viii

HENRY OF GHENT ON
INDIVIDUATION, ESSENCE, AND BEING

Martin Pickavé

We commonly attribute two basic features to our everyday objects: on the

one hand, every such object is a singular, individual object, distinct from
every other thing; on the other hand, there is hardly an object that does
not—at least potentially—resemble something else. Even more, some
resemblances are so strong that we talk of things of the same kind. For
Henry of Ghent, these two features, sameness and individual difference,
are due to two different metaphysical principles. Things resemble each
other and belong to (natural) kinds because they have the same specific
form or nature and one thing differs from another through its individu-
ating principle.
In this contribution I will use Henry’s discussion of individuation as a
point of entry into his ontology. This may come as a surprise since there
does not seem to be a clear consensus among interpreters about what
exactly Henry’s account of individuation amounts to.1 In some sense
Henry himself can be regarded as the source of the confusion, for in
different texts he emphasizes different factors involved in individuation. I
shall try to show, however, that Henry does have a consistent account (I.).
Henry’s views about the relationship between the individuating principle
and that which it individuates will put the spotlight on the general
question of the extent to which individual objects can be considered as
ontological composites. I shall explore this question further by looking
at Henry’s arguments for why creatures can be considered as composites
of an essence and existence (II). As we will see, Henry not only defends
the somewhat traditional distinction between essence and existence, but
also distinguishes between essence and a special mode of being proper to

1 According to Stephen Brown, for instance, subsistence is Henry’s candidate for the

principle of individuation; for Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin it is a double negation.

See Stephen Brown, “Henry of Ghent,” in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle
Ages and the Counter-Reformation, –, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia (Albany, NY, ),
pp. –; Marie-Dominique Roland-Gosselin, Le ‘De ente et essentia’ de S. Thomas
d’Aquin (Paris, ), p. .

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essences themselves: the so-called being of essence (esse essentiae). After

we will consider what Henry has in mind by referring to the being of
essence or essential being (III.) I will turn to the question of why Henry
thought it necessary to introduce this special mode of being in the first
place (IV.). I will end with some general remarks about Henry’s ontology
and its reception (V.).
Henry developed his metaphysical views in debate with his contem-
poraries and defended his views against their criticism. It is therefore
almost impossible to write about Henry of Ghent without also writing
about Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines, among
others. His polemical exchanges with the latter two in the period around
Quodlibet X and Quodlibet XI (/) are notorious. Unfortunately,
I will have no space to explore these fierce debates in their own right. I
will only allude to them to the extent to which they help to clarify Henry’s
views. In any case, the criticism of his colleagues did not make Henry
change his mind.2

I. Individuation

Let’s start with a simple case: human beings. According to Henry, we

are human beings because each of us shares a specific form, i.e., the
form that accounts for the ‘humanness’ (humanitas) of that which it
informs.3 In this sense one can say that such a form is distributed or
divided among all the individual human beings. However, this form is

2 For Henry’s debate with Giles and Godfrey on being and essence see Jean Paulus,

“Les disputes d’Henri de Gand et de Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l’essence

et de l’existence,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge  (–
), pp. –; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines
(Washington, DC, ), pp. –; id., “The Relationship between Essence and Exis-
tence in Late Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey
of Fontaines, James of Viterbo,” in Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval, ed.
Parviz Morewedge (New York, ), pp. –; Concetta Luna, “Nouveaux textes
d’Henri de Gand, de Gilles de Rome et de Godefroid de Fontaines. Les questions du
manuscrit Bologne, Collegio di Spagna, . Contribution à l’étude des questions dis-
putées,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge  (), pp. –.
For their debate about individuation see my “The Controversy over the Principle of Indi-
viduation in Quodlibeta (-ca. ): A Forest Map,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the
Middle Ages, vol. II: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden, ),
pp. –, esp. –.
3 I use the term ‘specific form’ in its literal meaning as form that belongs to/is

constitutive of a species.

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fully in Plato, Socrates, you, me and every other human being; there
are no degrees of ‘humanness’. The form is not divided like a cake is
divided among the people eating it; in fact, the form enjoys a special
kind of unity that makes it impossible that it could be divided like a
cake at all. What it means to be human (i.e., to be rational, having a
body etc.) is indifferent to the fact that it might be instantiated in this or
that individual, but there are many distinct human beings. The upshot
of this is that specific forms cannot be divided into many individuals
by something intrinsic to the forms or by other substantial forms, for
this would ultimately mean that Socrates and Plato differ in humanity.
Such a form can only be divided per accidens, i.e., by something extrin-
sic or accidental to it. For this very reason we talk about individuation
of forms, and not about their division; individuation applies to some-
thing that, as the name indicates, is in itself indivisible. As we see, for
Henry the issue of individuation concerns primarily the multiplication
of forms.4
What is the feature extrinsic to forms and capable of multiplying them,
the “cause and reason of individuation” (causa et ratio individuationis)?
Although it must be something accidental, for it relates to forms merely
extrinsically, the principle of individuation is of course not an accident in
the proper sense of accident. Accidents are ontologically posterior to the
things in which they inhere. Hence, they cannot cause the individuality
of their underlying substances. Rather the opposite: accidents are indi-
viduated by their subjects and only render their subject’s individuality
manifest.5
At least in case of material objects, matter is often taken to be what
causes the multiplication of forms. Henry agrees with this, broadly speak-
ing, Aristotelian picture of individuation. What allows matter to individ-
uate forms is the fact that matter, before it receives a substantial form, first
receives the form of quantity and so has extension and dimensions. But in

4 For Henry’s explanation of the meaning of individuatio see Henry of Ghent, Quodli-

bet V, q. , ed. Badius (Paris, ; repr. Leuven, ), fol. vGH; id., Quodlibet II, q. ,
ed. Robert Wielockx (Leuven, ), p. . For the different meanings the term individ-
uatio can adopt in the late th and early th centuries see my “The Controversy over
the Principle of Individuation”. This article also contains a more detailed interpretation
of Henry’s teaching on individuation than the one proposed here. In particular, it also
reflects on Henry’s sources.
5 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rIK; see also id., Quodlibet II,

q. , ed. R. Wielockx, p. .

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virtue of being extended and having dimensions, matter is divisible into

many different parts, and thus capable of individuating the forms that
inform the bits of matter.6 Henry, however, opposes the tendency to gen-
eralize the individuation-by-matter view to such an extent that matter
is considered as the exclusive principle of individuation, a tendency he
attributes to the philosophers and the “philosophizers” (philosophantes),
i.e., to fellow theologians who slavishly follow Aristotle at all costs.7 His
point is that there also has to be an individuating principle for imma-
terial forms. For if matter is the only principle of individuation, then
it follows that non-material forms cannot be individuated at all. What
then accounts for the singularity of non-material substances? Nothing,
it seems. But since everything that exists, exists as something individ-
ual, forms of immaterial substances must then be individuals through
themselves and by their own nature. For Henry this amounts to saying
that immaterial substances exist through themselves, which would make
them into necessary beings.8
It is Henry’s considered opinion that “matter and quantity cannot
be called the precise reason (praecisa ratio) and cause of individuation
and of the distinction of individuals belonging to the same species,”
although matter and quantity are clearly causes in the individuation
of material things.9 That matter is not the precise reason and cause
of individuation can mean two things. Either it means that matter is
not the only principle and that there are other principles for different

6 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rvL. Here someone might object

that quantity is an accident and therefore, as was said earlier, unable to account for the
individuation of its subject, which is ontologically prior. Henry counters this with the dis-
tinction between determinate and indeterminate dimensions. The quantity that individu-
ates forms in matter simply gives extension and dimensions to matter, but not determinate
extension or dimensions. Understood in this sense, indeterminate dimensions are onto-
logically prior to the composite substance, whereas determinate dimensions are always
posterior. For the background of this distinction see Silvia Donati, “Materia e dimensioni
tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle dimensiones indeterminatae,” Quaestio  (),
pp. –.
7 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. , ed. R. Wielockx, p. . For this expres-

sion see Etienne Gilson, “Les ‘philosophantes’,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire
du moyen âge  (), pp. –; Pierre Michaud-Quantin, “Pour le dossier des
‘Philosophantes’,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen âge  (), pp. –
.
8 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. , ed. R. Wielockx, p. ; id., Quodlibet V, q. , ed.

