MANU/SC/1382/2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18977 of 2016)
Decided On: 20.12.2024
Appellants: Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Shrimant
Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Amar Dave, Sr. Adv., Parimal Shroff, Mahesh
Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, S. Lakshmi Iyer, Nidhi, Advs. and E.C.
Agrawala, AOR
For Respondents/Defendant: Sunil Fernandes, Sr. Adv., Nupur Kumar, AOR, Diksha
Dadu, Sachin Patil, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv., Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR,
Geo Joseph, Durgesh Gupta and Risvi Muhammed, Advs.
JUDGMENT
R. Mahadevan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the Defendant No. 1 viz., Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and its
trustees, against the Order dated 26th April 2016 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay1 in the Civil Revision Application No. 904 of 2014, whereby the
High Court dismissed the said application preferred by the Appellants challenging the
Order dated 29th April 2009 passed by the 7th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Pune2. By the said order, the trial Court rejected the application filed by the
Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19083 for
rejection of plaint being barred by limitation.
3 . The Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff filed a Special Civil Suit No. 133 of 2009 against
the Appellants and the State of Maharashtra, inter alia for the following reliefs:
(a) to declare that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit lands more
particularly described in Schedule of the plaint;
(b) to declare that other than the Plaintiff, no other person is entitled to deal
with, alienate and create any third-party interest in respect of suit lands;
(c) to restrain the Appellants/Defendants permanently, from in any manner
holding themselves as owners or representing themselves as owners of the
said suit lands;
(d) to declare that the compromise decrees passed in Special Civil Suit Nos.
152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal No. 787/2001, Pune, are void ab-
initio, null and void and to set aside the same;
(e) to direct the Appellants/Defendants to vacate and hand over the
possession of the suit lands to the Plaintiff.

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4. Pending the aforesaid suit, the Appellants took out an application Under Order VII
Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint as the reliefs sought in the suit were barred
by limitation. The said application was seriously resisted by the Respondent No.
1/Plaintiff by stating inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts
and law and it has to be adjudicated only in the trial.
5. The trial Court by order dated 12.10.2009, rejected the aforesaid application filed
by the Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. Aggrieved
by the same, the Appellants preferred Civil Revision Application No. 731 of 2009
before the High Court, which set aside the order dated 12.10.2009 and remanded the
matter to the trial Court for considering the application filed Under Order VII Rule
11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure afresh.
6. After remand, the trial Court vide order dated 29.04.2014, rejected the application
filed by the Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure,
observing inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts,
for which, the parties will have to lead evidence. Challenging the same, the
Appellants preferred Civil Revision Application No. 904 of 2014, which was dismissed
by the High Court, by order dated 26.04.2016 impugned in this appeal.
7 . The learned Counsel for the Appellants, at the outset, submitted that on a bare
perusal of the averments made in the plaint disclosed that the reliefs sought in the
plaint were barred by limitation. However, the High Court erroneously dismissed the
Civil Revision Application on the ground that the question of whether the suit is
barred by limitation is for the trial Court to independently decide considering the
evidence led before it by the parties as the limitation is a mixed question of law and
facts which cannot be decided based on the pleadings alone. Adding further, it is
submitted that the High Court could have examined the maintainability and
sustainability of the revision proceedings initiated by the Appellants Under Order VII
Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure.
7.1. Elaborating further, on facts, the learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted
that the Defendant No. 1 - Trust had purchased 3/4th share of the suit lands
mentioned in the Schedule in an auction sale conducted by the Civil Court, Pune, in
the year 1938 from the previous Inamdar Gosavis family and the same was duly
registered; and they had also purchased the remaining 1/4th share in the suit lands
in the year 1952 by another registered sale deed. Till then, the subject lands were in
possession of the Government. Thereafter, the Defendant No. 1 Trust became entitled
to the suit lands in pursuance of the compromise decree dated 05.01.1990 passed in
Civil Suit No. 1622 of 1988, and they entered into several agreements with third
parties, who constructed buildings in the suit lands. While so, without any right, title
and interest, the Respondent No. 1 preferred Special Civil Suit No. 133 of 2009
claiming declaration and possession over the suit lands. According to the learned
Counsel, the Respondent No. 1 by filing the said suit, has attempted to question the
correctness of various orders passed by several Courts including the order passed by
this Court. These orders date back to the year 1953. Further, this exercise is done
with an oblique motive to set at naught the orders which have attained finality
decades ago and the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff and its predecessors having slept
over the orders which conclusively affirmed the title and ownership of the Appellant
Trust over the suit lands, cannot now suddenly come up with a suit to overturn the
effect of the orders in the guise of there being a fresh cause of action.
7.2. Drawing our attention to paragraphs 34 and 53 of the plaint filed by the
Respondent No. 1, the learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the

