Occasional Paper

ISSUE NO. 453 NOVEMBER 2024

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Finding an End to the Myanmar
Crisis: ASEAN’s Massive Task
Premesha Saha
Abstract
Over three years since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made little progress in helping resolve the
crisis despite releasing a ‘Five-Point Consensus’ (5PC) in April 2021. The political
crisis that followed the coup poses a challenge for the ASEAN, which must now
deliberate on ensuring not only the early implementation of the 5PC but also
whether, and how, it should continue to abide by its principles of non-interference
in members’ internal affairs and consensus-based decision-making. This paper
analyses the ASEAN’s role in the Myanmar situation and outlines options for the
way forward for the grouping to effectively deal with the crisis.

Attribution: Premesha Saha, “Finding an End to the Myanmar Crisis: ASEAN’s Massive Task,” Occasional Paper No. 453, November 2024,
Observer Research Foundation.
 T
he 2021 Myanmar coup and the ensuing political crisis have
posed crucial questions for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN)a on the usefulness of its legacy principles—
i.e., non-interference in members’ internal affairs, as stipulated
in its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and consensus-
based decision-making (or the ‘ASEAN Way’). As people continue to flee
Myanmar for Thailand and India, regional stability is under threat,1
and Thailand’s former Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted as early as
in 2021 that “ASEAN not only has the right, but the responsibility, to act
decisively and take concrete actions to ensure that Myanmar’s generals end
the violence, reverse their coup, respect the will of the people, and allow
democracy to prevail in Myanmar.”2

ASEAN states have taken varied stances on the Myanmar coup. Vietnam
and the Philippines, for instance, have referred to the coup as an internal
matter; others like Malaysia and Indonesia, for their part, have raised
concerns.3 In 2021, former Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin
said his country was “gravely concerned over the tragic situation” in
Myanmar, and that he was “appalled by the persistent use of lethal violence
against unarmed civilians which has resulted in a high number of deaths
and injuries, as well as suffering across the nation. It contradicts the
Introduction

principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, which we in ASEAN commit

ourselves to promote and protect so that peace, security, and prosperity for
our region is guaranteed.”4 Similarly, former Indonesian President Joko
Widodo (Jokowi) called “for an immediate end to the use of violence in
Myanmar to prevent further loss of lives.”5 Jokowi had also called for an
emergency ASEAN meeting to discuss the Myanmar coup; one was held in
April 2021, following which the grouping released a ‘Five-Point Consensus’
(5PC) on tackling the Myanmar situation, which comprised the following:
(1) an “immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar” and for all parties to
“exercise utmost restraint”; (2) “constructive dialogue among all parties
concerned…to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people”;
(3) “a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the
dialogue process”; (4) “humanitarian assistance” to Myanmar; and (5) “the
special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties
concerned.”6

a A political and economic grouping of 10 Southeast Asian states. Its members are Myanmar, Laos,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

3
 In 2022, amid Myanmar’s failure to make progress on mitigating the
crisis, ASEAN leaders decided to exclude the military generals and their
appointees from attending all of the group’s meetings henceforth. The
military generals protested, saying it went against ASEAN’s policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of its member countries. Today, the
member countries continue to be divided on the approach the grouping
should adopt. While some ASEAN members (i.e., Thailand, Cambodia, and
Laos) recommend easing punitive measures such as suspending Myanmar’s
generals from attending group meetings, others, like Indonesia, support
such strict actions.7

To be sure, ASEAN has in the past successfully tackled crises through the
ASEAN Way. However, in recent years, the group has struggled to reach a
consensus on effectively addressing security issues like the South China Sea
disputes and the Myanmar coup and its fallout.

This paper analyses ASEAN’s role in the ongoing Myanmar crisis and how
this impacts the grouping’s relevance not only in the region but globally. It
offers recommendations for the way forward.
Introduction

4
 O
n 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military (also known as the
Tatmadaw) took control of the government and detained
civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint,
and other senior members of the National League for
Democracy (NLD) party. The coup dealt a blow to Myanmar’s
democratic journey (which began in 2011 after the military, in power since
1962, implemented parliamentary elections and other reforms8). Tensions
between the NLD and the military had been rising in the months before
the coup. Suu Kyi’s party won the November 2020 national elections by a
The Myanmar Crisis:

landslide.9 The NLD had been looking for opportunities to proceed with
constitutional reforms that would curtail the military’s role in politics and
governance, and the election victory provided the much-needed momentum
to implement this reform. However, enacting such changes was expected to
be difficult given the tight constitutional restrictions for amendments.

The Tatmadaw, in its attempt to prove the election results were rigged,
raised allegations of fraud and indicated that attempts to resolve the issue
were rebuffed by the election commission.b,10 The stand-off over the elections
was Suu Kyi’s first serious conflict with the military since her release in
2010.11 Suu Kyi had, in recent years, taken a more reconciliatory attitude
An Overview

towards the army than was expected and even defended the Tatmadaw at
the International Court of Justice over accusations of atrocities against the
Rohingya.

Commander-in-chief Senior General (and current self-appointed prime

minister) Min Aung Hlaing has said the Tatmadaw “needs to abide by the
Constitution,” which is the “mother of the law”.12 Notably, the military
can declare a national emergency as per the provisions of the 2008
Constitution.13 Under the constitutional provisions, the military can also
reserve for itself 25 percent of seats in both houses of the parliament and
can appoint serving military officials to those seats.14

On 1 February 2021, the scheduled starting day of the new parliament,

the military staged a coup. Mass demonstrations began mere days later in

b The military had demanded that the election commission, the government, or outgoing
parliamentarians prove at a special session before the new parliament convened on 1
February 2021 that the elections were free and fair. The demand had been rejected. See:
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-what-has-led-to-the-coup-in-
myanmar-7169624/

5
 Yangon, the nation’s largest city. The protestors were from across various
sectors, and social media and encrypted messaging apps were used to
mobilise.15 As the protests grew, the military resorted to violent means to
quell them. These operations led to war crimes against ethnic minorities
in the Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan states. The military also burned
villages in the Magway and Sagaing regions, and prevented aid groups
from providing food, medical care, and other assistance.16

