnel Compartment Lengths with doors in between MV1/MV1 and
Egress Shafts .................................................................................................................................. 15
Figure 2-5: Wet Utility Tunnel Typical Cross Section ........................................................................ 16
Figure 2-6: Overview of Wet Tunnel with distances between Vertical Egress Ladders ...................... 18
Figure 4-1: Typical MEP Rooms Arrangements................................................................................ 21
Figure 5-1: Composition of egress time for RSET............................................................................. 27
Figure 5-2: Location of the Dry tunnel cable fires ............................................................................. 30
Figure 5-3 Location of the Wet tunnel fire......................................................................................... 31
Figure 5-4: Layout and number of cables dry tunnel fires ................................................................. 32
Figure 5-5: HRR Growth Rate for MV1 Tunnel ................................................................................. 32
Figure 5-6: HRR Growth Rate for MV2 Tunnel ................................................................................. 33
Figure 5-7 HRR growth rate for MV2 tunnel ..................................................................................... 33
Figure 5-8: Dry Tunnel (MV1) ASET vs RSET curve ........................................................................ 37
Figure 5-9: Dry Tunnel (MV) ASET vs RSET curve .......................................................................... 37
Figure 5-10: Wet Tunnel ASET vs RSET curve ................................................................................ 38
Figure 5-11: Dry Tunnel (MV1) ASET vs RSET Curve Showing Effects of Sprinklers ....................... 38
Figure 5-12: Dry Tunnel Vertical Egress Arrangements .................................................................... 39
Figure 5-13: Dry Tunnel Horizontal Egress Arrangements ................................................................ 40
Figure 5-14: Wet Tunnel Vertical Egress Arrangements ................................................................... 41
Figure 5-15: Staircase and Exit Passageway Arrangements ............................................................ 43
Figure 6-1: Tunnel Cross Compartment Arrangements .................................................................... 46
Figure 6-2: Fire Barrier Vertical Continuity ....................................................................................... 47
Figure 6-3: Various Types of Penetrations ....................................................................................... 48
Figure 7-1: Typical Incident Scenario Timeline ................................................................................. 50
Figure 8-1: Fire Alarm System, LHDS Dry Risers Schematic (03-186005-4200000074-CH2-ELV-
DRG-235001) .................................................................................................................................. 53
Figure 8-2: Fire Alarm System, LHDS Dry Risers Schematic (03-186005-4200000074-CH2-ELV-
DRG-235002 ................................................................................................................................... 53
Figure 8-2: Fire Alarm System, Aspirating Detectors and Zones(03-186005-4200000074-CH2-ELV-
DRG-235004) .................................................................................................................................. 53
Figure 8-3: Fire Alarm System (WET/DRY) Tunnel Layout Snip showing fire alarm systems installed
........................................................................................................................................................ 55
Figure 9-1: Exit Signs ...................................................................................................................... 57
Figure 12-1: Fire Station Locations .................................................................................................. 60
Figure 12-2: Fire Apparatus Access Around Building (Sprinklered) ................................................... 61
Figure 12-3: Turning Facilities (SBC 801 Figure D103.1) ................................................................. 62
Figure 12-4: Fire Lane Sign Examples (SFC Figure D103.6) ............................................................ 62
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Figure C-1: CFD Results – MV1 Fire – Visibility on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ........................ 68
Figure C-2: CFD Results – MV1 Fire – Temperature on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ................. 69
Figure C-3: CFD Results – MV1 Fire – Carbon Monoxide on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ......... 70
Figure C-4: CFD Results – MV1Fire – Temperature on a section through Linear Heat Detectors ...... 71
Figure C-5: CFD Results – MV2 Fire – Visibility on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ........................ 72
Figure C-6: CFD Results – MV2 Fire – Temperature on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ................. 73
Figure C-7: CFD Results – MV2 Fire – Carbon Monoxide on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ......... 74
Figure C-8: CFD Results – MV2 Fire – Temperature on a section through Linear Heat Detectors ..... 75
Figure C-9: CFD Results – Wet tunnel Fire – Visibility on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway............... 76
Figure C-10: CFD Results – Wet tunnel Fire – Temperature on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway ..... 77
Figure C-11: CFD Results – Wet tunnel Fire – Temperature on a section through LHDs .................. 78
MV Medium Voltage
HV High Voltage
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1. Introduction
The NEOM project was announced in October 2017 and attracted global interest. This was in part due
to the unparalleled aspirations for the project: “The land of the future, where the greatest minds and
best talents are empowered to embody pioneering ideas and exceed boundaries in a world inspired by
imagination”. Further NEOM Project information can also be found at www.NEOM.com.
The project is located within the NEOM Industrial City Region on an island formed by the dredging of
the basin for the Port of NEOM.
The project is located within the NEOM Industrial City Region as shown in
Figure 1-1 Project Location (Ref. DMP Update Report, WSP, Feb 2022)
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Figure 1-2: Oxagon Port Illustrative Masterplan (Ref. DMP Updates, WSP, July 2022)
NEOM appointed Jacobs to provide design consultancy services and undertake the Detailed Design
for the OXAGON Village infrastructure (Zone F in the sketch below).
• Seaside Section
OXAGON Land Side, consists of various Zones as described in the Sections below:
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Jacobs has been appointed by NEOM COMPANY, the Employer, to provide Design Consultancy
Services for the Neom Oxagon Village under the Contract Agreement No: 4200000074, Service Order
No.: 011 dated 15 May 2024.
Located within the Oxagon village Zone F is two utility tunnels (Dry and Wet Utility) that traverses
through the spine (North to South) carrying dry and wet utility services intended for the key
infrastructures serving the island. This report outlines the fire strategy of dry and wet utility tunnel
along with supporting technical rooms (MEP Rooms 1 to 8).
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The scope of this project is to prepare all the Stage 3C and 3D deliverables for Infrastructure, and Public
Realm for the Oxagon Village, with all associated drawings, reports, specification, cost plan and pricing
issuance to the approval of the NEOM while complying with NEOM design Procedures (mainly NEOM
Design Deliverables Procedure and other relevant guidelines/standards/procedures).
All the previous deliverables/documents by other consultants shall be validated by Jacobs prior to
proceeding to following design scope of work.
Stage 3B: Developed Design – Public Realm (Including the resolution of earlier design stage comments)
Stage 3C: Detailed Design - Infrastructure & Public Realm (Including the design validation &
comment resolution of earlier design stages)
The purpose of this document is to present the detailed design and calculations of the Fire Life Safety
strategy of the Utility Tunnels passing through Zone F of Oxagon Village. The aspects of the design
taken from prescriptive guidance and where necessary performance-based analysis of certain
aspects are detailed.
