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Journal of Economics, Management and Religion

Vol. 3, No. 2 (2022) 2250008 (34 pages)
© World Scientific Publishing Company
DOI: 10.1142/S2737436X2250008X

Religion, Morality, and Economics: Insights

from the Sikh Tradition

Nirvikar Singh
Department of Economics, University of California
Santa Cruz 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA
[email protected]

Received 11 January 2022

Revised 4 December 2022
Accepted 26 December 2022
Published 31 January 2023

This paper analyses the Sikh religious tradition in light of research on the connec-
tions between religion, morality, and economics. Sikhism provides a compact and well-
documented example of the creation and evolution of a religious community, in which
moral guidance is paramount, but interacts with material incentives and material conditions.
The time scale of this case, and its geographic and conceptual location in juxtaposition to
Hinduism and Islam, make Sikh tradition a useful additional data point for analyses of the
relationship of religion, morality, and economics. At the same time, considering the Sikh
tradition in these more general conceptual frameworks provides a clearer understanding of
this specific case.

Keywords: Religion; morality; economics; ethics; evolution; Sikhism.

JEL Classification: B55, D60, Z12

Introduction
Religion, broadly defined as a collection of shared beliefs and practices with super-
natural components, is relatively recent as an object of scholarly study that seeks
to conduct that study whilst avoiding a particular normative stance about any such
collection. Discussions of the relationship between religion and morality have a
longer history, based on philosophical analysis (Kant, Hume), but recent scholar-
ship has drawn on psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory (biological
and cultural). An example of the scholarly questions asked is whether adherence to
some religion contributes to moral behaviour, or, more strongly, if morality requires
a religious basis.

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More recently, the economics of religion has emerged as a field of inquiry.

Early contributions focussed on applying standard neoclassical models of economic
behaviour to the formation and functioning of religious groups, theorising them as
a category of ‘clubs’, and empirically testing them in the context of Western Chris-
tianity (Iannaccone, 1992, 1998).1 This literature has broadened (Iyer, 2016) to
include more expansive conceptualisations of individual motivations (associated
with behavioural economics), more dynamic models that connect closely with evo-
lutionary accounts of religion and morality, and more attention to non-Western
religions.2
Finally, to complete the circle of connections, there are continued attempts to
integrate contemporary economic theory with moral philosophy. Of course, the con-
nection between economics and moral philosophy goes back to Hume and Smith in
the 18th century CE. In the 20th century, welfare economics (Pigou, 1920), partic-
ularly concerns with equality and equity (Sen, 1973), was one example of a project
to provide normative foundations for a predictive economics that sought to emulate
the natural sciences.3 Going beyond the standard economic framework, there have
been attempts to go beyond individual preferences conceived as morally neutral, to
considerations of ethical (Harsanyi, 1985) or moral (Sen, 1974) preferences, or to
go beyond preferences to consider rights as building blocks of normative evaluation.
This literature has not engaged with specific social norms, such as are embedded in
religious teachings, as the basis for moral judgements, chiefly considering the latter
in the abstract.
This paper will draw mainly on analyses of the first of these three pairings,
but includes overlaps with the other two pairings. To some extent, these overlaps
are unavoidable, and considering them all together provides added insights to the
discussion. Often, the connection between religion and morality does not tackle
economic issues directly, although many evolutionary accounts include material
progress as an essential element, and economics is thereby a part of the overall

1 Carvalho (2019) surveys the religious clubs approach, and provides numerous references to this

literature.
2 Kuran (1994) distinguishes between the economics of religion and what he calls ‘religious eco-

nomics’, which he characterises as “reflect[ing] a desire to subordinate economics to some religion,”

such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and so on. To the extent that this concerns a specific set of social
norms that constrain behaviour and societal evolution, this category fits under the religion-morality
literature.
3 Samuelson (1947) was a milestone in this project of seeking to make economics as theoretically
rigorous (often implying mathematical) as the natural sciences. More recently, laboratory-based
experimental economics and randomised controlled trials in the field have continued this intellec-
tual approach, with normative concerns mostly in the background, although they shape the questions
asked and the theories tested.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

picture. The goal of the paper is not to add general arguments or conclusions to
any of these three literatures, but rather to relate some aspects of the Sikh tradition
and its evolution to the overall knowledge base in all three. Sikhism is relatively
understudied by scholars, particularly in relation to other traditions, and still suffers
from some problematic scholarly interpretations.4 The tradition is also distinctive,
in terms of the recency of its founding (just over five centuries ago) compared
to other recognised major religions, as well as in some of its specific beliefs and
practices. The location of its origin, in what is now Northwestern India, also gives
it added interest, because of a recently postulated scholarly dichotomy between so-
called Abrahamic and Dharmic religions, and Sikhism’s place on the geographic
and conceptual boundary between these constructs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
overview of three overlapping literatures, on the pairwise connections between reli-
gion, morality, and economics. Each of these raises both conceptual and empirical
issues, and it is impossible to do full justice to all the questions raised, but the
goal is to provide sufficient background for a consideration of the Sikh tradition.
Section 3 considers this tradition. It first provides a somewhat novel historical sum-
mary, motivated by the conceptual frameworks of Sec. 2. Then it considers Sikhism
in the context of religion and morality, religion and economics, and morality and
economics. In the first two of these discussions, Sikhism provides a specific case
study of religion, and therefore a data point for these broader literatures. In the
third pairing, Sikh thought plays a more indirect role, to the extent that it offers
general ideas on morality that can be abstracted from its specific context. Section 4
concludes with a summary and possible lessons of the prior analysis.

Religion, Morality, and Economics: An Overview

In this section, we attempt a brief overview of some of the main currents in the three
literatures alluded to in the introduction, each dealing with a specific pair from the
title triad. The most relevant for this paper, and the one given the most attention, is
the connection between religion and morality. There are two strands to this branch
of literature. One examines the conceptual and philosophical relationship between
morality and religion, whilst the other explores the relationship empirically —
with, of course, some theoretical underpinnings. The literature on the evolution of
religion and morality is grounded in the objective of explaining how both came to
be part of human societies and behaviour, and therefore appeals to historical and
contemporary evidence, whereas the analytic philosophical literature does not rely

4 Even the recent Pew survey of religions in India (Pew Research Center, 2021) makes some basic

errors with respect to the tradition, in particular with the classification of ‘sects’ in Sikhism.

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on such methods, instead focusing on logical reasoning. Of course, such reasoning

does use concrete examples, and these may be specific to particular religions or
cultures.

Religion and Morality

Philosophical discussions of the relationship between religion and morality, roughly
speaking, can end up in two different places — either taking the position that
morality requires some form of religious belief and the existence of God (Kant), or
the position that religion is irrelevant for morality (Hume).5 Some of this literature
also necessarily tackles the conceptual complexities inherent in each term, although
considering the nature of morality itself leads down its own intellectual pathway.6
Most of these concerns are beyond the scope of this paper, although they will be
addressed in specific contexts when discussing the Sikh tradition.
Most relevant for the discussion in this paper are research efforts that model the
evolution of religion and morality, drawing in various ways on biology, psychology,
anthropology, and economics. The psychological perspective, in turn, shades into
cognitive science and the biology of the brain. Briefly, one broad conclusion from
the cultural evolutionary literature is that prosocial religions (those with moral
principles supporting cooperative behaviour) began as non-adaptive by-products of
the biological evolution of various cognitive functions in the brain, but then served a
role in cultural evolution, enabling larger-scale cooperation than had been previously
possible. Norenzayan et al. (2016) provide a detailed and comprehensive account
of this perspective, and the accompanying symposium for that paper illustrates a
wide range of possible limitations or nuances to this approach.7
Lahti (2009) offers a similar encompassing account of the “correlated history of
social organisation, morality, and religion,” provisionally systematised in an eight-
stage model. Banerjee and Bloom (2014) go so far as to emphasise increased material

5 This is obviously a simplification of the complexities of the debate. Aside from the original arguments,

useful examples of recent interventions on these arguments are Merrill and Wester (1980), Herman
(1985), Wainwright (2005), Zagzebski (2007), and Mawson (2009). Zagzebski and Mawson both
provide concise, but distinctive, accounts of the range of different philosophical positions and logical
arguments with respect to the connection between religion and morality.
6 The literature here is, of course, enormous, and includes the relationship of morality to ethics, which

has its own implications for the connections between religion and morality: one example is Williams
(2012).
7 Eswaran (2011b) offers a more specific version of the idea of morality as a by-product of evolu-
tion, arguing that self-awareness of culpability, arising from evolution, provides the basis for moral
behaviour. Independently, Appiah (2010, p. 204) extends this kind of consideration to argue that hon-
our is essential for moral revolutions: beyond self-awareness of culpability, he argues that, “It takes
a sense of honour to feel implicated by the acts of others.”

