Original Article (Literature Review or Lit Review with Annotated Bibliography)

Journal of Planning Literature

2022, Vol. 37(3) 433-451
Growth Management Effectiveness: A © The Author(s) 2022

Literature Review Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/08854122221077457
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpl
Reid Ewing1 , Torrey Lyons2, Fariba Siddiq3, Sadegh Sabouri4,
Fatemeh Kiani5 , Shima Hamidi6, Dong-ah Choi7, and Hassan Ameli7

Abstract
Although growth management programs have many purposes, a critical one is to contain urban and suburban sprawl. Their effi-
cacy in this regard is not well understood. In this paper, we review a comprehensive set of growth management tools, used by
urban planners and policymakers to curb sprawl, starting with the history of the tool, then describing how it works in practice,
and finally presenting any available empirical evidence on how well it works to curb sprawl and/or achieve other public purposes.
While growth management isn’t a panacea for controlling sprawl, it is certainly not the failure implied by critics.

Keywords
growth management tool, sprawl, compact development, smart growth, inside game, outside game

Introduction assessment of smart growth programs, and this is not organized

by tool but rather by state (Ingram et al. 2009). It does not
The original purpose of growth management was farmland address the specific issue of whether tools induce or discourage
preservation but a shift has occurred in recent years to growth
sprawl, the main topic of this paper. It is also dated at this point.
management as a tool to promote compact development over Our graduate planning students have been working for the
sprawl (Park et al. 2020). Today, it is common for contempo- past several years on a comprehensive literature review of
rary planners to believe in the following causal chain: growth management effectiveness, particularly in controlling
sprawl. It is a big job. There are many measures/tools and
growth management tools - - -> compact development –––> good many studies of each. This review covers the major growth
outcomes management tools used since the early 1970s and offers a
detailed overview of each tool and empirical evidence on
The second link in the causal chain is shown with a solid arrow. each tool’s effectiveness. Our tentative conclusion:
Planners may quibble about the precise benefits of compact devel- Effectiveness depends on the particular place, the particular
opment, but the empirical evidence in favor of compact develop- measure, and how it is designed and implemented. In other
ment is overwhelming (Ewing and Hamidi 2015). words, “It all depends.”
What is less compelling is evidence of growth management
effectiveness. In a recent study, Landis (2021) published a com-
prehensive overview of some of the local growth management
1
programs in the U.S. The study described the evolution of these Department of City & Metropolitan Planning, University of Utah, Salt Lake
programs and the literature on the effectiveness of these pro- City, UT, United States
2
Department of Urban planning, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
grams in practice. Further, it tested the effectiveness of some NC, United States
of the growth management tools by comparing a region imple- 3
UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles,
menting a program with one that has not, based on population California, United States
growth, sprawl, and fiscal and housing price outcome measures.
4
Senseable City Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Results were mixed. Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States
5
Utah Department of Transportation, Salt Lake City, Utah, United States
Some publications place growth management and smart 6
Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins
growth in historical perspective (Chapin 2012; Weitz 1999, University, Baltimore, Maryland, United States
7
2012). Others, including Growth Management in Florida: Department of City & Metropolitan Planning, University of Utah, Salt Lake
Planning for Paradise (Chapin, Connerly, and Higgins 2007) City, UT, United States
and Growth Management and Public Land Acquisition
Corresponding Author:
(Chapin and Coutts 2011), put together extensive reviews of Fatemeh Kiani, Utah Department of Transportation, Planning department,
growth management programs in one or more U.S. states 4501 South 2700 West, Salt Lake City 84114, Utah, United States. Email:
(e.g., Florida, Maryland). There exists only one comprehensive [email protected]
434 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

Table 1. Growth Management Tools Reviewed in This Study.

Inside game/ Implementation

outside game* Growth management tool method Purpose

Inside game Form-based code Zoning Manage physical form to create a walkable, compact and mixed-use
development with a high-quality public realm
Density bonus Zoning Incentivize density bonus to developers who support infrastructure
improvements, creation of public spaces, building affordable housing
units and environmental conservation
Tax increment financing Legislation/ policy/ Channel tax increments from new developments into economic
project developments and other environmental improvements
Concurrency/adequate Zoning Direct growth to areas with adequate public facilities and service
public facilities ordinances
Priority funding areas Legislation/ policy/ Promote growth in specific areas to preserve existing communities
project
Impact fees Legislation/ policy/ Compensate communities for the increased demand for infrastructure
project and public services generated by new development
Outside game Agricultural protection Zoning Protect farmland and farming activities from incompatible nonfarm
zoning uses
Purchase of development Legislation/ policy/ Preserve large contiguous blocks of agricultural or environmental
rights (PDR) project lands
Mixed Urban containment policies Legislation/ policy/ Promote density in the urban core, limit sprawling development in
project rural areas, and preserve agricultural and natural landscapes
Transfer of development Legislation/ policy/ Allow denser development in some areas and leave other areas with
rights (TDR) project unique land features undeveloped

Perhaps it most depends on how growth management tools In addition, one can think of compact development and
are packaged together, as is often the case. Growth management sprawl as lying on a continuum, with compact development
tools individually or in packages aren’t a panacea for control- having higher densities, more diverse land uses, more intercon-
ling sprawl, but as we will show in this paper, they are certainly nected streets, more accessible destinations, and less distant
not the failure implied by some critics. transit (the 5 Ds – Ewing and Cervero 2010; Ewing and
Hamidi 2017).
Growth management programs vary widely (see Table 1).
Growth Management Generally Growth management to curb sprawl has two components: a)
This review uses the term growth management to encompass The Inside Game - where development is desired and promoted;
both growth management in its original form and what has and b) The Outside Game - where development is generally dis-
more recently been called smart growth. The former began in couraged and allowed only at low density (inside/outside termi-
the 1970s, emphasizing traditional anti-sprawl growth manage- nology is borrowed from Rusk 2010). Some tools do not neatly
ment policies. The latter began in the 1990s, concentrating fall into one category or the other. These, we refer to as mixed.
growth in walkable urban centers. The tools of growth manage- While controlling sprawl has long been identified as the “prin-
ment and smart growth overlap, as do the purposes. Both strive cipal spatial objective” of growth management measures, the
for compact development over urban sprawl. One can think of efficacy of regulations in realizing such an objective remains
smart growth as the end, and growth management as the means. largely debatable (Landis 2000). Caruthers (2002) expresses
This is not to say they are the same but rather to say the tools this ambiguity by noting “Despite their considerable promise
covered in this review encompass both. for reducing sprawl, growth management programs remain con-
Perhaps the feature that most distinguishes “smart growth,” troversial because there is little rigorous empirical evidence of
as initiated in Maryland, from its growth management predeces- their effectiveness” (Carruthers 2002). To the contrary,
sors is its reliance on spatially specific incentives instead of land land-use controls have sometimes been found to encourage,
use regulations. and even incentivize, urban sprawl (Cowan 2006; Landis
1992; Pendall 1999).
“Local governments can grow anywhere they want but State funds Though studies of sprawl have yielded a diverse volume of
for accommodating development are available only within priority definitions and interpretations of the term, an established and
funding areas (PFAs). Property owners need not clean up and rede- widely cited report by Ewing et al. identifies urban sprawl as
velop their properties but grants are available for doing so…. Such embodying four predominant features: a population that is
reliance on incentives is what enabled these programs to pass the widely dispersed in low-density development, a rigid separation
Maryland legislature and what makes them so attractive to other of land uses, a lack of well-defined activity centers (including
states” (Knaap 2017). regional, town and neighborhood centers), and a road
Ewing et al. 435

network typified by large blocks and poor connectivity This paper strives to shed light on current knowledge of
(Ewing, Pendall and Chen 2003a; Ewing, Schieber and growth management effectiveness. We present nine sections
Zegeer 2003b). The effects of this type of development that discuss single growth management tools or multiple
pattern have been extensively studied in the planning literature closely-related tools. We start by outlining the tools’ history,
and include more traffic fatalities (Ewing and Hamidi 2015; then proceed to explain how the tools work. We conclude by
Ewing, Schieber and Zegeer 2003), poorer health outcomes providing empirical evidence, if it exists, on how these
(Berrigan et al. 2014; Ewing et al. 2014b; Fan and Song growth management strategies either contain or do not
2009; Hamidi and Ewing 2020; Plantinga and Bernell 2007), contain sprawl.
more air pollution (Schweitzer and Zhou 2010; Stone 2008),
more extreme heat events (Stone, Hess, and Frumkin 2010),
higher residential energy use (Ewing and Rong 2008), lower Zoning – Inside Game
social capital (Nguyen 2010), longer emergency response In 1926, the concept of land use regulation was so novel that
times (Trowbridge, Gurka, and O’Connor 2009), increased the New York Times encased the term zoning in quotation
teenage driving (Trowbridge and McDonald 2008), greater marks in a news account describing the emerging regulatory
private-vehicle commute distances and times (Ewing, Pendall, trend (New York Times 1926). Nine decades later, zoning
and Chen 2003a; Ewing, Schieber, and Zegeer 2003b; Ewing remains the hallmark of land use regulatory frameworks in
et al. 2014a; Hamidi et al. 2015; Hamidi and Ewing 2015; American cities and towns. And yet as concerns have
Ewing et al. 2014b; Ewing et al. 2016a; Ewing, Hamidi and shifted from the “evils of overcrowding” (Euclid v. Ambler
Grace 2016b), higher housing plus transportation costs 1926 [Revell 1999]) to problems associated with sprawl pat-
(Hamidi and Ewing 2015), lower upward economic and terns of development, local and state governments have insti-
social mobility (Ewing, Hamidi et al. 2016a, 2016b); emer- tuted, nearly as expeditiously as zoning gained a foothold in
gence of food deserts (Hamidi 2020); shorter life expectancy the nation, various zoning reforms.
(Hamidi et al. 2018), higher mortality rates from the Zoning for large lots can limit the supply of new housing in
COVID-19 pandemic (Hamidi Sabouri, and Ewing 2020; the jurisdictions that impose them. Demand for housing that
Hamidi, Ewing, and Sabouri 2020), higher adherence to goes unmet because of the control will probably be met in
social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic (Hamidi another location, but empirical studies provide mixed evidence
and Zandiatashbar 2021) and lower innovation and economic on whether development will occur as infill in existing urban-
productivity (Hamidi and Zandiatashbar 2019; Hamidi, ized areas or as sprawl in newly developed areas (Pendall
Zandiatashbar, and Bonakdar 2019). 1999). Conventional zoning (also referred to as Euclidean
In response, growth management efforts in recent years have zoning) stands on the principle of homogeneity, separation,
focused on challenging these trends, particularly emphasizing and exclusion that makes it what some consider
development that is compact and pedestrian-friendly and ‘sprawl-inducing zoning.’ Conventional zoning often limits
embraces medium-to-high densities, mixed-use centers, and the accessibility of people in need of public amenities by
high levels of street connectivity. placing housing far from nonresidential uses. The restrictions
Which growth management measures, if any, effectively on maximum units per acre, minimum lot size per unit,
contain sprawl patterns of development and trigger the build- minimum street frontage per unit, front yard setbacks and enor-
ing of compact, mixed-use centers? Many states with the most mous parking lots called for by conventional zoning negate the
comprehensive of growth management regulatory structures possibility of compact development (Barry 2008; Hall 2007;
lack basic performance measures to gauge efficacy (Landis Talen 2013). To combat these challenges caused by conven-
2021). Further, as programs and priorities for smart growth tional zoning, several zoning reforms have emerged.
differ from state to state, successful policies also vary Form-based codes, density bonuses, upzoning, and cluster
widely. While states with well-established growth manage- zoning are some of the growth management strategies that
ment programs were successful in some of their priority poli- have the potential to counter sprawl (Talen 2013).
cies, they also performed poorly in other policy areas (Ingram
et al. 2009). Though cities and towns have instituted a great
number of regulations and incentives in hopes of curtailing Form-Based Code
sprawl, lack of systematic empirical evaluations of growth History. Modern initiatives for embracing physical form as the
management policies has handicapped efforts to accurately core principle of land development regulation first began in
measure overall effectiveness (Bengston, Fletcher, and 1980s when it started to become evident that urban sprawl
Nelson 2004). was a result of conventional Euclidean zoning. Form-based
What is clear is that in many regions, sprawl development codes emerged as one of the promising alternatives to mitigate
continues largely unabated (Landis 2017; Linkous 2017). sprawl (Parolek, Parolek, and Crawford 2008; Talen 2009;
Preference for strong local government autonomy and the Talen 2013).
enduring popularity of low-density zoning appears to effec- Among large American cities, Miami was the first to adopt
tively handicap smart growth efforts in many regions, even in a form-based code (FBC) followed by Denver (Parolek,
those that advocate anti-sprawl efforts (Richardson 2003). Parolek and Crawford 2008). Borys and Talen (2017) have
436 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

identified more than 600 codes in the US that meet the number of urban design features, particularly those linked to
Form-Based Codes Institute (FBCI) criteria mostly clustered urban design qualities such as imageability, complexity and
in the Southern California region. human scale.

