THE

FEENCH IN INDIA.
 LONDON
P II [ X T M I» li V S 1' O T T I S \V 0-0 T) F. A X I) V O.

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THbOeENCH IN INDIA
FROM THE FOUNDING OF PONDICHERY IN 1674
TO THE CAPTURE OF THAT PLACE IN 1761.

MAJOR G. B. MALLESON,

LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1868.
 DEDICATION.

TO

TIE REY. SIR CHARLES CLARKE, BART.

WORLINGHAM HALL.

My dear Sir Charles,

A statesman and writer whom, as you know,

I very much admire, has pronounced a dedication to he
* the most graceful offering of friendship.’ Believing
this to be a true definition, there is no one whom, in
the Dedication of this Volume, I should prefer to your¬
self. For, 'throughout the literary exercise of which it
is the fruit, I have been sustained and encouraged, not
less by the recollection of the kindness which contributed
so much to the enjoyment of my last visit to England,
and pf the character which won my affection and esteem,
than 'by the conviction, that my efforts, however humble
and insignificant, would, if worthily directed, at least
meet yom- sympathy and approval.

I remain,
My dear Sir Charles,
Yours very sincerely,

G. B. MALLESGN.
 ADVERTISEMENT.

A COMPLETE and connected account of the doings of

the French in India throughout the period embraced
in this volume has never yet been given to the world.
The student and the soldier whose curiosity and whose
interest may have been alike aroused by the outline of
the deeds of Dupleix and of La Bourdonnais, of Bussy
and of Lally, given in the pages of Mr. Mill’s History of
India, and who may have felt anxious to learn something
more of the policy and aims of those famous French¬
men, have hitherto been compelled to fall back for such
information upon the voluminous work of Mr. Orme. Of
the historical value of this work there can be no doubt.
Mr. Orme was a member of the Madras Council and had
access to all the Madras records, besides enjoying, as a
contemporary, the .opportunity of conversing with many
of the actors of that stirring period. Of the feelings of
the English in Madras, of the principles which animated
their leaders civil and military, of the movements of their
fleets and armies, his history is a most full and detailed,
and, I believe, generally a faithful, record. Yet, with all
this, Mr. Orme’s work, judged even from an English point
of view, constitutes rather a compendium of information
for others to use, than a history which in the present day
 ADVERTISEMENT.

would commend itself to the general render. It is often

diffuse even to prolixity, and brings into prominence
actions not mainly affecting the current of the narrative,
and such as in the present day would be interesting only
to the student of individual character. At the same time,
whilst it indulges in tire fullest details regarding tire ex¬
ploits of the ensigns and lieutenants who assisted Clive
and Lawrence in annihilating the schemes of Dupleix and
Lally, it regards the French rather as acces,series than as
principals in the story, seldom entering at any length into
the reasons of their military movements, never conveying
to the reader any fixed idea of the policy by which the
rulers of Pondichery were guided. Throughout the work,
indeed, there is a natural but entire want of sympathy
with French aspirations. Even Orme, therefore, full and
explicit as he is regarding the doings of the English,
would fail to satisfy the inquirer for a complete and con¬
nected account of the deeds of the French in India.
Nor is the omission supplied, so far as I am aware, by
any French history. The most' valuable of these that I
have met with in my researches is the Histoire des hides
Orientates by the Abbe Guyon, published in Paris iff the
year 1744. The value of this work consists mainly in the
long and copious extracts given by the author from the
archives of Pondichery, and in the correspondence, also
inserted, between M. Dumas and the Native Princes of
India. The supplements to the memoirs of La Bourdon-
nais, of Dupleix, of Lally, of Bussy, of De Leyrit, of Mo-
racin, and of many others, give at full length the official
correspondence of the various periods. These, likewise,
form an excellent basis upon which to found a. history,
but there are few who would take up such works for
 ADVERTISEMENT. ix -

amusement, or who would consider the trouble of wading

through so many bulky tomes, all of them more than a
hundred years old, compensated for by the information
they might impart.
The void then undoubtedly existing, I have written this
volume to supply it. Led, in the first place, rather acci¬
dentally, to examine the career of Lally, the interest of
the subject induced me to look more deeply into the his¬
tory of the settlement with which he was so prominently
connected. ^To this study I have devoted most of my
leisure moments during the past two years and a half.
My labours have, however, all along been greatly stimu¬
lated by the conviction that I have been able to throw
some new light upon a most interesting period. The
story of Frangois Martin, the founder of Pondiehery, is, I
believe, unknown to, at all events it has been unnoticed
by, English historians. A new and, I am satisfied, a cor¬
rect version is given of the quarrel between Dupleix and
La Bourdonnais; the reasons for the conduct of the latter
are fully set forth ; and if this portion of the history be
regarded as too overladen with detail, I trust it may be
remembered that for a hundred years the historians of
France* and England have, in connexion with this very
point, covered the memory of Dupleix with obloquy;
and that charges so weighty, so sustained, and so long
uncontradicted, are not to be refuted without full and
sufficient proof. I trust also it may be found that the
reasons which guided Dupleix in his policy, the relations
of Bussy with the Subadar of the Dekkan, and the cause
of the fall of Chandernagore, have been placed in a clearer
and more intelligible light than heretofore.
In executing the task which I sot myself, I have natu-
 ADVERTISEMENT.

rally incurred many heavy obligations. I am anxious to

express the great debt which I owe, in common with
every other writer of the Indian history of that period, to
Mr. Orme, the minute detail of whose work makes it in¬
valuable to the historian. To the work of the Abbe
Guyon, and to the various French memoirs to which I
have referred, I am likewise greatly indebted. It is by
means of these that I have been enabled to give the his¬
tory of the period from a point of view entirely Indo-
French, showing, I trust clearly, the plans and policy of
the rulers of Pondichery. Colonel Lawrence’s Memoirs,
Mr. Grose’s Voyage to the East Indies, Dr. Ive’s History,
and the Seir Mutakherin, have also been consulted.
Amongst others, of more modern date, I may mention
Colonel Wilks’s Southern India, Captain Grant Duff’s
History of the Mahrattas, Professor Wilson’s edition of
Mill, M. Xavier Baymond’s Inde, Baron Barchou de
Penkoen’s Histoire de la Conquete de l'Inde rpar I’Atigle-
terre, and that most admirable, though, unfortunately,
too little known volume, Broome’s History of the Bengal
Army. I take advantage of this opportunity also to
express my obligations to the writer (unknown to me) of
an article on ‘ Dupleix,’ in the 15th volume of the extinct
National Review, which not only, displays ability and
research of no ordinary character, but is also remarkable
as being, so far as I am aware, the first attempt to do
justice to that illustrious Frenchman. I beg also grate¬
fully to acknowledge the courtesy of M. Bontemps, Go¬
vernor of the French Establishments in India, and of
M. Derussat, Chief of those Establishments in Bengal, in
replying to the various questions with which I troubled
them, and in forwarding to me extracts from the archives
 ADVERTISEMENT. xi'

of their respective seats of Government. Nor can I close

this long list of obligations without expressing the deep
sense I entertain of the encouragement afforded me in the
prosecution of this work by Lord Ellenborough — an
encouragement which mainly induced me to expand the
original sketch of Lally into the history of his countrymen
in India—as well as by my honoured friend, Sir Henry
Durand, one of the Members of the Supreme Council of
India.
I may add, in conclusion, that this work originally
appeared, in separate parts, in the pages, of the Calcutta
Review, though it has since been thoroughly revised and
indeed partly re-written. It was my wish, before offering
it in a complete form to the English public, to submit it
to the ordeal of the criticism of those, some of whom,
from their long experience of India and their close ac¬
quaintance with its history, were thoroughly competent
to pronounce an opinion as to its merits. If I may pre¬
sume to draw any conclusion from the recorded opinion
of the Indian press on the work as it appeared in parts, I
shall have no reason to regret the act which I am now
aboiXt to take upon myself—of presenting it to my coun¬
trymen as a whole.
G. B. M.

Simla : May 24, 18C7.

 CONTENTS.

CHAP. rA6E
I. The Early French in India.I

II. The Perpetual Company of the Indies . .39

III. The Rise of the French Power in India . . . , 62

1Y. La Bourdonnais and Dupleix.127

Y. The First Struggle in the Carnatic . . . .186

YI. French India at its Zenith ..... 227

YII. The Struggles of Dupleix with Adversity . • 277

VIII. Bussy' to 1754 ........ 338

IX. The Fall of Dupleix.375

X. Godeheu and de Leyrit.420

XI. Chandernac.ore and the Dekkan .... 451

XII. Tiie Last Struggle for Empire.492

Index.569
 LIST OP MAPS.

Sketch Mae of Southern India, illustrating the Military Operations,

1744 to 1761.to face title-page.

Maps of the Operations before Trichinopoly, to face pp. 303 £ 383.

 HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA.

Errata. '

Page 176, note, line 6 from top, for just arrived from England read
just arrived from France.
Page 196, line 8 from foot, for- be marched on that day at the head
read he marched at the head.
Page 198, top line, for December 1 read December 17.
Page 227, note, foot line, for pieces justifications read pieces justificatives.
Page 245, line 11 from top, for The army of Mozuffer Jung and
Mahomed Ali read The army of Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib.
Page 256, line 3 from top, for Chunder Sahib read Chunda Sahib.
Page 268, line 2 from top, for Subadar of the Carnatic read Subadar
„of the Dekkan.
Page 268, line 15 from foot, for Cape Cormorin read Cape Comorin.
Page 383, line 6 from, foot, for Astruc detached read Astruc sent
forward.
 HISTORY

FRENCH IN INDIA.

CHAPTEE I.

THE EARLY FBENCH IN INDIA.

Op the five great European maritime powers of the six- chap.

teenth and seventeenth centuries, France was the fourth -—^—■
to enter into the race for commercial communication with
India. The fifth power, Spain, never attempted the con¬
test, and Portugal, Holland, and England had reaped
considerable benefits from their enterprise before the
attention of the French people had been sufficiently-
attracted to the trade. Nevertheless, though the last to
. enter upon the venture, though entering upon it after the !
three ppwers we have named had obtained a firm and ; 1
solid footing on the soil, the genius of the French people \
asserted itself in a manner that speedily brought them on ..
a level with the most securely planted of their European
rivals. The restless action that had made the France of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the fomenter of
disturbances in Europe soon found in India a wide field
for its display, whilst the ambition that had urged her
most famous monarch to dream of universal dominion in
the West, began before very long to form plans for the
attainment of a French empire in the East. He was a
French statesman who first dared to aspire to subordinate
 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

"Tihap. the vast empire of the Mogul to a European will. He

■—i—- was a French statesman who first conceived the idea of
conquering India by the aid of Indians—of arming, drill¬
ing, and training natives after the fashion of European
soldiers, thus forming the germ of that sepoy army which
has since become so famous. They were French soldiers
who first demonstrated on the field of battle the supe¬
riority of a handful of disciplined Europeans to the uncon¬
trolled hordes of Asia. As we contemplate, indeed, the
great achievements of France on the soil of Ilindostau;
as we read the numerous examples of the mighty con¬
ceptions, the heroic actions, the mental rigour, and the
indomitable energy displayed there by her children, we
cannot but marvel over the sudden destruction of hopes
so great, of plans so vast and deep-laid. There may be,
indeed there always are, many excuses for ill-success.
Sometimes failure is to be attributed solely to the superior
skill, genius, and force of character of an adversary.
Sometimes, the hostile intervention of a third party, or
his failure to keep engagements made with a principal,
tends to the same result. But there are other fluctuating
causes, which are often more influential still. An attack
of dyspepsia prevented the destruction of the Russian
army at Borodino, and thus caused the annihilation of
the soldiers of Napoleon in the snows of Russia. A care¬
less movement on the part of Marshal Marmont/induced
by a feverish desire to monopolise to himself the glory of
expelling the English from Spain,'brought on that battle
of Salamanca which was the turning point of the Penin¬
sular war. The storm on the night of June 17 materially
affected the movements of the French Emperor at
Waterloo, and contributed greatly to the actual result of
that terrible battle. The misdirection of a despatch
brought on the battle of Navarino ; and it is believed in
Vienna that the accidental absence of the Austrian
General from his post alone prevented the capture of
Napoleon III. at Magenta. There are thus many causes,
 INSTRUCTIVE NATURE OP THE STORY.

some natural, some dependent on the constitution of an chap.

individual man, some not to be foreseen, and in no way -——
to be calculated upon, which affect the fortunes of a
people. It is not that all the genius, all the strong
character, all the valour are on the side of the conquerors.
Genius, indeed, has been compelled to succumb to a
combination of incidents apparently insignificant, and
impossible to have been guarded against. There suddenly
appear, when least expected, influences, apparently so
small, and yet really so powerful, that all calculations are
upset, and we are compelled to acknowledge the might
of that Providential superintendence, which, working
with its own instruments and for its own designs, fashions
and directs the destinies of nations.
Notwithstanding this theory, there is always, when
contemplating the results of the action of men, a great
deal that is to be accounted for and explained on natural
grounds. The character of the governing or directing >
body as a body, and the characters of the instruments
used to carry out their policy, are sufficient to explain
many of the consequences. And it is in this respect that
the history of the French in India presents a most
interesting and instructive lesson. That lesson is interest¬
ing, because the great deeds of great men always charm
and excite the imagination : it is instructive, because we
have in fit a- great deal of individual action, and a great
insight into individual character. The scene is laid at
such a distant period from the present, that we have the
actors before us conducting their skilful intrigues and
engaged in their complex negotiations as they were at the
time, and we have in addition now, what their rivals had
not then, a clear view of the motives that prompted them,
of the causes that urged them on. So rich in detail is this ^
eventful period that the history possesses all the interest jj
and excitement of a romance. Yet in no romance that jj \
was ever penned did any of the characters dare to enter- I
tain such wide-spread and deep-laid schemes as were j
B 2
 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

cherished by many of the actors in this real scene. And

.it is yet another peculiarity of this eventful history that
the actors in it did not only dare to conceive, but they
brought their vast plans to the very brink of success;
they failed, too, only to let those plans fall into the lap
of another and a rival nation, which, bewildered by their
vastness, long refused to entertain them, and only con¬
sented at last, when the force of events had convinced
them that there was no middle course between the
prosecution of those plans and their own destruction.
It is strange that this story, with all its wonders, has
almost faded away from the tablets of history. There
exists, indeed, a record, published in the last century, of
the facts connected with the rise and progress of the
French East India Company, but since its appearance
a flood of light has been shed upon events which were
then dark and mysteriuos. Yet even this record has been
almost a sealed book to the present generation. Glimpses
of the deeds accomplished by the French on Indian soil
are occasionally to be found in old accounts of famous
voyages, in forgotten French histories of India, and more
recently in those English histories which are devoted to
the glorification of the triumphs of our own countrymen.
Occasionally, too, in some old biographic memoir, or in
the notes to some graver history, we meet with curious
accounts of men, who, when tlieir prospects as-r-a nation
had been annihilated, strove, and strove earnestly, in the
service of native princes, to prevent the development of
the fortunes of their successful rivals. We have sometimes
wondered why a more modern history of this eventful
episode has never been undertaken by the French. It
cannot be because a brilliant career culminated in disaster.
It was a disaster which at all events reflected no discredit
on the soldiers of France. What discredit there was is
directly to be imputed to the effete administration of the
most effete and degraded representative of a House which
France herself has expelled. We believe it is rather due
 THEIR EARLY TRAFFIC WITH THE EAST.

to tlie fact, that the mighty gulf of the French revolution chap.
intervenes between the times of which we are writing and —A—
the present; that the military history of modern France l303-
begins with the wars of 1792 ; and that, however much
France may regret that the great Eastern prize did not
fall into her hands, she cares little for the details of a
struggle which occurred before the period at which she
conquered the great nations of the Continent, and con¬
stituted herself, for a time, mistress and arbitress of the
greater part of Europe.
We have stated that three of the maritime powers of
Europe had effected permanent settlements in India,
before the attention of France had been sufficiently
attracted to the advantage of the trade. That this was
so was attributable far more to the distractions of her
government, than to any want of enterprise on the part
of the French people. A period in which foreign wars
alternated with civil dissensions, was certainly not favour¬
able to fostering commerce with far distant countries.
Yet, despite the turbulence of the period, and the inherent
vice of their government, the desire for Eastern traffic
displayed itself at a very early period amongst the French.
In the reign of Louis XII., in the year 1503, two .ships
were fitted out by some merchants of Rouen to trade in
the Eastern seas. But it is simply recorded of them that
they sailed from the port of Havre in the course of that
year, and were never afterwards heard of. The successor
of Louis XII., King Frangois I., issued to his subjects, in
the years 1537 and 1543, declarations in which he ex¬
horted them to undertake long voyages, and placed before
them the pecuniary and national advantages which would
result from their following his counsel. But the records
of the reign of Frangois are filled with accounts of exhaust¬
ing wars, and it is owing probably to this cause that we
do not find that his wishes in respect of distant navigation
were attended to. Probably the constant civil dissensions
which occupied the reign of Henri III. neutralised any
 TIIE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, effect which an edict of his, to the same effect as those of

»—i—• his grandfather, dated December 15, 1578, might have
1604. ]m(i jn ]ess troublous times. The peaceful and prosperous
: reign of Henri IV. opened out, however, new prospects.
On June 1,1604, a Company was established under the
Xing’s letters patent, granting it an exclusive trade for
fifteen years. But, though the services of Gerard Leroy,
a Flemish navigator, who had already made several voy¬
ages to the Indies in the employ of the Dutch, were
engaged, disputes amongst the proprietors, and the paucity •
of funds, hindered the action of the Company, and the
design came to nothing. Seven years later, however, the
project was renewed under Louis XHI., but, owing to
the same causes, nothing was undertaken during a period
of four years. But in 1615, two merchants of Eouen,
disgusted with the inactivity of the Company, petitioned
the King for the transfer to them of the privileges accorded
to it, expressing at the same time their readiness to fit
out ships that very year. This petition was opposed by
the Company. The King, however, after hearing the
arguments on both sides, decided in favour of a coalition
between the contending parties; and on this being effected,
he issued (July 2, 1615) letters patent conferring the for¬
mer privileges on the thus united Company.*
This Company quickly proceeded to action. Jn the
1016, following year (1616) it fitted out two ships, the edmmand
of the larger of which was given to Commodore de Nets,
an old naval officer; and of the smaller to Captain An¬
toine Beaulieu, who had already made a voyage to the
coast of Africa. Of the expeditions to the Indies, Beau¬
lieu has written an interesting account.f The first one,
though not in itself to be called positively successful, was
yet deemed so in that age, inasmuch as it was mot abso¬
lutely a failure. It appears that the navigators met with
considera^^ Dutch at Java, and as
* Relations de diverses Voyages enrieuses, par M. Tlievenot.
t Voyages des Hides, par Tavernier.
 Beaulieu’s expedition.

there happened to be a considerable number of Dutch chap.

sailors amongst their crews, they were considerably in- ■—1—
convenienced by an order of the President of the Dutch 1616-
possessions, by which all servants of the republic were
required instantly to leave the French vessels. This ne¬
cessitated the sale of Beaulieu’s ship, and the transfer of
himself and the remainder of the crew to that commanded
by Commodore de Nets. They succeeded so far, how¬
ever, in their trading negotiations, that, notwithstanding
the loss of one ship, the voyage was not financially a
failure.
Encouraged rather than deterred by the result of this 1619.
first effort, the Company equipped another expedition of
three ships in 1619, giving the chief command to Beau¬
lieu, vyliom they created commodore. The names of the
ships were the ‘ Montmorenci,’ of 450 tons, carrying a
hundred and sixty-two men, and twenty-two guns ; ‘ L’Es-
perance,’ of 400 tons, carrying a hundred and seventeen
men, and twenty-six guns; and ‘ L’Hermitage,’ an advice
boat, of 75 tons, thirty men, and eight guns. They were
all victualled for two years and a half. This expedition
sailed from Honfleur on October 2, 1619, and, after a
prosperous voyage, reached Acheen in the island of
Sumatra. At Java—whither they subsequently pro-
ceeded-^-Beaulieu had the misfortune to lose one of his
ships—^L’Esperance ’—not without strong suspicions,
amounting in his mind to conviction, that it had been sunk
by the Dutch. But, whatever the immediate cause, it is
certain that she foundered off Java with all her crew on
board, and a cargo valued at between seventy and eighty
thousand pounds sterling. After experiencing this loss,
Beaulieu returned to Havre, and arrived there, with his
vessel well laden, on December 1, 1620.
For upwards of twenty years after this second attempt 1620..
to open out a trade with the East, the Company effected
nothing. A few desultory efforts, by individual traders,
to make a settlement in Madagascar, produced no definite
 TUB EAKLY FEENC1I 1ST INDIA.

chap, result. The powerful Minister, who then virtually ruled

L - Erance, was occupied during the greater part of his tenure
1620. of power in firmly establishing his master’s authority over
the resisting nobles, and he could ill spare any consider¬
able portion of his time to foster large commercial under-
1642.. takings. In 1642, however, Richelieu was master; he
.had triumphed over every enemy, and he at once ad-
I dressed himself to the revival of commercial intercourse
I with the East. Under his auspices a new Company was
formed, for the avowed purpose of trading to the Indies.
Letters patent, dated June 24,1642, accorded to it exclu¬
sive privileges for twenty years, and its Directors, desig¬
nating it ‘La Compagnie des Indes,’ began to make
serious preparations to justify their right to the title.
Their first ship had scarcely started on its expedition
when Cardinal Richelieu died. This event, however, did
not at all affect the resolution which had incited the
French Company to devote their energies, in the first
instance, to the development of the large and fertile island
of Madagascar.
We are not in a position, judging even by the light of
subsequent events, to pronounce this determination to
have been unwise. It appears, on the contrary, to have
been dictated by a sound and far-seeing policy. The ad¬
vantage of a resting-place midway between Europe and
the Indies, had been illustrated in the possession of the
Cape of Good Hope by the Portuguese. This was an
example which the French, embarking for the first time
seriously on a distant trade, were too prudent to neglect.
Nor was it, in its consequences, an unsuccessful venture.
For though forced after several trials to abandon their
hold on Madagascar, it was only, as we shall sec, to seize
and secure the smaller islands contiguous to it, the pos¬
session of which from 1672 to 1810 proved to them a
tower of strength in their wars with England ; a festering
thorn in the sides of their maritime rivals.
Madagascar, originally discovered by Marco Polo in
 TIIEIE FIRST ATTEMPTS ON MADAGASCAR. 9

1298, and subsequently lost sight of, had been reopened chap.
to European enterprise by the Portuguese under Eernan ■_*: _
Suarez, one of the officers of Lawrence Almeida, in 1506. 1642.
It was visited the following year by a Portuguese squad¬
ron under Tristan de Cunha; but that celebrated navigator,
after a minute examination of the topography of the
place, the customs of the inhabitants, and the productions
of the soil, thought it inexpedient to form a settlement
there, and continued his voyage eastward. Two years
later, however, the Portuguese Government resolved to
form a post on tjie seaboard of the island. A settlement
was accordingly made on its northern part, but those who
formed it had been massacred by the inhabitants before
the period of the French expedition of 1642.
The first French vessel equipped by the French India ;
Company reached Madagascar in the summer of 1642, j
and landed the settlers at a point near the southern ex-!
tremity of the island. Their, landing was opposed, though
ineffectually, by the natives of the country. They forth¬
with attempted to carry out a regular scheme of colonisa¬
tion, and to this purpose they devoted all the resources
of the Company. They soon found, however, as the wise ‘
Tristan de Cunha had foreseen, that, though in appear-
ance rich and fertile, the soil of the island could not pro¬
duce, in any great quantity, those articles which entered
the most into European consumption. When they began
to make inroads into the.interior, they found still greater
difficulties awaiting them. They came in contact, then,
with a numerous and warlike race, detesting strangers,
and preferring savage-freedom to foreign domination. By
the bulk of these, the French settlers were received, from
the very outset, with marked hostility. This feeling was
increased to absolute hatred in consequence of the trea¬
cherous seizure and deportation to the neighbouring
island of Mauritius, as slaves, of a number of natives who
had voluntarily entered the limits of the French territory.
This- act was ruinous in its consequences to the French
10 TIXE EAKLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, settlers. Not content from that time with repulsing

_every effort of the French to penetrate into the interior,
1661. the inhabitants, gaining boldness from success, assumed
the offensive, and began in their turn to attack the
wretched wooden stockades which the colonists had
erected with infinite labour and expense, and had digni¬
fied by the name of ‘ Forts.’ So numerous were the
islanders, and so determinedly hostile, that the French
experienced very great difficulty in offering to them an
effectual resistance. The time and the labour employed
in so doing drew them away almost entirely from cultiva¬
tion ; and, though they were ultimately successful in de¬
fending their forts, it was a success which was as costly
as a defeat; for it sank all the large sums which had
been expended on the enterprise without the chance of a
return. It would be surprising that, under these circum¬
stances, and though the French India Company relin¬
quished their claims to the island in 1672, the French
Government should have continued to maintain their hold
of the seaboard several years longer, were it not for the
fact that the retention at all costs of a portion, at all
| events, of the country, was considered eminently desirable
l as forming a resting-place and a shelter in the'long voyage
/ to India.
The ill-success of this enterprise was not, however, at
once recognised in France, although for a time all desire
for a renewal of the effort appeared to languish. The
long minority of Louis XIV., the ministry of Cardinal
Mazarin, with its wars of the Fronde and its contests with
Spain, were not favourable . to commercial enterprise.
Mazarin, however, died in 1661. His successor, Colbert,
was one of those men who stamp their name on the age
in which they live. Colbert was one of the glories of
| France. Born in the middle rank of life, the son of a
1 merchant, himself educated as a banker, and having, in
that capacity, been charged with the management of the
affairs of Cardinal Mazarin, he had gained so entirely
 THE GENIUS OF COLBERT.

the confidence of that Minister, that, on his dying bed, the

Cardinal recommended him to his master as a man of
immense capacity, strict fidelity, and unwearied applica¬
tion. Colbert succeeded him, first only as Controller of
Finances, but not long after he was invested with the
entire administration of the country. Under his guiding
hand, France quickly assumed a position such as she had
never before held in Europe. The finances, commerce,
industry, agriculture, art, all felt the impulse of his strong
will and firm direction. He made the French navy. In
a few years after his accession to power, there were a
hundred vessels of war, and 60,000 sailors inscribed on
the rolls. He created the naval ports of Brest, Toulon,
and Eochefort; he bought Dunkirk from the English, and
he commenced Cherbourg ; and ‘ binding together in¬
dustry, commerce, and the marine in one common future,
he founded French colonies to assure outlets to industry
and commerce, and an employment of the navy in time of

Colbert had been neither blind nor indifferent to the

great advantages which had accrued to the Portuguese,
the Dutch, and the English from their possessions in
India, and he made it one of his greatest objects to en¬
courage the formation of a grand Company, somewhat on
the English model, to open out a regular traffic with that
country. ' He held out to it promises of the strongest
support of the administration. . He offered it a charter
granting it the exclusive right of commerce with India for
fifty years; it was to be exempted from all taxation; and
the Government agreed to engage to reimburse it for ail
losses it might suffer during the first ten years after its
formation. On these conditions, in the year 1664, the j
French ‘ Compagnie des Indes ’ was formed. Its capital ,
was 15,000,000 ‘livres tournois,’ equivalent to about
600,000/.; but as, even under the conditions mentioned,
the entire sum was not subscribed for, a fifth of the
amount, 3,000,000 livres, was advanced by the Treasury.
 TIIE EARLY FRENCH

chap. This example lmd a great effect upon the nobility and
. -L .. rich courtiers; and these at once became eager to join an
. 1664. undertaking which the Government seemed to cherish as
one of its most favoured projects.*
The prospects of the Company on its formation were
thus brilliant. Starting under the auspices of a monarchy
which had not attained the height of its power, but was
then fast rising up to it, which, in its capabilities for
offensive operations and for the display of real strength,
contrasted favourably with the other European states,
this Company seemed to require but firm and steady
direction to become a groat' success. Nevertheless, its
first movements were neither well considered nor fortu¬
nate. Full of the recollection of the attempt made in
1642 upon Madagascar, a settlement in which was still
regarded as an indispensable preliminary to a voyage to
the unknown Indies, the Directors of the new Company
conceived the idea that, by transporting simple colonists
to that island, they might yet realise some of the results
of the labours of their predecessors. Their first ex-
upedition was accordingly directed to Madagascar. On
March 7,1665, four large ships, equipped for war as well
as trade, and carrying five hundred and twenty men,
sailed from Brest harbour, and reached Madagascar on
July 10th following. The first act of the colonists was
to change the name of the island from St. Lawrence, as
it had been called by the Portuguese, to Isle Dauphine,
in honour of the heir-apparent, then four years old. It
proved to be but a poor compliment to the Dauphin.
They soon discovered that, instead of profiting by their
predecessors’ mistakes, they had themselves fallen into
those predecessors’ errors. The now colonists, like those
who went before them, found that their labour was

* Louis XIV. himself, under the that trade to India was not dcroga-
influence of Colbert, endeavoured to tory to a man of noble birth._lidit
reconcile his nobility to a participa- du Hoi, Aoftt, 1064,
tion in the enterprise, by declaring
 MADAGASCAR ABANDONED 13

hindered by three causes, by climate, by the nature of/ chap.

the soil, and by the hostility of the natives. This last-' .._ ..
mentioned cause produced yet another, for it necessitated 1664.
to the unfortunate emigrants constant exposure and
constant fatigue. To such an extent did they suffer, and
disclose by their sufferings the hopelessness of the under¬
taking, that the Company, although for a long time it
continued to reinforce the colonists with supplies of men,
resolved ultimately to give up all thoughts of perma¬
nently colonising Madagascar, and to divert their energies
to another quarter. The movements of the colonists
were however Quickened by the action of the natives,
who succeeded, in 1672, in surprising Port Dauphine,
and massacring the majority of those who were within
its walls. Of the baffled colonists, some proceeded ulti¬
mately to Lidia; others, however, contented themselves
with the formation of a small settlement in the island of
Mascarenhas, lying with Ceme a little to the east of
Madagascar. These islands, under the names of the Isles
of Prance and Bourbon, and again as the Islands of
Mauritius and Reunion, have since become well known.
The Isle of Mauritius, or Cerne, had been early dis¬
covered, and as soon abandoned, by the Portuguese;
occupied in 1598 by the Dutch, who, in honour of Prince
Maurice of Nassau, called it Mauritius; abandoned by
them at ■some time between the years 1703 and 1710;
and occupied later, between that period and 1719, by
the French, who cliange'l its name to the Isle of France.
Bourbon, or Mascarenhas, called so after a Portuguese
nobleman, was absolutely desolate when the French,
touching there on the way to Madagascar in 1649, took
possession of it in the name of the King of France. It
remained uncolonised till 1654, when eight Frenchmen
and six negroes emigrated to it from that island, but
deserted it again four years later. The island continued
uninhabited till 1672, when, on the subversion of the
Madagascar enterprise, an inconsiderable number of the
14 Y FRENCH

chap, colonists tool? possession of it, and formed the nucleus of

■_a settlement which was one day to be powerful.
1666. But the French Lidia Company had not wasted all its
resources in their attempts on Madagascar. In 1666
. another expedition was fitted out, and the command of
I it bestowed upon one Franjois Caron, a man who pos¬
sessed at that time considerable reputation for liis expe¬
rience in Eastern undertakings. Caron, though of French
origin, had been bom in Holland, and lie had spent
many years of his life in the service of the Dutch re¬
public. At a very early age, he had obtained a situation
as a cook-mate on board a Dutch man-of-war bound foe
Japan; but during the voyage he showed such intelli¬
gence that he was promoted to the post of chief steward.
This office gave him a little leisure which he devoted to
the study of arithmetic. On the arrival of the vessel at
Japan, he at once applied himself to obtain a knowledge
of the language of the country. Having acquired this
knowledge, he was able to make almost his own terms
with the agents of the Dutch Company in that country,
and he was soon appointed a member of the general
council of administration, and director of commerce.
But, little satisfied with this, he applied for a post of still
higher importance in Batavia.* He was refused. Where¬
upon, Caron, listening only to his anger, abruptly re-
* It is stated by some authorities unfortunately for Caron, in rolling
that, -when Caron was in charge of the ..casks up the beach, one of them
the Dutch agency at Japan, he made fell m pieces, and a brass gun made
an audacious attempt to establish its appearance. This discovered the
himself on the coast. Having in¬ deception. Caron was at once seized,
gratiated himself with the King, he sent to Jeddo, and confronted with
obtained permission to build a house the King. Being unable to offer
close to the Dutch factory. Know¬ excuse, be was sentenced to have
ing the Japanese to be ignorant of beard pulled out hair by hair; t(
fortification, he built this house in dressed in a fool’s coat mid cap;
the form of a tetragon—made it, in to be exposed in that condition
fact, a regular fortification. He then every street in the city. After this
applied to the Governor of Batavia he was shipped back to Batavia.—
to send him along with casks of Recvdl de Voyages du Word, vol. iii.
This story is not credited by later
taining guns, and filled up with cot¬
ton or oakum. This was done, but,
 caeon’s voyage. 15

signed his appointment under the Dutch, and tendered chap.

his services to Colbert. Colbert closed eagerly with the ■—r—
offer, and Caron soon after received -letters patent nomi- 166<5-
nating him director-general of French commerce in India.
Associated with Caron was a Persian named Marcara, a
native of Ispahan, from whose local knowledge of India
many advantages were anticipated.
The expedition sailed from Prance in the beginning of 1667.
1667, and. made a fair voyage to Madagascar. But, on
arriving there, Caron found the French establishments
on the coast in a condition so deplorable, and the prospect
of being able to effect an amelioration so discouraging,
that Ire determined not to waste any of his resources in
the attempt, but to proceed at once to India. He di¬
rected his course, accordingly, towards Surat, a place
which the enterprise of the other maritime powers of
Europe had made familiar to traders to the East. On ■
December 24, he touched at Cochin, where he was well '
received. Thence he continued his voyage, reached'.!!
Surat in the beginning of 1668, and established there ' ]
the first French factory in India. The negotiations into
which he entered were at first very successful. A very
valuable cargo was quickly transmitted to Madagascar.
And this result was no sooner known in France, than, as
a reward for his exertions, and possibly to incite him to
others, tlTS King at once conferred upon Caron the riband
of St. Michel.
In the following year,*an extension of their operations
was resolved upon. Marcara was directed to proceed to
the court of the then independent King of Golconda, ^
with the view of obtaining from him the privilege of /
trading throughout his dominions, and of establishing a
factory at Masulipatam. To procure this, Marcara had
not only -to fight his way through those obstacles peculiar
to an oriental court, but he had to meet also the oppo¬
sition of the English and of the Dutch. However, he
triumphed over all difficulties, and on December 5, 1669,
16 THE EAHLY MtENUII IN INDIA.

chap, obtained a firman which permitted the French Company

—i— to undertake negotiations in the dominions of the
1667. King, without payment of duty, import, or export; a
license was granted him at the same time to establish a
factory at Masulipatam. Thither, accordingly, Marcara
proceeded.*
It is curious, that the one fatal feeling which attended '
all the efforts of the French to establish themselves in
India, and which contributed very greatly to their failure,
should have shown itself at this early epoch. This feel¬
ing was jealousy. It seldom happened that a man, high
in office, could endure that auy great feat should be
accomplished by another than himself. Rarely could a
sense of patriotism, a love of country, an anxiety to
forward the common weal, reconcile a servant of the
French Company to the success of a rival. We shall see,
as we proceed, what golden opportunities were lost, what
openings were deliberately sacrificed to the gratification
: of feelings as mean and paltry in themselves, as they were
base and even treasonable in men who had been sent to
' advance the fortunes of their country in a distant land.
The French had not been two years in Surat before
this feeling evinced itself. Caron, though he could boast
of great achievements himself, could not endure the idea
that one of his associates should obtain solely credit for
deeds in which he could claim no share. The/success of
Marcara then, so far from being to him a source of joy,
as to a patriotic Frenchman fit' ought to have been,
awakened feelings of envy. He at once removed all
• the friends of the Persian from employ, and represented
his conduct iu a most unfavourable light to the French
Minister. Marcara, however, on receiving an account ol
these aspersions, transmitted to Colbert a statement of
his proceedings. This statement was so precise, and
was so well supported by facts, that, after a full inquiry,

* Mdmoirea du Sieur Marcara; Histoire des Indes Orieutnles.

 HIS FAILURE AT POINT Dli GALLE. 17

Marcara was declared to have cleared himself of every chap.

charge brought against him. The contest, however, . L .
between the two principal officials in India did not tend 1671.
to the stability of the rising settlements.*
Caron, however, was bent upon effecting some results
of greater importance. He accordingly represented to
the Minister that, to obtain a firm footing in the country,
it was necessary to hold some place in absolute possession,
unassailable by the natives of India, and to use it as a
stronghold whence commercial operations could be carried
on with the inhabitants of the mainland. Following the
idea of Albuquerque, his own conclusions had led him to .
favour, for this purpose, the occupation of an island, and
he had indicated the seabord of Ceylon, then partially
occupied by the Dutch, as well adapted to the end in
view.f He did not fail to point out likewise the great
commercial advantages which must accrue to France
from an immediate participation in the spice trade, and
he intimated he had sounded the King of Candy on the
subject of the dispossession of the Dutch, and that the
enterprise would meet with his support. The project was
approved by Colbert, and a fleet under the command of
Admiral Lahaye—a man of some reputation, \ who had
quitted high civil employment to gratify his passion for
warlike operations—was placed at the disposal of Caron
to carry out the design. They made their first attempt
towards the end of the year 1672 on Point de Galle. But
either the place was too strong, or the jealousies on board
the French squadron were too great: for the French were

* In consequence of Lis quarrel X If would appeal* tliat Lab aye's

■with. Caron, Marcara, unable any reputation was far greater than could
longer to work with him, embarked be justified; not only had lie, when
with liis adherents on board a French Governor-General of Madagascar,
ship, and sailed to Java. - Arriving abandoned the colonists there when
at Bantam, they established factories they were pressed -.hard by the na-
there, of which, however, they were tives, but his conduct in the attack
dispossessed by the Dutch some ten upon Ceylon, and subsequently, ap-
years after (l(iS2). pears to have been utterly unworthy
t Journal du Voyage des Grandes of a man occupying his high posi-
18 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, unsuccessful. They were more fortunate at Trincomalee,

*•—. which they took and garrisoned. But they had hardly
1672. landed the guns necessary to defend the fortress, when a
Dutch fleet of at least equal force, under Commodore
Bylckoff van Goens, came in sight* Admiral Lahn.ye
declined an encounter, and leaving the garrison at Trin¬
comalee to shift for itself, made sail to Meliapore, then
known as St. Thome, on the Coromandel coast. Though
this place had been well fortified by the Portuguese, from
whom it had been taken by the Dutch some twelve years
before, the French commander managed to take it in a
very short, time with the loss of only five men.
This solitary result of an expedition, from which so
much had been hoped, gave little satisfaction to the French
Ministry. Trincomalee had had to surrender with all its
garrison to the Dutch fleet, and now of their conquests—
for at Surat and Masulipatam they had but factories—
St. Thomd alone remained. As is common in such cases,
the first outcry was against the projector, and every
possible fault was at once attributed to Caron. Some
were jealous of his position ; others detested his imperious
character, and declaimed against his grasping disposition.
Had Caron succeeded, but little perhaps would have been
heard of these faults, but having failed, they were made
use of to procure his recall. The French Directors, who
likewise looked very keenly to results, were so much
mortified at the ill-success of this costly expedition, that
they also petitioned the Minister to recall Caron, in order,
they said, that they might inspect his accounts. The
petition was complied with, and, to prevent the chance of
any evasion of the instructions, the order sent to Caron
did not convey his absolute recall, but directed him, in
complimentary terms, to return to France, that he might
be personally consulted with regard to some new enter¬
prise. Caron at once obeyed, and, embarki ng all his

dales ties Provii:

 EARLY CAREER OF

wealth, of which he had amassed a great deal, he set sail

in 1673 for Marseilles. He had already passed the Straits
of Gibraltar, when he learned from a stray vessel the real
intentions of the French Government regarding him. He
at once altered his course and proceeded towards Lisbon.
But, on entering the harbour, the ship struck on a rock,
and almost immediately foundered. The only survivor
of the disaster was one of the sons of Caron.*
In the expeditions undertaken against Ceylon and St.
Thome, a very prominent part had been taken by one
Francois Martin,.a Frenchman, who devoted a long career,
in singleness of heart and with great success, to the
furtherance of the designs of France in the East. Little
is known of him prior to the year 1672, beyond the fact
that lie, too, had commenced his career in the gervice of
the Dutch East India Company, and that he had left it at
an early age to join the French. He had probably made
the acquaintance of Caron when they were both serving
under the Dutch flag. This is certain, that he was known
at Surat as a man on whose energy and discretion Caron
had the greatest reliance; and he was regarded, at the
time of its being carried out, as the soul of the enterprise
undertaken against Point de Galle and Trincomalee.
Some, indeed, have asserted that the attempt on Point de
Galle fei|ed, because Martin, who had the direction of
the attack, had applied for, and been refused, the gover¬
norship of that place. -But this statement, which was
but little credited at the time, is refuted by the whole of
his subsequent career. It is no slight proof of the confi¬
dence which he had inspired in those under whom he
served, that although he was the trusted subordinate of
Caron, he was regarded with equal favour by those in
vyhose hands the departure of that official left the di¬
rection of affairs in 1674. These were Admiral Laliaye
and M. Baron.

* Histoire de : Lides Orientates, rol. iii.

20 THE EARLY FRENCH

CHAP. The position in which these gentlemen found them-

•—l—- selves- was by no means enviable. They had provoked
:l674- the hostility of the Dutch by attacking their possessions,
and the Dutch were now masters of the seas, and inflamed
against them with a particular animosity. They had re¬
taken Trincomalee, and the French could scarcely hope
that they would allow them to retain peaceable possession
of St. Thome. With a view, therefore, to provide them¬
selves with a place of refuge in case of evil days, the two
French Directors ordered Martin to place himself in
communication with Shere Khan Lodi,.the Governor of
the possessions of the King of Bejapore in Tnnjorc and
the Carnatic, for the grant of a piece of land which they
might call their own. Martin obeyed, found the Governor
accessible, and was allowed to purchase a plot of ground
on the sea-coast in the province of Gingee, near the
mouth of the river of that name, considerably to the
north of the river Coleroon.
This arrangement concluded, Martin returned to St.
Thome. He there found the two Directors not at all doubt¬
ful regarding the intentions of the Dutch. It was no longer
a secret that the Government of Holland, highly incensed
at the attack upon its possessions in Ceylon, was by no
means satisfied with the recapture of Trincomalee, but
had sent out pressing instructions to its agent.;}; to drive
the French likewise from St. Thome. Possessing the
power, that Government determined to exercise it by
striking out the-French from the list of its rivals in the
Indian trade. Whilst, therefore, showering rewards upon
Admiral "Van Goens for the energy with which he had
acted with reference to Trincomalee, it urged him to
follow up his blow, and, by a well-aimed stroke, to put
a final end to the ambitious projects of the French in the
East.
The Dutch agents immediately set to work to carry out
these instructions. Their first care was to provide them¬
selves with native allies. They, therefore, represented
22 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, such a clause. But these had little idea, in all proba-
_^_., bility, of the use that would be made of it.
1674. To a small but resolute minority of the French gar¬
rison, this capitulation, if a blow, was a blow which
they had expected, and for which they were prepared.
Having been allowed to choose their own destination,
they at once selected the grant which they had purchased
north of the Coleroon. Thither, accordingly, marched
some sixty of them, under the orders of Francois Martin,
and there they arrived in the month of April, 1674.
They had everything to do, and their resources were at
a very low ebb. The remainder, who constituted a large
majority, determined to return at once in the ships that
remained to them to Surat. Amongst those who adopted
this course were the two Directors, Messrs. Lahaye and
Baron*
The supreme authority now remained with Martin. He
had with him sixty Europeans, including the crew of the
‘ Vigilante ’ frigate, which alone remained in the roads at
his disposal. He had likewise all the effects which had
been brought from St. Thome, and a considerable sum in
ready money. His first care was to obtain permission
from the Governor to erect such buildings as should be
necessary to secure his people and their property from
desultory attack. He had entered into such ..relations
with the Governor that this permission was' granted
without much difficulty. The command of the sea by
the Dutch had forbidden him to "think of opening a trade
with Europe, and as the Governor was in want of funds,
and he had those funds lying idle, he had thought it good
policy to lend them to him at the then moderate interest
of eighteen per cent. The character of Shere Khan Lodi

* It would appear that both La- site selected by Martin was bettor
liaye and Baron visited the plot of fitted for their purposes than any
ground on which Pondichery waa other on the Coromandel const.’_
afterwards built en route to Surat. Memoirs dans les Archives de la Com-
From Surat Baron wrote to the Com- pngnie das hides.
pauy that ' next to St, ThomA, the
 MARTIN POUNDS PONDICHERP, ’ 23

enabled him to do this without much risk; and, contrary chap.

to the old proverb, the transaction made of the borrower ■—r—-
a fast friend.* Under his protection, the slender defences 1675-
and the houses within them sprang up rapidly; and by
the wise dealings of Martin with the natives, a little
village, containing the native population who worked for v
the factory, soon grew up under its walls. The whole
formed a sort of town which was at first called by the
natives ‘ Phoolchery,’ but was gradually altered to the
designation, which it bears at present, and by which it
has always been known to Europeans, of ‘ Pondicliery.’ f
The measure! adopted by Martin for regulating his
commercial transactions were characterised by the same
prudence. In those days India supplied Europe with
piece-goods, and it was to the opening of a trade in this
commodity that the attention of the little colony was at
first directed. So successful were their efforts that in
about two years after their arrival, Martin wrote to the
Company that ho would be able to send them an annual,
supply to the value of 1,000,000 livres or more. He added
a full description of the place; stated that he considered
it as well adapted as any other on the coast for the pur¬
pose of a French settlement; that the roadstead in front
of it, which prevented the near approach of men-of-war,
rendered it secure against any sudden attack; that it was
fairly sheltered from the monsoon; that it was healthy
and well situated for commercial purposes. This report,
and the intelligence which accompanied it, so different
from, the accounts which the fall of St. Tlioind had led
them to expect, were received with the greatest satisfaction
by the Directors.
It must not be imagined that the colonists were entirely ) I
free from troubles and alarms. Pondichery was, in fact, I
founded and nurtured amid the clash of arms and the
clamour of falling kingdoms. The Sultanut of Bejapore, //
* M&noires dans les Archives de la Compagnie des Indes.
t Browne’s Carnatic Chronology.
24 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, from which the ground on which it was built had been
. -1. _ obtained, ceased in 1676 to be ranked as an independent
1675. sovereignty. Twelve months later, Golconda, which bad
assisted in the expulsion of the French from St. Thome,
had. itself fallen a prey to the insatiable ambition of
Aurungzebe. At the same time, the enemy of all es¬
tablished authorities—Sevajee—was engaged in levying
contributions wherever he could obtain them, in annexing
towns and provinces, and in laying the foundation of that
predatory power which his successors carried to so great
a height. , In such a time, the only chance of safety,
especially for a community comparatively rich, was to be
well armed, and well capable of offering resistance. None
felt this more than Martin. As, then, he noticed the
periodical increase of his manufactories, he felt that they
had need of more numerous defenders than the few
Europeans who formed his party. He accordingly, in
1676. \(l676, applied to his friend Shere Khan Lodi, for permis¬
sion to entertain some native soldiers for the purposes of
' defence. Shere Khan willingly assented, and made over
to him three hundred of his own men. Martin used
these men not only as soldiers, but colonists. lie gave
each a piece of land, and encouraged them to build
houses, and to employ themselves profitably in the manu¬
facture of tissues and other articles for export. <-
For some time everything went on well, and the settle¬
ment continued to increase in prosperity. But in the
seventeenth century peace and tranquillity were rare in
India; and the turn of Pondichery came at last. In 1670,
Savajee, having in the four preceding years possessed
himself of many places on the Malabar coast, and been
WownedKng of the Mahrattas, proceeded to Golconda,
and, afterTiaving^made an affiance with its ruler for the
protection of his own territories during his absence,
poured like a torrent on the Carnatic. In May 1077, he
passed by Madras, then occupied by the English, and
appeared before Gingee, regarded as inaccessible. Gingee,
 25

however, surrendered, owing, it is stated, to a previous (

understanding with the commander. Proceeding fartheiu^
south, he was met by Martin’s friend, Shere Elian, at then
head of five thousand horse, but Shere Khan was defeated |
and taken prisoner. Sevajce then invested Vellore, took 1
Ami, and threatened to overwhelm the settlement cs- I
' tablished by the French, on the ground of their being [
dependents of his enemy Shere Khan.
The situation was critical. Martin’s three ^hundred
soldier-manufacturers were powerless in such an emer¬
gency, even supported as they would have been by the
entire European community. Resistance, therefore, was
out of the question. But Martin had before dealt with
Asiatics, and he knew that there was one argument
against which few of them were proof. For greater se¬
curity, however, he took the precaution, in the first
instance, to send all the property of the Company by sea
to Madras. He then requested one of the petty native
chieftains in his neighbourhood,* who had made his own
submission to the irresistible Mahratta, to represent his t
perfect readiness to acknowledge the authority of Sevajee, 1
and to pay the necessary sums for a license to trade in
his dominions. This request, accompanied by a handsome
offering, did not fail of success. Sevajee, never very
ready ta attack Europeans, had, on this occasion, no
personal1 animosity to gratify, and he granted all that
was asked of him on the sole condition that the French
■should take no part against him in military operations.
The negotiation was scarcely terminated, when the news
of the invasion of Golconda by the Moguls called him
away in a northerly direction, and Pondichery was the
safer for the danger that had threatened it.
After this, affairs went on for some time quietly. But
subsequently to the invasion of Sevajee, Shere Khan, the
old friend and protector of the rising settlement, appears
26 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, to have been engaged in constant warfare, and it was a

.. .. warfare that did not always end in success. It became
1689. therefore an object to the French that lie should repay,
whilst yet he was able, the sums that had been advanced
to him in 1674, amounting to eight thousand rupees. To
him therefore, in a friendly manner, Martin signified his
wishes. Shore Khan, unable to pay, granted him, instead,
the revenue of the lands in the district of Pondichery, and
made thg cession of that place itself absolute, an arrange¬
ment which was very advantageous to French interests.
Thus secure of a fixed revenue, Martin began with greater
vigour than ever to carry out his iiuplovements. Ills
sixty Europeans had beeii reduced to thirty-four; but he
did not despair. He continued to build houses, maga¬
zines, and stores; and in the beginning of 16S9, he
obtained likewise, though with much difficulty, the per-
I mission of Sambajee, son of Sevajee, to make of the
defences he had erected a regular fortification.*
In that year, however, war broke out between France
and Holland, and the Dutch appeared determined to take
advantage of the opportunity to repair the fault they had
committed in 1674, when they granted the French a free
retreat from St. Thome. The prosperity of Pondichery
alarmed them. The occasion was propitious. The French
navy was too much occupied in Europe to be able to
assist its possessions on the Coromandel coast—which,
indeed, had been systematically neglected from the outset.
The Dutch, on the contrary, had a strong force in the
Eastern seas; and, free from all fear of opposition, they
resolved to use it to nip in the bud the young French
settlement at Pondichery.
1693. In accordance with these views, a fleet of nineteen sail
of the line, exclusive of transports and smaller vessels,
appeared before Pondichery at the end of August 1G98.
It was one of the most imposing armaments that had ever
* It is a tradition of Pondichery carried out by a Capuchin monk,
that these defences were planned and Father Louis.
 POtTDICHEEY THEEATEMD BY THE DUTCH. 27

sailed on the Indian seas. It had on board fifteen hundred chap.

European troops, and two thousand European sailors, ■—^—-
besides some native Cingalese in Dutch pay; it had 169s- .
sixteen brass guns, six mortars, and a siege train. Never¬
theless, scarcely satisfied with their own means, the
Dutch had previously written to Earn Raja, who, on the
death of Sambajee, had been appointed Regent of the
Mahrattas, offering to buy from him the district of Pon-
dichery. The reply of Ram Eaja deserves to be4 remem¬
bered. ‘ The French,’ he said, ‘ fairly purchased Pondichery,
and paid for it a valuable consideration; and therefore
all the money in the world would never tempt me to
dislodge them.’* But when the Dutch fleet appeared
before Pondichery, the high-souled Mahratta was no
longer able to exert his influence in their favour. He
was shut up in the fortress of Gingee, on the capture of
which Aurungzebe had set his heart. The surrounding
country fell during this siege under the influence of the
preponderating power of the Moguls, and these did not
hesitate, on an application from the Dutch, to sell to
them the district of Pondichery for fifty thousand pagodas,
and even to detach a body of men to support them.
To resist this formidable attack, Martin had literally
no resources. The French Company, on taking stock in
1684, had been terribly alarmed by finding that, instead
of gaining by their commercial enterprises, they had
actually lost one-half of their capital. They were there¬
fore little in the mood to send out any material assistance
to Martin, especially as they had all along regarded his
undertaking as foolhardy and impracticable. Martin had
been therefore from the very outset left to himself. We
have seen what he had accomplished; how he had built
and fortified a town, established a trade, gained the con¬
fidence of the natives, princes as well as people, and laid
the foundation of an enduring prosperity. And now all
* Slcmoiro duns les Archives de 1ft Compngnic des Indes; Duff’s History
of the Mahrattas.
 THE EA Y FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, this promising fabric was to be overthrown. In the

._i—• course of one of those contests, in which the country was
1693. always engaged, his native allies were temporarily on the
losing side. From them, therefore, he could expect no
assistance. He had six guns, thirty or forty Europeans,
and some three or four hundred natives, and he was
attacked by a fleet and army strong enough to take pos¬
session of all the European settlements in India.
It must have been a sad day for Martin when he beheld
this storm breaking over his head, and destroying the
tangible evidences of his wise and skilful policy. Never¬
theless, Ire brought to bear against it all the resources of
a mind habituated to calm and cool judgment. He had
taken the precaution to move the idlers out of the town,
and Ire prepared for a vigorous defence. The Dutch,
however, gave him no respite. They landed their troops
at the end of August, cut him off at once from the inland
and from the sea, and plied their attack with such energy
that, on September 6, having then offered a resistance of
twelve days’ duration, Martin had no hopes of being able
to prolong the defence, and demanded a parley. This
resulted in a capitulation, signed on September 8, and
consisted of thirteen articles, the principal of which were,
that the place should be given up to the Dutch East India
Company; that the garrison should march outpwith all
the honours of war ; that the native soldiers should re¬
tire whither they pleased ; but that the French should
be sent to Europe, either that year or the beginning
of the next. These conditions were implicitly complied
with*
Thus ended, apparently for ever, the attempt of the
French to establish themselves permanently on the Coro¬
mandel coast. Of all the efforts ever made by that nation
to form a settlement in India, this one had been under¬
taken under the most gloomy auspices, and with the
* M&noire dans les Archives de la Compagme des Indes, in which the
capitulation is given in full.
 REFLECTIONS ON THE POLICY MARTIN. 29

smallest resources ; and yet up to the time of the capture CHAP-

of Pondichery, it had succeeded the best. Formed of -—!■—
the remnant of the garrison of St. Thome, composed ori-
ginally of but sixty Europeans, never regularly reinforced,
but receiving only stray additions, it had not only main¬
tained itself for seventeen years, but it had made itself
respected by the natives of the country. What it had
accomplished in its internal arrangements, we have al¬
ready recorded. As we ponder over the story of these
seventeen years of occupation, the question cannot but
arise, how it was that this handful of men, left to them¬
selves, accomplished so much, whilst other expeditions,
upon which all the resources of the Company had been
so exuberantly lavished, failed so signally. We can only
reply by pointing to the character of the leader. Every¬
thing was due to Francois Martin. His energy, his per¬
severance, his gentleness with the natives, his fair dealing,
formed the real foundations of Pondichery. Never was
there an adventurer—if adventurer he can be called—
who was more pure-handed, who looked more entirely
after the interests of France, and less after his own. In
this respect lie was the very opposite of Caron. Caron
was avaricious, grasping, jealous of others’ reputation.
Martin was single-minded, liberal, large-hearted, without
a thought of envy or jealousy, and a true patriot. Such
are the men who found empires, and who are the true
glory of their country ! The foundations which Martin
laid were not, it is true, destined to be surmounted by
an imperial edifice, but they only just missed that honour.
That they were worthy of it is his glory ; that those that
followed him failed, can reflect nothing upon him. We
see him now with all his hopes baffled, his seventeen
years of expectation destroyed, a. poor man, sailing to
Prance with nothing to show as the result of all his
labours. Was there indeed nothing? Aye, if'experience
of a distant country, if successful management of mankind,
if the ability to make for one’s self resources,—if these be
so THE EAKLY FRENCH IN' INDIA.

chap, nothing, Martin returned to his country destitute indeed.

■—1—- But in that age such acquirements were more highly con-
1693. gidered than they sometimes are now; and no long time
elapsed before Martin was to feel that they had gained
for him the confidence of his country to an extent that
enabled him to repair the losses of 1693, and to rebuild
on the old foundation a power whose reputation was to
endure.
Before, however, we proceed to record the further
attempts of the French to establish themselves on the
southern Coromandel coast, it is necessary that we should
glance at their proceedings in other parts of Hindustan.
We have already alluded to their establishment at
Surat.* This was strengthened in the year 1672 by the
transfer to it of the head authority from Madagascar,—
the Company’s settlements in which were abandoned in
that year, and Madagascar nominally transferred to the
French crown .f Some of the Madagascar settlers pro¬
ceeded, as we have seen, to the Isle of Mascarenhas,
afterwards known £® Bourbon ; others came on to Surat.
But the establishment at Surat did not prosper. The
wretched condition of the affairs of the parent Company
naturally affected their servants, and prevented them from
carrying on trade with the vigour or success of the Dutch
and the English. Politically, the location there of the

* Grant Duff records that when nation; and, considering that on tins
Surat was plundered for the second occasion Sevajee’s force consisted of
time by Sevajee (Oct. 3rd, 1070), fifteen thousand picked troops, whilst
‘ the English, as on the first occasion, the French were few in numbers, and
defended themselves successfully, occupied a weak position, it is scarcely
under the direction of Mr. Streing- astonishing that they entered into an
ham Masters, and killed many of the engagement which secured to them
Mahrattas; the Dutch factory, being their property. The plunder of the
in a retired quarter, was not molested j Tartar prince can scarcely be consi¬
but the French purchased an igno¬ dered a consequence of this engage¬
minious neutrality by permitting Se- ment. Surat was for three days in
vajee’s troops to pass through their the possession of Sevajees troops $
factory to attack an unfortunate Tar- and the Tartar prince would have
been plundered under any circum-
from an embassy to Mecca.’
Ignominiously avoiding a combat f Edict Louis XIV. 12th Novem¬
is not characteristic of the French ber 1671.
 THE DEPENDENCIES OP PONDICHERT.

factory was of no advantage to the French, and its com¬

mercial value lessened with the rising importance of Pon-
dichery and Chandernagore. For many years therefore
the trade at Surat languished, and the place was finally|
abandoned in the beginning of the eighteenth century.]
It was abandoned, however, in a manner little creditable'
to the French Company. Their agents left behind them
debts to a very large amount, and such was the effect on
the native merchants that, when a few years afterwards
(1714) a company, formed at St. Malo, despatched ships
to trade at Suratj the ships were seized and sequestered
on account of the debts of the French India Company,
with which that of St. Malo was in no way connected. In
dealing with the French intercourse with this place we
have advanced beyond the main point of the narrative;
but it is of the less consequence, as we shall have little
further occasion to make any reference to Surat.
The French factory at Masulipatam was, as we have
seen, founded by the Persian Marcara, in 1669, under ay
patent obtained from the King of Golconda. Its trade at
the outset was extremely flourishing ; but the expulsion
of the French from St. Thome, by the aid, it will be re¬
membered, of the -Golconda army, was a heavy blow to
its prosperity.' It exerted for a long time afterlittle poli¬
tical influence on the march of affairs. It revived, how¬
ever, with the rise of Pondichery. In 1693, the French
obtained permission to build a square, which is still in
existence, and is known by the name of France Peta.
Masulipatam became later one of the most important of
the minor French settlements. To the circumstances
connected with its rise we shall have occasion to refer
further on.
In the year 1663, Shaista Khan, the maternal uncle of
the Emperor Aurungzebe, having been driven out of the
Dekkan, and compelled to flee for his life by Sevajee,
whom he had been sent to repress, was appointed, to
compensate him for his humiliation, Viceroy of Bengal.
32 EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap. It was during Iris viceroyalty* that a French fleet entered

—5^—• the Hooghly, and disembarked a body of settlers at the
1693. village of Ckandernagore. This village was ceded to
those settlers by an edict of Aurungzebe in 1688. Eight
' years later, Sobha Singh, a landed proprietor of Burdwan,
rebelled against the authority of the Viceroy Ibrahim
Khan, the successor of Shaista Khan, anct rallying to his
standard the Orissa Affghans and other malcontents,
plundered Hooghly, and carried devastation to the very
gates of the European settlements. In this crisis, the
English, French, and Dutch traders pressed upon the
Viceroy the necessity of their being permitted to fortify
their respective settlements—a favour which had been
before asked and refused. The Viceroy would only tell
them in reply to provide for their own safety. This was
regarded as a tacit permission to fortify, and was acted
upon accordingly. Nevertheless, the French at Chander-
nagore never attempted to be anything more than traders.
For a long time their efforts in that respect were not very
successful. All French writers speak of their trade there,
for many years, as languishing. By letters patent, dated
February 1701, Chandernagore, with the other French
possessions in the Indies (Balasore, Kassimbazar—an
offshoot from Chandernagore—and Masulipatam), was
placed under the authority of the Governor of Pojidichery,
It was not, however, till nearly thirty years later that the
trade received an impulse which converted Chandernagore
into one of the most flourishing settlements of the Com¬
pany. To that change and its causes we shall refer at the
proper time. The factory at Balasore was insignificant,
and was virtually abandoned at an early period.
It will thus be seen, that of all the places in India in
which the French had made a settlement, Pondichery was
in 1693 the most advanced and most promising. And
now they had lost Pondichery. The Dutch knew well

* Stewart, in Ms IHUoiy of Bengal, says ‘about the year 1676.’

 THE DUTCH FOBTIFY PONDICHEKY. 33

the value of their conquest. Its situation, sheltered for chap.

nine months in the year from the monsoon, the incon- ■—1—-
siderable surf, and the fact of there being a little river 169S-
falling into the sea navigable for flat-bottomed boats,
rendered it superior as a settlement to any other place
on the Coromandel coast. They therefore determined to
make it worthy to be the capital of Dutch India. Their
first care was to strengthen its defences. They built new
walls, supported by bastions, and rendered it the strongest
fortress possessed by an European power in Hindostau.
They endeavoured also to cement their relations with the
natives, and to' establish with them the same cordial
intercourse which had existed with the French. It was
an end towards which they strove that, as in their wars
with the Portuguese, they had kept the fortified places
they had taken from them in India, so, after this contest
with the French, peace when it came might once more
confirm to them the possession of their Eastern gains.
Meanwhile, Martin and his companions had arrived in
France. The reception they met with was encouraging. The
Minister and the Directors were equally pleased to honour
a man who had effected so much with so little. The Eng
himself conferred upon him the dignity of Chevalier of
the order of St. Lazare. On the other hand, his descrip¬
tion of Pondichery and its advantages imparted vitality
and excitement to Directors who had had to experience
nothing but losses. They began for the first time to ap¬
preciate the importance of the place which they had
hitherto so neglected, and which, owing to that neglect,
had been lost to them. lust then, however, nothing could
be done. France was fighting single-handed against
Spain, Germany, England, and Holland; and of these
England and Holland were her successful rivals in the
Indies. There was nothing for it but to wait for peace.
Peace at last came. On September 21,* 1697, the

* All dates given in this volume are according to the new style.
34 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, treaty of Ryswick was signed. One of the articles of that

—^—■ treaty engaged that there should be a mutual restitution
1697. 0f a]i piaces taken on both sides, both in and out of
Europe ; and at the close of that article was a clause in
which the fortress of Pondichcry was particularly men¬
tioned, with an especial proviso, that its fortifications
should not be destroyed, but that it should be delivered
up in its then condition.
Pondichery thus recovered, the French Company re¬
solved that it should not easily again slip from their
possession. Martin was at once appointed to the command
of the place, and instructions were given him to add still
further to its strength. It was agreed to reimburse to the
Dutch 16,000 pagodas, which they asserted they had ex¬
pended on the fortifications. A squadron was at the same
time sent out to India, having on board two hundred
regular troops, several engineers, a large supply of military
stores, several heavy and field guns, and materials in
abundance for the use of the settlement.
On arriving at his destination, Martin commenced the
work of improvement. He enlarged and strengthened
the fortifications, and collected a garrison of between seven
and eight hundred Europeans ; he laid out a plan for a
large town, the erection of which he commenced. In
little more than a year, a hundred new houses had been
erected, and the place presented such an improved ap¬
pearance, that, it is stated, a person who had only seen it
in 1693 would not have recognised it. Nor did he omit
to renew his relations with the natives. By the same
course of gentleness and straightforward dealing which he
had formerly followed, he attracted them in great numbers
to the settlement, so much so that on his death, in 1706,
the native town was computed to contain nearly forty
thousand inhabitants.
We have stated that on the abandonment of Madagascar
in 1672, the supreme French authority in India was
transferred to Surat. But, iu 1701, less than three years
 Sii&iBi*.

t-GENERAE. 35

after the reoccupatiou of Pondichery, the trade at Surat ciiap.

had become so unprofitable that it was resolved to abandon. ■_L—
the factory at that place. How the factory was abandoned, 16S7-
we have already seen. But, prior to that not very cre¬
ditable episode, letters patent had been issued, by which
the Superior Council of the Indies, as it was called, was
transferred from Surat to Pondichery, and this place was
made the seat of the Director or Governor-general, with
supreme authority over the other Prench factories in any
part of India. Almost immediately afterwards, Martin
was appointed President of the Superior Council, and
Director-general of French affairs in India.*
Meanwhile, the affairs of the French Company, always
badly managed, did not reap much advantage from the
peace. Unable, from paucity of funds, to fit out trading
expeditions of their own, they were compelled to have
recourse to the system of selling trading licenses to others.
With funds and good management in Paris, and a Martin
at Pondichery, the Prench might have established a trade
in India, which it would not have been easy to destroy,
and which would have immensely aided the. ambitious
projects of some of the successors of Martin. But at the
close of the seventeenth century, the resources of the
French Company were nearly exhausted. They struggled
on, indeed, by means of the shifts to which we have ad¬
verted, for some time longer. But the material aid which
they afforded to the settlement at Pondichery was of the
slightest description. The traders who purchased their li¬
censes made fortunes; whilst the Directors of the Company
which granted those licenses were just able by their sale to
realise sufficient to keep their servants from starving. This
was an immense misfortune at a time when the affairs of
the Company were being managed in India by a man of
conspicuous ability and of rare integrity. Whilst the town
of Pondighery was increasing, and its native inhabitants

* Letters patent signed by Louis XIV., dated February 1701.

36 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

chap, continued enormously to augment, merely by reason of

■—r—• the good government that they found there, the connexion
1701. with the parent Company was becoming every day more
precarious and uncertain, and the Superior Council could
not, but fear, that, like Madagascar and Surat, the time
would shortly arrive when Pondichery too would be
abandoned.
1706 Whilst affairs were in this uncertain position, Martin
died—December 30, 1706. Upon the plot of ground
which he had occupied just thirty-two years before with
sixty men, there had risen up under his auspices a large
and flourishing town. He himself its founder, had not
only amassed no riches, but he died poor—poor but
honoured. He had devoted all his energies, private as
well as public, to his country. Pondichery, at his death,
although still in its infancy as a city, had an air of pro¬
sperity which it was impossible to mistake. There was a
fine palace for the Governor, built of brick, and other
houses and shops of the same material. Keeping in view
the rising importance of the city he had founded, Martin
had been careful to lay out the streets in such a manner
that those who built houses could not but contribute to
its regularity and beauty. The fruit of his excellent rules
was fully realised in the time of his successors, and is to
be seen at the present day. „
Nearly ten years had elapsed since the Dutch had re¬
stored Pondichery, and they had been years of peace and
growing prosperity. The French enjoyed in those days
a great reputation at the courts of the various native
princes for qualities the very opposite of those they were
wont to display in Europe.* The power and resources
of Prance, the sacredness of the persons of her sons, were
subjects which the French in India never dwelt upon.
They were careful, on the contrary, to pay the utmost
deference to the wishes of the prince with whom they

* Histoire des Indes Orientales.

 HIS WISE POLICY. 37

were brought in contact, and to attempt to gain his con- chap.

fklence by a recognition of his power and authority. -f—
Their policy, in fact, was to adapt themselves as much as 1706-
possible to native habits, whilst not departing from those
strict principles, an adherence to Avhich alone can beget
confidence. In this respect, the ruler of Pondichery had
something to repair, for the discreditable departure from
Surat had materially affected French credit. Though it
was left unavoidably to the successors of Martin to atone >
for that blot, yet, by the fairness of his own dealings, he
brought his relations with the natives to such a point, that
he and his French were not only trusted, but personally
esteemed and regarded. In this way he laid the foun¬
dation for that intimate connexion with native powers,
which the most illustrious of his successors used with such
effect to build up a French empire in India. Perhaps it
was, that, left so long to his own resources in the presence
of contending powers, any one of which was strong enough
to destroy him, he deemed a policy of conciliation his only
safe policy. But, even in that case, to him the credit is
undoubtedly due of being able to dive so well into the
character of the natives as to use them for his own pur¬
poses by seeming to defer to their wishes; to turn the
attack of Sevajee into a claim for Mahratta protection,
and to ^convert the loan to Shere Khan Lodi into the
means of obtaining a fixed and perpetual revenue.
It is a remarkable result, too, of Martin’s skilful policy
that the progress of Pondichery caused neither envy nor
apprehension to any of the native rulers of the country.
It is a result which can only be ascribed to the confidence
which that policy had inspired. The guns on the ram¬
parts were regarded, not as threatening to a native
power, but as a means of defence against one of the rival
nations of Europe. When a native prince visited Pon¬
dichery, he was received as a friend; he was carefully
waited upon; he was pressed to stay. The idea of re¬
garding the natives as enemies was never suffered by any
38 THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

ciiap. chance to appear. Acknowledging them as the lords

—-—■ paramount of the country, the French professed to regard.
1706. themselves as their best tenants, their firmest well-,wishers.
Pondichery rose, therefore, without exciting a single feel¬
ing of distrust. It was freely resorted to by the most
powerful princes and nobles in its neighbourhood. The
good offices of the French were not seldom employed to
mediate in cases of dispute. Thus it happened that they
gained not, only toleration but friendship and esteem.
They were the only European nation which the natives
regarded with real sympathy. Evidences of this regard
were constantly given ; that it was real, subsequent events
fully proved.
This cordial understanding with the children of the
soil—the solid foundation upon which to build up a
French India—was, with much more that we have de¬
scribed, the work of that Martin whom the latest* French
account of French India dismisses in half a dozen lines.
Was it his fault that his successors risked and lost that
which he had secured with so much care, with so much
energy, with so much prudence ? The most fervent ad¬
mirers of Dupleix, the most determined defenders of
Tally, the most prejudiced partisans of Bussy, cannot
assert that. Was it not rather that the very facility of
Martin’s success opened out to the most ambitions of his
successors that splendid vision of supreme domination,
which is especially alluring to those who feel within
themselves the possession of great powers P To answer
that question, we must turn, in an inquiring spirit, to
their careers. „

* Inde, par M. X, Raymond.

 39

CHAPTER II.

THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OE THE INDIES.

Eight years after the death of EranQois Martin the fifty chap.
years’ monopoly of the Company of the Indies, granted ■—^—
by Louis XIY. in 1664, came to an end. It was indeed 1714-
time. For several years the Company had been unable,
in consequence of its numerous debts and its want
of funds, to use the privileges with which it had been
invested for its own advantage. Even so far bach as
1682, being unable to purchase a sufficiency of goods
wherewith to load its vessels, it had permitted private
speculators to forward merchandise to India, on the sole
condition that such merchandise should be despatched on
board the vessels of the Company, and that it should be
paid for as freight. In 1708, it allowed a M. Creuzat to
equip two vessels under the name of the Company, on
condition that he should pay it fifteen per cent, of the
gross sum realised by the sale of his wares, and two per
cent, on the product of the captures his vessels might
make beyond the Line. The Company reserved to itself
at the same time the right of retaining for its agents in
India ten tons of the wares of Pondichery for the return
voyage. These expedients, however, failed to produce
such a return as would enable the Company either to
pay its debts or to re-enter upon its legitimate trade.
To such an extent did resources fail, that, in 1712, two.
years before the expiration of its charter, the Company
was compelled to abandon entirely even the attempt to
despatch vessels to the Indies, and to content itself with
giving up its rights in this respect to the merchants of
St. Malo, in consideration of an annual payment. Thus
40 THE PEHPETUAL COMPANY I? TIIE INDIES.

citap. it happened that when, in 1714, it petitioned the Tfing

—^—• for a renewal of its privileges, it was actually unable to
1714 avail itself of those privileges, but maintained a lingering
existence solely by letting them out to others.®
It can easily be imagined how this state of things re¬

!
acted on Pondichery. Wanting money, no longer even
receiving ships belonging to the parent Company, the
first successors of Martin, MM. Dulivier and Hebert, f
had been able to do but very little. The carrying trade
passed gradually from their hands into the hands of other
merchants and companies, and from this, time to 1722,
the commerce and credit of Pondichery alike continued
to decline. The debts contracted at Surat remained
unpaid, and this fact alone was sufficient to affect the
credit of the town to which the Government had been
transferred from that place. It was a hard time indeed
for those agents of a bankrupt Company. They strove
nevertheless to do what they could to second even the
paltry efforts which the Directors made from time to
time to increase their trade. But it was in vain. For¬
tunately during the entire period they were left unmo¬
lested by the native Powers. Though all India resounded'
with the clash of arms that followed the death of the
Emperor Aurungzebe in 1707, though warlike operations
were taking place in the Dekkau and on the Malabar
l coast, Pondichery remained unthreatened. It -was a
' period indeed which a rich parent Company in Prance,
supported by active agents on the coast, might have used
with immense advantage to French interests. But under
the actual circumstances of the case it was fortunate for
Pondichery, neglected and impoverished, that she was
* Histoire des Indes Orientates, when Dulivier re-assumed the office.
par M. l’Abba Guyon. He held it fur nearly tw6 years, when
t M. Dulivier succeeded Martin on he was again succeeded by Itebert,
January 1, 1707, but continued as who continued as Governor till Au¬
Governor only till the arrival of le gust 19, 1718.— Extract from the
Chevalier Hebert in July 1708. Hu¬ Archives of the Company, forwarded
bert continued to administer the by M. Bontemps.
affairs of tba colony till October 1713,
 ITS PRIVILEGES RENEWED FOR TEN YEARS. 41

able, for the fourteen years that followed the death of chap,
Martin, to drag on a feeble existence, hoping for better •—^—•
times. There was little in that interval to call for the 1714-
remark of the historian. The interest of the period is
rather concentrated in the change that took place in the
fortunes of the parent Company, and which, at the ex¬
piration of the fourteen years we have alluded to, enabled
the rulers of Pondichery to make a real start in the race
for wealth and prosperity. We propose therefore to
return to the affairs of the Company in Europe.
That Company had in 1714 applied, as we have
already stated, for a renewal of the privileges which i
would lapse in that year. The state of its affairs was
well known to the mercantile world of France as well
as to the Ministers, and a strong opinion was expressed
. against the policy of granting to the Company privileges
of which it could only make use by transferring them to
others. But notwithstanding public opinion, in those
days feebly expressed, the Directors had sufficient in¬
terest to carry their point. On September 29, 1714, a
Boyal edict was issued, directing the continuance to the '
Company for ten years of all its privileges, dating from
January 1st, 1715, with the sole proviso, that thence¬
forth, one-tenth of the product of the captures made by
the Company’s vessels beyond the Line should revert to
the Great Admiral of France.
It appeared then that for another ten years the affairs
of French India were doomed to languish, and perhaps
even to perish of atrophy. But on September 1, 1715,
an event occurred which changed for a time the current
of affairs in France and her dependencies. On that day
Louis XIV. died, leaving behind him a public debt of
2,412,000,000 francs, and the revenue mortgaged for
years to come. Misery and disease reigned amongst the
population, commerce and industry were in an extraordi¬
nary state of depression, national bankruptcy appeared
inevitable. The Due d’Orldans, brother of the Eng, upon
42 TIIE PEBFETUAL COMPANY OP THE INDIES,

cm?, whom had devolved the office of Regent, whilst he almost

■—r-—■ despaired of the means whereby to extricate the country
1.715. from the calamity by which it was threatened, was yet
determined to resort to any expedient rather than have
recourse to a measure so ruinous as a declaration of bank¬
ruptcy. Whilst yet meditating on the courses open to
him, there suddenly appeared in Paris, within a month
after the death of the King, a young Scotchman named
Law, who, addressing himself to the Regent, declared his
ability to rescue the country from the financial abyss into
which it had fallen, and to restore it to credit and
prosperity.
To understand the revolution which overtook the affairs
of the East India Company at this juncture, it will be
necessary to give here a brief outline of the measures
adopted by Law, under the sanction of the Regent. In
pursuance of his demands there was created, by letters
patent dated May 2,1716, a bank of deposit and discount,
authorised to issue notes payable to the bearer in coin of
the current value of the day. The capital of this bank,
styled the General Bank, consisted of 6,000,000 francs, in
1,200 shares of 5,000 francs* each, payable in four instal¬
ments, one-fourth in specie, and three-fourths in Govern¬
ment notes. One great object of the establishment of this
bank was thus to relieve the public credit, by accepting
at par, for the payment of its shares, Government notes
which were then scarcely saleable at 70 or 80 per cent,
discount. At the same time that it did this it declared'its
own notes payable in cash to the bearer at the current
value of silver. The sudden establishment of a bank on
such principles, and with a comparatively low rate of
discount, at a period when confidence had disappeared,
had an electric effect. Instantly there was a strong de¬
monstration in its favour, and a rush to partake of the
advantages it offered. The confidence in its stability
became so strong, that, although it possessed a capital of
but six millions, Law saw himself enabled, within a short
 LAW CREATES THE COMPACT OF THE WEST. 43

time of its establishment, to issue notes to the value of chap.

fifteen or twenty millions. The credit of the bank was ■—l—
further augmented by the publication, on April 15,1717, 1717-
of a decree, which commanded all the agents intrusted
with the management of the Eoyal revenues, to receive
the notes of the bank as money, and to cash such notes
' at sight to the extent to which cash was available.
The success of the bank had already greatly relieved
the State credit, for it being a condition of the purchase
of bank shares that they should be paid for, three-fourths
in Government notes, a run had ensued upon these se¬
curities, and they "had risen greatly in favour. The revival
of credit stimulated the other industries of the nation, and
commerce and trade, shortly before so depressed, began
to resume the position natural to a state of prosperity.
But this was only a beginning. Its success stimulated
Law to propose, and the Regent and the public to accept,
the more speculative schemes which were formed by his
teeming brain. The district of Louisiana in Forth
America, discovered in 1541, and traversed by M. de
Salle in 1682, seemed to Law to offer a basis upon which
to erect a scheme which would secure immense com¬
mercial advantages to Prance, and at the same time benefit
her finances. The idea itself was not new, for one Antoine
Crozat, a. speculative merchant, had already attempted
the task'of colonisation, and had failed. He was too
willing therefore to make over his privileges to Law. But
if the idea was not new, the treatment proposed by Law
was startling by its novelty. He declared it would be
necessaiy to raise a Sovereign Company, rivalling those
of England and Holland, and depending on a large capi¬
tal. This capital, he proposed, should be not less than
100,000,000 francs, divided into 200,000 shares of 500
francs each, payable in Government notes. As these
were still at a considerable discount, the proposal was
regarded with wonder, and at first, with some distrust.
But Law was confident. It was his object to cause by
44 TIIE PERPETUAL COMPANY OF THE INDIES.

chap, the success of his scheme a further run upon the Govern-
■—^—■ ment notes, so as to raise them to par.
1717. The scheme was presented to the public in August 1717.
Letters patent, bearing that date, conferred upon the
Company of the West, as it was called, for twenty-four
years, the privileges of a monopoly of the entire trade
with Louisiana and Canada. Every right of the citizen
and the tracer, and of the absolute owner of the soil, was
comprised in these privileges. .They were made depen¬
dent solely on the condition of rendering fidelity and
homage to the King of France in token of vassalage.
But though presented to the public in August 1717, some
time elapsed before Law saw fit to take the. scheme, as it
were, by the hand, and to push it into public favour.
Measures, hostile to himself and his plans, were being
hatched at the time under the auspices of the Parlement
of Paris, M. d’Argenson, President of the Council of
Finance, and the Brothers Piris. He deemed it more
prudent therefore to await the moment when he could
act with a certainty of success.
1718. H is perhaps unnecessary to allude here to the contest
of the Regent with the Parlement more than to record
the state of practical despotism which his victory esta¬
blished. Profiting by this victory, he caused to be
issued, on December 4, 1718, a royal proclamation by
which the General Bank was declared attached to the
State, under the designation of the Royal Bank, with
effect from January 1, 1719. The King, i.e. the State,
thus became security for the notes. The change was
effected by the purchase by the State of the twelve
hundred shares which constituted the original capital of
the bank. These shares were paid for in cash. It will
be recollected that the original shareholders had paid for
each share of 5,000 francs only the first fourth of 1,250
francs in cash, and the remainder in Government notes,
then at 70 or 80 per cent discount. The transaction
then was most favourable for the shareholders. It
 UNITES TO IT THE INDIA COMPANY. 45

seemed at first scarcely so for the State. So greatly chap.

indeed did the notes of the bank multiply that Law found •—^—
it would be impossible to act up to the rule which had 1718.
made the fortune of the General Bank, and which pro¬
vided for the payment in specie, to the bearer, of the
amount of the note at the current value of silver. Under
his auspices it was decreed that thenceforth the amount
represented by the note should be paid in ‘ livres tournois
of a fixed and unvarying value whatever might be the
after variations of coined money; ’ and that only notes
under 600 francs should necessarily be paid in cash, it
being optional to the banker to give change for notes
above that amount in notes or cash, as he might consider
most convenient.
This interference with the free trade of currency, this
upsetting of the ladder by which Law had made his first
reputation, was undoubtedly a great mistake. The
General Bank, however, had been so successful a project,
that the public were slow to perceive the error, and
before it could be exposed, Law had launched, in all
earnestness, that commercial and financial operation,
which is so intimately connected with the subject of our
history. We have alluded to the formation of the 1719.
Company of the West. Pending the conversion of the
General into the Royal Bank, Law had left this scheme,
as it were, to itself, and the shares, consequently, paid for
in depreciated notes, had fallen to the value of one-half.
He then suddenly conceived the idea of uniting to this
new Company, the old East India Company founded by
Colbert, as well as the Companies of China and of
Senegal, neither of which was in a very flourishing con¬
dition. To the thus united Company would fall, he
fondly hoped, the trade of Prance with the East as well
as. with the West. The Regent entered fully into the
scheme. By his advice a royal decree was issued dated
May, 1719, to carry it into effect. In this edict the
failure of the Company founded by Colbert was admitted
 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OF THE INDIES.

chap, and dwelt upon; the cessation of its trade, its abandon-
_■ ment of its privileges to others, were adverted to, and
1719- attributed to its bad management; the continuation of its
charter for ten years, by the late King, from January 1,
1715, was admitted: ‘ but,’ the edict went on to state,
‘ in place of fulfilling its legitimate duties (the payment
of its debts), the Indians have carried to us reiterated
complaints that the Company will pay neither interest
nor capital, and that for more than sixteen years it has
not sent any vessel to Surat.’ After a further reference
to the inevitable consequence of such .management, die
edict continued thus : ‘We have considered it proper for
the welfare of our Kingdom to re-establish and increase
the commerce of the French with* the Indies, and to
preserve the honour of the nation by paying to these
people the debts contracted by the Company. To carry
out this design we have resolved to suppress the privi¬
leges accorded to the Companies of the Indies and of
China, and to unite them to that of the West.’ After
this preamble there followed twelve decrees, revoking
the privileges of the old Companies, and conferring on
the Company of the West the sole right of commerce to
the countries east of the Cape, including, besides the
■ African Islands and the Indian Seas, the Red Sea, Persia,
the territories of the Mogul, Siam, China, Japan, as well
i as the Straits of Magellan and the seas to the south. To
! the same Company was likewise granted possession ‘ of
the lands, islands, forts, houses, magazines, property
movable and immovable, revenues, ships, barks, muni¬
tions of war and provisions, negroes, animals, mer¬
chandise, and, in fact, everything that the Companies of
India and China have been able to conquer or acquire,
or which has been conceded to them in Prance, in the
Indies, or in China, on condition of paying to the French,
as well as to the Indians, all the lawful debts of the
Companies of India and of China.’ The commercial
advantages granted to the new Company were most
 STYLES IT THE COMPANY OP THE INDIES. 47

liberal. It was allowed the exclusive right of importing chap.

from the countries indicated all products not prohibited-!■—-
in Prance, and facilities were accorded to it of selling the 1719‘
prohibited articles to foreign countries. By the 11th
decree it was directed that thenceforth the Company
should be styled the ‘ Company of the Indies,’ and should
assume the arms of the Company of the West.
But perhaps the most important of the decrees pro¬
mulgated on this occasion related to the mode in which
the funds necessary for carrying on the business of this
great Company should be raised. The part of the sixth
decree, which settled this point, ran thus: ‘ We have
permitted and do permit it to issue new shares to the
value of twenty-five millions of francs to be paid for in
ready money only, and at the rate of 550 francs for each
share. These will be of the same nature as the 100
millions of the Company of the West, which are before
the public, and their numbers will follow immediately
that of the last share of the 100 millions ; and in con¬
sideration of the ten per cent, which the purchasers will
pay above the par value, it is. our will that these shares
shall be on the same footing as the others.’
Law had thus at his disposal 50,000 shares of the
nominal value of 500 francs each, but for which the
purchasers were required to pay ten per cent, in excess of
that value. But his scheme comprehended something
far more extensive than the simple project indicated in
the decree from which we have quoted. Just prior to
the amalgamation of the Companies he had gone into the
market and had bought up all the shares of the Company
of the West that were to be had.* This proceeding
brought them up to par, and even to a premium. But it
was after the amalgamation had been decreed that he
made his great coup. Acting under his influence, the
Begent caused to be decreed on June 20 following, that,
to insure an equal chance to all, without favour to any,
no one should be eligible to become a purchaser of the
 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP THE INDIES.

chap. new shares, who did not possess in the old shares (of the
■—r—• Company of the West) a value four times greater than
1719- that for which he now wished to become a subscriber.
Now it is curious to mark the consequence of this edict.
The old shares had been issued at 500 francs each, pay¬
able in four instalments in Government notes, then at,
perhaps, 70 per cent, discount. Of this sum the first
instalment only had been called up ; that is to say,
possession of each of these shares had been obtained by
a cash payment of less than 40 francs.* Now the effect
of Law’s new proposal to forbid the sale of shares in the
new Company to all who did not possess four times the
amount in the old was to cause an extraordinary run on
the old shares. They rose consequently to an enormous
premium. The original holders, and those who, like Law
and his friends, had purchased before the amalgamation,
made thus very great profits. The Parisians, with their
usual felicity of nomenclature, styled the old shares meres,
and the hew shares Jittes, appropriately remarking that
these latter always brought with them their dower ; for
such was the hourly increasing rage for speculation that
a purchaser could almost immediately realise double or
treble the amount he had invested/}1
Another impulse was soon after given to the shares of
the Company of the Indies. The profits of tire coinage
for nine years were made over to it, on the’ payment to
the King of fifty millions of francs, by regular instalments,
in fifteen months. To raise this sum a new issue of shares
became necessary. Consequently authority was decreed
to the Company to issue 50,000 new shares at a nominal
value of 500 francs each. But at that time the first issue
of shares, the filles, had risen from their issue value of
550 francs to 1,000 francs each in the market, or nearly

* Supposing that Government notes represented the first call made

notes -were then at 70 per cent, dis- on the shareholders of the Company
count, the value of 125 francs in of the West,
notes could he purchased hy 37£ t Law, son Systeme et son iEpoque.
francs in cash. Now, 125 francs in
 TIIE COMPACT ACQUIRES THE TOBACCO MONOPOLY. 49

cent, per cent. To profit itself by this rise, the Company chap.
decreed that though issuing these new 50,000 shares at •—7—
a nominal value of 500 francs each, they would be 1719-
purchasable only at the current rate of the other shares,
or 1,000 francs each. But in addition to this, and still
further to increase the value of the old shares, Law caused
it to be notified that to obtain these shares at their
advanced rates, it would be necessary to own paper of
five times the amount applied for, in old shares, and to
pay for them, not in specie, but in notes of the Eoyal
Bank. This, thq latest issue of shares, received at once
from the public the name of petites-flles. The desire to
obtain these increased not only the value of the meres,
but made every one anxious to exchange his coin for
notes of the Boyal Bank. This measure, as it were, con¬
summated the first part of the financial revolution in¬
augurated by Law. The Government notes, which, in
1715, had been at 70 to 80 per cent, discount, rose
actually to par,* and the shares of the Company of the
Indies were quoted at 200 per cent, premium.
In the same year the Company made a most important,
purchase, for it proved to be almost the only one of those ;
that survived the golden reign of Law, and contributed '
in later times even to the prolongation of their existence.
They acquired from the Government, for 4,020,000 francs,
the monopoly of tobacco. The value of this monopoly
increased to such an extent, that in after years it brought
in an annual revenue of eight millions, a sum almost
sufficient, at 8 per cent., to pay the total interest on the
capital of the Company, as it was fixed in 1725. There
was granted to it about the same time the fanning of the
salt mines of Alsace and Franche Comtd.

