Seven Lakes Negates

For decades the African Union has faced challenges of instability, but thankfully the
African Union has learned from its mistakes as African nations enjoy long-term
stability as Abubakar Usman of the University of Malaysia reports last year that
Abubakar Abubakar Usman 23, Research fellow with International Islamic University Malaysia Institute
of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIiBF) and affiliated with the Asia Middle East Centre for Research and
Dialogue (AMEC), 5-31-2023, "West African countries show how working together over decades builds
peace and stops wars breaking out", Conversation, https://theconversation.com/west-african-countries-
show-how-working-together-over-decades-builds-peace-and-stops-wars-breaking-out-205498, Accessed
12-15-2024, ARC (recut lcp)

Africa is often portrayed as a continent ravaged by war, terrorism, poverty and political instability. But over
the past five decades few violent conflicts have occurred between states. In Europe, for comparison,
there have been more than 25 inter-state conflicts since 1945. It’s true that Africa has seen 214 coups, the most of any
region; 106 have been successful. Out of 54 countries on the African continent, 45 have had at least one coup attempt since 1950. West Africa,
a region of 16 independent states, has experienced 53 successful and 40 failed coups since 1950. There are also cross-border security
challenges such as terrorism, banditry, piracy and the wide presence of arms. But, since independence in the late 1950s, the
region’s countries have not gone to war with one another – except for a minor armed confrontation between Burkina
Faso and Mali in 1985. In a recent paper we explored the possible reasons for this. As scholars studying the political dynamics of west Africa, we
arrived at our insights by analysing historical data, diplomatic interactions and scholarly research. We found evidence that the
principles
of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes defined the relationships between west African
countries. The 15 states under the umbrella of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) positively identify with the fate
of others in the bloc. The regional body was formed in 1975 by west African countries seeking to promote economic development. We
found a strong correlation between decades of regional cooperation and the rarity of conflicts between
states in west Africa. We conclude that systemic cooperation between states in the region has led to a collective
identity forming over time. A sense of community has developed. The community has developed
conflict management mechanisms. This has prevented members from going into war. This finding highlights the
importance of collaboration and diplomacy in maintaining peace and resolving conflicts. Making sense of the ECOWAS peace Regional dynamics
and historical factors shape conflict, as can be seen in the Horn of Africa. That region has witnessed conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and
between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example. In the west African region, we found that the security arrangements agreed under
ECOWAS have helped to foster peace between states. The ECOWAS agreement was updated in 1993. It includes principles
that were absent in the earlier pact. Among them are: solidarity and collective self-reliance non-aggression between member states promotion
and strengthening of good neighbourliness to maintain regional peace, stability and security peaceful settlement of disputes among member
states active cooperation between neighbouring countries promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.
This has led to west African countries choosing peaceful dispute resolution over sovereignty. For example,
a border dispute between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was settled in 2017 through an international tribunal.
This approach has prevented violent conflicts. A key factor is that member states have mechanisms for settling disputes peacefully. In both
Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s wars, which threatened to engulf other countries in the region, ECOWAS used these
settlement mechanisms. It deployed military troops to supervise ceasefires brokered by the then Ghanaian president, Jerry Rawlings.
Another factor is what in our study we call pan-West Africanism. We describe this as a regional version of pan-Africanism that
emphasises unity and collaboration among countries. In practice it has facilitated trade, cultural exchanges
and diplomatic collaborations. It has also created a sense of shared identity and solidarity among member countries. We argue that
the idea of pan-West Africanism has promoted regional solidarity and reduced the possibility of violence in
inter-state relations. It is not just a philosophy, but a practical approach to regional integration and cooperation. Conclusion Our paper
supports the argument that systemic cooperation among states can lead to a collective identity forming over time. This has happened with the
European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Their collective identities are based on
norms that reflect the history and political cultures of their member states. The importance of shared identity and peaceful
coexistence is often overlooked in explaining complex international relations. But it’s essential in understanding the relations of
west African states.