How It works. A form-based code is a land use regulation that

places greater emphasis on physical design than land use as Density Bonus
the organizing principle of a city’s urban form. The code reg- History. In the United States, a density bonus program was first
ulates the elements of the built environment in relation to each introduced in New York in 1961. This policy stipulated that in
other. The intended outcome is a walkable, dense, compact exchange for providing public space within the property, devel-
and mixed-use development (Cole 2008). The relations opers would be allowed to build additional square footage. In
between building facades, public spaces, scale and types of fact, this first program allowed three additional square feet of
streets and blocks, the form and mass of buildings are construction for every one square foot of public space improve-
addressed in the standards of the code. Narrow streets, ment. In 1974, Montgomery County, MD established one of the
shorter blocks, and the elimination of on-site parking require- earliest and most successful examples of density bonus to create
ments are some common features of FBCs that contribute to inclusionary housing. The program offers developers up to 22
an improved built environment (Parolek, Parolek, and percent of density bonuses and has led to more than 14,000
Crawford 2008). By allowing different uses on the same units of affordable housing since its introduction (Dawkins,
block or lot and facilitating compactness, the urban form Jeon, and Knaap 2017).
achieved by implementing FBCs can produce urban areas
that are reminiscent of early American cities built before the How it works? Infrastructure improvements, creation of public
dominance of the automobile. The inclusion of stakeholder spaces, building affordable housing units and environmental con-
input to FBC creation has been related to more predictable, servation are the common public interests which developers must
consistent urban forms (Barry 2008). advance in order to receive a density bonus (Ramírez de la Cruz
Cities can adopt FBCs in mandatory or voluntary forms. A 2009). The threshold of density bonuses is context specific, but
mandatary form involves replacing the existing zoning ordi- they range from 20 to 50 percent over the otherwise allowable
nance with the FBC. A voluntary form does not replace the level of density. This tool encourages growth in designated
current zoning regulation of the city, rather, it is an additional areas and helps to preserve environmentally sensitive outlying
zoning regulation that runs parallel with the existing zoning areas from encroachment (Brody, Carrasco, and Highfield
ordinance. Developers and property owners can choose which 2006). Compared to the other incentive-based zoning tools
code they prefer to regulate their design (Barry 2008; Talen (e.g., reduced parking requirements, financial bonuses), density
2013). Cities also adopt hybrid codes that have regulations bonuses are the most common incentive offered to developers
from both conventional zoning and FBCs (Talen 2013). by municipalities (Gwinnett County, n.d.; Useful Community
Development n.d.). Most scholars suggest that the tool
Empirical findings. Kohr (2004) concluded that FBCs are a becomes more effective when applied with other tools, like inclu-
promising alternative to Euclidean zoning and can spur better sionary zoning (Stromberg and Sturtevant 2016). California’s
and a more cohesive development than conventional zoning density bonus law provides different bonuses based on the per-
ordinances. Garde and Kim (2017) found that most FBCs in centage of very low, low, and moderate-income housing within
their list of 26 cities have led to improvement over conventional a residential development (Garcia 2020).
zoning they replaced in integrating compact development and
mixed-use neighborhood centers, but not necessarily compared
Empirical findings. Ranking the efficacy on a Likert scale (most
to the matched cities with conventional regulations. In a
effective; very effective; moderately effective; no response;
follow-up study, Garde (2018) compared the same list of
minimally effective; not effective), Taves (2002) found that a
cities in terms of downtown redevelopment and concluded
density bonus is a moderately or very effective tool in green
that FBCs have more integrated design principles such as
space conservation, based on interviews with planners and
compact development, a reduced parking footprint, and walk-
developers in British Columbia. Brody et al. (2006) conclude
able streets.
that density bonuses cannot curb sprawl well in cities where
Similar studies of Denver and Miami concluded that FBCs
there is little room for expansion and open space conservation
better integrate planning principles such as walkable streets,
within the existing built up area.
reduced parking footprint and compact development (Garde
and Hoff 2017; Garde, Kim, and Tsai 2015). However, in
their study of parking policies in Miami, Hananouchi and Tax Increment Financing – Inside Game
Nuworsoo (2010) found that parking guidelines in these
FBCs are not significantly different than conventional zoning History
and thereby do not limit potential auto-centric development In 1952 California became the first state to authorize Tax
and urban sprawl. Hansen (2014) reported that FBCs have the Increment Financing (TIF), and by the time California
potential to create walkable streets, if they regulate a high Governor Brown decided to do away with the tool in 2011,
Ewing et al. 437

almost every other state in the nation was actively using it There is some evidence that TIF positively impacts real
(Briffault 2010; Johnson and Kriz 2019). Though data on TIF estate value growth (Byrne 2006; Ginsburg 2003; Smith
is difficult to come by, estimates of the number of existing 2009; Blackmond Larnell and Downey 2019). A recent study
TIF districts is in the thousands, and in 2001 more than 10% suggests that parcels located within TIF districts sold for
of California’s property tax base was located within a TIF boun- more than parcels outside of TIF districts by approximately
dary. The rapid rise and popularity of TIF can be attributed to $5,000 (He and Azizi 2020). This premium is mainly due to
several factors. One commonly cited factor is that TIF is a the positive effect on commercial and agricultural parcels,
way for municipalities to raise funds for development without which outweighs the negative TIF impact on residential types.
voter approval as opposed to issuing bonds. In the 1980s, Conversely, Merriman et al. (2011) found that while
many states began limiting city taxes and expenditures. This, Wisconsin’s use of the tool has revitalized development
coupled with federal withdrawal of redevelopment funds, put within TIF districts, property values have been unaffected.
pressure on cities to use creative methods to fund infrastructure Some scholars, though, have documented a negative impact
projects (Briffault 2010). on property values (2003; Weber, Bhatta and Merriman 2003
Johnson and Kriz (2019), in their book Tax Increment & Dye and Merriman 2000). A recent study showed that as
Financing and Economic Development, provide a comprehen- the share of county assessed value in TIF increases, assessed
sive review of the implementation, use, and structure of value in non-TIF areas decreases and assessed value within
various TIF programs across the country. TIF was initially TIF districts stays the same, which raises concerns about the
adopted to fund relatively small projects in community devel- efficacy of TIF (Hicks et al. 2019).
opment, and the source of financing was primarily the property From a growth management perspective, our understanding
tax increment. The types of projects, funding sources, and agen- of TIFs is quite limited. Dye and Merriman (2000 and 2003)
cies that use TIF have expanded and diversified widely found that development within a TIF district substitutes for
(Johnson and Kriz 2019). growth outside it, with the exception of manufacturing real
estate. LeRoy and Walker (2006) found that TIF relocations
to Minneapolis’ urban fringe stimulated suburban sprawl.
How It Works Skidmore et al. (2009) found that TIF implementation was
related to municipal annexation decisions and showed that in
When property values rise in an area after a nearby redevelop-
Wisconsin each TIF district is tied to a 3% increase in municipal
ment project is completed, the additional tax that is generated is
land area. Between 1990 and 2013, this equated to half the total
the tax increment. In designated TIF districts, all the tax incre-
annexed land area in Wisconsin, which raises concerns about
ment that results from a new development or redevelopment
farmland conversion.
project is diverted from the usual pools of funds and channeled
A 1999 study found that almost half of Wisconsin’s 661 TIF
into subsidizing the new development for a designated period of
districts had included open space—mostly farmland (LeRoy
time. One of the most common ways this is done is to issue
2008). If TIF is to be an effective growth management tool,
bonds to pay for necessary infrastructure improvements,
its efficacy and equitability must be improved. Zhao, Das,
backed by the TIF revenue stream. These can include upgrading
and Larson (2010) recommend that jurisdictions collaborate
streets, curbs, water mains, sewage facilities, storm drainage,
on the implementation of TIF, take a close look at context,
parks, or providing environmental remediation, land grants, or
protect existing local businesses and original residents,
planning services (Briffault 2010; Merriman, Skidmore, and
involve community groups in the process, and allow for
Kashian 2011; Smith 2009).
annual adjustments to aid other city services. Halls and Bartel
Because TIFs are meant to concentrate economic develop-
(2014) suggest improving TIF accountability and performance
ment, theoretically they should in turn limit growth on the
by filling the gaps between design, implementation, and
urban fringe (unless the urban fringe is designated a “redevelop-
evaluation.
ment” area).

Concurrency/Adequate Public Facilities

Empirical Findings
Ordinances – Inside Game
According to Weber and Goddeeris (2007), “research on the
effects of TIF has raised more questions than it has answered.” History
So far, there seems to be no consensus on the relationship Ramapo, New York was one of the first to officially implement
between TIF and economic growth (Youngman 2016), the an adequate public facilities ordinances (APFO) in July 1969.
effect of TIF on property value growth (Byrne 2006), and the Officials added a measure to the city code to ensure that the nec-
overall benefit of TIF for municipalities (Briffault 2010). In a essary facilities were adequately financed before approving
recent time-series analysis of TIF in Kansas City and building permits (Nolon 2003). The legality of this ordinance
St. Louis, El-Khattabi and Lester (2019) found “no conclusive was confirmed in the 1972 case Golden versus the Planning
evidence that the TIF program in either city has a causal impact Board of Ramapo (334 N.Y.S. 2d 138). The case also contains
on key economic development indicators.” the caveat that restricting growth based on infrastructure must
438 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

fulfill a legitimate public purpose and not constitute a regulatory outlying areas is encouraged due to freely available roadway
taking, that is, an elimination of all economic opportunities for a capacity.
piece of land; there also had to be a plan for correcting the infra- One study found that concurrency and APFOs can affect
structure deficiency within a finite time frame (Boggs, Glenn, and housing prices, developers’ certainty and willingness to
Apgar 1991). invest, housing affordability, and job location (Anthony
Following the confirmed legality of adequate public facilities 2003). In an update to this work, Anthony (2017) also sug-
ordinances, more municipalities adopted similar policies. gested that there are some indications that Florida’s concur-
Florida’s concurrency law often gets heralded as the poster child rency and APFO policies had led to a reduction in sprawl. In
of this approach (Ben-Zadok 2005). In 1975, the State formed any event, the concurrency policy in Florida was mostly
the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and legislated con- driven by development and economic growth and as a result,
sistency (idea that growth should follow an adopted plan). Finally, the state withdrawal from transportation and school concur-
in 1985, the idea of concurrency was adopted in law by the State. rency (the most complex and costly facilities) largely elimi-
In 1999 the Urban Infill and Redevelopment Act pushed the nated the spatial components required to mitigate suburban
boundaries of concurrency to include transit, bicycle, and pedes- sprawl.
trian infrastructure (Phillips and Guttenplan 2003). Pendall (1999) hypothesized that APFOs—which require
In 1991, Maryland also passed an APFO law to ensure that new development to pay its own way—encourages higher
the spillover growth from Washington D.C. did not outpace density in new development. His results were consistent with
Maryland’s infrastructure. At this time, 14 of the 25 counties this hypothesis: for every 10 percent of a county’s land area
adopted APFOs (Balashov 2014). A national survey of 728 controlled by an APFO, its density increased by about 9 new
jurisdictions in 1994 and 2003 reported that APFOs have residents for every 100 new urban acres. One would expect
been mainly popular in fast growing sunbelt states of Florida, impact fees to have a similar effect.
Texas and California while Illinois also ranked second among
the 23 states in the sample (Pendall et al. 2018).
Funding
How it Works History
The idea of concurrency or APFO comes from municipalities’ Priority Funding Areas (PFAs) are locations where state or local
police power (White 1996). When areas experience rapid governments target infrastructure spending and development
growth in a short time, maintaining adequate levels of service incentives to support infill and compact growth. This ensures
becomes extremely difficult without a major increase in that the state is not responsible for subsidizing sprawl
public expenditures. Concurrency and APFOs are intended to (Maryland Department of Planning 2007). PFAs do not restrict
direct growth to areas with adequate public facilities and land uses, but rather incentivize and promote growth in specific
service, not to stymie it. They are also intended to slow the areas. In 1997, Maryland became a pioneer in land use policy
pace of growth to coincide with available revenues. with the adoption of the Smart Growth Areas Act. The central
Concurrency allows municipalities to establish minimum tool of this legislation was instigating priority funding areas
level of service (LOS) standards for roadways as well as (PFAs) across the state. This legislation directed state spending
other public facilities and services (DeGrove 1992). For concur- to PFAs, designated by local county and municipal govern-
rency or APFOs to have force in a municipality, they need to be ments. The Smart Growth Areas Act was the first piece of leg-
adopted into local ordinances. The issuance of building permits islation to implement PFAs, though similar growth
needs to hinge upon shown compliance with concurrency stan- management techniques such as urban growth boundaries
dards (Florida State Code 9J-5.0055). (UGBs), enterprise zones (EZs), and urban service areas
(USAs) had been used before with some success. No other
state has since implemented PFAs, though others have shown
Empirical Findings an interest (Sakowicz 2004; Salkin 1999).

