British Journal for Military History

Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

"Going downhill": the consequences of the Stabilisation Scheme on

Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain and into 1941

Stephen Moore

ISSN: 2057-0422

Date of Publication: 19 July 2021

Citation: Stephen Moore, ‘"Going downhill": the consequences of the

Stabilisation Scheme on Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain
and into 1941’, British Journal for Military History, 7.2 (2021), pp. 122-147.

www.bjmh.org.uk

This work is licensed under a Creative

Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The BJMH is produced with the support of

British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

‘Going downhill’: the consequences of the

Stabilisation Scheme on Fighter Command
during the Battle of Britain and into 1941
STEPHEN MOORE*
Newcastle University, UK
Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT
By September 1940 the quality of pilots supplied to Fighter Command had become
unacceptably low. Reducing earlier stages of training was meant to be replaced by
increased Operational Training Unit instruction, but this merely provided conversion
to operational type. To preserve the first-line fighter force Fighter Command
adopted a ‘Stabilisation Scheme’, relegating a third of squadrons to a training role.
Pilot demand remained high and the Stabilisation Scheme was retained until pilot
numbers in first-line squadrons were finally satisfactory in June 1941, and the need
for training squadrons disappeared, despite increases in flying accidents during
1941.

Introduction
On 7 September 1940 a meeting took place at RAF Bentley Priory, the headquarters
of Fighter Command.1 By September the quality of pilots provided to Fighter
Command from Operational Training Units (OTUs) had fallen to an unacceptable level
and drastic measures had become necessary to preserve the first-line fighter force.
This meeting is represented to a reasonable degree within the historiography, although

*
Dr Stephen Moore recently graduated from Newcastle University with a PhD in
History. The author is extremely grateful to Dr James Pugh for constructive comments
on an earlier draft of this article. The author also wishes to thank the RAF Museum,
Exeter University and the British Commission for Military History for the opportunity
to present the paper which forms the basis of this article, and for the assistance of
Sebastian Cox, Head of Air Historical Branch (RAF), for providing access to records
held by AHB.
DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v7i2.1558
1
The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA): AIR 16/330, Air Ministry: Fighter
Command; Registered Files, Reinforcement of No. 11 Group, Minutes of a Conference
held at Headquarters, Fighter Command, on Saturday 7 September 1940.
www.bjmh.org.uk 122
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

the level of detail varies. All accounts agree on the reclassification of the squadrons
within Fighter Command.2 Several convey the difficulty that the other participants had
in persuading Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Sholto Douglas, the Deputy Chief of the Air
Staff that the pilot crisis was real and immediate action was essential.3 Predictably, the
defensive and selective Douglas memoir does not mention either the meeting or
classification of squadrons at all, although the Douglas despatch does acknowledge the
decline in operational pilot quality and squadron classes.4 The historiography also
reflects the understated insistence of Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Hugh Dowding in
the meeting minutes that his command had to prepare ‘to go downhill’.5

In order to understand how this situation developed, it is necessary to go back to

before the Second World War began, to give context to both the long and short-term
developments of the Royal Air Force (RAF). This article shows how the processes of
continuity and change within British pre-war air power policy and practice during the
expansion of the RAF led to training resources being compromised due to shortages
of aircraft and crews. Despite attempts to rectify deficiencies, the enormous demand
for pilots following the fall of France required drastic measures to increase pilot
production. These amendments increased the proportion of training carried out at
the operational conversion stage, at the expense of earlier stages of training. As the
quality of pilots supplied to Fighter Command deteriorated, a ‘Stabilisation Scheme’
was implemented to manage resources which enabled daylight operations to continue.
While demand for casualty replacement fell after the end of the Battle of Britain,
squadrons continued to be inundated with trainees from OTUs so that they became
congested with non-operational pilots. After the Stabilisation Scheme was formally
rescinded in December 1940, the pilot supply crisis was considered to be over.
Despite the formation of additional OTUs to improve pilot supply, several factors
combined to aggravate the pilot shortage. This meant that pilots joining squadrons
during the first half of 1941 still required further training before they could be

2
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, (London: Aurum, 2000), p. 297; Richard
Hough and Denis Richards, The Battle of Britain – The Jubilee History, (London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1989), p. 251; Francis K. Mason, Battle Over Britain, (London:
McWhirter Twins,1969), p. 355; Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow
Margin, (London: Arrow, 1969), p. 220.
3
Peter Flint, Dowding and Headquarters Fighter Command, (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1996),
pp. 111-112; James Holland, The Battle of Britain, (London: Bantam, 2010), pp. 529-531;
John Ray, The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives, (London: Arms and Armour, 1994), pp.
90-91.
4
Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, (London: Collins, 1966) and Sholto Douglas, 'Air
Operations by Fighter Command from 25 November 1940 to 31 December 1941',
The London Gazette, 16 September 1948, Number 38404, p. 5021.
5
TNA, AIR 16/330, Minutes of a Conference on 7 September 1940, p. 1.
123 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

considered as operational, effectively reintroducing the Stabilisation Scheme. As the

year progressed the accident rate remained high, prompting an increase in the length
of courses to reverse the deterioration in the standard of training. The implications
of, and reasons for this scheme, have been largely ignored or misunderstood in the
historiography of the Battle of Britain.

The Pre-War Expansion of the RAF

Despite being seen as an era of ‘appeasement’, the expansion of the RAF had begun in
1934, but Scheme ‘A’ which was to give the Metropolitan (UK based) Air Force
twenty-eight fighter squadrons by April 1939 had made little progress by the spring of
1935.6 In order to achieve air parity with Germany, a ministerial committee reported
that this scheme should be expanded to contain thirty-five fighter squadrons, and
accelerated to give a completion date of April 1937. After the Cabinet approved the
committee’s report in June, the Air Ministry were then committed to fulfilling the
requirements of Expansion Scheme ‘C’.7 John Ferris has described British air defence
as ‘planned for a bad case but not the worst case’, against an enemy flying across the
North Sea rather than being based on the other side of the English Channel. 8 By 7
November 1938 fifty squadrons of fighters had been sanctioned under the full ‘ideal’
scheme.9 Between 1936 and 1938, however, the British aircraft industry fell eighteen
months behind those of Germany and the United States in monoplane development
so that the RAF received no modern aircraft during this period, which impacted British
air expansion.10 Fighter Command remained at a nominal strength of thirty squadrons
until the autumn of 1938. At this point a further eight squadrons were to be formed
under the intermediate stage of the ‘ideal’ scheme by April 1940. Expansion Scheme
‘M’ then replaced this to require forty-four squadrons by April 1939, before starting
to form ten more in the year beginning April 1940. This was intended to allow the
Command to spend the intervening year discarding obsolete types for the monoplane
fighters expected to be available by that date.11 By September 1939 only twenty-two
of the thirty-nine Fighter Command squadrons had received their monoplane fighters

