The People’s Housing:

Woningcorporaties and the

Dutch Social Housing System
Part 1: The History
J U N E 20 2 3 | H A N N E K E VA N D E U R S E N
 Joint Center for Housing Studies
Harvard University

The People’s Housing:

Woningcorporaties and the Dutch Social Housing System
Part 1: The History
Hanneke van Deursen

June 2023

©2023 President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of the Joint Center for Housing
Studies of Harvard University or of any of the persons or organizations providing support to the Joint Center for
Housing Studies.

For more information on the Joint Center for Housing Studies, visit our website at www.jchs.harvard.edu.
Abstract
Social housing makes up 29 percent of the total housing stock in the Netherlands. While the definition of
“social housing” has changed over the last 120 years, as of 2022 it means 29 percent of housing in the
Netherlands is leased for less than €763 per month. What makes the Dutch system unique is that its
social housing is built, owned, and managed by a robust and decentralized network of 284 non-profit
housing associations. In total, the housing associations own about 2.3 million units, making social
housing an €87.3 billion sector. Even more striking, the housing associations do not receive any direct
subsidy to fund their activities. They are able to manage and maintain their housing stock on a revolving
fund from rental income and they make use of long-term loans to fund construction projects. These
features of the Dutch social housing system—that it is a decentralized system of non-profit
organizations independent from the state; that they own almost one-third of the country’s housing and
keep it off of the market; and that the system operates on a revolving fund, requiring no direct state
subsidy—make this system a fascinating case study for countries around the world looking for new
models to provide affordable housing.
This is the first paper in a two-part case study on the Dutch social housing system. This first
paper deals with the history, telling the story of how the modern system came to be. Throughout this
history, the resilience of the social housing system is apparent, as housing associations adapt over and
over to the conditions of their time. The history proves to be foundational to the modern system, which
is able to operate on such a large scale only because of the investments of the past. The second paper
will take a look under the hood, unpacking how the Dutch social housing system’s institutional structure,
governance, and financing work together to make it possible to provide below-market-rate housing
without direct subsidy. In this paper, the intricate system of checks and balances, unique funding
mechanisms, and techniques of governance will reveal how the gears all turn together to run a
financially stable social housing sector that fosters innovation in housing production and sustainability.
Housing associations started as member-based philanthropic associations in the late nineteenth
century. Wealthy philanthropists sold shares that funded the construction of working class housing and
paid a modest 3 percent return to investors. Because the rental profits were not fully turned over to
shareholders, the association was able to reinvest its surplus in further construction; it was “capitalist
philanthropy.” The privately initiated housing associations were formalized by the Housing Act of 1901,
which made long-term, low-interest government loans available to housing associations to fund their
construction projects. The only condition for these loans was that the housing associations convert to

1
fully non-profit organizations. With access to a line of credit from the government, the number of
housing associations and the scale of their activities began to grow.
After World War II, a serious housing shortage required construction on an unprecedented
scale. Unfortunately, high construction costs and frozen rents made development unappealing for the
private sector. The national government engaged housing associations, treating them as an extension of
the public sector. In addition to construction loans, the government provided operating subsidies so that
housing associations could build beyond the capacity of their revolving funds. In exchange for public
investment, housing associations’ activities were closely dictated by the government, which determined
what would be built, where, and with how many kitchen cabinets. After this period of heavy public
investment, social housing accounted for approximately 37 percent of the total housing stock.
As the postwar housing crisis calmed, the large public investments and heavy-handed public
control were less necessary. From the 1960s onward, housing associations were pushed out from under
the wing of the state and towards financial and operational independence. In these years, new financial
instruments were created that decreased housing associations’ dependence on subsidies and loans from
the government. The gradual independence built up from the 1960s through the 1980s was made final
in 1995 with the Balancing Act. This act canceled housing associations’ last debts and subsidies out
against each other, thereby severing the only remaining financial tie between the housing associations
and the government. After ninety-two years of using government loans for construction, housing
associations had to “hold up their own pants” on the private market.
In the modern era, housing associations are social enterprises: non-profit organizations that
provide social services in a business framework. The first years of independence were a period of
experimentation, as housing associations tested how they could mobilize their real estate portfolios to
continue fulfilling their social mission without public support. They fancied themselves Robin Hoods,
making profits in the private market and investing them in social housing. However, not all experiments
were successful. Amidst some scandals, bad investments, and a mandate from the European Union, the
sector was reregulated in the 2010s to bring it back to its “core task.”
The reregulation was not necessarily a bad thing. While the housing associations’ capacities to
build new housing were limited, the decade of strict regulation required them to tighten their
operations. As a result, today housing associations have healthy finances and strong leadership, and
they have figured out how to “hold up their own pants.” They mobilize portfolio-based financing, long-
term guaranteed loans, and strategic sales to build, maintain, and rent housing at rates affordable to
those with the lowest incomes. They are able to do this without direct subsidies from the government.

2
Recognizing the strength built up by the sector, in the face of a new housing shortage the government is
loosening the reins again so that housing associations can expand their capacities and rise to meet the
challenge.
The Dutch social housing system has proven resilient throughout its history. Today, over a
quarter of the Dutch housing stock is rented at below-market rates. Social rents are regulated by the
national government, and rental assistance augments the income of all who qualify. Those who live in
social housing are well protected by rights of tenure and suffer little threat of losing their homes.
Housing associations are building, operating, and maintaining housing at affordable rates without any
direct financial support from the government. Housing associations are leading climate-adaptation
efforts, and the quality of social housing competes with the offerings of the private sector, even winning
architecture prizes. All things considered, it is a beautiful system. While there are still improvements
being made, the social housing system is powerful precisely because it is able to adapt to changing
circumstances while carrying with it all the investments of decades past.

Acknowledgements
Thank you to those who have supported me throughout this research endeavor. Thank you to Chris
Herbert at the Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies for your mentorship and your support
on this project. Thank you to Woonstad Rotterdam for inviting me in and being such excellent hosts for
the research. Thank you to Marja Elsinga from TU Delft for the time you put into reviewing the drafts.
And thank you to all those who took time out of their days to sit down with me for an interview. Your
insights, your passion, and your willingness to share what you know have left me indebted to you.

3
Introduction
Social housing makes up 29 percent of the total housing stock in the Netherlands, a nation of
approximately 17.5 million people. While the definition of “social housing” has changed over the last
120 years, as of 2022 it means 29 percent of housing in the Netherlands is leased for less than €763 per
month. This housing is available to households with annual incomes below €40,765 for single-person
households and €45,014 for larger households; these criteria make approximately 40 percent of Dutch
households eligible. 1 What makes the Dutch system unique is that its social housing is built, owned, and
managed by a robust and decentralized network of non-profit housing associations. The social housing
sector is comprised of 284 independent housing associations with real estate portfolios ranging from
less than 400 units to over 80,000. 2 Together, the housing associations own about 2.3 million units,
making social housing an €87.3 billion sector. 3 Even more striking, the housing associations do not
receive any direct subsidy to fund their activities. They are able to manage and maintain their housing
stock on a revolving fund from rental income and they make use of long-term loans to fund construction
projects. These features of the Dutch social housing system—that it is a decentralized system of non-
profit organizations independent from the state; that they own almost one-third of the country’s
housing and keep it off of the market; and that the system operates on a revolving fund, requiring no
direct state subsidy—make this system a fascinating case study for countries around the world looking
for new models to address affordable housing crises.
This is the first of two parts of a case study on the Dutch social housing system. In this paper, I
will trace the history of social housing in the Netherlands to show how the modern system was built on
the legacies of previous iterations. Housing associations date back to the mid nineteenth century, and
they have proven resilient through two postwar housing crises, economic depressions, and neoliberal
budget cuts. In each of these eras, housing associations adapted to the needs and resources of the time.

1
Woonbond [Housing Union], “Wat kost huren in 2022 [What does renting cost in 2022 Woonbond: De Stem van
hurend [Housing Union: The voice of the Netherlands’ renters], December 17, 2021,
https://www.woonbond.nl/wat-kost-huren-2022-0.
2
Stichting Ymere, “Jaarstukken 2020 [Annual Report 2020 2021, https://www.ymere.nl/media/2309/jaarverslag-
en-jaarrekening-2020.pdf.
3
Authoriteit Woningcorporaties, “Staat van de corporatiesector 2021 [State of the Housing Association Sector
2021 (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport, January 2022); Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [Central Bureau of
Statistics], “Woningvoorraad naar eigendom; regio, 2006-2012 [Housing stock by ownership; region, 2006-2012
CBS StatLine, March 4, 2014,
https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/71446ned/table?ts=1658484196140.
4
Today, the system is again being reworked, as housing associations are mobilized to combat the housing
shortage and climate crisis. 4 The history is crucial because the strength of the modern system is built on
the public investments made in the past, both financial and relational. In short, this paper will trace how
the Dutch social housing system got to where it is today. The second part of the case study will take a
look under the hood and detail the mechanics of the system today: from institutional structure, to
governance, to financing. That paper will walk through each of the institutions and policies involved in
the system’s elegant construction of checks and balances. It will highlight the unique funding
mechanisms and the techniques of governance which establish a financially stable social housing sector
that fosters innovation in housing production and sustainability. Informed by over twenty interviews
with professionals in and around the social housing sector, this case study captures a complex and
dynamic system that, to my knowledge, has not yet been outlined by any one source, especially not in
English. My hope is that these papers make the Dutch social housing system more visible, so that its
innovations can be shared with a broad and international audience.

