Constitutional Law 1

-S3ULGI-

NOTE: Majority of the Questions and Some of the Answers were directly taken in the Outline of
Cases in Constitutional Law 1, August 2022 and Political Reviewer June 2023 Edition That is
Prepared by Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan.

1. What is Political Law?

• Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defined the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil.
887, 897, 1922)

2. What is the effect of change in sovereignty to the Political Law of the former sovereign?
• Upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 330, 311, 1912)

3. What is the effect of change in sovereignty to the municipal law of the former sovereign?
• While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the law of
the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror. (Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 330, 311, 1912)

4. What is the postliminy theory or jus postliminium?

• When a foreign power occupies a state and exercises the powers of government, the
political laws of said state are deemed automatically suspended but the former
government automatically comes to life and will be in force and in effect against upin
the re-establishment of the former government. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615)

5. What is the Doctrine of “Supremacy of the Constitution”?

• All laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. If a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267
SCTA 408)

6. When is a provision of the 1987 Philippine Constitution a self-executing or non-self

executing?
• If a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. But if a
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not-self executing. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCTA
408)

7. What is the Meaning of Amendment of the Constitution?

 • It implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as
will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.
(Raul Lambino et al v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)

• Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. And amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended. (Supra)

8. What is the Meaning of Revision of the Constitution?

• It implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. (Raul
Lambino et al v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)

• There is revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution. (Supra)

9. Who may propose the Revision of the Constitution?

• The following can propose the revision of the Constitution:
i. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its Members; or
ii. A constitutional convention. (Article XVII, Sec. 1, 1987 Philippine
Constitution)

10. Who may propose the Amendment of the Constitution?

• The following can propose the amendment of the Constitution:
i. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members;
ii. A constitutional convention; or
iii. By the people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
((Article XVII, Sec. 1 &2, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

11. What are the Requisites for a valid people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution:
• The following are the requisites for a valid people’s initiative to propose amendments
to the constitution:
i. The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf;
ii. As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
iii. There must be a total signatory of at least 12% votes or all registered voters
and that every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein; and
iv. There must be a law enacted by the Congress for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. (Raul Lambino et al v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006 and Art. XVII, Sec. 1 & 2 of the Philippine Constitution)

12. What is the Doctrine of Proper Submission?

• Doctrine of proper submission means all the proposed amendments to the
Constitution shall be presented to the people for their ratification or rejection at the
same time, not piecemeal. (Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702)
13. Does a shift or change in the government from Bicameral-Presidential System to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary System a revision or an amendment?
• In the case of Lambino v. Comelec, 505 SCRA 160 it was held that, a change in the
structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced in two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution.

• A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential System to a Unicameral-

Parliamentary System is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of the government. (Lambino
v. Comelec, supra)

14. What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?

• The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines. (Art. I, 1987 Philippine Constitution.)

15. What are the elements of a state?

• As held in the case of Collector v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23, the following are the
elements of a state:
i. People;
ii. Territory;
iii. Sovereignty; and
iv. Government.

16. What are the different meanings of the word “PEOPLE” as used in the Constitution?
• As Inhabitants:
i. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (Article
XIII, Section 1)
ii. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Article III, Section 2)

• As Citizens:
i. We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of almighty God, in order
to build a just and human society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution. (Preamble)
 ii. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them. (Article II,
Section 1)
iii. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service. (Article II, Section 4)
iv. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (Article III,
Section 7)

• As Voters:
The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for
a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the
day of the election and shall en at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President
shall not be eligible for any re-election. No persons who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to
the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Seante shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one them shall forthwith
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Article VII, Section 4)

17. What are the Two-Fold Functions of the Government?

 • The two-fold functions of the Government are constitute and ministrant. The former
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature.
The Latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional. (Bacani v. Nacoco, 100 Phil. 468)

• BUT TAKE NOTE: In the case of ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649, it was held that the
growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government (constitute and ministrant) quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. Hence, the constitute and ministrant functions of the
government are not applicable today.

18. What is the Principle of Parens Patriea?

• The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriea. (Govt. v. Monte De Piedad, 35 Phil 738)

• This prerogative of parens patriea is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity
to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to
the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. (Cabanas v.
Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94)

• Hence, the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens parties, is called
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to
his best interest. (Cabanas, supra)

19. What kind of government was the “Aquino Government” after former President Marcos left
Malacanang due to the EDSA Revolution?
• The people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. (In
Re: Saturnino Bermudez, G.r. No. 76180, October 24, 1986)

20. What are the Three Kinds of De Facto Government?

• The following are the three kinds of de facto government:
i. Government de fact to in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority,
the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the
latter;
ii. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and which is denominated a government of paramount force;
iii. The third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants
of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the
government. (Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.r. No. L-5, September 17,
1945)

• But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government

de facto, but which might perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of
paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are:
 i. That its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories,
and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government;
and
ii. That while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens
who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by
laws of the rightful government. (Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, supra)

21. What is the Doctrine of Sovereignty as Auto-Limitation?

• In the succinct language of Jellinek, “is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction. A state then, if
it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence. (Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968)

• Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. They may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary
in character. The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at
the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. (People v. Gozo, 53
SCRA 476)

• But Take Note That, the state is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory.
If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien
character. They retain status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. (Reagan v. CIR, Supra)

22. What is the Incorporation Theory or The Incorporation Clause of the Constitution?
• The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations. (Article II, Section 2, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

• As such, even if the Philippines is not a signatory to a generally accepted principle of

international law like the Geneva Convention on Land Warfare, it may validly use the
same in the trial of war criminals during the Second World War. (Kuroda v. Jalandoni,
83 Phil. 171 and Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195)

23. Does a Generally Accepted Principle of International Law Prevails over a Constitutional
Right of a Citizen?
• The constitutional right shall prevail. Though Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations prohibits rallies within 500 feet of any foreign embassy, the
same shall give way to the constitutional right of the citizens to peaceably assemble
and to petition the government for redress of their grievances. (Reyes v. Bagatsing,
125 SCTA 553)

24. May a Citizen Refuse to Render Personal Military Service/Training Because he has a Family
Support and He Does Not Wish to Kill or Be Killed or That He Does Not Have Military
Inclination?
 • No. The Defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of
this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service. (People v. Lagman G.r. No. L-45892, July 13, 1938, and Section 4, Article II,
1987 Philippine Constitution)

• Without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be,
against his will, against his pecuniary interest, and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk
the chance of being shot down in its defense. (Jacobson v. Massachusetts as cited in
the case of People v. Lagman, supra)

25. What are the Provisions of the Constitution Supporting the Separation of the Church and
the State?
• The following are the provisions of the Constitution Supporting the Separation of the
Church and the State:
i. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. (Section 6, Article II)

ii. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting

the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. (Section 5, Article III)

iii. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant

thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Section 28, Article VI,
Paragraph 3)

iv. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or

employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(Section 29, Article VI, Paragraph 2)

v. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizen’s arms of the
Commission on Election. Religious denominations and sect shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which
are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration. (Section 2, Article IX (C), Paragraph 5)

vi. At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall
be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or
approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or
 wards belong, without additional cost to the Government. (Section 3, Article
XIV, Paragraph 3)

26. What are the Paramount Consideration by the Philippines in Dealing With Other Nations?
• The state shall pursue and independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states, the paramount consideration shall be:
i. National sovereignty;
ii. Territorial integrity;
iii. National interest; and
iv. The right to self-determination. (Article II, Section 7, 1987 Philippine
Constitution)

27. What is the Meaning of Nuclear-Free Philippines?

• It means that if it is consistent with the national interest, nuclear weapons is allowed
in the Philippines. Thus, the Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts
and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. (Article II,
Section 8, 1987 Phil. Constitution)

• As such, if it is consistent with national interest, like an instance where our

neighboring countries have nuclear weapons already, the same is not prohibited
because it will be for our “national interest” to have nuclear weapons also.

28. Does Republic Act No. 8762 or the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 Violates Section
9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution or the Mandates of the 1987 Constitution for
the State to Develop a Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy Effectively
Controlled by Filipinos?
• No. While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of
a self-reliant and independent economy effectively controlled by Filipino
Entrepreneurs, it does not impose of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.
The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preferences in all areas of
development.