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

prosperity in a very narrow time window (500–300 BCE) as an inflection point in

the overall process. On the other hand, there are positions that are more cautious,
even sceptical. Bloom (2012) argues that a positive connection between religion
and morality is not the only possibility, and that religion can have bad moral effects.
Furthermore, he avers that there is little evidence that specific religious beliefs have
moral effects. Stich (2020) is even more critical, arguing that there is no cogni-
tive faculty for making moral judgements, and, more strongly, that moral judge-
ments are not a well-defined subset of normative judgements. He does, however,
accept the idea that religion could have played a role in the evolution of cultural
norms. Teehan (2016) is more sanguine about the role of religion, and more explic-
itly connects evolutionary accounts to previous theorising on the religion-morality
nexus.
Whilst theories of long-run evolution of religion and morality rely on an incom-
plete historical record, one can empirically test some of their predictions using
contemporary evidence. More traditional psychology, which uses data on attitudes
and behaviour, as well as cognitive science that incorporates the biology of the
brain, are both helpful in this endeavour.8 Pyysiäinen and Hauser (2009) provide
evidence for the ‘initial by-product and subsequently adaptive’ view of religion in
the evolutionary narrative of prosocial behaviour and societal developments. Shar-
iff et al. (2014) review some of the evidence, and highlight differences between
theists and non-theists in areas such as prosociality within groups and the opposite
with respect to outsiders, but also a more general scope for moralising attitudes
amongst the religious. Stavrova and Siegers (2014) explore the difference between
true prosociality, in the sense of being other-regarding, and religiosity driven by
external social pressures. They suggest that social enforcement of religiosity can
cause the latter to dominate the former.
Specifically with respect to brain structure and function, McNamara (2002), in
an early analysis of these issues, argues quite explicitly that religious practices, both
physical and mental, activate the frontal lobes of the brain, and this can lead to more
favourable mental states as well as more prosocial behaviour in particular dimension.
More recently, Greene (2014) offers a more complex picture, in which there is no one
part of the brain that governs moral judgements and decision-making. Instead, both
judgements and actions result from a complicated interaction and coordination of
different brain components and functions. One can possibly connect this biological

8 Discussions of moral psychology and cultural variation are not always linked to an evolutionary
account: see Mustea et al. (2010) for an example and overview of this approach. Perhaps as an
indicator of how one might begin to explore the concerns of Bloom (2007), Stich (2020), and Cohen
and Rozin (2001) map differences between American Jews and Protestants in specific attitudes towards
mental states and moral status.

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evidence with the cautions of McKay and Whitehouse (2015), who argue against
overly broad or ill-defined notions of religion, morality, and prosociality, proposing
instead a decomposition of each of these categories into more precise, theoretically
grounded components.

Religion and economics

Modern economics has been associated with the analysis of the working of com-
petitive markets. A key idea, first clearly articulated by Smith (1776) is that com-
petitive markets can lead to ‘good’ economic outcomes, even when people are
acting in their own self-interest. The concept of goodness in this theory is quite
weak — merely that no one can be made better off without making someone else
worse off, known as Pareto optimality, after Sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. Excep-
tions to the optimality of market outcomes arise when there is market power (e.g. a
monopoly), asymmetries of information, externalities (unaccounted for spillovers,
such as pollution), and simultaneous consumption possibilities (non-rival, or
public goods).9 Furthermore, Pareto optimality can be consistent with extreme
inequality.
An extension of ‘economic’ reasoning to other societal contexts, such as
marriage and family, was pioneered by Becker (1960, 1973), and he described
this approach as “combined assumptions of maximising behaviour, market equi-
librium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly” (Becker,
1976, p. 5).10 This approach is often referred to as ‘rational choice theory’, and
Iannaccone (1995), for example, strongly defends its application to the study
of religion from an economic perspective. As he puts it (Iannaccone, 1995,
p. 77). “The combined actions of religious consumers and religious producers
form a religious market that, like other markets, tends towards a steady-state
equilibrium.”
Economic analyses of religion may obviously allow for preferences to have
a broader scope than just the consumption of material commodities or practical
services, and they have to focus somehow on collective aspects of consumption,
which are not well handled in competitive markets. In such circumstances, taxes
and/or voluntary contributions can be used, and economics has theories of local

9 Externalities may be positive as well as negative, and affect many people at once: indeed, the case

of public goods can be considered as a specific type of externality. I am grateful to Daniel Friedman
for reminding me of this connection. Asymmetries of information may be partially ameliorated by
devices such as signalling (e.g. education as a signal of productivity). Signalling possibilities also
arise in the context of religion (e.g. Sosis, 2005).
10 Preferences, in economists’ theorising, translate into maximising a ‘utility function’, if some addi-

tional technical assumptions are made about the nature of preferences.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

public goods,11 and their private counterpart, clubs.12 The latter form the basis for
economic analyses of religion (Iannaccone, 1998; Iyer, 2016).13 These may be
coupled with models of voluntary bargaining to determine who gets what, but well-
defined preferences and maximising behaviour are at the heart of this approach,
which also forms the basis for empirical analyses of religious behaviour, both on
the side of individuals (demand) and of religious organisations (suppliers) (e.g. Azzi
and Ehrenberg, 1975).
One limitation of research in the economics of religion (Iannaccone, 1998, p.
1490) is that it has tended to sidestep questions of the substance of religion, so that
it does not provide insight into the differences between religious organisations and,
say, pure social clubs, or between religiously motivated or other forms of actions
(e.g. collective prayer versus bowling together).14 Clearly, the literature on religion
and morality is relevant here, and this is taken up again in the next subsection on
morality and economics.15 One pitfall that this approach seeks to avoid is that of
incorporating particular moral or religious judgements into the analysis, the latter

11 Economists often model the provision of public goods in terms of government action, which leads

into issues of how government can best be organised, especially since those acting with government
may be self-interested, or have differing degrees or ideas of morality and ethics.
12 Furthermore, such situations of collective decision-making do not have to involve formal organisa-

tions. Families, kinship groups, and circles of friends all operate chiefly on the basis of social norms.
On this point, a seminal work in the social sciences is Ostrom (1990). I am grateful to Daniel Friedman
for reminding me of this. See also Friedman (2008), as well as the general literature on the evolution
of religion and morality.
13 As pointed out by a referee, this literature has grown rapidly in recent years, especially since

Iyer’s 2016 survey. Examples of relatively general treatments include Botticini and Eckstein (2012)
on the evolution of Judaism and the role of education in economic success; Platteau (2017) and
Kuran (2018) on Islam and economic development; Rubin (2017), comparing the economic histories
of Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East; Iyer (2018, 2020) on religion in modern India;
Johnson and Koyama (2019) on the evolution of religious freedom in Christian Europe; and a wide-
ranging assessment of conceptual and empirical advances in the economics of religion, in Carvalho
et al. (2019).
14 Iannaccone points out that the characteristics of religious goods and services may be captured in

the abstract, by more general concepts such as that of a credence good, where the true nature of the
product and benefits of consumption are difficult or impossible to ascertain, even ex post. This also
brings in issues of risk and uncertainty, which may be particularly applicable to religious services.
Credence goods are an example of asymmetries of information, where the seller knows the quality
of the good better than the buyer — this can be an obstacle to optimal outcomes even in competitive
markets without externalities. Eswaran (2011a) models the supply and demand sides of ‘spiritual
goods’ in a competitive market, but with differentiated products that serve consumers with varied
tastes.
15 There are possibly two distinct issues here. One is that of the boundary between what is religious

and what is not — a religious and a secular wedding ceremony may have very similar forms and

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being what Kuran (1994) has termed ‘religious economics’. Perhaps the only area
in which economists have devoted considerable attention to what might be termed
the moral sphere is that of inequality of income and wealth, and the economics
of religion has begun to ask questions on this is well (Iyer, 2016), such as the
relationship between religiosity and income inequality (e.g. Norris and Inglehart,
2004).
Whilst the literature on the economics of religion has been somewhat narrow
in scope and methods, it has been broadening in both dimensions (Carvalho et al.,
2019). For example, Iyer (2016) brings out the overlap between this literature and
research on the evolution of morality and religion that was discussed in the previ-
ous subsection.16 Indeed, the latter literature, rather than necessarily using stable
individual preferences as a foundational assumption, allows for behaviour and out-
comes to be determined more at the group level, with preferences evolving as well.
The key assumption in evolutionary models is that some fitness function is max-
imised, and, whilst individuals as carriers of genes are still the fundamental unit
of selection, cultural adaptation and selection are less closely tied to the standard
economic model of maximising fixed individual utility functions.