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The primary function of the utility tunnel (dry) is to carry cables from one end to another while
maintaining an optimum operational temperature in the tunnels to prevent cable overheating. The
cables in the tunnel have been designed to operate within a threshold temperature beyond which cables
will start heating beyond its operating temperature. If heated beyond its threshold, it can affect the
cables current conductance ability (within design tolerance). Furthermore, overheating of tunnel can
lead to cable fires that have catastrophic consequences with substantial asset loss that cost millions of
dollars in disruptions and lost business. The fire can also affect the tunnel structural integrity due to
rapid deterioration of concrete strength and thermal expansion which could subject the entire tunnel for
collapse.
The utility tunnels are divided into several zones with ventilation buildings at either ends that can house
large axial fans providing ventilation-based cooling into the tunnels as and when required. Similarly,
should there be a fire in the tunnel, there are several fire safety systems installed within the tunnel to
overcome the effects of fire both for life safety as well as property system. The tunnel ventilation fans
have been adequately sized such that an active smoke control or purging operation can be handled.
Similarly in the Wet Tunnel, even though the probability of cable heating is very low, the design caters
for ventilation system such that air quality can be maintained (wet utilities) and heat control, smoke
control and smoke purging operation can be carried out if needed.
Oxagon Village Zone F will consist of three utility tunnels, two dry and a wet tunnel. These will contain
medium voltage cables and ICT cables and piping respectively along their full length.
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2.2 Dry Utility Cable Tunnels
The dry tunnel is a 2-cell tunnel with each cell having a different cross-sectional area and each
carrying medium voltage (MV) cables suspended in cable trays. For this report, the wider dry tunnel
carrying 13.8 KV cables will be called as MV1, and the narrower cell carrying 30 KV cables will be
called MV2.
Table 2-1 below shows the dimensions of each cell in detail. Each tunnel also has two ceiling
mounted Jet fans suspended along the ceiling, together with cable trays, lighting, and fire protection
systems.
Both tunnels are dimensioned to include clear walkable space as well as the installation of equipment.
The specific dimensions of this are illustrated in Figure 2-3 below, taken from drawing 03-156001-
4200000074-CH2-ELE-DRG-033301 displaying a cross section of a typical section of the tunnels side
by side.
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The total length of the dry tunnel is 2357 m long and is separated into three distinct compartments
each with a MEP room at either ends. The length of each compartment is indicated in following Figure
2-4. At intervals not exceeding 300 m, there are means of egress provision made within the dry utility
tunnel through either providing a cross-connecting door between the MV1 and MV2 cells or by
escaping from the end of one compartment to other via fire resistant doors which act as an end of
compartment barriers.
Figure 2-4: Overview of Dry Tunnel Compartment Lengths with doors in between MV1/MV1 and Egress Shafts
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• Clear leaf door opening of at least 810mm and a minimum clear height
of 200mm.
• Equipped with automatic door closer to ensure door closes after use.
• Side-hinged or pivoted-swinging type.
• The unlatching of any door shall not require more than one operation.
• No level distance before or after the door
• The forces required to fully unlock and unlatch any leaf door in means
of egress doesn’t exceed 67N nor does it exceed 133N to set it in
motion.
• All means of egress doors shall be labelled and in compliance with
NFPA 80
The dry utility tunnel as two cells adjoining each other with cross-connecting doors to provide
access/egress from one tunnel to another. Further details for these provisions can be found in Section
5.5.
The wet utility tunnel is a single-cell tunnel also divided into 3 fire-rated compartments. The cross-
sectional area is generally uniform along the whole tunnel. The compartment layout differs from the
dry utility tunnel.
The wet tunnel carries piping on each side throughout and is similarly dimensioned to include a walk
space and area for installation of equipment. The specific dimensions of this layout are illustrated in
Figure 2-5, taken from drawing 03-156001-4200000074-CH2-ELE-DRG-033301, displaying the
typical cross section of the wet tunnel.
The following
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*The walkable height is in accordance with the headroom requirements of SBC 801 1003.3.1.
The total length of the wet tunnel is 2041 m long and is also separated into three distinct
compartments each with a MEP room at either end.
Unlike the dry utility tunnels, the wet tunnel is a single cell so the means of egress here is near the
end of each compartment through vertical ship ladders that can be used to emerge to surface.
Alternatively, personnel can traverse between compartment which are separated at the end of each
compartment through fire resistant doors. Each compartment of the wet tunnel is also served by MEP
rooms at either end that contain Tunnel ventilation Axial fans.
The Wet Tunnel is approximately 2041m long and is also separated into three compartments. Each of
which are protected by a set of smoke ventilation fans at either end contained within MEP rooms. The
lengths of each compartment are indicated in the following Figure 2-6.
VG-PS-CFD (22.12.2024):
In Section 2.3, the wet tunnel is noted as a
'single cell', where it is noted elsewhere
that the wet tunnel is not a single fire cell
but is split into three fire cells. Please
clarify if it is meant to say that there is a
single wet tunnel.
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For a more detailed illustration on the tunnel layout, see Appendix A – Tunnel Layout and Appendix B
– Compartmentation Layout.
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Project requirements
This report is to be read in conjunction with the following reports and Drawings. Where specific
information from other drawings and reports is used, relevant cross-reference shall be provided within
this report.
Table 3-1 List of relevant reports
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MEP structures are located in dedicated underground building containing Fan room, Electrical room,
ELV room, and Fire panel room. The fan room (Tunnel Ventilation Axial Fans) is responsible for two
functions, the first and main function is a) controlling temperature and secondly b) smoke
management during various modes of operation. The fan room structure has a separate vertical
means of egress.
The fan rooms are arranged in a supply and exhaust basis with MEP Room 1 dedicated for supply
while MEP room 2 is dedicated for exhaust. However, since the fans have reversible functionality,
they can operate in both smoke extraction and/or fresh air makeup modes depending on the detection
signal and fire locations. Fan rooms have maintenance and equipment access points as per below 3D
view of typical fan rooms. All fan rooms are 2 hours fire resistance rated.
The other rooms within the MEP rooms provide functionality to the Tunnel ventilation fans. These are
electrical rooms, fire panel rooms, ELV rooms and other mechanical rooms that provide the relevant
functional requirements for the tunnel.