Following Suu Kyi’s arrest, the police also accused her of corruption,
The Myanmar Crisis:

incitement, breaching the Official Secrets Act, illegally importing two-way

radios, violating pandemic-related restrictions, and making statements that
could cause fear or alarm and induce others to commit offences against the
state. In September 2022, three deposed Cabinet ministers—Soe Win, Set
Aung, and Kyaw Win—and Australian economic adviser Sean Turnell were
convicted under the Official Secrets Act, and all were sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment. That same month, Suu Kyi and Win Myint were each
sentenced to three years and hard labour under electoral fraud charges.
Suu Kyi remains under house arrest; she has been sentenced to a total 27
years.17
An Overview

A shadow administration, the National Unity Government (NUG), was

formed in April 2021 by ethnic leaders and elected parliamentarians. Some
of the shadow government’s leaders operate from rebel-held parts of the
country, others from overseas. In May 2021, it established the People’s
Defence Force, which now has about 60,000 soldiers. Its units have been
battling the Tatmadaw, sometimes alongside ethnic armed groupsc that
have fought against the government for self-rule for decades. Between
them, unity government forces and the ethnic armies are thought to control
about half the country’s territory.18 In areas under military control, semi-
autonomous resistance groups have also sprung up, and their total numbers
are comparable to those of the People’s Defence Force. Some of these units
have engaged in guerrilla attacks, including the assassination of local leaders
who enforce military rule.19 These resistance groups are combatting a
common enemy—the military junta—and have a common goal—removing
the junta from power and establishing a federal democracy.20,21

c Such as the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, Karenni Nationalities Defence Forces, and Chin
National Army.

6
 On 27 October 2023, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army,
an ethnic armed organisation operating in the Shan State alongside other
groups like the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army,
launched Operation 1027, a joint offensive on military outposts in the state.
The operation again led to a rise in hostilities and sparked widespread
armed uprising in Myanmar. The resistance forces managed to gain control
of over 100 military outposts, including strategic border crossings with
China and India. They are also aiming to take over Loikaw, the Karenni
State capital, and Laukkai, which is known for transnational human
The Myanmar Crisis:

trafficking and online scams. Analysts have pointed out that the military
is currently at its weakest, and a collapse may be imminent.22,23 According
to mid-2024 estimates, amid widespread violence in Myanmar, “over 2.5
million people have now been displaced internally in the country since the
beginning of the coup, and over 100,000 people have been displaced into
neighboring countries.”24 Nearly 6,000 people have been killed and 30,000
imprisoned in the war-torn country. A third of the 55 million population is
in need of humanitarian aid as of August 2024.25 According to UN sources,
millions are displaced internally within Myanmar, with the majority in the
Northwest, in Rakhine State in the Southeast, as well as in Kachin State
in the Northeast. In addition to a growing number of IDPs in Myanmar,
An Overview

thousands of refugees are estimated to have sought safety in neighbouring

countries since 1 February 2021. This new displacement is in addition to a
protracted refugee situation in the region involving refugees from Rakhine
State’s Rohingya community. 26

7
 M
any governments were quick to denounce the military
takeover. Within days, the UN Security Council (UNSC)
issued a press statement expressing “deep concern about
the arbitrary detention of members of the government,
calling for the release of those detained and emphasising
the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from
violence, and fully respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and the
rule of law.”27 In December 2022, the UNSC adopted a resolution calling for
an immediate end to the violence by the military junta; all members voted
for the resolution, except for China, India, and Russia, which abstained.28

The US was also quick to approve sanctions on coup leaders, their business
interests, and close kin, and redirected more than US$40 million of aid
from the Myanmar government to civil society, while New Zealand rejected
“the legitimacy of the military-led government” and suspended high-level
military and political contacts.29 Japan also expressed “grave concern” and
China said it had taken “note of the situation and hoped the parties would
properly settle their differences.”30 In February 2022, the EU imposed
sanctions on junta-controlled businesses, including the Myanmar Oil and
Gas Enterprise.31 In April 2022, the US House of Representatives passed
International

the BURMA Act, directing President Joe Biden to sanction individuals

who undermine stability and democracy in Myanmar.32 However, given
the limited Western investments in Myanmar and the Tatmadaw’s attitude
towards such sanctions, these are unlikely to have an impact on Aung
Hlaing and other senior commanders, nor on resolving the situation.33
Reactions

Notably, neighbouring countries China and India have continued to trade

and engage with Myanmar, despite their reservations about the domestic
situation.34 At the April 2024 meeting of the security chiefs of the Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC), India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval expressed to
Myanmar’s Admiral Moe Aung New Delhi’s concerns over the instability in
Myanmar, particularly in relation to the four Indian northeastern states that
share a border with the country (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram,
and Manipur).35

8
 I
n response to the coup, Brunei, which was the ASEAN chair in
2021, released a statement calling for “dialogue, reconciliation and
the return to normalcy” in Myanmar, citing the ASEAN Charter’s
democratic principles.36 Singapore also called on the military to
release President Win Myint and Suu Kyi.37

On 24 April 2021, ASEAN held an emergency summit in Jakarta on the

situation, which was also attended by Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung
Hlaing (despite international pressure for ASEAN to recognise the NUG).
It was during this meeting that ASEAN issued the ‘five-point consensus’.38,39
ASEAN’’ s Response

During the summit, the member countries conveyed to Min Aung Hlaing
that a dialogue between the contending parties in Myanmar should be
brokered immediately with the help of the ASEAN envoy.40 Jokowi also
stated,d “The situation in Myanmar is unacceptable and should not continue.
Violence must be stopped, democracy, stability and peace in Myanmar
must be returned immediately.”41 During Indonesia’s subsequent term as
ASEAN chair in 2023, it faced many expectations and substantial pressure
to ensure the 5PC was enforced.

