Origen:

Cosmology
and
Ontology of Time
 Supplements
to
Vigiliae Christianae
Formerly Philosophia Patrum
Texts and Studies of
Early Christian Life and Language

Editors
J. den Boeft, J. van Oort, W.L. Petersen,
D.T. Runia, C. Scholten, J.C.M. van Winden

VOLUME LXXVII
 Origen:
Cosmology
and
Ontology of Time

by

P. Tzamalikos

BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2006
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 In memory
of my Mother

Maria
 CONTENTS

Preface .......................................................................................... ix
Abbreviations .................................................................................. xi

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

PART I
COSMOLOGY

Chapter One GOD AND TIME ........................................ 21

Chapter Two THE PROVIDENTIAL CREATION ........ 39

Chapter Three THE FALL AND CREATION OF

THE WORLD .............................................. 65
The conception of the world ................................................ 99
The notions of not seen and invisible ...................................... 110
God is incorporeal ................................................................ 112
The world is material ............................................................ 113
The world as a ‘downfall’ (katabolÆ) ................................ 116

Chapter Four ‘BEGINNINGLESS WORLD’: A MYTH

RECONSIDERED.......................................... 119

Chapter Five God the Logos and World .......................... 165

The ‘place’ of the Logos ...................................................... 165
World and Time .................................................................... 172
Conclusion .............................................................................. 174

PART II
ONTOLOGY OF TIME

Chapter Six TIME PROPER ................................................ 179

The background .................................................................... 179
Time as extension (diãsthma) .................................................. 206
viii contents

The term co-extended-alongside-with (sumparekte¤nesyai) ........ 210

Time is a dimension .............................................................. 219
Time is a creature ................................................................ 233
Time is a continuum ............................................................ 243
Time and the notion of Infinite .......................................... 245
Relativity and Time .............................................................. 259
Origen’s influence on his successors .................................... 260
Conclusion .............................................................................. 268

Chapter Seven PROLONGATION OF TIME .................... 272

The cause of consummation ................................................ 281
The end of aeon and Judgement ........................................ 292
The outcome of Judgement .................................................. 296

Chapter Eight TIME AND CAUSALITY .......................... 310

Categorizing motion .............................................................. 310
Free moral action as motion .................................................. 313
Trial of motion in time ........................................................ 316
The notions of ‘fastness’ and ‘slowness’ .............................. 318
God and creaturely freedom ................................................ 321
The conception of causality .................................................. 324
Natural causality .................................................................... 325
Causality in rational action .................................................. 326
Existential causality ................................................................ 327
The notion of pre-existent causes ........................................ 328
Time as the extension of freedom ...................................... 332
Causality between time and timelessness ............................ 337
Timeless causality? ................................................................ 355
Conclusion .............................................................................. 359

CONCLUSION

Bibliography .................................................................................. 377

Index of Names and Terms ............................................................ 393
Index of Greek Terms and Expressions ............................................ 402
Index of Biblical Citations .............................................................. 414
 PREFACE

Having studied Origen for the last twenty-five years, I have come
to believe that he is the most tragic character of all Christian schol-
arship, if not of all Christian history. I mean the epithet ‘tragic’ in
its original sense, referring to a noble person engaging in a morally
momentous struggle ending in ruin, essentially as a consequence of
some extreme quality, which is both the source of his greatness and
the cause of his downfall. Perhaps celebrity and adulation came too
early in his life; perhaps it was his stormy character and his audac-
ity to furnish tentative theological conjectures, which were received
(not always in good faith) as definitive doctrines, although he him-
self proposed them as possible exegeses of thorny portions of the
veiled Scripture, not as mandatory dicta.
It seems to me that for an approach to Origen to be indisputable,
it is necessary to determine in the first place tenets such as his con-
cept of Time, which necessarily involves his Cosmology. Once car-
dinal notions such as this are firmly established, one can go ahead
with illustrating other aspects of his theology, being considerably
intact from the current endless and chaotic controversy over the
authenticity of what has been left behind.
This is why I present this monograph on his Cosmology and
Ontology of Time. Not only because this is the spine of his thought
(indeed of any philosophical or theological thought), but also because
it is hard to dispute tenets which are latent, and yet decisively per-
meate all of this theology. My intention is to go ahead with his
Philosophy of History and Eschatology (yes, I am aware of many
scholars still denying that such a thing even exists in Origen), whereas
disputed doctrines such as his Trinitarian theology will follow, draw-
ing heavily on this and the forthcoming monograph on history.
One of my aims in this book was to contribute to realization that
extensive revision of ingrained claims about Origen is called for,
although I am aware of how hard it is for certain assumptions to
be disconfirmed. Origen must be credited with having pioneered the
principal ideas of the Christian concept of Time, while his Cosmology
stood in harmony with this theory. He must also be given the credit
that, pace Paul, he made these ideas palatable, since they imbued his
x preface

homilies, commentaries, discourses. These ideas were in fact preva-

lent among those which determined his entire theology, and yet they
went unnoticed because they were never expounded in any ad hoc
treatise.
I cherish the hope that it will come out that his Cosmology and
Ontology of Time throw a flood of light on other subjects, so that
a more unclouded view of Origen will emerge before the reader.

P. T.
 ABBREVIATIONS

1. Origen’s works

Cels Contra Celsum

Dial Dialogus cum Heraclide
Eng De Engastrimytho
epAfr Epistula ad Africanum
epGr Epistula ad Gregorium Thaumaturgum
homGen Homiliae 1–16 in Genesim
commGen Fragmenta ex Commentariis in Genesim
selGen Selecta in Genesim
adnotGen Adnotationes in Genesim
homEx Homiliae in Exodum
commEx Fragmentum ex Commentariis in Exodum
selEx Selecta in Exodum
adnotEx Adnotationes in Exodum
homLev Homiliae in Leviticum
selLev Selecta in Leviticum
homNum Homiliae in Numeris
selNum Selecta in Numeris
selDeut Selecta in Deuteronomium
adnotDeut Adnotationes in Deuteronomium
homJos Homiliae in Josuam
selJos Selecta in Josuam
adnotJos Adnotationes in Josuam
selJud Selecta in Judices
adnotJud Adnotationes in Judices
frRuth Fragmentum in Ruth
frReg Fragmenta 1–22 in Reges
selJob Selecta in Job
enarrJob Enarrationes in Job
selPs Selecta in Psalmi
excPs Excerpta in Psalmi
frPs Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150
commProv Fragmenta ex commentariis in Proverbia
expProv Exposita in Proverbia
xii abbreviations

frProv Fragmenta in Proverbia

Cant Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum
minCan Fragmentum ex commentario minore in Canticum
Canticorum
homJer Homiliae 1–20 in Jeremiam
fr21Jer Fragmentum ex Homiliiae 21 in Jeremiam
fr39Jer Fragmentum ex Homiliae 39 in Jeremiam
fr1-71Jer Fragmenta 1–71 ex homiliis in Jeremiam
fr1-118Lam Fragmenta 1–118 in Lamentationes
frLam Fragmentum in Lamentationes
frEz Fragmenta in Ezechielem
selEz Selecta in Ezechielem
frOs Fragmentum ex Commentariis in Oseam
fr1,2Matt Fragmenta ex Commentariis in Matthaeum 1,2
commMatt Commentariorum in Matthaeum libri 10–17
frMatt Commentariorum series 1–145 in Matthaeum
homLuc Homiliae 1–39 in Lucam
frLuc Fragmenta 1–112 in Lucam
commJohn Commentarii in Joannim
frJohn Fragmenta 1–140 in Joannim
homAct Fragmentum ex homiliis in Acta Apostolorum
commRom Commentarii in Romanos
comm1Cor Fragmenta ex commentariis in 1 Cor.
commEph Fragmenta ex commentariis in Ephesios
frHeb Fragmenta in Hebraeos
exhMar Exhortatio ad Martyrium
deOr De Oratione
Princ De Principiis (P. Koetschau)
frRes Ex Libro Secundo Origenis de Resurrectione
Res Fragmenta de Resurrectione

2. Other works

ACO Schwartz, E. Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum

BGF Bibliotheca of the Greek Fathers (volume, page)
epAv Jerome, Epistula ad Avitum
FP G.W. Butterworth (tr.), Origen on First Principles
GCS Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten
drei Jahrhunderte
 abbreviations xiii

L. and S. Liddell, H.G. – Scott, R., A Greek-English Lexicon

libOr Justinianus Imperator, Liber adversus Origenem (or, Epistula
ad Mennam Constantinopolitanum)
PG J.P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca
Mansi J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio
SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, (volume, page, verse).
TU Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchrist-
lichen Literatur
 INTRODUCTION

There is a remarkable difference in how space, on the one hand, and

time, on the other, has been treated. At the dawn of Greek philos-
ophy (the onset of philosophy itself ) the Presocratic philosophers
regarded the spatial aspect of the fÊsiw as an unquestionable datum.
They sought to discover the permanent principles behind the fainÒmena,
but no one put the very existence of space proper in question. Thus
the Euclidean conception of space encountered virtually no contro-
versy throughout its historical life. In fact this conception of space
remained uncontested for more than two thousand years.
By contrast, the question of time has received a vast variety of
considerations and has been a matter of controversy since Antiquity,
in a debate which is still going on. Parmenides’ denial of succession
as real established the first radical doubt about the very existence of
time. This problem never ceased to tantalize philosophers ever since
until our day. This is quite understandable even through common
experience. Space constitutes a concrete sensory tangible reality. In
spite of the fact that the world is an obviously temporal reality, time
proper is an evasive conception. Meditation upon it demands intro-
spective experience and recollection; in short, it demands abstrac-
tions far more elusive than the notion of space does. Space is available
to the most immediate experience namely, sight, or so it was thought
to be. Time appears as a reality apprehended subsequently to space
and thus it is grasped as an abstruse conception. This led to reflection
on time through non-temporal features and mainly to the ‘spatial-
ization of time’, an illustration established and embedded in intel-
lectual tradition, which is nonetheless responsible for many of the
miscomprehensions of time proper and its nature. This tendency
began with the observation of the periodicity of motions of heavenly
bodies; it went on with the correlation of time to spatial motion;
eventually time in itself came to be virtually spatialized and thus
altogether eliminated. Quite aptly Bergson, more than a hundred
years ago, pointed out that if we try to conceive of time as a static
geometrical line, we are really thinking of space.1

1
H. Bergson, Essai sur les donées immédiates de la conscience (Paris, 1889), translated
into English by C. Bogson as Time and Free Will, London, 1910; pp. 90–1, 98–110.
2 introduction

The conceptualization of space proved to be far more steadfast

than that of time. As the concept of space went effectively unchal-
lenged right through the centuries, it provided a sufficient philo-
sophical base, which played a decisive role in the growth of natural
science. On the other hand, the non-commensurate development (or,
at least, a non-comprehensive acceptance) of a sound philosophical
ground for the ontology of time played its part in a disproportion-
ate development of understanding human nature and society. Great
thinkers, especially religious ones, offered their accounts on the nature
and meaning of time. The historical failure, however, lies either in
the fact that these thinkers were neglected, even by their immediate
addressees, or that they were not understood. Yet it is primarily the
conception of time which profoundly affects a certain philosophy of
history and, in the final analysis, all aspects and manifestations of
human being in its temporal course. Even the most elementary man-
ifestations of life involve the notion of time. The very notion of expe-
rience involves the distinction between past, present and future. Even
the sense of to be as an individual, as well as the personal view of
it, is based upon a certain understanding and evaluation of the his-
torical process.
It was not meant to be so, it was not even realized that the prob-
lem of time was directed to such a spatialized perception, yet the
fact is that this evolution lasted since Parmenides and Zeno until the
present time. Certainly this was not accidental. For no philosopher
devoted his entire reflection to the question of time exclusively: to
the extent that this actually happened, this was just a part of his
grasp of reality as a whole. Hence, how time was regarded became
an infallible indicator of cardinal orientations of a certain philoso-
phy. For such a view is not just a fortuitous by-product of a phy-
sical or metaphysical system or doctrine, proposed by a philosopher
or a school of thought. It is an essential component, an expressive
and meaningful factor manifesting the gist of a perception of reality
as a whole, and forming the attitude towards this reality.
This is the reason why it is reasonable to expect that a certain
conception of time can provide significant conclusions about the over-
all philosophical attitude respective to this. As the concept of time
is pivotal into a general existential attitude, such a study may further
enlighten other facets of a philosophy. Crucial conceptions, such as
cosmology, anthropology, eschatology, the attitude to death, moral
ideas—all are directly involved and interwoven with how time is per-
 introduction 3

ceived and what its meaning is felt (if not always consciously known)
to be. For indeed time constitutes an essential element of an entire
philosophy and thoroughly imbues all the vital premises of an exis-
tential attitude.
How thinkers conceive of time then, as well as the manner in
which they portray their perception of it, is consonant with their
overall view of reality. The ontology of time stands in harmony with
their fundamental philosophical premises, their understanding of being
as a whole, as well as with their methods and dialectics of investi-
gation of philosophical problems.
In view of this, the attitude of thinkers towards the notion of time
is highly indicative of their general philosophical orientation. For it
is not only their general philosophical tendency that determines the
conception of time; but also, a certain view of time plays a critical
role in the formation of a general philosophical and existential atti-
tude. How to live, what, if any, is the purpose of individual exis-
tence, how death is faced, what might constitute the content of a
possible hope: all those questions are bound by time. Furthermore,
how, if at all, God is conceived; the perception of the world, its des-
tination and purpose, if any; whether the world was created, or not,
as well as all the temporal implications that the notion of creation
entails—all these are bound by the very conception of time, too.
This close connection of one’s general view of reality to his conception
of time decisively forms his ideas of the future, namely, expectations,
anticipation and the overall visualization of things in the time to
come. For it is mainly the concern for the future that affects an exis-
tential attitude. No one, for example, feels fear at thinking that he
did not exist before he was born; on the contrary; this thought rather
brings about a feeling of inexplicable safety. But the awe at the idea
of future non-existence is not unusual. As a matter of fact, such a
horror is only one facet of the fear of death, which shows that death
is very much bound up with considerations about time.
Beyond these general considerations, there are special reasons,
which render the study of Origen’s ontology of time necessary. The
Alexandrian’s thought has been a point of intense, and frequently
tempestuous, controversy2 since the fourth century until our day. It

2
In the period around the years 300–500 A.D. occurred what is known as
‘Origenistic controversies’. The main ancient sources providing an account of this
4 introduction

should be expected then that a definition and elucidation of his con-

ception of time might provide clarifications, as well as elimination
of miscomprehension, of other crucial facets of his highly contro-
versial theology,3 especially with respect to his cosmology.
The criticism levelled against Origen varies. At best he is regarded
as the thinker who brought Greek thought and the emerging reli-
gion of Christianity too close to each other.4 A midway stance is
the assertion that he was restricted by the church tradition and the
Bible—but only to the extent that they did not contradict his own
ideas.5 A more extreme opinion is that he was but a Platonist, who
did nothing more than composing an amalgam, a sui generis hybrid
of Platonic and Plotinian thought in biblical terms.6 At any rate, it
is a commonplace to charge him with the responsibility for the

dispute are the following: Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, VI.3–18; Sozomen, Ecclesiastical
History. V.27ff. Epiphanius, Panarion seu adversus lxxx haereses, 6.63–4; PG 41.173ff.
Rufinus, De Adulteratione librorum Origenis, PG 17.616–32. A modern account of these
controversies is given by G.W. Butterworth in the introduction of FP, pp. ix–xxiv;
s also, by Philip Schaff in his History of the Christian Church, Vol. III, pp. 698–705.
Also s. M. Villain ‘Rufin d’Aquilea, la querelle autour d’ Origène’, Recherches de
Science Religieuse, 27 (1937), pp. 5–37, 165–95. In the Fourth Century Origen’s chief
adversaries were Methodius and Peter of Alexandria. Later, Origen’s views were
attacked by Epiphanius of Salamis and Theophilus of Alexandria. According to
Socrates (Ecclesiastical History, VI.13), Methodius, Eustathius and Apollinaris also
wrote treatises against Origen. Chief defenders of Origen were Rufinus, Eusebius
of Caesarea, Didymus of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa and
Hilary of Poitiers. Pamphilus (and Eusebius) wrote an Apologia pro Origene, of which
only the first book is extant in a Latin translation by Rufinus (PG 17.521ff ). Also
s. Gregory Thaumaturgus, in Origenem oratio panegyrica, PG 10.1052. Also s. Socrates,
Ecclesiastical History, III.7; Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, VI.33.
3
For discussion on the condemnation of Origen’s views, s. P. Schaff, op. cit., pp.
770–1; Butterworth, op. cit., pp. xxvi–xxvii; C.C. Richardson, ‘The condemnation
of Origen’, Church History, 6 (1937), pp. 50–64. Gustave Bardy asserts that the fifteen
anathemas secured by Justinian in the Fifth Century are directed not so much
against Origen himself but against the ‘Origenists’ who were contemporaries of
Justinian; Cf. Recherches sur l’histoire du texte et des version latines du Princ d’Origène, Paris,
1923; pp. 205–6. The text of the fifteen anathemas is preserved in J.D. Mansi,
Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Vol. IX, pp. 396–400.
4
Cf. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, London, 1983, pp. 151, 316,
etc. My occasional disagreement with R. Sorabji should not obscure my great respect
for his excellent exposition as a whole, as well as my respect for his heavy under-
taking brilliantly carried out in that book.
5
Cf. R. Hanson, Allegory and Event, London, 1959, pp. 369ff.
6
Cf. C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Oxford, 1913, throughout. These
references are only mere examples of attitudes towards the thought of Origen. The
relevant assertions, both in these works, as well as in a large number of others, will
be discussed in detail in due course.
 introduction 5

‘Hellenization’ of Christianity. In this context he is considered as a

kind of Christian ‘Gnostic’, in as much as Gnosticism is regarded as
an ‘extreme Hellenization’ of Christianity. To deal with this question
in general is beyond my scope, since my aim here is to ponder upon
Origen’s conception of creation and time. This criticism, however,
in its various degrees of moderation or extremity, will be considered
in as much as it is related to aspects of his thought pertaining to
my topic.
The birthplace of Origen, Alexandria, was where a number of
different streams of thought converged. Greek-Hellenistic schools,
Hebrews, Christians and exponents of various oriental cults encoun-
tered each other, all this at a time when the Roman Empire was
in a powerful period of its history. Controversies, disputes, syncretism,
eclecticism, allowed the flourishing of schools of thought such as the
Judaeo-Hellenistic thought and Gnosticism in a Christian garment.
Origen found himself in the midst of this variety of religious, philo-
sophical and existential attitudes. It is therefore significant to con-
sider this famous ‘Greek’ background which allegedly influenced him
profoundly to a degree regarded as an unforgivable deviation from
the Christian orthodoxy. A survey then of the various conceptions
of time preceding Origen should by all means be carried out. Following
this, one might be able to judge whether he formed his conception
of time under the influence of, or in contrast to, his background or
contemporary environment. Such a survey becomes all the more nec-
essary since his writings show that he was well aware of the various
streams of thought converging in Alexandria. Despite the controversy
surrounding his thought, his erudition has never been questioned.
On the contrary, this has often been regarded as his crime, since it
is sustained that his philosophical background was the cause for him
to ‘Hellenize’ Christianity.
Most certainly Origen was an erudite man. We know though that
his purpose was not to show off his erudition, but to edify his read-
ers or his audience. Certainly he was a copious writer, ranking among
the most prolific writers of the Church ever to appear. The question,
however, is this: was it a matter of knowledge? This is the critical
question, which brings to the core of his presuppositions of concep-
tion of time. In order to answer this question it will be of utmost
significance to consider not only the evolution of a particular philo-
sophical notion (be it time, creation, or whatever), but also to take into
account the profound changes which were taking place at the time.
6 introduction

The epoch in which Origen was born (185 A.D.) is a period in

which radical transformation was under way. It was not a question
of employing this or that philosophical opinion. It was something
more thorough, more urgent, and more dramatic: a profound, and
nonetheless painful, change of existential attitude is the main character-
istic of the era. The more people were coming in contact with the
various philosophical systems, the more they realized that philoso-
phy was unable to fulfil its own self-imposed task: that is, to offer
people the deeper knowledge of truth, through which they would
reach virtue and bliss. Scientific knowledge (already largely under-
mined by Scepticism) no longer believed that it possessed the truth.
In the Stoic assemblies there was an idea which was constantly gain-
ing ground: they realized and admitted that it was impossible for
any human being to materialize their ideal of the wise man, which
the Stoic philosophy had clearly and persistently portrayed. From all
the quarters, in all streams of thought, it had become evident that
a human being cannot know the reality of things through his own
endowment. Subsequently, no man could attain to virtue and hap-
piness if he relied exclusively on his own ability. People were living
under the Roman Empire in which social inequalities were an every-
day experience; they were seeing all the goods of earth around them
and yet not belonging to them. Having to cope with the exigencies
of daily life, they were faced with the inclemency of both political
reality and philosophy. They felt ensnared in a world where neither
the institutional framework of the Roman Empire (animated by real
people in everyday life), nor science, nor philosophy could provide
the solace so earnestly longed for. There was therefore an increas-
ing change of interest from this world towards a better one. After
the elapse of many centuries, people found themselves again filled
with a passionate desire for the supernatural, a hunger for religion,
a profound need for salvation rather than mere knowledge and its
confirmed quandary.7
Civilization, which had already given its fruits of Art and Science
and had exhausted itself, was turning to Religion again. The quest
for discovering the reality of things in a supernatural non-sensible
world was already posited by Plato and the Aristotelian monotheism.

7
Cf. W. Windelband – H. Heimsoeth, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1,
p. 246ff.
 introduction 7

Besides, the Stoic ethics had already established its own tradition.
All those were elements of a past still echoing, at a period when
people were orienting themselves towards redemption beyond the sen-
sible world: a redemption regarded as attainable not through the
process of intellectual activity, but by means of revelation offered to
people in one way or another.
So the requirements of science and life converged. Science sought
to find in religion the solution to the problems, which had been tan-
talizing it for so long a time. Life, on the other hand, was seeking to
base the hunger for religious faith on a scientific foundation or form.
Alexandria was the center of this radical historical procedure and
transformation of the entire civilization. In the Library (Museum) of
this cosmopolitan commercial city all fruits of the Greek erudition
were treasured. People of every tribe and origin were gathered there
in order to find answers no longer to scientific questions, but to the
feelings and existential requirements which were overwhelmingly
pressing them. There were of course differences among cultures,
stemming from diverse options for certain values. Still the quest for
salvation seemed to prevail as the common pursuit of these different
people.
Such was the environment in which early Christianity was devel-
oping. It has been suggested that Christianity built the system of its
own doctrines by coming to terms with the old philosophy.8 Origen
found himself in a period in which the history of philosophy was
increasingly interwoven with the history of dogma. The Apologists
(even St Paul himself ) had already established some relation between
Christianity and philosophy; this phenomenon was to proceed for
a very long time. Still the question was not one of two different
intellectual worlds coming to terms with each other. Rather, it was
a pressing question of how everyday life was to be conceived of.
The rearrangement of values which was introduced with Christianity
would be felt even by people who had hardly been initiated in the
new dogma. In the Homilies on Luke, for instance, we find Origen
addressing his audience of catechumens and exalting ‘humility’ as a
virtue. The social values of the time, however, did not regard humil-
ity as a virtue; indeed the Greeks never considered humility to be
a virtue at all; the word for it used in Luke 1,48, always had a

8
W. Windelband – H. Heimsoeth, op. cit. p. 247.
8 introduction

negative connotation in secular Greek: in terms of morality it meant

‘baseness’ or ‘vileness’, socially the word indicated ‘lowness of posi-
tion’. And yet Origen strove to present humility as a virtue to an
audience of catechumens who were not used to thinking of it as
such.9
The task facing Origen, therefore, was not to compose a theory
of time and add one more account to the long series of scientific or
philosophical tradition which reached him. It was the urgent need
of the period to form a view of time, which should be in tune with
the Christian perception of the world and would serve to the expo-
sition of the new religion. For indeed there were serious reasons ren-
dering this demand urgent.
My scope in this book is to explore Origen’s conception of time
in itself, which of necessity involves study of his doctrine of creation.
I shall argue that the concept of time is present in Origen’s entire
theology as a fundamental element, which was formed in full accor-
dance with his general perception of the world from a Christian
point of view. This concept reflects the entirety of his theological
views and thoroughly imbues them. Thus, although it was not my
purpose to expound the whole of Origen’s theology, I regarded the
study of several aspects of it as an indispensable presupposition for
understanding and expounding of this crucial facet of his thought.
For, as I pointed out, how a thinker conceives of time is an expres-
sive manifestation of his entire thought. This conception stands in
close relation to one’s entire perception of reality, in natural, philo-
sophical and theological terms. The notions comprising a certain
view of time make the quintessence of a philosophy actually buttress
up its cardinal tenets. This concept, therefore, cannot be determined
unless every aspect of this thought is perused. For the notion of time
both determines and is determined by all the facets of a certain philos-
ophy or theology or existential attitude in general.
The scientific benefit of the study of Origen’s conception of time
lies in the fact that this may elucidate other crucial aspects or par-
ticular points of his theology. I shall argue that his view of time is
the decisive means through which long-standing miscomprehension
of his thought can be eliminated.

9
Homilies on Luke, 8.5; Origen, Homilies on Luke, tr. Joseph Lienhard, Washington,
1996, p. 35.
 introduction 9

In studying this, I have followed certain principles drawn from

the experience of how his work has been studied or treated hith-
erto. As a matter of fact, the state of the art in Origen-studies is
peculiar, since there is no universal consensus on the grounds of
epistemology. There is no unanimity in what should be accepted as
a reliable source: either his Greek writings or the Latin translations
are upheld as trustworthy by some scholars, while either Greek or
Latin remnants are disputed to all possible degrees by others. What
is uncommon in scholarhip is to find particular facets of Origen’s
theology considered as having developed in due course, as evolving with
age and experience, which is in fact the most common thing to hap-
pen in any intellectual activity, all the more so in the thought of a
pioneer, at a time when Christian doctrine was in the making.
A large part of Origen’s writings is preserved in the Greek orig-
inal text; another is extant only in Latin versions; there are also sec-
tions preserved both in the Greek original and in Latin translation.
Latin versions should be read with caution, but caution within rea-
son. Rufinus himself has no hesitation to explicate that he has taken
some liberties in rendering Origen’s thought, but the degree of his
initiative varies from work to work. I regard his prologues a reliable
source for determining the degree of confidence which should be
given to each Latin translation of his. Certainly, a comparison between
Greek original texts and their respective one in Latin show that the
difference is not always just linguistic: it is considerable, yet not in
the sense of fidelity, but because of abridgements which had to take
place for mostly practical reasons.
In the 1980’s, finding myself in the midst of the controversy about
the reliability of sources about Origen, I had resolved to rely on his
Greek extant works, rather than the defamed Latin translations. An
early version of this topic was produced on that account. I realized
though that by following this principle in methodology, I relinquish
valuable evidence, which after all is supportive of significant corol-
laries. Besides, the whole question should be considered not simply
in the context of philological analysis (which anyway is a difficult
task to carry out; it provides unreliable conclusions, since Greek and
Latin parallels are too few to be able to support firm resolutions),
but on more general considerations, some of which I shall only
sketch: a more attentive study of Rufinus’s prefaces and perotations;
assessment of the historical setting of Justinian’s era and, specifically,
his mentality as an emperor and his theological aspirations; reflection
10 introduction

on Jerome ad hominem, on his overall disposition vis-à-vis Origen

and his attitude towards the controversy over him; attention to be
paid to testomonies such as that of Pamphilus (which is contested),
of Photius, of Procopius of Gaza, of John of Damascus; also of
testimony scarcely taken as seriously as it should in scholarship, such
as that of Socrates the historian.
I am now satisfied that Latin translations should be studied atten-
tively, bearing in mind, however, that there is no such thing such
as the blanket notion ‘Latin translations’: Each Latin rendering apiece
is a different case and should be studied and relied upon on its own
merits. In any event, they make up too important a stock to be left
out of consideration.
I still believe, however, that Princ is a exceptional case of its own
and should be studied and used on grounds quite different from all
other extant works. It is not just a question of Rufinus striving to
avoid misunderstandings, or to comply with what was regarded as
‘orthodoxy’ at his time; neither is it his being rather loquacious, in
his endeavour to produce an interpretation or commentary rather
than a mere translation in a language less polished and less techni-
cal and indeed less sophisticated. The most critical point is that
Rufinus himself had not comprehended principal facets of this thought,
such as Origen’s conception of time, let alone his eschatology. Thus
he a priori regarded the task of translation as too intricate, while the
requisite was simply a plain verbatim rendering of the Greek text
in Latin. Thus he did not abstain from interpolating what he saw
as his own emendations of the Greek text.
It is regrettable that, although this is declared as a free render-
ing, claims about Origen’s thought were made based mainly on this
text. The Latin rendering of Princ is indeed an outstanding monu-
ment of such an unfortunate approach.
In this text there are points crucially involving the conception of
time; yet they appear to be treated with utter unawareness of their
momentous significance. Some examples frequently appearing in this
respect are the notion of God’s being in relation to time; the rela-
tion of the persons of Trinity between themselves; and God’s rela-
tion to the world. Terms such as ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘earlier’, ‘later’,
‘younger’, ‘older’, applied to these subjects, seem to be used with no
attentiveness to their significance. For example, there are portions
such as this: “. . . to prevent anyone from thinking that the title of
Almighty belonged to God before the birth of wisdom, through which
 introduction 11

he is called Father; . . .” or: “. . . the title of Almighty cannot be older

in God than that of Father, for it is through the Son that the Father
is Almighty . . .”.10
It is obvious that the terms ‘before’ and ‘older’ imply a kind of
temporal sequence or temporal priority. Further, there are expres-
sions such as ‘the world . . . began to exist at a definite time;’11 God
did not exist ‘even for a single moment’ without begetting his wisdom.12
There is also reference to ‘certain ages or periods of time . . . during
which the world’ might not exist, in order to reject the idea that
there were ‘ages or periods’ when God was not almighty and a ‘time
when he began to have creatures’.13 Also, ‘wisdom is everlasting’,14
whereas the author wonders whether ‘there will ever be a time when
there will be no world anywhere, or if there ever was a time when
there was no world at all’.15
Expressions of this kind seem to imply that time itself is some-
thing taken for granted; as a matter of fact they suggest that time
is not taken into account at all. This simplistic manner in which the
question of time seems to be treated in the Latin rendering of Princ
indicates that time is applied to God thoughtlessly, without any seri-
ous consideration of the whole question.
The same happens with the notion of eternity. It is stated that
“the term everlasting or eternal properly denotes this which had no
beginning of existence and can never cease to be what it is . . . His
wisdom therefore is an everlasting brightness enduring eternally . . .”.16
Although there is the additional clause ‘yet not in time’, the phrase
suggests that the Son’s co-eternity to the Father is understood by
placing the Son’s birth back to the infinite temporal past.
Points such as these seem to indicate that temporal notions are
treated with unawareness of their crucial implications, even when
they are attributed to the divine being. It is not difficult to find quite
a number of similar passages in Princ where temporal notions are
used in an awkward manner. The frequency of such terms is striking,

10
Princ, I.2.9.
11
Princ, I.Pref. 7; III.5.1.
12
Princ, I.2.2.
13
Princ, I.2.10.
14
Princ, I.2.11
15
Princ, II.3.1.
16
Princ, I.2.11.
12 introduction

particularly for someone who approaches this work with the inten-
tion to study the concept of time.
It would be not unexpected then if someone concluded that Origen
considers time as an unquestionable datum attributed also to God’s
life. However, I intend to argue that such a claim can be justified
and grounded, to a certain extent, only in the event of the study
being concentrated in the Latin rendering of Princ. Expressions such
as ‘yet not in time’ are actually Origen’s; yet they are almost lost
and neglected into the flood of Rufinus’s arbitrary and unthought-
ful use of unfit temporal notions and terminology.
This notwithstanding Rufinus could not help not translating one
or two passages where God’s transcendence in respect of time is
clearly enunciated.17 It is true that in view of the length and the
importance of a work such as Princ, the point where God’s tran-
scendence to time is explicated would be rather untrustworthy, some-
thing like one more interpolation by Rufinus. On the face of it, such
a suspicion would be not unjustified once the study is confined mainly
into Princ. For these statements are too scarce in a voluminous work
of four books, compared to the extensive inattentive use of tempo-
ral notions, where time appears to be unquestionably ascribed even
to the divine life. If there is a mistake, this is not the incredibility,
which could be attributed to the one or two passages of Princ, which
prove that it is not quite the case. The mistake lies simply in the
fact that the study of this question focuses in this work, as my dis-
cussion in this book shall show. For this text contains contradictions,
which have led to averments such as that “everything contained in
his Princ has also its antithesis in the same work”.18 Some of these
contradictions will be pointed out in as much as they are related to
my topic. As a matter of fact, it will be mainly points such as these,
contrasted with Origen’s consistency throughout his writings in Greek,
which will reveal the damaging entries of Rufinus and the untrust-
worthiness of his Latin translation of Princ.
The best way to ground my assertions therefore is to corroborate
them through writings preserved in the Greek original text confirming
them by appeal to Latin texts. Thus I do not compare simply texts,

17
Cf. Princ, II.2.1.; IV.4.1.
18
H. Crouzel, ‘L’Hadès et la Géhenne selon Origène’, Gregorianum Commentarii de
Re Theologica et Philosophica, 79 (1978); p. 331.
 introduction 13

which is not all too easy, since there are not so many parallels in
both Greek and Latin; rather, I compare ideas found here and there.
Although authentic views of Origen can be found in the original
Greek text, the same may well happen in the Latin version. Hence
the Latin version should be taken into account, with reasonable (but
not exaggerated) caution. An opinion in Latin should be regarded
as absolutely authentic not only once this can be corroborated by a
Greek text, but also when this fits neatly with Origen’s overall ideas.
This procedure has proved particularly useful in interpreting points
of Latin versions, since in some of them (par excellence in Princ) the
perspicuity of the Greek text has been deleteriously obscured.
Subsequently, it is evident that this kind of research presupposes
the study of the entirety of Origen’s writings. The reason is that
since he did not compose an ad hoc treatise on time, but formed a
conception of it which underlies and imbues his entire theology, it
would be unacceptable to overlook any part of his work. Besides,
this is a way of expressing in practice my objection to the practice
of making claims on the basis of two or three treatises—not to men-
tion scholars of old times who studied Princ almost exclusively.
It is my view (which will be discussed and proven again and again
presently) that what we have is a compilation which should be taken
as an ancillary source interpreted in the light of all Origenistic corpus
(Greek and Latin) rather than being put into use in order to inter-
pret Origen, or provide sound conclusions about his theology. Princ
should not be regarded as a cornerstone for determining Origen’s
ideas. Since the evidence to be collected from Princ is meagre and
tantalizingly inconclusive, we should not concern ourselves overmuch
with criticism based on this untrustworthy rendering, with its gaps
filled with biased statements hostile to the Alexandrian. Such an
interpretation is a task which still waits to be fulfilled.
I have taken into account a number of editions of this Princ:
P. Koetschau’s edition, the English translation of it, as well the French
edition by H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti. Koetschau quite arbitrar-
ily interpolated texts of authors subsequent to Origen—most of them
hostile to him. This editor has shown an excessive facility in employ-
ing any kind of irresponsible (and probably malicious) criticism against
Origen, incorporating it into the text of Princ, presenting it as ‘views
of Origen’, which are allegedly ‘filling gaps’ of the Latin translation
of Rufinus. This edition (as well as claims of the English translator
G.W. Butterworth, who not only promptly consents to Koetschau’s
14 introduction

tactics, but also makes his own contribution to similar allegations)

is open to severe criticism, which I did not fail to entertain. This
has been done, to a certain extent, with points of the French edi-
tion, which contains some points which should not be left without
comment. But I touched upon this problem only in as much as this
is related to my topic. I leave for the future a more detailed account
of my comments on this edition. At any rate, an edition of Princ elu-
cidated and commented in the light of the entirety of Origen’s authen-
tic views would be welcome in the English-speaking world. As regards
Princ in general, I have used it only as an ancillary source, as a text
highly precarious, full of contradictions (due to Rufinus’s interpola-
tions) and, at any rate, as a source of confusion rather than eluci-
dation of any aspect of Origen’s thought, unless this is compared
with relevant Greek, and nonetheless Latin, portions. It will in any
case be unwise to put too great a stress on the words which Rufinus
uses on time and temporal notions.
As regards other writings of Origen, I am apt to accept the authen-
ticity of the Scholia in Apocalypsis. Although it has been argued that
there is no testimony that he ever wrote any comment in the
Apocalypsis,19 certain philological and linguistic considerations seem
to me to suggest the opposite. I postpone elaboration on this point
until a next work of mine, since in this treatise this point plays no
decisive role. As far as my topic is concerned, of what is stated in
that work there is nothing to appeal to, or to dispute. However, the
fact that in all his writings, (from the early commJohn written in
Alexandria in 218 to Cels written in Cesarea in 248)20 there is no
reference to that work is no real evidence of non-authenticity, in
view of the vast bulk of lost Greek writings.
There are particular reasons, which render the study of Origen’s
own words useful. He had a very good command of Greek and was
very scrupulous in the use of every word. As regards language, he
subjected scriptural passages to meticulous scrutiny, very often appeal-
ing to the etymology of a word and offering lucid analytical exege-
ses. In using a word, he was always aware of its grammatical,

19
Cf. BGF, 9, p. 20, n. 2.
20
For dating of Origen’s works s. Marguerite Harl, Origène et la fonction revalatrice
du Verbe Incarné, Paris, 1958, pp. 70–1; also in Adolf von Harnack, Die Chronologie
der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 27–54.
 introduction 15

philosophical and theological implications. In his Commentaries on

the Epistles of Paul, he often goes as far as to do what he calls
épokatast∞sai tØn frãsin (to restore the phrase). That is, to ren-
der the text in correct Greek, although he certainly finds the Epistles
consonant in all their parts and providing an unerring grasp of the
purport of revelation. That Origen is scrupulous in treating language
is not just an assumption drawn from the study of his texts. It is he
himself who argues for the significance of the correct interpretation
as well as the proper use of the Greek language, which he highly
respected for its elegance and expressional potential21 even in its
slightest details and nuances; that is, pondering upon every single
word in order to wring its deeper significance. To understand Origen’s
method on this point, we should recall the practice of ancient rhetoric:
those who studied rhetoric in the ancent world were educated and
trained to analyse a text word by word, until every possible allusion
and every conceivable relationship of every word had been drawn
out of it. Here then is a sample of his strenuous advocacy for felic-
itous precision:
And let anyone know that it is impossible to treat properly any prob-
lem, be it moral or natural or theological, unless he uses terms with
their accurate meaning and depicts the logical signification in due way.
It is not futile to follow the accuracy of the signification and to pon-
der upon it painstakingly; for there are cases where we commit seri-
ous mistakes because of failing to clear up homonyms (mØ kaya¤rontew
tåw ımvnum¤aw), doubts, misuses of the terms, literal meanings and con-
tradistinctions. . . . We have said all these, in order to show that we,
who wish not to be mistaken in understanding the divine Scriptures,
believe that it is utterly necessary to be attentive to and aware of the
logic of the terms used.’22
Explicit statements such as this, as well as his use and explanation
of nuances of the Greek language, convince that he knows this lan-
guage in depth. Origen approaches the biblical text in a way markedly
different from modern exegesis: modern readers focus on the sen-
tence or the pericope as the unit of understanding; Origen, by con-
trast, takes every single word as the unit of understanding the purport
of the divine text. He assumes that no word in the Scriptures is idle.

21
commJohn, 20, XXII; s. also commJohn, 2, II.
22
commGen, 3 (comm. on Gen. 1,16ff ), PG.12.89; the same in Philocalia, 14, 2.
16 introduction

He is always alive to the fact that the manner in which he treats

language should serve to an accurate exposition and he is highly
perspicacious in his remarks. Given his statements about the significance
of linguistic scrutiny and accuracy, it is reasonable to expect that
the study of his writings preserved in Greek can provide his real
theological views authoritatively. We also may focus our analysis on
certain crucial terms he uses; for when he uses terms, especially those
loaded with special significance, he is alert to their philosophical or
theological implications. As my discussion shall show, following Origen’s
own practice on a thorough study not only of notions but also of
their phraseology itself, is a principle of research which provides fruit-
ful conclusions.
A subsequent point of major importance is the significance attached
to the ‘homonyms’. In the foregoing passage, he points out that it
is a task ‘to clear up the homonyms’ (kaya¤rontew tåw ımvnum¤aw).
This notion is frequently used in order to indicate a term under
which there are more than one conceptions to be understood. In
the Prologue of the Commentary on the Song of Songs there is an account
of the meaning of homonyms:
The Divine Scriptures make use of homonyms; that is to say, they use
identical terms for describing different things . . .; and not only are the
same terms employed, but also the things themselves are compared
with one another.23
This definition is also found in Greek texts: “homonyms are those
which have only their name in common, but their essential content
is different” (ım≈numa d¢ §stin, œn ˆnoma mÒnon koinÒn, ı d¢ katã
toÎnoma t∞w oÈs¤aw lÒgow ßterow).24
In expounding his own exegeses of the Scripture, his constant con-
cern is to carry out what he sets forth as a task of the biblical inter-
preter, that is, to ‘clear up the homonyms’. It was a substantial means
towards his aim to probe into the deeper truths and unveil the trea-
sures of wisdom which, as he was convinced, lie hid in every word
spoken by the Spirit. It was part of his objective to elicit the moral,

23
R.P. Lawson, Origen: The Song of Songs, Commentary and Homilies, London, 1957,
p. 26.
24
homJer, 20, 1; Cf. Aristotle, Categoriae, I. As G. Bardy points out, “la citation
est textuelle, mais Aristotle n’est pas nommé par Origène”; Cf. G. Bardy, “Origène
et l’Aristotelisme”, Mélanges Gustave Glotz, tome I, Paris, 1932, p. 78, n. 4.
 introduction 17

theological or mystical meaning that the biblical text is presumed to

contain. More significant though is that he uses homonyms himself
in order to couch his own conceptions. This fact, although highly
determining the comprehension of his thought, has not heretofore
been adequately noticed, nor due attention has been paid to it. This
has not been utilized as a means for unraveling critical aspects of
his theology. To clarify the homonyms used by Origen, that is, to
determine the variegated imports ascribed to the same term, is a
task which I have meticulously pursued during my research.
Finally, in discussing Origen’s views, I was conscious of the fact
that I am dealing with a thinker whose thought (or alleged thought)
has been highly and tempestuously controversial for more than seven-
teen centuries: from shortly after his death until our day the dispute
has never really ceased to rage. Nevertheless, it is frustrating to study
extended scholarhip about him and being faced with so much dis-
tortion and miscomprehension—already since the era of Jerome, later
Justinian, until today. For there are allegations, which come to stark
contrast with what Origen really held and himself explicitly enunci-
ated. There are assertions, which are supposed to be an ‘answer’ to
him—and yet they are nothing more than a mere repetition of
Origen’s own words.25 There are citations of points of his writings,
which are adduced in order to prove exactly the opposite of what
the passages themselves show—and they could show the real views
of Origen if they were quoted, not just cited as references. Perhaps
it is the barrier of language; perhaps it is because the study was not
extended over the whole of his work, or because the reference is
considered out of context. Be that as it may, the fact does not change.
For if texts and ideas of Origen’s are extant, it is not acceptable to
adduce them in order to prove different (indeed the opposite) points.
This is why the voluminous bulk of his work should not be over-
looked. For, once this task is carried out, the reader will have amassed
a formidable array of texts and ideas in support of a certain view
of time and the notions which determine this.

25
It is tragically ironical that the word ‘answer’ (in italics) was used in cases of
this sort, as it happened with R. Sorabji (op. cit., p. 151). G. Florovski, on the other
hand, (Aspects of Church History, Greek tr. by P. Pallis, Thessaloniki, 1983, pp. 69–70)
speaks of Athanasius’ ‘step beyond Origen’ at a point where Athanasius simply
echoes Origen’s views. I discuss these claims in due course.
18 introduction

I have, therefore, followed it as a principle that the views of Origen

should not be cited as references but, whenever necessary, be quoted—
even if the quotation could be somewhat lengthy. In view of the
scholarship referring to his thought, it has been my practice to bol-
ster my views not only by means of reference to titles and chapters,
but to let Origen speak for himself. This method of dealing with
this thought may lead to a treatise lengthier than what was desir-
able. Yet the scientific benefit of this procedure seems considerable
to me. It is only a by-product that I have taken the opportunity of
rendering into English, for the first time, a number of Greek pas-
sages, which elucidate determining tenets of the Alexandrian. What
is important is that this way of expounding this thought leaves no
room for controversy. For it is Origen himself who speaks and it is
his own words which elucidate crucial aspects of his authentic views.
I am satisfied that only through such a methodology what Origen
really believed can after all be resolved conclusively.
The upshots with respect to my topic prove that this procedure
was worth the effort. For the conclusions pertain to crucial facets of
Origen’s thought, which are now seen under an entirely new light
against current misapprehension. At any rate, my conviction that the
conception of time constitutes an essential element of a thinker’s
thought has become stronger than it was in the beginning of this
research. For the conclusions eliminate fundamental misunderstand-
ings and prove that Origen’s influence is far more extensive and
decisive than it has been reckoned so far.
 PART I

COSMOLOGY
 CHAPTER ONE

GOD AND TIME

On the question of the being of God with respect to time, Origen’s

concern to be accurate in couching his views is evident. On this
specific topic though there is a particular difficulty facing him: he
knows that, in order to treat this question, language is inadequate
to express the reality of the being of God; hence his constant
concern for accuracy cannot be fulfilled. The main reason is that
the tenses of verbs are always placed in a certain ‘time’;1 a verb will
be in a xrÒnow, either Present or Present Perfect tense or Past tense
etc. It is impossible to use a verb apart from any implication of time.
In contrast to a noun or adjective, a verb not only expresses an
action or a passion or a state of the subject, but also indicates the
time which this action or passion or state is referred to. On this
point he follows Aristotle’s statements verbatim; for indeed it was
the Stagirite who had said that ‘a verb is a sound which not only
conveys a particular meaning but has a time-reference also’2 in con-
trast with a ‘noun’ which ‘is a sound assigned with an import estab-
lished by convention alone, but no reference whatsoever to time’.3
Origen regards the divine reality as a timeless state radically tran-
scendent to time. In the portrayal of God’s being then any verb is
a priori inappropriate, there is a linguistic predicament, since no verb
can be used apart from a certain concomitant temporal implication.
Had he employed another perception of God’s being (for example,
everlasting duration or perpetual present), there could be no difficulty:
he could use Present tense. But it is he himself who emphasizes that
God’s being cannot be expressed by any of the forms of verbs,
because this being is atemporal as God radically transcends all time.
In frJohn, quoting John 1,1 ‘In the beginning was the Logos’,
Origen is quick to address himself to this stumbling block, by means
of a comment which reads as follows:

1
In Greek the word for ‘tense’ is the same to that of ‘time’, namely, xrÒnow is
used either for ‘tense’ or ‘time’.
2
Aristotle, De Interpretatione, II.16b6.
3
Ibid., II.16a20.
22 chapter one

Speaking about the Logos of God it would be more accurate to say

‘is’ (§st¤n); but he [sc. John] used ‘was’ (∑n) instead of ‘is’ (§st¤n) in
order to relate the being of the Logos to his incarnation, which took
place in a certain time; one should bear in mind that, in reference to
the atemporal things, the accurate meaning of verbs such as ‘was’ (∑n)4
and ‘is’ (§st¤n) and ‘will be’ (¶stai) should not be taken literally. For
Logos the God, being the Son of the Father, is himself timeless God.
Therefore, the verbs applied to him should not be considered together
with the time which they imply, since the Son is not under time (ÍpÒ
xrÒnon); for a verb is what indicates time (tÚ proshma›non xrÒnon), as
Aristotle says.5
In frJohn the same assertion is found, in the exegesis of the same
passage, namely, John 1,1:
Since there are some who have fallen from the right faith thinking
that it is only him who was born from the virgin that exists, very ably
the theologos writes for them that ‘In the beginning was the Logos’
(§n érxª ∑n ı lÒgow); using the verbs properly, he applied the term
‘became’ (§g°neto) to the flesh and the term ‘was’ (∑n) to the divinity.6
Speaking of the Logos of God it would be more accurate to say ‘is’
(§st¤n); but he used ‘was’ (∑n) instead if ‘is’ (§st¤n) in order to relate
the being of the Logos to his incarnation, which took place at a cer-
tain time; anyone nevertheless should know that, in referring to atem-
poral things, he should not take the meaning of verbs literally; for that
which is signified by a verb implies co-existence of time together with
it: for example, when we say ‘was’ (∑n) we mean that which does not
exist any more but existed only in the past; accordingly, ‘is’ (§st¤n)
denotes what exists now and ‘will be’ (¶stai) points to what will exist
in the future. But no one should think that the time implied by a cer-
tain verb can be applied to the Logos of God, since he is timeless
(é˝diow).7
In the passages here Origen is explicit that é˝diow means timeless. So,
here at least, there can be no room for the usual dispute as to
whether é˝diow has a meaning of ‘timelessness’ or ‘everlasting dura-
tion’. R. Sorabji asserts that Plato made no conscientious attempt
to distinguish between the terms é˝diow and afi≈niow.8 As I will note
later, it is not clear whether Plato holds the eternity of the Ideas

4
Cf. John 1, 1.
5
frJohn, CX; italics mine.
6
This opinion is also found in frJohn, CXI.
7
frJohn, I.
8
Cf. R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 116.
 god and time 23

to be in everlasting duration or timelessness. As regards Philo,

H. Wolfson points out that he, too, did not make a clear distinc-
tion between é˝diow and afi≈niow.9 At any rate, I do not maintain
that Origen always used a˝diow in the sense of timeless; he used it
also in order to suggest perpetual duration. In these cases, however,
this is used as a manner of speaking rather than as a literal sug-
gestion of endless time.10
There is good reason then for banning the use of ‘was’, or ‘will
be’, or even ‘is’, when referring to the divine being. Whenever Origen
strives to adumbrate the abstruse conception of the divine subsis-
tence, he constantly bears in mind the fundamental premise: he refers
to a reality transcending all time. He also is aware of the incapa-
bility of language to express this reality adequately or at least with
some accuracy.
In expProv he refers to the portion, ‘It was me who was his delight’
(ÉEg≈ ≥mhn √ pros°xaire)11 and explains: ‘The ‘was’ (≥mhn) referring
to God does not indicate any existence of time as it does when it
refers to those that are under time, such as in the case of one say-
ing, ‘I was in a market place’. And since she [sc. Sophia] ‘was
befitting (∑n èrmÒzousa)’ God who is without beginning (t“ énãrxƒ),
then she is timeless (é˝diow), too’.12
God’s being is an atemporal reality which transcends all time.
Although the use of language for the portrayal of this reality is
deemed inevitably inadequate, he is very cautious of how he couches
his statements. The inadequacy of expressions is taken for granted,
still there is constant vigilance and endeavour to reduce this inac-
curacy to the bare minimum:
I use all these terms, not because they actually apply to God himself,
but because I find myself in an impasse as I stand before, to call them
so, ineffable words (érrÆtvn =hmãtvn)13 which only God himself and,
after, him his only-begotten Son is able either to say or to think prop-
erly about himself.14

9
Cf. H.A. Wolfson, Philo, vol. I, pp. 234–5.
10
Cf. selDeut, where é˝diow is used to indicate the same meaning with that of
the expression efiw tÚn afi«na. PG 12.813.
11
Prov. 8, 30.
12
expProv, 8 PG 13.32.
13
The term used here for ‘words’ is =Æmata, which literally means ‘verbs’ both
in the technical grammatical sense and in the that of ‘words’.
14
commJohn, 32, XXVIII. P. Plass asserts erroneously that Origen held a notion
24 chapter one

In the light of these analyses, we can assess the assertion of

R. Sorabji15 that Origen did not always have a very firm grasp of
the idea of timelessness. Origen’s own texts do not allow for the pos-
sibility that he was groping for the idea of timelessness. The points
where he seems to speak as if God had foreknowledge, not timeless
knowledge, are only loose and inaccurate expressions used inevitably,
yet consciously, because of the limited potential of language to express
what is beyond language. This is exactly the point made here.16 The
very being of godhead with respect to time is perceived not in terms
of everlastingness or sempiternity (that is, being at all times), but in
unambiguous terms of atemporality. In reference to the divine ontol-
ogy, God’s being is timeless, not omnitemporal.
It is then quite plain that Origen did have an unwavering grasp
of the idea of timelessness and the above passages show that he does
not fall short of this conception. It is also clear that by the term
é˝diow he again denotes what is timeless and applies to the reality
which, as he puts it, is not ‘under’ time.17
In view of these statements in Greek, similar ones in the Latin
version of Princ can be taken as authentic:
Of course, these terms that we use, such as ‘always’ or ‘has been’, or
any similar ones that bear a temporal significance, must be interpreted
with reservations and not pressed since they relate to time. But the
matters of which we are now speaking, although described in tempo-
ral language for the purpose of discussion, in their essential nature
transcend all idea of time.18

of ‘sacred time’ of God; he further claims that Origen took this notion from the
Jewish and Christian Gnosticism; s. P. Plass, “The Concept of Eternity in Patristic
Theology”, Studia Theologica, 36 (1982), p. 13. A similar view has been taken by
J. Danièlou in Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, tr. J.A. Baker (London, 1973),
pp. 458ff, 469ff. The folly of the claim that Origen had anything to do with
Gnosticism is discussed presently. Here I point out this contradictory fact: Origen
has been particularly criticized for holding the notion of timelessness. To scholars
such as O. Cullmann this seemed a kind of contamination by the ‘danger’ of Greek
thought (s. infra). It is then quite strange that the notion of ‘sacred time’ is attrib-
uted to Origen. Such an assertion would delight the scholars who deny any notion
of timelessness, yet it is wrong.
15
R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 123.
16
Even so, however, when Origen speaks of the ‘knowledge’ of God, he uses
Present tense (which implies timeless knowledge), not Past tense (which implies fore-
knowledge). I discuss the question of foreknowledge later on.
17
expProv, 8; s. also selPs, 101; 102; expProv, 23.
18
Princ, I.3.4.
 god and time 25

By the end of the Fourth Book a similar remark is made:

This phrase that we use, however, that there never was a time when
he did not exist, must be accepted with a reservation. For the very
words, when or never, have a temporal connotation, whereas the state-
ments we make about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit
must be understood as transcending all time and all ages and all eter-
nity. The rest of things, however, which are external to the Trinity,
must be measured by ages and periods of time.19
There is also an implicit reference20 to time according to which ‘no
thought of before or after can be entertained’ in respect of ‘the per-
sons of the Trinity’. However, the notion really suggested at this
point is not so much the relation of the Trinity to time, but the
relation between the Three Persons themselves as hypostases equally
coeternal. The idea is that there was no state in which the Son and
the Holy Spirit did not exist together with the Father, since the very
being of the Trinity is timeless.21
It is important for the further development of my topic to make
clear a point that I regard as fundamental for a proper understanding
of Origen’s thought. It has to be emphasized that he holds a con-
ception of God as radically transcending time not only with respect to
time, but also before all time. Although the term ‘before’ is inevitably
used in a loose sense (for ‘before’ makes no sense in the absence of
time), the notion indicated is that God is being regardless of exis-
tence or non-existence of time. This comes to mean a conception
of God in Himself, that is, God who is being in the absence of cre-
ation or even any thought of creation. To think of God in Himself
does not necessarily entail to think of him as Creator. Hence when
one perceives God as Creator, through observation of the outcome
of his creative act, this by no means could mean that this percep-
tion applies to Himself.
This view constitutes a significant contrast with Platonism and
Neoplatonism. This is also a facet of Origen’s thought that has been
widely misunderstood. I shall then dwell on this point in order to
make it clear through words of his own. In Cels it is affirmed that

19
Princ, IV.4.1.
20
Princ, II.2.1.
21
The term also suggests that this fundamental theological view of Origen is
grounded not only on the notion of divine timelessness, but also on other facets of
his theology.
26 chapter one

‘it is not absurd that we also should accept the view that the char-
acteristics of God which we know do not apply to God Himself. For
the attributes of God are superior to any of those which are known
not only to human nature, but even by the natures of the beings
which have ascended to the higher ranks of life.’22
God Himself is ‘beyond what can be perceived through the mind’
(§p°keina t«n noht«n).23 So ‘everything we know about God is infe-
rior to God Himself ’ (pãnta ë ‡smen §lãttona §st¤ YeoË).24
According to selPs God is ‘known as Creator, Wise, Provident and
Judge’. In point of the first of these conceptions of God, ‘he is
Creator because he brought creatures into being out of non-being’
(ka‹ dhmiourgÒw m¢n diã tå gegonÒta épÒ toË mØ ˆntow efiw tÚ e‰nai).25
The knowledge of God as Creator is based on (and derived from)
a certain because. This means that God as Creator is known through
an act of his will. But God in Himself cannot be known at all. There
is not any ‘because’, there is not any ‘act’, there is no creature
through which God could be known in Himself. It is only through
Christ and God’s self-manifestation that men may figure a notion of
God in Himself.
Thus the fundamental distinction between God known in Himself
(ginvskÒmenow) and God as creator (dhmiourgÒw) is clearly made.26 In
observing creation one does not see anything of God in Himself; all
he may see is the wisdom according to which everything was cre-
ated; for ‘In the corporeal heavens God dwells as creator through
his multi-embroidered wisdom.’27
God in Himself ‘is unattainable by reason’,28 and ‘no one knows
the accurate knowledge which Trinity has of herself.’29
On this point there are penetrating analyses, which are worth fol-
lowing verbatim, in order to see how the distinction between God
in Himself and God as Creator is made:
No one can see God through a process of his own mind, as it hap-
pens with visible things which are said to be seen through an act of

22
Cels, VI, 62; italics mine.
23
exhMar, XLVII.
24
Cels, VI, 62.
25
selPs, 138; PG 12.1661.
26
frPs, 118, 91; selPs, 118; PG 12.1604; expProv, 6; PG 17.177.
27
selPs, 122.
28
Cels, VI, 64.
29
frMatt, 244.
 god and time 27

seeing. But God is seen to those whom he might judge that He should
be seen by revealing Himself. For if one were seeing God, then he
would see Him, so to speak, in His quality proper and His magnitude
proper (oÂow ka‹ ˜sÒw §stin). But it is not man who sees, it is God
who shows what is seen; this is why God presents Himself in a way
that might be comprehended by creatures. As the Saviour says ‘I will
present myself ’;30 he did not say ‘he will see me’, but he said ‘I will
present myself ’.31
There is particular emphasis on the notion that ‘the divine things
cannot be seen without an action of their own’, namely through
God’s ‘grace’.32 Subsequently, creaturely mind
cannot see God through an intellectual act of its own. So we conceive
of God, to the extent that it is possible to us, through the theological
notions about him—at least those which we have; even so, however,
we conceive of Him obscurely. But God in Himself (aÈtÒw d¢ ı YeÒw)
has knowledge of Himself not through any means of this kind, but He
has a knowledge that is appropriate to Him. For it is Himself who is
both the subject and the object of comprehension. This is why it is
only the Son who knows Him; it is the Son who is comprehended by
the Father and it is he who comprehends the Father.33
Origen knows that ‘there are many people who have a conception
of God as Creator, yet they do not profess Him as Father of the Son’.
(Ka‹ pollo¤ goËn ¶xousin ¶nnoian YeoË dhmiourgoË, oÈ mØn ımol-
ogoËsin aÈtÒn ufloË pat°ra). But to speak of ‘knowledge’ of God
means in fact to know Him ‘in as much as He is God and in as
much as He is the Father’ (kayÒ YeÒw §sti ka‹ kayÒ patÆr §sti).34
In view of this, ‘even if we be found worthy of seeing God now
by means of mind and heart, we see him not “as he is”,35 but as
he appears according to his dispensation towards us’.36 However, there
is the objective reality of what God is in Himself, albeit creatures
cannot know it; and this objective reality is singled out in the same
passage by means of the expression ˜ §stin (that which God is).37

30
John, 14, 21.
31
frJohn, XIV.
32
Cf. homLuc, 3; Cf. also commMatt, 12, 10; 14, 24.
33
frJohn, XIII.
34
frLuc, 34.
35
1 John, 3, 2.
36
commMatt, 17, 19.
37
commMatt, 17, 19.
28 chapter one

Therefore, by reason of the radical chasm between God and the

world then, any knowledge of God in Himself is impossible.38 God
is the ‘creator and God of the prophets and Father and God of
Christ and our father’.39 But from a worldly point of view, one can
see not God in Himself, but God as he represents Himself to us.40
In observing the world we have just ‘conceptions’ of God; we do
not know Him Himself; we can only form a ‘conception’ of God as
Creator.41 Therefore,
neither can anyone worthily know the uncreated and firstborn of all
created nature42 in the way that the Father who begot him knows him;
nor can anyone know the Father in the same way as the living Logos
who is God’s wisdom and truth.43
Even when God will be seen by creatures ‘as he is’,44 this will hap-
pen in the way which is possible for God to be known by creatures
(kay≈w §sti dunatÒn to›w genhto›w gn«nai tÚn YeÒn). It is not possi-
ble to take the [expression] ‘as he is’ as denoting God Himself (oÈ
går oÂÒn te §klambãnein tÚ kay≈w §stin ı YeÒw aÈtÒw).45 This is the
sense in which ‘the prophets or patriarchs or angels have seen God.’46
Once again, the notion of God Himself (ı YeÒw aÈtÒw) is evidently
enunciated.
The radical divine transcendence is tellingly expressed in the onto-
logical relation of God to the world. Origen refers to the world
through the term whole (˜lon)47 which is a Stoic term.48 Still he rejects
the Stoic doctrine that God is immanent in the world;49 he also
explicitly opposes both ‘the Stoics and the followers of Plato’ who
held that the ‘whole’ world is ‘god’.50 His view is that God is nei-
ther ‘part’ nor ‘whole’. This statement is one of those which under-
line the radical divine transcendence:

38
frMatt, 244.
39
commJohn, 19, V, comm. on Rom. 1, 1–7.
40
commMatt, 17, 19.
41
frMatt, 243.
42
Cf. Col. 1, 15.
43
Cels, VI, 17.
44
1 John, 3, 2.
45
frJohn, X.
46
frJohn, XIV.
47
Cels, VII, 44.
48
SVF, II, 167, 8.
49
Cels, VI, 71.
50
Cels, V, 7.
 god and time 29

All things are parts of the world yet God is not part of the whole
(pãnta går m°rh kÒsmou, oÈd°n d¢ m°row ˜lou ı YeÒw); for God must
be regarded as not incomplete as the part is incomplete. And proba-
bly a deeper consideration could show that strictly speaking, just as
God is not a part, so also he is not the whole (YeÒw Àsper oÈk §sti
m°row oÏtvw oÈd° ˜lon), since the whole comprises parts (§pe¤ tÚ ˜lon
§k mer«n §sti).51 And reason does not demand that we should allow
for the supreme God comprising parts, each one of which cannot do
what the other parts can.52
That the world is the ‘whole’ was a Stoic doctrine. However, Origen’s
affirmation of the ‘world’ which as the ‘whole’ is similar to the Stoic
one only in letter. His premise for holding this view is sheerly different:
this is the transcendence of God—a notion which has no room in
Stoicism where God is regarded as immanent in the world. Origen’s
conception is different: God is incomposite; for if the ‘whole’ was
the reality of both God and world, then, God would be regarded
as ‘part’ of the ‘whole’: “the whole is the composite of the parts.
For ‘all’ cannot be predicated where there is no diversity in quan-
tity and quality”.53
God is not ‘part’ of the ‘whole’. He is beyond the ‘whole’. Beside
the conception of the radical transcendence of God, this suggests a
fundamental conception of his which has been underestimated, and
sometimes denied by scholars who overstressed and miscomprehended
his allegorical exegesis: for what Origen does here is to strongly
affirm the full reality of the world.
We know that there is an actual reality of God in Himself, yet
this knowledge is not drawn from the observation of the creation,
but from the self-revelation of God recorded in the Scripture. This
knowledge is obtained from ‘the testimonies given’ to us (tå martÊria
tå paradedom°na).54 These ‘testimonies’ (martÊria) are the message
of the divine scriptures,55 both the Old Testament (‘. . . the testi-
monies having been said many times . . .’), and the New Testament
(‘. . . I find new testimonies . . . the testimonies of Jesus Christ . . .’).56

51
Cf. SVF, II, 167, 35ff; also in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, IX.338–49,
352; II.264; Phyrronia, III.98–101; Cf. Athanasius, Contra Gentes, 28; M.25.4ff.
52
Cels, I, 23.
53
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 4.1.11.
54
selPs, 118, PG 12.1621; frPs, 118, 118–9, 138.
55
selPs, 118.
56
Ibid.
30 chapter one

The only way to know of God being more than the Creator is
through His own revelation in God the Logos throughout the bib-
lical history. It is through historical events, culminanted in the event
of ‘incarnation’ (diã t∞w sark≈sevw), that the transcendent God
became ‘approachable’ (prositÒw) to men.57 So using ‘truth and the
testimony of events and all sorts of working of wonders as a kind
of voice, God suggested His own sublimity to humans.’58
Even so, divine instruction is necessary for ‘the law can be known
only by revelation’ and no intellectual ability alone is adequate for
that.’59 Which means that the ‘parables and obscure words’ which
were uttered by the Holy Spirit through the prophets need to be
‘readable’ and they become readable to those who are ‘participants’
of the Holy Spirit and taught by him. For no one can comprehend
the divine Scriptures unless though illumination by the Holy Spirit.60
God through his ‘great providence for the sake of man’ guides
and enlightens man toward ways that ‘human nature itself does not
know.’61
These passages demonstrate that it is not the world, but it is God’s
self-revelation that provides a hint of the divine being. In the final
analysis, this means that Origen holds a Theological, not a Cos-
mological conception of God. His theology springs from the self-
revelation of God throughout history, not from observation of nature.
To expound Origen’s theology in detail, that is, his concept of God
in Himself, is beyond the scope of this book. I shall only refer to
his conception of Wisdom and Logos; and this only to the extent
that this bears upon the conception of time. For an important point
that needs to be made is not only that there is a conception of God
in Himself far beyond the notion of God as Creator ; there is also a
visualization of a reality preceding creation, that is, a reality in which
only God is and there is no creation at all. This will lead to the
conclusion that the current opinion that Origen cannot think of God
without necessarily thinking of him as Creator is erroneous.62

57
frMatt, 54.
58
selPs, 45, PG 12.1433.
59
selPs, 118, PG 12.1592.
60
expProv, 24; PG.17.233.
61
excPs, 77, PG 17.144.
62
That God is Creator of necessity is the Platonic and Neoplatonic conception—
which lead to the allegation that Origen held a doctrine of eternal creation. This
is a current (yet entirely erroneous) opinion. The whole question will be canvassed
anon.
 god and time 31

Despite the fact that God’s being is regarded as ‘above’ time, that
is, as a radically transcendent reality, Origen does go ahead with a
portrayal of God’s being in Himself. This is made at the point where
he interprets the portion of John 1,1 ‘In the beginning (§n érxª) was
the Logos’.63
In trying to interpret this passage, he is faced with a challenge to
his conception of the divine being as a timeless reality. For the term
érxÆ is one of those, which par excellence have a temporal impli-
cation, namely, beginning. How is it possible to speak of the divine
Being as an atemporal state while at the same time speaking of a
certain ‘In the beginning’ (§n érxª)? This is the challenge, which he
has to cope with, in order to sustain his conception of the divine
life as a timeless reality.
Before any discussion about the actual meaning of the foregoing
portion of John, he points out that there are many meanings of the
word érxÆ. This ‘multi-signification’ (tÚ polÊshmon) of the term can
be found not only among the Greeks but also into the Holy Scripture.64
Thus he expounds all the different purports of the term érxÆ found
in the Scripture. It is only after this extensive exposition that he
comes to the portion of John 1,1 in order to offer his own exegesis:
Having seen that the term érxÆ means so many things, we now exam-
ine which of them should be employed in the [portion] ‘In érxÆ
was the Logos’ (ÑEn érxª ∑n ı lÒgow). It is clear that this does not
allude to any moving over or to any road or length; it is also obvi-
ous that it does not refer to any generation. It is nevertheless possible
to take it that it refers to him, who is the maker, whom ‘God ordered
and everything has been made’.65 For in a sense it is Christ himself
who is the creator, to whom the Father says ‘let there be light’66 and
‘let there be a firmament’.67 Christ then is creator as an érxÆ, for he
is wisdom, called érxÆ just because he is wisdom. For it is wisdom
who, according to Solomon, says ‘The Lord created me at the begin-
ning of his ways towards his works’ (ÑO YeÒw ¶ktis°n me érxÆn ıd«n
aÈtoË efiw ¶rga aÈtoË),68 so that ‘the Logos is in the érxÆ’, that is, in
the wisdom.69

63
commJohn, 1, XVI
64
Ibid. Speaking of ‘Greeks’, Origen obviously has in mind Aristotle and his
analyses on érxÆ, especially in Metaphysica, 983a, 1033a, 1049a, 1075b.
65
Psalms, 142, 5.
66
Gen. 1, 3.
67
Gen. 1, 6.
68
Prov. 8, 22.
69
commJohn, 1, XIX.
32 chapter one

Further in the same work, he explains: ‘In interpreting the ‘In érxÆ
was the Logos’ it is clear (for it is found in many passages of the
Proverbs) that it is the wisdom who is meant by the term érxÆ.’70
Thus ‘one should understand that the Logos has always been in the
érxÆ, that is, in the wisdom’.71
Hence Origen’s answer is virtually this: The opening of John 1,1,
‘In érxÆ was the Logos’ is a sort of answer not to the hypothetical
question ‘when was the Logos?’, but to the question ‘in what was the
Logos?’ This assessment is clearly stated later, when it is pointed out
that what we have learned from the passage of John 1,1 is the answer
to the question ‘in what’ (§n t¤ni) was the Logos, and the answer to
this was that the Logos was ‘in the wisdom’ (§n érxª).72 Later in the
same work he reiterates his affirmation that by érxÆ it is the wis-
dom herself that should be understood, and the passage of John
means that the Logos was ‘in’ the wisdom.73 If a ‘temporal’ mean-
ing should be applied to the ‘§n érxª’ this should be only a sense
of atemporality, indicated by the fact that the Logos was ‘in’ the
wisdom. In that case the hypothetical question ‘when was the Logos?’
could be the same as the question ‘In what was the Logos?’ As a
matter of fact, there is a point in the same work where it is stated
that what we learn by this passage of John is ‘when or in what’ the
Logos was.74
After the analyses of the subject (before as well as after this point
of commJohn) it is obvious that the term ‘when’ has been put in such
a context that the only purport remaining for it is that of atempo-
rality. This is obviously why Origen has no hesitation (when he says
‘when or in what’, twice in that section) to suggest that, in this case,
he takes the terms ‘when’ as well as ‘in what’ as virtually synony-
mous. This sounds paradoxical, yet when one deals with a problem
such as a timeless reality one should be prepared to face some state-
ments which sound paradoxical in their current use. It is possible,
however, to explain how this synonymity is understood. To the ques-
tion ‘when was the Logos?’ the answer is ‘timelessly’. This answer is
obvious identical to the answer ‘In timelessness’. But this expression

70
commJohn, 1, XXXIX.
71
Ibid.
72
commJohn, 2, IV.
73
commJohn, XXXVII.
74
commJohn, 2, IX; italics mine.
 god and time 33

is virtually an answer to the question ‘In what was the Logos?’. Thus
when and in what are regarded as apparently synonyms on account
of both providing one single answer referring to the being of the
Logos in the divine timelessness.
It is then quite plain that God’s being is held to be an atempo-
ral reality. He feels so strongly about it, that he interprets terms such
as érxÆ (which currently has a temporal import) in a manner abol-
ishing the notion of temporality altogether.
Within this reality, Wisdom is a living personal hypostasis who is
identified with the Son of God.75 This is the person whom God
spoke to when he created the world, according to the narration in
Genesis. Nevertheless, this wisdom exists as a timeless subsistence
before the creation of the world: she lives in God before time, as a
personal subject, as a living personal hypostasis.76 For wisdom ‘is her-
self a subsistent being, who was begotten before the aeons and existed
as a timeless one even before creation’.77
The Logos is also identified with the Son of God and has time-
lessly been in the divine being regardless of any perception of creation.
But Logos becomes (g¤netai) only with respect to men who formerly
were unable to conceive the advent of the Son of God, who is the
Logos; yet the Logos does not become ‘with God’78 as if he formerly
were not there, but he is said to be always in the Father (parã d¢ t“
ée¤ sune›nai t“ patr¤ l°getai): ‘And the Logos was (∑n) in God’ since
‘he did not become with God’ (oÈ går §g°neto prÒw tÚn YeÒn). And the
same verb, namely ‘was’ (∑n), predicates the Logos both when he ‘was
in érxÆ’ and when he ‘was with God’; this means that neither is the
Logos separated from the érxÆ nor is he left over (époleipÒmenow) by
the Father; and again this means that neither the Logos ‘became’ in
the érxÆ, as if he were not in the érxÆ, nor did he ‘become’ ‘in God’
as if he were not ‘with God’ before. For before any existence of time
or aeon ‘in érx∞ was the Logos’ and ‘the Logos was with God’.79
It is accordingly pointed out that ‘John did not say that the Logos
became or that he was made in the érxÆ, but he said that ‘In the

75
commJohn, 1, IX; 1, XIX; 1, XXXI; 1, XXXIV; 1, XXXIX; 6, XXXVIII;
frJohn, I; commProv, 1; Cels, III, 81; V, 39; frMatt, 237; expProv, 1; expProv, 16; excPs,
50; adnotDeut, 16; Princ, I.2.2., III.3.1.
76
expProv, 8.
77
Ibid.
78
John 1, 1.
79
commJohn, 2, I; italics mine.
34 chapter one

beginning was the Logos’. For he was in the beginning creating the
heaven and the earth’80 yet he existed ‘before them, being their
beginning in the sense that it was him who caused them to be’.81
It is further reiterated that the Logos who ‘was in érxÆ’ was
‘always’ (ée¤) ‘with God’, being himself God; ‘he did not obtain this
state as if he previously was not with God’, but he has always been
in the ‘perpetual view of the paternal depth’ (tª édiale¤ptƒ y°& toË
patrikoË bãyouw).’82
So the Logos is he ‘who lives in himself, yet not separated from
the Father (ka‹ lÒgon toioËton kayÉ •autÒn z«nta). The Logos is not
someone other than Christ, Logos the God, who is in the Father,
through whom everything has been created.’83
In the First Book of commJohn it is averred that ‘it is necessary to
examine the conceptions of the Son painstakingly84 in order to
see which of them have always been in God before creation (§n
makariÒthti) without any beginning. Is it only Wisdom which existed
without beginning, or it is also the Logos, and even life and truth?’85
At that point though Origen goes only as far as to set forth the
question.
A systematic account of this issue is given in the Second Book of
the same work. This involves some determining points of his view
of time. The exposition is composed be means of a meticulous philo-
logical analysis of scriptural portions, with Origen pondering upon
two portions of John: ‘In the beginning was the Logos’ (§n érxª ∑n
ı lÒgow),86 and ‘life became in the Logos’ (§n lÒgƒ).87 Referring to
this opening of John’s gospel, he states:
Let us regard these two instances of In (§n) and examine their difference:
First, let us see this as it appears in [sc. the expression] ‘Logos in the
beginning’ and secondly in [sc. the expression] ‘life in the Logos’. The
Logos did not become ‘in the beginning’; this is why it is said ‘in the
beginning was the Logos’; for there was not when the érxÆ was irra-
tional (êlogow); but life became and this is why ‘life is the light of men’.88

80
frJohn, I; italics mine.
81
frJohn, I.
82
commJohn, 2, II.
83
commJohn, 1, XIX.
84
s. infra.
85
commJohn, 1, XX.
86
John 1, 1.
87
Cf. John 1, 4.
88
John 1, 4.
 god and time 35

This means that when there was no man at all, there also was not
any ‘light of men’; for the light of men is understood only in its rela-
tion to men. And let no one accuse us, thinking that we are consid-
ering all those questions in a sense of temporal sequence; for time
cannot be found at all when the third and fourth conceptions of the
Logos did not exist yet. In the same way then that it is said that
‘everything became through him’89 (not everything was through him),
and ‘there was nothing that became without him’90 (not there was noth-
ing that was without him), life is what became in him, not what was in
him. Again, the Logos was not what became in the beginning, but what
was in the beginning.91
An excellent portion in his Homilies on Exodus leaves no room for
ambiguity:
‘To become as stone’ is, by nature, not to be stone, for one becomes
only what was not originally.92
This argument was aptly upheld by Gregory of Nyssa against the
argument of Eunomius: if the Logos is put within limits, then God
himself is put within limits. But God is infinite and by the same
token the Logos should be regarded as infinite. For ‘infinte is extented
alongside with the infinite’ (sumparate¤nei t“ épe¤rƒ tÒ êpeiron).93
E. de Faye makes a serious mistake in asserting that ‘it is in the
nature of the Son to be multiple and diverse’, appealing to Origen’s
analyses of the conceptions of the Son in commJohn. What he did
not comprehend is that the conceptions of the Son, after Wisdom
and Logos, became and they could in no way be regarded as being
‘in the nature’ of the Son. They are simply economic functions of
the Logos within the world, once this world came into existence.
Henceforth, the assertions about a ‘Gnostic influence’ on Origen on
this subject are wrong. For the essential notion of Origen’s about a
certain ‘when the third and fouth conceptions of Logos did not exist
yet’ eluded E. de Faye,94 as the statement ‘there was not yet time
before the world existed’95 eluded him too. Nevertheless Origen’s

89
John 1, 3.
90
John 1, 30.
91
commJohn, 2, XIX; italics mine.
92
Refering to Exodus 15, 16; Homilies on Exodus, VI.9.
93
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 3. 2. 20.
94
Cf. E. de Faye, “De l’influence du Gnosticisme chez Origène”, Revue de
l’Histoire des Religions, Paris, 87 (1923), p. 211.
95
Homilies on Genesis, I.1.
36 chapter one

statements are clear-cut: “the Saviour too, under different aspects,

has many names, since he may be one in substance but varied in
powers,” still “there is one substance in my Lord Jesus Christ”, while
at the same time there are “many perspectives for diverse names for
him”.96
Christ is indeed one in essence but may be designated in many
ways according to his virtues and operations, for example he is under-
stood to be grace itself, as well as righteousness, peace, life, truth, the
Word . . .97
Therefore, ‘The Logos is one’ (lÒgow gãr eÂw), he is a ‘unit’ (monãw)
and ‘one’ (ßn). Thus even if someone refers to the Logos through a
multitude of conceptions, in fact ‘he always refers to the one Logos’
(ßna ée¤ l°gei lÒgon).98 The perceptions of the Son pertain to his
action, indeed to his ‘salvation-bringing’ action, such as that by which
he appears as “peace, rightoeousness, truth, the door through which
one enters to the Father, the shepherd, the lion of the tribe of Judah,
the lion’s whelp who rises from sleep, sanctification, redemption, and
whatever else of this kind that seems to agree with his dignity.”99
The preceding quoted portion points out the sense in which Christ
(regarded as Creator) is stated to be the ‘source’ and ‘origin’ of all
virtues.100
The phrase used at that point is ˜stiw …spere¤ phgÆ tiw ka‹ érxÆ
t«n toioÊtvn tugxãnei. Similar kind of expression appears in Plato,101
whereas Philo uses a similar expression stating God as ‘the source
and origin of all graces’.102 It would be misleading, however, to regard
this expression as ‘Platonism’. This is but a figure (undoubtedly from
Origen’s own background) and this is why he introduces it through
the word …spere¤ (as it were). Beyond that, however, what under-

96
Homilies on Jeremiah, 27.4.
97
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 5.7.7.
98
commJohn, 5.V.1. Cf. “Christ is indeed one in essence but may be designated
in many ways according to his virtues and operations, for example he is under-
stood to be grace itself, as well as righteousness, peace, life, truth, the Word” (Cf.
1 Cor. 1, 30; Eph. 2, 14; John 1, 1.); Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 5.7.7.
99
Cf. peace, Eph. 2, 14; rightousness, 1 Cor. 1, 30; truth, John 14, 6; door, John,
10, 7; shepherd, John 10, 9 and 11; lion, Rev. 5, 5; lion’s whelp, Hos. 5, 14; Gen. 49,
9; sanctification, redemption, 1 Cor. 1, 30. Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 7.19.8.
100
Cels, I, 57.
101
Plato, Phaedrus, 245C.
102
Philo, de Mutatione Nominum, 58; Cf. De Specialibus Legibus, II, 156.
 god and time 37

lies this expresion is the fudamental view that the conceptions of the
Son became, which implies the creative act of God. This is the con-
text in which similar expressions should be considered.103
Of all the conceptions of the Son, it is only Wisdom and Logos
that were with the Father beginninglessly. The rest of them became,
which means they had a beginning and are the product of the cre-
ative act of God. Since this point is central for understanding the
relation of God to creation, I discuss it presently.
R. Norris is one more scholar among those who used Princ as a
main source. Consequently, serious mistakes were inevitable: he asserts
that ‘the Logos appears in Origen’s system as the first step ‘down’
from the One in the stream of existence. . . . As such, he is, of course,
‘generated’—but not (as Justin and Tertullian seem to have taught)
at some point prior to the creation of the world.’104
In the light of the abundance of texts where Origen explicates his
view of the Logos, assertions such as this seem astonishing. This is
why I have regarded it as an indispensable part of my method to
quote Origen’s own words. For distorting allegations such as these
of Norris’ appear as views of the mainstream scholarship, which
appears to be determined to find Plotinus’ world-picture and per-
ception of Being into Origen’s thought. Thus he thinks that Origen’s
God must be the Plotinian One. The Plotinian Mind (which is imme-
diately down from the One) must be the Logos, and so on.
In view of the vast number of scholars who made similar allega-
tions about Origen, the case of Norris is only an example, yet a
paradigmatic one. To avoid an unnecessarily excessive length of this
work, I have to consider views rather than individual scholars. Similar
allegations (namely, postulating either a Platonic or Neoplatonic per-
ception in Origen’s thought) were made by others, such as C. Bigg,
H. Crouzel, M. Simonetti, E. Molland, J. Daniélou, G. Florovski
(to mention some of those supposed to be prominent exponents
of Origen’s thought); the views of them, as well as of others, like
T. Torrance, P. Plass, M. Werner, and others mentioned in due
course. While C. Bigg put the term ‘Platonist’ in the title of his work
including Origen’s thought, M. Werner had no hesitation: he asserts
that Origen found a secure position ‘in the religious philosophy of

103
Cf. Cels, IV, 53; IV, 44; VIII, 17; deOr, XXII
104
R.A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology, New York, 1965, p. 154.
38 chapter one

Neoplatonism’.105 There are others who provide accounts of Origen’s

thought through assertions which are misleading generalizations, such
as this: ‘Philosophically the doctrine of Origen is a synthesis of
Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic elements, with the conception of
divine providence and of divine law being Platonic and Stoic.’106
Subsequent to his decision to brand Origen as a Platonist and tar
him with the brush of Neoplatonism, Norris claims that Origen
‘insists . . . that one cannot think of God without thinking at the same
time of the world in which God’s creative goodness is manifested.’107
This is the typical expression describing Plato’s thought. Indeed,
this expression is the stock motto used by the scholars who regard
Origen as a ‘Platonist’. However, Origen holds a conception of God
in Himself apart from any conception of creation. In his view, the
Son of God (conceived as Wisdom and Logos) is in the divine real-
ity as a person who is related to no one but God. In this state there
is no creation; the sole reality is the divine one, namely, the being
of God Himself.

105
M. Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma, tr. S. Brandon, New York, 1957,
p. 118.
106
W.A. Banner, “Origen and the Tradition of Natural Law Concepts”, Dumbarton
Oaks Papers, 8 (1954), p. 70.
107
R.A. Norris, op. cit., p. 154. Cf. G. Florovski, op. cit. p. 49. It is already clear,
however, that Origen holds a conception of God Himself without necessarily think-
ing of the world at the same time. This is a telling point to which I shall return
later.
 CHAPTER TWO

THE PROVIDENTIAL CREATION

The important element in my analysis hitherto is that Origen holds

a conception of a reality ‘when’1 there is neither time nor the world;
a reality where there is nothing apart from God himself. This is why
he states that it is God who is the original ‘place, as it were’ (oflone¤
tÒpow) of the Logos.2 Certainly it is utterly hard to adumbrate this
reality, since this is the divine life itself. It is significant, neverthe-
less, that there is a perception of a state before creation (tå prÚ gen°sevw).3
It is out of this reality that God decides to create and the notion of
‘coming into being out of non-being’ begins to make sense.
This is a critical point of the conception of God as Creator. The
question though is this: what did God create in the beginning? Only
once the answer to this question is comprehended, the doctrine of
creation will be approached properly. The Wisdom of God is por-
trayed as a
‘subsistent being’ (oÈs¤a) who exists ‘before the aeons’ (prÚ t«n afi≈nvn)
and existed before creation as a timeless (é˝diow) being; when she estab-
lished a relation to creatures (tå gennhtã), then she became the ‘beginning’
(érxÆ) of God’s ways, both of the constructional and providential (t«n poi-
htik«n ka‹ pronohtik«n); so this beginning (érxÆ) has been yoked
together with the creatures, as she became their beginning, relating herself to
them by creating them; yet this wisdom is timeless and exists as a sub-
stantial subject with God before all aeons (≤ d¢ sof¤a é˝diow, oÈsivd«w
prÚ afi≈nvn parã t“ Ye“ Ípãrxousa).4

The determining element introduced is the distinction between what

is called providential creation from the constructional one, which came
into existence as the material world.

1
commJohn, 2, XIX.
2
commJohn, 20, XVIII.
3
commJohn, 20, II.
4
expProv. 8; PG.17.185. P. Plass asserts that in Origen Wisdom is one ‘level’ (as
he calls it) below God, which is erroneous. P. Plass, “The Concept of Eternity in
Patristic Theology”, op. cit., p. 13.
40 chapter two

There are two different portions of Genesis which suggest that the
very creative act of God consists in bringing certain reasons (lÒgoi)
into being out of non-being. What God ‘uttered’ was not just ‘words’;
it was a sheer creative act in itself.5 The divine ‘words’ (lÒgoi) are the
‘reasons’ (lÒgoi) according to which creation is functioning and pro-
vided for.
The first passage is the saying ‘Let us make man in our image,
after our likeness . . . So God created man in his own image, in the
image of God created he him; male and female created he them’.6
The second passage is, ‘And the Lord formed man of the dust of
the ground’.7
The inference drawn from these scriptural portions is that God
‘created’ human nature and it is only later that the material element
enters into the narration. This means that what was made ‘in the
image’ of God had nothing to do with ‘matter’, since ‘the first man’
who was made ‘in the image of God’ was ‘immaterial and superior
to any corporeal nature’.8
The same notion is expressed in the Latin translation of the Homilies
on Luke:
There are two images in man.9 One he received from God when he
was made, in the beginning, as Scripture says in the book of Genesis,
‘according to the image and likeness of God’.10 The other image is
earthly.11 Man received this second image later. He was expelled from
Paradise on account of disobedience and sin, after the ‘prince of this
world’12 had tempted him with his allurements. For, just as the coin,
or denarius, has an image of the emperor of this world, so he who does
the works of the ‘ruler of the darkness’13 bears the image of him whose
works he does. Jesus commanded that that image should be handed
over and cast away from our face. He wills us to take on that image

5
This point, as well as the ensuing discussion, show that creation came into
being out of non-being by a deliberate creative act of God. The contention of Nygren
who strives to show that Origen really held a doctrine of emanation rather than cre-
ation is not correct. (A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. by Phillip Watson, Philadelphia,
1953; p. 382.)
6
Gen. 1, 26–27.
7
Gen. 1, 26–27.
8
Dial; BGF, v. 16, p. 374.
9
Cf. Commentary on the Canticle, Prologue 2.4–5.
10
Gen. 1, 27.
11
1 Cor. 15, 49.
12
John 12, 31.
13
Eph. 6, 12.
 the providential creation 41

according to which we were made from the beginning, according to

God’s likeness.14
The idea is expounded also in the Commentary on the Canticle:
Paul the Apostle knew this well; and being possessed of a very clear
understanding of the matter, he wrote in his letters more plainly and
with greater lucidity that there are in fact two men in every single
man. He says, for instance: ‘For if our outward man is corrupted, yet
the inward man is renewed day by day’; and again, ‘For I am delighted
with the law of God according to the inward man’;15 and he makes
some other statements of a similar kind. I think, therefore, no one
ought any longer to doubt what Moses wrote in the beginning of
Genesis about the making and fashioning of two men, since he sees
Paul, who understood what Moses wrote much better than we do, say-
ing that there are two men in every one of us. Of these two men he
tells us that the one, namely, the inner man is renewed from day to
day; but the other, that is, the outer, he declares to be corrupted and
weakened in all the saints and in such as he was himself. If anything
in regard to this matter still seems doubtful to anyone, it will be bet-
ter explained in the appropriate places. But let us now follow up what
we mentioned before about the inner and the outer man.16
What kind of ‘creation’ was this man of ‘the beginning’? Is this a
Platonic perception of an ‘incorporeal world’ made in the beginning
-a notion that so many scholars have promptly ascribed to Origen?
The anwer to this can be traced at a number of points of Greek
portions, which evince that his perception of the outcome of the cre-
ative act of God is far from being what is currently alleged to be.
When he speaks of the ‘incorporeal’ that came into being out of
non-being, he actually refers but to these lÒgoi, which means (both
in its literal sense and essential purport) ‘utterances’ of God, as well
as ‘reasons’. This is the ‘incoporeal’ that came into being out of non-
being. Particular care is taken to make this point clear-cut: when it
is said that God made Adam, it should be taken into account that
the term ‘Adam’ in Greek means just ‘man’. Thus the narration of
Moses does not refer to ‘any individual’ (oÈx oÏtvw per¤ •nÒw tinow),
but simply points to the creation of ‘the human nature’ itself (per¤
t∞w toË ényr≈pou fÊsevw).17

14
Homilies on Luke, 39.5.
15
2 Cor. 4, 16 and Rom. 7, 22; Cf. Eph. 3, 16.
16
Commentary on the Canticle, Prologue 2.4–5.
17
Cels, IV, 40; the same in Cels, VII, 50.
42 chapter two

In commMatt it is pointed out that the first of these portions of

Genesis refers to ‘male and female’, not to ‘man and woman’; also,
the same phraseology is used in the Hebrew original text, which is
adduced at that point of commMatt. The difference is regarded as
substantial; for the expression ‘male and female’ points to what was
created ‘in the image’, whereas either ‘man’ or ‘woman’ can never
pertain to what is perceived as ‘in image’ of God (oÈd°pote går gunÆ
tÚ katÉ efikÒna oÈd° énÆr).18 Again Origen reiterates his fundamen-
tal opinion that the incorporeal creation does not refer to the creation of any
individual person, but only to the creation of these logoi.
In commJohn Origen focuses on the saying ‘and God saw that it
was good’.19 He points out that this reference to what was created
can pertain only to the ‘reasons’ of things, not to the actual mate-
rial things themselves. This ‘creation’ is the coming into being of
the reasons of all those which were to come into existence. At that
point there is an extensive argument appealing to instances from
Genesis. Speaking about ‘sea beasts’20 and ‘cattle, and creeping things,
and beasts’,21 how is it possible to say that it was the actual crea-
tures that God saw as being ‘good’? Are these beasts ‘good’ them-
selves? Certainly not, Origen avers. Therefore, it was not these
creatures themselves that God saw as ‘good’: “what was good was
the reasons about them”.22 Referring to John 4, 45, ‘Behold I say to
you, Lift up your eyes and see the fields, for they are already white
for harvest’, he comments thus:23
The expression ‘lift up your eyes’ occurs in many places in Scripture
when the divine Logos admonishes us to exalt and lift up our thoughts,
and to elevate the insight that lies below in rather sickly condition,
and is stooped and completely incapable of looking up,24 as is written
for instance in Isaiah, ‘Lift up your eyes and see. Who has made all
these things known?’25
On the other hand, no one who experiences passions and who has
clung to the flesh and been concerned with material things, has

18
commMatt, 14, 16.
19
Gen. 1, 10.
20
Gen. 1, 20.
21
Gen. 1, 24.
22
commJohn, 13, XLII.
23
commJohn, 13, XLII.
24
Cf. Luke 13, 11.
25
Isa. 40, 26.
 the providential creation 43

observed the command that says, ‘Lift up your eyes’. As a result,

such a person will not see the fields, even if they be ‘already white
for harvest’. Likewise, no one has lifted up his eyes if he continues
to perform the works of the flesh.26
But ‘the fields are already white for harvest’ when the Logos of
God is present clarifying and illuminating all the fields of Scripture
that are being fulfilled by his sojourn. But perhaps, too, the white
fields that are ready for harvest to those who lift up their eyes are
all the beings that are perceptible to the senses, including heaven
itself and the beings in it. This would be true because the reason
(lÒgou) of each one of them is clear to those who, by being ‘trans-
formed into the same image from glory to glory’,27 have assumed a
likeness of those eyes that have seen how each of the things that
have been made was good. For the declaration concerning each of
the created things, ‘God saw that it was good’28 means this: God
looked deeply (§ne›den) into the reasons (lÒgoiw) of each creature and
saw how each of the creatures is good regarding the reasons accord-
ing to which it had come to be (kayÉ oÏw g°gonen ßkaston lÒgouw
§st¤n kalÒn).
If anyone does not take the saying, ‘God saw that it was good’29 in
this way, let him explain how the statement ‘God saw that it was good’
holds true in the verse, ‘Let the waters bring forth the creeping crea-
tures having life, and birds flying above the earth under the firmament
of heaven’30 and even more to the point, ‘God made the great sea-
monsters’.31 But the reason of each of these, (ı lÒgow ı per¤ •kãstou) which
God saw, is ‘good’. We must say the same things also about the words
‘Let the earth bring forth the living creature according to the kind,
four-footed creatures, and creeping creatures, and beasts of the earth
according to their kind’,32 to which also is added, ‘God saw that it
was good’.33 For how are beasts and creeping creatures good, unless
the reason concerning them (ı lÒgow ı per¤ aÈt«n) is good?34
Those reasons (lÒgoi) are the object of creation. This means that we
do not have creation of individual personal beings, far less of

26
commJohn, 13, XLII.
27
Cf. 2 Cor. 3, 18.
28
Gen. 1, 10.
29
Gen. 1, 10.
30
Gen. 1, 20.
31
Gen. 1, 21.
32
Gen. 1, 24.
33
Gen. 1, 25.
34
commJohn, 13, XLII; italics mine.
44 chapter two

incorporeal personal beings. We have creation of logoi, that is, of

relations, of possibilities, of principles and constitutive and cohesive
causes, of laws and casualities of all kinds. We have creation of the
principles according to which the world not only will come into
being, but also will be held and sustained. We have the sine qua non
framework for the emergence of the world to be possible. We have
an evolutionary conception of creation, yet the world is not regarded
as an automaton, or a self-regulated system concerning its own evo-
lution. Creation is constantly dependent on the Logos, because all
these created principles and logoi are being in the Logos. In the
final analysis creation is sustained and kept in being only because
the Logos wills so.35 On the other hand, this means that the inces-
sant presence and action of the Logos makes creation to be inces-
santly created. The reasons, the constitutive causes make this universe
to evolve and to be transformed ceaselessly.
The actual material creation exists on account of the Providential
creation, the latter is the ‘cause’ for the existence of the former, a
sustaining system of logoi. “It is because of this creation that the
entire world has been able to have come into existence” (diÉ ¥n
kt¤sin dedÊnhtai ka‹ pçsa kt¤siw Ífestãnai),36 yet this is not under-
stood in terms of temporal succession: the Providential creation is
present and incessantly at work and it is because of this continuous
action that the material world is being held in existence. Matter
functions on account of its being ruled by this set of ‘reasons’, laws,
possibilities and causes, according to which the world exists and
moves foreward.
This fundamental conception of Origen was in fact taken up by
subsequent major theologians, such as Gregory of Nyssa and his
brother Basil of Caesarea. It seems to me that they must have dis-
cussed and reflected on this view of Origen, since I find similar
approaches in the writings of both. Gregory, for instance, says that
creation is constantly orientated towards its ‘first cause’ (pr«ton a‚tion),
it is sustained in existence by ‘participating in this’ (metous¤&), and
the world is ‘ceaselessly being created’ (pãntote kt¤zetai).37
Basil moved along the same vein. What he calls ‘beginning of cre-
ation’ (érxÆ t∞w kosmogon¤aw) he understands as an instantaneous act

35
Cels, VI, 65.
36
commJohn, 1, XXXIV.
37
Gregory of Nyssa, In Canticum canticorum, PG 44, 885D.
 the providential creation 45

of God, according to which He introduced ‘the causes and impulses

and forces at one go’ (§n ékare›) into the universe.38 It was not
difficult for him to grasp this real import of Origen’s concept of cre-
ation. For instance, what did Origen really mean when he referred
to everything created ‘in the beginning’, certainly including the earth,
and stated that this was was ‘invisible’, and the ‘earth’ was ‘invisi-
ble and unbuilt’ (tÚ t∞w g∞w éÒraton ka‹ ékataskeÊaston), too?39 He
meant that the reasons were already a constitutive element of the
world, yet their interaction had not yet brought into existence what
is called ‘earth’. In fact Origen did not say anything different from
modern cosmology.
Holding this conception of creation, which is ceaselessly evolving
according to the principles created in the beginning, he sustains a
similar view for the creation of man: the human genus came forth
in like manner as an individual man comes from the human sperm.
An embryo has in itself all the potential to be developed to a human
being. This potential is latent in early stages, but it is not dormant.
The principles of its own development are there and they are ceasessly
working, so that the embryo evolves into a human being. So the
principles for human growth are within and do not come ‘from out-
side’.40 This dynamic and evolutionary conception of creation applies to
human beings as well as to the entire world. The two conceptions
resemble each other in this: what precedes them is the existence of
the reasons, the principles, according to which their actual existence
comes to pass. The object of creation then is the causative and con-
stitutive principles according to which everything that was to come
forth emerged; those are the principles according to which this world
and everything in it, from start to finish, will exist and act and react
to each other, being animate or inanimate, being a senseless object
or a person. Before anything visible appeared, God created the set-
ting for this to emerge and to make sense and to develop, be that
planets, things, persons or phenomena. The organizing principles,
the potentiality and sustainability and workability of the setting—
this was the primal object of creation.
This conception of creation is further illuminated by a passage in
the Homilies on Genesis. Referring to Genesis, 1, 21–23, Origen reasons:

38
Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae in hexaemeron, PG 44, 72AB.
39
Cels, VI, 49.
40
comm1Cor, 84.
46 chapter two

But someone asks how the great whales and creeping creatures are
interpreted as evil and the birds as good when Scripture said about
them all, ‘And God saw that they were good’.41 Those things which
are opposed to the saints are good for them, because they can defeat
them and, when they have overpowered them, they become more glo-
rious with God. Indeed when the devil requested that power be given
to him against Job, the adversary, by attacking him, was the cause of
double glory for Job after his victory. What is shown from the fact
that he received double those things which he lost in the first place,
is that he will no doubt also receive similarly in the heavenly realm.
And the apostle says that ‘No one is crowned except for the one who
has striven lawfully’.42 And indeed, how will be there a struggle if there
not be one who resists? How great the beauty and brightness is of
light would not be made out unless the darkness of night intervened.
Why are some praised for purity unless because others are condemned
for arrogance? Why are strong men magnified unless weak and cow-
ard men exist? If you use what is bitter then what is sweet is ren-
dered more praiseworthy. If you consider what is dark, the things
which are bright will appear more delightful to you. And, in short,
from the consideration of evil things the glory of good things is indi-
cated more brilliantly. For this reason, therefore, the Scripture says
this about everything: ‘And God saw that thery were good’.43
Why, nevertheless, is it not written, ‘And God said that they were
good’, instead of, ‘God saw that they were good’? That is, God saw
the usefulness of those things and that way by which, although in
themselves they are as they are, nevertheless, they could make good
men perfect. For this reason, therefore, he said, ‘Be fruitful and mul-
tiply and fill the waters in the seas, and let the birds be multiplied
upon the earth’,44 that is, that the great whales and the creeping crea-
tures be in the sea, as we explained above, and the birds upon the
earth.45
Hence the goodness of the object of creation is derived from the
usefulness of the relations which come to being. This evolutionary
conception of creation suggests that the object which emerged out
of nothing was, in the first place, relations, indeed potential relations.
There is neither determinism nor predestination. There are only
potentialities and possible outcomes. What the aftermath of a historical
uncertainty will be is known to God, it is foreknown, yet not as

41
Gen. 1, 21.
42
2 Tim. 2, 5.
43
Gen. 1, 21.
44
Gen. 1, 22.
45
Homilies on Genesis, I.10.
 the providential creation 47

divine experience but only as a foresight of God, understood from

the point of view of the world. This is presumably why Origen makes
the point above: God saw that the object of creation was good, it
is not written that God said that this object was good. The juxta-
position which Origen invents at this point is pretty telling: ‘God
saw’ means God had foreknowledge of what was to come to pass in
due historical course; to say that God said that the object he cre-
ated was good, would suggest that this was already a fact full of
potentialities, which had not produced the spatio-temporal conse-
quences from the interplay between the logoi.
Hence, the ‘creation’ of the divine wisdom and providence, by
virtue of which these beasts came into being—this was what God
saw as a ‘good’ creature. This is a delicate point of this concept of
creation: Wisdom of God is called both his beginningless Son and
the product of his creative act, which came into being and ‘embroi-
dered’ the ‘body’ of his Son, as I discuss presently.
Why (that is, the ‘reasons’ why) these beasts should come into
being is known to God alone. For God does nothing in vain or with-
out reason: even the falling of a small sparrow does not take place
without God’s providence.46 There is a ‘reason’ for everything, and
this reason is known to God alone, a ‘reason’ dwelling in his wisdom.
So the theory is about the creation of ‘reasons’ which make up
the Providential Creation. This notion is suggested also in Cels:
If anyone wants to see the reasons that persuade us to believe the
Mosaic story of the creation of the world, which are supported by the
arguments that seemed right to us, let him take our studies in Genesis
from the beginning of the book down to the words ‘This is the book
of the generation of men’.47 In them we have tried to argue from the
divine scriptures themselves what was the heaven that was made ‘in
the beginning’, and the earth, and the notion of the invisibility and shape-
lessness of the earth (tÚ t∞w g∞w éÒraton ka‹ ékataskeÊaston), and what
was the abyss, and the darkness upon it, and what was the water, and
the Spirit of God that was borne upon it, and what was the light
which was created, and what was the firmament as distinct from the
heaven made in the beginning, and so on.48
Consequently, when Origen speaks about an ‘incorporeal’ that was
made in the beginning, he does not refer to anything that might be

46
frMatt, 212; frLuc, 57; Homilies on Luke, 32.3.
47
Gen. 5, 1.
48
Cels, VI, 49; italics mine.
48 chapter two

taken as a personal individual being. It was the reasons of the world

that constitute what was created. It was precisely those reasons which
came into being out of non-being.
In the light of this perception we can understand the meaning of
portions such as this:
The Son of God is also called wisdom, made as a beginning of his
ways towards his works, according to the Proverbs;49 which means that
wisdom existed only in relation to him, of whom she was wisdom, having no
relation to anyone else at all (≤ toË YeoË sof¤a, prÒw tÚn o §st¤ sof¤a
Ípãrxousa, oÈdem¤an sx°sin prÒw ßterÒn tina e‰xen); but the Son of
God himself became God’s benevolent decision (eÈdok¤a YeoË genÒmenow)
and willed (±boulÆyh) to bring creatures into being. This wisdom then
willed (±y°lhsen) to establish a creative relation (sx°sin dhmiourgikÆn) to the
future creatures (prÚw tå §sÒmena); this is precisely the meaning of the
saying that she was made the beginning of God’s ways.50
According to this perception of the providential creation, Wisdom is
an incorporeal (és≈matow) living (z«sa) hypostasis (ÍpÒstasiw) com-
prising various objects of contemplation (yevrÆmata). These objects
of contemplation contain the reasons of all existing things (periexÒntvn
toÁw t«n ˜lvn lÒgouw). This wisdom is a living personal being, ‘hav-
ing a soul as it were’ (ka‹ oflone¤ ¶mcuxon).51
This definition of wisdom points to both the Son of God and the
created wisdom, which came into being and ‘embroidered’ the body
of the Son. The Son of God is regarded not only as living in the
same way as God lives, but also as an individual personal hyposta-
sis of his own, notably a subsistent personal being. However, this
point should not detain us here, for what it takes is nothing short
of a full exposition of Origen’s Trinitarian Theology.

