Neutral Citation: (2024) KEHC 16607 (KLR) : ST ND
Uploaded by
Hardik TwitterNeutral Citation: (2024) KEHC 16607 (KLR) : ST ND
Uploaded by
Hardik TwitterKenya Human Rights Commission & 8 others v Koomemnchebere; Law
Society of Kenya & 2 others (Interested Parties) (Application E082 of 2024)
[2024] KEHC 16607 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (31 December 2024) (Judgment)
Neutral citation: [2024] KEHC 16607 (KLR)
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT AT NAIROBI (MILIMANI LAW COURTS)
JUDICIAL REVIEW
APPLICATION E082 OF 2024
J NGAAH, J
DECEMBER 31, 2024
BETWEEN
KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION .................................... 1ST APPLICANT
KATIBA INSTITUTE ....................................................................... 2ND APPLICANT
KENYA SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ
KENYA) ............................................................................................... 3RD APPLICANT
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL KENYA (TI) ................... 4TH APPLICANT
THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY (TISA) .... 5TH APPLICANT
AFRICA CENTER FOR OPEN GOVERNANCE .......................... 6TH APPLICANT
SIASA PLACE ..................................................................................... 7TH APPLICANT
TRIBELESS YOUTH ......................................................................... 8TH APPLICANT
MUSLIMS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (MUHURI) ............................ 9TH APPLICANT
AND
JAPHET KOOME NCHEBERE .......................................................... RESPONDENT
AND
LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA .................................................... INTERESTED PARTY
KENYA MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS, PHARMACISTS AND DENTISTS
UNION (KMPDU) ................................................................... INTERESTED PARTY
KENYA UNION OF CLINICAL OFFICERS ........................ INTERESTED PARTY
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 1
JUDGMENT
1. The applicants’ application is a motion dated 17 April 2024 expressed to be led under sections 8 and
9 of the Law Reform Act cap 26; sections 7, 8, 9, 11 and 14 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act,
2015; and, Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The applicants have sought the following orders:
“ 1. Prohibition restraining the Respondent, Japhet Koome Nchebere, the
Inspector General of the National Police Service, or any other ocer
subordinate to him, from enforcing Nchebere’s decision of 14th April 2024 to
suspend Articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution by cancelling medics’ right
to strike and to picket peaceably and unarmed.
2. Certiorari quashing Nchebere’s decision of 14th April 2024 to suspend Articles
36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution by cancelling medics’ right to strike and to
picket peaceably and unarmed.
3. A declaration that the Inspector General of National Police Service, such as
Nchebere, or other superior ocer are personally liable under the doctrine of
command responsibility for:
a) issuing unconstitutional orders and directives to ocers under
their command to use unlawful force to disperse peaceable and
unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests, and pickets under Articles
36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
b) abdicating eective control of police ocers under their
command by failing to investigate and discipline ocers who
violate the Constitution by using unlawful force to disperse
peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests, and pickets
contrary to Articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
4. A structural interdict or supervisory mandamus be and is issued directing the
Respondent to investigate and to discipline police ocers who have violated
the Constitution, by using unlawful force, to disperse peaceable and unarmed
strikes, assemblies, protests, and pickets by the medics contrary to Articles 36,
37, and 41 of the Constitution.
a) The investigation to include the OCPD of Capitol Hill Police
Station and any other ocer culpable for using unlawful force
against Dr Davji Atela and other medics at a peaceable and
unarmed strike, assembly, protest, or picket on 29 February 2024
at Afya House.
b) The Respondent be and is ordered to publish, in a newspaper of
national circulation within 14 days of this order, an apology to
Dr Davji Atela for the violation of his rights by the police.
c) The court further orders the Respondent to le an adavit
within 30 days of the court’s order, outlining his steps to comply.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 2
5. The Respondent, from his personal funds, pays Dr Davji Atela, compensation
in the form of general damages (under Article 23 of the Constitution and
section 7(1)(j) of the FAA) for violating his rights while using unlawful force,
to disperse the peaceable and unarmed picket at Afya House, Nairobi on 29
February 2024.
6. A costs order requiring the Respondent to pay, from his personal funds, the
costs of this litigation, to deter his future attempts to suspend Articles 36, 37,
and 41 of the Constitution or his use or authorisation of the use of unlawful
force, to disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests, and
pickets contrary to Articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.”
2. The application is based on a statutory statement dated 15 April 2024 and an adavit sworn on even
date by Mr. David Malombe verifying the facts relied upon.
3. Mr. Malombe has sworn that he is the executive director of Kenya Human Rights Commission, the 1st
applicant in these proceedings, and that he is competent, duly informed, and authorised to swear the
adavit on behalf of the rest of the applicants.
4. Mr. Malombe has sworn that Mr. Japhet Koome Nchebere, the former Inspector General of the
National Police Service,habitually acted with high impunity and that he regularly directed subordinate
police ocers to disperse peaceable and unarmed protests forcibly and violently. At times, he personally
participated in forcibly dispersing peaceful assemblies.
5. It is alleged that Mr. Nchebere never investigated or disciplined police ocers who forcibly, violently,
or lethally dispersed peaceable and unarmed protests. For instance, he failed to investigate or discipline
the police ocers, including the Ocer Commanding Police Division for Capitol Hill, who violently
attacked one Dr Davji Atela on 29 February 2024 at a peaceable picket at Afya House. Dr. Atela is the
secretary general of the Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists, and Dentists Union (KMPDU).
6. In a show of bias, Mr. Nchebere is said to have ignored or even facilitated certain other protests. For
instance, on 28 December 2023 at Milimani Law Courts, he did not take any action on protests in
support of the housing levy verdict. He also did not disperse the protests through town and around the
Supreme Court over the same levy. According to the applicants, such open and glaring bias by an ocer
who should be neutral, is discriminatory and violates articles 27 and 47 of the Fair Administrative
Action Act,2015.
7. The applicants allege that true to his habit, on 14 April 2024, Mr. Nchebere claimed to suspend
articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution by cancelling the KMPDU members’ right to strike, assemble,
protest, or picket peaceably and unarmed. He disclosed that he had directed police commanders to
“deal rmly and decisively” with the striking and picketing KMPDU members. To him, the striking
KMPDU members had “become a public nuisance” by “blowing whistles and vuvuzelas during the
demonstrations” yet blowing whistles and vuvuzelas is exactly what striking and picketing workers do,
not just in Kenya but everywhere else in the world.
8. Except for the appalling act of violence and use of unnecessary and excessive force perpetrated against
members of the KMPDU during their peaceful demonstration on 29 February 2024 in Nairobi during
which Dr. Atela was gravely injured by a teargas canister thrown at him by the police, the 1st applicant
has observed that the KMPDU members’ strike had been peaceful.
9. It is the applicants’ case that Nchebere’s decision was disproportionate, intrusively limiting the rights
of the KMPDU members to strike, assemble, or picket under articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 3
They urge that the use of batons, teargas, or rearms, as a rst option to disperse peaceable and
unarmed KMPDU members on 29 February 2024 was unreasonable. According to the applicants, the
decision was illegal under international and local law, including this Honourable Court’s decisions.
Secondly, the decision was so outrageous in its deance of logic that no reasonable Inspector General
of Police would replicate it. Mr. Nchebere’s actions are also said to have been ultra vires article 47 of
the Constitution and section 4 of the Fair Aadministrative Action Act.
10. The applicants seek to have have Mr. Nchebere held accountable for issuing unconstitutional orders
and directives to ocers under his command to use unlawful force to disperse peaceable and unarmed
strikes, assemblies, protests, and pickets contrary to articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution. They also
seek him to be held accountable for abdicating eective control of police ocers under his command
by failing to investigate and discipline ocers who violate the Constitution by using unlawful force to
disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests, and pickets despite Articles 36, 37, and
41 of the Constitution.
Despite having been served with the application and the hearing notice neither Mr. Nchebere nor his
oce responded to the application. Of the three named interested parties, only the 1st interested party
responded by way of a replying adavit.
1st interested party’s case
11. The replying adavit was sworn by Ms. Florence Muturi who introduced herself as the secretary to
the 1st interested party’s council and its chief executive ocer. She deposed that the 1st interested party
is a statutory body established by the Law Society of .Kenya Act, 2014 with a statutory mandate under
section 4 to assist the Government and the courts in matters relating tb legislation, the administration
of justice and the practice of law in Kenya; uphold the Constitution of Kenya and advance the rule of
law and the administration of justice; and to protect and assist the members of the public in Kenya in
matters relating to or ancillary or incidental to the law.
12. The rest of the depositions made in the adavit are more or less similar to those made by Mr. Malombe
on behalf of the applicant. As a matter of fact, Ms. Muturi has sworn that the 1st respondent agrees
with the applicants' bid to impeach the respondent's decision to suspend the Constitution and to hold
him personally liable for his actions and omissions.