Moreover this progress has solidified the African Union on the global stage as Hannah
Ryder of the Center for Strategic and International Studies found in March
Hannah Ryder et al. 24, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program, 3-26-2024, "Is the African
Union Evolving in the Right Direction?", CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/african-union-evolving-
right-direction, Accessed 12-12-2024, ARC (recut lcp)

In his 1996 bestseller, The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington

foresaw the establishment of a multipolar world
order following the end of the Cold War. The Harvard professor predicted a division of political and economic influence
according to civilizational lines. As such, he advocated for a radical change to multilateral diplomacy and called,
three decades ago, for each of the nine principal civilizations, including Africa, to play a central role in
international affairs. As the current global geopolitical architecture transforms in front of our eyes, an increasing number of major
players are now competing for resources and influence, including through high-intensity conflicts. As a result, world geopolitics is heading
toward its most unstable point since the end of the 1980s. To reflect these changing global power dynamics and retain legitimacy, the United
Nations must modify its institutions to hand greater responsibility to emerging powers. The dramatic demographic, economic, and diplomatic
changes in Africa highlight the practical and moral necessity of providing the continent with a greater voice in multilateral diplomacy. The
African Union, which enjoys both domestic and international legitimacy, should, therefore, receive a permanent
seat at the United Nations Security Council. The vast majority of African countries still have a very dynamic
demographic growth. According to the African Bank of Development, in 2050, the continent will be home to 25 percent of the world’s
population. In parallel, large swaths of Africa are [is] experiencing rapid economic development. The
continent’s GDP could (assuming consistently high rates of growth) triple by 2050. As a result, regional and world
powers are increasingly courting African states and competing for influence. However, the most significant changes reshaping Africa’s reality
are in the diplomatic arena. In
the past five years, several events have proven the ability of African countries to
influence [in] world affairs according to their interests effectively. The first example is the grain crisis triggered by the
war between Russia and Ukraine. The continent, which heavily depends on wheat imports from the two
belligerents, dispatched Macky Sall, Senegal’s President and then head of the African Union, to
negotiate reopening grain imports with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Second, almost three months ago,
South Africa led a highly publicized legal suit against Israel at the International Court of Justice. While
Pretoria’s assertion of genocide was politically motivated, lacking factual basis, and ultimately rejected
by the court, the diplomatic initiative[s] showed the ability of an African country to exercise leadership
on a topic of global importance. Third, and maybe most importantly, the last decade has seen numerous African
countries slowly disengage themselves from the influence of former colonial powers , Cold War patrons, and
powerful petro-states. For the first time since independence, many of the continent’s nations are developing
genuinely independent foreign policies based on their national interests. As such, several Sahel countries
have severed ties with France, which had heavily dominated the region’s politics for decades, and
established entirely new alliances. Many African nations refuse to bow to Western pressure and
condemn Russia in United Nations resolutions as they see continued relations with Moscow as in line
with their strategic interests. Similarly, during the Yom Kippur War and the Second Intifada, numerous African countries were forced
by the Arab League to suspend their diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. However, not a single of the continent’s nations has done so following
the October 7 attacks and the Israeli offensive in Gaza. Finally,
Africa is slowly increasing its presence and influence in
multilateral organizations. In 2023, the African Union became part of the G20, cementing its status as
an increasingly influential player on the global scene. The same year, two additional African countries,
Ethiopia and Egypt, joined the BRICS organization, sitting on an equal footing with major players such
as China, India, and Brazil. Such developments seemed unthinkable only several years ago. They demonstrate the ability
of large parts of the continent to develop influential and independent policies in the international arena.
They also justify the African Union’s need to finally access the select group of powers that determine the
rules of global cooperation. Of course, numerous obstacles still stand on the road to the Security Council. Africa’s fifty-four states
have different cultures, interests, and sets of alliances, making consensus difficult to achieve. Smaller nations may also be sensitive to pressure
from global powers seeking to influence the Union’s position. Additionally, conflicts between African countries could further escalate tensions
within the regional organization. Constant diplomacy and significant compromise will thus be essential, particularly given the high levels of
instability persisting in parts of the continent. However, the arguments for AU representation appear more cogent today, and Africa
is
slowly gaining the international status it deserves. Its economies are growing, its diplomatic influence is
spreading, and the prospects of its demographic growth are immense. Its main multilateral organization,
the African Union, has also proven to be an effective source of legitimacy on the continent. As multipolarity
beckons, the time has come to grant the African Union a robust voice in the concert of nations.

