THE LIMITS OF ORTHODOX THEOLOGY

THE LITTMAN LIBRARY OF JEWISH CIVILIZATION

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 The Limits of
Orthodox Theology

Maimonides’ Thirteen
Principles Reappraised

MARC B. SHAPIRO

Oxford · Portland, Oregon

The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization
The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization
Chief Executive Officer: Ludo Craddock
Managing Editor: Connie Webber
PO Box 645, Oxford OX2 0UJ, UK
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© Marc Shapiro 2004

First published 2004

Reprinted, with corrections, 2005

First published in paperback, with corrections, 2011

First published in electronic form 2014

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No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by

any means, without the prior permission in writing of The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization

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The Library of Congress catalogued the hardback edition as follows:

Shapiro, Marc B.

The limits of Orthodox theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen principles reappraised / Marc B. Shapiro p. cm.—(The

Littman library of Jewish civilization)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Maimonides, Moses, 1135–1204. 13 ikarei ha-emunah. 2. Thirteen articles of faith (Judaism). 3. Judaism

—Doctrines. I. Title. II. Littman library of Jewish civilization (Series)

BM607.M353S53 2003

296.3—dc22 2003055798

E-book ISBN 978-1-909821-13-2

Publishing co-ordinator: Janet Moth

Copy-editing: Lindsey Taylor-Guthartz

Proof-reading: Philippa Claiden

Index: Peter Andrews

Design: Pete Russell, Faringdon, Oxon.

 To Lauren

‘Set me as a seal upon thy heart’

SONG OF SONGS 8: 6
 Preface

S WILL be explained in the introduction in Chapter 1, this

A book grew from an article I wrote some years ago. In the
intervening period, many people were kind enough to share their
comments with me, for which I thank them all. In particular, I
would like to thank Yisrael Dubitsky and Zalman Alpert, librarians
at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and Yeshiva
University, who were most helpful throughout the writing of this
book. I must also thank Professor Zev Harvey, who very patiently
answered my numerous queries about the most arcane points of
Maimonidean philosophy. Finally, I must express my appreciation
to an outstanding scholar who wishes to remain anonymous and
who was always generous with his time and knowledge. For
financial support, I thank the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation and
the University of Scranton.
My parents and in-laws have been incredibly supportive
throughout the writing of this book. The same is true for my wife,
Lauren. While actively pursuing her own successful career and
taking care of our family, she has selflessly enabled me to devote
myself to scholarly pursuits. I could not have wished for a better
partner in life. My children, Aliza, Yael, Danielle, and Joshua
continually bring joy to my life. My greatest pride remains
watching them grow up.
 Contents

Note on Transliteration and Conventions Used in the Text

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction

2. The Existence and Unity of God

3. The Incorporeality of God

4. Creation Ex Nihilo

5. Only God is to be Worshipped

6. Prophecy and the Uniqueness of Moses

7. Revelation of the Torah

8. Eternity of the Torah

9. God’s Knowledge; Reward and Punishment

10. The Messiah; Resurrection of the Dead

Conclusion

Appendix I: Other Areas of Dispute

Appendix II: Illustrations

Bibliography

Index of Biblical and Rabbinic References

General Index
Note on Transliteration and Conventions
Used in the Text

THE transliteration of Hebrew in this book reflects consideration

of the type of book it is, in terms of its content, purpose, and
readership. The system adopted therefore reflects a broad
approach to transcription, rather than the narrower approaches
found in the Encyclopaedia Judaica or other systems developed for
text-based or linguistic studies. The aim has been to reflect the
pronunciation prescribed for modern Hebrew, rather than the
spelling or Hebrew word structure, and to do so using
conventions that are generally familiar to the English-speaking
Jewish reader.
In accordance with this approach, no attempt is made to
indicate the distinctions between alef and ayin, tet and taf, kaf and
kuf, sin and samekh, since these are not relevant to pronunciation;
likewise, the dagesh is not indicated except where it affects
pronunciation. Following the principle of using conventions
familiar to the majority of readers, however, transcriptions that are
well established have been retained even when they are not fully
consistent with the transliteration system adopted. On similar
grounds, the tsadi is rendered by ‘tz’ in such familiar words as
barmitzvah, mitzvot, and so on. Likewise, the distinction between
ḥet and khaf has been retained, using ḥ for the former and kh for
the latter; the associated forms are generally familiar to readers,
even if the distinction is not actually borne out in pronunciation,
and for the same reason the final heh is indicated too. As in
Hebrew, no capital letters are used, except that an initial capital
has been retained in transliterating titles of published works (for
example, Shulḥan arukh).
Since no distinction is made between alef and ayin, they are
indicated by an apostrophe only in intervocalic positions where a
failure to do so could lead an English-speaking reader to
pronounce the vowel-cluster as a diphthong—as, for example, in
ha’ir—or otherwise mispronounce the word.
The sheva na is indicated by an e—perikat ol, reshut—except,
again, when established convention dictates otherwise.
The yod is represented by i when it occurs as a vowel (bereshit),
by y when it occurs as a consonant (yesodot), and by yi when it
occurs as both (yisra’el).
Names have generally been left in their familiar forms, even
when this is inconsistent with the overall system.
Thanks are due to Jonathan Webber of Birmingham University
for his help in elucidating the principles to be adopted.

The abbreviation R. (for ‘Rabbi’) before a name is used to

designate those scholars whom I regard as traditional authority
figures, who are the focus of this book. When dealing with pre-
modern scholars about whom we have no information other than
their works, I have placed an R. before the name, as there is no
reason to assume that they were not part of the traditional
community.
References to Maimonides’ Guide and to other classic works
(such as Emunot vede’ot, Kuzari, Sefer ha’ikarim, Pardes rimonim)
are to volume and chapter.
Although I have made use of the standard translations
(especially Pines’ translation of the Guide), I have not hesitated to
make changes where it appeared they were warranted.
 Abbreviations

CCAR Central Conference of American Rabbis

EJ Encyclopaedia Judaica
HTR Harvard Theological Review
HUCA Hebrew Union College Annual
JJS Journal of Jewish Studies
JQR Jewish Quarterly Review
JSQ Jewish Studies Quarterly
MGWJ Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des
Judentums
PAAJR Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish
Research
REJ Revue des Études Juives
TUMJ Torah u-Madda Journal
 ONE

Introduction

exploring the subject of this book a number of years

I
FIRST BEGAN

ago after reading an article by R. Yehudah Parnes in the Torah

u-Madda Journal, published by Yeshiva University. In this article
Parnes argued that as far as Orthodox Judaism is concerned,
heresy is defined by the Thirteen Principles of Maimonides (Moses
ben Maimon, 1138–1204), which appear in his Commentary on the
Mishnah (Sanhedrin, introduction to chapter 10). Parnes further
asserted that one is forbidden to study anything that disagrees
with these Principles, since it is ipso facto heresy.1
Although I had never before read such a sharp formulation of
the issue, Parnes’ point made logical sense. If it is true—and most
people seem to think so—that Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles are
the Orthodox catechism, then Parnes is correct in saying that any
writer disagreeing with the Principles would be advocating a
heretical position. The second stage of his argument relies on the
notion, widely accepted in the Orthodox world, that one is
forbidden to study heresy. Thus, the equation is complete:

A (anything in dispute with Maimonides’ Principles is

heresy)

+
 B (it is forbidden to study heresy)

C (it is forbidden to study anything that does not conform

to Maimonides’ Principles)

However, despite its apparent logical structure, Parnes’

argument was without historical precedent, since it would mean
that much of Jewish literature of the most traditional variety,
including portions of the Talmud, Zohar, rishonim (early
authorities), and aḥaronim (later authorities) were forbidden
reading, since they disagreed with aspects of Maimonides’
theological formulations in the Principles.2 Although the majority
of traditional scholars, including the most right-wing among
them, would certainly not go as far as Parnes, the underlying
assumption that the Thirteen Principles are the bedrock of
Orthodoxy has never been openly challenged in modern times by
those who identify with Orthodoxy. Indeed, the most influential
assault on the veracity of the Thirteen Principles is Louis Jacobs’s
Principles of the Jewish Faith,3 and this book was written in part as
an explanation of why he could no longer regard himself as
Orthodox. That is, for Jacobs, Orthodoxy is essentially viewed as
identical with the Thirteen Principles. This is so despite the fact
that many post-Maimonidean scholars, continuing into modern
times and including those with impeccable ‘Orthodox’ credentials,
have never felt entirely bound by the Principles.
It was this realization which led me to explore the history of the
acceptance of Maimonides’ Principles, and the first fruits of this
research, an article entitled ‘Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles: The
Last Word in Jewish Theology?’, appeared in the same journal
that had published Parnes’ earlier piece.4 This article, written
under the pressure of time constraints, accomplished its purpose
which, as indicated by its title, was to show that traditional Jewish
theology has allowed for much more latitude than found in the
Thirteen Principles. As a result, many outstanding sages did not
regard the Thirteen Principles as the last word in Jewish theology.
Indeed, there is a history of opposition to Maimonides’ Principles
among the ranks of traditional, or as it is called in modern times,
Orthodox Judaism.
What is fascinating is that this opposition exists together with
widespread assertions that the Thirteen Principles are the defining
features of Judaism. As a method of shorthand, the Principles are
indeed a very good way of expressing the fundamentals of Judaism
as understood by most Jews until the rise of the Reform
movement. However, as with most shorthand formulations, while
correct in many essentials, they are not correct in their entirety. A
good parallel to this is the popular expression that a righteous
person observes all 613 (taryag) commandments, an expression
also mentioned by Maimonides.5 This catchphrase is even used
with reference to the patriarch Jacob, who lived long before the
giving of the Torah.6 Of course, as everyone is well aware, it is
impossible for any individual to observe ‘all taryag mitsvot’, but this
does not take away from the power of the idea behind the phrase.
The nature of this subject is such that by the time the original
article appeared, I had already assembled enough information to
enlarge it significantly. Since then the material has continued to
accumulate, until I felt it was time to put it all into book form.
Hardly a week goes by without my coming across more sources
that bolster the book’s conclusion, leading to the realization that a
delay in publication would have produced an even more complete
book. However, since such a concern would have prevented the
book from ever seeing the light of day, I thought it was better to
adopt Hillel’s maxim, ‘If not now, when?’ (Mishnah Avot 1: 14). I
realize that some readers of this book might be put off by its
somewhat encyclopedic nature, but no other approach seemed to
be capable of proving my point. I also recognize that the
numerous sources I have gathered will become a reference tool for
many, although I hope that the interpretations I have offered will
also be given due regard.
Anyone thinking about Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles should
be struck by the irony of it all, in that just as Maimonides’ halakhic
masterpiece, the Mishneh torah, did not put an end to traditional
talmudic dialectics and confusion about the law but instead led to
even more disputes, so too Maimonides’ formulation of the
Principles did not put an end to discussion regarding the
fundamentals of Judaism, but rather propelled later thinkers into
new discussions on the very topic which Maimonides thought he
had closed. However, in spite of all the discussions and
disagreements with Maimonides, the rhetorical acceptance of the
Principles could not be avoided. This acceptance is illustrated by
the popularity of the Yigdal hymn and the Ani ma’amin catechism.
To be sure, these popularizations carry on the spirit of
Maimonides’ ideas, yet they also vulgarize, and at times distort, a
philosophically sophisticated text. It was this vulgarization which
received widespread rhetorical acceptance. As Menachem Kellner
has noted, ‘Not only were Maimonides’ principles accepted
without the theological substrate which gave them coherence and
which made of them something more than an elegant literary
device for teaching Jewish ideas; they were not even accepted in
the form in which Maimonides presented them, but, rather, in a
simplified, even debased fashion.’7

Maimonides and Dogma

Kellner, in his justly praised Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought,8
has already demonstrated the all-pervasive influence of
Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles in late medieval times.
Maimonides’ formulation assumed such significance that all the
post-Maimonidean dogmatists were forced to confront it. Kellner
also points out the interesting fact that the Principles, and dogma
as a whole, were not given extended treatment in the two
centuries after Maimonides, and that it was only in the fifteenth
century that scholars began to concentrate on issues of dogma. It
was then, in response to Christian polemics, that thinkers first
commented in detail on Maimonides’ formulation. Before Kellner,
Louis Jacobs wrote his now classic Principles of the Jewish Faith,
which provides a valuable elucidation of the text itself, in addition
to examining the Principles from a modern philosophical and
scholarly outlook.
My goal is not to continue Kellner’s treatment into more
modern times, nor to expand Jacobs’ discussion. Rather, I will
concentrate on those aspects of the Principles which did not
receive unqualified acceptance, and, in doing so, will probe the
outer limits of Orthodox theology. Although Jacobs dealt with
this topic to some extent, and I freely acknowledge my debt to
him in this regard, it still demands a systematic and comprehensive
treatment, which I attempt to offer in this book. To be sure, there
are times when I depart from these narrow confines and elucidate
aspects of the Principles themselves. I do so when the context
requires it and when I believe that I can offer an original
contribution. However, throughout the book I assume that the
reader already has an understanding of the Principles. Those who
do not are well advised to study the books of Kellner and Jacobs
before tackling this one.
The Thirteen Principles are a very conservative document, yet
the sources discussed by Kellner focus overwhelmingly on
disagreements with Maimonides over whether certain Principles
are actually ‘roots’ of Judaism—an entirely semantic issue—rather
than with the correctness of Maimonides’ fundamental theological
views. As Kellner puts it, ‘the plethora of competing systems
reflects not conflicting views of the nature of Judaism, but a
dispute concerning the nature of dogmas or principles of faith.’9
For the scholars on whom Kellner concentrates, Maimonides’
thirteen tenets are correct, even if many of them do not qualify as
‘principles’—that is, as theological positions upon which Judaism
stands or falls. My concern, in contrast, is with those scholars who
thought that Maimonides’ Principles were wrong, pure and
simple.
With regard to the question of how far back Jewish dogmatics
can be traced, Kellner has argued that Maimonides was rabbinic
Judaism’s first true dogmatist.10 However, this is incorrect, for R.
Sa’adiah Gaon (882–942), rabbinic Judaism’s first great
philosopher, had himself posited principles of faith. Nevertheless,
this list of principles had no influence on subsequent generations,
and indeed was unknown until modern times, presumably because
it was written in Arabic and did not appear in R. Sa’adiah’s
magnum opus, Emunot vede’ot.11
Kellner himself notes that R. Hananel ben Hushiel of Kairouan
(c.975–1057) anticipated Maimonides in saying that certain beliefs
are necessary to merit the world to come.12 However, as Kellner
points out, Maimonides goes further than R. Hananel, and R.
Sa’adiah as well, by saying that acceptance of his Principles are also
a sufficient condition for attaining paradise.13 That is, Maimonides
holds that one can commit every possible sin, but as long as the
sinner accepts the Principles and his sins are not part of a rebellion
against God, he will receive a share in the world to come. Such a
man is regarded as a ‘sinner in Israel’, and one must love him and
show him compassion.14 By the same token, Maimonides states
that not only one who denies, but even one who harbours so
much as a doubt about any of the Principles is a heretic who has
removed himself from the Jewish people. Other Jews are in turn
obligated to hate and destroy him.15 The fact that this ‘heretic’
may be a punctilious observer of mitsvot is irrelevant according to
Maimonides.16 Contrary to Kellner, these latter points need not be
included in a definition of dogma, and there is thus no question
that R. Hananel should also be regarded as a dogmatist. As with
R. Sa’adiah, R. Hananel’s dogmas had no influence on subsequent
thinkers and were not even published until the nineteenth century.
Thus, even though Maimonides can no longer be regarded as the
first Jewish dogmatist, he is certainly the first dogmatist of any
lasting influence.
 As noted above, Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles appeared in
his first major work, his Commentary on the Mishnah, which was
designed to be a popular work and was written in Arabic.
Nevertheless, it is significant that Maimonides himself in his later
years, even in his ‘exoteric’ works, did not feel bound to them in
the way that later became the norm in Jewish history. From what
is known of the subsequent history of the Thirteen Principles, one
would have expected Maimonides to put great emphasis on them,
quoting them in his later works and letters—but this is hardly the
case. Although Maimonides revised the text of the Principles later
in life, as he indeed revised his entire Commentary on the Mishnah,
he refers only once to the Principles as fundamentals of Jewish
faith.17 Even here the Thirteen Principles are not set apart as being
fundamentally more significant than the rest of the Commentary on
the Mishnah or the Mishneh torah. He writes:

When I learned of these exceedingly deficient folk and their doubts, who,
although they consider themselves sages in Israel, are in fact the most
ignorant, and more seriously astray than beasts. . . . I concluded that it was
necessary that I clearly elucidate religious fundamentals in my works on law .
. . I therefore published principles that need to be acknowledged in the
introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah regarding prophecy and the
roots of tradition and what every Rabbanite had to believe concerning the
Oral Law. In chapter 10 of Sanhedrin I expounded fundamentals connected
with the beginning and the end, i.e. what pertains to God’s unity and the
world to come and the other tenets of the Torah. I acted the same way in
my major work, which I called Mishneh Torah.18

On the other occasions on which Maimonides makes reference

to the Principles, it is only with regard to specific points discussed
there. For example, in Guide ii. 35 Maimonides notes that he
explained the nature of Moses’ prophecy in the Commentary on the
Mishnah (where the Principles appear). Another example is found
in a responsum where he refers to his discussion of the Eighth
Principle, concerning the equal sanctity of all parts of the
Pentateuch.19 Certainly, had Maimonides continued to regard the
Thirteen Principles as the essence of Judaism one would expect
more than this.20
In his great code of Jewish law, the Mishneh torah, which also
defines heresy and what Jews are obligated to believe, Maimonides
does not list the Thirteen Principles as a unit. To be sure, all of the
Principles, with the addition of some others, are to be found in
this work, scattered in a few different places.21 Yet if he had
regarded the Thirteen Principles as his final statement on the
fundamentals of Jewish faith, one would have expected them to be
listed at the very beginning of his code, in the section entitled
‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’ (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah).
Furthermore, not all of the details of the Thirteen Principles are
repeated in the Mishneh torah. Presumably, Maimonides would be
surprised that in seeking to define the essentials of Judaism, later
generations of Jews, both scholars and masses, had latched onto
his earlier work rather than his more detailed formulation in the
Mishneh torah.
Finally, remembering that Maimonides stated that belief in the
Thirteen Principles is essential to being a Jew, one must wonder
why there is no mention of the Principles in his discussion of what
a future convert should be taught about the religion. While it is
common today for prospective Orthodox converts to be instructed
in the Principles, all that Maimonides himself writes about
theology and converts is the following: ‘He should then be made
acquainted with the principles of the faith, which are the oneness
of God and the prohibition of idolatry.’22 This limited theological
instruction is itself significant, since the Talmud has nothing of the
kind, mentioning only that a convert is instructed in ‘some of the
less weighty and some of the more weighty commandments’.23 As
Maimonides was adding to the talmudic prescription, why did he
not add the other Principles, especially the Third Principle, that of
divine incorporeality?
In the Guide there is also no listing of the Principles. Seeking to
explain this omission, R. Isaac Abarbanel (1437–1508) writes:
‘He postulated the Principles for the masses, and for beginners in
the study of Mishnah, but not for those individuals who plumbed
the knowledge of truth, for whom he wrote the Guide.’24 In
Abarbanel’s mind, only limited attention should therefore be paid
to Maimonides’ early formulation of dogma, and it would
certainly be improper to make conclusions about his theological
views on the basis of a text designed for beginners.
Even if one does not accept Abarbanel’s understanding of
Maimonides’ purpose in writing the Principles, the question still
remains: why is there no place in the Mishneh torah and the Guide
where all the Principles are listed? It certainly seems that
Maimonides was not as closely tied to his youthful formulation of
the Principles as is often assumed. This would make the Principles
one of a number of examples where one finds different emphases,
if not outright contradictions, between what Maimonides writes in
his Commentary on the Mishnah and what appears in his later
works. In fact, this very suggestion has already been proposed by
two rabbinic scholars, R. Joseph Schwartz (1804–65)25 and R.
Shelomoh Goren (1917–96),26 both of whom called attention to
the fact that Maimonides did not include the Principles in his later
works, in particular in the Mishneh torah, where he presents his
various categories of heresy. To their minds this indicates that he
abandoned his earlier system of Thirteen Principles.
As far as Maimonides’ Mishneh torah is concerned, it is also
important to note that the definition of a heretic in this work
differs from that in the Commentary on the Mishnah. In the section
‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’ Maimonides does indeed discuss most of
the Principles as part of his overall exposition of Jewish theology.
If all we had was ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’ we would probably
assume that the Mishneh torah shares the perspective of the
Commentary on the Mishnah, and that lack of belief in any of the
Principles makes one a heretic. However, when it is time to define
the parameters of heresy for which one loses one’s share in the
world to come, Maimonides’ formulation in the Mishneh torah
reads: ‘Five individuals are described as minim: 1. One who says
there is no God or ruler of the world; 2. One who says that there is
a ruler but that there are two or more’, and so forth (‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’ 3: 7–8). Maimonides also follows this model in defining
an epikoros and a kofer batorah (two other types of heretic).27 In
other words, according to this text it is essential that one’s heresy
be stated publicly. Apparently, one who has heretical thoughts but
conducts himself as a good Jew does not lose his share in the
world to come.28
 To be sure, in the Mishneh torah Maimonides warns people to
keep away from heretical thoughts, which can lead to spiritual
destruction. Citing Numbers 15: 39, he even regards this as a
negative commandment. Yet although he comes close in this
halakhic formulation, he never actually states that entertaining the
thought alone makes one a heretic with no share in the world to
come.29 Similarly, Maimonides writes: ‘Whoever permits the
thought to enter his mind that there is another deity besides this
God violates a prohibition, as it is said, You shall have no other gods
before Me (Exod. 20: 3, Deut. 5: 7), and denies the essence of
religion—this doctrine being the great principle on which
everything depends.’30 However, once again, Maimonides does
not say that such a person is a heretic. He has violated a
commandment and has, in his mind, denied the essence of
Judaism, but as long as his heresy is not publicly voiced he
apparently remains a (sinning) Jew in good standing.
R. Hayim Hirschensohn (1857–1935), a liberal halakhist of the
last century, particularly stressed this point, expanding upon it in a
way that goes beyond anything Maimonides wrote in the Mishneh
torah.31 According to Hirschensohn, someone who merely thinks
heretical thoughts is absolutely blameless, for one does not have
control over one’s thoughts. In support of this assumption, he
cites R. Asher ben Jehiel (c.1250–1327),32 who put forth an
innovative understanding of the talmudic statement that, in
contrast to other sins, when it comes to idolatry there is
punishment for mere intention.33 According to R. Asher, all this
means is that, if you worship an idol, God combines your
intention before the act together with the act itself. However, if
you do not worship the idol, then your thoughts remain no more
than thoughts. According to Hirschensohn, this is a proof that
simply having a heretical thought, in this case that idols have
power, does not make you a heretic unless you actually concretize
this heresy in the real world.
Hirschensohn also offers his own distinction between publicly
voicing one’s heresy and attempting to influence others to follow
in one’s path. According to him, it is only the latter which causes
one to lose one’s share in the world to come, as well as to be
punished by an earthly court. The lone heretic, even if his heresy is
publicly voiced, is left to God, who can punish him as He sees fit.
However, such a person does not lose his share in the world to
come. Hirschensohn thus denies Jewish courts the role of
inquisitor, except when the innocent population is put at spiritual
risk.
Hirschensohn himself notes that his point about humans being
unable to control their thoughts was also the opinion of a leading
medieval philosopher, R. Hasdai Crescas (died c.1412). Crescas
was adamant that beliefs are always involuntary, as one cannot
force oneself to disbelieve that which one believes. Contrary to
Maimonides, according to Crescas there can thus be no reward or
punishment for belief. If someone, for whatever reason, does not
believe in one of Maimonides’ dogmas, he cannot be held culpable
for this disbelief. What, then, does Crescas do with the notion,
found throughout rabbinic literature, that a heretic is punished in
the afterlife? In very original fashion, Crescas argues that, while
one is not punished for disbelief, he is punished for the joy he feels
through this disbelief as well as for the lack of effort made to
discover the truth. Similarly, and again contrary to Maimonides,
‘one is not rewarded for belief, but for the effort [hishtadlut] to
apprehend the truth of the belief’,34 and for the joy that
accompanies this.35
To return to the Thirteen Principles: not only does Maimonides
require one to affirm them without any doubt, but he also leaves
no room for honest error, a point concerning which there was a
good deal of debate in medieval times, with R. Simeon ben
Tsemah Duran (1361–1444)36 and R. Joseph Albo (fifteenth
century)37 emerging as Maimonides’ great critics.38 According to
them, even one who disagrees with a basic Jewish doctrine is not
regarded as a heretic, if his error arose as a result of well-
intentioned study. R. David ibn Zimra (1479–1573) goes so far
as to include in this category one who thinks it reflects positively
on Moses that some of the ancients thought he was God.39
These opponents of Maimonides thus made it very difficult to
condemn someone as a heretic, as long as the person in question
was known to be a committed Jew who erred unintentionally.
Approaching matters from a different angle, R. Abraham Isaac
Kook (1865–1935) also differed with Maimonides. While, as
noted above, Maimonides does not leave any room for the honest
doubter, Kook specifically excludes such a person from being
categorized as a heretic. In a passage that deserves to be quoted at
length, Kook writes:

Know that, as far as the halakhah is concerned, it is absolutely forbidden and

a festering sore for one even to cast a doubt concerning the truth of the
content of our perfect faith. However, we do not find our Sages deeming
such individuals heretics. Only one who definitely denies, that is, who
decides that the very opposite of our faith is true, is included in this
category. A categorical denial cannot possibly be found in Israel except in
one who is completely wicked and an intentional liar, for the greatest
wickedness can only sow doubt in the minds of the weak. One who is
brazen enough to say that he is a complete denier is thus certainly wicked . .
. and he cannot claim that he has no control over his thoughts. If the heresy
in our generation was honest it would always be in a position of doubt, and
its doubts could be easily clarified. However, it intentionally falsifies and
claims certainty in its denial, even though those weakest in faith can only
arrive at a level of doubt.40

Kook’s recognition that doubt is part of the religious struggle,

and his consequent refusal to label the doubter a heretic, is in
direct contradiction to Maimonides. He does not stand alone in
this view, however. R. Nahman of Bratslav (1772–1810) stated:
‘It is entirely proper that objections can be found to God. It is
right and suitable that this should be so because of God’s greatness
and exaltedness. Since in His exaltedness He is so far above our
minds there are bound to be objections to Him.’41 Concluding a
wide-ranging analysis on the subject of doubt in the religious
experience, the contemporary Modern Orthodox leader R.
Norman Lamm wrote: ‘We found that there is place for doubt
within the confines of cognitive faith; it must not be allowed to
interfere with normative halakhic practice, which is the expression
of functional faith.’42 In this regard, it is also worth quoting the
following story, immortalized by Martin Buber.

Once when Rabbi Noah [of Lekhovitz] was in his room, he heard how one
of his disciples began to recite the Principles of Faith in the House of Study
next door, but stopping immediately after the words ‘I believe with perfect
faith,’ whispered to himself: ‘I don’t understand that!’ and then once more:
‘I don’t understand that.’ The zaddik left his room and went to the House of
Study.
‘What is it you do not understand?’ he asked.
‘I don’t understand what it’s all about,’ said the man. ‘I say “I believe.” If
I really do believe, then how can I possibly sin? But if I do not really believe,
why am I telling lies?’
‘It means’, answered the rabbi, ‘that the words “I believe” are a prayer,
meaning “Oh, that I may believe!” ’ Then the hasid was suffused with a
glow from within. ‘That is right!’ he cried. ‘That is right! Oh, that I may
believe, Lord of the world, oh, that I may believe!’43

Maimonides, however, had a very different view. According to

him, one who does not believe in his Principles, or even doubts
one of them, is a heretic, and it makes no difference if the heretic
knows no better (e.g. if he has been taught to think in this way
from his youth). It is true that in his later works Maimonides
counsels tolerance when dealing with Karaites who do not realize
that they are heretics,44 but there he is only concerned with how
Jews are supposed to relate to them. That is, rather than hating
them and hoping for their destruction, which is normally the case
with regard to heretics, one should treat them with friendship and
respect and attempt to convince them to abandon their errant
ways. From a theological perspective, however, a heretic is
doomed to eternal perdition and cannot be exculpated on the basis
of the argument that he did not know any better.45
To be sure, Maimonides’ position has found its modern
defenders, and in a famous rhetorical flourish R. Hayim
Soloveitchik (1853–1918) proclaimed that a ‘heretic, nebich, is still
a heretic’.46 That is, it is unfortunate that he is a heretic and
condemned to hell, but what can one do—this is the way of the
world. Yet Orthodoxy as a whole, both ultra-Orthodox and
Modern Orthodox, has not accepted Maimonides’ judgement in
this regard. One must search long and hard to find a
contemporary Orthodox writer who asserts that a non-religious
Jew who doesn’t know any better is damned.
Why did Maimonides adopt this uncompromising view that
unintentional heresy prevents one from attaining the world to
come? The answer is found in his understanding of how one
attains immortality, which for him is not a ‘reward’ bestowed by
God. Rather, as with prophecy, it is a natural process that depends
on the perfection of one’s intellect so that one can apprehend the
Creator and the various intelligibles. It is this knowledge which
gives one immortality. If one were to hold a heretical opinion,47
for whatever reason, this acts as a block on the intellect’s move
towards perfection.48 In trying to make this medieval idea more
palatable, Rabbi J. David Bleich suggests: ‘The situation is crudely
analogous to that of the student who fails to master algebra
through no fault of his own and must then be refused permission
to enroll in a calculus course. Such denial is not by way of
punishment, but an assessment of the fact that one who has not
mastered the rudiments of a subject cannot profit from advanced
instruction in that discipline.’49 For the opponents of Maimonides,
on the other hand, immortality is a reward bestowed by God
through a supernatural act. He can therefore forgive heretical
opinions arrived at unintentionally. He is the Almighty, after all.
Once Maimonides’ conception of immortality is properly
understood, we are confronted with how, in his discussion of
heresy in ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, he could state that the heretic must
publicly voice his heresy for him to be condemned to perdition. In
the Mishneh torah Maimonides writes as if God has some role in
this affair, and can choose to give someone a share in the afterlife
if the person is prudent enough not to voice his heretical opinions.
However, according to Maimonides, an anthropomorphist or an
idolater is by definition unable to achieve the intellectual
perfection required for immortality. Whether this heresy is stated
or only believed is thus of no significance in Maimonides’
theology. Any assertion to the contrary, as was attempted by
Harry A. Wolfson,50 is directly contradicted by Maimonides’
words in Guide i. 36: ‘I do not consider as an infidel one who
cannot demonstrate that the corporeality of God should be
negated. But I do consider as an infidel one who does not believe
in its negation.’51 It is also obvious, according to Maimonides, that
one who voices a heretical opinion without believing it is not
denied a share in the world to come. As Maimonides states in
Guide i. 50: ‘Belief is not the notion that is uttered, but the notion
that is represented in the soul when it has been averred of it that it
is in fact just as it has been represented.’52
We must therefore conclude that Maimonides’ use of the words
‘one who says’ in describing a heretic are only in imitation of
Mishnah Sanhedrin 10: 1, where the same formulation is found,
and not too much should be read into this. One who believes in a
corporeal God or in the existence of many gods, even without
saying so publicly, is indeed a heretic as far as Maimonidean
theology is concerned. Such a person will not face any penalties
from an earthly court, but he is certainly denied a share in the
world to come.
Returning to the Thirteen Principles, the characteristic that
gave them their afterlife and caused them to become the
formulation of the Jewish creed is precisely their outer form, that
is, the fact that they were formulated as a catechism with all the
Principles listed together. Had Maimonides listed a different
number of Principles in the Mishneh torah (e.g. twelve or
fourteen), these would have become the principles of Judaism. But
he did not, and thus the Thirteen Principles stuck.
Had Maimonides never drawn up his Principles, issues of
Jewish belief in the popular mind would have developed very
differently. In fact, the widespread acceptance of Maimonides’
creed is not so much a function of scholarly approval but rather of
popular acceptance. Although later authors tried to offer
competing creeds,53 none could displace that of Maimonides, both
because of his supreme authority and because popular piety prefers
more dogmatic statements rather than fewer.54 That is, thirteen
principles are more appealing than three, as were offered by Duran
and Albo.55
In addition, the masses could never be expected to latch on to
any of the competing systems of dogma, with their subtle
distinctions between principles of faith without which the religion
is inconceivable, and other equally true and required beliefs which
are less significant in a structural sense, though not in any essential
way. Since popular piety is attracted to a creed, something which
people can hold on to and look towards as their document of
faith, it is not surprising that Abarbanel’s approach, in which there
are no special beliefs but rather all aspects of the Torah are equal,
was never able to win widespread acceptance.
I have mentioned above that in the Guide Maimonides did not
record the Thirteen Principles as the fundamental beliefs of
Judaism. Indeed, as we shall see, there is at least one Principle that
is explicitly contradicted by the Guide, and if read as an esoteric
work it is clear that the theology of the Guide is not the theology
of the Thirteen Principles. This latter point will not concern me
greatly, however, since my focus is primarily the rabbinic scholars
who were, almost without exception, oblivious to the radical
possibilities inherent in Maimonidean philosophy as expressed in
the Guide.
It is certainly one of the great ironies of Jewish history that the
Thirteen Principles became the standard by which orthodoxy was
judged, for, as is well known, Maimonides himself was attacked
for supposedly holding heretical views, at odds with his very own
Principles. Where else, in Judaism or any other religion, do we
have a parallel example in which an authority’s doctrinal
formulations, dependent in large measure on his religious
standing, are regarded as binding but the authority himself is
condemned for insufficient orthodoxy?
Quite apart from the debate over the esoteric meaning of the
Guide, some of Maimonides’ openly proclaimed views were also
attacked mercilessly, even by scholars who at other times were
great defenders of Maimonides. For example, he argued that
certain stories recorded in the Torah only occurred in dreams.
Concerning this view, Nahmanides (1194–1270) writes: ‘Such
words contradict Scripture. It is forbidden to listen to them, all
the more to believe in them.’56 R. Yom Tov Ishbili (Ritva,
c.1250–1330) defended Maimonides in the face of this attack,57
but on another occasion, in discussing the latter’s view of biblical
exegesis,58 was just as unrelenting as Nahmanides had been,
referring to Maimonides’ view as ‘heretical’ (da’at minut).59 In the
Igeret hakodesh, which for a long time was mistakenly attributed to
Nahmanides and which Charles Mopsik has most recently argued
was written by R. Joseph Gikatilla (1248–c.1325),60 Maimonides’
view, in agreement with Aristotle,61 that the sense of touch is a
‘disgrace to us’,62 is characterized as having a ‘taint of heresy’
(shemets minut).63 As is well known, Maimonides believed that
only humans can receive individual providence and that the animal
and plant kingdoms receive a general providence. Individual
animals, plants, and inanimate objects are thus subject to the
vagaries of chance.64 Yet two hasidic leaders, R. Simhah Bunem of
Przysucha (c.1765–1827)65 and R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira (1872–
1937),66 both claimed that this view is heresy. R. Simhah Bunem
was not merely satisfied with asserting that the view itself is
heresy, but even stated that the one who holds this view is a
heretic!
Some kabbalists taught that as a punishment for what
Maimonides wrote in his philosophical writings he was
condemned to be reincarnated as a worm.67 The kabbalist and
rabbinic scholar R. Joseph Ashkenazi (1525–77), known as the
‘tana of Safed’, publicly denounced Maimonides as a heretic.68 R.
Gedaliah ibn Yahya (1515–87) reports that opponents of
Maimonides defaced his tombstone, writing on it
‘excommunicated’ and ‘heretic’.69 In more recent times, R.
Nahman of Bratslav is also known to have held a very negative
view of Maimonides, reportedly even saying, ‘There are certain
philosophers generally considered great, particularly Maimonides,
but in the future it will be known that he was a heretic and an
unbeliever.’70 It is a testament to Maimonides’ towering stature
that, despite such assaults on his orthodoxy, his doctrinal
formulation retained its authority.
To return to the point already mentioned above, if there is one
thing Orthodox Jews the world over acknowledge, it is that
Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles are the fundamentals of Jewish
faith. The common knee-jerk reaction is that there is room for
debate in matters of faith, as long as one does not contradict any
of these Principles. In line with this conception, R. Abraham
Isaiah Karelitz (the Hazon Ish, 1878–1953), one of the last
century’s preeminent non-hasidic scholars, stated that he ordered
his life on the basis of complete faith in the Thirteen Principles.71
Among hasidic luminaries, R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira stated: ‘We
are believers, sons of believers, in the Thirteen Principles in
accordance with their simple meaning, in accordance with their
innermost truth.’72 Another hasidic leader, R. Pinhas Shapiro of
Korets (1726–91), recommended daily recital of the Principles.73
Similarly, the non-hasidic and saintly R. Israel Meir Hakohen (the
Hafets Hayim, 1839–1933) wrote that it is a mitsvah to recite the
Principles every day.74 Going even further, R. Aaron (Arele) Roth
(1894–1944) wrote that it is praiseworthy to repeat the Thirteen
Principles upon waking, before going to sleep, and at other times
during the day.75 It seems that there is even halakhic significance
to the Principles, as seen in the fact that R. Israel Meir Hakohen
records that one who denies the divinity of the Torah, reward and
punishment, the future redemption, and the resurrection cannot
serve as a prayer leader.76 Had Maimonides not included these
Principles in his list, it is unlikely that denial of the last two, which
are not necessarily of prime importance to a religious life, would
disqualify one in this way.
Earlier I noted Kellner’s observation that Maimonides’
Principles were not the subject of scholarly discussion in the first
two centuries after their appearance, though this did not stop
them from achieving a great measure of popularity even then. This
can be seen from the early date of the hymn Yigdal, which
summarizes the Principles and was composed by either Daniel ben
Judah Dayan of Rome (c.1300) or, less likely, by Immanuel of
Rome (c.1261–after 1328), who is the author of a very similar
poem.77 Yigdal is known to have entered the daily Ashkenazi
liturgy in the fifteenth century,78 and is mentioned in this regard
by R. Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller (1579–1654).79 R. Joseph Yuzpa
Hahn (c.1730–1803) recorded that it was the practice in Germany
to recite Yigdal after every prayer, which apparently means three
times a day. He also recommended studying it carefully and saying
it with kavanah.80
In another illustration of how popular the Principles became,
we know of almost a hundred different poetic versions of them, of
which Yigdal is only the most famous. These originated in a
variety of countries, beginning in the early fourteenth century.81
Today Yigdal is a standard prayer, appearing in most prayer
books. Yet there are different customs related to it, with some
people reciting it every day and others saying it only on Friday
night, when it is usually sung publicly. Many Moroccan Jews
recite it on Sabbath morning before the Barukh she’amar prayer.82
This custom is probably based on the notion that the Thirteen
Principles are hinted at in Barukh she’amar, with each of the
thirteen instances of the word barukh (blessed) in this prayer
corresponding to a different Principle.83 In Morocco and Gibraltar
there was also a custom of reciting Yigdal at circumcisions,
redemptions of the firstborn, and burials.84 There is even a
Christian adaptation of Yigdal which to this day is sung in many
Anglican as well as other Protestant churches in the English-
speaking world.85 In addition to Yigdal, most prayer books also
contain the Ani ma’amin, and in years past some Sephardi
communities would gather in the synagogue the day before Rosh
Hodesh (New Moon) in order to recite this as well.86
The widespread popularity of Yigdal and similar compositions
actually led to concern among some rabbinic authorities that this
concentration on the Thirteen Principles would overshadow the
rest of what Judaism has to say. R. Jacob Moelin (c.1360–1427)
wrote:

The rhymes and poems that people write in Yiddish on the unity of God and
the Thirteen Principles—would that they were not written! For most of the
ignorant believe that all of the commandments depend on this, and they
despair of various positive and negative commandments, such as tsitsit and
tefilin and the study of Torah. And they believe that they fulfil their
obligation by saying those rhymes with kavanah. And those rhymes do not
mention a single one of the 613 commandments that Jews are commanded
—only the fundamentals of Jewish belief.87

R. Solomon Luria (c.1510–74) expressed himself similarly to

Moelin. He noted that there were people in his day who believed
that they could commit all the sins in the world as long as they
accepted the Thirteen Principles. Luria agreed with Abarbanel’s
suggestion that Maimonides’ formulation was no more than a
Jewish response to the medieval Islamic philosophers who put
their own faith in the form of principles. Not surprisingly, he
recited neither Yigdal nor the Ani ma’amin.88
R. Isaac Luria (1534–72) is also known to have opposed
recitation of Yigdal, but for a different reason entirely, which has
nothing to do with the practical concerns expressed by Moelin. As
his student R. Hayim Vital (1542–1620) explained, Luria did not
recite any song or poetic composition that was not a product of
the early luminaries such as R. Akiva, R. Ishmael, and R. Eleazar
Kalir.89 He believed that such early works were full of kabbalistic
significance, unlike works composed by later authors, ‘who do not
know what they are saying’.90 Luria’s influence was so great that
R. Isaac Safrin of Komarno (1806–74), an important hasidic
teacher, was led to remark that those who do not remove Yigdal
from the prayer book are showing their ‘lack of faith’.91 Taking
Luria’s words most seriously, hasidic prayer books are
conspicuous in their exclusion of Yigdal.
Although in more recent centuries the Thirteen Principles have
indeed become identified with the fundamentals of Judaism, there
were also scholars in earlier times, such as R. Meir Aldabi
(c.1310–c.1360),92 R. David ben Yom Tov ibn Bilia (fourteenth
century),93 R. Simeon ben Samuel of Regensburg (fourteenth–
fifteenth centuries),94 and R. Moses ben Joseph Trani (1500–
80),95 who regarded the Thirteen Principles as the beliefs that
defined Judaism. The outstanding medieval philosophers did not
share this view, however. This was so even when they believed in
the Principles, and even when they believed that denial of a
Principle equalled heresy. Believing the Principles to be true, even
obligatory, and regarding them as the fundamentals of Judaism
were regarded by medieval philosophers as two separate things. It
is because of this that they spent so much time dissecting
Maimonides’ method and categories and defending their
alternative systems.96
The disputes of the medieval rabbis were soon forgotten,
however, and as mentioned above, in more recent centuries there
was general agreement among traditional Jews that the Thirteen
Principles were indeed the fundamentals of Judaism. Denial of
even one Principle was usually enough for one to be branded as a
heretic. For the masses, and for many rabbis as well, this became
unquestioned truth. In the seventeenth century, R. Saul Morteira
(c.1596–1660) declared that ‘all agree’ with Maimonides’
Principles, ‘and whoever denies them has no share in the world to
come’.97 In the eighteenth century, Isaac Wetzlar (c.1685–1751),
in his Yiddish Libes briv, urged that all children be taught the
Principles.98 Sharing Wetzlar’s sentiments, Gedaliah ben Abraham
Teikus published his Emunat yisra’el (Amsterdam, 1764), a
Hebrew–Yiddish elaboration of the Principles designed for the
common people. It was reprinted a number of times, thus
illustrating its popularity. For those rabbis who were aware of
many of the disputes we shall be discussing, appeal to the
Principles still had religious and, just as important, rhetorical
power, in particular when confronting religious dissenters. Many
citations illustrating the centrality the Principles assumed could be
given, and I offer here only some representative examples.
As part of his attempt to undermine traditional Judaism, Saul
Berlin (1740–94), in his notorious forgery Besamim rosh, aimed
his arrows at the Thirteen Principles. He inserted into the mouth
of R. Asher ben Jehiel the notion that the Principles of Faith are
not eternal but can be re-evaluated with the passage of time.99 In
his response to Berlin, R. Mordechai Banet (1753–1829) wrote,
with reference to the Thirteen Principles: ‘Our teacher Moses
[Maimonides] did not add or subtract anything, and all his words
are explicit in Scripture and in the writings of the Sages.’100 In his
polemic against the nascent Reform movement, R. Tsevi Hirsch
Chajes (1805–55) noted that until the rise of this heretical
movement all of Jewry was united around the Thirteen
Principles.101 In an anonymous, harshly worded letter to R. Esriel
Hildesheimer (1820–99), while attempting to show that one of
his students had departed from the proper path, the author wrote:
‘I don’t know if he believes in the Thirteen Principles.’102 Moses
Leib Lilienblum (1843–1910), discussing his path to heresy,
wrote, ‘When I rejected Maimonides’ articles of faith, I did not
rejoice.’103 It was obvious to Lilienblum that since he had rejected
the Thirteen Principles he was an unbeliever. When the Orthodox
Jewish Congregational Union of America was formed in 1898, it
included in its convention statement the following: ‘We affirm our
adherence to the acknowledged codes of our Rabbis and the
thirteen principles of Maimonides.’104 Half a century earlier in
Philadelphia, Isaac Leeser (1806–68) had also declared that the
Thirteen Principles were the authoritative Jewish creed.105
A prominent Lithuanian rabbi, who insisted that all Jews are
obligated to believe in the Principles, also addressed the gentiles,
declaring: ‘As long as you do not believe in these Thirteen
Principles, you have no belief.’106 A well-known hasidic leader,
who did not share Maimonides’ views as expressed in the Guide,
nevertheless declared that all Jews are obligated to believe in the
Thirteen Principles.107 When, in the face of harsh criticism, an
anti-Zionist figure wanted to defend his rejection of the Balfour
Declaration, he stated simply: ‘Does this equal denial of one of the
Thirteen Principles?’108 A nineteenth-century false messiah accused
his non-believing antagonists of denying one of Maimonides’
Principles.109 In trying to discredit his kabbalistic opponents, R.
Yihyeh Kafih (1850–1932) accused them of contradicting the
Thirteen Principles, a charge they vehemently denied.110 In trying
to show the great wickedness of Jews who chose to have their
bodies cremated, R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira assumed as a matter
of course that they must also deny the Thirteen Principles.111
More recently, when R. Immanuel Jakobovits (1921–99)
announced that he intended to give a lecture under Conservative
auspices, a local Orthodox rabbi protested that his ‘presence would
serve to add a great deal of prestige to an institution that denies
many of the Thirteen Principles’.112 The guidelines of a popular
Orthodox website state: ‘The Rambam’s Thirteen Principles of
Belief (and/or the Ani Ma’amins and/ or the Yigdal) are baseline
standards for our discussion group.’113
Other contemporary authors in the Orthodox community
express themselves similarly: ‘It should be stressed that all Torah
scholars agree on the validity and significance of the Principles’.114
‘The fact is that Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles are all derived
from the Talmud and the classic Jewish tradition, and were never in
dispute’.115 ‘The principles have been discussed for the past eight
hundred years, and are still accepted by all Jews as the one clear
unambiguous creed of Judaism’.116 ‘It is universally recognized as
definitive halacha that firm belief in, and adherence to each of
these Thirteen Principles is the sine qua non of Torah faith’117
(emphasis added to all four quotations). ‘From an Orthodox
standpoint, though the 13 Principles of Faith have a history, they
are obligatory nonetheless.’118 ‘Fundamentalists we are indeed in
the original sense of the word. We hold the thirteen Ikkarim
[Principles] to be fundamental to Torah Judaism.’119
What emerges clearly from what we have seen is that
Maimonides’ Principles came to be regarded as central to Jewish
belief.120 Once his Principles were accepted, it was only a short
step to agreement with Maimonides that any deviation from the
Principles was enough to categorize one as a heretic. After this
became something of an unofficial dogma, the notion further
developed, as seen in some statements cited above, that Torah
scholars throughout history have always been in agreement with
the Principles. Some interesting flights of fancy were also made in
support of the authority of the Principles. For example, Morteira
points out that the singular noun mitsvah appears thirteen times in
the Torah in contexts in which one would have expected the
plural, mitsvot. Morteira illustrates how each of these examples
points to one of the Principles.121 In more recent years, R. Hayim
Eleazar Shapira thought it significant that the gematriyah of ,
signifying God, is 13.122 Other examples are R. Nathan Adler’s
(1803–90) assertion that the Principles are already present in
Onkelos’ Aramaic translation of the Torah,123 and, also in the
nineteenth century, R. Elijah Soloveitchik’s claim that the
Principles are taught in the New Testament, which he believed
was written by faithful Jews.124 R. David Cohen, a contemporary
scholar, even claims that one can find the Thirteen Principles in
the Passover Haggadah.125
Maimonides’ rationalism notwithstanding, his Principles
became too significant to leave to the philosophers and talmudists,
and it therefore should not surprise us that there are also
kabbalistic and hasidic interpretations of them.126 In fact, the
prayer book of the Biala hasidim includes an ‘updated’ version of
the Principles. The seventh Principle reads: ‘I believe with perfect
faith that all the words of the prophets and the [kabbalistic]
teachings of Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai, Rabbi Isaac Luria, and the
Ba’al Shem Tov and his students are true.’ In the Eighth Principle
it is stated that these kabbalistic teachings were given to Moses.
Apparently, even this is not enough, so the prayer book adds two
more Principles: that Israel is the chosen people, and that ‘in every
generation there are righteous ones like Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob’.127
Because Maimonides’ Principles were so important, it also
should not surprise us that the maskilim and early nineteenth-
century proto-Reformers, who composed a variety of manuals of
Jewish belief, placed great emphasis upon the Thirteen Principles.
Yesodei hadat, by Judah Leib Ben-Ze’ev (1764–1811), is typical,
for it states that all religious people must believe in the
Principles.128 Indeed, ‘the Maimonidean creed is hardly ever
absent from these presentations’.129 Needless to say, the Principles
were reinterpreted in accordance with these thinkers’ Zeitgeist,
which placed an emphasis on the ‘spirit’ of the law while playing
down the Torah’s ceremonial and ritual components. Thus, books
were written which summarized the essence of Judaism without
mentioning traditional religious obligations such as kashrut and
the Sabbath, or even explaining what Jewish law is all about.
Mordechai Gumpel Schnaber Levison (1741–97), a prominent
maskil who wrote Shelosh-esreh yesodei hatorah (The Thirteen
Foundations of the Torah; Altona, 1792), provides another good
example of the importance of the Principles in the maskilic
imagination, as well as how they were used (and misused). As
David Ruderman puts it: ‘Levison began with a putative
discussion of Maimonides’ thirteen principles of faith only to
subvert them radically in the end. . . . He had virtually
transformed a Maimonidean theology of the twelfth century into a
conventional deism of the eighteenth.’130
Some modern Reform thinkers have continued along this path,
as seen in the recent book by Kerry M. Olitzky and Ronald H.
Isaac, The Thirteen Principles of Faith: A Confirmation Textbook.131
Nor could the Dönme, the believers in Shabetai Tsevi after his
conversion, overlook the popularity of the Principles. For
Maimonides’ Ninth Principle (the immutability of the Torah),
they substituted the following: ‘I believe with perfect faith that the
Torah will not be changed and there will not be another Torah;
only the mitsvot are null but the Torah will be forever and ever.’132
Even when Maimonides’ original formulation is not the focus,
the notion of thirteen principles has remained strong. Thus Ibn
Bilia added an extra thirteen principles to those of Maimonides,
addressed specifically to the philosophically inclined intellectual.133
In an example entirely removed from Maimonidean thinking, R.
Yekutiel Aryeh Kamelhar (1871–1937) identified thirteen
principles of Beshtian hasidism.134 Concluding that beliefs could
no longer ‘function as a means of Jewish unity’, Mordecai Kaplan
(1881–1983), the founder of Reconstructionism, set forth the
principles of his new movement in terms of thirteen ‘wants’.135
The Jewish secular humanists have also got in on the act, with
their leader Sherwin Wine outlining thirteen principles to guide
their movement, including ‘selecting an alternative that one
believes in, [and] shedding expectations of magical powers’.136
Further reflecting the popularity of the Thirteen Principles, even
the Jewish sectarians were influenced. Thus, Simhah Isaac ben
Moses Halutski (1670–1746) enumerates a list of thirteen Karaite
principles, which are actually quite similar to those of
Maimonides.137 Finally, even Christian missionaries, in an early
‘Jews for Jesus’-type manifesto, developed their own formulation
of thirteen principles.138
Returning to the statements mentioned above concerning the
unanimous agreement accorded the Principles—and many more
examples of such rhetoric could be cited—a comment by Gershom
Scholem, made in a entirely different context, seems relevant:
‘This seems to me an extraordinary example of how a judgment
proclaimed with conviction as certainly true may nevertheless be
entirely wrong in every detail.’139 This is so, for as the present
book seeks to demonstrate, even a cursory examination of Jewish
literature reveals that, both before and after his time, Maimonides’
Principles were not regarded as the last word in Jewish theology.
Nevertheless, it is amazing that so few modern rabbinic scholars
have explicitly acknowledged this fact, even when writing for their
peers. It is possible that many scholars simply regarded it as
obvious and perhaps others even began believing their own
rhetoric. Whatever the reason, I have found only three modern
traditional scholars who openly acknowledge the validity of
disputes concerning the Thirteen Principles. R. Samuel David
Luzzatto (1800–65),140 after noting that some sages had disagreed
with the Principles, writes: ‘Heaven forbid that we agree with
Maimonides in what he said (in his commentary on Sanhedrin, ch.
10), that anyone who does not believe with perfect faith in the
Thirteen Principles that he set up for our religion has left the fold
and is a complete heretic.’141 R. Reuven Amar writes: ‘With
regard to the Principles of Faith, Maimonides’ words are not to be
regarded as divinely revealed since he did not receive them via
tradition dating back to Moses, but they are the product of his
own reasoning and knowledge.’142 R. Bezalel Naor writes: ‘The
truth, known to Torah scholars, is that Maimonides’ formulation
of the tenets of Jewish belief is far from universally accepted.’143 I
have found one other source that departs from the notion that the
Thirteen Principles are the last word in Orthodox theology,
though it is not as blunt as the scholars quoted above. Surprisingly
enough, it is the editors of the Artscroll publishing house,
regarded by many as the quintessential Orthodox obscurantists,
who offer a careful formulation, stating that the Principles
achieved ‘virtually universal acceptance’.144 After examining the
evidence, I think most readers will agree that even this statement is
wide of the mark.
Many years ago Leon Roth wrote: ‘O for the masterpiece (but
it will have to be published not only anonymously but also
posthumously) which will demonstrate to our formula-bound
souls that there is no single one of the Thirteen Articles even of
Maimonides’ alleged creed which was not rejected, explicitly or
implicitly, by leading lights in the history of Judaism, including, I
fancy (but only whisper the suspicion), no less a person than
Maimonides himself.’145 As we shall see, Roth has exaggerated
only slightly in this statement. His basic thrust is certainly on the
mark, even with regard to his suggestion about Maimonides
himself. Unlike Roth, however, I do not believe that the present
book, masterpiece or not, must appear anonymously or
posthumously. After all, the Jewish inquisitorial authorities closed
up shop a long time ago.146

The plan of this book is simple enough. After a short examination

of the place of dogma in Judaism, I will proceed to examine each
of Maimonides’ Principles and document the controversies
concerning them. Since this is a study of Maimonides’ Principles
and not Maimonidean philosophy as a whole, I shall generally
refrain from detailed discussion of an esoteric Maimonides who
would be regarded as a heretic according to his own Principles.
However, where Maimonides openly contradicts the Principles in
his other writings, further examination is called for.
I must make one more point about the structure of this book.
As I have already demonstrated, it is often asserted that
Maimonides’ Principles were accepted as dogma by the
traditionalists—what is today known as the Orthodox
denomination of Judaism. This being the case, it would make no
sense in the context of this book, which deals with traditional
responses to the Principles, to discuss those scholars who are not
regarded as acceptable to the traditionalists (and who, in fact,
usually did not regard themselves as traditional or Orthodox). To
be sure, some figures mentioned in this book have been involved
in disputes and opposed by members of the wider community, as
was indeed the case with Maimonides himself.147 However, the
scholars discussed in this book always regarded themselves as part
of the traditional community. They were also regarded as such by
significant, if not overwhelming, segments of this community, in
particular by the religious and intellectual leadership, both during
and after these scholars’ lifetimes. In many cases, these men were
even leaders of their community. The fact that they differed with
aspects of Maimonides’ Principles never caused them to lose this
status, which itself shows that traditional Jews rejected a central
facet of Maimonides’ Principles, namely, that denial of any of
them turns one into a heretic. For my purposes, this acceptance on
the part of their peers and succeeding generations suffices to place
these scholars in the traditional or ‘Orthodox’ category. While it is
true that some of these individuals are only minor figures, and
thus probably not an acceptable source for those seeking to create
a new Orthodox theology, they are still significant from a
historical standpoint, that is, when one seeks to document how
traditional figures did not feel bound by the Thirteen Principles.
I have omitted those scholars whose overall views place them
clearly at odds with what traditional Jews have generally regarded
as religiously acceptable. In modern times these scholars are
usually, but not always, at odds with the halakhic system (in whole
or in part), and do not regard themselves as part of the Orthodox
community. When dealing with medieval society, matters are
more complex since there is no clear breakdown of
denominations. Furthermore, the radical philosophers whose
writings have come down to us all seem to have lived in
accordance with Jewish law, even if their view of its significance
diverged drastically from that of the talmudists. In choosing
whom to include, I shall concentrate on figures who were
accepted by significant segments of the community and whose
religious legitimacy was, when occasion warranted, publicly
defended by their colleagues. This explains why, for example, I
include R. Samuel ibn Tibbon (c.1160–c.1232), and his son-in-
law R. Jacob Anatoli (c.1194–1256),148 but not Moses ben Joshua
of Narbonne (commonly called Narboni; died 1362), Isaac
Albalag (thirteenth century), and a host of other radical medieval
philosophers who constitute a veritable ‘school’ of extreme
rationalism.149

Dogma in Judaism
There is no need for me to attempt here a detailed study of the
place of dogma in Jewish intellectual history. Fortunately, this task
has already been carried out by other scholars, in particular Louis
Jacobs and Menachem Kellner, from whose work I have benefited
greatly. However, because of its importance it is necessary to make
a few comments on this issue.
There is no question that one of the great misinterpretations of
Judaism, so frequently repeated that it is often assumed as a matter
of course, is that Judaism does not have dogmas. To be sure, all
would agree that belief in God and some sort of revelation are
dogmas that the tradition has always affirmed, but, aside from
these, Judaism has commonly been portrayed as granting
complete freedom in matters of thought. However, even if one
discounts Maimonides’ original advocacy of what can be termed
salvific dogmas (namely, dogmas the belief in which guarantees
one a place in heaven), the fact remains that for all medieval
authorities, as well as the talmudic rabbis, there were certain
dogmas which Jews were obligated to believe in, simply because
the religion is unintelligible without them. Although it is likely
that the talmudic rabbis had fewer of these dogmas than their
medieval colleagues, they too were prepared to lay down some
parameters of belief. For example, Mishnah Sanhedrin 10: 1 states:
‘These are they who have no share in the world to come: he who
says that there is no resurrection of the dead in the Torah, he who
says that the Torah is not from Heaven, and the epikoros.’150
Although it is hard to know what the Mishnah meant by the term
epikoros (probably someone who denies God’s providence151),
clearly this mishnaic formulation does not exhaust the list of
rabbinic dogmas. It is likely that the Mishnah only mentions those
beliefs which were not then obvious, that is, those concerning
which there was dispute in the Jewish community. This would
explain why nothing appears here regarding belief in God.
In his classic study of the dogmas in Judaism, which totally
disproves the notion that Judaism is unconcerned with belief,
Solomon Schechter stated the point very well.