Applicants’ submissions
13. In their submissions, the applicants identied the following issues for determination. I reproduce the
issues verbatim as follows:
“ a) Whether the Respondent’s decision of 14 April 2024 limited the medics’ rights
under Articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
b) Whether the Respondent’s actions are tainted with illegality, irrationality, or
procedural impropriety.
c) Whether the Respondent’s actions violated or posed the threat of violation to
the rights provided for under Article 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution.
d) Whether the Respondent’s decision of to suspend the medics’ rights under
Articles 36, 37 and 41 was justiable in the circumstances of the case in terms
of Article 24(1) of the Constitution 2010.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 4
e) Whether the Inspector General of Police can be held criminally responsible
under the doctrine of command responsibility for the actions of his
subordinates.”
14. On the rst issue, the applicants have submitted that article 24 of the Constitution establishes the criteria
for limiting any constitutional right and urged that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights
can be limited only by law, in pursuit of a legitimate objective, and only to the extent that the limitation
is necessary. In assessing whether the limitation of a right is reasonable and justiable, the Court ought
to consider the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and
extent of the limitation, and the fact that the need for enjoyment of the right by one individual does
not prejudice the rights of others, as well the consideration of the relationship between the limitation
and its purpose, and whether there were less restrictive means to achieve that purpose. In support of
these arguments, the applicants have relied on the Supreme Court decision in Karen Njeri Kandie v
Alassane Ba & Another [2017] eKLR and also Seth Panyako & 5 Others v Attorney General & 2 Others
[2013] eKLR.
15. They have also urged that under article 24(3) of the Constitution, the onus of proving that a limitation
on a right or freedom is reasonable and demonstrably justied in an open and democratic society lies
with the respondent and in this regard they have cited Robert Alai v Attorney General [2017] eKLR at
para 56; R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. Thus, the respondent bears the burden of satisfying this court
that limitation was, rst, provided by law; second, it was intended to serve a legitimate aim; and, third,
it was necessary in an open and democratic society.
16. The applicants urge that the respondent did not meet this burden. His limitation of the rights in articles
36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution was outside article 24. Accordingly, the limitation was an arbitrary
abuse of power and was only calculated to prejudice the legal rights of the peaceful protestors.
17. The applicants have also submitted that article 36(1) of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right
to freedom of association, including the right to form, join or participate in any association.
18. The right to freedom of association protects, inter alia, expression; criticism of state action;
advancement of the rights of those discriminated-against, marginalized and socially vulnerable
communities, including the rights of women and children. This right also protects all other conduct
permissible in the light of regional and international human rights law according to which, states
are enjoined to respect, in law and practice, the right of associations to carry out their activities,
without threats, harassment, interference, intimidation or reprisals. States are also under obligation
to protect associations, including their principal and most visible members, from threats, harassment,
interference, intimidation or reprisals by third parties and non-state actors.
19. Contrary to these constitutional provisions and international norms, the respondent is alleged to
have unlawfully threatened to disrupt the strike and directed police commanders to “deal rmly and
decisively” with the striking and picketing medics. Therefore, the respondent’s decision of 14 April
2024 limited the KMPDU members’ right to participate in a strike called by their union, the KMPDU,
under Article 36 of the Constitution. The respondent’s actions and decisions aimed at abridging the
striking KMPDU members’ rights to engage in their respective unions’ activities are said to have
violated the constitutional right to freedom of association.
20. Article 37, it is urged, equally entitles every person peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, demonstrate,
picket, and present petitions to public authorities. Under Article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Kenya is also
state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights whose Article 21 states that the
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 5
“right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized”. Article 11 of the Banjul Charter also states that “every
individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others”
21. In support of their submissions, the applicants have relied on Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu v Attorney
General and 12 Others [2016] eKLR where it was held that, besides guaranteeing the right to assemble,
demonstrate, picket and petition, article 37 is itself an imperative rights’ article and its import is that
it brings together other rights critical in any free democratic society. The article inherently invites
the freedom of expression and opinion as well as the freedom of association. In the course of their
demonstrations, persons are bound to assemble and associate and likewise, in the course of picketing
the picketers are simply bound to express themselves, their common views and opinions. The police
service has an obligation to assure the public of peace and order. The public in these respects include
both the participants in the demonstrations and picketing as well as the non-participants. There is a
positive obligation on the State to facilitate and protect a peaceful exercise of the Article 37 rights.
Against this background, it is urged, the Constitution obligates the respondent and the police ocers
in general to facilitate the exercise of the right provided under Article 37.
22. The applicants have also relied on the Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa
which are to the eect that:
“ the right to freedom of assembly extends to peaceful assembly. An assembly should be
deemed peaceful if its organizers have expressed peaceful intentions, and if the conduct
of the assembly participants is generally peaceful. ‘Peaceful’ shall be interpreted to include
conduct that annoys or gives oence as well as conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or
obstructs the activities of third parties. Isolated acts of violence do not render an assembly
as a whole non-peaceful”.
23. The applicants have also urged that Article 41 confers a right to fair labour practices including the right
to participate in trade union activities and programmes and go on strike. They have cited Kenya Ferry
Services Limited v Dock Workers Union (Ferry Branch) [2015] eKLR where it was held that:
“ the right to strike is a fundamental element in stable collective bargaining. Employees
promote and protect their economic and social interest, and resolve labour disputes,
through strike action…Employees who may feel they should continue to work during the
strike, must be protected”.
24. For the same argument they cited Okiya Omtatah Okoiti v Attorney General & 5 Others [2015] eKLR
where the court declared sections 78(1)(f) and 81(3) of the Labour Relations Act invalid as far as they are
inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that they purported to derogate from the core content
of the right to strike under article 41(2)(d) of the Constitution. They sought to nullify the right to go
on strike for workers in essential services sector.
25. The applicants urge that the respondent’s directive to his subordinates to ‘deal rmly and decisively’
with the striking and picketing KMPDU members was intended to curtail their rights to strike under
article 41(2)(d) of the Constitution. Thus, the respondent’s usurpation of the power to determine who
enjoys the right to picket and who does not is unconstitutional and a misuse of his oce’s powers.
26. On the second issue of whether the respondent’s actions were tainted by illegality, irrationality
or procedural impropriety, the applicants urge that the respondent’s action of issuing orders and
directives to ocers under his command to use unlawful force to disperse peaceable and unarmed
strikes, assemblies, protests and pickets are contrary to the provisions of Articles 36, 37 and 41 of the
Constitution. They have relied on the Council of Civil Unions vs Minister for the Civil Service [1985]
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 6
AC 2 where Lord Diplock dened the ground of illegality, amongst other grounds for judicial review.
According to the learned judge, a decision-maker must correctly understand the law that regulates his
decision-making and must give eect to it failure of which his decision is exposed to nullication on
the ground of illegality.
27. It is urged that the oce of Inspector General of Police is established by Article 245 of the Constitution
of Kenya, with its parent statute being the National Police Service Act, 2011. The powers and functions
of the Inspector General of Police are set out under Section 10 of the National Police Service Act, 2011.
Sub section 4 of section 10 states as follows:
10(4)(b) In the performance of functions set out under the Constitution, this Act or any
other law, the Inspector General shall uphold the national values, principles and objects set
out in Articles 10, 232 and 244 of the Constitution.
28. Article 10 of the Constitution to which reference has been made bespeaks the national values and
principles of governance. Article 10(2)(b) highlights the right to, human dignity, equity, social justice,
inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized as being
part of the national values and principles of governance.
29. Article 232 of the Constitution provides for the values and principles of Public Service. Under article
232(1)(e), these values and principles include accountability for administrative acts. The Constitution
further provides under Article 244(c) that the National Police Service shall comply with constitutional
standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
30. The applicants relied on Republic v Betting Control and Licensing Board & another Ex parte Outdoor
Advertising Association of Kenya [2019] eKLR on when a decision is deemed illegal and urged that
the respondent’s suspension of the KMPDU members’ right to strike, assemble, protest or picket
peaceably and unarmed, is illegal since no law allows him to cancel those rights. By cancelling the
rights instead of facilitating the enjoyment of those rights, the respondent acted outside the jurisdiction
conferred to him by articles 244 and 245 of the Constitution of Kenya.
31. Further, the respondent violated his duty to ‘execute command by issuing lawful orders, directives or
instructions’ as required of him under Section 8A(4) of the National Police Service Act. His decision to
suspend the rights are also in violation of Section 49(4) of the Act which requires that a police ocer
who performs an ocial duty or exercises police powers shall perform such duty or exercise such power
in a manner that is lawful.The respondent’s decision to cancel the rights of the KMPDU members to
strike and picket peaceably and unarmed also violates the rules of natural justice under Articles 47 and
50, and sections 4(1), 7(2)(a)(v) and 7(2)(c) of the Fair Administrative Action Act. In particular, the
respondent did not accord any of the KMPDU members a hearing before suspending their right to
strike, assemble, or picket peaceably and unarmed under Articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
32. The applicants have also submitted that, in the recent past, prior to the ling of the application, the
respondent had adopted a pattern of facilitating the protests he fancied and disrupting those he did not
like. This open bias in selectively respecting the rights of the groups he liked while curtailing the rights
of the groups he dislikes is, according to the applicants, discriminatory and in violation of article 27 of
the Constitution. This bias also violates section 7(2)(a)(iv) of the Fair Administrative Action Act under
which the court is empowered to review an administrative action where the administrator is biased or
may reasonably be suspected of bias.