Cambodia’s Term as Chair (2022)

After Cambodia took over as chair of the grouping, many high-ranking
Cambodian government officials, including Prime Minister Hun Sen,
visited Myanmar in an effort to push forward the 5PC. Although the
Cambodian government applauded Min Aung Hlaing’s pledge to extend
a national ceasefire until the end of 2022 and his welcoming of the ASEAN
ASEAN

envoy, it did not hesitate to also criticise the regime. In July 2022, for
instance, Cambodia strongly criticised the junta for executing five pro-
democracy activists and for not making an effort to implement the 5PC.42
In May 2022, Cambodia organised a consultative meeting to discuss the
ASEAN Humanitarian Response Framework, particularly operational
challenges that impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance and devise
mechanisms to easily provide such support to all parties involved in the
Myanmar conflict.43

d Indonesia, home of the ASEAN Secretariat, was responsible for organising the summit and
releasing the 5PC.

9
 The Myanmar crisis was at the top of the agenda during the 2022 ASEAN
Summit in Phnom Penh. The grouping released the ‘ASEAN Leaders’
Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus’, a
15-point statement on the resolutions and steps to resolve the crisis. ASEAN
leaders also committed to providing humanitarian assistance, and stressed
the need for political dialogue, the cessation of violence, and the adoption
of the 5PC. The grouping also called for the international community to
assist in implementing the 5PC which, according to the grouping, was the
best means to deal with the Myanmar situation.

The ASEAN special envoy made two visits to Myanmar, the first being in
ASEAN’’ s Response

March 2022 and the second from 30 June to 2 July 2022, but the trips did
not yield results. There was a plan for a third visit by the Special Envoy in
September 2022 as well.44 Notably, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s
visit to Myanmar in January 2022,45 where he met with the junta chief but
not Suu Kyi, was not well-received. Hun Sen had himself seized power
in a 1997 coup and has been criticised for using violent means to keep
his political opponents in check during subsequent elections. However,
the Cambodian authorities stressed that his visit was only to hasten the
implementation of the 5PC.46 Despite this, little progress was made on
the 5PC due to the military junta’s unwillingness to meet with the pro-
democracy leaders.47

Indonesia’s Tenure (2023)

Given Indonesia’s experience in brokering agreements between ASEAN
member countries amid deadlocks, there were expectations that the
ASEAN

grouping would make progress on resolving the Myanmar crisis under

Jakarta’s leadership. However, at the end of Indonesia’s tenure, “Myanmar
was still not close to holding an inclusive national dialogue, although Jakarta
said it would continue to try nudging everyone into having such talks.”48
Indonesia reportedly organised over 180 meetings (both virtual and in-
person) with all stakeholders in Myanmar during its tenure as ASEAN
chair in an attempt to expedite a resolution. Indonesia also oversaw the

10
 completion of the Joint Needs Assessment by the ASEAN Coordinating
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management and the
partial delivery of humanitarian aid to Myanmar on 7 May 2023.49

Indonesia was also keen to ensure the continuance of initiatives to tackle the
Myanmar situation and thus instituted the ‘troika’ approach—an informal,
consensus-based mechanism consisting of Indonesia (the previous chair),
Laos (the current chair), and Malaysia (the next chair)—to keep track of
the progress in implementing the 5PC and help the ASEAN special envoy
(appointed by each new chair) understand the situation and plan for future
measures.50
ASEAN’’ s Response

Under Laos’s Leadership (2024)

There have been apprehensions that Laos may not be able to guide ASEAN
through the various challenges confronting the bloc. Although Laos shares
a short 238-km border with Myanmar, it has experienced an influx of drugs
and transnational crimes amid the crisis.51 Still, the country has not been
critical of the military’s actions. The theme for Laos’s tenure (‘Enhancing
Connectivity and Resilience’) highlights its desire to transform from a
landlocked to an infrastructurally developed land-linked country. This, in
turn, showcases the economic dependency Laos will have on China, which
is heavily investing in the Kunming-Vientiane railway.52 Given that China is
attempting to maintain cordial relations with the junta in Myanmar, Laos
will likely maintain its present course, which is to not be too critical of the
junta. Even if Laos chooses to reiterate the 5PC in the ASEAN meetings it
hosts, unless it takes strong actions to implement the consensus, it will not
ASEAN

harm the country’s interests in any big way.53

Laos appointed veteran diplomat Alounkeo Kittikhoun as ASEAN

special envoy to Myanmar, and he met Min Aung Hlaing in January 2024.
However, no statement was issued at the end of the meeting, nor was there
any mention of it in Laos’s state-run media. However, Myanmar’s state-
run newspaper, Global New Light of Myanmar, reported that the two leaders
discussed “efforts of the government to ensure peace and stability of the
State and national reconciliation”.54 A second official meeting between the
special envoy-led ASEAN delegation and the Myanmar military was held

11
 in May 2024. According to statements and media reports, the two sides
discussed “cooperation efforts with the aim to settle the current ongoing
conflict, the conditions of Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN meetings,
and the bloc’s provision of humanitarian aid to Myanmar.”55

Despite these meetings, however, the situation in Myanmar remains

unchanged. Violence and conflict have continued as neither the military
nor the resistance groups appear to have an interest in negotiating for a
resolution. While Laos has engaged with the military junta, ASEAN will
not be able to broker a solution until these dialogues also include the pro-
democracy groups, NUG, and the other concerned parties. Notably, some
ASEAN’’ s Response

analysts have pointed out that “the 5PC over time has become even more
out of step with conditions on the ground in Myanmar, where resistance
militias and ethnic armed groups have made considerable gains over the
past year, particularly in Rakhine, Shan, and Kayin (Karen) states.”56 Still
others have noted that the 5PC “remains relevant as the main reference to
address the political crisis in Myanmar. However, the implementation of
the terms of this Consensus needs to be revisited, particularly with regard
to the arrangement of the Special Envoy and the mediation strategy to end
the conflict.”57

The 2024 ASEAN Summit

The Myanmar crisis was at the top of the agenda of the ASEAN Summit
held at Vientiane, Laos, in early October 2024. The inability to implement
the 5PC was a matter of frustration among the ASEAN leaders. Notably, this
was the first time that a senior official from Myanmar attended the summit
ASEAN

since the grouping banned the military junta’s participation. Aung Kyaw
Moe, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar,
even participated in the two-day retreat attended by the foreign ministers
of the other ASEAN countries.58 This development is believed to have
been a result of the closed-door consultations between Laos’s special envoy
and the Myanmar junta. However, it is still uncertain if Aung Kyaw Moe’s
participation means the grouping is moving closer to resolving the crisis,
especially since even after attending the emergency summit in 2021 and
agreeing to help implement the 5PC, Min Aung Hlaing had characterised it
as “suggestions by ASEAN leaders” and said that the junta “would consider
implementing it when the situation returns to stability.”59