• The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and
services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does
not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. (Rep. Espina Et Al v.
Exec. Sec. Zamora, G.r. No. 143855, September 21, 2010)

29. Does the Constitution Absolutely Prohibit Abortion?

• No. Because under Article II, Section 12 of the Philippine Constitution, it allows
therapeutic abortion or when the life of the mother is in danger. But all other forms of
abortion are prohibited.
30. Is the Provisions of the RH Law Allowing Contraceptives Violative of Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution Which Prohibits Abortion?
• No. Provided that said contraceptives do not kill or destroy a fertilized ovum. But
contraceptives that prevent the union of male sperm and female ovum are not
prohibited by the constitution. Contraceptives before fertilization are not prohibited.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.r. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

31. Does the Provision of the RH Law Allowing a Spouse to Undergo Reproductive Health
Procedures Like Tubal Ligation or Vasectomy Without the Knowledge and Consent of the
Husband Unconstitutional?
• Yes. Because it violates the provisions on “Family”. Family is shared by both spouses.
One person cannot complete a family. There should be mutual decision-making on the
part of the spouses on said procedures. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.r. No. 204819, April 8,
2014)

32. Does the Provision of the RH Law Allowing Contraceptives Violative of the Constitutional
Provisions on the Right to Health Since Contraceptives Are Hazardous to One’s Health?
• No. There exist adequate safeguards in the RH Law which safeguards that only
contraceptives which are safe shall be made available to the public because
dispensation and distribution of contraceptives shall still require the prescription of
a physician. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.r. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

33. Is a Law Prohibiting the Sale of Girlie (Bold) Magazines to Minors Violates the Right of
Parents in Rearing Their Children for Civic Efficiency?
• No. A law prohibiting the sale of “girlie magazines” is constitutional and does not
violate the above provisions. This is so because parents could buy said magazines for
their children if they believe the same is already suitable to the understanding of their
child. This is in accordance with this provisions which states that the parents have the
natural and primary right in rearing their child for civic efficiency. (Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 US 629, 1969)

34. May the State Prohibit the Teaching of a Particular Language in Any School?
• No. Because the child is not a mere creature of the State and the parents have the
natural right and duty of rearing their children for civic efficiency. (Meyer v. Nebraska,
260 US 260, 1922)

35. May the State Require Parents to Enroll Their Small Children Only to Public Schools?
• No. A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional
since it interfered with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the
right to choose which school is best suited for the development of their children
without interference from the State. This so because the children are not mere
creatures of the State. (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 1925)

36. Do We Practice the Free Enterprise System in the Philippines or Is it the Welfare State
Concept?
• The Philippine never practices the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-state
concept which is being followed as shown by the constitutional provisions on agrarian
reform, housing, protection to labor. (ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30, SCRA 649)
 • Our Constitution, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire
(or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an economic principle. Although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. This is clear from the following provisions of Article XII, Section 6 and Section
19 of the Constitution. (Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
Authority, 286 SCRA 109)

37. Is Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1 which provides that “No member or staff of the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance” Constitutional?
• No. Because it violates the following constitutional provisions:
i. Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7. This twin provisions of the
Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively there constitutional rights.

ii. Article VI, Section 21. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting
such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as to
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.

iii. Article XI, Section 1. This provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a
public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties
pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in
trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of
all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends
to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the officer. In other
words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.
(Sabio v. Gordon, G.r. No. 174340, October 17, 2006)

38. What is Legislative Power?

• Legislative power or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws. It is vested
in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representative. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. (Abakada Guro Partylist v. Hon. Purisima, G.r. No. 166715, August 14,
2008)

39. What are the Limitations to the Congress Power to Exercise Legislative Power?
• The following are the limitations to the congress power to exercise legislative power:
i. It cannot pass irrepealable laws;
ii. Principle of separation of powers; and
iii. Non-delegability of legislative powers.

40. What is the Principle of Separation of Powers?

• The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the
three fundamental powers of the government. It means that the Constitution has
 blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.

• Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Thus, the legislature has not
authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. (Belgica
v. Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 208569, November 19, 2013)

41. Is the Pork Barrel System or the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Senators
and Congressmen Constitutional?
• No. Because it violates the following:
i. Principle of Separation of Powers. Insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine.

ii. Principle of non-delegability of legislative Power. Insofar as it has created

system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations
bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment.

iii. It Denied the President Power to Veto Items. Insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the
affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called
to monitor and scrutinize.

iv. It Impaired Public Accountability. Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who

are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions.

v. It Subverted Genuine Local Autonomy. Insofar as it has conferred to the

President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to the other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public
funds under the broad classification of priority infrastructure development
projects.

42. What are the Constitutionally Allowed Delegation of Legislative Power by Congress to Other
Government Agencies?
• The following are the constitutionally allowed delegation of legislative power:
i. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
(Section 23, Par. 2, Article VI)

ii. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and exports quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
 duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government. (Section 28, Par. 2, Article VI)

iii. Delegation to local governments. The reason behind this delegation is because
the local government is deemed to know better the needs of the people
therein.

iv. Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies.

v. Delegation to the People. Section 32, Article VI and Section 2, Article XVII.

43. What is the Completeness Test and the Sufficiency of Standard Test?
• The completeness test is that the law must be complete in itself – it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delated. The
Sufficiency of Standard Test is that the law fix a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569)

44. What is the Composition of the Senate?

• The Senate shall composed of 24 Senators who shall be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law. (Section 2, Article VI)

45. What is the Composition of the House of the Representatives?

• The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform an progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Section 5 (1), Article VI)

46. What is the Term of Office of the Senators?

• The term of office of the Senators shall be 6 years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.

• No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.

• Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was
elected. (Section 4, Article VI, 1987 Phil. Constitution)

47. What is the Term of Office of the Members of the House of Representatives?
• The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of 3 years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30 th day of June
next following their election.

• No member of the House of the Representatives shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms.
 • Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was
elected. (Section 7, Article VI, 1987 Phil. Constitution)

48. What are the Qualifications to be a member of the Senate?

• The following are the qualifications:
i. A natural born-citizen of the Philippines;
ii. On the day of the election, at least 35 years of age;
iii. Able to read and write;
iv. A registered voter; and
v. A resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election. (Section 3, Article VI, 1987 Phil.
Constitution)

49. What are the Qualifications to be member of the House of the Representatives?
• The following are the qualifications:
i. A natural born-citizen of the Philippines;
ii. On the day of the election, at least 25 years of age;
iii. Able to read and write;
iv. Except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected; and
v. A resident in the district in which he shall be elected for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Section 6,
Article VI, 1987 Phil. Constitution)

50. Is a COMELEC Resolution Requiring a Candidate for Senator to undergo Drug Testing as a
Condition to the Validity of Certificate of Candidacy for Senator Constitutional or Valid?
• No. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws
or promulgating rules and regulations, validly impose qualifications on candidates for
Senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. (Pimentel v. COMELEC, G.r.
No. 161658, November 3, 2008)

• If Congress cannot require a candidate for Senator to meet such qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. (Supra)

51. Is a Person Who was born in the Philippines and later Enlisted in the US Marine Corps and
took an oath of allegiance to the United States, and then reacquired his Philippine
Citizenship through Repatriation Considered to be Natural Born in order to be Member of
the House of Representative?
• Yes. A Person who did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine Citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. The act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
Citizenship. (Bengson v. HRET and Teodoro Cruz, 357 SCRA 545)

• Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
 as a naturalized Filipino Citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino. (Supra)

52. Does a person who garnered second place in the election of the Office of the Representative
of Sixth District of Manila be declared as the winner, if the first placer was declared ineligible
for the office for lack of residence in the Sixth district of Manila after the election?
• No. There must be a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified
candidate to be considered “stray”. Hence, when a final judgment during the election
day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. The settled
jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes to be declared winner. (Ocampo v. HRET, G.r. No. 158466,
June 15, 2004)

• If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption of office. (Codilla v. De
Venecia, G.r. No. 150605, December 10, 2002)

53. Does a Person is Qualified to Run for Congressman for the 1st District of Laguna, where he
does not have a real property in the district and that he is living only in a leased townhouse
in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuya (5th District of Laguna)?
• Yes. The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property
owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for
at least a year prior to election day. (Fernandez v. HRET, G.r. No. 187478, December
21, 2009)

• To use ownership of property in the district a the determinative indicium of

permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing
a property requirement to hold public office, which property requirement would be
unconstitutional. (Supra)

• There is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a

congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy
new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat
in that other district. (Supra)

54. If a Person was disqualified by the COMELEC to run for Congressman because he did not
comply with the residency requirement, may he be substituted by his wife and assuming his
wife won, may she be declared as Congressman?
• No. A candidate disqualified under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
be substituted because the Certificate of Candidacy is void from the beginning for lack
of the qualification mandated by the Constitution which is he must be a resident of
the place for at least 1 year immediately preceding the election. A valid Certificate of
Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid candidate’s substitution. (Tagolino v.
HRET, G.r. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
 • It is different for a candidate disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. He could be substituted because he has all the qualifications but was
disqualified due to an election offense like vote-buying, terrorism, etc. (Supra)