Political economy, hygiene, statistics, are very fine things. But no sane man
would for them make those sacrifices which Judaism requires from us. It is
only for God’s sake, to fulfill his commands and to accomplish his purpose,
that religion becomes worth living and dying for. And this can only be
possible with a religion which possesses dogmas. It is true that every great
religion is ‘a concentration of many ideas and ideals’, which make this
religion able to adapt itself to various modes of thinking and living. But
there must always be a point round which all these ideas concentrate
themselves. This centre is Dogma.152

That so many scholars could, in the face of all the evidence,

continue to assert that Judaism has no dogmas probably tells us
more about their attempts to justify their own freethinking than
about the history of Jewish thought. Although the denial that
Judaism has dogmas was more common in previous generations,
this view continues to be advanced by some modern thinkers. In
their opinion, Judaism is a religion of law and one can basically
believe what one wishes. Thus, to give one example, the late Zvi
Kurzweil, a Modern Orthodox thinker, argues for this position
and writes that ‘while fundamentalism in Christianity includes
dogmatic belief in certain basic tenets of faith, Judaism lacks such
dogmas. There is more than a grain of truth in Leon Roth’s
reference to “dogmalessness as the only dogma in Judaism”.’153
Kurzweil supports his view regarding the lack of dogmas in
Judaism by citing Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), Isaac Breuer
(1883–1946), and Isaiah Leibowitz (1903–94). Leaving aside the
question of whether Mendelssohn is a representative of traditional
Judaism, Kurzweil is correct that, in his Jerusalem, Mendelssohn
asserted that Judaism has no dogmas.154 Yet Kurzweil neglects to
point out that matters are more complicated than this, and it may
be that Mendelssohn himself was unsure on this point. Indeed, he
often accepted the existence of certain dogmatic principles,
although these are not to be understood as dogmas in the
Christian sense—that is, articles of faith which have been
formulated by an authoritative body or which stand in
contradiction to reason. Furthermore, even according to the most
liberal understanding of the passage referred to by Kurzweil,
Mendelssohn obviously agreed that some beliefs are required, for
without them one cannot even speak of a Jewish religion.155
As for Breuer, it is true that he had some interesting views
regarding the nature of faith and its relation to Jewish law.
However, although he put individual faith in the background and
acceptance of the law in the forefront, he never denied that
Judaism required dogmas, without which, he believed, the religion
would be incomprehensible. For Breuer, it was the acceptance of
the dogmas by the community which was crucial, and it was only
for the wavering individual that he emphasized the importance of
law over dogma. That is, the dogmas of Judaism are important,
though, ex post facto, an individual who observes the halakhah is
not to be viewed as a heretic because of his lack of belief.156
However, it is essential to note that Breuer did not regard this
situation favourably. According to him, non-believers are in error
and every effort must be made to set them right. He was clearly
not a relativist in matters of belief.
Only Leibowitz remains to support Kurzweil’s contention.
However, Leibowitz was the first to admit that his views
disregarded vast portions of what has always been regarded as part
and parcel of Jewish thought and values.157 Thus, to give one
example of many, Leibowitz did not believe that Israel is the ‘Holy
Land’. As he explained on numerous occasions, the word ‘holy’
can only be applied to ‘the disciplined and saintly conduct of
human beings who master their desires and inclinations and serve
the Lord by leading a life of Torah and mitzvot’.158 This attitude
enabled Leibowitz to call for the demolition of the Western Wall,
which he considered to be an idol of stone. The fact that
Leibowitz was probably the first observant Jew in history who did
not view the Land of Israel or the Western Wall as holy was of no
concern to him, yet we should keep it in mind whenever someone,
such as Kurzweil, tries to quote Leibowitz as an illustration of
traditional Jewish thought. What Kurzweil does not mention is
that at least since the rabbinic period, every important rabbi,
talmudist, Bible commentator, and philosopher believed in
dogmas. Salis Daiches is therefore entirely correct in writing that
‘all authoritative exponents of Judaism are agreed as to the
necessity of making spiritual truth the basis for material action.’159
A few more points must be noted in this regard. As we shall
see, there have been those who opposed the Principles of
Maimonides because they believed them to be mistaken. This is
very different from the attitude of Abarbanel,160 R. David ibn
Zimra,161 and R. Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–88),162 who,
although they accepted the truth of Maimonides’ dogmas,
opposed his singling them out as being the most significant
aspects of Judaism. According to them, no special dogmas can be
established because everything contained in the Torah is, in and of
itself, a dogma of paramount importance. Thus, one who denies
any Torah teaching is to be regarded as a heretic. One example of
Abarbanel’s thought on this matter is as follows:

I, therefore, believe that it is not proper to postulate principles for the divine
Torah, nor foundations in the matters of beliefs, for we are obliged to
believe everything that is written in the Torah. We are not permitted to
doubt even the smallest thing in it. . . . For he who denies or doubts a belief
or narrative of the Torah, be it small or great, is a sectarian and epikoros. For,
since the Torah is true, no belief or narrative in it has an advantage over any
other.163

However, it would seem that this comment misses the mark,

because, with the exception of the words of criticism directed
against him, Maimonides believed everything advocated here. One
who denies the divine origin of anything in the Torah is indeed
regarded by him as a heretic, in accordance with the Eighth
Principle. It is also quite imprecise for Abarbanel, as part of his
polemic against Maimonides, to assert without clarification that a
belief which is found in the Torah cannot be denied. Abarbanel’s
assertion simply begs the question: who is to determine that the
belief is really found in the Torah? As this book will demonstrate,
the fact that traditional scholars, none of whom would dream of
denying a ‘belief of the Torah’, argued about basic issues of Jewish
theology shows that even explicit Torah texts can be interpreted in
a variety of ways. Abarbanel also speaks of denying a narrative of
the Torah. Again, this begs the question: what does ‘deny’ mean?
Is one who understands a narrative in the Torah allegorically
guilty of ‘denial’? All this is quite apart from the fact that many of
Maimonides’ Principles are not found explicitly in the Torah.
Maimonides believed them to be latent, but this is not the same as
being explicit.
Furthermore, although Abarbanel does not make the
distinction, there is a difference between believing something and
simply not doubting it. For example, there is a great deal which
the masses do not doubt, but which by the same token they do
not believe either, because they simply know nothing about the
subject. By positing his Thirteen Principles, Maimonides
distinguished between obligatory truths (that is, truths which
everyone must believe) and non-obligatory truths. With regard to
the Thirteen Principles, one cannot remain in blissful ignorance or
be agnostic. This is acceptable with regard to other true beliefs,
even those recorded in the Torah, but the Principles are in a
separate category in that they must be positively affirmed. As R.
Hayim Soloveitchik quite properly explained in relation to the
distinction between the 613 mitsvot and the Principles, if one does
not know about a certain mitsvah his Judaism is lacking but there
is nothing heretical about this person. However, one who does
not acknowledge the Thirteen Principles is a heretic.164 So we see
that there are many true beliefs which are not necessarily
obligatory beliefs, i.e. beliefs which every Jew must hold in order
to be a Jew in good standing. It is this basic point that Abarbanel
overlooked.
Returning to the structure of this book, I have already
mentioned that I will not generally concern myself with those
scholars who opposed Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles and
substituted their own. They did not, for the most part, deny that
Maimonides’ Principles were correct and indeed obligatory on
Jews to believe. Their disagreement with Maimonides concerned
which doctrines they viewed as indispensable to Judaism, that is,
without which Judaism would be inconceivable.
This is most important, for scholars have often tried to show
that, because Albo only postulated three articles of faith, this
meant that he did not think that the others were essential, or that
their denial equalled heresy. In fact, a leading halakhist, R. Jacob
Meshulam Orenstein (1775–1839), is among those who advocates
this position and even adopts it as his own. According to him, one
is only a heretic if he denies the existence of God, Torah from
heaven, and reward and punishment, which are Albo’s three
fundamental principles. One who denies Maimonides’ other
Principles is to be regarded as completely wicked but, contrary to
Maimonides, is not a heretic and thus has not removed himself
from the religion.165
While Orenstein’s liberality is certainly noteworthy, his
assertion that he is following Albo is incorrect, at least with regard
to Albo’s dominant position. Albo’s differences with Maimonides
regarding dogma relate to ‘classification and grading’,166 not
substance. Indeed, Albo himself regards one who only accepts his
principles as a heretic. Thus, although Albo did not view belief in
the messiah as a ‘fundamental’ principle—without which Judaism
would be inconceivable—he still thought that one who denied the
coming of the messiah, knowing it was incumbent upon Jews to
believe this, should be viewed as a heretic with no share in the
world to come.167 In fact, R. Simeon ben Tsemah Duran, whose
reduction of the principles to three was later adopted by Albo,
states explicitly that Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles are the ‘roots
of our faith’ (shorshei emunatenu).168
One final point: although we have seen that many traditional
thinkers identified heresy with denial of the Thirteen Principles,
this should not be taken to mean that they regarded these
Principles as the sole determinants of what constitutes heresy. This
is certainly a popular conception, and in Orthodox circles
departure from a traditional viewpoint is often justified by saying
‘This is not one of the Thirteen Principles.’ Yet it is unlikely that
any rabbinic figure ever adopted this approach. I say this for the
simple reason that Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles are not all-
inclusive. For example, they do not include the idea that the Jews
are God’s chosen people.169 In addition, there are a number of
dogmas which Maimonides discusses in other places but excludes
from the Thirteen Principles.170 Thus, there is no mention in the
Principles about the existence of free will or miracles, despite the
overriding importance of these notions in Maimonides’ thought.
Although creation and resurrection, Principles 4 and 13, are
examples of the miraculous, the traditional belief in miracles
encompasses much more than this. Nor does Maimonides include
providence as a Principle. Reward and punishment are mentioned,
but while they can be included under the general rubric of
providence, the concept itself implies much more than simply
reward and punishment. In fact, most post-Maimonideans include
providence in their detailed lists of dogmas, and some of them
include it in addition to reward and punishment.171 Only R. Shem
Tov Falaquera (thirteenth century), in his Sefer hamevakesh, follows
Maimonides in listing reward and punishment as a principle while
omitting providence (although in another work he does list it).172
All this may lend credence to Arthur Hyman’s argument,
anticipated by Duran173 and Abarbanel,174 that the Thirteen
Principles were never intended to comprise all of the most
important aspects of Judaism. Rather, they were formulated so as
to correspond with the structure of the Mishnah in tractate
Sanhedrin upon which Maimonides was commenting. In addition,
Duran claims that Maimonides chose as Principles only those that
were explicitly found in biblical verses.175 Another suggestion
noted by Duran is that Maimonides’ choice of thirteen is parallel
to God’s thirteen attributes, and this forced him to omit principles
which should have been included.176 According to Albo,
Maimonides only included those Principles which can be seen as
deriving from Albo’s own three foundational beliefs: the existence
of God, Torah from heaven, and reward and punishment.177 R.
Joseph Joshua Preil (1858–96) argued that Maimonides’
Principles only include those beliefs which separate Judaism from
other religions, a point he used to explain why the coming of the
messiah is included as dogma even though, as pointed out by
Albo, it is not indispensable to the religion.178 All these scholars
are thus in agreement that not everything Maimonides regarded as
a basic Jewish belief was included in the Thirteen Principles, but
this need not imply that it was any less important in his eyes.179
Since one can view the Thirteen Principles as less than all-
inclusive, it should not surprise us that since Maimonides’ day
many traditional scholars felt comfortable expanding the list of
obligatory beliefs. To give one example, I referred earlier to R.
Abraham Isaiah Karelitz’s comment that he ordered his life on
complete faith in the Thirteen Principles. Yet Karelitz added a new
dogma to the list, namely, the belief that all agadot in the Talmud
have their origin in the sages’ prophetic power.180 As with every
dogma, one who denies this is to be regarded as a heretic.
Maimonides himself, however, did not share Karelitz’s extreme
fundamentalism in this regard, for he rejected the authority of
various agadot and acknowledged that the talmudic sages could
err.181 Occasionally, one even finds him subtly criticizing the
talmudic sages: ‘You also know their [the talmudic sages’] famous
dictum—would that all [their] dicta were like it.’182 Maimonides
also expresses a tolerant opinion of ‘a perfect man of virtue’ who,
because of his own speculation, improperly rejected agadot.
According to Maimonides, even though such a man is led to
regard various talmudic sages as ignoramuses, ‘in this there is
nothing that would upset the foundations of belief.’183

1 Parnes, ‘Torah u-Madda’.

2 After I called attention to this fact in a short letter to the editor, Parnes
reaffirmed his view. See TUMJ 3 (1991–2), 155–6.
3 New York, 1964.
4 TUMJ 4 (1993), 187–242.
5 See Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 53; Letters, ed. Kafih, 118 n. 85.
6 Genesis 32: 5 reads: , ‘I have lodged with Laban.’ Playing upon
the letters of the word , there is an agadah that puts the following into
Jacob’s mouth: ‘Though I have lodged ( ) with Laban, I have observed the
613 ( ) commandments.’ See Rashi ad loc. For the textual issues
concerning this comment of Rashi, which actually appears to be a later
interpolation, see M. Kasher, Torah shelemah, ad loc. and the Ariel edition of
Rashi (Jerusalem, 1988), ad loc.
7 Must a Jew Believe Anything?, 69.
8 Oxford, 1986.
9 Dogma, 1.
10 Kellner (ibid.) calls attention to the principles of biblical faith of Philo,
but as he notes, Philo did not operate within the context of rabbinic
Judaism.
11 See his Commentary on Psalms, 82 n.; Ben-Shamai, ‘Sa’adiah’, 11–26.
As Ben-Shamai shows, principles of faith are also found in R. Sa’adiah’s
other works, including Emunot vede’ot, but they are not numbered or listed
together as a catechism.
12 Commentary, 28.
13 Dogma, 8.
14 Since Abarbanel, Rosh amanah, ch. 23, S. Luria, ‘Hanhagat maharshal’,
326, and a number of modern scholars (see Kellner, Dogma, 35) have
argued that Maimonides was influenced in his approach to dogma by early
Islamic theologians, it is worth noting the similarity of his position to that of
al-Ghazali, who also argued that ‘not a single one of the faithful will abide
eternally in the fire of hell. One who has in one’s heart the weight of a single
grain of faith will be brought out of it.’ See the excerpt published in
Williams, Word, 162–3. Although the Kharijites and Mutazilites disagreed,
this was the Orthodox Muslim position. See Wensinck, Muslim Creed, 45–9,
61–2, 103–4, 125, 130, 180–2, 192.
15 See R. Samuel David Luzzatto’s criticism of Maimonides in this
regard, in id., Letters, iv. 599. Lamm, ‘Loving’, 150 ff., argues that in his
later works Maimonides somewhat softened his harsh stance towards
heretics: ‘At the very least, there is enough material in his halakhic code to
support the contention that he was no longer as certain then that heresy
leads to exclusion from the Jewish people as he was when he wrote the
Commentary to the Mishnah’ (pp. 156–7).
16 Commentary on the Mishnah, iv, San. 10: 1, p. 145 (all future references
will be to this edition). See also Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot rotse’aḥ’ 13: 14. R.
Joseph Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 1, understands Maimonides to be saying that
one who does not consider his Principles to be just that, namely basic
principles of the faith, is also a heretic. In Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 1–2 Albo
proceeds to refute this position, while concluding nonetheless that such a
person is a sinner. In truth, Maimonides says nothing of the kind attributed
to him by Albo. What is important for Maimonides is whether or not one
accepts his Principles. In his view, one who accepts them but nevertheless
believes that they are not basic to Judaism is neither a heretic nor a sinner.
17 Essay on Resurrection, in Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 320 (Arabic), 342
(Hebrew).
18 Translation in Halkin and Hartman, Crisis, 212–13.
19 Responsa, ii, no. 263.
20 As Kellner, Dogma, 236 n. 181, points out, in one of his medical
works he makes reference to a composition on the ‘principles of religion’,
but this could just as easily refer to the Guide. Kellner also refers to the
almost certainly apocryphal Ma’amar hayiḥud as making reference to the
Principles.
21 See ibid. 228 n. 60.
22 Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot isurei biah’, 14: 2.
23 BT Yev. 47a. See Twersky, Introduction, 474–5.
24 Rosh amanah, ch. 23. See also ibid., ch. 9. See the similar formulation
of R. Gedaliah b. Solomon Lipschuetz in his commentary on Albo’s Sefer
ha’ikarim, i. 3: ‘He enumerated them [the Principles] for the benefit of the
masses in order to strengthen their belief in the Torah.’ See also ibid. iii. 18.
However, the conclusion R. Gedaliah draws from this is quite different from
that of Abarbanel.
25 Divrei yosef, iii–iv, no. 57.
26 Torat hashabat, 570. Goren even suggests that Maimonides retreated
from his Thirteen Principles in favour of a conception of Jewish theology
later advocated by Abarbanel. As we shall see, Abarbanel argued that one
cannot distinguish between so-called principles of Judaism and other aspects
of the religion, since all must be regarded as equal.
27 For his own conceptual reasons, which have no talmudic basis,
Maimonides distinguishes between the epikoros, the min, and the kofer
batorah. This is only a technical differentiation since all of these people are
guilty of a form of heresy and lose their share in the world to come. See
Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 6–8, and Rabinovitch, Yad peshutah, ad
loc. At times, the distinctions between the terms break down and they can
be seen as synonymous. For example, in ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 8
Maimonides defines a kofer batorah as one who says that the Torah is not
from Heaven. However, in his Responsa, ii, no. 263 (based on BT Berakhot
12a), he refers to this person as a min. See Kellner, Dogma, 20–1; Shailat’s
note in Letters, i. 37–9; Shloush, Ḥemdah genuzah, ii. 115.
28 Cf. Nissim b. Moses, Ma’aseh nisim, 159–60.
29 ‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’, 2: 3.
30 ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 6. See also ‘Hilkhot melakhim’, 11: 1,
‘Hilkhot ishut’, 8:5, and Sefer hamitsvot, Negative Commandments, nos. 1
and 47.
31 See his comments in Hamisderonah, 1 (1885), 188–9, 233, 240–3; id.,
Malki bakodesh, ii. 168, 170. See similarly S. D. Luzzatto, Yesodei hatorah,
70–9.
32 RH 1: 6 (36b in the Vilna edition). For Maimonides’ view of this
passage, see ‘Hilkhot ishut’, 8: 5.
33 BT Kid. 40a.
34 W. Z. Harvey, Physics, 145–6.
35 See Crescas, Or hashem, ii. 5: 5. According to Harvey, the upshot of
Crescas’ view is that ‘it is better to be a spiritually tormented infidel than an
apathetic, passionless believer’ (Physics, 146). R. Obadiah Sforno also claims
that one does not have control over one’s thoughts, and that therefore there
are no biblical commands ‘to believe’. See Sforno, Kitvei, 411–12, 418.
36 Ohev mishpat, 15a. Duran excludes from his defence one who rejects
the ‘roots’ of the religion, for instance by believing in two gods.
37 Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 2.
38 See Kellner, ‘What is Heresy?’, 55–70; id., ‘Inadvertent Heresy’, 393–
403; id., ‘Heresy’.
39 She’elot uteshuvot haradbaz, no. 1258.
40 Igerot hare’iyah, i. 20–1.
41 Likutei moharan, 2nd ser., no. 52, trans. in Jacobs, Beyond Reasonable
Doubt, 24.
42 Faith and Doubt, 30.
43 Tales, ii. 158.
44 Maimonides’ later edition of his commentary on Mishnah Ḥulin 1: 2
(see J. Kafih’s edition, ad loc., n. 33); Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot mamrim’, 3:
3; Responsa, no. 449.
45 See R. Isaac Ze’ev Soloveitchik, quoted in Sternbuch, Teshuvot
vehanhagot, 452.
46 Wasserman, Kovets ma’amarim, 19; Gerlits (ed.), Hagadah, 175. For
elaboration of Soloveitchik’s view, see Schulzinger, Mishmar halevi: Ḥagigah,
unpaginated letter at the end of the book (called to my attention by Rabbi
Chaim Rapoport).
47 According to his formulation in the Thirteen Principles, denial, or even
doubt, about any of the Principles causes one to lose his share in the world
to come. However, from a Maimonidean philosophical perspective, it is only
denial of one of the first five Principles that causes one to be excluded from
the world to come. Denial of the other eight only leads to exclusion from
the community of Israel. See Kellner, Dogma, 34–49; id., Must a Jew Believe
Anything?, 83–6. See also Hyman, ‘Maimonides’ “Thirteen Principles” ’,
141–2.
48 According to Alexander Altmann’s last essay on the topic, this
perfection is not conjunction with the Active Intellect, but merely the
achievement of similarity to it. In Altmann’s words, ‘Similarity, not identity,
is the only realistic goal of accomplishment.’ See his Aufklärung, 85. A
development in Altmann’s views is apparent here. In his essay ‘Verhältnis’,
305, he spoke of conjunction without any hesitation. In his later article,
‘Beatitude’, he wrote, with less certainty, that Maimonides ‘seems to refer to
conjunction’ with the Active Intellect.
49 With Perfect Faith, 180.
50 Studies, ii. 443 ff.
51 See also Maimonides’ introduction to Mishnah Avot, ch. 2: ‘I maintain
that observance and transgression may also originate in the rational faculty,
in so far as one believes a true or a false doctrine, though no action which
may be designated as an observance or a transgression results therefrom.’
52 See the commentaries of Narboni, Efodi, and Abarbanel ad. loc.;
Mishneh torah, Sefer hamada, ed. Kafih, 608 n. 31; H. A. Wolfson, Studies, ii.
163–4.
53 Even in our day new principles of faith continue to be formulated: see
e.g. Peli, ‘Attempt’. Peli does not reject any of the Maimonidean Principles;
he only wishes to add some more.
54 Petuchowski, Theology, 25, attributes the Orthodox acceptance of
Maimonides’ Principles to the popularity of Yigdal, ‘which has found its way
into all synagogues’. This merely begs the question, why did Yigdal find its
way into synagogues, and further, why were poetic compositions of
Maimonides’ Principles, of which Yigdal is only the most famous,
composed? Obviously, widespread acceptance of the Principles pre-dates the
poetic versions, not the other way around. As for Yigdal finding its way ‘into
all synagogues’, this too is incorrect, as will be documented below.
55 I should call attention to a significant philosophical and halakhic point
which appears to have gone unnoticed. The Vilna Gaon (R. Elijah b.
Solomon Zalman, 1720–97) apparently believed that the First and Second
Principles are the only true principles in Judaism. According to him, one
who believes in God’s existence and unity, despite his other sins, is regarded
as a Jew in good standing and he is thus able to be included in a minyan
(quorum for public prayer). None of the numerous discussions regarding
whether a Sabbath violator may be included in a minyan seems to have taken
note of the Gaon’s comment, which appears in his commentary on Tikunei
zohar, 42a. See also the interesting approach of R. Jacob Moelin, She’elot
uteshuvot maharil, no. 194.
56 Commentary on Gen. 18: 1. R. Abraham Hayim Viterbo uses almost
identical language when referring to this view of Maimonides; see his
Emunat ḥakhamim, 33a–b.
57 See his Sefer hazikaron, 55–62.
58 See the introduction to Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, i.
10, where Maimonides argues that asmakhta (a type of scriptural support for
a law) is only a mnemonic provided by the rabbis to connect the law to
Scripture, but that in reality the law is entirely independent of any scriptural
proof. See Schimmel, Oral Law, 55–6; Kooperman, Peshuto, ch. 9.
59 Commentary on BT RH 16a. Ritva does not mention Maimonides by
name, leading M. Roth, Kol mevaser, ii, nos. 21–2, to argue that he had Ibn
Ezra in mind, and that had he known that Maimonides held the same view
he would not have used such harsh language. See Ibn Ezra’s commentary on
Exod. 21: 8 (long and short versions), 25: 18, Lev. 21: 2, 22: 7. This
shared position of Ibn Ezra and Maimonides was overlooked by my late
teacher, Professor Isadore Twersky, ‘Did Ibn Ezra Influence Maimonides?’.
See also Judah Halevi, Kuzari, iii. 73, who appears to be the first to suggest
the explanation later offered by Ibn Ezra and Maimonides.
60 Lettre, 13 ff.
61 Nicomachean Ethics iii. 10.
62 Guide ii. 36, 40, iii. 8, 49. In Guide iii. 51 Maimonides states that
Moses’ intellect ‘attained such strength that all the gross faculties in the body
ceased to function; I refer to the various kinds of the sense of touch’.
Strauss, Persecution, 75–6, argues that Maimonides’ esoteric opinion is
somewhat less ascetic than this.
63 Although R. Israel b. Joseph al-Nakawa incorporated the entire Igeret
hakodesh into his own Menorat hamaor, he was careful to omit the criticism
of Maimonides. See Menorat hamaor, iv. 90. An almost identical formulation
to that which appears in Igeret hakodesh, and clearly adapted from it, is
offered by the kabbalist R. Abraham Saba; again Maimonides is not
mentioned. See id., Tseror hamor, on Gen. 4: 1. R. Jacob Emden, whose
own sexuality was quite complex, also spares Maimonides. See his Mor
uketsiah, no. 240: ) (. . . . ; id.,
Amudei shamayim, 352b: R. Moses Sofer
writes almost identically: see id., She’elot uteshuvot, ‘Even ha’ezer’, 2, no. 40.
Elsewhere Emden takes great glee in recounting how Aristotle himself
succumbed to physical lusts: see id., Migdal oz, 49a (‘Neveh ḥakham: Ḥalon
tsuri’, no. 64); id., Mitpaḥat sefarim, 154. Regarding this legend, see Shmuel
Ashkenazi, Alfa, 234–6. For the many scholars who agreed with
Maimonides’ negative view of the physical, see Kaufmann, Sinne, 188–9;
Malter, ‘Shem Tob’, 480; Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, 93.
64 Guide iii. 17. This view is shared by many others. D. M. Halperin,
Ḥemdah genuzah, 1, provides references to Nahmanides, Sefer haḥinukh, R.
David Kimhi, R. Bahya b. Asher, Gersonides (R. Levi b. Gershom), R.
Obadiah Sforno, R. Moses Cordovero, R. Moses Hayim Luzzatto, and R.
Joseph Ergas.
65 Simḥat yisra’el, ‘Ma’amrei simḥah’, no. 32. See also R. Pinhas Shapiro
of Korets, Imrei pinḥas, vi, no. 95, that one is obligated to believe that God’s
providence extends to everything.
66 Minḥat ele’azar, i, no. 50. Shapira writes that it is forbidden to read
such a view, which I assume means that he regards it as heretical.
67 R. Joseph Karo—or rather the magid or heavenly guide who appeared
to him—claimed that although this was indeed Heaven’s decree,
Maimonides’ Torah learning and good deeds protected him so that he was
not forced to become a worm, although he did have to go through one
reincarnation before reaching heaven. This passage appears in an expurgated
version in Magid meisharim, ‘Vayakhel’ (batra). See Werblowsky, Karo, 31,
170 n. 2. For kabbalists, belief in the doctrine of metempsychosis (gilgul) is
itself one of the fundamental principles of Judaism, and, in the words of R.
Levi b. Habib, ‘we are all obligated to believe in it without any hesitations
or doubts’: id., She’elot uteshuvot ralbaḥ , no. 8.
68 See the text published by Bloch, ‘Streit’, 264.
69 Shalshelet hakabalah, 101.
70 Green, Tormented Master, 331 n. 8.
71 Kovets igerot, ii. 41, 111. Interestingly enough, it was actually Karelitz
who softened Maimonides’ harsh judgement about the status of a heretic
and ‘redeemed’ him. He argued that all the harsh things said about heretics,
not least of which was that they should be killed, were only stated with
reference to an era in which one could properly rebuke sinners and in which
God’s providence was manifest; however neither of these apply in
contemporary times. See id., Ḥazon ish, 2: 16, 28. However, while rebuke
was certainly more of a possibility in Maimonides’ day than in Karelitz’s
(since more Jews in medieval times accepted the authority of the Torah),
divine providence was hardly more manifest in the twelfth century than in
the twentieth. Concerning this point, Karelitz should be regarded as
disputing with Maimonides, not interpreting him.
72 Divrei torah, iii, no. 96.
73 Midrash pinḥas, 119.
74 Mikhtevei ḥafets ḥayim, no. 18.
75 Shomer emunim, i. 232b. See also R. Abraham Isaac Hakohen (the
leader of the conservative hasidic sect of Toldot Aharon), Zekhor le’avraham,
124, and Magid, ‘Modernity’.
76 Mishnah berurah, 126: 2. In the section ‘Sha’ar hatsiyun’, n. 3, he
claims that this formulation is taken from Orenstein’s Yeshuot ya’akov, but I
have been unable to find the reference.
77 See Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy, 77; I. Davidson, Otsar hashirah, ii. 266–7.
R. Eliyahu Katz sees a hint of Daniel b. Judah’s authorship in the first word
of the song, . The first two letters allude to the Thirteen Principles and the
last two letters allude to the author’s name, Daniel. See his letter in D.
Barda, Revid hazahav, 108. Surprisingly, R. J. S. Delmedigo, Novelot
ḥokhmah, 92b, assumed that Solomon ibn Gabirol wrote Yigdal. R. Jacob
Emden, who at times went so far as to deny Maimonides’ authorship of the
Guide (see Schacter, ‘Iggeret’, 442 n. 12), actually believed that Maimonides
wrote Yigdal. See his Amudei shamayim, 176b (introduction to Shir hayiḥud,
no. 3). Although Emden did not include Yigdal in his prayer book, it is
found in the popular and oft-reprinted Sidur beit ya’akov, which, although
attributed to Emden, is largely a product of the printer. In this Sidur, 95a,
‘Emden’ advised the God-fearing to recite the Thirteen Principles every day
—words of advice which are not to be found in Emden’s Amudei shamayim.
Although he nowhere offered his own list of principles of faith, Emden
claimed that a literal understanding of the kabbalistic notion of tsimtsum is a
fundamental concept of Judaism: . See his Mitpaḥat
sefarim, 117.
78 See Davis, ‘Philosophy’, 215. In this article Davis argues that ‘the belief
in dogmas of Judaism entered Ashkenazic culture in the late Middle Ages’.
79 See his introductory derashah to R. Asher b. Jehiel, Orḥot ḥayim, 10
(final numbering).
80 Yosif omets, no. 60 (although the title of this work is often given as
Yosef omets, this is incorrect; see Ben-David, Shevet miyehudah, no. 20).
81 See Marx, ‘List’, 305–36; I. Davidson, Otsar hashirah, iv. 492.
82 See Ovadiah, Natan david, 336; Azrad, Torat imekha, 101–2.
83 See Auerbach, Oraḥ ne’eman, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, 51: 1.
84 See Gaguine, Keter shem tov, i. 196.
85 See Petuchowski, Theology, 25; Rothkoff, ‘Yigdal’.
86 See Gaon, ‘Recitation’, 39–41. Gaon refers to special Hebrew and
Ladino publications of the Principles, designed to be recited at this time,
printed in Venice, 1700 and Salonika, 1775. See also Isaac De Fes’ Hebrew
and Judaeo-Spanish Hoda’at emunat yisra’el. Strictly speaking, one cannot
speak of the Ani ma’amin, for in addition to the Ashkenazi (standard)
version there are at least two Sephardi versions. It is not known who
composed any of the versions.
Both the standard Ani ma’amin and Yigdal formulations of the Thirteen
Principles differ in a number of ways from what Maimonides actually wrote.
Regarding this, as well as textual variations of Yigdal, see Gaguine, Keter
shem tov, i. 198; Lamm, Faith and Doubt, 159 n. 31; Goren, Torat hashabat,
556, 572; Schueck, She’elot uteshuvot rashban, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, no. 45;
Hirschensohn, Malki bakodesh, ii. 238–42; E. M. Preil, Hamaor, 13–15;
Waxman, ‘Maimonides’, 402–3; Pines, History, 16–20; id., ‘Philosophic
Purport, 3; Messas, Mayim ḥayim, 97; Berliner, Writings, i. 19–20, 122, ii.
230; Birnbaum, Peletat soferim, 83–4; Sparka, Yesodei ha’emunah, 63–8;
Rosenberg, ‘Biblical Research’, 88; D. Cohen, Masat kapai, 92; David
Yitshaki’s comment in Tsefunot, 5 (Tishrei 5750 [Oct. 1989]), 107;
Warhaftig, ‘Notes’, 18; Katan, ‘I Believe’, 41–4; Cosman, ‘Maimonides’
Thirteen Principles’, 337–48 (some of these sources contain errors because
they rely on the faulty translation of Maimonides’ Mishnah commentary
found in the standard editions of the Talmud).
87 Sefer maharil, 626 (translation in Davis, ‘Philosophy’, 215). R. Joseph
B. Soloveitchik is reported to have opposed the recitation of Yigdal, which
he regarded as an imitation of the Christian practice of recitation of the
catechism; see Schachter, Nefesh harav, 231.
88 Abarbanel, Rosh amanah, ch. 23; S. Luria, ‘Hanhagat maharshal’, 326.
As has already been noted, Abarbanel also argued that Maimonides’
Principles were designed exclusively for the masses.
89 He believed Kalir to be a tana, as is stated in Tosafot, Ḥagigah 13a,
s.v. veraglei; Maḥzor vitri, 362–4 (quoting Rabenu Tam); Asher b. Jehiel,
Berakhot 5: 21; and see Langer, ‘Kalir’. Some medieval scholars recognized
that Kalir’s dates were much later. See Tosafot, Menaḥot 35b, s.v. vekamah
and Ḥulin 109b, s.v. nidah.
90 Vital, Peri ets ḥayim, i. 15 (also recorded in the commentary on the
Shulḥan arukh by Judah Ashkenazi, Ba’er heitev, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, 68: 3). The
anonymous Ḥemdat yamim, 57a, claims that Luria’s objection was to the
first four stanzas, which are not in accord with kabbalistic truth. Therefore,
Ḥemdat yamim concludes, there is no objection to reciting the rest of the
poem. For a suggestion as to what, in particular, motivated Luria’s
kabbalistic objection, see R. Meir Mazuz’s comment in Y. Barda, Yitsḥak
yeranen, 113. Citing unnamed kabbalists, and calling attention to some
problematic linguistic aspects in the poem, Emden also opposed recitation of
Yigdal; see id., Amudei shamayim, 175b.
91 Shulḥan hatahor, 68: 3 (section ‘Zer zahav’). On the other hand, the
famed kabbalist R. Isaiah Horowitz, Shenei luḥot haberit, i. 94a (‘Sha’ar
ha’otiyot’), refers to Yigdal as an ‘excellent hymn’. R. Shabetai Sofer was
unaware of any kabbalistic opposition to Yigdal. After mentioning that other
scholars, in particular Abarbanel, disputed with Maimonides as to the proper
number of principles, he wrote: ‘Perhaps it is due to this dispute that a small
number of people refused to recite this hymn.’ See id., Sidur shabetai sofer, ii.
2.
92 Shevilei emunah, Netiv 1.
93 Yesodot hamaskil, 56.
94 See Davis, ‘Philosophy’, 195–222.
95 See Kellner, Dogma, 77, 198–9.
96 See Kellner, Dogma, who discusses the different theoretical bases for
the various dogmatic formulations.
97 Givat sha’ul, 76a (‘Tetsaveh’).
98 See Faierstein, Libes Briv, 96–7 (English), 50–1 (Yiddish).
99 Besamim rosh, no. 251. Nahman Krochmal agreed with Berlin; see
Krochmal, Kitvei ranak, 439.
100 Parashat mordekhai, no. 5. See also Hayim Berlin, Nishmat ḥayim, no.
180 (beginning).
101 Kol sifrei, ii. 979–80. See, similarly, Z. J. Friedman, Emet ve’emunah,
52–5.
102 See my ‘Letter’, 18.
103 ‘Ḥatot ne’urim’, 112.
104 See Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (eds.), Jew in the Modern World, 470.
 105 See Sussman, Isaac Leeser, 78.
106 Broide, Shir ḥadash, 63–4. While not going this far, R. Hayim David
Regensberg argues that Maimonides requires a ger toshav (a resident alien
who keeps the Noahide laws) to accept his Principles; see his Mishmeret
ḥayim, 155. R. Abba Mari Astruc of Lunel states that one should not
condemn Aristotle for not believing in creation, since it is not included in
the seven Noahide commandments. See id., Minḥat kenaot, ed. Dimitrovsky,
257. (That non-Jews are not obligated to believe in creation is also stated by
Kamenetzky, Emet leya’akov, 311.) The implication of R. Abba Mari’s
comment is that Noahides are not obligated to believe in any principles of
faith, since none is included in the Noahide commandments. Although, to
be sure, Noahides are forbidden to practise idolatry, there is no command
against believing in polytheism. As Aviner, She’elat shelomoh, vii, no. 214,
points out, it is better for a non-Jew to be an atheist than an idolater, since
belief in God is not one of the seven Noahide commandments. See,
however, Maimonides, Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot melakhim’, 8: 11, who
indeed requires Noahides to affirm at least some aspects of a proper
theology. Regarding the old question of which is worse, an atheist or an
idolater, see Ibn Ezra, commentary on Exod. 20: 1 (end); Albo, Sefer
ha’ikarim, i. 14; Herzog, Decisions, ii, no. 119; Jacobs, Principles, 55; Kook’s
view as interpreted by Naor, ‘Rav Kook’, and in Naor’s translation of Kook,
Orot, 51 ff.; and the quotation from Abraham Azulai, see below, Ch. 2 n. 3.
Maimonides apparently believed that atheism is worse. See Letters, ed. Kafih,
111 n. 79.
107 See Safrin, Heikhal haberakhah, i. 29a.
108 M. Friedman, Ḥevrah vedat, 320.
109 See Goitein, Zikhron avot, 50–1.
110 See Araki et al., Emunat hashem, 176 ff., 325 ff. This book reprints Y.
Kafih, Milḥamot hashem, followed by the kabbalists’ refutations. See Tobi,
‘Who Was the Author?’.
111 See his responsum in J. J. Weinberg, Seridei esh, ii. 282.
112 J. M. Cohen (ed.), Dear Chief Rabbi, 259.
113 <www.aishdas.org>.
114 Mordechai Blumenfeld in his introduction to Y. Weinberg,
Fundamentals and Faith, 18.
115 Genack, ‘Ambiguity’, 73.
116 A. Kaplan, Maimonides’ Principles, 3.
117 Fendel, Torah, 314.
118 Yaakov Elman, as quoted in Wellsprings (Summer 1996), 19.
119 Danziger, ‘Modern Orthodoxy’, 5.
120 For other Orthodox works that reflect this notion, see Sparka, Yesodei
ha’emunah; Kutner, Ha’emunah vehaḥakirah; Roller, Ma’amrei be’er ḥayim
mordekhai; Gottesman, Emunah shelemah; Danin, Sha’ar emunah; Neriyah,
Yod-gimel ha’ikarim; anon., Ma’ayanot ha’emunah.
121 Givat sha’ul, 129a–132a (‘Ekev’). See also ibid. 76a (‘Tetsaveh’),
where he finds another allusion to the Thirteen Principles in the Torah.
122 Divrei torah, ix, no. 6.
123 Introduction to Netinah lager, sect. 4.
124 Kol kore, introduction.
125 Masat kapai, 129–31.
126 See Safrin, Heikhal haberakhah, i. 29a–37b; Gurary, Thirteen Principles.
127 Anon., Sidur ḥelkat yehoshua, 291–5 (called to my attention by Rabbi
Daniel Yolkut). See also I. D. B. Hakohen, Ohel yisakhar, 16–17.
128 (Vienna, 1811), 2nd introduction.
129 Petuchowski, ‘Manuals’, 63. See also Eliav, Jewish Education, 73–44,
244, 262.
 130 Enlightenment, 129–30.
131 Hoboken, NJ, 1999.
132 See Naor, Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism, 8. As Naor points out,
Shabetai Tsevi was actually less conservative than his followers, and stated
unambiguously that Maimonides’ Ninth Principle was untrue (ibid. 151 n.
10).
133 See Ibn Bilia, Yesodot hamaskil, and Kellner, Dogma, 77–9.
134 Dor de’ah, i. 46–7.
135 See Scult (ed.), Communings, i. 218; Kaplan and Kohn (eds.), Sabbath
Prayerbook, 562–5.
136 Forward (15 Oct. 1999), 6.
137 Kevod elokim (Ramleh, 2000).
138 See Delitzsch, Bikurei te’enah, Hebrew introduction. (Not all of these
hanaḥot, as Delitzch terms them, are theological.) Is it only a coincidence
that the Mormons also have thirteen ‘Articles of Faith’? See J. Smith, Pearl,
60–1.
139 Major Trends, 130.
140 Although, strictly speaking, Luzzatto should perhaps not be
categorized as ‘Orthodox’, I have included him because of his strong ties to
tradition. In fact, it is probably not helpful to refer to Italian scholars by
categories developed in western Europe. In Italy he was always regarded as a
traditional scholar, and he trained a generation of Italian rabbis. My
reluctance to categorize him as Orthodox is due to the fact that in a private
letter he admitted that he did not accept a certain halakhah as set down in
the Talmud, preferring instead Ibn Ezra’s interpretation of the verse in
question. However, he also noted that this was a completely private opinion.
See Luzzatto, Letters, 246 (concerning shaving with a razor). In one essay,
Luzzatto claimed that the book of Ecclesiastes was a heretical work: see
Peninei shadal, 161–206. However, he later retracted this view: see Vargon,
‘Identity’, 365–84. With regard to Luzzatto’s original view of Ecclesiastes,
the closest parallel among traditional sources is that of R. Israel Bruna, who
seemingly states that the book of Ecclesiastes was not divinely inspired; see
id., She’elot uteshuvot, no. 66.
141 Studies, ii. 19.
142 S. Berlin, Besamim rosh, appendix, 40.
143 Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism, 8. In his note, Naor writes that he heard
this insight from his teacher, R. Shelomoh Fisher of Jerusalem.
144 Scherman (ed.), Artscroll Siddur, 178.
145 L. Roth, Is There A Jewish Philosophy?, 11 (called to my attention by
Professor Menachem Kellner).
146 To be sure, there are still some heresy-hunters about. After my
original article appeared in the Torah u-Madda Journal, both myself and the
editor of the journal, Rabbi Dr Jacob J. Schacter, were attacked in a
scurrilous fashion by Binyamin Jolkovsky in the Satmar paper Yidishe
tsaytung (28 July 1995). Jolkovsky, who telephoned me for an interview,
was at least honest enough to admit that he had never read the article.
147 A good example is R. Abraham Isaac Kook, who was regarded as a
heretic by many of the anti-Zionist Hungarian rabbis, including a figure
who is himself quoted a number of times in this book, R. Hayim Eleazar
Shapira of Munkacz. See H. E. Shapira, Divrei torah, vi, no. 82; id., Sha’ar
yisakhar, 373; Weinberger (ed.), Igerot shapirin, no. 219.
148 See Gordon, ‘Rationalism’, 128–33; G. Stern, ‘Menahem ha-Meiri’,
204; Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom, 18. R. Abba Mari Astruc of
Lunel, who instigated the assault on extreme rationalism in Provence, denied
that he was including Anatoli in this category. See Gordon, ‘Rationalism’,
150 n. 1; G. Stern, ‘Menahem ha-Meiri’, 204 n. 71. Aside from
Maimonides’ positive comments about Ibn Tibbon (see p. 77), R. Abraham
Abulafia quotes Ibn Tibbon and even agrees with his theory of providence.
See Scholem, Origins, 377 n. 32. R. Isaac b. Jacob Lattes also refers very
positively to Ibn Tibbon and his Ma’amar yikavu hamayim. See Halbertal,
Between Torah and Wisdom, 144. Nahmanides refers to Ibn Tibbon’s
Ma’amar yikavu hamayim in his sermon on Ecclesiastes. See id., Kitvei
ramban, i. 187. R. Menahem Meiri was influenced by Ibn Tibbon and
Anatoli and had a great deal of respect for them, though I think Stern
exaggerates somewhat when he writes (p. 205): ‘Meiri reveres Anatoli and
the Tibbons’ (emphasis added). See Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom,
ch. 2.
149 Dov Schwartz has performed a tremendous service in bringing to
light these philosophers, most of whose writings are still in manuscript. In
addition to his many articles, see his books, Old Wine and Messianic Idea.
150 Although Maimonides understands epikoros to have a theological
connotation (Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 8, ‘Hilkhot gezelah’, 11:
2, ‘Hilkhot rotse’aḥ ’, 4: 10), and this is clearly the context in which it
appears in Mishnah San. 10: 1, the Talmud offers a few different definitions
of the term, none of which has anything to do with theology. Thus, an
epikoros is defined as one who shows disrespect for the sages, for one’s
neighbour, or for one’s teacher (see BT San. 99b–100a). For analysis of how
Maimonides uses the term, see Abraham di Boton, Leḥem mishneh on
‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 7; Kellner, Dogma, 19 ff. In ‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’,
10: 1, Maimonides states that an epikoros is to be killed because he leads
people away from God. See also ‘Hilkhot edut’, 11: 10. In his commentary
on Mishnah San. 10: 1, Maimonides explains epikoros as coming from the
root hefker, and not from the Greek philosopher Epicurus. This is surprising
as Maimonides knew of Epicurus and refers to him in Guide iii. 17. (Even if
Maimonides had not heard of Epicurus when he wrote his commentary on
the Mishnah, we know that he revised it throughout his life and yet he never
altered this explanation.) See Nathan b. Yehiel, Arukh hashalem, s.v. epikoros.
Simeon Duran, Magen avot, i. 2 (p. 4b), and the section of this work on
Mishnah Avot 2: 14, also called Magen avot (Leipzig, 1855), points to the
Greek philosopher as the origin of the term epikoros.
151 See Schiffman, Who Was a Jew, 44. As Schiffman points out, Josephus
describes the Epicureans, as well as the Sadducees, as those who deny God’s
providence. The Sadducees also denied both the resurrection and that the
Oral Torah was from heaven, thus making it very likely that this Mishnah
was formulated against this latter group. See ibid. 42 ff.
152 Studies, i. 181.
153 Kurzweil, ‘Fundamentalism’, 9. See L. Roth, Judaism, 125.
154 Jerusalem, 100.
155 See e.g. ‘Jerusalem’ and Other, 154, where, in his reply to Charles
Bonnet’s Palingénésie, Mendelssohn wrote that Judaism has three principles:
God, providence, and legislation (i.e. revelation of the Torah). In his reply
to Lavater, Mendelssohn offered the identical opinion. See Altmann,
Mendelssohn, 544. See also E. Jospe, Mendelssohn, 121, for his letter to Elkan
Herz, in which he clarified his opinion: ‘We have no dogmas that go beyond
or against reason’ (emphasis added). A hundred years ago, Solomon
Schechter called attention to this common distortion of Mendelssohn’s
views: see his Studies, 147–8. See also Friedlaender, Jewish Religion, 16–18,
and Altmann’s note in his edition of Jerusalem, 217. Mendelssohn also
believed that Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles had significant religious and
educational value, and he therefore translated them into German and
included them in a book he published for students: see A. Shohet, Changing
Eras, 256; A. E. Simon, ‘Philanthropism’, 163. However, rather than
recording them with the formulation ‘I believe’, he used the phrase ‘Ich
erkenne für wahr und gewiss’ (I recognize it as true and certain). In section I
of Jerusalem (p. 63 in Altmann’s and Arkush’s edition) he listed God,
providence and future life as the fundamental principles ‘on which all
religions agree, and without which felicity is but a dream’.
156 Not surprisingly, this view encountered opposition. See I. Breuer,
Concepts, 3–4; M. Breuer, ‘Changes’, 174 n. 38; id., Jüdische Orthodoxie, 493
n. 35; E. Stern, Ishim vekivunim, 135 n. 29. Yerahmiel Yisrael Yitshak
Domb, in his polemic against the ethos of German Orthodoxy, refers
specifically to this view of Breuer; see his Ha’atakot, 275–6.
157 See the numerous refutations of Leibowitz’s various positions in Ben
Yeruham and Kolitz (eds.), Shelilah lishemah.
158 Kurzweil, Modern Impulse, 51. See also Leibowitz, Judaism, index, s.v.
holiness. Leibowitz cites R. Meir Simhah of Dvinsk, Meshekh ḥokhmah, on
Exod. 32: 19, as agreeing with his view, since the latter writes that nothing
in this world is intrinsically holy, but rather becomes holy by virtue of our
observance of the mitsvot. See also the discussion in Fox, ‘Holiness’, 157 ff.
Yet even R. Meir Simhah’s view, which I believe is unique in traditional
literature, is somewhat different from that presented by Leibowitz, for he
posits that if Jews fulfil God’s will, physical objects, such as the Temple and
the Land of Israel, do assume real holiness. See Ben-Sasson, Philosophical
System, 164–7. Leibowitz, on the other hand, denies that the concept of
holiness can ever be applied to inanimate objects. There are, of course, many
halakhot whose very basis is the holiness of the Land of Israel. See J. D.
Bleich, Contemporary Halachic Problems, ch. 8, ‘The Sanctity of the Liberated
Territories’.
159 ‘Dogma’, 249.
160 See Kellner, Dogma, 184 ff., for an important analysis of Abarbanel’s
position.
161 She’elot uteshuvot haradbaz, no. 344.
162 Neunzehn Briefe, 79 (fifteenth letter). See, however, the seventeenth
letter, in which he acknowledges that Judaism may indeed be based on the
Thirteen Principles, but points out that they hardly comprise the entire
religion.
163 Rosh amanah, ch. 23.
164 Gerlits (ed.), Hagadah, 197–9.
165 Yeshuot ya’akov, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, 126: 1. I have seen a number of other
writers who also misrepresent Albo’s position, despite the fact that
throughout Book I of his Sefer ha’ikarim he leaves no room for doubt. See
e.g. Graetz, Structure, 167; Taenzer, Religionsphilosophie, 36; and I. Epstein,
Faith, 321 n. 13. Moses Mendelssohn also seems to err in this regard; see
id., Jerusalem, 102.
166 Husik, History, 416.
167 See Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 23. See also Schechter, Studies, 171–2; Jacobs,
Principles, 392–3; and Ch. 10 n. 26 of this book. See also the careful way in
which the messianic belief was formulated at the Dispute of Tortosa, in
which Albo participated; Lopez, Disputa, i. 544. There is, to be sure, a
famous contradiction in Albo regarding this point, and this is perhaps what
Orenstein had in mind; see p. 144 of this book.
168 Introduction to Magen avot on Avot.
169 Regarding this omission, see Maimonides’ Introductions, ed. Shailat,
219. For the view that this is a basic principle of Judaism, denial of which is
heresy, see M. Klein, Mishneh halakhot, introd., 3 (unnumbered).
170 See Kellner, Dogma, 53 ff.
171 See Kellner, Dogma, 200 ff. Albo lists reward and punishment as a
basic principle and providence as a ‘root’ or derivative principle. See ibid.
146–9.
172 See Kellner, Dogma, 74–5. Hyman, ‘Maimonides’ “Thirteen
Principles” ’, 139, writes: ‘Even more striking is Maimonides’ omission of
the World to Come from the “thirteen principles”.’ He contrasts this to
‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, where ‘the World to Come forms a part of the discussion
of reward and punishment’. This is incorrect, as Maimonides includes the
world to come as part of the Eleventh Principle. In his words: ‘The greatest
reward is the world to come and the greatest punishment is karet’. Hyman’s
assertion that Maimonides does not mention creation of the world in the
Principles has also been shown to be inaccurate, with the publication of the
Kafih edition of Maimonides’ commentary on the Mishnah. For attempts to
explain the omission of free will, see Simeon Duran, Ohev mishpat, 13b;
Gedaliah b. Solomon Lipschuetz’s commentary on Albo’s Sefer ha’ikarim, i.
3 (found in the standard editions); Leibowitz, Faith, 85–6; Maimonides’
Introductions, ed. Shailat, 187–8; Goldman, ‘Halachic Foundation’, 117–18.
Goldman concludes that ‘free-will was not for him a decisive dogma to be
compared with Revelation or Resurrection’. However, in ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’, 5: 3, Maimonides writes that free will ‘is a fundamental concept
and a pillar [on which rests the totality] of the Torah and mitsvot’ (see also
ibid. 6: 1). In Guide iii. 17 Maimonides terms free will ‘a fundamental
principle of the Law of Moses our Master’. In his ‘Letter on Astrology’ he
states that free will is not simply a fundamental principle of the Torah, but is
also acknowledged by all the philosophers. See Letters, ed. Shailat, ii. 486. In
Shemoneh perakim, ch. 8, Maimonides writes: ‘If Man’s actions were done
under compulsion, the commandments and prohibitions of the Law would
be nullified and they would all be absolutely in vain. . . . All of this is utterly
absurd and false, contrary to what is grasped by the intellect and perceived
by the senses, destructive of the wall around the Law, and a judgement upon
God, the Exalted, as being unjust—may He be exalted above that.’
Shlomo Pines and Alexander Altmann have identified Maimonides as a
determinist and regard this view as his esoteric doctrine. In fact, this
approach was anticipated by Abner of Burgos. See Pines, ‘Studies’, 195–8;
Altmann, Essays, 47–59; Gershenson, ‘View’. Still, even if correct, this would
have nothing to do with the omission of free will in the Principles, since
there is no question that the Thirteen Principles represent the exoteric
teachings of Maimonides. See Altmann, Essays, 54: ‘There can be no doubt
that in the Mishna Commentary and kindred texts of a theological character
Maimonides subscribes to the theory that, no matter how strong the impact
of circumstances and motivations, man is able to overrule them by his free
choice.’ (Cf. however, W. Z. Harvey, ‘Maimonides’ Interpretation’, 18, and
id., ‘The Mishneh Torah’, 24 ff., who does not make any distinction between
the Guide and the more popular texts.) For recent discussions of this issue,
see Gellman, ‘Freedom’; Safran, ‘Maimonides’.
173 Magen avot, 2b.
174 Rosh amanah, ch. 6. Abarbanel also claims that Maimonides’ Thirteen
Principles can be derived from the creation story. See id., Mifalot elokim, i. 4.
175 Ohev mishpat, ch. 8.
176 Ibid. 13b. See similarly Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 3. R. Isaiah Horowitz,
Shenei luḥot haberit, i. 96a, also relates the Thirteen Principles to God’s
attributes, and not merely in terms of their number. He regards them as
‘hinted at’ in the thirteen attributes of God. See similarly Safrin, Heikhal
haberakhah, i. 29a and Rothschild, Oniyah belev hayam, 33b. On the number
13, see also J. D. Bleich, With Perfect Faith, 13 n. 2: ‘The notion that the
credal principles of faith are thirteen in number may well be an ancient
tradition. R. Avraham ha-Levi [sic] Horowitz . . . cites a certain prayer
ascribed to Rav Tavyomi, one of the talmudic sages, which contains a
reference to thirteen principles.’ Actually, Bleich’s point was anticipated by
R. Moses Sofer, She’elot uteshuvot, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 356. However, both are
mistaken. Horowitz, Shenei luḥot haberit, 97a, never refers to Rav Tavyomi.
He simply mentions a prayer composed by a certain Tavyomi, which is
another way of writing the name Yom Tov. See the letter from Leopold
Loew in Kerem ḥemed, 9 (1856), 78; J. Schwartz, Divrei yosef, iii–iv, no. 57.
(In an earlier responsum, She’elot uteshuvot, ‘Even ha’ezer’, ii, no. 148, Sofer
himself realized that Tavyomi’s prayer has nothing to do with Maimonides’
Thirteen Principles. His change of mind remains a mystery.) This prayer was
actually composed by R. Yom Tov Lipmann Muelhausen (14th–15th
cents.), and was published by Efraim Kupfer, ‘Sefer haberit’, 340–1. For a
fanciful explanation as to why Maimonides picked the number 13, see
Schueck, Sidur haminhagim, iv. 42a; id., Sidur rashban, 2a. See also Michael
Chilton’s ridiculous suggestion that ‘the very number thirteen perhaps
received an added emphasis in Jewish tradition because it was considered
unlucky by Christians’, in id., Christian Effect, 193.
177 Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 4.
178 Eglei tal, 24a. The same approach is followed by Schechter, Studies,
179; Petuchowski, Theology, 23; Neumark, History of Jewish Dogma, ii. 130;
Maimon, Maimonides, 63.
179 See Hyman, ‘Maimonides’ “Thirteen Principles” ’, 131 n. 73, 138–9.
See also Raffel, ‘Maimonides’ Fundamental Principles’, 77–88. According to
these scholars, Kellner is not correct when he says that Maimonides would
not regard as a heretic one ‘who inadvertently denies some teaching not
included in the principles’. It would depend upon which teaching he is
denying. See Kellner, ‘Heresy’, 309.
180 Kovets igerot, i. 42–3.
181 See my ‘Maimonidean Halakhah’. For the numerous ge’onim and
rishonim who did not share Karelitz’s embrace of all agadot, see Saperstein,
Decoding the Rabbis, ch. 1.
182 Guide i. 59.
183 Ibid., introduction.
 TWO

The Existence and Unity of God

The First Principle

HE FIRST PRINCIPLE declares that God exists, that he is perfect in
T every way, and that he is the cause of the existence of all
things. The Principle also includes the belief that God is eternal,
for he is ‘an existent Being which is perfect in all aspects of
existence’, and perfect existence precludes dissolution. Needless to
say, later Jewish thinkers all concurred with Maimonides that God
exists, is eternal, and is perfect. Those thinkers who significantly
limit God, as we shall see (particularly in our discussion of the
Tenth Principle), do not dispute with Maimonides the fact that
God is perfect and thus omnipotent. According to them, the fact
that even God cannot do the impossible is not an imperfection,
and Maimonides agrees with this. He explains his position in
Guide i. 75: ‘We do not call a human individual weak because he
cannot move one thousand hundred-weights, and we do not
attribute to God, may He be exalted, incapacity because He is
unable to corpify His essence or to create someone like Him or to
create a square whose diagonal is equal to its side.’ In Guide iii. 15
he writes:

The impossible has a stable nature, one whose stability is constant and is not
made by a maker; it is impossible to change it in any way. Hence the power
over the maker of the impossible is not attributed to the deity. This is a
point about which none of the men of speculation differs in any way. . . .
Likewise, that God should bring into existence someone like Himself, or
should annihilate Himself, or should become a body, or should change1—all
of these things belong to the class of the impossible; and the power to do
any of these things cannot be attributed to God.2

This view is a non-controversial position reaffirmed by all post-

Maimonidean philosophers.3 Even before Maimonides arrived on
the scene, the same notion was strongly affirmed by Sa’adiah
Gaon.4 Kabbalists could also feel comfortable with this basic idea,
and the great Spanish mystic R. Ezra ben Solomon (died c.1238)
is just as adamant as Maimonides that it implies no defect in God
to assert that he cannot do the impossible.5 The dispute between
Maimonides and those who ‘limit’ God is only over what
constitutes the impossible, with Maimonides having a more
restricted understanding of this than some other thinkers.
It is worth noting, however, that there have been Jewish
thinkers who reject Maimonides’ basic assumption, and believe
that God can do the logic ally impossible. They argue that this is
only impossible from the human standpoint, and there is no
reason to posit that ‘because the human intellect cannot conceive
the existence of something possessing simultaneously
contradictory properties, such existence is necessarily impossible in
reality’.6 Against those, such as Maimonides, who argued that God
cannot do the impossible and, in particular, asserted that God can
have no physical movement, the Tosafist R. Moses Taku
(thirteenth century) wrote: ‘They are issuing a decree to the
Creator as to how He must be. By so doing they are degrading
themselves.’7 R. Nahman of Bratslav also argued that God can do
the logically impossible, and that to claim otherwise is to restrict
God’s freedom. One of his disciples reported: ‘He mentions that it
says in their [the philosophers’] books: “Is it possible that a
triangle be a rectangle?” Our master said: “I believe that God can
make a rectangular triangle. For the ways of God are hidden from
us; He is omnipotent, and no deed is beyond Him.” ’8 As Arthur
Green put it in summarizing R. Nahman’s position, ‘Faith is to
exist even in the face of logical absurdity. . . . The tradition of
Tertullian has here found its Jewish parallel.’9
Maimonides’ other point in this Principle is that God is the
cause of the existence of all things. This is not an assertion of
creation ex nihilo, a point that will be discussed in relation to the
Fourth Principle. Rather, it establishes God’s ontological priority
to the universe. In other words, the universe is dependent upon
God for its existence. However, Maimonides’ formulation leaves
open the possibility that the universe has coexisted eternally with
God.

The Second Principle

The Second Principle teaches the absolute unity of God, which is
unlike the unity of anything else. No Jewish teacher has openly
disputed this.10 To be sure, opponents of kabbalah viewed the
mystical doctrine of the Sefirot, the ten aspects, or powers, of the
Godhead, in the same way as the Trinity, namely, as a violation of
God’s absolute unity and thus idolatrous.11 In a famous
responsum, R. Isaac ben Sheshet (1326–1407) quotes a
philosopher who argued that, whereas the Christians believe in
‘three’, the kabbalists believe in ‘ten’.12 The renowned kabbalist R.
Abraham Abulafia (thirteenth century) agreed with the
philosophers in this regard, seeing the standard kabbalistic
understanding of the Sefirot as even worse than the concept of the
Trinity.13
There can be no doubt that, had Maimonides known of this
concept, he would have responded in the same fashion, and
opponents of kabbalah have understandably regarded themselves
as following in Maimonides’ footsteps. It is impossible to reconcile
the kabbalistic understanding of God and his various sefirotic
manifestations with the simple, unknowable God of Maimonides.
This is especially so when dealing with those kabbalists who insist
that the Sefirot are actually part of God’s essence. For example, R.
Moses Cordovero (1522–70) writes: ‘At the start of the
emanation, the Ein Sof, King of all kings, the Holy One, blessed
be He, emanated ten Sefirot, which are from His essence, are one
with Him and He and they are all one complete unity.’14
The kabbalists, for their part, never regarded the doctrine of the
Sefirot as doing violence to God’s absolute unity. In their mind,
the Sefirot are always united with Ein Sof, God’s unknowable
essence, and are manifestations of the various aspects of God’s
nature. The Zohar asserts that Israel lost its battle against Amalek
because they misunderstood this point.15 Yet the fact remains that,
even after accepting the kabbalistic assumptions, there have been
times when it is difficult for all but the most vigorous defenders of
the sefirotic system not to see in it a departure from the doctrine
of the unity of God.
For centuries kabbalists have been adamant that, although Ein
Sof, or as it is often referred to, Ilat Ha’ilot (Cause of causes), is
unknowable, it is through the ‘light’ (power) of Ein Sof that the
world was created and providence is exercised. Thus, although one
should focus on various Sefirot during prayer, the prayer itself is
fundamentally directed to Ein Sof (or to its ‘light’, which envelops
the Sefirot and works through them). In this conception, even if it
appears that prayer is directed towards the Sefirot, it is never to
the Sefirot alone, only to Ein Sof as revealed in the Sefirot.
Orthodox kabbalists also regarded as heretical the notion
popularized by the Shabatean kabbalist Abraham Miguel Cardozo
(1626–1706), that the hidden God, called the ‘First Cause’, is
entirely removed from any contact with the world. According to
Cardozo, it is the Demiurge, the ‘God of Israel’, who created the
world and exercises providence. In other words, it was the
Demiurge, not the First Cause, who appeared to the Patriarchs,
sent the plagues, and took the Israelites out of Egypt. It thus
comes as no surprise that it is the Demiurge to whom prayers are
addressed. As Scholem put it:

even the moderate Sabbatians tried to evolve a conception of God which

conflicted with the fundamental tenets of Judaism. Their passionate
insistence in proclaiming a derivative of something else the supreme object
of religion has something strange and perturbing. The furious reaction of
Orthodoxy and also of orthodox Kabbalism against this attempt to tear the
God of Reason and the Revealed God asunder, is only too
comprehensible.16

Before looking at the centuries preceding the Shabateans, it

must be pointed out that in the succeeding centuries there was at
least one rabbinic figure, R. Isaac Lopes of Aleppo (seventeenth
century), who saw nothing heretical in Cardozo’s view. Lopes
even advocated this position himself, quoting from Cardozo’s
unpublished Boker avraham. He stated that he was unaware of the
origin of this work; since he believed that a great kabbalist had
written it, he was able to evaluate its position and find it
acceptable.17 It is true that some scholars reject Lopes’ claim that
he did not know the identity of the author of Boker avraham, and
regard him as a secret Cardozian,18 yet the fact remains that the
renowned halakhist and kabbalist R. Joseph Hayim ben Elijah Al-
Hakam of Baghdad (1832–1909), who strongly rejects Lopes’
Cardozian position,19 nevertheless had a very high opinion of
him.20 Lopes is also cited a number of number of times by R.
Jacob Kassin (1900–94), the late rabbi of Brooklyn’s Syrian
community.21
Although Cardozo’s view was regarded as heretical in his day,
there were outstanding kabbalists in medieval times who held a
very similar position. Like Cardozo, they believed that Ilat Ha’ilot
has no involvement with human affairs, being completely
impersonal and transcendent. Therefore, no prayers are directed
towards it. Instead one prays to the ‘God’ who is immanent, who
created the world and exercises providence in it, that is, the God
of Scripture, who is identified with either the first Sefirah (Keter)
or the second Sefirah (Hokhmah).22 Among the kabbalistic works
which promulgated this opinion, mention should be made of the
influential and anonymous Ma’arekhet ha’elohut, which Scholem
believes was written around the turn of the fourteenth century.23
Even if it is incorrect to say that there are two Gods in this
conception, there is no escaping the fact that there are two
supreme powers in the Godhead—precisely what another religious
tradition might call two ‘persons’. In line with this, R. Isaac ibn
Latif (thirteenth century) describes the immanent ‘God’ (what he
terms the ‘First Created Being’), in words that Maimonides would
view as blasphemous dualism:

The First Created Being, may He be blessed, knows everything by virtue of

His essence, for He is everywhere and everything is in Him, as it is written,
the whole earth is full of His glory (Isa. 10: 3); and all beings exist through him
by way of emanation and evolvement, and nothing exists outside of Him.24

Even among ‘mainstream’ kabbalists, we still find views very

much at odds with Maimonidean conceptions. For example, R.
Jacob the Nazirite (twelfth century) claimed that the first three
and last three benedictions of the Amidah prayer are directed to
the Sefirah Binah. The middle blessings are directed to Tiferet
during the day and to Binah at night. The renowned R. Abraham
ben David of Posquières (Rabad; c.1125–98) differs in that he
believes that the first three and last three blessings are directed to
the Supreme Deity (Ilat Ha’ilot), but the middle blessings, which
are more personal, are directed to the divine entity which is the
manifestation of Ilat Ha’ilot, the Creator (Yotser Bereshit). The
logic behind this position is as follows: the early and later
blessings contain only praise rather than supplication, and they can
therefore be directed towards Ilat Ha’ilot. However, in the middle
blessings man beseeches the Lord, and one does not do this with
Ilat Ha’ilot. While it is true that Ilat Ha’ilot is the ultimate cause
of all, it is not involved in the world in any way and does not hear
prayers. Thus, one must direct these prayers to the Creator, who
exercises divine providence and in whose image man is created.25
On the issue of prayer, it should be noted that there were some
kabbalists, such as R. Joseph ben Shalom of Barcelona
(thirteenth–fourteenth centuries), author of a famous commentary
on Sefer yetsirah falsely attributed to Rabad,26 who even believed
that the Sefirot pray to Ilat Ha’ilot!27 With such a view, especially
when merged with the popular kabbalistic notion that the Sefirot
do not perceive the true nature of Ilat Ha’ilot,28 it becomes
increasingly hard to accept the rhetoric that even in the sefirotic
system the unity of God remains uncorrupted. This is doubly so
when we consider the view of the great kabbalist R. Azriel of
Gerona (thirteenth century), that, with the exception of the first
Sefirah, which exists eternally with Ilat Ha’ilot, the other Sefirot
all had a beginning in time.29 Furthermore, what is one to make of
the assertion made by R. Isaac Pilitz (nineteenth century), that
while it is obvious that Ein Sof knows the future, since it is not
subject to time, it is most likely that the Sefirot, which run the
world, do not know the future? Pilitz believed that this is the best
solution to the old problem of preserving man’s free will in the
face of God’s knowledge.30 Non-kabbalists will find it difficult to
understand why views such as this, where Ein Sof is severed from
the Sefirot, do not create a dualism in the divine realm.
Finally, there were also kabbalists who directed prayers to the
‘Unique Cherub’, an anthropomorphic entity of the divine realm
which emanated from, or was created by, God and in whose
image man is created.31 Maimonides would no doubt agree with
the judgement of Abraham Epstein that this figure eventually
evolved into a ‘virtual second God’.32 Concerning prayer to the
Cherub, Dan writes:

The theological necessity dominant in the formulation of the concept of the

Cherub, that is, the need to have a divine entity as the subject of
anthropomorphic descriptions of God, was probably replaced by mystical
devotion to this divine power, which in turn was elevated to the previously
forbidden role of accepting prayers from the people of Israel. The
theological reservations which had motivated earlier thinkers, forbidding
prayer to an entity with an image and limits, did not seem to bother the
participants in this later stage of development.33

In conclusion, although there is certainly much more that can

be said about the nature of kabbalistic prayer, it is not necessary
for our purposes. It is true that the kabbalists all believed that their
detailed speculations on the Godhead did not damage the
fundamental unity of God. Yet from a Maimonidean perspective,
which knows only a simple monotheism and a simple divine unity,
they indeed violated the intent, if not the letter, of the Second
Principle.

