Cover


 Cyber Physical Systems
Cyber physical system (CPS) is an integration of computation, networking, and physical
processes: the combination of several systems of different natures whose main purpose is
to control a physical process and, through feedback, adapt itself to new conditions in real
time. Cyber Physical System: Concepts and Applications includes in-depth coverage of the lat-
est models and theories that unify perspectives.
It expresses the interacting dynamics of the computational and physical components of
a system in a dynamic environment.

Key Features

• Covers automatic application of software countermeasures against physical

attacks and impact of cyber physical system on Industry 4.0
• Explains how formal models provide mathematical abstractions to manage the
complexity of a system design
• Offers a rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the principles of design,
specification, modeling, and analysis of cyber physical systems
• Discusses the multiple domains where cyber physical system has a vital impact
and provides knowledge about the use of specialized models that serve as math-
ematical abstractions to control the complexities of a system’s architecture
• Provides the rapidly expanding field of cyber physical systems with a long-needed
foundational text by a panel of domain experts

This book is primarily aimed at advanced undergraduates and graduates of computer sci-
ence. Engineers will also find this book useful.
 Chapman & Hall/CRC Cyber-Physical Systems

SERIES EDITORS:

Jyotir Moy Chatterjee

Lord Buddha Education Foundation, Kathmandu, Nepal
Vishal Jain
Sharda University, Greater Noida, India
Cyber-Physical Systems: A Comprehensive Guide
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Introduction to the Cyber Ranges
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Security Analytics: A Data Centric Approach to Information Security
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Cyber Security Applications for Industry 4.0
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Cyber Physical Systems: Concepts and Applications
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 Cyber Physical Systems
Concepts and Applications

Edited by
Anupam Baliyan, Kuldeep Singh Kaswan,
Naresh Kumar, Kamal Upreti, and Ramani Kannan
First edition published 2023
by CRC Press
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and by CRC Press

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Names: Baliyan, Anupam, 1976- editor. | Kaswan, Kuldeep Singh, editor. | Kumar, Naresh, 1983- editor. |
Upreti, Kamal, editor. | Kannan, Ramani, editor.
Title: Cyber physical systems: concepts and applications / edited by Anupam Baliyan, Kuldeep Singh Kaswan,
Naresh Kumar, Kamal Upreti, Ramani Kannan. Other titles: Cyber physical systems (CRC Press: 2023)
Description: First edition. | Boca Raton : Chapman & Hall/CRC Press, 2023. | Series: Chapman & Hall/CRC
cyber-physical systems | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2022041539 (print) | LCCN 2022041540 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032116044 (hardback) | ISBN
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ISBN: 978-1-032-11604-4 (hbk)

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ISBN: 978-1-003-22066-4 (ebk)

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664

Typeset in Palatino
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents

Preface............................................................................................................................................. vii
About the Editors............................................................................................................................ix
List of Contributors.........................................................................................................................xi

1 Digital Flow-Based Cyber-Physical Microfluidic Biochips............................................ 1

Jagjit Singh Dhatterwal and Anupam Baliyan

2 Reliability Driven and Dynamic Re-synthesis of Error Recovery in

Cyber-Physical Biochips......................................................................................................15
Jagjit Singh Dhatterwal, Anupam Baliyan, and Om Prakash

3 Online Decision-Making-Based Cyber-Physical Optimization in

PCR Biochips..........................................................................................................................35
Piyush Parkash, Nitin, and Shalini Singh

4 Security and Privacy Aspects of Cyber Physical Systems............................................53

Chhavi Sharma

5 Challenges in the Taxonomy of Cyber-Physical Security and Trust.......................... 67

Piyush Parkash, Nitin, and Shalini Singh

6 Cyber Physical Systems in Supply Chain Management...............................................85

Rajbala, Pawan Kumar Singh, and Avadhesh Kumar

7 Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems.......................................... 111

Himanshu, Bharti Nagpal, Ram Shringar Rao, and Shobha Bhatt

8 The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems on Industrial

Development.........................................................................................................................125
Sanjay Kumar, Sahil Kansal, Kuldeep Singh Kaswan, Vishnu Sharma, Javed Miya, and
Naresh Kumar

9 Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems............................................ 141

Umesh Kumar Singh, Abhishek Sharma, Suyash Kumar Singh, Pragya Singh Tomar,
Keerti Dixit, and Kamal Upreti

10 Cyber Physical System Approach for Smart Farming and Challenges

in Adoption........................................................................................................................... 165
Rajesh Kumar, Amit Pandey, and Kuldeep Singh Kaswan

Index.............................................................................................................................................. 177

 v
Preface

Cyber physical system (CPS) is an integration of computation, networking, and physical

processes: the combination of several systems of different natures whose main purpose is
to control a physical process and, through feedback, adapt itself to new conditions in real
time. This book includes an in-depth coverage of the latest models and theories that unify
perspectives, expressing the interacting dynamics of the computational and physical com-
ponents of a system in a dynamic environment.
This book focuses on the new design, analysis, and verification tools that embody the
scientific principles of CPS and incorporate measurement, dynamics, and control. It also
covers the application of CPS in numerous sectors, including agriculture, energy, trans-
portation, building design and automation, healthcare, and manufacturing. This book
presents an in-depth review of the state of the art of cyber physical systems and their
applications, reviews the design challenges of CPS, and evaluates their impact on systems
and software engineering.
The book addresses foundational issues central across CPS applications, including sys-
tem design: how to design CPS to be safe, secure, and resilient in rapidly evolving envi-
ronments; system verification: how to develop effective metrics and methods to verify and
certify large and complex CPSs; real-time control and adaptation: how to achieve real-time
dynamic control and behavior adaptation in diverse environments, and role of CPS in
Industry 4.0.

vii
About the Editors

Anupam Baliyan serves as an Additional Director (Engineering) in

the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University
Institute of Engineering, Chandigarh University, Mohali, Punjab. He
has more than 22 years of experience in academics. Baliyan obtained
his MCA from Gurukul Kangari University, Haridwar, and his MTech
(CSE) and PhD (CSE) from Banasthali University, Rajasthan. He has
published more than 30 research papers in various international
journals indexed at Scopus and ESI. He is a lifetime member of CSI
and ISTE. He has chaired many sessions at international conferences
across India. Baliyan has published some edited books and chapters.
He is also the assistant editor of some journals that are Scopus indexed. His research area
includes algorithms, machine learning, wireless networks, and AI.

Kuldeep Singh Kaswan is a Professor in the School of Computing Sciences and Engineering,
Galgotias University, Uttar Pradesh. He received a doctorate in Computer Science under the
Faculty of Computer Science at Banasthali Vidyapith, Rajasthan. He obtained his master’s in
Computer Science and Engineering from Choudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa (Haryana).
He is also a member of the Computer Science Teacher Association (CSTA), New York, USA;
International Association of Engineers (IAENG), Hong Kong; International Association of
Computer Science and Information Technology (IACSIT), USA; professional member of
Association of Computing Machinery, USA, and IEEE; and life member of Computer Society
of India, India. His areas of interest include IoT, machine learning, and soft computing. He
has a number of publications in international/national journals and conferences to his credit.

Naresh Kumar is a Professor in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering,

GL Bajaj Institute of Technology and Management, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India.
He has 15 years of experience in teaching and research. He received his PhD in Computer
Engineering from the University Institute of Engineering and Technology, Maharishi
Dayanand University, Rohtak, Haryana. He completed his MTech in Computer Science
and Engineering from Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, Thanesar, Haryana, in 2004.
He has presented several papers at international conferences and published work in peer-
reviewed and Science Citation Index (SCI) journals. Kumar has also authored a book titled
Objective Computer Science: Training Minds and Creating Opportunities (Inkart Publishing). He
is an active reviewer for many top journals of IEEE, IET, and Springer. He is also a Cisco-
certified trainer for Cisco Network Security, CCNA, and CyberOps. His area of research
covers information extraction, big data analytics, and computer networking.

Kamal Upreti is an Associate Professor in the Department of

Computer Science & Engineering, Dr. Akhilesh Das Gupta Institute
of Technology & Management (formerly NIEC), affiliated with Guru
Govind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi. He is a corporate
trainer in HCL in the field of cyber security and data science. He
completed his BTech (hons) from UPTU, MTech (gold medalist) from
Galgotias University, PGDM (Executive) from IMT Ghaziabad, and
PhD in Computer Science and Engineering from OPJ University.

ix
x About the Editors

He has obtained 30+ patents and published 30+ books, 32+ magazine issues, and 40+
research papers in various international conferences and reputed journals. His areas of
interest are physics, cyber security, machine learning, wireless networking, embedded
system, and cloud computing. He has years of experience in corporate and teaching expe-
rience in engineering colleges.
He worked with HCL, NECHCL, The Hindustan Times, Dehradun Institute of Technology,
and Delhi Institute of Advanced Studies, with more than 15+ years of enriching experience
in research, academics, and corporate sector. He also worked with NECHCL in Japan in the
project “Hydrastore,” funded by a joint collaboration between HCL and NECHCL. Upreti
worked on a government project—“Integrated Power Development Scheme (IPDS)”—
launched by the Ministry of Power, Government of India, with the objective of strengthen-
ing the sub-transmission and distribution network in the urban areas. He has served as
a session chairperson at national, international conferences and as a keynote speaker in
various platforms such as skill-based training, corporate trainer, guest faculty, and fac-
ulty development programs. He has been awarded with the titles of the best teacher, best
researcher, extra-academic performer, and was also a gold medalist in his MTech program.
He has published patents, books, magazine issues, and research papers in various
national, international conferences and peer-reviewed journals. His research area includes
cyber security, data analytics, wireless networking, embedded system, neural network,
and artificial Intelligence.

Ramani Kannan obtained his PhD in power electronics and drives, Anna University,
Chennai; ME in power electronics and drives, Anna University; and BE in electronics and
communication, Bharathiyar University, Coimbatore.
Kannan has teaching, administration, and research experience in the past decade work-
ing in K.S. Rangasamy College of Technology, Tiruchengode, Tamil Nadu. He is currently
working in Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering at Universiti Teknologi
PETRONAS, Perak, Malaysia.
Career Achievements:

• Career Award for Young Teachers (CAYT) from AICTE, New Delhi in the year
2013–2014
• Best Teacher Award (2010–2011) at K.S. Rangasamy College of Technology,
Tiruchengode
• Outstanding Teacher Award for 100% results produced: 13 times in university and
end semester results
• Outside Interaction Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Asian Scientific Research (Online
ISSN: 2223-1331 Print ISSN: 2226-5724); REGIONAL EDITORS SOUTH-ASIA
International Journal of Computer Aided Engineering and Technology, Inderscience
publisher (Scopus index) ISSN online: 1757-2665
List of Contributors

Abhishek Sharma Nitin

Vikram University, India PDM University, India

Anupam Baliyan Pawan Kumar singh

Chandigarh University, Punjab Galgotias University, India

Amit Pandey Pragya Singh Tomar

Bule Hora University, Ethiopia Vikram University, India

Avadhesh Kumar Piyush Parkash

Galgotias University, India PDM University, India

Bharti Nagpal Ram Shringar Rao

Netaji Subhas University of Technology, Netaji Subhas University of Technology,
India India

Chhavi Sharma Rajbala

Abdul Kalam Technical University, Galgotias University, India
India
Rajesh Kumar
Himanshu JECRC University, India
Netaji Subhas University of Technology,
India Sanjay Kumar
Galgotias University, India
Javed Miya
Galgotias College of Engineering and Shobha Bhatt
Technology, India Netaji Subhas University of Technology,
India
Jagjit Singh Dhatterwal
Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Shalini Singh
Foundation, India PDM University, India

Kamal Upreti Suyash Kumar Singh

Dr. Akhilesh Das Gupta Institute of University of Connecticut, USA
Technology and Management, India
Sahil Kansal
Keerti Dixit Jagan Institute of Management Studies,
Vikram University, India India

Kuldeep Kaswan Umesh Kumar Singh

Galgotias University, India Vikram University, India

Naresh Kumar Vishnu Sharma

Galgotias University, India Galgotias University, India

xi
1
Digital Flow-Based Cyber-Physical
Microfluidic Biochips

Jagjit Singh Dhatterwal and Anupam Baliyan

CONTENTS
1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 What Is Microfluidics.............................................................................................................2
1.2.1 Significance of Microfluidic Biochips......................................................................3
1.2.2 Intelligent Control Cyber-Physical Integration...................................................... 3
1.2.3 Techniques of CAD..................................................................................................... 4
1.2.4 Level of Design............................................................................................................4
1.2.5 Applications of Microfluidics.................................................................................... 5
1.3 Manipulation of DMFB Encapsulation................................................................................ 6
1.3.1 Electro Wetting-On-Dielectric-Based Microfluidic Chips....................................6
1.3.2 Generation of High Complexity in Microfluidics.................................................. 7
1.3.3 Error Recovery in Microfluidic Chips...................................................................... 7
1.3.4 Direct Addressing in DMFBs.................................................................................... 8
1.3.5 Commercialization of Digital Microfluidic Technology....................................... 8
1.3.6 Open-Source DMFB Synthesis.................................................................................. 8
1.4 Large Scale of Flow-Based Microfluidic Biochips..............................................................9
1.4.1 Model of Biochip......................................................................................................... 9
1.4.2 Building Block of Microvalves................................................................................ 10
1.4.3 Fully Programmable Flow of Valve Arrays.......................................................... 10
1.4.4 Protocols of Routing Crossbars............................................................................... 10
1.4.5 Commercialization of Microfluidic Technologies................................................ 11
1.5 Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 11
References........................................................................................................................................ 11

1.1 Introduction
A cyber-physical microfluidic biochip (CPMB) is essentially a fluid handling system at its
heart. Microfluidic refers to the existence of microliters or smaller fluid sizes. Microfluidics
apply more generally to various methods used to manipulate such small-scale fluids. Such
developments are multidisciplinary and encompass, for one thing, the areas of polymer
science, mechanics, electro-technology, biotechnology, and computer design. Microfluidic
fluid processing is also called a “biochip” or a “microfluidic framework.” “Microfluidic
device” refers to electronic components, while “bio” refers to biochemical applications.
Cyber physical system occurs when detectors, transducers, and controls are included
to expand microfluidic biochip technologies significantly. All of this may together be
DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-1 1
2 Cyber Physical Systems

referred to as a microfluidic cyber-physical device or network, which, where applicable, is

the language used. We can use CPMB to refer to the whole system, but in particular, one
must be well prepared for the optimal device with all these modules: a lightweight and
user-friendly platform for experimental procedures. For example, terms like micro-total-
analytical systems (μTAS), lab-on-an-chip (LOC), and sampling-to-answer methods are
often interchangeable terms with microfluidics.
In this part, we study the CPMB technologies. In this work, we are focusing on two
strategies suggested that supply cyber-physical integration and design automation tech-
nologies, while there are several ways to control low amounts of fluid: digital microfluidic
biochips (DMFBs) and fluidic microfluidic biochips (FMFBs).

1.2 What Is Microfluidics
Just the size of the controlled fluids is the literal description of microfluidics. The word in
terms of application specifics is also vague since various technologies can conduct fluid
manipulation on a small scale. The limitless advantages of the scale guided the invention
of microfluidics into the sub-microliters field by conventional clinical laboratories:

• Sample and reagent use decreased: Several systems test samples or manipulate
them with many reagents. The reduction in fluid intake to lower volumes inevita-
bly reduces. This is appealing because ingredients can be hard to acquire and even
more challenging to substitute samples.
• Improved output: A high-volume surface-to-area ratio allows greater temperature
control, which results in increased resolution and sensitivity performance [1].
• Low power consumption: Low mass ensures that the movement of fluids needs
less force. Tools configured for compact and remote operation or operation with
low power consumption gain also enables a closer integration of the physical
device, as it means less cell heating and less energy transfer. Surplus heating can
also conflict with the testing process.
• Transportation: Another small-scale natural by-product. Unfortunately, the por-
tability bottleneck has proven to be the supporting hardware for the microfluidic
biochip operation [2].
• Physical impacts: Fluids in small sizes are subject to laminar flow instead of tur-
bulent flow. This is to the benefit of the microfluidic biochip builder since fluid
movements can be predicted and monitored more effectively. Surface/interface
stress, capillary pressures, and fluid movement across channels dominate in the
microscale [3].
• Automation: Typical lab practices require comprehensive human workflow inter-
ference, including installation and movement of measurements and reagents
between different instruments. Scaling enables the convergence of several other
device elements into one substratum, reducing the need for human interaction
while still allowing increasingly sophisticated protocols to be implemented.

The important point [4] is about how molecular research, biodefense, molecular genetics,
and microscopy applied to microfluidics as we know it today, from the fascinating topic of
Cyber-Physical Microfluidic Biochips 3

view of the growth of microfluidics. The fluid processing methods are substantially dif-
ferent, such as document [5] droplets and auditory activation, reaction kinetics [7]. These
developments do not feature in this paper. Despite all this diversity, the subjects of the rest
of this segment can still be discussed in the type of information system.

1.2.1 Significance of Microfluidic Biochips

The ideal version shape of a microfluidic system and its application in the real world are
significantly different at the moment. The ideal can be thought of as a Star Trek diagnostics
tricorder: portable, inexpensive, non-invasive, all of which can detect a specimen to pro-
vide the testing at quicker response times. The reality is that they are mainly cumbersome
experimental interfaces. There are also certain implementations as a wick that require
the proper functioning of several external laboratory instruments. This limits their use as
natural laboratory on-chip platforms. Devices without this restriction are autonomous and
can be labeled by their actuation mechanism [8].

• Passive, personality microfluidic biochips use capillary flow and colorimetric

sensing systems with no international support capability. Examples of passive
microfluidics and home blood transfusion are their versatility and precision have
brought enormous, colossal success.
• Hand powered devices require human intervention, either pressed, piped, or
squeezed blister packs, to supply the primary driver. Active systems use mechani-
cal sensors, actuators, pumps, and controls to simplify fluid handling.

For example, many compute clusters use humans to pipette them into a cartridge and load
them into an automatic processing system. Computer operating systems may have hybrid
properties. The main subject of this book is microfluidic biochips that are involved. In
some cases, we study them as they already exist now, but in others, we intend them to be
completely self-contained structures into eventual deployment.

1.2.2 Intelligent Control Cyber-Physical Integration

A biochip includes only the substratum for manipulating fluids. This is sufficient to
achieve the necessary flexibility for specific devices, such as those dependent on blood
capillary acceleration. But cyber-physical integration, including the use of physiological,
behavioral manipulation sensors, actuation, and communication systems, is essential for
more group projects on DMFBs and FMFBs [9].
The sensor’s feedback and monitoring will work together to execute scattering deci-
sions in the provisional protocol, an equipment issue or a mistake like an inadequate
mix [10], or carry out corrective measures. Cyber-physical convergence also allows for
the communication of CPMBs to other computers. Transfer information recorded and
edited on-field for review. This opens up known vulnerabilities and is the subject of
the following chapter.
For example, sensors for CPMBs include spectroscopy detectors, cameras, and, at times,
patented designs like Nanopore Technology from Oxford that detects shifts in the current
as particles go through a nano-free hole. Sensors may be built into the biochip in specific
ways. However, these elements and the interface require equipment greater than the size
of the chip to be incorporated for the charge of fluids in the biosensor. This is due to the
design of the commonly used techniques used in biochips. In contrast, initial experiments
4 Cyber Physical Systems

for the manufacture of silicon-borrowed microfluidics are now widely used in PDMS and
low-cost PCB production of polydimethylsiloxane.

1.2.3 Techniques of CAD

• Growth of computer-aided control strategies, progressively advanced methods,

and protocols for fluid handling have partly influenced the systems engineering
community with tremendous achievements [11]. Manual design and monoto-
nous operating solutions support some of these technologies, while others can be
designed to enable high-performance, increased applications. The CAD commu-
nity for microfluidics is too large to explain here and perhaps outside the reach of
this text, but we make some significant contributions. Architectural synthesis: The
challenge of creating a biochip architecture that meets those performance targets
can be addressed with metaheuristic methods such as taboo searching and com-
putational annealing [12].
• Fault-tolerance and reliability: A variety of failure modes affect microfluidic sys-
tems. Any of them may be promptly induced during daily use. Improved yield
and stock life can be accomplished by improving stability in the design process
[13, 14].
• Test: While complexities are permanently reduced, the difficulty for practical
research in microfluidics remains unique to the VLSI test. The time variables
are slower, and the trial phase may degrade consistency. The test methodolo-
gies comprised microfluidic biochip modeling as an analog sequence of sig-
nal processing and the usage of VLSI techniques with some minor alterations
[15–18].
• Optimization of the protocol: While we always assume that the biochemist has
a mentally prepared protocol for platform execution, this mechanism will be
streamlined and optimized in many cases. For example, the before analysis pro-
cedure is the diluting and mixing sample fluid in many known quantities. Excess
fluid intake and biochip deterioration are likely to occur [19–22].

1.2.4 Level of Design

• Currently, CPMBs are manufactured in vertical directions; the devices are

designed and produced in the same workshop or plant. It is fair to anticipate that a
longitudinal supply chain would be introduced with new technology comparable
to the semiconductor industry. The modernization of biochip architecture is also
possible when the parties no longer fight to build their fabrication equipment to
design new methodological procedures.
• A microfluidic biochip can use one of the two concept flows described in Figure.1.1.
In general-purpose movement, the bio code first describes the logical characteriza-
tion of what the test is supposed to do. A high standard specifier using terminology
such as BioCoder [23] is produced by the bio code, which includes a comprehen-
sive definition of the test with standards download, remix, temperature, and
identify. The top-level setup is subsequently sent to the biosensor manufacturers
to aggregate the features and capabilities required for biochip production. The
manufacturer uses a CAD tool provider’s biochip supplier’s equipment/software
Cyber-Physical Microfluidic Biochips 5

FIGURE 1.1
Design level of microfluidic biochips.

equipment. The hardware supplier offers production details such as the specific
rules for gravure of electrodes, tubes, valves, pumps, and fluids, which can be
comfortably regulated on the device. The hardware vendor serves the same pur-
pose as the foundry in the IC design process and will provide the biochip designer
with a product development package.

The vendor of CAD instruments writes a program for synthesis which transforms the
test data into indications on biochip hardware. The concept is produced, installed, and
submitted to the verification tester and the end customer. After the evaluation is com-
pleted, the unit must be collected in the plant that takes biological waste for handling and
recovery since its useful life has been surpassed. An implementation biochip design flow
is identical, but before being supplied to the manufacturing plant, design details should be
sequenced by the biochip manufacturer.

1.2.5 Applications of Microfluidics

• Scientific research: This covers drug development and a range of “omics,”

including genomics and proteomics, some of the primary uses of microfluidics.
Historically, these operations have only been confined to laboratories with many
infrastructure and service expenditures. The use of microfluidics can accomplish
high-performance sequencing in laboratories with small resources.
• Defense and community security: The detection of harmful chemicals and patho-
gens can be done using microfluidic instruments. This was one of the principal
reasons microfluidic technologies were developed [4]. For example, surveillance
of contaminants in the environment [24, 25], identification of bacteria or food pro-
tection antibiotics [26], and detection of biological and chemical weapons [27] are
both microfluidic instruments designed for security applications. This unique fea-
ture is intriguing since it delivers a physical wellbeing measurement but is prone
to dangerous usage.

Medical diagnosis: The capacity to quickly diagnose disorders and multichannel assays
can boost holistic care and better quality of treatment, located in poor settings from out-
side medical clinics. In the sense of protection and confidence, we will review several of
these implementations in the following paragraphs.
6 Cyber Physical Systems

1.3 Manipulation of DMFB Encapsulation

The microfluidics class comprises electronic microfluidic biosensors that use isolated
droplets to handle fluids [28, 29]. It is different from microfluidic droplets [6], which are
instruments encapsulating target molecules in goblets. The distinction is that droplets are
shuttled through reservoirs and channels to vibration microfluidics, and digital microflu-
idic biochips travel at distinct distances. The expression “DMFB” does not presume a single
type of medical triggering but has become correlated with “electro-on-dielectric” (EWOD)
over the last decades [30]. The configuration of a standard DMFB includes a designed elec-
trode grid that is hydrophilic (Figure.1.2). Vessels and pipelines may also be modeled, and
the square or rectangular form of the electrode’s grids may be formed. If there is a top
surface, it is mainly made of a translucent conduction material to observe drip motions
and the electrode plate. When a voltage is applied to the electrodes, the EWOD is induced
to goblets and may be used by fluids. Using a large-scale avoids evaporative fluid cooling;
requiring droplets to move in a charged particle-like silicon oil may decrease the neces-
sary switching frequency.

1.3.1 Electro Wetting-On-Dielectric-Based Microfluidic Chips

The Young–Lippmann equation can be used to model electro-on-dielectric [28]:

0rV2

cosθ = cosθ0 +_____ (1.1)

2γd

While θ is the oscillating angle and is the static contact angle of μL and the substratum,
±0 is the static pressure difference without stress, r is the dynamic dielectric viscosity, V
is the voltage, μ is the filling media surface tension, and d is the dielectric thickness. The
touch angle can be modified, and activities such as the supplying, transportation, mixing,
and sweating of droplets can be performed by changing the voltage level and controlling
the output of the DMFB. Subject to complicated biosensors, including in-vitro and random
mutagenesis biosynthesis, these operations may be applied [28, 31]. In reality, industrial
device designers describe the fundamental mechanics of EWOD droplet motion without
affecting efficiency or functionality in any aspect directly. In general, a grid of electrodes
is sufficient for a controller to transmit rising or falling voltage levels. The application
guides particle migration to a dropstick electrode of lower power and the adjacent elec-
trodes of high voltage. Application components are known as switching devices used to

FIGURE 1.2
Encapsulation of digital microfluidic biochips.
Cyber-Physical Microfluidic Biochips 7

perform bioassay. The electronic circuits which are logically high (1) and conceptually low
(0) can be delivered from the digital microcontroller to the DMFB through the right level
charging facilities (as DMFBs usually need hundreds of voltage regulators almost always!).
Applications of the DMFB are constrained in terms of the mechanics of the acceleration of
the droplet and are in the order of hours to thousands of hertz in standard systems [28].

1.3.2 Generation of High Complexity in Microfluidics

• For even reasonable simplicity tests on small DMFB arrays, the difficulty of pro-
ducing actuating sequences is unaffordable. To cope with this strain, the idea of
high-level proliferation was introduced early from VLSI [11]. Generally, high-level
DMFB flow begins with a bioassay requirement to be performed on chip. The
figurative language of this requirement is highly detailed and is translated to the
process synthesis applications. In the general case, three problems with NP-hard
specialization are resolved.
• The planning shall determine the scientific method to meet the requirements
of precedent resources [11]. Installations are the distribution for activity, such as
combining physical biochip resources [13]. There are two different methods: free
positioning, using FPGA floors scheduling algorithms [32], and virtual topology
positioning [33, 34], which presupposes those operations can include only those
chip areas. In terms of compact size and profitability, virtual topography also con-
tributes to better quality performance.
• Droplet transfer routes from their dispatch ports to running modules must be
determined and then to a waste port or an output terminal. VLSI scheduling algo-
rithms, such as a Soukup labyrinth router [35], may be implemented, and multi-
droplet routing can be compressed to simultaneous occurrence [36].
• The goal of automation is usually a time of fulfillment, efficiency, and testing [11,
37]. The same resources for compilation and routing within a DMFB are common
for both of those steps to their VLSI equivalents. In VLSI fabrication, semiconduc-
tors and switches are employed to perform logic, whereas lines are used for inter-
connection. DMFBs utilize conductors both for the processing and transmission of
liquids. It has been suggested to address alternative synthesis flows continuously
in all transitions, often with higher effects of performance optimization [17, 38, 39].

1.3.3 Error Recovery in Microfluidic Chips

DMFBs are prone to a wide range of faults due to possible defects such as constant load
and several mechanisms during bioassay [40]. Biosynthetic and checkpoint-dependent
error recovery Bayesian inference was demonstrated as one of the most successful ways to
address DMFB engineering’s core shortcoming.
International border failure retrieval tracks the application of DMFBs in space and time
at specific locations. If a mistake is discovered, it can redirect time to restore more effi-
ciently than restart the test. CCD cameras are also used to provide a biochip controller
with input from the sensor in real time. CCD cameras can be configured, and the bio-
chip’s status can be determined in random places and times. Controller-run software uses
pattern-matching algorithms to collect images from the camera and derives droplet pre-
sentation, length, and concentration from implementing programs. The proposed models
involve creating a map for the whole biochip and evaluating the position of enzymes with
8 Cyber Physical Systems

the most significant correlation. The association of a single droplet after the picture has
been cropped to a certain point. While CCD scanning is versatile and reliable, it may not
be used to test luminous reagents. As has recently been seen with reliability-hardening,
we also notice that different findings suggest they can execute safety control signals.

1.3.4 Direct Addressing in DMFBs

The sample size used to drive a DMFB is one of the most significant contributors to costs
and complexity. The earliest generic DMFBs needed one IO pin from the driver circuit, a
system called “specific addresses.” And for recent addition, this can quickly become unre-
alistic. For example, a proved biosensor DMFB for a moment in time testing demands over
one thousand pins—simply adding to typical MCU packets the number of connections—
for the use of direct management. Pin-constrained DMFBs lower the number of pins and
limit the mobility of the drop of water. The final stage in the good innovative flow can be
produced with pin-constrained DMFBs, or the overall biochip architecture can be allowed.
The same immunological test is employed when the biochip’s 64 less pins are used to
transmit more than 1,000 terminals.

1.3.5 Commercialization of Digital Microfluidic Technology

• The authors know only of two commercial offers which are based on microfluid
science, all of which have been stopped:
• The oldest is the late Illumina NeoPrep Library System, developed and
improved at its publication by Dartmouth College and is based on Advanced
Liquid Logic. Nonetheless, this technology is a longtime perfect representative
of renowned DMFB systems but is mainly mentioned in papers for research-
ers in digital microfluidics. The DMFB for the viewing is Baebies SEEKER and
reproduction of infant lysosomal conditions from the King University. This
platform is appealing since it has been given FDA clearance for an interesting
standard medical program.
• A technology still being developed is the Oxford Nanopore VolTRAX, with sev-
eral prototypes published to a specific community. According to company docu-
mentation, it seems like this system will be a USB interface for the preparation
of samples and connectivity with Oxford’s other technology. This device’s light-
weight shape factor, which will allow remote analysis, is a distinctive feature.

1.3.6 Open-Source DMFB Synthesis

• The role of digital microfluidics is on the rise. There are currently two experimen-
tal frameworks and one DMFB synthesis software application.
• Bordeaux Open Drop is an easy-to-achieve technology channel for dynamic digi-
tally based on DC, PCB, and is reasonably affordable. It has little funding at pres-
ent and whether the development will proceed is unclear.
• The Wheeler DropBot has an AC actuator and includes various prescriptions
describing its application in real-life circumstances (including a field trial in
Kenya). Initially, costly external lab infrastructure was required to work, but
the platform is constantly enhanced in version 3.0. Also available is a biochip
Cyber-Physical Microfluidic Biochips 9

monitoring and configuration tool, but sophisticated automation methods such as

error recovery are not implemented.
• MFStaticSim of UC Riverside is a C++ system used to synthesize actuation
sequences. It incorporates many algorithms for programming, positioning,
sequencing, pin mappings, and wire transmission and provides a resulting help-
ful culture.

1.4 Large Scale of Flow-Based Microfluidic Biochips

Microfluidic biochips based on flow (FBMBs) are used to steer flux across networks of
reaction chambers using engraved microchannels, microvalves, and micropumps [3]. In
comparison to optical microfluidics, fluid flows are steady. FBMBs are an efficient way to
produce the research facility because they can be rapidly and efficiently assembled and
made [4]. Indeed, FBMBs are the basis of the principle of sizable implementation of micro-
fluidics (LSI).
Generally speaking, these instruments cannot be reconfigured, as the valves need to
be regulated and worked correctly for the particular goal. There are efforts to develop
multifunctional flow-based biochips (RFBs) to increase their sophistication and develop a
technology category akin to department door arrays (FPGAs).​

1.4.1 Model of Biochip
The microfluidic circulation systems, borrowed from the semiconductor industry [4], were
made using silicon and glass substrates. Polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) is generally the
leading commodity due to its simplicity and relatively precise manufacturing, elasticity,
and physicochemical characteristics. Biochips of PDMS are manufactured using the soft
lithography multilayer process: The biochip structure is modeled using lithography and
used as molds on silicon wafers. There is a thin coating of PDMS on the chips using an
elastomer. The input and output points for the fluid and vibration origins are introduced.

FIGURE 1.3
Generation of DMFBs.
10 Cyber Physical Systems

FIGURE 1.4
Structure of model chips.

Multiple levels may be configured and bundled in a dynamic channel, but only two layers
are most commonly utilized, as shown in Figure 1.4.

1.4.2 Building Block of Microvalves

One of the essential building components of FMFBs is the tiny valves. The usual setup of
the flow-based biochip is shown in Figure 1.4. Two layers of elastomers are network manu-
factured and linked together. One layer includes flow paths for sample and reagent modu-
lation. Pumps attached at the bottom of all fluid reservoirs produce streams. A network
of modulation schemes connecting to outside tension outlets is used in the second layer.
Stress source triggering triggers a deflection in which the power and flow channels are cut
and form a funnel. The stimulation may be conceived for regular inspiration. In standard
FMFBs, the pressure operation in the control layer strengths of the valve is disrupted by
the valve closing and the dynamic motion in the flow path.

1.4.3 Fully Programmable Flow of Valve Arrays

Crossing fluid valves and canals to the complete multifunction valve arrays (FPGAs) can
be organized in perpendicular meshes. FPGAs allow for a full network setup. The massive
microfluidic integration (MLSI) will make maximum density. Sequence analysis of the
valve conditions also allows for mixing. For high-performance and parametric studies,
this can be used. For example, samples of M input may be evaluated for particular n bio-
chemical solvent interactions for the whole M by N. This kind of equipment is applied in
different industries, covering surfaces test techniques and phosphodiesterase in the digital
response chain. FPGAs may be improved to enable durable and sturdy systems to develop
optimization targets like pin counting. Designs are also possible.

1.4.4 Protocols of Routing Crossbars

In recent times, crossbar networking has been suggested (alternatively, for routing manu-
facturing) so that additive manufacturing and adaptations to biochemical protocols in real
time could be made. This idea has also been implemented in research on individual net-
works and has shown the potential to create more space-efficient structures.
The horizontal connectors are based on the two input and two output electricity grid
concepts and are made utilizing a valve performance potential. The original was built
Cyber-Physical Microfluidic Biochips 11

in using a substratum made of ablated polycarbonate piled over polydimethylsiloxane

(PDMS). The valves are shaped in the networks as displacements and may usually be
opened or closed. An elastomeric membrane surrounds the valve. As the vacuum is acti-
vated (or compressed), these membranes spread into the space, and fluid passes through
(or be blocked). One output port chooses a 2-to-1 multiplexer among two input ports and
preferably a 1-to-2 DE multiplexer. The fundamental transposer then creates ever more
complex routing topologies that may be selected from an endless number of nodes.

1.4.5 Commercialization of Microfluidic Technologies

Flow-based microfluids are among the most evolved and valuable chemicals in workbench
systems among this plethora of available microfluid innovations. A remarkable example is
the Biomark HD Fluidigm, available on the market as of the mid-1990s and capable of han-
dling its various types of own built-in integrated fluid circuits (IFCs). IFCs are available in
the current cartridge to carry out digital PCR and the DNA sequence.

1.5 Conclusion
The basic functioning concepts and their development, design, and advancement in the
commercial exploitation of digital and flow-based microfluidics are discussed in this chap-
ter. In all these inventions, the perfect microfluidic biochip can be realized. Microfluidic
biochips can be successfully implemented in design automation, which significantly
reduces the development time and improves usability. This suggests the safety and trust-
worthiness of these systems, like the rest of this book shows.

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2
Reliability Driven and Dynamic Re-synthesis
of Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips

Jagjit Singh Dhatterwal, Anupam Baliyan, and Om Prakash

CONTENTS
2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 15
2.1.1 Related Work............................................................................................................. 16
2.2 What Are Cyber-Physical Biochips.................................................................................... 17
2.2.1 Sensing Systems of Digital Microfluidic Biochips............................................... 18
2.2.2 Digital Chip Software.............................................................................................. 20
2.2.3 Biochip Software....................................................................................................... 21
2.3 Ease of Error Recovery.........................................................................................................22
2.3.1 Planning of Error Recovery.....................................................................................22
2.3.2 Ensure Reliable Error Recovery.............................................................................. 24
2.3.3 Difference among Numbers of Sensing Schemes................................................ 25
2.4 Physical-Aware Sensor Software........................................................................................ 26
2.4.1 Offline Data Preparation.......................................................................................... 26
2.4.2 Online Monitoring Microfluidics Chip................................................................. 27
2.4.2.1 Step 1: Detecting of Error.......................................................................... 27
2.4.2.2 Step 2: Updating Structure of Graph....................................................... 27
Steps of Graph Sequences............................................................................................................. 28
2.4.2.3 Step 3: Concept of Proper Handling....................................................... 28
2.5 Compilation of Sensing Scheme Optimization................................................................ 30
2.5.1 Developing of Plasmid DNA...................................................................................30
2.5.2 Interpolating Protein Dissolve................................................................................ 31
2.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 32
References........................................................................................................................................ 32

2.1 Introduction
In this segment, we introduce a “physical-aware” device restructuring approach that
uses sensor data at intermediary crossings to dynamically rearrange the biochip, based
on recent developments in digital microfluidics cybernetic implants in the application of
sensor networks [1]. The differences in electrode action are recalled with the computerized
maintenance management re-synthesis process, which produces new results in module
placement, droplet navigation pathway, and global markets through minimal effect on the
time-to-response.

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-2 15
16 Cyber Physical Systems

The following are the chapter’s most meaningful achievements:

• A digital biochip of a microfluid charge-coupled component (CCD)-based sensing

mechanism.
• A droplet estimation and monitoring scanning algorithm based on the available
information from a CCD sensor [2].
• An error-recovery technique based on durability.
• Maintainability synthesis using path redundancy based security algorithm
(PRSA) and greedy strategies are paralleled strategies referring to the plans of
virtual vacuum distillation.
• Three symbolic antibacterial activity simulation findings.

2.1.1 Related Work
Digital microfluidics’ simplification of operating system configuration and monitoring
sparked exploration into different areas of automatic semiconductor manufacturing and
microprocessor implementations. A variety of techniques for architecture and design
propagation [3], the placement of the device, and the drop of water [1–4] are published.
A method, on the other hand, neglects the functional complexities and domain-specific
limitations that come with attempting to perform biological functions and microfluidic
operational activities on an electronic chip.
Predictive modeling and precision monitoring are difficult to achieve due to the dynamic
and random numerous contributions that are common in biological/chemical reactions
[5, 6]. Various errors can occur during the operation of a bacterial genome, in addition to
manufactured flaws. For example, DNA fouling can cause several electrodes in a biochip
to malfunction, and an improper acceleration voltage added to an electrode can cause elec-
trode degradation and charged trap [7–9]. These flaws are difficult to diagnose a priori,
but they do exist in some bioassays [9]. Despite this intrinsic variability, many scientific
trials, such as therapeutic antibodies and drug production, necessitate highly reliable and
detailed fluid-handling functions. For the concentration and volume of raindrops, each
phase in a biochemical experiment procedure has an “acknowledgment range.” The pH of
the solution used in preparing plasmid DNA materials, for example, should be much less
than 8.0 to prevent a major decrease in the lysozyme’s performance [10]. If an accidental
mistake happens during the procedure or the antibacterial activity protocol’s conditions
are not followed, the results of the whole procedure will be erroneous. To fix the mistake,
all of the measures of the procedure must be replicated [11, 12]. Experimentation is repeated
again and again, wasting costly reagents and difficult-to-find specimens. The following
issues arise as a result of the repeated implementation of on-chip laboratory experiments:

i. Improvements to the antibacterial activity outcome that are detrimental to legiti-

mate detection and easy implementation;
ii. Waste of hard-to-get or store materials and expensive ingredients.

As a result, strategies for tracking assay consequences on subcortical structures must be

established, as well as an effective error-recovery mechanism. In the literature, error recov-
ery in electronic microfluidics has gotten a lot of coverage. The study in [11] is the only
research that has been published on the microfluidic biochip, which suggested interme-
diary phase tracking and rolling back error correction. The study in [11] uses a sensing
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 17

device to check the accuracy of necessary and proper clause droplets at different stages
of the on-chip procedure. When a sensor detects a malfunction, the resulting droplet is
eliminated if the droplet’s density or strength is below or above the measured distance
necessary. The procedure is resumed when an investigation’s production does not fulfill
the consistency specifications resulting from sensor calibration. To substitute the under-
qualified droplet, new product droplets will be formed.
The original sequence diagram of a bacterial genome that works as a sensor evaluates
the outputs of each administering, combining, and separating process. The machine will
re-execute the related administering and combining procedures if a mistake occurs at
operation. It displays the latest error-recovery sequencing table, which includes the new
material particles manufactured in activities 12, 13, and 14. In [11] there are some vulner-
abilities in the exclusion of the detection and correction method “physical-aware” moni-
toring systems:

• Overgeneralization of fault identification, as well as the stereotypes that go with

it, is the first disadvantage. For the calibration of each detection process, a stan-
dardized “perceived outcome” is unreliable. It is significant to mention that as
antimicrobial activity behavior continues, the structure of transitional raindrops
differs significantly. As a consequence, many occasions and gradually the calcula-
tion are needed.
• All recovery operations are separately performed in [11]. When an error is found,
all other existing bioassay-related fluidic procedures are halted. Long waiting
times implemented by recovery operations can result in sample deterioration and
incorrect assay results [13]. Some procedures, such as different spectrofluoromet-
ric enzymes, necessitate specific durations as defined by the intervention protocol,
and they cannot be extended without adding unpredictable nature into the experi-
mental outcome [14].
• Where many errors occur throughout a bacterial genome, the error-recovery solu-
tion in [11] is ineffective. For example, [11] indicates that all methods of data trans-
mission will work and that mistakes throughout restoration don’t really happen.
• The technique of error recovery in [11] ignores the problem of consistency. The accu-
mulation of positively charged electrodes is normally the source of errors like the
creation of droplets with irregular volumes [7, 8]. If such electrodes are used in the
future, they are likely to introduce further errors [7, 8]. As a result, we would reduce
the use of these electrodes, ensuring the biochips are accurate and reliable. In order to
overcome the above drawbacks, we are using gradual “cyber physical” measures to
develop sensor input and to monitor equipment biochip processes. We are present-
ing a technique of “physically conscious” system redesign using visual data at inter-
faces to restructure the biochip functionally [15] by leveraging recent developments
in the implementation of wearable sensors in a digital microfluidics biochip [16].

2.2 What Are Cyber-Physical Biochips

The cyber-physical framework on biochips and on all parts of the machine is presented in
this chapter. “Physically aware” control software is now possible thanks to the availability
of biochip sensing systems. The term “physical-aware” refers to the fact that the device
18 Cyber Physical Systems

FIGURE 2.1
Framework of a cyber-physical digital microfluidic system.

will obtain input from the sensing mechanism about the result (error-free/erroneous) of
fluid-handling procedures. The monitoring system will correctly modify the microfluidic
biochip based on sensor input. The different phases of the bioassay are then carried out
based on substrate results and real-time reporting. Figure 2.1 shows each aspect of a cyber-
physical network on the microfluidic basis. A feedback signal is sent from the monitoring
system to the microfluidic biochip and a sensor on the chip tracks the effects of liquid
functioning practices. The results are related to the “expected values,” or pre-determined
cutoffs. If the reference findings show a warning message saying that the monitoring sys-
tem gets a “repeating command” and that it can execute again the following operation in
which the problem occurs. This is the way to fix the error.

2.2.1 Sensing Systems of Digital Microfluidic Biochips

On optical microfluidic biochips, sensation procedures could be used in the cyber-physical
framework.
The first sensing scheme is CCD camera based. CCD devices are used to independently
capture the edges of raindrops, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Droplets can be dynamically identified by the control program using photographs taken
by the CCD sensor. The technique for searching for droplets automatically can be repre-
sented as a “template matching” problem. The illustration of a “typical” droplet may be
used to depict a pattern in this case. We transfer the biometric template to all possible
locations in the image of the whole sequence and during the matching step and crop a
sub-image that is the same width as the reference picture. The correlation index, which
calculates the resemblance between both the prototype and the “cropped picture,” is then
calculated by the control program. On a pixel-by-pixel analysis, the correlation factor is
determined, as seen in Figure 2.3a. Both photographs in the control program are processed
in grayscale. Matrixes or vectors may be used to decode these grayscale files. Assume
the template image is stored in a one-dimensional array: x D.x1;x2;::xN/x D.x1;x2;::xN/x
D.x1;x2;::x. Here, xi denotes a pixel’s gravel level, and N denotes the template image’s total
number of pixels. In the same way, the cropped sub-image to be contrasted with the proto-
type picture can be translated as y D.y1;y2;:::;yN/. As a result, the similarity factor between
these two pictures is:

å(x - x) i ( y - y)
i i

cor = i =1
,
N N

å(x - x) i å( y - y)
2 2
i i
i =1 i =1
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 19

FIGURE 2.2
Structure of the template matching image.