55. What is Legislative Apportionment and Reapportionment?

• Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination
of the number of representatives which a State, country or other subdivision may send
to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to
the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalized population and
voting power among the districts. (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 176970, December
8, 2008)

• Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative

districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation. (Supra)

56. Does Republic Act No. 9371 where it increase Cagayan de Oro’s Legislative District From
One to Two Unconstitutional, Because it was Not Submitted First to the People Therein in A
Plebiscite in Accordance with Section 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution?
• No. There is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar
action on a legislative district. What is applicable is Article VI, Section 5 and not Article
X, Section 10. (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 176970, December 8, 2008)

• A legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a
local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite
requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay
under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the
validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment. (Supra)

57. Whether or Not A population of 250,000 is an Indispensable Constitutional Requirement

for the Creation of a New Legislative District in a Province?
• No. Section 5(3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
(Aquino v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 189793, April 7, 2010)

58. Is RA 9591, Creating A Legislative District For the City of Malolos, Bulacan Constitutional,
Where the National Statistics Office Projected that the Population of the City will be 254,030
by the Year 2010, But at Present it only has 223,069?
• No. A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative
district only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000
population. A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the
immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. (Aldaba
v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 188078, January 25, 2010)

59. In the Computation of Party-list Representatives, is the Veterans Federation Party v.

COMELEC Formula or the Panganiban Formula Still Applicable?
• No more because it results in a mathematical impossibility. To strictly comply with it
requiring at least 2% for every sectoral representative to obtain in order to garner 1
seat would require 116% in order that there will be 58 sectoral representatives [in
 2013 based on the number of legislative districts at present]. Also, the 20% party-list
membership in the House of Representatives shall be fully filled up, not just 20, 21,
22, or 23 when the Panganiban Formula was used. (Political Law Reviewer, Atty.
Gacayan, June 2023, Edition)

60. Does the Denial of Ang Ladlad’s Application for Registration as a Party-list by the COMELEC
is valid on the Ground that the LGBT Sector is Neither Enumerated in the Constitution and
RA 7941, Nor is it Associated with or Related to any of the Sector in the Enumeration?
• No. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sector is not exclusive.
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. (Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

61. Is the COMELEC Correct in Denying the Application of Ang Ladlad for Registration as a
Party-list on the Ground of Religion?
• No. Because our non-establishment clause under the Constitution calls for
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. It is was a grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. (Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 190582,
April 8, 2010)

62. Does the Constitution Requires the Appointment of Sectoral Representative to the House of
Representative to be Confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?
• Yes. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representative in paragraph 2, Section 5,
Article VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution”, referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appoints are subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. (Deles v. Commission on Appointment, G.r. No. 83216,
September 4, 1989)

63. What is Gerrymandering?

• Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. (Ceniza v.
COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763)

64. In case of Vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives under Section 9, Article
VI, is it Automatic for the COMELEC to Hold a Special Election?
• No. there must be a law passed by Congress appropriating the funds for the said
purpose. Since the holding of special elections in several regional districts where
vacancies would entail huge expenditure of money. (Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA
337)

• And that COMELEC cannot through Mandamus to compel the legislative to create a
law appropriating for such special election. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be
compelled through a petition for mandamus. (Supra)
65. Is a Senator Entitled to Increase of the Compensation, When he is One of the Senators Who
Approved the Same?
• No. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase. (Article VI, Section 10, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

66. When Does a Senate or a Congressman Privileged from Arrest?

• A senator or member of the house of representative shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. (Article VI, Section 11, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

67. While a Member of Congress is Not Allowed to Appear as Counsel for Any Party, Can He
Intervene in Case before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters, as a Stockholder to
Protect his Interest as a Stockholder?
• No. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a
member of Congress who is an alleged stockholder of the corporation involved in a
case before the SEC is not allowed to appear under the guise that he is appearing as
such, not as counsel for the corporation, but as an stockholder trying to protect his
rights. (Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31)

68. Does the Sandiganbayan Has the Power to Put a Senator on Preventive Suspension Who is
Charged under Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
• Yes. It is a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information
is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.
(Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.r. No. 128055, April 18, 2001)

• Section 13 of RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with
which he has ben charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office”
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular officer under which he stands accused. (Supra)

• RA 3019 which mandates the suspension for 90 days of all public officials after a valid
arraignment applies to all government officers and employees. To exclude Senators
and Congressmen from the said provision violates the “equal protection clause” of the
Constitution. (Political Law Reviewer, Atty. Gacayan, June 2023, Edition)

69. In the Election of Speaker of the House of Representative, is the 2 nd Placer Automatically
Becomes the Minority Floorleader by Virtue of Tradition?
• No. The new rule requiring those in the minority (who voted for the losing candidate
for Speaker) and those who abstained in the election of Speaker, to elect the minority
floor-leader and not the losing candidate to automatically be the Minority Floor-
leader, is valid and cannot be declared by the Supreme Court as invalid, since it would
be an unwarranted invasion to the prerogative of co-equal department. (Brawner v.
Speaker Pantaleon et al., G.r. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)
 • Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the
sole authority to, inter alia, determine the rules of its proceedings. These legislatives
rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them. (Supra)

• Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts,
for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of the majority. (Supra)

• Its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any
attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By
and large, this concerns an internal matter of a co-equal political branch of
government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion cannot be
judicially interfered with. (Supra)

70. In Case of Conflict Between the Entries in a Journal of Both Houses of Congress and
Extraneous Evidence Like Affidavits of Witnesses, Which shall Prevail?
• The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists
and reporters as to what the proceedings all about. (US v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729).

71. In case of Conflict Between the Journal and the Enrolled Bill, Which Shall Prevail?
• The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. (Casco Phil. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347)

72. What is the Composition of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET) or the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)?
• The following are the composition of the HRET or the SET:
i. It is composed of Nine Members.
ii. Three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice.
iii. The remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of the
Representative, as the case may be, who are chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
iv. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

73. When Does the COMELEC Loses Jurisdiction and When Will HRET Exercise Jurisdiction Over
All Contests Relating to the Election, Returns, and Qualifications of Their Respective
Members?
• Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s Jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begin. (Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)

• The HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the
House of Representative. And to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
i. Valid proclamation;
ii. A proper oath; and
 iii. Assumption of office. (Supra)

• The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon
on the 30th day of June following their election. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction. (Supra)

• BUT TAKE NOTE: In some case, the SC has made the pronouncement that one a
proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualification ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begin. However, it must be noted that in those cases, the
doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had
not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office. For example, the
case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC. (Supra)

74. Does the HRET has Jurisdiction Over the Question of Qualifications of Nominees of Party-
list Organizations, Who Took the Seats at the House of Representative That Such
Organization Won in the Election?
• Yes. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the election, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s Jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Abayon v. HRET, G.r. No.
189466, February 11, 2010)

75. What is the Composition of the Commission on Appointment?

• The following are the composition of the Commission on Appointment:
i. The President of the Senate as ex officio Chairman;
ii. Twelve Senators;
iii. Twelve Members of the House of Representatives.

• The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives are elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.

76. May the Congress Change the Members of the Commission on Appointment As a Result of
Change in Membership of the Different Political Parties?
• Yes. The House of Representatives may change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent
and do not include the temporary alliance or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another. (Raul Daza v. Singson, G.r. No. 86344,
December 21, 1989)

• In the Case of Cunanan v. Tan, G.r. No. L-19721, it disallowed the changes of the
members of the Commission on Appointment for the reason that, a shifting of votes
at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like
the one that has led to the formation of so-called “Allied Majority”, does not suffice to
 authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House.
Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as
votes shift from one side to another in the House.

