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The Limited Powers of Cities
Streams of Migration
Racial Conflict in The Postwar Era
The Suburban Exodus
The Rise of the Multiethnic Metropolis
Has the Urban Crisis Disappeared?
Index
PREFACE
The first edition of City Politics was published in 1979, and since that time the
book has undergone changes as profound as the subject matter with which it
deals. To keep it current and relevant, we have always taken care to describe
significant new developments both in the “real world” and in the literature of
the field; in this ninth edition, for example, we include material on the recent
debates over immigration policy, voting rights, the continued fiscal problems
that cities face, and the urban impacts of inequality. In making these changes,
we have included enough citations so that students will be able to conduct
further research of their own.
Over the years, City Politics has been used in college courses at all levels,
from community colleges to graduate courses in research universities. City
Politics has reached across disciplines, too; it has found its way into courses in
urban politics, urban sociology, urban planning, urban geography, and urban
history. We have relied upon three elements to make it relevant to such a broad
audience: a strong and original thematic structure with a blending of the vast
secondary literature with primary sources and recent scholarly materials, new
data, and our own original research. To make the complex scholarship of the
field as accessible and interesting as possible, we build the book around an
admittedly sweeping narrative. As far as possible, each chapter picks the story
up where the previous one left off, so that the reader can come to appreciate
that urban politics in America is constantly evolving; in a sense, past and
present are always intermingled.
Three threads compose the narrative structure of the book. From the
nation’s founding, a devotion to the present, the private marketplace and a
tradition of democratic governance have acted as the twin pillars of American
culture. All through the nation’s history, cities have been forced to strike a
balance between the goal of achieving local economic prosperity and the task
of negotiating among the many contending groups making up the local polity.
An enduring tension between these two goals is the mainspring that drives
urban politics in America, and it is also at the center of the narrative that ties
the chapters of this book together.
The governmental fragmentation of urban regions provides a third
dynamic element that has been evolving for more than a century. A complete
account of American urban politics must focus upon the internal dynamics of
individual cities and also upon the relationships among the governmental units
making up urban regions. Today, America’s urban regions are fragmented into
a patchwork of separate municipalities and other governmental units. With the
rise of privatized gated communities in recent decades, this fragmentation has
become even more complicated. In several chapters of this edition of City
Politics, we trace the many consequences that flow from this way of
organizing political authority in the modern metropolis.
We divide the book into three parts. Part I is composed of five chapters that
trace the history of urban America in the first long century from the nation’s
founding in 1789 through the Great Depression of the 1930s. This “long
century” spans a period of time in which the cities of the expanding nation
competed fiercely for a place in the nation’s rapidly evolving economic
system. At the same time, cities were constantly trying to cope with the social
tensions and disruptions caused by wave after wave of immigration and a
constant movement from farm to city. These tensions played out in a struggle
between an upper- and middle-class electorate and working-class newcomers.
The New Deal of the 1930s brought the immigrants and the cities they lived
within into the orbit of national politics for the first time in the nation’s history,
with consequences that reverberated for decades.
In Part II, we trace the arc of twentieth-century urban politics. Over a period
of only a few decades, the old industrial cities went into a steep decline, the
suburbs prospered, and a regional shift redistributed population away from the
industrial belt to other parts of the country. For a long time, urbanization had
been driven by the development of an industrial economy centered in a few
great cities. But the decline of industrial jobs and the rise of a service economy
profoundly restructured the nation’s politics and settlement patterns; as a result,
by the mid-twentieth century the older central cities were plunged into a social
and economic crisis of unprecedented proportions. In the years after World
War II, millions of southern blacks poured into northern cities, a process that
incited a protracted period of social unrest and racial animosity that
fundamentally reshaped the politics of the nation and of its urban regions.
Affluent whites fled the cities, carving out suburban enclaves in an attempt to
escape the problems of the metropolis. The imperative of governance—the
need to find ways of brokering among the contending racial, ethnic, and other
interests making up the urban polity—became crucially important.
Part III of the text focuses on the urban politics produced by the
deindustrialization and globalization processes of the 1980s and beyond. The
emergence of a globalized economy is one of its defining features. Older
central cities and entire urban regions that had slipped into decline began to
reverse their fortunes by becoming major players in the post-industrial
economy. At the same time, the fragmentation within metropolitan regions has
taken on a new dimension because cities fiercely compete for a share of
metropolitan economic growth. Today, central cities and their urban regions
are more prosperous, but at the same time more fragmented than ever, and one
consequence is that social and economic inequalities are being reproduced on
the urban landscape in a patchwork pattern that separates urban residents.