* When Law, in introducing to the value, the public, incredulous, de¬

public the scheme of the Company of dared thnt if he were to accomplish
the.West in 1717, boasted that one this, he would bo worthy of having
of its effects would be to raise the statues raised to him all over France,
depreciated Govemmeht notes to par Yet he did it
50 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP TIIE INDIES.

chap. But great as had been the previous measures of Law,

_^_. and unexampled as had been their success, he was pre-
1719. pared to go still further. It was his great ambition to
extinguish, by means of the Company, the public debt
of France. This debt amounted at that time to from
1,500 to 1,800 millions of francs, and its yearly interest
to 80 millions. Law believed it possible, in the then
state of confidence and excitement, to substitute for the
public debt the shares of the Company of the Indies,
lie offered then to lend to the State twelve hundred
millions, a sum afterwards increased to? fifteen hundred
millions, at 3 per cent, per annum, on the condition of
receiving authority to issue shares to that amount, and
of being intrusted with the collection of the public taxes.
On the 2nd of September the Government officially
accepted these offers. The Company at once created
324,000 new shares, bearing the nominal value of 500
■ francs each, but as the value of the other shares had by
that time risen to 1,000 per cent.—each share being thus
worth in the market 5,000 francs—it was at first
determined to offer them to the public at that rate.
Subsequently, however, ,it was resolved to sell them, in
series, by public auction, in front of the magnificent
palace which the Company had just then purchased at
the corner of the Rue Vivienne. Here, and in the
neighbouring streets, crowds were wont to sit through
the long nights, caring neither for cold nor hunger nor
thirst, each man armed with his heavy bag of coin or
well-filled pocket-book, anxious only to secure or' to
maintain a good place, from which to bid for the coveted
shares. At this public auction the Company realised for
the 324,000 new shares no less a rate than a thousand
per cent, on the nominal value of each share. Taking
stock in November, the Directors ascertained that whilst
they had issued 624,000 shares, representing 312 millions,
for which they were responsible, they had sold them for
1,797,500,000 francs, representing the enormous profit
 THE EAGE FOE SHARES. 51

of 1,485,500,000 francs! Unfortunately but a small chap.

portion of this was realised
It is impossible to describe the eagerness and alacrity
with which all classes entered into this race for wealth.
Men who had been beggars became suddenly rich beyond
previous calculation. A cobbler made for some time two
hundred francs a day by establishing a stall for the supply
of pen and paper for the calculations of the speculators.
Men made a trade of lending their backs as desks upon
which speculators might write, and gained thereby con¬
siderable sums. _ The Due de Bourbon realised twenty
millions of francs, and the Due d’Antin twelve. Nor was
theirs a solitary example. Luxury increased in propor¬
tion to the establishment of wealth. Unheard-of prices
were paid for furniture, carriages, and articles of dress.
It seemed as though the age of gold had dawned. The
principal advantages, however, were realised by those
who happened to be in the confidence of Law. To
obtaiii his friendship, even his acquaintance, was the aim
of every man’s ambition. Princesses vied with duchesses
for the honour of an introduction to this disburser of
fortunes,® and when this was impossible, they did not
hesitate to have recourse to all sorts of artifices to obtain
an opportunity of speaking to him. All this time, the
great mart of business, the Eue Quincampoix, was crowded
by ‘ nobles and footmen, bishops and clergy, men of the
sword and shopmen, magistrates and pickpockets, mar¬
quesses and servants, Frenchmen and foreigners,’ all
animated by but one object, the scramble for wealth'.
So entire was the confidence in Law’s paper, that it was
actually preferred to coin, which was then regarded as
but a clumsy sort of circulating medium.f Law him¬
self was nominated, on January 5, 1720, Controflcr-
* The dowager Duchesse d’Origans other women kiss him ? Cochid,
wrote : ‘ Law is so pursued that he Law, son Systems et son Lpaque.
has no rest night or day. A duchess _ * Coekutj Law, son Systeme et son
has kissed his hand before everybody.
And if duchesses act thus, how will
52 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP THE INDIES.

chap. General of Finances, having paved the way for the

■—A— assumption of that high office by embracing the Eoman
1720' Catholic faith.
But though apparently at the summit of his ambition,
the crisis was at hand. Many of those who had realised
fortunes from their speculations were clearheaded enough
to perceive that it would be wise to invest a portion of
their gains in land. This movement, adopted almost
simultaneously by very many, threw a number of shares
into the market and cheapened the price of all. Even
at the end of 1719 shares had indicated gn inclination to
fall. Law, however, threw himself manfully into the gap.
By a series of measures he endeavoured to make the
possession of paper-money still more advantageous to the
public than specie. He offered increased facilities to
small capitalists and annuitants to invest in the scheme.
At the same time he showed a bold front to the public
by directing the employes of the Royal Bank to display
the utmost readiness to exchange specie for notes. But,
in February 1720, the rage for speculation had been
superseded by the rage for realising. Men of all sorts
hastened to exchange their notes for silver, and for the
most part to invest this silver in tangible property. To
such extravagance, in its turn, was this system carried,
that after the shops of the jewellers and upholsterers
had been exhausted, people invested their realisations in
groceries and even books. Any investment was preferred
to the now discredited paper. To so great an extent had
it fallen, in an incredibly short space of time, in public
estimation, that in March, shopkeepers advanced their
prices 50 and 100 per cent, when paper was presented
to them for payment.
Meanwhile Law, still confident, endeavoured, by fresh
artificial and arbitrary measures, to keep up the value
of paper and to lower that of specie. To effect this
purpose edict followed upon edict. It was forbidden to
employ silver in making payments above ten francs, or
 THE DOWNFALL OF THE SCHEME. 53

gold above three hundred. The wearing of diamonds, chap.

pearls, and precious stones was forbidden, and the manu- •—A—-
facture of articles of gold and'silver was confined to the lr20'
narrowest limits. A decree of the 2Sth January directed
a lowering of the standard of the coinage above a certain
value, with a view to recall all such pieces in circulation
into the Treasury. Another, of the 27th February, for-'
bade the possession by any one of more than 500 francs
in silver, and directed that all payments above 100
francs were to be made in bank-notes. On March 11,
gold was entirely recalled from circulation from May 1
following, and the use of silver, the small pieces ex¬
cepted, forbidden with effect from August 1. In the
same month, to prop up the Eoyal Bank, Law united it
to the Company of the Indies. The saleable value of
the shares of this latter was fixed, irrevocably, at 9,000
francs each, and two offices were opened for the con¬
version of shares into bank-notes, and vice vers&, at this
rate. The office for the conversion of shares into bank¬
notes was at once crowded. Taking the notes, men
rushed to sell these at a depreciated value for cash, or
sent them for sale in the provinces where they were still
accepted. The proceeds they invested in any sort of
tangible property.
Thesf contrivances did not prevent the downfall of
the entire scheme. The prohibitory clauses brought
indeed great stores of specie into the bank from the un¬
titled classes, but they were powerless against the higher
nobility who, in those days, were above the law.* But
though they brought in money, they absolutely destroyed
confidence, and the depreciation continued. Law, after
other minor experiments, which proved inoperative, en-

* As soon as the decree was issued the law. In the house of one shop-
thc Prince de Conti drew from the keeper, fifty' thousand marks in g-old
hank three carts full of crown pieces, and silver were seized by the State,
The Due de Bourbon withdrew on account of his non-compliance
twenty-five millions. Others, of with the edict.—Ztiw, son Syst&me
lower rank, wero unable thus to defy et son JSpoQtm.
54 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP THE , INDIES.

chap, deavourecl to stop the depreciation by the issue of a

—^—• decree on May 21, by which the value of the shares
1/20' was to be gradually decreased to 5,000 francs each, at
the same time that the bank-notes were reduced to one-
half their actual value. The measure, in consequence of
the debasement of the coinage, would, had confidence
•existed, have been beneficial to the shareholders. But
in the actual state of affairs they regarded if simply as a
depreciation of nearly one-half of their property. The
panic therefore increased so greatly in intensity that Law
was forced, on May 27, to issue another edict with¬
drawing that of the 21st. But this wavering on his part
only increased the want of confidence. Shares fell to a
mere nominal value; tumults took place in the streets;
capital had disappeared; the misery of the populace for
want of a purchasing medium increased daily; the Boyal
Bank was crowded by poor wretches anxious to exchange
their small notes for silver; a guard was placed over
Law, nominally to prevent his escape, really for his
protection. Everything foreboded a catastrophe. At
this crisis the Company of the Indies came forward, and
offered to take up all the depreciated notes of the Eoyal
Bank and to extinguish them at the rate of fifty millions
a month for a year, provided its commercial privileges
were made perpetual. This offer was accepted by the
Government; a decree dated June 1720, was issued, and
thenceforth the Company which ruled French India from
■ the Rue Vivienne is known in history under the designa¬
tion of the Perpetual*Company of the Indies.
But this measure, which the Parlement refused to con¬
firm, did not stop the panic. In October of the same year
it was therefore determined to effect a return to cash pay¬
ments. The union between the Royal Bank and the Per¬
petual Company of the Indies was therefore dissolved, and
that Company was reorganised on the footing of a com¬
mercial association independent of the State, the value of
its shares being reduced to 2,000 francs each. About the
 THE COMPANY EE-ORGAKISED. 55

same time the contract, which secured to it the right of chap.

coining money and collecting the revenues of the State, ■—^—
was cancelled. Shortly after, Law having been forced to 1720-
retire from France, its shareholders were declared respon¬
sible for all the engagements it had contracted and for all
the notes it had issued ; its property was sequestered, and
a provisional board, composed of officials denominated
Eegisseurs, was appointed by Government to carry on its
affairs. The investigations and cancellings to winch this
Board had recourse resulted in leaving the Company, in
1723, a private commercial association, with a capital of
112,000,000 francs in 56,000 shares of 2,000 francs each.
Two years later the number of the shares, was reduced by
5,000 representing 10,000,000 francs. Of all the great
privileges conceded to the Company during the adminis¬
tration of Law, there then remained only the inheritance
bequeathed to it by the old Company founded by Colbert,
and the monopoly of tobacco.*
Meanwhile, the Company of the Indies had not forgot¬
ten, in the midst of its vast speculations, one of the main
objects of its being. Confident in the permanence of its
prosperity, and anxious to draw from it every possible
advantage, it had equipped and despatched to Pondichery,
in 1720, three vessels richly laden, not only with the mer- .
chandisa of Europe, but with gold and silver. These
vessels reached their destination in 1721. Lenoir, the
ablest of the successors of Martin, had just then succeeded
temporarily to the office of Governor, in the place of M.
de la Provostiere,f who had died. He was a steady,
plodding merchant, shrewd, hard-headed, and well fitted
to be the chief of a peaceful community. But the arrival

* In this account of Law, the follow¬ t M. de la Provostiere was ap-

ing works have been consulted: Law,
son Systbnc ct son Epoqite. Cochut. sss on ”AugustSI0,tem8. ° He
Ilistoire (lit Hyst'emc des Finances sous died in October 1721, and was suc¬
la Minorite de Louis X V. Duverney. ceeded temporarily by Lenoir. —
With these have been compared the Extract from the Archives oftheCom-
various edicts issued during the Ke- pimy.
56 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP THE INDIES.

chap. 0f these three vessels took him completely by surprise.

•——■ We have already seen how, since the year 1712, the
172 Company had been absolutely obliged to give up its com¬
merce, and to abandon it, on certain considerations, to the
merchants of St. Malo. The sudden arrival then of ships
laden, not only with merchandise but with specie, was an
event for which Lenoir was by no means prepared. It
was nevertheless a most acceptable arrival. The non¬
payment of the debts originally contracted at Surat had
long lain heavily upon French credit in India. Other
obligations too had, in the state of destitution in which
the establishments had been left since the'death of Martin,
been unavoidably entered into at Chandernagore, Balasore,
and other places. Lenoir, correctly judging that good
credit was the foundation of mercantile success,, determined
to invest the greater portion of the money he received in
payment of the debts of the old Company, rather than,
leaving these unpaid, to purchase return cargoes for the
vessels. This course accordingly he adopted, with, how¬
ever, the unavoidable result that the Company received
but a very poor immediate return for a very large outlay.
Meanwhile, as we have seen, the system having col¬
lapsed, and the notes of the Company having been sup¬
pressed, before the close of 1720, it no longer possessed
the funds to equip ships for India. None were sent, there¬
fore, in 1721 or the year following. In consequence of
this, the settlement of Pondichery was reduced in 1722
and during the greater part of 1723 to the direst straits.
The local Government had neither merchandise, nor
money, nor resources, and became,, on that account, a
butt for the ridicule of its rival traders to the Hooghly
and the Coromandel coast. But this was not the worst
result of the collapse. Lenoir had, naturally enough, re¬
garded the advent of the three ships and the specie in
1721 as a type of what was to follow. He had, in fact,
been assured by his Directors that a similar supply should
be sent him yearly. In anticipation, then, of the arrival
 nunisi ruim

THE CRISIS AT POKDICHERY. 57

of the fleet of 1722, he hacl made great preparations to chap.

open out new markets for the expected cargoes. But -——^
when, not to speak of the cargoes, he was unable to wel- 17"2'
come even a ship, he felt utterly overwhelmed. His credit
had been pledged, and it was upon its credit with the
natives that the prosperity of the little settlement at Pon-
'dichery at this epoch mainly depended. But it is on such
occasions that the real character of a Government is most
surely tested. In this crisis the French settlers reaped
the advantage, not less of the system of good faith adopted
by Martin, than of the act of the previous year, by which
Lenoir had devoted his sudden accession of wealth to the
payment of the debts of the Company. The rich natives
unth whom he had contracted, knowing the cause of his
failure to fulfil his engagements, were content to wait for
better times. It was by their aid and forbearance alone
that Lenoir was enabled to save the credit of the colony
in this dire necessity. -
We have already noticed how in 1723 the restrictions 1728.
imposed by the French Government on the Company
were removed, and it was left in that year a private Com¬
pany with a capital of 112,000,000 francs. In conse¬
quence of this arrangement there were despatched to
Pondicliery two ships laden with merchandise. One of ;
these brought out likewise the nomination of M. Beau-
vallier de Courchant to the office of Governor in room of
Lenoir. M. Beauvallier assumed office on the 6th October
of that year, without however in any way interfering
with the system of his predecessor. The cargoes of the
two ships of 1723 did little more than satisfy the claims
which two years of neglect had produced in the French
settlement, and they were able to carry back but a poor
return in the shape of merchandise. Nevertheless from that
date to 1726 the Company continued to despatch each year
three or four vessels to Pondicliery, and by the aid of these
the nearly extinct commerce began gradually to revive.
Subsequently to 1726 it made still greater progress. The
58 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP THE INDIES.

chap, many years of peace, which, with but a slight intermission,

—^—• signalised the administration of Cardinal Fleury, were of
1728, the greatest advantage to the Company and its settlement.
Lenoir, who replaced M. Beauvallier as Governor for
the second time on September 4, 1726, had thought it
an immense advance on previous transactions, in being-
able to transmit to Europe in October 1727, and January'
1728, merchandise valued at 2,234,385 francs, nearly
900,000 rupees; but in September 1729, and January
1730, he sent home cargoes worth 5,404,290 francs, or
nearly 2,170,000 rupees; and although this was an ex¬
ceptionally good year for the colony, it testifies to the
great commercial progress made by the settlement, and to
its entire recovery from the state of nullity and depression
into which it had fallen in 1722 and 1723. The capital
of the Company had been reduced, as we have seen, in
1725, by the withdrawal of 5,000 shares, representing
10,000,000 francs, which were, by a royal decree, publicly
annulled and burnt in that year. The interest on the
remaining capital at 8 per cent, was provided by the sum
paid to the Company by the farmers-general for the
tobacco monopoly. The Company was able therefore to
hope for additional profits from the mercantile operations
we have recorded. But its expenses were considerable.
It had laid out large sums on Port L’Orientj, and had
' made it one of the finest harbours in Prance; it had been
compelled to place upon an efficient footing its marine
establishments there and in India; * to build large ships,
purchase lodges and comptoirs, and to erect magazines;
it had-been forced likewise to expend 15,000,000 francs
on the swamps of Louisiana. Still, until exhausting
wars, with their consequent ruin to commercial traffic
and' their large calls upon the Company for assistance,
increased expenditure and cut off all prospect of receipts,
the Perpetual Company of the Indies occupied a position,

* Dictionnairc do Commerce, toI. ii.

 LENOIR EMBELLISHES PONDICHERV.

which, if insignificant when compared with that it had

assumed in the golden era of the Controller-Generalship
of Law, was still considerable and promising.
To revert to the colony. With its prosperity Governor
Beauvallier had begun, and, after him, to a far greater
extent, Lenoir had carried on, those improvements in the
town Avhich had been in contemplation ever since the
time of Martin. As in the course of years the number of
its inhabitants, drawn thither by the increased traffic, had
greatly augmented, ifwas resolved, first of all, to surround
the city with a wall. For this purpose a tax was laid
upon the inhabitants, equal to one day’s pay per mensem.
This moderate impost produced a sufficient sum to enable
the authorities to commence the work, and even, after a
considerable time, to complete three sides of the town.
It was reserved for Dupleix, under a very pressing emer¬
gency, to erect the side, in his day the most important of
all, looking towards the sea. About the same period too,
commenced, on a great scale, the embellishment of the
town. Under the auspices of Lenoir and his successor
this made great progress. Ou the west side of the Go¬
vernor’s house a beautiful garden was laid out, planted
.with fine avenues, which served as public walks. In the
midst of this garden was a large and well-furnished
building,.tlestined to be the residence of foreign princes
and ambassadors. Near this was the college of the Je¬
suits, containing twelve or fifteen priests, to whom was
committed the care of the education of the youth of the
colony. There was a house also for the foreign Missions,
containing two or three priests, and another near it, for
the Capuchins, with seven or eight. One of the conditions
on which the land had been granted to the French re¬
quired toleration of the Hindoo religion; consequently the
two pagodas, or temples, which they found there, still
remained. All the streets were regularly traced out,
broad and at right angles, and the houses joined one
another. The sea face of the town was distant about a
60 THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OP THE INDIES.

chap, hundred yards from the sea, which at full tide had never
•—A—• more than two feet of water. Tire largest ships were
}i2G. forcecj £0 rj(je ahout three miles distant from the shore.
Its fortifications, as made after the restoration of the town
by the Dutch, and added to by Lenoir and Dumas, were
sufficient to keep out a native enemy, but it was not until
the -war of 1743 that Dupleix succeeded in making them
sufficient against the chance of European attack. The
native town was divided from the European town by a
canal; the houses in this were solidly constructed of wood
and chunam—the latter being a composition made of
shells ground to powder, and wrought into a kind of
paste, which, by exposure. to the air, becomes as white,
and almost as hard, as stone.
The Government of Pondicliery consisted of a Supreme
Council composed of not less than five members, presided
over by the Governor. In their hands was the entire
administration. Justice was administered and the laws
were enforced in the name of the King, but the Governor
and the Councillors were the servants of the Company,
liable to removal without any reference to the Sovereign
or his Ministers. All the colonial offices, judicial and
other, were in the gift of the Council, and to it were like¬
wise subject the subordinate chiefs of the' other Drench
comptoirs or settlements in India.* It is curious to read
the account of the state observed by the Governor in
those primitive ^days of Indian occupation. Attending
upon him on great occasions, it is stated, ‘ are twelve horse-
guards clothed with scarlet laced with gold, and an officer,
with the title of Captain, commands them. He has also a
foot-guard of three hundred men, natives of the country,
called peons, and when he appears in public, he is carried
in a palanquin very richly adorned with gold fringe.’
Such, however, was in those early days the economy of
the administration that, except on public or particular
 SUCCESS OP THE POLICY OF ffON-IXTERFEREffCE. 61

occasions, these guards were employed in the commercial CIjjiP‘

service of the Company, and earned all the wages they •—
received. At the time of the accession of M. Dumas, the
native population is computed to have exceeded seventy
thousand.
All the institutions dependent on the action of the local
Council received their full development during the incum¬
bency of the successors of Martin, more especially of
Lenoir. Theirs was indeed a system of peace. It would
perhaps have been happy for the colony had it been able
much longer to adhere to the policy of non-interference
with native Princes. But though its rulers were, for a
long time, animated by the very best intentions, circum¬
stances were ultimately too strong for them. But a few
months before Lenoir assumed the Governorship for the
second time, an event had occurred which introduced
prominently on the scene a man who was destined, some
years later, to act no inconsiderable part in the contests
which were then to ensue for existence or for empire.
That event we propose now to describe.
62 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH l’OWER IN INDIA.

CHAPTER HI.

THE RISE 03? THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap. In the year 1725, a small French squadron under the

■_command of M. de Pardaillan, acting under the orders
1725, of the Government of Pondichery, came to opposite the
little town of Maihi,* just below Tellichery, on the Mala-
] bar .coast, and summoned the place to surrender. The
Governor refused. The situation of Maihi indeed seemed
to place it out of all danger. On high ground rising up
from the sea, and washed on its north side by a little river,
the entrance into which, as it ran into the sea, was closed
by rocks for even the smallest boats, Maihi seemed to be
able to bid defiance to any enemy who should attack it
on the side of the sea.' So at least thought the Governor,
and so, apparently, seemed to think the French commo¬
dore. He, at all events, was hesitating as to the course
1 he should adopt under the circumstances, when the captain
A of one of his ships submitted to him a plan which he
I begged he might be permitted to carry himself into exe-
i'cution. The name of this captain was Bertrand Francois
Mahd de La Bourdonnais.
As this is a name which-will occupy considerable space
in these pages, it may be as well to take the earliest
opportunity of describing who and what manner of man
this was, the earliest trace of whose action in the Indian
seas we have just adverted to. La Bourdonnais was born
* But little is known of Maihi pursuance of orders from the Direct-
prior to the attack upon it by the ors, with the view to secure, on the
French. It formed nominally a part Mal'abar coast, a post that would
of the possessions of the petty Eajsih indemnify the French for the loss of
of Cherical, but, in all probability, was Surat. Tor this purpose Maihi was
practically independent The attack well suited.
 EAELY CAREER OP LA BOUBDOHNAIS.

at St. Halo in 1G99. When not ten years old he was

entered as a common sailor on board a merchant ship
bound for the South Sea. Returning thence, he made, in
1713, a second voyage to the East Indies, and to the
Philippines. During this voyage, a Jesuit on board taught
him mathematics. In 1716 and 1717, he made a third voy¬
age to the North Sea, and in the following year a fourth to
the Levant. In his twentieth year, he entered the service of
the French India Company, as second lieutenant in a ves¬
sel bound to Surat. In 1722, he was promoted to be first
lieutenant, and in^ that grade made a third voyage to the
Indies. He occupied his leisure hours during the passage
out in composing a treatise on the masting of vessels. But
he had an opportunity of showing on the return voyage,
that he was as daring in action as he was prompt and
ready in suggestion. His vessel, the ‘ Bourbon,’ on her
arrival off the Isle of Bourbon, was in a sinking state and
in want of everything. No ship was in sight, and no aid
was procurable from the island. In this extremity, La
Bourdonnais proceeded in one of the ship’s boats to the
Isle of France, to search there for a vessel to render assist¬
ance to his charge. His search was successful, and the
‘Bourbon’ was, by this daring exploit, saved from de¬
struction.
La Bou/donnais had scarcely returned to France, when
he found himself under orders to proceed to the Indies as
captain commanding a frigate. During his previous voy¬
ages, he had acquired a knowledge of navigation, of car¬
pentering, of everything that related to the construction
of a ship, and of gunnery. But in this, under the able
instruction of M. Diclier, an engineer in the Eoyal Service,
he devoted himself to engineering, and soon became a
proficient in that science. On arriving at Pondichery, he
was attached to the squadron of M. de Parclaillan, just
starting for the conquest of Maihi. It is under the orders
of this commodore, hesitating regarding the attack of the
place, that we now find him.
64 THE RISE OP TIIE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap. The plan which La Bourdonnais submitted to the com-

•—;—modore, was to land the troops oil a raft of his own
3‘ designing, in order of battle, under cover of the fire of the
squadron. He pressed also that he might be permitted'
to lead them himself. M. de Pardaillan, struck with the
ingenuity of the plan, and with the energy and quickness of
decision evinced by the young officer, gave his consent to
the scheme. It was carried out almost instantly. The
^ raft was made, the troops were placed upon it, and, piloted
!\by La Bourdonnais, were landed, with diy feet and almost
in order of battle, at the foot of the high ground. This
difficulty being surmounted, the place was stormed. As
an acknowledgment of the skill and enterprise of his
young captain, the commodore, by a slight alteration of
j the letters which went to form the name of the captured
^ town, transformed it from the Indian Maihi or Mahi
into the French Mahe—the first name of La Bourdon¬
nais. This new name not only took root, but it gradually
effaced the recollection that the town had ever borne an¬
other.*
The order of events, as they occurred at Pondichery,
will not allow us to proceed for the present with the ca¬
reer of La Bourdonnais. Him, we shall meet again, a little
later on the scene. Meanwhile it will be necessary to
advert to the proceedings of one whose influence upon
French India was destined to be even more direct, more
commanding, more enduring;—whose brilliant genius all
but completed the work which Franpois Martin' had be¬
gun ;—who was indebted for all that he did •accomplish
to his own unassisted energies ; who owed his failure to
carry through all liis high-soaring designs to that sys¬
tem of universal corruption, which, daring the reign of
Louis XV., consumed the very vitals of France, ruled in

* We are indebted to the Carnatic ‘MahS.’ It was evidently unlmown

Chronology of Mr. 0. P. Drown, late to Mr. Mill, and equally so to tlie
Madras C. S., for tlie information re- authors of the 1 Indian Gazetteers.’
garding the origin of the name
 DUPLEIX SENT INDIA. 65

her palaces, and tainted all her public offices. We need CHAP.
1U.
scarcely say, that we advert to Joseph Frangois Dupleix. -
"l725T
This illustrious statesman was born at Landrecies, in the
province of Flandre, in 1697. His hither was a wealthy
farmer-general of taxes, and a Director of the Company '
of the Indies. The young Dupleix displayed, at a very
early age, a strong passion for the exact sciences, and
particularly for mathematics. To the mercantile life, to
which his father had destined him, he showed a decided
aversion. To cure him, therefore, of his speculative habit
of thought, and to plunge him at once into practical life,
the old farmer-general sent the thoughtful and retiring
student, then just seventeen, to sea." The result corre- -
sponded entirely to his hopes. Dupleix returned from
voyages in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, cured of his .
love of abstract sciences, anxious to mix with the world,
eager to put in force theories he had formed on the sub¬
ject of commercial enterprise. It was in the power of
his father to comply at once with his wishes. Director of
the Company of the Indies, and a man of no small im¬
portance in the direction, he was able to nominate his
son, then only twenty-three, to the second position at
Pondichery. This was the office of First Councillor and
Military Commissioner of the Superior Council. Dupleix f
joined Ins appointments in 1720, and at once began top S'
put in force the theories which had formed the subject of
his speculations.- He found the colonists absorbed by the
contemplation and care of the trade between Europe and
Pondichery. His idea was to develop and foster a coasting
trade and inland traffic. He desired to open out large
schemes of commercial exchange at the various towns on
the coast, and with the large cities in the interior. It did
not seem sufficient to him, that Pondichery should be the
exporter merely of her own manufactures and the manu¬
factures of the country in the immediate vicinity; he would
make her the emporium of the commerce of Southern
 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

India. The Government of Pondichery was not pecu¬

niarily in a position, at the outset, to embark in the
undertaking, although the Governor, Lenoir, regarded its
execution as practicable, and even eminently desirable.
But this formed no bar to the prosecution of the plan by
Dupleix. On the contrary, private trading being per¬
mitted by the Company, he was glad of an opportunity of
showing the European residents of Pondichery, who were
mostly clerks of the Company, how they might, by legi¬
timate means, enrich themselves. Anything which could
open out to them an independent position would tend to
give them a higher interest in the country and in the
prosperity of the settlement. He himself did not scruple
to set a bold example, and to embark his fortune in the
trade. The results were such as he had anticipated. He
speedily realised a very handsome return, and the know¬
ledge of this had more effect than all his theories in in¬
ducing his fellow-countrymen to follow in his footsteps.
Since the formation of the Perpetual Company of the
Indies, the control of the Directors in Paris over their
. agents in Pondichery had become far more stringent and
I direct than it had been prior to 1720. Details were
1 interfered with, regarding the proper management of
which the Home Government could have no knowledge,
• and the most arbitrary, and often ill-judged, orders were
issued. These orders led to misunderstandings and dis¬
sensions, and it resulted from one of these, M. Lenoir
being at the time Governor-General, that in the. month
' of December 1726, Dupleix was suspended from his office
by order of the Directors.. But, though offered a free
passage to France, Dupleix determined to await in India
the result of an appeal he at once proceeded to make
against that decision. At the end of nearly four years,
I
! the result he had striven for occurred. • The sentence of
•suspension was removed (September 30, 1730), and, as
a compensation for- the injustice he had suffered, he was
appointed very soon after Intendant or Director of Chan-
 IS APPOINTED TO CIIANDERNAGORE.

dernagore, a junior officer previously appointed by Lenoir

being removed to make way for him.
From the period of its first occupation in 1676, to the
time when Dupleix assumed the intendontship, Chander-
nngore had been regarded as a settlement of very minor
importance. Starved by the parent Company in Paris, it
had been unable, partly from want of means, and partly
also from the want of enterprise on the part of the
settlers, to carry, on any large commercial operations.
The town, as we have seen,* had been fortified in 1688.
Lodges, or commercial posts, dependent upon Chauder-
nngore, had also been established at Kassim Bazaar,
Jougdia, Dacca, Balasore, and Patna. But their opera¬
tions were of small extent. The long stint of money on
the part of the Company of the Indies had had, besides,
a most pernicious effect upon the several intendants and
their subordinates. The stagnation attendant upon po¬
verty had lasted so long that it had demoralised the com¬
munity. The members of it had even come to regard
stagnation as the natural order of things. It had thus
deprived them of energy, of enterprise, of all care for the
future. The utmost extent of their efforts was limited to
an endeavour to surmount a pressing emergency. That
once accomplished, they relapsed at once into the far
niente mqde of life that had become habitual to them.
The place itself bore evidence to the same effect. It had
a ruined and forlorn appearance; its silent walls were
overgrown with jungle; and whilst the swift stream of
the Hooghly carried past it Eastern merchandise intended
for the rivals who were converting the mud huts of
Chuttanutty into the substantial warehouses of old Cal¬
cutta, the landing-places of Chandernagore were com¬
paratively deserted.
To govern a settlement thus fallen into a state of pas¬
sive and assenting decrepitude, Dupleix was deputed in

Chapter I.
 68 THE OP HIE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

, v^731. But, decaying and lifeless though he found it,

' Dupleix regarded its situation with far other feelings than
those of anxiety or dismay. He saw, almost at a glance,
the capabilities of the place, and, conscious of his own
abilities, having tried and proved at Pondichery his ideas
regarding the power of trade, he felt that. the task of
restoring Chandernagore. would, under his system, be
comparatively easy. The office of Intendaut had for him
this great recommendation, that there was something for
a man to do, and he felt that he was the man to do it.
Little time did he lose in deliberation. He at once set
in action the large fortune he had accumulated, and in¬
duced others to join in the venture. He bought ships,
freighted cargoes, opened communications with the in¬
fo terior, attracted native merchants to the town. Chander-
jVnagore soon felt the effect of her master’s hand. Even
'/the subordinates, whom he found there, recovering under
the influence of his example from their supineness, begged
to be allowed to join in the trade. Dupleix had room for
all. To some he advanced money, others he took into
partnership, all he encouraged. He had not occupied the
intendantship four years, when, in place of the half-
dozen country boats which, on his arrival, were lying
unemployed at the landing-place, he had at sea thirty
or forty ships, a number' which increased before his
departure to seventy-two, engaged in conveying the
merchandise of Bengal to Surat, to Jeddo, to Mocha, to
Bussora, and to China. Nor did he neglect the inland
trade. He established commercial relations -with some
of the principal cities in the interior, and even opened
communications with Thibet. Under such a system,
Chandernagore speedily recovered from its forlorn con¬
dition. From having been the most inconsiderable, it
became, in a few years, the most important and flourish¬
ing of the. European settlements in Beilgal. Its revival
caused the greatest satisfaction in France. The Govern¬
ment and the Directors thoroughly appreciated the ad-
 II. DUMAS GOVERNOR OP PONDICHERY.

vantage of having at the head of the settlement a man c^-p-

who had such confidence in his own plans, and who ——■
cared so little for responsibility, that he never hesitated 17°1-
to advance his own funds for public purposes. Dupleix
was always ready to do this, whilst he traded at the same
time on his own account. Thus it happened that his /
fortunes and the fortunes of Chandernagore grew up side*/
by side. If his own gains were great, a comparison of
the Chandernagore of 1741 with the Chandernagore of
17 31 would have shown that the gains of the dependency
which he governed were certainly not in smaller propor¬
tion.
Meanwhile M. Lenoir, whose second administration of ' 17
Pondichery and its dependencies lasted nine years, had
been succeeded as Governor-General on the 19th Septeni- 4^
ber, 1733, by M. Benoit Dumas, then Governor of J*-*
the Isles of France and Bourbon. Up to this period,
since the death of Franpois Martin, the relative position s
of Pondichery to the native chieftains in the neighbour- [
hood had but little varied. But with the advent of M. I
Dumas appeared the first symptoms of a new. order of^
tilings, in no way attributable indeed to the character of
that gentleman, but the consequence rather of the. cha¬
racter of the events of which the province of the Carnatic
was aboi\,‘ to become the scene. It is therefore necessary
that we should record the events of the government of
M. Dumas with some minuteness.
M. Dumas had been a servant of the old Company of
the Indies, He had entered the service at the age of
seventeen, in the j-ear 1713, and had proceeded direct to
Pondichery. Here he displayed so much ability and
aptitude, that, five years later, he was made a member
of the Supreme Council, and, in June 1721, Attorney-
General. Transferred thence to the Isles of France and
Bourbon as a member of the Supreme Government, and
filling there in turn the offices of General Director for
the Company of the Indies, and of President* of the
70 THE EISE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

°hap. Supreme Council, lie was finally appointed Governor of

■—A— those islands. This position he held till 1735,-when he
17S5‘ was nominated to succeed M. Lenoir as Governor-General
of the Trench possessions in the Indies.* The new
Governor was a shrewd, calculating, prudent man—one
not given to risk much without having in view a very
tangible result; brave, resolute, jealous of the honour of
France, thoroughly acquainted with native ways, holding
fast by the traditions of Fran§ois Martin, a lover of peace,
and anxious, above all, to extend the French territories
in India by smooth means.
M; Dumas, it may be imagined, was just the man to
Scarry out a mild and peaceful policy. Certainly under
i his sway Pondichery lost nothing of its attractiveness to
the independent native rulers. Indeed, almost imme-
' • diately after his accession to office, a circumstance oc¬
curred which served to knit, even more closely, the bonds
of friendship that existed between the French and the
most powerful of their neighbours—Dost Ah Khan,
Nawab of the Carnatic.
In 1732, Sadutoolla Khan, Nawab of the Carnatic, one
of the most enlightened native noblemen of that period,
died. His nephew and nearest of kin, Dost Ali, at once
assumed the vacant dignity, without Hor^mobtaining
the sanction of his immediate superior, the Vicetoy of the
Dekkan. It may have been 'partly on that account that
Dost Ali showed very early a disposition to lean upon
European support, and it was not long before he estab¬
lished very intimate relations with the courteous, hospit-
\ able, and friendly people who had established themselves
| at. Pondichery. With M. Dumas, in particular, he formed
!. an intimate friendship. Dumas, anxious to turn this to
the advantage of the settlement, pressed upon Dost Ali

* Tie account of tie previous ser- ing the ennobling of M. Dumas,

vices of M. Dumas is taken from tie on tie occasion of iis return to
letters patent issued by Louis XV., France.
• dated September 4, 1742, confirm-
 OBTAINS PERMISSION TO COIN MONET. 71

tlie advisability of procuring for him the permission to ? c^i>-

coin money—a permission which had been granted tot-—
the English, but, by them, after a short trial, neglected. \ 17u6‘
The Nawab forwarded the request with his own strong \
recommendations to Delhi, and he succeeded, at the end /
of 1736, in procuring a Firman issued by Mahomed Shah, j
' and addressed to the ISTawab of Arcot, authorising the
coinage by the French of the current coin of the realm,
in gold and silver, bearing, on one side, the stamp of the
Mogul, and, on the other, the name of the place at which
the money was coined.*
The advantages which the French derived from this
permission were very gre^&rdeed. The reputation of
the Indo-French mon.ey Trecame in a^short time so great,
that it was the cause of establishing a very profitable
trade in bullion. But, in addition, the actual profits were
large. The annual amount struck off did not fall short of
five or six millions of rupees,f and the profits on the
coining of this amount were considered equal to an in¬
come of 200,000 rupees annually;—a very great consi¬
deration in a settlement, which, like that of Pondichery,
was left almost to shift for itself by the Directors in
Europe. J
. But the intimacy with Dost Ali was productive of more
important results. Dost Ali had two sons, of whom the
'elderwaTBufder Ali, and several daughters, one of whom
was married to his nephew, Mortiz Ali, and another to a

* The following- is a translation of ness it was superior to the English *

an extract from, the letter addressed standard. The gold coin was called
on this occasion by Post Ali to M. the ‘ pagoda,’ equal in value to about
Pumas. ‘The reputation you have nine shillings. Three hundred and
acquired of being a true and faithful twenty rupees were considered equal
friend is known everywhere. In the to one hundred pagodas; hence an i. ■,
view, therefore, to gain your' friend- Indo-French rupee was worth more ivA
ship, I grant you permission to coin than two shillings and nine pence,
rupees at Pondichery of the coinage % As a reward for tire success of
of Arcot, conformably to the Pur- liis negotiations in this matter, M.
vvanah which I send you.’— Gmjon: Dunras was made ICnight of the
t The French rupee was a little Order of St. Michel, and received
broader than an English shilling, and patent letters of nobility.—Gmjon.
very mneb thicker. In point of line-
72 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA,

more distant relation, Chunda Sahib. Of these, Sufder

—Ali, whilst he did not altogether share his father’s liking
for the French, had a very great respect for their power,
and especially for the fortifications ofPondichery; Ohunda
Sahib, on the other hand, carried his admiration for the
foreigners to a very high pitch. Alone, perhaps, amongst
his countrymen, he understood them. Born himself with¬
out wealth, but possessing great capacity, considerable
energy, and unbounded ambition ; brought, moreover, by
his marriage with the daughter of Dost Ali, into a posi¬
tion, in which, whilst he dared openly aspire to nothing,
he might secretly hope for almost anything; yet possess¬
ing but a small personal following, and being ever in the
presence of relatives whose claims and whose power were
superior, and whose ambition wras equal, to his own ; he
had been for a long time sensible that he must look for
support beyond the circle of his own family. The posi¬
tion of the French bad early attracted him. He appears
even then to have detected their latent desire to increase
their territory. It is certain, at all events, that he took
the first opportunity to proffer his aid to bring fresh lands
under their rule. That he did this with the view to ob¬
tain for himself French support is scarcely to be doubted.
Ever since his connexion with Dost Ali, he, of all the
native allies of M. Dumas, had been the mostrfrequent
visitor at Pondichery, and had attracted, more than any
other, the personal regards of the high officials in that city.
* It had happened that at the end of the year 1785, the
Hindoo Raja of Trichinopoly had died without issue. A
contest for power immediately arose between his widow,
the Ranee, and a relation of the deceased prince. In her
distress, the Ranee appealed to Dost Ali for assistance. The
opportunity was too tempting to be foregone. Dost Ali
despatched a force, of which his son Sufder Ali was the
nominal, his son-in-law Chunda Sahib the real, commander,
to take possession of the disputed territories. The kino-dom
was soon overrun; the capital alone'bade defiance to the
 CII US’D A SAHIB TAKES TKICHIKOPOLY. 73

invaders. Of this, however, Chunda Sahib obtained pos- chap.

session the 26th April, 1736, on taking an oath,* that his •—-A—.
troops should be employed only in the service of the -1'36-
Banee. But he kept this oath only until Trichinopoly
was in his power; lie then imprisoned the Banee, and
being invested by Sufder Ali, who returned to Arcot,
'with plenary powers, he assumed the government as
lieutenant for his father-in-law. While in that position he
continued to maintain intimate relations with the French.
Adjoining Trichinopoly, lying between it and the Coro¬
mandel coast, lay^the Hindoo kingdom of Tanjore This
was bounded on the north side by the rivSrColeroon,
which falls into the sea about thirty miles below Pondi-
chery. Tanjore, one of the conquests of Shahjee, father
of the famous Sevajee, had been bestowed in perpetuity
by the latter on his brother Venkajee. Venkajee was
succeeded by his son Tookajee. This latter, dying in the
month of February 1738, left behind him three sons— 1738.
Baba Sahib and Sahoojee, legitimate, the third, Pertab
Singh, the offspring of a concubine. Baba Sahib suc¬
ceeded to the sovereignty, but died, the same year, with¬
out issue. After a short interregnum, during which Seid
Khan, the Mahomedan commandant of Tanjore, raised
two candidates only to cause them immediately to dis¬
appear, tjte surviving legitimate son, Sahoojee, obtained
possession of power. But in a very short time Seid Khan
brought forward Sidoojee, a pretended cousin of Sahoojee,
and endeavoured to effect a. revolution in his favour. Sud¬
denly collecting their friends, they seized on the palace and
on the strong places in.Tanjore. Sahoojee had barely time
to save himself on horseback. Accompanied by a few
friends, he passed the Coleroon, and took refuge in the
pagoda, Chillumbrum, a very strongly-fortified position
* Onne states that the people of himself free from the responsibility
the country believed that the Ranee of the oath, because he had taken it
Ifad fallen in love with Chunda Sa- upon a brick instead of upon the ICo-
hib; but the story is improbable, ran—the brick having been wrapped
Chunda Sahib may have considered up in the usual covering of the Koran,
 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

about six miles north of the Coleroon, and only twenty-

four distant from Pondichery. From this .place Sahoojee
^opened negotiations with M. Dumas. He offered to make
i over to the French the town of Karigal, and the fort of
' Kircan Gurree, ten villages in the country adjacent, and
5 all the lands depending upon them, if M. Dumas would
- afford him material aidripjJiQ) recoverylof^TanJofgr'Tllie
TiIFer~was tfte mosTtempting that couldTliave~)5een made.
The French had been long engaged in endeavouring to
effect an arrangement, which would secure to them a
footing in the kingdom of Tanjore, but up to that time
they had been thwarted by the jealousy of the Dutch at
Negapatam, a settlement a few miles south of Karical.
[I Now, however, all that they desired was offered to them.
The risk was but little, for they had but to supply one of
the contending parties with material aid to ensure an easy
victory. M. Dumas did not hesitate. He at once entered
into an engagement with the envoys. of Sahoojee, by
which he bound himself to supply that prince with a lakh
of rupees in silver, to furnish him with arms, gunpowder,
and other warlike stores, and to render him all other
assistance in his power. In return for this engagement,
Sahoojee sent him a formal cession of the town of Karical,
of the fort of Kircan Gurree on the river Karical, of the
ten villages, and of the lands dependent upon them. In
pursuance of this engagement, M. Dumas despatched two
ships of war, the ‘Bourbon’ of sixty guns, and the ‘St.Geran’
of forty, with troops, artillery, and warlike stores, to take
possession of Karigal, and to afford the promised assist¬
ance. These ships anchored before Karical in the month
of August of that year (1738).*
Meanwhile Sahoojee had been using other methods
more congenial to him than force. By dint of bribes and
promises he had gained over the principal nobility of

* Tlie account of the expedition Dumas to the Ahb6 Guyon, and from
against Karical has heen taken mainly a very old paper entitled Memoirs
from the statement communicated by partiadiire sur1’acquisition deKaricd.
 PRUDENCE OP M. DUMAS. 75

Tanjore, and amongst them the all-powerful Seicl. A CHAP.

in.
plan of operations was agreed upon in pursuance of which,
the usurper, Sidoojee, was suddenly seized in his palace.
Intelligence of this -was at once despatched to Chillum-
brum, and Sahoojee immediately ■ mounting his horse,
returned in triumph to Tanjore.
This was the intelligence that greeted the captains of the
‘ Bourbon ’ and the1 St. Geran,’ when they anchored in the
roads of Karical. It was accompanied by an intimation
that the French succours were not wanted ; that Karical
was occupied by between three and four thousand, troops
under Khan Sahib, a trusted officer of Sahairo7^nd that
any attempt to land rvould be considered as a hostile act,
and would be met accordingly. In consequence of this
intimation the senior French captain determined to suspend
action pending instructions from Pondichery.
But whilst Sahoojee had transmitted instructions of the
nature we have recorded to Karical, he had written in a
somewhat different strain to M. Dumas. To him he de¬
clared his perfect willingness to surrender Karical, but the
impossibility of doing so immediately. He was, he said,
scarcely secure in his own capital, and he -was threatened
at the same time by Chunda Sahib from Trichinopoly.
He pointed out the impossibility of surrendering, under
such circumstances, resources which were essential to his
safety.
These excuses, plausible though they were, did not
deceive M. Dumas. Yet there can be no doubt that the
slipping from his grasp of this much-coveted place just a.t
the moment his hand was closing upon it, caused him
great mortification and annoyance. He was -well aware,
at the same time, that with the force in the two ships of
war before Karical, it would have been easy to take pos¬
session of the place, and that, to a less prudent man,
•would have been a very great temptation. But M. Dumas’
great characteristic was. prudence. He would not risk,
even for so valuable a prize, the character gained by the
76 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

CiiiP' ^renck as a non-aggressive nation. He preferred to wait

■——■ for the opportunity wliicli he felt sure would, sooner or
1788- later, present itself, satisfied that he had made a great step
; in advance in having secured from the Bajah of Tan) ore
the legal cession of Karical and its dependencies. He
therefore recalled the ships to Pondichery.
The opportunity he waited for soon came. Ho sooner
did the intelligence reach Chunda Sahib that Bajah Sa-
hoojee had refused to fulfil his engagement regarding
Karical, than it seemed to that astute prince that the mo¬
ment had arrived for him to cement his, alliance with the
French. He accordingly wrote to M. Dumas, informing
him that he was at war with Sjifckeojeef'lftM offering to
march his own troops upon Karical, to conquer it, and to
make it over, in full sovereignty, to the French. From
them he asked no assistance : he would employ, he said,
none but his own soldiers.
Chunda Sahib, it will be recollected, was son-in-law of
Dost Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic, and feudal lord of the
territory to the north of the French possessions; he him¬
self, as Dost Ali’s lieutenant, held the country on the south¬
west ; that on the south-east alone was held by the Bajah
of Tanjore. It was clear then that Chunda Sahib’s offer
to conquer a portion of that Bajah’s possessions involved
no risk to the French ; it did not even invoke theTsuspicion
of a greed for territorial extension. It was the ofier of a
powerful Indian potentate to compel a weaker ruler to
adhere to his agreement. M. Dumas then violated no
principle of his predecessors’ policy by accepting that
offer. This he did almost as soon as it was made.
Ho sooner had Chunda Sahib received this permission
to act, than he detached four thousand horse, commanded
by Francisco Pereira, a Spaniard in his service, but who
was entirely attached to French interests, to Karical. The
Tanjore forces receded at their approach, and Pereira
arrived at Karical, February 6, 1739, without meet¬
ing with any opposition. . He found, however, the fort of
 THE FEE2TCH ACQUIRE KARICAL. 77

Kircan Gurree, on the river Karical, and about a mile and chap.
a half from the town, occupied, by about four hundred •—•
Tanjoreans. He immediately attacked this fort, and/?1'89-
stormed it the same day. He then hastened with the'
news to Pondichery. M. Dumas, delighted with the
prompt success, at once equipped a small vessel of a
hundred and fifty tons burden, and despatched her with
all the troops and stores she could carry to Karical-f-
Pereira accompanying them. They reached their destina¬
tion in four and twenty hours, when Karical, the fort of
Kircan Gurree, .and the adjacent territory, previously
ceded by Sahoojee, were made over to the French by*
Pereira. This cession bears date February 14, 1739.
A. few days later, on receiving an account of the French
.occupation, M. Dumas despatched to Karical a ship of war,
laden with everything necessary to place the settlement in
a state of security.*
The effect, of these forcible measures upon Rajah Sa¬
hoojee was such as might have been expected from a man
of liis weak and unmanly nature. It completely overawed
him. He at once sent messages to Pondichery, casting
all the blame of his previous hostile conduct on the evil
counsels of the Dutch at Negapatam ; stating that he had
always intended to cede the territory at the proper time ; /
and professing his readiness now to execute in full the
treaty of Chillumbrum. As a proof of his sincerity, he
sent at the same time two instruments, dated April 25,
1739, one of which contained a ratification of the former
treaty, and the other, an order to the inhabitants of the /
districts he had yielded, to acknowledge and obey the
French in future as their masters. It is probable that the
complaisance of Sahoojee in this matter was quickened by
the fact that one of the clauses of the treaty of Chillum¬
brum contained a stipulation for the payment to him of

* Full details of these occurrences particuliere tar l'acquisition de Ka-

are given in Guyon’s Histoire des rtcal.
Indes Orientates, and in tlie Memoire
78 THE EISE OP THE FRENCH POWEE IN INDIA.

chap. 100,000 rupees—a stipulation which the French, now

tin possession, might, according to oriental notions, have
1739. 1300^ inclined to evade. Before, however, his proposi¬
tions reached Pondichery, a domestic revolution hurled
Sahoojee from his throne.' But his successor and half-
brother, Pertab Singh, not only confirmed the agree¬
ment of Chillumbrum, but added to it a greater extent of

1 territory. In a personal interview he held with M. Dumas

in the beginning of the year 1741, Pertab Singh even
; recommended him to fortify the towns in his new posses-
I sions. Prom this date, the district of Karical may be
regarded as an integral portion of the French possessions
[ in India.*
But meanwhile events of great importance had oc¬
curred. The Mahomedaii conquests in the south of India,
had roused the jealousy of the Mahrattas, and an army of
50,000 f men .of these famous warriors had assembled
under the orders of Baghojee Bhonsla—serving under
whom, his first campaign, was the afterwards famous
Morari Bao — and had marched eastward with the
avowed intention of plundering the long-untouched Car¬
natic. But Dost Ali was not prepared to grant them,an
easy ingress. Learning, towards the end of 1739, that
they were approaching by the Damalcherry pass, situ¬
ated to the north of the river Pone, he at once'occupied
that strong position with the only troops at his disposal,
amounting to about 10,000 men, and sent pressing orders

* The ceded districts consisted of 5.000 inhabitants. The fortress of

the town of Karical, the fortress of ICircan Gurree was about gunshot
Kircan Gurree, ten villages on the distance from Karical. Doth are on
sea-coast, and. a tract of country fif- the river Karical, a branch of the
teen or sixteen miles in extent, very Coleroon, navigable for vessels of
fertile in l-ieo, and producing also about 200 tons burden. Karical is
cotton and indigo, inhabited by ten 76 miles south of Pondichery and 12
or twelve thousandneonle. and vield- miles north of Negapatam.
ing a yearlv rent of ten thousand t Grant Duff (History of the. Mah¬
pagodas,
1 -a, aequal to about £4,500 ster- rattas).—Captain Duff took the num¬
ling. The x—a 0f jCai-ical, at the bers from Maliratta manuscripts; they
time of cession, contained G38 houses differ somewhat from those given bv
stone and brick,, and upwards of Orme and other writers. '
 DOST ALI DEFEATED AND SLAIN.

to his son, Sufder Ali, and to his son-in-law, Chunda

Sahib, to hasten to his assistance. But both Sufder Ali
and Chunda Sahib were prosecuting their conquests in
the south of India, and though they professed their rea¬
diness to obey the summons they had received, they
moved, especially Chunda Sahib, with slow and unwilling
steps. Before they could arrive, the Mahrattas had ap¬
proached the pass. This, as the most important, was
hek^ by. Dost Ali in person, but there was a gorge, or
opening, to the south of his position, the defence of which
he had intrusted to one of his commanders, a Hindoo.
This latter had allowed himself to be seduced from his
allegiance, and permitted the Mahratta army to march
through the gorge' he was guarding on the night of the
19th May. The Mahrattas, thus secure of their prey,
moved swiftly at daybreak the nest morning on the rear
of the position occupied by Dost Ali. This chieftain,
noticing the approach of cavalry, imagined that his son,
Sufder Ali, had arrived to reinforce him, and was only
undeceived when their movements indicated undisguised
hostility. Driven to bay, however, he determined to sell his
life dearly. The battle which ensued was, notwithstanding
the disparity of numbers, contested most desperately, and
it only terminated when Dost AH himself and his second
son, HasSan Ali, lay dead upon the field, and his first
Minister, Meer Assud, had been taken prisoner. Almost
all the principal officers were killed or trodden under foot
by elephants, and the slaughter was unprecedented even
in that age. Ho rout could have been more complete.
The account of this defeat spread dismay and conster¬
nation in the Carnatic. , Sufder Ali, the son of the de¬
ceased Nawab, received the news when he had advanced
as far as' Arcot; he immediately, for greater security,
moved at the head of his forces to Vellore, which was
better fortified, there to wait the course of events.
Chunda Sahib, more dilatory, had not moved beyond
the boundary of his satrapy. The intelligence he received
 THE RISE OB' THE DRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

C'niP' (^etei'mi1'ie(l him to remain within it, and to place its chief
—r——■ city in the best possible state of defence. He returned,
1740‘ therefore, to Trichinopoly.
On one important matter, however, the two brothers-
in-law acted as though they had been inspired by one
brain. Begarding the result of the contest with the
Mahrattas as extremely uncertain, they bethought them
of the protection which the fortifications of Pondichery
might be able to offer, and they determined to consign,
the one his father’s family, the other his own, with all the
valuables that could be lightly carried, rto the courtesy of
M. Dumas.
M. Dumas was placed, by the result of the battle,
in very much the same position as that in which M.
Martin had found himself after the defeat of Shere Khan
Lodi by Sevajee. On that occasion, as on this, the Mah¬
rattas had completely defeated the actual rulers of the
country—the allies and protectors of the French. There
was, however, this difference, that the Pondichery go¬
verned by M. Dumas was far more capable of offering an
effective , resistance than the infant-city under the rule of
Frangois Martin. But M. Dumas, notwithstanding his
confidence in the defences of Pondichery, was very Well
aware of the difficulties of his position, and. he prepared
to act with his usual prudeuce and judgment. He greatly
strengthened, with all the means at his disposal, the west
fortifications of the place. For fifteen days carts and
beasts of burden were seen pouring into Pondichery laden
with grain and other stores. M. Dumas superintended
himself all the arrangements for procuring and storing
this grain, and of ordering the defences. ' No point was
neglected; his industry was untiring. At the same time,
the natives of the surrounding country, who had anything
to lose, poured in in vast numbers, bringing with them
their stores and valuables. But other and greater guests
were approaching. On May 25th, five days after the
battle, whilst the preparations we have above alluded to
 M. DUMAS DECEIVES TIIE WIDOW DOST ALI. 81

-were still progressing, a grand cortege was seen moving ciiap.

towards Pondichery. This proved to be the widow of -—■
Dost Ali Khan, with her children, her dependents, her 17'i0'
jewels and other property, under the escort of a large
body of cavalry. Arriving before the walls, she at once
sent a message to the Governor, praying for admission
into the city.
None knew better than M. Dumas, that if anything
would most certainly draw down upon himself the power
of the Malirattas, and would infallibly induce them to
move upon Pondichery, it would be the knowledge of tire
fact that the city contained within its walls the most valu¬
able property of the late Nawab. It is certain that under
any circumstances, the chivalrous feelings natural to a
real man would have incited him to throw wide open the
gates to one who was not only a woman, but a woman in
distress. But there was no occasion for him to act from
mere feeling. It was preferable in his eyes to run the
risk of bringing the Malirattas upon Pondichery, than to
undergo the certainty of being dishonoured and contemned
throughout India. Sufder Ali also was still unsubdued,
and the refusal to admit his mother- would undoubtedly
make an enemy of one, who had even then the best chance
of becoming the feudal lord of the country about Pondi¬
chery. However, before replying to the request of the
widow of Dost Ali, M. Dumas summoned a Council. He
told the members that, in his opinion, honour, gratitude,
humanity, and policy, all pointed to t.lie admission ; ho
added his reasons, pointed out the risks, and then asked
for their opinion. The Council approved his arguments,
and a decision was at once arrived at to admit the ca¬
valcade.
This was done with great state and ceremony. The
garrison was placed under arms, the ramparts were
manned. The Governor himself, in a magnificent palan¬
quin, and followed by his horse and foot guards, went down
to the Yaldaur gate. The gate was then thrown open.
82 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap. Immediately there entered the widow of the Nawab, her

—.—'—■ daughters and relations, in twenty-two palanquins, followed
1740- by fifteen hundred cavalry, eight elephants, three hundred
camels, two hundred bullock-carts, and two thousand
beasts of burden. The entrance of the principal person¬
age was saluted by a discharge of cannon from the ram¬
parts, and she was conducted by M. Dumas in person to
the apartments he had provided her.* A similar hospit¬
able reception was accorded a few days later to the wife
and son of Chunda Sahib, f Meanwhile the Mahrattas,
taking advantage of their victory, ha/1 marched upon
Arcot, and had occupied it without opposition. Thence
they sent detachments to pillage the country. But though
the devastation they caused was ruinous and often wanton,
the actual receipts fell far short of their expectations. The
inhabitants of the Carnatic had taken advantage of the
first rumours of war to remove all their valuables into
fortified places. Some had fled to Madras, some to Vel¬
lore, some to Pondichery. The consequence was, that
though the Mahrattas gleaned every blade of grass, there
was but little else to gather, and they were beginning to
feel, that looking at it with the eyes of marauders, the
campaign had been a failure.
That was a frame of mind which would willingly have
listened to offers of payment for retiring from iso barren
and desolated a country, and such offers they did receive
at the proper time. They had liberated Meer Assud, first
Minister, of the deceased Dost Ali, and he, betaking him¬
self to Vellore, prevailed upon his new master to make
proposals of peace to the invader. Meer Assud was a
bitter enemy of Chunda Sahib, and he had succeeded in
imbuing the mind of Sufder Ali with suspicions as to the

* These details, together with the der Ali also took refuge in Pondi-
account generally of M. Dumas’ ad¬ chery, hut it appears from the corre¬
ministration, are taken from the ex¬ spondence of M. Dumas with the
tracts given in the Abbe Guyon’s Mahrattas that she joined her hus¬
work, already referred to. band at Vellore.
f Ornie states thatthe wife of Suf¬
 HE DEFUSES TO SURRENDER HIS GUESTS. 83

designs of his brother-in-law. He had easily convinced chap.

him also that the sacrifice of Chunda Sahib would lighten -—^—
the conditions likely to be imposed .upon himself. This 1740‘
being agreed upon as a basis, negotiations were opened,
and after a short interval, a treaty was signed in the
month of August 1740, by which it was arranged that Suf-
der Ali should be recognised as Nawab of the Carnatic in
place of his father; that he should pay by instalments ten
millions of rupees to the Mahrattas; that he should join
his troops to those of the Mahrattas to drive Chunda
Sahib from Arcot j and that all the Hindoo princes on the
Coromandel coast should be reinstated in possession of
the places they held prior to 1736. The two last articles,
however, were kept secret, and the better to prevent their
existence being suspected, the Mahrattas at once retired
from the Carnatic.
Some information, however, regarding the secret clauses
of this treaty reached M. Dumas, and he did not fail to
take advantage of it. He had already teen threatened
by Baghojee Bhonsla, and a correspondence, not tending
‘ at all to accommodate matters, had ensued between them.
He had been asked to pay tribute, and he had refused ; lie
had been called upon to give up the wife and son of
Chunda Sahib with their treasures, he had replied that all
the Frencjl in India -would die first.; Ponclichery had been
threatened with the fate of Bassein, then recently cap¬
tured by the Mahrattas from the Portuguese, he had an¬
swered that if the Bhonsla came against Ponclichery, he
would try to deserve his esteem by successfully defending
it.* In this state of the correspondence, the intimation
* The following are extracts from 'Our sovereign, persuaded thatvou
the correspondence between Raglio- were deserving of liis friendship, that
iee. Bhonsla and M. Dumas: From the French were people of their word,
Haghojee Bhonsla. ‘Forty years have who would never fail in their engage-
elapsed since our sovereign gave you menta towards him, made over to you
permission to establish yourselves at a considerable territory. You agreed
Dondichery; nevertheless since our to pay an annual tribute, which you
army has arrived in these parts, 1 never have paid. At last, after a
have not received a single letter from considerable time, the army of the
you. Mahrattas has arrived in these dis-
84 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

CHAP. he had received regarding the secret clauses was of great

importance. He continued, with the same' ardour, the
1740.
tricts. It lias beaten the Mussul¬ Extract from the reply of M. Du¬
mans, puffed up with pride, and forced mas: ‘You tell me that we have
them to pay tribute. We need not owed for forty years past a tribute to
tell you this news. We have now your King. Never has tbe French
orders from the Maharaja to taho nation been subject to any tribute..
possession of the fortresses of Tric-hi- It would cost me my head, if the
nopoly and Gingee, and to put garri¬ King of France, my master, were in¬
sons in them. We have also orders formed that I had consented to pay
to collect the tribute due from tbe tribute to any one. When tho princes
European towns on the sea-coast. I of the country gave to the French a
am obliged to obey these orders. piece of land oil the sands of the sea¬
When we consider your conduct, and shore, upon which to huild a fortress
the manner in which the King has and a town, They required no other
favoured you. in allowing you to es¬ conditions, but that the pagodas and
tablish yourselves in his territory, I the religion of the people should be
cannot hinder myself from saying that unmolested. Although your armies
you are wrong in not paying this tri¬ have never yet appealed in our neigh¬
bute. We bad consideration for you, bourhood, we have always faithfully
and you have acted against us. You observed these conditions. * * ’*
have" given refuge to the Moguls in ‘ You say that you have orders to
your town. Was that well done? take possession of the fortresses of
Again, Ckunda Sahib has left, under Gingee and Trichinopoly. Well and
your protection, the treasure chests good, so long as that does not oblige
of Trichinopoly and of Taujore—the you to become our enemy. As many
precious stones, elephants, horses, and of the Moguls as have fieon masters
other things of which lie possessed here have treated the French with
himself in those kingdoms, as well as friendship and distinction. From .
Iiis family—was that, too, well done? them we have received only favours.
If you wish that we should be friends, In virtue of this friendship, we have
you must give up this treasure, these given shelter to the widow of the late
jewels, those horses, these elephants, Nawnb, Dost Ali Khan, with all her
as well as the wife and son of Ghiuida family. Ought we to have shut our
Sahib. I send my cavalry to whom gates and leave themin_the country ?
you can make them over. If you de¬ Men of honour are incapable of such
cline to do so, we shall he compelled cowardice. Tbe wife of (JbundaSaliib
to force you to it, as well as to the pay¬ has also come hither with lier mother
ment of the tribute which you have and her brother, and the others have
kept back for forty years. proceeded to Arcot.
1 You know bow we have treated ‘ You have written to me to make
tbe town of Bassein. My army is over to your horsemen this lady, her
very numerous, and it wants money son, and the riches she has brought
for its expenses. ^ If you do not act here. You, who are a nobleman full
in conformity with my demands, I of bravery and generosity, what would
shall know how to draw from you you think of me, if I were capable of
■wherewith to pay my whole army. such baseness ? Tbe wife of Chnnda
Our ships will arrive in a few days. Sahib is in Pondichery under the
It will be better for you to terminate protection of the King of France, my
the matter quickly. I rely upon master, and all the French in India
your sending me, in conformity with would die rather than deliver her to
this letter, the wife and son of C'luinda you. * * *******
Sab ih, with his elephants, horses, ‘You threaten me finally that if I
jewels, and treasure.’ do not comply with your demands,
 SUFDEE ALI VISITS POXDIOIIERY. 85

repair of the fortifications at tiie same time that new cle- csap.
fences were erected. lie formed a body of European •—A—
infantry 1,200 in number, and supplemented them by
four or five thousand Mahomedans, whom he armed and
drilled in the European fashion—the germ of the Sepoy
army—and who were found most useful in performing
the routine duties of the garrison. He brought into the
town also, all the crews of the ships in the roads, and
exercised them in the various operations of land warfare.
Stores of all sorts he likewise continued to accumulate.
Whilst these preparations were going on, the new
Eawab, Sufder Ali, paid a visit to Pondichery. The
avowed object was to thank M. Dumas for the protection
he had afforded to the female members of his father’s
family. Hone knew better than Sufder Ali, how galling
to the Mahrattas had been the knowledge that the fami¬
lies and valuables of his late father and of Chunda Sahib
were in safety behind the walls of Pondichery. He was
well aware that Baghojee Bhonsla, their leader, had ex¬
pressed his determination to make the French suffer for
• their audacity; and he, in common with the other chiefs
of the Carnatic, had been struck with admiration at the
quietly defiant attitude assumed by M. Dumas. His
object in visiting him now was to thank and to reward
him. He*was quickened in this also, by a message his
mother sent him from Pondichery, desiring to see him.
Chunda Sahib, who knew little of the storm that was
brewing against him, and who had already at Arcot
offered homage to his brother-in-law as Nawab of the

you will send your armies against me confidence in Almighty God, before
and lead them hither yourself. I am whom the most powerful armies are
preparing myself to the utmost of my like the light straw which the wind
ability to receive you well, and to blows away. I hope He will favour
deserve your esteem, by showing that the justice of our cause. I have
I have the honour of commanding heard what lias happened at Bassein,
the bravest nation in the world, who hut that place was not defended by
know how to defend themselves with Frenchmen.’—Mhnoira clans ks Ar~
intrepidity against those who attack chives cle la Cmnpapnie ties Index
them unjustly. Above all I place my
86 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH ROWER IN INDIA.

chap. Carnatic and his liege lord, accompanied him on this

—• occasion to Pondichery.
1740. There they arrived on the evening of September 1,
1740, and were received with great demonstrations of
friendship and respect by M. Dumas, in a tent, splendidly
adorned and illuminated, without the walls. After rest¬
ing there some time, Sufder Ali was conducted to the
house which Lad been set apart for his mother and sisters
in the public gardens. Here he remained for two days
in mourning and seclusion. On the 4th, Sufder Ali paid
a visit of state to M. Dumas. He thanked him repeatedly
for the courtesy and hospitality extended to the members
of his father’s family, at a season of great difficulty and
danger; declared that it should never be forgotten, and
that henceforth the French should be as much the masters
of the Carnatic as he himself was. Although these words
were merely the expression of the oriental form of gra¬
titude, and were doubtless only taken as such, the Hawaii
had evidently deemed it sound policy on his part to con¬
ciliate M. Dumas by some practical proof of his esteem.
Simultaneously with the announcement of his arrival at *
Pondichery, he had delivered to the French Governor a
parchment conferring upon him personally lands border¬
ing on the southern territory of Pondichery, bringing in
a yearly revenue of 10,000 rupees. Tills cession was
soon afterwards confirmed by a finnan from the Court
of Delhi.
After a stay of several days in Pondichery the visitors
left, Sufder Ali with his father’s family proceeding to
Arcot, Chuncla Sahib, leaving his wife and family with
their jewels in Pondichery, making his way alone to
Trichinopoly. To the immediate fortunes of this chief¬
tain we must now turn our attention.
That M. Dumas had a strong idea that all clanger from
the Mahrattas had not passed away, is evident from the
fact that even after their departure, he continued to labour
at the fortifications and to store supplies. That he had
 CHU2TDA SAHIB ATTACKED BY MAHEATTAS.

communicated these suspicions to Cliunda Sahib, and had chap.

induced him, on the strength of them, to leave his family
and valuables at Ponclichery, is extremely probable. Yet 1740,
it is certain that Cliunda Sahib had no sooner quitted
Pondichery than he began to act in a manner entirely
inconsistent with the idea that he had any fear of a second
Maliratta inroad. During the first invasion, he had taken
the precaution to store Trichinopoly with grain, under
the conviction that with ample supplies within the walls,
the fortifications were strong enough to keep out the
Mahrattas for an indefinite period. But no sooner had
he returned from his visit to Pondichery, than, as though
he felt assured of the future, he sold the grain, and so
far from thinking* that any necessity to defend his own
territories could arise, he began to entertain a design of
adding to them, and sent for that purpose his brother,
Bara .Sahib, to Madura. This was in the end of No¬
vember. An account of the movements of Bara Sahib
and the unprovided state of Trichinopoly was quickly
conveyed to Rnghojee, who, at the head of his Mahrattas,
had retired only to Shevagunga, some eighty miles in a
southerly direction from the capital. The news was that
for which Raghojee had been waiting. Without an hour’s
loss of time, he assembled his forces, made forced marches
upon Trifthinopoly, and sat down before it, before Cliunda
Sahib had taken any steps to replenish his empty stores.
Nevertheless, though taken by surprise, Cliunda Sahib
resolved to defend himself with resolution. He had
hopes too from his brother, Bara Sahib, and to him
accordingly he sent a message urging him to march to
his relief. Bara Sahib at once complied, and collecting
supplies, escorted them, at the head of three thousand
horse and seven thousand foot, towards Trichinopoly.
The Mahrattas, however, had knowledge of all liis move¬
ments, and on his approaching to within about fifteen
miles of the city, they detached a superior force—
amounting to about 20,000 men—to intercept him. A
 THE RISE OF TIIE FRENCH TOWER IN INDIA.

crap, desperate encounter ensued, Bara Sahib fighting with all

■——- the energy of despair. A chance shot, however, hurled
1'i0' him from his elephant, and his followers, missing the
inspiration of his presence, at once gave way. The body
of Bara Sahib, which was found on the field of battle,
was carried to the camp before Trichi nopoly, clothed
there in rich stuffs, and sent in to Cliunda Sahib, to
announce to him, as under similar circumstances the
head of Asdrubal had announced to Hannibal, the futility
of depending upon his brother for aid.
Tims driven to depend upon his own resources, Cliunda
Sahib nevertheless continued to display unflinching re-,
solution and determined courage. At last, after defend¬
ing himself for upwards of three months, the trenches
having been opened on the 15th December, having ex¬
hausted all his money, stores, almost all his ammunition,
and having lost some of his best troops, he had no alter¬
native but to surrender. The terms were hard, his life
only being secured to him, but they were the best lie
could obtain. On the 21st of March, he opened the
gates of tiie city, and surrendered himself a prisoner.
He was at once sent off under a strong guard to Sattara,
whilst the Malirattas appointed Morari Bao as Governor
of the kingdom, leaving 14,000 men to support him.
Whilst engaged in the siege of Trichinopoly, JEtaghojee
Bhonsla had not ceased to lavish his threats upon M.
Dumas. His demands even increased. They now em¬
braced the immediate payment of 6,000,000 rupees, a
regular annual tribute, and the delivery to liim of the
wife and son of Cliunda Sahib, with their elephants,
horses, and jewels. To these demands M. Dumas con¬
tinued to oppose a steady refusal. He took, however,
the precaution of despatching a special messenger to the
Isles of France and Bourbon, requesting the early trans¬
mission of as many men as could be spared thence to
reinforce his garrison. The Mahratta, however, was bent
upon intimidating him. In this view, whilst still liimself
 EAGHOJEE THREATENS PONDXCIIERT. 80

before Trichinopoly, lie detached a force of about 16,000 chap.

men to beat up the coast. These marched upon Porto- •—ri—
novo, a town about thirty-two miles south of Pondichery, 1741’
and then used as a depot by the Dutch, French, and
English. This they plundered, though little to the detri¬
ment of the French, who had taken the precaution to
'move the greater part of their property within Pondi-
ehery. They next moved upon Cuddalore, an English
settlement twelve miles from Pondichery, and pillaged it.
Marching then to within five miles of the French settle¬
ment, and halting there, they sent, in threatening letters
to M. Dumas, -whilst they detached small parties to ravage
the country and to collect plunder. At the same time,
in pursuance of advices received from the Bhonsla, an
expedition was organised on the western coast to attack
the French settlement of Mali A
M. Dumas was uot appalled by these letters, nor by
the still more threatening visit of one of the chief officers
of the Mahratta army, sent to inform him that the fate
of Trichinopoly was reserved for Pondichery. On the
contrary, he received this officer with the utmost polite¬
ness, showed him the supplies he had stored up, the guns
bristling on the ramparts, the drilled Europeans, the
armed Sepoys; he hid, in fact, nothing from him. He
then calmly informed him, that so long as one French¬
man remained alive, Pondichery would not be evacuated.
With reference to the demand of the Mahratta General
for tribute, he sent a message to him through the envoy
that the territory occupied by the French possessed
neither mines of gold nor mines of silver; but that it
was rich in iron, and that those who occupied it were
ready to use that iron against any assailants. The envoy
left immensely impressed with the power and resources
of the French settlement, and with the resolute bearing
of its Governor.
It happened that on taking his leave, the Mahratta
envoy had received from M. Dumas, under the name of
90 TIIE RISE OF THE FREXCII POWER IN INDIA.

crap, cordials, a present of ten bottles of liqueurs. Some of

—^ these he made over to Ms general, Raghojee Bhonsla,
1741. ant[ jj6) -n turn, gave them to his wife, who found
them so much to her liking that she insisted upon others
being procured, whatever might be the cost. The in¬
fluence of woman is proverbially powerful. Raghojee
was most unwilling, after all his threats, to abate one
iota of his demands against Pondichery. Yet the Nantes
cordials had given the French an ally against whom he
was but a child. These cordials were to be obtained by
any means, and it seemed they could only be secured by
friendly communication with M. Dumas. The determi¬
nation to possess them led, therefore, after a good deal
of circumlocution, to negotiations, which ended finally in
a pacification. Raghojee was so charmed by the oppor¬
tune present of thirty bottles of these cordials, that he
soon became disposed to forget all his previous anger
against the French. He prohibited any pillaging in the
neighbourhood of Pondichery, and he began to listen
without anger to the reports which were made to him
that in attacking Pondichery he had everything to lose
and nothing to gain. He accordingly withdrew his
demands for the payment of a sum of money, as tribute,
and for the surrender of the family of Chunda Sahib,
and retired without any further demonstrations, fortified
by cordials, to the western coast.
The expedition against Mahe, to the organisation of
which we have alluded, resolved itself into a blockade,
which lasted eight months, when it was put an end to by
M. de la Bourdonnais in a manner to which we shall pre¬
sently refer.
The conduct of M. Dumas on this occasion—his bold
and resolute refusal to deliver up his guests; the coolness
with which he had defied the conqueror of Tricliinopoly
—procured him, amongst the nations of Southern India,
the reputation of a hero. Congratulations and thanks
 II. DUMAS RESIGNS.—IIIS CHARACTER. 91

poured in to him from all sides. The Subadar of the chap.

Dekkau, Nizam-ool-Moolk, wrote to him a letter of thanks, .—L^L_
couched in terms of the highest respect, and transmitted 1741 ■
to him, at the same time, a dress of honour. Suftler Ali,
as a mark of esteem, sent him the armour of his deceased
father, richly adorned with gold and precious stones,
' together with three elephants, several horses, many swords
and jewelled weapons, and accompanied by a letter carried
by his favourite Minister. The Emperor of Delhi, Maho¬
med Shall, on hearing of this successful resistance to Mah-
ratta presumption, conferred upon M. Dumas the rank and
title of Nawab, with the command of 4,500 horsemen,
2,000 of whom he was allowed to keep about his person
in time of peace, without being at any charge for their
maintenance. On the application of M. Dumas the title
and command were declared transferable to his successor.
Shortly before the receipt of these honours, M. Dumas
had intimated to his masters his wish to return to his
native country. His resignation had been accepted, and
Monsieur Joseph Frangois Dupdeix, the successful Intend-
ant of Chandernagore, had been nominated to succeed
him. M. Dupleix arrived at Pondichery in the month of
October 1741, and took at once the oaths as Governor- ’
General, at the same time that he declared himself to be
the Mogul’s Uawab, and caused himself to be acknow¬
ledged as such by the 4,500 horse, of whom his predeces¬
sor had held command.
The records of the six years’ administration of M.
Dumas show with sufficient clearness that he was no un¬
worthy successor of Frangois Martin. His administration
was signalised by the display of tact, prudence, boldness,
and skill. He understood the native character thoroughly.
Bo well did he make use of that knowledge, grafted as it
was on his daring yet prudent nature, that though all his
allies were beaten, he managed to reap advantage, in the
most legitimate manner, from their misfortunes. So adroit
92 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH TOWER. IN INDIA.

chap, was Ms conduct, that the territory which he coveted he

—gained without drawing the sword ; he even accepted it,
17-1 as a favour to his native friends, instead of asking for it
as a benefit to himself. Under his rule, the dominions of
the French on the Coromandel coast increased very greatly
in extent and value, whilst the prestige of the French
power attained, in the eyes of the natives, a height which,'
even to us who look back at it, appears perfectly astound¬
ing. It seemed, indeed, when Dumas left Pondichery,
that it would be only necessary for his successor to con¬
tinue the same cautious and prudent, yet daring and ac¬
quisitive policy, to make Pondichery the most powerful
aud important city in Southern India.
That successor, as we have seen, was Dupleix. Wc
left him last engaged in restoring the credit and fortunes
of Chandernagore. This lie had succeeded in accom¬
plishing beyond his most sanguine expectations. It could
not be expected that, occupying as he had the position of
Intendant or Director-General of Chandernagore, nomi¬
nally under the orders of the Governor and Superior
Council of Pondichery, yet practically irresponsible—daily
and hourly forced, in fact, to act upon Iris own responsi¬
bility—he should not sometimes have run counter to the
ideas of his immediate superior. The very promptness of
Dupleix’s acts must have made them often appear rash
and precipitate in the eyes of men of ordinary prudence
and caution. Difference of opinion on these points had
latterly arisen between himself and M. Dumas, and Du¬
pleix, chafing under a control which he felt to be un¬
wise, and believed to be unauthorised, had requested M.
Godeheu, a member of Ms Council who was returning to
Europe, to explain, more fully than he could write, the
exact state of affairs. The Directors at Paris entered fully
into the views of their agent at Chandernagore, from
whose daring, yet practical, genius they had so largely
benefited, and on the resignation of M. Dumas they at
once appointed Dupleix to the post of Governor-General
 DUPLEIX ASSUMES TIIE BEINS. 93

at Pondicheiy. Into this he was installed in the month chap.

of October 1741.* •—A—
He left Chanclernagorc, which he had found almost a
•ruin, the most important European settlement in Bengal,
possessing two thousand brick houses, an extensive trade,
and unsurpassed credit. He had made for himself, by-
private trade—a proceeding not only allowed but encou¬
raged by the Directors—an enormous fortune. In the
early part of the year in which he was appointed to Pon-
dicheiy, Dupleix had married the widow of one of his
councillors, Madaipe Vincent,f a lady who had been born
and educated in India, but whose strong yet devoted cha¬
racter and brilliant intellect made her an admirable com¬
panion for the far-sighted and deep-scheming politician.
.Her proficiency in the native languages rendered her aid
invaluable to Dupleix in his confidential dealing with
native princes. She likewise added to that proficiency a
quickness of comprehension and zealous devotion to his
interests, such as form, when united, an inestimable en¬
dowment.
On assuming the government of Pondichery, Dupleix
found the settlement suffering from the effects of the
Mahratta invasion. These marauding warriors, where
they had not eaten up the land, had, by the fact of their
presence, .prevented its being tilled, and now the misery
of famine had succeeded to the desolation of -war. Added
to this, the Carnatic was in a condition bordering upon
anarchy. Sufder Ali had only rid himself of the antici¬
pated rivalry of Chuncla Sahib to fall into the real clutches
of Hizam-ool-Moolk, the Subadar of the Dekkan, who

* Neither Mr. Orme nor Mr. Mill doubtedly correct. The fact that
gives the exact date of the appoint- Dupleix visited Chandernagore in
ment of Dupleix. The writer of the 1742 may have misled the other
article on Dupleix in the National authorities.
Jtcciew, and the Noucelh Biographic t She was the daughter of a M.
Generate give 3742, hut the Ar- Albert, a Frenchman. Her mother
chires cle la Compac/nie cles Indes belonged to the Portuguese family of
give the month of October 1741 as De C'astro.
the precise date; and this is un-
94 THE EISE OF THE FKENCH POWEE IN INDIA.

chap, loudly called upon him for the arrears of revenue, due by
—^—• him as a vassal of the Mogul. The fortifications of Pondi-
1741 • chery, too, however formidable they might have appeared
to a native power, were quite insufficient for defence,
against an European enemy, and there were no funds
available to enlarge or to repair them, notwithstanding
that, even at this date, the rumours of the probability of
war between Prance and England were brought out by
each sailing vessel.
But Dupleix was equal to the occasion. Convinced
that Pondichery had now attained such a stage of deve¬
lopment as to require that the power. of Prance should
be recognised and acknowledged, he at once assumed,
with an ostentatious publicity, the dignities that had been
conferred upon him by the Mogul, receiving homage from,
those petty chieftains in the neighbourhood who were of
a lower order of nobility. He at the same time set him¬
self to work to inquire into the causes of the increasing
public expenditure, to check corruption among the subor¬
dinate officers of the administration, and to examine the
state of the defences. On these several points, with the
mode in which they should be remedied, he transmitted
full reports to the Company. Having thus set everything
in train, he proceeded to Bengal to be installed as Hawaii
at Chandernagore. When the ceremony, which was con¬
ducted with great pomp, was concluded, he went in state
to Hooghly for the purpose of paying a visit of respect to
the Mahomedan Governor. But this latter, recognising
the superior rank of Dupleix, insisted upon making the
first visit himself.* The honours with which he was re¬
ceived, and the state which he assumed, appear to have
made a deep impression upon the natives, prepared as
they were to regard with favour everything that was
French, and to have rendered his relations with them of
a still more intimate and agreeable character.

* Ilistoire des Indes Orientalea, vol. iii.

 IS REQUIRED TO PRACTISE ECONOMY.

On his return to Pondickery from these visits, Dupleix

at once assumed a greater state than had been indulged
in by any of his predecessors. It was a part of his policy
to impress upon the native princes in his vicinity that he
too was an officer of the Mogul; that he owed his rank
to the Emperor of Delhi. lie, therefore, would not per¬
mit a single sign or symbol which rightfully belonged to
his rank to be omitted or neglected. Situated at Pondi-
c-hery, far away from the reach of the distracted court of
the descendant of Akbar, he was able to avail himself of
the credit which his position as an officer of that monarch
gave him amongst the natives, without in the smallest
degree confining his own action, or making any infringe¬
ment on the duties he owed to his sovereign. He, in fact,
was absolute master of the situation, and he simply used
the power given him by his title to strengthen and confirm
his position.
Just at this moment, whilst engaged in this laudable
design, and preparing at the same time to make Pondi-
chery really as impregnable as the natives believed it to
be, Dujileix received from the Company one of those
strange despatches so often written by narrow-minded
officials holding supreme power, to cripple and thwart
. their more capable agents on the spot. In this despatch,
dated September 18,1743, he was informed by the Direc¬
tors that, in consequence of the approaching prospect of a
war between France and England, they were compelled to
restrict the number of vessels for India to four, two of
which were destined for Pondichery, and two for Bengal;
they then proceeded to press upon him, as the greatest
and most important service he could render, (1) the re¬
duction of all the expenses in India by at least one-half;
and (2) the suspension of all expenditure on account of
building and fortifications. /To carry out this service,
they added their belief, ‘ that this 'operation cannot be
intrusted to better hands than yours, whose wisdom and
zeal are known. It is that which determines it ’—the
96 TIIE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap. Company—‘ to charge you alone with the sole execution

-——• of this operation, free from consulting with the Council
m3. regarding it.’ •
The announcement in this despatch, that a war with
their great European rivals in India and on the seas was
impending, and the injunction which accompanied it to.
spend no money on the fortifications—the unsatisfactory
condition of which was, nevertheless, known to the Com¬
pany—must have sounded strange in the ears of Dnpleix.
Not only were the fortifications in bad order, but on the
front facing the sea there was a space of a thousand
toises—nearly a mile and a quarter—which was abso¬
lutely open. Eegarding this in connexion with the inti¬
mation he had received of the prospect of an European
war, in which the enemies of France might obtain the
mastery of the Indian seas, he felt that his duty as Go¬
vernor of Pondichery—a place for which he was respon¬
sible to his sovereign—was paramount to every other.
The orders which he received lie therefore boldly disrc-"
garded. He caused a solid rampart to be erected along
the entire length of the open space, with a broad and
deep ditch in its front. On this, night and day, the
workmen were employed; yet with all their vigilance,
the rampart was not completed until nearly two years
after war with England had broken out, and It, required
the exercise of all the genius and talent of Dnpleix to
prevent an attack, by a powerful English squadron, on
the unfinished defences. The expenses of this under¬
taking Dnpleix supplied by his purse and by his credit.
From the same sources he furnished cargoes to the two
vessels which, in pursuance of the notification, came out
to Pondichery, and which otherwise would have been
forced to return empty. The other point, that of reducing
the public expenditure, he parried out with a firm hand.
The difficulty of his situation in this respect was enhanced

Memoirs pour Dnpleix.