Badius, fol. vM.

9 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. , ed. R. Wielockx, p. ; id., Quodlibet V, q. , ed.

Badius, fol. vL.

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kinds of beings; or it means that even in the case of material beings, it

is not completely adequate to call matter the principle of individuation.
Henry obviously endorses the second alternative, yet, so he assures his
readers, once we have discovered the “precise and proximate cause of
individuation”, we will also see why it is true that material forms are
individuated by matter.
At this point we need to step back for a moment. I started by pointing
out that for Henry every created thing has one distinct metaphysical
element in virtue of which it resembles other objects and falls under a
natural kind (or species) and another element in virtue of which it is
a singular, individual object. The second element thus determines and
limits the first element. In line with this general picture, Henry often
refers to created things as ‘supposits’, which consist of a nature (or form or
essence—in our context Henry uses these terms often interchangeably)
and something that limits the nature and makes the whole into this or
that supposit.10 From this point of view the individuating principle is
simply what determines the nature and therefore accounts for the ratio
suppositi. The question can thus be rephrased: What exactly confers the
ratio suppositi?
Whatever it is that confers the ratio suppositi, it seems to be an intrin-
sic feature of the supposit. This does not rule out that there also can
be extrinsic causes of individuation (and of the supposit). The agent,
for instance, that causes an individual/supposit to exist, can thus also
be called an individuating principle; especially since every real action
happens with regard to singulars. This explains why Henry sometimes
refers to God as the principle of individuation, for God is the first effi-
cient cause.11 In comparison with the role of the agent, it becomes clear
that matter too functions for Henry as an extrinsic cause of the supposit
and thus of individuation. This explains why matter cannot be the precise

10 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fols. v–rM. The expression

‘supposit’ has its origin in discussions on the nature of Christ. In the vocabulary of
medieval theologians, Christ has two natures (divine and human) in one supposit. On
Henry’s understanding of suppositum see Gordon Wilson, “Supposite in the Philosophy
of Henry of Ghent,” in Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on
the Occasion of the th Anniversary of his Death (), ed. Willy Vanhamel (Leuven,
), pp. –. Wilson also discusses Quodlibet V, q.  at some length at pp. –
.
11 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rV. See also id., Quodlibet III,

q. , ed. Badius, fol. vL. For God as the ultimate causa individuationis see id., Quodli-
bet II, q. , ed. Wielockx, p. .

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cause of individuation even for material things.12 The internal or formal

principle, the principle that makes a supposit into a supposit, is the
precise or proximate cause.13
Henry presents two accounts of the “precise cause” of individuation. In
Quodlibet II, q. , he refers to subsistence (subsistentia) as that principle
determining the form and constituting a supposit. Two objects of the
same species are distinct from each other, because the subsistence of the
one is not the subsistence of the other.14 Although he leaves open what he
exactly means by ‘subsistence’,15 it looks as if this candidate for a principle
of individuation matches all of the criteria that turned out to be essential
for a principle of individuation. Subsistence is not limited to material
beings, it also accounts for the individuation of immaterial substances.
Although subsistence is something exterior to the form and can therefore
be called an accident in a broad sense, the argument demonstrating that
a real accident cannot individuate a substance does not apply.
If the second Quodlibet offers what one could call a positive account of
the principle of individuation, Henry’s fifth Quodlibet provides a negative
one. In the latter text Henry argues in favor of a double negation as
the principle of individuation. He begins by asking himself whether
the feature individuating a form and establishing a supposit can be
something positive and absolute (aliquid positivum et absolutum) in itself.
This, however, seems impossible, for as a complete being this positive
and absolute item must itself be a supposit and one can ask of it too
which positive item caused it to be a supposit. And so we run into an

12 Henry must have in mind here what his contemporaries refer to as “designated

matter” (materia designata).

13 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rM: “Sed quid est in

supposito super formam quo habet esse hoc et quo per ipsam formam habet esse hoc,
quia est huius? Dico aliquid praeter materiam et praeter agens quod est quasi dispositio
suppositi inquantum suppositum est, quod non potest esse materia nec agens. Haec enim
dispositio derelicta est circa formam in supposito et facit suppositum esse suppositum,
ut habens formam et rationem compositionis ex forma et ratione determinationis in
ipsa. Hoc enim viso videbitur ratio suppositi et individuationis proxima et quid est quod
suppositum formaliter faciat in creaturis.” See also id., Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius,
fol. rV.
14 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. , ed. R. Wielockx, p. , –: “Et sic non est

dicendum quod hoc solo differunt quia natura unius non est natura alterius—eadem,
dico, secundum numerum—, sed quia subsistentia unius non est subsistentia alterius,
quae facit differre essentiam ut est in uno ab ipsa ut est in altero . . . Ipsa enim subsistentia
in supposito omnino necessaria est ad essentiae existentiam actualem, tam in uno quam
in altero, non secundum idem numero, sed secundum aliud et aliud numero, consimile
tamen specie.”
15 On the meaning of the term ‘subsistence’ see below p. .

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 henry of ghent on individuation, essence, and being 

infinite regress. But since that is impossible, then the individuating ele-
ment must be either something negative or a positive relation. The latter
can be ruled out right away. For a relation is grounded in some really
existing thing, i.e., in a thing that is already a complete supposit. Thus,
there remains only something negative, a negation, and so Henry con-
cludes that individuation happens by a negation. He explains the nature
of this negation in the following terms:
This negation is not a simple one, but a double negation. For it removes
from the inside any possibility for plurification and diversity and removes
from the outside any identity, so that in this way the form is called this
form, because it is only this form, not having inside of it the possibility to
be this and another one, a possibility possessed by the form of a species.
And moreover, it is only this form because it is not the form of other things
of the same species.
Henry goes on to calls such a double negation the principle that individ-
uates essences and that establishes a supposit.16
John Duns Scotus had the negative account of individuation in mind
when he objected to Henry that a merely negative principle could never
cause individuation, because it could not cause anything at all.17 How-
ever, it should be clear that the negative account is only one side of the
coin, and the positive account, according to which subsistence individu-
ates, is the other side of the same coin. Modern interpreters too are often
unaware of this, but Henry explains the relationship himself. In Quodli-
bet XI, q.  he concludes his discussion of the individuation of angels with
the following remark:
And in this way the positive individuation of the form takes place effec-
tively only through the producing agent and formally only through this
being [i.e., the being proper to the supposit]. But I have explained some-
where else how individuation happens to take place negatively.18
Notice that Henry here describes the subsistence (through which a
form has being in a supposit) as that which “formally” causes the indi-
viduation of a form.19 This does not mean that subsistence is a form,
but that among all the causes involved in individuation (such as the

16 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rM. See also id., Quaestiones

ordinariae (Summa), art. XXXIX, q.  ad , ed. Gordon Wilson (Leuven, ), pp. –
.
17 See, e.g., Ordinatio II, dist. , p. , q. , nn. –, Opera omnia VII, ed. Vaticana

(Vatican City, ), pp. –.

18 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rV.
19 See also the texts in above in nt. .

