Asset Integrity Engineering (FZE) P.

O Box 8693, SAIF Zone

Technical Note Sharjah, UAE
Tel No. 06 5741933 / 0552309832
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.assetintegrityengineering.com

To: JV In Salah Gas

FAO: Peter Barker, Virginia Hutchinson

Address: Algeria

Date Sent: 23rd March 2022

Subject: Fitness for Service and Risk Assessment of HMN7 Flowline

From: Muhammed Rizwin, Venkatesh Rajashekar, Dave Pitt

AIE Ref. No: ISG/IMS/TN/22-003 Rev 0

No. of Pages (Including this sheet): 10

A. Introduction

ISG operates flowline from HMN7 well to BV06 valve station [1]. This flowline failed during its start-up operation
on 15th December 2021 at around pressure of 40 barg [2]. The failure by leak occurred on 13Cr line pipe (UNS
S41426) near girth weld with a 22Cr flange (UNS S31803); see Figure A.1.

Figure A.1: Image of Leaked Defect

The failure was apparently caused by internal corrosion pitting due to water left over in the line following its
pre-commissioning hydrotest in February 2021. Though no lab analysis is available for this water, which
supposedly contains significant salt (chlorides), it was informed that the water had been treated with chemicals
(corrosion inhibitor, oxygen scavenger and biocide) to prevent corrosion. Therefore, the corrosion mechanism
which led to the pitting had not been clearly identified and the failed pipe section was sent for a detailed lab
analysis as part of root cause investigation.

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It is postulated that several similar pitting anomalies could be present in the HMN7 flowline, considering that
the line was entirely filled with the hydrotest water. Therefore, to revalidate the integrity and as recommended
by ORA, the flowline was subjected to a pressure test. However, there was no pressure build up and a leak
was identified at anchor flange near HMN7 wellsite. Following the second leak, further detailed inspections
were performed which included UT thickness survey, internal visual inspection, radiography etc. These
inspections have revealed more isolated pitting (majority near weld) in the line at HMN7 wellsite [3].

Figure A.2: Defects Identified at HMN7 Wellsite

Post repair and replacement of 70m flowline section near HMN7 well, a successful hydrotest was conducted
at pressure of 265 barg. In the midst of uncertainty related to the severity of pitting corrosion defects elsewhere
in the uninspected sections of the pipeline, ISG now intends to commence the operation of the flowline. ISG
is planning to raise a TCR to operate the line with the existing integrity issues and requested AIE to support
by assessing immediate and future integrity of the flowline based on available information [4]. This technical
note presents results of the assessments performed.

B. Objectives
The objectives of this technical note are to [4]:

• Determine dimensions of possible defects that could withstand hydrotest pressure of 265 barg;

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 • Review operating condition of the flowline and estimate corrosion severity/rate;
• Predict future remaining life of the line in-service;
• Present the risk summary considering all credible threats; and
• Provide short-term integrity management plan by recommending appropriate mitigations and
inspections to prevent failure of the flowline in the future.
Note that, it is recommended to review the assumptions and considerations made in this technical note when
the RCFA is finalised.

C. Abbreviations
AIE Asset Integrity Engineering
COF Consequence of Failure
CPF Central Processing Facility
HAZ Heat Affected Zone
HMN Hassi Moumene
ILI Inline Inspection
ISG In Salah Gas
ORA Operational Risk Assessment
POF Probability of Failure
RCFA Root Cause Failure Analysis
SMTS Specified Minimum Tensile Strength
SMYS Specified Minimum Yield Strength

D. Input Data
Table D.1 presents relevant data of HMN7 flowline [1, 5, 6].

Table D.1: HMN7 Flowline Data

Parameter Value

Diameter 219.1 mm
Wall thickness 11.1 mm
Material AP 5LC80 - 13Cr Super Martensitic Stainless Steel (UNS S41426)

Design standard Algerian gas pipeline code / ASME B31.8

Service Wet gas
SMYS 535 MPa
SMTS 675 MPa
Design pressure 211 barg
Hydrotest pressure 265 barg
Wellhead shut-in pressure 180 barg

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 Parameter Value

Operating pressure 54 barg

Design temperature 126°C
Operating temperature 85°C
Flowrate 15 MMSCFD (minimum) / 60 MMSCFD maximum

The wet gas transported by the flowline is realised to contain ~2 mol% of CO2 and 2 ppm of H2S though it has
been designed to handle up to 4.61 mol% CO2 and 15 ppm of H2S. No formation water is anticipated during
the initial production of the line; only condensed water would be present with negligible chlorides. However,
the design considered 127500 mg/l of chlorides.