 ■ ASSUMES THE BESP02TSIB1LITY OP HIS ACTS. 97

by the fact that he alone was intrusted with the execution chap.
of the order; that lie was thus not only deprived of the ——-
support of his Council, but its members might cast ob- 1743‘
stacks in the way of the carrying out of a requisition, in
which they were so lightly treated. Abuses were put
down, corruption was strangled, salaries were reduced,
until, in spite of murmurs on all sides, which, however,
were not directed against him personally, the necessary
reductions were effected.*
These proceedings on the part of Dupleix were most
agreeable to the Company. His very disobedience of
their order* in repairing and completing the fortifications
of Pondichery, seems to have met with their approval.
No wonder, perhaps, considering that the expense of those
repairs and of that completion had fallen upon himself!
We find them muting to him a letter, dated Novem¬
ber 21, 1743, regarding the provision of cargoes for the
two ships they had sent out-: ‘The Company, as you
will see by this letter, has been very much pleased at the
zeal which you and the Councils of Pondichery and Chan-
dernagore have displayed for its interests in procuring car¬
goes for our two ships, the “ Fleury ” and the “ Brillant,” -
sent from the Isle of Prance, As it is by your endeavours
that this operation was completed, it is proper that you,
especially? should enjoy the honour of it.’
With respect to the fortifications, they wrote, under
date November 30, 1746: — ‘The promptitude with
which the town of Pondichery has been enclosed on the
side facing the sea, has given us real pleasure; we are
under a great obligation to you on that account’—for
this disobedience of their orders! Further on_‘ We
have not seen with less satisfaction all the measures you
have taken, both to provide, notwithstanding your po¬
verty, cargoes, for the ships, the sailing of -which we had

* M&noire pour Dupleix.

98 TI-IE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, announced to you, and to second M. de la Bourdonnais in

—^—• the operations which he was planning.’ *
1744‘ But before the receipt of this second letter war between
France and England had been declared. This war had
been long threatening. The death of the Emperor
Charles VI. without male issue, had tempted France,
Prussia, and Bavaria to combine to despoil his heroic
daughter of the possessions she had inherited. In this
war, the Enng of England, George II., soon found himself
involved as Elector of Hanover. Without any declaration
of war on the part of England, he had, in 1743, trans¬
ported a combined army of English, Hanoverians, and
Hessians into the valley of the Main, to cooperate with
the Austrians. On the 27th June of the same year, when
in danger of being compelled to surrender with his whole
army to the French general, the Due de Noailles, the mad
impetuosity of the Due de Grammont not only saved him
from that calamity, but enabled him to gain a great vic¬
tory before even the two nations were professedly at war.
But tills was too much for the endurance of France, and
in the month of March, 1744, she formally declared war
against England.
It will thus be seen, that the event which now took
place had been long expected, that the breaking out of
war had been regarded as a mere question of time. We
have seen how Dupleix prepared himself to meet'those
hostilities when they should come. We have now to
regard him in a different aspect, to notice how earnestly
and indefatigably he strove to ward them.off altogether.
When the Directors of the Company of the Indies
intimated to their Governor-General at Pondichery, that
war with England was inevitable, they apprised him at
the same time that they had instructed the Governor of
the Isle of France, M. de la Bourdonnais, to proceed with
a squadron to his assistance, but they especially urged

• MSmoire pour Dupleix.

 PROPOSES NEUTRALITY TO THE ENGLISH. 99

upon him to endeavour to bring about a treaty of neu- chap.

trality with the Governor of the English settlement, and ■—-T—
to arrange with him that the commercial operations of 1744,
both countries with India should continue without molest¬
ation from either. Those instructions found Dupleix in
the very mood to comply with them, though very little
hopeful of success in the negotiation. Of the movements
of La Bourdonnais he had no positive knowledge. Even
before the declaration of war, the English cruisers had
spread themselves over the Indian seas, ready to carry
devastation into,French commerce.* Yet from stray
vessels, and from other sources, intimation had reached
him that a squadron under Commodore Barnet was on
its way out, especially charged with the entire destruction
of the French settlement.
Nevertheless he- made the attempt, earnestly, almost
beseechingly. But Mr. Morse, the Governor of Madras,
and his Council, had precisely the same reasons for wishing
for war, by which Dupleix was influenced in his desire for
peace. The squadron under Commodore Barnet was,
they well knew, in the Eastern seas, engaged in inter¬
cepting the French traders between China and Europe;
it was shortly expected, indeed, with its prizes, at Madras;
letters had been, some time previously, received an¬
nouncing its departure from Europe, and those letters
contained the instructions for the annihilation of French
commerce to which we have just alluded. To the urgent
requisition of Dupleix, Mr. Morse pleaded therefore the
orders he had received from England, f
But another disappointment awaited the French Go¬
vernor. He had hoped that, should these negotiations
fail, he might derive some assistance from the promised
squadron of La Bourdonnais. But, just about the time

* The French commerce with the fitted for the Indian trade. Ten or
Indies had made great progress since twelve of these were sent every year
the time of Lenoir. In 1740 the to the Indies.—Histvire ties limes.
Company possessed forty Luge ships t Dupleix, Orrne, Cambridge.
100 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

°iiiI>’ im^av0lu'able reply was received from Mr. Morse,

•——■ intimation also reached him that in obedience to in-
17^‘ structions received from Paris, La Bourdonnais had sent
back his squadron to France, and was apparently power¬
less to assist him. Ignorant, as he was then, of the un¬
daunted energy and persistent resolution which so emi¬
nently characterised the Governor of the Isle of France,
Dupleix felt himself at that moment absolutely cast upon
his own resources. He had now but himself to depend
upon. With a garrison of but 436 Europeans, the forti¬
fications of Pondichery progressing, but not then finished,
with but one small ship of war at his disposal, he had to
meet the threatened attack of three men-of-war and a
frigate, subsequently increased to six vessels of war, whose
cannon alone, playing upon the unfinished rampart from
the roadstead, could demolish, uninjured, the hostile town.
Even the one vessel at Ms disposal he despatched to the
Isle of France, with an urgent requisition to La Bour-
donnais to come to his aid. This was a situation to test
in the most searching manner the capacity of a man.
Was it possible, under such circumstances, to escape the
threatened danger, and even to turn it to his own profit P
It did not seem so certainly, yet Dupleix proved that it
could be done. It was when the European enemy ap¬
peared most threatening, that the policy adopted from
the commencement—the system inaugurated by Martin
and carried on by his successors—the system of treating
the natives of India as friends and as equals, bore its
natural fruits. From the menaces of Mr. Morse, Dupleix
appealed to the friendship of the successor of Shere Elian
Lodi and of Dost Ali. The reply he received showed
that the esteem, which the Nawabs of the Carnatic had
always professed to feel for the representative of the
French nation, was no transient or fair-weather sentiment.
Anwar-oodeen, the representative, though not the relative,
of tjjose chieftains, had inherited their traditions; he re¬
sponded to the call made upon him with a fidelity to
 STATE OE THE CARNATIC. 101

professions not always exercised in Europe, and Pondi- chap.

cliery was saved. To render the account of subsequent w-*1—.
events more clear and intelligible, it is necessary that we 1744‘
should state very briefly the principal events that had
occurred in the Carnatic since ive last left it.
• The Carnatic suffering from the famine caused by the 1741.
invasion of the Mahrattas; Chunda Sahib a prisoner at
Sattara; his brother-in-law, Sufder Ali, ISTawab, but pressed
by his feudal superior, the Subadar of the Dekkan, for
arrears of revenue; such was the condition of the Carnatic
in the middle of J741. It was worse for the people than
for the ruler. The people had been plundered and were
starving. Sufder Ali, on the contrary, had had his trea¬
sures well guarded at Ponclichery. Notwithstanding his
professions, he had still abundance of wealth to pay up
the arrears demanded by the Subadar. But he did not
choose t® pay them. The Subadar had not supported his
demands by force, and Sufder Ali was resolved not to
yield to a mere verbal request. He amused therefore the 1742.
Subadar with excuses, and, to be prepared for the worst,
he took up his residence at Vellore, whilst he deposited
his treasures in the custody of the English at Madras.*
But a crisis was at hand. The assessment, which the
stipulated payment to the Mahrattas had compelled Sufder
Ali to impose upon his nobility, had made him extremely
unpopular, and had even caused a combination amongst
some of his courtiers to resist it. The unsatisfactory
nature of his relations with the Subadar had induced
these conspirators to believe that his overthrow would not
be regarded with disfavour in that quarter. Amongst
those who had joined this conspiracy, was the other
brother-in-law of Sufder Ali, Mortiz Ali by name, a man

* Orrne states that lie transferred connexion -which existed between

his confidence, in regard to the cus- Chunda Sahib and M. Dnpleix. This
tody of his family and treasures, Meer Assud was the bitter enemy of
from the French to the English on Chunda Sahib, and the author of all
the advice of his Prime Minister, his calamities.
Meer Assud, who suspected the
102 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER 1ST INDIA.

chap, well known for Lis cowardice, Lis cruelty, Lis wealth,
—i1.^ and Lis parsimony. On September 2,.J»742, tliis man,
H42. taking advantage of tlie confidence inspired by the con¬
tempt which the Nawab felt for him, seized the opportu¬
nity of Sufder Ali being with but few attendants, first,
to cause him to be poisoned, and, that proving ineffectual,
to have him stabbed to death. He then proclaimed him¬
self Nawab, and obtaining by artful representations pos¬
session of Vellore and acknowledgment from the troops,
installed himself at Arcot. But the detestation of his
crime combined with the contempt felt for his cowardice
to make his tenure of office extremely brief. His principal
officers appealed to Morari Bao, Governor of Trichino-
poly, and he declared war against him. The English were
requested by the insurgent nobility to protect the family
and treasure of Sufder Ali, whilst the army, the support
of his power, suddenly made a tumultuous demand upon
Mm for the payment of their arrears. Mortiz Ali, terrified
at these demands, and not possessing spirit equal to his
• crime, bent before the storm, and disguising himself in
woman’s clothes, flecl in safety to the fort of Vellore. On
his flight becoming known, the son of Sufder Ali, Seid
Mahomed Khan, an infant who was with his mother at
Madras, was at once proclaimed Hawab.
1748. The appointment of an infant to this position did not
tend to the tranquillity of the province. Every nobleman
assumed an independent position. But, in the beginning
of the following year, Nizam-ool-Moolk, 'the Subadar of
the Dekkan, appeared upon the scene at the head of
an army of 80,000 horse and 200,000 foot. He at once
became the master of the situation. The upstart noble-
. men were put down on the threat of being scourged,
should they dare to assume the title of Nawab, and one of
Ms cMef officers, Khoja Abdalla, was appointed to admi¬
nister the province. The Subadar then moved upon
Trichinopoly, which the Mahrattas evacuated without
striking a blow in its defence. Having recovered this
 ANWAROODEEN NAWAB. 103

principality for tlie Mogul, he returned to Golconda, chap.

taking Khoja Abdalla with him.
It had been intended by the Subadar that this officer 174S-
should return to assume the regency of the Carnatic the
following year, but on the very eve of starting, he was
found dead in his bed. Anwaroodeen, known as a brave
and experienced soldier, was appointed to succeed him as
governor and guardian to the son of Sufder Ali.
But a few months, however, elapsed, before, at a wed¬
ding to which Mortiz Ali, the murderer of his father,
had also been iuvjtecl, Seicl Mahomed Khan was assassi¬
nated. In the confusion that followed, Mortiz Ali took
to his horse, and escorted by a large body of cavalry,
escaped to Vellore. The immediate result was that An¬
waroodeen, who was no relation of the old family, was
appointed Nawab of the Carnatic.
This was the man to whom, in the difficult circum- 1745. .
stances in which he was placed, the Governor of Pondi-
chery made his appeal. He reminded him of the long¬
standing friendship between his predecessors and the
French nation ; of the moral support and protection to
the families of those predecessors given at the time of the
Mahratta invasion ; he alluded to the conciliatory dispo¬
sition always shown by the French ; to their desire to be
at peace*with all around them; and he urged upon the
Nawab to prevent, by his authority, the aggression of
the other European nation occupying a portion of the
seaboard of the Carnatic, upon those wh'o had always been
friends to his predecessors, and whose Governor wrns him¬
self an officer and vassal of the Mogul.
Anwaroodeen was not insensible to the force and rea¬
son of this appeal. Neither of the European powers on
the Coromandel coast had shown up to that point any
aggressive tendencies, nor had then the superiority of the
European soldier in the field been demonstrated in any
-way. It was natural that he should desire to maintain
peace in his jurisdiction and its dependencies, and it is
104 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, very probable—indeed, subsequent events proved—that

—L—- he was not at all insensible to the marks of friendship and
1745' cordiality which the rulers of Pondichery had always
evinced. He therefore sent a pressing message to the
Governor of Madras, informing him that he would not
permit any attack on the possessions of the French on
the Coromandel coast. The despotic character of this
resolution he endeavoured to soften by a show of fair¬
ness ; for he informed Mr. Morse, at the same time, that
should hereafter the French power preponderate, he
would use the same authority to prevent any aggressive
action on then’ part. Mr. Morse had no course but
compliance.
But though thus saved from immediate attack, the situa¬
tion of Dupleix was still particularly trying. The English
squadron had come round to the coast, had even received
reinforcements, and the vessels of which it was composed,
cruising about, were enabled to intercept and destroy the
French merchantmen. The Company of the Indies, even
before the outbreak of the war, had ceased to send any
ships to Pondichery, so that Dupleix was dependent for
his intelligence on stray arrivals. At Pondichery too and
its neighbourhood, the prestige of France had received a
rude shock. It was known everywhere that, but for the
interference of the Nawab, Dupleix would have been com¬
pelled to succumb to the English, and, as a matter of
course, the timeservers and sycophants, of whom there are
many in every nation, fell off from him. Still, amid the
doubt and despondency that surrounded him, he main¬
tained a bold and resolute bearing. Though within all
was anxiety, without, there was the security of apparent
composure. He was, however, immensely relieved, when,
1746. in the month of May, 1746, he learned from a sure source,
that the long-announced and long-despaired-of squadron
of M. de la Bourdonnais had been heard of at Mahe.
La Bourdonnais was last introduced in these pages as
the skilful and enterprising officer who had devised the
 LA EOL'RDONXAIS. 105

means by -which Mahe—so named, it will be remembered, chap.

after himself—had been captured in 1725. We shall •—L—-
now briefly relate the course of his life during the nine- 1746‘
teen years that had elapsed since that first brilliant essay
of arms in India. Reduced by the peace, to which Prance
at that period seemed disposed, to inactivity, La Bourdon-
nais, after the capture of Mahe, fitted out a ship on his
own account, and traded for three or four years in the
Arabian seas. The ascendency which he here speedily
assumed over all with whom he came into contact, and
which especially signalised itself on the occasion of a dis¬
turbance, that he succeeded in quelling, between some
Portuguese and Arab sailors, in the harbour of Mocha,
recommended him to the Governor of Goa, and induced
that Viceroy to offer him the command of a ship of war
under the Xing of Portugal—an appointment carrying
with it several orders and titles. LaBourdonnais accepted
the offer, and made an expedition to Mozambique, and
several cruises in the Indian seas. But the-situation of a
foreigner in the service of another country can never be
wholly satisfactory, and at the end of two years La Bour-
donnais found that the annoyances to which he was con¬
stantly subjected were not compensated by either the
pleasure or profit of his command. He therefore threw
it up ancbreturned in 1733 to Prance. There he married,
and, in 1735, he was appointed to succeed M. Dumas as
Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon.
To understand all that La Bourdonnais accomplished in 1710.
his new position, it is necessary that we should refer to the
connexion of the French with those islands from the time
of their earliest occupation. We have already* given a
brief sketch of their history from their first discovery by
the Portuguese to the occupation of Bourbon by a small
number of the baffled colonists of Madagascar in 1672,
and the settlement in the Isle of France at some period

• * Chapter I.
106 TIIB RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

. chap; between 1710 and 1719. It is probable, that the rem-

nants of the Madagascar colonists, never much caring for
171°- labour on its own account, would, had they been able,
have taken an early opportunity of leaving an island, in
which they seemed entirely cut off from association with
the outer world. But they had escaped—a mixed crew
of men and women—the latter, it is stated, being natives,
—in two canoes, and they had no means of proceeding in
any direction. They betook themselves therefore perforce
to the erection of huts, and to the cultivation of articles
of food. Fortunately the nature of the soil was such that
a very small expenditure of labour was sufficient to enable
them to live in comfort and abundance. Soon after, their
numbers were increased by the wreck upon their coast of
a piratical craft,* on board of which were many female
prisoners. By degrees too they were joined by deserters
from East Indian ships which touched there. These were
for the most part attracted by the easy life which the fer¬
tility of the soil enabled its inhabitants to enjoy. The
prosperity of the island increased in a greater degree than
could be imagined, if the elements of which its society
was formed were alone considered. Houses were erected,
small trading vessels were built, many of them for piratical
purposes, slaves were purchased, and articles fit for export
were cultivated. So glowing indeed were-the accounts of
this prosperity taken home to France, by ships which
touched at the island, that towards the close of the seven¬
teenth or the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
French Company put in their claim to its possession, and
sent thither five or six families and a Governor, f The

* It is stated that amongst other settled oil the island, and had a par¬
additions from various sources, the don from the King of France. Some
early inhabitants of Bourbon ‘re¬ of them were alive in 1703, and their
ceived an increase by some English descendants are numerous on the
pirates, who came along with Avery, island.’ — Dulrymple’s Oriaxtal Re¬
England, Condon, and Pattison, who, pertory, vol. ii.
after acquiring considerable riches in t It would appear, however, from
the Red Sea and coasts of Arabia the Calemlrier des Isles de Frame et
and Persia, quitting their way of life, de Bourbon that the inhabitants had
 >»»* raituc •

TIIB ISLES OF FRANCE AST) BOURBON.

Governor was well received at first, but the descendantl^^^P--"4

of the pirates and deserters soon found him an
nient incumbrance. They accordingly seized and impri- 1717-
soned him, and kept him in a dungeon till he died. Their
rebellion had no other result. A new Governor was sent
with orders to punish the ringleaders, and to erect a fort
for his protection—orders which he is stated to have
carried out effectually.
In 1717, the population of the island was computed at
two thousand nine hundred free men, and eleven hundred
slaves. In the following year an event occurred which
gave an impetus to its trade, and which assured its future
prosperity. This was the introduction of the cultivation
of coffee, which thenceforth became the staple trade of the
island. Two years prior to this, possession had been taken
of the deserted Isle of France, although no earnest attempt
at colonisation was made before 1721. An edict, dated
November of that year, however, decreed the erection of
a Provincial Council in that island dependent upon that of
Bourbon, and in 1723, M. Dumas was appointed Governor 1723.
of both islands. Great inducements were at the same
time held out to the inhabitants of Bourbon to emigrate
into the larger island. For this purpose grants of land
were made to settlers, and sums proportionate to each
grant were advanced to each settler by the Company. Yet
for several years, it seemed as though the colonisation of
the Isle of France was likely to be unprofitable, and that ■
its abandonment was constantly threatened. The colonists
had been unable at the expiration of twelve years to set
on foot a trade sufficient even to enable them to repay the
sums that had been advanced them by the Company. But,
in the crisis of the hesitation as to the line of action to be
adopted, La Bourdonnais appeared in France. The fame

Bad a regular succession of governors puchin, arrived there in tlie quality

of tlieir own since the formation of of Cure, and took upon himself the
the settlement. Thus, it is recorded right of Governor.’
that 'in 1675, Pere Hiacinthe, Ca-
108 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN' INDIA.

chap. of his skill, his energy, his indomitable resolution, had

—p™- preceded him, and the Directors resolved to give one more
1735‘ chance to the new colony, by appointing as Governor of
the Isles of Prance and Bourbon, one who had given so
many proofs of the possession of great qualities.
La Bourdonnais went there. He found in Bourbon a
fertile soil, a healthy air, and, comparatively, a settled
community. He found the greater part of the Isle of
Prance, on the other hand, still covered with almost im¬
penetrable forests; possessing two harbours, one of which
at all events, up to that moment unimproved and scarcely
safe, might, with a little labour, be made excellent for all
purposes; a soil less fertile indeed than that of Bourbon,
but still capable of production ; and a climate, mild, tem¬
perate, and healthy. The fact that it possessed a harbour
gave to the Isle of France a great superiority in the eyes
of La Bourdonnais over Bourbon, and he at once made it
the seat of government.
But the people ! Had La Bourdonnais been less of a
real man than he was, he might well have been appalled
at the task of making anything of a race to whom toil of
any sort seemed the worst species of evil. Almost naked,
defenceless, and starving, having preferred to be comfort¬
less and miserable rather than to exercise even the small
amount of labour which in such a clime would have
amply supplied their necessities; dwelling in wretched
cabins; possessing no energy, living in fear of their lives
from the attacks of the Maroons—the free descendants of
the slaves who had been kidnapped from Madagascar, and
who had found a refuge in the interior—endowed appa¬
rently merely with the animal love of existence—these so-
called colonists were yet capable of combining to resist
any lawful authority over them. But La Bourdonnais was
not a man to be baffled. He taught them, in a hundred
instances, that he was resolved to be master. And yet,
in doing this, he showed such tact, he was so gentle while
he was determined, his measures were so wise, and the
 THE ENERGY OF LA BOURDOXNAIS. 109

benefits resulting from them so evident to all, that he chap.

forced these colonists, even whilst murmuring against him,
to admit in their reasonable moods, that he was the wisest, 1737-
gentlest, and best of governors, the only man who could
have induced them to forego their old habits of indolence
and sloth.
By his own personal teaching—whether as regarded
the merest rudiments or the higher requirements of agri¬
culture—the first principles of mechanical labour or the
acquirements of the skilled artisan ; by constantly im¬
pressing on the minds of these people the absolute neces¬
sity under which they lay to work, he succeeded before
long in forming out of this unpromising raw material a
civilised community. Under his influence, some took to
planting, some to manufacturing, others to soldiering.
La Bourdonnais assisted them in various ways. He im¬
ported negroes from Madagascar, and employed these as
policemen, as cultivators, and as artisans. In a short time
the island assumed a new appearance. In place of the
uncultivated waste of the interior, and the wretched hovels
scattered along the coast, he caused to be built substantial
private dwelling houses, magazines, arsenals, barracks,
fortifications, mills, quays, canals, and aqueducts. Of
these last, one in particular is mentioned, built for the
purpose of bringing down fresh water to the port
and to the hospitals, as having been 3,600 toises (more
than four miles and a quarter) in length. But his
greatest efforts were directed to the sea-coast. There
were, we have seen, two harbours, one on the south-east
side of the island, open to the prevailing winds, the other
on the north-west side, sheltered from the wind, but only
to be entered through a narrow channel. On this he
bestowed all his efforts, and he very soon made it fit in
every respect for the reception of thirty-five or forty ships.
He provided it likewise with wet and dry docks, pon¬
toons, canoes, yards, and timber. It was thus as easy to
lay up and repair ships at Fort Louis, for so he named
no THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, the capital, as in any port in Europe. In 1737, eighteen

——i—■ months after his arrival, he was able to launch a brigan-
1737, tine; the following year, he built two good ships,* and
put another of five hundred tons on the stocks. This,
however, was but a portion of what he effected in that
respect during his viceroyalty.'
His internal administration was equally energetic and
judicious. He took very good care that the negroes were
not unduly oppressed by the colonists. He compelled
the landowners to lay out tapioca plantations, five hun¬
dred yards square, for each negro .and family serving
under them. He encouraged the cultivation of sugar,
soon to become a great success, prevented the indiscrimi¬
nate slaughter of cattle, and, until the breed should
revive, he forced the ships’ crews to live upon fish and
turtle during their stay in port.f
Nor was he less successful in Bourbon, though that
island, at the time of his arrival, was further advanced in
civilisation than the other. His principal object was to
administer the two islands, so that they should be valuable
to France, and to make them fit to be the commercial
station between France and India. To tins end, it was
necessary that they should be fortified. Though the
means were apparently wanting, La Bourdonnais com¬
menced the work, and in less than five years h<J_succeeded
in providing them with such fortifications as would have
rendered an attack upon them extremely hazardous.'
In 1740, La Bourdonnais returned to France. On his
arrival there he learnt that complaints preceded him.
Cardinal Fleury was then still Minister. A timid econo¬
mist, with little breadth of view, Fleury had but one

* As might have been expected, great deal of timber and put other in
the first attempt at shipbuilding was her place before she was lit for sea.’
not altogether a success. It is related This vessel, the ‘Insulaire,’ was lost in
of his first ship, that ‘ after a great 1746, in the Ganges, on her way to
deal of trouble, time, and expense in Ckandernagore after the action with
building, she was found so heavy in Commodore Peyton,
launching, that they were obligee! to t Mfimoire pour La Bourdonnais.
haul her ashore again, and rip off a —Eaynal's India.
 HIS PROPOSALS TO PLETJRT. Ill

principle of external policy. This was the maintenance chap.

of peace, especially of peace with England, at any price. -—~r—
It was partly from a fear of giving umbrage to England, 1'41-
partly from his economic habits, that he starved the
French navy, neglected the army, and gave no encourage¬
ment to commerce. Such a man could have little sympathy
with a genius so fertile, an energy so buoyant, a desire to
advance French interests so. irrepressible, as were bound
together in the person of La Bourdonnais. When there¬
fore some of those repressed speculators, and baffled ship-
captains, whose gains and depredations had been lessened
by the measures of La Bourdonnais, presented to the
Minister and to the Directors of the Company a long list
of then' grievances, accompanied by insinuations common
to their class, that La Bourdonnais was working mainly
for his own interests; the narrow mind of the Cardinal
did not repel the charges, and, worked upon at the same
time by the Directors, he began to concert with them
measures for his disgrace. It was partly the intima¬
tion of this, and the consequent desire to justify himself,
that had brought La Bourdonnais from the scene of his
labours.
Though narrow-minded to a degree, Fleury was not
intentionally unjust. He received the great colonist with
marked disfavour at the outset, but he did not remain
long proof against the candour and frankness which cha¬
racterised alike his demeanour and his statements. La
Bourdonnais in fact insisted upon being informed of all
that had been said against him, and, this, done, he had
little difficulty, not only in justifying Ms conduct, but in
convincing the Minister and the Director's of the great
value of the measures he had accomplished. The per¬
sonal charges against him dissolved into air. He showed,
in the course of his justification, that he had never pos¬
sessed a foot of land in the islands; that he had never
traded for a single Uvre ; and that so great had been the
confidence of the colonists in his impartiality, that all the
112 TIIE BISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, differences in the islands had been terminated, by his arbi-

-—h—• tration, without recourse having been had, except in one
17i1' solitary instance, to a lawsuit.
Eeleasecl from the charges against him, and reinstated
in the confidence of his masters, the fertile mind of La
Bourdonnais began at once to revolve fresh schemes. At
that time (1740-41), hostilities between France and
England seemed imminent. The two nations had taken
opposite sides in the war of the Austrian succession, and
it was evident that not all the devices of Fleury would be
able much longer to keep back a declaration of war.
Under these circumstances, La Bourdonnais foreseeing
that that nation which, on the breaking out of the war,
should have an overwhelming superiority of force to the
other in the Indian seas, would be able to crush its rival,
advised that he should be allowed to equip and fit out a
squadron of six or eight ships as vessels of war. With
these he proposed to sail to the Isle of France, there to
await the breaking out of hostilities. On that event oc¬
curring, he would be able, he said, to intercept and cap¬
ture the English merchantmen, and then, steering to India,
would ruin the English settlements in that country.
This plan, practical, easy of execution, and, under an
unfettered La Bourdonnais, certain of success, was never¬
theless too grand in its grasp to commend itcelf to the
timid and cautious policy of the Directors of the" Company
of the Indies. These therefore declared against it at once.
But Fleury, timid as he was, had too much of the states¬
man. in his composition, not to perceive the immense'ad¬
vantages that might accrue from its successful operation.
La Bourdonnais too was on the spot, and La Bourdonnais
was careful to point out to him, amongst other arguments,
that his consent to the plan did not commit him to any
overt act of hostility against England, that the squadron
would patiently await in the harbour of Port Louis the
first declaration of war. Fleury, convinced by these and
similar arguments, gave in to the plan, merely altering
 TAKES 1'IVE SHIPS TO THE ISLANDS. 113

some of the details; the opposition of the Directors he chap.

for the time silenced. -—
The alteration in the details of the scheme, as origin- 174:1‘
ally proposed, consisted in the idea of substituting at
least two ships of the Drench navy for those which La
Bourdonnais was to fit out. But, in France, in the reign
of Louis XV., action seldom followed counsel. When the
tune came for the squadron to sail, the two King’s ships,
witb*which so much might have been effected, were di¬
verted to some unimportant purpose, and La Bourdonnais
found himself reduced to the command of five vessels
belonging to the Company. But these would have been
sufficient for his purpose, had he been allowed to pursue
that purpose to its end. They carried a considerable ar¬
mament,* and they had on board 1,200.sailors and 500
soldiers: Vet even amongst these, he had difficulties to .
contend with. But few of the sailors had ever been at
sea, and the soldiers had been but little instructed in
military exercises. With both these classes, La Bourdon¬
nais pursued the course he had found so successful with
the colonists of the Isle of France. He taught them what
their duties were, and he set them himself the best exam¬
ple of doing them. To train them to the various labours
likely to devolve upon them, was his constant and unre¬
mitting business on the voyage; and to such an extent
did he succeed, that the ships which left France oil the
5th April, 1741, manned by landsmen as sailors, and carry¬
ing recruits for soldiers, arrived at the Isle of France on
August 14th following, with crews as efficient as those
which manned the King’s navy, and soldiers as well
trained in all their musketry exercises as those who fought
at Fontenoy.
It was the sad fate of those heroic men who struggled
to establish a French Empire in India, to find their chief-
est and most redoubtable enemies in France itself. The
* These ships wei-e the 'Fleury1 of of60 each, the 'Renommie ’ of28,and
56 guns, the ‘•brillant’ and 'Aimahle' the fParfaite’ of 16.
114, THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

CHAP, genius of Clive, the persistent valour of Coote, and the

. m- . almost forgotten gallantry of Forde* might have strag-
1741. g]ec| ^ vain to overturn a settlement which was based on
the solid foundations on which the early rulers of Poncli-
chery had begun to build up a French India, had France
herself been true to her struggling children. But the
France of Louis XV. more resembled the Medea of the
ancient story than the tender and watchful mother.
Often did she, ‘ with her own hands, immolate hej off¬
spring,’ and, failing this, she treated the best and bravest
of her sons rather as enemies to be thwarted, baffled, per¬
secuted, and driven to despair, than as men who were
devoting all their energies, the every thought of their
lives, to increase her dominions. Yes, it was France who
was their enemy;—not the France of Napoleon III.,
jealous of the fame, the rights, the privileges, the com¬
forts, of the meanest of her children:—not the France
of the Revolution and of the first Empire, ambitious of
glory and of dominion—but that France of-the eighteenth
century, which lay, bound and gagged and speechless,
untaught yet to give out even an articulate sound, at the
feet of a man, who, shameless and conscienceless himself,
cared little what might become of his subjects, provided
only that he was permitted to wallow perpetually in all
the excesses of the vilest forms of debauchery. «
And it was now that France betrayed her champion.
She betrayed the man, who, but for the acts of the
rulers of France, would have enjoyed the best opportunity
of effectively establishing a French Empire in India, of
rooting out every rival. La Bourdonnais had scarcely
set sail, when those infamous intriguers and whisperers
—the certain hangers-on of corrupt Governments—began
to uplift the voices which in his presence had remained
mute. Amongst the Directors, the cry was raised that
this expensive armament was useless for the purposes of

Vide Broome’s History of the Bengal Army, vol. i. pp. 215-220.

 IS THWARTED BY 1XTRIGCERS. 115

France; that it was intended to minister to the ambition CHij?.

of its promoter. They declared that a policy of neu- __n;L_^
trality in the Indian -seas was the only sound policy, and 1741-
they expressed a conviction that, in case of war, the
English would be glad to accede to such' an arrangement.
From the Directors the ciy rose to the Ministry. The
weak Fleury, then ninety years old, and no longer under
the influence of- the spell of La Bourdonnais’ presence,
after a short struggle, gave way to the clamour. In an
evil hour for France and for French India, this dispenser
under Louis XV., of the fortunes of his country trans¬
mitted orders to La Bourdonnais to send back his ships
to France, ‘ even though they should have to sail without
cargoes.’*
Meanwhile, La Bourdonnais, unsuspicious of back¬
stairs influence, had, as we have seen, arrived at the Isle
of France. The intelligence which awaited him there,
was of a nature to stimulate all his energies. He re¬
ceived the news, which had some short time before
arrived, of the danger which threatened Pondickery
from the anticipated attack of Baghojee Bhonsla, and
further that the authorities of the islands, obeying an
urgent requisition from M. Dumas, had despatched their.
garrisons to India. Impressed with the necessity of
saving Ppndichery at all costs, La Bourdonnais remained
only a week at the Isle of France, and sailed then for
Pondichery. Arriving there on September 30, he found
that the tact and skill of M. Dumas had warded off the
danger from that settlement, but that Make was still be- •
leaguered. Thither, accordingly, to the scene of his early
Indian triumphs, he sailed, and arriving there speedily
re-established French ascendency. There being nothing
more for him to accomplish in India, he sailed back
to the Isle of France to carry out the scheme he had
concerted with Fleury. It was on his return thither

Memoire pour La Bourdonnais.

116 TIIE RISE OF THE ■ FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, that he experienced the bitter pang which those alone

can feel who, prompted in their actions by noble and
174L generous sentiments, find themselves restrained and held
back by men of inferior powers. Then for the first time
the order reached him to send back his ships to Europe.
He knew the full significance of that order ; he felt that
it was to give up, for the coming war at all events, all
hope of Trench preponderance in India ; he felt that it
would leave him a powerless spectator of the triumphs of
the English—disarmed and defenceless, perhaps even a
prey to their attacks; lie felt that it destroyed the hope
of his life, the object of all his toil, the certain accomplish¬
ment, but for that, of his legitimate ambition. But what
was he to do? The order was imperative. He must
obey it. With a pang, the bitterness of which few meu
can have experienced, and which must have been en¬
hanced afterwards by the prompt realisation of all his
anticipations, he sent back the fleet. With it however
he sent his own resignation, with an earnest prayer that
*he might be speedily relieved.
Why did he obey ? Surely it was not his fault that
he did obey. But what cruel destiny was it that was
weighing down the fortunes of France ? A few favour¬
ing gales, a swift-sailing ship, an energetic captain, and
the fate of India might have been changed! ^ Scarcely
had the first keenness of the disappointment caused by
the departure of the fleet been obliterated in the ener¬
getic action which now found a vent in the care of the
colony, when there arrived at Port Louis a French
ship conveying a despatch from the Controller of the
Finances and Minister of State, M. Philibert Orry, au¬
thorising La Bourdonnais to retain the fleet, and express¬
ing a hope that he had disobeyed his previous instructions.
Cardinal Fleury in fact was dying, Orry was virtual
Minister, and taking in at once the great importance of
La Bourdonnais’ schemes, he had sent out this ship and
these instructions. Too late, alas ! for La Bourdonnais’
 THE ENGLISH PEOFIT BY HIS PEOPOSALS. 117

hopes. The ships had gone, and there was no possibility chap.
of recalling them. Too well had he obeyed his Sovereign’s ■—--r-t—
order, for the obedience lost him an Empire! 1741'
It is difficult to imagine the aggravation of disappoint¬
ment which this message from the new Minister must »
have caused. How many it would have utterly erushed!
How many it would have driven to despair! But La
Bourdonnais was made of a very hard material. He was
not proof against all the attacks of fortune, for he too,
as we shall have occasion to describe, had his weak side;
but this disappointment neither crushed him nor stopped
his action; Learning a little later that the Minister and
Directors refused to accept his resignation, he calmly
resumed his duties as Governor of the islands, and began
at once to make preparations for a possible future.
The French Ministry refused to accept the resignation l"4S,
of La Bourdonnais, but they did not immediately send
back the ships. They informed him that he possessed all
their confidence, and that it was to him they looked to
take the Governor-Generalship of French India in case of
any accident happening to Dupleix. • Meanwhile Cardinal
Fleury had died (January 29, 1743), war had been de¬
clared between France and England, and La Bourdonnaia
saw with pain the great rivals of his nation reaping the
field whifth he had sown to gather.* That English fleet
under Commodore Barnet, of which we have already
spoken, had come to cruise in the Indian seas, and French
merchantmen were picked up in every direction. La
Bourdonnais could do nothing to hinder their depreda¬
tions. As if to add to his perplexities, he at this time,
when utterly powerless himself, received a pressing mes¬
sage from Dupleix, with whom he had been some time in
correspondence, begging him to hasten, with all the force
at his disposal, to the defence of Pondichery.

had talren, 'that which M. de la

you,’ said Commodore Barifet to the Bourdonnais had projected against
captain of a French merchantman he
118 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

" chap. Then was seen, in full perfection, an example of the

. m~ . truth of the maxim that great difficulties are nothing more
1744. than obstacles which a real man may overcome. It would
seem impossible that this man, left destitute himself, should
* have been able to carry assistance to a countryman in dis¬
tress. But no axiom is more true than this, that nothing
is impossible to a brave man—brave, we mean, not in the
narrow view of personal courage, but in its widest and its
broadest sense; brave to bear the reproach, the obloquy,
the hatred, the discontent, of his fellow-men; brave to
disregard the studied neglect, the insolent glance, the open
attacks, of men whom accident has placed higher than
himself in the social scale; brave still, despite of all*, to
go on straight to the end he has marked out to himself,
despite of jeers and taunts, of open opposition, and secret
calumny. It was in that sense that La Bourdonnais was
brave, and being thus brave, he conquered the impossible.
What was the impossible P 'Without ships, without
sailors, without an army, the Indian Ocean covered by
hostile cruisers, with no resources but those which he had
made in the colony, he was asked to embark an army, to
traverse the Indian Ocean, to avoid or encounter the
trained fleet of the enemy, and to relieve the beleaguered
capital of French India. Could he stamp upon the ground
and bring into existence the men, the guns, the'"material,
the ships, that he had not ? Did it not seem a very im¬
possibility? Yet, undeterred by this seeming, calmly,
patiently, steadfastly, did La Bourdonnais set to work to
accomplish the undertaking.
To succeed in such an attempt it was especially neces¬
sary to greatly dare ; to throw to the winds all dread of
responsibility ; to use to the utmost extent the powers at
his disposal. La Bourdonnais thus acted. Every ship—
and some, despite the English cruisers, did pass that way
—that touched at Port Louis, likely to be suitable for his
purpose, he detained. The objections of the captains and
of others interested in the vessels he peremptorily silenced.
 HE CONQUERS THE IMPOSSIBLE. 119

It was unfortunate that, in addition to other difficulties, chap.

the islands, offing to an unwonted scarcity caused by a ■—
total failure of the crops, were unable to supply sufficient 1745-
food for the crews; equally so that a vessel laden with
provisions from Europe, the ‘ Saint Goran,’ had gone down
at the very entrance of the harbour. Such was the
scarcity, that the inhabitants of the islands were restricted
by an order of the local council to daily rations of one
pound of bread or rice for every European and freeman,
and a pound and a half*of rice for each negro. The
necessary requirements for the equipment of the ships,
carpenters' and smiths and tailors to work upon them,
sailors sufficient to man them, and soldiers to be conveyed
by them, were alike wanting. But La Bourdonnais de¬
termined to make what lie had not. He himself, carpen¬
ter, engineer, tailor, and smith, constructed with his own
hands the model of all the articles that were required.
Under his own personal superintendence, some men were
trained to act as tailors, to cut out and prepare sails;
others, as carpenters, busied themselves with gun-carriages,
and fitted the vessels to receive them. Some were set to
work to prepare materials for building ships, others to put
together those materials. Then again the sailors were
trained to work together, to serve the guns, to scale walls,
to fire afr a mark, to use the grappling hook. Finding
their number insufficient, he recruited from the negroes,
and formed the whole into mixed companies. Working
in this way, lie soon found himself at the head of a body
of men, well taught and well disciplined, and ready to
undertake any enterprise he might assign to them.
Nor was he less painstaking and energetic regarding the
supply of provisions. He had already detained and had
begun to equip five vessels, including the twenty-six gun
ship which had brought him the pressing requisition from
Dupleix, when he received intelligence from France that
a squadron of five ships had started from L’Orient, and
would be with him in October of that year (1745). The
120 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, arrival of this squadron would cause a double strain upon

—i1,-—. his slender stock of provisions. He therefore arranged
1745- that, so soon as a ship should be equipped, she should sail
at once for the coast of Madagascar, and there lay in sup¬
plies of rice and other articles of food that might be
procurable. In this way he managed to over-ride that
which otherwise would have 'been an insurmountable
difficulty.
1746. The squadron, promised in October 1745, arrived in
January of the following year.* It consisted of one ship
of war of seventy guns, the ‘ Acliille,’ and of four unarmed
merchantmen.* To arm and equip these latter, and to
reconcile their officers to the displacement of their several
cargoes,f tasked all his resources. However, he succeeded.
The armament consisted almost entirely of eight and
twelve pounders, a calibre insignificant when compared
with that of the guns ordinarily found, even in those days,
on board a man-of-war. Even of these he had an insuffi¬
cient number, and almost all his improvised fighting ships
were pierced for a greater number of guns than they ac¬
tually carried. However, one by one, partially equipped
as they were, they left the island for the rendezvous at
Madagascar. When all had taken their departure, he
himself, brimful of bright hopes and enthusiasm, set sail
to join them. J
This was on March 24. Scarcely, however, had he
sighted his squadron, when one of those tempests which
* La Bourdonnais’ expression re¬ of the vessels forming the squadron
garding these vessels runs as follows: and their respective armaments. The
‘ It is proper to observe regarding ‘Achille’ of 70 guns; the ‘'Bourbon,’
these vessels that they were very pierced for 42, carrying 34 guns; the
badly off for crews. The “ Achille'” ‘ Phenix,’ pierced for 44, carrying 38
alone was fitted out as a ship of war. guns; tlie ‘Neptune,’ pierced for 36,
The others were no more armed than carrying 30 guns; the ‘ Saint Louis,’
simple merchant ships.’—Mhnoire. pierced for 36, carrying 20 guns; the
t The armament of these vessels ‘Lys^i erced for 36, carrying 24 guns;
necessitated the landing of all the ‘ Due d’Orldans,’ pierced for 36,
the merchandise with which they carrying 24 guns; the ‘ Pumommde,’
were laden, to the great loss of the pierced for 28, carrying 24 guns; and
officers. the ‘ Insulaire ’ of 30, carrying 20
t We subjoin a list of the names guns.—Memoir?pour Za Bourdonnais.
 STORM SHATTERS HIS FLEET. 121

periodically sweep over the Indian Ocean burst upon him. chap.
His ships were driven from their anchoring ground, and •—ri—
for three days were tossed about by the storm. One 174c-
of them foundered ;* the admiral’s ship, the ‘ Achille,’
lost her three masts, and many of the others suffered
equally. At last, however, they found a safe refuge
in the Bay of Antongil, on the north-eastern coast of
Madagascar. In this bay, lying off a desert island within
it, the work of refitting was undertaken. Perhaps never
was such a work begun under so many accumulated dis¬
advantages. The island was marshy and insalubrious;
the periodical rains had begim; the ships had suffered
fearfully, and their crews were knocked up by fatigue.
There was no landing-place; the forest whence wood was
to be procured was on the mainland, upwards of two miles
distant; between it and the shore was a marsh three miles
in circumference ; a winding river with sufficient water to
render the frequent crossing it wearisome, but not suffi¬
cient to float the logs down to the sea ; and, even when
in the sea, they were yet three miles from the shipping.
But these difficulties, great as they were, were all over¬
come. He built a quay of the stone which the island
produced, he erected workshops for the construction of
masts, ropes, and other appliances ; he threw a road across
the marsh ? he caused the logs to be dragged along the
bed of the’river, and constructing rude canoes, he launched
them at its mouth, and by their aid paddled the logs to
the side of the disabled vessels. To choose these logs, he
penetrated into the pestilential forests, in order that he
might be sure that he had the advantage of the best
species of wood procurable. His example stimulated the
whole fleet. Those who, at first, had beeu inclined to
show discontent, could not long resist his magic influence.
But a short time elapsed before all worked with an energy
of which before they had scarcely seemed capable. At
the end of forty-eight days they had repaired every
* The 1 Neptune des Indes,’ of 31 guna, not included in the above list.
122 THE RISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, damage, though at a loss, from climate and exposure, of

n.1, _ ninety-five Europeans and thirty-three negroes. The fleet
1746, however was saved, and was once more ready to sail for
the long-wished-for goal.*
At length, on June 1, it started. It consisted now
of but nine ships. Besides the ‘ Achille ’ of seventy
guns, one vessel carried thirty-eight guns, one thirty-four
guns, one thirty guns, one twenty-six, three twenty-four,
and one twenty guns. He had on board 3,342 men, of
whom nearly one-fourth were Africans. Sailing with a
fair wind, constantly exercising and encouraging his crews,
La Bourdonnais arrived off Mahe at the end of the month.
Here he learned that the English fleet had been last heard
of off Negapatam, below Karical; that though inferior in
the number of ships, and slightly inferior in the number
of crews, it was much superior in weight of metal, being
armed with 24-pounders, and that it was waiting at Nega-
patam to intercept him. Summoning his captains on
board his ship, La Bourdonnais at once held a council of
war. He was resolved to fight, but he wished first to test
the temper of his subordinates. To his delight he found
in them an eagerness almost equal to his own, a desire to
gain, if possible, the empire of India on the sea. His
mind entirely at ease on this point, he altered his course,
and a few days later arrived off Trincomalee. ^
It is time now that we should turn to the proceedings
of the English fleet. We left Commodore Barnet, pre¬
vented by the interdiction of the Nawab Anwaroodeen
from attacking Pondichery, reduced to the necessity of
confining his operations to sea. Taking up a position at
Mergui, near the entrance of the Malacca Straits, he had
employed himself industriously in intercepting French
traders, and in effectively stopping French commerce.
Hearing some rumours in the early part of 1746 of the
intended expedition of La Bourdonnais, he had returned*

* Momoiro pour La Bourdonnais.

 ENCOUNTERS THE ENGLISH FLEET. 123

to the Coromandel coast, and anchored off Fort St. David, chap.
Here in the month of April he died, and the command of X74-0.
the squadron devolved upon Commodore Peyton.
This squadron consisted of one ship of sixty guns, three
of fifty, one of forty, and one of twenty guns, six ships
in all.* But they carried mostly 24-pounders, and were
armed with their full complement of guns. A judicious
commander would have been able, with such a force,
to cause terrible destruction amongst the liglitly-armed
vessels of La Bourdonnais.
Intelligence had been conveyed to Commodore Peyton
of the appearance of a French fleet off Ceylon, and he was
cruising off Negapatara to intercept it. Early on the
morning of July 6 it was descried. The discovery was
made about the same time on board the French vessels,
and the hostile squadrons began at once to manceuvre,
the English to preserve the advantage of the wind, the
French to gain it. La Bourdonnais, knowing his inferi¬
ority in weight of metal, and his superiority*in men, had
felt that his only chance of success lay in a hand-to-hand
encounter, and his great object was to board. But the
skill of Commodore Peyton, who divined liis enemy’s ob¬
ject, defeated this intention, and at half-past four o’clock
in the afternoon that officer had gained a position which
enabled hitfi to open fire at a safe distance on the French.
This distance was all in favour of the English. With
their 24-pounders they inflicted great damage on the
French ships, which these latter, with their 8 and
12-pounders and musketry, were very partially able
to repay. Three of their ships were disabled at the
beginning of the action—one indeed completely dis¬
masted—and had not La Bourdonnais, coming up with

* Subjoined are the names of the Chester/ Cnptam Lord T, Bertie, 50

vessels and their commanders:—The gains; the ‘Medway’s Prize/ Captain
‘Medway/ Commodore Peyton, 60 Griffith, 40 guns; the‘Lively/Cap-
guns ; the ‘ Preston/ *Captain Lord tain Stevens, 20 guns. Tlie total
Korthesh, 50 guns; the ‘Harwich/ number of the crews amounted to
Captain Carteret, 50 guns; the ‘Win- 1,600 menGrose's East Indies.
124 THE EISE OP THE FRENCH POWER IN' INDIA.

chap, the ‘ Achille,’ the only ship of his squadron that carried its
- proper complement of heavy guns, drawn upon himself
174c' for half an hour the whole fire of the English, the squadron
could not have escaped defeat. As it was, night separated
the combatants before a decisive advantage had been
gained on either side.
Day broke showing the French squadron formed in line,
the advantage of the wind still being, as on the previous
day, with ’the English. It rested with the latter therefore
whether the contest should be renewed. There were very
many weighty reasons in favour of prompt and vigorous
action. The English had had but sixty men killed and
wounded* the previous day, and one only of their ships
had received any considerable damage from the enemy’s
fire; they were all ships of war; eight of the French
ships were but imperfectly and lightly armed; the English
fleet had been stationed off Negapatam to obstruct the
advance of the French fleet; to abandon the field there¬
fore was to leave Madras a prey to the enemy.
Butin 1746, the English were not accustomed to re¬
gard the empire .of the seas as their own. Some of those
on board that squadron might perchance have recollected
the time when the English Channel had been scoured for
weeks, unopposed, by the victorious fleet of de Tourville
—the English fleet having sought refuge in thS Thames.f
Certain it is, that Commodore Peyton acted as English*
commodores of the time of the revolutionary war never
would have thought of. acting. Because one of his ships
was leaky he deemed the attack too hazardous to be made.
A council of war having confirmed this view, he made
sail to the south, bound for Trincomalee, leaving the way
open to Pondicliery—deserting that Madras which he had
been sent to protect.
If % La Bourdonnais was relieved by the departure of
* The English lost fourteen men t After the hattle off Beachy Head,
hilled and forty-six -wounded: the Tune 30, 1690.
French, twenty-seven killed and fifty- % La Bourdonnais* states in his
three wounded. memoirs that it was with extreme
 REPULSES IT AED REACHES POJTDICHEEY. 125

his enemy, he did not show it. On the contrary he made chap.
. an appearance of pursuing the English. But it was only •-—^
an appearance. He must, in reality, have been greatly 1745'
relieved by their sheering off. He had expended- a great
portion of his ammunition, he had provisions but for
twenty-four' hours longer. The disappearance of the
English left him free to accomplish his object. His dis¬
masted ship, the ! Insulaire,’ he ordered to Bengal to be
repaired; then quickly collecting the remainder of his
squadron, he resumed almost immediately his northerly
course, and on the, following evening cast anchor in the
Pondichery roads.
One portion of his seemingly impossible task had thus
been accomplished. Pondichery was safe, the French
fleet mistress of the Indian seas, Madras uncovered. The
positions of the contending rivals hacl been exactly re¬
versed. It would now be for the French to threaten, for
the English to sue for neutrality. What will be the
result P Will the Nawab of the Carnatic, standing neutral
between the contending parties, extend to the English
the same protection he had accorded to their rivals P If
not, it would seem as though their case were almost des¬
perate. Abandoned by their fleet, with but three hun¬
dred Europeans within its walls, Madras presented far
fewer means of defence than Pondichery. Governor
Morse too was neither a Dumas nor a Dupleix. Oil the
other band, the French had at their head two masters,
both men of genius, of energy, of ambition ; the one a
master in council, an adept at statecraft, skilled in all the

l-C'grot he saw the English escape money for you on board, and, more
him. He adds, that being without than that, the scarcity of food, of
- provisions and having on board a which many ships had only four and
great number of siclt and wounded, twenty hours’ supply, made me con-
he was constrained to renounce their template tile frightful situation in
pursuit. In his letter to Dupleix, which I should be, if I were to fall
however, he says nothing about 'the to the leeward of the place; this
disappearance of the English, 'but determined me to bear up for Pondi-
writes thus :—‘ The fear of miss ing chery.’
Pondichery, the large amount of
126 THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

chap, wiles of a subtle policy, but himself unacquainted with

—r——• war and its details: the other a man, great in action and
1746' prompt in council, accustomed to command, accustomed
to see Iris will obeyed, to bear down every obstacle ; but
whether equally fitted to carry out the will of another, as
yet unproved. The uncertainty in this respect formed
the only cloud in the horizon of the fortunes of French
India. Would the active genius, who had ‘ conquered the
impossible,’ who, by the sheer force of his will, has
created the soldiers and the sailors, the ships and the
guns, wherewith he has relieved Popdichery, would he
now subordinate that will to the will of another man, his
superior in position, but whom he has yet only heard of
as a successful trader? Up to the moment of casting
anchor at Pondichery not a shadow of a contest had arisen.
Hitherto each had acted independently of the other. The
communications between the two Governors had been
most friendly. ‘The honour of success,’ wrote Dupleix
in the early part of the .year, ‘ will be yours, and I shall
liold myself lucky in contributing thereto through means
that owe their value entirely to your skill.’ ‘ We ought,’
wrote La Bourdonnais on his side, ‘ to regard one another
as equally interested in the progress of events, and to
work in concert. For my part, Sir, I devote myself to
you beforehand, and I swear to you a perfect confidence.’
But circumstances had altered. Success had now been
attained; the two men were about for the first time to
come in contact. Which of them was to take the lead ?
It was in the chance of some disagreement between those
strong natures, both accustomed to command, that lay
the best chance for Governor Morse and Madras.
 127

CHAPTER IV. .

LA BOUEDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

The eight ships which formed, after the repulse of the chap.
English fleet, the squadron commanded by La Bourdon- ._iy- .
nais, anchored off Pondichery on the evening of July 8, 1746.
1746. The meeting between the Governor and the vic¬
torious Admiral was cordial.* There was no reason why
it should not be so, for they were striving alike after the
same object—an object which could be attained only by
their mutual cooperation. La Bourdonnais held an in¬
dependent command, but on the continent of India he
was subordinate to the Council o£,Pondichery.f In the
contemplated expedition, however, against the English,
Dupleix was very willing to giv,e up the entire control of
the operations to La Bourdonnais. He was mainly
anxious to see that the operations themselves were well-
matured, and he was naturally resolved to hold in his
own hands the supreme political power. The correspond¬
ence between the two had been conducted, as we have
seen, in the most cordial manner. Dupleix had declared
that the honour of success would belong to La Bourdon¬
nais ; that he would use every effort in his power to con¬
tribute to that success. He had added : ‘ I shall esteem
myself happy to have contributed to it by causes which

* La Bourdonnais asserts in liis Bourdonnais in 1741 provided, that

memoirs that he was received in an whilst under all circumstances he
unbecoming (peu decade) manner; was to command on the seas, his
hut even if it were the case, it does control over the land forces, in any
not appear, if we may judge from the French settlement beyond the limits
correspondence, to have affected the of the Isles, was dependent on the
friendly terms upon which he con- authority with which the local Coun-
sorted with Dupleix for the first few cils might invest him.—Extract des
days after his arrival. Ordres du Minisire, 16 Janvier 1741.
f The order sent from Paris to La
128 LA BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, -will only derive merit from your conduct and its happy
■——' results, for which I am ardently desirous. I hope that
1746. my previous assurances, as well as this one, will convince
you of the light in which I regard the question. I feel
too much the importance of our union, not to give myself
entirely to bring it about. Have no fears, therefore, on
the score, but count on me as on yourself.’ * La Bour-
donnais had replied in similar terms : 1 Be assured,’ lie
wrote from the Malabar coast on June 21, ‘ that my con¬
duct will be guided as much as possible by your counsels.
I burn with impatience to embrace you, and to consult
with you measures for repairing our losses.’ There
certainly seemed no reason why these two men should
clash.
And yet there was seen here, what the world has seen
so often since, an example of the extreme difficulty with
which men of action, accustomed to command—to. plan
as well as to execute—submit to a superior authority.
They will obey, it is true, a man of acknowledged genius,
iu whose hands is vested irresponsible power. Thus Mas-
sena and Ney, Soult and Suchet, acknowledged and
obeyed genius and power combined in the person of
Napoleon. But away from the influence of his presence,
Ney chafed and grumbled when placed under the orders
of Massena, and even Suchet, able as he was,' refused to
make a movement which would have given to the French
army a great superiority over Lord Wellington, when, as
a consequence of it, he would have been brought under
the orders of Soult. Perhaps it was, at Pondichery in
1746, that La Bourdonnais, conscious of his own abilities,
felt a revulsion which he could not control at being called
upon to work under one who was known to fame chiefly
as a successful merchant and trader, and whose skill as a
manager of men he had had no opportunity of testing.
This is certain, that La Bourdonnais had not been long

* Dated, April 23,1746, and received by La Bourdonnais at Mah&

 DESIGNS OP THE FRENCH ON MADRAS. 129

on shore before he began to adopt a line of conduct en- chap.

tirely inconsistent with his well-known character for en- ;—J—-
terprise, to show doubt, hesitation, and uncertainty, to 1746-
refuse to move on an expedition without positive orders
from the Council, of which, in virtue of his commission
as admiral, he was a member, to decline .even to make an
election of the two alternatives which were presented to
him—to go in search of the English fleet, or to sail at
once for Madras.
The taking of Madras had been all along regarded by
the two French leaders as the first fruits of a decisive vic¬
tory at sea. A very few days after his arrival at Pondi-
chery, La Bourclonnais addressed a lengthy letter to Du-
pleix on the subject of his plans, and lie thus alluded to
the project regarding Madras: 4 At the time of our
former squadron of 1741, you know what designs I had
formed upon Madras. Encouraged by M. Dumas, to
whom I had communicated my project, I begged him to
communicate it to you, at the time of your installation.
You approved of it, and made preparations which the
continued peace rendered useless. Since the outbreak of
war, persisting in my first design, I have imparted it to
you, begging you at the same time to add to your former
preparations, others to facilitate our success. * * * *
My plan "is to destroy or disperse the English squadron, if
it be possible; the capture of Madras must result.’ *
The reply of Dupleix was couched in the same spirit.
4 Your idea regarding Madras,’ he wrote,']’ ‘is the only
one which can indemnify the Company for all its losses .
and expenses, restore the honour, of the nation, and pro¬
cure for this colony a more solid footing than hitherto.
This enterprise is very easy, and your forces are more
than sufficient to carry it out, but it cannot be attempted
with safety, before the English squadron is destroyed or
beaten.’ As to the treatment of Madras, in case it should

Dated July 17,1746. t Dated July 20,1746.

i
 LA BOUBDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

fall into his hands, La Bourdonnais had thus, on July 17th,

addressed the Governor-General: ‘ If fortune favours
you,’ lie wrote, ‘ wliat do you think we ought to do with
Madras P My idea is to take possession of and carry off
all the merchandise we may find there, and to ransom the
remainder; for if we should raze every stone in the town,
it would be rebuilt in a year, and Madras would be much
stronger than it is now.’ The answer of Dupleix on this
point deserves to be remembered. He replied, on June
20 :—41 cannot say at present what it would seem good
to do with Madras; if you should haye the good fortune
to take it, circumstances will decide as to the fittest course
to be adopted. But I beg you to recollect, that so long
as Madras remains as it is, Pondichery will languish, and
commerce will fall off. It is not sufficient to think only
of a present, and, perhaps, an uncertain advantage; we
must look forward to the future. I am not of the opinion
that this town, once dismantled, could be restored in a
year. It has taken very many years to make it what it
now is, and the facilities and means for re-establishing it
are less than they were for making it.’
In the letter from which we have extracted, La Bour¬
donnais had given an exact statement of the condition of
the armament of his fleet, and had requested Dupleix to
supply from the arsenal of Pondichery the deficiencies
-under which he laboured. He had indented upon Dupleix
altogether for forty-four eighteen, and for fourteen
twelve-pounders. It was not in the powrnr of Dupleix to
comply literally with this demand, -without weakening, to
a dangerous extent, the defences of Pondichery. But he
supplied instead a larger number than were asked for.
In place of forty-four guns of eighteen, and fourteen of
twelve, he sent Mm twenty-eight of eighteen, twelve of
twelve, and twenty-two of eight, and offered to change
those which were only slightly damaged.- He accom¬
panied this offer with an explanation. so frank and cour¬
teous, that it seems surprising that his conduct in this
 VACILLATION OF LA BOURDONNAIS. 131

respect should ever have beeu made the subject of ani- chap.
madversion.* ~~—■-—
Yet notwithstanding the supply of guns, ammunition, 174S-
provisions, and inen,+ La Bourdonnais could not make up
liis mind to set sail The idea that the English fleet
might keep out of sight until it were reinforced from
Europe, and that, thus reinforced, it might take him at a
disadvantage when before Madras, seemed at first greatly
to weigh upon him. To obviate this risk, and to draw
the English within fighting distance, he proposed, on
August 10, that a force should proceed to Cuddalore,
twelve miles south of Pondichery, to attack Port St.
David, built by the English in its vicinity. If the Eng¬
lish fleet were to bear up to assist that fort, he would
then attack it; but if it should not, it would be a proof
that it had been very severely handled in the former
action, and he would have no difficulty in taking Port St.
David. J
* After enumerating the necessity your demands, I am ready to make
that Pondichery should he a strong over to you twenty-eight eighteen-
place, under whose walls French ves¬ pounders, twelvo of twelve, and
sels might always find a secure refuge, twenty-two of eight, and to change
and alluding to the probable increase those which are hut slightly da¬
to their naval enemies by the chances maged, and which, after being re¬
of a war with Holland, Dupleix adds: paired, can he made serviceable.
‘ This augmentation of enemies, the These guns will make a great gap,
only thing -fre have to apprehend, hut the word of honour you give me
ought to render me more circumspect to return them, and the moral cer¬
with regard to a place so consider¬ tainty I feel of your victory over the
able; the safety of which depends enemy, permit me to take the step of
entirely on others: ’ (the victorious dismantling the walls with less dis¬
courseof the French fleet). ‘ A thou¬ quietude.’—M. Dupleix A M. de la
sand mishaps, to which sea forces are Bourdomais, July 20, 1746.
subject, might disappoint this place + The reinforcements furnished by
for a long time of the guns which Pondichery consisted of 200 Eu¬
you wish to take from it. The Mi¬ ropeans, 100 topasses or Indo-Por-
nister has given me orders to assist tuguese, 300 sepoys, besides officers,
you, and I obey willingly orders so in addition to lascars, as well as 170
deserving of respect. But I cannot sailors and 50 European soldiers be¬
persuade myself that his intentions longing to the garrison already serv¬
are that I should risk the safety of ing on the fleet.
Pondichery. I believe, on the con¬ t It is in this letter that La Bour-
trary, and I flatter myself that he donnais informs Dupleix of the sick¬
will be better pleased, that I should ness caused on board his squadron,
not place it in- jeopardy. Never¬ and from which he himself especially
theless, to act up to his orders and suffered, from drinking the water
132 LA BOUBDOXXAIS AXD DUPLEIX.

chap. Against this plan, as an alternative to the long-medi-

■—^—• tated attack upon Madras, Dupleix strongly protested,
me. e cuddalore and Fort St! David,’ he wrote on. the 12th,
‘ are not worth the powder and shot you will expend
upon them.’ He pointed out that their capture would
very probably range the Nawab on the side of the Eng¬
lish, and that this would save Madras. ‘ The enterprise
against Madras,’ he added, ‘ is the only one which can
indemnify us, and do honour to the nation in India, and
I cannot agree with you in your plan of abandoning that
project for one which merits neither-your attention nor
mine, and of which the consequences will be costly and
injurious to us.’ He continued to urge upon him, in a
lengthened argument, that two principal objects had
brought him to India—the destruction of the English
squadron and the taking of Madras—and that abandon¬
ing one of those, he ought to attach himself with his
whole heart to the other. The day after this correspond¬
ence, La Bourdonnais took advantage of a favourable
breeze to go in search of the English squadron. He
arrived off Karicah on August 13, and there obtained,
with some difficulty, positive information of the enemy.
They had been descried on the 10th, six vessels in num¬
ber, a little to the north of the northernmost point of
Ceylon, about fifteen miles off the coast. To the Dutch
officer who boarded them they stated that they had been
repulsed by the French, but that they were only waiting
the arrival of reinforcements to renew the attack. All
their damages had been repaired. Satisfied, then, as he
stated, that he was free from all attack on that side, La
Bourdonnais resolved to return at once to Pondichery,
and, arriving there on the 19th, to embark the soldiers,
sepoys, and other troops awaiting him, and to proceed
immediately with the grand design against Madras. He

taken in at Pondichery. _ In ills me- was a part of the general scheme to

moirs, lie makes of tliis a. charge annoy him.
against Dupleix, insinuating that it
 HE CONTINUES TO HESITATE. 133

added in bis letter, however, that his health was greatly chap.
enfeebled, and that not for all India would he stay on the •—A-'
coast after October 15, when the monsoon would set in. 1746-
Instead, however,- of acting upon this plan, which he had
communicated to Dupleix through M. Paradis, the com¬
mandant of the Karical garrison, La Bourdonnais sud- .
denly changed his mind and went in search of the
English. He found them off Negapatam, and endeavoured
to bring them to action. But though he hoisted Dutch
colours to deceive them, they fled before him, he reported,
in a manner that soon took them out of sight.* Think¬
ing that they might return to Negapatam, he waited there
two days; but not meeting them, he again put out, and
on the evening of the 25th anchored off Pondichery.
This escape of the English, and the uncertainty whither
they had proceeded, completely changed the views of La
Bourdonnais. He who, on the 14th, when he knew the
English fleet to be below Negapatam waiting for reinforce¬
ments, had declared his readiness to proceed with the
utmost haste to Madras, had become, on the 26th, after
that fleet had sailed he knew not whither, hesitating and
doubtful. He dwelt on the difference between command¬
ing King’s ships and vessels belonging to the Company.
‘ In the former,’ he said, ‘ one hazards everything for
glory, in die latter one must look to profit; ’ and he stated
his opinion that his squadron was insufficient for the
double task of attacking Madras, and beating off the En¬
glish squadron reinforced by its expected ships. In this
difficulty he appealed to the Superior Council for its
advice.f
An extraordinary meeting of the Pondichery Council

* Mr. Orme statestliat'theEnglish, English admiral of the present day.

perceiving the addition of cannon with The English ships were mostly armed
which the enemy had been sup- with 24-poimders, whereas the French
plied at Pondichery, avoided an en- had only taken on board twenty-eight
gagement.’ Air. Aliil simply remarks 18-pounders, and others of smaller
that the English fled. The reason calibre.
given by Mr. Orme would not, we + H. de la Bourdonnais it 51.
think, he considered sufficient by any Dupleix, 26 Aout, 1746.
134 LA BOUEDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, took place to consider this appeal. There rvere present

——. at it thirteen members, and they came to a very decided
mo. opinion. This was contained in a letter addressed to La
Bourdonnais bearing the same date.* In this letter, after
recapitulating the preparations that had been made, the
time that had been lost, the change in the opinions of the
Admiral, they set before him the choice of two alterna¬
tives. Either, they said, you should go to Madras and
attack it, or you should go and drive the English fleet
from these seas. At present they are, they said, in a
position in which they can intercept every vessel coming
from Europe, whilst you are here, effecting nothing now,
and talking of leaving us to the mercy of the English fleet
in October. They concluded with these words: ‘ We are
bound to add also that it would be shameful and dis¬
graceful for the nation to abandon these two means,
whilst we have a moral certainty that the treasure and
the vessels which we expect from Europe will be taken
by the enemy’s squadron, and an equal certainty that you
can succeed in one of the two. It is equally important
not to render useless the strength of your squadron, and
the money spent upon it. What reproaches will you not
have to make yourself, if at the same time that you
abandon the project which would serve to indemnify us,
our enemies take possession of the vessels wq. are ex¬
pecting from Europe, almost within sight of your
squadron!’
It is strange—the' transformation which a forced sub¬
ordination to authority can sometimes make in the entire
character of a man. Who would have believed that the
daring, energetic leader, who had ‘ conquered the impos¬
sible’ at the islands, who had there made ships and
sailors, and soldiers and guns, who had sailed across the
ocean with his untried crews, and had met and scattered
the war-ships of the enemy, that the man whose motto

Lettre du Conseil Superieur du 20 Ao4t, 1746.

 THE EFFECTS OF WOUNDED VANITY. 135

was action, should, have suddenly so changed as to call CHAP.

IV.
forth an incitement to action couched in the terms we
have just given ? Yet we have seen in our own day how 1746.
blind to all perception of right, how oblivious even of
the ordinary obligations of politeness, how open to the
malignant suggestions of whisperers and sycophants,
wounded vanity will make even those who, in other re¬
spects, soar far above the common run of their fellow-
men. Up to the time of the despatch of that letter,
Dupleix and the Council had. met every requisition on
the part of La Bourclonnais in the most obliging spirit.
They had made over to him the particular officers he had
asked for, of whom Paradis was one, all the stores, am¬
munition, and, as we have seen, all the guns they could
spare. They had only pressed upon him to act. But
the feeling that he was thus under control, that he, who
had always impressed his own will upon all around him,
should be subject to the will of another, had changed the
heart and the blood of La Bomdonnais. The burden of
all his letters -was, that he could not attack Madras,
because the English squadron had not been destroyed,
that the English squadron had not been destroyed, be¬
cause he could not brj,pg it to action, and that he could
not stay . on the coast later than October 15. The
meaning tors that he would do nothing till then. Even
the letter of the Superior Council failed to move him.
Plain as were its terms, that he should either attack the
English fleet or Madras, he had the boldness to declare .
that its contents prevented him from moving, because it
did not prescribe precisely which of the two courses he
was to adopt. Taking the letter in his hand, he declared
publicly to all who would listen to him, that the Superior
Council was the only obstacle to action on his part. This
proceeding thoroughly roused Dupleix. He re-summoned
the Council on the 27th, and put before it, for considera¬
tion, the course adopted by the Admiral.
The deliberations of the Council at this crisis were
fe
386 LA BOCRDONKAIS AXD DUPLEIX. .

chap, short, prompt, and to the point. They resolved to serve

■-i on La Bourdonnais a summons, calling upon him, ‘ on the
1746- part of the King and the Company, to make choice of one
of the two plans which had been presented to him on the
26 th—the only plans we consider practicable, suitable to '
present circumstances, .to the glory of the King, the
honour of the nation, the interests of the Company, the
force of his squadron, and the weakness of our enemies
by sea and land; in default of doing this—of the choice
of which he is left master—he to be held responsible in
his own name for all that may happen in consequence, as
well as for all the expenses which his project on Madras,
so long meditated and conducted to the point of execu¬
tion, has occasioned the Company. If hindered by sickness
from acting himself, as there is no time to lose and
moments are precious, the Council consider M. de la
Portebarre, of whom the capacity and prudence are known,
to be very capable of executing whichever of the two
plans he may select.’
The reply of La Bourdonnais was short: ‘ I have re¬
ceived,’ he wrote, ‘ the citation and its contents. I con¬
sulted the Council of Pondichery only regarding the alfair
of Madras. It rested with it to <give its opinion for or
against that. As to the destination of my squadron, it
has no right to interfere with it. I know whaf, I ought
to do, and my orders have been given for it to leave
Pondichery this evening.’ *
The fleet accordingly sailed -under M. de la Portebarrd,f

* A Messieurs du Conseil Supd- Dupleix directed the re-landing of

lieur de Pondichery, 27 Aout, 1746. 260 soldiers and 100 topasses with
f Mi’. Mill states, that Dupleix their officers, assigning the following
carried his ‘unfriendly proceeding’ as a reason: ‘The distance which
so far as to command La Bourdonnais your squadron may find itself from
to ‘ re-land the Pondichery troops.’ this place hy some event which God
It is very true that on August 27, alone can foresee, and these troops
knowing ouly, hy the reply of La being useless in your vessels, I beg
Bourdonnais to the citation, that the you to disembark the troops above
fleet was to leave, but ignorant of the referred to, in order that X may he in
direction it was to take, or the object a condition to answer to the Iving for
on which it was. to he employed, the place which he has confided to
 FORT ST. GEORGE. 137

La Bourdonnais himself alone remaining behind on ac- chap.

count of his sickness. The squadron sailing along the >—A—•
'coast succeeded in capturing two small vessels in the 174G-
Madras roads. It then returned to Pondichery. The
health of La Bourdonnais, meanwhile, had improved, and
his announced determination to attack Madras seems to
have improved his relations with the Council. On the
evening of the 12th, accordingly, he embarked to proceed
on this long-meditated enterprise. On the 14th, approaching
the shore, twelve miles south of Madras, he landed 500
or 600 men, with two pieces of cannon. Sailing slowly,
parallel with these troops, on the loth, he arrived at
midday within cannon-shot of the town. He then landed
with 1,000 or 1,100 Europeans, 400 sepoys, and 300 or
400 Africans, and summoned the place to surrender. He
had still from 1,700 to 1,800 men on board his squadron.
Port St. George, and the town of Madras, of which it 1639.
formed the defence, had been built upon a plot of ground,
which the last of the Hindoo rulers of Bijanugger had
made over to the English in 1639. Fourteen years later,
the little settlement had been raised to the rank of
a Presidency, and it constituted for a long time afterwards
the principal emporium of the English in India. It was
not very well situated for that purpose. On a bluff point
of the coast, where the current was always rapid, and
exposed to all the violence of the monsoon, and the in¬
convenience of a surf which made navigation for English
boats impossible, it would have been difficult to find a
position less adapted for commercial purposes than
Madras. The roadstead was dangerous during some
months of the year, especially from October to January,
so much so, that on the appearance of anything approach-
138 LA BOURDONNAIS AND DLTLEIX.

chap, ing to a gale during tliose months, vessels were forced to

^—- slip their anchors,' and run out to sea. Kor did the
1639. fertility of the neighbouring country compensate for these
disadvantages. The soil was hard, dry, and barren ; the
population poor and sparse. In those days, however, it
was apparently the custom of the different European
nations to select, as their settlements, points on the coast
in as close a contiguity to one another as was possible.
And the situation of Madras probably owed its value in
the eyes of Mr. Day, the English merchant who negotiated
for the land, to the fact that it was but foiir miles from
the Portuguese settlement of St. Thome.
But notwithstanding its unfavourable situation, the
industry and enterprise of English settlers soon brought
prosperity to Madras. In 1678, the native population,
attracted thither by the protection and opportunities of
traffic they enjoyed under the English flag, amounted to
300,000, and the revenue, derivable from taxation, was
estimated, nine years later, at about 160,000 rupees,
equal, allowing for the probable increase of population
during that period, to a capitation tax of eight annas.
In 1696, Mr. Thomas Pitt, the grandfather of the great
Commoner and possessor of the famous Pitt diamond,
became Governor, and held the office for eleven years.
It was during his administration that Madras 'first came
into hostile contact with the native princes of the coun¬
try. Daood Khan, Kawab of the Carnatic under the
Emperor Auxungzebe—a chief noted for his fondness
for the strong waters of Europe—made a sudden demand
upon Mr. Pitt (1702) for 10,000 pagodas, about 40,000
rupees. Mr. Pitt endeavoured by civilities and sump¬
tuous entertainments to amuse the Kawab into forget¬
fulness of his demand. But if Daood Khan loved
cordials much, he loved rupees even more. Einding his
requests evaded, he subjected Fort St. George to a strict
blockade, cut off all supplies from the country, seized all
the goods coming into the place, and only raised the siege
 CHARACTER OE GOVERNOR MORSE. 139

when Mr. Pitt consented unwillingly to a compromise. In chap.

addition to Madras, and subordinate to it, the English -—^—-
possessed at this time, on the Coromandel coast, the 1702-
settlement of Fort St. David, close to Cuddalore, sixteen
miles south of Pondichery, and the factories of Porto
Novo, Pettipolee, Masulipatam, Modapollam, and Vizaga-
patam. It does not appear that the history of Madras
was marked by any other incidents of importance till the
period of which we are treating. In the year 1744, Mr. 1744 .
Nicholas Morse was appointed Governor of Fort St.
George. Morse was an old Company’s merchant, ignorant
of politics, caring little for them, a quiet, easy-going,
useless sort of man, who ever carried out, with a literal
obedience, and regardless of any changes that might have
occurred in the interval, the orders of his masters in
England. Thus it was, that when, shortly after Iris
accession to office, he received overtures from Dupleix
to preserve neutrality in India during the coming war,
Governor Morse, well convinced, all the time, of the
wisdom of the measure, excused himself from entertaining
it, on the ground of the instructions he had received from
the Company.
We have seen how little these instructions had availed 1745,
the English. With the command of the seas when the
war broke/out, they had, nevertheless, been prevented by
the interest of M. Dupleix with the Nawab Anwaroodeen,
from profiting to the full extent from their advantage. A
positive prohibition had been placed upon them with
reference to the French settlements on the coast, and they
had been compelled to confine their operations to the
capture of stray merchantmen on the seas. The Court of
Directors, deeming themselves secure of conquest, had
never contemplated the possibility of Madras being in
danger. They had, therefore, altogether neglected to
supply soldiers for its defence; nor does it appear that
the contingency of defence being necessary ever presented
itself to Governor Morse. When, therefore, the news in 4
140 LA BOCRDONXAIS AND DBPLEIX.

chap, quick succession reached Fort St. George, that La Bour-

—^—• donnais’ squadron had left the Isle of France, that it had
174S. engaged and repulsed the English squadron off Negapatam,
that it had arrived at Pondiehery, and was making pre¬
parations for an attack upon Madras itself, the surprise
and consternation which prevailed amongst its residents
may perhaps be imagined. The defences of Fort St.
George were certainly not very formidable. *The Fort
itself was an oblong, 400 yards by 100, surrounded
by a slender wall, defended by four bastions and four
batteries, very slight and defective in their construction,
and with no outworks to defend them. . The English
garrison consisted of 300 men, of whom 34 were
Portuguese vagabonds or deserters, or negroes; of the re¬
mainder only 200 were fit for duty. The officers were
three lieutenants, two of whom were foreigners, and seven
ensigns who had risen from the ranks.*
In his extremity, Governor Morse applied to the
Nawab of the Carnatic. It will be recollected that when
this nobleman hacV forbidden the exercise of hostilities by
the English against any place in the possession of the
French on the Coromandel coast, he had accompanied his
order by a promise, that should the French at any future
time obtain the superiority, he would place similar re¬
strictions upon them. The event, which had th^n seemed
so improbable as to be impossible, had now happened.
The Fhench were preparing to attack the English settle¬
ments on the Coromandel coast. Governor Morse, there¬
fore, claimed at once the interference of the Nawab.
It cannot be supposed that a man possessing the Indian
experience of Governor Morse was unacquainted with
the formalities necessary for approaching an Indian ruler.
It is, nevertheless, certain that he managed the mission
to the Nawab—a mission, on which the very existence of
the English at Madras seemed to depend—in such a

East India Chronicle.

 EFFECTS OF HIS ‘ BLUXTNESS.’ 141

manner as to militate very much against its chances of chap.

success. It is a time-honoured custom in Eastern Courts •—^—-
that an envoy should never go into the presence of the 1746.
Prince to whom he is accredited empty-handed. Whether
the custom is good or bad is not the question. It is a
custom, the form of which is kept up by the English even
in the present day; to neglect it, in the days of which we
are wilting, was regarded as nothing less than an insult.
But Governor Morse, in his blunt English way, as though
he had been dealing with his own countrymen, did
neglect this precaution. He sent his messenger empty-
handed into the presence of the Fawab, to remind him
plainly of his promise, to claim for the English that pro¬
tection which he had so recently accorded to the French
messenger, well provided with presents, and who had
returned to beg the Nawab’s permission to punish his
rivals. It thus happened that, when the English messenger
arrived, he found the Fawab apparently undecided, and
though that nobleman declined to give any formal per¬
mission to the French to attack Madras, he refrained,
equally to their advantage, from giving utterance to a
direct prohibition.
Governor Morse was under the influence of the dis¬
appointment attending his negotiations with the Nawab,
when, on-August 29, the fleet of La Bourdonnais appeared
in the roadstead. The unskilful manner in which the
squadron was handled made it evident, however, to the
garrison of Fort St. George, that the famous Admiral
who had brought the ships from the Isle of France was
not with them.® Seeing nothing of the English fleet,
and finding the way open, the officer commanding the
squadron, M. de la Portebarre, contented himself, as we
have seen, with making prize of two merchantmen he
found in the roadstead, and then returned on Septem¬

\
ber 5 to Pondichery. Eight days after, La Bourdonnais
142 LA BOUBDONKAIS AKD DUPLEIX.

chap, embarked, and arriving before Madras on the 15th,

-JZ-—■ summoned it, as already recorded, to surrender.
,1746. Up this point, Governor Morse had been partially
sustained by the hope, that Commodore Peyton would
yet be prepared to strike a blow for the preservation of
the principal English settlement on the Coromandel coast.
But these hopes were destined to be disappointed. Al¬
most simultaneously with the arrival of the French fleet,
he received the disheartening intelligence, that the Com¬
modore with all his ships had appeared on September 3
off Pulicat, and had then borne up for Bengal. That
leaky sixty-gun ship was again assigned as the reason for
the desertion of Madras, the excuse for avoiding a trial
of strength with the battered squadron of La Bourdonnais.*
Meanwhile, La Bourdonnais, having landed his troops
on the 15th, prepared, on the evening of that day and
during the 16th, to erect batteries which should play
upon the town. On the 17th the native portion of the
garrison made a sortie, but they were easily repulsed,
and the French, following up their success, took possession
of the Governor’s house—about half-musket range from
the walls of the town—and fortified themselves in it. On
the 18th, early in the morning, they commenced the
bombardment from their land batteries, and |s soon as
night fell, the three vessels of the squadron possessing the
strongest armament opened fire on the town. A circum¬
stance occurred in the course of the night of the 18th,
which shows how easy it would have been for Com¬
modore Peyton, commanding as he did a squadron which
sailed better than that of the French, ’ to have saved
Madras. On September 17, four ships were sighted off
Pondicliery. Dupleix conceiving they might be part of
the English squadron, wrote off hurriedly to La Bour¬
donnais with the information. To him this was most
startling. Had it been true, it would have been but a
 LA BOURDONNAIS ATTACKS MADRAS.

confirmation of the views which he had so often pressed

upon Dupleix, that to attempt the siege of Madras before
the English fleet had been destroyed, was the height of
rashness. He himself declares that he felt, under these
circumstances, that but one path lay before him, and that
was to push the siege with the utmost vigour. Mr. Orme,
indeed, asserts, though upon what authority we know not,
that ‘the report caused so much alarm in the French
camp, that they were preparing to re-ship their heavy
cannon.’ However this may have been, this at least is
certain, that had Commodore Peyton borne up at that
moment for Madras, and attacked the half-manned French
fleet in the roadstead, he would have inflicted upon it
very great damage, even if he had not compelled the
raising of the siege.
But on the morning of the 19 th, an express arrived
from Dupleix, stating that the information regarding the
strange ships was incorrect. Believed on this point, yet
not knowing how soon a hostile squadron might appear,
La Bourdonnais pushed the siege with vigour, and with
such effect, that in the evening he received a letter from
Mrs. Barneval, the daughter of Madame Dupleix, and
married to an English gentleman in Madras, offering on
the part of Governor Morse to treat.
The reply of the French Commander being favourable
to such a course, Messrs. Monson and Hallyburton pre¬
sented themselves on the following morning in the French
camp. They proposed to enter into negotiations to pay
a certain sum to induce La Bourdonnais to retire from
before the town. This, however, in unmistakeable terms,
the Frenchman refused, and the deputies returned to
demand fresh instructions from the Governor. On the
departure of the deputies, the fire recommenced, and
continued till three o’clock. Between that hour and
eight o’clock in the evening, however, no one appeared
on the part of the English, except a foreigner in the
service of the Nawab, without powers or authority to
144 LA BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLEIN.

chap, negotiate. At eight o’clock, therefore, La Bourdonnais

—^—• reopened the fire, and maintained it throughout the night
1746. from the land batteries and the ships. The re¬
appearance of the English deputies on the following
morning caused it to cease.*
This time, these latter were armed with full powers to
capitulate. After some discussion, they agreed to the
conditions, of which the following are a free summary.
They agreed, 'first, to make over to.M. de la Bourdonnais
at 2 p.m. on that day, September 21, Fort St. George
and the town of Madras with their dependencies. All
the garrison, and generally all the English in the town,
to become prisoners of war. All the councillors, officers,
employes, and other gentlemen in the service of the
Company to be free on their parole, to go and to come
as. they wished, even to Europe; provided only they did
not carry arms against France, offensively or defensively,
without being exchanged.
The articles of the capitulation having been signed, it
was arranged that those regarding the disposal of the
place should be regulated in a friendly way by M. de la
Bourdonnais, the Governor, or his deputies, the two last
engaging on their part to deliver faithfully to the French
the goods and merchandises received or receivable from
merchants, the books of account, the arsenals, ships,
provisions of war and supplies, together with all the
property appertaining to the English Company, without
reserve; besides materials of gold or silver, merchandises,
goods, and any other effects whatever, contained in the
fort or town, to whomsoever they might belong, without
exception.
The garrison was to be conducted to Fort St. David,
as prisoners of war. But should the town of Madras be
ransomed and restored, the garrison might be allowed to'
reoccupy it, as a means of defence against the natives.

^ * The French did not lose a single man in the siege: the English only
 MADRAS SURRENDERS TO THE FRENCH.