FIGURE 2.3
Structure of the microfluidic coplanar digital chip.

where xN and yN are the prototype image’s and clipped sub-image’s average gray levels,
respectively. A similar procedure cor has a spectrum of values around 1 and C1. A higher
absolute value of a correlation factor indicates a greater relation between different pic-
tures, according to the concept of correlation.
The relationship diagram between both the prototype and the initial input image is
obtained after deriving considerations of differentiation for all potential roles of absolute
biosensor composition. Assume the biochip has droplets. Apposition of droplets can be
calculated by looking at the correlation chart with the highest correlation variables. Figure
2.2[17] shows an example.
The original input signal of the entire chip and the pattern image with the best cor-
responding positions, i.e., the droplet coordinations derived from the control program,
as (77, 107), (77, 147), (77, 147), and (76, 208), respectively. As a result, the control program
locates the droplets on its own. The dimensions and wavelengths of raindrops can be stud-
ied further using the picture. After analyzing the image captured by the CCD sensor, the
amounts and distributions of droplets can be obtained in this method. Instead of scanning
the entire picture for droplets to see if the drops were moved to their correct positions, we
use data modeling.
The following procedures are used to carry out this procedure:
Before beginning the experiment, several calibrations are performed. We select a wide
number of sub-images both with and without raindrops and calculate their n design rela-
tionship. We find an appropriate proportion for the correlation index (Cth) based on the
estimation results: if the similarity is greater than Cth, we infer that the clipped thread has
a goblet; therefore, the short and mid would not have a raindrop. We trimmed the short and
mid, closed the projected places of the particles, and quantified the appropriate association
indexes while the antibacterial activity works to determine the absence/presence of particles.

(i) Identify exactly where errors are

(ii) Perform spot corrections as soon as they appear when using a CCD camera-based
sensing system.
20 Cyber Physical Systems

A downside of this strategy is that the monitoring of the cyber-physical environment

requires the use of other equipment, such as CCD cameras.
The second detecting method, as suggested in [14, 16], relies on optical transmission
instruments. The composition of an intermediate in the production of a digital microflu-
idic biochip can be calculated by analyzing the intensity of the substance in the raindrops
using fluorophores [14, 16]. Whenever a raindrop comes in contact with a fluorescence indi-
cator, different substance quantities result in different spectrums of light being emitted
(i.e., different colors). Capacitive properties that transform the emitted light into electrical
voltage and current signal will sense this color difference [16]. On the microfluidic series,
combined properties of nanoparticles have recently been implemented [14, 16]. In [14], for
example, a digital microfluidic array was combined with an optical detection system. A
light-emitting diode (LED) and a photodiode that serves as a light-to-voltage converter
make up this device. The concentration of compounds can be measured using the photodi-
ode’s output voltage. Thin film In GaAs photoconductor, for example, can be attached to a
glass framework AF-coated coating and put into the microelectronic virtual environment.
Figure 2.3 [14] shows a coplanar optical microfluidic chip with an embedded In GaAs
phototransistor.
The downside of the optical transmission sensor device is that the sensor is not accu-
rately identified in the unfortunate case, despite the fact that no instruments with a large
footprint and precise orientation are needed in this process. If a transmitter is sent a drop
of water from the mission to meet the specifications of the bacterial genome, we know that
an error has occurred, but we cannot indicate when or where this error occurred. The CCD
camera-based sensing contrast with sensor-based sensing in Table 2.1 reveals.

2.2.2 Digital Chip Software

As on-chip measurements are accessible, autonomous microfluidic biochips are enabled
to use sensor information to detect error during intermediate examination inaccuracies
during phylogenetic analysis execution. For a microfluidic biochip, the study in [11] sug-
gested intermediary phase testing and rollback error recovery. The main concept behind
this research is to use the on-chip sensing device to check the correctness of production
raindrops at different stages of the on-chip procedure. The following is how error recovery
is conducted with this method. Where a checkpoint detects an error, procedures whose

TABLE 2.1
Comparative Analysis of the Camera Sensing System CCD and the Sensing System Dependent on
Detectors
CCD camera-based scheme CCD camera-based scheme

Accuracy of locating electrodes High Low

with defect
Response time Error recovery can be triggered Error recovery can only of the faulty
immediately when an error operation be triggered at the end
occurred
Application for photosensitive Cannot be used Can be used
samples/reagents
Cost The price of the CCD camera is The cost of fluorescent labels is
around $3,000 around $30/mol and the laser is
around $200
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 21

outputs failed to fulfill quality specifications due to sensor configuration are re-executed
to correct the problem. To allow recovery, the discarded intermediary substance drop-
lets must be deposited in specifically specified positions on the chips. For error recovery,
supplementary droplets of substances and materials must be distributed from reservoirs.
The technique for dependability error recovery as well as the algorithm for develop-
mental effects of error recovery will be implemented based on the error-recovery process
suggested in [11].

2.2.3 Biochip Software
The cyber-physical connection here between the microfluidic platform’s control operat-
ing systems is then defined. For cyber-physical coupling, two frameworks are required.
The CPU receives the data transfer from the first equipment when the investigation is
complete, and uses that information to decode the sensor values. The second interface
converts the feedback information of the control program to voltage signals which can be
implemented on the electrodes of the biochip.
The cyber-physical structure is depicted schematically in Figure 2.4. A machine, a
peripheral circuit, a separate microcontroller, and a biochip are all part of the device. The
program on the machine sends a command signal to the biochip during the implementa-
tion of a bacterial genome. Via the solitary microcontroller, the software simultaneously
provides input from the biochip’s sensing mechanism. Based on sensor inputs, the control
program recalculates the timetable of fluidic activities, module positioning, and droplet
waterways. The key idea is to have an on-chip sensor to coordinate experimental regu-
lation related to restructuring. When the on-chip system detects an error, the irregular
droplet is immediately discarded, preventing experimental error.
Cyber-physical microfluidics’ closed-loop incorporation can also be used to monitor the
time it takes for biosensors to complete. Serum samples must be thoroughly combined
with an enzyme-mediated reagent when evaluating glucose in blood, for instance [18]. A
droplet’s state is tracked by an imaging system and during the mixing process. Through
studying and contrasting photographs of the droplet, the degree to which blending has

FIGURE 2.4
Flow of biochip software.
22 Cyber Physical Systems

been achieved can be determined. As a result, the biochip’s control program would cause
it to keep mixing until the input data indicates that the droplets are properly blended. As
a result, even without understanding the exact mixer execution time ahead, the combin-
ing procedure can be accurately regulated, and the on-chip glucose concentration results
obtained can be as accurate as those obtained by a traditional materials scientist bench-top
analysis tool [18].

2.3 Ease of Error Recovery

2.3.1 Planning of Error Recovery
The gelation temperature error recovery is formulated in this section. For each discharg-
ing, combining, dilution, and separating operation in the given antibacterial activity pro-
cedure, we use the on-chip sensing device to assess the consistency of the output droplets.
It’s worth noting that the period idea of upgrading detector operations is insignificant, as
on-chip sensor reaction times are measured in milliseconds [19].
There are two types of fluid-handling procedures on a microfluidic biochip: irrevers-
ible and nature of intelligence operations. Microvascular procedures include blending and
dilution, while reversible operations include discharge and separating. Errors that arise
during irreversible procedures have relatively straightforward recovery mechanisms. If
two droplets with inconsistent quantities are formed during a splitting process, the bio-
chip will first combine the two irregular droplets into a larger one instead of separating
the larger droplet. When a distributing error occurs, the chip will return the irregular
droplet and will allocate a further raindrop to the proper reservoirs. There is therefore
a fast recovery period and no additional droplets are required for problems that crop up
throughout the process of turning things around.
Microvascular procedures have a more complex error-recovery mechanism. We will
require input raindrops from procedures whose interfaces provide an unsuccessful inter-
face activity in effort to properly relate the microvascular operations and correct the error.
As a result, all predecessors of the incorrect process will need to be re-executed. If an error
happens at procedure 7, for example, operations 1–6 will need to be re-run. As a result,
the time expense of performing error-recovery procedures can be quite high. In order to
reduce the risk of a worst-case scenario, we use the following steps:

• If only one of the separating operation’s output particles the other (superfluous)
drop of water was used as a reference for its eventual successor’s replacement in
case of a mistake at a later time. Operation, for example, is a separating operation
that produces two output droplets. The fluid management of each cycle is used
in the series diagram procedure, and only one of these two droplets is used as
the input of installation. In the sequencing table, the discarded droplets are not
visible.
• All discharge procedures are planned for implementation as quickly as practical
and their output particles are deposited on the biochip if an error occurs. We also
leave any droplets on the table as a buffer for any future error-recovery proce-
dures. Those discarded contingency droplets will be returned to their accompany-
ing reservoirs after performing the assay.
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 23

When a renal artery stenosis operation fails, the control program first scans to see if con-
tingency raindrops stored on a biochip will sustain the operations of the organization. If
the reaction is yes, then the time expense of the organization will be reduced. Anything
other than that during error repair, further operations will be performed. According to the
number of tests and droplet overconsumption in their error-recovery methods, the activi-
ties in the bioassay can be separated into three groups based on the above analysis. The
below are the formal classifications for fluidic-handling operations:
Both irreversible operations fall into this category. If a mistake happens, they will easily
be re-executed.
Category II operations are those that are nonreversible and with which basic under-
standing may have contingency droplets.
Category III: This takes a couple of nonreversible procedures for which the immediately
responsible forerunners are unable to supply contingency droplets.
Each node in a provided decoding diagram indicates an operation. The in-number of a
procedure the quantity of raindrops and the quantity of particles is specified a procedure
is defined as the number of output particles. Any activity optk can be classified based on
its in-number and out-number values, as listed below:

• If optk’s in-number equals zero, optk is a dispensing activity. As a result, we have

optk 2 Category I.
• Optk is a slicing operation if the in-number of optk equals one and the out-number
of optk equals two. As a result, we have optk 2 Category I.
• Assume optj is optk’s immediate forerunner. The number of contingency rain-
drops at optj’s production can then be measured as Boptj D ONjMNj, where ONj
is optj’s out-number and MNj is the percentage of subordinates immediately. If the
reference droplet counts for optk’s nearest neighbors are all greater than 0, then
optk 2 Category II is appropriate; otherwise, optk 2 Category III is appropriate.

According to the categorization result for opti, the collection of its error-recovery opera-
tions, Ri, can be deduced. Since the input droplets for Category I and II procedures are
retained on the chip, they can easily be re-executed if an error happens. However, the
inputs to Category III operations come from the outputs of predecessor’s procedures, and
we have no protection for these particles. As a result, if an error happens in a Category III
operation, we must not only re-run the procedure but also backtrace to its counterparts.
Suppose opte is the error procedure, and that optp1 and optp2 are its immediate succes-
sors. If these basic understandings are Category I or II processes, we will re-execute optp1,
optp2, and then opte for error recovery, resulting in Ri D foptp1; optp2; opteg. If optp1 and
optp2’s understandings regarding are not in Category I or II, we would try to expand Ri
by including their nearest neighbors. This backtracing and augmentation process must be
replicated before we hit predecessor procedures which provide replacement raindrops to
feed the outputs of error procedures. The trace and expansion of all the above Ri set can be
summed up as follows. We define predatory to beginning with opti/ as a mapping from
opti to a collection of opti’s immediate predecessors in the sequencing graph.
We characterize the operator Pr as follows for a series of operations O D
fopto1;opto2;:::;optok g:

1: Classify opcralions into Category I, Category II, and Category III;

2: Initialization of Ri : Ri = opti :
24 Cyber Physical Systems

3: Initialization of intermediate variable Re : Re = pr (Ri );Re : Re - P(Ri )

4: while {Re - Ri ) ∩ {Set of operations in Category III} ≠ ∅ do
5: Update Ri Ri = Pr (Ri ):
6: Update ReRe = Pr (Ri );
7: end while
8: Ri = Re ;
9: Ri is the set of recovery operation for opti;

Pr : O ® ∪
i = o1 , o2 ,... ok
{opti , opt j | opt j Î pred ( opti ) ,"j}

The method can be used to extract the set of error-recovery procedures Ri for any opera-
tion opti. According to the foregoing section, we may extract the set of recovery efforts Ri
for any process opti.
We can add edge among activities in the set Ri describing the relationship between pro-
cedures in the initial sequence graph, and thus extract the error-recovery graph GRei for
opti. We can re-execute procedures in GRei for error recovery if an error happens in opti.
It’s worth noting that certain electrodes on the biochip have been purposefully left unused
and are being used to store backup droplets. Storage cells are dedicated and reserved for
all electrodes on the chip’s boundary. As a result, replacement particles can be delivered
on a cybernetic implant safely.

2.3.2 Ensure Reliable Error Recovery

It is unworkable that reliable processes are maintained by simply restarting the course
of treatment about which an accident appears when an error is found during the imple-
mentation of a bacterial genome. This is because errors in sample preparation execution
are often triggered by electrode abnormalities; therefore, numerous errors can happens at
different times in the very same biochip region. In the accompanying main instances, the
objective of the charging phenomenon and DNA losing possession are seen.
Psychologically trapping charge and persistent voltage can cause mechanical failures
as microfluidic digital biochip architectures are overly powered [7, 8]. Charging is a state
where the charging is concentrated in the superconducting insulating material of the bio-
chip. The load is stuck and decreases the separation technique strength and antimicrobial
activity equipment failures.

• Let’s pretend that Electrode 1 has stuck charge in its dielectric insulator plate, but
Electrodes 2 and 3 don’t. Excitation current and voltage are connected to Electrode
1 and Electrode 3 in order to perform a splitting process. The electrowetting power
would be weakened by the voltage trapping on Electrode 1. Inequitable forces will
break the raindrop, and the two raindrops that arise can have different amounts.
Additional errors can occur if we merely re-execute the separating process while
continuing to use Electrode 1. Worse, the charge trapping mechanism has the
potential to permanently degrade the electrode’s dielectric properties [7, 8]. As a
result, if an error is observed, the electrode at which the problem happened must
no longer be used to introduce fluid-handling operations in order to maintain the
biochip’s reliability.
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 25

• Droplets comprising macromolecules (such as DNA) have the potential to foul the
electrode surfaces [20]. As a consequence, the distribution of droplets can shift in
unfavorable ways. Other droplets can become infected while these infected interfaces
manage to be used. The region of the decontamination of DNA is a member of the
mixture combining operation’s output droplets which could have odd concentration.
• To achieve maintainability error recovery, we employ a basic technique. Where an
error is observed, the bioassay’s execution is modified as follows:
• The protocol with the fault is restarted. In future procedures, the instruments
that can lead to errors are not used. The servo controller monitors what more stor-
age is used by each operation. The field where the mistake happens will then be
returned, based on the error raindrop. Both electrodes in this area are considered
to be suspect for defects. As a result, these electrodes would be circumvented.

2.3.3 Difference among Numbers of Sensing Schemes

In terms of fault detection, error repair, and complex re-synthesis, the individual handling
of strategies presented.
The evaluation of a stuck charge on an electrode will be used to demonstrate the differ-
ences in these two sensing systems. Assume a droplet separating procedure happens for
inconsistent particles. Electrode 1 can accurately be defined as the electrodes with remain-
ing charges in the CCD camera-based sensing device since the droplet density is smaller
than the implementation agency.
In the other side, the outputs of the connector, which comprises of Electrodes 1, 2, and 3,
will no longer be used by the optical detector-based sensing device. Electrodes 2 and 3 will
no longer be used, according to the diagnostic outcome of the CCD camera-based sensing
device, resulting in a waste of on-chip energy.
The bioassay is then used to demonstrate the variations between the two sensing systems.
Assume that the droplets for distributing operations come from various distributing
ports. For both of the bioassay’s combining processes, as well as their production. The
product of module positioning in relation to synthesis. It’s worth noting that “resource”
refers to an electrode array component that is occupied by the blended phase. A converter
is located at the top right angle of the container by the configuration of the electrodes, e.g.,
the back corner of the combined module M1 seems to be in the sixth and second rows and
has a two-row, three-column electrode array. As a result, the mixer is referred to as a 3 2
mixer at the venue (2, 6).
Assume that the DNA-fouling anomaly happens after the operation has been running for
3s in Mix 3. Only after Mix 3 has been done is the quality of Mix 3 tested for the electronic
detection system. As a result, the detection and correction procedures are launched at the
time instant t D 10. The CCD camera-based device detection and correction process will start
seriously once DNA contamination occurs at clearing t D 3. These are the summaries of the
three instances. Recovery can only be activated at the conclusion of an incorrect activity in a
detector-based sensing device, according to our findings. Recovery can be activated directly
after a mistake happens in sensing device on the CCD camera. In the sensing on the CCD
camera device, on the other hand, restoration can only be initiated after an error has occurred.
It’s worth noting that the camera’s light will affect certain biochemical substances in the
droplet, such as fluorescent markers [21]. As a result, we must select a detector-based digi-
tal dashboard to track experiments with photographic film packages.
26 Cyber Physical Systems

2.4 Physical-Aware Sensor Software

With hardware that can give input to the monitoring systems now available, it’s time to create
technology that can understand sensor information and adjust the output of the synthesizing
efficiently using flow-through organizational upgrades. This implies, among these modifica-
tions are the resource connections, the position of the component, and the droplet navigation.
The re-synthesis process is divided into two phases: the first is off-line data planning
prior to antibacterial activity execution, and the second is online control for fluid-handling
activities as well as dynamic antibacterial activity re-synthesis. The following sections
provide more information.

2.4.1 Offline Data Preparation

Order to convert the bioassay’s sequencing graph to a guided acyclic graph (DAG) and sav-
ing the DAG in memory for use by the control program is the first step in data planning.
The vertices in this DAG reflect microfluidic data aggregation, while the edges display
precedence relationships between them. The ancestors and descendants of any procedure
can be found by doing a depth-first scan on the graph [22].
Identifying error limits for each activity is the second stage of data processing. The pre-
cision required for the bacterial genome determines these standards, which are stored in
the system as a table for use by the management system. When during the immunoassay
performance, a detecting answer is over the spectrum of predesignated thresholds, we
conclude that the next operation has produced an error.
Deriving bioassay’s initial synthesis outcome is the final step in data processing. The
sequence chart of the quarterly sales and on-chip properties are mapped to the prepara-
tion, resource links, placement module, and the outcomes of droplets navigation for every
protocol operation.
For a sequence network of n processes, the conclusion may be expressed in terms.

ReRe = Pr (Ri )

S = {Mopt
*
1
*
, Mopt 2
*
,...Mopt n
}
*
where Mopti
,1 £ i £ n is the synthesis output for the ith operation opti. The element Mopt
*
i
can
be viewed as an ordered 6-tuple:

*
Mopti
=< ts ( opti ) , te ( opti ) , x ( opti ) , col ( opti ) , row ( opti ) >

where ts and te are the organization’s start and stop times, including both; x and y are the
service module x- and y-coordinates; and col (row) is the number of columns (rows) repre-
sented by the process in the sequence.
Several suggested algorithms for solving this optimization technique have previously
been released for digital microfluidic biochip computer-aided design and development.
For instance, PRSA-based propagating techniques may be utilized to quickly provide opti-
mum outcomes of synthesizing [23].
Because after optimum summary findings are received, another off-data acquisition
stage is done. Antioxidant activity is then carried out based on the initial propagation
result, followed by droplet monitoring in real time.
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 27

2.4.2 Online Monitoring Microfluidics Chip

The control program shall take the following actions during the execution of the bacterial
genome.

2.4.2.1 Step 1: Detecting of Error

The procedures of error detection for the intelligent control CCD-based camera moni-
toring program and technology vary. Outputs of each activity shall be submitted to
an on-chip detector for the detector-based sensing systems. Following each operation
of the optical detector, the program contrasts the detection effect with the preset error
thresholds. If we do not satisfy the condition of the experiment, the optical detection
result concludes that a mistake has occurred. Error detection triggers the detection
and correction procedure: i.e., the program adjusts the synthesis effects dynamically
to restart the process where the problem happened. The program also circumvents all
questionable electrodes where the mistake happened. For example, presume that the
process performance droplet doesn’t fulfill the criteria and that the defect can then be
concluded in the resources devoted to opt. This area will be circumvented in order to
guarantee the stability of future operations.
The program will watch all droplets in the biochip in real time for the CCD camera-
based sensing device. The CCD camera simultaneously detects the colors and thicknesses
of the particles and evaluates them for comparisons. This triggers error repair as soon as
a mistake happens.

2.4.2.2 Step 2: Updating Structure of Graph

The control system specifies the recovery operations necessary when an error occurs. The
program adjusts the sequencing of the bioassay according the type of operation if there
is a mistake in the course of the operation. If a permanent error happens, the recovery
process is simple. In the event of a mistake during a not phase change, before activities
can be identified, the programming language has to verify the prior procedures and give
backing nanoparticles to send restoration outputs to the saved method. The pseudo-code
for sequence graph modification. The GRei define for operational opti for the detection
and correction diagram. The revised sequencing diagrams, respectively, are the defects
in procedures in Categories I, II, and III. You will find the classification of operations.
Importantly, the recovery subprocesses might vary according to the error for certain oper-
ations. For example, two droplets are generated; one of them is therefore implanted on
the semiconductor as a “duplicate droplet” for image transmission. Where a single mis-
take occurs, the biochip re-runs operations. If an error happens in an operating ancestor,
however, the recuperation subroutine is different for operation 14 if an error occurs, for
instance, it is used as an input to restore error by using the operating backup droplet.
When another fault happens subsequently at service, the operating output contains no
extra droplets. Thus, the operational recovery simulation environment must be extended
and activities are now included. Therefore, where a fault happens in the process, the repair
steps are entirely different.
Upon definition of an operation retrieval stored procedure, the control program updates
the graph sequence and the accompanying DAG, which then performs the developmental
effects process.
28 Cyber Physical Systems

Steps of Graph Sequences

1: Derive the graph Goriginal by deleting edges between the erroneous operation and
its immediate predecessors in original sequencing graph;
2: Derive the error-recovery graph GRei for opti;
3: Copy GRei and label the nodes with different names;
4: Derive the union graph for GRei and GOriginal.

2.4.2.3 Step 3: Concept of Proper Handling

When a bug is found at a control point, a different visualization of the subjected to intense
(which include careful treatment of intermediate results) of the phylogenetic analysis
would be triggered in the cyber-physical framework envisaged. This method is called a
re-synthesis based on the original design derived from the a priori neutron activation. The
re-synthesis method comprises the following:

• Other processes must be prevented from interrupting. Take the example below.
For bioassay with transcription, an error-recovery procedure at particular instant
10 should be activated. The Mix 1 procedure is introduced when the error-recov-
ery mechanism is initiated. In order to prevent disruption, the results of the re-
synthesis shall be the same in the previous studies of the synthesis.
• In the findings of the re-synthetic analysis, electrodes at which the mistake was, it
is sometimes considered that it should be circumvented.

We suggest two re-synthesis methods for complex re-synthesis to fulfill these criteria. First,
a local greedy algorithm, and secondly, a multi-objective optimization algorithm based on
PRSA [3]. The first step is determining all operations for the greedy algorithm that has to
conform to the outcome of re-synthesis. These include: the error-recovery diagram pro-
cedures, incorrect procedures, and corresponding operational processes to be carried out
on electrodes with defects in the original propagation result. The original product of the
synthesis will be used for further operations.
As a module positioning with challenges challenge, dynamic recon synthesis on the
microfluidic array can be designed as formulation outcomes for certain procedures are
defined. The procedures that are carried out a priori as “obstacles” are here determined by
the initial synthesis outcome, and other surgeries needed for regeneration are re-synthe-
sized and inserted greedily in the remaining biochip region accessible. The following are
thorough measures. The following.
First, the control program puts all activities that will need to be replanted in a list of
priorities, depending on the quantum mechanical sort outcome for the procedures. These
procedures include error repair operations and all error descendants. For each process
on the queue, the program then gives priority. The lowest priority is given to the stored
procedure operations, i.e., the complete competence at the topographical level, whereas the
assignment of scarce in the queue is the “bassiest” operation (top of the topological sort).
Then on-chip resources are allocated to these procedures in the control program. R var-
ies with the time t in the on-chip resource package. In order for the current process to be
the primary concern, the control program would look for appropriate tools. For example,
if a mixing procedure is the process with the top importance, the machine will look for
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 29

an accessible mn subarray of the electrode that has not been controlled from time to t C
4t. Time to t here 4t is the time necessary for activation of the mn subset of sensors. If suf-
ficient vacant opportunities are distributed, resource coupling will be successful, and the
new schedule will be taken into account. Instead, the surgery will be deferred for supplies.
If the multi-resource possibilities are delivered concurrently, the software will choose one
and link it to a matching activity. The procedure will be withdrawn from the priority
queue after the commodity is bonded and the start/stop time determined. Be aware that
the above measures can also be used to produce re-synthesis results where many errors
are observed at the same time. In this case, several recovered procedures are enabled
simultaneously and a priority queue for every rehabilitation process is created by the con-
trol program. After these priority queues have been combined, the control program gives
a topologically dependent priority to each feature. Finally, with any combined priority
queue process, the control program calculates different synthesizing performance.
There are challenges in finding appropriate instruments for use in a microfluidic biochip
using a computer system with just a limited number of MN and P terminals. This algo-
rithm of re-synthesis is “O” (i.e., “The whole vacant rectangles”) (MN C P). Each electrode
surface port in the array is scanned and monitored extensively by software. Since there
might be a purpose in optimizing the amount of distribution channels and the techniques
for big arrays, the worse condition is O (MN). Computing cost is O in some sections of the
algorithm (1). The completion of the re-synthesis method is thus O (MN).

1: Locate the error operation at control locations based on feedback;

2: Identify the procedures to be altered and put in the priority queue Q;
3: Remove all initial operating synthesis results;4: while Q = 0 / do
5: Searching for the resource accessible for operation q0 that has the greatest priority
in Q;

It displays the scheduling that matches the graph scheduling and both display the sched-
uling that matches the graph numbering. We present only the timetable for combining
procedures in order to be clear. This is the timeline obtained with the algorithm of [11]
error recovery.
We can observe that Mixture 1 has been paused ten times during data transmission.
Around 18-time places and 28-time places raise the minimum traditional statistics which
could be recognized for only certain conditions. The related complex planning outcome
is if the error is found in Mix 3 at 10; the current Mix 1 process will be performed on the
basis of the initial outcome of propagation. It is expected that the computing benefit of
implementing the previous phone is 1 time slot. The calculating time is really smaller than
the liquid organizational processes reduction in time at least in an astronomical amount.
At the latest date 11, a re-synthesis result will be produced based on the revised Mix 1,
and 12 will be completed without interruption. At time 18, the experiment is completed.
Throughout these bioassays, no time penalty or obstruction of other activities is executed
“seamlessly.”
A PRSA-based optimization algorithm approach from [3] is also used to solve the re-
synthesis problem. The inputs and limitations of the issue with re-synthesis vary from the
original problem with synthesis. Assume that the re-synthesis dilemma operation set is
P0 and the limitations set is C 0. P0 and C 0 can be derived based on the added P and C.
On the set P, we identify first a constructor T. T is a projection from the set to the sequence
of steps currently begun instantly at t.
30 Cyber Physical Systems

T .t/ W P ! P.t/ D foptijMopti .1/ tg

In case an error in operation opti is found at the moment, P0 D P[Ri [OQ P.t/] can be
written in a series of operations which require synthesis. In this respect, Ri is the set of
recovery operations that matches the wrong operational opti, and OQ is the set of subse-
quent operations that are carried out on electrodes with defects during the initial synthesis
result. The procedure is adopted to determine the Ri operations. Then, the OQ operations
can be calculated based on the module positioning details contained in the original result
and on the position of electrodes with defects. For opti 2 P0 Mopt0, we have written new
synthesis findings. Besides the set of limitations C, the product of the re-synthesis must
meet the restriction that the area where a mistake is considered is not to be in use. The
topic of re-synthesis optimization can be written as follows:

minimize: Max 0fMopt0 i .2/g opti2P

Using PRSA-based synthesis technique implemented in [3], the above enhancement prob-
lem can be resolved. This approach can be used to extract global propagation results with
fast completion of the test, whereas for a standard bacterial genome, the CPU time is in
the order of 20 min [11]. This approach is also not ideal for online re-synthesis effects
calculation.

2.5 Compilation of Sensing Scheme Optimization

In this part, we test the re-synthesis method in representative bioassays for data transmis-
sion that are particularly likely to be fluidic. Completion times are measured for the two
sensing strategies; the m actually results from the optimization method and the global
optimization algorithm centered on PRSA are also discussed.

2.5.1 Developing of Plasmid DNA

We replicate first the biosensors known as the “alkalinelysis specimen preparation of plas-
mid DNA with SDS” [15, 24]. A combination of three reagents is essential during the sepa-
ration process. The three reactants are:

1. R1: Alkaline lysis Solution I [50mM glucose, 25mM Tris-HCl (pH 8.0), 10 mM EDTA
(pH 8.0)].
2. R2: Alkaline lysis Solution II [0.2N NaOH, 1% SDS (w/v)].
3. R3: Alkaline lysis Solution III (5M sodium acetate, glacial acetic acid).

The required concentration of the mixture is 0.22% of R1, 0.44% of R2, and 0.34% of R3,
56 28 44
which can be approximated as ReRe = Pr (Ri ) of R1, of R2, and of R3.
128 128 128
The processing diagram in mixing R1, R2, and R3 to achieve the necessary concentra-
tions is obtained. This bioassay is converted to an electrical array and is used to store all
electrode at the array border. When mistakes are observed, the cyber physical microfluid
system’s error-recovery capacity may be assessed on the basis of the completion period of
Error Recovery in Cyber-Physical Biochips 31

the bioassay. Even during bioassay, the errors are uniformly inserted into the chip and the
timeframe of both sensor systems is comparable. In this case, the fulfillment time comes
from the implemented optimization method. The findings are on balance ten times the
obtained values by repeating the tests. For this (no error recovery), where an error happens
during the bioassay, the final result of the whole procedure is wrong. In order to correct the
mistake, it is necessary to remove the biochip and to replicate the experiment on a new bio-
chip. If we conclude that the procedure is effective, the lifetime of the bacterial genome in
the defect-free case will be twice as long. Based on these data, error recovery can minimize
the completion period for bioassay and can also reduce the use of biochemical substances.
In data transmission based on performance, in other procedures, electrodes that are con-
sidered to have a defect are not used. However, the area in which the mistake occurs will
continue to be employed in following procedures during the rehabilitation process of per-
forming problems [15], where an accident happened throughout implementation. These
defective electrodes will lead to additional failures. The following approximation is devel-
oped for comparison of performance and dependability detection and correction of vital
operational durations. Completely at random, we pick one choice as the first instance of
the error in the implementation of the bacterial genome in the reliability-obvious error
recovery. Optfe-based electrodes are alluded to as “default electrodes.” We conclude that
there is a Pfail risk that this experiment will fail, when another operation is performed
again on these defective electrodes. We run the simulation 15 times for reliability-informed
error detection for a fixed value of Pfail and detect typical execution time.
Then we choose another procedure as optfe arbitrarily and display the results again.
Optfe’s electronics now include an effort exerted. We found that in the event of further
electrons being unreliable, the total duration for reliability-recovery errors is greater. The
reliability-based issue healing process doesn’t rely and preserves minimal time complex-
ity on the source of the semiconductor failure.

2.5.2 Interpolating Protein Dissolve

We assess the transcription for three binary protein assays and error recovery. These tests
lead to a test organism using two processes, namely interpolation and incremental dilu-
tion. It displays the two protocol sequencing charts [11]. The procedures are outlined in [11]
for these two biomarkers.
Completion of biosensors in the case of CCD-based sensor network even without route
discovery interpolation of preliminary testing. A 1010 electrode array is used in the bacte-
rial genome.
It records the power consumption of the linear interpolation mix bioassay when many
errors are added. The completion time here is specified only for fluid handling and
excludes re-synthesizing time used on the CPU. We can observe that the total duration
of PRSA algorithm total duration and that of the gloomy algorithm are nearly identical;
however, the CPU times are different for these two algorithms. The simulation has been
done on an Intel i5 6GB memory controller of 2.6GHz. Based on the same original propa-
gation outcome, all re-synthesis algorithms are applied. The CPU time needed to com-
pute the re-synthesis results with PRSA is about 33 minutes, which is ten times greater
than the duration of the bioassay. Although the CPU time for the optimization method is
less than 5 seconds, that is just 2.5% of the project duration for bioassays. The bioassays
resulting from the convolutional neural network are just marginally longer for the PRSA.
Notwithstanding, because of the low CPU time, the greedy algorithm is more appropriate
for interactive re-synthesis [25].
32 Cyber Physical Systems

Although the PRSA solution is less appealing to decision-making in real time, the gold-
based algorithm offers a valuable calibration point and demonstrates that it is efficient
for prompt phylogenetic analysis completion. In addition, the PRSA-based approach can
be used as the basis for alternative techniques of route discovery by pre-calculating and
pre-loading retrieval timelines. We equate the power consumption for the maintainabil-
ity and reliability-obvious error-recovery strategies with the exponential dilution protocol
implemented in [11]. First, we pick arbitrarily one optfe operation as the first instances of
failure in the bioassay, where optfe is a 14 electrode subarray dilution procedure. We then
initialized Pfail to reflect the likelihood that further actions on this deficient antenna struc-
ture would also fail. Then we execute the experiments 15 times according to any value
of Pfail and draw the average reliability-obligeable error-recovery project duration. The
faulty electrodes are, by comparison, sidestepped with the error recovery due to durabil-
ity. Thus, the time duration is separate from Pfail for the serviceability error recovery. At
the same time, we prevent the dilemma that any collection of faulty electrodes will lead
to repeated failures, thus reducing the number of mistakes in the bioassay and improving
the investigation’s quality. The cost of the procedure is minimized when less reagents/
samples are collected.

2.6 Conclusion
We’ve seen in this chapter how recent progress can be used in integrating a sensing device
into a biochip for digital microfluidics to render biochips error resistant. For the reconfigu-
ration of the “physical-aware” framework, we have introduced a cyber-physical solution,
using sensor data at intermediary control points to automatically reconfigure the biochip.
Real-time monitoring techniques were considered dependent on combined optical detec-
tors and CCD cameras. In order to dynamically create new timelines, module placing, and
droplet routing routes for the bacterial genome with minimal effect on response time, two
separate sensor-driven re-synthesis technologies have been developed. These two meth-
ods were analyzed and compared with the time required for re-synthesis bioassays and
CPUs. The synchronization of the control program of the physiological and microfluidic
biochip makes it possible to use sensor data as input to decide full operations, improve
electrode acceleration sequencing for subsequent processing, and reorganize the biochip
dynamically. Four selected protein biosensors have shown the feasibility of the proposed
solution by simulations.

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3
Online Decision-Making-Based Cyber-
Physical Optimization in PCR Biochips

Piyush Parkash, Nitin, and Shalini Singh

CONTENTS
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 35
3.2 Online Strategic Planning Cyber-Physical Biochip......................................................... 37
3.2.2 IA-Optimized DNA Amplifying Statistical Modeling....................................... 39
3.3 Optimizing Immediately Adjacent Positioning of Resources........................................ 40
3.3.1 Device-Proximity Constraints on a PCR Biochip................................................. 40
3.3.1.1 Separation Constraints.............................................................................. 40
3.3.2 Goal Equipment Localization Functionality........................................................ 41
3.3.3 Positioning of Equipment on a Biochip PCR........................................................ 41
3.3.4 Machine Positioning Parameter Optimization....................................................42
3.3.4.1 Listing All Conceivable Gadget Arrangements.....................................42
3.3.4.2 Deployment of Computer Simulation Ring-Based Devices.................43
3.4 Deployment of PCR Biosensor Immunoassay Reservoirs..............................................44
3.4.1 Low-Cost Biosensor Electrolytic Rings.................................................................44
3.4.2 Low-Cost PCR Biosensor Particle Sequencing..................................................... 45
3.4.3 Deployment of Virtual Screening Reservoirs....................................................... 45
3.5 Particle Localization Accessibility...................................................................................... 47
3.6 Cyber-Physical and Layout-Aware PCR Biochip.............................................................. 48
3.6.1 Polymerase Chain Probability Monitoring........................................................... 48
3.6.2 PCR Bioelectronics Design and Structure............................................................. 48
3.6.3 PCR Biochip Designing Deficiency Compatibility.............................................. 49
3.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 50
References........................................................................................................................................ 50

3.1 Introduction
A significant constraint for a wide range of genomic bioanalysis is the quantity of physiol-
ogy sample [1–4], namely deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). For example, during the analysis
of gene quantities of tumor DNA by functional genomic crossbreeding, the procedure
takes hundreds of nanograms of DNA strands to identify the fluorescence. [2]. A signifi-
cant number of DNA strands straight from organic materials is challenging to acquire. The
PCR algorithm is utilized to multiply (faithfully recreate) the original DNA strands [2, 3, 5]
as the first step in this bioanalysis to address this difficulty. The genomic optimization algo-
rithm may be split into three distinct phases based on the kinds of activities involved [6].

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-3 35
36 Cyber Physical Systems

One stage is the development of PCR samples. The second stage is an enhancement of
DNA furrows. Following DNA amplification, a third stage involves mixing the DNA fur-
rows with other droplets to detect the amplified furrows’ absorption and hybridization [4].
The second phase consists of the amplification of the DNA furrows.
Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) are widely utilized for economic evaluation and
are feasible for biomolecular interactions. The systems for controlling many PCR processes
on a single chip control system [3]. Droplets on a DMFB may be manipulated by employing
an electrode effect [3, 7, 8], a two-dimensional electrode array. A direct measurement for
the droplet and response time in the investigation may be accomplished with microflu-
idic system sensors like photodetectors and immunofluorescence microscopes [3, 9]. The
DMFB platform offers numerous benefits in implementing PCR in comparison to older
equipment and testers. The whole PCR technique may be implemented smoothly and react
to reduced usage. Short-term results include quick cooling/heating rates and various inte-
gration of processing modules [5, 10]. The complete PCR system may also be decreased in
size and electricity usage.
This is a perfect example. A heater creates a “hot” area and a “cooled” region. Typically,
94ı and 65ı are placed in the heated and chilled areas.
First, “PCR mix” is created on the biochip and is kept in a reservoir, including dNTPs
and MgCl2 Taq template DNA and aqueous reactions buffers. The “PCR mix” droplets are
then combined with the target DNA sequences sampled. The gutter can then be mixed
alternately [3, 7]. There are two stages to each thermal cycle: one to heat the droplet, divid-
ing into two strands of the double-stranded DNA inside the droplet known as “DNA
melting,” and the other to cool the droplet. Every strand of the DNA recognition site for
manufacturing “primary annealing” of new DNA strands. This allows for millions of cop-
ies of the original DNA strands [3]. As fluorophores mark the amplified DNA strands in
the droplets, the target DNA strands may be generated by monitoring their fluorescence
intensity at each PCR cycle using the assistive technologies of microfluids [4–6].
Some biochips are integrated with the detecting electrodes (DEs). [11–14] to allow on-
chip hybridization of amplified DNA. The surface of these DEs is manufactured using
golden sensors with various immobilized DNA samples [11, 13]. The droplets containing
the DEs are left immobile in expanded nucleotide bases following the PCR process. DNA
hybridization happens when complementing strands are the PCR amplification strands
and the samples are immobilized on the detectors. DNA fragments can therefore be exam-
ined in the amplified DNA strands.
Despite several advantages, there are four limitations in the earlier work on PCR imple-
mentation for DMFBs:

• The function modules utilized in the PCR three-stage process are created in all
previous works by themselves [3, 7], and the same design cannot be combined
effectively. This inability of the three steps often influences the accuracy and effec-
tiveness of the entire immunoassay.
• Bioanalysis is not regarded to be inherently random and complicated. When the
droplet is delivered to the biochip, the droplet cannot contain enough PCR DNA
(called a “vacuum droplet”) [15]. The biochips built for earlier work cannot control
the presence of empty droplets; therefore, the wasteful execution of the PCR can-
not be stopped.
• In earlier work, there was no consideration of interference (electric, thermal,
optical, fluid) with biochip devices arising because of the nearness effects. High
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 37

temperatures surrounding the heater, for example, can lead to biological sample
degradation in a reservoir [16]. Therefore, they cannot be positioned too near each
other for the heater and the pool.
• The mixing schedule is unknown for the previously developed PCR biochips [6].
In combining procedures, this might cause excessive transport of droplets during
the PCR reaction, adversely influencing the biochip’s performance and speed.

It offers the first design technique, which optimizes the cyber-physical, digital biochip
PCR method to resolve the short remarks mentioned previously. This work has the follow-
ing significant contributions:

• A statistical model for gene delivery is utilized to detect if the droplet contains
enough DNA strands to perform the PCR to solve the challenge of empty droplet
detection. The luminous intensity measured by photodetectors (PDs) [17–19] or by
a fluorescence microscope is retrieved by the system online in order to determine
whether the heat cycles can be continued or not. This enables us to develop an
effective PCR biochip for cyber-physics on a DMFB platform.
• Suggestion for developing a technique of designing, which includes reservoirs,
sensors, and thermal units, taking the interference between the on-chip parts into
account. A heuristic approach reduces the biochip size and electrode count and
meets proximity requirements.
• The positioning of modules considers the time costs of the transit of droplets and
the PCR biochip fault tolerance. The total mixing/mixing/dilution duration is
adjusted for a particular bioassay, and a droplet routing mechanism is devised
to circumvent electrode errors. Table 3.1 presents the timeline for the historical
development of biosensors.

The visibility of outlets for cyber-physical biochips in the sensor module is explored.
Mixing is planned to guarantee that the sensor system can monitor the droplets from top
and side perspectives in real time.

3.2 Online Strategic Planning Cyber-Physical Biochip

The lab configuring for the PCR biochip [9] is presented. The biochip sensor system moni-
tors the antioxidant capacity in the droplets and gives the control software with input.
Thus, the program may manage PCR process execution based on the sensor data.
In PCR, fluorescence is generated when a DNA coloring qualified majority binds to dou-
ble-binding DNA. Therefore, a rise in DNA during PCR results in an expansion in the
fluorescence intensity [4–6]. The sensor system measures the fluorescence brightness of the
droplet and supplies the control program with input. Therefore, the software may manage
the PCR prouse confinement effects to manipulate the PCR process’s performance number
in a droplet’s statistical method.
DNA droplet number is a nonlinear function that may be seen in the collection and
DMFB processes [15, 20]. We find that the distribution process quantitatively follows
Poisson from various information obtained from biochemistry studies where there is little
38 Cyber Physical Systems

TABLE 3.1
Development of Biosensors in Different Timelines
Year Development of biosensor
1906 M. Cramer observed electric potential arising between parts of the fluid [20]
1909 Soren Sorensen developed the concept of pH and pH scale [21]
1909 Griffin and Nelson were the first to demonstrate the immobilization of the enzyme invertase on
aluminum hydroxide and charcoal [4, 22]
1922 W.S. Hughes discovered a pH measurement electrode [23]
1956 Leland C. Clark, Jr invented the first oxygen electrode [8]
1962 Leland C. Clark, Jr et al. experimentally demonstrated an amperometric enzyme electrode for
detecting glucose [9]
1967 Updike and Hicks realized the first functional enzyme electrode based on glucose oxidase
immobilized onto an oxygen sensor [10]
1969 Guilbault and Montalvo demonstrated and reported the first potentiometric enzyme electrode-based
sensor for detecting urea [11]
1970 Discovery of ion-sensitive field-effect transistor (ISFET) by Bergveld [24]
1973 Guilbault and Lubrano defined glucose and a lactate enzyme sensor based on hydrogen peroxide
detection at a platinum electrode [12]
1974 K. Mosbach and B. Danielsson developed an enzyme thermistor [13]
1975 D.W. Lubbers and N. Opitz demonstrated fiber-optic biosensors for carbon dioxide and oxygen
detection [14]
1975 First commercial biosensor for glucose detection by YSI [25, 26]
1975 Suzuki et al. first demonstrated a microbe-based immunosensor [27]
1976 Clemens et al. demonstrated the first bedside artificial pancreas [15]
1980 Peterson demonstrated the first fiber-optic pH sensor for in vivo blood gases [28]
1982 Fiber-optic biosensor for glucose detection by Schultz [29]
1983 Liedberg et al. observed surface plasmon resonance (SPR) immunosensors [19]
1983 Roederer and Bastiaans developed the first immunosensor based on piezoelectric detection [30]
1984 First mediated amperometric biosensor: ferrocene used with glucose oxidase for glucose
detection [18]
1990 SPR-based biosensor by Pharmacia Biacore [28]
1992 Handheld blood biosensor by i-STAT [28]
1999 Poncharal et al. demonstrated the first nano biosensor [31]
2018 S. Girbi et al. demonstrated a nerve-on-chip-type biosensor for assessment of nerve impulse
conduction [32]

density of the DNA strands in the biological sample. The number of DNA strands in a
droplet is therefore obtained from [15, 20]:

lk
P ( Xc = k ) » e -l
k!
Where k is the quantity of droplet nucleotide bases, and the overall amount of droplet
DNA strands is obtained [15, 20].
The process of PCR cannot be adequately performed when a droplet exceeds a modest
boundary amount of DNA strands [21]. Droplets containing low DNA strands are called
“empty droplets.” If after the PCR completion, empty droplets are identified, the time spent
operating the heat cycles is squandered. The output signals from the sensors included in
the biochip may be used to investigate this issue to decide online if the droplet is empty.
In the course of the PCR, as stated in [6, 7], on-chip detectors can assess the strength of
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 39

photoluminescence in the droplets. If the chance of “the droplet being blank” is high, the
droplets will be rejected. A fresh droplet for PCR amplification will then be delivered onto
the biochip.
The next part provides prediction algorithms for PCR bioassay to develop an online
decision-making system.