These developments can best be appreciated by putting them into historical
context. As in the past, urban politics continues to revolve around the two
imperatives of economic growth and the task of governance. As in the nation’s
first century, cities are engaged in a fierce competition for new investment.
The great tide of immigration that took off in the nineteenth century shaped the
politics of cities for well more than a century. The intense period of
immigration that began in the 1970s has yet to run its course, and it, too, will
reverberate through all levels of the American political system for a long time
to come. Any account of urban politics in the present era will be greatly
enriched if we recognize that we are a nation of immigrants, and always have
been. The several new features incorporated into this ninth edition include:
Dennis R. Judd would like to thank Sam Bassett and Anahit Tadevosyan for
their valuable research assistance and intellectual companionship. We also wish
to thank Melissa Mashburn, our editor at Longman, for helping to keep the
book on track.
Dennis R. Judd
Todd Swanstrom
CHAPTER 1
City Politics in America:
An Introduction
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Three Themes
The political dynamics of America’s cities and urban regions have remained
remarkably similar over time. From the nation’s founding to the present, a
devotion to the private marketplace and a tradition of democratic governance
have been the pivotal values defining American culture. Finding a balance
between these two imperatives has never been easy; indeed, the tension between
the two is the mainspring that energizes nearly all important political struggles
that occur at the local level. The politics of growth becomes obvious when
conflicts break out over public expenditures for such things as airport
construction, convention centers, and sports stadiums. Projects like these are
invariably promoted with the claim that they will bring prosperity to everyone
in the urban community, but such representations do not lay to rest important
concerns about whether these are the best or the most effective uses of public
resources. The fact that there is conflict at all lays bare a second imperative: the
politics of governance. Public officials and policymakers must find ways to
arbitrate among the many contending groups and interests that demand a voice
in local government. The complex social, ethnic, and racial divisions that exist
within America’s cities have always made governance a difficult challenge. A
third dynamic has evolved in step with the rise of the modern metropolis over
the past century: the politics of metropolitan fragmentation. During that period,
America’s urban regions have become increasingly fragmented into a
patchwork of separate municipalities. One of the consequences of the extreme
fragmentation of political authority within metropolitan regions is that it helps
perpetuate residential segregation, and makes it nearly impossible to devise
regional solutions to important policy issues such as urban sprawl.
The growth imperative is so deeply embedded in the politics of American
cities that, at times, it seems to overwhelm all other issues. Urban residents
have a huge stake in the continued vitality of the place where they live; it is
where they have invested their energies and capital; it is the source of their
incomes, jobs, and their sense of personal identity and community. Because of
the deep attachments that many people form for their local community, its
continued vitality is always a high priority. Throughout American history,
“place loyalty” has driven civic leaders to devote substantial public authority
and resources to the goal of promoting local economic growth and prosperity.
In the nineteenth century, for instance, cities fought hard to secure connections
to the emerging national railroad system by providing huge subsidies to
railroad corporations. Today, the details are different, but the logic is the same:
since the 1970s, cities have competed fiercely for a share of the growing
market in tourism and entertainment, the “industry without a smokestack.” To
do so, they have spent huge amounts of public money for such things as
convention centers, sports stadiums, cultural institutions, and entertainment
districts. These kinds of activities, all devoted to the goal of promoting local
economic growth, are so central to what cities do that it would be impossible to
understand urban politics without taking them into account.
The imperative of governance arises from the social, racial, and ethnic
differences that have always characterized American society. America is a
nation of immigrants, and for most of the nation’s history, anxiety about the
newcomers has been a mainstay of local and, for that matter, national politics.
Attempts to curb immigration can be traced back to the 1830s, when the Irish
began coming to American shores in large numbers. Episodes of anti-
immigrant reaction have flared up from time to time ever since, especially
during times of economic stress. Ethnic and racial conflicts have been such a
constant feature of American politics that they have long shaped national
electoral and partisan alignments. This has been as true in recent decades as at
any time in the past. At the metropolitan level, bitter divisions have often pitted
central cities against suburbs, and one suburb against the next.