Thus, in order to preserve the growth of those who need it most. We proudly negate
the Resolution Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the
Republic of Somaliland as an independent state. Preserving growth is not just a choice
but a responsibility for future generations. This occurs in two key ways.

First is Legitimacy
Voting for the Affirmative violates Article 4 of the African Union’s Constitutive Act
which would irreparable harm trust and destroy the fundamental principles of the
African Union as Hagos Gebereamlak explains in October that
Hagos Gebereamlak 10-2, Journalist at The Reporter Ethiopia from Addis Ababa University, 10-2-
2024, "Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders", Reporter
Magazine, https://thereportermagazines.com/3214/, Accessed 12-11-2024, ARC (recut lcp)

Once Ethiopia officially recognizes Somaliland, it could have significant geopolitical implications. Ethiopia’s recognition,
and
potentially that of other states, would likely trigger a series of diplomatic and strategic changes in the
region. This move could challenge long-standing principles governing African borders, and the
consequences would likely extend beyond the Horn of Africa. The Impact on Colonial Borders in Africa The borders in
Africa, including those in the Horn of Africa, were largely established during European colonialism. When European powers divided
the region, they split nations, tribes, and clans across several newly created states. This division created
diverse colonies with groups of people who were often placed under the administration of distant
capitals. The result has been a lack of national cohesion in many African countries, leading to
secessionist and irredentist tendencies across the continent. In the Horn of Africa, the boundaries of countries like
Ethiopia were drawn by colonial powers such as Italy, Britain, and France. This division separated ethnic groups and communities across
multiple countries, contributing to long-term instability. After
gaining independence, African states largely adopted a
policy of respecting the borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the preservation of borders
as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos,
and conflict across the continent. African countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that
the recognition of secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents.
Adhering to precedent solves conflicts as Allard Duursma a Professor at Cambridge
explains in 2020 that
Allard Duursma 20, Assistant Professor in Conflict Management and International Relations at ETH
Zurich. My research focuses on how mediation and peacekeeping can help to prevent and end armed
conflict. I also study the links between patronage politics and political order, 2020, "African Solutions to
African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa," Cambridge University Press,
https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000041, Accessed 12-13-2024, ARC