Developing the Dutch Social Housing System

Today, the Dutch social housing system is an intricate and powerful machine. However, this system was
not designed in one go. Rather, it was built up iteratively over more than a century. With each iteration,
the system changed; the character of housing associations, their relationship with the government and
the private market, how their social duty was defined, and their financing mechanisms—all were
regularly adapted to the political and societal needs of the era. These changes were cumulative, carrying
over but modifying what was built by the previous generation. Tracing the housing associations from

4
Since 2013, home prices in the Netherlands have soared. The pressure on the housing market as a whole has
increased pressure on the social housing system. The result has been long waitlists. Those who qualify for social
housing face wait times as long as fifteen years (in Amsterdam). Those whose incomes are just above the threshold
for social housing are falling through the cracks. They earn too much to qualify for social housing but cannot afford
to buy in the hot housing market. Without access to social housing or homeownership, they are left to rent in the
private sector. Rent liberalization and rising property values have created a significant gap between social rents
and market rates, leaving the middle cost-burdened by rent. There is a significant need for middle-income housing,
but it is not profitable to build, so the private sector is not providing it. Since the financial crisis in 2008, new
construction has remained short of demand, further driving up housing costs. As the Netherlands’ housing crisis
deepens, the widening impact has spurred national debate and protest on housing affordability and availability.
For a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary housing crisis and the political decisions which led to it, see
Cody Hochstenbach, Uitgewoond: waarom het hoog tijd is voor een nieuwe woonpolitiek [Lived Out: why it is high
time for a new housing politics] (Amsterdam: Das Mag Uitgevers, 2022).
5
their nineteenth-century origins to today, we will see the modern social housing system emerge from six
iterations of the model:
I. Pre-1901: The First Housing Associations
II. 1901–1945: Formalization with the Housing Act
III. 1945–1965: Postwar Housing Shortage
IV. 1965–1989: Self-Sufficiency
V. 1990–1995: Making Independent
VI. 1995–Today: The Modern System

Pre-1901: The First Housing Associations [Woningbouwverenigingen]

The unique social housing model in the Netherlands has its origins in the mid-nineteenth century. As in
many cities, industrialization had drawn an influx of laborers to Dutch urban centers. The Netherlands
saw conditions similar to those documented in cities like Manchester and New York: workers lived in
cramped conditions with limited access to daylight and ventilation, fueling disease and social unrest.
While poor living conditions for the working class were nothing new, their physical concentration in
cities was. The effect of poor living conditions on the productivity, health, and stability of the working
class became an issue for all of society. Starting in 1852, members of the upper classes, ranging from
religious leaders to factory owners, responded to these conditions by establishing housing associations
[woningbouwverenigingen] that would build decent and affordable housing for working-class families.
The business model worked as follows: a new association sold shares to various wealthy individuals who
would become members of the association. The revenue from the sale of shares funded the
construction of a building. Rental profits from that housing, rather than being paid out in full to
shareholders, would largely be reinvested in more housing. Thereby, the associations established a
revolving construction fund while shareholders received a modest 3 percent return on their investments
and contributed to the betterment of society. One could call it “capitalist philanthropy” [filantropisch
kapitalisme]. 5

5
This “capitalist philanthropy” approach had first been used in London to improve “industrious class” dwellings.
Shareholders of early housing associations in the Netherlands did receive a return on their investment, but that
annual dividend was capped at a modest 3-4 percent, varying by association. Profits in excess of these returns
were reinvested, creating a revolving fund for the production of additional housing. Twenty-five shares were sold
for the first housing association in the Netherlands, De Vereeniging ten Behoeve der Arbeidersklasse, for ƒ2,000

6
 Free from state oversight, the members of the association had full control over their properties.
Principals such as health, cleanliness, and morality stood central. Healthiness and cleanliness motivated
proper access to daylight and ventilation in the dwellings, as well as connecting the plumbing system
with drinking water. Morality translated into rental terms that were elaborate and strict: public
intoxication and missed rent were grounds for immediate eviction. In this era, social housing was not
intended for the most vulnerable populations, but instead for working-class families. In fact, central to
the system was the belief that social housing was not charity. Decent housing would “help the poor help
themselves,” 6 increasing standards of living for the working class and in exchange securing a more
stable, clean, healthy, moral, and (importantly) more productive labor force. Most housing associations
were not established out of good will for the poor, but rather from a recognition amongst the upper
classes that housing plays a pivotal role in the health and productivity of the laboring class which
impacts all strata of society.
In today’s terms, the first housing associations were social enterprises, private organizations
that have social objectives alongside financial ones. Their objectives were philanthropic: to supply high-
quality housing at a cost that was affordable to the working classes. But they also wanted to continue
this mission into the future, requiring a sustainable business model and stable returns. These social and
financial interests were tested when setting rents or the rates of shareholder returns, and balancing the
two interests was a continuous effort. 7 At least 200 independent housing associations were established
over the course of the nineteenth century and over 10,000 working-class families lived in housing built
by these associations. 8 While this represented only a small percentage of new construction at the time,
the business model established by these early private initiatives is still an essential part of the system
today.

each (today €20,000). Later housing associations would lower this share price to accommodate a broader segment
of shareholders.
“Capitalist philanthropy” [filantropisch kapitalisme] is a term used by scholars of Dutch social housing history. See,
for example, Wouter P. Beekers, Het bewoonbare land: geschiedenis van de volkshuisvestingsbeweging in
Nederland [The livable country: history of the people’s housing movement in the Netherlands] (Amsterdam: Boom,
2012); Jos van der Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing] (Amsterdam: Vereniging
Canon Sociaal Werk, 2021), 11.
6
van der Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting, 11.
7
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land, 52.
8
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 11.
7
1901–1945: Formalization with The Housing Act [De Woningwet]
In 1901, the national government formalized the housing associations’ activities with the passage of the
Housing Act of 1901 [Woningwet 1901]. This law introduced new funding and regulations. The Housing
Act made the “people’s housing” [volkshuisvesting] the “national government’s business.” 9 In typical
Dutch fashion, this “national business” was delegated to the municipalities, who worked with the
private sector to meet the national policy goals. The Housing Act of 1901 gave housing associations
access to a line of government credit to finance new construction. Housing associations could borrow
directly from the national and municipal governments, who issued bonds to finance these loans.
Because the government could borrow at a low interest rate, it was able to lend to the housing
associations at low interest rates for 50-year terms. The favorable loans lowered monthly debt service
payments, which made it feasible to lease housing at affordable rates. 10 In addition to loans, the
Housing Act made it possible for the government to give housing associations subsidies. If a site had
dilapidated buildings, a subsidy was given to cover the demolition costs, which would otherwise exceed
what could be paid off with rental revenue. By providing loans and subsidies to housing associations,
which were specialized in housing construction, the government saved having to take on the work
themselves. 11 Housing associations made use of their access to government financing, and around 1920,
the government had ƒ400 million (guilders) in outstanding loans to housing associations and three
million guilders 12 in subsidy obligations. 13 By 1922 there were 1350 registered housing associations, 14
and in 1921 alone the sector built 25,000 new units. 15
With access to government credit came increased oversight and regulation of the housing
associations’ activities. In order to access the loans, housing associations had to attain the status of

9
Ibid., 17.
10
In addition to loans for construction which future rents had proven to be able to repay, the government
recognized that extra investment was needed to clear out uninhabitable dwellings. Housing associations could do
this work more cost-efficiently than the government, so direct subsidies were made available to fund the
demolition. Later, after World War I had driven up building costs, the subsidies were expanded to help
compensate for higher interest rates and price increases so the associations could meet the need for housing. Loan
terms were also extended to 75 years to help finance the rebuilding efforts. Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The
livable country], 96, 137.
11
Beekers, 96.
12
The guilder (ƒ) was the Dutch currency before the Netherlands transitioned to the euro in 1999. In today’s euros,
ƒ400 million is approximately €350 million. The ratio of euros to dollars is currently (2022) very nearly 1:1.
13
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 145.
14
Hochstenbach, Uitgewoond [Lived Out], 143.
15
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 28.
8
“permitted institutions” [toegelaten instellingen]. The central requirement for this status was that any
profit rendered would be reinvested in social housing, and therefore would not be paid out to the
association’s members. 16 In other words, permitted institutions had to be non-profit. 17 This changed the
character of housing associations. While the members of early housing associations were wealthy
philanthropists, the members of permitted institutions were often working-class men who hoped to rent
one of the association’s units. Members acquired shares by contributing small weekly payments towards
a ƒ5–ƒ100 (guilder) share. Though the financial contribution was minimal, these shares involved present
and future tenants in the association, and they granted them voting rights at meetings. 18 In addition to
requiring that housing associations become non-profit, the government also introduced rent
regulations. 19 In 1918, housing associations were required to adjust their rents to 16 percent of a
tenant’s salary. 20 The municipal governments’ power also increased through the Housing Act. Municipal
governments were tasked with setting building standards for construction permits and developing
zoning regulations. With these rent and building regulations and their conversion to nonprofit status, in
exchange for government financing, housing associations had to allow for increased government
regulation.
With access to new funds, housing associations were building. However, there was still a dearth
of quality housing available for the working class. In 1915, the municipal government of Amsterdam
appropriated the private-sector model and set up its own municipal housing company (gemeentelijk