The Dry Tunnels pose the most severe risk of fire due to the danger of combustion present within the
cables that traverse through the tunnels on cable brackets.
The wider MV1 Tunnel contains a total of 14 Medium Voltage cables, providing the highest potential
for fire growth of any of the three tunnels. Fire hazard analysis carried out based on cable inventory
and its properties produce a peak heat release rate of 4.4 MW reached in 36 minutes and 40
seconds.
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VG-PS-CFD (22.12.2024):
2 In Table 4-1, The HR is correctly
The Heat Release Rate is taken NUREG/CR-7010 [Ref 2] Table = 250kW/m
calculated as 78.54kW per 1m of
as 250kW/m2 7.1
VG-PS-CFD 1 cable. For 14 cables this should
(22.12.2024): be 78.54 x 14 = 1100 kW approx.
In Table 4-1, The BT A conservative design fire
The
calculation should beHeat Release (HR) of each HRR x C 250 x 0.31 assessment shall assume all 14
(CLx1000)/(HR) metre
insteadis calculated = 78.54kW cables reaching to a peak HRR
of (HRx1000000). HR is on a fast t2 curve.
on not required. CL is in
MJ and HR is in The
kW. burn time (BT) is calculated (CL x 1000) / (HR x 1000000) (172.8 x 1000) / (78.54 x
Please update. 1000000)
= 2200s
Speed of flame spread (Sp) in NUREG/CR-6850 [Ref 1] = 0.9mm/s
one direction is taken as R.4.1.2
0.9mm/s
Similarly, the adjacent Medium Voltage tunnel (MV2) contains at its most dense 12 cables, providing
a lower potential for fire growth due to the lower quantity of cabling. Calculations produce a peak heat
release rate of 3.7 MW reached in 36 minutes and 40 seconds.
The calculations include significant conservatisms (including that all cables are ignited
simultaneously) and therefore they are used for worst-case calculation purposes, but it should be
noted than a real fire incident is likely to result in lower heat release rates than indicated by these
results.
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The burn time (BT) is (CL x 1000) / (HR x 1000000) (172.8 x 1000) / (78.54 x
calculated 1000000)
= 2200s
Speed of flame spread (Sp) in NUREG/CR-6850 [Ref 1] = 0.9mm/s
one direction is taken as R.4.1.2
0.9mm/s
Length of burning section (L) is ((Sp) x 2) x BT = 3960mm
calculated
Peak HR (PHR) for one cable (L/1000) x HR (3960 / 1000) x 78.4
is calculated = 311kW
The number of cables (Ca) is Proposed Design = 12
taken as 14
The peak HRR for MV1 is PHR x Ca 311 x 12
calculated = 3732W
= 3.7MW
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The wet tunnel poses the least severe risk of fire due to the lack of combustible material. The piping
itself doesn’t present a risk in this regard. Therefore, the biggest threat posed are the limited amount
of Low Voltage cables running through for the purpose of lighting and telecom as well as compressed
gas cylinders used for hot work. Estimation for a peak heat release rate is taken as 500 kW.
This is not the product of any calculation due to the lack of combustible content within the tunnel
limiting potential input data for this kind of analysis. Rather an assumption is made as to encompass
the heat release rate of any of the combustible components fixed within the tunnel as well as fire
loads brought in with the maintenance crews such as tools, bags, and transport.
The calculations take the assumption that no more than three personnel will be in any one tunnel at
any point. The possibility of additional fire load being carried into the tunnels by these personnel i.e.
bags are deemed sufficiently accounted for under the figures for fire growth produced.
4.5 Categorisation
In alignment with the provisions provided by the prescriptive guidance, a utility tunnel will fall into the
category of Group U as per SBC 201 which is identified as a budling or structure of an accessory
character and miscellaneous structure not classified in any specific occupancy.
Provisional requirements of Group U will be referenced throughout this report to provide guidance on
strategies in various sections.
As well as this Occupancy Group the nature of the structure itself as a subterranean space/ tunnel
qualifies it for the prescriptive guidance of other standards such as NFPA 520, 502 etc.
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By exploring the provisions and requirements imposed on this design by a series of standards and
codes that encompass it categorically as a Group U structure; Subterranean Space; Tunnel or new
structure, then an outline of prescriptive guidance can be compiled on Means of Egress requirements.
This is detailed in Table 5-1 along with a description as to the extent to which each standard relates to
this project to evaluate the applicability.
Table 5-1: Prescriptive Guidance on Travel Distances
Due to the lack of specified prescriptive guidance regarding Utility Tunnels and the inconsistencies in
provisions sourced from general standards encompassing it categorically, a performance-based
design has been produced through an analysis on the specific structure to demonstrate that the
Means of Egress provision for each tunnel is adequate. produce an allowable time of egress and
means to achieve this.
The basis for the performance-based review was a comparison of the Available Safe Egress Time
(ASET) versus the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) to find the exit travel distances needed for
occupants to escape in sufficient time.
The criterion for viability of means of egress will be that the results of the ASET exceed that of
the RSET.
Calculations for the Required Time for Safe Egress (RSET) are based on the time it takes for
occupants to walk from the most remote point in the compartment to an available Point of Relative
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This methodology was used on the furthest point from an exit in a series of hypothetical
compartments whose length is increased by increments of 100m up to but not exceeding the 1200 m
maximum allowable travel distance permitted within prescriptive guidance. This is to test the viability
of potential compartment sizes within this criterion.
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The figures for Available Safe Egress Time are determined from Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD)
modelling of smoke spread that causes visibility to drop below the prescribed 10 m in accordance with
the assessment criteria. This indicates the time in which the conditions of the compartment would
become uninhabitable by the occupants in egress.
The CFD analysis assumes a typical section of each of the compartments, with the fire close to the end
of the compartment to predict the smoke movement when the end compartment exit is out of use due
to the presence of the fire. The smoke is also expected to travel at the maximum speed due to the
blockage effect of the compartment doors, so all the smoke plumes will effectively only travel in the
direction of the occupants’ egress path.
CFD modelling is performed using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) version 6.9.1.
FDS developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is a computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) model highly regarded in fire engineering, especially for applications like tunnel fire
safety. FDS is designed to simulate fire and smoke propagation in enclosed spaces, with detailed
modelling of fluid flow, heat transfer, and combustion. This capability makes it particularly useful for
Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) vs. Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) analyses in tunnels,
where predicting smoke movement, visibility, and temperature profiles is essential for occupant
safety.