77. May a Committee in Congress Imprison a Person Who Was Cited For Contempt, Because He
Refuses to Answer Without Valid Reason?
• Yes, Provided, that the imprisonment is not too long a to violate the right to due
process of law and it should not be longer by the term of the member or committee
who cited the person for contempt. (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29)

78. Is There a Compliance With Section 21, Article VI or the Requirement that the Senate Shall
Conduct Inquiries In Aid of Legislation by Publishing its Rules of Procedure in the Internet?
• No. The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tanada v. Tuvera
ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. And RA 8729 or the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations. (Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Committees on Public Information, G.r. No. 170339, December 23, 2008)

79. May the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Conduct Investigations in Aid of Legislation
for an Alleged Illegal Acts Committed by Police Generals (Wherein They Were Apprehended
by Airport Authorities in Moscow for Failure to Declare in Written Form the Almost 10
million pesos in their luggage) in Moscow, Russia Which is Outside the Philippine
Jurisdiction?
• Yes. The provision of Article 16 (3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provides
that each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision has been
traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference,
except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process. (Spouses PNP Director Eliseo De La Paz & Maria Fe
De La Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, G.r. No. 184849, February 13, 2009)

• The matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the Philippine is a state-party to the United Nation Convention Against
Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime. The Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s compliance with the
obligations required of state-parties under these convention. Thuse, the respondent
Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to the source and
purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow as this would involve the Philippine’s
commitments under these conventions. (Supra)

80. Distinguish the Power of Congress to Conduct Investigation in Aid of Legislation and the
Power to Call Department Secretaries, etc., During “Question Hour”?
• The Power of the Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is mandatory
or the appearance or the attendance is compulsory. This power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch and the aim of which is to . While the
Power to Call Department Secretaries, etc., During Question hour is discretionary and
 the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. (Senate of the Philippines represented by Senate President Franklin Drilon,
et al., v. Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita, Et al., G.r. No. 16977, April 20, 2006)

• Hence, the President by enacting E.O. 464 where it requires the consent of the of the
President before the Heads of the Executive Departments appear before the senate in
question hour is valid and constitutional, because Section 22, Article VI is only
discretionary. (Supra)

81. When is the Power of the Congress of Inquiry in Aid of Legislation is Not Allowed?
• The power of both house of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute. The investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of person under
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right
not be compelled to testify against one’s self. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, G.r. No. 89914, November 20, 1991)

• Hence, when a person is indicted before the Sandiganbayan the Committee cannot
conduct its own investigation of an issue that is already within the Sandiganbayan,
because it would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal. (Supra)

• For the Committee to prove and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already
before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. (Supra)

82. What is Executive Privilege?

• Schwarf defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it
as the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. (Senate v. Ermita,
G.r. No, 16977, April 20, 2006)

83. What are the Two Kinds of Executive Privilege?

• Presidential Communications Privilege – These are communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that
the President believes should remain confidential.
i. In the Case of Neri v. Senate Committee, G.r. No. 180643, the Supreme Court
held that the Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provides
the elements of Presidential Communication privilege to wit;
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power”.
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3. The Presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
 that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

• Deliberative Process Privilege – It includes advisory opinions, recommendations and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated. It applies to decision-making of executive officials.

84. Does the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete Has the Power to Issue Subpoena and
Contempt a Person Who Refuses to Appear Before the Committee Who is Conducting an
Investigation in Aid of Legislation Related to the Operation of Public Utilities?
• No. The power (contempt and subpoena) attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent
and coordinate branch of government. The same thing cannot be said of local
legislative bodies which are creations of law. (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative
v. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Dumaguete City, G.r. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987)

• There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local
legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for
contempt, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to the
punish the petitioner for contempt. (Supra)

• But Take Note: That they may conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as,
the legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. The difference lies
in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of
the local legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who are willing to
supply information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. (Supra)

85. Is RA 7716 (E-Vat Law) Unconstitutional for it Violate Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, Because Accordingly the Law was Created as a Result of the Consolidation of
Two Distinct Bills, House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 and That House Bill No.
11197 and RA 7716 are Not Substantially the Same.
• No. It is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. A bill originating in the House
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting
of the whole. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.r. No. 115455, August 25, 1994)

• To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as
the House Bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality
of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior
to the Senate. (Supra)
86. What is Disbursement Accerelation Program (DAP), and Does it Violate Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that “No Money Shall be Paid Out of the Treasury Except
in Pursuance of an Appropriation Made by Law”?
• The DAP was a government policy or strategy to designed to stimulate the economy
through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the
laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or implement
the DAP. (Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III, G.r. No. 2029287, July 1, 2014)

• No law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its
being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system
of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the
authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully
executed. (Supra)

87. What are the Requisites for the Valid Transfer of Appropriated Funds Under Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
• The following are the requisites:
i. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;
ii. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriation for
their respective offices; and
iii. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III,
G.r. No. 2029287, July 1, 2014)

88. What is Known as the “Cross-Border Augmentations” or “Cross-Border Transfer”, Is it

Allowed by the Constitution?
• Cross-Border Transfer happens when funds appropriated in a Department like the
Executive Department crossed another Department like the Legislative in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. (Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III, G.r. No.
2029287, July 1, 2014)

• Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under

Section 25(5) Article VI of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III, G.r. No.
2029287, July 1, 2014)

89. Is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) Unconstitutional?

• Yes. Because it violates Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that No law
shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. For the two last requisites
are not met for the valid transfer of appropriate funds. There were no savings from
which funds could be sources for the DAP and No funds from saving could be
transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items not provided in the GAA.
(Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III, G.r. No. 2029287, July 1, 2014)
90. When Does the Constitutional Requirement That “Every Bill Shall Embrace Only One Subject
Which Shall be Expressed in the Title Thereof”?
• It is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. (Tio v. Videogram
Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208)

• The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statue are related, and are germane
to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject and title. (Supra)

91. What is General Veto Power and What is Item-Veto Power of the President?
• General Veto Power of the President refers to the Paragraph 1 of Section 27, Article
VII of the Constitution which provides that “Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, x x x x The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; x
x x x”. And If exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.
(Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.r. No. 87636, November 19, 1990)

• Item-Veto Power or the Line-Veto Power of the President refers to the Paragraph 1 of
Section 27, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that “The President shall
have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object”.
It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item
of an Appropriation Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove
any item or items in an Appropriation Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part
of an item and to approve the remaining of the same item. (Supra)

92. What is the so-called Executive Impoundment?

• It refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any
type. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.r. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)

• Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the

authority of the President:
i. The authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by
Congress;
ii. The executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-chief;
and
iii. The Faithful Execution Clause. (Supra)

93. Is There an Instances That the President May by Issuing an Executive Order to Impose an
Addition to Any Other Duties, Taxes and Charges Imposed by Law on All Articles Imported
Into By the Philippines And Additional Duty of 5% Ad Valorem, Without Violating the
Provision of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution which Requires that All Appropriation,
Revenue, or Tariff Bills, etc. shall Originate in the House of Representatives?
 • Yes. Article VI, Section 28 (2) of the Constitution provides that “The Congress may, by
law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage, wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national government development program of the Government.

• Hence, When Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition
to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into by
the Philippines and additional duty of 5% ad valorem, the Supreme Court held that it
is constitutional because the there us constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions it may impose to
fix within specific limits tariff rates … and other duties and imposts. (Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219)

94. What is Executive Power?

• It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer that laws. It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
(Ople v. Torres et al., G.r. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)

95. May the President Refuse to Enforce a Law on the Ground That in His Opinion it is
Unconstitutional?
• No. It is not the duty of the President to say whether a law is or is not constitutional.
It is his duty to enforce the law until such time as it has been legally declared
unconstitutional. To hold an executive personally liable or nonperformance of official
duty, in legal effect, would make him a judge as to when a law is or is not
constitutional. (L.S. Moon & Co. v. Harrison, 43 Phil. 38)

96. What is the Extent of the Executive or Administrative Order that May be Issued by the
President as the Chief Executive, Under the Administrative Code of 1987?
• Administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with
the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy. (Ople v. Torres et al., G.r. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)

• Hence, Administrative Order A.O. 308 that was Issued by Former President Ramos is
declared by the Supreme Court unconstitutional because A.O. 308 does not merely
implement the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such system requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies - the primary of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. As said Administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of out citizenry vis-à-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evidence that it deals with a subject that should be covered
by law. (Supra)

97. What are the Qualifications to be Elected as a President of the Philippines?

• The following are the qualifications:
i. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
 ii. A registered voter;
iii. Able to read and write;
iv. At least forty years of age on the day of the election and
v. A resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.