But in this, case, an equal number of French prisoners

(made elsewhere) were to be restored to the French.
The sailors were to be sent to Cuddalore,. and their
exchange begun with those actually in Pondichery, the
remainder to proceed in their own ships to England.
But they might not carry arms against France until
regularly exchanged, either in India or in Europe.
On the same day that this capitulation was signed, La
Bourdonnais wrote a few hurried lines to Dupleix. His
first letter, dated 2 P.M. on the 21st, simply states that
he had just entered Madras at the head of 500 men, and
that the white, flag had been hoisted on the ramparts.
The second, dated 8 p.m. of the same day, is more im¬
portant, as showing the view which La Bourdonnais
entertained at the time regarding the conditions he had
granted. In this he says,—‘ The haste with which I
informed you of the taking of Madras did not allow me
to enter into any detail; I was too much occupied in
relieving the posts of this place. The English surren¬
dered to me with even more precipitation than I wrote
you. I have them at my discretion, and the capitulation
■which they signed has been left with me, -without then-
having dreamt of demanding a duplicate.’
Two days later, the 23rd, he wrote a long report, in
•which he* discussed the whole question of the future.
This letter began thus: ‘ At last Madras is in French
hands. The conditions on which it surrendered, place it,
so to say, at my discretion. There is, nevertheless, a
sort of capitulation signed by the Governor, of which I
subjoin a copy; but it does no more, as you will see,
than authorise me to dispose of the place.’
It would appear from these extracts, and from the
tenor of the capitulation itself, that Madras had surren¬
dered at discretion; that the town, the fort, and every¬
thing belonging thereto, had become absolutely French
property. It is equally clear that there h&d been some
discussion between La Bourdonnais and the English
146 LA EOCRDONNAIS AND DLTLEJX

chap, deputies regarding a ransom, but - that it was finally re-

-_solved to leave this question for future adjustment.®
1740. * -0our(3oimai3 thus describes capitulation signed by the Governor;
in iris memoirs the engagement he you are now master of the town, and
entered into regarding the ransom : you can enter it when you like.” ’
‘ The next day, the 21st, the deputies It must always he home in mind,
returned for “the second time, and however, when reading the memoirs
agreed at last to surrender on the of La Bourdonnais, lstly, that they
conditions which had been proposed were written some time after the
to them the previous evening, that is events described, and, 2ndly, that
to say, on the condition of being per- they were written with the view of
nutted to ransom the town. Imme- exculpating himself from specific
diately the articles of capitulation charges brought against him. Now,
were "written out, Mr. Hallyburton the question of the ransom, and espe-
took them to the Governor, who, daily the question as to whether
having examined them, sent them any absolute engagement was en-
baek by the same Mr. llallvburton, tered into at the time of the sur-
with orders to represent to M. de la render, formed one of these specific
Bourdonnais, that neither the Go- charges. On such a point, therefore,
vernor nor the Council ought to be it is necessary to read La Bom-don-
regarded as prisoners of war, so long nais’ own statement with the greatest
r as the question of the conditions of caution. Tho official correspondence
ransom should be under consideration, is a far surer guide. Let us see what
Upon this representation, M. de la that says. We have given all that
Bourdonnais, who wished the Go- relates to the proceeding relative to
vernor and his Council to remain the surrender, in the "text. From
prisoners of war until these condi- this we find, first, that no mention
tions should be agreed upon, con- is made of any promise regarding a
tented himself with assuring the de- ransom. In the letter dated 8 r. at.
putics, that he would give an act of the 21st, written only six hours
of liberty to the Council and the after the interview he describes
Governor, as soon as they should above, La Bourdonnais says,—‘ The
agree with him regarding the ransom. English surrendered to me with even
The deputies having then demanded more precipitation than I wrote you.
that this proposition should be in- I have them at discretion.’ Not a
serted in the capitulation, M. de la word about ransom. In the more
Bourdonnais consented, and it was elaborate letter written two days later
made an article. The deputies then he'writes,—‘ The conditions on which
took hack the capitulation to the it surrendered, place it, so to say, at
Governor, who _ signed it. In bring- my discretion. There is, nevertheless,
mg it back again, they asked M. do a sort of capitulation signed by the
la Bourdonnais for his parole, os an Governor, of which I enclose a copy ;
addition to the promise regarding the but it does no more, as you mil see,
ransom, "Yes, gentlemen,” replied he, than authorise me to dispose of the
“ I renew to yon the promise I made place.’ Again, not a wol-d of the
you yesterday, to restore to you your solemn and reiterated promises re¬
town on condition of a ransom, which corded at such full detail in the
we will settle in a friendly way, and memoirs!
to be reasonable regarding the con- It; further, we examine the capi-.
ditions.” “ You give us then your tulation itself, we shall find every-
word of honour,” answered the depu- thing conditional, There had un¬
ties. “ Yes,” said he,‘‘I give it you, doubtedly been some discussion
and you may be assured that it is regarding a ransom, but the question
inviolable.” iV Very well,” replied the had been refereed for further deli-
two Englishmen, “here then is the beratiou; that it was a doubtful one
 «***»«« rsaus Li»»«f|
DUPLEIX CAJOLES THE NAWAB. 147

Meanwhile, the intelligence had reached the Nawab chap.

Anwaroodeen, that the French had really carried out .—
tlieir intentions, and had laid siege to Madras. Inclined 1746-
as this prince undoubtedly was to French interests,
nothing was further from his intention than to permit
their establishing themselves in the territories of their
European rivals. He, therefore, at once despatched a
messenger on a swift dromedary to Dupleix, the bearer
of a letter, in which the EFawab expressed his surprise at
the events passing at Madras, and threatened that unless
the operations against 4hat place were instantly put an
end to, he would send an army to enforce obedience to
his commands. But Dupleix thoroughly understood
Asiatics. Determined not to forego his designs on
Madras, yet unwilling to bring down upon himself the
hostility of the representative of the Mogul, he devised a
plan whereby, as he thought, Madras would be lost to
the English for ever, even if it were not gained to the
French. In accordance with this idea, he sent instant
instructions to his agent at Arcot, to inform the ETawab
that he was conquering Madras for him, and that it was
his intention to make it over to him on its surrender.
Well acquainted with the vague ideas regarding the
ransom of Madras, to which La Bourdonnais had given
utterancq,*in previous correspondence, it became impera¬
tively necessary for Dupleix to make known to the Ad¬
miral the engagement into which he had just entered.
At 8 P.M., on the evening of the 21st, therefore, he
despatched to him a special messenger conveying a letter,
in which La Bourdonnais was informed of the negotia¬
tion with the ETawab, and was specially warned to enter-

is, we think, shown by the words Bourdonnais to make such an offer,

employed^ in the fourth article, in Madras being completely at his
which it is stated, that ‘ if the town mercy; and, likewise, that it was
is restored by ransom, then the Eng- entirely opposed to the views which
lish, See. See. he knew that Dupleix, his superior
However this may be, it is certain officer on Indian soil, entertained,
that there was no occasion for La
148 LA BOCBDOXXAIS AND DtPLEIM.

chap, tain no proposals for the ransom of Madras after its-

-,1—• capture, ‘ as to do so -would be to deceive the Nawab,
17'1G- and make him join our enemies.’*
This letter readied Madras on the night of the 23rd.
Before its arrival La Bourdonnais had, as we have seen,
sent to Dupleix a copy of the capitulation, together with
a long letter in which he entered fully into the subject of
the reasons by which, he had been actuated. Three courses
he stated were before him. He might either make Madras
a Trench colony; he might raze it to the ground, or he
might treat regarding its ransoi».f The first he did not
consider advisable, because it was not, in his opinion, for
the interests of the Company that they should have on
the same coast, and in close vicinity to one another, two
rival establishments. He added: ‘ by the first orders
received from the Minister, I was forbidden to keep any
conquests: J It is certain that at the peace, the surrender

* The perusal of this letter -mil La Bourdonnais expressly considers

leave no doubt on the reader’s mind himself at liberty to decide upon one
of the sincerity of Dupleix’s nego- of the three courses indicated, two of
tiations with Anwaroodeen. He which would have rendered the ran-
writes:—11 have informed the Na- som of the place impossible, proves
wab through my agent at Arcot, that conclusively that up to the 3rd, he
as soon as wc are masters of the town had entered into no binding engage-
of Madras, we will make it over to ments to ransom Madras, and’that
him, it being well understood, in the the story related in his memoirs was
state in which we may think fit,’ manufactured afterwards,
meaning, he would first raze the for- J As this is the onlyoplace in the
tifications. He adds,—'This infor- entire correspondence in which La
mation ought to determine you to Bourdonnais alludes to the prohibi-
press the siege vigorously, and’ not to tion on the part of the French Mi-
listen to any propositions which may nistry to keep any town or settlement
be made you for the ransom of the place conquered from the enemy, and as,
after its capture, as that would be to nevertheless, he uses it in his me-
deceive the Nawab and make him join moirs as a principal justification of
our enemies: besides, once masters of his conduct; as, moreover, Mr. Orme,
the place, I do not see with what the Mr. Mill, and other writers of Indian
English will be able to ransom it. history down to the latest, Mr. Marsh-
So long, too, as Madras remains as it man, have adopted without examina-
is, it will always he an obstacle to tiou the assertions of La Bourdonnais
the increase of this place. I begyou on this point, it becomes necessary to
to weigh well these consideration.^’— subject those assertions to the test of
Dnplei.r to Za Bourdonnais, dated critical inquiry.
Pondichery, September 21,1740, 8r.ir. It is perfectly true that the French
Tiio fact that, in tins letter, Ministry bad sent to La Bourdonnais
which accompanied the capitulation, an order prohibiting him‘from taking
 TI1REE COURSES OPUS’ TO LA BOUKDOSJTAIS. 149

'of this place would form one of the articles of the treaty, chap.
the King will restore it, and the Company will have no —-
advantage from it.’ 174;G’
. Against tire second plan, the destruction of the place,

possession of any settlement or comp- cause, when conducting an indepen¬

b/ir of the enemy for the purpose of dent cruise five years before, he had
keeping-it; ’ but'even independently been restrained' from making con¬
of the" circumstance that such an quests that were to be permanent, he
order did not render necessary the was, 'therefore, restricted from carry¬
restoration of the captured place to ing out then the instructions of one
the enemy, it is a fact that this order who had supreme authority on all
bore no reference to the campaign in Indian soil that had become or that
which La Bourdonnais was engaged might become French. The fol¬
in 1740. It is true, that in his me¬ lowing extract from the commission
moirs, he places it ainonn other orders borne by Dupleix shows very clearly
issued in 1745 and 1746, to all of that his powers were of that ex"-
which the date is attached, hut he tensive nature. He was nominated
has curiously omitted to assign any ' Governor of the Town and Fort of
date to this "one. The fact is, it was Pondichery, and of the places sub¬
issued in. 1741, at a time when La ordinate to it, President of the Su¬
Bourdonnais had just been placed at perior Council, to command there,
the head of a combined fleet of King’s not only the inhabitants of the
and Company’s ships to cruise in the said places, the clerks of the Com¬
Eastern seas, the moment hostilities pany and other inhabitants esta¬
should break out. But even, under blished there, but all Frenchmen and
foreigners who may establish them¬
tended to be prohibitory in its action. selves there hereafter, of whatsoever
As Professor H. II. Wilson justly quality they may be; likewise all
remarks (Wilson’s Mill, vol. iii. officers, soldiers, and yens tie guerre
p. 411, ante) ‘ The letter to the who may be there, or in garrison.’
proprietors explains the purport of Further he was ordered < to do ge¬
M. La Bourdonnais’ instructions more nerally whatever he might consider
correctly (than Mr. Mill had stated). proper for the preservation of the
He was* nob to form any new settle¬ said eomptoirs and commerce, and
ment., and the only alternatives in the glory of our name, and to he
Iris power with regard, to Madras entitled for the said charge to the
were to restore or destroy it. The accustomed honours, authority, pre¬
object of the French East India Com¬ eminence, and prerogative, and to
pany was to improve their existing all the appointments ordered by the
settlements, at least, before new ones Company.’ Further, all the officers
were established.’ Thus, even when and servants of the Crown and clerks
originally issued, the real purport of of the Company were ordered to re¬
the order was very diiferent to that cognise the said Sieur Dupleix in the
which La Bourdonnais assigned to it. said quality of Governor and Pre¬
But the circumstances of 1746 were sident of the Superior Council, and
far different from those of 1741. In to obey him, without contravention
1746, he was acting on territory, in any sort or manner on pain of dis¬
which the moment it became French obedience.’ The orders of October
by conquest, fell at once under the 1745 were even more categorical in
sway of the Governor-General of their assertion of the supreme autho¬
French India. It was clearly beyond rity of the Governor of Pondichery
his authority to maintain, that be¬
150 • LA BOTTEDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

CHAP' be argued, that it would be impossible to prevent the

-—English from establishing on the coast some other em-
1746. porium equally fit for their purpose, and at a less expense
than they would now willingly pay for the ransom of
Madras. He then added that his opinion was strongly in
favour of that plan, and that there would be no difficulty
in carrying it out, as Governor Morse was ready to give
bills on England for the^amount demanded, and to make
over eight or ten hostages till payment had been made.
This letter, with the capitulation accompanying, was sent
to Pondichery by M. Paradis, then commanding the
Pondichery contingent. On the following day, La Bour-
donnais wrote a short note to Dupleix summarising his
arguments, and begging that he might be furnished with
the ideas of the Governor-General as to the manner in
which Madras should be treated; * and on the 25th, he
sent a formal reply to a letter he had received from the
Superior Council of Pondichery thanking him in the name
of the nation for the difficulties, the cares, the labours,
the fatigues, he had experienced and overcome—which
contained this remarkable expression: ! I have received
the gracious letter you have done me the honour to write
me on the subject of the taking of Madras; after the
thanks you have to render on that account to the God
of armies, it is M. Dupleix who deserves your gratitude.
His activity, his attentive care in supplying me with all
that I needed for the siege, were the chief causes of its
success?.
We have thus alluded in detail to the course pursued
by La Bourdonnais after the taking of Madras, in order
that no doubt may exist as to the actual occurrences of
that much canvassed period. We think it is clear, lstly,
that La Bourdonnais had, as commander of the expe-

* Dated September 24,1746. The cette ville;’ a request-which shows

actual words were ‘Faites moi done, very plainly that no positive engage-
Monsieur, un plan suivi de la faqon ments to ransom the town had "been
dont vous pensez que je doive traiter entered into on the 21st.
 THE POLICY OP DUPLEIX. 151

dition, no right to conclude any definitive treaty with the chap.

English, without the consent of the Governor-General —^—-
of French India; 2ndly, that up to September 25, the 17.46.
fifth day after the capitulation, no such definitive treaty
had been entered into, although there had been some
conversation regarding a ransom; and Srdly, that, up to
that date, the feelings of La Bourdonnais, gratified by
success, had been most friendly towards the Pondichery
authorities. He had even gone out of his way, as we
have seen, in a letter to the Superior Council, to render
justice to Dupleix.
'We have now to refer to that action on the part of
Dupleix and the Pondichery Council which changed that
friendly feeling into one of fierce and bitter hostility,
ruinous alike to the cause and to the leader. But before
doing this, we must examine at some length the motives
which influenced Dupleix, in the responsible position
which he occupied, in deciding upon his course of action.
There can be no doubt but that at this period the
main object of the policy of Dupleix was the expulsion of
the English from the Coromandel coast. The experience
of the three preceding years had taught him that the
safety of the one European power could only be assured
by the expulsion of the other. It had tasked all his
energies, he had had to draw upon all his resources, to
preserve Pondichery from the dangers which had threa¬
tened it in 1744. But for the prohibition given by the
Nawab Anwaroodeen, the French settlements must then
have been destroyed. But that was a reed upon which
it would not be wise to lean for ever. The successor of
Anwaroodeen might not be animated by the same senti¬
ments ; another incursion of the Mahrattas might render
powerless the representative of the Mogul; or anarchy
might again prevail, as it so recently had prevailed,
throughout the Carnatic. That he could not depend
upon the French Ministry, or on the Directors of the
French Conmanv. the events of the last few vears had
152 LA B0URD02WAIS AST) DUPLEIX.

chap. , fully convinced him. With a three years’ warning of the

_hostilities that were pending, the men who governed
1746. ■ French India from Paris had literally starved their most_
important dependency. They had sent it neither ships of
; war, nor money, nor even good intelligence. Hesitatingly
■ and fearfully they had despatched two merchant vessels
in as many years, with most inadequate supplies. Nay
more, when another enterprising Governor had proposed
a plan, whereby, at the smallest amount of risk, the as¬
cendancy of France in the East could have been secured,
and had wrung from the aged Minister an assent, they
had taken the earliest opportunity to cancel the scheme,
and had deprived the.Governor of the means by which
he had hoped to carry it into execution.
From France then Dupleix had little to hope. On the
other hand he beheld England thirsting to destroy him,
England strong in the energy of her sons, the resources of
the India Company, and, more than all, in her compara¬
tive good government. He had seen that in the year
which was now going on, England had acted as La
Bourdonnais had proposed to act, and had thereby reaped
the most important results. That stroke on the part of
England, but for the interference of the Nawab, would
have destroyed him. The superior energy and good
direction of the England of the eighteenth century over
the France of Louis XV., could not then have failed
to impress him with the belief, that, in all probability, an
opportunitywould.be afforded to the English of renewing
the attempt under more favourable conditions.
What then formed his chance of success at such a con¬
juncture ? Surely there was but one. It was to adopt
that policy, even then consecrated by genius, the policy of
Alexander, of Hannibal, of Gustavus—to carry the war
into the enemy’s country, and to use the means, which
had been so wonderfully, so unexpectedly, placed at his
disposal, to crush him at once and for ever. Madras in
 HE OPPOSES THE RANSOM OP MADRAS. 158

his hands, Fort St. David could scarcely hold out, and chap.
then, secure of the Coromandel coast, it might be possible -—T—■
to despatch a fleet to Bengal, to destroy the colony -which 1740.
had rivalled, and -was now threatening to surpass, his own
tenderly nursed settlement of Chandemagore.
Such being his views, his mortification may be well
conceived, when he learned that notwithstanding his pre¬
vious warnings, notwithstanding the positive arrangement
he had made with the FTawab, La Bourdonnais was still
harping upon the ransom of the place which he had
conquered. The result of this he felt could only be, that
the moment the English fleet should recover its former
superiority in the Indian seas—an . event daily dreaded
nlike by Dupleix and La Bourdonnais—an attempt would
promptly be made to subject Pondichery to the fate of
Madras, an attempt of which, if successful, the English
would undoubtedly take the fullest advantage.
Impressed with these ideas, he wrote on September
25th a letter to La Bourdonnais, in which, whilst reminding
him that according to the orders of the Minister, he was
_ subject to the authority of the Superior Council of
Pondichery, he pressed upon him the necessity of aban¬
doning all notion of ransom. 6 The ransom which you
are thinking of demanding from Madras,’ he said, ‘ is only
a momentary, and, at the most, an uncertain advantage.
All the hostages which you may have will not bind the
English Company to accept the bills which the Governor
may give you, and he, now a prisoner, will probably say
that he has acted under compulsion to procure his freedom,
and the Company will say the same.’ The same post
conveyed to La Bourdonnais an official letter from the
Superior Council on the same subject.
This letter, and the tone of superiority which pervaded
it, seem to have decided the action of La Bourdonnais.
It would appear that up to, and during, September 26th,
he had been engaged in discussing with Governor Morse
154 LA BOUKDONNAIS AXD DUPLEIX.

c^p- and the English deputies the terms of ransom. On the

—^—■ morning of the 26th he wrote to Dupleix to state that lie
1746. ]lat| aimost agreed with Mr. Morse regarding the condi¬
tions ; that there remained only a few slight differences to
adjust, and to arrange the terms of payment. But'during
the 26th he received from Dupleix not only the letters to
which we have alluded, but another from the Council,
dated the 24th, in which he was informed that Messrs.
Dulaurent and Barthelemy would arrive that day from
Madras, to congratulate him on his success, and to form
with MM. Despremesnil, Bonneau, Desforges, and Paradis,
all Pondichery men, a Council, over which he was to
preside. Instantly his part was taken. He states in his
. memoirs that from that moment he could not doubt the
views of Dupleix ; that he saw that he was resolved to be
master of Madras and of the ships, to dispose of all as he
wished. The assumption of such superiority he resolved
at once to dispute.
Although the ransom-treaty was not then signed, he
wrote to Dupleix as though it had been : ‘ I wish with all
my heart,’ he said,4 that the deputies had arrived five or
sis hours earlier; there would have been time then to
inform them of all that passed between the English
Governor and myself. But all had been concluded at the
time of their arrival.’ He added: ‘ if nevertheless these
gentlemen wish to employ themselves during their stay in
this town, I will find them employment.’ At the same
time he addressed the Council, taking up high ground;
acknowledging that all the then French establishments in
India were under the Governor-General of Pondichery,
he claimed the right of disposing of Madras, because he
had conquered it. He disavowed, in fact, all subordina¬
tion to Pondichery. The next morning he put the seal to
his declarations, by sending to Madras the copy of an un¬
signed convention with Governor Morse, by which he
bound himself to restore Madras to the English on re-
 LA BOUBDCOTAIS DEFIES DUPLEIX. 155

ceiving bills for 1,100,000 pagodas, payable at certain chap.

dates not very distant.* •-A-
Then ensued between the two men a contest injurious
to the cause which they had equally at heart, to the
country to which they belonged, and fatal in its result to
the fortunes of one of them. Dupleix, feeling that this
restoration of Madras was in effect to leave Pondichery
open to attack, the moment La Bourdonnais and his
squadron should have sailed to the islands, determined to
maintain ike authority which the King and the Company
had conferred upon him. La Bourdonnais, on his side,
unwilling to submit to any authority, and impatient of all
control, declared that the Minister having left to him, as
Admiral, the sole conduct of his operations, he was even
on Indian soil independent of the Government of Pon¬
dichery. Admitting that the phrase, ‘ master of his ope¬
rations,’ used by the French Minister to La Bourdonnais,
seemed to convey to him an independent authority, it was
manifest that it could never have been the intention of the
French Government thus to establish a second supreme
authority, an imperium in impe-rio, within a few miles
of the seat of their Government. Yet La Bourdonnais
cared little for such considerations. Although, before
starting oq this expedition from Pondichery, he had
carried his recognition of the authority of the Council to
such an extent as to refuse to act without a positive
order from them; he now, when the victory had been
achieved, and when he was required by them to carry out
their instructions, as emanating from an authority para¬
mount to his own, daringly disavowed his subordination,
and refused to recognise their supremacy.
It may not be out of place to inquire here what it

* Equal to four lalchs and forty 600,000 in three equal payments

thousand rupees. The terms -were of 200,000 pagodas each, the first
500,000 pagodas, payable in Europe payment to he made one month, and
at six months’ sight, in fixe letters of the second one year, after the arrival
exchange of 100,000 each; and of the ships from Europe.
156 30CKDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, really was, what was the motive reason that prompted
him to this insubordination, to this sacrifice of the best
174C. interests of his country. Was it solely because he deemed
his own policy to be the correct policy? That could
hardly be. No one had felt more strongly than La Bour-
donnais, that it would be impossible for him to remain on
that coast, with any degree of safety, later than the second
week in October. His plan had been to send two or
three of his ships to winter at Acheen, and to bear up
with the remainder, laden with cargoes, for the islands, en
route to Fz-ance. Yet, it was not once or twice, but many
times, that Dupleix had explained to him that, under those
ch'cumstances, Pondichery would be in the greatest
danger. Unprotected by a squadron, having incurred the
wrath of the NTawab, and invited the retaliation of the
English, nothing but the return of La Bourdonnais in the
spring, with an overwhelming force, could have long saved
the French capital, situated as it was between two English
settlements—Fort St. George and Fort St. David—from
capture. The ransom of Madras, then, not for cash, but
for bills of exchange not then accepted, with the vision
looming in the future of that Madras shortly being in a
position to demand a ransom from Pondichery, could not
have seemed, even to La Bourdonnais, a sound policy for
France.
But there is another light in which it is necessary to
regard the transaction. Let us inquire whether, though
it was not a sound policy for France, it did not seem a
sound policy for the private interests of La Bourdonnais.
And here we meet with some revelations which cannot
fail to startle. We have seen in the course of the pre¬
ceding narrative, that during the six days, from the 21st
to the 25th of September, a negotiation had been going
on between La Bourdonnais and Governor Morse, as to
* the amount and the terms of the ransom. But besides the
question of public ransom for Madras, there was the other,
perhaps equally weighty question, of private present to
 LA BOURDONNAIS IS BRIBED. 157

La Bourdonnais. That he did receive * a considerable chap.

present'is undeniable, and, though such a transaction ac- •—^—
1 1746.
* It was charged against La Bour- gentleman, Mr. Grose, who wrote im
donnais in his lifetime, that he had account of his voyage to, and resi¬
accepted a present from the English dence in, the East Indies. He states
of 100,000 pagodas (about four as follows: — ‘ The Governor and
lalchs of rupees) as the price of Council settled the price of the ran¬
the ransom-treaty made with the som with the French Commodore
English. (La Bourdonnais) at 1,100,000 pa¬
The charge was brought forward godas, or 421)0067 sterling', besides a
separately by M. Despremesnil and very valuable present to the Commo¬
M. de Kerjean. The first said, that he dore, who was willinej to evacuate his
had heard M. Dupleix affirm that conquest upon these terms, and leave
an Englishman had told him that the English in full possession of their
100,000 pagodas had been given to Presidency.’ — Grose’s East Indies,
La Bourdonnais for the ransom. He vol.ii. p. 29.
added that he had done his best to In Mill's India, 5th edition, vol.
ascertain the truth of the fact, but iii. pp. 87, 38, we have evidence to
had been able to learn nothing. the same effect. Professor II. IL
n
The second, M. de Kerjean, as¬ Wilson affirms that ‘ a letter to a
serted, that he had heard a Jew,
retired to Pondicliery, affirm, that the
rietor of India Stock, published
750, by a person who was evi¬
English had given M. de la Bour- dently concerned in the Government
donnais 100,000 pagodas, as an of Madras at the time, describes dis¬
acknowledgment of the good treat¬ cussions which took place at home,
ment they had received at his hands, in regard to the payment of certain
and that he, the Jew, as his share bonds given by the Government of
of this payment, had been taxed at Madras to raise money to the extent
7,000 pagodas, which amount he had of 100,000 pagodas, which, it ia
not paid. intimated, were presented to the
La Bourdonnais’ reply to these as¬ French Commander as the price of
sertions was, in substance, that they his moderation.’ But there exists
emanated from two men, one the proof of the fact, far' more clear and
nephew, the other the son-in-law, of positive. Papers, now in the India
Bupleix, that he had avoided the last House, (Law Case, No. 31, dated
farewell to the English Governor, March 3, 1752,) show that the Di¬
because he heard that he intended to rectors of that day were convinced,
offer him a present; that had he re¬ on the testimony of Madras members
ceived such a present, he would not of Council, that La Bourdonnais was
have placed himself in the position promised by bond, 100,000 pagodas
of being obliged to restore it, by (about 40,0001) oyer and above the
deferring' the evacuation of Madras 2,100,000 pagodas stipulated in -the
from October to January; that it bond given him for public use, in
was not probable that he would have consideration of his restoring Madras
been received with such distinction to the English. This, we think, is
in London by two members of the conclusive.
Madras Council, if they had known— The existence of this Law Case
as if it had been true, they must have was first made known to the writer
known—that the ransom had been by Sir Walter Morgan, Chief Justice
the result of a bribe. of the High Court of Agra. The
Here the matter dropped for a time, nature of its contents was subse¬
it being considered that the charge quently verified on the spot by bis
had fallen through. It was revived, friend, Professor FitzEclward Hall,
however, in 1772, by an English Librarian of tbe India House.
158 LA BOURDOXNAIS AND PLEIX.

chap. corded with the customs of India in those early days, this
. IV~ . acceptance of money must, in almost every case, have
1746. considerably influenced the conduct of those who received
it. With the knowledge of this fact before us, the refusal
of La Bourdonnais to entertain the statesmanlike plans
of Dupleix becomes at once intelligible. Knowing, as
we know now, that of the three measures which he himself
submitted to Dupleix, viz., the occupation of Madras by
the French, its destruction, and its ransom—that of the
ransom was the only one which would bring him in ma¬
terial advantage, all the mystery that enveloped his conduct
disappears. He stands robbed of much of his glory—of
that bright halo of pure disinterestedness with which his¬
torians have sought to encircle him—but he is at least
an intelligible being. We can watch his acts now, morally
certain that we have our eyes on the secret spring by
which all those acts were directed.
But we would not be understood to assert that this was
the sole motive which influenced him. We even conceive
it possible that La Bourdonnais himself was not at all
conscious of the effect thus produced upon his actions.
Even-great men are very often unconsciously acted upon.
More especially was this likely to be the case with a man
who chafed so fretfully against superior control as did La
Bourdonnais. Determined not to subordinate*jiis will to
the will of Dupleix, he may have been himself unaware
of that secret influence, which, notwithstanding, most
powerfully moved him. What can be more probable than
that the two motives, powerfully assisting one another, so
worked upon and mastered his reasoning powers, that he
was but faintly, if at all, aware of the real moving and
guiding power within him, but persuaded himself that he
was influenced by considerations of duty—the selfish and
sordid views which lay at the root of his conduct being
kept entirely out of sight? However that may be, we
have in this place to judge of the man by his acts. And
in looking at those acts, we cannot but take advantage to
 THE SECRET MOTIVES OP THE RIVALS. 159

the full of any circumstances which tend to throw light chap,

on the motives that prompted them. Hitherto, no con- •—^—•
sideration has been paid to those motives. In the contest 174e*
between Dupleux and La Bourdonnais, the former has
been ruthlessly condemned—condemned, we are satis¬
fied, without a full and fair inquiry—without having
been heard by means of public documents, in his own
defence. Yet, it is surely something in the question
between them to inquire, whether there were any secret
motives besides those that have been assigned, which
might have tempted either of them to overstep his powers.
In the case of Dupleix, we see the avowed reason—the
determination, to root out the English at any cost from the
Coromandel coast—based upon the powers which as Go¬
vernor-General of French India he believed himself to
possess—but we can find no trace of any other. He had
no personal objects to gain by refusing to ransom Madras.
It appeared to him so plain that the restoration of that
place involved two dangers—hostility from the Hawab,
and renewed hostility from the English—to Pondichery
which might be defenceless: the reason of his conduct is,
in fact, so plain, so apparent, that we search in vain for
any secret motive, least of all for any which might have
been beneficial to his private fortunes.
But it is.hot so with La Bourdonnais. It is now clear
that up to September 26th he had entered upon no positive
engagements to ransom his conquests. It is, we think,
certain, that on that 26 th the terms were verbally agreed
to with Governor Morse, one of those terms stipulating
for a private present to himself of nearly 40,000/.; that,
receiving on- the same day convincing intimation from
Pondichery, that Dupleix and the Superior Council would
be no party to any scheme for a ransom, he suddenly
resolved to break with them, to assert his own indepen¬
dent action.- Is it too much to infer tlfet the alarmed
private interests stimulated, perhaps unconsciously, his
160 LA BOUKDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, jealous and easily roused ambition to a revolt against the

_. better feelings of his nature ?
1746. To return to the narrative. WeleftLaBourdonnaison
the evening of the 26 th and on the morning of September
27th, refusing to acknowledge the authority of the agents
sent to cooperate with him by the Superior Council,
sending to Pondicliery for ratification a copy of the treaty
of ransom, and yet—strange inconsistency—asserting his
entire independence of the control of that Council.
But before this actually happened, some intimation that
it was about to happen had reached Pondichery. Amongst
the officers of the besieging army—the commandant, in
fact, of the Pondichery contingent—was M. Paradis, a
Swiss by birth, and a man of a bold, energetic, daring
nature. He had previously been known to La Bourdon-
nais, and the latter had, even before his arrival at Pondi¬
chery, made a special application for his services. Placed
in command of the Pondichery contingent, and second
only, on land, to La Bourdonnais himself, he had behaved
in a manner to give the greatest satisfaction to his chief,
and, until the time of the capitulation, the relations
between the two had been of the most cordial nature.
On the 26th, we learn for the first time that some differ¬
ence had arisen on a point connected with the command
of the troops, and that Paradis had left Madfas for Pon¬
dichery on the 23rd, armed with letters from La Bour¬
donnais for Dupleix. It seems probable that Paradis,
from his position in the force, had been made acquainted
with the nature of the negotiations that were progressing
at Madras, and that he had pointed out to the Superior
Council that, unless they asserted their authority, none
would remain to them. The Council were probably in¬
fluenced by these considerations when they sent MM.
Despremesnil, Dulaurent, and Barthelemy to Madras. But
on the 28th, thby received the defiant letters-of La Bour¬
donnais. They at once wrote to him a letter, in which
they recapitulated the arguments they had used against
 DUPLEIX APPEALS TO LA BOUBDOXNAIS. 161

the restoration of the place to the English ; told him that chap.
M. Despremesnil, the second member of Council, and then ■—L—■
at Madi-as, would be authorised to take over from him the 1746-
command of the place, with the Pondickery contingent
under him; and concluded with a formal protest against
all the engagements he might contract without the know¬
ledge and confirmation of the Superior Council. On the
following day, Dupleix despatched to him a letter written
with his own hand—most touching, most entreating in its
terms, conjuring him as a brother, as a friend, to give up
all idea of ransoming the place, and to enter heartily into
the designs he was nursing for the uprooting of the English.
After dwelling upon the worthlessness of a rausom agreed
to by prisoners, and adducing examples from history to
prove that conditions made under such circumstances had
never been considered binding, he added : ‘ in the name
of God ; in the name of your children, of your wife, I
conjure you to be persuaded of what I tell you. Pinish
as you have begun, and do not treat with an enemy, who
has no object but to reduce us to the most dire extremity.
Such are the orders which the enemy’s squadron executes
wherever it is able. If it has not clone more, it was
because it could not do more. Providence has been
kinder to us than to them. Let us then profit by our
opportunity, for the glory of our monarch, and for the
general interests of a nation which will regard you as its
restorer in India. Heaven grant that I may succeed in
persuading you, that I may convince you of the necessity
of annulling a treaty which makes us lose in one moment
all our advantages, the extent of which you will recognise,
immediately, if you will pay attention to my representa¬
tions.’
Meanwhile, the three Councillors, MM. Despremesnil,
Dulaurent, and Barthelemy, finding their powers dis¬
avowed by La Bourdonnais, transmitted to him on the
27th, a formal protest against his usurpation of authority,
as well as against the restoration of Madras to the English ;
M
162 LA BODBDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, they sent also to the various commandants of troops

- IV' . copies of the King’s orders conferring supreme authority
1746. in India upon Dupleix—a step to which, they said, they
had been driven by the measures adopted by M. de la
Bourdonnais in opposition to the orders he had received
from Pondichery. On the 30th, the three Councillors
made a second protest, and announced their intention to
withdraw to St. Thome, there to await further orders
from Pondichery.
This was only the prelude to other and stronger
measures. On October 2, a Commission, composed of
the Major-General de Bury, M. Bruy ere, the Procureur-
General, and M. Paradis, arrived at Madras, armed with
powers to execute the orders with which they were
intrusted by Dupleix, as representative of his Sovereign
in the East Indies. They carried a declaration made by
Dupleix on behalf of the King and the Company of the
Indies, which they were instructed to read publicly at
Madras, setting forth, amongst other terms, that tire
treaty of ransom had been made ‘ by the simple act,
without lawful authority, of M. de la Bourdonnais, with
prisoners who were unable to engage others on their
account, especially in an affair of such importance; that
it was null and void, and to be regarded as never having
been executed.’ A second declaration, issued by Dupleix,
on behalf of the King, and carried by them, created a
Provincial Council of Port St. George, ‘ to render justice
in the name of the King, civil as well as criminal, to all
the inhabitants present and to come.’ Of this M. Des-
premesnil was appointed President, and MM. Dulaurent,
Barthelemy, Bonneau, Desforges, Bruyere, and Paradis,
members. By another declaration M. Desprdmesnil was
nominated Commandant and Director of the town and
fort of Madras, ‘ to command in it, under our orders, the
officers of land and sea forces, the inhabitants, the clerks
of the Company, and all other Frenchmen and foreigners,
established in it, of what condition soever they might be.’
 LA BOUEDOfOTAIS REVERTS TO FORCE. 163

They carried with them, besides, two requisitions, one chap.

from the Superior Council of Pondichery, the other from .——
the principal inhabitants of the town, both alike protest- 1746.
mg against the usurpation of authority on the part of La
Bourdonnais, and against the restoration of Madras to
the English, as a measure injurious to the national in-
, terest, and fraught with danger to Pondichery.
Early on the morning of October 2, six* of the
members of the newly appointed Provincial and Execu¬
tive Councils, accompanied by their chief clerk, entered
Madras, and proceeded to the head-quarters of La Bour¬
donnais. By him they were received and conducted to
the large hall. Here the business of the day was com¬
menced by General de Bury handing over to La Bour¬
donnais a letter from the Superior Council, stating that
he, the general, was authorised to reply to his letter of
the 27th ultimo. The chief clerk then read aloud, in
the presence of a large concourse of people, who were
attracted by the rumours of some extraordinary scene,
the several declarations and protests we have enumerated
above.
Whilst this reading was going on, officers of all grades
came crowding into the hall, the great majority of them
belonging to the troops who had come with La Bour¬
donnais fqhn the isles. As soon as the clerk had finished,
La Bourdonnais replied. He stated that he would re¬
cognise no authority in India as superior to his own; as
the orders which he had received from Prance con¬
cluded with a special proviso, leaving him ‘ master of his
operations.’f M. Despremesnil replied, that the authority

* They -were, MM. Despremesnil, fused to act, unless the Council pre-
Dulaurent, Barthdlemy, Bruyere, scribed to him a positive course. It
Paradis, and General de Bury. may be observed in addition, that the
t Undoubtedly this was the case, fact of his being master of his operar-
and this was recognised by the Coun- tions, while it left him the choice of
cil of Pondichery, when two months his ground, did not relieve him of
before they had pressed upon him the subordination to the authority of the
necessity of a decision regarding representative of his Sovereign, in
them. La Bourdonnais had then re- territories subject to that Sovereign
164 LA BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLE1X.

chap, just quoted iu no way invalidated the powers conferred

iT-'upon the Governor-General, and, in fact, bore no refer-
1746- ence to the subject. La Bourdonnais, however, was
obstinate, and seeing himself supported by a number of
his own adherents, he assumed a haughtier tone, and
threatened to beat the general, and get the troops under
arms. Immediately a cry was raised in the assembly
against tailing up arms against one another. Upon this
La Bourdonnais assembled in the next room a council of
war, composed of the officers who had come with him
from the islands, and after a short sitting, communicated
the result to the deputies from Pondichery. This was,
in effect, that they considered he ought not to go back
from the promise he had given to the English. Upon
this the deputies retired.*
La Bourdonnais having thus repulsed the demands,
legally preferred, of the Pondichery deputies, proceeded
without delay to deprive them of every chance of exe¬
cuting them by force. Spreading a report that the
English fleet had been seen off Pulicat, he issued a
general order to send fifty men on board each vessel.
He at the same time privately instructed his trusted sub¬
ordinates to assign this duty to the troops of the Pondi¬
chery contingent. This was executed on the morning of
October 4, and he found himself then at tfj,e head of
troops entirely devoted to him, absolute master of his

The members of the Provincial Council did not the

less attempt to establish their lawful authority by legal
means. Discovering during tire day the ruse which La
Bourdonnais had employed so well, apparently for his
own interests, they resolved to place him under a moral
restraint. Eor this purpose, General cle Bury, accom-

* There are two accounts of this count written three years afterwards
interview—one a prods verbal drawn by La Bourdonnais. The latter
up at the time hy DesprSmesnil and abounds with personal imputations
his colleagues; the other the ac¬ which we have omitted.
 TIE ARRESTS THE DEPUTIES. -165

panied by MM. Latour and Largi, proceeded to his head- chap.

quarters, and delivered to him a written document, ad- ■—^—-
dressed to him as Commandant of the French squadron, 1746.
forbidding him to leave Madras with the French troops,
without a written order from Dupleix. But the time
had passed when it was necessary for La Bourdonnais to
dissemble his resentment. He had rid himself of the
Pondichery troops, and he was determined to use his
usurped authority with the utmost rigour. He at once
placed the three deputies under arrest, and when Pa¬
radis, hearing of this indignity, hastened to remonstrate .
with him, he charged him with being ‘ a marplot who
had brought them all within two fingers of destruction,’
and sent him to join his associates. He declared at the
same time that he would leave them prisoners to the
English on October 15—the day on which he had cove¬
nanted to restore Madras to that nation.
We will not attempt to describe the feelings of Dupleix
on receiving a report of these proceedings. To carry
through the darling object of his policy, the destruction
of the English power in the Carnatic, he had employed
entreaty, advice, persuasion, menaces, and moral force—
and all in vain. The determined pertinacity of his rival
left him stranded. Hot a single resource remained to
him. His authority denied, his soldiers sent on board
the Admiral’s ships, his deputies arrested and 'confined in
Madras—his entreaties answered by cold refusals, liisl
assertions of authority7 by a contemptuous denial of it_\
what remained for him to do P It was vain to appeal \
to Paris. Thence no reply could arrive within fifteen \
months, and La Bourdonnais could not stay fifteen days
longer, without extreme risk, upon the coast. He was
irritated and annoyed, not only at the dissipation of the
vast schemes which he had formed, but at his powerless-
ness to prevent any act which it might please the infu¬
riated chief of the forces, naval and military, to carry
out. The utmost that he could do was to protest. This
166 LA BOUEDONNAIS AND BUPLEIX,

chap, he did, in a temperate and dignified letter, * so soon as

intelligence of the proceedings at Madras reached him.
1740. Nor was La Bourdonnais himself at all at his ease. The
month of October—a month famous for the storms and
hurricanes -which it brings upon the open Coromandel
coast—was now well upon him. He had felt and had
always declared that it would be dangerous to stay in the
Madras roadstead after October 15. Yet, so intent had
he been on this'quarrel with Dupleix, that very little had
been done in the way of embarking the property of which
he had made prize. Not even an inventory had been
made out. To leave Madras, too, on the 15th, as he had
intended, with a treaty uuratified by the Superior Oouncil
of Pondichery, would be to make over his conquest to
Dupleix without conditions, and to lose for himself and
for Prance the ransom-money he had been promised.
That defiance of the Pondichery authorities which had
■ apparently succeeded so well, what would it profit him,
if, after his departure, those authorities should choose to
. ignore all his proceedings, and should deal with Madras
as a conquest of which they alone had a right to dis¬
pose ? And yet what was more probable than that they
would thus act ? Pielying upon the physical force which
he disposed of, he had contemned their orders, refused to

* Hated Madras, October 6, 1746. feel the inutility of such a demand.

From the Superior Council of Pon- We can now take no part with re¬
(licliery to La Bourdounais. ‘ We ference to all that you may do, but
learn % the letter of the Council of to wait tranquilly the issue of your
Madras of the 4th current, that you proceedings.
have caused to be arrested MM. ‘We confirm the order to the
Bury, Paradis, Latour, Largi, and Council of Madras, to the officers
Cba'ngeac. Our former letters, and and troops of Pondichery, not to
that which M. Buiy intimated to evacuate Madras, and not to embark
you, would have informed von that on board the ships, at least, until you
the Pondichery contingent not being forcibly compel them. But we tell
under your orders, we had nominated, them, nevertheless, to obey all your
a Commandant at Madras, and had
established a Council there. Things
being upon this footing, we might
hare demanded of you hv what right,
and by what authorit y, you have
caused them to be arrested. But we
 HE MAKES OVERTUBES TO DUPLE IK.

acknowledge their authority, arrested their generals, and cilap.

put them to open scorn. It would have been contrary to •—^—•
all his experience of men to imagine, that, the physical 1740.
force being on their side, they would acknowledge any
of the arrangements which, in open defiance of their in¬
structions, he might have made.
At the moment then of his apparent triumph, La Bour-
donnais felt all the hopelessness and helplessness of his
position. Unless he could come to terms with Dupleix,
all his plans would be subverted, the bills for public ran¬
som and private gratitude would not be worth the paper
on which they were written. Yet, how to come to terms
with those whom he had slighted and scorned, seemed of
all tasks the most impossible. To bend.his haughty spirit
to sue for the amity which, when pressed upon him ‘ as a
brother, as a friend,’ he had rejected, was a course which
La Bourdonnais, of all men, would have scorned. Some¬
thing, nevertheless, must be done. Dupleix could afford
to wait for the future. It was from La Bourdonnais that
the overtures must come.
lie made them. Hot, indeed, in that open, straight¬
forward way, which ivould have acknowledged his error,
and which would have caused the immediate renewal of
cordial relations with Dupleix, but in that tortuous, indi¬
rect manner which those adopt, who, having committed
an error, and finding that the consequences of that error
are recoiling on themselves, are yet too much the slaves
of a false pride to make a candid confession.
This was the plan he adopted. He commissioned
Paradis, the Commandant of the Pondichery contingent,
and whom, it will be remembered, he had placed in arrest,
to sound Dupleix as to whether he would agree to the
treaty of ransom, provided the restoration of Madras were '
deferred from October to January or February, with a
viewr, ostensibly, to make a proper division of the spoils.
If he could agree to that, Paradis added, La Bourdonnais
168 LA BOURDONNAIS AND . DUPLEIX.

chap, would leave behind 150 of his own troops to reinforce

- those of Pondichery.
1746. This proposition came upon Dupleix just immediately
after his authority had been insulted and defied, when he,
the civil power, had had flaunted before him, by the chief
military power, the irresistible argument of brute force.
He had divined some, if not all, of the motives of La
Bourdonnais, and he had made up his mind to keep no
terms with him. Openly to break off all correspondence
with one who wielded the physical force of the colony
would be however, in his opinion, conducive neither to
French interests in general, nor to the interests of Pon¬
dichery in particular. But on receiving this indirect
overture from Paradis, he saw in it a means of getting
rid of one who refused to carry out himself, and who
prevented others from carrying out, the views which he
deemed essential to French interests. He resolved, there¬
fore, to adopt that policy which the weak in all ages
have deemed a legitimate weapon when battling against
the strong, and to dissemble. He, accordingly wrote, on
October 7, to La Bourdonnais, stating that he would en¬
tertain the project. But on the following day a circum¬
stance occurred which immensely strengthened the hands
of Dupleix. Three ships of war, long expected, the
‘ Centaure’ of 74 guns, the ‘ Mars’ of 56, and the ‘ Bril-
lant’ of 50, having on board 1,520 men,* anchored that
morning in the Pondichery roadstead. They brought out
startling intelligence. M. Orry had been, in December
1745, replaced as Controller-General by M. Machault
d’Arnonville—a member of the Council of State—of no
experience in finance, .but devoted to Madame de Pornpa-
deur. The Company informed Dupleix of this, as well as
of the fact that war between Prance and Holland was im¬
minent, and that he would, therefore, have to arrange to
meet a new enemy in his neighbourhood. They also for-

* Grose’s East Indies, vol. ii. chap. 29.

 TITE ADMIRAL'S POSITION DEFINED. 169

■warded to him, in anticipation of his being joined by La chap.

Bourdonnais, specific instructions as to the relations to ■—,—-
himself which the Commander of the French fleet would 174G-
bear.
As tfiis was the very point upon which La Bourdon-
nais had based his resistance to the orders of Dupleix,
this document had naturally very great interest for the
Ponclichery Council. It was dated October 6, 1745, and
was thus worded : ! The Company considers it right and
proper that the Commander of the squadron should be
present at the meetings of the Superior Council; that he
be summoned to it when any military expedition, in
which this Commander is to bear a principal part, is under
consideration -r and that he have in it a deliberative voice.
But it requires also that the conclusion, which shall be
arrived at after discussion, whatever be the nature of the
affair, be carried out by him without opposition, even
though it should concern the disposing of all the ships of
the Company which he may command.’ These orders
appeared to Dupleix to be too clear to be disputed ; he,
therefore, sent a copy of them the same day to La Bour-
donnais with the additional intimation, that they had
been approved of by the new Minister.*

* The date’-of this letter—Octo- But this reasoning, plausible as it is,

her G, 1745, a-Jate exactly two months has no foundation. It is perfectly
antecedent to the appointment of M. true that M. Maohault’s appointment
Maehault as Controller-General— as Controller-General dates only from
together with the statement made by December 6, 1745, hut it is no less
Dupleix that its contents ‘ had been so, that for several months prior to
approved by the new Minister,’ af- that date he had been designated as
forded an opportunity to La Bour- the successor of Orry, who was in
donnais, of which he took full ad- disgrace, and that he had been con-
vantage, to contest its validity. ‘How suited on all the arrangements that
is it possible,’ he observes in sub- were under discussion. Dupleix
stance in his memoirs, ‘that the new merely states in his letter, that the
Minister should have sent M. Dupleix orders he had received from the Corn-
orders, dated October 6, when his pany had been ‘ approved of ’ by the
appointment dates only from Decern- new Minister. What was more na-
ber 6, and I myself received by the tural than that such important orders
same opportunity letters from M. had been submitted, before trans-
Orry, the old Minister, dated Novem- mission to a distant settlement, to
her 25 ? ’ He proceeds, on this, to the man who was virtually, though
speak of it as a ‘pretended letter.’ not actually, Minister, and who would
170 BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap. But the shifts to which a wilful nature, working for a

1V- . definite end, is able to resort, were not yet exhausted.
1740. La Bourdonnais, in his reply, thus referred to the instruc¬
tions of the new Minister : ‘ With respect to the extract
you have sent me, you may depend that I shall always
conform to the orders of the Minister after I shall have
received them. But he no longer writes to me here, and
the extract you have sent me concerns the Company’s
captains and not me.’ * He added that he had received
be intrusted -with tlieir execution? dispose of them according to circum¬
That such was the practice is cer¬ stances, and the news you may re¬
tain, and the very tvord used by Du- ceive from the Indies. It ought,
pleix implies that the practice was however, to be your chief duty to
carried out on this occasion. The send to Pondichery, at a proper sea¬
very ships which earned out the son, the number of vessels which may
orders sailed from France before the
and with promptitude, the money
and the troops, the ammunitions of
war and the supplies, which are des¬
necessity nor excuse — for Dupleix tined for that settlement.’
to have employed the expression ‘ I do not dictate to you the man¬
■which he did 'use, if it had not ner in which you ought to act, to
been founded upon fact. Of the succeed in this expedition, of which
authenticity of the order there can you will yourself feel all the im¬
he no doubt. But there is another portance, persuaded as I am that you
point. La Bourdonnais adds that the will do all for the best. Your chief
letter of Orry to him was a confirm¬ point of view ought to he the pre¬
ation of his independent authority in servation of the town of Pondichery,
the Indian seas, and ho quotes two and of the other establishments
garbled extracts from it to prove this. which the Company possesses beyond
We give here, entire, the two first tlie Cape of Good Hope and in India.
paragraphs from which those extracts This object ought t£T he preferred
are taken, believing that they strongly to all other enterprises." You should
confirm the view we are supporting. come to an understanding on this
It must be remembered that the letter point with M. Dupleix, and should
is addressed to La Bourdonnais, as send him all the assistance he may
Governor of the Isles of France and demand of you, and for which he will
Bourbon, and that at the time it was look to you,’—Dated November 25,
despatched Orry had not the smallest 1745.
idea that La Bourdonnais would have Now, this letter gives very large
been able to succeed, before its re¬ powers to the Governor of the Isles
ceipt, in fitting out a fleet for the of France and Bourbon^ hut it in no
Indies. He believed him, in fact, to way authorises that Governor to as¬
he still at the Isle of France. The sume authority in the country of the
letter runs thus:—‘The Company Governor, for whom some of the as¬
will send you this year, sir, six of sistance was intended. And yet that
its vessels, of which five will sail at was the strained interpretation La
the beginning of next month, and Bourdonnais put upon it.
the sixth in the course of February, * La Bourdonnais to Dupleix,
[t has determined to address them dated Madras, October 10, 1746.
all to you, leaving you master, to
 jA BOUEDONNAIS OFFERS CONDITIONS. 171

but one letter from the Company, and begged Dupleix to c^.vp-
have the others sought for. This despatch had scarcely —-A-
been sent off, when the missing letters arrived. Whether 1746-
or not they contained any reference to the orders sent to
Dupleix, it is impossible to say,* but this is certain, that
from the date of their receipt the tone of his letters
chancred. In that of the 10th he announced to Dupleix
that he would wait the receipt of his ideas till the 13th,
and assured him that there was no condition he would
refuse, if it did not involve the forfeiture of his word.
The same evening he received the reply of Dupleix to
the overtures made through Paradis, and he at once
transmitted to Dupleix the conditions on which he would
make over Madras to the Pondichery authorities, and
depart.
The principal of these conditions were, a promise that
the treaty he enclosed should be rigidly observed; that
the Governor should be taken from his officers, and not
from Pondichery; that Madras should be evacuated on
January 1, 1717. The treaty contained articles very
favourable to the English, especially when it is re¬
membered that Madras, with its wretched garrison, was
incapable of further defence when it surrendered. The
second article provided that one-half of the munitions of
war should be returned to the English ; the fourth, that
the residue of the supplies, of which the quantity was
large, after the re-victualling of the Trench squadron,
should be restored to them ; the other articles related to
the ransom and matters previously noticed. On the
following day, the 12th, he sent another letter, in which
he stated' that as M. Despremesnil had assured him that
Dupleix would agree to the conditions, he was now im¬
patient to depart. He enclosed five articles, the two
principal of which provided that Madras should be
172 LA BOURDOMVAIS AM) DUPLEIX.

chap, evacuated, at the latest, at the end of January, that it

should not be attacked by either nation before that period,
1716. and that as long as it should remain in the hands of the
French, the roadstead should be accessible to the ships of
both nations. The Superior Council replied to these
letters on the 13th and 14th. With reference to the
conditions insisted upon by La Bourdonnais, they agreed
to keep the engagement entered into with the English,
provided the English kept theirs; but they required that
La Bourdonnais should leave them 150 of his troops as
he had promised Paradis, that Despremesnil should be
Gommandaut, assisted by a Council of four, two of whom
might be named by La Bourdonnais, subordinate to
Pondichery ; and that the place should not be evacuated
till a complete division of the prize property should have
taken place. In their letter of the 14th,* the Conned
positively refused to agree to evacuate the place by the
time proposed, and entered into reasons which showed
how dangerous it would be to French interests to accede
to the other conditions proposed.f
But before this letter reached La Bourdonnais, an un¬
foreseen event had cut the more than Gordian knot which
neither party could agree to untie. In his letter of

* In reply to La Bourdonnais of Tory willing to engage to receive

the 12th. them, on the understanding, that this
t We extract the most salient acceptance on our part does not pass
passages from this letter of the Su- for an acquiescence iu the articles
perior Council, dated Pondichery, which relate to them. The
October 14, 1746 : ‘M. Dupleix has roadstead of Madras cannot he open
communicated to us your letter of the to the English during the division
12th, with some articles which we of the prize property; the English
have examined very attentively, squadron has only to come there with
Many reasons prevent us from being' five or six ships from Europe, as well
able to accede to them. The time as from India, and to disembark their
to which you limit the evacuation of crews gradually. It would thus be
the place is not sufficient to enable very easy, as you will see, for the
us to make a division of the artillery, English to take possession of Madras
rigging, and the supplies, and to take at least to concentrate there a force
them away. All that we can pro- of 2,000 Europeans. It is for this
mise you, is to work as promptly as reason that we have inserted a para-
possihle. • • • • graph that the roadstead of Madras
W ith respect to the hostages, let- must not he open to the English.’
tevs of exchange, and Dills, we are
 HIS SHIPS DISPERSED BY A HURRICANE. 173

October 11 addressed to Dupleix, La Bourdonnais had ciiap.

remarked—1 What we have most against ns, is the mon- .—^—•
soon; I can stay here very well till the 20th, perhaps 1746.
even to the 25th, if the weather continues favourable.’
On the following day he wrote—‘Already the northerly
wind has set in, then follows, as you know, the decided
necessity of quitting the place. * * * I am writing to¬
day to each captain, giving them such orders, that in case
the new moon and bad weather should compel them to
put to sea, they may regain the coast afterwards.’ The
nest clay, the 13th, was a lovely day, one of the finest of
the season. During the night, however, there came on
one of those hurricanes which periodically cause ruin and
devastation along the Coromandel coast. The Preach
vessels, with the exception of three—the ‘ St. Louis,’ the
‘ Lys,’ and the ‘ Benommee ’—which had been sent to
Pondichery with a portion of the spoils of Madras, were
in the roadstead loading. In addition to their crews,
they had on board nearly five hundred troops—the
Pondichery contingent, which, it will be recollected, La
Bourdonnais, to assure his own unquestioned authority in
Madras, had embarked upon them. The storm, as usual
with such storms, gave but little warning of its approach.
Before, however, it attained anything like its greatest
severity, the ships had all slipped their cables, and put to
sea. All night long the hurricane. raged with terrible
fury. La Bourdonnais, who, at the first whistle of the
storm, had busied himself in making preparations to meet
every possible conjuncture of fortune, vainly strained his
eyes, as the day slowly broke, to discover any trace of his
fleet. Not a vessel was to be seen. The hurricane con¬
tinued to rage furiously, and, at eight o’clock in the
morning, appeared to be even augmenting in force.
During the whole of that day his anxieties increased.
But lie was not idle. Here, again, the old qualities of
the great organizer of the islands displayed themselves to
their full perfection. He sent parties along the coast,
174 LA BOUKDOSmiS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, with means and appliances to succour the crews that

—^—• might stand in need of aid. At Madras itself, he made
1746. preparations on a large scale for the same purpose; he
wrote letters to Dupleix, detailing his terrible anxieties,
and asking news of the ships at Pondichery ; besides this,
all the boats having been destroyed, he detached cata¬
marans,* at half past three in the afternoon, when the
storm had begun to abate, with letters detailing the state
of things at Madras, and asking for information from any
vessel they might fall in with. No intelligence reached
him, however, before eight o’clock, nor did a single sail
appear in view. At that hour he learned that the ‘ Marie
Gertrude,’ an English prize, having many soldiers in her,
had been lost with nearly all on board, between St. Thome
and Covelong; that one ship totally dismasted, and
another, with all her masts standing, were anchored safely
off St. Thome ; that a Dutch vessel had gone down near
the same place, and that two small trading barks had met
with a similar fate. All next day his anxiety was in¬
creasing. At nine o’clock he learned that the ‘Bourbon’
was at anchor fifteen miles off, with only a foremast
standing, and leaking terribly; that the ‘ Achille ’ was
almost in the same state, and that another ship, name
unknown, had been descried totally dismasted. Every
hour brought news of fresh disasters. At sevenVclock in
the evening he reported to Dupleix that the ‘ Bourbon ’
was lost beyond redemption,f and that ■ it would be pos¬
sible to save only a very few of the crew ; that the ‘ Due
d’ Orleans ’ was lost, one man only being saved, and that
another vessel, totally dismasted, was in sight.
On the 16th the weather moderated; but it was not
till the 17th that La Bourdonnais became acquainted
with the entire extent of his losses. Of the eight French

* A catamaran is composed of which a man stands with a paddle,

three or four pieces of wood, about f She was, however, eventually
twenty feet long, tied together, upon saved.
 TERRIBLE LOSSES OP THE FLEET. 175

vessels® anchored in the Madras roads on the evening of chap.

the 13th, the ‘ Achille,’after incurring great danger, losing -/—•
two of her masts, and throwing over sixteen 18-pounders, 1746.
anchored safely in the roadstead; the ‘ Neptune ’ had
been totally dismasted, had thrown over fourteen 12-
pounders, and had seven feet of water in her hold. All
her prize-cargo had been ruined. The ‘ Bourbon ’ was
saved by a miracle; she had lost her main and mizen
masts, and been compelled likewise to throw over fourteen
of her guns. She had received in other respects such
damage as to make her quite unfit to put to sea. The
‘ Phenix ’ was lost with all on board; the ‘ Due d’ Orleans ’
underwent the same fate, eight only of her crew being
saved; the ‘Princesse Marie’ was dismasted, and had
seven to eight feet water in her hold; the ‘ Marie Ger¬
trude ’ and the ‘ Advice ’ had foundered. Of these eight
vessels, then, four were lost; two of the others were
rendered utterly unseaworthy, and the remaining two were
so damaged as to require almost superhuman exertion
to fit them for sea. The Drench fleet had, in fact,
suddenly ceased to exist. The loss in men alone had
exceeded l,200.f
It was whilst in the midst of his troubles, before even
he knew the full extent of his losses, that La Bourdonnais
received the letter, dated October 11, from the Superior
Council to which we have alluded,$ and in which they
declined to fix an absolute term to the time of the with¬
drawal of the Drench troops from Madras. He apparently
had expected some such answer. ‘ I have received from
the Council,’ said he, in reply, ! the answer which I ex¬
pected regarding the affairs of Madras. I shall take that
which I believe to be the simplest part, which is to leave

* These were the 'Achille/ the prizes.

'Bourbon/ the 'PhSnix/ the ‘Nep- t Besides sixty men of the English
tune/ the ‘Due d’Orleans/ fitted out garrison who were onboard the ‘Due
as men-of-war, the ‘Princesse Ma- d’Orldans.’— Grose’s Hast Indies.
rie/ an English prize, the ‘Marie % Vide note to page 172,
Gertrude/ and the ‘Advice/ also
176 IA BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, you a copy of the capitulation, and to abandon to you

. 1Y- . the field, in order to devote myself entirely to saving the
1746. debris of our losses.’ Four days later, -writing when his
losses were fully known to him, he still expressed himself
hopefully about the future, proposing to winter and repair
damages at Goa, whilst the undamaged portion of the
fleet should remain at Acheen for the protection of
Pondichery. He then added—‘ My part is taken regard¬
ing Madras; I abandon it to you.* I have signed the
capitulation, it is for you to keep my word. I am so
disgusted with this wretched Madras, that I would give
an arm never to have put foot in it. It has cost us too
much.’
The next day he signed the treaty—the same treaty
which, on the 11th and 12th, he had forwarded to Pon¬
dichery, and to some articles of which, on the 14tli, the
Council of Pondichery had objected—he signed this treaty,
stating in the preamble that he did so, because the Pon¬
dichery Council, by articles signed on the 13th, and by
that same letter of the 14th,f had engaged itself to hold
to the capitulation in those terms.
Having thus concluded, by an act not only unauthorised,
but, under the circumstances, even dishonourable, that
struggle for authority, and—would that we could omit
the remainder—for his own private ends—for the securing

* It is necessary to notice that this refer to it he will find, that so far

was not written until La Bourdon- from giving La Bourdonnais autho¬
nais had made a rain attempt to bring rity to accede to the terms mentioned,
under his orders the captains of the it distinctly objected to two of the
‘ Centaure,’ the ‘Mars,’ and the ‘Bril- most important conditions — condi¬
lant,’ just arrived from tions which, nevertheless, are found
They pleaded, in reply, the orders unaltered in the treaty which La
they had received to place them¬ Bourdonnais, on the strength, as he
selves at the disposal of the Go¬ says, of this letter, signed. La Bour¬
vernor-General and Council of Pon¬ donnais, in his memoirs, declares that
dichery.—La Bourdonnais a Messieurs the previous letters of Dupleix, agree¬
du Conseil Supreme de Bondicheru, ing in general terms to his conditions,
Octobre 18, 1746. authorised him to act thus;—hut
t In a foot-note to page 172 we why, then, did he not quote these in
have given the most important ex¬ the preamble P
tracts from this letter. If the reader
 LA BOURDCWKAIS LEAVES MADRAS. 177

to himself of the private sum which was additional to the cfap.

public ransom—La Bourdonnais assembled the members —.
of the English Council, and, reading to them the treaty in 17 46.
both languages, received their acceptance of its terms.
Governor Morse and five of his * Councillors then attached
to it their signatures. The treaty was sent the same day
to Pondichery, accompanied by an intimation from the
Admiral to the Council, that he would hold them respon¬
sible, individually and collectively, for all contraventions
perpetrated against its conditions by the French.
Meanwhile, La Bourdonnais had made extraordinary
exertions to repair and refit his vessels. Here -he was in
his real element. Nothing could surpass his energy, or
the zeal and determination he instilled into his subordi¬
nates. In less than five days 'after the remnants of the
shattered squadron had re-anchored in the Madras roads,
he had succeeded in rigging the ‘ Achille ’ with jurymasts;
the ‘ Neptune ’ and the ‘ Princesse Marie ’ had been ren¬
dered seaworthy, and even the ‘ Bourbon ’ had been
patched sufficiently to make the passage to Pondichery.
Having placed what prize property he could on board
these vessels, La Bourdonnais, on the morning of October
23, ordered a grand parade of the troops, and formally
made over command to Despremesnil. As he did this,
it came on,’again to blow, and the ships, fearful of another
hurricane, at once made for the open sea. La Bourdon¬
nais himself waited for the conclusion of the ceremony,
then threw himself into a country boat, and amid a terrible
storm put out to join them, thus bidding a last adieu, amid
the conflict of the elements, to that Madras, with regard
to which he 1 would have given an arm never to have set
foot in it.’

* Mr. Grose, -who was a contem- vourable circumstance to the English

porary, and who naturally adopted Company.’ No doubt, and that is
the English view, writes:—‘ If the just why Dupleix opposed it, though
French had not perfidiously broke he broke no engagement, havingmado
their engagement, the price of the none,
ransom would have been a very fa¬
ll
178 LA BOTJRDOOTUIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap. All, meanwhile, had been quiet at Pondichery. The

. 1V~ . storm of the night of the 13th and the two following days
1740. had not extended so far south as the French capital. The
three ships arrived from France, as well as the three which
had been despatched from Madras some time previously
to the storm, had thus ridden calmly in the Pondichery
roads, whilst their consorts at Madras had been damaged
or sunk. No sooner had the terrible losses become known,
than the Council assembled to concert measures to be
adopted to meet the possible results of such a calamity.
Little, however, could be done, as the demands made on
Pondichery for the expedition to Madras had exhausted
all its stores, and the ships were not in a condition to take
the sea immediately. On the 22nd a Council was held,
at which the captains of the ships assisted, to deliberate
on the disposal of the fleet. After hearing the opinions
of the captains, a resolution was arrived at that the six
vessels then off Pondichery should proceed to Acheen,
under M. Dordelin, the senior captain, there to remain
till the 20th or 25th of December, when the squadron
should bear up for Pulicat, to proceed thence, if circum¬
stances were favourable, to Madras. These orders were
sent sealed to M. Dordelin. Neither Dordelin nor any of
his junior captains appear to have been men of energy or
character. The authority in whose presence*- they found
themselves at the moment, acted upon them with a force
that to their feeble natures was irresistible. They had
not been many hours at sea, when they received a letter
from La Bourdonnais informing them of his departure
from Madras, and directing them to proceed along the
coast to joinhim. On opening at the same time their sealed
orders, their perplexity was extreme. It was difficult for
them to decide to whom their obedience was due. Whilst
yet hesitating, they fell in with the maimed squadron of
La Bourdonnais. His daring, decided spirit settled the
question in a moment. Taking upon him the command
of the united squadron, he ordered them to accompany
 HE MAKES NEW HtOI’OSALS. 179

him, as he continued his course for Pondichery. In that chap.

roadstead he anchored on the 27th. -—^—■
Once more at Pondichery, the contest between the two 174G.
men recommenced. It formed part of the plan of La
Bourdonnais, and there can be no doubt that, as a plan, it
was able and well considered, to take round the squadron
to the Malabar coast. Leaving the sound vessels cruising
in the Arabian Sea, he would have taken the damaged
ships into the neutral harbour of Goa, and have there
completely refitted them. Buying then other vessels at Goa
and Surat, he would have reunited his squadron, and have
come round with a force, sufficient to counterbalance the
English force, to the Coromandel coast. But to carry
out this plan he required to draw upon all' the resources
of Pondichery.
He required to borrow from her .all her soldiers, all her
heavy guns, a great part of her ammunition, and the re¬
mainder of her all but exhausted stores. He demanded
of Pondichery, in fact, to take upon herself all the risks
which might possibly attend his cruise, remaining herself
all the time open to the attacks of an enemy. This idea,
however, quite mastered him for the moment, and he
pressed it, with all his earnestness, upon Dupleix. ‘ Aid
me,’ he said, ‘ with the same zeal with which you
aided me .for the taking of Madras, and we shall be
able not only to recover ourselves, but to gain fresh ad¬
vantages.’
It is doubtful whether, even under any circumstances,
the Governor of Pondichery would have felt himself jus¬
tified in undertaking so great a risk, even with the prospect
of gaining so important an advantage. Certain it is that,
after the experience of the preceding four months, Dupleix
felt no inclination to permit the safety of the colony to
rest on the caprices of a man who, up to that time, had
never ceased to thwart and oppose his best devised
schemes. Considering that the squadron of Commodore
Peyton was yet miconquered, he felt it was absolutely
180 LA BOUEDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

chap, necessary for the safety of Pondichery, that the bulk of the
IT~ . fleet should proceed to an anchoring ground, whence it
J 746. might be recalled on an emergency. Such a position did
Acheen, in the opinion of himself and his Council, offer.
Although, therefore, the letters of La Bourdonnais making
this proposal were couched in the most conciliatory
language; although in them Dupleix was urged to forget
the past, and give once more, as he had given before
the expedition to Madras, all the resources of Pondichery,
in aid of the new scheme, he felt constrained to refuse to
entertain it. The fact is he could not forget the past; lie
could not forget the terrible trials of the preceding six
weeks; the open defiance of his authority, the arrest of
his agents, the disposal of the Pondichery contingent on
board the ships of the squadron, the usurpation of an
authority supported by physical force alone. These
things, indeed, would have been very hard to forget at
any time. Especially were they so at the moment when
he who had suffered most from such proceedings had
upon his shoulders the sole responsibility of the future of
Pondichery. To have again voluntarily placed the settle¬
ment in the power of one who had shown no respect for
the authority of its Governor, would have been the height
of folly. The honied phrases of La Bourjlonnais fell,
therefore, upon ears which thoroughly mistrusted both
them and their author. The Superior Council declined
to entertain liis plan* for a moment. La Bourdonnais
himself had refused to land; they declined to proceed on
board his ship, as he requested, to discuss matters together.
Neither party, in fact, would trust the other. Under
these circumstances, it is scarcely to be wondered at, that
the tenor of the reply to La Bourdonnais’ proposition went
simply to reiterate the orders which had directed the
squadron to proceed to Acheen.
In the first letter * which La Bourdonnais addressed to

* A Messieurs du Conseil de Pondiclieiy, Octobre 26, 1746.

 HE LEAVES FOR THE ISLANDS. 181

the Superior Council after his junction with the squadron chap.
of M. Dordelin, he had promised that he -would not inter- •—A—
fere with their command over the Company’s ships. This 1746-
promise, on his new plan being rejected, he proceeded to
fulfil. He had at his disposal seven vessels—four in good
order,* three damaged and shattered.f Of these he pro¬
posed to form two squadrons, which, sailing together,
should endeavour to gain Acheen. If they succeeded, he
would send thence the ‘ Lys ’ and the ‘ Sumatra ’ to the
islands, and repairing the ‘ Achille,’ would make, at the
end of December, for Pulicat, there to carry out the orders
of the Superior Council. But should he not be able to
gain Acheen with the two squadrons, the first under the
command of M. Dordelin was to make for that place, there
to act under orders from Pondichery, whilst he himself,
with the damaged squadron, should bear up for the
islands.
Upon this plan he acted. On October 29th, after a
stay in the Pondichery roads—for he did not land in the
town—of only two days, he set sail with the seven ships
before indicated for Acheen. The result he had antici¬
pated happened. The three damaged ships were soon
left out of sight by those of the uninjured squadron.
These latter sailing their best, as had been ordered,
reached ,4-cheen on December 6th. La Bourdonnais,
despairing of being able to gain that" anchorage with
ships that had been so shattered as his own, gave up all
idea of reaching it, and bore up for Port Louis. He
arrived there, his ships in a miserable condition, on
December 10 th.
In this manner, after a short sojourn of four months,
did La Bourdonnais leave those latitudes, to gain which
had been the dream of his heart during the best years of
* These-were the ‘Centaure,’ the in a shattered condition from the
‘ Brillant,’ the ‘ Mars,’ and the ‘ St. islands. The other ships, the ‘ Bour-
Louis.’ hon,’ the 'Neptune,’ the ‘Renom-
t The ‘Achille,’ the ‘ Lys,’ and the mee,’ and the ‘ Princess Marie,’ had
‘ Sumatra.’ The ‘ Sumatra ’ had come heen too disabled to make the voyage.
1S2 LA BOURDOXNAIS AXD DUPLEIX.

chap, his life. Yet, in those four months, what stirring events
—■ had been concentrated ! Arriving in the Indian seas with
]74G- a fleet which he had, for all the purposes of the expe¬
dition, made himself, with crews he had trained, and
soldiers whom he had taught and drilled, he first encoun¬
tered and beat off an English fleet, inferior, indeed, in the
actual number of the ships, but far superior in weight of
metal; then, refitting and rearming at Pondichery, he
sailed out to encounter once more the English squadron.
Not daring to accept his challenge to an engagement,
they fled before him, and he, having thus obtained the
mastery of the seas, sailed then to attack the stronghold of
the English on the Coromandel coast. Taking it without
the loss of a man, he heard very soon afterwards of the
arrival of a reinforcement of three ships, armed as ships
of war, at Pondichery! What a position did that give
him! Conqueror of Madras, master of the ocean, with
no one to oppose his onward progress, with a Governor-
General at Pondichery who was constantly impressing
upon him the necessity of rooting out the English from
every settlement in India, he might have sailed up the
Hoogbly, have conquered Calcutta, and have destroyed
English commerce in the Indian seas. In acting thus he
would have fulfilled the very purpose of his mission; lie
would have carried out the most cherished dreams of his
life. Why, then, did he not effect this P The answer is
to be found in the motives which we have unveiled. It
was partly—we believe chiefly—because .though he had
triumphed over difficulties such as would have baffled
most men, though he had conquered enemies on shore,
and driven every rival from the sea, lie had not overcome
himself. Yet there was another reason too, regarding
which it is impossible to be silent. The price of the
ransom-treaty of Madras, even if it had no acknowledged
influence on his conduct, stimulated, nevertheless, by its
demoralising power, that spirit of rebellious pride, which
led him first to oppose every order which would have set
 IS TAKEN PBISQNEE BY THE ENGLISH. 183

aside the treaty that he had concluded, and afterwards to chajp.

assume a position, as defiant as it was unbecoming, as •—^—
baneful to the interests of France as it was prejudicial to !746.
his own character.
He has now, at the epoch of which we are writing,
gazed for the last time on the scene of his triumphs. Ho
more was he to be called upon to strike a blow for
French India. Arriving in the Isle of France, in the
beginning of December, he found a successor, M. David,
installed there, with orders to leave to La Bourdonnais the
command of the fleet, only in case he found the accounts
of his government in proper order.
M. David having pronounced favourably in this re¬
spect, La Bourdonnais was placed in command of the
squadron, and directed to proceed to France, taking
Martinique on the way. A storm shattered his ships off
the Cape of Good Hope, but he succeeded, with four of
them, in gaining Martinique. Here he learned that the
homeward route was barred by English cruisers, whom it
would be impossible to avoid, and who were too nume¬
rous to contend against. Impatient, however, to arrive in
France to justify himself, he proceeded under a feigned
name to St. Eustache, converted all his property into
jewels,* and took a passage to France in a Dutch ship.
War, liov/ever, had been declared between England and
Holland, and the Dutch vessel was taken and carried into
an English port. Here La Bourdonnais was recognised,
and was at once constituted prisoner of war.
We diverge for a few moments from the strict record
of our history to bring his career to a conclusion. Ee-
garded by the English, in consequence of his conduct at
Madras, as the champion of their interests in India—a
poor compliment to a French Admiral—testimonies of

* Madame de la Bourdonnais em- safely in Liston; thence slie pro-

lmi-ked in a Portuguese ship with ceeded to Paris,
most of these jewels, and arrived
184 LA ■ BOUEDONKAIS AXD DUPLEIX.

chap. esteem and regard were showered upon him from all
•-:—- sides. By the Royal Family, by the Court of Directors,
174G. anci by the public, he was treated with the greatest
distinction. The Ministry even permitted him, on his
own urgent request, to return to France on his parole,
his anxiety to answer the charges brought against him
being irrepressible.
But his reception in France was unfavourable. Accu¬
sations were lodged against him. of having disregarded
the King’s orders, of having entered into a secret under¬
standing with the enemy, of having diverted to his own use
the funds of the Company. On these charges he was
thrown into the Bastille, and was for three years kept
confined in that fortress, deprived of the visits of his
family, debarred even from the use of pen and ink.
When, at the expiration of this period, his innocence®
of the charges brought against him was declared, he came
out from prison only to die. By means, nevertheless, of
handkerchiefs steeped in ricewater, of coffee dregs, and
of a pea made out of a piece of copper money, he had
succeeded in writing his biography—and this, published
at a time when the fate of Dupleix was trembling in the
balance, contributed not a little to turn the popular feel¬
ing against that statesman. La Bourdonnais died shortly
after his release, on September 9, 1753.
But we must turn now to Pondichery, where Dupleix
remains undisputed ruler, master of Madras, master even
for the moment of the seas. His policy has triumphed,
but yet dangers seem to be rising on two sides of him.
On the one, England, alarmed at the loss of Madras, is
making superhuman efforts to retaliate on Pondichery.
On the other, the Nawab of the Carnatic, jealous of
French aggrandisement, is demanding with eager messages

it was iu lucpvvci tuuiic m wb cue umirge oi Diioery. J

Directors of the East India Company ferred, on every account, to
and of the Madras Council to prove ’
 THE DANGERS WHICH THREATEN DUPLEIX. • 185

the surrender to liimself of Madras, tlie renunciation by chap.

the French of further designs of conquest, threatening —-
hostilities in case of refusal. 1746.
In our next chapter will be recorded the consummate
skill by which, in this crisis, Pondichery was preserved,
Madras retained, and which planned the first direct blow
for a French Empire in India.
18G TITE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

CHAPTER Y.