6
T. C. G. James, The Growth of Fighter Command, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 18.
Expansion Scheme ‘A’ also allowed for forty-seven bomber squadrons as well as those
for fighters. Further reference to Expansion Schemes in this paper exclude bomber
figures for the sake of clarity.
7
James, Growth of Fighter Command, p. 20.
8
John Ferris, ‘Achieving Air Ascendancy: Challenge and Response in British Strategic
Air Defence, 1915-40', in Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo,
eds. Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 21-50, p. 42.
9
James, Growth of Fighter Command, p. 37.
10
Ferris, ‘Achieving Air Ascendancy’, p. 43; Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power: The
Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-1941, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997), p. 258.
11
James, Growth of Fighter Command, p. 41.
www.bjmh.org.uk 124
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

and the formation of another eighteen fighter squadrons equipped with inadequate
machines further exacerbated the shortage of suitable aircraft.12

The Impact of Expansion on Pilot Supply

Expansion of the Royal Air Force was obviously not limited to aircraft: without pilots
to fly them the schemes would be pointless. In 1938 it was calculated that there would
be a deficiency of 720 regular pilots by April 1940 that could not be corrected until
September 1940. To address this problem, eight new Flying Training Schools (FTSs)
were required, but since the personnel to man these would have to be drawn from
squadrons in the first-line, concern was expressed at the impact on operational
efficiency, so the number of extra FTSs was cut down to four.13 The difficulty of
simultaneously expanding Fighter Command while remaining an effective fighting force
can be demonstrated by the position in September 1938. Only five of the twenty-nine
squadrons were using modern equipment, the Hurricane, although three more would
soon receive this type.14 The problems of equipment pale into insignificance compared
to the reserve pilot position. Only 200 out of the total pilot reserve of 2,500 were fit
to join service units immediately. While the others were brought up to the required
standard of training, the replacement of casualties in operational commands would be
impossible.15 Inter-war planning had paid careful attention to wastage and training, but
as this planning was for a ‘bad case’, it assumed that home defence fighter squadrons
would be outnumbered by two or perhaps three to one, from across the North Sea.
The fall of France and the Low Countries meant that in the summer of 1940 Fighter
Command faced four times its strength, described by Ferris as being ‘next door’.16 The
shortage of modern aircraft meant that only a minority of pilots were trained to fly
them because such types had only just become available.17 The conversion of the large
number of fighter squadrons still operating obsolete aircraft at the beginning of the
war did not allow an increase in the reserve of suitably trained pilots.

12
Denis Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. I, (London: HMSO, 1953), p. 65.
13
TNA, AIR 41/4, Air Ministry: Air Historical Branch Narratives, Flying Training 1934-
1942 (1945), pp. 142-143.
14
The Hurricane had entered service in December 1937 and would not be in
widespread service until December 1938. The Spitfire entered service in August 1938,
but was not yet operational, and widespread service would not be achieved until
September 1939. The third of the initial ‘monoplane generation’ fighters, the Defiant,
would not be in service until well after war was declared: Francis K. Mason, The British
Fighter Since 1912, (London: Putnam, 1992), pp. 254, pp. 258-259 & pp. 268-269.
15
James, Growth of Fighter Command, pp. 42-45.
16
Ferris, ‘Achieving Air Ascendancy’, p. 43.
17
Ferris, ‘Achieving Air Ascendancy’, p. 43.
125 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

The Introduction of Operational Training

By May 1938, however, the Chief of the Air Staff, ACM Sir Cyril Newall, had
recognised the need for training units to bridge the gap between FTS and operational
squadrons. This was to be achieved using 'lighter types' of modern aircraft with similar
characteristics to those in use at the squadrons.18 In November 1938 the role of these
new units was expanded beyond training to be used as pilot pools for the replacement
of casualties in both Bomber and Fighter Commands. Priority was given to Fighter
Command for the first two of the new units, now known as ‘Group Pools’, to serve
No. 11 and No. 12 Groups exclusively.19 It was acknowledged that trained
replacements were 'an urgent necessity' for Fighter Command as it would be obliged
to respond to enemy attacks, and was unable to limit casualties by reducing operations
in the same way that Bomber Command could.20 There would, however, be a delay
before either Group Pool began training pilots. The first ‘extra-ordinary measures’ to
strengthen Fighter Command were taken in the autumn of 1938 for a possible conflict
in the April of 1939. As the ‘critical period’ was predicted to be the first three or four
weeks of war, only a small reserve of fighters could be retained to ensure that line
squadrons were at full strength.21 The Air Officer Commanding of Fighter Command,
ACM Dowding, concentrated on increasing first-line strength at all costs in ‘working
up’ to ‘full operational pitch’. Shortage of time and lack of modern aircraft meant that
Fighter Command was the only Command to oppose plans forming special training
units for operational training.22 No. 11 Group Pool therefore only began operating in
March 1939.23 The Air Ministry pointed out that the absence of Fighter Group Pools
would lead to a shortage of casualty replacements when the intensity of fighting
increased, and that operational training aircraft could be used to reinforce the first-
line in an emergency. Fighter Command therefore ‘reluctantly agreed’ to the formation
of the No. 12 Group Pool in September 1939. Both Pools together were, however,
only capable of producing half of the planned output of 1,100 pilots per year.24 It is not
difficult to argue that Dowding faced an impossible choice; either he continued to
increase the number of first-line squadrons to meet the requirements of Scheme ‘M’
at the expense of operational training, or he slowed down the rate of expansion to
provide aircraft for training, which would cease as soon as those aircraft were used to

18
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 162. It was found that the only aircraft with ‘similar
characteristics’ were those in use by the operational squadrons.
19
James, Growth of Fighter Command, pp. 50-51.
20
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 230.
21
James, Growth of Fighter Command, p. 50.
22
TNA, AIR 41/71, Air Ministry: Air Historical Branch Narratives, Flying Training, Vol.
II, Organisation, Part III, Operational Training (1952), p. 817.
23
James, Growth of Fighter Command, p. 51.
24
TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 819.
www.bjmh.org.uk 126
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

reinforce the first-line. Either course of action could be seen as the wrong decision
and was guaranteed to lead to criticism.