49
Prov. 8, 22.
50
frJohn, I; italics mine.
51
commJohn, 1, XXXIV; Cf. exhMar, XLVII. It could be a mistake to translate
yevrÆmata as ‘ideas’, since it takes for granted a Platonic conception. Should Origen
wished to imply ‘ideas’ he would simply have employed the term for this, namely,
fid°a. What he has in mind though is not ‘ideas’, but the ‘logoi’ of creation, which
are comprehended by the wise. In fact he uses the term lÒgoi for this. The term
yevrÆmata is rather of Aristotelian resonance. Cf. de Memoria 450b25, de Divinatione
per Somnia, 463b19. It suggests speculative propositions formed as a result of mys-
tical contemplation. In general, he refers to the term ‘ideas’ with some derision,
calling this a ‘phantasy’ of Plato (Cels, VI, 4), or, ‘imaginary forms, which the Greeks
call ideas’ (Princ, II.3.6.) and quotes Aristotle who calls ideas ‘twitterings’ (teret¤smata)
in Analytica Posteriora 83a33. Cf. Cels, I, 13; II, 12.
 the providential creation 49

In view of this conception, there is reference to the wisdom of

God as ‘containing the reasons of everything which has been created’52;
and ‘one by one the reasons of those ruled are in God’s Logos and
in his Wisdom’ (ofl kayÉ ßna lÒgoi t«n dioikoum°nvn efis¤n §n t“ toË
YeoË LÒgƒ ka‹ t∞ Sof¤& aÈtoË).53 This is the sense in which the dis-
tinction between two states is made: first, the ‘concepts of God’ (tå
§nnoÆmata toË YeoË) which (second) later ‘were somehow substantified
and came into actuality’ (oÈsivm°nvn pvw ka‹ efiw ¶rgon §rxom°nvn).54
This means that although wisdom is the Son of God, there is also
a notion of multitude attributed to this wisdom: ‘in’ Wisdom there
are the ‘reasons, according to which everything has been made by
God in wisdom.’55 This initial creative act of God, the providential
creation, is not a creation of individual personal beings. This is a
crucial point of the perception of God as creator. Moreover, the
outcome of the divine creative act is perceived to be in God, and
more specifically, in his wisdom, namely, in the Son. This is why
Origen, although regarding wisdom as a personal living being, also
appears to hold a notion of ‘multitude’ in her. This multitude is
what was created by God in the beginning, namely the ‘reasons’
and the ‘system of objects of contemplation’ which ‘embroidered the
body’ of Wisdom (the Son) and have been in this Wisdom ever since.
Providential creation, therefore, is the ‘reasons’ of the material
world, caused-into-being out of non-being. This is the sense in which
this ‘creation’ is said to be incorporeal, since the ‘reasons’ and ‘objects
of contemplation’ are obviously incorporeal.
What was ‘created’ out of the providential creation was not a
‘man’ or a ‘woman’, it was ‘male and female’. This means that it
was just ‘human nature’ in antipitation of the real interplay between
the reasons that came into being out of non-being. This is the sense
in which ‘the beginning of human beings was in paradise’,56 and this
is also why the ‘rational creature, which was placed in paradise’ was
‘perfect’, since the created reasons anticipating the future emergence
of human nature ‘in the image’ of God were perfect.57

52
Cels, V, 39.
53
commEph, Fr. VI, p. 241.
54
Op. cit., pp. 240–1.
55
commJohn, 19, XXII, quoting Psalm 103, 24.
56
commJohn, 13, XXXVII.
57
Loc. cit.
50 chapter two

This is the sense in which human kind was ‘first’ (prÒteron)58 made
‘incorporeal’, whereas what is known as ‘man and woman’ was cre-
ated ‘at some later stage’ (ÏsterÒn går pote).59 The saying ‘Let us
make man in our image after our likeness’60 pertains to all men’;
and what hoi polloi understand by the expression ‘in image’ is ‘older’
(presbÊteron) than that which Adam became when he assumed ‘the
image of the earthly’ ‘because of sin’.61
Thus, the statement in homLuc 39, “As it is written in Genesis, in
the beginning man was made ‘in the image of God’, then he assumed
an earthly image also” epitomizes the doctrine of creation of man.
This ‘first’ creation of God then is only the ‘clear utterances’ of God
which were ‘uttered first’, or ‘uttered in advance’ (protranvy°ntaw).
The actual material creation came into existence according to these
‘clearly pre-uttered words (or, reasons) which were in wisdom’ (katã
toÁw §n t∞ sof¤& protranvy°ntaw ÍpÒ YeoË t«n §som°nvn lÒgouw).
This is why, whenever treating this issue, Origen always uses the
Future tense.62 It is characteristic indeed that he refers to the actual
beings as ‘those who will exist’ (tå §sÒmena), representing God to
‘call’ them into being out of non-being.63
In view of this exposition, it is not difficult to see how Origen
can use such an expression. In the primal state of a universe which
had a long way of evolution to go, there was no actual human kind.
However, the principles, the logoi, according to which a human kind
could appear at a certain moment of time, in a certain planet called
earth, were there. In the eyes of God this being is obviously not a
future being, it is already present in the mind of its Creator. This is
the background against which this strange relation of God to the
‘future beings’ should be grasped.
This notion of God addressing ‘things that are not’ and calling
them into being is found also in Athanasius,64 who seems to follow
Origen almost to the letter.65 This is the sense in which ‘there are

58
Dial; BGF, vol. 16, p. 374.
59
commMatt, 14, 16.
60
Gen. 1, 26.
61
1 Cor. 15, 49. homJer, 2, 1.
62
t«n §som°nvn: s. commJohn, 1, XIX; tå §sÒmena: s. frJohn, I.
63
s. infra.
64
Contra Arianos, 2.22; De Decretis Nicaenae Synodi, 11, 2.
65
commRom, 25.
 the providential creation 51

certain creatures which are invisible’,66 namely incorporeal.67 Those

‘incorporeal’ are simply the ‘reasons’ which were created in the
Wisdom and are called ‘wisdom’, too. These reasons are perceived
as decorating the ‘body’ of Wisdom and are likened to a ‘book’. It
is indeed manifestly marked out that the content of this wisdom is
‘the reasons of providence and judgement.’68
Besides, it is stated that it is possible to ‘see’ this wisdom and to
comprehend these ‘reasons’. This happens when a rational creature
attains to eternal life. There is a crucial notion here, which should
be emphasized: even when this ‘wisdom’ is seen and clearly com-
prehended, this does not mean that it is God in Himself who is seen.
Through this wisdom God may be seen only as Creator. This, because
God manifested himself as Creator through his Logos. God as Creator
is related to what he decided and willed to do. God in Himself is rad-
ically transcendent and beyond all comprehension.
What is seen, therefore, is only the upshot of the creative act of
volition. It is clearly enunciated that all that can be seen through this
wisdom is God ‘as creator and wise and provident and judge’.69 And
when it is said that contemplation of the incorporeals is contempla-
tion of God as Creator, this follows from the fact that God is the
creator not only of what is corporeal but also of what is incorporeal,70
namely, of the ‘reasons’ of providence and judgement. This is the
‘system of objects of contemplation’ (toË sustÆmatow t«n §n aÈt“
nohmãtvn)71 which make up the providential creation. The ‘creatures’
in this creation are the ‘reasons of providence and judgement’.72 They
constitute the object of ‘moral and natural and theological’ knowledge,73
that is, the object of all kinds of knowledge. This is the context in
which ‘objects of contemplation’ (yevrÆmata) are understood to have
been created and placed into the Wisdom of God and they are called
wisdom, too.74

66
Cels, VII, 37. Origen relates this conception to the saying ‘The invisible things
of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made’ (Rom. 1, 20).
67
s. infra, my discussion on the ‘not seen’ and ‘invisible’ notions.
68
frPs, 138, 14.16; selPs, 138, PG 12.1660.
69
loc. cit.
70
selPs, 2, PG 12.1108; Cf. expProv, PG 17.161; 196; 249.
71
commJohn, 1, XIX.
72
expProv, 1; selPs, 138.
73
selPs, 138.
74
excPs, 36; Cant, 3; Cels, V, 39; commJohn, 2, XVIII; 2, XXVIII.
52 chapter two

In portraying God as Creator then Origen makes a further step

and sets forth his notion of ‘conceptions’ (or, ideas: §p¤noiai) of
Wisdom. By this term he refers to certain predicates attributed to
the Son, such as logos, light, truth, Christ, king, real vineyard, first
and last, beginning and end, paraclete, propitiatory, consecration,
good, great arch-priest etc. As I pointed out in the previous chap-
ter, all these appellations are called ‘conceptions’ which are ‘in’
Wisdom; they are also called ‘names of the Son’.75 They by no means
pertain to the ontology of the Son; they only signify his economic
function within the world.
Although our Lord Jesus Christ is one in his substance and is noth-
ing other that the Son of God, nevertheless he is represented as various
and diverse in the figures and images of the Scripture. . . . . . . there-
fore, the Lord himself accommodates his form in correspondence to
the place and time and certain individual conditions . . .76
He also speaks of the ‘objects of contemplation (yevrÆmata) of the
truth’ in order to indicate that ‘the Father does not want to confine
and keep them from dispersing (oÈ sun°xvn ı patÆr); this is why he
makes the figure of these objects of contemplation in the Logos in
a form of ‘belching out’ (§reÊgetai) and this is why the Logos is
called ‘image of the invisible God’.77 It is remarkable that he pon-
ders upon the use of the word ‘belch out’, or ‘disgorge’ (§reÊgetai),
which is found in Scripture.78 He avers that other words, such as
‘my heart has projected’ or ‘my heart has uttered’ might seem more
appropriate; yet it says, ‘disgorged’. What he actually suggests is that
the ‘prefiguration’79 of these ‘objects of contemplation’ in the Logos
is an act of God. It is through the contemplation of these ‘objects of
contemplation’ that one would ‘see’ the Father when he sees the Son.
This is the sense in which Origen refers to the ‘objects of con-
templation of the Logos’ (t«n toË lÒgou yevrhmãtvn).80 Therefore,

75
‘in’ the wisdom; s. commJohn, 1, XIX; ‘names of the Son’; s. commJohn, 1, XX.
76
Homilies on Genesis, XIV, 1. Cf. the same notion in Homilies on Exodus, VII.8.
This cardinal idea of Origen’s Christology is fully developed in commJohn, 1. IX–X.
77
Cf. Col. 1, 15; commJohn, 1, XXXVIII.
78
Quoting Psalm, 44, 2–3: ‘My heart has disgorged an utterance which is good’.
79
Cf. Princ, I.2.2. ‘these created things that had been as it were outlined and
prefigured in herself (sc. wisdom).”
80
Cant, 3. It is not accidental that the term ‘theoremata’ (visions, yevrÆmata) is
used in the foregoing passage, namely Cant, 3, at the point where an exegesis is
provided about the mystical communion of the soul with Christ. Origen regarded
 the providential creation 53

what came into being out of non-being was a ‘multitude’ of ‘wis-

dom’ (sof¤an), ‘reasons’ (lÒgouw), ‘forms’ (tÊpvn), and a ‘system of
conceptions’ (sustÆmatow nohmãtvn)81 and ‘objects of contemplation’
(yevrÆmata), which were made ‘in wisdom’, they were called ‘wis-
dom’, too, and placed, as it were, in the Wisdom of God, the Body
of the Son, and they ‘embroidered’ this Body. It is according to this
latter conception that in the Proverbs Wisdom is said to be ‘created’.
Hence Origen’s conception of ‘coming into being out of non-being’
pertains to the providential creation which is in the divine life. This is
the sense in which the Son is stated as ‘creature’, although most cer-
tainly Origen’s teaching is the outstanding counter-point of what
later became known as Arianism.82 On that account he refers to ‘the
firstborn of all creation’ (as in Col. 1, 15) who ‘is the oldest of all
created beings and . . . it was to him that God said of the creation
of man: ‘Let us make man in our image and likeness’83 for ‘wisdom’
is regarded as ‘created’ in the ‘body’ of Christ.
Therefore, it becomes plain what Origen means when he regards
wisdom not only as the person of the Son, but also as the contem-
plation and apprehension of the divine things. It is impossible to
apprehend God unless through his wisdom, by reason of the fact
that the Father has formed and placed the apprehension of truth
there. This is the meaning of the scriptural saying that it is only
through ‘seeing’ the Son that one might ‘see’ the Father,84 since the
Son is related to the world as the Logos revealing God and it is he
who was present in all the theophaniae recorded in the Old Testament.
Those ‘objects of contemplation’ (yevrÆmata) were formed and
placed in the divine Wisdom out of an act of the Father. This is
why at some points the Son is stated as ‘creature’85 although it is
also clearly enunciated that the Son is not a creature. The ‘objects
of contemplation’ constitute the ‘decoration’ of Wisdom (the Son),

the Song of Songs as the book which contains the divine mysteries in a mystical
way; s. expProv, 22.
81
commJohn, 1, XIX.
82
Origen is regarded as the one who first couched the phrase oÈk ¶stin ˜te oÈk
∑n (there is no when he was not) (Athanasius, De decretis Nicaenae synodi, PG 25.465)
which afterwards became famous as the pivotal phrase of the defenders of Christian
orthodoxy against the Arians.
83
Gen. 1, 26. Cels, V, 37.
84
commJohn, 19, VI. Cf. John, 14, 9; 12, 44.
85
Cels, V, 37.
54 chapter two

who is quite often predicated by the scriptural adjective ‘multi-embroi-

dered’ (polupo¤kilow).86 In the objects of contemplation (yevrÆmata)
and in the ‘reasons’ (lÒgoi),87 the explanation of everything in the
world can be found. This is the sense in which the name ‘wisdom’
is applied not only the Son of God, as a person, but also the knowl-
edge of the ‘reasons’ according to which everything can be explained
and thus clearly known.
Those ‘reasons’ is what God created in the beginning. Taking into
account that the term lÒgoi means both ‘words’ and ‘reasons’, Origen’s
view is that these lÒgoi are the words uttered by God when he was
speaking to his Son at the moment of the creation of the world
according to Genesis. The lÒgoi of God arise from the creative
gennhyÆtv, out of which the notion of ‘coming into being out of
non-being’ began to make sense. It is certainly God who brought
them into being, but the act of this ‘creation’ is portrayed as an
‘utterance’ of the Father to the Son. These ‘utterances’ (in Greek,
lÒgoi means ‘utterances’, ‘words’, as well as ‘reasons’) is what actu-
ally came into being out of non-being.
The ‘objects of contemplation’ and ‘reasons’ decorate the ‘body’
of wisdom and are assimilated to ‘precious stones’ (l¤doi t¤mioi), yet
living ones.88 It should be emphasized that although these ‘stones’
are regarded as living, this life is not the life of anyone other than
God: this is the divine life of the Wisdom herself, that is, the life of
the Son of God, as a living personal substantial incorporeal hyposta-
sis. Speaking of ‘stones’, in the plural, no notion of ‘distinction’ or
‘division’ is implied: the expression is a reference to incorporeal
nature, in which the notion of ‘division’ makes no sense.
Accordingly, the reality portrayed here is the divine one. There
is no corporeal nature and there is no world at all. It is God who
lives; for ‘life without a body is found in the Trinity alone’.89 There
is only God who is without parts, since he ‘is entirely one and sim-
ple’ (ı yeÒw m¢n oÔn pãnth ßn §st¤n ka‹ èploËn).90 Even the Logos
(who exists in timelessness) is ‘one although he comprises many objects
of contemplation, each of them understood as part of the Logos’.91

86
Cf. Eph. 3, 10.
87
commJohn, 19, XXII.
88
Cels, VI, 77. Cf. 1 Cor. 3, 12; Rev. 17, 4; 18, 12; Ps. 18, 11; 20, 4; etc.
89
Princ, II.2.2.
90
commJohn, 1, XX.
91
commJohn, 5, V.
 the providential creation 55

This is the state which Origen calls ‘bliss’ (makariÒthw),92 by this

pointing to the reality of the divine life, at the state where the notion
of ‘being out of non-being’ had begun to make sense.93 The terms
‘the heavenly’ (t«n oÈran¤vn) or ‘up’ (ênv) are used also.94 In this
context he refers to “the holy ones (t«n èg¤vn) who live a completely
immaterial and incorporeal life in bliss”.95 It should be added here
that the term ‘the holy ones’ (t«n èg¤vn) points to the reality of the
divine holiness. In the same vein, there is reference to becoming ‘a
citizen of the holy (place) of God’, the term ‘holy’ being a neuter,
not a masculine adjective. It is also in this sense that statements
about ‘invisible creatures’96 should be understood. This is why he
has no hesitation in calling these creatures ‘the invisible things of
God’ (to›w éorãtoiw toË yeoË) and ‘eternal ones’, which are ‘eternal’
(afivn¤oiw), by virtue of the fact that they are ‘invisible’ (éorãtoiw),97
that is, because these ‘creatures’ are in the divine reality. Since, at
this stage, any temporal notion is excluded, it is obvious that ‘eter-
nal’ indicates the quality of being in the divine life which is ‘eter-
nal’. The term ‘eternal’ in this case suggests a quality of being -not
any quantity of time (that is, not everlasting or beginningless dura-
tion), since duration itself is excluded from that state.
The fundamental characteristic of this divine reality is ‘unity’ and
‘agreement’. This is actually the kind of unity that applies to the
relation of the Son to the Father. To depict this unity was a task
regarded by Origen significant enough as to devote extensive analy-
ses to it.98
In the light of this unity (and although the radical difference of
wisdom from what was created has been clearly pointed out), pas-
sages such as the following could not raise doubts or questions:
Wisdom is a sister of ours; for the Father who made incorporeal nature,
made her too; but here it is not the Son of God who is meant; it is
the contemplation of the corporeals and incorporeals, as well as whatever
exists in wisdom, whether it is has to do with judgement or providence.99

92
commJohn, 1, XVII; 1, XX; 32, XVIII; Cels, VI, 44.
93
commJohn, 32, XVIII.
94
commJohn, 19, XXII.
95
commJohn, 1, XVII.
96
Cels, VII, 37.
97
Cels, VII, 7. also commJohn, 2, XVII.
98
selGen (in Gen. 11, 1); Dial; BGF, v. 16, pp. 367–8; frOs.
99
expProv, 7.
56 chapter two

This is one more answer to those who ascribe to Origen a notion

of ‘eternity of the world,’ even in the mode of existing in wisdom.
Origen stresses that the ‘objects of contemplation’ and ‘reasons’ exist-
ing in wisdom are ‘made’, they are not beginningless. Thus this
‘made’ wisdom is distinguished from the person of the Son who is
timelessly and beginninglessly with the Father. I will discuss this
question later.
It is accordingly pointed out that it is possible to speak of wis-
dom in two ways: first, the term may refer to the Son of God, who
is a personal hypostasis (§nupÒstatow); secondly, it may denote the
wisdom given to the faithful, as either oral or written speech100 (tÚ
g°now t∞w paide¤aw ka‹ t∞w gn≈sevw), since “education and knowl-
edge are included in the wisdom, which is bestowed by the Holy
Spirit and this is why education and knowledge are called speech of
wisdom”.101 Elsewhere he says that wisdom is a deep knowledge of
the divine things (§pistÆmh ye¤vn), as well as comprehension of human
things (ényrvp¤nvn pragmãtvn katãlhciw), stating further that wis-
dom is Christ himself.102
This does not imply that there are two notions held about the
actual meaning of wisdom. The concept remains consistent: wisdom
is a person, identified as the Son of God, bestowing the knowledge
of the divine mysteries (elsewhere called ‘mystic teaching and con-
templation of the truth’),103 which are called wisdom, too. The term,
therefore, indicates the person of the Son, as well as what is bestowed
by this person to certain rational cratures.
In the vein of this conception, in selDeut Origen refers to the ‘king-
dom of heavens’, saying that ‘it is Christ who irrigates this good
earth providing the streams of wisdom’.104 In selPs he refers to those
who “reach the end” and find “a table of rational foods prepared
by the Lord. For the Lord’s Wisdom will have prepared her own
table of luncheon on which she is going to offer her own sacrifices”.105
It is quite characteristic that, within one and the same passage, he

100
expProv, commProv, 1; selPs, 22; selDeut (comm. on Deut. 8, 3); comJohn 1, XIX;
1, XX; 1, XXIV; 1, XVIII; 1, XXXI; 1, XXXIV; 2, XVIII; frJohn, II.
101
Ibid.
102
commProv, 1, PG 13.17. This is the Stoic definition of wisdom; (Aëtius, SVF, II,
15, 4). Cf. cels, 111, 72; homJer, 8, 2; commMatt, 17, 2; commProv, 1, PG 13.90.
103
selPs, 22, PG 12.1264.
104
selDeut, (comm. on Deut. 8, 3), PG 12.809; Cf. selPs, 109, 7.
105
commJohn; 1, XXXIV; 2, XVIII.
 the providential creation 57

speaks of wisdom at the same time in both meanings assigned to

this term. Here is how the actual purport of wisdom is elaborated
in the same work:
And wisdom has prepared not only a table of foods; but also she offers
plenty of wine, which is made from her own self who is the real vine-
yard; she offers this wine having mixed the divine mind with human
words; and she distributes the wine taking it from this vessel and
offering a glass to each one.106
It is precisely the notion of the plentitude of the divine mysteries
existing in wisdom, which allow Origen to regard Wisdom as a
‘hypostasis of various objects of contemplation’.107
This idea of conceptions of wisdom does not imply any notion of
distinction or division in wisdom herself. It certainly does not impair
the oneness of the Son, nor does it impugn his unique subsistent
personhood.
Attention is called to the fact that “no one should suppose that
these conceptions attributed to the saviour imply any distinction in
substance”.108 This means that the various predicates applied to wis-
dom do not introduce any actual division in the substance of wis-
dom herself. If there seems to be a notion of distinction, it only
stems from the different ways in which human intellect comprehends
the Son of God.
Once Origen has made this point, he spends a large part of the
First Book of commJohn in order to inquire into the appellations of
Christ found in the Scripture. He deems it “useful to ponder upon
the meanings (xrÆsimon ¶stai tÚ basan¤sai tåw §nno¤aw) which stand
behind those names”.109
He is clear both in portraying the full presence of the Logos in
the atemporal being of God, and in pointing out the relation of the
Logos to Wisdom.
Although all the conceptions of Wisdom virtually pertain to the
same person, namely the Son, it is not possible to interchange his
names. For example, one does not do the same thing by applying
to Christ either the conception of ‘beginning’ or that of the ‘end’; he
certainly speaks of the same subject, but alludes to different perceptions

106
selPs, 22, PG 12.1264; Cf. frPs, 77, 19–25; excPs, 77, PG 17.145.
107
commJohn, 1, XXXIV.
108
commJohn, 1, XXVIII.
109
commJohn, 1, XXIV.
58 chapter two

of him. This is why Christ ‘is not the same when he is named by
conceptions of him’ (oÈ katã tåw §pino¤aw ı aÈtÒw).110 This non-
sameness stems from the different functions of the Logos in relation
to the world and this difference of functions produces different con-
ceptions of the Son. Origen is clear that beyond the first two con-
ceptions of the Son which pertain exclusively to himself (that is,
Wisdom and Logos), the “third and fourth” conceptions of the Son
are in fact “imposed upon creatures by the Logos”111 since they stem
from the function of the Logos in respect of the world.
Likewise, the Son is érxÆ only when he is conceived as Wisdom:
he is not érxÆ when he is conceived as Logos. So “no one should
be surprised, that the Saviour, as we said before, is many goods
(pollã égayã) and there are many conceptions of him, one first, one
second, one third”;112 for “if anyone is capable of scrutinizing the
hidden truth of the Scripture, he might find the full range of the
conceptions which are found there; yet I do not think he will find
them all”.113
The conclusion is that “if one examines painstakingly all the con-
ceptions of the Son, he will find that he is regarded as érxÆ only
in as much as he is thought of as wisdom: he cannot be regarded
as érxÆ even if he is conceived as Logos.”114
What Origen wishes to denote here is this: the scriptural ‘con-
ceptions’ (§p¤noiai) of the Son should be placed in a classified range.
They stand in an ‘order’,115 such as Wisdom—Logos—Life—Truth—
Justice—. . . etc.116 This succession is long and his conviction is that
however well may one study the Scripture he will not eventually be
able to say that he has found all the conceptions of the Son. In this
‘order’ each conception is what it is ‘on account’ (kayÉ ˜) of what
the previous conception in the succession indicates.117 This means
that each conception in the order is understood to be ‘broader’ in
relation to that next to it. Thus, ‘wisdom’ is a conception of the Son

110
commJohn, 1, XXXI.
111
commJohn, 2, XVIV.
112
commJohn, 1, XIX.
113
commJohn, 1, XXXI.
114
commJohn, 1, XIX.
115
commJohn, 1, XXXI.
116
commJohn, 1, XX; 1, XXXI.
117
commJohn, 1, XXXI.
 the providential creation 59

which is, as it were, ‘broader’ than that of Logos, which comes next.
For Logos ‘was in érxÆ’, which means, the Logos was ‘in Wisdom’,
since it is only Wisdom who can be conceived as érxÆ. Once Wisdom
contains, so to speak, the Logos, it follows that Wisdom is a con-
ception broader than that of Logos. So the Logos cannot be regarded
as érxÆ, since érxÆ is a conception ‘broader’ than the Logos.
Wisdom is érxÆ because she is God’s wisdom herself and in full,
while Logos alone cannot be considered as a full manifestation of
God’s wisdom. Wisdom is érxÆ because she can be manifested as
Logos and to be comprehended by the creation that was made ‘in
wisdom’. She is érxÆ because she contains the Logos, she can be
manifested as Logos. She contains the Logos yet she is not contained
in him.
This is the sense in which the Logos cannot be thought of as
érxÆ. Logos is a particular, so to speak, manifestation of wisdom,
because (as stated in John 1, 1) the Logos was in érxÆ, namely he
was in the Wisdom. It was not the wisdom who was in the Logos;
it was the Logos who was in Wisdom.
In like manner the Logos is broader than the next conception,
namely, ‘life’. For life ‘was made in the Logos’.118
So the Logos is the Wisdom of God manifested in such a way
that she can be perceived by rational creatures. Creation contains
rationality, and it is through this rationality that creation manifests
God’s wisdom. Again, the Logos is God’s wisdom that creates life
and rationality.119 Logos is the divine manifestation, through which
rational creatures receive a hint of God’s wisdom, because the Logos
is Wisdom herself manifested in the world.
There is, therefore, no difference in essence between Wisdom and
Logos; neither is there any ontological classification of them, simply
because there is no substantial distinction between them at all. Their
distinction is only an intellectual one. This is why the issue is about
conceptions of the Son. Moreover, it goes without saying that there
is no notion of temporal distinction between them, since both these
conceptions exist in the atemporal life of God.

118
commJohn, 1, XIX, quoting John 1, 4; s. also, commJohn, 1, XIX; frJohn, II.
119
frJohn, II. It is quite characteristic that the term ‘rationality’ (logikÒthw) in
Greek has the same root with the term ‘Logos’ (lÒgow). This expresses better Origen’s
notion that ‘rational creatures’ (logikã) are called so because of their ‘participation’
in the Logos of God; s. infra.
60 chapter two

Concerning the notion of providential creation, the question, which

arises is this: do all the conceptions of Christ make sense when God
is conceived in Himself without any notion of his creative action?
When God is perceived in Himself, and not as creator, when God
is perceived, so to speak, before he decided to create, does it make
sense to speak of conceptions of the Son at all? And, if it does,
which of them make sense in the divine timelessness in the absence
of any decision to create and in the absence of any creative act of
his?120 As a matter of fact, Origen himself poses this question at a
certain point.121 Although he leaves this question without further
examination at that moment, he does face it later in the same work.
In view of the real meaning of the succession of the Son’s con-
ceptions, Origen raises the question of their relation to the world
and to time. His answer is that, among all these conceptions, it is
only Wisdom and Logos that have always existed in the atemporal
being of God, even in the reality that God had not yet decided to
create. The Logos was present in God’s wisdom beginninglessly, in
the reality where there was no creation at all. The Logos is he
‘through whom’ the world was made. But the Logos was not him-
self made ad hoc; he was not ‘made’ at all: he ‘was with God’ always.122
The rest of the Son’s conceptions, however, had a beginning. They
make sense only in as much as God is regarded as Creator. They
appear providentially when God brought providential creation into
being, into the ‘system of objects of contemplation that was created’;
still they make actual sense only when the actual creation came into
existence. This, because, in order to speak of ‘conceptions’, there
must be individuals who ‘conceive’ of Christ in one way or another
and come in a certain relation to him. Thus, in order to conceive
of Christ as a ‘shepherd’, there should be an actual ‘flock’, other-
wise this conception makes no sense.
The above analyses allow now a proper inquiry into the assertion
that the Son ‘is many goods’ (pollã égayã).123 Those ‘goods’ are but
the ‘conceptions’ of the Son. Therefore, these ‘goods’ do not imply

120
Obviously the term ‘before’ is used in a loose sense, just for the sake of couch-
ing a certain notion. For strictly speaking ‘before’ makes no sense in a reality which
is timeless. This is an expressional problem which Origen himself faced and described;
s. supra.
121
commJohn, 1, XX.
122
John 1, 1.
123
commJohn, 1, XIX.
 the providential creation 61

any kind of Platonic notion of ‘existing in themselves’: they exist

only ‘in mind’ (katÉ §p¤noian),124 not in themselves as individual and
distinct beings.
This point is significant, because it actually constitutes an essen-
tial difference of Origen’s notion of ‘conceptions’ of Christ from any
Platonic notion of ‘ideas’. In Plato, Ideas have a real and undis-
putable existence as beings in themselves. This means that Ideas
have an essential being—in fact it is in the Ideas that the essence
of things is to be found.
By contrast, in Origen the ‘conceptions’ have no being of their
own, as ideas. As he explains “the fact that we discern conceptions
in the saviour should not embarass anyone; for no one should think
that we do the same thing in essence” (mhde¤w d¢ proskopt°tv
diakrinÒntvn ≤m«n tåw §n t“ svt∞ri §pino¤aw, ofiÒmenow ka‹ tª oÈs¤&
taÈtÒn ≤mçw poie›n).125 Thus, the ‘conceptions’ do not have any essen-
tial existence in themselves, neither do they introduce any essential
distinction in the Son of God.
Therefore, the conceptions which stand after Wisdom and Logos
can make sense only in the existence of time, that is, in the exis-
tence of the actual material creation.126 This means that the rest of
the Son’s conceptions, from the third downward, may exist only in
the presence of time.127 It is then obvious that there can be no sim-
ilarity of these ‘goods’ to any Platonic notion of atemporal ‘ideas’
existing, as distinct subsistent individuals. In respect of this, there is
a significant classification of the conceptions of Christ in a threefold
scheme:
Firstly, conceptions which do not pertain to Christ himself, but
only ‘to others’ (oÈx aÍt“, éllÉ •t°roiw):128 such are the predications
of him as ‘shepherd’, ‘way’, ‘gate’, ‘rod’.
Secondly, conceptions which pertain both to Christ himself and
to others (aÍt“ ka‹ •t°roiw)129 alike: such is the conception of Christ
as Logos; also as Wisdom, to the extent that creatures can com-
prehend the divine wisdom.

124
commJohn, 1, IX.
125
commJohn, 1, XXVIII.
126
s. infra.
127
commJohn, 2, XIX.
128
commJohn, 2, XVIII.
129
Ibid.
62 chapter two

Thirdly, conceptions which pertain only to Christ himself and to

no one else (•aut“ ka‹ oÈden¤).130 In this category there is the con-
ception of Christ as Wisdom, in as much as a certain ‘system of
objects of contemplation in him’ (sustÆmatow yevrhmãtvn ˆntow §n
aÈt“) cannot be comprehended by any created nature.
In view of this third category of conceptions, Origen speaks of
Christ stating that “there is a system of objects of contemplation in
him, in as much as he is wisdom, some of which are incompre-
hensible by the rest of the created nature” (tª loipª parÉ aÈtÒn
gennhtª fÊsei).131 Accordingly, the ‘multitude of objects of contem-
plation’ (tÚ pl∞yow t«n yevrhmãtvn) about Christ is incomprehensi-
ble not only by human beings, but also by any creature, since it is
only Christ and the Holy Spirit who can comprehend them.132
In reference to the conception of ‘life’ (which is the focal notion
of the spatio-temporal reality), he maintains that this conception
belongs to the first category: the conception of ‘life’ pertains not to
Christ himself, but to others (oÈx aÍt“ éllã •t°roiw).133
My conclusion, therefore, is that there can be no notion of ‘life’
of rational creatures ‘before’ the creation of bodily nature itself. If
one speaks about life ‘before’ the existence of bodily nature, he can-
not speak of anything else but of the life of God. Life referred to
rational creatures ‘before’ the creation of bodily nature is unthink-
able and makes no sense. In the setting of Origen’s thought, to apply
the notion of ‘life’ to rational creatures ‘before’ time is an nonsen-
sical philosophical premise.134
This is why Origen states that ‘life’, as a conception of the Son,
did not exist in timelessness, but ‘became’ with creation.135 Particular
attention should be paid to a point which is delicate: Recalling my
previous remarks, it should be pointed out that the affirmation that
life became pertains to creaturely life, as Origen himself explains.136
The conception of Christ as ‘life’ is not beginningless on account of
the fact that creaturely life is not beginningless.

130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132
commJohn, 2, XXVIII.
133
commJohn, 2, XVIII.
134
commJohn, 2, XIX.
135
Ibid.
136
commJohn, 2, XIX.
 the providential creation 63

Therefore, one can speak of ‘creaturely life’ only in the context

of the actual creation. It is only then that the notion of ‘others’
(together with that of ‘diversification’) starts to make sense. This
occurred when creatures came into existence. ‘Before’ the actual cre-
ation, the notion of ‘life’ applies to the divine life only. For ‘the
Father is life and, being life, he sets forth life’ and God, as life,
‘established a relation to rational creatures, as he willed to benefit
them’137 and so ‘he brought them into existence’.138
At this point it is important to consider a doctrine of creation,
which seems to stand close to that of Origen. This is the doctrine
of Valentinus, a Gnostic whom Origen attacks by name many times.139
The doctrine of creation of Valentinus is now available in the
Tractatus Tripartitus from Nag Hammadi. God’s being is conceived as
developing out of a primal mysterious unity into a series of powers
or ‘aeons’, collectively called ‘the plÆrvma’ or ‘fullness’. The start-
ing point is a process by which the mysterious Godhead arrived at
a conception of himself, which has to be in some degree incomplete.
The process is then repeated and produces a series of powers, which
are not mere aspects of functions of the Godhead, but are, endowed
with personalities and will of their own. But as these moved away
from the original unity and acquired a distinct individual form, the
divine perfection was progressively limited or diluted to the point at
which actual error or sin could arise; all this in some eternal pre-
temporal state before this lower world was mistakenly created.
According to Valentinus, God has all the attributes that make for
perfection. God’s attributes, however, can only mirror the divine life
if they themselves acquire life and consciousness. But then they fall
into error by forgetting their own limitations and their need of each
other to represent the whole divine fullness.
The Nag Hammadi Tractatus Tripartitus provides a valuable and
suggestive version of Valentinus’ doctrine, which now can be con-
trasted with that of Origen.
First, Origen allows for no development in the divine being. There
is no process through which God changes in his very being, in any

137
frJohn, II.
138
Ibid.
139
Cels, II, 27; commJohn, 2, XIV; homJer, 10, 17; homLuc, 20; frLuc, 78; 166; 247;
commMatt, 12, 12; 12, 23; frEph, 17; selJob, 41; enarrJob, 21, 41; homLuc, 20; 34; 39.
64 chapter two

way. Thus the created reality affects him in no way. Origen sheerly
opposed the emanation theory, on the grounds that there can be no
continuity between the perfect God and fallible sinful creatures. If the
Aeons are in any sense divine and part of God’s own being, it is
blasphemous to represent any of them as involved in error and sin.
On the other hand, Origen argued that the created world is not
evil in itself. The origins of evil are to be found rather in the gift
of creaturely free will, and the misuse of it. Nevertheless free will
is a condition of moral life and moral progress; in the long process
of history the mistakes arising from man’s immaturity and weakness
of will can be corrected, so that humanity is fit to share in the
wonders of the age to come. Furthermore, the divine act of creation
was not only deliberate, but also wise and benevolent. In no case is
this act regarded as a ‘mistake’ of God—according to Valentinus a
malevolent and imperfect God. Origen repeatedly argues against
Valentinus, Basilides and Marcion, that there is no warrant in the
Bible for postulating another God beyond the Creator. Had there
been any similarity between Origen’s doctrine and that of Valentinus’,
the attacks by the former against the latter would not be so vigor-
ous. Origen attacks what he calls the ‘misguided wisdom of the
followers of Valentinus’140 not only on general grounds, but also when
he articulates his own view of creation in his symbolic and thought-
ful manner. It is then to be assumed that this theory is sheerly oppo-
site to that of Origen’s. I pointed out this contrast, since sometimes
Origen was victimized just because of linguistic similarities with
streams of thought not only alien to him, but also fiercely attacked
by himself, such as that of Valentinus. As a matter of fact, I have
in mind a testimony of Clement of Alexandria, about ‘the followers
of Valentinus’ who ‘allow for the Only-Begotten to be called the
arche or beginning’ (ÉArxÆn m¢n går tÚn Monogen∞ l°gousin),141 which
has to be stressed as being of no significance and could on no account
diminish Origen’s sheer diferrence from the Gnostics, as this will be
canvassed presently.
This creatures’ coming into existence marks the actual creation of
the world and is directly related to a notion of ‘diversification’, which
stems from the fall out of the divine life. This concept of Fall is
what I shall examine next.

140
Cels, VI, 35.
141
Clement of Alexandria Excerpta ex Theodoto, 1.6.1.
 CHAPTER THREE

THE FALL AND CREATION OF THE WORLD

In order to expound the concept of the Fall, we should take into

account the reality called the state before creation (tå prÚ gen°sevw).1
There is only one actual meaning which the term ‘life’ can have
when applied to that reality: this is the divine life. For in that state
there is no actual world; subsequently, there is no corporeality and
time, which are interwoven with the actual existence of the world.2
What therefore ‘lives’ is the Trinity, since ‘life without a body can
be found in the Trinity alone’.3 I have pointed out, nevertheless,
that Origen holds a notion about the wisdom of God as a ‘multi-
embroidered’ one (polupo¤kilow, as in Eph. 3, 10). This implies a
notion of ‘multitude’. This multitude, however, does not allude to
any distinction: ‘for it is impossible to speak of a part of what is
incorporeal or to make any division in it’.4 Still wisdom is a ‘living
incorporeal hypostasis of various objects of contemplation’,5 which
are held to ‘contain the reasons of everything’.6
In commEph there is a telling comment on the phrase of Paul ‘we,
like everyone else, were in our nature children of wrath’:7
We do not know what those who introduce the theory about spiritual
natures existing in the beginning could answer to the [saying] ‘We,
like everyone else, were in our nature children of wrath’. For how is
it possible for someone who is by nature Son of God to be called Son
‘of wrath’? To this they owe a reply. But, on account of our ‘body of
humiliation’,8 we think we have become ‘children of wrath in our
nature’, when our mind ‘had since our youth been inclined toward
evil things’9 (efiw d¢ tÚ ‘≥meya fÊsei t°kna Ùrg∞w …w ka‹ ofl loipo¤, oÈk

1
commJohn, 20, II.
2
frJohn, XIII; s. infra.
3
Princ, II.2.2.
4
Princ, IV.4.4.
5
commJohn, 1, XXXIV.
6
Ibid.
7
Eph. 2, 3.
8
Phil. 3, 21.
9
Gen. 8, 21.
66 chapter three

o‡damen ˜, ti pot° §roËsin ofl tåw pneumatikãw érx∞yen fÊseiw efisãgontew.

p«w går ı fÊsei uflÒw yeoË fÊsei e‰nai l°getai uflÒw ‘Ùrg∞w’ épokrin°syvsan.
≤me›w d¢ ofiÒmeya diã tÚ ‘s«ma t∞w tapein≈sevw’ gegon°nai ‘t°kna fÊsei
Ùrg∞w’ ˜te ‘§n°keito’ ≤m«n ‘≤ diãnoia §p¤ tå ponhrã §k neÒthtow’).10

The notion implied in this passage is that the world is a product of

wrath. Origen alludes to his notion of the Fall referring both to cor-
poreal nature (from Phil. 3, 21) and to God’s wrath because of man’s
disobedience, as implied in the quoted passage from Genesis. This
is certainly not accidental. Both those notions point, to a certain
extent, to his conception of the Fall, which is regarded as the ‘cause’
for this world, as it stands, to come into existence.
Origen’s conception of the Fall is the most delicate tenet of his
entire theology. I certainly refer to his written thought; for although
he held a certain conception of the Fall, he deliberately eschewed
to expound it explicitly in writing. I shall argue that many of the
miscomprehensions surrounding his thought are due to failure to
grasp this particular facet of his thought.
No systematic exposition of the conception of the Fall can be
found in the works in Greek. Orderly analyses of the various mean-
ings of érxÆ are preserved; exegeses on the notion of world are extant,
too; but the conception of the Fall was never explicated. I shall argue
that this is not unintentional at all.
Many things have been said about Origen’s mysticism;11 yet these
analyses are actually drawn from what he expressed himself. Origen
was haunted by the fear that he might enunciate mystical percep-
tions which he was not allowed to. He was always bearing in mind
that there are certain mystical truths, which God granted some peo-
ple; yet he forbade those people to utter these truths aloud. He was
always thinking of what Paul says in 2 Cor. 12, 4 about ‘ineffable
words, that man is prohibited from uttering’.
As a preacher, he always felt himself on the horns of a dilemma:
on the one hand, he felt that it was not his right to deprive people
from the wisdom which God granted him. On the other, his fear
was that he might explicate more than what he was allowed to do.
This agony is expressed in his Dial. Intending to speak about the

10
commEph, p. 404.
11
Cf. H. Crouzel: Origène et la conaissance mystique, Paris, 1961; also R.P. Lawson,
op. cit., Introduction.
 the fall and creation of the world 67

soul (a topic directly related to the concept of Fall) he makes a long

introduction, emphasizing that ‘the ideas are delicate’ and, therefore,
they demand listeners who are able to apprehend the deeper truths;12
for ‘we have reached a mystical doctrine’ (§p¤ lÒgon ≥lyomen mustikÒn).13
Here is how he feels on saying a few words about this mystical truth:
I feel agony when intending to speak; I feel agony when intending not
to speak (égvni« efipe›n, égvni« ka‹ mØ efipe›n). I want to speak for the
sake of those who are worthy, lest I be accused of depriving of the
word those able to understand it. Because of the unworthy I shrink
from speaking for the reasons I have given, lest I should be flinging
holy things to dogs and casting pearls before swine. It was the work
of Jesus only to know how to distinguish among his hearers between
those without and those within, so that he spoke to those without in
parables, but explained the parables to those who entered into his
house.14 To remain without and to enter into the house have a mys-
tical meaning (mustikÒn §stin). ‘Why should I judge those that are
without?’15 Every sinner is without. That is why those without are
addressed in parables in case they should be able to leave the things
without and enter the things within. To enter the house has a mysti-
cal meaning (mustikÒn §stin); he who enters Jesus’ house is his true
disciple. He enters by holding the doctrine of the Church, by living
a life according to the teaching of the Church. ‘Within’ and ‘without’
have a spiritual sense.16
Here is then the reason for being anxious:
If I display before the common crowd what the Holy Spirit has revealed
and entrusted to me, I sell it for a price and do not teach without
payment, what else am I doing except selling doves, that is, the Holy
Spirit? When I sell the Spirit, I am cast out of God’s temple.17
Thus, he regards the concept of Fall as a mystical truth, which should
be not enunciated or couched at all. For to inquire deeply in and
speak about ‘the creation of the Lucifer, is beyond our ability. For
the doctrine about this question is great and difficult to speculate’
(polÊw går ı per¤ toÊtou lÒgow ka‹ dusye≈rhtow).18 This doctrine is

12
Dial; BGF, v. 16, p. 373.
13
Ibid.
14
Cf. Mark 4, 11; Matt. 13, 36; similarly, Cels, III, 21.
15
1 Cor. 5, 12.
16
Dial; BGF, v. 16, pp. 373–4.
17
He refers to Luke 19, 45 ‘He went into the temple and . . . he cast out those
who were selling doves.’ homLuc, 38, 5.
18
selPs, 109.
68 chapter three

about the ‘mystery of creation.’19 and, as such, it cannot be easily

grasped, ‘even by those who are trained in philosophy, unless by
means of divine inspiration’20 The actual creation itself was made
according to ‘a secret reason’,21 and thus ‘the doctrine of the cre-
ation of the world’ is mystical; this is one of the mysteries hidden
in the scripture (tå per¤ kosmopoi¤aw ka‹ êlla mustÆria)22 and to
refrain from explicating mystical doctrines is an attitude rigorously
advocated:
The doctrines about these questions are great and mystical. To this
teaching the saying ‘it is good to hide the mystery of the king’23 is
befitting. For we do not want the teaching about souls (which do not
assume a body according to a doctrine of transmigration) to be cast
before just any audience, nor that holy things should be given to the
dogs, nor that pearls be cast before swine.24 For that would be impi-
ous, as it constitutes a betrayal of the secret mysteries of the wisdom
of God (prodos¤an peri°xon t«n éporrÆtvn t∞w toË YeoË sof¤aw log¤vn),
of which it is well written: ‘Wisdom will not enter into a soul that
practices evil neither will it dwell in a body involved in sin’ (efiw
kakÒtexnon cuxÆn oÈk efiseleÊsetai sof¤a oÈd° katoikÆsei §n s≈mati
katãxrev èmart¤aw).25 It is then enough to give an account of the doc-
trines which are said in a mystical way, under the guise of a story,
by just following the course of that story, in order that those who have
the ability may work out the meaning of the passages for themselves.26
If someone is ‘supported by the spirit of wisdom’ he should be cau-
tious not to ‘thoughtlessly enunciate the divine mysteries of the Holy
Scripture.’27
This is the background against which this doctrine of creation
should be considered. It is plain that had he held any sort of Platonic

19
commMatt, 15, 23.
20
Cels, IV, 65.
21
frMatt, 166.
22
commGen, 3; BGF, 15, 121; PG. 12.84; Philocalia, 23, 20.
23
Tobit 12, 7.
24
Matt. 7, 6.
25
Wis. 1, 4. Origen makes full and unqualified use of the Septuagint. There are
no ‘apocrypha’ for him. The version of the Septuagint he uses is the same as the
text used by the Eastern Orthodox Church today. The same holds for the num-
bering of the Psalms.
26
Cels, V, 29.
27
frPs, 111, 5; also s. the section in commMatt, 14, 12, which strangely enough
is not extant in the Latin rendering, since there is a lacuna in the Latin transla-
tion at that point.
 the fall and creation of the world 69

conception, he could have no difficulty in expounding this. Quite

significantly though he persistently kept refraining from explicating
his doctrine. It could be certainly absurd to assume that Origen held
a Platonic conception and yet he eschewed enunciating what was
available to the layman of his day. Instead, he constantly sustained
that he does not wish to explicate the doctrine about the soul, which
is ‘mystical’28 and ‘secret’.29 In the same vein, he states that
only few people are able to comprehend those who expound the doc-
trines about the state before creation (tå prÚ gen°sevw) and the deeper
meaning of creation (ka‹ tå §n gen°sei) of everything that exists more
systematically; these doctrines might embarrass one (tarãjai ên tina
tå toiaËta) who will hear but will not accurately understand them
(sun°nta m¢n taËta, mØ ékriboËnta d¢); this is why, in relation to these
[doctrines], we imperil ourselves; for to speak about and elaborate on
them is precarious (§pisfal°w) eventhough the doctrines are true (tÚ
l°gein ka‹ énaptÊssein tå toiaËta §st¤n §pisfal°w kên élhyeÊhtai).30

Even in case one preaches a true doctrine (lÒgow élhyÆw), this could
cause undesirable effects to a soul ‘which is sick and does not need
this kind of food’. Therefore, ‘to explicate the true doctrines is dan-
gerous’ (ka‹ oÏtvw ka‹ télhy∞ l°gein kindun«d°w §sti).31 It is dan-
gerous not only to enunciate untrue doctrines, but also (to enunciate)
true ones, once they should not be enunciated.32 For it is necessary
‘not to divulge’ (dhmosieÊein) doctrines which are ‘mystical and
deeper’.33 Even the evangelists (as Matthew, in this case) kept them-
selves ‘far from the danger of exposing the mysteries’.34
To Origen this was an attitude of piety. As he explains in Cels,
“we practice a pure piety towards the creator and praise the beau-
tiful things that he has created, without defiling the divine things
even by naming them”.35

28
selEz, 4, PG 13.781.
29
commMatt, 15, 34.
30
commJohn, 20, II. What Origen means by ‘mystery’ is stated in Cels, 5, XIX.
He refers to ‘secret truths . . . which are not appropriate for the simple-minded and
for the ears of the common crowd’. Thus a ‘mystery’ (quoting 1 Cor. 15, 51) is a
“word usually applied to the deeper and more mystical doctrines which are rightly
concealed from the multitude”.
31
commJohn, 32, XXIV.
32
expProv, 23, PG 17.224.
33
expProv, 22, PG 17.217.
34
commMatt, 30.
35
Cels, IV, 48.
70 chapter three

The concern that his thought might be misunderstood haunted

him throughout his life.36 And yet, despite his cautiousness and ret-
icence on doctrines that were liable to being misunderstood, history
shows that he did not avoid what he was afraid of: he eventually
was miscomprehended and ascribed views which were never sus-
tained by him.
This is the personal background against which, in Cels, he refers
to the conception of Fall; yet all he says on this subject is this: “And
the man who is evicted from the paradise together with his wife . . . has
a meaning which is ineffable and mystical”.37 In view of what he
held about those truths that are ‘ineffable and mystical’ it is not sur-
prising that he deliberately avoided setting forth a systematic expo-
sition of his doctrine of the Fall.
We can, nevertheless, find some reference to this subject at some
points of his work in Greek and thus identify some vital elements
of this concept. We can also use the Latin rendering of Princ; but
in this case we should use this work with much more caution than
usually. In the Introduction I have argued that this work should not
be used (as it usually is) in order to interpret Origen’s thought; rather
it should be used only as an ancillary source. In point of the con-
ception of the Fall, Princ should be cleared from many of the mis-
interpretations of Rufinus, as well as from views falsely ascribed to
Origen by others and embodied in Koetchau’s edition. It is most
unfortunate that these fragments have been dignified with the word
evidence. At any rate, this work will be taken into account where
statements preserved in Greek corroborate portions preserved only
in Latin.
Considering Origen’s perception of God and creation there are
two realities which have been distinguished thus far:
First, the reality of God, the divine life, in which there is God only.
Secondly, the divine reality in which God ‘decorated’ the ‘body’
of the ‘multi-embroidered’ wisdom: the providential creation came
into being out of nothingness. This marks the creation of incorpo-
real nature. Speaking of existential reality in this state, it should be
clear that it is only the person of Christ who lives as Wisdom, whereas

36
homJer, 16, 1; Cels, VII, 38.
37
Cels, IV, 40.
 the fall and creation of the world 71

the created ‘reasons’ and ‘objects of contemplation’ are also called

‘wisdom’38 and are regarded as decorating the ‘body’ of Christ.
A third reality, subsequent to the second one, is the Fall out of
the ‘body’ of Christ. It is only then that the actual creation comes
into existence out of non-existence; it is then that space-time comes
into existence and rational creatures, as individual personalities, start
to exist.39
This explicit exposition, once enunciated in words, seems para-
doxical already. For how can the second reality be said to be ‘after’
the first one once there was no time yet? We see, therefore, that
the explicit illustration requires the compromise to discuss what appears
as a paradox only once couched in words. For there is no doubt that any
one can figure a reality ‘before’ creation, which cannot be stated as
‘before’ all the same. In any event, the paradox of expressions does
not end here.
The second reality is that in which incorporeal nature was made.
Origen has already asserted that what in Genesis is stated as hav-
ing been made ‘in the image’ of God has nothing to do with ‘matter’:
‘the first man’ who was made ‘in the image of God’ was ‘immate-
rial and superior to any corporeal nature’.40 The question at this
point is: was this creaturely life? The answer to this is unqualifiedly
negative. For life pertains only to what is related to time, since the
notion of creaturely life is closely associated with the actual creation
of the world.41 Considering the Pauline portion, ‘Because all things
are from him and through him and in him’,42 and applying his usual
scrutiny on the meaning of the prepositions, he observes that ‘from
him’ suggests ‘something originative’.43

38
expProv, 7, PG 17.180; Cf. commJohn, 1, xxxiv; 2, xviii; Cant, PG 17.260.
39
P. Plass gives an erroneous account of Origen’s views on this subject: he thinks,
there are “no less than four different levels: God, Wisdom, minds before the fall,
minds fallen into time/space/matter” (op. cit., p. 13). Accordingly, he is inclined to
see here as God the Plotinian One, and Wisdom as the Plotinian Mind etc. and
thinks that it is only the names which change. On the assertion about the relation
of God to Wisdom I have already commented. With regard to the implied world
‘before the fall’, this is wrong, too, as I argue presently.
40
Dial; BGF, v. 16, p. 374.
41
commJohn, 2, XIX.
42
Rom. 11, 36.
43
John 1, 3–4; Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 3.10.3.
72 chapter three

But Paul is not the only apostle who maintains distinctions in the use
of prepositions, for indeed John does this as well. When, for example,
he says of the Logos of God that ‘all things were made through him’,
he testifies that life was not made through him but in him. For he says,
‘What was made is life in him’.44
Hence, when Origen speaks of ‘first’ creation he points to an ‘act’
of God in his wisdom. Speaking of life in that reality, it is the divine
life that should be understood. There is a reality then which appears
obscure: on the one hand there is a created reality, and yet, on the
other, there is no creaturely life. For, at that state, it is only the Son of
God to whom the predication of life pertains. When, therefore, Origen
speaks of ‘first’ creation, which was ‘incorporeal’, he does not refer
to any ‘incorporeal world’ whatsoever. For strictly speaking there is
no world at all. The reality is the ‘body’ of Christ, which was dec-
orated, ‘embroidered’ by those reasons (called ‘precious stones’) which
were ‘created’ and were seen by God as ‘good’. As a reply to those
who ascribe a Platonic conception to Origen,45 he makes a significant
distinction:
Although God is incorporeal and what was made is incorporeal
too, there is a profound difference between them: The ‘made’ incor-
poreal is explicitly said to be not ımooÊsion (consubstantial) with
God.46 The difference lies precisely in that the latter incorporeal
nature is created, whereas God himself is uncreated. This conception is
then essentially different from any Platonic one. For Plato never
made such a radical distinction.47

44
John 1, 3–4; op. cit., 3.10.2, p. 231.
45
This is what G. Butterworth does in FP, p. 253, n. 4, where he thinks that
Origen’s conception that God created two universal natures, namely, the incorpo-
real and the corporeal one, might be compared with what is stated in Plato’s Phaedo,
79A. One, however, does not have to study too hard that point of Plato’s work in
order to see that Origen’s affirmations have nothing to do with it.
46
commJohn, 13, XXV. The same notion is suggested in Cels, VI, 44. It is char-
acteristic that Augustine, who was prompt to condemn Origen by name, (Augustine,
De haeresibus, XLIII; Migne, PL, XLII.) espoused, for quite some time, the Manichaean
view that the soul was of the same substance as God. As he himself states, he strug-
gled to free himself from this doctrine (de Ordine, 2.46).
47
Cf. Johanneskommentar, GCS, 4, p. 249; also C. Blanc, Commentaire sur S. Jean,
III, p. 112. I think that the text at this point could be restored thus: ÑAllÉ oÈx
ır«sin <ofl toiaËta l°gontew> ˜ti pantÒw <toË ımoous¤ou suggen°w tÚ e‰nai tÚ aÈtÒ>
ka‹ t«n aÈt«n dektikÒn: efi d¢ §d°jato tÚ porneËsai ≤ pneumatikÆ fÊsiw, ımooÊsiow
oÔsa <tª égennÆtƒ ye¤& fÊsei ˜sa> énÒsia ka‹ éseb∞ ékolouye› t“ lÒgƒ t“ katÉ
aÈtoÊw per¤ yeoË oÈd° fantasivy∞nai ék¤ndunÒn §stin. The word suggen°w which
 the fall and creation of the world 73

When G. Florovski48 argues that the ‘difference’ between God and

the world lies in the fact that they are not ‘consubstantial’, he is
unaware that this is only a faint echo of the views of Origen (whom
he so often decried for what he had taken to be his conception of
the world).49 This is why Florovski feels it necessary to appeal to
Augustine who said; “non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de
nihilo . . . quapropter creaturam universam neque consubstantialem Deo,
neque coaeternam fas est dicere, aut credere” (Nature was not cre-
ated from God but by God . . . Hence we should not say or believe
that universe is consubstantial or co-eternal with God).50 What Florovski
ascribes to Augustine is in fact Origen’s conception about the ‘non-
consubstantiality’ of God and creation. He also speaks about a dis-
tance between God and the world, yet ‘not a spatial one but pertaining
to nature’ (oÈ tÒpƒ éllã fÊsei) appealing to John of Damascus.51
But this quotation is a word-for-word portion from Origen’s commJohn
(oÈ tÒpƒ)52 employed by John of Damascus.
What was ‘made’ as incorporeal was not a world of living indi-
vidual persons, as we have seen. On the other hand, this is not so
simple as to say that this was not living, namely, that it was just a
bundle of ‘ideas’ or ‘forms’ in God’s mind, as Philo might have said.
If those ‘made’ incorporeal were just that, then the conception of
the Fall could hardly make sense. This, because, another substantial
difference between the ‘made’ incorporeal and the divine essence lies
in the fact that the created incorporeal is susceptible of a kind of
‘change’. As Origen argues alluding to the notion of Fall, those which
are ‘consubstantial are also susceptible of the same properties’.53 But
he does not elaborate on this remark any further.

I propound here, as well as the syntax of suggen°w with Genitive, is familiar to

Origen and it is found in the same work more than once; Cf. commJohn, 10, XXXIX,
the expressions suggenoËw •bdomãdow and suggenoËw diastÆmatow.
48
G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, Greek tr. by P. Pallis, Thessaloniki, 1979;
p. 52.
49
G. Florovski, Aspects of Church History, pp. 45ff.
50
De Genesi ad Litteram, I, PL XXXIV, p. 221. G. Florovski wrote an entire work
(Studia Partistica, VI, 1962, 36–57, repr. in Aspects of Church History, pp. 45–73.) in
order to prove that Athanasius’ conception of creation is the counter-point of Origen’s
views. What he actually did, however, was to expound Origen’s theory of creation
(being himself unconscious of this fact) attributing them to Athanasius, thinking that
they are contrasted with what he had misunderstood as views of Origen.
51
G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, pp. 53 and 310.
52
commJohn, 19, XX.
53
commJohn, 13, XXV.
74 chapter three

This is a delicate point of the entire doctrine. One could take it

that these incorporeals were living yet not a life of their own, but the
life of Christ. This is what seems to be a paradox and which Origen
did not wish to elaborate on. A figure of this perception might be
traced in Paul’s saying ‘I live; yet not I but Christ lives in me’,54
which is a statement, to which Origen appeals quite often. Another
useful figure of Origen’s perception at this point is the scriptural
instance where Paul speaks of being ‘one flesh’ and of marriage as
‘a great mystery’, which points to ‘Christ and the Church’.55
It is out of this state that the Fall occurs. This is a fall from God.56
In the light of this, Origen criticizes Heracleon who wrote that the
Logos in his relation to creation is not he ‘from whom’ or ‘by whom’,
but only ‘through whom’ creation was made.57 He takes exception
to this view, but again he does not elaborate further. He only says
that he himself has also treated the notion of ‘through whom’, but
Heracleon, as it seems from his opinion, seems not to have been
instructed properly by the divine writings.58
Elsewhere, however, it is stated clearer that the world is in a sta-
tus ‘out’ of God. For it is Paul who, in Rom. 11, 36, portrayed the
beginning of everything by the expression ‘out of him’ (§j aÈtoË).59 In
general, the scriptural passages supporting the view that the world
came out of God, are the following: ‘yet for us there is one God,
the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist’;60 ‘For
from him and through him and to him are all things’,61 and the
saying about Jesus who ‘has come out of God’.62
Origen is very cautious in adumbrating63 how this fall occurred.
The step towards this direction is to introduce the idea that a ‘moult-
ing’ (pterorrÊhsiw) is possible from the body of wisdom.64 Here is

54
Gal. 2, 20.
55
Eph. 5, 31–32.
56
Cels, VII, 69.
57
commJohn, 2, XIV.
58
Ibid.
59
Cels, VI, 65.
60
1 Cor. 8, 6.
61
Rom. 11, 36.
62
John 13, 3. S. commJohn, 32, III; 20, XIX.
63
I say ‘adumbrating’ instead of ‘portraying’, since nowhere does Origen attempt
to explicate his doctrine of the Fall.
64
Cels, VI, 43. In his translation of Cels (p. 360, n. 11) H. Chadwick takes this
affirmation as an allusion to Plato, Phaedrus 246B, C. It is Origen himself though
 the fall and creation of the world 75

the most mystical point of his doctrine. This is why he endeavours

to express this in a manner appropriate to the case, that is, not by
a wording of his own, but through a scriptural quotation from Ezekiel:
But let us now see what the actual words of prophecy teach us. ‘The
word of the Lord’, it says, ‘came unto me, saying, Son of man, take
up a lamentation for the prince of Tyre, and say unto him, Thus saith
the Lord God: Thou wert a signet of likeness and a crown of honour
in the delights of the paradise of God. Thou wast adorned with every
fine stone and gem, and wast clothed with sardius and topaz and emer-
ald and carbuncle and sapphire and jasper, set in gold and silver, and
with agate and amethyst and chrysolite and beryl and onyx; with gold
also didst thou fill thy treasuries and thy store-houses in thy midst.
From the day thou wast created with the cherubim, I placed you in
the holy mount of God. Thou wast in the midst of the fiery stones,
thou wast stainless in thy days, from the day thou wast created until
the time that iniquities were found in thee; from the multitude of thy
commerce thou didst fill thy storehouses with iniquity, and thou didst
sin and wast cast wounded out of the mount of God. A cherub drove
thee forth from the midst of the fiery stones. Thy heart was lifted up
at thine honour; thy knowledge was corrupted with thy beauty; for
the multitude of thy sins I have cast thee down to the earth in the
presence of kings.’65
This passage of Ezekiel is taken to point to ‘an adverse power’ which
‘was formerly holy and blessed’ and ‘fell from this state of blessedness
and was cast down into the earth . . . from the time that iniquity was
found in him, while his fallen condition was not due to his nature.’66
The Fall is a fall of ‘one’. In the foregoing passage, it is Rufinus
rather than Origen who feels it necessary to fill the expression by
saying ‘an adverse power’. For Origen himself eschews any elabo-
ration of this and simply speaks of ‘one’: he leaves this numerical
just like that, refraining from any account as to ‘who’ or ‘what’ this
‘one’ is. He just speaks of ‘one, who fell from the bliss’;67 further he

who refers to Plato explicitly, indeed to the same point of Phaedrus, in order to
declare that his conception of the fall has nothing to do with the Platonic views in
general and particularly as stated at that point of Phaedrus.
65
Ezek. 28, 11–19. Princ, I.4.4.
66
Princ, I.4.4. Here I am reminded again the awkward treatment of temporal
notions by Rufinus. He speaks of the ‘one’s’ fall ‘at some later time‘ (ibid., italics mine).
Although the fundamental conception is undoubtedly Origen’s, there is nothing of
his caution and meticulousness in treating this crucial point, as it appears in his
writings in Greek.
67
commJohn, 32, XVIII.
76 chapter three

speaks of ‘one’, applying the adjective ‘ruler’ without stating any

noun again; ‘while there were many rulers (érxÒntvn) who were
made (genom°nvn), it was one who fell’.68
It is significant that no noun is applied to the ‘one’ who fell. This
directly stems from the tenet, which sustains unity in the primeval
reality of providential creation.69 It should also be noted that the
adjective érxÒntvn (‘rulers’) is derived from the word érxÆ.70 Whenever
Origen speaks of the Fall, he refers to it as a fall of ‘one’71 that has
‘moulted’ (pterorruÆsaw) and, therefore, fell from the ‘bliss’.72 Formerly
this ‘one’ was in the paradise of God, but became satiated, as it
were, and was lost, according to the scriptural writer73 who said mys-
tically: ‘you have come to a dreadful end and shall be no more for
ever’’.74 This ‘one’ is also called ‘the first’ (ı pr«tow).75 For “after the
moulting of the first (t“ pr≈tƒ !p!t!erorruÆsanti) others moulted also
(ka‹ ˜ti épÒ tinvn pterorruhsãntvn) and followed this first one down
(ka‹ katakolouyhsãntvn t“ pr≈tƒ)”.76 This ‘one’ is also described
as ‘evil’ (ponhroË); it is quite characteristic that the term §kpesÒntow
at that point is the Past participle of the verb §kp¤ptv, which means,
‘fall down out of a place’. This is how both notions about the Fall
(a fall out of the divine being, as well as a fall down,)77 are denoted.
Certainly when Origen refers to the aftermath of the Fall (and not
the occurrence itself ), he attributes a number of names to this ‘one’
who fell ‘first’. He calls it a ‘dragon’, or a ‘big sea-monster’ (as in
Job 3, 8); also, he uses other names, mostly drawn from allegorical

68
Ibid. It is significant to notice again that Origen says that this ‘one’ like the
others, was ‘made’; he also says that ‘while he was in divine reality, he fell’. Ibid.
69
Cf. commJohn, 10, XXXV.
70
érxÒntvn means ‘of those who hold the érxÆ’, that is ‘the power’; but as here
érxÆ means the wisdom itself, the term érxÒntvn means ‘those who are in arche’,
namely ‘in wisdom’. From this follows that the term érxÒntvn is not any particu-
lar definition of this ‘one’; it simply indicates that, ‘before’ the fall, this ‘one’ was
in the wisdom.
71
commJohn, 20, XXII.
72
Cels, VI, 44.
73
He means Ezekiel, alluding to the passage in Ez. 28, 19, which follows.
74
Cels, VI, 44.
75
Cels, VI, 44.
76
Cf. Cels, VI, 43; also VI, 44. Quite tellingly Origen uses the verb katakolouyh-
sãntvn which is the Past participle of the verb katakolouy« and means ‘follow
down’; in this way the notion that the world is ‘down’ with respect to God’s time-
less eternity is denoted again; s. also, commJohn, 19, XXII.
77
Cels, VI, 43. I will discuss this notion about the world later.
 the fall and creation of the world 77

interpretations of the Scripture.78 Again, however, any explicit state-

ment is eschewed.
He says that sin entered this world through one man, and it is cer-
tain that he designates this place in which men live as the earthly
world. Because of this you will ask, of course, whether sin entered no
other place79 or whether it is not also found in those places where ‘the
spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places’80 are named? A futher
question you should consider for yourself is: From where did sin enter
this world?81 Where was it prior to its entrance here? Did it even exist
at all? Or was it prior to him to whom it is said, ‘Up to the time
when iniquities were found in you’; and, also, ‘for this reason I cast
you to the earth’?82 But it is not safe to discuss these things further,
because we may observe that the Apostle has scarcely touched these
matters in individual discourses.83
Once Origen articulated this fundamental notion about the fall of
the ‘one’, he refers to ‘some others’ who ‘moulted’ also and ‘fol-
lowed’ the ‘first’ ‘down’.84
There is a characteristic point made in commJohn, referring to the
devil that fell and is stated as ‘man-killer’ (ényrvpoktÒnow) in the
gospel of John.85 It is pointed out that the devil, who killed the man
who was made ‘in image’ of God, did not perpetrate this ‘killing’
to any particular individual creature: John’s expression refers to human
nature in general (oÈ diã tina ßna fid¤vw poiÒn, éllã diÉ ˜lon tÚ
g°now ˜ ép°kteinen).86 In this way Origen maintains his view that
providential creation does not refer to any individual creature, but
bears upon the reasons which interact and converge to the emergence
of human nature. In the same passage, however, it is pointed out that

78
commJohn, 1, XVII; also Cels, VI, 43.
79
Cf. ibid., 3.6.6.; commMatt, 13, 20.
80
Eph. 6, 12.
81
Cf. commJohn, 2, XV; Princ, I.5.2–5.
82
Ezek. 28, 15–17; for interpretation of this portion as referring to the ‘one’ who
fell ‘first’, cf. ibid., 5.10.13; Princ, I.5.4; Hom in Ezek, 1, 3; apud ibid., p. 313, n. 91.
83
Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 5.1.17, p. 312; the translator P.
Scheck at this point (n. 91) thinks that “Erasmus reasonably conjectures that Rufinus
has omitted material at this point.” Erasmus is not correct: Origen himself at numer-
ous instances alludes to ‘mystical doctrines’ refraining from any elaboration on them.
This tactic recurs in Cels, and even more in Dial.
84
Cels, VI, 43; also, VIII, 25.
85
John 8, 44; commJohn, XXVI; XXVII.
86
commJohn, 20, XXV.
78 chapter three

this creature (that is, human nature) was not just an ‘idea’ in God’s
mind, but it was living. The fall of Adam is ‘death’ and it is argued
that ‘strictly speaking, no one can be said to be dead unless he lived
before’.87 Yet this was the divine life, not a personal creaturely life
of their own.
Since Adam means man, by Adam’s fall one should understand
the doctrine ‘about man and his former life and the descending
because of disobedience’.88 At any rate, it was the devil that fell first,
once he took himself ‘to be self-sufficient and not needing the help
of Jesus.’89 Thus
everyone who wishes to do the desires of the devil . . . has become a
child of the devil, and has been formed from wishing to do the desires
of the worse one, and is in the image of the wicked father [sc. the
devil], from whom the images of that earthly man come and receive
their imprint.90
For ‘that first was earthly’91 and “since he fell away from the supe-
rior reality and desired a life different from the superior life, he
deserved to be a beginning neither of something created nor made,
but of ‘something molded by the Lord, made to be mocked by his
angles’.92 As far as we [sc. humans] are concerned, our true sub-
stance, too, is in our being according to the image of the Creator,93
but the substance resulting from guilt is in the thing molded, which
was received from the dust of the earth.94 Thus “the abuse (of the
devil) is directed against us; this abuse, nevertheless, does not orig-
inate in his capricious dealing with us, but in his enmity against
God”.95
The immediate result of the Fall is the actual creation, which
comes into existence according to the created reasons. More specifically,
this marks the emergence of bodily nature, creation of matter itself
for those who ‘needed a material life’ in the ‘world’ which ‘was cre-

87
Ibid.
88
homLuc, 34.
89
homLuc, 31.
90
commJohn, 20, XXII.
91
Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 47–49. Ibid.
92
Job 40, 19. Ibid.
93
Cf. Col. 3, 10.
94
Cf. Gen. 2, 7.
95
frMatt, 298.
 the fall and creation of the world 79

ated as a material one’.96 Also, ‘once the dragon fell down from the
clear life’, which was ‘immaterial and absolutely incorporeal’, ‘before
anything else, he has been bound with matter and body’.97
A main result of the fall is the destruction of the original unity.
Hence, what comes forth is ‘multitude of number’ (pl∞yow ériymoË),
‘schism’ (sx¤sma), ‘division’ (dia¤resiw) and ‘disagreement’ (diafvn¤a).
All these are regarded as ‘signs of wickedness’. This conviction is so
strong that these characteristics are established as a guideline for exe-
gesis: whenever these notions are found in the Scripture, they should
be interpreted as denotations of evil and the relevant passages should
be interpreted accordingly.98 There is a critical question which is a
fundamental prerequisite for comprehending this conception of
the Fall: what was that which fell?; and a subsequent question: what
is that which constitutes the personal identity of the rational crea-
tures? This question is directly related to the notion of ‘moulting’
(pterorrÊhsiw) which is the most mystical point of this doctrine of
the Fall; yet it has to be answered, at least to the extent that it could
be possible, since this is the crucial point of the entire conception.
It is a fundamental tenet of Origen that the ‘end’ will be like the
‘beginning’.99 Although he does not elaborate on the essence of this
‘one’ who fell, he does so when he expounds his conception of the
end. I have quoted above a significant passage from Princ, accord-
ing to which this ‘one’ had been placed by God ‘in the midst’ of
precious stones.100 But there is no allusion pointing to what this ‘one’
was: we learn ‘where’ this was (in the divine reality), we understand
that this was incorporeal (since that reality is entirely incorporeal);101
we also learn ‘in the midst’ of what this ‘one’ was—it was in the
midst of precious stones. But we can pick up nothing about this
‘one’ itself.
From Cels we learn something more about this ‘one’ and its orig-
inal and impeccable state: this was a ‘precious stone’ among other

96
commJohn, 19, XX.
97
commJohn, 1, XVII.
98
selGen (comm. on Gen. 11, 7); also commJohn, 5, V
99
Princ, VI.6.2, II.1.3., III.5.4, III.6.3, III.6.8. Cf. selPs., 117.
100
Princ, I.4.4.
101
s. also, Dial, where Origen speaks of the state before the fall as an “immate-
rial and superior to any bodily hypostasis” (ê#lon ka‹ kre›tton pãshw svmatik∞w
Ípostãsevw). BGF, 16,374,16.
80 chapter three

precious stones in the divine reality; it was placed as an ‘ornament’

in the ‘body’ of the ‘multi-embroidered’ Wisdom;. it was a ‘living
stone’,102 yet this life was not its own life: this was the divine life of
Wisdom herself. It is pointed out that the scriptural reference to
‘precious stones’ has a ‘mystical meaning’ and ‘the just are them-
selves every species of select and precious stones’.103 After all,
the divine words teach about resurrection in a mystical manner, which
can be apprehended by those who are able to listen to the voice of
God by means of a more divine hearing and they say that . . . the
body of Christ . . . will be rebuilt with stones which are living, as well
as precious.104
What fell, therefore, was an ‘ornament’ from the ‘body’ of Wisdom.
What lived until that moment is pretty clear: it was Wisdom her-
self, living her divine life. On no account can we say that this ‘orna-
ment’, this ‘precious’ ‘living stone’, was living as an individual hypostasis
in the divine life, in the sense that it was conducting a life of its
own; for in that reality (which is incorporeal) there can be neither
‘distinction’ nor ‘division’. Besides, what was created in the provi-
dential creation was not any individual creature and, in any event,
‘we cannot speak of parts of what is incorporeal’.105
It should be emphasized that it is mainly this point which Origen
eschewed to enunciate. Although he says certain things about his
doctrine of the Fall, here is how he goes on:
We have exposed a few of our views according to our faith in Scripture;
we did so having committed a bold venture upon the subject (épote-
tolmhm°nvw), and having made a risky venture (parakekinduneum°nvw);
in fact, however, we have said nothing.106
It is out of this ‘said nothing’ that one should endeavour to portray
this conception of the Fall. There is no other way, since he delib-
erately does not state anything about this tenet explicitly. But to

102
Cf. 1 Pet. 2, 5. Cels, VIII, 19 and 20.
103
Cels, VIII, 20.
104
Cels, VIII, 19.
105
s. supra.
106
Cels, VI, 44. The following question might be posed: How is it possible to
speak at the same time of both, namely, of ‘distinction’ non-existent and of ‘one’
who committed sin and fell? How the notion of ‘non-distinction’ is compatible with
that of ‘one’? On this question Origen eschewed to elaborate, seeking to preserve
the mystical character of the doctrine.
 the fall and creation of the world 81

ascribe to Origen a Platonic notion about pre-existing personal incor-

poreal rational creatures, which received a body, is just a simplistic
and misleading solution, which garbles his real doctrine.
Origen himself was aware of the Platonic theory about the issue.
Yet he says that
the man who is evicted from paradise together with his wife ‘clothed
in garments of skins’,107 which were made by God because of the
human offence, has an ineffable and mystical sense, which is higher
than the notion of Plato who holds that soul comes down and moults
‘until it finds something solid’.108
In selGen he comments once more on the same passage of Genesis
and rejects the exegesis that the ‘garments of skins’ suggest assump-
tion of material bodies. Here is how he argues: “if the garments of
skins signify flesh and bones, how is it possible for Adam to say
before that: ‘This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh’?”109
Again, however, he does not explicate his own opinion. He deems
it enough to contrast his own conception from the Platonic tenet,
referring to this by name; all he says is that one “should inquire
into the hidden treasure of the scriptural letter.”110 The same stance
is taken in frMatt, 431, where it is stated that mind has been joined
together with flesh “according to reasons known to God alone” (kayÉ
oÏw o‰de lÒgouw).111
Therefore, it is Origen himself who quotes Plato and contrasts his
own views with Platonism. To attribute Platonism to him on this
doctrine is then only a simplistic way out of the puzzle of his doc-
trine, for which the only thing for sure is that it is not the Platonic
one, according to Origen’s own statements. Besides, it could be ludi-
crous to assert that he strove to disguise his own tenet so as to con-
trast it to Platonism, doing so by saying nothing about it and making
only some hints; and this, when the Platonic basics were known to
every fairly educated man of Origen’s era.
Thus peronal creaturely life starts only with the existence of the
actual creation. For only then do personal beings begin to exist as

107
Gen. 3, 21.
108
Cels, IV, 40. Quoting Plato, Phaedrus, 246B, C; s.also Cels, VIII, 53.
109
Gen. 2, 23.
110
selGen, (comm. on Gen. 3, 21), PG 12.101; Cf. commJohn, 10, VI.
111
frMatt, 431.
82 chapter three

individuals; it is only then that they acquire a life of their own. It

is only then that it makes sense to speak about ‘the first moment of
their creation by God’,112 or about ‘the time their personality first
emerged’.113 These are certainly expressions from the Latin render-
ing of Princ, where temporal terms are used too frequently and too
awkwardly; still we can discern this essential facet of this doctrine
behind expressions of this kind.
There is something at this point, which might appear as a para-
dox: while coming into being out of non-being refers to an occurrence into
the divine life, creaturely life pertains to space-time. This is a nuance,
which should be taken into account. The former notion refers to the
second of the realities stated above (the Wisdom which became, embroi-
dered with the ‘precious-stones’-reasons), whereas the latter refers to
the third reality (actual creation of the material world). The former
refers to the unity in the ‘body’ of Christ, the latter refers to the
emergence of diversity and individuality (namely, to the world), which
is external to the divine reality. When Origen avers that life is one of
the conceptions that does not pertain to Christ himself, but only ‘to
others’ (oÈx aÍt“, éllÉ •t°roiw),114 it is obvious that a fundamental
premise has been established: the predication ‘others’ itself implies a
notion of distinction—a notion which by no means can be applied to
the divine life. This ‘others’—clause is significant and has to be borne
in mind together with the phrase that there was no “time, when the
third and fourth conceptions [of the Son] were not existing at all”.
The conception of ‘life’ starts to make sense only when this is life
of ‘others’, that is, when ‘otherness’ makes its mark in ontology.
Which means that ‘otherness’ begins to make sense when ‘multitude
of number’ (pl∞yow ériymoË), ‘schism’ (sx¤sma), ‘division’ (dia¤resiw)
and ‘disagreement’ (diafvn¤a) make their mark as ‘signs of wicked-
ness’, as noted earlier. Beyond Wisdom and Logos, all other con-
ceptions make sense only in the context of the relation between the
Logos and the world, indeed the “third and fourth” conceptions are
‘imposed by the Logos, and time cannot be found in the state where
the third and the fourth conceptions did not exist at all’.115 Before

112
Princ, I.5.3.
113
Ibid.
114
commJohn, 2, XVIII.
115
commJohn, 2, XVIV.
 the fall and creation of the world 83

the Fall, therefore, the ‘precious stones’116 which ‘embroider’ the body
of Wisdom are not actually ‘others’ and their life is not a life of
‘others’. Time appears as an element of the world when the notion
of ‘life of others’ starts to make sense, that is, upon the Fall.
Distinction virtually denotes existence of the material world.117 This
is why the predicate of creaturely life cannot be applied to the reality
‘before’ creation of the world. It is then worth pondering on the
conception of that reality further. Referring to the actual creation
of the world Origen portrays this as follows:
Accordingly, just as life came to be in the Logos, so the Logos was
in the beginning. And consider if it is possible also for us to take the
statement, ‘In the beginning was the Logos’ in accordance with this
meaning, so that all things came to be in accordance with the wis-
dom and the forms of the system of concepts which exist in him [sc.
the Logos] (·na katã tØn sof¤an ka‹ toÁw tÊpouw toË sustÆmatow t«n
§n aÈt“ nohmãtvn tå pãnta g¤nhtai); for I think that, just as a house
or ship are built or constructed according to the architectural forms,
having as their beginning the plans and reasons (lÒgouw) in the artificer,
in like manner all things have come to be according to the reasons
(lÒgouw) of what will be, which reasons were distinctly articulated by
God in wisdom (oÏtv tå sÊmpanta gegon°nai katã toÁw §n t∞ sof¤&
protranvy°ntaw ÍpÒ YeoË t«n §som°nvn lÒgouw); for ‘he made all things
in wisdom’.118 And we should say that once God had created the living
wisdom, so to speak, (kt¤saw, ·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv, ¶mcuxon sof¤an ı YeÒw),
he allowed from the forms which were in her to present to the things
which exist and to matter [both] their actual creation (plãsin)119 and
the species, and I focus my reflection on whether this holds true also
for individual existence.120
This is the context in which Origen’s statement that the ‘reason’ of
this world (tÚn per¤ toË kÒsmou lÒgon), regarded from a worldly point
of view, is the ‘last of the corporeals and the beginning of the incor-
poreals’ (˜w lÒgow m¢n §sti teleuta›ow t«n svmatik«n, érxÆ d¢ t«n
ésvmãtvn).121 This ‘reason’ (lÒgow), according to which the world

116
commJohn, 10, XLII; Cels, VIII, 19 & 20.
117
s. infra.
118
Ps. 103, 24.
119
The meaning of plãsiw as ‘actual creation’ is a central theme in Origen’s
theology, and is contrasted with po¤hsiw, which points to providential creation; s.
infra, the juxtaposition of the terms po¤hsiw (as in Genesis 1, 26) and plãsiw (Genesis
2, 7): homJer, 1, 10.
120
commJohn, 1, XIX.
121
Cant, 2, PG 17.265 (and Boehrens, p. 233).
84 chapter three

came into existence out of the Fall, is itself a creature, by virtue of

which the providential incorporeal creation comes into the closest rela-
tion to the actual creation which came into existence as a spatio-tem-
poral reality. Thus, it is through the contemplation of this particular
‘reason’ that the transitional point from the providential incorpore-
ality to corporeality could be visualized.
Hence, whereas God’s former creative act was a creative ‘utter-
ance’ to his wisdom, an utterance which ‘embroidered’ his Wisdom
(that is, his Son), the actual world comes into existence after God
allowed the Logos to bring the material creation and indeed matter
itself into existence. This creation was made according to ‘reasons
which were distinctly articulated by God in wisdom (protranvy°ntaw
lÒgouw)’, according to the ‘pre-uttered reasons’ which came into being
with the providential creation.
This wisdom, however, cannot be regarded in analogy to human
mind, which is, so to say, ‘enriched’ out of a creative plan formed
into this same mind. The divine Wisdom is a personal hypostasis,
the Son of God. Still, providential creation is the indispensable pre-
requisite for the actual creation to come to be. The latter came into
existence because the former was already made:
If one is able to comprehend an incorporeal hypostasis comprising the
various objects of contemplation (yevrhmãtvn) which contain the rea-
sons of everything, a hypostasis, which is living and animate, as it
were, he will understand the Wisdom of God who precedes all cre-
ation and who appropriately says of herself: ‘God made me the begin-
ning of his ways towards his works’122 It is because of this creation that all
creation has also been able to subsist, since it has a share in the divine wis-
dom, according to which it has been created.123
Thus a distinction is drawn between the ‘former’, namely provi-
dential creation, and the latter, which is the actual world as a tan-
gible spatio-temporal reality.
In the same vein, he distinguishes between po¤hsiw and plãsiw.
The former is used in Genesis 1,26, where God says, ‘Let us make
(poiÆsvmen) man in our image and likeness’. The latter is found in
Genesis 2,7, where it is said that God ‘made (¶plasen) man’.124 This

122
Prov. 8, 22.
123
commJohn, 1, XXXIV; italics mine.
124
homJer, 1, 10.
 the fall and creation of the world 85

is why in the previous passage reference to the actual creation’s com-

ing into existence is made through the term plãsiw. Particular atten-
tion shoud be paid to an expresion used in a mature portion of
commJohn, where the adversary who fell is described as something
‘neither created, nor image, but something ‘molded by the Lord,
made to be mocked by his angels’.125 What is important in this por-
tion is that this adversary is excluded from both the terms kt¤siw
and plãsiw; which suggests Origen’s fundamental tenet that the devil
as such is not a creature made by God. This is not part of the prov-
idential creation, it is negation of creation rather than a part of it.
This adversary is the tendency and unceasing effort to lead being
into non-being, it is the persistent denial of the creative act of God
and activity towards nothingness: this denial has its origin in the Fall
(which means it followed original creation) and accordingly any
Manichaen point of view is explicitly rejected, indeed by name.126
Accordingly, a distinction is drawn between g°nesiw and g°nnhsiw.
The former pertains to the initial creation, whereas the latter sug-
gests existence out of the Fall.127 At another point, a similar dis-
tinction is made between g°nesiw and kt¤siw, the latter denoting the
creation of space-time.128
In all three cases Origen alludes to his view that the former cre-
ative act of God pertains to a reality which is the divine one. Since
there is no corporeality and time, there can be no notion of inde-
pendent life applied to creatures. As he points out, the first creation
pertains to the ‘making of the substance’ (oÈs¤vsin)129 of ‘rational
creatures’, yet this ‘making’ was ‘in Wisdom’.130 This is the sense in

125
Job, 40, 19; commJohn, 20, XXII.
126
s. repudiation of the ‘paranoia of Manichaens’: frLuc, 78; frLuc, 226; also
comm1Cor, 81; frJohn, 28.
127
frMatt, 11.
128
selPs, 32. The terms, as distinguished here, do not have this meaning univer-
sally throughout Origen’s work. What is important is the distinction itself which he
makes. These terms are involved and contrasted just because they are found in the
scriptural passages. At another point he might use the term g°nesiw suggesting the
spatio-temporal reality of the world; in fact he does so in frJohn, XIII. The main
point, however, is the distinction between the two creations, namely the providential
and the actual one.
129
selPs, 32, PG 12.1305.
130
Ps. 103, 24; commJohn, 1, XIX. This point should not be misunderstood: this
‘substance’ suggests the ‘nature’ of rational creatures, such as human nature -and
not the individual substance. Origen is explicit that the substances of individuals came
into existence only with the actual creation.
86 chapter three

which God created wisdom as a beginning towards his works.131

What was actually created in the former creation was a ‘wisdom’
perceived as a ‘system of objects of contemplation . . . and forms and
reasons’ according to which ‘future beings’132 were made. So ‘mat-
ter and creation and the species . . . and the substances’ were made
‘out of the forms, which were in wisdom’ and those forms were
made, too.
Thus po¤hsiw and g°nesiw point to the providential creation whereas
plãsiw, g°nnhsiw, and kt¤siw refer to the actual creation of the world.
The actual purport of the distinction between the two categories is
this: Po¤hsiw and g°nesiw refer to ‘coming into being out of non-
being’;133 this is the creation of the ‘essence’, which Origen calls
‘substantification’ (oÈs¤vsiw)134 of rational natures (not of individual
rational creatures). This means that what was created was the nature
of rational natures starting to make sense as a potentiality under a
certain concurrence of reasons and causes; it was not any individ-
ual hypostases or persons that were made at that stage. Thus the
words of Job, as well as of David, ‘your hands have made me and
fashioned me’ (afl xe›rew sou §po¤hsã me ka‹ ¶plasãn me)135 allude to
a ‘great doctrine’.136
The core of this doctrine is implied through the notions of po¤hsiw
and plãsiw, yet this is as far as Origen is prepared to go: he explic-
itly states that he does not wish to elaborate any further.137 This
however does not prevent him from highlighting the notion of ‘com-
ing into being out of non-being’ throughout his writings. Creatures
appeared ‘from non-being’ (§j oÈk ¯ntvn)138 and from ‘non-existence’
(§k toË mØ ˆntow)139 and they ‘received being from God’ (ÍpÒ tow yeoË
tÚ e‰nai dejãmenoi).140
A significant pont is how he treats the question of essence proper.
When he comes to explain this, all he does is to expound the views

131
Prov. 8, 22. commJohn, 1, IX; XVII; XIX; 6, VI; 19, IX; 20, XVI; XXXIX.
132
commJohn, 1, XIX.
133
frMatt, 11.
134
selPs, 32.
135
Job 10, 8; Ps. 118, 73.
136
Quoting Heb. 5, 11. Cf. Cels, V, 59; VII, 32; commJohn, 6, XIV; commMatt,
17, 2.
137
Cels, IV, 37. commJohn, 13, 50; frPs, 118, 73; homJob (codd. Vat.), p. 363.
138
expProv, 16; expProv, 18; commJohn, I, XVII; selPs, 9; selPs, 115; Philocalia, 24, 2.
139
frMatt, 3; commJohn, XXXII, 16; expProv, selPs, 54; selPs, 138.
140
selPs, 21, PG 12.1260.
 the fall and creation of the world 87

of philosophers of different schools of thought. He offers an account

of ‘what essence is’ according to either of those who maintain that
the reality of incorporeal things is primary,141 or according to ‘those
who hold that the reality of incorporeal things is secondary and that
of corporeal things is primary’.142 He subsequently affords a quite
detailed account of both those definitions of essence.
It is characteristic though that he does not suggest any view of
his own on this question—which is certainly not incidental. On the
contrary, it is indicative of his perception of rational creatures as
only conceptually (not actually) consisting of a corporeal and an
incorporeal element. When he speaks of providential creation, his
perception of it has nothing to do with any Platonic view of some
pre-existing spiritual world. Were this his opinion, he could have no
difficulty to enunciate this. Subsequently, he could have employed
that definition of essence, which stems from a virtually Platonic per-
ception of the world and its origin. The fact is, however, that he
employed neither an idealistic nor a materialistic (Stoic) or an
Aristotelian view143 of what essence proper is. It is obvious that he
opts for remaining impartial in respect of these definitions of essence.
The reason is that a certain definition of essence is directly related
to (actually it stems from) a certain conception of the world and its
origin, be it created or uncreated. That Origen wishes to hold aloof
and not endorse any one of these views, denotes that his conception
of creation had nothing to do with the pagan ones. To explicate his
own definition of essence, he knew that he should first provide a
detailed account of his ‘mystical’ doctrine of the soul. This is exactly
what he wished to avoid and in fact he did not do. This is why he
states that “the doctrine about essence is a doctrine which is great
and difficult to contemplate” (polÊw dÉ ı per¤ t∞w oÈs¤aw lÒgow ka‹
dusye≈rhtow).144
What is for sure is that to him essence was brought into being
out of nothingness, since God ‘found essence uncreated’ (tÚn YeÒn
ég°nnhton eÍrÒnta tØn oÈs¤an).145 God himself is ‘beyond essence’

141
deOr, XXVII, 8.
142
Ibid.
143
Although no explicit reference to any philosophical sect is made, the definitions
of ‘essence’ which are propounded here actually pertain to those schools of thought.
144
Cels, VI, 64.
145
commGen, 1; PG 12.48.
88 chapter three

(Íper°keina t∞w oÈs¤aw);146 he is ‘beyond mind and essence’ (§p°keina

noË ka‹ oÈs¤aw)147 and ‘God does not participate in essence at all’
(éllÉ oÈdÉ oÈs¤aw met°xei ı YeÒw).148
So when he speaks of the essence of God, he just uses this term
in a conventional, if loose, sense. For whereas the essence of a thing
determines this thing in principle and attributes to it its individual
ontological authority, God is beyond any notion of essence. It is God
who attributes to essence its ontological significance, if any. There is
no ‘oscillation’, as H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti claim,149 assigning
to Origen a Platonic view and taking his attitude as similar to that
of Philo and Clement. Origen is unequivocal on this issue and has
enunciated his view in many parts of his work. This is not the
instance where he employs a current philosophical notion in a loose
sense—but only after he has explicated his own views on a ques-
tion. This is what he does with the notion of ‘eternal death’, or
‘infinite time’ or ‘infinite souls’, or even when he speaks of the Logos
as ‘having soul’, although he is explicit in his view that the term
‘soul’ applies only to human beings. These figures are not rare in
his works; this is why expressions like ‘as it were’ (oflone¤) or ‘so to
say’ ( ·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv) are used frequently.
Thus when he expounds the radical transcendence of God to any
created nature, he says that “the essence of God is distinguished
from any created nature”—yet this affirmation (as usually in such
cases) starts once again with the expression ‘as it were’ (oflone¤ éfistãnti
tØn oÈs¤an toË YeoË épÒ pãntvn t«n gennht«n).150 In any case, the
claim that Origen ‘oscillates’ about the relation of God to ‘essence’
is not correct. Even at the point where he states that the doctrine
about essence is ‘great and difficult to contemplate’, the phrase starts
with the affirmation that ‘God does not participate in essence’.151
What eluded H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti is not simply this state-
ment of Origen’s: the main issue in this context is his conception of
God with respect to essence, when referring to the created things or

146
commJohn, 19, VI. The vocabulary is obviously Platonic (Respublica, 509b9), but
the import is not.
147
Cels, VII, 38.
148
Cels, VI, 64.
149
Origène, Traité des Principes, II, 25, n. 23.
150
deOr, XXIII, 5.
151
Cels, VI, 64.
 the fall and creation of the world 89

ideas. So far as essence suggests the very being, the ontological sta-
tus, it can be attributed only to a created reality. Speaking of God,
Origen does not inquire into his essence (least of all does he ‘oscil-
late’ about it). He simply wonders about the question of what God
himself is. This question constitutes the heart of theology. But there
is no evidence that Origen ever accepted the view that the question
‘what is this?’ (t‹ §st¤n) should be taken with its Aristotelian conno-
tations, that is, as indicating the ‘essence’ of a thing.
In fact, he finds the question ‘about the essence of God’ (per¤
oÈs¤aw toË yeoË) inaccurate. This is why he uses the word ‘as it
were’ (oflone¤) and wonders whether is it possible ‘to say anything’
(efipe›n ti) about it. He does not push the question too far, but clearly
suggests that, speaking of God, the question is not simply choosing
between corporeality and incorporeality. God is beyond them both
‘by virtue of his seniority and power’ (presbe¤& ka‹ dunãmei). If one
wishes to know what God is, the answer can be found in John 4,24,
‘God is Spirit’. Therefore “his essence, as it were, is his spirit” (oflone¤
oÈs¤a e‰nai aÈtoË tÚ pneËma).152 Obviously the spirit of God cannot
in any respect be figured simply through incorporeality. For both
incorporeality and corporeality belong to the creaturely reality; there-
fore, they are ontologically posterior to the being of God.
The point which eluded H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti is this: It
is one thing to speak of substance of human nature, but to speak of sub-
stance of an individual human being is quite another. The former came
into being out of nothingness with the providential creation. The lat-
ter (namely, the substance of individual persons) appears only with
the actual material creation. Origen is explicit that what was cre-
ated in the actual creation was not only ‘matter’ (Ïlh) and ‘species’
(e‡dh) but also ‘individual beings’ (oÈs¤ai)—in fact, he is at pains to
emphasize this point through the expression ‘and I focus my reflection
on whether this holds true also for individual existence’ (§g≈ d¢
§f¤sthmi efi ka‹ tåw oÈs¤aw).153
The critical conclusion out of this statement is this: The substance
of human nature (which involves no individuality) was created in the
providential creation. This is why the providential creation is stated
as incorporeal. For, even today, speaking of ‘human nature’, who

152
commJohn, 13, XXI. The same account for God as ‘fire’ (Deut. 4, 24; Heb.
12, 29), Ibid.
153
s. supra; commJohn, 1, XIX.
90 chapter three

could possibly take it as something personal or corporeal? On the other

hand, the actual subsistence of individual rational creatures came
into being only with the actual creation. This is why, in Origen,
what is personal is always also corporeal, as I shall argue presently.
This analysis makes clear why Origen does not uphold the Platonic
view of ‘essence’—despite the fact that created ‘incorporeality’ is
affirmed as prior to the created corporeality. To him the substance
of an individual person is not prior to this, as a Platonist would main-
tain, according to the doctrine of a pre-existing spiritual world. The
personal substance comes into being simultaneously with the actual cre-
ation of a personal spatio-temporal creature. There is ‘substance of
human nature’154 since the very beginning of creation, but it is only
with the material creation that the notion of ‘substance of an indi-
vidual person’ starts to make sense. This is the critical point that
eluded all those who criticize this doctrine of creation.
On the other hand, Origen seems to be at one with secular phi-
losophy as regards ‘unchangeability’ as a fundamental characteristic
of essence155 But ‘unchangeability’ is exactly what does not pertain
to rational creatures. They have something of their primordial ori-
gin, that is, an incorporeal element. On no account, however, is this
element any kind of pre-existing subsistent individual personality.
The notion of individuality means that the material and immaterial
element are interwoven inseparably. If either of them is taken away,
what remains is by no means an individual, a person. There is no
personality apart from the material element. This is why a human
being, like any rational creature, possesses a material body not only
during his lifetime, but also both before and after it. Matter in itself
is not regarded as evil;156 rather it is a symptom of the existence of
evil and it came into being once evil appeared. On the other hand,
the ‘incorporeal’ element of rational creatures does constitute a kind
of affinity with God, since there is a substantial difference: this incor-
poreal is created whereas God is uncreated.

154
I speak of ‘human nature’ as an example, simply because Origen himself pro-
vides an account of the meaning of the creation of man according to Genesis. The
same statements can be made about the rest of rational creatures. (Cf. commJohn,
1, XIX). As I discuss anon, Origen’s world comprises a number of ranks of life,
of which ‘human’ is only one among many.
155
deOr, XXVII, 8.
156
Cels, IV, 66.
 the fall and creation of the world 91

The difference between Origen’s conception of essence and the sec-

ular ones lies exactly in the distinction drawn above. If a rational
creature were simply a ‘soul’ clothed with a body (in a merely Platonic
sense) then the question of essence could be simple: essence would
be the existing ‘personal incorporeal hypostasis’, or (which many
scholars erroneously ascribe to Origen) the personal ‘spirit’. The case,
however, is not that at all. A rational creature is an inseparable entity,
not an incorporeal spirit (least of all is it a pre-existing one) clothed
with a body. The essence of its existence does not lie in any unchange-
able incorporeal personality (there is no room for such a notion in
Origen’s thought), but in the relation of the rational creature to God,
as I shall argue shortly below. In Princ there is a telling passage
which is worth following:
God has created two universal natures, a visible, that is a bodily one,
and an invisible one, which is incorporeal. These two natures each
undergo their own different changes. The invisible, which is also the
rational nature, is changed through the action of the mind and will,
by reason of the fact that it has been endowed with freedom of choice;
and as a result of this it is found existing sometimes in the good and
sometimes in its opposite. The bodily nature, however, admits of a
change in substance, so that God the Artificer of all things, in what-
ever work of design or construction or restoration he may wish to
engage, has at hand the service of this material for all purposes, and
can transform and transfer it into whatever forms and species he desires,
as the merits of things demand. It is to this, clearly, that the prophet
points when he says, ‘God who makes and transforms all things’.157
This passage can be taken as authentic since a similar one is found
in Greek: “God created a nature which is indestructible and akin to
him” (êfyarton går fÊsin pepo¤hke ka‹ •aut“ suggen∞).158
This is also a point where this thought is radically different from
the Gnostic one. The incorporeal of rational creatures is ‘akin’ to
God, but not ‘consubstantial’ with him. Such a distinction would be
inconceivable by a Gnostic. Besides, this incorporeal undergoes
‘changes’ within the world; it does not remain ‘intact’ throughout
the ‘episode’ of its mixture with matter—which is also unacceptable
to the Gnostics. Finally, this incorporeal was ‘made’. There is no

157
Amos 5, 8; Princ, III.6.7.
158
Princ, III.1.13.
92 chapter three

question about the ‘reality’ of the material world, which is regarded

as fully true, just as the state before the Fall was. In Gnosticism, on
the other hand, ‘true being’ is only that of the transcendent world.
On these three points, Origen’s thought is sheerly different from
Gnosticism. H. Puech regards these three topics as the fundamental
characteristics of Gnostic thought.159 Irenaeus160 states that, to the
Valentinians, the ‘pneumatic generation’ (tÚ kÊhma pneumatikÒn) is
and remains consubstantial with the ‘Mother’, the feminine entity that
is an Aeon of the pleroma (ımooÊsion Ípãrxon tª mhtr¤). Clement
of Alexandria deals with the Gnostic views of consubstantiality between
God and man in his Stromateis.161
Origen does affirm that ‘incorporeal nature’ was ‘made’ by God,162
stressing that not only the ‘corporeal’, but also the ‘incorporeals’ are
‘made’ (gegonÒtvn).163 He also holds that both incorporeal and cor-
preal nature are susceptible of change. The former changes in mind
(in terms of moral quality), whereas the latter changes in quality of
matter. Besides, creatures are susceptible of change on account of
creatureliness. ‘Creation of essence’ proper then does not suggest
making of any personal individual. The latter took place only when
the actual creation came into existence.
Thus plãsiw, g°nnhsiw, and kt¤siw point to the actual creation of
the world: that is, to the creation of rational creatures, which have
a personal identity and a life of their own; they are in a fallen status,
belonging to a reality completely distinguished from the divine life.
According to the Valentinian doctrine of creation, which I sketched
above, the ‘first’ who ‘fell’ had already a life ‘of his own’. In the
primordial state, this ‘first’ mirrored the divine life, but he had his
own life as well as consciousness. He fell only once he forgot his
own limitations and the need of each other to represent the whole
divine fullness.
In sheer contrast to this, according to Origen, there was no indi-
vidual creaturely life in the primeval state. Life was the divine life

159
H.C. Puech, “Gnosis and Time”, From Man and Time. Papers from the Eranos
Yearbooks, vol. 3, p. 75.
160
Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, I,5,6.
161
Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, II.16.74.I.
162
selPs, 38, PG 12.1389.
163
selPs, 117, PG 12.1581. The term gegonÒta (or, ginÒmena) is always used to
refer to what has been created by God; Cf. frLuc, 58; frMatt, 212; s. also Part II.
 the fall and creation of the world 93

only. The created things were ‘decorations’ of the divine Wisdom;

they were living yet not a life of their own. In any case, God did
not need to create out of the need to arrive at a conception of him-
self, which has to be in some degree incomplete. Neither was divine
perfection progressively limited or diluted to the point at which actual
error or sin could arise. This was a state of perfection, where the
creatures were ‘divine’ by the grace and benevolence of their Creator.
This is not an accidental or isolated facet of Origen’s theology.
Rather, it is vital to his doctrine of ‘deification’ (yeopo¤hsiw), which
is central to his theology; also, this has much to do with the doc-
trine of restoration and ultimate end: these, however, are beyond
the scope of this book, and I have to postpone them until they be
treated on their own.
Therefore, what lives before the actual creation is God’s Wisdom
herself: her body was ‘multi-embroidered’ with living ‘precious stones’,
since they are in the living body of Christ. What lives after the actual
creation are the fallen ‘stones’ having acquired corporeal bodies and
having been ‘substantificated’ as individual personalities.
There is nothing in common between these two lives. The for-
mer is the life of God, namely life in Wisdom, while the latter is
the fallen status of creatures, a life outside of God. The chasm between
divinity and creation is a radical one. The world is absolutely ‘out-
side’ of the divinity164 and there is no ring of the Plotinian notion
about the world as an ‘effluence’ of divinity.
The point that creaturely ‘spiritual nature’ is not ‘homoousios to
the uncreated nature’ of God165 is a decisive one. For this is the
ground on which Origen rejects the Platonic and Neoplatonic notion,
that incorporeal nature is one and, therefore, there is a sort of con-
tinuity from the highest down to the lowest modes of being. As a
matter of fact, Origen here reiterates the radical chasm between God
and creaturely nature. His conception of the Fall is not as simplis-
tic as a notion of pre-existing spirits, which ‘fell’ and were clothed
with material bodies.

164
Princ, IV.4.1. also commJohn, 20, XVIII. The notion of the world as being out-
side of God is significant for this conception of time and particularly for the raison
d’ être of time.
165
commJohn, 13, XXV. Here Origen rebukes Heracleon who asserted that crea-
turely incorporeal nature is homoousios with God.
94 chapter three

If there is a notion of Platonic dualism here (namely, dualism of

spirit-matter) this is merely an intellectual, not an actual, one. Origen
was aware of the Platonic views on the subject and does not fail to
contrast his own tenet to them. Although he does not elaborate on
his own conception of the Fall, he highlights its difference from the
Greek views:
Our Lord and Saviour indeed alludes to yet another world, which is
difficult to describe and depict in actual truth, beyond this visible one.
For he says, ‘I am not of this world’;166 and the words ‘I am not of
this world’, suggest that he was of some other world. I have already
said that it is difficult for us to explain this other world; and for this
reason, that if we did so, there would be a risk of giving some men
the impression that we are affirming the existence of certain imagi-
nary forms which the Greeks call ‘ideas’. For it is certainly foreign to
our mode of reasoning to speak of an incorporeal world that exists
solely in the mind’s fancy or the substantial region of mind; and how
men could affirm that the Saviour came from thence or that the saints
will go thither167 I do not see.168
Platonic dualism is then explicitly rejected. Rational beings, as indi-
vidual personalities, are conceived as entities having a corporeal body
as well as something incorporeal in them; yet this distinction is but
an intellectual depiction of their nature. It is stressed that “it is only
in idea and thought that a material substance is separable from them,
and that although this substance seems to have been produced for
them or after them, yet they have never lived or do they live with-
out it;” for “life without a body is found in the Trinity alone”.169
Statements about rational creatures in Princ, such as “All these are
incorporeal in respect of their proper nature, but though incorpo-
real were nevertheless made”,170 should be understood in the light
of the foregoing analysis. G. Butterworth, in his translation of Princ,
considers this passage out of context in order to conclude that Origen

166
John, 17, 14–16.
167
Cf. John, 17, 24.
168
Princ, II.3.6.
169
Princ, II.2.2. The expression ‘to have been produced from them or after them’
shows that Rufinus had not grasped the precise views of Origen on the question
of the substance of individual rational creatures. It is also obvious that the (non-
extant) original Greek text at this point had excluded the notion of this substance
existing without beginning.
170
Princ, I.7.1.
 the fall and creation of the world 95

held a notion of an original spiritual world of rational creatures. As

for the foregoing passage, in which such a view is explicitly rejected,
he considers this as modified by Rufinus. 171 It is obvious that
Butterworth is unaware that these ‘precious stones’, being ‘ornaments’
in the body of the ‘multi-decorated’ Wisdom, are also called ‘crea-
tures’. For it is Origen himself who says that “God is invisible and
there are some creatures invisible, that is to say intelligible (nohtã)”172
employing the term which Paul uses in Rom. 1,20, namely, ‘the
invisible things of God’. It is in the same sense that Origen refers
to ‘God and the invisible things of God’,173 explaining that “what is
signified by the term ‘invisible’ is incorporeal”.174
Again his authentic views can be traced into Princ:
It is proved by many declarations throughout the whole of Scripture
that the universe was created by God and that there is no substance
which has not received its existence from him; which refutes and dis-
misses the doctrines falsely taught by some, that there is a matter
which is co-eternal with God or that there are unbegotten souls, in
whom they would have it that God implanted not so much the prin-
ciple of existence as the quality and rank of their life.175
Despite the distinction between corporeality and incorporeality, it is
sustained that the very nature of rational beings has an existential
unity and no notion of dualism can be applied to their existence
per se. There is only an intellectual grasp of incorporeality applied
to rational creatures; and this stems from the conception of the Fall.
Not infrequently is it stated or suggested that this incorporeality,
applied to rational creatures in the foregoing sense, is an element of
a certain ‘affinity’ between God and the world.176
All rational creatures then, regardless of their rank of life, have
the same origin: they are originated in the divine reality.
Once actually created as indivuduals, they were dispersed in the
various ranks of life, yet all of them have something in common.

171
FP, p. 81, n. 1.
172
Cels, VII, 37.
173
Cels, VII, 7.
174
Cels, VI, 64. On the significant distinction between the notions of ‘not seen’
and ‘invisible’ I discuss presently.
175
Princ, I.3.3.
176
Cels, IV, 25; III, 75; I, 8; III, 39; IV, 40; IV, 83. exhMar, XLVII; commJohn,
13, XLII; 19, IV; frJohn, XLV. expProv, 7.
96 chapter three

This common is the ‘rational essence’ (≤ logikÆ oÈs¤a), part of which

is the human one, which is called ‘soul’.177 A rational being is ‘an
existence which is rationally capable of feeling and movement’.178
Rational creatures are living beings, receiving commands from God,
since, quite plausibly, commands can be given only to living beings.179
Moreover, ‘rational creatures are of one nature’,180 as ‘things which
have one definition have also undoubtedly the same substance’.181
This incorporeal in rational beings is what allows them a kind of
communication with God through the Logos.182 In the final analysis,
the element which constitutes the personal identity of rational crea-
tures lies exactly in this relation with God. Their bodies change,
since ‘it is possible for matter, which underlies all qualities, to change
quality’ (dunatÒn éme¤bein poiÒthtaw tØn Ípokeim°nhn pãsaiw poiÒthsin
Ïlhn).183 The quality of bodies of rational creatures changes accord-
ing to their merits; what remains unchangeable is their faculty to
communicate with God through the Logos, since they are endowed
with rationality. It is through their ‘incorporeal’ dimension that they
communicate with God.
This conception of the personal identity of rational creatures does
not really suggest any actual existence of the dualism (matter/spirit)
in the rational creature itself in any sort of Platonic sense. The per-
sonality of rational creatures is not compound, it is single. The qual-
ity of their body reflects the quality of their incorporeal, and vice
versa. This means that the body has a certain quality, on account
of the quality of the incorporeal element. If a rational creature is a
daemon, this state corresponds to the quality of the body and mind,
which dictates the kind of the respective actions. It is not the incor-
poreal itself (understood abstractly, as if it were an independent indi-
vidual subsistence—which it is not), but it is the faculty of the creature
in his relation to God that constitutes his personal identity. The qual-
ity of mind changes, the quality of body changes, too—indeed it

177
commMatt, 17, 34.
178
Princ, VIII.8.2.
179
Princ, I.7.3.
180
Princ, III.5.4.
181
Princ, VIII.8.2.
182
s. infra.
183
Cels, III, 42.
 the fall and creation of the world 97

changes accordingly. What remains unchangeable is the capacity of

this ‘mind-body’ entity to come in a dialectical relation to God, to
be distinct in the eyes of God as an individual personality, and to
be free to obey or disobey God’s will. There can be no notion of
personal incorporeal mind existing in this fallen state. Mind existing
in itself into the world is an intellectual abstraction, not an inde-
pendent reality. Mind does not live in itself either ‘before’ or after
the Fall. For after the Fall it is the rational creature, as an insepa-
rable being, who lives; on the other hand, ‘before’ the Fall it is God’s
Wisdom who lives.184 In either case mind is regarded as participat-
ing, as it were, in life—still in no case does it live itself as an inde-
pendent personal incorporeal being.
Speaking of ‘soul’, Origen points out that this is the state of mind
applying to human being only: a ‘man’ is ‘a soul using a body’.185
Yet it is himself who emphasizes that this is only a figure of speech
irrelevant to any Platonic notion; this is just a ‘metaphor’.186 In
commJohn he states that a human being is an inseparable entity.
Although ‘soul’ and ‘body’ are regarded as ‘contrary by nature’ (fÊsei
§nant¤a), human being is actually ‘one unity’ (krçsin m¤an).187
So we can see Origen censuring Gnostics such as Marcion and
Valentinus by name, for holding that humans are but ‘souls’, thus
reducing the human existence to the incorporeal and neglecting the
body. Against this, Origen pronounces human existence as being
‘one’ (ßn) comprising the two in unity (tÚ sunamfÒteron). The ‘life’ of
soul and body is ‘common’ (zvÆ koinÆ) to them both and resurrection
makes sense only as one of both soul and body.188 By the same
token, that ‘the incorporeal soul is not punished without a body’ (˜ti
és≈matow ≤ cuxÆ, ka‹ ˜ti êneu s≈matow oÈ kolãzetai).189 This ‘unity’
of human nature applies even to Christ himself who is he who
‘assumed human nature altogether’ (pãnt˙ ênyrvpon éneilhf°nai).190

184
commJohn, 2, XVII.
185
Cels, VI, 71; VII, 38; s. also Princ, IV.2.7. Also in Latin translations: Homilies
on Luke, 14.4 (translated by Jerome) and Homilies on Leviticus, 9.6.4. (translated by
Rufinus).
186
“we should use the metaphor of bodily clothing . . .”; Princ, II.3.2.
187
commJohn, 13, L.
188
frLuc, 242.
189
frMatt, 209; the same in selPs, 1.
190
Princ, IV.2.7.
98 chapter three

What constitutes the personal identity of a rational creature is to

be found in his relation to God rather than in the creature itself
regarded as an isolated and independent subsistence. This is why
Origen states thoughts such as the following:
Moreover when the scripture says that God created all things ‘by num-
ber and measure’,191 we shall be right in applying the term ‘number’
to rational creatures or minds for this very reason that they are so
many as can be provided for and ruled and controlled by the provi-
dence of God;’192 God ‘made all things by number and measure; for
to God there is nothing either without end or without measure’;193
‘every created thing, therefore, is distinguished in God’s sight by its being
confined within a certain number and measure, that is, either num-
ber in the case of rational beings or measure in the case of bodily
matter.’194
Rational creatures are distinguished in the sight of God and this
happens ‘from the time their personality first emerged’.195
Thus the sheer fact of the individual personal relation to God con-
stitutes the personal identity of a rational creature. This is why ‘to
receive commands from God’196 is considered as a fundamental char-
acteristic of a rational being. This personal and concrete dialectical
relation to God, as a fact, is what actually remains constant and
unchangeable throughout the alterations of rational creatures (both
in their incorporeal and corporeal nature) from one ‘aeon’ to another.
In selEz this conception is enunciated thus:
Regarding our birth in flesh, we have a father and a mother. But such
a father or mother is the soul’s [father or mother]; for it is God alone
who is the creator and father of the soul. This is what God teaches
by saying that ‘All souls are mine’;197 and each soul has its own hyposta-
sis and stands for reasons of its own and not [for reasons] of anyone
else (ka‹ •kãsth cuxÆ fid¤an ÍpÒstasin ¶xei, §n t“ fid¤v lÒgƒ flstam°nh,
ka‹ oÈk §n êllƒ).198

The very fact that God has established a personal relation with each
rational being endows it with its individual personality, which is

191
Wis. 11, 20.
192
Princ, II.9.1.
193
Princ, IV.4.8.
194
Princ, IV.4.8; my italics.
195
Princ, I.5.3.
196
Princ, I.7.3.
197
Ez. 18, 4.
198
selEz, 18, PG 13.817.
 the fall and creation of the world 99

thereafter free to come to a dialectical relation either to God or to

other rational beings.
This is the answer that Origen offers as a result of his funda-
mental view of rational creature as an inseparable entity, in which
the distinction between body and incorporeal element are mere intel-
lectual abstractions. A rational being is in itself indivisible, single and
not compound. Thus what is theoretically described as an ‘incorpo-
real’ element of a rational creature, is in no way understood to live
in itself autonomously and independently from the body.

The conception of the world

There are serious reasons, which render the study of Origen’s con-
cept of cosmos an indispensable presupposition of studying his
concept of time. As we shall see in due course, the concept of time
proper is defined in close correlation to that of cosmos. It is then
reasonable to anticipate that it will be possible to determine some
principal characteristics of time in correspondence to similar char-
acteristics of the cosmos. For instance, if the cosmos is held to be
eternal, then time should be regarded as eternal too, in the sense of
endless duration. Besides, it has been claimed that Origen holds the
notion of a world before time, in a Platonic sense. Again, a study
in his concept of cosmos will show whether or not can we speak of
cosmos without necessarily implying the coexistence of time; that is,
to find out whether cosmos can make sense in the absence of time.
The analysis of this concept of time would be either impossible
or misleading, unless it is clear how the cosmos is conceived, and
what its content (or, contents) is. It is therefore fundamental that,
before any discussion on time proper takes place, the notion of cos-
mos be canvassed.
Origen was conscious of the crucial importance of the concept of
cosmos. He often focused his analysis on the meaning of it; indeed,
there are numerous points where he tries to illustrate (sometimes
through extensive expositions) the meaning of cosmos. The Commentary
on Genesis is the work, which would offer the most systematic analy-
sis on the question. It would be reasonable to assume that, in that
work, the issue had been treated in detail. This work,199 however, is

199
Apart from fragments. s. PG 12.45ff; 17.12ff; GCS, 6, 23–30 (homilies).
100 chapter three

lost and this is a serious gap in his extant writings.200 For, in his
exegesis of the First Chapter of Genesis, he had provided an exten-
sive account of his views about the cosmos. This is not just a con-
jecture: it is he himself who makes references to his analyses in that
commentary.201 His conception, nonetheless, can be gathered from
other points of his extant work. For the purpose of my topic, these
references are rather sufficient; for my aim at this point is consid-
eration of the meaning of cosmos, not of his entire Cosmology.
The central idea is that the term kÒsmow, as found in the Scripture,
is a ‘homonym’ (ımvnum¤a). In the commGen it is stated that “the
word [sc. cosmos] should be examined as a homonym” (tØn l°jin
…w ım≈numon §jetãzesyai).202 It is a task of the interpreter to assign
to scriptural terms each time that meaning which upholds the rev-
erence to the magnificence of God.203 It is also argued that those
who have neglected the fact that the term cosmos is a homonym
have committed the fault of making most irreverant assertions about
God.204
This is the rule according to which a specific content should be
attributed to the term cosmos in each particular case. This rule is
reverance to God and avoidance of ‘malicious interpretations’ (moxyhr«n
§kdox«n).205 Thus, in interpreting the passage of Scripture I John
5, 19, ‘The world lies in the power of evil’, he avers that, by the
term ‘world’, John refers only to ‘the earthly and human affairs’ (t«n
perige¤vn ka‹ ényrvp¤nvn); for if someone thinks that the term points
to ‘the system of heaven and earth and those contained in them’ he
would be led to the most impertinent and irreverent assertion about
God, namely, that the sun and the moon and the stars ‘lie in the
evil’ although they just perform a regular movement by order of
God.206

200
Instead, we have sixteen Homilies preserved in Latin, now available in English
translation: Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, tr. R.E. Heine, Washington, 1981.
Of this text, only a small fragment is preserved in Greek (from Homily 2). Origen’s
exegeses of Genesis have partially been preserved by Eusebius and Procopius of Gaza.
201
Cels, VI, 60.
202
commGen, 3, (comm. on Gen. 1, 16–18); PG 12.89; Philocalia, 14, 2.
203
commGen, 3, (comm. on Gen. 1, 16–18); commJohn, 1, XXXVIII; also Princ,
I.5.4; IV.4.3.
204
commGen, 3, (comm. on Gen. 1, 16–18).
205
Ibid.
206
commGen, 3, (comm. on Gen. 1, 16–18)
 the fall and creation of the world 101

Accordingly, the scriptural portion John 1, 29 ‘This is the lamb

of God who bears the sin of the world’ refers to ‘earthly places’
(perige¤oiw tÒpoiw) and only those who ‘are unaware of the homonym’
(diã tØn êgnoian t∞w ımvnum¤aw) would ‘stupidly argue’ (filoneikoËntew
±liy¤vw) that at this point the term ‘world’ could have a broader
meaning.207 Again, in the passage 2 Cor. 5, 19, ‘God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself ’, the term ‘world’ refers only to the
earthly and human reality, not ‘to those existing in the whole world’
(per¤ t«n §n ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ).208
In commJohn it is once more stated that there are various mean-
ings of the term cosmos (§k t∞w ÑKÒsmowÉ fvn∞w) in the Scripture;209
and in commMatt he once more undertakes the task to clarify the
different imports of this ‘homonym’ by selecting and interpreting sev-
eral passages of the Scripture where the term appears. Quoting
Matthew 18, 7–14, ‘Woe to the world for the temptations to sin’,
he sets his intention forth: “Intelligere autem aliquid poterimus, si
congregemus scripturarum exempla in quibus nominatur mundus”.210
He does so by referring to numerous passages of Scripture where
the term ‘cosmos’ appears. So, “one should not think that it is the
same thing to speak simply of the world or of the world of heaven
or of the world of Esther”.211
The conclusion at that point is that the usual meaning of cosmos
in the Scripture is not that of the ‘system consisting of heaven and
earth’ (tÚ §j oÈranoË ka‹ g∞w sÊsthma),212 but ‘only the earthly place’
(ı per¤geiow mÒnow tÒpow).213 Sometimes the meaning of cosmos is even
narrower, pointing just to that part of the earth, which is inhabited
by people, that is the ofikoum°nh.214 In Cels it is stated that it is usual

207
Ibid.
208
Ibid.
209
commJohn, 6, LVII.
210
commMatt, 13, 20. The text is extant only in Latin since, at this point, there
is a small lacuna in the original Greek text; nevertheless, there is no question about
the validity of the Latin translation at this point, since an account of the various
meanings of cosmos follows in the ensuing Greek text.
211
commMatt, 13, 20.
212
The expression “the system of heaven and earth” (tÚ sÊsthma §j oÈranoË
ka‹ g∞w) is a Stoic definition; s. SVF, II,168,11; II,169,39; II,192,35. Diogenes Laertius
ascribes this definition to Posidonius verbatim: Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosopho-
rum, Book 7, section 137. Origen uses this definition at several points: Cels, VI, 59;
commJohn, 1, XV; commMatt, 13, XX; commGen PG 12.89; Philocalia, 14, 2; selPs, 118.
213
commMatt, 13, 20; s. also Princ, I.5.5.
214
commMatt, 12, 27; 13, 20.
102 chapter three

(¶yow) to find the term cosmos in Scripture in the sense of ‘the

earth’.215
It is plain then that there are different purports assigned to the
term cosmos: this may mean the visible whole which consists of
‘heaven and earth’,216 that is, the visible firmament consisting ‘of the
moon and the sun and the heavenly bodies called ‘planets’ or wan-
derers,217 or just the earth (per¤geiow tÒpow), or that part of the earth
which is inhabited by people (ofikoum°nh), or even the human envi-
ronment itself.218 However, it should be constantly borne in mind
that all these different meanings are employed for the sake of exe-
gesis. In interpreting a certain passage the import of cosmos which
should be employed is that which could in no case lead to irrever-
ent implications about the grandeur or goodness of God. Any inter-
pretation of cosmos which would put the magnificence or righteousness
of God in question should be dismissed and another import (either
broader or narrower) should be applied to it.
All these interpretations of the term cosmos, therefore, are upheld
for an aim which is primarily theological. The question then, which
is invited, is this: did Origen hold a notion about the actual con-
tent of cosmos, which would be a natural one? That is, did he main-
tain a natural conception of the world, a theory independent from
the circumstantial need to interpret a particular point of the Scripture?
Did he hold a picture about the (in his view) objective structure of
the world? Did he have a theory about the cosmic structure that
would serve to the exposition of his cosmology?
As a matter of fact, beyond all the specific meanings adopted for
the sake of a particular exegesis, Origen did hold a clear personal
conception of the cosmos. This is expounded both in Princ and in
many of his writings in Greek alike.
In the Second Book of Princ, he attempts ‘to inquire into the mean-
ing of the actual term ‘world’; for this is a term which is frequently
shown in the holy scriptures to be assigned different imports.’219 He
makes a systematic inquiry into the meaning of the term: the name

215
Cels, VI, 49.
216
Cels, VI, 49.
217
Princ, II.3.6.
218
commMatt, 12, 27.
219
Princ, II.3.6.
 the fall and creation of the world 103

cosmos indicates not only the world but also (in its literal sense) the
notion of ‘ornament’. The latter is found at certain points of the
Old Testament.220 In Scripture cosmos often means our earth together
with its inhabitants. But this visible universe which consists of heaven
and earth is also called world, since Paul says, ‘The fashion of this
world will pass away’.221
Continuing the notional topography of his world, Origen makes
a step further: there is yet another heaven, of another broader sphere;
this heaven contains and encloses that earth which Jesus in the gospel
promises to the ‘meek’ and ‘gentle’222 and this sphere is called in the
holy scriptures the ‘good land’ and the ‘land of the living’. There is
then another ‘heaven’ and another ‘earth’ beside this visible firmament.
That place, however, is but one, indeed the highest among all these
which constitute the world: this is an abiding place for the pious
and blessed, in a ‘good land’, as it were, and a ‘land for the living’,
which the ‘meek’ and ‘gentle’ will receive as an inheritance. There
are also other places in the world. In general though, by the term
‘world’ he understands “all that is above the heavens, or in them,
or on the earth, or in what is called the lower regions, or any places
that exist anywhere; together with the beings who are said to dwell
in them. All this is called the world.”223
The conclusion is that “the entire universe of things that exist,
both celestial and supercelestial, earthly and infernal, may be spoken
of in general way as a single perfect world, within which or by which
those other worlds that are in it must be supposed to be contained”.224
This is Origen’s fundamental world-picture; in his work preserved
in Greek there are numerous references to the various ‘spaces’ in
the world. In Cels he refers to the ‘most pure celestial spaces of the
world’ (§n to›w kayarvtãtoiw toË kÒsmou xvr¤oiw §pouran¤oiw) and to
the ‘even purer supercelestial ones’ (≥ ka‹ to›w toÊtvn kayarvt°roiw
Íperouran¤oiw).225 There is also reference to the ‘aether and those
places which are located above it’ (§n afiy°ri ka‹ to›w énvt°rv aÈtoË

220
Is. 3, 17, Is. 3, 17, 24, Wis. 18, 24.
221
1 Cor. 7, 31; Princ, II.3.6.
222
Matt. 4, 4.
223
Princ, II.4.3.
224
Princ, II.3.6.
225
Princ, II.3.6.
104 chapter three

tÒpoiw).226 In homJer it is pointed out that the ‘kingdom of God . . . comes

from the superior places’ (épÒ t«n kreittÒnvn xvr¤vn);227 and in
commJohn it is stressed that when we say that the gospel has been
given to the whole world, by ‘world’ is meant not only the ‘earthly
place’ (t“ perige¤ƒ tÒpƒ), but also ‘the whole system consisting of
heaven and earth or heavens and earth’ (t“ sustÆmati t“ §j oÈranoË
ka‹ g∞w ≥ §j oÈran«n ka‹ g∞w).228
Pointing to places which are lower and inferior compared to the
human condition, he refers to beings which exist ‘down in hades or
in any space like that’ (§n ëdou kãtv ≥ tini toioÊtƒ xvr¤ƒ).229 The
places which are ‘up’ are numerous and among them there are
differences.230 In commMatt he refers to the ‘heavenly places’ (oÈrãnioi
tÒpoi)231 putting the terms in the plural. Likewise, in selPs, he speaks
of the ‘dimmer spaces’ (skuyrvpot°roiw xvr¤oiw)232 using plural too.
In the same work he speaks of ‘various worlds’ (toÁw poik¤louw
kÒsmouw) which ‘contain the various bodies of rational creatures’ (tå
diãfora s≈mata t«n logik«n).233 In expProv he speaks of all ‘rational
natures’ (logik«n fÊsevn) which ‘are sorted out in various worlds
and bodies in proportion to their existential state’ (diairoum°nvn
kÒsmoiw ka‹ s≈mati katã énalog¤an t∞w katastãsevw).234
This is the sense in which he speaks of ‘bodies, which comprise
the world’,235 drawing a distinction between ‘life in flesh and blood’
and life ‘in aetheral body’.236 The latter belongs to ‘resurrected’ crea-
tures: they are believed to live in ‘places’ (xvr¤oiw) which are of most
pure aether and so thin as to be more translucent than light itself
(ka‹ leptÒthti fvtÒw diaugest°roiw).237 The quality of the matter of
these bodies is commensurate with the moral quality of creatures.