33. On the question of irrationality, the applicants have argued that section 7(2)(k) of the Fair
Administrative Action Act, provides that a court or a tribunal may review an administrative action or
decision if it is unreasonable. Section 7(2)(i) of that Act also provides that an administrative action
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 7
or decision may be subject to review if the action is not rationally connected to; rst, the purpose for
which it was taken; second, the purpose of the empowering provision; third, the information before
the administrator; and, fourth, the reasons given for it by the administrator.
34. The applicants have cited Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 Others ex
Parte Rongo University [2018] eKLR, where the court spelt out the criteria for legal unreasonableness
as any or all of the following:
i. Specic errors of relevancy or purpose
ii. Reasoning illogically or irrationally
iii. Reaching a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justication such that an
interference of unreasonableness can be drawn even where a particular error in reasoning
cannot be identied
iv. Giving excessive or disproportionate weight— in the sense of more than was reasonably
necessary—to some factors and insucient weight to others.
35. The applicants have submitted further that the respondent’s decision was made in deance of logic and
that no reasonable and informed Inspector General of Police would purport to cancel constitutionally
provided for rights on a whim. The decision to cancel the KMPDU members’ rights provided in articles
36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution is not rationally connected to the reasons given for it. Moreover, the
respondent's decision is in violation of article 24 of the Constitution, which requires that there be a
rational connection between a limitation of a constitutional right and the purpose of the limitation. It
is urged that the respondent’s decision to suspend the peaceful strikers’ constitutionally provided for
rights meets all the points in the criteria set above.
36. As far as the ground of procedural impropriety is concerned, it has been urged thatthe respondent’s
action of issuing orders and directives to ocers under his command to use unlawful force to
disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests and pickets lack procedural propriety.
The case of Republic v Cabinet Secretary for Interior & Co-ordination of National Government
& another; Ex parte Applicant: Peter Adiele Mmegwa & another [2020] eKLR, has been cited on
what constitutes procedural impropriety. In that case the Court is said to have established two ways
procedural impropriety can manifest: rst, procedural ultra vires— where an administrative decision is
challenged because a decision maker has overlooked or failed to properly observe statutory procedural
requirements; and, second, common law rules of natural justice and fairness.
37. For the same argument, the applicants relied on Pastoli v Kabale District Local Government Council
and Others (2008) EA 300. The applicants have concluded that the respondent’s decision to
suspend the rights of the KMPDU members to strike and picket peaceably violated the right to fair
administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, which provides that every person
has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, ecient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally
fair.
38. In support of their argument, the applicants have relied onSuper Nova Properties Limited v the
National Land Commission [2019] eKLR where it was held that procedural fairness requires that
persons who are likely to be aected by a decision be allowed to be heard before the decision is taken.
The respondent, it is urged, did not allow any of the KMPDU members’ to be heard before he decided
to suspend their right to strike, assemble, or picket peaceably and unarmed. Thus, the respondent's
actions and decisions breach the rules of natural justice and bias and, as such, constitute procedural
impropriety.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 8
39. On the their issue whether the decision of the respondent to suspend the rights of the KMPDU
members as provided for under article 36, 37 and 41 was justiable in the circumstances of the case in
terms of article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya, it has been urged on behalf of the applicants that the
Constitution in article 20(2) provides that every person shall enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms
in the Bill of Rights to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental
freedom.
40. To this end, the applicants have cited Louis Henkin, in his book, ‘The Age of Right’ where he stated,
inter alia, that individual human rights cannot be sacriced even for the good of the greater number,
even for the general good of all. This proposition is mirrored in article 24 of the Constitution which is
to the eect thatthat a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except
by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justiable in an open and
democratic society. They also cited R v Oakes (1986) 1SCR 103 which set out the criteria that could
be used in establishing whether a limitation to constitutional rights is reasonable and justied in a free
and democratic society.
41. The applicants submit that the respondent’s decision to suspend articles 36, 37 and 41 of the
Constitution by cancelling the KMPDU members’ right to strike, assemble, protest, or picket peaceably
and unarmed, and issuing the directive to ‘deal decisively and rmly’ with the demonstrators is a
limitation that does not meet the criteria above.
42. As far as the question of whether the Inspector General of Police can be held personally responsible
under the doctrine of command responsibility for the actions of his subordinates, the applicants have
submitted that the respondent is personally culpable for the harm by police ocers to Dr Atela on 28
February 2024. In support of their argument, they have relied on Republic v University of Nairobi ex
Parte Michael Jacobs Odhiambo & 7 Others [2016] eKLR which cited Judge Bakone Justice Moloto
in ‘Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals’ in which he stated:
“ To hold a person criminally responsible under the doctrine of command responsibility for
an international crime, the prosecution must prove three legal elements:
1. The existence of superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as a
supervisor and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate.
2. That the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be
or had been committed; and
3. That the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the
power of the superior to control the acts of his or her subordinates…A superior
position for purposes of command responsibility can be based on de facto
powers of control…At least in the military context, command responsibility
applies to every commander at every level of command. What matters is
whether the superior has actual powers to control the actions of his or her
subordinates. To determine this, all three aforementioned tribunals apply the
“eective control” test, which aims to determine whether the superior has “the
material ability to prevent and punish criminal conduct.”
43. If a superior has this ability, then there is a legal basis for command responsibility. The applicants
also citedthe International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic,
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 9
Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo (Appeals Chamber) IT-96-21-A (ICTY); at paragraph 98,
the court stated as follows:
“ If a superior has control over subordinates, to the extent that he can prevent them from
committing crimes or punish them after they committed the crimes, he would be held
responsible for the commission of the crime if he failed to exercise such abilities of control.”
44. Based on these authorities, the applicants have submitted the Inspector General of National Police
Service such as the respondent ought to be held personally liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility for;
“ i. Issuing unconstitutional orders and directives to ocers under their command
to use unlawful force to disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies,
protests, and pickets under Articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution.
ii. Abdicating eective control of police ocers under their command by failing
to investigate and discipline ocers who violate the Constitution by using
unlawful force to disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests,
and pickets contrary to Articles 36, 37 and 4 of the Constitution.”
1st interested party’s submissions
45. The 1st interested party’s submissions are, by and large, similar to those made by the applicants in
support of their case except that, in some instances, the 1st interested party has cited cases dierent from
those cited by the applicants but which are, nonetheless in agreement with those which the applicants
have relied on in support of the legal arguments they have posited.
46. For instance, on the argument that article 24(1) of the Constitution is express that a right or fundamental
freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law and, therefore,the Inspector General
did not have the legal authority to unilaterally suspend constitutional rights, the 1st interested party
has cited Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of
the Republic of South Africa and Others (2000) [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3)
BCLR 241 (CC).
47. It is urged that the case concerned the validity of a proclamation issued by the President of South
Africa to bring certain sections of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act
into operation. The Constitutional Court held that the President had acted beyond his legal authority
because the proclamation was issued without fullling the necessary statutory requirements. The 1st
interested party urges that the case established that the exercise of all public power must be consistent
with the Constitution and that public ocials must act within the scope of their legally conferred
authority and that it reinforced the principle of legality, emphasizing that actions taken without proper
legal authorization are invalid. For the same argument, the 1st interested party has cited other South
African decisions of Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council and Others (1998) [1998] ZACC 17 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR
1458 (CC); Aordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another (2005) [2005]
ZACC 3; 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC); 2005 (6) BCLR 529 (CC); . Masetlha v President of the Republic
of South Africa (2007) Citation: [2007] ZACC 20; 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC); 2008 (1) BCLR 1 (CC)
and Minister of Home Aairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of
Oenders (NICRO) and Others (2004) [2004] ZACC 10; 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC); 2004 (5) BCLR
445 (CC).
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 10
48. On the right to due process, the 1st interested party urged that the suspension of rights without
following due process, such as consultation with relevant stakeholders or obtaining necessary judicial
approvals, raises concerns about the legitimacy and fairness of the administrative action. Due process
requires that any action aecting constitutional rights must be carried out in a manner that follows
established legal procedures. This includes providing notice, the opportunity to be heard, and a fair
and impartial decision-making process. The unilateral suspension of rights by the Inspector General
bypasses these procedural safeguards. It is urged that the principle of due process is fundamental in
ensuring fairness and justice in administrative and judicial actions. In Kenya, the courts have addressed
the absence of due process in several signicant cases.
49. For these submissions, the 1st interested party cited Dry Associates Limited v Capital Markets
Authority and Another (2012)(Petition No. 328 of 2011); Kenya Human Rights Commission v Non-
Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Board (2016), Petition No. 471 of 2016; Trusted Society
of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General & 2 others (2012) (Petition No. 229 of 2012); Judicial
Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & Another (2015); Civil Appeal No. 52 of 2014; and, Moses
Kipkolum Kogo v Nyamogo & Nyamogo Advocates (2004) Citation: Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2004.
50. The 1st interested party has also urged that the respondent’s action was arbitrary and capricious hence
calling for the intervention of this Honourable Court. It has been submitted that the respondent’s
action may be deemed arbitrary and capricious because it lacks a sound basis, such as any clear and
present danger to public order, health, or safety. The rationale for such a drastic measure must be
transparent and well-founded and that for an administrative action to be lawful, it must be based on
reasonable and legitimate grounds.