THE HIRST STRUGGLE 1ST THE CARNATIC.

chat. The mode in which Dupleix had purchased the consent

--——- of the Nawab of the Carnatic to the prosecution of his
1746' plans against Madras has been already related. With one
great end in view—that of wresting Madras from the
English—he had, during a crisis which might otherwise
have been fatal, sacrificed the less important portion, of
the scheme, and, renouncing extension of territory for his
own countrymen, had promised the Nawab to resign to
him the conquests he should achieve. We have given
our reasons why we believe Dupleix to have been sincere
in this engagement. In his letter on the subject to La
Bourdonnais—a letter intended for no other eye—he
had expressed his intention to resign the town to the
Nawab after demolishing its fortifications, and he had
used this as a reason why it would be impossible for him
to agree to any terms regarding ransom with the English.
We have seen how the obstinacy of La Bourdonnais had
for a long time prevented the accomplishment of these
designs—how, from the date of the capitulation, the 21st
of September, to his departure from Madras on the 23rd
of October, that impetuous and self-willed officer had kept
Madras in his own hands, and how, therefore, during that
time, and for a week subsequently, the entire attention of
Dupleix had.been devoted to obtaiuing possession of the
place, which had been conquered only to be kept from
him. We have seen too how fatal the delay had been to
him in one respect—in the destruction of the fleet which
had been at once his mainstay for defence, and the power
upon which he counted for future blows against the
 THE XAWAB ASSERTS HIS POWER. 187

English. Yet, damaging as had been the result in that chap.

respect, it sank into apparent insignificance when con-
trusted with the effect it had upon the suspicious mind of 17 6>
the Asiatic who had trusted him, only, it would seem, to
be deceived.
Tire fact indeed that upwards of five weeks had elapsed
since the French flag had first floated over the ramparts
of Fort St. George, and that there were no indications of
lowering it to make way for tire flag of the Mogul, was in
itself a circumstance more than sufficient to justify the
doubt which Anwaroodeen was beginning to display.
The quarrel between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais wrould
naturally appear but a shallow and transparent artifice,
invented for the purpose of cheating him out of his pro¬
mised gains. It was enough for him that Madras continued
French; to the name of the Frenchman who commanded
there lie was indifferent. His engagement had been made
with the Governor of the French possessions in India,
and to that Governor he looked for its absolute and literal
fulfilment.
When, however, day succeeded day, and week followed
week, and he received, instead of Madras, excuses founded
upon the alleged insubordinate behaviour of the French
official in command at Madras, the patience of the FTawab
began tQ'give way. Who were these French, he asked,
these foreigners who had been so submissive and com¬
pliant, that they should thus not only beard him to his
face,'but should use him as a tool wherewith to effect
their purposes ? Upon what force did they rely to enable
them to carry out their daring resolves ? If they had a
few hundred European and two or three thousand native
soldiers, he could bring into the field twenty men to their
one, and, against the means which the possession of a few
places on the coast might make available for them, he
could wield the resources of the entire province of the
Carnatic. He would teach these faithless Europeans to
know their place and to respect his power, and if they
188 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap, should hesitate longer to carry out their engagement, he

—~r— would compel its fulfilment by force of arms. At this
1746, determination Anwaroodeen had arrived long before La
Bourdonnais had made over his conquest to Despreiuesnil.
Ife had even sent a detachment of his troops to the
vicinity of Madras, there to remain until it should be
joined by the main body. This main body, in number
about 10,000, and commanded by Maphuz Khan, eldest
son of the Nawab, followed very shortly after, and en¬
camped under the walls of Madras about the same date
as that on which La Bourdonnais bade a final farewell to
the roadstead of Pondiclxery.
This then was the first great difficulty which it fell to
the lot of Dupleix to encounter after the departure of his
rival. Let us consider for a moment what was actually
his position. He had promised to make over Madras to
the Nawab, but he had resolved, at the time he made that
promise, first to demolish its fortifications. The insubor¬
dination of La Bourdonnais had prevented the possi¬
bility of doing one or the other before the 23rd October,
and on that date his lieutenant, Despretnesnil, found him¬
self threatened by the troops of the Nawab. He was on
the other hand embarrassed by the engagements into
which La Bourdonnais had entered with the English, and
with which, although he had not ratified them} jt would
now be incumbent on him to deal in a decided manner.
There was thus presented to him a complication of diffi¬
culties such as might well appal a mere ordinary mortal.
Yet Dupleix set himself to meet them in the dear and
logical manner natural to his well-ordered intellect. Of
the difficulties we have enumerated, that caused by the
threatening attitude of the Nawab was the most pressing.
This, therefore, he set himself in the first instance to en¬
counter. No man was more sensible than he of the veiy
delicate nature of the task which thus lay before him.
He had, indeed, promised to make over Madras to the
Nawab, intending, as we know, to make it over in a dis-
 THE REASON OF DUPLEIX* CONDUCT. 189

mantled state. But being now for the first time in a op¬
position to perform the promise, he was prevented from
accompanying that performance by the dismantling which,
in his opinion, was a most necessary adjunct to it, and the
more so, because Madras was at that moment invested by
the Nawab. To dismantle Madras in the presence of the
army of Maphuz Khan, would have roused in the breast
of the Nawab an indignation equal to that which had been
already kindled by abstaining from surrendering it. To
make over Madras, on the other hand, with its fortifica¬
tions still standing, would, he considered, be an act of
treachery to French interests. It would be in that case,
he felt, in the power of the Nawab to make his terms with
the English, and to re-sell them a place which the French
had conquered, with the view to the permanent expulsion
of that nation from the Coromandel coast. To such a line
of conduct Dupleix could never reconcile himself. In the
temper of the Nawab, however, any other course was
fraught with danger. That danger and the' possible dis¬
aster consequent upon it were, however, in the eyes of
Dupleix, less formidable than the certain danger and cer¬
tain disaster attendant upon an abject submission to the
threats of the Nawab. He resolved, therefore, to risk the
fury of his wrath rather than surrender French interests
to his mercy, and to retain Madras for himself, rather than
make it over with its fortifications undestroyed. But
while he came to this fixed resolution, he determined to
employ every art, to exhaust every device, to induce the
Nawab to forego his claim, and to avert those hostilities
with the satrap of the Mogul, which now, for the first
time, seemed to threaten the French colony. As to his
promise, he considered himself absolved from its perform¬
ance by the fact, that the Nawab was now endeavouring
to obtain by force of arms that which Dupleix, if left to
himself, would have been willing, on the earliest possible
occasion compatible with his own security, to concede.
Having resolved on this course, Dupleix sent iustruc-
190 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNA

chap, tions to Despremesnil to keep Madras at all hazards, but

—^—• to refrain from any act of hostility towards the troops of
1746. ]^[aplluz Khan, beyond those which would necessarily re¬
sult from the defence of the place. The French troops
who garrisoned Madras amounted to between five and six
hundred Europeans, and about the same number of natives
disciplined in the European fashion. In obedience to the
ordersreceived from Dupleix, the Governor, Despremesnil,
withdrew the whole of these troops within the walls on
the approach of the enemy, with the intention of confin-.
ing himself strictly to the defence of the town. But as
Maphuz Khan showed himself very earnest in his attack,
and in the course of a few days reduced the garrison to
■ some difficulties, by cutting off from them the only spring
which supplied them with good water, Despremesnil found
it necessary to abandon this cautious policy, and to try
the effect of a sortie. On the 2nd November therefore,
early in the morning, he detached a body of 400 men,
accompanied by two field-pieces, to attack that portion
of the enemy’s army which had gained possession of the
spring. As this handful of men advanced, the guns fol¬
lowing close in the rear, to encoimter, as it seemed, cer¬
tain destruction from the overwhelming force of the
Mogul, the enemy’s cavalry hastily collected and galloped
towards them with the intention of riding them down.
Still steadily, undaunted by the imposing array of the
squadrons charging towards them, the French advanced.
When, however, they judged the enemy to have arrived
within point-blank range, they opened out from the centre,
uncovering the field-pieces, and halted. The first dis¬
charge from the two guns went straight into the mass of
the hostile cavalry, killing some of the foremost horses,
j This caused a temporary confusion and halt, which gave
| the French time to load again. The enemy, unaccustomed
to such rapid firing, knowing so little of the European
practice of artillery as to consider one shot in a quarter
of an hour excellent practice, were confounded at this
 HE SENDS PARADIS TO MADRAS. 191

second discharge. Instead, then, of taking advantage of chap.

it to charge home, they halted to look on in mingled doubt, ■—A—
wonder, and fear. But when a third discharge succeeded 174C-
a second, and a fourth a third, all carrying destruction into
their ranks, they hesitated no longer. Terrified at this ,
novel mode of warfare, they fled precipitately, leaving j
their tents and baggage a prey to the conqueror. They ]
lost from this cannonade about seventy men, whilst
amongst the French not a man was even wounded*
Meanwhile Dupleix had not been less indefatigable at
Pondichery. The accounts he received as to the reality
and earnestness of the attack on Madras, had convinced
him likewise that persistence in a purely defensive line of
action would be highly impolitic, and he had determined
to effect a diversion by threatening the enemy’s camp
from the side of Pondichery, -with the view of compelling
him to raise the siege. The command of the detachment
which was to effect this end, and which numbered about
230 Europeans and 700 native sepoys, he entrusted to
Paradis, the most capable officer under his orders.
The news of the march of this detachment reached
Maphuz Khan immediately after the defeat of his cavalry
by the Madras garrison. He appears to have instantly
taken a resolution worthy of a greater commander. This
was to mEfrck with the bulk of his force to intercept and
destroy that small detachment, before an opportunity
should be afforded it of opening communications with the
garrison of Madras. With this view he marched to St.
Thome, and took up a position on the northern bank of
the little river Adyar, which runs into the sea on its
southern side, and which it would be necessary for Paradis
to cross in order to communicate with Madras.
On the morning of November 4, Paradis came iii
sight of the host of the Nawab, numbering nearly
10,000 men, posted on the north bank of the river,

Orrne, Dupleix.
192 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap, their position covered by guns. He bad no guns, but he

—was a man of a stern and a resolute nature, prompt in his
1746' decisions, and losing no time in carrying them into effect.
He was little startled by the sight before him. His orders
were to open communication with Madras, and these he
could not carry out by either halting or retreating. He
therefore resolved to cut his way through the enemy.
Without waiting to reconnoitre, he dashed into the river,
which he knew to be fordable, scrambled up the bank in
face of the enemy’s guns, then halting to deliver one
volley, ordered a charge. The effect was electric. The
enemy at once gave way, and retreated in terrible con¬
fusion into the town, from behind the defences of which
they attempted to offer a new resistance. But Paradis
was not the man to leave half his work undone. He
followed the enemy .with vigour, and halting in front of
the town, poured in volley after volley on the masses
jumbled together in the crowded streets. These had but
one thought—to escape. Their very numbers, however,
impeded their movement in any direction, and it was not
until after many of them had fallen, that they succeeded
in extricating themselves from their position. Hardly
had they accomplished this, however, when they found
themselves assailed by another enemy. The garrison of
Madras had hastened on the first intimation "of the ap¬
proach of Paradis to march to his aid. They arrived in
time to intercept the retreating masses of the Nawab’s
army, and to convert -their defeat into an utter and de¬
moralising rout. Their general, Maphuz Khan, had fled
on the first charge of the French; the body of men who
formed his army, without a leader, aud terror-stricken by
their crushing overthrow, at once gave up all thoughts of
gaining Madras, and did not halt till they had traversed
many' miles from that place in the direction of Arcot.*
It may be well asserted that of all the decisive actions

■ * Orme, Dupleix.
 RESULTS OP THE FRENCH VICTORY. 193

that ever were fought in India, there is not one more ci-iap.
memorable than this. Not indeed that there has not -—d—
since been displayed a daring equal to that of Paradis, or 1746’
that numbers as disproportionate have not within the
memory of the living achieved a victory as important.
The circumstance which stamps this action as so memo¬
rable is that it was the very first of its kind, that it proved,
to the surprise of both parties, the absolute and over¬
whelming superiority of the disciplined European soldier
to his Asiatic rival. Up to that time the native princes of
India had, by virtue of their position as lords of the soil or
as satraps of the Mogul, of their numerous following, their
acknowledged power, arrogated to themselves a supe¬
riority which none of the European settlers had ever
thought of disputing. With the French, as we have seen,
it had been a maxim of settled policy to avoid even the
semblance of hostility towards them. We have noticed
how Martin and Dumas and Dupleix had toiled to effect
this end. When at last Dupleix, to avoid a more dan¬
gerous contingency, accepted this dreaded alternative, lie
did so more in the hope that he might find some means
of pacifying the Hawaii whilst the siege was in progress,
than in any expectation of routing him in the field. And
now suddenly, unexpectedly, this result had been achieved.
From beiitg the suppliants of the Nawab of the Carnatic,—
the vassals whose very movements depended upon his
license,—they in a moment found themselves, in reality,
his superiors. This action at St. Thome, in fact, com¬
pletely reversed the positions of the Nawab and the
French Governor. Not only that, but it inaugurated a
new era, it introduced a fresh order of things, it was the
first decided step to the conquest of Hindostan by a
European power. Whether that power were French or
English would depend upon the relative strength of either
nation, and even more on the character of the men by
whom that strength should be put in action. The battle
which introduced this change was one then that well de-
o
 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN’ THE CARNATIC.

serves to be remembered; and, in remembering it, let not

us, who are English, forget to record that the merit of it
is due, solely and entirely, to that great nation which
fought with us the battle of empire on Indian soil, and
did not win it.
To Dupleix this victory presented the means of extri¬
cating himself from all his difficulties. He now found
himself able to carry out the plans which he had conceived
at the time of the capture of Madras by La Bourdonnais.
The conduct of the Nawab in declaring war against him,
in besieging Madras, and in endeavouring to intercept
and destroy his little army, had quite cancelled the obli¬
gation under which he had placed himself to make over
to him his conquest. That difficulty had been happily
surmounted. Nor did the other, bequeathed to him by
La Bourdonnais, that of restoring Madras to the English,
present any longer an obstacle. He had never ratified
the unauthorised engagements into which La Bourdonnais
had entered. To him they were as though they had
never been made. Madras, he knew well, would have
surrendered at the same time, or at the utmost a day
later, had no reference been made to a ransom. The
place wras not at the time capable of further defence. He
regarded it therefore as his conquest, as a lawful prize to
French valour, and he determined, now that he'possesscd
the power, to use it for the interests of France, regardless
of those engagements into which La Bourdonnais had
been lured, and which he had never sanctioned.
No sooner, then, had he received intimation of the
utter defeat of the Nawab’s army, and .of the triumphant
relief of Madras, than he appointed Paradis military go¬
vernor of that place, instead of Despremesnil, who, as
a civilian, would not, lie considered, exercise sufficient
authority over the troops, and instructed him to issue a
declaration proclaiming Madras to be French by right of
conquest, and disavowing all engagements entered into by
La Bourdonnais as null and void.
 DUPLEIX KETAIXS MADEAS. 195

Paradis was not slow to act upon his orders. He had chap.
beaten the Nawab’s army on November 4, and had -~-d -
entered Madras the same day. On the 9th he received
his instructions, and on the 10th he issued his procla¬
mation. In this, he annulled La Bourdonnais’ ransom-
treaty ; declared all the merchandise, provisions, warlike
stores, and horses to be French property, and ordered all
the English residents, who would not take the oath of
allegiance to the French, to quit the town within four
days. On the other hand, the English were permitted to
dispose of their moveables, clothes, and jewels, and they
■were simply required not to serve against the French till
they should be exchanged. Governor Morse and the
other officials were conveyed as prisoners to Pondichery,
where, however, they were treated with the greatest
courtesy and consideration.* The entire English com¬
munity, indeed, protested against the high-handed pro¬
ceeding of Paradis, and some of its members even made
their escape to Fort St. David. Amongst those who
adopted this course was a young writer named Robert
Clive.
Fort St. David, about twelve miles south of Pondichery,
and about two north of Cuddalore, had been purchased
by the English in the year 1691, and had been, by de¬
grees, fairly fortified. Its strength for purposes of resist¬
ance was increased by its proximity to Cuddalore, which
was fortified on three sides, that facing the sea being
alone undefended. It had now become, by the capture
of Madras, the English seat of government, and those who
occupied the chief places of authority were animated by
a resolute determination to defend it to the last ex-

* Mr. Orrne declares that the Eng- -was invented by La Bourdonnais,

lish prisoners were marched in oaten- 'who had left Pondichery long before
tatious procession through the streets the prisoners arrived. In vol. xv.
of Pondichery, hut he gives no au- of the National Review> art. 'Dupleix/
thority for his statement. The fact the true version is given on the au-
5s; that the English prisoners were thority, apparently, of the Ariel
treated with the greatest considera- Papers.
tion. The story of the procession
 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap, tremity,—even to invoke, for that purpose, the aid of the

—^—- native chieftains.
1746- It was indeed high time that they should do something,
for Dupleix had resolved that their last place of refuge
should be his next conquest. This great statesman, iu
fact, believed that now, after all the vicissitudes of his
career, after all the trials he had been subjected to, he
had at last found his opportunity. Madras in his possession,
free from all fear of effectual interference on the part of
the Kawab, what was there to hinder him from carrying
out his darling plan of expelling the English from that
coast? To bring matters to their present point, he had
risked the contest with La Bourdonnais, the fury of the
ruler of the Carnatic, and now, having attained that end,
he felt his hands free to push his advantage to its utmost
limit, and to strike at Port St. David. With his accus¬
tomed promptitude, he determined to carry out this plan
without any loss of time,—a determination the more ne¬
cessary, as he fully expected that a few months would
deprive lyn of the advantage which he then possessed of
the mastely at sea.
The command of this expedition Dupleix intended to
intrust to the officer whom of all under his orders lie
considered the most capable. This was Paradis. To
him, therefore," he sent instructions to return to Pond i-
chery with all the troops he could spare, so soon as he
should have settled the affairs of Madras. It was not
before the first week of December, however, that Paradis
was able to move. Leaving then the bulk of the garri-
>son behind him, he marched owgAafr'dwy at the head of
800 men, escorting the plunder of Madras, in the direc¬
tion of Pondichery.
These proceedings on the part of the French did not
escape the attention of the hTawab. The me nth that
had elapsed since the defeat at St. Thome had very much
effaced the sharper stings of the lesson the Moguls had
then received. Maphuz Khan, especially, burned with
 PARADIS REPULSES THE MOGULS. 197

impatience to efface the galling recollection of that day’s chap.

defeat. No better opportunity, lie thought, would pre--^—
sent itself than that which seemed now about to offer,
when a body of three hundred men should be embar¬
rassed by the numerous coolies laden with the plunder
which they were escorting. Impressed with these ideas,
lie assembled a body of 3,000 foot and 2,000 horse, the
flower of his army, and took up a position at the little
village of Konetur, thirty-two miles south of Madras,
through which lie knew that the French detachment must
pass. Paradis was marching in a careless style, unsus¬
picious of the vicinity of an enemju He had divided his
force into two bodies, an advance party and rear-guard,
and between these were the coolies. Suddenly the
cavalry of Mapliuz Khan appeared upon the plain, and
made as though they would attack the rear-guard. The
attitude of the French, however, shook their resolution,
and they contented themselves with hovering about in
the vicinity, dashing at stragglers, and forcing the troops
who composed the rear-guard to constant formations.
Uneasy at this, and fearing to be overtaken by night before
he should reach the Dutch settlement of Sadras, Paradis
at once altered his order of marching. Sending the
coolies in front of the troops he covered them with the
body th^t had formed his advanced-guard, and with it ■
hastened on to that place. The rear-guard, meanwhile,
had the task assigned it of proceeding at a more leisurely
.pace, so as to engage the attention of the enemy. This
manoeuvre answered all his expectations.' The first de¬
tachment with the coolies reached Sadras without the
loss of a man, whilst of the second, only twelve men were
captured, and these more from a disposition to loiter
than from the fault of the commander. Arriving at
Sadras, Paradis halted until he should receive further rein¬
forcements. On the arrival of these he marched without
molestation to join the main encampment of the French
army at Ariancopan, two miles south of Pondichery.
198 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap. Here he arrived on December 1, • Maphuz Khan, for his

•—^—• part, finding it impossible to gain any material advantage
1746. oyer jTjench troops, had desisted from his attempts
after the arrival of the Drench at Sadras.
The junction of Paradis completed all the preparations
of Dupleix. With a force of about 900 Europeans, 600
natives, 100 Africans, six field pieces and six mortars, he
was, it appeared, absolutely master of the coast. The
English garrison of Port St. David numbered but 200
Europeans and half the number of natives. The French
too had all the inspiration of recent victory. The success
of the intended expedition seemed certain, far more cer¬
tain in fact than the success of La Bourdonnais had ap¬
peared at the period of his attack upon Madras. No one
knew better, however, than Dupleix that, in spite of all
favourable appearances, one necessary element of success
was yet wanting. He had the soldiers, the guns, the
munitions of war, but had he the general ? This was the
one want without which the success which seemed to be
his would yet slip from his grasp. He knew this well,
and with his accustomed energy he set himself to supply it.
The Commander-in-chief of the French troops in Pon-
dichery at this time was General de Bury, an officer not
only old, but possessing the worst characteristics of age.
■ To intrust the command of the expedition to such a man
was, Dupleix felt, to insure its failure. Yet, as the
senior, he had the right to command. On the other hand,
there was Paradis, the hero of St. Thome, an engineer by.
profession, and ’ a man whose courage and capacity were
established. In his hands the expedition would have the
best chance of success. To give the command to Paradis,
therefore, all the efforts of Dupleix were directed.
Unfortunately for France, for himself, he did not
succeed. There were other officers between Paradis and
de Bury, and these protested against such a supersession.
His Swiss birth, his inferior rank, the jealousy which his
recent success had caused amongst the small-minded, all
 THE FRENCH MARCH ON CUDDALORE.

contributed to binder the elevation of Paradis, and in the

presence of the great discontent which the proposal ex¬
cited, Duplcix was, at last, forced to abandon the idea.
Under the command of De Bury, therefore, the force
marched on the night of December 19, crossed the
river Punar the following morning with but little oppo¬
sition, and took possession of a walled garden, about a
mile and a half to the north-west of Port St. David.
Here deeming themselves secure, and being fatigued and
hungry from then’ march, the troops lodged their arms,
and prepared to cook their dinners.
It is time now that we should turn to the movements
of the English. Irritated by the high-handed proceedings
of Dupleix at Madras, by the abrogation of the treaty,
these had resolved to undergo any extremity rather than
surrender. In addition to the garrison of 300 men, to
which we have adverted, they had taken into their service
1,000 irregular native troops, known then by the name
of peons, and, what was of more importance, they had
entered into an intimate alliance with the Hawab. In
concert with him, it had been agreed that, whilst the
Preach should be engaged in the attack on Port St. David
and CJuddalore, both of which they were determined to
defend to the utmost, he should suddenly seize that
opportunity to attack them, and place them between two
fires.
It is probable that had the French been led by a gene¬
ral of even ordinary capacity this attack would have
failed, but De Bury was wanting in all the qualities that
go to form a general. In taking possession of the garden,
and allowing his troops to disperse to cook their morn¬
ing meal, he considered he had quite sufficiently acted
his part. lie took no care that pickets were told off, or
that sentries were posted. Hot a single man was, there¬
fore, on the look out. He did not even himself suspect
the capabilities of the position he was occupying. Care¬
lessly giving himself to the repose which his age required,
 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IH THE CARNATIC.

chap, he acted, and allowed his soldiers to act, as though he

—r-—• and they had just completed an ordinary march, in a
1746‘ time of peace, through a friendly country.
Bightly was he punished for this neglect. His men
were dispersed, their arms grounded, he himself taking
his repose, when suddenly the alarm was given that the
enemy were upon them. A panic seized them. Grasp¬
ing at the first weapon that was at hand, some indeed
half-dressed, they rushed disorderly to quit a place which
they might have defended against the Nawab’s whole
army. Their one thought was to reach and cross the
river, and towards it they ran without order or array.
But the enemy, who were 6,000 horse and 3,000 foot of
the Nawab’s army, commanded by his two sons, were
there before them. Notwithstanding this, the French
rushed recklessly into the river, impatient only to gain
the opposite bank. Fortunately for them, their artillery,
which was admirably handled, and to the troops compos¬
ing which the panic had not extended, kept the enemy
at a distance. .More than that, its commander, not con¬
tent with covering the disordered retreat of the infantry,
deliberately transported his own guns, one by one, in face
of the enemy, and, when on the other bank, served them so
as to keep the Moguls at bay. It was not until the French
had retreated for upwards of two hours, that the. natives
could be prevailed upon to pursue them, and then only
after they had been urged thereto by the English garrison
of Fort St. David, which had arrived too late to take any
part in the skirmish at the river Punar. Their pursuit,
even when they did enter upon it, was fruitless in results.
The French had long before recovered from their panic,
and the attitude they presented on the approach of the
enemy, made the Mogul Princes think rather of their
own safety than of an attack on their position. M. de
Bury on his part was equally indisposed to expose' his
army to further risks. As soon, therefore, as the allied
force of the English and Moguls commenced a retrograde
 TIIET ARE REPULSED. 201

movement towards Cuddalore, he continued his retreat chap.

to Ariancopan, where he arrived the same evening, after ■—-r-—
having sustained a loss in this ill-conducted expedition of 1‘
twelve men killed and one hundred and twenty wounded.
A small quantity of muskets and stores, which had been
left behind in the garden at Cuddalore, fell likewise into
the hands of the enemy. He had on his side the solitary
satisfaction of having saved all his artillery, and of having
killed and wounded of the Nawab’s army upwards of two
thousand men*
For three weeks after this fruitless expedition, the
French army continued in its encampment. Dupleix,
however, had not been idle. On the fresh outbreak of
hostilities,' he had despatched instructions to M. Dordeliu,
who, it will be remembered, commanded the squadron
which had gone to winter at Acheen, to hasten with his
four ships f to the coast. In the expectation of the early
arrival of these, he resolved to re-open negotiations with
the Nawab, to point out to him .the folly of extending
further protection to a people, reduced, as were the
English, to the last extremity, and the expediency of
maintaining amicable relations with the European power,
which, in Europe as in Asia, occupied the first position
among nations. That self-interest might aid in inducing
the Ktiwab to lend a willing ear to these proposals, he
directed the commandant of Madras to undertake without
delay measures to threaten Arcot with an attack from a
French army.
The messengers of Dupleix found the Nawab tired of
fruitless hostilities, and not altogether indisposed to enter
into an accommodation with the French, though still de¬
manding the execution of the original agreement. To
induce him either to decide at once, or to render his
decision of less importance, Dupleix determined to endea¬
vour to surprise Cuddalore. On the night of January 10,
* Orme, Dupleix.
t The (Centaure/ the 1 Brillaut/ the 1 Mars/ and the 1 St. Louis.’
202 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

char, he embarked five hundred men from the camp at Arian-

>——- copan in boats for the purpose. The night was dark
1747. £n6) Cuddalore was open on the seaside, and every¬
thing promised success. But the boats had hardly got
through the surf, when a storm arose which forced them
to return.
Ten days later, M. Dordelin’s squadron arrived. It now
seemed to lie in the power of Dupleix to make upon the
English settlement a combined attack by sea and land
such as must be fatal.. It is difficult to say why the
attempt was not made. The importance of it was un¬
doubtedly obvious to Dupleix. It is probable, however,
that he was hampered by the character of his naval and
military commanders. Dordelin was feeble and unenter¬
prising ; De Bury, as we have seen, worn out and in¬
capable.
But though he did not use the squadron for the purpose
to which it might, under better auspices, have been di¬
rected, its presence on.the coast was not absolutely rcsult-
' less. The Nawab, struck by this accession of force, and
learning at the same time that the country round Arcot had
been ravaged by the Erench troops, could no longer resist.
the conclusion that he had engaged in a struggle which
could but end in loss and dishonour to himself; that the
English had evidently been abandoned even- by their
own countrymen, and that every consideration of policy
prompted him to accept the offers of the Erench Gover¬
nor. He no longer therefore continued to insist upon the
fulfilment of the agreement regarding Madras, but signed
at.once a treaty, by which the French were confirmed in
possession of all the territories which they then held, and
the Nawab agreed to leave the English to their fate. This
treaty was ratified by Maphuz Khan in person during a
visit of ceremony which he paid to Dupleix at Pondichery,
at the end of following February.
Now, at last, the English were apparently in his power.
Abandoned by every one, numbering but two hundred,
 DUPLEIX MISSES AST OPPORTUNITY. 203

occupying a position little capable of prolonged defence, ciup.

what could possibly save them F If, at this conjuncture, —
Dupleix had put into action that great principle of warfare,
—a principle applicable alike to all transactions in which
men ordinarily engage,—to bring the greatest force to bear
on the decisive point of the scene of action, he must have
gained his great end. Between the time of Dordelin’s
arrival, January 20, and the visit of Mapliuz Khan
at the end of February, there had been ample time to
carry out an expedition, which must under ordinary cir¬
cumstances have succeeded. In allowing his fleet and
army to remain inactive during this period, we fail to
trace the practical ability and fertile genius which so often
guided the operations of the French Governor. The in¬
activity is the more inexplicable as Dupleix well knew
that Commodore Peyton’s squadron in the Hooghly was
waiting only the arrival of reinforcements, then daily
expected, to re-assert the predominance of the English
power in the Bay of Bengal. It is possible, indeed, that
this very knowledge may have contributed to his inaction.
We have seen how in his correspondence with La Bour-
donnais, he clung to the idea of keeping a reserve of
French ships within call of Pondichery. Dordelin’s squad¬
ron was alHhat remained to him, and it can be conceived
that he hesitated to engage those four ships, under a
commander so wanting in energy and steadfastness, against
the batteries of Fort St. David, knowing, as he did, that
the northerly breezes which at that season blew down the
bay might at any moment bring upon them the squadron
of Peyton, reinforced by fresh ships from England. It. is
probable, likewise, that the same consideration urged him,
as soon as his negotiations with the Nawab had been
brought to a successful close, to despatch that squadron to
the safe and neutral anchorage of Goa. This he did on
February 19.
But whatever were his motives, whether he was in¬
fluenced by the considerations we have recorded, or by
204 THE HIRST STRUGGLE IX THE CARNATIC.

chap, others of which we have no knowledge,* it is certain that

*——• he lost a golden opportunity. He too was fated soon to
17(1:7 • experience the truth that such opportunities, once granted,
are seldom vouchsafed a second time; that, when offered,
therefore, they ought to be seized with a promptitude and
used with a determination before which all other consider¬
ations should be made to give way.
He did not, however, at all resign the great object of
all his political manoeuvres. On the contrary, he was
more than ever bent on the expulsion of the English from
Fort St. David. No sooner then had the accommodation
with the Nawab been completed, and the Mogul troops
withdrawn, than he summoned a council of Avar, placed
before it the situation in which he was, the daily expected
approach of an English squadron, and the expediency of
attempting once more the capture of Fort St. David. He
urged at the same time the fitness of Paradis for the com¬
mand, and pressed upon the assembled officers the neces¬
sity of suppressing all considerations of self-interest in the
presence of a crisis, calling so much for self-denial and
earnest co-operation for a great end, as that which, then
existed. This appeal to their patriotism was at once
heartily responded to, and the French officers consented to
acknowledge and obey Paradis as their general.
Before, however, all these preliminaries had been carried
out, the garrison of Fort St. David had received a small
reinforcement of twenty men, and a considerable supply
of money. An English ship decoyed into the Madras
roads at the end of November by the sight of the English
colours flying over the Fort, and then suddenly attacked,
had managed nevertheless! to escape and to make its way

* In Ilia memoir, Dupleix does not the superiority at sea was about
allude to the possibility of using his to pass almost immediately to the
ships for the purpose of attacking English, he coniId not better employ
Cuddalore and Fort St. David, al¬ endeavour to detach
though Cuddalore, at least, was open the native powesrs from their alii-
towards the sea. He seems to have
been impressed by the idea that, as t Other ships
 PARADIS MOVES OR OUDDALORE. 205

to Trincomalee. There the captain received information chap.

of the actual state of affairs on the Coromandel coast, and -—f—-
thinking he might be able to serve his countrymen, he 1747'
gallantly resolved to bear up for Fort St. David. He
succeeded in this, in spite of the four ships of war under
the unenterprising Dordelin, and conveyed to the English
garrison a reinforcement of twenty men and £60,000 in
silver. This was the more acceptable, as, shortly before,
another English ship, carrying soldiers and bullion, and
consigned to Madras, had touched at Fort St. David, where
deeming the state of the garrison irretrievable, her captain
had refused to land either soldiers or money, but had pro¬
ceeded in all haste to Bengal.
The small reinforcement we have referred to reached
Fort St. David on March 2. On the 13th, Paradis put
his troops in motion, and marching along the coast, took
up a position the same day on the north of the Pimar,
about a quarter of a mile from the river. The Punar,
though in some parts fordable, was in others of a sufficient
depth to make crossing in the face of an enemy a difficult
operation. Knowing this, the English garrison wisely re¬
solved not to wait for the French within the Avails of the
fort, but to oppose the passage of the river. They accord¬
ingly moved out, took up a position on the southern bank
of the Punar, and commenced a brisk cannonade on the
French with three field-pieces they had brought with
them. Paradis, for the time, contented himself with, re¬
plying, but in the evening he moved with the bulk of his
force higher up the river, and crossed it without opposi¬
tion,—the English volunteers, Avho had been sent to observe
him, retiring on the loss of two of their number, and
retreating with the main body within the Port. Paradis
immediately took possession of the walled garden from
Avhich De Bury in the former expedition had fled so pre-

note. One especially, haying on tlie roadstead in the same manner

board £60,000 in bullion, besides and there boarded.—Orme.
stores of all sorts, was entrapped into
206 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

CHAP- cipately, and made Ms preparations for the attack on the

■——■ Port on the following day.
1747. Then was seen, with a clearness incapable of being mis¬
understood, the terrible, the fatal effect of throwing away
an opportunity. From December 10 to February 13,
the French army had been idle at Ariancopan. Dor-
delin’s squadron had arrived on January 20, and within
ten days of its arrival, the JSTawab had signified his in¬
tention of withdrawing his support from the English,
Had Paradis been allowed to march even a month earlier,
on February 13 instead of on March 13, he must have
been able within those twenty-eight days to force his
way into Fort St. David. Even one week earlier, and
his chances would have been considerable. Whilst Dor-
delin’s squadron might have attacked the open face of
Cuddalore with a certainty of mastering it, he might have
moved, with an equal confidence of victory, upon Fort St.
David. That it would have fallen may be considered
certain when we recollect how quickly it surrendered, after
its defences had been greatly strengthened, some years
later, to the attack of Daily. Had that been accomplished,
the fleets of England would have found no resting-place
for the soldiers they carried with them on the soil of the
Carnatic, and the ineradicable foundation of a French
Empire might have been laid.
But it was not to be. The inaction of one month, un¬
explained, and to our minds inexplicable, threw away that
great chance, lost that splendid opportunity. In this one
instance, Dupleix acted as though he believed he could
count for ever on the favours of fortune. The fickle god¬
dess showed him in return that she will never continue to
help those who decline to help themselves. She aids the
daring and skilful warrior, but she leaves him the exercise
of his free will. Should he evince carelessness, indecision,
or blindness, she leaves him then, and rightly leaves him,
to the consequences of his own acts.
On March 14, Paradis was in the position, in which,
 IS FORCED TO RETREAT. 207

had Dupleix willed it, he might have been early in chap.

February. In February he would have had the English •—-1—■
garrison, then having received no reinforcement and 1747,
destitute of supplies, to deal with. But, on the morning
of March 14, as, before making his advance against the
Fort, he cast his eyes over the sea, the sight of several
vessels, evidently vessels of war, sailing from the north, met
his anxious gaze. Who could these strangers be ? Not
Dordelin and his ships, for Bordelin, he knew, was well on
his way to Goa. They could scarcely even be French, for
the French had but one vessel in the Madras roads. Who
could they be, he felt, but the reinforced squadron of
Peyton ? His uncertainty, if he felt any, did not last long.
The hoisting of the Union Jack soon told him that the
third expedition against Fort St. David had failed.
It was, indeed, the long expected, long dreaded squad¬
ron, reinforced by two ships, one of sixty, one of forty
guns, and, what was of equal consequence, strengthened by
the arrival of a new commander. This officer, Admiral
Griffin, learning at Calcutta the danger which threatened
Fort St. David, had sailed without delay to its succour,
and thus arrived in time to save it and the English gar¬
rison from the fate by which both were threatened. He
brought with him as a permanent reinforcement a hun¬
dred Europeans from Bengal, but the sailors on board
the squadron were capable of affording still more nume¬
rous aid.
Under such circumstances but one course remained to
Paradis. The arrival of this fleet endangered the safety of
Pondichery. His little army constituted the main strength
of that place, as well for defence as for attack. Thither,
accordingly, he must return. He made up his mind at
once, and before the English had recovered from the
reaction of joy which the arrival of their ships produced
amongst them, he had re-crossed the Punar, and was well
on his way to Ariancopan. There he arrived the same
evening. A few days after, on the appearance of Admiral
 THE. FIRST STRUGGLE IX TIIE CARNATIC.

Griffin’s fleet before Pondichery, he was recalled within

the town.
It was now the turn of Dupleix to be cut off from the
sea, to be left entirely to his own resources. Not only
was a powerful English fleet in the Pondichery roadstead,
but ships from England, from Bombay, Tellichery, and
other places, continued to bring reinforcements to the
garrison of Fort St. David. The three hundred Euro¬
peans and natives of 'which it was composed in January,
had increased in July to 2,000, including upw'ards of 600
Europeans borrowed from the fleet. The friendship of
the Nawab, he knew, would always go with the stronger
power. Madras had but a small garrison, and any move¬
ment of the Nawab’s troops -would cut off the only pos¬
sible communication,—that by land,—with Pondichery,
whilst that city itself lay exposed to the bombardment, as
well as to the blockade, of a powerful squadron. Yet
Dupleix was born to shine in adversity. Never did his
great qualities appear so great as when he was surrounded
by dangers. Though cut off from all communication
with the sea, he yet managed to 'send instructions to
Dordelin to proceed, as soon as the monsoon should be
over, to the islands, to join his' squadron to any French
ships that should be there, and to represent to the Go¬
vernor the necessity under which he was of speedy and
efficient aid. He held himself, meanwhile, ready not only
to defend Pondichery against all attacks, but even, should
occasion offer, to retaliate on the enemy.
The possession of the Isles of France and Bourbon,
midway between the mother-country and India, gave the
French a very great advantage over their English rivals
in this early stage of the battle for empire. These islands
formed, in fact, the base of the operations, naval and mili¬
tary, which the French undertook in India. Secure, as
they were believed to be, against hostile attacks, a French
squadron could wait its opportunity in the commodious
harbour of Port Louis, could re-fit, and re-victual; and
 DUPLEIX SENDS TO THE ISLES FOE AID. 209

could reckon, almost to a certainty, the chances of meet- chap.

ing or avoiding a hostile fleet. Here single ships could ^—
be"detained, as they had been in the time of La Boiu’don- 1'47'
nais, until a sufficient number should be collected; and
even should that number prove insufficient for the pur¬
pose required, that man, full of energy and resources, had
proved the possibility of providing ships from materials
which were to be found in the islands themselves. The
English possessed no such position. It was only when
allied, as they were on the occasion of which we are
writing, with the Kepublic of Holland, that they were
able to make use of the Cape of Good Hope, and even
to augment their armament from its resources. This un¬
certain and temporary advantage, however, liable at
times to be rendered nugatory, was not to be compared .
with the permanent benefit resulting to the inhabitants
of Pondicherv from the possession of a solid point d’appui
in the Indian Ocean.
It was to derive from these islands the advantages they
were so well capable of affording, thatDupleix despatched
Dordelin on his mission. His arrival at the islands in
December 1747 was opportune. He found the Gover¬
nor of Bourbon, M. Bouvet, well inclined to respond to
the call, arid possessing or expecting the means which
would enable him to do so with effect. In fact, one ship
of fifty guns, and another of forty, had arrived some short
time since from Prance, conveying reinforcements and
treasure for Pondichery, and were then shortly expected
on their return from a cruise in search of prizes on which
they had been despatched to the Malabar coast. Two
smaller vessels were in Port Louis, ready to sail.
Accidental causes deferred the departure of this squad¬
ron, now consisting, by the union of the cruising vessels,
of seven large ships * and two small ones, from the islands

* There was one of 74 guns, one of 66, two of 50, two of 40, and one of
210 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IK THE CARNATIC.

chap, till the beginning of May. M. Bouvet then set sail, and
■-r—• having a fair wind, arrived off Karical about the middle
1748- of June. There he learned the superiority in numbers
of the English squadron,* and he resolved, instead of
hazarding an engagement, the result of which might
jeopardise and even ruin French interests in India, to
manoeuvre so as to delude the English Admiral with the
expectation of a contest, and to take advantage of the
darkness of the night to run on to Madras. He carried
out his plan with exceeding skill. Arriving off Fort St.
David on the afternoon of the 21st, and descrying and
being descried by the English squadron, with which, lie
being to windward, it was optional to him to engage, he
altered his course to the south-west, as though he in¬
tended to wait for the morning to attack. The English
Admiral was so impressed with the idea that either this
or a desire to gain Pondichery was his intention, that he
took no more advantage of the land wind which blew from
off the coast in the evening, than to maintain out at sea
the latitude of Fort St. David. But night had no sooner
fallen than the French Admiral again altered his course,
and stood up for Madras. Having reached it the following
morning, he waited only to land 800 soldiers, including
several that were invalids, and 200,0007 in silver; this suc¬
cessfully achieved, he hastened back to the Isle, of France,
having completely deceived the English Admiral, and
accomplished at least one great part of his purpose.
But the indirect effects of this expedition were greater
even than those which were apparent. Ignorant of the
course taken by the French fleet, Admiral Griffin left his
position off Fort St. David to go in search of it. This
intelligence had no sooner reached Dupleix, than he
determined to profit by it, and by a bold effort to sur¬
prise Cuddalore. To this end he despatched on the 27th
June a force of 1,800 men, of whom 800 were Euro-
* This consisted of three ships of 60 eruus, three of 50, three of 40, and
one of 20 guns.
 THE FRENCH AGAIN RErULSED. 211

peans, to make such a detour as would bring them with- chap.

out being observed into the vicinity of that town, upon --—
which they were to fall in the darkness of midnight. But
Major Lawrence, who had arrived six months before from
England to command the English forces India, was too
well served by his subordinates. He was informed not
only of the approach of the French, but of their inten¬
tions. He made no secret of the knowledge. Indeed,
he openly used it to increase the confidence of the enemy.
He ostentatiously removed the garrison and the guns from
Cuddalore, and gave out that he intended to confine him¬
self to the defence of Fort St. David. No sooner, how¬
ever, had night fallen than he threw a strong garrison
into the place, and mounted all the guns he could spare
upon the ramparts. The French, completely deceived by
his movements during the day, made sure of their con¬
quest, and neglected every precaution. At midnight they
advanced carelessly towards the place, believing they
would meet with only a nominal resistance. But they
had scarcely planted their scaling ladders than they were
received with such a fire of grapeshot and small arms as
sent destruction and disorder into their ranks. Utterly
confounded and panic-stricken, they retreated in the
utmost confusion, scarcely stopping for a halt, till, baffled
and humiliated, they reached Pondichery.*
Thus for the fourth time was Dupleix forced to re¬
nounce his designs upon the last refuge of the English.
The Unfit on this occasion was certainly not his own.
An experienced and resolute general at the head of such
a force as that of which the French detachment was com¬
posed, would have made Major Lawrence bitterly regret
hisyiwesse. Had the French advanced against Cuddalore,
as soon as they observed its walls dismantled and its <uir-
l'ison retreating, the chances in their favour would have
been very great. Major Lawrence, and not the French,
* We have been unable to ascer- manded the French troops on this
tain the name of the officer who com- occasion.
p2
212 THE. FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap, would then have been surprised ; the tables would have
._*1—- been turned on the author of the stratagem. But to do
1748- this required a head to devise, a resolution to execute
promptly and at the moment. These were wanting in
the leader of the French force. A foolish confidence
reigned where energy and watchfulness ought to have
held sway, and the movement which might have been
made fatal to the English was, without thought, without
examination, tacitly and complacently permitted by the
French leader to become the means of inflicting upon
his army a terrible defeat—upon the French colony a
danger that appeared to forebode almost inevitable de¬
struction.
For, in ordering this last attack, Dupleix had a far dif¬
ferent purpose than that by which he was prompted in
sanctioning those that preceded it. Then he was fighting
for empire—lie was struggling to expel the English from
' the coast. But since the last attack for that object, made
on March 14 of the previous year, had been foiled by
the arrival of the English fleet, the aspect of affairs had
changed. It was not only that Admiral Griffin still re¬
mained on the coast, preventing French traffic, obstructing
all communication with France ; it was not alone that M.
Bouvet had appeared off Madras only to land a few sol¬
diers and to return to the islands; but since that attack,
intelligence had reached Dupleix that the English had
fitted out a most formidable fleet and army, larger than
any that had yet appeared in the Indian seas, with the
express object of laying siege to Pondicliery, and of re¬
torting upon that city the disaster which had befallen
Madras. He knew, from letters received from the French
Ministry, that that fleet and army had left England during
the preceding November, and might be expected to appear
at any moment in the Bay of Bengal. It was, then,.in an
entirely defensive point of view that he had designed his
fourth attack upon Cuddalore. Securing that place, and
by its means Fort St. David, during the absence of Adrni-
 DUPJjEIX PUEPAEES POE DEFENCE. 213

nil Griffin, lie would have deprived the English force of chap.
any base of operations on the shore, and would have coin- .—;—-
pulled them to attempt, in the face of an enemy, a landing ms-
upon a coast which presented natural difficulties of a most
formidable character. The carelessness of his officers de¬
feated, however, this well-considered project.
Forced then, once again, to depend upon his own re¬
sources, to resign himself to defence, he began, with cha¬
racteristic energy, to strengthen as much as possible, be¬
fore the enemy should appear, the places which he yet
held. Of these, next to Pondichery, the principal was
Ariancopan, a small post two miles from Pondichery,
and about a mile and a half from the sea. To this
place Paradis was sent, in his capacity of chief engineer,
with instructions to make it as capable as possible of
defence. He executed his instructions in a most effective
manner. The fort itself was a triangle, with but few
defences exterior or interior. Paradis set to work to con¬
struct three cavaliers within the body of the place, a deep
ditch, and a covered way. The care of the works thus
fortified was consigned to a young captain, named Law, a
nephew of the famous Scotch financier, whose influence
on the affairs of the French India Company has been
before referred to.
We have already recorded the noble maimer in which
Duplc-ix, in the early days of liis administration, had de¬
voted himself to the completion of the defences of Pondi¬
chery.® The fortifications facing the sea, on which he
had laboured with so much earnestness, consisted of two
demi-bastions, one at each extremity of the face. On the
three other sides the city was defended by a wall and a
rampart flanked by eleven bastions. The entire works
were surrounded by a ditch and an imperfect glacis.f

* Chapter III. from the journal of an English officer

t The account of the fortifications present at the siege, reprinted, in the
of Pondichery, and of the siege gene- Asiatic Annual liegister for 1802, and
rally, so far as relates to tlie opera- which Mr. Ornie 'has copied almost
tiuus of the English, has been taken verbatim.
214 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN’ THE CARNATIC.

chap. The side opposite to the sea, facing the interior, was also
-—I-—- defended by several low batteries, capable of mounting
1748. UpWards of one hundred pieces of cannon, and command¬
ing the approaches from that side. Besides these artificial
defences was a formidable natural protection, consisting
of a hedge of prickly pear, which, beginning on the north
side at the sea, a mile from the town, continued a semi¬
circle all round it, until it joined the river Ariancopan,
close to the fort of the same name ; from that point the
river continued the line of defence to the sea. Within
this enclosure were cocoa-nut and palm trees so thickly
studded as to render the ground very difficult for the ad¬
vance of an enemy. Of these fortifications, Paradis, after
the completion of the defences of Ariancopan, was consti¬
tuted chief engineer, and charged with the defence.
It will be recollected that, on the occasion of the attack
upon the French at St. Thome by the Dutch, in 1674,
that enterprise owed its success principally to the fact that
the Dutch admiral had succeeded in inducing the King of
Golconda to operate by a land attack at the same time ;
and that similarly, during the siege of Pondichery in 1693,
the Dutch had enlisted in their service a large body of
native troops. Dupleix was now warned by the French
Minister that these tactics would again be pursued, that
immense efforts would be made to gain over The native
princes to English interests, and that the English com¬
mandant was well provided with presents for that especial
purpose.
Leaving, for a moment, the French Governor devoting
himself to the defence of the territories which he held for
his Sovereign, and endeavouring, by all the means in his
power, to counteract beforehand the effects which the
presents of the English were, he well knew, only too
likely to produce on the mind of Anwaroodeen, we must
turn to the. proceedings of that fleet, the departure of
which from England had caused so much perturbation
and excitement in the French settlement. It was true,
 BOSCAWEN SAILS FKOJI ENGLAND. 215

indeed, that the English East India Company, indignant obap.

at the loss of Madras, had determined to spare no efforts -d—"
for its recovery, and that the English Ministry, sharing
the sentiments prevalent at the India Board, had promised
to aid it with a fleet and army. Of these, when all the
other arrangements for their departure had been de¬
termined, the double command was bestowed upoli
Bear-Admiral the Hon. E. Boscawen, this constituting
the second and final occasion, subsequently to the Revo¬
lution of 1688, in which two such commands were united.
Admiral Boscawen was a man of birth and character.
A grand-nephew of the famous Marlborough, he had
entered the navy at the age of twelve years, and, passing
with credit through all the subordinate grades, had found
himself, when only twenty-six years old, captain of a man-
of-war. Two years later, the ship which he commanded
formed a part of that fleet at the head of which Admiral
Vernon took Porto Bello and failed at Carthagena. In
these expeditions, only partially successful as they were,
Captain Boscawen lost no opportunity of distinguishing
himself, and he soon acquired a reputation for skill and
enterprise such as, combined with his high birth, marked
him out for future command.
This was not long-in coming to him. When it was
decided in' England to make a great effort to deliver a
counter-sfroke for the capture of Madras, Boscawen, then
only in his thirty-sixth year, was selected to command the
expedition. The instructions he received were to endea¬
vour to deprive the French of the base of their operations
against India, by the capture of the Isles of France and
Bourbon, and, succeeding or not in that, to deliver his
main blow against Pondichery itself.
On this expedition, with eight ships of war,* and a
convoy of eleven ships, having on board 1,400 regular

* The fleet was composed of one guns, a bomb-batch, with her tender,
ship of 74 guns, one of 04, two of 00, and a hospital ship.—Or-nip,
two of 50, one of 20, a sloop of 14
216 THE FIEST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC!.

chap, troops, Boscawen left England on November 15, 1747.

*—-4— Tlie greater number of these reached the Cape of Good
1748. jjope on April 0 of the following year. The remainder
arrived sixteen days later, but it was not till May 19 that
the Admiral left Table Bay for the islands. He had
received here, however, a considerable accession of force
in six ships and 400 soldiers belonging to the Dutch East
India Company. The united force, with the exception of
three vessels, sighted the French islands on the morning
of July 4.
Had the Isle of France been in the same position with
respect to its defences in which it was in 1735, the English
Admiral would have found little difficulty in gaining
possession of it. But by the efforts of La Bourdonnais,
during the first five years of his administration, fortifications
had been erected all along the coast, such as rendered
an attack upon it, especially at a season of the year
when the wind blew strongly from the land, a matter
of great uncertainty. Thus, although the garrison was
small, consisting of only 500 regular troops and 1,000
sailors lent from the ships at anchor hi the harbour, the
defences had been so skilfully thrown up, and there ap¬
peared to be such a firm resolution to defend them with
pertinacity, that the Admiral, after three days spent in
examination of the coast, and in futile efforts'to obtain
some information as to the strength of the garrison, felt
constrained to call a council of war t.o deliberate on the
expediency of an attack. At this council it was resolved,
with the concurrence of the Admiral, to avoid an encounter
which might perhaps disable the fleet from attempting its
greater undertaking, and to push on with all speed to
Pondichery. They set sail for Fort St. David accordingly
on the following day, and, parting company until the
Dutch ships, arrived there on August 11, effecting a junc¬
tion with Admiral Griffin’s squadron.
This union constituted a force at the disposal of the
English Commander the most powerful that had ever
 fsnsJMso* p-'

THE ENGLISH REPULSED. 217

arrived in the Indian seas—far more so than that with chap.

. which the Dutch had conquered Pondichery in 1693, and
infinitely more effective than that which La Bourdonnais '
had led to the capture of Madras. In this case, moreover,
the English Admiral was at ease regarding his communi¬
cations. There was no hostile fleet threatening to inter¬
fere with his plans, or to contest with him the supremacy
at sea. He was in possession of such strength " that he
was able to divest his mind of all fears of naval attack,
and to flatter himself with a certainty of the conquest of
Pondichery. To attempt this last he landed an army
which, by its junction with the troops already at Fort
St. David, and with 120 Dutch sent from Negapatam,
amounted to 6,000 men, of whom 3,720 -were Europeans.
Of this force he detached 700 Europeans, on the morning
of August 19, to attack Ariancopan. We have noticed
the preparations which Dupleix had made at this place—
the outwork of Pondichery—to resist the enemy. So
well, indeed, had his plans been carried out, that the
English were entirely unacquainted with the additions
that had been just made to its strength, and, like the ..
French at Cuddalore, they marched to its attack with a
■ careless confidence, that seemed to betoken a certainty on ‘
their part of easy victory. Law, who commanded the
garrison, allowed them to approach within forty yards of
the works without firing a shot. Then, however, he
opened upon them with grapeshot and musketry, making
great havoc in their ranks. The English, completely sur¬
prised, without scaling ladders, unable to advance and
unwilling to retreat, for a short time kept their ground.
But as the fire of the enemy continued they became sen¬
sible of the folly of a further continuance in such a posi¬
tion. They accordingly moved off, but not until they had
lost 150 of their number killed and wounded. This suc-

* Ilis fleet after the junction with 30 ships, of which 13 were ships of
the fleet of Admiral 'Griffin, who the line.—Orme.
himself left for England, consisted of
218 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap, cess greatly inspirited the French garrison, and restored

— _■—. to its soldiers the confidence which their several repulses
1748‘ at Cuddalore had taken from them. They had reason
now to hope that a persistent defence at Ariancopan
would contribute to save Pondichery. Impressed with
this view, they proceeded at once to throw up a battery
of heavy guns on the opposite side of the little river, to
the north of the fort, by means of which an advancing
enemy would be taken in flank and enfiladed. Upon this
the English, after one or two failures, erected a battery
covered by an intrenchment, to reply to and silence the
enemy’s fire, and manned it partly by sailors from the
fleet. Law, however, resolved to take advantage of the
enthusiasm which their recent success had excited amongst
his garrison, and moved out of the fort with 60 cavalry
and about 150 infantry, under cover of a fire from the
ramparts. Charging them at the head of his horse, he
threw, first the sailors, and immediately afterwards the
regular troops, into disorder, drove them from the in¬
trenchment, and took some prisoners, conspicuous amongst
whom was Major Lawrence, whose defence of Fort St.
David and Cuddalore had given him a reputation which
he was soon to raise to a far greater height.
Up to this point the French had great reason to con¬
gratulate themselves on the success which liac! attended
their defensive operations. They began even to entertain
the hope of keeping Ariancopan secure from the enemy.
But, at this crisis, one of those accidents from which no
army is absolutely secure occurred to dash their hopes.
A large store of gunpowder within the fort was suddenly
ignited and blew up. The effect was most disastrous.
Nearly a hundred men of the garrison were killed and
wounded, and, what was of greater importance, a convic¬
tion was produced in the mind of tlieir leader, that the
. place could no longer be successfully defended. They
accordingly blew up the walls and the cavaliers, and re¬
treated at once to Pondichery.
 PAEADIS KILLED IN A SORTIE. 219

Still, however, their success against the English had chap.

produced a great effect upon the garrison of that city. —-A--
Their confidence too was increased by observing the cau- 1748-
tion of the English. commander. Admiral Boscawen,
indeed, occupied Ariancopan on its evacuation by the
French, but, instead of moving at once upon Pondichery,
he remained five days to repair the fortifications of a
place which was useless to him, and which, in its dis¬
mantled state, could not be used to any purpose by the
enemy.
On the 6th September, however, Boscawen moved on
Pondichery, taking possession of a redoubt in the north¬
west angle of the prickly pear edge. But it was not until
the 10th that he opened ground, and then only at a dis¬
tance of 1,500 yards from the covered way. The next '
day 150 men having been detached to make a lodgment
about a hundred yards nearer, 1,200 men of the garri¬
son* under the command of Paradis made a sortie, attack¬
ing both trenches at once. But the fall of Paradis, who
was mortally wounded early in the sally, threw the party
into disorder, and it was repulsed with the loss of seven
officers and a hundred men. The death of Paradis, which
occurred within a few days of his wound, was the great¬
est misfortune that could have occurred to Dupleix at this
conjuncture. He was his most capable officer—the only
man upon whose combined prudence, knowledge, and
daring he could absolutely rely. In his memoirs he de¬
scribes him as ‘ a man of intelligence, well acquainted with
his profession, thoroughly familiar with the locality, and
with all the defects of the place. He had prepared all
manner of devices to offer opposition to the enemy, espe¬
cially in the weak points of the defences.’ The loss of
such a man was the greater, as there was no one within
the walls to supply his place. That is, rather, there would
have been no one, had not Dupleix himself showed that

* The French garrison consisted' of 1,800 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys._

Dupleix.
 TlIJi FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

great genius is capable of universal application, and that

even the arts of the warrior are not beyond its attainment.
Another, though a lesser, misfortune befell him at the
same time. True to the instructions -he had received in
England, Admiral Boscawen had not delayed to urge the
Nawab of the Carnatic to pronounce decidedly against
those French, whose destruction he announced to be cer¬
tain. The Admiral supported his requisition by presents
of considerable value. Dupleix had little to offer on his
part. Yet so great was the respect in which the French
name was held, so high the opinion entertained of the
great qualities of Dupleix, that, notwithstanding his appa¬
rently forlorn and helpless condition, the Nawab hesitated
long before he gave way to the entreaties of Boscawen.
It was only after the fall of Ariancopan, and when the
French were shut up within the walls of Pondichery, that
he agreed to the alliance pressed upon him, and promised
to assist the English with 2,000 horse. . He actually sent,
however, only 300 men, and those towards the conclusion
of the siege.
One consequence of the death of Paradis was that the
management of all the details of the defence devolved
upon Dupleix. To use his own modest expression, ‘ the
study of mathematics, and especially of fortification, which
his father had impressed upon him, became now of great
assistance to him; he was sufficiently fortunate to be able
to recollect the knowledge of this nature which he had
acquired, so that all his operations succeeded even beyond
his hopes.’* Fortunately for him, his efforts were se¬
conded by the inexperience of the English Admiral in
military operations, and the consequent neglect by him
of some of the first principles affecting the conduct of a
siege. But even this incapacity would not have interfered
with the ultimate success of the English, had the garrison
been permitted to give way to the despondency which
reigned among them, in consequence of the death of the
* Miliuoiro pour Dupleix.
 STRIKING QUALITIES OP DUPLEIX. 221

chief engineer. It was Dupleix who prevented this. It chap.

was Dupleix who, calm in danger, maintained an out- -Tp
ward serenity and confidence that became contagious;
who, by the attention he paid to all points of the defence,
by the skill with which he strengthened the -weak places,
and repaired those damaged by the enemy’s fire, speedily
transferred to his own person a belief in his capacity that
savoured almost of enthusiasm. It was, in a word, this
civilian Governor who became the life of the defence, the
hope of the defenders, the one principal cause of the ill
success of the besiegers.
From the 6th of September, the day on which Bos-
cawen moved on Pondichery, to the 17th October, forty-
two days of open trenches, the siege was pushed with all
the vigour of which the English leader was capable.
But his efforts were thwarted by the skill and gallantry
of Dupleix. Constant sorties, more or less successful,
always retarded and often effectually destroyed the ap¬
proaches of the besiegers. The English having, after •
much labour, advanced the trenches to within eight
hundred yards of the walls, it was found that owing to
the existence of a morass, it was impossible to carry them
further on that side, and it became necessary to raze the
batteries that had been erected. When at last a heavy
fire was opened on another part of the town, it was found
that owing to the skill and energy of Dupleix, the fire of
the besieged at that point was double that of the be¬
siegers. The ships of the fleet which were brought up,
as a last resource, to bombard the town, were compelled
to sheer off after receiving much more damage than they
had been able to inflict.* So energetic, so determined,
so successful was the defence, that the English Admiral
found, at the end of five weeks, that lie had actually
gained no ground at all; that he had lost some of his

* The author of the journal before from the town, and the heavy swell
referred to, innocently remarks that of the sea, shots never successively
‘ owing to the distance of the ships struck the same object,’
222 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap, best officers and very many men; that the enemy had
-—r—■ been able to concentrate on his several attacks a fire far
1748. more destructive than that which he had been able to
bring to bear on their defences. Added to this, the
periodical rains which began to fall at the end of Sep¬
tember had brought sickness into his camp, and had
warned him that the real difficulties of his position were
only about to begin. Under these circumstances, acting
under the advice of a council of war, he commenced on
the 14th October the destruction of the batteries, and
the re-embarkation of the sailors and heavy stores. Oil
the 17th, this vast army, the largest European force that
had till then appeared on Indian soil, and which counted
a Clive * amongst its ranks, broke up and retreated to
Port St. David, leaving behind it 1,065 men, who had
perished either from the fire of the enemy, or from sick¬
ness contracted during the siege.f
Thus had Dupleix, by his firmness, his skill, the won¬
derful activity of his genius, baffled that great enterprise
which was to bring destruction upon French India, to
root out the French establishments from the soil of Iiin-
dostan. If we take a retrospective glance at all that had
been accomplished during this first struggle in the Car¬
natic, we shall be utterly unable to refrain our tribute of
' admiration from the man who possessed the. brain to
conceive, the stedfastness to carry out, that long list of
daring achievements. The • capture of Madras, its pre¬
servation to the French, the determination to bear the
brunt of the contest with the Mogul, the glorious result

* The author of the journal writes istic endowments.’

as follows : ‘ The celebrated Lord t The loss of the French during
Clive, then an ensign, served in the the corresponding period amounted
trenches on this occasion, and by his to 200 Europeans and 50 natives,
gallant conduct gave the first prog- On their way to Fort St. David, the
nostic of that high military spirit, English wreaked a last vengeance on
which was the spring of his future the fort of Ariancopan, by utterly
actions, and the principal source of destroying what remained of its de-
the decisive intrepidity and elevation fences.—Onne, Dujik-ix.
of mind, which were his character-
 THE ENGLISH FORCED TO RETIRE. 223

that followed that determination, together with this chap-

crowning defence of Pondichery, were works of his con- -
ccption; to him too is mainly clue the merit of their
execution. Even at the greatest crisis of his fortunes he
found means to send efficient aid and support to the other
settlements dependent on Pondichery—a wonderful feat,
gratefully 'acknowledged as such by his masters*
If, on one occasion, owing to circumstances of which
we have no knowledge, he failed to take advantage of a
great opportunity that offered for the destruction of the
last establishment of the English on the Coromandel coast,
few .will deny that he made up for that one mistake by
the wonderful skill and energy, with which, as civil
governor, as commandant, as engineer, he conducted the
defence of Pondichery against a force that might well
have been regarded as irresistible. Truly may we echo
the language used on the occasion by the Directors of the
Company of the Indies, and declare that if all liis other
achievements merited the thanks of that France whose
interests he served so well, this crowning success placed

* ‘ All that you hare done up to nais; that it was your firmness, the
that time ought, in truth, to have wisdom of your measures, and the
made us tranquil regarding the fate choice of the brave officers you had
of Pondichery, and your last letters employed, which compelled the Mo¬
of the 28th August, -written at the guls to sue to you for peace; that
time that the English had commenced you would even have taken Fort St.
their attack upon your advanced David from the English but for the
posts, left us nothing to desire, either unexpected arrival of Admiral Grif¬
with reference to the precautions you fin ; and that, (finally, despite the
had taken, or to the courageous dis¬ difficulty of communications during
positions whieh you had inspired in the entire -war, you had found means
the garrison and in everybody. to provide for the substance and
Ought then our demonstrations of security of the settlements of Chan-
joy to be less, -when, on the 20th dernagore, Karical, and MahiS; what
of last month, a courier despatched praises do you not deserve now, when
by Monsieur Durand, our agent in by the glorious use of the succours
London, announced to the Court sent you by M. David’ (alluding to
this new triumph of the national M. Bouvet’s fleet) ‘you have repulsed
the most powerful efforts of your
‘If it has been already satisfactory enemies, and have preserved to the
for you, that the Company could Company all their establishments.’—
declare that the capture of‘Madras Letlre de la Compaanie des Indes, 11
was due to the succours which you Am-il, 1740.
had furnished to M. de la Bourdon-
224 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

chap. Hm on a pinnacle far beyond the reach of ordinary ap-

—-2—• plause.
1<48‘ We can well imagine—we who have traced Dupleix
up to this point of his career, who have noticed the man¬
ner in which he seized every occasion of exalting the
power of France in the eyes of the natives of India—how
eagerly and effectively lie used the opportunity offered by
the retreat of the English army to increase and magnify
its effects. Messengers were instantly despatched to Arcot,
to Hydrabad, even to Delhi, to acquaint the native poten¬
tates how the most formidable foreign army that had ever
landed in India had been shattered against the walls of
Pondichery. The answers to these communications showed
how thoroughly he had mastered the characters of those
whom he addressed. Letters of congratulation poured
upon him from all sides. He received the greatest com¬
pliments on his success. The English were regarded as
an inferior, almost an annihilated, power; and the one
result of this long-threatened attack was to invest Dupleix
with an influence and an authority, such as had up to that
time devolved upon no European leader on Indian soil.
The siege of Pondichery had been raised, as we stated,
on the 17 th October. The English had retired in a state
of deep dejection to Fort St. David, where for a time they
occupied themselves more with thinking of J;heir own
safety than of attacking the possessions of France. Du¬
pleix, on his side, made earnest preparations for the
renewal of offensive operations. He received early in the
1749. following year (1749) farther' supplies of men* and
money from M. Bouvet, who, despite the presence at Fort
St. David of the still numerous English fleet, gained the
Madras roadstead and landed the soldiers and specie with¬
out molestation. It was at this time, when Dupleix was
planning new enterprises against the English, that orders
from Europe reached both parties for a suspension of

' 200 in number.—Orm

 dupreix forced to. restore madras. 225

arms, pending the result of negotiations which had been cm

entered into at Aix-la-Chapelle. These were shortly •—A--
afterwards followed by an intimation of the conclusion of 1749,
the treaty which bears the name of that ancient city.
By one of the articles of this treaty a mutual restitution
of conquests was agreed upon between Trance and Eng¬
land,—a condition which necessitated the abandonment
by Dupleix of that Madras, gained by so much daring,
and guarded with so much jealousy and vigilance. Bit¬
ter. must have been the pang with which the Trench
Governor received the order to make a restitution which
lie knew well would be the first step towards providing
Ins hated rivals with a new foundation of greatly in¬
creased power; deeply must he have lamented the blind¬
ness of the Ministers, who, not possessing his vast coup
cl’ceil, could look upon Cape Breton as a sufficient com¬
pensation for a place which, if retained in 1749, would,
as We shall see hereafter, most certainly have given the
French an overwhelming superiority, leading to empire,
in Southern India. But Dupleix was there, not to remon¬
strate, but to obey. The orders he had received were
without appeal, and in obedience to them he, towards
the close of the month of August, made over Madras to
Admiral Boscawen. As if to add to his chagrin, he was
forced to .make it over, not in the state in which he had
gained it, but improved in every way,—with new and
fresh fortifications, the town cleared of obstructions, and
every thing in train to make it worthy of the fortune to
which he too confidently had destined it.
Thus, after a contest of five years, the two nations
found themselves, in outward appearance, in the position
in which they were at the outbreak of hostilities. Yet, if
apparently the same, in reality how different! The vin¬
dictive rivalry between both, exemplified in the capture
of Madras, the attempts upon Tort St. David and Pondi-
chery, had laid the foundation of an eternal enmity,_an
enmity which could only be extinguished by the destruc-
Q
226 THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

cihlp. tion of one or other of the adversaries. Then, again, the

'—V—- superiority evinced by the Europeans over the natives, in
1,49‘ the decisive battle at St. Thome, had given birth, espe¬
cially in the mind of the French leader, to an ambition
for empire which, if at first vague and indistinct, assumed
every day a more and more practical shape. Added to
this, the expense of keeping up the greatly increased
number of soldiers sent out from Europe pressed heavily
on the resources of both nations, and almost forced upon
them the necessity of hiring" out their troops to the rival
candidates for power in Southern India. Thus, during
five years which elapsed between 1745 and 1749 their
position had become revolutionised. No longer simple
traders, regarded as such only by the rulers of the Car¬
natic, they were then feared, especially the French, by
all the potentates in the neighbourhood, their alliance was
eagerly sought for, their assistance an object of anxious
entreaty. From vassals they had jumped almost to the
position of liege lords.
A new era, resulting from this war, dates thus from the
moment when the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle placed the
rival European powers in the position which they had
nominally occupied in 1745. By the East India Com¬
panies in Paris and London this change was not even sus¬
pected. They fondly believed that the new treaty would
enable their agents to recommence their mercantile ope¬
rations. They hoped that the reaction after five years’
hostilities would lead to a feeling of mutual confidence
and trust. Vain dream! The peace that reigned in Europe,
was it not then to extend to both nations in India ? Alas!
with ambition aroused, mutual jealousy excited, the
temptation of increased dominion knocking at their doors,
•what had they to do with peace P
 227

CHAPTER VI.

FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

The peace between the Powers 'of Europe which had chap.
been signed at Aix-la-Chapelle afforded, as we have
already stated, an opportunity for the introduction into 1719-
India of a system, afterwards carried to a very consider¬
able extent, whereby the European Powers, moved by
promises of material advantage, lent out their soldiers to
the native rulers. It is but right to add, that in almost
every case the temptation came from the natives, and it
should also be remembered that the treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle had been concluded at a time when an unusual
number of the troops of both nations had been thrown
on the Indian soil, and when therefore the employment
of, and provision for, these soldiers, caused no little
anxiety to the governors of the settlements. Dupleix
indeed, in a letter* which he wrote to the Company of
the Indies at the time, expressly justified his recourse to
such a lirgc of conduct by the necessity under which he
was to practise the strictest economy.
In this custom, however, the English set the example.
The account of the expulsion of Rajah Sahoojee from
Tanjore has been given in a previous chapter.f The
duplicity of that monarch, his double overthrow by his
own people, and his final expulsion in 1749, in favour
of Pertab Singh, will doubtless be recollected. It is
necessary to refer to it here, because it was this same

* Dated March 31, 1749. All the tached to the Mimoire pour Dupleiv.
letters quoted are to be found at f Chapter III.
length in the pieces jiistificaUaa» at-
228 EKENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap. Sahoojee, twice expelled from his kingdom, who, by his

._- promises and entreaties, induced the' English to lend
1749. themselves to the principle of supporting expelled and
wandering royalty—a principle which nearly ruined them
on this occasion, and which, more than ninety years after,
almost brought their empire to destruction in the snows
of Afghanistan.* Eleven years had elapsed since Sa-
hoojee had been expelled, and during that time Tanjore
had enjoyed a quiet and a prosperity to which, under his
rule, it had been a stranger; yet the desire of governing,
so strongly planted in the Asiatic breast, would not allow
the dethroned monarch to be tranquil. Although his
experience of the attraction of a crown had been such as
would have been sufficient to deter a naan of ordinary
sense from again striving for the dangerous prize, although
on one occasion he had barely escaped from his enemies’
hands, and on the other had been seized by them in the
midst of his own guards, to the imminent danger of his
life, he never ceased to sigh for his departed grandeur.
To attain that state of sensual existence which had once
been his, lie was ready not only to stake his life, but to
consent to the dismemberment of his country.
When, therefore, the news of the meeting of the
European plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle caused a
suspension of arms in India, Sahoojee, who had been
struck with the great superiority evinced in the field by
the European over the Asiatic soldiers, resolved to en¬
deavour to enlist on his behalf the aid of some of those
redoubtable warriors. It was, however, he well knew,
useless for him to appeal to the French. Hot only had

* It is uracil to be regretted tliat cret intriguers in England. By an

tbo principle yet lives and flourishes, expenditure of money, often as great
although it is carried-out in a dif- as that which in former days they
ferent manner. In the present day would have lavished on their armies,
the spendthrift "Rajahs and Nawabs, they obtain the aid of all who are
whose own vices have caused their venal. The extent to which this
expulsion from the thrones they had system is carried on is scarcely cre-
soiled, appeal, not to the Governor- dible.
General of British India, but to se-
 THE ENGLISH KEXEW HOSTILITIES. . , 229

lie deceived them in 1738, but they had since lived upon chap.
good terms with • his successor Pertab Singh. His only -—^—-
chance was with the English, and to them, therefore, he 1749' •
made his demand.
He was extremely liberal in his offers. The payment
of all the expenses of the war, and the cession of Devi-
cotta, a town at the mouth of the Coleroon, one hundred
and twenty-two miles south of Madras, with the territory
attaching to it, formed a tempting bait to a people pos¬
sessing a surplus of soldiers, and just resting after a war
which had severely tried their resources. At. any rate it
was eagerly grasped at, and in the beginning of April,
1749, a force of 430 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, under
the command of Captain Cope, was despatched to re¬
establish ex-Raj ah Sahoojee on his ancestral throne.
In a history relating mainly to the transactions of the
French in India, it will be necessary to follow the move¬
ments of the English only in those instances in which an
effect was thereby produced on the policy of their rivals.
We do not propose, therefore, to enter into the details
of this expedition against Tanjore. The results will be
found chronicled hereafter. It is essential, however, that
we should allude prominently to the fact of the enter¬
prise, in order to make it clear that in the course which
Dupleix .adopted at this period, he but followed an
example which the English had set him. The main
difference between his proceedings and theirs was this,—
that whereas in all his undertakings he had a settled
purpose and design,—his smallest actions tending to one
mighty end,—the English had, for long, no great prin¬
ciple of action, and it was only after a time that they
instinctively adopted the policy of offering, ou all occa¬
sions, a steady opposition to French aggression.
In a previous chapter* we have recorded the fate
which befell Chunda Sahib in his endeavours to defend

* Chapter III.
230 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap. Trichinopoly against the army of Baghojee Bhousla.

——- Taken prisoner by that general, lie had been sent off
1749. (1741) under a guard to Sattara, and there kept for seven
years in confinement. , Vainly had he exerted his utmost
endeavours to effect his release. Although in that period
the Moguls had re-occupied Trichinopoly, although the
Nawabship of the Carnatic had passed from the family of
Dost Ali, to which he was related, to a stranger, he was
kept rigorously a prisoner. Not indeed that the Mali-
rattas had any state object in view in thus keeping him
from his native province; it was simply a question of
ransom. Chunda Sahib was comparatively poor. Allied
only by marriage with the house of Dost Ah, he had not
exercised, independent authority for a sufficiently long
time to amass any very considerable wealth. The jewels
which constituted the greater- part of it were with his
wife and family in Pondicliery. The remainder had been
taken- when lie lost Trichinopoly. For a long time, how¬
ever, the Mahrattas insisted upon the payment of a
kingly ransom as an essential condition of his release,
and all. this time Chunda Sahib, unable to pay it, saw
opportunities vanish, kingdoms pass into other hands,
and he felt too that every year added to that forgetful¬
ness of himself, which is the unvarying consequence of
the absence of a leader from the scene of action.
At last, however, fortune seemed to unbend. In the
month of April, 1748, Mahomed Shah, Emperor of Delhi,
died. His eldest son, Ahmed Shah, succeeded him, but
the first months of his accession were too much engaged
in preparations to maintain himself against his namesake,
the Abdalli, and other enemies, to allow him to turn his
attention to the events that were occurring in the remote
Dekkan. It was, however, just at this moment that the
attention of the feudal lord of the empire was particu¬
larly required in those parts. A few months after the
' death of Mahomed Shah (June, 1748), JSfizam-ool-Moolk,
Viceroy of the Dekkan, followed him to the grave at the
 NAZIR JUNG SEIZES THE DEKKAN. 231

ripe age of seventy-seven years * The succession had chap.

become, through the weakness of the central authority, .——-
by custom rather than by consent, hereditary in the 1749,
family. Now Nizam-ool-Moolk had left five sons. The
eldest, Ghazee-oodeen Khan, was, however, high in the
imperial service, and preferred pushing his fortunes at
Delhi to striking for an inheritance which he felt could
only be gained by the sword. The second son, Nazir
Jung, had been engaged in constant rebellion against his
hither, but he was with him, having been recently released
from' captivity, when he died. The other three sons
were looked upon as men of little mark, content to live
a life of ease and pleasure at the court of Aurangabad.
Besides these sons, there was a grandson, Mozuffer Jung,
the son of a daughter, who had been always indicated by
his grandfather as his successor. The consent of Ma¬
homed Shah to this arrangement had been previously
obtained, and on the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, a firman
was issued by the Court of Delhi nominating Mozuffer
Jung viceroy in his place.
When that event occurred, however, Mozuffer Jung,
the legitimate successor, was at his government at Bija-
pore, whilst the lately rebellious son, Nazir Jung, was on
tire spot. This latter at once acted in accordance with
the customs which had obtained from time immemorial
under the Mahomedan sway in Hindostan. • He seized
his father’s treasures, bought over the leading men and
the army, and proclaimed himself Subadar of the Dekkan.
The claims of Mozuffer Jung he derided, and set his
person at open defiance.
Mozuffer Jung, however, was not inclined to give up
his pretensions without a struggle, though for the moment
he did not possess the means to support them. In this'
crisis he bethought him of the Hahrattas, the hereditary
enemies of Mahomedan authority, and he decided to go
* So says Elphinstone and other ters however indicate 104 years as
trustworthy authorities. Some wri- his age at the ueriod of his demise.
232 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, in person to Sattara to demand their assistance. At

—ZJ:— Sattara he met Chunda Sahib, of whose great reputation
1749. he was fully cognisant. The two men felt at once that
they could be mutually serviceable to one another. They
therefore soon came to an understanding. They agreed
to endeavour to obtain material aid from the Mahrattas,
insisting also on the unconditional release of Chunda
Sahib.
A negotiation was accordingly opened. But whilst it
was in progress, and seemed to promise well, Chunda
Sahib, who had little real wish to conquer the Carnatic
by the aid of his old enemies, communicated full details
of their plans to Dupleix, with whom he had maintained,
through his wife, a constant correspondence. Threatened
at the time by the English, Dupleix had no desire to add
to the existing complications by bringing on the province
a Mahratta invasion. The prospect, however, of placing
on the viceregal throne of the Dekkan one who would
thus be a protege of his own, and over the province of
the Carnatic a man so devoted to French interests as he
knew Chunda Sahib to be, was too alluring to be resisted.
Pondering in his mind how this could be effected, the
thought struck him that it needed only a daring and
decided policy of his own to bring about such a result.
He at once embraced the project with all the ardour
of his impassioned nature; wrote to Chunda Sahib to
negotiate only for his release, and not for troops; en¬
gaged to the Court of Poona to guarantee the ransom that
might be agreed upon; and promised to both Mozuffer
Jung and Chunda Sahib all the influence and po-wer
which he, as ruler of French India, was capable of exert¬
ing. iTis despatch had the desired effect. On receiving
a guarantee from Dupleix for the payment of 700,000
rupees, Chunda Sahib was released and furnished with
a bodyguard of 3,000 men to escort him to his own
country.
One of the first acts of Chunda Sahib after his release
 THE FBEUrCH ASSIST CHUNDA SAHIB. 238

was to enter into an engagement with Eupleix, whereby chap.

he took upon himself the payment of about 2,000 natives, •—.—
drilled in the European fashion, belonging to the Pon- 1749-
dichery garrison. In consideration likewise of being
assisted by 400 Europeans, he agreed to make to the
French the cession of a small tract of land in the imme¬
diate neighbourhood of Pondichery. Whilst arrange¬
ments were in progress for these troops to join him, he
had succeeded in making his way, after some changes of
fortune, to the frontiers of the Carnatic, and in augment¬
ing his force to 6,000 men. Here he was joined by
Mozuffer Jung at the head of 30,000. Chunda Sahib,
who was by far the abler character of the two, resolved,
so soon as he should be joined by his French auxiliaries,
to march upon Arcot. A victory here would place the
resources of the Carnatic at his disposal, and bring him
into close association with the French. He could then
make it, with every prospect of success, the basis from
which to operate against FTazir Jung.
Towards the end of July the French force already in¬
dicated, under the command of M. d Auteuil, and accom¬
panied by the son of Chunda Sahib, joined the latter at
the Damalchery Pass, which he had taken care to secure.
Here they received information that Anwaroodeen and
his two .sons, at the head of 20,000 picked troops, in¬
cluding among them 60 European adventurers, had taken
post at Amboor, about thirty miles to the south, pre¬
pared to give them battle. Thither accordingly they
marched. The position taken up at Amboor was ex¬
tremely strong, being defended on one flank by a
mountain surmounted by a castle, and on tire other by
a large lake. The ground between these, constituting
naturally a very strong pass into the Carnatic, had been
further fortified by intrenchments. These were defended
by guns served by the Europeans to whom we have
alluded. Behind these was the main army of the Uawab.
It was on the morning of August 3 that the combined -
234 FBENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, army of Chunda Saliib and M. d’Auteuil came in sight of

._XX_• this position. It was at once resolved to storm it, and
1749. d’Auteuil offered to lead the attack with his French.
Such an offer was gladly accepted, and at the head of
• his gallant countrymen, d’Auteuil advanced boldly to the
attack. The Nawab’s guns, however, were so well served
by the Europeans in his service, that the assailants fell
back with some loss. Indignant at this, d’Auteuil rallied
them, and led them himself, notwithstanding a heavy fire,
up to the foot of the intrenchment. The breastwork was
even mounted by some of them, but in the crisis of the
attack, M. d’Auteuil was-wounded in the thigh, and, in
the confusion that followed, his men lost order and re¬
treated. The command then devolved upon M-. de Bussy,
and the troops, encouraged by him and the other officers,
eagerly called to be led on for the third time. This
determination on their part disheartened the defenders,
inany of whom had already fallen. Even had they stood
more firm, however, they could scarcely have resisted,
the impetuosity of the charge. Led on by the gallant
Bussy, the French reserved their fire till close to the in-
trenchinents ; then delivering a volley, they dashed over
the breastwork, and the day was their own. Having lost
this defence, the native portion of Amvaroodeen’s army
made but little resistance. Followed by the troops of
Chunda Sahib and by that leader in person, the French
pushed on. It was in vain that Anwaroodeen, himself
! 107 years old, made the most gallant efforts to restore
the fight. In the very act of singling out Chunda Sahib
for a hand to hand encounter, he was shot through the
heart by an African soldier. A general' disorder fol¬
lowed; the defeat became a rout; Maphuz Khan sur-
. rendered himself a prisoner, and the second son, Mahomed
All, saved himself by an early flight. The camp, the
baggage, sixty elephants, many horses, and all the
artillery fell into the hands of the victors. But their
greatest prize was the province of the Carnatic, secured
 TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES. 285

to them by this victory. Of this they obtained an im- chap.

mediate gage in Arcot, the capital, which they occupied -—J—
the next day. In this battle the French lost 12 men 1749-
killed and 63 wounded. About 300 of their sepoys were
killed and wounded*
The earliest act of Mozuffer Jung on his arrival at
Arcot was to proclaim himself Subadar or Viceroy of the
Dekkan, and to nominate Chunda Sahib Nawab of the
Carnatic.f Having secured the surrounding country by
means of flying parties, the two governors proceeded to
Pondichery, Mozuffer Jung to acknowledge the aid he
had received, Chunda Sahib to pour out his thanks for
the protection, which, for so many years, and under such
trying circumstances, tiie French governor had afforded
to his family. They were received with the greatest
pomp and ceremony. No one knew better than Hupleix
the effect of display upon the Oriental mind. He took
care, however, that accompanying the glitter of outward
show there should be a simultaneous exhibition of that
material power which, more than any other, is in Asia
capable of insuring respect. The defences which had
defied the English were dressed out for the occasion; the
European troops, whose superiority had been proved at
St. Thome and Amboor, wmre conspicuously drawn up, the
ships in the harbour displayed their brightest flags. No
artifice was omitted in fact to impress upon the minds of
his guests, that the pomp and ceremony of their reception
were but the natural consequence of a wealth and in¬
fluence based upon a power that nothing in the south of
India could resist. The effect was all that he could wish.
Mozuffer Jung was captivated by the display; the gra¬
titude of Chunda Sahib was unbounded. In the first

* Chunda Sahib presented the Chunda Sahib on his elevation and

French troops after the battle -with to acknowledge him as Nawab, was
75,000 rupees, and M. d’Auteuil -with the Governor of Fort St. David,
laud worth 4,000 rupees per annum. Mr. Floyer.—rMemoire pour Dupbis,
—Dupleix.
t One of the first to congratulate
236 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, moments of Ms delight he conferred upon Dupleix the

_- sovereignty of eighty-one villages, adjoining the ground
1749. 0f wbich Pondicliery was the representative capital.
MozufFer Jung stayed eight days at Pondicliery. His army,
amounting to from 45,000 to 50,000 men, remained en¬
camped meanwhile within twenty miles of the city.*
But amid all the festivities that followed the arrival of
these two Nawabs, Dupleix did not lose sight of the
main object which had brought them into the field. We
have already state that though MozufFer Jung held the
higher rank, Chunda Sahib was of the two by far the
abler man. When then MozufFer Jung, at the expiration
of eight days, rejoined his camp, twenty miles from
Pondicliery, Dupleix retained Chunda Sahib to settle the
plan of the campaign. It was true that the possession of
the Carnatic seemed to have been decided by the battle
of Amboor. The old Nawab had been killed, his eldest
son taken prisoner, and the younger, Mahomed Ali, had
- sought refuge in flight. Yet so long as there remained a
pretender to the dignity, Chunda Sahib could not con¬
sider himself firm in his seat. It is beyond question that
he had, both by hereditary descent and by imperial
nomination, a greater right to the office than any of the
family of Anwaroodeen. He was, in the first jilace, the
representative of the family of Dost Ali, and, in the
second, he had been nominated by MozufFer Jung, whose
title to succeed Nizam-ool-Moolk as Viceroy of the Dekkan
had been confirmed by a firman from the Court of Delhi.f
But in the distracted state of the Mogul empire, no right
could be considered secure that was not based upon a
possession that could be maintained. Nor, at the same

* Extrait tie la Lettre de M. Du- It is upon these worts and upon the
?leix a la Compagnie, le 28 juillet correspondence and official documents
749; Copie d’un Extrait du Edgi- contained in them that the state¬
stre des Ddlilierations du Conseil Su- ments in this chapter are based,
perieur de Pondiehdry, 13 juillet k + Dupleix, p. 43. Seer Mutak-,.
1749; Hemoire pour Dupleix; Orme,
Cambridge, Ihiymond, and others.
 DESIGNS OP CHUNDA SAHIB. 237

time, could any possession be regarded as perfectly tenable, chap.

to which any pretender was in the field waiting for an •-■-—
opportunity to assert his claims. Dupleix, well aware of 1749-
this, did not cease to press upon Chunda Sahib the abso¬
lute necessity of insuring the submission of Mahomed Ali,
before he resigned himself to the more peaceful cares of
his government. Rapidity in his movements was, he
pointed out, the more requisite, as Mahomed Ali had
taken refuge in Trichiuopoly, the fortifications of which
had been greatly strengthened since Chunda Sahib had
been compelled to surrender it to Raghojee Bhousla. He
added the information that Nazir Jung, the pretender to
the viceroyship of the Deklcan, was engaged in levying an
army wherewith to crush his nephew and rival, and that
it was, therefore, more especially necessary to clear the
Carnatic and its dependencies of all foes, before this
greater enemy should be ready to march upon it. The
■exhortations of Dupleix to Chunda Sahib to march with¬
out any delay upon Trichinopoly were earnest and
repeated.
One circumstance, however, served to hinder the native
chieftains from moving. The battle of Amboor had been
fought on August 3; Madras, in pursuance of the ar¬
ticles of the treaty of Aix-la-Chnpelle, had been made over
to the English at the end of the same month, but still
Admiral Boscawen remained on the coast. More than
that, he had taken advantage of the disordered state of
a (lairs to possess himself of the little settlement of St.
Thome, upon which lie had hoisted the English flag. It
was known too that lie was’himself strongly impressed
with the necessity of remaining to support English in¬
terests, and that lie had declared he would remain, if he
were publicly requested to do so.* It appeared then to
Chunda Sahib, that for him to move on Trichinopoly,
whilst Admiral Boscawen was still on the coast, would
288 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, act as a final inducement to that officer to remain, and

—^—■ -would impel the English to cast in their lot, whilst their
1749. forces were yet considerable, with his rival, Mahomed
Ali. He, therefore, hesitated as to his action, preferring
to wait at all events in the hope that the October gales
might compel the departure of so dangerous an enemy.
Whilst he and his allies are thus watching their oppor¬
tunity, it may be convenient for us to turn to the move¬
ments of the English, and to relate as briefly as may be
the result of their expedition against Tanjore.
This expedition had been undertaken, as we have
already stated, with the avowed object of re-seating upon
the throne of that kingdom the twice expelled Kajah
Sahoojee—with the real purpose of gaining for themselves
the possession of Devicotta. Consisting of 430 Europeans
and 1,000 sepoys, under the command of Captain Cope,
this force had left Fort St. David in the early part of
April, and, on the 24th, arrived on the bank of the river
Vellaur, near Portonovo. On the following morning a
terrific storm ensued, which caused great damage to the
land forces, and greater to the fleet. Of the former, many
of the carriage-cattle, and a large proportion of the
military stores were destroyed; of the latter, the Admiral’s
flagship, the ‘Namur,’ of 74 guns, the ‘Pembroke,’ of
60 guns, and the ‘ Apollo,’ hospital ship, with the greater
part of their crews, were totally lost.* It thus became
necessary to suspend for a time the progress of the
undertaking.
When, however, after having made good his losses,
Captain Cope renewed his march and arrived on the
borders of the Tanjore territory, he found the actual state
of things to differ very much from the representations
that had been made him. Not only was there no dispo¬
sition evinced by the Tanjoreans to strike a blow for
Sahoojee, but their army was found posted on the southern

* Journal of an officer present at tlie siege of Pondicliery.

 THE ENGLISH MOVE ON DEVICOTTA. 239

bank of the Coleroon, ready apparently to oppose the chap.

passage of the English. They had entertained, however, -——-
no intention of fighting; they hoped rather to entice 1749-
Captain Cope into the difficult country to the south, where
his destruction would have been certain. But the direc¬
tion taken by the English after the passage of the river,
showed very plainly the real object they had in view in
espousing the cause of Sahoojee. Their army marched
in the direction, not of Tanjore, but of Devicotta, where
they expected to find support from the fleet. But on
their arrival that same evening within a mile of Devicotta
not a ship was to be seen. Having with them no supplies,
and finding the place too strong to be escaladed, they
resolved, after cannonading it fruitlessly during the night,
to retreat. This they effected without serious molestation,
and on the second day reached Port St. David. Had the
real object of the English been that which they professed
—the restoration of the ex-Raj ah Sahoojee—they had
seen enough to be convinced that to effect this they must
be prepared to employ all the resources of their Pre¬
sidency in a war with a native power. They no longer
however even pretended to have this in view. But
Sahoojee had promised them Devicotta,* and the advan¬
tages presented by that place were too great to be lightly
given up.* Whether they received it from Sahoojee or
Pertab Singh was to them immaterial. They were re¬
solved to possess it at any price, and with this avowed
object, throwing over Sahoojee, they despatched by sea
a second expedition, consisting of 800 Europeans and
1,500 sepoys under the command of Major Lawrence.
Without entering into the details of this expedition, it
will suffice to state that it was successful. Devicotta,
after a gallant resistance, was stormed, and Pertab Singh,

* The river Coleroon, which runs difficulty was presented by the sands,
into the sea near Devicotta, was he- but it was thought that these, with
lieved to be capable of receiving ships a little labour and expense, might be
of the largest tonnage. The only removed.—Ormo.
240 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, to avert further hostilities, and anxious now to secure

—^—• the alliance of the English against Chunda Sahib, whom
1749. ]ie regarded as the most dangerous enemy of the Tanjore
kingdom, agreed to cede that fortress, together with so
much of the surrounding territory as should produce an
annual revenue of 86,000 rupees. The English, on their
part, promised to abandon the cause of Sahoojee, and even
to keep him under surveillance at Madras, on condition of
his receiving a life pension of 4,000 rupees. Such was the
result to him of his alliance with a European power.
The English were occupied with their new conquest,
when they learned the success of Chunda Sahib at
Amboor, They hastened to acknowledge him at Arcot.
Nevertheless, noticing his subsequent visit to Pondichery,
his protracted stay there, and the intimacy which he
vaunted with Dupleix, they were not deaf to the solicita¬
tions—poor as they considered his chances of success—
of Mahomed Ali., They waited, however, the further
proceedings of Chunda Sahib before committing them¬
selves to any definite action. When, moreover, they saw
that that chieftain remained idle at Pondichery, making
no movement against his rival, they hesitated still more
as to the course they should follow. Admiral Boscawen,
on his part, was eager to support Mahomed Ali, and even
offered to stay on the coast, if he were officially j-equested
to do so. But the Governor, Mr. Eloyer, shrank from a
line of policy which seemed to commit the Presidency to
the support of a pretender in extremis. He therefore
suffered the Admiral to depart on November 1, taking
from him only 300 men as an addition to his garrison.
The departure of Admiral Boscawen constituted the
opportunity for which Chunda Sahib had been so long
watching. All his preparations had been made. Dupleix,
with that rare disinterestedness and care for the resources
of the colony which so eminently characterised him, had
advanced to this chief 100,000 rupees from his own funds,
, and had induced other individuals to contribute 200,000
 THE VIEWS OF DUl’LEIX. 241

rupees in addition* He also supplied Mm with 800 chap.

European troops, 300 Africans, and a train of artillery, •—A_-
from the support of which Pondichery was thus freed, 1749-
whilst the troops remained at the disposal of Dupleix.
They were now with Chunda Sahib under the immediate
command of M. Duquesne. On the very day after the 1
departure of the English fleet, this united army marched
upon Tricliinopoly. There, as Dupleix pointed out to
the leaders, they would find the end of all opposition.
The only man who had the shadow of a claim to oppose
to the pretensions of Chunda Sahib was in that fortress.
To take it therefore was to destroy the last stronghold of
the enemy, and with it the only chieftain capable of
offering any opposition.
It is indeed clear to us now, as it was clear to Dupleix
at the time, that upon the capture of tins place depended
the permanent preponderance of French influence in
Southern India. Had that been accomplished, there
could have been no possible rival to Chunda Sahib, the
English would have had no. excuse to refuse to acknow¬
ledge his supremacy. In fact that supremacy would have
been so firmly rooted, so strongly established, that they
would not have dared - to dispute it; they would, in a
word, have been forced to recognise the sway on the
Coromandel coast of a governor who, by inclination,
gratitude, interest, was bound irrevocably to the French.
Such indeed was the policy of Dupleix. To carry it
out he had brought every resource to bear on his native
allies. He had given them money, men, guns, and
officers, and they, on their part, had left Pondichery,
under an engagement to pursue the cburse of action he
had pressed upon them, as alike best suited to his interests
and theirs, viz. to march direct upon Tricliinopoly.
Yet this occasion afforded another instance of the use¬
lessness even of great genius, when the tools which
* These advances "were secured on lands •which were temporarily made
over to the French.—Dupleix,
242 FfiEUCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, genius is compelled to employ are weak and vacillating.