16
For this reason, other models of workers’ housing that had been developing in the nineteenth century, especially
cooperative workers’ housing, died out at the turn of the century. Cooperatives never took off in the Netherlands
in the same way they did in other European countries, because in cooperative models members share profits
collectively, which was not permitted by the Housing Act of 1901. This meant that housing cooperatives were
unable to access government loans.
17
“Financial advantage” for any members, shareholders, directors, or board members was not permitted. Any seed
capital that had been raised by members or borrowed privately was limited to a 4 percent return. Permitted
institutions were required to submit annual financial reports for municipal government approval. Beekers, Het
bewoonbare land [The livable country], 112.
18
Voters elected a director who would handle daily business, and they elected a board of advisors (Beekers, Het
bewoonbare land [The livable country], 122). Directors could allocate housing units to members almost entirely at
their own discretion, leading associations to have varying identities, for example catering specifically to Catholics
or Protestants. However, as state funding and control grew, there was increasing pressure on the director’s
freedom to allocate units at will. (Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 173).
19
Initially, regulation was introduced to keep rents from being too low. Social rents were to conform to market
standards to prevent the social sector from accelerating urbanization with below-market rents. This was
considered an “objective” rent policy because, at the time, the market rate was close to cost-recovery for
construction and operation. Later policies basing rent on income considered “subjective” policy.
20
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 140.
9
woningbedrijf) to build social housing of its own. Other municipalities followed suit, and soon municipal
housing companies were using the Housing Act loan mechanism to augment the work of the private
associations. As part of the government, municipal housing companies had access to the same loans as
private associations as well as some internal funding. They served a counter-cyclical function, stepping
up production in periods when the market slowed; of the 25,000 housing units built in 1920, 13,000
were built by private housing associations and 8,000 by municipal housing companies. 21
The Housing Act of 1901 formalized the activities of the privately initiated housing associations,
creating a pathway for public financing but tying that support to regulatory oversight of institutional
structure, rent amounts, and construction quality. This approach sets the Dutch system apart from that
of other countries like the UK where the national government itself built social housing. With the
Housing Act of 1901, the Dutch government facilitated the innovations of the private sector, making use
of the existing housing associations to build up a decentralized social housing system that remains in
place today. Another distinctive feature of the Housing Act was a linguistic choice: people’s housing
(volkshuisvesting), rather than worker’s housing (arbeidershuisvesting). Historian Wouter Beekers
describes this as a deliberate linguistic choice by the politicians of the time to retain “necessary wiggle
room” in who the system was for.22 Until 2009, there were no income limits for social housing. It was
intended to house a large swath of the population. “People’s housing” signified in name that “social”
was not reserved only for the most vulnerable, but was rather a viable alternative to private-sector
housing for anyone.

1945–1965: Postwar Housing Shortage [Woningnood]

With World War II, everything changed. The destruction caused by the war left the Netherlands facing a
massive housing shortage. It was estimated that about one-quarter of Dutch homes were damaged in
the war and that 300,000 families did not have a place to live. 23 The housing shortage was declared
“public enemy number one.” 24 The postwar political landscape gave birth to the Dutch welfare state,
characterized by serious public investment in social services. To address the housing crisis, the national
government turned to the housing associations. In a moment when the scale of the crisis left little room

21
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 35–37.
22
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 95.
23
Ibid., 95.
24
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 51.
10
for debate, the national government set heavy-handed standards and directives for the housing
associations, expanding their reliance on (and integration with) the state apparatus. 25
If the state wanted to solve the housing crisis, it would need to invest. The national government
had frozen rents during the war to protect renters, but construction costs had risen. Financial support
was needed to make new construction feasible. 26 As before, housing associations had access to loans
from the government to build housing, but now in addition to loans to fund construction, the national
government provided subsidies to pad the deficit between rental income and the costs of operation and
loan repayment. This additional subsidy enabled housing associations to build beyond the capacity of
their revolving fund. The subsidy calculation went as follows: if a €5 million loan had covered
construction costs, and over the 50-year term of the loan €3 million was expected in rental revenue
after operating and maintenance costs, then the government would contribute €2 million in subsidy
over the course of the loan. The necessary subsidy amount was readjusted on an annual basis. With
these operating subsidies in hand, housing associations were able to step up and produce housing on an
unprecedented scale. A useful tool had been created. In the face of crisis, the private housing
associations could be activated as an extension of the government specialized in housing production and
management. Because they were financially and operationally tied to national leadership, the
decentralized network of local housing associations carried out the centralized national strategy.
Because the government sponsored the housing associations, social housing became an element of the
welfare state apparatus in the postwar Netherlands. In this period, housing associations were still
nominally independent, but in practice functioned as an appendage of the government.

Once again, increased financial support brought increased regulation. In the postwar period, the
government’s influence over housing associations expanded to the point that they began to lose their
autonomy. National and municipal governments dictated the architectural style of new housing, the unit
floor plans, the unit mix, how the housing would be managed and maintained, whom it would be rented
to, what the rent would be, and what the rental profits could be invested in. 27 Even decisions regarding
the number of drawers in the kitchen cabinets or whether units would have an electric or manual
doorbell were made by the government. 28 Unit allocation was increasingly influenced or even taken over

25
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 175.
26
Ibid., 182.
27
Ibid., 176.
28
Ibid., 186.
11
by the municipal government. Because association membership was no longer a prerequisite nor an
assurance of unit allocation, membership lost its value. 29 Additionally, associations merged together
their organizations and their portfolios to streamline operations. The increased scale and decreased
member influence mark a professionalization of housing associations in this period, which came at the
cost of the involvement of tenants and other members in the housing associations. 30

While it left little autonomy for housing associations, the postwar social housing apparatus was
an efficient machine. By November of 1962, seventeen years after the end of the war, the one-millionth
postwar home was completed. There had been a 38 percent expansion of the housing stock in less than
20 years. 31 Nine years later, the two-millionth house was built. 32 Figure 1 shows housing associations’
(municipal and private) relative share of the Dutch housing stock growing rapidly between 1945 and
1970. Whereas before the war 13 percent of Dutch households lived in social housing, by 1975 this was
37 percent. Broad availability of social housing was paired with broad eligibility. In the postwar period,
there were no income limits for social housing. Small business owners, young couples, and academics
lived alongside harbor laborers and carpenters. Regardless of their means, people could choose if they
wanted to live in social housing, private rental housing, or buy a home. Because social housing was
rented by a broad swath of society, high concentrations of social housing did not signify a concentration
of poverty. Broad eligibility and availability created mixed-income neighborhoods even in parts of the
city that were exclusively made up of social housing.

29
Ibid., 192.
30
Ibid.,, 210.
31
In 1945, there were 2,177,000 housing units in the Netherlands (including those too damaged by war for long-
term occupation). By the end of 1962, there were 3,008,000.
32
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 54.
12
 Figure 1: Dutch Housing Stock by Sector

Figure derived from Cody Hochstenbach, Uitgewoond. 2022, 67.

The postwar period was characterized by a massive expansion of the social housing stock.
Between 1945 and 1970, social housing’s proportion of the total housing stock increased by 24 percent.
The government’s involvement expanded as well. Financial ties and operational oversight brought the
private associations more under the wing of the national and municipal governments than they had ever
been before.