The ‘Phoney War’ and the Aftermath of the Campaign in Western Europe
During the ‘Phoney War’ the Group Pools struggled to meet the requirements of the
fighter squadrons in France. This led the Air Ministry to overrule Fighter Command’s
objections about the diversion of resources to the operational training organisation at
the end of April 1940.25 The true rate of combat wastage during the Battle of France
has been demonstrated by Peter Dye; nearly 1,000 aircraft were lost in a month, close
to the losses predicted for maximum-effort operations.26 Altogether 396 Hurricanes
and 67 Spitfires were lost outright during the French campaign, with nearly 280 fighter
pilots killed, missing or taken prisoner, while another sixty were wounded.27 Following
the fall of France, the enormous demand for pilots prompted sweeping changes within
Training Command to increase output. Initially this was attempted by posting pilots
from Service Flying Training Schools (SFTSs) a week before the end of the course.
During May fifty-two fighter pilots were obtained by this method, but clearly much
greater numbers would be required in the future months.28 By 20 June 1940 there
were fifty-eight squadrons in Fighter Command, compared to forty-seven on 10 May.
These numbers were, however, deceptive, as twelve of the squadrons were unfit for
operations. In addition, thirty-seven of the remaining squadrons had no more than
thirteen aircraft on strength compared to the required sixteen initial equipment
establishment. Only nine squadrons within Fighter Command were therefore at full
strength. It was to be ‘well into July’ (with the Battle of Britain officially starting on 10
July) before all Fighter Command squadrons were fit for operations, but already a pilot
deficiency of nearly twenty percent of establishment was apparent. 29 The fighter OTU
course had been reduced from four to two weeks in the last week of May, and while
this increased the number of pilots produced, the training became little more than a
conversion to operational type. With insufficient OTU capacity available it was
necessary for operational squadrons to take significant numbers of pilots straight from
SFTS for conversion and training.30 A series of amendments to training (the First to
Third Revises) were then used to further reduce the course length of pilot training,

25
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 246-247.
26
Peter Dye, Logistics Doctrine and the Impact of War: The Royal Air Force’s
Experience in the Second World War’, in Air Power History, eds. Cox and Gray, pp.
207-223, p. 219.
27
James, Growth of Fighter Command, p. 98.
28
TNA,TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 309.
29
James, Growth of Fighter Command, pp. 98-99. The start date of the Battle is as defined
in Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, (London: HMSO, 1957), pp. v-vi.
30
TNA,TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 497-498.
127 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

consequently introducing a fundamental deficiency into the training system which

would continue throughout 1941.

The Training ‘Revises’

For the First Revise, in June 1940, the Elementary Flying Training School (EFTS) course
was reduced by a week to seven weeks, with a fifteen percent increase in pupil
numbers and the SFTS course (for fighter pilots only) cut by four weeks to twelve,
with twin-engine OTUs to operate a fourteen-week course. To accommodate the
larger flow of pupils it was intended to increase the number of aircraft at each School
to provide 100 hours of training, but this was not possible so the SFTS course was
reduced to eighty hours per pupil.31 The Second Revise in August 1940 shortened all
SFTS courses to twelve weeks and cut an extra week off the EFTS course down to
fifty hours. Since the numbers of training aircraft could not be increased the intention
was to transfer a proportion of the instruction displaced from twin-engine SFTS
courses to a lengthened OTU course. At the same time, it was also intended that the
reduction of the fighter OTU course which had been implemented in May 1940 would
be reversed back to four weeks and all pilots passed through an OTU before going to
a fighter squadron. By 13 August it was realised that this increase would have to be
postponed, so the fighter OTUs continued to provide nothing more than a conversion
course.32 From June 1940, therefore, it had been necessary for all new pilots joining
Fighter Command to receive further training in their squadrons, which was still
possible during the Kanalkampf (Channel Attack) phase of the Battle of Britain. When
operations escalated after the Adlerangriff (Eagle Attack) phase began this training
became difficult, and was then abandoned once ‘The Battle of the Airfields’ began in
late August.33 The First and Second Revises between them increased the pilot output
from the SFTSs by thirty percent, but the Battle of Britain demonstrated that the
largest possible output was imperative. The only options to further boost output were
to increase the effort from instructors while also providing the SFTS with more
aircraft, or make a further cut in the duration of the course.

On 20 August the Third Revise implemented both of these options to increase pilot
output. The EFTS course was cut further to five weeks and thirty-five hours flying,
while all SFTS courses were reduced to ten weeks comprising seventy-two hours of
flying, with no night training. At the same time all SFTSs were to train an additional

31
Before the reduction in hours, the length of RAF pilot training had already only been
eighty percent of the equivalent Luftwaffe system, Williamson Murray, The Luftwaffe
1933-45, Strategy for Defeat (London: Brassey’s, 1983), p. 314.
32
TNA, AIR 20/2759, Air Ministry: Papers Accumulated by the Air Historical Branch,
Vice-Chief of Air Staff; Miscellaneous Papers: Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Replacement
of Pilots in Fighter Squadrons, 13 August 1940, p. 2.
33
Phases of the Battle of Britain follow those from Collier, Defence of the UK, pp. v-vi.
www.bjmh.org.uk 128
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

twenty-five percent of pupils, with no increase in aircraft or instructors. Air Marshal

(AM) Lawrence Pattinson, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Flying Training
Command, questioned whether pilots would be competent enough to handle
operational aircraft at OTUs after only 120 hours of combined flying at EFTS and SFTS.
He said,

I consider that pupils with a total of 120 flying hours and with only ten weeks
training in the SFTS will not be fit to fly operational types. In my opinion, a
reduction to ten weeks would have the effect of increasing flying accident rate
and reducing the flying ability of the pilots that were finally passed out of the
OTUs.

However, ‘a body of opinion’ considered the transfer of training to the OTU stage
would make no material difference to the final standard, and that Flying Training
Command’s attitude appeared conservative and reactionary. What mattered was that
the theoretical pilot output was now double what it had been in May, which equalled
the estimated demands of the first line, giving the prospect of a balanced flow into the
OTUs.34 Although these changes were too late to influence pilot supply during the
Battle of Britain, the effects of the Third Revise would be felt by Fighter Command for
many months afterwards.

The ‘Stabilisation Scheme’

By September 1940 it was clear that the number and quality of pilots within Fighter
Command had fallen drastically during the August battles. The demand for pilots meant
that OTU course length ceased to have any meaning. Pilots were passed onto
squadrons as soon as they were considered capable and the training was completely
ad hoc. John Terraine argued that 'the RAF's disorderly pre-war expansion' had
stretched training resources to the limit, although he does not document the
consequences of the struggling training system.35 As August ended the forty-nine and
a half operational Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons were short of 352 pilots based on
a twenty six pilot squadron establishment, or a shortage of 154 pilots from a twenty
two pilot establishment. No manipulation of the numbers could disguise the fact that
107 pilots within these figures were non-operational, as shown in Table 1.36

34
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 313-315.
35
John Terraine, The Right of the Line, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 193.
36
TNA, AIR 20/2062, Directorate of Operations (HOME); Fighter Command:
Miscellaneous Papers, Memorandum on the Pilot Position in British Fighter Squadrons,
2 September 1940, Table A.
129 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

Position in 1 August 1940 15 August 1940 31 August 1940

Squadrons on
H’cane Sp’fire H’cane Sp’fire H’cane Sp’fire
Selected Dates
Operational
530 363 512 334 498 330
Pilots
Non-operational
125 39 63 41 54 53
Pilots
Total Pilots
655 402 575 375 552 383
(Aircraft)
Total Pilots
1057 950 935
(Command)
Total Non-
164 104 107
operational
Establish-
793 494 793 494 793 494
ment
26
Shortage 138 92 218 119 241 111
Pilots
Total
230 337 352
Shortage
Establish-
671 418 671 418 671 418
ment
22
Shortage 16 16 96 43 119 35
Pilots
Total
32 139 154
Shortage
37
Table 1: Pilot position in Fighter Command, August 1940

The general quality of pilots being provided to Fighter Command from OTUs had
fallen to an unacceptable level. Before May 1940 pilots had received twenty eight
weeks training before joining a fighter squadron, but after the First Revise this was
reduced to twenty one, as shown in Figure 1.