12
 The differing approaches of the ASEAN countries toward the Myanmar
issue were once again on display at the Laos summit. While countries like
Indonesia strongly advocated for the need to suspend the junta from being
a part of the ASEAN summits, countries like Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos
have said the country’s representatives must be included “to make Myanmar
more presentable as a member of ASEAN and to facilitate humanitarian aid
entering the country.”60

Meanwhile, Thailand reiterated that the solution to the crisis must come
from within Myanmar. Nikorndej Balankura, spokesperson for Thailand’s
foreign ministry, said, “Thailand remains committed to facilitating internal
ASEAN’’ s Response

consultations. Any solution must be Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned.”61

Thailand also offered to support the elections that the military junta said it
would hold in 2025 (notably, ASEAN has yet to comment on the planned
elections). Thailand has offered to host an “informal consultation” with the
other ASEAN countries later this year to try to resolve the crisis. Thai Prime
Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra told ASEAN leaders that the grouping
“should send a unified message to all parties in Myanmar that there is no
military solution. It is time to start talking.”62

Several ASEAN countries have repeatedly criticised the junta for not
complying with and not implementing the 5PC. Malaysia, the next ASEAN
chair, has stated that there is a need “to approach everybody in Myanmar”,63
indicating there is a possibility to invite all parties involved in the conflict to
future group meetings to encourage a more inclusive dialogue. Thailand
has suggested that India and China, Myanmar’s big neighbours, should
also play a role in helping broker a peace deal in the country.64
ASEAN

Still, the condition in Myanmar continues to worsen with a rise in

transnational crimes, a humanitarian crisis, and economic instability. As
such, ASEAN must now consider alternative approaches to resolve the
situation.

13
 A
SEAN’s inability to help resolve the Myanmar crisis can
be attributed to three reasons: (1) the differing opinions
among the member countries on the approach to tackling
the crisis; (2) the longstanding policy of non-interference in
each other’s domestic affairs; and (3) the limitations of the
ASEAN Way.

Despite agreeing to the 5PC, the military junta has not tried to implement
ASEAN’’ s Limitations

any recommendations that pertain to it. This has stalled any wider progress
in implementing the 5PC. As such, it may be said that the military’s actions
have made a mockery of ASEAN’s ‘consensus’. This has raised many
questions about the grouping’s competency. ASEAN’s ability to respond
to human rights abuses and situations that challenge democracy has been
impeded given its enduring policy of non-interference in the internal
affairs of its member countries. The situation in Myanmar is no exception.
For instance, not only did ASEAN invite Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s
representative to the April 2021 emergency meeting on the crisis, but it
also recognised him as the “chairman” of the State Administration Council
(SAC, as the ruling military calls itself) in June.65

ASEAN has also not backed the wider international community in its bid
to take strong punitive measures against the military junta. For instance,
in late May 2021, the grouping’s countries worked together to stall a
UN resolution calling for an arms embargo against Myanmar. When the
resolution was finally voted on at the UN General Assembly in June,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei abstained.66
ASEAN

The grouping’s inability to deliver a cohesive response to the crisis

stems from how the members view the situation.67 Thailand, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos have refrained from taking a critical stand on the
coup. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have criticised the
use of force against unarmed civilians and have pointed to the ASEAN
Charter, which requires a commitment from all members to act in “respect
for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights,
and the promotion of social justice.”68

14
 All member countries adopted the ASEAN Charter, which included
multiple references to democracy, in 2008. The preamble includes a
commitment to “adhering to the principles of democracy, the rule of law
and good governance.” Article 1 identifies “strengthening democracy,
enhancing good governance and the rule of law” as among ASEAN’s main
“purposes”. Article 2 on the grouping’s “principles” includes the “adherence
to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and
constitutional government”. However, there was no mention of how these
ASEAN’’ s Limitations

principles would be operationalised and enforced by ASEAN.69 Despite

these principles being ingrained in the ASEAN Charter, the 5PC did not
mention Myanmar’s transition to democracy and the need to acknowledge
the 2020 election results.

Critics have questioned ASEAN’s decision to meet only with Min Aung
Hlaing and not any other parties—such as the pro-democracy forces,
the NUG, ethnic groups, and other resistance groups—involved in the
ongoing crisis70 as this can be seen as legitimising the overthrow of the
elected government and the violent crackdown that followed thereafter.
Additionally, critics have also panned the decision to not invite the NUG to
the ASEAN summits attended by the military junta when this could have
provided an opportunity for dialogue.71

The 5PC also does not mention or call for the release of political prisoners,
which is needed for any “constructive dialogue” to take place between
Myanmar’s military government and the opposition. Some critics have
indicated that the omission may have been done at the behest of the military
junta.72 Similarly, although the 5PC does call for an end to all forms of
ASEAN

violence, it does not provide a timeline for doing so. This has perhaps given
the Tatmadaw the leverage to move slowly on arriving at an understanding
with the opposing parties73 while continuing to use violence against civilians
and launch offensives that have led to the displacement of thousands of
people in the border areas. Indeed, a mere month after the release of the
5PC, Charles Santiago, a Malaysian parliamentarian who co-chairs the
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights group, had urged ASEAN to
take more stringent action, saying, “Min Aung Hlaing is blatantly ignoring
ASEAN’s calls and wasting their time. ASEAN must prove that they can pay
more than just lip service.”74

15
 ASEAN’s current approach to resolving the Myanmar crisis has had little
impact on the junta. Although it heard the concerns raised by the grouping
at meetings and agreed to follow the 5PC, the Tatmadaw has not done so
and continues to implement hardline domestic policies to curb critical voices
and silence its opponents. Similarly, the chances of the junta implementing
any future ASEAN decisions or policies are low.