51. Arbitrarily suspending constitutional rights, especially in response to industrial action by a specic
group, can be seen as a capricious use of power without a sound legal basis. It is submitted that the
directive by the Inspector General made on 14 April 2024 is the archetypal paradigm of caprice. It was
not based on any law and even the excuses given warranting the purported suspension of constitutional
rights are wholly hollow, bereft of any evidence and groundless.
52. As to what the concepts of "arbitrary and capricious" entail, it has been submitted that they refer
to decisions made by public ocials or bodies that lack a rational basis or are not grounded in
consideration of relevant factors. One of the cases cited in support of the 1st interested party’s
arguments is the case of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. (1983)1 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The case is said to have involved the National Highway
Trac Safety Administration's decision to rescind a regulation requiring passive restraints in vehicles.
The Court found that the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to provide a
reasoned explanation for its change in policy and did not consider all relevant factors.
53. Other decisions cited in support of the 1st interested party’s submissions are Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) [1999] 2 SCR 817; . Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
(2000) [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC); R v. Minister for Home
Aairs and Others Ex Parte Sitamze (2008) [2008] 2 KLR (EP) 15; Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service (1985) [1984] UKHL 9; [1985] AC 374.
54. On the issue of lack of proportionality on the respondent’s part, it has been urged that the suspension
of fundamental rights must be proportionate to the threat or issue at hand. The intervention of this
Honourable Court is necessary because overreaching measures that excessively restrict constitutional
rights can be challenged as disproportionate and unjustied. And the principle of proportionality
requires that any restriction on rights must be necessary and proportionate to the aim sought to be
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 11
achieved. Suspending the rights to strike, assemble, protest, or picket, especially without exploring less
restrictive means, must be deemed disproportionate.
55. Speaking of proportionality, it has been urged that the principle is a key element in administrative law
and constitutional law, ensuring that the actions of public authorities do not exceed what is necessary
to achieve a legitimate aim. To this end, the 1st interested party has relied on R v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, ex parte Daly (2001) Citation: [2001] UKHL 26 which is a case that involved
a challenge to a prison policy that allowed prison ocers to examine legally privileged correspondence
between prisoners and their lawyers. The House of Lords found the policy disproportionate, as it was
more intrusive than necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of prison security.
56. Also cited in support of the 1st interested party’s argument is the Canadian case of R v. Oakes (supra).
Other cases cited on this question of proportionality are S v. Makwanyane (1995) [1995] ZACC 3;
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); Tennessee v. Garner (1985)2 Citation: 471 U.S. 1
(1985); Katiba Institute & 3 others v. Attorney General & 2 others (2018) Petition No. 372 of 2016;
and, R (on the application of Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) Citation:
[2001] 2 AC 532.
57. It was also urged that the respondent’s action constituted abuse of power where executive authorities
might circumvent legal procedures and checks to impose restrictive measures unilaterally. Once again,
the 1st interested party relied on Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another
(supra); In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (2000) [2000] ZACC 1;
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) where it was held that the exercise of all public power
must comply with the Constitution, and any action taken without proper authority or in bad faith is
invalid. The court emphasized that the rule of law is a fundamental principle of the Constitution, and
abuse of power by public ocials violates this principle.
58. Other South African decisions cited for the same argument are President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others (SARFU case) (1999) [1999]
ZACC 9; 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC); Minister of Health and Another NO
v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (2005) [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC);
2005 (3) BCLR 292 (CC); Aordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another
(2005) [2005] ZACC 3; 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC); 2005 (6) BCLR 529 (CC). Besides the South African
decisions, the 1st interested party also cited the Canadian decisions of Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959)
[1959] SCR 121; Operation Dismantle v. The Queen (1985) Citation: [1985] 1 SCR 441; . Baker
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) [1999] 2 SCR 817; Canada (Attorney
General) v. Bedford (2013) Citation: [2013] 3 SCR 1101; and, 5. Vavilov v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) (2019) Citation: [2019] 4 SCR 653.
59. The 1st interested party also cited host of other Canadian decisions for the argument thatarbitrary
suspension of rights can erode public trust in law enforcement and government institutions, leading
to increased social unrest and loss of legitimacy. It can also escalate social unrest, particularly when
the aected group, such as the KMPDU membership, is engaged in lawful industrial action to address
grievances.
60. Public trust and the integrity of government actions are crucial themes in Canadian jurisprudence
and the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed these issues in several landmark cases, emphasizing
transparency, accountability, and the preservation of public trust. Amongst the cases cited in this regard
are Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959) [1959] SCR 121; . R. v. Morgentaler (1988) Citation: [1988] 1 SCR
30; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford (2013) Citation: [2013] 3 SCR 1101; Reference re Secession
of Quebec (1998) [1998] 2 SCR 217; 5. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (2008) Wabomba Masinde and
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 12
Associates - [2008] 1 SCR 190; and, Vavilov v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (2019) [2019]
4 SCR 653.
61. In conclusion, the 1st interested urged that the abuse of power, strikes at the very heart of our democracy
and the rule of law. It is not merely a breach of duty; it is an aront to the very foundations upon which
our society is built. Power, entrusted to public ocials, is not a privilege but a sacred responsibility
and, therefore, it must be exercised with utmost integrity, transparency, and in strict adherence to the
principles of justice and fairness. When this power is abused, it erodes public trust, undermines the
rule of law, and inicts harm upon those it was meant to protect.
Analysis and determination.
62. In the absence of an adavit or any sort of response from the respondent to controvert the applicants’
allegations of facts, I am entitled to proceed on the presumption that the foundational facts upon
which this application is based are as deposed by the applicants and the 1st interested party.
63. Central to this application is, rst, the fact that on 28 or 29 February 2024, the police perpetrated
violence against KMPDU members during their peaceful demonstration. Dr. Davji Atela, the
KMPDU secretary general was injured by a teargas canister red by the police during the
demonstration on the material date. Second, on 14 April 2024 the respondent purported to suspend
the KMPDU members’ right under articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution, more particularly, the
KMPDU members’ right to strike, assemble, protest, or picket peaceably and unarmed and stated in
categorical terms that he had directed Police Commanders to “deal rmly and decisively” with the
striking and picketing the KMPDU members.
64. In proof of this fact, Mr. Malombe exhibited to his adavit a copy of the press statement issued by the
respondent expressing his discontent with the applicants’ conduct and cautioning them of the police
response if they did not desist from the demonstrations which the respondent described as “a threat
to public safety and security”. It is worthwhile reproducing the statement here in its entirety for better
understanding. It reads as follows:
“ Oce of the Inspector General
National Police Service
Press Statement
National Police Service Headquarters
For Immediate Release
Statement on strike by Doctors and Clinical Ocers
The National Police Service takes cognizance of the ongoing doctor’s strike, with utmost
concern. The service has witnessed and received reports of the inconveniences arising from
the strike, with medics lying on the streets thus obstructing highways, public roads and
disrupting free ow of vehicles and movement of people.
The medics have become a public nuisance, blowing whistles and vuvuzelas during the
demonstrations thus causing discomfort to patients in hospitals and general public.
Contrary to the constitutional provisions on the right to picket, petition or demonstrate,
the medics continue to engage in demonstrations without notifying the police. Yet, we
have information that non-medics with intention to cause havoc and terror to the public
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 13
intended to join the ongoing processions, a move that poses a threat to public safety and
security.
In the interest of national security therefore, all respective police commanders have been
instructed to deal with such situations rmly and decisively in accordance with the law.
We wish to caution all doctors to refrain from infringing on the rights of others while
demonstrating, and that their eorts to disrupt smooth operations of hospitals will not be
tolerated.
We wish to assure the public that our country is safe, and that the National Police Service
remains committed to maintaining law and order.
Signed
IG Japhet Koome, MGH,EBS, ndc (k)
Inspector General,
National Police Service &
President of Afripol General Assembly
April 14,2024.”
65. The respondent’s conduct as expressed in the violence meted out on KMPDU members as a result
of which their secretary general was injured and, subsequently, his press statement issued on 14 April
2024 need to be weighed against the constitutional and statutory provisions on the KMPDU members’
rights and the respondent’s obligation to not only respect those rights but also to protect them.
66. With this perspective in mind, the applicants' application brings into focus the question of whether
the executive can, in the rst place, interfere with certain individual constitutional rights and, if so, the
extent to which it may interfere. The constitutional rights brought to the fore and about which the
applicants are concerned are specically, their right associate which, of course, necessarily constitutes
the right to form, join or participate in the activities of an association of any kind. Coupled with this
right is the right to assemble, picket and present petitions to authorities. The application also brings to
the fore the right to fair labour practices including the right to form, join or participate in the activities
and programs of a trade union.
67. These rights are respectively expressed in articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution as follows:
36. (1) Every person has the right to freedom of association, which includes the right to form, join or
participate in the activities of an association of any kind.
(2) A person shall not be compelled to join an association of any kind.
(3) Any legislation that requires registration of an association of any kind shall provide
that—
(a) registration may not be withheld or withdrawn unreasonably; and
(b) there shall be a right to have a fair hearing before a registration is cancelled.