37
Adapted from TNA, AIR 20/2062, Memorandum on the Pilot Position in British
Fighter Squadrons, Table A
www.bjmh.org.uk 130
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

30
25
20 Suspended
WEEKS

OTU
15
OTU
10
5
0
Original First Second Third
TRAINING REVISE

Figure 1: Changes to pilot training in 1940

There had already been a noticeable decline in quality amongst replacement pilots
from training schools since the fall of France, and in July 1940 out of 107 pilots killed
eighteen had been died in flying accidents.38 A system of Sector Training Flights had
previously been used in 11 Group to bring OTU pilots up to operational standards,
but the heavy fighting in August made this impossible.39

Class Group Minimum Pilot Requirements

Operational Non-operational
A 11 Constantly maintained at 16 pilotsN/A
A 10 and 12 16 pilots As convenient
B 10, 12 and 16 pilots Up to 6 pilots
13
C 10, 12 and 3 pilots (8 for Nos. 3, 232 and 245 Up to
13 Squadrons) establishment
All Blenheim and Defiant squadrons to be maintained to Class B standard
Table 2: Squadron Classifications under the Stabilisation Scheme40

38
Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 194.
39
TNA, AIR 16/330, Minutes of a Conference on 7 September 1940, p. 8.
40
Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/330, Policy for Maintenance of Fighter Squadrons in
Pilots, 8 September 1940, p. 1
131 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

Following the meeting at Bentley Priory ACM Dowding was forced to use extreme
measures to preserve the first-line fighter force and employ a ‘Stabilisation Scheme’
which categorised his squadrons in such a way that a third of them (C squadrons)
were relegated to a training role.41 Although the normal establishment for fighter
squadrons was twenty-six pilots, the scheme prescribed the minimum requirements
for each class of squadron as shown in Table 2.42 Dowding realised that his command
was ‘going downhill’, and that the reduction in unit establishment to consider anything
above fifteen pilots as being acceptable would greatly increase the strain on his
squadrons.43 Nevertheless he knew that if Fighter Command could hold on and
maintain the front line for a few more weeks, the deteriorating weather conditions
would prevent an invasion attempt for the rest of the year. 44 His first-line strength of
twenty nine A squadrons (South East England) would be maintained by pilots trained
in the nineteen C squadrons shown in Table 3.

Class Group Hurricane Spitfire Total

A 10 2 2 4
11 14 7 21
12 2 2 4
Total 18 11 29
B 10 1 - 1
12 - 1 1
13 2½ 1 3½
Total 3½ 2 5½
C 10 2 1 3
12 4 3 7
13 7 2 9
Total 13 6 19
Table 3: Distribution of Squadrons45

41
Richards, Royal Air Force, Vol. I, p. 192.
42
TNA, AIR 41/18, Air Defence of Great Britain (subsequently ADGB), Vol. IV - The
Beginning of the Fighter Offensive 1940–1941 (1947), Part 1, Paragraph 59.
43
TNA, AIR 16/330, Minutes of a Conference on 7 September 1940, p. 6.
44
Vincent Orange, Dowding of Fighter Command, (London: Grub Street, 2008), p. 196.
45
Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/330, Policy for Maintenance of Fighter Squadrons in
Pilots, 8 September 1940, p. 2
www.bjmh.org.uk 132
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

Although the major daylight battles were over before this scheme took effect, heavy
fighting still continued until the end of October 1940.46 While the quality and
experience of pilots joining Fighter Command from the OTUs was debatable, Peter
Dye has demonstrated that the overall strength of Fighter Command continued to
increase throughout the Battle of Britain.47 Although the training of pilots from OTUs
was continued primarily in the C squadrons, an analysis by Tony Mansell showed that
nearly half of the pilots posted into 11 Group after the Stabilisation Scheme took effect
had previously served there, which mitigated the decline in quality, which the standard
works on the campaign fail to acknowledge.48 The deterioration in the overall strength
of Fighter Command was, however, clear to those within its headquarters. At the end
of July, the Command had fielded sixty two squadrons and 1,046 operational pilots
and whilst the number of squadrons had increased to sixty-six and half by the end of
October 1940, the number of operational pilots was only 1,042. 49 The controlled
decline of Fighter Command envisaged by Dowding meant that he could still field
twenty-six A squadrons with two B squadrons in reserve at the beginning of
November.50 Within the historiography, Francis Mason described Dowding’s decision
to ‘milk and dismember’ his squadrons as completely vindicated, despite Collier
insistence that scheme was ‘unwelcome’.51

Demand for casualty replacements in A and B squadrons fell after the end of the Battle
of Britain, but C squadrons continued to be inundated with pilots from OTUs. At the
end of October Fighter Command consisted of 1,506 pilots, but 464 of these were
considered as 'non-operational'.52 The intensity of fighting during the Battle of Britain
had demonstrated that sixty two front-line squadrons required a supply of 108
operationally trained pilots per week.53 The pilot output from OTUs during this period
has been estimated at 260 per month, which demonstrates that very few of those

46
Michael J. F. Bowyer, The Battle of Britain – 50 Years On, (Wellingborough: Patrick
Stephens, 1990), p. 207.
47
Peter Dye, 'Logistics and the Battle of Britain', Air Power Review, 2000; 3 (4), pp. 14-
53, p. 29.
48
Tony Mansell, 'Dowding and his Manpower. The Case of Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots
of the RAF and its Reserves in 11 Group', Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 22
(2000), pp. 126-131, p. 128.
49
TNA, AIR 16/374, Fighter Reinforcement of the Middle East, Notes on Pilot Position,
Fighter Command, as at 31 October 1940, 2 November 1940, p. 1.
50
Douglas, 'Air Operations by Fighter Command', The London Gazette, Number 38404,
p. 5021.
51
Mason, Battle Over Britain, p. 426 and Collier, Defence of the UK, p. 250.
52
TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 59.
53
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 502.
133 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

trainees had achieved operational status after reaching a squadron. 54 By November