One reason why the grouping is currently facing a challenge in dealing

ASEAN’’ s Limitations

with crises such as the Myanmar situation is perhaps because the drafters
of the ASEAN Charter chose not to accept the proposal of the Eminent
Persons Groupe to adopt bold measures like suspending any member state
if it failed to follow or breached the laws and principles contained in the
Charter.75 Notably, the Tatmadaw continued to pursue violence against
pro-democracy supporters even while the emergency ASEAN meeting was
underway in Jakarta in April 2021,76 and said in a press release that it would
“give careful consideration to constructive suggestions made by ASEAN
leaders”—referring to the 5PC without mentioning it—“when the situation
returns to stability”.77 The continued violence and instability in Myanmar
in 2024 would indicate that the junta does not take ASEAN seriously.

Notably, despite ASEAN’s success in brokering peace in other conflicts

and the optimism associated with Indonesia’s tenure as chair (and indeed,
during Cambodia’s term as well, given that it has benefited from the group’s
peace process efforts), the Myanmar situation has proved to be a bigger
challenge. There are several factors that contribute to this:

• Cambodia’s worries
ASEAN

The political environment in Cambodia was an impediment to how it dealt

with the Myanmar crisis. Elections held in Cambodia have seldom met
democratic standards as the National Election Committee is dominated
by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party. There are ongoing efforts by
opposition forces in the country to establish a shadow government under
the title of a ‘national unity government’, much like the one in Myanmar.78
As such, Cambodia is wary that recognising the NUG in Myanmar could
have an impact on its own internal affairs. Opposition leaders in Cambodia,

e A group of prominent citizens from the member countries tasked with creating the document.

16
 critics in Southeast Asia, and civil society groups have also criticised the
Cambodian government for rights issues, particularly its handling of
domestic political rights. If these issues are to escalate in the future,
Cambodia will be safe from scrutiny and criticism by the regional countries
provided ASEAN continues to abide by its principle of non-interference.
Notably, Hun Sen had referred to Min Aung Hlaing as the head of the
Myanmar state in a 2021 open letter that pledged to help Myanmar amid
the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.79
ASEAN’’ s Limitations

• Indonesia’s dilemma
ASEAN believes that an inclusive dialogue—all stakeholders engaging in
dialogue in an informal meeting followed by an official group meeting—is
the only solution to the Myanmar situation. However, this can only happen
if the junta agrees to end the ongoing violence. Additionally, there is a lot
of antagonism between the SAC, NUG, and ethnic armed organisations in
Myanmar. This power struggle has made a national dialogue unattractive
to all parties involved. Also, the junta is aware that most ASEAN member
countries do not support its actions, and so the grouping is unlikely to have
a neutral attitude. After the 2021 coup, Indonesia issued a condemnation of
the SAC, and voted in favour of a UN resolution criticising the SAC and
calling for the unconditional release of political detainees.80 If Jakarta were
to play a mediatory role, the junta is aware that it would be at the receiving
end of harsh criticism, and so view Indonesia’s proposal for a national
dialogue as a ruse to weaken its rule.81 However, Indonesia is still holding
closed-door dialogues with all stakeholders. The Indonesian government
has said that these dialogues are still at a nascent stage and the current
ASEAN

focus is on building trust.82

• The external factor

Russia and China continue to supply arms and provide economic assistance
to the junta. As such, the junta continues to have resources at its disposal, and
so there is no rush to end the violence. Chinese arms suppliers—such as
the China North Industries Group, the Aviation Industry Corp., the China
Aerospace Science and Industry Corp., and the China National Aero-

17
 Technology Import & Export Corporation—have continued to provide the
military with arms. At the same time, China is also supplying arms to ethnic
armed groups such as the Arakan Army and the United Wa State Army.
Russia has also been cooperating closely with the military by supplying
it with arms, training the army, and providing university scholarships to
members of the military who have been blacklisted by Western nations.83
Additionally, China is investing heavily in official, private, and grey-zone
industrial and real estate projects in Myanmar’s border areas (particularly
ASEAN’’ s Limitations

those with China and Thailand) and is now reportedly also looking at an
environmentally controversial mega hydroelectric project.84

If it succeeds, China will have a presence across Myanmar, from the Rakhine
State bordering Bangladesh on the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of Martaban
almost to the Andaman Sea.85 This will not only complicate the situation for
Myanmar but also for neighbouring countries like India. In such a situation,
India is bound to maintain a working relationship with the Tatmadaw.
India has reportedly been supplying arms worth over US$50 million and
has been attending high-profile political events in Myanmar.86 Besides the
China issue, India is concerned about border security. While “India’s focus
right now is on short-term sheltering and protection of refugees…the need
is also to plan for long-term reconstruction of the country.”87
ASEAN

18
 D
espite these hurdles, ASEAN is still in the best position to
broker a peace agreement to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
The grouping has a few options to tackle the situation, but a
united ASEAN is key to any effort.

ASEAN must exert sustained pressure on the military to end

the use of violence against the opposition. This pressure can be applied
in concert with international players, including Western countries and
neighbouring countries like India. The Myanmar issue must be brought
up at all ASEAN meetings, as well as those of related organisations, such as
the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. The
grouping must stress a timeline for the resolution. While this measure may
not have an immediate result, international and regional pressure must
ASEAN’’ s Options

continue.

ASEAN must work to bring the opposing sides together for a dialogue.
For this to happen, the ASEAN special envoy must also meet with the
NUG, and not just the junta. The 5PC stipulates the need for a constructive
dialogue, and ASEAN must take the first step to achieve this. Indonesia
should consider using its ‘shuttle diplomacy’ approach towards this end.

ASEAN must impose sanctions on the junta, much like some Western
countries have already done. If the regional countries also put economic
pressure, then the military will be forced to make concessions to arrive at
an agreement and resolve the situation.

There is an imperative for sustained international pressure, especially from

ASEAN

the US, Japan, India, Australia, and the European Union, on Russia and
China who continue to extend support to the military junta. Additionally,
the ASEAN countries must be vocal in their criticism of this support and
must express their concerns to Russia and China bilaterally or through the
grouping and other forums.

The international community, supported by ASEAN, must impose an arms

embargo to curb the flow of weapons to the junta. While China and Russia
may continue to supply arms despite the ban, an international embargo will
certainly help end some of the violence in Myanmar.