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agent, matter etc.) subsistence plays a role similar to that of a form.20

But the main point of the passage is that both accounts of individua-
tion, the positive and the negative, are supposed to complement each
other.21
This leaves us with a puzzle: How can a negation be also a positive
principle? In other words: Are these two accounts really compatible? It
is important to keep in mind that Henry’s reference to a double negation
does not mean that individuation is not caused by some metaphysically
robust principle. What brings about that a nature or form is individuated
is not identical with that very form or nature and it is not something that
differs from the form only to the extent that we have different concepts of
it and the form. On the other hand, the individuating principle cannot, as
we saw, be some added thing in the proper meaning of ‘thing’, i.e., some-
thing positive and complete. Henry holds that there is something half-
way between the Scylla of a real addition and the Charybdis of a merely
conceptual addition, something that accounts for a robust metaphysical
composition or distinction without turning the composite into a com-
posite of two things: it is the composite that results when an “intention”
(intentio) is added to something else. On this picture subsistence adds
to a form or nature merely an “intention”, so that form or nature differ
from the individuating factor “intentionally”, i.e., by an “intentional dif-
ference”.22 Now, because the individuating principle is not another thing
and because it therefore does not itself have a distinct nature, it is hard to
grasp it in positive terms. It can best be grasped by reference to what
it does, namely to determine the form or nature. It is presumably for
this reason that Henry talks about a double negation as the individuat-
ing principle. For according to our human capacities we best grasp this
principle as something that manifests itself in a double negation.23

20 The idea to analyse individuation in terms of the four causes was quite common in
the late th century and it seems to have become even more common after Henry of
Ghent. See my article “The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation.”
21 In Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXXIX, q.  ad , ed. G. Wilson, pp. –

, Henry seems to anticipate Scotus’s objection. But there he simply refers to the
(extrinsic) agent as the positive thing effectively causing the individuation of a universal
essence.
22 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. , ed. R. Wielockx, pp. – and –; id.,

Quodlibet III, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vL.

23 This explanation is influenced by Henry’s general remarks about unity. According

to Henry, we grasp and define unity in terms of a negation: one is what is not divided
in itself. But in reality unity is something positive. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones

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 henry of ghent on individuation, essence, and being 

In summary it is worth pointing out that on Henry’s account vari-

ous causes are involved in individuation and that subsistence is only one
of them, although arguably the most important one. This is important,
for otherwise Henry would be open to criticism of the following sort:
It looks as if subsistence is always the subsistence of essences and there
are no independent ‘subsistences’. Subsistence (like existence) is there-
fore incapable of individuating forms or essences, because it depends on
them ontologically.24 Henry would not have found this objection very
troublesome, since for him it assumes a series of questionable premises.
The most salient is that it seems to assume that subsistence was pro-
posed as an efficient cause of individuation, and for Henry it is obvious
that subsistence cannot be—and does not have to be—such an efficient
cause.

II. Essence and Existence

Henry’s treatment of individuation makes clear that he considers all cre-

ated things as metaphysical composites of some sort, as composites not
of two real things, but rather of items that differ only intentionally. What
this means and what he means by subsistence will become more clear if
we look at another way in which creatures are composites, according to
Henry of Ghent, namely if we look at the difference between essence and
existence.25

ordinariae (Summa), art. XXV, q. , ed. Badius (Paris, ; repr. St. Bonaventure, NY,
), fol. vE. For Henry’s views about (transcendental) unity see my Heinrich von
Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem
letzten Viertel des . Jahrhunderts (Leiden, ), pp. –.
24 This sort of criticism was put forward by Thomas Sutton. See his Quaestiones ordi-

nariae, q. , ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich, ), pp. –. See also Gyula Klima,
“Thomas Sutton on Individuation,” Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Meta-
physics [http://faculty.fordham.edu/hlima/SMLM/PSMLMS.pdf]  (), pp. –.
25 For some of following see my Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, chapter IV. A sur-

vey of the debate about the distinction between essence and existence (and its sources)
can be found in John Wippel, “Essence and Existence,” in The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasti-
cism –, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, ), pp. –. Henry’s
ontology is also discussed in a series of older studies: see Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand.
Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique (Paris, ); Paul Bayerschmidt, Die Seins-
und Formmetaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Christologie: eine
philosophie- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie (Münster, ); José Gómez Caffarena, Ser
participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante (Rome, ).

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For Henry, every single existing thing has an essence, which deter-
mines what it is, and also has existence. Obviously there must be a dis-
tinction of some sort between the two. If my actual existence were iden-
tical with or part of my essence, then my existence would be necessary.
My existence would be part of my essence in the same way in which
the sum of angles equal to two right angles is part of the essence of
triangle. But that is obviously not the case, for it is clearly possible for
me not to exist. If, however, there is a difference between actual exis-
tence and the essence of an object, how can we best capture this differ-
ence?
Maybe essence and actual existence differ in the way two things (res)
differ. Henry, who accuses Thomas Aquinas of holding such a position
about the relationship between essence and existence,26 opposes this view
strongly. But rather than Thomas Aquinas, it was Giles of Rome’s recent
defense of the so-called real distinction between essence and existence
that prompted Henry to take a position on this issue in his first Quodlibet.
Henry uses four main arguments against the real distinction. The first
argument points out that if essence and existence were two things, then
every creature or contingent being would be a real composite of two
things and could never really be one substance (i.e., a true ens per se). The
second and third of Henry’s standard arguments ask what kind of thing
this added existence could be. Presumably the thing ‘existence’ would
itself be something created. But if that were so, then this existence would
have its own existence from something else. For it seems to be a feature of
creatures that they do not have their existence from themselves but from
their creator. But then we have to ask the same question about this other
existence. This leads to an infinite regress unless we stop at one existence
which has its being from itself. Yet there seems to be no good reason why
a particular created being should have its existence from itself and why
this should not have applied to the essence from which we started. The
third argument asks even more specifically: Of what sort is the added
thing ‘existence’. Is it a substance or an accident? Henry then goes on

26 See Henry’s remarks in Quodlibet I, q. , ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, ), p. ,

where he blames certain theologians (theologi) for not spotting the apparent falsity of
this view. The direct quotations from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae in other parts of the
quodlibetal question (see pp. –) leave no doubt that Henry has Aquinas in mind.
According to Edgar Hocedez, Henry is here mainly targeting Giles of Rome’s teaching; see
Edgar Hocedez, “Le premier quodlibet d’Henri de Gand (),” Gregorianum  (),
pp. –.

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at length to show that neither alternative will do.27 Moreover, fourth, if

essence and existence are both different things (res) on their own, then
it looks as if an essence has some kind of existence on its own before it
receives as a subject its existence. For only to something that is can we
add something else. Yet proponents of the real distinction introduce it
for the very reason that they do not believe that an essence has existence
on its own. But now it seems as if their own view forces them to accept a
version of the view that they intend to refute.28
It follows that for Henry an object’s essence is to a certain degree
the same thing as the object’s actual existence. Does this mean that the
distinction between being and essence is merely conceptual? But that will
not do either. For then it would follow that my existence is really identical
with or is a part of my essence, although I do not grasp them by the
same concept. It is hard to see how such a view could avoid making my
existence necessary.29 As in the case of individuation, Henry concludes
that there must be an intermediary distinction between a real and a
merely conceptual distinction and that this distinction applies to the
relationship between existence and essence, an “intentional distinction”.
In other words: the addition of existence to essence is an instance of an
intentional addition.30
Keep in mind that existence is strictly speaking the actuality of the
essence, as the use of knowledge in contemplation is the actuality of the
knowledge. There is no existence except the existence of things with a

27 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –. Henry repeats some of
these arguments in Quodlibet X, q. , ed. Raymond Macken, (Leuven, ), pp. –.
The second argument can also be found in Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXVII,
q. , ed. Badius, fol. vM. For an ‘Averroistic’ background of Henry’s arguments argues
Ruedi Imbach, “Averroistische Stellungnahmen zur Diskussion über das Verhältnis von
esse und essentia: von Siger von Brabant zu Thaddaeus von Parma,” in Studi sul XIV secolo
in memoria di Anneliese Maier, ed. Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani
(Rome, ), pp. – at –.
28 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –. In other words:

For Henry the proponents of the real distinction have a misguided understanding of
what participation in being (and therefore creation) amounts to. For other passages in
which Henry accuses proponents of the real distinction of a mistaken understanding of
participation see ibid., pp. –; id., Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –; id.,
Quodlibet XI, q. . For another error allegedly committed by them see id., Quaestiones
ordinariae (Summa), art. XXIX, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rF.
29 For Henry this amounts to making creatures into necessary beings like God. See

Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. .