E. Immediate Integrity Assessment

The significance of corrosion defects subjected to hoop stress induced by internal pressure is assessed using
NG18 method [7]. The method ensures reasonable conservatism compared to ASME B31G or DNV RP F101
methods which is necessary considering:

• Empirical depth limit (typically 80% of wall thickness) had been ignored for calculating failure pressure
of short defects; and
• Defects (pitting) appeared to have sharp features similar to a manufacturing defect or gouge that could
cause local stress concentration.

Note that, the flowline is expected to have limited tensile axial load since it is buried / well supported.
Furthermore, the reported pitting defects are located at 6 o’clock position with minimal circumferential extent
to be affected by axial load. Therefore, the significance of corrosion defects subject to axial stress induced by
combined internal pressure and thermal loads has not been assessed.

The failure pressure of a defect as per NG18 method is given by:

𝑑
2𝑡 (𝜎𝑦 + 𝜎𝑢 ) 1 − 𝑡
𝑃𝑓 = [ ]
𝐷 2 𝑑1
1−
𝑡𝑀

𝑙 2
𝑀 = √1 + 0.52 ( )
√𝐷𝑡
Where
𝑃𝑓 = Failure pressure, MPa

𝑡 = Pipe wall thickness, mm

𝐷 = Pipe Diameter, mm
𝜎𝑦 = SMYS, MPa

𝜎𝑢 = SMTS, MPa
𝑑 = Defect depth, mm
𝑀 = Bulging factor
𝑙 = Defect length, mm

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Based on NG18 method, it is calculated that up to 10.6 mm deep pit could withstand the hydrotest pressure of
265 barg assuming the pit will have a length/width of 20 mm minimum; see Figure E.1. Note that, a shorter pit
with length less than 20 mm can survive deeper depth in theory. However, the assumption of 20 mm pit length
is considered reasonable as there seems to exist a correlation between pit depth and diameter, i.e. deeper
pits were comparatively wider or longer.

100%

Failure
80%
Defect depth (%WT)

60%
Acceptable
40%

20%

0%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Defect length (mm)

Figure E.1 : Failure Assessment Diagram at Pressure of 265 barg

As the flowline had successfully withstood hydrotest pressure of 265 barg and revalidated its integrity, it is
deemed fit to operate at design pressure of 211 barg in accordance with ASME B31.8S [8]. However, the
standard recommends considering corrosion growth in service to establish the period of safe operation and
integrity revalidation interval; see Section F and Section G.

F. Corrosion Review
Ten pitting locations have been identified by testing/inspections and all are around 6 o’clock position [3]. They
were found near HAZ of 13Cr pipe, except for three defect locations which were outside HAZ. The
microstructure for HAZ of the initially leaked pipe spool did not find any evidence of metallurgical anomaly; see
Figure F.1. Therefore, it can be concluded that the welding process did not compromise the corrosion
resistance of the material.

Figure F.1: Micrograph of Parent Metal at Pit Edge

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As mentioned earlier, the raw water used for the hydrotest is considered as primary reason for the corrosion.
However, no lab analysis data is available for understanding minerals (corrosive species) present in the water.
The chlorides present in the ground water of southern field wells typically ranged between 600 ppm to 900
ppm which could not be considered as detrimental. However, the concentration of chlorides may locally
aggravate to harmful levels in a small pocket of water due to evaporation and could lead to high pitting rate in
presence of oxygen. As for the three chemicals (corrosion inhibitor, oxygen scavenger and biocide) added to
prevent corrosion, their role either in supporting or mitigating corrosion is not clearly understood.

The particular water had been eventually removed during the start-up process. In future, during operation, it is
very likely that the localised pitting areas of the flowline would be re-passivated and there is little threat on
stability of the passive layer considering:
• No formation water would be present; hence chlorides are likely to be negligible; and

• H2S is less than 15 ppm (more likely to be less than 2 ppm as per wet gas testing results of IS CPF to
REG CPF pipeline).

Based on the above considerations, corrosion rate of 13Cr material can be estimated using pH as shown in
Figure F.2 [9]. The condensed water within the flowline is calculated to have a pH in between 3.6 and 4.3 over
the expected range of operating temperature (120°C to 60°C), pressure (180 barg to 50 barg) and CO2/H2S
concentration. It implies the corrosion rate is likely to be less than 0.1 mm/year. However, considering
uncertainties with respect to fluid composition and defect dimensions, a corrosion rate of 0.3 mm/year is
selected for future integrity considerations.

Figure F.2: Corrosion Rate of 13Cr Material (UNS S41426)

G. Future Integrity Assessment

Based on NG18 method and ignoring pressure reversal phenomenon, a 20 mm long pit is not predicted to fail:

• At wellhead shut-in pressure of 180 barg, when defect depth is up to 10.7 mm.
• During free flow (with choke fully open) pressure of 80 barg, up to defect depth of 10.9 mm (safety
margin to failure pressure is ~1.25 times).

• At normal operating pressure of 54 barg, up to a defect depth of 10.9 mm (safety margin is ~2.0 times).