3.2.2 IA-Optimized DNA Amplifying Statistical Modeling

The chance of creating a “good droplet” may be calculated during the calibration of the
dissipation operation [15]. A good droplet has enough DNA strands to perform the PCR.
Let G denote that “the biochip has a nice droplet.” A biochip with an unfilled droplet (Gc)
is a rare occurrence.
We suppose that the chance of detecting a fluorescence intensity (indicating that the
DNA has been replicated) during the ith heat cycle is pi when the PCR operates on a fine
droplet. Let Ak denote that “the droplet in the temperature rise does not indicate.” The
combined chance of G and Ak c is thus

P ( G ∩ Ak ) = Õ (1 - p ) × P (G )
i =1
i

If at the kth thermal cycle, no signal is detected, the posterior distribution of “the excellent
droplet” (represented as P.G jAk/) will be set as a quotient with G and Ak joint probabili-
ties and Ak likelihood:

P ( G∩ Ak )
P ( G | Ak ) =
P ( Ak )

P ( G∩ Ak )
=
P ( G∩ Ak ) + P Gc ∩ Ak ( )
k

where P ( G∩ Ak ) = Õ (1 - p ) × P (G ) and P (G ∩ A ) = P (G ) = 1 - P (G ) .
i =1
i
c
k
c

Therefore, we have:

Õ (1 - p ) × P (G ) i

P ( G | Ak ) = k
i =1

Õ (1 - p ) × P (G ) + 1 - P (G )
i =1
i

1 - P (G )
(
P Gc | Ak = ) k
.
Õ (1 - p ) × P (G ) + 1 - P (G )
i =1
i
40 Cyber Physical Systems

3.3 Optimizing Immediately Adjacent Positioning of Resources

We provide our approach to optimize the arrangement under design limitations in this
part. The device distance limitations are explained, and the objective function for the per-
formance of components on a PCR biochip is provided. The positioning method for the
geometry-based device offers two ways, which may be utilized to choose the optimum
device positioning results.

3.3.1 Device-Proximity Constraints on a PCR Biochip

There are three kinds of appliances on the PCR cybernetic implants: reservoirs, transistors
for detection, and a thermal unit (e.g., a heater). For avoiding interference between the
on-chip devices, it must be presumed that the following restrictions must be met, which
impose minimal intrapair (threshold) and interpair separation lengths between the differ-
ent device pairs. These parameters are supplied by biochip manufacturers as inputs.

3.3.1.1 Separation Constraints

• Restoration tank: The segregation connecting the two tanks should not be smaller
than an LRR [22] threshold to prevent fluidic leaking among them. A typical LRR
value is four times the circuit length on the DMFB [4].
• DE to DE disconnection: If the DEs are too near together, the immobile droplets
may have unwanted intercontamination. The separation from two DEs should
thus not be smaller than the maximum LDD value. A standard LDD value is the
dielectric quantity of four times the size of the DMFB.
• DE separation reservoir: Fluids put into repositories may have luminous labels,
affecting precision in the microscope when evaluating the concentration of the lumi-
nous DE [11]. Furthermore, the droplets sprayed from the reservoir may destroy
crops to the surfaces of the DE if a DE and a pool are positioned near together. The
distance between them should thus not be smaller than an LRD threshold. A stan-
dard LRD value is five times the conductor length on the DMFB [18].
• Heater separation tank: As heating can degenerate the tissue material and the
reagents placed into tanks [16], no less than a criterion LRH should have been the
length between that and storage and the burner. A standard LRH value is five
times the electrode length on the DMFB [3].
• DE for separating heaters: The heaters on the cybernetic implants cannot intersect
with a DE on the biochip due to the manufacturing process limitation [23]. The
distance from the DE to the heater must thus not fall short of the electrode length.
The spacing from a DE to a heater must be LDH 1.

For simplicity, we create an operator C, which corresponds to the necessary base station
between a pair of gadgets randomly chosen (represented as da and db):

C : ( da , db ) ® Minimum distance between da and db .

For example, if DE is represented by da, and a heater is represented by db, then C ( da , db ) = LDH .
For instance, if the dais DE and the DB heaters are C.da;db/D LDH.
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 41

In a PCR biochip configuration for all the components (written as: x1;y1/, X2;y2/;::,​.xn​
;yn/), we shall define the parameters of ::;.​.xn​;yn/ in order to define the configuration.

( xi - x j ) + ( y i - y j ) ³ C ( di , d j ) , "i, j.
2 2

3.3.2 Goal Equipment Localization Functionality

• The optimization problem evaluates the effectiveness of device deployment out-

comes. In the optimal solution, we examine two metrics:
• The biochip PCR area. The cost of manufacturing the biochip grows. Suppose that
all device parameters may be entered as x1;y1/,.x2;y2/;::​.xn​;yn/ for a particular
device location G. The biochip area may be calculated as follows:

Area = [ max ( x1, x2 ,...xn ) - min ( x1, x2 ,...xn )]

´ [min ( y1, y 2 ,...y n ) - min ( y1, y 2 ,...y n ) .

• The maximum deviation between the heater and the biochip containers. As the heater
has a positive temperature coefficient, the specimens in the reservoirs might degrade.
If the limitation on the base station between the storage tanks and the heater is not
broken, the liquid can be overheated in the storehouses. But it is better to put the reser-
voir as far as feasible from the heaters to further protect the integrity of the physiologi-
cal samples in the reservoir. Assuming that all Nr repositories may be marked as xr1;
yr1/,xr2;yr2/;::;xrNr; year/ in dimensions for a particular gadget deployment result G,
and the heater co-ordinates are Xh;yh/. The defined distance here between the heater
and the tanks may therefore be calculated as follows:
Nr 1

å é( x r - x h ) 2 + ( y r - y h ) 2 ù 2
êë i i úû
Davg = i =1
.
Nr

The mathematical formulation for biochip design optimization (F.G/) may be calculated as
follows for the given equipment placing outcome G:
b
F ( G ) = aArea +
Davg ( G )
Where alignment and alternate weighting are user-determined characteristics that may
be modified to take into account the comparative value of each measure. If F.G1/<F.G2/,
G1 shall be seen as positive performance in two device deployment outcomes, G1 shall be
regarded for G1 and G2.

3.3.3 Positioning of Equipment on a Biochip PCR

There are two features for the device positioning challenge in a biochip:

• Commonly, the design of an e-fluidic digital biochip design and a 2D range with
the same electrodes. We may thus assume that the electronics and electrodes
remain at integer data points alone.
42 Cyber Physical Systems

As each gadget pair might have a different limitation on the separating pacing of each
device, the entire computational complexity may be vast, and we assume that it’s an
NP-hard issue to discover a minimal area layout [24]. This part proposes a greedy approach
based on an iterative process for developing our design tool.
The PCR pattern should be created on a “digital plane” with all coordinated integer points.
The digital planes can be numerically expressed as Z2, where Z is an arithmetic setting. A
“digital point” in Z2 is believed to be positioned in the middle of each portable computer.
When DA and DB are put on the chip for connected devices, we draw a circle with C.da;
DB/ radius centering da. The area inside the ring is described da as the “forbidden area”
of DB. All electrodes, which overlap permanently or temporarily with the prohibited area
of DB, are denoted as O.da; DB. Note that in a collection of visual points, the O.da; DB/
may be seen as the “digital object” in Z2 [25]. The digital item that matches the heating is
indicated.
In other words, when the reservoir is located on the body or outside the physical prod-
uct of the heater, the appropriate separation requirement is fulfilled for the pools and the
heating element. All components must be positioned as near as possible to reduce the chip
area. An example of a correct and compacted positioning of R2 in the vicinity of H, DE D1,
and R1. This is a digital object with the isostatic convex envelope fiction of three prohibited
areas (H, D1, and R1, respectively, regarding R2). Please note that the R2 tank should not be
placed in this item for the proper context; it should be positioned as carefully as possible
for its compaction to reduce the whole surface area of the chip, including all of the compo-
nents. All PCR biochip equipment are included in the ready queue, Qdev, during the first
step of device installation. Device stacking is random in Qdev.
This technique for placing a device is shown in Figure 5.3b, where a new R2 reservoir
may be appropriately positioned in the context of an H, DE D1, and an R1 pool. We also sup-
pose that the heater is the first step in our algorithms at the beginning of the construction.
We selected the gadget from the head of the resource provisioning Dev. for every suc-
cessive stage. In all previous versions, the gadget has been well positioned in terms of its
capabilities.

3.3.4 Machine Positioning Parameter Optimization

• The results of placing in a particular sequence may be determined from the placer
of the devices that fulfill all the limitations on the closeness of the instrument.
Suppose we have no distinctive reservoirs, no distinctive DEs, and Nh heaters.
The amount of feasible job scheduling including all equipment (i.e., the number
of decision variables for PCR biological chip deployment) is therefore shown by:

( N r + N d + N h )! .
Nr ! Nd ! Nh !
• We may use two different techniques to pick the “best” option based on the pro-
vided objective functions.

3.3.4.1 Listing All Conceivable Gadget Arrangements

• As a result of its high manufacturing costs, just a few EDs are incorporated into a
biochip, and only a single refrigerating module is enough. In a standard mixing
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 43

process following a reverse transcription, the number of compounds required is

around eight. The output outlets of the capacitors are customarily placed around
the chips and the heaters within. Therefore, a management system considerably
decreases the number of viable orders. We may thus carry out all the orderings of
the previously stated heuristic method. For each gadget, the value of the inserted
optimization problem may be computed. An “optimal solution” is identified for
placing corresponding to the minimal value of the optimization problem.

3.3.4.2 Deployment of Computer Simulation Ring-Based Devices

The rising number of devices on a PCR biochip might make computing too expensive to be
effective. In this situation, we offer a technique based on genetic algorithms (GA) to find an
ideal position of the instruments.
Each initial study includes all PCR-based devices and is encoded in the GA-based
method as a genetic material. The following defined random keys have chromosome vec-
tors (or “genes”):

Chromosome = (gene(1), gene(2), gene(3), …, gene(n))

The sampling number from Œ0;1 is where n is the instrument size to be adjusted and the
genes i/ I’ve been 1 to n). The device i’s precedence value is set to Pdev.i/D gene.i/.
The focus on process thinking lists all devices generated by sorting the priority values.
The placer of the device then introduces a work placement that can be created using any
chromosome to meet the nearness restrictions.
4n chromosomes are produced haphazardly at the commencement of the GA-based
method. The heuristic method takes into account the following techniques called:

• Reproduction. The chromosome that matches the lowest cost value is transmitted
to the following generation.
• Crossover. Two-parent chromosomes are selected randomly from the aging pop-
ulation during the crossover operation. In the following manner, the offspring
chromosome is produced. The gene of the chromosome’s offspring can be either
replicated from the parent chromosomal gene. The likelihood of gene inheritance
i/ in the father and mother is determined by P and 1 P correspondingly. The chro-
mosomes of the future generation’s kids are being examined by the civilization
breeding them.
• Mutation. The population’s new chromosome is haphazardly produced to ensure
population variety.

The set of chromosomes in each generation remains 4n in the GA-based heuristic. In the
evolutionary process, the n best chromosomes are replicated into the next generation, the
chromosome equivalent to the most minor and cost density function. In the initial demo-
graphics, the original population developed 2n chromosome, and unpredictable media
generated an additional n genetic material. This % can be further enhanced by testing.
After multiple decades of development, the lowest-cost chromosome is selected from the
final subpopulation. The solution for positioning the gadgets is built using the chromo-
somal set. In the framework of a specific PCR procedure, we discuss how to improve drop-
lets’ transit and mingling.
44 Cyber Physical Systems

3.4 Deployment of PCR Biosensor Immunoassay Reservoirs

Several healing potions must be combined in a specified ratio following a standard mix-
ing method after DNA amplification. The number of mixed divides is dependent on the
algorithms and the objective ratio. Combining operation is typically described in a blend-
ing diagram G., two examples of the infrastructure fund graph [26]. The bioassay sequence
diagram is guided. Every null in-grade node in the network indicates a dissipation oper-
ation and the fluidic processes (e.g., mixing and diluting) is the interior node [27]. The
travel costs for droplets in the PCR should be selected depending on the supplied bioassay
sequenced architecture which needs the proper relocation of reservoirs and combining/
dilution planning as outlined in the sequence graph.
The conceptual design technique for the PCR brain chip will be discussed in this part.
The low-cost biochip “electrode ring” construction is implemented. A low-cost PCR bio-
chip droplet transportation problem is presented. It contains the bioassay algorithm for
the assignment of PCR biochip resources.

3.4.1 Low-Cost Biosensor Electrolytic Rings

For each of the gadgets on a 2D grid, the positioning method described above allocates a
position. The heater generally places reservoirs at the middle of the arrangement and is
located on the edge of the biological chips. The design process of the PCR biochip has to be
completed by determining the locations of the electrodes on the biochips and establishing
droplets between the devices, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The output terminals of all reservoirs are interconnected by a “cycle” of electrodes to
decrease conductors in the usual low-cost bio channel [7, 8]. The mixer modules are not
predestined to have a particular zone; every combining action occurs on the electrode
between the reservoir output ports. Let D1 and D2 indicate two distributing procedures
of reservoirs R1 and R2. Let M1 symbolize a mixing process between those two droplets,
where droplets of R1 and R2 are combined in the antenna structure between these two
electrodes.
The load balancing of PCR biochips can be increased by positioning the reservoir
output on the circumferential electrode route. The arrow shows their original transport

FIGURE 3.1
Working of PCR biosensor.
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 45

pathways, and the two drops must be combined. The travel trajectories of these two
droplets are transformed when a fault exists on the pattern. Therefore, the PCR bio-
chip may perform bioassays with an alternate droplet travel path, notwithstanding the
defect.

3.4.2 Low-Cost PCR Biosensor Particle Sequencing

All reservoirs are regarded as undifferentiated gadgets while assessing the location of
equipment. We must nonetheless assign reservoirs to every specimen/reagent employed
in a bioassay cytotoxic activity on the PCR biosensor to be performed.
If a cheap biometric scanner is available, an “electrical ring” shape must do numerous
activities simultaneously; the drip routing pathways may clash. Here we suppose that x1
to x7 reagents are kept in tanks R1 to R2.
According to the sequence graphs, the drips discharged from the R1 and R4 storage
tanks must be mixed in operation M5, and the raindrops released from R3 and R5 must
be combined in the M3 system. We suppose that output locations are arranged in the
same way in R1, R3, R4, and R5. The particles dispensing from R1, R3, R4, and R5 must
be carried in the order specified by the arrow to execute mixing operations M3 and
M5. It may be noted that these four droplets cannot be taken simultaneously on the
biochip to avoid head-on accidents. Therefore, M3 and M5 mixing can’t be performed
simultaneously.
By altering the reservoir assignment settings, droplet transportation conflicts can be
eliminated. Assume that the R1 R7 reservoir outputs are positioned, the degree of parallel-
ism will rise for the procedure. The subtree methods with the M9 root node (as described
as SubtreeM9) include just the droplets of the R1 and R4 tanks. Thus, all SubtreeM9 opera-
tions may be carried out on transistors immediately linked to the R1 and R4 output ports.
Since there is no additional reservoir output port in this location, droplets with R1 and R4
dispenses can be combined without droplet routing problems.
Similarly, activities can be conducted in the areas listing electrodes connecting the ana-
log inputs of the reservoirs in subtreeM8, subtreeM13, and subtreeM14. Ri, Rk is spelled as
Regions. Ri is represented as Continent. There is no conflict between droplet routings, and
hence, all blending activities in the mixture tree may be carried out locally.

3.4.3 Deployment of Virtual Screening Reservoirs

The findings the consumer makes an assignment of the reservoirs, droplet routing, and
planning for fluid management may be determined as follows based on this discourse.
Sequence diagram cluster formation: If the substring SubG operation includes drop-
lets from just two reservoirs, all the SubG activities between these two liquids can then
be conducted in the region. At this point, we thus need to determine the maximum
subsection on the sequence chart, so there are only two ingredients of RSi and RSJ
for operations within the subsection. In the sequenced graph, this number of pixels
is described as “basic mingling clusters.” We monitor the significance of the resulting
droplet “components” based on the nodes representing the bioassay’s final blending
procedures (i.e., null-out-degree nodes). For instance, the M18 output droplet combines
four R1, R2, R3, and R4 reactants. Then we have to retrace the previous M18 processes
and then inspect their resulting droplet for components. Until the N operation is
found, this trace-back process repeats. There are just two significant elements in their
46 Cyber Physical Systems

respective weight’s droplets. A foundational sequential mixing group is the subpara-

graph comprising operation N and its antecedent.
Allocation of the reservoir: The bioassay-specific assignment of the pool may be estab-
lished after discovering all bare mixture clusters of the sequenced diagram. For every clus-
ter mixing. The RSi; RSJ/specimens will be laid out as “neighbors” for the RSi and RSJ
respective reservoirs. An explanation of the neighborhood concept is provided as follows:

Definition 1. Suppose a set of pools is present, SR D fRn1, Rn2, Rn3, Rnk g, and they
are all arranged on a circle of electrodes. Pairs Rni and Rnj (n1 ni < nj nk), where
the electrode route P.Rni; Rnj / travels through the Ri and Rj output ports, have
“relatives” in the SR, and on this cathode route, there is no output port of other SR
reservoir configured.
Definition 2. Rnj will be the “neighbor counterclockwise” of Rni if you move from
Rni to Rnj along the P.rni; Rnj/electrode route in a clockwise manner. Rnj is the
“neighbor” against the clock in Rni, otherwise.

The following is an example. The histogram may be broken down into five major groups
of mixing. An indifference curve can indicate the link between these mixing groups. A
reservoir symbolizes each node in the network; when the same cluster has two pools,
the edge between node pairs matching those of storage tanks is provided. In the related
unspoken graph, each gout contains two alternative routing instructions, like low-cost bio-
chips’ electrode ring. If there are two fundamental mixing groupings in a reservoir, drop-
lets that have been discharged from the storage tank cannot be employed simultaneously
in all these clusters during mixing. Therefore, the undirected graph removes a portion of
the connections such that every node has no more than two parameters. The following
guess is as follows: Conjecture 5.1. Suppose that GC reflects the mixing ratio of the clusters
in a bioassay, but partial derivatives are in each node in GC. Then we can always position
the reservoir on the ring of the electrodes so that every pair of pools among them may be
placed next door.
When there is a rim between them, we position Rni as the neighbor of Rnj for two reser-
voirs Rni and Rnj. As mentioned above, there are two neighbors for each reservoir on the
electrode rings: clockwise, outwards, and anti-clockwise. If another pool is in Rnj’s nearby
places (e.g., clockwise neighbor), we place Rni in an empty location. Notice that each edge
is not beyond two borders; therefore, no additional reservoirs occupy both neighboring
areas of Rnj.
Operational planning: The sequencing of activities may be established based on the
sequenced network once the storage allocation phase has been finished. As activities may
take place locally without long-distance transfer in each core mixing cluster, transactions
can be done simultaneously in several groups. The planning of activities within the depen-
dency among outputs and inputs might be predicated on the same clustering [28].
At the beginning of the bioassay, procedures included with the fundamental blending
groups are conducted. After the blending cluster activities are done, more operations are
performed. For example, M1 and M3 are in the entire cluster’s mixture in Figure 5.4 R1;
R4/. After cluster procedure. R1; R4/ when done, one of the clusters. R1; R4/output droplets
are mixed with M8-Droplet R2, cluster output droplets. Cluster R1; R4/. In operation, M9,
R2, R4/ will be combined. The programming of all the hydraulic steering action may be
obtained from this technique in the sequencing graph.
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 47

3.5 Particle Localization Accessibility

The surveillance of particles is crucial in a computerized maintenance management
digital microfluidic system. Investigators typically employ fluorescence cameras and
imaging technology placed on the computing platforms to observe many activities
concurrently on the biochip [29, 30]. The pictures obtained may be used to monitor the
quantities and percentages of the tiny particles at each phase of the experiment and
accurately estimate the time necessary to accomplish vacuum distillation procedures
on a biochip [29, 30].
The abuse of the top-view picture will nevertheless contribute to incorrect findings
for the final adjustment amount. For instance, for 10s, a fluorescence droplet is fused
with a non-fluorescein droplet, and the fluorescence microscopy captures combined
droplet pictures from top and side views [30], respectively. The fluorescence reagent
can be seen in the combination droplet uniformly distributed from the top, i.e., the
mixing process might look completed. The merged droplet has several layers from
the side profile, which is insufficient for the mixing procedure. Cyber-physical micro-
fluidic biochips from many viewpoints are so essential to monitor. On the computing
platform, digital sensors may be fixed so that pictures can be obtained from two dis-
tinct views. If many droplets are handled simultaneously on the biochip, a side-view
evaluation should consider the droplet’s transparency. It is assumed droplets 14 are
combined in four biochip mixers concurrently, with arrows specifying the vehicle’s
motion. We suppose that these four droplet-combining procedures start simultane-
ously with the droplets in the same orientation.
Droplets 1 and 3 are positioned in one line of the range of the electrode, and in the same
line of the electrode, there are droplets 2 and 4 in the starting position. When the 1 and 3
movements are planned onto the y-axis, they always intersect during the mixing process.
Therefore, when the cameras are positioned, and the side views of all four showers are cap-
tured, droplet 1 is always hidden under droplet 3. The monitoring system will see droplet
1 as “invisible.” Drop 2 is concealed below droplet 4, and the monitoring mechanism is
likewise invisible. Likewise, when the camera is fixed and the four drips are monitored
on the side of the camera, drops 2 and 4 are always invisible to the monitoring program.
To detect all the combining operations concurrently, the condition that “some of the rain-
drops are transparent for the camera or fluorescence microscope” must be prevented. We
may specify multiple starting locations for droplets to address this drawback. The connec-
tion between time and the position of these two raindrops is projected on the x-axis by the
mobility of droplets 1 and 2. Droplets 1 and 2 do not overlap at any point; thus, the camera
may take pictures of both of these goblets. The most significant number of droplets visible
from the side view may be further determined by projecting the motions of droplets on
the x- or y-axis.
For example, we may calculate the maximum number of raindrops that can be seen in
parallel for 14 mixers that overlap the projection on the y-axis by selecting different begin-
ning locations and traveling orientations.
In designing fluid treatment operations on a microfabrication biosensor, this transpar-
ency restriction of nanoparticles should be considered. The simulation program aims to
check the accessibility of each droplet for the movements of the droplets toward this x- or
y-axis. If a transparent droplet is available, the biosensor detection systems modify the
original positions of the droplets.
48 Cyber Physical Systems

3.6 Cyber-Physical and Layout-Aware PCR Biochip

This subsection shows the actual simulated results to validate the technique proposed for
developing a cyber-physical and layout-conscious PCR biosensor. Then effects of the tests
are submitted for three protocol blending benchmarks.

3.6.1 Polymerase Chain Probability Monitoring

The proposed mathematical formulation may be used for online decision-making during
the DNA nanoparticle amplification. It is essential to highlight that those fluorescent indi-
cations from multiplex PCR cannot be instantly detected when the targeting DNA strands
are duplicated. This is due to each recognition method’s anticipated noise signal (MDS)
[28]. The plasmid fragments’ fluorescence signal is not visible if its amplitude is less than
the MDS. We thus assume that the probability of the fluorescence intensity on extended
DNA strands before the Nth combustion stroke is zero. The odds of estimating the fluores-
cence channel (i.e., the DNA is enhanced) are highest.
If we suppose that the connection between the amount of gamma irradiation carried
forward) and P. GcjAi/(i.e., the likelihood of that “droplet being vacant”).
The equivalent P.GcjAi/ connection in this case. The value of p is 104, 105, and 106 in the
three curves, correspondingly. Figure 10.5 shows the likelihood that if “this droplet is an
unfilled droplet,” it is set to 105 if no signal at the 36th melting process exists, 60%; if there
is no signal at the 37th melting process, it is likely to become 99%. Thus, if no sign is found
after heat cycle 37, we have a confidence of 99% that the droplet is sufficient and should be
eliminated for the PCR DNA strands.
A complete prediction model may be used to assess the reverse transcription stage. As
in the ideal case, the number of stranded DNA in a droplet increases exponentially; the
PIM value is high.

ì0, if i < N
ï
ï
pi = í p * ´2i - N , if N £ i £ N - log 2 p *
ï
ïî1, if N - log 2 p* < i

3.6.2 PCR Bioelectronics Design and Structure

One of these designs is minimal in the form of “R,” “D,” and “H,” correspondingly, rep-
resenting the analog inputs of the tanks, the PDS, and the heater. If the unit area of each
electrode is considered to be the shortest rectangular surrounding, the layout rotates.
After designing a minimal area architecture, a specific PCR technique is established
by allocating an appropriate reservoir to decrease droplet movement. A solution mix-
ing method is referred to as Bioassay 1 [26]. The genetic algorithms may obtain the best
outcome of the assignment of the reservoir according to the regularity of use in the
mixing operation. The final architecture achieved after selecting the pool reduces the
travel time of droplets. R17 is equipped with x17 reactant. During the bioassay, mixer
paths can be allocated to the electrode connecting the output ports of a pair of reser-
voirs. Therefore, all mixing procedures in the protocol may be done “locally” without
problems in routing droplets via vast distances. For example, M1, M4, and M8 are
reagent x4 and x7 inputs, which are to be conducted on electrodes somewhere between
Cyber-Physical Optimization in PCR Biochip 49

R4 and R7 correspondingly. The degree of concurrency in the fluid treatment proce-

dure is also high because conflicts may be avoided between the transfer of ideas and
droplet routing in the biochip. Here we suppose the mixing duration on a 1 4 mixer is
5s. And the traveling time of the droplet from electrodes is tms (tm usually varies from
0.01 to 1 [31]). Then it’s computed in (35+36tm) seconds that the entire biomass essay
must be performed.
Here we develop a further positioning of the gadget as the basic algorithm. The primary
approach is to arrange all devices at the layout of one boundary (including exit ports for
reservoirs, PDs, and heats), LMAX D'MAX {LRR, LDD, LRD, LRH, LDH} The distance
between two devices is specified. All these devices are connected via a circular route, con-
sisting of all the border electrodes.
The baseline technique size of the antenna structure is 20 15, whereas the necessary elec-
trode number is 68. The whole bioassay is carried out with .80 C 115tm/s.
Thus, the suggested design technique may lower the size of the chip by 59.7% and 35.3%,
and the executable time by 57.8%, compared to the previous algorithm (when the value of
tm is set as 0:1).
We then investigate a technique representing a genuine PCR mixing ratio [32]. This bio-
logical test is known as physical test 2. In the eight components, the mixing balance is
written as follows:
In addition to this, Bioassay 3 is a mixing technique with three sample preparation. We
are considering this. Bioassays are enhanced considerably in layout size, electrode count,
and prediction accuracy compared to the baseline procedure in all three situations.
Since the number of devices to be put is very modest, these three laboratory bioassays
maximize the experimental findings of the method suggested. We are also developing
three benchmarks with comparatively many algorithms, and the fundamental algorithms
are used to obtain the results. The simulated results are provided. It should be noted that
the approach, due to the high computational complexity, is inaccessible while finding the
optimal outcomes of device placement for benchmark tests 2 and 3. The approach sets the
constants èf and èf correspondingly as 1 and 10. Compared with the baseline method, we
find that approach 2 can lowers the biochip area by 64.1–72.9%.

3.6.3 PCR Biochip Designing Deficiency Compatibility

Physical flaws may arise on DMFBs due to manufacturing errors and electrode deteriora-
tion. These faults can be categorized according to their placement on the biochip in two
groups. Suppose a defect disengages the droplet path to two “isolated portions” or the
deficiency intersects on the biochip with a biochip storage tank. In that case, the error is
classified as a “catastrophic defect” (potentially fatal defect). All other deficiencies are cat-
egorized as “non-disaster flaws.”
The PCR biochip cannot be utilized further in the event of a disastrous failure. The most
vulnerable parts of semiconductors in terms of pathophysiology experimental method are
found. The total number of terminals where defects are devastating for each of the three
PCR biosensors constructed for bioassays for each of the three PCR biosensors constructed
for bioassays.
If there is a failure to resolve a calamity, we can forward the droplets to their destina-
tion. The re-routing of the droplets can affect the road strength and reduce the popula-
tion administration parallelism. It should be noticed, therefore, the execution period of
the immunoassay on a biochip with a non-disaster flaw is more time-consistent with the
defect-free biochip.
50 Cyber Physical Systems

For each PCR biochip, a non-catastrophic flaw is randomly inserted into the biochip, and
the measurement duration is then calculated. The defective insertion simulation has been
carried out for all potential non-catastrophic faults in the layout—the accurate tempera-
ture and confidence interval for the performance of bioassays on defective biochips. The
tm value is set to 0.1. The proportion of electrodes with disastrous faults ranges from 33.3%
to 52.3% from the table. The PCR biochip may be employed by graceful degradation with
27.267% increase in the execution duration of bioassay with just the existence of a single
non-catastrophic flaw.

3.7 Conclusion
These chapters have shown that fundamental in liquid operations, such as supply and
temperature cycling, notwithstanding the uncertainties, cyber-physical connectivity in
digital microfluidics may be employed for reliable bioassay on the chip. In response to data
provided by sensors, the suggested design method allows dynamic, informed decisions
online for the ending of heat cycles. We have also launched new device arrangements and
arrangement designs to protect the array from undesired device noise and interference,
minimize conflicts in droplets’ routing, and decrease bioassay runtime. Droplet transpar-
ency is also addressed during the planning of liquid activities in the monitoring program.
The simulated data from lab procedures show that the suggested design approach may
obtain significant dependability and fault tolerance with reduced chip sizes and electrode
counts.

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4
Security and Privacy Aspects of
Cyber Physical Systems

Chhavi Sharma

CONTENTS
4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 53
4.2 Characteristics of CPS..........................................................................................................54
4.2.1 Embedded Systems...................................................................................................54
4.2.2 Real-Time Systems.................................................................................................... 55
4.2.3 Network Protocol...................................................................................................... 55
4.3 General Architecture of Cyber Physical Systems............................................................. 56
4.4 Defining Security and Privacy............................................................................................ 56
4.4.1 Cyber Security and Privacy..................................................................................... 57
4.4.2 Physical Security and Privacy................................................................................. 57
4.5 CPS Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, and Failure.......................................................... 57
4.5.1 CPS Security Threats................................................................................................ 57
4.5.1.1 Cyber Threats............................................................................................. 58
4.5.1.2 Physical Threats......................................................................................... 59
4.5.1.2.2 Loss.............................................................................................................. 59
4.5.2 CPS Vulnerabilities................................................................................................... 60
4.5.2.1 Reasons of Vulnerabilities........................................................................ 60
4.6 Generalized Attacker and Attack Models for Cyber Physical Systems........................ 61
4.6.1 Limitations of Cyberattack Models........................................................................ 62
4.7 Security and Privacy in CPSs.............................................................................................. 62
4.7.1 Privacy in Cyber Physical Systems.........................................................................63
4.7.2 Security in Cyber Physical Systems.......................................................................63
4.8 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................63
References........................................................................................................................................64

4.1 Introduction
Cyber physical systems (CPS-type receptor) play an important role in the sector of the
Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry-v4.0. The CPS allow intelligent application and ser-
vices, in order to properly function, in real time. The integration of cyber physical systems
for the exchange of different types of data and the confidentiality of the information in real
time [1]. The CPS receiver is a network of in-house systems. This is a network of internal
systems, which interact with the physical inputs and outputs. The CPS-type receiver has
three main components: sensors, collectors, and actuators. The CPS is the backbone of
DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-4 53
54 Cyber Physical Systems

TABLE 4.1
CPS Description and Classification
Naming Classification Description

Smart house Industrial consumer IoT Control smart devices

Smart grid Industrial IoT Smart efficient energy
Oil refinery Industrial transportation IoT Naphtha, gasoline, diesel
Water treatment Industrial consumer IoT Improved water quality
Medical devices Medical wearable IoT Enhanced medical treatment
Smart cars Industrial transportation IoT Enhanced driver experience
Supply chains Industrial transportation IoT Real-time delivery

the patient's ability to respond to new conditions. The CPS-type receivers, the system can
bring the environment to adapt to and monitor the physical world [2​​–​, 13] (Table 4.1).
The CPS-type receiver systems are widely used in many fields [photo 1]. The CPS-type
receiver systems, communication systems, for example, the power transmission sys-
tems, communication systems, agricultural/environmental management systems, mili-
tary systems [7, 8], and the autonomic system (the system for unmanned aerial vehicles,
robotics, autonomous vehicles, etc.) [9, 10]. The CPS-type receiver can be used in the
health care system in order to improve the quality of health care [11], and a supply chain
management system is to provide an eco-friendly, reversible, cost-efficient, and safe pro-
duction process.
The CPS receiver system is heterogeneous in nature. The CPS-receiver systems, the con-
fidence of a personal and confidential information. The CPS-type receiver system has a
wide range of locations. The system is subjected to physical security threats, attacks, and
challenges.

4.2 Characteristics of CPS
The recipient of the CPS type consist of in-house systems, real-time systems, networks,
and control theory.

4.2.1 Embedded Systems
The internal systems of several computers to interact directly with the physical world (sen-
sors, actuators, or actuators) need the CPS-type receiver system with limited resources.
They don’t have the total computational power of classical computers. In some of our inter-
nal systems, while work experience is not running, the operating system, but it is just that
you are working inside the program. The firmware may not be modified or deleted by the
end user without the need to use special programs and remains in the unit, irrespective of
whether it is on or off.
Cyber physical systems, which allow for the monitoring and control of complex physical
processes with the help of a computer and the IoT technology are becoming increasingly
relevant in the major application areas, including manufacturing automation and smart
cities.
Security and Privacy Aspects of CPS 55

4.2.2 Real-Time Systems
Real-time systems is that the system is real-time, which means that the system is subjected
to real time, that is, the answer is, they can’t guarantee that, within a specified time, the
system needs to comply with the time limit referred to in it. For example, flight control
system, real-time displays, etc.

4.2.3 Network Protocol
A formal language is compulsory for the communication between the transmitter. For
speech, in order to be effective, it is important to agree on a common language between the
two of communicating with people. This means that language is an important part that
will give the necessary rules of social communication.
The task is to turn on the unit, the unit of communication, that is, the general provisions
laid down in the series and to the feedback. This is where some of the protocols come into
play. It defines a set of rules that are required for the communication to work as expected
(Figure 4.1).

FIGURE 4.1
CPSs are used in multiple domains.
56 Cyber Physical Systems

4.3 General Architecture of Cyber Physical Systems

Figure 4.2

4.4 Defining Security and Privacy

Security is one of the set of measures that are designed to ensure that the system is
able to reach the intended target, but not the negative behavior. New features may
be added to the system in order to enhance the functionality in order to enhance the
functionality [18​​– 32].
When a function is connected to the system, it must be secured in such a way that it does
not compromise on the intended function(s) and in the face of new attacks. The concept of
security and privacy is for appropriate use and protection of your information. Integrity is
the ability to limit your ability to express yourself. In general, it is often considered to be a
security issue. Privacy is a difficult part of your life. An operating system must protect the
privacy of its users. Ensure confidentiality and security, which cannot be communicated
to unauthorized persons, but also of privacy, as it allows the owners of their own, in order
to regulate the dissemination of information.

FIGURE 4.2
Architecture of cyber physical systems [12].
Security and Privacy Aspects of CPS 57

4.4.1 Cyber Security and Privacy

The CPSs comprise the information technology and physical dimensions. The concepts
of data privacy and security can be applied to both and the individual CPSs. That is, the
central committee of the Central Public Sector Undertaking (CPSU) and some of the secu-
rity measures to be applied. Cyber security is a combination of attack, prevention, detec-
tion, suppression, recovery, and clean-up in order to accommodate a risk-management
strategy.
The three core principles of information security, is “the CIA Triad”, confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Integrity, is only authorized users can access resources related
to CPS.
Disabled-the Assets are accessible to authorized parties at appropriate times.
The CIA triad provides secure access to the right information to the right people.
Principles of data privacy:
Identification: The process or action of an identifier, or a user process.
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is a presentation of irrefutable evidence that a mes-
sage may be sent or received. If a message or a transaction can be challenged, in a major
event identification, which can be appealed, and the benefits.

4.4.2 Physical Security and Privacy

The following principles are designed to provide shelter:

Deterrence: Deterrence is the act of preventing an act or event that, by suggestion,

doubt or fear the consequences.
Detection: Finding a positive rating to a particular item that can cause a potentially
harmful action.
Delay: The delay time on the obstacles slows down or prevents the enemies, you will
be limited in your options and may be compelled to take an adverse action.
Response: The answer is action—action taken by the appropriate forces on the
ground, and for a period of time in order to stop the enemy advance.
Neutralization: The neutralization of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, to
deprive the enemy of the ability to take action or any other activity.

4.5 CPS Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, and Failure

There is a broad range of IoT devices that can use the receiver’s CPS. IoT domains are inter-
acting using a variety of techniques and protocols. In the CPS-type receiver, the system is
vulnerable to threats and attacks.

4.5.1 CPS Security Threats

Threats to the security of CPS receivers can be classified as cyber-physical threats:
58 Cyber Physical Systems

4.5.1.1 Cyber Threats
The information technology threats: The main focus is in the area of industrial security on
the internet was to focus on cyber threats, rather than a natural hazard.
Cyber security can’t be assessed; however, we can analyze it from different points of
view, as shown in Tables 4.2​and Table 4.3.
Some of the threats in the context of CPS, the type of recipients include:

1. Function: It consists of concealing the identity of a reliable, is actually damaging an

unknown source. In this case, the attack is able to replace the sensor, for example, by
sending you on a bad, misleading, and/or inaccurate data in measuring, control of the
center.
2. Sabotage: Sabotage consists of the unlawful interception of communication traffic
and invasion by a malicious third-party software, or as to interfere with the commu-
nication process. Disturbance of supply of products and services that failure due to
shutdown may be caused by a variety of factors, including physical attacks, challenges
to open CPS equipment, receiver types, and the whole electromagnetic infrastructure.

TABLE 4.2
Different Perspectives of Evaluating Cyber Security
Cyber security perspectives Description

Centering information Requires protecting the data flow during the storage phase, the transmission
phase, and even the processing phase.
Oriented function Requires integrating the cyber-physical components in the overall CPS.
Oriented threat Impacts data confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability.

TABLE 4.3
Different Threats in CPSs
Wireless exploitation It requires knowledge of the system’s structure, and thus, exploiting its wireless
capabilities to gain remote access or control over a system or possibly disrupt the
system’s operations. This causes collision and/or loss of control.
Jamming In this case, attackers usually aim at changing the device’s state.
Reconnaissance This results in violating data confidentiality due to the limitation of traditional
defenses.
Disclosure of Hackers can disclose any private/personal information through the interception of
information communication traffic using wireless hacking tools violating both privacy and
confidentiality.
Unauthorized access Attackers try to gain an unauthorized access through either a logical or physical
network breach and to retrieve important data, leading to a privacy breach.
Interception Hackers can intercept private conversations through the exploitation of already
existing or new vulnerabilities leading to another type of privacy and
confidentiality breach.
GPS exploitation Hackers can track a device or even a car by exploiting (GPS) navigation systems,
resulting in a location privacy violation.
Information gathering Software manufacturers covertly gather files and audit logs stored on any given
device in order to sell this huge amount of personal information for marketing
and commercial purposes in an illegal manner.
Security and Privacy Aspects of CPS 59

FIGURE 4.3
Threats associated with CPSs.

3. Service disruption or denial: Uninterrupted or error-free, that the store will attack
the physical can affect the device to the break of work, the services, or to modify
the configuration. These are serious consequences, especially in the case of medical
applications.
4. Tracking: Due to the nature of the device is a physical person can receive in this unit,
and/or even their age (Figure 4.3).

4.5.1.2 Physical Threats
Recently developed industries, the emergence of Innovative Metering Infrastructure (s),
and the Country Network (Finance), as well as the storage yards of the monitoring and
management, the dependability of the CPS, type of receiving antenna to the branch offices
[13] all contribute to the widespread adoption of the CPS-type receiver. In fact, the natural
hazards can be classified into the following three main factors:

4.5.1.2.1 Physical Damage
A variety of systems like the power grid, power station, base station are well-operated
and well-protected, to implement a security mechanism that is based on access control,
authorization, and authentication mechanisms, for example, the username and password,
and maps, in the field of biometrics and video surveillance. Stations, which are the power
lines, are the target of sabotage, attacks, and disruptions. The smart meter, and the delicate
hot-sensors [11]. It’s hard to get involved with the smart meter. Smart meters need to be
constantly hacking the fullest possible information. Physical disruption of the peace and
larceny on the side of the combatants, and not only to carry out. There are ways to lessen
the blow of the danger; however, the impact of the risk can be reduced.

4.5.1.2.2 Loss
Aggressive, toxic threat in the event of a power substation failure is that there is a possibil-
ity of a complete shutdown of the large major cities, and within a few hours, the intelligent
network is severely degraded [12].

4.5.1.2.3 Repair
The repair may be based on a self-healing process [14]. A self-healing process, which is
based on the strength or sensation, interference with, or failure to isolate the issue and
to alert the appropriate system to auto-configure the backup resources in a continuous
60 Cyber Physical Systems

supply of the required maintenance. In order to facilitate a speedy restoration, it is prefer-

able that no time frame be specified. However, the critical components suffer from a lack
of or a limited backup capability. Therefore, self-healing is able to react quickly to a serious
injury.

4.5.2 CPS Vulnerabilities
In this section, we are going to present you the most important vulnerabilities of the CPS
receiver, which may be the subject of the above-mentioned threats. Frankly speaking, it
refers to the inability to fight against the enemies of the environment.
Analysis involves the identification and analysis of the weak points of the system
that make the use of the CPS receiver. It also includes the identification of appropri-
ate corrective and preventive measures to reduce, mitigate, or eliminate any potential
vulnerabilities [15].
Table 4.4 gives a brief description of the vulnerability of the CPS receiver.

4.5.2.1 Reasons of Vulnerabilities
The vulnerabilities occur for many reasons:

Assumption and isolation: Probably also in the system, the challenge is to create a
reliable and secure operating system, with a view for the implementation of any
necessary service, provided that there is a system in isolation from the rest of the
world.
Increasing connectivity: Increasing the connection, the receiver, as the CPS is now
more connected to each other, and there is no guarantee that the software on these
devices is a free vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a hacker. In most of the
cases, the users and manufacturers address the CPS-type receiver connectivity,
which is “install and forget” devices, which makes the potential security vulner-
abilities in software accessible to the internet for many, many years to come. This
is a type of risk which increases the risk that the system will have to be a victim to
safety and security breaches.
Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity of the components of the third-party sites is cooked
and presented in the CPS, the type of recipients for the creation of applications,

TABLE 4.4
Brief Description of CPS Vulnerabilities
Category Description Examples

Network Include weaknesses of the Man-in-the-middle, eavesdropping, replay,

vulnerabilities protective security measures, sniffing, spoofing and communication-stack,
compromising open wired/ back-doors, DoS/DDoS and packet
wireless communication and manipulation attacks [16].
connections.
Platform Include hardware, software,
vulnerabilities configuration, and database
vulnerabilities [17].
Management Include lack of security guidelines,
vulnerabilities procedures, and policies.
Security and Privacy Aspects of CPS 61

the CPS, the type of recipients. This diversity, in the end, it will increase the attack
surface of the smart grid, and possibly increase vulnerability. Each of the hetero-
geneity of the components is subject to various security issues.
USB usage: Usage of USB is the main reason for the vulnerability of the CPS receiver.
Anyone who knowingly distributes USB flash drives infected with malware that
monitors a user’s file system and network activity. Any gamer using a CPS system
is vulnerable to the infection. Consequently, the thought, in and to the USB port.
Then it was wired into a hub, from which it branched out to other devices for
usage and duplication.
Bad practice: A bad experience in the first place because of the lack of encryption/
knowledge, which causes the execution of a code in an endless loop will be very
easy to modify to an attack.
Spying: The receiver, which the CPS is under the attack of the spying/espionage, pri-
marily, the use of spyware (malware) forms secretly enter and remain undetected
for many years, and it is the most important task for the interception, theft, and a
collection of proprietary/confidential information.
Homogeneity: For example, this is the kind of cyber physical systems, the suffering,
alone, and at the same vulnerabilities, that is, when they are abused, it can affect
all of the devices in its vicinity.
Suspicious employees: Suspicious-employed, they can be intentional or uninten-
tional loss or damage to the receiver, which is a CPS unit, acts of sabotage, and to
change the encoding of the language, or to provide remote access to hackers, to
open a closed port, or attach an infected USB drive.