The extreme fragmentation of America’s metropolitan areas has its origins
in the process of suburbanization that began unfolding in the late nineteenth
century. For a long time, the term “urban” referred to the great cities of the
industrial era, their diverse mix of ethnic groups and social classes, and their
commanding national presence as centers of technology and economic
production. The second “urban” century was very different. Increasingly, the
cities of the industrial era became surrounded by rings of independent political
jurisdictions – what came to be called suburbs. Beginning as early as the
1920s, the great industrial cities centers went into a long slide even while the
suburbs around them prospered. Ultimately, an urban geography emerged that
was composed of a multitude of separate jurisdictions ranging from white and
wealthy to poor and minority, and everything in between. Recently the central
cities have begun to attract affluent (and especially younger) residents and the
suburbs have become more representative of American society as a whole.
Even so, a complicated mosaic of governments and even privatized gated
communities continue to be important features in the daily life of urban
residents: where people live greatly influences with whom they come into
contact with, their tax burdens and level of municipal services, and even their
political outlook. Within metropolitan areas there is not one urban community,
but many.
The three strands that compose city politics in America—the imperative of
economic growth, the challenge of governance, and the rise of the fragmented
metropolis—can be woven into a narrative that allows us to understand the
forces that have shaped American urban politics, both in the past and in our
own time. Reading a letter to the editor of the local newspaper protesting a
city’s tax subsidy for a new stadium (a clash of values typical of the politics of
growth); walking down a busy city street among people of every color and
national background (which serves as a reminder of the diversity that makes
governance a challenging task); entering a suburban gated community (and
thus falling under the purview of a privatized governing association, still
another of the many governing units that make up the metropolis): all of these
experiences remind us that there are consistent patterns and recurring issues
that shape the political dynamics of urban politics in America.
The politics of Growth
Local communities cannot be preserved without a measure of economic
vitality, and this is why growth and prosperity have always been among the
most important priorities for urban residents and their civic leaders. Founded
originally as centers of trade and commerce, the nation’s cities and towns came
into being as places where people could make money and find personal
opportunity. From the very beginning, European settlement in North America
involved schemes of town promotion. The first colony, Jamestown, founded in
1607, was the risky venture of a group of English entrepreneurs who
organized themselves into a joint stock company. Shares sold in London for
about $62 in gold. If the colony was successful, investors hoped to make a
profit, and of course the colonists themselves had gambled their very lives on
the success of the experiment. Likewise, three centuries later, when a flood of
people began spilling beyond the eastern seaboard into the frontier of the new
nation, they founded towns and cities as a way of making a personal bet on the
future prospects of a particular place. The communities that grew up prospered
if they succeeded in becoming the trading hub for a region and an export
platform for agricultural and finished goods moving into the national
economic system. For this reason, the nineteenth-century movement across the
continent placed towns at the leading edge of territorial expansion:
America was settled as a long, thin line of urban places, scattering outward and westward from the
Atlantic seaboard. The popular imagination has it that farmers came first and villages later. The
historian’s truth is that villages and towns came first, pulling farmers along to settle the land around
and between urban settlements.1
Each town was its own capitalist system in miniature, held together by the
activities of entrepreneurs in search of profit and personal advancement. The
restless pursuit of new opportunities encouraged the formation of what urban
historian Sam Bass Warner has called a national “culture of privatism,” which
stressed individual efforts and aspirations over collective or public purposes:
“[The] local politics of American cities have depended for their actors, and for
a good deal of their subject matter, on the changing focus of men’s private
economic activities.”2 The leading philosophy of the day promoted the idea
that by pursuing their own individual interests, people were also contributing
to the welfare of the community.
On the frontier, the founders of cities and the entrepreneurs who made their
money in them recognized that in order to ensure their mutual success, they
would have to take steps to promote their city and region. Local boosters
promoted their city’s real or imagined advantages—a harbor or strategic
location on a river, for example, or proximity to rich farming and mining
areas. They also boasted about local culture: music societies, libraries, and
universities. And they went further than boasting; they used the powers of city
government to promote local growth. Municipalities were corporations that
could be used to help finance a variety of local undertakings, from
subscriptions in railroad stock to improvements in harbors and docks. There
was broad support for such undertakings because citizens shared in the
perception that local economic vitality was absolutely necessary to advance the
well-being of the urban community and everyone in it.
