VOL.

191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 429

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 84873. November 16, 1990.

ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER

TRADING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, FISCAL
ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE
331st PC COMPANY, BACOLOD CITY, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrant; Right

against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed under Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.—The right against unreason-

_______________

20 Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80030, promulgated on October 26,
1989, 6.

* FIRST DIVISION.

430

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

able searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights),
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; The issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause; Probable cause defined; Requisites.—
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984,
133 SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the x x witnesses
personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination
must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The opinion or finding of probable cause
must to a certain degree be substantiated or supported by the record.—It
has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree
upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna
v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding
of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be substantiated or supported by
the record.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirement mandated by the law
and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the
warrant was not sufficiently complied with; Case at bar.—In this case, We
find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge
must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not
sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any
searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only
part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the
application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed
questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a
robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and
control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be
issued.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To establish probable cause, the
examination must be probing and exhaustive not merely routinary or pro
forma.—“It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and

431

VOL. 191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 431

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause
is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.”
Same; Same; Same; The law requires that the articles sought to be
seized must be described with particularity.—Another infirmity of Search
Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the articles sought to
be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the
warrant, to wit: “NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line
accessories” are so general that the searching team can practically take half
of the business of Kener Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as
alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent Court of Appeals and
which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of
buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories
and empty bottles.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Items described in the application do not
fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.—Far more important is that
the items described in the application do not fall under the list of personal
property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition
alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense;
b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense;
and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
Same; Same; Same; In issuing a search warrant, the Judge must
strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the Statutory
provisions.—“Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly
comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights
secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.”
Same; Same; Same; Use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to
an invalid search warrant enjoined by Section 3 (2), Article III of the
Constitution; Return of the Articles seized to petitioner is proper.—Finally,
the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC

432

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet

angular bar (p. 21, Record). There is no showing that the possession thereof
is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is proper. Also,
the use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid search
warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ledesma, Guinez, Causing, Espino & Serfino Law Office for
petitioner.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision
(pp. 38-42, Rollo) of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed
the orders dated August 24, 1987 (p. 43, Record) and October 14,
1987, (pp. 53-54, Record) of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental in Criminal Case No. 5657.
 On February 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-
in-Charge of the Philippine Constabulary-Criminal Investigation
Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an application for a search
warrant, alleging:

“x x x.
“That he was informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who
may be found at KENER TRADING located at Rizal Street corner Lacson
Street, Bacolod City has/have in her/his/their possession and control the
following property/ies, to wit:

“NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires

and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories

which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises above mentioned.

“The undersigned has verified the report and found it to be the fact and
has therefore reasons to believe that a SEARCH WARRANT should be
issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession
and bring the following described property/ies, to wit:

“NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires

and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.

433

VOL. 191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 433

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

“WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays this Honorable Court to issue a

SEARCH WARRANT commanding any peace officer to search the
premises/house described in this application and to seize and bring to this
Honorable Court the person/property/ies above-mentioned to be dealt with
as the law may direct. Bacolod City, Philippines
Feb. 4, 1987 _______.

SGD. FELIPE L. ROJAS, JR.

ILT, PC
OIC, PFOCIS, Bacolod City”

(p. 18, Records)

The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D.

Magallanes of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City and
supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L.
Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation)
and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City, quoted as
follows:

“We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after having been duly
sworn to, testify as follows:

“1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal

circumstances?
“ANSWER: IGNACIO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an
employee of NAPOCOR and presently residing at Eroreco
Subdivision, Bacolod City and AIA EDUARDO ABAJA, CIS,
regular member of the CO/INP CIS Command, Bacolod City.
“2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KEN-NETH
SIAO located at Rizal Street, near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?
“ANSWER: Yes, Sir.
“3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said
KENNETH SIAO who may be found in the said premises/house
has/ have in his/her/their possession and control the following
property, to wit:
“NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly,
aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line
accessories?
“ANSWER: Yes, sir.
“4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described
property/ies is/are being kept in said premises /house?

434

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

“ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were able to

purchase some of these items.
“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands and
affixed our signature this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.

“SGD. IGNACIO L. REYES SGD. EDUARDO J. ABAJA

Affiant Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at
Bacolod City, Philippines.

SGD. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES

Judge
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
BACOLOD CITY”

(p. 19, Record)

On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge

Magallanes issued Search Warrant No. 181, commanding the search
of the property described in the warrant.
Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City
conducted a search of the premises described in the search warrant
and seized the following articles, to wit: 1) 272 kilos of galvanized
bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The
receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked
“from Kenneth Siao” (p. 21, Record).
 A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)
was filed against Kenneth Siao with the office of the City Fiscal by
the National Power Corporation. Thereafter, Siao filed a counter-
affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all his rights
and ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle
Pendon. In a resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated May 18, 1987, the
office of the City Fiscal recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation
against petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24, Record) for
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against petitioner and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5657 of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental. The case was raffled to Branch 47 of the same
court presided over by respondent Judge Enrique T. Jocson.