1965–1989: Self-Sufficiency
As the severity of the postwar crisis calmed, the need for centralized and heavy-handed government
steering waned. Across several sectors in the Netherlands, centralized welfare-state planning shifted
back towards decentralized municipal networks. Neoliberal ideas on liberalization and market efficiency,
coming from the United Kingdom and the United States, entered Dutch political debates through the
conservative parties. It was a slow process, but as the welfare state budget started to strain the national

13
government cut back its social spending, starting in the social housing sector. To compensate for
decreasing public investment, the government developed three new market-based financial instruments
for social housing, which have become cornerstones of today’s financing mechanism.
The first of these financial instruments was a new type of subsidy: Rental Assistance. The 1950
Rent Law [Huurwet] had given the government the authority to set limits on rent increases. With this
authority came the responsibility to mediate between the needs of landlords and of tenants. By 1970,
there was a widening gap between what tenants could afford to pay and what landlords needed to
cover operations. Up until then, social housing subsidies had taken the form of grants and loans given
directly to housing associations so they could invest in the “bricks and mortar.” In other words, subsidies
were supply-side, contributing to construction and operating costs. In response to the rising costs for
landlords and stagnated incomes of tenants, the national government introduced its first demand-side
subsidy instrument: rental assistance. Originally designed as a temporary measure until prices equalized,
the gap between what tenants could pay and what landlords needed only grew. Since 1975, subsidies
for “people” (rather than for “bricks and mortar” 33) became a permanent feature of the Dutch social
housing system. 34 Though most tenants who qualify for rental assistance live in social housing, the
subsidy is administered by the tax authority. It is not exclusive to social tenants, and therefore it is not
considered a subsidy to housing associations, but rather a redistributive subsidy to individuals. As
supply-side subsidies to housing associations (for the “bricks and mortar”) have decreased, demand-side
subsidies (for the “people”) have increased. 35 To this day there is debate about the efficiency of
demand- versus supply-side social housing subsidies, and the more recent housing affordability crisis in
the Netherlands has led to calls for renewed supply-side investment in social housing production.
The second new market-based financial instrument was a guarantee fund. In 1984, the national
government stopped granting loans or subsidies to housing associations for renovation work on postwar

33
The distinction between investments in “people” vs. investments in “bricks and mortar” is common in the Dutch
social housing world. It is an accessible way to talk about demand-side vs. supply-side investments.
34
Hugo Priemus and Marja Elsinga, “Housing Allowances in the Netherlands: The Struggle for Budgetary
Controllability,” in Housing Allowances in Comparative Perspective, ed. Peter A. Kemp (Bristol University Press,
2007), 193–214.
35
This trend of increasing demand-side and decreasing supply-side investments in housing since the 1970s mirrors
trends in the United States. Rental assistance can be compared to the Section 8 program in the United States
which overtook direct investment in the “stones” of public housing. A key distinction is that Dutch rental assistance
covers only the difference between what a family can afford and the social rent, not, as with Section 8 vouchers,
the difference between what can be afforded and the market rent. In other words, rental assistance covers a much
smaller gap in the Netherlands.
14
housing. If housing associations needed to renovate their properties, they would have to borrow money
on the private capital markets. 36 The Guarantee Fund for Social Housing [Waarborgfonds Sociale
Woningbouw, WSW] was established to back loans for social housing. With seed money from the
national government and housing associations, the WSW set up a triple-tiered guarantee system for
housing associations’ loans. In case of default, the first tier would be the association’s real estate
portfolio, which was collateral for the loan. The second tier would be the WSW mutual fund, which all
housing associations pay into. And finally, the third tier would be the national government, which would
serve as a lender of last resort to cover the debt. However indirect, the ultimate guarantee of the
national government earned the WSW a AAA credit rating. 37 The WSW guarantee enabled housing
associations to borrow from private lenders with favorable interest rates. With the help of the WSW,
housing associations of the mid-1980s were proving that they could stand on their own feet and access
financing on the private capital markets. The availability of low interest rates prompted many
associations to refinance their government loans with private-sector capital. Within a few years, ƒ30
billion (guilders) of government loans had been refinanced, saving almost ƒ1 billion (guilders) per year in
interest payments. 38
The third financial instrument was an oversight entity that would monitor the finances of the
social housing sector. The Central Fund for Social Housing [Centraal Fonds voor de Volkshuisvesting,
CFV] was established in 1987 to support the increasingly independent housing associations. The CFV was
a quasi-governmental authority 39 with two tasks: financial oversight and emergency financial support. In
2015, the CFV was merged into a new public institution, the Housing Association Authority, which took
over its oversight role. 40 As an overseeing entity, the CFV (and now the Housing Association Authority)

36
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 259.
37
Waarborgfonds Sociale Woningbouw [Guarantee Fund for Social Housing], “Over WSW,” accessed December 13,
2022, https://www.wsw.nl/.
38
The ƒ1 billion savings in annual interest payments equals approximately €870 million in today’s euros.
39
More specifically, the CFV was an autonomous administrative authority [zelfstandig bestuursorgaan], a common
feature of the Dutch government. They are organizations that carry out government tasks but are not overseen by
a specific ministry. Well-known examples include the Chambers of Commerce, the Centre for Work and Income,
and De Nederlandse Bank.”
40
Woonbond [Housing Union], “De onafhankelijke Autoriteit Woningcorporaties komt er toch” [The independent
Housing Association Authority will be established anyway], Woonbond: De Stem van hurend nederland [Housing
Union: The voice of the Netherlands’ renters], February 10, 2015,
https://www.woonbond.nl/nieuws/onafhankelijke-autoriteit-woningcorporaties-komt-toch.
15
kept housing associations in check as they tested their independence and monitored the financial health
of the social housing sector as a whole.
With these new instruments in place, the national government cut another financial tie with the
social housing sector. In addition to discontinuing lending for renovation work, the national government
would no longer issue loans for new social housing construction. Ceasing government lending marked a
fundamental shift in social housing’s history. Access to public credit had been the financial engine of the
system since the original Housing Act of 1901. After several incremental steps towards financial
independence, by the end of the 1980s, the outstanding debts and operating subsidies were the only
remaining financial tie between the government and the housing associations. As the dire need for
housing subsided throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the subsidy tap was twisting shut.

1990–1995: Making Independent [Verzelfstandiging]

By the 1990s, the neoliberal wind had blown into the Netherlands. 41 As financial ties were stepped back
in the preceding decades, the housing associations were edged towards full independence. This
incremental trajectory culminated in the early 1990s with the deregulation of the social housing sector
and the severing of all financial ties. With a now-famous memo, “The People’s Housing in the 1990s”
[nota Volkshuisvesting in de jaren negentig, 1989], Secretary of State Enneüs Heerma summarized the
historic and contemporary developments in the social housing sector, and laid out the playing field for
the next era of social housing. The memo was peppered with neoliberal buzzwords: “decentralization”
(shifting responsibility from the national government to municipal governments) and “making

41
Margaret Thatcher in the UK (1979-1990) and Ronald Reagan in the US (1981-1989) are often cited as the
figureheads of neoliberalism. Both politicians massively reformed the public housing systems in their respective
countries to align them with market-driven logics characteristic of neoliberalism. The Netherlands was looking to
these countries, particularly the UK.
16
independent” 42 [verzelfstandiging] (severing public ties with housing associations). It was “Operation
Heerma.” 43
Heerma’s memo outlined what independence would look like for housing associations. There
would be greater operational freedom; the government’s role would shift from steering, dictating
“what” and “where” housing associations would build, to negotiating, with housing associations that
operated autonomously but made agreements with the government. In the memo, Heerma outlined the
four duties of housing associations: (1) to provide housing for vulnerable groups, (2) to ensure the
quality of their assets, (3) to involve tenants in decision-making, and (4) to stay financially healthy.
Within this definition lies the assumption that social housing is a part of the social safety net for a
narrowing group of vulnerable people, rather than something for everyone. This was a departure from
the original notion of “the people’s” [volks] housing, meant for a wide band of society. This new version
of social housing introduced the notion of “skewedness” [scheefheid] to describe higher-income tenants
who were not “supposed to” rent from the social sector. Based on Heerma’s memo, the revised duties
of housing associations were legally formalized in 1992. 44 43F

By the early 1990s, housing associations were proving they could handle their newfound
independence. They were successfully borrowing on the private capital markets and had accrued