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The remaining life of the flowline is therefore calculated as 4 months at 180 barg and 1 year at both 80 barg &
54 barg using corrosion rate of 0.3 mm/year. Consequently, it is recommended to revalidate integrity of the
flowline within six months of operation using a suitable integrity assessment technique mentioned in ASME
B31.8S (ILI, direct assessment or pressure test) [8]. ILI is the preferred integrity assessment method and if
considered the ILI tool should have detection/reporting threshold of minimum 1 mm * 6 mm * 6 mm (defect
depth, length, width).

H. Risk Assessment

H.1. Risk Matrix

Figure H.1 presents risk matrix used for the pipeline risk assessment [6]. The definition for risk levels and
guidance for PoF and CoF scores is provided in Figure H.2, Figure H.3 and Figure H.4 respectively.

Figure H.1: Risk Matrix

Figure H.2: Risk Level Definitions

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Figure H.3: PoF Definitions

Figure H.4: CoF Definitions

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H.2. Risk Assessment Results

Table H.1 presents risk summary of the flowline. The maximum COF is for people consequence at road
crossing.

Table H.1: Risk Assessment Summary of HMN7 Flowline

Maximum Maximum
Threat Justification Risk
POF COF
The flowline is very likely to have deep pitting.
Though the line has been hydrotested at 265
Internal corrosion 4 4 High
barg, there is uncertainty with respect to severity
and growth of pitting in-service.
Environmental The partial pressure of H2S is within tolerable
1 4 Low
cracking limit (1.5 psi).
No sand loading expected, flow velocity would be
Internal erosion 2 4 Medium
less than 10 m/s.
CP Off potential within acceptable limit (between
External corrosion 1 4 Low
-500 mV and -850 mV) since commissioning.
Cathodic CP Off potential within acceptable limit (between
1 4 Low
overprotection -500 mV and -850 mV) since commissioning.
Flowline is in remote location far from human
Third party damage settlements. Military surveillance and frequent 2 4 Medium
ROW patrolling done.
The line is adequately supported above ground;
Mechanical
roads designed adhering to international 1 4 Low
overload
standards.
Pressure cycling is likely to be below fatigue
Fatigue 1 4 Low
endurance limit.
Operational Procedures need to be updated to reflect new
2 4 Medium
malfunction controls (e.g. PSV set limit).
Functional testing results of flowline valves not
Equipment failure 2 4 Medium
available.

The flowline is at ‘high’ risk due to internal corrosion. Therefore, it is recommended to perform leak survey
daily for first five days of the flowline operation and weekly thereafter considering no leak detection system
has been provided for the line. The leak survey shall utilise appropriate gas detection and/or infrared
thermography devices. Alternatively, a leak detection system should be installed and commissioned at
the earliest opportunity.

I. Conclusion and Recommendations

Following conclusions and recommendations are made:

1. HMN7 flowline is calculated to have a remaining life of 1 year at operating pressure / free flow
pressure (54 barg / 80 barg) and 4 months at wellhead shut-in pressure of 180 barg using
corrosion rate of 0.3 mm/year presuming:
a. deep defects in the line would be at least 20 mm long; and
b. passive layer will be formed over the existing pits during the operation.

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 2. The integrity of the flowline should be revalidated within six months of its operation using
appropriate method as per ASME B31.8S and subjected to outcome of the RCFA study.
3. The flowline is at ‘high’ risk due to internal corrosion. All other threats are assessed as either a
‘low’ or ‘medium’ risk.
4. Leak detection survey should be performed on a daily basis for initial five days of the operation
and weekly thereafter using appropriate gas detection and/or infrared thermography devices until
the commissioning of a permanent leak detection system.

J. References

[1] ISG, “Pipeline Integrity Management Strategy (PIMS),” UU00-A-OOTY-000-0039-2.

[2] ISG, “Initial Incident Anouncement,” December 15, 2021.

[3] ISG, “Email from Integrity Team Leader <[email protected]> to AIE; Subject: Fw:
Radiography film development results,” January 31, 2022.

[4] ISG, “Email from Integrity TA <[email protected]> to AIE; Subject: HMN 7 - update
FRA / FFS request,” March 4, 2022.

[5] ISG, “Email from Integrity TA <[email protected]> to AIE; Subject: FW: In Salah Gas
SWO HMN 7 Tech Support - Item # 3 Fitness for Service,” March 10, 2022.

[6] AIE, “Pipeline Risk Assessment 2018,” UU00-A-XXXR-000-0010 Rev.1, March 20, 2019.

[7] Penspen, “The Pipeline Defect Assessment Manual”.

[8] ASME, “Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines,” ASME B31.8S-2020.

[9] NACE, “An Effect of pH on Corrosion Resistance of UNS S42000, UNS S41426 and UNS S31803
steels in Low H2S Environment,” NACE paper no. 4274.

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