—J—• Surely Dupleix had a right to believe that his native
1749. allies, having been equipped and supplied by him, and
having started on an expedition they had promised to
carry out, would at least march to their destination.
Once there, he relied on his own commander, Duquesne,
to do the rest. His mortification then can be imagined
when he learned that, after crossing the Ooleroon, they
had diverged from ’the road to Trichinopoly and had
taken that to Tanjore.
The fact was that, during their stay at Pondichery,
Ckunda Sahib and Mozuffer Jung had exhausted on their
own pleasures the money Dupleix had intended for
the expenses of the army, and they found themselves,
after crossing the Ooleroon, in an enemy’s country with an
empty treasure chest. In this emergency Ckunda Sahib
bethought him of the Bajah of Tanjore—a prince whose
riches were proverbial, and whose arrears of tribute to
the Mogul, Mozuffer Jung, as Subadar of the Dekkan,
considered himself entitled to receive. In the hope of
compelling this monarch to pay such a sum as would
place them at ease regarding their expenditure, and in
the belief that with the aid of their French allies the task
would be easy of execution and short in its time of dura¬
tion, they, without even consulting Dupleix, turned aside
from the road leading to Trichinopoly, and tobk that to
Tanjore.
This city, situated in the delta of the Ooleroon and the
Cauveri, was defended by two forts, the greater and the
lesser. The former was surrounded by a high wall and
a ditch, but the fortifications were too inconsiderable to
resist the attack of a vigorous enemy. The lesser fort, a
mile in circumference, was far stronger, being surrounded
by a lofty stone wall, a ditch excavated from the solid
rock, and a glacis. Within this was a pagoda surpassing
in magnificence all the buildings of Southern India, and
believed to contain countless riches. The allied army
 THE TAXJOREAJT OUTWITS CHUNDA SAHIB. 243

arrived before this place on November 7, and at once chap.

summoned it to surrender. The Eajah, Pertab Singh,
with a view to gain time, expressed at once his willing-
ness to negotiate, whilst he sent pressing messages to the
English and to Nazir Jung, demanding assistance. The
English, who had already despatched 120 men to aid
Mahomed Ali at Trichinopoly, ordered twenty of these to
proceed to Tanjore. How Nazir Jung responded to the
summons we shall see further on. On receiving the reply
of the Tanjorean, Duquesne, the commandant of the
Prench contingent, acting upon instructions received from
Dupleix, urged upon Chunda Sahib not to waste his time
in vain negotiations, but to compel compliance with his
requisitions by force. This was undoubtedly the direct
and proper course to pursue. But Qhunda Sahib, who
wanted only the money, and who believed the Eajah was
in earnest about paying it, earnestly requested Duquesne
to abstain from all appearance of hostilities so long as
negotiations should be going on. In Pertab Singh, how¬
ever, he met a man more wily and cunning than himself.
For six weeks he suffered himself to be duped by pro¬
testations and promises, fruitless though they were of any
result. Hi vain did Dupleix press upon him the superior
advantage of Trichinopoly; to no purpose did he point
out to him-that he was giving time to Mahomed Ali to
strengthen his position, and to Nazir Jung to march upon
his communications. Chunda Sahib was infatuated with
his negotiation. To such an extent did he carry this
feeling, that Dupleix, seeing the gathering storm, and
apprehending not only the failure of his hopes, but danger
to French interests, sent positive orders to Duquesne to
break off the negotiation by an attack upon Tanjore.
Duquesne obeyed; and his vigorous measures had a
decisive effect. On December 26, he captured three
redoubts about 600 yards from the walls; three days
later, after some fruitless negotiations, he assaulted and
carried one of the gates of the town. This so intimidated
244 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITII.

chap, the Rajah, that he at'once gave in, and on the 31st signed
—A— ■ a treaty whereby, amongst other stipulations, he agreed
17^9- to pay to Mozuffer Jung and Cliunda Sahib 7,000,000
of rupees; to remit from the French East India Company
the annual ground rent of 7,000 rupees, which it paid
him; to add to the French possessions at Karical territory
comprising eighty-one villages; and to pay down to the
French troops 200,000 rupees. But, meanwhile, Nazir
Jung had succeeded in collecting an enormous army, and
was on his march to crush his nephew and rival. In¬
telligence of this had already been conveyed by the
English to the Rajah of Tanjore, and this monarch had
recourse to all the arts of which he was master to lengthen
out the term of payment. By sending out, in satisfaction
of the sum he had agreed to pay, sometimes plate, some¬
times obsolete coin, sometimes jewels and precious stones,
he detained Chunda Sahib for some weeks longer under
his walls, and it was not until a pressing message from
Dupleix informed him that Nazir Jung had entered the
Carnatic, that this chieftain renounced the hope of
obtaining, even by those instalments, the promised ran¬
som. Even then Dupleix recommended vigorous measures.
He urged him to seize Tanjore at once, both as a means
of punishing the faithless Rajah, and of providing himself
with a place of refuge. Chunda Sahib was willing enough
to act upon this advice, but his troops refused to follow
him. They too had heard the rumours of the approach
. of the vast army under Nazir Jung, and, panic-stricken
at the report of its numbers, they broke up without orders,
and fell back rapidly on Pondichery.
Thus, by the weakness of the instruments he was com¬
pelled to use, were the great plans of Dupleix temporarily
shattered. Nay more, the very men who had caused
their defeat, and who by their want of energy had plunged
themselves as well as him into misfortune, now came to
beg him to extricate them from their difficulties. He
made the attempt, not indeed with any great confidence
 THE ALLIES BAFFLED. 245

in his allies—for the past three months had shown him chap.
their weakness—but yet with a steadfastness, an energy, ■—A—
an adaptation of means to the end, such as even at this 1750-
distant day must challenge and command our admiration.
He did not, as we shall see, succeed in the outset, but his
patience, his perseverance, his energy, could not be long
working without producing some advantageous result.
Before however noticing the manner ■ in which he acted,
we propose to take a comprehensive glance- at the
situation. , vl,■
The army of MozufFer Jung and Mehamed-Adi, 40,000
strong, panic-stricken from the rumours of the vast force
of Nazir Jung, and mutinous from want of pay, was under
the walls of Pondichery. With it had come the French
detachment of 800 men, now commanded by M. Groupil,
its former leader, Duquesne, having died of fever at Tan-
jore. On the other side, the enormous army of Nazir
Jung, consisting of 300,000 men, of whom one-half were
cavalry, together with 800 pieces of cannon and 1,300
elephants, was marching on them from Arcot. On its
way it was joined by Morari Kao at the head of 10,000
Mahratta horse, fresh from a skirmish with the allied
army at Chillumbrum; whilst on reaching Valdaur, fifteen
miles from Pondichery, Mahomed Ali, the pseudo-Nawab
of the Cayiiatic, brought 6,000 horse into the camp of
Nazir Jung, and, what was of far greater consequence, he
was strengthened a few days later—April 2—by the junc¬
tion of 600 Europeans under Major Lawrence. The
English, in fact, had resolved to take advantage of the
check received by the proteges of the French at Tanjore,
by using all their influence to support the rivals and oppo¬
nents of those chieftains.
Against such a force what was Dupleix to do ? There
was but one course, which even to conceive, it was neces¬
sary that a man should have been born with a profound
and daring intellect. Successfully to encounter this force
it was absolutely necessary that the opposing army, how-
24.6 FRENCH INDIA AT .ITS ZENITH. .

char, ever disproportionate in numbers and deficient in mate-

-—t——■ rial, should oppose to it a bold and resolute front. Yet
1750. how to infuse the necessary courage into the panic-stricken
and mutinous soldiers of his two allies? This was a
problem which seemed hard to solve. Dupleix never¬
theless attempted it. First of all, he stopped their muti¬
nous spirit. This he effected by advancing from his own
funds a sufficient sum to pay up their arrears. Their
courage lie endeavoured to reanimate by showing that he
was not afraid to support them by the entire available
garrison of Pondichery. Goupil, who had succeeded to
Duquesne, having himself fallen ill, Dupleix placed at the
head of the contingent M. d’Auteuil, who had recovered
from the wounds he had received at Amboor, and in¬
creased its strength to 2,000 men. The force, encouraged
and strengthened by these means, moved in a north-west¬
erly direction from Pondichery, and took up at the end
of March a strong position opposite the enemy’s camp at
Yaldam'. At the same time Dupleix did not neglect those
means which he had often used so successfully, of endea¬
vouring by intrigues and secret communications to work
upon the mind of Nazir Jung in favour of French interests.
He was on the point of succeeding, when unexpected
events, impossible to have been guarded against, neutral¬
ised the effect of these negotiations, and brought down
the fabric of his vast plans.
It happened, unfortunately for Dupleix, that a very bad
feeling prevailed at this moment amongst the officers of
his army. The sum of money received at Tanjore had
been -divided amongst those troops only who had partici¬
pated in that service. Many of these had received leave
of absence, and those who took their place, as well as
those who joined with the fresh troops, grumbled most
unreasonably at having been assigned a duty which would
expose them to great risks without the chance of prize-
money. For the moment Dupleix was powerless to
punish the malcontents, so few were the officers at his dis-
 MUTEST OP THE FRENCH OFFICERS. 247

posal. He trusted, however, to their military honour to chap.

behave as soldiers and Frenchmen in the presence of an .—ZJ;—
enemy. But in this hope he was disappointed. On the 1750.
very evening of the day in which the two armies had for
the first time exchanged a cannonade from their respec¬
tive positions—April 3—thirteen officers of the French
army went in a body to M. d’Auteuil, resigned their com¬
missions, and refused to serve. This was not the least of
the evil. Hot content with refusing to fight themselves,
these officers had done their best to induce the soldiers
they commanded to follow their example. By a baseness
happily unparalleled they had succeeded in sowing
amongst the soldiers the seeds of disaffection and distrust.
Even the sepoys in the pay of France could not see un-
, moved the sudden withdrawal of those they had been ac¬
customed to regard as their leaders. ■ Doubt and hesita¬
tion pervaded their ranks, and d’Auteuil suddenly found;
on the eve of a battle, which, if it were unfavourable to
him, would be ruinous to French interests, that he com¬
manded an army which was utterly demoralised, which
could not be relied upon to face the enemy.
Few men have ever found themselves in circumstances
more difficult, more requiring quick and prompt decision.
To stay where he was, to meet with his demoralised force,
and the hative levies of his two allies, the vastly superior
numbers of Nazir Jung, the Mahrattas, and the English,
wras to court -destruction for all. His men would not fight,
and their retreat would have drawn with it the disorderly
flight of the followers of Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib.
It seemed too more than probable that such a rout would
encourage the enemy to make another attempt upon Fon-
dichery. On the other hand, the withdrawal of his troops
during the night would save the French army for future
operations, and would assure the safety of the French
capital. But before taking any steps in the matter,
d’Auteuil made one great effort to induce his army to
sustain the part which best befitted them as soldiers. But
248 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, his entreaties, his remonstrances, even his threats, were all
—4—- in vain. The poison of mistrust had entered their ranks;
1750. the mutinous officers had persuaded them that they were *
being deliberately sacrificed to superior numbers, and so
firmly had they imbibed this idea, that all the reasoning
of their commander was ineffective. They would not
fight. Convinced now that his only course was to retreat,
d’Auteuil sought an interview with his two allies, and
laid before them the circumstances of the case. He
showed them that he was forced to retreat, and he put it'
to them whether they would prefer to follow his fortunes,
or to endeavour to make their own terms with the enemy.
Then came out the difference in the character of the two
men. Chunda Sahib, whose long acquaintance and con¬
stant intercourse with the French had given him a high
appreciation of their character and a confidence in their
fortunes, declared unhesitatingly that he would cast in his
lot with his European allies. Mozuffer Jung, naturally
weaker, possessing little self-reliance, and unable to be¬
lieve that d’Auteuil had not some other motive for his con¬
duct, determined, on the other hand, to trust to the
tender mercies of his uncle.
In accordance with these resolutions the French con¬
tingent commenced its retreat at midnight, followed by
Chunda Sahib, who, with his cavalry, insisted upon taking
the post of honour in the rear. So great however was
the disorder in the French camp, so complete their demo¬
ralisation, that no one- communicated the intelligence of
the intended movement to the gunners, who, to the num¬
ber of forty, manned the batteries in front of the camp ;
these therefore with their eleven guns were left behind.
Day dawned before the retreat of the French was dis¬
covered. But no sooner was it known than Moraii Bao,
at the head of 10,000 Mahratta horse, started in pursuit
of them. He came up with them just before they reached
the prickly pear hedge, which formed the outer defence
of Pondichery. Noting his approach, d’Auteuil formed
 THE FRENCH RETREAT ON PONDICHERY.

his men up in a hollow square, whilst Chunda Sahib held

his cavalry in readiness to attack him after his repulse.
Morari Eao, however, a splendid horseman, little ac¬
quainted with squares or European tactics at all, boldly
charged and broke into the Erench formation. But at
the same time Chunda Sahib charged his cavalry, who
were thus, with the exception of fifteen, prevented, from
following their leader. In this manner Morari Bao was
with bu-t fifteen men inside the French square, apparently
lost. But the sullenness of the Europeans and his own
daring saved him. He dashed at the other face of the
square, and succeeded, with the loss of nine men, in cut¬
ting his way out. He then joined his cavalry who were
engaged with Chunda Sahib. With him and with the
French he kept up a running fight till they reached the
hedge, when he thought proper to retire..
In this retreat the French lost nineteen men in addition
to the forty left behind, many of them were sabred by the
natives, the remainder rescued from their clutches, and
taken prisoners, by the English. It was however less the
loss of men and of guns that afflicted Dupleix, than the
destruction, by this misfortune, of his vast plans. We
have said that he was on the point of succeeding iu in¬
ducing Nazir Jung to enter into engagements with him¬
self. He1 had even persisted in this attempt after he had
become aware of the existence of the mutinous feeling
amongst the French officers, and it is probable that had
the army only maintained its position in the field during
the next day,' Nazir Jung, would have signed the treaty
which was being pressed upon him. But this mutiny
spoiled all.
‘ It is easy to imagine,’ he says, writing in the third
person in his memoirs, ‘what was the mortification of
Dupleix, when he was informed of all the details of the
conduct of our cowardly officers, and further, to complete
his misfortunes, that Mozuffer Jung had been taken pri¬
soner and placed in irons by Nazir Jung.’ This last in-
250 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, telligence was but too true. Though Nazir Jung had
•—^—- sworn upon the Koran to restore his nephew to the go-
1750. vernments he had held, yet, in accordance with the cus¬
toms not uncommon in Europe in the thirteenth and four¬
teenth and in India in the eighteenth centuries, he at once
loaded him with irons. He thus became undisputed
Subadar of the Dekkan, and one of his first acts was to
appoint Mahomed Ali Nawab of the Carnatic. This was
the destruction to which we have alluded of those great
schemes whereby Dupleix hoped to bring Southern India
in entire subordination to French interests. No doubt his
mortification was extreme, yet great as it was, it neither
caused him to give himself to despair, nor even to abandon
his plans. On the contrary, it impelled him to try new
and bolder expedients to bring them to maturity.
He himself and the other inhabitants of Pondichery had
received the first intelligence of the disgrace of the French
army from the run-away officers themselves. These had
hurried into the town on the morning of the retreat, and
alarmed the inhabitants with the cry that the French army
was beaten and that the Mahrattas were upon them. The
first act of Dupleix, on receiving intelligence of a nature
so different to that he had expected, was to arrest these
cowards. He then hastened to meet the army,to endeavour,
if possible, to weed it of the disaffected, and to fevive the
spirit of the remainder. To this end he had recourse to the
most stringent measures. All the disaffected officers were
placed under arrest; d’Auteuil even was brought to trial
for retreating without orders. The soldiers were reminded
that their retreat was in no way.due to the enemy, but
to the recreant behaviour of their own officers. This
confidence in difficult circumstances did not fail to beget
its like. The French soldiers felt in his inspiring pre¬
sence that they had been indeed guilty, and to insubordi¬
nation succeeded an irrepressible desire to be allowed an
opportunity of recovering their name.
But whilst thus engaged in restoring the discipline of
 THE SKILL AND ENERGY OF DUPLEIX. 25V

the army, Dupleix was equally prompt in dealing with c^p-

the enemy. This could only be in the first instance by ■—r-'—■
negotiation, and we shall see that here he exerted the 17 °0,
skill of which he was so great a master. Instead of
showing, in this hour of his extremity, by any abatement
of his pretensions, how fallen were the fortunes of Pon¬
dichery, he directed his envoys to make demands little
inferior to those which would have resulted from a French
victory. They insisted, therefore, in his name, that no
one of the family of Anwaroodeen should be appointed
Nawab of the Carnatic, and that the children of Mozuffer
Jung should be established in the estates and governments
of their father. But they did not stop there. To favour
their negotiations, they had recourse to those wiles which
they had learned from the Asiatic princes, and which
they now showed they could use more skilfully than
their masters. Thus they took credit for the defeat of
d’Auteuil, and exaggerated the loss experienced by Morari
Eao in his attempts to cut them ■ off from Pondichery.
All this time these same agents intrigued with the chiefs
of the Nizam’s anny, especially with the Patan Nawabs
of Kuddapa, Kurnool, and Savanore, and succeeded in
establishing with these and others relations of a confi¬
dential nature.
Nazir ’Jung himself refused to agree to the terms pro¬
posed by MM. du Bausset and de Larche, the envoys of
Dupleix, and on the seventh day these two gentlemen
returned to Pondichery. By this time a good feeling
had been restored in the army; the officers who had
disgraced themselves had been severely punished; others,
less guilty, were only anxious by some brilliant achieve¬
ment to wipe out the stain on their honour; d’Auteuil,
who had shown very clearly that he had acted in the
only manner possible for him to act under the circum¬
stances, had been restored to the' command. Now was
the time to strike a blow; this the opportunity to show
the ruler who had rejected his proposals that the French
252 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, were yet, as an enemy, to be feared. No sooner tlien

vl . had the envoys returned than Dupleix sent instructions
1750. to d’Auteuil to beat up the camp of Morari Eao, situated
between Pondichery and the main body of Nazir Jung’s
army. On the night of April 12, only eight days after
the retreat from Valdaur, d’Auteuil detached 300 men
under the command of M. de la Touche to surprise the
enemy. They marched about midnight, reached and
penetrated the camp without being discovered, killed
about 1,200 of the surprised and terror-stricken enemy,
and returned to Pondichery at daybreak, having lost but
three men of their party. This bold stroke had such an
effect upon Nazir Jung, that trembling now for his own
safety, he broke up his camp, and retired in all haste to
Arcot, abandoning the English, who returned to Fort St.
David.
Having thus caused the prestige of success to return to
his colours, Dupleix resolved to follow up his blow.
Nazir Jung, on reaching Arcot, had resolved on a move¬
ment, by means of which, whilst he himself should
remain safely shut up in that capital, he might avenge
himself of his enemies. He accordingly took forcible
possession of the lodges and factories which the French
had established at the town of Masulipatam on the Orissa
coast, and at Yanoon, situated at the junction of the
Coringa river and the Godavery.
But he did not hold them long. It had happened
shortly before these occurrences, th$,t two ships, the
‘Fleury’ and the ‘ d’Argenson,’ bound for Bengal, had
touched at Pondichery for the purpose of discharging a
portion of their cargoes, and re-loading at that place.
On hearing of the proceedings of Nazir Jung, Dupleix,
without confiding in any one, made the necessary pre¬
parations, and the night before these ships were to sail
he embarked on board of them 200 European and 300
native soldiers, with a battering train, and directed the
commander to sail direct for Masulipatam, and take
 HE STEIKES TWO BLOWS AT JfAZIE JUJTG. 253

possession of the place. They arrived there on the chap.

evening of the third clay. The commander at once —-
landed his troops, surprised the town, and took possession 1730.
of it without the smallest resistance, and without spilling
a drop of human blood. The Trench colours were at
once hoisted on the place, and preparations were made
for its retention.
But it was in the neighbourhood of Pondichery that
Dupleix resolved to strike his most effective blow. Very
soon then after Nazir Jung had left for Arcot, and the
English for Fort St. David, he ordered d’Auteuil to march
with 500 men, cross the river Punar, and take possession
of the fortified pagoda of Tiruvadi, only thirteen miles
from Cuddalore, and almost in sight of the army of
Mahomed Ali. The object of this was to obtain a point
d'appui on tire Punar, which would give him command
of the neighbouring country and its revenues. The
expedition completely succeeded. D’Auteuil captured
the place without resistance, and having garrisoned it
with 20 Europeans, 20 topasses, and 50 sepoys, began to
make arrangements for pushing his conquests further.
But Nazir Jung, alarmed at the loss of Tiruvadi, yielded
now to the pressing solicitations of Mahomed Ali, and •
reinforced him with 20,000 men. At the same time
the English, to whom the possession of Tiruvadi by the
French was a standing menace, sent a force of 400
Europeans and 1,500 sepoys under Captain Cope to join
Mahomed Ali. This combined army took up a position -
on July 30, near the French force, which they found
encamped on the river Punar, about seven miles from
Cuddalore.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority of the
enemy, d’Auteuil resolved to maintain his position. This
was not only strong by nature, but it had been strongly
fortified. To hazard an attack upon Frenchmen in a
position defended by intrenchments did not suit the feeble
nature of Mahomed Ali. Acting on Captain Cope’s
254 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, advice, therefore, lie moved against Tiruvadi in the hope

—- of drawing out d’Auteuil to its assistance. But d’Auteuil
1750. -was too wary to be caught by so transparent a device,
and Mahomed Ali, when he wished to change the feigned
assault into a real one, found that his soldiers had the
same objection to stonewalls as to intrencliments, when,,
both were manned by Europeans. He accordingly
marched back to his position in front of the French
camp, and encouraged by Captain Cope, opened upon it
a violent cannonade. The fire of the French was, how¬
ever, so brisk, and their guns were served so efficiently,
that at the end of six hours the allies had had enough of
it, and retreated with a considerable loss in killed and
wounded. The French loss was slight; but they were
too few in numbers to venture in pursuit. They con¬
tented themselves with maintaining their position, ready
to profit by the disagreement which, they felt sure, would
be produced by this repulse between Mahomed Ali and
his English allies.
So indeed it happened. As prone to be unduly de¬
pressed in adversity as to be inflated in prosperity,
Mahomed Ali did not consider 'himself safe from the
attacks of the French so long as he remained in the open
country. He therefore proposed to retreat upon Arcot.
The English, who wished to cut off the French from Pon-
dichery, findiug that Mahomed Ali would neither listen
to their advice nor advance any more money, returned to
Fort St. David. No sooner was Dupleix acquainted with
this movement, than he directed d’Auteuil to break up
from his encampment, and march on Tiruvadi; there to
join a corps of 1,300 Europeans and 2,500 sepoys led by
de la Touche, and 1,000 horse commanded by Chunda
Sahib. With this force he was to surprise the camp of
- Mahomed Ah. This Nawab, with an army of upwards
of 20,000 men, of whom the greater part were cavalry,
had taken up a position between Tiruvadi and Fort St.
David, with the river Punar in his rear, and awaited
 TIIE FRENCH DEFEAT MAHOMED ALI. 255

there the instructions for which he had applied to Nazir chap.

Jung. But- on the afternoon of September 1, the day —^—
after the departure of the English, he was attacked by 1750.
d’Auteuil. The French army advanced in good order,
the artillery in front, the cavaliy on either wing. In this
fiprmation, in full view of the army of Mahomed Ali, the
handful of men moved forward, halting occasionally to
fire their guns. So long as they were at a distance, the
gunners of the Nawab’s army replied by an ineffective
fire.. But when, within two hundred yards of the in- .
trenchments, d’Auteuil brought up his infantry, and
ordered a general charge, the coinage of the Asiatics
gave way. Not an effort was made to defend the .
entrance into the camp; the intrenchments were aban¬
doned as the enemy reached them; and the French,
quickly bringing up their guns, opened out from one end
of the camp a tremendous fire on the masses now huddled
between them and the river. Unlike Chunda Sahib,
Mahomed Ali showed neither courage nor presence of
mind. Herg, as at Amboor, he thought only of his own
safety. His men, left to themselves, behaved, as might
have been expected, like sheep without a shepherd. The
15,000 cavalry who were in the camp did not strike one
blow for their master. How to cross the Punar in safety •
was the problem each man sought to solve for his own
advantagS. Victory they never had dreamt of; now
even orderly retreat was out of the question. Fortu¬
nately for them the river was fordable. Yet, before it
could be crossed by the fugitives, they had left nearly a
thousand of their number on the field of carnage. They ■
left besides, to fall into the hands of the French, a great
quantity of munitions of war, immense supplies of grain
and fodder, thirty piece's of cannon, and two English
mortars. The French did not lose a single man in the
engagement; a few sepoys only were wounded by the
explosion of a tumbril.
If battles are to be. judged by their consequences, this
256 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, action may truly be termed a great victory. By it, tlie

—. French more than regained the ascendancy they had lost
1750. by the disastrous retreat from Valdaur ; Chundei? Sahib,
their ally, resumed, in consequence of it, a position in
■which he could lay a well-founded claim to the possession
of the Carnatic ; whilst his rival, Mahomed Ali, who had
but two months before been master of the whole of that
province—the territories ceded to the French and Eng¬
lish alone excepted—was forced by this defeat into the
position of a beaten and baffled fugitive, fleeing with
two attendants for refuge to Arcot. The English, on
their part, sulky with Mahomed Ali, on the point of
losing their commandant Major Lawrence, who was
about to embark for England, were likewise by the same
means reduced to an almost compulsory inaction, for they
were not at war with France, and the dispersion of
Mahomed All’s army had left them almost- without a
native ally whom indirectly to assist.
It was true indeed that Nazir Jung was yet exercising
the functions of the office of Subadar of the -Dekkan, and
Nazir Jung was their ally. Sunk in debauchery and the
pleasures of the chase, Nazir Jung, however, left the
direction of affairs to his ministers and nobility, and the
chief of these had already—thanks to the intrigues of
Dupleix—been won over to the interests of France.
Whilst the army he had given to his protege, Mahomed
Ali, was being destroyed in the field, he remained inactive
at Arcot, not yet thinking himself hi danger, not yet
believing that the army which fled before him at Valdaur
would dare to compete with him in the field. Of this
inaction, which he had used all his effort to secure, and
of the consternation caused amongst the partisans of
Mahomed Ah by the victory of d’Auteuil, Dupleix re-
• solved to take the- fullest advantage. He therefore sent
instant orders to d’Auteuil to detach a sufficient force
under M. de Bussy to attack Gingee, a fortress, fifty miles
 BU3SY ATTACKS GINGEE. 257

inland, and the possession of which would, he thought, chap.

decide the fate of the Carnatic. ■—^—
The town of Gingee, surrounded by a thick wall and x750.
flanked by towers, is situated at the base of three moun¬
tains forming the three sides of an equilateral triangle.
Each of these mountains was defended by a strong citadel
built on its summit, and by- the sides, in many places
naturally steep and hi others artificially scarped, by which
alone access -was possible. A cordon of advanced works
contributed likewise to make all approach a matter of
extreme difficulty. It was no wonder then that in the
eyes of the natives Gingee was deemed quite impregnable.
Even Sevajee, the ruthless founder of the Mahratta power,
had been forced, in 1677, to come to an understanding
with its commander to effect its reduction, and Zulfikar
Elian, the general of Aurungzebe, had brought about the
same result by means of a blockade of the strictest nature.
The belief in its impregnability made it always the refuge
of defeated armies, and the scattered parties of Mahomed
Ali’s force, to the number of 10,000 or 12,000 men, had
fled to it after the battle on the Punar for the protection
which it was deemed so well able to offer. Against this
—the strongest of all the fortresses of the Carnatic—
Dupleix directed d’Auteuil to send a detachment with all
possible speed, indicating at the same time Pussy as the
commandant of whom he would approve for such a
service. This is not the first tinie that -we have met with
this officer. He it was, it will be recollected, who, when
the French troops had twice recoiled, before the intrench-
ments thrown up by Anwaroodeen at Arnboor, when
their commandant, d’Auteuil, had been struck down,
rallied the repulsed infantry, and led them, the third time,
victoriously to the charge. But little is known of his.
early childhood—a strange circumstance when it is re¬
collected that he occupies a principal figure, in the
estimation of some the foremost figure, in the' history of
258 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, the French in India. This much, however, is ascertained,

that he was born in 1718, at Bu£y, near Soissons: that he
1750. had lost his father at an early age, and inheriting little
beyond his pedigree,* he had come out to the Isle of
France at the time that La Bourdonnais was governor,
and had formed one of the expedition led by that famous
admiral to India in 1746. When La Bourdonnais returned
to Europe at the end of that year, de Bussy remained
behind as an officer of the Pondichery army. Here he
found himself constantly in contact with Dupleix, and, in
their frequent meetings, he had not been less struck by
the large views and brilliant genius of the Governor-
General than had been Dupleix by the frank nature, the
striking talents, the desire to acquire knowledge, especially
knowledge of India and its people, displayed by the
young officer. He had given many proofs of adding to
these qualities a courage, a daring, and a presence of
mind, which, when united in a soldier, inevitably lead him
to fortune ; and it was on this account that he had now
been selected to lead a detachment of the French army on
the most daring- expedition on which European troops
had yet been engaged in India.
The force placed at the disposal of Bussy consisted of
250 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys, and four field-pieces.
They left the scene of the action with Mahomed Ali on
September 3rd, and came in sight of Gingee on the
11th. Here at the distance of three miles Bussy encamped,
and here intelligence reached him that the remnants of
Mahomed Ali’s army,-10,000 or 12,000 strong, together
with 1,000 sepoys trained by the English, and some
European gunners with eight field-pieces, were encamped
on the glacis, and were about to take advantage of their
overwhelming superiority of numbers to attack him.
Immediately afterwards the enemy were seen advancing.
Bussy waited for them till they came within pistol-shot,
when he ordered a general advance, the four guns open-
* He was named Oharles-Josepli Patissier, Marquis de Bussy-Ca^telnau.
 CAPTURES IT. 259

ing at the same time on the enemy’s cavalry. This, as chap.

was usual, not only prevented their advance but threw ■—^—
them into confusion. They had already broken when 1750.
the main body of the French army under. d’Auteuil was
seen approaching the field. A general panic instantly -
ensued amongst all branches of the enemy’s forces, and.
Bussy, taking advantage of it, advanced and secured their
guns, killing or taking prisoners the Europeans who served
them. He then pushed forward and drove the fugitives
under the walls of Gingee, the cannon of which opened
fire on the pursuers.
But it did not stop Bussy. Following the fugitives to
the entrance of the town, he applied a petard to the •
principal gate and blew it in. He at once rushed forward,
sword in hand, followed by his men, and engaged in a
desperate hand to hand contest with defenders. Nothing,
however, could resist French gallantry. Before nightfall
the place was their own, and it was occupied during the
night by the remainder of the force under d’Auteuil.
Their situation was, nevertheless, still one of great clanger.
We have already stated that the town of Gingee lies at •
the base of three mountains, the summits of which were
strongly fortified. From these summits there poured in
now an incessant fire on the French in Gingee. Small ■
arms, grape, round shot, and rockets were used with all
the vigour of which the garrison were capable. For some
time Bussy replied by a fire from his mortars, keeping his
men under cover. But no sooner had the moon gone
down than he moved out three detachments of picked
troops, all Frenchmen, to escalade the three citadels at ■
the same time. The ascent. was steep; redoubt after
redoubt hindered their progress; a terrific fire rained
upon them from all sides ; but no obstacle was too great
to be overcome by Bussy and his comrades. The storm¬
ing of one redoubt filled them with the greater determina¬
tion to attempt the conquest of another; their onward
progress gave them fresh animating power, whilst the
 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, defenders after each loss became more and more dis-
•—^—• couraged. At last mounting higher and higher, they
1750. came to the citadels. These too, just as day broke on the
horizon, fell into their hands, and the victors could gaze
and wonder at the almost insuperable difficulties which
they nevertheless had surmounted.
It was indeed a wonderful achievement, great in itself,
and calculated by its effect upon the people of Southern
India to be much greater. They could be no second-rate
warriors who could, within twenty-four hours, defeat an
army vastly superior in numbers, and storm a fortress re¬
puted impregnable, and which for three years had defied
the best army and the best general of the renowned Au-
rungzebe. Not lightly would such a feat be esteemed in
the cities of the South. The fame of it would extend
even to imperial Delhi on the one side, and to the palaces
of Poona on the other. It was a blow which, by the in¬
trinsic advantages resulting from it and by the renown it
would acquire for those who had delivered it, would strike
not only Mahomed Ali but Nazir Jung, woidd seat the
nominees of Dupleix at Golconda and Arcot, might bring
Delhi itself almost within the grasp of the Prencli Go¬
vernor. Well might Dupleix hope that, by following it
up, by using carefully yet vigorously every opportunity,
this capture of Gingee might indeed be made- the first
stone of a French Empire in India.
The immediate results of the capture on the minds of
the natives were all that could have been expected.
Nazir Jung, till then devoted to pleasure, now roused
himself to action. Yet even he, the Viceroy of the
Mogul, the disposer of an army of 300,000 men, was
thunder-struck at the feat. These French, he felt, must
be beaten or conciliated. It appeared to rest with him
whether he should attempt the first, or accomplish the
second, for almost simultaneously with the news of the
fall of Gingee intelligence reached him that d’Auteuil
was marching ' on Arcot, whilst he at the same time
 DUPLEIX OFPEES PEACE. 261

received peaceful overtures from Dupleix. The principal chap.

of these suggested the release of Mozuffer Jung and his _-
restoration to the governments he had held in his grand- 1750. .
father’s lifetime, the appointment of Chunda Sahib to be
Nawab of Arcot, and the absolute cession of Masulipatam
to the French. It is probable that Nazir Jung would <
have made no difficulty regarding the second and third of
these conditions, but the release of Mozuffer Jung was
tantamount to a renewal of the civil contest, and rather
than assent to that, he preferred to try the fortune of war.
Summoning then his chiefs to Arcot, he set out at the
head of an army consisting of 60,000 foot, 45,000 horse,
700 elephants, and 860 cannon, in the direction of Gingee.
When, however, he had arrived -within twelve miles of
the French force—which, after making one or two
marches in the direction of Arcot, had returned on the
news of the approach of the enemy to Gingee—the
periodical rains set in with such violence that any move¬
ments in the face of an enemy became impossible. An •
inaction of two months’ duration, from September to the
beginning of December, succeeded, the French army
remaining encamped about three miles from Gingee,
whence, for some weeks, it drew its supplies. When
these had_ been exhausted, it received others, thanks to
the excellent arrangements of Dupleix, and despite the
unsettled state 'of the country, direct from Ponclichery.
Nazir Jung, on his side, was forced to remain in a most
inconvenient position, hemmed in by watercourses swollen
by the rains, and able to obtain supplies only with the
greatest difficulty.
But these two months of military inaction constituted •
a busy period to Dupleix. Corresponding secretly with
the chiefs of Nazir Jung’s army, he had succeeded in
persuading many of them, especially the Patans and the
Mahrattas, that it would be more to their interest to re¬
gard the French as friends than as enemies. Both these
sections had several causes of dislike to Nazir Jung. His
262 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, manifold debaucheries, the treatment, after his solemn

J—■ promise to grant him liberty, of Mozuffer Jung, his con-
1750. stant refusal to entertain the propositions for peaces, and
the knowledge that, with Mozuffer Jung upon the vice¬
regal seat, they would enjoy not only peace and alliance
with the French, but an accession of honours and dignities,
all conspired to whet their desire to be rid of him. On
the other hand, their admiration, mingled -with fear,, of
the French nation, and especially of the statesman who
was so daringly guiding its fortunes, gave to the proposals
of Dupleix a weight which they found it difficult to resist.
A secret agreement was accordingly arrived at between
the two parties, which stipulated that if Nazir Jung should
refuse any longer to agree to the terms offered by Dupleix,
but should decide upon marching against the French, the
malcontent nobles should withdraw their forces from
those of their feudal superior, and should range them¬
selves, a short distance from them, under the flag of
France. To such an extent were the details of this
arrangement carried out, that a French standard was
secretly conveyed to the malcontents, to be by them on
the proper occasion hoisted on the back of an elephant in
the most conspicuous part of the field. Other secret
arrangements were at the same time entered into between
Mozuffer Jung and the conspirators, with which Dupleix
had no concern. There can be little doubt but that the
death of the Subadar and the distribution of his treasures
equally between Mozuffer Jung on one side and the con¬
spirators on the other, were resolved upon.
But meanwhile better thoughts had come over Nazir
Jung. The difficulties of his army, the fear of finding
himself engaged in a long and doubtful campaign with
an enemy whom he dreaded, and, above all, the depriva¬
tion of much loved pleasures which this campaign would
necessitate, induced him to re-consider the terms repeat¬
edly pressed upon him by Dupleix. To these he had
given no reply. But when the fine days of the early
 LA TOUCHE ATTACKS NAZIR JUNG. 263

December showed him that the time had arrived when chap.
action could not be avoided, he determined to give up -—r—■
everything, to set free Mozuffer Jung, to yield Masuli- 1750-
patam, to appoint Chunda Sahib—to make any con¬
cession, in fact, so that he might be free to drain the cup
of pleasure. He accordingly wrote to Dupleix, offering
to agree to his terms. With this letter he sent three of
his officers provided with full powers to negotiate, for the
purpose of signing the treaty. Dupleix, caring little with
whom the treaty was made, provided only that his own
propositions were agreed to, determined to accede to the
offers of Hazir Jung, and wrote at once to the commander
of the French forces to suspend all hostilities until he
should receive further instructions. His orders however
arrived too late. M. de la Touche, upon whom the
command had devolved in the absence of d’Auteuil laid
up with the gout, had, before this letter reached him,
received from the conspirators the signal he had precon¬
certed with them to advance. They were in fact acquainted
with the contents of the letter sent to Dupleix, and justly
feared that, if time were allowed, it would interfere with
their long-meditated plans. Hence the sudden resolution
to bring matters to a crisis and their call upon the French
general to perform his part. Ignorant of the negotiations
going on .at the time at Pondichery, de la Touche had no
option. In compliance therefore with instructions which
had been given him as to his action in the event of his
receiving such a summons from the conspirators, he set
out on the night of December 15 from Gingee, at the head
of 800 Europeans, 3,000 sepoys, and ten guns, in the
direction of the Subadar’s camp, under the guidance of a
native who had been sent for that purpose by the con¬
spirators. After a march of sixteen miles, de la Touche
at four o’clock in the morning came in sight of the enemy.
Their advanced posts which gave the alarm were soon
dispersed, and de la Touche found himself with his 3,800
men in front of an army of more than 25,000. By the
264 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, skilful management of Ms guns however he succeeded in

_. keeping at bay, and eventually throwing into confusion,
1750. the vast masses of cavalry which were constantly threaten¬
ing to charge him. No sooner were these dispersed than
he advanced on the infantry, and after a very severe con¬
test succeeded in breaking them. But this had hardly
been accomplished when he perceived a body of at least
20,000 men advancing on his left flank. At the sight of
this new enemy the French began almost to despair of
success, but as they advanced nearer, de la Touche dis¬
covered to his joy the French standard displayed on the
back of the foremost elephant: almost immediately after¬
wards a messenger from Mozuffer Jung conveyed to de
la Touche the intelligence of the success of all the plans
of the conspirators.
Nazir Jung in fact, relying on the full powers with
which he had accredited the envoys he had sent to
Pondichery, would not believe that they were French
who were attacking him. When it would no longer
admit of a doubt, he sent orders to his generals to repulse
‘this mad attempt of a parcel of drunken Europeans,’*,
whilst, seated on his elephant, he took his station amongst
his guns. Near him, on another elephant, was seated
Mozuffer Jung under the guardianship of an officer who
had received instructions to behead him on the first
appearance of treason. In the midst of the action, seeing
some of his men retiring from the field, the Subadar
inquired and learned that the Patan Nawabs, the Bajah
of Mysore, and the Mahrattas, had ordered their troops
to abstain from any participation in the action. Enraged
at this, he started on Ms elephant to threaten them, first
giving orders for the beheadal of Mozuffer Jung. The
Nawab of Kucldapah, whom he first met and upbraided,
replied by a defiant answer, and directed his attendant to
fire at the Subadar. As the piece however missed, he
unslung his own carbine, and shot Nazir Jung through
the heart. The Subadar’s head was instantly cut off and
 TRIUMPH OF THE FRENCH ARMS.

laid at the feet of Mozuffer Jung, whose own had just es- chap.
caped a similar ceremony* —^—
This was the intelligence conveyed to M. cle la Touche 1750.
by the messenger of Mozuffer Jung, just after the French,
to their delight, had beheld their national standard dis¬
played on the foremost elephant of the advancing party.
The first act of the French leader was to despatch his
second in command, de Bussy—although he had been
wounded in the fight—to congratulate the new Subadar
on his elevation. Bussy found the newly made potentate
seated on the splendidly caparisoned elephant of his late
rival, acknowledged as the Mogul’s viceroy, not only by
the conspiring nobles, but by all but a very small minority
of the army which but a few hours before had obeyed
the orders of Nazir Jung. The same evening M. de la
Touche himself, accompanied by his principal officers, paid
a congratulatory visit to Mozuffer Jung, and received
from him the commission to inform Dupleix that nothing
would be undertaken without his advice, to obtain which
he, Mozuffer Jung, proposed instantly to proceed to
Bondi chery.
Whilst matters had thus progressed in the field,
Dupleix had been awaiting in Pondichery the return of
the messenger he had sent to the army to direct the
suspension of hostilities. But before that messenger
could return, the intelligence of the great victory and its
results reached the town.f The excitement, the joy, the
enthusiasm may be imagined. That the French might
have entered into a satisfactory arrangement with Nazir
Jung had been hoped; but every bound of reasonable ex¬
pectation was exceeded when it was ascertained that, owing
to the exertions of 800 Frenchmen, and 3,000 sepoys
trained by them, the protege of France had become the
ruler of Southern India, the lord over thirty-five millions
of people. Still greater was the national exultation when
* He simply owed liis escape to t Hr.Orme states that it was con-
the fact that the officer in whose veyed in person hy Chunda Sahib to
charge he had been placed was one Dupleix.
of the conspirators.—Dupleix.
 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, it became known through a brief despatch from M. de la

—IJ:—- Touche how modestly Mozuffer Jung bore his triumph;
1750. how deferentially he acknowledged his obligations to the
French people ; and how submissively he had announced
his intention to do nothing until he should have com¬
municated personally 'with the great ruler of French
India. The fire of artillery, the chanting of Te Deums,
illuminations, processions, and durbars, announced all the
joy which these occurrences inspired.
Well, indeed, might the French in India feel a pride
in their, success. Not seventy-six years had elapsed since
Francois Martin at the head of sixty Frenchmen had
bought the plot of ground on which had since risen the
city of Pondichery, and we find his successor in a position
to give laws to thirty-five millions of people! . Though
besieged and taken by the Dutch, though besieged but
two years before by an immensely superior force of
English, Pondichery had risen to see the decadence of
one nation as a rival on Indian soil, and the compulsory
inaction and loss of reputation—both indeed destined
only to be temporary—of the other. The genius of the
people had suited itself so well to the natural tempera¬
ment of the children of the soil, that the French were
regarded everywhere as friends; the increase of their
territory excited no jealousy. Their policy hftd been a
policy of fidelity and trust. The intimacy of Frangois
Martin with Shere Khan Lodi had been continued by
his successors to the family of Dost Ali. Neither the
overthrow of that Nawab, nor the captivity of his successor,
had been able to shake it. To support that traditional
alliance, M. Dumas had bade defiance to the threats of
RaghojeeBhousla, and his, till then, irresistible Malirattas;
Dupleix had, for seven years, fed the hopes of the im¬
prisoned Chunda Sahib with the prospect of a throne.
And now this policy had blossomed and borne fruit.
Chunda Sahib, released from captivity by the efforts of
Dupleix, had made common cause with Mozuffer Jung,
the claimant of the viceregal dignity in the south of India
 53ITIOX ACQUIRED DUPLEIX. 267

and, after many reverses, the two friends—thanks to chap.

French generalship and French valour—seemed to have —1^—-
attained the summit of their very highest wishes. 1750.
The glory which H. Dupleix had acquired by this suc¬
cessful policy attained its most dazzling elevation when,
on December 26, Mozuffer Jung and his followers ar¬
rived at Ponclichery. Entering the town in the same
palanquin with the French Governor, this ruler of thirty-
five millions paid him in outward appearance the homage x
and respect due to a feudal superior. He at-once made
over to him all the treasure, the jewels, the gold and silver
ornaments found in the camp of his late rival, and re¬
quested him to assume the office of arbitrator between
himself and his confederates, the Patan Nawabs, with
whom already misunderstandings had broken out. Du¬
pleix in tins trying position was true to the traditional
policy of the French in India. It was a main portion of
that policy to respect native customs, to conciliate native
opinion, to rule by means of that rather than by force, to
be liberal, generous, trustful, confiding. His position as
the secret ruler of the Dekkan, directing all its resources,
surely yet unostensibly, by means of its native ruler, keep¬
ing his own power, of the superior might of which he
was assured, necessarily in the background, was in his
opinion more strong and more really powerful, than if he
had claimed for himself the ostensible dignity, and with it
a territorial extension such as would provoke the jealousy
of those even who granted it. His first act therefore was
to disclaim for his own part any share in the booty taken
after the victory. This, he decided, in his quality of arbi¬
trator, should be divided equally between Mozuffer Jtmsr,
on one side, and the confederate Hawabs on the other,
reserving the jewels only without division to Mozuffer
Jung. Any claim which the French might have upon the
latter for the part they had played in helping, him to his
dignities, he left entirely to his own generous impulses.
Having thus, and by some other arrangements, which
it is unnecessary to detail, effected an amicable settlement
268 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, of all misunderstandings, Dupleix prepared for the solemn

—J—- investiture of Mozuffer Jung, as Subadar of the-GarnatM^1'
1750. ^ the presence of his tributaries and vassals. This im¬
posing ceremony—a ceremony noticeable as indicating
the period when French power in .India had almost at¬
tained its zenith—took place in a magnificent tent pitched
in the great square of Pondichery. The splendours of
that day, the honours granted to Dupleix, the high posi¬
tion lie assumed, have scarcely yet been obliterated from
the traditions of Southern India. Let us imagine, as we
well can, either side of the gorgeously draped tent lined
by the armed nobility of the Dekkan. Mozuffer Jung
enters and takes his seat at the head of the assembly.
Quickly behind follows the Governor of French India, and
presents to the Subadar, as he salutes him, the offering due
to his rank. Mozuffer Jung advances to meet the French
Governor and places him on a seat designedly set there,
and betokening a rank equal to his own. To them, thus
seated, though nominally only to the Subadar, the assem¬
bled nobles offer their gifts. On the conclusion of this
ceremony, the Subadar rises, and proclaims the honours
he proposes to confer on his French ally. He declares
him Nawab or Governor of the country south of the river
Kistna up to Cape Co^morin, including Mysore and the
entire Carnatic ; he bestows upon him as a personal gift
the fortress of Valdaur, about fifteen miles from Pondi¬
chery, with the villages and lands dependent upon it, as
well as a separate jaghire of-100,000 rupees a year. He
confers upon him the title of munsuh, or commander of
7,000 horse, with permission to bear the ensign of the
fish, one of the highest honours in the Mogul empire. He
directs that the Pondichery currency shall be the sole cur¬
rency .of Southern India; he confirms the sovereignty of
the French Company over the newly-acquired districts of
Masulipatam and Yanoon, and an extension of the terri¬
tories about Karical. Then, turning to Dupleix with the
air of a vassal to his liege lord, he promises never even to
grant a favour without his previous approval, and to be
 HIS ACUTE POLICT AT THE DURBAR. 269

guided in all things by his advice. Dupleix, on his side, chap.

is true to himself, to his policy, on this tempting and try- .—J—-
ing occasion. With a generosity which, if assumed, shows i?50-
his political fitness in a still stronger light, he calls up
Chunda Sahib to his side, presents to the Subadar his old
and tried companion, and urges that if he himself is to
hold the nominal dignity of Nawab over the country
south of the Kistna, the real sovereignty and emoluments
of that part of it known as the Carnatic may be bestowed
upon one who had shown so much stedfastness and fidelity.
We can well imagine the impression that would be con¬
veyed to the minds of an Oriental assembly by an act so
generous and graceful. He who could thus give away
kingdoms, who, in the height of his prosperity, could re¬
collect and reward those who under all circumstances had
been true to him, showed the possession of qualities
which, in that rude day, the priuces of Asia could admire
though they could not imitate. From such au one, prac¬
tising such lofty sentiments, there was nought, they would
bcdieve, for them to fear. That one act of abnegation wTas
sufficient to make them acquiesce without envy, without,
the least hesitation or doubt, in the substantial acquisitions
that had been made that day to Dupleix. He indeed was
the hero of the day’s ceremony. He emerged from that tent
the acknowledged superior of the lord of Southern India.
We have not yet enumerated all the advantages which
accrued to the French on the occasion of this visit. In
addition to those promulgated by Mozuffer Jung at the
time of his installation, one sum of 500,000 rupees was
made over to Dupleix for the soldiers who had fought at
the late battle; another of the same amount was repaid
to the Company, on account of mone3's that had been ad¬
vanced, and security given for the amount remaining due.
The increase of revenue likely to accrue to the French
Company by the territorial cessions we have adverted to,
was computed at little short of 400,000 rupees annually.
To commemorate these great results thus obtained,
Dupleix ordered the creation of a town on the site of the
270 FBENUH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

chap, battle which had caused them, to be entitled Dupleix-

—^—. Futteh-abad.* This design, founded on sound policy,
1750. being in strict conformity with those native usages by
which alone the mass of the people were likely to be im¬
pressed, and not, as has been ignorantly charged against
him, on ridiculous vanity, was not, it is true, destined to
be realised. Events were too strong even for this strong
man. He, the pioneer of European conquest and Euro¬
pean civilisation, whose vast plans were not, as so many
of his contemporaries believed, too vast to be accom¬
plished, was yet destined to see them appropriated to a
great extent by his rivals. It will be for us, very soon,
to point to the single weak point in that strongly welded
armour—the solitary defect in that almost consum¬
mate genius, by means of which one great adversary,
possessing the quality wanting to Dupleix, shattered the
vast fabric of his plans ere yet they were proof against
attack.
Not only the urgent and pressing instructions from the
Company of the Indies, but his own conviction of the
necessity of the case, disposed Dupleix at this period to
consolidate his conquests by a definite peace. Peace,
however, was utterly impossible so long as the rival can¬
didate for the Nawabship of the Carnatic, Mahomed Ali,
was at large maintaining his pretensions. This chieftain,
seeing that by the death of Nazir Jung his chances of
dominion had been reduced almost to zero, abandoned by
the English, and without following, had fled, on the news
of the defeat, to Trichinopoly, behind whose walls he
had once before found refuge. Dupleix, who had on that
previous occasion experienced the delays and difficulties
attending the attack by a native army on a fortified town,
was particularly anxious to induce the fugitive nobleman
to enter into some arrangement, by which, in virtue of
some concessions made to him, he would engage to recog¬
nise the new order of things. He was the more hopeful
1
* Indicating The place of the victory of Dupleix.’
 MAHOMED ALI OFFERS TO SUBMIT. 271

that negotiations to this effect might succeed, as Mahomed chap.

Ali was now literally abandoned by all the world. To .—A—.
his gratification and surprise the first overtures for this 1750.
object came from Mahomed Ali himself. Eajah Janojee,
one of the Mahratta leaders who had been with Nazir
Jung, and had subsequently transferred his temporary
services to his successor, was charged by Mahomed Ali
with a proposal to recognise Chunda Sahib as Nawab of
the Carnatic, and to make over to him the city of Trichi-
nopoly and its dependencies, on condition (1) that he
should be put in possession of the treasures left by his
father, no inquiry being made into his administration,
(2) that the Subadar should engage to give him another
government in the Dekkan. Dupleix eagerly embraced
these terms, and requested Janojee to inform Mahomed
Ali of his acceptance of them. This led to the opening
of a correspondence between the French Governor and
Mahomed Ali, throughout which the latter ardently ex¬
pressed his desire to be reconciled to the Subadar.
This important matter being regarded as settled, Mo-
zuffer Jung, not doubting that peace would thenceforth
reign in the Carnatic, informed Dupleix of his intention
to proceed to the northern part of the Dekkan, as well to
consolidate his power, as to settle divers matters which
in consequence of the war had fallen into great confusion.
But he represented at the same time to Dupleix that, in
order to undertake, with safety and success, a journey
across provinces which had been so recently hostile, it
would be very desirable that a body of French troops,
upon whom he knew he could rely, should accompany
him. He expressed himself willing to defray all the
charges connected with these troops, and, he added, he
would not send them back before he had given to them,
as well as to the Company they served, real marks of his
gratitude.
This proposal chimed in exactly with the policy of
Dupleix. It assured him against any change of policy
272 FRENCH INDIA. AT ITS ZENITH.

chap. in. the councils of the Subadar. It made him virtually

Z-. - master of the Dekkan, ruling Southern India through the
1750. representative of the Mogul. He consented therefore to
the proposal. Perhaps if he had known the secret in¬
tentions which Mahomed Ali still cherished, he might
have delayed the departure of his troops until the affairs
of the Carnatic and its dependencies had been quite
settled. But lie had excellent reasons for believing that
Mahomed Ah had entered into his schemes; that he
would resign Trichinopoly in favour of a government
elsewhere. Had he not been satisfied with the assurances
he had received on this head, it is certain he would not
have detached so far from Pondichery a considerable
contingent of his little army, and — what was of far
greater importance—his best officer to command it. But,
as it was, believing peace re-established, anxious to have
French interests powerfully represented at the court of
the Subadar, and not indifferent to the financial con¬
siderations resulting from the transfer to another ex¬
chequer of all the charges connected with the troops
thus detached, he agreed to send with the Subadar to
Aurangabad, his capital, a force of 300 Europeans and
2,000 sepoys, the whole' under the command of Bussy.
For such a purpose, or indeed for any office, political or
military, a better selection than that of Bussy could not
have been made; but in sending him, d’Auteuil being
still, incapacitated by sickness, and de la Touche having
returned to France, Dupleix deprived himself of the one
man upon whom he could depend, in the event of any
unforeseen military disaster.
1751. On January 7, 1751, Mozuffer Jung left Pondichery to
join his army, and ou the 15th, in pursuance of the agree¬
ment he had entered into with Dupleix, he was joined by
Bussy and the French contingent. At the end of about
three weeks they entered the territories of the Nawab of
Kuddapah, who was himself with the army. Here a
tumult, apparently accidental, but really preconcerted,
occurred between some troops belonging to the army of
 CONSPIRACY AGAINST MOZUFFER JUNG. 273

the Subadar and some villagers. The Nawab of Kudda- chap.

pah hastened to support his tenants, and attached the —^—
rear-guard of the main body of the Subadar’s army, that 1751.
being the part of the force with which the ladies of his
harem travelled. Mozuffer Jung, enraged at this inso¬
lence, determined to avenge it, but wished, in the first
instance, to assure himself of the countenance and support
of Hussy. The orders given to this officer had been to
avoid, as much as possible, all appearance of hostility,
and in accordance with these, he addressed himself to the
task of bringing about an accommodation between the
two angry chieftains. But it soon appeared that the
Nawab of Kuddapah had allied himself with the Nawabs
of Kurnoul and Savanore against their former confederate,
Mozuffer Jung, and that, although anxious, if possible, to
avoid hostilities with the French, they were resolved to
seize the opportunity of one of the confederates being
within his own district, to effect the destruction of the
Subadar. Mozuffer Jung had no sooner satisfied himself
regarding their plans than he ordered out his troops to
attack them, calling upon Bussy to support him. This,
Bussy, who considered himself bound to side with the
Subadar against traitors, promised to do. But Mozuffer
Jung, without waiting for the slower march of the infantry,
at once attacked the confederates with his cavalry. An
obstinate contest ensued, many being killed on both sides.
The confederates, however, maintained the position they
had taken up, until Bussy and the French contingent ar¬
rived on the ground. A few rounds from their artillery
and a general advance of their infantry decided the day.
The rebel army broke, fled, and dispersed, leaving the
Nawab of Savanore dead on the field, and taking with it
the Nawab of Kuddapah, grievously wounded. Mozuffer
Jung, indignant at the idea that he, the principal con¬
spirator, should escape, outstripped his French allies to
pursue him on his elephant. In his headlong course he
came upon the third confederate, the Nawab of Kurnoul.
 FRENCH INDIA ITS ZENITH.

chap. A desperate liand to Land contest ensued, in the course of

-—A—■ which the newly made Subadar, MozufFer Jung, was
1751. thrust through the brain by a spear, whilst his antagonist,
the Nawab of Kurnoul, was instantly afterwards hacked
to pieces.
The death of MozufFer Jung, Subadar of the Dekkan,
was in itself a severe, and might have been a fatal, blow
to the policy of Dupleix. In his person was struck down
the main defender of the French alliance, the man who
had personally experienced advantages to be derived from
French wisdom and French valour, the personal friend
and protdge of Dupleix. No successor could occupy the
position he had occupied with reference to French India.
It was indeed possible that the government of the vast
possessions he had inherited only to lose might devolve
upon a minor, or a declared antagonist, who might repu¬
diate all the engagements and cancel all the advantages
to which MozufFer Jung had agreed. Under these cir¬
cumstances the wisdom evinced by the selection of Bussy
became apparent. Feeling that to secure French interests
it was necessary for him to act, and act on the moment;
that it was essential that the chiefs and the army should
not be left in doubt as to their ruler, but that a man
should be appointed equally agreeable to them and to the
French, Bussy, with the concurrence of the principal offi¬
cers of the army, set aside the infant son of MozufFer
Jung, and at once proclaimed the next brother of the old
Subadar, Nazir Jung, Salabut Jung by name, as Subadar
or Yiceroy of the Dekkan for the Emperor Ahmed Shall.
From a throne to a prison, from a prison to a throne,
constituted in those days a condition of affairs which
might almost be’termed normal. Salabut Jung was no
exception to the rale. He was taken from confinement
to rule over thirty-five millions of his fellow-creatures !
The first act of the new Yiceroy was to confirm all the
concessions that his predecessor had granted to the French;
his next was to add to them. In gratitude, we may
suppose for his elevation, he joined to the French pos-
 CONCESSIONS MADE BY SALABUT JUNG. 275

sessions at Masulipatam, the lands attached to the villages chap.

of Nizainpatimm, of Condavir, of Alemanava, and of •—J—•
Karsapore in its neighbourhood. He ordered the re- 17Si.
building of all the factories at Yanoon 17111011 Ms brother,
Nazir Jung, had destroyed; and finally lie presented to
Dupleix the territory of Mafoosbundur in the district of
Cliicacole. • A few days later the army resumed its route,
stormed on March 18 the fortress of Kurnoul, the resi¬
dence of the deceased rebel Nawab of that title; bought
off the threatened hostilities of the Mahratta, Ballajee
Bajee Bao, by a present of two lacs of rupees; reached
Ilydrabad on April 12; remained there a month, and
finally made a triumphant entry into Aurangabad on
June 29. Here Salabut Jung, in the presence of Bussy
and all the nobles of the province, was solemnly invested
as Subadar of tiie Dekkan, on the authority of a firman
stated to have been received from the imperial court of
Delhi, but regarding the authenticity of which there are
very grave doubts. Here we must leave him, and with
him for a time the indefatigable Bussy, revolving great
schemes, which, had all gone well iu the Carnatic, rvould
undoubtedly have produced abundant fruit in their

We can leave them indeed with the greater satisfaction

at this conjuncture, because, regard being had to the
influence exercised by Diipleix, it constitutes the period
at which French domination in India may be said to have
attained'its zenith. A glance at the map of India will
show the enormous extent of country, which, in the
spring of 1751, recognised the moral supremacy of Pondi-
cliery. The entire country between the 'Yiudya range
and the Kistna, exceeding the limits of the territory now
known as that of the Nizam, was virtually ruled by a
French general; for a French army occupied the capital,
and French influence predominated in the councils, of the
Subadar. South of the Kistna again, the Governor of
French India had been constituted by the Mahomedan
276 FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

Viceroy of Southern India Nawab of tlie entire country,

•—ri—■ a country comprehending, be it remembered, the entire
i75l. Carnatic; and, theoretically, the whole of Mysore, the
kingdoms of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Cochin, and the
provinces of Madura and Tinivelly. If indeed the French
Governor did not hold these places under his own sway,
it was mainly because it was a part of his settled policy
to keep his authority in the background, and to govern
through the Princes of the country. It was for this
reason that he had made over the Carnatic to Chunda
Sahib, and contented himself with exercising a moral
influence, amounting, in fact, to a real supremacy, over
the others. But in the beginning of 1751, his power
was so flu-established that there was nowhere a sign of
opposition. Mahomed Ah, the rival of Chunda Sahib,
had promised submission and obedience, and had con¬
sented to retire from the stronghold of Trichinopoly.
The English, thus deprived of all pretext for interference,
were sulking at Madras and Fort St. David. Their pre¬
sence, it is true, constituted a thorn in the side of the
French ruler, but his bauds were withheld from attacking
them, and the utmost he could aim at was to bring about
such a state of things in Southern India, a condition of
such universal acquiescence in French arbitration, as
would leave Iris rivals without consideration and without
power. Aimed with the promise of Mahomed Ali to
agree to the conditions that had been proposed, he seemed
almost to have brought matters to that point in the spring
of 1751.
Whilst, then, Bussy is marching on Aurangabad—the
dictator of the Dekkan—everything seems to smile on the
daring statesman who, from his palace in Pondichery, di¬
rects all the movements on the board, and of him thus
triumphant, of him who in ten years lias made Pondichery
the centre-point of Southern India, we cannot refuse the
expression of our admiration of the soaring genius, the
untiring energy, the vast and comprehensive intellect.
 277

CHAPTER YU.

THE STEH&OLES OF DUPLEIX "WITH ADVEBSITY.

The energetic measures taken by Bussy after the death of c^p-

Mozuffer Jung had confirmed the ascendancy which the •-
French had attained in the counsels of the Subadar. All 1751.
the promises, all the arrangements, made by the deceased
Prince, had been at once ratified by his successor. Of
these perhaps the most important at the moment was
the engagement entered into with Mahomed Ali. It will
be recollected that this noble, the representative of the
family of Anwaroodccn, abandoned by everyone after the
downfall of Nazir Jung, bad taken refuge in the strong
fortress of Trichinopoly. Here, at the instance of the
Mahratta, Ilajah Janojee, he had opened with Dupleix ne¬
gotiations, which had terminated in a promise pn the part
of Mohamed Ali to recognise Chunda Sahib as Nawab,
and to make over to him Trichinopoly and its dependen¬
cies, on condition of being himself secured in the posses¬
sion of his father’s treasures, free from all inquiry as to
his administration, and of being intrusted with a subordi¬
nate government in another part of the Dekkan. It was
in the fullest belief that this engagement would be adhered
to, and that the matter was settled, that Dupleix had des¬
patched Bussy to Aurangabad.
Yet notwithstanding that Mahomed Ali had before the
march of Bussy agreed to the terms proposed, and that
Dupleix, on his part, had obtained and forwarded to him
the sanction of the Subadar to their being carried out in
their entirety, the matter seemed to hang fire. Whether
it was that lie distrusted the promise's of Dupleix, or that
 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITII ADVERSITY.

chap, lie trusted to the chapter of accidents, this at least is

_'1 1-_ certain, that Mahomed Ali delayed, on one pretext after
1751. another, compliance with the terms to which he had
agreed. At last, driven hard by Dupleix, he declared that
further concessions would be necessary before he could
give up Trichinopoly. So anxious was Dupleix for a
peaceful settlement of the question, that even this new
demand did not exhaust his patience. He sent the letter
of Mahomed Ali to Bussy, with a request that he would
obtain from the Subadar the necessary authority to enable
him to agree to the terms it contained. Considerable as
they were, these new demands were in his opinion small
iu comparison with the consequences which, he believed,
compliance with them would entail, viz. the evacuation
of Trichinopoly, and, with that, the pacification of the
Carnatic. The consent of the Subadar was easily obtained
by Bussy ; the proper documents were then forwarded to
Mahomed Ali, to be considered valid only on the condi¬
tion that he signed the treaty without further delay. Ma¬
homed Ali, however, still hesitated. He had been in fact,
throughout this period, urgently beseeching the English for
their assistance ; and it was only when, at the end of four
months after he had received intimation of the Subadar’s
consent to the additional conditions he had required, he
wrung from them a promise of substantive aid, that he
■ boldly threw off the mask, and refused to surrender Tri-
chinopoly on any conditions whatever.
Thus again was Dupleix, much against his own incli¬
nations, much, as he well knew, against the wishes of his
masters in Paris, forced into war. Thus again did the
question of French domination in India depend upon the
capture of the city of Trichinopoly. The army, which in
November, 1749, had marched from Pondichery with the
intention of carrying out this purpose, had been unwisely
diverted to another object. But tliis time Dupleix was
resolved there should be no such mistake. To the native
army of Chanda Sahib, consisting of from 7,000 to 8,000
 BOTH PAETIE3 ATAKCII OX VOLCOXDAII.

men, lie added therefore a European detachment of 400 chap.

men, a fetv Africans, and some artillery—the whole .——-
under the command of M. d’Auteuil. These left Poncli- 1751.
chery in the month of March, 1751.
Meanwhile the English, recognising and rightly recog¬
nising that their only chance of safety lay in their sus¬
taining the cause of the anti-French pretender to the
government of the Carnatic, had resolved to support
Mahomed Ali with all the means at their disposal. In
the early part of February, therefore, they despatched
Captain Cope at the head of 280 Europeans and 300
sepoys to aid in the defence of Triehinopoly; at the end of
March following, they ordered a force of 500 Europeans,
100 C'affres, 1,000 sepoys, and eight field-pieces to march
from Fort St. David, for the purpose of co-operating in
the field with the troops that still adhered to Mahomed
Ali, and which were expected from Triehinopoly. This
force was commanded by Captain Gingen, and, serving
with it as commissariat officer,—the second time we have ...
met him,—was Lieutenant Eobert Clive.
The first detachment,—that under Captain Cope,—had
during the same month made an unsuccessful attempt to
capture the city of Madura, held for Chunda Sahib by
Allim Khan, and had returned dispirited to Triehinopoly.
Captain Gingen, for his part, having been joined in the
middle of May by Mahomed All’s troops, 1,600 in number,
had at once marched on the pagoda Verdachelum, about
forty miles from the coast, and commanding the communi¬
cations between Fort St. David and Triehinopoly. Taking
and garrisoning this, and being joined by a further de¬
tachment of 4,000 men from Mahomed Ah, and 100
Europeans despatched to his aid by Captain Cope, lie
moved forward to intercept Chunda Sahib and the
French, of whom he had last heard as marching on Yol- .
£ondah, about forty-five miles to the north of Trichi-
nopoly, and on the high road to that place.
Volcondah was a considerable place, strong in its natu-
280 THE STRUGGLES OP DITPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

cttap. ral position, and, for a native town, very fairly fortified.
The governor held it for the Hawaii of the Carnatic, but
1731. as the rival forces approached it from different quarters,
he was apparently undecided as to whether Chimcla Sahib
or Mahomed Ali had the better claim to that title. It
was evident that a battle was imminent, and, uncertain as
to its results, he feared the consequences which a prema¬
ture declaration in favour possibly of the faction that
might be vanquished, might have on the party that should
prove victorious. He therefore judiciously declared that
the cession of the place would depend upon the issue of
the impending contest, whilst at the same time he lent an
attentive ear to the offers that were made him by both

The march of Chunda Sahib had been so slow that the

English had had time to take up a position to the south¬
west of Yolcondah, before he had advanced beyond that
place on his road to Tricliinopoly. It had now become
indispensable for him either to occupy Yolcondah, or,
gaining the governor, to drive the English from the neigh¬
bourhood. To this second end he spared neither per¬
suasion nor promises. Whether these would, under other
circumstances, have brought about the desired result may
be doubtful, but this at least is certain, that the shifty con¬
duct of the governor so wearied the English commander,
—who had likewise tried his persuasive powers,—that after
a fortnight’s useless negotiation, he resolved to compel
that which the other would not willingly yield. On the
evening of July 19, therefore, without apparently acquain¬
ting the Governor with his intention, Captain Gingen
marched a great portion of his force against the place,
with the intention of taking possession of it.
The outer defences of the town, and the town itself, fell
at once into the hands of the assailants; but this attack,
and the burning of some houses outside, roused the gar¬
rison of the fort, and the English were compelled to recoil
from its stone walls with considerable loss. Their ill-
 TIIE ENGLISH ARE BEATER. 2S1

advised movement decided the governor. lie threw him- chap.

self at once into the arms of Chunda Sahib* and summoned _
the French to his aid. Before daylight, consequently, 1751.
d'Auteuil put his force in motion, and entering the fort
with a portion of his troops, poured upon the English
such a fire of artillery, that notwithstanding all the efforts
of their officers they quitted the field in a panic,
abandoning their native allies, and leaving sis pieces of
cannon, several muskets, all their camp equipage and
stores of ammunition, as a prey to the conqueror. Had
the French pursued with anything like vigour, the war
would have been that day at an end. But a fatality
seemed to attend all the operations that might have been
decisive. D’Auteuil was laid up with gout, and was quite
unable to give his personal attention to details, nor had he a
single officer with him upon whom he could rely. Instead,
therefore, of taking advantage of the panic which had
overcome the English, and of converting their defeat into
an overthrow which must have been ruinous, the French
and their allies contented themselves with maintaining a
brisk cannonade on the enemy from the north bank of
the little river Yalaru, which he had crossed .in his retreat.
It has been said,* indeed, that Chunda Sahib was hindered
in his onward movements by the defection of one of his
generals, in command of 4,000 horse. Desertions from a
victorious to a vanquished enemy are not common, least
of all among nations of the East. But however that may
have been, it did not influence in the smallest degree the
movements of the French. It was for them, on this as on
previous occasions, to give the cue to their native allies.
All the accounts of their historians, the memoirs of Dupleix
himself, record that they failed to do this, and that they
failed because of the illness and apathy of their general,
and the want of spirit of their officers.
Never before, indeed, had such an opportunity been
 TIIE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

offered them; never such an opportunity neglected. The

force under Captain Gfingen constituted, with the excep¬
tion of ISO men under Captain Cope at Trichinopoly,
and a few left to mount guard at Fort St. David and
Madras,* the entire available force of English soldiers on
the Coromandel coast. A little display of energy on the
part of d’Auteuil and his officers would not only have
insured the destruction of this force, but, as a necessary
consequence, the fall of Trichinopoly, and the restriction
of the few English -who remained to the limits of their
possessions on the coast. This is no idle supposition.
It is capable of positive proof. So complete was the
panic which possessed the soldiers of the little army
under Captain Gingen, that they left their native allies to
fight whilst they fled in confusion; •f they heard without
shame the taunts of the brother of Mahomed Ali on
their cowardice; and notwithstanding that they were
not pursued, they abandoned their encampment at mid¬
night, and leaving behind them their guns, camp equi¬
page, and munitions of war, fled precipitately in the
direction of Trichinopoly. Can any one doubt that upon
men so panic-stricken, the vigorous pursuit of an enemy
would have produced the most decisive effect F Can any
one believe that the consequences of such decisive action
would not have been ruinous to the English ?
But no pursuit was attempted that day; d’Auteuil con¬
tented himself with seeming possession of Yolcbndali.
On the following morning, however, finding that the
enemy had disappeared, d’Auteuil followed on his track,
halting within a few miles of the position he bad , taken
up in the hilly country round Ootatoor, about twenty
miles north of Trichinopoly. Here during a halt of three
days, several skirmishes ensued, in one of which the
English fell into an ambuscade and suffered severely.
On the third day, Chunda Sahib attacked the English
* The reinforcements to he suhse- Fort St. Dnvicl till the end of July,
qiicntly alluded to did not reach t Orme, Cambridge.
 TEIE FRENCH IXVEST TRICHINOPOLY. 283

position, and although, owing to the non-arrival at the chap.

-cene of notion, at the time agreed upon, of the French ■—
contingent, he was repulsed, yet his attack made so serious 1751.
an impression upon the English, that they retreated the
same night to the banks of the Coleroon. They crossed
this river, followed by Chunda Sahib and the French, on
the 25th, and took possession of Seringham, an island
formed by the separation of the Coleroon from the river
Cauveri, but not deeming themselves even here secure,
they abandoned this also and the pagoda upon it—a very
strong position in which, supported by the troops in the
city, they might have defended themselves against five
times their number—and took refuge on July 28 under
the walls of Trichinopoly.
The French and then’ allies meanwhile pushed on, and
crossing the Coleroon took possession of Seringham.
First completing the conquest of this island by the
capture of the mud fort of Coiladcly, at its eastern
extremity, they crossed the Cauveri, aud encamped on
the plain to the east of the town near a position now
known as the French Rock. From this they commenced
a sort of bombardment of the place.
Trichinopoly * is situated on a plain which once was
crowded with rich villages and plantations of trees. The
town is in form of an oblong square, the longest sides of
which are east and west. On the north runs the river
Cauveri, less than half a mile from the fort. The town
at the time of which we are writing was nearly four
miles in circumference, with a double enceinte of walls
with round towers at equal distances. The ditch was
nearly thirty feet wide but not half so deep, and at
different seasons was more or less supplied with water.
The outer wall was built of greyish stone; it was about
eighteen feet high, and four or five thick, without parapet
or rampart; the inner wall, distant from it about twenty-
2S4 tiie struggles of dupleix with adversity.

chap, five feet, was much stronger, and was thirty feet high.
. vn- . Its thickness at the bottom was thirty feet, and it gra-
1751. dually decreased as it ascended by means of steps, to
a width of ten feet at the summit. In the middle of 'the
old town stood a most extraordinary rock about 300 feet
high. On the top of it was a pagoda ‘ which,’ says
Colonel Lawrence, ‘ was of singular use to us the whole
war; here was constantly stationed a man with a tele¬
scope, wrlio gave us by signals and writings an account of
all the enemy’s motions.’ It remains to be added that
the city is about ninety miles from the_ coast, the river
Cauveri running something less than half a mile to the
north-east of its northern face; beyond that, about a
mile from the south bank of the Cauveri, is the pagoda of
Scringham, and beyond that again the branch of the
Cauveri known as the Coleroon.
The French had, as we have seen, taken post to the
east of the city, and had opened fire on the walls.
Before, however, much progress had been made in the
siege, d’Auteuil, whom gout had utterly incapacitated,
was, at his own request, relieved from his command, and
returned to Pondichery. His successor was M. Law,
nephew of the famous Scotch financier, and who had1
recently returned from France with strong recommenda¬
tions from the Directors. We do not meet him here for
the first time. He it was who, at the time of the attack
on Pondichery by Admiral Boscawen, had been intrusted
with the defence of the outpost of Ariancopan; a service
in which he had displayed energy and vigour. His past
services and the character he then bore were sufficient
to authorise the expectations which Dupleix had formed
from his nomination. He was indeed destined to be
disappointed. But Captain Law’s case is not the only
instance in which showy qualities have covered infirmity
of purpose, or where pomposity and self-assertion in the
cabinet have been mistakenly regarded as indications of
ability in the field.
 CLIVE APPEARS- OX THE SCENE. 285

Nevertheless, at the commencement of his proceedings, ciiap.

Law displayed no lack of energy. Finding that the —.
English were resolved to defend Trichinopoly to the last, 1751.
and that its defences precluded the possibility of a suc¬
cessful assault, he determined to take advantage of the
possession given him, by the recent French victory, of
the neighbouring country, and to subject the town to a
strict blockade. Everything seemed to favour such a
proceeding. The great body of tlie English troops were
shut up in Trichinopoly, the few that remained could not
expect to cope successfully with the French in the field,
still less to introduce supplies into the town: in tlie
entire Carnatic, but one place, the small fort of Verda-
ehelum, on the road from Fort St. David to Trichinopoly,
held out for Mahomed Ali. The cause of the English
seemed hopeless; the fall of Trichinopoly, if strictly
blockaded and pressed vigorously, appeared certain.
Yet it was in these desperate circumstances, in this \
crisis of the fortunes of France and England, that there I
. appeared upon the stage one of those men whose daring I
genius and power of original conception supply the want I
of armies. We„ have already stated that with the force I
led by Captain Gingen to endeavour to intercept the
march of Chunda Sahib and the French on Trichinopoly,
there served as commissariat officer Lieutenant Robert
Clive. This officer had originally come out to India as
a writer in the civil service of the Company in the year
1741, and had been in Madras when that place was
taken by La Bourdonnais. On the departure of La
Bourdonnais, and the disavowal by Dupleix of the terms
of capitulation which he had unauthorisedly granted,
Clive had escaped to Fort St. David. Here he enjoyed
many opportunities of noticing the method of war adopted
in the East, in the several attacks made upon Fort St.
David by Dupleix and his allies, and in the movements
of Anwaroodeen and his two sons to hinder their success.
. When, subsequently, the arrival of Admiral Boscawen
2SG Till- STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

char, secured for the English a preponderance on the Coro-

mandel coast, and the siege of Pondichcry was resolved
1751. upon, Clive obtained permission to join the besieging
army in the rank of ensign. He is stated to have dis¬
tinguished himself on this occasion by his daring courage,
but the skill which was wanting in the leaders of the
besieging army shone brilliantly within the walls of the
town, and the enterprise miscarried. We next hear of
Clive at Devicotta, as usual in the foremost rank; and
shortly afterwards as commissariat officer of the expedi¬
tion sent to intercept Clmnda Sahib. In the panic which
followed the failure of Captain Gingen to possess himself
of Volcondah, Clive showed considerable presence of
mind, and attempted, though in vain, to rally the fugi¬
tives. * When the force retreated the following day
towards Trichinopoly, Olive returned to Fort St. David,
arriving there just as a reinforcement of about 400 men
landed from England. One detachment of these he
accompanied to Verdachelum, and a second to Trichi¬
nopoly, increasing the English garrison in that place to
000 men. Clive himself did not remain in Trichinopoly.
What lie saw there was not encouraging. The men
were dispirited, and had lost all confidence in their
officers, none of them remarkable for capacity or presence
of mind. The French were superior in numbers, and
seemed to be pushing their attack with resolution. The
surrender of the last stronghold of Mahomed Ali appeared
to him therefore to be inevitable, unless it were possible
to infuse a sort of revolutionary energy into the counsels
of_ the English. To attempt this at Trichinopoly would
bei he knew, useless. The fate of the English must
depend upon the action taken at the Presidency. To
rouse and influence it, he left therefore Trichinopoly and
returned to Fort St. David.
The plan which Clive had revolved in his own mind as
* Orme states, ‘ Captains Gingen, Clive endeavoured to rally them, but
Dalton, Killpatrick, and Lieutenant in vain.
 Ills INBORN GENIUS. 2S7

l lie plan absolutely necessary for the safety of his country¬ CHAP.
men, was due doubtless rather to his inborn genius than VII.
to extensive reading or study. It ivas nevertheless the 1751.
plan which the greatest military leaders have loved to
pursue,—a jilan which, adopted by a man possessing
daring and prudence, must always be successful, except
when opposed- by immensely superior numbers, or by
genius of the very highest order. There is this, too,
with respect to such a plan. Ho one but a great captain
ever has tried it, ever could try it. It is too much for the
spirit, for the capacity, of aij inferior man. To him it
seems too bold, too venturesome, too hazardous. It leaves
tea) much at stake. Aud this,—though the plan is as safe
as it is bold,—is safe because it is bold. We allude to
the carrying the war into an enemy’s country. The
inferior general who hesitates to do this, though he sees
that if it could be done it would save him and ruin his
enemy, does not calculate on the inevitable effect which
such a movement 'must produce on the “ morale ” of the
force opposed to him, especially when that force constitutes
the principal, perhaps the entire, available army of the
enemy. He does not consider that such a movement must
paralyse the onward march of his opponent. Yet history
abounds with such examples. Even the great Frederic
gave up, at a critical period, his movements in Saxony,
when he found the Austrians were marching on Berlin.

would act thus, what may we imagine would be the

■fleet of such a movement on men of inferior capacity ?
Lt must always be startling, almost always decisive.
Clive, we say, had arrived at such a conclusion by the
nere force of Ins genius. He had the capacity to open
he eyes of his mind, and see the result that must follow.
Ie went therefore, on Ins return from Trichinopoly,
iirect to the Governor, Mr. Saunders ; pointed out to him
ow if matters were allowed to take their slavish course’
.riclunopoly, and, with it, English interestsTmust fall ■
2SS THE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, that Chunda Sahib, having brought all his resources to

•—A—- bear upon the siege, had left his capital comparatively
1751. unguarded; that there was no force of his or of the French
ia the field; that Law was at Trickinopoly, Bussy at
Aurangabad ; that, therefore, a blow might be struck at
the heart of the enemy’s possessions, which, if successful,
would either force him to leave his hold on Tricliinopoly,
or wpuld open out a new field for military operations,
success in which would compensate for the loss of that
place. To add force to his proposition, lie offered to lead
himself the troops that might be destined to carry it into
effect. Mi'. Saunders, who had been appointed governor
the preceding year, was a man who possessed the not
inconsiderable merit of appreciating the large schemes of
others, though he might not have been equal to devising
any of his own. He cordially received the propositions
made to him by Clive ; ordered for field service a force
of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys,—thus reducing the
garrisons of Madras and Fort St. David to their lowest
point,—and crowned the whole bj' nominating Clive him¬
self as commandant, with the rank of captain, and with
unlimited powers.*
Arcot, the place at which Clive aimed his blow, was the
capital of the Carnatic,—the seat of the Eawab’s govern¬
ment. At the time of which we are writing it was an
open town possessing about 100,000 inhabitants. There
was, it is true, a fort with the outward signs of fortifica¬
tions, but these had long since fallen into decay. The
ramparts were in a state of ruin, and the bastions were
crumbling from age and want of repair. The- garrison,
entirely native, consisted of about 1,000 men, nearly one
half of whom were cavalry ; to the native gunners, how¬
ever, had been attached two or three French artillerymen
for the purpose of instructing them in the European

* Mr. Orme states tint 'besides never been in action, and four of tlio
Clive, there were hut eiuht officers six were members of the mercantile
with this furee, six of whom had sen-ice.
 Dl'PLErX MAKES A COUNTER-MOVE. 289

method of rapid firing. These were at the time in chap.

Arcot. _ '—;—
To attack and take possession of this place, Olive, at the 1751.
head of the force above detailed, left Madras on Septem¬
ber G ; on the 11th, after halting one day at Oonjeveram,
he arrived within ten miles of the capital. Thence he
resumed his march, and, notwithstanding the unpropi-
tiousuess of the -weather, which displayed itself in a
thunder-storm of almost unprecedented violence, arrived
the same day at the very gates of Arcot. The news of
his march had preceded him, and the native garrison,
terrified at the idea of opposing a man who could thus
bid defiance to the elements, had hastened to evacuate the
place. Clive therefore entered it without opposition, and,
prescient as to the effect which its capture must have
upon the enemy, proceeded at once to repair and improve
its fortifications.
This successful occupation of the capital of his native
protege and ally, whilst it surprised and vexed, did not at
all disconcert, the active-minded and energetic Governor
of Pondichery. If Clive had calculated that his raid would
lead at once to the abandonment of the siege of Trichino-
poly, he found himself mistaken. Dupleix, in fact, looking
at matters with the glance of a statesman and a general.,
saw that notwithstanding this diversion, the chances were
still ten to one in his favour. It was by pressing more
earnestly the siege of the strongly fortified Trichinopoly,
the last refuge of Mahomed Ali, that he felt he could
conquer Clive in Arcot. He therefore bent every energy
of lvis mind to increase and render effective the force
under Law. lie sent him Europeans from Pondichery,
and a battering-train from Karical, and he urged both
upon him and upon Chunda Sahib the urgent necessity of
permitting no consideration whatever to interfere with the
pressing and absolute necessity of conquering Trichin-
opoly. This was the true policy for nullifying and de¬
feating the daring action of Clive.
290 THE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap. But, unfortunately for Dupleix, he was badly served.