19
 If the junta proceeds with plans to conduct an election in 2025, ASEAN
should form an Election Watch Committee to monitor the polls and ensure
a smooth proceeding.

ASEAN must consider amending its Charter, primarily to include a clause

on ‘zero tolerance to military coups’. The experiences of the African Union
and Organization of American States show that including such a clause
in a foundational document reduces the occurrences of coups due to the
imposition of disincentives by the regional bodies.88 ASEAN should also
amend the ‘ASEAN Political and Security Community Blueprint 2025’89 to
include provisions to deal with coups and other crisis situations when not
all member countries are democracies.
ASEAN’’ s Options

ASEAN must institutionalise the special envoy position to enable the

individual to make monthly visits to Myanmar, conduct dialogues with the
junta and opposition forces, and present timely reports to the grouping
in a bid to push for official peace dialogues at an ASEAN meeting.90
The special envoy should have prior experience in dealing with crisis
situations and should know how to use ASEAN to convene a meeting with
all involved parties. Currently, the special envoy is the representative of
the ASEAN Chair, that “shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process,
with the assistance of the Secretary General of ASEAN.”91 It may not be
possible for the special envoys to achieve such complex goals as each new
appointee will need to build trust with the various stakeholders, and so
the position should be institutionalised.92 Institutionalising the position will
help facilitate the process of bringing the opposing parties together for
a dialogue. ASEAN should set up an office run by the special envoy. To
ASEAN

ensure that both conflicting sides are heard equally—and the junta cannot
claim the process is biased and ASEAN is not neutral—the envoy should
work with a representative from the SAC and the NUG.

20
 A
SEAN may currently appear ill-equipped to deal with
the prolonged Myanmar situation as its efforts thus far,
particularly the 5PC, have not borne fruit. While there
are indeed differing views among the members on the
Myanmar crisis, all ASEAN countries are aware of how the
conflict is impacting regional security and the grouping’s own credibility.93
ASEAN’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member
countries is well established. Additionally, several member countries may
not be concerned about the Myanmar situation given their own political
histories. Nevertheless, this should not hold ASEAN back from taking a
more proactive approach to Myanmar.

For ASEAN to facilitate the end to the conflict and restore its own
credibility, it must take the lead in pushing the two opposing sides into
dialogue, even if such an initiative is spearheaded by one member country.
ASEAN’s handling of subregional disputes, such as the Cambodia-Vietnam
and Cambodia-Thailand conflicts, gave it the recognition of being an
organisation capable of handling critical issues in the Southeast Asian region.
However, its recent sluggishness in dealing with the Myanmar situation is
putting the grouping’s abilities under the scanner. As such, ASEAN must
now consider alternate ways to handle the crisis, including updating its
Charter.
Conclusion

Premesha Saha is Fellow, Indo-Pacific, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF; and Research
Fellow for 2023-24, Japan Foundation Indo-Pacific Partnership.

21
 1 Kelly Ng, “Myanmar: Young People Attempt to Flee Ahead of Conscription Order,”
BBC, February 27, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68345291

2 Rodion Ebbighausen, “Myanmar Coup: ASEAN Split Over the Way Forward,” DW,
March 29, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-coup-asean-ties/a-57042503

3 Aaron Connelly and Shona Loong, “Conflict in Myanmar and the International
Response,” IISS, June 2023, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-
pacific-regional-security-assessment-2023/aprsa-chapter-6/

4 “Indonesia, Malaysia Call for Urgent ASEAN Summit on Myanmar Crisis,”

Radio Free Asia, March 19, 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/
summit-03192021184051.html#:~:text=Concerned%20over%20the%20Myanmar%20
military%20junta%E2%80%99s%20relentless%20deadly,discuss%20the%20turmoil%20
in%20their%20fellow%20member%20state

5 “Indonesia, Malaysia Call for Urgent ASEAN Summit on Myanmar Crisis”

6 ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting,” https://asean.org/

wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-
2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf

7 Edna Tarigan and Jim Gomez, “Indonesia’s President Admits ASEAN Has Made
No Progress on Myanmar Crisis,” The Diplomat, May 11, 2023, https://thediplomat.
com/2023/05/indonesias-president-admits-asean-has-made-no-progress-on-myanmar-
crisis/

8 Russell Goldman, “Myanmar’s Coup and Violence, Explained,” The New York Times,
Endnotes

March 29, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html

9 Feliz Solomon and Niharika Mandhana, “Myanmar Coup: What’s Happening and
Why are There Protests?,” The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/myanmar-coup-aung-san-suu-kyi-11612169495

10 Solomon and Mandhana, “Myanmar Coup: What’s Happening and Why are There
Protests?”

11 Nirupama Subramanian, “Explained: What Has Led to the Coup in Myanmar?,” The
Indian Express, February 3, 2021, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-
what-has-led-to-the-coup-in-myanmar-7169624/

12 Subramanian, “Explained: What Has Led to the Coup in Myanmar?”

13 Goldman, “Myanmar’s Coup and Violence, Explained”

14 Subramanian, “Explained: What Has Led to the Coup in Myanmar?”

22
 15 Solomon and Mandhana, “Myanmar Coup: What’s Happening and Why are There
Protests?”

16 Richard C. Paddock, “Myanmar’s Coup and Its Aftermath, Explained,” The New York
Times, December 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-
coup.html

17 “Myanmar Events of 2022,” Human Rights Watch Report, https://www.hrw.org/world-

report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar

18 Paddock, “Myanmar’s Coup and Its Aftermath, Explained”

19 Paddock, “Myanmar’s Coup and Its Aftermath, Explained”

20 Emily Fishbein and Zau Myet Awng, “Fighting is All Around’: Myanmar Faces
Deepening Humanitarian Crisis,” Al Jazeera, December 14, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2023/12/14/fighting-is-all-around-myanmar-faces-deepening-humanitarian-
crisis

21 John Yang and Andrew Corkery, “What a Rapidly Changing Civil War Means for the
Future of Myanmar,” PBS News, May 5, 2024, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/
what-a-rapidly-changing-civil-war-means-for-the-future-of-myanmar