37. Every person has the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to
picket, and to present petitions to public authorities.
41.(1) Every person has the right to fair labour practices.
(2) Every worker has the right—
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 14
(a) to fair remuneration;
(b) to reasonable working conditions;
(c) to form, join or participate in the activities and programmes of a trade
union; and (d) to go on strike.
(3) Every employer has the right—
(e) to form and join an employers organisation; and
(f) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers
organisation.
(4) Every trade union and every employers’ organisation has the right—
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities;
(b) to organise; and
(c) to form and join a federation.
(5) Every trade union, employers’ organisation and employer has the right to
engage in collective bargaining.
68. These rights are amongst a cluster of rights in the Chapter Four of the Constitution recognised as not
only inherent in every individual but are also an integral part of Kenya, as a democratic state. The
rights guaranteed are rights already possessed and enjoyed by the individual; they are neither created by
the Bill of Rights nor given by the state. They are the benchmark for the state’s social, economic and
cultural polices. Article 19(2) of the Constitution states that these rights are recognised and protected
because they are the only means by which the dignity of the individual and communities can be
preserved. The same article is categorical that it is also through such recognition and protection that
social justice and realisation of the potential of all human beings can be promoted.
69. The question that then follows is this: from whom are these rights to be protected?
According to B.O. Nwabueze, in his book, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (at page 34),
almost every executive act bears directly or indirectly upon citizens and, in order to protect the
individual from the excesses of the state, there is an established principle that the executive has no
inherent discretionary power to act against the citizen. The Bill of Rights embraces this principle.
70. According to the learned author, this principle was applied by the Privy Council as early as 1931 in
Eshugbayi Eleko versus Ocer Administering the Government of Nigeria and Another (1931) AC
662. In that case, the Ocer Administrating the Government of Nigeria, which was then a British
Colony, purported to depose and deport Chief Eshygbayi Eleko under the Deposed Chiefs Removal
Ordinance. In holding that the Governor had no such authority, the Privy Council held as follows:
“ Prima facie deposition with the sanction appears to point to deposition by some authority
other than the Governor which would only become eective when sanctioned by the
Governor: in which case it would appear that a valid deposition by the appropriate authority
would be necessary as well as the sanction by the approving authority.”
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 15
71. Reiterating that the executive can only exercise power which it has been bestowed with, the Privy
Council held that:
“ The Governor acting under the Deportation Ordinance acts solely under executive powers,
and in no sense as a court. As the executive he can only act in pursuance of the powers given
to him by law.
In accordance with British jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere with
the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the
legality of his actions before a court of justice. And it is the tradition of British justice that
courts should not shrink from deciding such issues in the face of the executive.” (per Lord
Atkin).
72. In Kenya, it is not just a question of jurisprudence that the individual’s right to liberty or property, or to
any other right in the Bill of Rights, for that matter, should not be interfered with. It is a constitutional
imperative that such rights must and ought not to be interfered with and may only be limited as
provided by law. Article 24 of the Constitution lays out the circumstances under which these limitations
may apply. It reads as follows:
24.(1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then
only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors,
including–
(a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any
individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and
(e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive
means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Despite clause (1), a provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom—
(a) in the case of a provision enacted or amended on or after the eective date, is not
valid unless the legislation specically expresses the intention to limit that right or
fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation;
(b) shall not be construed as limiting the right or fundamental freedom unless the
provision is clear and specic about the right or freedom to be limited and the nature
and extent of the limitation; and
(c) shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or
essential content.
(3) The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court,
tribunal or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satised.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 16
(4) The provisions of this Chapter on equality shall be qualied to the extent strictly necessary for
the application of Muslim law before the Kadhis’ courts, to persons who profess the Muslim
religion, in matters relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance.
(5) Despite clause (1) and (2), a provision in legislation may limit the application of the rights or
fundamental freedoms in the following provisions to persons serving in the Kenya Defence
Forces or the National Police Service–
(a) Article 31—Privacy;
(b) Article 36—Freedom of association;
(c) Article 37—Assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition;
(d) Article 41—Labour relations;
(e) Article 43—Economic and social rights; and
(f) Article 49—Rights of arrested persons.
73. Despite the limitations, it is not implied that the executive has power, independent of statute, to act in
derogation of the rights of citizens. In light of these provisions, not only must the exercise of executive
powers be authorised by law but it must also keep strictly within the scope of that authority.
74. This means that when there is a law upon any particular matter, the executive, just like any private
person, cannot defy it or refuse to be bound by it. A fortiori, a subordinate ocer of the government
who has committed a contravention of the law cannot plead in defence that he can acted upon the
orders of the government. The government and its ocers enjoy no special dispensation or immunity
from the ordinary laws of the land. Neither can the executive give itself the necessary legal authority to
interfere with private rights. (See Nwabueze (supra) at page 35).
75. As far as the respondent is concerned, his oce is among those recognised as security organs in Chapter
14 of the Constitution, on National Security. According to article 239, the other two organs are the
Kenya Defence Forces and the National Intelligence Service. Article 239 (2) is express that the primary
object of the national security organs and security system is to promote and guarantee national security
in accordance with the principles mentioned in Article 238(2). In order to understand the context of
these principles, it is necessary to reproduce here, in its entirety, article 238 of the Constitution. It reads
as follows:
238. Principles of national security
(1) National security is the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace,
stability and prosperity, and other national interests.
(2) The national security of Kenya shall be promoted and guaranteed in accordance with
the following principles—
(a) national security is subject to the authority of this Constitution and
Parliament;
(b) national security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with the
utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental
freedoms;
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 17
(c) in performing their functions and exercising their powers, national security
organs shall respect the diverse culture of the communities within Kenya; and
(d) recruitment by the national security organs shall reect the diversity of the
Kenyan people in equitable proportions.
76. Besides these principles, it is reiterated in article 239 (3) that in performing their functions and
exercising their powers, the national security organs and every member of the national security organs
shall not, inter alia, act in a partisan manner. Further, in execution of their functions, they must submit
to the dictates of the Constitution and comply with the law, respecting its rule, democracy, human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
It is apparent from these provisions that national security organs have the obligation of not just
protecting the people of Kenya but their rights and freedoms as well.
77. Further, section 10 (4) of the National Police Service Act, cap. 84 which has been enacted to give eect
to articles 243, 244 and 245 of the Constitution states that in the performance of functions set out
under the Constitution, the National Police Service Act or any other law, the Inspector-General shall not
just have all the necessary powers for the performance of such functions but, in exercising them, he is
under obligation to uphold the national values, principles and objects set out in Articles 10, 232 and
244 of the Constitution.
78. Amongst the national values and principles of governance in article 10 are, of course, the rule of law,
democracy, human dignity, human rights and non-discrimination. Article 232, on the other hand, is
about values and principles of public service and they include accountability for administrative acts;
and nally, article 245 is with respect to the command of the National Police Service and it states, inter
alia, that the Inspector General shall, among other things, exercise independent command over the
National Police Service, and perform any other functions prescribed by national legislation.
79. Considered from the foregoing perspective, the unprovoked police action of violently breaking up the
KMPDU’s members’ peaceful and unarmed demonstration in exercise of their constitutional right to
assemble, demonstrate, picket and present their petitions and, in the process, hurting Dr. Atelu was
an act that contravened articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution. It was not act that is within the
limitations circumscribed in article 24 and neither could it be justied under any written law.
80. Although, in his press statement of 14 April 2024, the respondent warned of ‘rm and decisive’ action
against the striking KMPDU members, ostensibly because the National Police Service had “received
reports of the inconveniences arising from the strike, with medics lying on the streets thus obstructing
highways, public roads and disrupting free ow of vehicles and movement of people” there is no
evidence that the violence visited upon KMPDU members’ earlier, more particularly in February 2024,
was informed by such information.
81. In the absence of any reason or any valid reason why the police violently broke up the KMPDU
members’ demonstration, it can only be assumed that the purported reports of the “inconveniences
arising from the strike, with medics lying on the streets thus obstructing highways, public roads and
disrupting free ow of vehicles and movement of people” and the allegation that the “medics have
become a public nuisance, blowing whistles and vuvuzelas during the demonstrations thus causing
discomfort to patients in hospitals and general public” were only meant to lay ground for further
unprovoked and unwarranted disruption of the KMPDU members' exercise of their rights under
articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 18
82. The reason that the police had information that “non-medics with intention to cause havoc and
terror to the public intended to join the ongoing processions” which, according to the respondent,
posed a threat to public safety and security, is not also plausible because, no proof or basis of such,
rather alarmist report was provided by the respondent. Secondly, according to Chapter V of the
Interantional Labour Organization's (ILO) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No.8) strike picketing is aimed at ensuring the success of a strike by
persuading as many persons as possible to stay away from work.
83. Thus, although on the face of it the statement appears to have been an innocent communication from
the respondent’s oce, in truth, and going by what had transpired in February 2024 when the police
descended upon KMPDU members and violently broke up their demonstration, the statement is laced
with veiled threats against further demonstrations by the KMPDU members in exercise of their right
to picket. I interpret the respondent's statement that “all respective police commanders have been
instructed to deal with such situations rmly and decisively in accordance with the law” to have been
no more than a threat to disrupt the KMPDU members’ demonstrations and to subdue their resolve.