98. What are the Instances Where the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and Their Deputies or Assistants May Hold Any Other Office or Employment During Their
Tenure or What Does the Phrase “Unless Otherwise Provided in this Constitution” in Article
VII Section 13 of the Constitution Refers to?
• It refers to the following:
i. The Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section
3 (2), Article VII or acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7 (2) and (3), Article VII; and

ii. The Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. (Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 83815, February 22, 1991)

99. Does Prohibition Under Section 13 (paragraph 1) Article VII Which Provides that the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and Their Deputies or Assistants
Shall Not, Unless Otherwise Provided In this Constitution, Hold Any Other Office or
Employment During Their Tenure, Covers Ex-Officio Offices?
• No. Provided that the ex-officio posts held by the executive officials concerned is
without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of his office. They do not fall under the definition of “any other office” within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.r. No. 83815, February 22, 1991)

• In order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or
functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is
to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving
any additional compensation therefor. (Supra)

100. Does the Appointment of Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the DOTC by
President Arroyo and Her Subsequent Designation as Temporary Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of the Administrator of MARINA Constitutional?
• No. It violates the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants under Article VII, Section 13 of
the Constitution. (Funa v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.r. No. 184740, February 11,
2010)

• While the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the
words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both
appointments and designation because the appointee or designate performs the
duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or
multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and
not to the nature of the appointment or designation. (Supra)
 • To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and
administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office. (Supra)

101. What are the Requisites of a Valid Appointment?

• The following are the requisites:
i. Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
ii. Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;
iii. A vacant position at the time of appointment; and
iv. Receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.r. No. 203372,
June 16, 2015)

102. What Constitutional Provisions Which Bans Midnight Appointment or Last-minute

Appointments.?
• Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution Bans Midnight Appointment, Which
provides that “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety”.

103. What Conditions Must Concur So That the Appointment of the President Will Not Fall Under
Midnight Appointment?
• The following are the requisites:
i. The date of the appointment must be before the prohibited period and that
their appointment papers must be transmitted before the appointment ban;
ii. The appointee must take and oath before the prohibited period; and
iii. The appointee must assume their office before the prohibited period.
(Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.r. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)

104. Does the Appointment of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of More Than 800
Appointments to Various Positions in Several Government Offices in 2010 Constitutional?
• No. Because all of them are made on or after March 11, 2010 which is the start date of
the ban on midnight appointments. And that none of the Appointees have shown that
their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issue (and released)
before the ban.

105. May the President Appoint or Fill Vacancies in the Judiciary During Period of the Ban on
Appointments Imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution?
• Yes. Because the prohibition on midnight appointments extend only to the Executive
Department and the prohibition does not extend to the judiciary. (De Castro v. JBC, G.r.
No. 191032, March 17, 2010)

106. What Appointments Made by the President Shall be the Subject of Confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments?
• The following are the appointments where the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointment is Needed?
i. The heads of the executive departments;
 ii. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
iii. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
iv. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. (e.g.
COMELEC, CSC and COA Chairpersons and Commissioners)

107. What are the Four Groups of Officers Whom the President Shall Appoint?
• The following are the four groups whom the President Shall Appoint as held in the
case of Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.r. No. 79773, December 17, 1987:
i. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
ii. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
iii. Those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint;
iv. Officer lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

• The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by Nomination and, if the
nomination is Confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
Appoints. (Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.r. No. 79774, December 17, 1987)

• The second, third and fourth groups of officers does not require the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointment. (Supra)

• Hence, There are officers whose appointments does not require no confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher rank, compared
to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII. (Supra)

• To illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation

by the Commission on Appointment, even if he is higher in the rank than a colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service. (Supra)

• Even the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is not required. (Supra)

108. Is There Are Instances Where the Appointments Vested in the President in the Constitution
Which, By Express Mandate of the Constitution, Requires No Confirmation?
• Yes. The following are the instances:
i. Appointments of members of the Supreme Court and Judges of Lower Courts.
(Section 9, Article VIII); and
ii. The appointments of Ombudsman and his deputies. (Section 9, Article XI)

109. Does the Appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Right
Requires the Confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
 • No. The appointment is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself. And that
they are among the officers of government whom the President may be authorized by
law to Appoint. (Concepcion-Bautista v. The Commission on Appointments, G.r. No.
864439, April 13, 1989)

110. Does the Appointment of the President of Sectoral Representatives Requires the
Confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
• Yes. The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly
derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted under the
second Whereas Clause of E.O. 198. Thus, appointments by the President of Sectoral
Representatives requires the consent of the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. (Deles
et al., v. Commission on Appointments, G.r. No. 83216, September 4, 1989)

111. Distinguish Ad-Interim Appointments from Appointments In An Acting Capacity?

• While both are effective upon acceptance. Ad-interim appointments are extended only
during a recess of Congress. They are submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection. While Appointments in an acting capacity or acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy and they are not submitted
to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the
need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (Pimentel et al., v.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.r. No. 164978, October 13, 2005)

112. What is the Take Care Power of the President?

• It is the power vested in the President under Section 17, Article VII which provides
that The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

• As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in
existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. In the exercise of such functions, the President, if needed, may
employer the powers attached to his offices as the Commander-in-Chief of all the
armed forces of the country, including the PNP under the DILG. (David v. GMA, G.r. No.
171396, May 3, 2006)

113. Distinguish the Power of Control Over the Power of Supervision?

• Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers performs their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
(Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143)

114. May the Executive Secretary, Acting by Authority of the President, Reverse a Decision of the
Director of Lands that Had Been Affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources?
 • Yes. The Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of
the President’s. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The
assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President
may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. (Lacson-
Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895)

115. What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency?

• Due to the multifarious functions of the Chief Executive in the Executive Department,
he can designate this functions to be performed by and through the executive
departments, and that act of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Separate
Opinion of Former Chief Justice Fernando in Lacson – Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA
895)

116. Is There an Instances Where the President Must Exclusively Exercise the Power Personally
and Could Not Be Delegated to Any Cabinet Member?
• Yes. There are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be
delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any those powers by any other
person. Some of which are:
i. The power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law;
ii. The exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy or the exercise of the
pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused. (Freedom From Debt Coalition v. Cuisia, et al., 472 SCRA 505)

117. What are the Three Extraordinary Powers of the President:

• The following:
i. The Calling Out Power;
ii. Suspending the Privilege of Habeas Corpus; and
iii. Declaring Martial Law.

• The Calling Out Power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The power to call is fully
discretionary to the President. The only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In fact, the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is not
subject to judicial review. (Lagman, et al., v. Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 231658, July
4, 2017)

• The Power of Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Declaring
Martial Law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and
public safety requires it. The Constitution imposed the following limits in the
exercises of these powers:
i. A time limit of 60 days;
ii. Review and possible revocation by Congress; and
iii. Review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court. (Supra)
 • The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial
law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the
latter powers. (Supra)

118. What are the Requisites or the Parameters for Determining the Sufficiency of the Actual or
the Declaration of Martial Law and/or the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus:
• The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
i. There must be actual rebellion or invasion;
ii. Public Safety Requires it; and (The first two requirements must concur)
iii. There is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion. (Lagman, et al., v. Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017)

119. May the President Validly Declare Martial Law Throughout Mindanao Due to Terrorism
Perpetrated by the Maute Group, and Not Due to Rebellion or Invasion, Which are the
Grounds in Accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution?
• Yes. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader
scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed. (Lagman, et al., v. Executive Secretary,
G.r. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

120. Is the Power of the Court to Review the Sufficiency of the Factual Basis of the Proclamation
of Martial Law or the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Under Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is Independent of the Actions Taken by Congress?
• Yes. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the
other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the
power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent
from each other. (Lagman, et al., v. Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

• NOTE THAT, in Fortun v. Arroyo the SC held that the Supreme Court shall await first
the action of the Congress before they shall act to revoke the declaration of martial
law. BUT in the Case of Lagman v. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court Overturn
their decision in Fortun and held that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power
of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress.

121. Is There a Need for a Joint Session of the Senate and House of Representative If They
Approve or Concur With the Extension of Martial Law by the President?
• No. The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the
Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the purpose of revocation
of the President’s proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus. (Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.r. No. 231671, July 25, 2017)

122. What are the Limitations or Restrictions of the Power of the President to Grant Pardon?
• The following:
i. In cases of impeachment;
 ii. Violation of election laws, rules and regulations without favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC; and
iii. When there is no conviction by final judgment. (Vidal v. COMELEC, G.r. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)

• Hence, the Congress cannot by any act of by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
the pardoning power of the President. And that Former President Estrada is qualified
to run for Mayor of the City of Manila as a result of the Absolute Pardon that was
extended by Former President Arroyo to him. (Supra)

123. May the President Grant Executive Clemency in Administrative Cases?

• Yes. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses. (Llamas v. Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)

124. Is Breach of the Condition of Pardon Subject to Judicial Review of the Court?
• No. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and
the proper consequences of such breach is not subject not subject to judicial scrutiny.
(Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272)

125. Distinguish Pardon From Amnesty?

• Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the court take no notice thereof.
While Amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of the
Congress, and it is a public act which the court should take judicial notice.
(Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, G.r. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)

• Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of

persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institute of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. (Supra)

• Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offenses
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon and in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
impose upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the la precisely
as though he had committed no offense. (Supra)

126. Is the VFA Between the Philippines and the US void and Unconstitutional? Is It a self-
executing Treaty That Can be Implemented Without Ratification by the US Senate Though
Ratified by the Philippine Senate?
• No. It is Constitutional. And The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the US Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. (Sombilon v. Romulo, G.r. No.
175888, February 11, 2009)
127. What is Political Question Doctrine:
• Those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, or a particular measure.
(Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30)

128. What are the Requisites of Judicial Review?

• The following are the requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy;
ii. The petitioner must have to raise a question of unconstitutionality;
iii. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
iv. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. (Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73, SCRA 333)

129. What is Judicial Power?

• Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Section 1, Article VIII)
130. What are the Powers of the Supreme Court?
• The following are the powers of the Supreme Court:
i. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus;

ii. Review, revise reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in;
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulations is in
question;
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
3. All cases in which jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher;
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

iii. Assign temporarily judges of lower court to other stations as public interest
may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months without
the consent of the judge concerned;

iv. Order change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice;

v. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
 underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

vi. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law.