In Florida, assessing the impact of concurrency presents a chal-

lenge because of its position in what is known as the “3 Cs” of
growth management. These are consistency, concurrency, and How It Works
compact development. The adoption of each “C” took place Maryland identified three goals for PFAs:
at a different point in time, but they continued to interact and
impact each other (Boarnet, McLaughlin, and Carruthers 2011). 1. To preserve existing communities;
More recently, Kim et al. (2014) argued that the transporta- 2. To make the most efficient and effective use of taxpayer
tion concurrency in Florida relied heavily on roadway LOS and dollars for costly infrastructure by targeting state
the lack of roadway capacity in urban counties had a quite resources to build on past investments; and
opposite growth management impact which resulted in further 3. To reduce development pressure on critical farmland
sprawl. In other words, in this model, new development in and natural resource areas by encouraging projects in
Ewing et al. 439

already developed areas.” (Dawkins, Knaap, and Sartori can require decades to take effect. Accordingly, most of the
2012) studies on PFAs were conducted in the decade following imple-
mentation in Maryland—more recent and more comprehensive
PFAs can be considered a weak form of urban containment, analysis is needed before the true effects and best practices of
which is incentive-based rather than regulatory. Hence our PFAs can be determined.
treatment of PFAs separately from urban containment tools. There are also some successful examples of PFAs through
PFAs only incentivize specific kinds of growth. Additionally, transportation land use connected (TLC) programs. For
PFA boundaries are more flexible than those of UGBs. PFAs instance, SANDAG has developed a Smart Growth Concept
account for about 10 percent of total land area in Maryland Map and identified areas as smart growth opportunity areas.
(Landis 2021). Since 2008, SANDAG has provided $5 million every year to
Some MPOs only support projects that fall into a priority or local agencies to improve streetscapes and provide bicycle,
opportunity area (i.e., a PFA), but they might call it something pedestrian and transit access in the smart growth opportunity
different. For instance, San Diego Association of Governments areas or simply, PFAs (SANDAG n.d.). For other examples,
(SANDAG) calls PFAs Smart Growth Opportunity Areas, see Sabouri et al. (2019).
while North Central Texas Council of Governments describes
them as Sustainable Development Areas of Interest, and Impact Fees – Inside Game
San Francisco Bay region’s MPO labels them Priority
Development Areas.
History
The suburban development boom of the post-war period in the
United States presented new challenges to local governments.
Empirical Findings Municipalities were forced to come up with new and creative
In 2001, the Baltimore Regional Partnership conducted the ways to pay for the exploding costs of providing infrastructure
first evaluation of Maryland’s PFA strategy and found that to places that were once considered far beyond the geographic
based on the current zoning, almost a quarter of new extent of their authority. The housing growth of this time was
growth could occur outside of the PFA boundary between costing local governments more than the amount that they
2000 and 2020. PFAs did not seem to affect the conservation could recoup with traditional taxing structures, and the first gen-
of natural resource land (Jantz, Goetz, and Shelley 2004); eration of impact fees were levied in the form of water and
residential construction continued to proliferate outside of sewer connection fees (Adams et al. 1999).
PFA boundaries (Sohn and Knaap 2010); location decisions Growth continued in the 1960s and 70 s, and cities were
for economic sectors were mostly unaffected (Sohn and faced with even more pressure to fund their expected contribu-
Knaap 2005); compliance was spotty (Howland and Sohn tions to infrastructure and public services. Raising taxes and
2007; Sohn and Knaap 2005); affordable housing was issuing bonds were not a popular solution among residents
pushed to the outskirts of the boundary, essentially creating and voters, so the practice of levying impact fees expanded.
sprawl (Frece et al. 2003). Comparing communities with Impact fees were most rapidly adopted during the 1970’s, and
and without PFAs, Landis (2021) concluded that PFA is par- they have since been used in most states in the United States
tially effective in growth management. (Nelson 1988). The proliferation of this tool has continued
By 2009, ten years after implementation in Maryland, Lewis into the 21st century, with 60% of all US municipalities with
et al. (2011) declared that PFAs had “fallen short of expecta- populations greater than 25,000 imposing impact fees (Been
tions,” citing ineffectual boundary configurations, lack of inte- 2005). Impact fees are most common in the South and West
gration with land use decision making processes, and a spatially and are relatively rare the Northeast and Midwest (Nelson,
erratic allocation of funds. Many others agree (Calandrillo, Nicholas, and Juergensmeyer 2017).
Deliganis, and Woods 2015; Dawkins, Knaap, and Sartori
2012; Hanlon, Howland and McGuire 2012).
On the other hand, some scholars have found benefits with How it Works
PFA implementation. Parcels within PFAs are more likely to Impact fees are one-time assessments charged to land develop-
be developed than those outside (Hanlon, Howland, and ers, designed to compensate communities for the increased
McGuire 2012, Irwin and Bockstael 2004); growth tends to demand for infrastructure and public services generated by
be more concentrated within PFAs than outside (Shen and new development. Nelson (1988) identifies the political objec-
Zhang 2007); and investments in water and sewer infrastructure tives of impact fees:
are more numerous within the PFA boundaries (Howland and
Sohn 2007). More recently, Towe et al. (2014) found that 1. Shifting the capital financing burden to new
PFA shifted new development away from areas outside the development
PFA boundary compared to their counterparts with similar char- 2. Coordinating new development with the construction of
acteristics inside PFAs. new infrastructure
Sakowicz (2004) explains that wherever smart growth prin- 3. Internalizing the costs of new development such that
ciples are implemented, there will be challenges, and policies indirect subsidies are wholly or partially eliminated,
440 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

allowing the market to more accurately allocate annexation of agricultural land was a permissible exercise of
resources to new development home rule expansion. The expansion of urban and suburban
4. Conciliating the anti-growth sentiments of local citizen areas outward toward historic agricultural lands continued as
groups market pressures incentivized the selling of these lands for res-
idential development (Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins 2002).
Impact fees are most commonly applied to water and sewer
facilities. The next most common application is the building
of new roads. However, impact fees have also been levied to How it Works?
pay for improvements to existing roads, recreational parks, Agricultural protection zoning refers to designations made by
public schools and other public institutions, emergency local jurisdictions that are intended to protect farmland and
medical services, police, and firefighting facilities (Landis farming activities from incompatible nonfarm uses (Coughlin
et al. 2001). Nelson et al. (2017) predicts that based on the 1991; Daniels and Bowers 1997; Nelson, Pruetz, and
observed trends (more than 77 percent increase of the nonutility Woodruff 2013). It is a primary zoning classification permitting
impact fees for single family homes), this tool will continue to open land uses such as grazing lands or pasture, crop and live-
grow at rapid rates until market forces or legislation limits it. stock production, and part-time small tract farming. This zoning
classification can also be applied to portions of an urban area
Empirical Findings that are designated as agriculture or as an urban reserve under
Only a few scholars have assessed how impact fees fare in their a city’s’ comprehensive plan. Agricultural zoning, in certain
ability to slow sprawl style development. Burge and Ihlanfeldt cases, also permits other compatible uses of an open nature
such as cemeteries, parks, and recreational uses on land that
(2006) determined that impact fees increased the construction
of new small homes within inner suburban locations (a sprawl- has favorable environmental conditions.
reducing effect) and increased construction of larger homes Agricultural zoning can be classified as exclusive or non-
exclusive. While exclusive zoning completely restricts any
throughout all suburban areas (a neutral or sprawl-facilitating
effect). This finding is counter to what had been the non-farm development, non-exclusive zoning is more flexible
previously-established consensus that impact fees suppress and allows construction of non-farm dwelling units (Coughlin
1991). If residential development is allowed in an agriculture
home building as builders and owners simply opt to develop
in municipalities without the fees (Skidmore and Peddle 1998). zone, it is limited by large lot size requirements (e.g., no
A novel approach known as a “zone-based” impact fee more than one to four units on 64 acres), fixed area ratio
limits (e.g., one house per 25 acres, the owner of a 100-acre
program was implemented in Albuquerque, New Mexico
(NM) with the hope of limiting sprawl. The municipality farm could subdivide four house lots of no more than two
intended to alter its pattern of growth by utilizing a tiered acres each, or a total of eight acres), or a sliding scale (e.g.,
one house for the first 20 acres, the second house for the next
impact fee structure which made infill and redevelopment
more economically viable. Suburban sprawling development 40 acres, the third house on the next 60 acres) (Daniels and
became much more costly under this program. When Burge Bowers 1997; Daniels and Keene 2018).
Agricultural protection zoning varies somewhat around the
et al. (2013) found that this program is linked to a drop in
total construction and a redistribution of the location of building United States. In the Midwest, it is generally one house per
permits, with the urban core exhibiting a much higher propor- 40 acres (quarter-quarter zoning). In the Northeast, it is one
house per 20 or 25 acres, and in the west, it is one house per
tion of the total permits than before the policy’s
implementation. 80 acres.
The academic literature suggests that impact fees are more of
a public finance tool than a growth management tool. They are Empirical Findings
simply a way for local governments to internalize costs of
greenfield development, rather than a way to limit it. Anthony (2004) tested the effectiveness of state growth man-
agement laws in limiting urban sprawl analyzing the data in
49 states over a 15-year period and found that among different
Zoning – Outside Game growth management strategies, agricultural zoning has a signif-
icant effect in protecting farmlands and controlling sprawl. In
History Black Hawk County, Iowa, relatively little farmland has been
Agricultural protection zoning has been used widely at the re-zoned for non-farm uses, and several proposals for
county and municipal levels across the United States to non-farm uses have been denied. These figures suggest that
protect lands that produce food and fiber (Lawrence 1997). urban sprawl is being fairly well contained (Daniels and Reed
However, the statutory definition of “agriculture” or “farm” – 1988).
is not a resolved issue. Since the early 1930s, shortly after the Evidence indicates that loss of farmland is mainly due not to
proliferation of zoning practice, this definition came under liti- suburban sprawl but rather to rural residential development
gation. This happened as towns began to adopt zoning ordi- (Valliant and Freedgood 2020). Whether agricultural protection
nances following widespread judicial conclusions that zoning is effective in curbing suburban sprawl depends where
Ewing et al. 441