84. If at all the respondent had any information that “non-medics” intended to join the strike to cause
havoc and terror, it was incumbent upon him to arrest such elements and foil any attempts to cause
the alleged havoc or terror without necessarily interfering with the KMPDU members’ rights under
articles 36,37 and 41 of the Constitution. I need not belabour the point that under Article 38 of the
Constitution, protection of the people of Kenya and their rights and freedoms is a vital component of
the principles of National security.
85. And as much as the respondent may have been aware of the inltration of the KMPDU members’
demonstration with characters that were out to cause chaos, he had the constitutional obligation to
ensure national security "in compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law,
democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms” as he ought to under article 238 (2)(b). No
doubt, the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which reference is made include the KMPDU
members’ rights under articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution. Under our constitution, it is possible
for the respondent and the police under his command to maintain law and order even as the citizens
exercise their rights under articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution.
Command responsibility.
86. The next issue to which my attention has been drawn is whether the respondent ought to be held
personally responsible for the acts of the ocers under his command under the doctrine of command
responsibility. In particular, the applicants seek to hold the respondent personally accountable for the
injury sustained by Dr. Atela when the ocer lobbed a teargas cannister at him during the KMPDU
members’ demonstrations on 28 February 2024.
87. The applicants’ case in this respect is based on their argument that the respondent issued
unconstitutional orders and directives to ocers under his command to use what turned out to be
excessive and unlawful force to break up what was otherwise a peaceable and unarmed assembly of
KMPDU members exercising their constitutional right to protest and picket under articles 36,37 and
41 of the Constitution.
88. The second limb of their submissions is that the respondent eectively abdicated his responsibility of
eective control of police ocers under his command who violated the Constitution. The respondent
is said to have failed to take any measure towards investigating and disciplining ocers who violated
the Constitution by employing unlawful force to disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies,
protests and pickets contrary to articles 36,37 and 41 of the Constitution.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 19
89. In support of the applicants’ argument to hold the respondent personally accountable under the
doctrine of command responsibility, the applicants have cited cases where this doctrine has been
applied one of which is Republic v University of Nairobi ex Parte Michael Jacobs Odhiambo &
7 Others (supra). In this case, the court is said to have cited Justice Bakone Moloto, in his article
“Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tribunals”, 3. Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 1 (2009).12
at page 15, where the learned judge stated that one can be held criminally responsible under the
doctrine of command responsibility for an international crime if, rst, there is in existence a superior-
subordinate relationship between the accused as the superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate; second, the superior must have known that the crime was about to be committed or that
had been committed; and, third, the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators.
90. The learned judge noted further as follows:
“ Superior-subordinate relationship
The doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the power of the
superior to control the acts of his or her subordinates. In this respect, a military hierarchy
is not required, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Court have all held that the doctrine
of command responsibility applies not only to military commanders, but also to political
leaders and other civilian superiors in possession of authority. It is also not necessary
that a formal, de jure subordination exist. A superior position for purposes of command
responsibility can be based on de facto powers of control. Furthermore, the perpetrator
does not need to be directly subordinated to the superior but can be several steps down
the chain of command. At least in the military context, command responsibility applies
to every commander at every level of command, even if the troops were only temporarily
commanded by the superior.
What matters is whether the superior has actual powers to control the actions of his or
her subordinates. To determine this, all three aforementioned tribunals apply the “eective
control” test, which aims to determine whether the superior has “the material ability to
prevent and punish criminal conduct.” If a superior has this ability, then there is a legal basis
for command responsibility. Lesser degrees of control, however, for example “substantial
inuence,” do not incur command responsibility.
In determining whether the “eective control” test had been satised, a tribunal must
consider the evidence of each particular case. There are, however, factors that may be
generally indicative of an accused’ position of authority. Some indicia of authority include:
the accused’s ocial position, his or her capacity to issue orders, the procedure for
appointment, the accused’s position in the military or political structure, and the actual tasks
that he or she performed. In cases of irregular armed groups with less formal structures, it
becomes more important to focus on the superior’s de facto authority.”
91. The other case cited by the applicants in support of holding the respondent culpable for acts of the
ocers under him is Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo (Appeals
Chamber) IT-96-21-A (ICTY).
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 20
92. As the cited article and cases suggest, the doctrine of command responsibility appears to be more
pronounced in international criminal tribunals. In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Statute, for example, the doctrine is covered in article 6(3) and (4) thereof. This article reads as follows:
“ Command Responsibility (Article 6(3))
a) Statute
Article 6:
“3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve
his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.”
“4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal
responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment
if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so
requires.”
93. The acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 are, of course crimes against humanity and included such crimes
as genocide, murder, torture, rape persecution on political, racial and religious grounds and other
inhuman acts.
94. The Tribunal in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (Trial Chamber), June 7, 2001,
explained the elements of the doctrine of command responsibility in article 6 of the Statute to comprise
“(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship of eective control between the accused and
the perpetrator of the crime; and, (ii) the knowledge, or constructive knowledge, of the accused that
the crime was about to be, was being, or had been committed; and, (iii) the failure of the accused to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or stop the crime, or to punish the perpetrator.”
95. The superior-subordinate relationship was explained in Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20
(Trial Chamber), May 15, 2003 to be “a relationship which requires a formal or informal hierarchical
relationship where a superior is senior to a subordinate.”
96. As to whether the doctrine would apply to a civilian set-up such as the police as contrasted to the rank
and le of a military command, the Tribunal held that “the relationship is not limited to a strict military
command style structure” and that “Article 6(3) provides that civilian leaders may incur criminal
responsibility for acts committed by their subordinates or others under their ‘eective control.” (see
Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T (Trial
Chamber), February 21, 2003.
97. On what “eective control” entails, it was held in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR-95-1-A (Appeals Chamber), June 1, 2001, that it is where “the superior has eective control
over the persons committing the [crimes], in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and
punish the commission of these oences.” The ability to prevent and punish a crime being a question
that is inherently linked with the given factual situation.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 21
98. The Tribunal also held in Bagilishema (supra) that command responsibility is not based on strict
liability. It held: “As to the mens rea, the standard that the doctrine of command responsibility
establishes for superiors who fail to prevent or punish crimes committed by their subordinates is not
one of strict liability”
99. No doubt, as is the case with similar statutes for trial of international crimes, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda Statute, was specic to a particular set of circumstances or situation. Nonetheless,
the application of those statutes oer a guide to the understanding and application of certain concepts
and doctrines such as the doctrine of command responsibility, the application of which is certainly
not restricted to any particular statute or tribunal. The concept is of universal character except that, as
noted, it is more pronounced in international criminal tribunals.
100. That said, with or without this doctrine, the constitutional and statutory provisions with respect to the
respondent's oce, read in their entirety point to the conclusion that the Inspector General of Police
bears the responsibility of the actions of the ocers under his command. In article 245 (2) (b) of the
Constitution, for instance, the Inspector-General exercises independent command over the National
Police Service. Article 245(1) and (2) reads as follows:
245. Command of the National Police Service
(1) There is established the oce of the Inspector-General of the National Police Service.
(2) The Inspector-General—
(a) is appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament; and
(b) shall exercise independent command over the National Police Service, and
perform any other functions prescribed by national legislation.
101. Section 8 of the National Police Service Act is also clear that the National Police Service is under the
command of the Inspector General and even in a case where he has delegated tasks that would otherwise
be performed by himself, he is not thereby divested of the responsibility of the exercise of powers or
the duties delegated. The section reads as follows:
8. Command of the Service
(1) The Service shall be under the overall and independent command of the Inspector-
General appointed in accordance with Article 245 of the Constitution and the
provisions of this Act.
(2) The Inspector-General may perform the functions or exercise the powers of the oce
in person or may delegate to an ocer subordinate to him.
(3) A delegation under this Act—
(a) shall be in writing;
(b) shall be subject to any conditions the Inspector-General may impose;
(c) shall not divest the Inspector-General of the responsibility concerning the
exercise of the powers or the performance of the duty delegated, and
(d) may be withdrawn, and any decision made by the person so delegated may be
withdrawn or amended by the Inspector-General.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 22
(4) The Inspector-General shall give direction in situations of conict between the
dierent mandates of the dierent Services and units within the Service (Emphasis
added).
102. The extent of the Inspector General’s responsibility as one in whom the command of the police service
vests is also explicit in section 8 A of the National Police Service Act. This section reads as follows:
8A. Inspector General to be responsible for matters relating to command and discipline of the
service
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law, independent command of the
Inspector-General in relation to the Service envisioned in Article 245(2)(b) and section
8 of the Act, means that the Inspector-General shall be responsible for all matters
relating to the command and discipline of the Service subject to disciplinary control
of the Commission.
(2) The Inspector-General shall exercise Command over the National Police Service and
lawfully administer, control and manage the National Police Service as a disciplined
Service.
(3) The Deputy Inspector-General's of Kenya Police and Administration Police under the
direction of the Inspector-General shall command, control and administer the service
for which he or she is responsible.