4.6 Generalized Attacker and Attack Models for Cyber Physical Systems

Many of the attack models are available for cyber physical systems (CPS receivers). An
attack model is used to create a parameter-attack of the procedures and functions that are
targeted to specific CPS receivers. A model which looks to be on the attack could capture
both the physical and the loose, and it combines a number of existing attack models for a
single structure.
Cyber physical systems (CPS for the recipient), the integration of computational algo-
rithms and physical company attacker models are proposed for cyber physical systems
(CPS). The attack models derived from the attacker model are used to generate parameter-
ized attack procedures and functions that target a specific CPS. The attacker models can
capture both physical and cyberattacks and unify a number of existing attack models into
a common framework.
Cyber physical systems (CPS) are an integration of computational algorithms and physi-
cal components. CPS systems find their application in infrastructure like water treatment,
smart grid, and transportation, and in smaller systems such as a pacemaker or an insu-
lin pump. There is a possibility of cyberattack in such systems. It is important to design
mechanisms for detecting and defending a CPS attack. Attacks may be cyber or physi-
cal. A “cyberattack” affects communication networks whereas a “physical attack” disturbs
physical elements of a CPS such as motors, generators, pumps, etc.
62 Cyber Physical Systems

TABLE 4.5
Various Types of Attack Models
Attack models Attacks occurring

Network-centric models Man-in-the-middle and denial of service attacks

Information security-centric models Buffer overflow and code injection
Cryptography centric attacks Plaintext, password cracking
CPS-centric attacks Bias and surge attacks

There are different types of attacks that CPS systems have to defend against. Existing
attack models can be used for defending against an attack or a new one can also be
designed. Various of attack models are shown in Table 4.5.
The receiver system is the CPS that is used for infrastructure, water treatment, smart
networks, and transportation, and in smaller systems, such as a pacemaker or an insulin
pump. You will have the possibility of cyberattacks in such a system. It is essential to
develop detection and protection mechanisms to prevent the attack on the receiver, as the
CPS. The attacks could be a cyber or physical. In a “cyberattack,” there is an impact on the
network, and in this context, a “physical attack” as a violation of the physical components
of a CPU, such as motors, generators, pumps, and so on.
To whom does the CPS-type technology need to provide protection, and against what
kinds of attacks? Defending against an assault is possible with the modeling at your dis-
posal, and you can even utilize these models to create new defenses (Table 4.5).
Various attack models are indicated in Table 4.5.

4.6.1 Limitations of Cyberattack Models

Cyberattack models suffer from the following limitations:

(a) Any non-compliance with the various types of attacks in a general-purpose

system.
(b) No liability to the physical device.

These limitations can be overcome by careful design and method.

4.7 Security and Privacy in CPSs

We will discuss a wide range of applications in the industrial and personal CC of the CPSU
and of the consequences of accident, protection, safety, security, and privacy. In a CPS-type
receiver, the system shows many relationships, dependencies, and system interactions. The
receiver is vulnerable to both digital and physical threats because of their dependency on
the CPS. Additionally, the complexity of a physical system rises when its constituent parts
are encouraged to communicate with one another via the use of a network.
The CPS-type of the receiver of the attack may be made to the cyber-physical-or domain-
specific and domain, it is possible to be, the individual and the individual’s protected, but
Security and Privacy Aspects of CPS 63

it is only in one part of the system, where both of them at the same time, the domain (s) that
is to be protected, is indeed to be protected.
These CPSs can have a variety of points of attack, security, and privacy, such as:

• The interface between the devices

• To your device
• The infrastructure that supports them
• The internet, as well as the
• Malicious users

4.7.1 Privacy in Cyber Physical Systems

Understanding the CPS’s security requires an understanding of both the physical and
cyber domains, and their interactions. The CPS’s integrity appear to be more complex.
When the findings are known, solid, receiver type, the CPS, and their interactions, then
secrecy may be maintained.
In the internet age, all of the data collected is finally split up in a row. Already in the
IoT the management of information is done by the computer manually. Now, medical
devices, the state-of-the-art facilities, according to the drive, the cell phones, smart devices,
connected cars, connected homes, and many other devices that are to be collected for an
unknown amount and type of information to the users. Users are aware that these devices
to interact over the internet. People fail to realize is that their devices are connected to the
internet, and they do not fully understand the implications of being safe and secure. This
can result in the leak of information that could be gathered, or stolen, without the knowl-
edge of the affected user.

4.7.2 Security in Cyber Physical Systems

This example is imported in this section to say that the safety of the complexity of a sys-
tem is to make the transition from cyber or physical to cyber-physical. We’ll talk about the
CPSU central committee’s physical setup and its people, as well as the committee’s overall
contemporary design in Figure 4.4.

4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have defined the security and integrity, the application of the classical
definition, both in the digital and physical worlds, and the development in the area of the
CPSs. We have illustrated the various security and privacy issues between the infrastruc-
ture and the individual CPSs and shown how the communication between the systems is
affected, that is to say, the need for security and integrity of the network infrastructure. A
number of examples showing what happens when a part of the security and the integrity
is neglected have been presented, and we have also discussed the methodology in order to
ensure that the system has been designed and has been used in a wrong way. Finally, we
discuss the current challenges faced by consumers and the industry, as everywhere, the
spread of the CPSs is on its way to becoming the new norm.
64 Cyber Physical Systems

FIGURE 4.4
Various attack points in CPSs.

That is, as the number of devices that are connected to the computer, such as the CPSs, is
continuing to grow at an exponential rate, safety, security, and privacy needs to be taken
seriously. Attention should be given to both and the physical dimensions of the CPSS, as
well as their interaction. Also, there is a serious concern, and the risk of substance abuse
can be decreased by the existence of these devices is on the formulation of the project,
or the general arrangement is adopted, the costs and benefits should be considered. The
central committee of the CPSU, is it forever, and their presence is going to have a greater
impact on the daily lives of billions of people around the world. So, the security and the
privacy of individuals is incalculably important in the development, promotion, manage-
ment, operation, and replacement of the CPSs.

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5
Challenges in the Taxonomy of Cyber-
Physical Security and Trust

Piyush Parkash, Nitin, and Shalini Singh

CONTENTS
5.1 What Is Security and Trust?................................................................................................ 67
5.2 Classification of Attacks....................................................................................................... 68
5.2.1 Attacking Area.......................................................................................................... 69
5.2.2 IP Attack Modeling................................................................................................... 70
5.2.3 Difficult Prediction................................................................................................... 70
5.3 Intrusion Outcomes.............................................................................................................. 71
5.3.1 Modifying Sensors................................................................................................... 71
5.3.2 Attack on Services.................................................................................................... 71
5.3.3 Altering Function...................................................................................................... 71
5.3.4 Designing Robbery................................................................................................... 72
5.3.5 Leakage of Sensitive Data........................................................................................ 72
5.4 Malicious Modification in Signals...................................................................................... 73
5.4.1 Quantifying and Amplifying Nucleic Acids in a DNA Sample........................ 73
5.4.2 Attacks on Multiple Small Reaction Chambers................................................... 73
5.4.3 Operating Principles of dPCR................................................................................. 74
5.4.4 Simulation Process in dPCR.................................................................................... 74
5.4.5 Detection Capabilities.............................................................................................. 75
5.4.6 Fabricating Data........................................................................................................ 75
5.5 Challenges of Microfluidic Security.................................................................................. 75
5.5.1 Privacy in Medical Diagnostics.............................................................................. 75
5.5.2 Capability of Public Safety...................................................................................... 76
5.5.3 Basic Research Integrity Tool..................................................................................77
5.5.4 Blood Testing Platform.............................................................................................77
5.5.5 Drug Performance.................................................................................................... 78
5.5.6 DNA Fingerprinting Techniques............................................................................ 79
5.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 79
References........................................................................................................................................ 81

5.1 What Is Security and Trust?

• Security violations are reported almost every day. It is enticing to use its sup-
posed identity to further the argument for security and reliability. Over the past
couple of years, we have seen Facebook’s role in huge data collection [1], personal
data breaches from Equifax [2], and personal voice-activated companions [3] being

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-5 67
68 Cyber Physical Systems

deported. Although it is true today that every system designer would do well
to examine the safety ramifications of their work, we also emphasize additional
important reasons for considering cyber-physical microfluidic biochip (CPMB)
security:Untrusted supply networks: Transnational distribution channels in the
contemporary production of semiconductor products result in a complex web of
players with diverse capacity and motive for harmful actions such as hardware
insertion from Trojan [4] and piracy for property rights (IP) [5]. Commercial micro-
fluidic devices of the next generations should adapt to the sophistication of manu-
facturing processes and will therefore be subject to the same assaults [6].
• In addition to being a boon to developing secure and reliable systems, cyber-
physical integration also poses a severe safety problem for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it involves the presence of a digital control unit. This controller usually
is built with a single circuit board or an off-shelf microcontroller and can add
several new potential vulnerabilities such as a network interface. Second, an
intruder may exploit the physical features of the system to tremendous advan-
tage; the data is not just the only thing in danger, but physical properties can
also now be altered and destroyed. By exploiting the app’s physical weaknesses,
scientists may learn more about the application’s inner workings and exposing it
to possible threats.
• Increased adoption rate: Microfluidics literature has repeatedly shown that this
technique still has to be marketed on a wide scale [7]. Security and confidence are
elements that may be developed and automatically converted into CPMBs and
which provide a high degree of protection. In contrast to macrolabs, training con-
formity with regulations and audits is the norm under human supervision. The
security-centric design might eventually lead to viable solutions for general imple-
mentation using microfluidics from mostly academic studies.
• Prevention: After the fact, the computing sector is seeing the adoption of safety
measures. A response-oriented strategy guarantees that genuine issues prompt
solutions but at a significant expense for the people involved. Microfluidics is still
a new technology that offers few motivating examples. But this is essentially why
microfluidics provides an opportunity since the architecture of safety and confi-
dence can first and foremost prevent such events.
• Amazing: Microfluidic technology can be pretty convenient for safety-centered
design. The designers can construct security networks naturally using unique
microfluidic characteristics. For example, in general, the complexities of technolo-
gies such as these are smaller than that in VLSI [8], and time scales are frequently
less than those in the semiconductors in microfluidic systems [9]. In addition,
standards have to be released as scientists continue to investigate new notions of
design and study fundamental physics and materials [7]. Thus, there is a chance
to include safety in standards development.

5.2 Classification of Attacks
Here, we present an integral classification of potential vulnerabilities, threat models, and
motives that may affect CPMBs. We notice that while hypothetical, this categorization is
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 69

based entirely on ideas and instances from other fields. The categorization emphasizes
elements that are unique to microfluidics as much as practicable.

5.2.1 Attacking Area

• A surface for an assault is a possible entry point for an offensive attack. According
to the following taxonomies, the attacking regions can have:
• Indirect physical access: unintentional usage of IP address and port number to
perform an attack. This would include uncovered USB and Internet jackets ini-
tially used to maintain or transfer information and the unloading of cartridge
trays for biochips. In addition, some microfluidic systems are built on ordinary,
in-shelf processors and accessible to a variety of underutilized physical ports.
• Direct physics access: Many developers aim to develop a fully portable, autono-
mous lab-on-one chip. This offers numerous practical advantages but physically
renders the platform insecure. For example, a gadget for pollution management
installed in remote areas would readily be manipulated. Fault injecting through
power or clock smoking and exploiting controllers, samples, or chemicals may be
feasible in intrusive, direct physical attacks, in particular, in susceptible environ-
ments. This also implies the privacy of wearable sensors, as signal tracks may be
picked off.
• Network access: Network-enabled cyber-physical connectivity offers a robust
assassination surface for malevolent opponents seeking distant attacks. Zero-day
feats, intelligence agency hacking tools, uncached systems, and social technology
contribute to networked computer vulnerability. It complicates the reality that
CPMBs are typically implemented in environments that cannot be maintained
regularly either because of costs or inaccessibility. The only method to avoid net-
work interfaces being misused is to eliminate them, but the utility of the CPMB
would be significantly limited.
• Wireless access: The convenient way to transfer data, especially to smartphone
applications integrated with mobile terminals, such as wirelessly and using
Zigbee. This offers the possibility for a microfluidic platform for attackers nearby
but not necessarily in possession.
• Documentation of the configuration: The knowledge needed to make a foundation
for the microfluid might consist of circuitry schemes, procedures for biochemical
testing, or biochip layouts. System specification may be easily exploited for adding
capacity attacks in their raw form.
• Default interfaces: This refers to user experience, such as a touchpad or a chassis
cut-out, which is often required to observe the advancement of the test. If not cor-
rectly constructed, such connections may disclose protected information or allow
permissions to escalate. For example, damages may ensue if operational parame-
ters that the user may select are not safe from unauthorized or hazardous settings.
Or, by carefully constructing a collection of liquids that can signal the blending
sequence, an attacker may try to revise a protocol.
• Side-channel attacks utilize physical phenomena that were initially not consid-
ered in system design. Insecurity literature, microwave radiation, and power
side channels were primarily investigated and proven to be effective in disrupt-
ing unprotected cryptography algorithm hardware implementations [10]. CPMBs
70 Cyber Physical Systems

have different physical properties, such as temperatures, luminescence, and

metabolites, that can be used for this purpose.

5.2.2 IP Attack Modeling

• Based on the criteria provided forth in, we classify an enemy country tactical and
operational capability [11]. Technical skills represent an attacker’s understanding
of how the microfluidic platform operates and its ability to obtain this experi-
mentally based intelligence. Operations skills define the way an opponent may
use or inject the type of malware, for example, I/O ports on a microflow platform,
while an IP assault implies the assailant has access to an installation. Note that
because we include IP-based attacks, our concepts of security and reliability are
more comprehensive than those mentioned in [11]. We offer possible threat models
categorized by attacker sites for researchers to determine.
• The untrusted supply chain is responsible for generating threat models. Biochip
platform developers should deal with components from different suppliers and
combine them. These suppliers might be situated abroad, and many suppliers
can be employed simultaneously. These parties would probably wish to carry out
IP-related assaults and have considerable technical and operational skills since
vital design information is supplied.
• Once the microfluidic technology is implemented and functioning, field risks
occur. Opponents might include malevolent end users wishing to change the
operation of a technology and distant adversaries involved in data or natural
facilities being compromised. Those opponents can have excellent technologi-
cal skills, especially remotely parties, which can be found globally and sup-
ported by national governments. They have limited operating skills, as their
ability to attack is constrained by the accessible equipment and software attack
vectors.

5.2.3 Difficult Prediction
There is a wide range and challenging prediction of human incentives to compromise
cyber physical systems; however, based on various relevant disciplines, we may list several
typical motives that are likely to drive the assault.

• Financial gain: All IP assaults are motivated. There is plenty of evidence that IC
products are counterfeit, over the manufacture, and reverse engineering. Other
assaults may be driven by malware, ID theft, and sales of user data. Intriguing and
recent phenomena are unethical marketing attacks, which can reveal a security
weakness and lead to significant changes in the market value of a firm. This has
occurred recently with the surprising revelation of numerous vulnerabilities in
AMD processors [12].
• Revenge: Disgruntled workers have reported some of the most prominent safety
violations in recent years [13]. These assailants are incorporated in an organiza-
tion, and after they have been incorrect, they use the destructive effect from their
accessibility and expertise.
• Policy: The Stuxnet worm’s emergence in 2010 reassessed the actual scale of gov-
ernment-sponsored, politically driven cyber threats [14]. Engineers working on
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 71

cyber-physical systems should consider formidable adversaries who could steal

trade secrets or conduct other forms of damage to the system for personal gain.
• Personal gain: Academics may be motivated to manufacture data under pressure
to publish. Dubious scholars may be encouraged to look for advanced fraud tactics
due to the rising efficiency of the procedures used to identify falsified data.

5.3 Intrusion Outcomes
• Due to this flow of architecture and the typical biochip building, many kinds of
assaults are conceivable. Depending on the success, we may generally rate attacks
as follows.

5.3.1 Modifying Sensors

• Reading falsification refers to the modification or manufacturing sensor readings

to deceive the end user. After digesting and sensing the microfluidic platform, the
computer that eventually stores, analyzes, and sends sensor information can be inter-
fered with. The use of message security mechanisms [15] can handle computer-based
assaults, but cyber-physical interconnectivity leaves the potential of a physical assault.
• As microfluidics finally moves toward wearable electronics that may be quickly
implemented in the field, the physical aspect becomes more and more a worry. A
hostile end user can modify the sensor equipment by disrupting the sensor/con-
troller link. A fake picture can be presented before the camera system in the optical
detecting systems to delude the controllers. This might lead to a medical diagno-
sis application’s harmful or disastrous patient results. Alternatively, an adversary
might change sensor values for errors detection equipment used on the biochip.

5.3.2 Attack on Services

• Denial-of-service (DoS) is a type of attack that breaches the system’s unavailability

and makes it useless. DoS is experienced more often as a nuisance on the Internet
every day. There is a possibility for significantly more damage in a microfluidic
biochip. It might be costly to collect and refill specimens that are suitable for use
with microfluidic devices. Several hardware defects such as external contamina-
tion make dependable functioning difficult [16]. DoS is hard to protect against
since an intruder must only exploit a single vulnerability, and an operation can
be carried out at any stage of the design flux. The dynamics that make DoS preva-
lent nowadays for computer security, such as computer platform homogenization
and DoS-as-a-service, will likewise play an unwanted role in microfluidic biochip
deployments if no attention is paid to this design stage.

5.3.3 Altering Function

• Functionality changes are a danger to the undesired performance of a CPMB. The

line between denial of communication and functioning is complex. Aside from
72 Cyber Physical Systems

the fact that the device is now inoperable, it also continues to perform in an unan-
ticipated or degraded manner. The device is now functioning. A product that fails
to comply with specifications may cause frustrations for the end user and may
cause the producer to lose customers. We see abuse from the end user as a viable
place to target functional modifications; to attain an intended result, if an end user
wants to bend the microfluidic platform to him, it is a breach of the authenticity
of the assay. It violates the confidence in the applications in which the platforms
are implemented on a broader scale. A hostile end user poses a severe concern
because it is challenging to construct manipulative devices caused by physically
intrusive attacks [17].

5.3.4 Designing Robbery

• Design robbery is a wide range of copyrighted material and cyber-physical

device-manufacturing risks and knowledge. The intellectual capital in the micro-
fluidic realm exists as masks, substances, and procedures that form a substratum
for manipulating fluids and protocols. These are thus instructions for the perfor-
mance of the biochemical analysis. For the most part, sophisticated technology
is required to develop these protocols, and businesses want to safeguard their
funds by preventing unauthorized use. In general, in 2014, the market of LOC
technologies reached $3.9 trillion and is predicted to rise by $18.4 trillion by 2020
[18]. Design robbery might increase the sector’s significant growth in future years.
Arguments over property rights infrequently happen in microfluidics [19] and
waste the financial capabilities that might be better used somewhere. In addi-
tion, when the offenders of invention theft are situated overseas, there may be
the minimum legal consequence. Halbleiter suffers from production constraints
such as over construction, IP theft, and counterfeiting [20]. It is fair to expect the
microfluid sector to face difficulties because many manufacturing techniques are
developed from semicontroller procedures. With the increasing complexities of
microfluidics, more vertical integration of the supply chain is expected. The reli-
ability of the design flow [6, 21] thus leaves unanswered concerns.
• IP theft can even happen at the end of end-user fluid operation and is commonly
seen. A standard microfluidic device is produced using a transparent plate, as
an image sensor is required to detect the end output. The motion of fluids on the
device is thus easy, and the procedure based on these measurements is reverse
engineered. Low complexity and low operating characteristics aggravate the
issue, and thousands of hertz are typically operated by digital microfluidic bio-
chips (DMFBs) [22].

5.3.5 Leakage of Sensitive Data

The unlawful disclosure of personal or confidential data is a security and privacy issue.
Untrustworthy supply chains provide numerous avenues of attack for knowledge leak-
ing. Patient data, unique biochemical procedures, and private keys are examples of per-
sonal knowledge. Many microfluidic biochips are used in medical settings for diagnosis.
Therefore, critical patient information needs to be managed appropriately. Due to the
nature of the hardware industry’s supply chain, horizontal research has been given a high
priority. Trojans were shown to be compact despite divulging sensitive data, including
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 73

cryptographic private keys. Since most of the ingredients and procedures used for manu-
facturing microfluidic devices immediately borrowed from the IC sector are also relevant,
microfluidics’ peculiar physics can lead to susceptible communication systems.

5.4 Malicious Modification in Signals

A fraudulent change to impulses used to operate a biochip is an act of manipulation
attack initially described as part of DMFBs with changed actuation sequences [23]. The
assault outlines how a hostile opponent might accomplish results such as denial-of-service
or statistic manipulation. Various attack vectors may perform power transfer manipula-
tion, such as data manipulation in memory locations, the programming alteration used to
produce actuating sequencing or physical equipment insertion. Flow-based biochips can
potentially be tampered with by their pressure control valve to actuate [24]. The overall
efficacy and adaptability of manipulation assaults make it appealing to malevolent oppo-
nents. The book’s hardware security approaches include counteracting assaults through
actuators manipulation.
We are examining ways to mitigate digital polymerase chain reaction (dPCR), an impor-
tant application field for microfluidics, to emphasize the risk presented by this assault in
a CPMB [25].

5.4.1 Quantifying and Amplifying Nucleic Acids in a DNA Sample

A comparatively new approach for measuring and multiplying nuclear acids in template
DNA is the digital polymerase chain reaction. The input must be divided into numerous
tiny reaction chambers by volumes and is different from standard PCR methods. dPCR
has several strengths, such as inhibitor tolerance, absence of calibration curves, and the
opportunity to give quantitative actual, not comparative [26]. We discuss the ideas under-
lying dPCR in this section and how a commercial microfluidic device developed for dPCR
may be hacked so that the dissemination of target DNA among some of the compart-
ments is partial. Since a benchtop device contains the dPCR processes and physical valve
processes, the end user would be unable to attack if the biochip was checked for statisti-
cal abnormalities and evaluated, thereby completely deregulating the goal of benchtop
automating. We will then address the consequences for variance in copy numbers and the
overall integrity of research.

5.4.2 Attacks on Multiple Small Reaction Chambers

The standard implementation of the microfluidic dPCR chip-based catalyst is used for the
development. The reaction cell, including inlets for materials and reagents, is a detach-
able chip. The chip is installed into an embedded controller, which incorporates a variety
of sensors. To produce numerous tiny reaction chambers, the microcontroller analyzes
the on-chip actuators and cycles the temperatures to conduct PCR responses. Embedded
fluorescent detectors communicate the test results to the built-in computer that displays
or stores the data on an incorporated monitor. The operation of the microfluidic platform
streamlines several previously performed manual procedures. Therefore, user mistake
falls quickly. In this operations protocol, however, it is implied that the devices execute the
74 Cyber Physical Systems

test with integrity, as the end user does not take any step from the sample preparation to
the final reading.
Suppose an attacker can disturb the activation of the microwave biochip. In that case, it
may be possible to skew the dispersion of DNA samples or stop the PCR process, resulting
in inaccurate estimations of the actual target DNA concentration. We have investigated a
marketable microfluidic platform that has been determined to reflect its architecture, as
illustrated accurately by an exposed attack surface on the USB, serial, and ethernet inter-
faces. An attacker can load computer viruses if these channels are unprotected. We found
out that a single board computer with bespoke software loaded into a CompactFlash (CF)
card is utilized on this specific platform off-the-shelf. The replacement of a CF card by
a malignant one might jeopardize a technically susceptible machine. An external entity
might use the connection to the internet to take over the device. An assailant might par-
tially cause the pneumatic actuators to malfunction when the microcontroller is affected.
The commands may be adjusted to shorten the start time or provide a transitional control
signal. The opening of elastomer valves has a linear response to pressure changes over
most of their operation [27]. Consequently, the sampling rate would be interrupted in all the
reaction chambers, and a Gaussian system with constant parameters would be breached.

5.4.3 Operating Principles of dPCR

dPCR’s working concept is to divide the DNA sample arbitrarily into many tiny chambers.
These reaction chambers may be carried out in a chip-based array of dPCRs or created by
encapsulation of materials in droplets produced by oil emulsion (droplet dPCR). The PCR
amplification is done on all partitions to enhance the specific DNA sequence. The fluores-
cence monitor then reads the reaction. The percentage of affirmative to negative responses
can be utilized in calculating the number of nucleic acid sequences in the sample. The aim
is to have a Poisson distributive distribution following the randomized data division and
determine the expected number of target nucleotide sequences (M').

Mˆ = -ln (1 - H / C)ˆ 5.1

Where H Ç is the affirmative chamber seen, and C is the total compartments [28].
Inconsistent receptacles and a non-random arrangement of molecules have, yet, restricted
the adoption of dPCR for clinical diagnostics [29] in their assessment of positive chambers.
dPCR methods have been loaned to microfluidic technology, which provides applications
like multiple genetic variability investigations and medicine processing. These devices are
presently being offered only for research, and diagnostic applications are likely to occur
only once the technology matures [26, 29].

5.4.4 Simulation Process in dPCR

A large-scale mathematical model demonstrates the effects of an assault. The random
assignment of M molecules into C tetra reaction chambers dispersed through K of a panel
can be mimicked by a dPCR experiment. In other words, we choose one of the reaction
compartments and assign the component to each component with a probability propor-
tional. We next evaluate the genuine concentrations of molecules based on observation of
the variety of positive reaction chambers H and assume that the identification works cor-
rectly in these simulations.
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 75

5.4.5 Detection Capabilities
Differences in architectural repetition numbers (CNVs) in genomic segments are differ-
ences [30–32]. CNVs are different. CNVs have been researched by the sensitive and pre-
cise identification of techniques like dPCR, which have provided significant insight into
how minor variants play a role in genetic disorders such as autism and Crohn’s condi-
tion. Multiple genes ratios established during illness investigations may be affected by
the quantity of positive responses an attacker generates while undermining microfluid
frameworks for the performance of dPCR. Without the correct copy numbers, positive
connections between these genomic changes and illnesses are not possible. Worse, it may
be possible to create faulty connections. Spurious relationships will prevent therapies for
improvement.

5.4.6 Fabricating Data
Instead of entirely falsifying data to make more compelling proof that the experiments
have been performed, the attacker might be driven to interference with materials and
equipment. Attacks on parts required threaten to overturn recent orders to improve
research performance and repeatability. In particular, within the dPCR, many investiga-
tors were unaware of the technical, fundamental methods and pitfalls—starting from
an initial was result published in 2013 expressly to address those questions for posting
Mathematical Digital PCR Experimentation (Digital MIQE) guidelines [33]. However, an
investigator might cooperate fully with the norm and still produce unreproducible data.
Therefore, time and resources need to be squandered to discover these false outcomes.
Scientists or technicians in the laboratory are sometimes driven to create or strengthen
financial data. These breaches of research excellence can significantly affect everyday
individuals, apart from defecting scientific publications. Currently, dPCR is utilized in
research settings because of the cost of the technology involved and resource needs. dPCR
microfluidics technologies are predicted to mature to become an appealing diagnostic
platform. Hence, a PCR platform assault’s possible safety consequences may jeopardize
patients’ well-being. An attacker might affect a medical provider’s decision-making by
distorting the definitive diagnosis to the extent that they are within reach.

5.5 Challenges of Microfluidic Security

We now give thorough analyses on applications that present a substantial obstacle or a
possibility for creative development to further stimulate work in microfluidic safety.

5.5.1 Privacy in Medical Diagnostics

Medical diagnosis constitutes an essential field of applications for research into microflu-
ids. It will be advantageous for patient participation and better treatment quality to swiftly
identify illnesses and multiplex tests in distant areas outside the medical centers. However,
if precautionary steps are not implemented, the multiplication of untrusted inexpensive
gadgets will result in many invasions of privacy. Data gathered after the processing of flu-
ids and personal metadata might be included in confidential documents on a microfluidic
76 Cyber Physical Systems

device. Transparency of patient information has become a concern to medical equipment

manufacturers [34]. Many of the same problems and risks will apply to microfluidic cyber
physical systems.
The biological laboratory analytical chips would theoretically undergo approved dis-
posal processes; however, regulations guaranteeing safe disposal will be divided between
countries and the Environmental Protection Agency [35]. In addition, safety is not part of a
routine. In health care facilities, in physically insecure plastic containers, the biohazard col-
lecting containers are situated. Sterilization procedures, such as burning, autoclaving, and
microwaving, are quite damaging and likely remove confidential material. However, these
technologies have negative limitations such as energy, area, and expense for expensive
equipment and pollutants generation. There are now no disposal restrictions for biochips,
and there will probably be no time for any legislative changes. And although standards
are publicized and mandated, diagnostic equipment that employs remote controls cannot
rely on end users to follow proper disposal procedures. Designers must guarantee that
critical information may be safeguarded even if no architectural safety measures are intro-
duced when the device enters the appropriate disposal.

5.5.2 Capability of Public Safety

Microfluidics offers an excellent framework for public protection and defense applications.
The enhanced water and wastewater treatment capacity and the benefit of a larger specific
surface area ratio allow the analysis of chemicals to carry out an abundance of unusual
reactions in the chip. Examples include environmental pollutants monitoring [36, 37],
pathogen identification, food security protection medications [38], and chemical or biologi-
cal weapons [39], for instance, microfluidic devices intended for public collision avoidance.
Early identification of toxins and infections is one of the essential elements in successful
protection against biological weapons. Early diagnosis allows therapy before symptoms
occur entirely while also safeguarding against people who have affected immune function
like the elderly. Detection techniques must thus operate reliably and efficiently at all times.
It is hard to estimate the actual threat of biological warfare as 170 nations have accessed
and accepted the Convention on Chemical Weapons 1972 [40]. Whether these governments
are now actively producing or hosting bioweapons is entirely speculative. But events in
Damascus have demonstrated the development and deployment of biological weapons:
the sarin nerve toxin was discharged in armed form. It was responsible for the slaughter
and injury of people. The Assad regime refused to engage and called the tale manufactur-
ing. Sustainable environmental surveillance devices allowing microfluidics might offer an
early warning and an assault at a time when the fundamental facts are being discussed
about actual occurrences.
The disability of detection techniques will also be necessary for organizations concerned
about guaranteeing optimum performance and believable negligence of their biological
warfare. Countries are one of the few entities that are able and adequately determined to
create huge stocks of biological weaponry. Therefore, security designers have to presume
that attackers are technically advanced.
Immunoassays and nucleic acid screening are two approaches used to identify biologi-
cal and chemical weapons on the chip [39]. Immunoassays detect how much analytic a
solution has by attaching an antibody to a particular macromolecule. At the same time,
PCR is used to enhance and recognize pathogens of DNA in nucleic acid tests. For all types
of detection techniques, several DMFB-based devices were mentioned in the documenta-
tion. The manipulation might be done using software or by loading Trojan hardware. In
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 77

biochips with continuous flow, gates are computerized and may thus be tampered with
the same action. Then fluids can mix or produce early insufficiencies accidentally.

5.5.3 Basic Research Integrity Tool

In the chemical and biological disciplines, microfluidics as a fundamental research tool
helps to increase performance and automate complicated processes that enhance repro-
ductivity and dependability while decreasing operating mistakes. Indeed, microfluidic
methods were predicted to replace the bottle. Despite these upsides, microfluid studies
in engineering vs. biology and healthcare have a primary connection. The more produc-
tive engineering microfluidics publications are devoted to the proof-of-conception of new
technologies and techniques. Biological and medical researchers adopt these technologies
slowly and widely, while microfluidics remains limited. Instead of just reproducing cur-
rent laboratory procedures, research has shown that microfluidics researchers might profit
from inventing new methods and applications. One such use might be confidentiality and
trustworthiness.
As demonstrated in the case study of dPCR, microfluidic systems might give an advanced
path for false investigators to commit investigational fraud credibly. Although peer review
and findings can automatically screen for fraud, the procedures are reactive. This leads to
situations like the disgraced scientist Haruko Obokata whose mentor died suddenly after
retracting her Nature publications when scientific fraud results in a human loss.
The second fraud incident occurred in 2010 when a third-party research facility entrusted
with FDA medication assessment mainly produced data over the years. This information
was utilized for medication approval, with about 100 allowed on the marketplace. And
despite this disclosure, many of these medicines remain on the market for pharma manu-
facturers. The problem might potentially have been averted if the instruments utilized for
these experiments had provided safe and trustworthy microfluidic technology.
Can any sort of integrated error checking used in mass spectrometers prevent such high
levels of fraud from occurring? Another strong justification for preventive actions was
made in the FASEB publication: “The longer the scientific community responds to events
that reduce confidence, the more it leaves the public luck to fund its work.” Ambitious
aims, such as maintaining the integrity of research and certifying sensor readings, are
functions that conventional technical laboratories cannot achieve; the advances in safety
and the confirmation of confidence clearly illustrate the superiority of laboratories. The
equipment and machinery used to carry out the research may be controlled using cyber-
physical microfluidics to ensure responsibility. To safeguard researchers’ privacy, it would
only be possible for service providers to examine the information for this study at issue.
Microfluidics is appealing in this respect as a framework for doing research—it allows
accurate fluid handling while incorporating sensors to track experiential stages in real
time. Developments in condensed sensing might also help effectively capture the result of
an investigation.

5.5.4 Blood Testing Platform

Monsanto has developed Edison, a technology for microfluidic blood tests, in the mid-
2010s. Only a few droplets of blood were needed while the prices were reduced to really
cheap levels and was seen as innovative. However, the firm received criticism and unfa-
vorable media over their cloud computing scientific basis. In 2016, when Monsanto had to
record blood test data for several years, the criticism appeared well-founded. Consumers
78 Cyber Physical Systems

were confronted that erroneous laboratory tests determined their medical attention. The
technical specifics of the case of Monsanto are not known, but the compromising of a well-
used blood diagnosis test may be investigated: in vitro glucose measurement. Regular dia-
betes testing is required for appropriate monitoring of diabetic individuals. The amount
of insulin to be administered to the patient is decided dependent on the extent of glucose
levels. The smoothly conducted nightstand glucose tests with automatic microfluidic bio-
chips provide fast, low-cost, and effective measurement. A diagram represents the glucose-
measuring test, known as a sequenced network. This test usually evaluates the amount of
glucose in a blood sample by building a known concentration solution’s inoculating loop
of the glucose calibration curve. The X-axis shows the various concentrations of dilution
(mg/dL), and the Y-axis is the response rate measured by the change in the absorbance
grade expressed as AU/s (absorbance unit per second). This curve helps to interpolate the
concentrations of the glucose sample being tested, which is why it is necessary to achieve
maximum accuracy.
Two realistic result-manipulation assaults against glucose-based microfluidics have
been disclosed in Ali et al. The first attack (Attack 1) wants to mess with the test results
by altering the diabetic content in the sample. The heavy dotted lines represent sequence
graph modifications relative to the brilliant sequence graphs. The S3 buffer droplet W1
is combined with the I6 glucose outlet and diluted Dl10. Since hypoglycemia is halved in
intensity, the test result is incorrect. The user cannot understand the absorbance values
of the waste buffer droplets. A malformed calibration curve initiates the second attack
(Attack 2) by manipulating the sequence graphs on the reaction chains 2 and 4. For this
reason, the two D1 and S3 waste buffer droplets are utilized.
Intentionally destructive attack network was created by malicious attackers. The thick
lines represent the changes in the platinum plot. In reaction chain 1, the waste buffer gout
(after D1) is blended with glucose (the I2 droplet), diluting reaction chain 2. Concentration
levels of glucose solvents in reaction chain 2 are lowered to half of their platinum levels
(400, 200, 100, 50, 25, and 12.5 mg/dL). Similar effects may also be seen in chain 4 when the
S3 waste buffering droplet is combined with the I7 glucose solution droplets—the sharp
curve in the malignant Attack 2 calibration graph.

5.5.5 Drug Performance
Over the years, several high-profile situations have arisen that led to championships
being dropped and the tournament being suspended. Many of these drug doping charges
emerged after the test failed, and drug acceptance was revealed after that. In certain situa-
tions, doping is performed systematically on a massive scale, such as in East Germany and,
more recently, Russia. But how efficient these exams are is an unsettled topic. What’s the
wrong positive rate? What’s the false-negative rate? Is it possible to hack the organizations
and tools utilized in drug monitoring? And are the quantitative rationale for these drug
screenings problematic?
To handle general pro guidelines and legislation and to provide monitoring and train-
ing for athletes, the World Anti-doping Agency (WADA) was established in 1999. WADA
provides the ISTI, which outlines, among other things, protocols for the performance of
athlete communication for out-of-competing testing. WADA releases the ISTI. Practices for
the athletes have begun. The examination may be easier to schedule and less invasive if
POC diagnostic tools were available. Still, this type of use allows athletes and instructors
to manipulate equipment or even use samples that are not part of the athlete-under-test.
The ISTI also notes that “The certification organization for the specimen collection session
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 79

concerned owns specimens from a participant.” This might raise a problem of property
and security because the drug testing method should only answer whether or not athletes
utilized prohibited substances. The prospect of identifying and disclosing irrelevant infor-
mation might enable the removal of whole specimens. The authenticity of sport and the
ease, convenience, and confidentiality of athletes might be benefited from a reliable POC
testing ground.
Change in features can be done via tampering, manufacture of falsified devices, or
neglect by an end user. The hardware or software elements can be modified at all stages
of a project round. A state involved in widespread doping fraud is likely to use its techni-
cal ability to change diagnostic equipment’s functioning. Powerful vulnerability scanners
will unavoidably demand security and trust approaches to such workloads.

5.5.6 DNA Fingerprinting Techniques

The use of DNA profiling techniques to detect persons in police prosecutions includes
the implementation of DNA forensics. DNA collection is carried out first, then extraction,
amplification, detection, and storage or destruction in the conventional forensic DNA
flow is done. Each stage of DNA processing must be done in a pathology lab specifically
equipped. Forensics laboratory regulation in the United States is fragmented, with just a
few states which need forensic DNA accreditation. In addition, forensic DNA processing
problems were discovered even with certification and government supervision, such as
microbial spoilage and analytical neglect. DNA forensics development and adaptation of
microfluid technology was driven by its ability to tackle the weaknesses inherent in stan-
dard laboratory flows and save time and expense, as shown in Figure 5.1.
Microfluidic devices have successfully executed cell lysis, DNA separation, extraction,
polymerase chain reaction, and detection. However, all these procedures are not inte-
grated into one mobile lab-on-a-chip device by the present state of the art. In this writ-
ing, practical use of this technology is limited. The microfluidic innovation is projected to
reach maturity so that a crime scene device may be implemented with reliability and per-
formance in mind. Automation and the reduced number of project phases in the examina-
tion decrease the probability of contamination or deliberate fouling. On the other hand,
new technology might introduce new, unexpected attack avenues. The nascence of micro-
fluidics in forensics with DNA offers the possibility to build security and confidence in
critical applications, such as crime and government. In the fictional case shown in Table
5.1, Suspect A is excluded from the crime scene sample source. On the other hand, Suspect
B matches the crime scene sample at 13 STRs. A calculation of Suspect B’s genotype fre-
quency, based upon the STR allele frequencies within Suspect B’s ethnic group, reveals
that the likelihood that a random member of this ethnic group has this profile is about 1
in 1.5 billion. It is essential to understand that this number is the probability of seeing this
DNA profile if the crime scene evidence did not come from the suspect but another person.

5.6 Conclusion
The safety and confidentiality of CPMBs encompass new physical modalities and excit-
ing new areas of application, comprising classic hardware security components, automa-
tion, and control system safety and more conventional information security methods. Due
 80

FIGURE 5.1
DNA fingerprinting technique.
Cyber Physical Systems
Cyber-Physical Security and Trust 81

TABLE 5.1
Example DNA Profiles Showing the STR Alleles for Each Sample and the Genotype Frequency of
Suspect B for Each STR Locus
Suspect B’s genotype frequency
STR locus Evidence sample Suspect A Suspect B for each STR

D3S1358 15, 17 17, 17 15, 17 0.13

vWA 15, 16 18, 19 15, 16 0.22
FG 23, 27 21, 23 23, 27 0.31
D8S1179 12, 13 14, 15 12, 13 0.34
D21S11 28, 30 27, 30.2 28, 30 0.06
D18S51 12, 18 14, 18 12, 18 0.11
D5S818 13, 13 9, 12 13, 13 0.29
D13S317 12, 12 12, 12 12, 12 0.21
D7S820 10, 11 9, 10 10, 11 0.26
CSF1PO 8, 11 11, 12 8, 11 0.18
TOX 7, 8 8, 8 7, 8 0.30
THO1 9.3, 9.3 6, 9.3 9.3, 9.3 0.38
D16S539 9, 13 11, 12 9, 13 0.10

to the complex multidisciplinary structure of the system components, the challenges are
complex, yet those new characteristics create innovative countermeasures. In addition, we
argue that hardware security is required: the analysis of vulnerabilities resulting from the
decision to design hardware and the creation of remedies in both equipment and software.
It addresses various security problems that may arise on specified microfluidic platforms
produced, marketed, or provided under open-source licensing. This article is by no means
exhaustive; curious readers can instead consult up-to-date scholarly works to learn more
about the capabilities of today’s biochips. It gives examples of scenarios under various
attack surface and assault results. It has several distinctive features that microfluidic bio-
chips can be employed or exploited.

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6
Cyber Physical Systems in Supply
Chain Management

Rajbala, Pawan Kumar Singh, and Avadhesh Kumar

CONTENTS
6.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 86
6.2 Digitalization Transformation of Industry 4.0 of Supply Chain Management........... 86
6.3 What Is a Cyber Physical System?...................................................................................... 86
6.4 CPS Innovations.................................................................................................................... 87
6.4.1 Features of CPSs........................................................................................................ 87
6.5 Designing and Importance of Cyber Physical Systems.................................................. 89
6.6 What Is Supply Chain Management (SCM) 4.0?..............................................................90
6.7 Concepts of Supply Chain 4.0............................................................................................. 92
6.7.1 Logistics in Supply Chain Management............................................................... 92
6.7.2 Supply Chain 4.0 in Defense Combat Action....................................................... 93
6.7.3 Significance of Supply Chain 4.0............................................................................ 93
6.7.4 Dependencies on Supply Chain 4.0........................................................................ 95
6.7.5 Challenges of Modern Procurement Policy in the Defense Sector.................... 95
6.8 Modern Integration Systems of Supply Chain 4.0........................................................... 96
6.8.1 Connection of Supply Chain 4.0............................................................................. 96
6.8.1 Distribution of Supply Chain 4.0............................................................................ 97
6.8.2 Supply Chain Partners and Externalization 4.0................................................... 97
6.8.3 Vulnerability of Supply Chain 4.0.......................................................................... 98
6.9 Supply Chain 4.0 Risk Management.................................................................................. 99
6.9.1 Analysis of Risk........................................................................................................ 99
6.9.2 Models of Risk Management................................................................................. 100
6.9.3 Existing Technology of Risk Management Models........................................... 100
6.10 Latest Technological Models Used for Supply Chain 4.0.............................................. 101
6.10.1 Latest and Effective Wireless Communication Systems................................... 101
6.10.2 Threats in Wireless Communication Systems.................................................... 101
6.10.3 Emerging System in Wireless Communication Systems.................................. 102
6.11 Cloud Computing CPS Supply Chain Management..................................................... 102
6.11.1 Threats against Cloud Computing CPS Supply Chain Management............. 103
6.11.2 Strategies in CPS Supply Chain Management in Cloud Computing.............. 104
6.12 IoT and Industry 4.0 Systems in CPS Supply Chain Management.............................. 105
6.12.1 CPS Supply Chain Management Threats to IoT and Industry 4.0 Systems..........106
6.12.2 Decision-Making in IoT and Industry 4.0 CPS Supply Chain Management........106
6.13 Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 107
References...................................................................................................................................... 107

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-6 85
86 Cyber Physical Systems

6.1 Introduction
Individually tailored commodity requirements contribute to the difficulty of supply chain
preparation and management (SCs). Digitizing business processes is a crucial develop-
ment and a necessary prerequisite to achieving optimum flexibility and performance. In
particular, cyber physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly essential for the digital transfor-
mation of SCs. Industry 4.0 principles and innovations (I4.0) will become a central facilita-
tor. Implementing such technology also ensures that an enterprise may have disruptive
consequences so that management supports change processes. In this sense, the manage-
ment challenge to deal with improvements has grown increasingly, along with the con-
struction of digital systems’ features and functionalities. CPS can provide a wide range
of technological equipment and specifications for various applications. Support for the
design and development of CPSs in SCs is required [2].

6.2 Digitalization Transformation of Industry

4.0 of Supply Chain Management
Modern electronic communication systems are used for the present synchronization of
networked SCs. The hypernym “Industry 4.0” sums up this digitalization of the industry
in Germany. Even though the term “Industry 4.0” has been in existence for many years, no
uniform definition exists. Bischoff gives a systematic description suited to the extent of the
paper. He describes I4.0 by connecting the physical and the online environment as devel-
oping processes for output and increases in productivity. This connection is provided by
self-controlled CPSs, which allow horizontal and vertical implementation to produce the
goods or services of the SC efficiently, decentralized and versatile. Digital transforma-
tion is considered an essential criterion for obtaining I4.0. Thus, businesses in an SC cre-
ate digitization plans to coordinate their activities and digital transformation campaigns.
Enhancing an organization’s success and reach using new technology is digital transfor-
mation. The following description applies to and can be used for the digital transforma-
tion of operations. Using new technology to sustain or increase productivity means that
digital innovation combines improvements in business processes [3].