1940 the C squadrons had become so congested that they held 230 operational and
320 non-operational pilots, an average of twelve operational and seventeen non-
operational pilots per squadron.55 Although Bungay insists that Fighter Command was
40% ‘stronger’ by November 1940, this calculation is based on total pilot numbers,
and not the large number of non-operational pilots.56 This overcrowding appeared to
be addressed by increasing the length of the OTU course to four weeks and
transferring some pilots to the Middle East, so that the Stabilisation Scheme could be
abandoned in December 1940.57 Mason provides a table that shows Fighter Command
fielding nearly 1,500 aircraft at the end of December 1940, but does not provide the
context of how many trained pilots were available, which the analysis above
demonstrates problems with continuing supply.58 Douglas had never really approved
of the system, and one of his first acts as the new head of Fighter Command was to
rescind it. 'This was a successful expedient but it was bad in principle', commented Sir
Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air in a letter to Winston Churchill, 'and
you will be glad to hear that the new C-in-C, Fighter Command has decided to
abandon it forthwith’.59 The C squadrons were then able to train the pilots they
already had and work towards operational status. The three existing fighter OTUs
could not provide enough pilots from four week courses, and as Third Revise pilots
would require an extra two weeks of training an expansion of the OTU organisation
was essential.60 Additional OTUs were therefore approved to ensure that pilot supply
never fell to critical levels again, including the establishment of the first night fighter
OTU in December 1940.61 This optimistic outlook failed to take into account the
consequences of the changes to training implemented during 1940.

The Decline in Pilot Supply During 1940-1941

By January 1941 it was clear there had been no improvement in pilot supply to Fighter
Command. In many respects the situation had actually deteriorated. Although the
Third Revise was supposed to have produced 1,800 pilots from SFTSs in November

54
Dye, 'Logistics and the Battle of Britain', p. 29.
55
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 501-502.
56
Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 368.
57
TNA AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 825.
58
Mason, Battle Over Britain, p. 481.
59
TNA, PREM 3/24/2, Prime Minister's Office: Operational Correspondence and
Papers, AIR, Pilots, Training Schools, Employment of Pilots, Secretary of State for Air
to Prime Minister, 29 November 1940.
60
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, pp. 502-503.
61
TNA, AIR 41/17, ADGB, Vol. III - Night Air Defence, June 1940 - December 1941
(1949), p. 90.
www.bjmh.org.uk 134
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

and December 1940, the reality was completely different.62 Archibald was politically
astute enough to have qualified this estimate with a caution of ‘No provision is made
for loss of output due to enemy interference or to exceptionally bad weather
conditions’.63 The pilot shortage was aggravated by the combination of several factors
which exacerbated the crisis.

Towards the end of December 1940 SFTS units were finding the completion of Third
Revise courses difficult. Each SFTS had to produce 7,200 flying hours per month from
108 aircraft. Shortage of spares and winter weather combined to extend courses by
several weeks and reduce pilot output, so it would not be until June 1941 that a Third
Revise SFTS course was completed within the scheduled ten weeks. By December
1940 lack of spare parts had rendered twenty one percent of SFTS Miles Master
aircraft unserviceable. Around the same percentage of advanced trainers would be
immobilised by shortage of spares until July 1941 when the situation began to
improve.64 The future supply of advanced trainers was also causing concern. Although
the Air Ministry had asked for forty percent of all aircraft produced to be trainers, in
January 1941 Sinclair was complaining that this had been reduced to twenty percent
and was continuing to decrease. He warned that this was delaying the expansion of
the training organisation.65 As well as the direct effect of bad weather in reducing the
hours available for flying, the intensive operation of SFTS grass airfields had caused
many to become unserviceable.66

Operations at the established OTUs were also disrupted over the winter of 1940-
1941. As well as bad weather affecting flying, accommodation was a problem at 57
OTU (Hawarden), where tents had been used during the previous summer.67 The
situation for the new OTUs planned the previous autumn was even worse and none
were yet operational. One OTU was held up by construction and accommodation
difficulties, while a suitable station could not be found for a second. With the increase
in fighter OTU course length, back to four weeks in November and then to six weeks
in December, the three established OTUs produced few pilots during the winter of
1940-1941.68 The combined output of all three fighter OTUs in the first quarter of
1941 was only 471 pilots, giving an average of 157 pilots per unit. Considering it had
been previously calculated that 108 pilots per week were required for sixty two

62
TNA, CAB 66/13/27, Paper No. WP (40) 447, Royal Air Force Training,
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air, 15 November 1940, Appendix C.
63
TNA, CAB 66/13/27, Appendix C.
64
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 319.
65
TNA, PREM 3/24/2, Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister, 5 January 1941.
66
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 320.
67
TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
68
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 504.
135 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

frontline squadrons, the average production from each OTU was fewer than forty
pilots per week.69 It would take until April 1941 before all seven day-fighter OTUs
were operating, with an obvious lag before pilots were produced, as shown in Table
4 and Figure 2.70

No. of Intake % of Total Output % of Total

Month
OTUS Intake Output
January 3 169 3.7188 5.1
February 4 154 3.3137 3.7
March 7 312 6.8146 3.9
April 7 286 6.2213 5.7
May 7 335 7.3229 6.2
June 7 468 10.2
411 11.1
July 8 549 11.9
387 10.4
August 8 540 11.7
400 10.8
September 8 503 10.9
475 12.8
October 8 539 11.7
459 12.4
November 8 382 8.3340 9.2
December 8 370 8.0326 8.8
Jan - Jun 6 1724 37.4
1324 35.7
July - Dec 8 2883 62.6
2387 64.3
Totals 4607 3711
Table 4: Intake and output of pupils from fighter OTUs during 194171

69
TNA, AIR 16/1144, Record and History of Operational Training Units under Nos.
81 and 9 Groups and No. 12 Group: 1 July-31 December 1941, Vol. II, Input and
Output of Pupils in 1941, pp. 488-493.
70
TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
71
Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/874 and AIR 16/1144
www.bjmh.org.uk 136
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

600
500
No. of Pilots

400
300
Intake
200
Output
100
0
J F M A M J J A S O N D
Month

Figure 2: Intake & Output from Fighter OTUS in 1941.