In an ASET vs. RSET analysis, FDS calculates ASET based on the development of hazardous
conditions (such as reduced visibility and increased toxicity) that might impact safe evacuation.
Outputs from FDS simulations, including detailed temperature and smoke distribution data that can be
visualized with post-processing tool Smokeview, enabling assessment of ASET.
FDS is widely accepted across the fire safety industry and is commonly used for tunnel safety
analyses. Its use aligns well with various standards, such as those from the NFPA which recognize
CFD-based methods in fire analysis when assumptions are validated. As an open-source tool with
extensive peer-reviewed validation, FDS is trusted for its accuracy in modelling fire scenarios
particularly in the tunnel environment.
Visibility criterion is the governing factor to determine safe egress, aligned with NFPA guidelines, and
serving as a benchmark for ensuring occupants can identify exits and obstacles during a fire event. It
is proposed that smoke obscuration levels should be maintained below the point at which a sign
internally illuminated at 80 lx (7.5 ft-candles) is discernible at 30 m (100 ft), and doors and walls are
discernible at 10 m (33 ft). This visibility guideline is applied to the location where occupants need the
wayfinding capacity to evacuate.
The required wayfinding capacity is not as critical as the survivability criteria based on heat effects or
smoke toxicity in circumstances such as occupants queuing at the base of vertical circulation
elements or evacuating along egress walkways in enclosed trainways. In these circumstances, smoke
obscuration could be maintained at a reduced level, to the point at which an exit sign is discernible at
no less than 10 m (33 ft) and doors and walls are discernible at no less than 3.75 m (12 ft) [34]. Other
survivability criteria affecting tenability such as heat effects and smoke toxicity should also be
evaluated.
Other criteria for occupant safety assessment include maximum allowable temperatures, and toxicity
levels, for instance, NFPA 130 (which is a standard developed for metro tunnels but is relevant for
underground environments such as the utility tunnels here) also limits exposure temperatures to 60°C
in areas accessed during evacuation, ensuring that occupants are not harmed by excessive heat
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As introduced in the previous section, a typical section of tunnel for the longer section was modelled
for all three number of tunnel types: Dry tunnel MV1, Dry tunnel MV2 and Wet Tunnel. The design fire
introduced in Section 3 of this report was represented in the modelling software FDS as cable fires for
the dry tunnels and a pool fire for the wet tunnels. The analysis set out to produce the most
reasonably onerous fire scenario in each tunnel compartment with placement of the fire at the
compartment end location to ensure that all the smoke plumes would travel towards the egress
direction. The fire growth rate, peak Heat Release Rate (HRR) and visibility parameters were also
chosen to be the worst case for this design fire. Figure 5-2 below shows the location and fire setup
modelled in FDS for the dry tunnel fires, and Figure 5-3 for the wet tunnel.
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Both fire types were modelled located in the longest tunnel section however they can be used to
determine ASET for other tunnel sections too, because they represent a typical cross section of the
tunnel which is the same throughout the whole of the different tunnel types.
The dry tunnel fires are modelled with the parameters as shown in Section 4 of this report, with cable
fires which grow at the rate set out in the most conservative prediction from NUREG fire tests. The total
heat release rate and time taken to reach peak HRR is based on the number of cables in each tunnel
and on the maximum growth speed along the cables. In the design fire growth rate in Section 3, the
cables are specified to reach peak HRR at 34 minutes and 40 seconds, however in the modelling, a
further factor of safety of about 20 % is added to reach the peak within 30 minutes. For the MV1 tunnel,
the peak HRR is 4.4 MW and for the MV2 tunnel this is 3.7 MW. This is based on the number of possible
cables in each of the tunnels as shown in the modelling cross section in Figure 5-4.
Both cable tunnels assume that the fires start immediately at the beginning of the ignition despite the
many conservativisms inherent in that assumption. The flame spread occurs linearly along the cables
up to a maximum of 3.2 m when the suppression system is assumed to stop further increase in the
HRR. No burn out of fuel is assumed during this period. For both simulations, the fire is only modelled
for the first 600 s because it is intended purely for ASET calculation, and the egress period is assumed
completed by this point. Fire HRR time curves for MV1 and MV2 are presented in Figure 5-5 and Figure
5-6 respectively. Table 5-4 provides the key properties used in the modelling as well as the output used.
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The wet tunnel is a sterile environment for fire and as introduced in the Fire Hazard Analysis, the
maximum fuel load expected to be the most onerous is due to the equipment bought in to the tunnels
by maintenance staff. The peak HRR is 500 kW, and the growth rate is linear, with the timescales
based on a fast t2 fire. This then continues to burn at a medium rate once additional equipment
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CFD results demonstrate that visibility at 2.5 m above walkway level does not drop below 10 m for
any evacuees during the egress period. This is afforded by the low visibility spread rate (smoke
speed) never exceeding 0.6 m/s whereas the walk speed is a minimum of 1.3 m/s and therefore even
occupants close to the fire and evacuating only when smoke is in very close proximity to them can
safely egress to the nearest point of safety with good margins. A more detailed presentation for the
three fire scenarios is presented below and the results images can be found in Appendix C.
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The below graphs in Figure 5-8 (MV1 tunnel fire) Figure 5-9 (MV2 tunnel fire) and Figure 5-10 (Wet
tunnel fire) provide a comparison of the calculated RSET based on the detail introduced in Section 5.2
and the most onerous tenability plot (visibility at 2.5 m above walkway). This detail demonstrates that
in all of the fire scenarios the walk speed is significantly higher than the smoke spread speed. The solid
green curve representing the occupants greater than 30 m away from the fire (assumed to have not
seen the fire start) includes the full alarm and premovement time before evacuation. The green dotted
lines represent the occupants closer to the fire and assume that only a premovement time is warranted
before evacuation is assumed to take place. It is assumed that if smoke reaches the occupants during
this waiting period then evacuation would occur immediately and the evacuation RSET curve is plotted
accordingly.
Whilst the occupants are equipped with breating apparatus in the event of smoke reaching them before
the evacuation occurs, this should not be required because as shown in Appendix C the results plotted
for the most onerous toxicity product (Carbon Monoxide) show that even for the worst case scenario
(MV2) the toxicity levels based on fractional dose of CO never reach the levels that could cause effects
of egress impediment. These levels are set out by WHO and referenced in NFPA 502 indicating that
toxicity levels of CO approaching 1200 ppm may start to cause health effects to occupants within 10
minutes. The toxicity levels during the course of the egress never exceed 400 PPM and only begin to
reach 1200 PPM closer to the fire after 10 minutes have elapsed and all egress in all tunnels is
completed.