6.3 What Is a Cyber Physical System?

The above description explained that a CPS plays a significant role in I4.0, forming the founda-
tion and leading technologies. The part of the CPS is to connect the digital and physical envi-
ronments. They can continue supporting and performing tasks independently by planning
and controlling the SC. Lee is one of several and most commonly used CPS interpretations:
Cyber-physical structures are collaborations of complex physical processing. Incorporated
computer networks usually supervise biological phenomena with feedback mechanisms
when physical procedures impact calculations and vice-versa. This characterization is not
enough since special techniques are also explained as CPSs in this interpretation. Broy
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 87

also explains that they can communicate and thus collaborate as a core attribute of CPSs.
Nevertheless, the news does not have available communication capacity in the medium, as
has been popular in autonomous vehicles for computational mathematics systems for years,
in the form of multiple routes. Instead, the many CPS renewal builds relationships via open
and global communication technologies, especially the internet. Open and connected sys-
tems that connect with metric quantities—virtual reality with the actual operation world
is beginning to emerge. As a result, CPSs can start taking over management and execution
tasks in SCs while also reacting effectively through collaborative efforts in real time. Apart
from the descriptions, the dictionary diagram is valid and applied in the context of planning
and scheduling in SC: Socio-technical structures are a way of interacting with the various
systems; pushing to improve relations between internal and foreign clients in SC is possible
to lessen interface issues and to mitigate maximum interoperability issues.

6.4 CPS Innovations
Several technological elements and individual functions can challenge the development
of the CPS. These frequently rely on the scope and intent of the CPS. Not all innovations
should be sensibly used in preparation and control depending on the weather of a process.
Various potential solutions can also be developed according to the scheduling and control
mechanism specifications in the design of a CPS.

6.4.1 Features of CPSs
CPSs have procedure features and technological features. Given that CPSs are mostly
embedded with current organizational structures and are closely linked with the flow of
materials and knowledge, process features play a vital role throughout the design phase.
The categorization and systematizations presented are the basis of these characteristics.
Method planning and monitoring in SCs is distinguished by decisions that can be found
and followed in various manners. The development of CPSs means that the separation of
duty between humans and the system must be established. The first feature to be listed is
the source of protection for decision-making. The following terms may be rendered depen-
dent on humans, decentralized and machines.
Coordination is needed where there are interrelationships and interactions among
decision-making components of a structure, including functional levels and procedures,
which can be taken as a consequence of the division of work. It differentiates between
hierarchy and hierarchical collaboration and intermediary events. The maximum level
of self-regulation can be reached in hierarchical teamwork; in its work on physical sen-
sors, the individual components of a structure organize each other in decision-making
and develop this feature by separating vertically, together, geographically, between three
modes of synchronization.
Using technology, a CPS can execute different functions. This will help the manage-
ment and forecasting activities in SCs incredibly. Functional criteria characterizing the
behavioral and additional features of a device are decided by developing CPSs. Based on
the phylogenetic box taxonomy according to the distinctive skill of a CPS, time consump-
tion, data management, data gathering, data capturing, data provision, acting, decision-
making, networking are provided with the expresses of the stereotypical “function.”
88 Cyber Physical Systems

Environmental conditions can adversely affect the activity of a CPS. These can be largely
subjective depending upon the type of implementation and can significantly hinder the
incorporation or function of a CPS. Also, under dynamic environmental circumstances,
it must be assured that CPS works efficiently. External conditions include issues that can
affect the part of the system, especially in a positive relationship. The detrimental vari-
ables in this document were pointed to as the main characteristics of the negative effect on
a CPS in the system. Because CPS represents a mixture of digital and physical features, no
destructive force, material flux factor, or knowledge flux factor can be expressed.
The adverse impacts of a company’s supply chain are directly associated with the objects.
They are the simplest CPS methods. Many other physical artifacts, such as materials, struc-
tures, means of transport, manufacturing facilities, or logistics elements, are found in SC
processes and may thus be considered procedure CPS’s features. The scope is focused
on material items in the SC to minimize the available subjects. The main concern of such
artifacts is a CPS in terms of manufacturing and logistical capabilities. In addition, both
fixed and mobile artifacts can be used. The following expressions are given to the specific
“physical entity”: apparatus, work assistance, location, substance, and person.
The technical elements in the CPS are closely connected to the method features. These
technological advancement features allow individual functions to be performed with the
help in SC’s planning and control activities. There is no uniform description of the CPS,
and even the technical parts or features of such structures are not consistently specified.
Besides the Lee definition, the documentation also proposes several other CPS meanings.
Roy gives an outline of his work on different CPS concepts. A CPS literature review is
also performed to classify the most relevant technical elements of a CPS, based on further
descriptions of a CPS. There are additional phylogenetic features of the box. The essential
technical aspects of a CPS can be determined based on the meanings. A tangible entity
situated in the process setting constitutes the foundation of each CPS. These are comple-
mented by microcomputers, sensors, and drives and developed into embedded systems.
On that basis, it becomes a CPS through communication systems, such as the internet,
clouds, other subjects and techniques. Below are the technical features which reflect the
characteristics of the morphological box. Additional literature research shall be used to
define the quality.
The physical thing must be aware of its atmosphere and condition to equip an object
with information. Sensor technology provides the opportunity to monitor and measure
real-world parameters and translate them to electronic pulses. For I4.0, sensors are a vital
precondition for and above technological improvements. Sensors, embedded and intel-
ligent sensors, and wireless sensor networks may possess essential technical attributes:
identifying sensors.
Actuators allow interaction with the world and affect it. They will enable the reaction
of material things. Closing controller actuators are an essential feature for the automation
of operations. Their skills can differentiate them. Responses, physical activity, and user
engagement are included in the anatomical boxes of the following words.
The cognitive processes are another technological aspect of a CPS and hence a feature of
the morphologic box (see Figure 6.2). The measures required to manipulate a state variable
are generally decided in the construction of knowledge (VDI 2004). Their systematizations
discuss the place of knowledge discovery. Three types of data processing can then be
established: subcontracted, together, and incorporated.
Different humans and machines may interact with a CPS using a variety of physical
things. One term is the relationship with the complex organism. When functions and
procedures are increasingly complicated, appropriate technology must assist people.
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 89

However, virtual interfaces exist between other physical devices and information systems
because only connectivity and communication allow efficient CPS potential optimization.
The development of such an interface may be based on the following characteristics: con-
tact between the person and the computer and interaction between the machines. They are
linked in a network to allow physical structures, persons, or systems to communicate and
share data. The internet is a critical network in CPS communications. However, contacts do
not need to be carried out across a worldwide open network. Therefore, a wired, cellular,
mobile network would depend on the form and type of network link.
The CPS literature review indicates that clouds are often referred to in CPS contexts. A
shared interface allows local physical items to be connected globally with others. Cloud
computing facilitates connectivity between those artifacts through companies by offering
them technology, including applications, data storage, and services via data center links
like the internet open to users of these IT resources. Various operator models are expressed
as cloud-based: private, public, and mixed cloud. There are no different models available.

6.5 Designing and Importance of Cyber Physical Systems

In the steel corporation’s manufacturing and supply sector, the morphology box is used
as a creative method in designing CPSs for two uses. In seminars with experts from the
respective field, the identification of the program director was conducted. A total of eight
CPS-based scheme materials for different procedures have been formed, two of which are
discussed below.
The first instance of use is a checking of goods receipt in which the CPS will allow us
to identify deliverable plaques. The plates are carried by rail from Rotterdam harbor to a
company’s facilities in Germany. The commodity parts cannot currently be accurately clas-
sified, and they could be altered on the transportation path between seller and consumer.
Therefore, the platforms cannot be controlled, and the storage cannot be accomplished.
The labels should be fitted with an RFID tag shortly. The number of the material part is
stored, making the pieces unique. The rail is passed through an RFID gate in the receiving
zone to read out the RFID tags and return identity information. After retroactivity of the
data, the locomotive engineer is provided with the lead through a data warehouse with
ordered items to save the slabs. It is primarily managed by distributed decision-making
and vertical collaboration. The relevant data from the warehouse is showcased via a pro-
jector to the forklift driver and made accessible to the control scheme. Communications
between the processes are primarily interconnected, and central, inner database man-
agement systems provide, store, and analyze the information. In the second instance, the
method involves producing steel coils and transporting them internally through both pro-
cessing stages. The process is highly resistive and results in a high cost of cooperation and
long time frames. In the future, a remote system network will link multiple manufacturing
facilities, buffer areas, manufactured coils, troop carriers, and cranes. These assets can
clearly define, record, shop, and inform process flow data. This data is conveyed to opera-
tive workers via smartphones on the physical subjects decentralized. The manufacturing
unit upstream is coordinated with the downstream manufacture planning of the machine,
which contains information such as maximum throughput use, faulty work, or manufac-
turing programmer. Such documentation is hosted in the server, analyzed through techni-
cal working, and made accessible to participants. After manufacturing the coil at the first
90 Cyber Physical Systems

stage of processing, the structure begins its transitional storage by interacting with the
independent transport and crane system. Similarly, the downstream manufacturing unit
is responsible for the recovery of the required coil—this whole system is part dependent,
and operation and lateral coordination are based on machinery. Critical essential con-
nectivity usually occurs via a cell network, which can often contribute to issues with data
transmission quality in production halls. In addition, excellent physical and mechanical
stress is placed on steel belt manufacturing.

6.6 What Is Supply Chain Management (SCM) 4.0?

“Supply Chain 4.0” means physical, technical assimilation of network-wide systems that
enable increased production, organization, and financial performance, typified by autono-
mous actions that are location-independent, prevalent integration, numerous technological
services, and by their ability to respond in a context to customer demands and require-
ments. Specifically, this word coined the industrial development 4.0 to signify the industri-
alization and the absorption of intelligent technology in suppliers and customers as shown
in Figure 6.1. These systems promote the growth and functioning of industries and govern-
ment, highlighting global network exchange and safe ownership of templates and informa-
tion [5]. For firms, supply chains are necessary to meet critical logistical and operations.
Supply Chains 4.0 are more like a kind of tactical capability and may perhaps have a more
extended mission and life-critical implications. Companies are now based on industrial
information platform networks for digital operations every day. This dependence creates
cyber insecurity as complicated cyber and physical hacker situations breach those systems.
The advancement and security of cyberattacks is a research field internationally involved.

FIGURE 6.1
Framework of SCM 4.0.
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 91

The capacity of both the government and the non-national state continues to expand and
increase. Around the same time, Supply Chains 4.0, integrated and technologically enabled
[6], are getting ever slimmer. A significant field of study is created by the connection among
digital technologies with the ever-more militarized cyber area. Depending on computing
and information brains, the operation and accessibility of supply chain architectures are
changing. The disposition of a military supply chain by leveraging a weakness will lead to
economic implications and threaten human life [7]. As security materials are widely pro-
cured, the defensive surface for malicious actors is widening internationally, resulting in the
possible increase in the impact of a cyber assault on supply chain networks 4.0 [4].
Even more than before, broadband and action potential are critical to the global Supply
Chain 4.0. This reliance undermines their safety. Changes that have taken place in func-
tioning, architecture, and network administration reaffirm the need and future importance
of global value chains. The supply chain risk is classified as the unpredictable likelihood of
altering the macro or the supply chain systems, which influences any element of the sup-
ply chain operations (including IT and OST). Risk management, cyber threat forecasting,
and risk identification management frameworks to avoid or lessen its impact [8] assist in
showing a supply chain cyber risk evaluation 4.0. There are two analytical forms of vul-
nerabilities inside the supply chain: interruptions and service [9]. The risk of disruptions is
not reduced by any natural disaster, for instance, storms or floods. Operational risk, such
as cyber assaults, deals with failed production and consumption procedures in manufac-
turing or delivering finished goods.
Project management of security risk, agile technology, and risk control will help stan-
dardize the supply chain procedures 4.0 and mitigate mission success [10]. It also enables
technological innovations to be implemented safely, blockchain, the Internet of things
(IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), the cyber physical systems, etc., for example, the Internet of
things (CPS) [11] are providing companies with automatic and reliable resources, increas-
ing efficiency and supply chain flexibility 4.0. Models of mission assurance will alter the
response of the military and defense organizations. Themed technologies such as crown-
joy research, the methodology for high availability, online semantic models, operation
orchestration structures, and upgrading obsolete or deteriorated systems and procedures
can increase organizational task security. The technology world impacts how military
operations and competition in this area will provide challenges and opportunities for
the efficiency of operations in the military supply chain. As a result, defense companies
increasingly need to assess how emerging technology will influence their supply chains to
implement or counteract them as required.
This caption focuses on the singularity of how the armed forces function, focusing on Supply
Chain 4.0 and their stable assimilation with technological advances. The stress is less on their
information systems than on data they contain and customer data. They are supporting ele-
ments. It includes an extensive literature review on the link among cyber security, security,
Supply Chain 4.0, and semantic modeling. In this regard, this chapter describes:

• The proper business goals of the supply chain management army in light of the
developing world of interconnected forces;
• An analysis of the current condition of the chain management military and
defense networks;
• Logistical support;
• Various ways to measure the effect of emerging developments on the military
supply chain.
92 Cyber Physical Systems

It summarizes evolving Supply Chain 4.0 principles, connects them to emerging business
and the army demands, and outlines the need for semantical modeling to consider the
issues and problems in this space. Eventually, this work describes the core developments
and technology interactions with growing technical interconnectedness in this field.

6.7 Concepts of Supply Chain 4.0

The history of production processes and their predecessor Supply Chain 4.0 is discussed
in this section. The importance of the 4.0 supply chain for military and industrial applica-
tions has also been emphasized in this segment.

6.7.1 Logistics in Supply Chain Management

Shows assimilation by the physical supply network between customers, distributors, tools,
manufacturing plants, and computer science [32].
Supply Chain 4.0 creates an alteration that rethinks the conception of the electronic sup-
ply chain of businesses. Because of consumer demands for speed, efficiency, and open-
ness, several approaches have been developed to upgrade current procedures. In addition
to adaptation, supply chains can improve operational productivity dramatically and take
advantage of the benefits of new market models of the digital supply chain. Supply chains
must be quicker, open, precise, and agile to produce their advantages.
Various analytical approaches were explored, anecdotally the first step in many agreed
risk management systems to determine cyber risks from the supply chain. The writers
in the article say that augmented intelligence from cyber threats would help Industry 4.0
solutions further identify and consider cyber hazards. One of the most significant issues
created by earlier research was the data sources or actual data that allow obtaining cred-
ible conclusions from supply chain network cyber risk occurrences. The supply chain also
influences the information management of technologically advanced products. Usefulness
and supply chain management steps inevitably lead to device and performance mea-
surement that results in a uniform network that raises vulnerabilities and decreases the
challenges to an intruder. The foundation for these problems contributed to unique field-
specific buildings in the cyber supply chain risk management.
This cyber risk inventory control covers activities for assessing and mitigating later opera-
tions (planning, programming, manufacturing, integrating, and implementation included).
The IT channels’ equipment/software structures comprise supply chains. Efficient and
realistic supply chain control provides network and corporate connections throughout the
entire chain. The sophistication of distribution networks raises uncertainties that spread
across the whole network and possibly affect company operations. The supply chain mod-
els have to provide concerns for retailers’, distributors’, and clients’ volatility to politically
mitigate the adverse effects of instability in the supply chain. An institution’s capacity to
maintain the efficiency of the supply chain depends on commodity consistency, pace of
business execution, and agility changes depending on the need of the consumer.
Improving the level of connecting nodes in each supply chain is the fundamental con-
cept of supply chain management, thereby reducing service costs or the time required
to modify the environmental stimuli and adapt. Coordination is essential for lowering
product stocks, removing limitations, and achieving high standards. Enhanced awareness
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 93

of the supply chain enables supply chain operators with prompt and reliable information.
This increased availability to the system requires understanding and dynamic response
and improves the supply chain value stream, allowing waste to be reduced and efficacy to
be improved. Therefore, an integrated design of lean business models and skills is neces-
sary to efficiently and effectively operate global supply chains.

6.7.2 Supply Chain 4.0 in Defense Combat Action

Supply Chain 4.0 enables drug interventions, operations, and strategies. Combat actions
cannot be maintained without practical and effective logistics operations. Military suppli-
ers have various effects on civilian counterparts and start operating with a distinct final
state to consider. Army needs to include confrontation preparedness, the flexibility of the
supply chain, diversity of items, and unpredictable requests. A conventional supply chain
is the network of goods and services, processes, and organizations that provide value to
the end users of them. Conventional forces are the great candidates between nations, dis-
tributing and transportation systems that build a world network as a whole, as shown
in Figure 6.2. The supply chains include “material flows, products and knowledge flows,
interconnected by various direct and indirect facilitators, namely partnerships, procedures,
operations and coordinated information structures inside and between organizations.”
Their technology base includes delivery systems, channels and connectivity networks,
and physical delivery networks. Supply chains are usually subdivided into three phases:
sourcing, manufacturing, and delivery [13].
Supply chains are precisely the definition of logistics but are distinct. As part of the
continuing and interconnected operation, supply chains combine procurement, process-
ing, and delivery. The logistic “point of origin to the point of usage” is seen as just part
of the convergence of logistic supply chains into all primary market operations [14]. This
includes process integration and coordination, an electronic data exchange, and sustain-
able strategic relationships. Production methods have evolved scaled versatility from wide
stocks with low advance notice and deferred commodity setups that deliver optimum
value for capital and a high degree of versatility when combined with demand manage-
ment practices.

6.7.3 Significance of Supply Chain 4.0

Supply Chain 4.0 is the convergence of production and communication technology to
enhance the development of conventional supply chain networks through independent

FIGURE 6.2
Supply Chain 4.0 in defense combat action.
94 Cyber Physical Systems

intervention, prevalent integration, a variety of integrated resources, and the ability of

traditional supply chain systems to respond in a sense to consumer preferences and needs.
The depth of the supply chain in Industry 4.0, as seen in Figure 6.1, demonstrates the dif-
ference between expected noncombatant outcomes [15]. The assaults on armed forces’ sup-
ply chains often significantly target these specific standards to affect military activities.
The results of a 4.0 supply chain failure vary according to the meaning and quality of a
supply chain. Whereas there are many advertising distribution channels for the supply of
profit-enabling goods [16], defensive system product lines can affect a force’s management
and strategic capacity, which directly influences a person’s existence and the achievement
of a quest. In contrast to many businesses, military devices are less geared to maximiz-
ing profits and are increasingly security-oriented, leading to immediate and military con-
flicting interests [17]. Supply chains, as well as strategic thinking, are closely connected.
Modifications in global value chains are flowing into the military-strategic plans. The
enhanced capability to deploy troops, prevent complications, and deliver more competent.
Interoperable logistical forces are linked to the objective of optimization of the enterprise
structure of the logistics data system. The organization, monitoring, and final execution
of strategic distribution and logistics features demand highly integrated, secure logistics
information technology. For example, the Royal Australian Air Force document describing
their commitment to procurement does not discuss the safeguarding of the security sup-
ply chain and does not discuss computer security.
In the strategic edge of companies, this global security supply chain is an interac-
tive mechanism that allows enterprise systems to turn capital into goods and services.
Increased computing supply chain management by greater mobility, process automa-
tion, supply chain virtualization and digitization and responsiveness to the markets was
achieved in the shift to a knowledge economy that not on commodities but knowledge.
The knowledge exchange across the supply chain inevitably contributes to a virtualization
of the supply chain paradigm that logically leads to process convergence. Customers, man-
ufacturers, dealers, and product designers are integrated into the supply chain through
standard processes and shared knowledge. The idea of an expanded company depends on
more incredible energy and exchange of knowledge. The advantage is that the corporate
value chain is extended to and through other markets and organizations. The convergence
of network players and nodes into a single infrastructure creates a different degree of com-
petitiveness, which will build on the networking participants’ advantages and skills to act
more effectively on business demands in a competitive way.
While the military continues to imitate manufacturing worldwide to reduce stocks and
improve performance, several steps have been taken in roles and procedures. The authors
argue that there continues to be more room for progress in the alignment of the supply
chain across both DoD and its providers—processes that influence the net cost and effi-
ciency of the supply chain collectively. This is a significant objective that includes sev-
eral vendors and businesses. These initiatives have been strengthened in several ways.
The CORE project aims to realize effective, quick, and accurate supply chain solutions.
CORE has several application demonstrations to illustrate how symbolic operational sce-
narios can accomplish a safe global supply chain. The WEF has established the World
Economic Forum, a draft of alliances, policies, strategies, and technologies for resilient
supply chains [18].
Various evolving nearest cluster centers and conceptual models aim for market usability,
military supply chains, or emerging industries like Industry 4.0 to be defined and semanti-
cally formed. Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) 2.0 is the best-known method
for amending business operations. Numerous BPMN extensions expand the notification
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 95

formally established to include new concepts, including the cloud network [19] and the use
of IoT platforms [20]. Processes to incorporate BPMN into combat actions and procedures
are increasing, though are not accessible at the time of this writing for peer review and
analysis. The Open Group Architectural Framework (TOGAF) [22] and the Department
of Defense Architecture Framework are alternatives to BPMN (DoDAF). These degrees of
complexity are higher than BPMN but generally agreed upon. During Industry 4.0, there
is no detailed updating phenomenology capturing this field, given the exponential growth
and rapid release schedules currently experienced [21]. Instead, one factor is based on most
formal methodologies and conceptual frameworks in this field.

6.7.4 Dependencies on Supply Chain 4.0

Critical criteria drivers and considerable developments in the expansion of the industry
supply chain, a harsh fundamental reality impacts the production and creation of defense
capacity. The US Defense Department (DoD) has estimated that about 70% of electronics
products are redundant, replaced, or out of demand in several procurement phases before
the finished system is deployed. It’s not only for system upgrades and overhauls, which
also need the purchase of new parts.
Despite improved exposure across the interconnected supply chain, the clarity remains
minimal for several reasons. Commercial drivers may, in some situations, impede the
exchange of knowledge. Even though records reside within the supply chain, proprietary
data security can hide details and minimize assurance. The size of global supply chains
may, in some situations, operate toward the control time, such as Australia, where the vol-
ume of transactions is not necessary for international suppliers to exchange knowledge or
work together. Computing, IT, and networking facilities are also used in supply chains.
Governments worldwide have considered and implemented prohibitions on Huawei tech-
nology from governance and international forums regarding supply chain contamination
and other associated flaws in purchasing IT products. This strategy was found both too large
and ultimately futile because it would not resolve all kinds of attacks from the supply chain.

6.7.5 Challenges of Modern Procurement Policy in the Defense Sector

In defense organizations, a lack of current procurement policy describes business pro-
curement. It thus makes it hard for insights from defense experience and the current
market to be translated into a managerial paradigm application [23]. Cyber susceptibility
can occur with supply chains as sophisticated systems (SoSs). Corporate consequences
are mainly when supply chain components rely on the information from the Internet
of things. Incorporating broader military environments of subnets, technologies and
facilities of the supply chain create problems for their safe use—prospective strategies
for mitigating device integration risk. The development of company architecture (EA)
approaches [24] is part of dynamic supply chain processes. EA deployments’ standard
requirements include independence for policy intervention reductions, a proposed pol-
icy perspective if appropriate, and the ability to respond quickly to changes. In the past,
support and assistance were an alternative to secure complicated EA, but they do not
have a comprehensive solution [25].
In developed market economies, IoT convergence is a rising development, and it is
anticipated that these technology companies will join military supply chains through the
period. Thus, the security chain systems and networks can undermine the figure within IoT
devices. The insecurity of IoT devices within supply chains is influenced by many factors,
96 Cyber Physical Systems

including limiting specifications and restrictions on resources, cloud storage and process-
ing consequences, extensive data protection, and reduction in prices [26–28]. Though there
are obfuscation techniques for these potential threats, the efficiency, financing, interoper-
ability, required resources and flexibility, sophistication, and viability of the comprehen-
sive method will cost them [29–31]. The complexity of military supply chain networks and
technology poses considerable threats to their safety. Therefore, from the highest develop-
ment of specific networks and modules to the global environment, protection in the supply
chain must be established so that we don’t ignore any loophole that could have disastrous
implications for the militancy.

6.8 Modern Integration Systems of Supply Chain 4.0

SoS-based Supply Chains 4.0 operate and never exist as individual organizations. To be
functional, these programs can then be combined, or the weak link will still be attacked.
Knowledge sharing, teamwork, confidence, desire to work together, collaboration, and
shared business interests are the most shared factors influencing the convergence of the
supply chains [33]. The changing defense environment brings a wide range of variables
impacting defense supply chain service, insecurity, and responsiveness. Interconnection
and synchronization of networks, partners and outsourcing, life cycle components, threat-
ening actors, and defense company problems are all factors to be considered.

6.8.1 Connection of Supply Chain 4.0

Military supply chains never operate as single entities but often involve merging several
SoSs. The design of this device combination turns the management of these complex sup-
ply chains into a company’s problem. External applications have their features, compatibil-
ity considerations, and accessibility requirements of both public and private organizations,
which may pose challenges for integration. The SoS, which comprises a comprehensive
Security Supply Chain 4.0, has no consistent frontier with the other information systems,
with which it is unavoidably linked. Security supply chains cannot be regarded as sole bod-
ies because they are mostly related to networks to notify, instead of shape, the supply chain.
The definition of the potential business environment affects the efforts and course of
capacity growth. When assessing future power capacity and architecture and contemplat-
ing existing and future priorities, there is a great need to recognize the current operational
climate. The military technology process information uses the term “extended attack flat”
to characterize a greater area of the intrusion triggered by the mixture of networks, per-
sons, and risks of growing amounts and variety. This chapter concludes:

These programs have the greatest weakness to facilitate their usage and use: perfor-
mance. Natural monopolies and reliability in the management of businesses are greatly
appreciated, whether cost-cutting or the demand. As these networks face a surge of
automation that drives performance, threat actors may be more easily attacked. Stated:
hacking effectiveness is simple.

The working climate for tomorrow is also changing from emerging technology. Artificial
intelligence convergence (AI) and machine education systems enhance the success, with
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 97

emerging innovations being generated, transformed into Supply Chain 4.0 by drones and
robots, together with the ubiquity and effectiveness of the Internet of things (IoT). The
world’s supply chains will benefit from any such advancement forward. This is defined
as “the industry’s networking contribution to developing the natural foundation for AI
implementation and scaling that enhance the human constituents of global supply chains
that are strongly organized.” Such techniques pose their threats, making assailants more
vectors and possibly permitting hybrid cyber and movie offensive actions within a mili-
tary setting, AI services supporting attack tracking and speeding, and data armament.
Military weapons are mostly purchased from suppliers of diverse and non-transparent
supply chains, and parts are transited via the SoS before delivery to their ultimate desti-
nation. Accountability for the accuracy and credibility of each piece of goods will also be
hard to assess. Therefore, electronic system shipping can be undermined before reaching
the military Supply Chain 4.0. The incorporation of Supply Chains 4.0 is intended to allow
a mutually advantageous ecosystem capable of capturing the convergence of enterprise
applications between intra- and inter-entrepreneurs to maximize the general business
operation of the organization.

6.8.1 Distribution of Supply Chain 4.0

A 4.0-enabled integration supply chain combines multiple silos to shape the whole supply
chain or an end-to-end vision. The standard procedures in chain supply risk manage-
ment have been observed for the combination of the operational technologies (OT) that
manage systems for distribution and manufacturing electricity generation and navigation
processes for production and control, with IT that administer software and connections,
as well as the supply chain that assists suppliers, products. Integrating the economic and
market advantages realized with greater productivity requires the distribution network.
There is a benefit in world supply networks. Transparency from end to finish, from manu-
facturing to delivery convergence and bridge cooperation, improves the agility, stability,
and slow-moving stock that is not achieved in massive supply chains.
The common operating picture (COP) is one step toward strengthening the supply chain,
presenting the actual status of logistical processes with a single integration stage. In military
programs, assignments, and procedures, COPs are widely used. However, a COP highlights
how well our future technology may be integrated and automated by their designers. The
degree of convergence into a fully integrated supply chain worldwide goes well beyond the
notion of a COP. In short, military networks are not intended to deal with the scale and com-
munication that potential supply chains will provide, which is usually used to track and con-
trol operations. The correlation between material and non-physical objects develops various
limitations which, without instruments from the 21st century, are extraordinarily complicated
to comprehend and handle. This will demonstrate the complex design of the applications
since the risk is managed using Microsoft Excel tablets and PowerPoint. For example, the Joint
Strike Fighter Program allows operative military forces to pay for success rather than replace-
ment parts. Instead of the nation’s airplane, Lockheed Martin has this multinational supply
chain administration. This directly affects the independence of aircraft capabilities and the
potential to support aircraft in a crisis involving the powers of the supply chain.

6.8.2 Supply Chain Partners and Externalization 4.0

Supply chains are not made up of a single company but rely on foreign retailers and sellers
to buy their goods. Supply chains are made up of SoSs that never function as individuals.
98 Cyber Physical Systems

Those systems must ultimately be implemented to ensure efficient and viable supply chain
management methods. The most common factors impacting supply chain integration are
knowledge exchange, teamwork, confidence, readiness to work together, collaboration,
and shared business goals [34]. The armed force supply chains have four major risk cat-
egories; partner’s risk, hidden risk disclosures, interest risk dispute, and risk control. They
can be manifested by the lack of cooperation between organizations concerning cyber
security requirements, influencing civilian allies, contradicting their expectations of the
need to secure measures, and subcontracting the scattering of confidence.
Programmable interfaces for applications (APIs) that support program creation and
use are typically available for app developers beyond the product company to custom-
ize a program for their individual needs. This speaks volumes about both the platform’s
lack of API compatibility regulation. The disconnect between strategic and trade supply
chains can have different potential for weakness due to the mismatch of priorities with
organizational results and profits, respectively [1]. A military violation of protection will
have severe implications for civilians’ lives and national sovereignty. Conversely, the
events are expected to become more economically central in business activity. This is
shown by a data breach of the Australian Security Force in 2016, in which assailants
reached their targets by exploiting one of the ADF vendor vulnerabilities. The number
and positions of the many manufacturers needed to manufacture a product may also
threaten military supply chains. About 70% of foreign exchange contains semi-finished
goods undergoing final remodeling. In the world economy and global supply chains,
parts from various countries and suppliers may also be the most accessible goods. For
example, a 600-meter Dell Inspiron Notebook includes components made in more than
ten countries, including the Philippines, Malaysia. And the F-35 Strike Fighter, used by
countries such as the United States, Europe, and Australia, includes components from
all over the world and China.

6.8.3 Vulnerability of Supply Chain 4.0

The cyberspace world is rapidly changing, with frequent advances and vulnerabilities.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposes database reported 3,297 weaknesses in 2018
alone. In both numbers and complexities, cyber threats are year on year increasingly
advanced and have a range of consequences for people, companies, and government. The
primary goal is a cyberattack vector relevant to security supply chain networks. It applies
to cybercriminals that compromise enabled objectives to reach the enterprise with more
significant benefit. An intruder will, in this situation, breach a military infrastructure by
one of its supply chains associates, which have less established network defense.
Protection by anonymity is the best security practice from the historical viewpoint.
Examples of protection by obscurity involve modification of default property parameters
or the allocation to facilities of odd ports. The technology is often applied to applications
unfamiliar to people like SCADA systems. Although dark safety can be a defensive strat-
egy toward opponents, it is not adequate for a plan. Cybercriminals do not necessarily
need to recognize a structure in its entirety to target it and achieve their objectives.
The number, efficiency, and scope of cyber-offensive operations have increased over the
last decade. Advanced persistent threats (APTs), problem organizations, and crime syndi-
cates are highly diverse and spend time and money on cyberattacks. It cannot be denied the
demonstrated success of cyberattacks for military purposes. Given this efficiency, the sup-
ply chain is a possible objective, a central element of the new military: coordinated efforts
in supply chain management, network security, government and commercial networks,
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 99

and perhaps a large attack surface. Cyber security is similar to asymmetric combat, with
the malicious players only having to rely on a safe system’s weakest node.
Cyberattacks in trade areas often produce some kind of numerical result, either directly
or indirectly, like using industrial spying or encryption. The 2017 attacks by Winery
emphasize how financial insurgencies are motivated. The assault was thwarted by encryp-
tion to restrict access to data that could only be recovered after a monetary ransom was
paid. The car industry had recently substantially displayed another example of hacking
manual control systems with multiple integrated and perhaps internet-connected com-
puter controls. This introduces additional cyberattack mechanisms in physical networks
with no oversight or input into their function. There are no long-term effects on vehicles
that integrate major ITs.
Such hidden cyberattack interfaces are also present in the case of drones, robotics, and
other remote-controlled devices. In the future factory, cameras, drives, and autonomous
robots are generally controlled by complete military activities. A cyber assault on trans-
portation facilities could hypothetically affect activities, cause diversion of vital machin-
ery on the way, movement of machinery, compromise routes or disturb device activities,
and halt all flow of logistics.
Since essential facets of the potential supply chain are anticipated to be greatly simpli-
fied and cyberattackable, it is assumed that the safety perimeters have been broken for
many military structures. If data is damaged by a threat or a spontaneous mistake, sup-
portive logistics should be resilient and secure enough to ensure that data manipulation
is continued to be adequately supported. The capacity of an opposing party to control or
interrupt production lines are both of operational and supply chain financial capabilities
excellence paths if a physical and cyberattack is orchestrated.

6.9 Supply Chain 4.0 Risk Management

This discusses the risk assessment process and the application to the 4.0 supply chain and
tests its usefulness in a military supply chain situation.

6.9.1 Analysis of Risk
Structures for risk analysis help companies identify their possible vulnerabilities and eval-
uate how those vulnerabilities could impact the company and its processes. Analytical
approaches determine whether the network security priority of the enterprise is to avoid
an attack in a first case, to react when an intrusion occurs efficiently, or to both. The evolv-
ing scope of risk reduction has changed from the security of assets to business processes
or the safety of missions. The task goals for such evaluations affect evaluation weighting,
and these scores change criteria like the duration of the mission and the promptness. Risk
matrices may also be used for assessing the status and effect of possible threats within a
system. Traditional risk evaluation matrices classify risk with magnitude and frequency
and futile reasoning to expand the potential beyond such classifications.
Crown Jewel Analysis contributes to evaluating and informing more risk analyses in
kinetics, cyber, and supply chain, leveraging cyber assets that are mission-critical for the
process. The project goals for these evaluations affect the relative weight of the review,
with considerations like mission duration and directness change. Implementations for
100 Cyber Physical Systems

risk assessments help companies identify their potential weaknesses and determine their
potential impacts on the enterprise and its processes. The CSCRM is described as the orga-
nizational approach and programmatic practices used to evaluate and manage risks over
the whole IT supply chain, hardware and software supply chain processes. Testing strate-
gies involve deciding whether the network security objective of the enterprise is to avoid
an attack, respond appropriately when one occurs, or both.
The supply chain development responses of Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton have three pos-
sible end states which decide that if a risk is unreasonable, the efficiency is enhanced, or
productivity degraded, based on the system’s potential risk situation. Capacity consider-
ations that may not always be numerical in military supply chains should be included in a
risk evaluation of factors such as reconstruction, capacity, versatility in procurement, and
total capacity that impact organizations.
Due to increasing cyber risk sophistication frameworks over the past decade, the threats
to the future of new cyber security incident management and harm risk mitigation
approaches and concepts are apparent. The transitions in technologies, processes, and net-
work configurations also need innovative strategies to resolve and minimize the influence
of cyber safety incidents. Unique, agile, and integrated market systems like supply chains
are not a marginal method or an active analysis area in current and evolving frameworks.

6.9.2 Models of Risk Management

Existing supply chain management models should be applied in enterprises to enhance
supply chain operations. First, it defines process management goals and then measures,
analyzes, improves, and ultimately controls the process. The Six Sigma DMAIC model
included in 2006 decided that although the technique could also be used, there were lim-
iting factors which limited their likeliness to be implemented, including stock keeping
policies and the degree of activity, in an examination of the adequacy of implementing
the Six Sigma methodology to the UK supply chains. The Cyber Kill Chain is a way to
define the phases of an assault in cyberspace. The Cyber Kill Chain phases include rec-
ognition, armament, supply, use, activation, command and control, and targeting opera-
tion. Re-evaluations of the cyber physical system model have suggested modifications to
the well-established interpretation of attacks, particularly within communication systems
and computer objects with concrete results. The SCOR is a cross-industry platform to
evaluate and improve the efficiency and management of the business across the whole
company. It is an option in the Cyber Kill Chain. SCOR illustrates and interconnects the
following specified modules, procedures, benchmarking methods, management strate-
gies, and application navigation. SCOR aims “to collaborate, compare, and establish new
or enhanced processes in the supply chain” [9].

6.9.3 Existing Technology of Risk Management Models

The possible risks generated by deploying advanced technologies in military supply lines
may be evaluated using risk identification and organizational design. Many frameworks
are available, namely CSCRM, management of credit risk, Crown Jewel Analysis, and the
supply chain’s durability architecture. While these models contribute to the risk evalua-
tion, they do not offer a systematic and balanced assessment of the direct and indirect fac-
tors required to use emerging technology in military supply chains. Many attempts were
made to simulate processes and frameworks in the semitone risk evaluation, with some
success. Considering the scope, nuance, and meaning necessary for the various businesses,
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 101

governments, and political areas, this is an ongoing field of research and development,
which adds more sophistication, visualization, and simulation required by cyber applica-
tion into these systems.
Existing network security management and supply chain management models are pri-
marily based on cyber security or Supply Chain 4.0. The models under discussion were
cross-compatible, but none directly established the strategic background of supply chains.
Although components of these frameworks will help explain how emerging technologies
can affect operational supply chains, they are not an overall solution, and the study gap
persists.

6.10 Latest Technological Models Used for Supply Chain 4.0

Multiple attack vectors make the protection of supply chains insecure, and therefore, these
vectors should all be regarded to create resilience to the defensive supply chain. The field
of technology is constantly expanding. This is shown by Moore’s rule, which makes com-
puter boards more economical and accessible. Since a comprehensive model for evaluating
the effect of any technology on military supply chains cannot be found, this section involves
reviewing purely technical models to determine the main characteristics that could apply to
a technical process framework. The model emphasis on Supply Chain 4.0, the military back-
ground, and the aim as an evaluation system would be the main criteria for this evaluation.

6.10.1 Latest and Effective Wireless Communication Systems

The fourth generation of wireless connections is crucial to boost internet, Industry 4.0,
and related global supply chains (5G). 5G aims to provide heterogeneous networks with
high speed, cheap networking by using more excellent range bands. By introducing 5G,
it would be possible to access the necessary technology for broad track and trace net-
works, such as those used for defense supply chains. A better abundance of data and the
introduction of potential risks for IoT applications in supply chains falls along with the
delivery of 5G networks. The invention of “monitors and locates,” the ability to track items
in transit and inventory in real time, is one of the critical cases for 5G. Tracking gives com-
petitors less ability to poison the supply chain or cut supply chain output to benefit their
competitiveness. However, introducing such technology could also have possible conse-
quences requiring further testing. Track and trace enable products to be monitored in sup-
ply chains in virtual environments. This may have significant tactical effects in a military
setting, with such devices likely to be dependent upon in operation operations, such as the
supply of fuel and munitions. Monitor and tracking enable precise forecasts and product
development and enhance transparency inside the supply chain. Any application inte-
grates 5G with RFID tags or related systems to label artifacts that move through networks.

6.10.2 Threats in Wireless Communication Systems

The 5G technology depends on significant, current, capacity-based functionality. Defense
and combat technologies can be implemented in areas that exist or are disputed. Operating
without independently run networks presents additional obstacles, as does the idea of
owning such a system that possible opponents regulate.
102 Cyber Physical Systems

RFID infrastructure-focused cyber invasions often attack anonymity, encryption, or

access to trace and detect systems and infrastructure. Via acts like sensitive monitoring
and inventory records, these assaults can be embodied by creating illegal identity tags
and preventing access by lawful vendors to RFID facilities, where appropriate [12]. The
remoteness, the abuse of the products and the facilities of the chains, and their redirected
commodities/services are all possible threats; they include strategic nuclear bases.
Fortunately, the 5G technology has shortcomings that influence its defense track and
trace features. 5G suffers from a substantial lack of insertion from multiple input and
numerous electrical technologies to work at necessary concentrations. These standards
face possible problems in operating military settings where there might not be an accept-
able degree of facilities. Lower generations in telecommunications, reduced data trans-
mission rates, and perhaps harmful evolution of an organization may also have to be
relied upon.

6.10.3 Emerging System in Wireless Communication Systems

The bridge of new systems from many other sectors of computer hackers, such as cryp-
tographic, has generated contemporary solutions to handle these issue areas. However,
industrial RFID tags can lack the needed computational capacity to support public-key
cryptography due to their high complexity, poor efficiency, and high cost. As the 5G
technologies enable the material to be simultaneously tracked and traced, challenges to
these networks can impair their military capability in real time. This is interdisciplin-
ary. Many research works are minor in scale, and their conclusions do not apply to other
sophisticated fighter supply chain technologies, particularly in light of the consequences
of 5G adoption.
To impose on all suppliers the ubiquitous deployment of the RFID tracking and trac-
ing into the supply chain, the US Defense has appealed the decision of activated RFID
tag requirements. This practical application presented issues throughout the integration
phase, showing an insufficient grasp of how technologies may affect the supply chain and
the need for more implementation evaluations.

6.11 Cloud Computing CPS Supply Chain Management

Cloud computing applies to “the technologies provided in the data centres providing such
resources as services on the internet and to hardware and systems software.” Millions
of people worldwide, infrastructure, automation, network access, and storing elements
are used as components of cloud computing, found in application groups such as service
applications, a database, and networks as a service. Business opportunities for technical
solutions such as fog-2-fog collaboration exist in developments in such areas as fog and
cloud technology that offer cloud-specified prominent features. Cloud computing gen-
erally benefits from simplicity, place isolation, scalability, and cost-efficiency. But cloud
infrastructure also creates new challenges for IoT devices in terms of stability. In the new
arena, most of the audience search for different techniques in the market. They are finding
search exciting concepts, one of which is CPSSCM. According to Table 6.1, in year 2020,
most people used the highest web search about CPSSCM but in 2008 more minor arch than
in the year 2010 and again increase in 2014 but year 2020 shows significantly less search on
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 103

TABLE 6.1
Search about CPS Supply Chain Management
Year Image search: all category Web search: all category YouTube search: all category

2008 494 633 385

2009 497 572 334
2010 471 535 464
2011 462 525 523
2012 466 493 485
2013 451 475 631
2014 472 475 623
2015 477 471 807
2016 513 475 891
2017 646 485 781
2018 839 503 521
2019 866 525 561
2020 965 539 494

1200
CPS-SCM

1000

800

600

400

200

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Image Search: All Category Web Search : All Category
You tube Search: All Category

FIGURE 6.3
CPSSCM.

CPSSCM. CPCM-related concept was YouTube’s highest search in 2016 and was substan-
tially less searched in 2009. Image search on CPSSCM was highest in 2020 and significantly
less in 2013 as shown in Table 6.1.
Data set: Data is taken from Google Trends from 2008 to 2020 for 11 years for different
categories, as given in Table 6.1.
Figure 6.3 shows year-wise categories searched by users. The single type shows the
highest density compared to others.

6.11.1 Threats against Cloud Computing CPS Supply Chain Management

Cloud networking weaknesses include service reliability problems, memory allocation
mistakes, location-based problems, application control issues, overflows of authentication
queries, and service denial of assaults. Data routing between IoT sources and the cloud
service providers that handle the data is based on secured, private interfaces. Identify
104 Cyber Physical Systems

innovative for a range of IoT wearable sensors, such Wirelesshart, ZigBee, IEEE 1451, and
6LOWPAN might differ across those protocols. One suggested approach for improving
the compatibility of various IoT sensors and devices is the intelligent gateways and the fog
computing architectural design; this is achieved by investing additional capital into IoT
color’s architecture.
Because cloud services combine large data stocks from various networks in a highly
virtualized environment, identity management is a significant obligation for providers.
Clouds are essentially resource sharing by multitenancy schemes, ensuring that multiple
users are not isolated at the hardware level. Multitenancy can create barriers to secrecy, as
records can be broken and divulged, and remains as allocations for information sharing
shift. One way to reduce computer characteristics is to protect messages and then delete
the passwords so they can’t be retrieved even though it’s accessed later.
Another cloud problem for IoT is its availability. IoT innovations using the cloud have to
have daily access to those resources for the provision and acquisition of data. Then the per-
formance of affected IoT devices could be reduced as clouds for IoT go offline or become
inaccessible. The design of cloud technology allows the generation of reliable failing pat-
terns challenging for unit commitment. That may mean unpredictable service drop-outs,
and several hours of accessibility can be prevented. Thanks to the omnipresent incorpora-
tion of modern IoT technologies into certain parts of society, IoT cloud interruption can
have a devastating impact on consumers, for example, by preventing them from commu-
nicating with protection or security systems.
Denial of service assaults pose a unique challenge to IoT-enabled cloud computing plat-
forms, as modern devices are increasingly embraced. While cloud servers are versatile
enough to change resource specifications, they cannot deny service attacks. Decentering
the cloud is one method of reducing network denials, but it may come at the cost of other
safety hazards like reduced resource elastic modulus and more specific attacks.