you are in the United States. Agricultural protection zoning has 2013). The money for PDRs comes directly from public
been effective in the Northeast and much of the Midwest and in dollars, and the development rights are retired rather than sold
parts of California and Oregon (Daniels and Bowers 1997; for bonus development. In fact, some have suggested that
Daniels and Keene 2018; Rothwell and Massey 2010). TDR programs grew out of the difficulty of funding PDR pro-
The reality is that agriculture zoning is best used as part of a grams (Wolfram 1981). Programs like PDRs require much
package of farmland protection techniques, including urban more funding to achieve the same goal of land conservation
growth boundaries, purchase of conservation easements, (Nelson, Pruetz, and Woodruff 2013).
right-to-farm protection, and use-value taxation based on pref-
erential assessment of agricultural land. Leading counties in
growth management that use these tools include: Baltimore Empirical Findings
County, MD, Lancaster County, PA, Lexington-Fayette
County, KY, and Sonoma County, CA (Daniels 2010). By comparing farmland loss between counties with and without
PDR programs, using a 50-year, 269-county data set, Liu and
Lynch (2011) found significant effect of having a PDR
Purchase of Development Rights program—annual farmland loss reduction of 375 to 550
(PDR) – Outside Game acres. There is less information, however, related to the
sprawl suppressing effects of PDR programs. It can be
History assumed that lands that are preserved by PDR programs
The primary focus of purchase of development rights (PDR) might have otherwise been developed in a sprawling pattern,
programs is preserving large contiguous blocks of agricultural but empirical studies of this effect have been scarce.
or environmental lands (Daniels and Payne-Riley 2017).
Besides community growth and development management,
PDR programs serve other goals, such as protecting the local Urban Containment Policies – Mixed Tool
agricultural industry, maintaining opportunities for locally-
grown food, and transitioning farmlands to the next generation History
(Daniels 2020). PDR programs provide a way for state or local Urban containment policies (UCPs) encompass a range of
government to financially compensate willing landowners for growth management techniques ranging from urban service
not developing their land. When buying development rights, limits (USLs) to urban growth boundaries (UGBs) and green-
the community obtains a conservation easement, that belts (Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002). While the objectives
(usually) permanently restricts development on the land. and outcomes of each approach are different, UCPs share a
Suffolk County in Long Island, New York, pioneered the use common goal of promoting density in the urban core, limiting
of PDR in 1972 (Daniels 1991). During a six-year period, sprawling development in rural areas, and preserving agricul-
development rights were purchased for 51 parcels of land tural and natural landscapes.
with a total of 3,214 acres. Maryland established the first state- UCPs are now commonplace, so much so that Nelson and
level farmland preservation program (the Maryland Dawkins (2004) described urban containment as the most sig-
Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (MALPF)) in nificant movement in planning since the Supreme Court sanc-
1977, including PDR, which achieved preservation of tioned zoning in Euclid v. Ambler. Modern greenbelts
228,854 acres that took up 10% of its agricultural acres by developed in Europe in the 1800s and spread to Asia and
2013 (Daniels 2020; Horowitz, Lynch, and Stocking 2009). Australia, where they are still popular. They are less popular
In the 1980s, only four states – Connecticut, Maryland, in the United States, however, where only a few communities
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire – had enacted PDR pro- have bona fide greenbelts. The most prominent example,
grams but by 1990, nine states had adopted a PDR approach: located in Boulder, Colorado, has been in place for 50 years.
all six New England states along with Mid-Atlantic states of Boulder’s greenbelt now comprises 45,000 acres.
Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Compared to other growth management tools, UGBs are a
more recent phenomenon. The first UGB in the United States
was established in Lexington, Kentucky in 1958 (Nelson and
How it Works Duncan 1995). Leaders in the city and host county of Fayette
PDR programs are similar to transfer of development rights felt compelled to preserve the landscape surrounding
(TDR) programs, with one big exception (Nelson, Pruetz and Lexington for horse farms and so implemented a strict UGB
Woodruff 2013). They differ in the way that the money to pre- that has been in effect—though amended—ever since.
serve sending sites is distributed. In TDR programs, money Much of the literature on UGBs focuses on Portland, OR
comes from the profits gained from the extra development in (Dempsey and Plantinga 2013; Kim 2013; Jun 2004; Kline
the receiving area. As a result, TDR programs can achieve sub- et al. 2014; Knaap 1985; J. Phillips and Goodstein 2000). By
stantial land preservation without money from bonds, the the turn of the century, more than 100 cities and counties had
general fund, state/federal grants, sales taxes, property taxes, adopted some form of growth boundary (Staley, Edgens, and
or private foundation funding (Nelson, Pruetz, and Woodruff Mildner 1999).
442 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

How It Works regulate growth into containment boundaries have a better

record in limiting exurban sprawl than those without contain-
USLs are a rather tepid form of urban containment. Like green-
ment boundaries. A recent study found that greenbelts lead to
belts and UGBs, USLs employ a geographic boundary separat-
a reduced obesity rate due to the influence of the transportation
ing the core from the periphery. The governing body enacting
mode choice (Jeon et al. 2020). In addition, greenbelts reduce
the USL commits to (a) provide utilities and infrastructure to
the obesity rate because they provide recreation spaces for
land uses within the limit and (b) not extend these benefits to
people.
properties outside the limit. USLs, then, are more concerned
Some have questioned the ability of UCPs to increase land
with the “geographical sequencing of growth rather than its
values (Knaap 1985) and population density (Jun 2004;
constraint” (Pendall et al. 2002). USLs are more flexible and
Dawkins & Nelson 2002). Researchers in Seattle
more easily amended than UGBs and greenbelts, making
(Hepinstall-Cymermann, Coe, and Hutyra 2013), Portland
them less effective from a growth management perspective.
(Jun 2004), other areas in Oregon (Kline and Alig 1999;
Suburban or exurban development can spill out beyond the
Nelson and Moore 1996), Knoxville (Cho, Poudyal, and
USL, provided there is well and septic availability.
Lambert 2008), and in some cross-sectional studies (Paulsen
UGBs are specific geographic areas defined by local,
2013; Staley, Edgens, and Mildner 1999) have found UCPs
regional, or state governments beyond which urban develop-
are ineffective in containing sprawl. Greenbelts in particular,
ment, with few exceptions, is not allowed to expand. The
because of their inflexible nature, have been criticized for con-
goal of UGBs is not to prevent or restrict development, but
tributing to leapfrog development (Esparza and Carruthers
rather to direct it to appropriate areas. UGBs are frequently
2000; Catenaccio 2011). UCPs have also been criticized for
redrawn by the legislative body responsible for implementing
raising housing prices and reducing the available housing
them. Since the UGB in Portland, Oregon was created in
supply (Cox 2001; Zorn, Hansen, and Schwartz 1986; Staley
1980, six large and several small expansions of the boundary
et al. 1999), but these assertions have been refuted by Levine
have taken place (Sullivan 2015). UGBs can be adopted by a
(1999), Dawkins (2009), Downs (2002), Landis (1986), and
state government (Oregon, Washington, Tennessee), regional
Phillips and Goodstein (2000).
government (Minneapolis-St. Paul), county government
(Miami-Dade), or city government (San Jose, Honolulu,
Virginia Beach). Transfer Of Development Rights
Greenbelts are an even more rigid form of urban contain- (TDR) - Mixed Tool
ment. In the case of UGBs, private property owners largely
retain rights to land outside the growth boundary. In the case History
of greenbelts, governments typically buy up the land surround- The general concept of TDR was first introduced in 1961 in an
ing the urban limit. This gives local governments a greater article by Gerald Lloyd published by the Urban Land Institute
degree of regulatory control and permits them to provide recre- (Lloyd, 1961 cited in Fulton et al. 2004). Lloyd proposed
ational uses like trails and bikeways within the greenbelt. expanding the concept of clustering to allow developers to
transfer development rights between parcels. This would
allow denser development in some areas, while leaving other
Empirical Findings areas with unique land features undeveloped. The idea was
Research on Portland has shown UGB to be effective in this that development rights could be transferred to parcels that
regard (Dong and Gliebe 2012; Kim 2013; Kline et al. 2014; were better suited to accommodate development (Ibid).
Nelson and Moore 1996; Nelson and Sanchez 2003; Phillips New York City developed the first TDR program in the
and Goodstein 2000). Similar effects have been observed in United States in 1968 to permit the severance and sale of devel-
other areas of Oregon (Daniels and Nelson 1986; Dempsey opment rights from one parcel to another for the purpose of pre-
and Plantinga 2013; Gosnell et al. 2011; Kline 2005), San serving historic landmarks (Stevenson 1998). By 2005, about
Jose, CA (Landis 1986), Lexington, KY (L. R. Phillips 140 counties across the US had adopted TDR programs
2015), Boulder, CO (Correll, Lillydahl, and Singell 1978), (Walls and McConnell 2007) and, by 2017, it increased to
Seattle, WA (Cunningham 2007), and in several cross-sectional 283 counties (BenDor et al., 2021). The majority of TDR pro-
studies (Howell-Moroney 2007; Peiser 1989; Nelson 1985; grams are located in the Northeast, California, Washington and
Wassmer 2002; Bento, Franco, and Kaffine 2006; Nelson Florida (Nelson, Pruetz, and Woodruff 2012).
1986).
Landis (2021) compared the efficacy of UGB of Multnomah
County, OR with the more flexible “urban growth areas” in How it Works
Clark County, WA across different metrics and found that TDR, sometimes known as a transfer of development credits
UGB has performed better than “urban growth areas” in limit- (TDC), is a market-based tool that allows communities to
ing growth. In a national analysis of the 35 largest metropolitan channel development toward designated growth areas and
areas in the United States, Nelson and Sanchez (2005) found away from a community’s natural assets, farmlands, forest-
that metropolitan areas with containment policies that strongly lands, rural areas, or historically or culturally valuable
Ewing et al. 443

landmarks. Although the main purpose of a TDR program is the “helpful” category (Pruetz and Standridge 2008). Ewing
land preservation, it can also serve other functions like mitigat- (2009) used data for successful programs from the earlier
ing the effects of natural hazards or revitalizing urban areas. If article and analyzed degrees of success based on the presence
the landowner chooses to participate in a TDR program, they or absence of individual success factors using regression analy-
can sell their right to develop their sending area property hold- sis. Having a TDR bank was the only factor that added signifi-
ings while still holding onto ownership of the land itself cantly to the success of a program, on average, increasing the
(Triedman et al. 2014). By selling their development rights to amount of land preserved by almost 30,000 acres.
a landowner in a receiving area, they enable the receiving
area landowner to increase developmental density on the receiv-
ing land. Along with this, their sending area land must remain
undeveloped in perpetuity, or not developed any further Conclusions
(Woodbury 1975). The receiving site gains a density bonus We began this paper with a conceptual diagram that showed the
above what would otherwise be allowed by the zoning code. relationship among growth management tools -> compact devel-
In some cities’ master plans, potential receiving sites are specif- opment -> good outcomes. We noted that the literature relating
ically designated by the plan (Linkous 2016; Nelson, Pruetz, growth management tools to compact development is much
and Woodruff 2013; Rose 1984). weaker than the literature relating compact development to
good outcomes. This is only partly due to the greater volume
of studies in the latter category (Ewing and Cervero 2010;
Empirical Findings Ewing and Hamidi 2015). It also results from the greater
In the book The TDR Handbook, Nelson et al. (2013) extensively ability to operationalize (with existing data) compact develop-
elaborate on five essential types of preservation that result from ment and good outcomes than to operationalize growth manage-
TDR: farmland preservation, environmental preservation, rural ment tools, which are heterogeneous by nature. This isn’t to say it
character preservation, historic preservation, and urban design is impossible because Landis, Pendall, Daniels, and others have
and revitalization. Similarly, Landis (2021) compares the growth done it. But it is challenging. A suggestion for future research is
outcomes of Palm Beach County, FL which has a TDR to have more rigorous studies along these lines, which quantify
program with that of Broward County, FL which does not have the effectiveness of growth management tools.
such a program and finds that the TDR program has been partially Next, we categorized tools as Inside Game, Outside Game,
successful in preserving lands in fringe areas. or Mixed. Ten tools are so categorized: form-based code,
On the other hand, a number of studies argued that the per- density bonus, tax increment financing, concurrency/adequate
formance of TDR programs in the United States is mixed with a facility ordinances, priority funding areas, impact fees (all
few good examples and several failures (Fang et al. 2019; Shriar part of the Inside Game); agricultural protection zoning, pur-
and Akins 2018). It depends on whether the program aligns chase of development rights (Outside Game); and urban con-
with real estate market conditions in a specific area (Nelson, tainment policies, transfer of development rights (Mixed
Pruetz, and Woodruff 2013). Linkous and Chapin (2014) and Tools). Our sense is that the evidence in favor of mixed tools
Linkous (2016) analyzed the effectiveness of TDR programs is stronger than inside or outside alone, though evidence in
in managing growth in Florida and identified three distinct favor of anything is weak. It has been stated more than once
TDR approaches. The early TDR programs, that mostly facili- in this paper that the scholars in this area favor packages of
tated rural-to-urban transfers, had limited success. Hybrid TDR tools over individual tools, and that there is no silver bullet
programs with a smart growth orientation have been most suc- when it comes to managing growth. This conclusion, while
cessful at retrieving development rights in areas that cannot not empirically based, squares with common sense. We
support growth; and rural TDR programs with a focus on eco- would imagine that the best package would include a mix of
nomic development have saved many acres but at the expense inside, outside, and mixed tools. This sounds like Portland,
of increasing rural sprawl. Linkous and Chapin (2014) con- Seattle, Montgomery County, MD, and Arlington County,
cluded that the majority of TDR programs in Florida have VA, all successful examples of growth management.
little impact on managing growth and the acres saved is inade- A lack of rigorous research obviously hampers this literature
quate. Fang et al. (2019) drew a similar conclusion from their review. As one author quoted above put it, this review may leave
study on the TDR’s effect on farm preservation for three coun- “more questions than answers.” For every study that finds a
ties in Maryland—limited success in retaining farmland and strong relationship between growth management tools and
increasing amounts of low-to-medium density development. compact development, another finds no relationship or a weak
Pruetz and Standridge (2008) reviewed 191 TDR programs to or partial relationship. There could be many reasons for this.
investigate what factors applied to the 20 top successful pro- Contexts differ, as was clear from Daniels’ conclusion about
grams in terms of land preservation. They found that having ade- PDR programs being more effective in certain regions than
quate demand for TDRs because baseline densities are low ended others. Funding levels may differ from place to place. Time
up in the “essential” category; offering favorable transfer ratios since implementation may make a huge difference in effective-
was in the “extremely important” category; and having a publicly ness, as land use patterns change slowly over time. Political
operated TDR bank to buy and sell development rights fell into climate may make one region more tolerant of land use
444 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