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Respondent No. 1 attempted to create an illusion of a cause of action by erroneously
stating that the cause of action to file the suit arose on 02.03.2007 when he came to
know that his rights over the suit properties have been affected by the proceedings
between the Defendants and another. Further, the Respondent No. 1 relied on the
pleadings stated in the writ petition filed by one Dr. F. Wadia, who claims to be in
possession of a portion of the subject lands. The Respondent No. 1, in paragraph 34
of the plaint stated that ".... One Advocate Shri Godge had appeared in the said
matter. The said Advocate is well acquainted with the Plaintiff. The said Advocate,
after reading all the necessary related proceedings, informed the Plaintiff of the
mischief committed by the Defendants. The Plaintiff thereafter collected all the
necessary information and documents. The Plaintiff then instructed his Advocates to
file the present suit". However, there is no averment as to when the Respondent No.
1 was intimated by Mr. Godge. Thus, the cause of action alleged by the Respondent
No. 1 is purely illusory and has been stated with a view to get over the bar Under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure.
7.3. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the limitation
period for seeking cancellation of an instrument as per Article 59 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, is 3 years from the date when the existence of document first becomes
known to the Plaintiff. In case of registered document, the date of registration
becomes the date of deemed knowledge. Accordingly, the Respondent No. 1 and his
predecessors are deemed to have implied notice of the contents of the registered sale
deeds and as per Article 58, the period of limitation to obtain any declaration in the
suit commences within 3 years from the date when right to sue accrues. However, the
Respondent No. 1 by clever drafting, attempted to circumvent the provisions of the
Limitation Act. That means, the Respondent No. 1 knowing fully well that a challenge
to the registered sale deeds of the years 1938 and 1952 in and by which the
Defendant No. 1 Trust acquired the title over the subject lands, would be hopelessly
barred by limitation, has attempted to question the title of the Defendant No. 1 Trust
by inventing an imaginary cause of action to sustain his suit.
7.4. The learned Counsel for the Appellants further submitted that according to
Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right to possess immovable property or any
interest therein, based on title, must be asserted within twelve years from the date,
when the possession of the Defendant becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. Admittedly,
the Respondent No. 1 did not assert any right over the subject lands prior to the year
2008 or 2009. Consequently, the relief sought for possession is also barred by the
law of limitation. Ultimately, it is submitted that the Respondent No. 1 being
stranger, has no locus standi to seek a declaration that compromise decrees passed
in Special Civil Suit Nos. 152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil appeal No. 787/2001 are
void ab initio, null and void and be set aside. 7.5. Without properly appreciating all
these aspects, the trial Court erred in rejecting the application filed by the Appellants
Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure and the same was also
affirmed by the High Court, by the order impugned herein, which will have to be set
aside, according to the learned Counsel for the Appellants.
8 . Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submitted that in the
year 1710, Raja Shahu Chhatrapati, the ancestor of the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff
gave a sanad to Guru Shree Jadhavgir Gosavi of all the lands mentioned in the
Sanad. The said Sanad gave rights of revenue grant which was hereditary. The said
grant did not confer any titular rights over the land to the Gosavi family. The
descendants of the Gosavi family though not empowered to create third party rights
and interests, created third party rights. Thus, the said Gosavis who only had Inam
grant in their favour entitling them only to the revenue from the land, had
overstepped their authority and had parted the suit properties to the Defendant No. 1

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Trust, when they absolutely had no right to sell the suit properties. It is further
submitted that the Defendant No. 1 filed Special Civil Suit No. 152/1951 against the
State of Bombay and one Sukramgir Chimangir Gosavi in relation to the lands in
village Yerawada, Taluka Haveli. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 entered into
compromise and it was agreed between them that the Yerawada Inam Village was a
grant of soil and the Defendant No. 1 was Nivval Dhumaldars of the village to the
extent of 12 anna share. The Respondent No. l/Plaintiff was not a party to the said
suit and without his knowledge, the consent decree was obtained clandestinely.
Therefore, the said sale deeds and compromise are not binding on the Respondent
No. 1. It is also contended that the parties cannot be permitted to construct and
improve the terms of sanad of the year 1710 in 1950s to their whims and fancies. In
any event, the Court had not given a determinative finding after adjudication, and
hence, the compromise decree of the Court cannot be put against it.
8.1. Continuing further, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submitted that
the Respondent No. 1 specifically stated in paragraph 39 of the Plaint that the
Defendants have played systematic fraud on various courts and without any judicial
pronouncements have usurped the lands under suspicious compromises arrived at
before the Court. Moreover, in paragraph 44 of the Plaint, the Respondent No. 1
stated that the compromise arrived at in the suits filed in District Court, Pune,
appears to be clearly an attempt to deprive the legal rights of the Plaintiff in respect
of the said suit lands.
8.2. It is also submitted that whether the Respondent No. 1 is entitled to declaration
as sought for in the Plaint is a matter of trial and that cannot be gone into at the
stage of deciding the application Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil
Procedure. The Respondent No. 1 in paragraph 53 of the Plaint clearly stated that he
had come to know about the proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only when he was
informed about Civil Application No. 1562/2006 in Writ Petition No. 3813 of 1996
filed by Dr. F Wadia. The knowledge of the fact that the Respondent's right in the suit
property has been affected by the proceedings between the Defendants and another
on 2nd March 2007 is the crucial date from which the clock starts ticking to
determine limitation. Thus, well within the period of limitation, he preferred the
Special civil suit against the Appellants and another for declaration and possession of
the suit properties.
8.3. That apart, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 that
when an issue requires an inquiry into the facts, it cannot be tried as a preliminary
issue. To buttress the same, he placed reliance on the decision in Satti Paradesi
Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala MANU/SC/0601/2014 : 2014:INSC:467
: (2015) 5 SCC 674, wherein, it was held that 'the court has no jurisdiction to try a
suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue'.
8.4. Referring to the decision in Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi Mishra (2005) 13
SCC 687, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 that while
dealing with an application Under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, there
is no requirement to consider the written statement filed by the Defendant. That
apart, in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/1185/2002 :
2002:INSC:554 : (2003) 1 SCC 557, it was held by this Court that 'a perusal of Order
VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that the relevant facts which
need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in
the plaint; the pleas taken by the Defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage; and therefore, a direction to file the written statement
without deciding the application Under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure
cannot be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial

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Court'.
8.5. Considering all these factors, the High Court rightly dismissed the application
filed by the Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure, by
observing that the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold, as the issue of
limitation is a mixed question of facts and law for which the parties will have to lead
evidence. Thus, according to the learned Counsel, there is no requirement to interfere
with the order impugned herein and the appeal filed by the Appellants is liable to be
dismissed.
9 . We have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for
both sides and perused the materials available on record.
10. The subject matter of the present proceedings is qua lands in S. Nos. 14A/1A/1,
144, 145, 95, 90, 129, 191A (part), 160 (Part), 191 (part), 20, 103(part), 120(part),
141, 233, 94(part), 104 and 105 situated in Yerawada, Taluka Haveli, District Pune.
The Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff preferred Special Civil Suit No. 133 of 2009, for
declaration of his ownership and possession in respect of the suit properties. Seeking
rejecting of the said plaint, the Appellants filed an application Under Order VII Rule
11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the reliefs sought in the suit
were clearly barred by limitation. The trial Court rejected the application filed by the
Appellants stating that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law, for
which, the parties will have to lead evidence. The revision application filed by the
Appellants against the said order of the trial Court, was also rejected by the High
Court, by observing that (i) the Plaintiff has specifically asserted that Gosavis family
had no authority to create third party rights and they were only entitled to revenue
grant; (ii)whether the Plaintiff is entitled to declaration in terms of prayer Clauses (a)
and (b) in view of the sale deeds executed in favour of Defendant No. 1, is a matter
of trial and that cannot be gone into at the stage of deciding the application Under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure; and (iii) the Defendants played a
systematic fraud on various courts and without any judicial pronouncements, usurped
the suit lands under suspicious compromise arrived at before the Court. Feeling
aggrieved and being dissatisfied with the rejection orders of the Courts below, the
Appellants are before us with the present appeal.
11. The law applicable for deciding an application filed Under Order VII Rule 11 of
Code of Civil Procedure4 was outlined by this Court in the decision in Dahiben v.
Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives
MANU/SC/0508/2020 : 2020:INSC:450 : (2020) 7 SCC 366 and the same read as
follows:
23.1 ...
23.2. The remedy Under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special
remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the
threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on
the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be
terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no
cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation Under Rule
11(d), the Court would not permit the Plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the
proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end
to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

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 23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi5 this Court held that the whole
purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a
litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be
permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words: (SCC
p.324, para 12)
12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure
that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive
should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court, and
exercise the mind of the Respondent. The sword of Damocles need
not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or
purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily
exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any
cause of action.
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is,
however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11
are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine
whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments
in the plaint6, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or
whether the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which
the Plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under:
14. Production of document on which Plaintiff sues or relies.-
(1)Where a Plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document
in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such
documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is
presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document
and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of
the Plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or
power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the Plaintiff
when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added
or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly,
shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on
his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) Nothing in this Rule shall apply to document produced for the
cross examination of the Plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a
witness merely to refresh his memory.
(emphasis supplied)
23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 Code of Civil Procedure, the
documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into
consideration for deciding the application Under Order VII Rule 11(a). When
a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should
be treated as a part of the plaint.

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 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine
if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial
dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is
made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the Defendant in the written
statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be
irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration7.
23.11. The test for exercising the power Under Order VII Rule 11 is that if
the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with
the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed.
This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea
Success I which reads as: (SCC p.562, para 139)
1 3 9 . Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is
essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must
be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the
averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be
correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint
are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. MANU/SC/7671/2007 :
2007:INSC:576 : (2007) 5 SCC 614 the Court further held that it is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It
is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The
plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of
words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the
court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.
D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman MANU/SC/0154/1999 :
1999:INSC:97 : (1999) 3 SCC 267.
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is
manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to
sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power Under Order VII
Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure.
23.14. The power Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure may be
exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the
plaint, or after issuing summons to the Defendant, or before conclusion of
the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra MANU/SC/1185/2002 : 2002:INSC:554 : (2003) 1 SCC 557.
The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial
was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states
that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in Clause
(a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a
cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no
option, but to reject the plaint.
24. "Cause of action" means every fact which would be necessary for the
Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It
consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the Plaintiff to
prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

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 24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam
MANU/SC/0287/2005 : 2005:INSC:205 : (2005) 10 SCC 51 this Court held:
24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it
would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove an order to support his
right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of
facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the Plaintiff a
right to relief against the Defendant. It must include some act done
by the Defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of
action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement
of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is
founded
(emphasis supplied)
24.2. In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal MANU/SC/0034/1977 :
1977:INSC:204 : (1977) 4 SCC 467 this Court held that while considering an
application Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure what is required
to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or
something purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
5. ...The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not
formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless,
in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise
his power Under Order VII, Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure taking
care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in
the bud at the first hearing ...
(emphasis supplied)
24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal
(1998) 2 SCC 170 this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting
which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear
right must be made out in the plaint.
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion
of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed
Jalal MANU/SC/0485/2017 : 2017:INSC:366 : (2017) 13 SCC 174 held that
it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest
stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression,
and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the
process of the court.
25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all
suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression "period
of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for
suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted
after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may
not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific
article, then it would fall within the residuary article.
26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period
of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of
an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under:

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 The period of limitation prescribed Under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act
is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first
accrues.
2 7 . In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India MANU/SC/1054/2011 :
2011:INSC:667 : (2011) 9 SCC 126 this Court held that the use of the word
'first' between the words 'sue' and 'accrued', would mean that if a suit is
based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run
from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are
successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of
action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period
of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued.
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh
MANU/SC/0612/1991 : 1991:INSC:200 : (1991) 4 SCC 1: 1991 SCC (L&S)
1082 held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the
right to sue first accrued to the Plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts,
the plaint is within time. The words "right to sue" means the right to seek
relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the
cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in
the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to
infringe such right by the Defendant against whom the suit is instituted.
Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments
in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.
12. As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments
in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane. The
averments in the application can be taken into account only to consider whether the
case falls within any of the sub-rules of Order VII Rule 11 by considering the
averments in the plaint. The Court cannot look into the written statement or the
documents filed by the Defendants. The Civil Courts including this Court cannot go
into the rival contentions at that stage. Keeping in mind the legal position, let us
examine whether the suit filed by the Respondent No. 1 is barred by limitation, in the
light of the averments contained in the plaint filed by him.
1 3 . The Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff claimed title, right and interest over the suit
properties, stating that he is the direct descendent of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj
from the Bhonsale Dynasty and he has inherited the vast lands all over Maharashtra
from his ancestors. He further stated in his plaint that Raja Shahu Chhatrapati gave
only the rights of revenue grant to Guru Shree Jadhavgir Gosavi and the said grant
did not give any rights in the lands to the Gosavi family and hence, they had no right
to sell the suit properties to the Defendant No. 1. Though the Respondent No. 1
relied on the report of the Inam Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the
Act XI, 1852, which stated that the grant enjoyed by the Respondent No. 1's
ancestors was only a revenue grant and stated that Gosavis family had no authority
to create third party rights in the suit lands, the same was not substantiated with

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proper pleadings and documents. It was further stated by the Respondent No. 1 that
by order dated 17.02.1980, the Government of Maharashtra was pleased to direct
that the Satara Saranjam (Jagir/grant of land) shall be continued in the name of the
Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff, but, at that time, he was a minor. That apart, the
Friendship Treaty was continued by the Government of Maharashtra vide its
resolution dated 28.02.1980 and on attaining the age of majority by the Plaintiff, the
Maharashtra Government by resolution dated 01.09.1984 continued the said
Saranjam upon the Plaintiff. Hence, the Respondent No. 1 continues to be the owner
of the suit properties. We are unable to accept these statements. The averments in
the plaint disclose that even prior to the alleged Resolution dated 28.02.1980, a
major portion of the property (3/4th share) has been conveyed as early as in 1938
through Court auction and the remaining portion (1/4th share) in 1952. The Plaintiff
was a minor in 1980 and by 01.09.1984, he claims to have become a major.
However, he has not stated as to when he was born. From the averments, it can be
presumed that the Plaintiff must have born in 1965/1966 considering the fact that he
was declared as a major in 1984. The above statements in the plaint imply that the
Plaintiff was not even born when the property was sold. What also remains
undisputed is the fact that the Plaintiff's predecessors had not challenged the sale in
1938 and 1952. By the time, the alleged resolution was passed, the property had
already been conveyed. The resolution can convey any right only over the properties
which have not been conveyed. The Plaintiff though has annexed a Family Tree chart
along with the plaint, he has not produced any other documentary evidence to the
various claims which he has made. In paragraph 10 of the plaint, the Plaintiff claims
that the estate was attached as there were no natural heirs. He has narrated many
facts in the plaint from paragraphs 11 to 32, which are adverse to his claim of title.
The averments in the plaint relating to grant of Sanad are vague without any
reference to specific date. They, according to us, are baseless and vague statements,
cleverly crafted to create a cause of action. The Plaintiff himself avers in paragraph
25 that a suit was filed by the Appellant/1st Defendant claiming his title based on the
auction purchase against the Government. The averment does not even disclose that
it has come to his knowledge only recently. We feel it strange for the Plaintiff to even
plead in paragraph 26 that he was not impleaded as a party in the 1951 suit,
compromised in 1953, when he was not even born.
14. The Plaintiff, in our wisdom, cannot assert or deny something which was whether
within the knowledge of his predecessor or not, when he was not even born.
Irrespective of the above, the fact that the predecessors of the Respondent No.
1/Plaintiff, never challenged the sale of property to the Defendant No. 1/Appellant by
court auction and the subsequent registration of the deeds, despite constructive
notice, would imply that they had acceded to the title of the Appellant, which cannot
now be questioned by the Plaintiff after such long time. There is also a presumption
in law that a registered document is validly executed and is valid until it is declared
as illegal. In this regard, this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal MANU/SC/8139/2006 :
2006:INSC:280 : (2006) 5 SCC 353, held as under:
27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A
registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus
of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the
presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut
the said presumption.
15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to relevant portion of Section 3 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as under:
3. Interpretation clause......