6.11.2 Strategies in CPS Supply Chain Management in Cloud Computing

Cloud infrastructure aims to incorporate into strategic supply chains as contractors use
these resources more and more to reduce cost and performance. If cloud computing begins
to impact companies, government institutions, and people interconnected technological
environments, it is crucial to understand how cloud computing services can impact those
participants.
Fog computing is another basic technique for Industry 4.0. Fog computing is a grid com-
puting model that applies to cloud computing closer but nearer to the edge. The fog will
handle time-sensitive activities and other connected elements to the server, securing the
cloud benefits closer to the data sources. The low latency results for Industry 4.0 have some
tangible advantages. Fog computing was considered and evaluated in situations lead-
ing to UAV integration into catastrophe scenarios. This study examined the effect of fog
expansions in disaster scenarios such as flooding at the edge of the cloud and how these
technological developments can improve service quality (QoS) in predicting and prepar-
ing catastrophes. In assessing the appropriateness of these fog deployments, the research
highlights many considerations, including technological needs such as intensity and range,
cooperation with nodes and teamwork criteria, including latency and confidence. While the
report does not concentrate directly on military supply chain situations, this study aims to
determine how emerging technologies such as fog can affect current systems.
The fog computing trust management (COMITMENT) improves service quality and
historical metrics to boost fog architectural security as a cloud extension. However, the
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 105

approaches outlined in the methodology are intended to have quantitative and diverse
implementations in different contexts. This research does not rely on the military or sup-
ply chain.
Tariq proposes a Hybrid Cloud Computers’ Agent-based Information Security Program
that serves as a decision-making mechanism to evaluate threats within a cloud infrastruc-
ture and respond to them. The job is highly risk-oriented and has no account of implica-
tions in this sense that goes beyond properties, risks, and vulnerabilities. The research
should not even concentrate on possibilities for the defense chain. The study results, how-
ever, help to determine the efficacy of various risk management approaches in the context
of taking into account risks to cloud service systems.

6.12 IoT and Industry 4.0 Systems in CPS Supply Chain Management

The IoT refers to the internet-based computer connections that provide physical world
information through observation, like sensors. IoT allows data from reality to be collected
and promotes customer perception and a willingness to adapt to situations. IoT supplies
computing and internet traffic to current computers that can connect heterogeneously
through networking devices. In the production and sale of products, the IoT is also used.
IoT systems have been credited with up to 20 per cent improvement in industrial per-
formance. More and more networks are used to operate services within industry-wide
communications systems, including supporting technology such as wireless sensing and
cloud usage.
The IoT is an enabling infrastructure for the new Industry 4.0 idea where innovative
production processes are developed. Other technologies, such as cloud, extensive data
analysis, and cyber-physical networks, are also supported by Industry4.0 in addition to
IoT. Industry 4.0 offers fantastic things, on-demand production, energy-efficient homes,
intelligent cities, and technology in all aspects of everyday life. The IoT allows data to be
collected from reality that promotes a change in the view of consumers and a desire to per-
sonalize the situation. The technology which allows IoT extension include RFID tagging
(RFID), sensors, Near Field (NFC), cloud computing, Wi-Fi and Cellular networking. The
modern features are also available. IoT is now integrated into the production and delivery
of goods, allowing for the creation of personalized and scalable products.
The growth and continuous enhancement of demand production is a complementary
technology for Industry 4.0. Highly tailored, scalable production and supply chain man-
agement systems rapidly permit re-tooling and system customization throughout the near
future. The linkage with 3D printing, cutting tools, and other processes managed by com-
puting enables improvements in their production and supply processes. 3D printers can
generate mobility in supply chains that allow the machinery to be printed and replaced
locally. The 3D printing of instruments on Earth’s Space Station has illustrated this prin-
ciple. The enhanced network access that would enable remote publishing and object for-
mation enhance the scope of a cyberattack. The skills and threats related to supply chain
management would change with 3D printing technology. With seamless integration, agile
supply chains are being interrupted.
In addition to converting military customers into “prosumers” as manufacturing con-
sumers, the introduction of Industry 4.0 in military supply chains can allow agile, fast
response supply, and product growth. Industry 4.0 offers defense, as the equipment can
106 Cyber Physical Systems

be modified more quickly and efficiently to its environmental requirements, and logisti-
cal assistance can be prepared more reliably. Industry 4.0 will transform how goods are
produced within the framework of the military supply chains. For Industry 4.0, future
dynamic network designs will include the durability and flexibility required to operate
the supply chain in agile military ecosystems. In addition, however, Industry 4.0 has some
possible security problems, and the systematic consequences of cyber protective action
violations are not well understood for Industry 4.0 deployments.

6.12.1 CPS Supply Chain Management Threats to IoT and Industry 4.0 Systems
The present challenges of IoT research include uniformity, safety problems, and the possi-
bility of data leakage. Obstacles to omnipresent internet connections, such as connections
security limits, operational considerations, and network abandonment, are susceptible to
seriously disrupting the conduct of armed forces, particularly in the field. Highly classi-
fied defense information is also a threat to IoT deployment, as it is likely that computers
will not capture security information without authorization. IoT adoption has many vari-
ables that minimize deployment viability in the military background and IoT adoption.
In armed force environments, IoT technology must be strategically applied and leveraged.
IoT devices depend on a network infrastructure outside of themselves, like analytical
platforms. This puts constraints on the isolation of military capabilities and resources
from commercial networks and thus enhances the military’s trust in third-party technol-
ogy service providers. Furthermore, these third parties and their control of existing infra-
structures will directly affect the service life of those systems used by armed services. This
raises further concerns regarding the competence of these devices as military assets and
the changes and contacts that third-party facilitator can make to them.
The integration of IoT and Industry 4.0 ecosystems of fog computing has both safety con-
sequences and can also improve the safety of military environments. There is no guaran-
tee of stable cloud connection; fog technologies may be deployed in locations where there
is little to no signal. However, some architectural advantages emerge, bringing additional
efficiency and safeguards. There are also solid semantical areas of research aimed at defin-
ing and contextualizing the field in this area and related areas.
The processing, owing to operational needs for in-house data and technical specifica-
tions for the external manufacturing process, filtering, and analytics (DPS) of the IoT sen-
sors and devices, often presents problems for the military. It is not practicable to gather
data and submit it to be stored abroad in some situations by providing it before restoring
the data to the original site. This needs reliance on multiple networks, both secure and
public, encryption across a dynamic sequence of events; confidence in the protection of
third parties; data storage and analysis for data mining. In designing products according
to the requirements, the interconnectedness of small production plants and the capacity
to reprogram and modify production and industrial products in real time also play a key
role. Interconnection and versatility are two essential characteristics of product growth
that affect product design in Industry 4.0. Production advantages on request and Industry
4.0 innovations have to be measured at a granular level.

6.12.2 Decision-Making in IoT and Industry 4.0 CPS Supply Chain Management

To measure the impact of the IoT on the distribution network, we combined the “neutro-
sophic decision-making formulation and confirmation technique (N-DEMATEL) approach
with analytical hierarchy (AHP)”. AHP determines the cause and development of the
Cyber-Physical in Supply Chain Management 107

safety conditions of a supply chain using graded parameters. The DEMATEL technology
was used to cover many situations in the supply chain, including the replacement parts
industry, environmentally sustainable supply chain management, and the rapid turn-
around of consumer items. This method also can be used in military supply chain situa-
tions with different technologies but is probably to take account of the particular features
of supply chain defense chains such as in tactical settings in a broader model. Cyber risk
evaluations for IoT products were often suggested as methods to measure the effect of IoT
technology on military supply chains.

6.13 Conclusion
A morphological box is presented in this chapter to design the CPS in SC planning and
control processes. A literature review to classify 11 traits of distinct expressions is carried
out for this reason. These are classified into the features of method and technology. In
addition, a steel manufacturing firm applied morphology in two usage cases. In brief, the
technological characteristics deal with the advancement in the structural architecture of a
CPS. In SC preparation and control systems, adding method features into the morphologi-
cal box also considers the criteria for these system solutions. The process owners also take
part in an early CPS design stage.

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7
Security and Privacy Aspects in
Cyber Physical Systems

Himanshu, Bharti Nagpal, Ram Shringar Rao, and Shobha Bhatt

CONTENTS
7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 111
7.2 Literature Review............................................................................................................... 112
7.3 Architecture of Cyber Physical Systems.......................................................................... 114
7.4 Proposed Framework of Cyber Physical Systems in Transportation System............ 115
7.5 Security and Privacy Issues in Cyber Physical Systems along with Its
Countermeasures................................................................................................................ 116
7.5.1 Risk Assessment..................................................................................................... 116
7.5.2 CPS Security Analysis............................................................................................ 116
7.5.3 CPS Security Solutions........................................................................................... 117
7.5.3.1 Single-Layer-Based Solutions................................................................. 117
7.5.3.2 Multilayer-Based Solutions..................................................................... 117
7.6 Attacks on Cyber Physical Systems.................................................................................. 118
7.6.1 Network Attacks..................................................................................................... 118
7.6.2 Cryptographic Attacks........................................................................................... 118
7.6.3 Malicious Software................................................................................................. 118
7.6.4 Cyber Threats.......................................................................................................... 119
7.6.5 Cryptanalysis.......................................................................................................... 119
7.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Cyber Physical Systems........................................ 120
7.7.1 Advantages of Cyber Physical Systems............................................................... 120
7.7.2 Disadvantages of Cyber Physical Systems.......................................................... 121
7.8 Applications of Cyber Physical Systems.......................................................................... 121
7.9 Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 122
References...................................................................................................................................... 123

7.1 Introduction
Cyber physical systems refers to modern systems with a combination of physical and com-
putational abilities which can interact with humans in a new way. Expanding and interact-
ing with the physical world by methods such as communication, control key, and computing
are the primary foci of current and future study [1]. And these research challenges include
design and implementation challenges. Engineering norms centered on technology and sup-
ported by solid mathematical assumptions form the basis of cyber physical systems. Both
the physical and digital components of pervasive computing may benefit from the notion of
privacy and security. Information assurance, information protection, and cyber security are

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-7 111

112 Cyber Physical Systems

just a few examples of phrases that mean essentially the same thing but sound different. The
informational and non-physical aspects are crucial to the function of cyber physical systems.
Cyber physical system is a vast tree that includes Internet of Things, robotics, machine auto-
mation, process control system, industrial internet, and industrial control systems. The main
five principles for the nonphysical side of cyber physical systems are confidentiality, integ-
rity, availability, authorization, and nonrepudiation. There are so many methods available for
implementing these principles. In order to ensure that the data has not been tampered with,
for instance, an encrypted data and block cipher are utilized. Confidentiality, in this context,
is keeping sensitive information hidden via the use of cryptography and decryption methods.
The redundancy function is used to ensure that all necessary system components are always
up and running. The authentication principle ensures that only authorized users may get
access to a resource by using tools like passwords and certificates. The diabetes and diabetic
principle follows from the authorization concept and states that once a message has been sent
or an approved use of an item has taken place, neither may be revoked. Privacy is the word that
is related to the confidentiality principle. The interconnection of elements in the cyber physical
systems leads to regular inspection. Because the cyber physical systems is the combination of
both cyber and physical processes which means it gives the pathway to both the physical and
cyberattack. The vulnerabilities that may occur on the physical side and cyber side can’t be
added they are multiplied. To achieve a fully protected cyber physical system the protection is
to be done both on the cyber side and the physical side. Because protecting a single pathway
doesn’t protect the whole cyber physical system. Furthermore, the potential components may
be safeguarded by the usage of elements that are employed in both the physical and cyber
realms. In a cyber physical system assault, the attacker goes at the devices themselves, the
interconnection between them, the CPS’s supporting facilities, and the internet. The attacker
uses the ambiguity in the weak inter-protocol communications to their disadvantage. They
also make use of security flaws in the poor design and the implementation of Application
Program Interface (API) to trade off the components. They also monitor the communication
between the clients and the peer-to-peer communication between devices. So each of the vul-
nerabilities is covered by the security and also secures the components [2].
Aeronautics is one industry that makes extensive use of cyber physical systems for
things like aircraft landings, flight crew communications, and flight health monitoring.
Firefighters, farmers, and those who clean up after accidents like mudslides or chemical
spills at sea may all benefit from cyber physical systems. Cyber physical systems are also
used in the medical and transportation sectors.
Section 7.2 contains the literature review of eight papers. Section 7.3 presents the general
architecture of cyber physical systems. Section 7.4 presents the proposed framework of
cyber physical systems (CPS) in the transportation system. Section 7.5 contains the security
and privacy issues in cyber physical systems along with their countermeasures. Attacks on
the cyber physical systems are discussed in Section 7.6. Section 7.7 contains the advantages
and disadvantages of cyber physical systems. An application of cyber physical systems is
discussed in Section 7.8 and then Section 7.9 contains the conclusion of this chapter.

7.2 Literature Review
Jianuha shi, jiafu wan, and Hehua yan hui suno (2011) elaborate on the survey of cyber
physical systems. The cyber physical systems and its features are also elaborated on by the
Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems 113

authors. The authors illustrate the layout of cyber physical systems and also discussed the
research process. The research processes include energy control, security control, manage-
ment and transmission, and model-based software design. The classic applications of the
cyber physical systems are also illustrated in this paper. The present condition is contrasted
to the traditional trend of features, and the characteristic research issue is examined [3].
Jairo Giraldo and Esha Sarkar et al. (2017) describe security and privacy issues in cyber
physical systems in a survey of studies. This paper elaborates the general cyber physical
systems diagram and the taxonomy related to CPS. The CPS security and privacy taxon-
omy which are domain, security, privacy, and defenses are also illustrated by the authors.
The authors also described the taxonomy-related work with the help of graphs to under-
stand which taxonomy is illustrated in which paper. The authors also gave the future
research direction and the recommendation in the future research area. The taxonomy-
related papers are selected and presented [4].
Abdul Malik Humayed et al. (2017) describe cyber physical systems security in a study.
The three coordinates of the cyber physical system security with the help of a framework
are described in this paper. These three coordinates are cyber physical systems, threats,
and possible vulnerabilities. The authors also presented the applications of the cyber phys-
ical systems with the help of diagram authors described all the applications. The threats
against the cyber physical systems that are illustrated in this paper are grid-related threats,
ICS-related threats, medical devices-related threats, and smart cars-related threats. The
vulnerabilities that lead to these threats illustrated above are also defined in this paper.
The authors also described the attacks on the CPS applications and also the security
controls related to them. The challenges related to the cyber physical systems are also
described in this paper [5].
K.P. Chow, Eric Ke Wang, Xiaofei Xu, S.M. Yiu, Yunming Ye, and L.C.K. Hui (2010) dis-
cuss the security issues and challenges for cyber physical systems. This paper presents the
basic workflow of cyber physical systems. The general workflow includes four steps which
are monitoring, actuation, networking, physical process, and computing. The confiden-
tiality, availability, integrity, and authenticity of security objectives are also described in
this paper. Important types of attacks are also defined in this paper and these attacks are
denial of service attack, key compromised attack, eavesdropping, and man-in-the-middle
attack. The authors also presented the importance of the context-related framework and
its working in this paper. The workflow of that framework is also illustrated in this paper
with the help of adversaries of the security [6].
Francesco Bullo, Fabio Pasqualetti, and Florian Dörfler (2013) elaborate on the attack
identification and detection in cyber physical systems. This paper presents a math-
ematical structure for attack identification, detection, and monitoring. The authors
also discussed the fundamental parameters and limitations regarding the monitoring
process. The graphical representation of classic and theoretical characteristics is also
presented in this paper. The authors also design the monitors for attack detection and
identification. With the help of the example, the result is validated and verified. The
basic monitoring limitations include system-based theoretical monitoring and graph-
based monitoring limitations. Certain examples for understanding the concept are
also presented in this paper [7].
Ragunathan (Raj) Rajkumar, insup lee et al. (2010) describe the cyber physical systems as
the next computing revolution. This paper elaborates on how the cyber physical systems
are used in companies nowadays. The grand challenges and the vision towards the future
are also discussed in this paper. The authors also illustrated the foundation and challenges
related to the scientific approach in cyber physical systems. The various problems in cyber
114 Cyber Physical Systems

physical systems are safety, robustness, composition, architecture, hybrid systems, compu-
tational transparency, and sensors. The authors also discussed the infrastructure and the
social impact of cyber physical systems [8].
Zhipeng Cai and Xu Zheng (2018) elaborate on the mechanism for uploading data in the
cyber physical systems. Firstly, the authors described the problem statement which con-
sists of functions like system input, utility, privacy, and the design objectives.
This article also presents a framework for uploading data, detailing the many processes
necessary to carry out this operation, including determining the operation’s difficulty, pro-
viding a comprehensive overview of the framework, and choosing a content-based algo-
rithm. This research also presents an examination of productivity while using a greedy
method with a trace opposite shoulder. All the performance analysis factors like time
complexity, effectiveness, and completeness are also calculated in this paper based on the
performance. The evaluation of the performance is also presented in this paper by taking
general performance and performance with the individual. With the help of the graph, all
the performance is shown in this paper [9].
Jinjun Chen, Muneeb Ul Hassan, and Mubashir Husain Rehmani (2019) elaborate on the
distinctive privacy issues in cyber physical systems. This paper presents comprehensive
privacy issues in cyber physical systems applications like transportation system, energy
systems, power grid, and healthcare systems. The comparison table based on the privacy
strategies like encryption, anonymization, and differential privacy is also presented in
this paper. A framework related to the differential privacy in cyber physical systems is
also presented in this paper. The authors also compare the design parameters of the cyber
physical systems with the help of a table so that it can be easily understood. The authors
basically taking the application one by one and then with the help of framework and dia-
gram they elaborates the whole process and then with the help of table and taking certain
parameters for the comparison for a single application of cyber physical systems [10].

7.3 Architecture of Cyber Physical Systems

Figure 7.1 depicts the overarching structure of cyber physical systems as a four-tiered
architectural; at the lowest level, embedded with sensors measure and change physical
quantities, respectively. After the output of the sensors and actuators has been measured
and modified, the human operator is utilized to do any remaining network- and sensors-
related tasks, such as assessment. The application layer is between the network layer and
the physical layer. The third layer is the network layer which connects the physical pro-
cess to the internet which is also known as the cyber part of the cyber physical systems.

FIGURE 7.1
Basic architecture of cyber physical system.
Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems 115

The network layer generally provides the interconnection between controllers to the user.
The network layer is a part of the cyber part of the cyber physical systems. So it is a very
important layer in this architecture and most of the operation is done by that layer. The
fourth layer is a hardware and software control layer in which all the controlling related
information related to sensors and actuators is taken by this fourth layer hardware and
software control layer. It is the brain of the cyber physical systems because all the impor-
tant problems are processed by that layer.

7.4 Proposed Framework of Cyber Physical

Systems in Transportation System
Figure 7.2 describes a suggested architecture for a cyber physical system in the transpor-
tation sector, where data from three types of vehicles (electric cars, autonomous vehicles,
and trains) is stored in the cloud and queried by an analyst. Increases in efficiency and
convenience for both motorists and passengers are driving the transportation industry’s
steady expansion. Railways are the main mode of freight transport around the world, so
the advancement in railways has brought several opportunities and challenges. As the
advancement is also done in the vehicular networks so it makes possible for vehicle to
vehicle connections and vehicle to drivers connections. But the connections and the cloud
storage is little prone to the attacks, but it have more secure than the previous framework

FIGURE 7.2
Cyber physical system in transportation system.
116 Cyber Physical Systems

for the transportation system because here the protected data and unprotected data is
classified so that the main focus is to be done on the data which is more important. Some
privacy and security also added at the end of the cloud database so that the storage data
is found more protected by the analyst. Encryption and hashing is used during the com-
munication of vehicles and drivers so that the intruder does not take the advantage of that
particular communication channel.

7.5 Security and Privacy Issues in Cyber Physical

Systems along with Its Countermeasures
Control security and data security are the two main areas of CPS security. Data security
refers to the practice of protecting data throughout its transmission, storage, and use in a
network, especially in the case of ad hoc or other types of networks with a high degree of
loose coupling. The control security involves rectifying any command-related matters in
the network environment and lightens the command structure from any type of attack on
the control methods and system evaluation [11]. Data security’s primary function is to pre-
vent unauthorized access to data by use of cryptographic safeguards. The most important
factors affecting information integrity are as follows:

1. Secured access to device

2. Secured transmission of data
3. Securing the applications
4. To achieve secure data storage
5. Secured actuation and sensors

7.5.1 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is an essential element in the security aspects of CPS. With widespread
use, cyber physical systems (CPS) have become an easy target for hackers. There has to
be a shift in security’s primary focus, hazard identification, from the evaluation of indi-
vidual computers to that of whole networks. The primary goal of this strategy is to ensure
the safety of future cyber physical systems. The cyber physical system risk assessment
technique involves three steps, which are specifying what might occur to the systems,
estimating the chances of the incident, and assessing the results. There are three more
components while doing CPS risk assessment which are listed below:

1. Asset recognition
2. Threat recognition
3. Vulnerability recognition

7.5.2 CPS Security Analysis

When a gravitational acceleration is combined with a digital one, like in a cyber physical
system, new difficulties arise and must be taken into account throughout the system’s
Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems 117

design. Adding to the difficulty is the fact that further protections must be taken to protect
private information from the myriad of devices that may connect to the network at any one
time, regardless of their location. For avoiding challenges during designing, the designer
should include these three parameters in the mechanism that is detection, mitigation, and
prevention. There are some attackers who do not attack the direct vulnerability but try to
attack the layers vulnerability simultaneously. So some phase which might kept in mind
during the designing are listed below:

1. Security analysis on perception layer

2. Security analysis on transmission layer
3. Security analysis on application layer [12]
4. Network access security
5. RFID and WSN security analysis

7.5.3 CPS Security Solutions

A different type of security is required at different stages of cyber physical systems. For
example data privacy is an important concern of the intelligent transportation system and
medical intelligent medical system. Data authenticity is more important in the smart grid
and intelligent urban management. There are so many researchers who have proposed the
framework and models for the cyber physical system. Some security techniques are also
presented and addressed in the following subsections. The two subsections are the single-
layer-based solutions and multilayer-based solutions.

7.5.3.1 Single-Layer-Based Solutions
In order to improve encryption methods, a researcher suggested an identity-based dis-
tribution channels, while another author provides key management encryption [13]. So it
is illustrated that if the small key size is used then the computational process also takes
less time in the asymmetric key encryption [14]. If the available sources are limited then
it will also do the cost estimation analysis. For preventing the RFID tags from the sniff-
ing attack a lightweight authentication protocol is proposed. This protocol also provides
mutual authentication for the RFID readers [15]. The authors also proposed the secured
WSN that combines the healthcare system and cloud computing. The proposed frame-
work also does the monitoring and decision-making [16]. For providing message integrity,
authorization, and authentication, a two-step mutual scheme is proposed for the smart
grids. Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used for achieving the session key exchange [17].

7.5.3.2 Multilayer-Based Solutions
Some writers have provided multilayer-based solutions for cyber hardware and software
confidentiality and protection, recognizing that single-layer approaches to cyber security
problems are not always enough. For example, securing just one layer of a cyber physical
system won’t make it bulletproof; instead, you will need to protect all of the layers. A com-
bined public key-based approach which is an offline authentication is proposed. A mas-
sive data authentication and cross-domain authentication problem of security is solved
by this mechanism. This mechanism also provides security preservations for the data
transmission and the sensor data. This mechanism provides the solution at the perception
118 Cyber Physical Systems

transmission and the application layer [18]. A framework called “context aware security”
is suggested for the cyber physical system to help identify the behavior and study the sur-
roundings. This new framework protective measures, sensing, and cyber are all intercon-
nected. It’s flexible for the CPS since it includes security controls, cryptography, and key
agreement. The main objectives of this framework are integrity, authentication, confiden-
tiality, and authorization [19].

7.6 Attacks on Cyber Physical Systems

These days the challenges in security and privacy have been a major cause of concern between
customers and organizations because different cyberattacks are growing around the world.
When the data is being transmitted through an open network between source and destination,
the protection of sensitive data gets vulnerable. On this open network there is a probability of
a cyberattack of extracting data or device disability for individual misuse [20]. The connected
objects for example vehicles, smart homes, smart classes, and malls have been breached by
hackers for gathering money and exposing the personal data. The arrangement of managing
privacy and the safety of information and devices has become the center of focus for several
companies. The different kinds of attacks are discussed further.

7.6.1 Network Attacks

The information could be revealed because of shortcomings in control and security. There
are two types of network attacks that are passive attacks, which imply information is been
observed, and active attacks, which imply data is being changed or altered [21].
If we do not have any plan for security, our information and network could be unsafe
and prone to any type of attack. Those attacks normally exist on devices and networks.
The frequent attacks on networks are information modification, network eavesdropping,
ID spoofing (IP address spoofing), attacks based on passwords, denial of service, the mid-
dle man, application layer attack, the exploration attacks, the attacks on privacy, disastrous
attacks, and so on.

7.6.2 Cryptographic Attacks

The process of ignoring the security of device/system after finding the vulnerability [22]
in a cipher, security algorithm, operating systems, the cryptographic protocol, or manage-
ment of the key system is called a cryptographic attack. The process is also termed crypto
analysis. There are many classes of attacks that can be partitioned into crypto analysis.
These vulnerabilities are susceptible to chosen plaintext, known plaintext, selected key,
and crypto locker attacks.

7.6.3 Malicious Software

The softwares which are used for exposing cyber physical system infrastructures, breach-
ing or stealing of data, and getting access controls of CPS are termed as malicious soft-
wares. The main target of the malicious software is causing vulnerability to the host
device. Because if it harms the host device it can breach the information of the devices
Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems 119

connected through it. Rat-trapping, browser hijackers, different kinds of virus, worms,
and phishing are the most used malwares by attackers these days [23].

7.6.4 Cyber Threats

It is also termed a malicious attack. It is also known as an intentional assault. With these
assaults, hackers probe computer and network security flaws in order to compromise a
targeted organization or person. A primary goal of cyberattacks is to cause damage to
and severely limit the functionality of a system [24]. Our company faces a wide range of
cyberattacks from the following key origins: EM leakage, harmonic distortion, and natural
disasters (such as storms, flooding, device measurement failure, and node line faults) [25].

7.6.5 Cryptanalysis
The study of analyzing the hidden parameters of an information system is known as
cryptanalysis [26]. It is the process of breaching the cryptographic system to achieve access
to the data of encrypted messages, even when the cipher key is unknown. Cryptanalysis is
also the study of the cryptosystem, cipher key, cipher text, and ciphers with the main goal
of understanding how they actually work in order to improve the techniques for weaken-
ing them. In this, cryptanalysts try to decrypt the cipher text without the knowledge of
plain text and the encryption key.
The main goal of cryptanalysis is to search for weaknesses in or to defeat the cryptographic
algorithm. The result analyzed by the cryptanalyst is also helpful for the cryptographers
to improve the flaws in the algorithm. Researchers also discovered some approaches of
attack that fully crack an encryption algorithm, which may result in the cipher text which
is to be encrypted by that particular algorithm and could be decrypted without knowing
the encryption key as shown in Figure 7.3. When a flaw in the algorithm’s implementations

FIGURE 7.3
Basic block diagram of cryptanalysis.
120 Cyber Physical Systems

is found, the number of keys that need to be tried to decipher the intended encrypted text
is reduced.
Cryptanalysis attack types include:

1. Known-Plaintext Analysis (KPA): In this attack, the attacker decrypts cipher texts
with the knowledge of the known partial plaintext.
2. Chosen Plaintext Analysis (CPA): In this method, the attacker uses cipher text that
is similar to the selected plaintext by using the same algorithm technique.
3. Cipher text Only Analysis (COA): In this approach, the attacker has a large known
collection of cipher text.
4. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack: In this attack, the attack is basically done
when two users exchange a message via the communication channel that seems
to be secure but actually is not.
5. Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attack (ACPA): in this method, the attacker uses the
cipher text and chosen plain text based on the previous encryption results.

7.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Cyber Physical Systems

There are so many advantages of using CPS and so many disadvantages of CPS. So this
chapter presents the ten advantages and six disadvantages of using cyber physical systems.

7.7.1 Advantages of Cyber Physical Systems

1. Cyber physical system is the quickest method to make sure of protection in actual
global operations.
2. CPS makes sure of good effectiveness in different actual global operations.
3. There is an advancement of life standards for millions of people because of cyber
physical systems.
4. Cyber physical system has the capability to conduct an optimistic revolution on a
global level.
5. Cyber physical system can execute millions of calculations instantly.
6. Variability in cyber-physical operation of the system. The process of demonstrat-
ing a plan’s repeatability is called proof-of-concept.
7. Cyber physical system is capable of developing and processing through new and
untrustworthy circumstances.
8. Cyber physical system is capable to supply better performance with regard to
feedback and automated re-design with a close interconnection of sensors and
cyber architecture.
9. As a thread of cloud computing cyber physical system is capable of giving assets
to users in terms of their needs.
10. Cyber physical system has the potential to supply more resources than wireless
sensor networks and cloud computing on its own.
Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems 121

7.7.2 Disadvantages of Cyber Physical Systems

1. Cyber physical system gives less efficiency with regard to assets and potentiality.
The unbalanced type of cryptography makes its instantaneous interaction vulner-
able because of the extra time taken by encryption.
2. Due to its all-automated nature, it creates unemployment in the world.
3. Because of cyber physical system’s real-time communication, it creates
unpredictability.
4. In terms of cyber physical system forensics, it is vulnerable to many problems with
regard to the deficiency of tools, expertise, and feedback against any non-forensic
activities.
5. The efficacy of Intrusion Detection Systems is reduced by the fact that there are
many distinct kinds of these systems, including sign-based, action-based, and
peculiarity-based systems, which are often deployed in the context of Internet of
Things subdomains.
6. By cyber physical system the devices could achieve their own consciousness. This
can actually be a very big challenge in the coming future.

7.8 Applications of Cyber Physical Systems

1. Green architectures: Greenhouse effect is now one of the world’s most pressing
problems. Up to 72% of all produced power is used by the older facilities, leading
to the warming of the atmosphere that, in turn, enhances the greenhouse gases.
We want to achieve our goal of zero net energy consumption by using an inte-
grated WSN, control mechanisms, and cognitive management.
2. Smart grid: This ecosystem’s decision-making and management abilities will
hinge on the quality of the data upon which they are based. Several conventional
parts are used in cyber physical system by the smart grid. Smart grid is being used
in four processes that follow: distribution, generation, consumer side, and also
in transmission as well. The interconnection, networking, and working features
within the electrical generation are controlled by smart grid. Cyber physical sys-
tems monitor and secure the smart grid’s linked distribution and communication
networks. Smart grid allows for two-way communication and management of the
electricity grid by its customers [27].
3. Medical cyber physical system: The observation of well-being and medicines
management of patients and gathering of diagnostic data is done by wireless sen-
sor networks (WSN). A foundational requirement to high-credence medical CPS is
given by the gathering of calculating and controlling contrivance to the important
medical data transmitted [28].
4. Smart teaching could also be done by cyber physical system. The appropriate data
about the physical environment is integrated by the cyber physical system in the
smart learning environment, gives important and prompt assistance to students,
teachers, and colleges, and ultimately transforms computed information into data
122 Cyber Physical Systems

and findings. The Software Learning Environment (SLE) will ultimately revolu-
tionize the way people study and work in colleges.
5. The cyber physical system can be used in flight implementations for example air test
instrumentation, structure well-being observation, the landing of flight, the enter-
tainment wireless compartment in the flight, and staff-pilot intercommunication etc.
6. In recent times, many civil engineers face the challenge of management of getting old
of architectures like flyovers, buildings, dams, etc. A mechanical sensor, fiber optic
sensors, and micro electrical sensors and wireless intercommunication automation
give enormous assurance for accuracy and uninterrupted architectural observation.
7. Cyber physical system gives a path to upgrade the performance of control of traffic
system [29]. An environment that lies in the natural geopolitical environment and
artificial environment, for example, flyovers across the ocean or waterways, and
huge underpass, high-threat sub-grade slope, city uplifted flyovers are assembled
by road traffic control by cyber physical system, and also tremendous diversity of
vehicles, humans, and different goods in the road environments [30].
8. Humanoid robots: Humanoid robots of this sort are employed to provide care for
elderly people who live at home or in other locations where they may be easily
accessed by the robots. These types of robots are used in underwater sea opera-
tions, muddy military operation, landmine detection, space operations, rainforest
environments, and critical infrastructure problem-based task. They are used for
personal use and they are also used in the agricultural field. These types of robots
are especially helpful in emergency scenarios and violent confrontations when
human lives are under jeopardy.
9. Manufacturing: The cyber physical system is also used in the manufacturing
department for monitoring and controlling operations. Cyber physical system also
improves the manufacturing process by distributing information between the
business system, suppliers, customers, supply chain, and machines. For improv-
ing the traceability of the security goods, the cyber physical system does that work
easily by doing a certain set of operations [31].
10. Water distribution cyber physical systems: Nowadays, water distribution sys-
tems have become more automated. Tanks, pumps, wells, pipes, and reservoirs
are used for creating these types of automated water distribution systems. The
sensors are used for detecting the overflow of water in tanks and pipes, and the
algorithm is used for automated operations likes opening of valves, data acqui-
sition, supervisory and monitoring control, and all the devices which lie in the
network. They uncover the systems to possible attacks on the related software
that has control of it. If the attacker can get the remote access of any component of
the cyber physical system so they can also do damage like stealing data, cut water
supplies, and damage equipment.

7.9 Conclusion
This chapter presents the security and privacy issues in cyber physical system. The lit-
erature reviews of eight papers have been done in this chapter which is related to cyber
Security and Privacy Aspects in Cyber Physical Systems 123

physical systems. A general architecture of the cyber physical system is also presented in
this chapter along with its components. A simple framework for the cyber physical system
used in transportation system is also proposed along with the description of the proposed
framework. The attacks on cyber physical systems are also elaborated on in this chapter.
The advantages and disadvantages are also presented in this chapter. The applications of
cyber physical systems are also elaborated. The latest research topics and future research
areas in cyber physical systems are also discussed. This chapter will help future research-
ers working in this area and related topics because this chapter contains all the security-
and privacy-related aspects of cyber physical systems along with the proposed framework,
architecture, pros and cons, and the applications.

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8
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical
Systems on Industrial Development

Sanjay Kumar, Sahil Kansal, Kuldeep Singh Kaswan,

Vishnu Sharma, Javed Miya, and Naresh Kumar

CONTENTS
8.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 125
8.2 Literature Review............................................................................................................... 127
8.2.1 Research Methodology.......................................................................................... 130
8.2.2 A Case Study Is about Automobile Manufacturing.......................................... 130
Step 1: Recognizing Commerce Requirements and Process............................. 130
8.3 Process Identification and Mapping................................................................................ 132
8.3.1 Decisions about Operations.................................................................................. 133
8.3.2 Organizing Needs by Priority.............................................................................. 133
8.3.3 Nonpractical Specifications................................................................................... 134
8.4 Layers of Overhaul Company and Application............................................................. 134
8.4.1 Analysis of a Case Study....................................................................................... 135
8.4.2 The Amount of Time Exhausted in and out of Institutions............................. 135
8.5 It’s Time to Put the Pieces Together.................................................................................. 135
8.5.1 Devotion to the Wash Process............................................................................... 135
8.5.2 Capturing Business Processes and Flexibility.................................................... 136
8.5.3 Manufacture Informed Decisions........................................................................ 136
8.5.4 Mechanisms Are Being Integrated into the CPS................................................ 136
8.6 Conclusions and Further Work......................................................................................... 137
References...................................................................................................................................... 137

8.1 Introduction
An automobile engine programmer might have a price tag of over US$2 billion (one-third
of a production line’s costs are spent on setup and maintenance). As modern manufactur-
ing systems technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and intelligent goods are
becoming more common, smart manufacturing systems can reduce costs while meeting
demand. These systems are designed to be self-organizing, self-maintaining, controllable
in real time, efficient, robust, and autonomous [1]. One of the terms established by several
research groups worldwide to describe the evolving paradigm is Endeavour Industries
4.0, a German initiative to redefine manufacturing. A system composed of dispersed
components and closely linked digital representations, commonly called “twins.” These

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-8 125

126 Cyber Physical Systems

systems are referred to in academic literature as cyber bodily systems. Digital modeling
and the IoT can often bring the digital and physical worlds together and provide unique
item identification in connection with materials, equipment, goods, and people [2]. It has
been recognized that CPSs can meet clients’ unique demands while also establishing and
creating a creative production model in the health check, power, and communications sec-
tors. By leveraging better defect detection to raise production yield and minimize waste,
cyber physical production systems (CPPSs) improve product quality, production efficiency,
and system flexibility. The availability of real-time, current, and historical system data
facilitates the development of credible simulations for planning, production prepara-
tion, load complementary and flexible, decentralized labor reserve organization to meet
fluctuating demands. As part of the “smart manufacturing” paradigm [3]. Industrialized
and logistics systems should be updated capabilities to increase the visibility of goods
and processes and optimize resource utilization and sustainability practices. At the local,
national, and international levels, reliable assets and products are essential to creating
sustainable supply chains. Radiodiffusion Television Ivoirienne (RTI), such as motionless
ages racks cases, is widely old to collect stock and optimize the logistics process. The use
of RTIs helps reduce solitary use wrapping and safeguard mechanisms from injury and
ecological threats throughout transit to meet global sustainability goals. Packaging and
RTIs are important in the supply chain because they allow component aggregation that
are keen on a solitary body, which improves logistical competence. Still, they also serve
as tools for aggregating components into a single entity, which improves logistical effi-
ciency [4]. RTI monitoring and management systems have to be adaptable and changeable
to suit changes in demand and diversity as part of “smart manufacturing.” Only 33% of
SMEs see the immediate benefits, and 80% believe their IT infrastructure is incapable or
inadequate to enable such use. Regardless of their variety of payback, RTIs have down-
sides such as inefficient logistical procedures and conclusion hold up [5]. RTI is frequently
absent, deleted enduringly, or injured (i.e., rendered worthless). Over 10% of RTIs need
to be replaced every year, with another 10% requiring maintenance, with one example
costing US$2 million. The direct costs of replacing and updating RTIs are straightforward
to calculate, but a slew of secondary expenses have far-reaching implications for a com-
pany [6–8]. Indirect costs include missing components (both completed and in progress),
late component entrance into manufacturing processes, and the provision of defective
components. Everybody loses when factories stop producing and people stop spending
money Additionally, determining the appropriate RTI navy dimension can be difficult; an
enlarged fleet wastes resources, whereas an undersized fleet fails to satisfy demand neces-
sitating the development of a system to aid in the monitoring and optimization of RTI
use. Two such difficulties are extreme client investment time and harm caused by abuse.
An ECHT of RTIs may be attributed to a number of causes, including incorrect demand
forecasts, a lack of necessary facilities, a delay in initiating necessary arrangements, and a
failure to fully appreciate the associated costs. About ten percent of RTI's fleet disappears
every year due to theft. For effective RTI returns, companies often rely on personality cov-
erage and kindness among stakeholders. To detect, treat, and remove damaged RTIs from
circulation, companies must guarantee that RTI surveillance technology with techniques
is inside put. RTIs’ existing visibility leads to a lack of procedure possession, delaying prob-
lem resolution. The present is a necessity toward guarantee monitoring and tracking RTI
efficiently is input with the configuration of contracts, incentives, fines, and preservation
commitment inside and flanked by organizations [9]. This may aid in reducing arguments
about who is accountable for replacing RTI casualties and whether or not the decisions
made were acceptable. The RTI monitor system must gather and present information on
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems 127

RTI input presentation indicators (KPIs) to overcome the constraints imposed by cyber
physical production system (CPPS) standards and multi-stakeholders. RTI data must be
precise plus obtained in “real-time” as of the provided chain to make suitable judgments.
RTI fleets may demand regular real-time data collection, necessitating a low-cost solu-
tion. RFID’s use to provide real-world instance data collection makes it possible to build
a tracking system with little outlay of resources by facilitating Automatic Identification
(AIDC) of assets. This paper investigates the tools necessary to design a sophisticated RTI
monitoring system, with the goal of improving management and transparency around
RTI implementation [10]. This chapter which was carried out in partnership with the auto-
maker was used to improve CPPS capability with minor communications adjustments.
RTI usage management (to eliminate bottlenecks and delays) and quality assurance for
RTI utilization objectives, which are a significant element of their production processes
for decreasing engine defects, were the two aims of the smart RTIs monitoring system.
The previously provided research on smart RTI design and implementation is examined
to help expand the prospect system, therefore causal to the corpse of proof supporting
the acceptance of CPPS and its possible use in elegant RTI organization. The following is
the chapter structure: The section “Literature review and motivation” reviews relevant
literature and provides the rationale for this inquiry [11]. The unique system architecture
is offered in section “Smart RTI system design,” and the procedures for the evaluation
case study are detailed in section “Research methodology.” Section “Case study within an
automobile factory” describes the implementation. In contrast, section “Conclusions and
additional work” describes the outcomes and future work [12].
The requirement for suppleness and receptiveness among organizations, as delicate as
a multifaceted and incessantly changing corporate surroundings and customer insist, are
pushing knowledge advancement. Technology has long been recognized as a critical stra-
tegic instrument for assuring an organization’s long-term success and effectiveness. Many
companies are already using e-business technology to improve operational efficiency by
streamlining their business processes and achieving convergence [13]. They’re spend-
ing a lot of money on automation and robots right now so they can take advantage of
Industry 4.0’s cutting-edge innovations in the manufacturing sector. Industry 4.0 has been
predominantly examined from production as an operational vision in recent literature
and industry papers. On the other hand, Industry 4.0 and the technology that enables
it can transform each feature of factory plus organizations, vastly enhancing executive
disciplines such as providing sequence and logistics organization [14]. As a result of the
continual rise in business system automation, companies are adapting the manufacturing
4.0 in-service model to another aspect of operations and the efficiency and productivity
gains and quality enhancements that come with it. What makes this research stand out is
its endeavor to provide a comprehensive and integrated shift toward implementing tech-
nological innovations connected to Industry 4.0 in the service of providing sequence orga-
nization [15]. Third, it presents an incorporated framework for illustrating how embracing
Industry 4.0-related technology improvements could boost supply chain performance.

8.2 Literature Review
According to the authors, tags can be classified depending on their authority and commu-
niqué capabilities. Since the event wave is a modulated multispectral signal from a passive
128 Cyber Physical Systems

ticket, it may be utilized as a transmission media. It must be reachable via antennas. A

partially dormant label retains contact with its authoritative source via altered backscat-
ter transmissions. Lively tags have inbuilt power, can broadcast signals, enhance loca-
tion accuracy, and need electricity, making them more luxurious to put up and uphold. A
mechanism for tracking active tags in the grocery supply chain was created to track RTI.
Because of the variety of settings and the necessity to check hotness, with the require-
ment to execute all monitors “on product” relatively than on communications, active tags
were chosen [16–18]. Since dynamic tag technology had a deeper comprehension of writ-
ing range, read/write capabilities, and the capacity to accept additional production orders,
it was compatible with the cold sequence supply system. Although the authors claimed
their method was cost-effective, they have not yet built a prototype or offered estimates
of what they would cost to create. You may need to know when a creation enters and exits
particular product traceability areas. This 462 may be done by placing an inert RFID tag
on a crop and placing a reader in the places that need to be monitored. Technology is an
industrial magazine that focuses on cutting-edge research and development in that field.
Neal et al. However, while employing RFID tags, it’s crucial to think about which tags to
use and where they'll go on things because some materials might cause interference. This
may be avoided by employing proper identifiers, such as the RFID bolt described, which
is used to track crankshafts throughout milling and assembly. However, the crankshafts
underwent an extra balancing operation when the bolts were removed from the items. An
active new upgraded tag system was used [19]. The technology was developed modestly in
a real-world context with an automobile industry partner. Innovative technology provides
better granularity to RTI and its state. The vigorous improved tag scheme necessitated the
supply of a continual power source, which had consequences for maintenance and charg-
ing. Furthermore, low-cost deployment of such a system is no longer possible due to the
increasing difficulty and linked expenses of the different mechanisms. Passive RFID is a
comparatively reasonable approach for establishing a unique identifier inside constructing
elegant substance and capturing data from physical processes for use in the digital world.
An inert tag can also be worked to sense hotness and dampness to maximize the data col-
lected. On the other hand, these tags will only work if there is RF power present, which
may necessitate the installation of supplementary communications in areas where sensor
records are necessary. A half-inert or lively tag intended for footage antenna data may be
more cost-efficient [20]. The labels used and the system’s setup impacts a traceability sys-
tem’s cost. Antennae in communication with middleware vary depending on the range of
organization and storage space.
The widespread use of RFID and sensors across a system has caused a meteoric increase
in information creation and has performed a thorough, collaborative analysis of a massive
dataset including RFID ticketing data. In yet another approach to RFID data management,
an RFID Cuboids model is employed to organize data based on event series and manu-
facturing rationale. The data might then be used to trace down where the products went
and compile statistics to aid in decision-making. Solutions have been shown to reduce
data volume effectively. Increased usage of tagging and sensors across the system results
in more data and increases the danger of misreads. As a result, it is attractive to have an
information organization system to organize and sieve pertinent data. ​However, neither
technique considered what would happen if a tag or piece of information was not read in
a real-world scenario; it’s feasible that a location might vanish.
Although the research did not clearly show system efficacy or possible obstacles to sys-
tem adoption in the industry, they must be analyzed to identify the recommended real-
world benefits. Many research studies looked at analytically; for example, Kang and Lee
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems 129

suggest a generic RFID monitoring system evaluated using an algorithm in a “typical”

instance. To reduce human operator cargo handling mistakes. Traceability improved when
additional degrees of track and classification was added. Still, the price was more signifi-
cant than, according to the findings, intermediate implementation findings would benefit
both minimizing cargo loss and lowering implementation costs. Even though an industry
partner was brought in to document current operations and offer input on simulation
findings, demonstrate a variety of RFID-based tracking and traceability approaches for
improving industrial processes. For example, a system for tracking goods and methods in
intra-company logistics and production was established [21]. Corporeal pattern, request
repair, and communal communication levels were part of the three-layer framework. As
essential services as part of this system, (i) real-time production and transportation data
were collected, (ii) real-time data analysis and monitoring, and (iii) decision support mea-
sures, such as capability evaluation and task integration, were selected. An arithmetical
replica was shaped to recognize the best manufacturing and shipping alternatives based
on time and cost. An imaginary case study was provided for the system, but it was never
used. It is used in the real world and relies on flawless system operation. They also created
an RFID-enabled tracking system for modeling production flow, with four RFID tracking
application scenarios to choose from including fixed and mobile “antenna-reader” and
“detection space control mode” combinations. Some of the request scenarios that have
been found are as follows: (i) I installed an RFID antennae/reader at a location where
tagged objects pass through. (ii) RFID antennae/readers that are fixed in a space where
tagged things pass; (iii) RFID antennae/readers that are fixed in a space where tagged
items pass; (iv) RFID antennae/readers that are fixed in a space where tagged items pass;
(v) a reader installed on a mobile vehicle that tracks item movement (vi) gateway antennae
that track people and assets entering and leaving, and (vii) a mobile scanner with pre-
programmed tag locations. Many of the concerns that may arise during the deployment
of a real-world system, such as data privacy restrictions, distrust and misunderstanding
of the process, and changing demands, were not present during the case study examina-
tion, which took place in a sterile laboratory setting [22]. We suggest employing an active
RFID tag for greater location monitoring of automated guide vehicles based on real-world,
potential concerns seen during deployment of more autonomous systems and CPPSs that
use an automated vehicle. A mathematical model is used to show and verify the results,
but it is not experienced in a genuine earth case. The focus of the text review was mostly
on CPS and RFID models and laboratory and theoretical container study, with real-world
implementation lessons being overlooked. Despite a few examination beds in areas like an
elegant energy grid and smart city, few academics have focused on physical RTI deploy-
ment in the industrial sphere. The authors found no verified architecture in the literature
to hold the creation of the RTI tracking system, encompassing software growth, addition
inside CPPS, and the Industry 4.0 example, as well as deployment. It is critical to evaluate
how these tracking systems labor in the genuine earth to ensure their applicability and
implementation in business. A real-world innovative system implementation study also
aids in identifying and resolving the issue that might obstruct extensive use of this tech-
nology in the industry, limiting the realization of potential CPPS benefits. This publication
contains the findings of this inquiry [23] (Figure 8.1).
We suggest employing an active RFID tag for greater location monitoring of automated
guide vehicles based on real-world, potential concerns seen during deployment of more
autonomous systems and CPPSs that use an automated vehicle [24]. The architecture
described here and the lessons learned may be applied to a broader range of domains
where current infrastructure must be modified to intelligent capabilities.
130 Cyber Physical Systems

FIGURE 8.1
SOA and RAMI4.0 are used in the CPS RTI monitoring architecture.