226
Cels, III, 42; V, 4.
227
homJer, 14, 17.
228
Once again the Stoic definition by Chrysippus, for the need of exegesis;
commJohn, 13, XXXVII; Cf. Cels, 6, 59.
229
commJohn, 13, XXXVII.
230
commJohn, 19, XXII.
231
frMatt, 51.
232
selPs, 21, PG 12.1256.
233
selPs, 138, 14–6, PG 12.1661.
234
expProv, 3, PG 17.168.
235
Cels, IV, 57. s. also, Cels, III, 51–52.
236
commJohn, 1, XXVI.
237
frJohn, CXXXIX.
 the fall and creation of the world 105

This is why he speaks of ‘aetheral places’ (afiyer¤ouw tÒpouw).238 As a

matter of fact, this expression is a kind of natural explanation of
why these bodies are ‘not seen’: their material character (which is
proportionate to their moral superiority) is so fine that it is ‘more
translucent’ than light itself and cannot be seen by humans.
The notion of ‘body’ then should be understood in a broader
sense. There is no need to insist on the nature of these bodies. Suffice
it to bear in mind that all rational creatures are corporeal. This cor-
poreality can be realized through different forms of bodies, even
through something corporeal which is ‘different from a body’ (ka‹ tÚ
toiÒn m¢n s«ma, ka‹ poiÒn s«ma, êllo d¢ ti ßteron s≈matow).239
The differences among rational creatures of different ranks of life
lie in the different degree of their participation to (and knowledge
of ) the Logos.240 Christ nevertheless is present in all ranks of life
since ‘all rational creatures participate in Christ’.241 Rationality (ı
lÒgow) is what establishes a certain affinity between God and crea-
tures.242 Creatures ‘cannot be regarded as totally alienated from
God’243 precisely on account of their rationality, even though the degree
of rationality in rational creatures varies. Christ, as Logos, descends
to all ranks of life244 and ‘is present in each rational creature’.245
Even ‘daemons are regarded as created by God, not as daemons
but inasmuch as they are rational creatures’ (kayÒ logiko¤ tinew).246
The higher a ‘heaven’ the closer to the Logos this is believed to be.
This is the sense in which Christ is ‘the king of heavens’ and his

238
commJohn, 13, XL. At this point there are two obviously small gaps in the
original text. E. Preuschen in the edition Der Johanneskommentar of the Prussian
Academy propounds this restoration of the text: “§n to›w prÚ t∞w <efiw toÁw> afiyer¤ouw
tÒpouw <ıdoË> xvr¤oiw” (Origenes Werke, 4, p. 266). I think that instead of ıdoË, which
does not make much sense here, it is énabãsevw that should be adopted, as it is
a usual expression of Origen’s. Thus the text should be read thus: “§n to›w prÚ t∞w
<efiw toÁw> afiyer¤ouw tÒpouw <énabãsevw> xvr¤oiw”; Cf. C. Blanc, Origène, Commaintaire
sur S.Jean, III, p. 174, n. 2.
239
commJohn, 20, XXVIII.
240
selPs, 5. A rather extensive account of the ‘secret’ doctrine of different ranks
of rational creatures is given in commMatt, 17, 2.
241
commJohn, 2, XI; s. infra.
242
Cels, IV, 25.
243
ı går lÒgow tØn érxÆn ¶xvn épÒ toË parã YeoË lÒgou oÈk §ò tÚ logikÒn
z«on pãnt˙ éllÒtrion nomisy∞nai YeoË. Ibid.
244
commJohn, 1, XXXI; Cels, I, 62.
245
frJohn, XVIII.
246
Cels, IV, 65.
106 chapter three

‘kingdom is not a sovereignty over a part of the lower places, or of

a part of the higher ones, but it is [sovereignty over] all the higher
places which have been called heavens’;247 this because Christ the
Logos has full authority ‘not only over one heaven, but over all the
heavens’.248
Origen’s averments about the incarnation of the Son should be
understood in the light of this analysis. The Logos is he who came
down to the earth ‘descending not only one heaven but all of them,
whatever their number may be’ (katabãw oÈx ßna mÒnon oÈranÒn,
éllã pãntaw, ˜soi pot° efis¤n).249 Although Origen rejects the opinion
about the existence of ‘seven heavens’,250 he affirms that ‘the Bible
does seem to teach that there are many heavens, perhaps meaning
the spheres of the planets of which the Greeks speak or perhaps
something else more mysterious.’251 Thus he appeals to Moses who
says that in a divine dream our forefather Jacob had a vision in which
he saw a ladder reaching to heaven and angels of God ascending and
descending upon it, and the Lord standing still at its top;252 perhaps
in this story of the ladder Moses was hinting at these truths or at yet
more profound doctrines. Philo also composed a book about this lad-
der, which is worthy of intelligent and wise study by those who wish
to find the truth.’253
This statement, as well as similar others, should be understood in
the light of the conception of the world comprising different spaces
or particular ‘worlds’.
This is the context in which a particular point in Princ, should be
understood in order to avoid misunderstandings: it is averred254 that
Jesus
alludes to yet another world, beyond this visible one, which is difficult
to describe and depict in actual truth. For he says, ‘I am not of this

247
commMatt, 14, 7.
248
commMatt, 13, 31.
249
excPs, 17, PG 17.112.
250
Cels, VI, 21; VI, 23.
251
Cels, VI, 21. Origen held a notion which was ‘more mysterious’, since he per-
ceived these particular worlds to be different in quality, not in terms of geometrical
distance. s. infra.
252
Gen. 28, 12–13.
253
Cels, VI, 21. Origen here alludes to Philo’s work de Somniis.
254
Princ, II.3.6.
 the fall and creation of the world 107

world;255 and the words, ‘I am not of this world’, suggest that he was
of some other world.
At that point it is remarked that this notion can in no way be related
to the Greek one about a spiritual ‘world of ideas’. What is implied
is that Jesus, in descending to the human rank of life, has passed
through the higher worlds. This is why the ‘world’, which Jesus
speaks about, ‘excels in quality and glory, but is nevertheless con-
tained within the limits of this world’,256 which obviously alludes to
the uppermost rank of life, in which Christ is understood to reign, too.
The term used to denote these particular ‘places’ which comprise
the entire ‘single’257 world is xvr¤on. This is derived from x«row which
means ‘place’ or ‘space’. Thus xvr¤on means a particular space. It
is remarkable that the same term x«row is used in modern science,
particularly in the mathematical theory of spaces. It is also significant
that Origen has a clear grasp of the differences among these par-
ticular spaces: they are not understood in terms of spatial distance;
these spaces are separated from each other by means of a certain
qualitative, not geometrical, distance. If these spaces are to be exam-
ined only in terms of geometrical distance, then there is no actual
distance among them: they are all here, on the earth. This notion
is upheld in Princ, through an appeal to Clement of Rome who
‘speaks of other parts of the world which none of our people can
reach, nor can any of those who live there cross over to us; and
these parts themselves he called ‘worlds’, when he says, ‘The ocean
is impassible to men, and the worlds beyond it are governed by the
same ordinances of God the Ruler’.’258
However, in this Latin portion it is not clear whether Clement of
Rome regarded the distance between the worlds as a spatial one, or
not.259 Origen, on the other hand, is categorical on this point: in

255
John, 17, 14–16.
256
Princ, II.3.6. It should be noted, however, that in Princ the notion of a radi-
cal chasm between God and the world is extremely vague, in contrast to the clar-
ity with which this notion is explicated in the Greek texts. Thus the Latin rendering
of Princ may well lead to miscomprehensions as to whether certain passages refer
to the higher ranks of life of the world or to the divine reality.
257
Princ, II.3.6.
258
Princ, II.3.6.
259
Cf. Clement, Epistula ad Corinthios, XX, 5, 8: “The unsearcheable places of the
abysses and the unfathomable realms of the lower world are controlled by the same
108 chapter three

selEz he explicitly states that these other worlds are ‘on the earth’:
‘There are certainly other worlds on the earth and this can also be
shown from our education (mayÆmata); for it is also Clement who
says, ‘The ocean is impassible to men and these worlds beyond it
are governed by the same ordinances of the Ruler’.’260
So, although Origen’s world is one and ‘single’,261 it comprises
particular worlds. Nevertheless, being a theologian, he is primarily
interested not in these worlds, as places, but in the dwellers of them.
The pertinent reference in Princ is quite expressive; the ‘places’ come
only ‘secondly’; what is significant is the hierarchy of the creatures:
The entire constitution of the world is various and diverse; for it
consists of rational beings, and others more divine, and of bodies of
different kinds; . . . then secondly of places, such as heaven or the
heavens.262 . . . In this world some creatures are said to be superceles-
tial, that is placed in the more blessed abodes and clothed with the
brighter and more heavenly bodies; and among these many differences
are revealed.263 . . . Some creatures, however, are called earthly, and
among these, too, there are no small differences, for some are bar-
barians, others Greeks, and of the barbarians some are wilder and
fiercer, whereas others are more gentle.264 . . . . . There are also certain
invisible powers, to which the management of things upon earth is
entrusted; and we must believe that among these, too, no small differences
exist, just as is found to be the case among men. The apostle Paul
indeed intimates that there are also certain infernal powers and among
these in like manner a condition of variety must undoubtedly be looked
for.265
Hence, although Origen is very clear in expounding the hierarchy
of his world, his main interest is focused not on the particular spaces
themselves, but on the dwellers of these places: each space is the
dwelling place of a particular mode of rational existence. When he
refers to the ‘world’, he primarily has in mind and wants to indi-

ordinances . . . The ocean, which men cannot pass, and the worlds beyond it, are
ruled by the same injunctions of the Master.” (tr. by K. Lake; Loeb Classical Library,
Apostolic Fathers, vol. 1, p. 45).
260
selEz, 8, PG 13.796.
261
Princ, II.3.6.
262
Princ, II.1.1; s. also, Princ, II.2.2.; II.3.4.; II.1.4.; II.9.1.
263
Princ, II.4.3; also commJohn, 1, XXVII; 2, XXII; 19, XX.
264
Princ, II.4.3; using the language of 1 Cor. 15.40.
265
Princ, II.4.3. He presumably refers to those who dwell in the ‘lower parts of
the earth’, according to Eph. 4, 9.
 the fall and creation of the world 109

cate the entirety of rational creatures living in all the particular spaces
of the world. “These are who dwell ‘in heaven and on earth and
under the earth,’266 the three terms indicating the entire universe.”267
The notion about the different modes of existence and ranks of
life is bolstered by scriptural authority: he appeals to Paul, namely
Col. 1, 16, where the apostle speaks of ‘thrones, dominions, princi-
palities and powers’; also, to Eph. 1, 21, where he speaks of Christ
‘who is above every principality and authority and power and domin-
ion, and every name that is named not only in this world, but also
in the world to come’. And here is the conclusion:
Here he [sc. Paul] plainly shows that besides those beings he has men-
tioned, there are certain others, which may be named indeed in this
world, but yet have not on the present occasion been enumerated by
him, and which perhaps were not known to any other person; and
there are others still, which cannot be named in this world, but will
be named in the world to come.268
This view, as expressed in Princ, can be found in and confirmed by
the writings in Greek. In commJohn there is reference to the crea-
tures of other spaces which have been created by God through the
Son:269
I think therefore that rational beings are classified in various ranks and
among them there is the supreme one, then the second, then the third
and so on, down to the last of the whole; to say for sure which is the
supreme rank of life, which is the second and which is the third and
to classify them down to the last one is not within human capability,
but it is beyond our nature.270
At this point, he attempts to afford a classification of the higher
rational beings by their names based on scriptural passages where

266
Philocalia, 2, 10.
267
Princ, I.6.2.
268
Princ, I.5.1. The scriptural passages on which Origen grounds this notion are
the following: Heb. 1, 4; Col. 1, 16; Eph. 1, 21; also, Matt., 25, 41 and Rev. 12,
7 (for the expression ‘angels of the devil’); John 12, 31; 14, 30; 16, 11 (‘prince of
this world’); 1 Cor. 2, 6 (‘princes of this world’) and also Eph. 6, 12; Luke 7, 21;
4, 33 (‘evil spirits’ and ‘impure daemons’); Phil. 2, 10 (being ‘earthly’ or ‘under the
earth’); Deut. 32, 9 (considering ‘the reference to certain different classes, as when
it is said ‘the Lord’s portion in his people Jacob, Israel in the cord of his inheri-
tance’) and Deut. 32, 8 (‘angels of God’).
269
commJohn, 2, XIV.
270
commJohn, 1, XXXI.
110 chapter three

those names are found. Thus he divides them into ‘gods’,271 ‘thrones’,
‘dominions’, ‘principalities’, ‘powers’.272 In commMatt he speaks of ratio-
nal beings which are ‘superior to humans’ (tå kre¤ttona ényr≈pvn).273
His general view though is that “it is only God who knows the var-
ious regiments of souls or the powers that are with them” and it is
only he who knows the causes of this classification.274 In like man-
ner he refers to the ranks of life below the human one, namely,
demons.275
The conclusion is that what is strictly meant by the term ‘world’
is the entirety of particular worlds each of which contains a certain
grade of life. Although this cosmos consists of many particular spaces,
it is regarded as one, single and perfect.276 The main interest is
focused on those who live there, not on the spaces themselves. So
Origen’s world is virtually the entirety of persons, endowed with the
capability of free moral action.277

The notions of ‘not seen’ and ‘invisible’

This fundamental distinction plays an important role and is made

by means of a comment on the following passage of Paul:
All things were created in him [sc. Christ], things in heaven and things
on earth, things visible and invisible, whether thrones, dominions, prin-
cipalities or powers, all were created through him and in him, and he
is before all creatures, and he is the head.278
This portion is taken to suggest that the term ‘visible’ applies to
what is corporeal, whereas ‘invisible’ denotes what is incorporeal.279
The term ‘invisible’ points to
a substance in which we can discern neither colour nor shape nor pos-
sibility of touch nor size, a substance perceptible to the mind alone

271
Quoting Ps. 135, 2; Ps. 49, 1; 1 Cor. 8, 5.
272
Quoting Col. 1, 16; s. also commMatt, 17, 20.
273
commMatt, 13, 20.
274
commMatt, 17, 21.
275
commJohn, 1, XXXI; also Princ, I.5. 4–5.
276
Princ, II.3.6; II.4.3; commJohn, 12, XXXVI.
277
Princ, III.1.1.
278
Cf. Col. 1, 16–18. Princ, I.7.1. Cf. Ch. 5, p. 173.
279
Ibid.; s. also Princ, I. Pref. 8–9; I.7.1; IV.3.15; Cels, VI, 64; VII, 46. frJohn, XIII.
 the fall and creation of the world 111

which anyone can call whatever he pleases. The Greeks speak of this
substance as asomaton, or incorporeal; but the divine scriptures call it
‘invisible’.280
There is also reference to another passage of Paul, namely 2 Cor.
4,18, where the distinction between ‘things, which are seen’ and
‘things, which are not seen’ is drawn. Here is how this is explained:
Now the things which are invisible are not only not seen, but do not
even possess a nature which admits of their being seen; they are what
the Greeks have called ‘asomata’ or incorporeal. But the things of
which Paul said, ‘they are not seen’, possess a nature which admits of
their being seen; he is explaining, however, that they are not yet seen
by those to whom they are promised.281
These two Pauline passages are taken as the scriptural basis for the
distinction between incorporeal and corporeal nature to be made.
This is the distinction in terms of which the radical transcendence
of God to the world (particularly to space) is portrayed. As it will
be shown later, the same perception of God (namely, his transcen-
dence) is also expressed by means of the notion of atemporality.
According to this distinction, ‘invisible’ is what is incorporeal and
hence cannot be seen by reason of its essence. On the other hand,
‘not seen’ is that which cannot be seen, not because this is incor-
poreal, but because it is made of a kind of matter which cannot be
seen by humans. Thus what is ‘not seen’ is material, whereas what
is invisible is incorporeal beyond any connection with any matter at
all. The term ‘spiritual’ is sometimes used to denote the same per-
ception of immateriality.282
Although this distinction is not only made, but also explicated, it
has in fact disappeared in the rush of producing Latin renderings
of Origen’s writings. The incisiveness of the contrast was by and large
overlooked by his ancient translators, yet this should not allow for
misleading conclusions. For instance, when Rufinus passes on to us

280
Princ, IV.3.15. The so-called Fragment 2 in Koetschau’s edition is one of his
interpolations in Princ, I. Pref. 8, and reads thus: “The term ‘asomaton’, that is
incorporeal, is unused and unknown, not only in many other writings but also in
my scriptures”—a passage from Antipater of Bostra in John of Damascus, Sacra
Parallela, II.770; PG 96.501.
281
Princ, II.3.6.
282
selPs, 23, PG 12.1269, also Cels, III,47.
112 chapter three

statements about ‘a creation besides the one that we see’ he is no

doubt faithful to Origen, yet the ensuing phrase ‘for there is another
one now invisible to us’283 should be read with attentiveness to this
crucial distinction that Origen draws between ‘not seen’ and ‘invisible’.

God is incorporeal

Origen states that “when the apostle says that Christ is the image
of the invisible God, he declares that God is invisible”.284 Therefore,
the substance of the Trinity, which is the beginning and cause of all
things, ‘of which are all things and through which are all things and
in which are all things’285 must not be believed either to be a body
or to exist in a body, but to be wholly incorporeal.286
The point is futher elaborated thus:
God must not be thought to be in any kind of body, nor to exist in
a body, but to be a simple intellectual existence, admitting in himself
of no addition whatever, so that he cannot be believed to have in
himself a more or less, but is Unity, or if I may so say, Oneness
throughout, and the mind and fount from which originates all intel-
lectual existence or mind. Now neither does mind need physical space
in which to move and operate, nor does it need a magnitude dis-
cernible by the senses, nor bodily shape or colour, nor anything else
whatsoever such as these, which are suitable to bodies and matter.
Accordingly . . . only the species of deity, if I may so call it, has the
privilege of existing apart from all material intermixture . . . That mind
needs no space in which to move according to its own nature.287
Moving along this line, reference to ‘the invisible and incorporeal
God’,288 is frequent; he refers to the divinity, which ‘in virtue of the
majesty of its incorporeal nature, is confined to no place, in no
place’289 since ‘the nature of the Trinity is one and incorporeal.’290

283
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 7.12.10.
284
Col. 1, 15–16; Princ, IV.3.15.
285
Rom. 11, 36.
286
Princ, IV.3.15.
287
Princ, I.1.6.
288
Princ, IV.4.1.
289
Princ, IV.4.1.
290
Princ, IV.4.5.
 the fall and creation of the world 113

Besides, ‘it is impossible to speak of a part of what is incorporeal

or to make any division in it.’291 The significance of this remark will
become clear in treating the notion of corporeality, which is next.

The world is material

As opposed to the divine nature, creation is bound with matter and

distinction: “every created thing . . . is distinguished in God’s sight by
its being confined within a certain number or measure, that is, either
number in the case of rational beings or measure in the case of bod-
ily matter”—which makes up the bodies of rational creatures, since
all of them “make use of bodies”.292 Further, “a body has a shape”.293
“Every body is made of matter” and has “shape and size and colour”
which “are properties of bodies.”294 Moreover,
To see and to be seen is a property of bodies, which it would cer-
tainly not be right to apply either to the Father or to the Son or to
the Holy Spirit in their relations with one another. For the Trinity by
its nature transcends the limits of vision, although it grants it to those
who are in bodies, that is to all other creatures, the property of being
seen one by another. But incorporeal, and above all intellectual nature
is capable of nothing else but to know and to be known.295
At that point it is clearly pointed out that the expression ‘those who
are in bodies’ indicates the entirety of creatures in all ranks of life.
This is the context in which the distinction between ‘things invis-
ible’ and ‘things not seen’ should be understood. The things stated
by Paul as ‘not seen’ should be understood as ‘not yet seen’, not as
not admitting of being seen at all; which means that they are not
invisible in their essence.296 We do not see these things, not because
they are not capable of being seen, but simply because it is our
physical structure in the human rank of life which does not allow
these things to be seen by us.297

291
Princ, IV.4.4.
292
Princ, IV.4.8.
293
Princ, II.10.2.
294
Princ, II.4.3.
295
Princ, II.4.3.
296
Princ, II.3.6.
297
This physical structure is directly related to moral reasons; I discuss this later,
in reference to the idea of ‘pre-existent causes’.
114 chapter three

We should also notice one more property applied to bodily nature,

which is ultimately a property of the world itself: “this nature [sc.
the bodily one] is proved to be changeable and convertible by the
very condition of its being created—for what was not and began to
be is by this very fact shown to be of a changeable nature”.298
Therefore, “rational nature is changeable and convertible”.299 It is
stressed again that “since these rational beings, which as we said
above were made in the beginning, were made before they existed,
by this very fact that they did not exist and then began to exist they
are of necessity subject to change and alteration”.300
Let us then see the conclusions out of these assertions about
corporeality.
Since incorporeal nature can be applied to God alone and “life
without a body is found in the Trinity alone”301 and “bodily nature
was created out of nothing after a space of time and brought into
being from non-existence”,302 it follows straight off that the entire
‘world’ is ‘material’. I put this term in quotation marks, because
‘matter’ in this case has a broader meaning: this is the stuff not only
of bodies ‘seen’, but also those ‘not seen’. This fact is possible since
material substance possesses such a nature that it can undergo every
kind of transformation. When this is drawn down to lower beings it
is formed into the grosser and more solid condition of body and
serves to distinguishing the visible species of this world in all their
variety. But when it ministers to more perfect and blessed beings it
shines in the splendour of ‘celestial bodies’303 and adorns either the
‘angels of God’ or the ‘sons of the resurrection’304 with the garments
of a ‘spiritual body’.305 All these beings go to make up the diverse
and varied condition of the one world’.306 This is why there is ref-
erence to ‘a variety and diversity of bodies, out of which a world is
always composed’307 and ‘the diversity of the world cannot exist apart

298
Princ, IV.4.8.
299
Ibid.
300
Princ, II.9.2.
301
Princ, II.2.2.
302
Ibid. The expression ‘after a space of time’ should be regarded in the context
of what I have argued about the awkward use of temporal terms in the Princ.
303
Princ, II.1.4.
304
1 Cor. 15, 44.
305
Cf. Luke 20, 36; Matt. 22, 30.
306
Princ, II.2.2.
307
Princ, II.3.3.
 the fall and creation of the world 115

from bodies’ and ‘bodily nature admits diverse and various changes
to such an extent that it can undergo every kind of transformation.’308
There is also reference to ‘seen or not seen creation’,309 as well
as to ‘the other creation he [sc. Paul] has spoken of here can be
understood of a creation beside the one the we see. For there is
another one now invisible to us,310 and “Paul indeed knew that the
creations of God are many and innumerable, of which even he had
not received complete knowledge, only partial knowledge”.311
The conception of the ‘world’ as material is fundamental for the
overall understanding of Origen’s thought.312 It is surely possible to
corroborate the foregoing points of Latin translations from portions
preserved in Greek.
In commJohn, there is reference to the ‘world’ (kÒsmow) which has
been made ‘material’ (ÍlikÒw genÒmenow), and has ‘various places’
(tÒpouw ¶xei diafÒrouw) some of which are lower, whereas others are
higher (e‰en ên tinew tÒpoi ofl kãtv ka‹ êlloi ofl ênv); still all those
‘places’ of the world should be regarded as being ‘down’, so long as
they are compared with what is ‘immaterial and invisible and incor-
poreal’. The term ‘down’ has ‘not so much a spatial significance’ (oÈ
tosoËton tÒpƒ), but denotes the qualitative superiority of the invisible
and incorporeal nature over the corporeal one (˜son tª prÚw tå
éÒrata sugkr¤sei). This is the sense in which incorporeal nature (tå
¶jv svmãtvn) is ‘above all the heavens’. Hence all the creatures of
the world should be regarded as being inhabitants of a place being

308
Princ, II.1.4.
309
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 7.10.6. T.P. Scheck has offered a good
translation from Latin, but crucial facets of Origen’s theology eluded him, e.g. he
thinks Origen sustains a ‘pre-existence of souls’ (p. 90, n. 206) and he translated
unsuspicious of the crucial distinction between ‘not seen’ and ‘invisible’. It will take
some time until a misleading past in shcolarhip will no longer exert influence upon
younger and obviously diligent scholars. Cf. similar points retaining to this criticism
in Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1–5, transl. T. Scheck, book
series: The Fathers of the Church, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington,
2001; p. 91, n. 282; p. 374, n. 573. Likewise in Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to
the Romans, Books 6–10, transl. T. Scheck, Washington, 2002; p. 168, n. 231.
310
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 7.12.10.
311
Ibid., 7.12.11; italics mine.
312
R. Norris, like so many others, took for granted that what Origen perceives
as ‘world’ is an ‘order of rational spirits’ (op. cit., p. 148) which exist eternally (pp.
154–5). References by C. Bigg, G. Florovski, H. Crouzel. M. Simonetti, E. de Faye,
and others, on this topic are more or less similar to that and are discussed in due
course.
116 chapter three

‘down’, even if they live in the highest rank of life (ka‹ går pçw ı
t«n blepom°nvn pol¤thw ka‹ parerxom°nvn ka‹ proska¤rvn §k t«n
kãtv §st¤n, kên §n sugkr¤sei tÒpvn §k t«n énvtãtv tugxãn˙).313
We see, therefore, that there is a close interconnectedness between
the notions of world and corporeality. The term ‘world’, whenever used,
implies corporeality. It follows then that this term cannot be used
in expressions such as ‘spiritual world’ or a ‘world of incorporeal
rational creatures before time’. For what is spiritual is of necessity
incorporeal, whereas what refers to the world is of necessity corpo-
real. Spiritual (that is, incorporeal) life is exclusive to the Deity. The
terms world and spiritual (that is, incorporeal) are incompatible with
each other. This is why there is no room for expressions such as
‘spiritual world’, which can make no sense in this frame of thought.
Origen definitely moves in a Stoic vein in taking the view that
created rationality is always and necessarily embodied in matter. This
Stoic tenet was an aspect of their doctrine that matter is permeated
and controlled by a rational principle. According to the Stoics, the
universe had its origin in fire; but this was not a mere amorphous
blaze; it embodied a controlling principle. Thus the whole universe
is organized with a rational end in view, namely to promote the
good of rational creatures, including men; and its overall rationality
is reproduced in varying degrees in the organizing principles which
control the development of its parts, the so-called ‘seminal princi-
ples’ (spermatiko¤ lÒgoi). Thus the cosmos as a whole exhibits a
rational structure and governing principle, but obviously some parts
of it are distinguished by having a rationality of their own, and are
called ‘microcosms’ on this account.

The world as a ‘downfall’ (katabolÆ)

The qualitative difference of the world vis-à-vis the divine life is

expressed through the word ‘down’,314 according to the foregoing
discussion. The same notion is adumbrated by means of the word
katabolÆ. An account of this appears in Princ:

313
commJohn, 19, XX -commenting on John 8, 23.
314
Ibid.
 the fall and creation of the world 117

Still, there is a point which I do not think we ought to pass by lightly,

and that is that the holy scriptures call the foundation of the world
by a new and peculiar name, terming it katabolÆ. This word is incor-
rectly translated into Latin by constitutio or foundation, for katabolÆ
in Greek has rather the significance of deicere, that is, to cast down-
wards, and is, as we have said, incorrectly rendered into Latin by con-
stitutio. An example occurs in the gospel of John, when the Saviour
says ‘And there shall be tribulation in those days, such as hath not
been from the foundation of the world’.315 Here ‘foundation’ stands
for katabolÆ and the meaning of this term must be taken to be as
explained above. Moreover the apostle used the same word in the
epistle to the Ephesians, when he says, ‘Who chose us before the foun-
dation of the world’;316 for here, too, the ‘foundation’ represents katabolÆ,
which must be taken to have the same meaning as that given in our
interpretation above.317
The inference out of this discussion is that “A descent . . . of all alike
form from higher to lower conditions appears to be indicated by the
meaning of this word katabolÆ.”318
There would be no question about the authenticity of this point,
since the same reasoning appears in commJohn, in the exposition of
the qualitative difference between corporeality and incorporeality. At
the point where Origen says that we should ‘in a sense’ (katã ti t«n
shmainom°nvn)319 term the Son of God himself as ‘world’ (kÒsmow).
The term kÒsmow is used here as a metaphor, in order to indicate
the ‘multi-decorated’ wisdom of God. Thus he affirms that this ‘world’
is but the Son of God, ‘the Logos who is perfectly apart from any
matter’.320 There is nothing in common between that ‘world’, which
is ‘up’, and our world which is ‘down’, being a katabolÆ from that
higher world. His opinion is that it is not accidental that ‘the saints’
have ‘invented this term’ (tÚ ˆnoma plasãntvn)—namely, katabolÆ—

315
The portion attributed to John, is actually from Matthew, 24, 21, where how-
ever the word used is érxÆ, not katabolÆ. In OT, the term katabolÆ appears in
Matt, 13, 35; 25, 34; Luke, 11, 50; John, 17, 24; Eph. 1, 4; Heb. 4, 3; 9, 26; 1
Peter 1, 20; Rev. 13, 8; 17, 8. The comment on the Latin meaning of katabolÆ
as constitutio was obviously made by Rufinus. To make his own point, Origen deals
with the scriptural use of the term katabolÆ in commJohn, 19, XXII.
316
Eph. 1, 4.
317
Princ, III.5.4.
318
Princ, III.5.4.
319
commJohn, 19, XXII.
320
Ibid.
118 chapter three

in order to express the conception (diã toiaÊthn §p¤noian) of the

world as being ‘down’. For they would have just said ‘before the
creation (kt¤sevw) of the world’, yet they did not say so; they said
‘Before the katabole of the world’.321
The term katabolÆ literally means ‘thrown down’. It, therefore,
implies a notion of fall. This is why this term is most suitable as a
scriptural basis (though not the only one) to which Origen alludes
whenever he refers to his doctrine of Fall. The notion itself indicates
that the material world had a beginning and it is clear that provi-
dential creation had a beginning, too. However, his views on this
question have been widely miscomprehended. Thus he has been
ascribed a notion of ‘eternal creation’ in a Platonic sense; that is, a
notion of a beginningless world of spirits, out of which the Fall
occurred.
My analyses hitherto have made clear that such an allegation is
altogether ungrounded. However, since this claim is well entrenched
among scholars, and since the question of the duration of the world
is closely related to Origen’s conception of time, I shall dwell on
further discussion of this subject in the ensuing section, so that that
no doubt should remain that this allegation is entirely erroneous.

321
John 17, 24. Ibid.
 CHAPTER FOUR

‘BEGINNINGLESS WORLD’:
A MYTH RECONSIDERED

Origen’s opinions about the ‘duration’ of creation have been a mat-

ter of controversy, since a notion of so-called ‘eternity of the world’
has been ascribed to him. This is one of the main points on which
Origenism (or, what was thought to be Origen’s thought) was con-
demned.1 As time proper is defined in close relation to the world
(which I shall discuss presently), his opinion about the ‘duration’ of
the world affects directly his view of time. Analysis of this issue then
is critical for a proper understanding of this ontology of time.
In canvassing the question of creation having a beginning or not,
we shall take into account the fact that it is Origen himself who
calls the reader’s attention to the different significations denoted by
the tenses in which verbs are used.2 Thus he is alive to the fact that
the Imperfect tense denotes what was always existing (like ‘was’); this
is also what he believes about the Present tense (as in the case of
‘is’, which denotes the timeless being of Wisdom, in the same way
‘was’ does). As opposed to this diction, he is conscious of what the
Past tense denotes:3 it indicates what happened at an indefinite
moment in the past.4 A similar view is found in the Commentary on
the Song of Songs:
Because of these, therefore, it is said to the holy body of the Bride:
‘How lovely have thy cheeks become!’. And notice that He did not
say ‘How lovely your cheeks are!’—but ‘How lovely have thy cheeks
become!’ He means to show that previously they were not so lovely.5

1
Cf. Fragment 5, Koetschau from Justinian’s, libOr (Mansi IX.528) incorporated
in his edition of Princ, in I.2.10. Also, Fr. 10 (from the same writing of Justinian’s),
incorporated in Princ, I.4.5.
2
frLuc, 34. commGen, 3 (commenting on Gen. 1, 16–18.); expProv, 5; commJohn, 2,
I; 2, II; 2, XIX; 20, XXII; frJohn, I; frJohn, CX and CXI. Cf. supra: following
Aristotle, Origen is very much alive to the temporal signification of tenses.
3
Cf. frLuc, 34.
4
The word ÉAÒristow (Past Tense) literally means Indefinite.
5
R.P. Lawson, op. cit., p. 146; italics mine. In English the verb is in the Present
Perfect tense, but in the Greek text, on which Origen comments, the verb is in the
120 chapter four

The analyses on the actual implications of the term ‘became’ (in

reference to the Logos being ‘with’ God) demonstrate an awareness
of the actual signification of the tenses and elucidate determinative
tenets. This is why I maintain that a philological analysis of Origen’s
terminology can provide significant upshots about his authentic views.
For when he uses terms, especially verbs, he is particularly meticu-
lous in respect of the philosophical and theological implications
entailed by the way these terms are used.
In the beginning of this section we saw how he interprets the
scriptural language, as well as how he couches his own views refer-
ring to the divine being itself. It is he himself who draws the reader’s
attention to the use of verbs of the scriptural language and exten-
sively reflects through considerations of this kind.6 Let us then see
how he uses language himself in reference to the ‘creative relation’7
of God with the world.
Origen’s doctrine of the divine being has certain aspects which
are quite clear: Wisdom was timelessly in God apart from any cre-
ation, be it providential or actual. This means that God is visualised
apart from any creation or even thought of creation. He created
because he willed so. Wisdom ‘was in herself in no relation to any-
one’ (sof¤a Ípãrxousa oÈdem¤an sx°sin prÚw ßterÒn tina e‰xen).8 This
is the state in which God is conceived in Himself, not as Creator.
It is out of God’s decision to create that the Son of God, as Wisdom,
‘became’ ( genÒmenow) ‘God’s benevolent decision’ (eÈdok¤a) and
‘wanted’ (±boulÆyh) and ‘willed’ (±y°lhsen) ‘to establish a creative
relation to future creatures (tå §sÒmena)’.9 Creation then is but a
product of an act of volition. This act then is fundamentally imbued
by the essential predicate of contingency. Which means that had the
divine will wished otherwise, it could have brought it about that the
world never came into existence at all.
This point calls for particular consideration. Although I shall argue
for Origen’s innovative conceptions, the doctrine of creation out of

Past tense. The passage Cant. 1, 10 reads thus: ‘t‹ …rai≈yhsan ofl siagÒnew sou …w
trugÒnow, trãxhlÒw sou …w ırm¤skow;’. The verb form which Origen points out is
…rai≈yhsan.
6
commJohn, 2, XIX; frJohn, I; homJer, 9, 4.
7
frJohn, I: sx°sin dhmiourgikÆn.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 121

nothing appears in him not as something like a parthenogenesis.

There was indeed a background to the idea and it should be taken
for granted that Origen drew heavily on this tradition.
Origen understands the creation of the world not as the unfold-
ing of a cosmic essence, but as an act of volition. This concept of
freedom of will stands in the core of this doctrine of creation. In the
first place, the notion of freedom pointed to the finite human per-
sonality, regarded in its moral action. According to Aristotle, free-
dom is the capacity to choose among different (but, given) options,
without coercion by external pressure or constraints. With the
Epicureans, freedom received a metaphysical import: it was the
uncaused action of a rational substance.
This particular notion of action emerging out of self-motivation,
not out of any compulsion, in Christianity takes the form of cre-
ation ex nihilo: the uncaused production of the world solely out of
the divine will. The world exists becaused God willed so; the world
is as it is, because God will this to be so.
Just as I might say that we exist, this cannot be understood to mean
that we exist as a wage for our works. Plainly it is a gift of God that
we exist; it is the grace of the Creator who willed us to exist.10 . . . even
the fact that we are able to do anything at all, to think and to speak,
we do through his gift and generosity.11 . . . Just as the Father gives life
to whom he wills and the Son gives life to whom he wills, and just as
the Father has life in himself and he has granted to the Son to have
life in himself,12 so also the grace that the Father gives, this the Son
also gives. One should know, of course, that all that human beings
have from God is grace. For they have nothing as a debt. For who has
first given to him and it will be paid back to him? Therefore, what-
ever he who was not and is has, by receiving it from him who always is
and will be forever, is of grace.13
This is the major constrast14 between Christianity and Platonism:
God creates not only out of nothing, but also out of grace, that is,
out of love. There is nothing to compel him to do so.

10
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 4.5.2.
11
Ibid., 4.1.14.
12
Cf. John 5, 21 and 26.
13
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 10.38.
14
The foregoing portion is a compilation from Origen’s Commentary on the Epistle
to the Romans. The italics are mine and accentuate this contrast.
122 chapter four

As I said, the idea of the world having a beginning is not an

innovation of Origen. It existed already in previous writers, in different
forms and variations. It is usual to aver that the Greeks sustained
the idea of a world without beginning and this holds true for Plato
and his immediate successors, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates. For
them, the universe existed from all eternity. However, beside the
majority of Platonists, there was a minority, who taught that the
world had a real beginning. In this minority one can find person-
alities such Plutarch and Atticus, who argued that the world had
a real beginning, though not precisely a beginning in time as we
know it. As for Philo, his wavering position on the issue is discussed
forthwith.
On the other hand, the author of Wisdom15 says merely that God’s
all-powerful hand created the world out of formless matter, an opinion
which the Christian apologist Justin was content to reproduce.
However, nowhere in these writers do we find the view later
defined by orthodox Christians that God created the world ex nihilo.
It is not to be taken for sure that, the writer of 2 Maccabees, when
referring to God ‘making the world out of what is not’ (§j oÈk
¯ntvn),16 may have envisaged this doctrine.
During the first century A.D. some voices might be taken to sug-
gest something of the notion of a world having a beginning. But
one cannot be sure. Thus Eudorus seems to have sustained the idea
that God created not only the Ideas but also matter; however, all
he probably meant was that matter, like the Ideas, was eternally
dependent on its divine origin; it was after all a fairly natural devel-
opment of the Pythagorean theory that all things proceed from the
One. Cicero, on the other hand, knows, but rejects, the view that
matter was created by divine providence.17
Beside the (concious or latent) idea of the world having a begin-
ning, the notion of a momentarily creation was also current.
Creation ex nihilo was expounded with great clarity by Basilides,
early in the second century. Origen, refers to Basilides, and treats
him as a Gnostic ‘heretic’.18 This doctrine was adopted into orthodox

15
Wis. 11, 17.
16
2 Maccabees, 7, 28. Cf. C. Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, p. 68.
17
s. C. Stead, op. cit. pp. 67–8. This page is indebted to this excellent scholar.
18
homJer, 10.5; homLuke, 1; homJer, 17.2; fr1Cor, 8; selJob, 41; ennarJob, 41.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 123

Christianity by Theophilus of Antioch, c. A.D. 180, and is taken for

granted by Irenaeus. An argument commonly used was that it was
impossible to imagine matter existing eternally without interference
or imporvement alongside an almighty God. Theophilus of Antioch,
however, went well beyond this: the notion of pre-existing matter is
unacceptable to him, because it contradicts God’s omnipotency. It
is not at all important if God was to create out of an already sub-
sisting matter: men such as craftment do exactly the same. God’s
divine power appears in the fact that he brings things to the fore
‘out of non-being’ (§j oÈk ¯ntvn). The phrase is used twice in the
same section; the idea is that not only substances come to being out
of nothingness, but also a human being receives ‘motion and soul’
(cuxÆn kai k¤nhsin) from God.19
Origen took up this expression, namely ‘out of non-being’ (§j oÈk
¯ntvn), from Theophilus of Antioch and used it word-for-word,
expounding his views in a similar context,20 no doubt bearing in
mind the expression of 2 Maccabees 7, 28.
So Wisdom was in God’s atemporal being; and this Wisdom ‘willed’
(±boulÆyh, ±y°lhsen) ‘to accept a creative relation’ (énalabe›n sx°sin
dhmiourgikÆn) to what was to come into being out of non-being out
of God’s decision. Besides, there is reference to a reality where ‘time
cannot be found’21 and ‘the third and fourth conceptions of the Logos
did not exist’,22 since there was no creation yet.
It is out of this reality that ‘God brought (≥gagen) everything into
being’23 and ‘God made (§po¤hsen) the beings out of non-beings’;24
‘life is the holy Trinity who gives life to everything and it is she who
brought (paragagoËsa) creatures into being out of non being’;25 ‘those
who did not exist before (tå mÆ prÒteron ˆnta) have been handed
out to Jesus by the Father himself; and this is not said about just
some of them, but about them all’.26 There is also reference to all
those who ‘have received their being from God’ (ÍpÒ går toË YeoË

19
Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, 2, 4.
20
fr1Cor, 84.
21
commJohn, 2, XIX.
22
Ibid.
23
frJohn, II.
24
commJohn, 1, XVII.
25
expProv, 16, PG 17.196.
26
commJohn, 32, III.
124 chapter four

tÚ e‰nai dejãmenoi)27 and were ‘brought into being out of non-being’

(§k toË mØ ˆntow efiw tÚ e‰nai parÆxyh).28 Moreover, it is averred that
we are indebted to God because ‘he made (§po¤hsen) us who did
not exist before’.29
In Cels he speaks of ‘God who made everything’30 and elsewhere
he explains that in this ‘everything’ time should be included, too:
If everything is made through him, it is well said that he exists before
the aeons; and this is whence we learn that the aeons came into being
out of non-being.31
It is also stated that Christ is said to be the beginning ‘because it
is he who gave (didoÊw) being’.32
Accordingly, God is said to be ‘creator, because it is he who brought
things (gegonÒta) into being out of non-being’.33 For the ‘heaven and
the earth and everything in them have been produced into being
out of non being’.34
Again, in reference to the Son, it is said that ‘the Son and Logos
of God is a hypostasis, it is he who produced (paragagÒnta) every-
thing from non-being into being, by his Wisdom’.35 Moreover, in
excPs, it is compliantly stated that by the term ‘works’ of God (as in
Psalm 144, 9) David means ‘the rational natures’ (nËn ¶rga tåw fÊseiw
tåw logikãw l°gei).36
Much the same goes for expressions pointing to the creaturely
nature of the soul. There are references to the ‘the created ‘hege-
monikon’ ( tÚ dhmiourghy°n ≤gemonikÒn ), 37 the ‘created nature’
(dedhmiourghm°nhn fÊsin) of ‘the human soul’,38 as well as ‘the maker’
of the ‘soul’ (≤ to¤nun cuxÆ pollã parã toË kt¤santow aÈtÆn laboËsa).39

27
selPs, 21, PG 12.1260.
28
selPs, 115, PG 12.1557.
29
selPs, 144, PG 12.1672.
30
Cels, II, 79.
31
selPs, 54, PG 12.1469.
32
expProv, 1, PG.17.156.
33
selPs, 138, PG 12.1661.
34
expProv, 18, PG 17.204.
35
expProv, 9. According to the fundamental view of the actual content of the
‘world’, reference is made to the entirety of ranks of life: to ‘rational creatures’ (tå
logikã), not just to human beings; Cf. commJohn, 13, XXXVII; frJohn, II.
36
selPs, 144.
37
fr1–118Lam, XXVII.
38
Cels, IV, LXXXIII.
39
fr1–118Lam, XXXIV.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 125

The notion of creation out of nothing is unfolded as a datum on

which Origen does not appear to have to elaborate. It befits the
divine property to make beings appear from nonthingness:
the Apostle seems profuse in God’s praises and has recorded the begin-
ning of his initial creation with admiration, when God made the uni-
verse exist ex nihilo and called the things that were not, by virtue of
his power, as things that are and that do exist. Nothing was difficult
for him in the process of creating, to such an extent that although
nothing was existing, everything, suddenly called forth, came into exis-
tence as if they had always existed.40
Like the foregoing Latin portion, a similar statement in Princ is no
doubt to be trusted.
It is proved by many declarations throughout the whole Scripture that
the universe was created by God and that there is no substance which
has not received its existence from him; which refutes and dismisses
the doctrine falsely taught by some,41 that there is a matter which is
co-eternal with God, or that there are unbegotten souls, in whom they
would have it that God implanted not so much the principle of exis-
tence as the quality and rank of their life.42
The portion goes on with reference to the so-called Shepherd of Hermas
and the Book of Enoch 2, 5, which further butress up the idea of
God having caused all thing to be out of nothing.43
There is, therefore, a battery of passages where Origen’s concep-
tion of creation ex nihilo is unequivocally explicated. These are not
the only points where he puts forward his tenet that it is God who
brought everything into being out of nothing: he expresses this belief
elsewhere, too.44 These passages certainly help towards seeing his
ideas in a better light. What is of primary interest in these portions
though is not the very idea itself, namely, that God is the sole cre-
ator out of nothing, a view which of course is neither unexpected
nor does it come forth for the first time.45 What is significant is the

40
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 4.5.13. A similar explicit statement to
God, who made ‘what did not exist’, in 4.7.3.
41
Against the Gnostic Marcion and others, if we are to believe Tertullian (Adversus
Marcionem, I.xv) who charges this Gnostic with having upheld the Platonic notion
of an uncreated original formless stuff.
42
Princ, I.3.3.
43
FP, p. 31, and notes 1–3.
44
Cf. selEz, 16.
45
Yet even this view of Origen’s has been challenged by scholars who attribute
126 chapter four

manner in which this is presented, the mode of the expressions used

at crucial points in order to spell out aspects of this conception of
creation ex nihilo.
As a mater of fact, whether creation out of nothing is a biblical
notion or not is a matter which does not enjoy unanimity. As
R. Sorabji points out,46 an early Biblical account of God’s creative
power in the Book of Job 28 and 38 has been taken to mean that
God put order into pre-existing chaos, rather than creating out of
nothing. In the Wisdom of Solomon 11, 17, it is stated that God
‘created the cosmos out of a formless matter’ without saying whether
that matter had a beginning. In 2 Maccabees 7, 28, the reference to
creation out of nothing can easily be reinterpreted.47 Thus it has
been asserted that neither in the Bible nor in the Jewish-Hellenistic
literature is there a clear statement of creation out of nothing in a
sense which can include a beginning of the material universe. In
that case it is sustained that the view of creation out of nothing was
invented by Christians in the second century A.D., in controversy
with the Gnostics.
It should be noticed that Origen unwaveringly uses the past tense,
in order to denote that the world had a beginning. God was ‘before’
any notion of creation and created because he ‘willed’ so. Studying
the diction through which the notion of creation is expressed, one
can see that there is nothing to indicate or imply that God had
decided from everlasting to create the world and that his decision was
simply realized at the moment which marks the beginning of cre-
ation. Coming into being out of non-being is a notion which in itself began
to make sense only once God decided to create. There was nothing
to compel him to do so. He did this out of a ‘benevolent decision’
(eÈdok¤a), that is, out of an act of loving freedom.
Creation, on account of being per se the product of an act of voli-
tion, is in its essence relative to what God did. On no account does
it bear upon what God in Himself is.

to him a doctrine of ‘eternal creation’. R. Norris, for example, suggests this as fol-
lows: “Origen feels it necessary to insist explicitly on the teaching that nonmater-
ial beings (or rather, some nonmaterial beings) must be classified as ‘created’ . . .”
(op. cit., p. 149; italics his). In order to abide by his premise that Origen held a
‘doctrine of eternal creation’ (op. cit., p. 154) he goes as far as to impugn what
Origen so often and so explicitly states, namely that everything was created.
46
Cf. R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 194.
47
Cf. H.A. Wolfson, Philo, Cambridge Mass., 1947; vol. 1, pp. 302–3.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 127

This is a point of particular significance and we should dwell on

this a little further.
If Origen held a tenet such as that creation has beginninglessly been
God’s decision, this should imply that the will of God to create
existed in him beginninglessly, too, even if creation had not been
realized yet. What he suggests, however, is quite the opposite; this
is clearly portrayed both explicitly and by means of certain uses of
language, that is, through the mode of the expressions employed in
each case.
He uses the past tense in a conscious way, knowing that this tense
denotes that something occurred, something became while it did not
exist before as such that one subsequently became. The past tense
itself implies a kind of progress or process from one situation to a
next one. This is why Origen so strongly excludes any use of past
tense when he attempts to adumbrate the life of God Himself. This
is also why he emphasizes that ‘the Logos did not become in the
beginning, but he was what he was in the érxÆ’.48 Which means that
if the past tense were used instead of Imperfect, this could denote
that there was a reality in which the Logos was not in the érxÆ,
that is, in the Wisdom. But this runs contrary to his principal dogma
that the Logos has beginninglessly been with Wisdom.
He knows, and has stated,49 that when one strives to portray the
being of God, no verb can adequately express this reality. Nevertheless,
he uses language in such a manner that the inevitable inaccuracy
should be diminished to the minimum possible. Thus he uses either
imperfect tense50 or present tense51 as more fit (rather, less inaccu-
rate) in order to point to the being of God Himself.
On the other hand, it is the past tense which is deemed more
suitable to express what came into being out of non-being. In the
same sense that he states that ‘the Logos did not become in the begin-
ning, but he was what he was in the beginning’,52 he points out
(referring to this portion of John):
Using the terms befittingly he [sc. John] applied the form ‘Became’ to
his flesh, while ‘Was’ indicates his divine nature.53

48
commJohn, 2, XIX.
49
frJohn I.
50
commJohn, 2, XIX.
51
frJohn, 1.
52
commJohn, 2, XIX.
53
frJohn, I; s. also frJohn, CXI.
128 chapter four

It is then quite plain that Origen is perfectly aware of the significance

of the past tense: it denotes what came into being at a moment of
the indefinite past, while before this it did not exist at all.
This is the conceptual background against which his use of the
past tense with respect to God’s creative act should be considered. It
is noteworthy that this way of expression (that the world is an occur-
rence brought into being out of non-being) is used not only for the
actual creation, but also for the providential one. This means that
the will and decision of God to create originated in his benevolent
freedom. This is a belief clearly and meticulously couched—although
there is perfect awareness of the problems of putting such an abstruse
and elusive notion in words.
Hence, it is stressesed that Wisdom ‘wanted’ (±boulÆyh) and ‘willed’
(±y°lhsen) creatures to come into being—using the past tense. It is
also averred that Wisdom ‘became’ (genÒmenow) God’s benevolent
decision (eÈdok¤a), which actually suggests that God Himself became
creator.54
The very creative act out of this decision is couched in an com-
pliant manner: he refers to the providential creative words of (and
‘reasons’ created by) God as ‘pre-uttered words’ (protranvy°ntaw
lÒgouw).55 It is significant again that the term protranvy°ntaw is a
verbal form in the past tense, namely, past participle. This means
that these ‘uttered words’ of God to his Wisdom are not a fact in
Wisdom from everlasting, but they became, so to speak, ‘when’ God
willed so.
In the same vein, it is stated that Wisdom, conceived as life,
‘accepted (éned°jato) a relation to rational creatures (tå logikã)’
because this ‘life’ willed (boulom°nh) to benefit them; so she brought
their substance to participating in life (§p¤ tÚ z∞n aÈtã proslabÒnta
metous¤aw trÒpƒ).’56
It is plain that there is only a sole mode, in which Origen refers
to the divine will to bring creation into being out of non-being: this
is the steadfast use of the Past tense. This evincibly suggests that
God’s will did not exist from everlasting, but it emerged as it were,
and is realized in the creation.

54
frJohn, I.
55
commJohn, 1, XIX.
56
frJohn, II. The term éned°jato expresses the notion quite meaningfully. For the
verb énad°xomai means accept, entertain and give security to; s. L. and S., p. 103.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 129

There is a decision of God to create; yet this decision is conceived

not as a beginningless one: it is expressed as a product of the divine
volition, which on no account is a concomitant of the divine being
per se.
Origen does not say that the Wisdom of God ‘wants’ or ‘wills’
(which would be y°lei or boÊletai); nor does he use the imperfect
tense (which would be ≥yelen or §boÊleto and might be rendered
in English as ‘used to want’ or ‘used to will’). Both tenses here
(namely present or imperfect tense) could imply that this particular
decision of God (that is, the decision to carry out the creative act)
was a beginningless one.57 But, quite demonstrably, the forms used
are ‘wanted’ and ‘willed’, which underscore the contingent character
of his decision to create.
Accordingly, it is not said that Wisdom accepted a creative rela-
tion to the world ‘being’ himself (which would be v Ö n) God’s ‘benev-
olent decision’ (eÈdok¤a); but it is said that he ‘became’ (genÒmenow)
God’s ‘eÈdok¤a’58 and ‘accepted a relation’ (sx°sin prÚw aÈtã éned°jato),
because she wanted ‘to benefit’ (»fel∞sai- this form is in the past
tense, too) ‘the rational creatures’ (tå logikã),59 which are called
‘future beings’ (tå §sÒmena)60—using the future tense of the verb ‘to
be’ in order to denote that the product of creation did not exist
beginninglessly.
It has been argued that the Christian view differs from the Platonic
one on account of the role of will.61 The Platonic illustration of body
and shadow, or sun and light, has been regarded as excluding God’s

57
I certainly use the terms here by convention: the terms ‘past’ or ‘beginning’
make no sense in timelessness; what nevertheless I inquire here is whether Origen
holds a notion of ‘eternity of the world’, even if this ‘world’ is expressed in terms
of God’s purpose to create it. For some scholars alleged that even if one concedes
that the world did not actually exist, they ascribe to Origen a view of God as begin-
ninglessly having decided to create. This is what G. Florovski did (Aspects of Church
History, pp. 45ff ). My point is is that Origen does not hold such a notion.
58
frJohn, I. This ‘became’ should be given particular attention. It is the same
verb, in the same form, about which Origen explicitly states that it denotes a pre-
vious nonexistence; s. supra.
59
frJohn, II.
60
frJohn, I.
61
Cf. J. Pépin, Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne, Paris, 1964; pp. 502–6;
C. Tresmontant, La Métaphysique du christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie chréti-
enne, Paris, 1961; pp. 190–4; 319–26; 364; A.H. Armstromg, ‘Elements in the
thought of Plotinus at variance with classical intellectualism’, Journal of Hellenic Studies,
3, (1973), pp. 13–22.
130 chapter four

will and choice. On the contrary, the Christian idea is that creation
involves divine will, not necessity, and this had already been asserted
before Origen, as I said.62
On the other hand, the notion of will is not altogether absent
from the Platonic texts. For example, this can be found in Plato’s
Timaeus.63 In that work, the Demiurge is repeatedly represented as
deliberating, that is, thinking out how to achieve his aims. As regards
Plotinus, although he does not follow his master all along, he pre-
sumably feels able to be dismissive of volition in connection with
lower tiers of reality. Thus, although notions of will are found in
the Enneads (boÊlhsiw, y°lhsiw, ¶fesiw),64 they are mainly used in
order to dismiss the idea that secondary beings exist through the
will of the One.65 At any rate, Plotinus allows the lower levels of
reality to create by will (y°lhsiw), but he regards the creation of
lower levels of reality as necessary.66
So the very notion of will, regarded in itself, is a distinction which
has not been unchallenged as a criterion for the distinction between
the Platonic and Christian conception of creation, since a notion of
will can be found in Plato as well as in Plotinus.67 However, there
is a point in Origen’s thought which does distinguish these two con-
ceptions of creation. The contrast with all versions of Platonism which
Origen established is to be found in what actually the notion of the
divine will denotes and entails.
The notion that he actually upholds is that of a radical chasm
between God and the world. In his thought makes no sense to speak
of necessity in lower levels of reality, or absence of necessity in higher
levels of reality. These Plotinian affirmations flow from the Neoplatonic

62
Cf. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 2.1.1; 2.30.9; 3.8.3. Christian writers after Origen
pointed out this distinction, too; Cf. Augustine De Civitate Dei, XI, 24: Enarratio in
Psalmum 134, sermo 10; Thomas Aquinas in Caelo I, lectio 29, n. 12.
63
Timeaus, 29E–30A; 41B; s. Pépin, op. cit.
64
Enneads, VI.8.9 (44–8); VI.8.13; VI.8.15 (1–10); VI.8.18 (35–52); VI.8.21 (8–19).
Plotinus, nevertheless, dismisses many of these references as inaccurate; s. Enneads,
VI.8.13 (1–5 and 47–50); Enneads, VI.8.18 (52–3).
65
Enneads, V.1.6 (25–7).
66
Enneads, II.9.3 (1–18); II.9.8 (21–7); III.2.2; 3.2.3 (3–5); IV.8.6 (12–13); V.1.6;
V.1.7 (37); V.3.16 (1).
67
Later Platonists also attributed a notion of ‘will’ to the Demiurge’s creative
act. Cf. Iamblichus de Mysteriis 3, 28: Proclus, in Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, (ed.
E. Diehl, Leipsig, 1903–6); 1.362; 1.371, 4.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 131

conception of the world and particularly the conception of continuity

from the One down to the Intellect and Soul and matter. Affirmations
of this kind are sheerly alien to Origen’s thought. To him there is
no essential difference between the different ranks of life. Whether
they are higher or lower, there are two fundamental elements which
determine their being:
First, all rational creatures are of one nature, on account of being
creatures, and by reason of the (varying, notwithstanding) relation
of all species with the Logos. In respect of this, there is a univer-
sality of nature of all rational creatures, namely rationality, although
its degrees vary.
Secondly, the world is outside of God, it is a ‘downfall’ (katabolÆ),
the sheer down from the divine being. Hence, even a supreme rank
of life is regarded as being ‘down’.68
In Origen, ‘strictly speaking’ (t“ ékrib°w §jetãzonti),69 there are
no ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ levels of reality of the world proper, in the
way that Platonists regard it. What actually exists is the absolute dis-
tinction between ‘up’ and ‘down’, that is, an ontological dissimilar-
ity between the timeless divine being and the temporal world. The
notion of the radical hiatus between those two realities, as well as
the notion of the divine volition, is precisely the ground on which
he rejects any notion of necessity concerning the creation of the world.
Even the supreme rank of life is regarded as being ‘down’ in pre-
cisely the same sense that the rest of them are ‘down’, too. They
all comprise the one single world, which is essentially ‘out’ of God,
since the divine nature is radically alien to the wordly essence, an
essence imbued by the notion of creaturliness.
Beyond that, there is another point which contrasts Origen’s thought
from Neoplatonism. The conception of God who creates because he
wills to benefit, that is, creates out of love, constitutes a stark difference
from the Plotinian conception of creation—a difference which has
eluded scholarship.
In Plotinus the creative being’s thought and will is turned upon
itself. This thought is not directed towards producing a creature and
(which is a most striking contrast) it is not for the sake of a creature.

68
commJohn, 19, XXII; also s. homJer, 8.
69
Ibid.
132 chapter four

It creates not because it decides to do so in order to benefit the crea-

tures (least of all regarded as future ones), but creates simply by being
what it is. This actually means that the creative act is a mode of
the creator’s very being.70 The role of will in the Neoplatonic view
has rather the meaning that anything which is already perfect will
generate something of itself.71
It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that here Plotinus expresses
his conception of the relation of the secondary reality, namely Intellect,
to the One. It is to the One creating the Intellect that Plotinus denies
the role of will.72 He regards it as something like the light which
surrounds the sun.73 As turning into something illuminated is part
of the essence of light, in like manner God is nothing without this
creative procedure, through which the cosmos is generated. There
is a necessity established in the essence of this supreme creative force:
creation is a meaningful action, but this is not a free action. Creation
of the world by the deity is a standing atemporal and eternal necessity.
Perhaps this analysis should be regarded to call for a parallelism
with Origen’s theology: in fact a vast number of scholars saw in
Origen’s doctrine of creation a Neoplatonic provenance, taking his
view of the relation between the Father and Son to be a Plotinian
concept in Christian language.
To prove how fallacious such a view is demands a treatise of its
own, but one or two objections must be considered, and the truth
be extracted from them. Then they will appear as bereft of reason.
I note therefore that those who make these misleading assertions
contradict themselves. For they also use the so-called Fragment 32,
incorporated by P. Koetschau in his edition of Princ, where it is
explicated that ‘the Son was born out of the will of the Father’.74 The
juxtaposition shows that those who want to give credit to Justinian’s
testimonies (and they are exactly those who attribute Neoplatonism
to Origen) cancel out themselves. For it becomes clear that, even at
this point, the very notion of the Father’s will radically contrasts
Origen’s thought (as represented by Justinian) from that of Plotinus’:

70
Enneads, III.2.1–2; V.1.6.
71
Enneads, V.1.6; V.1.7 (2 and 37); V.4.1.
72
Enneds, V.1.6 (25–7).
73
Enneds, V.1.6; V.1.7 (2 and 37); V.41.
74
libOr, Mansi IX.525.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 133

whereas Plotinus denies any role of will to the One creating the
Intellect, Origen is represented to affirm a role to the will of the Father
begetting the Son. Plotinus’ affirmation of a necessity in the creation
of lower levels of reality (that is, the visible world) renders the con-
tradistinction of the Neoplatonic conception of creation from that of
Origen’s even stronger.
At all events, even in the few cases that Plotinus indicates the role
of will in one way or another, creation itself has a character of a
cosmic law rather than a free decision—least of all has it the charac-
ter of a benevolent decision, an act of volition out of love. So although
Plotinus indicates a will, this suggests that a cosmic law of creation
which is beyond whatever possesses choice (proa¤resiw), or even life.
With regard to Neoplatonism then, Origen’s tenet is not the case
of a divine will which is but a mode of the ontology of the divine
being, a natural manifestation of the divine being itself. Such a man-
ifestation could be regarded as will only in the most attenuated sense.
It is the case of a free decision, which is by no means dictated by the
nature of the divine Being per se. A decision which has nothing to
do with the ontology of God Himself. Which means that the notion
of God Himself stands in an absolute ontological priority to that of
God as Creator.
This is a distinction on which great stress should be put. For in
fact this is a concept which constitutes a major catalyst and a mas-
sive transformation in the development of the Christian doctrine of
creation.
Vast is also the difference from the Hebraic conception of cre-
ation. For with Origen the case is not simply creation out of noth-
ing, but creation out of love.
As regards Plato, he did adhere to the general tradition of his day
that nothing ever becomes out of nothing.75 This is a common Greek
view, according to which the world has neither beginning nor end;
creation out of nothing is a view generally not upheld by the different
Greek schools. Even Plato, who spoke of a beginning of time,76 did

75
Cf. A.H. Chroust, “The meaning of time in the ancient world”, The New
Scholasticism, XXI (1947), p. 21.
76
Aristotle points out that among all thinkers of the past Plato alone taught that
time had a definite beginning; Cf. Physica, 251b16ff. Even in that case, however,
space proper is regarded as beginningless.
134 chapter four

stick to the general tradition of his day. The Demiurge did not cre-
ate ex nihilo, but he put a pre-existing matter in order.77 To him,
strictly speaking, ‘creation’ consists in bringing order and ‘measure’
into chaos78 and in nothing beyond that. The notion of ‘creation’ as
found in Timaeus does not imply any original generation ex nihilo,
but an act of ordering and bringing symmetry into the pre-existing
chaos of the original ‘cosmic stuff ’. This is the point of major con-
trast between Plato and Origen.
According to Plato, Being and Action, true existence and its cre-
ative action, Substance and Function, are synonymous.79 To him,
god would have never really existed before he actually created. It is
god’s infinite charity and his perfection that always compels him80
to exercise his creative power in actuality. Therefore, in Plato there
is an intrinsic ontological connection between what god does and
what god is. The divine creativity is exactly the point of this relevance.
On the contrary, Origen did hold the idea of coming into being
out of non-being, and repeatedly lays stress on this notion. On
account of this he did not need to employ any Platonic notion of
everlasting exercise of the divine creativity. God in Himself and God
as Creator are by no means synonymous, as they are in Plato. They
are not related on the level of ontology. Simply, the latter (that is,
the creative act) is but a manifestation of the ungraspable divine will.
In Plato, the divine creativity is a constitutional element of the ontol-
ogy of the godhead. In Origen, the act of creation constitutes only
a small fraction of the discourse about God—and even this by no
means pertains to the divine ontology. This is the point which Rufinus
did not grasp and hence his interpolations into the Princ where he
deals with a problem for which Origen’s theology actually allows no
room at all.
It is a stark contrast that in Origen it is not will which is beyond
God, but it is God Himself who is beyond the notion of God’s will.81
Following the preceding discussion, the contrast with Origen’s con-
ception of God as Creator is quite obvious. My analysis right from

77
Origen is aware of this view and states that in Cels, VI, 48. Cf. tÚ parã
Plãtvni §n ta›w §pistola›w lelegm°non . . . per¤ toË diakosmÆsantow tÒde tÚ pçn.
78
Timaeus, 30A.
79
Sophista, 247 D; 248 C.
80
Timaeus 29 E ff.
81
s. supra.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 135

the beginning of this chapter shows that in him the notion of God
Himself stands in an absolute ontological priority to that of God as Creator.
This means, in the final analysis, that the existence of creation in
itself has a contingent character: this is not originated in any necessity
whatsoever.82
This is the sense in which Origen avers that the ‘so to speak,
essence’ of God should be distinguished from the essence of any cre-
ated nature (oflone¤ éfistãnti tØn oÈs¤an toË YeoË épÒ pãntvn t«n
gennht«n) with which this ‘has no communication’ (oÂw oÈ koinvne›)
at all.83 This accentuates the radical dissimilarity between creaturly
essence and what intellectual abstraction would call the ‘essence’ of
God. Indeed, the expression ‘so to speak’ points to his fundamental
view that God is ‘beyond essence’,84 namely, he ‘does not participate
in essence at all’.85 For it is he who created the ‘essence’, which was
‘uncreated’ (ég°nnhton) before. God ‘is transcendent to anything that
pertains to the world’ (tÚn Íperba¤nonta pãnta tå toË kÒsmou prãg-
mata).86 It is par excellence in terms of the radical distance between
divine nature and creaturely essence that the radical hiatus between
them is conceived. In this context, Origen refers to the love of God
for human beings, although in terms of ‘nature’ he ‘has nothing to
do with them’.87 Hence, on account of this emphasis on God’s radical
transcendence to the world there can be no question of essence of
God. His being is beyond any problematique about essence whatever.
For this began to make sense only once creation came into being;
therefore, essence proper is ontologically posterior to God Himself.
In view of this, the remarks of G. Florovski88 about the ‘distance of
essences’ between God and the world is an incomplete and inaccurate
echo of a tenet already expounded by Origen. Florovski’s ascription

82
Which means that R. Sorabji’s assertion that the basic idea of ‘conditionality’
in the creation of the world is originated in Augustine is not correct. The credit
should be given to Origen. Cf. op. cit., p. 241.
83
deOr, XXIII, 5.
84
commJohn, 19, VI (Íper°keina oÈs¤aw); Cels, VII, 38 (§p°keina oÈs¤aw). The
statement §p°keina t∞w oÈs¤aw is a Platonic one (Respublica, 509B8–9), referring to
one supreme Form, the Form of the Good, which is ‘not being, but beyond being’.
The notion of the uncreatedness of ‘essence’ before creation is also stated in commGen, 3.
85
Cels, VI, 64.
86
frMatt, 357. The opinion that ‘essence’ was uncreated before creation is stated
in commGen, 1 (comm. on Gen. 1, 12); . . . tÚn YeÒn, ég°nnhton eÍrÒnta tØn oÈs¤an.
87
commRom, 25.
88
G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, p. 53.
136 chapter four

of this notion to John of Damascus89 should then be disqualified. He

also appeals to Augustine who said “nihilque in ea esse quod ad
Trinitatem pertineat, nisi quod Trinitas condidit” (there is not any-
thing which is related to the Trinity, apart from the fact that the
Trinity has created it).90 But it was Origen who had preceded
Augustine by pointing out the radical irrelevance of Wisdom to any-
thing created and the ‘acceptance’ of a ‘creative relation’ to the
world out of the benevolence of God (eÈdok¤a YeoË). It was indeed
Origen who sustained that ‘the nature of the Trinity has nothing in
common with the creation except the work of goodness’.91
I, therefore, can say this: in reference to God’s creative act, Origen
uses the verbs in a manner which is quite indicative of how he con-
ceives of the ‘creative relation’92 of God to the creation: Whenever
he refers to the being of Wisdom, namely the Son of God, he uses
the present tense and stresses that the ‘Wisdom is being’ (§st¤ Ípãrx-
ousa),93 thereby denoting his conception of the atemporal being of
God; for he deems the present tense the most appropriate in order
to talk about the being of God.94 He also quotes the imperfect tense
used by John in the beginning of his gospel and emphatically points
out that the being of the Logos of God is expressed through the
term ‘was’ (∑n), not by any other form such as ‘became’ (§g°neto).
He also points out that the latter is suitable only for what came into
being out of nothing, such as ‘life’. For it is John himself who says
that life ‘became’ in the Logos.95
On the other hand, when referring to the actual creation, he states
this as ‘future beings’ (tå §sÒmena), using the future tense. He is per-
fectly conscious of the connotation of this tense: it is used to indi-
cate something not existing at present but comimg into existence in
the future,96 that is, after what is indicated by the present tense.

89
G. Florovski, op. cit., p. 310, n. 12.
90
Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, I; cited in G. Florovski, op. cit., p. 53.
91
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 8.13.7.
92
frJohn, I.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
John, 1, 4; frJohn, II. In fact John says ‘In him was life’. In Fr. II, however,
the opening of the Gospel is considered with the full-stop put thus: ‘Without him
was not any thing made. What became in him, was life’. (Xvr¤w aÊtoË §g°neto
oÊd°n. ÜO g°gonen §n aÊt“ zvÆ ∑n.)
96
frJohn, I.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 137

Finally, when he refers to the decision of God to create and the

will of Wisdom to establish a creative relation with what was to come
into being, he uses the past tense. Thus he maintains that this deci-
sion came out of God’s freedom and it is not a predication which
could be applied to God Himself. By referring to the ‘creative rela-
tion’ of the Logos to the creation by means of the past tense, he
denotes an occurrence which appeared as of an indefinite moment of
the past, while this did not exist from everlasting.97
The point which I have just made is a crucial one, not only for
the portrayal of Origen’s ontology of time, but also for his theology
as a whole, since it is generally claimed that he held the so-called
doctrine of eternity of the world. The tenet ascribed to him is that
he regards the world as something like an eternal companion of
God. Koetschau embodies in his text two Fragments representing
Origen to hold such a tenet. These two passages,98 however, do not
really belong to this work; they are only allegations of Justinian,
made in his libOr. Nor is there any reason to accept that these por-
tions have something to do with Origen’s authentic views. Far to
the contrary.
If Origen held a view of the world being with God apart from
any notion of beginning, then this world (whatever its nature would
be) should stand in a relation to God not really different from the
relation of the Father to the Son. For both, the world and the Son,
would be regarded as timelesss as well as beginningless. It is inter-
esting to see, however, how Origen couches his view of God’s rela-
tion to the world on the one hand and of the Father’s relation to
the Son, on the other. For it is again in implicit, yet decisive, terms
of time that he depicts the radically different nature of the relation
in either of these two perceptions.
As far as the world is concerned, I need not make any further
analyses since God’s creative relation to the world has already been
canvassed: God ‘willed’ to bring the world into being out of non-
being, and so he did. I have also argued that this notion entails that
there was a ‘when’99 that only God was; and there was a ‘then’ that

97
This wording, however, should be regarded in the context of Origen’s state-
ments about the difficulty to express doctrines which involve timelessness. Cf.
commJohn, 2, XIX.
98
Fragment 5 Koetschau in Princ, I.2.10, and Fragment 10 Koetschau in Princ, I.4.5.
99
Those who attribute this view to Origen allege that he held a notion of some
138 chapter four

there were both God and his decision to create beings out of non-
being.100
Let us then see how the relation of the Father to the Son is por-
trayed. A passage from homJer deserves to be quoted in full, all the
more since it has been sometimes fallaciously construed:
If ‘anyone who commits a sin is said to be begotten by the devil’,101
then we have been begotten by the devil as many times as we have
committed sins; miserable then is he who is begotten always (ée¤) by
the devil and, again, blessed is he who is begotten always (ée¤) by
God. For I shall say that a just man has been begotten by God not
only once (oÈ går ëpaj), but he is begotten always (ée¤) out of each
particular good deed in which God begets a just man; and if I let you
know about the Saviour, that the Father did not just beget the Son
and then severed him from his generation, but always begets him (oÈx¤
§g°nnhsen ı patÆr tÚn uflÒn ka‹ ép°lusen aÈtÒn épÒ t∞w gen°sevw aÈtoË,
éllÉ ée¤ gennç aÈtÒn), then I shall say something similar about any
righteous man. Let us see then what our Saviour is. He is an ‘effluence
of glory’.102 We cannot say that the effluence of glory was begotten
once and is no longer begotten (oÈx¤ ëpaj geg°nnhtai ka‹ oÈx¤ gennç-
tai), but the effluence of God’s own glory is begotten as long as there
is the light which creates the effluence. Our Saviour is God’s Wisdom
and this Wisdom is an ‘effluence of eternal light’.103 Since therefore
the Saviour is always begotten (efi ı svtÆr ée¤ gennçtai), this is why
he says ‘he begets me before all hills’104 (he does not say that he has
begotten me before all hills, but he says ‘he begets me before all hills’);
hence the Saviour is always begotten by the Father (ka¤ ée¤ gennçtai
ı svtÆr ÍpÒ toË patrÒw).105

The same notion is found in the Princ:

The Father begets the only begotten Son and brings forth a Holy
Spirit, not as beings who did not exist before, but in the sense that

‘spiritual world’ before time; regardless of any other argument against such a claim,
the fact is that in his thought the notions of ‘spiritual’ and ‘world’ when used
together make no sense; the only exception is Origen’s term ‘intellectual world’
(nohtÒw kÒsmow) used in a specific context; Origen points out that this expression
means the Son of God, the term ‘world’ being just a metaphor. Cf. commJohn, 19,
XXII.
100
Ibid; s. also frJohn, I.A. Hamman develops his arguments on the erroneous
premise that Origen held a doctrine of ‘eternity of creation’; Cf. A Hamman,
“L’Enseignement Patristique sur la Création”, Revue des Science Religieuse, 42 (1968),
pp. 101–4.
101
1 John 3, 8.
102
Heb. 1, 3.
103
Wis. 7, 26.
104
Wis. 7, 26.
105
homJer, 9, 4. s. also commJohn, 1, XXIX.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 139

the Father is the origin and source of the Son or the Holy Spirit and
no thought of before or after can be entertained in respect of them.106
Any idea that ‘God the Father ever existed, even for a single moment,
without begetting his Wisdom’107 is explicitly rejected.
It is remarkable that, at that point of Princ, he refers to the rela-
tion of the Father to the Son by commenting on the same scrip-
tural passage (namely, Prov. 8, 25) as in the Greek passage in his
Homily on Jeremiah:
God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was indeed
born from him and draws his being from him, but he is yet without
any beginning, not only of that kind which can be distinguished by
periods of time, but even of that kind which the mind alone is wont
to contemplate in itself and to perceive, if I may so say, with the bare
intellect and reason. Wisdom, therefore, must be believed beyond the
limits of any beginning that we can speak of or understand.108
Thus Origen accentuates once again that it is the present tense which
can express (with minimal inaccuracy) the relation of the Father to
the Son. Certainly ‘all things were made by him’,109 but ‘he himself
is before everything’ (Efi gãr ‘pãnta diÉ aÈtoË §g°neto’, ka‹ aÈtÒw §sti
prÚ pãntvn).110 Wisdom, that is the Son, who said ‘God made me
the beginning of his ways towards his works’,111 was ‘before’ God
‘made anything’ (prÚ toË ti poi∞sai).112
This notion is incisively stated in a pithy passage of the Eighth
Homily on Luke:
Christ is the ‘image of the invisible God’,113 not having himself
become image’ (oÈ genom°nh efik≈n); on the other hand, the soul was
made ‘in image’ of an image (that is, in image of Christ) which was
‘existing before her’ (that is, before creation) (éllã ‘katÉ efikÒna’
pro#pãrxousan aÈt∞w). As a matter of fact, every soul strives to
become the ‘image of Christ’ who is ‘the archetype, the Son of God,
the image of God’.114

106
Princ, II.2.1.
107
Princ, I.2.2.
108
Ibid. Here Origen alludes to the Stoic notion of katalhptikÆ fantas¤a; s.
infra, pp. 158–61.
109
John 1, 3.
110
selPs, 23; PG 12.1269; italics mine.
111
Prov. 8, 22.
112
commMatt, 14, 14; italics mine.
113
Col. 1, 15.
114
homLuc, 8; italics mine.
140 chapter four

What Origen strongly rejects here is any implication that the birth
of the Son is an event which occurred once and the Son exists there-
after. The birth of the Son, the relation of the Father to the Son,
is an ontological relation: no notion of beginning, such as coming into
being out of non-being, can be applied to this.
But this is exactly what Origen affirms about creation. The expres-
sion ‘to come into being out of non-being’ is typical of the wording
through which he points to creation. By means of this expression he
contrasts the Son’s being with the becoming of creation:
The birth of Christ115 is not a way from non-being to being, as some
people think, but it is a way from ‘being in form of god’116 to under-
taking the ‘form of a servant’.117
That the Son, unlike the world, is co-eternal with the Father is a
tenet of Origen testified to by eminent Fathers, such as Athanasius118
and the historian Socrates.119 Athanasius clearly indicates that it was
Origen who inspired him in much of his battle against Arianism.120
The contrast in the two different ways in which he regards these
two different relations (Son/world) to God is quite obvious: the world
came into being out of non-being. Such a notion can by no means
be applied to the Son.
It is indicative of how strongly Origen feels about this view that
he remains remarkably meticulous when he refers to the two imports
of the term ‘wisdom’: regarding the ‘theoremata’ (or, objects of con-
templation) and ‘reasons’ (which are also called ‘wisdom’), he stresses

115
He refers to the Incarnation.
116
Phil. 2, 6.
117
Phil. 2, 7; frMatt, 3.
118
Athanasius, De Decretis Nicaeae Synodis, 27, 1–2.
119
Socrates, Historia Ecclesiastica, Book 2, chapter 21. In the same work, Book 6,
chapter 12, Socrates rebukes those who falsely attacked Origen stating them by
name (Methodius of Olympus, Eustathius of Antioch, Apollinaris, Theophilus of
Alexandria) adducing as evidence against them Athanasius and his statements about
Origen preaching the Son as coeternal with the Father.
120
Here is how R. Norris attempts to ‘explain’ what, ‘from the point of view of
a Platonist’ (namely Origen), he sees as a ‘contradiction’: that is, how is it possible
that something is both incorporeal and generate? All he does is to regard that the
term ‘beginning’ has the meaning which Origen (explicitly and so many times)
attributes to the relation between the Father and the Son. In order to stand by his
contention about the ‘doctrine of eternal creation’ (op. cit., p. 154), Norris (op. cit.,
p. 151) goes as far as to ascribe to Origen a notion which the Alexandrian theologian
so strongly rejected.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 141

that they are not beginningless, but ‘made’;121 in this way this ‘wis-
dom’ is distinguished from the person of the Son of God who time-
lessly was (not became) with the Father.122 The same notion is more
poetically expressed in the Cant, where the providential creation (that
is, creation of ‘theoremata’ and ‘reasons’) is adumbrated in terms of
‘pregnancy’ (or, conception: sÊllhciw): ‘the beginning of being lies
in the conception’ by the ‘mother’ (diã tÚ §n t∞ sullÆcei tØn érxÆn
t∞w sustãsevw e‰nai),123 that is, the divine life.
According to this relation of creation to God, he is stated at points
as the ‘cause’ of creation. This is applied to the notion of ‘coming
into being out of non-being’, to the creative act of God, which is
to the creation of both incorporeal and corporeal nature. God is
stated as ‘cause’ by virtue of the fact that he created ‘corporeals and
incorporeals’ (t«n svmatik«n ka‹ t«n ésvmãtvn, ka‹ toÊtvn èpãntvn
afit¤ou YeoË).124
The same predication is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as he is
regarded as Creator, namely as Wisdom who ‘willed’ to ‘accept a
creative relation to future beings’. Thus Christ is a ‘cause’ because
it is he who gave the ‘being’ (afit¤a . . . …w tÚ e‰nai didoÊw) out of
non-being.125
In another instance, Christ is stated as the ‘cause’ of everything,
be it ‘visible or invisible’, in the sense that he ‘is before them and
the cause of them’ and gave them their ‘being’ (tÚ e‰nai).126 At that
point Origen makes clear that he alludes not only to the actual cre-
ation, but also to the providential one: he speaks of the making as
well as of the ‘substantification’ (oÈsi≈sei),127 pointing out that Christ
is the ‘cause’ not only of the actual existence of things, but also of

121
expProv, 7.
122
C. Bigg takes for granted that Origen held a notion of eternity of the world
(The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, pp. 240–2). I have already argued how mistaken
he was in rendering Origen’s views of the ‘conceptions’ of the Son (op. cit., p. 210,
n. 1; s. supra). Bigg failed to grasp that whereas Wisdom and Logos were timelessly
conceptions of the Son, the rest of them became, due to the very fact that the world
was brought into being out of non-being.
123
Cant, 3; commenting on Song of Songs 3, 4.
124
selPs, 2.
125
expProv, 1.
126
frJohn, I.
127
Ibid.
142 chapter four

the ‘reasons’ for them—a notion to which he attributes par excel-

lence the notion of ‘coming into being out of non-being’.128
In the context of his claims about Origen’s thought, C. Bigg means
to associate his doctrine of creation with Platonism. He knows, how-
ever, that he cannot do that through an immediate relation with
Plato. For in the Timaeus the world of Ideas appears to have an
independent eternal existence from the Demiurge, and Bigg acknowl-
edges that.129 Thus, he endeavours to sustain the allegation of Platonism
in Origen through a connection with Philo’s concept of creation,
according to which the Ideas exist in the divine Mind.130 But this is
wrong since in Philo there is a Platonic notion to which Origen’s
concept of creation is sheerly contrasted: Philo considers a ‘world of
ideas’ which function not only as ‘models’ but also as efficient causes.131
These efficient causes have to exist beginninglessly in a timeless world,
which is not the case with Origen: here the models are present in
the world, they are not transcendent beings. In Origen, the object
of providential creation constitutes an actual creature: these ‘reasons’
are but creatures, whereas the sole ‘cause’ of creation is God.132 At
the providential stage creation is already a fully real fact, not creation
of a latent form.
Besides, as Philo refers to an ‘original matter’,133 there is a con-
ception which excludes creation ex nihilo in a strict sense. This has
been pointed out by A. Chroust as an inference. I can, however,
support this assertion by appealing to a passage where God is pre-
sented to create in a Platonic sense, namely, as ‘putting in order
what is disorderly’ (tØn ékosm¤an §n kÒsmv tiye¤w). The only difference
from Plato is that Philo perceives this eternal ‘disorderly’ cosmic state
as ‘incorporeal’.134 Besides, there are at least two statements of Philo

128
selPs, 32.
129
C. Bigg, op. cit., p. 296.
130
This was also held by eclectic Platonists such as Plutarch of Chaeronea; Cf.
Philopoemen, I, 10.1: Svkrãthw ka‹ Plãtvn xvristãw t∞w Ïlhw oÈs¤aw tåw fid°aw
Ípolambãnei §n to›w noÆmasi ka‹ ta›w fantas¤aiw toË YeoË toÈt°sti toË noË,
Ífest≈saw.
131
Cf. De Opificio Mundi 3Eff; 5C; 7Bff; 29C; Legum Allegoriarum Libri, 44A; De
Migratione Abrahami, 404B (edit. Magney); also Cf. Plato, Timaeus 28Aff. cited in
A.H. Chroust, op. cit., p. 61, n. 370.
132
Cf. points where God is stated as the cause of creation: commJohn, 1, XVII;
commJohn, 2, I; selPs, 2; expProv, 1.
133
De Opificio Mundi, 2B; ap. Chroust.
134
De Opificio Mundi, I.33–35.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 143

that creation out of non-being is impossible,135 although he condemns

the view that the cosmos has always existed.136 Philo’s position is
unclear anyway. As Christopher Stead remarks,137 although Philo
condemns the view that the cosmos has always existed, he argues
that there was no time before it began;138 but he also paraphrases
the Timaeus passage on the goodness of the Demiurge139 and uses it
to explain God’s ordering of the cosmos in accordance with his pre-
existing designs.140 His reading of the Timaeus, therefore, allows a
definite creative act which in fact was instantaneous.141 This seems
to rule out the allegorical explanation of the past tense, though Philo
uses one to explain away the ‘six days of creation’. Other points are
simply left unclear, for instance, how time began ‘either at or after’
the creation of the world.142
In fact, therefore, Origen’s conception of providential creation can-
not be associated with Philo’s views. For in Origen the ‘patterns’ are
created out of nothing, they are a real part of creation, not a tran-
scendent cause of it. They are being, as well as functioning, within
the world. This is a critical point on which Origen’s thought stands
in contrast to the corresponding tenet of Philo.
The idea of God as ‘cause’ of ‘creation’ (both the providential
and actual one) is of utmost importance. For the adoption of the
notion of cause is strikingly indicative of the conception of creation
having an actual beginning.
A fundamental principle set forth by Origen is that what proceeds
from a cause must necessarily have a beginning.143 The very fact, therefore,
that creation had a cause entails that it had a beginning, too. R. Sorabji’s
assertion, that Origen sustains that there is an ‘intelligible world’
which is ‘without beginning’144 is not correct. I have already argued that
the term ‘intelligible world’ makes no sense, since creation ‘without
beginning’ is a notion alien to this frame of thought. This pertains
also to the providential creation. The ‘reasons’ and yevrÆmata which

135
De Aeternitatae Mundi, 2.5; De Specialibus Legibus, 1.266.
136
de Orificio Mundi, 7.
137
Christopher Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, Cambridge 1994, p. 67.
138
Ibid. 26.
139
Timaeus, 29e.
140
de Orificio Mundi, 21–2.
141
Ibid. 13.
142
de Opificio Mundi, 26.
143
Princ, III.5.1.
144
R. Sorabji, op. cit., 251, n. 111.
144 chapter four

are the outcome of that creation had a beginning. This is what eluded
R. Sorabji and hence his assumption that these creatures ‘have existed
always’.
Certainly this ‘cause’ does not imply any notion of causality; it
only suggests that the world came into being out of non-being,145 as
well as that it is God who caused this world to be.146 The fact that
God created the world does not constitute any causality whatsoever:
to be the cause of creation does not necessarily imply any causality.
Causality is a principle according to which something has to come to
pass, as a result of a previous occurrence (according to Aristotle this
occurrence might be even simultaneous). God caused the world to
be, not according to any principle, but just because He freely and for
once wished to create. Causality can hardly be related to a notion of
‘for once’. Occurrences according to a principle such as causality
come to pass more than once.
Moreover, here we have one more indication of Origen’s con-
ception of God as contrasted with the Platonic concept of Creator.
The Platonic God has to be Creator; it is in his nature, as God, to
create. This means that the creative action is an ontological principle
attributed to the Platonic God, as well as to the Plotinian One. On
the contrary, for Origen God created (that is, caused creatures to be,
that is, creatures exist because God willed so), but neither does this
divine act follow any principle nor is this subject to any established
law compelling creation.
The very adoption of the notion of cause, nevertheless, positively
brings up his fundamental tenet that creation is not beginningless.
What is more, the idea of beginning itself indubitably indicates that
God Himself is prior to the created reality. In fact Origen upholds
the principle that ‘What creates is senior to what has been created.’
(Pçn går tÚ poioËn presbÊteron toË pepoihm°nou).147
The relation of God to creation is radically different from the
relation of the Father to the Son.148 There can be no perception of

145
selPs, 2. Cf. my ensuing discussion on ‘Timeless Causality’, pp. 355ff.
146
expProv, 1. Origen here emphisizes that the term érxÆ (beginning) may also
mean ‘the cause of coming into being’ (ÉArxÆ ka‹ ≤ tinÒw Ípãrjevw afit¤a), obvi-
ously availing himself of Aristotle, as noted earlier.
147
commGen, 3; the same expression in frGen, Philocalia, 28, 14; commJohn, 2, IV
(s. infra). This phrase was taken up by Eusebius verbatim: Preparatio Evangelica, 6.11.56.
148
Asserting that those two kinds of relation are virtually the same, R. Norris
made a mistake. Cf. op. cit., 151.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 145

a reality in which the Son was not being; but there is a clear con-
ception of the divine being where there was no creation at all.149
Origen’s views themselves, therefore, as well as the manner in
which they are couched, determinably demonstrate that in his thought
there is no room for any notion such as ‘eternity of the world’. It
is he himself who vehemently attacks Heracleon who “most imper-
tinently . . . says that neither the aeon nor what is in the aeon was
made through the Logos, thinking that they were made before the
Logos”.150
The very notion of beginning denotes that creation was created
out of non-being. This is why, in Cels, he challenges ‘those who hold
that the world is not created’, arguing that those who sustain such
a tenet ‘cannot speak of any beginning of the world’ (…w oÈk ¶stin
oÔn to›w ég°nhton Ífistam°noiw tÚn kÒsmon érxÆn aÈtoË efipe›n).151
They are those who believe in any kind of beginningless world, such
as the Platonists who sustained the idea of an intelligible world and
a beginningless matter.
Origen’s exposition has nothing of the suggestiveness of Plato’s
one, which left room for so many subsequent interpretations. The
same goes for Philo’s statements. They were seminal, so that his
viewpoint was finally proved controversial. Although he issues at least
one denial of creation out of nothing, there are some seeming
affirmations along with it. At any rate, he was sufficiently vague to
allow room for debate. Besides, he by and large falls short of the
timeless conception.
In contrast, Origen’s conception of creation ex nihilo is clear-cut.
There is no point of his work allowing for the possibility that he
was groping for a notion of beginning. On the contrary, he has an
unwavering grasp of the idea and attaches to this an indubitably
clear sense. This is why he forcefully opposes the Greeks (who are

149
E. de Faye has grounded his work De l’influence du Gnosticisme sur Origène on
two mistaken assumptions. Firstly, that Origen holds a notion of a ‘trasncendent
world’ of spirits. Secondly, that he holds a ‘doctrine of eternal creation’, an assump-
tion quite fallacious, too, as the discussion here shows. The claims of de Faye in
that work, where he asserts an influence of the Gnostics on Origen, grounding these
assertions on false premises inevitably lead him to conclusions which seriously dis-
tort Origen’s authentic views. Cf. E. de Faye, “De l’influence du Gnosticisme chez
Origène”, Revue de l’Histoire des Religions, Paris, 87 (1923), 181–235.
150
commJohn, 2, XIV.
151
Cels, IV, 79.
146 chapter four

in fact implied in his foregoing portion) and does speak of the begin-
ning of the world (namely, its creation out of non-being) throughout
his theology. Subsequently, he has no difficulty in speaking of a state
‘before’ creation of ‘any rational nature’ (prÚ pãshw logik∞w fÊsevw),152
whereas in Cels he reaffirms that ‘the world has come into existence’
(ı kÒsmow geg°nhtai).153
In contrast to those who ‘cannot speak of any beginning of the
world’,154 Origen himself quite often uses the notion of beginning. In
denying that evil exists in rational creatures by nature, he brings the
notion of beginning up again, speaking of ‘natures existing in the begin-
ning’ (érx∞yen fÊseiw).155 In point of this, he contends that a ratio-
nal nature is what it is (in terms of moral quality) because of its
own responsibility and on account of its structure itself, that is,
because it was made free in the beginning (érx∞yen).
Although God’s decision to create appears in a timeless reality
(the divine one), Origen inevitably has to express this notion in tem-
poral terms. This is why he calls on the reader not to be embar-
rassed by the use of temporal terms in a discussion involving the
timeless reality.156 Behind this literary convention, however, we can
discern his deeper distinct perceptions of God Himself and God
as Creator, as well as the ontological priority of the former to the
latter.
In his thought there is a notion of when God decided to create.
It is then significant to ponder upon this ‘when’ and see how this
is perceived.
The Wisdom of God is a subsistence existing before the aeons as a
timeless one; but when (˜te) she accepted a relation to the creatures,
then (tÒte) she became the beginning of God’s ways, be they construc-
tional or providential; so this beginning is yoked together with the
creatures of which she became beginning (œn g°gonen érxÆ), and we mean
her relation to creatures; but Wisdom herself is timeless, substantially
being with God before the aeons (≤ d¢ sof¤a é˝diow, oÈsivd«w prÚ
afi≈nvn parã t“ Ye“ Ípãrxousa).157

152
selPs, 109, PG 12.1569; the same in selPs, 4, PG 12.1133.
153
Cels, IV, 79.
154
Ibid
155
commEph, p. 404, 219–223; also, 407, 34–35.
156
commJohn, 2, XIX.
157
expProv, 8, PG 17.185.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 147

Thus, although the atemporal character of Wisdom’s being is stren-

uously emphasized, the concept of creation not existing in Wisdom
herself, even as a thought or will or decision of God, is maintained.
There is a notion of ‘when . . . then’, which conclusively indicates
the conception of God as being Creator not of necessity, and also
figures a reality in which God is not Creator yet. Thereupon lies the
conception of God Himself quite apart from any notion of creation.
The conception of God Himself as distinct from his being known
as Creator is precisely what allows Origen to sustain that creation
does not introduce any change in God. This is why he had no rea-
son to deal with the pseudo-question ‘what was God doing before
creation?’. R. Sorabji158 ascribes this concern to Origen, but his mis-
take is that he bases his case on Princ, whereas all Greek and other
Latin texts show that he did not need to deal with such nonsense.
For such a question is based on a completely unreasonable premise:
when one makes this before a serious point of debate, he has already
established the entirely arbitrary presupposition that time exists. He
speaks of the divine life having postulated that this is a temporal
reality. This is why he speaks of ‘before’. Once, however, it has been
set forth that the divine reality is timeless, no question of the sort
can be posed. As a matter of fact, it is not enough to merely pos-
tulate that time did not precede the world at all. This premise has
to be constantly borne in mind and to be entertained all along the
pertinent problematique. Otherwise it is reduced to a faint theoret-
ical echo within a discourse where the existence of time has virtu-
ally been instilled.
Origen was a man of sound logic and a thorough knowledge of
the rules of dialectics. This is why he did not feel it necessary to
deal with a pseudo-question such as this. Once he had affirmed, in
the clearest terms possible, that the divine reality is timeless, he knew
that terms such as ‘before’ or ‘after’ or ‘later’ are just inevitable (yet
conscious) linguistic inaccuracies.159 Least of all would he take this
inevitable linguistic inaccuracy as an actual philosophical problem
and deal with it seriously. For the notions of ‘before’ or ‘after’ applied
to the divine timelessness suggest nothing more than the ontological
relation of the will of God to creation.

158
R. Sorabji, op. cit., 196.
159
commJohn, 2, XIX.
148 chapter four

Beyond that, however, what R. Sorabji calls the ‘why not sooner?’
argument originates in a tacit Platonic premise: it takes for granted
that God should do something ‘before’ he created. For God cannot
be perceived as not doing anything, since in Platonism and Neoplatonism
the divine creativity bears upon the very essence of the divine being
itself.
The answer actually lies in the sharp contrast between Origen’s
thought and both Platonism and Neoplatonism. For, as I empha-
sized, on no account has his concept of creation anything to do with
what God is. Any facet of his doctrine of creation, and certainly the
notion of creation ex nihilo, has to do only with what God did. There
is no legitimate way of drawing any conclusion about the divine
being in itself from the creative act of God; an act which in no way
can provide conclusions about God Himself. Unlike Platonism, in
Origen the creative act of God has nothing to do with the divine
ontology.
Besides, the deeper meaning of his creative act, as an act of free-
dom, is this: any notion of why is excluded in an absolute sense. God
did not create within any context involving any why whatsoever. The
notion of God being free to assume the function of creating suggests
the thorough absence of such a context, the completely uncondi-
tional decision and the fully contingent character of creation. This free
divine exercise of creativity is the absolute absence of any notion of
why compelling, or even just impelling, towards creating the world.
The concept of the divine freedom in creation is pivotal, because
it is indispensable for understanding this point. It should be absolutely
dissociated from the sense attached to human freedom. For it per-
tains not only to the manner in which God acts (or, does not act at
all), but also points to the manner in which God Himself is. This
means that the state of God in Himself perceived in the absence of
creation (in the state prior to creation, so to speak—but in fact a
state ontologically ungraspable) is also excluded from any notion of
why. Which means that there are no reasons for God not only to
create, but also not to create. Which also means that there were no
reasons on account of which God did not create earlier, so to speak.
There were no reasons which were augmented in a later stage and
it was then that God decided to assume the function of Creator
on account of these reasons. The absolute absence of any causal
nexus between the divine Being and the divine creative Function, as
well as the absolute absence of any why for God to become Creator,
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 149

are two indispensable notions for this doctrine of creation to be

comprehended.
So much with regard to the ‘why not sooner?’ argument. It is not
only the notion of ‘sooner’, but also that of ‘why’ which in no way
carries over the divine case. A lot of stress has been put by schol-
arship on this ‘sooner’, which after all points to the relation of God
with the product of his creative act. I think that the notion of ‘why’
deserves to be paid particular attention and consideration, all the
more since it mainly bears upon the divine being per se.
Hence Origen did not need to expound his considerations in the
vein that R. Sorabji160 does; that is, to wonder how is it possible for
creation to imply no change in God Himself. The usual mistake
(made there, too) over Origen’s conception about the ‘generation’ of
the Son from the Father is this: scholars speak of ‘eternal genera-
tion’ of the Son, as if this were a continuous action of the Father. The
fact, however, is that he speaks of ‘generation’ portraying an onto-
logical relation within the divine life, not an act whatsoever.161
By contrast, creation came into being out of non-being through
a creative act of God, namely, out of his creative ‘utterance’ gennhyÆtv
(let be). It is quite a crucial point that creation is regarded as not
‘consubstantial’ with God, whereas the Son is portrayed as ımooÊsiow
to the Father, a notion which has serious implications for Origen’s
doctrine. Again though I shall not elaborate on this point, which is
beyond my scope and requires an extensive exposition of this theology.
At any rate, the fact that creation is a product of God’s free will,
as well as that what came into being out of non-being is ‘not cosub-
stantial’ with God Himself, are two principal points which underline
that God’s creative act does not establish any change in Him Himself.
The distinction drawn between God in Himself and God as known
to the world, is one of the most fundamental conceptions stated
throughout Origen’s work.162

160
R. Sorabji, op. cit., 310.
161
Further discussion on this particular topic is beyond my scope. However, the
passage from homJer quoted above (p. 138) is quite eloquent.
162
One can now see how wrong is the assertion of R. Norris, that one cannot
think of God without thinking at the same time of the world. To him ‘the doc-
trine of ‘eternal creation’ is, in Origen, a correlate of his understanding of the divine
nature.’ (op. cit., 154). These are the views of G. Florovski, too (Aspects of Church
History, p. 49) and of a vast number of scholars, some of which have already been
mentioned.
150 chapter four

Human intellect, being of necessity in time, would be tempted to

pose a question such as ‘does this decision of God coincide with the
realization of creation, or is it prior to this?’. The strict answer is
that this question itself makes no sense at all, since in timelessness
there can be no notion of ‘before’. Still Origen does affirm that the
providential creation was brought into being ‘before’ the actual one.
The ‘when . . . then’ notion indicates that this creation of reasons,
according to which the world was made, is not something pertain-
ing to the ontology of Wisdom: it only indicates a process, yet not
a process in time, in fact a similar one to the notion of ‘days’ in
Genesis, which indicate no temporal succession, but ony a process
of thought.
This means that the relation of Wisdom, even as Logos, to crea-
tures is not an element of the substance of Wisdom herself. This is
what is really expressed by the statement that Wisdom ‘accepted’
(§d°jato) this relation to ‘future’ creatures (tå §sÒmena). Hence if it
is asked whether or not can we visualize a state of Wisdom without
necessarily thinking of creation, or implying this in any way, Origen’s
answer is that indeed we can envisage Wisdom in such a way. For
creation itself is but a product of God’s volition. This is the actual
perception hinted at by the expression ‘when . . . then’, as well as by
verbs such as ‘accepted’ (§d°jato), ‘wanted’ (±boulÆyh) and ‘willed’
(±y°lhsen), in the passages canvassed in the previous pages. In point
of the doctrine of creation, to say that someone is a Platonist is tan-
tamount to saying that he holds God to be Creator of ontological
necessity. Origen is far from any notion of this sort, as we have seen.
In view of this, the basic idea of conditionality of creation does exist
in Origen’s works. R. Sorabji’s assertion,163 therefore, that this idea
is a discovery of Augustine is not correct. It was Origen who deci-
sively enunciated that creation is a product of God’s free will, namely,
that God would have never created had he not willed to do so.
R. Norris, on the other hand, took for granted that Origen holds a
Platonic view of an ‘eternally’ pre-existing ‘world of intelligences’.
He has thus upheld the typical claim which has been taken up by
numerous scholars. However, he finds himself somewhat confused,
as he notices certain notions which are unlike a Platonist: “From a

163
R. Sorabji, op. cit., 241.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 151

point of view of a Platonist, there is a contradiction involved in say-

ing that something is both incorporeal and generate.”164 The prob-
lem of Norris is that although he brands Origen as a ‘Platonist’, still
he finds fundamental views which are discordant with Platonism.
This falls foul of the original claim: how could those be squared
with each other? This places an onus on him to afford a convinc-
ing resolution. However, he does not put his premise in question
and remains defiant to the outright fact that his own considerations
render his claims self-defeating. Instead, he endeavours to accom-
modate his answer to his bias, contenting himself with beating a
hasty retreat and reverting to his original premise: Origen is not
after all an inconsistent Platonist; he did not really hold that creation
had a beginning and came into being out of non-being.
This conclusion, however, is wrong, since the premise about a
world of ‘rational spirits’ existing without beginning is wrong in the
first place. For in Origen the notion of beginning is too strongly enun-
ciated to be extinguished. Certainly it is not a very apt comment to
say that “Origen wants to have his cake and eat it”: that is, to main-
tain that the ‘world of spirits’ is without beginning and at the same
time to speak of ‘beginning’. The simple answer is that Origen does
not hold any notion of a beginningless world. If I am to break down
resistance, I could say that Norris’s comment applies rather to him-
self. For, on the one hand, he seeks to maintain his assertion that
Origen holds a ‘doctrine of eternal creation’ and, on the other, he
concedes the inescapable fact that Origen does sustain that the cre-
ation had a beginning. Certainly this is not a ‘contradiction’ of Origen,
but a miscomprehension of Norris.165
The final comment which I wish to make is that Norris would be
more confused if he had grasped one more point, which has totally
eluded him: not only did Origen hold that something can be incor-
poreal as well as generate, but also this ‘generate’ is not ‘consub-
stantial’ (ımooÊsion) with the divine incorporeality. This is a distinction
which Plato had no inkling of, whereas to the Gnostics it could seem
outrageous. Besides, it is well-known that Augustine struggled hard
to free himself from the Manichaean view that the soul is of the
same substance with God.

164
R. Norris, op. cit., 149ff.
165
Loc. cit., 149–54.
152 chapter four

There should be no doubt that in Princ Rufinus has severely

obfuscated the notions expounded there.166 For the perception of the
‘reasons’ coming into being out of non-being into the Wisdom (a
notion so conspicuously expounded in the works in Greek) is not
clearly expounded; to the extent that this is there, it is rendered in
an obscure (and I think, intentionally obscure) manner. Quite obvi-
ously Rufinus had not grasped Origen’s distinction between God
Himself, on the one hand, and God as Creator out of a free decision
and will of his, on the other. He apparently feared that creation’s
coming into being could entail some kind of change in God Himself.
I maintain that these points of Princ (in which the so-called ‘why
not sooner?’ argument seems to be implicitly handled) are only a
catastrophic interpolation by Rufinus,167 which provoked misunder-
standing of Origen’s real views. Rufinus was obviously apprehensive
that this theology could not answer a quaint question such as ‘what
was God doing before creation?’, or ‘why did he not create sooner?’
Hence he tucked an entirely unnecessary, and even misleading, argu-
mentation into the text of Princ.
Such an argument can be found in Aristotle opposing the view
that there could have been rest for an infinite period and then
motion, in the sense that ‘orderly succession’168 could be impossible.
Augustine’s answer to a similar question (namely, ‘what did’ God do
before creation) was that ‘He was preparing hell for people who pry
into mysteries’. His serious answer to this question is that there was
no time before creation. Still this is simply a mere repetition of an
inspired view of Origen, already put forward in commJohn, 2, XIX,
in frJohn, XIII, as well as in Princ, IV.4.1: this latter passage of Princ
acquires a totally different meaning regarded in the context of the
fact that Origen did not hold any notion of beginningless creation.

166
Cf. Princ, I.2.2.
167
Princ I.1.6; I.2.10; I.4.3–5. (This section is found in one MS only and has
been obliterated from another. s. Koetschau’s ed., p. 65, n. on 1.8); II.5.2–3.
168
Cf. Aristotle: Physica, 8.1, 252a11–19; De Caelo, 1.12, 283a11. Augustine:
Confessions, XI.12 (answer to the ‘why not sooner?’ argument); Confessions, XI.13; de
Genesi contra Manichaeos, I.2.3; De Civitate Dei, XI.5–6 (there was no time before the
creation). In modern times this argument has been set forth by G.W. Leibniz in
his famous exchange of five papers with S. Clarke: he developed his argument of
‘why not sooner?’ in attacking the Newtonian opinion that time exists independently
of change. However, any further discussion on this point is beyond my scope. Cf.
H.G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Manchester, 1956; 26–7, 37–8, 75–7.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 153

The fact is that such a question was posed not by Origen, but by
the Gnostics and Manichaeans,169 notably the heretics against whom
he polemicized so many times either implicitly or by name.
The interpolation of this question in the Latin rendering of Princ
was a major mistake of Rufinus. Juxtaposition of texts extant both
in Greek and Latin illustrate him as a man of good will, a devoted
man enthusiastic for Origen, but of no particularly high intelligence,
or interpretative ability. All the writings extant in Greek clearly show
that Origen did not need to address himself to this fake-question.
For he definitely distinguishes the conception of God Himself from
the notion of God’s decision and will to create. That God decided to
create does not entail any change in Himself. On the contrary, despite
the fact that God decided to create, He Himself remains unchanged.
The statements in Cels leave no room for doubt on this question: it
is explicitly contended that “the teaching of Jews and Christians pre-
serves the unchangeable and unalterable [nature] of God (tÚ êtrepton ka‹
énallo¤vton toË YeoË) . . . For in prayers to God the Scripture says
‘But You are the same’. And it is believed that it is God who said
‘I have not changed’.’’170
In the same work this conception of God is unequivocally enunciated:
If he [sc. Celsus] had read the words of the prophets, where David
says, ‘But You are the same’ and where Malachi, I think, says ‘And
I have not changed’, he would have seen that none of us say that change
takes place in God concerning either His action or our conceptions about Him.
Remaining the same He controls the things that are subject to change,
as that is their nature; and his Logos persuades [us] that they are
under control.171
The scriptural passages, which Origen appeals to, are Ps. 101, 28
and Mal. 3, 6. It is remarkable that he uses them both in the two
passages, quoting them in the same order. It is obvious that the first
portion mainly points to the notion of God Himself, whereas the
second one alludes to the fact that any notion about Him does
not imply any alteration to God Himself. In his translation of Cels,
H. Chadwick172 has translated the passage of Malachi 3, 6 as ‘I

169
Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 2.28.3; Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I.2.3.
170
Cels, I, 21; italics mine.
171
Cels, VI, 62; italics mine. Cf. Cels, V, 21: ‘the entirely unchangeable nature
of God’ (tÚ pãnt˙ êtrepton toË YeoË).
172
Op. cit., p. 21.
154 chapter four

change not’. I understand that this is the English rendering of the

scriptural oÈk ±llo¤vmai, quoted by Origen. However, the verb is
in the present perfect tense, not in the present tense; so the passage
means ‘I have not changed’. Whether in the Hebrew text the verb
is in the present prefect tense or in present tense, I do not know.
What I do know, however, is that in the Greek text of the Septuagint,
which Origen quotes, the expression is in the form oÈk ±llo¤vmai.
It is important for this topic to point the difference out, as the quo-
tation is meant to suggest that eventhough God decided to create, and
so he did, there is no change or alteration that took place in God
Himself.
The ontological priority of the notion of God Himself to any con-
ception of Him is again positively put forward. The conceptions of
God as Creator or as Judge or as Provident, or whatever one would
conceive him of, do not suggest any change in God Himsef, who is
beyond any possibility of change. Particularly, as far as his creative
act is concerned, the notion of his decision and will plays a deter-
minate role in this distinction, which is a fundamental premise of
Origen’s entire theology.
What Rufinus did not grasp in its full significance was the major
break between Platonism and Origen: this break lies in the notion
of ‘coming into being out of non-being’ without any necessity involved.
Besides, at the same point of Princ,173 Rufinus represents Origen
to maintain that creation, as narrated in Genesis, does not point to
the very beginning of the world. In fact he appears unaware of the
distinct conceptions of providential and actual creation. His concern
is to represent Origen as holding that God was never idle. He takes
into consideration only the existence of the actual world and inter-
polates the assertion that the narration in Genesis refers only to the
creation of the present world. He confuses the notion of succesive
worlds with Origen’s conception of the creative act of God. The lat-
ter totally eluded Rufinus.
Hence, anyone who would rely on such statements of Princ is
bound to be confused and misled. This in fact has befallen the vast
majority of those who offered accounts of Origen’s thought on this
point out of a study of Princ only and without a considered study of
all the works in Greek and Latin.