Morality and economics

Standard ‘welfare economics’ is grounded in the approach that uses stable individual
preferences as the basic foundation of theoretical and empirical analysis. For exam-
ple, if a market equilibrium is not Pareto optimal because of externalities, this can
potentially be corrected by the use of appropriate taxes or subsidies (Pigou, 1920).
Concerns about equality, absent from the Pareto criterion, can be incorporated by
an appropriate aggregation of individual preferences into a social choice function
or social welfare function (SWF) (e.g. Sen, 1973).17 An SWF can have additional
requirements added to the Pareto criterion, ones that reflect moral judgements, such
as aversion to social inequality or respect for individual autonomy. However, it turns
out that even a small set of individually plausible and desirable criteria for social
choice can be inconsistent when taken together (Arrow, 1951).

content, for example — and the other is that of the boundary between what is moral and what is not —
wedding vows may differ in terms of their moral content, irrespective of their religious status.
16 See also Cohen (2020) for a recent collection of pieces that explore these methods in the context

of religion.
17 Concerns for social equity are not new: for example, Smith (1776, p. 732) himself states that, “It is
not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to
their revenue, but something more than in that proportion.” This is an early example of arguing for
progressive taxation. Taxation to reduce inequality has a different underlying rationale than taxation
to correct inefficiencies associated with externalities or other sources of market ‘failure’.

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Whilst much effort has gone into analysing various sets of conditions for aggre-
gating individual preferences into social orderings, especially for escaping impos-
sibility results, another approach has been to challenge the fundamental basis of
the exercise, in terms of starting from individual preferences, abstractly defined.
The argument is that, whilst these may be suitable for making predictions about
everyday behaviour of consumers, workers, and government officials, they are not
appropriate for normative judgements that seek to capture aspects of moral values.
Harsanyi (1985) made an early case for using a different criterion, what he called
ethical preferences, which individuals might use to evaluate societal outcomes.
More recently, Amartya Sen has offered a multidimensional critique of the standard
welfare economics approach, suggesting the importance of capabilities and rights,
rather than just the standard arguments of utility functions (e.g. Sen, 1979, 1982,
1985),18 and — close to Harsanyi’s formulation — using a different set of evaluative
criteria, moral preferences Sen (1974), for normative societal decision-making. For
example, I may generally prefer to have greater wealth and consumption (personal
preferences), but still give political support for a tax increase that will reduce both
(ethical or moral preferences).
There are some deeper philosophical issues involved in this literature, including
consequentialist versus deontological approaches to normative evaluation,19 and,
relatedly, the role of actions versus preferences. Philosophers may object that pref-
erences of any kind are not the central object for a study of what is right and what
is wrong — it is doing that matters. Thus, Sandel (2009) is titled Justice: What’s
the Right Thing to Do? For economists, actions reflect preferences, so the two are
intertwined. Sandel provides many examples and a clear discussion of many of these
conceptual issues.20
Separately from the issue of preferences versus actions, for escaping impossi-
bility results in social choice, the rights approach may not a panacea. The problems
are shifted one level up, to meta-preferences over rules of choice, but can re-emerge
at that level (e.g. Grofman and Uhlaner, 1985; Suzumura, 1996; Wieland, 1995).
Nevertheless, the informational basis of moral judgements is strengthened in these
enriched frameworks, presumably in the direction of better reflecting individual

18 With respect to Sen’s theory of capabilities, the exchange between him (Sen, 2001) and Pettit
(2001) is helpful in clarifying some of the conceptual issues. Behavioural economics has focussed on
describing, validating or categorising departures from the basic assumption of consistent, fixed, and
self-interested preferences. Departures can include preferences that incorporate altruism, envy, habit-
formation, rules of thumb, temporary emotional responses, inconsistencies in rankings of alternatives.
Specific departures can be tested in laboratory or field experiments.
19 In the context of the current overview, the exchange between Scanlon (2001) and Sen (2001) on
this issue is particularly pertinent.
20 I am grateful to Keshav Singh for these points and for the reference.

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moral positions in social choices. There may also be scope for flexibility that results
in greater feasibility, which comes from the use of plural bases for judgement, and
is something that is informally proposed by Sen (1974, p. 63), and formalised in
one particular way by Silva-Leander and Seth (2017).21
Much of the literature motivated by Sen’s critique of traditional welfare eco-
nomics relies on formal mathematical methods and maximising according to some
criterion, even if that is done in a much broader and more flexible manner than
approaches based on individual preferences. Whilst Sen (2001) re-emphasises this
avenue, Anderson (1993, 2001), a philosopher who has engaged specifically with
economists’ methods, appears to posit a different approach, one that is, in a sense,
less definite. Her own conclusion, in evaluating even the broadest of economics-
based approached to morality, is that (Anderson, 2001, pp. 37–38), “To understand
the nature of rational choice, then, we need to enrich our information basis beyond
individual preferences, and include the ideas of identity, collective agency, and rea-
sons for action, where the test for valid reasons is universalizability amongst those
with whom one rationally identifies.” This is not easily reducible to a mathematical
formulation, but intuitively, and based on her examples, such as gender identity and
gender inequality, there are issues of context and content in this approach to moral-
ity and ethics that are not easily captured in abstract mathematical modelling.22
Arguably, Anderson’s perspective leads to deeper considerations of the nature of
the self (e.g. Santos and Sia, 2007), and in considering Sikh moral teachings and
ethical guidance, this will be a useful reference point.
Finally, this discussion of morality and economics has not touched on evolution-
ary accounts, but, as alluded to earlier, behaviour within the economy and economic
development are part of those accounts. Whilst the earlier references were primar-
ily to work by anthropologists, psychologists, and biologists, economists have also

21 Another kind of flexibility is in the possibility of having the right to give up rights (Basu, 1984),
which can also help reduce problems of inconsistency in aggregating individual rights and preferences
into societal choices.
22 Both Anderson and Sen agree that there are basic differences in situations where a person feels pain at
another’s suffering (still selfish or egoistic), versus direct concern for the other’s suffering (Anderson,
2001, Footnote 1). Intuitively, they may not fully agree on how this difference is incorporated into a
theory of morality. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, have built a theory of identity into the utility function
framework. Davis (2007) distinguishes between their use of identity as social identity, and personal
identity, which he suggests is itself a function of the Akerlof–Kranton extended utility function
(Davis, 2007, Eq. (3), p. 359) — so, the possibilities of mathematical representation are quite varied.
Eaton et al. (2011) make a case that identity, in the form of insiders and outsiders, plays a role in
evolutionary survival, offering an evolutionary foundation for the Akerlof–Kranton utility function.
Carvalho (2013) incorporates the Akerlof–Kranton approach into the religious club model to analyse
veiling by Muslim women.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

been active participants in that research programme. For example, Friedman (2008)
explicitly develops the idea that moral codes are an instance of social norms that
complement — or possibly impede or regulate — the working of markets. Social
norms provide a way of controlling unchecked greed or other forms of self-interest
that would lead to outcomes that are not Pareto optimal. In this account, morals came
long before markets, and markets evolved from specific norms of reciprocity, such
as gift exchange. In fact, other species also practice reciprocity, but only humans
engage in explicit trading, which is the essence of a market. Taking this further,
even markets need rules (the stock market and eBay are two examples), and rules
may be created and enforced through social norms, or else through the government
and its legal system.23
There is no independent judgement of value or goodness in this analysis, beyond
whether it increases evolutionary fitness, with increased collective welfare also
being a means to that end. Morality is just an instrument, rather than being based on
some underlying, essential concept of what is good. Perhaps it is this soullessness
of the answer that disturbs non-economists, but all scientists can be subject to that
stricture, to the extent that they seek descriptions of reality rather than making
normative judgements. This charge of moral emptiness against economics is not
universally justified. Adam Smith, writing before his more well-known work on
economics (Smith, 1759) seems to accept that ‘moral sentiments’ are not purely
instrumental or utilitarian, though his work precedes evolutionary theorising.24

The Sikh Example: History and Analysis

The Sikh tradition is just over five centuries old, and its compactness and recency
make it potentially useful for adding perspectives on the connections between reli-
gion, morality, and economics, outlined in the previous section. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, this has not been previously attempted. Several synoptic scholarly historical
accounts of the Sikhs exist, including, most recently, Grewal (1994), as well as
older works by Ray (1975), Narang (1946), and Banerjee (1936, 1947).25 More
recently, scholars have focussed on subperiods of Sikh history, and, in particular,
much attention has been devoted to post-colonial renderings of the Sikh tradition,

23 In particular, some social norms may limit the erosion of other norms by market pressures, something

that has been a common concern (e.g. Sandel, 2009). Laboratory experiments that demonstrate this
limiting effect have been performed by Bartling and Özdemir (2017).
24 However, there is in Smith’s writing, recognition of the fundamental driving forces of Nature: “Thus

self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great ends which Nature seems to have
proposed in the formation of all animals” (Smith, 1759, 1790, p. 69).
25 These are not necessarily the best known: that distinction perhaps lies with Singh (1963, 1966),

whose writing was in a more popular vein.