1 See R. Joseph ibn Kaspi’s commentary on the Guide, Amudei kesef

umaskiyot kesef, ad loc., where he discusses this point with reference to
Christian doctrine.
2 See also Guide ii. 13.
3 R. Abraham Azulai wrote: ‘God can do all things that are impossible
according to nature, for he created nature, but it is not to be imagined that
he can do things that are impossible according to reason. . . . Yet there is no
need to publicize this among the Gentiles . . . because if they hear it they will
be led to doubt God’s existence’: id., Ba’alei berit avram, 121. Since the
context of this comment shows that he is speaking about Christians, the
words just quoted would appear to refer to the Trinity. In other words, if
Christians learn that a triune God is an impossibility, it will lead them to
complete unbelief, which is worse than their present doctrine.
4 Emunot vede’ot, i. 3, ii. 13. See H. A. Wolfson, Repercussions. This view
was also standard among both Christian and Muslim philosophers. See id.,
Philosophy, 578–89.
5 Nahmanides, Kitvei ramban, ii. 494 (commentary on Song of Songs 3:
9); Scholem, Studies, 28. For a long time R. Ezra b. Solomon’s commentary
on Song of Songs was mistakenly attributed to Nahmanides. See Chavel’s
introduction in Nahmanides, Kitvei haramban, ii. 474–5; Vajda,
Commentaire.
6 Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, 30.
7 Ketav tamim, ed. Kirchheim, 82. Although he calls the idea ‘strange’, R.
Elijah Delmedigo, Beḥinat hadat, 82, seems to regard the notion that God
can do the impossible as an acceptable belief. See Ross’ note, p. 120.
8 See Green, Tormented Master, 306. See, similarly, R. Tsevi Elimelekh of
Dynów, Benei yisakhar, ‘Sivan’ 5: 19 (103a); Marcus, Keset hasofer, 9.
9 Green, Tormented Master, 306. In his note, Green writes: ‘ “Their
books” here may be a garbled reference to Maimonides’ Guide 3: 15.’
Actually, the ‘garbled’ reference is probably to Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 22,
who, unlike Maimonides, actually discusses triangles and squares. R.
Nahman’s position is also discussed in Jacobs, Faith, 201–9, who calls
attention to the similar view of R. Aaron b. Moses of Starosselje. See also
Jacobs, Seeker, 101–2. Tertullian is often quoted as saying ‘Credo, quia
absurdum est’ (I believe, because it is absurd), yet these exact words are
nowhere found in his writings. What he does say is, ‘Certum est, quia
impossibile est’ (It is certain because it is impossible) and ‘prorsus credibile
est, quia ineptum est’ (it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd
[senseless]). See De carne christi, 5. On what Tertullian meant by these
phrases, see Roberts, Theology, 75–8.
10 See Jacobs, Jewish Theology, ch. 2.
11 See R. Meir b. Simeon of Narbonne’s letter published in Scholem,
Studies, 16–18; E. Delmedigo, Beḥinat hadat, 91; Halamish, Kabbalah, 75.
12 She’elot uteshuvot harivash, no. 157. See also Leone da Modena’s
comment, quoted in Idel, ‘Differing Conceptions’, 163. Cf. Guide i. 50,
where Maimonides compares those who believe that God has attributes with
the Christians.
13 See Jellinek, Ginzei ḥokhmat hakabalah, 19. For Abulafia’s view of the
Sefirot, see E. R. Wolfson, Abraham Abulafia, pt. II.
14 Pardes rimonim, iv. 4. For Cordovero’s view of the Sefirot, see Ben-
Shelomoh, Mystical Theology, ch. 2. Regarding Sefirot as part of the divine
essence, see Idel, Kabbalah, 137 ff.
15 Zohar ii. 64b; Scholem, Mystical Shape, 52–3.
16 Major Trends, 323–4. See also Yosha, ‘Philosophical Background’; D.
J. Halperin, Abraham, chs. 4, 10.
17 Kur matsref ha’emunot umare ha’emet, 101a–103b.
18 See Yosha, ‘Philosophical Foundations’, 192 ff.
19 See Joseph Hayim ben Elijah Al-Hakam, Od yosef ḥai, 27 ff.
(‘Vayeshev’; in the Jerusalem 1910 edition, this appears on pp. 22 ff. of the
second pagination). See also id., Rav pe’alim, iii, section ‘Sod yesharim’, no.
11, regarding prayer and Ein Sof.
20 See Rav pe’alim, i, section ‘Sod yesharim’, no. 1.
21 See his Yesod ha’emunah. There are, to be sure, a number of cases of
Orthodox kabbalists who defended problematic passages in Shabatean
works. For example, the Yemenite authors of Araki et al., Emunat hashem,
did so with Nehemiah Hayon’s Oz le’elohim, which had been attacked as
heretical by their opponent, R. Yihyeh Kafih. This says a great deal about
the elasticity of apologetics. In the case of Emunat hashem, after R. Abraham
Isaac Kook, in his haskamah, pointed out the true nature of Hayon’s book,
the authors excised their defence of this work. See Emunat hashem, 605.
Regarding Shabatean works which have been unknowingly accepted in the
Orthodox world, see Naor, Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism.
22 Heller-Wilensky, ‘ “First Created Being” ’, 264 ff.
23 See Scholem, ‘Kabbalah’, cols. 557–8; Gottlieb, ‘Ma’arekhet ha-
Elohut’, cols. 637–8.
24 Heller-Wilensky, ‘ “First Created Being” ’, 263.
25 Dan, Jewish Mysticism, ii. 248–51; id., ‘Unique Cherub’, ch. 14;
Scholem, Origins, 212. See also Scholem, ‘Concept of Kavvanah’, 177 n. 31,
where he cites the Oxford manuscript in which the positions held by R.
Jacob b. Shalom and Rabad are reversed. See also Idel, ‘Kabbalistic Prayer’.
26 Scholem, ‘Chapters from the History’.
27 Scholem, ‘Kabbalah’, 567.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 568.
30 Zera yitsḥak, 10b–11a.
31 Dan, ‘Unique Cherub’, 72, 110 (which quotes a manuscript description
of the Unique Cherub as having ‘an image and form, and a human form,
and eyes, and hands . . . and phylacteries are on his head’).
32 Kitvei, ii. 239. For a medieval text that refers to the Cherub as the
‘lesser YHWH’, see Scholem, Origins, 216.
33 ‘Unique Cherub’, 238. Regarding R. Elhanan b. Yakar’s view that one
should pray to the Kavod, which emanated from the Shekhinah, see ibid.
168 ff. See also Abrams, ‘Evolution’.
 THREE

The Incorporeality of God

The Third Principle

HE THIRD PRINCIPLE teaches God’s incorporeality—that God is
T without image and form. According to Maimonides, this
Principle includes the assertion that God cannot be described as
being in movement or at rest, for this would mean that he has
form and physical dimensions.1 Although, as we shall see, the
Bible and Talmud speak of a corporeal God, Maimonides’
philosophical outlook forced him to insist on divine
incorporeality. This is so because a corporeal God is a
contradiction in terms, as it is impossible for a corporeal God to
have the defining characteristics set down in the First and Second
Principles.2 As noted above, Maimonides also states that God,
omnipotent though he is, is unable to assume corporeal form. In
fact, Maimonides goes even further and states that one who
believes in God’s corporeality is worse than some types of
idolater.3 R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn Shem Tov (fifteenth
century), one of Maimonides’ standard commentators, explains
this strong statement as follows: the idolater Maimonides refers to
at least believes in an incorporeal god (the idol being merely an
intermediary or something that has the power to do good or evil).
However, a ‘corporealist’4 denies God’s existence entirely, for a
corporeal being is, by definition, not the Deity. Arthur Hyman
has pointed out that, in insisting, as did the Almohad rulers,5 that
the masses be taught God’s incorporeality, Maimonides is
imparting metaphysical truths which have no political expediency.6
According to Hyman, this stands as a refutation of Lawrence
Berman’s thesis that Maimonides’ purpose in imparting these
metaphysical truths was political in nature without any intrinsic
value for the masses.7
Whether Maimonides’ purpose in teaching the masses the
doctrine of an incorporeal God was to instil part of the knowledge
required in order for them to attain immortality (as argued by
Hyman),8 was designed to make possible perfect halakhic
observance,9 or was meant to ensure the Jews’ dhimmi status,10
makes no difference when one is actually confronted with a
corporealist. According to all understandings of Maimonides, such
a person cannot attain immortality. This is an important point to
which I will later return. For now, I simply note in support of
Berman’s thesis the fact that the dhimmi status of the Jews in
Islamic lands would indeed have been endangered had they held to
a corporeal conception of God. In other words, contrary to
Hyman’s assertion, the principle of God’s incorporeality certainly
did have political expediency.
In addition, I find Hyman’s larger argument problematic.
According to Hyman, not simply this Principle but all of the
Principles dealing with God are intended to impart to the masses
knowledge of divine things, thus ensuring them some measure of
immortality. Yet would Maimonides ever agree that the masses
could attain immortality simply through affirmations lacking any
cognitive content, that is, without any actualization of the
intellect?11 At the most, we can say that the Principles are directed
towards those non-intellectuals who have the potential of
actualizing the intellect. After all, there are gradations of
intellectual attainment. Even one who is not a scholar can achieve
some understanding of these Principles, even though his initial, and
to a large extent even continuing, acceptance of them was due to
tradition. This is what Maimonides means when, after reviewing
his efforts at popularizing religious truth, he writes, ‘They [i.e. the
philosophically illiterate] will no longer cast the knowledge of God
behind their backs, but will exert themselves to the limit of their
power to attain what will perfect them and bring them nearer to
their Creator.’12 Maimonides also has this population in mind
when he writes:

Accordingly if we never in any way acquired an opinion through following

traditional authority and were not correctly conducted toward something by
means of parables, but were obliged to achieve a perfect representation by
means of essential definitions and by pronouncing true only that which is
meant to be pronounced true in virtue of a demonstration—which would be
impossible except after the above mentioned lengthy preliminary studies—
this state of affairs would lead to all people dying without having known
whether there is a deity for the world, or whether there is not, much less
whether a proposition should be affirmed with regard to Him or a defect
denied. Nobody would ever be saved from this perdition except one of a city
or two of a family (Jer. 3: 14).13

We thus see that, for Maimonides, immortality is not

exclusively for philosophers. Yet, all of Maimonides’ efforts
notwithstanding, it also seems clear that the mass of simple people
who, especially in medieval times, constituted the overwhelming
majority of Jews, have no hope of attaining the Maimonidean
world to come. The ‘limits of their power’ are simply not sufficient
to attain any real apprehension of the divine things that are the key
to immortality.
Returning to the Principle, it must be stressed that, contrary to
popular belief, the notion that God is incorporeal was not always a
unanimously accepted Jewish (or Christian14 or Muslim15) view.
Before examining the particulars of this corporealism, it should be
obvious to all that Maimonides’ insistence on God’s incorporeality
contradicts a simple reading of the Bible. Here God is frequently
described as a physical being, with a back, head, and hand. Indeed,
nowhere in the Bible does it state that God is incorporeal (or
invisible, for that matter). Even Deutero-Isaiah, whose prophecies
speak of a transcendent and all-powerful God, only states: ‘To
whom then will ye liken God? O what likeness will ye compare
unto Him?’ (Isa. 40: 18). This is not a denial that God has a form,
only that this form is unlike anything else. Similarly, when
Deuteronomy 4: 15 states: ‘Ye saw no manner of form on the day
that the Lord spoke to you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire’,
this is not a denial of divine corporeality, only a statement that
God’s form was not seen.
While not denying God’s corporeality, the Bible does, however,
state that seeing the Lord is hazardous to one’s health; as God says
to Moses, ‘Thou canst not see My face for man shall not see Me
and live’ (Exod. 33: 19). Even before God said this, Moses was
aware that seeing God was not easily accomplished. As Exodus 3:
6 states: ‘And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon
God.’ The danger present in gazing upon God is also expressed by
Isaiah, who, after seeing God sitting on his throne, proclaimed:
‘Woe is me! For I am undone . . . for mine eyes have seen the
King, the Lord of hosts’ (Isa. 6: 5). Isaiah nevertheless survived
this experience, as did Moses, whom the Pentateuch describes as
having beheld ‘the likeness of the Lord’ (Num. 12: 8). The
prophet Micaiah was also able to proclaim, ‘I saw the Lord sitting
on His throne’ (1 Kgs. 22: 19).16
From the perspective of Maimonides and his followers, all of
these verses obviously have to be understood figuratively. In the
words of R. Menahem Me’iri (1249–1316), ‘The principles of
faith are not tied to the literal meaning of Scripture and agadot.’17
As for the fairness of condemning as heretics those simpletons
who do not know any better and take these biblical descriptions of
God literally, Maimonides writes:

If, however, you should say that the external sense of the biblical text causes
men to fall into this doubt [regarding God’s incorporeality], you ought to
know that an idolater is similarly impelled to his idolatry by imaginings and
defective representations. Accordingly there is no excuse for one who does
not accept the authority of men who inquire into the truth and are engaged
in speculation if he himself is incapable of engaging in such speculation. I do
not consider as an infidel one who cannot demonstrate that the corporeality
of God should be negated. But I do consider as an infidel one who does not
believe in its negation; and this particularly in view of the existence of the
interpretations of Onkelos and of Jonathan ben Uziel, may peace be on both
of them, who cause their readers to keep away as far as possible from the
corporeality of God.18
 Maimonides is correct in asserting that the Targumim often shy
away from anthropomorphism,19 but this is hardly the case with
talmudic and midrashic literature. In this literature there are
numerous descriptions of God as a corporeal being, one of the
most famous being BT Berakhot 6a, which describes God as
wearing tefilin. As with the biblical descriptions of God’s
corporeality, Maimonides understood all of the rabbinic passages
in a figurative way. As he put it, ‘the doctrine of the corporeality
of God did not ever occur even for a single day to the Sages, may
their memory be blessed, and this was not according to them a
matter lending itself to imagination or to confusion’.20 But is this
the only way to read these texts? It would seem not, for there is
little doubt that a popular view in rabbinic times was that God
indeed had a form. Because medieval theology has been so
influential, this statement will no doubt surprise many. Yet, as
Alon Goshen-Gottstein has pointed out, ‘in all of rabbinic
literature there is not a single statement that categorically denies
that God has body or form’. Furthermore, ‘there is absolutely no
objection in all of rabbinic literature’ to the idea that man was
created in the image of God’s physical form.21 Although this last
statement would seem to be an exaggeration,22 it is not far off the
mark, as can be seen from Yair Lorberbaum’s recent exhaustive
study of the subject.23
Furthermore, as Goshen-Gottstein has stressed, there are some
examples in rabbinic literature that are very difficult to understand
metaphorically.24 Indeed, they seem to show clearly that at least
some of the rabbinic sages believed in divine corporeality. In
Vayikra rabah 34: 3, we are told of Hillel, who was on the way to
the bathhouse:

His disciples asked him: ‘Rabbi, where are you going?’ He said to
them: ‘To perform a commandment.’ They said to him: ‘And
what then is this commandment?’ He said to them: ‘To bathe in
the [public] bath.’ They said to him: ‘And is this a
commandment?’ He said to them: ‘Yes. If the man who is
appointed to take care of the images of kings, which [the gentiles]
set up in their theaters and circuses, scours them and rinses them,
and they provide his livelihood, and not only that, but he occupies
an important place among government officials, how much more
I, who was created in the image [tselem] and in the likeness
[demut] [of God].’
Goshen-Gottstein also calls attention to Avot derabi natan 2: 4,
where, in a list of people born circumcised, Adam is listed first;
the prooftext is that he was created in the image of God. ‘This
prooftext would only work if the correspondence between man’s
body and the divine body is understood to be exact.’25 Another
good example is found in Rosh hashanah 24b and Avodah zarah
43b. In explaining why it is forbidden to make a portrait of a man,
the prooftext cited is Exodus 20: 20: ‘You shall not make with
Me’, which is read as ‘You shall not make Me’. That is, since man
is made in God’s image you cannot reproduce the human face,
because by doing so you will be doing the same with God’s face.
In other words, the human face is a literal copy of God’s face.
Meir Bar-Ilan has also studied the relevant rabbinic literature
and come to an identical conclusion, namely, ‘that in the first
centuries Jews in the Land of Israel and in Babylon believed in an
anthropomorphic God’.26 In fact, two generations ago Arthur
Marmorstein concluded that there was ‘a school in Judaism, and
an important one too, that believed in a God who accompanies
man in human form and shape’.27 Marmorstein also points to the
school of R. Ishmael, which according to him did not understand
God in this manner. However, neither Goshen-Gottstein nor Bar-
Ilan sees any evidence to justify the conclusion that R. Ishmael’s
school did not share an anthropomorphic conception of God. Bar-
Ilan cites a text which actually shows R. Ishmael referring to an
anthropomorphic God.

This is how you are to make it (Gen. 6: 15)—it teaches that God pointed out
to Noah with His finger, and told him ‘like this you shall make’. It has been
taught: Rabbi Ishmael said: five fingers in the right hand of God—all are a
great secret; the little finger—with it God showed Noah what to do. . . . The
second finger, next to the little, with it God smote the Egyptians. . . . The
third finger, the middle one, with it God wrote the tablets. . . . The fourth
finger, the index, with it God showed to Moses what Israel should give to
save their souls. . . . And the whole hand, with it the Lord will ruin the
children of Esau that are His foes, and destroy the children of Ishmael that
are His enemies, as it is written, Your hand shall be lifted up over your
adversaries (Mic. 5: 9), and it is written, In that day the Lord will extend his
hand yet a second time (Isa. 11: 11).28

A revealing passage, which is not cited by Goshen-Gottstein or

Bar-Ilan, appears in Midrash tanḥuma29 and Pesikta derav kahana:30

Isaiah said: Seek ye the Lord while He may be found (Isa. 55:6), David said:
Seek ye the Lord and His strength (Ps. 105: 4). [What did he have in mind in
going on to say in the same verse] Seek His face continually (ibid.)? To teach
you that the Holy One, may His name be blessed, is at times seen and at
times not seen. . . . Thus he showed Himself to Moses, as is said, And the
Lord spoke unto Moses [face to face] (Exod. 33: 11). But then He turned away
and hid from him, so that Moses had to say, Show me, I pray Thee, thy glory
(Exod. 33: 18). He likewise showed Himself to Israel at Sinai, as is said:
They saw the God of Israel (Exod. 24: 10) and The appearance of the glory of the
Lord was like devouring fire (Exod. 24: 17). But then He turned away and hid
from them, as is said: Take ye therefore good heed unto your-selves—for ye saw no
manner of form (Deut. 4: 15)31 and Ye heard the voice of words, but ye saw no
form (Deut. 4: 12).

According to this passage, the anti-anthropomorphic verses in

Deuteronomy, which state that God’s form was not seen, only
refer to a time when God chose to turn away. At other times, as the
text clearly states, God was indeed visible.32
Because Adam was created in the image of God, and thus looks
like him, Bereshit rabah 8: 10 reports that even the angels were
confused.

Rabbi Hoshaya said: When the Holy One, blessed be He, created Adam, the
ministering angels mistook him [for God] and wished to exclaim ‘Holy’
before him. What does this resemble? A king and a governor who sat in a
chariot and his subjects wished to say to the king, Domine! [Sovereign] but
they did not know which it was. What did the king do? He pushed the
governor out of the chariot, and so they knew who was the king. Similarly,
when the Lord created Adam, the angels mistook him [for God]. What did
the Holy One, blessed be He, do? He caused sleep to fall upon him, and so
all knew that he was [but mortal] man.
 Another revealing text is found in Pirkei derabi eli’ezer:33

Rabbi Shimon said: When Isaac was bound to the altar he lifted his eyes and
saw the Shekhinah [Divine Presence]. But it is written, Man may not see Me
and live (Exod. 33: 19). In lieu of death his eyes dimmed when he got older,
as it says, When Isaac was old and his eyes were too dim to see (Gen. 27: 1).
From here you learn that blindness is considered as death.

It is hard to understand this passage as meaning anything other

than that Isaac actually gazed upon God’s Presence.
Matters are necessarily more complicated than I am able to
summarize here, and it is possible to argue, following Goshen-
Gottstein, that at least some rabbinic passages reflect the notion
that God’s body is a divine body of light rather than a corporeal
body.34 Still, it seems impossible to deny that a widespread
rabbinic view was that God does, in fact, have a physical body,
even if it is more perfect than the human body that is modelled on
it.35
Josephus is also part of the anthropomorphic tradition, as he
clearly implies that God has a form, although it is beyond our
powers of comprehension.

By His works and bounties He is plainly seen, indeed more manifest than all
else, but His form and magnitude surpass our powers of description. No
materials, however costly, are fit to make an image of Him; no art has skill
to conceive and represent it. The like of Him we have never seen, we do not
imagine, and it is impious to conjecture.36

What can we say about the views of the masses during rabbinic
times? Philo, who thanks to Greek philosophical influence was a
strong anti-anthropomorphist, claims that the biblical
anthropomorphisms are for the benefit of those who ‘are very dull
in their natures, so as to be utterly unable to form any conception
whatever of God apart from a body’.37 He goes on to say, in
opposition to what Maimonides would later argue, that ‘we must
be content if such men can be brought to a proper state, by the
fear which is held over them by such descriptions’.38 It would
appear from this that anthropomorphism among the masses was
not uncommon in Philo’s day. Evidence for this from a later
period can be found in the anthropomorphic representations of
God’s hand extending from heaven which appear in the excavated
synagogues of Dura Europos (third century) and Beit Alfa (sixth
century).39 It is also significant that Justin Martyr (second century)
describes the Jews as believing that God ‘has hands and feet, and
fingers, and a soul like a composite creature’.40
Yet despite all the evidence that many Jews in rabbinic times
believed in some form of divine corporeality, I believe that there
were also significant segments of the Jewish world which
worshipped an incorporeal God. The evidence for this comes from
descriptions of Jewish life and worship by Greek and Latin
authors. For example, a very early writer, Hecateus of Abdera
(fourth century BCE), reports that Moses was of the opinion that
God has no human form. While this perhaps leaves open the
possibility that God has some other form, Strabo (first century
BCE–first century CE) writes that Moses taught ‘that the Egyptians

were mistaken in representing the Divine Being by the images of

beasts and cattle . . . for, according to him, God is the one thing
alone that encompasses us all and encompasses land and sea’. Livy
(58 BCE–17 CE) states flatly that the Jews ‘do not think that God
partakes of any figure’. Tacitus (c.55–c.117 CE) also reports that
according to the Jews God ‘is incapable of representation and
without end’. It seems most unlikely that a few philosophically
oriented Jews of Philo’s ilk could have decisively influenced these
writers’ judgement. These authors, who would have been more
than happy to report that the Jews, or at least great numbers of
them, were corporealists, offer a very different perspective.41
Earlier I noted that Maimonides believed that all
anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Torah must be
understood figuratively. However, he also pointed out that
anthropomorphic conceptions of God were indeed held in biblical
times, even by some important figures. I shall later discuss his
shocking explanation as to why the Torah uses anthropomorphic
expressions. Here I simply wish to call attention to Maimonides’
understanding of Exodus 24: 9–11: ‘Then went up Moses, and
Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel; and
they saw the God of Israel; and there was under His feet the like
of a paved work of sapphire stone, and the like of the very heaven
for clearness. And upon the nobles of the children of Israel He laid
not His hand; and they beheld God, and did eat and drink.’
According to Maimonides, it was only Nadab, Abihu, and the
seventy elders who are described by this text as seeing God. Had
the text only mentioned this, it would not have been exceptional,
as Moses was also described as seeing God and Maimonides
interprets this figuratively. However, this text also speaks of them
observing something under God’s feet. According to Maimonides,
this shows that their apprehension of God was marred, ‘inasmuch
as corporeality entered it to some extent—this being necessitated
by their overhasty rushing forward before they had reached
perfection’. For this, they deserved to perish.42
According to Albo, Isaiah also almost fell victim to this error.43
I have already quoted Isaiah 6: 5, where we read that Isaiah saw
God and feared that it would be his undoing. Instead of trying to
explain Isaiah’s vision—‘I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high
and lifted up’—in a philosophical manner, Albo claims that Isaiah,
through his power of imagination, really did envision a corporeal
God. This was because his prophetic ability was not as exalted as
that of Moses. Albo adds, however, that Isaiah realized his error
and exclaimed ‘Woe is me! for I am affected by imagination.’44
Albo explains, ‘The meaning is, I am affected by the power of
imagination and my prophetic inspiration is not through a
luminous glass like that of Moses, who heard a voice speaking to
him without seeing any image before his eyes.’45 According to the
Talmud,46 this utterance of Isaiah, which contradicted Moses’
statement: ‘For men shall not see Me and live’ (Exod. 33: 20), was
one of the reasons Manasseh slew him.
While on the subject of Isaiah’s vision, it should be noted that a
desire to view God47 need not imply that God has an actual
physical form. Elliot R. Wolfson, in his justly praised book,
Through a Speculum that Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval
Jewish Mysticism,48 has provided us with numerous examples of
mystics imagining God in anthropomorphic ways, though this
hardly means that they regarded God as having a corporeal form.
It is obvious that they were simply imagining him this way.
Although this would certainly not be to Maimonides’ liking, since
these mystics believed in an incorporeal God there was no
violation of the Third Principle.
Despite Maimonides’ forceful attacks against the belief in divine
corporeality, he did not immediately succeed in uprooting it.
Furthermore, there were a number of scholars in medieval times
who were corporealists, which should not surprise us since they
were simply following the rabbinic tradition already described.
This led R. Abraham ben David (Rabad) to his famous defence of
the corporealists: ‘Why has he [i.e. Maimonides] called such a
person a heretic? There are many people greater and superior to
him who adhere to such a belief on the basis of what they have
seen in verses of Scripture and even more in the words of those
agadot which corrupt right opinion about religious matters.’49
Although, unfortunately, we do not have much in the way of
written records from these corporealists, there are a number of
texts that enlighten us. The most significant is the Ketav tamim of
R. Moses ben Hasdai Taku, a Tosafist.50
Although there is some dispute as to how ‘extreme’ an
anthropomorphist Taku was,51 there is no question that he
rejected Maimonides’ Third Principle and viewed God as having
an image and form, or at least able to assume these at will. Thus,
according to him, when the Bible states that various prophets saw
God, it means that they literally beheld the Creator.52 The
philosophical objections raised against such a position were of no
significance when contradicted by explicit biblical and rabbinic
texts, which attest to both God’s omnipotence and his
corporeality. Directing his ire at Maimonides, Taku writes: ‘Is it at
all proper for a believer in the Torah to say that the Torah speaks
in the language of man?’53
 Taku’s literalism is so extreme that he views as blasphemous the
rationalists’ denial that God literally sits on his throne. After all,
BT Rosh hashanah 31a clearly states (in Taku’s version): ‘On the
sixth day they said, The Lord reigneth, He is clothed in majesty (Ps.
93: 2). He completed His work and ascended and sat on His royal
throne in Heaven.’54 Responding to the view popularized by
Sa’adiah Gaon55 and the Hasidei Ashkenaz,56 and quite popular
today, that God’s presence is to be found everywhere, Taku
writes: ‘Heaven forbid that the Holy One of all holiness should be
found in a place of filth and in the midst of idols. The Torah
writes, Therefore shall thy camp be holy, that He see no unseemly thing
in thee, and turn away from thee (Deut. 23: 15). Thus, the Torah
testifies that God is not found in unfitting places.’57 In Taku’s
mind, God can at times be found in a definite place, and indeed,
‘He does not need to be everywhere to know what He has
brought about, for this is His greatness, that He is above all, and
knows all, and is [nevertheless] close to all.’58
How then does this square with Jeremiah 23: 24: ‘Do not I fill
heaven and earth? saith the Lord’? According to Taku, the
greatness of God is seen in the fact that, while filling the world
(excluding the filthy areas) with his majesty, he can still occupy
one place!59
In support of his anthropomorphic conception, Taku cites an
interesting talmudic passage in Sanhedrin 46b. In explaining the
Torah’s prescription that one who is executed should not hang
overnight (Deut. 21: 22–3), R. Meir offered a parable:

To what is this matter comparable? To two twin brothers [who lived] in one
city; one was appointed king, and the other took to highway robbery. At the
king’s command they hanged him. But all who saw him exclaimed, ‘The
king is hanged!’, whereupon the king issued a command and he was taken
down.60

In other words, man’s physical appearance resembles that of God.

What, then, is one to do with the verse in Isaiah 40: 18: ‘To
whom then will ye liken God? Or what likeness will ye compare
unto Him?’ Taku explains that it is stated with reference to God’s
greatness and the splendour of his glory, that nothing compares to
them. The verse does not, however, mean that God has no
image.61
Another significant anthropomorphic text is that of the Sefer
hamaskil, written at the end of the thirteenth century by R.
Solomon Simhah of Troyes (c.1235–1300), a descendant of Rashi
(1040–1105) and student of R. Meir of Rothenburg (c.1215–93)
and R. Peretz of Corbeil (thirteenth century).62 According to R.
Solomon, and this is a major theme of Sefer hamaskil, God is
identical with the air that is found everywhere. In line with this
conception, R. Solomon adds ‘blessed be He and blessed be His
name’ whenever he mentions the air (or better, Air). R. Solomon
also claims that in the upper world the Air is of infinite brightness,
and that the sun is a window allowing us to glimpse a portion of
God’s substance.63 When God is described in human form, as in
prophetic visions, this is not to be interpreted in an allegorical
fashion. Rather, God, or more precisely an element of God
referred to as his ruaḥ nifrad, actually assumed such a form.
Since R. Solomon’s lineage is traced to Rashi, it is not without
interest that both Meir Bar-Ilan and Israel M. Ta-Shma have
recently claimed that even Rashi was a corporealist.64 As proof of
this, Bar-Ilan points to Rashi’s comment that the measurement of
the heavenly Torah, which is said to be 3,200 times bigger than
the universe, is arrived at by calculating in accordance with the
‘cubit of the Holy One, blessed be He’.65 Not noted by Bar-Ilan is
that, elsewhere in his talmudic commentary, Rashi refers to both
God’s face and his arm.66 In his commentary on Exodus 7: 5
(‘That I may lay my hand upon Egypt’), in order to prevent one
from thinking that in this verse ‘hand’ means simply ‘power’,
Rashi writes ‘An actual hand [yad mamash], to smite them’.67 In
his commentary on Genesis 1: 26 Rashi states that, when the
Bible records that man was to be created in God’s ‘image’ (tselem),
it means in God’s ‘form’ (defus). This is distinguished from the
other biblical expression, which states that man was to be created
in God’s ‘likeness’ (demut). According to Rashi, this latter
expression means that man was created ‘to understand and to be
intellectually creative’. In other words, both man’s physical form
and his intellectual ability are modelled on those of God. As if to
make sure that no one misunderstands what he is saying, in his
comment on the next verse Rashi writes: ‘This teaches you that
the form that was established for him [i.e. man] is the form of the
image of his Creator [tselem deyukan yotsro]’.68
Martin Lockshin has argued that R. Samuel ben Meir
(Rashbam, c.1085–c.1174), Rashi’s grandson, was also a
corporealist.69 His major proof is Rashbam’s comment on Genesis
48: 8:

Israel saw. Even though below [verse 10] it is written that he could not see, it
is possible to see a person’s shape without recognizing the features of his
face. So also Man may not see Me and live (Exod. 33: 20) and I saw the Lord
(1 Kgs. 22: 19).

According to Lockshin, what Rashbam is saying is that while one

cannot see God clearly, one can see him ‘in the same way that a
partially blind man can see non-detailed images’. Lockshin also
cites Rashbam’s comment on Leviticus 16: 2 (‘For I appear in the
cloud upon the ark-cover’). Rashbam writes: ‘This is to be
understood according to its literal meaning, for at all times I am
beheld from the midst of the cloud upon the ark-cover.’70
Another example of anthropomorphism among medieval
European Jews is found in a text published by Ephraim E.
Urbach. According to this text, certain names of God are written
on God’s forehead which, in Shiur komah fashion, is described as
being of gigantic size. The text then continues: ‘God resembles an
old man, a handsome man, a Jew, and a sage.’71 Apparently, the
author of this text shared R. Moses Taku’s conception of the deity.
Another anonymous text,72 which is quite ancient and to this day
is recited at the beginning of the Avodah section in the Sephardi
and hasidic Yom Kippur liturgy, is a piyut which reads: ‘You
fashioned a clod of earth in your form.’73 An anthropomorphic
conception of God would also appear to be behind the following
comment of R. Jacob Moelin: ‘Perhaps Moses’ eyes beheld [the
face of] his Master [God], blessed be He, and he turned to his
right, may his Master forgive him.’74 R. Joseph Ashkenazi, the
inveterate opponent of Maimonides, has this to say:

[Maimonides] wrote in Sefer mada that anyone who says that God has a
form is a heretic. According to this it is certainly the case that the Torah and
the believer of its words are also to be regarded as heretics, because it states
there [with reference to Moses] the likeness of the Lord doth he behold (Num.
12: 8). . . . They say that God is Intellect and does not change, and with this
they deny God’s seeing and hearing things and His speaking . . . for all these
require corporeality [gashmut] and even more so His descent on Sinai and
ascent to the Heavens.75

The great historian of Jewish philosophy Harry A. Wolfson

claimed that very few Jews had a corporeal conception of God in
the days of Maimonides.76 This opinion was supported by J. L.
Teicher, who also asserted categorically that no medieval scholar
held such views.77 However, even if we ignore evidence provided
by Christians,78 Muslims,79 and Karaites,80 there are still many
sources which indicate that corporealist views of various sorts
were widespread among both ordinary people and scholars,
especially among Ashkenazi Jews.81 Sa’adiah Gaon speaks of
people who imagined God as a body, and others who, while not
attributing a crude corporeality to God, applied to him
characteristics, such as quantity, quality, and location, that only
apply to physical beings.82 R. Abraham ibn Daud (twelfth
century) reports that masses of Jews believed God to be a material
being.83 Maimonides, who argues so forcefully against the
corporealists, himself speaks of numerous people, including ‘the
majority’ of the ignorant, who held anthropomorphic views.84 In a
revealing passage in his Essay on Resurrection, he also writes:

I have met some who think they are among the sages of Israel—by God,
they indeed know the way of the Law ever since childhood, and they battle
in legal discussions—but they are not certain if God is corporeal, with eyes,
hands, and feet, as the Bible says, or if He has not a body. Others, whom I
have met in some lands, assert positively that He is corporeal and call
anyone who thinks differently a non-believer, name him a heretic and
Epicurean. They explain the homilies of [BT] Berakhot literally. I have
received similar reports of some whom I have not met.85

In Guide i. 1 Maimonides states:

They accordingly believed in it [divine corporeality] and deemed that if they

abandoned this belief, they would give the lie to the biblical text; that they
would even make the deity to be nothing at all unless they thought that God
was a body provided with a face and a hand, like them in shape and
configuration. However, He is, in their view, bigger and more resplendent
than they themselves, and the matter of which He is composed is not flesh
and blood.

R. Yedaiah Bedershi (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries) writes

that it is well known that ‘in previous generations’ (i.e. before
Maimonides was able to reverse matters) the belief in God’s
corporeality was spread throughout virtually all Israel.86 Other
scholars who testify to corporeal views being held by Jews include
R. Isaiah of Trani (the Elder; died c.1260),87 R. Moses of Salerno
(thirteenth century),88 R. David Abudarham (thirteenth–
fourteenth centuries),89 the anonymous author of Ma’amar
hasekhel,90 R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn Shem Tov,91 and R. Isaac
ben Yedaiah (thirteenth century), who refers to ‘faithless
“Sadducees” who say that God is [composed of] a matter which is
finer, purer, and more transparent than the matter of any shining
star’.92 Following in Rabad’s path, R. Meir ben Simeon of
Narbonne (thirteenth century) is more sympathetic. After noting
that the ‘majority’ of the masses believe in a corporeal God, he
asserts that ‘verses of the Torah and prophets cannot mislead one
and thereby turn him into a heretic’. He therefore assumes that
one who is led to his error by misinterpreting the Scriptures
remains a Jew in good standing.93
R. Abraham ibn Ezra (1092–1167),94 R. David Kimhi (1160–
1235),95 R. Abraham Maimonides (1186–1237),96 R. Meshullam
ben Solomon da Piera (thirteenth century),97 R. Samuel Sapurto
(thirteenth century),98 an anonymous thirteenth century anti-
Maimonidean poem,99 R. Shem Tov Falaquera,100 R. Isaac ibn
Latif,101 and R. Moses Alashkar (1466–1542)102 all speak of
corporeal conceptions of God being held by scholars. As we see
from R. Abraham Maimonides’ letter, some of the scholars did
not believe that God has a hand or a face, and in their mind this
sufficed to remove from them the charge of corporealism. Yet as
R. Abraham points out, they remained corporealists without
realizing it, for they believed that God is literally to be found in a
particular place, which by definition means that he has physical
dimensions.
With regard to scholars and corporealism, a particularly
revealing passage is found in Nahmanides’ famous letter to the
French sages. Nahmanides wrote this letter in an attempt to make
peace between the two sides in the Maimonidean controversy. The
French rabbis had recently proclaimed a ban on study of
Maimonides’ Guide and Sefer hamada, the first volume of the
Mishneh torah. This in turn led to indignation among Maimonides’
followers and eventually to the excommunication of R. Solomon
ben Abraham of Montpellier (thirteenth century) and his pupils,
the main antagonists of Maimonidean philosophy. In his attempt
to make peace between the two parties, Nahmanides wrote to the
French rabbis: ‘I have heard others say that you have seized upon
the Sefer hamada for it states that there is no [physical] form or
image on high.’103 Assuming this testimony was correct, and it is
certainly in line with the evidence mentioned in the previous
paragraph, for at least some of the French rabbis it was not only
Maimonides’ advocacy of philosophy which was so objectionable
but also his opposition to corporealism. From Nahmanides’ letter
we also see that he shared Rabad’s view of the matter, namely,
that while corporealism was incorrect, it was not enough to
condemn one as a heretic.104
Significantly, R. Abraham Klausner, an important fourteenth–
fifteenth century Austrian talmudist, was still able to wonder, two
hundred years after Maimonides, whether Taku’s opinion was the
correct one.105 Even more surprising, in the fifteenth century we
find that while R. Elijah Delmedigo (died 1497) acknowledged
that denial of God’s incorporeality is heretical, he nevertheless
argued that if someone believed in a corporeal deity, ‘his belief in
the essence of God and in God’s eternal attributes would not be
damaged’.106
Although it was difficult for post-medieval scholars to
sympathize with the anthropomorphist position, this was not the
case for the Italian scholar R. Samuel David Luzzatto, who writes:
‘I reject Maimonides on the issue of corporeality . . . I have long
believed that the earlier generations ascribed to all spirits (souls,
angels, God Himself) a very refined matter.’107 Elsewhere he
writes: ‘The early ones ascribed to God and the angels and the
souls a very fine spiritual essence, more subtle than any body
known to us but nevertheless characterized by form and build.’108
Not surprisingly, Luzzatto also attacks Maimonides by pointing
out that his dogma condemns as heretics generations of pious
Jews who did nothing wrong but simply believed what they had
been taught.109
Yet Luzzatto did not advocate a base corporeality, i.e. a God
who resembles humans, but a perfected corporeality. He was also
certain that one cannot see God, and that passages that imply
otherwise are to be regarded as figurative.110 As part of the sages’
effort to prevent people from falling into the mistaken notion that
God can indeed be seen, he points to Exodus 34: 23 (‘Three times
in the year shall all thy males appear ( ) before the Lord God,
the God of Israel’). According to Luzzatto, this text was originally
understood as ‘Three times in the year shall all males see ( ) the
Lord God’, and the Masoretes, following a tradition going back to
Second Temple times, ‘corrected’ the text.111 Luzzatto also felt
that Maimonides’ extreme opposition to corporealism went far
beyond his predecessors and was a new position in Judaism. In
fact, he regarded the Maimonidean position as dangerous, for it
undermined traditional beliefs. Rather than corporealism being
heresy, as Maimonides claimed, Luzzatto argued that it is the
doctrine of incorporeality which, through its association with
philosophy, leads to heresy. He thus felt that it would be infinitely
better if Jews were to return to the traditional belief in a corporeal
God.112
While they did not go as far as Luzzatto, we find other
opponents of Maimonides’ harsh condemnation of the simple
believers in God’s corporeality. These sages follow in the footsteps
of Rabad, who did not regard belief in an incorporeal God as a
fundamental principle of faith, denial of which means exclusion
from the Jewish people. R. Simeon ben Tsemah Duran113 and R.
Joseph Albo114 both argue in this fashion, and, like most of their
successors, they emphasize the fact that the corporealist, although
he is in error, does not know any better. R. Joseph Yavets
(c.1435–1507) likewise claims that a simple believer, punctilious
in the performance of mitsvot, who can only conceive of God in a
corporeal fashion, is not to be regarded as a heretic. On the
contrary, God prefers him to all the philosophers, whose faith
leaves much to be desired.115 R. Hayim Hirschensohn is another
scholar who expresses complete agreement with Rabad’s
position.116
In a fascinating story recorded by R. Moses Hagiz (1671–
1751), a simple man in Safed, a former Portuguese Marrano,
brought bread to the synagogue every Friday in order for God to
eat. The synagogue beadle would actually take the bread but the
man was convinced it was God himself who was pleased with his
offering. It happened that the local rabbi once saw the man
bringing the bread, and upon learning what he was doing harshly
rebuked him, both for his foolishness and for the great sin he was
committing by holding an anthropomorphic conception of God.
However, when R. Isaac Luria heard of this, he informed the
rabbi that, since the destruction of the Temple, God’s greatest
pleasure was when this simple man brought his bread. Since the
rabbi had put a stop to this, it was decreed that he should die, and
so it happened.117
R. Moses Cordovero shared Luria’s tolerant approach.
According to him, the only people who should be regarded as
heretics are those who, knowing the teaching of the Torah,
nevertheless continue to advocate the corporealist position.
Cordovero sees this as parallel to his view that denial of the Sefirot
is only regarded as heresy if one knows that the doctrine is part
and parcel of the Torah and still refuses to accept it.118 Along these
lines, R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (1889–1943) argues that
one who has not yet reached a state of spiritual elevation in which
his conception of God is pure is permitted to visualize God in a
physical way. As he rises in spiritual sensitivity this physical image
will disappear on its own.119
In line with this attitude, R. Menahem M. Kasher (1895–1983)
writes, with reference to how children are instructed:

We teach them belief in God in a simple and clear fashion, in accordance

with their understanding, until they mature and are able to understand
matters in a more profound way. But there are many who grow up and still
retain their early education, and they never have the ability to reach a
profound understanding of belief in God, in accordance with the approach
of R. Sa’adiah Gaon and Maimonides. Can one possibly regard these people
as heretics?120

As support for this tolerant viewpoint, Kasher cites the rabbinic

saying: ‘It is written, They have forsaken Me, and have not kept My
law (Jer. 16: 11). That is, would that they had forsaken Me but
kept My law, since by occupying themselves therewith, the light
which it contains would have led them back to the right path.’121
In other words, those who, through no fault of their own,
harbour false beliefs about God are not condemned as heretics but
are encouraged to keep the Torah’s commandments in the hope
that they will eventually be led to the proper theological
understanding. Kasher also cites a very relevant passage from the
writings of R. Bahya ibn Pakuda (eleventh century), which,
surprisingly, was not cited by other defenders of the
anthropomorphists:

The foolish and simple person will conceive of the Creator in accordance
with the literal sense of the Scriptural phrase. And if he assumes the
obligation of serving his God and strives to labour for His sake, he is
excused by reason of his ignorance and lack of understanding. A man is
judged only on the basis of his intellectual ability, his powers of
discrimination, and his readiness to act. When this same simple man is able
to master this knowledge but is heedless of it, then he is liable to be judged
accordingly and punished for his inaction and his neglect of the pursuit of
knowledge.122

In the same vein, there is a wonderful tale told by R. Israel ben

Shabetai Hapstein (1733–1814), the Magid of Kozienice.
According to the Magid, after Maimonides proclaimed the
corporealists heretics, the souls of many pious Jews who held this
view were chased out of Heaven. Only after Rabad defended them
were they allowed to return. The Magid continues by pointing out
that it was only Maimonides’ ignorance of kabbalah that led him
to his view. He thus did not know that ‘God is clothed in the
worlds and the worlds are the measure of the image of His body,
as it says “Let us make man in our image”.’123 Although the
Magid’s quasi-pantheistic conception does not correspond to the
primitive corporeal outlook referred to by Rabad, a point he was
presumably aware of, his identification with the simple believers of
medieval times is quite significant.124
Even after the philosophical triumph of God’s incorporeality,
later thinkers still occasionally express themselves in ways that
seemingly contradict this. Perhaps some of them were even
anthropomorphists without realizing it, to use R. Abraham
Maimonides’ words in describing the French rabbis who opposed
Maimonides.125 For example, R. Israel Lipschuetz (1782–1860)
writes that Moses, unlike the other prophets, saw, as it were,
God’s reflection.126 Obviously, there must be a substance to cause
a reflection, unless Lipschuetz means that he saw the reflection in
a vision. R. Moses Gentili (Hefetz, 1663–1711) offers a similar
comment in his discussion of Numbers 14: 9: ‘Their defence
[literally ‘shadow’] is removed from over them, and the Lord is
with us; fear them not.’ Gentili explains that it is the nature of a
shadow to shrink until it entirely disappears if the body casting the
light is greater than the darkened body. He continues: ‘And God,
who is the body [guf] that shines, is with us, therefore do not fear
them, for our [light] is greater than their [darkness].’127
The eighteenth-century Tsava’at harivash, which purports to
record the testament of R. Israel Ba’al Shem Tov (c.1700–60),
states that one should ‘always be happy, and think and believe
with perfect faith that the Shekhinah is at his side and watches
over him and one should look upon the Creator, blessed be He,
and the Creator will look upon him.’128 The anthropomorphic
element of this passage was actually cited by the (in)famous
mitnaged, R. Avigdor ben Joseph Hayim of Pinsk (eighteenth–
nineteenth centuries) in his memorandum to the Russian
government against the hasidim. Commenting on this passage, he
wrote: ‘With this we see how the wicked express insolence against
God and praise themselves falsely, saying that they see the Creator,
as if He has a form. With this they deny the Torah of Moses in
which all the nations of the world believe. As a result of this they
are against all the nations.’129 R. Avigdor did not mention that just
a few paragraphs earlier, Tsava’at harivash discusses seeing the
Creator with the mental eye (ein sikhlo), which certainly reflects a
non-corporeal understanding of God.
The Talmud, Ḥagigah 15a, states: ‘On high there is no sitting
[and no standing]130 no division and no cohesion.’ This text is
cited by Maimonides in the Third Principle as well as in other
places131 as support for his assertion that God, as an incorporeal
being, cannot be described as being in movement or at rest.
However, R. Samuel Edels (Maharsha, c.1555–1632), one of the
most outstanding talmudic commentators, understands this
passage to refer to the angels alone, and not to God. This is so for
God, unlike the angels, indeed sits, as Micaiah stated: ‘I saw the
Lord sitting on His throne’ (1 Kgs. 22: 19).132
R. Jacob Isaac Horowitz (died 1815), the Seer of Lublin,
writes that there are people who actually see God, and that one of
these was Abraham. Before his circumcision God only appeared to
his soul, but after the circumcision even his body could behold
God!133 The Seer would have been quick to point out that he was
referring to a spiritual, incorporeal vision, but from a
Maimonidean standpoint a vision apprehended by the physical
eyes is by definition not incorporeal.
Finally, what is one to make of the following story, told by R.
Adin Steinsaltz?
When I was a young man I met someone in Israel who was at the time a
very important political personality.134 We were talking, and he asked me,
‘Where does God put his legs?’ For a moment I didn’t understand. I thought
he was joking, but he was asking this question seriously. When I tried to tell
him that, as far as I knew, God has no legs, he told me that I did not know
what I was talking about as a religious person, because his father truly
believed that God has legs! I tried to remonstrate. I opened the Siddur and
showed him that not only do we not believe that, but we should not: it is
forbidden. He ended the conversation by telling me that he was very friendly
with the rosh yeshivah of Mir and that he would warn him that there was a
person in Jerusalem who should be destroyed!135

Although Maimonides is adamant that even children must be

instructed in God’s incorporeality,136 not everyone held to this
position. Thus, in the medieval Sefer ḥasidim we are told that the
teacher should instruct children that God lives in Heaven, and he
should even point to the sky to illustrate this.137 I have no doubt
that the author of this passage, who was part of an anti-
corporealist milieu, would agree that this description crossed the
line of strict theological propriety, but he would nevertheless
argue that in the education of children one need not be bound by
such concerns. In fact, as R. Reuven Margaliyot points out in his
notes to the text, the approach of Sefer ḥasidim is based on a story
told in the Talmud (Ber. 48a) about Rava and Abaye as children.
When asked where God lives, Rava pointed to the roof and Abaye
went outside and pointed to the sky. Upon seeing this, Rabbah
commented approvingly to the boys, ‘Both of you will become
rabbis.’
It is possible that this tolerance of childish anthropomorphism
has a parallel in tolerance of anthropomorphism that was never
intended to be taken seriously. This would explain the artistic
personifications of God that have not been entirely absent from
post-Maimonidean Jewish history.138 Indeed, as late as 1540,
1698, and 1742 we have title pages from rabbinic works with
images of God (see Figs. 1–3 on pp. 163–7). Now this certainly
does not mean that Jews at these late dates believed in a corporeal
God, and such examples are indeed very rare. In fact, it is probably
because there was general agreement that God is incorporeal that
some tolerance was given to Jewish artists in portraying God in a
physical form (or to the use of such portrayals from non-Jewish
artists, if that was the case). In any event, these examples of an
anthropomorphic God are certainly very un-Maimonidean.
In concluding our discussion of the Third Principle, one more
point must be noted. There is no question that, according to
Maimonides, a corporealist has no share in the world to come.
This is such an important Principle that even ‘children, women,
stupid ones, and those of a defective natural disposition’ must be
instructed in it.139 One who believes that God is corporeal by
definition denies God’s unity and is even worse than some types of
idolater. It is irrelevant whether or not this mistaken belief is
unintentional.140
Having said this, Maimonides must explain why the Torah used
corporeal expressions to refer to God. His answer is striking.141
Since the masses needed to be instructed in God’s existence but
could not conceive of the existence of an incorporeal God, it was
necessary for them to be led to this belief in a progressive fashion.
First they were taught of the existence of one corporeal God,
which was an improvement to believing in many corporeal gods
or having no belief. Only following this were they taught about
God’s incorporeality. (Maimonides does not tell us if this process
was be accomplished quickly or took a number of generations.142)
As Howard Kreisel has noted: ‘It follows from Maimonides’
remarks that the Torah deliberately misleads the people in the
matter of the corporeality of God. . . . The Torah has no choice
but to compromise with reality in order to educate the people
effectively.’143
Here we are not dealing with a population that understood the
Bible in a corporeal sense rather than turning to the wise men for
guidance. Rather, and this is what is so significant, it was the
Torah which originally intended the masses to accept God’s
corporeality. In other words, it is not merely that the Torah
‘misleads the people’, but rather that the Torah taught them a
heretical doctrine. Of course, it must be emphasized that for an
ancient Israelite to believe in God’s corporeality was actually an
improvement over his earlier state when he had no belief in God.
Only when the ancients advanced beyond this stage would they be
able to understand that the anthropomorphic expressions in the
Torah are to be understood figuratively. If one of the ancients died
without having rejected a corporeal conception of God, he would
suffer the consequences of his heresy, namely, denial of a share in
the world to come. Once again, it must be noted that the spiritual
consequences of heresy are not to be viewed as a punishment but
rather as a necessary outcome of the world’s metaphysical
structure. An incorporeal conception of God is a basic necessity
for intellectual perfection at all times and places.
That the Torah taught a heretical doctrine is certainly a radical
position for Maimonides to take. Yet this is not all he says.
Elsewhere he explains that both the Torah and the sages use
positive attributes with reference to God, since the masses are
unable to achieve a representation of him otherwise.144 Now,
although ‘the Torah speaks in the language of men’, the fact
remains that one who continues to regard God as having positive
attributes ‘has abolished his belief in the existence of the deity
without being aware of it’.145 The far-reaching nature of this
statement is grasped when one sees that, according to
Maimonides, not only is one not supposed to instruct the masses
regarding God’s attributes,146 but the Torah even regards it as
necessary for the masses to believe in positive attributes, such as the
notion that God displays anger.147 Thus, although the Torah
intends the masses to hold these beliefs in order to create a stable
society, the result is that they effectively deny the existence of
God. Although this certainly appears to be unfair to the masses, I
think Maimonides would argue that it is not the Torah that is
responsible for these people having no share in the world to come.
As far as he is concerned, anyone who believes in positive
attributes is, in any event, unable to achieve the intellectual
perfection required for immortality. Maimonides might also
wonder why the masses would even be interested in the
immortality he has in mind, which is, after all, completely
intellectual and reserved exclusively for the philosophically
enlightened.
Having said this, it is interesting that Maimonides does, in fact,
justify the punishment of the corporealist who does not know any
better, or who was led to his heretical belief from what he saw in
Scripture. I have already quoted at length Maimonides’ comments
in Guide i. 36, in which he states: ‘There is no excuse for one who
does not accept the authority of men who inquire into the truth
and are engaged in speculation if he himself is incapable of
engaging in such speculation.’ However, it would seem that
Maimonides’ justification is directed at those who do not grasp his
true beliefs. The philosophers are aware that the attainment of
immortality is not related to any questions of fairness and that
God does not need to be justified for withholding this ‘reward’.
For Maimonides, the attainment of immortality by means of
intellectual perfection is a natural process and not a reward. Thus,
there is no difference between the example given by Maimonides
and a person who grows up on a desert island and therefore has
no wise men to turn to for instruction about God. Since neither of
them has achieved the minimum measure of intellectual
perfection, their intellects cannot live on.

1 See also Guide i. 12, 26; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1:
11.
2 In ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 7 and Guide i. 35, Maimonides argues
that the perfection of God (First Principle) and the unity of God (Second
Principle) are only applicable to an incorporeal God.
3 Guide i. 36. See, similarly, Hakokhavi, Sefer habatim, ‘Migdal david:
sefer emunah’, 39, ‘Migdal david: sefer mitsvah’, 286.
4 I prefer this term to ‘anthropomorphist’ (which I also use when
appropriate), since as we shall see, there were those who believed that God
is a physical being, although he does not have a human form.
5 See Heinemann, ‘Maimuni’.
 6 ‘Maimonides’ “Thirteen Principles” ’, 137–8, 141.
7 Berman, ‘Ibn Bajah’, 137–8. See also Pines, History, 14.
8 Hyman, ‘Maimonides’ “Thirteen Principles” ’. See also Guttmann,
Philosophies, 201–3.
9 See Kellner, Dogma, 37 ff. Kellner also offers two other reasons, but
this appears to be his main point.
10 See Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 162. Silver does not exclude the
presence of other motivations.
11 See Nuriel, ‘Remarks’, 49–50; Hartman, Maimonides, 229 n. 31;
Mesch, ‘Principles’, 88.
12 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 321 (Arabic), 343 (Hebrew); Halkin and
Hartman, Crisis, 213.
13 Guide i. 34.
14 In the early Church there were many who took the biblical descriptions
of God literally. To combat this heresy, Bishop Theophilus of Alexandria
issued a pastoral letter in 399. After being confronted with his error, one old
monk found it impossible to pray and declared: ‘Woe is me! They have
taken my God away from me, and I have none to grasp, and I know not
whom to adore or to address.’ See Cassian, Conferences, 10: 3, in Chadwick
(ed.), Western Asceticism, 235. See also ibid. 234, where it is reported that
nearly all the monks in Egypt received the bishop’s letter ‘with bitterness and
hostility; and a large majority of elders from all the ascetic brotherhood
decreed that the bishop was guilty of a grave and hateful heresy, because (by
denying that Almighty God was formed in the fashion of a man when
Scripture bears clear witness that Adam was created in his image) he seemed
to be attacking the text of Holy Scripture’. It is known that rioting broke
out when Theophilus’ letter was received, and the monks even threatened to
kill him. See Clark, Origenist Controversy, ch. 2 (called to my attention by Dr
Edward Mathews). See also G. Stroumsa, ‘Form(s) of God’; Paulsen, ‘Early
Christian Belief’; Paulsen and Griffin, ‘Augustine and the Corporeality of
God’. Paulsen writes: ‘Ordinary Christians for at least the first three
centuries of the current era commonly (and perhaps generally) believed God
to be corporeal’ (‘Early Christian Belief’, 105).
15 See Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi, Moslem Schisms, 67–72; Wensinck, Muslim
Creed, 67–8, 86–7, 91–2; Tritton, Muslim Theology, 48 ff., 74–5; Sweetman,
Islam, pt. 2, vol. ii, 7. Averroes wrote: ‘Most of the Muslim people have
come to believe that the Creator is a body, but unlike other bodies. This is
what Hanbalites and most of them who follow them accept. . . . The sect
which accepts the corporeality of God believes those who deny it to be
denying the existence of God.’ See Sweetman, Islam, pt. 2, vol. ii, 115–16.
See also Wolfson, Philosophy, 8 ff., 76–7, 102 ff.; R. M. Frank, Al-Ghazali,
80; Martin et al., Defenders, 68–9.
16 Biblical anthropomorphism is a very large topic but lies outside the
scope of this book. See E. R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum, 13–28, who also
provides the relevant bibliography.
17 Beit habeḥirah on BT Shab. 55a.
18 Guide i. 36.
19 Yet in the Targumim there is still a great deal of anthropomorphism.
See M. L. Klein, Personification. See also Nahmanides, commentary on Gen.
46: 1; Abarbanel, commentary on Guide i. 27; Ishbili, Sefer hazikaron, 62 ff.
20 Guide i. 46.
21 ‘ The Body as Image of God’, 172–3. See also M. Smith, Studies, ch.
11.
22 For example, Bereshit rabah 27: 1 states: ‘Great is the power of the
prophets, who liken that which is created to its Creator, as it is written . . .
And upon the likeness of the throne was a likeness as the appearance of a man upon
it above (Ezek. 1: 26).’ (The parallel text in Pesikta derav kahana, 65, and
Bamidbar rabah 19: 3 reads: ‘Great is the power of the prophets, who
compare the likeness [demut] of the Power on High to the likeness of man.’
See Midrash tehilim, 3a, n. 48, regarding the two formulations.) In other
words, the prophet portrays God as a man, but he does not actually have a
physical form. Maimonides cites this midrash in Guide i. 46. However, even
this passage has been read anthropomorphically; see Lorberbaum,
‘Doctrine’. I find Lorberbaum’s interpretation most far-fetched.
23 ‘Image of God’.
24 S. Friedman, ‘Graven Images’, also argues that the rabbinic passages
that refer to God’s image must be understood literally.
25 A. Goshen-Gottstein, ‘The Body as Image of God’, 175.
26 ‘The Hand of God’, 331.
27 Marmorstein, Old Rabbinic Doctrine, ii. 52. I should note, however,
that David Stern offers an alternative reading of rabbinic anthropomorphic
passages which does not presume a belief in divine corporeality. See his
‘Imitatio Hominis’. See also E. R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum, 33 ff.
28 Midrash hagadol on Genesis, 159; Pirkei derabi eli’ezer, ch. 48, p. 116a.
29 ‘Ha’azinu’, 4.
30 p. 471.
31 This verse only appears in the Pesikta derav kahana version.
32 On Moses’ vision of ‘the likeness of the Lord’, see also BT Ber. 7a,
quoting R. Joshua b. Korhah and R. Jonathan.
33 Ch. 32, p. 73b.
34 Goshen-Gottstein’s ‘divine body of light’ thesis has been disputed in
Aaron, ‘Shedding Light’.
35 In early Jewish mysticism, in particular in the Heikhalot literature, one
encounters highly developed anthropomorphic myth. The problem with this
type of literature is that it is never clear when descriptions of God are to be
taken literally and when they are only symbolic. Furthermore, with regard to
some figures, e.g. Akatriel, who is mentioned in BT Ber. 7a, it is not clear if
what is being discussed is God himself, his ‘Glory’, or simply an angel. See
E. R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum, ch. 3; Abrams, ‘Divine Shape’;
Deutsch, Guardians. For the uncertainty surrounding the seemingly grossly
anthropomorphic Shiur komah, see Dan, Early Jewish Mysticism, ch. 4;
Sherwin, ‘Human Body’, 78 n. 2; Farber-Ginat, ‘Studies’; Martin Cohen,
Shiur Qomah. Cohen writes (p. 99):
The single most characteristic feature of the Shiur Qomah is the description
of the divine body and the revelation of the names and dimensions of the
limbs and some of the internal organs of the Deity. Whether or not this
notion implies a rejection of the principle of divine incorporeality in the
mind of the author, or in the minds of his earliest readers, is not a question
that can be decided with certainty. It does seem, however, that if we ask in
absolute terms, whether this must have been the case, the answer would have
to be that it is not so, as evidenced by those gaonic and medieval scholars
who praised the text and who accepted it as a valid text of Jewish mystic
expression, and who, yet, are known to have held the doctrine of divine
incorporeality as a cardinal element in their religious systems.
In his youth Maimonides apparently believed that Shiur komah was an
authentic rabbinic work. See his commentary on Mishnah San., 142 n. 42; J.
Kafih, Writings, 475 ff. Later in life he changed his mind and regarded it as
a heretical work that should be destroyed. See his Responsa, no. 117. See also
Jospe, ‘Maimonides’.
36 Contra apionem ii. 23. This passage was called to my attention by
Professor Louis Feldman.
37 De somniis i. 40: 236. See also Quod deus immutabilis sit, xi, xiv, and H.
A. Wolfson, Philo, ii. 94 ff.
38 De somniis i. 40: 237. See also ibid. 135, that the anthropomorphisms
found in the Bible are ‘concerned not with truth, but with the profit
accruing to its [i.e. the Bible’s] pupils’.
39 See Goodenough, Jewish Symbols, i. 246 ff., x. 180 ff.; Wischnitzer-
Bernstein, ‘Jewish Pictorial Art’, 210; Sukenik, Synagogue of Dura Europos,
119; id., Synagogue of Beth Alpha, 41.
40 Dialogue with Trypho, ch. 114.
41 For the authors cited in this paragraph, see Bland, The Artless Jew, 60–
1.
42 Guide i. 5. See, however, ibid. i. 28, ii. 26, for a non-anthropomorphic
understanding of the verses in Exodus.
43 See Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 17.
44 is normally translated as ‘I am undone’. As Husik points out in his
note on the passage, Albo has connected it with the word .
45 See, however, Sefer ha’ikarim, ii. 14, where Albo offers a non-
anthropomorphic understanding of Isaiah’s vision.
46 Yev. 49b.
47 On this desire see Pedaya, ‘Seeing, Falling, Singing’.
48 Princeton, NJ, 1994.
49 Hasagah on ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 7. This is undoubtedly the correct
version of the gloss; see Kaufmann, Geschichte, 487–8 (many of the medieval
sources to which I refer in this chapter were first collected by the
astonishingly erudite Kaufmann). See also Twersky, Rabad, 282 ff.; W. Z.
Harvey, ‘Incorporeality’; Gellman, ‘Philosophical Hassagot’, 153 ff.; Gellman
writes: ‘Rabad probably wanted to support the permissibility of the belief in
corporeality and not just its not being culpable in certain cases’ (p. 155).
There is no evidence that Rabad upheld the permissibility of such a belief.
On the contrary, Rabad’s concluding words show that his comments are
merely an ex post facto justification for those who erred in this matter.
50 There were those who referred to the work as ; see Kiryat sefer, 4
(1928), 338; Kupfer, ‘Cultural Image’, 137. Before Kirchheim published
Taku’s Ketav tamim, R. Joseph David Sinzheim (1745–1812) saw the
manuscript and discussed it in a letter; see his Minḥat ani, i. 110 (the
editor’s note is incorrect). Regarding Taku, see Ephraim E. Urbach’s edition
of Abraham b. Azriel, Arugat habosem, iv. 78 ff., Urbach, Ba’alei hatosafot,
425 ff.; Ketav tamim, ed. Dan, 7–27.
51 See Hayim Hillel Ben-Sasson’s review of the first edition of Urbach’s
Ba’alei hatosafot in Beḥinot, 9 (1956), 51–2; Urbach, Ba’alei hatosafot, 423 n.
74*; Davis, ‘R. Yom Tov’, 51 n. 49; Ta-Shma, Talmudic Commentary, ii.
194 n. 8.
52 Ketav tamim, ed. Kirchheim, 83.
53 Ibid. 77.
54 Ibid. 85. For a similar version of this text see Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei
soferim, ad loc.
55 Emunot vede’ot, ii. 13. Taku quotes from a Hebrew paraphrase of
Emunot vede’ot. Concerning this work, see Kiener, ‘Hebrew Paraphrase’.
56 See Dan, Esoteric Theology, ch. 6.
57 Ketav tamim, ed. Kirchheim, 69. Concerning God avoiding places of
filth, see also ibid. 82.
58 Ibid. 97.
59 Ibid. 61.
60 BT San. 46b; Taku, Ketav tamim, ed. Kirchheim, 60.
61 Ketav tamim, ed. Kirchheim, 61. For other examples from Taku, see
Jacobs, Principles, 121–2.
62 See Ta-Shma, ‘Sefer hamaskil’; Freudenthal, ‘The Air, Blessed Be It’.
 63 Freudenthal discusses possible influences on R. Solomon’s strange view
at length, without coming to any definite conclusions.
64 Bar-Ilan, ‘The Hand of God’, 326–7; Ta-Shma, Commentaries, ii. 194.
65 BT Eruv. 21a, s.v. esrim. A cubit is a body-based measurement, being
the distance from the elbow to the fingertips.
66 BT Yev. 49b, s.v. nistakelu, BT Ber. 6b, s.v. vekhulhu.
67 See also Rashi on Exod. 14: 31.
68 It is noteworthy that, despite the clear anthropomorphic elements
found in Rashi’s writings, Maḥzor vitri, 514, which emanates in large part
from Rashi’s school, states explicitly that ‘God has no likeness or form’.
Ginzberg, ‘Anthropomorphism’, argues that Rashi did not hold
anthropomorphic views by citing BT Mak. 12a, s.v. ḥamuts, where Rashi
‘remarks that the angels are not composed of flesh and blood, which, in
philosophic phraseology means the “angels are incorporeal”.’ According to
Ginzberg, if the angels are incorporeal, no doubt God must be too. Yet
Ginzberg’s proof from Makot is completely false and has nothing to do with
rejecting anthropomorphism. From the Talmud itself it is clear that angels
are not made of flesh and blood. Rather, while they look like men, they
consist of fire and water: see JT RH 2: 4 and Shir hashirim rabah 3: 11.
With regard to this fire, see Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews, v. 21: ‘The fact
that angels were created of fire does not interfere with their incorporeality,
for in legend fire, particularly the heavenly fire, is incorporeal.’ Leaving aside
the fact that Ginzberg does not explain how water—the other component of
angels—can also be incorporeal, it must be stressed that nowhere in rabbinic
literature is it stated, or even implied, that the angels are incorporeal. The
Bible itself (Gen. 18–19, Josh. 5: 13 ff., Judg. 6: 12, Isa. 6: 2, etc.) speaks of
corporeal angels. In BT RH 24a–b and BT AZ 43a–b it states that one is
forbidden to reproduce an image of an angel, showing that they indeed have
physical form. According to BT Ḥag. 16a, angels have wings. Sa’adiah
Gaon, who was the leading philosophical opponent of divine corporeality
before Maimonides, believed that angels are physical beings; see Emunot
vede’ot, iv. 2, vi. 4. Medieval Ashkenazi sages also thought that angels are
corporeal; see Rabad, hasagah on ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 8: 2; and the letter
published by Scholem, Origins, 226. Although Maimonides believed that
angels are incorporeal (‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 2: 3, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’,
8: 2, Guide i. 49, ii. 6, Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 323, 327 (Arabic), 346–7, 354
(Hebrew)), he did not mind if the masses believed otherwise; see Letters, ed.
Shailat, i. 323 (Arabic) 346–7 (Hebrew). In fact, he even recorded the
talmudic law that one cannot reproduce angelic images (‘Hilkhot avodah
zarah’, 3: 11). This is an example of Maimonides recording a law even
though it did not fit in with his world view. For other examples, see
Levinger, Halakhic Thought, 129–30, and cf. my ‘Maimonidean Halakhah’,
99 n. 135.
69 Rabbi Samuel, 338.
70 See, however, Rashbam’s commentary on Gen. 1: 26–7, where he
argues that man was created in the image of the angels, not God. If he
believed that God has a physical form, why did he depart from the simple
meaning of the biblical text? For further evidence of what seems to be an
anti-corporealist outlook, see Japhet (ed.), Rabbi Samuel, 128 ff. Lockshin
has argued against identifying the author of this commentary with
Rashbam, but even he acknowledges that it contains a great deal of
Rashbam’s comments. See his review essay, ‘ “Rashbam” on Job’.
71 Abraham b. Azriel, Arugat habosem, iv. 76–7. The editor, Urbach (ibid.
78), believes that anthropomorphism was the accepted doctrine among the
early German mystics.
72 .
 73 . This is the original text, but some maḥzorim have
eliminated the anthropomorphism by substituting for . Regarding
this piyut, see J. Karo, Avkat rokhel, nos. 27–8; Malachi, ‘Yom Kippur’, 17–
20.
74 She’elot uteshuvot maharil, no. 40. The first bracketed text is found in
one of the manuscripts.
75 See the text published in Scholem, ‘New Information’, 210, 229.
76 Wolfson, Philosophy, 100 ff.
77 ‘Literary Forgery’, 85.
78 G. Stroumsa, ‘Form(s) of God’, 269–88; Bonfil, ‘Evidence’, 332.
79 See Wolfson, Repercussions, 40 ff. In line with his view that Jewish
anthropomorphism was very rare, Wolfson regards the Islamic statements he
cites as ‘misinformation’ (ibid. 43).
80 See Nemoy, ‘Al-Kirkisani’, 114 ff.; Wolfson, Repercussions, 44 ff.
81 Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, 79, writes: ‘it seems likely that the
views of Moses b. Hasdai [Taku] do approximate a significant body of
Franco-German opinion’. See also Sonne, ‘Scrutiny’.
82 Emunot vede’ot, ii, introduction.
83 Ha’emunah haramah, 47, 91.
84 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 322 (Arabic), 346 (Hebrew).
85 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 320 (Arabic), 341 (Hebrew); Halkin and
Hartman, Crisis, 212. In the forged ethical will attributed to Maimonides,
the author harshly attacks the French Jewish scholars for viewing God
anthropomorphically. See Lichtenberg, Anthology, ii. 40a.
86 See Solomon ben Adret, She’elot uteshuvot harashba, no. 418 (p. 216,
s.v. vehitbonenu). See also Delmedigo, Beḥinat hadat, 86, and A. I. Kook,
Ma’amrei hare’iyah, 106, who, entirely ignoring R. Sa’adiah, give
Maimonides all the credit for discrediting the corporealists. Concerning R.
Sa’adiah’s efforts in this regard, see Rawidowicz, ‘Saadya’s Purification’.
87 See Ta-Shma, ‘R. Isaiah’.
88 See Teicher, ‘Literary Forgery’, 84–5.
89 Abudarham hashalem, 362.
90 14a. This work is attributed to R. Eliezer b. Nathan of Mainz (12th
cent.).
91 See his commentary on Maimonides’ introduction to the Guide (p. 10a
in the standard edition).
92 See Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, 185–6.
93 See the text published in Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom, 125–6.
94 See his commentary on Exod. 33: 21, where he refers to scholars who
understood literally the talmudic statement (BT Ber. 7a) that God showed
Moses his tefilin.
95 See Lichtenberg, Anthology, iii. 3c.
96 See ibid. 16 ff. When Maimonides says that the faith of the sages of
Montpellier ‘is not far from their [Christian] faith’ (ibid. 17a), he is also
referring to corporealism and not belief in the Sefirot, as has been suggested
by Sendor, ‘Emergence’, 165.
97 See his poems, published by Hayim Brody:

(ibid. 34) . See

also ibid. 91 for another defence of the corporealists.
98 See the text published (perhaps by Solomon Judah Rapoport) in
Kerem ḥemed, 5 (1841), 12. Sapurto is apparently the author of this letter
directed to the French rabbis, in which he writes: ‘Are there to be found
among the foolish of the nations corporealists [magshimim] such as you?’
See also his letter, published in Ginzei nistarot, 4 (1878), 44 ff. (Halberstam,
who edited this letter, does not believe that the letter published in Kerem
ḥemed was written by Sapurto; see ibid. 37.
99 Otsar neḥmad, 2 (1857), 85:
100 See his letter in Lichtenberg, Anthology, iii. 23 ff. (This letter also
appears in Bislikhis’ edition of Abba Mari Astruc of Lunel, Minḥat kenaot,
183 ff.) The letter is anonymous but there is reason to assume that
Falaquera is the author; see Graetz, Geschichte, vii. 474. In reference to
Rabad’s assertion that there were people ‘greater and superior’ to
Maimonides who believed in God’s corporeality, Falaquera responds
sarcastically: ‘Perhaps they were greater than him in height and physical
attractiveness.’ (Lichtenberg, Anthology, iii. 23b).
101 See [Schorr], ‘R. Nissim’, 91–2.
102 She’elot uteshuvot maharam alashkar, no. 117 (p. 312). Alashkar singles
out the French rabbis. In his words, they were guilty of , a phrase
which appears earlier in Bedershi’s letter.
103 Kitvei ramban, i. 345.
104 This was noted by R. Tsadok Hakohen, Divrei soferim: sefer
hazikhronot, 28a.
105 See Kupfer, ‘Cultural Image’, 135.
106 Beḥinat hadat, 82. See Ivry, ‘Remnants’, 258–9.
107 Letters, 1196–7. See also Leone da Modena, Magen vaḥerev, 40, who
makes the same observation with regard to the medieval rabbis of France
who opposed Maimonides.
108 Luzzatto, Peninei shadal, 274. See also id., Studies, ii. 205.
109 Peninei shadal, 416.
110 Commentary on Isaiah, 1: 12.
111 Commentary on the Torah, ad loc.; id., Commentary on Isaiah, 1: 12.
112 Letters, 1195. See M. Harris, ‘Theologico-Historical Thinking’, 317 ff.
 113 Ohev mishpat, ch. 9.
114 Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 2.
115 Or haḥayim, 32b. See also R. Simeon Sofer, Igerot soferim, iii. 41, who
adopts a similar approach regarding the masses’ ascription of corporeality to
divine things (although he does not seem to be referring to a belief in the
corporeality of God himself).
116 Musagei shav ve’emet, 118 (second pagination). R. Ishmael Hanina of
Valmontone (the teacher of R. Menahem Azariah da Fano), in his
apologetic work Shivah ḥakirot, 4a, uses Rabad’s approach to exonerate
Christians from the sin of idolatry.
117 Mishnat ḥakhamim, no. 220. R. Arele Roth also tells this story in
Shomer emunim, i. 95b.
118 Pardes rimonim, x. 9.
119 Benei maḥashavah tovah, no. 7 (called to my attention by Uriel Frank).
120 Torah shelemah, xvi. 302–3. See also ibid. 320–1 and id., Hatekufah
hagedolah, 143–4. In writing this chapter I benefited greatly from Kasher’s
wide collection of sources.
121 Eikhah rabah, introduction, sect. 2, and see the similar passage in JT
Ḥag. 1: 7.
122 Ḥovot halevavot, i. 10.
123 See Jehiel Moses of Komarovka, Niflaot ḥadashot, 49d, and a slightly
different version of the story in H. E. Shapira, Divrei torah, v, no. 10 (here
the protagonist is R. Jacob Isaac Horowitz).
124 R. Meir b. Simeon of Narbonne finds Maimonides’ opinion so
difficult to fathom that he claims that Maimonides agrees with Rabad!
According to him, Maimonides’ comment is only directed against one whose
error has been pointed out to him, yet obstinately holds to his opinion. But
he does not refer to someone who arrived at his error accidentally. See
similarly R. Samuel Messer Leon, quoted in Benayahu, ‘Revolutionary’,
148; Tsevi Elimelekh of Dynów, Ma’ayan haganim, 32b; Serero, Mishneh
kesef on Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 7; S. B. Bamberger, ‘Open
Letter’ (called to my attention by R. Chaim Rapoport), and Karelitz, Ḥazon
ish, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 96a. They obviously never saw Guide i. 36, cited above, p.
48. Hirschfeld, Mishnat rishonim, 37 ff. is aware of Guide i. 36, but he
misunderstands what Maimonides says.
125 This is how R. Joseph Ergas regarded those, such as R. Raphael
Immanuel Hai Ricchi, who understood tsimtsum literally. According to
Ergas, such a conception must mean that God has a form and occupies
space. See Ergas, Shomer emunim, 70–2, and, similarly, T. Hakohen, Divrei
soferim, 32b. Needless to say, the advocates of literal tsimtsum strongly
disagreed with this position.
126 Tiferet yisra’el, on Mishnah Kelim, ch. 30, ‘Boaz’, no. 1.
127 Melekhet maḥshevet, 125a.
128 p. 23; regarding this work see Gries, Sifrut hahanhagot, chs. 4–5.
129 Wilensky, Hasidim umitnagdim, i. 245.
130 These words were in Maimonides’ text but are lacking in ours. See
Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei soferim, ad loc.
131 Guide i. 12; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 11.
132 Maharsha, ad loc. Rashi also understands the text to be referring to
angels, but he does not tell us why.
133 Zikhron zot, 10 (‘Vayera’).
134 ‘It is interesting to note that he was also a son of a very famous rabbi
who was a member of the Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah in Poland’ (Steinsaltz’s
note). Could the reference be to R. Yitshak Meir Levin (1894–1971), the
Agudat Yisrael leader and son of R. Hanokh Tsevi Levin (1871–1935),
rabbi of Bendin and one of the leading Polish scholars of his time?
 135 ‘Where’, 162. Because this story is so astounding—testifying as it does
to the existence of Orthodox anthropomorphism in the twentieth century—I
have my doubts as to its veracity.
136 See Guide i. 35.
137 No. 304.
138 See C. Roth, ‘Representation’; Saltman, ‘ “Forbidden Image” ’;
Kochan, Beyond the Graven Image, 113.
139 Guide i. 35.
140 Ibid. 36.
141 R. Bahya ibn Pakuda, Ḥovot halevavot, i. 10, adopts the same
approach, but since he does not regard the unknowing corporealist as a
heretic, his use of this explanation is not as striking as when it is used by
Maimonides.
142 See Guide i. 26, 46; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 9.
See also Bahya ibn Pakuda, Ḥovot halevavot, i. 10, and Rawidowicz, Studies, i.
182–3. Since the prophets use corporeal expressions, it was apparently a
lengthy process. It is only when there is general acceptance of God’s
existence that children, women, etc. are also to be instructed in his
incorporeality. Thus, there is no contradiction between the progressive
approach of Guide i. 26, 46 and i. 35–6, where Maimonides insists that all
must be instructed in God’s incorporeality. In his commentary on Guide i.
26, Ibn Kaspi gives a similar interpretation, but includes a number of points
which are totally at odds with Maimonides’ opinion. Thus, he writes that the
progressive method described in Guide i. 26, 46:
whereas as regards Maimonides’ assertion in Guide i. 35–6 that one must
entirely cleanse the nation of anthropomorphism:
(see also his commentary on
Guide i. 35). Thus, Ibn Kaspi believes that, with some exceptions, the
masses are not to be exposed to the notion of God’s incorporeality.
However, Ibn Kaspi’s understanding is directly contradicted, not merely by
what Maimonides writes in the Third Principle and in the Mishneh torah, but
also by his words in Guide i. 35–6. In these chapters Maimonides is adamant
that the time has come when the masses must be informed of God’s
incorporeality. (In fact, Ibn Kaspi himself advocates this opinion in his
commentary on Isa. 26: 10, printed in Mikraot gedolot: haketer, 171.) Even
in Guide i. 46, Maimonides clearly states that by the time of the sages there
was no excuse for anyone to hold corporeal views.
Having said this, I must note that there appears to be an esoteric hint in
the Guide that not all the sages believed in an incorporeal God. In Guide i.
46 Maimonides states that ‘the doctrine of the corporeality of God did not
ever occur even for a single day to the sages, may their memory be blessed,
and that this was not according to them a matter lending itself to
imagination or to confusion.’ This assumption enables Maimonides to
explain why the Talmud and Midrash did not shy away from speaking of
God anthropomorphically. In Guide i. 3 Maimonides also explains that the
Hebrew word tavnit refers only to ‘the build and aspect of a thing; I mean
to say its shape. . . . For this reason the Hebrew language does not use this
word with reference to attributes that apply in any way to the Deity.’ Yet
according to the Talmud, Ket. 8a, one of the traditional wedding blessings,
recited to this day, states that man was fashioned in the tavnit of God. We
thus have a contradiction of the seventh cause (see Maimonides’
introduction to the Guide), and Guide i. 3 holds the key to Maimonides’ true
view. In accord with his practice of not deviating from the text of prayers
established by the talmudic sages, the anthropomorphic version is codified
by Maimonides (Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot berakhot’, 2: 11, ‘Hilkhot ishut’,
10: 3). Regarding the anthropomorphic element in this blessing, see
Berliner, Writings, i. 96; Gaguine, Keter shem tov, i. 607–8.
143 ‘Intellectual Perfection’, 34. See also Leo Strauss’s introductory essay
‘How to Begin’, p. xlii. For a similar approach by Maimonides in order to
explain why resurrection is not mentioned in the Torah, see Letters, ed.
Shailat, i. 334 ff. (Arabic), 368 ff. (Hebrew). See also Guide iii. 32, which
focuses on Maimonides’ view of sacrifices. When Maimonides writes that the
Torah and Prophets ‘explicitly’ set forth that God is not a body (Mishneh
torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 8), he means only that it is explicit to
philosophers and sages.
144 Guide i. 26, 59.
145 Ibid. 60. See also his harsh words in Guide i. 50 and Mishneh torah,
‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 2: 10 that belief in divine attributes is a denial of
God’s unity.
146 Guide i. 35.
147 Ibid. iii. 28.
 FOUR

Creation Ex Nihilo

The Fourth Principle

HE FOURTH PRINCIPLE affirms God’s priority to other beings (not
T his eternity, as has often been assumed),1 and creation ex
nihilo, i.e. creation after2 absolute non-existence.3 There are no
Jewish scholars who question God’s priority, however it may be
defined. However, this is not the case with regard to the doctrine
of creation ex nihilo, which has never achieved unanimous
acceptance. Thus, in describing creation, Ibn Ezra writes: ‘Most
biblical commentators explain that the word bara indicates
creation ex nihilo’; he rejects this and concludes: ‘The meaning of
bara is to cut or to set a boundary. The intelligent person will
understand [what I am alluding to].’4 The implication of this, and
some other comments of Ibn Ezra, is that he believed that the
world was created by giving form to eternal matter. In his
commentary on Genesis, Ibn Ezra writes that the entire creation
story refers to the sublunar world,5 implying that the spheres are
eternal. This implication is even stated explicitly in his
commentary on Daniel 10: 21, where he states that the heavenly
bodies ‘do not begin, nor do they end’. Among those who
interpret Ibn Ezra along these lines are Levi ben Abraham
(thirteenth–fourteenth centuries),6 R. Nissim ben Moses
(fourteenth century),7 R. Joseph ben Eliezer Bonfils (fourteenth
century),8 R. Ezra Gatigno (fourteenth century),9 R. Isaac
Abarbanel,10 R. David Arama (sixteenth century),11 and R. Joseph
Solomon Delmedigo (1591–1655).12 Although there has recently
been a great deal of discussion among scholars about Ibn Ezra’s
view, with some arguing that he advocates an emanationist
doctrine, it is fairly clear that he is denying creation ex nihilo.13
R. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of Maimonides’ Guide
and a philosopher in his own right, is another of the medieval
scholars who did not accept creation ex nihilo. According to him,
the four elements (i.e. matter) are eternal, as are the heavenly
spheres. All creation, such as it was, took place in the sublunar
world.14 Some years later, the outstanding philosopher and
biblical commentator Gersonides (1288–1344) maintained that
the world was created from eternal formless matter, describing his
view at length in Book VI of his Milḥamot hashem. He is quite
adamant that creation of matter out of nothing is impossible, and
this is the basic stumbling-block for creation ex nihilo as far as he is
concerned. That even God cannot do this does not limit him in
Gersonides’ eyes, for, as we have already seen, inability to do the
impossible implies no imperfection. It is interesting that, while
Gersonides sees creation ex nihilo as an impossibility, he is quite
willing to defend the notion of matter without form, something
Aristotle rejected.15
R. Shem Tov Falaquera also accepted the notion of creation
from eternal matter, which Maimonides identifies with Plato’s
view.16 Perhaps afraid of the controversy such a view would
engender, as well as worried about the effect this view would have
on the religiosity of the masses, Falaquera was somewhat
ambiguous in some of his discussions of creation. Nevertheless, a
complete reading of the relevant texts clearly demonstrates that
Falaquera rejected creation ex nihilo.17 Indeed, not only does he
say that Plato’s opinion corresponds to the view of the Torah, he
even states that Plato received this information from the Jewish
sages!18 Two centuries before Falaquera, R. Solomon ibn Gabirol
(eleventh century) was also not entirely clear regarding this
matter, and some scholars understand him to be denying creation
ex nihilo.19 As a curiosity, we should also note the view of R.
Judah Halevi (died c.1140), that the patriarch Abraham believed
in the eternity of matter when he wrote Sefer yetsirah, a work
popularly attributed to him. Only later, after receiving God’s
revelation, did he abandon this view.20 Yet, according to Halevi,
there is no fundamental religious objection to Abraham’s original
belief. In Halevi’s words: ‘If a believer in the Torah finds himself
obliged to acknowledge and admit pre-existent matter and the
existence of many worlds prior to this one, this would not impair
his belief that this world was created at some particular time.’21
There is also the position advocated by R. Abraham Abulafia
(thirteenth century),22 R. Hasdai Crescas,23 and R. Joseph ibn
Kaspi (1280–1340)24 that God continually and from eternity
‘creates’ the world (‘eternal creation’), or, to use Averroes’ words,
God ‘convert[s] the world eternally from non-being into being’.25
What creation means, according to these thinkers, is eternal
ontological dependence of all existents upon the Creator, ‘or if you
will, the continuous information of matter by the Form of the
world’.26 In support of this contention, Abulafia and Crescas cite
the words of a prayer from the morning service: ‘He creates each
day continuously the work of creation.’27 Similarly, Ibn Kaspi
writes: ‘Every use of the expression “creation” is true, and how
many creations are there in the world every day?’ This
combination of creation and eternity of the world, while
reconcilable with the biblical account, conflicts with the notion of
temporal creation after non-existence, which is what Maimonides
requires.
Before taking leave of this Principle, one more point must be
noted. One need not be an esotericist to see that that there are
serious problems with Maimonides’ claim that one who doubts
creation ex nihilo is a heretic with no share in the world to come.
Without delving too much into the often discussed problem of
whether Maimonides had a secret view of creation, it is clear from
Maimonides’ exoteric teaching in the Guide that even he did not
regard creation ex nihilo as a fundamental religious doctrine. Also
significant in this regard is the passage in Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’ 3: 7, where Maimonides lists those who qualify as
minim; there is no mention here of creation ex nihilo. Instead, he
refers to one who denies ‘that He alone is the First Cause and
Rock of the Universe’. Another place in which one might have
expected some mention of creation ex nihilo is at the very
beginning of the Mishneh torah, but what Maimonides actually
says there is somewhat different. It is striking how he seems to go
out of his way to avoid any mention of creation:

The foundation of all foundations, and the pillar of all the sciences, is to
know that there exists a First Existent, that He gives existence to all that
exists, and that all existent beings, from the heaven to the earth and what is
between them, exist only due to the true reality of His existence.28

According to this passage, God is the cause or source of all that

exists, but this does not mean that he created these existents out of
nothing. Rather, ‘gives existence’ can be understood as meaning
that God is the eternal cause or source.29 In fact, nowhere in the
Mishneh torah does Maimonides mention creation ex nihilo, a point
which raised eyebrows and created controversy in medieval
times.30
In the Guide Maimonides discusses at length the Platonic view,
which maintained that the world was created by God fashioning
eternal matter. He refers to a passage in Pirkei derabi eli’ezer31
which seemingly advocates this position:32

Wherefrom were the heavens created? From the light of His garment. He
took some of it, stretched it like a cloth, and thus they were extending
continually, as it is said: Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment, who
stretchest out the heavens like a curtain (Ps. 104: 2). Wherefrom was the earth
created? From the snow under the throne of His glory. He took some of it
and threw it, as it is said: For He said to the snow, Be thou earth (Job 37: 6).

Since Maimonides believed this passage to have been written by

the important tana R. Eliezer, its apparent acceptance of the
Platonic position must have been regarded by him as highly
significant.33 Yet, although Maimonides, as well as Duran34 and
Albo,35 discusses the implication of this passage, neither he nor
they entirely discount the possibility that there is another way of
understanding it. R. Ezra ben Solomon, however, states without
hesitation that this text is ‘in accord with Plato’s opinion that it is
impossible for the Creator to create something from nothing’.36
Yet, before one concludes that his position is no different from
that of Gersonides, it must be noted that as a kabbalist he does not
believe that the eternal matter existed in the temporal world.
While the matter indeed existed, it was hidden in the Divine Mind
and was only brought into the temporal world through a process
of emanation.37 Certainly, the kabbalistic ‘existence’ that R. Ezra
speaks of hardly corresponds to anything the philosophers had in
mind.38
As for Maimonides’ view of the Platonic position, he notes that
there are many passages in the Torah and other writings that
could be interpreted to support it.39 In contrast to the Aristotelian
view that the world is eternal, which according to Maimonides
would destroy the Torah, he claims that there is no religious
reason to reject the Platonic view. Thus, he would have no
difficulty accepting this view and interpreting Scripture in
accordance with it if reason so dictated. Marvin Fox has
summarized Maimonides’ opinion as follows:

it seems evident that, even though he does not consider the Platonic view to
be the preferred or the exclusively correct view, Maimonides does admit it,
alongside the theory of creation out of nothing, as a legitimate and
acceptable opinion on both philosophical and religious grounds. It can be
shown to accord with one acceptable reading of Scripture and with the
teachings of numerous canonical midrashim. From this evidence, we
seemingly must conclude that Maimonides accepts the Platonic position as
consistent with prophetic teaching, although it does not follow that he
considers it to be the best interpretation of that teaching. . . . If someone
finds it persuasive, there is no reason to object, since it does not contradict
any principle of the Torah or of philosophy.40

It must be emphasized that Fox is not describing any hidden

view of Maimonides. As he puts it, ‘this acceptance of the Platonic
position should not be viewed as an esoteric position; it is
perfectly open and direct’.41 Taking note of this fact, and not
having access to Maimonides’ corrected edition of the Principles, it
made perfect sense for R. Gedaliah ben Solomon Lipschuetz
(seventeenth century) to suggest that the reason Maimonides did
not include creation ex nihilo in the Principles is precisely because
he did not regard it as an essential belief, even for the masses to
whom Lipschuetz believed the Principles were addressed.42
Having thus seen that Maimonides himself was fully prepared to
deny creation ex nihilo, there is simply no way one can take
seriously his contention that someone who even doubts this
Principle is a heretic.43 As to his reasons for saying something he
does not really believe, I will return to this in my discussion of the
Eighth Principle.
Although, as noted already, this book does not devote much
attention to the esoteric reading of Maimonides, with regard to
this Principle it must be mentioned that not only does Ibn Tibbon
deny creation ex nihilo, but he can also be read as implying that
Maimonides’ secret teaching denies it as well.44 This must be taken
very seriously for the simple reason that Maimonides himself said
that Ibn Tibbon completely understood the secrets of the Guide.45
Ibn Kaspi,46 R. Nissim ben Moses,47 R. Profiat Duran (fourteenth
century),48 R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn Shem Tov,49 and Moses
of Narbonne50 also thought that Maimonides’ secret teaching was
not in accord with his exoteric affirmation of creation ex nihilo.
Among modern scholars who have argued this point, mention
should be made of Herbert Davidson,51 who adduces evidence
that Maimonides held the Platonic view, and Abraham Nuriel52
and Warren Zev Harvey,53 who believe that Maimonides accepted
the Aristotelian position.
There are even those who have argued that not just the Guide
but also the Mishneh torah teaches the eternity of the world. This is
in contradiction to Maimonides’ exoteric view that his method of
demonstrating the existence of God in the Mishneh torah, based on
eternity, does not represent his true view.54 Among those who
advocate this position are Isaac Albalag,55 Shlomo Pines,56 and
Warren Zev Harvey. Harvey makes the following striking
statement. ‘An examination of Maimonides’ statements in his great
Code, the Mishneh Torah, reveals that the Aristotelian premise of
eternity is indeed required for the fulfillment of the divine
commandments to know God and to know that he is one, and that
Abraham our father had in fact come to know God on the basis of
the Aristotelian premise of eternity.’57

1 That God is eternal is implied in the First Principle. This was

recognized by R. Nissim b. Moses; see Mesch, ‘Nissim’, 86.
2 ‘The term “after” would of course have to be purged of any implications
of time, inasmuch as time came into existence only with the creation of time
[see Guide ii. 30]’: H. A. Wolfson, Studies, i. 215. See also Guide ii. 13, and
the helpful discussion in Seeskin, Searching, 71 ff.
3 This is explicit in Maimonides’ later addition to the Principles, and is
found in the Kafih edition, p. 142. See also Maimonides’ letter to the
scholars of Marseilles (Letters, ed. Shailat, ii. 483), and his medical work,
Pirkei mosheh, ch. 25, where he also expresses this opinion. (This last source
was called to my attention by Professor Charles Manekin). The
overwhelming majority of scholars believe creation ex nihilo to have been
implicit in Maimonides’ first formulation. See Kellner, Dogma, 57. Kellner
(ibid. 55–6) attempts to refute this position, and argues that the original
formulation only places God ontologically, but not temporally, prior to the
universe. In other words, ‘without God the universe could not exist; but
God and the world may have coexisted eternally’ (ibid. 241 n. 218).
However, the notion that the world is dependent upon God for its existence
was already stated explicitly in the First Principle.
4 Commentary, Gen. 1: 1.
5 Commentary, Genesis, 156 (alternative commentary on Genesis).
6 See Nissim b. Moses, Ma’aseh nisim, 219 n. 31.
7 Ibid. 219–20.
8 Tsofnat pane’aḥ , 28–30, 41. See D. Schwartz, ‘Creation Theory’, 616–
18.
9 See the text published in D. Schwartz, ‘Philosophical
Supercommentaries’, 93.
10 Commentary, Genesis, 3 (first question), 5 (second question), 19; id.,
Mifalot elokim, ii. 2.
11 Perush al harambam (Amsterdam, 1706), 9a.
12 Novelot ḥokhmah, 6b. R. Judah Moscato, Kol yehudah on Judah Halevi,
Kuzari, i. 67, is suspicious of Ibn Ezra but does not come to any definitive
conclusion.
13 See Solomon Franco, quoted in D. Schwartz, ‘Worship’, 226–7;
Rosin, ‘Religionsphilosophie’, 66 ff.; Orschansky, Abraham ibn Esra, 12 ff.;
Neumark, History of Jewish Philosophy, ii. 276, 280 ff.; Lévy, ‘Philosophie’,
172; Bernfeld, Da’at elokim, i. 179; Greive, Studien, 53–60; Sirat, History,
106; Rottzoll, Abraham, 34 n. 23; Heller-Wilensky, ‘Ibn Ezra’, col. 1169;
Husik, History, 190; Guttmann, Philosophies, 135–6; Schwartz, Old Wine,
102–14; and the comprehensive discussion in J. Cohen, Philosophical
Thought, 106 ff., 166 ff. Cohen makes a strong case that Ibn Ezra entirely
excludes the elements and spheres from creation, ex nihilo or otherwise. For
scholars who understand Ibn Ezra as affirming creation ex nihilo, see
Friedlaender, Essays, 3 ff.; Lipshitz, Studies-Ibn Ezra, 151 ff.; and Prijs,
Abraham, 6–7, 60. Nahman Krochmal’s interpretation does not seem to be
in opposition to Maimonides’ Principle either: see his Kitvei ranak, 306 ff.,
and the discussion in J. M. Harris, Nachman Krochmal, 67 ff.
14 See Vajda, ‘Analysis’, 147–9; Rivlin, ‘Shmuel Ibn Tibbon’, 43 ff.;
Nehorai, ‘R. Solomon’, 133 ff.; Ravitzky, ‘Philosophy’, 221 ff., id.,
‘Aristotle’s Meteorologica’, 225–50; Sirat, History, 218–20.
15 Milḥamot hashem, v. 2, vi. 18. For detailed discussion of Gersonides’
view, as well as a translation of the relevant texts, see Staub, Creation;
Gersonides, Wars, iii. Nahmanides also accepted the notion of formless
matter; see his comment on Gen. 1: 1 and C. D. Chavel’s note in his edition
of Nahmanides’ Commentary, i. 12.
16 See Guide ii. 13.
17 See R. Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 156–64; S. Harvey, Falaquera’s Epistle,
111–19; R. Jospe and D. Schwartz, ‘Shem Tov’, 171 ff. For more radical
readings of Falaquera, see Abarbanel, Mifalot elokim, ii. 1; Yair Shiffman’s
introduction to his edition of Falaquera, Moreh hamoreh, 19 ff.
18 Moreh hamoreh, 117 (introduction), 259 (ii. 13). In the second source
he is more hesitant, stating that ‘perhaps’ this is where Plato learned this
view.
 19 See Kaufmann, Studien, 66; Husik, History, 68; Seeskin, Searching, 70.
See also S. D. Luzzatto, Studies, ii. 19.
20 See Kuzari iv. 25 ff.; Silman, Philosopher, 222–3. It is possible that
Maimonides’ esoteric view is similar. See Turner, ‘Patriarch’, 148–9.
21 Kuzari i. 67. The proper translation of this passage has been the
subject of some controversy. See Kaufmann, Geschichte, 138 n. 56; id.,
‘Jehuda Halewi’, and Hartwig Hirschfeld’s response, ibid. 374–8; Neumark,
History of Jewish Philosophy, ii. 304 ff.; Waxman, Selected Writings, i. 77 n. 36.
According to Neumark, History of Jewish Philosophy, ii. 304–5, and id., Essays,
240–1, Halevi actually believed in eternal matter.
22 Sitrei torah, 114–21. See W. Z. Harvey, ‘Third Approach’, 76. To be
sure, Abulafia was harshly criticized by perhaps his generation’s leading
talmudist, R. Solomon b. Adret, who even affixed to his name the curse
shem resha’im yirkav (may the name of the wicked rot). See id., She’elot
uteshuvot harashba, no. 548; Idel, ‘Solomon’, 235–51. Despite this, his
writings are quoted by a number of mainstream kabbalists, including R.
Hayim Vital and R. Moses Cordovero. See the publisher’s introduction to
Abulafia’s Razei ḥayei olam haba and A. Kaplan, Meditation, ch. 3. See also
Abulafia, Sefer haḥeshek, which was published with the approbation of R.
Israel Jacob Fischer, av beit din of the ultra-Orthodox Edah Haredit in
Jerusalem, and R. Netanel Safrin, the rebbe of Komarno.
23 Or hashem iii. 1: 5. There is a good deal of ambiguity in the text, and
my understanding follows that of W. Z. Harvey, Physics, 18 ff. For an
alternative approach, see Feldman, ‘Theory’, 289–320.
24 Commentary on Guide ii. 13. This passage is translated in Mesch,
Studies, 97–100. See also H. Kasher, ‘Joseph ibn Kaspi’, 54–61. Although
Ibn Kaspi had a number of untraditional philosophical views, I have
included him in this book since he is given an entry in H. J. D. Azulai, Shem
hagedolim, 92, and Goldwurm, Rishonim, 178–9, published by Artscroll. He
is also included as one of the commentaries in Artscroll’s popular version of
the Pentateuch, Scherman (ed.), Chumash: Stone Edition, in the new Mikraot
gedolot ‘haketer’, published by Bar Ilan University Press, and in Otsar
harishonim, published with the approbations of such noted authorities as R.
Jehiel Mikhel Feinstein, R. Samuel Wosner, and R. Ya’akov Perlow.
25 Tahafut al-tahafut, 103. See H. A. Wolfson, Studies, i. 376–7.
26 W. Z. Harvey, ‘Third Approach’, 77. Barzilay, Delmedigo, 198–203,
believes that R. Joseph Solomon Delmedigo also held this position. To
arrive at this conclusion, one must regard the many pages in which
Delmedigo defends the philosophical soundness of this approach (Novelot
ḥokhmah, 80 ff.) as representing his true view, and ignore his assertion (ibid.
107a–b) that, despite all that he has written, the Torah does indeed teach
creation in time.
27 See W. Z. Harvey, ‘Third Approach’, 83 n. 23.
28 ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 1.
29 See Ibn Kaspi, commentary on Guide ii. 13; W. Z. Harvey, ‘The
Mishneh Torah’, 20–2; Kellner, ‘Literary Character’, 33–4.
30 See Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom, 120–5.
31 Ch. 3, 7b–8a.
32 Guide ii. 26. See also ibid. 30 for a rabbinic passage citing R. Judah
and R. Abahu which Maimonides believes might refer to the eternity of
time. According to him, eternity of time also means the eternity of the
world.
33 According to V. Aptowitzer, some of the sages believed that light is a
sort of prime matter. See his ‘Zur Kosmologie’. For a rejection of this view
see Altmann, Studies, ch. 5.
34 Ohev mishpat, 14b–15a.
 35 Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 2.
36 See Nahmanides, Kitvei ramban, ii. 494 (commentary on Song of
Songs 3: 9); Scholem, Studies, 28.
37 See Altmann, Studies, 139; Gottlieb, Studies, 82–3.
38 Even when kabbalists speak of creation ex nihilo, they mean creation
out of God. ‘This Nothing from which everything has sprung is by no means a
mere negation; only to us does it present no attributes because it is beyond
the reach of intellectual knowledge. In truth, however, this Nothing— to
quote one of the Kabbalists—is infinitely more real than all other reality. . . .
For this Nothing comprises a wealth of mystical reality although it cannot be
defined’: Scholem, Major Trends, 25. See also id., ‘Kabbalah’, 562–3.
39 Guide ii. 25. He does not say what these other writings are, but is
undoubtedly referring to the other books of the Bible and rabbinic literature.
40 Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, 291, 295. R. Simeon ben Tsemah
Duran, Ohev mishpat, 15a–15b, goes further than Maimonides and claims
that, if necessary, he could even reinterpret the Torah in accord with the
Aristotelian view that the world is eternal. See Kellner, Dogma, 257 n. 70.
41 Interpreting Maimonides, 291.
42 Commentary on Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 3, 15 (found in the standard
editions).
43 The contradiction between Guide ii. 13, where Maimonides claims that
from a religious standpoint Plato’s view does not differ from Aristotle’s, and
Guide ii. 25 has been dealt with by a number of authors. See most recently
Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, 290–6.
44 See Ravitzky, ‘Philosophy’, 221 ff.
45 Maimonides’ words of praise for Ibn Tibbon were recorded by his son.
See Lichtenberg, Kovets, iii. 16c. This comment does not, however, appear in
any of the three manuscripts used by Reuven Margaliyot in his edition of R.
Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot hashem: see ibid. 53 n. 17. R. Solomon b.
Abraham of Montpellier, Maimonides’ great opponent, writes that Ibn
Tibbon revealed that which Maimonides had concealed. See Solomon’s ‘No.
7: A Copy of the Letter’, 100, and Halberstamm (ed.), Letters, 52.
46 Commentary on Guide i. 9, ii. 13.
47 Ma’aseh nisim, 223.
48 Commentary on Guide i. 9.
49 Commentary on Guide i. 9. See also A. I. Kook, Otsarot hare’iyah, ii.
945, for R. Kook’s reaction to this. Shem Tov’s opinion, while clearly
alluded to, is contradicted by an explicit statement in his commentary on
Guide ii, introduction, ‘Eighteenth Premise’. Like Maimonides, Shem Tov
made expert use of the method of contradictions.
50 Pirkei mosheh, 302–3; M.-R. Hayoun, Philosophie, 128 ff.
51 ‘Maimonides’ Secret’, 16–40. See also Samuelson, ‘Maimonides’
Doctrine’, 249–71.
52 ‘Question’, 372–87.
53 ‘Third Approach’; id., ‘The Mishneh Torah’, 15 ff.
54 See Guide i. 71.
55 Tikun hade’ot, 50–1.
56 ‘Philosophic Purport’, 5.
57 ‘Third Approach’, 76–7. See also id., ‘The Mishneh Torah’, 15 ff.
 FIVE

Only God is to be Worshipped

The Fifth Principle

HE FIFTH PRINCIPLE teaches that only God is to be worshipped.
T Stars, spheres, angels, and elements and their compounds
have no free will, and as such must not be used as intermediaries
to reach God.1 As Maimonides puts it, ‘our thoughts should be
directed towards Him, may He be exalted, and we should leave
aside everything else’. Apart from employing philosophical reasons
in support of this Principle, Maimonides would have been able to
point to a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 9: 1:

If a man who has a friend is faced with a time of distress, he does not enter
his [friend’s] house suddenly but goes and stands beside the courtyard door
of his protector and calls upon his [friend’s] servant or a member of his
family, who reports to him, ‘A certain person is standing outside.’ The Holy
One, blessed be He, is not so. Instead, He has said: ‘If a time of distress
comes upon you, appeal neither to Michael nor to Gabriel to answer you;
appeal to Me, and I will immediately answer you.’

There is no dispute among later authorities about the first part of

this Principle, namely, that only God is to be worshipped, but
there is a great deal of debate on Maimonides’ comment about
intermediaries.2 The Talmud discusses how angels bring man’s
prayers to God, concluding that therefore one should not pray in
Aramaic, as the angels do not understand this language.3 The
Talmud simply refers to prayers directed towards God, which are
then brought before him by the angels. While there is no
indication from this source that the person engaged in prayer has
the angels in mind, this is only a short step from actually asking
the angels to intercede on one’s behalf.
It is thus not surprising that such intercession is indeed found
in talmudic literature.4 For example, BT Berakhot 60b records a
prayer directed towards the angels upon entering the privy.5 BT
Sanhedrin 44b states: ‘Rabbi Johanan said: One should ever
implore mercy that all [heavenly beings] may support his effort [in
prayer] so that he may have no enemies on high.’ According to
Rashi and R. Samuel Strashun (1794–1872), this text refers to
requests for angelic assistance. Midrash tanḥuma6 portrays Moses
asking the earth, stars, mountains, valleys, sea, and the angel Sar
hapanim (Metatron) to intercede with God on his behalf.
It is possible that similar requests for angelic intercession led
the anti-Christian polemicist Celsus (second century) to believe
that contemporary Jews actually prayed to angels,7 though it is
also possible that some Jews did direct certain prayers to angels. In
later years we find that one of the ge’onim, either Sherira (c.906–
1006) or Hai (939–1038), defended the practice of requesting
favours from angels, either directly or through amulets.8 As is well
known, Jewish magical texts and amulets often invoke angels.9
Among rishonim, R. Eleazar ben Judah of Worms
(c.1165–c.1230),10 a leader of the Hasidei Ashkenaz, and R.
Zedekiah ben Abraham Anav (thirteenth century)11 defend the
practice of asking angels to intercede with God, citing rabbinic
sources to buttress this opinion. In line with this, a prayer
attributed to R. Jacob ben Meir (Rabenu Tam; c.1100–71)
begins, ‘I entreat you, Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael, that you
stand in prayer before the King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed
be He.’12 R. Samson Morpurgo (1681–1740) also defends this
practice, arguing that, since all power lies with God, there can be
no harm in asking the angels for assistance.13 The numerous other
sages who agree with this view include R. Israel Bruna (c.1400–
1480),14 R. Gedaliah Lipschuetz,15 R. Jacob Emden (1697–
1776),16 R. Judah Aszod (1794–1866),17 and R. Samson Raphael
Hirsch.18
It thus comes as no surprise that a number of commonly recited
seliḥot (penitential prayers) contain requests for angelic
assistance.19 For example, the seliḥah Makhnisei raḥamim, which
appears in the prayer book of R. Amram Gaon (821–75), includes
the plea ‘Angels of mercy, usher in [our petition for] mercy before
the Lord of mercy. . . . Intercede [for us] and multiply prayer and
entreaty before the King, the most high God. Mention before
Him, and let Him hear of the [observance of the] Torah and of
the good deeds [performed] by those who repose in the dust.’20 A
similar request for angelic intercession, recited during the
sounding of the shofar, is found in the Habad maḥzor.21 The best-
known request for angelic assistance is actually recited by many
Jews on a weekly basis, for it is found in the third paragraph of the
Friday night hymn Shalom aleikhem, which reads ‘Bless me for
peace, O angels of peace, angels of the Exalted One.’22 Also
noteworthy is the phrase in the Grace after Meals, which reads ‘On
high, may merit be pleaded upon them and upon us.’23
The following prayer is directed towards the angel Zevadyah
and appears in many contemporary hasidic and Sephardi prayer
books: ‘Zevadyah, preserve me and keep me alive; so shall it be
Thy will, Living God and King of the universe who has all living
things in His hand, Amen.’ The prayer, which first appears in R.
Raphael Immanuel Hai Ricchi’s Mishnat ḥasidim (Amsterdam,
1727)24 is supposed to be recited three times after Hallel on Rosh
Hodesh as a special prayer for long life. Recognizing the
problematic nature of this request, some prayer books instruct the
reader only to have the prayer in mind, rather than actually
verbalizing it. Other modern prayer books substitute ‘God’ for
‘Zevadyah’, thus solving the theological problem of addressing
prayers to angels. This emendation also makes the prayer
correspond to Psalm 41: 3: ‘The Lord preserve him and keep him
alive.’
Although he personally opposed all prayers directed towards
angels as a violation of Maimonides’ Fifth Principle, R. Samuel
Leib Kauders (1768–1838) recognized their history and
popularity, and was forced to conclude, ‘We must not regard all of
Israel as erring, God forbid, and in particular since the great ones
of the generation saw and heard this and did not protest, this
means that they did not regard the practice as forbidden.’25 In
other words, acceptance of Maimonides’ Fifth Principle was
regarded by him as a matter of choice, and this is how matters
stand today throughout the Orthodox world.
Although Maimonides includes as part of the Principle the
notion that angels do not have free will, there are numerous
sources that disagree with this. For example, BT Yoma 77a reports
that God punished the angel Gabriel for not fulfilling his
command properly. That one can have a philosophical bent and
still not share Maimonides’ view on this matter is apparent from
the fact that both R. Sa’adiah Gaon and R. Samuel ben Hofni
(died 1013) believed that angels have free will.26 R. Meir ben
Simeon of Narbonne, best known for his vitriolic attack on the
doctrine of the Sefirot, also asserted that angels have free will.27 Of
course, the very notion of requesting angelic assistance would
make no sense unless the angels possess this freedom.
Many important authorities, including R. Sherira Gaon (or R.
Hai Gaon),28 R. David Kimhi,29 R. Bahya ben Asher (died
c.1340),30 and R. Hayim ben Attar (1696–1743)31 even claim that
angels have the authority to alter their divine mission. Their proof
comes from the story of Lot (Gen. 19). After the angels tell Lot
that they are going to destroy the entire plain of Sodom and
Gomorrah, as God has commanded them, Lot asks them to spare
one of the cities so that he can flee to it. One of the angels replies,
‘See, I have accepted thee concerning this thing also, that I will
not overthrow the city of which thou hast spoken.’ Another
relevant passage, not noted by these scholars, is Genesis 32: 27,
where Jacob demands, and receives, the angel’s blessing. This too
shows that angels have free will and that they can make ‘on the
spot’ decisions independently of God.
R. Bahya further points out that there is an explicit biblical text
that supports the notion that angels can use their free will in
opposition to God’s plan. Job 4: 18 reads: ‘Behold, He putteth no
trust in his servants, and His angels He chargeth with folly.’ As if
this were not enough, R. Bahya even speaks of angels who ‘sin’,32
as does R. Hezekiah ben Abraham (fourteenth–fifteenth
centuries)33 and R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz (c.1690–1764).34 In
support of this notion, Eybeschuetz calls attention to the famous
High Holiday piyut, Unetaneh tokef, traditionally attributed to R.
Amnon of Mainz (tenth century), which reads: ‘Behold, it is the
Day of Judgement, to muster the heavenly host for judgement.’
Eybeschuetz remarks: ‘If there is punishment, there must be sin.’
Although he believes that angels have free will, Eybeschuetz also
agrees with some rabbinic sources that assert that angels do not
have an evil inclination.35 How then, he asks, could they come to
sin? He responds that their sins are not acts of rebellion, but rather
the product of good intentions. Equally uncomfortable with the
idea that angels can deliberately disobey God, R. Moses Hayim
Luzzatto (1707–46) claims that there are times when an angel is
not given full knowledge of his mission and has to exercise his
own free will, which sometimes leads to error.36
Although it undoubtedly makes many moderns uneasy, the idea
that angels can challenge and even rebel against God, as well as the
notion of ‘fallen angels’, can find support in a number of rabbinic
and zoharic texts,37 as well as in Philo.38 For example, Bereshit
rabah 50: 9 states: ‘Because the ministering angels revealed God’s
secrets, they were banished from their precincts for a hundred and
thirty-eight years. . . . Rabbi Hama ben Hanina said: [They were
punished] because they expressed themselves boastfully.’ The first
part of this midrash is cryptic, since it is not clear what secrets the
angels revealed. There is no confusion about the last part, which is
alluded to by Rashi;39 it refers to the idea that the angels
overreached themselves by taking personal responsibility for the
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, saying ‘for we will destroy
this place’ (Gen. 19: 13). In Devarim rabah 11: 10 we read how
‘two angels, Uzah and Azael, came down from near Thy Divine
Presence and coveted the daughters of the earth, and they
corrupted their way upon the earth until Thou didst suspend them
between earth and heaven.’ Confronted with the evidence, even as
modern a scholar as R. David Tsevi Hoffmann (1843–1921) is
forced to conclude that the belief in fallen angels is part of the
rabbinic tradition, accepting it even though he acknowledges that
it is difficult to understand.40
Although Maimonides considers these beliefs heretical and
would either reject or, more probably, interpret any objectionable
rabbinic passages allegorically,41 the sources quoted illustrate that
such views are part and parcel of the Jewish tradition and that
Maimonides’ Fifth Principle has not been accepted. As for
Maimonides’ opinion, it has been suggested (correctly) that his
views on this matter were influenced by Greek philosophy, and
‘we do not say that one is required to follow after and believe that
which Maimonides said as a philosopher.’42 R. Joseph Messas
(1892–1974) goes so far as to suggest that Maimonides did not
truly deny the validity of prayers containing requests for angelic
intercession. Rather, his opinion was only stated as a protective
measure (lemigdar milta) and was directed towards the masses of
his time, in order to prevent them from thinking that angels could
act independently of God, for good or bad. ‘But in our generation,
when there is no one who believes this’, Messas concludes that
even Maimonides would permit such prayers!43
 Leaving aside the obvious error of Messas’ assertion, his
comment is interesting for two reasons. First, it is a good
illustration of a common phenomenon in which post-
Maimonidean scholars attempt to bring Maimonides’ views, in
particular his philosophical views, into line with popular practice
and conceptions.44 Since Maimonides is such a central figure,
many regard this tactic as preferable to saying that Maimonides’
view should be rejected. (For those who were not satisfied with
explaining ‘problematic’ passages in Maimonides’ philosophical
works on an ad hoc basis, there arose, as early as medieval times,
the view that towards the end of his life Maimonides became a
kabbalist.45 Those who accepted this legend were no longer
troubled by Maimonides’ now irrelevant philosophical views.) The
second point of interest in Messas’ comment is his claim that
Maimonides did not actually accept everything he stated in the
Principles. This notion, that there are ‘necessary beliefs’ in the
Principles, is something I will return to in greater detail in my
discussion of the Eighth Principle.
Another opponent of Maimonides, although in a less extreme
way, is R. Nissim Gerondi (fourteenth century), who puts forth
the strange and original position that there is one particular angel
before whom prostration is permitted.46 R. Nissim makes this
claim in the course of explaining how it was that Joshua prostrated
himself before an angel (Josh. 5: 14), an act which should be
forbidden, just as it is forbidden to sacrifice an animal, burn
incense, or pour a libation to an angel. (Prostration, sacrifice,
incense-burning, and libation are the four forms of worship
singled out by the Talmud as always being forbidden, even if this
is not how the deity in question is usually worshipped.47) R.
Nissim does not suggest that prostration to an angel performed as
an act of honour is permitted, just as it is with humans.48 This is
probably because the Talmud (BT San. 61b) specifically exempts
prostration to humans from the prohibition if it is not done as an
act of worship.49 The implication is that prostration is by
definition to be regarded as a form of worship with regard to
angels. According to R. Nissim, however, there is one angel who
is special in this regard, and before whom one can prostrate
oneself. This is the angel spoken of in Exodus 23: 20–2,
concerning whom God says ‘My name is in him.’ It is because this
angel in some way shares an aspect of God’s divinity that it is
treated differently from the other angels. As R. Nissim put it,
‘Prostrating before him is as if one is prostrating before God.’
R. Menahem Recanati (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries)50 and
R. Joseph ben Solomon Alashkar (sixteenth century)51 offer an
alternative approach, suggesting that one is permitted to prostrate
oneself before an angel if it assumes human form, just as one is
permitted to do this in front of a real human. R. Isaiah of Trani
(the Elder) and Albo propose a different reason, claiming that one
may prostrate oneself before an angel, but only in recognition of
its role as a messenger of God.52
Before concluding this discussion of the Fifth Principle, it must
be noted that, despite the clarity of Maimonides’ formulation,
difficulties are presented by his other writings. Indeed, it appears
that Maimonides later changed his view from that expressed in this
Principle. In Guide ii. 7 he writes:

The spheres and the intellects apprehend their acts, choose freely, and
govern, but in a way that is not like our free choice and our governance,
which deal wholly with things that are produced anew. . . . All this indicates
that they apprehend their acts, and have will and free choice with regard to
the governance committed to them, just as we have will with regard to that
which from the foundation of our existence has been committed to us and
given over to our power.

This passage directly contradicts Maimonides’ statement in the

Fifth Principle, as well as in his letter to Obadiah the Proselyte,53
that the angels (= intellects54) and spheres have no free will. One
of the biblical prooftexts cited by Maimonides in the Guide is
already familiar to us—Genesis 19: 21, in which the angel, in
response to Lot’s request that he spare one of the cities of the
plain, replies, ‘See, I have accepted thee concerning this thing also,
that I will not overthrow the city of which thou hast spoken.’55
To be sure, the free will of which Maimonides is speaking is
different from human choice, for humans ‘sometimes do things
that are more defective than other things, and our governance and
our action are preceded by privations; whereas the intellects and
the spheres are not like that, but always do that which is good,
and only that which is good is with them.’56 Thus, the angels and
spheres have free will that they exercise consciously, yet they
always choose the same thing, the good. This means that, while
there is a theoretical difference between what Maimonides writes
in the Principles and what he writes in the Guide, there is no real
practical difference with regard to angelic actions. For our
purposes, however, the difference is quite significant, for in the
Principles Maimonides requires one to affirm a theological notion
that is contradicted by the Guide.
Maimonides also contradicts the Fifth Principle in the Mishneh
torah (‘Hilkhot tefilah’, 7: 5), where he records a talmudic ruling
(BT Ber. 60b): ‘Whenever one enters the privy, before entering, he
says, “Be honoured, holy honourable ones, servants of the Most
High. Guard me, guard me. Wait for me until I enter and come
out, as this is the way of humans”.’57 This prayer is directed to the
angels which are said to accompany every man; their protection is
needed at this point since the privy was regarded as a place
inhabited by demons (it would not be proper for the angels to
accompany one inside). Leaving aside the problems created by the
fact that Maimonides does not acknowledge the existence of
demons, and that in Guide iii. 22 he interprets the idea of two
angels accompanying every man to refer to the good and evil
inclinations, this halakhah stands in direct contradiction to his
admonition in the Fifth Principle not to turn to the angels, as ‘our
thoughts should be directed towards Him, may He be exalted, and
we should leave aside everything else’.58
Finally, there is one more place where Maimonides contradicts
the Fifth Principle. In his Essay on Martyrdom he speaks of God
punishing the ministering angels after they have criticized the
Jewish people.59 If angels do not act on their own, as Maimonides
states in this Principle, they obviously cannot be ‘punished’. Even
according to the Guide, which states that angels have free will,
they never exercise this will wrongly. This contradiction can
probably be explained by noting that Maimonides’ Essay on
Martyrdom is not a philosophically sophisticated treatise; rather, it
is a popular work designed to get a point across, and, as Haym
Soloveitchik has argued, it should be regarded as a work of
rhetoric. As he put it, the Essay on Martyrdom ‘aimed not at truth
but at suasion, at moving people by all means at hand toward a
given course of action’.60 Even without positing the existence of
an esoteric Maimonides, it is axiomatic in Maimonidean
scholarship that the opinions expressed in such popular works do
not necessarily represent Maimonides’ true view.

1 See also Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’, 2: 1. Since Maimonides

does not explicitly mention anything about asking the dead to intercede, I
have not discussed this subject, although it may be implicit in this
prohibition.
2 The most comprehensive discussion is Sprecher, ‘Controversy’.
3 BT Shab. 12b, Sot. 33a. Not willing to countenance any intermediaries
between God and man, Maimonides omitted this from the Mishneh torah:
see my ‘Maimonidean Halakhah’, 81. However, it is regarded as halakhah by
numerous other authorities, including Shulḥan arukh, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, 101: 4.
4 Numerous sources are found in the writings of those who permit the
practice. See especially Medini, Sedei ḥemed, viii. 288 ff. (‘Ma’arekhet rosh
hashanah’, 1: 2); Zunz, Poesie, 148–51. A relevant midrashic text, which, as
far as I recall, has not been noted by earlier authors, is Eikhah rabah 2: 6
(brought to my attention by Rabbi Jay Zachter).
5 See my ‘Maimonidean Halakhah’, 102–4.
6 ‘Va’etḥanan’, 6.
7 Origen, Contra Celsum, i. 26 and v. 6.
8 See Lewin, Otsar hage’onim, Shabat: Teshuvot, 4–6, Ta’anit, 24; Sherira
Gaon, Teshuvot, no. 8 (see n. 1 regarding the authorship of this responsum).
9 See Gaster, Sword; Ḥarba demosheh; Trachtenberg, Jewish Magic, 97 ff.,
139 ff.; Baron, ‘A Unusual Excommunication Formula’, 32 (a request that
the wicked be cursed by angels); Swartz, ‘Scribal Magic’, 173 ff.; id.,
Scholastic Magic. A very strange anonymous work from the talmudic era,
Sefer harazim, explains how to invoke angels for a variety of purposes, but,
as Margulies shows in his introduction, this book is clearly sectarian.
10 See his responsum, published in Zachter, ‘Roke’ah’s Responsum’, 41–
6. See also ibid. 46 n. 32, where Zachter quotes a passage from R. Eleazar
b. Judah’s unpublished work Hashem in which the author offers a formula
for requesting angelic assistance.
11 Shibolei haleket, no. 282.
12 Hahn, Yosif omets, no. 484. See Kanarfogel, ‘Peering through the
Lattices’, 172–6.
13 Shemesh tsedakah, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, nos. 23–4.
14 She’elot uteshuvot, no. 275.
15 See his commentary on Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, ii. 28 (found in the
standard editions).
16 Mor uketsiah, no. 3.
17 Yehudah ya’aleh, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, no. 21.
18 See his responsum published in Sprecher, ‘Controversy’, 728.
19 See ibid. 707–9, for a list of such seliḥot.
20 Rosenfeld (trans. and ed.), Selichot, 21.
21 Maḥzor hashalem-ḥabad, 116.
22 Surprisingly, although there is a great deal of discussion in rabbinic
literature about the recitation of seliḥot that entreat the angels, the third
paragraph of Shalom aleikhem has not been the focus of much attention.
There were, however, some rabbinic figures who refused to say it, such as
the Vilna Gaon (Tosefet ma’aseh rav, She’elot, no. 128); R. Hayim of
Volozhin (see Katzenellenbogen, Sha’arei raḥamim, 9a, no. 26), and R.
David Feinstein (see Feinstein, Igerot mosheh, viii. 146).
 23 . See Y. D. Berg’s note in Beit aharon veyisra’el, 14
(Nisan–Iyar, 5754/1994), 109. See, however, Sprecher, ‘Controversy’, 710
n. 14, who claims that this prayer is not directed to the angels and should be
interpreted as a prayer to God that he should command the angels to plead
merit on our behalf.
24 Page 100a in the Brooklyn, NY, 1975 reprint.
25 Olat shemuel, no. 88.
26 See Greenbaum, ‘Shmuel Hofni Gaon’s Commentary’, 276–9.
27 See Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom, 124 n. 23.
28 See above, n. 8.
29 Commentary on Gen. 19: 21, 32: 29.
30 Commentary on Gen. 3: 6, 19: 13, Exod. 23: 20. For the ‘fallen
angels’ motif in R. Bahya, see Lipshitz, Studies-Bahya ben Asher, 33.
31 Commentary on Gen. 19: 20.
32 Commentary on Gen. 3: 6.
33 Malki’el, 13 ff.
34 Ya’arot devash, i. 15b–16a (Derush 2).
35 See Bereshit rabah 48: 11, Vayikra rabah 24: 8; Moses of Coucy, Sefer
mitsvot gadol, introduction to positive commandments.
36 Ginzei ramḥal, 40–1. See, similarly, Sefer ḥasidim, no. 530. Luzzatto’s
position is not entirely clear, for while he claims that angels can only err
through lack of knowledge but not through sin, on page 40 he says that
Samael rebelled against God.
37 See Jung, Fallen Angels; Marmorstein, ‘Discussion’; B. J. Bamberger,
Fallen Angels; Schulz, ‘Angelic Opposition’; Lauterbach, Studies, 149 ff.;
Schäfer, Rivalität; Bodoff, ‘Real Test’, 90–2; Altmann, Essays, ch. 1; M.
Kasher, Torah shelemah, Gen. 6: 2. Modern scholars agree that the ‘fallen
angels’ motif is the product of non-Jewish influence.
 38 See H. A. Wolfson, Philo, i. 382 ff.
39 Commentary on Gen. 19: 22.
40 Commentary, 133.
41 He would do the same for all the examples assembled in Aptowitzer,
‘Rewarding’. According to Maimonides, since there is no providence for
individual animals, there can be no reward and punishment. See Guide iii.
17. For those who disagreed, including Sa’adiah Gaon, see Malter, Saadia
Gaon, 210 n. 482.
42 See the anonymous responsum published by Lampronte, Paḥad yitsḥak,
vii. 37b, 53b (s.v. tserakhav; the quotation comes from the second reference).
The discussion of this issue in Paḥad yitsḥak extends to fifty pages.
43 Mayim ḥayim, no. 159.
44 See my ‘Maimonidean Halakhah’, 73, concerning R. Hayim Eleazar
Shapira’s view that Maimonides did not really reject the existence of demons
and other supernatural phenomena. As with Messas, he argues that
Maimonides’ comments in this regard were only directed towards the
masses.
45 See Scholem, ‘From Scholar to Kabbalist’; Shmidman, ‘On
Maimonides’ “Conversion” ’. The other tactic is to deny that Maimonides
wrote the Guide; see above, Ch. 1 n. 77, for a claim to this effect by R.
Jacob Emden. R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira also denied the authenticity of
certain sections of the Guide: see id., Divrei torah, vii. no. 70.
46 Derashot haran, 57–8.
47 BT San. 60b. See Maimonides, Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’,
2: 1, 3: 3, 6: 8.
48 This approach is, however, adopted by R. Isaiah of Trani (the Elder) in
Kuntres hare’ayot, 57–8, and Abarbanel, Rosh amanah, ch. 12.
49 R. Aaron Samuel of Kremenets (d. c.1620) put forth the bold view
that one can indeed prostrate oneself as an act of worship before a tsadik.
Since the tsadik is infused with God’s divinity, one who does this is not
worshipping the tsadik per se, but rather the divinity within him. See id.,
Nishmat adam, 100. This strange text has been a focus of dispute in the
current debate over the religious legitimacy of Habad messianism; see
Berger, Rebbe, 165–6.
50 Commentary, Exod. 20: 3. See also the similar justification of R.
Abraham b. Eliezer Halevi, ‘Ruling’, 144, and the discussion of Halevi’s
view in Robinson, ‘Abraham’, 208 ff.
51 See Abrams, ‘Boundaries’, 315–16. In this article Abrams offers a
comprehensive discussion of the ambiguous figure of Metatron, who at
times is portrayed as the highest angel and to whom prayers are addressed.
52 Isaiah of Trani, Kuntres hare’ayot, 57–8; Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, ii. 28.
Halperin, Ḥemdah genuzah, 39 n. 121, points out that this opinion is the
same as the heretical error of Enosh and his generation, as described by
Maimonides, Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’, 1: 1. R. Abraham b.
Eliezer Halevi, ‘Ruling’, 148, rejects this approach, for if it is correct, one
should then be able to offer sacrifices, libations, or incense to angels under
the same pretext, which he regards as an absurd proposition.
53 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 236.
54 According to Maimonides, the angels are identical with the Aristotelian
‘separate intellects’ (or ‘intelligences’ (sekhalim nifradim/nivdalim)): see Guide
ii. 6; Blumberg, ‘Separate Intelligences’. Maimonides also states that natural
and psychic forces are referred to as angels, as well as prophets and those
with ‘all the intellectual and moral virtues’. See his commentary on Mishnah
Avot, 5: 13; Guide ii. 6–7, 42.
55 See Shem Tov’s comment ad loc., which discusses Maimonides’ use of
this verse.
 56 Guide ii. 7.
57 I discuss this passage in ‘Maimonidean Halakhah’, 102–4.
58 For R. Meir b. Simeon of Narbonne’s attempt to explain this halakhah
in a Maimonidean fashion, see S. E. Stern (ed.), Me’orot harishonim, 32–3.
59 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 36.
60 H. Soloveitchik, ‘Maimonides’ Iggeret’, 306.
 SIX

Prophecy and the Uniqueness of Moses

The Sixth and Seventh Principles

HESE PRINCIPLES teach the existence of prophecy, and that
T Moses was the greatest prophet who ever lived. He
prophesied with intellect alone, without the imaginative faculty
playing any role.1 In addition to listing four ways in which Moses’
prophecy differed from that of all other prophets,2 the Seventh
Principle also includes the belief that no prophet as great as Moses
will ever arise again. ‘He reached a greater understanding of God
than anyone who has lived or will ever live.’ Thus even the
messiah is not regarded as Moses’ prophetic equal, and elsewhere
Maimonides says explicitly that the messiah will approach, but not
surpass, Moses’ level.3
There are, to be sure, great disputes about the nature of
prophecy,4 but no thinker denies it outright. Indeed, to do so
would be to reject the notion that Judaism is a revealed religion.
As to the unsurpassed greatness of Moses’ prophecies, most see
this as established in Deuteronomy 34: 10, a verse which
seemingly could only have been written many years after Moses’
generation: ‘And there has not arisen a prophet since in Israel like
unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face’ (
 ). This notion is widely
assumed in talmudic and midrashic literature, though there is a
talmudic passage, concerning Ezra, and a couple of strange
midrashim, dealing with Balaam and Samuel,5 that seem to take a
different approach.
On Ezra, BT Sanhedrin 21b states:

It has been taught: Rabbi Jose said: Had Moses not preceded him, Ezra
would have been worthy of having the Torah presented to Israel through
him. Of Moses it is written, And Moses went up unto God (Exod. 19: 3), and
of Ezra it is written He, Ezra, went up from Babylon (Ezra 7: 6). As the going
up of the former refers to the receiving of the Torah, so does the going up
of the latter. Concerning Moses, it is stated: And the Lord commanded me at
that time to teach you statutes and judgements (Deut. 4: 14) and concerning
Ezra, it is stated: For Ezra had prepared his heart to expound the law of the Lord,
to do it and to teach Israel statutes and judgements (Ezra 7: 10).

This passage certainly seems to imply that Ezra was as great a

prophet as Moses.6 While the text itself is careful to state only that
Ezra would have been worthy of receiving the Torah, R. Joseph
Messas declares: ‘This shows that Ezra was equal to Moses, and if
he had preceded Moses, it [i.e. the Torah] would have been given
through him.’7
On Balaam, there is a famous passage in Bamidbar rabah 14:
34:

It was taught: And there has not arisen a prophet since in Israel (Deut. 34: 10):
In Israel there has not arisen one like him, but there has arisen one like him
among the nations of the world. This was in order that the nations of the
world might have no excuse for saying, ‘Had we possessed a prophet like
Moses we would have worshipped the Holy One, blessed be He.’ What
prophet did they have who was like Moses? Balaam the son of Beor.

The midrash continues by enumerating three ways in which

Moses’ prophecy surpassed that of Balaam, as well as three ways in
which Balaam surpassed Moses. For example, God only spoke
‘face to face’ with Moses. On the other hand, Balaam spoke to
God whenever he wished, which was not the case with Moses.8
Although many post-talmudic authorities reinterpret this midrash
so that Balaam is no longer regarded as Moses’ equal,9 there are
those who do indeed take it in its simple sense. For example, R.
Samuel of Rushino (twelfth century) quotes the midrash without
comment.10 Abarbanel states plainly that Maimonides’ Principle
contradicts this rabbinic teaching about Balaam.11 Among post-
talmudic authorities who disagree with Maimonides with regard
to prophets other than Balaam and the messiah is R. Abraham
Hayim Viterbo (seventeenth century). In the midst of his polemic
against Maimonides concerning the immutability of the Torah,12
Viterbo states that God may indeed speak to us by means of a
prophet as great as Moses.13 In another instance of conflict with
this Principle, R. Kalonymus Kalman Epstein (died 1823) writes
that, with proper preparation, ‘anyone can reach Moses’
[prophetic] grasp’.14
The issue becomes more complicated in relation to the messiah.
It must be remembered that Deuteronomy 34: 10, cited above, is
speaking of the past and says nothing about a future prophet.15
According to a midrashic tradition the messiah ‘shall be more
exalted than Moses’.16 Although one can perhaps quibble about
the exact meaning of the word ‘exalted’, there seems to be no
question that this midrash opposes Maimonides’ Principle, since
the Seventh Principle includes the belief that Moses achieved the
highest perfection possible for a human being. Indeed, both
Albo17 and R. Tsevi Hirsch Chajes18 understand this passage as
contradicting the Principle. Nahmanides clearly disagrees with the
Principle, for he says that the messiah will attain a more complete
knowledge of God than Moses.19 Gersonides also disagrees with
Maimonides, for he believes that the messiah will equal, and even
surpass, Moses’ level of prophecy.20 R. Hayim ben Attar (1696–
1743), while not coming to any definitive conclusion, leaves this
open as a possibility.21
It is interesting to see how Gersonides uses the verse ‘And there
has not arisen a prophet since in Israel’, which Maimonides and
others see as a proof that no future prophet can surpass Moses.
Gersonides focuses on the words ‘in Israel’, which he believes are a
clear proof that a prophet like Moses will arise among the nations.
After explaining why this prophet could not be Balaam, he
concludes that the messiah is intended, for he will not simply be a
prophet for Israel but for the nations as well. Thus, the verse
means that, while a prophet like Moses will not arise in Israel, that
is, to prophesy for Israel exclusively, one will arise to prophesy for
both Israel and the nations.
Finally, I must mention R. Isaac Luria’s view that Moses’
understanding of divine matters was inferior to that of certain
kabbalists (including himself!). This notion is elaborated upon by
R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady (1745–1813), who asks, ‘How did
Rabbi Isaac Luria, of blessed memory, apprehend more than he,
and expound many themes dealing with the highest and most
profound levels [penimiyut], even of many Sefirot?’ According to
R. Shneur Zalman, because Moses only used prophetic powers he
was not able to reach the heights of R. Simeon bar Yohai, Luria,
and other kabbalists, who attained their understanding through
wisdom and knowledge (ḥokhmah veda’at). According to R.
Shneur Zalman, this means that, while these kabbalists had a more
profound understanding of divine matters, none of them actually
reached Moses’ prophetic level. Thus, there is no conflict with
Deuteronomy 34: 10, since this verse only states only that another
prophet as great as Moses will never arise again.22
According to R. Shneur Zalman, this superior understanding of
the kabbalists in comparison to Moses explains the talmudic
saying, ‘A wise man is better than a prophet.’23 R. Shneur Zalman
comments: ‘Because by his wisdom he can apprehend exceedingly
beyond the levels that can descend netherwards in a mode of
revelation to the prophets in the vision of their prophecy. For only
the lowest ranks can descend and become revealed to them.’24 Yet
Maimonides’ Principle includes the notion that Moses ‘reached a
greater understanding of God than anyone who has lived or will ever
live’. The assertion that certain kabbalists were privy to exalted
theological matters of which Moses, for whatever reason, was
ignorant is thus clearly a violation of Maimonides’ Principle.