regulation than another. There is no overstating the importance of constitute a package of growth management (grow inducing)
political feasibility in adopting growth management tools. techniques.
Also limiting this review are the multiple and different pur- Finally, there is the law of unintended consequences. An
poses of the different tools. APFOs or impact fees may lead to UGB a la Portland, or a greenbelt a la Boulder, or a rezoning
more compact development by raising the cost of land and that limits development in one spot may cause it to leapfrog to
housing, but that is not their main purpose. Their main a less desirable location. Sarasota’s five-acre ranchettes outside
purpose is to fund needed infrastructure in rapidly growing its urban growth boundary is the worst kind of sprawl
areas. So it comes as no surprise that there is more compelling (Linkous 2019). Are growth management tools effective in fos-
evidence of curbing sprawl in areas with UCPs than APFOs or tering compact development? As we said before, “it all depends.”
impact fees. Indeed, the only tools with the main purpose of
curbing sprawl are the strong UCPs.
Also limiting this review is the dearth of studies using rigor- Acknowledgments
ous research designs to infer cause and effect. Landis’s several The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of three master’s
studies using quasi-experimental methods to compare outcomes students at the University of Utah, who wrote the first drafts of sections
for otherwise comparable municipalities with and without on individual growth management tools: Jordan Baker, Alex Barton,
growth management is the rare exception in this literature. and Amanda Dillon.
Most studies use descriptive statistics to suggest the magnitude
of program impacts, and individual case studies (however valu- Authors’ Affiliation
able) lack the external validity of cross sectional statistical and
Reid Ewing is a Distinguished Professor of City and Metropolitan
quasi-experimental studies.
Planning at the University of Utah. Torrey Lyons is a Transportation
Even in the more rigorous studies of urban growth boundar- Electrification Policy Analyst at the Idaho National Laboratory.
ies, the subject of these studies is nearly always Portland, OR, a Fariba Siddiq is a doctoral student at the UCLA Luskin School of
unique place with a unique form of government and unique Public Affairs and a researcher at the UCLA Institute of
political culture. From the weaker studies, it is impossible to Transportation Studies. Fatemeh Kiani is the Transportation Project
assert the counter-factual of what would have happened in the Manager at Utah Department of Transportation. Sadegh Sabouri is a
absence of growth management. It is certainly possible that Postdoctoral Associate at the Senseable City Laboratory in the
compact development and good outcomes would have hap- Urban Studies & Planning Department at the Massachusetts Institute
pened to some degree anyway, or it is possible that in the of Technology. Shima Hamidi is a Bloomberg Assistant Professor at
absence of growth management, the growth trajectory would the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University.
have been much worse. Dong-ah Choi is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of City and
Metropolitan Planning at the University of Utah. Hassan Ameli is a
Probably the biggest impediment to any simple assessment
Ph.D. candidate and instructor in the Department of City and
of the effectiveness of growth management tools in containing Metropolitan Planning, the University of Utah.
sprawl lies in the nature of implementation. One UGB isn’t
equivalent to another. One TDR program isn’t equivalent to
another. Perhaps nowhere in this paper is this more obvious Authors’ Contribution
than in the Albuquerque “zone-based” impact fee program. Ewing conceived the paper, supervised its drafting, responded to
While flat impact fees may be ineffective in directing growth reviewer comments, and edited the final draft. Lyon’s contributions
inward, or may even have the opposite effect, a fee that is grad- include original drafts of sections and supervision of drafting and
uated to favor infill development may be very effective. editing. Siddiq’s contributions were the original drafts of certain sec-
Perhaps the future of growth management lies in the combi- tions, review, and editing. Kiani’s contributions were the original
nation or packaging of tools together, either in the Inside Game drafts of certain sections, review, and editing. Sabouri’s contributions
and/or the Outside Game. As noted by an anonymous reviewer, were the original drafts of certain sections, review, editing, and prepar-
no one growth management technique is a silver bullet and it is ing responses to reviewer comments. Hamidi edited the paper exten-
sively to fit within the journal’s word limit. Choi’s contributions
common for local governments to combine two or more tech-
were the original drafts of certain sections, review, and editing.
niques to create a growth management package. As a result, it
Ameli was involved in preparing responses to reviewer comments
is sometimes difficult to attribute success or lack of success to and editing the final draft.
a single tool. For example, in the case of the Outside Game,
the use of PDR alone has not been effective in places with
heavy development pressure – e.g., suburban Boston. But com- Declaration of Conflicting Interests
bining PDR with strong zoning, and urban growth boundaries The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
can create a package of tools that limits sprawl as in the case the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
of Sonoma County, CA, Marin County, CA, Baltimore
County, MD, and Lancaster, PA. Similarly, for the Inside
Game, combining Form-Based Codes with TIF and concur- Funding
rency, and targeted state infrastructure investment (PFAs) can The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship
and/or publication of this article.
Ewing et al. 445

ORCID iDs race, and property values.” Economic Development Quarterly 33

Reid Ewing https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4117-3456 (4): 316–330.
Fatemeh Kiani https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8031-0444 Boarnet, Marlon G., Ralph B. McLaughlin, and John I. Carruthers.
2011. “Does State Growth Management Change the Pattern of
Urban Growth? Evidence from Florida.” Regional Science and
References Urban Economics 41 (3): 236–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
regsciurbeco.2010.12.004.
Adams, J. S., J. Cidell, L. J. Hansen, H. J. Jung, Y. T. Ryu, and
Boggs, H., I. I. Glenn, and R. C. Apgar. 1991. “Concurrency and
B. J. VanDrasek. 1999. “Development impact fees for
Growth Management: A Lawyer’s Primer.” J. Land Use & Envtl.
Minnesota? a review of principles and national practices.”
L 7: 1.
Minneapolis: Center for Transportation Studies, University of
Borys, H., and E. Talen. 2017. The codes study: Trends in zoning
Minnesota. Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital
reform. Retrieved from http://www.placemakers.com/2017/02/15/
Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/1034.
codes-study-trends-in-zoning-reform/
Anthony, Jerry. 2003. “The Effects of Florida’s Growth Management
Briffault, Richard. 2010. “The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment
Act on Housing Affordability.” Journal of the American
Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government.”
Planning Association 69 (3): 282–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/
University of Chicago Law Review 77 (1): 65. https://
01944360308978020.
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol77/iss1/4.
Anthony, J. 2004. “Do state growth management regulations reduce
Brody, Samuel D., Virginia Carrasco, and Wesley E. Highfield.
sprawl?.” Urban Affairs Review 39 (3): 376–397.
2006. “Measuring the Adoption of Local Sprawl: Reduction
Anthony, Jerry. 2017. “State Growth Management and Urban Sprawl
Planning Policies in Florida.” Journal of Planning Education
Reduction: Lessons from Florida.” Journal of Urban Planning and
and Research 25 (3): 294–310. https://doi.org/10.1177/
Development 143 (4): 04017013. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)
0739456X05280546.
UP.1943-5444.0000393.
Burge, Gregory, and Keith Ihlanfeldt. 2006. “Impact Fees and
Balashov, A. 2014. “Keeping a Foot in Each Camp: Adequate Public Single-Family Home Construction.” Journal of Urban Economics
Facilities Ordinances as Both a Concurrency Tool and Means of 60 (2): 284–306. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2006.03.002.
Generating Revenue.” University of Baltimore Journal of Land Burge, G. S., T. L. Trosper, A. C. Nelson, J. C. Juergensmeyer, and
and Development 3 (2): 4. J. C. Nicholas. 2013. “Can Development Impact Fees Help
Barry, John. 2008. “Form-Based Codes: Measured Success Through Both Mitigate Urban Sprawl?” Journal of the American Planning
Mandatory and Optional Implementation Note.” Connecticut Law Association 79 (3): 235–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944363.
Review 41: 305. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/7. 2014.901116.
Been, V. 2005. “Impact Fees and Housing Affordability.” Cityscape Byrne, P. F. 2006. “Determinants of Property Value Growth for tax
(Washington, D C ) 8 (1): 139–85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ Increment Financing Districts.” Economic Development
20868573 . Quarterly 20 (4): 317–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
Ben-Zadok, Efraim. 2005. “Consistency, Concurrency and Compact 0891242406291540.
Development: Three Faces of Growth Management Calandrillo, S. P., C. V. Deliganis, and A. Woods. 2015. “When
Implementation in Florida.” Urban Studies 42 (12): 2167–90. Private Property Rights Collide with Growth Management
https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500332015. Legislation.” Cornell Real Estate Review 13: 20. https://
Bendor, T. K., J. Branham, A. Whittemore, E. Linkous, and digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/127/.
D. Timmerman. 2021. “A national inventory and analysis of US Carruthers, John I. 2002. “The Impacts of State Growth
transfer of development rights programs.” Journal of Management Programmes: A Comparative Analysis.” Urban Studies
Environmental Planning and Management, 1–21. 39 (11): 1959–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098022000011317.
Bengston, David N., Jennifer O. Fletcher, and Kristen C. Nelson. 2004. Catenaccio, G. 2011. “Urban growth boundaries: Two American
“Public Policies for Managing Urban Growth and Protecting Open examples.” The MIT Journal of Planning 3: 31–51.
Space: Policy Instruments and Lessons Learned in the United Chapin, T. S. 2012. “Introduction: From Growth Controls, to Comprehensive
States.” Landscape and Urban Planning 69 (2): 271–86. http:// Planning, to Smart Growth: Planning’s Emerging Fourth Wave.” Journal
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2003.08.007. of the American Planning Association 78 (1): 5–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.
Bento, Antonio M., Sofia F. Franco, and Daniel Kaffine. 2006. “The 1080/01944363.2011.645273.
Efficiency and Distributional Impacts of Alternative Anti-Sprawl Chapin, Timothy S., Charles E. Connerly, and Harrison T. Higgins.
Policies.” Journal of Urban Economics 59 (1): 121–41. http://dx. 2007. Growth Management in Florida: Planning for Paradise.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2005.09.004. New York, NY: Routledge.
Berrigan, D., Z. Tatalovich, L. W. Pickle, R. Ewing, and R. Ballard- Chapin, Timothy S., and Christopher Coutts. 2011. Growth
Barbash. 2014. “Urban sprawl, obesity, and cancer mortality in Management and Public Land Acquisition: Balancing
the United States: cross-sectional analysis and methodological chal- Conservation and Development. Ltd: Ashgate Publishing.
lenges.” International journal of health geographics 13 (1): 1–15. Cho, Seong-Hoon, Neelam Poudyal, and Dayton M. Lambert. 2008.
Blackmond Larnell, T., and D. C. Downey. 2019. “Tax increment “Estimating Spatially Varying Effects of Urban Growth Boundaries
financing in Chicago: The perplexing relationship between blight,
446 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