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which has led to a foreshortened view of its history, and a loss of perspective.26
These problems with recent interpretations are an independent reason for the nar-
rative provided here, besides the novel goal of connecting Sikh history, beliefs, and
practices to the broader intellectual issues discussed in the previous section.

Historical summary
The founding of the Sikh tradition, in the Punjab region of South Asia,27 can be
clearly associated with Nanak (1469–1539), who is viewed by followers as having
had a divine revelation at the beginning of the 16th century. He is reputed to have
travelled widely, engaging in spiritual discourse, followed by the founding of a
community of followers. Whilst some scholars have questioned whether this period
marked the founding of a religious community, the weight of evidence is on the
side of this conclusion. Relevant features of this period include written spiritual
compositions by Nanak; the appointment by Nanak of, and formal transmission of
authority to, a successor who also used the name Nanak in his writings; evidence
of a communal religious and social life; the use in Nanak’s compositions of the
term ‘Sikh’ (literally, student or learner), which can be translated as disciple in
this context; and the content of Nanak’s own writings, which include questioning
of existing religious practices, both Hindu and Muslim, and which describe his
own experience and motivation as transmission of a divine message that he had
received.
Alternative perspectives to this standard account emphasise the existence of sim-
ilar contemporary and predecessor spiritual movements, typically described under
the broad umbrella of bhakti (relating to religious devotion), or a subset of this
that has been termed the Sant movement (Barthwal, 1936). The argument made is
that there is insufficient homogeneity or differentiation during this period to view
the followers of Nanak as a distinct religious tradition (e.g. Oberoi, 1994), though
this perspective has been criticised for lacking historical grounding (Singh, 1996;
Grewal, 1998). A somewhat different argument, often melded with the first, is that
the notion of religion, as used in the contemporary West, is anyway inapplicable

26 Some of this literature fixates on the appropriateness of the term ‘religion’ for the Sikh tradition

prior to the British colonial period, as well as the Christian connotations of the term (Smith, 1991;
Asad, 1993). Whilst this certainly is not a trivial issue, it requires a separate analysis. In the current
context, the use of the term ‘religion’ for the entire arc of Sikh history seems to match the usage in
the literature on the evolution of religion and morality. This will become clearer as the narrative is
presented.
27 Whilst South Asia is a more modern term for the larger geographic region, the term Punjab (or

Panjab) became common during Nanak’s lifetime. It literally means ‘five waters’, a reference to the
rivers that are Punjab’s main natural feature.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

to this period in South Asia. According to this view, religion as a category corre-
sponding to current usage, and the definition of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sikhism
as religions in this sense, are only appropriate and accurate for the colonial period
and its aftermath.
Whilst these revisionist perspectives are currently popular, it is not difficult to
offer refutations. For example, the term ‘Sant’ turns out to be both anachronistic
and associated with a later project of cultural nationalism (Singh, 2001). Further-
more, historical examples such as conflict between Buddhists and Hindus over a
millennium earlier (e.g. Usarski, 2007), and the presence of Islam in the region for
several centuries, suggest that ideas of religious boundaries were not alien to the
population. Even if the term ‘religion’ did not have exactly the same connotations
in the 16th century as it does now, the same is true for Islam (Asad, 1993) and even
Christianity. Hence, the use of the term is as reasonable for the Sikh community
in this period as for any other spiritual tradition, especially in the framework that
models religious communities in the context of biological and cultural evolution.28
Even if one hesitates to date the beginning of Sikhs as a religious community
to the early 16th century, the rapid development of the tradition strongly supports
a perspective of definition and distinctiveness by the early 17th century. Specific
developments include the continuation of a line of successors who use the signature
‘Nanak’; a compilation of a definitive central sacred text that includes extensive
ethical and spiritual guidance; control of territory — albeit limited in nature; creation
of a hierarchical leadership structure to manage geographical dispersion; and enough
recognition to precipitate internal contests for control of the community as well as
suppression by Mughal imperial authorities. The last of these led to the death in
Mughal custody of Arjan, the fifth ‘Nanak’, in 1606. Over a century of struggle
followed, with the community sometimes teetering on the brink of survival. A
crucial event late in this period was the hardening and sharpening of the boundaries
of the community by Gobind Singh, the 10th and last ‘Nanak’, by introducing
a new mode of initiation and code of conduct, as well as abolishing the role of
intermediary authorities, creating a grouping termed the Khalsa.29 This was soon
followed by an ending of the line of human spiritual leaders (Gurus — a title that
was early on attached to Nanak and his successors) and the elevation of the sacred
text to the status of Guru — that is, the Guru Granth Sahib (GGS) — after Gobind
Singh’s death by assassination. The late 17th and early 18th centuries also saw a
heightened effort to systematise codes of conduct for Sikhs, and to emphasise the
Khalsa identity for Sikhs (Chann, 2017).

28 Further unpacking of these debates requires a separate analysis, beyond the scope of this paper.
29 This followed, and is considered to have been partly motivated by, the public execution of Gobind’s

father, the ninth ‘Nanak’, by Mughal emperor Aurangzeb.

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The effective collapse of the Mughal empire in the 18th century allowed the
newly strengthened community of Sikhs — or at least a subset, the ‘saint-soldiers’
of the Guru’s Khalsa — to wrest political control of Punjab, culminating in several
decades of Sikh rule at the start of the 19th century. In 1849, Punjab was the final
domino in Britain’s conquest of India, bringing Sikhs into the colonial project, and a
closer engagement with European ‘modernity’. This period has tended to dominate
recent scholarship on the Sikhs, creating a foreshortened view of the tradition, and
contention over the extent to which this engagement has shaped the contemporary
Sikh community.30 An extreme position is that Sikh tradition was transformed dur-
ing this encounter, to the point of ‘rupture’, and that modern Sikhism is disconnected
from its pre-colonial past, but according to the most reliable historians of the Sikhs
(e.g. Grewal, 1994), there is much greater continuity than the claim of ‘rupture’
admits.

Sikhism, Morality, and Ethics

Sikhism is a religion in the sense that it relies on appeals to a supernatural power that
is responsible for all creation, and which provides a lodestone for human beings. In
the case of Sikhs, the Guru is the spiritual guide who can assist them in connecting
to this divine power. Doing so provides a certain freedom or release. This has a
metaphysical dimension, in a concept of release from the cycle of rebirth after one’s
life, but also a practical dimension, in the achievement of a state of equipoise (sahaj)
that comes from an ‘immersion’ in the divine power.31 There is considerable overlap
between the language of Sikh metaphysics and that of Hinduism and Buddhism,
especially the former. Nanak himself was born in an upper-caste Hindu family.32
The Sikh concept of a divine being has similar cultural roots, being unitary and
above creation, but also manifest throughout creation. Abstractly, the divine is the
truth — the totality of existence — and a connection to the divine comes from
transcending one’s individual sense of a separate self to achieve a realisation of this
truth.
The interconnection of all creation (but with a special place for human con-
sciousness) within a divine order (Hukam) is the basis for Sikh morality and ethics.

30 Briefly, the current state of conventional wisdom assigns overwhelming importance to the impact

of colonisation, though often in differing ways across various scholars. Again, a separate analysis is
required, but a case can be made that this post-colonial lens has unduly neglected the role of the first
three centuries of Sikh tradition.
31 One metaphor that is used to convey this state is that of a cloth (the human) being dyed (with the

‘colour’ of the divine).