In addition to this, a plot of visibility for the sensitivity case where the fire sprinklers activate during
egress demonstrate that the sprinkler activation only improves the tenability times by lowering the
horizontal momentum of the smoke plume and only causing the smoke plume to drop in close proximity
to the fire. The ASET vs RSET curve is presented in Figure 5-11 for comparison
A full set of CFD results for the three fire scenarios is presented in Appendix C, which includes visibility
plots, temperature plots and CO plots at 2.5 m above walkway level and temperature plots through the
fire and LHDs showing the time at which the detection occurs.
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700
600
Distance (m)
500
400
300
200
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Time (s)
smoke distance (m) egress distance (m) egress distance for occupants < 30 m
700
600
Distance (m)
500
400
300
200
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Time (s)
smoke distance (m) egress distance (m) egress distance for occupants < 30 m
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700
600
Distance (m)
500
400
300
200
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Time (s)
smoke distance (m) egress distance (m) egress distance for occupants < 30 m
700
600
Distance (m)
500
400
300
200
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Time (s)
smoke distance (m) egress distance (m) egress distance for occupants < 30 m
Figure 5-11: Dry Tunnel (MV1) ASET vs RSET Curve Showing Effects of Sprinklers
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Exit discharge is the last component of means of egress discharging directly to public/ open area/
above surface level area, in the utility tunnels the exit discharge is utilized by using a Staircase
Enclosure, Vertical Egress with CAT Ladders.
The used mechanical ventilation system is a hybrid of mechanical ventilation rooms and the entry/exit
to/from these rooms is via a vertical egress with the permanent CAT ladder. The CAT ladders are in
the common corridor area that terminates at a hatch with an automatic closer.
The provision of exits provided for egress from the dry tunnels concluded from the performance-
based review will consist of a series of compartments and sub-compartments providing incident
containment and horizontal evacuation partnered with vertical exit points in the form of staircases to
ensure a distance between exits not exceeding 300 m and travel distance not exceeding 150m.
For further details on the layout of the compartmentation, see Section 6.2
Vertical cable dropdowns are provided to MV2 to allow for direct access of exterior exit staircases and
eliminate the need to enter the MV1 to escape to ultimate safety.
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The provision of exits provided for egress from the wet tunnel concluded from the performance-based
review will consist of a series of compartments providing incident containment and horizontal
evacuation partnered with vertical exit points in the form of ship ladders to ensure a distance between
exits does not exceed 300 m.
For further details on the layout of the compartmentation, see Section 6.2
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The Horizontal exit access door shall be complying the following requirements as
per SBC 201 Chapter 10, Section 1010:
• The minimum door clear width should not be less than 810mm and the
Maximum door lead width should not be more than 1200 mm as per SBC 201,
section 1010.1.1.
• The height of the door opening shall not be less than 2000m as per SBC
201, section 1010.1.1.
• The forces required to fully unlock and unlatch any door leaf manually in a
means of egress shall not exceed (67 N) where the door hardware operates by
push, pull, or slide.
• The forces required to fully open any door leaf manually in a means of
egress shall not exceed (133 N) to set the leaf in motion, and (67 N) to open the
leaf to the min. required width.
• Door handles, pulls, latches, locks, and other operating devices shall be
installed 850 mm minimum and 1200 mm maximum above the finished floor as
per SBC 201, Section 1010.1.9.2.
• There shall not be projections into the required clear width lower than 850 mm above the floor
or round.
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A smoke-proof staircase enclosure is located at junction boxes, with a stair exit access door at
junction box/tunnel wall, and discharges via an airtight hatch to ground level. The staircase design
shall be in accordance with SBC 201 Chapter 10, Section 1011.
Exit access is the first component to be used to initiate tunnel evacuation, in the utility tunnels the exit
access is utilized to be either a horizontal exit door assembly or vertical ships ladder, highlighted as
follows:
Vertically path through a CAT ladder (in compliance with SBC 201 & 501) with a hatch that opens
directly in the above-ground discharge levels shall comply with the following details:
• The side railing shall extend above the parapet or roof edge not less than 750 mm.
• Ladders shall have rung spacing not to exceed 350 mm on the centre. The uppermost rung
shall be not greater than 600 mm below the upper edge of the roof hatch, roof, or parapet, as
applicable.
• Ladders shall have a toe spacing not less than 150 mm deep.
• There shall be not less than 450 mm between rails. Rungs shall have a diameter of not less
than 19 mm and be capable of withstanding a 136 kg load.
• Ladders over 9000 mm in height shall be provided with offset sections and landings capable
of withstanding 488 kg per m2. Landing dimensions shall be not less than 450 mm and not less than
the width of the ladder served. A guard rail shall be provided on all open sides of the landing.
• Climbing clearance. The distance from the centreline of the rungs to the nearest permanent
object on the climbing side of the ladder shall be not less than 750 mm measured perpendicular to the
rungs. This distance shall be maintained from the point of ladder access to the bottom of the roof
hatch. A minimum clear width of 375 mm shall be provided on both sides of the ladder measured from
the midpoint of and parallel with the rungs except where cages or wells are installed.
• Landing required. The ladder shall be provided with a clear and unobstructed bottom landing
area having a minimum dimension of 750 mm by 750 mm centred in front of the ladder.
5.11 Staircase
A smoke-proof staircase enclosure is in 3 locations at dry tunnel, with a stair exit access door at
tunnel wall, and discharges via an airtight hatch to ground level. The staircase shall contain an
emergency lighting system as well as a pressurization system. The staircase design shall be in
accordance with SBC 201 Chapter 10, Section 1011, and shall comply with the following:
• Min. headroom is 2,300 mm with projections from the ceiling, not less than 2,000 mm (SBC
201, Section 1003.2, 1003.3.1)
• The minimum staircase width shall not be less than 1100mm per SBC 201 Section 1011.2.
• 2,000 mm measured vertically from a line connecting the edge of the nosing (SBC 201,
Section 1011.3).
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• Vertical Riser/ Maximum Height Between Landings: 3,600 mm (SBC 201, Section 1011.8)
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The type of construction proposed as per the base build design is derived to be Table-07 and the
base build type of construction shall remain effective throughout the building. Based on the
requirements construction type IB has been considered.