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 ......
a person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or
when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to
have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
Explanation I.-Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is
required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any
person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such
property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date
of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district,
or where the registered instrument has been registered Under Sub-section
(2) of Section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the
earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has
been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the
property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or
interest is being acquired, is situated:
Provided that-(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration
completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16
of 1908), and the Rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or
memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books
kept Under Section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the
transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the
indexes kept Under Section 55 of that Act.
Explanation II.-Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or
interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if
any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
Explanation III.-A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if
his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of
business to which that fact is material:
Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall
not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to
or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.
1 6 . When a portion of the property has been conveyed by court auction and
registered in the first instance and when another portion has been conveyed by a
registered sale deed in 1952, there is a constructive notice from the date of
registration and the presumption Under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act,
comes into operation. The possession, in the present case, also has been rested with
the Appellant before several decades, which operates as notice of title. This Court in
R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab MANU/SC/0433/2000 :
2000:INSC:338 : (2000) 6 SCC 402 at page 410, held as follows:
15. Notice is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be
actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or constructive. "A
person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or
when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to
have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation II of
said Section 3 reads:
Explanation II.-Any person acquiring any immovable property or any
share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice

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 of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual
possession thereof.
Section 3 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1929 in relation to the
definition of "notice". The definition has been amended and supplemented by
three explanations, which settle the law in several matters of great
importance. For the immediate purpose Explanation II is relevant. It states
that actual possession is notice of the title of the person in possession. Prior
to the amendment there had been some uncertainty because of divergent
views expressed by various High Courts in relation to the actual possession
as notice of title. A person may enter the property in one capacity and having
a kind of interest. But subsequently while continuing in possession of the
property his capacity or interest may change. A person entering the property
as tenant later may become usufructuary mortgagee or may be agreement
holder to purchase the same property or may be some other interest is
created in his favour subsequently. Hence with reference to subsequent
purchaser it is essential that he should make an inquiry as to the title or
interest of the person in actual possession as on the date when the sale
transaction was made in his favour. The actual possession of a person itself
is deemed or constructive notice of the title if any, of a person who is for the
time being in actual possession thereof. A subsequent purchaser has to make
inquiry as to further interest, nature of possession and title under which the
person was continuing in possession on the date of purchase of the property.
In the case on hand Defendants 2 to 4 contended that they were already
aware of the nature of possession of the Plaintiff over the suit property as a
tenant and as such there was no need to make any inquiry. At one stage they
also contended that they purchased the property after contacting the Plaintiff,
of course, which contention was negatived by the learned trial court as well
as the High Court. Even otherwise the said contention is self-contradictory.
In view of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and definition of "notice"
given in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act read along with Explanation
II, it is rightly held by the trial court as well as by the High Court that
Defendants 2 to 5 were not bona fide purchasers in good faith for value
without notice of the original contract.
17. The next aspect to be considered herein is the cause of action arose for filing the
suit by the Respondent No. 1. In this regard, we may quote the following paragraphs
of the plaint:
3 4 . The Plaintiff says that in Writ Petition No. 3813 of 1996 a Civil
Application No. 1562 of 2006 came to be filed. One Advocate Shri. Godge
had appeared in the said matter. The said Advocate is well acquainted with
the Plaintiff. The said Advocate, after reading all the necessary related
proceedings, informed the Plaintiff of the mischief committed by the
Defendants. The Plaintiff thereafter collected all the necessary information
and documents. The Plaintiff then instructed his Advocates to file the present
suit.
3 5 . The Plaintiff says that the present suit has been filed on the latest
information received by the Plaintiff in respect of the lands in possession
with the Defendants. The Plaintiff has accordingly described the suit
properties in the Schedule annexed as Exhibit "B" hereto. The Plaintiff craves
leave of the Hon'ble Court to amend the plaint in the event any other lands of
the Plaintiff are detected and are found. The Plaintiff may also be permitted
to amend the plaint and bring on record the parties in whose favour the

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 Defendants may have created third party rights.
5 3 . The Plaintiff states and submits that he got the knowledge of the
proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only when he was informed about the Civil
Application No. 1562 of 2006 in Writ Petition No. 3813 of 1996 filed by Dr.
F. Wadia. The said knowledge gives cause of action for the Plaintiff to file
suit. The knowledge that the Plaintiffs right in the suit Property have been
affected by the proceedings between the Defendants and another the said
day i.e. 2nd March 2007 is the date as prescribed by law for the limitation to
start, as he first got the knowledge then. The Plaintiff has thereafter collected
all the information and approached this Hon'ble Court as soon as possible.
There is much more information that the Plaintiff awaits in respect of the
land in Village Yerwada. The Plaintiff is also filing a separate application
Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure reserving right to seek
other additional reliefs against the Defendants.
On a reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that the Plaintiff was well acquainted
with the counsel Mr. Godge. If the Plaintiff was already acquainted with Mr. Godge,
whom upon verification of the records from the status of the suit, we find to have
entered appearance in the suit for the 20th Respondent on 21.07.2005 itself, would
have acquired knowledge much prior to 2nd March 2007. We also find that Civil
Application No. 1562 of 2006 was not filed by Mr. Godge. Therefore, it is a clear case
where the Plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands. We have no
hesitation to hold that the 2nd March 2007, is a fictional date, created only for the
purpose of this suit. As such, the judgment in T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal
MANU/SC/0034/1977 : 1977:INSC:204 : (1977) 4 SCC 467 squarely becomes
applicable.
18. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have held that
the question of the suit being barred by limitation can be decided at the time of trial
as the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. Though the
question of limitation generally is mixed question of law and facts, when upon
meaningful reading of the plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the
given circumstances, after dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion
of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint can be rejected Under
Order VII Rule 11. In the present case, we have already held that 02.03.2007 is a
fictional date. It is not a case where a fraudulent document was created by the
Appellant or his predecessors. The title of the suit property as observed by us earlier
was conveyed in 1938 and 1952, and what transpired later by way of compromise
was only an affirmative assertion by the State. While so, the prayer (a) made in the
suit relates to declaration to the effect that the Respondent No. 1 is the owner of the
suit properties.
19. As per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a declaration to adjudge the
documents as void or voidable must be sought if it causes a serious injury. In the
present case, the sale deeds undisputably stand adverse to the interest and right of
the Plaintiff and hence, a relief to declare them as invalid must have been sought.
Though the Plaintiff has pleaded the documents to be void and sought to ignore the
documents, we do not think that the document is void, but rather, according to us, it
can only be treated as voidable. The claim of the Plaintiff that the grant is only a
revenue grant and not a soil grant, has not been accepted by the State which entered
into a compromise. In paragraph 14 of the plaint, there is an averment that the
original sanad was lost and a new sanad was given to the effect that the inam was a
revenue grant based on the report of the Inam Commissioner. Again, specific dates
are not mentioned in the plaint. In paragraph 25, the Plaintiff alleges that third party