on Land Development and Land Value.” Land Use Policy 25 (3): 320– Dawkins, Casey, Gerrit Knaap, and Jason Sartori. 2012. Barriers to
29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2007.08.004. Development Inside Maryland’s Priority Funding Areas:
Cole, Rick. 2008. “Form-Based Codes: A Guide for Planners, Urban Perspectives of Planners, Developers, and Advocates. https://doi.
Designers, Municipalities, and Developers.” Journal of the org/10.13016/M2736M61R.
American Planning Association 75 (1): 91–2. https://doi.org/10. Dawkins, C. J., and A. C. Nelson. 2002. “Urban containment policies
1080/01944360802540224. and housing prices: an international comparison with implications
Correll, M. R., J. H. Lillydahl, and L. D. Singell. 1978. “The effects of for future research.” Land Use Policy 19 (1): 1–12.
greenbelts on residential property values: some findings on the politi- DeGrove, J. M. 1992. ““The New Frontier for Land Policy: Planning &
cal economy of open space.” Land economics 54 (2): 207–217. Growth Management in the States.” Cambridge.” MA: Lincoln
Coughlin, Robert E. 1991. “Formulating and Evaluating Agricultural Institute of Land Policy. https://trid.trb.org/view/410873.
Zoning Programs.” Journal of the American Planning Association Dempsey, Judith A., and Andrew J. Plantinga. 2013. “How Well Do
57 (2): 183–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944369108975486. Urban Growth Boundaries Contain Development? Results for
Cowan, S. 2006. “Anti-snob Land use Laws, Suburban Exclusion, and Oregon Using a Difference-in-Difference Estimator.” Regional
Housing Opportunity.” Journal of Urban Affairs 28: 295–313. Science and Urban Economics 43 (6): 996–1007. https://doi.org/
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-9906.2006.00293.x. 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.10.002.
Cox, W. 2001. American dream boundaries: Urban containment and Dong, H., and J. Gliebe. 2012. “Assessing the impacts of smart growth
its consequences. Atlanta GA: Georgia Public Policy Foundation. policies on home developers in a bi-state metropolitan area:
Cunningham, C. R. 2007. “Growth controls, real options, and land Evidence from the Portland metropolitan area.” Urban Studies 49
development.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (2): (10): 2219–2235.
343–358. Downs, A. 2002. “Have Housing Prices Risen Faster in Portland Than
Daniels, Thomas. 1991. “The Purchase of Development Rights: Elsewhere?” Housing Policy Debate 13 (1): 7–31. https://doi.org/
Preserving Agricultural Land and Open Space.” Journal of the 10.1080/10511482.2002.9521432.
American Planning Association 57 (4): 421–31. https://doi.org/ Dye, R. F., and D. F. Merriman. 2000. “The Effects of tax Increment
10.1080/01944369108975517. Financing on Economic Development.” Journal of Urban Economics
Daniels, Thomas. 2010. “The Use of Green Belts to Control Sprawl in 47 (2): 306–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/juec.1999.2149.
the United States.” Planning Practice & Research 25 (2): 255–71. Dye, R. F., and D. Merriman. 2003. ““The Effect of tax Increment
https://doi.org/10.1080/02697451003740288. Financing on Land use.” The Property Tax.” Land Use and Land
Daniels, Thomas. 2020. “Assessing the Performance of Farmland Use Regulation 37: 49–51.
Preservation in America’s Farmland Preservation Heartland: A El-Khattabi, A. R., and T. W. Lester. 2019. “Does Tax Increment
Policy Review.” Society & Natural Resources 33 (6): 758–68. Financing Pass the ‘But-For’ Test in Missouri?” Economic
https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2019.1659893. Development Quarterly 33 (3): 187–202. https://doi.org/10.1177/
Daniels, Thomas, and Deborah Bowers. 1997. Holding Our 0891242419859097.
Ground: Protecting America’s Farms And Farmland. Esparza, Adrian X., and John I. Carruthers. 2000. “Land Use Planning
Washington, DC: Island Press. and Exurbanization in the Rural Mountain West: Evidence from
Daniels, Thomas, and John C Keene. 2018. The Law of Agricultural Arizona.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 20 (1):
Land Preservation in the United States. 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/073945600128992573.
Daniels, Thomas, and Arthur C. Nelson. 1986. “Is Oregon’s Farmland Ewing, Reid. 2009. “When Quantitative Research Trumps Qualitative
Preservation Program Working?” Journal of the American —What Makes Transfer of Development Rights Work.” Planning
Planning Association 52 (1): 22–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Magazine 75 (1): 49. http://www.arch.utah.edu/cgi-bin/wordpress-
01944368608976856. metroresearch/wp-content/uploads/2012/publications/
Daniels, Thomas, and Lauren Payne-Riley. 2017. “Preserving Large researchyoucanuse/January_2009.pdf.
Farming Landscapes: The Case of Lancaster County, Ewing, R., and R. Cervero. 2010. “Travel and the Built Environment:
Pennsylvania.” Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and A Meta-Analysis.” Journal of the American planning association
Community Development 7 (3): 67–81. https://doi.org/10.5304/ 76 (3): 265–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944361003766766.
jafscd.2017.073.004. Ewing, Reid, and Shima Hamidi. 2015. “Urban Sprawl as a Risk
Daniels, T. L., and D. E. Reed. 1988. “Agricultural zoning in a metro- Factor in Motor Vehicle Occupant and Pedestrian Fatalities:
politan county: An evaluation of the Black Hawk County, Iowa, Update and Refinement.” Transportation Research Record 2513:
program.” Landscape and urban planning 16: 303–310. 40–7. https://doi.org/10.3141/2513-05.
Dawkins, C. J. 2009. “Urban sprawl and the transition to first-time Ewing, R., and S. Hamidi. 2017. Costs of Sprawl. New York, NY:
homeownership.” Cityscape: 83–100. Taylor & Francis.
Dawkins, Casey, Jae Sik Jeon, and Gerrit Knaap. 2017. “Creating and Ewing, Reid, Shima Hamidi, and James Grace. 2016b. “Urban Sprawl
Preserving Affordable Homeownership Opportunities: Does as a Risk Factor in Motor Vehicle Crashes.” Urban Studies 53 (2):
Inclusionary Zoning Make Sense?” Journal of Planning Education 247–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098014562331.
and Research 37 (4): 444–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/ Ewing, Reid, Shima Hamidi, James B. Grace, and Yehua Dennis Wei.
0739456X16659763. 2016a. “Does Urban Sprawl Hold Down Upward Mobility?”
Ewing et al. 447

Landscape and Urban Planning 148 (April): 80–8. https://doi.org/ Integrating Planning Principles.” Journal of the American
10.1016/j.landurbplan.2015.11.012. Planning Association 81 (1): 46–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/
Ewing, R., S. Hamidi, A. C. Nelson, and J. B. Grace. 2014a. 01944363.2015.1043137.
“Combined Effects of Compact Development, Transportation Ginsburg, B. 2003. “TIF case studies.” Community Center for Labor
Investments, and Road User Pricing on Vehicle Miles Traveled Research, Chicago, IL.
in Urbanized Areas.” Transportation Research Record: Journal Gosnell, Hannah, Jeffrey D. Kline, Garrett Chrostek, and
of the Transportation Research Board 2397: 117–24. http://dx. James Duncan. 2011. “Is Oregon’s Land Use Planning Program
doi.org/10.3141/2397-14. Conserving Forest and Farm Land? A Review of the Evidence.”
Ewing, Reid, Gail Meakins, Shima Hamidi, and Arthur C. Nelson. Land Use Policy 28: 185–92. 185–92.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
2014b. “Relationship Between Urban Sprawl and Physical landusepol.2010.05.012.
Activity, Obesity, and Morbidity–Update and Refinement.” Gwinnett County. n.d. “Innovative Planning Approaches.”. https://
Health & Place 26: 118–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. www.gwinnettcounty.com/static/departments/planning/unified_
healthplace.2013.12.008. development_ordinance/pdf/ipa_incentive_zoning.pdf.
Ewing, R., R. Pendall, and D. Chen. 2003a. “Measuring Sprawl and Its Hall, Eliza. 2007. “Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative
Transportation Impacts.” Transportation Research Record 1831 Critique of Euclidean Zoning.” University of Pittsburgh Law Review
(1): 175–83. https://doi.org/10.3141/1831-20. 68 (4), https://doi.org/10.5195/lawreview.2007.77.
Ewing, Reid, and Fang Rong. 2008. “The Impact of Urban Form on Hall, J. L., and C. E. Bartels. 2014. “Management Practice Variation in
U.S. Residential Energy Use.” Housing Policy Debate 19 (1): 1– Tax Increment Financing Districts: An Empirical Examination of
30. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2008.9521624. the Administrative Theory of Performance.” Economic
Ewing, Reid, Richard A. Schieber, and Charles V. Zegeer. 2003b. “Urban Development Quarterly 28 (3): 270–282.
Sprawl as a Risk Factor in Motor Vehicle Occupant and Pedestrian Hamidi, Shima. 2020. “Urban Sprawl and the Emergence of Food
Fatalities.” American Journal of Public Health 93 (9): 1541–45. Deserts in the USA.” Urban Studies 57 (8): 1660–75. https://doi.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.9.1541. org/10.1177/0042098019841540.
Fan, Yingling, and Yan Song. 2009. “Is Sprawl Associated with a Hamidi, Shima, and Reid Ewing. 2015. “Is Sprawl Affordable for
Widening Urban–Suburban Mortality Gap?” Journal of Urban Americans?: Exploring the Association Between Housing and
Health 86 (5): 708–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-009-9382-3. Transportation Affordability and Urban Sprawl.” Transportation
Fang, Li, Marie Howland, Jinyhup Kim, Qiong Peng, and Jiemin Wu. Research Record 2500 (1): 75–9. https://doi.org/10.3141/2500-09.
2019. “Can Transfer of Development Rights Programs Save Hamidi, Shima, and Reid Ewing. 2020. “Compact Development and BMI
Farmland in Metropolitan Counties?” Growth and Change 50 for Young Adults: Environmental Determinism or Self-Selection?”
(3): 926–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/grow.12305. Journal of the American Planning Association 86 (3): 349–63.
Frece, J., E. Holler, G. Knaap, and Jungyul Sohn. 2003. “Smart http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2020.1730705.
Growth, Housing Markets, and Development Trends in the Hamidi, S., R. Ewing, I. Preuss, and A. Dodds. 2015. “Measuring
Baltimore-Washington Corridor.” In. https://doi.org/10.13016/ Sprawl and its Impacts: An Update.” Journal of Planning
M23F4KS1D. Education and Research 35 (1): 35–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
Fulton, W., J. Mazurek, R. Pruetz, and C. Williamson. 2004. TDRS and 0739456X14565247.
Other Market-Based Land Mechanisms: How They Work and Their Hamidi, Shima, Reid Ewing, and Sadegh Sabouri. 2020a.
Role in Shaping Metropolitan Growth. Washington, DC: The “Longitudinal Analyses of the Relationship Between
Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. Development Density and the COVID-19 Morbidity and
Garcia, D. 2020. “Revisiting California’s Density Bonus Law: Mortality Rates: Early Evidence from 1,165 Metropolitan
Analysis of SB 1085 and AB 2345.” Terner Center for Housing Counties in the United States.” Health & Place 64: 102378.
Innovation.University of California Berkeley; https://www.habitat- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2020.102378.
ca.org/wpcontent/ uploads/2020/08/Revisiting_California%E2% Hamidi, Shima, Reid Ewing, Zaria Tatalovich, James B. Grace, and
80%99s_Density_Bonus_Law.pdf. David Berrigan. 2018. “Associations Between Urban Sprawl and
Garde, A. 2018. “Form-based codes for downtown redevelopment: Life Expectancy in the United States.” International Journal of
Insights from Southern California.” Journal of Planning Environmental Research and Public Health 15 (5): 861. https://
Education and Research 38 (2): 198–210. doi.org/10.3390/ijerph15050861.
Garde, Ajay, and Andrea Hoff. 2017Zoning Reform for Advancing Hamidi, Shima, Sadegh Sabouri, and Reid Ewing. 2020b. “Does
Sustainability: Insights from Denver’s Form-Based Code.” Density Aggravate the COVID-19 Pandemic? Early Findings and
Journal of Urban Design 22 (6): 845–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Lessons for Planners.” Journal of the American Planning
13574809.2017.1337495. Association 86 (4): 495–509. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.
Garde, A., and C. Kim. 2017. “Form-based codes for zoning reform to 2020.1777891.
promote sustainable development: Insights from cities in Southern Hamidi, Shima, and Ahoura Zandiatashbar. 2019. “Does Urban Form
California.” Journal of the American Planning Association 83 (4): Matter for Innovation Productivity? A National Multi-Level Study
346–364. of the Association Between Neighbourhood Innovation Capacity
Garde, Ajay, Cecilia Kim, and Oscar Tsai. 2015. “Differences Between and Urban Sprawl.” Urban Studies 56 (8): 1576–94. https://doi.
Miami’s Form-Based Code and Traditional Zoning Code in org/10.1177/0042098018767002.
448 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