32 Here we use Hinduism somewhat broadly, to include various manifestations of Brahmanism (Tha-

par, 1989) as well as a range of yogic and bhakti sects.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

Whilst achievement of a connection to the divine ultimately depends on divine grace,

following an appropriate life path is vital to be in a position to receive this grace.
For Sikhs, the Guru is the guide, in the form of the teachings written in the GGS.
Sikhs are enjoined to read, discuss, listen to, and sing these teachings, in order to
reflect or meditate on the nature of truth. In addition, they are enjoined to share with
others, to treat all as equal, and to be pure in mind and body. They are to inculcate
virtues (truthfulness, humility, love, compassion, contentment) and eschew vices
(lust, wrath, greed, attachment, arrogance) in their behaviour and states of mind
(Singh, 2021).33
More practical ethical guidance includes injunctions to work hard and earn an
honest living, to share the fruits of one’s labour with others, and to carry out one’s
responsibilities as a householder. Sikh teachings include criticism of empty ritu-
als, dishonest and rapacious government officials, and exploitation and insincerity
amongst those with religious authority (both Hindu and Muslim). Whilst much of
the cultural and metaphysical framework of Sikh teachings has roots in pre-Islamic
South Asia, the rejection of the classical Hindu or Brahminical caste system as a
basis for spiritual advancement seems to be aligned much more closely with Islam.34
Furthermore, the Sikh practice of community kitchens and shared food (langar),
prepared and eaten in a conscious framework of spiritual equality, is a strong rejec-
tion of otherwise dominant Hindu notions of food pollution, and has parallels with
(but also differences from) Sufi communal food sharing practices of that period. The
later creation of the Khalsa extended these ideals of egalitarianism and rejection of
caste in a dramatic manner. The Khalsa also expanded early ideals of community
solidarity and social justice, traceable to the writings of Nanak himself.35
To summarise, the Sikh religious tradition, over its first two centuries, evolved a
set of moral principles and practical ethical guidance that had overlaps with exist-
ing religions present in the region, but also enough innovation to be distinctive.
The Gurus who led the tradition, and at least one other key leader (Gurdas Bhalla,

33 I have used this source’s translation of the Punjabi words for the five vices. It provides a particularly

clear discussion of Sikh virtues and vices, as well as positioning Sikh thought in relation to Western
philosophy, particularly Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.
34 Arguably, much of the bhakti movement would have been influenced by Islamic egalitarianism, but
the Sikh tradition took these ideas further. A rejection of caste in such matters is also characteristic of
Buddhism, one of the reasons for the resistance that Buddhism received from Brahmin elites (Usarski,
2007).
35 As Grewal summarises, the “basic ideal [was] that true renunciation consisted in living pure amidst
the impurities of attachment. The followers of Guru Nanak at Kartarpur [a town that was the first Sikh
centre] and elsewhere pursued honest occupations for livelihood. They demonstrated thus how to com-
bine piety with worldly activity. A disciplined worldliness was the hallmark of this new community”
(Grewal, 1994, pp. 40–41).

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N. Singh

who was the scribe of the original canonical manuscript of the sacred text, and a
prolific commentator on the community in the early 17th century) explicitly viewed
it as offering a novel spiritual path, distinct from those of Muslims and Hindus
(Gill, 2009, 2017). In crafting this new tradition, they also sought to subsume
existing traditions, by including selected works of over a dozen members of the
bhakti movement, as well as those of the most prominent Sufi poet of the region.36
The increasing popularity of this alternative provoked a deadly reaction from the
imperial Mughal authorities, but the ultimate Sikh response was to strengthen the
community’s identity, whilst rejecting cooptation by external political or religious
authorities. In some respects, the boundaries of the community remained con-
tested, partly a consequence of the heterogeneity of Hindu identity, as well as the
powerful hold of caste on social organisation and practices, especially marriage
customs.37
Whilst biological evolution is irrelevant at this time scale, Sikh writings have
a strong element of focusing on internal transformation of the mind, through a
combination of recitation, listening to, and singing of the sacred text, along with
matching actions, within the context of worship as well as in everyday life. Indeed,
in the Sikh ideal, the boundary between the everyday and the sacred is irrelevant,
so that ‘disciplined worldliness’ expresses piety. One can, of course, find similar
ideas in other religious traditions, although the extent and depth of this integration
of spiritual and worldly in Sikhism may be somewhat distinctive, because it resists
the retreat from the world that tends to emerge in other religious traditions, in the
form of monasticism or asceticism.
The Sikh sacred text expresses ideas of mental transformation in poetry and
metaphor, but they are consistent with the models of McNamara (2002) and Greene
(2014), which hypothesise how religious actions and practices trigger changes
in the brain and its cognitive functions. Centred specifically around musical or
other aural aspects of religious practice, Kaur (2019) combines detailed ethno-
graphic analysis of Sikh practices with insights from cognitive neuroscience (e.g.
Calvert et al., 2004; Stein and Stanford, 2008), yielding thick description and
a more ‘technological’ conceptual framework for the impacts of the worship
practice on the worshipper. In other words, this provides an example of how
Sikh ‘spiritual technology’ (Kaur, 2019, p. 127) lays religious foundations for
morality.

36 The historical record, going back to the 12th century, is unclear, and it is possible that these writings

were the work of multiple authors using the same signature, Sheikh Farid. By contrast, the writings
of the Sikh Gurus were collected in their lifetimes, and contemporaneously authenticated.
37 For example, the results of the Pew Survey of Indian Religions (2021) bring out the persistent

influence of caste and other ‘Hindu’ religious features amongst India’s Muslims and Christians.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

Sikhism and the economics of religion38

Accounts of the evolution of the Sikh tradition are able to draw on much more
complete historical evidence than, say, an analysis such as Banerjee and Bloom
(2014), that focuses on 500–300 BCE as an inflection point in the rise of moralising
religions as a societal phenomenon. This shift is attributed to the greater long-term
material value of such religious norms once a threshold of prosperity was crossed.
In any case, the level of material prosperity in the 16th century and pervasiveness
of religious organisations imply a different level of cause and effect.
Material conditions do play a significant role in accounts of the formation of
Sikhism. Syan (2014) and Sahota (2017) emphasise the rise of a mercantile econ-
omy in the period in which Nanak was born, as well as his membership in a mer-
cantile caste.39 The argument is that these two factors are important in shaping Sikh
moral perspectives: it illustrates historical analyses that reduce individual and group
motivations to advancement of material benefits, in turn fitting with a subset of evo-
lutionary theorising. These approaches are also aligned with the standard method
of the economics of religion, which often works with self-regarding preferences.
However, Nanak’s own foundational writings emphasise individual and collective
improvement or transformation in a moral plane that is conceived in terms of mental
states as well as actions. Writings by Nanak and his successors also explicitly decry
placing too much importance on wealth accumulation.40
It is certainly true that the development of the Sikh community came at a time
of relative stability and prosperity for Punjab. Under Afghan and Mughal rulers of
the period, agriculture and trade flourished. The Mughal Province of Lahore (cov-
ering Punjab) was economically advanced, and its capital city one of the largest
in the empire. Agriculture already used well irrigation, which enabled high quality
cash crops. The cities of Lahore and Multan were on important trade routes, and

38 I am particularly grateful to the referee for numerous insightful comments and suggestions for this
subsection.
39 Syan (2014) emphasises the importance of mercantile castes amongst Nanak’s followers, claiming

that this explains the positive attitude to commercial activity that is found in the Sikh sacred text,
expressed through the use of mercantile metaphors for the relationship between humans and the
divine (who/which is described, for example, as the ‘true merchant’).
40 One example of a statement of moral limits on commerce, is sabh ko vanaj karay vaapaaraa; vin
naavai sabh totaa sansaaraa, translated as “Everyone deals and trades; without the divine connection,
all the world loses” (GGS, p. 1064). Other verses criticise exploitation for material gain, and greed
more generally (GGS, p. 1417). Greed is condemned on its own, as well as in conjunction with the
other four vices. Comments on wealth accumulation also implicitly or explicitly criticise attachment
and arrogance, associated with material wealth and the power that emanates from it (GGS, p. 278,
1246). At the same time, working honestly and sharing one’s earning is extolled (GGS, p. 587, 1245),
and material prosperity achieved morally is perfectly acceptable (GGS, p. 648).

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N. Singh

Punjab also exported manufactures. Within this economic environment, the succes-
sors of Nanak oversaw the geographical spread and dispersion of their followers
by creating a hierarchy of delegated authority through intermediaries. The Mughal
emperor Akbar provided tax-free land, and new towns were founded. In these semi-
autonomous local economies, public goods such as infrastructure and social insur-
ance were funded through donations from followers (Grewal, 1994, p. 59). Aside
from any spiritual gains, followers — including farmers, traders, shopkeepers, arti-
sans, and craftsmen — were presumably attracted by these material benefits.
This development occurred without military or political power, reflecting both
the possibilities and limits of social organisation based on religious solidarity.41
Arguably, Sikh principles of egalitarianism and promoting collective welfare sup-
ported public infrastructure projects that led to the development of several new
towns in the late 16th century, and the running of community kitchens, somewhat
independently of the Mughal state apparatus. Aspects of this kind of cooperation
survive, even in the context of modern India and in Western diasporic contexts,
where the state’s role in public good provision is much deeper. The Sikh case is in
broad alignment with similar phenomena in other religious traditions, and consis-
tent with the analytical framework of religious clubs, even if the details of prosocial
norms and motivations differ across different traditions.
The histories of other religions — Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and
others — all provide numerous examples of different alignments or oppositions of
religious and political authority. Platteau (2017) argues that Islam’s decentralisation
contributes to political instability. Rubin (2017) instead emphasises the degree to
which political rulers rely on religious leaders for legitimacy, with this factor being
stronger for Middle Eastern Islam than for Catholic Europe, with Protestantism
weakening it very significantly. This weakening allowed for greater innovation
and better economic performance. Johnson and Koyama (2019) postulate a ‘condi-
tional toleration’ equilibrium in Europe, with weak states relying on identity-based
(including religious) rules, which was undermined by the greater religious diver-
sity ushered in by the Protestant Reformation, laying the foundations for modern
versions of religious liberty and, ultimately, liberalism. In addition to these ‘grand
theories’, specific cases have also been analysed. Chaney (2013) uses centuries of

41 For most of Sikh history, political power has not resided with the community, so one cannot perhaps

draw reliable inferences with respect to the role of Sikh beliefs and norms in shaping long-run
development, though parallels with Weberian ideas are sometimes drawn: Singh (2022) discusses
the limits of these parallels. By contrast, Platteau (2017) makes a specific claim that Islam’s highly
decentralised structure makes politics relatively unstable, leading to rulers mitigating this instability
at the cost of institutional reforms that would support economic development. Kuran (2018) accepts
the validity of this analysis, but also offers some qualifications.