Much of mediation efforts’ success depends on the relationship between the third party and the
conflict parties. The social structure in which the third party and the conflict parties operate, in turn, greatly determines the nature of this
relationship. Within the African society of states, African leaders generally perceive that they are bound by norms
related to sovereignty, respect for the colonial borders, anti-neocolonialism, nonalignment, and
peaceful conflict resolution. The collective commitment to this cluster of norms provides African third
parties with a social status that, in turn, provides them with a high degree of legitimacy when mediating
armed conflict in Africa. I have argued that this high degree of legitimacy makes African third parties more
effective than non-African ones. My statistical analyses support the argument that African mediation outperforms non-African
mediation. Despite a higher degree of economic and military resources, non-African third parties are less
effective in mediating civil wars in Africa than African ones. Indeed, something other than third-party
capacity must explain the effectiveness of African third parties. The statistical analyses thus draw on what Hurd
describes as the logical necessity of legitimacy to show that African mediation efforts are likely to be regarded as more legitimate than non-
African mediation efforts.116 African third parties’ effectiveness is conditional on the government side’s commitment to the African solutions
norm. Thissuggests that rather than just a low degree of third-party capacity, African third parties are
effective because African governments perceive them as legitimate. Hence, I go beyond considering the effectiveness
of mediators that are considered weak mediators or lacking “muscle.”117 The effectiveness of African third parties is not a result of either the
presence or the absence of third-party capacity, it is about the presence of legitimacy. In this article I thus explain why third parties from Africa
that have comparable resources to “weak” non-African third parties like Norway or less resources than a nonAfrican third party like the US are
still more effective. For example, Beardsley notes about Kofi Annan’s mediation effort in Kenya’s post-2007 electoral crisis
that “Annan possessed no authority to promise aid or threaten sanctions against the intransigent parties,
nor did he have better access to information about the capabilities and resolve of the respective parties
than they had themselves.”118 For this reason, Beardsley identifies Kofi Annan’s mediation effort as a good
example of a third-party effort by a weak mediator. This is a valid observation, but what Kofi Anan did
have was a degree of third-party legitimacy. When the AU mediation team led by Anan arrived in
Nairobi to mediate, they told the conflict parties that they had discussed the conflict with Nelson Mandela and that he sent his best
wishes and sought to remind them that all of Africa was watching the process.119 Almost one month later the conflict parties
signed an agreement. This agreement would lay the basis for a grand coalition government that
successfully mitigated the conflict. One major question for future research is whether regional mediators in other regions can
also draw on their third-party legitimacy. This question requires further research, but a preliminary analysis included in the appendix suggests
that mediation efforts by regional third parties in the Middle East and Latin America— which are both regions where regional third parties with
a high degree of thirdparty capacity are largely absent—are significantly less effective than nonregional mediation efforts. This could mean that
the African solution norm bestows legitimacy onto African third parties that neither non-African third parties nor regional mediators in other
regions benefit from. The level of compliance with the African solutions norm in Africa contradicts the prevailing view in the literature that only
third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources are effective in mediating civil wars. Clearly, security dynamics in Africa can
be partly explained in realist terms, but international norms affect the 116. See Hurd 1999, 391. 117. Beardsley 2009; Svensson 2007b. 118.
Beardsley 2009, 273. 119. Roger Cohen, “How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya,” New York Review of Books, August 2008, 5. 32 International
Organization Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000041 https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 193.203.10.81, on
25 Apr 2020 at 13:02:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. behavior of African
actors to a great extent. African conflict parties’ understandings of the international environment in Africa constitute an international structure
that is highly influential in shaping the outcomes of mediation processes. From this perspective, it is striking that the role of third-party
legitimacy has largely been ignored in the literature on international mediation. In essence, solely focusing on third-party capacity entails
missing a relevant alternative source of mediation success, namely third-party legitimacy.

Second is Terrorism

Somalia has recently normalized relations with Ethiopia, which was previously on
track to be the first country to grant Somaliland independence as Bidhaan Dahir of the
BBC explains last week that
Bidhaan Dahir 12-11, Broadcasting Journalist at BBC World Service · Went to IJmond college · Studied
at University of the West of England, Bristol, 12-11-2024, "Ethiopia and Somalia reach deal in Turkey to
end Somaliland port feud", BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo, Accessed 12-16-
2024, ARC (recut lcp)