173
Princ, III.5.3.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 155

From these texts, however, it can be conclusively drawn that the

narration in Genesis is taken to refer to the very beginning of cre-
ation. The notions of providential and actual creation are grounded
on passages of Genesis. After all Origen is a Biblical theologian, who
is happier in quotation from the Scripture than in using philosoph-
ical terminology. Thus the pertinent analysis in these two sections
of the Latin version of Princ should be regarded as an interpolation
of Rufinus: he took the ‘why not sooner?’ pseudo-question as a real
problem; hence he deemed that he ought to defend his author on
this ground and shield him from a potential charge of heresy. At
the same time, however, he was unaware of critical facets of this
theology, such as the distinction between the notions of God Himself
and God as Creator, and consequently the conception of time, and
nonetheless the Alexandrian’s entire doctrine of creation. We know
that there is a lack of congruence between any given Greek frag-
ment and Rufinus’s Latin version. This means that the translator
abridged the work to a considerable extent. In the case of the doc-
trine of creation Rufinus’ initiative was harmful to the essence of
this theology.
What I have attempted in this section is to expound a crucial and
controversial aspect of one of the most mystical doctrines of Origen’s
entire theology. How delicate this tenet is evident from the histori-
cal fact that its distortion was fatal for the comprehension of this
theology as a whole.
In doing so, I solely based my argument upon his own statements,
avoiding deductions or conclusions drawn dialectically. Certainly there
are some points of this exposition which seem to be paradoxical.
For example, it could be asked: how is it possible to speak of a
‘beginning’ (in the sense of coming into being out of non-being) in
a reality which is timeless? Similarly, one could ask: how is it pos-
sible to speak of actual creation coming into being after the provi-
dential creation?
This is the very point where the distinction between God Himself
and God a Creator appears as the decisive factor for understanding
his dogma. This distinction is in fact a truth which cannot be appre-
hended by conscious mind, and Origen did know that this doctrine
was bound to be misunderstood once couched in words. This is why
he regarded this doctrine as a ‘mystical’ one. This is also why he
states that this doctrine is ‘difficult to enunciate’ (dusdiÆghton) and
156 chapter four

‘far beyond our linguistic ability’ (ka‹ poll“ t∞w l°jevw ≤m«n me›zon).174
We should recall, however, his emphatic statement that his use of
temporal notions when speaking of the divine timelessness should be
regarded in a loose sense on account of the non-existence of time.175
That a dogma is bound to be misunderstood once couched in
words is one of the main reasons which render a certain conception
mystical. Origen was very much alive to this fact. At the point where
Celsus speaks of the Greek tenets explaining why man has assumed
a body, he makes a short comment yet he forbears to set forth his
own views.176 He only makes a hint by means of the Stoic expres-
sion katalhptikÆ fantas¤a (direct cognitive impression),177 averring
that this in fact constitutes a criterion for knowledge of a certain
subject. In Princ, although not by the Stoic term, he alludes to this
intellectual capacity expounding the atemporal ontological relation
of the Father to the Son:
God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was born
indeed from him and draws his being from him, but he is yet with-
out any beginning, not only of that kind which can be distinguished
by periods of time, but even of that kind which the mind alone is
wont to contemplate in itself and to perceive, if I may so say, with the
bare intellect and reason. Wisdom, therefore, must be believed beyond the
limits of any beginning that we can speak or understand.178
The reference to direct cognitive impression (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a)
points to his belief that a certain knowledge of a mystical doctrine
is possible, through a flash of insight or, as he puts it, through bare
mind and reason. The same Stoic expression katalhptikÆ fantas¤a
is used in opining that “any attempt to substantiate a narration, even
if it is true, and to produce a full knowledge of it (katalhptikÆn
§mpoi∞sai per¤ aÈt∞w fantas¤an) is one of the most difficult tasks
and is in some cases impossible”.179 This is an issue on which much could
be said. However, since Origen himself does not elaborate, this ques-

174
commJohn, 10, XXXIX; s. also commJohn, 10, XLI.
175
Cf. commJohn, 2, XIX.
176
Cels, VIII, 53.
177
Cels, VIII, 53. KatalhptikÆ fantas¤a is a concept of the Stoic theory of
knowledge. It suggests a cognition of the intellect which is posited to be true and
no doubt can be entertained as to its truth. Cf. Cels, I, 42; Philocalia, 15, 15.
178
Princ, I.2.2.
179
Cels, I, 42.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 157

tion should not detain us here. I shall only make a few hints about
the deeper conception of grasping truth through ‘bare reason’.
In conceiving of God either in Himself or as Creator, there is a
correlation of the temporal human intellect with the atemporal divine
being. As Origen points out, human expressions can be but tensed,
in this agreeing with Aristotle. This is the so-called discursive thought
which takes one thing after another progressively, it depends on imprinted
images and, consequently, this thought is spread out in time. As a
matter of fact, in discursive thought there is an intrinsic complex
character.
In contrast to this, the non-discursive thought involves no complexity
and is not directed to propositions which are complex. The Greek
and, much more, oriental reflection, acknowledged this way of per-
ceiving truth; that is, through a sheerly unmediated and non-propo-
sitional way. The Stoics spoke of direct cognitive impression
(katalhptikÆ fantas¤a). Plotinus (although dissenting from the Stoics
on so many points) considered this kind of thought in terms of con-
tact with the higher reality.180 In fact, the contemplation of truth
through non-discursive thought involves an apprehension which has
a timeless object of knowledge, namely, the divine reality.
In Origen the case is rather different on account of the dissimi-
larity of his own world-picture and mode of thought from those of
the Stoics and Neoplatonists. The difference from the Stoics lies in
the application of this mode of contact with a transcendent reality.
Regarding Neoplatonism, Origen differs in holding this contact with
God to have a personal character. This, however, bears upon Origen’s
Trinitarian Theology, as well his doctrine of the Logos, which are
out of my scope.
The fact is that he viewed the doctrine of creation as not amenable
to being coherently couched in words. This is why he deliberately
eschewed an outright explication of what is not susceptible of being
entertained propositions which are strung together in ‘that’—clauses.
Instead, concepts are contemplated here in isolation from each other,
but they are not chained or concatenated at all. This conception
involves no entertainment of propositions which would build up a

180
Cf. Enneads, IV.4.1. On this point there is a particularly interesting article by
A.C. Lloyd: ‘Non-discursive thought—an enigma of Greek philosophy’. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, 70 (1969–70), 261–74.
158 chapter four

statement that something compositely couched is the case. Any state-

ment of this kind is simply impossible. This is why he avers that
there are certain things, the meaning of which is impossible to explain
by any human language, but which are made clear through simple
apprehension rather than through any power of words. This rule must
control our interpretation even of the divine writings, in order that
what is said therein may be estimated in accordance not with the
meanness of the language but with the divine power of the Holy Spirit
who inspired the composition.181
Similarly, in Princ: “Now . . . let us . . . contemplate the beginning of
creation, so far as it is possible for the mind to contemplate the
beginning of God’s creative work.182
According to Origen, no progress is adequate so as one might
come in contact with God. This is one of his major points of con-
trast to Plotinus,183 stemming from the Christian notion of a radical
gap and discontinuity between the divine reality and the world. If
Origen can hold (as he does) a concept of non-discursive appre-
hension of the divine reality, this is not because man ascends through
mystical progress, but because God descends, as Logos instructing
and as Holy Spirit casting light on a rational creature.
But we affirm that human nature is not self-sufficient in any way to
quest for God and to find him in Himself, unless it is helped by the
God who is object of the search. He is found by those who, after
doing what they can, admit that they need him, and shows himself to
those to whom he judges it befitting to appear, so far as it is possible
for God to be known to man and for the human soul which is still
in the body to know God.184
Thus apprehension ‘through bare mind and reason’, or ‘direct cog-
nitive impression’ (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a) as Origen calls it in Stoic
terminology, is actually a kind of instruction originated in the divine
gracious consent. In the final analysis, this is an illumination descend-
ing from (and pertaining to) timelessness; an illumination which is

181
Princ, IV.3.15. Plato, allows a certain kind of knowledge (namely, the knowl-
edge of the Forms) to be impossible to convey in writing. s. Protagoras, 329A; 347E;
Phaedrus, 274B; Seventh Epistle, 341C–344D.
182
Princ, II.9.1; italics mine.
183
Cf. Enneads, III.7.3.
184
Cels, VII, 42.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 159

offered into temporality all the same. In timelessness there is neither

complexity nor progress, and any discussion about this reality is
beyond any sort of dialectics. Needless to say that it is only the
terminology, not the import of the doctrine, which is of Stoic prove-
nance here, since whatever Origen accepted from others he made
his own, and the whole comes down to us with the stamp of his
personality upon it. In this case Origen’s exposition of the tenet pre-
supposes a transcendent reality: the function of ‘direct cognitive
impression’ applies to this, and we know that the idea of transcen-
dence was unacceptable to the Stoics.
One would say, however: ‘But this is not plausible!’ In saying this,
he will have, quite unconsciously, already enunciated the very definition
of ‘direct cognitive impression’ (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a) according to
Stoic thought. As a matter of fact, the Stoic conception is that the
‘direct cognitive impression’ (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a) is ‘different from
what is plausible’ (diaf°rein d¢ tØn katalhptikÆn fantas¤an toË
eÈlÒgou).185 What seems to be plausible is subject to dialectics; besides,
after a certain argumentation, this ‘plausible’ could be disputed. On
the contrary, direct cognitive impression (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a) is
not susceptible to disproof whatever.186 This means that whereas
‘plausible’ can be proven to be untrue, what is apprehended through
katalhptikÆ fantas¤a could never be proven to be untrue.187 This
is why this was regarded as a ‘criterion of truth’ (kritÆrion élhye¤aw).188
For, by definiton, ‘katalhptikÆ fantas¤a is what arises from what
really exists, that is, from what is true, and it would never arise from
what does not exist.’ (fantas¤a katalhptikÆ §st¤n ≤ épÒ toË Ípãrx-
ontow ka‹ katÉ aÈtÒ tÚ Ípãrxon §napomemagm°nh ka‹ §napesfragism°nh
ıpo¤a oÈk ên g°noito épÒ mÆ Ípãrxontow).189 So the truth apprehended
through katalhptikÆ fantas¤a is beyond ‘sensual perception’ (ka‹
xvr¤w t∞w katã tåw afisyÆseiw §nerge¤aw),190 as well as beyond what
seems to be ‘plausible’ (diaf°rei toË eÈlÒgou).191

185
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, I, 141, 5–6; again, in 15–16; (SVF: The numbers
indicate volume, page and verses).
186
tØn m¢n går [sc. katalhptikÆn fantas¤an] édiãceuston e‰nai, tÚ d¢ eÎlogon
kên êllvw époba¤nein. SVF, I, 141, 6–7.
187
Cf. SVF, II, 29, 39.
188
SVF, II, 22, 28–30.
189
SVF, I.18, 6–11; also in SVF, II, 24, 12–14; II, 31, 7; II, 33, 4.
190
SVF, II, 24, 11.
191
SVF, I, 141, 5–6 and, again, in 15–16.
160 chapter four

With respect to the problem of time, let me give this example:

the first of the celebrated Zeno’s paradoxes of motion disputed the
very possibility of a man to move at all. An obvious and ‘plausible’
everyday experience was rebutted by means of dialectics, and debate
on such grounds goes on until our day, although it should not, in
the light of the development of Infinitesimal Calculus.
The real import of direct cognitive impression (katalhptikÆ fan-
tas¤a) plays a crucial and decisive role in understanding Origen’s
concept of a non-beginningless world. It is certainly not incidental
that, whenever he treated this delicate question, he expressed (rather,
hinted at) his view using the Stoic notion of katalhptikÆ fantas¤a.
This fact must be paid serious attention and painstaking study in
order to comprehend his conception of creation and its relation to
God. To him these questions cannot be taught through words; they
can only be apprehended through direct apprehension. For the the-
ological notions used (t«n yeologoum°nvn §nnoi«n) are only a means
of expression, and actually stand between human mind and God.192
It should be emphasized, however, that even direct apprehension is
not regarded as an adequate intellectual function in order to com-
prehend these questions entirely. This comprehension, in its fullness,
is a hope stemming from the promise of ‘seeing’ God ‘face to face’,
it pertains to the eschatological reality and is destined to be fully
realized only then.193
This is the very fact on account of which this apprehension ‘through
bare reason’ (reason=lÒgow is also the term for Logos) cannot be
expressed through discursive thought. For once one ventures to attain
this, he will inevitably involve what is timeless (and thus not suscep-
tible of extension and progress) in a discursive thought and propo-
sitions which are a priori bound with progress and spread out in time.
This means that one might attempt to put into words a timeless
reality through means which are by nature bound with time, they
presuppose time, and analysis of them inevitably introduce a fusion
of timelessness with time—which is self-defeating.
This is the reason why Origen constantly eschewed outright expo-
sition of this timeless reality through discursive reflection. He just
appealed to apprehension ‘by the bare mind and reason’ and to the

192
Cf. frJohn, XIII.
193
Ibid.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 161

‘direct cognitive impression’ (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a) of those who

wish to comprehend these doctrines. This is an attitude which is
indicative not only of his respect for the ungraspable transcendence
of the divine reality, but also of his sound dialectical discipline. This
attitude cannot be challenged by anyone who purports to stick to
the rules of logic and dialectics. No one could ask the question about
any ‘before’ the providential creation, in which ‘before’ there was
only God and no creation at all. The very question is absurd. For
once one poses a question about any ‘before’194 (or implies a simi-
lar temporal notion), he has already postulated time into timelessness, and
thus, is oblivious of the fundamental premise; in fact, a virtually arbi-
trary and absurd assumption will have been illegitimately inserted
into the argument. Such a reasoning, therefore, is open, indeed
extremely vulnerable, to severe objections and can in no way make
suitable sense. The falsification and impropriety involved in this case
is quite plain. For notions pertaining to two radically different real-
ities are incongruously concatenated.
There is, therefore, a point which should be clear-cut: In approach-
ing this aspect of Origen’s thought, one should try to reflect in tune
to this kind of understanding. This is a crucial consequence which
flows from the very fact that this doctrine is suggested (rather than
plainly expounded) by means of a thinking which is not directed to
explicit propositions. Once one is prompt to frame in easy state-
ments a tenet which has been developed on the non-discursive premise,
he is bound to slip to wrong conclusions. In this respect then, the
assumption of a ‘Platonic conception of creation’ is but a falsification
made by those who overlook this requisite. The Platonic view is, at
least, susceptible of an explicit exposition and does not need to be
entertained such a kind of thinking in order to be comprehended;
quite obviously, this doctrine of creation does not need to appeal to
direct cognitive impression (katalhptikÆ fantas¤a) at all.
There is, therefore, a point which should be made perfectly clear.
In approaching this aspect of Origen’s thought, one should get rid
of premises which are plausible only in a temporal situation. For
instance, if we say that something was white and became blue, it is

194
This had been already stated by Plato, who concedes that any notion of
‘before’ or ‘after’ is possible only within time existent. s. Timaeus, 37 Eff; Cf. Parmenides,
156 Aff.
162 chapter four

reasonable to assume that there is a moment which marks the succes-

sion from being white to becoming blue. But such an assumption is
not plausible in timelessness. Unless this point is fully assimilated,
one is bound to think of timelessness on the same premises that one
reflects about a temporal state. In that case misguided conclusions
are inevitable and endless debate will be invited, such as those about
the narration of Genesis, challenging all reference to ‘days’ in the
absence of the world or in an incomplete creation.
Considering Origen’s views of time and creation with respect to
God, therefore, one has always to stick to the fundamental premise
put forward by himself: the divine reality is a state of timelessness—
not everlasting duration,195 not omnitemporality. This is the funda-
mental axiom of his doctrine, which should not be escaped by the
‘eternity of the world’-mongers.
On account of the sheer fact that atemporality is atemporality, one
cannot think of either succession or any turning points into timelessness,
as if this state were subject to (or, bound with) temporal flux. There
are neither turning points, nor moments, nor succession, nor temporal flux
in timelessness. Subsequently, any question pertaining to timelessness
and involving notions of this kind is groundless and misleading. Once
timelessness is regarded as a kind of duration, the discussion is bound
to be misleading and prejudicial to Origen’s authentic doctrine. For
the fundamental premise (that of timelesness) is disposed of through
the very fact that temporal notions such as ‘succession’ and the sort,
are arbitrarily introduced into the argument.
To couch this reality in words (which constitute a temporal func-
tion and are themselves a manifestation of the temporal reality) is
impossible. To visualize, or to feel it (in a way which is inevitably
vague) is not impossible. In any event, it could be a fatal mistake

195
That God has everlasting duration rather than atemporality was held by
Aristotle; Cf. Metaphysica, 12.7, 1072b13–1073a13. As regards Plato, there is still
intense controversy as to whether he regarded the Ideas as ‘everlasting’ or ‘time-
less’. For in his works the implications of duration and timelessness stand side by
side and he offers no clear resolution; thus J. Whittaker in ‘The ‘eternity’ of the
Platonic Forms’ argues that Plato’s notion of eternity is ‘everlasting duration’. This
is a view similar to F.M. Cornford’s who interpreted eternity in Parmenides and
Plato as ‘duration’; s. F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 98; 102. On the other hand,
L. Taran regards Plato as the first atemporalist and so does M. Schofield; Cf.
L. Taran, Parmenides, Princeton 1965, 175; Malcolm Schofield, “Did Parmenides
discover eternity?”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 52 (1978), 243–66. Both the
latter authors, unlike Plato, aver that in Parmenides eternity means ‘duration’.
 ‘beginningless world’: a myth reconsidered 163

(which could thoroughly mislead the entire problematique) to estab-

lish temporal notions and by means of them produce questions or
assertions intermingling temporality with timelessness.
My conclusion is that there is no such notion as ‘eternity of the
world’ in Origen’s thought. What he actually holds is quite the oppo-
site. Creation came into being out of non-being by an act of God’s
will, a decision of free volition out of love.196 In his own words foll-
wing Paul’s Eph. 3,18, “we are fixed and rooted in the love of
God”.197 This pertains not only to the creation of the material world,
but also to the providential creation of the yevrÆmata and lÒgoi,
even to God’s will and nonetheless to his decision to create. It can
definitely be sustained that Origen does hold a perception of God
in Himself, which par excellence underlines a perception of God
without necessarily thinking of him as Creator.
To speak of Platonism in Origen has been a kind of engrained
habit. This is the normal verdict which has been a virtually uni-
versal view. Differentiations relate only to the degree of the claimed
Platonism and Neoplatonism. It is certainly true that the cultural
environment of Alexandria was impregnated with the Platonic ide-
alism, which in fact held considerable sway in the region. But this
did not render Origen’s own intellectual evolution inevitably Platonic
all along. He was not bowled head over heels by the Platonic out-
look to the extent that is currently believed. With regard to my sub-
ject-matter at least, much has to be reconsidered and revised, and
the well-entrenched putative verdict should be disconfirmed. The
arid claim that Origen’s doctrine of creation is but a crude echo of
Neoplatonism, or even a refined one couched in Christian termi-
nology, is sheerly ungrounded.
The condemnation of 553 A.D. imposed on him was chiefly based
on pointless and distorting interpolations found within an untrust-
worthy rendering of Princ and false and hostile testimonies of Justinian;

196
Quite unconsciously, Justinian, in libOr, speaks of God’s ‘will’ (t“ boulÆmati)
to create. It is obvious, however, that he had not the slightest idea of the serious
implications that the notions of God’s will has in Origen’s theology. (Cf. Mansi,
IX. 489). The pertinent passage was incorporated by Koetschau in his edition of
Princ, as Fragment 24 (in Princ, II.9.1). The fallacy of this act of Koetschau’s is dis-
cussed later, at the point where Origen’s concepton of the relation between time
and the notion of Infinite is discussed.
197
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 7.11.2.
164 chapter four

testimonies, which did not lack political aims, in fact they stemmed
from ecclesio-political machinations which were continuously at work;
what was really missing was a definitive knowledge of Origen’s views.
Instead, Justinian and his theological advisors took for Origen’s the-
ology what the so-called ‘Origenists’ asserted, taking Origen’s spec-
ulations without understanding them and turning them lightheartedly
into dogmas. So the case was not practically against Origen himself
(dead for three centuries) but against those who called themselves
‘Origenists’. However, the charge of heresy had been directed against
Origen even during his lifetime.198
The following story is pretty indacative of the unending historical
plight of Origen. Pope Anastasius I, bishop of Rome (399–401),
issued a letter to John, bishop of Jerusalem. In this letter, the pope
approves of the condemnation of Origen’s writings—a condemna-
tion which had been issued by a synod of anti-Origenist bishops in
Egypt. The pope claimed that Origen’s object was to disintegrate
the Christian faith and he virtually anathematized Rufinus, the trans-
lator of Origen’s works. At the same time, however, the same pope
admitted that he had never read Origen’s writings and, what is more,
he had never heard of the man (the man he was condemning by
the same letter). The case was simply that this bishop of Rome was
acting under the influence of Jerome and Marcella (an anti-Origenist
friend of Jerome’s) and wrote this letter just for the sake of satisfying
Jerome’s wishes. To obtain the letter, Marcella had supplied the
pope with an edition of Rufinus’s translation of Origen’s De Principiis,
which contained forgeries.199 In view of such intrigues, anyone can
appreciate the value and authority of many condemnations passed
against Origen.
The truth is that the Princ is a conspectus not of Origen’s actual
theology but of the arguments against Origenism by his uninformed
opponents. How little had the so-called Origenism to do with Origen’s
real views is a question which still waits for its definitive answer; an
answer which could be reached only as an upshot of a thorough
research of his works extant both in Greek and Latin. As long as
this task is not fulfilled, much room remains open to a tragic his-
toric bias against the authentic views of an honest pioneer of Christian
thought.

198
Cf. Princ, 1.6.1; homLuc, 25.
199
On this incident, s. Rufinus’s complaints in his Apology Against Jerome, 1.19.
 CHAPTER FIVE

GOD THE LOGOS AND WORLD

The ‘place’ of the Logos

The distinction drawn between Wisdom and Logos is only an intel-

lectual one. The concept of cosmos is the central philosophical notion,
by means of which this distinction is made and understood. For the
Logos is perceived as the Wisdom herself in her relation to the world.
There is no question of any actual otherness. Speaking of either
Wisdom or Logos, the essential reference pertains to the same per-
son, namely, the Son of God. The difference is that Wisdom indi-
cates the living incorporeal personal subsistence in herself, without
any allusion to the world or to anything else, while the Logos is the
Wisdom conceived in her ‘communication with rational creatures’
(katã m¢n tØn sÊstasin t∞w per¤ t«n ˜lvn yevr¤aw ka‹ nohmãtvn t∞w
sof¤aw nooum°nhw, katã d¢ tØn prÚw tå logikã koinvn¤an toË lÒgou
lambanom°nou).1 This means that Wisdom is perceived as Logos by
a rational creature who communicates with her.
The notion of the conceptions (§p¤noiai) of the Son allows him to
portray the relationship of the timeless God with the temporal world.
This correlation is possible through the particular conception of the
Logos and its implications. Through his activity, the Logos becomes
a kind of span, something of a connection, through which this rela-
tion between Here and the Beyond is established.
Wisdom was made the beginning of God’s ways towards his works. It
is along these ‘ways’ that ‘the Son of God is moving decorating, pro-
viding for, making benefaction, favouring, in this made wisdom. The
Logos is, therefore, said to be érxÆ, being different form her [sc. the
wisdom] not in substance, but only in [mere] conception and relation;
so that he [sc. the Logos, who is] stated in the scriptures is the same
being (Ïparjiw) in substance; he is Wisdom inasmuch as he is affiliated
with God, [whereas] he is the creative Logos in so much as he has
inclined, so to speak, towards creatures. (érxÆn <oÔn> e‰nai tÚn lÒgon

1
commJohn, 1, XIX.
166 chapter five

fas¤n oÈx ßteron ˆnta aÈt∞w katÉ oÈs¤an éllÉ §pino¤& ka‹ sx°sei, ·nÉ
oÏtvw eÁpv, √ m¢n ”ke¤vtai t“ Ye“ sof¤a, √ d¢ n°neuken, ·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv,
prÚw tå dhmiourgÆmata ı dhmiourgikÒw lÒgow).2

The view reiterated here is that of the relation of the Logos to God
himself and to the world; but there is something more indicatad
through this passage: not only did the Logos create the world; but
also he is constantly related to it, as he acts perpetually ‘decorating,
providing for, making benefaction, favouring’.3 On the other hand,
the world is regarded as something ‘external’ to God.4 Hence we
should conclude that Origen conceives the Logos as being both ‘in’
wisdom, that is, into timelessness, and within the world, that is, ‘out-
side’ of the Trinity.
It is through this conception that the Logos may be regarded as
a mediator between the timeless God and the temporal world.
God is the original ‘place, as it were’ (oflone¤ tÒpow) of the Logos.5
But this is not the only ‘place’ of his: he is also fully present in the
world, yet not being himself part of the world; he is ‘stretched out
alongside with’ the world (sumparekteinÒmenow). The notion is found
in Jerome’s Latin translation of Origen’s Homilies on Luke; the verse
of the Psalm ‘The sound of his teaching has gone out into every
land, and his words to the ends of the earth’6 is commented thus:
‘Our Lord Jesus has been spread out to the whole world, because
he is God’s power.7 . . . . Behold the Saviour’s greatness. It extends
to all the world.’8 He goes on thus:

2
frJohn, I.
3
Ibid.
4
Princ, IV.4.1.; s. also commJohn, 20, XVIII.
5
commJohn, 20, XVIII. Determined to read Neoplatonism into the works of
Origen, R. Norris states that ‘the Logos appears . . . as the first step ‘down’ from
the One in the stream of existence’ and he is ‘the expression of eternal Mind’
(op. cit., p. 154). Origen never used these Plotinian categories. Beyond that, how-
ever, the assertion that the Logos is ‘existing down’ in relation to God is a mis-
comprehension by those who in all ways wish to attribute a Plotinian perception
of the world to Origen. The discussion in this section shows how wrong they are
in regarding the Logos as being somewhere ‘lower’ from God or ‘standing midway’
(s. infra) between God and the world. The Logos is and always was with God in the
divine timelessness.
6
Psalm 18, 4, also cited in Rom. 10, 18; Origen adds the expression ‘of his
teaching’ and twice substitutes ‘his’ for ‘their’.
7
Cf. 1 Cor. 1, 24.
8
Homilies on Luke, 4.5. On the Logos ‘extending’ to all the world, s. ch. 6,
p. 211.
 god the logos and world 167

Go up to the heavens.9 See how he fills the celestial regions: ‘He

appeared to the angels’.10 Go down in your mind to the nether world.
See that he went down there, too. ‘He went down, the one who also
went up, to fulfil everything’,11 ‘so that at Jesus’ name every knee might
bend, those of heavenly beings, and earthly beings, and beings in the
nether world’.12 Ponder the Lord’s power, how it has filled the world,
that is, the heavens, the earth, and the nether regions. He passed
through heaven itself and rose to the regions above. We have read
that the Son of God ‘passed through the heavens’.13
It should be noticed that the cosmic presence of the Logos is under-
stood to be ‘by his power’, which is a significant difference from
Stoicism, for whom the logos is a cosmic principle and hardly is
there a distinction between this logos per se and its action. The Logos
of Origen is transcendent to the world, still “by the power with
which he is said to fill the world,14 he comes to each man and speaks
in his heart and teaches him discretion of good and evil”.15 Which
means that there is also another ‘place’ where the Logos is present:
this ‘place’ is each individual rational being. In fact, Christ
is so powerful as to be invisible (éÒratow)16 in his divine nature, and
to be present in every individual man and also to be extended along-
side with the whole world (˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ sumparekteinÒmenow). It is he
who is declared by [the saying] ‘He stood in the midst of us’.’17
The presence of the Logos is affirmed in the ‘entire world’, that is
in all the ranks of life. It is exactly this presence of the Logos that
makes creatures to be rational (logikã). This Logos is actually an
educator, on account of his presence within rational creatures.

9
Cf. Ps. 138, 8 and Rom. 10, 6.
10
1 Cor. 5, 4.
11
Eph. 4, 10.
12
Phil. 2, 10.
13
Heb. 4, 14. We should bear in mind that Origen’s Homilies represent his the-
ology expounded before the public in the Church, including catechumens. Hence
no elaborate notions should be expected in such portions. However, even in such
instances fundamental views of his theology are implicitly present.
14
Cf. Jer. 23, 24; Wis. 1, 7; s. also commJohn, 6, XXXIX; Homelies in Leviticum,
5, 2.
15
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 3.2.9; Cf. commJohn, 1, XXXVII; 2, XV;
Princ, I.3.6.
16
It should be recalled that the term ‘invisible’ implies incorporeality, which is
a property exclusive to the Trinity.
17
John, 1, 26. commJohn, 6, XXX.
168 chapter five

He is, as it were, a teacher to those receiving instruction, existing

inseparably in the nature of rational creatures, instructing towards what
should be done, even when we decline to obey his instructions;18 . . .
Hence he [sc. Christ] says; ‘It is the Logos19 which I have pronounced
to you him who will judge you’,20 and this is equivalent to ‘I myself
the Logos, who is always speaking within yourselves, will condemn you
and there will be no room for you to justify yourselves’.21
It is the Logos within men who announces the Father to them.22
The Logos ‘made us out of nothing’; and, ‘once we were made, he
upholds us into being, and every day provides for us covertly and
overtly, both as a whole and each one individually, even though we
may be not aware of this.’23
When Origen maintains that ‘the good Father did not altogether
abandon those who fell out of him’,24 he actually suggests that God
the Logos (although external to the world, by virtue of his divinity)
is also present and acting within the world. Thanks to this function
of the Logos the world is being held in existence.
When Paul says about the Logos ‘For of him, and through him,
and to him, are all things’,25 the expression ‘of him’ (§j aÈtoË) ‘rep-
resents the beginning of existence of everything’ (paristãw tØn érxÆn
t∞w t«n pãntvn Ípostãsevw); the expression ‘through him’ implies
the world’s being kept into existence (ka‹ tØn sunoxÆn §n t“ ‘diÉ
aÈtoË’); and the expression ‘to him’ suggests the end (ka‹ tÚ t°low
§n t“ ‘efiw aÈtÒn’).26
The Logos, therefore, is present both in timelessness and in time.
It is through him that a perpetual communication between the world
and God is being kept up. Thus the fundamental tenet that God is
radically transcendent to the world is maintained; still it is through
the Logos that a working relation between the world and God is
established. This is a point of substantial dissent from certain schools

18
commJohn, 2, XV.
19
In Greek the word Logos means also ‘word’ and ‘speech’ and ‘instruction’ and
‘preaching’ and ‘teaching’.
20
John 12, 48.
21
commJohn, 2, XV.
22
commJohn, 1, XXXVIII.
23
selPs, 144, PG 12.1672.
24
commJohn, 1, XIV.
25
Rom. 11, 36.
26
Cels, VI, 65.
 god the logos and world 169

of the secular (mainly the Stoic) thought, which regarded god as

immanent in the world. Quite consciously it is stated in Cels that
‘the logos of everything is according to Celsus god himself, but in
my view it is the Son of God’ (éllã ka‹ ı t«n pãntvn lÒgow §st¤
katã m¢n K°lson aÈtÒw ı YeÒw, katã d¢ ≤mçw ı uflÒw aÈtoË).27
This view of the Logos eluded H. Chadwick. He takes it that,
according to Origen, the Logos as mediator between God and cre-
ation is ontologically standing ‘midway between uncreated nature
and that of all created things’.28 Subsequently, he takes it that Origen
holds a notion similar to that of Philo, according to whom ‘the Logos
is neither uncreated like God nor created like us, but midway’.29
If Chadwick had in mind pertinent Stoic and Aristotelian tenets,
I would assume that he took Origen to have fallen in line with these
tenets. As a matter of fact, the soul and intellect of which Plotinus
speaks are a sort of world-soul and world-intellect, which are also
within ourselves. Humans can ascend from the kind of thinking char-
acteristic to the soul to that which is characteristic of the intellect
and, finally, to a mystical experience of the One. What Chadwick
did not grasp though is that, at the point which he comments on,
Origen refers to the Logos as ‘diã metajÊ ˆntow t∞w toË égenÆtou
ka‹ t∞w t«n genht«n pãntvn fÊsevw’30 which is an expression pur-
porting to describe the function of the Logos for the sake of the world,
not his ontological status. For He in himself is prior to the world.
Origen is prompt to affirm that he is begotten,31 yet, he adds, this
portrays an ontological relation between the Father and the Son and
in no way does it relate to the kind of ‘genesis’ which means ‘to
come into being out of non-being’.32
It is quite indicative that, in selPs, he comments on Ps. 109, 3 by
representing the Father saying to the Son ‘I begot you before any
rational nature’. The Logos is a ‘ruler’ of the world, still he is also
‘together with’ the Father.33 This is plainly stated in commJohn, where

27
Cels, V, 24.
28
H. Chadwick, Origen, Contra Celsum, p. 151.
29
Op. cit., p. 151, n.4. Aristotle, on the other hand, introduces the agent intellect
in de Anima 3.5. The Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias maintains that this agent
intellect was God (de Anima, Commentaria in Aristotelem Craeca, Berlin, 80, 16–92, 11).
30
Cels, III, 34.
31
frMatt, 242.
32
frMatt, 3, s. also commMatt, Cf. A, in PG 17.289.
33
selPs, 109; s. also frJohn, CV.
170 chapter five

the reasoning is developed by considering the passages Gen. 1, 1:

‘In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth’; and John
1, 2: ‘He was in the beginning with God’. The inference is that the
expression ‘‘He was in the beginning’ clearly suggests a seniority to
what was created in the beginning’. Therefore, ‘the Logos is older’
than all creation (tÚ d¢ ‘En érx∞ ∑n’ saf«w presbÊterÒn §sti toË §n
érx∞ pepoihm°nou, oÈ mÒnon stere≈matow ka‹ jhrçw, éllã oÈranoË
ka‹ g∞w presbÊterÒw §stin ı lÒgow).34
This is the sense in which the term ‘Pantocrator’ (Pantokrãtvr)
is applied to Christ:35 He is ‘Pantocrator’ because ‘everything has
been given to him’ by the Father.36
T. Torrance took for granted that Origen held the ‘eternal coex-
istence of the universe’ with God.37 He claims that ‘according to
Origen God has endowed the creation with His own rationality. This
meant, as Origen pointed out, that God has limited Himself in the
limitation of creation . . .’.38 Torrance’s syllogism is that, since the
world and God are ‘coeternal’, there can be nothing in God which
is beyond or transcendent to the world; there can be nothing which
pertains only to God and not to the world. However, Origen’s views
about those conceptions pertaining ‘only to Christ and to no one
else’ (•aut“ ka‹ oÈden¤)39 grant quite the opposite: not only for God
the Father, but also for the Son (although he is also in the world,
as Logos) there are conceptions which do not pertain to the world;
in other words, God Himself should be thought of regardless of
creation.
The Logos, therefore, is both in God and in the world. It is not
in his nature to be ‘midway’. His ontology is not disputed: his divinity
is the same as that of the Father. To be in the world (both as a
whole and in each rational creature) pertains to his action and ‘his
power’,40 not his ontology. Probably those who confuse the action of

34
commJohn, 2, IV; italics mine. Once more, attention should be paid to the
manner in which Origen develops his arguments, namely the scrupoulous linguis-
tic analysis of scriptural passages, particularly the temporal significance and impli-
cations of tenses of verbs.
35
excPs, 23, PG 17.116; selPs, 23, PG 12.1269; frJohn, XLVI; Cels, VII, 10.
36
frMatt, 242, quoting Matt. 11, 27.
37
T. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, London, 1969; p. 63ff.
38
Ibid.
39
s. supra
40
s. supra.
 god the logos and world 171

the Logos in the world with his own ontology, misunderstand his
being a ‘mediator’ between God and the world. However, here is
how Origen leaves no room for misunderstanding:
The Apostle, when discussing the mediator, indicated this by a plain
distinction by saying, ‘the mediator between God and men, the man
Christ Jesus’;41 by which he was obviously teaching that ‘mediator’
must be referred not to Christ’s deity but to his humanity, i.e. his
soul.42
In Origen there is no question about the nature of the Logos in
himself. His nature is the divine one.
Christ came to this task not from the compulsion of his nature, but
moved by compassion alone. For he was ‘in the form of God’; and
when he sees that death is exercising dominion through the people by
the transgression of the one man, he is not oblivious to his own
creation.43
Even in the absence of any creative decision, or creative will, or cre-
ative act of God, the Logos has always been in the divine being.
The conception of divine transcendence remains both intact and use-
ful in adumbrating Logos in this way. The same conception allows
for a clear distinction from views of Heraclitus, which might be
apparently similar. As a matter of fact, Heraclitus regards rational
beings to be such by means of their participation to the Logos. Sextus
Empiricus, although expressing himself through Stoic terminology
(which is considerably later to the Presocratic vocabulary) is held to
render pretty faithfully Heraclitus’ views. He describes a ‘common
and divine Logos, by means of participation to which we become
rational’,44 adding that what appears to be common in all [rational
beings] is reliable, just because this is perceived by the Logos, which
is common to all and divine; but what happens to one single ratio-
nal being should not be given credit. Therefore, there is a common
world of truth, but this could be approached only if we leave our
individual and discordant senses behind, and draw conclusions through
them only by means of meditation, or, better still, through intuition.

41
1 Tim. 2, 5.
42
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 3.8.4.
43
Ibid., 5.2.5.
44
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII, 126ff; H. Diels, Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker, 4th ed., Berlin, 1934–37; 22A16.
172 chapter five

It is then quite obvious that to Heraclitus the Logos is simply a

cosmic principle and, what is more, there is no descending of this
Logos to rational beings, but rather an ‘ascending’ of them to this
Logos through ‘meditation’ and ‘intuition’. In Origen, by contrast,
we have the personal transcendent God the Logos, who condescends
out of grace and compassion to rational beings, being continuously
in them after he brought them into being.
This conception of the Logos allows two notions to be correlated:
first, God is timeless and radically transcendent to the world: sec-
ondly, God is the creator of this world, he communicates with it
and indeed acts within it.
This is the path through which Origen was able to step from his
Theology (that is, his conception of God in Himself ) to his Cosmology.

World and Time

There is one final point which should be made in examining God,

World and Time, and their mutual relation, in this section. It is the
appearance of time with respect to creation.
Regarding the assertion that Trinity alone transcends all time,
whereas ‘the rest of things . . . which are external to the Trinity, must
be measured by ages and periods of time’,45 Origen explains that
this ‘external’ means the world itself.46
The idea that the world was made through the Logos maintains
the view of God as changeless. It is a fact that God is beyond time,
which makes him not subject to change. Accordingly, rational crea-
tures are subject to alteration and change47 by reason of that they
came into existence out of non-existence. It is also on account of
the world being out of God (namely, that the world is something
‘external’48 to God) that the existence of the world does not entail
any notion of change in God Himself.

45
Princ, IV.4.1.
46
commJohn, 20, XVIII. I agree with the interpretation of the English translator
of Princ, G.W. Butterworth who, in his introduction to the book, states that ‘ratio-
nal beings . . . are definitely outside the Godhead, as the Son and Spirit are definitely
within.’. Cf. FP, p. lv.
47
Princ, II.9.2.
48
Princ, IV.4.2.
 god the logos and world 173

It is Origen’s view that the creation is closely related to the exis-

tence of time. It is pointed out that the term ‘genesis’ means ‘the
way of coming to being out of non-being’,49 as well as that it sug-
gests the ‘substantification’ (oÈs¤vsin) of rational natures.50 It is fur-
ther argued that the actual creation is also subject to time. This is
why ‘mind which is still subject to creation, and on account of this
it is also subject to time, cannot see God as it should’.51 Time is
‘something’ (t‹)52 which is closely connected to ‘material life’ (tª §nÊlƒ
zvª).53 It is not the same thing to speak of ‘not seen’ (tÚ mÆ ırçsyai)
and ‘invisible’ (tÚ éÒraton): ‘not to be seen does not entail to be
invisible’, but ‘to be invisible does entail to be not seen’; ‘for there
are many bodies which are not seen, although they are visible either
because they are covered, as it were, or because we are not in the
place where they are’. In reference to ‘invisible’, even rational crea-
tures which are in the supreme grades of life are not able to see
God, not so because of their disability, but because of God’s incor-
poreality.54
The close relation between the existence of time and the existence
of the world is positively affirmed: ‘time cannot be found’ when the
‘third and fourth conceptions’ of the Son of God ‘did not exist at
all’.55 It is ‘life’ which is regarded as the ‘third’ conception of the
Son of God; ‘life’ is is also one of the conceptions of the Son which
do not pertain to Christ himself, but only ‘to others’ (oÈx aÍt“ éllã
•t°roiw).56 This means that time is associated with creaturely ‘life’,
which involves ‘distinction’, ‘diversification’ and ‘corporeality’.
Therefore, the radical transcendence of God with respect to the
world is portrayed in a twofold way, both in terms of space (mainly
expressed in terms of corporeality) and time. The product of the

49
frMatt, 3.
50
selPs, 32.
51
frJohn, XIII.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid. The assertion of J. Cheek that the state ‘before’ the actual creation was
not a timeless one is wrong. (s. J. Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption in the Theology of
Origen, Drew University, 1962, p. 277). In his effort to identify Origen’s conception
of time to what O. Cullmann has asserted as ‘biblical view of time’, Cheek falls
into the mistake to attribute to Origen the doctrine of eternal creation; Cf. op. cit.,
p. 534, n. 15.
54
frJohn, XIII. Cf. Ch. 3, pp. 110ff.
55
commJohn, 2, XIX.
56
commJohn, 2, XVIII.
174 chapter five

actual creation is of necessity, and by its nature, a corporeal exis-

tence. Again, what came out of the creation of the world is of neces-
sity, and by nature, a temporal being. This is why Origen says that
any being, of any rank of life, is a ‘temporary’ (proska¤rvn) one
‘even if, in regard of his particular place, he is one of the supreme
ranks of life’ (kên §n sugkr¤sei tÒpvn §k t«n énvtãtv tugxãn˙).57

Conclusion

What I have discussed so far is the relation between God, World

and Time. In reference to the relation of God to time, God radi-
cally transcends time. No temporal notion can be applied to him at
all. Referring to God by means of language, it is clear that expres-
sions (especially verbs) are a priori inaccurate and simply conventional.
God is also incorporeal, and it is solely he who is incorporeal. Life
without a body is exclusive to God. There is no other way for the
term life to be applied to incorporeal nature. As God is timeless, and
hence absolutely exempt from all temporal notions, no concept of
duration can be applied to him. God’s being is not an everlasting
duration, which necessarily implies being into time in a mode of
dominating it. God is above and outside time. He should be then
comprehended as living in a reality of timelessness, not one of ever-
lasting duration.
The world is the outcome of God’s will. It came into existence
‘when’ the Fall occurred and was made by the Logos according to
a providential creation of a ‘wisdom’ which is a creature in the
Wisdom (namely, the Son) of God and came into being out of non-
being. God willed to create out of a benevolent decision of his own
freedom and love. Conceiving of God as Creator is quite different
from God Himself—a reality which stands in a radical ontological
priority to any other conception of God, or any theological notion
employed in order to speak of Him.
The world is innately associated with time in the sense that all
ranks of rational creatures (which are understood to comprise the
one and single world) are within time, they are temporal. As there
is no time prior to creation, strictly speaking it makes no sense to

57
commJohn, 19, XX.
 god the logos and world 175

speak of a before creation. Using the term loosely, however, it can

be said that there was no world before creation. The world is mate-
rial, consisted of matter of different qualities. This visible firmament
is just one of the different kinds of created matter.
The notion of the world implies of necessity the existence of both
corporeality and time. Any world apart from corporeality and time
is unthinkable, either as a philosophical notion or as a reality. In
Origen’s thought there is no room for any ‘incorporeal world’ ‘before’
time. The term ‘incorporeal world’ applied to this thought is self-
contradictory, self-defeating and hence absurd. For incorporeality
excludes any existence of ‘world’ and vice versa. Since the world
came into existence out of non-existence, there is no room for any
notion of ‘eternity of the world’, in the sense that any kind of world
may have existed before this creation. Such a notion is flatly and
unqualifiedly rejected. Only God himself was ‘before’ creation and
nothing was apart from him. The world is the radically out of God,
still God sustains this and intervenes and acts into it as God the
Logos.
God’s transcendence with respect to the world is portrayed in
terms of Space (mainly expressed in terms of corporeality) and Time.
I have thus far discussed the relation between God, World and Time.
Whatever may time be, we already know that Origen holds a notion
of atemporality; we have actually seen the limits of time’s existence,
that is, where time does not exist and where it does exist. This means
that we have seen the notions of atemporality and temporality, as
well as the relation between them. My next step then should be to
examine what Origen’s ontology of time is.
 PART II

ONTOLOGY OF TIME
 CHAPTER SIX

TIME PROPER

The background

With reference to the Hellenic background, it is a favorite general-

ization to speak of Greek conception of time, as if there were only
one view of it in the Greek world. The fact is, however, that there
was considerable dissent and, even more, intense controversy among
the different philosophical schools. I shall now examine what con-
stitutes the Greek and the non-Greek setting which reached Origen
as a background.
Of the entire Greek tradition, I shall mainly outline the Platonic,
Aristotelian and Stoic views of time in order to purport that the
Stoic conception of time was an autonomous one, quite independent
from that of either Plato’s or Aristotle’s. It will be shown that the
reasoning of the Stoic view of time springs from entirely different
premises. It is bound up with the entire Stoic philosophy and its
study ipso facto stems from, and brings to, the core of this particular
philosophy.
I shall argue that although there is a certain ring of the Stoic
view in Origen’s ontological conception, he himself pioneered a rad-
ical break-through towards a new concept of time, the Christian one.
It goes without saying that there was a rich legacy from the different
Greek schools of thought concerning time. These schools never really
reached any sort of agreement, not even on the fundamental premises
of this question. So the task was not simply one of choosing, or a
matter of syncretism. Bearing in mind his own theological outlook,
Origen had to clear the field of stumps and boulders, so that his
successors could walk freely and without hindrance over smooth
places.
The interconnections between the Stoic concept of time and the
rest of the crucial concepts of this philosophy will be examined in
due course; first though I should outline the other Greek concep-
tions, from which I purport that the Stoic one was different.
180 chapter six

Despite erroneous claims for the contrary,1 the Greeks did employ
time, along with space, as a frame for their thought-form. Already
in the seventh century B.C., Hesiod composed in the form of poetry
the myth of five races of men: the first, the golden race, lived in
the original blessed age in which earth of itself produced rich har-
vests and men were like gods. This was followed by the silver race,
then the copper race, later the race of heroes and finally the iron
race.2 Through such a mystic and mythological manner, using the
medium of allegoric or metaphoric imagery, many ancient Greeks
provided their accounts of the question of time, expressed in terms
of problems of beginning, becoming, enduring and ceasing.3
The Presocratic philosophers also touched upon the problem of
time in that unique poetic-philosophical manner in which they
expressed their conception of reality. Anaximander,4 Anaximenes,5
Heraclitus of Ephesus,6 Anaxagoras,7 Empedocles,8 deal with prob-
lems in which the question of time is a central one: cyclic destruc-
tion, regeneration, infinity of (successive or co-existing) worlds,
world-periods, and the like.
The Pythagoreans made a serious attempt to deal with the ques-
tion of time as such. Stobaeus9 adduces the testimony that Philolaus
deals with the beginninglessness and endlessness of the universe and
Aristotle provides information about the views of the Pythagorean
Alcmaeon,10 as well as of the Pythagorean Paron11 on time, which
they consider as infinite. They point out that ‘before’ and ‘after’

1
It has been asserted that Hebrew thought employed time as its thought form
whereas Greek thought employed space. This is a simplistic yet widespread opinion
among scholars. An example is the book by T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared
With Greek, tr. by J. Moreau, London, 1960; pp. 123ff.
2
Cf. Herodotus, II, 53.
3
Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Musaeus, Epimenedes, Acusilaus, Pherecides,
Epicharmus were some of the most prominent of them. Cf. H. Diels, Die Fragmente
der Vorsokratiker, 4th ed., Berlin, 1934–37; Appendices I, II, III.
4
Cf. Diels, op. cit., App. II, 9.
5
Ibid. 2, 17; 3, A 11; 3, b 2.
6
Ibid., 12, B30; B31; 12, A1; A9; 12, B60; 12, A6; A7; A8. Cf. Plato, Cratylus,
402A.
7
Diels, Frag. 12; Aristotle, Physica, 250b25ff.
8
Diels, Fr. 8; Fr. 17, 18; Cf. Aristotle, Physica, 252a33.
9
Stobaeus, Eclogue, I, 420.
10
Aristotle, Metaphysica, 986a27ff.
11
Aristotle, Physica, 222b18; Also cf. Simplicius, Commentary in Aristotle’s Physica,
754, 8; 754, 14.
 time proper 181

make sense only in time, whereas eternity is a timeless perpetual

‘now’.
Plato’s views of time have enjoyed a special interest, perhaps
because of the mythological (and thus, ambiguous) form in which he
expressed his views, as well as because of the special attention that
Christian theologians paid to them. To Plato, time proper is some-
thing continuous and thus beyond the possibility of conceptual
definition. To speak about moment is but an intellectual abstraction;
moment in itself is not actually time and does not really exist;12 for,
if it existed, time would become static and the content of it would
include the possibility of rest without motion and change. Time is
not an aggregate of static nows; it is inherently related with change
and motion. There can be no motion without time.13 Thus time—
motion—change are so closely connected together that they cannot be
understood independently from each other. This means that there
is no time without motion and change. Subsequently, whatever is
temporal is subject to motion and change. Plato rejects the possi-
bility of human comprehension of notions such as beginning or end
of time.14 Even the fact that God created time cannot be fully grasped:
one can have only a vague idea of such a notion.15 It is true though
that he definitely diasapproves of the concept of time being without
beginning.
Aristotle singles his master out stating that, with the exception of
Plato, all the philosophers are in agreement that time is uncreated.16
But the Platonic purport of this ‘creation’ is only the idea that time
appeared with the order which was set on the pre-existing ‘original
matter’. As a matter of fact, Plato, in tune with the general tradi-
tion of his day, rejects the idea of creation out of nothing. This,
nevertheless, should be regarded as a question needing some further
discussion, since it is he who elsewhere speaks of the ‘countless ages
of the past’.17 Besides, he holds that Being is synonymous with Action,
that is, true existence is synonymous with its creative act, Substance

12
Plato, Parmenides, 156D.
13
Plato, Parmenides, 151Eff; Timaeus, 38Aff.
14
Plato, Timaeus, 37Dff.
15
Plato, Timaeus, 38B.
16
Aristotle, Physica, 251b15ff.
17
Plato, Respublica, 499C.
182 chapter six

is synonymous with Function.18 God’s perfection always compels him

to act,19 and he cannot be conceived of being in timeless eternity
without exercising his creative ability. So it is beyond human com-
prehensive ability to grasp what God did before he created the uni-
verse—if such a notion could make any sense at all. Besides, it is
not clear whether Plato held a temporal beginning of the world.20
It is true though that he denied the existence of time in the origi-
nal chaos, since time is denied to the irregular and, therefore, to the
irrational motion of the chaos.21 Time did come into being and this
notion is stated in the celebrated passage of Timaeus:
When God the Father and creator saw the creature . . . the created
image . . . He rejoiced . . . and determined to make a copy . . . like the
original . . . But to bestow the attribute (of the eternal) in its fullness
upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a mov-
ing image of eternity (efik≈ d¢ §pinoe› kinhtÒn tina afi«now poi∞sai).
And when he set in order the heavens, he made this image eternal
but moving according to number (katÉ ériymÒn fioËsan afi≈nion efikÒna),
while eternity itself rests in unity. And this image we call time.22 . . .
. . . Time, then, and the heavens came into being at the same instant
in order that, having been created together, if there was ever to be a
dissolution of them, they might be dissolved together. This [sc. time]
was framed after the pattern of the eternal nature, in order that it
might resemble this as much as possible (katã tÚ parãdeigma t∞w
diaivn¤aw fÊsevw, ·nÉ …w ımoiÒtatow aÈt“ katã dÊnamin ¬). For the pat-
tern exists from eternity (tÚ m¢n går dØ parãdeigma pãnta afi«nã §stin),
whereas the created heaven has been, is, and will be, in all time. Such
was the mind and thought of God when he created time.23

18
Plato, Sophista, 247D; 248C.
19
Plato, Timaeus, 29eff.
20
Since Plato’s views in Timaeus are couched in an allegorical form, it is not sur-
prising that even his closest disciples disagree and vastly differ in their opinions
about the real meaning of Timaeus. Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo 280a20; 300b16; Physica
251b17; Metaphysica, 1071b31; 1071b37; De Anima 406b25ff. Aristotle clearly con-
trasts his views in De Generatione et Corruptione, 329a13. On this question there is fur-
ther reference in Simplicius, Commentarius in Aristotelis Physica, 488, 15; 489, 6; 489,
9; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentarius in Aristotelis Physica, 1091a27; Plutarch, De
Animae Procreatione in Timaeo III, 1; IV, 1; John Philoponus, De Aeternitate Mundi, VI,
8; VI, 21; VI, 27; V, I31.
21
Plato, Timaeus, 38B.
22
Plato, Timaeus, 37Cff.
23
Plato, Timaeus, 38B; Aristotle rebuked Plato for having tought that time was
created; Cf. Aristotle, Physica, 251b16ff.
 time proper 183

Aristotle treated the problem of time facing a vast extent of ques-

tions which are related to it.24 At the outset he states that time could
not be without change or motion,25 because it is only through the
different stages of motion or change within our mind that we are
able to conceive of time.26 Although ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ are defined by
time, time proper is something constant, because time is not defined
by time.27 Hence, although time is something related to motion or
change,28 it is itself something fundamentally different from motion
and change proper:
Clearly then it [sc. time] is not motion . . . But neither time exists with-
out change. . . . It is evident, then, that time is neither motion nor is
it independent from motion.29
Thus time is a number or measure of motion (kinÆsevw ériymÒw)30
as well as the number (ériymÒw) of motion with respect to our dis-
tinction between the ‘before’ and the ‘after’.31 As ‘everything that
moves is in time’32 and it is time which marks motion,33 ‘time is
what is counted and not that with which we count’.34 Hence to
Aristotle time is a number. To be ‘in time’, therefore, means to be
counted or measured by time.35 Time in itself is continuous since

24
Aristotle, Physica, bk IV, Chs. 10–14 (217b29–224a16).
25
Physica, 218b22. Aristotle was criticized for his attempt to relate time to motion
by Strato of Lampsacus (also called the ‘Physicist’). He discusses this question in
his work entitled Per¤ XrÒnou and perhaps in his Per¤ KinÆsevw, which are both
lost. Cf. Diogenes Laertius V, 59ff; Simplicius (op. cit., 965, 10); Proclus, In Platonis
Timaeum Commentarii, 242Eff. He was also criticized by Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrhonia,
III, 136ff; adversus Mathematicos, X, 176ff ) and Plotinus (Enneads, III.7ff ).
26
Physica, 218b22ff; 222b30ff; 235a11.
27
Physica, 218b14ff.
28
Physica, 219a1ff; 218b22ff; 236b20; 241a17; 251b11; 218b34.
29
Physica, 219a1ff: ÜOti m¢n oÔn oÎte k¤nhsiw oÎte êneu kinÆsevw ı xrÒnow §st¤,
fanerÒn. (It is evident, then, that time is neither motion nor is it independent from
motion). Physica, 218b22: ÜOti m¢n to¤nun oÈk §sti k¤nhsiw, fanerÒn. (Clearly then
it [sc. time] is not motion). Physica, 218b24: ÉAllã mØn oÈdÉ êneu metabol∞w (But
neither does time exist without change).
30
Physica, 221b8; 221a1; 251b10.
31
Physica, 219a13–34; 221b12–14; De Caelo, 279a14.
32
Physica, 223b31; 232b21; 236b20; 239a20ff; 241a15.
33
Physica, 220b16.
34
Physica, 219b5ff; 220b15; 221a1; 221b7; 221b11; 221b21; 221b25.
35
Physica, 221a3ff: “To be in time means, for motion, that both it and its essence
are measured by time”. Physica, 221a8ff: “To be in time means one of two things:
1. To exist when time exists; 2. as we say of some things that they are ‘in num-
ber’ . . . or that things have a number. Things which are always (immutable and
184 chapter six

this is an attribute of what is continuous, namely, the number of

motion:36 this is a single, infinite and uniform ‘continuum’.37 Time
is uncreated and it is infinite in respect of both its divisibility and
its extremities.38 Thus it has a uniformity of nature and “continues
through its entire duration inalienably and without modification”;39
it is always what it is, it is not in time and it is not contained by
time, or measured by time, or affected by time.40 Time is the ever-
lasting duration itself. Regarding the ontology of time, it is plain that
Aristotle moves from an epistemological premise (we notice time, when
and only when we notice change) to an ontological conclusion (time does
not exist without change). The equation of number with measure in
Aristotle's view aside, this definition actually seems to suggest that if
no one exists to do the counting, there is not anything countable.
This oblique reference to time as a measure establishes the sense in
which time is a number.
Of the immediate disciples of Plato it was only Haestiaeus of
Perinthus (of the so-called old Academy) who fully abided by his
master’s allegorical definition of time. He avers that “time is the
course of the heavenly bodies in their relation to one another”.41
Speusippus, on the other hand, seems to follow Aristotle, as he defines
time “the quantity within motion” (tÚ §n kinÆsei posÒn).42 In the
same vein, Xenocrates defines time as “the measure of what has
been created as well as everlasting motion” (m°tron t«n gennht«n ka‹
k¤nhsin é˝dion),43 which maintains the Platonic definition of time as
motion, and is also in line with the Aristotelian view of time as number.

unchangeable), namely God, are not, as such, ‘in time’. For they are not contained
by time, nor is their being or existence measured by time” (221b2). They are not
“affected by time, which indicates that they are not in time” (221b5). s. also Physica,
221b16; 221b21. Hence Aristotle distinguishes the infinite everlasting duration from
eternity proper which is a ‘being above time’.
36
Physica, 220a24ff. Cf. 219a10ff; 219b9ff; 233a14ff.
37
Cf. Aristotle’s views on the infinite divisibility of all quantities, including time:
Physica, 227a10ff; 231a21ff; 232a23ff; 233b15; 233b32ff; 234a10ff; 234a10; 235a25;
237a10; 237b8; De Generatione et Corruptione, 317a2ff; De Caelo, 306b22.
38
Physica, 233a18ff. Cf. 233a25.
39
De Caelo, 279a22ff.
40
Physica, 221b3ff.
41
Stobaeus, Eclogue, I, 250; about Haestiaeus of Perinthus, Cf. Diogenes Laertius,
III, 46.
42
Plutarch, Questiones Platonicae, VIII, 4, 3. In this definition, however, is not clear
as to whether time is the ‘number’ of motion or the ‘measure’ which is in motion.
43
Stobaeus, Eclogue, I, 250.
 time proper 185

On the other hand, the followers of Aristotle, the Peripatetics, did

abide by their master’s definiton of time,44 perhaps because this was
not allegorical and was more concrete. Besides, it had a scientific
character not susceptible to much controversy and variegated inter-
pretations, as happened with Plato’s views. Thus Theophrastus defends
the notion of a universe without beginning or end, and similar views
were exposed by Eudemus of Rhodes and Dicaearchus of Messina.
It was Strato of Lampsacus who expounded his own views of time
in an ad hoc treatise, challenging the Aristotelian definition of time
in terms of number or motion as unsatisfactory, and possibly erro-
neous. He defines time as ‘the quantity in all action’ (tÚ §n ta›w prã-
jesi posÒn)45 and ‘the quantity of everything that is in motion and
at rest’ (tÚ §n kinÆsei ka‹ ±rem¤& posÒn46 and m°tron kinÆsevw ka‹
mon∞w).47 This notion of rest is particularly interesting, since it was on
this that Plotinus grounded his arguments against the connection of
time with motion.48
As regards the Epicurean attitude, I shall only briefly state that
they generally were influenced by the Aristotelian view. They regarded
time as a ‘symptom accompanying things in motion’ (sÊmptvma toËto
dÉ §st¤ parakoloÊyhma kinÆsevn),49 namely, a concomitant of motion.
However, in view of Origen’s disdain for the Epicurean thought,
there is no need to pursue this issue any further.
I now come to the Stoic concept of time. According to the Stoics,
time is in essence an extension (diãsthma). This definition has enjoyed

44
Simplicius, Commentarius in Aristotelis Physica, 411, 5ff. Nevertheless, the real
meaning of Aristotelian definition of time is not exempt from controversy; particu-
larly there is dissent with regard to the meaning and distinction (or, link) between
number and measure. Cf. Gregory Vlastos “Creation in the Timaeus: Is it a fiction?”,
in R.E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato’s Metaphysica, London 1965, p. 413; also “The
disorderly motion in the Timaeus” (reprinted from Classical Quarterly, 1939, ibid., pp.
386–6. Julia Annas, “Aristotle, Number and Time”, Philosophical Quarterly, 25, 1975,
pp. 97–113, esp. 100. J. Whittaker, God, Time and Being, Two Studies, Symbolae Osloenses,
supp. vol. 23, p. 25, n. 5. J. Moreau, L’Espace et le temps selon Aristote, Padua, 1965,
pp. 125, 129–30. Also, A.H. Armstrong, note ad loc. in the Loeb edition, Cambridge
Mass., 1967 and the P.H. Wicksteed – F.M. Cornford Loeb translation of Physica,
219b1–2, Cambridge Mass., 1963.
45
Simplicius, op. cit., 789, 34.
46
Stobaeus, Eclogue, I, 250.
47
Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonia, III, 137; adversus Mathematicos, X, 228; X, 177.
48
S. infra, Enneads, III.7.8.
49
Stobaeus, Eclogue, I, 252.
186 chapter six

little attention and most probably it has been inadequately compre-

hended. Some scholars seem to be uncertain as to whether the Stoic
definition should be regarded as nearer to that of either Plato’s or
Aristotle’s, leaving this ambiguity unresolved.50 On the other hand,
it is only after a short consideration that A. Chroust concludes that
the Stoic definition of time was but an echo of the Aristotelian one.51
I think that the flaw in understanding the Stoic definition lies in
the failure to grasp the crucial, indeed ontological, significance of
the notion of extension, as I shall discuss presently. In reference to the
earliest of the Stoic accounts, Zeno’s definition is extant in a por-
tion stating that “of the Stoics, Zeno [says] that time is in general
the extension of any motion.” (pãshw èpl«w kinÆsevw diãsthma),52
while another one reads thus:
And Zeno said that time is an extension of motion (kinÆsevw diãsthma)
and the criterion of fastness and slowness. And it is in time (katã
toËton) that events occur and everything that becomes and all beings
are.53
To Chrysippus time is the ‘extension of the motion of the world’.54
Although this seems to be a more specific definition compared to
that of Zeno’s, on no account could this lend itself to the assertion
that it introduces an essential modification of Zeno’s view.55 For his
original conception of time as extension remains unchangeable and
is the kernel of Chrysippus’ conception, too. Besides, there is at least
one passage where Chrysippus’ view is cited in disjunction, or as an
explanatory one, to that of Zeno’s:
And Chrysippus [says] that time is the extension of motion (kinÆsevw
diãsthma) and this is why it is sometimes said to be the measure of
fastness or slowness; or [time] is the extension which closely attends
the motion of the world and [it is said that] it is in time that every-
thing is moving as well as being.56

50
J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge, 1969; pp. 273–4.
51
A. Chroust, “The meaning of time in the ancient world”, The New Scholasticism,
XXI (1947), p. 42.
52
SVF, I, 26, 14–15; ap. Simplicius, ad Cat. 80a4.
53
SVF, I, 26, 11–15; ap. Stobaeus, Ecl., I.8.
54
diãsthma kosmik∞w kinÆsevw; SVF, II, 164, 14ff.
55
As asserted by J. Rist, op. cit., p. 278ff.
56
tÚ parakolouyoËn diãsthma t ∞ toË kÒsmou kinÆsei; SVF, II, 164, 15–18. This
is how Appolodorus defines time, too: “Time is the extension of the motion of the
world” (xrÒnow dÉ §st¤ t∞w toË kÒsmou kinÆsevw diãsthma). SVF, III, 260, 18–19.
 time proper 187

It has been maintained that this definition in terms of its letter may
be nearer to Aristotle (time is the measure or number of motion),
but it is not impossible that the spirit of this definition be more
related to that of Plato (time is the moving image of eternity).57 I
do not see, however, why the Stoic definition should by all means
be associated with either the Platonic or the Aristotelian one. What
I think is that Zeno’s conception is clearly a third view, at least in
this respect: the Platonic is undoubtedly a metaphysical as well as a
theological conception, while the Aristotelian is a scientific and math-
ematical one. To Zeno though time is neither something related to
the Beyond or to metaphysics in any respect (for he was a materi-
alist Stoic), nor is it an intellectual mathematical perception, namely,
a number or measure. Time may be ‘and a criterion of fastness and
slowness’; but in the first place (that is, on the grounds of ontology)
the essence of time proper is postulated as extension.
Thus time is associated with a natural reality (that is, motion) and
is regarded in itself as a natural reality, too: a sort of extension which
is indispensable for motion to take place and to make sense. Time
is neither an image of a metaphysical reality, nor is it a mathematical
conception, namely number or measure. Time is a sort of natural extension.
It is true that Aristotle states periods of time as ‘extensions’
(diastÆmata). There are, however, certain substantial differences:
Aristotle never allowed for diãsthma to portray the ontological iden-
tity of time proper. To be the number of motion is one thing, but to
be the extension of it is quite another. He used the term diãsthma in
the everyday sense of something which joins two points. In this sense,
diãsthma may have an either temporal or spatial import. But on no
account does this constitute a definition of time proper. In fact
Aristotle never took diãsthma to indicate time proper, as Zeno and
Chrysippus did. For he held a different view of the essence of time
per se. Aristotle, as well as Plato, could, like everybody else, use the
commonplace of diãsthma suggesting parts, or periods, of time. But
they never suggested that time itself is an extension. It was only the
Stoics who explicitly defined diãsthma as indicating time proper onto-
logically. The portrayal of time as diãsthma is exactly what moving
image is for Plato and number or measure is for Aristotle.

57
Op. cit., pp. 273–4. Rist, anyway, states that he is not sure as to whose definition
should Zeno’s one be considered as more closely related.
188 chapter six

The Platonic definition of time is grounded on a fundamental

premise, which is the notion of transcendence. Whatever the interpre-
tation of Timaeus at this point may be, there is one fact which can-
not be disputed: the main point which Plato wished to make in his
definition is the similarity of time to eternity (s. supra: ·nÉ …w ımoiÒtatow
aÈt“ katã dÊnamin √). This, in the final analysis, implies the depen-
dence of the temporal to the eternal, the dependence of the image
to the archetype. It is true that Plato’s views on the question of the
beginning of the universe are vague and surrounded by rancorous
controversy. But this is so only because he directed his main atten-
tion not to the problem of beginning, but to the point that the cos-
mos is originated and dependent on an absolute and supreme transcendent
cause. This is the main notion expressed through the allegorical state-
ments in Timaeus. If some contradictions can be pointed out in the
statements concerning the notion of ‘beginning’,58 they are due to
Plato’s prime concern with the notion of dependence of the world
on an supreme absolute transcendent cause—which left the notion
of beginning in Timaeus as a second-class problem.
This background and reasoning are alien to the Stoic thought,
where the notion of transcendence makes no sense at all. The Stoics
firmly stick to the materiality of the world which is regarded as the
‘whole’ (tÚ ˜lon)59—with nothing existing beyond that. So the spirit
of the Stoic definition of time can have essentially nothing in com-
mon with the views of Plato.
On the other hand, the apparent similarity of the Stoic definition
to the Aristotelian one does not actually suggest any real affinity
between them. Once time is postulated as a number or measure of
motion, it follows straight off that time could not exist if there were
no soul at all. On this point Aristotle is quite explicit: if there is no
one to count, there can be nothing to be counted—thus there could
be no ‘number’,60 even though motion proper could still make sense.

58
For example, he affirms the pre-existence of human being; Cf. Meno 86A;
Respublica 611A; Phaedrus 245Dff; Phaedo 75Cff; 106D; Leges 781E. But since soul
(which in itself is an orderly reality) has always existed, this means that orderly real-
ity has always existed—which contradicts the statements that time was created when
order was brought into the pre-existing chaos and the ‘original stuff ’.
59
SVF, II, 167, 8.
60
Cf. Physica, 223a25–35: PÒteron d¢ mÆ oÎshw cux∞w e‡h ên ı xrÒnow ≥ oÈ,
éporÆseien ên tiw: édunãtou går ˆntow e‰nai toË ériymÆsontow édÊnaton ka‹
ériymhtÒn ti e‰nai, Àste d∞lon ˜ti oÈdÉ ériymÒw: ériymÒw går ≥ tÚ ±riymhm°non
 time proper 189

For it is only the soul which is qualified to count. Without soul there
is only motion. If there is only motion, but no possibility of count-
ing, this definition fails.
The statement of Aristotle, as quoted in the note below, has been
hard to accept by many commentators, who have sought to rein-
terpret the text. A list of interpretations is supplied by P.F. Conen.61
In a perspicuous discussion he cites Simplicius, H. Carteron, W. Bröker,
A.-J. Fegustière and J. Moreau. R. Sorabji, on the other hand, simply
takes it that Aristotle made a mistake at this point, namely, in his
assertion that where no-one exists to do the counting, there is no
countability. He makes an interesting comment:62 Aristotle here moves
from an epistemological premise (we notice time, when and only when
we notice change) to an ontological conclusion (time does not exist with-
out change). The remark is apt on the ground of analytical philo-
sophy. It would be said, however, that this facet of Aristotle’s definition
has an existentialistic vein. On this ground there can be a certain link
between experience and ontology. For Aristotle’s averment (we notice
time) is neither epistemological, nor even a psychological one. He
refers to the experience of time rather than to any sort of knowledge of
it. Anyhow, I shall take Aristotle’s words as they are clearly stated
in Physics and shall not deal with this analysis any further.
In Aristotle’s definition there are two fundamental premises: first,
motion; secondly, the soul, who is the counting agent and renders
a meaning upon number. Thus this definition of time is sound only
if there are those two prerequisites, namely, the moving (or chang-
ing) object and the counting intelligent subject. This point raised no
problems to his theory of time,63 since he held the notion of ever-
lastingness of the world.
In Aristotle, therefore, what is of ontological priority with respect
to time is motion. In contrast, to the Stoics the main ontological

≥ tÚ ériymhtÒn. Efi d¢ mhd°n êllon p°fuken ériyme›n ≤ cuxÆ ka‹ cux∞w noËw,

édÊnaton e‰nai xrÒnon cux∞w mÆ oÎshw, éllÉ efi toËto ˜ pote ˆn §stin ı xrÒnow,
oÂon efi §nd°xetai k¤nhsin e‰nai êneu cux∞w. TÒ d¢ prÒteron ka‹ Ïsteron §n kinÆsei
§st¤n: xrÒnow d¢ taËtÉ §st¤n √ ériymhtã §stin.
61
P.F. Conen, Die Zeittheorie des Aristoteles, Munich 1964, pp. 156–69.
62
R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 74.
63
According to a testimony of Censorinus, Aristotle himself taught that mankind
has always been. At any rate, Aristotle was quite clear in his view of the eternity
of the world: man is the end of nature, and hence of the world, which itself is
without beginning. Cf. F. Hultsch, Censorini, De Die Natali. Leipsig, 1867; IV, 3.
190 chapter six

definition of time is extension. Time would be regarded also as a ‘mea-

sure’, but this is just an additional property of it. This means that
if time is not regarded as a measure, and if there is no one to count
it, the Stoic definition of time does not fail—unlike the Aristotelian
one. The critical point which really stands behind this substantial
difference is, I think, the Stoic doctrine of cosmic periods.
The Stoics, as well as Aristotle, held that time is one and it is a
continuum. If, hypothetically, the Stoics held time proper to be in
essence a number, then the end of each cosmic period could entail
the end of time and the beginning of another time. But this is clearly
rejected. For they all, especially Chrysippus, are explicit that each
new world begins and ends with a cosmic destruction, but time does
not.64 This means that time proper is an element of the world quite
independent from whether the ‘substance’ (oÈs¤a), which constitutes
the world, is ‘decorated’ (diakekosmhm°nh) during the cosmic period,
or ‘undecorated’ (édiakÒsmhtow) during the dissolution of the world.
Time is one extension along which the alternations of this substance
occur periodically.
Time is one, it is without beginning, indeed this is a continuum
infinite in both directions. If time proper were defined as the num-
ber of the worldly motion (and thus: orderly—since there can be no
number of motion in disorder), this could entail that this present
world is without beginning or end. This is an idea held by Aristotle,
but totally unacceptable to the Stoics. Besides, in a general conflagration
there are no souls to count motion—and yet time does exist and its
continuity is maintained, too.
The conclusion is that if the Stoics accepted the Aristotelian
definition of time, then fundamental premises of their philosophy
(such as the doctrine of cosmic periods) could have no adequate
ground. In short, the Aristotelian definition of time is essentially
incompatible with fundamental Stoic doctrines. This is why time is
in principle an extension—a definition which can defy Aristotle’s denial
of successive worlds and does not necessarily presuppose an intelli-
gent subject to count time (which is indispensable for the Aristotelian
conception of time to make sense). To Stoics, time may be regarded

64
Cf. Philo, De Aeternitate Mundi, I.33ff: “. . . ı kÒsmow . . . …w doke› to›w StvÛko›w
di∞kon êxri §kpur≈sevw, oÈs¤a tiw ≤ diakekosmhm°nh ≤ édiakÒsmhtow, o t∞w
kinÆsevw fas¤n e‰nai tÚn xrÒnon diãsthma . . .”.
 time proper 191

as also a ‘measure’, not because time itself is a number, but only

because motion takes place in time, namely, in the extension which
time proper is held to be. For it is not number, but extension that
constitutes the fundamental ontological definition of time proper.
Thus the occurrence of a cosmic catastrophe (which marks the end
of a world and the beginning of the next one) and the subsequent
absence of any orderly motion (as well as the absence of any intel-
ligent subject capable of counting motion) does not put the Stoic
definition of time in any question whatsoever. This is possible on
account of the fact that the Stoic definition of time is radically
different from the Aristotelian one. In Aristotle what stands in onto-
logical priority to time is motion. In contrast, to the Stoics the onto-
logical definition of time is extension. Time may also be a measure,
but this is an additional property, not the indispensable ontological
identity of it.
It is clear then that the Stoic definition of time is autonomous and
quite independent from either the Platonic or the Aristotelian one.
Later it was Proclus who pointed out that the Stoic view is actually
different from the views of time of either Plato or the Peripatetics.65
In the extant passage though there is only his claim, but no the
arguments for it. I cannot know whether or not Proclus distanced
Plato’s view on the grounds stated above. What I do know though
is that so far it has not been realized that the Stoic conception of
time is essentially independent from either the Platonic or the
Aristotelian one. This is why some scholars opt for relating it to the
Platonic views, others (such as H. Chroust) take it to be similar to
those of Aristotle’s, whereas others (such as J.M. Rist) do not plump
for either the former or the latter and leave the question moot.
To the Stoics (in contrast to Plato), time—motion—change are not
intrinsically associated to the extent that they could not be under-
stood independently from each other. It is true that the notion of
motion is deeply involved in the early Stoic definition. Time proper,
however, is by no means a reality dependent upon motion. The
Stoic definition in no way entails that time cannot exist without
motion. Such a conclusion could ensue from both the Platonic and
the Aristotelian definition—but not from the Stoic one. A Stoic could
never argue that there is no time in the absence of motion—which

65
SVF, II, 166, 6–10.
192 chapter six

Plato and Aristotle did. Certainly the Stoics did allow that whatever
is temporal is subject to motion and change. But on no account is
this concession a necessary corollary of their definition of time proper.
Among all the Greek definitions, it is solely the Stoic one in which
the notion of motion is not ontologically indispensable for the very
existence of time proper. This happens on account of the ontologi-
cal priority of time to motion. This is in fact the point of the crit-
ical relation of motion to time and this is how the involvement of
motion in the definition of time should be viewed. It is only in Stoic
thought that a per impossibile absence of motion does not necessarily
entail the impossibility of existence of time proper. Certainly in that
case the question which could be invited is what is the point for
time to exist at all. This, however, is an epistemological question, per-
haps a question pertaining to the meaning of time or the raison d’être
of it. But on no account is it an ontological question: which means
that the hypothetical absence of motion does not of necessity extin-
guish the ontological ground for the existence of time proper. The
discussion could perhaps invite the question of why in such a case
time should exist—but there is no ground to support the claim that
in that case time could not exist.
The nature of time is to be an extension for the motion of the
world, yet the existence of time does not depend on this motion at
all. Certainly to the Stoics the perpetual motion of the world is an
unquestionable fact. Nevertheless, they did not ground the existence
of time proper on motion itself as, more or less, the rest of the Greek
schools did. It is rather motion which is dependent on time. Particularly
in Zeno’s definition, the concept of time is ontologically prior to the
notion of motion—not vice versa. Time is the indispensable sub-
stratum for motion not only to take place, but also to make sense.
The Stoic time as diãsthma (extension) is related to diãstasiw
(dimension) rather than to motion, albeit it could hardly be claimed
that the Stoics in any respect anticipated the conception of time held
by Modern Physics. Nevertheless, the radical difference between time
as extension and those of time as either moving image or number
is quite obvious on the ground of this contradistinction: the Stoic
one is the case of a static time, as contrasted with the Platonic (as
well as the Plotinian) dynamic notion and the Aristotelian abstract
scientific mathematical perception.
There are assertions that neither the Pythagoreans nor the Stoics
made an explicit part of their theory that time will be the same
 time proper 193

throughout successive aeons. Taking into account the Greek idea of

the Great Year, for example, it could be argued that, once this
period comes round and the heavenly bodies return to their origi-
nal alignments, then time comes to an end and starts again. However,
there is a point which has to be made against these assertions.66 This
argument is sound only if time is regarded in the Aristotelian sense
of measure or number. Once time is essentially an extension, this argu-
ment is not sound. If time is but the number counting the years of
a cosmic period, then certainly it will reach the number of years
which comprise a cosmic period and then counting will have to begin
again, which means that another time should start all over again. In
contrast, if time in its essence is an extension, there is nothing to sug-
gest that this will begin again. This extension is infinite in both direc-
tions, as the Stoics explicated. I think that this is a main reason why
they seem to have not dealt with the question of the sameness, or
not, of time in the course of the world. They simply did not need
to do so.
Much debate has been made about cyclicity of either time or events.67
It is popular among scholars to speak about ‘cyclic’ or ‘rectilinear’
time, the former being regarded as the ‘Greek’ conception of it. This
notion of cyclicity enjoys much currency and use, perhaps because
it provides a simplistic spatial figure of time. This is, however, a dis-
tinction which is misleading for comprehension of the problematique
of time proper.
The notion of cyclicity could hardly make sense in any Greek
school. Cyclic events have no room even in philosophers such as
Heracletus or the Stoics. At most one would speak about periodical
events, which re-cur in normal periods of the infinite, linear, con-
tinuum of time. With regard to Plato, for instance, suggestions of
‘cyclicity’68 have their counter-parts in his works. In the Respublica,69
he seems to suggest that some day in the future the ideal State,

66
R. Sorabji suggests that it was only with Eudemus that the idea that time will
be the same was put forward (op. cit., p. 184).
67
Cf. R. Sorabji, op. cit., pp. 184ff.
68
Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 22Cff, 23Aff.
69
Cf. Plato, Respublica, 499d. per¤ toÊtou ßtoimoi t“ lÒgƒ diamãxesyai, …w g°gonen
≤ efirhm°nh polite¤a ka‹ §stin ka‹ genÆseta¤ ge, ˜tan aÏth ≤ MoËsa pÒlevw
egkratÆw genÆsetai. oÈ går édÊnatow gen°syai, oÈdÉ ≤me›w édÊnata l°gomen: xalepã
d¢ ka‹ parÉ ≤m›n ımologe›tai. Italics mine.
194 chapter six

which he portrayed, will materialize. It could then be reasonable to

argue that the portrayal of an occurrence lying in the indefinite
future is a t°low which implies a linear conception of time.
There is only one case for cyclical time to make sense: that is, a
hypothetical eclectic attitude, according to which the Stoic notion of
successive worlds is upheld, while time is also regarded as a number
(in an Aristotelian sense). At the end of a cosmic period time will
have to start again, because this will have reached the amount of
years comprising the cosmic period and it will not be possible for
this number-time to increase further. Since Aristotelian time is infinite
(with no absolute beginning or end), the counting (of the number, which
is time) will have to start again. Thus, there is no absolute begin-
ning and time proper seems to be repeated in a cyclic scheme. It
is only in such a hypothetical case that one would speak of cyclical
time: that is, an infinite series of counting up to a certain number,
and then starting from the beginning counting all over again. Such
an eclectic view of time, however, if ever any, never made a sub-
stantial mark in Greek thought.
Thus the very notion of repetition of events in fact implies a dis-
tinction of events, even if they are structurally identical from one cos-
mic period to another. Hence, the notion of cyclicity alleged as a
universal Greek conception of time is absurd. As for Aristotle, he
speaks of time as ‘something like as cycle’.70 It would have been a
flagrant mistake to take this phrase out of its context and allege that
Aristotle suggested that time is ‘cyclical’, a mistake which clealry
showed that this portion of Physica had not been properly studied—
anyway a mistake which I do not think is made nowadays.71 If one
wishes to stick to this notion of cyclicity (although there is no reason
to do so at all),72 he would at best speak of a spiral of space—time.

70
Aristotle, Physica, 223B.28–29; Cf. also 223B.24–25; 223B.31–33.
71
O. Cullmann buttressed his assertions about what he calls the ‘Greek’ view of
time on this point of Aristotle and refers to a number of scholars who treated the
passage in the same way; Cf. Christ and Time, (Greek tr. by P. Coumantos, Athens,
1980); p. 240, n. 3. Similarly, Cf. C. Puech, “Gnosis and Time”, in Man and Time,
Princeton, 1973; p. 42 and n. 6. What Aristotle suggests is that time is not recti-
linear but curved. Although not referring to Aristotle’s view, T. Boman criticized
Cullmann for asserting that time is ‘rectilinear’ whereas astronomical time is always
cyclic; Cf. T. Boman, op. cit. p. 162.
72
In fact the only reason is the insistence of certain theologians who assert a
simplistic and misleading catch-all description of time as a ‘Greek’ one, in order to
 time proper 195

Thus, on account of the conception of time as extension, the Stoics

did not need to enunciate that time is in essence one and the same
throughout the successive aeons. Nevertheless, they did emphasize
that time is a continuum which is not broken off during the destruc-
tion of a world. This point comes in support of my argument that
the Stoic concept is in essence radically different from that of Aristotle’s.
I conclude then that there is an autonomous Stoic tradition on
the conception of time (namely, on the particular question of what
time proper is). This stands beside the Platonic and Aristotelian views,
being independent from them. Any attempt to associate the Stoic
view with either the Aristotelian or the Platonic one could be point-
less. The claim about an essential similarity between the Platonic or
Aristotelian view on the one hand, and the Stoic one on the other,
in fact implies that there is an essential dependence of the Stoic
thought upon either the Platonic or the Aristotelian one. In effect
such a claim disputes the fact that Stoicism constitutes an indepen-
dent and self-directing stream of thought. It would be not only out
of my scope, but also superfluous, to argue that this is not quite the
case. For it would be absurd to call into question the historical fact
that Stoicism is quite independent from any other Greek school of
thought; that it had its own momentum and its highly vigorous and
influential presence in the spiritual environment and evolution of
ideas—namely, into that which is usually described by the all-embrac-
ing expression ‘Greek thought’.
It is true, nevertheless, that the Stoic definition has enjoyed little
attention among scholars. It is characteristic that, in a work aiming
to deal with certain conceptions of time in Antiquity, John Callahan73
leaves the Stoic view out of consideration. On the other hand, as I
said, it is only after a very short discussion that A. Chroust con-
cludes that the Stoic definition of time was only an echo of the
Aristotelian one.74 Perhaps all this is due to the lack of a detailed
Stoic treatment of the question. For indeed they never afforded a
comprehensive account of their tenet. Plutarch upbraids the Stoics

make the point of a Hebraic and Christian ‘rectilinear’ time. The issue of time,
however, is not that simple and needs a more sophisticated treatment.
73
John Callahan, Four views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, Connecticut, 1968.
74
A. Chroust, “The meaning of time in the ancient world”, The New Scholasticism,
XXI (1947), 42.
196 chapter six

with inconclusive indefiniteness. He observes that they define time

as an ‘extension of motion’ (diãsthma kinÆsevw) ‘and nothing else’
(êllo dÉ oÈd°n). He adds that they regard it as a mere attribute
resulting from motion, a consequence of motion (épÒ sumbebhkÒtow
ırizÒmenoi), while they ‘fail to consider its essence and its faculty’
(tØn dÉ oÈs¤an aÈtoË ka‹ tØn dÊnamin oÈ sunor«ntew).75
Plotinus also exercised a severe criticism against both Aristotle and
the Stoics. He rejected the definition of time as number, whereas
the Stoic definition of time as extension seemed to him as not touch-
ing upon the problem of time proper. His argument was that one
would never find what time proper is by simply counting it. On the
other hand, the Stoic statement that time is an extension seemed to
him a tautology, since time was defined by a predicate (namely,
diãsthma) which was not defined in itself. Thus, in his view, the
Stoics fell short of actually defining time:
But if someone were to say that the extension of motion is time, not
in the sense of extension itself, but that in relation to which the motion
has its extension, as if it were running along with it, what this is has
not been stated. For it is obvious that time is that in which the motion
has occurred. But this was what my discussion was trying to find from
the beginning, what time essentially is; since in fact this is like the
same as an answer to the question ‘What is time?’—which says that
it is extension of motion in time. What, then, is this extension which
you call time and put outside the proper extension of the motion?
Then again, on the other side, the person who puts the extension in
the motion itself, will be hopelessly perplexed about where to put the
dimension of rest. For something else could rest for as long as some-
thing was moved, and you would say that the time in each case was
the same, as being, obviously, different from both. What, then, is this
extension, and what is its nature? For it cannot be spatial, since this
also lies outside movement.76
It is plain that this assessment of Plotinus points to the earliest of
the Stoic accounts, namely, that of Zeno’s. The criticism is nonethe-
less extended to later Stoics, too. Chrysippus defined time as “an

75
SVF, II, 165, 20–22.
76
Enneads, III.7.8. I have in general followed the translation of A.H. Armstrong,
but with some substantial changes: I translate diãstasiw as ‘extension’, not as ‘dis-
tance’ which does not really mean diãstasiw, but épÒstasiw. Also, the expression
˜son går means ‘as long as’; Armstrong’s translation as ‘for the same space’ would
create confusion, as he obviously means ‘space of time’ exactly at the point where
Plotinus makes the crucial distinction between space and time.
 time proper 197

extension which is alongside following the motion of the world” (tÚ

parakolouyoËn diãsthma tª toË kÒsmou kinÆsei).77 Although Plotinus
does not refer to any Stoic philosopher by name, it is obvious that
the following portion of the Enneads is actually aimed against
Chrysippus:
As for calling it an accompaniment of motion, this does not explain
at all what it is, nor has the statement any content before it is said
what this accompanying thing is, for perhaps just this might turn out
to be time. But we must consider whether this accompaniment comes
after motion, or at the same time as it, or before it (if there is any
kind of accompaniment which comes before) for whichever may be
said, it is said to be in time. If this is so, time will be an accompa-
niment of motion in time.78
It is true that the Stoics do not offer any elaborate account of their
essential idea of time as extension. The foregoing criticism focuses
on this lack of elaboration, purposing to offer a cluster of puzzles
in the attempt to discredit the Stoic definition. This is understand-
able, since it comes from a Middle-Platonic and Neoplatonic direc-
tion, that is, rival schools of thought. I should have thought that
A.H. Armstrong is quite right in calling Plutarch ‘a very hostile
witness’ of the Stoics.79
This criticism, however, downgrades the ontological character of the
Stoic diãsthma. For the Stoics do not really regard time as a conse-
quence of motion: time is in fact the indispensable element for motion
to make sense and to take place. There is an absolute ontological
priority of diãsthma to motion, as well as to any other notion involved
in the early Stoic definitions.
On the other hand, it is no accident, nor is it due to negligence,
that they did not develop their conception in detail. On the con-
trary, it can be sustained that not to elaborate too much is an inher-
ent proclivity of their theory of time. This is explicable in the light
of their principles themselves: in Stoicism the notions of reality and
corporeality are closely related. The general old Stoic tenet was that
it is only bodies which are real (as real regarding only what is act-
ing or suffering). Hence they would regard time as real only once

77
SVF, II, 164, 16–17.
78
Enneads. III.7.10.
79
A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, London, 1981, 120.
198 chapter six

they had affirmed it to be a body. Since time is obviously not a

body, the spontaneous Stoic reaction in the first place would be to
reject the idea that time exists, indeed to negate it altogether. But
this is self-defeating, too, since it runs contrary to the putative human
experience, or a crude awareness of time, at least.
The Stoics solved the problem by conceding the existence of four
‘incorporeals’, namely, time (ı xrÒnow), space (ı x«row), an expres-
sion (tÚ lektÒn) and the void (tÚ kenÒn).80 It is apparent though that
in the Stoic philosophy, and its materialism, the term ‘incorporeal’
is a cause of embarrassment. On the other hand, a further analysis
of the question of time could cause further perplexity. This is what
they sought to evade. To them time has always remained a ‘some-
thing’ (t‹), which stands between being and non-being, in a state
between existence and non-existence.
The Stoics in general distinguished three degrees of reality: the
ˆnta (beings) were regarded as being of full reality and these were
only bodies. The incorporeals were called tinã (somethings), but they
were not regarded as ˆnta. Below them, the oÎtina (nothings) were
mere conceptions (§nnoÆmata). Time belongs to the second rank of
reality.81 Another distinction of degrees of reality is between what is
Ífest≈w (subsisting) and what is ˆn (being). The former seems to cor-
respond to tinã (somethings).82
This is why Proclus accurately observes that the Stoic conception
of time was far too different from that of either the Platonists or the
Peripatetics. To Stoics, according to Proclus, “time was one of what
they called the incorporeals, which are despised by them as inactive
and not being, and existing only in bare mind”.83

80
SVF, II.17.18–24. With reference to the Stoic thought, for the translation of
tÚ lektÒn as ‘an expression’ s. L. & S., p. 1037.
81
Cf. SVF II, 117, 1ff; II, 166, 4–10; Sextus Empiricus, adversus Mathematicos,
X.218; Cf. J.M. Rist, op. cit., Ch. 9; also, Pasquale Pasquino “Le statut ontologique
des incorporels”, in Jaques Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique (Paris, 1978).
82
Cf. R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 23.
83
SVF, II, 166, 4–10. ¶ti d¢ kéke›no lhpt°on épÒ t«n proeirhm°nvn ˜ti polloË
de› toioËton ÍponoÆseiai tÚn xrÒnon ı Plãtvn oÂon ofl épÒ t∞w Stoçw Íp°labon
≥ t«n §k toË Peripãtou pollo¤, ofl m¢n katÉ §p¤noian cilÆn aÈtÒn sunistãntew
émenhnÒn ka‹ ¶ggista toË mØ ˆntow: ßn går oÔn t«n parÉ aÈto›w ésvmãtvn ı
xrÒnow, ë dÆ katapefrÒnhtai parÉ aÈto›w …w édran∞ ka‹ oÈk ˆnta ka‹ §n §pino¤aiw
Ífistãmena cila›w: ofl d¢ sumbebhkÒw t∞w kinÆsevw l°gontew.
 time proper 199

In Stoic philosophy a theory ascribed to Chrysippus was that only

something ‘fully real’ should be considered as ‘existing’ (Ípãrxein).
They used to make the distinction between Ípãrxein and Ífestã-
nai.84 The latter is not a full but only a ‘potential’ reality. ‘Fully real’
is an event which takes place in actuality: ‘walking’, for example, exists
fully only as long as one walks; it does not exist fully when one in
lying or sitting.85 In this context, the Stoics argue that only the pre-
sent time is fully real. On the other hand, they hold time to be
infinite in both directions (namely, past and future) and infinitely
divisible. Obviously, they can infer the infinite divisibility from their
fundamental view of time as a continuum.86 According to a testimony
of Plutarch, to the Stoics the ‘present’ is time so infinitely small, that
it is ‘crushed’ between past and future (which are regarded as not
fully real). Finally, the present itself is extinguished and does not
really exist. What remains out of this ‘crushing’ is past and future,
which though are considered as not ‘full’ but ‘potential’ realities.87
This is the Stoic reasoning which subtracts reality from the present.
It is on account of this that Plutarch ascribes to the Stoics the opin-
ion that time itself is not a ‘being’.88
Such were the matters surrounding the question of time. Platonists,
for example, maintained that it is continuity itself that assigns unre-
ality to time.89 Chrysippus, however, rejects this assertion. He does
not allow that to regard time as a continuum entails an unreality of
the present, or of the events of the present time. Subsequently, he
develops a battery of arguments on this subject. What the Stoics
actually did was to draw a distinction between what exists (such as
material objects, or an action—as long as it takes place) and what
is real (which includes material objects, as well as incorporeal, such
as time). Perhaps this distinction eluded Proclus when he recorded
the Stoic view of time.90
There has been some criticism to my assessment of incorporeal-
ity being an element of embarassment to the Stoics, particularly my

84
SVF, II, 164, 27.
85
SVF, II, 164, 26–30.
86
SVF, II, 164, 23–25.
87
SVF, II, 165, 37–43.
88
SVF, II, 117, 42–43.
89
J.M. Rist, op. cit., 280.
90
SVF, II, 166, 4–10.
200 chapter six

opinion that ‘incorporeality’ and ‘reality’ are to them incompatible

ontological qualities.91 It would then be not without value to pro-
vide some further elaboration, so that no doubt should remain.
That the Stoics regarded time as an incorporeal which ‘existed in
thought’ (és≈maton, §nnooÊmenon)92 is a testimony which has significant
ramifications. Beside the testimony of Plutarch about time being
regarded by the Stoics as ‘non-being’ (oÈd°n, ˆnta dÉ oÎ),93 Sextus
refers to ‘those who deny the existence of expressions (lekt«n)’ report-
ing that they are ‘not only the Epicureans, but also the Stoics, such
as the students of Basilides, who opine that what is incorporeal is
non-existent’ (mhd°n eÂnai tÚ és≈maton).94 Sextus must be given credit
since he evidently had grasped crucial points of the Old Stoa, par-
ticulatly its dialectics. In this context an incisive distinction pointed
out by himself should be recalled: to speak of ‘truth’ (élÆyeian) is
one thing, but to speak of ‘what is true’ (tÚ élhy°w) is quite another.
These are two different things ‘in three ways, that is, in essence, in
constitution, in force of meaning’. It is significant to follow Sextus
pointing out the difference ‘in essence’ (oÈs¤&) between the two terms:
this difference ‘in essence’ is portayed thus: ‘truth is a body’ whereas
‘what is true (tÚ élhy°w) is incorporeal’.95 ‘Truth is a body’ means
(as I myslef indicated earlier speaking of ‘walking’) the actuality of
an fact taking place. To say that a body is real is an expression, which
is a ‘truth’: this is an ‘impression’ (fantas¤a),96 but this is not a body;
being just an ‘expression’, this is one of the incorporeals (tÚ lektÒn).
We have then two different existential statuses being different not
simply ‘in force of meaning’, but also ‘in essence’ and ‘in constitu-
tion’: 1) The reality of the body, which is ‘truth’ (élÆyeia). 2) The
expression of this reality, which is something ‘true’ (élhy°w), it is incor-
poreal and is not called ‘truth’: this is a certain ‘something’ (t‹), but
this is not endowed with the superior ontological authority such as

91
Marcelo Boeri in his “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals” (The Review of
Metaphysics, 54, June 2001, p. 735) referring to my article “Origen and the Stoic
View of Time” ( Journal of the History of Ideas, v. 52 (4), 1991, pp. 535–561) disputed
my opinion about the perplexity which is caused to Stoic thought out of the sheer
ontological difference between incorporeal and incorporeal reality.
92
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, X.218.
93
s. supra, SVF, II, 117, 40–43.
94
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VIII.258; SVF, III, 258, 5–8.
95
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII.38; SVF, II, 42, 18–39.
96
Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII.242; SVF, II, 25, 5ff.
 time proper 201

that with which a body is. This is in fact what Alexander of Aphrodisias
blamed the Stoics for: he pointed out their inability to determine
what is ‘being’ (ˆn) and what is a ‘something’ (t‹), demonstrating
their logical quandary which made them ‘escape from the question
which they have been asked and to which they should have answered’
(diafeÊgoien tÚ ±porhm°non).97 If then Plutarch might be regarded as
a hostile witness to the Stoics, and even if Proclus were too critical
of them, Sextus Empiricus appears at this point rather apathetic,
reporting indifferently what the Stoics really sustained on the onto-
logical difference between corporeals and incorporeals: the contrast
was a sheer difference of essence, the primary ontological authority
being ascribed to bodies. In view of this, I see no reason why credit
should not be given to Dexippus, who resports that ‘the Stoics did
not grant the incorporeals as existing in themselves’ (és≈mata går
mØ paradexÒmenoi kayÉ •autã).98
In any event, the foregoing assessment applies more to Old Stoicism
and not so much to that later version of the school which reached
Origen. C. Stead tells us that this was represented by three writers:
The well-known Roman littérateur Seneca (c. 2 B.C. to A.D. 65);
the freed slave Epictetus (c. 55–135 A.D.); and the emperor Marcus
Aurelius (b. 121, Emperor 161, d. 180). These thinkers were viewed
with sympathy by Christians, and Seneca was even supposed to have
corresponded with St Paul (the spurious letters in fact date from the
third or fourth century). All three believed in an overruling provi-
dence. Indeed the first two adopted a definitely theistic view, teach-
ing the kinship of the human mind with God.
In reference to the conception of time, V. Goldschmidt99 asserts
that Marcus Aurelius is actually a follower of Chrysippus. He takes
it that Marcus’s only divergence from early Stoicism is his pessimism
on the subject. J.M. Rist,100 on the other hand, holds that in Marcus’s
era (which is shortly before Origen) the problem of time had a totally
different content from the early Stoic one. To Zeno and Chrysippus
time is a problem of Physics: the questions concerning time arise
from the natural observation of bodies. This problem, therefore, is

97
SVF, II, 117, 1–8.
98
SVF, II, 150, 43–45.
99
V. Goldschmidt, Le Système Stoïcien et l’Idée de Temps (Paris, 1953), p. 197.
100
J.M. Rist, op. cit., p. 287.
202 chapter six

not related to morality. It is from this point of view that time is

regarded as a second class problem.
To Marcus time is itself a moral problem. What is the meaning
that moral life may have once all actions and accomplishments will
vanish into triviality? This was Marcus’s disheartening quandary. The
Stoicism of this period was distressed by a sense of frustration and
pointlessness, which was never really overcome. This is also the point
where time itself is related to ethics. Nowhere in his Meditations does
Marcus refer to any definitions of time, such as these afforded by
the earlier Stoics Zeno or Chrysippus or Apollodorus; nor is the
definition of time per se what is of interest to him when he deals
with this problem. It has been argued that in Marcus’s time Stoicism
had degenerated into an arid moralism. J.M. Rist contends that this
is a misleading generalization, yet he concedes that Marcus Aurelius
(who was aware of many of the theories of the early Stoa) had lost
the sense of their import. He further maintains that the fundamen-
tal interrelationship of ethics and physics has eluded Marcus.101
Moving on, I shall also make a brief reference to Plotinus’ view
of time. To him time is ontologically defined as life: the life of the
Soul in the motion, by which it changes from one phase of life to
another.102 So time, as well as the motions of the physical world,
are defined in terms of life and motions within the Soul as such.
The Soul partakes of both the spiritual world and the material
world103 and it is itself which produces both time and the physical
world. It is then the descent of the soul to the motion of this lower
realm that generates time. All physical motion is ‘in time’, but the
motions (namely, the life) of the Soul itself are not in time.104 Time
originates through the desire of the Soul to translate into physical
reality what it had visualized in the purely spiritual world.105 The
Soul generates time within itself as an image of eternity primarily
for itself, but subsequently for the physical world as such.106 Thus
the Platonic notion of time as an image is also maintained. The notion
that time moves is maintained in a sense; for time is regarded as ‘a

101
Op. cit., pp. 283–8.
102
Enneads, III.7.2.
103
Enneads, I.8.14; III.6.14; III.8.3; IV.8.7; VI.4.16; IV.8.3.
104
Enneads, III.7.13.
105
Enneads, III.7.3.
106
Enneads, III.7.10.
 time proper 203

state of the Soul consisting of alternating motions from one sphere

of life to another’.107 Beyond all these, however, the main ontologi-
cal definition of time in Plotinus is that time proper is life.
Approaching the second and first centuries B.C. it was a general
symptom of the era to seek refuge in eclecticism, mainly from Plato,
Aristotle and the Stoics. This happened with the question of time,
too. In thinkers such as Carneades (of the Middle Academy), Panaetius
and Posidonius, there is an apparent eclecticism and syncretism on
the question of time. On the other hand, Sextus Empiricus devel-
ops a battery of arguments in order to prove the unreality (énupÒsta-
tow) of time.108 It was the era when the historical period of scientific
inspiration and offer had run out, and the main human desire was
not for knowledge, but for salvation.109
Within this context, the Gnostic attitude towards time is inspired
not by the desire to attain to a scientific knowledge of it, but to be
emancipated from it. In tune with their overall hostile attitude towards
the world, which they regarded as evil, they seek salvation, not in
time, but from time. Regarding the being-in-the-world as a fallen state
from an original state of freedom, their attitude to time is inspired
by the nostalgia of a lost freedom. They detest time and seek to
shatter it, since this is a means for their being in slavery and servi-
tude.110 So their tendency is to annul it and deny it as a ‘lie’ or, at
least, to surpass it. The Gnostic mind is trying to escape the worldly
reality through a mythological thought. In this thought, atemporal-
ity and temporality are mingled together, as the Gnostic tries to
achieve a personal ‘resurrection’ and ‘perfection’, not through a
process in time, but rather through a mystic experience.
Beside this tradition (namely, the variegated Greek views, as well
as the Gnostic one) there was the Biblical attitude. Whether a specific
conscious Hebraic conception of time actually existed, or not, is a
question which I leave moot for the time being. What existed though
was the intense orientation towards the future and the expectation
for fulfillment of the divine promises, as stated in the Old Testament.

107
Enneads, III.7.10.
108
Pyrrhonia, III, 136ff; adversus Mathematicos, X, 169ff.
109
Cf. Windelband, W-Heimsoeth, H., Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 246.
110
Cf. H.C. Puech, “Gnosis and Time”, from Man and Time (Princeton, 1973),
pp. 38–84.
204 chapter six

Christianity, being primarily a religion of salvation, establishes a

mode of thought according to which the main concern is directed
towards the future. This attitude is found throughout the Bible, espe-
cially after the meaning that scripture acquired with the New
Testament. However, the question of time proper was never treated
in a manner allowing to speak of a tradition which reached Origen
on this particular issue.
The exception was Tatian (probably, 120–173 A.D.), who upheld
the idea of static time: all the notions about a temporal flux are but
a subjective impression based on the illusion that time moves. He
contends that it is not time that moves, but human beings who move
through time. Time does not move nor does it change. The feeling
that it moves (which produces the notions of temporal motion, or
change) is a fallacious imagery. This is like the impression of those
who are sailing on a ship and think that it is the landscape that
moves and not they.111
On no account however could this statement of Tatian’s be regarded
as an elaborated view of time. For this is all he had to say on the
issue in his combative work Against the Greeks: a work in which he
endeavours to touch upon all philosophers, all persons (mythologi-
cal or real) and all the questions which the Greeks dealt with in one
way or another; a vituperative composition aiming at an indiscrim-
inate attack on the Greek philosophers. No one could then expect
that in such a work any serious exposition of philosophical problems
could be offered. Anyhow, in this passage Tatian postulates a reversed
view: it is human beings, not time, that move, thus taking up the
notion of static time. This, however, is an assertion too general to
be regarded as a sufficient treatment of the issue. Certainly it is un-
Platonic, but not a positively un-Greek one. For Aristotle, as well as
the Stoics, would promptly endorse the opinion that time itself does
not move. On the other hand, the psychological division into past-
present-future cannot be denied at all. On this, all Tatian seems to
say is that the distinction into past, present and future is but a sub-
jective illusion. A. Chroust averred that this passage of Tatian’s con-
stitutes a ‘phenomenalistic’ and ‘subjectivistic’ interpretation of time.112

111
Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos, 26, PG 6.862.
112
Tatian, op. cit. Cf. A.H. Chroust, op. cit., 68.
 time proper 205

This, however, is exactly the opposite of what Tatian actually does.

For it is the ‘phenomenalistic’ and ‘subjectivistic’ conception of time
that Tatian contemptuously rebukes, regarding it as an illusion. This
view brings Tatian close enough to the Aristotelian Alexander of
Aphrosisias (fl. c. 205 A.D.) who held that the ‘generation’ of what
is called ‘instant’ ‘is in the mind’.113
With reference to time, the term diãsthma had also been used by
Athenagoras.114 This term is found in the expression ‘equal exten-
sions of time’ (fisom°troiw xrÒnou diastÆmasin).115 But it is doubtful
whether this constitutes an outright Stoic influence. As I argue
presently, mere usage of the term diãsthma alone is not sufficient
for the assumption of Stoic influence to be grounded solidly. There
is nothing really worth mentioning which Athenagoras did towards
formulation of a concrete Christian view of time. In his day there
was definitely no sophisticated conception such as that which Origen
initiated later on.
The variegation on this question during that early period of
Christianity can be better pointed out through the study of also
another Christian writer: until now it is only Tatian’s brief state-
ment which has enjoyed much attention among scholars. Still there
is another view which, as far as I know, has been neglected hith-
erto. I refer to Justin, who was contemporary to Athenagoras. In a
work purposed to refute certain views of Aristotle, he first quotes
Aristotelian passages and then states his own arguments against them.
At a number of points the reader can see that, although Justin rejects
certain Aristotelian views (such as beginninglessness and infinity of
time), he remains rather faithful to the Aristotelian view of time as
a ‘number’ of motion.116

113
R. Sharples, in collaboration with F.W. Zimmermann, “Alexander of Aphrodisias,
On Time”, Phronesis, 27 (1982), pp. 58–109.
114
Athenagoras, De Resurrectione Mortuorum, PG 6.1005.
115
Athenagoras, op. cit., 1005. It is remarkable that M. Spanneut believes that
the Stoic influence upon the early Christian writers does not go further than Clement
of Alexandria. s. M. Spanneut, Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l’Église (Paris, 1957), p. 356.
Besides, Origen’s fundamental view on the essence of time is totally different from
that of Philo’s. For the latter clearly holds a Platonic conception of time and pos-
tulates that the divine life (afi≈n) is “the archetype and model for time”; Quod Deus
Immutabilis Sit, 6.32.
116
Justinus Martyr, Philosophus, Confutatio quorundam Aristotelis dogmaticum. PG 6.1525ff.
The points to which I refer are 1525D, 1528B–C, 1529A, 1532C, 1533A etc.
206 chapter six

Thus, at the time of Athenagoras and Justin (that is, more or less
fifty years before Origen) the Christian writers were groping for a
new view of time. But there was no definite theory established as a
Christian one. Least of all does the question of time, if posed at all,
seem to have enjoyed unanimity among Christians.

Time as extension (diãsthma)

I am now going to assert that Origen has in the first place (and to
a certain extent) employed the fundamental early Stoic perception
of time as extension, forming his own view in line with his overall
theological principles. In doing so, he selected from the Stoic phi-
losophy whatever seemed to him as helping to the representation
of his own idea of time. Nevertheless, beyond whatever might be
regarded of Stoic origin, I shall argue that there is a unique con-
tribution of Origen himself towards the formation of a radically new
concept of time. This was actually a feat which had a decisive (still
not acknowledged as yet) impact on the Christian writers of the
centuries after him.
It is reasonable to assume that Origen was aware of the Stoic
treatment of time and the criticism against it. This can be gathered
not only from his generally acknowledged erudition, but also from
his profound knowledge of the Stoic thought—a knowledge which
stands out in his Contra Celsum. Still time is a subject upon which he
touches only occasionally. He was not interested in composing any
ad hoc treatise on time proper. But a study of his entire work (par-
ticularly that preserved in the Greek original text) reveals beyond
doubt that he did formulate a certain conception of his own. This
is constantly present in his entire theology, imbuing this essentially
and determinably.
Origen meets Stoicism at the time when this philosophy, as expressed
by Marcus Aurelius, displays symptoms of degeneration and stale-
mate. That he was well acquainted with early Stoicism was his advan-
tage. For he was aware of the whole historical process (and, particularly,
the evolution of ideas) which had eventually led this philosophy to
unsurmountable quandary.
As I have pointed out, the term diãsthma alone in a writer’s
phraseology is not sufficient ground to establish Stoic influence. This
would be a mere indication which needs to be buttressed up with
 time proper 207

more solid evidence. I shall adduce this evidence in due course. In

the first place though, the suggestion that time is held to be a kind
of extension is made by Origen himself. In contrast, he never uses
terms which even remotely would be reminiscent of either the Platonic
or the Aristotelian perception. Time is constantly regarded as a kind
of extension (diãsthma).
He speaks of ‘this temporal extension’ (tÚ xronikÒn toËto diãsthma)117
and ‘the temporal extension itself ’ (aÈtÒ d¢ tÚ xronikÒn diãsthma).118
Likewise, (quoting and explaining the parable in Matt. 20, 1–16)
there is reference to ‘extensions (diastÆmata) between the third the
sixth and the ninth hour’, as well as the ‘extension’ (diãsthma) from
the time of Moses until the time of Jesus Christ.119 In the same work,
he reflects on the deeper meaning of the scriptural ‘three equal exten-
sions (tr¤a ‡sa diastÆmata) [between] the third and sixth and ninth
hour’; also, of the ‘smaller extension’ (¶latton diãsthma) between the
eleventh and twelfth hour; and of the ‘extension (diãsthma) from the
dawn until the third hour’.120 Accordingly, the ‘extension of one day’
(miçw ≤m°raw diastÆmatow) is compared to the duration of ‘an entire
aeon’ (tÚn ˜lon afi«na).121 In reference to this, he reflects on scrip-
tural temporal terms considering them as possibly alluding to actual
‘temporal extensions’ (xronik«n diasthmãtvn).122 It is apparently on
account of time regarded as extension, that human life is stated as
a kind of ‘road’ (ıdÒw): ‘this life is a road which is walked by all men’
(ıdÒw går ı b¤ow, ÍpÒ pãntvn ényr≈pvn parodeuÒmenow).123 In the
same vein, there is reference to ‘length of time’ (m∞kow xrÒnou).124
In compliance with this conception of time as extension, human
action in time is regarded as a mode of walking. There is a com-
ment about those who ‘did not walk the way they ought to, nor did
they carry out the works they ought to’ (oÎte går ¥n ¶dei pore¤an

117
frMatt, 487.
118
Ibid. At this particular point, Origen uses the term ‘extension’ to denote not
a period of time, but a certain moment of it, namely the expected second advent
of Christ, according to Matt. 25, 31; it is also significant that, in this passage, he
refers to events as occurring in time (tå §n aÈt“).
119
commMatt, 15, 34.
120
commMatt, 15, 28.
121
deOr, XXVII, 13.
122
deOr, XXVII, 14.
123
frMatt, 102 II; italics mine.
124
selPs, 22, PG 12.1264; italics mine; the same expression in selJob, PG 17.61.
208 chapter six

periepãthsen oÎte ëw §xr∞n prãjeiw §pet°lesen) and speaks of the

walking towards the realization of ‘virtue’ (d°on ıdeËsai §p¤ tÚ p°peiron
ka‹ gluke›an poi∞sai tØn t∞w éret∞w stafulÆn).125 Also he states that
‘he who begins with the words of Jesus Christ when he is at pre-
liminary stage of exercise, still walks along the tough road, which to
the beginners seems to be steep, and violently captures the kingdom
of heavens which can stand violence’ (èrpãzei b¤& tØn basile¤an t«n
oÈran«n, b¤an Ípom°nousan).126 In commJohn, the eschatological per-
ception of acting in time is portrayed through the expression ‘the
road which leads above all heavens’ (tØn f°rousan ıdÒn §p¤ tå Íperãnv
pãntvn t«n oÈran«n).127 In the same work, he ponders upon the
different imports128 of the term érxÆ, in order to afford an exegesis
to the passage of John 1, 1 ‘In the beginning was the Logos’ (ÑEn
érxª ∑n ı LÒgow).129 When the analysis comes to the meaning of
érxÆ as beginning, this is regarded neither as a beginning of move-
ment (of a Platonic moving image of eternity), nor as a beginning (of
any Aristotelian number). Quite remarkably, the temporal signification
of it is pointed up through the statement that érxÆ denotes ‘some-
thing like the beginning of a road’:
One meaning refers to change and this pertains, as it were, to a road
and length which is declared by the Scripture: ‘The beginning of a
good road is to do justice’.130 For since a ‘good road’ is most great,
it should be understood that praxis, which is presented by the phrase
‘to do justice’, relates to the initial matters, and contemplation [relates]
to those that follow. I think its termination and goal is in the so-called
restoration because there is no one enemy left at that time, if indeed
the statement holds true, ‘For he must reign until he has put all his
enemies under his feet. And the last enemy to be destroyed is death.’131
For at that time those who have come to God because of the Logos
which is is with him132 will have contemplation of God as their exclu-
sive activity, that, having been accurately formed133 in the knowledge
of the Father, they may all thus become a son, since now the Son

125
commMatt, 17, 24.
126
frMatt, 227.
127
commJohn, 19, XX.
128
commJohn, 1, XVI
129
commJohn, 1, XVI.
130
Prov. 16, 7.
131
1 Cor. 15, 25.
132
Cf. John 1, 1.
133
Cf. Gal. 4, 19.
 time proper 209

alone has known the Father. For if someone should diligently exam-
ine when it is that those shall know the Father to whom the Son who
has known the Father reveals him, and should see that the one who
sees now sees ‘through a glass, darkly’,134 not yet having known ‘as he
ought to know’;135 he would be right in saying that no one has known
the Father even if he be an apostle or prophet,136 but it will come to
pass whenever they become one as [the] Son and the Father are one.137
But if anyone should think that we have digressed by clarifying one
meaning of ‘beginning’ and making these remarks, we must show that
the digression was necessary and useful for that which is to be explained.
For if ‘beginning’ has to do with change and a road and length, and
‘The beginning of a good road is to do justice’138 it is possible to learn
that every good road has somehow ‘doing justice’ as a ‘beginning’,
and after the beginning, contemplation, and in what manner it has con-
templation.139
In this passage Origen provides his view of the temporal meaning
of érxÆ, as ‘beginning’. What is more, he alludes to the raison d’ être
of time itself, as he clearly implies that this temporal ‘road’ is the
way along which rational creatures will ‘walk’ striving towards salvation.
The employment of this figure of speech suggests time to be an
extension. In this respect, it is not accidental that time itself is likened
to a road or a length. Although the term to be explained at this
point is a temporal one (namely, beginning), the text is full of spatial
notions, by means of which time is figured as extension. The set of
these passages demonstrates that whenever Origen refers to time (or
alludes to it by means of pertinent expressions) he always intimates
it as a kind of extension. I say a kind of extension, because he is not
entirely content with the usage of the term extension (diãsthma)
alone; or, at least, he does not feel that mere employment of this
term can fully represent his perception of time. For although exten-
sion is indeed an essential definition of what time proper is, this in
no way can be regarded as an exhaustive account of the question.