30 See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –; id., Quodli-

bet X, q. , ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, ), p. . In this last text Henry writes
that he is not picky about what this distinction (or addition) is called.

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nature or essence, just as there is no active contemplation (e.g., instances

of actually ‘doing’ mathematics) without knowledge (e.g., without having
mathematical knowledge). Existence is not independent of the essence,
but it is something over and above the essence.31 However, and this is
precisely Henry’s point, there is a difference between this close relation-
ship between essence and existence on the one side and the relationship
that applies between two real things on the other.
Many of Henry’s contemporaries objected to Henry’s idea of an inten-
tional distinction. One of his most vociferous critics was Giles of Rome
who discussed Henry’s ontology in a series of works. In q.  of his Ques-
tions on being and essence, Giles declares that the intentional distinc-
tion is simply unintelligible, insisting that things are either really distinct
or merely conceptually distinct.32 In Quodlibet X, q. , Henry replies to
Giles’s objection by analyzing three examples of distinctness.33 The first
examples is the distinction between a rational animal and a human being,
a case of a merely conceptual distinction, for a rational animal is nothing
else than a human being. Here we refer to the same reality by two different
concepts, and that is the only distinction there is. Henry also adds a more
technical characterization of the conceptual or rational distinction: this
distinction applies when one of the items of the distinction is incompati-
ble with the negation of the other and vice versa. In our case: it is impos-
sible that a human being is not a rational animal and vice versa. Rational
and white are Henry’s examples for the real distinction. If something is
both rational and white it is a real composite, and consequently the two
features are really distinct. The difference from the rational distinction
is obvious, for it is possible that something is rational but not white and
vice versa. Now look at the difference between a genus and its difference,
say animal and rational. A rational animal, i.e., a human being, is not a
composite of two independent things (say, two substances), one being
‘animality’ and the other ‘rationality’, nor is what is rational only concep-

31 See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius,
fol. vP. In this passage, as in many others, Henry explains the relationship between
essence and existence by using the example of light (lux) and the act of shining (lucere)
or life (vita) and living (vivere). There is no act of living without life and no actual shining
without light. However, life is not strictly speaking the same as the act of living. One can
observe this in the way we speak: for if they were strictly identical it would be true to say
‘life is the act of living’ or ‘light is the act of shining’, which is not true. For these examples
see also ibid., fol. rTV and Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. .
32 Quaestiones de esse et essentia, q.  (ed. Venice, ), fol. va.
33 For the following see Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –.

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tually distinct from an animal. There are many animals that are not ratio-
nal. That this case is different from the other two can also be gathered
from the fact that it is certainly possible that an animal is not rational,
whereas it is impossible for something rational not to be an animal.34
Henry is convinced that the previous examples are strong evidence of
the need for an intermediary distinction, but I doubt his opponents were
much impressed. After all, a genus does not really exist without a specific
difference, so it is not clear what the example is supposed to show.35 But
Henry’s general point is less opaque than it seems. His point is only that
some items, when added to something, simply add something else (as
an accident adds to a substance), but that other items do not really add
anything but rather contract that to which they are added. To make this
clear is the primary goal of the example of genus and difference. In the
same way, existence contracts the essence, i.e., makes it an essence that
exists at a certain time and place.
The comparison between Giles of Rome, a defender of the real dis-
tinction between being and essence, and Henry makes clear that Henry
has a very strict understanding of what a thing (res) is supposed to
be. A thing is “whatever is a nature or some absolute essence having
an exemplary reason in God.”36 Hence it is obvious why being is not a
thing different from the essence. Being itself does not have an essence
or a corresponding divine idea. Being is simply the act of an essence.
But what does count as a true thing (res)? Henry’s teaching on divine
ideas provides us with some cues. For Henry there are divine ideas
only of species and moreover only of species of substances, quanti-
ties, and qualities. Genera, numbers, relations, fictitious beings etc. have
no corresponding ideas in the divine mind.37 The fact that he denies

34 Henry’s three examples are influenced by a similar distinction that we can find in
Thomas Aquinas’s Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. , a. . For this background see
my Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, pp. –. After Henry’s response to Giles in
Quodlibet X, q. , Giles responded to Henry with questions  and  of the Quaestiones
de esse et essentia. Here again he accuses Henry of proposing an unintelligible distinction.
A short time after (in ), Henry replied in his eleventh Quodlibet (q. , ed. Badius,
fol. vR–rX), accusing Giles of misunderstanding the nature of the intentional
distinction by failing to see that it is a distinction sui generis.
35 As we will see later, Henry himself holds that a genus does not have real existence

outside the soul (unlike species). See below p. .

36 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rK. For Henry’s understanding

of res see also my Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, chapter IV.
37 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VII, qq.  + , ed. G. Wilson (Leuven, ), p. ,–

. For this text see Theo Kobusch, “Heinrich von Gent und die neuplatonische Ideen-
lehre,” in Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale, ed. Leo Benakis (Turnhout, ),
pp. – at –.

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relations the status of a thing, because they do not correspond to an

idea in the divine mind, is revealing. For relations, say the relation of
similitude between me and my next door neighbor, can apparently be
real without being things (res). In other words: not everything that is real
is a thing (res). The intentional distinction is in this sense real (as opposed
to merely mind-dependent) without being real as a distinction between
two things.38
It remains, however, to be seen how the distinction between essence
and existence relates to the distinction between form or nature and sub-
sistence. On the surface the two distinctions seem to refer to different
things. We cannot assume, for instance, that a form is identical with an
essence. This might be true for immaterial beings, but in material beings
it is not the case. The essence of human being is not constituted by the
soul alone but also involves the body.39 Henry, however, has no scruples
switching back and forth between form and essence when he discusses
individuation. Maybe it is not the form alone that makes up the essence of
a material object, but when a form is received in the appropriate matter,
it is the form that finally gives the object its actual essence. In this respect
the individuation of forms is identical with the individuation of essences.
That form and essence are used almost interchangeably in Henry’s dis-
cussion of individuation can also be gathered from his arguments for the
unity of forms and for the accidentality of the principle of individuation,
arguments that borrow heavily from Avicenna’s theory of essence.40
So maybe these two distinctions actually amount to the same thing.
After all we are told that in both cases the elements involved differ
‘intentionally’. Moreover, there is an obvious connection between the
arguments against a real distinction between essence and existence and
the arguments establishing that the intrinsic principle of individuation is
not an added thing.41 And Henry himself says that we find a supposit

38 According to Henry, the mistake of the proponents of the real distinction (like Giles
of Rome) is that they do not see this difference and that they think everything that is not
distinct from something else by a real difference is strictly identical with it. See Henry of
Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rQ.
39 See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. .
40 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rE–F.
41 Compare also the third argument against the real addition of existence (see above

nt. ) and the argument in Quodlibet II, q.  ad , ed. R. Wielockx, pp. –. Henry
argues in the first instance that existence cannot be a thing because it does not fall under
any of the ten categories (which he apparently considers as an exhaustive classification
of things); in the second case he uses this same line of thought to show that that which
causes something to be an individual form cannot be a thing.