Ethiopia and Somalia have agreed to end their bitter dispute over Addis Ababa's plans to build a port in
the breakaway republic of Somaliland following talks in Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed the "historic
agreement", which he said would eventually ensure landlocked Ethiopia's access to the sea. At the press conference he held hands with
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who both agreed to
respect one another's "sovereignty". The two neighbours have been at loggerheads since January when
Ethiopia signed a maritime deal with Somaliland - which Somalia considers as part of its territory. It
prompted fears of a wider regional conflict as Egypt has been backing Somalia - largely due to its anger with Ethiopia for building a dam on
the River Nile. Turkey has in recent years become an important geopolitical player in the Horn of Africa as it has close economic ties with Addis
Ababa and security deals with Mogadishu. Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift be healed? Ethiopia warns against invasion amid
regional tensions Why Ethiopia is so alarmed by an Egypt-Somalia alliance Erdogan said the agreement - announced on Wednesday night in the
Turkish capital, Ankara - was "the first step towards a new beginning". "I congratulate both my brothers for reaching to this historic
reconciliation with devotion and thank them for their constructive attitude," he said. President Mohamud said his country was "ready to work
with the Ethiopian leadership and the Ethiopian people". While Prime Minister Abiy
insisted Ethiopia's efforts to secure and
reliable access to the sea did not threaten Somalia and the two had "addressed the misunderstandings that
have occurred over the past year". The feud began on New Year's Day, when Abiy signed a controversial deal with
Somaliland to lease a 20km (12-mile) section of its coastline for 50 years to set up a naval base. In
exchange, Ethiopia - the world's most-populous landlocked nation - was to reportedly recognise
Somaliland as an independent country, although Addis Ababa never explicitly confirmed this. Somaliland, which broke away
from Somalia more than 30 years ago, has long been pushing for recognition - but Mogadishu described the move as an act of "aggression".
According to the Ankara joint declaration, the two Horn of Africa neighbours are to reconvene in February to hold "technical talks". In the
interim they will strive to reach "mutually beneficial commercial arrangements" to ensure Ethiopia gains access to the sea "under Somalia's
sovereignty". It is not clear if Ethiopia has discarded the deal it signed with Somaliland - something demanded by Somalia at earlier mediation
efforts. Last month, Somaliland elected a new president - former opposition leader Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi - who promised to
"review" the maritime deal. During his inauguration speech on Thursday morning he made no mention of it. Somaliland is located in a strategic
part of the world, and is seen as a gateway to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Recognizing Somaliland would wreck Somali-Ethiopian relations, stunting

collaboration and empowering al-Shabaab—a regional terrorist group as Michael
Phillips of the Wall Street Journal explains last week that
Michael M. Phillips 10-13, Staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal, has done four tours in Iraq with
the Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, 10-13-2024, "A Port Deal Unsettles U.S. Counterterror Fight in the
Horn of Africa", WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/a-port-deal-unsettles-u-s-counterterror-fight-
in-the-horn-of-africa-dbf69b0c, Accessed 12-16-2024, ARC (recut lcp)

NAIROBI—A surprise deal that could allow Ethiopia to base warships in a breakaway region of Somalia is stoking tensions throughout a
corner of Africa already ablaze with militant violence. Under the agreement, Somaliland, a self-declared state within Somalia’s
recognized borders, would grant landlocked Ethiopia rights to naval and commercial port facilities on the Red Sea. In exchange, Ethiopia
would become the first country in the world to recognize Somaliland as an independent state . The
accord, announced at the beginning of the year, has set the region on edge, with bellicose rhetoric now heating up between
Somalia and Ethiopia, and international players from Cairo to Washington getting involved. Somali authorities are opposed to
Somaliland’s independence. In response to the port deal, they are threatening to expel Ethiopian
troops who have been helping them fight al-Shabaab, the local al Qaeda affiliate. “As a landlocked nation, Ethiopia has
no right or claim to Somali territory for the establishment of a naval military base,” Somali Foreign Minister
Ahmed Moalim Fiqi told the United Nations Security Council this month. Egypt—furious over a giant dam Ethiopia built on the Blue Nile—has
joined Somalia’s camp and last month delivered a shipload of artillery and antitank weapons to Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. The U.S., which
has 450 commandos and other defense personnel stationed in Somalia to advise local troops fighting al-Shabaab and Islamic State, worries the
contretemps is distracting Mogadishu from the 18-year counterinsurgency war. A
year ago, Somalia’s campaign against al-
Shabaab seemed to be a rare case where the U.S. and its allies had the upper hand in the global
competition with militant Islamists. But American officials and their Western allies worry Mogadishu is so preoccupied with its
quarrel with Ethiopia that it has allowed al-Shabaab to regain territory and momentum it had lost. “Somalia did appear to be on a rebound and
more positive trajectory,” said a senior Western official. “Since then the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement has just given a renewed opportunity
for al-Shabaab to create mischief, violence and destruction.” In August, militants launched a suicide attack on Mogadishu’s Lido Beach, killing 37
civilians and injuring more than 210, according to the U.N. Al-Shabaab
is using the prospect of Ethiopia taking control of
Somali territory to recruit nationalistic Somali youth, according to Somali and Western officials.