Today, support for measures to promote the local economy continues to be
bound up with people’s attachments to place and community. Without jobs and
incomes, people simply cannot stay in the place that gives life to family,
neighborhood, and local identity. The environmental and social effects of the
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in the spring and summer of 2010 illustrate this
point. As the disaster unfolded, it seemed certain that thousands of jobs would
be lost in a long arc stretching from southern Louisiana to the Florida coast. At
the time, tourism was expected to drop by half on Florida’s Gulf Coast, costing
the state at least 200,000 jobs.3 In Louisiana, fishing, shellfish, and other
industries seemed to be on the verge of being wiped out. When people talked
about the disaster to news reporters, they spoke not only of the loss of
livelihood, but also, with great emotion, about its effect on family values and
community traditions—about the loss of a “way of life.”
No matter how calamitous, the oil spill was not likely to make coastal
communities disappear overnight, no matter how hard it may have been to
recover (fortunately, the long-term consequences of the spill were not as
severe as many feared). People identify with the community within which they
live, and they are often reluctant to move even in the face of genuine hardship.
The resilience of community was illustrated in the 1970s and 1980s when
massive losses of businesses and jobs hit the industrial heartland of the
Midwest and Northeast. The rapid deindustrialization of a vast region
threatened the existence of entire communities. The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
region experienced a 44 percent loss in manufacturing jobs from 1979 to
1988, three-quarters of them related to steel. Unemployment levels reached as
high as 20 percent, not only in Pittsburgh, but also in Detroit and several other
cities of the industrial belt.4 Some people fled for more prosperous areas of
the Sunbelt, but a great many of them elected to stay. Rather than giving up, in
city after city public leaders took measures to rebuild their economies; indeed,
in most places the cause of local renewal took on the character of a permanent
crusade. Communities of the Gulf Coast reacted in a similar way. People
resisted leaving; instead, they put their efforts into regenerating their local
economies and strengthening their communities because they were not willing
to abandon the traditions and cultures that brought meaning to their lives.
It might seem that the intimate connection between material well-being and
community identity would leave little room for disagreement over the premise
that cities must do everything they can do all the time to promote local
prosperity. But this commitment does not always translate into support for
every politician and developer ’s bright idea or ambitious proposal. Disputes
break out because policies to promote growth cannot benefit everyone equally;
they are not always sensible or plausible; and there are always winners and
losers. For renters and low-income residents, the gentrification of their
neighborhood may bring higher rents and home values that ultimately force
them to move. Growth in the downtown corporate and financial sectors may
create some high-paying jobs for educated professionals but leave many
central-city residents with low-paying jobs or on the unemployment rolls. A
downtown that encroaches on nearby neighborhoods may benefit the
businesses located in the new office towers but may also compromise the
quality of life for nearby residents. People who do not care about sports may
resent helping to pay for a new football stadium. Different perspectives such as
these explain why there is frequent disagreement about how to promote
growth, even though everyone believes that local prosperity is a good thing.
The use of eminent domain by local governments illustrates the kinds of
disputes that can divide communities. All across the nation, cities have
aggressively used their power to take private property for “higher uses” to
make way for big-box stores, malls, condominium projects, sports stadiums,
and a great many other initiatives. For most of the nation’s history, local
governments have possessed the authority to take property without the owners’
consent if it serves a legitimate public purpose.5 Public officials have liberally
interpreted this power as a useful tool for economic development, but
homeowners and small businesses who find their property condemned so that
it can be sold to a big developer look at it with a skeptical eye. On December
20, 2000, a group of homeowners led by Sussette Kelo filed a suit challenging
a decision by the city of New London, Connecticut, to cede its eminent domain
authority to a private corporation that wanted to raze their homes. Things came
to a head on June 23, 2005, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld lower court
rulings in favor of the development corporation. The Court’s decision ignited
a firestorm of protest that swept the nation. In response to the public furor, by
the fall of 2006, state legislatures in 30 states had enacted legislation to restrict
the use of eminent domain, and hundreds of towns and cities had done likewise.