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when it is caused to exist in actuality. Moreover, for many medieval

authors the term ‘subsistence’ denotes simply the act of existence proper
to substances.42 But despite all this, Henry seems to draw a distinction
between actual existence and subsistence. Describing the relationship
between essence and actual existence he writes the following:
All other conditions [of the essence] are somewhat accidental to it [i.e., the
essence]. And of such a sort are being in the soul or in the intellect as in
a cognizer (ut in cognoscente) and being in a supposit existing outside the
soul as in something subsisting (ut in subsistente). To this latter thing not
only belongs (accidit) being of existence (esse existentiae), which it has in
the supposit existing outside the soul, but to it also belongs in a certain way
being in a supposit (esse in supposito).43
This passage is a good example of Henry’s endorsement of Avicenna’s
theory of essence. An essence, such as ‘humanness’ or ‘horseness’, is itself
indifferent to existing in the mind or existing outside the mind, or to
existing in a singular or being a universal etc. All these conditions are
simply outside the essence of a human being or the essence of a horse.44
What is important for our purposes, however, is that in the passage above
Henry separates the condition of being in a supposit from the condition
of actual existence. This would be surprising if he considers them as one
and the same. Moreover, in some of the texts in which Henry defends the
indifference of essences with respect to their subsequent conditions, he
explicitly speaks about a twofold indifference (duplex indifferentia): one
with respect to actual existence or non-existence, another with respect
to existence as singular or as universal. Again, it would be hard to
understand this if existence is the same as subsistence in a supposit.45

42 This is, for instance, what Godfrey of Fontaines takes subsistence to be (according

to John Wippel). See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, p. .
43 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vQ. See also Quodlibet II, q. ,

ed. R. Wielockx, p. , where Henry distinguishes subsistentia in supposito and existentia
essentiae by explaining that the former is a necessary requirement for the later.
44 See also Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet III, q. . On Avicenna’s influence on Henry’s

understanding of essences see Pasquale Porro, “Universaux et esse essentiae: Avicenne,

Henri de Gand et le ‘Troisième Reich’,” Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen –
 (), pp. –.
45 See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. , ed. R. Wielockx, p. , –: “Quantum

est ex ratione essentiae ut est essentia absolute, duplex est in ea indifferentia. Uno enim
modo indifferens est ad esse actualis existentiae et ad non esse . . . alio vero modo est
indifferens ad esse universale et particulare.” For the distinction between subsistence and
existence see also Walter Hoeres, “Wesen und Dasein bei Heinrich von Gent und Duns
Scotus,” Franziskanische Studien  (), pp. – at .

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So it is incorrect to say that for Henry individual things (and their

forms) are individuated by their existence, although the actual existence
outside the soul is intimately related to subsistence in a supposit. In the
context of the quoted passage, Henry does not tell his readers why he is
so keen on separating subsistence and (actual) existence. But the reason
may simply be this: If objects are individual supposits only through their
existence, what about individuals that no longer exist? What about the
dead Plato or Socrates? In a certain sense they are still individuals (and
supposits), but individuals that do not have actual existence anymore.

III. Further Complications: Two Kinds of Being

Henry is famous not only for defending an intentional distinction be-

tween essence and existence, but is equally notorious for distinguishing
two kinds of being: being of actual existence (esse actualis existentiae)
and being of essence (esse essentiae).46 Distinguishing an object’s essence
from its existence might be a good thing to highlight the contingency of
objects, but why does there have to be yet another kind of being? Does
the talk of an essential being or being of essence not reintroduce the very
reification of essences that the intentional distinction was meant to avoid?
Here is how Henry presents the two kinds of being in Quodlibet I, q. :
The first being belongs essentially (essentialiter) to the essence of a creature,
though by way of participation (participative), insofar as the essence has a
formal exemplar in God. And through this it falls under that being which
is essentially common to the ten categories . . . And this kind of being is the
being belonging to the definition of a thing (esse rei definitivum) . . . The
second being is such that a creature does not have it from its own essence,
but only from God, insofar as the creature is an effect of the divine will
according to the exemplar of the thing in the divine mind.47

46 Although this is sometimes claimed in the secondary literature on Henry of Ghent,

Henry is by no means the first to use the expression esse essentiae. It can already be found
in Roger Bacon’s questions on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. See Questiones supra libros prime
philosophie Aristotelis, lib. VII, ed. Robert Steele (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi X,
Oxford, ), p. ; Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie, lib. II, ed. Robert
Steele (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi XI, Oxford, ), p. . The history of this
expression has still to be written.
47 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –. For the distinction

between esse essentiae and esse existentiae see also id., Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa),

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 henry of ghent on individuation, essence, and being 

What is important in this passage is the contrast between these two

kinds of being: actual existence is something extrinsic to the essence
of an object, something an object receives from its efficient cause (and
ultimately from God as the first efficient cause), whereas the essential
being is intrinsic to it. The origin of both kinds of being is in God, but
the essential being is more immediately connected with the essence than
is actual existence. This difference further highlights the accidentality of
existence. But if actual existence is somewhat accidental, then it cannot
be the object of any scientific knowledge. For knowledge is primarily
concerned with what is essential to the object known.48 This puts some
new light on the dictum that knowledge is primarily of essences.
Other texts are even more explicit on the relations to God involved in
the two kinds of being. In the third Quodlibet, Henry writes the following
as a further clarification of essential being:
Such a being does not belong to anything unless there is an exemplary
reason (ratio exemplaris) of it in the divine intellect through which it is
capable of existing in extra-mental reality, so that as a thing has from a
relation and respect (ex relatione et respectu) to the plan of God as to the
efficient cause that it is a being in effect (ens in effectu), so it has from a
relation and respect to the plan of God as to the exemplary form that it is
a being by essence (ens per essentiam).49
One has to be careful here to avoid misunderstanding. Neither existence
nor essential being is a relation itself.50 And when it is said that both
forms of being result from a relation to the first cause, this should not be

art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vK; ibid., q. , fol. rE–vG; ibid., q. , fol. rO–vR; id.,
Quodlibet III, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vE; id., Quodlibet III, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rO; id.,
Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. , and many other texts.
48 For the accidentality of actual existence see, for instance, Henry of Ghent, Quod-

libet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. ; id., Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. ; id.,
Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rvQ. For the view that esse existentiae is not the
object of knowledge see Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXVI, q. , ed. Badius,
fol. rD. Henry does of course not claim that actual existence is an accidens—this would
be at odds with his rejection of the real distinction—but only that it behaves “in the way
of an accidens” (modum accidentis).
49 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet III, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rO. The edition has ad formam

extra rem, but that is almost certainly a misreading of formam exemplarem.

50 There are occasional passages in Henry’s writing that seem to show that he takes

being itself to be a relation. See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae
(Summa), art. XXVII, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vM: “Esse existentiae cuiuslibet creaturae
non sit nisi esse quod est ad aliud se habere.” However, this means only that existence is
related to something else, but not that existence is a relation. For otherwise Henry should
rather have said that existence non sit nisi ad aliud esse. For Henry’s theory of relations

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understood in the sense that there is one relatum, the creature, and the
other, God, and by means of the relations existing between them, the first
receives being. This would make the creatures somewhat independent of
the relation to God; but the creatures exist only as a result of the divine
production, namely as the endpoint (terminus) of such a production.
Thus without the relation existing in the first place there is nothing that
could be related to God at all. The talk about being resulting from a
relation to God simply means that creatures are dependent on their first
cause because they are caused by God insofar as God is their formal
and efficient cause. However, the two relations according to which the
creatures are related to the first cause are not only distinct with respect
to what they refer in God and to what they cause in the creatures,
they also differ from each other insofar as the relation to God’s ideas is
eternal, whereas the relation to God as the first efficient cause is only
temporal.51
As was already said, we should not imagine that there really exists
a set of essences of which some have essential being and some also
existential being, depending on their relation to God. In many places
Henry make clear that he considers it wrong to think that essences are
something absolutely prior in reality and that they receive, as subjects,
being of whatever kind.52 This picture has only heuristic value; it follows
our human way of capturing the ontological structure of a creature,
for we first think of a thing’s essence and then of its various modes
of being.53 Keeping this in mind, the reference to the formal exemplar
in God, the divine ideas, indicates that one of the roles of essential
being is to demarcate those essences that can possibly exist from those

see Mark G. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories – (Oxford, ), pp. –
; Jos Decorte, “Relation and Substance in Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysics,” in Henry of
Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought, ed. Guy Guldentops and Carlos Steel
(Leuven, ), pp. –, and Decorte’s publications mentioned below in nt. .
51 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius, fol.

rS; id., Quodlibet XI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rG.

52 See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. – and , where

he denounces the proponents of the real distinction for committing this mistake.
53 Similarly, I consider the many passages where Henry analyses creatures starting

from the notion of res as passages aimed at a structural analysis of the different ontological
features of creatures. See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rD;
id., Quodlibet VII, qq.  + , ed. G. Wilson, pp. ,–,; id., Quaestiones ordinariae
(Summa), art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vK; id., Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa),
art. XXXIV, q. , ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, ), p. . On these passages see
my Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, pp. – and –.