42
A quick note on translation. The Dutch word used by scholars to describe this political shift, verzelfstandiging,
contains some linguistic and cultural-political specificity that requires clarification. Verzelfstandiging means literally
“to become independent,” but when translated to English in the context of companies the best translation is
privatization. However, a keen reader will quickly note that the housing associations were never officially part of
the Dutch government and thus have always been private. Therefore the notion of “privatizing” the already private
institutions exposes the shortcomings of this translation. To better understand the true meaning of
verzelfstandiging, one must consider the nature of Dutch governance. As we have seen in the case of housing
associations, the Dutch have a characteristic “knack for creating sources of expertise and agency at arm's length
from the government” (David Laws, Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam). The postwar
loans and subsidies provided to the housing associations transformed them from purely private associations into
this ambiguous semi-public position, operationally and financially dependent on the government. When Dutch
scholars speak of verzelfstandiging, or, as this paper will translate it, “making independent,” they speak of the
dissolution of these direct ties between the government and the “social enterprises.” It is like the privatization of
an entity that was never technically publicly owned, but was performing public duties with public monies, de facto
operating as an extension of the state. When the housing associations were “made independent,” that de facto
public status was rescinded, and the housing associations once again had to give form to their social duties
independently, without the money or influence of the state.
43
Operatie Heerma is a phrase taken from the title of Wouter Beekers’ chapter on making independent in his
dissertation on the history of social housing in the Netherlands. Beekers, Het bewoonbare land.
44
They were formalized by the “Decision for the Management of the Social Rental Sector” [Besluit Beheer Sociale
Huursector, BBSH], a constitution for the newly liberalized housing associations. Beekers, Het bewoonbare land
[The livable country], 243–71.
17
substantial real estate portfolios since the postwar building boom. However, the government was still
tied to the associations by billions of guilders in loans and outstanding subsidy obligations. Social
housing expenditure accounted for almost 10 percent of the national budget. With the upcoming
transition to the euro, the Dutch government had to limit its budget deficits and national debt. It was
time for the final push of Operation Heerma. The housing association’s outstanding loans were
approximately equal to the government’s outstanding subsidy obligations. There were about ƒ30 billion
(guilders) on each side of the balance sheet. 45 With a truly radical operation in 1995, the Balancing Act
[Wet Balansverkorting Geldelijke Steun Volkshuisvesting] canceled the outstanding debts and remaining
subsidy payments against each other. The housing associations suddenly owned their housing stock free
and clear, but they were also fully cut off from public financial support. For the first time since the
Housing Act of 1901, housing associations were totally independent from the government. Advocates
for independence reasoned that the government’s postwar investments in social housing had built up a
sector that could now be self-sufficient. Housing associations could mobilize their large portfolios. The
portfolio could be used as collateral for cheap loans, and rental incomes would pay into a revolving
fund. Housing associations now had the freedom and responsibility to give form to their social duties on
their own. 46
It is important to note that while the housing associations were no longer financially tied to the
government, they were not entirely disentangled from the state. Supply-side subsidies to housing
associations were cut, but the demand-side rental assistance remained, augmenting tenant incomes.
Even though social rents are regulated far below market rates, the lowest-income families still would
not be able to afford their housing without the added rental assistance. Rental assistance remains a key
component of the social housing system post-independence. In terms of regulation, the national
government no longer dictates social housing development, but they do retain influence over allocation
and affordability. The national government regulates affordability by setting income limits for social
tenants, a maximum social rent, and a maximum rent increase percentage.
Increased operational and financial independence pushed housing associations out from under
the wing of the national government towards a position in between the public and private sectors. This
in-between position is held by the social sector, comprised of non-profit foundations that meet societal
needs that are unmet by the private market. A long-time “third leg” of the Netherlands’ economic stool,

45
ƒ30 billion in 1995 guilders is approximately €22 billion in today’s euros.
46
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 265–71.
18
in the neoliberal era the social sector’s non-profit institutions became known as social enterprises
[maatschappelijke ondernemingen]. Social enterprises are organizations that provide social services like
education, housing, and healthcare in a business-like fashion. Social enterprises are not a part of the
public sector, but they are also distinguished from the private sector because they have special
privileges and regulations tied to their social product. Institutionally, social enterprises are foundations,
meaning they are non-profits that operate revolving funds and reinvest their profits in the social
product.
The 1990s marked the beginning of a new era for housing associations. The landscape laid out in
Heerma’s memo remains foundational to the system today. The end of supply-side loans and subsidies
from the public sector was a fundamental shift in how the government invested in social housing. In the
single fell swoop of the Balancing Act, housing associations owned their portfolios free and clear. They
were transformed from de facto extensions of the government to private social enterprises. Now
independent, housing associations had greater freedom to give form to their social duty independently,
but they also entered into the Wild West of the private market. Somewhat contradictorily, housing
associations were encouraged to act more like market parties, while serving an increasingly narrow
population that was supposedly left behind by the market.

1995–Today: The Modern System

Once converted to social enterprises, housing associations had to start thinking in terms of the market.
It has been an experimental era, not without scandals, bailouts, or course corrections. However, the
system kept adapting, which has led today to strong, nimble, and self-sufficient organizations. What
comprises the proper balance of freedom and accountability in the social sector is still a topic of policy
debate. As of summer 2022, the policies regulating housing associations are actively being rewritten as
the government engages them to combat the latest housing crisis. The continued retooling of the social
housing system is an indication of its lasting power. The system has proven resilient through over one
hundred years of history, because it has been able to adapt to the needs and conditions of the times.
The institutional position of housing associations in between the public and private sectors is dynamic,
changing as needs and resources shift. Because of this, housing associations can easily be mobilized by
the national government when the market is not meeting society’s needs.

19
Housing Associations Change
After the Balancing Act in 1995, housing associations were left to “hold up their own pants,” 47 and no
one really knew what was going to happen. Without access to financial resources from the government,
associations had to figure out how to leverage the market’s resources to maintain, operate, and develop
the social housing stock. Housing associations did have a few advantages over commercial developers,
advantages that made development at social rents feasible. First, as non-profit organizations, they paid
lower taxes because their profits were immediately reinvested into the social housing stock. Second, the
guarantee of the WSW (and ultimately the national government) gave housing associations access to
favorable loans on the private capital markets. Third, if associations bought or leased land from the
government, they could do so at the “social” rate. This land discount alone gave housing associations a
collective €400 million advantage over commercial developers annually. 48 Fourth, housing associations
benefited indirectly from continued tenant rental assistance subsidies. However, this was not exactly an
advantage, because any developer offering units at social rates could benefit from it. Rental assistance
was available to all qualifying tenants, regardless of who owned the property. As had been the case
throughout history, these four remaining subsidies (however indirect) came with government regulation
attached. Even after independence, the national and municipal governments retained the power to
regulate the quality, availability, and affordability of social housing.
The independence of the social housing sector led to a number of changes in the organizational
structure of the associations. As they were pushed towards self-sufficiency on the market, housing
associations started to merge together. With bigger real estate portfolios, housing associations spread
their risk and were better positioned to compete in the private sector. The mergers had already begun
with the rumblings of independence in the 1970s; the number of associations dropped from 1022 in
1970 to 824 in 1990. 49 After financial independence, the mergers picked up pace; the number of housing
associations halved by 2010, and only 284 associations remain today. 50 Of course, the housing stock,
while partially sold off, has not diminished at nearly the same rate. Housing portfolios have gotten
bigger, with roughly 10,000 units per association.

47
A translation of the Dutch expression “eigen broek ophouden.”
48
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 273–75.
49
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 27–28.
50
Aedes vereniging van woningcorporaties [Aedes association of housing associations], “Huurders Tevreden,
Corporaties Overbelast, Rapportage Aedes-Benchmark 2021” [Renter Satisfied, Housing Associations
Overburdened, Aedes Benchmark Report 2021], November 2021.
20
 Another cause of growing portfolios was the privatization of municipal housing companies.
Some of today's largest housing associations—like Woonstad in Rotterdam (53,000 units 51) and Ymere in
Amsterdam (83,984 units 52)—are the result of mergers between newly privatized municipal companies
and existing housing associations. In these mergers, the municipal companies transferred their public
portfolios into the social sector, and they also brought the social responsibility to house the poorest and
most vulnerable members of society to the private housing associations. The privatization of municipal
housing companies was another means by which the government scaled back its direct involvement
with the social housing sector.
With such large portfolios, the power of individual renters diminished. While housing
associations were originally structured as associations with members, as associations merged, they
opted to convert to foundations. More anonymous, the foundation structure mirrored corporate
governance structures from the business world. As foundations, the housing associations were run like
corporations by executive and supervisory boards. However, unlike corporations, they did not have
shareholders and still reinvested all profits to serve the interest of social housing. The conversion from
member-based associations to foundations was another step in the ongoing professionalization of
housing associations initiated by the Housing Act of 1901. 53 As housing associations professionalized, so
did tenants. In 1990, a national tenant union, the Nederlandse Woonbond, was founded. It
consolidated three tenant unions that had been founded in the early 1970s to protest for specific
renter’s rights. The 1998 Consultation Law [Overlegwet] created a structural position for tenant unions
to negotiate with housing associations. 54 Today, biannual performance agreements are made between
each housing association, its municipality, and Woonbond, and these steer the activities of the housing
associations.
Housing associations also needed a way to advocate for themselves at the national level.
Without direct government ties, the sector needed to have a clear, unified voice with which it could
weigh in on policy debates. The association of housing associations, Aedes, was established in 1998,

51
Woonstad Rotterdam, “Woonstad Rotterdam,” accessed July 13, 2022, https://www.woonstadrotterdam.nl/.
52
Stichting Ymere, “Jaarstukken 2020” [Annual Report 2020].
53
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 277–78.
54
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 75–78; Woonbond [Housing Union],
“Rechten huurdersorganisaties” [Rights of tenant organizations], Woonbond: De Stem van hurend nederland
[Housing Union: The voice of the Netherlands’ renters], August 20, 2015,
https://www.woonbond.nl/huurdersorganisatie/huurderswerk/rechten-huurdersorganisaties.
21
from a merger of two social housing advocacy organizations that date back as far as 1913. Aedes
consolidates and communicates the needs of housing associations to the national government. 55 Aedes
also keeps tabs on housing associations, collecting and publishing data on each association and the
sector as a whole. With Aedes, the dispersed and localized social housing sector has been consolidated
into a singular voice, increasing its political power to negotiate.