In the fall elections of 2006, voters in 12 states passed referendums prohibiting
the taking of property for private development if it did not serve a clear public
purpose.6
The lesson from the Kelo v. New London case is that despite the fact that
almost everyone embraces the goal of local economic growth, sometimes the
policies to promote it clash with other values, such as individual property
rights, the health of a neighborhood, or a preference for less governmental
intrusion. Everyone may seem to share the same interest in promoting the
wellbeing of the urban community, but they frequently disagree over how to
make that happen.
The Politics of Governance
International migration is transforming societies around the globe, and the
United States is no exception. More immigrants came to the United States in the
1990s than in any previous decade in the nation’s history, and the flow has
continued into the twenty-first century. The social and political effects of large-
scale population movements are often on display in big global cities such as
Miami, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, and in many smaller places as
well. For this reason, in the global era, as in the past, city politics often pivots
around issues of racial and ethnic identity and feelings of community
solidarity at least as much as around issues of economic development.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, when colonial-era values still prevailed,
men of wealth and high social standing made most of the decisions for the
urban community. In the cities, “leadership fell to those who exercised
economic leadership. All leadership, political, social, economic, tended to
collect in the same set of hands.”7 Business owners, professionals, and
aristocrats ran municipal affairs without challenge. The members of this social
and political elite shared a mistrust of what Thomas Jefferson called
“mobocracy,” a word he used to signify his opposition to rule by popular
majority. Governance was remarkably informal. Local notables served on
committees formed to build public wharves, organize town watches, and build
and maintain public streets, and even the most essential services, such as crime
control and fire prevention, generally relied on the voluntary efforts of
citizens. Such a casual governmental structure fit the pace of life and the social
intimacy of small communities.
By the industrial era of the 1850s, cities were growing at breakneck speed,
and they were also becoming socially stratified and ethnically complex. Waves
of immigrants were crowding into densely packed neighborhoods. They came
from an astonishing variety of national cultures, from England, Ireland,
Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and later from Italy and a broad swath of
eastern European countries. From time to time, ethnic tensions rose to a fever
pitch, and tipped over into violence time and again. In the industrial cities, the
colonial-era style of politics could not survive the change, and in time, a new
generation of urban leaders came onto the scene. They came from the
immigrant precincts and entered politics by mobilizing the vote of the urban
electorate. Their rise to power set off decades of conflict between wealthy and
middle-class elites and the immigrants and their leaders, a story we tell in
Chapters 3 and 4.
In the twentieth century, large movements of people continued to flood into
the cities, but the ethnic and racial composition of these urban migrations
changed dramatically. The immigrant flood tide ended in the early 1920s,
when Congress enacted legislation that nearly brought foreign immigration to
a halt. By then, however, a massive internal population movement was already
picking up speed. In the first three decades of the twentieth century and again in
the years following World War II, millions of African Americans fled the
hostile culture of the South for jobs and opportunity in the industrial cities.
They were joined by successive waves of destitute whites fleeing the
unemployment and poverty of Appalachia and other depressed areas, and by
Mexicans crossing the border to escape violence and poverty in their own
country. These streams of migration virtually guaranteed that twentieth-century
urban America would be riddled with violent racial conflict. One consequence
of the rising tensions in the cities is that millions of white families left their
inner-city neighborhoods and fled to the suburbs. A social and racial chasm
soon separated cities from suburbs, and echoes of that period continue to
reverberate to this day.
A vivid example of the continuing racial divide was on display in New
Orleans in the late summer of 2005. When the storm surge from Hurricane
Katrina breached the dikes surrounding New Orleans on August 29, 2005, 80
percent of the city was flooded and nearly 100,000 people were left to deal
with the consequences. Wrenching images of human suffering filled television
news programs: 25,000 people trying to live under impossible conditions in
the Superdome, 20,000 more in the Convention Center, residents fleeing
across bridges and overpasses and desperately waving from rooftops. More
than 1.5 million people were displaced, 60,000 homes were destroyed, and
1,300 people died.8 African American neighborhoods located on the lowest
and least desirable parts of the city bore the brunt of the destruction. The racial
segregation that made this possible is a legacy of New Orleans’ past, and
despite the civil rights advances that protect the rights of minorities to live
where they choose to, it is a pattern that has not disappeared—in New Orleans
or anywhere else.