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rights were created by the Gosavi family without any right. Here also, the details are
vague. It can be inferred that such rights ultimately culminated into court auction, in
which, the property was sold to the Appellant. Since the original Sanad was lost, the
Plaintiff had initiated a suit against the State which was compromised. It is not in
dispute that there was a grant. There is only a dispute with regard to the contents of
the Sanad, which was lost. In the absence of the original Sanad, it is not possible for
any court to determine the contents of the same. The alleged misrepresentation is
neither to the character nor is there any allegation of forgery or fabrication. It is also
settled law that a document is void only if there is a misrepresentation on its
character and when there is a misrepresentation in the contents, it is only voidable.
In the present case, the averments in the plaint make out only a case for voidable
transaction and not a void transaction. Fraud is merely pleaded without any specific
attributes but based on surmises and conjectures. It will be useful to refer to the
judgment of this Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar
MANU/SC/0145/1968 : 1968:INSC:10 : (1968) 2 SCR 797: (1968) 2 SCJ 555: AIR
1968 SC 956, wherein it was held as under:
5 . The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent
misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its
character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent
misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent
misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it
has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is
merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon [(1869) 4 CP 704] the action was by
the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The Defendant pleaded that he endorsed
the bill on a fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a
guarantee. In holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed:
It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where
fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not
accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to
sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the
contract to which his name is appended.... The Defendant never
intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never
intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or
thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as
to the legal effect, but as to the 'actual contents' of the instrument.
This decision has been followed by the Indian courts Sanni Bibi v. Siddik
Hossain [MANU/WB/0230/1918 : AIR 1919 Cal 728], and Brindaban v.
Dhurba Charan [ MANU/WB/0313/1929 : AIR 1929 Cal 606]. It is not the
contention of the Appellant in the present case that there was any fraudulent
misrepresentation as to the character of the gift deed but Shiddappa
fraudulently included in the gift deed plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village
without her knowledge. We are accordingly of the opinion that the
transaction of gift was voidable and not void and the suit must be brought
within the time prescribed Under Article 95 of the Limitation Act.
19.1. In the present case, the right to sue had first accrued to the predecessors of
the Plaintiff, when the properties were brought for sale by the court. No challenge
was made to the court auction or to the conveyance in 1952. At this length of time,
we can only assume that the predecessors of the Plaintiff had not initiated any
proceedings as according to them, either it was a grant of soil or during that period,
the rights had not resumed. The Plaintiff had become a major by 1984. By virtue of
Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Plaintiff has a right to seek a declaration

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that the alienation of a property in which he had a right, was void within 3 years.
Though the Article prima facie looks to be applicable only to cases, where there was
an alienation by the guardian, we feel that the period of limitation would be
applicable even when a third party had alienated the share or property of a minor.
Even otherwise, Article 58 would come into operation and the Plaintiff ought to have
filed the suit within three years from the date when he became a major to seek any
declaratory relief, as it is the date on which his right to sue first is deemed to have
been accrued. The Plaintiff has asserted that by government resolutions in 1980 and
1984 he has acquired the title over the properties. Therefore, as a prudent man, he
ought to have initiated necessary steps to protect his interest. Having failed to do so
and created a fictional date for cause of action, the Plaintiff is liable to be non-suited
on the ground of limitation.
20. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, the court auction was held in 1938 and
sale deed was registered in the year 1952 in favour of the Defendant No. 1 in respect
of the suit properties, whereas, the suit was filed only in the year 2008, though the
Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff and his predecessors were aware of the existence of the
said registered sale deed of the suit properties. In fact, there is no averment in the
plaint to the effect that the predecessors were not aware of the transactions. The
limitation period for setting aside the sale deed would start running from the date of
registration of the same and as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, after three
years of the registration, the Plaintiff is barred from seeking cancellation of the said
registered sale deed or the decree that was passed before 50 years and the
consequential judgements. We have already referred to Section 3 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963. The Plaintiff, in our view, has miserably failed to ascertain the
existence of the fact by being diligent. The question as to when a period of limitation
would commence in respect of a registered document is no longer res integra. In this
regard, this Court in Dilboo v. Dhanraji MANU/SC/3318/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 702,
held as follows:
20...... Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes
the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases where a fact could be
discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to
the Plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend the period of
limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge
21. It will also be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Noorul Hoda
v. Bibi Raifunnisa MANU/SC/1414/1996 : 1995:INSC:821 : (1996) 7 SCC 767,
wherein the effect of willful abstention from making enquires was laid down and the
following paragraphs are relevant:
5 . Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 regulates rights and
liabilities of the buyer and seller. The seller is bound to disclose to the buyer
any material defect in the property or in the seller's title thereto of which the
seller is, and the buyer is not, aware, and which the buyer could not with
ordinary care discover. The seller is to answer, to the best of his information,
all relevant questions put to him by the buyer in respect of the property or
the title thereto. The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that
the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsists and
that he has power to transfer the same. Section 3 provides that "a person is
said to have a notice of a fact when he actually knows the fact, or when but
for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made,
or gross negligence, he would have known it". Explanation II amplifies that
"any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in
any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any