The SBC 201, Sections 504 and 506 stipulate minimum fire resistance ratings for building structural
members and other building elements based on the overall construction classification of the facility. The
intent of these requirements is to assure structural integrity and to resist the spread of fire to adjacent
buildings and areas.
A summary table determining the construction type as per SBC 201 Table 504.3, 504.4 and 506.2 for
each building is shown in Table 6-2. The fire-resistive rating requirements of Type IB are described in
SBC 201 Table 601, and the rating requirements are summarized in Table 6-3 below.
Spaces Compartmentation
(hours)
Vertical shaft enclosures (exit stairs, MEP shafts, elevator shafts, etc.) 2
Exit Passageways 2
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Compartmentation and its corresponding opening protective requirements will be provided as per
SBC 201 Table 716.5, outlined in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4: Compartmentation
The compartmentation layouts for the Utility Tunnel and MEP rooms presented in the Fire Life
Safety (FLS) drawings submitted separately and should be referred to in conjunction with this
report.
6.2 Compartmentation
Compartments in dry cable utility tunnels will be created by providing a fire barrier using fire dry walls
for the tunnel sections. These walls not only stop smoke from spreading deeper into the
tunnel but also stop fire from spreading from one tunnel section to another, thus maintaining the
integrity of tunnel assets and minimizing fire damage.
The structure has been designed to provide a series of connected compartments to contain any fire
that develops in the tunnels, providing points of relative safety throughout for the occupants to
evacuate to in sufficient time. For further detail on these considerations, see Section 5.
The dry tunnels have been designed with the same compartmentation layout for both MV1 and MV2.
Consisting of 3 compartments, sized 884m, 903m and 569m. These are further broken down by cross
passages between tunnels ranging between 131m and 300m in spacing to ensure travel distances
not exceeding 300m in a fire situation, see Section 5.5 .
• As per the 1st engagement meeting between Jacobs & NEOM LPFS dated, it has been
agreed that the proposed design philosophy shall be a performance-based design approach they will
follow NFPA 520 as the nearest applicable standard, and with reference to NFPA-520, the maximum
travel distance between any two means of egress shall not exceed 1220 meters.
• The number of cables inside the tunnel compartment and resultant heat generation shall
increase if the tunnel compartment length is to be further increased and that will cause oversizing or
unacceptable performance of the ventilation system.
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The wet tunnel is also broken down into 3 compartments sized at 700m, 813m and 529m. These
compartments contain vertical ship ladders space between 520 and 800m to ensure a travel distance
not exceeding 800m in a fire situation, see Section 5.5. This is because the lower potential fire hazard
of the wet tunnel allows for a proportionate decrease in egress provisions (see Section 4.3 and 5).
Fire barrier walls are utilized to mitigate smoke and fire spread throughout the building. These barriers
will be constructed in accordance with SBC 201 707 requirements. The fire barrier wall is required to
extend floor to floor / the underside of a roof. The fire barrier shall also extend through concealed
spaces as shown in Figure 6-2.
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The previous section of this report outlines the fire-resistive rating requirements for various walls and
assemblies within the building. Where noted, doors within the walls isolating hazardous and special
use areas are also required to be fire rated. The fire-resistive rated doors are required to be installed
in accordance with Section 716 of the SBC 201. Other openings, including glazed openings, in fire-
resistive rated assemblies are also required to be protected in accordance with Section 716 of the
SBC 201.
All penetrations through compartment wall and floor with a required fire resistance will be protected
according depending on the penetration with, but not limited to, the following. This includes, but not
limited to, fire barrier walls, dampers, expansion joints:
• Ducts and air transfer openings (as per SBC 201 717)
• Penetrations through fire barrier walls (as per SBC 201 714.3)
• Penetrations through horizontal fire barrier assemblies (as per SBC 201 714.4)
Mechanical penetrations of fire barriers are required to be protected by fire dampers. Where the fire
barriers have a 1-hour rating, the fire damper can be omitted provided the penetration consists of a
ducted HVAC system, and the duct is constructed of sheet steel of not less than 0.47 mm thickness,
where the duct is continuous from the air handling equipment to the air outlet and inlet terminals in
accordance with SBC 201 Section 717.5.2.
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The following subsections discuss the above requirements in slightly more details, which have been
coordinated and shared with relevant disciplines. For more details, refer to the reference codes and
standards.
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7.1 Introduction
The currently proposed fire protection design and water flows for all the buildings are in line with the
recommendations of SBC-201 and SBC 801.
Fire protection system proposed for the dry tunnels is via a wet sprinkler system (deluge) which is
connected through section valves in zone lengths of 20m. Once the LHDs detect the location of the
fire, the sprinkler system activates on a basis of a three-zone system with total discharge length of
60m.
This section of the report summarises the fire protection system that will be provided for Utility
Tunnels and Underground MEP Building. Further details of these systems can be found within the
MEP design report for fire protection [Ref 4].
Through the functionality of the designed fire protection systems, a typical incident scenario can be
estimated and is illustrated in the Figure 7-1 below. The vertical arrows represent the sequential
timeline of events, and the coloured groupings represent those happening at the same time.
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Occupants’ complete
evacuation of the
tunnel. VG-PS-CFD (22.12.2024):
Does is also send signal to
fire service or is the fire
service signal only on heat
detection and sprinklers?
VG-PS-CFD (22.12.2024):
The evacuation of all Where are the fire service
occupants out of the attendance points along the
tunnel is confirmed. tunnels? Will a fire control panel
be provided at each attendance
point with over-riding fire service
key?
Firefighting
operations are
completed.
The tunnel is
returned to operation.
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Deluge Sprinkler systems will be included as part of the FLS and be designed in accordance with the
guidance in NFPA 13.
The system is designed to operate on a zoned basis, using the LHD to identify the location of the fire.
The maximum protected area is 232m2 and the maximum protected area per sprinkler is 9m2 which
can be used to find the minimum sprinkler number of 26.
The flow rate per sprinkler should be 109.8 lpm with a considered K factor of 11.2. No one sprinkler
should fall below a pressure of 0.5 bar.
Further detail of the sprinkler system design is available in the Fire Protection System report [Ref 4].
Fire extinguishers are included in the FLS strategy and will meet the requirements of SBC 801 2005
which requires them to be always kept accessible.
In the Tunnels, Fire Extinguishers shall be spaced at frequent intervals based on the type of hazard
and in accordance with the requirement of NFPA 10.