22 Fishbein and Zau Myet Awng, “Fighting is All Around’: Myanmar Faces Deepening
Humanitarian Crisis”

23 “NSA Ajit Doval Visits Myanmar,” The Hindu, July 26, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/
news/international/nsa-ajit-doval-visits-myanmar/article68448562.ece
Endnotes

24 Yang and Corkery, “What a Rapidly Changing Civil War Means for the Future of
Myanmar”

25 Shannon Teoh, “Great Expectations as Malaysia is Set to Head Asean in 2025,”

The Straits Times, October 31, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/great-
expectations-as-malaysia-is-set-to-head-asean-in-2025

26 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “Myanmar Situation,” UNHCR,

https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar

27 “Responding to the Myanmar Coup,” Crisis Group Asia Briefing, February 16, 2021,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b166-responding-myanmar-
coup

28 “Myanmar Events of 2022”

29 “Responding to the Myanmar Coup”

23
 30 “US Announces New Sanctions Targeting Myanmar’s Military Generals as Protests
Against Coup Continue,” ABC News, February 11, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2021-02-11/biden-announces-new-sanctions-against-myanmar-generals/13143132

31 Council of the European Union, “Myanmar/Burma: EU Imposes Restrictive Measures

on 22 Individuals and 4 Entities in Fourth Round of Sanctions,” February 21, 2022,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/21/myanmar-burma-
eu-imposes-restrictive-measures-on-22-individuals-and-4-entities-in-fourth-round-of-
sanctions/

32 Sydney Tucker, “The Burma Act of 2022: Promises and Pitfalls,” Stimson, August 17,
2023, https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-burma-act-of-2022-promises-and-pitfalls/

33 Sebastian Strangio, “ASEAN’s Special Leaders Meeting on Myanmar, One Month On,”
The Diplomat, May 24, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/aseans-special-leaders-
meeting-on-myanmar-one-month-on/

34 Strangio, “ASEAN’s Special Leaders Meeting on Myanmar, One Month On”

35 “NSA Ajit Doval Visits Myanmar”

36 Sahil Mathur, “Myanmar’s Coup D’Etat: What Role for ASEAN?,” The Diplomat,
February 3, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmars-coup-detat-what-role-
for-asean/

37 “ASEAN Demands ‘Immediate Cessation of Violence’ in Myanmar,” Al Jazeera, April

24,2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/24/myanmar-coup-leader-in-jakarta-
for-southeast-asian-summit
Endnotes

38 Sebastian Strangio, “Assessing the Outcome of ASEAN’s Special Meeting on Myanmar,”

The Diplomat, April 27, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/assessing-the-outcome-
of-aseans-special-meeting-on-myanmar/

39 Barry Desker, “ASEAN’s Myanmar Dilemma,” East Asia Forum, May 23, 2021, https://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/23/aseans-myanmar-dilemma/

40 “ASEAN Leaders Demand Myanmar Coup Leaders End Killings,” The Hindu, April 24,
2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/asean-leaders-demand-myanmar-
coup-leaders-end-killings/article34401229.ece

41 “ASEAN Leaders Demand Myanmar Coup Leaders End Killings”

42 Phanit Vun and Sokvy Rim, “What Indonesia Can Learn from Cambodia Regarding
the Myanmar Crisis,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/
what-indonesia-can-learn-from-cambodia-regarding-the-myanmar-crisis/

24
 43 Vun and Rim, “What Indonesia Can Learn from Cambodia Regarding the Myanmar
Crisis”

44 Meng Seavmey, “ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy Plans to Visit Myanmar in September
in View of the Regime’s Policy and Recent Executions,” Cambodianess, August 7, 2022,
https://cambodianess.com/article/asean-chairs-special-envoy-plans-to-visit-myanmar-in-
september-in-view-of-the-regimes-policy-and-recent-executions

45 William Echols, “A Misleading Intervention by Cambodia’s Hun Sen in Myanmar,”

VOA News, January 11, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/hun-sen-cambodia-myanmar-
military-visit/6743239.html

46 “Cambodia to Take ‘Different Approaches’ to Myanmar Crisis as ASEAN Chair,”

Reuters, January 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cambodia-take-
different-approaches-myanmar-crisis-asean-chair-2022-01-08/

47 Han Noy and Chea Sameang, “Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship: Shortcomings and
Decisive Steps,” Cambodianness, December 11, 2022, https://cambodianess.com/article/
cambodias-asean-chairmanship-shortcomings-and-decisive-steps

48 Jayanty Nada Shofa, “Indonesia Doubts Myanmar is Close to Inclusive National

Dialogue,” The Jakarta Globe, November 1, 2023, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-
doubts-myanmar-is-close-to-inclusive-national-dialogue

49 Anthony Toh Han Yang, “Indonesia Pushes for Peace in Myanmar,” East Asia Forum,
June 2, 2023, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/02/indonesia-pushes-for-peace-in-
myanmar/
Endnotes

50 Jayanty Nada Shofa, “ASEAN Establishes New Troika to Find Solution on Myanmar
Crisis,” Jakarta Globe, September 8, 2023, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/asean-establishes-
new-troika-to-find-solution-on-myanmar-crisis

51 Joanne Lin, “Is Laos Able to Make a Difference in the Myanmar Crisis,” Fulcrum,
October 13, 2023, https://fulcrum.sg/aseanfocus/is-laos-able-to-make-a-difference-in-
the-myanmar-crisis/

52 To Minh Son, “How Will Laos Handle Its 2024 Chairmanship of the ASEAN?,” The
Diplomat, December 8, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/how-will-laos-handle-its-
2024-chairmanship-of-asean/#:~:text=One%20factor%20differentiates%20Laos%20
from,while%20Myanmar%20has%20ceded%20its

53 Son, “How Will Laos Handle Its 2024 Chairmanship of the ASEAN?”

54 “Laos Sends Special Envoy to Myanmar in New Role as ASEAN Chair,” Nikkei Asia,
January 10, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Laos-sends-special-
envoy-to-Myanmar-in-new-role-as-ASEAN-chair

25
 55 Sebastian Strangio, “ASEAN Envoy Travels to Myanmar, Meets Military Junta Chief,”
The Diplomat, May 17, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/asean-envoy-travels-to-
myanmar-meets-military-junta-chief/