(4) The Inspector-General shall execute command by issuing lawful orders, directives or
instructions to and through the Deputy Inspectors General;(5)The Cabinet Secretary
may lawfully give a direction in writing to the Inspector-General with respect to any
matter of policy for the National Police Service.
Further, section 10 (1)(c) of the same Act states that among the functions of the Inspector General is
that of coordinating all police operations.
103. Irrespective of whether these provisions are considered from the perspective of the doctrine of
command responsibility, or any other doctrine, by whatever name called, they all lead to the conclusion
that, where, as in the instant case, the Inspector General violently descends upon members of the public
exercising their rights to assemble and express themselves in a manner endorsed by the Constitution
in the Bill of Rights, to curtail or in any other way to disrupt their appropriation of these rights, he
will thereby be held accountable and personally responsible for the consequences that may inevitably
ensue. The buck stops with him, so to speak.
104. I am minded that under section 66 (1) of the National Police Service Act, “no matter or thing done
by a member, employee or agent of the Service shall, if the matter or thing is done in good faith for
the performance and execution of the functions, powers or duties of the Service, render the ocer,
employee or agent personally liable to any action, claim or demand whatsoever”.
105. However, according to section 66(2) of the same Act, a person is not precluded from bringing legal
proceedings against the Inspector-General in respect of an act or omission of the kind referred to in
subsection (1) as long as the aggrieved party can satisfy the court that the police ocer or other person
would, but for that subsection, have incurred liability for the act or omission.
106. In any event section 66 of the National Police Service Act, and indeed the entire Act is subject to
the Constitution and none of its provisions can be read or interpreted as abrogating the inherent and
inalienable rights in the Bill of Rights.
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 23
Conclusion
107. In conclusion, and turning back to the issues identied for determination, I hold that for the reasons I
have proered, the respondent’s decision of 14 April 2024 limited the KMPDU members’ rights under
articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution. In the same breath, the decision violated the rights provided
for under article 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the decision was not justiable in terms
of article 24(1) of the Constitution.
108. The decision was also tainted on the judicial review grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural
impropriety. It was tainted on the ground of illegality to the extent the decision coupled with the events
that transpired in February 2024 were ultra vires the Constitution and, in particular, contrary to articles
36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution.
109. And going by the denition of the ground of illegality given by Lord Diplock in Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374,410 it is apparent from the
respondent’s conduct that he did not understand correctly the constitutional and statutory provisions
regulating the functions of his oce, his powers in general and his decision-making power, in particular
and that, as far as the KMPDU members rights are concerned he never gave eect to these provisions.
110. As far as the ground of irrationality is concerned, I also take cue from Lord Diplock’s denition of
this ground in the cited decision and hold that a person in the station of the respondent, at the time
material to this suit, could not have possibly reached the same decision that the respondent made. The
fact that the decision of 14 April 2024 was made weeks after the respondent violently disrupted the
KMPDU members’ demonstration for no apparent reason, qualies the decision to be amongst the
category of decisions that would properly be described as being outrageous in their deance of logic
or of accepted moral standards.
111. Again, borrowing from Lord Diplock’s denition of the ground of procedural impropriety, I am
satised the respondent’s decision was bereft of procedural fairness towards the KMPDU members.
The decision deprived them of their rights yet they were never given any opportunity to be heard
prior to the making of the decision. The respondent failed to observe the basic statutory requirements
expressed in the Fair Administrative Action Act of making a decision that was likely to be prejudicial
to the parties aected by it.
112. As to whether the respondent can be held criminally responsible for the acts of ocers under his
command in violently disrupting KMPDU members’ peaceful assembly, demonstration or picketing
or other forms of expression consistent with the exercise of their rights under articles 36, 37 and 41 of
the Constitution as result of which Dr. Devji Atelu was injured, the answer is in the armative. The
respondent could, and can properly be subjected to a criminal trial for the acts or omissions of the
ocers under his command if those acts or omissions t the description of oences as dened in law.
113. Except for the prayer for the structural interdict which demands of this Honourable Court, in exercise
of its judicial review jurisdiction, to supervise certain actions to be taken by the Inspector General; and,
the prayer for damages to be paid to Dr, Atela as compensation for the injuries he sustained but which
this Honourable Court cannot grant for the reason it is not able to assess the damages payable in the
absence of any evidence of the extent of the injuries sustained, the rest of the applicants’ prayers are
allowed, more particularly in the following terms:
1. A Prohibition order is hereby issued restraining the Inspector General of the National Police
Service, or any other ocer subordinate to him, from enforcing the respondent’s decision of
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 24
14 April 2024 purporting to suspend Articles 36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution by cancelling
KMPDU members’ right to strike and to picket peaceably and unarmed.
2. The order of certiorari is hereby granted removing to this Honourable Court for purposes of
being quashed the respondent’s decision dated 14 April 2024 purporting to suspend articles
36, 37 and 41 of the Constitution by cancelling KMPDU members’ right to strike and to picket
peaceably and unarmed. For the avoidance of doubt, the decision is hereby quashed.
3. A declaration is hereby made that, under articles 238,239(3) and 245(2)(b); and, sections
8,8A and 10(4) of the National Police Service Act, cap. 84, the Inspector General of National
Police Service, is accountable and personally liable for the acts or omissions of ocers under
his command infringing on the rights of the individual under articles 36, 37 and 41 of the
Constitution and, in particular:
a) in issuing unconstitutional orders and directives to ocers under his command to use
unlawful force to disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests, and
pickets under Articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
b) abdicating eective control of police ocers under his command by failing to
investigate and discipline ocers who violate the Constitution by using unlawful force
to disperse peaceable and unarmed strikes, assemblies, protests, and pickets contrary
to articles 36, 37, and 41 of the Constitution.
4. The applicants will have the costs of the suit which shall be paid by the respondent, personally,
from his own sources.
It is so ordered.
DATED, SIGNED AND UPLOADED ON CTS ON 31 DECEMBER 2024
NGAAH JAIRUS
JUDGE
https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/16607/eng@2024-12-31 25
You might also like
- Neutral Citation: (2025) KESC 49 (KLR) : ST ND RD THNo ratings yetNeutral Citation: (2025) KESC 49 (KLR) : ST ND RD TH11 pages
- Full Petition KI & 2 Others V CS Kipchumba MurkomenNo ratings yetFull Petition KI & 2 Others V CS Kipchumba Murkomen71 pages
- Neutral Citation: (2024) KEHC 13655 (KLR) : ST ND RD TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH THNo ratings yetNeutral Citation: (2024) KEHC 13655 (KLR) : ST ND RD TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH15 pages
- SC Petition No. 31, 32 & 33 of 2024 - The Cabinet Secretary For The National Treasury and Planning & Others vs. Okiya Omtatah & OthersNo ratings yetSC Petition No. 31, 32 & 33 of 2024 - The Cabinet Secretary For The National Treasury and Planning & Others vs. Okiya Omtatah & Others137 pages
- Petition No. E181 of 2023 - Friday - Housing LevyNo ratings yetPetition No. E181 of 2023 - Friday - Housing Levy202 pages
- Onyango V Kenya Methodist University (Petition E007of2021) 2022KEHC13201 (KLR) (29september2022) (Judgment)No ratings yetOnyango V Kenya Methodist University (Petition E007of2021) 2022KEHC13201 (KLR) (29september2022) (Judgment)7 pages
- 1 - Petition No. E202 of 2023: Judgment: ST ND RD TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH THNo ratings yet1 - Petition No. E202 of 2023: Judgment: ST ND RD TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH172 pages