1 See also Guide ii. 36, 45 (end).

2 Shamir, ‘Allusions’, 216 ff., and Kraemer, ‘Naturalism’, 72–3, have
argued that Maimonides’ distinctions between prophets (which are also
repeated in Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 7: 6) are directed
against Muslim views of Muhammad. However, everything Maimonides
records has a basis in Bamidbar rabah 14: 34.
3 ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 9: 2; Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 106 (Arabic), 154–5
(Hebrew). See also Guide i. 54: ‘For what has been apprehended by
[Moses], peace be on him, has not been apprehended by anyone before him
nor will it be apprehended by anyone after him.’ The same formulation is
found in ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 1: 10 and Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 90
(Arabic), 126–7 (Hebrew). See also Guide ii. 35, 39.
4 For medieval discussion of the issue, see most recently Kreisel, Prophecy.
5 On Samuel, see Ginzberg, Legends, vi. 228–9. See also Septimus, ‘Piety’,
199, 209–10.
6 See Kellner, Maimonides, 14.
7 Naḥalat avot, vol. v, pt. 1, p. 298.
8 This midrash and its variants are discussed in Heschel, Theology, ii. 328–
32. See also Urbach, From the World of the Sages, 537–55.
9 See e.g. Nahmanides, commentary on Num. 24: 1; id., Kitvei ramban, i.
265; Menahem Recanati, commentary on Num. 22: 2 (printed in Jaffe,
Levushei or yekarot, 283 ff.); Efodi on Guide ii. 35; Gersonides, commentary
on Num., 136; I. Arama, Akedat yitsḥak, Num., Gate 85; Bahya b. Asher,
commentary on Num. 24: 4; Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 20; Abarbanel,
commentary on Deut. 34: 10; Eybeschuetz, Ya’arot devash, ii. 7a (Derush
2); Meklenburg, Haketav vehakabalah, on Deut. 34: 1.
10 Sefer rushino on Deut. 34: 10.
11 Commentary on Guide ii. 35. An alternative approach appears in his
commentary on Deut. 34: 10.
12 See Ch. 8 n. 22.
13 Emunat ḥakhamim, 28b.
 14 Maor vashemesh, 255 (‘Terumah’).
15 Although Maimonides does not mention this verse in the Principle, he
does mention it in Guide ii. 35. Abarbanel, in his commentary ad loc., notes
that were it a real prooftext, the verse would have said, ‘There will never
again arise a prophet in Israel like unto Moses’. See Reines, Maimonides and
Abrabanel, 68 n. 18. For explanations as to why Deut. 34: 10 also refers to
the future, see Hayim b. Attar, Or haḥayim, ad loc.; Maimonides, Letters, ed.
Kafih, 51 n. 28. They both claim that the word refers to the past, and that
refers to the future. According to R. Nissim Gerondi, the word is
actually a participle and refers to both past and future. See Derashot haran,
49. Surprisingly, none of these sources notes that the Talmud, BT RH 21b,
understands Deut. 34: 10 as referring to the future. For another approach,
see Hayim of Volozhin, Nefesh haḥayim, iii. 14.
16 Midrash tanḥuma, ed. S. Buber, i. 70a.
17 Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 20.
18 Kol sifrei, ii. 527.
19 See Kitvei ramban, i. 322–3. Referring to Abraham, Moses, and the
heavenly angels, Nahmanides writes: ‘None of them approaches the
knowledge of God as closely as the messiah.’
20 See his Commentary on Num. (pp. 136–7), Deut. (pp. 344–5, 352);
and the comprehensive discussion in Kellner, ‘Gersonides on Miracles’, 9 ff.
(English section).
21 Or haḥayim on Lev. 19: 2.
22 Likutei amarim, ‘Igeret hakodesh’, no. 19.
23 BT BB 12a.
24 Likutei amarim, ‘Igeret hakodesh’, no. 19.
 SEVEN

Revelation of the Torah

The Eighth Principle

HE EIGHTH PRINCIPLE teaches that the Torah was divinely
T revealed and that the Torah in our hands is exactly the same
as the Torah that Moses presented to the Children of Israel. In
addition, there is no difference in holiness between any parts of
the Pentateuch. The Principle also declares that the Oral Law is
likewise of divine origin.1
There has never been dispute about the Written and Oral Laws
being divinely inspired, but agreement ends at that. J. David
Bleich has correctly noted that ‘this principle is, in effect, an
affirmation of the authenticity of the Masoretic text’.2 It is also
much more than that. The Principle declares that the Masoretic
text established by Aaron ben Moses ben Asher (tenth century) is,
in its entirety, of Mosaic authorship.3 Consequently, it suggests,
there is no such thing as a history of the pentateuchal text, that is,
of the development of the textus receptus. As with the other
Principles, one who denies this, or even expresses doubt with
regard to it, is a heretic with no share in the world to come.4
In popular circles this aspect of the Principle is often repeated
dogmatically as if traditional Judaism is unimaginable without it.
For example, J. Newman writes: ‘The version [of the Torah] in
our hands today is identical with that which Moses received. . . .
[T]he entire text, in every detail, now in our possession is the one
given to Moses at Sinai.’5 Louis I. Rabinowitz writes: ‘The
Masoretic text is the sole textus receptus of the Torah. All other
readings represent man-altered variations from that authentic
text.’6 Avraham Kushelevsky writes: ‘The text of the Torah has
been preserved as it was given more than 3,000 years ago, without
an addition or deletion of a verse, a single word, or even a single
letter.’7 The intricate system of ‘codes’ which was discovered in the
Masoretic text, popularized by Orthodox proselytizers, and made
famous through Michael Drosnin’s bestseller, The Bible Code,8
depends on this Principle for its validity. As Drosnin puts it: ‘All
Bibles in the original Hebrew language that now exist are the
same letter for letter. . . . The Bible code computer program uses
the universally accepted original Hebrew text. Therefore, there is no
question that information about today’s world is encoded in a
book that existed at least 1000 years ago, and almost certainly
2000 years ago, in exactly the same form it exists today.’9
Nevertheless, there are a number of points, based only upon
traditional sources, which make this aspect of the Principle
extremely problematic. As Herbert Loewe put it: ‘It stands or falls
by an absolutely uniform text. If the manuscripts of the textus
receptus differ in one single iota, the doctrine is irreparably
shattered. Which, in that case, was the reading revealed to Moses
and recorded by him?’10 As quoted above, this Principle is seen to
affirm the Masoretic text. Yet strictly speaking, there is no such
thing as the Masoretic text. One can only speak of the texts
established by various Masoretic scholars, which differed in minor
details. Technically speaking, all of these disparate texts must be
termed ‘Masoretic’.11 It is thus only natural that Me’iri, to mention
one example of many, speaks of ‘Masoretic works’, rather than of a
single Masoretic text.12 In fact, he could not have spoken of the
Masoretic text because this characterization is not part of
traditional Jewish terminology, but is, rather, a relatively recent
invention of printers and editors.13 When we currently speak of
the Masoretic text or the textus receptus, we refer to the edition of
the Bible edited in 1525 by the future apostate Jacob ben Hayim
(c.1470–c.1538), including the corrections made to it by the
Masoretic scholars R. Menahem de Lonzano (1550–c.1620) and
R. Yedidyah Solomon Norzi (1560–1616).14 Before this time,
pentateuchal texts, even though they can be termed Masoretic,
were not united around a single text.
As early as talmudic times, it was understood that the
Babylonian rabbis were no longer aware of the proper defective
and plene spellings.15 According to such outstanding sages as R.
Isaiah Horowitz (c.1565–1630),16 R. Tsevi Hirsch Ashkenazi
(1660–1718),17 R. Jacob Reischer (c.1670–1733),18 and R.
Moses Feinstein (1895–1986),19 this explains why R. Moses
Isserles (c.1530–72) ruled that if such an error is found in a Torah
scroll, there is no need to take a new one out of the ark.20
Although, as a practical matter, scribes are instructed to write
these words in a certain way, since we do not truly know how
defective and plene words should appear, the new Torah scroll will
not necessarily be any better than the first. The upshot of all this is
that, as Feinstein writes, ‘the kashrut of our Torah scrolls is not so
certain’. Not surprisingly, Masoretic biblical manuscripts exhibit a
good deal of variety in this regard, and there is no consistent
orthography.21
Similarly, it was recognized long ago that a number of
quotations from the biblical text, including the Pentateuch, found
in the Talmud and Midrashim differ from the accepted
(Masoretic) text.22 In a famous responsum, R. Solomon ben Adret
(Rashba, c.1235–c.1310) discussed when Torah scrolls should be
corrected in accordance with the Talmud’s pentateuchal text.23 As
R. Jacob Hagiz (1620–74) points out, these differences are not
simply in matters of defective and plene, but even extend to actual
words.24 There are numerous examples of this, and one of them is
even found in the Ten Commandments, a text that one would
have assumed would not exhibit alternative versions, because of its
great significance and popularity. Yet this is not so: according to
the Jerusalem Talmud, Sukah 4: 3, the very first verse of the
Decalogue reads: , although our
versions of the Decalogue, in both Exodus and Deuteronomy,
have .
It is well known that medieval authorities also had differing
versions of the Pentateuch,25 and we often have manuscript
evidence to support these readings. Even R. Samuel David
Luzzatto, who doubts that there were any differences in medieval
Torah scrolls and attributes all variations to memory lapses, has to
admit that this can only be said from the period of the Masoretes
onwards. Before this time, however, even he admits that variations
occurred in the text.26 R. Aryeh Loeb Guenzberg (1695–1785)
and R. Eleazar Fleckeles (1754–1826) advance the startling view
that, as far as biblical law is concerned, Jews are no longer
required to fulfil the commandment of writing a Torah scroll,
since it can no longer be carried out properly because of
uncertainty about defective and plene spellings.27 Fleckeles and R.
Moses Sofer (1762–1839) both cite this uncertainty as the reason
why no blessing is said before writing a Torah scroll. Perhaps the
Talmud’s version is correct, which would mean that the Torah
scroll being written would actually be invalid.28
Scholars have also called attention to textual variations in the
Dead Sea Scrolls, Samaritan Pentateuch, Septuagint, Peshitta, and
Targumim.29 To be sure, many of these variants are due to scribal
errors, and with regard to the translations, it is often difficult to
know whether we are confronted with a different textual tradition
or whether the translator has simply taken liberties with the text.
However, there is universal agreement that at least some of the
examples do reflect traditions at variance with the Masoretic text.30
In fact, with regard to the Dead Sea Scrolls it is incorrect simply
to speak of alternative readings, since the reality is more
significant. For example, the text of the books of Exodus and
Numbers preserved in the Dead Sea Scrolls (and often paralleled
in the Samaritan version), shows us that there were basically two
editions of these books in Second Temple times.31 The Dead Sea
Scrolls version of these books is quite expansive, and is without
question an elaboration of a version similar to what we call the
Masoretic text, but this certainly does not mean that we can
dismiss all the textual variants found in the Scrolls.32
Indeed, that there were differences in pentateuchal texts in
Temple days is indisputable. It was because of this that R. Akiva
and R. Ami emphasized the importance of using a corrected
text.33 According to a number of midrashic sources, R. Meir
himself had a Torah text that differed from that of his colleagues.34
For example, while the standard version of Genesis 1: 31 reads:
‘And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was
very good’ ( ), R. Meir’s text read: ‘Behold, death was good’ (
).35 The standard version of Genesis 3: 21 reads ‘garments of
skin’ ( ), but R. Meir’s text read ‘garments of light’ ( ).
According to Nahmanides, the former example was not the result
of an error made by an ignorant scribe, but rather R. Meir himself
was responsible for the variant.36 In fact, it is possible that R.
Meir’s scroll was related to the so-called Severus scroll mentioned
in Bereshit rabati. This midrash lists a number of textual variants
found in a Torah scroll which ‘came out of Jerusalem in captivity
and went up to Rome and was stored in the synagogue of
Severus’. These variants include additions and deletions of letters
and even an occasional word. Some of them correspond to what
appeared in R. Meir’s text.37
R. Isaac Safrin agrees with Nahmanides that R. Meir was
responsible for writing ‘garments of light’ in his scroll, and he
offers a kabbalistic reason for this. According to him every Jew has
an obligation to write a Torah scroll in accordance with the ‘root’
of his soul. Since the word corresponded to the root of R.
Meir’s soul, this was what he wrote. In what appears to be a
unique halakhic position, Safrin states that while a Torah scroll
which contains the word should be changed to agree with the
standard reading, even without the change it remains a kosher
scroll which can be used in the synagogue. Safrin also claims that
all of the disagreements over defective and plene spellings, as well
as over the occasional letter, actually go back to the revelation at
Sinai. Whereas Maimonides establishes as dogma that Moses
received the Torah, gave it to the children of Israel, and that it is
this very Torah which is in use today, Safrin claims that Moses
received the Torah together with all the variants. He also states
that Moses gave each tribe a different Torah, each one in
accordance with the root of that tribe’s soul.38
Faced with all the textual differences, even Maimonides’ son R.
Abraham agreed that there was no authoritative text, and he was
therefore unwilling to invalidate scrolls that differed from
Maimonides’ prescriptions.39 Maimonides’ establishment of the
authority of the Ben Asher Masoretic text as dogma means that
the sages of the Talmud and Midrash, the Babylonian Masoretes,40
and countless medieval scholars stand in opposition to
Maimonides’ Principle, thus making them heretics! Even today the
Yemenites have a slightly different text from that used by the rest
of Jewry.41 It is thus impossible to speak about the Torah ‘found
in our hands today’ without clarifying that there is no such single
text. Considering all that has been mentioned with regard to the
non-uniformity of the Torah text, it should not be surprising that
R. Jacob Kamenetzky (1891–1986) argued that perhaps
Maimonides’ text of the Pentateuch differed from the one in use
today.42 In fact, with the publication of Jordan Penkower’s
monograph on the Aleppo Codex, we see that the letters in
Maimonides’ pentateuchal text (the Ben Asher text) were identical
to those of the current Yemenite text.43 This means that if
contemporary Ashkenazim and Sephardim accept Maimonides’
Eighth Principle with regard to their versions of the Pentateuch,
they stand condemned as heretics by Maimonides himself for
refusing to accept his version as the proper one.44
Rabbinic sources speak of tikunei soferim, that is, textual
changes introduced by the Scribes, some of which concern the
Torah.45 The unifying characteristic of almost all of these passages
is that before the ‘correction’ the biblical verse could be regarded
as offensive to God or grossly anthropomorphic. A famous
example, recorded in various early lists of the ‘corrections’, occurs
in Genesis 18: 22: ‘The men turned from thence and went toward
Sodom, but Abraham stood yet before the Lord.’ In truth, it was
God who came to Abraham, not the other way around, and
therefore the text should have said, ‘God stood yet before
Abraham.’ However, since this is offensive to God, for it is not
fitting to say that God was waiting for Abraham, the text was
‘corrected’.
According to Midrash tanhuma46 and Yalkut hamakhiri,47 it was
the Men of the Great Assembly who changed certain words in the
Torah. The anonymous Masoretic work Okhlah ve’okhlah (tenth
century?)48 and R. Joshua Falk (eighteenth century)49 credit Ezra
with the textual changes.50 R. Nathan ben Jehiel (d. 1106),51
Rashi,52 R. David Kimhi,53 various Masoretic notes,54 and Shemot
rabah as explained by the standard midrashic commentary Matnot
kehunah55 (which actually presents the peshat, the literal meaning
of the midrashic text), also state explicitly that the biblical text was
changed by the Scribes. Although missing from the standard
edition, there are some versions of Shemot rabah 13: 2 which
contain this explanation.56 R. Elijah Mizrahi (1450–1525) rejects
the notion that the various tikunei soferim are actual corrections in
the Torah text, but acknowledges that Genesis 18: 22 (mentioned
above) is different in nature from the other examples referred to in
rabbinic literature. In the case of this verse, he believes that the
Scribes actually did alter the Torah text.57
It is not important for us to determine whether this meaning of
tikun soferim is correct, since our primary focus remains the
sources that conflict with Maimonides’ Principle. Not surprisingly,
this view of the term was subject to harsh criticism by those who
refused to countenance that the Torah text could ever have been
purposely altered.58 According to their reading, the meaning of
tikun soferim is that the original biblical text contained the
euphemistic ‘scribal correction’, and it is referred to as such only to
show its similarity to what human scribes would be expected to do
in such cases. Saul Lieberman claims that the divergent views
about the nature of tikun soferim actually go back to rabbinic
times.59
There are other scholars who assert that the Torah’s text has
changed since Moses’ day. Ibn Ezra states that whether a word
was written defective or plene was left to the scribe, as it is the
sense of the word that is important, not its textual form.60 In line
with this, R. Samuel Tzartza (fourteenth century) explains that
according to Ibn Ezra, God dictated the Torah and Moses wrote it
down without paying any regard to defective or plene spellings.61
R. Joseph Solomon Delmedigo claims that whether a word is
defective or plene is not accidental, but is due to the wisdom of
the Masoretes.62 In the Pentateuch edited by R. Joseph H. Hertz
(1872–1946), widely used by Orthodox Jews, it is stated that the
alef in the first word of Leviticus ( ) is not part of the original
text but was added at a later date.63
 There is a well-known passage which appears with minor
variations in the Jerusalem Talmud,64 Avot derabi natan,65
Masekhet soferim (6: 4), and Sifrei devarim:66

Three books they found in the Temple court: the book , the book ,
and the book . In the one they found written and in the two
they found written (Deut. 33: 27), and they upheld the two and set
aside the one. In the one they found written and in the
two they found written (Exod. 24: 5) and they upheld the
two and set aside the one. In the one they found written nine times , and
in the two they found written eleven times , and they upheld the two and
set aside the one.

Obviously there is no reason why we should assume that the

texts that were in the majority were correct. However, as with all
halakhic decisions, objective ‘truth’ is set aside, and the decision of
the sages, in this case based on the majority principle, is
determinative. Indeed, R. David Kimhi,67 R. Profiat Duran,68
Me’iri,69 and R. Joseph ibn Waqar (fourteenth century)70 admit
that there were occasions when the rabbis could not determine the
proper text, and that this is why they instituted the keri ukhetiv (a
word read differently from the way in which it appears in the
text).71 As Kimhi puts it:

These variant words apparently developed because during the First Exile, the
texts were lost, the scholars were dispersed, and the Torah scholars died. The
Men of the Great Assembly who restored the Torah to its former state found
differences in the texts and followed the reading of those which they
believed to be in the majority. When they were unclear about this, they
wrote one version without pointing it, or they wrote it in the margin and
not in the text, or they wrote one version in the margin and one version in
the text.72

As can be imagined, despite the great efforts made by the sages,

not all difficulties were cleared up. This explains another passage
found in Bamidbar rabah 3: 13 and Avot derabi natan 34: 5, which
discusses the placing of dots over certain words in the Torah:

Wherefore are the dots? Thus said Ezra: ‘If Elijah will come and say, Why
have you written these words? I shall say unto him: I have already put dots
over them. And if he will say, thou hast written well, I shall remove the dots
over them.’

As David Weiss Halivni has observed, this passage ‘implies that

Ezra had the right to delete a word if he was sure of its
spuriousness’. In these instances he was unsure of the reliability of
the text, ‘but Elijah’s question to Ezra, “Why have you written
these words?” implies that Ezra possessed the power of textual
emendation’.73 According to R. Hayim Hirschensohn, it was not
only Ezra who doubted whether certain words should be included
in the Torah, but also the author of Targum Onkelos (the early
Aramaic translation of the Pentateuch) and the amora R. Yose.74
As for the use of dots to mark doubtful readings, Lieberman has
noted that this convention was also used by the Greek
grammarians of Alexandria.75
Acceptance of Maimonides’ Principle presumably means that
the extra inverted nuns at the end of the tenth chapter of Numbers
are also Mosaic. However, the unknown author of Ginzei
mitsrayim (eleventh century) quotes ‘some midrashim’ which state
that it was the sages who added the inverted nuns.76 R. Solomon
Luria describes twelve different ways of writing them, and adds
that the entire notion of inverted nuns has no basis in the Talmud
but is rather based on the kabbalah. Furthermore, according to
Luria, the way in which the inverted nuns are currently written,
with the addition of two extra letters, invalidates the Torah
scroll!77 In other words, there is no question according to Luria
and the midrashim referred to above that present-day Torah scrolls
are not identical to the Torah given to Moses.
Based on these sources, and many others not cited here, one
must conclude that acceptance of the Masoretic text as being
entirely of Mosaic authorship is neither compelling nor
‘Orthodox’, and by definition excludes the pentateuchal text
quoted in the Talmud. On this basis, R. Hayim Hirschensohn
declares that it is not heretical to believe that our pentateuchal text
suffers from corruptions. Indeed, one’s thoughts in this regard are
even considered Torah study.78 This also leads Hirschensohn to
declare that there is no religious objection to Lower Biblical
Criticism.79 The issue of which text is ‘correct’ is thus viewed
separately from the issue of which text appears in our Torah
scrolls. It is only the latter which has been sanctified by halakhah,
and this halakhic decision follows its own rules, which do not
correspond to how a biblical scholar would determine which text
is original.80 As R. Abraham ben Mordekhai Halevi (seventeenth
century) states, once the halakhah has been decided we treat our
Torah text as if (ke’ilu) it is from Sinai, even though in reality it is
the product of our scholars’ decision.81
Up until this point I have only dealt with differences that either
crept into or were purposely inserted into a text which was of
Mosaic authorship. Yet what of Maimonides’ assertion that the
entire (original) Torah was revealed to Moses? This is certainly a
very popular notion in Orthodox circles. For example, in the
introduction to the Artscroll Pentateuch, which is now the
standard Pentateuch in many English-speaking Orthodox
synagogues, Rabbi Nosson Scherman writes with reference to this
Principle: ‘Rambam sets forth at much greater length the
unanimously held view that every letter and word was given to
Moses by God.’82
However, contrary to Scherman’s claim, Maimonides’ view is
hardly unanimously accepted. To begin with, we must note that
nowhere in the Bible does it state that Moses wrote the entire
Torah. In fact, as is pointed out by Israel Knohl in Megadim,83 an
Orthodox journal of biblical scholarship, there seems to be
evidence that the authors of the biblical books of Ezra and Daniel
did not regard Moses as having written the entire Torah. Ezra 9:
10–12 reads:

For we are bondsmen; yet our God hath not forsaken us in our bondage,
but hath extended mercy unto us in the sight of the kings of Persia, to give
us reviving, to set up the house of our God, and to repair the ruins thereof,
and to give us a fence in Judah and in Jerusalem. And now, O our God,
what shall we say after this? For we have forsaken Thy commandments
which Thou hast commanded by Thy servants the prophets, saying: The
land unto which ye go to possess it is an unclean land through the
uncleanness of the peoples of the lands, through their abominations,
wherewith they have filled it from one end to another in their filthiness.
Now therefore give not your daughters unto their sons, neither take their
daughters unto your sons, nor seek their peace or their prosperity for ever;
that ye may be strong, and eat the good of the land, and leave it for an
inheritance to your children for ever.

The prohibition against intermarrying with the inhabitants of

Canaan is stated in Exodus 34: 15–16 and Deuteronomy 7: 3–4,
yet the book of Ezra portrays this prohibition as originating with
the prophets, thus implying that the Torah also includes the words
of various post-Mosaic figures.
Knohl also points to Daniel 9: 10–11:

Neither have we hearkened to the voice of the Lord our God, to walk in His
laws [torotav], which He set before us by His servants the prophets. Yea, all
Israel have transgressed Thy law [toratekha], and have turned aside, so as not
to hearken to Thy voice; and so there hath been poured out upon us the
curse and the oath that is written in the Law of Moses [torat mosheh] the
servant of God, for we have sinned against Him.

According to Knohl, all three references to ‘Torah’ refer to the

same book. ‘God’s Torah is the Torah of Moses the servant of
God, and it also contains laws that were given into the hand of
“His servants the prophets”.’84
Turning to the Talmud, there is a tannaitic opinion, accepted
by a number of post-talmudic authorities, that the last eight verses
in the Pentateuch, which contain the account of Moses’ death and
his ‘obituary’, were written by Joshua.85 In BT Makot 11a this
suggestion is even supported by a prooftext, ‘And Joshua wrote
these words in the book of the Law of God’ (Josh. 24: 26).
However, another tannaitic opinion is also offered here, which
understands this verse as referring to the section dealing with the
cities of refuge. Although the Talmud interprets this to mean that
Joshua wrote in his own book (i.e. the book of Joshua) the
information which already appears in ‘the book of the Law of
God’, the simple meaning of the tannaitic text is that the sections
in the Pentateuch dealing with the cities of refuge (Num. 35: 9–
34, Deut. 19: 1–13) were indeed written by Joshua.86
Returning to the notion that Joshua wrote the last eight verses
of the Pentateuch, R. Joseph ibn Migash (1077–1141), a figure
whose influence on Maimonides was enormous,87 stands out as
one who adopts this position.88 R. Tsevi Hirsch Ashkenazi
explains that, according to this view, the revelatory status of the
last eight verses is not equivalent to that of the rest of the Torah.89
R. Tsevi Hirsch Grodzinski (1858–1947) states: ‘Joshua wrote
them [i.e. the last eight verses] and they do not have as much
holiness as the other sections of the Torah which Moses wrote.’90
In an even more striking formulation, R. Abraham Hayim Schor
(nineteenth century) writes that, since the last eight verses concern
the period after Moses’ death, ‘their holiness is not so weighty’.91
R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1903–93) is reported to have held a
similar view.92 Quite apart from the issue of Mosaic authorship,
positions such as these contradict the Eighth Principle’s additional
affirmation that all verses of the Torah share the same sanctity,
Also worth noting is the view, shared by R. Isaac Ze’ev
Soloveitchik (1886–1959)93 and R. Joshua Leib Diskin (1817–
98),94 that not all parts of the Torah were revealed to Moses in the
same fashion. As Lawrence Kaplan has pointed out, this notion
‘directly contravenes the fundamental principle set down by the
Rambam that every single verse of the Torah was received directly by
Moses from God like a scribe taking down dictation!’95 R. Shalom
Schwadron (1835–1911) also contradicts this aspect of the
Principle, for he distinguishes between Deuteronomy and the rest
of the Torah, claiming that Moses’ prophetic level in the revelation
of Deuteronomy was at a lower level than when the rest of the
Torah was revealed.96
To return to the issue of Mosaic authorship, although
Maimonides regards it as heretical, the view that Joshua had a
hand in writing the Pentateuch is also affirmed by Ibn Ezra, who
claims that the last twelve verses were written by Joshua. He does
not regard this opinion as controversial and feels comfortable in
stating it openly.97 R. Meyuhas ben Elijah (twelfth century?)
agreed with Ibn Ezra,98 and R. Moses Sofer also sympathized with
this position.99 Presumably, these authorities did not see anything
radical in this notion since they were merely expanding upon the
rabbinic view mentioned above.100 This is different from
suggesting post-Mosaic authorship for a portion of the Torah not
discussed in the Talmud.
Significantly, as R. Ya’akov Hayim Sofer has pointed out,101
Nahmanides believed that Joshua was involved in the writing of
the poem ‘Ha’azinu’ (Deut. 32: 1–43).102 The same view is found
in a Tosafist work.103 According to R. Nissim Gaon (c.990–1062)
the ‘Ha’azinu’ poem was written by Moses together with seventy-
seven of the elders of Israel.104 R. Moses Schick (1807–79) goes
further and states that, ‘according to one opinion’, Moses wrote
the Torah up until, but not including, this poem, and Joshua
finished the book.105 Schick does not mention where this opinion
is found, and I have been unable to find any source which states
that Joshua wrote the entire poem, though there are midrashim
which state that, although Moses began to write the poem, he
died before completing it.106 This means that more than forty
verses were added to the Torah after Moses’ death.
Ibn Ezra’s views on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch
cover considerably more than just the end of the Torah. In his
comment on Deuteronomy 1: 2 (which actually deals with the
first verse in Deuteronomy: ‘These are the words which Moses
spoke unto all Israel beyond the Jordan’), Ibn Ezra writes: ‘If you
know the secret of the twelve, and of And Moses wrote (Exod. 24:
4, Num. 33: 2, Deut. 31: 9, 22), and of And the Canaanite was
then in the land (Gen. 12: 6), and of In the mount where the Lord is
seen (Gen. 22: 14), and of Behold his bedstead was a bedstead of iron
(Deut. 3: 11), you will discover the truth.’ This passage has long
been regarded as meaning that Ibn Ezra considered Deuteronomy
1: 1–5, as well as all the other verses mentioned, as similar to the
last twelve verses in Deuteronomy in that they too are post-
Mosaic.107 Quite apart from modern academic scholars, Ibn Ezra
has been understood along these lines by R. Solomon ben Samuel
(c.1160–1240),108 an anonymous student of R. Solomon ben
Adret (thirteenth century),109 R. Moses ibn Tibbon (thirteenth
century),110 R. Isaiah of Trani (the Elder),111 R. Samson Kino
(thirteenth century),112 R. Eleazar ben Mattathias (thirteenth
century),113 the commentary attributed to Ibn Kaspi,114 R. Samuel
Motot (fourteenth century),115 R. Joseph ben Eliezer Bonfils,116
R. Shem Tov ben Joseph Shaprut (fourteenth century),117 R.
Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Nathan Habavli (fourteenth century),118 R.
Solomon Franco (fourteenth century),119 R. Moses ben Judah ben
Moses Nearim (fourteenth century?),120 the anonymous author of
Avat nefesh (fourteenth century),121 R. Ezra Gatigno,122 R.
Yedidyah Solomon Norzi,123 R. Azariah dei Rossi (sixteenth
century),124 R. Eliezer Ashkenazi (sixteenth century),125 R. Moses
Almosnino (sixteenth century),126 R. Aviad Sar-Shalom Basilea
(c.1680–1743),127 R. Gad del Aquilla (eighteenth century),128 R.
Benjamin Ze’ev ben Solomon (eighteenth–nineteenth
centuries),129 R. Samuel David Luzzatto,130 R. Moses Tedeschi
(nineteenth century),131 R. Solomon Netter (nineteenth
century),132 and the contemporary Orthodox biblical scholar, R.
Mordechai Breuer.133
It is significant that R. Solomon ben Samuel, Ibn Tibbon,
Bonfils, R. Shem Tov ben Joseph Shaprut, R. Eleazar ben
Mattathias, Franco, del Aquilla, R. Benjamin Ze’ev ben Solomon,
and Netter all defend Ibn Ezra. According to Ibn Tibbon and
Bonfils, one must distinguish between the post-Mosaic addition of
commandments, which is objectionable, and narrative additions,
which are not. (Bonfils adds that positing post-Mosaic additions
of entire portions of narrative is also objectionable.) With the
possible exception of R. Eleazar ben Mattathias (see below), all
agree that any additions to the Pentateuch were written through
prophetic inspiration. This point is especially stressed by del
Aquilla, who points out that it is heresy to suggest that Moses (or
someone else) added a verse to the Bible at his own discretion.
However, if one assumes that the entire Torah is written through
divine inspiration, post-Mosaic additions cease to be problematic.
It is only because of this, del Aquilla adds, that the tannaitic view
which asserts that Joshua wrote the last eight verses is not
heretical.
R. Eleazar ben Mattathias goes even further. According to him,
Ezra, who was responsible for renewing knowledge of the Torah
among the common people, did not change any of the mitsvot
which were given to Moses. However, he did not hesitate to
enlarge the narrative portion of the Torah and ‘likely’ did this at
God’s command. In one case, R. Eleazar says, he even deleted a
verse from the Torah. R. Benjamin Ze’ev explains that the
statement ‘Moses wrote the Torah’ is comparable to statements in
1 Kings 6: 10 and 9: 1 that Solomon built the Temple. That is,
Solomon need not have literally participated in the building for
him to be credited with its construction. Similarly, a few post-
Mosaic prophetic insertions do not alter the fact that Moses is
regarded as the author of the Torah. R. Ya’akov Hayim Sofer, an
important contemporary rabbinic scholar, accepts this analysis.134
Ibn Ezra is not unique in this regard among rishonim. Two
leading Ashkenazi sages, R. Judah Hehasid (c.1150–1217)135 and
R. Avigdor Katz (the teacher of R. Meir of Rothenburg;
thirteenth century), maintain that there are post-Mosaic additions
in the Torah inserted by Joshua and the Men of the Great
Assembly.136 They obviously agreed with Maimonides that the
latter were also prophets,137 yet the implications they drew from
this diverged sharply from Maimonides’ view. According to them,
one of the post-Mosaic additions is Genesis 36: 31–9, which
contains a list of the kings of Edom ‘before there reigned any king
over the children of Israel’. This comment is particularly
interesting, for the view advocated here, focusing on the alleged
anachronism in these verses, was actually declared heretical by the
other ‘critic’, Ibn Ezra. As Bonfils explained, Ibn Ezra’s strong
feelings about this are due to the fact that, unlike R. Judah
Hehasid, he believed it illegitimate to posit that an entire portion
was added after the death of Moses.138
According to Moshav zekenim, a medieval Tosafist collection of
Torah commentaries, the famed R. Samuel ben Meir (Rashbam)
also identified Genesis 36: 31–9 as post-Mosaic, believing that it
was added in the days of the Judges.139 In his commentary on
Numbers 22: 1, Rashbam focuses on the phrase ‘beyond the
Jordan’, which concerned Ibn Ezra in his commentary on
Deuteronomy 1: 2. The difficulty is that ‘in Moses’ day the
Israelites had not yet entered the Promised Land and the term
“beyond the Jordan” would not have been used for the side of the
Jordan on which they were encamped’.140 According to Rashbam,
this phrase was written ‘after they [the Israelites] had crossed [to
the western side of] the Jordan. From their point of view the
plains of Moab [on the eastern side of the Jordan] are called
“beyond the Jordan”.’141 In other words, this phrase was only
added after Moses’ death, which occurred before the Israelites
crossed the Jordan.
Returning to R. Judah Hehasid, in addition to pointing to
post-Mosaic additions, he makes another fascinating remark.
Commenting on Numbers 21: 17 (‘Then sang Israel this song’),
he claims that the ‘song’ referred to is the ‘Great Hallel’ (Psalm
136). It was only in a later generation that King David removed it
from the Pentateuch, together with all the other anonymous
psalms written by Moses, and placed them in the book of
Psalms.142 R. Avigdor Katz, in his comment on this verse, also
claims to have heard that it refers to the ‘Great Hallel’ which was
removed from the Torah by David.143 Apparently, there was some
tradition regarding this verse, the source and nature of which is
unknown. Significantly, both R. Avigdor Katz and the late
fourteenth-/early fifteenth-century kabbalist R. Menahem Zioni,
who cites R. Judah Hehasid,144 quote this opinion without a hint
of objection. As Israel M. Ta-Shma has noted, there were other
Ashkenazi rishonim who believed that the Scribes took material
out of the Torah.145 They focus on a cryptic text in BT Nedarim
37b which speaks of itur soferim, usually translated as ‘scribal
embellishment’. However, according to both R. Abraham ben
Azriel (thirteenth century)146 and R. Asher ben Yehiel,147 the
phrase actually means ‘omission of the Scribes’, because the
Scribes (presumably the Men of the Great Assembly) removed
particular letters from the Torah. Although R. Abraham adds that
this was done on the basis of tradition (al pi hakabalah), he is
explicit that before the Scribes’ emendations earlier generations
had a different Torah text. For example, originally the Torah read
(Gen. 18: 5). The Scribes deleted the initial vav, so it now
reads .148 While Me’iri strongly rejects this opinion,
declaring ‘Heaven forbid that the Scribes would remove one letter
from the Torah’,149 R. Naftali Tsevi Judah Berlin (1817-93)
quotes R. Asher ben Yehiel’s comment without objection.150 The
medieval commentary on Nedarim attributed to Rashi151 which
appears in standard editions of the Talmud interprets the passage
somewhat differently. According to this commentary, the Scribes
never removed any letters, but they did switch the order of words.
In the example mentioned above, while originally the Torah read
 , the Scribes changed it to . Again, Me’iri rejects
this opinion, ‘for the Scribes did not change the order, to place
earlier that which comes later’.152
Ta-Shma has also recently published another text from R.
Judah Hehasid’s school, written by R. Solomon ben Samuel.153
He studied under both R. Judah and his father R. Samuel, and he
too speaks of post-Mosaic additions to the Torah. In commenting
on Leviticus 16: 10, R. Solomon assumes that the word azazel is
Aramaic. He then asks why this word is not written in Hebrew, as
is the rest of the Torah, and claims that this is not problematic
since Moses did not write this verse.154 (According to this
explanation Moses also did not write Leviticus 16: 8, 26 where
azazel also appears.) R. Solomon continues: ‘Do not be surprised
at what I say, that another wrote it, because this is not unique, and
there are many [verses] which Moses did not say, such as [from
And Moses went up (Deut. 34: 1) until In the sight of all Israel
(Deut. 34:12). Similarly, [Behold, his bedstead was a bedstead of
iron;] is it not in Rabbah of the children of Ammon? (Deut. 3:11),
was certainly[!] not written by Moses.’ R. Solomon then explains
why it is incorrect to believe that Moses said this last verse
prophetically, and nowhere does he imply that his opinion has any
great theological significance. He certainly did not regard his
approach as violating any essential Jewish doctrine.155
Although in later centuries the notion that a prophet other than
Moses added to the Torah was regarded as theologically
unacceptable, this approach was not entirely eliminated. Thus, R.
Shneur Zalman Dov Anushiski, a nineteenth-century Lithuanian
talmudist and scholar of the Zohar, writes: ‘Ezra the Scribe also
added material to Moses’ Torah as he saw fit.156 The reason he was
able to do so is explained in BT Sanhedrin 21b: “Had Moses not
preceded him, Ezra would have been worthy of having the Torah
presented to Israel through him”.’157 Another view which may
reflect a break with Maimonides’ Principle is advanced by R.
Solomon Tsevi Schueck (1844–1916). While agreeing that Moses
wrote the entire Pentateuch, he maintains that the portion dealing
with Balak and Balaam was inserted in the Torah by the elders and
prophets after the Children of Israel had already entered the
Promised Land.158
Although the scholars who accept post-Mosaic additions to the
Torah are in dispute with Maimonides, are they also in dispute
with the Talmud? The classic passage in this regard appears in BT
Sanhedrin 99a:

Because he hath despised the word of the Lord (Num. 15: 31). This refers to one
who says there is no Torah from Heaven. And even if he said that the whole
of the Torah is from Heaven, excepting a particular verse, which [he says]
was not said by the Holy One, blessed be He, but by Moses of his own
accord, he is included in because he hath despised the word of the Lord.159

It is possible that some of the scholars we have quoted understood

this passage as condemning, not the denial of complete Mosaic
authorship, but the denial of divine inspiration. That is, what the
Talmud regards as heresy is the assertion that Moses composed the
Torah on his own, without receiving it from God.160 Yet once the
Torah’s divinity is acknowledged, it is not heretical to posit that
some verses were revealed to post-Mosaic prophets. Indeed, the
Mishnah includes in its list of heretics ‘he who says that the Torah
is not from Heaven’.161 In other words, the stress is on the divine
origin of the Torah, not on whether Moses alone received the
revelation.
To be sure, there are a number of rabbinic sources that mention
that Moses said (and did) certain things mipi atsmo (of his own
accord), without having been commanded to do so by God.162
One famous talmudic passage states that the curses in
Deuteronomy were offered by Moses of his own accord.163 There
is even a zoharic statement that Moses composed the entire book
of Deuteronomy on his own.164 Whatever their original
meaning(s), which are far from clear and, as Heschel has shown,
may reflect a variety of views, as far as later rabbinic authorities
were concerned, passages such as these were not regarded as
relevant to the issue discussed here, and thus were not seen as
contradicting the passage in Sanhedrin cited above. These
authorities have always stressed that when these portions,
originally stated independently by Moses, were later included as
part of the Torah given to the Children of Israel, it was done at
God’s direction. This, and only this, is what sanctified the text.165
Nevertheless, despite this explanation we still find views that
seem to contradict Maimonides’ Principle. For example, in
discussing the talmudic view that the curses in Deuteronomy
originated with Moses, not God, R. Nissim Gerondi writes: ‘God
agreed that they be written in the Torah.’166 It is hard to see how
this approach, in which God is no longer directing but concurring,
can be brought in line with Maimonides’ insistence that the entire
Torah was prophetically revealed. Even if one asserts that God’s
prophetic concurrence satisfies Maimonides’ Principle, R. Nissim’s
comment still seems to contradict another of Maimonides’
statements, namely that, upon receiving the revelation, Moses
‘acted as a scribe to whom one dictates and who writes all of it
including its chronicles, its narratives, and its commandments’. Yet
according to R. Nissim, this was not the case with regard to the
curses, since here God simply permitted Moses to include his own
curses in the Torah.
It is possible that R. Nissim’s view was anticipated in the
following passage from Shemot rabah:167

Another explanation for Write thou these words (Exod. 34: 27): The angels
began to say before the Holy One, blessed be He: ‘Dost Thou grant
permission to Moses to write down anything he wishes, so that he may then
say unto Israel, “I have given the Torah to you and it was I who wrote and
gave it to you?” ’ But God replied: ‘Far be it from Moses to do such a thing,
and in whatever he does he can be fully trusted, for it says, My servant Moses
is not so; he is trusted in all My house’ (Num. 12: 7).

As Heschel has noted, the implication of this comment is that God

allowed Moses to have a hand in writing the Torah.168 In support
of this, Heschel cites the commentary of R. Ze’ev Wolf Einhorn
(nineteenth century) on this passage: ‘Even if Moses will write
something in the Torah on his own, it is not so that he will say,
Heaven forbid, that he personally thought of it. Rather, he is
trusted in the entire house of the Torah, and to him I have given
all the principles and ways of the Torah . . . and all that he will
expound he can say in God’s name.’169 Commenting on this
passage in his midrashic commentary Yefeh to’ar, R. Samuel Jaffe
ben Isaac Ashkenazi (sixteenth century) writes that, unlike other
prophets, Moses was able to understand on his own what God
wanted him to include in the Torah. Contrary to what
Maimonides states, ‘he did not need God to read it to him word
for word.’
Another relevant passage, which, in contrast to Maimonides’
assertion, describes Moses as having a role in the authorship of the
Torah and God’s acceptance of this, appears in Midrash hagadol:170

Rabbi Samuel bar Nahmani said: Why does it say concerning each thing
[Moses did] As the Lord commanded Moses?171 This may be compared to [the
case of] a king who commanded his servant, saying to him, ‘Build me a
palace.’ The servant expertly built him a great and spectacular palace. He
wrote on everything [he built] the name of the king. When he finished, the
king entered and saw it and was very pleased. He said: ‘All this honour has
my servant done me, including inscribing my name on every place, yet while
I am inside, he is outside! Call him that he may come right in.’ So, too,
when Moses finished the work of the Tabernacle, and he wrote in every
section, As the Lord commanded Moses, God appeared and His Shekhinah
dwelt in it [the Tabernacle] and He saw it and it pleased Him. . . . He said:
‘The son of Amram [Moses] has done Me all this honour and he is outside!
He is worthy to enter My presence and come under the shade of My
Shekhinah.’

In other words, Moses independently added the phrase ‘Even as

the Lord commanded Moses’, and because of this he was
rewarded. Using the words of R. Nissim, we can say that God
agreed that these words should appear in the Torah, but they
certainly were not dictated to Moses in the scribal fashion
described by Maimonides.172
 Taking into account all the pre-Maimonidean sources cited in
this chapter, and in particular, the discussion regarding the text of
the Pentateuch, it is impossible to believe that Maimonides should
be taken at his word when he writes that all are obligated to
believe that our Torah scrolls are the same as the one given to
Moses. Who better than Maimonides knew the problems implicit
in such a statement? He was perfectly aware of the textual
differences in various scrolls, and it was he who went to such great
lengths to establish a correct pentateuchal text173 that the legend
developed that he even travelled to France to examine the mythical
‘scroll of Ezra’ thought to be kept there.174 Significantly, nowhere
in the Mishneh torah does he mention an obligation to believe that
our Torah scrolls are identical with that given to Moses. Instead,
he defines a ‘denier of the Torah’ as one ‘who says that the Torah
was not given by God, even if he says that a single verse or word
thereof was spoken by Moses on his own authority’.175 The point
here is not the textual (Masoretic) aspect of the Torah but the
assertion that Moses (or someone else) intentionally added
material not transmitted by God. However, this says nothing
about mistakes that naturally crept in. In fact, I believe, as
suggested above with regard to BT Sanhedrin 99a, that even
Maimonides should be understood here as concentrating not on
denial of complete Mosaic authorship, but on denial of divine
inspiration. In other words, denial of complete Mosaic authorship,
while certainly false according to Maimonides, would not be
regarded as heretical.
Bearing in mind all the evidence cited here, one should not be
surprised to read the comments of the late rosh yeshivah of Yeshivat
Ner Yisrael, R. Ya’akov Weinberg (1923–99). After mentioning
some of the points already made, Weinberg states:

Rambam knew very well that these variations existed when he defined his
Principles. The words of Ani Ma’amin and the words of the Rambam, ‘the
entire Torah in our possession today’, must not be taken literally, implying
that all the letters of the present Torah are the exact letters given to Moshe
Rabbeinu. Rather, it should be understood in a general sense that the Torah
we learn and live by is for all intents and purposes the same Torah that was
given to Moshe Rabbeinu.176

Weinberg is specifically referring to Maimonides’ claim that our

Torah scrolls are exactly the same as that given to Moses.
However, what about Maimonides’ other assertion, namely, that
one must believe that the entire Torah was written by Moses? I
think that this too must be taken with a grain of salt. While there
is no question that Maimonides affirmed complete Mosaic
authorship,177 holding something to be true is very different from
establishing it as dogma. By doing the latter, Maimonides would
have rendered any other opinion heretical. Yet there is no question
that Maimonides did not regard Ibn Migash and Ibn Ezra—men
who denied complete Mosaic author-ship—as heretics.
That Maimonides could not have truly believed that all those
who differed with this principle were heretics is seen from another
angle as well. Speaking of rabbinic disputes concerning theoretical
matters, Maimonides declares on a number of occasions that one
cannot decide which opinion must be followed as one does in
questions of practical halakhah.178 This does not mean that one
does not offer one’s own view; indeed, Maimonides chooses
between different rabbinic opinions in these matters on several
occasions. What he means is that one cannot render another
opinion invalid and therefore forbidden to be held. This is no
different from that which occurs in halakhic disputes, where the
opposing opinion is also not rendered invalid. It is just that, for
practical purposes, one opinion must be followed. Maimonides’
point is that, when there are no practical implications, one cannot
compel belief in one opinion to the exclusion of another. As he puts
it: ‘If sages differ regarding some belief or opinion that has no
practical outcome, one does not say in this instance, “the halakhah
is like so and so”.’179 Since Maimonides’ philosophical views were
rejected by his rabbinic contemporaries, it is obvious that he had
to advocate this approach, if only to ensure that his own opinions
would not be rendered invalid.
As we have already noted, there is an opinion in the Talmud
that the last eight verses of the Torah were written by Joshua. For
Maimonides to declare a talmudic opinion heretical appears
extremely unlikely, especially when one bears in mind his view on
the impossibility of deciding authoritatively between rabbinic
opinions in theoretical matters. In response to this it may be
protested that, as seen above, Maimonides acknowledges that
there are rabbinic opinions which seem to accept the Platonic view
of creation, but he nevertheless regards creation ex nihilo as
dogma. A number of answers to this difficulty are possible. To
begin with, Maimonides does not suggest that these rabbinic
opinions accept the Platonic view, only that they may. Also, we
have already seen how Maimonides’ position on creation in the
Thirteen Principles is contradicted by what he writes in the Guide,
and cannot be taken as his true belief.
However, even if one chooses to disregard the Guide entirely, a
distinction can be made between creation and the authorship of
the Torah. It could be that Maimonides felt he had to insist on
creation ex nihilo in the Fourth Principle because this is a
fundamental aspect of Jewish theology. It was not as if he had to
decide between two theologically acceptable opinions. Rather, one
opinion was totally at odds with the Jewish outlook, and therefore
it was not a question of deciding between two opinions but rather
of affirming the only correct one. The same could be said with
regard to rabbinic passages that speak of angels as intermediaries.
Since these passages are theologically untenable, they are not
regarded as valid opinions any more than a view which permits
Sabbath desecration is a valid halakhic opinion. What we have,
therefore, is simply one opinion which Maimonides records, not
two opinions of which he chooses one. Where issues of dogma are
concerned, there is never more than one option. This is not the case
with regard to the last eight verses of the Pentateuch.
Theologically, it makes little difference if the last eight verses were
written by Moses or by Joshua under divine inspiration. There is
thus no reason why Maimonides should establish one rabbinic
opinion as dogma and, by so doing, classify the other rabbinic
opinion as heresy.180
I present this argument only to satisfy those who do not wish
to deal with what Maimonides writes in the Guide. However, for
those who are prepared to do so—and this is the only way to
achieve a true understanding of Maimonides—there is little doubt
that Maimonides’ assertions regarding creation ex nihilo (that it is
an obligatory belief) and the text of the Torah are to be viewed in
the same light. Both the Fourth and the Eighth Principles contain
things Maimonides did not accept, and yet he wrote that all Jews
must believe in them in their entirety. How is this to be explained?
I propose to solve this problem by comparing the Commentary
on the Mishnah (where the Principles appear) to Maimonides’
other works, in particular the Guide. In the Guide Maimonides
adopts the ‘daring method of admitting right off to misspoken
utterances (as we might call them today) and to half-truths. . . .
His endorsement of these views is necessary for obvious political
reasons, reasons which he obviously cannot divulge.’181 According
to the fifteenth-century Cretan kabbalist R. Michael Balbo, even in
the Mishneh torah Maimonides said things which did not reflect his
true view, but were ‘formulated according to the conventional
manner of speaking, in order to ease the way for beginners’ who
were not yet able to grasp metaphysical concepts.182 Interestingly
enough, Balbo’s great opponent, the philosopher R. Moses
Ashkenazi, agrees with this statement.183 The same tendency is
apparent in Maimonides’ Principles. Here, however, we do not
simply find Maimonides putting forth ‘misspoken utterances’, but
rather stating them as dogma. This may be easier to understand if
we find an appropriate context in which to place these ‘half-
truths’.
In Guide iii. 28 Maimonides discusses the differences between
what he terms ‘true beliefs’ and ‘necessary beliefs’. ‘True beliefs’ are
those which teach, in a literal fashion, some truth about God, such
as his existence, unity, eternity, and omnipotence. Their purpose is
to enable one to attain intellectual perfection. ‘Necessary beliefs’,
which are based on tradition rather than philosophy, are expressed
in a figurative manner and fulfil a political function in that, by
instilling obedience to the Torah, they regulate the social relations
of human beings. In addition, they enable people to acquire noble
qualities. For example, the Torah teaches that God is angry with
those who disobey him. Although in truth God does not possess
the characteristic of anger, the Torah found it advantageous to use
this concept for the effect it would have. It is ‘necessary’ for the
masses to believe that God is angry if they disobey him in order
for them to control their behaviour. In addition, it is ‘necessary’
for the masses to believe that God responds instantly to the prayer
of someone wronged or deceived; for them to believe otherwise
would be damaging to their faith.
Arthur Hyman has pointed out that Maimonides’
understanding of ‘necessary beliefs’ is dialectical rather than
sophistic; that is, they are ‘propositions which are true in some
respect though not in another’.184 Although Hyman uses this
distinction to make a different point, it would appear that it is also
relevant to the problem under discussion. In formulating the
Eighth Principle, Maimonides was aware that it is not entirely
‘true’. It is true that the Torah is divine and was given to Moses. It
is also true that the traditional interpretations are divine. It is even
true that Moses wrote the entire Torah, from beginning to end.
However, certain other elements are not true but only ‘necessary’.
It is necessary for the masses to believe that the Torah in their
hands is identical to the Torah of Moses. It is also necessary for
them to believe that it is heretical to express a doubt as to whether
Moses wrote the entire Torah. These ‘necessary beliefs’ are the
equivalent of telling someone that God gets angry or that He
responds immediately to prayer, in that all these beliefs have in
common the fact that, through them, people are kept from
straying from the proper path.185 This insight will also explain the
other problem noted above, namely, why Maimonides lists
creation ex nihilo as a dogma when he clearly did not view it in this
way.
The reason that Maimonides believed it important to insert
these ‘necessary beliefs’ into the Eighth Principle appears obvious.
In his time, Muslims were challenging the Jews, claiming that they
had altered the text of the Torah. This accusation began with
Muhammad, who, as quoted in the Koran, had charged the rabbis
with falsifying and tampering with the original Torah text. He
proclaimed: ‘Do you then hope that they would believe in you; a
party from among them indeed used to hear the word of God,
then altered it after they had understood it, and they know [this]. .
. . Woe then to those who write the Book with their hands and
then say this is from God’ (II. 75, 79). This charge was elaborated
by early Islamic scholars, with the theologian Ibn Hazm (994–
1064) taking a lead in publicizing the doctrine of Jewish
falsification of Scripture (taḥrif ).186
In the face of such an assault, it is not hard to see why
Maimonides felt it was important for the masses to believe that
their text was the exact equivalent of Moses’ text. The masses then
(and today) could not be expected to understand the problems
relating to the biblical text. Exposing them to some of this
knowledge could have undermined their unquestioned faith,
especially in the face of Islamic polemics. It was thus necessary for
the masses to affirm what, in reality, was not true, namely, that the
text of the Torah in their hands was entirely free from any textual
corruptions, even to the last detail.
That this interpretation of Maimonides is correct is further
illustrated by a passage in his Letter to Yemen. Referring to the
Muslim accusation that the Jews had altered the text of the Torah,
Maimonides responds by saying that in both East and West ‘there
exist no differences at all in the text, not even in the
vocalization’.187 Here Maimonides is not simply saying that the
Torah in his possession is identical to that of Moses, thus making
it the only correct version. Rather, he is denying a fact which was
obvious to anyone with even a perfunctory knowledge of the
Pentateuch, namely, that there were differences in texts. As for
denying differences in vocalization, this is the equivalent of
denying that the Masoretes ever existed. An Islamic opponent
would be excused had he charged Maimonides with a bald-faced
lie. However, Maimonides’ comments were not directed against
such a person, but towards the masses of Jews of simple faith who
had never heard of Ben Asher and Ben Naftali and may not have
been able to deal with the fact that there were differences in
biblical vocalization.188
It should be noted that this presumed fear of Maimonides finds
expression among later scholars. One of the reasons Bonfils gives
for not making Ibn Ezra’s hints known to the masses is the
ammunition they would provide for the Muslims.189 R. Hayim
ben Attar strongly assails the view that the end of the Torah was
written by Joshua, because, as he states, many Jews were confused
by this assertion and were led to heresy. In addition, the very
notion that Moses did not write the entire Torah gives support to
the Islamic view that the Jews altered the holy text after Moses’
time.190 The Muslim accusation of taḥrif is also mentioned by R.
David ibn Zimra in two responsa. In one he discusses a variety of
Masoretic details and states that if one explains matters in a
different way (for example with regard to tikun soferim), one gives
support to the Islamic polemicists. In the other responsum, he
mentions taḥrif in refusing to sanction the correction of Torah
scrolls according to the pentateuchal text found in the Zohar.191