• CO2 (BC type, 4.5 kg) portable fire extinguishers shall be provided in MV1, MV2 and inside
the MEP Room (Battery, Electrical, ELV, Fire Panel Room, Mechanical Room).
• Dry chemical (ABC type, 6kg) portable fire extinguishers will be provided in Wet Tunnel and
inside the MEP Room (Battery Room, Mechanical Room and TVS Fan Room).
All equipment and devices shall confirm to the requirements of either the Underwriters Laboratory
(UL) Approval List or the Factory Mutual (FM) Approval Guide.
Due to the depth of the wet tunnel floor not exceeding 9m in relation to level of firefighter access, a
standpipe system is not required as per the standards outlined in SBC 801 Clause 905.3.1 and will
not be provided optionally beyond this as the conditions of the utility culverts in a fire scenario will be
unlikely to be capable of accommodating manual firefighting operations. As stated above, a deluge
sprinkler system has been provided in the tunnels.
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Both systems would be interfaced with the automatic fire protection systems i.e. sprinklers or smoke
control to actuate them instantly and appropriately once triggered.
The underground MEP building shall be provided with an Automatic Fire Alarm system in accordance
with NFPA 72 and SBC 801. The system will comprise suitable automatic detectors and manual call
points linked to a fire alarm system and will provide the ability to identify the zone of fire alarm
incidence. Activation of the system will cause audible and visual warnings.
Manual call points shall be provided in the approved location as the MEP building is equipped
throughout with an automatic sprinkler system.
Smoke and heat detectors shall be provided throughout the building in accordance with NFPA 72. As
a minimum, the detectors shall be installed in the following spaces:
• Corridors
• MEP Rooms
Approved automatic heat detectors shall be permitted in spaces where smoke detectors cannot be
utilised due to ambient conditions, in accordance with SBC 801 907.4.3.
The LHD system will consist of detection cables installed on the tunnel ceilings to monitor the
atmospheric temperature and in the specific case of the dry tunnels then detectors would also be
installed on the cabling to monitor their temperature. It shall trigger when a temperature of 60°C is
reached and/or exceeded.
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Figure 8-2: Fire Alarm System, LHDS Dry Risers Schematic (03-186005-4200000074-CH2-ELV-DRG-235002
The ASD system will be provided to compliment the functionality of the LHD system, particularly to
provide early detection of a fire and initiate occupant evacuation. The ASD system will trigger upon
detecting smoke present in the air.
Manual call points shall be located not more than 1.5 m from the entrance to each exit as per SBC
201 907.4.2.1. The height of the manual call points shall be not less than 1.05 m and not more than
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Sounder and Sounder with Flasher shall be provided at a different location inside the tunnel and MEP
rooms as per the requirement to announce the alarms.
Audible alarm notification appliances shall be provided and emit a distinctive sound that is not to be
used for any purpose other than that of a fire alarm.
The audible alarm notification appliances shall provide a sound pressure level of 15 decibels (dBA)
above the average ambient sound level or 5 dBA above the maximum sound level having a duration
of not less than 60 seconds, whichever is greater.
The maximum sound pressure level for audible alarm notification appliances shall be 110 dBA at the
minimum hearing distance from the audible appliance. Where the average ambient noise is greater
than 95 dBA, visible alarm notification appliances shall be provided following NFPA 72.
Visible alarm notification appliances shall be provided in accordance with SBC 801Sections
907.5.2.3.1 through 907.5.2.3.3.
Further details design for the fire alarm annunciation system shall be referred to the ELV design
report number “03-186005-4200000074-CH2-ELV-RPT-000001” as well as fire alarm system design
can be found in the ELV Detail Design Drawing. The following 03-186005-4200000074-CH2-ELV-
DRG-231029 shows of Fire Alarm system drawing prepared for the Tunnels.
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Means of egress illumination shall comply with the requirements of SBC 801 1008.2 and under
emergency power the means of egress illumination shall comply with SBC 801 1008.3. Furthermore,
normal and emergency lighting shall be provided in public areas, corridors, stairwells and on the
exterior of the building at the exit discharge.
The means of egress serving a room or space shall be always illuminated during the room or space is
occupied throughout the building. The means of egress illumination level under normal power shall be
not less than 11 lux at the walking surface as per SBC 801 1008.2.1.
In the event of power failure in rooms, spaces, and buildings where two or more means of egress are
required, an emergency electrical system shall illuminate the following areas:
• Aisles.
• Corridors
• Vestibules and areas on the level of discharge used for exit discharge
• Exterior landings as required by SBC 801 1010.1.6 for exit doorways that lead directly to the
exit discharge
• Tunnels
The emergency power system shall provide power for a duration of not less than 90 minutes and shall
consist of storage batteries, unit equipment or an on-site generator. The installation of the emergency
power system shall be in accordance with SBC 801 2702.
Emergency lighting facilities shall be arranged to provide initial illumination that is not less than an
average of 11 lux and a minimum at any point of 1 lux measured along the path of egress at floor
level. Illumination levels shall be permitted to decline to 6 lux average and a minimum at any point of
0.6 lux at the end of the emergency lighting time duration. A maximum-to-minimum illumination
uniformity ratio of 40 to 1 shall not be exceeded.
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Exits and exit access doors are required to be identified by approved illuminated exit signs visible
from any direction of egress travel. Exit sign placement shall be such that no point in an exit access
corridor or exit passageway is more than 30 m or the listed viewing distance for the sign, whichever is
less, from the nearest visible exit sign. Additional exit signs are required in cases where the exit path
is not immediately visible to the occupants. Exit signs are not required at exit access doors from
rooms and areas where only a single exit is required or at the main exterior exit doors that are
obviously and clearly identifiable as exits. Exit signs are required as part of the emergency power.
Exits signs clear indicating the path of egress must be installed on any exit or exit access door and
readily visible from any direction of access as per SBC 801 Clause 1013.1.
These signs will meet the graphical requirements outlined in SBC Clause 1013.6.1.
Exit signs must be internally/externally always illuminated to a surface face intensity of no less than
55 lux as per SBC 801 Clauses 1013.3 and 1013.6.2.
They must also be provided with an emergency electricity supply in case of primary power loss to
maintain illumination for no less than 90 minutes as per SBC 801 Clause 1013.6.3.