In the meantime, bitter conflicts have, once again, broken out over foreign
immigration. The massive flows of immigrants in recent decades have made
cities culturally and socially dynamic places, but they have also meant that
ethnic identity has continued to fuel conflict in national and city politics. The
passage of Senate Bill 1070 by the Arizona Senate on April 23, 2010,
provoked a furious reaction across the country. The Arizona law authorized
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For some time the party devoted their time to exploring their
immediate surroundings, in a land which appeared to them a haven
of rest and of surpassing loveliness. They penetrated into forests of
great extent, to points on the mountain-tops from whence a
succession of wooded ravines and steep mountain-sides, clothed
with a luxuriant and ever-verdant vegetation, delighted their eyes;
the mountain streams giving life to a scene where, except only for
the songs of countless birds and the hum of insect life, all was still.
No four-legged animals or reptiles were to be seen. Fruits in
abundance seemed as if awaiting them, and in the crannies of the
rocks they found honey possessing the odour of violets. An opening
in the extensive woods, which was encircled by laurels and flowering
shrubs, presented an inviting retreat, and a tree of dense shade, the
probable growth of ages, offered a verdant canopy of impenetrable
foliage. In this spot they determined to form a residence from the
abundant materials with which Nature supplied them. This state of
innocent happiness was not destined to last long, as, though
apparently serenely contented with their surroundings as long as the
vessel anchored close at hand suggested a possible retreat and
return to the outer world, disaster befell them, for one night a storm
arose and their ship was driven out to sea. This calamity so greatly
distressed the fair lady that she became completely prostrated by
the shock, and in a few days she died in her lover’s arms. Machim, in
his turn, died of grief a few days after, having spent the intervening
time in erecting a memorial to his much-loved Anna. The dying man
dictated an inscription recording their sad story, concluding with a
request that if any Christians should at any future time form a
settlement in that island, they would erect a church over their graves
and dedicate it to the Redeemer of Mankind, a request which, it will
be seen, was afterwards carried out, when “Machim’s tree” was
supposed to have furnished sufficient material for the building of the
whole chapel.
On the morning of June 14, 1419, having anchored for the night in
a sheltered bay, which exactly corresponded with the description
given by Morales, who accompanied the expedition, of Machim and
Anna’s resting-place, Zargo and some of his followers landed—and
this is the first authentic account of the discovery of Madeira.
The party spent some days exploring this rich and fertile
acquisition to the Crown of Portugal, and on July 2 Zargo,
accompanied by two priests who formed part of the expedition, held
a ceremonious service of thanksgiving for the discovery of the island,
taking formal possession of it in the name of the King of Portugal.
Mass was celebrated and a service was held on the spot which was
supposed to be the grave of the two lovers. The final ceremony
consisted in the laying of the foundation-stone of a chapel
dedicated, in accordance with Machim’s request, to the Redeemer of
Mankind.
Santa Cruz was so named because at this spot the party found
some large trees lying on the shore, torn up by the elements, out of
which they formed a large wooden cross. Porto do Seixo owes its
name to the freshness and purity of its spring water, for which it is
still famous; and the explorers were so struck by the great springs of
pure water which gush out of a grand mass of rock, that they took
back with them to Portugal a bottle of the water as an offering to
Prince Henry.
From this point they saw a fine expanse of country, and at once
settled that this would be the best spot on which to build the future
city. As the district was remarkable for the thick growth of fennel,
which in Portuguese is called funcho, the site of the new town
received the name of Funchal.
Ribeiro des Soccoridos (river of the rescued) was the name given
to a place where two of the party lost their footing whilst attempting
to cross a river, and would have been swept into the sea if their
companions had not come to their rescue. Praya Formoso was aptly
named “beautiful shore.” The extent of their wanderings on this
occasion seems to have led them to the great cliff which towers
some 2,000 feet above the sea, so they named the cape Cabo Girao.
Having been startled by seeing some seals leaping out of caves in a
bay before they approached the great cliff, they named the spot
Camara do Lobos, or Wolves’ Lair, which is the site of the
picturesque village which was afterwards built in the sheltered
situation.
The year 1826 was a troublous time for Madeira, as the island did
not escape the civil war which raged in Portugal in consequence of
the Miguelite insurrection. Property was confiscated, the owners
being thankful if they escaped with their lives; and even after the
country had resumed the monarchy, it took some years before the
island returned to its former tranquillity and prosperity.
THE END
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