131. What is Fiscal Autonomy?

• As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
CSC, the COA, the COMELEC and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law of compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions. (Bengzon v. Drilon, G.r. No. 103524, April 15, 1992)

• Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends it
recommendation to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes empty and illusory platitude. (Supra)

132. What are the Functions of Judicial Review?

• The following are the functions of judicial review:
i. Legitimizing function or to declare the law valid and constitutional;
ii. Checking function or to declare the law unconstitutional; and
iii. Symbolic or educational function or when the Supreme Court decide a case
even if it is moot and academic to educate the lower courts and other
government officials.

133. What are the Instances Where Moot and Academic Cases Are Still Resolved by the Supreme
Court:
• The following:
i. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; (Province of Batangas v. Romulo,
429 SCRA 736)
ii. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
involved; (Lacson v. Perez, 357 SCRA 756)
iii. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; (Province of Batangas v.
Romulo 429 SCRA 736)
iv. The case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review; and (Acop v.
Guingona Jr., 383 SCRA 577)

134. What is Locus Standi?

• Locus Standi or Legal Standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. (Ching v. Carmelita, G.r. No. 244828,
October 12, 2020)
 • The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. (Supra)

• However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or
with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is an stake. (David v. Macapagal Arroyo, 489
SCRA 161)

• The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which
the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has
waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act. (Abaya v. Ebdane, 515 SCRA 720; Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744; Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 400 Phil. 307)

• In David, the Supreme court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called
“non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
i. For Taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
ii. For Voters, there must be showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
iii. For Concerned Citizens, there must be a showing that issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
iv. For Legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

• And in the case of Oposa v. Factoran G.r. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, The Supreme Court
held that minors have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations or the
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

135. May Inferior Courts Also Exercises the Power of Judicial Review in the Light of the
Requirement of Section 4(2) of Article VIII?
• Yes. The Supreme Court declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented
from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. (Ynot v. IAC, G.r. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)

• The Supreme Court have jurisdiction under the Constitution to “review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
 provide”, final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
(Supra)

136. What is the Operative Fact Doctrine?

• It simply means that the declaration of unconstitutionality of a law, treaty, etc., is
prospective. All acts done in connection with the said law before its declaration of
unconstitutionality shall be considered legal, valid and binding. It is only the
declaration of unconstitutionality which is the operative fact which would stop the
people from complying with its provisions. (De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429)

137. Does the CSC has Disciplinary Jurisdiction to Try and Decide Administrative Cases Against
Court Personnel?
• No, Under Section 6, Article VIII of the constitution it vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and other personnel thereof. (CSC v. Andal,
G.r. No. 185749, December 16, 2009)
• In case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard
procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. (Supra)

138. May the Office of the Ombudsman Entertain a Criminal Complaint for the Alleged
Falsification of a Judge’s Certification Submitted to the Supreme Court, and Assuming That
it Can, Whether a Referral Should be Made First to the Supreme Court?
• Yes, but the Ombudsman must refer the same to the Supreme Court. Where a Criminal
Complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties. (Judge Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.r.
No. 102781, April 22, 1993)

139. Does the Provision of PD 1606 Wherein the Sandiganbayan has Their Own Rule-Making
Power Violative of the Constitutional Provisions Which Vest on the Supreme Court the
Power to Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading, Practice and Procedure in All Courts?
• No. Since the Sandiganbayan is a Court, its rule-making power must be construed, out
of constitutional necessity, as being subject to the approval of the Rules by the
Supreme Court. The Sandiganbayan has submitted its Rules to the Supreme Court.
And in the Absence of any action of approval or disapprobation from this Court the
Sandiganbayan has to be guided by the Rules of Court. (De Guzman v. People, 119
SCRA 337)

140. What is the Composition of the Judicial and Bar Council?

• The following are the composition:
i. The Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman;
ii. The Secretary of Justice and a Representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members;
iii. A Representative of the Integrated Bar;
iv. A professor of law;
v. A retired member of the Supreme Court; and
 vi. A Representative of the Private Sector.

141. Does The Phrase Under Section 8 Article VIII of the Constitution “A Representative of the
Congress” Means that there Should Be 2 Members of the Judicial and Bar Council From the
Congress, 1 from the Lower House and 1 From the Upper House?
• No. The Framers of the Constitution intended that Congress be entitled only to 1 seat
in the JBC. Had the intention ben otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided. (Chavez v. JBC, G.r. No. 202242, April 16, 2013)

142. Does Taxing of the Salaries of Judges Violates Section 10 Article VIII of the Constitution?
• No. Because the Framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary Taxable. Hence, the ruling in Pefecto v. Meer and Endencia
v. David is discarded, because in this cases the SC ruled that the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the constitution.
(Nitafan v. CIR, G.r. No. 78780, July 23, 1987)

143. May Judge Manzano as an Executive Judge of RTC Branch 19 be Appointed as a Member of
the Provincial Committee on Justice?
• No. Considering that Membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative function, will be in violation
of the Constitution under Section 12, Article VIII, which provides that members of the
Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (In Re: Judge Rodolfo
Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988)

144. Does Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution Which Provides that “No Decision Shall be
Rendered by Any Court Without Expressing Therein Clearly and Distinctly the Facts and the
Law on Which it is Based, Applicable to Different Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Bodies
(COMELC, NLRC, NAPOLCOM, Military Commission, etc.)?
• No. It applies only to the courts as defined or included by Section 1, Article VIII. (Air
France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, VDA De Espiritu v. CFI, 47 SCRA 354, Buscayno v.
Enrile, 102 SCRA 7, Mangca v. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 273, Valladolid v. Inciong, 121
SCRA 205, NAPOLCOM v. LOOD, 127, SCRA 75, Nunal v. CA 169 SCRA 356 and
Mangelen v. CA, 215 SCRA 230)

• Even in the case of the Bedruz v. Office of the Ombudsman, 484 SCRA 452, it was held
that the decision of the Ombudsman need not to express in a clear manner the law on
which its decision it was based, because the constitutional provisions applies to a
decision of a court of justice.

145. When Does the Requirement That the Decision Shall State Clearly and Distinctly State the
Law and the Facts on Which it is Based?
• The “DECISION” contemplated under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
applicable only “CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION” i.e., given due course and after
the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution
is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. (Germani
Machineries Corporation v. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329)
 • Thus, when the court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings,
decides to deny due course to the petitions and states that the questions raised are
factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. (Supra)

• Hence, when the CA denied due course and outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Germani Machineries Corporation on the grounds that the factual
issues had already been passed upon the NLRC, and since its factual issues had already
been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with
the findings of the labor arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the CA; and
that the questions raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these
bases in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution. (Supra)

146. What are Periods Given To Courts to Decide Cases?

• The following are the periods:
i. 24 Months for the Supreme Court;
ii. 12 Months for the lower collegiate courts; (CA, SB, CTA, etc.)
iii. 3 Months for all other lower courts. (RTC, MTC, etc.)

• Take Note That: These periods are mandatory except for the Supreme Court wherein
it is merely directory, because if is impossible for the Supreme Court to decide a case
for 24 Months because of the many cases it handles.

147. Is a Probationary Employee Entitled to Security of Tenure?

• Yes. The Constitution puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or
regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees
enjoy security of tenure. (CSC v. Magnaye, G.r. No. 183337, April 23, 2010)

• Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their
probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to
qualify as regular employees. (Supra)

148. What are the Exceptions Where Appointments in the Civil Service is to Made only According
to Merit and Fitness?
• The following are the exceptions:
i. Policy Determining;
ii. Primarily Confidential; or
iii. Highly Technical.