134
1 Cor. 13, 12.
135
1 Cor. 8, 2.
136
Cf. Eph. 3, 5.
137
John 10, 30.
138
Prov. 16, 7.
139
commJohn, 1, XVI. Italics mine.
210 chapter six

The term sumparekte¤nesyai

The decisive innovation pioneered by Origen was the introduction

of the term sumparekte¤nesyai (to be stretched out alongside with)
in the nomenclature of time. This is a term pregnant with meaning
used whenever he points to time or wants to indicate a temporal
function. A passage in expProv reads as follows:
By the term aeon he means the period of human life, in like manner
that Paul says; ‘I will eat no meat in the aeon, so that I will not occa-
sion a temptation to my brother’;140 he called aeon that which is
stretched out alongside with the structure of his life (tÚ går sum-
parekteinÒmenon tª sustãsei t∞w zv∞w aÈtoË).141

Similar to this, he speaks of time as ‘measured alongside with’ (para-

metroÊmenow) everyone’s life.142 It should be noticed that he refers to
time through no noun at all; he just uses the participle sumparek-
teinÒmenon as an illustration of time itself.143 Everything pointing to
time is predicated by the term sumparekte¤nvn or sumparekteinÒmenow.
This is used in order to speak of either time itself, or of duration,
or even to denote a presence in time. In commMatt, here is how he
refers to the incapability of human nature to reach a perfect grasp
of God:
For we cannot hold a memory which could be enduring (diark∞) and
stretched out alongside with (sumparekteinom°nhn) the nature of objects
of contemplation (yevrhmãtvn), on account of the vast multitude of
them.144
What the term ‘stretched out alongside with’ suggests at this point
is a temporal apprehension, which would be extended throughout
the period of a lifetime; an apprehension which would have duration.
This is why, in the foregoing passage, the terms ‘enduring’ (diark∞)

140
1 Cor. 8, 13.
141
expProv, 10. Cf. a definition of afi≈n by Aristotle: tÚ t°low tÚ peri°xon tÚn t∞w
•kãstou zv∞w xrÒnon . . . afi≈n •kãstou k°klhtai; De Caelo 279a25.
142
selPs, 60, PG 12.1484.
143
The Greek term for “noun” is oÈsiastikÒn, which means a name for the
oÈs¤a (essence) of a person or thing. Origen does is not use any noun (oÈsiastikÒn),
that is, he does not give any outright indication of essence (oÈs¤a) of time proper
other than diãsthma.
144
commMatt, 12, 6. He refers to the ‘objects of contemplation’ (yevrÆmata) of
wisdom.
 time proper 211

and ‘stretched out alongside with’ (sumparekteinom°nhn) are inter-

changeable.
Even the temporal presence itself is indicated through the same
term sumparekte¤nesyai. In commJohn, he expounds his opinion that
the Logos of God is present in both the divine timelessness and the
temporal world. This presence of the Logos in time is denoted by
the term sumparekte¤nesyai. It is stated that Christ “is so powerful
as to be invisible by virtue of his divine nature, to be present each
individual man and to be also stretched out alongside with the whole
world (pant¤ d¢ ka‹ ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ sumparekteinÒmenow); this is what
is declared by the ‘He has stood in the midst of you’.”145 The same
predicate is used in another case as well:
And when it is said to him [sc. to the Son of God] the word ‘You
are my Son, I have begotten you today’,146 to him ‘today’ is always
(ée¤); for to God there is no evening and I think that there is no morn-
ing either; but the time, so to speak (·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv), which is stretched
out alongside with (ı sumparekte¤nvn) his unbegotten and timeless
(éÛd¤ƒ) life, this is the day called today, on which the Son has been
begotten; for there can be neither beginning nor any day of his birth.147
It is plain that this passage introduces no notion of time in God.
Not only because here the timelessness of the divine life is again
stressed; but also because the word time is used in a consciously loose
sense—hence, the expression ‘so to speak’ (·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv). The task
facing Origen at this point is to provide an exegesis of the term
‘today’ as found in the foregoing portion of the Psalms. What he
does then is to interpret this ‘today’ in a way consonant with his
fundamental view of the atemporality of God. The task is hard
indeed; yet he copes with it in a twofold way: first, he once more
explicates the timeless character of the divine life; secondly, he con-
siders ‘today’ as the timeless state of the divine life, in the same
sense that he has done it in the passage from his Homilies on
Jeremiah. His intention being to emphasize the unique ontological
relation between the Father and the Son, he elaborates on this in
a telling portion of his Homilies on Luke:148 although there may be

145
John 1, 26. commJohn, 6, XXX.
146
Ps. 2, 7, quoted in Luke 3, 22; Cf. Heb. 1, 5–7. Origen comments on this
also in Homilies on Luke, 31.4.
147
commJohn, 1, XXIX.
148
Homilies on Luke, 31.4.
212 chapter six

many saints who are called ‘sons’ by adoption, the Logos is called
“’his own Son’, in order to point to him who alone is begotten by
an ineffable generation from God himself ”.149 In view of this, the
‘day’ of the Psalm is by no means a temporal notion: this is simply
an analogy:
And you should see that as day we can consider the whole of the pre-
sent aeon, which is long with respect to us, but it is short and con-
sisting just of a few years with respect to the life of God and of Christ
and of the Holy Spirit.150
It is noteworthy that here human time is compared with divine life,
not with any divine time whatsoever. In the same vein, the term is
used in order to denote what exists in time. In interpreting the pas-
sage of Paul ‘according to the riches of his grace wherein he hath
abounded toward us in all wisdom and prudence’,151 he comments
as follows:
And thus the whole richness of the grace of God, which was abounded
to the saints, has from a certain beginning to be ‘nourished’ and
‘increaseth’152 and is multiplied in such a way that either one has these
aforesaid gifts stretched out alongside according to his merits or he
lacks them inasmuch as he fails to do what he has to do.153
This passage is of special significance, since Origen alludes to his
conception of the state before the Fall, as well as to the beginning
of time. It is remarkable that the expression ‘from a certain begin-
ning’ (épÒ tinow érx∞w) contains the term érxÆ in a twofold sense:
it indicates the Wisdom from whom those who deserve her are
‘nourished’;154 it also indicates the fact that the Fall marks the begin-
ning of time and it is from that beginning onwards that the grace
of God is ‘stretched out alongside with’ the world in order to help
it towards its restoration by its own free will.155 In this case, there-
fore, the term ‘stretched out alongside with’ signifies the bestowal of

149
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 7.9.3. s. ch. 4, pp. 138–40; 149.
150
commMatt, 15, 31.
151
Eph. 1, 7–8.
152
Col. 2, 19.
153
commEph, 239, 37–41.
154
In this case érxÆ, alludes to the wisdom itself and, therefore, it has a non-
temporal meaning.
155
At this point, the term érxÆ has obviously a temporal import, alluding to the
begining of time.
 time proper 213

God’s gifts upon creatures within time. More specifically, this alludes
to the notion that those gifts may be bestowed upon a rational crea-
ture for a period of time (and in that case this creature is said to
have those gifts ‘stretched out alongside with’ him), while at another
period of time those gifts are not there, on account of the rational
creature’s own merits.
Thus it is through the temporal implication of the term ‘stretched
out alongside with’ that Origen couches his notion of the non-per-
manent bestowal of the divine grace upon creatures and, subse-
quently, his view of time as a milieu where a dialectical relation
between God and creatures takes place.
The usage of the term sumparekte¤nesyai is a significant and mean-
ingful innovation. The initial Stoic view of extension is not abandoned.
In formulating the Christian concept, however, there is further
refinement and clarification of the pertinent terminology. The intro-
duction of this term constitutes a comprehensive and elaborate account
of what time proper is. What is more, it points to the relation of
time to space proper (which, at one point, is called ‘structure of this
world’). As a matter of fact, the term is used in order to point to a
presence in time: explaining the term of Paul ‘the aeon of this
world’156 it is stated that what would be understood by this expres-
sion is ‘time which is stretched out alongside with the structure of
this world from the beginning to the end’ (tÚn sumparekteinÒmenon
xrÒnon tª toÊtou toË kÒsmou épÉ érx∞w m°xri t°louw kataskeuª).157
So it is Origen himself who makes the intellectual distinction
between time proper and the ‘structure of this world’, in the same
way that he distinguishes between the time of Paul’s lifetime from
the ‘structure of his life’.158 What these distinctions actually suggest
is an abstraction figuring the ‘structure’ of the world (that is, space
proper), or the ‘structure of life’, conceived apart from time.
The significance of the introduction of this term can be better
demonstrated once sumparekte¤nesyai is scrutinized, in order to elicit
crucial notions that are inherent in this and are consciously denoted.
The verb did not exist in classical Greek.159 However Chrysippus

156
Eph. 2, 2.
157
commEph, p. 403.
158
expProv, 10.
159
In classical Greek there was the verb parekte¤nv.
214 chapter six

used the verb in a figurative manner, which probably was inspiring

to Origen: the Stoic philosopher refers to ‘the fired iron’ contrast-
ing this from the ‘fire’ itself which is ‘stretched out alongside with’
this iron.160 This distinction between fire and iron, although the fired
iron is one thing, must have played a role in Origen’s thought in
formulating the distinction between ‘time’ and the ‘structure of this
world’, namely between time proper and space.
During the Hellenistic period, the term was used in a variety of
senses. Among those who had used the term before Origen were
Galen (2nd century A.D.),161 Asclepiodorus Tacticus (1st century A.D.)
and Cleomedes (Mathematician, 2nd century A.D.). A characteristic
use of the term (in the sense of ‘co-extension’) is found in the work
De Musica of Aristides Quintilianus,162 who is estimated to have lived
only a few decades before Origen.
The meaning applied to sumparekte¤nesyai was ‘to have the same
extension with something else’. Of the Stoics, Marcus Aurelius had
used the term sumparekte¤nein,163 in the sense of ‘extending parallel
to’ and, therefore, ‘to contrast’ or ‘to compare’. The term was cer-
tainly used in the subsequent centuries and the Suda Lexicon (960
A.D.) included the lemma.
At all events, it was Origen who first employed the term in order
to couch a certain perception of time proper, as well as the relation
of time to space. I shall argue later that this concept itself, as well
as the pertinent terminology exerted a profound and decisive influence
upon the Christian writers of the later centuries: an influence not
acknowledged, not even suspected as yet. First though let us see what
is the conception of time denoted by the term sumparekte¤nesyai.
The verb is a compound one, consisting of the words sÊn-, parã,
§k-, and te¤nesyai. The first three are prepositions; the fourth is a
verb. What we have, therefore, is a verb predicated by three prepo-
sitions. The main body of the term is certainly the verb te¤nesyai,
which means ‘to be stretched’ or ‘to be spread’. The preposition §k

160
SVF, II, 177, 11. It is characteristic of how little importance was granted to
this term, that Johan von Arnim does not include this in his Index of the Stoic
terminology (the entire volume IV of SVF).
161
Galen (163 A.D.), Per¤ Xre¤aw Mor¤vn (De usu partium): sumparekteinÒmenon
˜lƒ t“ mÆkei t∞w rãxevw.
162
Aristides Quintilianus, De Musica, 2, 17.
163
Meditations, 7, 30: sumparekte¤nein tØn nÒhsin to›w legom°noiw.
 time proper 215

means ‘out’; thus, the verb §k-te¤nesyai means ‘to be stretched out’
or ‘to be extended’.
Up to this point the fundamental Stoic notion of time as exten-
sion is maintained. In fact, a Greek word for ‘extension’ (which is
¶ktasiw) is the noun derived from the verb §k-te¤nesyai. A further
step is to allow the preposition parã (side by side with, parallel to).
Zeno does not seem to make use of it, as we have seen. The prepo-
sition parã, however, is found in the wording of Chrysippus and
Apollodorus (par-akolouyoËn diãsthma). Origen discarded the term
parakolouyoËn on account of its implication that time ‘follows’, as
it were, space. Instead he maintained only the preposition parã,
which renders the verb par-ek-te¤nesyai meaning ‘to be stretched
out beside’. Finally, he upholds the preposition sÊn (with): thus he
intimates time to be an extension which ‘is stretched out beside’ and
yet with the ‘structure of the world’; which means that time is accom-
panying space, not following it.
The Stoics Chrysippus and Apollodorus had made an attempt to
adumbrate the relation of time to (what they called) the ‘world’
through the term parakolouyoËn diãsthma. The word parakolouyoËn,
however, means ‘that which accompanies following’. This term then
implies a notion of ‘coming behind, or after’. In this sense time is
regarded as ‘standing beside’ the ‘world’,164 yet ‘following’ it.
As a matter of fact, the Stoics seem to be uncertain as to whether
time was created ‘together with’ the ‘world’ (sÁn aÈt“), or ‘after it’
(metÉ aÈtÒn). Subsequently, they appear uncertain as to whether time
‘has been of the same age with the world’ (fisÆlika toË kÒsmou
gegon°nai), or it is ‘younger’ than the world (≥ ne≈teron §ke¤nou).165
On this uncertainty Philo follows the Stoics; the only thing he seems
to assert for sure is that time could not be ‘older’ than the world;
‘for it is unbefitting a philosopher to dare affirm’ this’.166 The Stoics
regard god as the creator of time; but they consider the world as
the ‘father’ of time.167

164
This is denoted by the preposition parã in the term par-akolouyoËn.
165
SVF, II, 165, 4–9. As we saw, this is a point on which Plotinus criticizes the
Stoics for their failure to define whether this parakoloÊyhma is ‘later or contem-
porary or earlier’ to motion. Enneads, III, 7.10.
166
De Opificio Mundi, I, 26–7: presbÊteron dÉ épofa¤nesyai tolmçn afilÒsofon.
167
SVF, II, 165, 10–12.
216 chapter six

The Stoic usage of the expression parakolouyoËn diãsthma, there-

fore, is an indication of this notion: time accompanies the world,
still it comes ‘after’, because it is realized out of the cosmic motion.
This tenet is actually a corollary of their definition, according to
which the extension-time lends itself to the cosmic motion, so that motion
can make sense and indeed take place at all. It is obvious though
that the Stoics never managed to hand down a precise account of
the relation between time proper and space.
By contrast, Origen couched his own view by introducing the term
sumparekteinÒmenow. He is very much alive to the fact that time does
not follow space. This point should be paid serious attention, since it
prevents the kind of criticism that Plutarch levelled against the Stoics.
Although there is reason to doubt whether Plutarch was absolutely
fair to the Stoics, he still observes that they define time as an attribute
resulting from motion, a consequence of motion. Be that as it may,
Origen is beyond the range of such criticism since he discarded the
term parakolouyoËn altogether.
There is a contradistinction which should be made at this point:
Plotinus, too, held the notion that time ‘runs together with life and
keeps pace in its course’ (√ sunye› ka‹ suntr°xei).168 In his mytho-
logical portrayal of the beginning of temporality, he speaks of “a
restlessly active nature, which wanted to control itself and be on its
own, and chose to seek for more than its present state, this moved,
and time moved with it.”169 In the Greek text the term ‘with’ is not
actually used. It is nevertheless stated that “once this nature moved,
time moved, too” (§kinÆyh m¢n aÈtÆ, §kinÆyh d¢ ka‹ aÈtÒw). Hence
the notion of accompanying is positively implied.
The difference lies in this: the Neoplatonic conception of time
moving with the world maintains the essential dynamic notion—time
itself moves. In Plato this is a moving image, indeed time is described
as travelling: he refers to something (the One) travelling with time
from the past via the now to the future, which suggests that the now
stands still and is overtaken.170 In the same vein, in Plotinus time

168
Enneads, III.7.13.
169
Enneads, III.7.11.
170
Plato, Parmenides 152A3. However, in the same work (152B4–D4) the now is
described as always present to the One, which implies that the now travels along
with the One. In any case, the dynamic notion is present in the Platonic concep-
tion of time.
 time proper 217

runs. His entire perception of time is also a dynamic one: time proper
originates in the motion of the Soul. By contrast, Origen does not
uphold such a notion at all. On no account does the term with
(inherent in the term sumparekte¤nvn) suggest any movement of time
proper, from which the notion of motion is consistently withheld.
The definition of time as being in essence diãsthma sumparek-
teinÒmenon is what establishes this radical difference from both the
Platonic and the Neoplatonic dynamic conception of time.
This is the structure of Origen’s term sumparekte¤nesyai for time.
Let us then see the implications of his steps. Although he took up
the Stoic perception of time as diãsthma, the term sumparekte¤nesyai
is derived from a completely different root, that is, the verb te¤nesyai.
I assume that he did so because he wished to obviate somehow the
primarily spatial notion implied by the term diãsthma. For he knows
perfectly well (as undoubtedly the Stoics did, too) that this extension
is not a spatial one: the term itself is but a metaphor, a figure of
speech. Since, then this is not of a spatial nature, what is the rela-
tion of this extension to space proper?
The Stoics undoubtedly were conscious of the fact that time is
something different from space;171 they also certainly knew that this
extension has no spatial purport. However, they did not manage to
invent a terminology expressing this awareness tellingly. This is the
point on which Plotinus focused his criticism against them. Zeno
(assuming that the extant fragments do justice to him) seems to have
thought that it is enough to take as obvious that the term extension
is just a simile. Chrysippus and Apollodorus simply added the par-
ticiple parakolouyoËn (being beside and following). This, however,
is not a very substantial contribution towards eliminating the ambi-
guity. For it confuses rather than elucidates the relation of time
proper to space.
It is not accidental that the meticulous Origen discards the term
parakolouyoËn altogether. What he does instead, is to opt for the
simultaneous usage of the prepositions sÊn (with) and parã (beside).
Thus time is illustrated as a kind of extension, which is stretched
out ‘alongside with’ space, being ‘beside’ it. Time is something different

171
As discussed already, it was a problem for the Stoics whether time should be
considered as a body or not, subsequently, whether it should be regarded as a
‘being’ or not.
218 chapter six

from space and yet it is stretched out alongside together with it. There
is no notion of ‘following’ one another: they are just associated and
linked ‘together’. This is how he resolved the ambiguities inherent
in the Stoic definitions.
I have already suggested that mere usage of the term diãsthma
alone is not sufficient in order to ground the assumption of Stoic
resonance. For there is an essential presupposition for the term
diãsthma to be regarded as an element of Stoic provenance: it should
be definite that this indicates the ontological perception of time
proper. Only then could one speak of a certain propinquity with
Stoicism. It is reasonable to assume that Origen adopted the fun-
damental Stoic conception of time proper as appropriate, in the first
place, to his own perception of it. In Stoic philosophy he found the
essential perception of what time proper is. He employed this as con-
cordant with the principal doctrines of his theology. But the fact that
the Stoic definition of time proper constitutes a springboard for him
can be substantiated and illuminated only by the further develop-
ments which he himself devised.
That Origen’s time as diãsthma is in fact the Stoic ontological
conception of time is demonstrated by the term sumparekte¤nvn. If
he used only the term diãsthma, this would be an indication, yet not
concrete evidence that he was regarding the Stoic conception as befitting
his own view of it. This is why I have refrained from endorsing
M. Spanneut’s opinion172 that the usage of the term diãsthma by
Athenagoras constitutes an outright Stoic influence.
With regard to Origen the indication becomes evidence once his
term sumparekte¤nesyai is thoroughly studied. This is what really
buttresses up the assertion that time proper is in essence perceived
as extension. For the term ‘stretched out alongside with’ (tÚ sum-
parekteinÒmenon)173 bears upon his conception of time, as well as its
relation to space. This is the reason why the study of this term is
an indispensable complement for the point of a certain relation
between Origen and the Stoics on the ontological conception of time
proper to be made. In fact though the elicitation of the implications
inherent in the term sumparekte¤nesyai does not stop here. For a con-
sidered view emerges out of further study: the term sumparekte¤neinvn

172
M. Spanneut, op. cit., 356.
173
expProv, 10; commJohn, 1, XXIX; commEph, fr. IX.
 time proper 219

itself, on the one hand, and certain other portions of his work, on
the other, indicate that time is held to be a dimension of the world.

Time is a dimension

It should be pointed out that in Greek the terms diãsthma (exten-

sion) and diãstasiw (dimension) have the same root; also, their mean-
ing has an inner connection: diãstasiw (dimension) is definitely a
ideational diãsthma (extension) alongside which life is moving on.
Besides, the notion of diãstasiw is inherent in the term sumparekte¤nvn,
as I point out presently in relation with certain considerations of
J. Callahan.
It is significant that Origen points to the divine life through the
term édiãstatow (dimensionless). This life is held to be the pre-
eminent one, a state which is called ‘perpetual life’ (éeizv˝aw).174 The
same term is used at another point, in order to indicate the divine
life as the final goal of all creation. This is described as ‘calm and
dimensionless life’ (étarãxou ka‹ édiastãtou zv∞w).175 Thus the con-
trast between the atemporal divine life and the temporal world is
pointed out through the term édiãstatow. This is a point which
deserves to be perused. I have already shown that the radical tran-
scendence of God to the world is portrayed in terms of space and
time. The life of creation is contrasted with the divine life on account
of the fact that the latter is spaceless and timeless. When, therefore,
the divine life is portrayed as dimensionless, obviously this implies
the absence of space and time.
Considering time as a dimension is the point where Origen’s onto-
logical definition of time as diãsthma (extension) and the notion of
diãstasiw (dimension) converge. For one thing, the two terms are
related to each other on the grounds of philology and etymology.

174
expProv, 16, PG 17.196; Cf. the same term in op. cit., 2, PG 17.168.
175
expProv, 2, PG 17.168. The term édiãstatow meaning without extension or dimen-
sion is used in Plutarchus, Moralia (ed. G.N. Bernandakis, 7 vols., Leipsig 1888–1896);
vol. 2, p. 601c; Plotinus, Enneads, I.5.7.; and Alexander of Aphrodisias in Aristotelis
Tropicorum libros octo commentaria, 31.18. (ed. M. Wallies, Commentaria in Aristotelis Graeca
iii, pars i. Berlin, 1891). As regards Christian writers, édiãstatow meaning without
extension or without dimension is found in Gregory’s of Nyssa adversus Eunomium, 8 (PG
45.796), 9 (PG 45.813ff; 804).
220 chapter six

For another, it is he himself who correlates them in order to express

a substantial facet of his conception of time.
The term édiãstatow was very favorite to Philo who uses this no
less than forty-nine times in his existing corpus. He uses this explic-
itly in relation to the concept of ‘dimension’,176 more usually in the
sense of ‘continuous’ and ‘stable’,177 and more specifically the con-
tinuous and stable condition ‘near God’,178 or even of the constancy
of things applying to God.179 In a telling passage,180 Philo directly
associates the notion of édiãstatow to its root-sense of ‘that which
has no dimension’. In this context, he distinguishes what is ‘dimen-
sionless nature’ (édiãstatow fÊsiw) from what is described and found
only ‘in terms of dimensions’ (diasthmatikÆ fÊsiw).
Time as dimension is then a point well worth-reflecting upon, in
order to ponder on the inner import attributed to the notion as well
as the effects flowing from it. Like the term diãsthma (extension),
the term diãstasiw (dimension) applied to time is not an invention
of Origen’s. While the former has a special position in the Stoic phi-
losophy of time, the latter is used by Plotinus in his treatment of
time. The term édiãstatow can be found at a good many points of
the Enneads, particularly in the section where the question of time
and eternity is canvassed.181 The word diãstasiw (dimension) was used
in the Neoplatonic treatment of time, too:182 time is a ‘dimension of
life’ (diãstasiw zv∞w),183 whereas ‘eternity’ (afi≈n) is ‘dimensionless’
(édiãstaton) and ‘non temporal’ (oÈ xronikÒn).184

176
De Decalogo, 26.
177
De opificio mundi, 153; Legum allegoriarum libri i–iii, 3, 92; Quod deterius potiori
insidiari soleat, 118; De posteritate Caini, 12; De plantatione, 53; De sobrietate, 29; De migra-
tione Abrahami, 33; Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, 16 and 200; De congressu eruditionis gra-
tia, 134; De mutatione nominum, 86; De Abrahamo, 138 and 154; De Josepho, 147; De
vita Mosis (lib. i–ii), 1, 123; 2, 55; 2, 184; De specialibus legibus (lib. i–iv), 1, 169; 1,
285; 1, 338; 2, 20; 2, 42; 2, 56; 2, 211; 2, 220; 4, 161; De virtutibus, 6 and 52; De
praemiis et poenis De exsecrationibus, 72, 102 and 105; De aeternitate mundi, 62 and 75;
De providentia, Fragment 2, 13; Quaestiones in Genesim ( fragmenta), 4, fragment 169.
178
De plantatione, 53; De migratione Abrahami, 56.
179
De confusione linguarum, 115; Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, 76; De congressu erudi-
tionis gratia, 4; De somniis (lib. i–ii), 1, 147.
180
De decalogo, 24.
181
In reference to time and eternity, the term édiãstatow can be found at the
following points of the Enneads: III, 7–13; III.7.3; III.7.6; III.7.11; III.7.13. Also, for
édiãstatow eternity in Plotinus, s. III.7.2 (31), III.7.3 (15&38), III.7.11 (54).
182
Enneads, III.7.8.
183
Enneads, III.7.11.
184
Enneads, I.5.7.
 time proper 221

On no account, however, does this suggest that Origen’s views

are in any way related to Neoplatonism. For one thing, he was
twenty years older than Plotinus; he wrote his commentaries on the
Proverbs (where the notion of dimension is found) probably around
238 A.D.185 Taking into account that the Enneads were composed
when Plotinus was rather aged, it follows that when Origen made
these assertions the Enneads had not been written yet. Besides, accord-
ing to Plotinus, time was not created as a being out of non-being,
but it followed down a ‘restlessly active nature’ which was in ‘that
quiet life’186 and so this ‘nature’ ‘moved and time moved with it’.187
Hence, time was existing ‘before’ time, as it were, and it ‘was at
rest with the eternity in real being’188 and ‘although it was not yet
time’, ‘it kept quiet too’.189 Time was made ‘according to the pat-
tern of eternity, and as its moving image’.190
Origen’s view of time is in essence radically different from the
Platonic one as regards this crucial point: to Plato, time is a mov-
ing image of eternity. The very term image connotes that time was
established in the world by the Demiurge so that a certain affinity
exists between this world and the world of Ideas. Time, as an image,
is the element by means of which an affiliation and resemblance is
established between Here and Beyond.
By contrast, Origen’s view is sheerly contrary: it is exactly in terms
of space and time that the radical schism between the transcendent
God and the world is portrayed. Time does not establish any affinity
between the divine life and the world. On the contrary, it is exactly
in terms of time that the radical hiatus between God and the world is
portrayed.
There is more: whereas to Plotinus time is life (of the Soul),191 to
Origen it is but a natural element, namely, an element in the make-
up of the world. So, although Origen’s life overlapped with that of
Plotinus’, he is far away from Neoplatonism on this point. At most

185
Cf. Marguerite Harl, Origène et la fonction revelatrice du Verbe Incarné, Paris, 1958,
p. 71.
186
Enneads, III.7.10.
187
Enneads, III.7.11.
188
Enneads, III.7.11.
189
Enneads, III.7.11.
190
Enneads, III.7.13; also, III.7.11.
191
Enneads, III.7.11.
222 chapter six

it could be said that he found it convenient to make use of a term

which was very dear to Philo.192
The Stoics did not regard time as a dimension of life. In confor-
mity to their materialism, they by and large considered the natural
character of the cosmic motion. Besides, they did not hold any escha-
tological ideas. To them time was not related to any transcendent
reality whatsoever; what is more, it was not assigned any theologi-
cal significance or purport.
Plotinus, on the other hand, treats the Stoic definition of time as
‘extension’ with contempt. He grounds his criticism on the lack of
elaboration of the Stoic definition and on what he sees as absence
of sound reason in their account. My view though is that the argu-
mentative mood of Plotinus stems from a deeper motive: that is, his
disdain for materialism and, even more so, the fact that the Stoics
determine time only in relation to the visible material world. On the
face of it, Plotinus seems to challenge the Stoic tenet about what is
real. I think, however, that what he really challenges is the Stoic
materialism and the lack of any notion of transcendence. In effect he
attacks the absence of a theology acceptable to him; he also repu-
diates the Stoic insistence on essentially linking the notion of real
with what is a body. The censure stems from a point of root incom-
patibility between Stoicism and Plotinus. To the former, it is only
in the most attenuated sense that incorporeality is granted reality.
To Plotinus, on the other hand, matter has so little hold on reality
that material things do not deserve a distinct slot of their own in
his scheme of being.
Origen is far from this kind of dispute: he held both a notion of
materiality (of the entire world) and a notion of (the divine) transcen-
dence. He is not dismissive or scornful of either corporeality or incor-
poreality, nor does he impeach the reality of either of them. They
are both fully real, if pertaining to different ranks of being. Thus he
can make use of the Stoic diãsthma, as well as of the Neoplatonic
diãstasiw and édiãstatow, and yet attribute time an import befitting
exclusively his own thought.

192
Cf. De aeternitate mundi, 75, At that point Philo says that “according to the best
professors of natural philosophy, fate has no beginning or end, being a chain con-
necting the causes of each event in unfailing continuity without a gap or break
(édiastãtvw)”.
 time proper 223

The distinction between time and the ‘construction of this world’,

or the ‘structure of life’, made in the commEph, Fr. IX and exProv,10,
implies the intellectual distinction between space and time. It is
through the establishment of time as a part of the make-up of the
world that ‘change’ and ‘alteration’ make sense. Thus a rational
nature is ‘changeable and convertible by the very condition of its
being created—for what was not and began to be is by this very
fact shown to be of a changeable nature’.193 Also, ‘rational nature is
changeable and convertible’,194 and it was ‘necessary for God to make
a bodily nature, capable of changing at the Creator’s will, by an
alteration of qualities, into everything that circumstances might
require’.195 What is called ‘structure’ of the world provides the set-
ting for the drama of the world (that is, the drama of God’s rela-
tionship with rational creatures) to take place; the ‘structure’, therefore,
provides the place. It is through time that action and movement (and
thus, change and alteration) can make sense and be realized. Time
then is a ‘dimension of life’ for creaturely freedom to make sense
and to be realized. For it is obvious that hardly could creaturely
freedom make sense in atemporality. Time, as a diãsthma (exten-
sion), is the diãstasiw (dimension) alongside which world moves
towards the end.
The concept of édiãstatow (dimensionless)196 applied to the divine
life indicates this life to be totally beyond time, since God himself
is beyond change or alteration; certainly it is not accidental that the
term ‘dimensionless’ is associated with the term ‘calm’ in reference
to the state of the divine reality.197 Everything in the divine life is
unchanged since it is perfect. This is why, at another point, the word
édiãstatow is used to indicate what is certain, positive and not sub-
ject to change.198

193
Princ, IV.4.8.
194
Princ, IV.4.8.
195
Princ, IV.4.8.
196
expProv, 2, PG 17.168.
197
Gregory of Nyssa faithfully follows Origen in the distinction between spatio-
temporal reality which is ‘contained within dimensions’ as opposed to the ‘dimen-
sionless’ divine reality: t∞w svmatik∞w ka‹ diasthmatik∞w fÊsevw . . . as opposed
to . . . ≤ noerã te ka‹ édiãstatow fÊsiw; De anima et resurrectione, PG 46.48; similarly
in De hominis opificio, 23.3; PG 44.212. This Gregory’s adherence to Origen’s ter-
minology is particularly striking in Contra Eunomium, 12; PG 45.933; ibid. 1064.
198
homLuc, 1.
224 chapter six

Origen considers time as a ‘dimension’ of the world and intro-

duces the term ‘stretched out alongside with’ (sumparekteinÒmenow)
in order to portray the very relation of this dimension to what, by
abstraction, he calls ‘structure of this world’ (alluding to space proper,
as a constitutive element of the world). In doing so, he actually seems
to have an inner grasp of what only in the twentieth century was
conceived as space-time. I cannot know to what extent he was con-
scious and had a clear conception of this reality; still, even if he had
such a conception, he would have never expounded that in a sep-
arate treatise. For he emphasizes that his purpose is to enunciate
theological views, not assertions on questions concerning nature
(fusiologe›n).199 Whether nevertheless, he had a clear conscious con-
ception of the reality of space-time or not, I can say that he had
an intuition of that.200
Beside this, nevertheless, he holds the psychological and phenom-
enological division of time in past, present and future: he refers to
Ezek. 16, 30 (‘and you have three times committed fornication’) and
comments as follows: “for the three times (ofl tre›w xrÒnoi) comprise
the whole aeon”,201 while at another point he refers to “the former
and the present and the future things”.202
In commJohn (canvassing the significance of tenses) he refers to exis-
tence in relation to the parts of time, namely to past, present and
future: the future refers to what ‘will exist’ (tÚ m°llon Ípãrjai).203 It
is also quite indicative of his conception of time204 that he refers to
the ‘kingdom of God’ as a ‘contemplation’ of the past aeons as ‘aeons
made’ (genom°nvn afi≈nvn), while the future time is stated as ‘aeons
which will be made’ (genhsom°nvn afi≈nvn). The meaning of this
‘contemplation’ has a different character in relation either to the past
or to the future: referring to the past (which is already ‘made’)
this contemplation means ‘memories’ (mnÆmaw) of the past aeons.205
In the case of future, this should be understood as a kind of fore-
knowledge or anticipation. Thus time is treated not only in terms

199
Cels, IV, 60.
200
Origen expressed this inner feeling of ‘space-time’ by the term ‘aeon’. Cf.
selPs, 5.
201
selEz, 16, PG 13.813.
202
expProv, 18.
203
frJohn, I.
204
selPs, 144; Cf. selPs, 9, 15, and 131; s. PG 12:1196, 1213, 1673.
205
selPs, 76, PG 12.1540.
 time proper 225

of an objective reality related to the world, but also is conceived

psychologically.
In the light of this analysis, I can now come to a point which
seems to have been puzzling so far. My point is that it can now be
conclusively established that it was Origen who was actually the
source of Augustine’s theory of time.
J. Callahan wrote a work206 arguing that it was Basil of Caesarea
who is the source of Augustine’s theory of time. Callahan’s asser-
tions are incorrect only to the extent that he takes Basil’s statements
about time to be original. These, however, are Origen’s own expres-
sions repeated verbatim. Perhaps things would have been clearer if
the Cappadocians had explicated that their affirmations could not
claim originality since they were mere repetitions of Origen’s per-
ceptions. John Callahan wrote his work in 1958. As late as 1983,
R. Sorabji207 refers to Callahan’s views and (although he has some
doubts referring to the alleged influence of Gregory of Nyssa upon
Augustine) he cannot himself solve what he regards as a ‘mystery’.
He suggests Aristotelians as a possible source of influence upon
Augustine,208 but he states209 that he is deterred from drawing con-
clusions because of Augustine’s slowness in acquiring Greek, the
language in which Basil and Gregory wrote.
Arguing that Basil is the source of Augustine’s theory of time,
Callahan also speaks of a ‘puzzle’,210 since there is no evidence that
Basil’s refutation of Eunomius (the work in which Basil’s views of
time are found, and adduced by Callahan as evidence) was ever
translated into Latin, in whole or in part. He also refers to the cur-
rent opinions about Augustine’s limited knowledge of Greek, espe-
cially at the relatively early age when he wrote the Confessions.
According to these opinions, Augustine would not have been able
to read Basil’s Greek with the facility that the adaptation of Basil’s
ideas in this chapter of the Confessions would seem to require.211 This
raises insuperable difficulties to Callahan: he cannot explain how

206
J. Callahan, “Basil of Caesarea: A new source of St. Augustine’s theory of
time”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 63 (1958), pp. 437–54.
207
R. Sorabji, op. cit., pp. 94–95.
208
Op. cit., p. 248.
209
Op. cit., p. 290, n. 14.
210
Op. cit., p. 438.
211
For what he regards as a ‘difficult question’ he cites the work by H.I. Marroù,
Saint Augustin et la fin da la culture antique, Paris, 1949, pp. 27–46, 631–637.
226 chapter six

Augustine could have ever come in contact with Basil’s writings. He

acknowledges that he cannot substantiate how Basil might have
influenced Augustine. Finally, he says that he cannot attempt any
solution to this question212 and all he concludes at the end of his
work is that Basil influenced Augustine ‘through some contact that
cannot at present be determined’.213
I think I can now offer a definitive and substantiated answer to
what has for a long time been regarded as a ‘difficult question’
(Marroù, 1949), ‘puzzle’ (Callahan, 1958) and ‘mystery’ (Sorabji,
1983). This answer can be provided out of the discussion thus far.
There is no need to search for some ‘contact that cannot at present
be determined’ between Basil and Augustine. For it was Origen who
directly influenced the latter. How Augustine came in contact with
Origen’s writings is no mystery. At his time, Origen’s works had
been translated into Latin: during Augustine’s lifetime (354–430)
Jerome translated a large part of Origen’s Homilies on the Song of Songs
(c. 380) eight homilies on Isaiah, fourteen homilies on Jeremiah, thirty
nine homilies on Luke, and Rufinus translated the Commentary on the
Song of Songs (c. 400), the De Principiis, homilies on Psalms, Genesis,
Exodus, Leviticus, Joshua, Judges, and, above all, the Commentary on the
Epistle to the Romans and other works of Origen. It is also plausible
that views of the Alexandrian might have been retailed to Augustine,
since the former was highly reputed. In any event, Augustine seems
to be aware of Origen’s views, since, in relation to other matters,
he refers to him by name.214
The passage of Basil which Callahan purports to have influenced
Augustine is from adversus Eunomium, I, 21. In that section, Basil states
that time is not the movement itself of heavenly bodies (as Eunomius
alleged) but it is “the extension which is stretched out alongside with
the constitution of the world” (xrÒnow d¢ §st¤ tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon
tª sustãsei toË kÒsmou diãsthma).215

212
Op. cit., p. 440.
213
Op. cit., p. 450.
214
De haeresibus, XLIII. The points made in this section, which show the extent
to which Augustine was indebted to Origen eluded B. Altaner in “Augustinus und
Origenes”, Historisches Jahrbuch, 1950, pp. 15–41.
215
adversus Eunomium, I, 21. xrÒnow d¢ est¤ tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon tª sustãsei
toË kÒsmou diãsthma, ⁄ pçsa parametre›tai k¤nhsiw, e‡te ést°rvn e‡te z≈vn e‡te
otinosoËn t«n kinoum°nvn, kayÒ l°gomen taxÊteron ≥ bradÊteron ßteron •t°rou:
taxÊteron m¢n tÚ §n §llãtoni xrÒnƒ ple›on diãsthma metaba›non: bradÊteron d¢
 time proper 227

There is no term or expression in this definition of Basil’s which

had not already been enunciated by Origen. He repeats this definition
not only in spirit, but also in letter. As a matter of fact, he utilizes
Origen’s expressions themselves.216 That Basil did not explicate the
fact that his statements are but mere repetitions of views and expres-
sions of his master is a historic and serious omission.
At the same point of this work, Basil argues that the movement
of stars does not indicate ‘what’ time is but ‘how much’ time is.217
In a column beside this section of adversus Eunomium, Callahan quotes
a passage from Augustine’s Confessions (X,23ff ). When he comes to
compare the two passages he asserts that thanks to the definition of
time as extension ‘stretched out alongside with’ (sumparekteinÒmenon
diãsthma) Augustine was able to aver that time is a distentio, as well
as that time is something distinct from the movement of heavenly
bodies.218 It is true that the very term sumparekte¤nvn suggests the
notion of ‘dimension’, both essentially and etymologically. In addi-
tion, nevertheless, Origen used the term diãstasiw, as already shown.
Hence Augustine did not have to think much on this, or to make
any inferences or discoveries. Origen had already potrayed the fun-
damental perceptions clearly and had introduced the appropriate
terminology.
I endorse Callahan’s position that, when Augustine introduces the
term distentio speaking of time, what he has in mind is the expres-
sion sumparekteinÒmenon tª sustãsei toË kÒsmou.219 As a matter of
fact, an oblique reference to time as dimension is inherent in the
expression sumparekteinÒmenon diãsthma itself. This is part of the
reason why this crucial term should be assigned the importance that
it really deserves.
However, I do not endorse Callahan’s assumption that this par-
ticular point, too, constitutes an influence of Basil upon Augustine.

§n ple¤oni xrÒnƒ kinoÊmenon. ı d¢ §peidÆ §n xrÒnƒ ofl ést°rew kinoËntai, xrÒnou

aÈtoÁw e‰nai dhmiourgoÊw épofa¤netai.
216
For the term diãsthma, s. Origen’s Fragmenta in Matthaeum, 487 (twice); Commentary
on Matthew, 15, 34; 15, 28; De Oratione, XXVII, 13; Time as ‘stretched out along-
side the constitution of the world’ is stated in the Commentary on the Epistle to the
Ephesians, Fr. IX.
217
oÈ går poiãn, êllÉ e‡per êra, posÆn mçllon ∑ efipe›n ofikeiÒteron. éllã t‹w
oÏtv pa›w pantel«w tØn diãnoian Àste égnoe›n ˜ti ≤m°rai m¢n ka‹ œrai ka‹ m∞new
ka‹ eniauto¤ m°tra toË xrÒnou efis¤n, oÈx¤ m°rh; ibid.
218
J. Callahan, op. cit., p. 444.
219
J. Callahan, op. cit., pp. 447, 450.
228 chapter six

For this is a notion of Origen’s found (both in letter and in spirit

alike) in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians (Fr. IX), as well
as in the Exposita in Proverbia, 10. This is what eluded Callahan and
all the other scholars, who spoke about ‘puzzle’ and ‘mystery’ in ref-
erence to the influence upon Augustine’s theory of time.
There is a line of usage of the crucial terms, which comes down
from Origen to John of Damascus. The technical vocabulary on time
which Origen introduced is easily traced in an continuous line of
theologians, from Origen himself down to John of Damascus. In this
chain, Augustine’s expression spatium temporis is in fact a translation
of Origen’s expression xronikÒn diãsthma, used, for instance (indeed
twice), in the Fragment 487 of the Commentary on Matthew.
There is a point though which Callahan could not suspect. It is
true that Origen’s (according to Callahan: Basil’s) perception of time
enabled Augustine to relate time to any motion. But is it coinciden-
tal that such a perception of time leads to this radical result? The
answer is no. For when Origen initiated his own view of time, he
held a concept of the world consisted of ranks of life. Time, as well
as motion, was perceived as existing in all of them. Thus he devised
a conception of time which can be related not just to the movement
of the heavenly bodies of the visible firmament, or even only to
movement of whatever is visible. Time is related even to motion of
worlds which are ‘not seen’ (that is, spaces other than this three-
dimensional visible one) still they are ‘material’. This is why this time
is related to any motion, not just to the movement of the visible heav-
enly bodies or of that of anything visible. For all the particular worlds
which comprise the entire (one and single) world are temporal, they
are moving and they are ‘material’, if made of a matter ‘not seen’.220
This is why time has to be related to any motion. This is a notion
closely related to the special purport that ‘world’ has.
Although Origen offered inspired statements about time as a dimen-
sion, he never composed an ad hoc treatise on the subject. The rea-
son is that works of this kind were always outside of his interest.

220
Modern science now takes for granted that the visible universe is made of
only 5% of the matter comprising the entire universe. The other 95% is ‘dark mat-
ter’ and ‘dark energy’, undetectable for the time being; we do however detect the
natural results of their presence all over the universe. It seems after all that humans
and the visible firmament are made of a matter ‘alien’ to this universe.
 time proper 229

With regard to the very word diãstasiw (dimension), he speaks rather

by contrast, namely of timelessness as ‘dimensionless’. Still the intro-
duction of the term sumparekte¤nvn was sufficient to indicate time
as a dimension. The point is though that one should study the whole
of Origen’s works in order to draw his crystal clear conception of
time. For if there are subtle changes found at one point, the reason
for them to be made can be found in other passages. This is what
Augustine seems not to have been able to do, probably because he
did not manage to have all the Greek texts of Origen in Latin trans-
lations available to him. Having obviously not comprehended Origen’s
conception entirely he arrives at this conclusion:
Thus it seems to me that time is nothing other than an extension (dis-
tentio), but what it is an extension of, I do not know. It would be sur-
prising if it were not an extension of the soul (animus) itself.221
Had Origen afforded an explicit account of his view of time as
dimension,222 Augustine would know what kind of dimension time
is. The fact is, however, that he was unable to comprehend and fol-
low Origen all the way. Hence he seems to seek refuge to Plotinus’
conception of the nature of time as ‘dimension’. It has been subse-
quently argued that his conception of time was influenced by that
of Plotinus.223 My view is that such a claim is not unjustified to a
certain extent.
This is a tragic irony. For although it was Origen who made the
radical transformations and it was he who decidedly established a
view of time entirely different from any Platonic or Neoplatonic
one—he is now placed outside orthodoxy accused of Platonism and
Neoplatonism.
On the other hand, Augustine succumbed to certain perceptions
of Plotinus. He certainly had an inaccurate knowledge of crucial
facets of Origen’s thought, as his attack against him by name shows.224
Thus, for one reason or another, he did not comprehend Origen’s
notion that time is one and it is an extension of the entire world,

221
Confessions, XI.26.
222
Origen’s references are not inadequate—but Augustine depended only on those
Latin versions available to him. It is then highly unlikely that Augustine ever acquired
a full account of Origen’s tenets, which are spread throughout his writings.
223
Cf. R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, pp. 165ff.
224
Augustine, De Haeresibus, XLIII (Migne, PL, XLII).
230 chapter six

namely that all rational creatures live in this and one time. Hence,
he introduced a notion of an ‘angelic time’225 which he posited depen-
dent on the mental movements of the angels.226 Thus the angels are
viewed as poised between time and eternity, the latter meaning time-
lessness. This idea of Augustine’s is vague, as he can say neither that
these movements are time nor that they are not. Finally he seems
to settle for the view that they are time, yet of a kind of its own: it
is a sort of quasi-time, a notion employed in order to put the angels
between time and the divine reality. In any case, one can hardly
help thinking that the relation of this ‘time’ to movements of the
souls of the angels is, in essence, quite reminiscent of Plotinus’ views
of the question.
None of these obscurities appear in Origen. For to him there are
only two states with respect to time: Temporality, which is the state
of the entire world (in all the ranks of life which comprise it); and
Timelessness, applied to the divine Beyond. There is no mixing or
confusion or intermediary state between those two realities. With
respect to this, and with no substantial basis, P. Plass makes the
erroneous statement that, in Origen, time is ‘the unsure, fragile
motion of minds’.227 This particular assertion is ironic; for the con-
ception of time in Origen is exactly the opposite to what Plass alleges.
In fact, Basil used Origen’s conception (as well as his terminology)
in order to polemicize against Eunomius, who maintained that ‘time’
is in itself ‘motion’. What Plass does here is to ascribe to Origen a
conception which is diametrically opposite to the one he really held.
I think that Augustine’s falling into employing Neoplatonic per-
ceptions is due to the fact that he was profoundly influenced by
Origen, but he was actually unable to appreciate how deeply and
essentially the Neoplatonic view of time as dimension (together with
the Stoic ontological definition of time as extension) was transformed
by the Alexandrian. I assume that this is a reason why (in contrast
to what happens in Origen) the psychological aspect of time prevails

225
De Civitate Dei, XII.16.
226
This theory had already been offered in two works straddling the Confessions:
De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus III.7–8 and de Genesi ad litteram, V.5.12; the men-
tal movements of the angels are described in de Genesi ad Litteram, IV.22.39 and De
Civitate Dei, XI.7.
227
P. Plass, op. cit., p. 13.
 time proper 231

over the objectivist one in Augustine’s thought. Plotinus’ general idea

was that time is somehow dependent on changes in the soul. Augustine
was never able to overcome radically the Neoplatonic principle of
close connection of the essence of time to soul—even though he regards
the notion of ‘soul’ in an apparently different context.
It is rather in vain that Callahan attempts to relate the term ‘day’
(as found in both Basil’s and Augustine’s compared passages) claim-
ing that the latter refers to ‘day’ because the former does so.228 The
connection of ‘day’ to the definition of time as ‘extension’ (diãsthma)
and ‘extended alongside with’ (sumparekte›non) was made by Origen.229
It was also he who had stated that the term ‘day’ does not mean
‘the course of the sun’ (tÚn drÒmon tÚn ≤liakÒn).230
Due to Origen’s definitions, Augustine did not stick to an entirely
psychological conception, but expounded his theory in a manner in
which the psychological aspect of time increasingly fades giving room
to a more objective definition of it. This is why Augustine’s view of
time is less psychological at the end of his reflection about it in the
Confessions than in the beginning of this work. So when Augustine
comes to regard the three functions of the mind,231 no longer regarded
as distinguished activities, but rather as three aspects of a single dis-
tentio, he just comes in line with Origen’s view of time.
Origen also held a psychological perception of time, namely time
felt to comprise past, present and future, as we have seen.232 It was
this aspect that influenced Gregory of Nyssa more.233 In Origen
though this is not a prevailing facet. He certainly speaks of ‘mem-
ory’ (mnÆmhn) of past time234 and of ‘contemplation’ (yevr¤a) of
future or past time,235 as well as of ‘knowledge’ (gn«sin) of things

228
J. Callahan, op. cit., p. 447.
229
commJohn, 1, XXIX.
230
selPs, 117.
231
Augustine held that time, as a distentio animi, has three aspects: memory, atten-
tion and anticipation. Without them past, present and future can have no mean-
ing. s. Chs. 14–28 of the Confessions, XI.
232
selEz, 16; expProv, 18; expProv, 28.
233
This point also provides an answer to what Callahan regards as a ‘serious
historical problem in relating Augustine to Gregory’; a problem to which R. Sorabji’s
hesitant suggestion (s. supra) does not solve, as he himself concedes. There was no
immediate relation of Gregory with Augustine: it was Origen’s thought that exerted
its influence upon both Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine.
234
selPs, 76.
235
selPs, 9; selPs, 15; selPs, 144.
232 chapter six

‘past, present and future’.236 Still these are always references to psy-
chological states reflecting motion in time rather than defining and
indicating time proper.
This is what constitutes a fundamental difference between Origen
and Plotinus. To the latter, time is in the soul; but he thinks of a
‘soul’ which is a universal principle that creates the world and every-
thing in it. In such a view, time is simply the productive life of this
soul, in which the universe and its motion have their existence. Time
is regarded as the power which produces motion (and does not mea-
sure it), everything is said to be in time. Thus time is stated as a
diãstasiw zv∞w (dimension of life) only in so far as it produces motion.
To Origen, on the other hand, the distinction of time itself from
space, established by the term sumparekte¤nvn (stretched out along-
side with), renders time a dimension existing in itself beside space.
Therefore, the term diãstasiw has a meaning radically different from
that in Plotinus. It is because Origen had considered time as some-
thing different from Plotinus’ diãstasiw zv∞w (dimension of life), that
Augustine’s distentio is rightly regarded as something different from
the Plotinian perception of time. Quite correctly, I think, Callahan
regards this view of time as a ‘radical transformation’.237 For, indeed,
by introducing the term sumparekte¤nvn, Origen made clear that
this diãstasiw (dimension) has nothing to do with the mental phe-
nomena of memory, attention and anticipation.238 Time in itself is
a natural (that is, objective) element in the make-up of the world.
Therefore, presentness, pastness or futurity are more than subjective
experiences or mere psychological impressions.
I also endorse J. Callahan’s assertion that without the definition
of time as extension ‘stretched out alongside with the constitution of
the world’, Augustine’s affirmation of time as the distentio animi could
be regarded as simply a transformation of Plotinus’ diãstasiw zv∞w.
But the ‘radical transformation’ of the Neoplatonic conception of
diãstasiw into a radically different notion is undoubtedly an accom-
plishment of Origen.

236
expProv, 18; expProv, 28; Princ, III.1.13. At that point Origen states that it is
only God who has such a knowledge, alluding to his conception of God as omniscient.
237
Callahan, op. cit., 450.
238
s. supra.
 time proper 233

Time is a creature

He then forms his own view according to his fundamental Christian

convictions. He has no hesitation in utilizing the wording of pagan
philosophical schools, being selective to the extent that his own expo-
sition is served. He took up the fundamental Stoic perception of time
as extension, yet he treated it in a way appropriate to his own
thought. In fact he accommodated the essential Stoic concept to his
own objectives: on the one hand, he put pagan terms into new use,
on the other, he initiated a terminology of his own; a meticulous
nomenclature expressing very subtle aspects of his own view of time.
Although pagan philosophical terms are literally found in Origen,
they serve in couching his own view of time. Moreover, their actual
purport is different. In reference to this, there are certain things
which should be pointed out.
The Stoics considered time as an element of this world. This con-
sideration sprung from both their lack of any notion of transcen-
dence and their virtual ban on incorporeality. Paradoxically though,
the full reality of time (although an element of the world) is rather
impugned, on account of the premises of the Stoic philosophy as a
whole.
Origen, on the other hand, had no reason to wonder whether
time itself is real. He explicitly affirms the full reality of it. Time is
a being made by God out of non-being. In fact there is visualiza-
tion of a state in which there is no time at all: “for time cannot be
found when the third and the fourth conceptions of the Logos did
not exist at all;”239 and “before any existence of time and aeon ‘in
the beginning was the Logos’ and ‘the Logos was with God’.”240
Time itself is something ‘outside’ the Trinity.241
Therefore, there was a state in which time did not exist at all.
Since time does exist now, it would be plausible to infer that it came
into being out of non-being. But there is no need to infer this dialec-
tically, since Origen himself enunciates this opinion: with reference
to Ps. 54, 20 ‘God shall hear and will humiliate them, he who is
before the aeons; for they have no changes, as they fear not God’
he comments thus:

239
commJohn, 2, XIX.
240
commJohn, 2, I.
241
Princ, IV.4.2.
234 chapter six

Since everything has been made through him, it is well said that he
exists before the aeons. And this is whence we learn that aeons have
come to being out of non-being.242
In commJohn it is pointed out that the expression ‘through whom’ of
John 1, 3 “is never stated in the first place, but is always employed
in the second place”.243 This assertion is buttressed up by appealing
to various scriptural passages. One of these is Heb. 1, 1–2, accord-
ing to which God ‘has in these last days spoken unto us by his Son,
whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made
the aeons (toÁw afi≈naw)’. Thus the scriptural authority is afforded by
Paul who “teaches us that God made the aeons through the Son; so,
on account of having made the aeons, it is the only-begotten whom
the ‘through whom’ is pointing to.”244 This is the context in which
Origen attacks Heracleon for holding that “neither the aeon nor
what is in the aeon was made through the Logos, claiming that they
were made before the Logos”.245 There should be no doubt that it
is time itself which is meant by the term ‘aeon’ in these portions.
For the ‘aeons’ are explicitly stated as consisting of ‘years’ and ‘days’:
He who has learned the ineffable and secret things of God has also
memories of the past aeons, and of the years in them and of the old
days which comprise them.246
At another point there is similar reference to ‘days of the aeon’,247
and elsewhere it is stated: “It is good to say that one should pray
to God day after day, and to sing praising the name of God in the
aeon of the aeon”. In point of this Psalm of David (namely, Ps. 61,
9) [the expression] ‘to sing praising the name of God’ is understood
to be extended (parekte¤nein) until the next aeon whereas the expres-
sion ‘to pray to him’ refers to the time, which comprises days, namely
the time which is counted alongside (parametroÊmenow) everybody’s
lifetime. “Therefore, as long as we are in life let us pray, so that we
become able to sing praising the name of God in the aeon of aeon.”248

242
selPs, 54, PG 12.1469.
243
commJohn, 2, X.
244
Ibid.
245
commJohn, 2, XIV.
246
selPs, 76.
247
commMatt, 15, 31.
248
selPs, 60.
 time proper 235

So the term afi≈n is employed in order to indicate time itself. In

the light of this, it is plain that in a reference in deOr about the ‘day
of so great an aeon’ (t∞w toË thlikoÊtou afi«now ≤m°raw)249 the term
afi≈n suggests a temporal duration. In commEph it is conformably
affirmed that the term ‘aeon of this world’ indicates “the time which
is stretched out alongside with the structure of this world from the
beginning to the end”. At the same point there is appeal to the same
scriptural passage (namely, Heb. 1, 3) in order to point out that the
expression ‘through whom he has made the aeons’ may well indi-
cate that the aeons ‘is a creature’ (dÒjei kt¤sma l°gein toÁw afi≈naw).
In respect of this, he observes that the expression of Paul in Gal.
1, 4, (‘that he might deliver us from this present evil aeon’) might
be taken as suggesting that time itself (that is, the ‘evil aeon’) is a
living creature. However, he makes the case clear adding promptly
that it is again Paul who teaches that this ‘creature’ is not a living
one: in his Epistle to the Galatians it is explicitly stated that the days
are not animate beings.250
In contrast to Marcus Aurelius, Origen does not personify time.
Such a view stems from his overall conception of it, as well as from
the purposes of his thought. In one case where he seems to per-
sonify time, it is obvious that he just uses an analogy. Thus in selJob
the passage Job, 32, 9 ‘It is not those who have lived long that are
wise’ is commented upon as follows:
He says that it is not necessary that only old men are wise; but it is
possible to listen to something important while still in youth. For if
time makes people wise, God does this all the more so.251
Even in that case, however, Origen’s attitude towards time is totally
different from that of Marcus Aurelius’. Marcus personifies time
in order to prove that it is a ‘destroyer’. He stands before the real-
ity with a feeling of melancholy and frustration. He believed in

249
deOr, XXVII, 16.
250
commEph, p. 403, 170–184: plÆn ¶xei tØn éntepeixe¤rhsin tÚ §k t∞w prÒw
Galãtaw §pistol∞w =htÒn, §pe¤ ka‹ per¤ ≤mer«n l°getai, t«n ımologoum°nvn …w
oÈk oÈs«n §mcÊxvn. s. also, selPs, 117. It is important that Origen uses the term
‘aeons’ (toÁw afi≈naw) in the plural, whereas the predicate applied to that term is
in the singular, namely, ‘creature’ (kt¤sma); it is again obvious that the term ‘aeons’
is used instead of ‘time’; this is why the predicate is in the singular.
251
enarrJob, 32.
236 chapter six

recurrence of identical worlds,252 so he held that nothing is created

and nothing is lost.253 His beliefs are often combined with an acute
sense of the transience of things and events, subjected by fatal vicis-
situdes to perpetual change;254 he endeavours to ‘love’ this poor and
heavy destiny,255 but in fact he is deeply depressed by what he sees
as vanity and nullity of man’s state on this ‘clod of earth’, namely
the world.256
By contrast, in the foregoing passage Origen personifies time in
order to imply a benevolent influence of it upon men. Besides, he
explicitly rejects what he calls ‘the mythology about aeons’ (tØn per¤
t«n afi≈nvn muyopoi¤an)257 obviously alluding to the tales of the
Gnostics.258 Thus Origen enunciates that time itself is a creature. As
God ‘made aeons through the Son’259 time is a creature which ‘came
into being out of non-being’,260 when ‘God made beings out of non-
beings’,261 since ‘the holy Trinity brought . . . everything . . . into being
out of non-being’.262
On this point O. Cullmann asserts that ‘aeon’ (in Heb. 1, 2) means
only ‘worlds’; also, that ‘aeon’ has only an ‘extensional’ meaning,
and all God did was to arrange time in an order of consecutive ‘aeons’
(the number of which, according to Cullmann, is three). His view is
that time ‘was not created’.263
This is in fact a purely Platonic and Neoplatonic frame of thought,
which is ironic, since this is precisely what Cullmann is committed
to fighting against. For one thing, it was Plotinus who really regarded
time as pre-existing ‘at rest’, as we have seen. For another, there
are certain comments to be made with respect to Plato, which
Cullmann seems to have never been suspicious of. It makes little
difference that Cullmann holds time as non-created whereas Plato

252
Meditations, VI, 37; VII, I; VIII, I; IX, 35 and 37; X, 27; XI, 1; XII, 26.
253
Meditations, II, 14; VII, 19; IX, 28.
254
Meditations, V, 13; VI, 15; VII, 25; IX, 19; X, 7.
255
Meditations, VII, 67, and Cf. X, 21.
256
Meditations, V, 33; X, 17 and 34; XII, 7 and 32.
257
commMatt, 17, 33.
258
s. also Cels, V, 60; commJohn, 2, XXIV.
259
commJohn, 2, X.
260
selPs, 54.
261
commJohn, 1, XVII.
262
expProv, 16.
263
O. Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 73.
 time proper 237

held matter (and virtually space proper) to be uncreated. In either

case there is something which is posited as a ‘compulsory’ eternal com-
panion of God, namely, existing from everlasting. Cullmann was
obsessed with his preoccupation to avoid any spatial reference which
would be regarded as a Greek ‘contamination’264 of Christianity.
Quite ironically though, in his effort he virtually followed Plato’s way
of thinking. That in Plato there is a certain notion of everlasting-
ness of space whereas Cullmann spoke of everlastingness of time,
does not really constitute a substantial difference. In either case, the
essence of thinking is virtually the same: Plato held that the world
is uncreated and the Demiurge simply put an original matter in
order. Cullmann takes it that all God did was to put a pre-existing
time in order, namely to arrange it into ‘aeons’. Plato held that mat-
ter always existed and the Demiourge established ‘order’ and ‘time’
in it. Cullmann claims that time always existed and God established
‘order’ (namely, ‘aeons’) and a ‘world’ in it. Thus all Cullmann does
is to furnish a reversed version of a fundamentally Platonic concep-
tion, according to a Platonic way of thinking. A version which, it
has to be said, falls short of originality and perceptiveness.
Certainly this is not the sole point where the Platonic frame of
thought prevails in a work purporting to contrast itself from what is
thought to be Greek. For it is Cullmann who speaks of the ‘flesh’
as the ‘great opponent of the spirit’265 and affirms that the ‘com-
munion with Christ’ becomes more essentially active ‘if we get rid
of this natural body as soon as possible’.266 I do not criticize the
actual content of statements such as these. I only note that they are
averments running in a Platonic vein, within a work in which Greek
thought, especially Platonism, are regarded as a kind of dangerous
‘contamination’ of the Christian way of thinking.
When Origen affirms that time itself is a creature, he actually goes
far beyond this Platonic way of thinking. He was able to do so
because he regarded the Greek schools of thought as merely ‘out-
side’ the Christian way of thinking, but he was not haunted by the
Greek thought, neither did he regard this as a ‘danger’ or something

264
The expression ‘contamination’ appears as a favourite one to H. Puech. Cf.
‘Gnosis and Time’, p. 52.
265
Op. cit., p. 154.
266
Op. cit., p. 231.
238 chapter six

‘contaminating’. He was able to employ this stance for the simple

reason that (in contrast to many modern scholars) he actually knew
in depth the Greek attitudes. This calm and clear-sighted familiarity
with this thought allowed him to challenge Celsus—and yet, in the
same work, to point out this:
We have employed the stance not to despise good teachings, even if
their authors are outside the faith yet teaching well, nor to raise objec-
tions against them, nor to seek to overthrow statements which are
sound’.267
This is only a small token of Origen’s iron will coexisting with peace-
ful and conciliatory spirit. He had the feeling (if not the clear con-
ception) of the reality of space-time. He did not refute such a
perception (a commonplace in modern science) because of the pres-
ence of the notion of space in it. To him, this notion was neither
‘contamination’ nor a ‘danger’. He was not obsessed with trying to
avoid any spatial category and deal only with temporal ones,268 as
scholars such as Cullmann did. He holds that ‘aeon’ may mean
either time or space—but, strictly speaking, this suggests both time
and space, namely, the reality of space-time.
At all events in Origen there is more than the conception of time
as a creature. Time is a ‘being’ which was made out of ‘non-being’;269
which leads to the conclusion that time is real. He uses the Present
Perfect participle gegÒnasin,270 meaning that which has been ‘made’.
Taking into account his vocabulary throughout his Greek writings,
one can see that this is the term used to enunciate the reality of the
existence of creation. It is stated, for example, that God “is creator
because of the beings (gegonÒta) brought into being out of non-
being”;271 or, “God as creator is in all beings (gegonÒsin)”.272
Thus time is itself a being. There is nothing of the Stoic doubts
and embarassment on the subject. Time is a being of full reality, a
creature made by God together with all creation and it is part of the
whole world, that is, part in the make-up of the natural reality.

267
Cels, VII, 46.
268
Probably this is a point which has never been forgiven by those who regarded
themselves as authoritative exponents of Christian faith.
269
selPs, 54, 21, PG 12.1469.
270
Ibid.
271
selPs, 138, 14–16, PG 12.1661.
272
selPs, 41, PG 12.1416.
 time proper 239

In the light of this, G. Florovski is wrong in claiming that it was

Augustine who ‘discovered’ that ‘time should be regarded as a crea-
ture’.273 It was Origen who established the view that time itself is a
creature. Also, R. Sorabji incorrectly ascribes the idea that ‘there
was no time before the creation’ to Augustine.274 He takes it that
this is ‘the best of solutions offered by Jews and Christians’275 to the
so-called ‘why not sooner?’ argument about creation. It certainly was
a brilliant notion, yet it was Origen, not Augustine, who enunciated
this idea. On this point Augustine was but a follower of Origen.276
Since I have argued for a certain, if limited, propinquity between
Origen and the Stoics on the ontological conception of time, I should
make the limits of this proximity clearer. I shall then make some
further remarks, which will demonstrate Origen’s decisive break-
through towards a radically new view of time.
Following my references to the creaturliness and reality of time,
it should be pointed out that the notions of body and incorporeal have
a different import in Origen. To the Stoics incorporeal is a ‘some-
thing’ between being and non-being. They resorted to the four incor-
poreals277 out of necessity: neither can they concede them to be
bodies, nor can they deny that they exist; the incorporeals are assigned
an intermediate tier of reality.
Origen’s view on this issue stands in stark contrast. For one thing,
incorporeal nature pertains to fully real existence. Incorporeality and
reality are not incompatible ontological qualities, as they nearly are
to the Stoics. On the contrary, they are compatible: it is the incor-
poreal God who pre-eminently is being. For another, corporeality
pertains to the fallen rational creatures, which were created at the
Fall. Corporeal nature is originated in moral causes, it has a moral
goal, and it will be terminated after proper free moral action. In
addition, corporeality is applied not only to the visible world, but
also to what is ‘not seen’ and yet material.
On this account, there are two main differences between Origen
and the Stoics:

273
G. Florovski, Aspects of Church History, (Gr. tr., Thessaloniki, 1979), p. 84.
274
Op. cit., p. 234.
275
Ibid.
276
This is not the only point on which Augustine follows Origen. s. infra.
277
Space (ı x«row), time (ı xrÒnow), the void (tÚ kenÒn) an expression (tÚ lektÒn),
SVF, II, 117, 18–23.
240 chapter six

First, he holds that the entire world is material; but he does not
argue that only what is a body is a ‘being’ (ˆn), as the Stoics did.278
Time is not a body and yet this is explicitly stated as a being. He
does not wonder as to whether time is real: he unequivocally finds
it all too real. He also maintains a notion of transcendence with respect
to the world and does affirm that what is incorporeal is real. What
is more, incorporeal nature is superior, since this is an essentially
divine property. Origen was prefectly well aware of the Stoic bewil-
derment on the question of the existence of what is onvisible and
incorporeal. A portion extant in Latin translation is worth quoting:
Moreover there are others who would claim that nothing invisible and
incorporeal exists, but they assign everything which exists to bodies.
On this basis they claim that God, the Father of all things, is a body.
Yet the consequence of their own logic, where it is agreed that every
body is corruptible, has undoubtedly forced them, although maintain-
ing that God is a body, to allow that he is corruptible. Because of this
logical difficulty they have turned to a verbal expedient and have said
that he is indeed of a corruptible nature, but he has not been cor-
rupted because there is nothing superior to him by which he could
be corrupted or destroyed. There are innumerable other fictious devices
of men composed with dialectical reasoning and with tricky sophisms.279
Secondly, the distinction between corporeality and incorporeality con-
cerns Origen for reasons purely theological, not natural. The bodies
of interest to him are those which have a theological significance:
such are the bodies of rational creatures only, since their attributes
in each case are a demonstration of a certain moral quality. In the
final analysis, corporeality is an property of the world as a ‘down-
fall’ (katabolÆ); it underlines the radical transcendence and superi-
ority of the incorporeal divine life over the entire world, which is
corporeal.

278
SVF, II, 117, 5–6.
279
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 3.2.16. The same argument, on the same
subject, extant in Greek, in Cels, VI, 71; on a fact of it, Cels, VIII, 72. Rebutting
the Stoic tenet of a corporeal God, without explicit reference to the Stoics, in
commJohn, 13, XXI. For their logical predicament on this and other issues, s, Cels,
IV, 48; VI, 68; V, 20; V, 23; VII, 15. Although sarcastic at this point, Origen had
some respect for other aspects of old Stoicism; Cf. Cels, I, 24; Cels, IV, 56; Cels,
IV, 74; Cels, V, 47.
 time proper 241

Origen, as well as the Stoics, knew the simple and plain phe-
nomenological datum that time is not a body. This datum was a
source of embarrassment to the Stoics, but certainly not to Origen.
The reason lies 1) in their different conceptions of the world itself;
2) their different views of the significance of corporeality and incor-
poreality; 3) the notion of transcendence (which the Stoics did not hold
at all); and 4) the different conception of what is real.
The fact that time is not a body raises no problem at all to Origen.
Time is not a body in the same sense that space proper is not a
body, expressions, phrases, affirmations are not bodies, ‘void’ is not
a body,280 in like manner that a ‘predicate’, or an ‘axiom’, or the
abstract notion of ‘to be attached’, or ‘to be interwoven with’, are
not bodies. He was far from the Stoic doctrine that only what is a
body is real. In his view it would be ‘absurd’281 to wonder as to
whether time is a body or not, in the same sense that he would find
it absurd to wonder whether or not length, or height, or breadth,
are themselves bodies. His fundamental doctrines prevent him from
such ‘absurd’ questions. In fact these doctrines enable him to affirm
explicitly that time is a creature of full reality and to keep away
from the disconcertment that this issue caused to Stoic thought. His
language is at points incisive and meticulously contrasts Christian
theology with the scope and understanding of pagan thought. For
his reasoning springs from entirely different premises.
As a result, he never found himself in the predicament of the
Stoics, who were ensnared in perplexities created by themselves. He
was exempt from this complexity. For the unsurmountable difficulties
facing the Stoics stemmed only from their fundamental tenets. It was
then inevitable for them to face the subsequent quandary, from which
they were never really disentangled. Still, they preferred to remain
in the visible material world maintaining their cardinal premises
(materialism, no notion of transcendence). This is what Origen calls
‘the absurdities of the followers of Zeno and Chrysippus’, declaring
that he does not sustain views which would lead him to ‘fall into
these absurdities.’282

280
Cf. SVF, II, 117, 20–22.
281
SVF, II, 117, 40–43.
282
Cels, VIII, 49.
242 chapter six

The sameness of the term diãsthma aside, Origen had parted way
with the Stoics almost right from the start of his perception of time.
A Stoic would go with him only a very short part of the way, but
he could not go with him far enough. For, in order to go all along,
a Stoic had to relinquish fundamental principles of his own philosophy.
Origen, therefore, could be regarded as indebted to early Stoicism
only for the initial usage of the term diãsthma in order to signify
time proper. Still he is immune to the kind of criticism which was
directed against the Stoics. He ploughed through his own way and
took some radical steps towards forming his own views. Thus not
only did he overcome the impasses of the Stoic philosophy, but also
moved towards formulating his own view of time.
With regard to time as a creature, a clarification should be made.
When Origen avers that time is a ‘being’ and a ‘creature’, he vir-
tually suggests the temporal nature of the world. In other words, he
denotes time as an element in the make-up of creation, by virtue of
which course and motion make sense. As regards the length of time,
this has been ‘made’ only until the present, no matter how this pre-
sent is conceived from different points of view.283 Time is an ‘exten-
sion’ for the movement to take place alongside this ‘dimension’ of
life. This extension though is not a completed creature until its end.
What was created was temporality, the faculty of the world existing
and functioning in this specific mode. The extension has been actu-
ally realized until the present. The future is not a pre-made exten-
sion alongside which the world will move; the future is an anticipated
reality, a positively potential reality, but not a pre-made one.
Nevertheless, the very fact that temporality (that is, the reasons for
time proper to exist) was created guarantees the flux of space-time
towards the future. This is why Origen considers time as ‘stretched
out alongside with’ the ‘structure’ of this world. Future is in front,
it is to be realized, but it is not realized yet.
Time then, is the creature by virtue of which the world is tem-
poral; it is not a pre-fabricated extension available to the world in
front of it. It is quite characteristic that Origen refers to the future
time (that is, to time to come, but not yet realized) using the term

283
As I discuss later in this section, Origen holds a notion of relativity as far as
perception of time is concerned, either regarded from God or from beings of other
ranks of life.
 time proper 243

parekte¤netai, which means ‘stretched out alongside’, but he does

not use the preposition sÊn (with), as he does with the term sum-
parekte¤nvn.284 This is how he makes the distinction between time
already realized and time which is still to be realized. In the first
case (that is, past and present), time is a creature made; in the sec-
ond case (that is, future), time is a creature planned beforehand, or
provided for. Thus, he accordingly notes that ‘God as creator is in
all creatures; . . . somewhere (he is present) in potentiality (dunãmei)
and somewhere (he is present) in actuality (§nerge¤&)’.285 What Origen
considers as created ‘dimension’ is temporality itself, as an essential
property of the make up of the world.
On the other hand, the notion of time comprising three parts is
certainly found in Greek thought also; this is particularly stated by
the Stoics. Yet since they relate past and future with a conception
of infinity,286 it would be interesting to study how Origen sees the
relation of time to the Infinite. Before this though, we should exam-
ine a notion directly stemming from the conception of time as a
dimension, namely, time as a continuum.

Time is a continuum

Whether time is a continuum or not was a matter of dispute in

antiquity. The Stoics in general were rejecting the doctrine of
Xenocrates about ‘atomic-time-elements’287 which was an Epicurean
tenet. In view of Origen’s contempt for the Epicureans and the fact
that both Aristotelians and Stoics (despite their differences) regarded
time as continuous, it would be plausible to expect that Origen also
regarded time as a continuum. Besides, this is a direct consequence
of the conception of time as extension. Beyond this, that time is a
continuum can be drawn also from Origen’s own statements. He
makes the distinction of what is distinct and discontinuous from what
is a continuum; to the counting of the former he applies the term

284
Cf. homJer, 12, 10; also, selPs, 60.
285
selPs, 41, PG 12.1416. Origen here employs the Aristotelian terms ‘dunãmei’
and ‘§nerge¤&’ as in Aristotle’s Metaphysica 1047b, 31, 1051a, 5 etc.
286
The Stoics held that time is infinite to both directions, namely to past and
future. (SVF, II, 164, 20–22) and so did Aristotle.
287
Cf. S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, London, 1959; p. 104.
244 chapter six

‘number’, whereas the term ‘measure’ is applied to the latter. Thus,

when he speaks of rational creatures (which are distinct beings) he
uses the term ‘number’, whereas in speaking of ‘matter’ he uses the
term ‘measure’:
Moreover when the Scripture says that God created all things ‘by
number and measure’,288 we shall be right in applying the term ‘num-
ber’ to rational creatures or minds by this very reason that they are
so many as can be provided for and ruled and controlled by the prov-
idence of God; whereas ‘measure’ will correspondingly apply to bod-
ily matter, which we must believe to have been created by God in
such quantity as he knew would be sufficient for the ordering of the
world. These then are the objects which we must believe were cre-
ated by God in the beginning, that is, before everything else.289
He also uses the term ‘number’ when he refers to ‘men’, who are
individual beings;290 and makes clear that God ‘made all things by
number and measure; for to God there is nothing either without
end or without measure’,291 concluding thus:
Every created being, therefore, is distinguished in God’s sight by its
being confined within a certain number and measure, that is, either
number in the case of rational beings or measure in the case of bodily
matter.292
It is against this background that the term ‘measure’ is applied to
time, clearly suggesting that this is a continuum: “the rest of things,
however, which are external to the Trinity, must be measured by ages
and periods of time”.293 Also, phrases such as ‘immeasurable ages’
are at work in the Princ.294 The same conception is found in frMatt,
where time is suggested as a continuum (dihnek°w) and action in time,
until the end of it, is stated to have a character of action ‘in con-
tinuity’ (dihnek«w).295

288
Wis. 11, 20.
289
Princ, II.9.1.
290
Princ, IV.3.12.
291
Princ, IV.4.8.
292
Princ, IV.4.8. Omnis igitur creatura intra certum apud eum numerum men-
suramque distinguitur, id est uel rationabilium numerum uel mensuram materiae
corporalis.
293
Princ, IV.4.1. Cetera uero, que sunt extra trinitatem, in saeculis et in tempo-
ribus metient sunt; italics mine.
294
Princ, III.1.23.; III.6.6.
295
frMatt, 22.
 time proper 245

It is then Origen’s explicit statements, as well as his terminology

itself, that denote time as a continuum. Besides, as it happens in
Stoicism,296 it is the very conception of time as extension that ren-
ders time a continuum, indeed a continuum ‘stretched out alongside
with’ the world. At last, time is regarded as a continuum on account
of the close connection of it to space, namely, the reality of space-
time. This theory is something of an anticipation of later ones, such
as that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who insisted that time is uni-
tary, that instants divide it only potentially, and that this should be
taken to mean that they divide it only in thought.
This conception of continuity of time is a basic one for notions
such as that of judgement, as well as prolongation of time, which
will be discussed presently. At this point though, I shall examine
time in its relation to the notion of the Infinite, as promised in the
previous section.

Time and the notion of the Infinite

The concept of the infinite plays a particular part in Origen’s thought;

and yet this is a point on which misunderstandings have occurred.
It has been correctly asserted that, for Origen, what is infinite is
incomprehensible. What has not been clearly said, however, is that
it is creation that Origen has in mind when he relates the notions
of ‘infinity’ and ‘incomprehensibility’. In Princ there is a passage
which reads as follows:
We must suppose, therefore, that in the beginning God made a num-
ber of rational and intelligent beings, or whatever the before-men-
tioned minds ought to be called, as he forsaw it would be sufficient.
It is certain that he made them according to some definite number
fore-ordained by himself; for we must not suppose, as some would,
that there is no end to created beings, since where there is no end
there can neither be any comprehension nor limitation. If there had
been no end, then certainly created beings could neither have been
controlled nor provided by God. For by its nature whatever is infinite
will also be beyond comprehension.297

296
For the Stoic view of time as continuum, Cf. SVF, II, 164, 23–25.
297
Princ, II.9.1. This text is preserved only in Latin and it is this which Koetschau
believed Fragment 24 to be an equivalent of. The ensuing discussion will show that
this section has nothing to do with Origen’s conception of the Infinite with respect
to God.
246 chapter six

There is also a passage preserved in Greek and classified by Koetschau

as Fragment 24. This, however, although incorporated in the Princ, is
not Origen’s; it is a portion from Justinian’s libOr,298 and reads thus:
For we must maintain that even the power of God is finite, and we
must not, under pretext of praising him, lose sight of his limitations.
For if the divine power were infinite, of necessity it could not even
understand itself, since the infinite is by its nature incomprehensible.299
In the same text of Justinian’s300 the following opinion is ascribed to
Origen:
Let no one take offence at the saying, if we put limits even to the
power of God. For to encompass things that are infinite is by nature
an impossibility.301
Those texts (incorporated in Koetschau’s edition of Princ, although
not Origen’s writings) constitute one more misleading rendering of
his authentic views. For were they true, this would entail that God
himself should not be regarded as ‘infinite’, because in that case he
would be unable to comprehend himself. Thus, the notion of ‘infinite’
could not be applicable to God.
But this is not quite the case. For Origen does apply this notion
to God himself. He states that ‘finite knowledge’ applies only to what
has been created, whereas the ‘knowlege’ of the Holy Trinity is ‘with-
out any limit’ (ép°rantow).302
The allegation of Justinian (that the notion of ‘infinite’ virtually
cannot be applied to God, because in such a case God would not
comprehend himself ) is then a distortion of Origen’s authentic views.
For he states that God himself is ‘infinite’ (t“ épe¤rƒ).303 God is also
‘from infinite to infinite’ (§j épe¤rvn §pÉ êpeiron).304 There is also an
expression which incontestably applies the notion of infinity to God:
‘to the greatness of God there is no limit’ (ka‹ oÈk ¶sti p°raw t∞w
megalvsÊnhw aÈtoË); and his providence (prÒnoia) of creatures is said
to be ‘from the infinite to the infinite and even beyond’ (§j épe¤rou

298
Mansi IX, 489 and 525.
299
Included in Princ, II.9.1.
300
Fragment 38 Koetschau (Mansi IX, 525).
301
Included in Princ, IV.4.8.
302
selPs, 144, PG 12.1673; the same in frPs, 70, 14; 138, 7.
303
Cels, III, 77.
304
deOr, XXVII, 16.
 time proper 247

§pÉ êpeiron).305 Hence in accordance with his real view of God,

Origen states him as ‘omnipotent’ (pantodÊnamow)306 and speaks of
his ‘ineffable power’ (éfãtƒ dunãmei).307 It is for sure then that
C. Stead’s assertion that “Gregory of Nyssa introduced a new fac-
tor by describing God as infinite”, which is “a natural extension of
the common belief in God’s total transcendence of the created order”
is not fair to Origen.308
The very use of the notion ‘infinite’ itself constitutes an outstanding
point of contrast between Greek and Christian thought. Whereas the
Greeks are very shy in attributing infinity to God, the Christians (on
this following Philo) speak of God as infinite without any hesitation
at all. In the Christian Fathers there is a close connection between
the infinity and the incomprehensibility of God.309 My discussion here
shows that Origen himself has no hesitation in attributing infinity to
God in the most explicit terms. Thus he contributed to the estab-
lishment of what today is regarded as a major conceptual (as well
as linguistic) contrast between Christians and Greeks.
It is true that in Origen’s thought what is infinite is related to
what is incomprehensible. But this notion is upheld only in respect
of the creation and duration of the world. A relevant portion in Princ
makes it clear:
Moreover, anyone who looks for them at his leisure can find in the
divine scriptures very many sayings of this sort, which assert that the
world both had a beginning and is expecting an end. If, however,
there is anyone who on this matter would oppose either the author-
ity or the credibility of our scripture, let us ask him the question,
whether he asserts that God can comprehend all things or that he

305
selPs, 144. Gregory of Nyssa followed Origen faithfully on this point, too;
referring to the ‘greatness’ of God, he makes his point by means of the notion of
infinite, using Origen verbatim: s. Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, Volume 3, 1, page
156 (‘the greatness of the divine power goes as far as infinity’); Contra Eunomium, 3,
chapter 3, 68 (‘the infinity of the divine power’); Epistulae, Epistle 3, 20 (‘the power
of Godhead’s power is something infinite and immeasurable’). In Oratio catechetica
magna, 10, the notion of infinity is applied not to the ‘greatness’ or ‘power’ of God,
but to the Godhead per se: “whereas human nature is small and easily describeable,
the Godhead is infinite; hence infinity cannot be contained by an individual”.
306
expProv, 18, PG 17.204; likewise in selEz, PG 13.809.
307
frLuc, 79; commMatt, 14, 9.
308
C. Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, Cambridge 1994, p. 202.
309
A.H. Armstrong–R.A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy, London,
1960; pp. 9–15.
248 chapter six

cannot? Now to say that he cannot is clearly impious. If, however, he

should say, as he must, that God comprehends all things, it follows,
from this very fact that they can be comprehended, that they are
understood to have both a beginning and an end. For that which is
absolutely without any beginning can in no way be comprehended.
However far the understanding may extend, so far is the ability to
comprehend withdrawn and removed endlessly, when there is held to
be no beginning.310
Part of this passage (namely §2ff, i.e. from ‘If, however . . .’ to the
end), as well as the ensuing paragraph (III.5.3) should be considered
with caution as it is most likely that they constitute interpolations of
Rufinus, as I have argued. The point which the reader should draw
from this passage is the relation between infinity, comprehensibility
and God. In expounding this argument, Rufinus had a vague idea
of Origen’s conviction that the world is finite—but not because God
could not comprehend what is infinite. Origen held that God does
comprehend what is infinite. His conviction about the finiteness of
the world stems from his conception of prophecy and, in the final
analysis, from his concept of time. The main argument is that if the
world is beginningless, foreknowledge as such makes no sense. If the
world is endless, fulfilment of prophecy and promise make no sense either.
Since these notions profoundly determine Origen’s concept of time,
he argues that the world311 must have a beginning and an end. In
the passage quoted in this section, the expression ‘the world had a
beginning and is expecting an end’ is undoubtedly Origen’s. The
rest of the text is Rufinus’s, who had only limited comprehension of
Origen’s conception of the relation between infinity, duration of the
world and God. This is why this text (like all the interpolations of
Rufinus) is expressed in an equivocal, vague and diffident manner—
that is, in a style which stands in stark contrast to Origen’s own
style in his writings in Greek.
Hence the argument of the connection between ‘infinite’ and
‘incomprehensible’ is adduced in order to ground his fundamental
view that the world is not beginningless. Which means this is an
argument in support of an idea sheerly opposite to that which Justinian
and others ascribed to Origen, who simply held space/time to be
finite.

310
Princ, III.5.1–2.
311
Homilies on Exodus, VI, 13.
 time proper 249

As often as ‘from aeon’ to aeon’ is said, a length of time is suggested,

but there is an end. And if Scripture says ‘into another aeon’, cer-
tainly something longer is denoted, but an end is designated. And as
often as ‘the aeons of the aeons’ is mentioned some end is indicated,
although perhaps unknown to us, nevertheless established by God.312
As a matter of fact, the connection between what is finite and what
is comprehensible is a Stoic argument. R. Sorabji313 seems to be in
doubt as to whether this is true or not. He says that he does not
himself find such an argument in the Stoic literature. It is a good
opportunity, at this point, to clear this doubt up by saying that this
argument was spelled out by Cleomedes (2nd c. A.D.) in arguing
that the world is finite:
d∞lon §k toË ÍpÒ fÊsevw aÈtÒn dioike›syai . . . de› går katakrate›n tØn
fÊsin otinow §stin. . . . Àste fÊsin ¶xvn tØn dioikoËsan, aÈtÒw m¢n
pep°rastai énagka¤vw.314

Sorabji adduces the citation which R. Wallis made in order to prove

the Stoic idea that only a finite number of states is knowable.315 But
this passage proves nothing of the kind; so Sorabji is rather justified
in doubting as to whether the Stoics actually held such an idea or
not. It seems that an old suggestion about this Stoic view was made
by earlier scholars, but the actual reasoning of this Stoic view was
lost. It seems also that R. Wallis was aware of the suggestion about
this Stoic view, but not of the source of it. At any rate he adduces
a passage which does not prove the point: for all it says is that the
gods can know the infinitely recurring events by knowing the events
of one cycle. This is why this question is surrounded by ambiguity.
I think that the passage which I quoted at this point will eliminate
this ambiguity, since it clearly proves that in fact the Stoics held the
idea that only a finite number of states is knowable. The Stoics were
bound to connect the notions of ‘finite’ and ‘comprehensible’ since
they held that the world is ‘administered by a nature’ and yet this
nature (namely, their god) is immanent in the world. Since there

312
Homilies on Exodus, VI, 13. The rest of the paragraph is evidently an interpo-
lation of Rufinus.
313
R. Sorabji, op. cit., pp. 185–6.
314
SVF, II, 170, 27–36: Cleomedes, De motu circulari corporum caelestrium, p. 2.
315
The citation of Wallis is from Nemesius’s On the Nature of Man, Ch. 38 (SVF,
II, 190, 10ff.).
250 chapter six

were Stoic affirmations identifying their god with the world, the
notion of the infinite was puzzling them in any case.
This was not a problem to Origen, who held the notion of God’s
radical transcendence to the world. He then could affirm that God
himself was ‘infinite’ whereas the world was ‘finite’. Yet the world
is finite not because God cannot understand what is infinite, but because the
world came into being for a certain purpose, according to the divine
dispensation and it is destined to an end, in the sense of both goal
and termination. The argument for the world to be finite lies in the
perception of the world itself (namely, that the world has a purpose
to accomplish), not in the perception of God whatsoever. Thus,
Origen’s argument for the world to be finite is not based on its com-
prehensibility by God, but on the fact that the world had a beginning
and is directed towards an end. Hence R. Sorabji is not right in
asserting that, although he does not find the argument of the ‘infinite’
being ‘incomprehensible’ in the Stoic literature, this argument becomes
explicit in Origen.316
Origen as well as the Stoics affirm that the world is finite. However,
they take this view departing from different premises and aiming to
different purposes. In Stoicism, the divine comprehensibility is mainly
manifested as sumpãyeia, whereas in Origen this is mainly perceived
as prÒnoia, the import of which is irrelevant to the Stoic homonym
in many respects. The Stoic sumpãyeia exists in the world and it is
also originated in the world since there is no notion of transcen-
dence at all. Thus sumpãyeia has to be finite just because the world
is finite, too.
In contrast, Origen’s view is that prÒnoia although manifested in
the world is originated in beyond the world, namely, in the divine
will. So there is no reason compelling him to accept that the world
is finite because the prÒnoia is finite. On the contrary, because prÒnoia
is not finite, he nowhere postulates that the divine comprehensibility
is finite. On the contrary, he explicitly, and in very strong terms,
stresses that the divine prÒnoia is infinite, as the above Greek por-
tions demonstrate.
Therefore, there is no logical nexus between the assertion that the
world is finite and the divine ability to comprehend. If Origen affirms
that the world is finite, he does so for reasons different from those

316
Op. cit., pp. 185–6.
 time proper 251

of the Stoics: the course of the world in time is not just a mean-
ingless and aimless natural movement, but there is a meaningful
motion through which a final goal is to be achieved. This is why
he emphasizes that the world is finite.317
Hence, it is not the Stoic argument, namely the divine ability to
comprehend the world, which determines Origen’s affirmation that
the world is finite. For the divine comprehensibilty in itself is explic-
itly stated as ‘infinite’.
This is why R. Sorabji is not correct in arguing that Origen’s atti-
tude on the infinity of the world is based upon the arguments of
the Stoics. The Stoics postulate the world as finite because they are
preoccupied with preserving the notion of the divine comprehensi-
bility. Origen takes for granted that the divine comprehensibility is
infinite, yet he avers that the world is finite because there is an eschato-
logical purpose which is to be fulfilled in the course of time. Therefore,
in the light of his statements in Greek, the point of the Latin ren-
dering of Princ where there appears to be a resemblance to the Stoic
argument should be regarded as a simplistic rendering due to Rufinus’s
failure to grasp the intense eschatological character of the Alexandrian’s
thought.318 It is Rufinus, not Origen, who appears to follow the Stoic
rationale, in contrast to all of his Greek writings. Accordingly, it now
becomes obvious how misleading the Fragments which Koetschau
included in his edition of Princ are.
Besides, in commMatt there is the following reasoning against the
notion of beginningless of the world:
If the world is not consummated, but exists infinitely, then God will
not be such as to ‘know everything before it was made’,319 but he
might be supposed to know only some of them before they were made
and, after them, he learned others; for what is infinite is by nature
not confined knowledge, as knowledge itself by nature imposes limits
to what is known.320
In this context the view expressed in Princ, that God has created
everything ‘by number and measure’, can be confirmed from writings

317
commMatt, 13, 1; s. infra.
318
I have already argued that this consitutes a reason for many of Rufinus’s mis-
comprehensions.
319
Dan., 42.
320
commMatt, 13, 1.
252 chapter six

in Greek, since in commMatt there is reference to ‘the finite number

of souls’ (§k toË …rism°nou t«n cux«n ériymoË).321 A meticulous study
of the argument at this point of commMatt shows that God’s com-
prehensibility is not actually questioned. What is argued for is that
there must be a certain before creation. For unless such a before is
allowed for, prophecy can make no sense. God knows the world as
finite not because God is unable to know what is infinite, but because
God is said to know everything before it was made. If the world is
beginnigless, the divine foreknowledge could make no sense—not
because God cannot comprehend what is infinite, but simply because
the notion of before looses all meaning.
Origen’s idea that what is infinite is incomprehensible is then
applied to the world only. On this he is quite explicit speaking about
the ‘infinite knowledge’ of God, as we have seen. However, the world
must be finite by reason of the fact that it was known to God before
it came into existence. His deeper aim is to argue that the world is
a finite creature, namely, that it had a beginning and it will come
to an end. This is in fact closely related to his conception of space-
time, which is destined to an end and is not the ‘extension’ of an
endless and meaningless cosmic movement. This is why he explic-
itly rejects the notion of an ‘infinite’ (épeirãkiw) recurrence of worlds.322
Origen then holds that what is not infinite (that is, what has a
beginning and an end) is comprehensible. From which follows that
what is comprehensible is not infinite; rather it has both a beginning and
an end. This is precisely his conception of time. Regardless of any
other statement about the duration of the world, his opinion about
the causative relation between infinite and incomprehensible renders time
finite. His view that it is indeed possible to acquire a ‘contempla-
tion of both past and future aeons’323 indicates his conviction that
time itself is comprehensible. Time then is not infinite: it has both
a beginning and an end. Origen uses the participle gegonÒta (those
made) to indicate what is a creature, as we have seen.324 It is then
clear that when he speaks of gegonÒta he includes time in them.
Accordingly, he states that “the contemplation of all made things
(gegonÒtvn) is a finite one, in this including also contemplation of

321
Ibid.
322
Cels, IV, 67.
323
selPs, 9, PG 12.1196; selPs, 15, PG 12.1209; selPs, 144, PG 12.1672.
324
Cf. selPs, 54, PG 12.1469; s. supra, p. 234.
 time proper 253

time;325 it is only the knowledge of the Holy Trinity that is infinite”.326

The very fact that time itself is a creature leads to the conclusion
that time is not infinite, but stretches from a beginning to an end.
This is why time is comprehensible and ‘contemplation’ of the whole
time makes sense.
The opinion on the finiteness of time can be assumed from the
passages referring to the ‘contemplation of made things’ (which ‘things’
include time also). In addition though there are special references to
the ‘contemplation’ of all time. In selPs ‘the kingdom of God’ is inter-
preted as “the contemplation of the aeons made (gegonÒtvn) and the
aeons which will be made (genhsom°nvn).”327 In the same work he
observes: “For the kingdom of Lord is the contemplation of all the
aeons, both of those made and those which will be made; and it is
by this contemplation that enemies become friends.”328 And further:
“the inheritance of rational nature is contemplation of these aeons
made and of those which will be made.”329 Time then is held to be
finite, that is, it had a beginning and will come to an end. This is
why he can speak of ‘the order of the entirety of aeons’ (per¤ t∞w
§n ëpasi to›w afi«si diatãjevw),330 or ‘all the aeons’ (˜louw toÁw
afi≈naw),331 as well as of ‘the extension of the whole time ( toË
diastÆmatow tÚn ˜lon xrÒnon)’.332
This notion of finiteness of time could have been gathered right
from the start, as a corollary flowing from the fact that time proper
is closely connected with the world itself. The implied notion (or,
feeling) of space-time could lead directly to the conclusion that time
and ‘the structure of this world’ (or, space) ‘begin’ together and also
come to an end together. Still Origen does explicate his view on the
question: time is not infinitely long, but it has a beginning and an
end. This is why he also speaks of ‘beginning and end and middle
of times’, as in Wis. 7, 17–18.333

325
The expression ‘contemplation of made things’ is usual in Origen; s. also
expProv, 19.
326
selPs, 144, loc. cit.
327
selPs, 144.
328
selPs, 9, loc. cit.
329
selPs, 15, loc. cit.
330
deOr, XVII, 14.
331
Cels, IV, 69.
332
commJohn, 10, XXXIX.
333
frLuc, 50.
254 chapter six

It is noteworthy that on the question of non-infinity of time Origen

is opposed to a fundamental Stoic doctrine, since the latter held time
to be infinite in both directions, that is, past and future. On this
question his thought is also opposed to O. Cullmann’s statements
which claim to expound the pure Christian conception of time with-
out any ‘Hellenization’ of it. As a matter of fact, Cullmann holds
time to be infinite in both directions, in this way standing not too
far away from the Stoic and Aristotelian conception of it. He indeed
postulates time as an extension infinite in both directions.334 To him
time is not a creature,335 it is infinite and it is in fact an eternal
companion of God. This is how he thinks he has solved the prob-
lem of time once and for all, so that ‘time is no problem any more’.336
It should be also stressed that the time of the ‘present aeon’ is not
regarded as something different from the time in which God is
thought to live. Simply, at this period of time there is not only God
but also the world living within the same time. That the essence of
this reasoning is virtually a Platonic one, in which the notion of the
‘everlasting world’ has simply been substituted by the notion of ‘ever-
lasting time’, has already been covered earlier.
Therefore, the notion of the infinite is involved not only in the
conception of what is infinitely long, but also infinitely short. It is
true that the Greeks failed to master the central concepts of infinitesimal
calculus, namely, the limit and the process of the convergence towards
a limit.337 The dramatic confrontation of Greek Mathematics with
the problems of continuity and the infinite seems in the celebrated
paradoxes of Zeno of Elea, in the first half of the fifth century B.C.
These paradoxes, recorded by Aristotle,338 propound, under the guise
of arguments, against the possibility of motion as some of the fun-
damental conceptions consider space as a continuum of points. It
was only the Stoic thought that made some remarkable advances in
the infinitesimal calculus and they anticipated some of the concepts
formed in modern Mathematics, beginning with the calculus and
leading to the fundamentals of theory of sets.339

334
Cullmann, op. cit., p. 61ff.
335
Op. cit., p. 73.
336
Op. cit., p. 63.
337
S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, London, 1959; p. 89.
338
Physica, VI, Ch. 9.
339
S. Sambursky, op. cit., p. 89.
 time proper 255

The Stoics were considering the ‘now’ as the limit between past
and future, as we have seen. This notion, if pushed a little, could
easily lead to the conclusion that this ‘now’ does not exist at all (tÚ
d¢ nËn ˜lvw mhd°n e‰nai).340 What is of importance for my subject
at this point is that the Stoics held a notion of time as infinitely
divisible. This mainly stemmed from their view of time as a con-
tinuum.341 To them, time is not only infinite in both directions, but
also it is susceptible of being infinitely divisible, towards a limit which
is a ‘duration’ reduced to nil.
Origen does not hold the former of these Stoic notions (namely,
of infinite time). However, he appears to hold the latter, that is, the
divisibility of time ad infinitum. In his thought it makes sense to speak
of an infinitely short time. This denotes a duration of which both
beginning and end virtually coincide. He considers this infinitely short
duration mainly in reference to divine action the world. It has to
be said, however, that the philosophical environment was already
mature for accepting the notion of infinite in the context that was of
main concern for Origen.
The concept of the infinite was a strange ground to reflect on within
the intellectuall frame of the Greeks, who always pursued entities of
moderation, of precision and, above all, entities which were inter-
grated in one way or another. Infinite is something unfinished and
not intergrated; this is why Greek metaphysics was reluctant to wel-
come this notion to the frame of its investigations. Whereas the
isolated use and definition of apeiron by Anaximander had a different
scope and orientation, Pythagoreans, Atomists and Plato regarded
infinite as a secondary, indeed inferior, reality. The same notion, how-
ever, was the most suitable to adumbrate the relation between deity
and the finite things of the world. Metaphysical thought envisaged
a god which is beyond limits, and adumbrated this deity by means
of all notions suggesting this as a boundless being, endless, indefinite,
unbounded, of immense power and unlimitited knowledge. In this
context, ‘infinite’ appears the the most appropriate term and notion
to render this conception of the divine, the supreme reality, God.
The term then enjoyed a place as an acceptable term in apophatic
theology. The ‘One’ of Neoplatonism, which was the ultimate source

340
SVF, II, 165, 39.
341
SVF, II, 158, 15–19 and 164, 23–26. This was an Aristotelian view, too.
256 chapter six

of all kinds and modes of being was ‘infinite’. As for the primary
divine power which dominates and administers the entire world,
which according to the Stoic-Neopythagorean philosophy of nature,
is the supreme essence which rules over all nature, it was deemed
befitting to be called ‘infinite’. In this vein, and consequently to this
phisosophical environment, it was natural for the creative power of
the Biblical God, which is subject to no limit and necessity, and cre-
ates everything out of nothing, to be called infinite, too. And not
only this divine power, but also the Person of this personal God to
be called infinite as well. This means that the notion of infinite is a
property of not only the supreme metaphysical reality, but also of
the inherent essence of things, and above all, of God.342 Thus even-
tually it was self-evident that the supreme being is the ‘infinite’ which
is different and beyond all finite things, notions and relations.
In commMatt it is stated that the Logos, although acting within
time, does not actually himself need time in order to act within the
world. Thus “if one needs much time in order to offer all his belong-
ings to the poor people, the Logos would not be hindered by time
in order to make perfect a man who acts in this way”. Therefore,
“there should be no hesitation in saying that this man becomes per-
fect all at once (eÈy°vw).”343 With reference to Judgement, it is accord-
ingly stated:
And no one should think that some kind of long time (makr«n tinvn
afi≈nvn) will be needed for everybody to render an account about all
his life here; for God, by his will, will all at one go (éyrÒvw) make
everybody recollect everything he committed during his life, be it good
or bad; and God, by his ineffable power, will make everybody feel
what that was he did so that he will understand why he is punished
or honoured. And one might dare say that the kairos of the expected
judgement does not need time (ı t∞w prosdokvm°nhw kr¤sevw kairÒw
oÈ de›tai xrÒnvn); but as the resurrection is said to happen ‘in a
moment, in the twinkling of an eye’,344 so I think the Judgement will
happen, too.345
In commMatt the same question comes up: no time is needed in order
to render an account of all the years we lived in this life (mØ …w

342
Cf. Windelband-Heimsoeth, op. cit., p. 276.
343
commMatt, 15, 18.
344
1 Cor. 15, 52.
345
frLuc, 79.
 time proper 257

xrÒnou polloË deÒmena, ·na sunaryª ≤m›n per¤ t«n ˜lvn xrÒnvn t∞w
§ntaËya zv∞w lÒgow); and no one should be unfaithful to the power
of God to make things happen with such a rapidity (t“ tãxei t∞w
toË YeoË per¤ taËta dunãmevw); for God did not need time to make
this creation; and if it is said that this has been made in six days
one should be very careful in understanding what the meaning of
the six days is.346 Indeed the Judgement will occur in a way which
is the same to that which Paul predicts about the Resurrection.347
Likewise, in a Fragment of homJer, quoting Jer. 28, 8 it is pointed
out that the consummation will happen all at one go (éyrÒvw).348
Therefore, Origen holds that it is possible for an action to take
place in time and yet to have no duration. There is a kind of tem-
porality which is time of no duration (not xrÒnow diarkÆw).349 This
means that a notion of infinitely divisible time is upheld; according
to this, a moment as a limit between past and future is an infinitely
short time without duration at all.
Origen is conscious of this conception; in attempting to depict the
significance of the Judgement further, he refers to the ‘beginning’ of
Judgement, stating that this will ‘begin with those who owe the most
debts’. Yet he put s the following in parentheses, in the middle of
his phrase:
[this beginning] should be understood only as an intellectual concep-
tion (§pino¤& lambanom°nhn); for we have not forgotten what we said
before.350
He knows that in such a case it makes no real sense to speak about
‘beginning’, as if this were something distinguished from the rest of
the whole duration. For to this ‘non-enduring-time’ notions such as
beginning, or end, or indeed even duration, apply only as intellec-
tual abstractions in the most attenuated sense.
Thus the notion of non-enduring time is applied to the creative
act of God, to the divine judgement, as well as to the resurrection.

346
Philo, also held that the six days of creation indicate no time but an order
of thought; Cf. De Opificio Mundi, I.26–7.
347
Appealing to 1 Cor. 15, 52 once more: commMatt, 14, 9.
348
Fragment XXXV of homJer; I translate the term ‘éyrÒvw genhyhsom°nhn’ as
‘taking place at one go’; Cf. Aristotle, Physica, 186a15.
349
commMatt, 14, 9.
350
That is, about the non-duration of the judgement; commMatt, 14, 10.
258 chapter six

There are also other conceptions to which this notion is applied. In

a Fragment of commJohn we read this comment on John 12, 27:
his [sc. Jesus’] soul was sad and embarassed about all these; but he
was not dominated by embarassment as one might think, since all this
was but momentary (ékaria¤vw); this is what the word now (nËn)
signifies; for as soon as it began it stopped (ëma går t“ êrjasyai ka‹
§paÊsato); and practically (…w ¶pow efipe›n) it was a point of time (shme›on
∑n xrÒnou). And you should see that he prays for his battle against
the powers fighting against him to take place not in duration of time
(oÈk §n paratãsei xrÒnou) but in a now (éllÉ §n t“ nËn), which was
enough for the soul of Jesus to conquer the power of the evil.351
This is how the notion of non-enduring time is described. All the
temporal terms used underline the coincidence of the beginning and
end of this duration. One also can see a ring of the conception of
time as extension and continuum in the figure of ‘point of a line’
applied to this non-enduring time.352 For indeed in Geometry a point
of a line is postulated as having no length and its beginning and
end coincide.353
Finally, although Origen holds the notion of infinitely short time,
he remains consistent with his conception of time as real. He has
none of the Stoic reservations which tend to dispute the reality of
‘now’ as they consider it ‘crushed’ to extinction by both past and
future. To him ‘now’ (nËn) is a fully real time, like all time is. It is
in this real ‘now’ that real temporal events occur; and those events
are not only real, but they also are considered to be divine actions
of enormous importance for the entire world.
The conclusion is that Origen rejects the view that time is infinite
in either of its directions. The interconnectedness between infinity
and comprehensibility is regarded in a context different from that
of Stoicism. Nevertheless he holds a notion of infinitely short time,
a time of no duration at all. In this case he does not use the term
‘infinite’ directly; yet he expresses his notion of an infinite divisibil-

351
frJohn, LXXXVIII.
352
Yet Origen knows that this is just an inaccurate expression; this is why he
uses the expression ‘…w ¶pow efipe›n’ which I translate as ‘practically’, following Liddell
and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, but the accurate meaning of this expression is ‘I
say so yet I use a inaccurate expression’.
353
It is indicative of a certain conception that in Greek the term for geometri-
cal ‘point’ and for ‘moment’ is the same, namely stigmÆ.
 time proper 259

ity of time leading to this conceptual limit by terms such as ‘at one
go’ (éyrÒvw), ‘momentary’ (ékaria¤vw), ‘now’ (nËn), or as the oppo-
site of what he calls ‘lasting time’ (xrÒnow diarkÆw).
Thus he rejects the notion of the infinite when it implies a time
very long, a time without beginning or end. But he does hold a
notion of ad infinitum division of the continuum of time, of a time in
which beginning and end coincide.