Fighter Command was still forming new squadrons to meet the renewed daylight
attacks expected when the Battle of Britain recommenced in spring 1941. AVM
Douglas had estimated that eighty squadrons, each with twenty three pilots would be
required to meet this threat.72 By the end of January 1941, however, 300 of the 1,461
pilots in Fighter Command were considered ‘not fit for operations’.73 Douglas had
already given up 119 pilots to be trained as instructors by the end of January 1941 and
was expected to provide another 100 for the new OTUs forming by the end of
March.74 Although the pilot establishment in fighter squadrons had been set at twenty
three at the end of 1940, by this stage the establishment of pilots in fighter squadrons
had fallen to about twenty one (compared to an overall average of 22.6 in October
1940), where it remained for the next three months. The decrease in experience
continued between November 1940 and the end of March 1941 as Fighter Command
lost 219 pilots killed and missing, with another 382 posted out of the Command, many
to become instructors.75 Offensive operations across the Channel between January
and June 1941 also cost the Command another ninety three pilots lost, with 74 and
611 Squadrons each losing nine Spitfires on such operations during this period.76 These

72
TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 62.
73
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 505.
74
TNA, AIR 16/491, Training at Operational Training Units, CFS Trained Flying
Instructors for OTUs, 18 February 1941, p. 1.
75
TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 60.
76
John Foreman, The Fighter Command War Diaries Vol 2: September 1940 to December
1941(Walton-on-Thames: Air Research, 1998), pp. 130-227.
137 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

included the experienced Battle of Britain pilot Squadron Leader John Mungo-Park of
74 Squadron, who was killed on 27 June 1941.77

The Reintroduction of the Stabilisation Scheme

The pilots coming from the OTUs were still inadequately trained, as despite the six
week OTU course most pilots joining fighter squadrons during the winter of 1940-
1941 had only managed to fly between ten and twenty hours in operational aircraft.78
Lack of experienced pilots was evident as early as October 1940, when the transfer
of 64 squadron to 11 Group was cancelled because only one out of four section
leaders had ‘experience of actual fighting’, and seven of the remaining nineteen pilots
were not sufficiently trained ‘to be considered operational’.79 At the beginning of
February Douglas, who had been promoted to Air Marshal in November 1940, was
clearly concerned, acknowledging that pilots needed to have completed ‘about 50
hours flying’ in an operational type aircraft before they could be considered
‘operational’. The majority of recent pilots from OTUs had flown fewer than twenty
hours due to bad weather restricting flying time, together with grass runways
becoming unusable after heavy rain. Despite previously abandoning the Stabilisation
Scheme on a point of ‘principle’, Douglas admitted that fighter squadrons were once
again undertaking ‘considerable training’, with a further thirty or forty hours flying
required before pilots could be classed as operational. With an eye towards the
additional squadrons being formed, Douglas argued that ‘the only alternative would be
to extend the OTU course in excess of 6 weeks which would result in the flow of
available pilots into the Command being reduced’.80

The Air Historical Branch narrative on operational training had no doubts about this
‘virtual reintroduction of the Stabilisation Scheme’.81 Neither did the Director of
Operational Training, who cautioned Douglas on 20 February 1941 that under no
circumstances should trainees be withdrawn from fighter OTUs until they had
completed twenty hours on operational type. Whilst accepting that bad weather and
unserviceable airfields had limited flying time, it was considered that courses should
be lengthened to ensure all pilots received the minimum amount of instruction.82

77
Kenneth G. Wynn, Men of the Battle of Britain (Croydon: CCB Associates’, 1999), p.
366.
78
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 505.
79
TNA, AIR 16/330, Reinforcement of No. 11 Group, Operational State of No. 64
Squadron, 15 October 1940.
80
TNA, AIR 16/491, Air Marshal Douglas to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 7
February 1941, pp. 1-2.
81
TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
82
TNA, AIR 16/491, Director of Operational Training to Air Marshal Douglas, 20
February 1941, pp. 1-2.
www.bjmh.org.uk 138
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

Training facilities had decreased as units were moved to other parts of the Empire and
were weakened further as airfields were handed over to operational squadrons.83 By
8 February 1941 there were 270 non-operational pilots in Fighter Command, and
there were concerns that while rushing pilots through OTUs might raise the
establishment strength in squadrons on paper, it would actually lower efficiency by
reducing the general standard of training. As the SFTS output was extremely small
during this period due to poor weather conditions, the Director was clearly
concerned that pilots with even fewer hours on operational aircraft would end up in
fighter squadrons.84

Douglas responded by insisting that ‘squadrons situated in the less active Groups are
perfectly capable of accepting a larger number of non-operational pilots than they have
at present’, which was a perfect description of what had previously been considered a
C squadron. He then argued that sticking to a rigid minimum of twenty hours would
prevent Fighter Command accepting the full number of pilots available and mean that
there would be unused training potential in quiet sectors. Incredibly, he went on to
insist that ‘passing out pilots from OTUs to squadrons with less than 20 hours will not
depress the general standard of training in comparison with the past, because it has
been very seldom that a figure of 20 hours per pilot has actually been obtained on
passing out from OTUs’.85 Arguing that the strength of Fighter Command would be
reduced if it did not accept partially trained, non-operational pilots that did not
increase fighting efficiency appears a singular view of reality at best. By insisting that
pilots with fewer than twenty hours would not depress the general standard of
training, Douglas ignored the increased importance of operational training in the Third
Revise to the completion of overall training.86 This argument looks even thinner after
considering that pilots training at OTUs at the beginning of 1941 under the Third
Revise had received seven weeks less training than their predecessors during the
Battle of Britain before being introduced to operational aircraft (see Figure 1),
something that would come back to concern Douglas.

By March Douglas was still sending pilots to squadrons with fewer than twenty hours
flying at OTU, insisting that his squadrons were under strength, and was forming five
new squadrons for which additional pilots were required. He was anticipating heavy
casualties ‘when the spring battle starts’ and was ‘naturally anxious to have all my

83
TNA, AIR 10/5551, Air Ministry, Air Publications, Second World War 1939-1945:
RAF Flying Training, Vol. I, Policy and Planning, p. 99.
84
TNA, AIR 16/491, Director of Operational Training to Air Marshal Douglas, 20
February 1941, pp. 1-2.
85
TNA, AIR 16/491, Air Marshal Douglas to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 24
February 1941.
86
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 313.
139 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

squadrons up to strength and the OTUs full of pupils when this situation arises’. He
went on to agree that it was a bad practice to send pupils straight from SFTS to fighter
squadrons, and ‘I hope that we shall never go back to that state of affairs’. He then
insisted that this ‘would not have happened last autumn if my predecessor had not set
his face for years against forming fighter OTUs’. 87 As none of the reasons given by
Douglas could be achieved by padding out his squadrons with partially trained pilots,
the motivation behind this policy is difficult to understand. The attack on Dowding
perhaps reinforces Douglas’s limited understanding of the logistics of pilot supply,
which had been highlighted during the 7 September 1940 meeting at Bentley Priory. It
should be noted that Douglas had continually interfered with the operations of Fighter
Command while he was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff during the Battle of Britain,
which points to a wider clash of personalities between the two commanders.88 The
choices available to Dowding from 1938-1940 were limited, and the resources of
Fighter Command were barely adequate at the start of the Battle of Britain. What is
clear is that in April 1941 Fighter Command had sixty five squadrons with far fewer
than twenty three pilots each, six of which were about to be sent to the Middle East.89
The expected attack would therefore have been met with six more day-fighter
squadrons than at the beginning of August 1940, but with only sixty more pilots. It was
expected that the average strength of the fifty nine squadrons would be around twenty
pilots. It should also be noted that the general level of experience throughout the
squadrons was lower than in 1940.90