Hamidi, Shima, and Ahoura Zandiatashbar. 2021. “Compact Metropolitan Area.” Environment and Planning B: Planning and
Development and Adherence to Stay-at-Home Order During the Design 31 (2): 251–71. https://doi.org/10.1068/b2983.
COVID-19 Pandemic: A Longitudinal Investigation in the United Jeon, J., S. Kim, and S. M. Kwon. 2020. “The Effects of Urban
States.” Landscape and Urban Planning 205: 103952. http://dx. Containment Policies on Public Health.” International Journal of
doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2020.103952. Environmental Research and Public Health 17 (9): 3275.
Hamidi, Shima, Ahoura Zandiatashbar, and Ahmad Bonakdar. 2019. Johnson, Craig L., and Kenneth A. Kriz. 2019. Tax Increment
““The Relationship Between Regional Compactness and Financing and Economic Development, Second Edition: Uses,
Regional Innovation Capacity (RIC): Empirical Evidence from a Structures, and Impact. Albany, NY: SUNY.
National Study.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change.” Jun, Myung-Jin. 2004. “The Effects of Portland’s Urban Growth
Understanding Smart Cities: Innovation ecosystems, technological Boundary on Urban Development Patterns and Commuting.”
advancements, and societal challenges 142 (May): 394–402. Urban Studies 41 (7): 1333–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.07.026. 0042098042000214824.
Hananouchi, Robert, and Cornelius Nuworsoo. 2010. “Comparison of Kim, Jae Hong. 2013. “Measuring the Containment and Spillover
Parking Requirements in Zoning and Form-Based Codes.” Effects of Urban Growth Boundaries: The Case of the Portland
Transportation Research Record 2187 (1): 138–45. https://doi. Metropolitan Area.” Growth and Change 44 (4): 650–75. https://
org/10.3141/2187-18. doi.org/10.1111/grow.12028.
Hanlon, Bernadette, Marie Howland, and Michael P. McGuire. 2012. Kim, J., R. L. Steiner, and Y. Yang. 2014. “The Evolution of
“Hotspots for Growth.” Journal of the American Planning Transportation Concurrency and Urban Development Pattern in
Association 78 (3): 256–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2012. Miami-Dade County, Florida.” Urban Affairs Review 50 (5): 672–
715501. 701. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087413518178.
Hansen, Gail. 2014. “Design for Healthy Communities: The Potential Kline, Jeffrey D. 2005. “Forest and Farmland Conservation Effects of
of Form-Based Codes to Create Walkable Urban Streets.” Journal Oregon’s (USA) Land-Use Planning Program.” Environmental
of Urban Design 19 (2): 151–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Management 35 (4): 368–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00267-
13574809.2013.870466. 004-0054-5.
He, C., and S. Azizi. 2020. “The Impact of tax Increment Financing on Kline, Jeffrey D., and Ralph J. Alig. 1999. “Does Land Use Planning
Property Value.” International Journal of Housing Markets and Slow the Conversion of Forest and Farm Lands?” Growth and
Analysis 13 (5): 689–711. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJHMA-05-2019-0049. Change 30: 3–22. https://www.fs.usda.gov/treesearch/pubs/24403.
Hepinstall-Cymerman, J., S. Coe, and L. R. Hutyra. 2013. “Urban Kline, J. D., P. Thiers, C. P. Ozawa, and J. A. Yeakley. 2014. “How
Growth Patterns and Growth Management Boundaries in the well has land-use planning worked under different governance
Central Puget Sound, Washington, 1986-2007.” Urban Ecosystems regimes? A case study in the Portland, OR-Vancouver, WA metro-
16: 109–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11252-011-0206-3. politan area, USA.” Landscape and Urban Planning 131: 51–63.
Hicks, M. J., D. Faulk, and S. Devaraj. 2019. “Tax Increment Knaap, Gerrit. 1985. “The Price Effects of Urban Growth Boundaries
Financing: Capturing or Creating Growth?” Growth and Change in Metropolitan Portland, Oregon.” Land Economics 61 (1): 26–35.
50 (2): 672–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/grow.12296. https://doi.org/10.2307/3146137.
Horowitz, John K., Lori Lynch, and Andrew Stocking. 2009. Knaap, G. J. 2017. “An Inquiry into the Promise and Prospects of
“Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Smart Growth.” In Towards Sustainable Cities, 61–79. Routledge.
Farmland Preservation in Maryland.” Land Economics 85 (4): Kohr, R. T. 2004. “From form to function: An evaluation of the effec-
555–75. https://doi.org/10.3368/le.85.4.555. tiveness and potential of form-based zoning codes.” Doctoral dis-
Howell-Moroney, Michael. 2007. “Studying the Effects of the sertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Intensity of US State Growth Management Approaches on Land Landis, John D. 1986. “Land Regulation and the Price of New Housing
Development Outcomes.” Urban Studies 44 (11): 2163–78. Lessons from Three California Cities.” Journal of the American
https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980701518958. Planning Association 52 (1): 9–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/
Howland, M., and J. Sohn. 2007. “Has Maryland’s Priority Funding 01944368608976855.
Areas Initiative Constrained the Expansion of Water and Sewer Landis, John D. 1992. “Do Growth Controls Work?: A New
Investments?” Land Use Policy 24 (1): 175–86. http://dx.doi.org/ Assessment.” Journal of the American Planning Association 58
10.1016/j.landusepol.2005.05.008. (4): 489–508. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944369208975831.
Ingram, G. K., A. Carbonell, Y. H. Hong, and A. Flint. 2009. Smart Landis, John. D. 2000. “Growth as Density: Understanding
Growth Policies. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. California’s Postwar Growth Patterns and Trends.” In:
Irwin, Elena G., and Nancy E. Bockstael. 2004. ““Land Use Metropolitan Development Patterns. Annual Roundtable.
Externalities, Open Space Preservation, and Urban Sprawl.” Landis, John D. 2017. “The End of Sprawl? Not so Fast.” Housing
Regional Science and Urban Economics.” Analysis of Urban Policy Debate 27 (5): 659–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.
Land Markets and the Impact of Land Market Regulation 34 (6): 2017.1296014.
705–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2004.03.002. Landis, John D. 2021. ““Fifty Years of Local Growth Management in
Jantz, Claire A, Scott J Goetz, and Mary K Shelley. 2004. “Using the America.” Progress in Planning.” Fifty years of local growth man-
SLEUTH Urban Growth Model to Simulate the Impacts of Future agement in America 145 (March): 100435. https://doi.org/10.1016/
Policy Scenarios on Urban Land Use in the Baltimore-Washington j.progress.2019.100435.
Ewing et al. 449

Landis, John D., Michael Larice, Deva Dawson, and Lan Deng. 2001. metropolitan growth management.” APA Planning Advisory
Pay to Play: Residential Development Fees in California Cities and Service Reports (520): 1–82.
Counties 1999. Nelson, A. C., and J. B. Duncan. 1995. Growth Management
Lawrence, Libby. 1997. “Farmland Protection Policy: An Economic Principles and Practices. Chicago, IL: Planners Press, American
Perspective.” Working Paper, 97–1. American Farmland Trust, Planning Association.
Center for Agriculture in the Environment. Nelson, Arthur C., and Terry Moore. 1996. “Assessing Growth
Leroy, G. 2008. “TIF, greenfields, and sprawl: How an incentive Management Policy Implementation: Case Study of the United
created to alleviate slums has come to subsidize upscale malls States’ Leading Growth Management State.” Land Use Policy 13
and new urbanist developments.” Planning and Environmental (4): 241–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/0264-8377(96)84555-8.
Law 60 (2): 3–11. Nelson, A. C., J. C. Nicholas, and J. C. Juergensmeyer. 2017. “Impact
Leroy, G., and K. Walter. 2006. The Thin Cities: How Subsidized Job Fees and the Planning Connection.” In Impact Fees, 155–70. New
Piracy Deepens Inequality in the Twin Cities Metro Area. York, NY: Routledge.
Washington D.C.: Good Jobs First. Nelson, A., R. Pruetz, and D. Woodruff. 2012. The TDR Handbook:
Levine, Ned. 1999. “The Effects of Local Growth Controls on Designing and Implementing Transfer of Development Rights
Regional Housing Production and Population Redistribution in Programs. Washington DC: Island Press.
California.” Urban Studies 36 (12): 2047–68. https://doi.org/10. Nelson, Arthur C., Rick Pruetz, and Doug Woodruff. 2013. The TDR
1080/0042098992539. Handbook: Designing and Implementing Transfer of Development
Lewis, R. C. 2011. Do smart growth instruments in Maryland make a Rights Programs. Washington, DC: Island Press.
difference?. College Park, MD: University of Maryland. Nelson, Arthur C., and Thomas Sanchez. 2003. “Periodic Atlas of the
Linkous, Evangeline R. 2016. “Transfer of Development Rights in Metroscape: Lassoing Urban Sprawl.” Metroscape, http://archives.
Theory and Practice: The Restructuring of TDR to Incentivize pdx.edu/ds/psu/16141 .
Development.” Land Use Policy 51 (February): 162–71. https:// Nelson, A. C., and T. W. Sanchez. 2005. “The effectiveness of urban
doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.10.031. containment regimes in reducing exurban sprawl.” disP-The
Linkous, E. R. 2017. “Transfer of Development Rights and Urban Planning Review 41 (160): 42–47.
Land Markets.” Environment and Planning A 49 (5): 1122–45. New York Times. 4 July 1926. 8: 3. Retrieved from: https://www.
Linkous, Evangeline R. 2019. “A Political Ecology of Exurbia in the nytimes.com/sitemap/1926/07/04/
Sunbelt: Lessons from an Award-Winning, ‘Unworkable’ Plan.” Nguyen, Doan. 2010. “Evidence of the Impacts of Urban Sprawl on
Urban Affairs Review 55 (4): 1175–217. https://doi.org/10.1177/ Social Capital.” Environment and Planning B: Planning and
1078087417726173. Design 37 (4): 610–27. https://doi.org/10.1068/b35120.
Linkous, Evangeline R., and Timothy S. Chapin. 2014. “TDR Program Nolon, J. R. 2003. “Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins
Performance in Florida.” Journal of the American Planning Association of Smart Growth.” The Urban Lawyer, 15–73.
80 (3): 253–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2014.985697. Park, Keunhyun, Reid Ewing, Sadegh Sabouri, Dong ah Choi,
Liu, Xiangping, and Lori Lynch. 2011. “Do Agricultural Land Shima Hamidi, and Guang Tian. 2020. “Guidelines for a
Preservation Programs Reduce Farmland Loss? Evidence from a Polycentric Region to Reduce Vehicle Use and Increase Walking
Propensity Score Matching Estimator.” Land Economics 87 (2): and Transit Use.” Journal of the American Planning Association
183–201. 86 (2): 236–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2019.1692690.
Lloyd, G. 1961. Transferable density in connection with zoning. Parolek, Daniel G., Karen Parolek, and Paul C. Crawford. 2008. Form
Technical bulletin no. 40. Washington D.C.: Urban Land Institute. Based Codes: A Guide for Planners, Urban Designers, Municipalities,
Maryland Department of Planning. 2007. Maryland, Growing and Developers. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
Smarter. Baltimore: 16. MDP. Print. Paulsen, Kurt. 2013. “The Effects of Growth Management on the
Merriman, David F., Mark L. Skidmore, and Russ D. Kashian. 2011. Spatial Extent of Urban Development, Revisited.” Land
“Do Tax Increment Finance Districts Stimulate Growth in Real Economics 89 (2): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.3368/le.89.2.193.
Estate Values?” Real Estate Economics 39 (2): 221–50. https:// Peiser, Richard B. 1989. “Density and Urban Sprawl.” Land
doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00294.x. Economics 65 (3): 193–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3146665.
Nelson, Arthur C. 1985. “Demand, Segmentation, and Timing Effects of an Pendall, Rolf. 1999. “Do Land-Use Controls Cause Sprawl?”
Urban Containment Program on Urban Fringe Land Values.” Urban Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 26 (4): 555–
Studies 22 (5): 439–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420988520080751. 71. https://doi.org/10.1068/b260555.
Nelson, A. C. 1986. “Using land markets to evaluate urban contain- Pendall, Rolf, J. Martin, and W. Fulton. 2002. “HOLDING THE
ment programs.” Journal of the American Planning Association LINE: URBAN CONTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,”
52 (2): 156–171. August. https://trid.trb.org/view/723961.
Nelson, Arthur C. 1988. “Development Impact Fees.” Journal of the Pendall, Rolf, Jake Wegmann, Jonathan Martin, and Dehui Wei. 2018.
American Planning Association 54 (1): 3–6. https://doi.org/10. “The Growth of Control? Changes in Local Land-Use Regulation
1080/01944368808977147. in Major U.S. Metropolitan Areas From 1994 to 2003.” Housing
Nelson, A. C., and C. J. Dawkins. 2004. “Urban containment in the Policy Debate 28 (6): 901–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.
United States: history, models, and techniques for regional and 2018.1494024.
450 Journal of Planning Literature 37(3)