- Petition No. E181 of 2023 - FRIDAY - HOUSING LEVYNo ratings yetPetition No. E181 of 2023 - FRIDAY - HOUSING LEVY8 pages
- Petition No. 20 E023 of 2022 Isaac Aluoch Polo Aluochier Vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries CommissionNo ratings yetPetition No. 20 E023 of 2022 Isaac Aluoch Polo Aluochier Vs Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission19 pages
- Week 4 - Matindi V AG - (Katiba Institute Review Motion) (Pages 1-15 and 136)No ratings yetWeek 4 - Matindi V AG - (Katiba Institute Review Motion) (Pages 1-15 and 136)343 pages
- Sonko V Clerk County Assembly of Nairobi City 11 Others (Application 14 (E022) Of2021) 2021KESC14 (KLR) (8november2021) (Ruling)No ratings yetSonko V Clerk County Assembly of Nairobi City 11 Others (Application 14 (E022) Of2021) 2021KESC14 (KLR) (8november2021) (Ruling)6 pages
- Petition Challenging The Formation of Presidential Taskforce On Human Resource For HealthNo ratings yetPetition Challenging The Formation of Presidential Taskforce On Human Resource For Health47 pages
- Petition No. E181 of 2023 - FRIDAY FINALJudgmentNo ratings yetPetition No. E181 of 2023 - FRIDAY FINALJudgment107 pages
- 2020 Election Petition Judgment (Scanned)No ratings yet2020 Election Petition Judgment (Scanned)58 pages
- Republic of Kenya: (Coram: Koome CJ & P, Mwilu DCJ & VP, Ibrahim, Wanjala, Njoki, Lenaola, Ouko, SCJJ)No ratings yetRepublic of Kenya: (Coram: Koome CJ & P, Mwilu DCJ & VP, Ibrahim, Wanjala, Njoki, Lenaola, Ouko, SCJJ)7 pages
- Stephenson V Director of Public Prosecutions 3 Others (Petition 21of2019) 2024KEHC15039 (KLR) (6november2024) (Judgment)No ratings yetStephenson V Director of Public Prosecutions 3 Others (Petition 21of2019) 2024KEHC15039 (KLR) (6november2024) (Judgment)6 pages
- Citizens Against Violence (Cavi) 018 Others V Inspector General of Police and OthersNo ratings yetCitizens Against Violence (Cavi) 018 Others V Inspector General of Police and Others2 pages
- Ruling Amb. Wasswa Biriggwa & 27 Others Vs Boniface Toterebuka BamwendaNo ratings yetRuling Amb. Wasswa Biriggwa & 27 Others Vs Boniface Toterebuka Bamwenda16 pages
- Khaemba V Mutua 2 Others (Election Petition E001of2022) 2022KEHC15532 (KLR) (22november2022) (Ruling)No ratings yetKhaemba V Mutua 2 Others (Election Petition E001of2022) 2022KEHC15532 (KLR) (22november2022) (Ruling)14 pages
- DR Lagu Charles and 3 Others Vs Attorney General (Miscellaneous Cause No 370 of 2020) 2023 UGHCCD 10 (31 January 2023)No ratings yetDR Lagu Charles and 3 Others Vs Attorney General (Miscellaneous Cause No 370 of 2020) 2023 UGHCCD 10 (31 January 2023)25 pages
- Kenya National Union of Nurses V County Government of Kisii Another (Petition E002of2025) 2025KEELRC429 (KLR) (19february2025) (Ruling)No ratings yetKenya National Union of Nurses V County Government of Kisii Another (Petition E002of2025) 2025KEELRC429 (KLR) (19february2025) (Ruling)5 pages
- Urgent Petition Against Police InactionNo ratings yetUrgent Petition Against Police Inaction165 pages
- Okiya Omtatah Okoiti V Attorney General Another 2013KEHC6170 (KLR)No ratings yetOkiya Omtatah Okoiti V Attorney General Another 2013KEHC6170 (KLR)2 pages
- Kajiado High Court Constitutional Petition No. E009 of 2023No ratings yetKajiado High Court Constitutional Petition No. E009 of 202345 pages
- Matindi & 3 Others V The National Assembly of Kenya & 4 Others Controller of Budget & 50 Others (Interested Parties) (2023) KEHC 19534 (KLR)No ratings yetMatindi & 3 Others V The National Assembly of Kenya & 4 Others Controller of Budget & 50 Others (Interested Parties) (2023) KEHC 19534 (KLR)64 pages
- Finance Act 2023 Judgment by The Court of AppealNo ratings yetFinance Act 2023 Judgment by The Court of Appeal120 pages
- Judgment SC Petition No. E008 of 2024 Charles Owino Likowa Vs Isaac Aluoch Polo Aluochier 3 OthersNo ratings yetJudgment SC Petition No. E008 of 2024 Charles Owino Likowa Vs Isaac Aluoch Polo Aluochier 3 Others45 pages
- Juliah Nyokabi and Others Kenya Presidential Election Petition 2022No ratings yetJuliah Nyokabi and Others Kenya Presidential Election Petition 202221 pages
- Ngoge Ta OP Ngoge Associates Advocates V Muiruri (Former Chief Magistrate) (Petition E035of2024) 2025KESC41 (KLR) (Appeals) (9june2025) (Ruling)No ratings yetNgoge Ta OP Ngoge Associates Advocates V Muiruri (Former Chief Magistrate) (Petition E035of2024) 2025KESC41 (KLR) (Appeals) (9june2025) (Ruling)4 pages
- SC Petition No. 2634 - 35 of 2019 Between Monica Wangu Wamwere and 5 Others Vs The Attorney GeneralNo ratings yetSC Petition No. 2634 - 35 of 2019 Between Monica Wangu Wamwere and 5 Others Vs The Attorney General45 pages
- Republic V Sam Nthenya, Chief Executive Officer, Nairobi Women's Hospital & Another Ex Parte Christine Nzula Commission On Administrative Justice (Interested Party) (2021) EKLRNo ratings yetRepublic V Sam Nthenya, Chief Executive Officer, Nairobi Women's Hospital & Another Ex Parte Christine Nzula Commission On Administrative Justice (Interested Party) (2021) EKLR13 pages
- Coram: Koome CJ & P, Mwilu DCJ & VP, Ibrahim, Wanjala, Njoki, Lenaola & Ouko, SCJJNo ratings yetCoram: Koome CJ & P, Mwilu DCJ & VP, Ibrahim, Wanjala, Njoki, Lenaola & Ouko, SCJJ270 pages
- Petition, NM Application & Supporting Affidavit-Isiolo County-02No ratings yetPetition, NM Application & Supporting Affidavit-Isiolo County-0239 pages
- Bull Dozer Justice Refer Material 25012025No ratings yetBull Dozer Justice Refer Material 2501202527 pages
- Judicial Service Commission V Speaker of The National Assembly & 8 Others (2014) eKLRNo ratings yetJudicial Service Commission V Speaker of The National Assembly & 8 Others (2014) eKLR50 pages
- Judicial Service Commission Another V LMN (Petition E040of2024) 2025KESC53 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (15august2025) (Judgment)No ratings yetJudicial Service Commission Another V LMN (Petition E040of2024) 2025KESC53 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (15august2025) (Judgment)17 pages
- Judgment SC Petition No. 19 E027 of 2021 Senate 3 Others vs. The Speaker of The National Assembly 10 Others 3No ratings yetJudgment SC Petition No. 19 E027 of 2021 Senate 3 Others vs. The Speaker of The National Assembly 10 Others 386 pages
- SC Petition Applic. No. 11 E008 of 2022 Hon. Mike Mbuvi Sonko vs. The Clerk County Assembly of Nairobi City 11 OthersNo ratings yetSC Petition Applic. No. 11 E008 of 2022 Hon. Mike Mbuvi Sonko vs. The Clerk County Assembly of Nairobi City 11 Others14 pages
- Gachagua V State Law Office 4 Others (Petition E565of2024) 2024KEHC12436 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (18october2024) (Order)No ratings yetGachagua V State Law Office 4 Others (Petition E565of2024) 2024KEHC12436 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (18october2024) (Order)2 pages
- Correction: Women's Unpaid Work in IndiaNo ratings yetCorrection: Women's Unpaid Work in India5 pages
- Folk Constitutionalism or Why It Matters How Ordinary People Think About The ConstitutionNo ratings yetFolk Constitutionalism or Why It Matters How Ordinary People Think About The Constitution31 pages
- JCPC 2022 0109 Judgment Updated 9be9085af5No ratings yetJCPC 2022 0109 Judgment Updated 9be9085af518 pages
- Lok Sabha Debate - 25 July 1966 - No Confidence Motion and Substantive BillsNo ratings yetLok Sabha Debate - 25 July 1966 - No Confidence Motion and Substantive Bills136 pages
- Abortion Access and The Benefits and Limitations of Abortion Permissive Legal Frameworks Lessons From The United KingdomNo ratings yetAbortion Access and The Benefits and Limitations of Abortion Permissive Legal Frameworks Lessons From The United Kingdom13 pages
- Raeesa Vakil - ICON Article About Admin Law and Constitutional Law ConfusionNo ratings yetRaeesa Vakil - ICON Article About Admin Law and Constitutional Law Confusion28 pages
- Revised Primer On Personnel Decorum (2024)100% (2)Revised Primer On Personnel Decorum (2024)100 pages
- 2017 Political and Public International Law Bar Questions and AnswersNo ratings yet2017 Political and Public International Law Bar Questions and Answers10 pages
- Crime and Omission - Command Responsibility From Manila To RomeNo ratings yetCrime and Omission - Command Responsibility From Manila To Rome18 pages
- Teaching IHL to Future Military LeadersNo ratings yetTeaching IHL to Future Military Leaders12 pages
- Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks: Warrior Creed100% (1)Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks: Warrior Creed142 pages
- 2017 Bar Examinations POLITICAL LAW Questions and Suggested Answers100% (3)2017 Bar Examinations POLITICAL LAW Questions and Suggested Answers15 pages
- 09 Rubrico V Macapagal-Arroyo GR No. 183871 Feb 18, 2010No ratings yet09 Rubrico V Macapagal-Arroyo GR No. 183871 Feb 18, 201051 pages
- All Groups Course Outline & Reading List GPR 3209 Humantarian LawNo ratings yetAll Groups Course Outline & Reading List GPR 3209 Humantarian Law20 pages
- Nuremberg Moot Court Competition (Defence Side)No ratings yetNuremberg Moot Court Competition (Defence Side)14 pages
- Unit III Lesson 7: Principles of OrganizationNo ratings yetUnit III Lesson 7: Principles of Organization4 pages
- Coc-Lea 1 Law Enforcement Organization and AdministrationNo ratings yetCoc-Lea 1 Law Enforcement Organization and Administration9 pages