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

Nile flood data to show that Nile failures strengthened religious authority when they
occurred. Ticku et al. (2018) find that in medieval India, negative weather shocks
increased the desecration of Hindu temples in Muslim-ruled states, with religious
repression serving as a state-maintenance strategy.42
The Sikh tradition evolved in parallel to the Mughal empire in India, and the
interplay of religion and politics for this case reflects that contemporaneity. Mughal
emperors typically balanced the needs of ruling a large region with significant
cultural and social diversity, including in the dimension of religion. They formed
matrimonial and other alliances with regional Hindu rulers who became vassals.
They were not necessarily very orthodox Muslims themselves, but paid attention to
pressures from members of the Muslim clergy. Akbar’s attempts to forge a syncretic
or eclectic state religion met with opposition from this quarter, but this did not stop
him from providing patronage to the Sikh community in the late 16th century. How-
ever, a struggle to succeed him led to his son, Jahangir, paying greater attention to
the rapidly expanding Sikh community, which was reported to be attracting Muslim
followers by this time. In a manner similar to some of the interplay of religion and
politics in European and Middle Eastern cases, political insecurity increased the
influence of religious leaders, and directly led to the arrest and execution of Guru
Arjan in 1606.
Subsequent to this turning point in relations between the Sikh religious commu-
nity and the empire, Jahangir and his successors continued to try to influence Sikh
religious leadership, including the succession to the mantle of Guru. For example,
Arjan’s brother and nephew were favoured with patronage over Arjan’s son, Har-
gobind, who adopted a more political role, including armed resistance. Hargobind
was imprisoned by Jahangir, but eventually released, and established himself as
the recognised leader of the Sikhs, despite lacking territory and material resources,
except those that came from his followers. These followers increasingly included
members of castes or tribes that lacked status in the classical Hindu caste hierarchy.
In this sense, the Sikhs represented a social movement as well as a spiritual com-
munity, trading off short-term material advantage for non-material benefits, though
not in the form of an eternal afterlife as would be the case for Abrahamic reli-
gions.43 Again, this interpretation is consistent with an expanded model of religious

42 Iyer (2022) provides a comprehensive discussion of the literature on the interaction between reli-

gious and political authority in various historical cases. She notes the paucity of analyses of South
Asia in this context, despite it providing a rich set of possible cases.
43 An interesting comparison here would be with Hindus and Buddhists, and their motives for similar

choices, but this is beyond the scope of the paper. In the case of the Sikhs, Syan (2013) claims that
Hargobind retained followers because of his control of resources through ownership of land, but offers
no empirical evidence.

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N. Singh

clubs, which allows for malleable and expanded utility functions. Throughout the
17th century, various Mughal emperors attempted to coopt or control the leader-
ship of the Sikh community, especially at times of succession, but the community
resisted these efforts. In fact, the ninth Sikh guru was arrested and executed in 1675,
after being accused of fomenting rebellion, and his successor, Guru Gobind, had to
regularly fight battles with imperial armies.
Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the Khalsa at the end of the 17th century can be
understood in the context of the generalised religious club model (Carvalho, 2019).44
The requirements of initiation fit strongly with the idea of sacrifice or raising the
cost of membership, to serve as a screening device. In fact, the traditional metaphor
in Sikh historical accounts is that the goal of the formation of the Khalsa was to turn
‘sparrows into hawks’. Whilst the substitution aspect of participation rules — shift-
ing incentives from non-group activities to group activities, is less important in this
case, versus examples of strictness from other religious traditions, other strategic
functions, namely, social sorting, esteem maintenance, religious commitment, and
cultural transmission, are all consistent with the features of the Khalsa. The Khalsa
are perceived of as egalitarian and defenders of justice for all, with higher propen-
sities to transmit these norms and rules of behaviour to the next generation. The
requirements of external appearance are a strong form of religious commitment. Of
course, one can also interpret all the requirements, which include daily prayers and
behavioural constraints, as promoting internal transformation as a spiritual goal,
rather than in terms of strategic methods for group sustainability, and both types of
explanations can coexist.45

44 The referee has raised the question of how the Gobind Singh’s replacement of the institution of a

human guru with the sacred text affected Sikhism’s subsequent trajectory. The suggested reference
point is the Botticini and Eckstein (2012) analysis of Judaism’s shift to a decentralised, scripture-based
religion after the destruction of the Second Temple, which created new incentives for education, with
subsequent implications for occupational choices and economic success. Whilst the text as guru pro-
vided Sikhs with a less fragile institution (including avoiding struggles over succession), permitted
greater geographic dispersion (since multiple copies of the text were available), and increased incen-
tives for literacy, all of which have supported the survival of the community, there does not appear to
be any significant impact on human capital acquisition or material accumulation that would be similar
to the Jewish case.
45 In detailing the political rise of the Khalsa, Dhavan (2011) shows that this process was not solely
driven by spiritual or religious motives. Khalsa leaders exhibited ambition and desires for material
success and status. They followed norms of behaviour associated with rulers of that time and place,
whether Hindu or Muslim. Nevertheless, Khalsa leaders did adhere to behavioural principles rooted
in Sikh teachings, including limits on economic exchange and on social hierarchies, and the treatment
of women in warfare situations. When this adherence weakened during the period of dominance
of a single Khalsa leader, Ranjit Singh (ruled 1799–1839), a backlash ensued amongst some Sikhs
(Khalsa and non-Khalsa), resulting in ‘reform’ movements in the 19th century (Nirankari, 1973).

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

Historians have given varying weights to material and non-material motives in

tracing the shaping of the Sikh community as a social and political entity, though
often without considering the nuances of religious or moral underpinnings of social
and political expression. There are almost no analyses of Sikhism based directly
on the economics of religion approach. One exception is Paxson (2004), which
uses economic reasoning to highlight the importance of religious institutions and
practices in supporting reputation and trust, with Sikhs as the specific case study,
in a manner consistent with more generic accounts of the evolution of social norms
of cooperation (Norenzayan et al., 2016).
Paxson focuses on the signalling role of the Sikh articles of faith, particularly
uncut hair for men, combined with wearing a turban.46 There can be situations
where immediate self-interest would lead to non-cooperative behaviour and worse
outcomes for all. In this context, Paxson views the Sikh symbols as serving as
“insurance for outsiders (and fellow Sikhs) that an otherwise anonymous stranger
can be trusted more so because of his affiliation with a clearly identifiable outside
group · · ·. Outsiders · · · can more readily identify prospective trading partners who
are signalling trustworthiness and reliability by their outwards religious symbols.”47
Here, one might argue that the benefits of the Sikh moral code to outsiders are a just

Later versions of these reform movements also provide an example of a willingness in the Sikh
community to place moral objectives ahead of material gain (Singh, 1978). By contrast, Fox (1985)
offers a historical account in which Sikh identity is largely shaped by material inducements from
British colonial rulers — a perspective in keeping with some of the older economics of religion
literature, but discredited by historians of the Sikhs.
46 Technically, only the initiated members of the Khalsa have explicitly sworn to maintain these articles
of faith, but a recent comprehensive survey of religion in India (Pew Research Center, 2021) reports
that about 60% of Sikh men and 90% of Sikh women observe the practice of uncut hair, much greater
than the percentage who are formal members of the Khalsa. Turban wearing is much less common
amongst Sikh women, though other head coverings are often used.
47 Greif (1993) highlighted the importance of trustworthiness within a group for effectively managing

far–flung trading networks in, the context of North Africa’s Maghribi clans. He also argued that kinship
networks had limits, and could not compete with newer forms of formal contracting, such as those used
by the Genoese in the same time period and geography as the Maghribis. Kinship networks are a part
of many evolutionary models of social and economic progress (Friedman, 2008). In a different vein,
Frank (1987) argued that biological mechanisms, such as blushing when trying to deceive, evolved
because they support trustworthy behaviour. Paxson’s implicit point in the context of the Sikhs is
that, by creating a community of trustworthy members, they have been able to flourish economically
in geographically widespread trading and other economic activities, beyond the confines of kinship.
Indeed, the argument is one of trustworthiness with respect to outsiders, and not just insiders, so it
requires additional assumptions to fit an evolutionary model (e.g. Eaton et al., 2011). In Sikh teaching,
trustworthiness is seen as a part of a framework of morality: manmukhaa no ko na vishee chuk ga-i-aa
vaysaas, translated as “No one places any reliance in the self-willed; trust in them is lost” (GGS,
p. 643).