1 On the question of which aspects of rabbinic tradition qualify as divine

Oral Law according to Maimonides, see Blidstein, ‘Oral Law’.
2 With Perfect Faith, 365.
3 The standard version of Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah does
not contain the words ‘this entire Torah which is found in our hands today’.
It does appear in the accurate Kafih edition as well as in the Ani ma’amin.
Not having the correct text of Maimonides’ Eighth Principle, Hirschensohn,
Malki bakodesh, ii. 234–5, was able to argue that Maimonides could not have
presented the accuracy of the Masoretic text as dogma. D. Cohen, Masat
kapai, 92, also errs in this regard.
4 In ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 8, Maimonides does not go to such an
extreme. All he says here is that it is heretical to say that a part of the Torah,
even one word, was added by Moses without divine inspiration (mipi atsmo).
According to this formulation, Maimonides is not concerned with the issue
of textual accuracy but with whether or not the divine word was falsified,
thus turning Moses into a charlatan.
5 Faith, 60–1.
6 ‘Torah’, 39–40.
 7 Meetings, 86.
8 New York, 1997.
9 Bible Code, 194–5; emphases added. Here is not the place to comment
on Drosnin’s incredible ignorance regarding the age of the Pentateuch.
10 Loewe and Montefiore (eds.), Rabbinic Anthology, p. lxii. I have
refrained from commenting on the differences between the script in
contemporary Torah scrolls (ketav ashuri) and ancient Hebrew script.
Although Maimonides insists that current Torahs are exactly the same as the
original one in Moses’ day, it is hard to know whether the issue of script is
included in this Principle. Maimonides believed that Moses’ Torah was
written in ketav ashuri (see his commentary on Mishnah Yadayim 4: 5).
However, this does not mean that he included this as part of the Eighth
Principle. Presumably he also did not include the issue of the enlarged or
reduced letters or other textual peculiarities, regarding which there is no
uniformity in biblical manuscripts and Masoretic lists. (See his Shemot kodesh
veḥol, 7–8 (Hebrew numerals), which notes that the unusual letters are of
rabbinic origin. However, it is doubtful whether Maimonides is truly the
author of this work. See Levinger, ‘On the Book Be’ur shemot’.) Maimonides
himself admits that in his day there was no uniformity with regard to the
tagim (the letters’ ornamental crownlets), even though they are of Mosaic
origin. See his Responsa, ii, no. 154. Nor do I believe that Maimonides is
referring to the issue of open and closed sections, although this is less certain
since here more significant halakhic considerations enter the picture; see e.g.
‘Hilkhot sefer torah’, 7: 11, 8: 3, and Penkower, ‘Maimonides’, 39 ff.; M.
Goshen-Gottstein, ‘Keter’, 880 ff. I understand Maimonides to mean that
the words which now appear in the Torah are identical with those that
appeared in Moses’ Torah.
11 I say ‘technically’, for there is no question that it is not improper, at
least for purposes of simplicity, to continue to refer to ‘the Masoretic text’,
and in the pages that follow I shall do so. The minor variations simply
reinforce the fact that there is an overwhelming measure of agreement. As
Moshe Goshen-Gottstein has noted, ‘the receptus tradition emerges clearly
from the vast majority of the codices’. See his ‘The Rise of the Tiberian Bible
Text’, 117 n. 122, and also his introduction to the Jerusalem 1972 reprint of
the Biblia Rabbinica, para. 19 (hereafter ‘Introduction’); Menachem Cohen, ‘
“Masoretic Text” ’; Barr, Variable Spellings, 5–6. Mordechai Breuer’s more
extreme conclusions in his Aleppo Codex are based on a methodological error,
as has been shown in Penkower, ‘Jacob ben Hayim’, 437–8, and Menachem
Cohen, ‘Introduction’, 54*–5*. My thanks to Dr Penkower for a lengthy
and detailed letter in which he clarified a number of points relevant to this
discussion.
12 Beit habeḥirah, on BT Kid. 30a.
13 See M. Goshen-Gottstein, ‘Introduction’, paras. 13, 17.
14 Ibid., para. 21; id., ‘Editions’, 226–7. Of course, this does not mean
that Jacob b. Hayim created a new text. Rather, he viewed his job as simply
correcting errors, and his role was limited to choosing between one of the
given variants, making his text very similar to earlier ones. However, as
Penkower has shown, his method was eclectic, and does not appear to be
based on any system. See id., ‘Jacob ben Hayim’, 51–2, 134. To give a few
examples: in Gen. 19: 13, his text is although the Spanish manuscript
which he normally used read . In Exod. 19: 4, his text is , despite
the fact that he noted that there was another reading, , and he did not
have any Masoretic notes to guide him. He decided on his own which
version should be recorded. In Gen. 16: 12, he has , even though he
acknowledges that, according to the Masoretic notes he used, it should be
. For these examples see Penkower, ‘Jacob ben Hayim’, 127, 135.
 As for the apostasy of Jacob b. Hayim, earlier scholars were often
unaware of this and thus referred to him in glowing terms: see e.g. Basilea,
Emunat ḥakhamim, 41b; Penkower, ‘Jacob ben Hayim’, 412–14.
Communications not being what they are today, this is not so surprising.
However, in our day, when anyone can open an encyclopedia and learn this
information, it is truly remarkable that a book could be published, in Benei
Berak no less, which describes Jacob b. Hayim as one of the great scholars of
Israel. I refer to Mosheh Tsuriel’s Masoret seyag latorah, i. 9, 94 ff. See
Mordechai Breuer’s harsh review of this work in Megadim, 20 (1993), 91–6.
15 Plene refers to a system of full orthographic notation, whereby vowel
sounds are indicated by vocalic signs (in particular the letter vav). BT Kid.
30a. Presumably this is the reason why there is no uniformity as to the
number of letters in the Torah. See the various numbers recorded in A.
Kaplan, Handbook, 135.
16 Shenei luḥot haberit, ii. 2b.
17 Ḥakham tsevi, no. 54.
18 Shevut ya’akov, ii, no. 3.
19 Igerot mosheh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, iii, no. 114.
20 Shulḥan arukh, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’ 143: 4.
21 On medieval textual traditions, see the important studies by Menachem
Cohen: ‘Basic Features’ and ‘Consonantal Character’. On the Babylonian
Masoretic tradition, see Ofer, Babylonian Masorah, ch. 11.
22 Among rishonim, see e.g. Tosafot on BT Shab. 55b, s.v. ma’avirim (and
R. Akiva Eger’s note ad loc.), and on BT Nid. 33a, s.v. vehinaseh; Me’iri,
Beit habeḥirah, on BT Kid. 30a; id., Kiryat sefer, 57–8; Halaveh, Teshuvot
maharam halaveh, no. 144; Nissim Gerondi on BT Ned. 37, s.v. at; Isaac b.
Sheshet, She’elot uteshuvot harivash, no. 284. Regarding this issue, see J. Z.
Stern, Tahalukhot ha’agadah, ch. 16; Aptowitzer, Schriftwort; D. Rosenthal,
‘Rabbinic’; Maori, ‘Rabbinic Midrash’; Leiman, ‘Masorah’; B. Levy, Fixing
God’s Torah.
23 She’elot uteshuvot harashba hameyuḥasot leramban, no. 232. For
comments on the textual aspects of this responsum, which appears here in a
mutilated form, see Penkower, ‘Maimonides’, 40 n. 3. Rashba contended
that, when the Talmud derived halakhot from words, these words should
then appear in our Torah scrolls as they do in the Talmud (see also Me’iri,
Beit habeḥirah on BT Kid. 30a, id., Kiryat sefer, 57–8, and David ibn Zimra,
She’elot uteshuvot haradbaz, nos. 1020, 1172). Although this opinion found a
number of outstanding defenders, it is not in accord with current scribal
practice. See Hirschensohn, Malki bakodesh, ii. 227; Maori, ‘Rabbinic
Midrash’, 123 ff.; Leiman, ‘Masorah’; B. Levy, Fixing God’s Torah.
24 Halakhot ketanot, i, no. 14.
25 Most of these are very minor differences. For example, our texts of
Exod. 25: 22 read . However, Ibn Ezra and some versions of
Rashi have . Although much has been written regarding textual variations
in talmudic and midrashic literature, we still await a comprehensive study of
this phenomenon with regard to the medieval writers, texts by whom are
constantly being published. Aptowitzer, Schriftwort, provides the initial
spadework. Future research must establish when we are confronting scribal
errors and lapses of memory and when we are presented with a different
textual tradition. For a step in this direction see Esh, ‘Variant Readings’.
26 Peninei shadal, 338; id., Ohev ger, 86, and his letter in Yolles, Hatorah
vehaḥokhmah, 148–9. See however, id., Letters, 277, where he points to a
textual variation in Ibn Ezra’s Pentateuch.
27 Guenzberg, Sha’agat aryeh, no. 36; Fleckeles, Teshuvah me’ahavah, iii.
58a. R. Abraham Tsevi Hirsch Eisenstadt, Pitḥei teshuvah, ‘Yoreh de’ah’,
270: 10, argues that, according to Guenzberg, there is no longer even a
rabbinic commandment to write a Torah scroll. R. Ephraim Hiksher, Adnei
faz, no. 13, claims that if one finds a mistake in a Torah scroll which does
not require a new one to be taken out—for example, if a defective word is
written plene—then when lifting the scroll at the end of the Torah reading
one does not say: ‘This is the Torah that Moses placed before the Children
of Israel’ (Deut. 4: 44). This view is difficult to understand, for the Talmud
makes clear that none of our Torah scrolls is letter perfect.
28 Fleckeles, Teshuvah me’ahavah, iii. 56b; M. Sofer, She’elot uteshuvot,
‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, nos. 52, 54.
29 An interesting phenomenon which has not yet been studied adequately
is the attitude of some Orthodox scholars who refuse to accept the notion
that the Talmud, Targum, and other ancient writings had textual variants.
What makes this approach so interesting is that its adherents are not content
with accepting a view that was supported by numerous rabbinic authorities.
See Maori, ‘Rabbinic Midrash’, 102 ff. To the sources cited by Maori, add
Ehrenreich, ‘Variations’.
30 Although traditional rabbinic scholars have not generally dealt with the
Septuagint, Peshitta, and Dead Sea Scrolls, they have written numerous
commentaries on the Targumim and have sometimes pointed to divergences
between the Masoretic text and the text upon which the Targum is based.
See e.g. Berkovitz, Ḥalifot simlot, and Schmerler, Ahavat yehonatan on Exod.
34: 30. R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg noted that there are passages in the
Peshitta which are based on variant readings; see my Between the Yeshiva
World and Modern Orthodoxy, 169 ff.
31 See Ulrich, Dead Sea Scrolls, 25–6, 64–5.
32 I exclude from this statement the orthography of the Dead Sea Scrolls,
which is distinctive in being ‘very full’, and is a later development than the
orthography reflected in the Masoretic text. See Tov, Textual Criticism, 108,
222.
33 See BT Pes. 112a, Ket. 19b. This point was noted by R. Jehiel Jacob
Weinberg; see my Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy, 169–70.
34 Bereshit rabah 9: 5, 20: 12, 94: 9; Bereshit rabati, 209.
35 See Guide iii. 10, for Maimonides’ view that this only reflects R. Meir’s
interpretation of the verse, rather than a different reading in the text he used.
36 Kitvei ramban,i. 184. See also Lieberman, Hellenism, 25.
37 Bereshit rabati, 209–12. See Loewinger, ‘Torah Scroll’; Siegel, Severus;
Tov, Textual Criticism, 119–21.
38 Heikhal haberakhah, i. 7a, 87b, 261a.
39 Teshuvot rabenu avraham ben harambam, no. 91. This responsum is
concerned with open and closed sections; however, I do not see why
questions of defective and plene spelling would not also be included by R.
Abraham.
40 e.g. in Num. 11: 21 the Tiberian Masoretes read while the
Babylonians read . See Ginsburg, Introduction, 189.
41 There are nine differences in single letters, seven of which concern
defective and plene spelling. The other two are Gen. 9: 29: (Ashkenazi-
Sephardi) vs. (Yemenite) and Deut. 23: 2: (Ashkenazi-Sephardi) vs.
(Yemenite). See Korah, Se’arat teman, 103–4; Penkower, New Evidence,
68 n. 180. For the halakhic ramifications, see Yosef, Yehaveh da’at, vi, no.
56.
42 Emet leya’akov, 388. To support this view he cites information obtained
from the critical apparatus of the apostate C. D. Ginsburg’s edition of the
Pentateuch (London, 1908).
43 See Penkower, New Evidence, 67 ff. In five places Ben Asher and the
Yemenite text differ with regard to the proper separation of words.
44 I have cited Kamenetzky’s view simply to show that a leader of the
right-wing yeshiva world had no difficulty rendering the Masoretic aspect of
the Principle non-binding. This does not imply that there is any validity to
his claim that, in the instance he discussed, Maimonides had a different text
of the Pentateuch. Even before the publication of Penkower’s book, the
textual variant was adequately explained as the result of Maimonides citing
from memory. Some of the other examples cited by Kamenetzky are simply
manuscript or printing errors, which do not appear in the most recent
critical editions of Maimonides’ works. (Neuhausen, Torah or leharambam,
the only comprehensive study of biblical passages in Maimonides, is severely
flawed, primarily because it relies on faulty texts.) Still, Kamenetzky’s
readiness to posit a different pentateuchal text in order to answer a difficulty
is an essential tool in biblical exegesis. A good example of this is provided by
Shmuel Ashkenazi in his note in Or torah, 24 (Nisan 1992), 567. Lev. 19:
33 reads: . R. Hayim b. Attar, Or haḥayim, ad loc., seeks to
explain why the verse begins with the singular and ends with the plural.
While any number of imaginative answers can be given for this difficulty, it
is important to realize that the reading is found in biblical manuscripts,
the Samaritan Pentateuch, and the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, and
is the basis for the translations found in Onkelos, Pseudo-Jonathan, Neofiti,
Septuagint, Vulgate, Peshitta, and Sa’adiah Gaon. Thus, almost certainly the
answer to Or haḥayim’s question is that the Masoretic text preserves an
inauthentic reading.
45 For all his radical ideas, it is actually Ibn Ezra who rejects the idea of
tikun soferim. See his Introduction to the Pentateuch (end), in his
Commentary, and his comment on Num. 11: 15, 12: 12, and especially Sefer
tsaḥut, 74a, where he claims that the notion of tikun soferim is merely a
solitary opinion, not accepted by the sages. Still, he has no doubt that,
according to this opinion, tikun soferim meant exactly that, namely, a post-
Mosaic correction of the biblical text.
46 ‘Beshalaḥ ’ 16.
47 Yalkut hamakhiri, on Zech., 30–2.
48 p. 113.
49 Binyan yehoshua on Avot derabi natan, 34: 5. Although Falk quotes R.
Meir Eisenstadt, the latter’s comments are not quite the same as Falk’s
interpretation.
50 See also Ginsburg, Masorah, ii. 710, who quotes a Masoretic note that,
in the opinion of some Masoretic schools, it was Ezra who was responsible
for the changes. Another such note attributes the changes to Ezra and
Nehemiah; see Ginsburg, Introduction, 351. A Genizah fragment (Taylor–
Schechter Collection, Joba) refers to a ‘tikun of Ezra and the Scribes’.
Another fragment (Taylor–Schechter Collection, Jobb) refers to a ‘tikun of
Ezra and Nehemiah and Zechariah and Haggai and Baruch’. See Barnes,
‘Ancient Corrections’, 403. See also Sachs, ‘Investigation’, 53; McCarthy,
Tiqqune Sopherim, 42–52; Zipor, On Transmission, ch. 3.
51 Arukh hashalem, iv. 181, s.v. .
52 Commentary on Gen. 18: 22. The relevant passage does not appear in
a number of manuscripts; see Abraham Berliner in his edition of Rashi al
hatorah, pp. xiv–xv. Those who deny the authenticity of this passage seem to
have overlooked Rashi’s comment on Job 32: 3, where he reiterates this
view. Barnes, ‘Ancient Corrections’, 403, 405, offers a radically different
interpretation of Rashi’s comment on Gen. 18: 22. However, contrary to
Barnes’s suggestion, Rashi cannot possibly mean that rabotenu or soferim are
identical with ‘the original writers or redactors of books of Scripture’.
Rashi’s comments on Num. 11: 15 and Job 32: 3 make clear what is
implied elsewhere (see his commentary on Hab. 1: 11, Mal. 1: 3, Job 7:
20), that for him there is no distinction between corrections of the Scribes
and what is known as (‘The text substitutes [one word for another]’).
53 See his commentary on Hab. 1: 12. When this is taken together with
what he writes in his commentary on Ezek. 8: 18 and 1 Sam. 3: 13, it is
obvious that, as with Rashi, he understands to mean a correction of
the Scribes. Bearing in mind both this and what Hayim Zalman
Dimitrovsky has recently written in Solomon b. Adret, Teshuvot harashba, i.
177–9, one can confidently reject Uriel Simon’s interpretation in ‘R.
Abraham’, 228–9. In addition, Kimhi usually refrains from mentioning the
tikunei soferim in his explanations of the text, which probably means that he
did not accept them.
54 See Ginsburg, Introduction, 350–1.
55 Shemot rabah 30: 15. See also Matnot kehunah on Bereshit rabah 49: 5.
This commentary was written by R. Issachar Baer b. Naftali Hakohen (16th
cent.).
56 See Lieberman, Hellenism, 28; Midrash shemot rabah, ed. Shinan, 256.
57 See his supercommentary on Rashi, Gen. 18: 22, Num. 11: 15;
Hirschensohn, Nimukei rashi, on Gen. 18: 22. Commenting upon Mizrahi’s
view, R. Samuel Jaffe b. Isaac Ashkenazi (16th cent.) writes: ‘It is not
correct, for if we admit that the Scribes altered [the text] in one place, what
prevents us from saying so with regard to the other places?’ See his Yefeh
to’ar on Bereshit rabah 49: 12. See also the rejection of Mizrahi’s view by R.
Issachar Baer Eylenburg (1570–1623), Tsedah laderekh, on Gen. 18: 22.
According to Eylenburg, in addition to such a view being heretical, the
phenomenon it describes should not be called tikun soferim but rather kilkul
soferim (corruption of the Scribes). Norzi, Minḥat shai, on Zech. 2: 12,
writes that it should be called tikun kesilim (fools’ correction).
58 R. Saul Cohen’s comment is typical, in explaining why tikun soferim
cannot mean an actual correction in the text of the Torah: ‘For this is one of
the Thirteen Principles, that the Holy Torah was not changed and will never
be changed.’ See id., Karnei re’em, 61, and also 62, where he acknowledges
the existence of rabbinic sources that understand tikun soferim in a way that
he regards as heretical. His way of dealing with them is two-pronged: either
they are not authentic or they are individual opinions that have been rejected
by the rabbinic tradition.
59 Hellenism, 28–37.
60 Safah berurah, 7a–7b. See also id., Sefer tsaḥut, 71b–72a; id.,
Introduction to the Pentateuch (fifth approach), in his Commentary, and his
comments on Gen. 18: 13, Exod. 11: 5, 18: 21, 20: 1, 25: 31, Deut. 5: 5.
61 Mekor ḥayim, on Exod. 20: 1. This approach conflicts with the halakhic
view that it is precisely the uncertainty regarding defective and plene letters
that makes the kashrut of our Torah scrolls questionable. See above, pp. 93–
4. From the standpoint of practical halakhah, since a certain text has been
accepted, a scribe is not permitted to decide independently between
defective and plene, for a wrong decision makes the scroll pasul. See BT
Men. 29b–30a, 32b; Maimonides, ‘Hilkhot sefer torah’, 7: 11, 13; 10: 1;
Shulḥan arukh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 275: 6, 279: 4. Regarding Maimonides’
understanding of the texts in Menaḥot, see M. Goshen-Gottstein, ‘Keter’,
875 n. 12, 881 n. 28.
62 Matsref leḥokhmah, 10b.
63 Pentateuch, on Lev. 1: 1. Although R. Samuel David Luzzatto is
quoted, his view actually differs significantly from that of Hertz. Luzzatto
does not agree that the Scribes inserted a letter which was not in the original
text. See his Commentary on the Torah on Gen. 26: 46.
64 Ta’an. 4: 2. This version will be quoted below. For discussion of the
passage and its textual variants, see Israel M. Ta-Shma’s note in Steiner,
‘Linguistic Features’, 52–3; Havlin, ‘Establishing Correct Manuscript
Readings’, 244 ff.
65 (B), ch. 46.
66 Piska 356.
67 Introduction to his commentary on the Prophets; commentary on 2
Sam. 15: 21, 1 Kgs. 17: 14.
68 Ma’aseh efod, 40.
69 Kiryat sefer, introduction; id., Beit habeḥirah on BT Ned. 37b.
70 See Steinschneider, Jewish Literature, 270 n. 15. He refers to the keri
ukhetiv as .
71 They say this despite the fact that, according to BT Ned. 37b, the keri
ukhetiv is a tradition from Sinai. In addition, the Talmud seems to derive
laws from the keri ukhetiv. See Ben-Yitshak, ‘Keri ukhetiv’.
72 Introduction to his commentary on the Prophets.
73 Peshat, 141. Regarding this passage, see also Spiegel, Pages, 64–5. See
Halivni, Peshat, 141, 218, for the rejection of R. Moses Feinstein’s assertion
that this passage is a heretical interpolation (Feinstein, Igerot mosheh, ‘Yoreh
de’ah’, iii, no. 114, p. 358). For authorities who cite the passage, see
Halivni, Peshat, 216 n. 18, 218 nn. 25–6, to which add Hizkuni on Gen. 16:
5 (‘Ezra the Scribe was in doubt about all the marked letters in the Torah’);
di Illescos, Imrei no’am, 197; H. J. D. Azulai, Penei david, 174a, quoting the
Tosafists; Levinson, Hatorah vehamada, 267; Yadler, Tiferet tsiyon on
Bamidbar rabah 3: 13 (‘Ezra was also in doubt about all these words and did
not know what to do, other than writing them and placing a dot above’).
Feinstein’s rejection of the authenticity of this passage should be viewed
as part of his pattern of discarding sources that do not fit in with his
understanding. He does so even when the sources are neither contradicted
by other writings of the authors involved nor by other versions of the text in
question. See e.g. Igerot mosheh, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, iii, n. 9, v, no. 20: 2, ‘Yoreh
de’ah’, ii, no. 7, iii, nos. 114–15, ‘Even ha’ezer’, i, nos. 63, 64 (pp. 161,
163), ‘Ḥoshen mishpat’, ii, nos. 69, 70 (pp. 295, 297). For rejections of
Feinstein, see Waldenberg, Tsits eli’ezer, xiv, no. 100 (p. 183); M. Bleich,
‘Role’, 45–8.
74 Malki bakodesh, ii. 218, 221–2.
75 Lieberman, Hellenism, 44
76 See ibid. 41 n. 28.
77 She’elot uteshuvot maharshal, no. 73. See id., Ḥokhmat shelomoh on BT
Shab. 115b, where he also states that it is forbidden to add the extra nuns.
However, in the case of a Torah scroll which contains the extra letters
(which in his responsum he flatly declared invalid), he is a little more
hesitant, stating: ‘It appears to me to be invalid.’
78 Malki bakodesh, ii. 219.
79 Ibid. 229, 247. See also Menachem Cohen, ‘The Idea of the Sanctity of
the Biblical Text’, 67–9. Cohen’s article is worth careful study. He discusses
how, why, and when the Masoretic text came to be viewed as the only
authentic text and why contemporary Orthodox Jews are reluctant to engage
in textual criticism of it, and concludes with suggestions on how Orthodox
Jews should integrate the results of textual criticism into their
Weltanschauung. See also Levy, Fixing God’s Torah, 38 ff.
80 For example, in the introduction to his Masoret seyag latorah, R. Meir
Abulafia states that, in questions regarding the pentateuchal text, he made a
decision based upon the majority of reliable scrolls and Masoretic works. R.
Yom Tov Lippmann Muelhausen is even uncertain about the possibility of
making a halakhic determination: ‘I have toiled to find a Torah scroll with
the proper letters and open and closed passages, but have found none, not to
mention a scroll which is accurate with regard to defective and plene
spellings, which have been completely lost to our entire generation.
Therefore, we are forced [to rely on our Torah scrolls].’ See Loewinger and
Kupfer, ‘Yom Tov’, 251. See also Rabenu Tam’s comment in Maḥzor vitri,
654: ‘[Scribes] are not expert in the accuracy of the text, as R. Joseph said at
the end of chapter one of [BT] Kidushin [30a], “They [in the Land of Israel]
are expert in defective and plene spelling; we are not expert.” And because
“it is a time to act for the Lord” [i.e. it is an exigent circumstance], therefore
our Torah scrolls are also considered kosher.’ After describing the great
efforts that went into guarding the Torah’s text from corruptions, R. Isaac
Pulgar, Ezer hadat, 156, writes as follows: ‘Despite their great diligence and
efforts in Masoretic matters, there are today some differences in the
Scriptures, and this is known to anyone who examines the famous Torah
scroll which is known to have been written by Ezra the priest, for you will
find in it words that differ in various ways from the corrected Torah scrolls
in our possession.’ Norzi, Mikdash yah (introduction to id., Minḥat shai, 9)
writes: ‘Not only has the Torah become two Torahs, but innumerable
Torahs due to the many variations.’ Bearing all this in mind, it is shocking to
find J. D. Bleich write: ‘It is indeed remarkable that despite the vicissitudes
of time, and the many upheavals and wanderings to which the Jewish nation
has been subjected, the Scrolls of the Law in the possession of even the most
far-flung and widely separated Jewish communities are identical in virtually
every respect. The variant spellings of the word daka in Deuteronomy 23: 2
are the exception which proves the rule’ (With Perfect Faith, 365). The
reason contemporary Torah scrolls are the same is because the invention of
printing enabled the textus receptus to triumph. There is nothing ‘remarkable’
in this. As a statement of fact, as opposed to one of polemical value, Bleich’s
comment would not have even been imaginable before the printing press. As
for his point about daka, it too is mistaken. See above, n. 41.
81 Ginat veradim, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, kelal 2, no. 6.
 82 Chumash: Stone Edition, p. xix (emphasis added).
83 ‘Between Faith and Criticism’.
84 ‘Between Faith and Criticism’, 125.
85 BT BB 15a, Mak. 11a, Men. 30a; Sifrei devarim, piska 357. This
opinion is attributed to either R. Judah or R. Nehemiah.
86 See Jacobs, Principles, 222.
87 See Twersky, Introduction, 8–9.
88 Ḥidushei hari migash on BT BB 15a. Maimonides studied this work and
refers to it in Responsa, i, no. 82, ii, nos. 251, 393. For other rishonim who
believed that Joshua wrote the last eight verses, see Heschel, Theology, ii.
388. To these sources, add Roke’ah, Perush haroke’aḥ on Deut. 34: 5 Bekhor
Shor, Commentaries, on Deut. 34: 5.
89 Ḥakham tsevi, no. 13. Baron, Social and Religious History, vi. 143, calls
attention to R. Abraham ibn Daud, Ha’emunah haramah, 102, as being in
opposition to Maimonides’ Principle, for Ibn Daud claims that not all of the
portions of the Torah are equal in rank. For example, sacrifices are on a
lower level than matters of faith. (For a similar downgrading of sacrifices,
see R. David Kimhi’s commentary on Jer. 7: 22.) However, Maimonides
agrees with this view. The Thirteen Principles are themselves of more
importance than other parts of the Torah. All Maimonides says is that every
verse in the Torah is of divine origin and of equal ‘perfection, purity,
sanctity, and truth’, a point with which Ibn Daud would also agree. This is
not the same as saying that all portions of the Torah are of equal
importance. ‘Hear, O, Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One’ is a more
important verse than ‘And the sons of Ham were Cush and Mitzraim and
Put and Canaan.’ However, since both verses were dictated by God, their
sanctity (and perfection, purity, and truth) is equivalent. Sanctity is due to
revelation, importance is due to philosophic and religious content. (This is
similar to the way in which the Islamic creed known as Fikh akbar II
describes the Koran: all of its verses have equal ‘excellence and greatness’,
but some are pre-eminent with regard to recitation or content. See
Wensinck, Muslim Creed, 196.)
Jacob Haberman has noted in this regard, ‘Did any martyr go to his death
proclaiming his faith in a sentence such as “Timna was a concubine” as
thousands did with the Shema on their lips?’: see his Maimonides and
Aquinas, 265 n. 2. Maimonides’ comments in Responsa, ii, no. 263, about
standing up during the reading of the Ten Commandments, should also be
read in this fashion. In this regard, note too the subtitle of Norman Lamm’s
recent book, The Shema: Spirituality and Law in Judaism as Exemplified in the
Shema, the Most Important Passage in the Torah. See also Mishneh torah,
‘Hilkhot keriat shema’, 1: 2, where Maimonides explains that one recites
Deut. 6: 4–9 as the first paragraph of the prayer known as Shema, ‘because
it contains a commandment concerning God’s unity, love of God, and study,
which is the basic principle upon which all depends’. In his commentary on
Mishnah Tam. 5: 1, Maimonides himself states that the Ten
Commandments are ‘the foundation of [God’s] command and its
beginning’. It is Abarbanel and others who, in some respects, see no layers
or levels in the Torah, and that is why they do not believe one can single out
any particular principles. See H. Kasher, ‘Principal and Subsidiary’.
90 Mikra’ei kodesh, i. 189. On whether the last eight verses of the Torah
are less important than the rest, see Duenner, Ḥidushei harav yosef tsevi duener
on BT Men. 30a.
91 ; id., Torat ḥayim on BT BB 15a.
92 Schachter, Nefesh harav, 321–2. Lawrence Kaplan has questioned the
accuracy of Schachter’s presentation: see id., ‘Multi-Faceted Legacy’, 79 ff.
93 Ḥidushei hagriz al hashas on BT Men. 30a (pp. 159–60). See, similarly,
Schulman, ‘Essay’, 509–10.
94 She’elot uteshuvot maharil diskin, 71b.
95 ‘Multi-Faceted Legacy’, 81 n. 62 (emphasis in original).
96 She’elot uteshuvot maharsham, iii, no. 290.
97 Commentary on Deut. 34: 1. See also Reifman, Studies, 40.
98 Commentary, Deut. 34: 1.
99 Torat mosheh on Deut. 34: 1.
100 See also Tosafot, Meg. 21b, s.v. tana. The expression ‘eight verses’ is
used here to refer to the entire last chapter of Deuteronomy. See Heschel,
Theology, ii. 392–3.
101 Yeḥi yosef, 194.
102 See his commentary on Deut. 31: 19 (‘Now therefore write [plural]
this song for you [plural]’). In a comment perhaps directed against
Nahmanides, Abarbanel writes: ‘It does not mean that both of them will
write it in God’s Torah, because Heaven forbid that Joshua should write
even one letter.’ However, Nahmanides is not entirely clear since, in the
same comment, he also seems to deny that Joshua had a hand in writing part
of the Torah. See Heschel, Theology, ii. 399–400 n. 26. In his introduction
to the Torah, Nahmanides explicitly states that Moses wrote the entire
Pentateuch. However, Abarbanel is just as explicit that Nahmanides believed
that there were non-Mosaic elements in the Torah; see his commentary on
Num. 21: 1 (although there is hardly any doubt that Abarbanel is mistaken
in this example). It is perhaps significant that Nahmanides, who is so quick
to criticize Ibn Ezra, says nothing about the latter’s view of Mosaic
authorship.
103 Hadar zekenim on Deut. 32: 44.
104 See Maḥzor vitri, 388, and Heschel, Theology, ii. 398 n. 20. According
to the anonymous medieval work Pitron torah, 149, the words ‘And the
Lord spoke unto Moses saying’, which appear frequently in the Torah, were
added by the elders.
105 Maharam shik al taryag mitsvot, no. 613.
106 Devarim rabah 11: 10; Midrash tanḥuma, ‘Ha’azinu’ 5. According to
the latter source, Deut. 32: 5 was the last verse Moses wrote. These
midrashim seem to be contradicted by Deut. 32: 44–5, which portrays
Moses as having recited the entire poem.
107 The anachronisms in these verses are explained by Jacobs, Principles,
232–3. As already noted, Ibn Ezra explicitly asserts the post-Mosaic
authorship of the last twelve verses. Thus, the ‘secret of the twelve’ must
mean that the principle of post-Mosaic authorship, stated regarding these
twelve verses, is also applicable to other verses.
108 See the text published in Ta-Shma, ‘On Bible Criticism’, 455–6.
109 See Friedlaender, Essays, 235.
110 See the text published in Dov Schwartz, Astrology and Magic, 330 ff.
According to Ibn Tibbon, Ibn Ezra also identified other post-Mosaic
additions. See also U. Simon, ‘Interpreting the Interpreter’, 102–6.
111 See D. Schwartz, Astrology and Magic, 332–4. Since R. Isaiah of Trani
the Elder wrote a commentary on the Pentateuch (extracts from which
appear in H. J. D. Azulai’s Penei david), the reference is undoubtedly to him.
R. Isaiah of Trani the Younger, though the author of commentaries on the
Prophets and Hagiographa, is not known to have written a commentary on
the Five Books of Moses.
112 See U. Simon, ‘Interpreting the Interpreter’, 102.
113 Simon, ‘Interpreting the Interpreter’, 106–9, and the text published in
Ben-Menahem, Jewish Treasures, 128 ff. He explains the ‘secret of the twelve’
in an original fashion.
114 See H. Kasher, ‘Ibn Caspi’s Commentary’, 108.
 115 Supercommentary on Ibn Ezra, Deut. 1: 2. The version of Motot’s
commentary that appears in Lazi (ed.), Margaliyot tovah is not merely
censored, as is Bonfil’s, but is actually an example of forgery. It explains Ibn
Ezra to mean that Moses wrote all these passages prophetically. However,
this does not appear in Motot’s commentary. In any case, what then would
the ‘secret’ be? To say that Moses wrote these passages prophetically is the
traditional view and does not need to be hidden. Since, as Lazi says in his
introduction, Motot’s commentary was very inaccessible, this was what
probably led him to believe he could get away with this forgery.
116 Tsofnat pane’aḥ on Gen. 12: 6, 22: 14, 36: 31, Deut. 1: 2. See the
discussion in Jacobs, Principles, 234–7.
117 Friedlaender, Essays, 223.
118 Tsofnat pane’aḥ , 46.
119 See the text published in D. Schwartz, ‘Worship’, 236–7.
120 Friedlaender, Essays, 239.
121 See the commentary on Gen. 12: 6, published in Gartig, ‘Critical
Edition’.
122 See the text published in D. Schwartz, ‘Philosophical
Supercommentaries’, 109.
123 Mikdash yah, 10. Although he never actually mentions Ibn Ezra by
name, there is no doubt that he is referring to him.
124 Me’or einayim, ch. 39 (p. 324).
125 Ma’asei hashem, i. 79d.
126 See the text published in Ben-Menahem, ‘Additional Explanation’,
153.
127 Emunat ḥakhamim, ch. 2 (p. 12a).
128 See the text published in Ben-Menahem, Inyanei ibn ezra, 326.
129 See the text of his commentary Ben yemini on Deut. 34: 6, published
in Fleischer, ‘Supercommentaries’, 54–5. In addition to this passage, see his
comments on Gen. 12: 6 and Deut. 1: 2. For some reason, this is a very rare
book; the only copy I was able to locate in the United States is at Yeshiva
University. This work was published with approbations and letters by,
among others, R. Ezekiel Banet and R. Moses Sofer. The commentary on
Deut. 34 is missing from the copy I examined.
130 Commentary on the Torah, 507; id., Hamishtadel, on Deut.1: 1.
131 Ho’il mosheh, 204.
132 Supercommentary on Ibn Ezra (Vienna, 1859), Deut. 34: 6. (See,
however, his comment on Gen. 3: 21 and Deut. 1: 2.) As he often does,
Netter has simply incorporated R. Benjamin Ze’ev’s words into his own
commentary.
133 ‘Divine Origin’, 131. Breuer adds: ‘I do not know if the sages approve
of these words. Yet they were stated by Ibn Ezra, and thus no one is able to
deny their legitimacy.’
134 Yeḥi yosef, 194.
135 See his Torah Commentaries, 64, 138, 198 (uncensored version). R.
Judah Hehasid’s view is discussed in Brin, ‘Studies’, 215–26; Katz, ‘Judah
he-Hasid’, 23–30; Jacobs, Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 63–5.
136 See the text by R. Avigdor Katz published in Zimmels, ‘Manuscript’,
259. R. Avigdor’s wording in this passage is virtually identical to that of R.
Judah Hehasid, which I assume means that he copied R. Judah’s comments
directly. It is also possible that one of R. Avigdor’s students inserted them
into the text. Incidentally, R. Avigdor’s version enables us to explain the
mysterious word that appears in Judah Hehasid, Torah Commentaries,
198. It should actually read (‘to Acre’).
137 See Guide i. 59. According to Maimonides, the Men of the Great
Assembly were members of Ezra’s beit din (see his introduction to the
Mishneh torah).
138 Tsofnat pane’aḥ on Gen. 36: 31.
139 See the text published in Isaac Lange, ‘Moshav zekenim’, 83.
140 Jacobs, Principles, 222–3.
141 See Lockshin, Rashbam’s Commentary, 260–1.
142 Torah Commentaries, 184–5.
143 Zimmels, ‘Manuscript’, 261.
144 Commentary, 64d.
145 Ta-Shma, ‘Open Bible Criticism’, 421 ff.
146 Arugat habosem, iii. 136.
147 Commentary on BT Ned. 37b (found in the Vilna edition of the
Talmud).
148 This reading is found in biblical manuscripts and the Samaritan
version, and is reflected in Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, Onkelos manuscripts,
the Septuagint, and the Peshitta. See C. D. Gins-burg’s edition of the
Pentateuch, ad loc.; Tov, Textual Criticism, 67.
149 Beit habeḥirah on BT Ned. 37b.
150 See Meromei sadeh, on BT Ned. 37b.
151 See J. N. Epstein, ‘Commentaries’, 175 if.; id., ‘Rashi’s’
Commentary’, no; Y. H. Sofer, Torat ya’akov, 886-90.
152 Beit habeḥirah on BT Ned. 37b.
153 Ta-Shma, ‘On Bible Criticism’, 455-6.
154 According to R. Moses ibn Tibbon, Ibn Ezra also believed that the
word azazel was post-Mosaic (though not the entire verse). See D.
Schwartz, Astrology and Magic, 330-1.
155 As is well known, the medieval Ashkenazi pietists were greatly
influenced by Ibn Ezra. Perhaps his view of post-Mosaic authorship also
found a following in this circle, which included R. Judah Hehasid, R.
Solomon b. Samuel, and R. Avigdor Katz. See Kanarfogel, ‘Peering through
the Lattices’, 96 n. 6.
156 .
157 Anushiski, Matsav hayosher, ii. 28b. The first volume of this work
appeared with glowing approbations from numerous prominent rabbis,
including Joseph Saul Nathanson, Tsevi Hirsch Kalischer, Elijah
Guttmacher, Jacob Ettlinger, Meir Leibush Malbim, Naftali Tsevi Judah
Berlin, and Isaac Elhanan Spektor.
158 Torah shelemah, i. 83a–83b, iii. 25b.
159 See also Sifrei bamidbar, piska 112; Heschel, Theology, ii. 94–7.
160 See Hirschensohn, Malki bakodesh, ii. 234 ff.
161 San. 10: 1.
162 For a comprehensive survey of talmudic and post-talmudic sources,
see Heschel, Theology, ii, chs. 6, 8–9, 11; M. Kasher, Torah shelemah, xix.
333 ff. Heschel’s collection of sources is breathtaking and has been of great
benefit to me. For Ibn Ezra’s views in this regard, see Brin, ‘Question’, 125
ff.
163 BT Meg. 31b.
164 Zohar, iii. 261a. See Heschel, Theology, ii, 184–5. For rabbinic
authorities who agree with this position, see ibid. 205–6 (Heschel is
mistaken in citing Moses b. Joseph Trani, Beit elokim, ch. 33, as also
agreeing with this notion). An unusual passage, which admittedly does not
contradict the principle, is found in R. Eliezer b. Nathan (12th cent.), Even
ha’ezer, no. 34. According to R. Eliezer, although all the Torah was revealed
by God, Moses himself arranged the book of Deuteronomy. Therefore, it is
only with regard to the first four books of the Pentateuch that one can apply
the principle that the Torah lacks chronological order (ein mukdam
ume’uḥar).
 165 See I. Karo, Toledot yitsḥak, 411 (beginning of his commentary on
Deut.); Abarbanel, introduction to his commentary on Deut. (Jerusalem,
1984), 6–7; Solomon Duran, She’elot uteshuvot harashbash, no. 21;
Schwadron, She’elot uteshuvot maharsham, iii, no. 290. Contrary to the
impression left by Heschel’s discussion of this issue, Theology, ii. 209 ff., he
did not identify any post-talmudic authorities who disagreed with this point.
166 Commentary on Alfasi on BT Meg. 31b (p. 11a in the Vilna edn.).
167 47: 9.
168 Heschel, Theology, ii. 294.
169 See also the commentary of R. David Luria ad loc.
170 Midrash hagadol, Shemot, 796.
171 See Exod. ch. 39, which describes the building of the Tabernacle.
Every paragraph concludes with these words.
172 See Heschel, Theology, ii. 345–6. See also ibid. 182 for a citation from
Midrash tanḥuma, ‘Shoftim’, 19, where, once again, God is portrayed as
agreeing with Moses’ addition. According to R. Elijah Benamozegh,
Introduction, 23, only the content of the book of Deuteronomy was
prophetically revealed. Moses himself was responsible for the actual words.
173 See Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot sefer torah’, 8: 4. This passage concerns
open and closed sections. According to Moshe Goshen-Gottstein,
Maimonides never intended to rule on issues of spelling, accentuation, etc.:
see id., ‘Authenticity’, 23, and ‘Keter’, 874–5. Still, as he himself points out
elsewhere, it stands to reason that Maimonides regarded the Ben Asher
codex as being authoritative in all areas. See id., ‘Hebrew Bible’, 49–50. This
latter point is stressed by Penkower in New Evidence, 54 n. 32. According to
Penkower, it would simply have been impractical for Maimonides to list the
thousands of defective and plene words in the Mishneh torah. As he notes,
Maimonides rules that a missing letter invalidates a Torah scroll (‘Hilkhot
sefer torah’, 10: 1). Such a halakhah would be incomprehensible if there did
not exist a letter-perfect text which would serve as the ‘master copy’. This
text is the Ben Asher codex.
174 See dei Rossi, Me’or einayim, ch. 9 (end). See also other versions of
the story in Loewinger and Kupfer, ‘Yom Tov’, 239–41. For other
references to the ‘scroll of Ezra’, see Benayahu, ‘Letter’, 205–6. It is possible
that the legend of Maimonides’ journey to France was invented precisely in
order to explain just how Maimonides could have put forth such a bold
claim, namely, that his copy of the Torah was identical with that of Moses.
If Maimonides had examined the scroll of Ezra, which presumably was the
same as the scroll of Moses, this problem disappears. Of course, the story of
the three Torahs in the Temple, which shows that there was no scroll of
Ezra in existence, is ignored in creating this legend. See M. Goshen-
Gottstein, ‘Authenticity’, 46, who explains the legend in another plausible
fashion.
175 ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 8.
176 Fundamentals and Faith, 90–1. This book is an authorized
presentation of Weinberg’s shiurim.
177 Complete Mosaic authorship is also affirmed in Maimonides’
Commentary on the Mishnah, i. 2; Introduction to the Mishneh Torah;
‘Hilkhot tefilah’, 13: 6; Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 90, 405 (Arabic), 127, 410
(Hebrew); and Maimonides, Ḥidushei harambam, 104. The authenticity of
this last work has been challenged by Levinger in Maimonides, 172–6. See
also ibid. 54–5, where Levinger argues that Maimonides’ esoteric view is
that the last eight verses are, in fact, post-Mosaic. Cf. Levinger’s earlier
Halakhic Thought, 96 n. 24, where this approach is only advanced as a
‘daring’ possibility. I see no compelling evidence to support Levinger in this
regard.
 178 Commentary, Mishnah Sotah 3: 3, San. 10: 3, Shevu. 1: 4; Sefer
hamitsvot, negative commandment no. 133; Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 327
(Arabic), 354 (Hebrew). This position was put forth earlier in Mavo
hatalmud, found at the end of tractate Berakhot in the Vilna edition of the
Talmud and attributed to R. Samuel Hanagid:
. (Concerning the
authorship of this work, see Margulies, Hilkhot hanagid, 68–73; Abramson,
‘Some Teachings’, 22–3.) See similarly Rashi, BT San. 51b, s.v. hakhi;
Cordovero, Elimah rabati, i. 1.
179 Commentary, Mishnah Sotah 3: 3 (translation in Naor, Kabbalah and
the Holocaust, 10).
180 Y. H. Sofer, Yeḥi yosef, 191 ff., attempts to understand Maimonides by
placing the issue in a halakhic context, but this strikes me as far off the mark.
A halakhic decision would not leave the rejected opinion in the category of
heresy. Sofer takes note of Maimonides’ view regarding the inapplicability of
halakhic decisions in theoretical matters, but understands this to mean that
normal procedures of halakhic decision-making are suspended (
). This interpretation is completely unfounded and cannot
possibly be foisted on Maimonides’ words. It is, however, typical of those
scholars who choose to view everything Maimonides wrote from a halakhic
perspective. In this regard, see R. S. Kanevsky, Siaḥ hasadeh, 29b, who tries
to explain why it is that Maimonides ‘decided in accordance with R. Simeon
that Moses wrote the entire Torah. This requires investigation for it is
accepted that in a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halakhah is
in accordance with R. Judah’ (see BT Eruv. 46b). See similarly Lichtman,
Benei tsiyon, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’ 428: 7. There is actually no difficulty whatsoever,
for Maimonides, in advocating the view that Moses wrote the entire Torah,
is expressing an ideological position, not a halakhic ruling, and this has no
connection with the rules of halakhic decision-making referred to by these
authors.
181 Ivry, ‘Islamic and Greek Influences’, 141–2.
182 See Ravitzky, Al da’at hamakom, 193–4, 201. As Ravitzky points out,
193 n. 74, the same position was also expressed in the anonymous 14th-
cent. German work, Alilot devarim.
183 See Ravitzky, Al da’at hamakom, 194–5.
184 ‘Spinoza’s Dogmas’, 189. This point had already been made by Albo
in Sefer ha’ikarim, ii. 14.
185 According to the esoteric interpretation of Maimonides’ view of
revelation, and contrary to what he writes in the Eighth Principle, the Torah
was not prophetically dictated to Moses by God. This view turns virtually
the entire Principle into a ‘necessary belief’. Supporters of this approach
include Reines, ‘Maimonides’ Concept’, 325–61; Bland, ‘Moses’, 49–66;
Kaplan, ‘ “I Sleep” ’; Ivry, ‘Isma’ili’, 294–5; Levinger, Maimonides, ch. 4.
Though he did not attribute this view to Maimonides, it is also advocated by
R. Nissim b. Moses, Ma’aseh nisim, 177–8 (only the general commands
came from God, and Moses supplied the particulars).
186 See Perlmann, ‘Eleventh-Century Andalusian Authors’, 271–7; Baron,
Social and Religious History, v. 88 ff.; Lazarus-Yafeh, ‘Ezra’; id., Intertwined
Worlds; N. Roth, ‘Forgery’; Adang, Muslim Writers, ch. 7. For similar
accusations in the Christian world, see Resnick, ‘Falsification’.
187 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 93 (Arabic), 131–2 (Hebrew). Penkower, ‘Jacob
ben Hayim’, 414–15, calls attention to the Letter to Yemen in the context of
taḥrif, and also notes the similar, though not so extreme, formulation given
by Abraham ibn Daud, Ha’emunah haramah, 80. As with Maimonides, Ibn
Daud was well aware of the facts, but he too had a polemical battle to wage.
The same is true for Albo, who wrote: ‘The Torah is exactly the same today
without any change among all Israel who are scattered all over the world
from the extreme east to the farthest west’ (Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 22). See
similarly Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, xiv. 213, and E. Breuer,
Limits, ch. 5, on Mendelssohn’s motivations.
188 Seeing the extremes to which Maimonides was willing to go, perhaps
my judgement in n. 10 above is mistaken. Assuming that the Eighth
Principle teaches ‘necessary beliefs’, perhaps Maimonides cast his net as wide
as possible, including as part of the Principle issues of script, exceptional
letters and anything else found in the text of the Torah. In fact, Maimonides
made some other peculiar, and apparently untrue, assertions. For example,
his claim that there are no disputes with regard to halakhot lemosheh misinai
is virtually impossible to justify (Commentary on the Mishnah, i. 10).
Levinger, Halakhic Thought, 63 ff., cites this as an example of Maimonides
responding to the needs of the masses by presenting them with an
understanding of Judaism which would enable them to withstand the
onslaught of Islamic polemics (or possibly Karaite assaults; see Letters, ed.
Shailat, ii. 442, Baron, Social and Religious History, v. 22). With such a goal,
namely, the creation of a religious myth, absolute truth is not important.
189 Tsofnat pane’aḥ on Gen. 12: 6.
190 Or haḥayim on Deut. 34: 6.
191 She’elot uteshuvot haradbaz, nos. 1020, 1172.
 EIGHT

Eternity of the Torah

The Ninth Principle

HE NINTH PRINCIPLE teaches that the Torah will never be
T abrogated, in whole or part, and that God will never give
another Torah. Maimonides repeats his insistence that the biblical
mitsvot and the Oral Law will never be abrogated, not even in
messianic days, in a few other places.1 While this is certainly a
popular position among rabbinic authorities, and has a talmudic
source,2 it is hardly unanimously accepted.
A number of rabbinic sources speak of future changes in the
Torah.3 The classic statement is made by R. Joseph: ‘The mitsvot
will be abolished in the Time to Come’ (BT Nidah 61b). Scholars
have debated whether this passage refers to the messianic age or
the time of the resurrection.4 However, none of this is relevant to
Maimonides, for he explicitly states that the resurrection will occur
‘in the lifetime of the Messiah, or before him, or after he dies’.5 In
other words, the resurrection will not usher in some new
eschatological world.6 Apart from this uniquely occurring miracle,
the world of the resurrection will not differ from the world in
which we currently live—a world in which, according to
Maimonides, the Torah remains binding in its entirety.
 Another famous passage is found in Vayikra rabah 13: 3, which
seeks to explain the rabbinic tradition that in the Time to Come
the righteous will consume the mythical beasts Behemoth and
Leviathan. The problem is that the same tradition portrays these
beasts as killing one another, hardly a valid method of sheḥitah.
Playing upon Isaiah 51: 4—‘Instruction [torah] shall go forth from
Me’—R. Abin ben Kahanah proclaimed: ‘The Holy One, blessed
be He, said: “A new Torah [torah ḥadashah] shall go forth from
me”, that is, a new Torah law [ḥidush torah] shall issue from me.’7
Similarly, Yalkut shimoni speaks of a ‘new Torah which will be
given through the messiah’.8
Aside from these general statements speaking of future changes
in the Torah, there are a number of other rabbinic passages which
specify certain mitsvot that will no longer be in force. For example,
Yalkut shimoni, Mishlei, no. 944 says: ‘All the festivals are to be
abolished in the future [messianic era], but Purim will never be
abolished. R. Eleazar said: Also Yom Kippur will never be
abolished.’9 BT Kidushin 72b asserts: ‘Mamzerim10 and netinim11
will become pure in the Time to Come: this is Rabbi Jose’s view .
. . Rabbi Judah said in Samuel’s name: The halakhah agrees with
Rabbi Jose.’ Midrash tehilim (146: 4) states:

The Lord looseth the bound (Ps. 146: 4). What does the verse mean by the
words looseth the bound? Some say that of every animal whose flesh it is
forbidden to eat in this world, the Holy One, blessed be He, will declare in
the Time to Come that the eating of this flesh is permitted. . . . [Others offer
a different interpretation:] Though nothing is more strongly forbidden than
intercourse with a menstruous woman—for when a woman sees blood the
Holy One, blessed be He, forbids her to her husband—in the Time to
Come, God will permit such intercourse.

Another midrashic passage on this verse, which is attested to by

Albo12 but is not found in our texts, reads: ‘The Lord looseth the
bound [ ]: He permits the forbidden [ ].’ Other
rabbinic passages speak of the mitsvot of remembering the Exodus
and offering sacrifices as being abolished in the future.13
R. David ben Samuel Hakokhavi (thirteenth century) accepts
the notion that in the Time to Come certain mitsvot will be
abolished. According to him, during this time, when ‘the earth
shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord’ (Isa. 11: 9), the nature
of humans will change so that they will be like angels and their
intellects will rule over their bodies. Thus there will be no need for
the many negative commandments that, Hakokhavi believes, are
intended to bring about the control of the sensual urges by the
intellect.14 R. Bahya ben Asher adopts a similar approach in
explaining why the prohibition on mixing milk and meat is to be
abolished.15
Another medieval scholar, R. Joseph Albo, is the most
important philosopher to disagree with Maimonides. Although in
Book I, chapter 23 of his Sefer ha’ikarim he states that ‘it is
incumbent upon everyone who professes the Law of Moses’ to
believe that the Torah will never be repealed nor changed, in Book
III, chapters 13–20 he presents an entirely different position.16
Although he considers his position only theoretical, he
acknowledges that, were a new prophet to arise whose mission
could be verified in the same public and miraculous way in which
Moses’ mission was verified, it would be possible for the
commandments of the Torah to be abolished. The only exception
to this is the Ten Commandments, which have a different status
from that of the rest of the laws of the Torah, having been
proclaimed to the Israelites directly by God.17 While it is true that
humans are commanded neither to add nor subtract from the
Torah, ‘what can there be to prevent God Himself from adding or
diminishing as His wisdom decrees?’18 According to Albo, the
view that the commandments can be abolished ‘belongs neither to
the category of the necessary nor to that of the impossible’.19 As
he elaborates in another passage:

There is nothing therefore to prevent us from supposing that the divine law
may in the future permit some things which are forbidden now, like fat or
blood or the slaughter of [sacrificial] animals outside the Temple. These
things were originally forbidden when the Israelites left Egypt because they
were addicted to the worship of evil spirits, and ate the flesh with the blood
and also ate fat and blood. . . . But when this form of worship has been
forgotten, and all people shall worship God, and the reason for the
prohibition will cease, it may be that God will again permit it. . . . To sum
up, I see no evidence, nor any necessity, from Maimonides’ arguments, that
the immutability or irrepealability of the law should be a fundamental
principle of a divine law generally or of the Law of Moses in particular.20

Albo’s opinion is quoted without objection by R. Moses

Sofer.21 Similar views, advocating the possibility of God changing
aspects of the Torah or giving an entirely new Torah, are
independently propounded by R. Tobias ben Moses Cohn (1652–
1729),22 R. Jacob Emden,23 and R. Abraham Hayim Viterbo.24
After repeating a point originally made by Albo, that although
Adam was forbidden to eat meat Noah was permitted to do so,25
Viterbo continues as follows:

They were permitted to consume the sinew of the sciatic nerve, but this was
forbidden to Jacob; Noah and Abraham offered sacrifices outside the Land
[of Israel]; and Jacob was permitted to marry two sisters, and later this was
forbidden in the Torah of Moses. What will the rabbi [Maimonides] say
[about this]? For everything is good and proper in its time and with the
passage of time the law will change and there is no regret, for it is possible
that at one time a certain practice is beneficial and years later another
practice will be beneficial. Since the divine law changed a few times before
the giving of the Torah, why should the rabbi decree that the Torah of
Moses will never change?

Most disturbing to Viterbo is what he views as Maimonides’

presumptuousness in instructing God, as it were, on how He can
conduct Himself.26
Emden makes a similar point:

We absolutely do not admit that which Maimonides laid down, that the
entire Torah will not change, for there is no decisive proof for this—neither
from reason and logic nor from the Bible. Verily, the Sages tell us that the
Holy One will give a new Torah in the future. If our King should wish to
change the Torah, or exchange it for another, whatever the King wishes,
whether it be to descend on Mount Sinai or another of the mighty
mountains, or even a valley, there to appear a second time before the eyes of
all the living, we would be the first to do His will, whatever be His
bidding.27

In order to show that God’s law can change, both Albo and
Viterbo cite examples of things which were at first permitted but
later forbidden (or, in the case of Adam and meat, first forbidden
and later permitted). In some of the examples, it was only before
the giving of the Torah that they were permitted, and they became
forbidden with the subsequent revelation of Torah law.
Surprisingly, neither Albo nor Viterbo cites Devarim rabah 4: 6, 9,
according to which divine law was changed even after the giving
of the Torah. The example given is that of Leviticus 17, where it is
stated that when one wishes to eat meat it must be slaughtered at
the sanctuary as a sacrificial act. However, in Deuteronomy 12:
15–16 this provision is revoked. It is significant that the midrash
does not say that the prohibition was only intended to be
temporary, due to the conditions of desert life. Rather, it says
‘God prohibited many things and He again made them
permissible elsewhere [in Scripture].’ In speaking of the new
permission in Deuteronomy 12, the midrash links it to the verse in
Psalm 146: 7, ‘The Lord looseth the bound’, which is interpreted
here as meaning that the Lord permitted that which was
previously forbidden.
Turning to the kabbalists, in discussing the world of the
messianic era, the section of the Zohar known as Raya mehemna28
states: ‘The Tree of Good and Evil,29 which is the forbidden and
the permitted, uncleanness and cleanness, will no longer rule over
Israel, for they will derive their sustenance only from the Tree of
Life,30 where there are no problems from the evil side, and no
arguments from the spirit of uncleanness.’31 In a later passage, the
Raya mehemna clarifies this by pointing out that only kabbalists
will be freed from the commandments in the messianic era. But
‘the forbidden and the permitted, uncleanness and cleanness, will
not forsake the ignorant, because on their side the only difference
between the age of exile and the Messianic Age will be [the
destruction of] oppressive political power, for they will not taste
of the Tree of Life, and they will need the halakhic teachings of
the forbidden and the permitted, the unclean and the clean’.32 In
commenting on the first Raya mehemna passage, R. Menahem
Mendel of Vitebsk (1730–88) writes:

The statement of our teachers, of blessed memory, that in the days of the
Messiah all commandments will be abolished rests on [the belief] that in the
Time to Come the earth shall be full of the knowledge of God as the waters
cover the sea [cf. Isa. 11: 9], and they will have a different Torah . . . and
that this knowledge will penetrate to the root of the Torah and the
commandments, that is, to the absolute Unity, the Ein Sof as expressed in
the words I am the Lord thy God (Exod. 20: 2, Deut. 5: 6). When this goal is
reached all commandments will ‘let down their wings’ and all statutes will be
suspended because the evil urge will then have been overcome.33

R. Isaac of Radzivilov (died 1835) writes:

Regarding that which is stated in the Zohar ḥadash, that in the future God
will give us a new Torah in the days of the redeemer, may he come speedily
in our days, it is not the Torah which is currently in our possession, and also
not the Torah which was given at Mount Sinai. Not this shall God give us,
but a new Torah which was in existence two thousand years before the
creation of the world. The Torah which God will give us in the future is
hidden in the Torah currently in our possession . . . and it is certain that it is
with regard to the Torah in our possession that the Sages of blessed memory
stated that the mitsvot will be abolished in the future.34
 According to R. Jacob Joseph of Polonnoye (died c.1782), in
the future the mitsvot will no longer have a physical component
but only a spiritual one. So, for example, one will be able to wear
wool and linen as this is only the external form of the mitsvah,
which in the future will be obsolete. Only the spiritual component
of the mitsvot is eternal.35
R. Isaac Luria, as quoted by R. Hayim Joseph David Azulai
(1724–1806),36 states that in messianic days the kohanim and the
Levites will exchange roles. R. Hayim Halberstam (1793–1876)
claims that the firstborn will take the place of the kohanim.37 Both
of these scenarios are certainly a change in the Torah’s scheme,
according to which only the descendants of Aaron are to be
priests. In fact, in speaking of Phinehas, the Torah is explicit that
his descendants will have an ‘everlasting priesthood’ (kehunat olam;
Num. 25: 13). Presumably, Luria and Halberstam understood
‘everlasting’ to mean until messianic times, when a new spiritual
era will begin.38
In Temple days the priests’ primary duties revolved around the
sacrificial order, and, as mentioned previously, there are rabbinic
sources which speak of sacrifices being abolished in the future. R.
David Kimhi, relying on Ezekiel’s eschatological vision, which
portrays the sacrificial order differently from the version specified
by the Torah, writes that in messianic days there will indeed be
changes in this regard. While most of the changes have to do with
the type and number of animals and accompaniments offered at
the various sacrifices, there will also be at least one completely new
feature in the new sacrificial order. The Torah commands that a
burnt offering be offered daily, both morning and evening (Exod.
29: 38–42, Num. 28: 1–8), but according to Kimhi, in messianic
days the daily evening sacrifice will be abolished in its entirety.39
(Maimonides understands Ezekiel’s vision to be referring to a
special service which will take place once, at the dedication of the
Third Temple.40)
A more striking passage is found in Vayikra rabah 9: 7 (and
parallels): ‘In the Time to Come all sacrifices will be annulled, but
that of thanksgiving will not be annulled.’41 This passage is cited
by numerous authorities, including Nahmanides in his
commentary on Leviticus 23: 17. It appears to be a reference to
the messianic era and not the time of resurrection, since the
prooftext cited from Jeremiah 33: 11 is a messianic prophecy.42
The great kabbalist R. Joseph Gikatilla (1248–c.1325) writes
that only the sacrifices slaughtered on the north side of the Temple
courtyard will be abolished in messianic days. These include the
burnt offering, the sin offering, the guilt offering, and the
communal peace offering (all regarded as ‘holy of holies’, kodshei
kodashim). In his comment on this passage. R. Mattathias Delacrut
(sixteenth century) claims that Gikatilla’s words are an explanation
of the Vayikra rabah passage cited in the previous paragraph.43
However, this is incorrect, for while it is true that the individual
peace offering, which is also known as a thanksgiving offering, can
be slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, the same is true of
a number of other sacrifices, including the sacrifice of the firstling
and the paschal sacrifice, all of which are regarded as kodashim
kalim (sacrifices of lesser sanctity).44 Thus, while according to the
Vayikra rabah passage cited by Delacrut only the thanksgiving
offering will exist in messianic days, according to Gikatilla all
kodashim kalim will continue to be offered.
On the subject of sacrifices, we must also call attention to the
view of R. Abraham Isaac Kook, as expressed in his commentary
on the prayer book.45 While agreeing that there will be sacrifices
in the messianic era, Kook argues that these will only be vegetable
sacrifices. Employing kabbalistic arguments, he claims that in
messianic days animals will themselves be full of the knowledge of
God and thus will not need to be sacrificed in order to achieve the
tikun (‘correction’, ‘perfecting’) that brings them close to God.
Kook’s biblical prooftext is Malachi 3: 4: ‘Then shall the offering [
] of Judah and Jerusalem be pleasant unto the Lord, as in the
days of old, and as in ancient years.’ This verse, in speaking of a
sacrificial offering in messianic days, mentions the minḥah
sacrifice, which is not an animal offering but consists of fine flour,
oil, and frankincense. This is also how Kook explains the passage
in Vayikra rabah: animal sacrifices will be abolished, but their
place will be taken by vegetable sacrifices.46 Kook’s opinion, which
alters the Torah obligation of animal sacrifices by substituting
vegetable offerings, must be understood as part of his
eschatological vision of vegetarianism.47 As for all the passages in
the Talmud, prayer book, and Kook’s own writings48 that speak of
a return to animal sacrifices, presumably he understood them as
referring to an early period in the messianic era, before the
vegetarian ideal could be realized.49 This view is in fact suggested
independently of Kook by R. Hayim David Halevi (1924–98),
late chief rabbi of Tel Aviv.50
R. Hayim Hirschensohn argues that in messianic days the
sacrificial system will undergo significant alterations in accordance
with the mindset and conceptions that will then prevail,
conceptions that people today cannot grasp.51 Although he does
not elaborate on this position in as much detail as could be
wished, it is clear that he is saying that cultured minds of the
future will not find meaning in the sacrificial system as it existed in
days of old. Since it is hard to imagine moderns finding spiritual
meaning in any form of sacrificial system, even a completely
revised one, Eliezer Schweid is no doubt correct in understanding
Hirschensohn to mean that in messianic days there will be
absolutely no sacrificial rituals. Rather, ‘worship will be spiritual in
nature, revealing the inner meaning of the sacrifices offered in the
past’.52 Kook understood this to be Hirschensohn’s implication,
and in a very conservative letter in which he accepts the return of
animal sacrifices, urged Hirschensohn not to be too enamoured of
Western culture, which regards sacrifices as an immature form of
worship. Rather, he should remember that behind the physical act
of the sacrifice stands profound holiness.53 Despite this criticism,
Hirschensohn continued to maintain his position. As for Kook’s
assumption that Hirschensohn had been taken in by what modern
society regarded as intellectually respectable and cultured, and that
this could change in the future, Hirschensohn defended himself by
declaring: ‘Knowledge and discernment will not regress, and lack
of culture will not be considered culture.’54
There have been other traditional thinkers in modern times
who denied that there would be a revival of sacrifices in the
messianic era. In 1919 R. Solomon Isaac Scheinfeld (1860–1943),
the leading rabbi of Milwaukee’s Orthodox community, published
an anonymous and controversial article in which he argued that,
since sacrifices would never be revived, they were now irrelevant
to Judaism and that therefore all references to them should be
removed from the prayer book.55 While he was not an outstanding
thinker, it is noteworthy that R. Sabato Morais (1823–97) also
denied that there would be a revival of sacrifices.56
From what we have seen so far, it is obvious that there is a
significant rabbinic position which declares that the
commandments will be abolished in messianic days. In fact,
Bezalel Naor has speculated that perhaps it was this knowledge—
that Maimonides’ Principle was subject to such dispute—that
prevented many great Torah scholars from reacting more strongly
to the false messiah Shabetai Tsevi’s violations of halakhah. Since
they knew that many authorities believed that Jewish law would
change in the messianic era, as long as it had not been established
that Shabetai Tsevi was not the messiah, his violations of Jewish
ritual were not a sufficient reason to condemn him.57
The question that must be asked once more is how Maimonides
could regard the immutability of the commandments as a dogma,
denial of which is heresy, when a good number of talmudic and
midrashic texts do not accept this position. As I suggested with
regard to the Fourth Principle and aspects of the Eighth, it is likely
that here too, as Jacob Levinger has argued,58 Maimonides was
formulating a ‘necessary belief’, directed towards the masses and
designed to help them deal with ideological assaults from the
Islamic world. I do not claim, as does Levinger, that the belief
itself is ‘necessary’, rather than ‘true’. On the contrary, according
to Maimonides, as expressed in a number of places in his writings,
the belief is indeed true. What was ‘necessary’ was for Jews to be
convinced that denial of this true belief was tantamount to heresy.
This is why it was included as one of the Thirteen Principles.
 In fact, there seems to be proof to support this reading of
Maimonides in the Mishneh torah. I have already argued that the
Fourth Principle and aspects of the Eighth Principle are
‘necessary’, in that, while Maimonides may have believed them to
be true, he did not believe that one who denies them is a heretic. I
have also pointed out that, when Maimonides offers a halakhic
definition of heresy in the Mishneh torah, he omits mention of
these ‘necessary’ beliefs. That is, he nowhere states that it is heresy
to deny that God created the world ex nihilo, that the entire Torah
was revealed to Moses, and that our current Torah text is identical
with the Torah given to Moses. It would therefore be expected
that in this case too, Maimonides’ formulation in the Mishneh
torah would not categorize someone who rejects the Ninth
Principle as a heretic. In fact, this is exactly what we find, for in
‘Hilkhot teshuvah’ 3: 8, Maimonides writes: ‘There are three
individuals who are considered as one who denies the Torah. . . .
One who says that though the Torah came from God, the Creator
has replaced this Law with another and nullified the Torah, as for
example the Christians and the Muslims.’ That is, Maimonides
defines a heretic as someone who says that God has already
abrogated the Torah. There is no mention here of someone who
asserts that there will be an abrogation in the future.

1 See Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 9: 1, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’,

3: 8, ‘Hilkhot megilah’, 2: 18, ‘Hilkhot melakhim’, 11: 1, 3; Guide ii. 39, iii.
34.
2 JT Meg. 1: 5, Sifra on Lev. 27: 34.
 3 See Palache, Lev ḥayim, ‘Oraḥ ḥayim’, no. 32; J. Rosenthal, ‘The Idea of
the Abrogation of Mitsvot’; Davies, Setting of the Sermon on the Mount, 156–
90; Biller, ‘God Will Not Change’; Heschel, Theology, iii. 49–81.
4 See Tosafot ad loc., s.v. amar; Urbach, Sages, 819 n. 43. Midrash
tana’im on Deut. 19: 9 explicitly distinguishes between the ‘days of the
messiah’, in which mitsvot are still obligatory, and the ‘Time to Come’, in
which there will be no commandments. R. Yeruham Meir Leiner of Radzyn
attempts to prove that, according to both Rashi and Nahmanides, R.
Joseph’s statement does indeed refer to the messianic era. See Medini, Sedei
ḥemed, iv. 306–7 (ma’arekhet mem 218). See also ibid., vol. ix, ‘Divrei
ḥakhamim’, no. 53 (pp. 34–6), where Medini discusses the view that only
the negative commandments will be abolished. R. Menahem Mendel of
Vitebsk also thinks that R. Joseph’s statement refers to the messianic era; see
his Peri ha’arets, 24 (‘Toledot’). According to R. Isser Yehudah Unterman,
Maimonides understood this passage as referring to the afterlife. See his
Shevet miyehudah, iii. 315–16. Although this is not the simple meaning of
the phrase ‘ Time to Come’, as Unterman points out, this view was actually
held by R. Solomon ben Adret, R. Yom Tov Ishbili, and R. Nissim
Gerondi. It is, however, possible that these sages advanced this view as an
apologetic response to Christian polemicists who cited R. Joseph’s
statement. See Lieberman, Sheki’in, 80–1. As part of his polemic against
Shabatean antinomianism, R. Eleazar Fleckeles also claimed that R. Joseph’s
statement referred to the afterlife. See Naor, Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism,
152 nn. 13, 15.
5 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 329 (Arabic) 359 (Hebrew).
6 This opinion, which Maimonides rejects, namely that the resurrection
will be the beginning of a new spiritual era, was held by a number of
scholars and was used to explain how R. Joseph’s view— which in their
opinion refers to a post-resurrection world—does not contradict the notion
of the immutability of Torah law. In other words, Torah law is only
immutable in our present world. See e.g. Loew (Maharal), Tiferet yisra’el,
chs. 52–3; Jacob Emden’s note on BT RH 30a (printed in the Romm
edition of the Talmud); Shneur Zalman of Lyady, Likutei amarim, iv (‘Igeret
hakodesh’), ch. 26; A. I. Kook, Igerot hare’iyah, i. 173, ii. 250–1; Messas,
Mayim ḥayim, i, no. 124; T. Y. Kook, Linetivot yisra’el, i. 38.
7 Some manuscripts lack the word ḥadashah, but this does not change the
meaning of the passage. See Midrash vayikra rabah, ed. Margulies, 278. The
version I cite is also found in Abraham ben Azriel, Arugat habosem, i. 242.
8 On Isaiah, no. 429.
9 See also Pirkei derabi eli’ezer, ch. 46.
10 Mamzer: the issue of an incestuous or adulterous relationship. He or
she is forbidden to marry other Jews of pure pedigree.
11 Netinim: an ancient nation whose members were forbidden to
intermarry with Jews of pure pedigree. See EJ vii, cols. 551–4.
12 Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 16.
13 See Heschel, Theology, iii. 60–8; Y. Hayoun, Otsarot aḥarit hayamim,
ch. 12. Regarding the famous apocryphal midrash that in the Time to Come
pork will be permitted, see Zavihi, Ateret paz, i, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 6;
Korman, Hatahor vehatame, ch. 7. On the possibility that the consumption
of the sinew of the sciatic nerve will be permitted, see Medini, Sedei ḥemed,
ii. 18–19 (ma’arekhet gimel 76).
14 Sefer habatim, i. 183–4.
15 Commentary, Exod. 23: 19.
16 Albo’s view in these chapters did not escape the eyes of Christian
polemicists. See the apostate Christfels, Gespräch, 177–8.
17 Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 18–19. According to Albo, the first two of the Ten
Commandments, unlike the remaining eight, cannot even be abolished as a
temporary measure.
18 Ibid. 14.
19 Ibid. 19.
20 Ibid. 16. At iii. 18 he quotes in support of this view Sifrei on Deut. 18:
5: ‘If a prophet . . . says that we should violate the Sabbath or transgress some
of the commandments as a temporary measure, or even permanently, provided
he does not subvert the foundations of the religion, we must listen to him.’ Our
version of the Sifrei does not include the italicized text. See Sifrei devarim,
piska 175. The phrase ‘foundations of the religion’ (shorshei hadat) would
certainly not have been used in the classical rabbinic period.
21 Torat mosheh on Deut. 34: 12.
22 Ma’aseh tuviyah, ‘Olam ha’elyon’, ma’amar 3, chs. 2–3.
23 Migdal oz, 26b–c.
24 Emunat ḥakhamim, 27–9.
25 See Sefer ha’ikarim, iii. 14.
26 Emunat ḥakhamim, 28b.
27 Translation in Naor, Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism, 8–9.
28 iii. 124b; translation in Tishby, Wisdom, iii. 1150–1. See also the
analysis of Gottlieb in Studies, 545 ff.
29 ‘The direction of the world by the opposing forces of good and evil,
which necessitates the inclusion in the Torah of regulations concerning the
forbidden and the permitted, unclean and clean, will come to an end, as far
as the Kabbalists are concerned, in the Messianic Age’ (Tishby, Wisdom, iii.
1150 n. 275).
30 ‘They will receive their spiritual and physical nourishment from the
Tree of Life, and not from the Tree of Knowledge, and therefore they will
not be subject to the laws of the forbidden and the permitted’ (Tishby,
Wisdom, iii. 1150 n. 277).
31 ‘Under the rule of the Tree of Life there will be no room for problems
and arguments in the study of halakhah, for these originate in evil and
uncleanness’ (ibid. 1150 n. 278).
32 iii. 125a; trans. in Tishby, Wisdom, iii. 1151.
33 Peri ha’arets, 28 (‘Toledot’), trans. in Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 237.
34 Or yitsḥak, ‘Pekudei’, quoted in Heschel, Theology, iii. 73, and see the
similar passage from this author quoted by Heschel, ibid., n. 22.
35 Toledot ya’akov yosef, 31 (introduction).
36 Midbar kedemot, 34a (ma’arekhet kaf, no. 14).
37 Divrei ḥayim, i. 92 (‘Yitro’).
38 See BT Kid. 15a, where the Talmud understands the word le’olam in
Exod. 21: 6 as meaning ‘until the Jubilee’.
39 Commentary on Ezek. 45: 22, 46: 4, 13. This is perhaps contradicted
by his comment on Jer. 31: 30, where Kimhi denies that there will ever be
another Torah other than ‘that which was given at Sinai’. It is possible that
he distinguished between a completely new Torah and changes in the
existing Torah.
40 Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot ma’aseh hakorbanot’, 2: 14–15.
41 Recognizing the radical nature of this passage, a number of
commentators have explained that ‘all sacrifices’ means all sin offerings,
which will no longer be needed since people will not be sinning. However,
according to these scholars communal sacrifices will indeed continue to be
offered. See David Sperber, ‘Future Sacrifices’, 100; Aviner, ‘Sacrifices’, 8
(Aviner appears to have made great use of Sperber’s article without
acknowledgement).
42 See Davies, Setting of the Sermon on the Mount, 162–3.
43 Gikatilla, Sha’arei orah, 75a.
 44 Mishnah Zev., ch. 5; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot ma’aseh hakorbanot’, 5:
2–4.
45 Olat re’iyah, i. 292.
46 See A. I. Kook, Otserot hare’iyah, ii. 756.
47 Ibid. 742 ff.
48 Igerot lare’iyah, iv. 24; David Sperber, ‘Future Sacrifices’, 97 n. 5.
49 David Sperber, ‘Future Sacrifices’, and Aviner, ‘Sacrifices’, argue that
Kook’s comments regarding vegetable sacrifices refer to a post-resurrection
world. However, this does not correspond to Kook’s view, since he believes
that mitsvot are to be abolished in the post-resurrection era. He also states
explicitly that since there will be no eating at this time, there will be no
sacrifices (or at least no sacrifices which leave parts to be consumed). See A.
I. Kook, Igerot hare’iyah, ii. 250. As we have seen, Kook writes that in the
future the only sacrifice offered will be a vegetable minḥah. Since the minḥah
sacrifice is eaten, it is obvious that Kook is speaking of the messianic pre-
resurrection era. R. Shelomo Goren, ‘Building the Temple’, 246 ff., also
understands Kook to mean that there will only be vegetable sacrifices in
messianic days.
50 Aseh lekha rav, ix. 120–1, id., Torat ḥayim, ii. 18–20.
51 Malki bakodesh, i. 37.
52 Demokratiyah vehalakhah, 82.
53 Igerot hare’iyah, iv. 24.
54 Malki bakodesh, iv. 8.
55 ‘Even Shayish’ (pseud.), ‘Reform’. On Scheinfeld, see Swichkow and
Gartner, History, 208–11.
56 See Eisenstein, ‘Between Two Opinions’, 133. On Morais, see
Nussenbaum, ‘Champion’. While not offering a definite opinion, R. Jehiel
Jacob Weinberg left open the possibility that sacrifices would not be
reinstituted. See id., ‘Über Opferwesen’, 11 Jan. 1918.
57 Naor, Post-Sabbatian Sabbatianism, 7–9.
58 Levinger, Maimonides, 62.
 NINE

God’s Knowledge; Reward and

Punishment

The Tenth Principle

HE TENTH PRINCIPLE states that God knows the actions of men.
T This would appear to be obvious to all religious people, and
Isaac Husik described any view which limits God’s knowledge as
‘surely very bold as theology, we might almost say it is a
theological monstrosity’.1 However, theological monstrosity or
not, such a view is not lacking among Jewish philosophers.
To begin with, it is important to point out, and this is
emphasized by the Moroccan sage R. Raphael Berdugo (1747–
1821),2 that Maimonides does not refer to God’s knowledge of
the contingent, that is, future choices that have not yet been made.
He certainly did believe that God had complete foreknowledge,3
but this does not appear to be included here as dogma. In
addition, as pointed out by R. David Cohen,4 Maimonides
mentions nothing here about God knowing the thoughts of
humans. Similarly, in the Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 8,
he defines a heretic as one who denies that God knows the actions
of man. This is noteworthy, if only because the popular Ani
ma’amin formulation for this Principle reads: ‘I believe with
perfect faith that the Creator, Blessed be His Name, knows all the
deeds of human beings and their thoughts, as it is said, He fashions
their hearts all together, He comprehends all their deeds (Ps. 33: 15)’.5
Similarly, the Yigdal formulation reads: ‘He scrutinizes and knows
our innermost secrets.’
Ibn Ezra should be mentioned among those who limit God’s
knowledge, although his view is not entirely clear. His comment
on Genesis 18: 21 states: ‘The Whole [God]6 knows the individual
in a general manner rather than in a detailed manner’, adding that
this idea contains a ‘great secret’. In this passage, as well as some
others, Ibn Ezra appears to be advocating the Islamic Aristotelian
view that God only knows the particular in a general way but not
the particular as such, since it is constantly changing. This is how
Ibn Ezra was understood by Nahmanides, who refers to him
pejoratively as ‘pleasing himself with foreign offspring [i.e.
philosophy]’.7 Ibn Ezra is also understood in this manner by
Gersonides,8 the commentary attributed to Ibn Kaspi,9
Abarbanel,10 Falaquera,11 R. Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Nathan
Habavli,12 R. Aviad Sar-Shalom Basilea,13 and by later scholars
such as Orschansky,14 Rosin,15 Husik,16 Guttmann,17 Lévy,18
Sirat,19 and Joseph Cohen.20
Although this may indeed be Ibn Ezra’s view, it must be noted
that there is another possible reading which does not fit in with
any philosophical system. The implication of his comment, when
taken together with the verse, appears to be that God can, if he
wishes, attain knowledge of the particular. If this is so, then we are
not talking of a God who is constrained by forces beyond his will,
but rather of a God who chooses not to be aware of particulars.21
This would then be similar to the point made independently by R.
Hayim ben Attar,22 that at times God chooses not to have
knowledge of human actions. It is unclear whether this opinion
too contradicts Maimonides’ Principle. Yet, Principle or not, as far
as Maimonides is concerned it is a philosophical impossibility for
God to be able to limit himself in this way, just as he is unable to
make himself into a body or create another god equal to him.23
Among those who oppose Maimonides’ Principle, Gersonides
famously develops the distinction between God’s knowledge of the
universal and the particular in Book 3 of his Milḥamot hashem.
Following in the footsteps of Avicenna,24 Gersonides argues that
God knows particulars in a universal way—that is, in accordance
with how they are ‘ordered by the universal laws of nature’.25 But
the actual doings of individuals, which are infinite and undergo
change through free choice, fall outside God’s knowledge and he
can do nothing to alter this. It is hard to imagine a view more at
odds with traditional Jewish conceptions of God,26 and
Gersonides was indeed subjected to withering criticism.
Nevertheless, despite this radical view, Orthodox Jews continue to
regard him as one of the outstanding medieval sages (rishonim).

The Eleventh Principle

The Eleventh Principle is that of reward and punishment.
Although there is considerable disagreement about the nature of
this doctrine, with some thinkers, including Maimonides,
adopting a naturalistic stance, there is none who denies it outright.
However, one cannot help but wonder whether any of the
Orthodox spokesmen who have advocated acceptance of the
Thirteen Principles are really aware of Maimonides’ view of
reward and punishment, for it diverges sharply from the
mainstream rabbinic tradition.
Without going into great detail, since the issue has recently
been discussed by Menachem Kellner,27 it can be stated that
according to Maimonides there is no heavenly reward for the
performance of mitsvot per se. As he makes clear on a number of
occasions in the Guide, and as his opponents were well aware,28
Maimonides believed that immortality is entirely consequent upon
an intellectual grasp of divine things. He states this explicitly in
Guide iii. 27:

[Man’s] ultimate perfection is to become rational in actu, I mean to have an

intellect in actu; this would consist in his knowing everything concerning all
the beings that it is within the capacity of man to know in accordance with
his ultimate perfection. It is clear that to this ultimate perfection there do
not belong either actions or moral qualities and that it consists of opinions
toward which speculation has led and that investigation has rendered
compulsory. . . . Once the first perfection [perfection of the body] has been
achieved, it is possible to achieve the ultimate, which is indubitably more
noble and is the only cause of permanent preservation.29

In Guide iii. 54 he writes similarly:

The fourth species is the true human perfection; it consists in the acquisition
of the rational virtues—I refer to the conception of intelligibles, which teach
true opinions concerning the divine things. This is in true reality the
ultimate end; this is what gives the individual true perfection, a perfection
belonging to him alone; and it gives him permanent perdurance; through it
man is man.30

In fact, this radical view of Maimonides, that intellect is the

source of immortality, is also stated explicitly in his Commentary on
the Mishnah31 as well as in the Mishneh torah.32 Although
Abarbanel terms this view ‘a nonsensical falsehood and repugnant
opinion’,33 it was also held by Ibn Ezra,34 R. Abraham ibn
Daud,35 R. Samuel ibn Tibbon,36 R. Jacob Anatoli,37
Gersonides,38 and, apparently, R. Netanel ben Isaiah (fourteenth
century).39
There are, to be sure, passages in Maimonides’ non-
philosophical writings which give a different impression, namely,
that the performance of mitsvot also leads to heavenly reward.40
That different emphases and even outright contradictions appear
in Maimonides’ works is of course well known, but with regard to
these contradictions, or at least some of them, it seems possible to
come to a resolution. For example, when Maimonides speaks of
the performance of mitsvot leading to heavenly reward in his
commentary on Mishnah Makot 3: 17, one must pay careful
attention to his stress on performing the mitsvah ‘properly’, with
‘the most complete perfection’, and ‘for its own sake out of love’.
These are code words pointing to an intellectual element—a
knowledge of the Divine.41 In other words, as R. Joseph Kafih
(1917–2000) stresses, Maimonides is stating that performance of
mitsvot together with their intellectual component leads to
immortality.42 It is not the performance of a mitsvah per se that
brings immortality, but the philosophical knowledge that
accompanies this performance.
This connection between observance of the mitsvot and
knowledge of divine things as a prerequisite for immortality is also
seen quite clearly in the Mishneh torah. For example, in ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’ 9: 1 Maimonides begins by pointing out that there is a
heavenly reward for observing the mitsvot; later in the paragraph,
however, he clarifies that this reward comes to someone who
observes the mitsvot and also ‘knows it [i.e. the Torah] with a
complete and correct knowledge’. This ‘complete and correct
knowledge’ refers to knowledge of divine things. Throughout this
passage Maimonides continues to stress the combination of mitsvot
and intellectual attainments as a prerequisite for heavenly reward:

According to the greatness of his deeds and abundance of his knowledge will
be the measure in which he will attain that [heavenly] life. . . . Thus we will
not be engaged all our days in providing for our bodily needs, but will have
leisure to study wisdom and fulfil the commandments and thus attain life in
the world to come. . . . For if wisdom is not acquired and good deeds are
not performed here, there will be nothing meriting a recompense hereafter.

In ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’ 10: 1 we find the same approach: ‘Let

not a man say, “I will observe the precepts of the Torah and
occupy myself with its wisdom . . . in order to attain life in the
world to come.” ’ Thus we may conclude that, while Maimonides
certainly regarded the mitsvot as central to Jewish life, he believed
that without the accompaniment of the knowledge of divine
things the mitsvot alone do not bring heavenly reward. In fact, as
already noted, according to Maimonides immortality should not
even be regarded as a ‘reward’ bestowed by God, but rather as
something that man achieves in a completely natural fashion. This
is what Maimonides means by ‘heavenly reward’.43
 The flip side of heavenly reward is divine punishment, which is
traditionally understood as some sort of torment suffered in the
afterlife. However, Maimonides’ entire philosophical approach to
the attainment of immortality leads to the conclusion that if one
does not achieve the world to come (in other words, if one dies
without attaining some knowledge of divine things), then one
simply ceases to exist. Since the soul has not achieved any
immortal knowledge, it cannot live on. In other words, there is no
continuing punishment after death.44 In this conception, when
Maimonides speaks of people who are punished after death and
yet retain their share in the world to come,45 the ‘punishment’ is
simply a lesser ‘heavenly reward’, but not any active form of
suffering.
Of course, reward and punishment do not merely refer to what
happens after death. Here too Maimonides parts company with
the traditional Jewish belief that God is responsible for all that
happens to a person in this world. Throughout history Jews have
regarded their sufferings as divine punishment and their successes
as divine reward. Not surprisingly, this viewpoint is reflected
throughout the Jewish liturgy, most vividly in the High Holiday
service, where the worshipper testifies that God determines the
fate of every individual for the coming year.
In his halakhic writings Maimonides also uses this type of
religious language.46 In the Guide, however, where he explains his
view of providence at length,47 he paints a completely different
picture. Here he asserts that the extent of a person’s divine
providence depends on his or her understanding of divine
things.48 The closer intellectually one is to God, the more one is
under the watchful eye of providence. According to this view, bad
things happen to people, not as a direct result of God ordering
them to occur, but as a result of the lack of divine providence
which leaves people open to all sorts of misfortunes. Thus,
contrary to the usual view of God punishing people, for example,
by giving them a disease, in Maimonides’ opinion the disease is
not an active punishment sent by God but simply the chance
outcome for people left without divine providence. Whether a
particular individual will contract the disease, and if so, how bad it
will be, is not due to God’s intervention but is a result of God’s
providence being removed, thus allowing the natural world to
operate unfettered. Speaking of those who are completely
ignorant, Maimonides states that they are like animals. Just as
animals cannot grasp intelligibles, and their lives are therefore
entirely given over to chance, so too the completely ignorant do
not benefit from any measure of providence. Thus, when
Maimonides speaks of God decreeing death on someone as a
punishment for his sins, this statement must be understood as only
symbolically true, not literally so.

1 History, 346.
2 Rav peninim, 414, quoted in Maimeron, Freedom, 82. Berdugo
mentions this as support for his own view that God’s knowledge of the
contingent is not a required belief. In fact, Berdugo actually argues that the
notion that God knows the contingent is contradicted by the Torah and is
thus theologically unacceptable! See Berdugo, Mei menuḥot, 32 ff.;
Maimeron, Freedom, 77–89; Manor, ‘Raphael’, 132. Other sages who denied
that God knows the contingent include Ibn Daud, Ha’emunah haramah, ii.
6: 2; Eliezer Ashkenazi, Ma’asei hashem, i. 100 ff.; I. Horowitz, Shenei luḥot
haberit, introduction, sect. ‘Beit habeḥirah’. This position might also be held
by R. Isaac Polgar; see Pines, ‘Isaac Polgar’, 396 ff. I was surprised to learn
that Nathan Aviezer, a scientist whose religious writings are popular in
Orthodox circles, holds the same opinion. See his Fossils, 101 (called to my
attention by Rabbi Jay Kelman).
3 See Shemoneh perakim, ch. 8; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 5: 5,
Guide iii. 20.
4 Masat kapai, 92.
5 Maimonides does not cite this biblical verse, which happens to be the
only verse mentioned in the Ani ma’amin. On this, see S. Y. Shohet, Ahavat
sha’ul, 98; Prins, Parnas ledorot, 272–3. That God knows the thoughts of
men is a concept found throughout the Bible: see e.g. Gen. 17: 17, 18: 12,
27: 41, 1 Sam. 27: 1, 2 Sam. 6: 16, Ps. 94: 11; Esther 6: 6.
6 See E. R. Wolfson, ‘God, the Demiurge, and the Intellect’; Kreisel, ‘The
Term Kol’.
7 Commentary, Gen. 18: 20.
8 Milḥamot hashem, iii. 6.
9 Perush hasodot, 152–3 (see H. Kasher, ‘Ibn Caspi’s Commentary’, 89–
108). However, this author understands Ibn Ezra to exclude the righteous,
i.e. those who are under the care of God’s providence, from this lack of
knowledge.
10 Commentary, Gen. 18: 20.
11 Moreh hamoreh, iii. 16.
12 Tsofnat pane’aḥ , 46.
13 Emunat ḥakhamim, vi. 17a.
14 Abraham ibn Esra, 10–11.
15 ‘Religionsphilosophie’, 62–3.
 16 History, 189. See also ibid. 193, where Husik agrees with the
commentary attributed to Ibn Kaspi (see above, n. 9).
17 Philosophies, 135–6.
18 ‘Philosophie’, 171.
19 History, 107.
20 Philosophical Thought, 256 ff. Cohen’s discussion is very comprehensive
and discusses all relevant sources. For those who oppose this interpretation,
see I. Arama, Akedat yitsḥak, Genesis, Gate 19, 165a–b; Friedlaender, Essays,
24; Lipshitz, Studies . . . Ibn Ezra, 32–4, 178–80; Frimer and Schwartz, Life
and Thought, 135.
21 This seems to be how Ibn Ezra is interpreted by Bonfils, Tsofnat
pane’aḥ , ad loc.:

See also Shem Tov, Sefer ha’emunot, 4a; Ibn Ezra, Commentary, i. 64 n.
40; Frimer and Schwartz, Life and Thought, 174–5. See, however, J. Cohen,
Philosophical Thought, 264 ff., who explains Ibn Ezra’s comment in an
Aristotelian fashion.
22 Or haḥayim on Gen. 6: 5. See the discussion of his view in Novak,
‘Self-Contraction’, 311–12. Cf. Ricchi, Yosher levav, ii. 1: 3–6 (pp. 29b–30b),
who claims that God chooses not to be aware of the future.
23 See also Hefetz, Melekhet maḥshevet, 162a.
24 See Marmura, ‘Avicenna’s Theory’.
25 Husik, History, 345. For detailed discussion of Gersonides’ view, as
well as a translation of the relevant texts, see Samuelson, Gersonides.
26 See e.g. Kellner, ‘Gersonides, Providence’.
27 Must a Jew Believe Anything?, appendix 1.
 28 See Crescas, Or hashem, ii. 6: 1 (see W. Z. Harvey, ‘Critique’); Aaron
ben Elijah, Ets ḥayim, chs. 88, 105 (see Husik, History, 384, and D. Frank,
‘Religious Philosophy’, p. civ); Joseph Ibn Yahya, Torah or, ch. 8;
Abarbanel, commentary on Guide i. 1; id., Mifalot elokim, viii. 8; Shem Tov,
Sefer ha’emunot, i. 1; Luzzatto, Studies, ii. 168, 183–4; id., Letters, 247; id.,
Yesodei hatorah, 71. For a typical example of apologetics in seeking to
remove the radicalism of Maimonides’ position, see R. Hayim Bleich’s
introduction to Ankawa, Sha’ar kevod hashem, 11 ff. (2nd pagination).
29 Emphasis added. As Ibn Kaspi, ad loc., points out, Maimonides’ view
follows that of Aristotle; see Nicomachean Ethics, x. 7.
30 See also Guide i. 30, 70, and the complete discussion in Altmann,
Aufklärung, 60–91.
31 Commentary on Mishnah, San., 138: ‘The survival of the soul consists in
the survival of the objects of its knowledge inasmuch as the one is identical
with the other.’ This passage is part of Maimonides’ Introduction to
Mishnah San., ch. 10, where the Thirteen Principles also appear.
32 ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 4: 9, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 8: 2–3, ‘Hilkhot
mezuzah’, 6: 13.
33 Mifalot elokim, viii. 6.
34 See Friedlander, Essays, 24 ff.; J. Cohen, Philosophical Thought, 268 ff.,
286 ff.
35 Ha’emunah haramah, i. 7.
36 See Ravitzky, ‘Samuel’, 102 ff.
37 See Gordon, ‘Rationalism’, 301 ff. As Gordon shows, Anatoli actually
required very little in the way of intellectual attainment in order to achieve
some degree of immortality.
38 Milḥamot hashem, Book I.
39 Maor ha’afelah, 26. This view was also held by some of the 15th- and
16th-cent. rabbis of Saddeh, Yemen: see their letter published in J. Kafih,
Writings, iii. 1219–20.
40 See e.g. his comment on Mishnah Mak. 3: 17; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’, 9: 1, ‘Hilkhot isurei biah’, 14: 3. See also Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 51,
that all who are martyred receive a portion in the world to come.
41 See W. Z. Harvey, ‘Critique’, 114–15. For the claim that love of God
means knowledge of him, see Maimonides, Shemoneh perakim, ch. 5, Mishneh
torah, ‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’, 2: 2, Guide i. 39.
42 See his commentary on Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot isurei biah’, 14: 3.
43 See H. Kasher, ‘ “Torah”’, 157. Me’iri offers a similar naturalistic view
of how one attains the world to come: ‘The wise one [heḥakham] said,
concerning this, that the world to come is not a reward for one’s actions but
their fruit, in other words, it derives from them like a fruit from a tree’:
Ḥibur hateshuvah, 541. See also ibid. 441, where Me’iri quotes this
assessment in the name of ḥakhmei hamada. However, he does not
completely share Maimonides’ intellectualism, for he believes that the
performance of mitsvot also gives one immortality. See Halbertal, Between
Torah and Wisdom, 30.
44 See Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything?, 132 n. 12.
45 Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 6: 1.
46 Ibid. 3: 3, 5.
47 Guide iii. 16–18, 51.
48 On the role of the mitsvot as a means to this end, see Kellner, Must a
Jew Believe Anything?, 135 ff.
 TEN

The Messiah; Resurrection of the Dead

The Twelfth Principle

HE TWELFTH PRINCIPLE is the coming of the messiah.1 It is
T somewhat surprising that although Maimonides speaks of the
revival of the Davidic dynasty, he says nothing in this Principle
about what else will occur in messianic days. While it is true that
Maimonides discouraged speculation about the details of the
messianic era, since there is no authoritative tradition in these
matters,2 one wonders why he did not include any of the basic
messianic concepts about which there is no dispute in rabbinic
literature, such as that ‘there will be neither famine nor war’.3
Since Maimonides omits these central elements of the messianic
idea, it is significant that he includes the following, which he
obviously did not regard as an unimportant detail: ‘Included in
this fundamental Principle is that there will be no king of Israel
except from David and from the seed of Solomon exclusively.
Whosoever disputes [the sovereignty of] this family denies God
and the words of His prophets.’
This stress on an actual messianic figure is noteworthy, since a
number of prophets and midrashim appear to disregard it. These
sources speak instead of a messianic era in which God alone will
be the redeemer, and there is no mention of a messiah–king. As
Jacobs points out, this conception is found in Nahum, Zephaniah,
Habakkuk, Malachi, Joel, and Daniel.4 In the sixteenth century R.
Samuel Jaffe ben Isaac Ashkenazi, the renowned midrashic
commentator, pointed to some other biblical texts that in his
opinion ruled out any notion of a personal messiah.5 For example,
Jeremiah 31: 10 states: ‘He that scattered Israel doth gather him.’
Isaiah 11: 12 says: ‘And He will set up an ensign for the nations,
and will assemble the dispersed of Israel.’ According to Ashkenazi,
the meaning of these verses is that God himself will redeem the
Jews.
Among midrashim that share this conception, R. Menahem M.
Kasher6 points to Midrash tanḥuma:7

God said: ‘In this world you were redeemed by humans. In Egypt [you were
redeemed] through Moses and Aaron, in the days of Sisera through Barak
and Deborah, among the Midianites [read: Philistines] though Shamgar the
son of Anath, as it says: And he also saved Israel (Judg. 3: 31), and also
through the Judges. Since they were human therefore you continued to be
enslaved, but in the future I Myself will redeem you and you will never again
be enslaved, as it says: O Israel, that art saved by the Lord with an everlasting
salvation (Isa. 45: 17).’

Midrash tehilim (107: 1) expresses the same idea:

Rabbi Berechiah said in the name of Rabbi Helbo who taught in the name
of Rabbi Samuel: Who are meant by the redeemed in Let the redeemed of the
Lord say (Ps. 107: 2)? The people of Israel. Isaiah made this explicit in
saying: And the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come with singing unto
Zion (Isa. 35: 10). He did not say ‘the ransomed of Elijah’, nor ‘the
ransomed of the king Messiah’, but the ransomed of the Lord. Even so, the
Psalm speaks of the redeemed of the Lord.

According to Kasher, denial of a personal messiah, in accordance

with these midrashim, is ‘perhaps’ to be regarded as an acceptable
belief.8
Going further than Kasher, Isaiah Levy, a contemporary
rabbinic scholar, states without hesitation that ‘anyone who
believes in the coming of the redemption, either through the Son
of David or by the hand of God Himself, is not to be regarded as
a heretic’.9 In fact, he claims that even Maimonides agrees with
this, for although the Twelfth Principle speaks of a personal
messiah, Levy notes that when Maimonides lists various types of
heretic in Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 5: 6, he speaks of one
who denies ‘the coming of a redeemer’, a designation that can also
apply to God. However, contrary to Levy, there is no reason to
doubt that this text indeed refers to a human messiah.
Furthermore, in another Mishneh torah passage, ‘Hilkhot
melakhim’, 11: 1, Maimonides writes that ‘one who does not look
forward to the coming of the Messiah denies not only the
teachings of the prophets but also those of the Law and Moses our
Teacher’. He then cites biblical verses in support of this
contention. Although Levy points out that these verses can also be
understood to speak of a messianic era rather than a personal
messiah, and this may indeed be Maimonides’ hidden teaching, his
exoteric view, as seen in the Commentary on the Mishnah and the
Mishneh torah, is clear: denial of a personal messiah is heresy.
While the midrashic texts mentioned previously exclude any
mention of a personal messiah, they do retain the notion of a
future messianic era. In contrast, there is a radical opinion in the
Talmud which goes so far as to reject the messianic idea in its
entirety. According to the amora R. Hillel, ‘There shall be no
messiah for Israel, because they have already enjoyed him in the
days of Hezekiah.’10 Upon hearing this apparently heretical
statement, R. Joseph responded, ‘May his Master [God] forgive
him [for saying so].’ It is concerning this view of R. Hillel that R.
J. David Bleich makes a number of significant points. After
pointing out that matters of belief are ‘inherently matters of
Halakhah’, he continues:

The concept of the Messiah is one example of a fundamental principle of

belief concerning which, at one point in Jewish history, there existed a
legitimate divergence of opinion, since resolved normatively. . . . Rav Hillel
certainly denied that reestablishment of the monarchy and restoration of the
Davidic dynasty are essential components of the process of redemption.
Rabbi Moses Sofer quite cogently points out that were such views to be held
by a contemporary Jew he would be branded a heretic.11 Yet, the
advancement of this opinion by one of the sages of the Talmud carried with
it no theological odium. The explanation is quite simple. Before the
authoritative formulation of the Halakhah with regard to this belief, Rav
Hillel’s opinion could be entertained. Following the resolution of the
conflict in a manner which negates this theory, normative Halakhah
demands acceptance of the belief that the redemption will be effected
through the agency of a mortal messiah.12

This passage is problematic for several reasons. To begin with,

we have already seen that Maimonides explicitly states that issues
of belief are not matters of halakhah that can be decided using the
method described by Bleich. Furthermore, Bleich’s analogy of
principles of faith and halakhah fails for another reason. Unlike
matters of belief, it is essential for halakhic disputes to be settled
because everyone must know how to act. This is a purely practical
consideration, entirely absent when dealing with matters of belief.
In fact, when it comes to deciding halakhah, Jewish scholars never
claimed infallibility. On the contrary, the famous story of the
‘oven of Akhnai’ (BT Bava metsia 59b) shows us that, in the sages’
minds, human consensus outweighs even divine original intent.
Central to this understanding of the halakhic process is that one
can continue to believe in the correctness of one’s halakhic
position even if the final halakhah has been decided otherwise. It is
forbidden to advocate a rejected position only if this is done for
the sake of practical application. Even in the days of the Sanhedrin
it was this, and this alone, which turned a dissenting sage into a
zaken mamre (rebellious elder).13 Theoretical disagreement with
the accepted halakhah is always permissible, and the sage in the
minority remains hopeful that his view will be adopted at some
future time.14 Contrary to Bleich, if I were to make an analogy
between halakhah and matters of belief, it would be between the
theoretical halakhah— where an authoritative sage’s view still
retains its legitimacy even if it is not accepted—and matters of
belief advocated by such a sage. The latter are also theoretical and
cannot therefore be delegitimized simply because the majority of
sages disagree.
However, as far as Maimonides is concerned, true principles of
faith are not and have never been subject to debate. As we have
seen, anyone who even expresses a doubt about a Principle, not to
mention denying it outright, is a heretic with no share in the
world to come. This judgement is applicable to the years before
Maimonides as well as to those after him. In fact, I am unaware of
any rishonim who hold the view Bleich describes.15 Furthermore, I
do not believe that there are any rishonim, and certainly not
Maimonides, who believed that R. Hillel’s opinion could ever be
entertained. In their mind it was always regarded as being a
mistaken, if not heretical, opinion, and for that reason was rejected
by R. Joseph. When Maimonides lists the coming of the messiah
as a principle of faith he is not deciding between two
contradictory opinions but merely giving the only opinion on the
subject. As far as he is concerned, a mistaken and even heretical
utterance by one of the amora’im does not suffice to create a valid
opinion which he must then consider in rendering a ‘decision’.
Had he thought otherwise, the doctrine of the messiah would not
have been listed as a dogma (unless it was to be understood as a
‘necessary belief’).
Since Bleich has inserted this principle of faith (and indeed all
of Jewish theology) in a halakhic context, I will use a halakhic
example from his own writings to illustrate my point further.16 It
is a well-established halakhah, perhaps even of biblical authority,
that the Jewish status of an individual is determined by the
mother. Needless to say, this is also how Maimonides records the
law.17 The fact that there is one opinion in the Talmud18 that
disagrees with this law does not mean that Maimonides, or the
Talmud for that matter, ever ‘ruled’ on the issue. Rather, the law
was always clear and unambiguous. The errant statement by
someone who lived in talmudic times did not change matters. This
was not a valid opinion which needed to be considered. Indeed, it was
not an opinion at all, as far as Jewish law is concerned. Rather, as
the Talmud states, the originator of it (Jacob of Naburaya) was to
be flogged. When Maimonides recorded the halakhah, he was
simply recording the one, and only, opinion which had the stamp
of truth. Similarly, the talmudic rabbis and Maimonides never
decided that the coming of the messiah was a dogma. They simply
expressed what they believed to be the indisputable view of the
Torah.
As for Bleich’s contention that R. Hillel’s view carried no
theological odium, this is certainly difficult to fathom. R. Joseph’s
reply, ‘May God forgive him’, undoubtedly shows that Bleich is
mistaken. As R. Abraham Bibago puts it, ‘They prayed to God so
that He would forgive him for his heresy’ (haminut vehakefirah).19
If, as Bleich claims, this was indeed ‘a legitimate divergence of
opinion’, why would R. Hillel need God’s forgiveness? In the
absence of any retraction, he is certainly to be regarded as a heretic
according to Maimonides. Albo makes this perfectly clear and says
nothing about any ‘legitimate divergence of opinion, since
resolved normatively’.20 Like Maimonides, Albo believes that there
is only one opinion which was ever valid and that R. Hillel’s
opinion is heretical. However, according to Albo, one who errs
unintentionally regarding a principle of faith, although he has
sinned, is not to be regarded as a heretic. In other words, R.
Hillel’s view was heretical, but this did not mean that he himself
was a heretic. Alternatively, and in contradiction to this approach,
Albo suggests that, although R. Hillel sinned by this belief, denial
of the messiah is not the equivalent of denying the entire Torah,
and that therefore he is not to be regarded as a heretic.21
David Weiss Halivni has recently commented on the passage in
BT Sanhedrin 99a and his words, exactly the opposite of Bleich’s,
also deserve to be quoted at length:

Issues of doctrine, in contrast [to halakhah], cannot be definitively settled

merely through the consensus suggested by a vote of the majority nor by the
judgment rendered by the passage of history. . . . Quantitative superiority
can play no role in the qualitative realm of speculation. Although matters of
science, logic, and theology—of objective reality—can be debated, they
cannot ultimately be settled in the chambers of the Sanhedrin. Additionally,
a theological doctrine that was once considered legitimate cannot simply be
branded heretical through the mere passing of time, for historical, and thus
contingent, factors have no role to play in the resolution of purely
intellectual matters. If an authoritative figure in the Jewish past maintained a
certain speculative standpoint, the truth or falsity of such cannot be
determined by tradition or consensus, and thus its legitimacy cannot be
judged by the systemic principles which govern the halakhic process.
Avenues of intellectual speculation once considered theologically sound
cannot be thwarted merely because they are no longer popular.22

Chaim Rapoport has similarly written:

It borders on the absurd to suggest that theological truths depend upon the
temporal state of the majority opinion. If one were to assume such an
approach to theological matters, one would possibly have to conclude that
one who in the middle ages believed in the doctrine of gilgul neshamot (the
reincarnation or transmigration of souls) was a heretic, whereas one who
nowadays does not subscribe to this belief is a heretic. Could it be that
whether or not souls are reincarnated depends upon the majority opinion?23

I agree entirely with these sentiments. Indeed, Maimonides

himself writes, with reference to speculative matters:

For when something has been demonstrated,24 the correctness of the matter
is not increased and certainty regarding it is not strengthened by the
consensus of all men of knowledge with regard to it. Nor could its
correctness be diminished and certainty regarding it be weakened even if all
the people on earth disagreed with it.25

However, Weiss Halivni continues with a more problematic

assertion:

The famous passage in b. Sanh. 99a that discusses the dating of the messianic
era illustrates the continued viability, despite unpopularity, of minority
theological positions. . . . The fact that R. Hillel’s opinion was recorded and
transmitted in the Talmud despite its obvious unpopularity exhibits the
multifariousness and license of rabbinic theology, and preserves this
speculative viewpoint as a viable one within the spectrum of traditional
Jewish thought.26 One would have expected, not unreasonably, that such a
controversial theological claim would be purposefully excluded from the
purview of rabbinic literature.27

The problem with Weiss Halivni’s point is his assumption that,

because the Talmud records the view of R. Hillel, this makes it a
‘viable’ option in traditional Jewish thought. As far as I know, no
traditional authority has ever advocated this position. By adopting
Weiss Halivni’s approach, one could even say that the view of
Jacob of Naburaya was a viable halakhic alternative before it was
rejected by the majority. I have already shown the untenability of
this view. Had R. Hillel’s view been recorded in the name of a
significant figure, I would agree with Weiss Halivni. However, as
Bibago points out, R. Hillel does not merit such a classification,
since he was only a minor scholar.28 For the same reason that I
have refrained from quoting the views of Isaac Albalag, Moses of
Narbonne, and Isaiah Leibowitz—men who were never regarded
as authority figures—one should also not quote R. Hillel when
seeking to define traditional Jewish thought.
Weiss Halivni anticipated this objection by claiming that the
Talmud would not have recorded this passage if it did not see it as
being viable. However, the same point could be made regarding
passages in which the Talmud quotes the views of sectarians. Are
we thus to say that the opinions of sectarians are also viable? As
Weiss Halivni well knows, these passages are quoted in order to
be refuted, and R. Moses Sofer makes the very same point with
regard to R. Hillel’s view, i.e. that it was only recorded in order to
show its untenability.29 Even if this were not the case with regard
to R. Hillel’s view, and indeed Albo specifically rejects this
approach,30 I know of no traditional Jewish sources which assert
that every rabbinic view mentioned in the Talmud or Midrash has
validity and must be taken seriously.31 Certainly no traditional
Jewish thinker has ever granted validity to R. Hillel’s view.
Returning to Maimonides, it is worth mentioning R. Abraham
Hayim Viterbo’s sharp criticism of him for including the messianic
belief among his Principles. While he acknowledged that all are
obligated to believe in Maimonides’ Principles, he agreed with
Albo that if someone is led through study to disagree with them
he is not a heretic. Viterbo’s polemic against Maimonides is
noteworthy, because while Albo attempted to uphold the
importance of the messianic idea while still defending the
unwitting non-believer, Viterbo’s defence leads to a significant
downgrading of the doctrine’s importance. After noting that
Maimonides had included the coming of the messiah among his
Principles, and, in the Mishneh torah, had counted those who deny
this among the heretics,32 Viterbo writes:

This is wondrous. From where did he derive it? Moses our teacher did not
speak of this at all and did not require us to believe in the coming of the
redeemer. How then can the Rabbi say that one who does not believe in his
coming, even though he observes all the commandments of God, the Torah
and its laws, is a complete heretic and is not regarded as one of Israel? . . .
For this is not a Torah matter nor even a halakhah lemosheh misinai [‘a law
given to Moses at Sinai’] but a rabbinic matter . . . and many outstanding
people[!] from our nation did not believe in it, and nevertheless the sages of
the Talmud did not, Heaven forbid, separate them from the community and
refer to them as heretics. . . . If one denies the coming of the redeemer and
believes that God will reward and punish in the next world, giving everyone
his due in accordance with his actions, whether good or bad, and holds to
the opinion of Rabbi Hillel, why does the Rabbi remove him from the
people of Israel? . . . After all, he believes in reward and punishment.33

Another significant point in the Twelfth Principle is that

Maimonides says that the messiah will be descended from
Solomon. R. Joseph Kafih apparently did not consider this section
essential (i.e. that denial of it equals heresy). I say this because in
his note on the passage, he explains this formulation as directed
against the Christians, who trace Jesus’ lineage to Nathan, another
son of David.34 Since Kafih explains this point as the result of
polemical considerations, he implies that it would not be included
in the Principle in the absence of these considerations. In fact, the
stipulation of Solomonic descent is missing from Maimonides’
discussion of the messiah in the Mishneh torah, where only Davidic
descent is mentioned.35 However, Kafih’s point is only
speculative, and I doubt that Maimonides knew anything about
the genealogy of Jesus recorded in the New Testament. The fact is
that Maimonides does include Solomonic descent as part of the
Principle, denial of which is equated with heresy. As he puts it:
‘Included in this fundamental Principle is that there will be no
king of Israel except from David and from the seed of Solomon
exclusively. Whoever disputes [the sovereignty of] this family
denies God and the words of His prophets.’ One must conclude
from this that even if there had never been a Christian religion,
Maimonides would still have considered it obligatory to believe
that the messiah would be of Solomonic descent.
Before noting the sources that disagree with Maimonides, it is
necessary to call attention to the comments of R. Meir Dan
Plotzki (1867–1928). Plotzki notes that, although Maimonides
also mentions Solomonic descent in the Sefer hamitsvot,36 this does
not appear in the Mishneh torah. On the basis of this, Plotzki
claims that Maimonides changed his mind and that his final view
on the subject excludes Solomonic descent from the messianic
doctrine.37 Not noted by Plotzki is the fact that Maimonides also
mentions the necessity of Solomonic descent in his Letter to
Yemen, another early work.38 It is certainly significant that,
although he mentioned this element in three of his early works, he
omitted it when he wrote the Mishneh torah. However, it must
also be noted that Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah went
through a few different versions, and in a couple of places he even
made corrections to the Principles.39 Despite this, he never altered
the original formulation of the Twelfth Principle.
A number of post-Maimonidean scholars did not feel bound by
Maimonides’ insistence on Solomonic descent. For example, R.
Jacob Hazan (thirteenth century), in his discussion of the
messianic era, follows the Mishneh torah and therefore mentions
only Davidic descent.40 In discussing Jewish kingship, the
anonymous Sefer haḥinukh (thirteenth century) states that it is
eternally reserved for the descendants of David, making no
mention of Solomonic descent.41 R. Azariah dei Rossi,42 R.
Gedalyah ibn Yahya,43 and R. Jehiel Heilprin (1660–1746)44 each
quote without objection the view, falsely attributed to Philo,45
that all of Solomon’s descendants were wiped out and only
Nathan’s line survived. This opinion is also supported by a
statement in the Zohar that the messiah will be descended from
Nathan’s wife.46 Although this passage does not explicitly state
that the messiah is descended from Nathan, this is the obvious
implication, and a recent commentator on the Zohar has
elaborated on the kabbalistic reasons behind the choice of Nathan,
rather than Solomon, as the messiah’s forebear.47

The Thirteenth Principle

The Thirteenth Principle concerns resurrection, the belief that the
dead will rise from their graves to live again.48 Pines has written
that many of the Thirteen Principles ‘run counter to philosophic
truth’.49 This is nowhere more apparent than in the dogma of
resurrection. For Maimonides, the ultimate reward is eternal
spiritual life, in which one basks in the glory of God.50 For
someone to be removed from this state of beatitude in order to be
placed again in a physical body runs counter to Maimonides’
entire conception of eternal life, which, as we have seen, he views
as a completely natural phenomenon. Maimonides’ claim,
expressed in his Essay on Resurrection, that the dead will be raised
up only to die again and return to eternal spiritual life is even
more confusing. The traditional view was always that the
righteous would live for ever in their resurrected bodies. As Jacobs
puts it, ‘So far as we know, Maimonides was the only philosopher
in the Middle Ages to commit himself definitely to the view that
the future existence is ultimately incorporeal.’51
The fact that resurrection is never discussed in the Guide could
certainly lead one to believe that Maimonides did not really accept
it in its literal sense.52 Indeed, even Harry A. Wolfson, generally a
very conservative Maimonidean scholar, stated that Maimonides
‘fought passionately against the literal interpretation of the belief
in resurrection’.53 This was also the opinion of a number of
Maimonides’ medieval interpreters, who believed that, when
Maimonides used the term ‘resurrection’, he really meant ‘the
world to come’, i.e. eternal spiritual life.54 Most notable among
the medieval figures was Sheshet Benveniste (c.1131–1209), who
engaged in a polemic on this issue during Maimonides’ lifetime.55
Benveniste stridently insisted that any physical descriptions of the
resurrection in traditional texts were only given ‘for the sake of
fools who are unable to understand’.56 Maimonides’ student
Joseph ben Judah ibn Simeon (twelfth–thirteenth centuries), for
whom the Guide was written, also interpreted resurrection
figuratively, forcing Maimonides to clarify his position in a letter
to him.57
Rabad, in his critical gloss on Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’, 8: 2, had already interpreted Maimonides’ words in this
way, writing: ‘The words of this man appear to me to be similar
to one who says that there is no resurrection for bodies, but only
for souls.’ Rabad was led to this view because Maimonides
mentions nothing about resurrection in his discussion of life after
death in the Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, chapter 8. This
could also imply that elsewhere, when Maimonides writes that one
must believe in resurrection,58 he is actually identifying it with the
world to come. In support of this approach, I would also suggest
the following. In ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, chapter 3, Maimonides
defines the different types of heretics who have no share in the
world to come. In his various lists he includes all of the Thirteen
Principles with the exception of the Eleventh Principle (reward
and punishment). Many have wondered how Maimonides could
have omitted this, especially since the most fundamental aspect of
reward and punishment is the fate of the soul in the next world.
Isn’t denial of spiritual reward, which is actually a denial of the
soul’s immortality, a prime example of heresy, indeed even more
so than almost all of the others he lists? However, if we assume
that the resurrection of the dead, which is included in this chapter,
really means the immortality of the soul, then everything makes
sense. In fact, in ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 6, Maimonides lists
‘resurrection’ before the ‘coming of the messiah’. If resurrection
refers to life after death, then it makes sense that he would place it
before the messiah, just as reward and punishment precedes the
messiah in the Thirteen Principles.
Rabad had no knowledge of Maimonides’ Essay on Resurrection
and was basing his gloss entirely on what Maimonides wrote in
the Mishneh torah. So too R. Meir Abulafia, who arrived at the
same conclusion as Rabad and fiercely attacked Maimonides in his
Kitab al-rasail.59 It is significant that, even though these sages
believed that Maimonides rejected the notion of physical
resurrection, they did not regard him as a heretic. Despite what
they viewed as Maimonides’ serious doctrinal error, he remained
for them a great man who had been led astray by philosophy. This
shows, once again, that Maimonides’ opponents were
uncomfortable using the neat Maimonidean categorizations when
seeking to define a heretic.
Even after Maimonides confronted the accusations that he
denied physical resurrection and publicly set forth his position in
his aforementioned Essay, a number of Maimonidean interpreters,
both supporters and opponents, refused to be swayed. They
regarded the Essay on Resurrection as a tract directed towards the
masses which did not reflect Maimonides’ true views.60 One
modern scholar has even claimed that the Essay on Resurrection
itself has a hidden meaning. In Howard Kreisel’s words: ‘There
are many hints in the Treatise on Resurrection that it contains an
esoteric level pointing to this conclusion [i.e. that resurrection is
not to be understood literally]. The only “resurrection” that takes
place is the immortality of the perfect intellect.’61 Yet for those
who do not posit an esoteric Maimonidean doctrine in this matter,
there can be no denying that Maimonides did indeed believe in a
literal resurrection, albeit of limited duration.62
While virtually all traditional Jewish thinkers have rejected an
esoteric reading of Maimonides as concerns resurrection (or any
other issue), there have been exceptions. Aside from those who
opposed Maimonides, and thus were quick to find evidence of
non-traditional views in his works,63 R. Shem Tov Gaguine
(1884–1953), av beit din (head of the rabbinical court) of the
Sephardi community of London, also held this opinion. In
support of it, he made the following interesting point. In the
Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot berakhot’, 10: 10, Maimonides writes:

A person who sees Jewish graves should recite the blessing: Blessed are You,
Lord our God, King of the universe, who created you with justice, gave you
life with justice, nourished you with justice, sustained you with justice, took
your lives with justice, and will ultimately raise you up in judgement to the
life of the world to come. Blessed are You, Lord, who resurrects the dead.

This passage is based on BT Berakhot 58b, though there it simply

states that God ‘will ultimately raise you up in judgement’. It is
Maimonides who adds ‘to the life of the world to come’. Only
after this does he conclude ‘Blessed are You, God, who resurrects
the dead.’ On the face of it, it seems obvious that Maimonides is
equating resurrection with the world to come, which is exactly
what he was accused of doing. For if he indeed believes that
people will literally rise from the dead, why would he change the
talmudic version of the blessing and interpret it metaphorically, so
that God ‘raising you up in judgement’, which in its original
context means physical resurrection, becomes ‘raising you up to
the life of the world to come’, i.e. to eternal life? According to
Gaguine, this is proof that, for Maimonides, ‘resurrection’ will be
in the world to come, and is simply another term for eternal
spiritual life. Recognizing the controversial nature of what he
proposed, Gaguine does not elaborate on this striking
interpretation, instead concluding with Ibn Ezra’s famous
comment, ‘and the intelligent will understand’.64
While not referring to Maimonides’ view on the subject, R.
Isaac Arama (c.1420–94), author of the biblical commentary
Akedat yitsḥak, also seems to have denied a physical resurrection.
Although he discusses the soul and the spiritual world to come at
great length, only once does he mention resurrection. In this
passage he makes clear that, in the opinion of the talmudic sages,
the two are nothing more than synonyms.65 Since, according to
Arama, the world to come is entirely spiritual, the fact that the
term ‘resurrection’ is used as a synonym must also mean that
teḥiyat hametim (resurrection of the dead) is not to be understood
literally. To support this position he quotes the following passage
from BT Kidushin 39b:

Rabbi Jacob said: There is not a single precept in the Torah whose reward is
[stated] at its side which is not dependent on the resurrection of the dead.
[Thus] in connection with honouring parents it is written: that thy days may
be prolonged, and that it may be well with thee (Deut. 5: 16). In reference to the
dismissal of the nest it is written: that it may be well with thee, and that thou
mayest prolong thy days (Deut. 22: 7). . . . And where is this man’s prolonging
of days? That it may be well with thee means on the day that is wholly good
and that thy days may be prolonged, on the day that is wholly long.
In Abulafia’s opinion, this passage shows that R. Jacob identifies
the world to come (‘the day that is wholly good . . . the day that is
wholly long’) with resurrection.66 For Arama, however, it is just
the opposite. R. Jacob is identifying resurrection with the world
to come, which, as noted, is an entirely spiritual realm in Arama’s
view.
A more recent Orthodox thinker, R. Joseph Seliger (1872–
1919), also denied the notion of physical resurrection. He
regarded it as a primitive, foreign import, and composed an entire
essay in support of this proposition. According to him, the
rabbinic concept of teḥiyat hametim is identical with the world to
come, and any texts which reflect a different approach are not to
be understood literally.67 As Jacobs has noted, R. Joseph H.
Hertz, Chief Rabbi of the British Empire, also implied that there
is no religious objection to viewing resurrection as identical to
spiritual immortality.68 Hertz cites Maimonides as holding this
position, and Jacobs objects by quite naturally pointing to
Maimonides’ comments in his Essay on Resurrection.69 Presumably,
Hertz agreed with those scholars who do not regard the Essay on
Resurrection as reflecting Maimonides’ true view, for, as mentioned
above, Maimonides’ philosophical system as set out in the Guide
has no place for physical resurrection. From my own experience, a
large percentage of the contemporary Modern Orthodox
community agrees with Seliger and Hertz and interprets the
notion of physical resurrection in symbolic fashion, or at least
regards this as a possible interpretation.70 However, with one
notable exception,71 this position has not yet been defended in
print by Modern Orthodox leaders.
 One other noteworthy understanding of resurrection is that of
the late R. Joseph Kafih, the renowned Yemenite scholar and
authority on Maimonides. In fact, Kafih was more than simply an
authority on Maimonides. He was a true Maimonidean, following
the master in all particulars, no matter how controversial. As a
conservative Maimonidean, he had to accept the Essay on
Resurrection as proof that Maimonides did indeed believe in a
physical resurrection. He also attacked Moses of Narbonne for
appearing to deny this.72 Nevertheless, Kafih was well aware that
the traditional view of resurrection cannot be reconciled with
Maimonides’ philosophical view of immortality.
In an attempt to have his cake and eat it—to maintain that
Maimonides believed in resurrection and still see him as affirming
a completely spiritual immortality—Kafih offers a new
interpretation, which is based on the understanding of
resurrection put forth by the medieval Yemenite sage R. Perahyah
ben Meshulam (c.1400). According to Kafih, when Maimonides
refers to a physical resurrection he is only speaking of the return of
the impersonal ‘life force’ to the body. This life force comes into
being with man’s creation and is responsible for the continuance
of physical life. In addition to this life force, which is common to
all people, Maimonides also speaks of the perfected intellect. This
is unique to each individual, is formed through the knowledge of
divine things, and is what remains after death. Once it has left the
body, Kafih asserts, it does not return.
In other words, since Kafih understands resurrection as
encompassing only the life force, it is a completely new birth,
tabula rasa! Since there is no resurrection of the developed
intellects of actual people who once lived on earth, in what sense
can one then speak of resurrection? The answer, according to
Kafih, is that it is the body, pure and simple, which is resurrected.
As he explains, this is the meaning of the blessing recited in the
morning prayers, ‘Blessed art Thou, Lord, Who restores souls
[neshamot] to dead bodies.’73
In Kafih’s conception, resurrection thus means nothing other
than God imparting a life force into dead bodies, but the newly
alive body has no essential connection to the individual who
previously lived in this body. This is also stated explicitly by R.
Perahyah, who writes that God will create a soul for the dead
body, separate from the soul that already left it.74 Thus, according
to R. Perahyah and Kafih, individuals who have left this world
never return to it, and Moses, R. Akiva, and the other great
figures of the past remain for ever pure intellect. In Kafih’s words,
‘If the righteous one immediately upon his death merits the world
to come and enjoys the divine splendour in accordance with his
attainments [lit. ‘his canopy’, see BT BB 75a], how is it possible
for God to uproot him from this great spiritual delight which the
eye has not beheld [cf. Isa. 64: 3] and return him [to earth] to eat,
drink, have sex, and enter latrines to fulfil his needs? Is this a
privilege? Is this not rather a degradation and a punishment
greater than all else?’75 What then, according to Kafih, is the
purpose of resurrection if not to reward the dead? He does not tell
us, but an examination of Maimonides’ Essay on Resurrection
provides the answer. According to this work, resurrection vividly
demonstrates that God is not bound by the constraints of the
natural order. By the same token, denial that God can breathe life
into a dead body ‘leads to the rejection of all miracles which is
equivalent to denying the existence of God and abandoning the
Faith’.76 This is undoubtedly where R. Kafih saw the true
significance of the doctrine.

1 On Maimonides’ understanding of the messianic era, see Ravitzky, Al

da’at hamakom, 74–104; Kraemer, ‘Messianic Posture’.
2 Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot melakhim’, 12: 2.
3 Ibid. 2: 5.
4 See Jacobs, Principles, 373.
5 Yefeh to’ar on Bereshit rabah 98: 14.
6 Hatekufah hagedolah, 118. In addition to the two midrashim I quote,
Kasher adduces two more examples from Midrash tehilim.
7 ‘Aḥarei mot’, 12.
8 Hatekufah hagedolah, 145. In support of this contention, Kasher also
cites R. Hillel, as interpreted by ‘Rashi’ (see n. 10 below).
9 ‘Resurrection’, 786.
10 BT San. 99a. In identifying R. Hillel as an amora I am relying upon
Urbach, Sages, 680–1. Others identify him as a tana. Regarding this passage,
see also Hadas-Lebel, ‘Il n’y a pas de messie pour Israël’. According to the
commentary attributed to Rashi, R. Hillel only denies a personal messiah,
but acknowledges that there will be a messianic era. (There is widespread
agreement among both academic and traditional scholars that another
medieval sage, perhaps R. Judah b. Nathan, Rashi’s son-in-law, wrote the
commentary on the last chapter of Sanhedrin. See Lieberman, Sheki’in, 92
ff.; Y. H. Sofer, Torat ya’akov, 884–5; Grossman, Early Sages, 217 n. 278.
Grossman also refers to those scholars who disagree with this assessment.)
As Herzog, Decisions, ii. 533, points out, according to ‘Rashi’s’
understanding, ‘R. Hillel’s view accentuates, rather than limits, the
miraculous nature of the ultimate redemption’. See, however, BT San. 98b
where Rav is quoted as saying that in messianic days the Jews will have years
of plenty. In answer to the question that this is obvious, the Talmud replies
that Rav’s statement was made in opposition to R. Hillel, who maintained
that there would be no messiah for Israel. This clearly implies that R. Hillel
believed that there would be no years of plenty in Israel’s future, i.e. no
messianic era whatsoever, and this is how he is understood by R. Meir
Abulafia in his Yad ramah. See also Schechter, Aspects, 346; Marmorstein,
‘Messianische Bewegung’, 176 n. 1. Forced reinterpretation of R. Hillel’s
view came about, as is sometimes stated explicitly, simply because many
viewed it as impossible that an amora would deny something so basic to
Judaism. A good example of such reinterpretation is Abarbanel’s view that
all R. Hillel meant was that ‘the messiah would not come by virtue of
Israel’s meriting him’. See Rosh amanah, ch. 14. For other reinterpretations
of R. Hillel’s statement, see M. Kasher, Hatekufah hagedolah, 133 ff.
11 She’elot uteshuvot, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 356.
12 With Perfect Faith, 4.
13 Mishnah San. 11: 2; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot mamrim’, 3: 6, 8.
14 See Mishnah Edu. 1: 5.
15 It is, however, the view of R. Moses Sofer (She’elot uteshuvot, ‘Yoreh
de’ah’, no. 356). R. Abraham I. Kook, Ma’amrei hare’iyah, 105, also sees the
majority principle as valid in matters of belief, even if it means rejecting the
view of Maimonides (see, however, ibid. 56, where Kook discounts this
approach). In Igerot hare’iyah, i, no. 302, Kook cites Maimonides’ view that
‘in matters of opinions [de’ot] there is no pesak halakhah’. He claims that this
is in line with the Babylonian Talmud as well as R. Bahya ibn Pakuda, Ḥovot
halevavot, introduction (s.v. ha’eḥad), who says that Deut. 17: 8–10, which
speaks of disputes being brought to the judges for ultimate decision, does
not refer to matters of theology. Kook also cites the Jerusalem Talmud,
which he believes holds that in matters of de’ot there are indeed binding
halakhic decisions. In Igerot hare’iyah, i, no. 103, he makes the same point,
but adds that the Jerusalem Talmud’s position is a ‘Land of Israel’ position.
For those in the Diaspora, who do not reach the spiritual heights found in
the Land of Israel (and this includes the authors of the Babylonian Talmud),
theological matters, which are the basic feature of agadah, have no
connection to halakhah and there is no binding halakhic authority with
regard to them. See also Igerot hare’iyah, iii, no. 793. Since my major
concern is with Maimonides’ view, I have only touched the surface of this
complicated question. A separate study is needed in order to provide a
comprehensive analysis of views of rishonim and aḥaronim concerning
whether matters of belief (both principles and less important issues) can be
decided in a halakhic fashion.
16 Contemporary Halachic Problems, 96–102.
17 Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot yibum veḥalitsah’, 1: 4, ‘Hilkhot isurei biah’,
12: 7.
18 JT Kid. 3: 12 and parallels. I refer to a certain Jacob of Naburaya.
Bleich calls him a ‘talmudic sage’. Whoever he was, he certainly was no sage:
a sage would not have been ignorant of such an obvious law. In Bereshit
rabah 7: 2 and parallels, we find another opinion of Jacob of Naburaya
which is equally outrageous. Either in total ignorance of, or rebellion
against, the halakhah, he claimed that one needed to ritually slaughter fish.
In Kohelet rabati 7: 47, he is referred to as a ‘sinner’, and put in the same
category as Elisha (b. Avuyah?) and other heretics. See the complete
discussion in Irsai, ‘Yaakov’.
 19 Derekh emunah, 102b. See also the similar comment of E. Delmedigo,
Beḥinat hadat, 87: ‘The sages said about him that which is said concerning
those who profane God’s name and who are involved with heretical books.
Their saying is “May God forgive Hillel.” We see therefore that they
thought that one who makes this statement [about the messiah] is like a
heretic.’ According to ‘Rashi’s’ reinterpretation (see above, n. 10), R. Hillel’s
view was merely mistaken but not heretical. This is seen from how he
explains R. Joseph’s reply: ‘May God forgive him, for what he said is
incorrect.’ But even ‘Rashi’ does not hold Bleich’s view. According to
‘Rashi’, R. Hillel never had the right to advance his view. It was always
regarded as being in error and he therefore needed God’s forgiveness.
20 See Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 1: ‘According to Maimonides this sage would
have to be classed as a heretic and excluded from a share in the world to
come.’
21 Ibid. 1–2. Albo’s second position is also advocated in Cohn, Ma’aseh
tuviyah, ‘Olam ha’elyon’, ma’amar 6, ch. 1 (called to my attention by David
S. Zinberg). R. Simeon Duran, Ohev mishpat, 14b–15a, has a similar, but
not identical, formulation. See also Ibn Zimra, She’elot uteshuvot haradbaz,
no. 1258; Wasserman, Kovets ma’amarim, 19.
22 Peshat, 94–6.
23 Messiah, 114.
24 We obviously do not feel as confident as Maimonides concerning the
possibility of demonstrating such matters.
25 Guide ii. 15.
26 In a note, Weiss Halivni cites Albo, Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 1. However, as I
have already pointed out (p. 34), Albo did not think that denial of the
messiah was an acceptable option. In this chapter Albo states that denial of
the messiah is a sin and elsewhere (i. 23) he says it is heresy! The following
are Albo’s exact words in i. 1: ‘R. Hillel was guilty of a sin for not believing
in the coming of the redeemer, but he was not a heretic.’ In i. 2, Albo states
that this is called ‘sinning through error’, and such a sin requires atonement.
In iv. 42 Albo writes: ‘Every adherent of the Law of Moses is obliged to
believe in the coming of the Messiah.’
Having seen what Albo’s true view of the messiah is, it is instructive to
compare this to what Graetz wrote (Structure, 167), for the number of
errors in one sentence is staggering. Albo’s opinion, according to Graetz, is
that the ‘messianic belief was definitely not a basic article or dogma of
Judaism, that it was merely a tradition[!], and that a disbelief in the coming
of the Messiah could never[!] be labelled heresy since even some[!]
Talmudic teachers had repudiated it.’ Graetz continues by saying that,
because of Albo’s view, Abarbanel accused him of heresy. He provides no
source for this latter comment, which is not surprising since Abarbanel never
makes such an accusation. Equally unfounded is Steven Schwarzschild’s
assertion: ‘In effect, Albo proclaimed not only that a Jew need not
necessarily believe in the Messiah but actually, by implication, recommended
against such belief[!].’ See id., ‘Personal Messiah’, 20.
27 Peshat, 96.
28 Derekh emunah, 102b. He also claims that R. Hillel was one of the last
amora’im, but this may not be correct.
29 This is what Sofer means when he writes:
. Sofer directs the reader to look at
Mishnah Edu. 1: 6 and not 1: 5. The same point was made earlier by the
15th-cent. R. Hayim ibn Musa; see Lawee, ‘ “Israel has no Messiah” ’, 267.
30 Sefer ha’ikarim, i. 1.
31 I am well aware that there are numerous sources which pay lip service
to this notion. However, after they have explained the ‘objectionable’
passages, what we are left with usually bears little resemblance to the text’s
original meaning.
32 ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 6.
33 Emunat ḥakhamim, 26–7.
34 This is not entirely correct. While Luke 3: 31 gives Nathan as the
ancestor of Jesus, Matthew 1: 6 has Solomon as Jesus’ forefather.
35 ‘Hilkhot melakhim’, 11: 1.
36 Negative Commandment no. 362.
37 Ḥemdat yisra’el, i. 14b (final numbering).
38 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 104 (Arabic), 151 (Hebrew).
39 See Kafih’s notes to the Fourth and Seventh Principles.
40 Ets ḥayim, iii. 301 ff.
41 No. 498. This point is noted in Katan, ‘I Believe’, 43 n. 3.
42 Me’or einayim, ch. 32.
43 Shalshelet hakabalah, 38. In his usual fashion, Ibn Yahya copied the
information from dei Rossi without acknowledgement. See Baron, History,
315, for Steinschneider’s comment regarding Ibn Yahya’s plagiarism.
44 Seder hadorot, 58a.
45 See Joanna Weinberg, ‘Azaria’.
46 Zohar iii. 173b. See Aptowitzer, Parteipolitik, 113 ff.
47 Daniel Frish, Matok midevash, ad loc. See also Chajes, Kol sifrei, ii. 523,
528; I. Luria, Zohar harakia, 35b; H. E. Shapira, Divrei torah, iv, no. 84;
and the discussion in Warhaftig, ‘Messiah’. Warhaftig calls attention to R.
Menahem Azariah da Fano’s attempt at a reconciliation between the two
views, in that the descendants of Solomon married those of Nathan, which
enables the messiah to be descended from both. See da Fano, Ma’amar
me’ah kesitah, no. 92. Plotzki, Ḥemdat yisra’el, i. 14b, mentions that there
were those who called attention to the conflict between Maimonides and the
Zohar in order to find fault with the latter. On this, see Samson Bloch’s
letter in Otsar neḥmad, 1 (1856), 44–5. R. Jacob Emden refers to this
passage in his criticism of the Zohar; see Mitpaḥat sefarim, 43. R. Moses
Kunitz, in his polemic against Emden, Ben yoḥai, 89, responds to some of
Emden’s criticisms of this passage, but does not mention anything regarding
Solomonic descent. R. Reuven Rapaport, in his response to Emden entitled
Itur soferim, printed as an appendix to the Lvov 1871 edition of Mitpaḥat
sefarim, p. 44, defends the Zohar’s position and cites in support of it the
passage of ‘Philo’ mentioned by dei Rossi. See also the anonymous article
‘Notes’, 155–8.
48 Although most scholars agree that the doctrine of a general
resurrection must be dated to the later biblical period, the notion of
resurrection per se is already found in Isa. 26: 19: ‘Thy dead shall live, my
dead bodies shall arise; Awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust; for Thy
dew is as the dew of light, and the earth shall bring to life the shades.’ Other
relevant biblical texts include Deut. 32: 39: ‘I slay and revive’, as well as the
stories of Elijah and Elisha raising the dead (1 Kgs. 17: 17 ff., 2 Kgs. 4: 18
ff.). The book of Daniel, in a passage scholars assign to the Maccabean
period, states: ‘And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall
awake, some to everlasting life, and some to reproaches and everlasting
abhorrence’ (12: 2). The Pharisees later advocated this position and it is
recorded in the Mishnah as dogma: ‘The following have no portion in the
world to come: one who says that resurrection is not a biblical doctrine’
(San. 10: 1). Resurrection is also mentioned in the second benediction of
the daily Amidah prayer. However, Philo never speaks of resurrection and
no doubt understood the concept to be identical with immortality of the
soul; see H. A. Wolfson, Philo, i. 404. Origen (d. 253) refers to Jews who
denied resurrection (Contra Celsum v. 14, 274), but it is hard to know to
whom he is referring. Perhaps these Jews were the last vestiges of those
influenced by Sadducean or Essene doctrine, which denied the resurrection.
Since the Talmud does not see fit to polemicize against this view, it does not
seem to have posed a significant threat to the rabbinic outlook. The
Emperor Justinian, however, as late as 553 felt it necessary to declare that
Jews were obligated to believe in resurrection of the dead, or suffer dire
consequences, showing that this was not a universally held view in the
Jewish community. See Kahle, Geniza, 316.
49 Translator’s introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed, p. cxviii.
50 See Commentary on the Mishnah, San., 138; Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’, ch. 8.
51 Principles, 407. As Jacobs (ibid. 406) notes, Ibn Ezra on Dan. 12: 2
may anticipate Maimonides. Yet his comment is not entirely clear, for he
writes that in messianic days the righteous will be resurrected and then ‘will
die a second death only to be resurrected in the world to come’. The
question is, does resurrection in the ‘world to come’ mean eternal spiritual
life? Bleich thinks not: see With Perfect Faith, 620.
52 Maimonides mentions resurrection twice in the Guide. In i. 70, he
quotes BT Ḥag. 12b concerning ‘the dew by means of which the Holy One,
blessed be He, will revive the dead’. As Maimonides explains, this ‘dew’ is
not to be understood literally, perhaps implying that the resurrection should
also be understood figuratively. In iii. 23 he quotes BT BB 16a that ‘Job
denied the resurrection of the dead’.
53 ‘Escaping Judaism’, 81 (this passage was called to my attention by
Professor Zev Harvey). On the other hand, Arthur Hyman writes: ‘To be
sure, the literal belief in the resurrection does not fit readily into his
philosophic scheme, but I see no reason to classify him with such Muslim
philosophers as Avicenna who consider the principle as a concession to the
imagination of the masses who can only conceive of the existence of
corporeal substances’. See id., Eschatological Themes, 79.
54 In a number of talmudic passages, the phrase ‘the world to come’ refers
to the era following the resurrection, in which the righteous will live for ever
in their resurrected bodies. This is also how it was understood by
Maimonides’ opponents. The abode of the souls after death was referred to
as ‘the Garden of Eden’. See Nahmanides, Kitvei ramban, ii. 294 ff.; Albeck,
Mishnah: Nezikin, 454.
55 See Benveniste’s letter published in Alexander Marx, ‘Texts’, 406–28,
esp. p. 425; Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, ch. 3.
56 Marx, ‘Texts’, 425.
57 See Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 310. See also ibid. 324 (Arabic), 348–9
(Hebrew), where Maimonides informs us that there were many people who
relied on his writings in order to deny a physical resurrection.
58 ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 6.
59 See Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, ch. 3. When Maimonides’ Essay
on Resurrection later arrived in Spain, Abulafia disagreed with it as well. See
his Yad ramah on BT San. 90a. R. Samuel b. Eli’s famous attack on
Maimonides’ view of resurrection, which also focuses on the Mishneh torah,
has now been published. See Langermann, ‘Rabbi Samuel’; S. Stroumsa,
Origins.
60 See D. Schwartz, Messianic Idea, 133–44; Langermann, Yemenite
Midrash, 300–1; Shem Tov, Sefer ha’emunot, 6a–b; S. D. Luzzatto, Studies,
ii. 166.
61 Prophecy, 312 n. 227. See, similarly, Kirschner, ‘Maimonides’ Fiction’.
62 Unlike our versions of Mishnah San. 10: 1
)( , Maimonides never requires one to
believe that resurrection is revealed in the Torah. These words were
probably lacking in his text of the Mishnah; see Rabbinovicz, Dikdukei
soferim, ad loc.; Lowe, Mishnah, 128a; Faksimile-Ausgabe, 303; M. Abulafia,
Yad ramah, ad loc. (p. 340) for texts that omit this requirement. See also
Sinzheim, Yad david: Sanhedrin, 173. If Maimonides did have our version of
the Mishnah, he might have ignored it in light of Tosefta San. 13: 1, where
this condition does not appear. It is also possible that, despite what the
Mishnah says, he believed it was too extreme to regard one who accepted
the belief as a heretic merely because he denied its pentateuchal origin.
63 See Shem Tov, Sefer ha’emunot, 6a–b; S. D. Luzzatto, Meḥkerei
hayahadut, ii. 166.
64 Keter shem tov, 651–2. According to Gaguine, R. Amram Gaon also
held this interpretation. See also Kafih, comment in his edition of
Maimonides, Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot berakhot’, 10: 10, who notes the
identification of ‘the world to come’ and teḥiyat hametim. Gaguine’s
interpretation should be read together with a point made by Isaiah
Leibowitz. The latter noted that the text of the Thirteenth Principle reads:
‘Resurrection of the Dead, and we have already explained it.’ Earlier in the
chapter Maimonides states that resurrection is a fundamental principle and
that one who does not believe in it has no religion and no tie to the Jewish
people. He also states that the wicked will not be resurrected: ‘How can the
wicked live again, since they are considered dead even while alive? Thus have
our Sages said, “The wicked, even in their lifetime, are called dead, but the
righteous, even after death, are called alive” [BT Ber. 18a–b].’ According to
Leibowitz, this shows that Maimonides identifies resurrection with life after
death, i.e. the world to come. See Leibowitz, On the World, 108; id.,
Conversations, 226. Although I do not find Leibowitz’s reading textually
compelling, one could support it with the following argument: Maimonides
says that one who denies the resurrection has no religion. This is very
difficult to understand. Why should denial of resurrection, if it means a
temporary physical reappearance, merit such opprobrium, especially if one
still believes in eternal spiritual life? If, however, the ‘resurrection’ here
spoken of means eternal spiritual life, then Maimonides’ formulation makes
perfect sense. Denial of eternal spiritual life means that there is no ultimate
reward and punishment and thus no chance for salvation. As Jacobs puts it,
‘a religious faith denuded of the belief in the immortality of the soul loses all
its spiritual power, a faith without the doctrine of the physical resurrection is
not affected at all’ (Principles, 415). Abarbanel also writes, with reference to
the doctrine of physical resurrection: ‘Even though this is a true belief . . .
why should the Torah collapse in its entirety and its commandments be
refuted if one believes that divine retribution occurs [both] in this world and
in the world to come, but that there is no bodily resurrection after death?’
(Rosh amanah, ch. 3).
65 Akedat yitsḥak, i. 71b: . See Heller-
Wilensky, Rabbi Isaac, 145; E. Kafih, ‘Nature of the Soul’, 161–2. Me’iri,
Beit habeḥirah: Avot, 107, also identifies teḥiyat hametim and the world to
come. But in Beit habeḥirah: Sanhedrin, 334, he adopts the exoteric
Maimonidean model and distinguishes between the two. See also Me’iri,
Ḥibur hateshuvah, 386. R. Jacob Anatoli’s position is ambiguous, for though
he speaks of a literal resurrection, he also refers to it as a ‘necessary belief’. As
noted above, in Maimonidean terminology this phrase means a belief that it
is necessary for the masses to adopt but which is not literally true. See D.
Schwartz, Messianic Idea, 142–3.
66 Kitab al-rasa’il, 64.
67 Seliger, Kitvei, 71–96. See, however, Kook’s response in his haskamah
to this work. This source was noted in Jacobs, Principles, 414.
68 Hertz, Prayer Book, 255.
 69 See Jacobs, Principles, 415–16.
70 This is not a new phenomenon. In R. Meir Abulafia’s letter to the
French sages he writes that the belief in resurrection has been abandoned by
most of his contemporaries. See Kitab al-rasa’il, 13.
71 See Hartman, Living Covenant, 257.
72 See his edition of Moreh hanevukhim (Jerusalem, 1977), 29 (1st
pagination). R. Joseph Rozin had earlier attacked Moses of Narbonne in
this regard; see M. Kasher, Mefane’aḥ tsefunot, 13.
73 Mishneh torah, Sefer hamada, ed. J. Kafih, 646–7. See ‘Hilkhot
teshuvah’, 8: 3, where neshamah is used in the sense of ‘life force’, and nefesh
refers to the perfected intellect.
74 See J. Kafih, Writings, i. 190.
75 Mishneh torah: Sefer hamada, ed. J. Kafih, 646. In fact, the kabbalist R.
Azriel of Gerona regarded resurrection—which in his mind appears to be
identical with gilgul—as nothing more than a punishment. The righteous,
however, ‘have no interruption [in their incorporeal existence] for ever and
all eternity’. See Septimus, Hispano–Jewish Culture, 111–12.
76 Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 328 (Arabic), 356–7 (Hebrew).
 Conclusion

HEN THE ARTICLE upon which this book is based first

W appeared, it created something of a sensation in Orthodox
circles. Some were overjoyed upon learning of the wide-ranging
beliefs expressed by Jewish scholars over the centuries; others were
horrified for the same reason. Still others were simply confused,
since the article refuted what had been a strongly held conviction
indoctrinated in them since their youth. (For this reason, one
reader called me an ‘iconoclast’, which I suppose is not a bad
thing.) In one well-known yeshiva, the article was passed from
student to student as if it were Haskalah literature in late
nineteenth-century Volozhin. Because of the great student
interest, a teacher at this yeshiva was even forced to speak about it
with his students.
What was it about the article that created such acclaim,
aversion, and confusion? Why were the opinions of great sages not
only unknown, but, for many, even unacceptable? The main
reason why the views I discussed were so unfamiliar is that Jewish
theology is not taken seriously in contemporary Orthodoxy.
Unlike earlier generations, which had their ‘professional’
theologians or, at the very least, scholars who devoted a great deal
of time to this field, today we have talmudists, who at best merely
dabble in it.
 Since the sources of Jewish theology are not part of the
curriculum in yeshivot, the students know nothing about them.
Nor is the typical posek, who has mastered the Talmud, codes, and
responsa, acquainted with the theological literature, and he often
does not even recognize the issues.1 As a consequence of both the
conservatism of these sages and their general lack of knowledge of
the history of Jewish thought, certain theological views have
become de rigueur in traditional circles. These conservative views
are repeated and expounded upon, but the wide-ranging opinions
of sages of past generations are rarely given a hearing. This is why
much of what I have discussed in this book will be surprising to
readers who have been raised in Orthodoxy, even if they received
an extensive yeshiva education.
While the issues I have discussed are not part of the traditional
curriculum, I believe them to be central to a proper understanding
of Judaism. Together with the turn to the right in Orthodoxy,
which has led to increasing stringency in many areas of halakhah,
an ever-increasing dogmatism in matters of belief is also apparent.
Many views that were once generally considered ‘acceptable’ are
no longer regarded in this way. If, as with the original article,
controversy breaks out over this book, it is because many fear that
exposing people to what the great figures of the past have written
will break down the walls of theological conformity that have been
so patiently erected. I am not a theologian; my approach is that of
an intellectual historian. I do, however, hope that traditional
Judaism will once again create theologians, as well as great
talmudists who will also concern themselves with the theological
heritage explored in this book.
 I wrote this book to examine the claim that Maimonides’
Principles are the last word in Jewish theology. Simply by looking
at traditional Jewish sources, I believe it has been clearly
demonstrated that many of his Principles were not regarded as
authoritative, either before his time or afterwards. The fact that
Maimonides placed the stamp of apostasy on anyone who
disagreed with his Principles did not frighten away numerous
great sages from their search for truth. The lesson for moderns is
clear.

1 R. Joseph Kafih’s commentary on the Mishneh torah cites many

examples of sages who misinterpreted Maimonides because they were
unaware of his philosophical views. A particularly surprising example of this
appears in Feinstein, Igerot mosheh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, ii. 239. Although R.
Moses Feinstein was the greatest posek of his time, he seems to have had no
knowledge of Maimonidean philosophy. He was therefore able to state that
Maimonides believed in the protective power of holy names and the names
of angels, as used in amulets. For Maimonides’ rejection of this, see his
commentary on Mishnah Sotah 7: 4 and Guide i. 61–2.
 APPENDIX I

Other Areas of Dispute

has focused on Maimonides’ Principles, his assertion

T
HIS BOOK

that denial of any of them equals heresy, and the rabbinic

authorities who rejected many of these positions. This appendix
will concentrate on four practices which Maimonides stamped as
heretical, or at least taken from the heretics. As with his Principles,
his assertions in this regard met with widespread rejection,
although in two of the cases Maimonides’ opinion eventually
prevailed.