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As per SBC 801 Clause 604.2 a secondary means of power in case of failure of primary system is
needed to serve the utility tunnels due to their subterranean construction, specifically necessary
regarding the following components of this design:
The emergency power system shall activate no longer than 10 seconds after the failure of the primary
power supply as per the requirements of SBC 801 604.1.3.
The system should be capable of providing power for a duration no shorter than 3 hours as per the
requirements of the NEOM Design Basis Document.
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An emergency smoke control system is available in the Utility Tunnels through tunnel ventilation axial
fans present in the respective MEP rooms at each compartment end of the dry and wet tunnels.
Tunnel ventilation fans are arranged in a duty standby configuration and work in push and pull mode
to exchange air directly through each of the tunnels. The strategy for smoke control in the tunnel is to
stop fans serving the incident section and pressurise the non-incident tunnels and pressurisation
shaft. The design has resilience to use the axial fans for smoke control should it be required by
occupants or fire service; however, this is not part of the strategy.
Upon activation of the aspirating detection system, the fire alarm system activates via audible and
visible notification. At this point, the tunnel ventilation switches from normal operation mode (fans
off/fans in duty) to emergency mode. During this model, fans operating in the incident tunnel shall
automatically switch off while fans in the non-incident tunnel shall operate in pressurisation mode. The
pressurisation activation mode is such that there is a sufficient positive pressure to prevent smoke
from migrating into the non-incident tunnel. All occupants commence evacuation upon notification of
the fire alarm and lead to either the adjacent non-incident tunnel, towards exit discharge or towards
the exit discharge.
Once occupants have escaped the tunnel and are confirmed to be safe at surface level, the tunnel
ventilation fans in the incident tunnel can be turned on to actively clear smoke from the tunnel. The
emergency smoke control system should be capable of functioning for either 120 minutes or 1.5x the
egress time, whichever is greater.
Firefighters shall be provided with a control panel for manual control of the smoke system.
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12.1 Introduction
The fire department vehicle access has been provided for all the buildings and entry points to the
tunnels.
Fire apparatus access shall be arranged such that fire appliances can easily and safely access the
structure and its immediate facilities, to assist with easy deployment of firefighting resources and
equipment. Currently, proposed Fire department access around the Oxagon Village Zone-F meets
the prescriptive requirements of SBC 801 Chapter 5.
The fire apparatus access road has been provided for the Underground MEP building & Utility Tunnel
and this chapter outlines these requirements.
Further detailed design of the fire service access strategy refer to the Document number “03-006000-
4200000074-CH2-FLS-RPT-000006 _ OXAGON VILLAGE - SITE WIDE DEVELOPMENT - FIRE &
LIFE SAFETY (SITE WIDE) DETAILED DESIGN REPORT”
The Oxagon Village has 2 fire stations that are covering the entire Zone F. The fire station has been
marked on the plan below to start from the two fire stations.
The design of civil defence station proposed within the NEOM Oxagon shall follow the Technical
Guideline – SMART method for fire station planning and design [Ref 6].
The fire station emergency response time to the remotest plot shall be followed as per the NFPA 1710
requirements. Please refer to the Site Wide Concept Design Report [Ref 7].
The main objective is to provide easy vehicle access to the Utility Tunnel. From there, access can be
gained into the exit stair enclosures and/or the Vertical Egress Cat ladders.
The SBC 801, Section 503 suggests that fire apparatus access roads shall extend to within 45 m of all
portions of the facility and all portions of the utility tunnel Per the SBC 801, the fire code official can
increase the dimension of 45 m where the building is equipped throughout with an approved
automatic sprinkler system. A maximum of 137 m is proposed as the Utility Tunnel is sprinkler-
protected throughout subject to Authority approval.
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Requirement Description
Width ≥6m (Gates: 6m or 3.7m if two lanes – SBC 801,
Appendix D103.5)
Vertical Clearance ≥4m – SBC 801 503.2.1
Inner Turning Radius ≥8.4m
Outer Turning Radius ≥14.4m
Maximum Dead-End 45m SBC 801, Appendix D103.4
Slope 10%, SBC 801, Appendix, D103.2
Dead-end fire apparatus access roads more than 45 m in length shall be provided with an approved
area for turning around fire apparatus as per SBC 801 503.2.5.
Turn around facilities have been provided throughout site to eliminate dead ends. The turning facilities
shall follow Figure 12-3 the following layout criteria:
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Gates securing the fire apparatus access road shall comply with SBC 801 D103.5.c
Signs marked “NO PARKING – FIRE LANE” having a minimum 300 mm width by 450 mm height with
letters on a white reflective background as per SBC 801 D103.6 have been provided as shown in
Figure 12-4:
Civil defence connections shall be provided in accordance with SBC 201 912 requirements.
With respect to hydrants, driveways, buildings and landscaping, civil defence connections to supply
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A working space of not less than 900 mm in width, 900 mm in depth and 1.95m in height shall be
provided and maintained in front of and to the sides of wall-mounted civil defence connections.
A meal sign with raised letters no less than 25 mm in size shall be mounted on all civil defence
connections serving automatic sprinklers, standpipes, or fire pump connections. such signs shall read:
AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS or STANDPIPES or TEST CONNECTION or a combination thereof.
The potable water supply to automatic sprinkler and standpipe systems shall be protected against
backflow as required by SBC 701.
Distance of civil defence connection from fire service accessway must not exceed limit noted in NFPA
13/14.
Based on the above-mentioned requirements, Breeching inlet connections are provided in the Utility
tunnel and Underground MEP buildings.
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Ref 2 - Cable Heat Release, Ignition, and Spread in Tray Installations During Fire (CHRISTFIRE),
Phase 1: Horizontal Trays (NUREG/CR-710, Volume 1); July 2012
Ref 3 - Jin, T. and Yamada, T., 1985. Irritating effects of fire smoke on visibility. Fire Science and
Technology, 5(1), pp.79-90.
Ref 4 - Oxagon Village – Utility Tunnel – Design Report for Fire Protection System, 03-186005-
4200000074-CH2-FPR-RPT-903025 Rev A
Ref 7 - Oxagon Village – Site Wide Development – Dry Utilities Infrastructure – Fire Safety
Engineering (Concept Design Report), 03-006000-4200000074-CH2-FLS-RPT-000050
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Figure C-1: CFD Results – MV1 Fire – Visibility on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway
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Figure C-5: CFD Results – MV2 Fire – Visibility on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway
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Figure C-9: CFD Results – Wet tunnel Fire – Visibility on a plane at 2.5 m above walkway
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