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a by-product of a system designed mainly to benefit adherents to the code. Those

benefits come from the idea of religious commitment in the clubs framework. There
are clear parallels with veiling amongst Muslim women, as analysed by Carvalho
(2013). He describes multiple effects of veiling, including internal commitment as
well as external social implications, which can be found in the Sikh case. However,
there are also differences in specifics that relate to historical experience and gender
identities, which deserve more attention.48
Paxson recognises that some of the benefits of external symbols could have
been unintentional, but ascribes historical motives that are recognised in the clubs
framework, “it certainly appears that the founders of Sikhism, who set forth the insti-
tutional and distinctly religious practices, understood the importance and strength of
self-monitoring, internalised norms, and relational awareness for sustained continu-
ity of tradition.” These are not material objectives, since the continuity and survival
of the community and its traditions are not quite the same as material prosperity, but
a similar stricture could apply to this motive as well, in that ‘doing the right thing’
has an inherent moral justification that transcends even the continuity of tradition.
On the other hand, sustaining a community that does the right thing can be seen as
increasing the likelihood that the right thing gets done.
The issue of ‘internalised norms’ is quite important, as the newer religious clubs
literature recognises (Carvalho, 2019).49 Membership in a religious community
typically implies adherence to certain kinds of conduct, and that conduct, whilst it
may be enforced or encouraged by external rewards and punishments, is ultimately
best motivated by being what members intrinsically want to do, or believe is the right
thing to do. In other words, preferences of community members ideally conform to
the social norm, rather than being separately determined. These observations also
apply to other examples of creating a shared religious identity, and indeed, to other
forms of organisation as well (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). But there is still the
issue of the underlying morality of that norm, so one is still pushed one level deeper
than economic explanations, to the question of what is good rather than what is
useful or expedient.50

48 French courts have treated Muslim hijabs and Sikh turbans as equivalent in terms of domestic
legal proscriptions on religious symbols, whereas Indian courts have argued that they have differing
historical and legal status, but without providing detailed analysis.
49 Paxson acknowledges that external articles of faith, or symbols, ultimately have to line up with

preferences, i.e. preferences internalise the beneficial norms. Discussions of the Sikh symbols,
whilst varying on specific interpretations and meanings, all agree that they are not just external
signals, but also reminders to the wearer of normative standards of conduct (e.g. Singh, 2011,
pp. 51–53).
50 Introducing morality into considerations of organisational identity and conformity brings in

ideas of self-awareness of culpability (Eswaran, 2011b) as well as honour (Appiah, 2010).

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

Morality, Economics, and Sikh Teachings

As discussed in the last two subsections, the development of Sikhism provides a
compact historical and contemporary example of the interaction of religion, moral-
ity, and economics in shaping societal evolution. The early history of the Sikhs is
relatively well-documented, though the sources have not always been used effec-
tively. In particular, the writings of Nanak and his successors, have not been treated
from the deeper analytical perspectives that frame this paper. The previous two
subsections have outlined Sikh experience as an example of religion playing a role
in social and cultural evolution. A final issue to explore is whether Sikh thought
can provide any insight into the more abstract issues of the basis of morality and its
translation into human behaviour.
The central Sikh sacred text (GGS) is primarily a collection of verses in praise
of the divine, meant to be recited, sung, listened to, discussed, and reflected upon.
But it also contains specific examples of moral and ethical guidance, critiques of
behaviour that departs from this guidance, commentary on other religious traditions,
and a few references to specific contemporary political events and practice. The
GGS is also rich in descriptions of nature, including flora, fauna, seasonal patterns,
and the larger cosmos — these are used to illustrate the wonder of creation and
the creator. Other illustrations from human behaviour use family relationships, life
passage events, farming, and mercantile activities to make general points about the
nature of existence, as well as to provide specific guidance for action and desirable
mental states.
The diversity of the content of the GGS, and language limitations amongst West-
ern scholars, have hindered attempts to distil the philosophical and ethical system
it contains. McLeod (1968) is relied on heavily in the Western academy, although
many attempts by Sikh scholars based in Punjab (e.g. Singh, 1970) go relatively
unnoticed. Singh (2021) overcomes this lacuna, providing a clear analysis of core
Sikh teachings with respect to ethics, connecting the framework enumerates virtues
and vices to an idea of self-centredness (haumai) and a basic objective of transcend-
ing this state to realise, or become imbued with, a sense of the unity of creation (that
is, a connection to the divine). His analysis goes on to provide a comparison of the
Sikh ethical system with Aristotelian and Kantian ethics, suggesting a closer con-
nection to the latter. This is done to anchor the analysis to philosophical approaches
more familiar in the West, not to imply any causality or equivalence. Similarly,
whilst Sikh teachings have a vocabulary and cultural roots that connect them to
other Eastern traditions, there are clear markers of distinction, particularly in the

But again, it does not seem possible to reduce these issues to an abstract mathematical
formulation.

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N. Singh

context of equality of human beings and social and ethical practices that emanate
from that basic position.51
What are the possible implications of Sikh thought — if any — for the general
literature on morality and economics, which, as discussed earlier, struggles with
providing a general abstract framework in which to consider questions of collective
welfare? One way to make the connection is to view Sikh ideals of altruism and egal-
itarianism as seeking a unification of personal preferences and moral preferences.
This goal is to be achieved by practices that shift the former closer to the latter.
Relating this to some of our earlier discussion, this also replaces extrinsic motiva-
tion with intrinsic motivation in achieving collective welfare. Conceptually, Khalsa
codes and observances represent a mechanism for constant reminders of this goal
(Singh, 2011). At a general level, similar mechanisms are a part of other religious
traditions as well, especially for monastic or ascetic orders within those traditions.
If everyone’s preferences somehow always reflect a concern for collective welfare,
then all problems of achieving collective welfare go away.
Unfortunately, this is neither a practical concept, nor one that is theoretically
easy to formalise. Issues of complexity, uncertainty, and asymmetric information
mean that complete preferences are a chimera. Indeed, there are deeper issues as
well. Recently, Basu (2021, 2022) has constructed simple examples of strategic
situations in which one person becoming more moral, in the sense of developing
other-regarding preferences, may worsen the collective outcome. Part of the problem
is that with the limited set of those who become other-regarding, and part of the issue
is limits on who is included in the ‘other’ of other-regarding. One can draw a parallel
with Sikh thought and practice which emphasises collectively seeking spiritual
improvement, through the effort of the entire congregation (sangat). Again, other
religious traditions have versions of this approach, though in some cases combined
with an insistence that their particular implementation is essential. Sikh teachings
walk an interesting line between universality and acceptance of diversity of paths.
Basu (2021) suggests that the problems he highlights may require a more deonto-
logical approach rather than the consequentialism embedded in the economic model
of preferences. This is certainly a valuable avenue to explore, but even then, a uni-
versally robust mathematical formulation to guide decisions for collective welfare
is unlikely to exist. Anderson’s (2001) appeal to go beyond preferences to consider

51 As expressed in Singh (2021, p. 331), “The only way to transcend the baseness of the self is to

recognise it as part of a larger unity and act out of this recognition. Thus, the cultivation of virtue must
involve a lived commitment to the equal worth of all through good deeds motivated by altruism and
egalitarianism — in other words, not just doing the right things, but doing them for the right reasons.”
A line often quoted in this context is sachahu orai sabh ko upar sach aachaar, translated as “Truth is
higher than everything; but higher still is truthful living” (GGS, p. 62).

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

identity, context, reasons, and so on, may be the best we can do. In that sense,
Sikhism, or any other religious tradition for that matter, cannot offer a perfect solu-
tion to all decision-making dilemmas.