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 person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof". Constructive
notice in equity treats a man who ought to have known a fact, as if he
actually knows it. Generally speaking, constructive notice may not be
inferred unless some specific circumstances can be shown as a starting point
of enquiry which if pursued would have led to the discovery of the fact. As a
fact it is found that Rafique filed the sale deed dated 1-12-1959 executed in
his favour by Mahangu, in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 for which the Petitioner
claims to have derivative title through Rafique. Rafique had full knowledge
that despite the purported sale, Bibi Raifunnisa got the preliminary decree
passed in 1973 and in 1974 under the final decree the right, title and interest
in the suit property passed on to her. Under Section 55 when second sale
deed dated 6-9-1980 was got executed by the Petitioner from Rafique, it is
imputable that Rafique had conveyed all the knowledge of the defects in title
and he no longer had title to the property. It is also a finding of fact recorded
by the appellate court and affirmed by the High Court that the Petitioner was
in know of full facts of the preliminary decree and the final decree passed
and execution thereof. In other words, the finding is that he had full
knowledge, from the inception of Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 from his
benamidar. Having had that knowledge, he got the second sale deed
executed and registered on 6-9-1980. Oblivious to these facts, he did not
produce the second original sale deed nor is an attempt made to produce
secondary evidence on proof of the loss of original sale deed.
6 . The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the
Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set
aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific Article to set aside a
decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in
Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act
will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other
ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a
decree either on fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be
applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a
contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the
instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is
whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or
instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and
seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets
attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set
aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud,
Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of
knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the Plaintiff seeks to establish his title
to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or
an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which
otherwise binds him, though not a party, the Plaintiff necessarily has to seek
a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set
aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits
for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against
whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable
apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him
serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court
may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled.
It would thus be clear that the word 'person' in Section 31 of the Specific
Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from
his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the

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 instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees
set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three
years from the date when the facts entitling the Plaintiff to have the decree
set aside, first became known to him.
7 . The question, therefore, is as to when the facts of granting preliminary
and final decrees touching upon the suit land first became known to him. As
seen, when he claimed title to the property as owner and Rafique to be his
benamidar, as admitted by Rafique, the title deed dated 1-12-1959 was filed
in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969. Thereby Rafique had first known about the
passing of the preliminary decree in 1973 and final decree in 1974 as
referred to earlier. Under all these circumstances, Article 113 is inapplicable
to the facts on hand. Since the Petitioner claimed derivative title from him
but for his wilful abstention from making enquiry or his omission to file the
second sale deed dated 6-9-1980, an irresistible inference was rightly drawn
by the courts below that the Petitioner had full knowledge of the fact right
from the beginning; in other words right from the date when title deed was
filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 and preliminary decree was passed on 2-1-
1973 and final decree was passed on 5-2-1974. Admittedly, the suit was filed
in 1981 beyond three years from the date of knowledge. Thereby, the suit is
hopelessly barred by limitation. The decree of the appellate court and the
order of the High Court, therefore, are not illegal warranting interference.
22. It will also be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Prem Singh v.
Birbal MANU/SC/8139/2006 : 2006:INSC:280 : (2006) 5 SCC 353, where the scope
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Article 59 was discussed and held as under:
11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does
not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said Rule is to be found in
Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the
determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for
instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property
shall be extinguished.
1 2 . An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the
Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The
Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles,
provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit
will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of
the fact as to whether any defence is set out or is raised by the Defendant or
not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit
instituted, appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed
period shall be dismissed.
13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed
on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold
fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.
1 4 . A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
3 1 . When cancellation may be ordered.-(1) Any person against
whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has
reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding
may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or
voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and