Experimenting with Independence: Robin Hoods

In the early years of independence, housing associations kept their operations limited. Their situation
was unprecedented, and no one knew quite how the numbers would work out without government
support. By definition, serving vulnerable and low-income groups was not a profitable enterprise;
however, housing associations did have massive real estate portfolios. Until the 1990s, these portfolios
had been valued operationally, by how much net operating income was generated each year. However,
once housing associations became independent market actors who could sell their real estate, their
whole portfolio was valued in terms of the market, by how much the building could be sold for. This
change in measurement alone increased the total value of the Dutch social housing stock from ƒ32
billion to ƒ140 billion. 56
With their newfound wealth and freedom, housing associations started experimenting with
market-based tactics to generate funds for social housing. Some housing associations started building
market-rate residential and commercial projects. They fancied themselves modern Robin Hoods,
skimming profits from the private sector to reinvest in the social sector. 57 Another way housing
associations raised funds was by selling off housing stock. 26,000 units were sold in 2002 and an average
of 16,000 every year thereafter until 2011. These sales brought €2-2.5 billion in revenue each year for
the development of new social housing. 58
As some might expect, competing in the private sector was risky business. Most associations
handled their new freedoms well; they strengthened their neighborhoods with improvements to non-

55
Lans et al., Canon volkshuisvesting [Canon of The People’s Housing], 32–34.
56
Arie Lengkeek and Peter Kuenzli, Operatie Wooncoöperatie: Uit de Wooncrisis Door Gemeenschappelijk Bezit
[Operation Housing Cooperative: Out of the Housing Crisis through Collective Ownership] (Amsterdam: Valiz,
2022), 27.
57
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 283 Building market-rate housing had become much more
lucrative since private-sector rents were deregulated in 1994.
58
Lengkeek and Kuenzli, Operatie Wooncoöperatie [Operation Housing Cooperative], 27.
22
residential elements like the public realm, community centers, schools, and health centers. However, a
handful of associations were less responsible. Not all directors were able to resist the temptations of the
market. For private developers, housing associations made appealing business partners because they
were inexperienced, had deep pockets, accepted low returns, and took risks private parties wouldn’t. 59
Scandals involving reckless investments, self-enrichment, and malpractice hit the press. A few stories in
particular have stuck in public memory: the director of Rochdale who acted like a “sun king” chauffeured
around in the company Maserati, millions invested by Woonbron in a cruise ship that proved to be a
sinking investment, and a financial engineering disaster by Vestia, which purchased bad derivatives. By
the mid-2000s, public opinion of housing associations was poor: their money was going to risky private
ventures, executive salaries were excessive, and the portfolios were too big for them to handle. The
scale and commercialization of housing associations were dissonant with their social duties. When the
market hit its downturn in 2008, some associations’ risky investments required the rest of the social
housing sector to bail them out. 60
While the public was suspicious about the Robin Hood strategy’s ultimate redistributive effect,
commercial developers were unhappy with the new competition. While housing associations’ subsidies
were not direct, they did still have access to lower interest rates and tax advantages. This was fine when
they stuck to social housing, where rents were too low for commercial developers, but when the
associations started to operate in the for-sale and commercial markets, they presented unwelcome
competition. Because the Dutch government created the housing associations’ advantages, albeit
indirectly, commercial investors brought their complaints to the European Commission. In 2005, the
commission sided with the investors and charged the Dutch government to re-regulate the sector and
end the unfair competition with the private sector.
As a result of the corruption scandals, the mismanagement of budgets and portfolios, and the
decision of the European Commission, the government reined in the liberalized social housing sector.
Over the next ten years, there were three new regulations that limited its activities. The new regulations

59
Ibid., 28.
60
Investments in bad derivatives cost the housing association Vestia €2 billion in 2012. All the other housing
associations had to contribute extra fees to the CFV (mutual fund at the time) in order to bail Vestia out. Marja
Elsinga, Hugo Priemus, and Peter Boelhouwer, “Milestones in Housing Finance in the Netherlands, 1988-2013,” in
Milestones in European Housing Finance, ed. Jens Lunde and Christine M. E. Whitehead, Real Estate Issues
(Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2016).
23
were written into law with the Housing Act of 2015, redefining the role of housing associations once
again.
The first new regulation was the introduction of an income limit for social housing tenants.
Since 2009, 90 percent of housing associations’ available social units have been required to be assigned
to households with less than the household income limit. In 2009, this was €33,000 per year; 61 as of
2022, the limit is €40,765 for single-person households and €45,014 for larger households. 62 With the
income limit, roughly 40 percent of Dutch households qualify for social housing. 63 The income limit
restricts access to social housing and hardens the idea that social housing is part of the social safety net
rather than a counterbalance to the private sector.
The second new regulation was the introduction of a landlord levy [verhuurdersheffing]. Rising
property values since the late 1990s had increased the value of the sector’s collective assets to €45
billion. The government argued that this value had accrued on assets that were built from public loans
and funded by public subsidies. With the global recession and shrinking austerity budgets, the social
housing sector started to look like a gold mine. Reinier van der Kuij described the conditions as “a
perfect storm.” 64 Scandals had damaged the reputations of housing associations, economic downturn
had made them financially unstable, and they were still figuring out how to “hold up their own pants.”
The government created a landlord levy—part punishment for irresponsible behavior, part cash grab—
specifically for housing associations. Since 2013, housing associations pay an annual levy on the market
value of their portfolios, costing the sector almost €2 billion per year. 65
The third new regulation required housing associations to split their social and commercial
activities into two separate portfolios. Housing associations had to split their real estate into Service of

61
Beekers, Het bewoonbare land [The livable country], 295.
62
Ministerie van Algemene Zaken [National Government Ministry of General Affairs], “Kom ik in aanmerking voor
een sociale huurwoning van een woningcorporatie?” [Do I qualify for a housing association’s rental housing
unit?],” Rijksoverheid [National Government] (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, February 10, 2020),
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/huurwoning-zoeken/vraag-en-antwoord/wanneer-kom-ik-in-
aanmerking-voor-een-sociale-huurwoning.
63
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [Central Bureau of Statistics], “Inkomen van huishoudens; inkomensklassen,
huishoudenskenmerken” [Household incomes; income classes, household characteristics], CBS StatLine, November
15, 2022, https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/83932NED/table?ts=1682180778893.
64
Reinier van de Kuij, Adviseur Strategie [Strategy Advisor], Havensteder, interviewed by Hanneke van Deursen,
July 6, 2022.
65
A significant portion of Aedes’ advocacy in the years since has been dedicated to outlining the ways in which this
levy has been hindering housing associations from performing their social duty. As of 2023, the levy will be lifted in
exchange for new performance agreements between the national government and the sector.
24
Public Economic Interest [dienst van algemeen economisch belang, DAEB] and non-DAEB. The DAEB
portfolio included social property like housing rented at social rates, and the non-DAEB portfolio
included private-sector activities like market-rate housing and non-residential real estate. The two
portfolios had to be kept separate administratively. Profits from the non-DAEB portfolio could still be
transferred to fund the DAEB side, but the indirect subsidies like guaranteed loans and discounted land
could not be used for non-DAEB activities. On the DAEB side, housing associations could make only
limited investments beyond housing. “Neighborhood livability” [leefbaarheid] improvements, once a key
part of an association’s work, were limited to certain types, excluding, for example, community
centers. 66
The early years of independence were marked by experimentation—sometimes wild
experimentation. The public sector was shocked by the freedom they themselves had granted housing
associations. The response was re-regulation: income limits, a landlord levy, and a separation of the
associations’ commercial and social activities. After the scandals, housing associations were impelled to
“return to the core task” [terug naar de kerntaak]: serving the most vulnerable members of society.
While these regulations, particularly the landlord levy, have limited housing associations’ capacity to
meet their social obligations, they have also forced housing associations to tighten up their operations.
After a decade under scrutiny, housing associations have found their footing as social enterprises. Re-
regulation required housing associations to get their budgets under control and find strong leaders.
Consequently, they have become financially healthy organizations that have the capacity to fulfill their
social duties without direct government support.