Relativity in the perception of time

Origen regards the entire world as being ‘in’ time354 or ‘under’ time.355
But although this time is objectively one, the perception of it is not
the same in different particular worlds. Thus he introduces a notion
of relativity in the perception of time in the various ranks of life. In
homJer, there is an interesting portion:
What is little to man is much to another living being. For instance,
what is little to a man is big to a child. So the time of human life-
time is little compared to the whole of the present aeon which com-
prises many years. Likewise, what is little to God is much to us and
the whole aeon is little to God. When, therefore, it is said, ‘Come,
my people, enter thou into thy chambers, and shut thy doors about
thee; hide thyself for a little moment’356 this saying about a little moment
should be regarded as referring not to the relation to those who are
ordered to walk and enter his chambers, but to the relation to Him
who commands that, to whom is little what to the former is much.357
Thus, beside the notion of the radical transcendence of God with
respect to time, there is a suggestion of relativity in the perception
of time itself by either God or creatures.
This is a point on which Origen’s thought is contrasted with the
Stoic theory. When they define time as extension, they do not intro-
duce any notion of relativity in the mental hold of it. To them the
world is material and their god is also material and immanent in
this. In perceiving time as extension, they regard it as a natural real-
ity which has an objective character. On account of this objectivity,

354
frMatt, 487.
355
frJohn, I; frJohn, CX.
356
Is. 26, 20.
357
homJer, 12, 10.
260 chapter six

they go further and attribute to time the property of being ‘a mea-

sure and criterion of both fastness and slowness’.358
In contrast, Origen maintains the notion of God’s radical tran-
scendence to the world. The notion of relativity is applied not only
with respect to God, but also with respect to the sense of time in
the different ranks of life:
And you should see that we may regard the whole of the present aeon
as day; the aeon is long with respect to us, but is short and consist-
ing just of a few years with respect to the life of God and of Christ
and of the Holy Spirit. Something similar can be said about the blessed
powers, who have ascended into places which are higher compared to
those many ones existing below the Holy Trinity. For the present aeon
has the same relation to their life, as a day in the human life in com-
parison with the whole time that a human being lives.359
In line with this idea of relativity in the perception of time, he states
that “there is nothing wonderful in the fact that to God the whole
aeon is regarded as the extension of one of our days; and in my
view, even less.”360

Origen’s influence on his successors

The innovations which Origen initiated constitute a dramatic break-

through and his radical originations had a strong impact on his suc-
cessors. This is an infallible measure of the importance of his
accomplishment. For in fact he has been the anticipator of critical
notions which played a decisive role during the critical interplay
between Christianity and paganism. The term diãsthma indicating
time proper was widely upheld later, during the Arian controversy
by both sides in the quarrel.361 The same term diãsthma, in the same

358
SVF, I, 26, 11–12.
359
commMatt, 15, 31.
360
deOr, XXVII, 13.
361
Thus Alexander of Alexandria states that what was alleged by the Arians was
that prohge›tai katÉ aÈtoÊw t∞w tå ˜la dhmiourgoÊshw toË YeoË sof¤aw §ke›no tÚ
diãsthma §n ⁄ fas¤ mÆ gegen∞syai tÚn uflÒn ÍpÒ toË patrÒw; Epistula ad Alexandrum
Constantinopolitanum, 6; PG 18.557. In the orthodox statements against the Arians,
the term diãsthma is used so frequently, that it sometimes appears as almost a syn-
onym to ‘time’. Thus Athanasius states: tÚ legÒmenon §n t“ . . . ca ! l
! m
! “ prÒw tÚn
uflÒn ‘≤ basile¤a sou pãntvn t«n afi≈nvn’ oÈk §pitr°pei tinã kên tÚ tuxÒn diãsthma
 time proper 261

context and in the same sense as in Origen, was taken up by John

Chrysostom,362 as well as by Essaias Abbas363 and Olympiodorus of
Alexandria.364
Not only the term diãsthma, but also sumparekte¤nesyai enjoyed
a prominent position in the vocabulary of subsequent Christian writ-
ers. It can be clearly seen that Origen was the forerunner of the
conceptions, as well as terms, which constitute the core of the view
of time in a vast number of Christian authors: Gregory of Nyssa,365

dialog¤sasyai §n ⁄ mØ Íp∞rxen ı lÒgow. Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.12; PG

26.37. Accordingly, Basil of Caesarea states: ˜te oÈk ∑n, Àw fate [sc. Eunomians]
t‹ ∑n §ke›no tÚ diãsthma; t¤na aÈt“ proshgor¤a §pinoÆsate; ≤ m¢n går koinÆ
sunÆyeia ≥ xrÒnoiw ≥ afi«sin ëpan diãsthma Ípobãllei. adversus Eunomium, 2.13;
PG 29.596. He also speaks about the Sabellians and Arians o· xroniko›w diastÆmasi
toË m¢n patrÒw tÚn uflÒn, toË d¢ ufloË tÚ pneËma tÚ ëgion diairoËsi. Liber de Spiritu
sancto, 59; PG 32.177. Quite expectedly, the term diãsthma in this case is used by
him who was most influenced by Origen’s thought, namely, Gregory of Nyssa. I
quote his statement, not only because the term diãsthma is frequently used, but
also because at this point Gregory offers an account of his conception of time as
‘extension’: ‘O presbut°ran t∞w toË ufloË zv∞w tØn toË patrÒw dogmat¤zvn diastÆmat¤
tini tÚn monogen∞ toË §p¤ pãntvn YeoË pãntvw di˝sthsi: toËto d¢ ≥ êpeiron . . . ≥
tisi p°rasi ka‹ shme¤oiw fanero›w ırizÒmenon. éllÉ êpeiron m¢n efipe›n oÈk §ãsei
ı t∞w mesÒthtow lÒgow ≥ pantel«w tØn toË patrÒw te ka‹ ufloË ¶nnoian diagrãfei
t“ lÒgƒ . . . oÈkoËn . . . oÈdem¤an ßjei x≈ran êpeiron §nnoe›n tÚ diãsthma, éllã
peperasm°nƒ tin¤ katã pçsan énãgkhn tÚn monogen∞ toË patrÒw diastÆsousi . . . ı
lÒgow otow oÈk ej éÛd¤ou e‰nai tÚn §p¤ pãntvn YeÒn: éllÉ épÒ tinow …rism°nou
shme¤ou tØn arxÆn §sxhk°nai kataskeuãsei. ˜ d¢ l°gv, toioËtÚn §sti . . . tÚ metã
ti genÒmenon diã toË prÒw •autoË diãsthma ır¤zei ka‹ tØn toË pro#ponooum°nou
ÍpÒstasin. Contra Eunomium, 1; PG 45.357–360; also: ≤ kt¤siw pçsa t“ t«n afi≈nvn
diastÆmati parametre›tai. Contra Eunomium; PG 45.364.
362
John Chrysostom: p°nte ≤m°raw §p¤ t∞w ofik¤aw kat°xetai tÚ prÒbaton [sc.
before Passover] . . . ¶peita yÊetai . . . p°nte diastÆmata xrÒnou dhloËtai ta›w p°nte
taÊtaiw ≤m°raiw épÒ Adãm m°xri suntele¤aw; In pascha 5.2; Cf. ibid. 5.1; PG 59.735ff;
also: t∞w §pioÊshw ≤m°raw . . . oÈk o‰daw efi tÚ diãsthma ˆcei; Homilia in Mattaeum 19.5.
363
Essaias Abbas: énÆlvsen §n mataiÒthti tÚ diãsthma t∞w ≤m°raw; Orationes, 10;
PG 40.1135.
364
Olympiodorus of Alexandria defines time thus: xrÒnow m¢n §sti tÚ diãsthma
kayÉ ˜ prãtteta¤ ti. Commentarii in Ecclesiastem, 3.1; PG 93.508.
365
Gregory of Nyssa: diasthmatikª tini paratãsei sumparekte¤netai [sc. ≤ ktistÆ
oÈs¤a]; Contra Eunomium, PG 45.933. Echoing Origen’s expression about the pres-
ence of the Logos in the world, he also states: ‡diÒn §sti t∞w yeÒthtow tÚ diã pãntvn
¥kein ka‹ tª fÊsei t«n ˆntvn katã pçn m°row sumparekte¤nesyai; Oratio Catechetica,
32, PG 45.80. Referring to the aeons as time, he once more sticks to Origen’s
own words, speaking of tØn diasthmatikÆn t«n afi≈nvn parãtasin; Contra Eunomium,
12; PG 45.1064. Following Origen in the sense of ‘begining’ (érxÆ) in Gen. 1.1,
as referring to the providential creation he states that ≤ går ‘érxÆ’ pantÒw diasth-
matikoË noÆmatow éllotr¤vw ¶xei; Apologia in hexaëmeron, 8.; PG 44.72. Echoing
Origen’s view that God is the ‘cause’ of creation in no sense of any temporal causal-
ity whatsoever, he speaks of God as afit¤an . . . pantÒw diasthmatikoË noÆmatow
262 chapter six

Gregory of Nazianzus, 366 Basil of Caesarea, 367 Theodoretus of

Cyrrhenia,368 Hesychius of Sinai,369 Athanasius of Alexandria,370
Maximus Confessor,371 Cyril of Alexandria,372 John Chrysostom,373
Procopius of Gaza,374 John of Damascus,375 are some of those who
echoed Origen’s view and technical terminology for time.
Recording the views of Gregory of Nyssa on time and eternity,
R. Sorabji376 purports them to constitute a ‘fuller’377 account of the
divine reality, compared to that of Origen’s. Ironically though, what
he adduces as views of Gregory’s (contrasting them with those of

Íperkeim°nhn; De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur, PG 46.172. Again, he refers to

the generation of the Son exactly as it was portrayed by Origen and uses his mas-
ter’s own terminology: mhd°n e‰nai . . . ı metajÊ t∞w toË ufloË prÒw tÚn pat°ra
sunafe¤aw eÍr¤sketai, mØ diasthmatikÒn ti nÒhma; Contra Eunomium, 4; PG 45.661.
366
Gregory of Nazianzus: ˜per ≤m›n ı xrÒnow . . . toËto to›w éÛd¤oiw, afi≈n, tÚ
sumparekteinÒmenon to›w oÔsin oÂÒn ti xronikÒn k¤nhma; Orationes, 38.8, PG 36.320.
367
Basil of Caesarea: tª •autoË éÛdiÒthti sumparekteinom°nhn ¶xei tØn patrÒthta;
adversus Eunomium, 2.12; PG 29.593; ibid., 2.13 (PG 596). Also, Àste ˜lh sxedÒn
ényr≈pou geneã tØn §k toË m¤souw ÙrgÆn sumparekte›nai; Epistulae, 204.1; PG
32.745.
368
Theodoretus of Cyrrhenia: ı YeÒw toË xrÒnou t∞w zv∞w aÈt«n Ípet°meto: ·na
mÆ efiw xrÒnon makrÒn param°nontew, sumparekte¤nvntai tª kak¤&; Commentarius in
Isaiam, 26.16; PG 81.496ff. Here Theodoretus follows a meaning of sumparek-
teinÒmenon as in Origen’s commEph: éntifilotimoÊmenon ka‹ sumparekteinÒmenon
katã tÚ dunatÒn; commEph, Fr. IV, p. 239.
369
Hesychius of Sinai: sumparekte¤netai ényr≈poiw ı b¤ow §n §niauto›w, §n
mhs¤n . . . toÊtoiw êra §xr∞n ka‹ ≤mçw sumparekte¤nein tåw §nar°touw §rgas¤aw; De
temperantia et virtute centuriae ad Theodulum, 2.58; PG 93.1529.
370
The following passage strikingly repeats Origen’s own words and was used by
Athanasius in his attack against Arianism: Tå . . . kt¤smata . . . diasthmatikÆn érxÆn
toË e‰nai ¶xei . . . ı d¢ toË YeoË lÒgow oÈk ¶xvn érxÆn toË e‰nai . . . ∑n ae¤; Orationes
tres adversus Arianos, 2.57; PG 26.268. What Athanasius uses here is not only Origen’s
conception of the relation of the Father to the Son, but also his terminology of
temporal notions.
371
Maximus Confessor: tª . . . épeir¤& sumparekte¤nvn sou toË poyoËntow tØn
k¤nhsin; Opuscula theologica et polemica, PG 91.9.
372
Cyril of Alexandria: tª toË s≈matow ≤lik¤& sumparekte¤nein tå §autoË; Scholia
de incarnatione, 13; PG 75.1369ff.
373
John Chrysostom: t“ pant¤ afi«ni sumparekteinom°nhn . . . tØn timvr¤an; Homiliae
in Genesim, 27.10; PG 53.23ff.
374
Procopius of Gaza: tå . . . ye›a yelÆmata . . . tª ye¤& épeir¤& sumparekteinÒmena;
Commentarii in Proverbia, 4, 14; PG 87.1256.
375
John of Damascus: afi≈n oÈ xrÒnow . . . éllã tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon to›w
éÛd¤oiw, oÂÒn ti xronikÒn k¤nhma ka‹ diãsthma; de fide orthodoxa libri quattuor, PG
94.864. This is the same wording used by Origen in commJohn, 1, XXIX.
376
R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 123.
377
Ibid.
 time proper 263

Origen’s),378 are but Origen’s own expressions employed by Gregory.379

The definition of time proper as diãsthma; its relation to space, por-
trayed by means of the term sumparekteinÒmenon; the adumbration
of the divine life through the term édiãstatow, and, in general, the
conception of time and divine timelessness are simply word-for-word
Origen’s ideas and phrases.
Hence, this is not the case of a ‘fuller’ account. It is rather the
case of merely repeating the view of time and divine reality, as estab-
lished and couched by Gregory’s master, Origen.
I give one example of the distortions which Origen’s thought
suffered. In a paper, B. Otis380 actually follows J. Callahan’s views
of the conception of time in Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Casarea,
as discussed shortly below. It is strikingly obvious, however, that Otis
has but a vague, distorted and, at any rate, indirect knowledge of
Origen’s thought. I shall not comment on his claim that Origen’s
thought was but a Christian version of Platonism; neither on claims
such as that Origen regards the Son as ‘creaturely’.381 I only note
how erroneous is to argue that the use of the terms diãsthma and
diãstasiw used for time proper ‘first comes into the Christian vocab-
ulary with Methodius’ critique of Origen’.382 And he further notes:
“The point of importance is that before the Cappadocians, diãsthma
is used in a negative sense (as in Methodius of Olympus) . . . It is
not used as an essential and inalienable mark of all creatures. But
it is clear that the importance of time is brought out by the aban-
donment of Origen’s eternal creation”.383 The reader can judge for
himself how much the author of the article is unaware of Origen’s
views. He certainly does not suspect that Methodius in his (unfair
anyway) ‘critique of Origen’ was simply using Origen’s own notions

378
Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 1.359–64 (PG 45.364); 1.370–1 (PG
45.368); 1.685–9 (PG 45.461–4); 2.459 (PG 45.1064) 8.5 (PG 45.796); 9.2 (PG
45.809); also hom. in Eccl. 7, (PG 44.729); in Hex. (PG 44.84). On Gregory’s view,
s. H. von Balthasar, Presence et pensée (Paris 1942), pp. 1–10.
379
R. Sorabji includes the definition of time by Basil of Caesarea among these
‘fuller’ accounts. On this he obviously follows a mistaken view of J. Callahan’s,
which I discuss presently.
380
B. Otis, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Conception of Time”, Studia
Patristica, 117 (1976), pp. 327–57.
381
Op. cit. p. 332.
382
Op. cit. p. 336.
383
Op. cit. p. 336, n. 1.
264 chapter six

and terminology. Further, he does not know that what he calls the
‘Cappadocian conception of time’ has two aspects: first, a mainly
‘objective’ view of time, held by Basil; secondly, a mainly ‘psycho-
logical’ one, held by Gregory. Both of them originated in Origen
and both appear in Augustine. The author further claims that Origen
does not actually distinguish between ‘time’ and ‘eternity’: “his sys-
tem makes little of the difference” he alleges. In fact, however,
Origen’s distinction between divine timelessness and worldly time is
far sharper than it is in Gregory of Nazianzus, for example. For to
the latter afi≈n is adopted in a sense which might be taken as a
‘time of God’384 whereas in Origen there is no room for such vague
ideas, exactly because time in itself has a certain and crucial raison
d’être.
I made this extended remark for two reasons. First, because I shall
not comment on this paper again. Secondly, to quote an example
showing the extent to which Origen’s thought has been distorted,
and how his conception of time is ignored. In fact, not only Origen
is arbitrarily assigned ideas which are precisely the opposite from
those that he really held; but also the views of later Christian writ-
ers who just utilized his conceptions are presented as an ‘answer’ to
Origen!
The fact is that Origen’s terminology exerted a profound influence
upon his successors. They obviously found this nomenclature highly
meaningful as well as expressive, and so they utilized terms and
phrases verbatim. On this issue, however, there is a very substantial
difference, which eluded some of these Christian writers.
Nowhere in his entire work does Origen say that the divine life
is called afi≈n. The epithet afi≈niow (= eternal, in the sense of time-
less) is certainly applied to God throughout his writings. But nowhere
does he aver that the divine life should be applied the term afi≈n,
which after all is a Platonic definition. Whenever he refers to the
divine life he applies to it no noun at all. He just uses the partici-
ple sumparekte¤nvn, obviously as a figure of speech.
In stark contrast (which establishes a direct affiliation with Platonism),
some of his successors took up the term sumparekte¤nvn in order to
define the divine life as afi≈n: Gregory of Nazianzus states that “aeon
is not time nor is it a part of time . . . but what to us is time . . . aeon

384
Cf. PG 36.320; PG 45.4.628.
 time proper 265

is to the timeless, namely, that which is stretched out alongside with

beings (tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon to›w oÔsin).”385
This was the situation at the end of the Fourth century. As late
as Eighth century, John of Damascus avails himself of this language
of Origen, but follows the definition of Gregory. He allows that the
term aeon has many significations (such as a lifetime, or a certain
long period of time). In reference to the purport of the ‘aeon to
come’ (afi≈n ı m°llvn), he states that this “endless state after the res-
urrection . . . is not time, neither is it a part of time . . . but this is
what is stretched out alongside with the timeless (tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon
to›w éÛd¤oiw); . . . thus what time is to the temporal beings, aeon is
to the timeless.”386
The repetition of the terminology initiated by Origen is pretty strik-
ing. Yet it is instructive to notice the distortion of his views towards
an un-Origenist (and virtually Platonic) vein. For there is a cardinal
difference between him and those who bungled his exposition: Origen
does not say that the sumparekteinÒmenon to›w éÛd¤oiw (which indicates
the divine life) constitutes a definition of afi≈n. What he regards as
afi≈n is a purely and exclusively natural reality, a spatio-temporal real-
ity, as explicated by him in the clearest possible terms through an
ad hoc definition.387 On the contrary, both Gregory of Nazianzus and
John of Damascus take the term afi≈n to denote the divine life; which
means that they regard afi≈n as a super-natural and timeless reality.
Both in letter and content, they employ the Platonic and Neoplatonic
conception: afi≈n is not time, although it has a similarity, an analogy,
to time.
To Origen ‘aeon is a natural system’. This definition is radically con-
trasted with the import assigned to it by Platonists and other Greeks.
Whereas they regarded afi≈n as indicating the divine realm, Origen

385
Gregory of Nazianzus: afi≈n går oÎte xrÒnow, oÎte xrÒnou ti m°row . . . éllÉ
˜per ≤m›n ı xrÒnow . . . toËto to›w éÛd¤oiw afi≈n, tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon to›w oÔsin.
Orationes, 38.8; PG 36.320.
386
John of Damascus: tÚ toË afi«now ˆnoma polÊshmÒn §sti . . . afi≈n går
l°getai . . . ≤ •kãstou t«n ényr≈pvn zvÆ: . . . pãlin . . . ı xil¤vn §t«n xrÒnow:
pãlin . . . ˜low ı par≈n b¤ow , ka‹ afi≈n ı m°llvn , ı metã tØn énãstasin
ételeÊthtow . . . pãlin oÈ xrÒnow, oÈd° xrÒnou ti m°row . . . éllã tÚ sumparek-
teinÒmenon to›w éÛd¤ow . . . ˜per går to›w ÍpÒ xrÒnon ı xrÒnow, toËto to›w éÛd¤oiw
§st¤n afi≈n. De Fide Orthodoxa Libri Quattuor, 2.1; PG 94.861.
387
Origen is clear in defining afi≈n as a purely worldly reality: ‘aeon is a natural
system’; selPs, 5; PG 12.1172.
266 chapter six

applies this to the world. Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus

(although they made use of the temporal terms of Origen’s) attrib-
uted afi≈n a downright Platonic sense, in stark contrast to what
Origen himself did.
Philo, too, uses the term afi≈n stating that it pertains to God. His
conception of it is entirely formed under Plato’s influence: he regards
afi≈n as the ‘exemplar and archetype of time’ (tÚ xrÒnou parãdeigma
ka‹ érx°tupon).388 At any rate, Philo’s conception of time is the same
as that of Plato’s: time, by being an ‘imitation’ of an ‘archetype’, is
something which constitutes an affinity between God and the world.
By contrast, Origen regards time as the element which pointedly con-
trasts the divine reality with the world. Time establishes no affinity
between those two thoroughly different states. This is why, in adum-
brating the divine reality, he forebears to use the term afi≈n.
Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus are supposed to be
the exponents of the Christian orthodoxy. It is then an irony that
these authors pick up Origen’s very words and yet distort his con-
cept towards a Platonic definition of afi≈n. Their definition is a strik-
ing case a dissent (unconscious, to be sure) from the Alexandrian.
The difference is thorough and cannot be expunged by their ver-
batim use of Origen’s nomenclature. For this definition is sheerly
adverse to his natural (and plain un-Platonic) conception of afi≈n—
and yet it was Origen who was anathematized as a Platonist.
R. Sorabji389 also asserts that Philoponus ‘picks up the very words’
which ‘Proclus and earlier Plotinus, Basil and Gregory’ used in their
treatment of time and divine reality. Proclus certainly follows Plotinus.
But, with reference to the Cappadocians, the ‘very words’ that
Philoponus actually ‘picks up’ are not theirs, they are Origen’s.
As regards Augustine, G. Florovski refers to the creation of the
world and time, claiming that it was with Augustine that this rela-
tion was clearly portrayed. However, he was not aware of the fact
that it was Origen who initiated the concrete perception of the rela-
tion between space and time.390 Florovski’s impression is that it was

388
Philo, De Mutatione Nominum, 267; Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, 32; Cf. Quis Rerum
Divinarum Heres Sit, 165: xrÒnow is the b¤ow of the kÒsmow afisyhtÒw, whereas afi≈n
is the b¤ow of God and the kÒsmow nohtÒw. This is the same (Platonic) definition of
afi≈n given by Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus.
389
R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 117.
390
G. Florovski, Creation and Redemption, (Gr. tr. Thessaloniki, 1980), p. 50.
 time proper 267

Augustine who first clearly pronounced that the world was not cre-
ated ‘in time’, but ‘together with’ time.391 The truth is, however, that
Augustine was anticipated by Origen who had explicated that time
came into existence together with space. In the passages quoted by
Florovski, Augustine makes the distinction between the ‘world’ and
‘time’. Origen, however, had made the much subtler distinction
between ‘the structure of the world’ and ‘time’. In this way not only
did he precede Augustine, but also afforded a more punctilious and
accurate articulation by drawing the intellectual distinction between
space and time.
Like the rest of the aspects of Origen’s theology, this contribution
to the ontology of time has not only been disregarded, but also
widely distorted. I give only one example of how Hal Koch assesses
this thought:
Albinus and Origen represent essentially the same form of eclectic
Platonism, sharing a kind of basic Platonic horizon, with numerous
Aristotelian and Stoic elements added in. They manifest a wide-rang-
ing similarity in terminology, and they are taken up to a large extent
with the same problems, to which they provide essentially the same
solutions. In brief: they belong to the same school.392
The fact is, however, that if one looks at how Albinus treats time
proper, he will be faced with the use of the Stoic term ‘extension’
within an entire definition which is purely Platonic. According to
him, time ‘was made as an extension of the movement of the world,

391
Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, V. 5, PL. XXXVI, 325: “factae itaque
creaturae motibus coeperunt currere tempora; unde ante creaturum frustra tempora
requiruntur, quasi possint inveniri ante tempora tempora . . . potius ergo tempora a
creatura, quam creatura coepit a tempore; utrumque autem ex Deo” (Thus cre-
ated beings begin to run <moving> into time; hence in would be in vain to search
for time before creation, as if it were possible to find time before time . . . so it is
more likely that time began from creation than creation from time; yet both <derive>
from God). Also in De Genesi contra Manichaeos, J.2. PL XXIV, 174, 175; De Civitate
Dei, XI, 6, PL xli, 321: “quis non videat quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura
fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret . . .?” (Who does not see that time would
have never existed unless creation had come into existence, which by some move-
ment could change something or other?) and in p. 322: “procul dubio non est
mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore” (There is no doubt that the world
was not created in time, but along with time). Also in Confessiones, XI, 13, PL
XXXII, 815–816 et passim. Cf. P. Duhem, Le Système du Monde, II, Paris, 1914,
p. 462ff.
392
Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, Berlin, 1932, p. 268.
268 chapter six

as an image of eternity; and this [image] is a measure of the immutabil-

ity of the eternal world.’
Intermingling Stoic, Platonic and Aristotelian terminoloy, Albinus
says that time, as we experience it in this world, serves to under-
stand how timeless reality is like. That said, however, the ontologi-
cal conception of time is clearly the Platonic one: time is an ‘image’
of the eternal world’ (efikÒna toË afi«now).393 The conception of time
could not be different, since Albinus says all this in an exposition of
the Platonic doctrine. At all events, it is all but the case that Origen
and Albinus ‘belong to the same school’.

Conclusion

The questions about time proper which Origen had to resolve may
seem simple in the first place, yet they are not actually simple at
all. For the question of the reality of time was a highly controver-
sial one, and still is. The arguments from the time of the Eleatic
philosophers until the Sceptics were raising strong doubts as to
whether time itself really exists. Aristotle’s syllogisms had also con-
tributed to such a consideration.394 To the Stoics, time was just a
‘something’ between being and non-being, as ‘time was one of what
they called incorporeals, which are despised by them as inactive and
not being and existing only in bare mind’.395 To Gnostics, on the
other hand, time has no full reality396 and their tendency is to negate
and annul it. Time is not a Platonic ‘image’ of eternity or even a
Plotinian ‘imitation’ of it; it is at best a caricature of eternity and it

393
Albinus, Epitome doctrinae Platonicae sive Didaskacikos, 14, 6.
394
Cf. Aristotle Physica, 4.10, 217b29–218a30. Of great interest, and yet neglected
with respect to the problem of time, is the passage in Metaphysica 3.5, 1002a28–b11.
At that point Aristotle expounds his view of the substance (rather, the non-sub-
stance) of now in time. s. also: Fred D. Miller “Aristotle on the reality of time”,
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, LVI (1974), pp. 132–55; Norman Kretzmann
“Aristotle on the instant of change”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 50
(1976), pp. 91–114.
395
SVF, II, 166, 8–10; Cf. A.A. Long, “Language and thought in Stoicism” in
his anthology Problems in Stoicism. An account of the ancient arguments about the
reality of time has been given by R. Sorabji in “Is time real? Responses to an
unageing paradox”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1982, pp. 189–213.
396
H.C. Puech, “Gnosis and Time”, p. 83.
 time proper 269

is so far removed from its model that, in the final analysis, it is

regarded as a lie.397
Even in our day there are views which strongly deny the reality
of time. Prominent among them is that of J.M.E. McTaggart,398
which has enjoyed much attention amongst those who study the
problem of time. Although it has been argued that the words express-
ing flow could be replaced by other time-words not expressing flow,399
this view has been resisted by scholars such as R. Gale,400 whereas
others have conceded the replaceability of flowing-words in certain
restricted contexts.401 On the other hand, the idea of flowing time
has been heavily repudiated by others, such as D.C. Williams402 and
D.H. Mellor.403 Besides, in Physics there is a recent version of the
view that time might exist, but with a lower degree of reality; this
view is different from the Stoic one, inasmuch as it suggests that
time depends on a more fundamental and nontemporal reality.404
In short, the question of the reality of time has received a vast
variety of answers. Time is real, time is unreal, time is of a quasi-
reality (a view equally appealing to schools as rival—even on the
question of time—as the Stoics and Epicureans),405 it is of lower
degree of reality; time in itself may be real, but at least its divisions
are in mind; the whole of time is present (a view of Appolodorus
of Seleucia, 130 B.C.), or the present corresponds to the minimum
perceptible period (Poseidonius of Apamea, 135–55 B.C.); time comes

397
Op. cit., p. 61.
398
Cf. J.M.E. McTaggart “The unreality of time”, Mind, n.s. 17 (1908), pp.
457–74, revised in his The Nature of Existence, London, 1927, (vol. 2, Ch. 3).
399
Cf. Hans Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York, 1948.
400
Cf. Richard Gale, The Language of Time; s. also “Tensed statements”, Philosophical
Quarterly, 12 (1962), pp. 53–9.
401
Cf. H.N. Castaneda, “Omniscience and indexical reference”, Journal of Philosophy,
64 (1967), pp. 203–10.
402
Cf. D.C. Williams, “The myth of passage”, Journal of Philosophy, 48 (1951), pp.
457–72.
403
Cf. D.H. Melor, Real Time, Cambridge, 1981.
404
David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, London, 1980, pp. 210–12.
405
A major difference on the question of time was that whereas Epicurus pos-
tulated time-atoms, the Stoics held time to be continuous and infinitely divisible.
The convergence on ascribing to time a lower reality is due to different reasons:
Epicurus regarded time as a mere attribute of an attribute, a mere appearence, a
symptom accompanying things in motion. The Stoic views on the question have
already been discussed.
270 chapter six

along in indivisible atoms,406 or in divisible leaps;407 there is a kind

of time which does not flow or time in itself flows or moves.408
These references are only an example of the controversy which
has raged from antiquity until our day. It is against this background409
that Origen’s treatment of time should be considered. For it is only
thus that his decisive contribution to a certain (namely, Christian)
view of time can be really appreciated. Although he held a subse-
quent psychological view of time, his main and fundamental con-
ception of it was that time is an objective element in the make-up
of the world. He allows for the Aristotelian view that human dis-
course can be but tensed;410 but to him there is nothing of the
Aristotelian doubts about the full reality of time and particularly of
the ‘now’.
In modern thought there is also controversy as to whether univer-
sals (such as truth, justice, etc.) should be regarded as timeless or
not. For example, S. McCall denies the idea that truth is timeless.411

406
Such was the view of Diodorous Cronus as presented by Sextus Empiricus;
s. adversus Mathematicos 10.85–90; 143; 347–9; also Phyrronia 2.245; 3.71. On Diodorus
Cronus, including biographical information, a work by David Sedley particularly
useful: “Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy”, Proceedings of the Cambridge
Philological Society, n.s. 23 (1977), pp. 74–120.
407
The history of this notion is expounded by R. Sorabji in Time, Creation and
the Continuum, Chs. 5 and 25. However, it is still a moot question whether these
‘leaps’ should be regarded as something different from ‘time-atoms’; on this there
is some debate stemming from different interpretations of ancient texts, especially
those of the Sceptic Sextus Empiricus and the Neoplatonists Simplicius and
Damascius—the head of the Neoplatonic school at Athens at the time of its clo-
sure by Justinian, in A.D. 529.
408
This is a distinction proposed by Iamblichus, who died around A.D. 325; Cf.
Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, Leiden, 1973; Frs
61–8. His views are also reported by Simplicius as presented in S. Sambursky and
S. Pines, The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism, pp. 94–99. According to this tes-
timony, Iamblichus distinguished a generative (genesiourgÒw) time and a generated
(genhtÒw) and flowing (=°vn) one. The former is regarded as existing before all tem-
poral things, whereas it is only the latter which is divisible into past, present and
future. In short, Iamblichus draws a distinction between a higher now and a lower
now.
409
The term ‘background’ pertains of course to the reader, not to Origen; for
many of the views referred here are posterior to Origen. What I meant to show
is that the questions about time on which Origen did provide answers have been
highly controversial since Antiquity until our day.
410
A modern work providing an account of Aristotle’s commitment to tensed dis-
course is Jaakko Hintikka’s Time and Necessity, Oxford, 1973; Chs. 4 and 5.
411
Cf. Storrs McCall, “Temporal flux”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1966),
pp. 193–224.
 time proper 271

On the contrary, others such as W.V.O. Quine412 and N. Goodmann

regard truth as timeless.413 On these questions Origen has provided
his own answers a long time ago, regarding ‘truth’ as one of the
‘conceptions’ of the Son and determining its ontological status accord-
ingly in his resolutions about the ‘third’ and ‘fourth’ conceptions, as
we have seen. His notion of the conceptions of the Son clearly
demonstrate his opinion on questions which even today are highly
controversial. Origen could have no hesitation in declaring that truth
is not timeless. For truth is but a conception of the Son and it is among
these conceptions which ‘became’ together with time.414 Thus one
can see that issues which are modern (and all the indications are
that they will keep on being controversial questions) have been treated
by Origen in terms of his theology.
As for his notion of relativity in the perception of time, this is a
point where the ‘psychological’ and the ‘objective’ views are closely
correlated. I have reasons to believe that further study of this par-
ticular topic could show that his conception of time is not only mod-
ern, but also it has anticipated the future development of the
problematique of time to an extent which should be treated in a
study of its own.

412
Cf. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge Mass., 1960.
413
Cf. Nelson Goodmann, The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge Mass., 1951.
414
commJohn, 2, XIX.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

PROLONGATION OF TIME

As he does with all the cardinal notions in his thought, Origen but-
tresses the concept of prolongation of time with the authority of
Scripture. He always remains a biblical theologian, who is happier
with quotation from Scripture than in using philosophical terminology.
There are two particular passages in which he deems that the ori-
gin as well as the answer to this question would be found. The first
is Heb. 9, 26: ‘For then he must often have suffered since the foun-
dation of the world; but once and for all at the end of aeons he
has appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.’ The sec-
ond is Eph. 2, 7: ‘That in the aeons to come he might show the
exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness toward us through Christ
Jesus.’1 The question which seems to arise out of the juxtaposition
of these passages is how is it possible, on the one hand to speak of
‘end of aeons’ and, on the other, of ‘aeons to come’. In deOr this
question is posed thus:
It has occurred to me many times, and I wonder when I compare
two apostolic expressions, how there is an ‘end of aeons’ in which
‘once’ ‘in order to put away sin’ Jesus ‘has appeared’, if there are
coming aeons.2
This juxtaposition is the springboard for reflection on prolongation
of time. An answer to the question is found a little further in the
same work:
And in reflecting about things of this kind, I think that, it happens in
the same way as the end of the year is the last month, after which
there comes the beginning of another month; similarily this present
aeon is the end of many aeons which comprise a year, as it were,
after which some future aeons will come, the aeon to come being their
beginning; and it is in these aeons that God will show ‘the riches of
his grace in his kindness’.3

1
deOr, XXVII, 15.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
 prolongation of time 273

Besides, the conviction that a lifetime is not sufficient a period for

a human being to reach perfection, is an additional factor for employ-
ing prolongation of time. In homJer it is stated that anyone who
passes away is ‘going out’ holding both ‘hay and reed’ and ‘gold
and silver and a precious stones’ in his hands, that is; he ‘goes out’
of this life having committed both sins and good deeds. The ques-
tion to be asked is what is going to happen to this man. The answer
is that consummation, as purifying fire, destroyes ‘hay and reed’ that
is, what is evil; for ‘in the holy scriptures can be found that God is
stating first what is dimmer and then what is better’.4
The notion of prolongation of time is employed out of the need
for this ‘then’ to come to pass. So it is possible to consider that there
will be more time for rational creatures to strive further for their
return to God.5
In employing this exegesis, Origen feels that he has established a
way to explain the scriptural passages so that they do not seem con-
tradictory. This exegesis renders these two passages compatible, that
is, expressing consistently one unique conception of time. Hence, he
sometimes appeals to one of them and sometimes to the other.6
This is the scriptural basis of the idea of prolongation of time to
be introduced. The world had a beginning which coincides with the
occurence of the Fall, which marked the beginning of time. The
movement of the world in time thereafter takes place in periods,
which are called by the scriptural name ‘aeons’. This enables Origen
to preserve both the doctrine of the Church that the world had a
beginning,7 and his tenet that the whole of time comprises periods
or ‘aeons’. It is once again in the Scripture (Isaiah 65, 22) that he
seeks for authority in order to buttress up his view that a future
world will come to pass:
For Isaiah teaches that there will be another world after this, when
he says ‘There shall be a new earth, which I will cause to endure in
my sight, said the Lord.8

4
homJer, 16, 6.
5
homJer, 16, 5.
6
Cf. commJohn, 1, VI; frJohn, X; homJer, 1, 8.
7
Princ, III.4.1.
8
Princ, III.5.3. We recall that this section for the most part (and definitely its
beginning) should be regarded as having suffered interpolations by Rufinus. However,
there is no reason to dispute the scriptural passage on which the notion of pro-
longation of time is grounded. Generally, the scriptural authority as found in Princ
274 chapter seven

Accordingly, he appeals to Ecclesiastes9 for the notion of previous

worlds having already existed:
And that there were other worlds before this one Ecclesiastes shows
when he says: ‘What is it that hath been? Even that which shall be.
And what is it that hath been created? That very thing which is to
be created; and there is nothing at all new under the sun. If one
should speak and say ‘See, this is new’; it hath been already in the
ages which were before us’.10
The conclusion drawn out of these biblical portions is that “clearly
the end of this world is the beginning of the world to come.”11 As the
foregoing scriptural passages are taken to provide an authoritative
ground for the notion of a prolonged space-time, the conclusion is
couched accordingly:
By these testimonies each proposition is proved at the same time,
namely, that there were ages in the past and that there will be oth-
ers hereafter. We must not suppose, however, that several worlds existed
at the same time, but that after this one another will exist in its turn.12
At another point in the same work it is also stated:
This world, however, which is itself called an ‘age’,13 is said to be the
end of many ages . . . But after the present age, which is said to have
been made for the consummation of other ages, there will yet be fur-
ther ‘ages to come’; for we learn this plainly from Paul himself when
he says, ‘that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches
of his grace in kindness toward us’.14 He did not say ‘in the age to
come’; nor ‘in two ages’; but ‘in the ages to come’. I think, therefore,
that the indications of the statement point to many ages.15
Thus ‘the present aeon’ is just one in the series of aeons past and
future; this is why Origen refers to ‘this world and aeon’,16 by ‘this’

is also found in writings in Greek. What constitutes the interpolation of Rufinus is

the idea that the narration in Genesis does not refer to the very beginning of the
actual creation (I adduce evidence in due course); but the notion of prolongation
of time is Origen’s. Anyhow, this notion is enunciated in deOr. (s. supra).
9
Eccl. 1, 9, 10.
10
Princ, III.5.3.
11
Princ, II.1.3.; s. also, Princ, II.3.1; III.5.3; deOr, XXVII, 15.
12
Princ, II.5.3
13
Wis. 13, 9.
14
Eph. 2, 7.
15
Princ, II.3.5.
16
commMatt, 14, 5; italics mine.
 prolongation of time 275

denoting that the present aeon is one in a series of many ones. This
is also why he speaks of ‘the future aeon’,17 as well as of ‘the forth-
coming aeons’.18
Since these considerations are found also in works in Greek, we
can accept that the relevant points in Princ are authentic. It should
also be noticed that Origen is consistent with his view of time as
‘stretched out alongside with’ the ‘structure’ of this world. For there
is always a unique correspondence between the world and time: in
every moment of time there is only a single world.19 The multitude
of worlds is understood only in terms of succession, not as simulta-
neous coexistence, which is explicitly excluded.
It is in the light of this analysis that the distinction between ‘ages’
and ‘periods of time’ should be understood: “the Father and the Son
and the Holy Spirit must be understood as transcending all time and
all ages and all eternity. . . . The rest of things, however, which are
external to the Trinity, must be measured by ages and periods of
time.”20
The term ‘age’ is used to express the duration of a cosmic period,
whereas the term ‘periods of time’ is used indefinitely in order to
express a period either longer or shorter than an ‘aeon’.
Thus the motion of the world in time is realized through stretches
of time called ‘aeons’ or ‘ages’. The whole of time, therefore, con-
sists of consecutive aeons; time as a whole comprises many aeons
and is longer than the present age.
If, however, there is something greater than the ages,—so that among
created beings we think of ages, but among those who exceed and
surpass visible created beings, something still greater21 which will per-
haps exist at the ‘restitution of all things’22 when the universe reaches
its perfect end, then possibly that period in which the consummation
of all things will happen, is to be understood as something more than
an age. With regard to this I am influenced by the authority of holy

17
commJohn, 19, XIV.
18
Ibid.
19
Princ, II.3.6.
20
Princ, IV.4.1.
21
Here, especially in the expression ‘we think’, we find once again Origen’s
notion of relativity in the perception of time from the point of view of various ranks
of life. It should be stressed that this relativity refers to the perception of time; this
is why he uses the expression ‘we think’ referring to the duration of ages.
22
Acts, 3, 21.
276 chapter seven

Scripture, which says, ‘For an age and still more’. Now when it says
‘still more’, undoubtedly it wishes something more than an age to be
understood.23
Thus the entire conception of successive cosmic periods springs from
the questions raised by juxtaposition of scriptural passages. It is also
deemed that the answer to the pertinent questions are also found in
the Scripture, namely, in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Hebrews,
as well as in Isaiah and Ecclesiastes. In other words, the assertion
is that both the origin and the solution of these questions are to be
found entirely in the Scripture.
The notion of successive worlds and the emergence of a world
after the consummation of the previous one, was also one of the
main Stoic doctrines. Tatian, for example, states that we should
“leave aside” the allegations of “Zeno, who claims that the same
people in the same situations will occur again, namely that Anytus
and Meletus will accuse again, Voussiris will be again a foreign-killer
and Hercules will again commit the deeds”.24
All those who accused Origen for his tenet of successive worlds
have essayed to associate his views with the Stoic doctrine. In Princ,
as edited by Koetschau and translated in English by G.W. Butterworth,
we find the following note: “In Theophilus of Alexandria’s Paschal
letter, translated by Jerome in his Ep. 96, we also find the follow-
ing: ‘Nor does any man die over and over again, as Origen dared
to write, in his desire to establish the most impious doctrine of the
Stoics by the authority of the divine scriptures’”; and the note goes
on thus: “Rufinus has carefully avoided giving the views that Origen
really expressed”.25 This obviously implies that those views might
provide ground for the accusations of Theophilus of Alexandria.
Origen himself, however, neither ignores nor tries to conceal the
fact that this notion of successive worlds seems to have some appar-
ent similarity to that of the Greeks.26 He explicates his own opinion
on the doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds, regarding this Stoic
belief as ‘ludicrous’.27

23
Princ, II.3.5.
24
SVF, I, 32, 19.
25
FP, p. 83, n. 1.
26
Cels, IV, 62.
27
Cels, V, 20.
 prolongation of time 277

I do not know why Celsus, in writing against us, thought it service-

able to throw out a doctrine which needs much proof, or at least a
subjective argument, to show as convincingly as possible that ‘the period
of mortal life is similar from beginning to end, and it is inescapable
that according to the set cycles the same things always have happened,
are now happening, and will happen’. If this is true, free will is dev-
astated. For if ‘it is inescapable that in the period of mortal life accord-
ing to the determined cycles the same things always have happened,
are now happening and will happen’, it is obviously inevitable that
Socrates will always be a philosopher and be accused of introducing
new deities and of corrupting the youth; Anytus and Meletus will
always be accusing him, and the assembly of the Areopagus will vote
for his condemnation to death by hemlock.28 Thus also it is inevitable
that according to the predetermined cycles Phalaris will always be a
tyrant, Alexander of Pherae will commit the same brutalities, and those
condemned to the bull of Phalaris will always groan inside it. If this
is admitted, I do not see how free will can be preserved, and how
any praise or blame can be reasonable. The reply to this assumption
of Celsus will be that if ‘the period of mortal life is similar from the
beginning to end’, and if ‘it is inescapable that according to the deter-
mined cycles the same things always have happened, are now hap-
pening and will happen’, then it is inescapable that Moses will always
come out of Egypt with the people of the Jews; Jesus will again come
to visit this life and will do the same things that he has done, not just
once but an infinite number of times according to the cycles. Further-
more, the same people will be Christians in the determined cycles,
and again Celsus will write his book, which he has indeed written
before an infinite number of times.
Celsus affirms that it is only ‘the period of mortal life’ which ‘accord-
ing to the set cycles’ has of necessity always been, and is now, and
will be identical. But most of the Stoics say that this is true not only
of the period of mortal life, but also of immortal life and of those they
regard as gods.29 For after the conflagration of the universe, which has
happened and will happen an infinite number of times, the same order
of all things from beginning to end not only has occurred but also
will occur. In attempting to remedy the absurdities in some way the
Stoics say in every cycle all men will be in some unknown way iden-
tical with those of former cycles. To avoid supposing that Socrates will
live again, they say it will be someone identical with Socrates, who

28
The instances in this argument are commonplace: Cf. Cels, V, 20; Tatian, 3;
Eusebius, Fragmenta ex opere de theophania, II, 21; Nemesius, de Nature Hominorum, 38;
Augustine, de Civitate Dei, XII, 13; Origen propounds the argument with biblical
instances in Princ, II, 3, 4. Cited in H. Chadwick’s Contra Celsum, p. 237, n. 5.
29
The Stoic gods are not exempt from the process of §kpÊrrvsiw and diakÒsmhsiw.
278 chapter seven

will marry someone identical with Xanthippe, and will be accused by

men identical with Anytus and Meletus. But I do not know how the
world can always be the same, and one world not merely identical
with one another, while the things in it are not the same but are iden-
tical to each other. However, the primary argument in reply to the
words of Celsus and the Stoics will be discussed elsewhere at a more
convenient time, since at the present moment to give a further account
is irrelevant to our immediate object at this point.30
He returns to this issue later in the same work, in order to argue
against the Stoic doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds:
The Stoics maintain that a conflagration of the universe takes place
periodically and after that a restoration of order appears, in which
everything is identical with what occured in the previous restoration
of the world. All those who were content with the doctrine31 said that
there is a slight and very small difference between one period and the
events in the period before it. Now these men say that in the suc-
ceeding period the same things will recur: Socrates will be the son of
Sophroniscus again and will be an Athenian, and Phaenarete will again
marry Sophroniscus and give birth to him. Although they do not use
the word ‘resurrection’, they certainly maintain the idea, when they
say that Socrates will rise again after originating from the seed of
Sophroniscus and will be formed in the womb of Phaenarete, and after
being ubrought nurtured at Athens will become a philosopher; and
somehow his previous philosophy will rise again and will similarly be
identical to the one before. Moreover, Anytus and Meletus will rise
again as Socrates’ accusers, and the assembly of Areopagus will con-
demn him. And, what is more ridiculous than this, Socrates will put
on clothes which will be identical with those of the previous period,
and will be in identical poverty and in a city called Athens which will
be identical with that before. Phalaris will be a tyrant once more, with
a cruelty identical with that of the previous world, and will condemn
men also identical with those before. But why need I particularize the
doctrine about these matters held by the Stoic philosophers, even
though Celsus does not laugh at it but probably even holds it in high
regard, since he thinks that ‘Zeno was wiser than Jesus’?32

30
Cels, IV, 67–68.
31
Some later Stoics rejected this doctrine, namely, Panaetius (Diog. Laert. VII,
142; Cicero, de Nature Deorum, II, 46; H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, 469) and Boethius
(Philo, de Aeternitate Mundi 78ff ). Clement suggests the correspondence with the
Christian idea of resurrection (Stromateis, V, 9, 4); cited by H. Chadwick, op. cit.,
p. 279, n. 6.
32
Cels, V, 20.
 prolongation of time 279

Regarding the scriptural passages where the term afi≈n is used in

the plural, H. Sasse points out that they constitute an “obvious sug-
gestion that the afi≈n is not unique, but there is a series of afi«new
in which all things flow in eternal recurrence.”33 He affirms, how-
ever, that “the biblical view of the uniqueness of the course of the
world, which is also a view of Persian religion, stands in antithesis
to the pantheistic and astrological doctrine of recurrence with its
confusion of God and the world, of eternity and time.”34 Origen
does reject the doctrine of recurrence either. What Sasse does not
explain is why the notion of many ‘aeons’ necessarily entails ‘eternal
recurrence’. He just postulates his view without providing any rea-
soning to sustain this. It will, however, be shown that this assump-
tion of Sasse is not correct: a time which is understood to comprise
many consecutive aeons does not necessarily entail any doctrine of
eternal resurrence.
Origen then is sheerly opposed to the Stoic doctrine of recurrence
of identical worlds. In the light of those passages then, we can accept
similar ones in Princ. Therefore, the foregoing testimonies adduced
by G. Butterworth,35 which suggest some kind of connection of
Origen’s notion with the Stoic tenet on the subject, is unjustified
and ungrounded; for even in Princ these views are stated with equal
clarity:
Moreover, as for those who maintain that worlds similar to each other
and in all respects alike sometimes come into existence, I do not know
what proofs they can bring in support of this theory. For if it is said
that there is to be a world similar in all respects to the present world,
then it will happen that Adam and Eve will again do what they did
before, there will be another flood, the same Moses will once more
lead a people numbering six hundred thousand out of Egypt, Judas
also will twice betray his Lord, Saul will a second time keep the clothes
of those who are stoning Stephen, and we shall say that every deed
which has been done in this life must be done again. I do not think
that this can be established by any reasoning, if souls are actuated by
freedom of choice and maintain their progress or the reverse in accor-
dance with the power of their own free will. For souls are not driven
on some revolving course which brings them into the same cycle again

33
H. Sasse, “Afi≈n”, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. 1, pp. 197–209;
p. 204.
34
Op. cit., p. 205.
35
FP, p. 83, n. 1.
280 chapter seven

after many ages, with the result that they do or desire this or that,
but they direct the course of their deeds toward whatever end the free-
dom of their individual minds may aim at.
What these men say, however, is the same as if one were to main-
tain that if a bushel of corn were poured out on the ground it could
happen that on two occasions the grains would fall in exactly the same
positions, so that each single grain would lie the second time next to
that grain besides which it was thrown at the first, and the bushel
would be scattered in the same order and with the same marks as for-
merly. Certainly this is an utterly impossible thing to happen with the
innumerable grains of a bushel, even if they were to be poured out
again and again for countless ages. It seems to me, then, impossible
that the world could be restored again a second time with the same
order and the same number of births, deaths and actions; but worlds
may exist that are diverse, having variations by no means slight, so
that for certain clear causes the condition of one may be better, while
another for different causes may be worse, and another intermediate.
What may be the number or measure of these worlds I confess I do
not know.36
It is interesting that Origen does not confine his criticism of the
opinion of recurrence of identical worlds only to the Stoics, but he
extends this to other Greeks as well, namely to ‘the Pythagoreans
and Platonists’,37 who ‘hold similar mistaken opinions’.38 In addition,
he states that ‘the learned men among Egyptians’ hold similar views.39
Furthermore, though the Pythagoreans and Platonists assert the world
to be indestructible, yet they fall into similar absurdities. For when in
certain determined cycles the stars adopt the same configurations and
relationships to each other, they say that everything on earth is in the
same position as it was at the last time when the universe contained
the same relationship of the stars.40 According then to this doctrine, it
is necessary that when after a long period the stars come into the
same relationship to one another which they had in the time of Socrates,
Socrates will again be born of the same parents and suffer the same
misery, and will be accused by Anytus and Meletus, and be condemned
by the assembly of the Areopagus. Are then the scholarly men among
the Egyptians who have similar traditions highly regarded and not
laughed at by Celsus and his like?’.41

36
Princ, II.3.4.
37
Cels, V, 21.
38
Cels, V, 21.
39
Ibid.
40
Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 39D.
41
Cels, V, 21.
 prolongation of time 281

In the same work, namely Cels, not only Origen did rebuke those
who hold the doctrine of recurrence of identical worlds, but also
expounds his own opinion on the question:
As for us [we] say that the universe is cared for by God in accor-
dance with the contingencies of the free will of each man, and that
as far as possible it is always led on to being better, and we know
that the nature of our free will is to admit various contingencies since
it cannot achieve the entirely unchangeable nature of God.42
H. Sasse regards that the aforementioned passage of Ecclesiastes nec-
essarily implies the doctrine of eternal recurrence, namely, ‘periods
of the world in their infinite succession’.43 Origen, however, regards
this scriptural portion as implying only the succession of worlds, which
is not infinite, because time in itself is not infinite.

The cause of consummation

This aeon will be consummated because there is ‘evil’ in it. This is

the cause for this aeon, as well as any aeon, to be consummated.
Authority is once more sought in his hero Paul, ‘the wisest of the
high priests and the most knowledgeable of the priests’.44
The blessed Paul says; ‘redeeming the time, because the days are evil’45
(and if they are evil, then there is evil in them); and Jacob ‘few and
evil have my days been’;46 and Moses in the Psalm ‘the days of our
years in these years’.47 And everywhere in the scripture the days of
this aeon are called evil.48
Likewise, quoting Matt. 6, 34, he calls the present aeon allegorically
‘present day’, saying that the “present day is one of being tormented
and hard work and suffering hardship and pain”.49 His belief is that
“to the just this aeon is a winter”,50 adding this:

42
Ibid.
43
H. Sasse, op. cit., p. 205.
44
Homilies on Leviticus, 4.4.
45
Eph. 5, 16.
46
Gen. 47, 16.
47
Ps. 89, 10.
48
frMatt, 134, quoting Matt. 6, 34.
49
Ibid.
50
commMatt, 17, 23.
282 chapter seven

This entire aeon is a night, it is darkness. Light is still withheld from

you; you now see through a glass yet you will see the light in the
future. Nevertheless this entire aeon is a night.51
Further he reiterates his view commenting on the same biblical work:
“This entire aeon is a night. Light is withheld from you. What you
take now as light, is just how you see it through a glass; ‘And in
thy light we shall see light’.52 We shall see it in the future. Yet this
aeon is a night; and since it is a night, there are many wars, many
beasts going around.”;53 this state of things is due to evil ruling over
the present aeon; this “ruler of this aeon is allegorically called
Caesar”.54 As to the real cause of consummation, Origen holds firm
that the causes are moral:
Curse and lie are the cause of consummation; therefore, if they did
not exist, anger and consummation could not exist, either.55
It is out of God’s anger at evil having been accumulated in the
world that consummation takes place. Referring to Ez. 5, 13 ‘Thus
shall mine anger be accomplished’ (ka‹ suntelesyÆsetai ı yumÒw mou)
he comments thus: “This denotes that the anger of God will come
to an end in the same way that world will be consumed.”56 Hence
“we maintain that the cause of these events is the excessive torrent
of evil which is purged by a flood or conflagration.”57 Further: “When,
therefore, He is said to be a consuming fire, we inquire what is fit
to be consumed by God; and we say that as a fire God consumes
evil and the actions resulting from it”.58 So, “in this sense also ‘rivers
of fire’ are said to be ‘before’ God, since he makes the evil which
has permeated the whole soul to disappear.”59 And here is the
conclusion:

51
selJob, 35, PG 17.96; enarrJob, 35, PG 12.1044.
52
Ps. 35, 10.
53
enarrJob, 35.
54
commMatt, 17, 28.
55
selPs, 58, PG 12.1477. This is one of the more expressive statements for the
need of a prolonged time. If, hypothetically, free moral action were the proper one,
by everyone and at every moment, then there would be no need for a prolonged
time comprising many aeons. Referring to 2 Cor. 5, 19, ‘For in Christ God was
reconciling the world to himself ’, Origen says that “the postponment of our con-
version and the negligence of our amendment lengthen out the periods of this rec-
onciliation and make them longer.” Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.41.8.
56
selEz, 5, PG 13.784.
57
Cels, IV, 12.
58
Cels, IV, 13.
59
Ibid.
 prolongation of time 283

Accordingly, we do not deny the reality of the purifying fire and the
destruction of the world to destroy evil and renew everything that
exists,60 since we say that we have learnt these things from the prophets
out of the sacred books.61
The arrangement of the next world stems from the quality of free
moral action. This conception refers not only to the arrangement of
the world, but also to the duration of a certain cosmic period, namely
an aeon. This period of time is not a constant natural datum, it is
not pre-arranged by any natural law; it is related to moral action.
This means that the duration of a cosmic period depends on the
‘evil’ (kak¤a) accumulated in the world during a certain aeon.
In commJohn a ‘certain reason’ is asserted to exist for the occurence
of ‘cataclysm’ (as in Gen. 6, 13ff ); this reason is the purpose for the
‘seed of Cain . . . to be extinguished’. In order to ground this asser-
tion Origen again appeals to the Wisdom of Solomon,62 as well as
to Deuteronomy: the destruction of Sodom and Gomorah was ‘a
work of the good God’. Certain references to Psalms63 about destruc-
tion occurred in Egypt are taken to suggest the same notion.64 For
it is taken for granted that ‘it is not in accord with God’s character
not to stop the spread of evil and bring moral renewal.’65
The ‘destruction’ of the world then, which marks the end of an
aeon and, thus, the duration of it, is not due to any natural deter-
minism or cosmic law. This duration is determined by free moral
action of rational creatures. Which means that this duration is deter-
mined by creaturely freedom. This is a point which considerably
contrasts Origen’s thought from any pagan conception of cosmic
periods and this is set forth in his reply to Celsus:
Does not Celsus appear laughable when he supposes that ‘evils could
never either increase or decrease’? For even if ‘the nature of every-
thing is one and the same’, the emergence (g°nesiw) of evils is not by
any means always the same. Although the nature of some particular
individual man is one and the same, things are not always the same

60
I translate the term pantÒw not as ‘universe’, but as ‘everything that exists’, in
order to maintain Origen’s conception of the world; anyway this term is used
because it was Celsus who used it in his allegations.
61
Cels, IV, 21.
62
Wis. 10, 3; 10, 4; 10, 7. Also, Cf. Deut. 32, 32 and 33.
63
Ps. 77, 47.
64
commJohn, 20, IV.
65
Cels, IV, 20.
284 chapter seven

so far as his mind, his reason, and actions are concerned. For at one
time he may not operate according to reason, while at another time
he acts with reason in order to do evil, and this varies in its extent
either more or less. And sometimes he may have oriented himself to
virtue and is makes more or less progress, and at times he attains to
virtue itself, realized in more or less contemplation. So also even more
may this be said of ‘the nature of everything’, that, even if this remains
one and the same in genus, yet the events which happen to this ‘whole’
are not always the same nor of the same kind. For there are not peri-
ods of productivity or of famine all the time, nor always of heavy rain
or drought. Similarly, neither are there determined periods of fertility
or famine in the life of better souls; and the flood of worse souls
increases or decreases. To those who want to attain an accurate knowl-
edge, awareness of the doctrine about evils is necessary; for indeed
evils do not always remain the same in number, on account of the
providence which either watches over earthly affairs or cleanses them
by floods or conflagrations, and probably not only earthly things, but
also those of the whole world,66 which is in need of purification when-
ever the evil in it becomes extensive.67
This ‘whenever’ indicates the fundamental correlation between free
moral action and the duration of an aeon. Origen though does not
fail to reject Gnostic as well as Neoplatonic views, according to which
it is matter itself that is evil. In his thought evil is closely related to
freedom: “ignorance of God is . . . among the number of evils, while
one of the greatest evils is not to know the way to worship God
and of piety towards him”.68 Also,
in our view it is not true that ‘the matter which dwells among mor-
tals’ is responsible for evils.69 Each person’s mind is responsible for the
evil that exists in him, and this is what evil is. Evils are the actions
that result from it. In our view nothing else is strictly speaking evil.70
Hence, not only the notion of successive worlds and aeons, but also
the idea of the limits marking the consecutive aeons realized through
destruction and restoration of the world, are grounded on Scripture.

66
I do not translate the expression §n ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ as ‘universe’. I think, that
the term ‘world’, in the sense already discussed, is more appropriate here. Origen
does not refer to the visible firmament, but to the moral action of rational crea-
tures of all ranks of life.
67
Cels, IV, 64.
68
Cels, IV, 65.
69
S. also Cels, III, 42.
70
Cels, IV, 66.
 prolongation of time 285

Nevertheless Origen is aware of the fact that this idea is found in

the Greeks, too: the doctrine of cosmic destructions was held ever
since Heraclitus down to the early Stoics and this was also sustained
even by Stoics as late as Marcus Aurelius. However, his constant
concern was to contrast his conception of successive worlds from
that of the Greeks, contending that his own doctrine is not actually
originated in Greek thought. He claims that the Greeks had taken
the idea from the Hebrews, namely Moses, yet they ‘misunderstood’71
and falsified it to such an extent that the whole conception is un-
acceptable to him:
The Greeks also have a doctrine that the earth is periodically purified
by flood or by fire, as Plato also says in one place as follows: ‘And
then the gods flood the earth, purifying it with waters, some in the
mountains . . .’72 and so on.73
In the same vein, he refers to “the Theaetetus, where according to
Plato Socrates says: ‘But neither is it possible for evils to be destroyed
from men, nor for them to find a place among the gods’74 and so
on”. Further, “the passage in the Timaeus which says ‘And when the
gods purify the earth’75 has shown that when the earth is cleansed
by water it has fewer evils than it had during the time before it was
purified. And in agreement with the opinion of Plato we maintain
that at times evils are less, on account of the passage in the Theaetetus
that says ‘evils cannot be destroyed by men’.”76
Origen, therefore, is aware of the Greek views on the subject, yet
he insists that it is from the Hebrews that the idea had been taken:
According to the opinion of some Greeks (probably drawing on the
very ancient nation of the Hebrews) a purifying fire is brought on the
world, and plausibly to each individual who needs judgement by fire
together with healing. This fire burns, but does not utterly consume,
those who have no matter which needs to be devoured by it, while it
burns and does utterly destroy those who have built ‘wood, hay, or
stubble’77 on the building (as this is through tropology called) by their

71
Cels, IV, 12.
72
Cf. Timaeus 22D; Cf. Cels, I, 19; IV, 11.
73
Cels, IV, 20.
74
Theaetetus, 176A; Cf. Cels, VIII, 55.
75
Timaeus, 22D.
76
Cels, IV, 62.
77
1 Cor. 3, 12.
286 chapter seven

actions, words, and thoughts. The divine scriptures say that the Lord
‘like the fire of a smelting-furnace and like a cleaner’s herb’78 will call
upon each individual who is in need, because they have been mixed
with (énamem›xyai) the evil flood of matter, as it were (oflone¤ faÊlhn xutÆn
Ïlhn), which results from evil; and I say that they need fire which, so
to speak, purges those mixed with ‘copper’, ‘and tin, and lead’.79 Those
who wishes to know, may learn these things from the prophet Ezekiel.80
Because of Celsus’ claim that the Christians “misunderstood what is
said by the Greeks or barbarians about these matters”,81 he insists
that it is the Greeks who have ‘misunderstood’ and, therefore, falsified
the original conception. For Celsus,
failed to pay attention to the ancientness of Moses, who is reported
by certain Greek writers to have lived in the time of Inachus the Son
of Phoroneus. He is also admitted by Egyptians to be of far antiquity,
and also by those who compiled Phoenician history. Anyone interested
may read the two books of Flavius Josephus on the Antiquity of the
Jews, that he may learn how Moses was more ancient than those who
said that at long intervals of time there are floods and conflagrations
in the world.82
Likewise it is pointed out that “Moses is much earlier than Homer
and even than the invention of the Greek alphabet.”83 He argues
then that it is the Greeks who ‘misunderstood’ the idea of ‘destruc-
tions’ of the world—an idea which is originated in the Scripture:
Moses and some of the prophets were men of far antiquity; they did
not receive the idea of the world-conflagration from others. If one pays
due attention to dates, the truth is that others miscomprehended
(parakoÊsantaw) them and reproduced inaccurate knowledge about
these things; they thus created theories about periodic identical recur-
rences, which are indistinguishable from one another in both their
individual characteristics and in the events involving them. We how-
ever do not assign either the flood or the conflagration to any cycles
or periodic mutual places of the stars.84
I quoted all these with the objective of showing Origen’s insistence
on contrasting his notion of successive aeons with that of the Greeks,

78
Mal. 3, 2.
79
Ez. 22, 18.
80
Cels, V, 15.
81
Cels, IV, 11.
82
Cels, IV, 11.
83
Cels, IV, 21.
84
Cels, IV, 12.
 prolongation of time 287

particularly the Stoics. Nevertheless, he does not hesitate to employ

the Stoic terminology on the subject. For in fact it was Marcus
Aurelius who first used the term ‘aeon’ in this sense, that is, to call
each world-cycle an ‘aeon’.85 However, Marcus used the same term
to indicate a notion rejected by Origen, namely that of infinite time.
For he speaks of infinite time as proceeding from aeon to aeon.86
Earlier Stoics used simply the term ‘infinite time’. It was Marcus
Aurelius who used the term ‘aeon’ in order to indicate both the
infinite time of the universe as well as the time from the beginning
until the end of a certain cosmic cycle.87
One may wonder why Origen is so insistent on contrasting his
conception with that of the Greeks; why does he again and again
appeal to the particular scriptural passages which are seen to but-
tress up this notion. The answer is that his deeper motive lies in his
aim to denote his different conception of time. The question of recur-
rence is a principal one. For the attitude to it implies two radically
different conceptions of time. The pagan opinion of identical recur-
rence of worlds entails some very significant consequences, such as
the following:
1. Human freedom is dismantled from its actual content, to an extent
that it makes no sense at all.88
2. Conflagration, as the ‘end’ of a cosmic period, is a purely nat-
ural phenomenon.
3. The span of time in which a ‘period’ is stretched is constant;
among earlier Greeks, Heraclitus used to call this period ‘Great
Year’ (megãlow §niautÒw).
4. The world itself, in its motion in time, moves towards nowhere.
This is what led some scholars to speak of ‘cyclic’ time in Greek
thought.
Origen, on the other hand, is thoroughly opposed to all these fun-
damental implications. A cosmic period has no definite length of
time. Consummation of a world stems from purely moral causes and

85
Meditations, II.12; IV.63; VI.15; VII.19; IX.28; IX.32; XI.2; XII.32; Cf. J.M.
Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 284.
86
Meditations, IX.28; Cf. J.M. Rist, op. cit., p. 284.
87
Cf. J.M. Rist, ibid.
88
Cf. A.H. Armstrong – R.A. Markus, op. cit., pp. 121ff.
288 chapter seven

the world is directed towards an end. It is then important to focus

our attention on a phrase of Princ:
For souls are not driven on some revolving course which brings them
into the same cycle again after many ages, with the result that they
do or desire this or that, but they direct the course of their deeds
toward whatever end the freedom of their individual minds may aim at.89
This in fact denotes a conception of time according to which the
course of events is not a meaningless repetition, but a purposeful
striving and course towards a goal and end.
The fundamental conviction of Origen is then that what is ‘next’
is intrinsically related to the freedom of rational beings. For they are
not imprisoned in a depressive cosmic recurrence: rather it is their
freedom, which actually determines the course of the world. This is
why, in deOr, he declares that he does not know how the next world
will be arranged by the divine dispensation (t“ m°llonti metã taËta
oÈk o‰dÉ ˜pvw ofikonomhsom°nou).90
When, in Cels, he argues extensively against the Stoic doctrine of
recurrence of identical worlds, his main argument is that such a con-
ception actually abolishes freedom. If the Stoic doctrine is accepted,
he says, “I do not know how our freedom of will be saved and how
either praise or blame will be justified”.91 Freedom is the essential
inherent element of moral action; and it is an axiom that “if you
take away the element of free will from virtue, you also destroy its
essence”.92 In commJohn, too, the view that the future arrangement
of the world is contingent is reiterated: “and I do not know if similar
things or even worse may happen in long recurring periods of time.”93
Thus, he holds not a merely natural conception of time, but also
a moral conception of it, since time acquires a deeper meaning
related to moral action and freedom. It is not a natural law but free
moral action that which determines the duration of an aeon.94
In the light of this, time has a meaning different from any of
those of the Greeks. For what they had endeavoured was to cap-

89
Princ, II.3.4.
90
deOr, XXVII, 15.
91
Cels, IV, 67.
92
Cels, IV, III.
93
commJohn, 10, XLII.
94
Cels, IV, 12.
 prolongation of time 289

ture a scientific ideal; to know the cosmic process as a whole, to

render nature wholly transparent to understanding. All particulars
were to be understood in terms of natural universal law. This nat-
ural conception of the meaning of being into the world had a fun-
damental implication: in such an existential attitude man stands
impartial in the natural process and what remains to him is to know
what the cosmic process is. There is no evolution towards any final
goal, there is only an endless repetition.
This is the fundamental notion that Origen rejects. To him there
is a vision of an ultimate end, because this was promised. In order
to attain to this end though there is a task to be accomplished: this
task will be carried out and the goal will be reached only in time
and through time, as I shall argue presently.
In this conception of time responsibility is not denied nor any
notion of inherent triviality is accepted. This is how a radical break
between Christianity and Classicism was established. Hence, although
the notion of recurrence appears to have some similarity to the Stoic
one, there is a thorough difference between them. The Stoics regarded
prolongation of time as an established natural law from which they
simply cannot escape. Marcus Aurelius had already claimed that
there is nothing to be gained by prolonging life95 and Seneca argued
that perfection does not require prolongation, as life can be made
perfect in a finite time, even if it is short.96 To Origen, however,
prolongation97 is needed because perfection has an actual spatio-tem-
poral content and prolonged life does not mean identically recurring
life; this is part of a process towards a final goal.
What constitutes then the essential difference in the notion of pro-
longation between the Stoics (and other Greeks, too, such as Aristotle98

95
Meditations, II.14; The same argument is found in earlier writers, namely,
Lucretius and Cicero. Cf. Lucretius, de Rerum Natura, 3, II. 1087–94; Cicero, Tusc.
1.39.94; cited by R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 180 and n. 14.
96
Seneca. Ep. Mor. 32; 93, 7; 101, 8–9. cited in loc. cit.
97
Plotinus also argues for recurrence by another argument: he maintains that
there is only a finite number of seminal reasons (lÒgoi); so, when there are as many
creatures as the number of seminal reasons, a new period and a new cosmos will
have to start, containing the same creatures. Cf. Enneads IV.7.1 (23–5); IV.7.3 (14–9).
98
Aristotle did not accept the idea of a prolonged time either. In point of this,
he argued against Plato that the Idea of Good would not be better through being
everlasting, in the same sense that a white thing will not be whiter for lasting longer.
(Ethica Nicomachea, 1.6, 1096b3–5; Ethica Eudemia, 1.8, 1218a10–15).
290 chapter seven

and Epicurus)99 on the one hand, and Origen on the other, is a

sheerly different conception of time. I shall take the opportunity to
elaborate on particular facets of this crucial point in due course.
This analysis should be borne in mind in canvassing Origen’s con-
ception of ‘consummation’ (sunt°leia): He speaks of ‘the destruction
of the world, which our writings call consummation’, during which
‘changes in bodies occur according to ways that have been appointed’
and ‘world is constituted of these bodies’.100
The scriptural passages to which he appeals are not only Matt.
13, 39 and Heb. 9, 26 which H. Chadwick cites,101 but also Matt.
13, 40, Matt. 13, 49, Matt. 24, 3 and Matt. 28, 20: On this, H.
Chadwick points out that pagan writers do not use the term sunt°leia
in this sense.102 This is true; and it is precisely on this very fact that
one should also see Origen’s insistence on contrasting his own views
with the pagan ones. The deeper distinction of his idea of consum-
mation lies on his concept of cosmos, namely, a world comprising
rational creatures, whereas the ‘natural’ environment of these par-
ticular ‘worlds’ is treated as an issue of minor importance. What is
of significance is not the ‘consummation’ of the natural world itself,
but that of rational creatures. The very term sunt°leia (consum-
mation) is derived from the term t°low (end) and is primarily per-
ceived as the end of the existential status in a certain rank of life
and judgment of action during the time of being there. Thus, either
conflagration or cataclysm is regarded mainly as the cause of end of
a certain arrangement of rational life in various kinds of bodies, whereas the
question of the existence of the world as a natural reality is not
treated in much detail.
This is why Origen’s conception of sunt°leia should be regarded
as different from the pagan one. After all he was above all a the-
ologian, and was unwilling to involve himself in debates on ques-
tions of Physics. Nevertheless, in arguing against Celsus he expounds
to a certain extent his view of ‘consummation’ in a natural sense:
Subsequently, since Celsus suspects or perhaps even himself knows
(sunid≈n) the answer that could be given as a reply to the question

99
Epicurus also held that life can be perfect in a lifetime, even if it is short;
Principal Sayings 19 and 20; Letter to Menoeceus 126 (Diogenes Laertius 10.126 and 145).
100
Cels, IV, 57.
101
H. Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum, p. 231, n. 2.
102
Op. cit., p. 231, n. 2.
 prolongation of time 291

about those destroyed by the flood, he says: ‘If he does not destroy
his own offspring, where is he to cast them out of this world which
he himself made?’ We reply to this that He does not cast those who
suffered in the flood out of the world, which consists of heaven and
earth. Rather, he delivers them from the life in the flesh (t∞w §n sark¤
zv∞w) and, as He removes them from these bodies, at the same time
he removes them from being on earth, which in many places in the
scriptures is usually called the world.103
Thus “those who suffer in the flood are not taken out of the world
in an absolute sense”, as the world is consisting of particular ‘worlds’,
which although not seen are nevertheless included into the world”.104
It is perfectly clear that ‘consummation’ is an occurrence affecting
the entirety of the world, not only the earth. This is why “we do
not deny the reality of purifying fire and the destruction of the world
to destroy evil and renew the whole [world] (toË pantÒw).”105
Besides, “floods and conflagrations” take place in order to purify
“not only earthly things but the whole world” (oÈ tå §p¤ g∞w mÒnon
éllã ka‹ tå §n ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ) whenever evil in it becomes extensive”.106
Although this assertion mainly pertains to rational creatures, it
appears to resemble the Stoic one, at least in letter. This is why H.
von Arnim included an extensive part of this section of Cels in his
edition of the fragments of Early Stoics taking it that at this point
Origen is quoting Chryssipus’ views.107
It is obvious, therefore, that ‘consummation’ is of interest in as
much as it has to do with the destiny of rational creatures, not with
the natural status of the world, as it happened with pagan thinkers.
Origen is certainly familiar with this kind of knowledge and deals
with it only in case he is challenged to do so. This is what he does
in the same work setting forth his concept of consummation. He
expounds his views of the ‘destruction of the world’, of the ‘nature
of bodies’ and of the nature of ‘matter’ on a natural basis spending
an entire section108 in order to make himself clear. But the conclu-
sion of this section is indicative of his overall direction and objective:

103
Cels, VI, 59.
104
Ibid.
105
Cels, IV, 21; s. also Cels, V, 43 and 44.
106
Cels, IV, 64.
107
Cf. SVF, II, 337, 33.
108
Cels, IV, 60.
292 chapter seven

he feels that such a kind of debate is out of the purposes of his the-
ology and beyond the scope of that particular work. Origen depre-
cated direct discussion with Celsus anyway; so he rather briskly puts
an end to this through this statement:
But we are not going to discuss now the nature of the world when
we reply to the accusations of Celsus (éllÉ oÈ taËta nËn prÒkeitai
épant«sin ≤m›n prÚw tåw toË K°lsou kathgor¤aw fusiologe›n).109

This statement constitutes an expressive element of Origen’s own

existential presuppositions in expounding his thought and particu-
larly his conception of time. This is why he deals with the question
of consummation in a way different from the pagan one. His aim
is to give emphasis to the theological, not the natural, implications
of this concept. It is in the light of this aim that his notion of con-
summation (as his entire conception of time) should be understood.

The end of aeon and Judgement

Due to this different view of time Origen holds a different concep-

tion of the end of each cosmic cycle. This end is not a mere moment
in the continuous cosmic process: it is a moment of special significance.
This marks not only the consummation of the aeon, but also the
time at which God judges rational creatures on account of their
action during the consummated aeon. This is also a point, which
contrasts his entire conception of cosmic periods with the Stoic one.
While remaining unchanged in essence (m°nvn tª oÊs¤& ˆtreptow), He
comes down on human affairs through his providence and dispensa-
tion (tª prono¤& ka‹ tª ofikonom¤a). We adduce the divine scriptures
saying that God is unchangeable through the words ‘But thou art the
same’110 and ‘I change not’.111 But the gods of Epicurus, who are com-

109
Cels, IV, 60. Origen uses the verb fusiologe›n (to discuss the nature of the
world) throughout his works in Greek: Cels, IV, 40; IV, 60; frGen; also, the noun
fusiolog¤a (discussion of the nature of the world) in Cels, IV, 77; V, 36; VIII, 21;
commMatt. 13, 6; 17, 7 (which echoes Chrysippus. Cf. SVF, III, 74, 13, apud Philo);
both fusiologe›n and fusiolog¤a in frEph, 29. He obviously took the term from
Aristotle, and employed this in order to express his lack of interest in discussions
about natural questions; Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 406b26; De Caelo, 298b29; Metaphysica,
988b27; Aristotle used the term fusiolÒgow referring to the Presocratics, in order
to denote their philosophical priorities.
110
Ps. 101, 28.
111
Mal. 3, 6.
 prolongation of time 293

posite made of atoms and liable to dissolution due to their constitu-

tion, are at pains to throw off the atoms which may cause their ruin.
Furthermore, since the God of the Stoics is corporeal, at one time,
when the conflagration is ongoing, consists entirely of mind (gemonikÒn
¶xei tÆn ˘lhn oÈs¤an), while at another time, when world-order comes,
he becomes a part of it. They then have been unable to enunciate
the natural conception of God’s nature, as being sheerly incorruptible
and simple and uncompounded, and indivisible.112
In addition:
The supervision and providence of God permeates all things, but not
in the sense that the spirit of the Stoics does. Providence contains all
those under ptovidence (peri°xei tå pronooÊmena prÒnoia), yet not as
a containing body containing something material, but as a divine power
which has embraced all those contained. According to the Stoics, who
sustain that the first principles are corporeal, and thus hold everything
to be destructible, venturing even to make the supreme God Himself
destructible113 (unless this seemed to them to be utterly outrageous),
even the Logos of God, who comes down to humans and to the most
insignificant things, is nothing other than a material spirit. According
to us [sc. Christians], however, who seek to show that the rational
soul is superior to any material nature and is an invisible and incor-
poreal essence (ka‹ oÈs¤an éÒraton ka‹ és≈maton),114 the divine Logos
is not material. Through him all things were made, and, in order that
all things be made by the Logos, he stretches out not only to men,
but also to things presumed to be unimportant and simply controlled
by nature. Let the Stoics may destroy everything in a. But we do not
concede that an incorporeal essence115 is subject to a conflagration, or
that the soul of man or the hypostasis116 of angels, or thrones, or
dominions, or principalities, or powers is dissolved into fire.117
On account of this Origen regards the end of an aeon not only as
a consummation, but also as a moment of time in which judgement

112
Cels, IV, 14.
113
Cf. SVF, II, 308, 2934; II, 311, 23–32.
114
I translate oÈs¤a as ‘essence’, that is, in its accurate correspondent in English.
The rendering of oÈs¤a (essence) by the term ‘being’ should be avoided at this
point, since soul alone is in no way regarded itself as a ‘being’.
115
Again, I translate oÈs¤a as ‘essence’, not as ‘being’.
116
I translate ÍpÒstasiw as ‘hypostasis’ since this Greek word has been employed
in English, too; Origen at this point uses the term cuxÆ for human beings; the
term ÍpÒstasiw points to the incorporeal element of the beings of higher ranks of
life. His tenet is that the term cuxÆ applies to human beings only (Cels, VI, 71;
VII, 38; commJohn, 1, XXV). Therefore, the term ÍpÒstasiw should not be trans-
lated as ‘being’ for the same reason that cuxÆ should be translated as ‘being’ either.
117
Cels, VI, 71; s. also Cels, VI, 58.
294 chapter seven

takes place. This is why ‘the fire that is brought on the world is
purifying’ and ‘it is applied to each individual who needs judgement
by fire together with healing’.118 Consummation in not just a natural
occurence; it is closely connected with Judgement:
But if there will be a certain time when the world will be brought to
the end, which it must necessarily have since it had a beginning, then
there will be a certain end of the world and after that a righteous
judgement of everyone.119
In commMatt there is extensive reference to the end of the aeon as
the ‘end of things . . . which is also called consummation of the aeon’;
it is then that ‘the angels of God, who have been ordered to do so,
will collect the malicious doctrines grown in the soul’ and will dis-
card them into the purifying fire and it is then that judgement will
take place.120 It is then that ‘God who is above everything will be
the just judge of everyone for everything made during his life’.121
The end of an aeon as judgement is based upon two fundamental
conceptions.
First, God is incorporeal and rational creatures have in themselves
an incorporeal element which is susceptible of change, but not of
destruction, during a consummation. As argued earlier, the incor-
poreal element of a rational creature is in no way held to live as
an independent being. The dualism ‘corporeal- incorporeal’ (element
of a rational creature) is only conceptual, not factual; it exists only
in mind as an intellectual abstraction. This is why Origen comments
on Matt. 10, 28 (‘fear him which is able to destroy both soul and
body in hell’) stating that what this passage teaches is that although
‘the soul is incorporeal’ it will be not punished without a body’.122
This incorporeal element then is not a subsistent being in itself; it is
only part of the outcome which emerges from the concurrence of those
reasons and causes which result to the making of a rational being.

118
Cels, V, 15.
119
Cels, IV, 9. I translate the term per¤ pãntvn verbatim, namely ‘of everyone’
or ‘about everyone’. Translation of this as ‘of all men’, could be inaccurate, since
nowhere does Origen speak of ‘men’ at all. To him ‘judgement’ applies to the
entirety of the world, not only to the human rank of life; this is why he speaks of
‘everyone’ (per¤ pãntvn), not just of human beings.
120
commMatt, 10, 2.
121
Cels, IV, 31.
122
selPs, 1, PG 12.1097.
 prolongation of time 295

Secondly, there is a uniformity of nature of rational creatures.

This notion stands beside that of continuity of time and discontinu-
ity of space, since the whole world is held to comprise particular
spaces totally separated from each other, yet “all rational beings are
of one nature, and it is only on this ground that the justice of God
in all his dealings with them can be defended, namely, when each
contains within himself the reasons why he has been placed in this
or that rank of life”.123 The same notion is found in passages pre-
served in Greek: “Thus the marvellous works done by God are as
it were the rain, while the differing wills are like the tilled and
neglected land, though as land they are both of one nature.”124
The tenet about uniformity of nature of rational creatures is a
fundamental one. For the perception of judgement, as well as of the
outcome of it as rearrangement of bodies, are grounded on this notion.
This is why he argues against the Gnostics who consider higher and
lower rational creatures as being of different nature:
To those, however, who introduce [the notion of ] diverse natures (to›w
d¢ tåw fÊseiw efisãgousi) . . . we must answer as follows: if they retain
the doctrine that the lost and the saved come ‘from one lump’125 and
that the Creator of the saved is also the Creator of the lost, and if he
who makes not only the spiritual but also the earthly is good (for this
follows from their reasonings), it is nonetheless possible for one who
has become at the present time a vessel of honour in consequence of
certain former righteous deeds and yet has not acted similarly here
nor in a way befitting a vessel of honour, to become in another aeon
a vessel of dishonour; just as on the other hand it is possible for one
who by reason of acts older that this life has become here a vessel of
dishonour to become, if he amends his ways in the ‘new creation’,126
a ‘vessel of honour sanctified and meet for the master’s use, prepared
unto every good work’.127
On account of the uniformity of creaturely nature, God is ‘God of
the daemons as far as their creation is concerned’,128 which suggests
that God is not responsible for their quality as daemons: it is their
free will, which is responsible for that.129 He is God of the daemons

123
Princ, III.5.4.
124
Princ, III.1.10; Cf. Princ, III.1.10.
125
Rom. 9, 20.
126
Gal. 16, 15.
127
2 Tim., 2, 21; Princ, III.3.23; s. also commMatt, 10, 11.
128
selPs, 135, PG 12.1656.
129
Cf. Cels, IV, 65.
296 chapter seven

only in as much as they are creatures. In commJohn he rejects any

claim that the ‘essence of the devil is different from the essence of
the other rational beings’.130 He argues that ‘it is impossible to admit
that the essence of the devil is different and that the devil is not
susceptible to moral improvement’.131 At that point he develops his
argument, stating that we cannot say that an eye which cannot see
properly is of different essence from an eye which can see well; and
if something happens to an ear and it cannot hear well, this is some-
thing accidental and does not introduce any diffenrece in its essence
of being an ear. Thus devil is responsible for his being evil and God
‘is in no way responsible for evil’. Therefore, ‘it is the most absurd
of all absurdities to blame him who substantified and created this
being’.132
The devil then ‘became’ devil and there was a certain reality
‘when he was flawless’ (êmvmow).133 So the conclusion is that “one is
Son of the devil not because of his own structure, nor is someone
amongst men called Son of God because has been created such; and
it is clear that it is possible that one who once was a Son of devil
may become a Son of God.”134 There are extensive analyses in order
to ground the case against those who hold that “there are some
creatures, which are Son of devil by reason of their creation itself ”.135
Thus the notion of God’s radical transcendence, as well as his
incorporeality, allow for the perception of God as a judge during a
consummation. This is one of the reasons (though not the principal
one) why it is through and through emphasized that God is incor-
poreal (and thus, transcendent to space) and timeless (that is, tran-
scendent to time).

The outcome of judgement

The tenet about the outcome of judgement is based on the view

that the entire world is material and matter (either ‘seen’ or ‘not

130
commJohn, 20, XXIII.
131
commJohn, 20, XXIV.
132
Ibid.
133
Princ, III.1.12.
134
commJohn, 20, XIII.
135
commJohn, 20, XV; s. also commEph, p. 404 and p. 407.
 prolongation of time 297

seen’) and susceptible of any alteration by the will of God: “it is

possible for matter, which is underlying all qualities, to exchange
qualities” (dunatÒn éme¤bein poiÒthtaw tØn Ípokeim°nhn pãsaiw poiÒthsin
Ïlhn).136 For matter is “by nature subject to change, alteration, and
transformation137 into anything the Creator desires and is capable of
possessing any quality which the Artificer wishes”.138 Hence “changes
occur in the qualities of bodies” as “by God’s will a quality of one
kind is imposed upon this particular matter, but afterwards it will
have a quality of another kind, one, let us say, which is better and
superior.”139
In view of these portions in Greek, the authenticity of certain
points of Princ can be confirmed. Thus “bodily nature admits of
diverse and various changes, to such an extent that it can undergo
every kind of transformation”;140 the nature of rational creatures is
“changeable and convertible by the very condition of its being cre-
ated” and “bodily nature” is “capable of changing at the Creator’s
will, by an alteration of qualities, into everything that circumstances
might require.”141
This is the fundamental notion on which the conception of the
outcome of judgement is grounded. In selPs, Psalm 1, 5 (‘Therefore
the impious shall not be resurrected in judgement’) is commented
on thus:
Judgement of the just creatures is the transition from the body of this
life to the angelic realms; and (judgement of ) the impious is the tran-
sition from the body of this life to dark and dim bodies. For the impi-
ous will be resurrected not in the forthcoming judgement, but in the
second one.142
This transition takes place because it is possible for God to ‘alter’
the ‘quality’ of matter, since he ‘is the creator of it.’143 In Cels it is
stated that during “the destruction of the world, which our writings
call consummation . . . changes in bodies occur according to ways

136
Cels, III, 41.
137
A dictionary definition; Cf. Doxographi Graeci, 307a.2.
138
Cels, VI, 77.
139
Cels, IV, 57.
140
Princ, II.1.4.
141
Princ, IV.4.8.
142
selPs, 1, PG 12.1092.
143
Ibid.
298 chapter seven

that have been appointed” and “the world is constituted of these

bodies.”144 In the light of this,
we also know that there are ‘both heavenly bodies and earthly bod-
ies’. . . . as we believe in the resurrection of the dead, we affirm that
changes occur in the qualities of bodies, since some of them which
have been ‘sown in corruption are raised in incorruption, and some
sown in dishonour are raised in glory’, and some sown in weakness
are raised in power, and bodies sown natural are raised spiritual.145
Hence the outcome of judgement during a consummation of the
world is a ‘transposition’, a change of body, a transition of a ratio-
nal being to another rank of life. It is then possible for human beings
to become angels.146 For those who are ‘resurrected’ may become a
‘regime of angels’147 and in such a case their body will change com-
pletely and will become a body worthy of an angel, a body ‘aetheral
and luminous like the nature of the light’;148 for the angels who now
are in the heaven were previously men who strived well in human
bodies; and so did others before them.149
Likewise there is reference to those who, according to their mer-
its (katã tØn éj¤an) enjoy (épolambãnontaw) ‘in the resurrection’ (§n
tª énastãsei) now being in the most pure and translucent ‘spaces’
(xvr¤oiw).150 And it is better to live a life in ‘aetheral body’ (§n afiyer¤ƒ
s≈mati) than to live a life ‘in flesh and blood’.151
Accordingly, it is possible for human beings to become superior
to angels, once the latter fall.152 It is also possible for human beings
not to change rank of life after a judgement, but to remain ‘men
saved in Christ’,153 since it is Christ who apportions the true her-
itage and shares his victory with his faithfull followers. Finally, it is
possible for men to be ‘expelled’ and ‘condemned to go to a place
which is without any light at all’.154 In any event, those who are

144
Cels, VI, 57.
145
Cf. 1 Cor. 15, 40–44; Cels, IV, 57.
146
commMatt, 13, 28; expProv, 28.
147
commMatt, 17, 30.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
150
frJohn, CXXXIX.
151
commJohn, 1, XXVI.
152
commMatt, 15, 27.
153
commMatt, 10, 13.
154
commMatt, 17, 16.
 prolongation of time 299

now human beings have been judged in a previous judgement and

have been found neither to fall too much nor to commit such deeds
as to become angels.155 Thus any kind of transformation and trans-
position is possible as an outcome of a judgement. This is how the
idea is expounded in a more general way.
It is, therefore, possible that one who is a seed of Abraham to become
also a child of his, through diligence; and it is possible for one who
is a child of Abraham to lose being his seed, because of negligence
and uncultivation.156
In view of this it is pointed out that “it is possible” that “the
soul . . . may either descend from the highest good to the lowest evil
or to be restored from the lowest evil to the highest good”;157 and
“in the day of judgement . . . the good will be separated from the
evil and the righteous from the unrighteous and every individual soul
will by the judgement of God be allotted to that place of which his
merits have rendered him worthy”.158
Subsequently, “during the consummation, those wicked on the
earth will be shaked, while the saints, being mountains159 will be
translated in the same way as as Enoch was.”160 So God is regarded
as “creator and wise and provident and judge”. That he is “judge”
is assumed from “the various bodies of rational creatures, and the
various worlds” (diã tå diãfora s≈mata t«n logik«n ka‹ toÁw poik¤louw
kÒsmouw).161
In order to ground the notion of ‘various bodies’, Origen appeals
to Paul162 who affirms that ‘God gives (d¤dvsin) to each a body as
he pleased (kay≈w ±y°lhsen)’:163 He argues that “like seeds that are
sown, so those who are sown in death, so to speak, and who, at the
appropriate time, take up (énalambanÒntvn) the body which is
appointed by God for each one in accordance with his merits, out
of the bodies that are sown.”164

155
commMatt, 12, 30.
156
commJohn, 20, V.
157
Princ, III.1.23.
158
Princ, II.9.8.
159
Using the language of Ps. 45, 3.
160
selPs, 45, PG 12.1433.
161
selPs, 138, PG 12.1661.
162
Quoting 1 Cor. 15, 35–38; s. Cels, V, 18.
163
1 Cor. 15, 38.
164
Cels, V, 19.
300 chapter seven

The participle énalambanÒntvn, being in the Present Tense, is

indicative of the concept of successive aeons. This in fact implies
that ‘taking up’ of a body is an occurence happening not just once,
but regularly, at the end of each aeon. Paul’s expression d¤dvsin
(gives) is also quite fit for Origen to couch his concept: this is a form
in Present Tense, which indicates an action which takes place reg-
ularly. In contrast, the expression kay≈w ±y°lhsen (as He pleased) is
in the Past Tense, which denotes an action which once took place in
the past: God established this ‘eternal law’165 once, because he willed
so out of an act of volition. There is no timeless causality compelling
him to do so, as I argue anon.
Therefore, the result of judgement is a rearrangement of rational
beings in different ranks of life. The rank of life, which a rational
creature will be granted after judgement, will be his space during
the aeon to come. At the end of that next aeon another consum-
mation will take place, also another judgement and another rearrange-
ment of rational beings in the ranks of life will follow according to
their merits.
In the light of this, R. Sorabji’s representation of Origen as enter-
taining the hypothesis that only those who need correction will be
reborn in successive worlds166 is not correct. This claim overlooks a
fundamental element of Origen’s thought: it is not the relation between
God-man that is studied, but the relation between God-rational crea-
tures, namely, the relation of God to a world comprising many ranks of
life and different spaces, separated from each other in terms of quality.
Hence the assertion that certain creatures “will not be reborn”
makes no sense at all. In fact, R. Sorabji implicitly ascribes to Origen
the Platonic conception a soul, which assumes a material body only
in case punishment and correction is necessary. What Origen holds
is that once a rational creature has been created, he will live through-
out all time, always in a body: thus he will certainly be present in all
the successive worlds in one rank of life or another, according to
his merits. If R. Sorabji states “only those who need correction” in
the sense of “to come into human life again”, this is not correct.
For a formerly human being may need correction and yet not to

165
commJohn, 20, XXXIX. Cf. Lev., 6, 15; Num., 15, 15; Is. 24, 5.
166
R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 188.
 prolongation of time 301

be reborn in the human rank of life: he may be found to deserve

transposition either to a lower, or a higher, rank of life.
According to this theory, the expected judgement at the end of
the present aeon will not be a ‘final judgement’. This is why there
are references to a ‘second’ judgement,167 implying that which will
take place at the end of the next aeon. This is a conviction trace-
able at other points of writings in Greek. In homJer there is refer-
ence to ‘the first resurrection’ appealing to Rev. 20, 6, but also
mention is made to ‘one of the later’ resurrections,168 through state-
ments such as this: “Who is he who is saved in a later resurrection?
It is he who needs to be baptized by fire.”169 In the Seventh Homily
on Jeremiah he implies the same notion speaking of ‘future punish-
ments’,170 since there are not only those for whom only one ‘pun-
ishment’ befalls in the ‘consummation’,171 but also others who incur
a ‘second’, even a ‘third’, nonetheless a ‘fourth’ and even a seventh
one.172 This latter is drawn from the passage in Leviticus 26, 21 (‘I
will bring seven times more plagues upon you’) which is taken to
“denote a certain mystery”.173 His view is that just as they “serve in
a sanctuary which is only a copy and shadow of heavenly things”,174
so the people of Israel were punished for their sin as a copy and
shadow of the real punishments; so all the punishments which have
been written in the law and the prophets actually contain “a shadow
of the real punishments”.175 So a punishment for sins committed in
a certain aeon may occur not only in the subsequent one, but also
in an aeon after that, which is a n idea grounded on Matt. 12, 32:
I understand that some are kept by their own sin not only in this aeon
but even in the aeon to come; they are those about whom the Scripture
says ‘whosoever speaks against the Holy Spirit, he shall not be for-
given neither in this aeon nor in the aeon to come’;176 and indeed not
only in the next aeon but also in the aeons to come.177

167
selPs, 1.
168
homJer, 3, 3.
169
Ibid.
170
homJer, 7, 1.
171
Ibid.
172
homJer, 7, 2.
173
Ibid.
174
Heb. 8, 5.
175
homJer, 7, 1.
176
Matt. 12, 32: Mark 3, 29: Cf. Luke 12, 10.
177
Using the language of Eph. 2, 7; s. also commJohn, 2, XI; 19, XIV.
302 chapter seven

On account of this, he refers then to “those people whose sins are

not forgiven not only in this aeon but also during the whole aeon
to come”.178 In deOr, Origen seems to have moved from this atti-
tude of his youth, yet he is still uncertain:
If I may offer a conjecture on so great a matter, I think that, as the
last month is the end of the year, after which the beginning of another
month ensues, so it may be that, since several ages complete as it were
a year of ages, the present age is ‘the end’, after which certain ‘ages
to come’ will ensue, of which the age to come is the beginning, and
in those coming ages God will ‘shew the riches of his grace in kind-
ness’: when the greatest sinner, who has spoken ill of the Holy Spirit
is under the power of sin throughout the present age as well as dur-
ing the aeon to come from beginning to end, [whereas] how he [sc.
God] will dispense things after that I do not know.179
Finally, in commMatt, a work of his theological maturity, it is stated
that sin will not be unforgiven indefinitely in the ‘aeons to come’,
but it will be kept only until the aeon to come. Commenting on the
Psalm 76, 8 (‘Will the Lord cast off in the aeons?, MØ efiw toÁw afi≈naw
ép≈setai KÊriow;) he says:
Speaking with greater daring, the Lord will not cast off ‘in the aeons’;
for it is already quite much that he casts off in one aeon; but cer-
tainly he will cast off in a second aeon, in the case that the sin is of
the kind which ‘is not to be forgiven neither in this aeon nor in the
aeon to come’.180
On this point one might notice an evolution in the doctrine of ret-
ribution of sins, although the fundamental conception of prolonged
time remains unchanged. The section of commJohn was written some-
time around 231 and here he seems to be categorical. The passage
in deOr (written in 232 or 233) represents a rather uncertain attitude
on the point, whereas commMatt (written in Caesarea in 244 and 248)
seems to expound his definitive attitude.181

178
homJer, 12, 10.
179
deOr, XVII, 15.
180
Matt. 12, 32; commMatt, 15, 31. Even in commMatt, however, there are rings
of his earlier attitude: Cf. commMatt, 14, 5: efi d¢ tiw Íperbãw tå katã tÚn kÒsmon ka‹
tÚn afi«na toËton èmartÆseiai, §ãn ka‹ toËto mikrÒn √, oÈk°ti ên ¶xoi eÎlogon èmarti«n
êfesin. . . . oÈk §sti d¢ êfesiw oÈd° édelf“ t“ Íp°r tå •bdomÆkonta ka‹ •ptã ≤marthkÒti.
Also commMatt, 16, 22: . . . frontiz°tvsan, mÆpote §ly≈n ı ÑIhsoËw §kbal≈n aÈtoÊw
§k toË fleroË (toË yeoË), ˜te ı §kbeblhm°now oÈd° §lp¤da toË efiselye›n ¶xei ˜yen
§jeblÆyh.
181
Cf. Marguerite Harl, op. cit., pp. 70–1; also s. A. von Harnack, Geschichte der
altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius, Leipsig, 1904; Teil II/2, pp. 26–57.
 prolongation of time 303

In any case, Origen’s time is not terminated at the end of the

present aeon. Hence it is possible to speak of an ‘after’ the con-
summation,182 denoting the continuation of time after the consum-
mation and judgement, in the aeon to come.
Thus the term ‘end’ may, in the first place, mean the end of the
present aeon,183 clearly implying that this is not an absolute end of
time itself, but merely a moment of it. For each of the consecutive
aeons is understood to be a part of the one continuum of time. This
is why one should speak of prolongation of time. Time is continued
throughout successive worlds and constitutes one reality of the world.
Recurrence of (non-identical) worlds is understood to occur in this
continuum; but although the ‘worlds’ are many, time is one. The
time of a next aeon is not, as it were, another time. It is one and
the same continuum. This is stretched out alongside with the struc-
ture of the series consecutive worlds. This is why Origen speaks of
‘the order of the entirety of aeons’ (per¤ t∞w §n ëpasi to›w afi«si
diatãjevw),184 and ‘the extension of the whole time’ (toË diastÆmatow
tÚn ˜lon xrÒnon).185 Likewise, the notion of time comprising aeons,
yet being one, is expounded as as follows:
And certainly nothing has been or will be neglected by God, who at
each time (kairÒn) makes what he should be making in a world which
is changeable and mutable. And just as at different seasons of the year
a farmer186 does different agricultural jobs upon the earth and its crops,
so God dispenses all the aeons as if they were years, so to speak (oflone¤
§niautoÊw tinaw ofikonome› ˘louw toÊw afi≈naw). In each one of them he
does what is reasonable for the whole, and the truth of this is clearly
comprehended and accomplished by God alone since the truth is known
to him.187
P. Plass suggests that Origen holds a notion of ‘a higher time con-
sisting of aeons’.188 This mistake is relevant to his claim that Origen
holds a notion of a ‘sacred time’, on which I commented earlier.
Subsequently he makes the mistake to aver that beyond time there

182
commMatt, 14, 12.
183
Cf. selJos, PG 12.820.
184
deOr, XXVII, 14.
185
commJohn, 10, XXXIX.
186
S. also Princ, III.1.14.
187
Cels, IV, 69.
188
P. Plass, op. cit., p. 14.
304 chapter seven

is a ‘changeless duration’ which is something between God and time.

This ‘duration’ is said to be ‘changeless only while it lasts’. All these
assertions are erroneous. In Origen there are only the distinct notions
of time and timelessness, existing respectively in two realities, which
are clearly distinguished from each other. The conception of ‘aeons’
simply depicts the idea of prolongation of time, and nothing beyond
that.
On the other hand, J. Daniélou claims that ‘the totality of time’
in Origen is consisted of ‘the jubilee of aeonian years’. He thinks
that on this point also he had been ‘anticipated by the Gnostics.’189
Obviously J. Daniélou misconstrued a passage in deOr190 where an
allegorical exegesis of biblical temporal terms is provided.
On account of this conception of time, scriptural temporal terms
such as ‘years’ or ‘days’ are quite often interpreted by Origen as
signifying ‘aeons’, according to the perception of a prolonged his-
torical process in the continuum of time.191 This is why he so often
entertains to terms such as ‘today’ or ‘yesterday’ the exegesis that
they may be figures, which actually indicate ‘aeons’. Thus, the term
‘today’ may mean the present aeon, whereas ‘yesterday’ may mean
the past aeon.192
It is noteworthy that O. Cullmann also holds a notion of succes-
sive aeons in what he regards as biblical view of time. He holds that
the infinite time is divided into three periods, which are also called
‘aeons’ according to scriptural terminology. He discerns a ‘past aeon’,
which is the time before creation;193 there is the ‘present aeon’, which
is the time since creation onwards; and finally there is a third aeon,
which is the ‘aeon to come’.194 The first aeon is beginningless and

189
J. Danièlou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, tr. J.A. Baker, London, 1973;
p. 496.
190
deOr, XXVII, 16.
191
Cf. frMatt, 396; frMatt, 400; commMatt, 15, 31; 15, 34. In homJer, 12, 10, it is
stated not only that ‘day’ denotes the ‘present aeon’, but also that the end of the
day will be ‘darkness and night’, because at the end of this ‘day’ there will be ‘con-
summation’ and ‘punishment’; also selPs, 40; selPs, 41.
192
deOr, XXVII, 13.
193
O. Cullmann, Christ and Time, pp. 62 and 76; he draws the notion from the
scriptural expression ‘before the aeons’ (prÚ t«n afi≈nvn, 1 Cor. 2, 7) and postu-
lates that this expression does not prove that what is ‘before time’ is timeless. Yet
he does not himself buttress up this assertion at all.
194
Ibid.
 prolongation of time 305

was terminated when creation was made. The present aeon had a
beginning and will have an end, which will mark the beginning of
the endless aeon to come. In any case Cullmann is not sure as to
how many aeons are indicated through the language of the New
Testament. So he speaks of ‘three aeons at least.’195
There is good reason for Origen to employ the notion of pro-
longation of time. On the contrary, Cullmann does not say why
(what he claims to be biblical) time should be regarded as consist-
ing of aeons. He just appeals to biblical passages where he finds the
term ‘aeon’ or ‘aeons’. His assertion that the passage in Revelation
10, 6 (‘there should be time no longer’) does not mean that time
itself will be terminated, but just means ‘there will be no more
delay’,196 is as elective as its opposite could be. The same goes for
his claim that time did exist before creation, since it is grounded on
his contention that time is not a creature made by God.197
According to Cullmann, God is in time and so is creation. It is
remarkable that, in our day (when there is little doubt that time
proper is inseparably connected with space, both of them constitut-
ing one reality), Cullmann claims that time ‘in its essence . . . is not
connected with the creation’ and time ‘in its essence’ has not ‘first
appeared with the creation’ as a state of ‘downfall’.198 All these are
postulated in order to avoid ‘the danger’ of a ‘Platonic conception’,
namely, the danger to regard that divine being is ‘timeless’.199 Cullmann
appears to be haunted by what he regards as ‘danger’ in Greek
thought.
In contrast, Origen affirms the close and inseparable coherence
between time and space and portrays this connection by means of
a sophisticated terminology. This is why, in order to speak of pro-
longation of time, it was necessary to expound the notion of suc-
cessive worlds. It is impossible to speak of prolonged time without
speaking of the world connected with it. It is rather through speaking
of the successive worlds in time that the notion of prolongation could
be properly understood. To claim that it is possible to speak of

195
Op. cit., p. 76.
196
O. Cullmann, op. cit., p. 63.
197
Op. cit., p. 73.
198
Op. cit., p. 73.
199
Op. cit., p. 73.
306 chapter seven

prolongation of time without also speaking of the world attached to

it, is tantamount to separating the one reality of space-time and to
speak of time while neglecting space. This is why I wish to point
out what is actually meant by references to the ‘shape’ of time, that
is, cyclical or rectilinear time, or other theories about the ‘shape’ of
time, which was partially discussed earlier.
When a certain kind of line is drawn in order to portray time,
this line does not actually portray time proper. It rather indicates
space in time. Each point of the line is but a certain position of the
world in time. So the consecutive points, which are supposed to com-
prise this line, render a geometrical scheme which actually portrays
the world in its consecutive positions into the continuum of time.
Using Origen’s sophisticated terminology, I can say this: the shape
of time is only the ideational succession of the ‘structure of the world’
in its consecutive positions of motion in time. So, prolonged time
and its meaning are studied through a study of the positions of the
‘structure of the world’ in time. Time proper cannot be represented
through a designed scheme; it is only spatial positions, which can be
portrayed through some kind of picture. It is through the movement
of the world in time, through the perception of the incessant suc-
cession of positions in time that the flux in time is perceived and por-
trayed through a geometrical figure.
Thus it is only through the notion of the inseparable association
of space with time that such a geometrical figure can make sense as
a portrayal of time. This is why Cullmann actually contradicts him-
self when he represents time as a line. For once he does not accept
the inseparable connection of time proper to space, there is no log-
ical argument for him to ground the view that this line portrays time.
By reason of Origen’s fundamental perception of space-time as an
inseparable reality, in this chapter the topic of prolongation of time
has been canvassed through his notion of successive worlds. Indeed
the succession of worlds actually indicates the flux in a prolonged
time. One might argue that, in the previous analyses, the notion of
time could be substituted by a term such as ‘history’.200 I shall not
object to that. Yet what really is history? Is it not a notion which

200
Let us, for a moment, disregard the fact that history is a notion pertaining to
the human rank of life, whereas Origen’s conception of the movement of the world
is something much broader than just human history.
 prolongation of time 307

intrinsincly entails spatio-temporal implications? Is not history just

the perception of the world’s existence moment-after-moment in the
flux in time? Hence, does not history itself, in the final analysis,
imply the kind of time itself ? As a matter of fact, history is but an
observation and portrayal of the flux of the world in time. History
is par excellence the notion which indicates the fact that space and
time constitute one reality.
This is what eluded Aristotle (as well as the Stoics, not to men-
tion the Epicureans and Sceptics) when they argued against the full
reality of time. He regarded the present as extensionless, the past as
not existing any more and the future as not existing yet. Thus there
is nothing of time actually existing. The reasoning of Aristotle (as well
as Zeno’s paradoxes) puzzled philosophers for a long time thereafter.
At the time of the closure of the Platonic Academy in Athens, in
529 A.D., its head Damascius was still working on them and philoso-
phers (Damascius, Simplicius, et al.) continued their studies even
after the closure of the school.
These arguments, however, are bound to be unresolved unless
space-time is faced as one reality. The Stoics quite erroneously regarded
as real what is present, namely what exists now. Accordingly, to Aristotle
now does not actually exist, but it is only a potential reality which
exists only once a point in a line is singled out—otherwise it does
not exist; this is one of the notions through which Aristotle attempted
to tackle with Zeno’s paradoxes.
Hence, according to the assertion that real is only what is present,
it could be argued that the reality of the battle of Thermopylae
should be challenged because it is not a fact present. This kind of
argument could certainly go too far. For what Aristotle did not do
in treating time in Physics was to consider time inseparably from space.
In the final analysis, his fundamental conception of time proper was
an imagery of a line—and so it has been treated for a long time
thereafter.
Quite rightly in late nineteenth century, H. Bergson argued that
if we try to conceive time as a static geometrical line, we are really
thinking of space.201 In fact Aristotle was reflecting on time purely in

201
H. Bergson, Essai sur les doneés immédiates de la conscience (Paris, 1889), tr. into
English by C. Bogson as Time and Free Will, London, 1910; pp. 90–1, 98–110.
308 chapter seven

terms of space. The Stoics, too, regarded as real (ˆn) only what actu-
ally exists and what potentially exists. To ‘walk’ actually (that is, at
this very moment) is a different (in fact, ‘fuller’) kind of reality from
the possiblity of walking, namely, the ability to walk at any future
moment or to have already walked. But the outstanding difference
lies in the Stoic view of time as extension. Although the Stoics pos-
tulated time as a natural element in the make-up of the world (not
merely as the ‘number’ of motion), they did not make much of their
discovery.
This view comes to the fore only with Origen. It was with him
that time is regarded both as an element of the creation existing in
itself and closely linked with space, so that no account of time may
be given apart from the notion of space. Origen treated space together
with time. This is why the notion of with stands out in the term sum-
parekte¤nvn. This is the fundamental and crucial element which, in
the sharp end, is absent from many ancient accounts of time. And
it is only on this misleading ground that the deductive arguments
challenging the reality of time would stand.
In Origen’s view, time is a natural dimension of the world along-
side which this world exists. There is no question of ontological
classification between time and motion—a question, which has been
given so much discussion until our day.202
We have already seen that he does not identify time with motion.
Also, he does not need to consider whether time is originated in
motion, or vice versa. For the definition of time as extension and dimen-
sion constitutes an objectivistic view of time non-dependent upon
motion. Here is what consitutes a step beyond the accounts of Greek
philosophy: Platonists, Peripatetics, Epicureans and Neoplatonists had
to give an account of the relation of time proper to motion. In them
all (despite their different conceptions of time) motion appears as an
intrinsic notion of their definition of time. To the Stoics time as
diãsthma stands in an ontological priority to motion. Their treat-
ment of the problem, however, left them rather vulnerable to criti-
cism by other philosophers, as we have seen.
By contrast, motion is not a notion inherent in Origen’s concep-
tion of time, because he defined it in a more sophisticated and

202
Origen, however, does deal with the question of the relation of time and
motion; s. Chapter 8, pp. 313ff.
 prolongation of time 309

objective manner: he introduced the term sumparekteinÒmenon, which

exerted so decisive an influence upon his successors. Origen’s world
is always in motion; to pose then hypothetical questions of a possible
‘time without change’203 is a pointless scholasticism. There is certainly
an ontological priority of time to motion, yet that is all, as far the
natural theory of time is concerned. Motion has a crucial and definite
purpose and space-time exists as long as motion is necessary. Time
is an objective reality, a dimension of the world. There is no rea-
son to pose the question of a possible nonexistence of motion. For
motion is not only a datum of the real world, but also is necessary for
a final goal to be fulfilled. At any rate, Origen had no reason to
treat the problem as to whether time cannot exist without motion,
because time proper is a reality closely related to (but non-dependent
upon) space, albeit co-existing with it. Once God is the creator of
time, there is no reason not to assume that time without motion
could not exist. But the actual point in Origen’s conception of space-
time with respect to God is that without motion time need not exist
at all. The very existence of time proper has a crucial intrinsic mean-
ing, character and purpose, namely, a raison d’être, which is indeed
salvation understood as return to the divine reality and deification.
To strive to reflect on a ‘time without change’, or time without
motion, constitutes an intellectual exercise which Origen did not need
at all. To him it would be a meaningless question, entirely out of
the purposes of his theology, let alone that ‘motion’ is a permanent
characteristic of his world, as we shall see in the next chapter.
Through the conception of time as essentially being an extension, the
reality of time is clearly affirmed and so is its close connection to
space and, subsequently, to motion.
A point which should be elucidated, however, is whether prolon-
gation is a notion which simply indicates the course in time, or it has
further implications which eventually come to pertain to time itself.
An account on this has by all means to be given. This question with
respect to the notion of causality is what I am going to discuss next.

203
Cf., for example, S. Shoemaker, “Time without change”, Journal of Philosophy,
66 (1969), pp. 363–81.
 CHAPTER EIGHT

TIME AND CAUSALITY

Categorizing motion

Despite the fact that Origen is mainly interested in rational crea-

tures of the particular spaces rather than the spaces themselves, he
does not fail to refer to motion in general. In this section I shall
discuss how he considers motion and particularly the causes of it.
Treatment of this question is supplied in Greek extracts of Princ,
as well as in deOr. A study of these points shows that the classification
of motion is dealt with in quite a systematic way. The points where
these analyses appear could in no way be considered as incidental.
For it is ‘because the teaching of the Church includes the doctrine
of the righteous judgement of God’ that Origen makes the analysis
of motion in Princ, in the beginning of Book III, Chapter 1, that is,
at the outset of his exposition of his doctrine of free will.1 It should
be emphasized that the criterion for the classification of motion is
the cause of it.2
Motion then, on account of the cause of it, is classified in the fol-
lowing categories:3
1. Motion which is caused from without:4 this is the motion of in-
animate things, like ‘stones and pieces of wood, which are cut
out of the quarry or have lost the power of growing’, that is,
things which ‘are held together merely by their form’.5 In the
same category are included also those called ‘portable things’6 in
general; that is, not inanimate things as above, but also living

1
The title of that chapter is “Free Will”.
2
This point seems to have eluded J. Oulton and H. Chadwick in their Alexandrian
Christianity, (On Prayer, Exhortation to Martyrdom, Dialogue with Heraclides), London, 1956;
p. 33: an otherwise good translation, of which I partially avail myself at this point.
3
Cf. SVF, II, 161, 25.
4
Princ, III.1.4; deOr, VI, 1.
5
deOr, VI, 1. Princ, III.1.2.
6
Princ, III.1.2; deOr, VI, 1.
 time and causality 311

things, such as ‘the bodies of living creatures, as well as portable

plants’. What is in common in these motions is that all of them
have their cause ‘from outside’ (¶jvyen)7 them.
2. Motion due to ‘the flux of bodies’ (tØn =Ësin t«n svmãtvn). It is
stated that this motion is not included ‘in the present discussion’,
namely in Princ.8 Still there is reference to this in deOr: this motion
applies to things which ‘are moved by virtue of the fact that all
bodies are in a state of flux as they decay’. Therefore, ‘this motion
which they have is inseparably connected with their state of decay.’9
3. Motion in which the cause exists in the moving body. This per-
tains to those moved ‘either by their own inherent nature or
soul’.10 These are things having the cause of motion ‘in them-
selves’ (§n •auto›w).11 This kind of motion applies both to inanimate
things and living creatures alike. Thus the following sub-categories
can be discerned in this case.
a. Motion of ‘metals, and fire and even springs of water’: where
it can be said to ‘have the cause of their motion in themselves’
(§n •auto›w d¢ ¶xein tØn afit¤an toË kine›syai).12 Origen states
that ‘they have the cause of their motion’ ‘with themselves’ (§j
•aut«n).13
b. Motion of ‘animates’14 or ‘living creatures’,15 which is called
motion ‘from within themselves’ (éfÉ •aut«n).16 These ‘living
creatures’ move ‘from within themselves when there arises
within them an image (fantas¤a) which calls forth an impulse’,
springing from ‘the imaginative nature setting the impulse in
ordered motion’. This is a kind of ‘natural’ motion related to
the nature of a certain animal. For instance, ‘in the spider, an
image of weaving a web arises and the impulse to weave it
follows’; this ‘impulse to weave’ is related to this animal because
this is the natural mode of its existence. The same happens

7
Princ, III.1.2; deOr, V, 5; also, deOr, VI, 1.
8
Princ, III.1.2.
9
deOr, VI, 1.
10
deOr, VI, 1; Princ, III.1.2.
11
Princ, III.1.2.
12
Princ, III.1.2.
13
Cf. L. and S., p. 498. Princ, III.1.2; deOr, VI, 1.
14
Princ, III.1.2.
15
deOr, VI, 1.
16
Princ, III.1.2; deOr, VI, 1.
312 chapter eight

with the ‘bee’ in which, too, ‘an impulse to produce a honey-

comb’ arises. Nevertheless, animals ‘beyond this imaginative
nature . . . possess nothing else’.17
c. Motion of rational creatures. This is different from the motion
of any other living creature. For the ‘rational animal . . . has
something more than the imaginative nature, namely, reason
which judges the impulses; some it rejects, others it approves
of, so that the creature may be guided in accordance with
these latter images.’18 This is why the motion of rational crea-
tures is regarded as motion ‘by themselves’ (diÉ aÍt«n).19 Thus
‘to decide to use what has happened either in this way or in
that is the work of nothing else but the reason within us, which,
as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards the
impusles that incite to what is good and seemly or else turns
us aside to the reverse’.20 So the possibilites of contemplating
good and evil are inherent in the nature of reason. It is out
of following these contemplations and choosing freely whatever
he wishes to choose that a rational creature is subject either to
praise for choosing the good or to blame for choosing the evil.
It is Origen’s view that external things do not lie within our power;
but to use them in this way or another (since we have received rea-
son as a judge and investigator of the way in which we ought to
deal with each of them), is our task.21 It is out of these considera-
tions of motion, that the idea of Judgement makes sense. For what
is mainly considered as motion stems from the freedom of rational
creatures. On account of this, no rational creature can escape per-
sonal responsibility:
To throw the blame for what so happens to us on external things and
to free ourselves from censure, is like declaring that we are like stocks
and stones, which are dragged among by agents that move them from
without, is neither true nor reasonable, but is the argument of a man
who desires to contradict the idea of free will.22

17
Princ, III.1.2.
18
Princ, III.1.3.
19
deOr, VI, 1.
20
Princ, III.1.3.
21
Princ, III.1.3; III.1.5.
22
Princ, III.1.5.
 time and causality 313

Free moral action as motion

If time is of importance in Origen’s world, this is so because it is

the extension where this motion takes place. For time, although fun-
damentally a natural element in the constitution of creation, is also
regarded as the extension where the will of God and the will of
rational creatures encounter each other. On the one hand, the
unchangeable will of God is manifested at certain times; on the other,
creaturely will comes to a dialectical relation to the will of God.
This kind of creaturely motion is perceived as free moral action, and
this is the kind of motion, which is the main theme of Origen’s
theology.
We see, therefore, that he holds a ‘vertically’ broader conception
of the world (in the sense that there are ranks of life above and
under the human one). He also holds a ‘horizontally’ broader con-
ception of time (in the sense that time is extended before, as well
as after this aeon). Accordingly, he holds a broader conception of
motion considering this mainly as free moral action taking place in
this broader space-time. Origen is aware of other kinds of motion
also, as discussed in the previous pages. However, he is not inter-
ested in them in the same way that he is not interested in the nat-
ural environment of the particular spaces comprising the world. In
the same vein, although he knows that time is a natural reality, he
mainly considers the theological, not the natural implications of this
reality.
This is why both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ arrangement of space-
time are dependent only on this kind of ‘motion’ (namely, free moral
action). For the continuum of time is arranged in consecutive aeons
which have duration directly related to free moral action, as we saw
in the previous section. Only this kind of motion is taken into account
at the time of judgement. Therefore, this is the only kind of motion
which determines not only the duration of an aeon, but also the
arrangement of the next world (that is, the ‘vertical’ arrangement of
space-time).
This is why Origen does not confine his conception of time to
the limits of the Stoic thought. In the first place, he employs a Stoic
terminology, yet the actual import attributed to the terms is quite
different: motion is not so much the natural one; rather it suggests
free creaturely action.
314 chapter eight

Certainly the connection between time and heavenly bodies is not

ignored: time exists as long as heavenly bodies exist and vice versa.23
This is the meaning of the term sumparekteinÒmenow. Nowhere, how-
ever, is it asserted that time exists out of the movement of heavenly
bodies; time co-exists with them, but this is an independent element,
as it were, related to the ‘structure of this world’. Nevertheless time
is connected with motion, the term ‘motion’ meaning free creaturely
action, and it is the means where this action can be realized. So
time should exist because there is a motion to take place. It seems
though that Origen perceived this question is a reverse manner as
well: motion should exist since there is the extension of time for this
to take place.
We already saw the criticism that Plotinus directed against the
Stoics for defining time in relation to motion. His argument was that
the Stoics could be unable to say anything about time if there were
no motion at all.24 Origen had no reason to deal with such a ques-
tion; still he provides a personal opinion about it, without naming
the problem explicitly. His view is that ‘motion’ is a faculty of ratio-
nal creatures always active. By ‘motion’ at this point he means free
action only. This is the context for the following portion of Princ to
be understood:
No movement can take place in any body which does not possess life,
nor can living beings exist at any time without movement.25
It is obvious that here he refers to free creaturely action; he states
accordingly that ‘the holy angels and other heavenly powers . . . are
capable of feeling and of movement’; for ‘what’ ‘is there in them’
is ‘rational feeling and movement’.26 Also, ‘It is certain that no liv-
ing creature can be altogether inactive and immovable, but it is
eager for every kind of movement and for continual action and voli-
tion; and it is clear, I think, that this nature resides in all living
beings. Much more then must a rational being such as man be
always engaged in some movement or activity.’27 Again, “the will’s

23
selPs, 71, PG 12.1524, lines 3032.
24
Enneads, III.7.8.
25
Princ, I.7.3.
26
Princ, II.8.2.
27
Princ, II.11.1.
 time and causality 315

freedom always moves in the direction either of good or evil, nor

can the rational sense, that is the mind or soul, ever exist without
some movement either good or evil.”28 Given the particular mean-
ing attributed to ‘movement’ (namely, creaturely free action in all
ranks of life) at this point (without naming the question of time at
all) he provides an answer to any potential criticism, such as that of
Plotinus against the Stoic view of time. What does Origen mean by
these statements? Taking into account that here ‘movement’ suggests
‘free moral action’, it is moral inactivity, as well as moral neutral-
ity of any action, that is actually denied. Works in Greek, such as
commJohn, can corroborate this.
It is clear that every man, endowed with reason, is either a Son of
God or a Son of the devil; in other words, he commits sin or he does
not commit sin, since there is nothing between committing sin and
not committing sin (oÈdenÒw ˆntow metajÊ toË poie›n tØn èmart¤an ka‹
tØn èmart¤an mÆ poie›n); and if he commits sin, he comes from the
devil; if he does not commit sin, he has been begotten by God.29
Although this point would be taken as reminiscent of the Early Stoa,30
here Origen stands outside the Stoic tradition, in the sense that he
takes a Stoic thesis to the extreme. The notion of the ‘intermidiates’
seems to have been introduced by Ariston, the pupil of Zeno and
strong critic of his master, whose doctrines were not upheld by
Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Later though this doctrine was a com-
monplace attributed to Stoicism. Thus, actions are distinguished into
three categories: the ‘good deeds’ (katory≈mata), the ‘sins’ (èmartÆmata)
and the ‘neuters’ (oÈd°tera).31 Origen knew the Stoic notion of
‘indifferents’ (édiãfora) and refers to that in Cels.32 He also was
aware of the notion of ‘intermediates’ (m°svn),33 and uses the term
katory≈mata himself.34 There is one case though where he uses the

28
Princ, III.3.5.
29
commJohn, 20, XIII; commMatt, 11, 12; Cels, IV, 15 and passim.
30
The Old Stoa held the character of human existence as always being active,
and hardly allowed for some intermidiate position between the wise and the fool.
Man had always a choice (§pilogÆ) to make. Cf. SVF, III, 188 etc.
31
Stobaeus, Eclogue, II, 96, 18 W; SVF, III, 136, 18ff.
32
Cels, VI, 73. Cf. I, 61; IV, 45; VII, 30 (ref. to Sextus); V, 36.
33
Cels, II, 59; Princ, III.1.18; commJohn, 20, XXII.
34
selPs, 117; Princ, III.1.19; III.1.23; commJohn, 2, XIII; 13, XLIII.
316 chapter eight

term ‘indifferent life, which is neither good nor bad; a sense in which
the impious and animals are said to live’.35 The notion that simply
‘to live’ is morally ‘indifferent’ is in fact a Stoic view.36
Origen has implicitly tackled the criticism of Neoplatonists against
the original Stoic definition of time. Since everything apart from
God is in time, there must be a kind of motion justifying, as it were,
the existence of time in all ranks of life. This is the perpetual free
creaturely action. This is why of all kinds of motion this is the one
of major significance and attention.