8.2.1 Research Methodology
The research technique is based on the recommendations of Areola and Baines, and it
employs an adapted human-centered plan method that is well-suited to the construc-
tion of CPPSs. The strategy was based on a published case study that was used to create,
implement, and assess the sophisticated RTI program. Stakeholders need admission to
pertinent information to improve human decision-making and choose the best course of
action for achieving stated goals. The approach used the information knowledge Wisdom
dominance hierarchy, which was introduced in [25], to guarantee that the scheme is built
to facilitate excellent decision creation. Genomic sequences have been adjusted to give con-
notation and context, and information a collection of facts and, in turn, comprehension,
estimate, and ability have been used to enhance decision manufacturing.

8.2.2 A Case Study Is about Automobile Manufacturing

Within their UK production and assembly factory, a large automobile manufacturer
embarked on expanding an elegant RTI system. A competent RTI organization is needed
to track RTI in a congested ring provide chain involving a crankshaft, camshaft, cylinder
head manufacturing plant, and a training meeting plant [26]. Every RTI comprises a weld
strengthen border and a set of artificial separator trays that ensure component placement
and prevent breakage.

Step 1: Recognizing Commerce Requirements and Process

Interviewing with identifying stakeholder’s older organization, operation management,
electrical and automatic repair team, and line-side workers were recognized as key stake-
holders. Procedure comments, interviews, and interactions with key stakeholders were
conducted to determine the standard operating procedure (SOP) for implementing RTIs.
Logistics are on the line (Figure 8.2).
Activities are scheduled, monitored, and organized by coordinating all material han-
dling. Management ensures that material moves smoothly through the facility. The func-
tion of the shop floor operator is to carry out the material handling activity physically.
This involves communicating with RTIs, separators, and components throughout the two
sites to guarantee that the proper materials and components are continuously provided
to the manufacturing and assembly lines. Business principles include things like electri-
cal wiring, software, and hardware, and it is the responsibility of the authority to ensure
that any plan implemented on the supermarket floor does not violate these standards [27].
The mechanical and electrical services crew is responsible for ensuring proper setup and
commission of supermarket ground gear after the PTME team has approved it. The team
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems 131

FIGURE 8.2
Framework of requirement process.
132 Cyber Physical Systems

oversees all manufacturing processes and ensures that the plant runs smoothly and meets
the corporation’s distinct presentation criteria. All stakeholders necessitate the capacity to
monitor and review presentation indicators intended for every one sector of the amenities,
counting the monitoring and management of RTI, to improve the company’s efficiency.
The logistics team, which includes the store’s management and front-line employees, is the
most important group of stakeholders for an RTI to track and manage.

8.3 Process Identification and Mapping

The experimental processes were codified using the Business Process Modeling and
Notation (BPMN) paradigm for stakeholder verification. A simplified BPMN diagram
depicting the primary functions in connection to the flow of RTIs with operations compo-
nents eliminated at the manufacturing or meeting stages at the finish of a part manufac-
ture line, RTIs are shipped empty. Where they are loaded with WIP or completed parts,
they’re kept in the manufacturing marketplace when they’re full. Due to a lack of stock
at the meeting facility, a demand mechanism will be dispatched to the urbanized mar-
ketplace in search of the necessary RTI, from whence it will be transported by truck. The
cargo specifics are sent to the lorry driver once it has been completed [27]. The RTIs are
brought to the assembly factory in their whole by the driver. Complete RTIs are delivered
to the assembly marketplace located inside the assembly plant. Empty RTI waits in the
assembly marketplace to be returned to the manufacturing facility. On the production
line, unfulfilled RTIs are sent back to the meeting market. In order to keep up with the
needs of the train meeting plant, which attempts to construct one engine every 30 seconds,
this method is kept going forever. Placing a separator on an RTI, filling it with compo-
nents, moving it to the assembly line, discharging it, and returning it to be refilled con-
stitutes a single cycle. A 12-hour assembly schedule was proposed to provide convenient
transit between manufacturing and assembly, lowering the danger of surface corrosion.
During BP2.8, empty RTIs are visually examined to check if they need to be cleaned after
being unloaded from the assembly factory. Separators can become polluted over time due
to their proximity to manufacturing activities such as drilling, cutting, and milling and
interactions with other Work in Progress (WIP) or transportation components [28]. When
separators get unclean, there is a danger of contamination of the final parts. Engine fail-
ure or early deterioration can occur due to a harmful component and a drop in expected
performance. To maintain track of this issue, and as part of an RTI management CPS, intel-
ligent separator and RTI cleaning methods must be implemented. RTIs and separators are
unidentifiable, and the washing machine lacks AIDC technology. As a result, the washing
process is currently unaudited, making any technique for increasing cleaning frequency.
Long client hold time deprived place recognition, and reduction are all difficulties that the
company faces, with RTI fleet replacements costing up to RTI. These concerns are similar
to those raised in the literature review. Visual inspections of RTI racks and separators are
performed, and basic training is offered to aid in recognizing probable pollutants and esti-
mating the contamination threshold for cleaning an RTI plus its partition [29]. There are
currently two methods for cleaning unclean separators and RTIs: (i) an automated washer
to jet clean and atmosphere dry the mechanism at 42 _C, and (ii) a physical plane cleaning
technique intended for RTI frame that uses a combination of manufacturing cleaner and
irrigates, follows by compulsory convection ventilation. The washing method now follows
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems 133

TABLE 8.1
Users and Their Responsibilities Are Identified
Stakeholders Domain Role/responsibilities

Logistics management on Logistics She supervises the logistical management and

the production line material scheduling throughout the industrial
plants.
Logistics on the line Logistics I must physically handle RTIs, separators, and
components.
Mechanical and electrical Installation and Responsible for facility maintenance and the
Services upkeep of hardware installation of additional manufacturing cells on
occasion.

a predetermined schedule that distributes time evenly among all separator types. RTI’s
condition or demand does not appear to be used to prioritize laundry. Since the examina-
tion approach is physical and therefore based on human insight, this work gives a wide
range of quality (Table 8.1).

8.3.1 Decisions about Operations

The bulk of RTI-related choices need data about the RTI population’s present and histori-
cal statuses. There were five major operational decisions to be made: (D1) Does the RTI or
Separator need to be washed. Where may empty or full RTIs be found? Do RTI processes
need to be changed? The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to reduce the judg-
ments necessary to achieve RTI observability and traceability to their underlying knowl-
edge and information components. AHP is a technique for analyzing the priority of every
one supplies by breaking down a far above the ground level aim, such as RTI monitoring
and control is broken down into the layer of different requirements, such as choices data,
in order, in addition to statistics. To evaluate which decisions deserve support, the value of
each decision is weighed against the importance of all other choices [29]. This is done on
a scale of one to nine, with one denoting equal importance and nine indicating the most
significant possible importance above the rest. All decisions that need to be supported, as
defined by the stakeholders, are compared. The main concern level of any option is strong
minded by adding all of the association principles in its row and separating by the figure
of all rows, as long as the primary anxiety value. The precedence principles in Table 8.1
illustrate that the judgments are in order.

8.3.2 Organizing Needs by Priority

Based on the DIKW hierarchy, the Sankey diagram depicts the relations flanked by deci-
sion, information, and data supplies and their relative importance. The level is based
on the Quality Function Deployment approach, which employs the ranges to priorities
demands (high correlation). The top three criteria identified throughout this technique
were an acquaintance of the dispensation pathways (RTI position (K3) (27%) and RTI shar-
ing (K2)). The figure of RTI cycles and the time it takes to transfer between facilities (I2) are
two factors to consider [30]. To hold up the in sequence, acquaintance, and judgment, 13
134 Cyber Physical Systems

information types were chosen to fulfill the senior height needs. RTI IDs are regarded as
high-priority data categories, as with time stamps (12%) and geographical identifiers (12%).

8.3.3 Nonpractical Specifications
Scalability guarantees that the arrangement can be scaled to convene any nicotinamide ade-
nine dinucleotide insists by participatory processes message proper procedure and scheme
reserve complement capabilities – additional RTI, facilities, and user, for example. Stakeholders
have specified additional non-functional requirements, such as flexibility, toward a deal by an
unexpected change in RTI route and commerce process. (iii) Modularity allows for the incor-
poration of future technology developments and unique RTI types, such as on-plank RTI sen-
sors. (iv) Sanctuary guarantees any CPS will manage and control its resources. Third-party
attacks such as “man-in-the-middle,” denial of service, and insertion of false data can lead to
unauthorized disclosure [31]. Support for these non-functional criteria is essential for some,
but there are several stakeholder requirements that academic research hasn’t previously iden-
tified when considering future technologies and system implications. The use case revealed
the following necessities: Existing conventional skillets that may be enhanced utilizing indus-
trial hardware/software architectures are used or enabled inside a CPS. The organization’s
supplies are defined, biased, and discussed by the stakeholders. The agreed-upon materials
for the classy RTI system are as follows: The following factors are included into my calcula-
tions: (i) travel time, (ii) proximity to amenities, (iii) compliance with standards, (iv) ease of
completion, (v) data security, and (vi) system viability.

8.4 Layers of Overhaul Company and Application

The idea of the secure online space was to facilitate customer dialogue and decision making
in light of program data. For data protection, we employed both a protected registry and a
classification basis. A set of interfaces was created within the GUI in compliance with human-
computer interaction principles. The interfaces were created using a pattern arrangement and
was iteratively experienced for usability. A navigation panel on the user interface allows users
to access various pages such as reports, system status, administration, and system adminis-
trator contact information (denoted A). Additional system information is shown based on the
choices of system stakeholders. The navigation panel offers stakeholders other details about
the RTI, such as customizable separators [32]. A number of data analytics base GUIs should be
developed to meet the wants of defining RTI navy size and commercial procedure devotion
or version. As decided by the automobile manufacturer, the extra page permits stakeholders
to look further into the data and pinpoint any issues with the RTI submission process.
In a similar vein, the histogram of time flanked by wash and the figure of a cycle a par-
tition passes from surface to side before a life form is washed are exhibited to recognize
the supremacy of drive effectiveness, RTI, and clean partitioning devotion. In each case,
the stakeholders requested that a count and increasing incidence be displayed; the system
engineers implemented these parameters in the administration panel. Any display can
be used depending on stakeholder preferences owing to the supple method the GUI was
designed. Using the data provided to the excellence boss, it is likely to recognize RTI that
were not following the wash procedure and ensure that the marked things were washed
before the subsequent use.
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems 135

8.4.1 Analysis of a Case Study

Observations regarding the company’s operations in terms of RTI flow and the difficul-
ties that must be solved may be made due to the manufacturing use trial. Through the
manufacturing usage trial, insights on the company’s operations in terms of RTI flow and
the challenges that must be addressed may be gained. Metrics like (i) time spent sleep-
ing in a room with amenities, (ii) time spent putting together a mechanism, and (iii) time
spent caring about the cleanliness of an activity have all been used to bring attention to
critical issues.

8.4.2 The Amount of Time Exhausted in and out of Institutions

The observations below demonstrate how many instances an RTI spends in a different
state, such as inside ability and traveling flanked by amenities. RTI uses fewer than 15
hours at the developed plant 50% of the time, according to statistics, while 21.3 percent of
RTIs spend 80 hours or more in the facility. Because most of this time is spent idle, this
indicates either an overcapacity or inadequate utilization of RTIs. RTIs stayed for fewer
hours at the meeting facility, which had less storage room in its market, with 50% staying
for less than 5 hours and merely 14.8% remaining for more than 50 hours.
When it comes to the occasion, it took to transport RTIs flanked by amenities 79.4% of
RTIs to be delivered within 5 hours or fewer when traveling from the production site to
the meeting factory, and 65.4% of RTIs were delivered in less than 5 hours on the go back
support. This demonstrates a reduction in the importance of returning RTIs, as evidenced
by the text. On the other hand, traveling to the production location took more than 20
hours, while RTIs took 12.9% longer to reach the assembly factory [32]. Based on this data,
it’s evident that there’s potential for improvement in RTI implementation and management
inside the hospital. Another issue addressed in the literature is RTIs that take excessive
time to transfer because they are misplaced or placed in the wrong locations.

8.5 It’s Time to Put the Pieces Together

The CPS experiment in place is a creative way to ensure that this condition is being met.
The time it takes for an RTI to leave the manufacturer, travel to the assembly site, and be
put together may be calculated as 53.2. Over the course of the 6-month trial, researchers
discovered that % of RTIs required 10 hours or less of construction. However, 36.2% of RTIs
were short of the required 12 hours [33]. The data would only be provided through if the
CPS was not deployed, components and their logistical operations would be monitored
manually. With this CPS implementation, the time-to-assembly measure may be moni-
tored in real-time if the user has the requisite expertise in creating new changes and keep-
ing tabs on their possessions

8.5.1 Devotion to the Wash Process

Every 10 cycles, at the very least, the separation has to be cleaned. The variety of cycles
an RTI has accomplished is directly related to the number of processes it has completed,
which is expressed as the number of conversions it has made across facilities. Collectors
136 Cyber Physical Systems

were only cleaned thrice throughout the six-month period. The first two occur after just
one series, and the third after 20 cycles. This shows a problem with the company’s quality
control, which must be addressed [33]. As a result of the poor performance, the RFID inte-
gration in the washing machine was examined to make sure it was working correctly. No
irregularities were established, implying that the clean devotion dimension was correct
[33]. Because of CPS’s continuous monitoring capabilities, the company may create planned
commerce procedure enhancements, in addition to quickly assessing their repercussions.

8.5.2 Capturing Business Processes and Flexibility

The right business processes must be documented to use the RTI state progressions, loca-
tions, and wash adherence in a CPS model. When specific business procedures are not
followed, i.e., erroneous processing routes and failure to detect the state of an RTI or sepa-
rator, the state determination services cannot accurately determine the form of an RTI or
partition to comply with established requirements. As a result, the system’s CPS model
is inaccurate, and any decisions based on it are most likely incorrect. This confronts puts
force on the organization to identify correctly, implement, and regulate RTI management
business processes and the CPS toward being flexible and recognizing what time proce-
dure deviations happen [34]. The RTI condition will power CPS repair could be expanded
to give stakeholders by recognized trend inside the dispensation route, allowing them
to choose whether they ought to be included keen on the CPS as different RTI state or
treated as wrong RTI dispensation, with stakeholders being notified if they carry on to
happen.

8.5.3 Manufacture Informed Decisions

The CPS can be implemented in a limited way, but it might be enhanced to provide extra
CPS base behavior and clever choice creation. Actual occasion decision on whether RTI
cleaning is necessary might be introduced to aid stakeholders in what time is moving bare
RTIs keen on the production plant. To evaluate if the RTI in transit should be transported
to the wash area, the CPS can maintain track of the present RTI ease of use, a figure of a
custom cycle, and wash mechanism utilization [34]. A CPS-equipped visual indication,
such as a show or pointer glow, might tell the operator of their options. The data col-
lected by the CPS could be utilized to create simulation and optimization services to help
with automated RTI and material handling scheduling. This could assist a corporation in
enhancing RTI usage by reducing inactive era and raising go back tax, resultant in lesser
RTI navy size and cheaper expenses.

8.5.4 Mechanisms Are Being Integrated into the CPS

Only the RTIs and separators were included in the CPS for the container learn completion.
RFID technology is being used to combine separate components that are being transferred.
Once connected, the CPS would exist cleverly to give a clear genuine occasion view of part
mobility inside the amenities, improve traceability and visibility of unique components,
and better understand the time-to-assembly metric [35]. With this technology, the demand
for trustworthy benefits toward CPS addition performance, i.e., using little tags that may
be fastened to metal components during production, is difficult. Alternatively, the advent
of intelligent containers, in which RTIs may identify the laden mechanism and interface
with the CPS to give additional data, such as creation experience, could facilitate more
The Impact of Industry 4.0 Cyber Physical Systems 137

excellent tracking [36]. Although the scheme was successfully installed with the findings
being old for choice support, the system’s more comprehensive application is limited due
to the necessity to build a more robust system for extreme situations.

8.6 Conclusions and Further Work

This chapter discusses the study and creation of a CPS to improve RTI monitoring and
management in the automobile industry. Rather than focusing on hypothetical, replicated,
or trim level laboratory difficulties, this investigation has integrated a comprehensive CPS
keen on entirely operating real-world car surroundings, anywhere RTIs are the proce-
dure on top of a nonstop foundation. The CPS provided total visibility of RTI plus their
associated separators to convene the wants of every significant stakeholder inside the
area. As a result of this operation, empirical RTI usage data has been collected, allowing
the company to examine the present condition of RTI procedures plus excellence stan-
dards. Several key RTI indicators (such as separator cycle, clean occurrence, an occasion
to a meeting, and logistical procedure delay) can be compiled and made available in a
secure GUI for stakeholder monitoring and decision-making. A proper CPS intend pro-
cedure was followed as a fraction of this completion, resulting in various information,
knowledge, and choice needs that aid stakeholders in the RTIs and benefits organization
areas. Constructing the CPS is likely to find difficulties linked to their implementations
inside the room. Among the problems are the additions of genuine-earth assets with the
digital globe, the documentation of commerce process, and the responsiveness of a CPS to
procedure alteration. More study is needed into the growth of innovative choice-making
services that can manage the run of RTIs and the option of integrating mechanisms inside
the CPS. These improvements can be made by utilizing accessible RFID communications
or constructing clever RTIs that use embedded sensors to detect and track components’
experiences. More research is needed to assess the viability of such a scheme completion
technique on a broader variety of demanding settings, such as those with a bit of commu-
nications, dampness, hotness, or powder.

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9
Security and Privacy Aspect of
Cyber Physical Systems

Umesh Kumar Singh1, Abhishek Sharma2, Suyash Kumar Singh3,

Pragya Singh Tomar4, Keerti Dixit5, and Kamal Upreti6

CONTENTS
9.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 141
9.2 Architecture of Cyber Physical System........................................................................... 145
9.3 Security Issues and Challenges of Cyber Physical System........................................... 146
9.3.1 CPS Security Threats.............................................................................................. 147
9.3.2 CPS Security Attacks.............................................................................................. 150
9.4 Security Objectives of Cyber Physical System................................................................ 153
9.5 Proposed Methods and Approaches to Secure Cyber Physical Systems................... 154
9.6 Security Research Areas in Cyber Physical System....................................................... 158
9.7 Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 159
References...................................................................................................................................... 160

9.1 Introduction
Systems that integrate the physical and computational domains are known as cyber physi-
cal systems. Digital chips, software products, sensors, and actuators are among the diverse
interacting components in CPS. As a result, the CPS ecology differs from and is more
advanced than conventional settings. It is principally true because CPS is set up to become
accustomed to its approach to the existing real-world environment in accordance to the
observed condition [1]. CPSs are comparable to IoT systems; however, they feature greater
physical and computational synchronization [2, 3].
CPSs interact with consumers, physical surroundings, and a range of hardware- and
software-based systems. This includes the integration, interoperability, monitoring, and
control of CPS components. CPS has a sequence of i/p and o/p connected to cooperating
components, unlike stand-alone devices. Furthermore, CPS deployments are not restricted
to a particular field; rather, they are found in nearly every field [4].
A CPS is defined through a wide range of organized technologies and a variable size
across such structures [5]. These technologies, among other things, offer better personaliza-
tion of health care, traffic control, finance, and the smart grid. Computing devices, embed-
ded systems, sensors, control units, and other devices that perform various duties can be
found in a CPS. A single CPS, for example, a room temperature surveillance and adjustment
system might usually comprise a few sensor and actuator nodes. A CPS, on the other hand,
can grow into a massive network of diversified and unstructured decentralized subsystems
for example, which may do diverse independent jobs on a solar energy plant [6].
DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-9 141
142 Cyber Physical Systems

FIGURE 9.1
Cyber physical systems (CPSs).

Biometric technologies, IoTs, smart citie​s/ind​ustri​es/he​althc​are/a​gricu​lture​/vehi​cles/​

build​ings and infrastructures, wearable technology, mobile communication, defense orga-
nizations, and climatology are just a few of the areas where CPSs are being developed
under the guise of technical methodologies shown in Figure 9.1
The fast expansion of CPS implementations has resulted in a slew of security and con-
fidentiality issues. Information security, as per ISO/IEC 27001: 2013, is the protection of
information’s CIA properties. CPSs have the flexibility to cope with this complication as
well as changes in system scale. The volume and diversity of deployed components dictate
the complexity of a CPS in most situations. Furthermore, the bulk of CPS engages sophisti-
cated response controller expertise. Response management denotes the capability to con-
trol cyber-physical measures in response to modifications in the physical environment [7].
The CPS is an important part of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Smart programs
and services can function in real time and with pinpoint precision thanks to CPS. They are
constructed on the actual exchange of variety of data and essential information through
the integration of cyber and physical systems [8].
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 143

Adopting industry 4.0 even without an external entity, which alters by combining new
technologies and systems, delivering independence, managed networked, state-driven art
accessibility, and reliability [9].
Biometrics, big data, smart grid, Internet of Things (IoT), neural networks, and deep
learning are only a few of the major topics covered by CPS. IoT devices have recently
become a serious concern, boosting the platform’s vulnerability to cyber assaults. To han-
dle cyber and physical risks, such platforms must be built with a secure, reliable, and fault-
tolerant framework [10].
CPSs have a variety of weak points where cyber physical attack vulnerability compro-
mises, resulting in data breaches to control platform dependability and robustness [11].
In today’s environment, CPS security needs a lot of effort since a growing number of
devices are affected during information transit [12].
The safety and security requirements of CPS devices need careful consideration in both
architecture and research [13]. Physical process, networking, computing, and actuation
are the four phases of the CPS communication process. The CPS workflow is depicted in
Figure 9.2.

(i) Physical process: The primary purpose of this phase is to monitor the CPS and
to build a connection and process communication channel. It offers data on prior
values and ensures feedback on previous actions as well as proper operation in the
actual world. The sole purpose of physical processes is to ensure resource integ-
rity and appropriate operation.
(ii) Networking: Data aggregation and dissemination must be possible throughout
the networking phase. The CPS sensor used to be able to store a large quantity of
data. Such sensors provide records in real time and have a large number of sensors
that can take data for analysis to evaluate forthcoming necessities.
(iii) Computing: Information gathered during the present stage is mostly utilized
for interpreting and evaluating the level of complication being supervised, as
well as ensuring that the physical process meets pre-determined standards. If

FIGURE 9.2
CPS workflow phases.
144 Cyber Physical Systems

satisfactory results are not obtained, remedial action is suggested to attain the
desired outcomes.
(iv) Actuation: The findings of the computation phase are used in this step to activate
specific functionality.

9.2 Architecture of Cyber Physical System

Computing systems, internetworking, and physical processes are all integrated into cyber
physical systems. As shown in Figure 9.3, these designs are usually characterized by three
primary levels: physical, network, and application layers.

(i) Physical layer: Physical layer consists of sensors/actuators and a range of supplemen-
tary devices and subcomponents having sensing/processing and communication
abilities [14]. Sensors inside this layer capture physical processes in the platform’s
physical surroundings. Actuator elements, that react to instantaneous event moni-
toring and interface with the application layer to facilitate data processing, are also
included [15, 16]. The actuator units have the capacity to alter the characteristics of
real-world physical objects and events [17]. Cyber physical activities are created as

FIGURE 9.3
Architecture of a cyber physical system.
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 145

a result of the platform’s processing of information, and they induce a physical pro-
cess to be triggered. A component of this layer has the capacity to communicate with
other networks, such as the internet, using a gateway is a key feature. Implementing
security guidelines is critical since this level is so prone to cyberattacks.
(ii) Network layer: The network layer’s job is communicating control instructions and
sensual data b/w the applications and physical layers. Because there are so many
distinct diverse networks connecting, specialized security procedures must be con-
sidered. Although it acts as a connection between the physical and application lay-
ers, as well as a pathway between sensors/actuators, network layer is important to
CPS functioning [18, 19]. The network layer is the path via that information, sen-
sor evaluation and orders to actuation are sent and received. Ethernet, Distributed
Network Protocol (DNP), Preferred Specification 16(RS-232), TCP/IP, dial-up
modem, and various wireless protocols are examples of network layer protocols [20].
Wireless communication is the most preferred technique for sensing and actuation
communication due to its dispersed landscape. Aimed at wireless technology, cloud
or actual servers are considering commonly. Network layer links application and
physical levels, capable of communicating and collaborating effectively.
(iii) Physical layer: Several features make up the application layer, including control
systems, databases, and an interface design. This layer collects input from the net-
work layer and creates control orders for actual machines and systems to be con-
trolled [21]. Access control, precision farming, remote sensing, smart cities, electric
grid, and other application-specific roles include data accounting and depiction,
trying to act as a controller for end customers, and proposing most visual interface
for a wide collection of applications/services are all handled by the application
layer. It also gives end users an interface and services for obtaining sensual data
through portable items or workstations that might take many dissimilar proce-
dures and consume very different safety needs.

9.3 Security Issues and Challenges of Cyber Physical System

CPSs are at a pivotal point in their growth, and as a consequence, they confront a slew
of challenges, the most significant of which is security. CPSs are subject to cyber assaults
aiming at gaining interior information otherwise interrupting storage and processing,
much as conventional software systems [22]. Intruders try to obtain access to the system,
distribute harmful code or malware, or collect confidential material for their malevolent
purposes, like harming businesses or impersonating a genuine user by collecting per-
sonal information [23]. When assaults against CPSs cyber aspect are carried out, the abil-
ity which regulates cyber physical events are disturbed [24]. Because they execute many
actions at various stages, CPS must protect appliances, information transfers, applications,
memories, and actuation procedures. The requirements are:

(i) Securing device access: The first difficulty is protecting device access. If authoriza-
tion is not given or is supplied in a bad manner, unauthorized entities may gain
entry and alter the environment [25]. As a consequence, neither the integrity of the
underlying binary codes nor the software functionality can be assured.
146 Cyber Physical Systems

(ii) Securing transmissions of data: Data transmission security is critical for detecting
pretenders and malicious acts in CPS communications systems, as well as restrict-
ing unauthorized access. For example, studying the data sent and received, attack-
ers try to capture the physical characteristics of network energy usage and temporal
characteristics [25]. Certain intruders seek and interrupt systems by initiating DoS
attacks or altering route architecture [26]. Several terminal devices lack significant
processing of data, communication, and data storage since they’re not complete
systems [27]. As a result, cyberattacks are much more likely to affect these devices.
Interconnection in Industrial Control System interfaces improves operational effi-
ciency and decreases operating costs by relying on open communications proto-
cols. While these interfaces make operations more efficient and productive, they
also expose the infrastructure to additional intrusions and hostile assaults, such
as malicious software, DDoS, eavesdropping, and unapproved access [28]. Another
contributor to security vulnerabilities is described as even design procedures are
constantly forced in terms of computational acceleration, physical servers, and
energy usage. Moreover, integrated structures are typically intended by specialists
with little expertise with security risks, and often prioritize functionality, checking
errors, and security throughput [29]. As a result, the platform is susceptible and
confidential material might be exposed to unauthorized or undesired individuals.
(iii) Application security: The application layer is where a field of application, and also
security issues, are brought all together. The data privacy that occurs at this layer
would not be resolved at another level, which does not face the same security chal-
lenges. As a result, hackers have access to critical information about users, which
can lead to information breaches and privacy issues. Spatial camouflage, faceless
space, and spatial cryptography are certain data security techniques employed at
this layer since this data may reveal information about prior and present places
visited by users. Many apps on this tier also have an influence on customers’ social
life, demanding their security [30].
(iv) Data storage security: It’s critical that private data in CPS equipment is kept secure.
Sensors, for example, make up the bulk of CPS equipment [26]. They are tiny,
wireless-linked nodes with limited resources. Regardless of the fact that several
technology approaches employ cryptography methods for certain instruments,
storage restrictions and the devices’ restricted computing power make them inad-
equate. Consequently, light-weight security techniques are essential [24].
(v) Securing actuation: Any actuation actions must originate from a trusted source,
according to actuation protection. In the event of a threat, this will guarantee that
the response and management orders are exact and protected. [27]. Accordingly,
to use the web as a transmission layer within CPS interconnections, there’ll be
security issues. Security must be given for entire system equally unified endwise
defense policy [30], instead of individual functional security tool at every level.
Furthermore, any desired security system must meet large memory requirements
and perform heavyweight calculations [28].

9.3.1 CPS Security Threats

According to the architecture of the cyber physical system (CPS) shown in Figure 9.3, secu-
rity threats to the CPS may be distributed into three categories, physical-layer threats,
network-layer threats, and application-layer threats:
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 147

(i) Threats in physical layer: Within the multilayered architecture of CPSs, the physi-
cal layer will be the significant foundation of sensory data and implementation
location for control orders. Because the bulk of physical layer nodes in the network
is located in unsupervised contexts, they are convenient targets for hackers. So
the physical layer’s observation network has limited data analysis, transmission,
and storage capability, traditional security approaches cannot be directly imple-
mented. The physical layer’s main security threats are detailed in Table 9.1.
The physical security of every node’s architecture, the gathering of represented
data, and the implementation of control instructions are all considerations at the
physical layer. Sensors/Actuators, RFID instruments, picture capture devices, as
well as additional technologies should be safe thanks to this layer’s security coun-
termeasures. The physical layer’s security is the bedrock of cyber physical system
security. The physical layer’s major security mechanisms and countermeasures
are as follows:
• Improve the administration and security of the node’s identification. This
will, to some extent, extend the time it takes for a node to be approved. In real
implementations, admins can evaluate the system’s effectiveness and safety to
develop a more appropriate node authentication approach.

TABLE 9.1
Security Threats at Physical Layer
Security Threats Description

Physical assault Physical attacks mostly called to the concrete damage of the nodes.
Failure of equipment Equipment functionality is reduced or lost as a result of external pressures, the
surroundings, or age.
Electric line failure Line failure refers to power lines failure on nodes.
Electrostatic leakage Intruders can recover actual information by analyzing electrostatic
communication devices emitted out at work.
Electrostatic intervention Excessive electromagnetic communications or commotions degrade overall
performance by interfering with valuable signals.
Denial of service (DoS) The intruder leads the target computer to stop providing services by
consuming network bandwidth.
Channel blocking Data transmission is not possible due to a transmission medium that has been
saturated for a long period.
Sybil attack A unique rogue node utilizes several identities to assault the network by
commanding the majority of nodes.
Data spoofing An intruder intercepts and changes data before sending it to the intended
receiver.
Unauthorized access Malicious hackers get access to resources.
Passive attack Sniffing and information gathering are used by the attacker to passively
acquire data.
Entity capture An intruder gets hold of a gateway node or a normal node.
Replay attack The hacker retransmits the genuine data received before in order to gain the
system’s confidence.
Perception data destruction The unlawful insertion, deletion, alteration, or destruction of perceptual data.
Data intercept Obtaining unauthorized access to information resources by intercepting a line
of communication.
148 Cyber Physical Systems

• Biometric systems and relatively close to digital systems will be used to better
protect perceptual data.
• Make the legislation more robust. Make the consequences of unlawful activity
with cyber physical systems obvious.
• Cyber physical systems combined with cryptography [17, 18], privacy protec-
tion [19–21, 26, 31–33], security routing [34, 35], security data fusion [22, 23, 36],
and safety positioning [24, 25] research.
(ii) Threats in network layer: The “next-generation networks” acts as the main carrier
network for CPS network layer. The design, access techniques, network infrastruc-
ture of the “forthcoming generation network” will expose CPS to the multitude
of security vulnerabilities. The high number of nodes and enormous information
over the network layer might introduce congestion issues, rendering the struc-
ture vulnerable to DoS/DDoS attempts. As a result of information exchange,
entry point authorization, and the convergence of security rules across various
networks, additional security problems for the network layer of CPSs will emerge.
The major network layer security threats are shown in Table 9.2.
The network layer of CPS has security mechanisms in place to certify integrity,
confidentiality, and uniformity of transmission information within the systems.
For network layer protection, both peer-to-peer and endwise cryptography meth-
ods can be employed [26]. The network layer’s major security mechanisms and
countermeasures are as follows:
• A point-to-point cryptography method ensures data confidentiality through-
out hop-by-hop communication. This approach demands a greater degree of
node dependability since any node in the chain may acquire plaintext data. A
few of the safety features include peer authorization, node-to-node encrypt-
ing, and inter-network verification.
• Endwise encryption provides data protection from start to finish, with adjust-
able protection rules for different levels of security. Edge encryption, on the
other hand, may not hide the data’s sender/receiver, and enemies might utilize
that knowledge to their advantage. Some of the security techniques include
endwise verification, important negotiating, and access control.
( iii) Application-layer threats: The network layer of CPS has security mechanisms in
place to confirm the integrity, confidentiality, and uniformity for transmission of
data in the system. For network layer protection, both steeplechase and endwise
cryptography methods can be employed [26]. This approach demands a greater
degree of node dependability since any node in the chain can acquire plaintext data.
A few of the safety features include peer authorization, hop-by-hop encrypting, and
inter-network verification, the description of security threats are shown in Table 9.3.
The application layer is the most important part of a CPS, since it is respon-
sible for creating choices and giving control orders. Huge data amounts on the
application layer of CPSs demand sophisticated data processing skills and com-
prehensive user privacy data security on this layer. The following are the primary
physical security measures:
• Strengthen the platform’s access control list.
• In various circumstances, strengthen the authentication and encryption
mechanisms.
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 149

TABLE 9.2
Network Layer Security Threats
Security Threats Description

DDoS A huge number of malicious nodes assault the target server around the same
moment as DoS sources.
Routing attack The intruder sends counterfeit routing information to disrupt the regular routing
procedure.
Sink node attack By targeting the sink node, data transfer between the physical and network layers
is disrupted.
Direction misleading Malicious node changes senders and receiver’s addresses of packets of data before
attack sending them down the incorrect path, causing confusion in network routing.
Black hole attack A malicious node deceives neighboring nodes into establishing routing links with
it, then discards packets that should have been routed, resulting in packet loss.
Flooding attack Smurf and DDoS consume the network servers’ capabilities upon that network
layer.
Trapdoor Permit an exemption to the security policy for transmitting particular data.
Sinkhole attack A malicious user draws regular nodes to itself as a point in the transmission range,
causing data to communicate via it.
Wormhole attack Malicious nodes band together to improve routing by reducing the number of
routing hops among them.
Routing loop attack A malicious node alters data route, resulting in endless routing loops.
Sybil attack By owning the most of the terminals, the rogue node can impede data transmission
by using several identities.
HELLO flooding attack The malicious node notifies others in the network which are their immediate
neighboring via broadcasting routing information through a strong signal.
Spoofing attack A malicious node impersonates a legitimate node in order to send data along a
sluggish route or to a node that has failed.
Selective transporting A malicious node loses part or every critical information in the redirect process on
purpose.
Tunnel attack Malicious nodes conceal their true connection extent in order to entice additional
nodes to create routes via them.
Fake routing details A malicious node tampers with the route knowledge to exploit the network layer
system.

TABLE 9.3
Application-Layer Security Threats
Security Threats Description

Privacy data leakage Consumers’ personal information is exposed due to unsecured data transfer,
storage, and display.
Illegal access Connectivity to network and system data that is not permitted.
Malicious code The system contains code that has no impact but may be a security risk.
Stolen control instructions Intruders deliberately utilize or damage a system by changing control
commands.
Loophole Attacking the system through application-layer flaws.
Viruses and Trojan horses The most frequent application-layer security risks are viruses and Trojan
horses.
SQL injection Attack SQL injection is a typical method of hacking a system’s database.
150 Cyber Physical Systems

• Strengthen network forensics capabilities by improving network forensics

mechanisms [27].
• Create consolidated, well-organized security management for different cyber
physical system applications.

9.3.2 CPS Security Attacks

Attacks against CPS might result in substantial environmental harm. Passively or
aggressively, each layer of the CPS can be assaulted. CPS is also more prone to assaults
than traditional IT systems. These assaults aren’t limited to CPS; they may also target
the network as a whole, notably the internet [23], in use as the transmission layer.
Physical layer intrusions involve assaults on nodes like sensors and actuators; network
layer attacker uses data leak or destruction, as well as security flaws throughout data
transfer; intrusions involve illegal entry that violates user privacy [37] at the applica-
tion level. As a result, identifying possible risks and putting in place solid security
architecture is critical. Regardless of the fact that all layer is prone to adverse sorts of
assaults, certain assaults may hit all levels, and examples of these attempts according
to [23, 26, 37, 38] include:

• Denial of service (DoS): It modifies performance using limiting communication

in terms of making the networking and service inaccessible, for example, by over-
whelming assets with fake demands and exploiting a protocol flaw. DDoS is also
a public assault that victimizes many resources at the same time, such as end
devices and networks, preventing accessibility and services [38].
• Man-in-the-middle (MITM): It delivers a false message to a victim’s assets that
subsequently takes excluded activities in response to the communication, such
as manipulating an original purpose, which might result in an unpleasant occur-
rence. This sort of attack can also damage the network layer, which in some cases
can lead to eavesdropping [39].
• Eavesdropping: The system’s data is captured at all times. Transferring control
data from sensor networks to CPS applications for monitoring reasons, for exam-
ple, might be subject to eavesdropping. Additionally, user privacy may be jeopar-
dized so the system is being watched [39].
• Spoofing: When trying to participate in system activities, pretends to be a
genuine customer. The intruder will have access to information and will be
capable of changing, removing, or inserting data after successfully acquiring
access [39].
• Replay (playback): To gain the system’s confidence, retransmits data received from
a destination node [38]. This sort of attack is carried out by spoofing and changing
or reacting to one of the devices’ identifying information.
• Compromised key: This assault is aimed at the secret key which can be used
to secure messages. A timing (side channel) exploit is used to do this, that
includes calculating the needed encryption time [38]. The hijacked key would
then be used to alter data and conduct computer investigation to decode addi-
tional private keys in similar system. In rare circumstances, attacker might
acquire access to sensors to complete business operations in order to extract
additional internal keys. During different situations, an intruder might be able
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 151

to replace a sensor node and pass themselves off as the genuine edition while
swapping keys with other units [26, 27], revealing the additional nodes' under-
ground keys.

At each level within CPS, various sorts of hazards and common assaults for each layer may
be categorized as follows, based on the CPS design:

(i) Attacks at the physical layer: End devices such as RFID tags and sensors make
up the physical layer, which is constrained by computer resources and mem-
ory capacity. Furthermore, because such items are typically used in exterior
and outdoor environments, they are susceptible to physical assaults such
as component tampering or replacement. As a result, terminal devices are
particularly vulnerable to numerous types of assaults. Physical layer attacks
include device malfunctioning, link failure, electromagnetic conflict, cogni-
tive information skimming [23], discrepancy power investigation [38], infor-
mation disclosure, monitoring, forgery, detecting security breaches, complete
destruction, and power fatigue. Examples of frequent sorts of assaults include
the following:
• Node capture: Gets hold of the cluster and acquires and exposes data, includ-
ing encryption keys, and formerly utilized jeopardize whole system security.
Secrecy, availability, veracity, and legitimacy are all targets of this type of
assault [38, 40].
• False node: It introduces a new node to the network and broadcasts malicious
data to jeopardize the integrity of records. It can induce DoS attack via deplet-
ing power of platform’s node [38].
• Node outage: Halts node operations, making it tough to declaim and collect
data from them, and initiates a slew of other assaults that jeopardize the net-
work’s availability and integrity [40].
• Path-based DoS: Overflowing packets are dispatched with a transmitting path
to the origin station, depleting node cells and disturbing the network, decreas-
ing node uptime [40].
• Resonance: Forces sensors or controllers that have been tampered with to
operate at an alternative resonance frequency [41].
• Integrity: Efforts to disrupt the system by manipulating sensor data and intro-
ducing external influence inputs [42].
(ii) Attacks at the network layer: Data leakage during data transfer is one type of
attack against another layer. This occurs as a result of the communication medi-
um’s accessibility that is particularly true with wireless systems. These exploits
imitate digital credentials by collecting a broadcast message through a radio chan-
nel, changing and demodulating it, or moving information across composite net-
works. Additional characteristics, including such web access methods used by a
significant set of network endpoints, which could also generate congestion prob-
lems, could render it more vulnerable to assault [23, 39]. Reaction and manipu-
lation, exploitation, fatigue, crash, black hole, flooding trap doors, base station,
orientation confusing sinkhole, wormhole, improper route planning, tunneling
[23, 26], and illegal access are all prominent assaults at this layer. Here are a few
examples of common network layer attacks:
152 Cyber Physical Systems

• Routing: Routing loops can cause network transmission resistance, higher

transmitting latency, or a longer source path [26, 38].
• Wormhole: It creates information gaps in the network by constructing fake
pathways through which every container is transmitted [43]. An announce-
ment of routing to supplementary nodes is made. Other attacks, such as selec-
tive forwarding and spoofing, might be launched using this method [26].
Introducing noise or a signal of comparable frequencies into the communica-
tion networks between the network system and the faraway ground control
station effectively jams the connection. By creating deliberate network distur-
bance, this attack might result in DoS.
• Selective forwarding: Allows hacked endpoints to discard packets while
forwarding those that are chosen. While the hacked node is still considered
authentic, it may cease sending packets to its intended destination or selec-
tively relay certain messages while rejecting the rest [26].
• Sinkhole: For traffic routing to other nodes, the optimal routing path is
announced. This technique could be used to initiate further attacks, like selec-
tive forwarding and spoofing.
(iii) Attacks at the application layer: Because it collects a considerable amount of user
data, attacks upon the layer lead to data loss, confidentiality loss (such as user hab-
its and health conditions), and unauthorized equipment. Customer data loss, illegal
access, malware, record forging, and control command fraud are all examples of
application-layer risks [23, 24]. Assaults on this layer are commonly seen as follows:
• Buffer overflow: Attacks are done by utilizing the advantage of every vulner-
ability that may lead to a buffer overflow [38].
• Harmful code: Attacks the customer’s application by generating harmful
script, like viruses and worms, which slows or damages the network.