Conclusion: The System Today

The post-independence social housing system is still changing, as the system has been from the very
start. However, the social housing system has come a long way from the first associations established at
the turn of the twentieth century. Now that the housing associations have found their footing as
independent social enterprises, the pendulum is swinging back, and their duties are expanding once
again to meet today’s housing affordability crisis. The government’s return to housing associations as
partners in combating the housing crisis demonstrates how instrumental housing associations are for

66
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat [Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management], “Leefbaarheid”
[Livability], Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport [Inspection of the Living Environment and Transit] (Ministerie van
Infrastructuur en Waterstaat, February 18, 2021), https://www.ilent.nl/onderwerpen/wonen/leefbaarheid.
25
the Dutch housing market as a whole. Where the market fails to produce what is needed, housing
associations are the government’s first line of defense. While they have adapted and changed
throughout their history, housing associations remain steadfast in their social duty.
The social housing system has navigated generations of social, political, and economic change.
Its aims, governance, and financial tools have adjusted to meet the needs of each era. From the
beginning, the core of the model has been a revolving fund that used rental profits from one project in
the portfolio to fund the construction of the next project. With the Housing Act of 1901, housing
associations became non-profits, and long-term low-interest construction loans were introduced to
replace shareholder capital. After World War II, the housing shortage required government support to
build at the scale and speed necessary. The government turned to housing associations, mobilizing the
existing network with new resources and directing development. Housing associations’ portfolios grew
to comprise 37 percent of the total housing stock. As the crisis waned, so did the need for heavy-handed
state intervention. With the creation of new financial instruments such as the WSW guarantee fund and
rental assistance, housing associations slowly began to stand on their own two feet. Their independence
was made absolute when financial ties with the government were severed in 1995. Now social
enterprises, housing associations had to figure out how to mobilize their large real estate portfolios to
continue fulfilling their social duties. Scandal and mismanagement called for a period of re-regulation,
during which housing associations have tightened their operations. Today, housing associations are
financially healthy, professionalized, and well-organized non-profits. Figures 2, 3, and 4 summarize how
the housing associations have changed in the course of their history. Figure 2 lists the changes in the
institutional structure, financing, regulation, and tenants in each iteration of the system. Figure 3 maps
this trajectory visually, tracing the changing institutional position of housing associations between the
public, private, and social sectors. Figure 4 tracks the changing financial instruments for the social
housing sector. While today’s housing challenges demand new solutions, the social housing system
continues to adapt, as it has throughout history, to meet the crisis of the moment. The Dutch social
housing system is powerful precisely because it is able to adapt to changing circumstances while
carrying with it all the investments of decades past.
The Dutch social housing system has proven resilient throughout its history. Today, over a
quarter of the Dutch housing stock is rented at below-market rates. Big cities like Groningen and

26
Rotterdam have an even higher concentration, as much as 57 percent. 67 Social rents are regulated by
the national government and rental assistance augments the income of all who qualify. Those who live
in social housing are well protected by rights of tenure and suffer little threat of losing their homes.
Housing associations are building, operating, and maintaining housing at affordable rates without any
direct financial support from the government. Housing associations are leading climate-adaptation
efforts, and the quality of social housing competes with the offerings of the private sector, even winning
architecture prizes. A general national framework leaves enough room for tailored solutions negotiated
at the local level. All things considered, it is a beautiful system, and one whose history gives insight into
how it may be built up in other contexts.

67
NOS Nieuws, “Bijna twee derde gemeenten heeft te weinig sociale huurwoningen” [Almost two-thirds of
municipalities have too few social housing units], NOS, March 26, 2022, https://nos.nl/artikel/2422683-bijna-twee-
derde-gemeenten-heeft-te-weinig-sociale-huurwoningen.
27
Figure 2: The Evolution of the Dutch Social Housing System

Era Institutional Structure Financing Regulation Tenants

Pre-1901: • “Capitalist • Revolving fund from • None • Working class

The First philanthropy” selling shares
Housing • Private associations • Investors received a 3%
Associations which sold shares return and all other
• Members: wealthy funds were reinvested
shareholders

1901–1945: • “Permitted • Direct construction • The Housing Act of • Working class

Formalization Institutions” loan from government, 1901 • Special
with the • Required to be low-interest, 50-year • Increased quality groups
Housing Act nonprofit, no payments term (supply-side) control with (municipal
to shareholders • Subsidy available to Building Code and housing
• Members: working- clean up blighted Municipal building companies)
class tenants (present neighborhoods (supply- permit
and future) side) • Access to loans
required
organization be a
“permitted
institution”

1945–1965: • Unofficial extension of • Direct construction • Almost everything • Everyone who

Postwar Housing the government loans from government was dictated by wanted social
Shortage • Membership no longer (supply-side) government: where housing
a pre-condition nor • Operating subsidies in to build, when, in
assurance of unit exchange for building what style, how
allocation, power of beyond revolving many units etc.
members wanes fund’s capacity (supply- • Loss of autonomy
• Professionalization of side) for housing
housing associations associations

1965–1989: • Regaining operational • Rental assistance • Government body • Everyone who

Self-Sufficiency autonomy with private- (demand-side) (CFV) created to wanted social
sector financing • Guarantee Fund (WSW) oversee and report housing
established to on financial health • First tenant
guarantee loans taken of social housing unions
from the private sector
market
• No more loans from
government: first no
renovation loans, then
no construction loans

28
Figure 2: The Evolution of the Dutch Social Housing System

Era Institutional Structure Financing Regulation Tenants

1990–1995: • Municipal housing • The Balancing Act: • Social duties • Rhetoric

Making companies privatized, outstanding debt and defined by BBSH shifted to
Independent merge with private subsidies canceled • Regulatory power “vulnerable
housing associations • Rental assistance for over rent setting groups”
tenants (demand-side) and unit allocation
• WSW Guarantee

1995–Today: • Mergers between • Discounted land prices • Government • 2009 Income

The Modern associations, bigger (indirect supply-side) regulates quality, limits, approx.
System portfolios availability, and 40% of
• WSW Guarantee
• Professionalization: affordability population
• Rental assistance
conversion from • Biannual • Vulnerable
(demand-side)
member-based Performance groups
associations to • Lower taxes as a non- Agreements • Woonbond:
foundations with profit between housing national
executive and advisory association,
tenant union
boards Woonbond, and
• Aedes: association of municipalities
housing associations

29
 Figure 3: Mobile Institutional Position of Housing Associations Throughout History

Triangular diagram of public (government), social (people), and private (market) sectors derived from:
Reinier van de Kuij, Adviseur Strategie [Strategy Advisor] for Havensteder, interviewed by Hanneke van
Deursen, July 6, 2022.

30
 Figure 4: Financial Instruments for Social Housing

Government Brick + Mortar Government Rental

Era Rent Regulation
Loans Subsidies Guarantee Assistance

Pre-1901

1901–1945 +++ +

1945–1960 ++ +++ +++

1960s + +++ + +++

1970s + ++ + ++ +

1980s + + + ++ ++

1990s ++ + +++

2000s onward ++ + +++

Table adapted from Hugo Priemus and Marja Elsinga, “Housing Allowances in the Netherlands: The Struggle for
Budgetary Controllability,” 195. Source: van der Schaar (1987).

Note: +++: dominant role; ++: substantial role, +: minor role.

31
Interviews
Cambridge Housing Authority
Fraden, Clara. Cambridge Housing Authority: Deputy Director of Planning and Development. Interview
by Hanneke van Deursen, June 9, 2022.
Gordon, Zach. Cambridge Housing Authority: Policy & Communications. Interviews by Hanneke van
Deursen, June 8, 2022 and June 16, 2022.

Scholars
Bortel, Gerard A van. Technische Universiteit Delft: Professor of Real Estate Management. Interview by
Hanneke van Deursen, June 29, 2022.
Elsinga, Marja. Technische Universiteit Delft: Professor of Housing Institutions & Governance. Interviews
by Hanneke van Deursen, July 1, 2022 and August 5, 2022.
Laws, David. University of Amsterdam: Professor of Transnational Configurations, Conflict and
Governance. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 7, 2022.

Havensteder
Kuij, Reinier van de. Havensteder: Adviseur Strategie [Strategy Advisor]. Interview by Hanneke van
Deursen, July 6, 2022.

Woonstad Rotterdam
Strategy & Policy
Deckert, Mike. Woonstad Rotterdam: Procesregisseur Strategie [Process Director Strategy]. Interview by
Hanneke van Deursen, June 29, 2022.
Kleij, Isa. Woonstad Rotterdam: Junior Beleidsmedewerker / Analist [Junior Policymaker and Analyst].
Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, June 27, 2022.
Pool, Melvin. Woonstad Rotterdam: Senior Manager Strategie & Beleid [Senior Manager of Strategy and
Policy]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 25, 2022.
Siemensma, Marvin. Woonstad Rotterdam: Senior Adviseur Strategie [Senior strategic advisor].
Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, June 30, 2022.
Real Estate Management and Development
Torren, André van der. Woonstad Rotterdam: Senior Projectcoördinator, Malieklos [Senior Project
coordinator for Malieklos]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, June 30, 2022.