56 Strangio, “ASEAN Envoy Travels to Myanmar, Meets Military Junta Chief ”

57 R. M. Michael Tene, “ASEAN Five -Point Consensus on Myanmar,” RSIS Commentary,

July 30, 2024, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/asean-five-point-consensus-
on-myanmar/

58 Ingyin Naing, “Myanmar Crisis Dominates ASEAN Talks as Consensus Plan

Languishes,” VOA, October 11, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-crisis-
dominates-asean-talks-as-consensus-plan-languishes/7819127.html

59 Naing, “Myanmar Crisis Dominates ASEAN Talks as Consensus Plan Languishes”

60 Naing, “Myanmar Crisis Dominates ASEAN Talks as Consensus Plan Languishes”

61 Panu Wongcha-um, “ASEAN Leaders Meet in Laos as Thai PM Urges Myanmar

Engagement Ahead of Election,” Reuters, October 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/
world/asia-pacific/asean-holds-summit-laos-thailand-floats-new-plan-myanmar-
crisis-2024-10-09/

62 Wongcha-um, “ASEAN Leaders Meet in Laos as Thai PM Urges Myanmar Engagement

Ahead of Election”

63 Naing, “Myanmar Crisis Dominates ASEAN Talks as Consensus Plan Languishes”

64 Naing, “Myanmar Crisis Dominates ASEAN Talks as Consensus Plan Languishes”

Endnotes

65 Olivia Enos and Patrick Coe, “ASEAN’s Response to Myanmar Coup is Failing,” The
Heritage Foundation, July 23, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/aseans-
response-myanmar-coup-failing

66 Enos and Coe, “ASEAN’s Response to Myanmar Coup is Failing”

67 Barry Desker, “ASEAN’s Myanmar Dilemma”

68 ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting,” https://asean.org/

wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-
2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf

69 Sahil Mathur, “Myanmar’s Coup D’Etat: What Role for ASEAN?”

70 “Myanmar Junta Opponents Say No Faith in ASEAN as Envoys Visit,” Reuters, June 5
2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-opponents-say-no-
faith-asean-envoys-visit-2021-06-04/

26
 71 “Myanmar Junta Opponents Say No Faith in ASEAN as Envoys Visit”

72 Sebastian Strangio, “Assessing the Outcome of ASEAN’s Special Meeting on Myanmar,”

The Diplomat, April 27, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/assessing-the-outcome-
of-aseans-special-meeting-on-myanmar/

73 Joshua Kurlantzick, “How the ASEAN Summit on Myanmar Might—or Might Not—
Impact the Situation in Myanmar,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 26, 2021,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-asean-summit-myanmar-might-or-might-not-impact-
situation-myanmar

74 “ASEAN Must Act with Urgency on Myanmar,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human
Rights, May 21, 2021, https://aseanmp.org/publications/post/asean-must-act-with-
urgency-on-myanmar

75 Desker, “ASEAN’s Myanmar Dilemma”

76 Gibran Mahesa Drajat, “The Indonesia Factor in ASEAN’s Response to Myanmar,” East
Asia Forum, May 21, 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/21/the-indonesia-
factor-in-aseans-response-to-myanmar/

77 Strangio, “Assessing the Outcome of ASEAN’s Special Meeting on Myanmar”

78 Andrew Mantong and Lina A. Alexandria, “Dealing with the Current Myanmar Crisis
under Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022: Analysis and Recommendations,”
CSIS Policy Paper, https://csis.or.id/publication/dealing-with-the-current-myanmar-crisis-
under-cambodias-asean-chairmanship-in-2022-analysis-and-recommendations/

79 Mantong and Alexandria, “Dealing with the Current Myanmar Crisis under
Endnotes

Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022: Analysis and Recommendations”

80 Shoon Naing and Poppy Mcpherson, “Indonesia Hosts International Meeting on

Myanmar with UN, Junta Rivals, Sources Say,” Reuters, October 4, 2024, https://www.
reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-hosts-international-meeting-myanmar-with-
un-junta-rivals-sources-say-2024-10-04/

81 Yang, “Indonesia Pushes for Peace in Myanmar”

82 Kate Lamb and Ananda Teresia, “Exclusive: Indonesia Quietly Engaging Key
Stakeholders in Myanmar Crisis, Foreign Minister Says,” Reuters, May 5, 2023, https://
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-quietly-engaging-key-stakeholders-
myanmar-crisis-foreign-minister-2023-05-05/

83 Mantong and Alexandria, “Dealing with the Current Myanmar Crisis under
Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022: Analysis and Recommendations”

27
 84 Gautam Mukhopadhaya, “What Can India Do to Move Myanmar Away from Further
Violence?,” The Wire, February 12, 2023, https://thewire.in/south-asia/myanmar-
military-coup-india-role

85 Mukhopadhaya, “What Can India Do to Move Myanmar Away from Further

Violence?”

86 “India Supplied $51 Million in Arms, Raw Materials to Myanmar Military Since 2021
Coup: UN Report,” Scroll, May 18, 2023, https://scroll.in/latest/1049327/india-supplied-
51-million-in-arms-raw-materials-to-myanmar-military-since-2021-coup-un-report

87 Amitav Acharya, “Myanmar Escalation: India Should Think Long-Term and

Recalibrate,” Times of India, December 2, 2023, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
blogs/voices/myanmar-escalation-india-should-think-long-term-and-recalibrate/

88 Nicola Williams, “Myanmar Pushes ASEAN to the Brink,” The Interpreter, June 10,
2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-pushes-asean-brink

89 ASEAN, “ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025,” https://asean.org/wp-

content/uploads/2023/04/ASEAN-APSC-Blueprint-2025.pdf

90 Mantong and Alexandria, “Dealing with the Current Myanmar Crisis under
Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022: Analysis and Recommendations”

91 Mantong and Alexandria, “Dealing with the Current Myanmar Crisis under
Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022: Analysis and Recommendations”

92 Mantong and Alexandria, “Dealing with the Current Myanmar Crisis under
Cambodia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022: Analysis and Recommendations”
Endnotes

93 Williams, “Myanmar Pushes ASEAN to the Brink”

28
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