• Policy Determining – One that is charged with laying down of principle or

fundamental guidelines or rules, such as that head of department.

• Primarily Confidential Position – It holds a position or office at the pleasure of the

appointing power. The essence of which is the utmost degree of confidence involving
such close intimacy which insures freedom or intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings or betrayals whether personal trust or official matters.
(Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330)
 • Highly Technical – Those that requires the appointee thereto to posses technical skill
or training in the supreme or superior degree.

149. Does the Appointment of a Person in a Newly Created Office, Who Just Rendered 1 Year of
Service, Valid, Who Possessed the Minimum Qualifications and That The Appointing
Authority Disregarded the Next-In-Rank Rule, Because The Other Person Who Applied For
the Position Rendered 20 Years of Service?
• Yes. The determination who among the qualified candidates should be preferred
belongs to the appointing authority. The Next in Rank Rule specifically applies only in
cases of promotion. In this case, it involves a new office and a position created in the
course of a valid reorganization. (Panis v. CSC, G.r. No. 102948, February 2, 1994)

• Even if the vacancy actually occurred that can be filled up only by promotion, the
concept of “next in rank” does not impose any mandatory or peremptory requirement
to appoint the person occupying the next lower position in the occupational group of
the office. (Supra)

• What the law requires only is that the next in rank is given preferential consideration
for promotion to the vacant position, but it does nor necessarily follow that he alone
and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested right granted the next in rank
nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority to promote the holder to
the vacant position. (Supra)

150. May the Civil Service Commission Substitute The Person Appointed by the Appointing
Authority, Because It Believed That the Other Applicant is More Qualified Than the One
Appointed?
• No. What the Commission is actually allowed to do is to check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved.
(Santiago, Jr. v. CSC, 178 SCRA 733)

• No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts

on, or as the decree says, approves or disapproves an appointment made by the
proper authorities. To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the person was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing
authority. (Supra)

151. Does the Appointment of a Person Who was Appointed by the Appointing Authority as
Permanent Changes as Temporary When the CSC Approved the Appointment as Temporary?
• No. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so, and it was not for the CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. (Luego v. CSC,
143 SCRA 327)

• What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself
and what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on
the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the
appointee to the position. Hence, the appointment of the petitioner was not
temporary but permanent and was therefor protected by the Constitution. (Supra)
152. May the Incumbent Mayor Dismiss For Any Reason Without Violating the Security of Tenure
Under the Constitution, the City Legal Officer of Davao City, Which was Appointed by the
Former Mayor and Approved as Permanent by the CSC?
• Yes. The position of a City Legal Officer is one which is primarily confidential. The
tenure of officials holding confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence,
because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus
their cessation involves no removal. (Cadiente v. Santos, G.r. No. L-35592, June 11,
1986)

• There being no removal or dismissal it could not, therefore, be said that there was a
violation of the constitutional provisions that “no officer or employee in the civil
service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law”

153. May a Person Otherwise Qualified But Who Admits Having Violated a City Ordinance on
Jaywalking and Another Ordinance Requiring a Cochero to Occupy Only the Seat Intended
for a Cochero in a Calesa, Be Disqualified for Appointment to the Quezon City Police Force?
• No. The Supreme Court held that not only violations of statutes enacted by the
national legislature can give rise to crimes or criminal record as these terms are used
in our law on local governments or the law of public officers. However, we take
cognizance of the distinction in the law of municipal corporations which distinguishes
between acts not essentially criminal relating to municipal regulations for the
promotion of peace, good order, health, safety, and comfort of residents and acts in,
intrinsically punishable as offense. (De Guzman v. Subido, G.r. No. L-31683, January
31, 1983)

• The phrase criminal record governing qualifications for appointments could not have
been intended by the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal
or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a
municipal ordinance to qualify as a crime must involve at least a certain degree of evil
doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably related
to the requirements of the public office. (Supra)

• Automatic and perpetual disqualification of a person who in one unguarded moment

threw a cigarette butt on the street, spat in public, deposited house garbage in a
market receptacle for garbage, exceeded the speed limit for vehicles, blew his car horn
near a school or hospital, or, as in this case, jaywalked, and who has paid the fine
imposed by ordinance as commensurate deterrence for the act, would be
unreasonable if not oppressive. (Supra)

154. May the President Put an Employee to a Temporary Position from a Permanent Position By
Creating an Office for the Employee?
• No. This would violate the security of tenure of the employee. There are transfers
which appears to be promotions or lateral movements but are in truth demotions.
(Marohombsar v. Alonto, G.r. No. 93711, February 25, 1991)
155. May Government Employees Form Unions For Purposes of Collective Bargaining and to
Strike Against the Government?
• Yes, they can form unions but only for mutual aid and protection and not for purposes
of collective bargaining and the right to strike against the government. (Alliance of
Government Workers v. MOLE, 124 SCRA 1)

156. May Government Employees Be Removed Without Cause as A Result of Government

Reorganization?
• In Mendoza v. Quisimbing, 186 SCRA 108, The Supreme Court held that the removal
was invalid because the reorganization undertaken was not in good faith.

• In Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84, The Supreme Court held that reorganization in this
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case
of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exits.
And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall.

• And in De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294, It was held that the abolition of an office
within the competent of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity and a valid abolition of office is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbent.

157. What is the Composition of the COMELEC?

• It is composed of a Chairman and 6 Commissioners.
• Majority of the Commission including the Chairman shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten year.
• Qualifications:
i. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
ii. At the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age;
iii. Holder of a college degree;
iv. Must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately
preceding elections.

158. What are the Jurisdictions of the COMELEC?

• It exercises Exclusive Original Jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.

• It exercises Appellate Jurisdiction over all contest involving elective municipal

officials decided by the trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction (MTC)

• Hence, if it involves a barangay official the contest shall be filed first with the MTC. If
it involves a municipal official the contest shall be filed first with the RTC. And that the
decision of the MTC or the RTC as the case may be is appealable to the COMELEC.

• The COMELEC En Banc may hear cases only that is on motion for reconsideration that
has been decided first by the COMELEC Division. (Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987
Constitution)
 • It is the COMELEC Division that has original appellate jurisdiction to resolve an appeal
to an election protest decided by a trial court. Hence, when the Second Division of the
COMELEC Transferred the case to the COMELEC En Banc because it cannot constitute
a quorum and the action of the COMELEC En Banc in deciding the appeal of Dumpit is
without jurisdiction. (Eriguel v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 190526, February 26, 2010)

159. Are Decisions of the COMELEC Appealable? If so, to What Court? On What Ground or
Grounds?
• In the case of Galido v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 95346, Wherein it involves the decision of
the COMELEC on appeal (or that they have exercised appellate jurisdiction) The
Supreme Court held that the fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final,
executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by
way of a special civil action of certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

160. Distinguish Referendum From Plebiscite?

• A referendum is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing
public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the
calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the
President. It is participated in by all citizen from the age of fifteen, regardless of
whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-convicts. (Sanidad v.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333)

• A plebiscite on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are 18 years of age or over, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least 6 months preceding the election. Literacy, property
or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with
the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
(Supra)

161. May the COMELEC Extends the Election Period Which is 120 Days?
• Yes. The 120-day period is mere the default election period. The Commission is not
precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Javier v. COMELEC, G.r. No.
215847, January 12, 2016)

162. Does the President Have the Discretion on the Release of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and May She Validly
Impose Conditions for the Release Thereof?
• No. Local Government have fiscal autonomy. Section 6 of Article X of the Constitution
mandates that:
i. The LGU’s shall have just share in the national taxes;;
ii. The just share shall be determined by law; and
iii. The just share shall be automatically released.
 • The LGU’s are not required to perform any act to receive just share accruing to them
from the national coffers. Even if the President has the best intention, it must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. And that the
President only has General Supervision and it exclude the power of control. (Batangas
v. Romulo, et al., G.r. No. 1527734, May 27, 2004)

163. What are the Requisites That Must Concur to Successfully Effect a Change of Domicile in
Order to be Eligible for the Election of Local Government Officials?
• The following are the requisites to successfully effect a change of domicile:
i. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
ii. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
iii. Acts which correspond with the purpose. (Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado, et al.,
475 SCRA 290)

• To effect a change there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. (Supra)

• Take Note That, The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s qualification

for election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. (Supra)

164. What is the Power of Recall?

• It is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of
office. The people’s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied
in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the
proper administration of public affairs. (Garcia v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 111511, October
5, 1993)

165. What is the Three-Term Rule in the Election of Local Officials?

• The term of local officials shall be 3 years and no such official serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. The Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

• Two Conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the 3-term limit
must concur:
i. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same government post; and
ii. That he has fully served the three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC,
311 SCRA 602)

• In the case of Borja v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 133495, July 28, 1999 , The Supreme Court
held that the 3-term limit does not apply when there is a succession of office. As when
a Vice-Mayor Who becomes Mayor by Succession by reason of the Death of the Former
Mayor. Supposed that he was re-elected after the term, he is qualified to run again in
the next election. Because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
 but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the
full term because he only continued the service of the dead mayor.