That comes at a time when counterterrorism efforts have been successful for the first
time in 17 years as Dr. Stig Hansen of West Point delineated last year that the
Dr. Stig J. Hansen 23, PhD in Political Science from the University of Wales Aberystwyth, professor at
the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, he’s a world expert
on Islamism in the Horn of Africa and the Shabaab Group, “Can Somalia’s New Offensive Defeat al-
Shabaab”, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab/ (recut lcp)

Abstract: There
are reasons to be optimistic that the current Somali offensive against al-Shabaab could
enduringly weaken the group. The operations have gained momentum and demonstrated that the Somali army has made large
improvements over the last decade. The use of local clan militias as well as U.S. and Turkish drone support have acted as force multipliers, and
the Somali government is finally making a concerted effort to go after al-Shabaab’s income generation. However, several factors should temper
this optimism. Al-Shabaab has been defeated on the battlefield in the past and has reemerged as a strong actor. What will be key is to erode al-
Shabaab’s ability to infiltrate government-controlled areas and to govern, tax, and implement ‘justice’ in these areas. In the past, this has been
crucial to al-Shabaab resilience and income. Accordingly, there needs to be more focus on a ‘clear and hold’ strategy rather than just ‘search
and destroy.’ In the long-run, there are several additional factors that will determine whether al-Shabaab can be definitively defeated. One
factor will be the degree to which counterinsurgency operations can be extended from central Somalia into al-Shabaab’s southern strongholds.
An additional factor will be the degree to which the Somali police can protect ordinary Somalis and businesses from being extorted by al-
Shabaab. Another factor will be finding a way to continue to mobilize clan militias against the terrorists without creating the sort of clan
rivalries and fragmentation and militarization of society that allowed al-Shabaab to emerge in the first place. The Harakat al-Shabaab
has defied all predictions of its doom and demise over the last 17 years. Today, al-Shaabab is the
numerically strongest affiliate in al-Qa`ida’s network, still controls large amounts of territory, and is
probably Africa’s strongest jihadi organization overall as well. The U.S. Department of Defense has
assessed the organization to be the “largest, wealthiest and most lethal al-Qaeda affiliate in the world,”
and some experts have mentioned al-Shabaab’s leader, Ahmed Diriye, as a potential replacement for al-Qa`ida’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan on July 31, 2022.1 The Somali terrorist group continues to carry out terrorist attacks throughout
Somalia, including a deadly bombing of the compound housing Mogadishu’s mayor’s office on January 22, 2023.2 Yet, the organization now
faces new challenges. A new offensive by the Somali government has been launched across central Somalia. Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, has even predicted an end to al-Shabaab’s insurgency by the end of 2023.3 Indeed, the offensive has seen many successes. So far,
al-Shabaab is on the retreat, losing village after village, and the offensive remains popular in Somalia,
with many Somalians having lost patience with the organization and especially its use of intimidation to
get the local population to pay what al-Shabaab refers to as taxes, but what in many ways function as protection
money. It is important to note that al-Shabaab has faced challenges before and proved surprisingly resilient. 4 The group was severely beaten
by the Ethiopian forces intervening in Somalia from December 2006 to the start of 2009; it nevertheless reemerged stronger than ever. Al-
Shabaab was largely driven out of Mogadishu in 2011, but still manages to both widely tax the city today and continue to launch heavy terror
attacks in the capital. The militant group lost large territories in the period of 2012-2017, but it managed to survive and increase its income-
generating activities. Still, there
are several new factors at play in the present offensive as compared with
previous offensives. Al-Shabaab is facing a more comprehensive and Somali-led offensive, stronger local ownership
over the operations, and a stronger focus on curtailing the organization’s income. 5 Al-Shabaab can nevertheless still take advantage of the
factors that ensured its resilience in the past: disunity among its enemies, its ability to infiltrate and even govern territories beyond its military
control, and to ‘tax’ much more efficiently in these areas than the government. 6 This article is an attempt to explore the factors that make this
offensive different from past offensives and the factors that both enhance and inhibit the government efforts in order to highlight what will
determine the future of al-Shabaab.