Flying Accidents in Fighter Command During 1941

At the end of April 1941 Douglas was becoming anxious about the number of flying
accidents in Fighter Command. Writing to his Group commanders, he highlighted the
eighty nine fatal accidents in the previous three months, which corresponded with
Douglas beginning to supply squadrons with pilots from OTUs having less than a rigid
minimum of twenty hours on operational type. Some pilots had been killed in
collisions, which Douglas accepted as a risk during training. Other pilots had flown
into high ground in bad weather, with Douglas attributing those accidents to
inexperienced pilots needing more instruction and advice on bad weather flying
techniques. He finished by urging his Group commanders to pay attention to a high
standard of flying discipline and supervision of flying training.91 As these skills should

87
TNA, AIR 16/491, Air Marshal Douglas to Air Marshal Garrod, 9 March 1941.
88
TNA, AIR 20/2062, Fighter Command: Miscellaneous Papers, Air Marshal Douglas
to Air Chief Marshal Dowding, 27 August 1940.
89
TNA, AIR 16/374, Air Marshal Douglas to Headquarters, all Fighter Groups, 12 April
1941.
90
TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraph 62.
91
TNA, AIR 16/663, Fighter Operational Records, September 1939-February 1942,
Flying Accidents during the First Quarter of 1941, 25 April 1941, pp. 1-2.
www.bjmh.org.uk 140
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

have been learnt in the fighter OTUs rather than on operational squadrons,
unnecessary deaths could have been prevented if Douglas had not removed pilots
from OTUs before they had reached a satisfactory standard of training. Table 5 and
Figure 3 summarise fighter pilot casualties in 1941, from both combat and flying
accidents:
Combat Flying Accidents
Month
Killed Injured Killed Injured
January 6 5 13 6
February 34 12 30 15
March 19 3 31 21
April 21 13 47 15
May 17 8 47 43
June 52 13 37 11
July 94 18 61 4
August 106 14 54 16
September 66 8 65 7
October 52 6 62 12
November 47 4 60 13
December 27 2 66 15
Table 5: Fighter Pilot Casualties During 1941 92

500
450 OTU Output
400
350
No. of Pilots

Combat Killed
300
250 Combat Injured
200
150 Flying Accidents
100 Killed
50 Accident Injuries
0
N
J
F
M
A
M

A
J
J

S
O

D
Month

Month

Figure 3: Pilot Casualties 1941.

92
Adapted from TNA, AIR 16/663, Summary of Fighter Pilot Casualties: January to
December 1941
141 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

Although casualties continued to rise throughout 1941, these were from a much larger
intake of pilots from OTUs. If total flying accidents for the first and second halves of
1941 are calculated as a percentage of the OTU output, an identical figure of fifteen
percent is obtained. Statistics, however, do not tell the whole story as casualty figures
for the second half of 1941 categorise operational losses not due to enemy action as
flying accidents, which adds uncertainty to the analysis. The underlying accident rate
therefore suggests a fundamental deficiency with training in general at this time.

The End of the Pilot Supply Crisis

Douglas had estimated in December 1940 that eighty day-fighter squadrons would be
required to counter a renewed daylight air offensive against the UK. By transferring
six squadrons to the Middle East in May 1941, the Air Ministry felt that the risk in
keeping Fighter Command short of establishment was justified. They reasoned that if
the Luftwaffe concentrated forces in the west again, experienced pilots could be put
through the training organisation to reinforce the defence.93 The opportunity for
Germany to take advantage of the training crisis in Fighter Command was coming to
an end, although Hitler’s attention was already directed towards the east.94 The seven
day-fighter OTUs doubled their output in May to over 400 pilots, with an average
flying time of forty three hours per pilot. The number of pilots produced and the
standard of training was at last considered satisfactory, and the need for training
squadrons finally disappeared.95 By June Douglas was able to supply sixty four pilots
for Middle East squadrons, while having an ‘appreciable surplus of pilots available to
form an additional twelve fighter squadrons’.96 As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4,
squadrons would continue to be formed throughout 1941 and some, especially
Hurricane squadrons, were steadily posted overseas. The number of pilots within
fighter squadrons rose significantly in the last quarter of the year, with concern being
expressed that the delays in expanding Fighter Command meant that insufficient
aircraft were available to keep the surplus of pilots generated in flying practice.97

93
TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paragraphs 63-65.
94
Horst Boog 'The German Air Force' in Germany and the Second World War, Vol. IV,
The Attack on the Soviet Union, eds. Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffman, Ernst
Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1991),
pp. 326-376, p. 326.
95
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 506.
96
TNA, AIR 16/374, Air Marshal Douglas to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 7 June
1941, p. 1.
97
TNA, AIR 16/491, Minutes of a Meeting held at the Air Ministry on 29 September
1941, 31 September 1941, p. 1.
www.bjmh.org.uk 142
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

DATE AIR- TOTAL NO. A/C PILOTS ON PILOTS FULLY

I.E. PER SQN

TOTAL I.E.
CRAFT OF SQNS SERVICE- EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL
FORMED OR ABLE STRENGTH (% OPERATIONAL)
FORMING (+/- I.E.)

07.02.41 H’icane 38 16 608 625 (+17) 895 722 (81%)

60 83%
Spitfire 22 16 352 329 (-23) 429 378 (88%)
07.03.41 H’icane 39 16 624 665 (+41) 903 761 (84%)
63 86%
Spitfire 24 16 384 371 (-13) 459 407 (89%)
04.04.41 H’icane 37 16 592 637 (+45) 884 748 (85%)
60½
84%
Spitfire 26 (2½) 16 416 410 (-6) 497 410 (82%)
02.05.41 H’icane 36 16 560 587 (+27) 787 663 (84%)
64 84%
Spitfire 28 16 448 440 (-8) 600 509 (85%)
30.05.41 H’icane 30 16 480 512 (+32) 678 594 (88%)
63 86%
Spitfire 33 16 528 542 (+14) 666 571 (86%)
04.07.41 H’icane 28 16 448 506 (+58) 698 N/A*
70
Spitfire 42 16 672 566 (-106) 743 605 (81%)
08.08.41 H’icane 30 16 480 544 (+64) 643 542 (84%)
73 78%
Spitfire 43 16 588 675 (+87) 962 713 (74%)
05.09.41 H’icane 30 16 400 538 (+138) 741 539 (73%)
74 78%
Spitfire 44 16 704 690 (-14) 999 821 (82%)
03.10.41 H’icane 28 16 448 476 (+28) 704 551 (78%)
72 78%
Spitfire 44 16 704 746 (+42) 1130 877 (78%)
07.11.41 H’icane 13 16 208 237 (+29) 460 317 (69%)
67 75%
Spitfire 54 16 864 833 (-31) 1420 1102 (78%)
02.01.42 H’icane 12 16 192 195 (+3) 332 234 (70%)
65
75%
Spitfire 58 (5) 16 928 890 (-38) 1582 1200 (76%)
Table 6: Single engine fighter strength: 07 Feb 1941 TO 02 Jan 194298
*
No figure available for fully operational Hurricane pilots on 04.07.41

98
Adapted from TNA, PREM 3/29/4, Prime Minister's Office: Operational
Correspondence and Papers, AIR, Strength of Fighters and Bombers (I), Other Daily,
Weekly and Monthly Returns, Weekly State of the Metropolitan Air Force (Part 1),
07.02.41-02.01.42.
143 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

10000

1000 Hurricane
Number

Spitfire
100
Total No. of
10 Squadrons

Date

Figure 4: Single Engine Fighter Strength.