Trial of motion in time

Following from the manner, in which the Stoic term ‘motion’ is

attributed the new import discussed above, ‘extension’ is the milieu
where trial of free moral action takes place. Which means that,
beyond the mere natural character of this extension, there is more
to be considered about its character. In homJer it is stated:
From youth, he says, until our day, and we did not listen to the voice
of the Lord our God.37 We sinned and we did not listen until now;
then once they returned, and begun conversion (§pistr°cantew), they
say, ‘We were sinning and we did not listen’. For it does not happen
that to want to listen means that we simultaneously listen immediately;
there is need of some more time (ka‹ går ¶ti xrÒnou de›). For just as
time is still required with a cure for wounds, so it is also with turn-
ing (t∞w §pistrof∞w) maturely and purely to God for conversion.38
The use of terms such as ‘returned’ (§pistr°cantew), ‘beginning’
(érxÆn), ‘for there is a need for some more time’ (ka‹ går ¶ti xrÒnou
de›), ‘for the return’ (t∞w epistrof∞w) indicates that time is not sim-
ply an extension, but it is the means for free action to be realized.
Time is then the milieu for trial to take place, a trial that is a
challenge to freedom. The outcome of this struggle is the reaction
to the devil, which also acts within time:

35
commJohn, 20, XXXIX.
36
Cf. SVF, I, 47, 24: III, 17, 20: III, 17, 21: III, 28, 6: Diog. 218, 16: Apollod.
261, 8.
37
Jer. 3, 25.
38
homJer, 5, 10.
 time and causality 317

The devil has been committing sins for so long a time (tosoÊtƒ xrÒnƒ),
since the creation and the downfall (katabolÆ) of the world, yet he
does not suffer any fire or whip; for he does not deserve those pun-
ishments which come from God.39
Time is the battlefield of this trial; this is what finally shows what
the result is. In selEx, the portion Ex. 31, 1 (‘And the Lord spake
unto Moses saying’) is commented on thus:
It was a good forty days that the most wise God kept Moses waiting
before giving him the law, although it was possible for him to give
the Law in three days. But [he did this] so that the time of Moses’
absence tries the impiety which was hidden in the depth of the Jews’
hearts.40
Thus time constitues the venue where free action is exposed to trial.
It is the length of time, which often tests the validity of a certain
attitude. Duration, length of time, constitutes a major challenge to
action. But although length of time is a means for the quality of
action to be tried, it does not in itself constitute an element of the
essence of morality. It is not the length of time, during which a man
is aware of the word of God, which is of the main significance; what
is important is moral action itself throughout time. The passage Matt.
19, 30 (‘many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first’)
is taken to suggest that those who accept the divine word later than
others ‘are not hindered by time’ (…w oÈk §mpod¤zontow toË xrÒnou
to›w Ïsteron pisteÊousin).41 Which means that the question is not
how long one is a faithful, but how Christian belief is realized in
action.
There is an extensive treatment of this point. There is also appeal
to Heb. 5, 12 (‘For when because of the time (diã tÚn xrÒnon) you
ought to be teachers’),42 in order to aver that the duration of sim-
ply knowing the divine law is not a sufficient pressuposition to be
‘first’. What is of prime significance is the duration of action accom-
plishing this teaching as a concrete action in time:
And it is possible for those who want to extend their force and energy
intensively on the work for less time within the vineyard, to have

39
selEx, PG 12.261ff.
40
adnotEx, PG 17.16ff.
41
commMatt, 15, 26.
42
Ibid.
318 chapter eight

carried out a work equal to that of those who began working since
dawn; for they did not get as tired as those who began working since
dawn.43
In enarrJob, the passage Job 2, 9 (‘After time enough had passed his
wife said unto him’) is commented on thus:
Look at how malicious he is. It is after much time had elapsed that
he attacks; for it is then that power is most weakened. Weakness was
ensuing both from the fact that he who was suffering had become
more weak because of the length of time and from the fact that his
hope was near to fading.44 . . . He was not overwhelmed either by the
loss of money, or by the untimely death of his sons, nor by the unspeak-
able torture of his body, nor by so long a time.45
This is how time is considered as the extension for trial of free moral
action: it exists as the indispensable means for freedom to be real-
ized. This is also where the divine ofikonom¤a is manifested.
As it happens with the terms ‘motion’ and ‘extension’, quite expect-
edly other Stoic terms are also assigned a different import befitting
Origen’s aims. Thus the Stoic notion of time as a natural ‘measure
of fastness and slowness’46 is applied a significant purport which
deserves to be canvassed.

The notions of ‘fastness’ and ‘slowness’

In the context of conceiving time as a dimension of life where a

dialectical relation between creatures and God takes place, this is
also regarded as a ‘measure and citerion of both fastness and slow-
ness’, as the Stoics used to define it generally, in addition to their
fundamental view of it as an ‘extension of motion’.47 Again we can
see that Origen formally considers time in this Stoic way (which at
this particular point is Aristotelian, too), yet in substance he attrib-
utes to this notion a different import: this is not a natural content,
but a moral one. In enarrJob he comments thus:

43
commMatt, 15, 34. Origen refers to the parable in Matt. 20, 1–16.
44
enarrJob, 2, PG 17.61.
45
enarrJob, 2; loc. cit.
46
SVF, I, 26, 11–12.
47
Cf. SVF, I, 26, 11–12.
 time and causality 319

And if someone might ask why the friends were so late . . . One should
know that the delay of arrival was some divine oikonomia . . . some
divine oikonomia took place for the friends to be late and the disease
to be prolonged; so that the just man will be exercised for more time
and will more justifiably be raised up by God.48
Accordingly, in Princ it is stated that
sometimes it does not turn out to the advantage of those who are
healed that they should be healed quickly (tãxion), if, that is they have
fallen of themselves into difficulties and are then easily released from
the conditions into which they have fallen; for, despising the evil as
being easy of cure and taking no precautions against falling into it,
they will find themselves in it for a second time. In dealing with such
persons, therefore, the eternal God, the perceiver of secret things, who
‘knows all things before they come to be’,49 in his goodness refrains
from sending them the quicker help (Ípert¤yetai tØn taxut°ran prÚw
aÈtoÊw boÆyeian) and, if I may say so, helps them by not helping
them . . . lest having quickly (tãxion) turned and been healed by obtain-
ing forgiveness they should despise the wounds of their wickedness as
being slight and easy of cure and should very quickly (tãxion) fall into
it again. Perhaps, too, though they had paid the penalty for their for-
mer sins which they committed against virtue when they abandoned
it, they had not yet fulfilled the appropriate time (oÈd°pv tÚn pr°ponta
xrÒnon §kpeplhr≈kesan) . . . and then afterwards (Ïsteron) to be called
to a more enduring repentance, such as would prevent them from
quickly (tax°vw) falling again into the sins into which they had previ-
ously fallen . . . God is sometimes long and sometimes slow (m°llei ka‹
bradÊnei) in doing good to men.50

At another point there is an explanation of the way in which God’s

oikonomia is manifested towards men. This text is again full of tem-
poral notions indicating that this ‘oikonomia’ is manifested ‘faster’
(tãxion), ‘slower’ (brãdion), or ‘not faster’ (mØ tãxion), or ‘after a long
time’ (Ïsteron poll“ xrÒnƒ).51 In commMatt it is pointed out that for-
giveness of sins may come ‘either slower or faster’.52 At another point
of the same work it is also stated that “forgiveness of sins reaches
things and to those who committed the sins this forgiveness is bestowed

48
enarrJob, 2; loc. cit.
49
Daniel (Susanna), 42.
50
Princ, III.1.17.
51
Ibid.
52
frMatt, 383.
320 chapter eight

according to justice, either this forgiveness comes later (brãdion) or

sooner (tãxion)”.53
What we see, therefore, is that not only free moral action takes
place within time, but it also is in a sense judged according to time.
Thus time is in fact a ‘criterion’ of ‘both fastness and slowness’.54
However, it is not the natural measuring of fastness or slowness
themselves, but the faculty of appreciating moral action, which is
considered. Therefore, this time is in principle an extension for moral
action to be tried out. This is regarded also as a ‘measure and cri-
terion’, not so much for measuring quantity (of time), but measuring
quality (of creaturely free moral action). Time is the extension where
freedom is tried out, since it is only within time that creaturely free-
dom can make sense.
Thus, the divine oikonomia is manifested in time. In realizing his
oikonomia, God acts ‘quickly or slowly’. Still Origen adheres to his
view of God’s timelessness stating that, although rational beings need
time in order to realize their freedom, God does not need time in
order to manifest his oikonomia. With respect to this, a portion of
commMatt is worth quoting:
And no one should have any hesitation in accepting the saying that
he who sold all his belongings and gave it to the poor, becomes per-
fect all at once (eÈy°vw). The belongings may be given over much time,
and much time is needed to give them to the above-mentioned poor,
but the Logos is by no means hindered by time in order to give (in
proportion to the things given to the poor), so that he who acted in
such a manner become perfect. And it is clear that he who carried
out these deeds will have a treasure in the heavens, becoming heav-
enly himself.55
So the Logos is in the world acting ‘quickly’ or ‘slowly’, yet his
action is not subject to the natural confinements of necessity imposed
on the temporal rational creatures. So the presence of the Logos in
time is conceived in a way of its own: God, even in his temporal
presence as Logos, dominates time by virtue of his being transcen-
dent to time and the creator of it.
There is then one more difference between Origen and the Stoics.
The latter held that ‘all beings are in time’56 and so was their god,

53
commMatt, 14, 5.
54
Cf. SVF, I, 26, 11–12.
55
commMatt, 15, 18.
56
SVF, I, 26, 13–14.
 time and causality 321

by reason of his being immanent in the world. The god of the Stoics
is bound, as it were, with time. In Origen’s view, on the other hand,
‘all beings are in time’ means that all created beings are in time. It
is the notion of transcendence of God vis-à-vis the world that allows
him to consider the relation of Logos to time in the way canvassed
earlier. Creatures are ‘in’ time,57 or ‘under’ time.58 On the other
hand, the notion of time having been created by God, as well as
the conception of a world broader than this visible firmament, allow
to regard time in a more flexible way. As a matter of fact, Origen
goes as far as to assert a notion of relativity in the perception of
time, as we have seen.
Hence he is not interested either in the motion of inanimate
objects, or in that of animals caused by impulses. Besides, he deems
the movement of heavenly bodies as ‘vanity’.59 At any rate, it is not
nature itself that he is preoccupied with. Nature is but a ‘supplement’60
forming the surroundings of moral action—which is the crucial issue.
He makes it perfectly clear that there is only one kind of motion,
which is of interest to him: this is motion, which is characterized by
the correlated notions of personal freedom and responsibility.

God and creaturely freedom

Thus each individual rational creature follows a personal direction

which is determined by its own free action. In this course though,
God is regarded as totally impartial. It is significant that Origen’s
conviction on this question is so strong that he speaks of ‘the prin-
ciple of impartiality’ of God. The notion suggested is that God by
no means interferes with creaturely freedom:
All these, down to the very least, God supervises by the power of his
wisdom and distinguishes by the controlling hand of his judgement;
and thus he has arranged the universe on the principle of the most
impartial retribution (aequissima retributione universa disposuit), accord-
ing as each one deserves for his merit to be assisted or cared for.
Herein is displayed in its completeness the principle of impartiality,
when the inequality of circumstances preserves an equality of reward

57
frMatt, 487.
58
frJohn, I; frJohn, CX.
59
Cels, VII, 50; selPs, 143; commJohn, 1, XVII, etc.; ref. to Rom. 8, 19–20.
60
commJohn, 1, XXV.
322 chapter eight

(aequitatis) for merit. But the grounds of merit in each individual are
known with truth and clearness only to God, together with his only-
begotten Word and Wisdom and his Holy Spirit.61
This kind of relation of God to temporal free action of rational crea-
tures is a fundamental tenet, which can be traced at other points of
his work as well: “So also must we understand in regard to the
divine providence, that he treats all who descend into the struggles
of human life with the most impartial care.”62 And further: “that all
will take part in the struggle, but individuals will either be matched
against individuals or at any rate will fight in such a way as shall
be approved by God, who is the just president of this contest.”63
With regard to the function of angels in relation to men, this prin-
ciple is portrayed thus:
Certainly we must suppose that all these duties are not performed by
accident or chance, nor because the angels were naturally created for
them, lest in so doing we should charge the Creator with partiality.
Rather must we believe that they were conferred in accordance with
merit and virtue and with the activity and ability of each individual
spirit, by God who is the most righteous and impartial governor of
all things.64
Hence “God does not offer possibilities to some beings so that they
commit sins nor does he offer possibilities to others so that they
carry out good deeds.”65 God’s foreknowledge in no way affects crea-
turely freedom.66 For ‘although it may seem strange’, occurrences
happen ‘not because they are foreknown, but they have been fore-
known just because they were going to happen.’67 Accordingly in
selEz it is stated: “So it is upon our choice either to listen or not to
listen, as if God had no foreknowledge at all; and our freedom of
will is neither less if God has foreknowledge nor more if God has
no foreknowledge.”68 This point is given particular emphasis is Cels:

61
Princ, II.9.8.
62
Princ, III.2.3
63
Princ, III.2.5.
64
Princ, I.8.1. Cf. Princ, III.1.10.
65
homLuc, 17.
66
commGen, 3.
67
Ibid. s. also Princ, III.1.23.
68
selEz, 2, PG 13.772.
 time and causality 323

Celsus thinks that something takes place by virtue of having been pre-
dicted by some kind of foresight. But we, do not allowing for this, say
that he who foretold an event is not the cause of this coming to pass
in the future, just because he foretold this. We grant that a future
event will occur, even if this is not predicted. For it is this occurrence
itself which provides the cause to a foreteller, so that he can predict
this. And all this is present in the foreknowledge of the prophet; for
if an occurrence is open to the contingency of either coming or not
coming to pass, either of these contingencies may actually occur. We
do not sustain that the one who has foreknowledge has the power of
canceling the possibility of an event happening or not happening,69
saying something such as this: This will definitely occur, and it is
impossible for it to come about otherwise. This pertains to all fore-
knowledge of events depending on our free will, whether we are deal-
ing with the divine scriptures or with Greek stories. And this which
by the logicians is called an idle argument, which is a sophism, could
not seem to be a sophism in Celsus’s view, although it certainly is a
sophism according to the principles of sound teaching.70
In commGen the same argument is adduced: “by no means is he who
has foreknowledge the cause of what has been foreknown”,71 and
“the foreknowledge of God does not impose any necessity upon those
which have been foreseen.”72
Origen has a clear perception of what constitutes God’s action (tå
ginÒmena) in the world.73 Thus he classifies the divine actions in three
categories: actions ‘out of will’ (katã boÊlhsin), ‘out of benevolence’
(katÉ eÈdok¤an) and ‘out of forgiving’ (katã sugx≈rhsin). These are
the three ways in which God acts in history. Obviously all three of
them are related to the divine will. The first category though (‘out
of will’) alludes to God’s action into the world not in response but,
as it were, by his own initiative. This divine action is distinguished
from the divine ‘foreknowledge’ (prÒgnvsin) which is understood not
to be action. The way in which this distinction is couched denotes
that the divine ‘foreknowledge’ (prÒgnvsin) is not understood as
related to the divine ‘will’ (boÊlhsin). Thus ‘foreknowledge’ is not

69
This is a Stoic argument, which Alexander of Aphrodisias rebuked as ‘coined
for the joke’s sake’ (paizÒntvn), de Fato, 10. Cf. SVF, II, 279, 13ff.
70
Cels, II, 20.
71
commGen, 3; PG 12, 57; 12, 65; Philocalia, 23: 3, 8, 12; 25: 1, 3.
72
Ibid. Cf. commRom, Section 1.
73
The term ginÒmena, used by Origen, is of Stoic origin expressimg the notion
of occurrences in the world; Cf. SVF, I, 26, 11–15.
324 chapter eight

related to any of the three categories of divine action. This distinc-

tion between ‘will’ and ‘foreknowledge’ of God is made more than
once.74
It is then obvious that Origen throughout his entire theology main-
tains his view of the creaturely freedom, insisting that God’s fore-
knowledge by no means introduces any restriction to this freedom.
Evidently, the tenet means to rebut the Gnostic view of ‘souls’ being
of a certain fixed ‘nature’, which abolishes not only freedom but also
personal responsibility. Numerous are the points where the Gnostics
are rebuked for teaching that ‘there are different natures of souls
and that they have been constituted by different creators’,75 espous-
ing the argument that ‘each of the members came to honourable or
less honourable duties of the body by offering some grounds for this
from themselves’: It is indeed not ‘without any causes’ that ‘each
one has been delegated to be a honourable or less honourable
member’ of the body of Christ.76 Therefore, if God dispenses things
in this way in the present age, he will also do so in the future, as
he in fact did in the past ages: He dispensed things ‘in a similar
way in respect to all rational creatures’.77

The conception of causality

Nevertheless there is a notion of causality in this conception of time.

Let us then see how this is perceived. In commGen it is asserted that
foreknowledge by God is the knowledge of succession and evolution
of actions according to a certain causality:
In the beginning of creation God has established the principle that
nothing should happen without a cause; so, by his mind he goes along
what is going to happen, seeing that it is because this happened that
follows; and if this takes place subsequently, that follows; and once this
happens, that will come to pass. And having proceeded in this way
until the end of things, he knows all those which will come to pass,
by no means being himself the cause for the occurrence of any of
those which are known to him. It is like knowing beforehand that

74
frLuc, 57—commenting on Luke 12, 6; frMatt, 212—commenting on Matt. 10, 29.
75
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.2.16.
76
op. cit., 9.3.2.
77
Loc. cit.
 time and causality 325

someone who, because of his ignorance dashes recklessly on a slippery

road, will slip down; yet he who knows that in advance is not the
cause of slipping down.78
Perhaps this passage should be treated with some caution and cer-
tainly a caveat should be introduced: the passage does not suggest in
a rather awkward manner that human action is but a chain of
causative acts. To take it this way would be a simplistic and tricky
notion impugning the real import of creaturly freedom and its pos-
sibilities. Anyway this text is an extract of the Philocalia, does not
come directly from Origen himself. What we should keep from this
passage is the notions of creaturely freedom and of natural causality.

Natural causality

Thus Origen allows for a natural causality. He also concedes that

actions may follow a causality of this sort known to God in advance.
He conformably grants that human beings are subject to this causal-
ity, in the same way that other living beings are. For example, it is
not within the power of choice to be subject to a certain external
impression, which gives rise to an image of one sort or another.79
Origen holds that in general external natural causes do not lie within
the power of man’s choice.80 In simple words, this kind of causality
means this: a man is free as regards his choice of moral action, still
he is a part of the natural reality, and thus subject to the physical
laws of nature. If he is on the fifth floor of a building and jumps
out of the window, he will fall down and be wounded or killed. His
freedom does not entail that he is ‘free’ not to be subject to the law
of gravity. Thus Origen refers not only to the possibilities of human
freedom, but also to what ‘is not within our choice’ (oÈk §fÉ ≤m›n).81
To be a natural existence entails to be subject to the natural laws
of this existence. It is significant that subjection to the natural laws
applies even to the humanity of Jesus:

78
commGen, 3, PG 12, 64; Philocalia, 23, 8.
79
Princ, III.1.3.
80
Princ, III.1.5.
81
commMatt, 14, 8. about those oÈk §fÉ ≤m›n s. also commGen, 3, PG.12.69; Princ,
III.1.5; homLuc, 20; Dial, 17; Philocalia, 21, 4; 21, 14; 23, 11.
326 chapter eight

It was not possible for him not to suffer pain from the torture inflicted
upon him by his executioners. For pain is feeling outside the control
of the will (éproa¤reton går ı pÒnow).82 . . . Once he had assumed a
body by birth he had assumed that which in its nature is capable of
feeling pain and the dreadful distress which befall those who live in
bodies.83
The inescapable subjection to the natural laws is then suggested
through the notion of natural causality.

Causality in rational action

Another kind of causality pertains to what is understood as a rea-

sonably expected course of events. This causality has no determin-
istic character. Since freedom is considered as a fundamental faculty
of rational creatures, Origen allows for a contingency of the choices
of free will:
And if someone says that the outcome may be this but it is contin-
gent that it might be a different one, we grant that this is true. What
is not contingent is that God may be false; contingency applies only
to what is contingent on occurring and it is possible for anyone to
think that certain things may or may not occur.84 . . . our freedom of
will is in no way affected by the fact that God knows what is going
to be done by everyone.’85
This causality exists during an aeon and does not stand beyond the
freedom of rational beings, since all possibilities for free action are
open.

82
Those functions of the body stand beyond any notion of choice and respon-
sibility. It is the things of the body (svmatikã) which Origen calls ‘intermediates’
(m°sa), that is, functions beyond ethical judgement. s. Cels, II, 59: t«n m°svn ka‹
svmatik«n; similar in commJohn, 1, XVII; 20, XXII; also Princ, III.1.18;
83
Cels, II.23; the entire section is in fact an attack to Docetism.
84
commGen, 3, loc. cit. It has been asserted that the singular and contingent does
not interest the Greek philosopher (Cf. H. Puech, “Gnosis and Time”, p. 43). I
shall not discuss this view itself since it is beyond my scope. I only note that the
singular and contingent does interest Origen. In fact this is one of the main preoc-
cupations of his thought. This is why a rational creature is defined by its personal
relation to God; this is also why God is stated as omniscient of any contingent act
of any single rational creature.
85
commGen, 3; s. also, deOr, VI, 4.
 time and causality 327

Existential causality

By contrast, there is another kind of causality which is realized at

the end of an aeon, namely, during86 a judgement. This causality
appears to stand beyond the freedom of rational creatures.
The moment at which judgement will occur is a result of free
action. For this judgement takes place during the consummation,
occurring ‘to the entire world, which is in need of purification when-
ever the evil in it becomes extensive’.87 Yet there are certain occur-
rences which are not under the control of creaturely freedom.
First, this freedom, as moral action, may accelerate or delay the
end of an aeon, yet the very moment of its occurrence belongs to
God’s choice alone. When the end of the aeon will occur is beyond
our knowledge.88
Secondly, the very fact that a consummation takes place at the end
of an aeon is an unquestionable datum in the course of the world.
Thirdly, the fact that a judgement takes place at the same time
is also beyond creaturely choice.
Fourthly, the rank of life, to which a rational being will be trans-
posed, is for God to judge.
All these elements constitute a supreme causality which is virtu-
ally beyond the freedom of rational beings. For they cannot avert
the ‘purification’ of the world; they cannot avert the fact that judge-
ment and rearrangement of rational creatures in the various ranks
of life takes place at that time. This causality is a datum in the
make-up and process of the whole world and stems from the will of
God only. This is as unquestionable as the very fact that this world
exists as a ‘downfall’ (katabolÆ). For once the Fall occurred, the
existence of the world is beyond the choice of the will of rational
beings; they can strive for salvation to come, but the realization of
this expectation depends on God’s judgement. This is not only a
question of divine knowledge or choice of the moment; it is also a
matter of divine help: this is why Origen states that ‘human will is
not sufficient in order to reach the end’89 and ‘God arranges the

86
The word ‘during’ is here being used loosely, since judgement is regarded as
having no duration at all.
87
Cels, IV, 64.
88
frMatt, 485; 486; 487.
89
Princ, III.1.19.
328 chapter eight

things of the world in the appropriate kairoi and he alone knows

the reasons of what occurs at these times.’90
Rational creatures cannot escape this supreme causality. Their
freedom itself is the cause of this causality, while their existential sta-
tus (that is, the rank of life in which they are placed) is the effect.
The will of rational creatures is entirely free to act during an aeon
and to come to a dialectical relation with the will of God. What
cannot be escaped is that this will is judged according to God’s
impartial righteousness.91 Hence, the very fact of judgement, although
occurring at certain moments of the continuum of time, actually
affects and determines the conception of all time. This is why Origen
avers that this causality ‘is a doctrine which should be regarded as
an eternal law’ (nÒmon afi≈nion)92 and, therefore, this is a fundamen-
tal element in the entire structure of creation.
This causality itself presupposes the existence of time, since no
relation between cause (as something before) and effect (as something
after) could make sense in the absence of time. The entire world is
temporal and it is only within time that creaturely freedom can make
sense. For freedom presupposes the possibility of (at least) a dilemma,
of reflection upon it, of decision and choice. All these faculties can
make sense only as successions in time. For a rational creature first
faces a multitude of possibilities, then considers them, then forms his
will and then makes his choice. Thus the notion of possibility of a choice
makes sense only as being before the choice itself.93 This is he sense
in which existential causality pertains to ‘the entire rational creation’.94

The notion of pre-existent causes

Holding this conception of time and motion, Origen goes ahead with
developing his notion of pre-existent causes. This is precisely what
underlines the existential causality, as well as his conviction about

90
Cels, IV, 69; also Cels, V, 15.
91
Princ, I.8.1. Cf. Princ, III.1.10.
92
commJohn, 20, XXXIX; s. supra, p. 300, n. 165.
93
Since the discussion here is about action of rational creatures, I need not refer
to the case (discussed by Aristotle) of cause and effect being simultaneous, as it hap-
pens in the case of an eclipse.
94
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 9.41.5.
 time and causality 329

freedom of will. Beside all other reasons, there is a particular one

leading him to assert the continuity of time throughout the aeons:
in the extension of time causality is established and this causality is
extended in more than one aeons. The arrangement (of the ratio-
nal beings in the various ranks of life) existing in an aeon is directly
related to both the previous and the next aeon. For this present
arrangement is the effect of free action which was realized in the past
aeon. At the same time, the ‘movement’ (that is, moral action) tak-
ing place during this aeon is the cause for the arrangement in the
aeon to come.
The continuity of time allows for this notion to make sense. Besides,
the continuum of time is not affected by the occurrence of rearrange-
ment of rational creatures in the various ranks of life, since that
moment (the moment of judgement) is regarded as having no dura-
tion at all. Thus there is no ‘break’ of the continuation of time at
the moment when a rearrangement of rational beings in the ranks
of life takes place. In this respect, the saying about this rearrange-
ment taking place ‘in the twinkling of an eyelid’ is particularly useful
to Origen. Hence, the existential status of rational beings during this
aeon is the result of pre-existent causes. Again, scriptural authority is
sought for this notion to be grounded:
It follows, I think, that we must also inquire what are the causes which
lead the soul of man to be influenced at one time by good spirits and
at another time by bad. I suspect that it is due to certain causes which
are older even than our birth in this body, as John indicated by his
leaping and rejoicing in his mother’s womb when the voice of Mary’s
salutation sounded in the ears of his mother Elisabeth, and as is declared
by the prophet Jeremiah who, ‘before he was formed in his mother’s
belly’ was known by God and ‘before he came forth from the womb’
was sanctified by him, and while yet a boy received the gift of prophecy.95
On the other hand, it is clearly proved that some people are possessed
right from their earliest years, that is, are born with an accompany-
ing demon, while others are declared by the testimony of histories to
have been under supernatural control from boyhood, and others still
have from their earliest years been indwelt by a demon whom they
term a Python,96 that is, a spirit of ventriloquism.
In the face of these examples, those who maintain that everything
in this world is governed by the providence of God, a doctrine which

95
Jer. 1, 5–6.
96
Acts, 16, 16.
330 chapter eight

is also part of our faith, can give no answer, as it seems to me, which
will prove divine providence to be free from all suspicion of injustice;
except to say that there were certain pre-existent causes which led
these souls, before they were born into the body, to contract some
degree of guilt in their sensitive or emotional nature, in consequence
of which divine providence has judged them worthy of enduring these
sufferings. For the soul always possesses free will, both when in the
body and when out of the body97 and the will’s freedom always moves
in the direction either of good or evil, nor can the rational sense, that
is, the mind or soul, ever exist without some movement either good
or evil. It is probable that these movements furnish grounds for merit
even before the souls do anything in this world, so that in accordance
with such causes or merits they are ordained by the divine providence
right from their birth, yes, and even before it, if I may so speak, to
endure conditions either good or evil.98
In the same context, it is stated that by reason of his merits in some
previous life Jacob had deserved to be loved by God to such an
extent as to be worthy of being preferred to his brother.99 There are
older causes to account for the ‘vessel of honour’ and the ‘vessel of
dishonour’; so the older reasons why Jacob was loved and Esau hated
lie with Jacob before he came into the body and with Esau before
he entered Rebecca’s womb.100 Hence
for antecedent causes a different position of service is prepared by the
Creator for each one in proportion to the degree of his merit, which
depends on the fact that each, in being created by God as a mind or
rational spirit, has personally gained for himself, in accordance with
the movements of his mind and the disposition of his heart, a greater
or less share of merit, and has rendered himself lovable or it may be
hateful to God.101

97
This is one more interpolation of Rufinus which undoubtedly must have played
its part in the distortion of Origen’s thought; it is also one more proof that Rufinus
lacked the understanding of many crucial facets of this theology. Origen firmly held
that a soul is never found without a body. This notion is in accordance with his
perception of a rational being as an inseparable entity, despite the conceptual dis-
tinction between incorporeal and corporeal element. At this point the mainstream
scholarship has miscomprehended Origen’s thought. H. Crouzel only recently revised
his older view of soul without a body and concedes the authentic view of Origen—
yet not to a satisfactory extent; H. Crouzel, “Mort et immortalité selon Origène”,
Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, 79 (1978), p. 186.
98
Princ, III.3.5.
99
Princ, II.9.7.
100
Princ, III.1.22.
101
Princ, II.9.7.
 time and causality 331

The conclusion that epitomizes the conception of existential causality

runs thus:
Each being, whether of heaven or earth or below the earth, may be
said to possess within himself the causes of diversity antecedent to his
birth in the body. For all things were created by the Logos of God
and were set in order through the operation of his righteousness; and
in his gracious compassion he provides for all and exhorts all to be
cured by whatever remedies they may, and incites them to salvation.102
This causality underlines the substantial sequence of the aeons into
the continuous extension of time. It also underlines that although in
principle time is perceived as an element in the make-up of the
world, and therefore a natural element, this is also deeply involved
in metaphysical considerations, since this is the venue where the divine
will (along with the creaturely one) is realized. Thus, the notions of
1) continuity of time, 2) ‘vertical’ discontinuity of space and 3) uni-
formity of nature of rational creatures—all play a significant role in
the exposition of the conception of this causality and its deeper
significance.
There are serious reasons for Origen to allow for this causality in
time. I have already mentioned the first reason; namely, that in this
way free action becomes meaningful, since it is oriented towards a
goal. The second reason is to call attention to God’s ‘impartiality’103
and ‘righteousness’104 in respect of creaturely freedom. The third rea-
son is Origen’s aim to establish a Christian conception of time con-
trasted to all Greek and Gnostic streams of thought.
Thus, as regards the past aeon, this causality explains the present
existential status of rational beings, so that God’s impartiality and
righteousness remain unquestioned. Regarding the next aeon, free
action is oriented to a goal and thus freedom is rendered meaning-
ful by expectation and hope. There is a future end which attributes
a deeper meaning to freedom and, therefore, to time. This is why
terms like prophecy, promise, hope, expectation, fulfillment, realization are
used. If there were no orientation towards the future and no hope,
then freedom should be absolutely meaningless. Subsequently, time
could lose its fundamental significance; it would just be a natural

102
Princ, II.9.7.
103
Princ, II.9.8.
104
Princ, II.9.4.
332 chapter eight

element of the world, as it was to the early Stoics. In the Greek

conception of recurrence of identical worlds, future has nothing to
promise; moral action vanishes into triviality. This was the deeper
meaning of Marcus Aurelius’ frustration.
It is out of this conception of time that judgement is regarded as
a ‘kairos’105 in which promise, expectation and hope are fulfilled. Yet
it is out of God’s goodness that this judgement is not the final one,
nor is consummation the absolute end of the world. Creaturely free-
dom, expectation of an ultimate realization of hope, as well as the
belief in God’s goodness, lead to a conception of time comprising
succeeding aeons. ‘Consummations’ and ‘judgements’ are fixed points
in which causality is realized. Besides, the continuation of time through
these fixed points has the meaning of giving to rational beings one
more chance for improvement and salvation, in this way vindicat-
ing God’s goodness.

Time as the extension of freedom

Thus time is not simply an element of the natural world, be it ‘seen’

or ‘not seen’. It is the extension where freedom is realized. In con-
trast to the early Stoics who did not relate the question of time to
morality (but considered it as simply a natural problem), in Origen
this correlation is plain. In homLuc, the portion Luke 1, 80 is com-
mented on thus:
‘To grow’ has a twofold meaning: it means to grow in body, where
human freedom does not collaborate; it also means to grow spiritu-
ally, where freedom is the cause of growth.106
Time is an ‘extension’ and a ‘dimension of life’ where it is not sim-
ply the morally indifferent motion of natural world that takes place:
this is also where freedom is manifested and realized in a crucial
way. Referring to the disciples who were asking Jesus about who
was the traitor foretold by him himself,107 Origen states:

105
Princ, III.1.14; commMatt, 17, 9; commMatt, 17, 9. s. also, frJohn, LXI; commJohn,
13, XLVIII; commJohn, 32, III.
106
homLuc, 11.
107
Matt. 26, 22; Mark 14, 19.
 time and causality 333

For they knew that, by reason of their being human, the choice of
those still in progress is alterable and this choice is susceptible of will-
ing the contrary to those willing before.108
Likewise in commMatt, quoting Matt. 7, 9–11:
Why did he call the disciples worthless? Because even though they fol-
lowed freely, they still had the changeability of human mind. It is only
the Son of God who is unchangeable both to his divine and human
nature.109
In fact ‘it is only animals which do not change from a lower gen-
der to a more noble one or vice versa; but, as far as men are con-
cerned, it is always possible to see people either just or evil; or to
see them reaching virtue out of evil or quitting improvement towards
virtue and falling into evil.’110 For ‘nothing is permanent in human
nature.’111 Accordingly, when Origen interprets the meaning of érxÆ
as ‘beginning’ of the extension of time, he relates this to movement,
perceiving this movement as moral action.112 Certainly the Stoics
held that moral action is of utmost significance.113 Marcus Aurelius,
in contrast to the early Stoics, correlates morality to time, consider-
ing time itself as a moral question. Is there then a point of affinity
between Origen and Stoicism?
The answer is no. For the way in which Marcus relates time to
morality is totally different to the way Origen does it. To Marcus,
time is the ultimate impasse and it is responsible for the ‘destruc-
tion’ of human feats, especially of human moral action. Marcus all
over again personifies time. It seems almost to be the governor of
the physical world and the source (or destroyer) of its reality. It swal-
lows up all action.114 So the fact that Marcus does not refer to the
early Stoics cannot be coincidental. J.M. Rist conjectures that this
might be coincidental; still he acknowledges that this is a strange
coincidence, because the manner in which Marcus speaks of time
would not square easily with these definitions.115

108
commJohn, 32, XIX.
109
frMatt, 141.
110
commMatt, 10, 11.
111
Cels, IV, 32.
112
commJohn, 1, XIX; commJohn, 1, XVI.
113
J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 286.
114
Op. cit., p. 288.
115
Op. cit., p. 287.
334 chapter eight

How Origen relates time to morality stands in contrast to the

manner Marcus does it. His stance towards time is in fact sheerly
different. To Marcus time is the ultimate impasse. To Origen time
is the means through which hope can be realized.116 As time is the
venue where rational creatures strive for their restoration, this is
regarded as the means for the realization of this goal, not as a destroyer
of the human deeds. It is clear that the deeper pessimism of Marcus
is due to the inherent incapability of Stoicism for transcendence. The
desire for redemption is distinguishable in Marcus more than in any
other Stoic. Besides, this is a general symptom of his era. Origen
met Stoicism at a time when this philosophy demonstrated symp-
toms of degeneration and impasse. His presuppositions, however,
were different and so were the aims of his thought. This is why he
was able to employ Stoic notions and yet to transform them so vig-
orously and radically, that they eventually come to stand in stark
contrast to the Stoic thought.
In fact, Origen uses Stoic notions attributing to them a content
stemming from his Christian faith. He regards time as an indis-
pensable means towards realization of hope; it is his conviction that
rational beings are endowed with free will; he holds a broader con-
ception of the world and the notions of Causality and Judgement
establish an intrinsic meaning on time. These are serious reasons for
him to employ prolongation of time. So, although the notion itself
sounds similar to the Stoic one, in fact it stems from sheerly different
presuppositions and aims.
Existential causality is a guarantee that time is not a destroyer of
moral action and action does not vanish into triviality. Time does
not depress Origen. On the contrary, present time, the period of
this aeon, is not enough to him—in contrast to Marcus Aurelius
who did not regard prolongation of time as necessary. It is the faith
to the goodness of God that makes Origen to hold that there is
always time available to rational creatures, so that they act freely
and return to Him by both his help117 and their free action.

116
The actual content of this hope pertains to Origen’s Philosophy of History and
Eschatology. He often uses the term ‘hope’ itself in order to portray not only the
final goal, but also the direction of action in time; s. Cels, IV, 38; V, 10; VIII, 50;
16, 167.
117
deOr, VI, 4.
 time and causality 335

There is though one point, which should be clarified. A facet of

the simplistic distinction drawn between Greek and Hebrew thought,
is to introduce the notion of quality of time.118 According to this, in
Greek thought the ‘quality’ of past time is the same with that of
present time and thus ‘time is homogeneous’.119 In fact, however,
the notion of quality of time is meaningless. Time in itself has no
quality. This is a natural element in the make-up of the world and
natural elements have no moral quality. Time has also a metaphysi-
cal significance because it is in time that the divine and creaturely
will encounter each other. In that case, the notion of quality applies
to free action in time, not to time proper. Regarding this action, time
can have an intrinsic meaning—but no quality. Certainly expressions
about ‘quality of time’ are used, yet they make sense only once this
distinction is made. It is inaccurate to speak of ‘quality of time’ in
a strict theological of philosophical sense, when one ponders upon
the problematique of time proper.
It would be useful to consider Origen’s notion of pre-existing causes
in view of the theory that it was a characteristic of Greek thought
to think causally and consequently in terms of natural science, whereas
Hebrew thought thinks finally or teleologically. T. Boman, who made
this claim, asserted this:
The one puts itself outside the events and looks backwards; the other
puts itself into the events and thinks itself ‘into’ the psychic life of the
man involved and how they directed themselves forward in thought
and will. The one concerns itself with the past, the other with the pre-
sent and future.120
Likewise, B. van Gronigen contends that the fundamental orienta-
tion of Greek thought was toward the past.121 He argues that for
the Greek the prevailing type of history was aetiological, in which the
inner dynamic or driving power in the historical process was sought
in the érxa¤, which was understood not so much in the sense of
‘beginning’ as in the sense of ‘causes’ (afit¤ai).122 I shall not assess
these assertions themselves, since such a discussion is beyond my

118
Cf. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared With Greek, p. 94.
119
Op. cit., p. 95; Cf. H. Puech, “Gnosis and Time”, pp. 39–46.
120
Italics mine; op. cit., p. 170; Cf. also pp. 171, 184ff.
121
B. van Gronigen, In the Grip of the Past: An Essay on an Aspect of Greek Thought,
Leiden, 1953; pp. 2–12; s. also pp. 94–5, 107–8, 115–9.
122
Op. cit., pp. 28–9.
336 chapter eight

scope. I only say that such distinctions seem to me over-simplistic.

My subject matter provides the opportunity of pointing out how
these distinctions could hardly withstand a serious criticism.
Origen does establish an aetiological character in the process in
space-time. He also has no hesitation in speaking about afit¤ai and
even érxa¤—in fact the latter appears in the title of Princ. Despite
this, however, his thought is par excellence a teleological one, entirely
preoccupied with the future, not with the past. The very notion of
causality established in his conception of time constitutes a percep-
tion of the eschatological process in a manner underscoring creaturely
freedom. Thus he can think both causally and teleologically.
To scholars such as Boman and van Gronigen, this affirmation
would seem contradictory. The study of Origen’s thought proves that
it is not contradictory at all. It further proves that simplistic dis-
tinctions and contentions such as the above-mentioned, despite their
appealing formulation, are weak and not intrusive in terms of phi-
losophy of history.
At any rate, perpetual creturely movement leaves all possibilities
open to rational action. These possibilities can be realized through
the causality imbuing this time. Thus ‘the Son of devil’ may become
‘Son of God’; for ‘a Son of devil is not a such by structure’, but he
has been what he is because his own action.123 What currently
differentiates rational creatures is only the result of their own free
action. This is how Origen maintains his ‘natural’ view of his world
relating it to metaphysical implications at the same time. Accordingly,
he defines an ‘aeon’ as ‘natural system, comprising various bodies
and containing differences of reason, which stem from the difference
in knowledge of God.’124
This definition points out ‘aeon’ as a reality, which is ‘natural’
and yet related to God. In the same definition the notion of causal-
ity is clearly suggested through the term ßneken (because of ). The
perpetual movement, as moral action, means that this existential
causality is not a contingent one. This means that it cannot be said
that if a cause arises then the effect appears. The cause does exist
all the time. Here cause is free moral action itself, which in Origen’s
world is perpetual.

123
commJohn, 20, XIII.
124
selPs, 5, PG 12.1172.
 time and causality 337

So this causality, as fully existing in time, determines the con-

ception of time itself and it is a constitutive element of creation. But
once this was established, God is impartial. Thus, although the very
existence of this causality is beyond creaturely freedom, both cause
and effect are entirely dependent upon creaturely freedom. For cause
and result appear to be determined by free moral action.
With respect to this point, I endorse H. Chadwick’s opinion that
“Origen is quite clear that the expansion of Christianity is not to
be accounted for by any naturalistic explanations.”125 Surely this
would seem confusing to T. Boman who contends that “to think
causally” necessarily means to think “in terms of natural science.”126 In
any case, this is another concept of causality, according to which it
is only the cause that stems from the temporal creaturely will. The
effect (namely God’s response, in his relation to creaturely freedom)
stems entirely from God’s will. Therefore, although manifested into
the world, it is originated in timelessness. Such is the case of prayer:
in that case causality is not a relation existing fully in time; rather
it is a relation involving both time and timelessness.

Causality between time and timelessness

In this subsection I want to consider a series of arguments intended

to counteract negation of either divine or human freedom, and all
having to do with History in one way or another.
The question of the relation between God and man through prayer
is directly related to the question of free will. It is not incidental
that the analyses about motion are expounded in deOr. The chal-
lenge is the question of whether or not it makes sense to pray at
all, but the real issue is this: how can divine foreknowledge be squared
with the contingency of future events?
Making no effort to escape the dilemma he deals with the views
of those who deny the use of prayer, not because they deny the
existence of God, but only because they place God above the uni-
verse and affirm Providence.127 Their argument is based on two par-
ticular points:

125
H. Chadwick, “The evidences of Christianity in the Apologetic of Origen”,
Studia Patristica, II, TU 64, 1957, p. 336.
126
T. Boman, op. cit., p. 170.
127
deOr, V, 2.
338 chapter eight

First, they concede that ‘God knows all things before they are’;128
of things that occur, He knows no one for the first time, as if they
were not known before this. This is a view of Origen’s, too. Yet
those who deny the value of prayer adduce the argument that ‘the
heavenly Father knoweth what things’ we ‘have need of before’ we
‘ask him’, as stated in Matt. 6, 8. Therefore, he who is the Father
and Creator of the world, who ‘loveth all things that are and abhor-
reth none of the things which’ he ‘hath made’,129 should dispense
what is for the well being of each one without being prayed to. Just
as the father does, who protects his babies and does not wait upon
their request, either because they are unable to ask at all, or because
through ignorance they often wish to receive things that are clean
contrary to their profit and advantage; and human beings are much
further off from God than mere children are from the mind of their
parents.
There is also a second argument: those who deny the value of
prayer aver that the future is not only foreknown to God, but also
predetermined by him and nothing comes to pass which has not
been predetermined by him. For if one were to pray that the sun
should rise, he would be regarded as foolish fellow, for requesting
that something should happen through his prayer, which would hap-
pen in any case without his prayer. Moreover, if ‘the wicked are
estranged from the womb’130 and the righteous man has been deter-
mined from his ‘mother’s womb’131 and ‘the childern being not yet
born neither having done anything good or bad, that the purpose
of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him
that calleth’,132 there is one conclusion to be reached: since God is
unchangeable and has predetermined everything that is, and abides
in what he has pre-arranged, it is obviously inconsistent to pray with
the idea of altering his plan by prayer or of entreating him as one
who has not pre-arranged it but awaits each one’s prayer. This would
be to make prayer the reason why God arranges what is fitting for
him who prays, and settles then what is deemed proper, as if it had
not already been foreseen by him.

128
Daniel (Susanna), 42.
129
Matt. 6, 8.
130
Ps. 57, 4.
131
Gal. 1, 15.
132
Rom. 9, 11–12.
 time and causality 339

Thus there is a twofold argument against the necessity for pray-

ing. Origen stated this through the same words that the problem
had been posed to him:
First, if God knows the future beforehand, and it must come to pass,
prayer is vain. Secondly, if all things happen according to the will of
God, and if what is willed by him is fixed, and nothing of what he
wills can be changed, prayer is vain.133
The question facing him at this point is not simply the value of
prayer. The very question is whether or not the dialectical relation
between God and creatures actually exists and makes sense; and fur-
ther, whether a creature’s action may cause a responding action from
God. The point is then how to square our freedom with God’s
knowledge of the future.
Prayer is in fact only a particular case of the question whether
an action taking place in time and referred to timelessness may cause
a reaction from timelessness at a time subsequent to this temporal
action. The very question, therefore, is whether Origen holds a notion
of causality extended in both time and timelessness. I shall maintain
that indeed Origen does hold such a notion. for the real question
is that of presentness of God vis-à-vis rational creatures. We find the
notion of presentness put to imaginative new uses, to show how
God’s knowledge is compatible not with his own freedom, but also
with creaturely freedom, too.
As a matter of fact, the rationale is once more based on the free-
dom of will. He avers that ‘from creation’134 and since ‘the founda-
tion of the world’135 God has known everything and therefore he
has foreknowledge of what the choice of our free will be. He stresses
once again that the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of all
future events or of future actions performed by us out of free will
and choice. God has arranged everything beforehand in accordance
with what he has seen concerning each act of free will and what
will be answered by his providence.136
Given this fundamental opinion, he enunciates his view of the
relation between God and man through prayer. Since each act of

133
deOr, V, 6.
134
Rom. 1, 20.
135
Matt. 25, 34; Luke 11, 50; Heb. 4, 3; 9, 26; Rev. 13, 8; 17, 8.
136
deOr, VII.
340 chapter eight

free will is known to God it is reasonable to assume that he also

knows what someone will pray for, his kind of disposition the nature
of his faith and what he desires to happen to him. It is according
to this knowledge that God disposes things somewhat as follows:
I will hear this man who will pray prudently, for the very prayer’s
sake which he will pray; but this man I will not hear, either because
he will be unworthy to be heard, or because he will pray for things
which are neither profitable for him who prays, non proper for me
to grant; and for this prayer (let us say) of so-and-so I will not hear
him; but for that I will hear him.137
Also,
I will grant this or that to this man who will pray, because it is meet
for me to do this for a man who will pray, blamelessly and will not
prove careless in the matter of prayer; and when he shall pray for a
certain time, I will bestow this or that upon him ‘exceeding abun-
dantly above’ what he ‘asks for’138 for it is meet for me to overpass
him in good deeds and to supply him with more than he has been
able to ask for.139
Thus Origen develops his argument by putting his own conception
of the mind of God into words as if spoken by God himself.140 It is
significant here that God is regarded as responding on grounds of
causality. Thus there are expressions like ‘because of the prayer itself ’
(diÉ aÈtÆn tØn eÈxÆn),141 ‘because he is unworthy of being heard’ (diã
tÚ énãjion aÈtÒn ¶sesyai toË §pakousyÆsesyai),142 ‘because he has
prayed these things for’ (diã tÚ taËta aÈtÒn eÎjasyai),143 ‘because it
is meet for me to do this for a man who will pray blamelessly and
will not prove careless in the matter of prayer’,144 ‘for it is meet for
me to overpass him in good deeds’ (§mo¤ går tÒnde pr°pei nikçn §n
ta›w eÈpoi˝aiw).145 What these expressions illustrate is that the relation
between man and God in prayer is conceived as a causative relation.

137
deOr, VI, 4.
138
Eph. 3, 20.
139
deOr, VI, 4.
140
Origen adopts the same method in deOr, XIV, 1; XV, 4; XXIX, 14.
141
deOr, VI, 4.
142
deOr, V, 5.
143
Ibid.
144
deOr, VI, 4.
145
Ibid.
 time and causality 341

The cause of this relation is the prayer itself and is originated in time;
the effect is God’s response and it obviously comes from the divine
timelessness.
Thus each of the two parts (cause-effect) of this causality lies in
realities different with respect to time. This causality, therefore, may
be seen either from the point of view of time or that of timeless-
ness. The first is quite simple, since this relation is realized in time:
the result of prayer (whatever this may be, that is fulfillment of the
petition, or not) is understood to come after prayer. But to see this
relation from a timeless point of view is extremely difficult, indeed
impossible.
According to a certain theory, Origen holds that God has answered
all prayers before all time or pre-eternally.146 This, however, is vir-
tually a denial of the very fact that the dialectical relation between
God and man takes place at the moment of the prayer onwards. I
should point out nevertheless that this proposition makes sense only
if it is seen from a temporal point of view. For in timelessness it
makes no sense to distinguish between ‘before all time’ and ‘now’,
since these notions make sense only within a temporal context.
However, once Origen’s expressions are studied meticulously, some
conclusions might be drawn. These expressions make evident that
what God holds before time is not the response itself, but his knowl-
edge of the response. This means that God, regarded from our point
of view, acts at the time of the prayer; the dialectical relation between
God and him who pays is fully real at that time; this is why Origen
portrays the state of prayer as follows:
He whose mind is set on prayer is in some sense profited merely by
the settled condition involved in praying, when he has disposed him-
self to approach God and speak in his presence as to one who watches
over him and is present.147
Origen adopts the method of putting his own conceptions of the
mind of God into words as if spoken by God himself. It is charac-
teristic that he represents God to speak in the Future tense: ‘I shall
hear’ (§pakoÊsomai), ‘I shall not hear’ (oÈk §pakoÊsomai), ‘he will be
unworthy of being heard’ ( diã tÚ énãjion aÈtÒn ¶sesyai toË

146
R. Sorabji, op. cit., pp. 247ff; 257ff.
147
deOr, VIII, 2.
342 chapter eight

§pakousyÆsesyai), ‘I will grant this or that’ (tãde m¢n tina poiÆsv),

‘I will bestow’ (dvrÆsomai).148 Certainly, it is Origen who says, “when-
ever verbs are applied to timelessness, the temporal implications of
these verbs should not be taken in a strict sense”; yet at the same
point he remarks that the Future tense denotes what “will exist in
the future”.149
From a timeless point of view, there is no ‘future’. Still what
Origen indicates is that the action of God is actually realized in
dialectical relation to prayer, at the time of prayer. This means that
the response of God is regarded as an action, which (from the crea-
turely point of view) takes place at that time. This becomes clearer
from the manner in which this divine action is related to time. In
the same work God is presented to think as follows: Moreover, to
such an one, who will become such as this, I will send this minis-
tering angel, to be his fellow-worker from this time onward (épÒ
toËde érjÒmenon toË xrÒnou), and to continue with him until such
a time (m°xri toËde)”, while to another “who after (metã) embracing
higher teaching is about to grow somewhat weaker and turn back-
wards to worldly things, from him I will remove (épostÆsv) this
mightier fellow-worker”. 150 This is why Origen states that “he
who . . . prays will hear while he is yet speaking, perceiving, by the
power of him who ‘hears in heaven’151 the ‘Here I am’ having cast
aside, before he prayed, all dissatisfaction concerning Providence.”152
This means that God responds (that is, acts) at the time of prayer.
What exists before is his knowledge of this act, in the same sense that
God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen in the world.
Any notion of prior, therefore, does not pertain to God’s act (or,
response to the prayer), but to his knowledge of what will happen in
the ‘train of future events’ (katã tÚn eflrmÒn t«n §som°nvn).153 This
divine knowledge has to do with his providence and the expressions
presenting God as ‘electing’ someone (such as Paul, for example) are
based on the fact that God is he ‘who knows the future events’ and,
therefore, ‘chooses’ Paul before knowing what Paul, due to his own

148
deOr, VI, 4.
149
frJohn, I; frJohn, CX.
150
deOr, VI, 4.
151
1 Kings, 8, 30.
152
deOr, X, 1.
153
deOr, VI, 3.
 time and causality 343

free will, will do during his life.154 Thus ‘God tries people out not
because he does not know the outcome of their trial but in order
to give them the opportunity to do what they want because of their
freedom of choice’.155 In view of that, ‘prophecy is a prediction of
future events’, yet an occurrence ‘took place not because it was said’
but ‘it was said because it was going to take place’.156
It is out of the manifestation of God in the world that ‘we all
have some conception of God and form some notions of whatever
kind about him’; thus ‘we see his holiness as he creates, foresees,
judges, chooses, forsakes, receives, turns away from, deems worthy
of honour, punishes each one according to his deserts’.157 Through
conceptions such as these, creatures have an apprehension of God
and come in a dialectical relation with him. In these notions ‘fore-
seeing’ is included also; yet this is not understood as a kind of action
of God in relation to creatures. This foreknowledge refers rather to
God’s knowledge of the appropriate time (kairÒw) which he will
choose for his action. This perception is stated in a Greek portion
of Princ:
For souls are, so to speak, innumerable and their habits are innu-
merable and equally so are their movements, their purposes, their incli-
nations and their impulses, of which there is only one perfect
superintendent, who has full knowledge both of the times (kairoÊw) and
the appropriate aids and the paths and the ways, namely the God and
Father of the universe.158
In Cels, however, particular emphasis is put on securing creaturely
freedom of will:
Since man is able to consider everything and to arrange everything in
order, it should be conceded that he is working together with provi-
dence (sunergoËnta tª prono¤& épodekt°on), does works which are the
product not merely of the natural instincts with which he is endowed
by the providence of God, but also of his own thought (ka‹ oÈ mÒnhw
t∞w prono¤aw YeoË ¶rga §piteloËnta éllã ka‹ t∞w •autoË).159

154
deOr, VI, 5.
155
selEx, PG 12.281ff.
156
frMatt, 21.
157
deOr, XXIV, 2.
158
Princ, III.1.14.
159
Cels, IV, 82.
344 chapter eight

The notion of causality between time and timelessness is perceived

not only in relation to the creaturely function of prayer, but also
with regard to any aspect of the dialectical relation between God
and rational creatures. Indeed Origen goes as far as to affirm a sort
of contingency in God’s action towards men. In homJer he portrays this
contingency by commenting on the saying
If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from evil, then
I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. . . . If it does
evil in my sight, that it does not obey my voice, then I will repent of
the good, wherewith I said I would benefit them.160
Origen feels it necessary to ‘explain the notion of God’s repentance.
For to repent seems to be a blemish and unworthy not only of God
but even of a wise man’, since repentance usually applies to what
has not been considered well. As God has a foreknowledge of future
events he cannot be said that he has not considered things well and
therefore he repents.161 This is a question to which extensive analy-
ses are devoted. The conclusion is that these are figures of speech
employed by God in his relation to men. This is like speaking to
‘babies’ and thus he ‘pretends’ not to know the future things,162 so
that ‘self-determination is free’163 and cannot be put in question.164
Since, therefore, ‘God foreknows everything, neither does he become
angry nor does he repent’: ‘repentance’ means God’s ‘casting off a
former thing and metathesis (metãyesiw) to another dispensation
(ofikonom¤a) of things’.165 Thus ‘repentance of God is said to be the
metathesis (metãyesiw) of the divine dispensation (ofikonom¤a) from one
thing to another’. In fact ‘the alterability of human choice cannot
be applied to God. It is us, and because of ourselves, who provoke
the changes of the divine dispensation by proving ourselves unwor-
thy of the honour gifted by God’. Thus when God says ‘I have
repented for having ordained Saul as a king’,166 this is said instead
of ‘I want to bestow the power of reigning to another one and sus-

160
Jer. 18, 8–10; homJer, 18, 5.
161
homJer, 18, 6.
162
homJer, 18, 6.
163
homJer, 18, 3.
164
homJer, 18, 6.
165
The arguments in the ensuing discussion are from frReg, IV, V.
166
1 Kings 15, 11.
 time and causality 345

pending him from being powerful’. It is as if God said that ‘Saul

made himself unworthy of being a king, so if I had a nature sus-
ceptible of repenting I could repent about him. Then why he was
ordained? Because at that time he was worthy. But, by changing his
mind he has become unworthy’.167
This reasoning is indicative of how strongly Origen feels about
the dialectical relation between God and rational creatures. There
is no need to challenge his arguments on a strictly logical basis; there
is no need to ask why God made this choice in the first place once
he foreknows that Saul would be unworthy, in the same sense that
he ‘chooses’ Paul by foreknowing what Paul would become by his
own free will.168 Faith in ‘divine dispensation’ involves conviction
about its benevolent goal, although it is not ‘easy’ for men to know
‘the reasons of dispensation’.169 The old Stoic tenet is particularly
helpful at this point.
What is of importance in these statements is that the divine and
creaturely will encounter each other in space-time and come to a
dialectical relation. This means that the responsibility, which of neces-
sity accompanies creaturely freedom is perceived in the context
of causality established between the time of the world and divine
timelessness.
God, therefore, has foreknowledge of the causative dialectical rela-
tions between him and the creatures; yet the causality itself is real-
ized at a certain time. I should, nevertheless, emphasize again that
the distinction between foreknowledge of a causative relation and a real-
ization of it makes sense regarded only from a temporal point of
view. For in the final analysis it is time that this distinction itself is
based on.
From a timeless point of view, however, this distinction makes no
actual sense, on account of the absence of time. In a causality where
both time and timelessness are involved, we cannot expect the con-
ventional temporal succession, as in a merely temporal causality. For
example, in a temporal causality the cause is always prior to the result
or, at most, simultaneous to it (as in Aristotle’s example of the eclipse).
But in a causality of the kind considered here this is not implied

167
homJer, 18, 6.
168
deOr, VI, 5.
169
Cels, III, 38; s. also Cels, IV, 69; VI, 79.
346 chapter eight

necessarily. Thus, Origen regards the future event as the cause of

God’s foreknowledge of it.170 This means that the divine foreknowl-
edge is the result of the fact that an event will take place in the
future. Hence, in this case the cause is posterior to the result. However,
the term ‘future’ applies only to a temporal point of view and this
causality (where the succession of cause and result is reversed) is
regarded from a temporal point of view, too. God knows the future,
but from a timeless point of view ‘succession’ makes no sense. It is
a temporal point of view from which it is said that God foreknows
the future: He knows it, yet not as future. This is why many ‘prophe-
cies about Christ have been stated in a form as if they ‘had already
come to pass’, namely Past Tense.171 Trinity sees them as already
having come to pass’ (aÈtã ≥dh gegon°nai), by virtue of the fact that
they ‘have been contemplated’ (lelog¤syai) by God.
If such a statement would seem strange and unconceivable a hun-
dred years ago, it should not seem so in our day. Twentieth century
marks a radical change of a world-picture which (with compara-
tively minor alterations) lasted for two and a half thousand years. A
vast number of works of modern scholarship on time should be dis-
posed simply because they insist on treating the question on the
premise that the universe is the Newtonian one. Certainly the Theory
of Relativity is not easily readable nor its ‘paradoxical’ notions and
claims are accesible to the layman. The fact is, however, that this
theory is being by and large vindicated for almost one century now.
Therefore, Philosophy should again return to its Chapter I, and this
chapter is the study of the world-picture according to the twentieth-
century perception. This is not the proper place for developing this
argument further, yet Einstein’s statement that the distinction of time
in past/present/future is only a human illusion is a good starting
point for reflection.
So, returning to my particular point, I say this: even in regard of
our visible universe, that the notion of simultaneity makes no sense is
nowadays commonly agreed upon. Our ‘now’ has not any objective
correspondent ‘now’ in a place of a few thousands light-years away.
The arguments about prayer since Antiquity are based upon this
premise: it is taken for granted that God’s ‘now’ is objectively the

170
Cf. Cels, II, 20.
171
selPs, 2.
 time and causality 347

same with the earthly ‘now’. In view of the fact that even in this
visible space (not to mention other, non-Euclidean, spaces studied
intensively, particularly during the last decades in connection with
the problem of Cosmology) there is no simultaneity, the contention
that God’s ‘now’ is the same with the earthly ‘now’ is just absurd.
As I argue in the Conclusion, the notion of simultaneity makes no
sense even in this visible universe. In the light of Theory of Relativity,
statements such as ‘any moment of time is the same in all places’
(P. Gassendi) or ‘every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere’
(Newton) are not valid any more. Modern scholars, so many years
after the constant verification of the Theory of Relativity should dis-
sociate themselves from the Newtonian world-picture.
In view of that, R. Sorabji’s opinion,172 that Origen wavers on
whether God’s changeless will should be viewed as timeless or exist-
ing in advance, does not actually represent what the theologian really
held about the divine will. Appealing to deOr 5–6, he takes it that
Origen plumps for the latter, namely, that God’s will exists in advance.
But this is not the case at all. The divine will exists timelessly and
is manifested in time in dialectical relation to creaturely freedom.
Thus, from a temporal (that is, historical) point of view, God’s will,
quite paradoxically, appears to be formed in time and indeed at the
time when a certain creaturely act takes place. This is why Origen
speaks of God’s ‘repentance’. Still he makes a very fundamental
point, which should be paid serious attention:
Speaking of God, the [notion of ] repentance is not a predicate of God
himself, but [it is a predicate] of the external things, which the repen-
tance is referred to.173
On the other hand, if God’s will is regarded from a timeless point
of view, then the notion of ‘in advance’ simply makes no sense at
all. Thus the case is not as simple as the distinction between what
is timeless and what is in advance. The actual distinction is whether
God’s will is regarded from a temporal or an atemporal point of
view. In the first case, divine will does not exist in advance or time-
lessly, but it is perceived as formed at the time when a certain dialec-
tical relation between God and creatures takes place. What exists

172
R. Sorabji, op. cit., pp. 240–1.
173
homJer, 20.
348 chapter eight

timelessly is God’s knowledge of events, not his will. But from an atem-
poral point of view, these distinctions make no sense. Once, there-
fore, we (as temporal beings) regard God from a temporal point of
view, his will does not exist in advance even though his knowledge of his
will exists timelessly. As a matter of fact, the question is about the
divine knowledge with respect to the entirety of time. There is ref-
erence to the richness of God’s knowledge of the things past and
present and future yet this knowledge is contrasted with his activity
in the world as Logos.174
In point of this, Origen actually did not face any dilemma of the
sort that R. Sorabji describes.175 In deOr he speaks of what God
knows, not what God does or wills. Everything related to the notion
of will is actually the knowledge of his will at the time when this comes
to a certain dialectical relation with a man’s will. So the case is not
that everything is determined in advance, as R. Sorabji remarks.
The case is that God knows everything timelessly and his will itself
is involved only when an occurrence takes place. Thus Origen denies
the notion of change of knowledge. However, he does not hesitate to
attribute to God a notion of willing a change, according to a crea-
ture’s merits; this does in fact suggest a change of will, which is time-
less. After all, willing a change does not really entail changing one’s will.
This interplay is understood in the context of God’s dialectical
relation with creatures. This is why this is the case of causality between
time and timelessness.
Celsus thinks that something takes place by virtue of having been pre-
dicted by some kind of foresight. But we, do not allowing for this, say
that he who foretold an event is not the cause of this coming to pass
in the future, just because he foretold this. We grant that a future
event will occur, even if this is not predicted. For it is this occurrence
itself which provides the cause to a foreteller, so that he can predict
this. And all this is present in the foreknowledge of the prophet; for
if an occurrence is open to the contingency of either coming or not
coming to pass, either of these contingencies may actually occur. We
do not sustain that the one who has foreknowledge has the power of
canceling the possibility of an event happening or not happening,176

174
expProv, 18, PG 17.204.
175
R. Sorabji makes the same inaccurate allegations about Origen’s views at
another point, too; Cf. op. cit., p. 257.
176
s. supra, n. 69, Alexander of Aphrodisias upbraiding this Stoic argument.
 time and causality 349

saying something such as this: This will definitely occur, and it is

impossible for it to come about otherwise. This pertains to all fore-
knowledge of events depending on our free will, whether we are deal-
ing with the divine scriptures or with Greek stories.177
In any event Origen does not hold that God has a changeless plan
for a sequence of events, as R. Sorabji178 and P. Plass179 and many
others claim. Such a view could compromise his fundamental doc-
trine of creaturely freedom, which plays a prominent role in his
entire conception of time.
R. Sorabji maintains also that God not only knows but also intends
the sequence of events. Yet Origen holds such an opinion only with
respect to God’s own actions, not to the creaturely ones of which
God has only knowledge. In contrast to Sorabji’s opinion, Origen
does hold that God thinks in token-reflexive terms and this is exactly
what constitutes the cruciality of this time. This is why he affirms
that even those which appear to be completely unimportant are ruled
by God’s providence (ka‹ tå êxrhsta nomizÒmena prono¤& YeoË
dioike›tai).180 And through him all things were made, and in order
that all things may be made by the Logos, he extends not only to
men but also even to things supposed to be insignificant and are
controlled by nature.181
Providence supervises and is involved not simply in the macro-
scopic function of the world, but also in individual operation of each
creature. In fact, divine supervision is concerned even with what
seems uniportant to human consideration.
All these, down to the very least, God supervises by the power of his
wisdom and distinguishes by the controlling hand of his judgement.182
The erratum of R. Sorabji concerning Origen lies in the assertion
that God established certain general principles in the world and
thereafter he does not need to care about creatures in particular. The
care of God for the world is regarded as just a care for the world

177
Cels, II, 20.
178
Op. cit., p. 260.
179
P. Plass, op. cit., pp. 16–7.
180
frMatt, 211; Matt. 10, 29–31.
181
Cels, VI, 71.
182
Princ, II.9.8.
350 chapter eight

as a whole.183 But this is exactly the opposite of Origen’s real views,

found in statements such as the following:
But God cares not only for the whole (toË ˜lou), as Celsus thinks, but
he par excellence (§jair°tvw) takes particular care of every rational
creature (m°lei . . . pantÒw logikoË).184
This in fact suggests the importance granted to each individual per-
son. At a time when the human individual (particularly a Christian)
was socially unimportant, Origen urges his heares to feel that each
one of them is, in the eyes of God, as important as the entire
universe:
Understand that you are another world in miniature and that there
is within you the sun, the moon and the stars. . . . . This world has
the Son of God. It has the Holy Spirit, as the prophet says, By the
Word of the Lord the heavens were formed and by the Spirit of his
mouth all their strength.185 And in another place, in like manner, The
Spirit of the Lord has filled the earth.186 Hear also what Christ says
to you: And behold I am with you always even to the end of the
age.187 About the Holy Spirit, it is said, And I will pour out my Spirit
on all flesh and they will prophesy.188
So the conclusion about the importance of every individual human
being before the eyes of God comes quite promptly: “You have
everything that the world has”,189 says Origen to his congregation,
which means that individual human action is in no sense unimpor-
tant. The Logos made us out of nothing and once we were made,
he keeps us being, and every day provides for us, both as a whole and
each one individually, and covertly and overtly, and even without us
being aware of it.190 This providence, however, does not imply his
will (tØn boulÆn) but only his foreknowledge (prÒgnvsin) which is
distinct from the notion of his will.191

183
The question of God having created a set of principles for the world will not
be discussed at this point. The issue here is whether there is a divine attention and
care for the particular creature at all times.
184
Cels, IV, 99. Cf. frJer, 2, 2; Philocalia, 10, 2; Cels, VII, 68.
185
Ps. 32, 6.
186
Wis. 1, 7.
187
Matt. 28, 20.
188
Joel, 2, 28.
189
Homilies on Leviticus, 5.3.4.
190
selPs, 144, PG 12.1672; italics mine.
191
frMatt, 212.
 time and causality 351

Moreover, in contrast to Sorabji’s conclusion at the same point,

Origen holds that God is omniscient and has full knowledge of even
the last detail of what happens in the world. What R. Sorabji asserts
here (though not unqualifiedly) is that a conclusion which might be
drawn from the deOr is that God does not need to think in token-
reflexive terms and, therefore, a strict omniscience is not needed by
God.192 What he suggests is that all God did in the world was to
establish certain principles and contingencies and he thereafter does
not need to know every detail of what happens in the world. Thus
he propounds a solution according to which conditionality could be
introduced into what God wills: “he wills that if I pray then my
prayer will be answered”.193
Such a view, however, is alien to what Origen holds. In fact this
could diminish the cruciality of free moral action in time and the
immediate and continuous dialectical relation between the divine and
creaturely freedom. On the contrary, he speaks of tÚ leptomer°w t∞w
prono¤aw, namely, the immediate particular care of God for even
what seems to be of non-importance.194
In view of these statements, when Puech portrays the Christian
view of time through the opinion that Providence is conceived as in
every instance particular,195 he actually (yet quite unconscioussly)
echoes Origen. Ironically though, at the same point of his paper, he
points out Origen as a representative of (what he takes as) a Greek
attitude even on this particular point.196 In any case, to Origen God’s
knowledge is extended down to the last detail of what exists in space-
time. And most certainly God is the sole omniscient of a detailed
knowledge of all time, namely past and present and future (AÈtÒw
går mÒnow gin≈skei tå pr≈hn ka‹ tå §nest«ta ka‹ tå m°llonta).197
The notion of repentance is one of those which par excellence under-
line the crucial and dramatic character of time. As opposed to this
C. Lewis states:

192
loc. cit; italics his.
193
R. Sorabji, op. cit., p. 251.
194
Cf. frMatt, 212: tÚ leptomer°w t∞w prono¤aw ka‹ ≤ m°xri t«n tuxÒntvn gn«siw.
Likewise, s. frLuc, 57: tÚ leptomer°w t∞w prono¤aw ka‹ ≤ m°xri t«n lept«n gn«siw.
Also, Homilies on Luke, 32.3. s. supra, p. 349 and n. 180.
195
H. Puech, op. cit., p. 48.
196
H. Puech, op. cit., p. 49ff.
197
expProv, 18; s. also expProv, 28; Princ, III.1.13. Further elaboration on this ques-
tion requires a detailed discussion of Origen’s conception of prÒnoia which beyond
my scope.
352 chapter eight

To God (though not to me) I and the prayer I made in 1945 were
just as much present at the creation of the world as they are now and
will be a million years hence. God’s creative act is timeless and time-
lessly adapted to the ‘free’ elements within it: but this timeless adap-
tion meets our consciousness as a sequence of prayer and answer.198
There are two main misconstructions of Origen’s thought at this
point. Firstly, the crucial distinction between knowledge of God and
will of God eluded Lewis. Secondly, the relation of divine will and
human will in time is not just a matter of consciousness of either
God or man. Origen is absolutely indifferent to such a question.
The question is the dialectical relation, which is underlined by the
encounter of these two wills. God has a timeless knowledge of it, but
this encounter, as a real historical occurrence, cannot be stated as pre-
sent in God. For such a claim destroys the cruciality of time and
the full reality of the dialectical relation between God and man.
In fact, on this question Origen’s thought is exactly the opposite
of a notion about a fixed transcendent plan of history in a timeless
Platonic overworld which provides the basis for a sophisticated typo-
logical interpretation of history.199 This is a widespread, yet falla-
cious, allegation about Origen’s thought. If he held such a concept
he would never have articulated notions such as that of recrucifixion
of Christ in the future pace Heb. 6, 2. If the course of history as such
was present to God, then Christ would not be regarded as suffering
and re-crucified because of a creature’s falling again into the same
sins. If history is present in Christ then there is no reason for him
to be regarded as suffering. He would rather be regarded as
indifferently observing the course of history, which is fixed accord-
ing to a transcendent plan. This is what Origen vigorously rejects.
For what actually lies on the basis of this rejection is the dramatic
character of time and the critical importance of the encounter of
divine and creaturely will in it.
The question is not as simple as to make the distinction between
what is present in God or what happens simultaneously with respect
to both human and divine life. If the question of what is present in
a remote place of the visible firmament needs some treatment to
receive an answer, the question of what is present to God is far
more difficult. At any rate, such questions are no more susceptible
of simplistic answers nowadays.

198
Cited in E. Jay, Origen’s Treatise on Prayer, London 1954, p. 101.
199
P. Plass, op. cit., pp. 16–7.
 time and causality 353

Regarding this relation from a temporal point of view, there is a

distinction which imbues Origen’s thought and actually elucidates
his conception of this relation: Knowledge by God is implicitly regarded
as a rather passive state. It is a characteristic of God to know every-
thing. The will of God, however, implies a perception of God being
in an active state, namely, in active dialectical relation with creatures.
No doubt this distinction is but a conceptual one, perhaps some-
what awkward. This is why Origen does not express it explicitly.
Although somewhat rough, it helps since it provides human intellect
with a portrayal of the conceptual distinction between the divine
knowledge (even the knowledge of His will in its dialectical relation
with creatures) and the divine will itself.
If this distinction is not made, then Origen’s conception of this
issue is bound to be misunderstood, as indeed it currently is. The
basis for a positive approach to his thought on this point is the fact
that God is perceived as really involved in this dialectical encounter
of his will with creaturely will in time. In the final analysis, the basis
for a comprehension of this point is the conception of the dramatic
character of time, which arises from this divine/creaturely dialecti-
cal encounter.
It should also be emphasized that in Origen it makes no sense to
speak about any pattern of history whatever. R. Markus maintained
that there could be no Christian philosophy of history in the pat-
tern-making sense. There is no Christian pattern; indeed Christianity
is the very negation of pattern.200 If this is to be accredited, then it
can be said that in Origen this negation of pattern is established in
the strongest terms possible.
Certainly the topic of the relation between foreknowledge and free-
dom has been an outstanding question of debate ever since Antiquity
and the bibliography on this is tremendous. My view is that in order
to sustain that divine foreknowledge (or, timeless knowledge) consti-
tutes a restriction to creaturely freedom one has to make a dialec-
tical jump. For there is no logical basis for the knowledge of the future
to be related to the future itself. A prediction of future actions (cer-
tainly on grounds of rationality) is possible in everyday human affairs.
Why or how this prediction should be held responsible or affecting
one’s foretold actions is something which simply cannot be grounded

200
A.H. Armstrong – R.A. Markus, op. cit., p. 132.
354 chapter eight

on reason or dialectics. Thus the allegation that prediction indicates

a limitation to freedom is but an arbitrary corollary, reached only
through a logical jump.
I think that the distinction between timeless knowledge and fore-
knowledge applied to the timeless God is only artificial and makes
not real sense. It stems from a Newtonian world-picture of scholars
who simply do not put into use the fact that this picture has col-
lapsed. Nelson Pike,201 J.R. Lucas,202 G. Iseminger,203 and R. Sorabji204
are some of those who argue that fore-knowledge would restrict human
freedom, whereas they concede that timeless knowledge would be in a
sense regarded as not restricting freedom. J. van Gerven asserts that
God’s timeless knowledge would not restrict human freedom was not
yet even recognized by Augustine;205 but R. Sharples argues that this
was recognized by Boethius.206 On this question there is an enor-
mous bibliography indeed.207 In my view though the arguments devel-
oped have two fundamental weaknesses.
Firstly, they are developed on the premise that the actual make-
up of the world is a Newtonian one. In fact they are all based on

201
Cf. Nelson Pike, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action”, Philosophical
Review, 74 (1965), pp. 27–46; also, by the same author, God and Timelessness, London,
1970, esp. pp. 104–7.
202
Cf. J.R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will, London, 1973; Ch. 14.
203
Cf. Gary Iseminger, “Foreknowledge and Necessity”, Summa Theologiae Ia, 14,
13, 2, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 1 (eds. P.A. French, T.E. Uehling Jr., H.K.
Wettstein), Moris Minesota, 1976; pp. 5–25.
204
Cf. Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, London, 1980; pp. 112–3.
205
Cf. J. van Gerven “Liberté humaine at prescience divine d’après S. Augustine”,
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 55 (1957), pp. 317–30.
206
Cf. Robert Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato: some parallels”,
Classical Quarterly, 28 (1978), pp. 243–66.
207
A question which has been posed is this: If God’s knowledge is either time-
less or changeless, can he know truths which depend on the flow of time? Cf.
Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness, London, 1970, Ch. 5; Arthur Prior, “The for-
malities of omniscience”, Philosophy, 1962, reprinted in Ch. 3 of his Papers on Time
and Tense, Oxford, 1968; Normann Kretzmann, “Omniscience and Immutability”,
Journal of Philosophy, 63 (1966), pp. 109–21; H.N. Castaneda “Omniscience and
indexical reference”, Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967), pp. 203–10; Nicholas Wolterstorff,
“God everlasting”, in Orlebeke and Smedes (eds.), God and the Good, Grand Rapids,
Michigan, 1975; E. Stump & N. Kretzmann, “Eternity”, Journal of Philosophy, 78
(1981), pp. 429–58; etc. On the question whether power can be changeless or time-
less, Cf. A.J.P. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford, 1979, Ch. 8; Peter Geach,
Truth, Love and Immortality, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979, p. 102; E. Bevan,
Symbolism and Belief, London, 1938, p. 98. However discussion of such questions is
outside of my present scope.
 time and causality 355

axioms such as those already mentioned: any moment of time is the

same in all places (P. Gassendi) and every indivisible moment of
duration is everywhere (Newton).208 Secondly, they are based on the
artificial distinction (attributed to God) between fore-knowledge and
timeless knowledge. In the final analysis, this distinction makes the
arbitrary assumption of attributing time to the timeless God. For this
distinction can in no way make sense applied to God himself: this
is rather a relative conception of God regarded from a temporal
point of view.
The conclusion is that Origen holds a conception of causality
between time and timelessness. He grounds this upon the notion of
freedom of rational creatures, as well as on the fact that their will
comes to a dialectical relation with the will of God. This causality
is realized in time because it is there that the divine and creaturely
will encounter each other; but, since it stems from this dialectical
relation, this causality is extended both in time and timelessness.

Timeless causality?

By the so-called Fragment 19, Koetschau embodied in his edition

of Princ a Greek passage from Justinian’s libOr, which reads as follows:
And if what has been subjected to Christ shall in the end be subjected
to God, then all will lay aside their bodies; and I think that there will
then be a dissolution of bodily nature into non-existence, to come into
existence a second time if rational beings should again fall.209
In accordance with this passage, Jerome, in epAv, ascribes to Origen
this view:
If all shall be subjected to God, then all will lay aside their bodies;
and then the entire universe of bodily things will be dissolved into
non-existence; but if necessity should demand it a second time, it would
come into existence again in the event of the fall of rational beings.210
In the same edition Koetschau included also the so-called Fragment
40, which is again a passage of Justinian from libOr, and reads thus:

208
Cf. M. Capec (ed.), The Concepts of Space and Time, Dortrecht, 1976, p. xxxv
and lvi, n. 4.
209
Fragment 19, Koetschau, from Justinian, libOr (Mansi IX.529), in Princ, II.3.3.
210
Jerome, epAv; cited in FP, p. 86, n. 6.
356 chapter eight

It must be that the nature of bodies is not primary, but that it was
created at intervals on account of certain falls that happened to ratio-
nal beings, who came to need bodies; and again, that when their
restoration is perfectly accomplished these bodies are dissolved into
nothing, so that this is ever happening.211
Koetschau put in one more passage from the same writing of Justinian:
[rational creatures will] rise again to the state in which they formerly
were, completely putting away their evil and their bodies. Then again
a second or a third or many more times they are enveloped in different
bodies for punishment. For it is probable that different worlds have
existed and will exist, some in the past and some in the future.212
Such allegations have been made to express Origen’s views and
played their role in the Anathemas decreed by the Council of
Constantinopole in 553. G. Butterworth, in his English translation
of Princ, notes that although these Anathemas cannot be taken as
literal extracts from the De Principiis, they express the teaching of this
work, doubtless for the most part in Origen’s own words.213 Such a
claim, however, is all too far away from the truth of the matter.
Justinian regarded the creation of worlds as taking place in a sort
of intervals (§k dialeimmãtvn). This means that there should be time-
lessness, and then time, then timelessness, then time again, and so
on. The idea of successive worlds is related to a notion of succes-
sion of incorporeality-corporeality-incorporeality—and so on for ever
(ée¤).214 Justinian, as well as Jerome, virtually allege on this issue that
Origen held a notion of timeless causality. Accordingly, he ascribes
to him the opinion that God has a timeless will according to which
whenever a fall takes place a material world should appear.
What should be noted in the first place is that nowhere in his
works does Origen imply such a notion. What he calls kosmopoi¤a
(creation of the world)215 is one and unique event. We can find his
expression the beginning of creation of the world (érxÆ t∞w kos-
mopoi¤aw).216 His entire theology refers to the world from that begin-

211
Fragment 40, Koetschau, from Justinian, libOr (Mansi, IX. 532) in Princ, IV.4.8.
212
From Justinian, libOr (Mansi, IX.512E) in Princ, II.8.3.
213
FP, p. 125, n. 7.
214
Cf. supra, Fragment 40, Koetschau, from Justinian, libOr (Mansi, IX. 532).
215
commMatt, 15, 27; Cels, I, 19; II, 9; V, 59; VI, 27; 28; 50; 51; frJohn, I;
XCV; etc.
216
commGen, 3, PG 12.64; deOr, VI, 5; frLuc, 104; Philocalia, 23, 8.
 time and causality 357

ning until the end of things.217 Nowhere is there even the slightest
implication that this creation is a manifestation of some kind of
unchangeable will of God or that this is an occurrence which has
taken place before this creation or that it will ever happen again.
The previous analyses on the relation of God to the world demon-
strate that what he held was sheerly different from what has been
attributed to him through the foregoing passages.
If the Fall is taken as not a unique event, it follows straight off
that God is himself involved in a timeless causality. Therefore creat-
ing should be applied to God himself as something compulsorily accom-
panying his own being. Thus creation is not the product of God’s
own freedom; this is not made as an act of volition. Rather this is
the product of the freedom of some rational beings before the Fall
assumed to live a life of their own. But the notion of rational beings
before the Fall is alien to Origen, falsely assigned to him by Jerome
and Justinian.
Hardly could a concept be more remote to Origen’s authentic
views than that. For what we have seen is that creation is a product
of God’s free will and benevolent decision; it came into being out
of non-being ‘once’ (˘te) Wisdom willed and wanted to establish a
relation to the future beings.
At this point we should recall the analyses about the significance
of the past tense used in couching these statements: past tense sug-
gests that this decision of God occurred once. If Origen held a notion
of timeless causality he would have said that the Wisdom of God
wills and wants that if a fall takes place then a creation should emerge.
But he does nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he clearly states
that God created by his own free and benevolent decision. He does
not say that the Wisdom of God wills or wants the establishment of
a relation to the future beings: he says that she willed and wanted
to do so.
What this actually means is that God is not Creator by essence.
If there was any kind of necessity or timeless causality by reason of
which God should create the world, this could entail a certain estab-
lished relation between God and the world. This very causality would
be the point at which the being of God and the being of the world

217
Ibid.
358 chapter eight

are of necessity related to each other. But this is exactly what Origen
strongly rejects: creation is a contingent occurrence and this thesis
immediately stems from his notion of radical transcendence of God
to the world and the radical hiatus between the divine being and
the existence of the world. That God willed to create this world is
a unique product of his freedom—a product, which came into being
out of non-being. Although God remains radically transcendent to
the world, he established a creative relation with it out of his good-
ness, not out of any necessity or causality.
This, in the final analysis, means that, hypothetically, God would
have never created the world. He would have either acted in another
way (certainly unconceivable), or even he might not have acted at
all in any way. Had he not willed, he could had never assumed the
function of Creator. The meaning of this hypothesis (and, subse-
quently, the meaning of use of past tense by Origen) is that there
is no timeless causality—not even one established by the will of God.
Origen refers to the decision of God using terms clearly denoting
that this creation is an event stemming from a unique decision of
God, which is sheerly irrelevant to any notion of causality.
The question of probability of some next creation is indeed out
of Origen’s main interest since he is entirely preoccupied with this
world throughout time. But if one by all means wishes to find some
allusions related to this question, then the conclusion should be that
he believes that no other fall will occur. Besides, this point is expli-
cated in the Latin rendering of the Commentary on the Romans.218
Thus the allegations by Justinian and Jerome that ascribe a notion
of timeless causality to Origen are false. He held precisely the oppo-
site of what is attributed to him: the world was created out a unique
benevolent decision of God. He is not Creator because of any causal-
ity compelling him to create. God created once because he willed to
do so out of his goodness. This is why the distinction between the
notions of God Himself and God as Creator is so vital. The fundamen-
tal conviction that the world was made out of a free benevolent and
unique decision of God plays an important part in that distinction.
Thus, to say that God is creator in Himself is a notion, which has

218
Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1–5, tr. T. Scheck,
Washington, 2001; pp. 374–378.
 time and causality 359

no room in this concept of time. Due to key presuppositions of his

theology, Origen could have never applied to God any timeless
causality of the kind discussed above; as a matter of fact, he never
did that.
When Justinian and Jerome attribute to him the idea that corpo-
reality emerges and dissolves into nothing intermittently, they do so
because they also ascribe to him the notion of a beginningless world.
The former allegation is actually subsequent to the latter. What they
virtually imply is that there is an eternal world of individual and
personal incorporeal souls, or minds, and this world may exist either
in a mode of corporeality or incorporeality. In any case, this world
is thought to be without beginning or end. What changes is the mode
of its existence, not the existence itself as an eternal fact; and this
mode of existence (that is, either corporeal or incorporeal form)
depends on the moral status of these incorporeal rational minds,
which are without beginning or end. However, it has been already
solidly proven that Origen’s authentic views have no relevance with
such a frame of thought.
Therefore, to the question raised in the section heading, whether
is there a timeless causality, I answer with an unqualified ‘no’, after
having explained what I mean: there is no concept of timeless causal-
ity. The creation of the world is not part of any causative scheme
of intermittent appearance or disappearance of bodily nature. There
is one creation which once came into being ex nihilo out of one and
unique decision of God.

Conclusion

Origen employed the fundamental Stoic perception of time as exten-

sion, yet he treated it in a way appropriate to his own thought. The
Stoics regarded time as a purely natural element. This way of treat-
ing time was understandably consequent to both their lack of any
notion of transcendence and their materialism. Origen, on the other
hand, did hold a notion of transcendence; besides, the notion of
materiality applies not only to the visible firmament but also to other
worlds which are material and yet not seen, due to the quality of
their matter. He also held a notion of incorporeality applied solely
to the divine being. Not only is the real existence of this incorpo-
reality not put into question, but also this is regarded as a reality
360 chapter eight

of higher quality. All these presuppositions fundamentally determine

his conception of time.
Thus the notions which constitute the Stoic definition of time have
in Origen’s thought a quite different import. Time is indeed held to
be a fundamentally natural reality. Yet there are also significant theo-
logical implications related to time proper. At any rate, the conjec-
ture of J. Cheek219 that Origen did not conceive of time as a problem
which had to be solved abstractly is wrong. The case is not that
Origen did not conceive, but that he did not wish to expound an ad
hoc theory of time, because he regarded this problem as a basically
natural one. But he did form a concept of time of his own for the
purpose of his own theological aims. This conception is decisively
present throughout his entire work. Origen’s conception of time is
far more advanced than any composition of the Christian view of
time made by contemporary theologians. For he had a good com-
mand of the problematique of time in itself—the lack of which is obvi-
ous in many modern scholars.
Whereas the Stoics spoke simply of extension, Origen clearly defines
the relation of this extension to space, by introducing the term sum-
parekte¤nvn, which in fact portrays the reality of space-time. The
Stoic predication of time as parakolouyoËn the movement of the
world is discarded, because it does not depict the relation of time
to space accurately; this may also be misleading (as indeed it was
for some people) on the strict relation of time to space, namely, as
to whether time is older or younger than space. The terminology
introduced by Origen excludes the possibility of such dilemmas.
Accordingly, the relation of this extension to the world has a different
meaning on account of the different conception of the world. Time
is a reality accompanying the entire world, it is related not only to
what is visible, but also to what is not seen. Thus, although both
the Stoics and Origen firmly relate time to the world, Origen’s view
is that time applies to a reality far broader than the Stoic one does:
time exists not only in the visible world, but also in the other spaces
in which rational creatures live.
Origen affirms that everything in the world is in time yet it is only
in letter that this expression appears to be the same with that of

219
J. Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption in the Theology of Origen, Drew University,
1962, p. 275.
 time and causality 361

Zeno’s. For the notion of to be in the world, and thus in time, in

Origen is far different from the Stoic views, by reason of the different
import applied to the world.
Likewise, the notion of motion related to time has a different import.
Although natural motion (which is what the Stoics meant in their
definition of time) is not neglected, this predication applied to the
conception of time is mainly understood as free moral action in all
ranks of life. By the same token, whereas time is also regarded as
a criterion of fastness and slowness,220 in Origen this predicate is mainly
applied to the trial of free creaturely action in time.
Besides, Origen regards time as a dimension. This term seems to
place this near to Plotinus’ statements about time. However, there
is no relevance to any Platonic or Neoplatonic concept. For time is
not any sort of moving image, it was not at rest with the eternity
in real being where it kept quiet before is moved down to the world.
Time came into being out of non-being and it did not exist before
the creation of the world. In the Platonic view, time is portrayed as
an image exactly because it is perceived as establishing a kind of
affinity between the world and the Beyond. On the contrary, in Origen,
not only does time not establish any affinity between the divine life
and the world, but also it is regarded as an element in terms of
which the radical chasm of essence between God and the world is
portrayed. The perception of time as dimension (both etymologically
and essentially) actually stems from it being regarded as an extension.
The Stoics did not regard time as a dimension of life because they
mainly considered the natural character of cosmic motion and they
did not have any eschatological ideas. On the other hand, Plotinus
treats the Stoic notion of time as extension contemptuously. He
grounds his arguments on dialectics and the lack of elaboration of
the Stoic definition. His objections though really arise from his con-
tempt for materialism and from the fact that the Stoics determine
time only in relation to the visible material world and their definition
excludes any notion of transcendence.
Origen is immune to this kind of dispute, since he held both
notions of materiality of the entire world and a notion of the divine
transcendence. This is why he can use Stoic as well as Neoplatonic
predications and yet to apply to them a different import befitting

220
SVF, I, 26, 11–15.
362 chapter eight

his own thought, which was later employed by the Cappadocians

and a vast number of Christian writers.
This conception of Origen is what Augustine picked up in order
to form his theory of time. In the light of my discussion in this sec-
tion, the originality of Augustine’s theory of time should be thor-
oughly reassessed. For what is currently alleged as his personal
contribution to a theory of time is simply a repetition of Origen’s
original perceptions as well as articulations. With regard to points
on which (for one reason or another) he was unable to follow Origen’s
radical transformations, Augustine remained a mere echoer of sub-
stantial aspects of Plotinus’ concept of time.
Origen employs prolongation of time for his own purposes. In
contrast to pagan thought, motion in space-time is not just a nat-
ural change of position, but a meaningful free moral action. There
is nothing of the pessimism and dispair of Marcus Aurelius. While
for the Gnostics the world is an abortive product, for Origen time
is not a destroyer: it is rather a source of consolation and hope in
a world perceived as a downfall (katabolÆ).
The notions of Judgement and Causality established in time under-
line a particular conception of it. In commGen the reason of faith and
the advent of Christ and the whole dispensation through the law
and the prophets and the toils of the apostles in order to establish
the Churches of God through Christ is grounded on the fact that
there will be a judgement by God. As it is pointed out there, if judge-
ment and resurrection is not established in time then all these events took
place in vain,221 and faith is futile also.
This belief to judgement fundamentally imbues this conception of
time. Its role is so decisive that if, hypothetically, this did not exist,
then this view of time is shed from crucial characteristics of it. In
such a case one has to speak of a totally different concept of time,
which could not be Origen’s view of it. For one thing, it is the con-
viction about the impartiality and righteousness of God—two notions,
which are regarded as principles. For another, freedom constitutes
an essential existential characteristic of rational creatures. Thus time
is understood as a reality created by God for freedom to make sense,
since freedom can make no sense in the absence of time.

221
commGen, 3; PG. 12.52; Philocalia, 23, 1.
 time and causality 363

So, although it cannot be sustained that the notions of Judgement

and Causality pertain to the essence of time, it can be argued that
they constitute fundamental characteristics of a particular concept of
time. This means that if Judgement and Causality are disregarded
or abolished, then what remains is another conception of time, which
indeed would be very close to some Greek school of thought. This
is why Origen consciously contrasts his own ideas to the Greek ones,
especially at points where misunderstandings are likely to emerge.
This is why it is mainly in terms of observation of the movement
of the world that the notion of proplongation of time has been
considered. What we see is that prolongation by no means suggests
identical recurrence, which would entail sheer indifference to this
possibility. Within this context this recurrence is pointless, since not
only commendable accomplishment but also everything contemptible
will recur. What is the point for living repeatedly a life of which no
detail will be changed? This is Origen’s main point against the Old
Stoa and this is his reaction to Marcus’ disrair at the possibility of
endless recurrence. Prolongation is not a purposeless natural phe-
nomenon, but a meaningful process: what is the point for living once
again a life once all the struggles were in vain, and one would relapse
into the condition which he had left with such effort? This concept
of prolongation is intended to overcome the frustration and the sense
of pointlessness, which is inescapable in a Stoic environment. There
is an ‘eternal law’ fulfilled in the existantial causality, but there is
nothing of the Stoic mechanistic fatalism which Origen has good
reason to attack, and so he does in order to defend a consequential
historical process.
Although it is only in an attenuated sense that an irregular ver-
sion of recurrence implies determinism, it is true that determinism
differs from fatalism in allowing that certain outcomes may be due
to the efforts we make, or we fail to make. With memory and antic-
ipation removed, no one could feel any concern about future recur-
rences. Here memory is indeed removed, but anticipation exists
because the principles of process are known. This awareness of the
rules of causality sets the rules of personal conduct, and this is the
factor that bestows upon time and temporal flux a critical import.
 CONCLUSION

The concept of time is present in the theology of Origen as an essen-

tial element, which is consonant with the entirety of his theological
views and profoundly imbues them all. Due to the very fact that his
purpose was theological exposition, he did not devote any ad hoc
treatise to natural or philosophical problems, one of which was the
problem of time. He was unwilling to make analyses of this kind,
although he had a good command of such a scholarship. Of inter-
est to him was the knowledge which ‘saves’, not the one of Physics
or Philosophy just for the sake of erudition. He was satisfied, never-
theless, that even this field of education is not worthless. Natural and
philosophical knowledge constitute important stages toward the essen-
tial study which is theology; but they should be left behind once the
stage of speaking on theological grounds is reached. As a master in
both Alexandria and Caesarea he paid homage to Mathematics,
Physics, Astronomy and Philosophy, which he regarded as indis-
pensable steps toward theological study, especially at his time, when
Christianity was striving to expound its own tenets and had to be
involved in polemical debates with all sorts of non-Christian thinkers.
Origen made decisive advances in philosophical vein, although he
would be utterly uniterested in being regarded as a philosopher of
note. Although he never regarded philosophy as a primary authority,
he always was a careful and well-informed student of philosophy.
Accordingly, he made some striking advances in a philosophical vein,
the question of time included. He was selective towards philosophy,
making clear that he did not regard philosophy as a primary authority;
that role belongs to Scripture, Christian tradition and the teaching
of the Church. However, despite the prominence which he ascribed
to theology, he sometimes expesses himself in a philosophical style.
Nevertheléss it is hard to find in him an all-out contempt for phi-
losophy, like the advertised contempt of Gregory of Nyssa for non-
Christian philosophy. In commJohn he deals temperately with the
Gnostic Heracleon in a style which is not the polemical one of his
Cels. Whenever needed, Origen treats his problems with consider-
able philosophical refinement. His aim was not to be polemical by
all means and at any rate. For instance, he held fast to the idea of
 conclusion 365

a transcendent timeless personal God, who is beyond any notion of

creation and yet he comes to a causal relation to this creation, con-
ceived as a product of his benevolent will. This causality notwith-
standing, God Himself is immutable. The idea that every particular
causal relation integrally involves change was tempting in itself, and
might readily be suggested to any reader due to existing impressive
and influential analyses at the time. What I believe Origen’s expo-
sition shows is that this tempting idea is false. On this point at least,
the Platonist example was on his side.
The scriptural reference to ‘beginning and end and middle of
times’, as well as the whole context at that point of the Wisdom of
Solomon, are regarded as pointing to natural knowledge,1 which is
not treated with any hint of contempt at all. He insists, however,
that the actual aim is the knowledge which ‘saves’ and this is the
teaching of Jesus Christ. At any rate, all kinds of knowledge can be
found in the Scripture: Ecclesiastes contains natural (fusikÆn) knowl-
edge; in the Proverbs it is moral (±yikÆn) one which can be found,
whereas the deepest, the theological (yeologikÆn) one is hidden in the
Song of Songs.2 The first is a ‘practical’ (praktikÆn) teaching, the
second is the ‘sophistical’ (sofistikÆn) and the third is the ‘theolog-
ical’ (yeologikÆn) one.3 No kind of knowledge is treated with con-
tempt. After all they are found in the Scripture and can be
comprehended by those who have ‘cleansed’ themselves,4 according
to his constant anti-Platonic attitude on the relation between Praxis
and Knowledge. Still, the conviction that theological knowledge is
the most sublime and worthwhile stands out in his entire work. His
ultimate concern and aim is neither the ‘wisdom of the world’, nor
the ‘wisdom of the rulers of this world’: it is the ‘wisdom of God’.
Origen therefore was a theologian who ascended the steps of nat-
ural, as well as moral knowledge. Once this fundamental fact, together
with his meticulous usage of critical terms, is taken into account,
one could discern his views of both natural and moral problems.
For they are indeed explicitly or implicitly expounded throughout
his writings.

1
Wis. 7, 17–18. frMatt, 140; frMatt, 506; frLuc, 50.
2
expProv, 22; PG. 17.220.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
366 conclusion

Hence, although it has not been my purpose to expound the whole

of Origen’s theology, I have considered the study of all the aspects
of it as an indispensable presupposition for understanding crucial
facets of his thought. For, as I emphasized in the Introduction, how
a thinker conceives of time is actually a reliable manifestation of his
entire thought. The concept of time stands in close relation to one’s
entire way of perceiving the whole of reality, in natural, philosophical
and theological terms. A certain view of time is formed according
to them and it is a factor which decisively affects the formation of
these standpoints. So the notion of time both determines and is deter-
mined by all the aspects of a certain philosophy, or theology, or atti-
tude to life in general.
Those are the fundamental presuppositions on which I have
approached Origen’s thought in order to expound my subject mat-
ter. The first thing is to underscore the new terminology which comes
in with Origen. This is not all too easy, since his most penetrating
reflections are delivered in passing, in works where his principal pur-
pose was theological and pastoral at the same time. For all his works
were pièces d’occasion, written to meet pressing pastoral or dogmatic
needs, in moments snatched from other duties. Origen appeared
when Christians were challenged to give a reasoned defence of their
faith, and not just the simple proclamation of their message (kÆrugma)
which the Apologists had done. He appropriated philosophical con-
ceptions to fit in his thought, especially when he was addressing
pagan audience. His purpose was to elicit an active faith in God
building on his hearers’ existing beliefs and notions.
One of the main points made in this book is that he formed a
completely new concept of time, profoundly determined by the
Christian attitude to life and history. Stoic or Plotinian terms can
be found in his nomenclature of temporal notions. At his era, how-
ever, the question of time was not just a problem of Physics. This
is why he does not rest content with the early Stoic treatment of it.
In giving his own account, therefore, he had to eschew the pristine
Stoic failures. Besides, he had to elaborate the notion of time from
a Christian point of view. But the conceptual transformations, as
well as the terminology, which he established in speaking of time,
are so radical, that it is in fact very difficult to speak of influence
upon him. Origen ploughed his own way towards the formation of
a Christian view of time. It is my conclusion and thesis that he did
accomplish his aim.
 conclusion 367

The ingrained claim that Origen sustained a theory of a begin-

ningless world is now discredited. This alone puts him in a different
line of thinking from Hellenism: indeed, that material universe had
a beginning seemed to most Greeks an absurdity. On the other hand,
the viewpoint of Philo, the Alexandrian Jew of the first century A.D.,
is so controversial, and proved so seminal, that could hardly count
as a background for Origen; for although Philo issues at least one
denial of creation out of nothing, he seems to affirm this at numerous
points. He runs together in his conception of creation the unyielding
idea of the world having a beginning out of God’s benevolent will
and decision. In addition it has been confirmed that the notion of
spiritual should in any case be withheld from the notion of world. The
notion of the world is incompatible and cannot be squared with that
of ‘spiritual’.
Origen’s universe is, and has to be, through and through material.
It comprises an undefined number of ranks of life. Each individual
species of rational being is defined by its position on the great scale
of being, and every rung on the ladder is filled, but filled by only
one specimen, which is understood to live always in a body appo-
site to its particular space. He professedly built his theory apparently
in deference to the view point of Paul, which is sheerly irrelevant
to the common scheme of the Hellenistic Gnosticism.
I have argued that the idea of an incorporeal ‘creature’ can be made
sense in a few cases. In other cases it cannot be, but that takes some
showing. Sometimes the coherence of this notion cannot be assumed
straight off.
On the conception of causality Origen broke an entirely new
ground. He went beyond Aristotle’s occasional wavering as to whether
a cause need precede its effect, or not. He knew of course that the
Platonists implied that there need be no temporal relation at all.
However, this was not an innovation for which the Platonists could
take credit, since it needs to be made intelligible how something time-
less can stand in causal relations. Origen avoided this horn of the
dilemma, by entertaining the idea of divine will, the theory which
places him beyond any Greek school of thought. Of course in ascrib-
ing a will, like anything else, to God, we should be prepared to find
that the ascription will not have quite the same implications as an
ascription to humans. This was one of his cardinal ideas, by means
of which, for the first time, he put Christianity on the offensive in the
debate on whether the universe had a beginning. This idea can no
368 conclusion

longer be so lightly dismissed, after the defences sustained Chapter 4.

Origen’s answer to the question of time has aspects, which are
natural, moral and theological. In principle, time is regarded as a
natural reality, as an element in the make-up of the world. He
employed the early Stoic conception of time as ‘extension’ (diãsthma),
but the extent to which he would be regarded as indebted to the
Stoics goes no further than that. He affirms that time is fully and
unequivocally real and is also a continuum and a dimension of reality.
His ontology of time is apposite to his entire theory of creation.
Time is a real creature which emerge s in the same sense that the
entire natural world does. This means that it comes forward accord-
ing to the logoi created at the Providential Creation. This stands for
an evolutionary concept of coming to being. In Platonic tradition,
to make the Forms living was even more tempting for Plato’s suc-
cessors, once they had made Forms to be thoughts in the mind of
the divine intellect, and had taken over the Aristotelian idea that
this living intellect is identical with its objects. In Origen the logoi
are neither ‘thoughts’ not are they ‘identical’ with God.
That the object which God created ‘in the beginning’ is the logoi,
or principles, suggests that God created the solfa, not the entire music
of the cosmic drama which was to evolve. It is plain that music
really exists when it is played, not when just written on paper. God
knows the entire ‘music’ which is to be played until the end of the
world, still he is not the sole author or player of it. What happens,
and is to happen, in the world is the result of the dialectical rela-
tion between Gos and rational creatures. Thus, for the whole of time
to exist it is not necessary that the whole should be accomplished
at one go.
In couching the relation of space proper to time proper, he intro-
duced a terminology which directly and profoundly influenced Christian
authors of the later centuries. He established a virtually anti-Platonic
view: time does not move. It is a continuum along which the world
moves it is a dimension of the world. Subsequently, time proper is
not movement. The Cappadocians, particularly Basil, said about time
nothing more than Origen did. Basil simply repeats what the
Alexandrian established as a Christian view of time. And, in the
light of my analyses in this book, Augustine’s originality regarding
his theory of time has to be thoroughly reassessed. For there seems
to be much less, if anything, said by him, which had not been already
set forth by Origen. At any rate, discussion here has provided the
 conclusion 369

answer to the long-standing question about the source of Augustine’s

theory of time: I have showed that it was Origen’s views, which
were employed by Augustine. Space-time is the central notion in
Origen’s natural conception of the world. Time is also finite; it came
into existence out of non-existence, as a creature of God, along with
space. It will also come to an end, which will be the end of the
reality of space-time as a whole.
The notions of timelessness and temporality are clearly enunci-
ated. God is timeless whereas the world is temporal. The finiteness
of space-time is also clearly propounded. There is no notion of any
‘sacred time’, or God’s ‘time’, or any infinite time. Time had a begin-
ning, there is a reason for this to exist and it will come to an end
when this reason will cease to exist. The distinction between atem-
poral and temporal realities appears just because time came into
existence as an element of the make-up of the world, which will
have a finite duration. ‘Before’ or ‘after’, so to speak, this duration
there is only timelessness.
The conception of time is an essential element of this thought,
which determines (and is determined by) how he comprehends God,
the world, and the relation between the divine reality and creaturely
life. His thought must be considered on the fundamental premise
that Origen is above all a theologian, an exponent of the message
of Scripture. As such, he is certainly not oblivious to his secular
background, be it natural science or philosophy—a background sound,
extensive, as well as deep. What is admirable though is that he did
not allow his conceptions to be influenced all along by this back-
ground, even though he made wide usage of the technical nomen-
clature available to him. On the contrary, whenever non-Christian
philosophical terms are employed, they have undergone such a pro-
found and radical transformation, that it is only in name that they
resemble their pagan homonyms. The transformation of the Stoic
definition of time as diãsthma, as well as the radical difference of
time as diãstasiw from the homonym term of Plotinus, are eloquent
examples of Origen’s inspiration. The conception of time, and the
pertinent terminology initiated by him, exerted a profound influence
upon subsequent Christian thinkers. Even so, however, these authors
did not always prove able to follow all over his radical dissent from
pagan conceptions.
Augustine follows Origen’s original perceptions, but he was unable
to follow him in the radical transformations of the Neoplatonic
370 conclusion

conceptions of time related to a kind of motion of soul, as well as to

the different purport that time as diãstasiw had in Origen. On the
question of time at least, Augustine has been regarded, not unfairly,
as having succumbed to the influence of Neoplatonism.
Besides, regarding the conception of afi≈n, Origen’s successors
employed his terminology verbatim—but not his conceptions all the
way. Thus, although he enunciates that afi≈n is a natural reality,
Gregory of Nazianus and John of Damascus postulated afi≈n as the
timeless divine life. In stark contrast to Origen’s views, what those
writers postulated as afi≈n was in fact the Platonic and Neoplatonic
conception of it; and yet, it is Origen who is regarded as influenced
be these pagan schools of thought.
If Origen holds a notion of atemporality, this is not because any
stream of Greek thought did influence him. After all, the Greek
schools which hold the notion of atemporality regard the world as
everlasting, not finite as Origen does. He upholds the notion of atem-
porality because there is a thoroughly significant reason for time to
exist: this is the natural element of reality, which renders creaturely
freedom meaningful. This freedom could make no sense in the absence
of time. It is through time that the world will return to God. This is
its raison d’être. It exists for a purpose to be fulfilled and this is why
time has a dramatic character and movement in this has a teleo-
logical direction. This is also the reason for employing a prolonged
time, comprising many aeons, yet a finite time. The idea of recur-
rent worlds provided solace to almost no one in the ancient world.
The theory was not a source of consolation, but often an additional
source of horror and the reason in plain: the notion of freedom in
time, the dialectical relation with a personal God, the finiteness of
time and the idea of a purpose to be fulfilled, all these were absent
from the pagan conceptions of time. Origen avoided the pagan horn
of the dilemma, by settling for a finite succession of worlds, which
in fact he had to do on the grounds and presuppositions of his own
theology. Otherwise, the crucial character of the encounter of ratio-
nal creatures with God would be removed. Moral action renders the
subject of it a crucial center of responsibility, considering the horror
that some people experience when they think of the infinitude of
time, and feel their own brief existence dwarfed by it. In that case
it might be urged that dispair would overwhelm the moral subject
and his dislike of future non-existence not surprisingly would disin-
tegrate into passive fatalism of a Far Eastern character. This is indeed
 conclusion 371

how an infinite time robs action of its significance, and reduces any
sense of freedom and responsibility into inert tameness.
This consideration shows that time (although in principle a nat-
ural element) has also serious, indeed dramatic, metaphysical implica-
tions. Time is where the divine and creaturely will encounter each
other and come to a dialectical relation. Creatures learn what the
will of God is through God’s own manifestations in the world in the
various kairoi. Yet they are free to conform to it, or not to do so;
they are free to obey or to disobey. On account of this freedom,
the duration of an aeon, of those which comprise the entirety of
time, is not constant or predetermined. It is not determined either
by cosmical laws or by any ontological fatalism, but it is the outcome of
this dramatic relation between God and the world.
Origen lived in a political and spiritual environment in which he
was faced with all kinds of challenges. While devoted to his pastoral
and edifying care, he also strove to provide a formulated dogma of
the new religion. This, at a time when the anti-Christian sentiment
was on the rise, the Roman State levelled furious attacks against
Christianity, intimidation was continuous and persecution not rare,
with pagan philosophers having made the case against the Christian
writers very sharp.
Besides, there were additional difficulties concerning the issue of
the abstruse notion of time. For the intensive debate about it never
ceased raging since Antiquity. What is more, Origen acted in a
period when Greek philosophy was not yet dead or even moribund
or scholastic, even though different schools of thought were jostling
each other and eclecticism and syncretism were under way. Which
means that the possibility of cross-fertilization between paganism and
Christianity was constantly present.
It is against this background that Origen’s feat of pioneering a
radically new view of time should be considered.
His background was profitably and fruitfully brought into the for-
mulation of the concept of time. Still he made transformations, which
constitute genuine innovations, not mere advances however massive.
For the kernel of his achievement was not the initial employment
of the Stoic ontological conception of time. The determining factor
was the dramatic breakthrough, which he himself accomplished: it
was the penetrating new use in which he put existing philosophical
terms. And, nonetheless, it was the inspired introduction of the nec-
essary new terminology in the philosophy of time, handled not in
372 conclusion

an off-putting manner, but in a readable way. This is why the

Neoplatonic censure against the Stoics does not put any onus on
Origen, who is in fact immune to this kind of criticism. For although
echoes of Stoicism are audible in his references, on the cardinal
issues of the ontology of time Origen parts company with Stoicism.
This was an enormous stride towards formation of a Christian view
of time.
It is beyond my scope to deal with Origen’s ‘orthodoxy’ or ‘non-
orthodoxy’. Regarding his concept of time though one could note
this. A rather simplistic rule has prevailed among scholars about the
relation between Greek and biblical thought: the Greek is supposed
to be concerned with space and nature, while Biblical thought is
taken to be preoccupied with time and history. The critics of Origen
underscore what they see as ‘Greek’ characteristics of his thought.
Others, who regard themselves as sympathizers of Origen, strive to
play down (to a point of exclusion, if possible) what they consider
as ‘Greek’ characteristics and to overstress what they regard as ‘bib-
lical’ ones. The former focus their attention on Origen’s considera-
tions concerning place, whereas the latter want to see only treatment
of time (in fact, everlasting time) and temporal notions in his works.
What they all neglect is that the position of either space or time in a
certain conception of reality has no antagonistic character—and this
is what happens in Origen’s thought. In the final analysis, space and
time constitute one reality. The very definition of the relation of time
to space clearly shows that he had the feeling, if not the conscious
conception, of this fact. At any rate, the notion of space-time is out-
standingly present in his works. The compendious term ‘co-extended
alongside with’ (sumparekte¤nvn), in itself a philosophically apt term,
passed into the ordinary currency of theological language. In this
manner unity of space and time was contained in one circumscription,
and the enormous influence of this idea was indeed brought out.
This is the fact which modern scholars want to disregard, simply
because they do not want to see that the world-view in our century
has entirely changed. During the last hunderd years it is constantly
proven that the world in which we live is not the Newtonian one.
During the last decades the mathematical Theory of Tensor Calculus,
which deals with different spaces, has begun to consider the prob-
lem of different spaces (other than the three- or four-dimensional
ones) in direct relation with Cosmology. Certainly, the theory deals
with other spaces in themselves, not with any possible beings ‘dwelling’
 conclusion 373

in them.5 However, the problems which arise are already obvious.