Voting for the Affirmative is the last thing that pushes Al-Shabaab to controlling the
entirety of east Africa as Phillips continues that
Michael M. Phillips 10-13, Staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal, has done four tours in Iraq with
the Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, 10-13-2024, "A Port Deal Unsettles U.S. Counterterror Fight in the
Horn of Africa", WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/a-port-deal-unsettles-u-s-counterterror-fight-
in-the-horn-of-africa-dbf69b0c, Accessed 12-16-2024, ARC (recut lcp)

A small force of Islamic State fighters in Somalia’s northeast is also gaining ground, according to a report last
month by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Western officials believe Yemen-based Houthi militants, who have been
launching missiles at shipping in the Red Sea in a purported show of support for Palestinians in Gaza, have made contact with al-
Shabaab. The officials fear it is a prelude to providing Somali militants with advanced weapons, such as
armed drones, that might enable al-Shabaab to mount deadlier attacks on U.S. and allied positions in
Somalia. Today’s tensions trace their roots to two-decades-old independence movements, one in Ethiopia and one in Somalia. In 1991,
Eritrea split off from Ethiopia after a three-decade war, taking Ethiopia’s only seacoast with it. Ethiopia has “been poking around the region for
some time for access to the sea,” said Michael Woldemariam, associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. Like
Eritrea, Somalia was colonized by Italy. Somaliland, in the country’s northwest, was a British protectorate and secured independence in 1960,
five days before Somalia formally broke free of Italian rule. Somalia and Somaliland united soon afterward, only to fall out when Somali dictator
Mohamed Siad Barre oversaw the slaughter of tens of thousands of Somalilanders in the late 1980s. Somaliland declared independence from
Somalia in 1991, but has failed to win international recognition. The
port deal with Ethiopia offers Somaliland its first
crack at being accepted on the world stage. Neither side has released the text of the memorandum of understanding. But it
appears likely that Somaliland is offering Ethiopia use of the port at Berbera. Somaliland authorities had previously offered use of the port and
adjacent runway to the U.S. military, in exchange for an upgrade of relations with Washington. While top American officials have visited the
site, the U.S. has been reluctant to provoke Mogadishu by accepting Somaliland’s offer. The
dispute over the Somaliland-
Ethiopia pact has delayed replacement of a 20,000-strong African Union military force that has been
fighting alongside the Somali military against al-Shabaab. The AU is supposed to replace the existing
force, which is scheduled to withdraw from Somalia by year’s end, with a new, 12,000-strong
international unit. The outgoing AU force includes thousands of Ethiopian troops deployed when
Ethiopia and Somalia were on better terms. Western officials say the Ethiopians are critical to fending
off al-Shabaab in certain areas of the country. Now Somalia says the Ethiopians are unwelcome in the new AU
force, leaving it unclear whether the AU will be able to muster enough troops to fill its ranks . “We cannot risk
the creation of dangerous security gaps, which could worsen the humanitarian situation,” U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood told the U.N. Security
Council last week. The U.N. says due to climate shocks and war, 6.9 million Somalis are in need of food, medical and other aid.