Conclusions
The introduction of the Stabilisation Scheme in September 1940 allowed Fighter
Command to manage a rapidly dwindling number of trained pilots and maintain
effective operations against daylight attacks, a situation that has been either trivialised
or completely ignored in the historiography. The approach of autumn meant that such
a scheme, described by Dowding as ‘a thoroughly vicious principle’, was only intended
as a short-term measure.99 As winter began and the threat of invasion passed, the
Stabilisation Scheme was abandoned, despite the large number of ineffective pilots still
in Fighter Command in December 1940,. Changes to training courses and the
expansion of the OTU network was meant to ensure that pilot supply would never
again become critical. The output from OTUs remained low during the winter of 1940-
41, due to bad weather, unserviceable airfields and a shortage of training aircraft.

The number of ineffective pilots in Fighter Command continued to increase, prompting

the reintroduction of the Stabilisation Scheme. The shortage of effective pilots
prevented the formation of planned additional squadrons, delaying the expansion of

99
TNA, AIR 2/5246, Air Ministry: Registered Files, Enemy Air Offensive against Great
Britain: Attacks on England from 11 September-31 October 1940: No. 11 Group
Report, Air Chief Marshal Dowding to Under-Secretary of State for Air, 15 November
1940, p. 1.
www.bjmh.org.uk 144
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

Fighter Command. The Fighter Command order of battle in April 1941 therefore
contained fifteen fewer day-fighter squadrons than Douglas had considered necessary
in December 1940. In this respect the legacy of the Stabilisation Scheme was that it
slowed down the rate that Fighter Command expanded, which fortunately never had
to be put to the test by a second Battle of Britain. With a renewed invasion attempt
seen as no longer realistic, six fighter squadrons were sent to the Middle East in May
1941. By June the output of the day-fighter OTUs was at last satisfactory, and the
second Stabilisation Scheme ended. The numbers of trained pilots continued to rise
to the point where concern was raised that insufficient resources were available to
maintain flying practice.

The long-term consequences of the Stabilisation Scheme were eloquently summarised

by the author of the AHB narrative on operational training:

The situation in Fighter Command in 1940, when over one-third of the

squadrons were relegated to what was, in effect, a training organisation, is a
further instance of the struggle between immediate operational requirements
and the long-term needs of training. Had it been possible to establish an
adequate OTU organisation, so that pilots from SFTSs did not have to go
straight from Harts to Spitfires (an instance is recorded of a pilot arriving at a
squadron having flown only a Tiger Moth) accident rates – to say nothing of
operational losses – would have been lower, and there would have been a
considerable reduction in operational aircraft requirements.100

Although this analysis was intended as a comment on the situation in 1940, the same
conclusions also apply to the continuation of the Stabilisation Scheme into 1941 where
the accident rate illustrated its continuing validity. Analysis of aircraft written off during
1941 demonstrated that these doubled from EFTS to SFTS phases and then doubled
again at OTUs and operational squadrons.101

Unit Write Off Rate

EFTS 2.5
SFTS 5
OTU 10
Operational Squadrons 10
Table 7: Aircraft written off per 10,000 Hours; January-September 1941102

100
TNA, AIR 41/71, Operational Training. p. 828.
101
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 355.
102
From TNA, AIR 41/4
145 www.bjmh.org.uk
British Journal for Military History, Volume 7, Issue 2, July 2021

The skill of pilots was not increasing as fast as the advance to more complex aircraft
so that the shorter training courses and reduced amount of flying practice during
earlier training made the prospect of accidents in combat situations more probable.
This trend can be further confirmed by a comparison of total accident rate with
fatalities during 1941.

Figure 5: Accidents per 1000 hours flown in 1941

EFTS SFTS OTU/Non- Operational

Month operational
Total Fatal Total Fatal Total Fatal Total Fatal
February 1.8 0.1 3.2 0.3 7.6 3.7 5.5 2.6
March 1.2 0.0 2.5 0.4 6.9 1.7 4.5 1.3
April 1.3 0.1 2.0 0.3 5.1 1.3 3.7 1.2
May 1.2 0.1 2.7 0.2 3.9 2.4 4.5 0.6
June 1.5 0.1 2.6 0.2 4.7 0.8 4.2 0.7
July 1.2 0.1 2.7 0.2 4.2 1.6 4.7 1.3
August 1.3 0.0 2.8 0.3 3.8 1.6 5.2 1.1
September 1.3 0.0 2.6 0.3 3.7 2.2 4.5 1.5
October 1.4 0.0 2.0 0.5 3.7 1.4 4.8 2.1
November 1.1 0.1 2.2 0.3 4.8 1.5 5.7 1.3
December 0.8 0.1 2.0 0.3 4.4 1.6 5.3 2.5
Average 1.3 0.1 2.2 0.3 4.8 1.8 4.8 1.5
Table 8: Accidents per 1,000 hours flown in 1941103

103
Adapted from Air Historical Branch (RAF), RAF Northolt, London, UK: SD (Secret
Document) 96, Monthly Analysis of RAF Aircraft Accidents Metropolitan Air Force,
March 1940 - June 1943, 1941(7) to 1941(12))
www.bjmh.org.uk 146
CONSEQUENCES OF THE STABILISATION SCHEME ON FIGHTER COMMAND

As the non-operational accident rate remained high throughout 1941, this also
suggests that a proportion of the 400 pilots lost on offensive sweeps over France in
the second half of 1941 might have been due to inadequate training under the Third
Revise, although other operational, technical and tactical considerations
predominated.104 The other legacy of the Stabilisation Scheme was that the attention
paid to operational type training disguised the deterioration in the standard of the
previous stages of training. By the end of 1941 the opinion of AM Pattinson, which had
been rejected as ‘conservative and reactionary’ a year earlier, was completely justified
and course lengths were doubled under the ‘New Deal’ proposals for training.
Unfortunately this came too late for the pilots killed on offensive fighter operations in
1941.105

104
TNA, AIR 41/18, ADGB, Vol. IV, Part 5, Paragraph 121.
105
TNA, AIR 41/4, Flying Training, p. 356. This coincided with a rapid increase in
availability of trained air crew from overseas, due to the success of the Empire Air
Training Scheme, C. J. Jefford, Observers and Navigators (London: Grub Street, 2014),
p. 211.
147 www.bjmh.org.uk