1. In Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot talmud torah’, 3: 10 Maimonides

writes:
One, however, who makes up his mind to study Torah and not to work but
to live on charity, profanes the name of God, brings the Torah into
contempt, extinguishes the light of religion, brings evil upon himself, and
deprives himself of the world to come, for it is forbidden to derive any temporal
advantage from the words of the Torah.

Maimonides elaborates on this position in his commentary on

Mishnah Avot 4: 7, where he claims that the great scholars of the
past refused to take money from the community, earning their
living by various pursuits instead. However, as is well known,
Jews throughout history, wherever they lived, have scrupulously
ignored Maimonides’ words. Maimonides himself acknowledged
that ‘the majority, or possibly all’ of his fellow Torah sages
disagreed with him.1 Not surprisingly, men continue to enter the
rabbinate expecting to be supported by the community, and
contemporary Orthodoxy has established a kolel system, in which
tens of thousands of young men are paid to study Torah
exclusively. In the words of R. Moses Feinstein, ‘Those who feign
piety basing themselves on Maimonides’ opinion are acting at the
instigation of the evil inclination. This is done in order to stop
their Torah study so as to engage in work, business, etc. In the
end they forget even that little which they have already learnt and
no longer have even a small amount of time for Torah study.’2

2. In Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’, 11: 12, Maimonides

writes:
One who whispers a spell over a wound and then recites a verse from the
Torah, one who recites a verse over a child to save it from terrors, and one
who places a scroll or phylacteries on an infant to induce it to sleep, are not
in the category of sorcerers and soothsayers, but they are included among those
who deny the Torah; for they use its words to cure the body, whereas these are
only medicine for the soul, as it is said, They shall be life to your soul (Prov. 3:
22). On the other hand, anyone in the enjoyment of good health is
permitted to recite verses from the Scriptures or a Psalm, so that he may be
shielded by the merit of the recital and saved from trouble and hurt.

In ‘Hilkhot teshuvah’, 3: 6, Maimonides writes that those who

deny the Torah have no share in the world to come. Nevertheless,
throughout Jewish history his words have been ignored and pious
Jews have indeed used the Torah ‘to cure the body’. The mezuzah
in particular became popular as a protective amulet, and Joshua
Trachtenberg reports that during the First World War ‘many of
the Jewish soldiers carried mezuzot in their pockets to deflect
enemy bullets’.3 Even today there are Orthodox Jews who will
place a small book of Psalms underneath a baby’s pillow, thinking
that it will protect the infant.

3. In Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot mezuzah’, 5: 4 Maimonides writes:

It is a universal custom to write the word Shaddai on the other side of the
mezuzah opposite the blank space between the two sections. As this word is
written on the outside, the practice is not objectionable. Those however,
who write names of angels, holy names, a biblical text, or [angelic] seals
within the mezuzah are among those who have no portion in the world to come.
For these fools not only fail to fulfil the commandment, but they treat an
important precept that expresses the unity of God, the love of Him, and His
worship, as if it were an amulet to promote their own personal interest, for
according to their foolish minds the mezuzah is something that will secure
for them advantage in the vanities of the world.

Today, one cannot find mezuzot that violate Maimonides’

proscription. This was not the case in medieval times, however,
when such mezuzot were common in Ashkenazi lands, many of
whose sages supported the practice. For example, R. Judah
Hehasid is known to have had holy names in his mezuzah,4 and R.
Eliezer ben Samuel of Metz (twelfth century) gives descriptions of
how to write mezuzot complete with angelic names.5 Maḥzor vitri
prescribes that ‘one should be careful’ to include the names of
angels and their seals,6 and both Sidur rashi and Sefer hapardes go
even further, regarding the practice as an obligatory aspect of the
commandment.7

4. In Mishneh torah, ‘Hilkhot isurei biah’, 11: 15, Maimonides

writes:
There is a custom which prevails in some places and which is mentioned in
the responsa of some of the ge’onim, whereby a woman who has given birth
to a male child may not have intercourse until the expiration of forty days,
and in the case of a female child eighty days, even if she has had a flow for
seven days only. This, too, is not a well-founded custom, but the result of an
erroneous decision in these responsa. It is a heretical practice in these localities
and the inhabitants learned it from the Sadducees. Indeed, it is one’s duty to
compel them to get it out of their minds, so that they return to the words of
the Sages, namely that a woman should count no more than seven days of
cleanness.

As Maimonides indicates, this practice of adding on to the days of

impurity following childbirth could find support in geonic
responsa. It is therefore understandable that, despite Maimonides’
harsh words, the practice, which included a number of local
variations concerning how many days to add, was not uprooted,
and remained well established in communities throughout the
world, often receiving the support of leading scholars.8 R. Jacob
Moelin (c.1360–1427, Germany) is known to have advocated the
practice.9 R. Alexander Suslein Hakohen (fourteenth century,
Germany) testified that the custom was widespread.10 R. Isaac ben
Sheshet (1326–1407, North Africa),11 R. Joseph Colon (c.1420–
80, Italy),12 R. Samuel Aboab (1610–94, Italy),13 R. Ezekiel
Landau (1713–93, Prague),14 and R. Aaron Worms (1754–1836,
Metz),15 to mention just some authorities from later years, record
that this was the practice of certain communities in their day. Both
Ben Sheshet and Colon refused to abolish the practice if there
were grounds to believe that it arose not in error but as an extra
stringency. R. Moses Isserles (c.1530–72, Poland) offered what he
regarded as clear halakhic justification for the practice.16 He also
ruled that women must follow this routine in a place where the
custom is to do so.17 R. Jacob Reischer (c.1670–1733, Prague,
Germany) recorded that the sages of Prague supported the
practice, and he too offers a justification for it.18 R. Joel Sirkes
(1561–1640, Poland) went even further, declaring that those who
abandon this custom, as Maimonides had demanded, ‘commit a
great sin’ and violate the biblical warnings ‘Do not forsake the
teaching of thy mother’ (Prov. 1: 8) and ‘whoso breaketh though
a fence, a serpent shall bite him’ (Eccles. 10: 8). He concludes that
a rabbi who rules otherwise requires atonement.19
Nevertheless, the influence of Maimonides, together with that
of his powerful supporters, was such that the popularity of the
practice was significantly reduced. We know of certain rabbinic
leaders, such as R. Tsevi Hirsch Ashkenazi (1660–1718,
Germany, Amsterdam)20 and R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz (c.1690–
1764, Prague, Metz, Germany),21 who took active steps to abolish
the practice in their communities. Virtually all other Ashkenazi
posekim, while not going to the extreme of formally abolishing the
practice, were firm in their insistence that it was without basis and
that women did not need to follow it.22 This Ashkenazi opposition
was so successful that R. Abraham Danzig (1748–1820,
Lithuania) could write that in his part of the world women did
not follow this practice.23 Some years later, R. Yehiel Mikhel
Epstein (1828–1909, Belorussia) declared that he knew of no
community where the practice was still followed.24
In the Sephardi world the popularity of the practice also
declined, although there remained some who spoke in its favour.
Among these should be mentioned R. Jacob Saul Elyashar (1817–
1906), the Rishon Letsiyon (Sephardi chief rabbi) of the Land of
Israel. He responded very sharply to an attempt by one rabbi to
abolish the practice, quoting Sirkes’ strong comments mentioned
above.25 This position was reaffirmed by his son, R. Hayim Moses
Elyashar (1845–1924), who also served as Rishon Letsiyon.26 R.
Joseph Hayim ben Elijah al-Hakam of Baghdad (1833–1909),
while not personally advocating the practice, regarded it as an
authentic custom that could not be abandoned without the
consent of a beit din (hatarat nedarim).27 The custom of Fez,
Morocco, was also identical to that which Maimonides blasts as
heretical. As R. Yedidyah Monsenego (c.1800–68) made clear,
this practice had the support of generations of rabbinic leaders of
Fez.28 R. Moses Toledano (died 1773) of Meknes, Morocco
likewise advocated this practice.29 Maimonides’ opinion was also
ignored in Djerba, Tunisia, where the practice was to wait forty
days after the birth of a male. With regard to a girl, however, there
were different customs, with some waiting sixty-five days and
others the full eighty.30 In Algeria31 and Aden32 the practice was in
opposition to Maimonides’ opinion. Many people in Yemen did
likewise,33 paying no regard to their sage, R. Hoter ben Shelomoh
(fourteenth–fifteenth centuries), who condemned those who
followed this practice as violating Maimonides’ Ninth Principle,
which speaks of the immutability of Torah law.34
 1 Commentary on Mishnah Avot 4: 7, and see Yitshak Shailat’s important
comments in his edition of Maimonides’ commentary on Avot, 73–5.
2 Igerot mosheh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, ii, no. 116.
3 Jewish Magic, 147.
4 Anon., Sefer hapardes, 26.
5 Yere’im, no. 400.
6 pp. 648–9.
7 Anon., Sidur rashi, 231; anon., Sefer hapardes, 26. See Daniel Sperber,
Minhagei yisra’el, ii. 103 ff., who refers to all the literature on the subject.
8 See Zimmer, Olam keminhago noheg, 220–39, for the most recent and
detailed discussion of this practice, focusing exclusively on the medieval
period. For additional sources see Sperber, Minhagei yisra’el, ii. 76 ff.
9 See Moelin, She’elot uteshuvot maharil, no. 140; id., She’elot uteshuvot
maharil ḥadashot, no. 93: 3; id., Sefer maharil: minhagim, 595. In this latter
source, Moelin is quoted as saying that the practice has biblical authority!
On this problematic quotation, see the Makhon Yerushalayim edition of the
Tur, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 194 n. 7.
10 Sefer ha’agudah: pesaḥim, 190 (no. 96); id., Sefer ha’agudah: nidah, 70a
(no. 18).
11 She’elot uteshuvot harivash, no. 40.
12 She’elot uteshuvot maharik, no. 144.
13 Devar shemuel, no. 196. On this practice in Italy, see also the
responsum of R. Aaron ben Israel Finzi in Bonfil, Rabbinate, 281, and
Sinigaglia, Shabat shel mi, ‘Ya’akov leḥok’, no. 44.
14 Noda biyehudah, 1st ser., ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 54.
15 Me’orei or: kan tahor, 135b.
16 Darkhei mosheh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 194. See also id., She’elot uteshuvot rema,
no. 94.
 17 Shulḥan arukh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 194: 1.
18 Shevut ya’akov, iii, no. 77.
19 Bayit ḥadash, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 194.
20 See Emden, She’elat ya’avets, ii. 15.
21 Tiferet yisra’el, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 194: 4 (printed together with id., Kereti
ufeleti).
22 See the sources quoted in Yosef, Yabia omer, iv. 251.
23 Ḥokhmat adam, 115: 19.
24 Arukh hashulḥan, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, 194: 23.
25 Yisa ish, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 4.
26 Sha’al ha’ish, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 12.
27 Rav pe’alim, ii, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 23, id., Ben ish ḥai, ii, ‘Tsav’, no. 20.
28 Kupat harokhlim, 123.
29 Hashamayim haḥadashim, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 30. There was
disagreement in Meknes regarding this practice; see Ovadiah, Natan david,
389. In many outlying villages of Morocco, Maimonides’ opinion was
ignored. See Blumenthal, Commentary, 161 n. 1.
30 See M. Hakohen, Veheshiv mosheh, ‘Yoreh de’ah’, no. 36; K. M.
Hakohen, Berit kehunah, i. 254–5 (s.v. yoledet; see also R. Meir Mazuz’s note
at the end of the book); R. H. Hakohen, Zikhrei kehunah, 566.
31 See Tseror, Dinei, 45; Blumenthal, Commentary, 161 n. 1.
32 See Tsalah, Piskei maharits, iii. 273 (Ratsaby’s commentary).
33 See ibid. R. Yahya Tsalah (1725–1806) says that in a ‘few places’
people waited forty days for a boy and eighty for a girl: see ibid. 269.
However, Ratsaby testifies that in more recent years this was the practice in
almost all communities.
34 Blumenthal, Commentary, 160–1.
APPENDIX II
1. Frontispiece to Arba’ah turim by R. Jacob ben Asher (Augsburg, 1540).
The two scenes at the bottom show God creating first the animals, and then
Eve from Adam (Gen 2: 21–2). Courtesy of the Jewish Theological
Seminary of America
 2. Title page of Ir binyamin by R. Benjamin Ze’ev Wolf Romaner
(Frankfurt am Oder, 1698). The scene (enlarged above) which appears at the
 bottom right of the title page shows Jacob’s dream (Gen. 18) with God
looking down from the top right, above the ladder. Courtesy of the Jewish
Theological Seminary of America
 3. Title page of Minḥat shai by R. Yedidyah Solomon Norzi (Mantua,
1742). The scene (enlarged above from a clearer copy) which appears at the
 bottom left of the title page shows Ezekiel’s vision of the Valley of Dry
Bones (Ezek. 37); God appears above, in the clouds. Courtesy of the Jewish
Theological Seminary of America
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 Index of Biblical and Rabbinic
References

BIBLE
Genesis

1: 26 ref1

1: 26–7 ref1 n. ref2

1: 31 ref1

3: 21 ref1, ref2 n. ref3

4: 1 ref1 n. ref2

6: 5 ref1 n. ref2

6: 15 ref1

9: 29 ref1 n. ref2

12: 6 ref1, ref2 n. ref3

16: 5 ref1 n. ref2

16: 12 ref1 n. ref1

17: 17 ref1 n. ref2

18: 1 ref1 n. ref2

18: 5 ref1

18: 12 ref1 n. ref2

18: 13 ref1 n. ref2

 18: 20 ref1 n. ref2

18: 22 ref1 (and n. ref2) ref3 (and n. ref4)

18–19 ref1 n. ref2

19 ref1

19: 13 ref1, ref2 n. ref3

19: 21 ref1

22: 14 ref1

27: 1 ref1

27: 41 ref1 n. ref2

32: 5 ref1 n. ref2

32: 27 ref1

36: 31 ref1 n. ref2

36: 31–9 ref1

48: 8 ref1

48: 10 ref1

Exodus
3: 6 ref1

7: 5 ref1

11: 5 ref1 n. ref2

18: 21 ref1 n. ref2

19: 3 ref1

19: 4 ref1 n. ref2

20: 1 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 nn. ref4, ref5

 20: 2 ref1

20: 3 ref1

20: 20 ref1

21: 6 ref1 n. ref2

21: 8 ref1 n. ref2

23: 19 ref1 n. ref2

23: 20–2 ref1

24: 4 ref1

24: 5 ref1

24: 9–11 ref1

24: 10 ref1

24: 17 ref1

25: 18 ref1 n. ref2

25: 31 ref1 n. ref2

29: 38–42 ref1

33: 11 ref1

33: 18 ref1

33: 19 ref1, ref2

33: 20 ref1, ref2

33: 21 ref1 n. ref2

34: 15–16 ref1

34: 23 ref1

34: 27 ref1

39 ref1 n. ref2
Leviticus
1: 1 ref1 n. ref2

16: 2 ref1

16: 8 ref1

16: 10 ref1

16: 26 ref1

17 ref1

19: 33 ref1 n. ref2

21: 2 ref1 n. ref2

22: 7 ref1 n. ref2

Numbers
11: 15 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 nn. ref4, and ,ref5

11: 21 ref1 n. ref2

12: 7 ref1

12: 8 ref1, ref2

12: 12 ref1 n. ref2

14: 9 ref1

15: 31 ref1

15: 39 ref1

21: 1 ref1 n. ref2

21: 17 ref1

22: 1 ref1
 25: 13 ref1

28: 1–8 ref1

33: 2 ref1

35: 9–34 ref1

Deuteronomy
1: 1 ref1

1: 2 ref1, ref2 nn. ref3 and ref4, ref5

1: 2–5 ref1

3: 11 ref1, ref2

4: 12 ref1

4: 14 ref1

4: 15 ref1, ref2

4: 44 ref1 n. ref2

5: 5 ref1 n. ref2

5: 6 ref1

5: 7 ref1

5: 16 ref1

6: 4–9 ref1 n. ref2

7: 3–4 ref1

12 ref1

12: 15–16 ref1

17: 8–10 ref1 n. ref2

19: 1–13 ref1

 21: 22–3 ref1

22: 7 ref1

23: 2 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

23: 15 ref1

31: 9 ref1

31: 19 ref1 n. ref2

31: 22 ref1

32: 1–43 ref1

32: 5 ref1 n. ref2

32: 39 ref1 n. ref2

32: 44–5 ref1 n. ref2

33: 27 ref1

34 ref1 n. ref2

34: 1 ref1

34: 6 ref1 n. ref2

34: 10 ref1, ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4) ref5

34: 12 ref1

Joshua
5: 13 ff. ref1 n. ref2

5: 14 ref1

24: 26 ref1

Judges
 3: 31 ref1

6: 12 ref1 n. ref2

1 Samuel
3: 13 ref1 n. ref2

27: 1 ref1 n. ref2

2 Samuel
6: 16 ref1 n. ref2

15: 21 ref1 n. ref2

1 Kings
6: 10 ref1

9: 1 ref1

17: 14 ref1 n. ref2

17: 17 ff. ref1 n. ref2

22: 19 ref1, ref2, ref3

2 Kings
4: 18 ff. ref1 n. ref2

12: 2 ref1 n. ref2

Isaiah
 6: 2 ref1 n. ref2

6: 5 ref1, ref2

10: 3 ref1

11: 9 ref1, ref2

11: 11 ref1

11: 12 ref1

26: 10 ref1 n. ref2

26: 19 ref1 n. ref2

35: 10 ref1

40: 18 ref1, ref2

45: 17 ref1

51: 4 ref1

55: 6 ref1

64: 3 ref1

Jeremiah
3: 14 ref1

7: 22 ref1 n. ref2

23: 24 ref1

31: 10 ref1

31: 30 ref1 n. ref2

Ezekiel
1: 26 ref1 n. ref2
 8: 18 ref1 n. ref2

45: 22 ref1 n. ref2

46: 4 ref1 n. ref2

46: 13 ref1 n. ref2

Micah
5: 9 ref1

Habakkuk
1: 11 ref1 n. ref2

1: 12 ref1 n. ref2

Zechariah
2: 12 ref1 n. ref2

30: 2 ref1 n. ref2

Malachi
1: 3 ref1 n. ref2

3: 4 ref1

Psalms
33: 15 ref1

41: 3 ref1
 93: 2 ref1

94: 11 ref1 n. ref2

104: 2 ref1

105: 4 ref1

107: 2 ref1

136 ref1

146: 4 ref1

146: 7 ref1

Proverbs
1: 8 ref1

3: 22 ref1

Job
4: 18 ref1

7: 20 ref1 n. ref2

32: 3 ref1 n. ref2

37: 6 ref1

Ecclesiastes
10: 8 ref1

Esther
 6: 6 ref1 n. ref2

Daniel
9: 10–11 ref1

10: 21 ref1

12: 2 ref1 n. ref2

Ezra
7: 6 ref1

7: 10 ref1

9: 10–12 ref1–ref1

OTHER LITERATURE
Mishnah

Ta’anit
4: 2 ref1 n. ref2

Sotah
7: 4 ref1 n. ref2

Sanhedrin
10: 1 ref1, ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7 n.
ref8

11: 2 ref1 n. ref2

46b ref1
 61b ref1

99a ref1

142 n. 42 ref1 n. ref2

Makot
3: 17 ref1

Eduyot
1: 5 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

1: 6 ref1 n. ref2

Avot
1: 14 ref1

2 ref1 n. ref2

4: 7 ref1

Tamid
5: 1 ref1 n. ref2

Yadayim
4: 5 ref1 n. ref2

Tosefta

Sanhedrin
13: 1 ref1 n. ref2
Jerusalem Talmud

Berakhot
9: 1 ref1

Rosh hashanah
2: 4 ref1 n. ref2

Sukah
4: 3 ref1

Megilah
1: 5 ref1 n. ref2

Kidushin
3: 12 ref1 n. ref2

Babylonian Talmud

Berakhot
6a ref1

6b ref1 n. ref2

7a ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6

12a ref1 n. ref2

58b ref1

60b ref1
Shabat
12b ref1 n. ref2

55a ref1 n. ref2

115b ref1 n. ref2

Eruvin
21a ref1 n. ref2

Pesaḥim
112a ref1 n. ref2

Yoma
77a ref1

Rosh hashanah
16a ref1 n. ref2

21b ref1 n. ref2

24a–b ref1 n. ref2

24b ref1

31a ref1

Megilah
31b ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3

Ḥagigah
 12b ref1 n. ref2

16a ref1 n. ref2

Yevamot
47a ref1 n. ref2

49b ref1 n. ref2

Ketubot
8a ref1 n. ref2

19b ref1 n. ref2

Nedarim
37b ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5

Sotah
33a ref1 n. ref2

Kidushin
15a ref1 n. ref2

30a ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

39b ref1–ref1

40a ref1 n. ref2

72b ref1

Bava metsia
59b ref1
Bava batra
12a ref1 n. ref2

15a ref1 n. ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and ref5

16a ref1 n. ref2

75a ref1

Sanhedrin
21b ref1, ref2

44b ref1

46b ref1 n. ref2

51b ref1 n. ref2

90a ref1 n. ref2

98b ref1 n. ref2

99a ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4, ref5

99b–100a ref1 n. ref2

Makot
11a ref1 (and n. ref2)

12a ref1 n. ref2

Avodah zarah
43a–b ref1, ref2 n. ref3

Menaḥot
29b–30a ref1 n. ref2
 30a ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

32b ref1 n. ref2

Nidah
61b ref1

Avot derabi natan

2: 4 ref1

34: 5 ref1

Midrashim

Midrash rabah

Bereshit rabah
7: 2 ref1 n. ref2

8: 10 ref1

27: 1 ref1 n. ref2

50: 9 ref1

Shemot rabah
13: 2 ref1

47: 9 ref1 n. ref2

Vayikra rabah
9: 7 ref1
 13: 3 ref1

34: 3 ref1

Bamidbar rabah
3: 13 ref1

14: 34 ref1 n. ref2, ref3

19: 3 ref1 n. ref2

Devarim rabah
4: 6 ref1

4: 9 ref1

11: 10 ref1, ref2 n. ref3

Shir hashirim rabah

3: 11 ref1 n. ref2

Eikhah rabah
2: 6 ref1 n. ref2

Kohelet rabati
7: 47 ref1 n. ref2

Midrash hagadol

Shemot

796 ref1

Midrash tana’im
on Deut.

19: 9 ref1 n. ref2

Midrash tanḥuma

‘Aḥarei mot’

12 ref1 n. ref2

‘Va’etḥanan’

6 ref1

‘Ha’azinu’

4 ref1

5 ref1 n. ref2

i. 70a ref1 n. ref2 (ed. S. Buber)

Midrash tehilim
3a n. 48 ref1 n. ref2

107: 1 ref1

146: 4 ref1

Pesikta derav kahana

65 ref1 n. ref2

471 ref1 n. ref2

Pirkei derabi eli’ezer

3, 7b–8a ref1 n. ref2

32, 73b ref1 n.ref2

 48, 116a ref1 n. ref2

Sifra on Leviticus
27: 34 ref1 n. ref2

Sifrei devarim, piska

357 ref1 n. ref2

Maimonides

Commentary on the Mishnah

i ref1 n. ref2

i. 2 ref1 n. ref2

i. 10 ref1 n. ref2

Sotah
3: 3 ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3

Sanhedrin
10 ref1, ref2

10: 1 ref1 n. ref2

10: 3 ref1 n. ref2

138 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

Shevuot
1: 4 ref1 n. ref2
 Avot
5: 13 ref1 n. ref2

Ḥulin
1: 2 ref1 n. ref2

Essay on Resurrection
ref1–ref2, ref3, ref4

Guide
i. 1 ref1

i. 3 ref1 n. ref2

i. 5 ref1 n. ref2

i. 12 ref1 n. ref2

i. 26 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6

i. 28 ref1 n. ref2

i. 30 ref1 n. ref2

i. 34 ref1 n. ref2

i. 35 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 nn. ref6, ref7

and ref8, ref9 nn. ref10 and ref11

i. 35–6 ref1 n. ref2

i. 36 ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7 n.

ref8, ref9

i. 39 ref1 n. ref2

i. 46 ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6 n.

ref7

i. 49 ref1 n. ref2
 i. 50 ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4 n. ref5

i. 54 ref1 n. ref2

i. 59 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

i. 60 ref1 n. ref2

i. 61–2 ref1 n. ref2

i. 70 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

i. 71 ref1 n. ref2

i. 75 ref1

ii. 6 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

ii. 6–7 ref1 n. ref2

ii. 7 ref1(and n. 56)

ii. 13 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7 n.

ref8, ref9 n. ref10

ii. 15 ref1 n. ref2

ii. 25 ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3

ii. 26 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

ii. 30 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

ii. 35 ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4 n. ref5

ii. 36 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

ii. 39 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

ii. 40 ref1 n. ref2

ii. 42 ref1 n. ref2

ii. 45 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 8 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 10 ref1 n. ref2

 iii. 15 ref1, ref2 n. ref3

iii. 16–18 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 17 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6

iii. 20 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 22 ref1

iii. 23 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 27 ref1

iii. 28 ref1 n. ref2, ref3

iii. 32 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 34 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 49 ref1 n. ref2

iii. 51 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

iii. 54 ref1

Mishneh torah
ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot yesodei hatorah’

1: 6 ref1 n. ref2

1: 7 ref1 n. ref2

1: 8 ref1 n. ref2

1: 9 ref1 n. ref2

1: 10 ref1 n. ref2

1: 11 ref1 n. ref2
 2: 2 ref1 n. ref2

2: 3 ref1 n. ref2

2: 10 ref1 n. ref2

4: 9 ref1 n. ref2

7: 6 ref1 n. ref2

9: 1 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot talmud torah’

3: 10 ref1

‘Hilkhot avodah zarah’

2: 1 ref1 n. ref2

2: 3 ref1 n. ref2

3: 11 ref1 n. ref2

10: 1 ref1 n. ref2

11: 12 ref1

‘Hilkhot teshuvah’
3 ref1

3: 3 ref1 n. ref2

3: 5 ref1 n. ref2

3: 6 ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4

3: 6–8 ref1 n. ref2

3: 7 ref1 n. ref2, ref3

3: 7–8 ref1
 3: 8 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7 n.
ref8, ref9 n. ref10, ref11, ref12 (and n. ref13)

5: 3 ref1 n. ref2

5: 5 ref1 n. ref2

5: 6 ref1

6: 1 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

8 ref1 n. ref2, ref3

8: 2 ref1 n. ref2, ref3

8: 2–3 ref1 n. ref2

8: 3 ref1 n. ref2

9: 1 ref1 (and n. ref2)

9: 2 ref1 n. ref2

10: 1 ref1

‘Hilkhot keriat shema’

1: 2 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot tefilah’
7: 5 ref1

13: 6 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot mezuzah’
5: 4 ref1

6: 13 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot sefer torah’

 7: 11 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

7: 13 ref1 n. ref2

8: 3 ref1 n. ref2

8: 4 ref1 n. ref2

10: 1 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

‘Hilkhot berakhot’
2: 11 ref1 n. ref2

10: 10 ref1

‘Hilkhot megilah’
2: 18 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot ishut’
8: 5 ref1n n. ref2 and ref3

10: 3 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot yibum veḥalitsah’

1: 4 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot isurei biah’

11: 15 ref1

12: 7 ref1 n. ref2

14: 2 ref1 n. ref2

14: 3 ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3

 ‘Hilkhot ma’aseh hakorbanot’
2: 14–15 ref1 n. ref2

5: 2–4 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot gezelah’
11: 2 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot rotse’aḥ’
4: 10 ref1 n. ref2

13: 14 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot edut’
11: 10 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot mamrim’
3: 3 ref1 n. ref2

3: 6 ref1 n. ref2

3: 8 ref1 n. ref2

‘Hilkhot melakhim’
2: 5 ref1 n. ref2

11: 1 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6 n. ref7

11: 3 ref1 n. ref2

12: 2 ref1 n. ref2

Pirkei mosheh
 25 ref1 n. ref2

Responsa
i, no. 82 ref1 n. ref2

ii, no. 154 ref1 n. ref2

ii, no. 251 ref1 n. ref2

ii, no. 117 ref1 n. ref2

ii, no. 263 ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4

ii, no. 393 ref1 n. ref2

ii, no. 449 ref1 n. ref2

Sefer hamitsvot

Negative Commandments
no. 1 ref1 n. ref2

no. 47 ref1 n. ref2

no. 133 ref1 n. ref2

Shemoneh perakim
8 ref1 n. ref2

5 ref1 n. ref2

Shemot kodesh veḥol

[attributed to Maimonides]
7–8 ref1 n. ref2
 General Index

A
Aaron ben Moses ben Asher ref1
Aaron b. Moses of Starosselje ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5
Aaron Samuel of Kremenets ref1 n. ref2
Abahu, R. ref1 n. ref2
Abarbanel, Isaac ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7 (and n. ref8), ref9
n. ref10, ref11–ref12, ref13 (and n. ref14) ref15, ref16, ref17 n. ref18,
ref19 n. ref20, ref21 n. ref22, ref23, ref24, ref25 n. ref26, ref27 n.
ref28, ref29 n. ref30
Abba Mari Astruc of Lunel ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Abin ben Kahanah, R. ref1
Abner of Burgos ref1 n. ref2
Aboab, Samuel ref1
Abraham, belief in the eternity of matter ref1
Abraham ben Azriel ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Abraham ben David of Posquières (Rabad) ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3 (and n.
ref4), ref5 n. ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9
Abraham ben Eliezer Halevi ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Abraham ben Mordekhai Halevi ref1
Abrams, Daniel ref1 n. ref2
Abudarham, David ref1
Abulafia, Abraham ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5), ref6
Abulafia, Meir ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 (and n. ref6), ref7 (and n. ref8)
Adler, Nathan ref1–ref2
agadot, acceptance of ref1
Akiva, R. ref1, ref2, ref3
al-Ghazali ref1 n. ref2
Alashkar, Joseph ben Shelomo ref1
Alashkar, Moses ref1 (and n. ref2)
Albalag, Isaac ref1, ref2, ref3
Albo, Joseph ref1, ref2 (and nn. ref3, ref4), ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8, ref9 (and
n. ref10), ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14, ref15, ref16–ref17 n. ref18, ref19,
ref20–ref21, ref22, ref23 (and n. ref24), ref25 n. ref26, ref27
Aldabi, Meir ref1
Almohads, insistence on God’s incorporeality ref1–ref2
Almosino, Moses ref1
Altmann, Alexander ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Amar, Reuven ref1
Ami, R. ref1
Amidah prayer, kabbalistic disputes about the direction of the benedictions
ref1–ref2
Amnon of Mainz ref1
Amram Gaon ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Anatoli, Jacob ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3 (and n. ref4), ref5 n. ref6
angels:
as Aristotelian ‘separate intellects’ ref1 (and n. ref2)
corporeality ref1–ref2 n. ref3
fallen ref1 (and n. ref2)
free will ref1, ref2–ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6
as intercessors between man and God ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and ref5,
ref6, ref7–ref8, ref9 n. ref10, ref11
Ani ma’amin ref1 (and n. ref2)
catechism ref1
God’s knowledge of men’s actions ref1–ref2
animals:
eating unclean animals in the Time to Come ref1, ref2 n. ref3
participation in providence denied ref1 n. ref2
perfection (tikun) through being sacrificed ref1
anthropomorphism ref1–ref2
Anushiski, Shneur Zalman Dov ref1 n. ref2
Aptowitzer, Victor ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Arama, David ref1
Arama, Isaac ref1, ref2
Aristotelianism, eternal nature of the world ref1 (and nn. ref2, ref3), ref4
Aristotle ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8, ref9 n. ref10, ref11
Artscroll:
attitude towards the Thirteen Principles ref1
Mosaic authorship of Pentateuch ref1
Asher ben Jehiel, see Rosh
Ashkenazi, Eleazar ben Nathan Habavli ref1, ref2
Ashkenazi, Eliezer ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Ashkenazi, Joseph ref1, ref2
Ashkenazi, Moses ref1
Ashkenazi, Samuel Jaffe ben Isaac ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4
Ashkenazi, Shmuel ref1 n. ref2
Ashkenazi, Tsevi Hirsch ref1, ref2, ref3
asmakhta ref1 n. ref2
Aszod, Judah ref1
atheism, whether it is worse than idolatry ref1 n. ref2
Averroes ref1 n. ref2
Avicenna ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Aviezer, Nathan ref1 n. ref2
Avigdor ben Joseph Hayim of Pinsk ref1
Aviner, Shelomoh ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6
azazel ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Azriel of Gerona ref1
Azulai, Abraham ref1 n. ref2
Azulai, Hayim Joseph David ref1 n. ref2, ref3

B
Ba’al Shem Tov (R. Israel ben Eliezer) ref1
Bahya ben Asher ref1, ref2
Balaam, prophetic character ref1, ref2, ref3
Balbo, Michael ref1, ref2
Balfour Declaration ref1
Banet, Ezekiel ref1 n. ref2
Banet, Mordecai ref1
Bar-Ilan, Meir ref1, ref2
Barnes, W. E. ref1 n. ref2
Baron, Salo ref1 n. ref2
Barzilay, Isaac ref1 n. ref2
Basilea, Aviad Sar-Shalom ref1, ref2
Bedershi, Yedaiah ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Behemoth ref1
Beit Alfa, synagogue frescoes’ representation of God’s corporeality ref1
beliefs:
and doubt ref1–ref2
and halakhot ref1 (and n. ref2)
 necessary ref1–ref2, ref3
true ref1
Ben Naftali, Moses ben David ref1
Ben-Shamai, Hagai ref1 n. ref2
Ben-Ze’ev, Judah Leib ref1
Benamozegh, Elijah ref1 n. ref2
Benjamin Ze’ev ben Solomon ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
Benveniste, Sheshet ref1
Berdugo, Raphael ref1 (and n. ref2)
Berechiah ref1
Berlin, Naftali Tsevi Judah ref1
Berlin, Saul ref1
Berliner, Abraham ref1
Berman, Lawrence ref1, ref2
Bibago, Abraham ref1, ref2
Bleich, J. David ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9, ref10
n. ref11
Blumenfeld, Mordecai ref1 n. ref2
Bonfils, Joseph ben Eliezer ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 n.
ref8
Bonnet, Charles ref1 n. ref2
Breuer, Isaac ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
Breuer, Mordechai ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5)
Bruna, Israel ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Buber, Martin ref1

C
Cardozo, Abraham Miguel ref1, ref2
Cassian, John ref1
Celsus ref1
Chadwick, Owen ref1 n. ref2
Chajes, Tsevi Hirsch ref1, ref2
childbirth, practices surrounding days of impurity after ref1–ref2
children, doctrinal education and use of God’s corporeality ref1, ref2
Chilton, Michael ref1 n. ref2
Christian literature:
Cassian, John, Conferences ref1 n. ref2
Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho ref1
Luke 3: 31 ref1 n. ref2
Matthew 1: 6 ref1 n. ref2
Origen, Contra Celsum ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Tertullian, De carne christi ref1 n. ref2
Christianity:
belief in the incarnation countered by impossibility of change within God
ref1 n. ref2
Christians as heretics in denying the Torah ref1
denial of God’s incorporeality ref1 (and n. ref2)
dislike of the number 13 in ref1 n. ref2
responses to concerning changes in the mitsvot ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
and the standing of the Thirteen Principles ref1
Cohen, David ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4
Cohen, Joseph ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and nn. ref4, ref5)
Cohen, Martin ref6 n. ref7
Cohen, Menachem ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Cohen, Saul ref1 n. ref2
Cohn, Tobias ben Moses ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Colon, Joseph ref1
commandments, post-Mosaic interpolations into the Pentateuch ref1
converts, theological teachings essential for ref1
Cordovero, Moses ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4 n. ref5
creation ref1 (and n. ref2) ref3 n. ref4
Aristotle’s lack of belief in ref1 n. ref2
through Ein Sof in kabbalistic beliefs ref1
eternal ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7
ex nihilo ref1–ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5
from formless matter ref1–ref2
cremation, practice implies rejection of the Thirteen Principles ref1
Crescas, Hasdai ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4

D
da Fano, Menahem Azariah ref1 n. ref2
Daiches, Salis ref1
Dan, Joseph ref1 n. ref2
Daniel ben Judah ref1 (and n. ref2)
Danzig, Abraham ref1
Davidic dynasty, and the messiah ref1, ref2–ref3
Davidson, Herbert ref1
De Fes, Isaac ref1 n. ref2
de Lonzano, Menahem ref1
dead, the:
not to be regarded as intercessors between man and God ref1 n. ref2
resurrection ref1–ref2
Dead Sea Scrolls, textual variants ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3 n. ref4
Decalogue:
importance within the Torah ref1 n. ref2
orthographical variants ref1
 permanence ref1 (and n. ref2)
dei Rossi, Azariah ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
del Aquilla, Gad ref1–ref2
Delacrut, Mattathias ref1
Delitzsch, Franz ref1 n. ref2
Delmedigo, Elijah ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6 n. ref7
Delmedigo, Joseph Solomon ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6
Demiurge, role between God and creation ref1–ref2
dhimmi status ref1 (and n. ref2)
di Boton, Abraham ref1 n. ref2
Dimitrovsky, Hayim Zalman ref1 n. ref2
Diskin, Joshua Leib ref1
doctrine, truth, and theological consensus ref1–ref2
dogmas, in Judaism ref1–ref2
dogmatics, origins in Judaism ref1–ref2
Domb, Yerahmiel Yisrael Yitshak ref1 n. ref2
Dönme, use of the Thirteen Principles ref1
doubt:
and belief ref1–ref2
classification of doubters as heretics ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
dreams, stories recorded as in the Torah ref1
Drosnin, Michael ref1
dualism ref1–ref2
Dura Europos, synagogue frescoes’ representation of God’s corporeality
ref1
Duran, Profiat ref1, ref2, ref3
Duran, Simeon ben Tsemah ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 n.
ref7, ref8 n. ref9
E
Ecclesiastes, regarded as heresy ref1 n. ref2
Edels, Samuel (Maharsha) ref1
Eihorn, Ze’ev Wolf ref1
Ein Sof:
kabbalistic belief in its lack of involvement with human affairs ref1, ref2
unity with the Sefirot ref1–ref2
Eisenstadt, Meir ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Eleazar, R. ref1
Eleazar ben Judah of Worms ref1 (and n. ref2)
Eleazar ben Mattathias ref1–ref2, ref3
Elhanan ben Yakar ref1 n. ref2
Eliezer, R. ref1
Eliezer ben Nathan of Mainz ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Eliezer ben Samuel of Metz ref1
Elijah ben Solomon Zalman, see Vilna Gaon
Elisha (b. Avuyah?) ref1 n. ref2
Elyashar, Hayim Moses ref1
Elyashar, Jacob Saul ref1
Emden, Jacob ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9 n. ref10
Epicureans ref1 n. ref2
denial of God’s providence ref1 n. ref2
Epicurus ref1 n. ref2
epikoros ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3–ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7
Epstein, Abraham ref1
Epstein, Kalonymus Kalman ref1
Epstein, Yehiel Mikhel ref1
Ergas, Joseph ref1 n. ref2
Essenes:
denial of resurrection of the dead ref1 n. ref2
Eybeschuetz, Jonathan ref1, ref2
Eylenburg, Issachar Baer ref1 n. ref2
Ezekiel, eschatological vision of the sacrificial system ref1
Ezra:
interpolations into the Torah ref1, ref2
prophetic character ref1–ref2
textual emendations of the biblical text ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3–ref4, ref5
n. ref6
Ezra scroll ref1 (and n. ref2)
Ezra ben Solomon ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3

F
Falaquera, Shem Tov Ben Joseph ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4, ref5
Falk, Joshua ref1 (and n. ref2)
Feinstein, David ref1 n. ref2
Feinstein, Moses ref1, ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5
Feldman, Louis ref1 n. ref2
festivals, abolition in the messianic era ref1, ref2
Finzi, Aaron ben Israel ref1 n. ref2
Fischer, Israel Jacob ref1 n. ref2
fish, ritual slaughter ref1 n. ref2
Fisher, Shelomoh ref1 n. ref2
Fleckeles, Eleazar ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3 n. ref4
Fox, Marvin ref1
Franco, Solomon ref1
free will:
and angels ref1, ref2–ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6
 idea not included in the Thirteen Principles ref1, ref2–ref3 n. ref4
preservation in the light of God’s foreknowledge ref1
among the spheres ref1, ref2
Freudenthal, Gad ref1 n. ref2
Friedman, Shamma ref1 n. ref2

G
Gaguine, Shem Tov ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
Gatigno, Ezra ref4–ref5, ref6
Gellman, Jerome ref1 n. ref2
Gentili, Moses (Hefetz) ref1
ger toshav ref1 n. ref2
Gerondi, Nissim ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4–ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8
Gersonides, see Levi ben Gershom
Gibraltar, use of Yigdal ref1
Gikatilla, Joseph ben Abraham ref1, ref2
gilgul/gilgul neshamot ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4
Ginsburg, C. D. ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Ginzberg, Louis ref1
God:
absolute unity ref1–ref2
creation ex nihilo ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3–ref4, ref5–ref6 n. ref7
eternal nature ref1 n. ref2
existence: denied by corporealists ref1–ref2; involves his perfectibility and
his being the cause of the existence of all things ref3–ref4
foreknowledge, and free will ref1
knowledge of human actions ref1–ref2
love as knowledge of God ref1 n. ref2
 perfection, implies incorporeality ref1 n. ref2
providence denied ref1 (and n. ref2)
thirteen attributes ref1 (and n. ref2)
whether he is incorporeal ref1–ref2
worship ref1; use of intermediaries between man and God ref2–ref3, ref4,
ref5–ref6, ref7
Goldman, S. ref1 n. ref2
Gordon, Martin L. ref1 n. ref2
Goren, Shelomoh ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Goshen-Gottstein, Alon ref1, ref2, ref3
Goshen-Gottstein, Moshe ref1 n. ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and ref5
Grace after Meals, invocation of angels as intermediaries between man and
God ref1 (and n. ref2)
Graetz, Heinrich ref1 n. ref2
Great Hallel, and post-Mosaic alterations to the Torah ref1
Green, Arthur ref1 (and n. ref2)
Grodzinski, Tsevi Hirsch ref1
Grossman, Avraham ref1 n. ref2
Guenzberg, Aryeh Loeb ref1 (and n. ref2)
Guttmann, Julius ref1

H
‘Ha’azinu’ poem, authorship ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Haberman, Jacob ref1 n. ref2
Hafets Hayim, see Hakohen, Israel Meir
Haggadah for Passover ref1
Hagiz, Jacob ref1
Hagiz, Moses ref1
Hahn, Joseph Yuzpa ref1
Hai Gaon ref1, ref2
Hakohavi, David ben Samuel ref1
Hakohen, Abraham Isaac ref1 n. ref2
Hakohen, Alexander Suslein ref1
Hakohen, Israel Meir (the Hafets Hayim) ref1
Hakohen, Issachar Baer ben Naftali ref1 n. ref2
halakhah, in matters of belief ref1–ref2
Halberstam, Hayim ref1
Halberstam, S. Z. H. ref1 n. ref2
Halevi, Hayim David ref1
Halevi, Judah ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4)
Halivni, David Weiss ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4–ref5, ref6 n. ref7
Halutski, Simhah Isaac ben Moses ref1
Hama ben Hanina, R. ref1
Hanagid, Samuel ref1 n. ref2
Hananel ben Hushiel of Kairouan ref1
Hapstein, Israel ben Shabetai ref1
Harvey, Warren Zev ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Hayim ben Attar ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7
Hayim of Volozhin ref1 n. ref2
Hayon, Nehemiah ref1 n. ref2
Hazan, Jacob ref1
Hazon Ish (Abraham Isaiah Karelitz) ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
Hecateus of Abdera ref1
Hefetz, R. Moses, see Gentili
Heilprin, Jehiel ref1
Helbo, R. ref1
Heller, Yom-Tov Lipmann ref1
heresy ref1–ref2
 denial of any dogma or narrative in the Torah ref1–ref2
doubt of the Thirteen Principles ref1, ref2, ref3
practices regarded as heretical by Maimonides ref1–ref2
Hertz, Joseph H. ref1
Herz, Elkan ref1 n. ref2
Herzog, Isaac ref1 n. ref2
Heschel, Abraham Joshua ref1 nn. ref2, ref3, and ref4, ref5, ref6 n. ref7
Hezekiah ben Abraham ref1
Hiksher, Ephraim ref1 n. ref2
Hildesheimer, Esriel ref1
Hillel, R. ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5), ref6 n. ref7, ref8, ref9 (and n.
ref10), ref11
Hirsch, Samson Raphael ref1 (and n. ref2) ref3
Hirschensohn, Hayim ref1–ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8
Hirschfeld, Barukh ref1 n. ref2
Hoffman, David Tsevi ref1
Horowitz, Isaiah ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6 n. ref7
Horowitz, Jacob Isaac ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Hoshaya, R. ref1
Hoter ben Shelomoh ref1
Husik, Isaac ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5)
Hyman, Arthur ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9

I
Ibn Bilia, David ben Yom Tov ref1, ref2
Ibn Daud, Abraham ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4–ref5 n. ref6, ref7 n. ref8, ref9
Ibn Ezra, R. Abraham ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 nn. ref8 and
ref9, ref10 n. ref11, ref12 n. ref13, ref14 n. ref15, ref16, ref17 (and n.
ref18), ref19 (and nn. ref20, ref21) ref22 nn. ref23, ref24, and ref25,
 ref26, ref27, ref28 n. ref29, ref30 n. ref31, ref32, ref33, ref34 (and n.
ref35), ref36, ref37 n. ref38, ref39
Ibn Gabirol, Solomon ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Ibn Hazm ref1
Ibn Kaspi, Joseph ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 (and n. ref6), ref7, ref8,
ref9, ref10 (and n. ref11), ref12 n. ref13
Ibn Latif, Isaac ref1, ref2
Ibn Migash, Joseph ref1, ref2
Ibn Musa, Hayim ref1 n. ref2
Ibn Pakuda, R. Bahya ref1, ref2 nn. ref3 and ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Ibn Tibbon, Moses ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4, ref5 n. ref5
Ibn Tibbon, Samuel ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5), ref6
Ibn Waqar, Joseph ref1
Ibn Yahya, Gedaliah ben Joseph ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
Ibn Zimra, David ref1, ref2
idolatry, whether worse than atheism ref1 n. ref2
Ilat Ha’ilot, see Ein Sof
Immanuel of Rome ref1
immortality:
denial to all but the philosophically enlightened ref1
through intellectual attainments ref1–ref2, ref3–ref4, ref5 nn. ref6, ref7,
and ref8, ref9 n. ref10
through the observance of mitsvot ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and ref5
impossibility (concept):
creation ex nihilo seen as an ref1
does not affect God’s perfection ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and ref5
incense-burning, as forbidden form of worship ref1
intellect, and the achievement of immortality ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4, ref5,
 and ref6, ref7 n. ref8
intermediaries, as intercessors between man and God ref1–ref2, ref3,
ref4–ref5, ref6
Isaac, Ronald H. ref1
Isaac of Radzivilov ref1
Isaac ben Sheshet ref1, ref2
Isaac ben Yedaiah ref1
Isaiah of Trani the Elder ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4 (and n. ref5)
Isaiah of Trani the Younger ref1 n. ref2
Ishbili, Yom Tov (Ritva) ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Ishmael, R. ref1, ref2
Ishmael Hanina of Valmontone ref1 n. ref2
Islam:
criticisms of Jewish belief in the eternity of Torah necessitate Maimonides’
Ninth Principle as a necessary belief ref1
criticisms of Jewish handling of Torah necessitate Maimonides’ Eighth
Principle as a necessary belief ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
denial of God’s incorporeality ref1 (and n. ref2)
influence on Maimonides’ approach to dogma ref1 n. ref2
insistence on God’s incorporeality possible reason for the Third Principle
ref1–ref2
Israel ben Joseph al-Nakawa ref1 n. ref2
Isserles, Moses ref1, ref2
itur soferim ref1

J
Jacob, R. ref1
Jacob ben Hayim ref1 (and n. ref2)
Jacob Joseph of Polonnoye ref1
Jacob ben Meir, R., see Rabenu Tam
Jacob of Naburaya ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
Jacob the Nazirite ref1
Jacob ben Shalom ref1 n. ref2
Jacobs, Louis ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9, ref10 n.
ref11
Jakobovits, Immanuel ref1–ref2
Jehiel Moses of Komarovka ref1 n. ref2
Jesus, ancestry ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Jewish Congregational Union of America, authoritative nature of the
Thirteen Principles ref1
Jewish status, dependent on mother’s standing ref1
Jews, as God’s chosen people, idea not included in the Thirteen Principles
ref1
Jolkovsky, Binyamin ref1 n. ref2
Jonathan, R. ref1 n. ref2
Jonathan ben Uziel ref1
Jose, R. ref1, ref2
Joseph, R. ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and nn. ref4, ref5), ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9
Joseph ben Judah ibn Simeon ref1
Joseph ben Shalom of Barcelona ref1
Joseph Hayim ben Elijah al-Hakam of Baghdad ref1, ref2
Josephus ref1 n. ref2, ref3
accepts God’s corporeality ref1
Joshua:
contributions to the Pentateuch ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
participation in writing Torah ref1 (and nn. ref2, ref3), ref4, ref5, ref6
Joshua b. Korhah, R. ref1 n. ref2
Judah, R. ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7
Judah Hehasid, R. ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7
Judah ben Nathan, R. ref1 n. ref2
Justin Martyr ref1
Justinian ref1 n. ref2

K
Kafih, Joseph ref1, ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5–ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9
Kafih, Yihyeh ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Kalir, Eleazar ref1 (and n. ref2)
Kamelhar, Yekutiel Aryeh ref1
Kamenetzky, Jacob ref1 (and n. ref2), Kaplan, Lawrence ref3 n. ref4, ref5,
ref6 n. ref7
Kaplan, Mordecai ref1
Karelitz, Abraham Isaiah (the Hazon Ish) ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
Karo, Joseph ref1 n. ref2
Kasher, Hannah ref1 n. ref2
Kasher, Menahem M. ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5)
Kassin, Jacob ref1
Katz, Avigdor ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4 n. ref5
Katz, Eliyahu ref1 n. ref2
Kauders, Samuel Leib ref1
Kaufmann, David ref1 n. ref2
Kellner, Menachem ref1, ref2–ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8, ref9 n.
ref10, ref11, ref12 n. ref13, ref14 n. ref15, ref16 n. ref17, ref18
Kelman, Jay ref1 n. ref2
keri ukhetiv ref1 (and n. ref2)
ketav ashuri ref1 n. ref2
Keter (first Sefirah) ref1
Kimhi, David ref1, ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4), ref5, ref6 n. ref7, ref8
Kino, Samson ref1
Klausner, Abraham ref1
Knohl, Israel ref1, ref2
kofer batorah ref1 (and n. ref2)
kohanim, status in the Time to Come ref1
Kook, R. Abraham Isaac ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6, ref7 n. ref8,
ref9 n. ref10, ref11 (and n. ref12), ref13, ref14 n. ref15
Kreisel, Howard ref1, ref2
Krochmal, Nahman ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Kunitz, Moses ref1 n. ref2
Kurzweil, Zvi ref1–ref2
Kushelevsky, Avraham ref1

L
Lamm, Norman ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5
Landau, Ezekiel ref1
Lattes, Isaac ben Jacob ref1 n. ref2
Lavater, Johann Caspar ref1 n. ref2
Lazi, Yekutiel ref1 n. ref2
Leeser, Isaac ref1
Leibowitz, Isaiah ref1, ref2–ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8
Leiner of Radzyn, Yeruham Meir ref1 n. ref2
Leone da Modena ref1
Levi ben Abraham ref1
Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides) ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7
Levi ben Habib ref1 n. ref2
Leviathan ref1
Levin, Hanokh Tsevi ref1 n. ref2
Levin, Yitshak Meir ref1 n. ref2
Levinger, Jacob ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5
Levison, Mordechai Gumpel Schnaber ref1–ref2
Levy, Isaiah ref1
Lévy, L. G. ref1
libations, as forbidden form of worship ref1
Lieberman, Saul ref1, ref2
Lilienblum, Moses Leib ref1
Lipschuetz, Gedaliah ben Solomon ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4
Lipschuetz, Israel ref1
Livy ref1
Lockshin, Martin ref1 (and n. ref2)
Loewe, Herbert ref1
Lopes of Aleppo, Isaac ref1
Lorbeerbaum, Yair ref1 (and n. ref2)
Luria, Isaac ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6
Luria, Solomon ref1 n. ref2, ref3–ref4, ref5
Luzzatto, Moses Hayim ref1 (and n. ref2)
Luzzatto, Samuel David ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4), ref5, ref6, ref7 n.
ref8, ref9

M
Maharsha, see Edels, Samuel
Maimonides:
accused of heresy ref1–ref2
as dogmatist ref1–ref2, ref3, ref4–ref5
Mishneh torah, attitude towards the Thirteen Principles in ref1–ref2, ref3
necessary beliefs in the Thirteen Principles ref1–ref2, ref3–ref4, ref5
his reincarnation as punishment for heresy ref1 (and n. ref2)
views negated when influenced by Greek philosophy ref1 (and n. ref2)
 see also Thirteen Principles
Maimonides, Abraham ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
mamzerim, purity in the Time to Come ref1 (and n. ref2)
Manekin, Charles ref1 n. ref2
Margaliyot, Reuven ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Marmorstein, Arthur ref1
maskilim, standing of the Thirteen Principles among ref1–ref2
Masoretic text:
claims to Mosaic authorship and its problems ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and
ref5, ref6 nn. ref7 and ref8, ref9–ref10 (and n. ref11)
development ref1–ref2
Mathews, Edward ref1 n. ref2
matter, formless, creation from ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6
meat:
changes in conditions permitting the eating of meat ref1
mixing with milk, abolition of the prohibition concerning ref1
see also pork; sciatic nerve
Medini, Hayim Hezekiah ref1 n. ref2
Meir, R. ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3)
Meir of Rothenburg ref1, ref2
Meir ben Simeon of Narbonne ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Meir Simhah of Dvinsk ref1 n. ref2
Me’iri, Menahem ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4–ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9, ref10
n. ref11
Men of the Great Assembly ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Mendelssohn, Moses ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Meshullam ben Solomon da Piera ref1
Messas, Joseph ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
messiah:
Solomonic descent ref1–ref2, ref3–ref4 n. ref5
messianic era:
and changes in the Torah ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5–ref6
coming ref1–ref2
metempsychosis, see gilgul
Meyuhas ben Elijah ref1
mezuzot, conditions surrounding their use considered heretical ref1
milk, mixing with meat, abolition of prohibition concerning ref1
minim ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
miracles, idea not included in the Thirteen Principles ref1
Mishnah, resurrection of the dead as dogma ref1 n. ref2
mitsvah/mitsvot:
abolition ref1–ref2
observance, and achievement of immortality ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and
ref5
Mizrahi, Elijah ref1 (and n. ref2)
Moelin, Jacob ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5)
Monsenego, Yedidyah ref1
Mopsik, Charles ref1
Morais, Sabato ref1
Morocco, use of Yigdal in ref1
Morpurgo, Samson ref1
Morteira, Saul ref1, ref2
Moscato, Judah ref1 n. ref2
Moses ref1
prophetic uniqueness ref1–ref2
Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne (Narboni) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5)
Moses of Salerno ref1
Motot, Samuel ref1 (and n. ref2)
Muelhausen, Yom Tov Lipmann ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Muhammad ref1
Islamic views about possibly countered by Maimonides ref1 n. ref2

N
Nahman of Bratslav ref1, ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4)
Nahmanides, Moses ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 n. ref7, ref8 (and n.
ref9), ref10, ref11 (and n. ref12), ref13 n. ref14, ref15
Naor, Bezalel ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4
Narboni, see Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne
Nathan ben Jehiel ref1
Nearim, Moses ben Judah ben Moses ref1
necessary beliefs ref1–ref2, ref3
Nehemiah, R. ref1 n. ref2
Netanel ben Isaiah ref1
netinim, purity in the Time to Come ref1 (and n. ref2)
Netter, Solomon ref1 (and n. ref2)
Neuhausen, Simon A. ref1 n. ref2
New Testament ref1
Newman, J. ref1
Nissim Gaon ref1
Nissim ben Moses ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4), ref5, ref6 n. ref7
Noah of Lekhovitz ref1
Noahide commandments ref1 n. ref2
Norzi, Yedidyah Solomon ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4 n. ref5, ref6
Nuriel, Abraham ref1
O
Obadiah the Proselyte ref1
Olitzky, Kerry M. ref1
Onkelos ref1, ref2 n. ref3, ref4
Oral Law, divine origin ref1
Orenstein, Jacob Meshulam ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4)
Origen ref1 n. ref2
Orschansky, L. ref1

P
Parnes, Yehudah ref1, ref2
Paulsen, David L. ref1 n. ref2
Peli, Pinchas H. ref1 n. ref2
Penkower, Jordan ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5), ref6 n. ref7, ref8
n. ref9
Pentateuch, see Torah Perahyah ben Meshulam ref1
Peretz of Corbeil ref1
Petuchowski, Jacob J. ref1 n. ref2
Pharisees, belief in resurrection of the dead ref1 n. ref2
Philo of Alexandria ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and nn. ref4, ref5), ref6, ref7, ref8 n.
ref9
Pilitz, Isaac ref1
Pines, Shlomo ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4
Plato ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4, ref5 n. ref6
views of creation ref1–ref2, ref3 nn. ref4 and ref5, ref6, ref7
Plotzki, Meir Dan ref1
pork, eating of in the Time to Come ref1 n. ref2
prayer leaders, disqualification because of rejection of Thirteen Principles
 ref1
Preil, Joseph Joshua ref1–ref2
priesthood, changes in the Time to Come ref1
prostration, use in worship ref1–ref2
providence:
Maimonides’ views regarded as heretical ref1
not included in Thirteen Principles ref1
Pulgar, Isaac ref1 n. ref2

R
Rabad, see Abraham ben David of Posquières
Rabenu Tam (R. Jacob ben Meir) ref1
Rabinowitz, Louis I. ref1
Raffel, Charles ref1 n. ref2
Rapaport, Reuven ref1 n. ref2
Rapoport, Chaim ref1
Rashba (R. Solomon ben Adret) ref1 n. ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4), ref5 n. ref6,
ref7, ref8 n. ref9
Rashbam (R. Samuel ben Meir) ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
Rashi ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4 n. ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 n. ref9, ref10 (and
n. ref11), ref12 nn. ref13 and ref14, ref15, ref16 n. ref17, ref18 n.
ref19, ref20 n. ref21, ref22 n. ref23, ref24 n. ref25
Ravitzky, Aviezer ref1
Rawidowicz, Simon ref1 n. ref2
Recanati, Menahem ref1
Regensberg, Hayim David ref1 n. ref2
Reischer, Jacob ref1, ref2
resurrection ref1, ref2–ref3
denial by Sadducees ref1 n. ref2
 not mentioned in the Torah ref1 n. ref2
Ricchi, Raphael Immanuel Hai ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4 n. ref5
Rosh (Asher ben Jehiel) ref1, ref2, ref3
Rosin, David ref1
Roth, Arele ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Roth, Leon ref1, ref2
Roth, Meshulam ref1 n. ref2
Rozin, Joseph ref1 n. ref2
Ruderman, David ref1–ref2

S
Sa’adiah Gaon, R. ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8, ref9, ref10
n. ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14 n. ref15
Saba, Abraham ref1 n. ref2
sacrificial system:
changes in the Time to Come ref1–ref2
Sadducees ref1 n. ref2
denial of resurrection of the dead ref1 n. ref2
teachings regarding practices surrounding days of impurity after childbirth
regarded as heretical ref1
Safrin, Netanel ref1 n. ref2
Safrin of Komarno, Isaac ref1, ref2
Samuel ref1
Samuel, R. ref1
Samuel ben Eli ref1 n. ref2
Samuel Hanagid ref1 n. ref2
Samuel ben Hofni ref1
Samuel ben Meir, R., see Rashbam
Samuel bar Nahmani, R. ref1
Samuel of Rushino ref1
Sapurto, Samuel ref1 (and n. ref2)
Schachter, Tsevi ref1 n. ref2
Schacter, Jacob J. ref1 n. ref2
Schechter, Solomon ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Schenfeld, Solomon Isaac ref1
Scherman, Nosson ref1
Schick, Moses ref1
Schiffman, Lawrence ref1 n. ref2
Scholem, Gershom ref1–ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Schor, Abraham Hayim ref1
Schueck, Solomon Tsevi ref1
Schwadron, Shalom ref1
Schwartz, Dov ref1 n. ref2
Schwartz, Joseph ref1
Schwarzschild, Steven ref1 n. ref2
Schweid, Eliezer ref1
sciatic nerve, sinew, eating of in the Time to Come ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Scribes:
alterations to the Torah ref1
introduction of textual variants into the biblical text ref1–ref2, ref3 n.
ref4, ref5 (and n. ref6)
Sefer hamaskil, God’s corporeality ref1–ref2
Sefer ḥasidim, God’s corporeality, doctrine’s use in education of children ref1
Sefirot:
doctrine’s denial seen as heresy ref1
prayers directed towards, according to kabbalistic beliefs ref1–ref2
regarded as contrary to the unity of God ref1–ref2, ref3
Seliger, Joseph ref1
seliḥot, invocation of angels as intermediaries between man and God ref1
(and n. ref2)
Septimus, Bernard ref1 n. ref2
Sforno, Obadiah ref1 n. ref2
Shabetai Tsevi ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3
Shalom aleikhem, invocation of angels as intermediaries between man and
God ref1 (and n. ref2)
Shapira, Hayim Eleazar ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 n. ref7, ref8
n. ref9, ref10 nn. ref11 and ref12
Shapira, Kalonymus Kalman ref1
Shapiro of Korets, Pinhas ref1
Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn Shem Tov ref1, ref2, ref3 (and n. ref4)
Sherira Gaon ref1, ref2
Shiur komah, God’s corporeality ref1 n. ref2
Shneur Zalman of Lyady ref1
Silver, Daniel Jeremy ref1 n. ref2
Simeon, R. ref1 n. ref2
Simeon ben Samuel of Regensburg ref1
Simeon bar Yohai, R. ref1, ref2
Simhah Bunem of Przysucha ref1
Simon, Uriel ref1 n. ref2
Sinzheim, Joseph David ref1 n. ref2
Sirat, Colette ref1
Sirkes, Joel ref1, ref2
Sofer, Moses ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 n. ref8, ref9, ref10,
ref11 n. ref12, ref13 (and n. ref14)
Sofer, Shabetai ref1 n. ref2
Sofer, Simeon ref1 n. ref2
Sofer, Ya’akov Hayim ref1, ref2, ref3 n. ref4
Solomon, and building of the Temple ref1
Solomon ben Abraham of Montpellier, R. ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Solomon ben Adret, R., see Rashba
Solomon ben Samuel, R. ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 (and n. ref5)
Solomon Simhah of Troyes ref1, ref2
Soloveitchik, Elijah ref1
Soloveitchik, Hayim ref1, ref2
Soloveitchik, Haym ref1, ref2, ref3
Soloveitchik, Isaac Ze’ev ref1
Soloveitchik, Joseph B. ref1 n. ref2, ref3
Sperber, David ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4
spheres, free will ref1, ref2
Sprecher, Shelomoh ref1 n. ref2
Steinsaltz, Adin ref1
Stern, David ref1 n. ref2
Stern, Gregg ref1 n. ref2
Strabo ref1
Strashun, Samuel ref1
Strauss, Leo ref1 n. ref2

T
Tacitus ref1
tagim ref1 n. ref2
taḥrif ref1, ref2
Taku, Moses ben Hasdai ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4 (and n. ref5), ref6 n.
ref7, ref8
Targumim, and God’s corporeality ref1 (and n. ref2)
Ta-Shma, Israel M. ref1, ref2, ref3
tavnit ref1 n. ref2
Tavyomi ref1 n. ref2
Tedeschi, Moses ref1
Teicher, J. L. ref1
Teikus, Gedaliah ben Abraham ref1
Ten Commandments, see Decalogue
Tertullian ref1 (and n. ref2)
textual variants in the Torah ref1–ref2
textus receptus, see Masoretic text
Theophilus of Alexandria, Bishop ref1 n. ref2
Thirteen Principles:
and the definition of Orthodoxy ref1–ref2
exclusions from ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
general ignorance about theological reactions to ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
influence ref1–ref2
Maimonides’ attitudes towards ref1–ref2, ref3, ref4–ref5
Maimonides’ contradictions ref1, ref2–ref3, ref4–ref5
positive affirmation essential to avoid heresy ref1
standing as basic to Judaism ref1, ref2, ref3–ref4, ref5
standing reinforced by gematriyah ref1
see also Maimonides
tikun soferim ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 nn. ref6, ref7, and ref8
Time to Come, and changes in the Torah ref1–ref2
Toledano, Moses ref1
Torah:
changes in ref1–ref2
 denial of any dogma or narrative in Torah regarded as heretical ref1–ref2
eternity ref1–ref2
Mosaic authorship and its problems ref1–ref2
Torah scrolls, textual variants and emendations ref1–ref2, ref3–ref4
Tortosa, Dispute of ref1 n. ref2
touch, sense of, seen as a disgrace ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3 n. ref4
Trachtenberg, Joshua ref1
Trani, Moses ben Joseph ref1, ref2 n. ref3
Trinity, regarded as contrary to the unity of God ref1
tsadik, prostration before ref1 n. ref2
Tsalah, Yahya ref1 n. ref2
Twersky, Isadore ref1 n. ref2
Tzartza, Samuel ref1

U
Unetaneh tokef ref1
Unique Cherub ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Unterman, Isser Yehudah ref1 n. ref2
Urbach, Ephraim E. ref1

V
vegetarianism, and the sacrifical system ref1 (and n. ref2)
Vilna Gaon (Elijah ben Solomon Zalman) ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n.
ref6
Vital, Hayim ref1 (and n. ref2), ref3 n. ref4
Viterbo, Abraham Hayim ref1 n. ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8

W
Warhaftig, Itamar ref1 n. ref2
wedding blessings, reference to God’s corporeality ref1 n. ref2
Weinberg, Jehiel Jacob ref1 n. ref2, ref3 n. ref4, ref5 n. ref6
Weinberg, Ya’akov ref1 (and n. ref2)
Western Wall ref1
Wetzlar, Isaac ref1
Wine, Sherwin ref1
Wolfson, Elliot R. ref1
Wolfson, Harry A. ref1, ref2 (and n. ref3), ref4
women, intercourse with during menstruation in the Time to Come ref1
world to come ref1–ref2, ref3 n. ref4
inclusion in the Thirteen Principles ref1 n. ref2
Worms, Aaron ref1
worship:
direction to God alone ref1
forbidden forms in the Talmud ref1
invocation of intermediaries between man and God ref1–ref2, ref3,
ref4–ref5, ref6

Y
Yadler, Isaac Tsevi Ze’ev ref1 n. ref2
Yavets, Joseph ref1
Yemenites, textual variants in the Masoretic text ref1 (and n. ref2)
Yigdal ref1
God’s knowledge of men’s actions ref1
indicative of the standing of the Thirteen Principles ref1 n. ref2, ref3–ref4
Yotser Bereshit ref1

Z
zaken mamre ref1
Zatcher, Jay ref1 nn. ref2 and ref3
Zinberg, David S. ref1 n. ref2
Zioni, Menahem ref1