Conclusion
This paper has sought to bring the history and characteristics of the Sikh religion
into dialogue with scholarship on the connections between religion, morality, and
economics. One direction of this dialogue uses the Sikh case as an additional exam-
ple for illustrating these connections, something that has not been explored much
by academics. Because the Sikh case is relatively compact and well-documented,
and has distinctive features, it provides useful examples and perspectives. One can
understand the Sikh religion as having been founded by Nanak in the early 16th
century, with a reasonably coherent moral philosophy and ethical principles. Sikh
teachings lay out a moral position that emphasises the equality and dignity of human-
ity, and the virtue of respecting that dignity and equality in one’s daily actions. There
is explicit and implicit moral guidance with respect to wealth accumulation, hard
work, sharing the fruits of that labour, and also the priority of spiritual advancement
over material success, though basic material well-being is not to be neglected. The
possibility of intrinsic moral judgements about human motivation, independent of
their narrow material consequences, should be relatively uncontroversial in the con-
text of a religious movement, but has tended to be submerged in recent accounts that
look only for materialist or instrumentalist explanations of events in Sikh history.
The evolution of the Sikh tradition was clearly shaped by the larger context of
South Asia, and by specific external events, in a manner that is also consistent with
newer approaches to the economics of religion (Iyer, 2016; Carvalho et al., 2019).
In particular, external threats led to a response from Sikh leadership that sought to
redefine membership in the community, in a manner consistent with several strategic
functions identified in the modelling of religious clubs, including screening, reli-
gious commitment, and esteem maintenance. The threats themselves were driven
by responses of a succession of Mughal emperors to varying pressures from Muslim
religious leaders, in the context of a heterogeneous cultural, religious, and social
milieu.
The manner in which Sikh leaders and Sikh community members responded at
different times to external pressures, particularly in a context of being a relatively
small and new tradition, compared to the geographically contiguous entities of
Hinduism and Islam, is still consistent with moral principles taking priority over
material benefits. However, one can admit different short-run and long-run effects
of these responses. For example, the creation of the Khalsa at the end of the 18th
century may have had negative short-run consequences, as they were hunted down by

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N. Singh

imperial armies, but may also have enabled the community’s longer-run flourishing.
One can also take the position that the material flourishing of the Sikh community
was not the ultimate goal of the early leadership, but rather, it was the uplift of
humanity.
Aside from Sikhism as an example of the evolution of cultural and social norms, it
also has the potential for providing additional insights. One is the interplay between
religious practice and human cognitive functioning. Sikh teachings emphasise a
kind of mental transformation, a state of equipoise but also regard for other humans
(and creation more broadly), as the goal of spiritual uplift. This is not to be achieved
simply by passive reflection or withdrawal, rather through active engagement with
the world in a manner consistent with a set of moral and ethical principles. This
engagement includes active worship, especially through listening to, discussing,
reciting, and singing verses from the sacred text, but also through various forms of
service activities. This combination is seen as an essential part of the path to mental
transformation. Broadly similar ideas can be found in every religious tradition, but
the Sikh case has not been subject to much comparative analysis in this dimension,
either conceptual or empirical.
A second area for fruitful exploration is the philosophical foundations of moral-
ity and ethics. Recent scholarship (Singh, 2021) has provided a significant step
forwards in carefully considering concepts of vice and virtue in Sikhism from
an analytical philosophical perspective, and connecting them to the foundational
goal of overcoming a self-centredness (haumai) that prevents the attainment of an
ideal state of consciousness. This mental state is conceived of as a melting away
of a sense of separation from the rest of creation, and from the creator. It is a
metaphysical notion, but one that potentially also links to new work on cognition
and neuroplasticity. Again, there are overlaps and similarities with other religious
traditions, but the Sikh case offers some distinctive features and data points for
comparison.52

52 For example, Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759), provides a theory of

morality based on human capacities for sympathy, or fellow-feeling. He explicitly places limits on this
capacity, assigning the greater capacity to an unseen, unfathomable higher power: “The administration
of the great system of the universe . . . the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible
beings, is the business of God and not of man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, but
one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension:
the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country: that he is occupied in
contemplating the more sublime can never be an excuse for neglecting the more humble department…”
(Smith, 1759, 1790, p. 215). It would be interesting to explore the similarities or differences between
Smith’s framework and Sikh teachings. In particular, Smith constructs his theory of morality on the idea
that human beings share some facts of existence, and this is the basis for virtue, and for recognition
and commendation of virtue. This is a modest empirical idea, but beyond the standard economic

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Religion, Morality, and Economics

A third promising research direction is the incorporation of Sikhism into studies

of the economics of religion. The Sikh external symbols are a potentially rich subject
for comparative and historical analysis. In addition to Muslim veiling, there are a
range of religious dress codes that can be compared to Sikh practices. One possible
difference that deserves analysis is that the Khalsa identity is not viewed by Sikhs
as precluding full participation in the modern economy, so that the substitution role
(inside activities for outside ones) of the basic religious clubs literature is much less
important. Historically, Khalsa norms were a product of external threats, and there is
anecdotal evidence that adherence to these norms rises at times of heightened threats.
Two examples are Hindu revivalism in later 19th century Punjab (specifically, the
Arya Samaj reform movement), which sought to convert Sikhs to Hinduism, and
the Indian government’s attack on the Sikhs’ central sacred site (the Golden Temple
in Amritsar, Punjab) in 1984. A different phenomenon affecting such adherence
has been the spread of modern media, including Bollywood and the internet, which
have overtaken traditional types of cultural transmission. Available data may not
permit as precise an analysis as, for example, Ticku et al. (2018), but there may still
be scope for testing hypotheses from the religious clubs framework.
Also within the economics of religion, the Sikh case can be a component of a
more comprehensive analysis of the interaction of religion and politics in South
Asia. We have noted the impact on the Sikhs of Mughal emperors balancing politi-
cal objectives of governing a culturally diverse region with pressures from Muslim
religious authorities. Four decades of Sikh rule in Punjab, as the empire declined
and the British encroached, also illustrate a balancing act of governance in the pres-
ence of multiple religious groupings. This period is not significant enough on its
own, but the interaction of different religious groupings within a centralised empire
and during its fragmentation can provide some complement to recent analyses that
have focussed on Europe and the Middle East in analysing the historical role of reli-
gion(s) in economic and political development (e.g. Botticini and Eckstein, 2012;
Platteau, 2017; Rubin, 2017; Johnson and Koyama, 2019). In reviewing Johnson
and Koyama, Iyer (2022) notes the omission of South Asia from their analysis, even
when they go beyond Europe and the Middle East. Kuran (2018) does review some
work on Islam in South Asia that fits within the economic approach, but acknowl-
edges it is scarce relative to much larger ‘area studies’ literature that uses humanistic
and interpretive methods. Iyer (2022, p. 272) remarks that South Asia is “the one
part of the world where religion is most saliently and inextricably linked with the
role of national politics and the state,” and the case of the Sikhs would be a crucial
part of a future correction of the omission she highlights.

framework of personal self-regarding preferences. It does, however, dovetail with key aspects of the
message of the GGS.

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N. Singh

This paper has touched on humanistic concerns at various points, and sought
to integrate them with economic approaches where possible. In this vein, the Sikh
case can also be useful in analysing the recently popular concept of a dichotomy
between Abrahamic and Dharmic traditions. In this framework, Judaism Christian-
ity and Islam are in one category, and Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and Sikhism
are in the other. It may be that there are metaphysical differences that provide a clear
split between the two groups, but one can also find enough differences within each
group to question the classification. But the Sikh tradition offers a unique challenge.
In essence, its emphasis on human equality and activist approach to social justice
in particular, and to the process of spiritual advancement, make it stand out from its
‘Dharmic’ counterparts, despite similar metaphysical roots. There are further com-
plications, of course, but the argument here is that Sikhism can be usefully studied
without imposing such conceptual groupings that become straitjackets. Conversely,
as emphasised in this paper, the Sikh case provides additional insights for general
analyses of the interactions of religion, morality, and economics in shaping human
societies.

Acknowledgements
I am indebted to an anonymous referee and an associate editor for valuable com-
ments and suggestions. Earlier versions of these ideas were presented at lectures
and conferences at San Jose State University, UC Riverside and Santa Clara Uni-
versity. I am grateful to Jugdep Chima, Daniel Friedman, Inderjit N. Kaur, Paul
Roth, Inder Mohan Singh, and Keshav Singh for helpful comments and suggestions
on various versions of the paper. Part of this research was supported by the Sarb-
jit Singh Aurora Chair in Sikh and Punjabi Studies, which I held at the time, and
by grants from the UC Santa Cruz Academic Senate. Responsibility for remaining
shortcomings is mine alone.

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