32
Portfolio Management
Kok, Barry de. Woonstad Rotterdam: Projectmanager Vastgoedontwikkeling en -beheer [Project
manager of real estate development and management]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July
12, 2022.
Hout, Gerben in ’t. Woonstad Rotterdam: Ontwikkelmanager [Development manager]. Interview by
Hanneke van Deursen, June 30, 2022.
Lipsch, Michael. Woonstad Rotterdam: Assetmanager [Asset manager]. Interview by Hanneke van
Deursen, July 21, 2022.
Velden, Bram van der. Woonstad Rotterdam: Manager ontwikkeling [Development manager]. Interview
by Hanneke van Deursen, July 7, 2022.
Verleisdonk, Lodewijk. Woonstad Rotterdam: Projectmanager Vastgoedontwikkeling [Project manager
for real estate development]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 11, 2022.
Finance & Control
Severin, Ronald. Woonstad Rotterdam: Financieel Adviseur [Financial Advisor]. Interview by Hanneke
van Deursen, July 21, 2022.
Scholte, Edwin. Woonstad Rotterdam. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 30, 2022.
Executive Board
Achkar, Mohamed el. Woonstad Rotterdam: Bestuur [Executive]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen,
July 28, 2022.

Aedes
Poel, Niels van der. Aedes: Senior Belangenbehartiger [Senior advocate]. Interview by Hanneke van
Deursen, June 25, 2022.
Witjes, Bob. Aedes: Belangenbehartiging Publieke Zaak [Advocate public matters]. Interview by Hanneke
van Deursen, June 25, 2022.

Municipal Government of Rotterdam

Dries, Janneke. Municipal Government of Rotterdam: Stedenbouwkundige [Delftshaven] [Urban
planner: Delftshaven neighborhood]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 15, 2022.
Engel, Wim van den. Municipal Government of Rotterdam: Senior Beleidsadviseur Wonen [Senior policy
advisory for housing]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 26, 2022.
Noeverman, Mariët. Municipal Government of Rotterdam: Beleidsadviseur Wonen [Policy Advisor for
Housing]. Interview by Hanneke van Deursen, July 26, 2022.

33
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34
Schaar, J. van der, and A. Hereijgers. Volkshuisvesting: Een Zaak van Beleid [Social Housing: A Matter of
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Engeland en Duitsland” [Governance of Social Housing in Europe: a comparison with England and
Germany]. Vereniging van Toezichthouders in Woningcorporaties [Association of Regulators of
Housing Associations], April 2014.
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organization]. “Regeling van de Minister Voor Volkshuisvesting En Ruimtelijke Ordening van 11
April 2022 Nr. 2022-0000161710 Tot Wijziging van Het Besluit Energieprestatievergoeding Huur,
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Uitvoeringsregeling Huurprijzen Woonruimte (Indexering 2022),” April 20, 2022.
Ministerie van Algemene Zaken [National Government Ministry of General Affairs]. “Hoe tel ik tot 1 juli
2021 de punten van mijn zelfstandige huurwoning?” [How do I count the points for my
independent housing unit through July 1st 2021]. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, May 20, 2020.
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2020/05/20/hoe-tel-ik-tot-1-juli-2021-de-
punten-van-mijn-zelfstandige-huurwoning.
———. “Kom ik in aanmerking voor een sociale huurwoning van een woningcorporatie?” [Do I qualify
for a housing association’s rental housing unit?]. Rijksoverheid [National Government]. Ministerie
van Algemene Zaken, February 10, 2020.
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/huurwoning-zoeken/vraag-en-antwoord/wanneer-
kom-ik-in-aanmerking-voor-een-sociale-huurwoning.
———. “Wanneer kan de verhuurder mij een tijdelijk huurcontract aanbieden?” [When can the landlord
offer me a temporary lease?]. Rijksoverheid [National Government]. Ministerie van Algemene
Zaken, February 20, 2020. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/huurwoning-
zoeken/vraag-en-antwoord/onderwerpen/huurwoning-zoeken/vraag-en-antwoord/wanneer-kan-
ik-tijdelijk-huren.
———. “Welke regels gelden er voor een huurverhoging?” [Which rules apply for a rent increase?].
Rijksoverheid [National Government]. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, March 24, 2020.
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/woning-huren/vraag-en-

35
 antwoord/onderwerpen/woning-huren/vraag-en-antwoord/welke-regels-gelden-er-voor-een-
huurverhoging.
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Relations]. “Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 7” [Civil Code Book 7]. Wettenbank [Law Bank], March 11,
2023. https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005290/2017-07-01/0/.
———. “Handreiking: Bouwbesluit & Woning” [Guide for Building Code and Housing], January 2015.
———. “Meer betaalbare woningen voor middeninkomens” [More affordable housing for middle
incomes].” Rijksoverheid [National Government]. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, May 19, 2022.
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2022/05/19/meer-betaalbare-woningen-voor-
middeninkomens.
———. “Nationale prestatieafspraken voor de volkshuisvesting,” [National performance agreements for
the people’s housing] June 2022.
———. “Taken van een gemeente” [The tasks of a municipal government]. Rijksoverheid [National
Government]. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, August 1, 2012.
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———. “Wat is de maximale huurverhoging in 2022?” [What is the maximum rent increase in 2022?].
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assistance payments]. Accessed July 13, 2022.
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proefberekening-toeslagen.
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Housing Associations
Stichting Ymere. “Jaarstukken 2020” [Annual Report 2020], 2021.
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36
Woonstad Rotterdam. “Woonstad Rotterdam.” Accessed July 13, 2022.
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Advocacy Organizations
Aedes vereniging van woningcorporaties [Aedes association of housing associations]. “Huurders
Tevreden, Corporaties Overbelast, Rapportage Aedes-Benchmark 2021” [Renters Satisfied,
Housing Associations Overburdened, Aedes Benchmark Report 2021] November 2021.
Raad voor de Leefomgeving en Infrastructuur [Council for the Environment and Infrastructure].
“Onderdak Bieden: Sturen Op Prestaties van Woningcorporaties” [Offering Shelter: Steering for
Housing Association Performance]. Den Haag, May 2022.
https://www.rli.nl/sites/default/files/advies_onderdak_bieden_def.pdf.
Ravestein, Rob. “Hoe komen huurprijzen tot stand?” [How are rents set?]. Aedes vereniging van
woningcorporaties [Aedes association of housing associations]. Accessed July 13, 2022.
https://aedes.nl/huurbeleid-en-betaalbaarheid/hoe-komen-huurprijzen-tot-stand.
Verdouw. “Wat Is BENG?” [What Is BENG?]. Accessed July 13, 2022.
https://www.verdouw.nu/kennisbank/bouwkennis/wat-is-beng.
Waarborgfonds Sociale Woningbouw [Guarantee Fund for Social Housing]. “Over WSW.” Accessed
December 13, 2022. https://www.wsw.nl/.
Witjes, Bob. “Toewijzingsregels veranderen per 1 januari 2022” [Allocation rule changes per January 1st
2022]. Aedes vereniging van woningcorporaties [Aedes association of housing associations],
November 3, 2021. https://aedes.nl/huurbeleid-en-betaalbaarheid/toewijzingsregels-veranderen-
1-januari-2022.
Woonbond [Housing Union]. “De onafhankelijke Autoriteit Woningcorporaties komt er toch” [The
independent Housing Association Authority will be established anyway]. Woonbond: De Stem van
hurend nederland [Housing Union: The voice of the Netherlands’ renters], February 10, 2015.
https://www.woonbond.nl/nieuws/onafhankelijke-autoriteit-woningcorporaties-komt-toch.
———. “Rechten huurdersorganisaties” [Rights of tenant organizations]. Woonbond: De Stem van
hurend nederland [Housing Union: The voice of the Netherlands’ renters], August 20, 2015.
https://www.woonbond.nl/huurdersorganisatie/huurderswerk/rechten-huurdersorganisaties.
———. “Wat kost huren in 2022?” [What does renting cost in 2022?]. Woonbond: De Stem van hurend
nederland [Housing Union: The voice of the Netherlands’ renters], December 17, 2021.
https://www.woonbond.nl/wat-kost-huren-2022-0.
Woonnet Rijnmond. “Woonnet Rijnmond.” Accessed July 13, 2022. https://www.woonnetrijnmond.nl/.

Numbers and Statistics

AlleCijfers. “Gemeente Rotterdam in Cijfers En Grafieken” [Municipality of Rotterdam in Numbers and
Figures]. Accessed July 13, 2022. https://allecijfers.nl/gemeente/rotterdam/.
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [Central Bureau of Statistics]. “Inkomen van huishoudens;
inkomensklassen, huishoudenskenmerken” [Household incomes; income classes, household
characteristics]. CBS StatLine, November 15, 2022.
https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/83932NED/table?ts=1682180778893.

37
———. “Voorraad woningen; eigendom, type verhuurder, bewoning, regio” [Housing stock: ownership,
type of landlord, occupation, region]. CBS StatLine, November 7, 2022.
https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/82900NED/table?fromstatweb.
———. “Woningvoorraad naar eigendom; regio, 2006-2012” [Housing stock by ownership; region, 2006-
2012]. CBS StatLine, March 4, 2014.
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