9.4 Security Objectives of Cyber Physical System

When it came to guaranteeing the protection of CPSs, there are a few security goals to
achieve:

(i) Confidentiality: Confidentiality refers to a person’s or system’s capacity to keep

information from being shared with unauthorized persons or systems [44]. Take, for
example, a Healthcare CPS. By encrypting the individual health history throughout
communication, restricting the locations where it would surface (in datasets, system
logs, archives, etc.), and limiting access to the places in which it is maintained, the
system intended to guarantee secrecy. When an illegal entity has access to personal
health information, this seems to be a violation of confidentiality in some form.
(ii) Integrity: In order to preserve integrity, CPSs must be capable of accomplishing
physical goals [27] by preserving, detecting, or suppressing manipulation risks on
information‑ supplied and acquired by sensors or controllers [45]. The capacity to
detect any (malicious purposes) introduced changes in the message being trans-
mitted is needed to ensure data integrity [46].
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 153

(iii) Availability: A CPS’s high availability attempts to guarantee that operations are
often reachable by avoiding computation, management, and transmission corrup-
tions induced by component failure, efficiency improvements, power cuts, or DoS
[47] presented a multi-cyber infrastructure based on the Markov model to increase
CPS availability.
(iv) Authenticity: In computer and transmission operations, it requires confirming
the authenticity of data, communications, and conversations. Authentication of all
linked processes, such as sensing, communications, and actuations is the objective
of CPS.
(v) Trustworthiness: This is the degree to which users may trust the CPS to com-
plete needed activities within specific domain and time restrictions. The software,
hardware, and collected data must all exhibit a level of trustworthiness in order
for a CPS to be viable and trustworthy.

9.5 Proposed Methods and Approaches to Secure Cyber Physical Systems

CPS assaults are more difficult to detect and prevent than internet attacks. Hackers may
use numerous attack phases to get access to a CPS in order to avoid detection. In the sec-
tions below, a number of security techniques for dealing with CPS assaults are detailed.
The CPS security techniques and their relevant references are shown in Figure 9.4.

(i) Attack taxonomy:

Cyber assaults against CPSs include not just typical IT-related cyberattacks, but also
attacks on CPSs that can transcend the cyber physical domain border [48]. The taxonomy
of assaults against CPS has already been addressed in depth in the above section.

(ii) Attack and threat modeling:

FIGURE 9.4
Modeling security approaches: cyber physical systems.
154 Cyber Physical Systems

Due to a number of constraints, simulation and modeling are commonly used to do research
on CPS attacks. The importance of replicating real-world assaults cannot be overstated [49]
[50]. Proposed hybrid attack graphs as a novel approach to modeling cyber-physical risks in
smart grids. Fabio Pasqualetti et al. proposed an attack paradigm that integrates stealth and
replays assaults into a unified architecture with better monitoring systems for malfunction
and attack detection [51]. Michael E. Kuhl and colleagues proposed a cost-effective and
time-saving modeling technique for representing computer networks in order to simulate
cyberattack scenarios for the purpose of assessing security solutions [52].
Because heterogeneity, dynamism, and complexity demands must be properly inves-
tigated and addressed, CPS modeling is important [53]. From information transmission
to process modeling, CPS modeling may cover a wide range of issues [54]. Security tech-
niques such as threat modeling, strategy planning, and a holistic approach to tackling
security and safety concerns together are discussed in this context by [55]. There are
several problems that apply to all models, regardless of their nature. The model should
be deterministic, capable of aiding in problem-solving, provable, and executable [56].
System dynamics, Bayesian networks, coupled component models, agent-based models,
and knowledge-based models are five typical modeling techniques for a complex system,
according to [57]. A Bayesian network’s objective is to characterize the influence of one
entity’s attributes on the characteristics of another entity, or one event on another event.
The linked component modeling method, on the other hand, entails integrating models or
model components from a variety of fields to arrive at a comprehensive solution [57, 58]. All
system elements are represented by interacting agents with particular behavior that takes
into consideration their influence on the overall system in agent-based modeling. Finally,
utilizing a knowledge base and logic tools, knowledge-based modeling extracts solutions.

(iii) Attack detection:

Several researchers have looked at the detection, isolation, and recovery of control sys-
tem faults. [59]. CPSs have vulnerabilities that are not present in traditional control sys-
tems, and suitable detection and identification methods must be developed for them [60].
Physical dynamics-focused internal assaults fail because security measures don’t conform
to the underlying physical process or method of control in any quantifiable way [61]. Robert
Mitchell et al. developed a general hierarchical model for assessing the performance of
intrusion detection algorithms in the context of a CPS [62]. They create two intrusion
detection techniques for identifying fraudulent attacks in a CPS and then use the hierar-
chical model that was created to assess the results of the two techniques and determine
the best design parameters for improving the CPS’s dependability. The author suggested
and tested a behavior regulation, configuration-based exploitation detection method for
medicinal devices surrounded in healthcare CPSs [63]. The causal connection between
components in a CPS is modeled using Bayesian networks and casual event graphs [64].
Florian Dorfler created a unified prediction system and an enhanced detection approach
in order to prototype an assault on a core network [65]. An Intrusion Detection Device
(IDS) is a vital component of cyber surveillance equipment that is designed to alert either a
human operator or another information security equipped system when an assault occurs.
The primary functions of IDS in CPS are to gather and analyze data about the entity that
has been infiltrated [66, 67].

• Network-based Protocols: Focuses on network traffic and the dangers it poses,

taking network protocols, traffic, and devices into consideration.
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 155

• Wireless: Identical to the first, except that those IDSs include wireless traffic and
protocols.
• Network behavior analysis: Monitors network traffic flows to identify unusual
activity patterns and policy breaches.
• Host-based IDSs monitor traffic, application activity, file actions, and configura-
tion activities for a single host. This type of ID is commonly used on critical infra-
structure nodes.

Based on how they identify threats, modern IDS may be divided into three categories [68]:

• Anomaly-based approaches presuppose the identification of deviations in behav-

ior from the normal.
• Signature-based systems depend on a database of up-to-date threat models to
identify and prevent intrusions.
• The identification of questionable behavior across the whole system, down to the
level of individual subsystems and interconnections, is a fundamental tenet of
specification-based approaches.

In [68], the authors provide a unique approach of classifying IDSs by classifying them
according to the audit material they examine, such as the host or network, and the detec-
tion methodology they use, such as experience and understanding or behavior patterns.
The same research also clarifies the distinctions between standard IDSs and IDSs for cyber
physical systems. To deal with the problem of CPS resource limits, scheduling techniques
have been devised, in which responsibilities are shared among CPS nodes in order to keep
the processing flow constant [69] [68, 70]. It offers a plan to improve the likelihood of an
attack being recognized by the use of verified safe monitors. Data obtained from a refer-
ence device is compared to data collected from other devices in the same environment
using so-called trustworthy devices [71]. Using this concept assumes that a collection of
sensors measure the same underlying physical parameters. The measurements are then
collected and evaluated using a sensor algorithm that takes into consideration the sensor
precisions that have been established. However, this technique is not particularly practi-
cal and may expose the system to both passive and DoS assaults. Time-based detection is
another method of intrusion detection in CPS [72], which assumes a predefined variable
for worst-case execution time (WCET). If the execution time exceeds the preset limits, the
system is considered hacked.

(iv) Security solutions

Keeping protected CPS surroundings is not stress free due to the consistent growth of
issues, integration concerns, limitations of presenter solutions, such as a security/privacy/
accuracy deficiency. Cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques are included.

(v) Cryptographic-based methodologies

These protections are common in SCADA systems to secure the route from active and
passive attacks, and also illegal access and disruption [73]. The main goal must be on pro-
tecting and ensuring the efficiency of the entire production system, rather than on data
security. As a result, a range of choices were made available [74]. Investigated CPS security
156 Cyber Physical Systems

and the degree to what reference images may be designed to improve safety. Security
problems, flaws in present security architecture, and alternative ways to restoring secu-
rity in power grids are all examined [75]. Security risks to water distribution systems are
highlighted [76], along with the need to build threat prototypes and supervision roles in
security management.

(vi) Non-cryptographic-based solutions

There were also a number of non-cryptographic solutions offered to limit and eliminate
any possible cyberattacks, including the following:

1. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs): Different IDS approach types are accessible
due to the availability of diverse network topologies [77]. When it comes to detec-
tion, setup, pricing, and network location, each IDS approach has its own set of
benefits and cons. A number of research projects were undertaken in order to
identify CPS assaults. [78]. These assaults are divided into two categories. A phys-
ics-based paradigm for defining basic CPS operations using anomaly detection
in CPS. According to [79, 80], a cyber-based model is utilized to detect possible
assaults. In reality, the techniques described were designed primarily to identify
particular attacks against specific applications, such as industrial control pro-
cesses [81] and smart grid [75].
2. Firewalls: Since the introduction of intrusion detection systems (IDS) and arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), firewalls have seen minimal use in the CPS sector. As a
result, only a few firewall-based solutions are available [82]. With the goal of
improving server computer networks, this report describes the use of paired fire-
wall in various network zones. The authors picked paired firewalls because of
the rigorous security and clear administrative separation. Ghosh et al. described
how they used event data to predict real-time network device failures such as
firewalls [83].
3. Honeypots and methods of deception: CPS uses deception as a decoy to conceal
and defend its system, which is a crucial defensive security measure. Honeypots
are mostly used to do this. Cohen talked about how honeypot deception might be
enhanced when used. [84], employing a variety of deceptive techniques. Author
proposed in [85] the HoneyBot was created using the HoneyPhy architecture.
According to the research, HoneyPhy may be used to replicate these actions in
real time. According to a recent study, HoneyBot can fool attackers into thinking
their attacks are effective.
4. Machine learning, threshold, and rule-based schemes: Understanding the dis-
tinction between basic rule-based procedures and machine learning algorithms
is critical (ML). At the same time, both can be represented in the same security
architecture. Rule-based mechanisms, which are based on previously collected
information, are used as the first line of defense against threats, detecting the most
significant risks that might harm the system. Feature extraction, feature selection,
rule-based detection, and ML algorithms for threat detection and rule extraction
are all important elements in a security architecture that combines ML algorithms
with rule-based processes. A more sophisticated method is to incorporate human
supervision into the security architecture, as provided by extracted information
from the machine-learning module. Specific traffic types, such as P2P, may be
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 157

prioritized from the raw input, which could be represented by packets or log files
that are recorded and analyzed. The identification of critical characteristics that
are useful for threat detection is part of the second step. In the third step, rule-
based processes are applied to the list of important traits, and potentially hazard-
ous elements are discarded.
5. Knowledge-based schemes: The ML module checks other entities that have not
been identified as harmful after the rule-based detection module has removed
malicious entities and created the learning set for the ML module. In addition,
rule inference modules can be added to the ML module to produce new rules in
response to new threats.
6. Security architecture and design:

Networked resource-contained devices are expected to make up the bulk of CPSs. CPS
security is essential for preserving data integrity and privacy while bolstering system
defenses against intruders. Sebastian Seeber and colleagues illustrate how security may be
utilized to secure communication in an RPL network in [86]. New security risks would tar-
get CPSs, such as the ability to manipulate the structure at the IT system level and inside
its immediate environment. In [87], the author delves into the many security flaws that
exist, and suggests a novel system design that merges ideas from the realm of Biological
Computing with the goal of developing upcoming safe CPS.

9.6 Security Research Areas in Cyber Physical System

In the context of CPS security, this section contributes to a discussion of many major out-
standing research problems.

• Protection of critical infrastructure: Smart grids are an excellent example of essen-

tial infrastructure, with several significant issues such as
(i) Variety of technologies and protocols;
(ii) Communication protocol flaws, since some lack security measures;
(iii) According to [73], certain physical devices have restricted capabilities;
(iv) A wide range of security approaches that vary depending on the application
domain.
• Cyber and physical components protection: One of CPS’s most essential criterion
is integrity. The security of a sensor network, as well as its superstructures and
data integrity, must all be taken into account. Another important challenge is the
lack of a common technique for developing secure CPS, which has resulted in a
plethora of proprietary solutions based on possibly flawed methodologies.
• Security and mobility: Because mobile devices connect with so many other net-
works and services, they are potential carriers of threats. Increased security
protections for wearable smart mobile assistants and implants have become a
serious issue since these gadgets have the potential to threaten human health
and even life.
158 Cyber Physical Systems

• Safety communication for geographically dispersed points: Ensuring secure com-

munication for certain of a system’s critical nodes or subsystems is a challenging
undertaking. Furthermore, apps that access data collected by sensor nodes, for
example, might be hijacked, resulting in a hard-to-detect passive attack on the sen-
sor network. The notion of federated learning, in which data is processed locally
rather than routed to a central node for processing, might be adopted as a viable
strategy. As a result, the local data set does not need to be sent to a central server;
just a global model update is required [88].
• Analytical and integration tools: There exists an uncertain necessity for novel
security models which integrate machine learning, decision-making algorithms,
and human-assisted analysis. Human-assisted analysis is still an important part
of recognizing dangers that have already been experienced. In addition, because
the most common threats demand real-time countermeasures and data volumes
are enormous, new solutions for quicker response times are necessary.
• Proactive security systems: Based on prior threats, proactive security systems
enforced by analytical tools might identify major attack paths and threat types. A
DDoS assault, for example, may be the most prevalent hazard to a system, neces-
sitating special protections.
• Enabling collaborative mechanisms for CPS protection: A shared threat mitigation
plan, as well as information exchange about previously experienced dangers, are
examples of collaborative techniques. A fragmented security approach is no lon-
ger feasible against emerging threats, according to a McAfee research [89]. A pro-
posal for an open integrated ecosystem for security activity coordination was also
developed. As a result, the sharing of threat information will assist security sys-
tems belonging to a variety of stakeholders. As new threats develop quicker than
threat mitigation systems can respond, reaction time and resource requirements
will be reduced. Another approach is to employ a common knowledge base that is
being expanded by several parties in order to increase threat mitigation efficiency.

9.7 Conclusion
Complex methods that rely on the convergence of physical and cyber or software com-
ponents are known as CPSs. CPS provides a diverse set of services. The number of CPS
deployed is steadily rising, posing a multitude of security and safety concerns. In this
study, researchers take an in-depth look at the idea and architecture of cyber physical sys-
tems (CPSs), discuss the security goals and challenges associated with CPSs, and analyze
the vulnerabilities and attacks faced by three CPS deployment tiers. It also spoke about
how important it is for CPS to develop new sophisticated methods in the field of security
and privacy. We looked at several mitigating strategies, such as sophisticated intrusion
detection systems that use machine learning algorithms. The fast growth of CPS has had
a profound impact on our way of life. CPS is now the highest focus in order to improve its
capabilities and create a lifecycle as easily as possible. Such CPS equipment is strongly cou-
pled by cyber space components and physical devices and are unified and synchronized
with the physical surroundings. CPSs are a viable framework for creating current and pro-
spective systems, and they have been predicted to get a significant influence on the actual
Security and Privacy Aspect of Cyber Physical Systems 159

world. CPS is more concerned with the design of complicated processes as a whole, instead
of particular cyber or physical systems. CPS systems are essential components of Industry
4.0, enabling Industry v4.0 by integrating the physical and cyber worlds. They’re clearly
changing the way individuals interact with their environment. CPS systems have a num-
ber of security and privacy problems that might jeopardize their dependability, safety, and
efficiency, as well as prevent broad implementation. In order to give a theoretical reference,
we looked at a variety of CPS risks and assaults in this chapter. We also looked at the cyber
physical system’s security objectives, ways to secure CPS, and security problems, as well
as open research questions. The CPS environment requires safe infrastructure to resist
severe cyber-physical attacks. We anticipate that CPS security researchers will find this
article useful in a variety of ways.

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164 Cyber Physical Systems

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10
Cyber Physical System Approach for Smart
Farming and Challenges in Adoption

Rajesh Kumar, Amit Pandey, and Kuldeep Singh Kaswan

CONTENTS
10.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 165
10.2 Cyber-Physical Farming Platform.................................................................................... 167
10.2.1 Improving Crop Productivity............................................................................... 167
10.2.2 Sensing Soil Capability to Improve Crops.......................................................... 168
10.2.3 Crop Performance and Soil Improvement Analysis.......................................... 168
10.3 Challenging Factor in Agricultural.................................................................................. 169
10.3.1 Agricultural Techniques........................................................................................ 171
10.4 Agricultural Approach...................................................................................................... 172
10.4.1 Agricultural Tools................................................................................................... 173
10.4.2 Cyber Physical Systems.......................................................................................... 173
10.5 Future Studies..................................................................................................................... 174
10.6 Conclusions.......................................................................................................................... 174
References...................................................................................................................................... 175

10.1 Introduction
Among the most significant difficulties highlighted for the twenty-first century are:

• Scarcity of resources – environmental challenges

• An aging population
• Rapid worldwide population expansion and widespread urbanization
• Globalization and increasing mobility
• Increased competitive pressure
• High dynamism in technological development
• Increased middleware

All of these have significant consequences for the most critical aim of our century: ensur-
ing the correct framework for feeding and supporting the whole world's population over
an indefinite “time horizon” [1].

The quality and diversity of agriculture items as crucial characteristics of the popula-
tion's nutritional value have long been a central objective of both experts and, particularly,

DOI: 10.1201/9781003220664-10 165

166 Cyber Physical Systems

administrations. On the other hand, there is a growing recognition that, in the case of
increased demography, not only are sustainable farming surfaces constricted, but the
impact of climate change on crop production may be so powerful that, in the very worst
sort of situation, the important environmental equivocation that allows all above con-
gregation to exist is likely to be destroyed.

Already, technology has had an effect “on the investment efficiency of agricultural pro-
duction: automation, artificial fertilizers, pharmaceutical pesticide application, and infor-
mation and technology have long proven their usefulness in raising the quantity of food
while requiring less human labor” [2].
Innovative products (biotechnologies, planning, and control) have also been introduced
to reduce negative environmental consequences and improve the efficiency of operations
of the agricultural sector. However, technology advancements have been employed in the
pato assist one or more components of the farm sector, without a comprehensive perspec-
tive of their interdependencies, rely without taking into account the feedback mechanism,
which includes the long-term risk associated.

“Agriculture’s development, particularly in the last fifty years, has favored specializa-
tion food and fiber productivity rose due to new technologies (mechanized farming,
automating, chemistry, and microbiology) and regulations favor maximizing output in
response to market forces. Because of these advances, fewer producers with lower labor
needs could provide the bulk of food and fiber in the most industrialized economies” [3].

“While these modifications have had numerous good benefits and decreased many dan-
gers in farming,” as stated in [1] “there have also been major expenses.” Topsoil degrada-
tion, groundwater pollution, the demise of agricultural producers, persistent disregard of
farm laborer social and studying circumstances, rising production costs, and the break-
down of the standard of living in rural areas are noteworthy among these [4].
During the last two decades, a significant movement has developed to challenge the agri-
business leadership’s role in encouraging practices that contribute to these socioeconomic
problems. Today, the sustainable agricultural movement is gaining traction and accept-
ability in mainstream agriculture. Sustainable agriculture not only addresses numerous
environmental issues, but it also provides creative and commercially viable options for
producers, laborers, consumers, legislators, and so many others across the food chain. The
referencing above is significant of a growing phenomenon in which the farmland entre-
preneurship model is shifting toward greater complexity, with behavior emerging from
the communication networks and coexistence of multiple portions that are independent of
the legislature and knowledgeable, through promoting best practices, of achieving a fully
functioning optimal solution, sharing “costs, and especially reducing the environmental
footprint. The environment is especially considered in this model, both as a specialized
efficiency requirement and as an explicit feature of the model” [5].
System dynamics, “ICT, and” information sharing now can enable the development of
such a framework by utilizing one of the most recent and demanding paradigms – cyber
physical systems.
This chapter seeks to give a systematic agricultural approach. Enterprise is described as
a dynamic system whose emergence behavior may be altered by changes in the external
environment.
The following part will introduce the notion of agricultural production enterprise used
in this work and the essential criteria for its operation.
Cyber Physical System Approach 167

A model of this firm will be given, emphasizing the complicated flow of information and
goods and their linkage.
The notion of cyber physical systems will be briefly described as solutions and technolo-
gies for an intelligence agriculture organization central controller, as an interconnected
multi-agent wireless mesh network. “Such design may be able to facilitate a lean migra-
tion from current industrially focused agriculture to sustainable farming in short, realistic
phases [6].”

10.2 Cyber-Physical Farming Platform

This work integrates traditional agricultural practices with modern cyber-enabled tech-
nologies to build adaptable SeDS diagnostic systems and assist agriculture. This study
employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches to overcome the absence of needed
data as well as related inadequacies in cyber-physical agricultural systems. As mentioned
in this part, the integrative technique in this work evaluates multiple factors (e.g., soil
physical, chemical, and biological characteristics) and variables (e.g., crop yield and qual-
ity) under real-world settings to enhance the dimensionality of CPS and data-driven selec-
tion. The “bottom-up” method to describing and forecasting local soil and environmental
conditions suggested herein indicates a possible paradigm change from existing tactics
that seek to improve production exclusively by relying on general, empirical connections
between fertilizers rate and agricultural yield [7].”

10.2.1 Improving Crop Productivity

The sensitivity and specificity of geostationary pictures “are in the neighborhood of feet
per pixels (a field-of-view of 10–50 km), but there is also lacking imaging data for land
regions under cloud covering under overcast meteorological conditions. Despite the dis-
advantages highlighted, drones constitute a desirable decision for a visual experience
of earth occurrences and cultivated lands since they are inexpensive to purchase for
on-demand instant scanning and picture processing [8]. Drone imaging has a position-
ing accuracy ranging from 0.25 to 4 inches per pixel (a field-of-view of 10–500 m). As a
result of the tremendous temporal granularity given by drone photos, soil health and crop
productivity may be assessed more often in developing field locations. This capability
is highly beneficial to farmers since it simplifies the impact evaluation. Drone-delivered
hyperspectral detectors are used to study the effects of a wide range of fertilizer types
and application rates. These webcams are becoming more popular in crop monitoring.
Compared with conventional display information, which provides image feature path-
ways connected with the electromagnetic radiation in the visible spectrum’s Red, Green,
and Blue (RGB) light-specific wavelength, infrared imaging cameras provide multiple
channels of visual energy in the near-infrared band of the electromagnetic spectrum. As
a result, these cameras gather crop intelligence that farmers cannot see or receive with
traditional RGB cameras [9]. Because it is connected to pigmentation, it is instrumental in
assessing crop performance (natural coloring of plant tissue). Precisely, vegetation hav-
ing low chlorophyll levels (as the primary photosynthetic pigment in plants) reflects less
light in the near-infrared spectrum than young seedlings. Similarly, decreased leaf hydra-
tion causes a shift in the transmitted wavelength content used to detect water scarcity
168 Cyber Physical Systems

in crops. Furthermore, increased drone data may be utilized to extract important crop
properties, such as leaf shape and color patterns that are not recorded in low-resolution
aerial photographs. Certain phenotypic (for example, metabolic and molecular qualities)
are distinguished by variations in the morphology of the leaves without changing the
crop’s spectral content. In addition, leaf coloration characteristics can determine sick plants
from nutritional ones. This work investigates the use of fieldwork mappings for numerous
regularly used switch virtual interfaces (SVIs), as well as leaf shape-color metadata, in the
building of business intelligence algorithms for assessing the influence of nutrients on
organically crop output [10].”

10.2.2 Sensing Soil Capability to Improve Crops

“This chapter seeks to deliver efficient and accessible decision support and services by
developing data-driven algorithms for diagnosing soil health issues and detecting tempo-
ral variations [11]. Accurate soil crop (SC) health monitoring is critical for increasing SC
durability and supporting agricultural operations. Soil health assessment models use deep
data-driven models learned from gathered data to depict intricate interactions among
degraded soils. SC health monitoring gives near-real-time data (data communication
delays) that enables farmers to make informed decisions. Soil health is an integrating attri-
bute that deals with soil geochemical, microbiological, and physical qualities and reflects
the fertility of the soil to support agriculture productivity and ecological services consis-
tently [12]. It depends on the preservation of four essential operations: carbon alterations,
nutrient cycles, soil characteristics, and pest and disease control; however, due to the very
complicated interconnections of the processes, diagnosing soil health by evaluating each
function independently is inadequate. The data-driven models developed in this study
soil improvement of crop yields by utilizing multi-source acquired data (detailed in Phase
I) and exploiting Deep Neural Networks’ high hierarchical data representational capacity
(DNNs). The obtained data and observations are divided into several groups based on the
soil-crop function. DNNs offer an automatic representation-learning strategy for raw data,
allowing models to conform to complicated relationships. DNN models that have been cre-
ated learn the association between soil/crop data and health/performance metrics [13].”

10.2.3 Crop Performance and Soil Improvement Analysis

“In conjunction with Phases 1 and 2, this process intends to strengthen a cyber-physi-
cal agricultural framework for real-time measurement and reporting of numerous envi-
ronmental variables (e.g., NPK values) as well as recognizing conservation agriculture
combinations to disclose better overall crop performance through techno-economic and
social-economic research findings [14]. A field-deployable identity soil surveillance data
collecting device is presented for obtaining real-time and regular observations of several
soil quality variables of interest. The sensory analysis system comprises numerous basic
components, including various soil-making data-driven decisions (such as pH and NPK), a
sensor aggregating and management boards, a communication module, and a data-driven
decision-making block as a communications network. The suggested cyber-physical infra-
structure for the communication system and the interactions of the elements of the system
are being watched. The sensing packages interface with the inbuilt microcontroller and
transmit data using the 3G/4G protocol via the transceiver. To extend the range of the sen-
sor channels, a repeater station might be installed in the field under monitoring, which
would receive data from numerous sensor platforms and transmit it to a field station for
Cyber Physical System Approach 169

synchronizing. This data is kept in the cloud to allow for remote collection and manage-
ment with stakeholders to enhance farming techniques instantaneously and daily [15].”

10.3 Challenging Factor in Agricultural

This chapter analyzes sustainable management as an expression of the notion that we
must address the requirements of the present without exacerbating existing issues or jeop-
ardizing existing resources [16].
As a result, sustainable agriculture has three primary connected goals: preserving/
improving ecological integrity, preserving/ensuring (an acceptable degree of) net cash
flow, and promoting social and economic fairness.
In the following sections, we will go through the components involved in assuring goal
attainment about the global issues outlined in the introduction.
Scarce resources – environmental pressures: Water, land, air, and electricity are the pri-
mary natural and ecologically conscious resources implicated in the agricultural industry.
On the other hand, being a comprehensive supply from the atmosphere, the weather may
be viewed as a deciding element in fertilizer application and a significant stochastic dis-
ruption [17].
Water quality is one of the most critical resources for agricultural output. It is estimated
that 2/3 of the Canadian population suffered from lack of it in some form or another. Not
only does agriculture require water, but the widespread use of synthetic chemicals, which
could improve efficiency with less effort than other alternative solutions, can affect water
and, as a result, either start reducing this commodity or imply, over time, increased costs
for its detoxification. Water management, encompassing water transport and storage, and
sophisticated irrigation schemes with continuous operation and assessment of local soil
moisture via networked sensor systems and controller design policies should become a key
issue in agricultural enterprises. Reusing and purifying water when measuring the produc-
tivity of the agricultural food manufacturing operation, expenses should be addressed [18].”
Floods and water shortages should be considered not only at the water distribution sys-
tem (by adequate resource stockpiling and preservation of natural resources, as well as a
good design and implementation of irrigated agriculture), but also at an elevated, world-
wide platform of operational management, through good speciation use, fertilizer applica-
tion, and increased automation operations for water fault detection.
Soil is the key resource for agricultural, and it is not only naturally restricted, but it is
also shrinking in the surface area owing to growing populations [19].”
In reality, it may be argued that productive agricultural landscapes are shrinking in size,
not simply due to the substantial growth of agriculture but densely populated locations
and due to excessive soil extraction and phenomena caused by climate “risk factors such
as desertification.”
Soil erosion is a significant danger to our capacity to generate enough food. Soil man-
agement encompasses various measures designed to maintain the soil in places, such as
reducing or even eliminating tillage, using irrigation scheduling management to decrease
runoff, and keeping the ground covered with vegetation or mulch. Soil quality not only
has a significant impact on food production, dictating its structure and expenses but it
may also be influenced by cultures, serving as both an input and a production for the agri-
cultural sector as a whole [20].
170 Cyber Physical Systems

We are taking the earth as a fundamental and fundamental resource, densely populated
locations, and due to excessive soil extraction and phenomena caused by the climate risk
factors such as desertification.
Soil erosion is a significant danger to our capacity to generate enough food. Soil man-
agement encompasses various measures designed to maintain the soil in places, such as
reducing or even eliminating tillage, using irrigation scheduling management to decrease
runoff, and keeping the ground covered with vegetation or mulch. Soil quality not only
has a significant impact on food production, dictating its structure and expenses but it
may also be influenced by cultures, serving as both an input and a production for the
agricultural sector as a whole [21].
Considering Earth itself to be a primary resource, renewable energy, especially hydro-
carbons, it would be economically unsustainable to quickly abandon or even reduce the
works (mostly mechanical) that depend on these nonrenewable energy sources. On the
other hand, sustainable farming practices need to look for extra reliable and preferably
electric resources (like energy obtained from organic waste); until then, excellent manage-
ment of the activities involved in agricultural production could decrease energy usage.

• Population aging: An older society means reducing skilled workers, which could
be made obsolete, but at a penalty in terms of energy assets. Furthermore, this
population sector, in particular, is driving up the production of organic, healthful
products [22].
• Population and rising and widespread urbanization: This entails a constant loss
of resources such as soil and water and a strain on the economic process of pro-
ductivity, as food and fiber output should increase as resources are depleted.
Furthermore, an unintended consequence of urbanization is the degradation of air
quality. In addition to having an immediate impact on the urban microclimate, air
pollution has the potential to trigger far-reaching weather patterns over time [23].”
• Globalization and greater mobility: Assurance and the potential to alter both the
distribution and distribution patterns of agricultural goods. Canadian currency
and financial pressure on the agribusiness company’s present expenses and rev-
enues; on the other hand, the growing susceptibility of the repercussions of dis-
ruptions in certain regions of the world to spread due to rising globalization [24].
• Increasing economic pressure: Profit drives any business, and its degree signifi-
cantly impacts how innovators conduct their work. There is high competition
between companies worldwide, resulting in high dynamism in client demands
and revenue maximization. These developments may have a significant impact on
agribusiness businesses.
• Highly technological advancement dimension: Managed to install mechanical
and mechanized systems in agriculture, increasing production. Production, a
reduction in the number of people employed, and more efficient soil utilization
overall. In addition, advances in ICT have resulted in more significant usage of
these techniques at every stage of agricultural production, laying the groundwork
for a paradigm shift in which the notion of cyber physical systems (CPS) might
find a wide range of applications [25].”
• Facilitating a Greater degree of communications: This factor may be a driver for
the intensive farming organization, as it means knowledge that could be used to
enhance functional departments and respond swiftly to environmental factors is
Cyber Physical System Approach 171

gathered through sound surveillance systems while keeping all of the above vari-
ables in mind through adequate measuring devices. These sources include things
like weather forecasting, transfer stock rates, and supply chain partners.

10.3.1 Agricultural Techniques
As mentioned in the preceding section, Figure 10.1 depicts a modular form of the super-
vised agricultural experience (SAE).
The firm is believed to have both vegetable and animal products, resulting in three criti-
cal subsystems:

• the land management subsystems, which encompasses all aspects of culture and
pasture scheduling, fertilization, and soil dampness continuous monitoring, as
well as natural conditions, weather forecasts, market predictions, business goals,
and producing technologies and knowledge [26];
• The production planning sub-system deals with achieving goals specified by the
soil conservation comment thread for crops; it considers elements such as seed
production, work planning based on crop-specific characteristics and growing
conditions, weather patterns, and plant population. The conservation farming
component has similar objectives but is concerned with animals.
• The first step of this process is to ensure that the terrain has the best enslavement
conditions possible, using different methods tailored to soil quality and snow con-
ditions, weather predictions, and long- and medium-term crop and livestock plan-
ning to meet customer expectations and full compliance.

A sensing network must continuously monitor temperatures, moisture, and nutrient

content in the soil to control and update data about soil quality via automated wager-
ing systems and fertilizer distributors. These technologies lead to building automation at
the physical level of agricultural production, allowing for consistent customer satisfaction,
which is the second step. The essential characteristic is that the first integration is based
on a system structure, which helps both the sensory system and the control network to
be constructed step by step depending on the importance of desired functionalities and
environmental conditions to be considered. Each type of organization and any predefined
agriculture surface can be described as an agent whose attributes and operating rules

FIGURE 10.1
Smart agricultural monitoring system.
172 Cyber Physical Systems

are stored in the world model and whose current state and evolution can be separately
upgraded, as shown in the implementation approach [27].
As the network’s dimensions grow, the agricultural company’s complicated behavior
will emerge with higher precision. The real benefit of this method is that humans may
participate. As autonomous algorithms and knowledge consumers, the agent architecture
provides sufficient expertise while also adding a lot of freedom.
The existence of a detection network – not only multisensory networks, but also more
elaborate gadgets that can construe various intelligence gathered from channels such as
sensors, living beings, and even news stations to recognize and even foresee pertinent
changes whereby the farm could perhaps adjust – appears to be required to guarantee the
flexibility of the producing to external conditions – weather, market, diseases [28].
In the last stage of deployment, agents work together to form a system that displays
emergent proactive behavior as a result of linking its inherent structure (as supplied by the
SAE). Stage I entails a production schedule (as completed by the AI system), while Stage II
involves an evaluation of the external world's evolution (regarding the SAE) based on the
sensing network and the perception of its knowledge via an effective knowledge adminis-
tering and context successful track record of integrating.
In this model, two massively parallel ecosystems could be recognized: one for produc-
tion, which is severely affected by climate, weather patterns, pests, and other factors, and
another for product-market capitalization, which is influenced primarily by environmen-
tal factors with a highly dynamic system progression.
Intelligent process and reporting systems, which connect sensing, actuators, computers,
and telecommunication technologies, could control the first one into a scalable ability to
scale with reliable and adaptive governance.
The second ecosystem is susceptible to market-driven disruptions that are difficult to
foresee and even appropriately detect.
SAE will have a comprehensive system monitoring and assessment, planning and con-
trol of crop development, and, last but not least, a production and distribution manage-
ment system as an intelligent farm.
Due to its integration into a global information system, SAE will have access to services
such as complex, large datasets containing a variety of crop selection options, correlated
with specific soil characteristics, weather forecasts, and market developments, as well as
the decision support that comes along with them, techniques for efficiently handling agri-
cultural outputs and scoring the greatest possible price on the global market.
The goal of an irrigation canal with actual self and acclimation functionality at environment
protection, snow conditions, and market mechanisms and instabilities in the general frame-
work of an autonomous, conservation and economical, and socially responsible improvement
is considered through appropriate machine collection, enhanced digital transformation, and
efficient subjugation of multi-annual data sets in the decision-making process.”

10.4 Agricultural Approach
As mentioned before, each component of an SAE paradigm can be thought of as a separate
but collaborating individual. It has to be able to process information related to its major aims
utilizing synaptic plasticity, evaluate its suitability with the stated goals along the course
of achieving its objectives, deliberate on goal revisions, and act it toward the environment.
Cyber Physical System Approach 173

10.4.1 Agricultural Tools
Since the success of this module depends on the participation of these other entities, gath-
ering data from a variety of sources belonging to them should be the top priority.
Complex behaviors might emerge from the hierarchical structure of these agents,
which could simulate various aspects of SAE during various stages of development and
deployment.

10.4.2 Cyber Physical Systems

“Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are designed systems that are developed from and rely on the
symbiosis of computing and factors more specific,” according to [3]. Developing CPS will be
synchronized, decentralized, and networked, and they will need to be both resilient and adap-
tive. Today’s new CPS will far outperform today’s simple, intelligent systems in terms of fea-
tures, flexibility, robustness, safety, reliability, and accessibility. CPS innovation will change
how people engage with designed systems in the same way that the internet transformed how
people interact with knowledge. In areas such as the electricity grid, transportation, architec-
ture, medicine, and manufacture, modern digital computer systems will fuel competitiveness.
A cyber physical system (CPS) is a system that:”

• is strongly interwoven and non-separable from a task-scheduling processor and

processes that take place from a behavioral standpoint;
• where the interplay of computing and communication components reveals func-
tioning and critical system properties;
• in which machines, systems, equipment, and the surroundings in which they are
embedded have physicochemical characteristics that interact with one another,
use resources, and lead to significant system behavior.

These systems will alter our methods of dealing with the external surroundings in the
same way that the internet has changed social communication.
Economic and social drivers, such as falling costs of computation, connections, and sen-
sor systems; rising demands for energy-efficient use of extensive and complex infrastruc-
ture facilities; and conservation of natural for technological solutions that make efficient
use of renewable resources and produce less waste all contribute to the CPS worldview. It
has genuine goods with usable information embedded in them.
The fundamental economic motive for implementing CPS in every business and applica-
tion is lowering computing, communications, and sensor costs. Computer and telecommu-
nications have evolved into the “universal system engineer” that joins disparate systems.
They make it possible to build CPS networks global or regional.
It is only reasonable to regard the intensive agriculture industry as a dynamic process,
operating on the premise of autonomously and interacting agents – either human or non-
human – behaviors, as previously indicated.
By integrating networking and computing infrastructure with manufacturing indus-
tries, promoting sustainable development, and related components, CPS enables a more
accessible evolution of “intelligent” structures. The voice wants and knowledge of the
“customers” will be integrated across the global supply chain in the upcoming generations
of enterprises in the twenty-first century. It will be a results-driven company that responds
swiftly to client needs while reducing resource consumption and enhancing environmen-
tal stability and economic attractiveness.
174 Cyber Physical Systems

The CPS approach might already be deployed on the first stage of an SAE model, also
incorporating the apparatus, equipment, and devices that offer soil treatments, thereby
applying control rules and minimizing the effects of perturbations that might act at this
level (drought, rain excess, pests etc.).
CPS necessitates more complex surveillance, forecasting, and understanding of associ-
ated data and characteristics on the second floor, based on information fusion and organi-
zational learning. Depending on the quality, productivity, and environmental needs, such
agricultural systems and approaches form the paradigms of a critical component of success.
Gradually expanding operational diversification and mechanization level, such a system
might be implemented, guaranteeing a lean migration from a homogenous specialized
income-producing property to a flexible, versatile, and responsive upgraded one.

10.5 Future Studies
Improved monitoring and complete evaluations can also provide appropriate soil/crop
performance evaluation; however, current methods are prohibitively expensive and don’t
even provide real-time data. The following are some possible future research directions:
Result measurements for soil/crop evaluation and SDSS observation methodologies are
being developed.

• Creation of a low-cost analysis tool that allows landowners to examine their farms’
soil/crop health quickly.
• A comparative of crop yield and phenotypic expression in fields altered with
organic fertilizer with areas handled with livestock wastes (e.g., bovine manure)
or chemical fertilizers.
• Exploration mineralization rates are high enough to support agricultural produc-
tion throughout the planting period, but they drop once the fallow season begins.
• Exploration of nutrients in contrast to the pulses of nutrients that soils receive fol-
lowing more contemporary agricultural practices.
• Exploration of biannual measurements of soil bulk density, carbon content, heavy
metals, macroinvertebrates, and microbes.”

10.6 Conclusions
Agricultural activity should really be re-designed as a sustainable food supply system
for a continually growing populace in the framework of relevant climatic changes, exten-
sive soil degradation, and reductions in drinking drinkable water sources. The rational
utilization of mineral wealth (soil, water, and energy) in the context of global sustain-
able development has already been recognized as necessary for the planet’s and its inhab-
itants’ health. Real progress in industrial automation, biology, and “microbiology” has
provided professionals with improved technological and organizational methods for pro-
ducing high-quality food through the agricultural field. Significant outcomes from ICT
Cyber Physical System Approach 175

made an application in the agricultural sector ensure more excellent production perfor-
mance and accuracy. As a result, additional value is created in a field that is critical to
humanity’s survival. As an effectual agroecosystem, the intellectual farm is frequently
mentioned, representing the effort to connect this industry in the digital reality of calcula-
tion and information exchange, allowing the Intelligent Cyber-Enterprise principle to be
implemented in the field through the Availability Enterprise. As an integrated intelligent
system, tomorrow’s farming will allow for effective soil exploitation, environmental con-
servation, and, not least, the provision of ecologically cheap nutrients, all of which will
have a significant impact on people's quality of life.

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Index

Accreditation, 91 Crypto, 118

Accurate, 17, 22, 50, 58, 74, 77 Cybernetic, 24, 40
Actuator, 88, 114, 144, 150
Adequate, 98, 126, 168, 171 Decades, 6, 43, 166
Adverse, 57, 88, 92, 150 Degradation, 16, 37, 50, 170
Aggravate, 72 Deliberate, 79, 172
Agroecosystem, 175 Depiction, 145
Algorithm, 49, 61, 114, 119, 155 Detection, 79, 129, 153
Ambiguity, 112 Diagnostic, 7, 21, 91, 167
Amenities, 1, 33, 136 Dilemma, 29, 32
Ancestor, 26 Disastrous, 49, 71, 96, 118
Antennae, 32, 49, 128 Disgraced, 77
Aqueous, 36 Dispersed, 74, 125, 145
Assault, 62, 68, 73, 99, 143 Diversion, 99
Assistive, 36 DropBot, 8
Astronomical, 29 Droplets, 6, 17, 22, 25
Athletes, 78
Augmentation, 23 Effectual, 175
Autism, 75 Empirical, 1, 37, 167
Endeavor, 125
Bayesian, 7, 154 Enormous, 122, 148
Bioassay, 7, 16, 25, 46 Enslavement, 171
Biochip, 16, 21, 29, 37, 68 Entrepreneurship, 166
Biosensor, 4, 16, 38, 47 Environmental, 1, 69, 171
Bolstering, 157 Equifax, 67
Erroneous, 28, 78, 136
Calibration, 17, 32, 39, 73, 78 Expertise, 70, 121
Cargo, 1, 29, 132 Exploitation, 58, 151
Cipher, 120
Civilian, 93, 98 Failure, 5, 19, 81, 153
Clipped threads, 19 Flanked, 128, 134
Collaborative, 87, 102 Fleets, 127
Collection, 23, 27, 42, 61 Fluidic microfluidic biochips
Competitiveness, 94, 173 (FMFBs), 2, 3, 11
Computation, 144 Fluids, 1, 6, 73
Confidentiality, 79, 118, 148 Forensic, 7, 21, 91, 150
Conflict, 2, 151 Foundry, 5
Conflicting, 94 Fraudulent, 73, 154
Congested, 130 Futile, 95, 99
Congestion, 1, 51, 148
Constrained, 7, 151 Genome, 16, 24, 31
Contingency, 22, 23 Granular, 1, 06, 167
Convergence, 3, 93, 96, 127 Grasp, 102
Coplanar, 20 Grid, 61, 104
Criterion, 40, 157
Critical, 60, 72, 89 Hazardous, 69, 157
Crucial, 47, 101 Heuristic, 37, 43

 177
178 Index

Hostile, 71, 146 Reagents, 2, 40

Hyperspectral, 167 Receptacles, 74
Rectifying, 116
Inaccurate, 58, 74, 136 Redundancy, 16, 112
Inadequate, 3, 126 Rehabilitation, 29
Inherent, 79, 172 Relevant, 54, 79
Innovative, 8, 59, 81, 104 Reservoirs, 122
Instance, 91, 112 Resilience, 101
Integrity, 63, 112 Resilient, 94, 99
Interface, 63, 89, 99 Resources, 120, 147
Intricate, 168 Restoration, 17, 25, 40
Intrinsic, 16 Reusing, 169
Intrusion, 71, 96
Intrusive, 72 Scenarios, 81, 104
Schemes, 128, 134
Legislative, 76 Seamless, 105
Leveraged, 106 Secrecy, 63, 151
Limited, 60, 70, 100 Semitone, 100
Locomotive, 89 Sensing, 3, 16, 26
Luminous, 8, 37 Solitary, 21, 126
Spoofing, 1, 18, 150
Malicious, 58, 157 Stability, 4, 27, 92
Military, 54, 91 Steering, 46
Mitigating, 100, 158 Subsection, 48
Morphological, 88, 107 Substantially, 3, 99
Motorists, 115 Substratum, 3, 72
Multispectral, 127 Surveillance, 126, 154
Susceptible, 69, 172
Navigation, 58, 97, 134
Neural, 3, 11, 43, 168 Tampering, 79, 151
Neutron, 28 Taxonomy, 87, 153
Templates, 90
Obfuscation, 96 Testing, 2, 100
Obsolete, 91 Therapeutics, 16
Occasion, 17, 137 Traceability, 1, 22, 136
Operation, 1, 27, 137 Transceiver, 168
Opponents, 69, 101
Overhauls, 134 Unified, 1, 46, 158
Urbanized, 132
Pacemaker, 61 Utilization, 135, 170
Paradigm, 94, 125
Perception, 1, 05, 172 Ventilation, 132
Pertinent, 128, 130 Versatility, 3, 93
Pervasive, 111 Violate, 72, 130
Phenotypic, 1, 68, 174 VLSI, 4, 68
Picked, 69, 156 Vulnerable, 1, 21, 148
Plethora, 11, 157
Polydimethylsiloxane, 4, 11 Wrapping, 126
Posterior, 39
Powered, 3, 24 Young Lippmann, 6
Precise, 75, 101
Prior, 26
Priority, 43, 72
Proximity, 40, 132