435

VOL. 191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 435

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an

application for the return of the articles seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record) on the ground that the said
search warrant was illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an
opposition to the application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application
was subsequently amended to an application for quashal of the
illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized by virtue thereof (pp. 33-38, Records).
On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order
impliedly denying the application for the quashal of the search
warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the issuance
thereof. The order states:

“Counsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in open court that at
least one of the seized items bears the identifying mark of the complainant
National Power Corporation, and there being no statement that the seized
items were acquired in usual course of business for value, this court is
constrained to have the case tried without resolving whether or not the
questioned search warrant was issued validly.” (p. 43, Records)

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was

denied on October 14, 1987 (p. 11, Rollo).
On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a
restraining order, assailing the legality of search warrant No. 181
and praying for the permanent prohibition against the use in
evidence of the articles and properties seized and the return thereof
to petitioner. On April 4, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The appellate court found the existence of a
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The
respondent court held:

“x x x
 “For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the validity of the issuance of the Search Warrant No. 181 and to
sustain further the ruling of the respondent trial court in denying the petition
for the return of the articles and personal properties seized thereunder.
“WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs

436

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

against petitioner. The previous order to maintain the status quo is hereby
withdrawn and set aside.
“SO ORDERED.” (p. 41, Rollo)

The motion for reconsideration of the above decision filed by

petitioner on May 2, 1988 was denied in a resolution (p. 49, Rollo)
dated July 21, 1988.
The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 181. It is the contention of petitioner
that the application for the search warrant and the joint deposition of
the witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed
by the Constitution and the rules.
The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the
joint deposition of Abaja and Reyes failed to comply with the
requisites of searching questions and answers. The joint deposition
of the witnesses showed that the questions therein were pretyped,
mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-
in. No examination of the applicant and of the joint deponents was
personally conducted by Judge Magallanes as required by law and
the rules.
Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of
Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither
of the affiants had personal knowledge that any specific offense was
committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were
stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth Siao.
Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of
polemics, that the articles belong to the latter, his Constitutional
right prevails over that of NAPOCOR.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines which provides:

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

437
 VOL. 191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 437
Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is

justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a
search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
(Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133
SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the x x
witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3)
the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v.
Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647). These
requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: “Sec. 4. Examination of
complain-ant; record.—The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.”
It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to
a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting
the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968),
however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain
degree, be substantiated or supported by the record.
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law
and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers
before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The
applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge
Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the
applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before
Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions,
none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a
robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession
and control of the person against whom the search warrant was
sought to be

438

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25,
1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No.
50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant himself
was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only “to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit)
and only because the application was not yet subscribed and sworn
to,” We held that:

“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.’
“x x x
“It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive,
not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents
of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification
of the application.” (italics supplied; p. 695)

Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses

presented by the applicant can hardly satisfy the same requirement.
The public respondent prosecutor admitted in his memorandum that
the questions propounded were pre-typed.
The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was
violation of the anti-fencing law which punishes the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
(Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The four (4) questions propounded could
hardly support a finding of probable cause. The first question was on
the personal circumstances of the deponents. The second and third
were leading questions answerable by yes or no. The fourth question
was on how the deponents knew about their answers in the second
and third questions. The judge could have exploited this last ques-

439

VOL. 191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 439

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

tion to convince himself of the existence of a probable cause but he

did not. There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the
articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge
that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be
seized were the proceeds thereof. It was not even shown what
connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading or with the
premises sought to be searched. By and large, neither the application
nor the joint deposition provided facts or circumstance which could
lead a prudent man to believe that an offense had been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any, are
in the possession of the person named in the application.

“x x x [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search

warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion
of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to
believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one
authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination
or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even
be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough
and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and
must be in writing. (Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA
388) (italics supplied)

And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162
SCRA 467, 483:

“As held in Nolasco v. Paño No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 163),
the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant’s
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and
conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.”

Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The

law requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described
with particularity. The items listed in the warrant, to

440

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

wit: “NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive

assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and
line accessories” are so general that the searching team can
practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises
searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner’s petition before
respondent Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by
respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap
metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the application
do not fall under the list of personal property which may be seized
under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that
the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b)
stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an
offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing
an offense.
It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about
the existence of probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant.
In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of
his motion to quash and application for articles seized by virtue of
search warrant No. 181, he stated:

“The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for search
warrant in the lower court is cured by the admission for the accused of
counsel that at least one of the items seized bore the identifying mark of
complainant National Power Corporation and the failure to aver in the
quashal motion and in the open hearing that the seized items themselves
were acquired in the usual course of business for value in good faith.
However, this order is without prejudice to the right of the accused to pursue
against the administrative liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes
Magallanes.” (p. 54, Rollo)

In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles

seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181 was taken from the
possession of petitioner who signed the receipt in behalf of Kener
Trading, which possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D. 1612,
which states:

“Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing.—Mere possession of any goods, article,

item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of

441

VOL. 191, NOVEMBER 16, 1990 441

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.”

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner

may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in
the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128
SCRA 388:

“x x x that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the
fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been
said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:

‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and
scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.”

“Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with
the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it.”
 Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC
Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2
feet angular bar (p. 21, Record). There is no showing that the
possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to
petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized
pursuant to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby
rendered: 1) declaring Search Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge
Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2) ordering the return
of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner;
and 3) permanently enjoining respondents

442

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pendon vs. Court of Appeals

from using in evidence the articles seized by virtue of Search

Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino,

JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Note.—Search warrant must satisfy the requirements of the Bill

of Rights. (Olaes vs. People, 155 SCRA 486.)

——o0o——

443

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