Law’s action will be hereafter referred to. As for Chunda
1751. Sahib, no sooner had he heard of the capture of Arcot,
than he insisted oil detaching 4,000 of his best troops to
retake his lost capital. Dupleix, though regretting that
the force before Tiicliinopoly had been thus weakened,
strengthened this detachment, as it passed Poudichery, by
100 Europeans. It was further increased by other native
levies to the number of 10,000 men. Thus augmented
it marched under the command of Eajah Sahib, son of
Chunda Sahib, upon Arcot.
The siege which followed not only presents one of the
most glorious pictures of Anglo-Indian history, but it may
be considered likewise as the turning-point in the Eastern
career of the English,—the foundation-stone of their
present empire. It was at Arcot that English officers
taught their sepoys, to follow them with the implicit confi¬
dence which superior skill and energy alone can inspire ;
it was at Arcot that they learned the lesson, followed up
afterwards with such magnificent results by their leader,
that in Asiatic warfare the question of numbers 4s merely
a secondary consideration ; that discipline and the self-
confidence born of it are of infinitely greater importance;
that there is nothing which a capable general, one who
can impress his spirit on his soldiers, may not prudently
attempt against an undisciplined enemy. It was at Arcot,
in fine, that the Anglo-Indian army received its baptism of
.victory.
The incidents of that famous siege are well known to
the readers of Anglo-Indian history.f On October 4th
Eajah Sahib took possession of the town, and commenced
the investment of the fort. On the 5 th, the besiegers
beat back a sortie headed by Clive in person. Fifteen
days later their battering-train 'arrived, mid on Novem¬
ber 4, two 18-pounders from Pondichery. The ^arrison
* The detailed account of Ornie leave n othiug be desired on this
and tlie brilliant sketch of Macaulay head.
 OLIVE BESIEGED 1ST AJECOT. 291

had been reduced to 120 Europeans and 200 sepoys. A chap.

reinforcement of 100 Europeans and 200 sepoys, sent .—L—
from Madras and commanded by Lieutenant Innis, was 1751.
attacked on the 5th at Tripatore, and forced to take
refuge in Poonamalee. The garrison was thus left
entirely to itself. Its stock of provisions, originally only
a sixty days’ supply, was more than half exhausted. On
the 10th, a practicable breach having been made in the
walls, Eajah Sahib sent to Clive a proposal to surrender,
offering honourable terms to the garrison and a consider¬
able sum of money to himself, and accompanying it by a
threat to storm the fort and put the garrison to the
sword, if his proposition were not acceded to. In reply
Clive rejected the proffered terms, contemptuously as
regarded the money, and tauntingly with respect to the
threats.
For some days Eajah Sahib yet hesitated. He might
still indeed, had he been left alone, have forced the eva¬
cuation of the fort by a continued blockade, for he was
well aware of the attenuated state of the supplies within
its walls. But, all this time, Mr. Saunders, the Governor
of Madras, had exerted himself with unsurpassable energy
to deliver bis young captain from his difficult position.
First, by reinforcements to Lieutenant Innis, under a
more experienced officer, Captain Killpatrick, he had en¬
abled the detachment to march from Poonamalee in the
direction of Arcot. But, secondly, and with a far more im¬
portant effect upon Eajah Sahib, he had induced the Mah-
rattas to take up arms on behalf of Mahomed Ali. A
body of 0,000 of these, under the command of Morari
liao, had been for some time awaiting the course of events
in the pass of Damalchery. But, though nominally the
allies of Mahomed Ali, the fortunes of tli#t chieftain were
at so low an ebb that they hesitated at first to commit
themselves in his favour. The sturdy defence of Arcot,
however, had not been without its effect upon these hardy
warriors. In the handful of men who had defended
 TIIE STRUGGLES OP DITLEIX WITH ADVERSITY

c*™p- its dilapidated fortifications against numbers so superior,

•—they recognised soldiers worthy of tlieir alliance. They
17ul* determined therefore, without further hesitation, to cast
in their lot with the English.
The intelligence of this finally determined Rajah Sahib.
He had to choose between an encounter with Morari Eao
in the field, supported by a sortie from the garrison, or
an immediate assault. With correct judgment he chose
the latter alternative, and, on the evening of the 24tli
November, made his preparations for the storm. Un¬
fortunately for the success of his plans, a deserter'disclosed
them_ tp...Clive. When, therefore, hisTroops~actvancecl,
early on the following morning, to the assault, they found
that every possible preparation had been made to receive
them, that cannon Avere pointed at the breach, that spare
muskets were loaded and in readiness, and that the small
garrison had. by the ability of their commander, been
utilised so as to supply by the skilful disposition of the
troops composing it the paucity of their numbers.
Nevertheless, preceded by elephants to burst open the
gates, the native troops of Rajah Sahib advanced boldly to
the attack. Unsupported as they Avere by the French
contingent, which strangely kept aloof, they mounted the
north-Avc-st breach, passed the first trench, and charged
the English draAvn up to receive them. They were how¬
ever received with such a terrible and continuous fire,
spare muskets lying handy for that purpose, that after
vain efforts, in which they lost their gallant leader, a
Maliomedan, they recoiled. The attack on the south¬
west made by means of a raft thrown across the Avet ditch
was equally unsuccessful, and at the end of ail hour, it
became evident to Rajah Sahib that his attack had failed.
His loss amomked to 400 men, slain AA-hilst gallantly
attempting to storm a fortress defended by Europeans, feAV
indeed in number but strong in discipline, and commanded
by a hero. No greater proof indeed could be given of
the means at the disposal of the defenders than this, that
 THE SIEGE EAISED. 293

although not exceeding 200, including sepoys, in num- chap.

her, they, besides serving five pieces of cannon, fired off 7_—
during this hour’s attack, not less than 12,000 musket 1751.
cartridges! *
The following morning, Rajah Sahib raised the siege and
retreated on Yellore, accompanied only by the French and
the troops which- had been sent from Trichinopoly, all the
rest deserting him. Here we will leave him whilst we
describe the effect of tins repulse on the French leader
himself.
We have already stated that Dupleix had never regarded
the attack upon Clive as aught but a very minor and
subordinate part of his great scheme. He had strenuously
opposed the weakening of the force before Trichinopoly
for the purpose of aiding in any such enterprise. And
when, owing to the fears of Chunda Sahib, the native
portion of that force was temporarily diminished, he had
reinforced it by 100 Europeans, chiefly with the view of
enabling it to contend, without certainty of defeat, against
the English. His hope was that, thus reinforced, Rajah
Sahib might detain Clive in Arcot until Trichinopoly
should be taken. It was a -well-considered policy, the
success of .which was seemingly certain, provided only.
that skill and energy directed the movements before the
walls of Trichinopoly.
We sec then Dupleix, in this crisis, fully alive to all its
dangers; detecting the able conceptions of Clive, and
taking the measures which, properly carried out, would
have thwarted them. We see him, so far from- being
deterred by Clive’s march upon Arcot from prosecuting
the siege of Trichinopoly, pressing that siege with greater
eagerness than ever; at the same time that he offered to
Clive’s movement an opposition just sufficient to secure
for himself time to cany out, unmolested, the great obje'ct
of the campaign.
294 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap. We left Law before Trichinopoly at the head of a force

11L . of about 400 Europeans. All the energies of Dupleix
1751. had been from the first directed to increase the number
of these to a force that should be irresistible. Every
detachment that landed from Europe, every party that
could be called in, was used for this end. They were all
sent off to the plain before Trichinopoly. So energetic was
Dupleix, so earnest and enthusiastic in all he did, that in
an incredibly short space of time Law saw himself at the
head of one of the largest disciplined forces that had till
then operated in the interior of the Carnatic, amounting
of all arms to nearly 900 Europeans and 2,000 disci¬
plined sepoys; whilst, encamped beside him, aiding him
in all his undertakings, was the native army of Chunda
Sahib, in number nearly 30,000, a very large proportion
of whom were horsemen. Besides these he had a park
of fifty guns, many of them of a very large calibre. The
most pressing orders were at the same time sent from
Pondiehery to push on the works, in order to capture the
place before the operations of Clive should make them¬
selves felt in the vicinity. Law in consequence made a
great show of activity, and succeeded in submitting the
garrison to a strict blockade. This however was all he
did do. The man so bold and vaunting in council, whose
pre-emiment object in life seemed to be to impress others
with a sense of his great cleverness, showed liimself, in
command of an army, to be absolutely incapable. Over¬
bearing to his officers, suspicious of everybody, haughty,
vain, and obstinate, unenterprising himself and checking
enterprise in others, Law gained no confidence and con¬
ciliated no opinions. Like an obstinate commander, de¬
ficient in vision, who, unable to see himself, distrusts the
eyesight of others, and thus allows opportunity after
opportunity to slip away, so did Law, headstrong and
incapable, persist in measures that were useless, and re¬
ject counsels that might have led to easy victory. The
English that garrisoned Trichinopoly were led by Captain
 THE BLIXDXESS OP LAW. 295

Gingen, of whose inferior abilities we have already spoken. chap.

They were animated by a spirit far less buoyant than that'
which had induced the soldiers of Clive to dare so many 1751.
dangers and difficulties. They were dispirited by defeat,
by retreat, and by being cooped up in a fortress, which
they appeared to have but small chance of defending with
success. An assault on the part of Law would almost
certainly have succeeded. This was pressed upon him
from all sides, by Chunda Sahib as much as by Duplerx.
Cut, confident in his own cleverness, despising or affect¬
ing to despise the opinions of. others, Law clung to his
own eoiu'ses, and adhered to the safe blockade which, he
thought, would in the end pull him through.
Yet, even in this course, he showed singular blindness,
and extraordinary deficiency in even the ordinary arrange¬
ments of his camp. The ruler of Mysore, encouraged by
the resistance which Trichinopoly was making, and by
the diversion of Clive, had sent a detachment of 500
Mahratta cavalry to harass the besiegers. These not only
defeated a small body of native horse, but were even
successful, thanks to the want of order and arrangement
in the French camp, and of spirit and enterprise on the
part of the French leader, in entrapping sixty French
dragoons into an ambuscade, and in destroying all but
ten of that number. They were so encouraged by this
success, that their leader, Innis Khan, proposed to Captain
Gingen that he should inarch out with his English, and
attack the united army of the besiegers. If Gingen -would
do this, and would undertake with his troops to engage
the French, lie promised, on his part, to encounter the
entire cavalry of Chunda Sahib, though out-numbering
bis own in the proportion of twelve to one. This was at
first declined. On receiving, however, a reinforcement of
1,000 men, Innis Khan renewed his proposition. Captain
Gingen being still unwilling, the commander of the Mah-
rattas did not hesitate to tell him that he and his soldiers
were of a very different nature from the men he had seen
296 THE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, fighting so gallantly at Arcot.* Captain Gingen was ap-

YIL . parently confirmed in his objection to active measures by
1751. the ill-success of a small force he had detached against
the little town of Eistinwaram, thirty miles from Trichino-
poly, occupied by the French,—the force having been
repulsed with some loss, and their leader, Captain Cope,
mortally wounded.
Thanks, then, to the incompetence of this opponent, the
measures of Law, unenterprising as they were, seemed
to be ou a fair way to success. But he forgot that there
were other actors on the scene besides himself. He for¬
got that the time, with -which he was trifling, might be
used to good purpose by his opponents. He forgot, or,
at least, acted as if he forgot, that his army and the for¬
tress of Trieliinopoly were not- isolated from all the world;
that, if he looked upon its capture as the final seal to
French domination, others were determined to use every
means in their power to prevent it. Tlius it happened
that he slumbered whilst others acted. When a little
energy would have given him possession of the coveted
prize, he was content to act with more caution and more
reserve than might have been expected even from a
Hicias ; nay more, he absolutely threw away chances,
courted defeat, and, by his conduct, gave to his rival that
empire of the East, which, but for him, might have been
gained, for at least a time, by the French. For whilst
Law, disregarding the entreaties of Dupleix, slumbered
before Trieliinopoly, the daring energy of Clive was gain¬
ing for England advantages and resources of which the
French were thus deprived. Ho sooner had the youthful
victor of Arcot seen the besieging army of Bajah Saliib
melt away from before him, than, having received the
reinforcement commanded by Captain Kilpatrick, and
having made the necessary arrangements for the defence
of the capital be had conquered, he set out in pursuit of
the enemy at .the head of 200 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and
 VICTORIOUS COURSE OP CLIVE. 297

three pieces of field artillery. Notwithstanding that his chap.

Maliratta allies, venturing too close to Yellore, had sus-
tained a severe defeat at the hand of the French who were 1751.
with Puijah Sahib, and that a reinforcement of these from
Pondichery had effected a junction with their countrymen,
raising their number to 300, Clive did not hesitate to
move in their direction. After a forced inarch of twenty
miles he came np with them as they were preparing to
cross the Ami. With their usual gallantry, the French
turned to meet their rivals, but, though somewhat superior
in numbers, they were absolutely deficient in that one
necessity, the possession of which by the English made up
for even greater disparity. The force under Clive con¬
sisted of 200 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and 600 Maliratta
horse. With the French, 300 in number, were 2,500
foot, and 2,000 horse levies. But whilst they had no
general, the English possessed Clive. The consequence
was that the French badly posted, and having no com¬
petent commander, were completely out-manoeuvred.
Charged in their flank at a critical period of the action,
they were forced to abandon the field, and with it their
guns, to the enemy. They retreated thence hastily on
Gingee with a loss of 50 Europeans and 150 natives,
killed and wounded. The English lost not one of their
own countrymen and hut eight sepoys ; of the Mahrattas
about 50 were missing.*
Encouraged by this success, Clive marched on Con-
jeveram, which had been meanwhile taken by the French,
reduced it after a smart resistance, and then returned
to Fort St. David to concert measures for the relief
of Tricliinopoly. Whilst engaged in this important
design, intelligence reached the Presidency that Eajah
Sahib, taking advantage of Clive’s absence, had recovered
■ Conjeveram, and had ravaged the country up to within
a few miles of Madras itself. Determined to clear
the province of this enemy before venturing on the
* Orme.
298 THE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, greater enterprise, Clive left Fort St. David at the head
. M1, . of a force, which, though inferior to that of the enemy,
1702. was yet considerable. The terror of his name preceded
him. Eaj ah Sahib and his French allies at once abandoned
the vicinity of Madras, and retreated to an entrenched
camp at Yendalore. Here, however, they conceived the
design of surprising Arcot, whilst Clive should be engaged
in the reduction of Conjeveram. Strengthening this
place, therefore, they moved by forced marches upon
Arcot. But Clive, suspecting their design, managed
to procure the surrender of Conjeveram on the first
summons, and then hastened in pursuit of the enemy.
He found them a little after sunset, strongly posted at
Covrepauk, about two-thirds of the distance on the road
to Arcot, evidently determined to resist his further
progress. On this occasion their artillery was so skilfully
posted, and committed such havoc amongst the English
gunners, that it appeared as though Clive would for
the first time be forced to retreat. By means of one
of his officers, however, who could speak French, the
English leader, at the moment when matters seemed
desperate, succeeded in deceiving the enemy’s sentries,
and in bringing a large force into their rear1. These
suddenly firing a volley, caused such a complete panic
amongst the French, that they hastily abandoned their
position and their guns, and fled as they best could.
Many of them were taken prisoners, and by this artifice,
an impending defeat was converted into a victory, till
then the greatest of the war. Another proof, if any
were required, that valour and strong positions are
useless if there is a general to attack, and none to defend
them.
From the scene of this victory Clive marched to Arcot,
and thence in the direction of Yellore. Whilst, however,
contemplating the reduction of this place, which was
held by Mortiz Ali on behalf of Chunda Sahib, he
received instructions to repair instantly to Fort St. David,
 LAWRENCE MOVES ON TRICHINOPOLY.

there to undertake immediate measures for the relief chap.

of Trichinopoly, the garrison of which was suffering .—
from the close blockade persisted in by Law. On his 1752.
way to that place, he came upon the site of the victory
gained by de la Touche over Nazir Jung, on which
the rising town of Dupleix-Futteh-abad, * was already
straggling into existence. Allowing for the moment his
hatred of the great Trench statesman to stifle his more
generous instincts, Clive razed the town to its foundations.
He then marched in all haste to Fort St. David. Here
he found that the governor had been unsparing in his
exertions to make provision for the contemplated enter¬
prise. So great, indeed, had been his energy that, in
three days after his return, Clive found himself in
readiness to march towards Trichinopoly.
This was on March 25, 1752. The following day,
however, brought once more to the shores of India the
tried veteran, Major Lawrence. His arrival caused a de¬
lay of two days, as well as some change in the position
of affairs. On the 28th, however, all was in readiness,
and a party of 400 Europeans and 1,100 sepoys, with
eight field-pieces, escorting military stores and provisions,
set out that morning for Trichinopoly under the com¬
mand indeed of Lawrence, but with Clive as his trusted
subordinate.
It is time now that we should return to Dupleix.
He it was who, at the time when he learned that Clive had
proceeded to Fort St. David to concert measures for the
relief of Trichinopoly, had, considering it no disgrace to
learn something even from an enemy, instigated Eajah
Sahib to make that raid into the English territories, the
results of which we have recorded. Though unsuccessful', it

it detestable action, the death of pleix’ policy, brought to it

zir Jiuig. The prejudices and point by the victory of de la Touche.
:sions oi
parlous of me
the Hour
hour may hare dis-
nave ais- The
me death ot of JNazir
Nazir Jui
Jung was an
po.-ed contemporary Englishmen thus incident of that victory, for which
to regard it, hut the statement is the French were not responsible.
300 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, cannot be denied that it eminently deserved to succeed,

. AIL . that it had almost succeeded, when at the moment that
1752. victory was in his grasp, the carelessness of the French
commander at Covrepauk threw it absolutely away.
Dupleix was terribly mortified at this failure. For the
moment indeed it entirely upset his plans. The defeat at
Covrepauk had not only deprived him of soldiers whom
he could scarcely spare, of field artillery that was priceless;
but it had cast down the spirits of his native allies to an
unprecedented and even dangerous degree. No longer
could he hope by their aid to effect a diversion in the
northern part of the Carnatic. The English had not
only gained territory, but with it, of more importance,
the confidence of the military class. Desertion by
wholesale had taken place from the French to the English
standard. More than one important satrap had renounced
his adherence to Chunda Sahib, and taken the oath
of fidelity to the besieged Mahomed Ali. And this was
the consequence of the victories of Clive, of the repeated
defeats, sustained by the French, more especially of the
fatal disaster at Covrepauk. To see advantages there
so nearly gained, so carelessly abandoned, was more than
even the composed spirit of Dupleix could bear. Those
of his own officers indeed whom he could have made
responsible for the disaster had either been captured or
killed. Upon Bajak Sahib, whose pusillanimity and in¬
capacity had been conspicuous, the weight, therefore, of
his anger fell. For several days he refused to see him,
and when at last they did meet, he showed towards the
son of Chunda Sahib a contempt, which it was impossible
for him, practised as he was in dealing with native princes,
to conceal.
But though mortified beyond measure at the ill-success
of plans which so well deserved to succeed, Dupleix still
adhered to that bold and daring policy which he justly
regarded as more than ever necessary to the attainment
of his vast plans. What had been lost in the northern
 DUPLEIX GIVES LAW AN OPPORTUNITY.

Curnatic might be gained in the south. Trichinopoly

might make amends for Arcot and Covrepauk. And
now, Trichinopoly was apparently at its last gasp. With¬
out money, with little ammunition, with deficient and
failing supplies, with a European commandant devoid of
ability, the English garrison and the Mogul soldiers and
them leader had already begun a course of recrimination,
which, occurring between allies, is the almost invariable
precursor of disaster. A little more energy on the part
of Law, and the place must have fallen. It was at this
crisis that -intelligence reached Dupleix of the measures
that were being concerted at Eort St. David. The num¬
ber of the men destined for the relief of Trichinopoly,
the nature of the stores they were to escort, the probable
date of their departure,—all were known to him. He
instantly took a resolution worthy of himself. Detailing
to Law the information which he had acquired, he sent
him, at the same time, the most stringent orders to mass
a great number of liis troops, leaving only a few to
maintain the blockade of Trichinopoly, in order to attack
and intercept the enemy’s convoy. These orders were
reiterated and enforced in successive despatches. The
very mode in which they could be carried out was
indicated with a clearness which left nothing to desire.
Ho sent him besides all the troops that had become
available by the cessation' of the campaign in the North
Carnatic, enjoining upon him that, upon this stroke,
depended the issue of the war,—that the English beaten
and the convoy captured, Trichinopoly must surrender,
Fi'cneh influence must triumph; that, failing in this blow,
France would have the mortification of seeing her power,
her influence, her authority so dearly gained, and till then
so vigilantly maintained, transferred to her hated rivals.
It was indeed a grand opportunity. Had there been a
Dussy instead of a Law in the French camp, who can
doubt how he would have executed the instructions of his
superior? But unfortunately for the real interests of
302 THE STRUGGLES OP DOPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap. France, Bussy, the true soldier, was far away at Aurung-
abad, and Law, the pretender, -was before Trichinopoly.
1732. It is vain indeed to speculate whether in the concussion
between the rival and not unequal powers of Bussy and
Clive, the latter or the former would have come forth
the victor. This at least is certain, that the youthful
hero who laid the first foundations of English empire in
India, though displaying on all occasions military talents
and resources of the very highest order, never did meet
on the field of battle an opponent of even ordinary merit.
We will now see how Law used his opportunity. The
distance from Fort St. David to Trichinopoly being about
150 miles, and the route necessitating the crossing of
eight considerable rivers, amongst which were the Yalaru,
the Coleroon, the A7eller, the Pudu Cauveri, and the
Cauveri, the latter three times, Law could calculate to a
nicety the time and the means for best attacking and
crushing the enemy. The necessity for the passage of so
many broad and rapid rivers multiplied his opportunities
for defending them. But he judged, it would seem wisely,
that he would himself run less risk, and would insure
the more complete destruction of the enemy, if he were'
to allow him. to approach within an easy distance of Tri¬
chinopoly, and were then to engage him in a position in
which his defeat would be certain. So far Law judged
correctly and wisely. But in the execution of this plan
he failed lamentably. Instead of detaching from his own
force a body of troops sufficient in number to render
success a matter of certainty, he sent to meet a party of
400 Europeans and 1,100 sepoys commanded by such
men as Lawrence and Clive, a force consisting of but 200
Europeans and from 300 to 400 natives. He did this
too at a time when the troops at his own disposal, in¬
dependently of the levies of Cliunda Sahib, consisted of
900 Europeans and about 2,000 sepoys. Well could he
have spared one-half of this number for the important
service he had in view! Far safer would it have been
 law’s incapacity. 303 .

for him to have undergone the small risk of a sortie on chap.

the part of the English garrison, commanded, .as it was, .—
by a man whom recent experience had proved to be 1752.
unenterprising, than to have courted defeat by sending
against Lawrence a force which must be beaten. He
might, under the circumstances, have safely left his camp
under the protection of one-fourth, of his army, and have
marched with the rest to crush Lawrence. So would
have acted a real general,* but experience has abundantly
proved that over-caution and incapacity in the field are
the almost invariable accompaniments of superciliousness
and self-laudation in the cabinet. .
Having persuaded himself that he could only, with,
safety to liis main force, detach 250 Europeans and 300
or 400 natives to crush 400 English, and 1,100 sepoys,
commanded by Lawrence and inspirited by Clive, Law
sent them to occupy the fortified post of Coiladcly, on
the northern bank of the Cauveri river. The position
was not ill-chosen, and, had it been occupied in sufficient
force, would undoubtedly have proved an insurmountable
obstacle to the advance of the English. A glance at the
map will show the inherent strength of this position.
The advance of Major Lawrence must necessarily take
place between the two branches of the river Cauveri.
Of these, the upper branch was defended by the fortified
post of Coiladdy on its northern bank, unassailable by
the English. Between the northern and the southern
bank the distance was less than half a mile. Possessing
Coiladdy, and having an equal or superior force available
to occupy the ground between the two branches, it would
have been easy for the Erench commander to have in¬
flicted upon an advancing enemy a crushing defeat. As,
however, the defending force did not nearly equal in
number the advancing foe, its commander resolved not
* The behaviour of Lor* Strath- which an enemy marching to relieve
nairn before Jkansie in 1857, under a besieged place may be met and
circumstances notdissimilar, presents destroyed,
a striking instance of the manner in
. 304 THE STRUGGLES OE DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, to attempt anything desperate. He considered, however,

that as the ordinary road led directly within cannon shot
1752. of Coiladdy, and that the English would probably follow
it, he would be able, not only to inflict upon them con¬
siderable loss in men, but to capture or destroy a great
portion of their convoy. Chance, at first, seemed to
favour his designs. On April 7, Major Lawrence, misled
by his guides, took his force even nearer to the upper
branch of the Cauveri than would have been the case
had he followed the ordinary route, and found himself
all at once under the fire of the guns of Coiladdy. These
did considerable execution, and before he could move
out of range, he had lost twenty Europeans, and his
convoy and baggage had been thrown into great disorder.
This was the time which the French force, had it been
strong enough, might have used with crushing effect.
But its commander had apparently inbibed the hesitating
and unenterprising nature of his chief. Partly on this
account, partly doubtless because he felt himself tied
down by the orders he had received, he remained sta¬
tionary in his stronghold. Major Lawrence therefore
was able, not only to extricate himself from his position,
but to safely convey that portion of the convoy # he had
with him to within ten miles of Trichinopoly.
Tims failed, and failed deservedly, Law’s first attempt
to crush the advancing English. Like all the measures
of weak men it was a half measure, aud was therefore
ineffective. Fearing to run the risk of an attack from
the garrison should he detach a strong force to meet
Lawrence, he sent only a weak one, and thus incurred
the greater risk of losing his whole army. For he ex¬
posed his force, first, to the risk of being beaten in
detail; secondly, to its being overwhelmed by the com¬
bined forces, superior in numbers, of Lawrence and
Gingen. To avert a very small risk, therefore, he ran a
* He had left tlie .remainder the south, of the upper Cauveri, a post
previous day at Trietapolly, on the belonging to the king of Taujoref
 HE PAILS. 305

very great one, and drew upon his force the destruction chap.
in which a bolder course of action would most probably .-A—
have involved the English. It is a crisis of this nature 17o2.
which really tries a man, which tests the material of
which he is made. Law failed because, with all his
pomposity and arrogance, he was essentially a man of a
limited intellect and narrow views.*
His next measures appear to have been conceived in no
abler spirit. Receiving intimation from the commandant
of the detachment at Coiladdy that he had been un¬
successful in preventing the advance of the English,.it
was even then possible for him, commanding as he did
the high road from that place to Trichinopoly, as well as
the country in its neighbourhood, to atone, by a combined
attack, for his previous inaction. But although he had
fur some time been well acquainted with all the move¬
ments of Major Lawrence, he had made no effort to
mass his forces. They lay scattered in the various posts
he had assigned them. When, therefore, the news reached
him that the English had passed Coiladdy, he was for the
moment, thanks to his own negligence, entirely without
the means of offering an instantaneous obstruction to
their further advance. Seeing nevertheless the great
advantage over him which the English would certainly
obtain, should they effect a junction with the garrison of
Trichinopoly, he hastily called in his scattered detach¬
ments, prepared, when too late, to risk a general action.
Such a resolution, taken twenty-four hours earlier, might
have saved his army, and even have gained Trichinopoly.
This movement could not be effected till the following
morning. All that night the detachments moved into

* We are veil aware that Law, in course would have been preferable
bis Pldinte emlre le Sieur Bupleir, to that which he adopted. But it
attempts to justify himself; but ad- is clear from the number he had
luitting his facts, he must still be with him at the time of Ms stir-
condemned. Ilad he, as he asserts, render—nearly 800—that the amount
only GOO Europeans, he should either of his force of Europeans on April 7
hare raised the siege, or hare inarched is understated at 900.
with those to crush Lawrence. Any
X
306 THE STRUGGLES OF DUFLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, camp, and at daylight the force proceeded to take up the

vn- . position assigned to it by Law, and upon which he fondly
1752. hoped the English general would march. Yet this posi¬
tion, although strong, was in a certain point of view almost
necessarily ill-chosen. Law was too close to Trichi-
nopoly to draw up his men so as to bar the road across
which Lawrence must pass, for in that case he would
have exposed himself to the serious danger of an attack
on his rear from the garrison. He was compelled, there¬
fore, to take up a position in which he could meet an
assault from both parties on his front. In this view he
drew up his forces in. a line drawn obliquely from the
village of Chucklepollam on the Cauveri to the French
Lock, and extended thence still more obliquely to the
almost inaccessible rock of Elmiseram. As the direct
road to Tricliinopoly lay between those two positions,
Law was not without hope that the English would move
upon them before attempting a junction with the garrison.
Major Lawrence, however, was far too wary. March¬
ing early in the morning from Killycottah, where he had
encamped the previous evening, he fell in, before he had
gone more than a mile, with an officer sent by Captain
Gingen to inform him of the disposition made by the
French. Feeling that the game was too secure in his
hands for him to risk the loss of it by a premature attack
on a strong position, he made a detour round the point of
Elmiseram in the direction of the Sugarloaf Eock, near
which place he was joined by 200 soldiers of the garrison,
under the command of Captains Clarke and Dalton. At
this place, therefore, the junction with the garrison may
he regarded as having been virtually effected.
It was just this moment, when the English could no
longer be assailed with advantage, when they might, in
case of defeat, take secure shelter under the guns of the
fort, that the incompetent Law selected to assault them.
Feebly made on his part, though supported with great
resolution by the levies of Chunda Sahib, his attack did
 £*&+***»*
MORTIFICATION. OF DUPLEIX. 307

not succeed. The superiority of tlie French in artillery chap.

was neutralised by the superior energy of Clive, who led .—
the English to the attack; and after an interchange of 1752.
cannon-shot, considered, -whilst it lasted, to have been
hotter than any till then experienced on the plains of
Hindostan, die French retreated to their rock with a loss
on their part of 40 men, on the part of their native allies
of 300. Had not Major Lawrence, in consideration of
the intense heat of the day, stopped the pursuit, they
would have suffered far more severely.* Having re¬
pulsed this attack, the English marched without moles¬
tation into Tricliinopoly.
Ho language can paint the anger and mortification of
Dupleix when intelligence of these events reached him.
Tliis then was tlie result of confiding the conduct of an
army to a man whose principal credentials consisted in the
super-excellent opinion, which he allowed all the world
to perceive, he had formed of his own abilities. All his
recommendations disregarded, inordinate caution pre¬
vailing when the necessities of the hour peculiarly
required dashing and daring tactics, the English army,
though encumbered by an enormous convoy, allowed to’
enter the beleaguered city virtually unmolested,—no
serious attempt having been made to hinder them till they
were under tlie walls of Tricliinopoly! Was it for such
a result that, Dupleix had schemed and planned, that he
had pledged the rising fortunes of French India to the
support of native princes who should be but the puppets
of France ? Was it to see the superiority in the field
passing from his hands to the hands of his hated rivals, to
witness not only the loss of the capital of the Carnatic,
but a repulse from the last refuge of Mahomed Ali ? He
was fated indeed to suffer disappointments more bitter
even than these. But, up to the present moment, lie had
been so thoroughly buoyed up by hope ; he had trusted
* The English, -who fought under the cannonade, seven however were
cover, tat fourteen men only from struck down by the sun.—Orme.
308 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, that when the time came Law would show himself what
. m . he had always boasted himself to be ; above all, he had
1752. counted so implicitly on the capture of this convoy, on
the destruction or, at least, the repulse of this relieving
party. To this end he had devoted all his faculties. He
had been to Law the eye to see, the ear to hear; it was
not, alas for him, in his power to be the mind to conceive
or the arm to strike. He had given Law all the necessary
information ; the rest, being soldier’s work, he had left to
him as a soldier to perform. The result showed that the
mere donning of epaulets does not make a man a soldier;
that if devoid of the intellect given by God to man, and
Dot, as some would seem to think, implanted in the dress
he wears, that very dress and the fancied knowledge
attaching to it make the pedant more pedantic, the
shallow-minded and narrow more vain, more obstinate,
more contemptuous of the opinion of the many wiser men
who wear it not.
Law had come out to Dupleix recommended by letters
from the directors and by his own. vauntings,—the latter
probably the cause of the former. Had he, who boasted
himself a soldier, acted even as a man of ordinary com¬
mon sense would have acted, it might have been pardoned
him had he failed in fair fight before the genius of a
Clive and the persistence of a Lawrence. But it is clear
that he would have failed equally before men of far
inferior capacity. It needed but for his opponent to be
capable of advancing,—a rarer quality, however, than
is generally supposed,—and Law would have succumbed.
He did everything out of season; and the reason was,
that although he Avore a soldier’s coat, he was not a
soldier.
How keenly Dupleix felt the bitter disappointment can
scarcely be described, nor will we attempt to describe it.
We would rather dwell on the measures which, in spite of
his disappointment, he adopted unhesitatingly, to remedy,
as far as possible, the disaster. His was indeed no easy
 LAW MEDITATES RETREAT. 309

position. Where was lie to find a general ? Bussy, the chap.

only competent commander he had under him, was at .—,-
Aurangabad with the Subadar; Law, helpless at Trichi- 1752.
nopolw Besides those two, there was but the infirm
d'Auteuil, disabled by the climate, by age, and by gout,
incapable certainly of making head against the vigorous
energy of Clive. It seemed almost preferable to main¬
tain Law, who was at least still young, in command,
than to intrust the last remains of the army to d’Auteuil.
Before, however, he could take any measures in this
respect, in fact the second day after he had heard of the
entrance of Lawrence into Trichinopoly, Dupleix received
from Law a despatch which threw him into even greater
amazement. This was to the effect, that, threatened by
the English, and despairing now of gaining the place, he
had determined to retreat at once -into the island of
Beringham. The madness of such a scheme was patent
to the far-seeing vision of Dupleix. It seemed to him
indeed that for a general deliberately to move his forces
into an island, where lie would be cut off from all com¬
munication with his couutrymeu, was an act of which no
one, who had not lost his head, could be guilty. There
could not, he felt, be a more dangerous, a more incom¬
petent commander at the head of an army than the man
who should propose such a step. Under the influence of
this feeling he instantly acted. Hoping that it might
not possibly be yet too late to avert a great calamity, he
sent strict orders to Law to retreat, if lie must retreat,
not into Seringhani, but upon Bondichery. With the
view of aiding him in this undertaking, and to be pre¬
pared at all events for the worst, he strained every nerve
to levy a fresh force to move towards Trichinopoly,
and to endeavour to effect a junction with Law. His
own funds, constituting the bulk of the private for¬
tune lie had amassed during his service, were freely
spent for this purpose. Ho regard for his own interests
stood in the way of the performance of his duty to his
310 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, masters and to France. Tims, by incredible exertions,

I*.1:.-. be succeeded in raising a force of 120 Europeans, 500
1752. sepoys, and with four field-pieces. The command of it
he made over to d’Auteuil, the only officer at his
disposal, with instructions that, on effecting a junction
with Law, he was to assume command of the combined
army. The party left Pondichery the second week in
. April.
Meanwhile, however, startling events had occurred in
the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly. Law, although re¬
pulsed on April 8 in his attempt to prevent the march of
the English into that fortress, still occupied an extremely
strong position. His right resting on the Cauveri, main¬
tained his communications with Seringham and with the
country on the northern bank of the Coleroon ; his centre
was protected by the French Idock, whilst his left extended
to the extremely strong post of Elmiseram, on the top of
which cannon had been mounted. Chunda Sahib with
Iiis troops occupied the line of the Cauveri, forming an
obtuse angle with the French position. Had the resolu¬
tion of Law then consisted in anything but words, he might
have safely awaited here the attack of the combined
English force; for, although he would then be fighting
with a river in his rear,—a most unpleasant position,—
yet the ground he occupied was so strong that had it
been resolutely defended, an attack upon it must have
resulted in the defeat of the. assailants. It would appear
that the English commander, Major Lawrence, thoroughly
recognised this fact; for he states in his memoirs that,
having sounded his native allies, and having ascertained
that on one pretext or another they were evidently un¬
willing to aid him in an assault on the French position,
he was extremely concerned as to the steps he oimht to
adopt to force Law to retreat.
Law, however, played his game most effectually. The
English, not thinking themselves strong enough to attack
the French position unsupported by their native allies, had
 HIS IMAGINARY FEARS. 311

resolved to beat up the quarters of Chunda Sahib. For chap.

this purpose, a detachment of 400 men under Captain .—r.i_^
Dalton, moved out of Trichinopoly on the night of April 1752.
12, hoping to surprise the native levies. Unacquainted
however with the road, they found themselves at break of
day in front of the strongest part of the French position,
between the French Eock and Elmiseram. Discovering
at once the danger which they ran of being crushed
by the entire French force, they endeavoured to retreat
without being perceived. The morning light, however,
warned the French of their presence before they were
out of danger, and the chances seemed all to be in favour
of their destruction. But the sight which would have
lent vigour and energy to an ordinary man, which would
have been used by Clive to make his own cause trium¬
phant, added terror and dismay to the palsied faculties of
Law. Far from regarding the retreating English as men
whom by an energetic movement he could cut off and
destroy, lie looked upon their presence there as an indi¬
cation that he and his force had been subjected to im¬
minent peril, from which they had miraculously escaped.
Instead, then, of moving to attack them, he rejoiced at
their retreating of their own accord. His apprehension
indeed caried him so far as to direct that, as soon as the
English should be well out of sight, preparations should
be made for an immediate retreat across the Cauveri into
the island of Seringham.
It would appear, indeed, that this movement had been
for a long time contemplated by Law, for he had often
insisted upon its necessity to Chunda Sahib, and had even
mentioned it in his letters to Dupleix. But Chunda
Sahib, a better soldier than Law, had not only pointed out
the insensate folly of the movement, but had absolutely
refused tQ join in it; whilst Dupleix, though for a long
time not regarding it as serious or possible, had pointed
out, in the clearest terms, that such a movement would,
more than any other, compromise his own force and the
312 THE STRUGGLES OP DITLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, interests of French India. When finally he heard that

it had been decided upon, he had replied, as we have
1752. already stated, by an imperative order to retreat upon
Pondichery, and by the supersession of Law by d’Auteuil.
It is difficult indeed to believe how a man in the posses¬
sion of his senses could have persuaded himself that
Seringham was a proper place to retreat upon. It was,
in the first place, actually within long cannon-shot of
Trichinopoly. In the second place, the fact of a small
force remaining in an island, the river surrounding which
could be crossed, in the course of its retreat from a
superior force, was surely to invite an enterprising enemy
to cut it off,—to force it in fact, unless relieved, to a sur¬
render. To attempt such a movement in the presence
of a Clive was a species of folly which that man only
coidd have committed, whose nerves and whose senses
had been utterly prostrated. Of all places that could
have been selected for such a purpose, Seringham was,
without exception, that one which most completely shut
the door of hope on the force occupying it, in the face
of an enemy strong enough to act on both banks of the
river.
Yet this was the place to which Law had resolved,
not by a sudden inspiration of folly, but after many days
of painful consideration, to carry over the French army.
Yet, though the matter had been long pre-determined
in his own mind, he had made no preparations for
carrying Ids plan into effect. Perhaps he had hoped
that after all it woidd not be,necessary. This at least
is certain that, up to the moment when the appearance
of the English retreating from before his own position
brought so vividly to his mind the idea of the clangers
that might be in store for him on the right bank,
not a single preparation for that retreat had bgen made.
Nevertheless, bent on effecting it, lie sent to Chunda
Sahib, and to him communicated his resolution. This
faithful ally of the French power received the intelli-
 HE RETIRES TO SERIXGIIASI. 313

gencc with anger and disappointment. Not he alone, chap.

but his principal commanders, opposed it with all their .—A—
resolution. Better far, they said, to meet defeat and 1752.
death in open action, than to retreat to a position in
which surrender must be necessitated. But all their
remonstrances remained without effect on the paralysed
spirit of Law. He would retreat, lie said; they might
act as they chose; and he issued orders at once to carry
out his resolution. Chunda Sahib, though unconvinced,
though despising the man, would not, at that dark hour,
abandon the nation that had so long supported him.
He might have escaped, but preferring to cast in his
lot with the French, lie accompanied them across the
Cauveri.
Great was the confusion of the retreat. Not a single
preparation had been made for it. The provisions,
necessary for the support of the troops in Seringliam,
were abandoned and burnt. Much of their baggage was
left behind. The guns were with great difficulty trans¬
ported. However, after infinite labour, the French troops
and those of Chunda Sahib found themselves in occu¬
pation of Seringliam, a detachment of the former only
having been left to guard the rock of Elmiseram, which
it woidd have been wiser to abandon with the rest of the
position.
The natural consequences of this movement were soon
apparent. First ensued the capture of Elmiseram, effected
on April 13, by Captain Dalton, after a faint resistance.
Next, the movement which Dupleix and Cliunda Sahib
had alike foreseen, the detaching of a portion of the
English army to the northern bank of the Coleroon, in
order not only to cut off the supplies of the French, but
to sever their communications with Pondichery. This
measure was suggested to Major Lawrence by Clive, and
the former, on consulting his native allies regarding it,
found to his satisfaction that it met with their approval
conditionally on the command of the English section of
314 THE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, the force being intrusted to the conqueror of Arcot.

. VIL . This matter having been settled, a detachment consist-
175-2. ing of 400 Europeans, 700 sepoys, 3,000 Hahrattas, 1,000
Tanjorean horse, with eight pieces of artillery, crossed the
Cauveri and Coleroon on the night of April 17, and on
the following morning took up a position at the village of
Samiavaram, nine or ten miles north of Seringham, and
on the high road between that place and Pondichery.
This masterly movement owed its success as much to the
boldness of the English as to the nerveless despondency
of the French leader. Had Clive been in the position of
Law, what an opportunity here presented itself of placing
the English in the position in which they had hoped to
pin the French, by crossing the Coleroon, and taking
them between the Seringham force on one side, and that
of d’Auteuil on the other. But all spirit and sense had
apparently fled from the counsels of Law. He acted,
as though he had but one object,—that of delivering
himself and his allies, bound hand and foot, to the
enemy.
Meanwhile d’Auteuil, who had left Pondichery on April
10 at the head of 120 Europeans, 500 sepoys, and four
field-pieces, reached Ootatoor, fifteen miles north of
Samiaveram, on the 25th of that month. Here he
learned the situation of affairs; that Law was cooped up
in Seringham, and that between Law and himself lay
Clive at the head of a superior force. Though old,
infirm, and gouty, d’Auteuil had still spirit enough left in
him not to be disheartened by these tidings. He had
been sent expressly to relieve Law, and he could not
leave him to himself without at least an effort on his
behalf. Accordingly, he resolved to make a cletour so as
to avoid Samiaveram, and thus to reach the Coleroon
without molestation from the enemy. He sent intelligence
to Law of his intended movement, but, unfortunately
for him, one of his messengers was captured by Clive,
Ignorant of this, however, d’Auteuil set out on the
 HE MISSES ANOTHER CUAXCE.
315

evening of the 25th, taking a route to the westward; but chap.

lie hficf not proceeded far, before intelligence reached him —'
that Clive, apprised of his movements, was on his march 1752.
to intercept him; he accordingly returned to Ootatoor.
Clive, learning this, moved back upon Samiaveram.
Meanwhile, however, Law had learned from one of the
messengers sent by d’Auteuil of his intended march.
Certain information reached him, at the same time, of
Clive’s intention to intercept him. Here was a splendid
opportunity. By making a forced march of ten miles
from Seringham, with his whole force, he might seize
Samiaveram whilst Clive should be engaged with d’Auteuil,
and then press on to crush the former in the field. Of
the many chances granted to the French leader, this
was the last and hot the least tempting,—not the least
likely to lead to great and important consequences. To
have even a probability of success, however, it was re¬
quisite that Law shoidd move with the bulk of his force,
and should move with the rapidity of lightning. But
this unfortunate leader, though a little braced up by the
intelligence of the approach of d’Auteuil, was still
incapable of real vigour or energy. Instead of moving
himself at the head of his force, he detached only 80
Europeans, of whom 40 were English deserters, and 7 00
sepoys,* to carry out a scheme, upon the success or
ill-success of which depended the domination of the
French or English in India.
This detachment arrived at Samiaveram after Clive
had returned from his fruitless search after d’Auteuil.
Little thinking, from his experience of the character of
Law, that there was the smallest fear of an attack from
the side of Seringham, Clive had made no preparations
to meet one, and had gone quietly to bed. The French
detachment meanwhile had succeeded, by means of the
deserters who formed a part of it, in persuading the
English sepoys that they had been sent by Major
* Orme.
316 TIIE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIS WITH ADVERSITY.

chap. Lawrence to reinforce Clive, and they thus obtained en-

- V11' ■ trance into the very heart of the English camp, before
1752. the presence of ail enemy was suspected there, and whilst
Clive was still sleeping. Yet sleeping though he was the
presence of that one man on the side of the English alone
made the difference between victory and defeat. Had he
been the leader of the French none can doubt but that
they would have that night crushed their enemies in their
camp, and have recovered all the results that had been so
wilfully thrown away. ‘But Clive was the leader of those
opposed to them, and never did he vindicate so com¬
pletely his title to be a leader of men, a prince amongst
his people, as on that eventful night. Never did any one
under such circumstances display a presence of mind
more perfect, a courage more brilliant and ready. The
circumstances were almost marvellous. The English force
at Samiaveram occupied two pagodas, about a quarter of
a mile distant from one another; round these were
encamped the natives. Now, the French force had
advanced through the natives, and had penetrated to the
lesser pagoda, in an open shed close to which Clive was
sleeping in his palanquin. Here being challenged, they
fired volleys into each of these places, one of them nar¬
rowly missing Clive, and most effectually awakening him.
They then moved on, occupied the pagoda, and drew up
the sepoys in front of it,—these keeping up an incessant
fire in the supposed direction of the enemy. Meanwhile,
Clive, on the first alarm, had run to the greater pagoda,
and marched up 200 of his Europeans to see what could
have caused the disturbance, still considering it a false
alarm of bis own sepoys, and never dreaming of an enemy.
Approaching close to the lesser pagoda lie went among
the French sepoys, still believing them to be bis own,
and ordered them to cease fire. He did not even discover
his mistake when one of them, ascertaining him to be an
Englishman, wounded him in two places, and then, -when
attacked by Clive, ran towards the lesser pagoda. Clive
 CLIVE’S READINESS AND DARING. 317

followed him, only however to find himself in the presence chap.

of six French soldiers, who called upon him to surrender. ■--—-
Then, for the first time, the whole truth burst upon him. 1752.
Comprehending it all in a moment, he called upon the
Frenchmen to yield in their turn ; told them he had even
come to offer them terms, and invited them to see for
themselves his whole army drawn up to attack them.
Completely deceived by his bold and ready artifice, three
of the Frenchmen at once laid down their arms ; the
remainder communicated Clive’s terms to the party in the
pagoda. These however refused to surrender, and it was
not till after a most sanguinary contest, in the course of
which Clive had another narrow escape, caused mainly
by the desperation of the English deserters, that they
yielded to terms. The sepoys, meanwhile, had marched
out of camp, but they were pursued by the Mahratta
cavalry and cut to pieces, it is said, literally to a man.
After this repulse, the situation of the French in Se-
ringham became desperate indeed. Entirely to cut them
off from all relief, as well as from all hope of escape,
possession was taken by theTanjorean allies of the English
of Coiladdy on May 7. There then remained only M.
d’Auteuil with whom to deal. To rid that part of the
country of him, Major Lawrence, on the 20th, despatched
Captain Dalton at the head of 150 Europeans, 400 sepoys,
500 Maln-attas, and four field-pieces,—leaving Clive’s de¬
tachment entire at Samiaveram.
Meanwhile, d’Auteuil, scared by the ill-result of his
attempt to turn Samiaveram, and of the well-meant but
ill-supported attempt of the Seringham party to surprise
that place, had remained quietly at Ootatoor waiting his
opportunity. The opportunity came, but did not find
him capable of taking advantage of it. In fact Captain
Dalton’s party after a skirmish in front of Ootatoor, which
had no decisive results, had advanced at once upon that
place. Late experience had shown the English that the
surest way to victory was to move straight on,—to
318 THE STRUGGLES OF Dl'PLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, destroy by that advance the morale of the enemy, and

A.n: „ thus to more than half beat him before the actual fight
1752. had begun. Acting on this plan, Dalton made such a
display of his troops, maintaining only a few with his guns
and sending the infantry to attack the enemy in flank,
that d’Auteuil imagined that he had not simply a detach¬
ment, but the whole force of Clive before him. Having
this impression, all his intellect fled, and he became the
slave of his fears. Had he been as bold as Dalton, a
resolute advance on the guns must hawe decided the
action in his favour. But fear, not physical but moral,
shutting liis eyes and taking away his senses, he allowed
himself to be deceived by this shallow device, and not¬
withstanding that he did actually repulse the English
from Ootatoor, he abandoned that place in the night, and
fled, unmolested, in the direction of Pondichery, thus
leaving Law to his fate, to England an unlooked-for
triumph.
Whilst this was going on, Law, noticing from the
watchtower of Seringham the march of Dalton’s troops,
concluded that they must belong to Clive’s force, and,
this time acting with boldness, crossed the river with the
bulk of his army, hoping to gain Samiaveram. But Clive
was not the man to expose himself twice to the chance of
being surprised. He at once inarched to meet him, and
came up with him just as he had crossed the Coleroon.
It was not for Clive, under the circumstances, to seek an
engagement. The enemy was already in the toils. A
battle alone could extricate him. On the other hand,
every circumstance should have induced Law to court an
action. It was, as we have said, his only chance, and
here the numbers were in his favour. But,—he did not
fight;—he returned to Seringham, only, alas for Drench
interests, to surrender.
The capture of Pitchandah, a fortified pagoda on the
northern banks of the Coleroon opposite Seringham, com¬
pleted the investment of the French, and took away from
 LAW TRUSTS TO ACCIDENT. 319

them tlic opportunity, till then open to them, of commit- chap.

nicating in any way with the direct road from Pondichery. --A—
This place having been gained, still farther to deprive 1752,
them of all hopes of reinforcements from cVAuteuil, Clive
marched in search of that officer, and coming up with
him on June 8, at Yolcondah, the native commandant of
which place had been secretly gained by the English,
he compelled him with his whole force to surrender.
Thus deprived of his last hope, what was there for the
unfortunate Law to do ? He, poor man, knew well, in .
his heart of hearts, to what end recent events had been
tending, and for some days past he had been well aware
that there was no alternative between cutting his way out
and a surrender. Under such circumstances great men
act; small men, on the contrary, allow themselves to be
acted upon by every vague rumour, no matter whence it
may have arisen ; nay, they go so far as to delude them¬
selves into the belief that somehow,—how they cannot
say,—all will in the end be well. Thus it was with Law.
He allotved himself to be deluded by all kinds of vain
imaginings ; for a long time it was d’Auteuil’s advance ;
then it was the hope of reinforcements from France ;
sometimes one thing, sometimes another. He appears
never ter‘have bethought him that a man’s energy is given
him to be employed ; that there is no conjuncture, how¬
ever trying, from which a man, by the exercise of that
quality, may not extricate himself; that to depend on
chance is altogether unworthy of a real man. Had he
only dared to look facts in the face, he must have seen
that he must surrender if he could not escape. His pro¬
visions were fast failing him, his native allies were
deserting him in hundreds, but still he had his Europeans.
In the beginning of June there yet remained to him 800
of these, in addition to about 2,000 trained sepoys, and
3,000 or 4,000 native levies who still remained faithful
to Clumda Sahib. With these he might easily have
taken advantage of the first fall of the Cauveri to attack
320 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVEESITT.

chap. Major Lawrence’s camp on the south of the river, to the

- -*L troops guarding which he was in numbers vastly superior.
1752. Overpowering this, he might have thence cut his way,
without much chance of molestation, to Karical. In vain
did Chunda Sahib over and over again implore him to
have recourse to some such means. He could not make
up his mind, he preferred to depend on accidents and
chances,—and he was lost!
Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that he was so
base as to be indifferent to the fate of that faithful
supporter of French interests. Law knew full well that
but one result to Chunda Sahib would follow his sur¬
render to the now triumphant Mahomed Ah. As for
surrender to the English, that was absolutely out of the
question, for France and England were not at war. In the
contest between Mahomed Ali and Chunda Sahib, the
French and English were not principals, they were
simply hired mercenaries engaged on opposite sides.
Whichever party might be_ victorious neither then could
claim the open direction of affairs. A proposition of
surrender to the English could not, therefore, and would
not, have been entertained. As for Mahomed Ali, it was
not to be expected that, brought up as he had been to
regard all means lawful to accomplish the death of a
rival, he would hesitate as to the punishment to be
meted out to one who had proved himself so persistent,
so daring, so fertile in expedients as the French-protected
Chunda Sahib. Having rejected all bolder counsels, and
having made up his mind to surrender, Law busied him¬
self therefore to find the means of saving the life of his
ally. For this purpose he entered into negotiations with
Manockjee, general of the army of the Punjab of Tanjore.
This chieftain readily accepted the terms offered, and
having received a stipulated sum of money in advance,
with the promise of more to follow, having likewise
sworn solemnly to protect the life of the fugitive Nawab,
Manockjee, on the. night of dune 11, sent an officer with
 MURDER OF G'lIUXDA SAHIB. >21

a palanquin to escort him to liis camp. No sooner, how- chap.

ever, had the unfortunate man arrived there, than he .—-
was violently seized, loaded with irons, and placed under 1752.
a guard. The next morning a conference was held to
determine his fate, at which Major Lawrence was present.
There can'be no doubt Avhatever that a firm persistence
on the part of that officer, more especially on the second
day,—after the English had become, by the surrender of
Law, absolute masters of the situation,—would have saved
the life of Cliunda Sahib. Major Lawrence himself as¬
serts that, in the course of the debate as to the manner
in which Chunda Sahib should be disposed of, he himself
was at first silent, but subsequently proposed that he
should be made over to the English. This, however,
was objected to, and no resolution was arrived at. The
second day after however, when Manockjee inquired
from him whether, he seriously desired to have charge of
the prisoner, the English commandant passed upon him
virtual sentence of death, by declaring that he did not
wish to interfere further in the dispute regarding his -dis¬
posal.* A few hours later Chunda Sahib was stabbed to
* This indifference,—to use a light tlieir possession, he thought it necessary
term,—of tile English commander to to know whether they seriously expected
the fate of Chunda Sahib has been this deference-, and accordingly, on
very gently treated by most English the same morning that the pagoda
liistoiians." The statement however surrendered, went to the major, with
of flrnid, biased as that writer is whom he'had a conference, which con-
anainst the French, shows how com- t-incetl him that the English were his
piukdy it was in the power of Major friends, and that they were resolved
Lawrence to have saved Cliunda not to interfere any further in the dis-
Sahib, had lie cliusen to stretch forth pate, i e, therefore, immediately on
liis hand. Orme, after alluding to his return to Chucklypollam put his *
the contest between Mahomed Ali, design into execution, by ordering the
the Mysoreans, and the Mahrattas head of Chunda Sahib to be struck of.
for the possession of the person of (The italics are our own.) It is uit-
Chunda Sahib, writes thus:—‘Ter- fortunately clear from this, that
riiied at the commotions which Major Lawrence did connive-at the
would inevitably follow if be gave death of the unfortunate prisoner,
the preference to any one of the Professor Wilson states, in depreea-
conipetitors, he (Manockjee) saw no tion of this verdict, that at that
method of finishing the contest, but period the English were not so well
by putting an end "to the life of his assured of their power, as to pretend
prisoner: however, as the Major to dictate to the native princes with
I Lawrence-) had expressed a desire whom they co-operated. It is clear
that tlie English might have him in that in the case now under notice it
322 TIIE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, the heart by order of Manockjce, and his decapitated

vu- . bead was sent to his triumphant rival.
1752. But before this tragedy had been consummated. Law'
himself had surrendered. Besting on the broken reed of
delusive expectations, he had allowed every opportunity
to pass by, until at last the arrival of a battering-train
from Bevicotta placed it in the power of the English to
compel him to submit to their own terms. After the
usual amount of protests, and threats to defend himself to
the last should those protests not be acceded to, it was
finally agreed that tlie French army should surrender
prisoners of war; that the officers should be liberated on
giving their parole never to serve against Mahomed Ali
and his allies; that the English deserters should be par¬
doned ; that all the arms, artillery, and munitions of war
should be made over faithfully to the English comman¬
dant; and that the island itself should be surrendered.
These conditions were faithfully carried out. On the
morning of June 13, 35 officers, 785 soldiers, and 2,000
sepoys laid down their arms and surrendered themselves
prisoners to the English commander, this latter acting not
on his own account but as representative of Mahomed Ali.
There were given up at the same time forty-one pieces
of camion, and an immense quantity of ammunition*
Thus fatally ended, after intense labour and anxiety to
its projector, the expedition which, but eleven months
before, bad been despatched, full of the certainty of
success, from Pondichery. What a termination to pros-
* pects which shone with such brilliancy in the outset, what
a sequel to plans which seemed, at the time of their pro-

was not at all a question of dictation, from the presence of Major Law-
It is too evident that a word from renee to order the execution of
Major Lawrence to Manockjee would Chunda Sahib?
have changed the fate of the victim. ’ Our authorities for the account
How can we avoid the simple con- of this short campaign are the history
elusion to be. drawn from the fact, ofMr.Orme, the journal of Major
that Manoekjee, satisfied that the Lawrence, and the niemoirandolficiiil
English would not interfere to save letters of Dupleix.
the life of the prisoner, went straight
 TUB FAULT XOT THAT OF iftFLElX. 323

je.'tion, to be proof against failure ! Tlien there was but chap.

one barrier to French domination in the Carnatic. They
possessed commanding resources, a ruler whose influence 1752.
with the natives was unparalleled, and, above all, the
prestige of victory. Opposed to them was a pretender
deserted by his allies, but occupying a fortified town,
and a mere handful of dispirited English. But at the
end of eleven months what a different picture do we be¬
hold ' The pretender lias become the de facto raler; the
1 landfill of dispirited English, the arbiters of the Carnatic;
the victorious French army arc prisoners of war. Whence
this revolution P Can we discern in the steady mind of
Dupleix any symptoms of faltering, any signs of decay ?
()u the contrary. Never had he shown more unfaltering
resolution; on no previous occasion did he manifest a
more zealous energy.. His orders to Law, his encourage¬
ment of Chunda Sahib, his attempt to infuse energy into
d'Auteuil, show the ardour of his spirit, the correct aim
by which his views were guided. Had his orders been
carried out, had even common prudence and energy been
displayed by his commanders, his policy must have tri¬
umphed, the genius of France must have conquered.
If, then, we look for the causes of a contrary result,
we must turn our eyes to another quarter. Dupleix was
the civil governor, possessing a power of devising plans,
even military plans, for there is nothing in military
plans which genius, though not specially trained to war-
tare, is unable to master,—such as has been accorded to
but few men iu any age. His was the eye to see, the
brain to conceive; but he possessed not in addition the
arm to strike. To carry out his vast plans he was com¬
pelled to confide in others, and it happened, unfortunately
for him, that whilst, at this period, those whom alone lie
was able to employ were men of singularly feeble intellect,
deficient in energy and enterprise, dreading responsibility,
afraid to run small risks, and therefore exposing them¬
selves to great dangers, his principal adversary was a man
324 TITE STEUGGfcS OP DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, of vast and comprehensive genius, of jin aptitude for war

VIL . surpassing all his contemporaries, of a ready audacity and
1752. prompt execution in the field, such as have never been
surpassed. Whilst then the designs for the French
campaign were most masterly, being conceived in the
brain of Dupleix,—their execution was feeble beyond
the power of description, that execution being left to
his lieutenants. The orders, the letters, the entreaties of
Dupleix stand living witnesses in the present day of the
exactness of his conclusions. Had they been obeyed,—
and it is clear that, obedience to them was easy,—Trichin-
opoly would have fallen whilst Clive was still besieged
in Arcot; or, had untimely occurrences prevented that
great triumph, a literal obedience to his instructions would
have insured the interception and defeat of the relieving
forces of Lawrence and Clive on the banks of the Cauveri.
Who could have believed that imbecility and fear of
responsibility would ever find the level reached in the
manufacture of a Law,—imbecility and fear of responsi¬
bility so clear as to draw even from the English historian,
jealous as he is on all occasions of the reputation of the
English leaders, the remark, that ‘it is indeed difficult
to determine whether the English conducted themselves
with more ability and spirit, or the French with more
irresolution and ignorance, after Major Lawrence and
Captain Clive arrived at Tricliinopoly ? ’ *
To judge fairly and candidly the degree of merit or
demerit attaching to Dupleix at this crisis of the fortunes
of French India, we propose to examine his conduct after
the occurrence of the misfortunes we have recounted.
InAvhat a position was he then! Law, with the main
body of the French troops, beaten and taken prisoners;
d’Auteuil, with the relieving force consisting of the only
French troops available for garrison purposes, beaten and
taken prisoners; Bussy, with all that yet remained, far off
at Aurangabad; Chunda Sahib, his trusted ally, murdered,
 HE HAKES HEAD AGAIXST DISASTER. 825

and liis levies dispersed. To Dupleix then there remained chap.

at this crisis merely Pondichery, Gingee, and the French .—
possessions on the coast, without garrisons to defend them, 1752.
still loss with troops available for operations'in the field.
His enemies, on the contrary, triumphant, possessors now
of the influence and of the material advantages for which
he had toiled, had it in their power apparently utterly
to overwhelm him. They had not only an army and
numerous native allies, but a Lawrence and a Clive to
command them. Dupleix had no longer an army, no
J longer an ally ; since the departure of Bussy he had never
; had a general: Ire had to depend upon no one but him-
I self,—and one oth er trusted and indefatigable councillor,—
! his own wife. Let us watch now how this man, thus over¬
matched, thus driven into a corner, made head against the
vast disproportion with which lie had to contend.
His own experiences and alliances with native chieftains
had satisfied Dupleix, that to such men there was no such
disorganiser as victory. Prepared after defeat to sacrifice
in appearance even their just claims, if by so doing they
could retain a basis for future action, they would on a
change of fortune, however occurring, show an absolute
forgetfulness of past admissions, and increase their de¬
mands to a most exaggerated degree. If this were the
case when a native prince might be in alliance with a
European power, to a much more extended and dangerous
degree would it occur when three or four native princes
should occupy such a position. For then each ally would
measure his own claims by the claims of his rival, and it
would inevitably happen that such claims would often
dash. How in the win- that had just then concluded,
■Mahomed Ali, the rival of Chunda Sahib, had been aided
by three native allies, — by the Eajah of Tanjore, the
Fmjali of Mysore,, and the Mahrattas. So long as it
seemed certain that Mahomed Ali and his English allies
would prove triumphant,—a conclusion which the imbe¬
cility of Law had made clear to the acute intellects of the
326 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVEESHT.

chap, natives at an early period of the contest,—it was evident

YI1- . to Dupleix that no attempts to bring them over to his
1752. side would have the smallest effect. Nevertheless he
maintained native envoys at their courts, instructed by him
from time to time to act as circumstances might render
advisable. It was then, when victory declared itself
against him, when he had' no more any troops and not a
single ally, that he put in action those arts of which no
one better than he understood the use. His attempts
were not at first made on Mahomed Ali. The English,
he well knew, were acting in the name of that prince, and
would be bound to attend mainly to his interests. Of the
other parties to the alliance, the Mahrattas were the most
influential, and with -these, at the moment when the
power lie’ represented lay lowest in the estimation of the
world, he commenced his secret negotiations.
So well did he succeed that Mahomed Ali and his
English allies soon found that almost the only profit they
had derived from their victory was the surrender of Law
and his army. In a moment, as it were, they discovered
that the animosity of the Mysoreans against Mahomed Ali,
and of Morari Eao against both, would prevent that com¬
bined action in the field on which they had previously
calculated; whilst the men of the Tanjore contingent, sick
of service which seemed likely to bring little advantage,
were clamorous to return to their own country. So pro¬
nounced were the secret intrigues and so undisguised the
mutual suspicions, that, although Law’s force had surren¬
dered on June 11, it was not till the 9th of the following
month that theNawab and his English allies were able to.
leave Trichinopoly, and even-then he was forced to leave
200 of the latter and 1,qOO of their sepoys as a garrison
to protect the city against his former associates, — the
Mysoreans and the Mahrattas.
■The delay he had thus obtained and the disaffection in
the enemy s camp he had thus caused were eminently
serviceable to Dupleix. It so happened that in that very
 KE30LVES TO IXTEECEPT THE ENGLISH. 327

interval the yearly reinforcements of troops arrived at chap.

Poiidichcry from France. It is true that the men com- •—F—-
posing it were not of the best material—indeed Dupleix 1752.
himself asserts that they were a collection of the vilest
rabble,—but they formed at least a basis upon which to
work. To increase their number he landed the sailors
from the fleet, and manned the vessels in their place with
lascars. By these means he found himself provided with
a body of nearly 500 European soldiers, able once more to
present a respectable appearance in the eyes of the native
powers. To effect all this he had freely drawn upon his
private resources, and made his entire fortune subservient
to the cause of his country. An opportunity soon pre¬
sented itself still further to confirm the opinions enter¬
tained regarding the magnitude of his resources, and to
intimate very clearly to the native princes that Pondichery
was yet uneonquered. Harassed by them native allies,
and by the intrigues fomenting around them, the English
had made but slow progress after leaving Trichinopoly.
They took indeed Tiruvadi, held by a small garrison of
French sepoys, on July 17; blit from that moment their
counsels became as uncertain as had been those of the
French two months earlier. Major Lawrence had left them
on account of his health; Clive had been compelled to
proceed to Fort St. David from the same cause ; and the
command of the troops in the field was left to the inca¬
pable Gingen. This officer remaining idle at Tiruvadi,
instructions were sent him from Governor Saunders,
contrary to the advice of Major Lawrence, to detach a
portion of his force against Gingee. Major Gingen obeyed
these orders by sending, on August 3, 200 Europeans, i
1,500 sepoys, and 600 of the Fawab’s cavalry under the
command of Major Kinneer, an officer who had but just
arrived from Europe.
Intelligence of the march of this detachment having
been promptly conveyed to Dupleix, he determined to use
it to strike a blow for the recovery of the prestige of the
328 TIIE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap. French arras. Sending orders, therefore, to the com-

, V]I- , mandant of Gingee to hold that place to the last extremity,
1752. he organised from his new levies a force of 300 Europeans
and 500 sepoys, and sent them with seven field-pieces to
occupy a position half way between Pondichery and
Gingee, and commanding the pass just traversed by the
English on their route to the latter place.
Gingee was a fortress on many accounts very dear to
the French. Its almost marvellous capture by Bussy
on the lltli September, 1750, had raised the reputation of
his countrymen to the highest point all over India: the
victory gained near it by de la Touche over the forces of
Nazir Jung, had seemed to consolidate and cement French
power in the Carnatic. The possession of Gingee alone
gave them a prestige in the eyes of the natives, which
it would have taken much to eradicate. Its natural inac¬
cessibility, Dupleix was well aware, was sufficient to enable
a well-commanded garrison to beat off a force five times
the strength of that commanded by Kinneer. That officer
likewise, he knew, was a stranger to the country and its
people, and it seemed highly improbable that in the lottery
of the distribution of commands, the English should draw
a second Lawrence, still less another heaven-born genius of
the stamp of Clive. His plan, therefore, seemed certain to
succeed. Operating on the rear of the enemy, who, he was
sure, would make nothing of his movement against Gingee,
he would induce him to attack the French in a position
previously chosen and previously fortified, and he would
then, it seemed certain, take his revenge for Seringham.
It fell out just as he had anticipated. .Kinneer arrived
before Gingee on August 6, summoned it, and met with
a determined refusal. Appalled at its strength he was
hesitating as to his action, when news reached him that
the French had taken up a position at Vicravandi in
his rear, cutting off his communications with Tiruvadi.
With the spirit of a soldier Kinneer turned at once to
attack this new enemy, and, rendered bold by the re-
 DEFEATS THEM. 329;

] wated successes of the English, he did not care to recon- cttap.

nuitre, but dashed directly on the French position. To ■-—-
draw on the English against the strongest part of this, 1752.
hi. de Kerjean, a nephew of Dupleix, who held the com¬
mand, directed his men to retire. The English, on this,
advanced with greater audacity, till they found themselves
exposed to the full fire of the enemy’s field-pieces, se¬
parated from them by a strongly fortified Wall. At this
moment Kinueer was wounded, the English sepoys re-
• treated, and even the English white troops began to
waver. Just then Kerjean directed a movement on their
flank. On this service 100 French soldiers started. The
manoeuvre was decisive. The English fell back after but
a slight resistance, leaving forty of their men dead on the
field of action.
Thus in less than tAvo months after the terrible and
seemingly irreparable losses caused by the incapacity
of Larv. did Dupleix bring back victory to the French
standards, and recover his influence amongst the native
princes of the Carnatic. The effect was increased by the
capture, shortly afterwards, of a company of Swiss mer¬
cenaries, employed by the English under the command of
Captain Scliauf on the high seas. The English denounced
this action as opposed to the law of nations, the two
countries being nominally at peace. But Dupleix tri¬
umphantly replied that he had as much right to capture
English soldiers on the seas, as the English had to capture
French soldiers on land; that on this occasion he was
w-irmreh-acting in self-defence, as these soldiers had been
sent to sea that they might the more effectually attack
the French possessions on'shore. There can be no doubt t\
as to the soundness and completeness of this reply. \) '
It was about this period that Dupleix received from the
ffnbadar of the Dekkan, Salabut Jung, a patent containing
his formal appointment as FTawab of the Carnatic, and of
the countries south of the Kistna, and as‘possessor of all
the other honours conferred upon him by Mozuffer Juno-.
3 30 TIIE STRUGGLES OF DITLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap. Salabut Jung also informed him that the Emperor

. VIL . Ahmed Shah would shortly send an embassy with the
1752. imperial patents of confirmation. In consequence of the
authority thus received, Dupleix appointed Rajah Sahib,
the son of the deceased Chunda Sahib, to hold the ap¬
pointment under him. Finding, however, that the young
man himself preferred pleasure and sloth to the occu¬
pation of war, he entered into negotiations with Mortiz
Ali, the surviving son-in-law and nearest relative of the
family of Dost Ali. Mortiz Ali responded freely to the
conditions, and agreed to advance a considerable sum of
money, and to levy troops in support of his title. In the
same month, likewise, the Directors of the Company of
the Indies wrote to Dupleix to express their entire satis¬
faction with his conduct, and to inform him that the
King of France had been pleased, in compliance with
their solicitations, to confer upon him the title of Marquis,
with reversion in direct line to his descendants. From
all the eminent public men in France he received by the
same opportunity congratulations on the receipt of this
well-merited honour, and expressions of entire concurrence
in the policy he had adopted. Meanwhile, all his hopes
raised by the success at Vicravandi, Dupleix renewed his
negotiations with the Mysoreans and Morari Rao, pressing
them to declare openly in his favour. This they agreed
to do, provided Dupleix should engage so to employ the
main army of the English as to leave them free to prosecute
their views upon Trichinopoly. In accordance with these
view’s Dupleix reinforced Kerjean to the utmost extent
possible, and sent him to enforce a blockade of Fort St.
David, so as to prevent any possible co-operation by the
English with their detachment at Trichinopoly. By this
means Kerjean’s force was increased to 400 Europeans,
1,500 sepoys, and 500 native horse.
The news of this vigorous action roused Major Lawr-
rence from his *bed of sickness. Proceeding to Fort St.
David by sea he arrived there on August 27, and on the
 LAWRENCE BEATS KERJEAN. 331

following morning moved out at the head of 400 Euro- chap.

] jeans, 1,700 sepoys, and 400 troops belonging to Mahomed
Ali, to reconnoitre the French position. Strong as it was 1752.
he resolved to attack it on the following clay. But Ker-
jean, not confident as to the result of an action, retreated
during the night to Bahoor, two miles from Fort St. David,
and the following evening,—Major Lawrence still advan¬
cing,—to Villanore, within three miles of Pondichery.
At this time Dupleix was momentarily expecting the
arrival of a ship called the ‘ Prince,’ having on board 700
men, and, what was of equal importance, a tried com¬
mander on Indian soil,—M. cle la Touche. As Major
Lawrence was forbidden by his instructions to attack the
French in their position on French soil, it would have
been wise policy on the part of the French commander
to remain where he was until the reinforcements should
arrive. But it would appear that Major Lawrence was
equally aware of the hopes entertained regarding the'
! Prince,’ and he wisely bethought him of trading on the
ambition of M. cle Kerjean, who could scarcely expect to
retain his command on the arrival of an officer with the
reputation of de la Touche. He resolved, therefore, to
move back to Balioox-, hoping that Keijean .would follow
him. The result fully answered his expectations.* ICer-
jean followed the English major the next clay, and early
on the morning of September 6 received the shock of
his attack. The action was obstinate and bloody. The
French received the assault with great intrepidity, crossing
bayonets with the enemy. Their sepoys, however, who
were stationed in the centre, could not support the
English charge and gave way in disorder. Their centre
thus pierced, the whole line fell back, and fled in cou-

* Major Lawrence states that Ker- can only be imagined that Kerjean,
jean was forced to act thus hy the who was taken prisoner in the action,
repeated orders of Dupleix, and by wished to clear himself at his uncle’s
the threat that he' would he super- expense. The movement was ex- *
seded by de la Touche. No autho- actly that which Dupleix would have
rity is given for this assertion, and it wished to delay.
 TIIE STRUGGLES OF DUrLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

chap, fusion. Kerjean himself, 15 officers, and about 100 men

were taken prisoners. The number of the killed and
1752. -wounded on the part of the French is not recorded. The
English, however, lost one officer killed, four wounded,
and 78 men killed or wounded.*
The worst result of the action for the French was the
unfavourable effect it had upon the Mysorean and Mah-
ratta chieftains. Of the warriors of the latter nation,
3,000 under Innis Khan, who were on the march to join
the French, at once transferred their allegiance to Ma¬
homed Ali, and the Mysoreans deferred for a short time
their plans against Trichinopoly. The work of Dupleix,
however, had been too well performed for a defeat of this
nature to cause its permanent failure. He promised the
Mysoreans that, if they could only take Trichinopoly, it
should be theirs. The magic of his influence, still all-
prevalent in the minds of the natives, was confirmed by
the inaction of Lawrence after his victory. Thus it
happened that, within six weeks of • that action, the
Mysoreans and the Malirattas abandoned the English
alliance, and declared openly for the French.
Another advantage before the termination of the
campaign of 1752 accrued to the French Governor. The
greatest of his opponents, Olive, was forced before the
close of the year to abandon the scene of his triumphs,
and to proceed to Europe for the benefit of-his health.
It is true that he signalised the few months prior to his
departure by two achievements, showing not less energy,
daring, and military talent, than had distinguished his
early victories. We allude to the capture of the forts of
Covelong and Chingleput; the former on the sea coast
about midway between St. Thome and Sadras, 16 miles
south of Madras; the latter on the river Palaur, com¬
manding the high road between Fort St. George and
. Pondichery, and about 40 miles from the English Presi-'
deucy. The capture of these two places is memorable
* Orme ; Lawrence’s Memoirs.
 clive’s beilliaxt successes. 3 S3

from tlic fact, that the 200 troops who formed the chap.
European portion of Clive’s little army were raw recruits,* ^L_
t! ie sweepings, of the English jails, and so little disciplined, 1752.
that, on a shot from the fort of Covelong killing one of
thc-m, all the rest ran away. Nevertheless, even upon
this rabble, Clive exercised an influence so magical; he
won their respect to such an extent by his own contempt
of danger and personal daring, his failing health notwith¬
standing ; that at their head and by their means he
reduced Covelong, defeated a force of 700 sepoys and 40
Europeans sent by Dupleix to relieve it, and then march¬
ing on C'hingleput, the strongest place next to Gingee in
that part of the country, forced the French garrison of
40 Europeans and 500 sepoys to evacuate it. He then
proceeded to Madras, and thence to England.
Notwithstanding these losses, however, a careful survey
of the position of Dupleix at the close of 1752, and a
contrast with the state to which he had been reduced by
the surrender of Law and d’Auteuil but six months
before, will show how much his vast genius had been
able within that short period to accomplish. To do this
completely, his relations to the Directors of the Company
. of the Indies must be borne in mind. This Company,
not possessing one-fourth part of the wealth of the
English Company, had deceived itself by the hope that
the position of Dupleix, as master of the Carnatic, was
too assured, toe secure for him to require any special aid
from France. The Directors looked rather to Dupleix
to transport to France vast sums of money. No doubt
even up to the end of 1751, the position of Dupleix
justilied’the public men in France in the most sanguine ,
hopes as to the future of French India. But that was

* Lord Macaulay, in Ms essay on for this statement, simply remarks, it

Clive, states that the farce was of could hardly he expected that any
such ft description that no officer hut officer who had acquired reputation
Clive would risk his reputation by would willingly risk it by talcing- the
commanding' it. Orme, however, command of them.
who was Lord Macaulay’s authority
334 TIIE STRUGGLES OP DUPLEIX AVITH ADAAEESITY.

CHAP. :• the very reason why real statesmen would have aided
; and supported him with all the means at their disposal.
1752. The transport of 2,000 or 3,000 men to Fondiehery in
1751, would, almost certainly have given France absolute
possession of Southern India. She herself would not
. have felt the loss of that insignificant number of her
; soldiers, whilst they could scarcely have failed to gain for
i her the coveted prize. But instead of support of this
\ nature, the Directors literally starved Dupleix. They
sent him comparatively a small number of ships, and no
funds; the feAv men to serve as soldiers—to gain for
France an empire greater than herself—were the off¬
scourings of the jails and the sweepings of the galleys.
When lie asked them for a competent general they sent
him a Law. It is true that, elevated by the hopes they
had formed from the success of his large schemes, they
vouchsafed him flattering letters and a marquisate. These
however were but cheap rewards which Dupleix would
gladly have bartered -for a few hundred of those brave
troops who were idling their time in the garrisons of
France. Thus left to his own resources we see him
evoking material strength out of nothing, drawing to
himself allies, when, as it woidd appear, there remained
to him nought but destruction. He thus succeeded,
because, in the first place, he possessed a genius for
; organisation of the highest order; because, in the second,
(he considered no sacrifice too great to be made for the
| glory and interests of France: Bitterly personal as was
(the hatred borne to him in that day by contemporary
Englishmen, seizing as they did every occasion to attribute
'. to him motives of personal ambition and personal vanity,
even they were forced to admit his genius and his devo¬
tion to his country. ‘ To give Dupleix his due,1 writes
/ : Major Lawrence in his memoirs, ‘lie was not easily
■*J i cast down; his pride supported him, and at the same
> time his mind ivas full of resources.’ Mr. Orme like-
j Arise admits that the French would have been com-
 EEAS0X5 OF DUPLEIX’ INFLUENCE. 335

] ,-i -lied • t.> rease hostilities after the capture of Seringham, chap.
had not M. Dupleix been endowed (and this at last is --A—
much to his honour) with a perseverance that even 1752.
superseded his regard to his own fortune, of which he
laid at that time disbursed £140,000,' and he continued
with the same spirit to furnish more.’ It was this
disinterestedness, this abnegation of his own interests
when the interests of France, were concerned, that gave
him influence and authority with his own people, that
mimed the lasting admiration and respect of all the
•native princes with whom lie came in contact. In
Dupleix they recognised a man not only thoroughly in
earnest, but who was proof against the ordinary conse¬
quences of disaster. Never was lie more full of resources
than when apparently the well of those resources had
been dried up. They never felt safe when they were
opposed to that versatile intellect, to that scheming
genius. When in the enemy’s camp they still continued
to correspond with him. So thoroughly did the English.
recognise this magic power, that they .kept their puppet,
Mahomed Ali, in the strictest seclusion. Dupleix
contrived nevertheless to correspond with Mahomed Ali.
It was only, however, to receive an answer, begging
Dupleix not to impute to him the fault of his conduct;
‘for,’ added Mahomed Ali, ‘you know that I am no
longer master of my actions.’
Never perhaps was his genius more eminently displayed
than after the catastrophe of Seringham. Without troops
lie was exposed to the full fury of the victorious army of
Lawrence and Clive, and though these were forbidden to
attack Pondicliery, they had it apparently in their power
to reduce the French settlement to the most insignificant
dimensions, to deprive it of all real power in the country,
of all influence with the natives. Yet by raising up -
enemies within their own camp, Dupleix delayed their
march from Trichinopoly, rendered any decided action
on their part impossible, gained for himself that which of
 THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

ciiap. all other things was most necessary to him,—time,—awl

VH- . actually succeeded in less than two months after that
1752. \igreat disaster, in beating in the field the victorious
. -.English, and in determining the most powerful native
•w' allies of that nation to transfer their material aid to the
French colony. But for the precipitancy of Kerjean, the
advantages gained by the English at Trichinopoly would
have been almost neutralised.
It was, it must be admitted, an immense misfortune
to Dupleix, that whilst his own commanders in the
Carnatic were men of the most ordinary ability, and even,
as in the case of Law, of marked imbecility of character,
there should have been opposed to him the greatest
genius for war of that epoch. The strong, sharp, incisive
blows of Clive were terribly effective on the besotted
leadei's of the French forces; they were met by no
counterstroke, by nought, in fact, hut weakness and
indecision. With a rough and determined hand Clive
. broke down the foundations of French dominion, infused
a confidence into .the English soldiers that never after¬
wards left them, and showed the world that the natives
of India, when well led and when possessing confidence
in their commander, are capable of evincing the best
qualities of real soldiers, alike courage and constanc}-,
heroism and self-denial. But for this one man no
diversion would have been attempted on Arcotj the
English garrison would have remained dispirited in
Trichinopoly, and, it is more than probable, would have
yielded that city to the superior numbers of Law. But
it was Clive that broke the spell of French invincibility :
he it was who first showed his troops and the natives of
the Carnatic, that it was possible to conquer even the
soldiers of Dupleix. He transferred, moreover, to the
. English troops that opinion of their own qualities in the
field, which till his coming had been monopolised by the
French. It was a hard destiny that brought to the
 EALAXCE OX TIIE WHOLE IX IIJS FAVOUR.

overthrow of the plans of Dupleix, a genius so warlike, a chap.

mastery over men so unsurpassed.
Yet, though unsuccessful, on the whole, in the Carnatic, 1752.
the victories of the French troops in another part of
Indian soil, more than compensated in the mind of k
Dupleix for the calamities they sustained near the coast. \
French influence was still paramount, the reputation | ,
of the French arms still supreme, the power of the French •
Governor still unquestioned, at the court of the Subadar.
To gain that influence, to maintain that reputation, to in¬
crease that power, Dupleix had not hesitated to deprive
himself of the services of his best, his only, general, even
to risk his supremacy on the Coromandel coast. Certainly
in those days it was considered even by the enemies of
Dupleix, that the gain at Aurangabad far outweighed the
losses in the Carnatic. To see how that gain was
achieved, how French influence was so consolidated as to
be for many years proof against the overthrow of French
power at Pondichery, we must now devote a few pages
to the romantic career of the energetic and stout-hearted
Pussy.
338 BUSSY TO 1754.

CHAPTEE YIII. ' .

.BUSSY TO 1754.

chap. The vigour and energy displayed by Bussy at Ainboor

and Gingee, his prompt action at Kuddapah, alike on the
1751.’ field of battle as after the death of Mozuffer Jung, his sub¬
sequent march through the entire breadth of the Dekkan,
and his triumphant entry into Aurangabad on June 29,
1751, have been already adverted to.* What there then
remained to him to accomplish, and how he accomplished
it, we have still to record.
But, in order that we may. obtain a complete and com¬
prehensive view of the situation—that, transporting our
minds to the past, we may gaze at a panorama from which
the light of the present is excluded, so as to see the India
of that day exactly as India then was—we .purpose in the
first place to give a brief retrospective sketch of the coun-
tiy known as the Dekkan, defining its original connexion
with, and its degree of dependence upon, the empire of
the Moguls.
The term Dekkan, though embracing in its literal mean¬
ing the whole of the southern part of India, was always
held by the Mahomedans, and has been since held by
, 1 ourselves, to comprehend only that portion of southern
j India lying between the Nerbudda and. t]je Kistna. After
the extinction of the .Toghluck dynasty in 1399, there
arose from the ruins of the Delhi monarchy six indepen¬
dent sovereignties south of the Nerbudda. These were,
the states' of Golconda, Bijapore, Aurangabad, Beder,.

* Chapter VI.
 THE DEK.KAX. 8B9

Bcrar,* and Khawlesh. Of these, in the course of time, chap.

lierar merged into Aunmgabad, and the greater part of -—
I Seder into Goleonda, the remainder being swallowed up 1751.
by Bijapore. 33ut with the accession of the House of
Timour to the throne, there commenced a struggle on the
part of its representatives to recover these ancient appa¬
nages of the empire. Their efforts were so far successful
that in 1599 Ehandesh was incorporated by Akbar into
his dominions. Thirty-eight years later, Aurangabad, till
then governed by the Nizam Shahee dynasty, and the
capital" of which had been captured by Akbar in 1600,
was finally conquered by Shah Jehan. The dynasty of
Adil Shah in Bijapore succumbed to his son and successor,
Aunmgzebe, in 16SG ; whilst the dynasty of Hootub Shah
in Goleonda offered a successful resistance to that monarch
lint a year longer. Thus it happened that, twenty years
before his demise, the whole of the country—lost to the
crown of Delhi on the dissolution of the empire under •
Mahomed Toghluek—had recognised the supremacy of
Atirungzebe.
It must not be imagined, however, that every portion
of the three fallen monarchies of Goleonda, Bijapore, and
Aurangabad, stretching as they originally did to the sea
to the westward, and comprising the cities of Poona and
Suttara, as well as Bijapore and Goleonda, was in an equal
degree subject to that monarch. Before even their con¬
quest had been achieved, there had appeared the first
germ-j nf a power destined to rival, and finally to over¬
shadow even, that, of the Mogul. Commencing as a robber
and a freebooter, Sevajee succeeded in baffling, sometimes
even in defeating, the armies of the Emperor. Leaving
the capitals of the Mussulman dynasties to be occupied ■
by the Moguls, he filched away whole districts for himself.

* The tiernr of those days did not Bhonsla. Nagpore itself did not
include nearly so much territory as form a part of it, lieing the capital
the Kingdom of that name governed of the adjoining province of Cfun-
hy the .Mahralta family ‘ of the dwana. Its capital was Elliehpore.
340 BUSSY TO 1754.

chap. So successful liad he been in such enterprises, that on

—r—- his death, in 1679, he left as an inheritance to his son
1751. the western or seaboard portion of the territories that
owed allegiance to the rulers of Aurangabad and Bijapore.
The consequence of this, and of the subsequent contest of
the Mahrattas with Aurungzebe, was that on the death of
that prince in 1707, the territory called the Dekkan, de¬
pendent on the Delhi Empire, comprised the ancient
kingdom of Golconda, a portion of the old kingdom of
' Aurangabad, with Aurangabad itself, and but a small
slice of Bijapore. Dependent on this, however, was the
long slip of 560 miles of territory on the eastern coast,
known as the Carnatic, The western coast, with the ex¬
ception of the parts occupied by the English and Portu¬
guese, but including the cities of Poona, Sattara, and Bija¬
pore, had become permanently Mahratta.
Aurungzebe was himself exercising regal functions in
the Dekkan when his last illness attacked him at Ahined-
nugger. On his death—February 21, 1707—the autho¬
rity in that quarter devolved upon his son, Azim Shall,
with whom was the best officer of the late Emperor,
Zoolhkar Khan. When, notwithstanding the efforts of
Zoolfikar, Azim Shah was defeated and slain by his
brother Sultan Moazzim, at Agra, in June of the same
year, the latter so highly appreciated the talents of his
opponent’s general, that he at once appointed him Subadar
of the Dekkan, conferring upon him at the same time the
title of Ameer-ool-Amrah. Zoolfikar, however, preferred
the intrigues of the Delhi court to an independent vice¬
royalty. He accepted, indeed, the appointment, but,
leaving Daood Khan Punnee as his deputy, he joined the
court of Moazzim, who had assumed the title of Bahadoor
Shah. On the death of this prince, iu 1712, a grand op¬
portunity was offered to Zoolfikar for the exercise of the
adroit baseness that with him was habitual. He took full
advantage of it, so full indeed, that he very speedily met
. with the ordinary fate of unprincipled intriguers. For,
 TIIE DEKKA2T. 341

having betrayed the Emperor Jehaudar Shall into the chap.

hands of his nephew Farokhsir, he was at once strangled -—r—
by order of the new sovereign. Zoolfikar was succeeded 1751.
in the governorship of the Dekkan by Cheyn Koolich
Khan, who was dignified on the occasion by the title of
Nizam-ool- Moolk, a title which has gone down to his
descendants, the present rulers of Hydrabad.
Nizam-ool-Moolk, known likewise as Asof Jah, was still
Subadar of the Dekkan when the first contest for supre¬
macy between the French and English began in the Car¬
natic. We have seen how in the early part of those
struggles he imposed his law upon the contending parties,
by the appointment, after the murder of Seid Mahomed
Khan, of his trusted lieutenant, Anwar-ood-deen, as Nawab
of the Carnatic. His death, and the consequences result¬
ing from it—the succession of his son Nazir Jung, his
alliance with the English, his murder at the battle of
Gingee; the installation of Nazir Jung’s nephew Mozuffer
Jung, his death at the moment of victory over the revolted
Nawabs; and, finally, the elevation in liis place of his
unde, Salabut Jung, the next surviving son of Nizam-ool-
Moolk, have been already recorded.* We have now to
see what sort of inheritance it was upon which Salabut
Jung thus entered, the obstacles that lay in his path, the
difficulties that seemed to increase with every movement
that he made. The office of Subadar of the Dekkan was
not an hereditary office. It was in the gift of the Emperor
of Delhi. Now, at the time of the death of Nizam-ool-
Moolk, the imperial throne had just fallen into the nomi¬
nal possession of Ahmed Shah, but that monarch found
himself too beset with difficulties of his own to pay much
attention to the affairs of the Dekkan. It was in conse¬
quence of this, and of the increasing anarchy at Delhi in
succeeding reigns, that the satrapy of Hydrabad—the
appointment to the government of which still i-emained

Chapters III. and VI.