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that cannot exist and are pure figments of the mind.54 Presumably the
essences of goat-stags and unicorns—if it is even correct to talk about
essences here—have no essential being. For this would indicate that goat-
stags and unicorns are not only producible in principle (because they
do not involve a contradiction), but also actually producible, because
God would have decided that the actual world is a world in which goat-
stags and unicorns can exist. The reference to God may sound odd here.
Imagine that someone asks “Why do these animals exist in our present
world and not those?”, and someone else responds “Because only the first
have a corresponding idea in God.” Not everyone will be happy with
such an answer and many people will wonder whether this counts as
an answer at all. But that seems to be exactly Henry’s point: for things
that involve no contradiction in themselves we cannot give a reason why
they rather than other things have the capacity to exist, because that
depends entirely on God, and is therefore unknowable to us in this life.
This does not mean that it is up to God’s free will which essences the
world exhibits and which not. For Henry, creatures and their essences
are likenesses of God, and so are determined by God.55 However, in our
present state we have no cognitive access to God except by means of
the created essences themselves. And this process of gaining knowledge
of the divine will never lead us to a non-circular criterion for possible
essences.56

54 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. ,–,: “Est

autem ista participatio divini esse in essentia, esse essentiae, in quantum essentia illa
exemplatum est divini esse secundum rationem causae formalis, quia per ipsum esse
essentiae ut per actum sibi proprium essentialem habet id quod res est ex ratione sui
generis, quod sit ens et natura et essentia proprie dicta, non solum figmentum.”
55 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. – and id., Quodlibet X,

q. , ed. R. Macken, p. , where Henry makes the distinction between the esse essentiae
as based on the creatures’ imitational similitude with the divine essence and the esse
existentiae as grounded in God’s will. Notice that there is no contradiction involved when
Henry sometimes says that esse essentiae derives from a relation to the ideas in God and
sometimes claims that creatures and their essences are likenesses of God (or the divine
essence). The ideas in God are nothing else than the divine essence under the aspect of its
imitability. See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, q. , ed. Raymond Macken (Leuven, ),
pp. –.
56 For a more detailed account of Henry’s teaching on possibilia see Pasquale Porro,

“Possibilità ed esse essentia in Enrico di Gand,” in Henry of Ghent, ed. W. Vanhamel,

pp. – at –; John F. Wippel, “The Existence of Nonexisting Possibilities
According to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” Review of
Metaphysics  (), pp. –. It is necessary to add that Henry distinguishes here
between two kinds of possibility: essences are possible not because they can receive

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But at this point one might reiterate the question regarding the rela-
tionship between being and essences on the level of essences themselves:
how do essences differ from essential being? It is hard to imagine that
there could be a difference at all: Is it not through the same relationship
to a divine idea that something is an essence and has essential being? In
some texts, Henry therefore states that essence and essential being dif-
fer only rationally (sola ratione). The being of essence (esse essentiae) is
so intimately connected to the essence itself that there is no more robust
distinction possible.57 But in Summa art. XXI, q. , Henry seems to be
of a different opinion. There he explicitly speaks of an intentional dis-
tinction between essence and essential being.58 Scholars have tried to
explain this discrepancy by assuming a change of mind on Henry’s part,59
but for two reasons that is not entirely convincing. First, Henry goes
on to describe the relationship between essence and essential being as
a rational distinction even after the question in the Summa.60 Second,
article XXI, q.  of the Summa is written in close temporal proximity to
the first Quodlibet and is full of cross-references to q.  of the latter, in
which he defends the rational distinction between essence and essential
being. The puzzle disappears when we become aware of the two different
ways in which Henry uses the term ‘essence’ in these two sorts of texts.
In the Quodlibet and texts emphasizing the rational distinction, ‘essence’
is taken to signify the essence as a whole including its essential being.
A real essence, i.e., an essence that falls under one of the ten categories
and that can really exist because it corresponds to a divine idea, is not
distinct from its essential being. It is only conceptually distinguishable.
But if we use ‘essence’ not to denote the essence as a whole but to denote
the “thingness” (res) or “content” to which an idea may or may not cor-
respond in the divine mind, then such an essence only forms part of a
real essence as a whole. Here, essential being and the essence it qualifies

a form (for instance, a form that makes them actually existing), but rather insofar as they
can be the endpoint of a (possible) production. For this distinction see especially Henry
of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken, pp. –.
57 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. .
58 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius, fol.

vQ.
59 See, e.g., Gómez Caffarena, Ser participado y ser subsistente, pp. –; Porro,

“Possibilità ed esse essentiae”, pp. –.

60 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet XI, q.  ed. Badius, fol. vQ.

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are more distinct, because together they make up the essence as a whole.
And since in this sense the essential being is said to contract the essence
to that which is actually possible, their distinctness must be of a different
kind.61

IV. Why Essential Being (esse essentiae)?

For some people, Henry’s talk about essential being sounds like the symp-
tom of an overly baroque ontology. Why introduce kinds of being? Is not
existence the only intelligible form of being? In the previous chapters we
have already encountered one of Henry’s motives for introducing essen-
tial being. We can imagine “essences” of things, but only some of them
are actually capable of existing; essential being distinguishes those from
the rest. Moreover, only of things that have this capacity of existing in
reality can we give a true definition, for only these things can be objects
of the intellect,62 the cognitive faculty through which we are able to form
definitions. And a definition expresses what a thing “is”.63 So real essences
must have some sort of being.
One of the worries is that the idea of essential being seems to lead to
a sort of Platonism. Remember that for Henry the relationship between
the divine ideas and the essence is eternal: does this not also mean that
the essential being is a being that the essence has from eternity? But
if something has such an eternal being, does it not then exist some-
where from eternity? Maybe in a separate realm of intelligibles? Some
interpreters approach the esse essentiae by asking whether it is a sort
of real being or a sort of mental being. In line with Avicenna, Henry
insists that everything that exists exists either in the mind or in (extra-
mental) reality. So the question is whether essential being is closer to the
first or to the second kind of being. But as Pasquale Porro and others

61 In the passage where he allegedly applies the intentional distinction to the relation-

ship between essence and essential being, Henry himself remarks on the different ways
of talking about essence and essential being. See Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae
(Summa), art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vP. For more on this see my Heinrich von Gent
über Metaphysik, pp. –.
62 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vD.
63 There are various passages in which Henry identifies the esse essentiae with the being

indicated in a definition. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I, q. , ed. Macken, pp. –
.

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have argued, to ask these questions is to commit a category mistake.

Essential being is not a diminished form of existence, but something
entirely different. Henry himself does not get tired of insisting on this
point.64 Essences exist nowhere except in really existing objects or in the
mind.
One might wonder whether Henry’s account of possible beings is the
only motive for his talk of essential being. In the following I want to
argue that there is another, more fundamental one. To see this other
motivation we have to go back to the issues discussed at the end of the
preceding chapter. There we discovered that for Henry a creature is not
only a composite insofar as it is composed out of essence and existence
(and subsistence), but that we can also talk about a composition at the
level of essences, a composition of a sort of “thingness” (res) and essential
being. But what exactly moves Henry to consider the essences themselves
as (intentional) composites? In recent scholarship on Henry of Ghent we
can find two types of responses to this question. () For some interpreters,
Henry introduced the doctrine of the two modes of being and the twofold
composition of creatures to emphasize the divine simplicity. God is
not only simple because God’s essence is identical with God’s existence
(according to the traditional view), but also because God’s essence is
strictly identical with its essential being.65 () For others, the aspect of
dependence is key. According to Jos Decorte, Henry aims at replacing
an Aristotelian ontology, which is basically a substance ontology, with an
ontology of relations. The two modes of being, which a thing has only
in relation to the divine, express the fundamental dependence creatures
have to God and thus highlights Henry’s relational account of objects.66
Both explanations are plausible and can be supported by many passages

64 See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet III, q. , ed. Badius, fol. vO. Porro, “Possibilità

ed esse essentiae,” pp. –. The most prominent defender of a “realist” understanding
of esse essentiae is John Wippel. See “The Existence of Nonexisting Possibilities,” pp. –
.
65 Porro, “Possibilità ed esse essentiae,” p. . See, for instance, also Henry of Ghent,

Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXXII, q. , ed. R. Macken, p. , –: “A cuius
simplicitate deficit omnis creatura, scilicet quia ipsa res quae ipsa est non est cuius esse,
sed habet ab alio esse tam essentiae quam existentiae.”
66 See Jos Decorte, “Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on God’s Relation to the

World,” Mediaevalia  (), pp. – at –; id., “ ‘Modus’ or ‘res’: Scotus’
Criticism of Henry of Ghent’s Conception of the Reality of a Real Relation,” in Via Scoti.
Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale,
Roma – marzo , ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome, ), pp. – at – and
; and id., “Relatio as Modus Essendi: The Origins of Henry of Ghent’s Definition of
Relation,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies  (), pp. – at .