• In the case of Bolos v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 184082, March 17, 2009, The Supreme Court
held that when Bolos was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for
Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his
office as Punong Barangay is deemed as voluntary renunciation of said office. Hence,
he has fully served his 3rd term.

• In the case of Lonzanida v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, The Supreme
Court held that during the 3rd Term of Lonzanida he was unseated as Mayor of San
Antonio Zambales, because the RTC ruled that there was a failure of election. Hence,
he did not fully serve the mayoral term because of involuntary relinquishment of
office. And that he is not disqualified to run for the next election and the 3-term limit
does not apply to him.

• In the case of Latasa v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, The Supreme
Court held that Latasa is disqualified to run for mayor after 3 consecutive term. The
conversion of Municipality of Digos into City does not mean the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor.

• In the case of Socrates v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, The Supreme
Court held that Hagedorn is qualified to run for a recall election, even though he
served as a mayor for 3 consecutive terms. The Constitution bars only those seeking
re-election in the regular elections and not on a recall elections.

• And finally, in the case of Aldovino v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 184836, December 23, 2009,
The Supreme Court held that Asilo is disqualified to run as Councilor. Even though
during his 3rd term, he was placed by the Sandiganbayan on Preventive Suspension.
Because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
exercising functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.

166. Does the Second Placer in the Election of the Mayor Be as Declared Winner After the First
Placer Has Been Disqualified?
• Yes. An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. He could not have been a candidate in the first place and that the popular vote
does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.r. No. 195649,
April 16, 2013)

• Take Note that the ruling in Labo v. COMELEC was abandon and was declared by the
Supreme Court as Obiter Dicta.

167. What is the Condonation Doctrine?

• A re-election of a public official to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor or
that the public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term. But this rule does not apply to criminal cases against the public
official. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.r. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)
 • BUT TAKE NOTE: In the case of Morales v. Binay, G.r. Nos. 217126-27, November 10,
2015, The Supreme Court Abandon the Condonation doctrine.

168. What are the Yardstick on How Public Officials Should Perform Their Duties?
• Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times:
i. Be accountable to the people;
ii. Serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
iii. Act with patriotism and justice; and
iv. Lead modest lives. (Article XI, Section 1, 1987 Phil. Constitution)

169. What are the Grounds of Impeachment?

• The following are the grounds:
i. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
ii. Treason;
iii. Bribery;
iv. Graft and corruption;
v. Other high crimes; or
vi. Betrayal of public trust.

170. Who Are Impeachable Officers?

• The following are the impeachable officers:
i. President;
ii. Vice-President;
iii. Members of the Supreme Court;
iv. Members of the Constitutional Commission;
v. Ombudsman.

171. What is the Extend of the Judgment In Case of Impeachment?

• Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines. (Section
3, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)

• In the case of Renato Corona, the Supreme Court Granted the Plea of Former Chief
Justice Corona’s Widow for the Grant of Retirement and other benefits to former Chief
Justice Corona and Survivorship Pension. It held that the effects of judgment on an
impeachment complaint extends no further than to removal from office and
disqualification from holding any public office. (A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12,
2021)

172. Differentiate Quo Warranto Proceeding From Impeachment?

• They are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a public
officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of “OUSTER”, while
impeachment affords “REMOVAL”. (Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno, G.r. No. 237428, June 12, 2018)

• A Quo Warranto Proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person’s right
or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper
action to inquire into a public officer’s eligibility or the validity of his appointment.
 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial
determination of the right to use or exercise of the office. (Supra)

• Impeachment is a political process undertaken by the legislature to determine

whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It does not ascertain the officer’s eligibility for
appointment or election or challenge the legality of his assumption of office.
Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the
impeachable official from office. (Supra)

173. May a Supreme Court Justice Be Removed From Office Through Quo Warranto Proceeding?
• Yes. Impeachment is premised on the fact that the election or appointment of a public
official is valid. The same does not apply if the appointment is void from the beginning
because the appointee is not qualified for the position he or she is presently
occupying. (Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, G.r. No. 237428,
June 12, 2018)

174. What Do You Mean by the Words “TO INITIATE” in Impeachment Cases?
• It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking
initial action of said complaint. (Francisco v. House of Representative et al., 415 SCRA
44)

• Initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice, or by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General
of the House. (Supra)

175. When Does the 1 Year Bar Period Begins In Impeachment Cases Under Article XI Section
3(5) of the Constitution?
• When the impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one-year period.
(Francisco v. House of Representative et al., 415 SCRA 44)

• TAKE NOTE: In Gutierrez v. House of Representative, G.r. No. 193459, February 15,
2011, The Supreme Court held that the limitation of the 1 year bar rule refers to the
element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should
defend himself in only one impeachment proceedings, so that he will not be precluded
from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only
one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main
work of law-making. Hence, it is allowed to file 13 impeachment complaint in a
different dates and simultaneously tried against the said officer within the same year,
there is no prohibition to Section 3 (5) of Article XI.

176. Who Prosecutes, Files Information and Investigate Public Officials?

• It is the office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. EXCEPT
When the offenses committed is election offenses, jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC. (Corpuz v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281)
177. Does the Power of the Ombudsman Is Only to Recommend The Dismissal or Suspension of
Public Official?
• No. The Supreme Court held in catena of cases that the Ombudsman has the power to
directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of an erring public official, other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary, within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided
in Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic
Act No. 6770. (Boncalon v. Ombudsman, G.r. No. 171812, December 24, 2008)

178. What is Academic Freedom?

• Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of
the school or college to decide for itself, its aim and objectives, and how best to attain
them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public interest calls for some restraints. (De La Salle University v. CA, G.r. No. 127980,
December 19, 2007)

• According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the

independence of an academic institution to determine for itself:
i. Who may teach;
ii. What may be taught;
iii. How it shall teach; and
iv. Who may be admitted to study. (Supra)

179. What are the Requisite for Administrative Cases for Students:
• The following are the requisites:
i. The student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
ii. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
iii. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
iv. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
v. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

• Take Note In the case of De La Salle University v. CA, G.r. No. 127980, December 19,
2007, The Supreme Court held that there is no denial of due process even though the
students were not allowed to cross examine the witnesses against them as long as
they were given an opportunity to be heard.

• The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary and cross examination
is not an essential part thereof. (Guzman v. NU, G.r. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986)

180. May the University Revoke or Rectify the Honor or the Degree of the Student Even Though
the Student Has Already Graduated?
• Yes. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained
through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or
distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon
 the graduation of the student. (University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. CA,
G.r. No. 134625, August 31, 1999)

181. How May the State Give Its Consent to be Sued?

• Expressly when there is a law allowing it and impliedly when it enters into a contract
with an individual because in the latter, it descended to the level of an individual
making it susceptible to counterclaims or suits.

182. May the Government Be Sued in the Exercise of Its Governmental Functions?
• Yes. If the government agency has a charter which allows it to be sued. (Rayo v. CFI of
Bulacan, 110 SCRA 456)
• Also, the government is not allowed to invoke its immunity from suit if by doing so, it
will be causing an injustice to its citizens. (Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA and
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294)

183. Distinguish Jure Imperii and Jure Gestionis?

• Jure imperii are governmental or sovereign act while Jure Gestionis are Private,
commercial and propriety acts. The state immunity extends only to acts jure imperii.
(U.S. v. Ruiz, G.r. No. L-25645)

184. Does State Immunity Extends to Officials of the Government?

• Yes. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the sate without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly committed by them in the discharge of their duties. (Arigo v. Swift, G.r. No.
206510, September 16, 2014)

• The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded
as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such
situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent. (Supra)

• But the rule does not apply if the official exceeded his authority thereby resulting to
injury to the rights of others. Public officials are liable in their personal capacity for
acts committed in bad faith. A public official cannot shelter himself by claiming that
he is acting by virtue of his government office where his acts are without authority or
clearly beyond his authority. (Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.r. No. 102667)

• The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
(Arigo v. Swift, G.r. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)