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 order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy
of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been
so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the
instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.
15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and
voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief.
16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a
document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be
necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a
nullity.
1 7 . Once, however, a suit is filed by a Plaintiff for cancellation of a
transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not
attracted, the residuary Article would be.
1 8 . A rti cl e 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence,
misappropriation or fraud which the Plaintiff asserts is required to be proved.
Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore,
apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to
instruments which are presumptively invalid. (See Unni v. Kunchi Amma
[MANU/TN/0093/1890 : ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26] and Sheo Shankar Gir v.
Ram Shewak Chowdhri [MANU/WB/0014/1896 : ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77].)
19. It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the
scope has been enlarged from the old Article 91 of the 1908 Act. By reason
of Article 59, the provisions contained in Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908 Act
had been combined.
2 0 . If the Plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for
declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in
possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of
adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that
the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the
event the transaction is held to be void.
2 1 . Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent misrepresentation was
made to him as regards the character of the document. According to him,
there had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its contents.
2 2 . In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [ MANU/SC/0145/1968 : 1968:INSC:10 :
(1968) 2 SCR 797: AIR 1968 SC 956] this Court held that the fraudulent
misrepresentation as regards character of a document is void but fraudulent
misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating:
(SCR p. 801 C-D)
The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent
misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but
as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With
reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void,

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 while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable.
In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and it was held that as
the suit was instituted within a few days after the Appellant therein came to
know of the fraud practised on her, the same was void. It was, however,
held: (SCR p. 803 B-E)
Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside an
instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the
Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a
three years' limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling
the Plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside are known
to him. In the present case, the trial court has found, upon
examination of the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of
the gift deed, Ext. 45 the Appellant knew that her husband prevailed
upon her to convey Surveys Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of
Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial
court is based upon the admission of the Appellant herself in the
course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the trial court it is
manifest that the suit of the Appellant is barred Under Article 91 of
the Limitation Act so far as Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga
village are concerned.
.........
28. If a deed was executed by the Plaintiff when he was a minor and it was
void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly
conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed
or within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the Plaintiff did not either sue
within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority.
Therefore, the suit was rightly held to be barred by limitation by the trial
court.
23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No. 1 also sought possession of
the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the
possession of immovable property or any interest therein, based on title can be
sought within twelve years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the
subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the
Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No. 1 and it can be safely said that at
least for a century, the Respondent No. 1 nor his predecessors have been in
possession of the properties after the grant of Inam. The Plaintiff has failed to sue
the Appellant/Defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We have
already held that the title claim of the Plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore,
the claim for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of
possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation.
24. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not produced any documentary evidence to show that
he is entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership of the suit properties except
by way of reliance of the resolutions of the government, which has lost its force in
view of the decree of the Civil Court and subsequent compromise decrees. The
decrees had also attained finality as the neither the Plaintiff nor his ancestors have
challenged the same in time. It is also evident on the face of record that the Plaintiff
is a stranger to the suit properties; on the contrary, the Defendants are the owners of
the suit properties. It is a settled principle of law that the owners cannot be
restrained from dealing with their own properties at the instance of a stranger. The

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said relief is again a consequential relief to the claim of title, which has been non-
suited on the ground of limitation. Hence, the prayer (c) made in the plaint is not
maintainable.
2 5 . Regarding the averments made in the plaint relating to fraud played on the
Plaintiff by the Defendants in relation to the compromise decrees obtained in their
favour, we are of the view that they are vague and general, besides baseless and
unsubstantiated. Rather, no case can be culled out from the averments made in the
plaint in this regard. The plea of fraud is intrinsically connected with the nature of
Inam. We have already discussed the plea of fraud in the preceding paragraphs. We
are also of the view that the plea has been raised only to overcome the period of
limitation. Admittedly the Plaintiff is a stranger to the suits which ended in
compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar Under Order XXIII Rule 3A of Code
of Civil Procedure, he cannot seek a declaration 'that the compromise decrees passed
in Spl. Civil Suit Nos. 152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal No. 787/2001, Pune
are void ab initio, null and void and the same are liable to be set aside'. The law on
this point is also already settled by this Court in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh
MANU/SC/0438/2020 : 2020:INSC:385 : (2020) 6 SCC 629: (2020) 3 SCC (Civ)
732. The bar Under Order XXIII Rule 3A of Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to
third parties as well and the only remedy available to them would be to approach the
same court. In the present case, such an exercise is also not possible in view of the
bar of limitation. Hence, we find the suit to be unsustainable.
26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of
law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting
the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record.
However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit
is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the
relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on record that
this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently
come to the knowledge of the Plaintiff. Rather, the Plaintiff and his predecessors did
not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action
is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed
the application filed by the Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil
Procedure. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of
limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence
along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the
averments made by the Respondent No. 1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule
11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of
Code of Civil Procedure is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex
facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only
cause more harm to the Defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading
evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.
27. In fine, this appeal stands allowed by setting aside the orders so passed by the
Courts below and the application filed by the Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of Code of Civil Procedure is allowed by rejecting the plaint in Special Civil Suit No.
133 of 2009 filed by the Respondent No. 1. However, there is no order as to costs.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

1 Hereinafter referred to as "the High Court"

2 Hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court"

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3 For short, "the Code of Civil Procedure"
4 "11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the Plaintiff, on being required by
the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do
so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper
insufficiently stamped, and the Plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the
requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the Plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or
supplying of the requisite stamp- paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the Plaintiff was prevent by any cause of
exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-
paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to
extend such time would cause grave injustice to the Plaintiff."
5 MANU/SC/0284/1986 : 1986:INSC:94 : 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in
Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, MANU/GJ/0786/1998 : (1998)
2 GLH 823
6 Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I,
MANU/SC/0951/2003 : 2003:INSC:659 : (2004) 9 SCC 512
7 Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., MANU/SC/0071/2004 : 2004:INSC:56 :
(2004) 3 SCC 137
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