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 henry of ghent on individuation, essence, and being 

in Henry’s works. However, I consider them rather as theological expla-

nations for Henry’s compositional account of creatures. But there are also
clearly philosophical reasons for why Henry considers essences them-
selves as composites, reasons which originate in Henry’s understanding
of the categories.
According to Henry, every being falling under one of the ten cate-
gories is composed of a res praedicamenti and a mode of being, a ratio
praedicamenti.67 At first sight, this may sound surprising: Do the ten cat-
egories not stand for ten general modes of being and thus for ten differ-
ent rationes praedicamenti? But Henry does not think a mode of being
alone makes for a complete categorical being. A substance is not ‘being
by itself ’ but a thing (res) having a certain kind of being, namely “being
by itself ” (esse non in alio); a quality is another kind of thing (res) having
“being in something else” (esse in alio) etc.68 Nor would a res praedica-
menti on its own be enough to constitute a categorical being. Only the
so-called three absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) are
distinguished in terms of different res praedicamenti. Relations do not
possess their own res, and all the other six forms of categorial being are
various sorts of relations. A relation is “a thing” insofar as it is grounded
in the res praedicamenti of its foundation. Henry advances a series of
arguments for this claim. One of them goes like this: Let us assume that
relations have their own “thing” (res) or “reality” in things they relate
and that this realitas is different from the reality of a related thing. In
this case, an object not related to something else—say, the white Socrates
who is not related to the black Plato—cannot enter into a relation if
there is not something new produced in it that was not there previ-
ously. There has to be some kind of transmutation, a real change; Socrates
who is not similar to Plato cannot become similar without being trans-
formed. For Henry, however, this conclusion is wrong. For imagine that a

67 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rD–vE: “Res creata in

simplicitate essentiae suae absque essentia actuali considerata rationem compositionis

habet ex eo quod est et quo est, sive ex essentia inquantum est ipsa realitas dicta et
ipso esse participato . . .. Et secundum illa duo quae cadunt in creatura secundum esse
quidditativum considerata, constituitur natura praedicamenti, et hoc ex illis duobus
quae sunt res praedicamenti et ratio praedicamenti.” For Henry’s understanding of the
categories cf. Henninger, Relations, pp. – and my “Simon of Faversham on Aristotle’s
Categories and the Scientia Praedicamentorum,” in Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s
Categories, ed. Lloyd A. Newton (Leiden, ), pp. – at –.
68 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXXII, q. , ed. R. Macken,

pp. –.

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quality in Plato is changed so that he, Plato, becomes white. Socrates will
immediately become similar to him, and this without any kind of real
change (i.e., without the acquisition of a “thing”) in Socrates.69 This argu-
ment shows that a too realist conception of relations would lead to the
absurd consequence that things are constantly changing and in transfor-
mation because they constantly enter into relations with new objects.
The details of Henry’s teaching on relations do not have to occupy us
here. I used the example of relations only to illustrate that each categori-
cal being is a composite of a ratio and a res praedicamenti, although in
the case of relations the latter is even borrowed from that categorical
being on which the relation is founded. What is important here is that
Henry connects his compositional account of categorical being with the
essence/esse essentiae distinction: the esse essentiae is the ratio praedica-
menti.70 If this interpretation is correct, one of the philosophical motives
for Henry’s introduction of essential being lies in his account of the cat-
egories and what falls under them.

V. The General Character of Henry’s Ontology and its Reception

For Henry creatures are complex things. They are complex not because
they are composed out of many different things nor because they only
appear to us as complex, but because they have an intrinsic ontologi-
cal structure below the level of a real composition.71 An individual sub-
stance, a human being, for instance, is composed out of a res (which
accounts primarily for what a human being is), and a series of ‘intentions’
added to it: essential being, being in a supposit, existence and maybe oth-
ers. The res itself can be further analysed in term of the intentions that

69 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VII, qq.  + , ed. G. Wilson, pp. ,–,: “Si relatio

poneret propriam realitatem a realitate sui fundamenti in suo subiecto relato, tunc de se
non relatum aliqua relatione, puta similitudine, quia nullum habet in se respectu alicuius
alterius, puta Sortes albus in respectu ad Platonem nigrum, non fieret relatum ad illud
similitudine quam haberet in se de novo et prius non habuit, nisi quia res aliqua de novo
facta est in eo, quae prius in eo non fuit. Hoc autem non est possibile fieri in aliquo sine
propria sui transmutatione. Sortes ergo similis Platoni non posset fieri similis eidem sine
sua transmutatione reali. Consequens falsum est, quia Platone transmutato . . ., ut de
nigro fiat albus, statim Sortes sine omni sua transmutatione de novo factus est similis
Platoni.”
70 See, e.g., the text in nt.  above. For more on this see my Heinrich von Gent über

Metaphysik, pp. –.

71 On this kind of composition see Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. .

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make it up: in our case, in the intentions ‘animal’, ‘rational’ etc. Such an
analysis of objects in terms of their intentional composition characterizes
the metaphysician’s point of view.72
Henry’s choice of the term ‘intention’ (intentio) might not have been
so fortunate. Intentio is sometimes used as a synonym for ratio, which,
when used in contrast with the term res, often simply means ‘concept’ or
that aspect of a thing that has been captured by a concept, whereas for
Henry the intentio is clearly more then a mere concept or its content.
For each of the intentions corresponds to something distinct ex parte
rei; or to be more precise: to each intention corresponds something ex
parte rei intellectae et conceptae, because without an intellect capable of
grasping the various ontological aspects of a thing there would be no such
intentions.73 This explains why Henry says that every intentio is also a
ratio, but not every ratio is an intentio, for it is not necessary that rationes
correspond to a distinction ex parte rei.74
At this point someone might object and point to Henry’s views regard-
ing the distinction between species and genus. For Henry (ultimate)
species have a natural unity, independent of the human mind, whereas
a genus has only unity through the mind.75 In other words: species
seem to be truly real, but a genus does not. If the intentional analysis
of an object leads to intentions like ‘animal’ or ‘substance’ etc., which
are intentions corresponding to genera, then it looks as if it leads to
something to which nothing corresponds ex parte rei. Note however that
Henry’s remarks about the unity of species and genus do not translate
into statements about their reality. Ultimate species have a special sort of

72 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IV, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rB. Henry himself calls such an

analysis a “resolution” (resolutio); see Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. , ed. R. Macken,

p. . In the latter text Henry also gives some indications as to how such a resolutio is
supposed to work.
73 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXVIII, q. , ed. Badius,

fol. rX. See also ibid., art. XXVII, q. , ad , ed. Badius, fols. vM–vR; id., Quodli-
bet V, q. ; ibid., q. , ed. Badius, fol. rXY. See also Hoeres, “Wesen und Dasein,”
pp. –; Porro, “Possibilità ed esse essentiae,” pp. –.
74 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rV: “Quaecumque

differunt intentione, differunt ratione, non econverso. Propter quod frequenter intentio
ratio appellatur.”
75 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rE. The passage in question

was later quoted word by word by William of Ockham in Ordinatio I, dist. , q. ,

ed. Stephen Brown and Gedeon Gál (Opera Theologica II, St. Bonaventure, NY, ),
pp. –. Ockham’s modern editors, however, have not recognized the author of the
quote and attributed it to Thomas Aquinas (without being able to point to an exact
passage).