Phillips, Lynn Roche. 2015. “A Comparative Study of Growth Schweitzer, Lisa, and Jiangping Zhou. 2010. “Neighborhood Air Quality,
Management Effectiveness and Urban Sprawl in Two Respiratory Health, and Vulnerable Populations in Compact and
Thoroughbred Landscapes in the U.S.” Applied Geography 65 Sprawled Regions.” Journal of the American Planning Association
(December): 58–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2015.09.002. 76 (3): 363–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944363.2010.486623.
Phillips, J., and E. Goodstein. 2000. “Growth Management and Housing Shen, Qing, and Feng Zhang. 2007. “Land-Use Changes in a Pro-
Prices: The Case of Portland, Oregon.” Contemporary Economic Policy Smart-Growth State: Maryland, USA.” Environment and Planning
18 (3): 334–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00030.x. A: Economy and Space 39 (6): 1457–77. https://doi.org/10.1068/a3886.
Phillips, R. G., and M. Guttenplan. 2003. “A Review of Approaches Shriar, Avrum J., and Alissa Akins. 2018. “Transfer of Development
for Assessing Multimodal Quality of Service.” Journal of Public Rights, Growth Management, and Landscape Conservation in
Transportation 6 (4): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2375-0901.6.4.4. Virginia.” Local Environment 23 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.
Plantinga, Andrew J., and Stephanie Bernell. 2007. “The Association 1080/13549839.2017.1382458.
Between Urban Sprawl and Obesity: Is It a Two-Way Street?” Skidmore, M., D. Merriman, and R. Kashian. 2009. “The relationship
Journal of Regional Science 47 (5): 857–79. https://doi.org/10. between tax increment finance and municipal land annexation.”
1111/j.1467-9787.2007.00533.x. Land Economics 85 (4): 598–613.
Plantinga, Andrew J., Ruben N. Lubowski, and Robert N. Stavins. Skidmore, M., and M. Peddle. 1998. “Do Development Impact Fees
2002. “The Effects of Potential Land Development on Reduce the Rate of Residential Development?” Growth and
Agricultural Land Prices.” Journal of Urban Economics 52 (3): Change 29 (4): 383–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2257.
561–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0094-1190(02)00503-X. 1998.tb00026.x.
Pruetz, Rick, and Noah Standridge. 2008. “What Makes Transfer of Smith, L. A. 2009. “Alternatives to property tax increment finance pro-
Development Rights Work?: Success Factors From Research and grams: Sales, income, and nonproperty tax increment financing.”
Practice.” Journal of the American Planning Association 75 (1): The Urban Lawyer, pp. 705–724.
78–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360802565627. Sohn, Jungyul, and Gerrit-Jan Knaap. 2005. “Does the Job Creation
Ramírez de la Cruz, Edgar E. 2009. “Local Political Institutions and Tax Credit Program in Maryland Help Concentrate Employment
Smart Growth: An Empirical Study of the Politics of Compact Growth?” Economic Development Quarterly 19 (4): 313–26.
Development.” Urban Affairs Review 45 (2): 218–46. https://doi. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891242405278183.
org/10.1177/1078087409334309. Sohn, Jungyul, and Gerrit Knaap. 2010. “Maryland’s Priority Funding
Revell, K. D. 1999. “The road to Euclid v. Ambler: city planning, state- Area and the Spatial Pattern of the New Housing Development.”
building, and the changing scope of the police power.” Studies in Scottish Geographical Journal 126 (2): 76–100. https://doi.org/
American Political Development 13 (1): 50–145. 10.1080/14702541003712903.
Richardson, J. J.Jr 2003. “Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland Staley, S., J. G. Edgens, and G. C. S. Mildner. 1999. A Line in the
Protection.” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 19 (1): Land: Urban-Growth Boundaries, Smart Growth, and Housing
59. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42842834 . Affordability. Reason Public Policy Institute, Policy Study No.
Rose, Jerome G. 1984. “Farmland Preservation Policy and Programs.” 263p, Policy Study No. 263, p. 49
Natural Resources Journal 24 (3): 591–640. https://www.jstor.org/ Stevenson, S. J. 1998. “Banking on TDRs: The Government’s Role as
stable/24882565. Banker of Transferable Development Rights.” New York University
Rothwell, Jonathan T., and Douglas S. Massey. 2010. “Density Zoning Law Review 73: 1329.
and Class Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Social Science Stone, Brian. 2008. “Urban Sprawl and Air Quality in Large US
Quarterly 91 (5): 112343. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956453. Cities.” Journal of Environmental Management 86 (4): 688–98.
Rusk, David. 2010. Inside Game/Outside Game: Winning Strategies http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.12.034
for Saving Urban America. Washington, DC: Brookings Stone, B., J. J. Hess, and H. Frumkin. 2010. “Urban form and extreme
Institution Press. heat events: are sprawling cities more vulnerable to climate change
Sabouri, Sadegh, Amanda Dillon, David Proffitt, Megan Townsend, and than compact cities?.” Environmental health perspectives 118 (10):
Reid Ewing. 2019. “State-of-the-Practice in Connecting and 1425–1428.
Coordinating Transportation and Land Use Planning in the U.S.A.” Stromberg, Brian, and Lisa Sturtevant. 2016. “What Makes Inclusionary
Transportation Research Record 2673 (9): 240–53. https://doi.org/ Zoning Happen? National Housing Conference.
10.1177/0361198119844762. Sullivan, E. J. 2015. “Urban Growth Management in Portland,
Sakowicz, J. C. 2004. “Urban Sprawl: Florida’s and Maryland’s Oregon.” Oregon Law Review 93: 455–498.
approaches.” Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 19 (2): Talen, Emily. 2009. “Design by the Rules: The Historical Underpinnings
377–424. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42842845. of Form-Based Codes.” Journal of the American Planning Association
Salkin, P. E. 1999. “Smart Growth at Century’s end: The State of the 75 (2): 144–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360802686662.
States.” The Urban Lawyer, 601–48. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ Talen, Emily. 2013. “Zoning For and Against Sprawl: The Case for
27895196. Form-Based Codes.” Journal of Urban Design 18 (2): 175–200.
SANDAG. n.d. “Comprehensive Land Use and Regional Growth Projects: https://doi.org/10.1080/13574809.2013.772883.
Smart Growth Tool Box.” Accessed July 11, 2021. https://www.sandag. Taves, L. 2002. Density Bonus as a Tool for Green Space
org/index.asp?projectid=334&fuseaction=projects.detail. Conservation. Burnaby: Simon Fraser University. https://
Ewing et al. 451

www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk4/etd/MQ81976.pdf? White, S. M. 1996. Adequate public facilities ordinances and trans-

oclc_number= portation management, Planning Advisory Service Report No.
57000815 465. Chicago: American Planning Association.
Towe, Charles, Rebecca Lewis, and Lori Lynch. 2014. “Using Wolfram, Gary. 1981. “The Sale of Development Rights and
Quasi-Experimental Methods to Evaluate Land Policies.” The Zoning in the Preservation of Open Space: Lindahl Equilibrium and
Oxford Handbook of Land Economics. July 22: 2014. https://doi. a Case Study.” Land Economics 57 (3): 398–413. https://doi.org/10.
org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199763740.013.027. 2307/3146020.
Triedman, Lucy, Caroline Caldwell, Elizabeth Sangree, and Mark McCauley. Woodbury, Steven R. 1975. “Transfer of Development Rights: A New
2014. “A Study of the Feasibility of a Transfer of Development Rights Tool for Planners.” Journal of the American Institute of Planners
Program in Lewiston, Maine.” Community Engaged Research Reports, 41 (1): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944367508977509.
January. https://scarab.bates.edu/community_engaged_research/17. Youngman, J. M. 2016. A good tax: Legal and policy issues for the
Trowbridge, Matthew J., Matthew J. Gurka, and Robert E. O’Connor. property tax in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln
2009. “Urban Sprawl and Delayed Ambulance Arrival in the U.S.” Institute of Land Policy.
American Journal of Preventive Medicine 37 (5): 428–32. https:// Zhao, Z. J., K. V. Das, and K. Larson. 2010. “Tax increment financing
doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2009.06.016. as a value capture strategy in funding transportation.”
Trowbridge, Matthew J., and Noreen C. McDonald. 2008. “Urban Transportation Research Record 2187 (1): 1–7.
Sprawl and Miles Driven Daily by Teenagers in the United Zorn, P. M., D. E. Hansen, and S. I. Schwartz. 1986. “Mitigating the
States.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 34 (3): 202–6. Price Effects of Growth Control: A Case Study of Davis,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2007.11.013. California.” Land Economics 62 (1): 46–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.
Valliant, J., and J. Freedgood. 2020. “Land Access Policy Incentives.” Journal 2307/3146562.
of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development 9 (3): 71–78.
Walls, Margaret, and Virginia McConnell. 2007. “Transfer of
Author biographies
Development Rights in U.S. Communities: Evaluating Program
Design, Implementation, and Outcomes : ConservationTools.” Reid Ewing is a Distinguished Professor of City and Metropolitan
2007. https://conservationtools.org/library_items/263-Transfer-of- Planning at the University of Utah.
Development-Rights-in-U-S-Communities-Evaluating-program-
Torrey Lyons is a Transportation Electrification Policy Analyst at the
design-implementation-and-outcomes.
Idaho National Laboratory.
Wassmer, Robert W. 2002. “Fiscalisation of Land Use, Urban Growth
Boundaries and Non-Central Retail Sprawl in the Western United Fariba Siddiq is a doctoral student at the UCLA Luskin School of
States.” Urban Studies 39 (8): 1307–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/ Public Affairs and a researcher at the UCLA Institute of
00420980220142655. Transportation Studies.
Weber, R., S. D. Bhatta, and D. Merriman. 2003. “Does tax Increment
Financing Raise Urban Industrial Property Values?” Urban Studies Sadegh Sabouri is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Senseable City
40 (10): 2001–21. Laboratory in the Urban Studies & Planning Department at the
Weber, R., and L. Goddeeris. 2007. “Tax Increment Financing: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Process and Planning Issues” (Working Paper No. WP07RW1). Fatemeh Kiani is the Transportation Project Manager at the Utah
Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Department of Transportation.
Weitz, J. 1999. “From Quiet Revolution to Smart Growth: State
Growth Management Programs, 1960 to 1999.” Journal of Shima Hamidi is a Bloomberg Assistant Professor at the Bloomberg
Planning Literature 14 (2): 266–337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University.
08854129922092694.
Dong-ah Choi is a PhD Candidate in the Department of City and
Weitz, J. 2012. “Growth Management in the United States, 2000–
Metropolitan Planning at the University of Utah.
2010: A Decennial Review and Synthesis.” Journal of Planning
Literature 27 (4): 394–433. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ Hassan Ameli is a PhD candidate and instructor in the Department of
0885412212451030. City and Metropolitan Planning, the University of Utah.