Even if one overlooked the theory of other spaces, there are significant
facts, which could hardly be denied.
Firstly, the notion of simultaneity throughout the entire universe (this
visible universe) makes no sense any more. In the light of the Theory
of Relativity, statements such as ‘any moment of time is the same
in all places’ (P. Gassendi) or ‘every indivisible moment of duration
is everywhere’ (Newton)6 are not valid any more. For in fact the
Relativity Theory discredits the notion of presentness, because it
relates to an observer’s frame of reference the question of which dis-
tant events are now present. Modern scholars, so many years after
the Theory of Relativity, and despite its overall verification, do not
want to (or, cannot) dissociate themselves from the Newtonian world-
picture. But this perception of the world is an irrevocable past. Many
unnecessary debates (particularly in the philosophy of time) could
have been avoided if scholars were less slow in realizing that the
premises of reflecting on crucial problems have thoroughly changed.
That the Theory of Relativity is not easily readable or comprehen-
sible does not make the fact of the radical change less real—it only
produces material, which is obsolete already before being printed. If
in Plato’s era it was necessary to receive lessons on Mathematics
before those of Philosophy, this was so because the old mythologi-
cal conception of the world had radically changed after the inspired
ideas of the Presocratic philosophers. A new disciplined approach
was necessary and Mathematics was a good means for conforming
with the emerging necessities of scientific methodology.
I believe that our day has the same characteristics and reflection
on metaphysical problems has begun to have pre-requisites similar
in quality with those of a distant era. For the stability of the con-
ception of the world has been profoundly shaken, since the conception
of reality mainly in terms of space has radically changed. The simple,
stable and easily apprehensible conception of the world has been
shattered. This is the actual next step after twenty-five centuries.
Subsequently, it is no more possible to reflect on time independently
from space. It is my view that Origen’s thought, approached in the

5
Cf. D.F. Lawden, An Introduction to Tensor Calculus, Relativity and Cosmology, 3rd
edition, New York, 1986.
6
M. ’apec, op. cit. pp. xxxv and lvi.
374 conclusion

light of the new presuppositions, can withstand these developments

and, even, the challenges which only now begin to loom. Towards
this direction much research is still necessary and I believe that the
findings of such a research will be of utmost interest.
Secondly, it becomes increasingly hard to maintain that human
beings are the only rational creatures in the visible universe (and,
again, I do not mention other spaces). What about the saving con-
sequences of the incarnation of Christ? Some centuries ago, the prob-
lem for ‘orthodoxy’ was quite simple: whether the earth is the
immovable center of the universe, or not, was a matter of a yes or
no. The ancient affirmation became negation, and the whole prob-
lem was surmounted. However, the challenges, which arise from the
evolution of our new world-view, are not so simple. How will these
rational creatures be saved? Were they already saved before human
beings? And, if so, how was God’s dispensation manifested?
Modern science tells us that the visible matter of the universe is
only a small fraction of the entire real matter existing in this; in fact
this is only five per cent of the entire cosmic matter. The remain-
ing ninety five per cent (callled ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’) is
invisible to humans, still this is real matter and the physical conse-
quences of its presence are more and more frequently detected. It
seems that human beings are made of (and can see) a matter which
is only five per cent of the existing matter. It seems that we, as well
as all the visible universe, are not made of the same material as the
rest of the really existing universe. What does the rest of cosmic
matter make up? Other worlds within the world? Other beings? Be
that as it may, Origen’s distinction between what is ‘not seen’ and
what is ‘invisible” should be recalled.
Certainly it would be unrealistic to expect Origen to fit neatly
into the categories of subsequent periods. We live, however, in an
intellectually revolutionary era, when too many of the traditional
notions, convictions and certainties are collapsing. In this rearrange-
ment and disarray, there are questions to which long-standing answers
seem no more sound and convincing. To such questions Origen
seems to have some answers to provide: The world comprises many
particular spaces. The divine-creaturely relation is not conceived in
terms of God-man, but in terms of God-rational creatures in various
spaces. In a future work I intend to show how Origen confirms that
the incarnation of Christ took place once and for all and enlight-
ened history from its beginning to its end. It was the entirety of
 conclusion 375

rational creatures, not only human beings, which were saved out of
that unique event.
The problems, which only now begin to loom (and current orthodoxy
will have to address them sooner or later) Origen has provided his
answers many centuries ago. Whether such views are to be taken as
answers for the future, remains to be seen in the process of histor-
ical life and in view of the future actual content of human knowledge.
There is no need either to underrate or accentuate the temporal
or spatial aspects of his thought, just for the sake of following mis-
leading and, nonetheless, obsolete criteria. This thought has always
been, and still is, a highly controversial one. In this work I have
argued that a main reason for this is that Origen’s work has not
been studied as a whole. Some Latin portions create rather than
solve problems: after the evidence for a creation of time, it is dis-
concerting to find that some of the passages speak as if there was
after all time before the creation, and indeed to find expressions
as if time were carrying over the divine being. As noted in the
Introduction, Princ is shot through with words implying that there
was an earlier time. After having determined Augustine drawing on
Origen concerning the concept of time, the question that has some-
times crossed my mind is whether the Augustinian opinion about
different kinds of time (a cosmic and an angelic one) is the misguided
product of the Latin rendering of Princ instilled into his writings.
After all there is a number of points showing Augustine’s views as
a crystallization of his predecessors’ ideas.
On the other hand, and Greek language has ceased to be a uni-
versal one long time ago. Too many modern monographs on Origen
were written with virtually no engagement with the vast bulk of his
Greek writings—which writings however took the herculean labours
of this Adamantius to be composed. No authoritative assertion can
really be made of this theologian, without consultation of this volu-
minus work.
To sum up, from a Greek point of view Origen’s theory of creation
and time constitutes an utterly bold theory, entirely unknown to any
Greek school of thought. In order for a Stoic to go along with this
concept of time, something more on his part needs to be conceded—
which however is far beyond the principal Stoic doctrines. Much the
same goes for a Neoplatonist. For the sheer range of arguments,
which bolster up Origen’s views are fully found and understood only
within the context of his theology.
376 conclusion

Origen’s stipulations on the ontology of time, and the launch of

crucial refinements and definitions of the subject, constitute a major
catalyst and a massive transformation in the development of the
Christian view of time. Yet they have not been appreciated thence-
forth. Still he has been the forebear of a very important anticipation
concerning a certain perception of time proper, as well as its relation
to space. His remarks were sharper than any of those of his successors
and his innovations have never been superseded. Some of the accounts
afforded by later Christian writers were more extended, but they
were not fuller. Others just fell short of being even a mere authentic
echo of his views. For although they utilized the vocabulary initi-
ated by him, they fell foul of the entire conception expressed through
this terminology.
If later theories influenced by Origen moved close to Platonism,
or succumbed to Neoplatonism, this occurred because indispensable
factors of Origen’s conception were absent from them. In fact they
were impoverished accounts of his views and they normally intro-
duced affinity with Platonism or Neoplatonism at points where Origen
has instituted a sheer dissimilarity. For he conspicuously moves in a
vein radically different from pagan philosophy.
Origen’s ontology of time, as a whole, actually constitutes a radical
break with Platonism. Still the fact is that an anathema was imposed
on him, in A.D. 553. The main blame against him was Platonism.
This is a tragic historic bias still accompanying him as a motif in
scholarhip, which persistently entertains the idea of Origen’s theology
being Platonism and Neoplatonism in Christian garment. I argue in
this book, however, that, on the issue of Ontology of Time and
Creation at least, the inveterate verdict about Platonism in Origen is
subject to serious criticism and lends itself to rebuttal buttressed up
with his own texts.
Thus far everyone is unaware of the fact that Origen for the first
time produced a really new theory of time. A brilliant accomplish-
ment, rarely equalled and never excelled by his successors. An accom-
plishment, for which he never received the credit he deserved. But,
in the light of the distortions and bias against his thought as a whole,
which led to the anathemas on him, the universal unawareness of
this inspired deed is not the worst which has happened to this tragic
figure of Early Christianity.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Origen’s works

I. Text Editions
Contra Celsum: Books 1–4; P. Koetschau GCS I (1899), p. 51, M.11.641, BGF, 9,
p. 72. Books 5–8, GCS 1, p. 1, M.11.1181.
Dialogus cum Heraclide: J. Scherer, Publications de la societé Fouad I de Papyrologie,
Texts et Documents 9, Cairo 1949; BGF, 16, p. 366.
De Engastrimytho: (I Reg. 28, 3–25), E. Klostermann GCS 3 (1901), p. 283; M.12.1012;
O. Guérand, Note préliminaire sur le papyrus d’ Origène découvertes a Toura,
Revue de l’Histoire des Religions, 1946; BGF, 16, p. 381.
Epistula ad Africanum: M.11.48; BGF, 16, p. 350.
Epistula ad Gregorium Thaumaturgum: ap. Phil, 13; M.11.88; BGF, 16, p. 363.
Homiliae 1–16 in Genesim: (Lat.), W.A. Baehrens GCS 6 (1922), p. 1; M.12.145;
Greek Fr. of Hom. 2 in Gen., GCS 6, p. 23; M.12.161; ap. Procopius Gazaeus
“Commentarium in Octateuchum” (Gen. 5, 14–15), M.87.273; BGF, 15, p. 154.
Fragmenta ex Commentariis in Genesim: M.12.45. (Note: commGen. 1, ap. Eusebious
Caesariensis, “Preparatio Evangelica” 7.20; commGen. 2, ib.6.11; commGen 3.12,13,
ap. Phil., 23.19,20; M.12.50]. BGF, 15, p. 107.
Selecta in Genesim: M.12.92; BGF, 15, pp. 126–51.
Adnotationes in Genesim: M.17.12; BGF, 15, pp. 151–3.
Homiliae in Exodum: (Lat.), GCS 6, p. 145; M.12.297. Greek Fr., GCS p. 217,
M.12.353, 354.
Fragmentum ex commentariis in Exodum: ap. Phil., 27; M.12.264; BGF, 15, pp. 156–64.
Selecta in Exodum: M.12.281; BGF, 15, pp. 165–73.
Adnotationes in Exodum: M.17.16; BGF, 15, 173–4.
Homiliae in Leviticum 1–16: (Lat.), GCS 6, p. 280; M.12.405. Greek Fr. of homLev 5,
GCS 6, p. 332, M.12.421B; of homLev 8, GCS 6, p. 394, M.12.493; ap. Procopious
Gazaeus Lev. 13, M.87.733–40.
Selecta in Leviticum: M.12.397; BGF, 15, p. 175.
Homiliae in Numeris 1–28: (Lat.), W.A. Baehrens GCS 7 (1921), p. 3; M.12.585.
Selecta in Numeris: M.12.576; BGF, 15, p. 181.
Selecta in Deuteronomium: M.12.805; BGF, 15, 187–93.
Adnotationes in Deuteronomium: M.17.24; BGF, 15, 194–200.
Homiliae in Josuam 1–26: (Lat.), GCS 7, p. 287; M.12.825; Greek Fr., GCS 7, p. 290;
M.12.917.
Selecta in Josuam: M.12.820; BGF, 15, 201–3.
Adnotationes in Josuam: M.17.36; BGF, 15, 203–4.
Selecta in Judices: M.12.949; BGF, 15, 206.
Adnotationes in Judices: M.17.37; BGF, 15, 206–7.
Fragmentum in Ruth: M.12.989; BGF, 15, p. 207.
Fragmenta 1–22 in Reges: GCS 3, p. 295; M.12.992; M.17,40; BGF, 11, p. 236.
Selecta in Job: M.17.57; BGF, 15, 208–17.
Enarrationes in Job: M.12.1032; BGF, 15, pp. 218–42.
Selecta in Psalmi: M.12.1053; BGF, 15, pp. 243–386; 16,11–157.
Excerpta in Psalmi: M.17.105; BGF, 16, 157–81.
Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150: ed. Pitra, Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmensi parata, vols. 2
& 3 (Venice, 1883): 2: 444–483; 3: 1–236, 242–245, 248–364.
Fragmenta ex commentariis in Proverbia: M.13.17; BGF, 16, 230 and 233ff.
378 bibliography

Exposita in Proverbia: M.17.161; BGF, 16, pp. 182–229.

Fragmenta in Proverbia: M.17.149; BGF, 16, 231–33.
Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum: (Lat.), GCS 8, p. 61; M.13.61; Greek Fr. GCS
8, p. 90; M.13.112; M.17.253, 369; ap. Procopious Gazaeus “Cant.”; BGF, 16, 246.
Fragmentum ex commentario minore in Canticum Canticorum: M.13.36; BGF, 16, p. 245.
Homiliae 1–20 in Jeremiam: GCS 3, p. 1; M.13.256; BGF, 11, 11.
Fragmentum ex homiliiae 21 in Jeremiam: GCS 3, p. 195; M.14.1310; BGF, 11, 154.
Fragmentum ex homiliae 39 in Jeremiam: GCS 3, p. 196; M.13.541; BGF, 11, p. 155.
Fragmenta 1–71 ex homiliis in Jeremiam: GCS 3, p. 199; M.13.544; BGF, 11, pp. 157–84.
Fragmenta 1–118 in Lamentationes: GCS 3, p. 235; M.13.605; BGF, 11, p. 187.
Fragmentum in Lamentationes: GCS 3, p. 279; M.13.613; BGF, 11, p. 224.
Fragmenta in Ezechiel: M.17.288; BGF, 16, 267.
Selecta in Ezechiel: M.13.768; BGF, 16, p. 269.
Fragmentum ex commentariis in Oseam: ap. Phil., M.13.825; BGF, 16, p. 302.
Fragmenta ex commentariis in Matthaeum 1,2: E. Klostermann and E. Benz GCS 12
(1941) pp. 3–5; M.13.829; BGF 14, p. 226.
Commentariorum in Matthaeum libri 10 –17: E. Klostermann GCS 10 (1935), p. 1;
M.13.836; BGF 13, p. 11.
Fragmenta in Matthaeum: GCS 12, p. 13; BGF 14, p. 233.
Commentariorum series 1–145 in Matthaeum: (Lat.) E. Klostermann and E. Benz GCS
11 (1933), p. 1; M.13.1599; BGF 14, p. 233. Greek fr. in GCS 11, pp. 21ff.
Homiliae 1–39 in Lucam: (Lat), M. Rauer GCS 9 (1930), p. 3; M.13.1801; Greek Fr.
in GCS 9; M.17.312; BGF 15, p. 11.
Fragmenta 1–112 in Lucam: GCS 9, p. 232; BGF 15, p. 61.
Commentarii in Joannim: E. Preuschen GCS 4 (1903), p. 3; M.14.21; BGF 11, p.
247ff; 12, pp. 11–332.
Fragmenta 1–140 in Joannim: GCS 4, p. 485; BGF 12, p. 333.
Fragmentum ex homiliis in Acta Apostolorum: ap. Phil. 7.2; M.14.829; BGF 15, p. 106.
Commentarii in Romanos: (Lat.), M.14.833; Greek Fr. ap. Phil. 25, M.14,841; ap. Phil. 9,
M.14.1076; H. Ramsbotham, JTS 13 (1912), pp. 210, 357; JTS 14 (1912), p. 10.
Fragmenta ex commentariis in I Cor.: C. Jenkins, Jounrnal of Theological Studies ( JTS),
9 (1908), pp. 232, 353, 500; JTS 10 (1908), p. 29.
Fragmenta ex commentariis in Ephesios: J.A.F. Gregg, JTS, 3 (1902), pp. 234, 398, 554.
Fragmenta in Hebraeos: M.14.1308 ap. Eusebious Caesariensis, “Preparatio Evangelica”
6.25, 11–14; BGF 15, p. 106.
Exhortatio ad Martyrium: GCS 1, p. 3; M.11.564; BGF 9, p. 35.
De Oratione: GCS 2, p. 297; M.11.416; BGF 10, p. 234.
Philocalia seu ecloga de operibus Origenis a Basilio et Gregorio Nazianzeno facta: J.A. Robinson,
Cambridge, 1893.
De Principiis: (Lat. with Greek fr.), P. Koetschau, GCS 5 (1913); M.11.115.
Ex Libro Secundo Origenis de Resurrectione. M.11.96; BGF, 16, p. 349.
Fragmenta de resurrectione: M.11.96, ap. Methodius Olympius “de resurrectione mor-
tuorum” 3 and 2; BGF, 16, p. 349.
Scholia 1–17 in Apocalypsin. C.J. Diobouniotis and A. Harnack, TU 3833 (1911), p. 21.
Scholia 28–38 in Apocalypsin. C.H. Turner, JTS, 25 (1923), p. 1.

II. Translated works

Blanc, Cecile, Origène, Commentaire sur S. Jean, (vols. I–IV). Paris, Sources Chrétiennes,
ns. 120, 157, 222, 290, 1966–1982.
Butterworth, G.W., Origen on First Principles. Introduction by Henri de Lubac. New
York, 1966.
 bibliography 379

Chadwick, Henry C., Origen: Contra Celsum. Introduction and notes. Cambridge at
the University Press, 1953.
Crombie, Frederick, Origen De Principiis. The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV. Edited
by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson. Grand Rapids, 1956.
Crouzel, H. – Simonetti, M., Origène Traite des Principes. Paris, Sources Chrétiennes,
Les Editions du Cerf. vols. I–V (ns. 252, 253, 268, 269, 312), 1978–84.
Fortier, P. – Lubac, H. de, Homélies sur l’Exode. Paris, Sources Chrétiennes, 16 (1947)
and 316 (1985).
Görgemanns, M. – Karpp, H., Vier Bücher Von Den Prinzipien. 2nd ed., 1985.
Harl, Marguerite – Dorival, Gilles – Le Boulluec, Alain, Origène: Traité des Principes
(Peri Archon). Traduction de la version latine de Rufin avec un dossier annexe
d’autres témoins du texte. Paris (Études Augustiniennes), 1976.
Jay, E., Origen’s Treatise on Prayer. London 1954.
Lawson, R.P., Origen: The Song of Songs, Commentary and Homilies. Ancient Christian
Writers, XXVI. Edited by J. Quasten and J.C. Plumpe. London, 1957.
Méhat, André, Homélies sur les Nombres. Paris, Sources Chrétiennes, 29, 1951.
Menzies, Allan, Origen’s Epistle to Gregory, Commentary on John (Books I–X), Commentary
on Matthew (Books I, II, and X–XIV). The Anti-Nicene Fathers, IX, additional vol-
ume. New York, 1897.
O’Meara, John J., Origen: Prayer, Exhortation to Martyrdom. Ancient Christian Writers,
XIX. London, 1954.
Origen Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, transl. from Latin R. Heine, book series: The
Fathers of the Church, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1982.
Origen Homilies on Leviticus, transl. from Latin G.W. Barkley, book series: The Fathers
of the Church, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1990.
Origen Homilies on Jeremiah, Homily on 1 Kings 28, transl. from Latin by J.C. Smith,
book series: The Fathers of the Church, The Catholic University of America Press,
Washington, 1998.
Origen Commentary on the Gospel of John Books 1–10, transl. from Latin R. Heine, book
series: The Fathers of the Church, The Catholic University of America Press,
Washington, 1989.
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II. Articles, Papers

Alés, A. d’, “La doctrine d’Origène d’après un livre récente”. Recherches de Science
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Armstrong, A.H., “Plotinus’ Doctrine od the Infinite and Christian Thought”.
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——, “Eternity, life and movement in Plotinus’ accounts of noËw”. Le Néoplatonisme
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——, “Elements in the thought of Plotinus at variance with classical intellectual-
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Balas, D.L., “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought.
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Banner, W.A., “Origen and the Tradition of Natural Law Concepts”. Dumbarton
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Bardy, G., “En lisant les Pères: Le ‘Contra Celsum’ d’Origène”. Revue Pratique
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——, “Les citations bibliques d’Origène dan le De Principiis”. Revue Biblique, Paris,
28 (new series 16) (1919), pp. 106–35.
——, “La regle de foi d’Origène”. Recherches de Science Religieuse, 9 (1919), pp. 162–96.
——, “Origène et l’Aristotélisme”. In Mélanges Gustave Glotz, tome I, Paris 1932.
——, “Aux origines de l’école d’Alexandrie”. Recherches de Science Relisieuse, 27 (1937),
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Barnard, L.W., “Origen’s Christology and Eschatology”. Anglican Theological Review,
46 (1964), pp. 213–9.
Bate, H.N., “Some Technical Terms of Greek Exegesis”. Journal of Theological Studies,
24 (1923), pp. 59–66.
Bianchi, Ugo, “Le Gnosticisme: Concept, Terminologie, Origines, Définition”. In
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Blanc, Cécile, “L’angelologie d’Origène”. Studia Patristica, XIV, TU 117, 1976, pp.
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Boyd, W.J.P. “Origen’s concept of the Love of God”. Studia Patristica, XIV, TU
117, 1976, pp. 110–16.
Brunt, P.A., “Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations”. Journal of Roman Studies, 74 (1974),
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Cadiou, R., “Dictionnaires Antiques dans l’oeuvre d’Origène”. Revue des Etudes
Grècques, XLV (October 1932), pp. 273–4.
——, “Le Développement d’une Théologie: Pression et Aspiration”. Recherches de
Science Religieuse, 23 (1933), pp. 411–29.
Callahan, J.F., “Greek Philosophy and the Cappadocian Cosmology”. Dumabrton
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——, “Basil of Caesarea, a new source for St. Augustine’s Theory of Time”. Harvard
Studies in Classical Philology, 63 (1958), pp. 437–54.
——, “Gregory of Nyssa and the psychological view of time”. Atti del XII Congresso
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Capec, Milic, “The theory of eternal recurrence in modern Philosophy of Science,
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——, “Eternal return”, in P. Edwards, ed., Encycplopaedia of Philosophy, New York 1967.
Castaneda, H.N., “Omniscience and indexical reference”. Journal of Philosophy, 64
(1967), pp. 203–10.
Chadwick, Henry C., “Origen. Celsus and the Stoa”. Journal of Theological Studies,
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——, “Notes on the text of Origen’s Contra Celsum”. Journal of Theological Studies,
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——, “The evidences of Christianity in the Apologetic of Origen”. Studia Patristica,
II, TU 64, 1957, pp. 331–9.
——, “Philo and the Beginning of Christian Thought”. The Cambridge History of Later
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Crouse, Robert D., “The Hellenization of Christianity: A Historiographical Study”.
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Cornélis, Humbert, “Les Fondements Cosmologiques de l’Eschatologie d’Origène”.
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Crouzel, H., “Origène et Plotin éleves d’Ammonius Saccas”. Bulletin de Littérature
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——, “Origène devant l’Incarnation et devant l’Histoire”. Bulletin de Littérature
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——, “Origène et la Connaissance Mystique”. Studia Patristica, V, TU 80, (1962),
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——, “Mort et Immortalité selon Origène”. Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, 79
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——, “L’Hadès et la Géhenne selon Origène”. Gregorianum, Commentarii de Re Theologica
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——, “Les divers sens de l’Écriture dans la tradition Chrétienne primitive”. Ephemerides
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——, “Origène comme exégète de la Bible”. Studia Patristica, I, TU 63, (1957), pp.
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——, “Origène”. Article in Supplement au Dictionnaire de la Bible, fasc. XXXIII, 1960,
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Dillon, John, “Origen’s Doctrine of the Trinity and some Later Neoplatonic Theories”.
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Faye, Eugene de, “De l’Influence du Gnosticisme chez Origène”. Revue de l’Histoire
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——, “Some Metaphysical Statements about Time”. Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963),

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——, “Early Alexandrian Christianity”. Church History, 40 (1971), pp. 133–44.
Grünbaum, A., “The Nature of Time”, in R. Colodny (ed.), Frontiers of Science and
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——, “The Status of Temporal Becoming”, in The Philosophy of Time, ed. R. Gale,
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Gueraud, O., “Note preliminaire sur les papyrus d’Origène découverts à Toura”.
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 INDEX OF NAMES AND TERMS

Abraham, 299. human discourse can be only

Academy (Platonic), 307. tensed, 270.
Acusilaus, 180. significance of the tenses of verbs,
Adam, 41; 50; 78; 81; 279. 21.
Albinus, 267; 268. singling Plato out for holding time
Alcmaeon (the Pythagorean), 180. created, 181; 182.
Alexander of Alexandria, 260. Armstrong, A.H., 129; 185; 196; 197;
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 182; 169; 247; 287; 353.
205; 219; 245; 323; 348. Arnim, Johan von, 214; 291.
Alexander of Pherae, 277. Asclepiodorus Tacticus (1st c. A.D.),
Alexandria, 5; 7; 14; 163; 364. 214.
Allen, R.E., 185. Athanasius of Alexandria 17; 29; 50;
Altaner, B., 226. 53; 73; 140; 260; 262.
Anaxagoras, 180. Athenagoras, 205; 206; 218.
Anaximander, 180; 255. Athens, 307.
Anaximenes, 180. Atomists, 255.
Ancient discipline, Atticus, 122.
Mathematics, 364; 373. Augustine, 72; 73; 130; 135; 136; 150;
Physics, 364; 366; 369. 151; 152; 153; 225; 226; 227; 228;
Astronomy, 365. 229; 230; 231; 232; 239; 264; 266;
Philosophy, 364; 369; 373. 267; 277; 354; 362; 368–9; 375.
Annas, Julia, 185.
Antipater of Bostra, 111. Baker, J.A., 24; 304.
Anytus, 276; 277; 278; 280. Balthasar, H. von, 263.
Apollinaris, 4; 140. Banner, W.A., 38.
Apollodorus, 186; 316. Bardy, Gustave, 4; 16.
Apologists, 7; 366. Basil of Caesarea, 44; 45; 225; 226;
Appolodorus of Seleucia, 203; 205; 227; 228; 230; 231; 261; 262; 263;
217; 269. 264; 266; 368.
Areopagus, 277; 280. Basilides, 64; 122; 200.
Arianism, 53; 140; 260; 261; 263. Bergson, H, 1; 307.
Aristides Quintilianus, (end of 2nd c. Bernandakis, G.N., 219.
A.D.), 214. Bevan, E., 354.
Ariston, 315. Biblical, attitude to time, 203–4.
Aristotle, 16; 21; 31; 119; 122; 133; 144; Biblical,
152; 157; 162; 169; 180; 182; 185; thought, 372.
187–192; 203; 204; 205; 254; 267–8; view of infinite God, 256.
289; 292; 307; 328; 345; 367–8. Bigg, C., 4; 37; 115; 141; 142.
account of essence, 87. Blanc, C., 72; 105.
Aristotelian monotheism, 6, Boeri, Marcelo, 200.
concept of time, 179; 183ff; 190; Boethius, 278; 354.
193; 194; 195; 207; 208; 254; Bogson, C., 1; 307.
270; 307; 318; Bohm, David, 269.
criticism to his concept of time, Boman, T., 180; 194; 335; 336; 337.
195–6. Bröker, W., 189.
conception of freedom, 121. Brunschwig, Jaques, 198.
criticizing Plato’s ‘ideas’, 48. Butterworth, G.W., 4; 13; 72; 94; 172;
against prologned time, 289. 276; 279; 356.
394 index of names and terms

Caesar, 282. the Son not the same when

Caesarea, 14; 302; 363. named after the c. of his, 58.
Cain, 283. Conen, P.F., 189.
Callahan, John, 195; 219; 225; 226; consubstantial, 72; 73; 91.
227; 228; 231; 232; 263. contingency of creation, 120; 129; 135;
Capec, M., 355; 373. 148; (conditionality), 150.
Cappadocians, 225; 263; 264; 266; Cornford, F.M., 162; 185.
362; 368. corporeality, different forms of, 105.
Carneades, 203. Cosmology, 347.
Carteron, H., 189. cosmos (or, world), 99; 165;
Castaneda, H.N., 269. being a homonym, 100.
Castaneda, H.N., 354. being one, single and perfect, 103;
catechumens, 8; 167. 108; 110.
Celsus, 153; 156; 169; 238; 277; 278; different imports of c., 100ff.
280; 283; 286; 290; 292; 323; 348. c. is ‘out’ of divinity, or, ‘external’
Censorinus, 189. to the Trinity, 25; 74; 82; 93;
Chadwick, H., 74; 153; 169; 277; 278; 131; 168; 172; 244; 275;
290; 310; 337. meaning ‘ornament’, 10.
change of existential attitude in Hellenistic Stoic definition of c., 101; 104.
era, 6, the entire world is material, 114;
Cheek, J., 173; 360. 115; 116;
Christ, 28; 29; 31; 36; 56; 70; 71; 72; time, as an element of the c., is
74; 80; 82; 93; 97; 101; 105; 124; ‘ouside’ Trinity, 233.
139; 140; 141; 167; 168; 170; 207; Coumantos, P., 194.
208; 211; 212; 237; 260; 272; 298; Council of Constantinopole (553 A.D.),
324; 346; 350; 352; 355; 362; 365; 356; 376.
374. Crouzel, H., 12; 13; 37; 88; 89; 115;
Chroust, A.H., 133; 142; 186; 190; 330.
195; 204. Cullmann, O., 24; 173; 194; 236; 237;
Chrysippus, 186; 187; 190; 196–7; 199; 238; 254; 304; 305.
201; 202; 213; 215; 217; 241; 291; cyclicity (of time, or events), 193; 194;
292; 315. 287; 306.
Church, 5; 67; 167; 310; 362. Cyril of Alexandria, 262.
Church tradition, 4; 364;
Church and Christ, 74. Damascius, 270; 307.
Cicero, 122; 278; 289. Danièlou, J., 24; 37; 304.
Clarke, S., 152. David, 86; 153; 234.
Classicism, 289. devil, (not made by God as such), 85;
Cleanthes, 315. 105; 295–6.
Clement of Alexandria, 64; 88; 92; Dicaearchus of Messina, 185.
205; 278. Didymus the Blind, of Alexandria, 4;
Clement of Rome, 107. 14.
Cleomedes (Mathematician, 2nd c. Diehl, E., 130.
A.D.), 214; 249. Diels, H., 171; 180; 278.
conceptions of the Son, 35; 36; 58; Diodorous Cronus, 270.
61; 62; 141; 165. Diogenes Laertius, 101; 183; 184; 278;
‘names of the Son’ which pertain 290; 316.
to the divine oikonomia, 52; 57; direct cognitive impression, 139; 156–61.
82; discursive thought, 157; 158.
all of them, except for Wisdom Docetism, 326.
and Logos, became, 37; Duhem, P., 267.
classified order of, 58; dynamic concept of creation, 45.
of all c. only Wisdom and Logos
are beginningless, 60; 82; 170; Ecclesiastes, 274; 280; 365.
271. Eclectic Platonists, 142; 267.
 index of names and terms 395

Eclecticism, 203. fullness (plÆrvma), 63.

Egypt, 164; 277; 279; 283. Future tense, significance of, 22; 50;
Egyptians, 280; 286. 129; 136; 224.
Einstein, A., 346.
Eleatic philosophers, 268. Gale, Richard, , 269.
Elisabeth, 329. Galen (2nd c. A.D.), 214.
emanation theory (rejected by O.), 64. Gassendi, P., 347; 355; 373.
Enoch, 125. Geach, Peter, 354.
Empedocles, 180. Gerven, J. van, 354.
Enoch, 298. Gnosticism, 5; 24; 35; 63; 64; 91; 92;
Epicharmus , 180. 97; 122; 125; 126; 145; 151; 153; 203;
Epictetus, 201. 236; 268; 284; 295; 304; 324; 331.
Epicureans, 121; 185; 200; 243; 269; Christian G., 5; 24.
307; 308. Jewish G., 24.
Epicurus, 290; 293. Hellenistic G., 367.
Epimenedes, 180. God as Creator,
Epiphaniusof Salamis, 4. notion of, 25; 26; 27; 28; 30; 51;
Epistemology, 9. 52; 60; 134; 135; 146; 147; 148;
Erasmus, 77. 152; 155; 157; 174; 357.
Esau, 330. Platonic and Neoplatonic notion of,
Essaias Abbas, 261. 30.
essence (substance), 95; God in Himself,
accounts of e. proper, 86–7; notion of, 25; 26; 27; 28; 30; 38;
common in all rational creatures, 96. 51; 60; 120; 127; 128; 133; 134;
creation of e. 92; 135; 137; 144. 146–9; 152–5; 157;
God is beyond e. 87–8; 135; 163; 170; 172; 174; 357; 365.
Esther, 101. is neither part nor whole, 29.
eternal generation (of the Son), 138–9; 149. Goldschmidt, V., 201.
eternity, 11; 24; 39; 264; (timeless e.), Gomorah, 283.
182. Goodmann, Nelson, 270.
Eudemus of Rhodes, 185. Great Year, 193.
Eudorus, 122. Greek language (not universal any
Eunomius: 35; 225; 226; 230. more), 375.
Eusebius of Caesarea, 4; 100; 144; Greek writings of Origen, 9; 10;
277. 13–18; 75; 147; 315.
Eustathius of Antioch, 4; 140. Greek-Hellenistic schools, 5,
Eve, 279. Greeks (or, ‘Greek thought’), 7; 31; 48;
everlasting duration, 21; 55; 174. 94; 106; 111; 133; 157; 179; 180;
evolutionary concept of creation, 45; 46. 192; 194; 195; 237; 238; 247; 255;
experience, involving distinction between 265; 276; 280; 284; 286–9; 305;
past, present and future, 1. 308; 326; 331; 335; 363; 367; 370;
Ezekiel, 286. 372; (Gr. stories), 323; 349; 351;
(Gr. alphabet), 286.
Far Eastern fatalism, 370. Gregory of Nazianzus, 4; 262; 264;
Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, 25; 265; 266; 370.
113; 138–9; 212; 260; 275; Gregory of Nyssa: 4; 35; 44219; 223;
principle of impartiality, attributed to 225; 231; 247; 261; 262; 263; 264;
God, 321–2; 331. 364.
Faye, E. de, 35; 115; 145. Gregory Thaumaturgus, 4.
fear of death, 3. Gronigen, B. van, 335; 336.
Fegustière, A.-J., 189.
Flavius Josephus, 286. Haestiaeus of Perinthus, 184.
Florovski, G. 17; 37; 38; 73; 115; 129; Hamman, I.A., 138.
135; 136; 149; 239; 266; 267. Hanson, R., 4.
French, P.A., 354. Harl, Marguerite, 14; 221; 302.
396 index of names and terms

Harnack, Adolf von, 14; 302. created i. nature is susceptible to

Hebraic, conception of creation, 133; change, 92; 98.
(view of time) 195; 203. meaning of i. creatures, 51; 95.
Hebrews, 5; 285; Hebrew text of OT, no parts, or division in i., 65; 80; 113.
154; H. thought, 180; 335. only conceptually a distinct element
Heimsoeth, H., 6; 7; 203; 256. in rational creatures, 99.
Heine, R.E., 100. only the life of the Trinity is i., 54;
Hellenism, 367. 67; 94; 114; 112; 114; 116; 174;
Hellenization 359.
of Christianity, 5, providential creation being i., 49;
of Christian view of time, 254; 79; 89.
Heracleon, the Gnostic, 74; 93; 145; the reality of i. asserted as primary,
234; 364. 51; 87.
Heraclitus of Ephesus, 171; 172; 180; uncreated vs. created i., 90.
193; 285; 287. created (or, made), i., 55; 56; 91; 92.
Hercules, 276. Wisdom is an i. hypostasis, 48; 54;
Hermas, 125. 84.
Herodotus, 180. Irenaeus, 92; 123; 130.
Hesiod, 180. Isaiah, 42; 273.
Hesychius of Sinai, 262. Iseminger, G., 354.
Hilary of Poitiers, 4. Israel, 301.
Hintikka, Jaakko, 270.
History, 306–7; 337; 352; 353. Jacob, 106; 281; 330.
Holy Spirit, 16; 30; 56; 62; 67; 158; Jay, E., 352.
301; 302; 350. Jerome, 9; 17; 97; 164; 166; 226; 276;
Homer, 180; 286. 355–9.
Hultsch, F., 189. Jesus, 29; 36; 40; 52; 67; 74; 78; 103;
humility as a virtue, 7. 106; 107; 207; 208; 272; 277; 278;
325; 332; 365; 395.
Iamblichus, 130; 270. Jews, 277; 286.
Ideas, Job, 46; 86.
contrast from the ‘conceptions’ of John Chrysostom, 261; 262.
the Son, 61; John of Damascus, 10; 73; 111; 136;
O.’s doctrine of creation contrasted, 228; 262; 265; 266; 370.
78; 93; 107; 140; 142; 143; 145; John Philoponus, 182; 266.
221; 368. John the Baptist, 329.
O.’s doctrine of Fall contrasted, 81. John, bishop of Jerusalem, 164.
of Plato’s philosophy, 23; 48; 369. Judaeo-Hellenistic thought, 5.
idle argument (érgÒw lÒgow), 323. Judas, 279.
Imperfect tense, 119; 127; 129; 136. Justin, 37; 122; 205; 206.
Inachus, 286. Justinian, 4; 9; 17; 119; 132; 137; 163;
incorporeal, 164; 246; 248; 270; 355–9.
‘caused’ to being by God, 141.
called ‘asomaton’ by Greeks, 111. kairos, 303; 332; 343.
contemplation of i., 51. Kenny, A.J.P., 354.
created i. in Wisdom, 70–1. kingdom of heavens (being Christ), 56.
created i. not consubstantial with knowledge self-sustained, impossible in
divinity, 72–3; 91; 93; (ref. to the Hellenistic era, 6,
Fall), 79. knowledge vs. salvation as the goal of
i. and the ‘reason’ of world, 83. Hellenistic life, 5–7; 203.
i. and transcendent God, 89. Koch, Hal, 267.
divine life being i.. 55; 92–3. Koetchau, P. 13; 111; 119; 132; 137;
i. nature not a Platonic ‘world’, 152; 163; 245; 246; 251; 276; 355;
41–3; 48; 72; 73; 81; 90; 93; 95; 356.
97. Kretzmann, Norman, 268; 354.
 index of names and terms 397

Latin versions of O. works, 9; 10; 13; Long, A.A. 268.

97; 107; 111; 115; 153; 154–5; 225; Lucas, J.R., 354.
226; 229; 245; 248; 251; 273–4; Lucifer, 67.
358; 375. Lucretius, 289.
Lawden, D.F., 372.
Lawson, R.P., 16; 119. Malachi, 153.
Leibniz, G.W., 152. Manichaeans, 72; 85; 151; 153.
Lewis, C., 351; 352. Mansi, J.D., 4, 119; 132; 163; 246;
Library (Museum) of Alexandria, 7, 355; 356.
Lienhard, J., 8. Marcella, 164.
life, a conception of the Son, 58; 59; Marcion, the Gnostic, 64; 97.
62; 72; 82; 123; 173. Marcus Aurelius, 201; 202; 206; 214;
life, notion of ‘creaturely’ l. is 235; 285; 287; 289; 332; 333; 334;
meaningless before actual creation; 362–3.
62; 63; 72; 74. Markus, R.A., 247; 287; 353.
linear conception of time, 194. Marroù, H.I., 225; 226.
Lloyd, A.C., 157. Mary, the mother of Jesus, 329.
Logos, 21; 22; 28; 30; 33; 160; 168; 172. matter,
being in wisdom, 31; 32; 59; 127. all bodies in all ranks of life made of
became what his ‘conceptions’ indicate. m., 113; 114.
37. changeable and convertible, 114.
being a ‘cause’ of creation, 141–4; 261. created upon actual creation, 40; 71;
‘first cause’ of creation, 44. 79; 89.
cannot be conceived of as ‘beginning’, functions by being ruled by the logoi,
59. 44.
conception pertaining to the Son and material world fully real, 92.
to ‘others’, 61. not evil, 90; (rebutting Gnostics and
cosmic presence of the L., 166–7; 211; Neoplatonists on this), 284.
256; 261; 320; 348. subsequent to logoi, 84; 86.
different degrees of participation in the ‘episode’ of m.’s mixture with the
him, 105; 131. incorporeal, 91.
different meanings in Greek, 168. Maximus Confessor, 262.
everything made through him, 72; 137; McCall, Storrs, 270.
293; 331; 349. McTaggart, J.M.E., 269.
fulfilling OT, 43. Meletus, 276; 277; 278; 280.
is a hypostasis, the Son of God, 124. Mellor, D.H., 269.
is different from being conceived of as Methodius of Olympus, 4; 140; 263.
Wisdom, 58. Middle Academy, 203.
is one in essence, many in conceptions, Middle-Platonism, 197.
35; 52; 54; 57. Migne, J.P., 72.; 229.
is the Wisdom in her relation to the Miller, Fred D., 268.
world, 165. Modern Science, 193; 224; 228; 238;
manifesting God as Creator, 51. 254; 269; 374; (Geometry), 258.
no difference in essence or ontology Molland, E., 37.
between Wisdom and L., 59; 165. Moreau, J., 180; 185; 189.
not everything made through him (acc. Moses, 40; 106; 277; 279; 281; 285;
to Gnostic Heracleon), 145; 234. 286.
ruling over ‘all heavens’, 106. Musaeus, 180.
sustains all creation, 44; 166; 168; 175; mysticism, (a teaching, or doctrine,
350. described by O. as being ‘mystical’,
through him rational creatures or ‘secret’), 66; 67; 80; 81; 87; 105;
communicate to God, 96. 106; 155–6.
united with the Father, 34; 55.
was timelessly, he did not become, 35; Nag Hammadi, 63.
37; 141; 171; 233. Nemesius, 249; 277.
398 index of names and terms

Neoplatonism, 4; 25; 37; 93; 131–3; Persian religion, 279.

148; 157; 163; 216; 221; 229; 230; Peter of Alexandria, 4.
231; 255; 265; 284; 361; 369–70; Phaenarete, 278.
376. Phalaris, 277; 278.
Neoplatonists, 308; 316; 367; 375. Pherecides, 180.
Neopythagorean (philosophy of nature), Philo, 23; 36; 73; 88; 106; 122; 142;
256. 143; 145; 169; 190; 205; 215; 220;
New Testament, 29; 204; 305. 222; 247; 257; 266; 278; 292; 367.
Newton, I., 152; 347; 355; 373. Philolaus (the Pythagorean), 180.
Newtonian world-picture, 346; 347; Philosophy, unable to provide solace in
354; 372. Hellenistic era, 6.
Non-Euclidian spaces, 347. Phoenician history, 286.
Norris, R., 37; 38; 115; 126; 140; 144; Phoroneus, 286.
149; 150–1; 166. Photius, 10.
Nygren, A., 40. Pike, Nelson, 354.
Pines, S., 270.
object of creation, Plass, P., 23; 24; 37; 39; 71; 230; 303;
the logoi—s. Greek Index), 40; 43; 349; 352.
44; 45; 46. Plato, 22; 28; 36; 72; 74; 75; 122;
the logoi are not a personal individual 130; 133; 142; 151; 161; 162; 179;
beings, 48; 49; 77; 80; 90. 180; 182; 185–193; 203; 216; 221;
created and being in Wisdom), 50; 236; 237; 255; 280; 285; 373.
152. P.’s concept of time, 179; 181ff;
‘system of objects of contemplation’, 193; 207; 208; 217; 266–7; 361.
51. P.’s metaphysics, 6.
objects of contemplation are ‘made’, Platonic,
56. P. thought, (compared with O.’s
notion of ‘created’ wisdom, 82; one), 36; 48; 72; 74–5; 81; 88;
‘pre-uttered reasons’, 83–4. 154; 221; 229.
Old Testament, 29; 53; 103; 204; P. thought, 4; 37; 88; 93; 94; 96;
Olympiodorus of Alexandria., 261. 130; 162; 370.
Origenism, 119; 164. P. concept of fall, 68–9; 72; 300.
Origenistic controversies, 3, 4, P. concept of substance, 90.
Otis, B., 263. P. perception of pre-existing
Oulton, J., 310. incorpoeral world, 41; 81; 87; 90;
97; 99; 115; 118; 352.
Pallis, P., 17; 73. Platonism, 25; 36; 121; 125; 140; 142;
Pamphilus, 10. 145; 148; 150–1; 199; 204; 263;
Panaetius, 203; 278. 267; 280; 365; 376.
Paradise, 40; 49; 75; 76; 81. P. contrasted with O.’s frame of
Parmenides, 1, 2; 162. thought, 121; 129; 130; 133–4;
Paron (the Pythagorean), 180. 142; 144; 150–1; 161; 163; 264;
Pasquino, Pasquale, 198. 265; 266.
Past tense, siginficance of, 21; 24; 119; Platonists, 308.
126–8; 137; 143; 300; 346; 357; Plotinus,
358. P.’s concept of time, 192; 202–3;
Paul, 7; 41; 65; 71; 72; 74; 103; 108; 205; 215; 219; 221; 232; 268;
109; 110; 113; 115; 163; 168; 201; 289; 361; 369.
211; 212; 213; 234; 235; 257; 274; P.’s criticism against Aristotle and
281; 300; 342; 345; 367. Stoics, 196–7; 215; 216; 217; 222;
Pépin, J., 129; 130. 314–5.
Peripatetics, 185; 191; 308; thought of P., 4; 37; 71; 93; 129;
(Aristotelians), 225; 243; 255. 130–133; 157; 158; 166; 169; 183;
perpetual present, 21. 185; 266.
 index of names and terms 399

P.’s influence on Augustine, 229; Sabelliansism, 261.

230; 362. salvation, the goal of life in Hellenistic
Plutarch of Chaeronea, 122; 142; 182; era, 6,
184; 195; 199; 200; 216; 219. Sambursky, S., 243; 254; 270.
Pope Anastasius I, bishop of Rome Sasse, H., 279; 281.
(399–401 A.D.), 164. Saul, 279; 345.
Poseidonius of Apamea, 101; 203; 269. Scepticism, 6; 268; 307.
precious stones (l¤yoi t¤mioi), Schaff, Philip, 4,
‘objects of contemplation’ and Scheck, T., 77; 115; 358.
‘reasons’, 54. Schofield, Malcolm, 162.
object of creation, 72; 95. Scholia in Apocalypsis, authenticity of, 14.
the ‘one’ who fell was a p.c., 79–80. Science, unable to provide solace in
object of creation, 82; Hellenistic era, 6,
living in divine life, 83; 85; 93. Sedley, David, 270.
Present Perfect tense, 21; 119; 127; Seneca, 201; 289.
154; 238. Septuagint, 68; 154.
Present tense, siginficance of, 21; 24; seven heavens, specific doctrine
119; 129; 136; 154; 300. rejected, 106.
Presocratic philosophers, 1; 171; 180; Sextus Empiricus, 29; 171; 183; 185;
292; 373. 198; 200; 203; 315.
Preuschen, E., 105. Sharples, R., 205; 354.
Prior, Arthur, 354. Shoemaker, S., 309.
Proclus, 183; 191; 198; 266. signs of wickedness (‘multitude of
Procopius of Gaza, 9; 10; 100; 262. number’, ‘schism’, ‘division’,
Proverbs, 365. ‘disagreement’), 79; 80; 82.
Providence, caring even for the most Simonetti, M., 13; 37; 88; 89; 115.
unimportant things, 349–351. Simplicius, 180; 182; 185; 189; 270;
Puech, H.C., 92; 194; 203; 237; 268; 307.
326; 335; 351. Socrates, the Historian, 4; 10; 140.
Pythagoreans, 122; 180; 192; 255; 280. Socrates, the Philosopher, 277; 278;
Python, 329. 280; 285.
Sodom, 283.
Quine, W.V.O., 270. Song of Songs, 365.
Sophroniscus, 278.
rational creature, Sorabji. R. 4; 17; 22; 24; 126; 135;
all r.c. are of one nature, 96; 131; 143; 147–50; 189; 193; 198; 225–6;
295; 331; 336. 229; 231; 239; 249–51; 262–3; 266;
r.c., an inseparable entity of 268; 270; 289; 300; 341; 347–51;
corporeal/incorporeal, 71; 87; 91; 354.
93; 95; 96; 99. soul,
r.c. are capable of receiving applying to humans, 97; 293.
commands from God, 96; 98. each s. standing on its own reason, 98.
personal identity of r.c., 96; 98. s. is a rational substance, 96;
Rebecca, 330. s. is invisible and incorporeal, 293.
Reichenbach, Hans, 269. Sozomen, 4.
resurrection, 97; 257; 278; 298. space, an unchallenged notion since
Richardson, C.C., 4. Antiquity, 1.
Rist, J.M., 186; 191; 198; 201; 202; Spanneut, M., 205; 218.
287. spatialization of time; 1; 307.
Roman Empire, 5, 6, Speusippus, 122.
Roman State, 371. spiral of space-time, 194.
Rufinus, 4, 9; 10; 12; 75; 77; 94; 97; spiritual world, a nonsensical
134; 152; 153; 154; 164; 226; 248; expression on O.’s thought, 116;
251; 273; 276; 330. 175.
400 index of names and terms

Stagirite, Aristotle the, 21. Theophilus of Antioch, 123.

Stead, Christopher, 122; 143; 201; Theophrastus, 185.
247. Theory of Relativity, 346; 347; 373.
Stephen, 279. theosis (deification), 93.
Stoa (Early, or, Old), 200; 202; 315; Thermopylae, 307.
363. Thomas Aquinas, 130.
Stobaeus, 180; 184; 185. Time,
Stoicism, t. is an elusive notion, 1, 2.
philosophy of nature, 256. formation of a Christian concept of
concept of time, 179; 185–193; 195; t. as a task, 8.
204; 222; 230; 233; 239; 245; t. interwoven with cosmological,
254; 259; 269; 307; 313; 318; anthropological, eschatological, the
320–1; 359–61; 375; (criticism to attitude to death, moral ideas, 2.
this), 195–6; 216; 314–5; 371; t. pivotal to an existential attitutde,
316; (reality of t.), 198–9; 206; 2; 366.
215–6; 218; 233; 238; 258; 239; t. the core of a philosophy and
240; 241; 255; 267–8. theology: 1; 366.
definition of cosmos, 101. timelessness vs. omnitemporality in divine
doctrine of recurrent worlds, 276; ontology, 24; 25; 31; 147; 174; 211;
278; 280; 285; 286–8; 292. 223; 259; 264; 275.
doctrine of the universe as a ‘whole’, Torrance, T., 37; 170.
29. Tresmontant, C., 129.
ethics, 6; 333. Trinitarian theology, 48; 157.
god immanent in the world, 29; Trinity, 25; 26; 54; 65; 94; 167; 172;
169. 246; 253; 260; 346.
god is destructible, 293. ‘substance’ (or, ‘nature’) of the T.
god, a cosmic principle, 167. is incorporeal, 112;
materialism, 87; 116. T. created everything from
corporeality and reality, 197–8; 217; non-being, 123.
222; 293. T. is beyond anything created, 136.
four incorporeals, 198. Three Persons of T. are equally
degrees of reality, 198; 307; 308. co-eternal, 25.
materialization of the idea of wise Tyre, 75.
man, 6.
rejection of transcendence, 29; 188; Uehling Jr., T.E., 354.
222; 233; 240; 250; 259; 321; 334.
theory of knowledge, 156–61. Valentinus, the Gnostic,
Stoics, 28; 157; 171; 187; 188; 189; doctrine of creation, 63–64; 92.
190; 191; 193; 197; 200; 202; 203; Valentinus, doctrine of human
243; 345. nature, 97.
Strato of Lampsacus (the ‘Physicist’), verbs, unable to express divine reality,
183; 185. 21.
Stump, E., 354. Vilain, M., 4.
Suda Lexicon, 214. Vlastos, Gregory, 185.

Taran, L., 162. Wallies, M., 219.

Tatian, 204; 205; 276; 277. Wallis, R., 249.
tensed expressions, 157. Watson, P., 40.
Tertullian, 37; 125. Werner, M., 37; 38.
Theodoretus of Cyrrhenia, 262. Wettstein, H.K., 354.
Theognis, 180. Whittaker, J., 162.
Theological vs. Cosmological Whittaker, J., 185.
conception of God, 30. Wicksteed, P.H., 185.
Theophilus of Alexandria, 4; 140; 276. Williams, D.C., 269.
 index of names and terms 401

Windelband, W., 6; 7; 203; 256. only through her God is known, 53.
Wisdom, 10; 11; 26; 28; 30; 31; 357; ontologically irrelevant to creation,
a ‘hypostasis of various objects of 48; 120; 123; 128; 146; 150–1.
contemplation’, 57; 65. the created ‘reasons’ and ‘objects of
a ‘sister’ of creatures, 55. contemplation’, 71; 140–1;
a living personal hypostasis, 33; 39; ‘conception’, or ‘pregnancy’ of the
54; 84; 146. logoi in Wisdom, 141.
a notion of multitude in her, 49; 53; the living person of Christ, 70.
65. various imports of the term, 56.
all knowledge of providence and was with God beginninglessly, 37;
judgement, 55. 39; 48; 137; 141; 147;
an incorporeal living hypostasis, 48; being the ‘beginning’, 59.
65; 83. becoming the beginning of creatures,
conception pertaining to the Son, 146; 165.
and not ‘to others’, 62; 136. Wolfson, H., 23; 126.
conceptual difference from the Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 354.
Logos, 165.
is both God’s beginningless Son and Xanthippe, 278.
contemplation and apprehension Xenocrates, 122; 243.
of all knowledge, 53; 54; 56.
is both God’s beginningless Son and Zeno of Citium (c. 334–c. 262 B.C.),
the product of his creative act, 47; 186; 187; 190; 196; 201; 202; 203;
48; 51; 53. 205; 217; 241; 276; 278; 361.
is the Son and Logos, she created Zeno of Elea (c. 490–c. 430 B.C.), 2;
everything, 124. 160; 254; 307.
no actual otherness from the Logos, 165. Zimmermann, F.W., 205.
 INDEX OF GREEK TERMS AND EXPRESSIONS

ég°nnhton, 135. tÚ e‰nai tÚ aÈtÒ> ka‹ t«n aÈt«n

égvni« efipe›n, égvni« ka‹ mÆ efipe›n, dektikÒn: efi d¢ §d°jato tÚ
67. porneËsai ≤ pneumatikÆ fÊsiw,
édiakÒsmhtow, 190. ımooÊsiow oÔsa <tª égennÆtƒ ye¤&
édiãstaton, 220. fÊsei ˜sa> énÒsia ka‹ éseb∞
édiãstatow, 219; 220; 222; 223. ékolouye› t‡“ lÒgƒ t‡“ katÉ aÈtoÊw
édiãstatow fÊsiw, 200. per¤ yeoË oÈd° fantasivy∞nai
édiastãtvw, 200; 263. ék¤ndunÒn §stin. (my proposition for
édiãfora, 315. restoration of lacuna in commJohn),
ée¤, 33; 34; 138; 211; 356. 72.
éeizv˝aw, 219. éllã ka‹ ı t«n pãntvn lÒgow §st¤
éyrÒvw, 256; 257; 259. katã m¢n K°lson aÈtÒw ı YeÒw,
éyrÒvw genhyhsom°nhn, 257. katã d¢ ≤mçw ı uflÒw aÈtoË, 169.
afl xe›rew sou §po¤hsãn me ka‹ éllã ‘katÉ efikÒna’ pro#pãrxousan
¶plasãn me (Ps. 118, 73), 86. aÈt∞w, 139.
é˝diow (meaning, timeless), 22; 23; 24; ÉAllã mÆn oÈdÉ êneu metabol∞w, 183.
211. êllo dÉ oÈd°n, 196.
é˝diow vs. afi≈niow, 22; 23. êlogow, 34.
éÛd¤ƒ, 211. ëma går t“ êrjasyai ka‹ §paÊsato,
afiyer¤ouw tÒpouw, 105. 258.
afit¤a . . . …w tÚ e‰nai didoÊw, 141. èmartÆmata, 315.
afit¤ai, 335. êmvmow, 296.
afit¤an . . . pantÒw diasthmatikoË énabãsevw, 105.
noÆmatow Íperkeim°nhn; 261–2. énalabe›n sx°sin dhmiourgikÆn, 123.
afi≈n, 205; 210; 220; 235; 265–6; 279; énalambanÒntvn, 299; 300.
370. énamem›xyai, 286.
afi≈n går oÎte xrÒnow, oÎte xrÒnou ti éned°jato, 128.
m°row . . . éllÉ ˜per ≤m›n ı énÆlvsen §n mataiÒthti tÚ diãsthma
xrÒnow . . . toËto to›w éÛd¤oiw afi≈n, t∞w ≤m°raw, 261.
tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon to›w oÔsin, ényrvp¤nvn pragmãtvn katãlhciw, 56.
265. ényrvpoktÒnow, 77.
afi≈n ı m°llvn, 265. éntifilotimoÊmenon ka‹
afi≈n oÈ xrÒnow . . . éllã tÚ sumparek- sumparekteinÒmenon katã tÚ
teinÒmenon to›w éÛd¤oiw, oÂÒn ti dunatÒn, 262.
xronikÒn k¤nhma ka‹ diãsthma, 262. énupÒstatow, 203.
afi«new, 279. ênv, 55.
afivn¤oiw, 55. éorãtoiw, 55.
afi≈niow, 22; 23; 264. éÒratow, 167.
ékaria¤vw, 258; 259. épeirãkiw, 252.
élÆyeian, 200. ép°rantow, 246.
éllÉ §n t“ nËn, 258. épokatast∞sai tØn frãsin, 15.
éllÉ oÈ taËta nËn prÒkeitai épolambãnontaw, 298.
épant«sin ≤m›n prÚw tåw toË époleipÒmenow, 33.
K°lsou kathgor¤aw fusiologe›n, épÒstasiw, 196.
292. épostÆsv, 342.
éllÉ oÈdÉ oÈs¤aw met°xei ı YeÒw, 88. épÒ sumbebhkÒtow ırizÒmenoi, 196.
ÑAllÉ oÈx ır«sin <ofl toiaËta l°gontew> épÒ t«n kreittÒnvn xvr¤vn, 104.
˜ti pantÒw <toË ımoous¤ou suggen°w épotetolmhm°nvw, 80.
 index of greek terms and expressions 403

épÒ tinow érx∞w, 212. g°nesiw, 85; 86; 283.

épÒ toËde érjÒmenon toË xrÒnou, 342. g°nesiw vs. g°nnhsiw, 85.
éproa¤reton går ı pÒnow, 326. genhsom°nvn, 253.
ériymÒw, 183. genhsom°nvn afi≈nvn, 224.
èrpãzei b¤& tØn basile¤an t«n genhtÒw, 270.
oÈran«n, b¤an Ípom°nousan, 208. gennhyÆtv, 54; 149.
érrÆtvn rhmãtvn, 23. g°nnhsiw, 86; 92.
érxÆ, 31; 33; 39; 58; 66; 76; 127; 144; genÒmenow, 120; 128; 129.
165; 209; 212; 261; 333. genom°nvn, 76.
érxa¤, 335. ginvskÒmenow, 26.
érxÆ ka‹ ≤ tinÒw Ípãrjevw afit¤a, 144. g¤netai, 33.
érxÆ t∞w kosmogon¤aw, 44. ginÒmena, 92.
érxÆ t∞w kosmopoi¤aw, 356. gn«sin, 231.
érx∞yen, 146.
érx∞yen fÊseiw, 146. dedhmiourghm°nhn fÊsin, 124.
d°on ıdeËsai §p¤ tÚ p°peiron ka‹
érxÆn <oÔn> e‰nai tÚn lÒgon fas¤n oÈx gluke›an poi∞sai tØn t∞w éret∞w
ßteron ˆnta aÈt∞w katÉ oÈs¤an éllÉ stafulÆn, 208.
§pino¤& ka‹ sx°sei, ·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv, dhmiourgÒw, 26.
√ m¢n »ke¤vtai t“ Ye“ sof¤a, √ d¢ dhmosieÊein, 69.
n°neuken, ·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv, prÒw tå diÉ aÈtÆn tØn eÈxÆn, 340.
dhmiourgÆmata ı dhmiourgikÒw diÉ ¥n kt¤sin dedÊnhtai ka‹ pçsa
lÒgow, 165–6. kt¤siw Ífestãnai, 44.
diÉ aÍt«n, 312.
érxÆn, 316. diã metajÊ ˆntow t∞w toË égenÆtou ka‹
érxÒntvn, 76. t∞w t«n genht«n pãntvn fÊsevw,
és≈mata går mØ paradexÒmenoi kayÉ 169.
•autã, 201. diã tå diãfora s≈mata t«n logik«n
és≈maton, 200. ka‹ toÁw poik¤louw kÒsmouw, 299.
és≈matow, 48. diã tØn êgnoian t∞w ımvnum¤aw, 101.
étarãxou ka‹ édiastãtou zv∞w, 219. diã t∞w sark≈sevw, 30.
aÈtã ≥dh gegon°nai, 346. diã tÚ énãjion aÈtÒn ¶sesyai toË
aÈtÒ d¢ tÚ xronikÒn diãsthma, 207. §pakousyÆsesyai, 341–2.
aÈtÒw d¢ ı YeÒw, 27. diã tÚ §n t∞ sullÆcei tØn érxÆn t∞w
AÈtÒw går mÒnow gin≈skei tå pr≈hn sustãsevw e‰nai, 141.
ka‹ tå §nest«ta ka‹ tå m°llonta, diã tÚn xrÒnon, 317.
351. diã tÚ taËta aÈtÒn eÎjasyai, 340.
aÍt“ ka‹ •t°roiw, 61. diã toiaÊthn §p¤noian, 118.
éfãtƒ dunãmei, 247. dia¤resiw, 79; 82.
éfÉ •aut«n, 311. diairoum°nvn kÒsmoiw ka‹ s≈mati katã
êfyarton går fÊsin pepo¤hke ka‹ énalog¤an t∞w katastãsevw , 104.
•aut“ suggen∞, 91. diakekosmhm°nh, 190.
diakÒsmhsiw, 277.
boÊletai, 129. diark∞, 210.
boÊlhsin, 323. diãstasiw zv∞w, 220; 232.
boÊlhsiw, 130. diãstasiw, 193; 196; 219; 220; 222;
boulom°nh, 128. 223; 227; 229; 232; 369.
brãdion, 319; 320. diãsthma kinÆsevw, 196.
diãsthma kosmik∞w kinÆsevw, 186.
gegÒnasin, 238. diãsthma sumparekteinÒmenon, 217.
gegonÒsin, 238. diãsthma, 185; 190; 193; 197; 205;
gegonÒta, 124; 238; 252. 206; 207; 209; 210; 217; 218; 219;
gegonÒtvn, 92; 252; 253. 220; 223; 227; 231; 242; 260; 261;
genesiourgÒw, 270. 262; 263; 308; 368; 369.
404 index of greek terms and expressions

diastÆmata, 187. diã tÚ ‘s«ma t∞w tapein≈sevw’

diasthmatikª tini paratãsei gegon°nai ‘t°kna fÊsei Ùrg∞w’ ˜te
sumparekte¤netai [sc. ≤ ktistÆ ‘§n°keito’ ≤m«n ‘≤ diãnoia §p¤ tå
oÈs¤a], 261. ponhrã §k neÒthtow, 65–6.
diasthmatikÆ fÊsiw, 220.
diaf°rei toË eÈlÒgou, 159. efiw kakÒtexnon cuxÆn oÈk
diaf°rein d¢ tØn katalhptikÆn efiseleÊsetai sof¤a oÈd° katoikÆsei
fantas¤an toË eÈlÒgou, 159. §n s≈mati katãxrev èmart¤aw
diafeÊgoien tÚ ±porhm°non, 201. (Wisdom of Solomon, 1, 4), 68.
diafvn¤a, 79; 82. efiw tÚn afi«na, 23.
didoÊw, 124. §k, 214; 215.
d¤dvsin, 299; 300. §k dialeimmãtvn, 356.
dihnek°w, 244. ¶ktasiw, 215.
dihnek«w, 244. §k t∞w ÑKÒsmowÉ fvn∞w, 101.
dÒjei kt¤sma l°gein toÁw afi≈naw, 235. §k toË mÆ ˆntow, 86.
dunãmei, 243. §k toË mÆ ˆntow efiw tÚ e‰nai parÆxyh,
dunatÒn éme¤bein poiÒthtaw tØn 124.
Ípokeim°nhn pãsaiw poiÒthsin Ïlhn, §k toË …rism°nou t«n cux«n ériymoË,
96; 297. 252.
dusdiÆghton, 155. §kinÆyh m¢n aÈtÆ, §kinÆyh d¢ ka‹
dvrÆsomai, 341. aÈtÒw, 216.
§kpesÒntow, 76.
§boÊleto, 129. §kp¤ptv, 76.
§g°neto, 22; 23; 136; 139. §kpÊrvsiw, 277.
§g≈ ≥mhn √ pros°xaire (Prov. 8, 30), ¶latton diãsthma, 207.
23. §mo¤ går tÒnde pr°pei nikçn §n ta›w
§g≈ d¢ §f¤sthmi efi ka‹ tåw oÈs¤aw, 89. eÈpoi˝aiw, 340.
§d°jato, 150. ßn, 36; 97.
¶yow, 102. §n ëdou kãtv ≥ tini toioÊtƒ xvr¤ƒ,
Efi gãr ‘pãnta diÉ aÈtoË §g°neto’, ka‹ 104.
aÈtÒw §sti prÚ pãntvn, 139. ßna ée¤ l°gei lÒgon, 36.
efi d¢ tiw Íperbãw tå katã tÚn kÒsmon §n ékare›, 45.
ka‹ tÚn afi«na toËton èmartÆseiai, §n érxª, 31; 32; 33.
§ãn ka‹ toËto mikrÒn √, oÈk°ti ên §n érxª ∑n ı lÒgow ( John, 1, 1), 31.
¶xoi eÎlogon èmarti«n êfesin. . . . §n •auto›w d¢ ¶xein tØn afit¤an toË
oÈk §sti d¢ êfesiw oÈd° édelf“ t“ kine›syai, 311.
Íp°r tå •bdomÆkonta ka‹ •ptã §n •auto›w, 311.
≤marthkÒti, 302. §n afiy°ri ka‹ to›w énvt°rv aÈtoË
efi ı svtÆr ée¤ gennçtai, 138. tÒpoiw, 103–4.
•aut“ ka‹ oÈden¤, 62; 170. §n afiyer¤ƒ s≈mati, 298.
e·dh, 89. ßneken, 336.
e‰en ên tinew tÒpoi ofl kãtv ka‹ êlloi §n makariÒthti, 34.
ofl ênv, 115. §n ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ, 284.
efipe›n ti, 89. §nerge¤&, 240.
efik≈ d¢ §pinoe› kinhtÒn tina afi«now §n tª énastãsei, 298.
poi∞sai, 182. §n t¤ni, 32.
§n to›w kayarvtãtoiw toË kÒsmou
efiw d¢ tÚ ‘≥meya fÊsei t°kna Ùrg∞w …w xvr¤oiw §pouran¤oiw, 103.
ka‹ ofl loipo¤’, oÈk o‡damen ˜, ti §n to›w prÚ t∞w <efiw toÊw> afiyer¤ouw
pot° §roËsin ofl tåw pneumatikãw tÒpouw <ıdoË> xvr¤oiw
érx∞yen fÊseiw efisãgontew. p«w (E. Preuschen), 105.
går ı fÊsei uflÒw yeoË fÊsei §n, meaning of, (apud. John, 1,1); 34.
e‰nai l°getai uflÒw ‘Ùrg∞w’ §n to›w prÚ t∞w <efiw toÊw> afiyer¤ouw
épokrin°syvsan. ≤me›w d¢ ofiÒmeya tÒpouw <énabãsevw> xvr¤oiw (my
 index of greek terms and expressions 405

proposition for restoring the portion zvÆ koinÆ, 97.

of commJohn), 105. z«sa, 48.
§nupÒstatow, 56.
§ne›den, 43. ≤ går ‘érxÆ’ pantÒw diasthmatikoË
§nnoÆmata, 198. noÆmatow éllotr¤vw ¶xei, 261.
§nnooÊmenon, 200. ≤ d¢ sof¤a é˝diow, oÈsivd«w prÚ afi≈nvn
§j épe¤rou §pÉ êpeiron, 247. parã t“ Ye“ Ípãrxousa, 39; 146.
§j épe¤rvn §pÉ êpeiron, 246. ≥ ka‹ to›w toÊtvn kayarvt°roiw
§j aÈtoË, 74; 168. Íperouran¤oiw, 103.
§j •aut«n, 311. ≤ kt¤siw pçsa t“ t«n afi≈nvn
§j oÈk ¯ntvn, (2 Macc. 7, 28), 86, diastÆmati parametre›tai, 261.
122; 123. ≤ logikÆ oÈs¤a, 96.
§jair°tvw, 350. ≥ ne≈teron §ke¤nou, 215.
¶jvyen, 311. ≤ noerã te ka‹ édiãstatow fÊsiw, 223.
§pakoÊsomai, 340. ∏ sunye› ka‹ suntr°xei, 216.
§pe¤ tÚ ˜lon §k mer«n §sti, 29. ≤ toË YeoË sof¤a, prÒw tÚn o §st¤
§p°keina noË ka‹ oÈs¤aw, 88. sof¤a Ípãrxousa, oÈdem¤an sx°sin
§p°keina oÈs¤aw, 135. prÒw ßterÒn tina e‰xen, 48.
§p°keina t«n noht«n, 26. ≤ to¤nun cuxÆ pollã parã toË
§p¤ lÒgon ≥lyomen mustikÒn, 67. kt¤santow aÈtÆn laboËsa, 124.
§p¤ tÚ z∞n aÈtã proslabÒnta ±boulÆyh, 48; 120; 123; 128; 150.
metous¤aw trÒpƒ, 128. ≥gagen, 123.
§pilogÆ, 315. ≤gemonikÒn ¶xei tØn ˜lhn oÈs¤an, 293.
§pino¤& lambanom°nhn, 257. ≥yelen, 128.
§p¤noiai, 52; 56. ±y°lhsen, 48; 120; 123; 128.
§pistÆmh ye¤vn, 56. ∑n, 22; 33; 136.
§pistr°cantew, 316. ∑n èrmÒzousa, 23.
§pisfal°w, 69.
¶plasen, 84. y°lei, 129.
§po¤hsen, 123; 124. y°lhsiw, 130.
§reÊgetai, 52. yeologikÆn, 365.
§st¤ Ípãrxousa, 136. yeopo¤hsiw, 93.
§st¤n vs. ∑n vs. ¶stai, 22. YeÒw Àsper oÈk §sti m°row oÏtvw oÈd°
§st¤n vs. ∑n, 22. ˜lon, 29.
¶stai, 22. yevrÆmata (objects of contemplation),
¶ti d¢ kéke›no lhpt°on épÒ t«n 48; (being in Wisdom), 51; 52; 85;
proeirhm°nvn ˜ti polloË de› (objects of contemplation as an act
toioËton ÍponoÆseiai tÚn xrÒnon ı of God), 52; 53; (containing all
Plãtvn oÂon ofl épÒ t∞w Stoçw knowledge), 54; (comprising created
Íp°labon ≥ t«n §k toË Peripãtou wisdom), 84; (the created ones had a
pollo¤, ofl m¢n katÉ §p¤noian cilÆn beginning), 143–4.
aÈtÒn sunistãntew émenhnÒn ka‹ yevrÆmata, 210.
¶ggista toË mØ ˆntow: ßn går oÔn yevrhmãtvn, 210.
t«n parÉ aÈto›w ésvmãtvn ı yevr¤a, 231.
xrÒnow, ë dÆ katapefrÒnhtai parÉ
aÈto›w …w édran∞ ka‹ oÈk ˆnta ka‹ ‡diÒn §sti t∞w yeÒthtow tÚ diã pãntvn
§n §pino¤aiw Ífistãmena cila›w: ofl ¥kein ka‹ tª fÊsei t«n ˆntvn katã
d¢ sumbebhkÒw t∞w kinÆsevw pçn m°row sumparekte¤nesyai, 261.
l°gontew, 198. ·nÉ oÏtvw e·pv, 88; 211.
eÈdok¤a, 120; 126; 128; 129. ·nÉ …w ımoiÒtatow aÈt“ katã dÊnamin
eÈdok¤a YeoË, 136. √, 188.
eÈdok¤a YeoË genÒmenow, 48. ·na katã tØn sof¤an ka‹ toÁw tÊpouw
eÈy°vw, 256; 320. toË sustÆmatow t«n §n aÈt“
¶fesiw, 130. nohmãtvn tå pãnta g¤nhtai, 83.
406 index of greek terms and expressions

fisÆlika toË kÒsmou gegon°nai, 215. kayÒ logiko¤ tinew, 105.

fisom°troiw xrÒnou diastÆmasin, 205. kay≈w §sti dunatÒn to›w genhto›w
gn«nai tÚn YeÒn, 28.
ka¤ ée¤ gennçtai ı svtÆr ÍpÒ toË kay≈w ±y°lhsen, 299; 300.
patrÒw, 138. kairÒn, 303.
ka‹ går ¶ti xrÒnou de›, 316. kairÒw, 343.
ka‹ går pçw ı t«n blepom°nvn pol¤thw kairoÊw, 343.
ka‹ parerxom°nvn ka‹ proska¤rvn kak¤a, 283.
§k t«n kãtv §st¤n, kên §n kên §n sugkr¤sei tÒpvn §k t«n
sugkr¤sei tÒpvn §k t«n énvtãtv énvtãtv tugxãn˙, 174.
tugxãn˙, 116. katÉ ériymÒn fioËsan afi≈nion efikÒna,
ka¤ dhmiourgÒw m¢n diã tå gegonÒta 182.
épÒ toË mÆ ˆntow efiw tÚ e‰nai, 26. katÉ §p¤noian, 61.
ka¤ •kãsth cuxÆ fid¤an ÍpÒstasin ¶xei, katÉ eÈdok¤an, 323.
§n t“ fid¤v lÒgƒ flstam°nh, ka‹ oÈk katã boÊlhsin, 323.
§n êllƒ, 98. katã m¢n tØn sÊstasin t∞w per¤ t«n
ka¤ katakolouyhsãntvn t“ pr≈tƒ, 76. ˜lvn yevr¤aw ka‹ nohmãtvn t∞w
ka‹ leptÒthti fvtÒw diaugest°roiw, sof¤aw nooum°nhw, katã d¢ tØn prÒw
104. tå logikã koinvn¤an toË lÒgou
ka¤ lÒgon toioËton kayÉ •autÒn z«nta, lambanom°nou, 165.
34. katã sugx≈rhsin, 323.
ka¤ ˜ti épÒ tinvn pterorruhsãntvn, katã tØn éj¤an, 298.
76. katã ti t«n shmainom°nvn, 117.
ka¤ oÈ mÒnhw t∞w prono¤aw YeoË ¶rga katã tÚ parãdeigma t∞w diaivn¤aw
§piteloËnta éllã ka‹ t∞w •autoË, fÊsevw, ·nÉ …w ımoiÒtatow aÈt“
343. katã dÊnamin ¬, 182.
ka‹ oÈk ¶sti p°raw t∞w megalvsÊnhw katã tÚn eflrmÒn t«n §som°nvn, 342.
aÈtoË, 246. katã toÁw §n t∞ sof¤&
ka‹ oÊs¤an éÒraton ka‹ ås≈maton, protranvy°ntaw ÍpÒ YeoË t«n
293. §som°nvn lÒgouw, 50.
ka¤ oÏtvw ka‹ télhy∞ l°gein katã toËton, 186.
kindun«d°w §sti, 69. katabãw oÈx ßna mÒnon oÈranÒn, éllã
Ka¤ pollo¤ goËn ¶xousin ¶nnoian YeoË pãntaw, ˜soi pot° efis¤n, 106.
dhmiourgoË, oÈ mÆn ımologoËsin katabolÆ, 116; 117; 118; 131; 240;
aÈtÒn ufloË pat°ra, 27. 317; 327; 362.
ka‹ poll“ t∞w l°jevw ≤m«n me›zon, katalhptikÆ fantas¤a, 139; 158–61.
156. katory≈mata, 315.
ka‹ suntelesyÆsetai ı yumÒw mou, kÆrugma, 366.
282. kinÆsevw ériymÒw, 183.
ka‹ tå êxrhsta nomizÒmena prono¤& kinÆsevw diãsthma, 186.
YeoË dioike›tai, 349. kosmopoi¤a, 356.
ka¤ tå §n gen°sei, 69. kÒsmow, 100; 115; 117.
ka‹ tØn sunoxÆn §n t“ ‘diÉ aÈtoË’, kÒsmow afisyhtÒw, 266.
168. kÒsmow nohtÒw, 138; 266.
ka‹ tÚ t°low §n t“ ‘efiw aÈtÒn’, 168. krçsin m¤an, 97.
ka‹ tÚ toiÒn m¢n s«ma, ka‹ poiÒn kritÆrion élhye¤aw, 159.
s«ma, êllo d¢ ti ßteron s≈matow, kt¤saw, ·nÉ oÏtvw e‡pv, ¶mcuxon
105. sof¤an ı YeÒw, 83.
kayÉ ˜, 58. kt¤sevw, 118.
kayÉ oÏw g°gonen ßkaston lÒgouw §st¤n kt¤siw, 85; 86; 92.
kalÒn, 43. kt¤sma, 235.
kayÉ oÏw o‰de lÒgouw, 81.
kayÒ YeÒw §sti ka‹ kayÒ patÆr §stin, lelog¤syai, 346.
22; 27. l¤yoi t¤mioi, 54.
 index of greek terms and expressions 407

logik«n fÊsevn, 104. mhde¤w d¢ proskopt°tv diakrinÒntvn

lÒgoi, as the secret explanations of ≤m«n tåw §n t“ svt∞ri §pino¤aw,
things, 43. ofiÒmenow ka‹ t∞ oÈs¤& tautÒn ≤mçw
lÒgoi, as relations, of possibilities, of poie›n, 61.
principles, constitutive causes, of laws mhd°n e‰nai . . . ı metajÊ t∞w toË ufloË
of all kinds, the sine qua non prÒw tÚn pat°ra sunafe¤aw
framework for the emergence of eÍr¤sketai, mØ diasthmatikÒn ti
the world to be possible, 44. nÒhma; 262.
lÒgoi, as potential relations, 46. mhd°n eÂnai tÚ és≈maton, 200.
lÒgoi, meaning ‘utterances’, ‘words’ m∞kow xrÒnou, 207.
and ‘reasons’, 54. miçw ≤m°raw diastÆmatow, 207.
lÒgoi, as ‘reasons’ which are ‘made; mnÆmhn, 224; 231.
lÒgoi, being not ‘beginningless’, 56; monãw, 36.
143. moxyhr«n ekdox«n, 100.
lÒgoi, contained in Wisdom, 65. mustikÒn §stin, 67.
lÒgoi, the primal object of creation,
as the organizing principles, the nohtã, 95.
potentiality and sustainability and nÒmon afi≈nion, 328.
workability of the setting, 45. nËn, 258; 259.
lÒgoi, as the object of creation, 40; nËn ¶rga tåw fÊseiw tåw logikãw l°gei,
51; 53; 124.
lÒgoi, containing all knowledge, 54.
lÒgoi, (seminal reasons), 289. ı går lÒgow tØn érxÆn ¶xvn épÒ toË
lÒgow élhyÆw, 69. parã YeoË lÒgou oÈk §ò tÚ logikÒn
lÒgow gãr eÂw, 36: 36. z«on pãnt˙ éllÒtrion nomisy∞nai
lÒgow, (the ‘reason’ according to which YeoË, 105.
the world was made), 83. ı YeÒw ¶ktis°n me érxÆn ıd«n aÈtoË
lÒgow, (the human ‘bare reason’ efiw ¶rga aÈtoË (Prov. 8, 22), 31.
apprehending reality), 160. ı YeÒw aÈtÒw, 28.
lÒgouw (in the making of any artifact), ı yeÒw m¢n oÔn pãnth ßn §st¤n ka‹
83. èploËn, 54.
ı YeÒw toË xrÒnou t∞w zv∞w aÈt«n
mayÆmata, 108. Ípet°meto: ·na mÆ efiw xrÒnon makrÒn
makariÒthw, 55. param°nontew, sumparekte¤nvntai tª
makr«n tinvn afi≈nvn, 256. kak¤&, 262.
martÊria, 29. ı kÒsmow . . . …w doke› to›w StvÛko›w
megãlow §niautÒw, 287. di∞kon êxri §kpur≈sevw, oÈs¤a tiw
m°lei . . . pantÒw logikoË, 350. ≤ diakekosmhm°nh ≤ édiakÒsmhtow,
m°llei ka‹ bradÊnei, 319. o t∞w kinÆsevw fas¤n e‰nai tÚn
m°nvn tª oÈs¤& êtreptow, 293. xrÒnon ı kÒsmow geg°nhtai, 146.
m°svn, 315. ı lÒgow (rationality, varying in rational
metÉ aÈtÒn, 215. creatures), 105.
metã, 342. ı lÒgow ı per¤ •kãstou, 43.
metãyesiw, 344. ı lÒgow ı per¤ aÈt«n, 43.
metous¤&, 44. ı per¤geiow mÒnow tÒpow, 101.
m°tron kinÆsevw ka‹ mon∞w, 185. ‘O presbut°ran t∞w toË ufloË zv∞w tØn
m°xri toËde, 342. toË patrÒw dogmat¤zvn diastÆmat¤
MØ efiw toÁw afi≈naw ép≈setai KÊriow; tini tÚn monogen∞ toË §p¤ pãntvn
(RÔ. 76, 8), 303. YeoË pãntvw di˝sthsi: toËto d¢ ≥
mÆ kaya¤rontew tåw ımvnum¤aw, 15. êpeiron . . . ≥ tisi p°rasi ka‹
mØ tãxion, 319. shme¤oiw fanero›w ırizÒmenon. éllÉ
mØ …w xrÒnou polloË deÒmena, ·na êpeiron m¢n efipe›n oÈk §ãsei ı t∞w
sunary∞ ≤m›n per¤ t«n ˜lvn xrÒnvn mesÒthtow lÒgow ≥ pantel«w tØn
t∞w §ntaËya zv∞w lÒgow, 256–7. toË patrÒw te ka‹ ufloË ¶nnoian
408 index of greek terms and expressions

diagrãfei t“ lÒgƒ . . . oÈkoËn . . . o· xroniko›w diastÆmasi toË m¢n

oÈdem¤an ßjei x≈ran êpeiron patrÒw tÚn uflÒn, toË d¢ ufloË tÚ
§nnoe›n tÚ diãsthma, éllã pneËma tÚ ëgion diairoËsi, 261.
peperasm°nƒ tin¤ katã pçsan ˜ §stin (God in Himself ), 27.
énãgkhn tÚn monogen∞ toË patrÒw ˜lon (the Stoic term for ‘universe’), 28.
diastÆsousi . . . ı lÒgow otow oÈk ˜louw toÁw afi≈naw, 253.
ej éÛd¤ou e‰nai tÚn §p¤ pãntvn ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ sumparekteinÒmenow,
YeÒn: éllÉ épÒ tinow …rism°nou 167.
shme¤ou tØn arxÆn §sxhk°nai ˜per ≤m›n ı xrÒnow . . . toËto to›w
kataskeuãsei. ˜ d¢ l°gv, toioËtÚn éÛd¤oiw, afi≈n, tÚ
§sti . . . tÚ metã ti genÒmenon diã sumparekteinÒmenon to›w oÔsin oÂÒn
toË prÒw •autoË diãsthma ır¤zei ti xronikÒn k¤nhma, 262.
ka‹ tØn toË pro#ponooum°nou ˜w lÒgow m¢n §sti teleuta›ow t«n
ÍpÒstasin, 261. svmatik«n, érxÆ d¢ t«n ésvmãtvn,
ı pr«tow, 76. 83.
ı t∞w prosdokvm°nhw kr¤sevw kairÒw ˜son går, 196.
oÈ de›tai xrÒnvn, 257. ˜son tª prÚw tå éÒrata sugkr¤sei,
ı x«row, 198; 239. 115.
ı xrÒnow, 198; 239. ˜stiw …spere¤ phgÆ tiw ka‹ érxÆ t«n
ofl kayÉ ßna lÒgoi t«n dioikoum°nvn toioÊtvn tugxãnei, 36.
efis¤n §n t“ toË YeoË LÒgƒ ka‹ t∞ ˜te oÈk ∑n, Àw fate [sc. Eunomians]
Sof¤& aÈtoË, 49. t‹ ∑n §ke›no tÚ diãsthma; t¤na aÈt“
ofl tre›w xrÒnoi, 224. proshgor¤a §pinoÆsate; ≤ m¢n går
ıdoË, 105. koinÆ sunÆyeia ≥ xrÒnoiw ≥ afi«sin
ıdÒw går ı b¤ow, ÍpÒ pãntvn ëpan diãsthma Ípobãllei, 261.
ényr≈pvn parodeuÒmenow, 207. ˜te, 146.
ıdÒw, 207. ˜ti és≈matow ≤ cuxÆ, ka‹ ˜ti êneu
ofikonom¤a, 344. s≈matow oÈ kolãzetai, 97.
ofikoum°nh, 101; 102. oÈ går ëpaj, 138.
oflone¤ §niautoÊw tinaw ofikonome› ˜louw oÈ går §g°neto prÒw tÚn YeÒn, 33.
toÁw afi≈naw, 303. oÈ går oÂÒn te §klambãnein tÚ kay≈w
oflone¤ éfistãnti tØn oÈs¤an toË YeoË §stin ı YeÒw aÈtÒw, 28.
épÒ pãntvn t«n gennht«n, 88; 135. oÈ går poiãn, êllÉ e‡per êra, posÆn
oflone¤ tÒpow, 39; 166. mçllon ∑n efipe›n ofikeiÒteron. éllã
oflone¤ faÊlhn xutÆn Ïlhn, 286. t¤w oÏtv pa›w pantel«w tØn
oflone¤, 88; 89. diãnoian Àste égnoe›n ˜ti ≤m°rai
oÂow ka‹ ˜sÒw §stin, 27. m¢n ka‹ œrai ka‹ m∞new ka‹
oÂw oÈ koinvne›, 135. eniauto¤ m°tra toË xrÒnou efis¤n,
ımooÊsion Ípãrxon tª mhtr¤, 92. oÈx¤ m°rh, 227.
ımooÊsion, 72; 93; 151. oÈ genom°nh efik≈n, 139.
ımooÊsiow, 149. oÈ diã tina ßna fid¤vw poiÒn, éllã diÉ
ım≈numa d¢ §stin, œn ˆnoma mÒnon ˜lon tÚ g°now ˜ ép°kteinen, 77.
koinÒn, ı d¢ katã toÎnoma t∞w oÈ katã tåw §pino¤aw ı aÈtÒw, 58.
oÈs¤aw lÒgow ßterow, 16. oÈ sun°xvn ı patÆr, 52.
ımvnum¤a, 100. oÈ tå §p¤ g∞w mÒnon éllã ka‹ tå §n
ˆn, 198; 201; 240; 308. ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ, 291.
ˆnta, 198. oÈ tÒpƒ éllã fÊsei, 73.
˘te, 357. oÈ tÒpƒ, 73.
ÜOti m¢n oÔn oÎte k¤nhsiw oÎte êneu oÈ tosoËton tÒpƒ, 115.
kinÆsevw ı xrÒnow §st¤, fanerÒn, oÈ xronikÒn, 220.
183. oÈd°n, ˆnta dÉ oÎ, 200.
oÏtv tå sÊmpanta gegon°nai katã oÈdenÒw ˆntow metajÊ toË poie›n tØn
toÁw §n t∞ sof¤& protranvy°ntaw èmart¤an ka‹ tØn èmart¤an mÆ
ÍpÒ YeoË t«n §som°nvn lÒgouw, 83. poie›n, 315.
 index of greek terms and expressions 409

oÈd°pote går gunÆ tÚ katÉ efikÒna oÈd° parakoÊsantaw, 286.

énÆr, 42. parametroÊmenow, 210; 234
oÈd°pv tÚn pr°ponta xrÒnon parekte¤nein, 234.
§kpeplhr≈kesan, 319. parekte¤nesyai, 215.
oÈd°tera, 315. parekte¤netai, 243.
oÈk §n paratãsei xrÒnou, 258. parekte¤nv, 213.
oÈk §pakoÊsomai, 340. paristãw tØn érxÆn t∞w t«n pãntvn
oÈk §fÉ ≤m›n, 325. Ípostãsevw, 168.
oÈk ±llo¤vmai, 154. pãshw èpl«w kinÆsevw diãsthma, 185.
oÈrãnioi tÒpoi, 104. p°nte ≤m°raw §p¤ t∞w ofik¤aw kat°xetai
oÈs¤&, 200. tÚ prÒbaton [sc. before Passover] . . .
oÈs¤a (subsistent being), 39. ¶peita yÊetai . . . p°nte diastÆmata
oÈs¤a, 190; 210; 293. xrÒnou dhloËtai ta›w p°nte taÊtaiw
oÈs¤ai, 89. ≤m°raiw épÒ Adãm m°xri suntele¤aw,
oÈsiastikÒn, 210. 261.
oÈsivm°nvn pvw ka‹ efiw ¶rgon per¤ oÈs¤aw toË yeoË, 89.
§rxom°nvn, 49. per¤ pãntvn, 294.
oÈsi≈sei, 141. per¤ t«n §n ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ, 101.
oÈs¤vsin, 85; 173. per¤ t∞w §n ëpasi to›w afi«si
oÈs¤vsiw, 86. diatãjevw, 253; 303.
oÈx aÍt“, éllÉ •t°roiw, 61; 62; 82; 173. per¤ t∞w toË ényr≈pou fÊsevw, 41.
oÈx oÏtvw per¤ •nÒw tinow, 41. per¤ toÊtou ßtoimoi t“ lÒgƒ
oÈx¤ ëpaj geg°nnhtai ka‹ oÈx¤ diamãxesyai, …w g°gonen ≤
gennçtai, 138. efirhm°nh polite¤a ka‹ §stin ka‹
oÈx¤ §g°nnhsen ı patÆr tÚn uflÒn ka‹ genÆseta¤ ge, ˜tan aÏth ≤ MoËsa
ép°lusen aÈtÒn épÒ t∞w gen°sevw pÒlevw egkratÆw genÆsetai. oÈ
aÈtoË, éllÉ ée¤ gennç aÈtÒn, 138. går édÊnatow gen°syai, oÈdÉ ≤me›w
oÎte går ¥n ¶dei pore¤an periepãthsen édÊnata l°gomen: xalepã d¢ ka‹
oÎte ëw §xr∞n prãjeiw §pet°lesen, parÉ ≤m›n ımologe›tai, 193.
207–8. perige¤oiw tÒpoiw, 101.
oÎtina, 198. per¤geiow tÒpow, 102.
peri°xei tå pronooÊmena ≤ prÒnoia,
paizÒntvn, 323. 293.
pçn går tÚ poioËn presbÊteron toË plãsin, 83.
pepoihm°nou, 144. pl∞yow ériymoË, 79; 82.
pãnt˙ ênyrvpon éneilhf°nai, 97. plãsiw, 85; 86; 92.
pãnta ë ‡smen §lãttona §st¤ YeoË, plÆn ¶xei tØn éntepeixe¤rhsin tÚ §k
26. t∞w prÒw Galãtaw §pistol∞w =htÒn,
pãnta går m°rh kÒsmou, oÈd°n d¢ §pe¤ ka‹ per¤ ≤mer«n l°getai, t«n
m°row ˜lou ı YeÒw, 29. ımologoum°nvn …w oÈk oÈs«n
pant¤ d¢ ka‹ ˜lƒ t“ kÒsmƒ §mcÊxvn, 235.
sumparekteinÒmenow, 211. plÆrvma, 63.
pantodÊnamow, 247. po¤hsiw vs. plãsiw, 84.
Pantokrãtvr, 170. po¤hsiw, 86.
pãntote kt¤zetai, 44. poiÆsvmen, 84.
parã d¢ t“ ée¤ sune›nai t“ patr¤ pollã égayã (is the Son), 58; (these
l°getai, 33. are the conceptions of the Son), 60.
parã, 214; 215; 217. polupo¤kilow, 54; 65.
paragagÒnta, 124. polÊw går ı per¤ toÊtou lÒgow ka‹
paragagoËsa, 123. dusye≈rhtow, 67; 87.
parakekinduneum°nvw, 80. ponhroË, 76.
parakoloÊyhma, 215. PÒteron d¢ mÆ oÎshw cux∞w e‡h ên ı
parakolouyoËn diãsthma, 215; 216. xrÒnow ≥ oÈ, éporÆseien ên tiw:
parakolouyoËn, 215; 217; 360. édunãtou går ˆntow e‰nai toË
410 index of greek terms and expressions

ériymÆsontow édÊnaton ka‹ sumparekte¤nein, 214.

ériymhtÒn ti e‰nai, Àste d∞lon ˜ti sumparekte¤nesyai, 210; 211; 213;
oÈdÉ ériymÒw: ériymÒw går ≥ tÚ 217; 218; 261.
±riymhm°non ≥ tÚ ériymhtÒn. Efi d¢ sumparekte¤netai ényr≈poiw ı b¤ow §n
mhd°n êllon p°fuken ériyme›n ≤ §niauto›w, §n mhs¤n . . . toÊtoiw êra
cuxÆ ka‹ cux∞w noËw, édÊnaton §xr∞n ka‹ ≤mçw sumparekte¤nein tåw
e‰nai xrÒnon cux∞w mÆ oÎshw, éllÉ §nar°touw §rgas¤aw, 262.
efi toËto ˜ pote ˆn §stin ı xrÒnow, sumparekteinom°nhn, 166; 210; 211.
oÂon efi §nd°xetai k¤nhsin e‰nai êneu sumparekteinÒmenon diãsthma, 227.
cux∞w. TÒ d¢ prÒteron ka‹ Ïsteron sumparekteinÒmenon tª sustãsei toË
§n kinÆsei §st¤n: xrÒnow d¢ taËtÉ kÒsmou, 227.
§st¤n √ ériymhtã §stin, 188–9. sumparekteinÒmenow, 216, 225; 314.
praktikÆn, 365. sumparekte›non, 231.
presbÊteron dÉ épofa¤nesyai tolmçn sumparekte¤nvn, 210; 211; 217; 218;
éfilÒsofon, 215. 219; 227; 229; 233; 243; 264; 308;
presbÊteron, 50. 361; 372.
prÚ pãshw logik∞w fÊsevw, 146. sÊmptvma toËto dÉ §st¤
prÚ t«n afi≈nvn, 146; 304. parakoloÊyhma kinÆsevn, 185.
prÚ toË ti poi∞sai, 139. sÊn, 214; 215; 217.
prÒgnvsin, 323; 350. sÁn aÈt“, 215.
prodos¤an peri°xon t«n éporrÆtvn t∞w sun°nta m¢n taËta, mÆ ékriboËnta d°,
toË YeoË sof¤aw log¤vn, 68. 69.
prohge›tai katÉ aÈtoÊw t∞w tå ˜la sunergoËnta tª prono¤& épodekt°on,
dhmiourgoÊshw toË YeoË sof¤aw 343.
§ke›no tÚ diãsthma §n ⁄ fas¤ mÆ sunid≈n, 290.
gegen∞syai tÚn uflÒn ÍpÒ toË patrÒw, sunt°leia, 290.
260. sustÆmatow yevrhmãtvn ˆntow §n
prÒnoia, 246; 250; 351. aÈt‡«, 62.
prositÒw, 30. sustÆmatow nohmãtvn, 53.
proska¤rvn, 174. sx°sin dhmiourgikÆn, 48, 120.
prÒteron, 50. sx°sin prÚw aÈtã éned°jato, 129.
protranvy°ntaw lÒgouw, 84; 128. sx¤sma, 79; 82.
protranvy°ntaw, 50; 128. Svkrãthw ka‹ Plãtvn xvristãw t∞w
pr«ton a‚tion, 44. Ïlhw oÈs¤aw tåw fid°aw Ípolambãnei
pterorruÆsaw, 76. §n to›w noÆmasi ka‹ ta›w fantas¤aiw
pterorrÊhsiw, 74. toË YeoË toÈt°sti toË noË,
Ífest≈saw, 142.
=°vn, 270.
=Æmata, 23. tå diãfora s≈mata t«n logik«n, 104.
tå §n aÈt“, 207.
shme›on ∑n xrÒnou, 258. tã §nnoÆmata toË YeoË, 49.
skuyrvpot°roiw xvr¤oiw, 104. tå ¶jv svmãtvn, 115.
sof¤a Ípãrxousa oÈdem¤an sx°sin tå §sÒmena, 48; 50; 120; 129; 136;
prÒw ßterÒn tina e‰xen, 120. 150.
sof¤an, 53. tå . . . ye›a yelÆmata . . . tª ye¤&
sofistikÆn, 365. épeir¤& sumparekteinÒmena, 262.
spermatiko¤ lÒgoi, 116. tå kre¤ttona ényr≈pvn, 110.
stigmÆ, 258. Tå . . . kt¤smata . . . diasthmatikÆn
suggen°w, 72. érxÆn toË e‰nai ¶xei . . . ı d¢ toË
suggenoËw diastÆmatow, 73. YeoË lÒgow oÈk ¶xvn érxÆn toË
suggenoËw •bdomãdow, 73. e‰nai . . . ∑n ae¤, 262.
sumpãyeia, 250. tå logikã, 124; 128; 129; 167.
sumparate¤nei t“ épe¤rƒ tÒ êpeiron, tå martÊria tå paradedom°na, 29.
35. tå mÆ prÒteron ˆnta, 123.
 index of greek terms and expressions 411

tå per¤ kosmopoi¤aw ka‹ êlla tÚ g°now t∞w paide¤aw ka‹ t∞w

mustÆria, 68. gn≈sevw, 56.
tå prÚ gen°sevw, 39; 65; 69. tÚ går sumparekteinÒmenon tª
tãde m¢n tina poiÆsv, 341. sustãsei t∞w zv∞w aÈtoË, 210.
tarãjai ên tina tå toiaËta, 69. tÚ d¢ ‘ÉEn érxª ∑n’ saf«w
tax°vw, 319. presbÊterÒn §sti toË §n érx∞
tãxion, 319; 320. pepoihm°nou, oÈ mÒnon stere≈matow
te¤nesyai, 214; 215; 217. ka‹ jhrçw, éllã oÈranoË ka‹ g∞w
t°low, 194; 290. presbÊterÒw §stin ı lÒgow, 170.
teret¤smata, 48. tÚ d¢ nËn ˜lvw mhd°n e‰nai, 255.
tª loipª parÉ aÈtÒn gennhtª fÊsei, tÚ dhmiourghy°n ≤gemonikÒn, 124.
62. tÚ e‰nai, 141.
tª . . . épeir¤& sumparekte¤nvn sou toË tÚ §n kinÆsei ka‹ ±rem¤& posÒn, 185.
poyoËntow tØn k¤nhsin, 262. tÚ §n ta›w prãjesi posÒn, 185.
tª édiale¤ptƒ y°& toË patrikoË tÚ §j oÈranoË ka‹ g∞w sÊsthma, 101.
bãyouw, 34. tÚ kenÒn, 198; 239.
tª toË s≈matow ≤lik¤& tÚ kÊhma pneumatikÒn, 92.
sumparekte¤nein tå •autoË, 262. tÚ l°gein ka‹ énaptÊssein tå toiaËta
tª •autoË éÛdiÒthti sumparekteinom°nhn §st¤n §pisfal°w kên élhyeÊhtai, 69.
¶xei tØn patrÒthta, 262. tÚ legÒmenon §n t“ . . . calm“ prÒw tÚn
tª §nÊlƒ zvª, 173. uflÒn ‘≤ basile¤a sou pãntvn t«n
tª prono¤& ka‹ tª o¤konom¤&, 293. afi≈nvn’ oÈk §pitr°pei tinã kên tÚ
tØn ékosm¤an §n kÒsmv tiye¤w, 142. tuxÒn diãsthma dialog¤sasyai §n ⁄
tØn boulÆn, 350. mØ Íp∞rxen ı lÒgow, 260–1.
tØn dÉ oÈs¤an aÈtoË ka‹ tØn dÊnamin tÚ lektÒn, 198; 200; 239.
oÈ sunor«ntew, 196. tÚ leptomer°w t∞w prono¤aw ka‹ ≤
tØn diasthmatikÆn t«n afi≈nvn m°xri t«n lept«n gn«siw, 351.
parãtasin, 261. tÚ leptomer°w t∞w prono¤aw, 351.
tØn l°jin …w ım≈numon §jetãzesyai, tÚ ˜lon, 188.
100. tÚ m¢n går dØ parãdeigma pãnta
tØn m¢n går [ÔØ. katalhptikÆn afi«nã §stin, 182.
fantas¤an] édiãceuston e‰nai, tÚ tÚ m°llon Ípãrjai, 224.
d¢ eÎlogon kên êllvw époba¤nein, tÚ mÆ ırçsyai, 173.
159. tÚ ˆnoma plasãntvn, 117.
tØn per¤ t«n afi≈nvn muyopoi¤an, 236. tÚ pãnt˙ êtrepton toË YeoË, 153.
tØn =Ësin t«n svmãtvn, 311. tÚ parã Plãtvni §n ta›w §pistola›w
t∞w §n sark¤ zv∞w, 291. lelegm°non . . . per¤ toË
t∞w §pioÊshw ≤m°raw . . . oÈk o‰daw efi diakosmÆsantow tÒde tÚ pçn, 134.
tÚ diãsthma ˆcei, 261. tÚ parakolouyoËn diãsthma tª toË
t∞w §pistrof∞w, 316. kÒsmou kinÆsei, 186; 197.
t∞w svmatik∞w ka‹ diasthmatik∞w tÚ pl∞yow t«n yevrhmãtvn, 62.
fÊsevw, 223. tÚ polÊshmon, 31.
t∞w toË thlikoÊtou afi«now ≤m°raw, 235. tÚ proshma›non xrÒnon, 22.
t‹, 173; 198; 200. tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon to›w éÛd¤oiw, 265.
t‹ §st¤n, 89. tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon to›w oÔsin, 265.
t‹ …rai≈yhsan ofl siagÒnew sou …w tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon, 218; 262; 263;
trugÒnow, trãxhlÒw sou …w 309.
ırm¤skow; (Song of Solomon, 1, 10), tÚ sunamfÒteron, 97.
112. tÚ sÊsthma §j oÈranoË ka‹ g∞w, 101.
tinã, 198. tÚ t∞w g∞w éÒraton ka‹
tÚ élhy°w, 200. ékataskeÊaston, 45; 47.
tÚ éÒraton, 173. tÚ t°low tÚ peri°xon tÚn t∞w •kãstou
tÚ êtrepton ka‹ énallo¤vton toË zv∞w xrÒnon . . . afi≈n •kãstou
YeoË, 153. k°klhtai, 210.
412 index of greek terms and expressions

tÚ toË afi«now ˆnoma polÊshmÒn t“ pant¤ afi«ni sumparekteinom°nhn . . .

§sti . . . afi≈n går l°getai . . . ≤ tØn timvr¤an, 262.
•kãstou t«n ényr≈pvn zvÆ: . . . t«n èg¤vn, 55.
pãlin . . . ı xil¤vn §t«n xrÒnow: t«n yeologoum°nvn §nnoi«n, 160.
pãlin . . . ˜low ı par≈n b¤ow, ka‹ t«n m°svn ka‹ svmatik«n, 326.
afi≈n ı m°llvn, ı metã tØn t«n oÈran¤vn, 55.
énãstasin ételeÊthtow . . . pãlin t«n perige¤vn ka‹ ényrvp¤nvn, 100.
oÈ xrÒnow, oÈd° xrÒnou ti t«n poihtik«n ka‹ pronohtik«n, 39.
m°row . . . éllã tÚ t«n svmatik«n ka‹ t«n ésvmãtvn,
sumparekteinÒmenon to›w éÛd¤ow . . . ka‹ toÊtvn èpãntvn afit¤ou YeoË,
˜per går to›w ÍpÒ xrÒnon ı xrÒnow, 141.
toËto to›w éÛd¤oiw §st¤n afi≈n, 265. t«n toË lÒgou yevrhmãtvn, 52.
tÚ xronikÒn toËto diãsthma, 207.
tÚ xrÒnou parãdeigma ka‹ érx°tupon, Ïlh, 89.
266. ÍlikÒw genÒmenow, 115.
to›w éorãtoiw toË yeoË, 55. Ïparjiw, 165.
to›w d¢ tåw fÊseiw efisãgousi, 295. ÍpÒ toË tÒ YeoË tÚ e‰nai dejãmenoi, 86.
tÚn drÒmon tÚn ≤liakÒn, 231. Ípãrxein, 199.
tÚn YeÒn ég°nnhton eÍrÒnta tØn Íper°keina oÈs¤aw, 135.
oÈs¤an, 87; 135. Íper°keina t∞w oÈs¤aw, 88.
tÚn ˜lon afi«na, 207. Ípert¤yetai tØn taxut°ran prÚw
tÚn per¤ toË kÒsmou lÒgon, 83. aÈtoÊw boÆyeian, 319.
tÚn sumparekteinÒmenon xrÒnon tª ÍpÒ går toË YeoË tÚ e‰nai dejãmenoi,
toÊtou toË kÒsmou épÉ érx∞w m°xri 123–4.
t°louw kataskeuª, 213. ÍpÒ xrÒnon, 22.
tÚn Íperba¤nonta pãnta tå toË ÍpÒstasiw, 48; 293.
kÒsmou prãgmata, 135. Ïsteron, 319.
tÒpouw ¶xei diafÒrouw, 115. ÏsterÒn går pote, 50.
tosoÊtƒ xrÒnƒ, 317. Ïsteron poll“ xrÒnƒ, 319.
tÒte, 146. Ífestãnai, 199.
toÁw afi≈naw, 234; 235. Ífest≈w, 198.
toÁw poik¤louw kÒsmouw, 104.
toË diastÆmatow tÚn ˜lon xrÒnon, 253; fainÒmena, 1.
303. fantas¤a, 200; 311.
toË ˜lou, 350. fantas¤a katalhptikÆ §st¤n ≤ épÒ
toË pantÒw, 291. toË Ípãrxontow ka‹ katÉ aÈtÒ tÚ
toË sustÆmatow t«n §n aÈt« Ípãrxon §napomemagm°nh ka‹
nohmãtvn, 51. §napesfragism°nh ıpo¤a oÈk ên
toÎnoma t∞w oÈs¤aw lÒgow ßterow, 16. g°noito épÒ mÆ Ípãrxontow, 159.
tr¤a ‡sa diastÆmata, 207. filoneikoËntew ±liy¤vw, 101.
tÊpvn, 53. frontiz°tvsan, mÆpote §ly≈n ı
t“ ékrib°w §jetãzonti, 131. ÑIhsoËw §kbal≈n aÈtoÊw §k toË
t“ énãrxƒ, 23. fleroË (toË yeoË), ˜te ı §kbeblhm°now
t“ épe¤rƒ, 246. oÈd° §lp¤da toË efiselye›n ¶xei ˜yen
t“ boulÆmati, 163. §jeblÆyh, 302.
t“ m°llonti metã taËta oÈk o‰dÉ ˜pvw fÊsei §nant¤a, 97.
ofikonomhsom°nou, 288. fusiologe›n, 224; 292.
t“ perige¤ƒ tÒpƒ, 104. fusiolog¤a, 292.
t“ pr≈tƒ pterorruÆsanti, 76. fusiolÒgow, 292.
t“ sustÆmati t“ §j oÈranoË ka‹ g∞w fÊsiw, 1.
≥ §j oÈran«n ka‹ g∞w, 104.
t“ tãxei t∞w toË YeoË per¤ taËta xrÆsimon ¶stai tÚ basan¤sai tåw
dunãmevw, 257. §nno¤aw, 57.
 index of greek terms and expressions 413

xronik«n diasthmãtvn, 207. xvr¤oiw, 104; 298.

xronikÒn diãsthma, 228. xvr¤on, 107.
xrÒnow, 21; 266. xvr¤w aÊtoË §g°neto oÊd°n. ÜO g°gonen
xrÒnow dÉ §st¤ t∞w toË kÒsmou §n aÊt“ zvÆ ∑n, 136.
kinÆsevw diãsthma, 186. x«row, 107.
xrÒnow d¢ §st¤ tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon
tª sustãsei toË kÒsmou diãsthma, cuxÆ, 293.
226. cuxÆn kai k¤nhsin, 123.
xrÒnow d¢ est¤ tÚ sumparekteinÒmenon
tª sustãsei toË kÒsmou diãsthma, Ön, 129.
v
⁄ pçsa parametre›tai k¤nhsiw, e‡te œn g°gonen érxÆ, 146.
ést°rvn e‡te j≈vn e‡te otinosoËn …rai≈yhsan, 120.
t«n kinoum°nvn, kayÒ l°gomen …w ¶pow efipe›n, 258.
taxÊteron ≥ bradÊteron ßteron …w oÈk §mpod¤zontow toË xrÒnou to›w
•t°rou: taxÊteron m¢n tÚ §n Ïsteron pisteÊousin, 317.
§llãtoni xrÒn‡v ple›on diãsthma …w oÈk ¶stin oÔn to›w ég°nhton
metaba›non: bradÊteron d¢ §n Ífistam°noiw tÚn kÒsmon érxÆn
ple¤oni xrÒnƒ kinoÊmenon. ı d¢ aÈtoË efipe›n, 145.
§peidÆ §n xrÒnƒ ofl ést°rew …spere¤, 37.
kinoËntai, xrÒnou aÈtoÁw e‰nai Àste ˜lh sxedÒn ényr≈pou geneã tØn
dhmiourgoÊw épofa¤netai, 226–7. §k toË m¤souw ÙrgÆn
xrÒnow diarkÆw, 257; 259. sumparekte›nai, 262.
xrÒnow m¢n §sti tÚ diãsthma kayÉ ˜ »fel∞sai, 129.
prãtteta¤ ti, 261.
 INDEX OF BIBLICAL CITATIONS

OLD TESTAMENT

Genesis 1 Kings
1, 1: 170, 261. 8, 30: 342.
1, 3: 31. 15, 11: 344.
1, 6: 31.
1, 10: 42, 43. Tobit
1, 12: 135. 12, 7: 68.
1, 16: 15.
1, 16–18: 100, 119. Job
1, 20: 42, 43. 2, 9: 318.
1, 21: 43, 46. 3, 8: 76.
1, 21–23: 45. 8, 10: 86.
1, 22: 46. 32, 9: 235.
1, 24: 42, 43. 40, 19: 78, 85.
1, 25: 43.
1, 26: 50, 53, 83, 84. Psalms
1, 26–27: 40. 1, 5: 297.
1, 27: 40. 2, 7: 211.
2, 7: 78, 83, 84. 18, 4: 166.
2, 23: 81. 18, 11: 54.
3, 21: 81. 20, 4: 54.
5, 1: 47. 32, 6: 350.
6, 13: 283. 35, 10: 282.
8, 21: 65. 44, 2–3: 52.
11, 7: 79. 45, 3: 299.
28, 12–13: 106. 49, 1: 110.
47, 16: 281. 54, 20: 233.
49, 9: 36. 57, 4: 338.
61, 9: 234.
Exodus 76, 6–8: 302.
15, 16: 35. 77, 47: 283.
31, 1: 317. 89, 10: 281.
101, 28: 153, 292.
Leviticus 103, 24: 49, 83, 85.
6, 15: 300. 109, 3: 169.
26, 21: 301. 118, 73: 86.
135, 2: 110.
Numbers 138, 8: 167.
15, 15: 300. 142, 5: 31.
144, 9: 124.
Deuteronomy
8, 3: 56. Proverbs
32, 8: 109. 8, 22: 31, 48, 84, 86,
32, 9: 109. 139.
32, 32: 283. 8, 30: 23.
32, 33: 283. 16, 7: 208, 209.
 index of biblical citations 415

Ecclesiastes Isaiah
1, 9: 274. 3, 17: 103.
1, 10: 274. 3, 24: 103.
24, 5: 300.
Song of Solomon 26, 20: 259.
1, 10: 120. 40, 26: 42.
3, 4: 141. 65, 22: 273.

Wisdom of Solomon Jeremiah

1, 4: 68. 1, 5–6: 329.
1, 7: 167, 350. 3, 25: 316.
7, 17–18: 253, 365. 18, 8–10: 344.
7, 26: 138. 23, 24: 167.
10, 3: 283. 28, 8: 257.
10, 4: 283.
10, 7: 283. Ezekiel
11, 17: 122, 126. 5, 13: 282.
11, 20: 98, 244. 16, 30: 224.
13, 9: 274. 18, 4: 98.
18, 24: 103. 22, 18: 86.
28, 11–19: 75.
Hosea 28, 15–17: 77.
5, 14: 36. 28, 19: 76.

Amos Daniel (Susanna)

5, 8: 91. 42: 251, 319, 338.

Joel 2 Maccabees
2, 28: 350. 7, 28: 122, 126.

Malachi
3, 2: 286.
3, 6: 153, 292.

NEW TESTAMENT

Matthew 20, 1–16: 318.

4, 4: 103. 22, 30: 114.
6, 8: 338. 24, 3: 290.
6, 34: 281. 24, 21: 117.
7, 9–11: 333. 25, 31: 207.
10, 28: 294. 25, 34: 117, 339.
10, 29–31: 349. 25, 41: 109.
10, 29: 324. 26, 22: 332.
11, 27: 170. 28, 20: 290, 350.
12, 32: 301, 302.
13, 35: 117. Mark
13, 36: 67. 3, 29: 301.
13, 39: 290. 4, 11: 67.
13, 40: 290. 14, 19: 332.
13, 49: 290.
18, 7–14: 101. Luke
19, 30: 317. 1, 48: 7.
416 index of biblical citations

1, 80: 332. 11, 36: 71.

3, 22: 211. 11, 36: 74.
4, 33: 109.
7, 21: 109. 1 Corinthians
11, 50: 117, 339. 1, 24: 166.
12, 10: 301. 1, 30: 36.
12, 6: 324. 2, 6: 109.
13, 11: 42. 2, 7: 304.
19, 45: 67. 3, 12: 285.
20, 36: 114. 3, 12: 54.
5, 4: 167.
John 7, 31: 103.
1, 1: 21, 22, 31, 32, 8, 13: 210.
33, 34, 36, 59, 8, 2: 209.
60, 208. 8, 5: 110.
1, 2: 170. 8, 6: 74.
1, 3: 35, 139, 234. 5, 12: 67.
1, 3–4: 71, 72. 13, 12: 209.
1, 4: 34, 59. 15, 25: 208.
1, 26: 167, 211. 15, 35–38: 299.
1, 29: 101. 15, 38: 299.
1, 30: 35. 15, 44: 114.
4, 24: 89. 15, 49: 40.
4, 45: 42. 15, 49: 50.
8, 23: 116. 15, 51: 69.
8, 44: 77. 15, 52: 256, 257.
10, 11: 36.
10, 30: 209. 2 Corinthians
10, 7: 36. 4, 16: 41.
10, 9: 36. 4, 18: 111.
12, 27: 258. 5, 19: 101, 282.
12, 31: 40, 109. 12, 4: 66.
12, 44: 53.
13, 3: 74. Galatians
14, 6: 36. 1, 4: 235.
14, 9: 53. 2, 20: 74.
14, 21: 27. 4, 19: 208.
14, 30: 109. 16, 15: 295.
17, 14–16: 94.
17, 24: 94, 117, 118. Ephesians
30, 16: 109. 1, 4: 117.
1, 7–8: 212.
Acts 1, 21: 109.
3, 21: 275. 2, 2: 213.
16, 16: 329. 2, 3: 65.
2, 7: 272, 274, 301.
Romans 2, 14: 36.
1, 1–7: 28. 3, 10: 54, 65.
1, 20: 95, 339. 3, 16: 41.
7, 22: 41. 3, 18: 163.
10, 18: 166. 3, 20: 340.
9, 11–12: 338. 3, 5: 209.
9, 20: 295. 4, 10: 167.
10, 6: 167. 5, 16: 281.
 index of biblical citations 417

5, 31–32: 74. 1, 3: 138, 235.

6, 12: 40, 77, 109. 1, 4: 109.
4, 3: 117, 339.
Philippians 4, 14: 167.
2, 6: 140. 5, 11: 86.
2, 7: 140. 5, 12: 317.
2, 10: 109, 167. 9, 26: 117, 272, 290,
3, 21: 65, 66. 339.

Colossians 1 Peter
1, 15: 28, 52, 53, 139. 1, 20: 117.
1, 15–16: 112. 8, 5: 80.
1, 16: 109, 110.
1, 16–18: 110. 1 John
2, 19: 212. 3, 2: 27, 28.
3, 10: 78. 3, 8: 138.
5, 19: 100.
1 Timothy
2, 5: 171. Revelation
5, 5: 36.
2 Timothy 10, 6: 305.
2, 5: 46. 12, 7: 109.
2, 21: 295. 13, 8: 117, 339.
17, 4: 54.
Hebrews 17, 8: 117, 339.
1, 1–2: 234. 18, 12: 54.
1, 2: 235. 20, 6: 301.
 SUPPLEMENTS TO VIGILIAE CHRISTIANAE

61. Marcovich, M. (ed.), adiuvante J.C.M. van Winden, Clementis Alexandrini

Paedagogus. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12470 5
62. Berding, K. Polycarp and Paul. An Analysis of Their Literary and Theo-
logical Relationship in Light of Polycarp’s Use of Biblical and Extra-
Biblical Literature. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12670 8
63. Kattan, A.E. Verleiblichung und Synergie. Grundzüge der Bibelhermeneutik bei
Maximus Confessor. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12669 4
64. Allert, C.D. Revelation, Truth, Canon, and Interpretation. Studies in Justin
Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12619 8
65. Volp, U. Tod und Ritual in den christlichen Gemeinden der Antike. 2002.
ISBN 90 04 12671 6
66. Constas, N. Proclus of Constantinople and the Cult of the Virgin in Late Antiquity.
Homilies 1-5, Texts and Translations. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12612 0
67. Carriker, A. The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13132 9
68. Lilla, S.R.C., herausgegeben von H.R. Drobner. Neuplatonisches Gedankengut
in den ‘Homilien über die Seligpreisungen’ Gregors von Nyssa. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 13684 3
69. Mullen, R.L. The Expansion of Christianity. A Gazetteer of its First Three
Centuries. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13135 3
70. Hilhorst, A. (ed.). The Apostolic Age in Patristic Thought. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 12611 2
71. Kotzé, A. Augustine’s Confessions: Communicative Purpose and Audience. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 13926 5
72. Drijvers, J.W. Cyril of Jerusalem: Bishop and City. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13986 9
73. Duval, Y.-M. La décrétale Ad Gallos Episcopos: son texte et son auteur. Texte
critique, traduction Française et commentaire. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14170 7
74. Mueller-Jourdan, P. Typologie spatio-temporelle de l’Ecclesia byzantine. La Mys-
tagogie de Maxime le Confesseur dans la culture philosophique de
l’Antiquité. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14230 4
75. Ferguson, T.J. The Past is Prologue. The Revolution of Nicene Historiogra-
phy. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14457 9
76. Marjanen, A. & Luomanen, P. A Companion to Second-Century Christian “Here-
tics”. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14464 1
77. Tzamalikos, P. Origen – Cosmology and Ontology of Time. 2006.
ISBN 90 04 14728 4