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unity, because they cannot be further divided into subspecies, whereas a

genus always has something under it. To capture this difference Henry
uses the difference between natural and conceptual unity.76 But it does
not follow that the generic features of an object are therefore unreal. On
the contrary, as Henry’s examples for the intentional distinction and in
particular his favorite example of the distinction between animal and
rational show, he considers genera as real (although, of course, not as
things).
Intentions and the intentional distinction thus track the internal onto-
logical structure of an object.77 Yet, given the number of things that
Henry considers as intentionally distinct, one wonders whether there are
not various subspecies of intentional distinctions.78 When Henry argues
for an intentional distinction between essence and essential being, he
remarks himself that these differ less than essence and existence.79 In
question  of his fifth Quodlibet, Henry consequently distinguishes six
degrees of the intentional distinction. The highest degree of intentional
distinctness can be found where that which is captured in one intention
is not captured in another intention (and where there is no overlap), such
as in the case of the intention ‘rational’ and the intention ‘vegetative’;
lower degrees of distinctness can be found in the opposite cases, of which
Henry list four separate ones.80

76 For we cannot find in nature beings that are instantiations of genera but not of

species.
77 That, according to Henry, the intentions and the intentional distinction deal, in a

certain sense, with really existing differences (without dealing with differences among
things), can also be gathered from passages where Henry approaches the intentional
distinction to the real distinction. See, e.g., Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae
(Summa), art. XXVII, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rN: “ . . . et sic quodammodo re differunt
essentia creaturae et esse eius . . .” But only quodammodo! For further discussion of
the differences between res, intentio, and ratio see Roland J. Teske, “Distinctions in the
Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent,” Traditio  (), pp. –; Hoeres, “Wesen und
Dasein.”
78 On the general importance of the intentional distinction in Henry’s philosophy

see Raymond Macken, “Les diverses applications de la distinction intentionnelle chez

Henri de Gand,” in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI. internationalen
Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société internationale pour l’étude de la
philosophie médiévale, . August–. September  in Bonn, ed. Wolfgang Kluxen et
al. (Berlin/New York, ), pp. –.
79 Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXI, q. , ed. Badius, fol.

vP.
80 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet V, q. , ed. Badius, fol. rvL. See also Teske, “Distinc-

tions,” pp. –; Hoeres, “Wesen und Dasein,” pp. –.

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 henry of ghent on individuation, essence, and being 

Compared with that of Thomas Aquinas, Henry’s ontology strikes us

as very different. But is his ontology original? And what did his con-
temporaries and successors think of it? I doubt that Henry would have
considered his teaching with regard to the main issues discussed here,
individuation, being, and essence, as very original. In all these topics
Henry makes it look as if he is merely developing ideas from Avicenna.
Although Henry does not acknowledge Avicenna for considering sub-
sistence as the principle of individuation, he nevertheless pictures his
own account of individuation as an explanation of what Avicenna had
in mind when he calls the individuating principle an “accident” and
a “merely adventitious item” (adventitium tantum).81 Henry’s account
of individuation is unthinkable without Avicenna’s theory of essence.
Modern interpreters agree that the idea of an intentional distinction is
also tributary to Avicenna. The terminology is directly lifted from the
famous chapter  of the first book of Avicenna’s Metaphysics.82 From
the same key text, where Avicenna also talks about a being proper to
a thing (proprium esse), a being that is different from existential being,
Henry derives the idea of an essential being (esse essentiae).83 And pre-
sumably Henry would also call Avicenna one of his allies regarding his
conception of the categories.84 Moreover, next to Boethius, Avicenna is
one of the major sources for the idea of distinguishing essence and exis-
tence.85
If Henry is ultimately not the inventor of all the various philosoph-
ical theories presented in this contribution, he is at least their most
prominent proponent and defender. His ontological views exercised an
enormous influence in the late th and early th centuries. This is
hardly surprising given the energy with which medieval philosophers
discussed the very questions Henry tried to answer. Even when later

81 See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q.  where Avicenna is omnipresent.

82 Liber de prima philosophia, lib. I, chapter , ed. Simone van Riet (Leuven, ),
p. .
83 Ibid., pp. –. See Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art. XXI,

q. , fol. rO–vP for the identification of Avicenna’s esse proprium with Henry’s esse
essentiae. For Henry’s Avicennian background see also Porro, “Universaux et esse essen-
tiae.”
84 See my Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik, pp. –.
85 There is of course the question whether Henry interpreted Avicenna correctly. This

does not have to occupy us here. But given Avicenna’s importance regarding the issues
mentioned, the debate Henry’s ontological views triggered also show elements of a debate
about the correct interpretation of Avicenna’s ontology.

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 martin pickavé

authors disagreed with Henry, they often used considerable effort to

describe the view against which they would advance their arguments.86
And indeed, most of the reactions to Henry of Ghent’s ontology were
critical. Notorious is Henry’s debate with Giles of Rome and Godfrey
of Fontaines during the years – when all three taught at the
University of Paris.87 Giles and Godfrey criticized all aspects of Henry’s
ontology and defended very different views in response to them. There
is almost no master at the University of Paris or Oxford in the late
th century who would not engage with Henry’s views in one way
or another.88 Particularly hard to swallow for Henry’s contemporaries
were Henry’s intentional distinction and his account of esse essentiae.
However, authors who reacted to Henry’s teachings cannot simply be
divided into those who defended his views and those who rejected them.
Henry’s positive influence can often also be detected in authors who
oppose him. One good example is John Duns Scotus. Scotus rejects
Henry’s esse essentiae and Henry’s account of the categories,89 as well
as his account of individuation—or at least what he takes it to be.90
But one of Scotus’s most original contribution to philosophy, the idea
of a formal distinction, shows clear similarities with Henry’s intentional

86 For the debate about individuation see my “The Controversy over the Principle of

Individuation”; Ruedi Imbach’s list of authors involved in the debate over the distinction
between being and essence also includes many who are influenced (either positively
or negatively) by Henry. See “Gravis iactura verae doctrinae: Prolegomena zu einer
Interpretation der Schrift De ente et essentia Dietrichs von Freiberg O.P.,” Freiburger
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie  (), pp. – at –.
87 See the literature in nt.  above.
88 For a general survey of Henry’s influence see Pasquale Porro, “An Historiographical

Image of Henry of Ghent”, in Henry of Ghent, ed. W. Vanhamel, pp. –. For more
reactions to Henry’s ontology see Francis E. Kelley, “Two Early English Thomists: Thomas
Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent,” The Thomist  (), pp. –.
Raymond Macken, Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo (Leuven, ), vol. ,
pp. – contains an impressive repertory of both abbreviations of Henry’s works
and of works composed to attack Henry’s teachings. A survey of Henry’s influence on
theologians at Oxford can be found in Jeremy I. Catto, “Theology and Theologians –
,” in The History of the University of Oxford. Vol. I: The Early Oxford Schools, ed.
J.I. Catto (Oxford, ), pp. –, esp. –.
89 For his criticism of esse essentiae see, e.g., Ordinatio II, dist. , p. , q. , n. , Opera

omnia VII, ed. Vaticana, p. . On Scotus’s response to Henry’s teaching on categories
see Giorgio Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: an Interpretation of Aristotle’s
Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century (Leiden, ); id., “Scotus’s Realist Conception
of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates,” Vivarium  (), pp. –.
90 See nt.  above.

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 henry of ghent on individuation, essence, and being 

distinction.91 I am convinced that greater familiarity with Henry’s philo-

sophical positions will enable us in the future to evaluate much better the
profound influence he exercised on several generations of philosophers
and theologians.

91 This has been shown, already some time ago, in Hoeres, “Wesen und Dasein.”

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