342 BUSSr TO 1754.

chap. nominally in the Crown—came to be regarded virtually

as an appanage of the family of Nizam-ool-Moolk. It
1751. was, however, the knowledge that the real appointment
was vested in' the Emperor, which induced the various
claimants of the family of Nizam-ool-Moolk to the Suba-
darship to fortify their pretensions by the publication of
an imperial firman. It was by virtue of such a rescript,
real.or pretended, that on the death of Nizam-ool-moolk,
his son, Nazir Jung, set forth his claims to be his succes¬
sor. Belying upon the same authority, the validity of
which was equally doubtful, Mozuffer Jung disputed those
claims. When death had removed these two competitors,
and the French general, Bussy, had elevated the third son
of Nizam-ool-Moolk, Salabut' Jung, to the dignity, that
nobleman, records Mr. Orme, ‘ did not think it safe to
appear in sight of the capital before he had acted the
stale but pompous ceremony of receiving from the hands
of an ambassador, said to be sent by the Great Mogulj|
letters patent, appointing him viceroy of all the countries.
which had been under the jurisdiction of his father,
N izam-ool-Moolk. ’
Salabut Jung, however, was but the third son of that
famous viceroy. The elder brother, Gliazee-ood-deen, had
indeed, as we have stated, preferred, on the death of his
father, to give a sullen acquiescence in the elevation of his
second brother, Nazir Jung, to the Subadarship, rather than
to plunge into a.contest with one who had taken care to
possess himself of his father’s treasure. But time had
changed the aspect of affairs. Nazir Jung had gone,
!■ Mozuffer Jung had gone, and in their stead reigned Sala-
| but Jung—a man reared in the lap of luxury, unused to
govern, effeminate, slothful, ‘and possessing an almost
empty treasury. This state of things presented an oppor¬
tunity for self-aggrandisement, which, in the decline of'
the Mogul Empire, few possessed sufficient virtue to re¬
sist. Ghazee-ood-deen at least had not that sufficiency.
■ Through the agency of Mulhar Bao Holkar, he opened
 G IfAZEE-00 D-DEEN CONSPIRES. 343

negotiations with the Peshwa, Ballajee Bajee Eao, and chap.

succeeded in inducing the great chief of the Mahrattas ■—.—
to support his pretensions. 1751<
We have seen how the difficulty presented by this alli¬
ance had been momentarily overcome. A present of two
lakhs of rupees, during bis march to Golconda, had in¬
duced the Wahratta general to retire. Such presents,
however, ever form but incitements to new attacks.
Prom the date of his triumphant entry into Auranga¬
bad—June 29, 1751—to the autumn of the same year,
Salabut Jung had indeed lived unthreatened. During
that interval, however, Ghazee-ood-deen and Ballajee
Bajee Eao had had time to cement their plans, and it soon
became but too clear that the prospect of a larger bribe
had combined with the promises of Ghazee-ood-deen to
determine the Peshwa to make a new and more formi¬
dable attack upon the Dekkan on the earliest and most
convenient^ occasion. Affairs in that quarter being thus
threatening, we may proceed to inquire how they were
influenced by the conduct of Bussy, how likewise his
presence in the capital of that division of the empire
affected, or was likely to affect, the plans which Du-
pleix was revolving for the growth of a French empire
in India.
The march of Bussy to Aurangabad in 1751, at the
head of a force of 300 Europeans and 2,000 disciplined
sepoys, his overthrow during that march of the three
conspiring Nawabs, his prompt elevation of Salabut Jung
to the office and dignity of Subadar, had had the primary
effect of making the French absolute masters of the situa¬
tion. Bussy had, indeed, been a consenting party to the
payment of two lakhs of rupees to Ballajee Bajee Eao,
as the price of his retreat, but solely because he con¬
sidered, and rightly considered, that the possession of
the capital, and the peaceful occupation of the country,
in the first instance, were objects which could scarcely
be purchased too dearly. Arriving at Aurangabad, be so .
344 BUSSY TO n

chap, ordered his conduct that whilst nominally the faithful

—'-^5— ally, lie might really be the master, of the Subadar. To
1751. this end he selected as his own residence, and as the place
to be occupied by his troops, a fortress at one of the ex¬
tremities of the city, and completely commanding it. On
the defences of this he mounted his guns, and disposed
his detachment in such a manner that it might be ready
for immediate service. He established amongst his men the
most rigorous discipline. Ho soldier was permitted to leave
the fort but at a fixed hour and at a fixed time, and not even
then without the written permission of the commandant.
Punishments, more or less severe according to the offence,
followed every infraction of discipline. The result was
all that could be desired. There were neither bouts of
drunkenness amongst the soldiers themselves, nor quarrels
or altercations with the townspeople. The richest aud
most valuable goods were freely displayed under- the pro¬
tection of the French soldiery. Indeed, their conduct at
Aurangabad was so exemplary, tbat the natives soon came
to admire them for their courtesy, as much as they had
before feared and esteemed them for their valour.*
Nor. was Bussy for a long time less happy or less suc¬
cessful in his dealings with the Subadar and his courtiers.
It was impossible that a man possessing any discrimina¬
tion of character could be long associated with Salabut
Jung, without noticing the frivolity and weakness'of his
nature. Pew could fail to see that in a Government like
that of the Dekkan—a Government quasi-independent,
N but which, notwithstanding, a powerful Emperor at Delhi
r might at any moment reclaim, a Government which, thus
s- founded on no solid or permanent foundation, was exposed
’ to the incessairt attacks of the encroaching power of the
Malirattas—everything must depend on the character of
the ruler. If that ruler were weak and unstable ; if lie

* The account of the proceedings of Dupleix, the histories of Orme,

of Bussy from 1751 to 1754 is based Wilks, and Grant Buff, and the ‘Seir
K upon the memoir and correspondence Mutakheriu.’
 ASTUTJG POLICY OF PUSSY. 343

had no resources -within himself, no mental energies upon chap.

-which to fall back and to depend, it was certain that he •—^
must become the sport of fortune, the tool and instru- 1751.
ment of the strongest mind that had access to him. Now,
Salabut Jung, Bussy early divined, was that weak and un¬
stable nature, and he determined that no one but himself
should play the part of the strong-minded counsellor. In
the force which he commanded he had one instrument
upon which he could count to enable him to attain the
desired position. It was not, indeed, that he displayed,
or intended to display, his troops in an attitude of men¬
ace. He was far too wise, far too clear-headed, for that.
He shut them up, as we have seen, in a fortress, and drilled
them into courtesy and gentleness. But the moral effect
of that force was increased thereby tenfold. Whilst they
excited no jealousy, not, a man but knew what they had
done, what they could do, what they were ready to at¬
tempt, at the slightest word from Bussy. His power of
restraining such a force added greatly to the influence of
its presence.
But it was not upon the force that he so greatly relied.
That was indeed the basis of his. power; but a less able
man might notwithstanding have used the influence given
him by so strong a position to little purpose. Bussy
trusted for the success of his plans to his own acquaint¬
ance with native character. Though frank, open, and
conciliatory, he was in those clays, before yet age and
gout had begun to undermine his faculties, a model of
resolution and taot. He had spent many years in India
in close contact with the natives, more especially with
those of high rank, and he understood them thoroughly.
He had too the advantage of possessing a settled plan.
Before leaving Pondichery he had concerted with Du-
pleix the manner in which he was to carry on his rela¬
tions with Mozuffer Jung, and he anticipated no difficulty
in following his instructions to the letter now that he had
to deal with the more facile character, of Salabut. A
346 BUSSY TO

chap, glance at the map of India, and the recollection of the

_history of the period, will show how vast, how gigantic,
1751. yet, under ordinary circumstances, how feasible was this
plan. Separated by tire Vindya range from the disor¬
ganised empire proper of the Mogul, the possessor of the
Mahomedan province of the Dekkan seemed to be in a
position to be able to give law to the whole of soutli-
I eastern India. He commanded a large army and ruled
I over a warlike population. He was the liege lqpd of the
} ruler of the Carnatic, and lie wielded in that province
j itself the authority of the Mogul. He was thus the pos-
| sessor of the moral and physical power; he had the right
' to use force, and the force ready to be used; and in those
days, when the name of the Mogul was everything, and
the reputation of the European settlers comparatively
nothing, that double power was apparently an irresistible,
really a very potent, lever.
j This being the position of the province known as the
j Dekkan, and this the power of its ruler, can we greatly
j blame that policy which at a moment when France had
all but overcome her hated rival in the Carnatic, deter¬
mined, without striking a blow, to make that position and
that influence purely French ? What a- vista did it not
hold out to a patriotic ambition! What dreams of empire,
what visions of imperial dominion ! Possessing the Car¬
natic, by this policy gaining the Dekkan, the minarets of
the Jumma Musjid and the jewelled ornaments of the
peacock-throne seemed near enough to excite the fancy
and to stimulate to irresistible action !
This tempting vision offered yet another advantage.
It seemed so easy of accomplishment. Knowing the
native character so thoroughly as did Dupleix, he was
well aware that notwithstanding the obligations under
which the reigning viceroy might be to the French, they
would all be forgotten unless he were continually re¬
minded of their power as a people—unless he had con¬
stantly before his eyes evidence of their superiority. It
 RISK INCURRED EY DUPLEIX. 847

was therefore, primarily, not less to maintain French chap.

influence at the court of the Subadar, than to support the >—^
pretensions of Mozuffer Jung, that Bussy had been directed 1751.
to accompany that prince to Aurangabad. Dupleix did
not doubt that with the French troops under a soldier-
diplomatist in occupation of his capital, engaged to support
the Subadar, and, what was of more consequence, the
Subadar himself feeling that he could depend upon them
alone to^gupport him, the soldier-diplomatist, if he were
skilful and able, would inevitably draw to himself the
whole influence of the province, that he would shape its
foreign policy, and inspire its political action—that he, in
fact, would become the omnipotent mayor of the palace,
the Subadar subside into the powerless automaton.
Thus to divide his forces and to lose the services of his
ablest general in the presence of such an enemy as were
the English, who had the sea as their base of operations,
was undoubtedly to rim a great risk. Yet before we j
condemn Dupleix too harshly for running such a risk, |
we must point to the situation of affairs on the coast at '
that time. The two nations were nominally at peace. I
The entire Carnatic and Trichinopoly, with the sole ex¬
ception-of the town of that name, had acknowledged
Chunda Sahib as *Nawab. The English had positively
refused to assist Mahomed Ali in the defence of that city.
But, even were lie' to succeed in persuading them to do
so, it seemed as though Dupleix had nothing to fear from
their efforts, for Lawrence, their ancient leader, ivas ab¬
sent, the genius of Clive had not then been discovered, and
Dupleix knew and rated at its real value the capacity of
such men as Gingen and Cope. Could he foretell that
out of that dispirited colony of baffled enemies, who, not
even venturing to remove their seat of government to
Madras, remained cooped up in Fort St. David, idle spec¬
tators of his daring enterprise, there would arise one of
the most consummate leaders of the age ? Ought he to
have acted as though such a contingency were possible ?
348 BUSSr TO 1754.

chap. Yes, undoubtedly, if we are to judge men by the highest

v- V,11'. - standard, if we are to make no allowances for human in-
1751. pulses and human passions, we are bound to declare that
he ought so to have acted. Before sending Bussy to the.
Dekkan, he ought at least, as a measure of wise precau¬
tion, to have made sure of Trichinopoly, to have crushed
the last rival of Chunda Sahib. Had he done that—had
he thus deprived the English of all pretext to interfere,
and had he then been able to send Bussy to Agjungabad
—the Carnatic would have been his, the Dekkan would
have become his, and, before long, all India south of the
Vindya range would have acknowledged the supremacy of
the French.
Still though it was a great, as it turned out, indeed, a
fatal fault, who will assert, that in the presence of so great
a temptation, and in the prospect, seemingly certain, of
repose in the Carnatic—for, it will be remembered, Ma¬
homed Ali had lulled the suspicions of Dupleix by promises
to surrender—who, we say, will assert, that such a fault
ought to be imputed as a crime to the illustrious French¬
man P We must recollect that the moment was so oppor¬
tune— Mozuffer Jung going to take possession of his
government, the necessity that he should be accompanied
by a body of Frenchmen so urgent, the peace of the. Car¬
natic so assured—that there seemed but small necessity
for the services of a Bussy. To Dupleix it must have
appeared as if he incurred a very small and a very distant
risk, in order at once to grasp a very present and very
certain gain— a gain which must have an enormous effect
on the result of any future struggles in the Carnatic. Can
we even blame, him much if he, looking into the future
with but human eyesight, decided to run that small risk ?
The prospect, indeed, was so peculiarly alluring to a
brilliant imagination, that Dupleix would not have been
Dupleix had he decided to neglect or to defer it.
As it was, everything seemed at first to favour the daring
plans of the French Governor. He could not certainly
 bussy's influence at aurungabad. 349

have been more fitly or more ably represented than by the

clever and versatile Bussy. We have already noticed the -—
skilful and unobtrusive manner in which this officer dis- 1'oL
•posed his soldiers in Aurungabad. His own conduct was
based upon the same principle. To appear as nothing,
yet to be everything in the State; to show himself to the
world as tha commandant of the French Contingent, main¬
taining in the eyes of the natives by his lavish expenditure
and outward show the dignity of that office; to direct in
secret all the foreign relations of the Government, to make
all their acts chime hi with French interests. In this
manner he laid the foundations of an influence destined to
survive the loss of power and prestige at Pondichery, and
which, had that power and that prestige not fallen, would,
in all probability, have worked with a most decisive effect
on the events that were to follow. From the date of the
arrival of Bussy in Aurungabad, on June 29, 1751, all
his efforts were directed to the establishment of this occult
influence. He entirely succeeded. Very little time
elapsed before he had brought Salabut Jung to the per¬
suasion that the safety of his person depended on the
presence of the French troops at his capital, and that the
security of his empire could be best assured by his follow¬
ing the counsels of the French general. The latter kept
himself all this time studiously in the background. His
secret influence, however, was exerted to appoint as
mink-ters of the Subadar men -whom he believed to be
devoted to himself; and although he was more than once,
as we shall see, deceived* by the superior finesse of Asiatic
intriguers, he never wanted the boldness and promptitude
to repair every error, and even to use to the advantage of
his country the opportunity afforded him by the attempts
to weaken his influence.
Whilst Bussy was thus employed in laying the founda¬
tion of French power at the court of the Subadar, the
intelligence reached him of the alliance between Ghazee-
ood-deen and the Mahrattas, having for its object the ex-
350 BUSSY TO 1734.

CHAP.* pulsion of the French nominee, Salabut Jung. Whilst,

. YI11, , in all probability, Bussy would have preferred to pursue
1751. that task of consolidation which, would have enabled him
to employ the resources of the Dekkan in aid of the
French designs in the Carnatic, he can scarcely have re¬
gretted 'the opportunity, which this threatened invasion
seemed likely to afford him, of teaching .the warlike
inhabitants of Western India to respect French discipline
and French valour. Whilst, therefore, the news, that
Ghazee-ood-deen himself was advancing from the north
at the head of 150,000, and Ballajee Bajee Eao from the
west with 100,000 men, spread consternation and dismay
in.the court of Aurungabad, whilst some counselled retreat,
and others even entered into negotiations with the invader,
Bussy himself remained calm and unmoved. When called
upon by the Subadar for his opinion, he gave him advice
of the same nature as that which Clive a little later gave
to Governor Saunders—advice which stamped him at once
as the man for the occasion:—‘ Care not,’ he said, ‘ for
the invading army, you will best preserve the Dekkan by
marching upon Poona.’ It is a signal proof of his great
influence at the court of the Subadar, that this bold advice
was promptly followed. The better to make his prepara¬
tions the Subadar had moved from Aurungabad to Gol-
conda. When, after many days, he ascertained that the
allied enemies had begun their movements from two
opposite directions upon Aurungabad, he, accompanied
by Bussy, and in pursuance of the plan suggested by him,
broke up from that place, and, leaving Aurungabad to its
fate, marched upon Beder,* the original capital of the

* Grant Duff and the author of gabad from Poona, and their natural
the ‘Seir Mutakherin’both state that route -would take them through
Ahmednugger -was the town upon' Ahmedntigger. Considering that
■which the Subadar marched after Ghazee-ood-deen was likewise
leaving Goleonda. Mr. Orme on the marching upon Aurungabad, a move-
contrary indicates Beder. We are ment of Bussy upon Ahmednugger
inclined to believe that in this in- would certainly not have had the
stance Mr. Orme is correct. The effect of alarming Ballajee Bajee Bao
Malirattas were marching on Aurim- about the safety of Poona. On the
 IIE DISCONCERTS BALLAJEE. 351

ancient kingdom of that name. Besides the large hut chap.

inviiular army of Salabut Jung, Bussy had with him 500 —-
French troops in the highest state of discipline, and 5,000 1751.
drilled sepoys. Meanwhile, no sooner was the rainy sea¬
son over, than Ballajee Bajee Eao entered the Dekkan,
and, proceeding on the true Mahratta principle of making
war support war, ravaged the country on every side. It
‘ is not to be imagined "that- he had any particular regard
for Ghazee-ood-deen, or any particular hatred for Salabut
Jumr. With him it was simply a matter of business.
Whilst the two Mahomedans were fighting for the sove¬
reignty of the province, it was for him to hold aloof until
one was thoroughly beaten, and .both were completely
exhausted. Action on his part, then, would give a large
.-lice- of the Dekkan to the Mahrattas. Meanwhile little
dreading any movement on the part of Salabut Jung, he
proposed to enrich himself and his followers by the plunder
of the border provinces of the Dekkan. The bold march
of Bus-y upon Beder, however, entirely disconcerted these
plans. Still more was Ballajee troubled when he saw that
the enemy had no intention whatever of remaining at
Beder, but were moving thence direct upon his capital.
Denouncing at ouce all thoughts of the invasion of the
Dekkan, Ballajee hastened to proceed to the defence of his
dominions. He was at the head of a numerous army,
confident in their leader, and in whom their leader reposed
the fullest trust. Very often had he led them to victory,
more than once indeed over this same army of the Dekkan,
which now had the presumption to invade the sacred
soil of thd" Mahrattas. Could he doubt the result now P
Of the foreigners who accompanied the army of Salabut
he might indged have heard, but the smallness of their

otlier hand, Beder lies in the direct the intelligence of an expedition

route from Golconda, where Bussy starting for Poona from that place,
then was, to Poona, and it is the would inevitably bring down Bal-
phic; whence the most telling attack lajee from the 'north to protect his
could lie made on the Mahratta ter- capital,
ritory. Wc can easily imagine how
 BUSSY TO J 754.

chap, numbers was sufficient to deprive them of any formidable

character. They, besides, had never come in contact with
1751. a regular Mahratta army; had never been called upon to
repel those sweeping charges of cavalry, which had so
often proved fatal to the armies of the Mahomedans.
Selecting then 40,000 of his best horse, and leaving the
remainder to follow, Ballajee hastened to bar the road to
Poona, and, if possible, to destroy the enemy at a blow.
The Subadar with his Trench allies had but just left Beder
en route to Poona, when they learned the approach of the
Mahrattas. In accordance with the Mahomedan tactics
they formed up to await their attack. Bussy, however,
so planted his guns, consisting of ten field-pieces, as to
command the ground over which the enemy must charge,
Having done this and placed his infantry in line of support,
he calmly awaited the approach of Ballajee.
It was indeed the first time that the Mahrattas had
regularly met a European enemy on the open field—for the ,
Mahratta contingent in the Carnatic had consisted of com¬
paratively a handful, and they had there acted the part of \
auxiliary skirmishers rather than of an independent force.
But Bussy had now before him the flower of the Mahratta .
army—and of the Mahratta army in its best form. The
Mahrattas were at that time the rising power of Hindus¬
tan. The warriors of that people had not then begun to
depart from the traditions, an adherence to which had
made them a nation. Their splendid horsemanship, their
long endurance, their ability to move without tents, with¬
out baggage of any sort, without other supplies than those
which each individual soldier carried upon his horse,
had combined with their daring tactics to render them
superior to those Mahomedan armies, which a long course
of misgovemment and want of system had ruined. The
luxurious equipments of the armies of Aurungzebe formed
a striking contrast to the unostentatious camps of Akbar,
and from the time of the death of Aurungzebe even the
appearance of discipline had ceased. The Mogul armies,'
 TIIB FBEXCII PROVE THEIR STEEL. 353

Impels" of victory, conscious of the incapacity of their chap.

leaders, lialf-beaten before they had struck a blow, felt -
themselves unfit to make head against the new power that 1751.
was gradually overwhelming Hindostan.
Busy was well aware of tins. Full well did he know
that the issue of the. contest that day depended upon, him¬
self and his soldiers, upon those French -whom he had led
almost across the continent; who, starting from the waters
of the Bay of Bengal, were now straining their eyes to
gaze upon the Arabian Sea. He waited for the attack,
however, full of confidence. At length it came. The
clouds of dust, the loud tramp of countless horses, could
forebode nothing else. It was clear that 40,000 of the
choicest horsemen of the East, headed by their Peshwa,
were about that day to endeavour to surpass all their
former deeds of valour. At full speed, though without
order, with spear in rest, shouting victory, they charged.
But the nerves of the little band of Frenchmen wrere
neither shaken nor unstrung. Standing at their guns,
they waited coolly the order of their commander. When
it came, discharges of grape and cannister, not single but
continued, combined with a never-ceasing file firing from
the infantry, told the Mahratta horsemen what kind of
enemy this was against whom they -would have to contend ■
for empire. The result was never doubtful. After a few
rounds, the Mahratta horse could bear no more. They
turned their horses’ heads and disappeared.* Bussy was
not the man to allow a victory to remain barren. He
persuaded the Subadar t6 march instantly towards Poona,
not stopping to listen to the offers of the Peshwa for ac¬
commodation, but to move straight upon the capital.
There werg, however, as is usual with an oriental army,
wheels -within wheels. Ballajee Bajee Eao, the Peshwa,

* The author of the 1 Seir Mutalc- half way with an army of 50,000
herin,’ a Slahomedan, thu3 writes of horse,hutwas defeated; at which time
the battle, ‘Rallajee Itao, without the French with their musketry and
suffering him (Salabut Jung) to their expeditious artillery drew
come so far (as Poona), met him smoke from the Mahratta breasts.’
354 BUSSY TO 1754.

chap, was on bad terms with Tara Bae, the grandmother of the
-,1™:.. youthful Bajah of Sattara, and she was even then dis-
1751. puting his right to govern for her grandson. With her,
therefore, to weaken Ballajee, the advisers of Salabut
Jung had entered into communication. On the other
hand, Ballajee, recognising at once the value of the
services rendered by the Trench contingent to the Suba-
clar, endeavoured, by all those means so common at an
oriental court, to excite jealousy of the French leader, by
attributing to him personal motives and private ambition.
We shall see that both these efforts bore their fruit in
their season.
Little caring for, probably ignorant of, these intrigues,
Bussy, still prevailing with the Subadar, moved on until
he found himself once more in the vicinity of the Mah-
ratta army at Rajapore on the Ghore river.' The time
was propitious for an attack. An eclipse of the moon
had called all the Hindoos to their devotions, and Bussy
was resolved to take advantage of their superstition to
beat up their quarters. It was a new thing to his Maho-
medan allies to witness this attempt to fight the Mahrattas
with their own weapons—to attempt to surprise those
who had owed a great part of their success to their own
• quickness and vigilance. So great was their opinion of
the Mahrattas that this attack seemed to them, witnesses
as they had been of the flight of the cavalry of Ballajee
in the open field, to savour more of rashness than pru¬
dence. Nevertheless Bussy attempted it. Taking advan¬
tage of the moment when the eclipse of the moon would,
as he believed, engross all the attention of the enemy, he
moved upon their camp, and opened suddenly a fire of
artillery and small arms. The surprise was complete.
Ballajee himself, who was ‘busy at his devotions, and
naked, had hardly time to throw himself on an unsaddled
mare, on which he saved his life by flying with all his
might.’* His example was followed by his entire army,
* Seir Mutakherin,
 THE JIAHRATTAS DISPIRITED. 355

and though the accounts of the slaughter vary,* it is chap.

certain that the Mahrattas lost an immense quantity of .—
booty, and that a heavy blow was dealt to their prestige 1751.
as warriors. Proportionately, and even more than pro¬
portionately, did the victory increase the reputation of
Pussy. It can easily be understood on how high an ele¬
vation those who had so dreaded Mahratta dash and
daring must have placed the man who knew thus how to
avail himself of their weaknesses.
The day following this exploit, November 23, 1751,
Bussy advanced towards Poona, the Mahrattas contenting
themselves with hovering about his flanks, and endeavour¬
ing, though unsuccessfully, to impede his advance. On
the 24th he attacked and destroyed the town of Tully-
gaom. Two days later, Ballajee made another desperate
effort to recover his lost prestige. Some of the most
famous Mahratta chieftains—amongst them two sons of
Banojee Sindia and Koneer Trimbuck Yekbootee—were
chosen to lead a renewed attack on the allied camp. On
November 27 this attack was made, the enemy charging
the native troops of Salabut Jung, dashing through every
obstacle and completely overwhelming them. It seemed
for an instant as though it would be impossible to restore
the day. The little band of Frenchmen all this time,
however, maintained their position, threatened but not
assailed. .At last, noting the slaughter of his allies, Bussy
changed his front and brought his guns to bear upon the
masses of hostile cavalry with such effect, that they re¬
treated from the field they had almost gained, and gave
time to the troops of the Subadar to rally from their dis¬
order. The next day the town of Korygaom on the Bhima

* Grant Duff asserts, on the autho- in tlie night, and with so much suc-
rity of Mahratta. accounts, that the cess, that they lost a vast number of
surprise was incomplete, and that men, whom the French consumed in
the Mahrattas did not suffer mate- shoals at the fire altars of their artil-
rially. The author of the ‘ Seir Mu- lery.’ Grant Duff admits that this
takherin ’ states, on the other hand, action had an immense effect in rais-
that the Mahrattas ‘ were set upon ing Bussy’s reputation.
AA2
356 BUSSY TO 1754.

chap, -was occupied by Bussy, who thus found hiruself within

twenty miles of the capital of the Peshwa.
1751. It formed no essential part of the plan of Salabut Jung,
however, to make any conquests from the Mahrattas.
His interests pointed rather to breaking up the confede¬
racy between that people and Ghazee-ood-deen, even2 if
possible, to forming an alliance with those who had been
the allies of his rival. Swayed by the wise counsels of
Bussy, he had, in the presence of two armies, each su¬
perior to his own, succeeded not only in preventing a
junction which would have overwhelmed him, but in
forcing the one army to meet him on the ground he had
chosen, and in so dealing with it as to convince its leader
that it was for his interest to ally himself with him, rather
than with his competitor for the rule of the Dekkan.
Thus, after the last battle, the Peshwa began to consider
whether it was necessary or advisable to continue the con¬
test further. Any nearer approach to Poona or Sattara
might, he felt, give to the partisans of Tara Bae a weight
sufficient to endanger his own influence and power. He
accordingly opened negotiations with Salabut Jung, and
although these were protracted, owing to some difficulties
raised by that nobleman, an armistice was concluded
at the beginning of the year.
1752. Salabut Jung -was, however, anxious to come to an
understanding with the Mahrattas, the more so 51s his own
army, badly organised and worse officered, was almost in
a state of mutiny. The men had some reason for their
discontent, for their pay was considerably in arrear, but
the officers, especially the superior officers, for the most
part uneducated in their profession, were jealous of the
credit gained by the French. They constantly insinuated
that Bussy had ulterior objects in view which a prolonga¬
tion of hostilities alone could procure for him. But there
was another reason not less potent. Ghazee-ood-deen was
now marching upon Aurungabad, and it was an object
with Salabut to deal with him whilst yet the recollection
 BUSSY OUTWITTED. 357

of the recent campaign should be fresh in the minds of chap.

the Mahrattas. The advice given by Bussy, under these —-
circumstances, was worthy of his reputation for tact and 17°2-
skill. The French leader had not been unobservant of
the signs of discontent. But it had seemed to him even
less desirable for French interests than for those of the
Subadar, to march upon Poona. He resolved, therefore,
to act in such a manner as at the same time to allay
those discontents, and to further the interests of his
countrymen. He accordingly supported the propositions
in favour of peace, both openly and in private, thus alike
disarming his enemies and gaining still more entirely the
confidence of the Subadar.
The armistice concluded, the army returned towards
(folconda, overthrowing on the way some refractory
Kajahs who had refused tribute. But in the course of
its march an incident occurred which called for the
prompt action of Bussy. The Prime Minister of the
Subadar, Bajah Eugoonath Dass, a man devoted to French
interests, was assassinated by some of the Affghan soldiers
of the army, whose officer the Bajah had insulted. It
then became necessary to arrange that a fitting person
should be appointed in his place. And here Bussy for
the first time allowed himself to be over-reached. He
had met at the court of the Subadar a nobleman of ability
and skilful address, Syud Lushkur Khan. This man had
divined the designs of the French, hated their persons,
and dreaded their influence. Nevertheless, in order the
better to counteract their plans, he dissembled his senti¬
ments, and pretended for Bussy in particular the greatest
■devotion and esteem. He hoped by this means and by
his influence to obtain office under the Subadar, intending,
after he should have obtained it, to use all his power to
thwart the French policy and to undermine the position
of the French leader. Bussy was completely taken in.
Believing Syud Lushkur to be the man he represented
himself to be, he recommended him to the Subadar as a
358 BUSSY TO 1754.

CHAP, fit successor to the deceased Bajah, and obtained for him
-I-1.——, the appointment.
1752. There was, however, much for Bussy to effect before
the intrigues which Syud Lushkur instantly set on foot
should have time to work. Ghazee-ood-deen yet lived
and threatened. So far indeed from abating his preten¬
sions in consequence of the defeat of Ballajee, he had
stirred up the Bhonsla to attack the Dekkan in the north¬
east, whilst he himself, with Mulhar Bao Holkar to assist
him, should enter it through the gate of Aurungabad.
The threatened invasion of Hindostan by Ahmed Shah
Abdallee had, indeed, combined with the hostile atti¬
tude of the Bohillas, and the consequent intrigues at
the court of Delhi, to detain Ghazee-ood-deen at that
capital longer than he had anticipated. By degrees,
however, the difficulties in the way of his, departure
were removed, and in the month of September, 1752,
he reached Aurungabad with an army computed at
150,000 men.
Then began those intricacies of intrigue such as are
seen only in an oriental court. There were assembled at
Aurangabad, Ghazee-ood-deen, whose real and avowed
object was to obtain the sovereignty of the Dekkan, and
to obtain wdiich he was ready to sacrifice a portion of it
to the Mahrattas; on the side of that people, Ballajee,
supported by Holkar and the Bhonsla, was endeavouring
to persuade each of the rivals to offer him a higher bid
than the other. Salabut Jung had there no avowed re¬
presentative, although his Minister, Syud Lushkur, was
present at the conferences. This man, however, the bet¬
ter to carry out his plans, had persuaded his master to
connive at the fiction iffiat he had been dismissed from
the office of Dewan, and had, therefore, proceeded as a
discontented noble to the confederates. In this way, he
urged, he could better worm out their secrets. His real
object, however, was to cement to the utmost of his power
the alliance between the Mahrattas and Ghazee-ood-deen,
 GIIAZEE-OOD-DEEN POISONED. 359

with the view of expelling Salabut Jung, and, with him, chap.
the French general and his troops. •—r—
The right of Ghazee-ood-deen, as the eldest son of his 1752.
father, gave him in this dispute a moral influence, which
was not without its effect on the nobles of the Dekkan,
and which very much disturbed Salabut Jung himself. It
is possible that under the circumstances, and in the face
of the Mahratta alliances, which Ghazee-ood-deen had at
length cemented by the offer of a considerable sacrifice of
territory, he might have been inclined to listen to a com¬
promise, when an event occurred which removed the
necessity for further negotiations. Living at Aurangabad
in the ancient palace of the Subadars, was one of the
widows of Nizam-ool-Hoolk—she who had borne him but
one son, the next in order to Salabut Jung, Nizam Ali.
All the hopes of this lady were concentrated in the ardent
desire to see this son sitting on the viceregal seat of his
father. Between that-wish and its accomplishment there
were however two obstacles. One of these, Salabut Jung,
was out of her reach the oilier, Ghazee-ood-deen, was at
Aurangabad. To thrust him out of the path she wished
her son to-follow she had no scruple as to the means by
which such a result might be obtained. She accordingly
invited Ghazee-ood-deen to a feast, and in a dish of which
she persuaded him to partake, telling him truly that it
had been prepared with her own hands, she poisoned
him. Ghazee-ood-deen died that night.
Freed by this crime from his principal rival, Salabut
Jung, as next in the order of succession, was at once
acknowledged Subadar of the Dekkan. He had still,
however, before him the whole force of the Mahrattas,
not only the army of the Peshwa, but, united with it,
those of Holkar and the Bhonsla. The ruler of the Ma-
homedan state of Burhanpoor, who had before declared
for Ghazee-ood-deen, uow announced his intention to
stand by his engagements with the Mahrattas, There
remained then to Salabut Jung the alternative of a mur-
360

chap, derous and doubtful war, or the resignation to the Mah-

-U-. _ rattas, offered by Ghazee-ood-deen, of the territory west
1752. of Berar from the Taptee to the Godavery. The decision
was left by the Subadar to Bussy, and he regarding a
solid peace on such conditions as more favourable alike
to the interests of the French and the Subadar than a
doubtful war, recommended compliance with the terms
offered, stipulating only that the Bhonsla should retire
beyond theWyn Gunga river. This stipulation was agreed
to, and peace was proclaimed.
1753. These arrangements having been completed, Syud Lush-
kur returned, unsuspected, to his office of Dewan, and the
Subadar, who, accompanied by Bussy and his army had
been moving in the direction of Aurangabad, set out for
Hydrabad, destined thenceforth to be the capital of the
Dekkan.- This was in the early part of 1753. During
■ the year that had passed, Bussy in addition to his own
duties had been in constant communication with Dupleix,-
had watched and lamented over the incapacity of Law
without being able to draw him from his embarrassment,
and had shown in every letter his own readiness to be
employed for- the best advantage of France. Li the
course of it he learned the decline and death of Chunda
Sahib, at the same time that he received from Dupleix
intimation as to the utter unfitness of him who should
have been his successor. Under these circumstances he
applied himself with untiring zeal to use his position at
the court of the Subadar for the benefit of France. How,
he thought, could this be more strenuously carried out
than by the appointment of Dupleix himself to the Nawab-
ship of the Carnatic. This appointment had indeed been
conferred upon Dupleix by Mozuffer Jung, but, from mo¬
tives of policy, Dupleix had made over the dignity of the
» office to Chunda Sahib. On the death of this latter, was
it to revert to Dupleix, for him either to administer the
office himself or to appoint a deputy in .his place, or was
he to suffer it to be bestowed upon some possible enemy
 BfSST FALLS SICE. 361

of the French power ? To such a question there could be chap.

but one reply. By his influence with the Subadar, with --
whom the nomination legally rested, the confirmation only
of the court of Delhi being required, Bussy procured the
issue of the patent for the investiture of Dupleix,- the
receipt of which at Pondichery we noticed in our last
chapter.
We have now described to our readers the manner in
which Bussy was employed during that trying period,
when the unassisted genius of Dupleix had to contend
against the steadfastness of Lawrence and the vigour of
Clive. Although the scene of his action continued to be
still distant from, Pondichery, yet his movements were so
intimately connected with the policy of Dupleix, that we
propose to continue the account of them up to the mo¬
ment when, in an evil hour for the interests of the French,
their greatest proconsul was recalled to be another victim
to die besotted Government he had served but too well.
The year upon which he was now entering, 1753, was
to see Bussy exposed to many trials, to witness his suc¬
cessful over-riding of the dangers and artifices peculiarly
calculated to test the qualities of a statesman: to show
how vain are troops and resources and strong military
positions, when there is not a man to command them. In
the month of January, just after peace had been con¬
cluded with the Malirattas, and whilst the Subadar was
on his return march to Hydrabad, Bussy, worn out by
fatigue and exposure, was suddenly prostrated by sick¬
ness. So severe was the attack, that, unwilling as he was,
at a moment so critical, to relax his grasp of the threads
of the various negotiations in which he was engaged, he
was nevertheless forced, in obedience to the directions of
his medical advisers, to consent to proceed for change of
air to Masulipatam. The reluctance with which he al¬
lowed himself to be persuaded was due mainly to his
conviction, that just at that precise period the mainte¬
nance of the iniiueiice of the French depended almost
362 BUSSY TO 1754.

chap, wholly on his own presence at the court of the Subadar.

. Ym' - He had no one near him to whom he could intrust those
1753. delicate negotiations; not a single officer, in whose judg¬
ment, even in whose ability to maintain discipline over
his troops, he could place any confidence, His second in
command, M. Goupil, was a man of the most ordinary
abilities—one of those simple characters whose want of
imaginative power constantly exposes them to the machi¬
nations of intriguers. To leave the force in his hands,
even had Bussy possessed, as he supposed, a devoted
friend in Syud Lushkur, was indeed a risk : to leave it
with him, when that Dewan was his determined though
secret foe, was to expose it to almost inevitable dis¬
grace. Fortunate was it for Bussy, that in the state of
weakness to which his malady had reduced him he
never once suspected the secret object to which all the
machinations of Syud Lushkur were directed. It is
scarcely too much to suppose that the shock of such
a discovery and the endeavour to counteract its effects
would have been fatal to him. Even though not suspect¬
ing it, the prospect of his departure caused him terrible
uneasiness. But there was no help for it, he must have
rest and change and relaxation or he must die. With a
heavy heart, then, he set out, leaving his place to Goupil,
his counsels to the Subadar and Syud Lushkur, and pro¬
mising to all a speedy return, little imagining the form
and fashion which that return would take.
No sooner had the Subadar reached Hydrabad after
his departure, than the Dewan commenced the secret ma¬
chinations, by means of which he hoped to effect a per¬
manent breach between the Subadar and the French, to
rid the country, in a word, of the latter. In this course
the weakness and indecision of Goupil came greatly to
his aid. We have before adverted to the strict discipline
which, from the time of his arrival at Aurangabad, Bussy
had introduced into his army, and we have pointed out
how the exact and rigorous order which he enforced had
 EfTBIOUBS OP STUD. LUSHKUB. 363

contributed to the confidence of the people, even to their ™A-P.

affection for their European allies. General as such feel- ■■—.—
ings were among the population, they were far more 1753.
deeply implanted in the breast of the Subadar himself.
Salabut Jung had not been a careless spectator of the fate
of his relatives. The fact that his own brother, Nazir
Jung, and his nephew, Mozuffer Jung, had both been
treacherously slain by their own adherents, had impressed
him with the advantage of having in his immediate vici¬
nity a body of men unconnected with his own nobles,
upon whom he could fully and entirely rely, whose sup¬
port would enable him to make a successful stand against
the worst form of rebellion. He had determined, there¬
fore, at the outset, never to separate himself from the
French. To them he had been indebted for his quasi-
regal position ; depending upon them only he felt that he
could maintain it. These resolutions in their favour had
been confirmed and strengthened by the signal services
rendered by Bussy in the war with the Hahrattas, not
less than by the exact discipline which he had maintained
amongst his men.
On the departure of Bussy, however, the Subadar not
only lost the man with whom alone, of all the French, he
was accustomed to hold confidential intercourse, but he
witnessed likewise,, very soon after, a marked change in
the conduct alike of officers and soldiers. Goupil, in fact,
was not even a disciplinarian; he was simply good-natured
and weak. The regulations which Bussy had so rigidly
enforced, were by him one by one set aside. The conse¬
quence was that the troops who had been, under the
one, the preservers of public order, became, under the
other, its persistent infringers. Drunkenness and licen¬
tiousness took with them the place of sobriety and disci- '
pline. This change of conduct on their part was naturally
followed by a change of feeling on the part of the people,
until by degrees the alienation became marked, and the
dislike to the foreigners intensified. Syud Lushkur had
364

chap, not only watched this change of conduct with an eager

. Tm' ^ eye, but he had, by many means in his power, excited
1753. and stirred it up. The most effective of these means was
the -withholding from the French their monthly pay. Hot
only did he hope thus to incite them to some acts of in¬
discipline such as would embroil them with the people,
and exhibit them in an odious light to the Subadar, but
he trusted to it likewise as the charmed weapon, by which
he would procure the removal of their head-quarters
from Hydrabad, and their final expulsion from the Dek-
knn. He set to work, however, with great caution and
with all the appearance of friendship. When he informed
the French officers that he possessed not the funds to pay
them, he accompanied this avowal with numberless pro¬
fessions of the most profound regret, laying the blame on
the tributaries who had neglected to send in their im¬
posts. When, some time afterwards, the French officers,
beset by their soldiers for want of money and themselves
seriously inconvenienced on' the same account, again com¬
plained to him on the subject, he went a step further.
The state of affairs, he said, as to the non-receipt of tlje
public revenue, remained the same, but, he added, the
French were at liberty to take the law into their own
hands, by moving against the refractory tributaries. These,
in different parts of the country, distant from one another,
he indicated ; nor did he fail to point out to the French
officers the pecuniary advantages which might result to
them personally from such a mode of collecting the reve¬
nue. This proposition, apparently so fair and even.con¬
siderate, completely deceived Goupil and his officers, and
some detachments were at once sent out. Under other
circumstances it might perhaps have been difficult to ob¬
tain the consent of the Subadar to their departure, but
the acts of violence and disorder recently committed by
the French had even scandalised Salabut Jung, and he
offered no opposition to the plan.
But though the force had been thus diminished, Syud
 365
TIIE FREXCII FORCE SCATTERED.

I. U'hkur determined to divide and weaken it still mor . &

II, . fiersuaded the Subadar to return to Aurangabad—the --
citv in his dominions most distant from the seat of the
French power—accompanied only by a small detachment
of French soldiers and sepoys, leaving the remainder at
Ilvdrabad, the Governor of which city received at the
«ame time the most positive instructions to maxe them no
advances of pay. He determined at the same time to
disembarrass himself and the court of the presence of H.
Goupil, who, imbecile as he was, yet by virtue ot his
commission as commandant ad interim of the French
forces, occupied a position which, when the plot was ripe
for execution, mi Hit give him sufficient influence with the
Subadar to defeat it. This part of his scheme he managed
with an adroitness the coolness of which is worthy of
admiration. He went to Goupil, told him of the intended
movement to Aurangabad, intimated the intention of the
Subadar to take with him but a small escort of French
troops, and then begged that he would command it.
Goupil, unsuspicious, replied that his duty was to remain
with the bulk of the force, and that as the escort was to
be so small, it would suflice if it were commanded by an
officer of inferior rank. He accordingly remained at Hy-
drabad, sending M. de Janville, an officer of but little
weight or experience, to command the escort accompany-
ing"the Subadar.
'Determined from the outset to leave no stone unturned
to accomplish his end, SyudLushkur had likewise entered
into a correspondence with the English, offering to aid
them with the whole power of the Delckan, if they would
assist him in his schemes for the expulsion of the French.
This proposition coincided entirely with the wishes of
Mr. Saunders, but, engaged at the time in a deadly straggle
■with the French before Trichinopoly, he was able to lend
only a moral support. He entered, however, into an active
correspondence with Syud Lushkur, and encouraged him
to persevere in his great undertaking. Towards the end
366 BUSSY TO 1754.

CHAP, of April, 1753, the plot seemed on the verge of success.

The French were scattered all over the country; {heir
1753. main detachment at Hydrabad had been starved into a
condition bordering upon mutiny; in attendance upon
the Subadar was a young officer without influence or
ability. It seemed natural to Syud Lushkur that troops,
so high-spirited as the French, thus starved and neglected,
would be but too glad to accept a free dismissal from the
country in which their presence seemed to be so unwel¬
come. So completely, indeed, did Syud Lushkur count
upon the success of this policy, that he wrote at that
period to Mr. Saunders, telling him to have no fear for the
result, ‘ for,’ he said, ‘ I have arranged the mode in which
to rid myself of your enemies. The plan is in action, and
with the assistance of Providence, the result will be what
you wish. I expect to be with you by the end of the
rains, and to arrange then everything in a satisfactory
manner.’
Meanwhile, the French at Hydrabad were in want of
everything. The Governor of that city, Mahomed Hoo-
sen Khan, had carried out only too well the orders he had
received, and had refused the French troops and sepoys
even the smallest supplies. Nor were their detachments
better off in the provinces. Separated from the main body
and from one another, they were not in a position to
effect anything in presence of the silent opposition that
seemed everywhere to rise up against them. They fell at
once into despondency; every thought turned towards
Bussy; had he been on the spot, they argued, this
dilemma would never have occurred; he alone could
extricate them from it.. Such were their thoughts, and,
thus thinking, they despatched messenger after messenger
to their old leader.
When Bussy received these messengers and the letters
they carried, he was lying still sick at Masulipatam. The
sea-breezes of the cbast had indeed contributed somewhat
to the restoration of his strength, but prudence would have
 EN'ERGY OP BDBSV. 367

counselled him a longer intermission from the harassing chap.

duties of official life. But almost simultaneously with the ,-—
letters from Hydrabad, there came from Pondiehery a 1753.
communication which decided him. That confidential
letter from Syud Luslikur to Mr. Saunders, from which we
have extracted, happened to be intercepted by French
agents. By them it was carried to Pondiehery, and handed
over to Dupleix.
Dupleix received this letter at a time when he was
meditating those proposals to Mr. Saunders for peace,
which he essayed in July of this year, and to which we
shall refer in their proper place. To this course Bussy,
from his sick bed at Masulipatam, had long urged him,
advising him to renounce the old policy of empire he had
so long followed. To make proposals for peace with any
effect, however, it was necessaiy for Dupleix that he should
be’ paramount in at least one province of India. Hitherto
he had trusted that his prestige in the Dekkan would make
up for his losses in the Carnatic. But now, this letter
showed him that his prestige in the Dekkan was waning,
his power about to be annihilated. He comprehended all
in an instant. He saw at once how it had happened, how
it was to be remedied. With him to think strongly was
to act vigorously. He at once despatched to Bussy a letter,
written in the most emphatic terms, urging him, even
though his health might not be completely re-established,
to set out immediately for Hydrabad. The manner in
which Bussy acted on the receipt of this letter is thus re¬
corded by Dupleix himself: ‘ Le sieur de Bussy,’ he writes,
‘was too zealous a patriot not to sacrifice even health
itself for the benefit of the State.’ Without delaying a day
he issued orders to all the detachments in the district to
unite at a place near Hydrabad, where he proposed to join
them at the end of that month.* Setting out then him¬
self, he found all his troops, amounting to 500 Europeans

May, 1753.
 BUSSY TO 1754.

chap, and 4,000 sepoys, assembled there. His first step was to
■ - re-establish the relaxed discipline of his little army, the
1753. next to restore their confidence : this done, he marched
upon Hydrabad. The Governor of that place, intimidated
by his prompt action, and seeing that the scheme of his
chief had missed fire, consented after some demur to liqui¬
date the arrears of pay, without, however, engaging to
make any stipulation for the future.
Meanwhile a letter from Dupleix to the Subadar had
made Syud Lushkur aware of the interception of his letter
to Mr. Saunders. He knew then that the mask had fallen
from his visage, and that the keen glance of the ruler of
Pondichery had read all the thoughts of his heart.. Still
he seemed resolved to trust to the chapter of accidents to
carry him through his hazardous game. Still he refused
to advance the necessary sums to Janville’s detachment.
Still he ordered Mahomed Hoosen Khan to temporise ahd
gain time. He thought most probably that at Auranga¬
bad, in the extremity of the Dekkan, in close contiguity
to the almost impregnable fortress of Dowlutabad, he
was safe even from the scorn of Dupleix and the vengeance
of Hussy.
But he was not. The communications of Eussy with
Mahomed Hoosen, and the shifting and prevaricating con¬
duct of the latter, very soon convinced the French leader
that, under the circumstances of the case, but one course
of action remained to him. He must march at once to
the city which the advisers of the Subadar had selected as
the place whence to offer to himself and his French these
repeated insults ; he must push these traitors from their
seats, and re-establish with the Subadar Iris old bonds of
confidence and amity. Every preparation accordingly
was at once' made for a march upon Aurangabad on the
conclusion of the rains.
An undertaking more hazardous, more difficult, more
daring, it is not «asy to conceive. From Hydrabad to
Aurangabad is a distance of five hundred miles. The
 HE COWES SU'D LUSHKCE. 369

officials of the entire country were under the sway of Syud chap.
Lii'iikur. The equipment of the force for such a march ■—
was a matter of no small consideration. No money was 1753.
forthcoming from Mahomed'Hoossen, and the expenses
not only of the equipment but likewise of the supplies had
t-1 be met and provided. But besides this, the possible
attitude of the Subadar and his advisers had to be looked
to. There were no means of knowing what Syud Lushkur,
wielding as he did the resources of the province, might
not attempt in such a conjuncture. There was the possi¬
bility, indeed, that the handful of Frenchmen might have
to fight their way to Aurungabad, surrounded by enemies,
with no resources but their own brave hearts and the
e linage and capacity of their leader.
Nevertheless, Bussy not only found means to equip the
f tree, but no sooner had the rains ceased to fall than lie
set out. The mere fact of his march completed the con¬
fusion that reigned in the mind of Syud Lushkur. It
unnerved and unstrung him. As abject and depressed as
he had before been haughty and confident, he despatched
letters of submission to Bussy, tendering his resignation,
confessing his fault, and requesting the French genend to
appoint another in his place. This submission, however,
did not stop Bussy. lie still marched forward until he
arrived within a few miles of Aurungabad. He then
altered his plan. Feeling himself master of the situation,
he was unwilling that the terms which he resolved to
impose should seem to be the result of force or compul¬
sion on his part. He resumed then at once the old cha¬
racter of the submissive ally of the Subadar. He claimed
nothing, but hinted at everything. Sometimes, he flat¬
tered Syud Lushkur, at other times he whispered the
faintest indication of a menace. The result answered
his expectations. Having allowed his wishes to be pene¬
trated, everything that he coveted was granted, and Syud
Lushkur, who had exhausted intrigue in order to rid the
LL-kkan of this French warrior, was forced to sign his
370

chap, nfeie to a treaty which rendered that same Frenchman

independent of ministerial influence ; which severed from
175S. the Dekkan to add to the government of Pondichery four
of the finest provinces on the eastern coast of Hindostan.
On December 4, all preliminaries having been arranged,
Pussy was met by Syud Lushkur and other lords of the
court, and conducted into the presence of Salabut Jung.
This interview, which was of a purely formal character,
having been concluded, Bussy signed with Syud Lushkur
the articles of agreement by which the French alliance
was thenceforth to be regulated. The principal of these
provided that the four provinces of Mustafanaggur, Ellore,
Eajamundry, and Chicacole, should be made over to the
French for the support of their army so long as a certain
strength should be maintained in the Dekkan, they re¬
ceiving the rents then due on account pf them ; that the
French troops should have the sole guardianship of the
person of the Subadar; that he should not interfere in the
affairs of the Carnatic ; and that the other affairs of the
State should be conducted with the concurrence and by
the advice of M. Bussy. In return for this Bussy engaged
to support Syud Lushkur in the office of Dewan.
By this treaty there accrued to the French 470 miles
of sea-coast, from the Chilka Lake to Motupali; stretching
inland to a distance varying from 30 to 100 miles, watered
by such rivers as the Kistna, the Gondecama, and the Go-
davery, and—including the island of Divi and the districts,
previously ceded — containing the important towns of
Ganjam, Chicacole, Yizianagram, Yizagapatam, Coringa,
Yanoon, Masulipatam, Ellore, and Nizampatnam. This
united territory, afterwards called the Northern Circars,
possessed an area of about 17,000 geographical miles,
and yielded an annual revenue of about 400,0007 ster¬
ling. The forests within its limits abounded in teak; one
part of the country was famous for its manufacture of
cloth, another for its growth of rice. Nor was it wanting
in capabilities of defence. Resting on the sea, it was
 GAIN'S THE CIECAES FOE FEAXLE. 371

covered from tlic inland by a chain of mountains run- emu?,

ning, at unequal distances, nearly parallel "with the coast. •—.
Tl:e-e mountains were ccfrered with impenetrable forests 1753-
j»i——iifjx only three or four passes, capable of being
defended by a hundred men against an army. To use
the language of the English historian, * these territories
rendered the French masters of the greatest dominion,
both in extent and value, that had ever been possessed
in Hindustan by Europeans, not excepting the Portuguese,
when at the height of their prosperity.’*
Was not such a prize worthy of the struggle ? Did
not this important cession of a rich, a defensible, country,
justify to some extent the pertinacity with which Dupleix
continued to struggle, the obstinate retention of Bussy in
the Dekkan? What impartial observer, looking at the
position of the French and that of the English in the ■
month of December 1753, would hesitate to affirm that
the main advantages rested with the French ? The Eng¬
lish of that period could not help seeing and admitting it.
Had it been possible for Dupleix at this period to have
waived something of liis high pretensions, to have given
up his scheme in its shadowy outline hi order to be the
more secure of its substantial proportions, his policy might
yet have ultimately triumphed. But it was not to be pos-
, sible. When we do revert to the history of the negotia¬
tions that he inaugurated, we shall, we fear, be forced to
allow that the sentence pronounced by the French his-
torianf upon one of whom in the greatness and versatility
of his genius Dupleix was in many respects the type and
the forerunner, may be applied also to him, and to admit,
that if in war he was guided by his genius, lie was some¬
times impelled, to too great an extent, hi polities by his
passions.
The first act of Bussy after receiving the patents for

* Orme, from whom this account of the Northern Circars has been mainly
| if. Thims. Uiifuire dit Cumtiut et tie fEmpire.
372 BUSST TO 1754.

chap, the transfer of the four provinces, was to send thither

a body of 150 Europeans and 2,500 sepoys to take pos-
1754. session of and to protect theifi ; that force being placed
under the orders of the French agent at Masulipatam,
H. Moracin. There is conclusive authority for stating
that the mode in which these provinces were administered
by the French was such as to do them great honour.
‘ The rent was moderate, enforced without rigour, accu¬
rate accounts were prepared, and most of the hereditary
officers, if not those possessing rent-free lands, were con¬
firmed in their property.’*
But although thus foiled, notwithstanding that his
efforts to expel the French had resulted in the aggran¬
disement of that nation, Syud Lushkur Khan did not in
the least relax his endeavours. He was still left Minister,
and to the Minister there were abundant opportunities of
whispering calumnies into the ears of a credulous prince.
Once more, therefore, he resolved to play upon the fears
of Salabut Jung. He represented to him that it had
ever been the policy of the French to make the acces¬
sion of a new ruler an occasion for their own profit and
advantage; that to this end they had supported Mozuffer
Jung against Nazir Jung, and on the death of the former
had preferred him, the present Subadar, to the legitimate
heir of Mozuffer Jung; he added, that out of all these
transactions the French had made a profit, and that now,
having obtained all that was possible from the reigning
noble, they would be prompt to listen to the ambitious
offers of his brothers'. He therefore urged the Subadar
at once to place his brothers in confinement. He did this
in the hope that Bussy, knowing the innocence of the two
princes, would at once intercede in their favour, and that
this intercession, interpreted by the Subadar to his dis¬
credit, would instil into his mind suspicions which. must
tend to his speedy disgrace.

* Grant Buff.
 SU'D Ll'SHKUl -VGA IX IXTEIGCES. 373

Willi the Subadar, indeed, this scheme produced the chap.

desired result. He issued prompt orders for the incareer- . ^,
atioti of his brothers. liyt Syud Luslikur had mistaken 1754.
1 lie character of Bussy. This aide officer at once recog-
ni-ed the* right of the Subadar to an uncontrolled supre¬
macy in his own family. The imprisonment of the two
princes did not- afl'eet Trench interests. Although, there¬
fore. urged by several of the nobility and by many friends
of Svud Luslikur to intercede in their behalf, he held him¬
self'studiously aloof. To all their importunities lie re¬
plied that he respected the orders and secrets of the
Subadar and his Ministers, and that he did not wish to
mix up in State affairs which did not concern the interests
of his nation. This prudent conduct on his part con¬
vinced the Subadar of the groundlessness of the suspicions
with which his Minister had endeavoured to poison his
mind. As to Syud Luslikur, he was so disconcerted at
the result of this second intrigue, that he sent in his re¬
signation and retired into private life. He was succeeded
in his office by Shall Nawaz Khan, a nobleman of high
c-hurai'ti-r and position, believed by Bussy to be attached
to Trench interests. Opportunity was taken at the same
time to remove from office all the adherents of the fallen
Minister, and to replace them by others professing devo¬
tion to the French.
This change had the happiest results. From the time
of its taking place to that of the recall of Dupleix in
August of the same year, the condition of the French
troops remained unaltered. It is true that . Jauojee
Bhonsla, son of the famous Baghojee, made an attempt
to invade the dominions of the Subadar. No sooner,
however, had he learned that it was Bussy who was
marching against him, than he hastened to conclude a
peace.* Another attempt of some stray Mahratta bands
to disturb the French occupation of the Northern Circars

* April, 1754.
374 BUSSY TO 1754.

chap, was dissolved by the fire of the French artillery; the dis-
-Z™—-- affected noble who had incited it being forced to throw
1754. himself on. the mercy of Salabut Jung. In other respects,
thanks to the prudence of Bussy, to the confidence which
he inspired in all about him, everything continued tran¬
quil. The French troops, well housed and regularly paid,
showed their ancient discipline and recovered the lost
confidence of the people. In the month of April, Bussy
accompanied the Subadar to Hydrabad. After remaining
with him there for two months, he set out for Masuli-
patam to settle the affairs of the four new provinces he had
obtained for France on a regular basis. The day before
his departure an incident occurred which is worthy of
being recorded. The Subadar summoned for that day a
grand council of his Ministers, and invited Bussy to be
present at it. On his entering the hall of audience, the
Subadar and his nobles hastened to assure him that as they
felt, one and all, that to him and to French valour alone
they owed their present peace and prosperity, they wished,
before he left for the coast, to swear to him ail inviolable
attachment and an eternal gratitude, requiring from him
a solemn oath on the sacred book of the Christians to
continue to them his protection, and to return to their aid
when they should be menaced by an enemy. A Testa¬
ment was then produced, and in the presence of all Bussy
took the required oath. Then, leaving behind him offi¬
cers whom he could trust, he set out for Masulipatam.
Here lie was when the arrival of Grodeheu at Pondichery,
on the 1st August following, gave him the first intima¬
tion of the fatal blow which France herself had dealt to
her own struggling children in the East.
 CHAPTER IS.

THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

Pr is now time that we should return to Dupleix. We c^p-

Vtt him at the end of 1752, disappointed indeed m his
\ j.-ws on the Carnatic, but still maintaining a bold front '°"‘
in 'bn- hi< enemies; still hopeful of the future, especially
hopeful of the action of Bussy in the Dekkan: not having
re.'igned one of his daring schemes, nor faltered in the
prosecution of his far-seeing plans of empire ; still cook
determined, resolute; confident in himself, confident in
the fortunes of France. He had likewise this consolation,
that the great Genius who had delivered the English at Tri-
chinopoly had left India for Europe, and he was himself
daily expecting the arrival of 700 men under a leader
who had proved his steel. It was not, alas! for him to
imagine that those troops and the gallant de la Touche
would meet with the most terrible of all deaths* on the
broad ocean, and that he would have again to parry, with
diminished resources and without a general, the powerful
attacks of Saunders and Lawrence.
The number of European troops which Dupleix had at
his disposal at the beginning of 1753 did not exceed 360.
To support these were 2,000 trained sepoys and 4,000
Mahratta horse under the command of Morari Bao. Major
Lawrence, on his side, was able to bring into the field not
less than 700 Europeans aided by 2,000 sepoys and
1,500 horsemen in the employ of Mahomed Ali. With

* A tody of 700 men under de la ‘ Prince,’ in 1752. She, however,

Tnuclie left the Isle of France for was destroyed by fire -with nearly all
l’ondiehery in a vessel called the on hoard.—Orme,
376 THE PALL OF DUPLE1X.

CHAP, respect to tlie cavalry arm, therefore, the French had the
superiority both in the number of the troops and the
1753. material of which they were composed. But in the
number of Europeans, the nerve and mainstay of an
army, the English had immeasurably the advantage*
But notwithstanding this real inferiority, Dupleix deter¬
mined to make up by the rapidity of the movements of
his force for its inequality in the. matter of Europeans.
In the leader of the Mahrattas, Morari Bao, he met with
a man ■nulling and able to second him in this mode of
warfare. With him it was concerted that whilst the
Mysoreans under their Regent, Nun deraj, the uncle of
their infant Rajah, should press the city of Trichinopoly
—upon which Dupleix had renounced none of his views
—he, with his own Mahratta cavalry and the entire
available French infantry, avoiding a pitched battle,
should so occupy Major Lawrence and the English, that
no opportunity should be afforded them of assisting the
beleaguered garrison of that city. The fall of that place
would, it was hoped, at once ensure the overthrow of
Mahomed Ali and the supremacy of the French.
In pursuance of this plan, the allied force of French
and Mahrattas, under the command of Morari Eao and
M. Maissin, marched from Valdaur on January 14, and
intrenched themselves on the river Punar, near Tiruvadi,
seven miles from Fort St. David, and in close vicinity to
the spot in which d’Auteuil had defeated Cope and
Mahomed Ali in July 1750. From this place, which
they fortified very strongly, they commenced a series of
harassing movements against the English, cutting off their
supplies, capturing their forage parties, and rendering it
most difficult for the garrison of Tiruvadi to hold any
communication with the garrison of Fort St. David, or
with the inhabitants of the surrounding country. In vain

* The statements in this chapter of Colonel Lawrence, and the histo-

are based on the memoir and corre- lies of Mr. Orme and Colonel Wilks,
spondence of Dupleix, the narrative
 ..awkeot rouro by thr msa.

,u ia.,y(«, *sr w***? ^

'""""'
hh whole«**'**£££
force as an eaoit to "sirriv“'
^ This service
was nectary for the supp be,ic]ea entailing upon it

"“'“l «* *£"£ ddnMm. "’'JO ”"er

many lo«c= iiom - , bis pne 0f march,
failed to hover abou * ‘ ‘ affairs continued, the

Tiruvacti tioin i _ . c Up enemy, and but for

rounded by the whole bo y of ^ French
the ability of Lawrence ™ , ne(i a defile which it ought
battalion, which lia* 1 y CTreat danger. The
to have held, won ^ e liavingCbeen joined by 100
same day, howev ei, ‘ Madras, determined to endea-
English and 10 >- “ unsatisfactory state of affairs
vour to put accordingly
by storming the Fieic‘ iu. it8 direction, the nest
made a strong ^
day even mounto V effect, however, which
he threw up against it. _rnflucea 0n the enemy’s
the fire from these tweof their strength

determined.3Major Lawrence to desist from the attempt

as one that was beyond his^powen ^ of the
The three months duringwlml-then^ ^^
English was thus kept employe different pur-
cadi, had been used meanwhile to ^ This
pose by the contenc og P ‘ left ^ the
ato die Captain Mtoa,
B>AM, —^y”^*hoef too EnropeaL and 1,500
S “iLbortfe attempt on .be part of the Bngent
378 THE PALL OP DUPLEIX.

chap, of 'Mysore to surprise the city after the departure of

'-1XJ— Major Lawrence, had resulted in his retiring with his
1753. troops to Seringham. Here he .entered into correspon¬
dence with Dupleix at. the same time that he continued
to profess friendship for Mahomed Ali and the English.
When, however, the junction of his subsidiary, Morari
Eao, with the French, and his stoppage of the supplies
necessary for the English, left no doubt as to his hostile
intentions, Mr. Saunders resolved no-longer to keep terms
with him, but sent instructions to Dalton to treat him as
an enemy.
The twelve months of renewed warfare before Trichi-
nopoly, of which we are about to give a general descrip¬
tion, were fraught with the most important consequences
to both the rival European nations then struggling in
India. We shall see the genius of the two peoples dis¬
played in the form for which each has for centuries been
remarkable. The daring of the French, their activity,
their courage, their devotion, will be found not less con¬
spicuous than the obstinacy, the perseverance, the cool¬
ness, the intrepidity under difficult circumstances, of the
English. We shall have to admire not less the address
and versatility of Dalton and the vigour and presence of
mind of Lawrence, than the skill of Astruc and the dash
of Mainville. In one point, and that an essential one, the
English had the advantage at the outset. Their European
soldiers were superior in number ; they too had shared
in all those conflicts which had terminated in the sur¬
render of Law ; they had served with Clive and with
Lawrence, and had. learned under their able leading to
believe in their own invincibility. The French soldiers,
on the other hand, were, at all events, for several months,
not only fewer, but they were dispirited by defeat, and
had ceased to place the smallest confidence in the officers
who led them on.
The campaign opened on January 3 by an attempt
on the part of Dalton to drive the Mysoreans and Mah-
 DALTOX AITUES FOR AID. 379

rattiis by a night-surprise out of Seringham. Eight-sur- chap.

yyUr- with a force composed to a great extent of native .—1—
i' loj)' arc always more or less hazardous, and this one 1758.
ploved no exception to the rule. At first victorious,
•die darkness of the night caused amongst his men a con¬
fusion. which the repeated charges of the Makratta cavalry
converted into disorder. The attack was consequently
ivpuhe 1. and Dalton was forced to retreat into Trichi-
nopoly with a loss in killed and wounded of 70 Europeans
and 300 natives. Far from being cast down by this
th-iVat, Dalton exerted himself with success to foil all the
attempts of the Mysore leader to take advantage of his
vii-toiy ; and when, at last, this latter succeeded in estab¬
lishing S.flUij of his best troops at the Fukeer’s Tope—a
strong position, four miles south of Trichiuopoly,—Dalton
availed himself of his personal acquaintance with the cha¬
racter of their commander—one Yirana—so to play upon
his fears, that he abandoned of his own accord his im¬
pregnable position, and left it still feasible for Dalton to
communicate with the open country beyond.
But before this had happened, Dalton had ascertained
from personal inspection that but three weeks’ supplies
remained to him in Trichinopoly. At the time he made
this discovery, the position of the Begent of Mysore in
Seringham, and of Yirana to the south of the town, had
effectually barred from him all communication with the
country, and ignorant then how far he might be successful
in his attempts to frighten the latter, he had despatched
an express messenger to Major Lawrence begging him to
march to the relief of the city.
Major Lawrence received this intelligence on the 1st
May, not quite three weeks after he had proved the in¬
utility of attempting the French position on the Punar.
His part was instantly taken. Leaving 150 Europeans
and 500 sepoys under Captain Chace for the defence of
Tiruvadi, he marched with the remainder of his troops,
380 THE PALL' OF DUPLEIX.

chap, amounting to 650* Europeans and 1,500 sepoys for Tri-

IX’ - chinopoly by way of Chillumbrum, Condure, and Tanjore.
1753. He took with him no tents and only the quantity of bag¬
gage absolutely necessary. As he approached Trichino-
poly the plain was crowded with the 5,000 cavalry and
3,000 infantry that formed Virana’s force- They, how¬
ever, offered him no opposition, retiring into Seringham,
as he, on the 17th May, entered Trichiiiopoly.
But this movement on the part of the English did not
escape the eagle eye of Dupleix. Conjecturing at once
that the destination bf their force could be no other than
Trichinopoly, he instantly despatched 200 Europeans and
500 sepoys to Seringham to reinforce the hundred men
he had sent thither at the beginning of the year. The
command of this force he confided to M. Astruc, a pro¬
mising officer though untried in command, and he directed
him to proceed by the Volcondah and Ootatoor route,
already familiar to us from the movements of the previous
year. In the intrenched camp on the Punar, there re¬
mained 160 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys under the com¬
mand of M. Maissin.
Hostilities between the rival powers before Trichinopoly
commenced on May 21, by a darings attempt on the part
of Major Lawrence to drive the enemy out of Seringham.
In this, however, after operations which lasted twenty
hours, he was foiled.f He accordingly withdrew his
troops, who had suffered but slightly, and moved to the
Fukeer’s Tope, the old position of Virana, four miles south
of the town. Despairing then of driving the French out
of Seringham, he set to work to supply the city with pro¬
visions. Owing, however, to the numbers of the Mahratta

* Major Lawrence had with him Trichinopoly, and his force was fur-
at the beginning of the year 700 ther thinned by desertions.
Europeans; he was joined in April f Mr. Orme attributes this failure
by 200 more, as stated in the text; less to the skill of M. Astrue than to
deducting from these the 150 left the want of perception on the part of
behind and 100 as casualties, there Captain Poliev, a Swiss officer in
would remain 650. Of these he the English service. He admits,
sent 100 into hospital on arrival at however, the ability of Astruc.
 CONTEST ON THE CAUVEBI RENEWED. 381

horse and the intrigues of the enemy with his allies, he ciiap.
found this a work of greater difficulty than he had an- .—^—
tieipated. Nevertheless, as its accomplishment was of 1753.
primary importance, he devoted to it all his energies,
though it compelled him rigorously to avoid hostilities for
the five weeks following his repulse from Seringham. ■
This time had been well employed by Dupleix. No
sooner had he ascertained the small number of troops left
behind by Lawrence at Tiruvadi—a number liable to be
diminished by the necessity of providing supplies for that
garrison and for Fort St. David—than he sent instructions
to Maissin to spare no efforts to storm it. . Maissin in con¬
sequence attacked the place first on May 3, and, failing,
renewed the assault some days later. He was, however,
once more repulsed, but when the English, not content
with repelling the attack, sallied forth to the number of
60, accompanied by 300 sepoys into the plain, they were
surrounded by the Mahratta horse, and cut to pieces to
a man. From this success resulted the capitulation of
Tiruvadi with all its remaining garrison, the capture of
Chillumbrum, and a movement on the part of Mortiz
Ali, the Nawab appointed by Dupleix, to recover the
strong places of the Carnatic. Accompanied by fifty
French soldiers and a considerable native force, this chief¬
tain did indeed cause considerable alarm to the partisans
of Mahomed Ali, completely defeating on one occasion
the troops of that Nawab commanded by Iris brother,
although aided by a party of forty English, most of whom,
after a gallant resistance, were slain in the encounter.
The Carnatic thus once more cleared of active enemies,
Dupleix again bent all his energies to the capture of Tri-
chinopoly. The troops that had been on the Punar were
accordingly despatched to reinforce those in Seringham—
a measure by which the French force in that island was
raised to 450 Europeans and 1,500 drilled sepoys. Their
arrival at that place combined with the inaction of Law¬
rence to incite Astruc to vigorous measures. Marching
3S2 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap, out of Seringham, therefore, he crossed the Cauveri, and

—r-—• took up a position to the south of Trickinopoly, a little
1753. to the north of the English camp.
Learning next morning that Major Lawrence was con¬
fined to the city by ill-health, Astruc profited by his
absence to take possession of some heights about a mile
south of and commanding the English camp. These
heights, known as the Eive Eocks, being guarded only
by sepoys, Astruc easily carried them. He at once dili¬
gently set to work to fortify them, and succeeded so well
that when Lawrence, hearing of their loss, moved out to
endeavour to recover them, he was repulsed and compelled
to retire to a position about a quarter of a mile nearer the
town out of reach of the enemy’s fire.
This bold and successful manoeuvre on the part of
Astruc gave an immense advantage to the French. Their
position at the Five Eocks was not only unassailable, but
it was the key of' the surrounding country. It enabled
them to intercept all the supplies destined for the garrison,
and to bar a passage to the enemy’s convoys. The ad¬
vantage they possessed in cavalry seemed to render any
movement on the part of Lawrence impossible. Hor did
the idea of a general action present.to the mind of the
English leader any impression that it would better his
position. Sickness and exposure had worked with such
effect upon his garrison, that he was unable to bring more
than 500 Europeans into the field. To support these he
had but 1,300 sepoys and 100 horse—the rest of his
native allies remaining in the city out of dread of an en¬
counter with the Mahrattas. On the other side, Astruc
commanded 400 French soldiers and 1,500 sepoys, sup¬
ported by 8,000 Mysore horse, 1,200 foot, 3,500 Mahratta
cavalry, and 15,000 irregular infantry. Was it likely,
was it even probable, that the small superiority in the
number of Europeans, or that the superior ability of their
leader, should make up for the general numerical supe¬
riority possessed by the French and them allies?
 BRILLIANT PROSPECTS OP THE FRENCH. 383

The position of the English was indeed gloomy, and it chap.

seemed as though a few days’ patience on the part of ■——•
Astruc must compel them either to attack an impregnable 1753.
position or to capitulate. To precipitate matters, how-
eyer, Astruc resolved to force the enemy to take refuge
within the city itself. This, he saw, must be the result ,
of the capture of another eminence called the Golden •
Eock, about a mile nearer to the city than his own
position, and on which there was only a sepoy guard, ;
This rock taken, there wras no position between it and
Trichinopoly which could afford shelter to the English
force.
We see now clearly the position of the hostile armies.
On the one side Astruc, with a force on the whole over¬
whelmingly, superior, though in one particular, that of
European troops, inferior by one-fifth ;—Astruc with this
force possessing an almost inaccessible position, barring
supplies from the garrison,* and needing only the posses¬
sion of another height, one mile nearer the city, to ensure
•its downfall; on the other side Lawrence, sick and weakly,
in a defensive position, unable to attack with any chance
of success, with no native allies, dependent solely on his
Europeans, and ■well aware that the capture of the Golden
Eock, from which they were but a mile distant, by the
French, was alone wanting to.insure his ruin. Such was
the position. It will be patent to all. that it only remained
for the English leader to await with what calmness he
could command the attack of the French.
After some days’ mingled dread and expectation it
came. On the morning of the 7th July, watching the
moment when a large number of the English sepoys had
been detached to receive their rations, Astruc -i'fftjflaV'i ab/,vT * -
select body of his grenadiers and best sepoys to attack,
the Golden Eock, whilst he himself supported their ou-i
slaught with his whole army. The advanced party moving
with the dash and celerity peculiar to French soldiers,
clambered up the heights, and after a vigorous resistance
384 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap, carried the post. Meanwhile Lawrence, who was in camp,

. ^ . had no sooner noticed the movements of the enemy against
1703. the rock, than he hastily collected all his available force,
amounting then to 420 Europeans and 500 sepoys, and
hastened to support his men on the rock. So much time,
however, had been lost in turning out, that he had scarcely
covered half the distance between his camp and the rock,
before the position had been carried by the French.
Scarcely, too, had he endured the mortification of seeing
the flag of France waving over its summit, when the fire
of the French artillery from either flank of the base of
the rock, showed him that the whole force of the enemy
had arrived to repel. any attack that might be made to
recover it.
, The loss of the rock and the extraordinary clanger of
his own position, became evident to the mind of Lawrence
at one and the same moment. What was he to do ? To
retire was to expose himself to almost certain destruction,
. for his retreat would be harassed and impeded by the
crowds of Mahratta horsemen who were even then threat¬
ening his battalion. To advance was to advance in the
face of a triumphant enemy, possessing a strong position,
vastly superior in numbers. It appeared indeed but a
■ choice of deaths. Thus seemed to think Lawrence. For
a moment lie halted, though but for a moment only.
That brief interval was sufficient to bring him to a reso-
• lution worthy of himself, worthy of the nation to which
he belonged. Under all doubtful circumstances to attack
is a principle which should be stamped upon the mind of
every commander. Especially when retreat and attack
present alike sombre aspects should the general recollect
that the one encourages, the other demoralises; the one
insures defeat, the other at least offers a chance of success;
it is, at the very worst, better to die advancing than re¬
treating, to command the respect of the enemy rather than
to afford him an opportunity for the display of his con¬
tempt, with its concomitant encouragement to his soldiers.
 SPLENDID CONDUCT OF LAWRENCE. 385

It is probable that some sucb thoughts coursed through chap.

the mind of Lawrence, as after that momentary halt he .—,A_^
detached a chosen body of grenadiers and sepoys to storm 1753.
the hill on its front, whilst he himself moved rapidly
against the main- body of the French, drawn up on the
left of its base. It was a heroic resolve heroically carried
out. The grenadiers and sepoys clambered up the hill
without pulling trigger, aud reaching the summit charged
the French stationed there with so much vigour and im¬
petuosity, that they drove them headlong down on the
opposite side. Meanwhile Astruc, noting the advance of
Lawrence, but not the movement of the grenadiers, had
drawn up his men with their right resting on the left spur
of the rock which, he deemed, covered his flank. Op¬
posing thus his own line to the English, who by this time
were within fifty yards of him, he ordered the Mahratta
horse and his native allies to move up and take them in
flank and rear. Their destruction seemed to him to be,
beyond question, inevitable. But just as his arrangements
were about to take effect, the fire of the English grena¬
diers from the rock on his right flank startled and dis¬
composed his line, and before they could recover from their
surprise, a volley from the English followed by a bayonet-
charge completed their confusion. The French officers,
and conspicuously amongst them the gallant Astruc him¬
self, exerted themselves to restore the battle, but it was
in vain. Completely panic-stricken by the suddenness of
the surprise at the moment when victory seemed certain,
the French soldiers hurried from the field, leaving it to
Morari Pmo and his Mahrattas to cover their retreat.
This service was performed by these famous horsemen
with their usual gallantly. They even indeed attempted
to dispute the field with the English, when, three hours;
later, Major Lawrence moved off to his old position with
the two French guns—the trophies of the day—which he
had captured. But the little body of Englishmen, formed
in a moving square, repulsed every attack, and, finally
386 THE FALL OF DTJPLEIX.

chap, halting, poured iii so continuous a fire upon the masses,

—that they broke and fled in all directions.
1753. It is impossible to overestimate the service .which Major
Lawrence rendered his country on this eventful day. But
for his unsurpassed coolness and presence of mind Trichi-
nopoly would have fallen, and with it all the hard-earned
conquests of the previous year. Fortunate indeed would
he have been if in the presence of the swarming Mahratta
cavalry, and the French troops, flushed with victory, he
had escaped the fate of Law. His merit on this occasion
was the greater, because the French leader, Astruc, com¬
mitted no glaring mistake. His plan was well conceived
and well executed. He could not imagine that his soldiers
would give up the place they had won almost without a
blow. He acted throughout with courage and judgment;
and though forced to succumb, it was in consequence of an
event which it had been impossible to foresee, and against
which he could not have provided. The greater honour is
on that account due to the Englishman, who, in a sudden
and dangerous crisis, elected to dare all in the face of an
overpowering enemy, rather than to yield to him the field!
Nor is it possible to leave this subject without a word
with respect to those gallant troops who followed him so
nobly. Those men had been trained by Clive and by
Lawrence himself to the same state of perfection attained
many years later by the veterans of Wellington. They
were men who could be trusted to perform any service—
men who regarded neither difficulties nor numbers, who
asked merely to be shown the position of the enemy and
to be told to attack it. No finer feat of arms has been
performed in any part of the world than the assault by a
handful of grenadiers of the Golden Bock, held by an
enemy that had just conquered it, and whose army was
formed up at its base! The attempt alone was sufficient
to intimidate an enemy whose morale was inferior, who
had not learned by experience that the one way to con¬
quer was to move straight on. It was, in fact, one of those
 5BH7£KBKBK

brennier’s two plans. 387

deeds of heroism which deserve to be recorded in the chap.

archives of a nation’s history, never to be suffered, as has
been the case with this, to fall into oblivion and neglect * 1/0
The French after their defeat retreated to the Fukeer’s
Tope, thence to continue the system of blockade which :
they had inaugurated. Astruc after his defeat resigned his
command, and proceeded to Pondichery. His successor,
M. Brainier, determined to attempt to effect by blockade
the object that force had failed to compass. He succeeded
indeed in reducing the townspeople to extremities: the
price of rice speedily rose to one rupee the pound ; of
firewood there was an absolute want; the city became
rapidly deserted by its inhabitants, who preferred even the
risk of attack from the enemy to death from starvation. In
his chief object, however, Brainier had no better fortune
.than his predecessor, for Lawnence, determined to employ
' every possible means to avert disaster, moved with the
main body of his army in the direction of Tanjore, leaving
Dalton to defend the city.
On learning this movement on the part of Lawrence,
Brainier proposed to himself two plans: the first to
storm Trichinopoly whilst so weakly guarded; the second
to move upon Lawrence with his whole force and destroy
him. But unfortunately for his own purposes, he allowed
his mind to rest upon both objects at the same time, in¬
stead of concentrating all his energies upon one. Thus,
the better to carry out the first, he sent into the town a
devoted Frenchman, named de Cattans, who engaged to
act the part of a deserter, and whilst so employed to make

* The story is told at length by his adversaries than. Mr. Mill to his ■
Mr. Orme, Colonel Wilks, and by friends. He writes : ‘ Lawrence,
Major Lawrence. Their works, how- knowing' how much he could depend
ever, published at intervals from up- upon his troops, marched boldly
wards of half a century to nearly against the French, .and, after an
ninety years ago, are scarcely avail"- ofistinate and bloody combat, re-
able for the general reader. Mr. mained master of tire field of battle.’
Mill describes the whole campaign It will not then he denied that this
of 1733 in nineteen lines, and makes gallant action has, with modem his-'
no particular allusion to this action, torions, fallen into ‘ oblivion and ne"-
Barchou de Penhoen is more just to lect.’ °
388 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap, drawings of all the internal defences, and to indicate the

Ix- . weak parts of the fortifications. It happened, however,
1753. that de Cattans was discovered, and obtained a promise of
his life solely on the condition that he should indicate to the
French leader the strongest parts of the fortress as those
which were the weakest and least guarded. This was ac¬
cordingly done * So much time, however, had passed in
the interval, that before these papers reached Brennier he
was entirely engrossed by the other plan—the intercep¬
tion and attack of Major Lawrence, who, he heard, was
escorting a large convoy of provisions from his camp
near Tanjore into Trichinopoly. It was of the utmost
consequence to the French that this movement should not'
succeed.
Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th August, Bren¬
nier moved from his camp and took .up an extended
position stretching from Weyconda on the south-west to
the French Bock on the south-east of the city—the points
the French occupied in force being Weyconda itself, next
to that the Golden Bock—the scene of the defeat of
Astruc, but of which in the absence of Lawrence they
had taken possession ;—the Sugarloaf Bock, distant about
half a mile from it; and the French Bock. Their infantry
and artillery were strongly posted at the Golden and Su¬
garloaf Bocks; the space between the Golden Bock and
the French Bock was filled by swarms of cavalry; there
was a small detachment at Elmiseram ; Weyconda was
held, by sepoys, the intervening spaces being filled by
masses of irregular troops, whose line stretched even to
the banks of the Cauveri. In this position, occupying
' all the strong posts, Brennier believed he could intercept
and destroy the English force, burdened as it was with a
large convoy.
But the English had advantages that he knew not of.
It was true that their force was burdened with a convoy,
* De Cattans -was nevertheless French force, on the return of Major
hanged as a spy in sight of the Lawrence to the city_Onne.
 LAWREXCE DARES TO ASPIRE.

but it was not less so that whilst encamped near Tanjore, cpup.
Lawrence had received a reinforcement not only of 5,000 ■——
Tanjoreans, but of 170 Europeans, and 300 sepoys from 1753.
Fort St. David., But that was not all. By means of the
high tower in the centre of the city, Dalton was able to
observe all the movements of the French, and to commu¬
nicate them to Lawrence. This he did not fail to do on
the present occasion. The English leader marched to the
attack therefore, not only at the head of a body of Euro¬
peans considerably larger than that of the enemy, but with
almost as perfect a knowledge of his movements as if he
had been an officer on Brennier’s staff.
It will have been noticed that the two rocks, called the
Golden and Sugarloaf, formed the key of the French
position. The Golden Bock was, however, by far the most
important of the two, as it commanded the entire country
between it and the city, and Brennier ought to have held
it at all costs. Lawrence, knowing jts importance, deter¬
mined, after depositing his convoy in safety, to direct on
it his main attack. The better, however, to delude Bren¬
nier, he halted his troops in front of the Sugarloaf Rock,
and made all his dispositions as if to attack it. Brennier,
completely deceived, believing that he was to be attacked
on the Sugarloaf Bock by Lawrence’s whole force, sent
hurried orders that the greater part of the force on the
Golden Bock should be despatched to reinforce him.
Lawrence gave him plenty of time to carry out this move¬
ment, but it had no sooner been effected than he detached
his grenadiers and 800 sepoys to seize the Golden Rock.
This they did without much difficulty. Before, however,
it had been accomplished, Brennier noticed the movement.
Then, too late, perceiving his error, he sent a detachment
to preserve or to recover it. This detachment finding the
i rock lost did not attempt to recover it, but taking up a
position on some high ground between the two rocks,
opened a very galling fire on the English. Lawrence,
noticing this, conceived the idea of cutting off and destroy-
390 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap, ing this detachment before it could be assisted by the main

--if— - body, which, after making a slight forward movement,
1753. remained as if paralysed on the slopes of the Sugarloaf
Rock. He accordingly detached 500 men, natives and
Europeans, for this purpose. They advanced without
guns in the face of a heavy fire of artillery which mowed
down many, of them. This caused a hesitation on the part
of their leader, but Lawrence, perceiving it, ran out to
them himself, and led them to the charge. At this mo¬
ment, also, Dalton, who from the tower within Triclii-
nopoly had watched the progress of the fight, hastened to
the ground with his detachment and two field-pieces, and
attacked the French in rear. Separated from their .main
body, which all this time remained in an extraordinary
state of inaction, the French detachment retreated to Wey-
concla, not however till they had inflicted and suffered
heavy loss. Brennier, whose earlier movement might
have saved the day, no sooner beheld the retreat of his
detachment, than, seeming to recover himself, he advanced
with his main body to attack the victorious English. It
was, however, too late ; for his troops, disheartened by the
retreat of their comrades, and by the sight of the English
in force on both flanks, declined the combat, and retreated,
as fast as possible, to the Five Rocks, and thence followed
their comrades in disorder to Weyconda. The Tanjorean
cavalry, which might have handled them severely, feared,
even in their retreat, to attack the soldiers of France.
They contented themselves with reducing Elmiseram,
which was but slightly guarded. .
This second battle before Trichinopoly cost the English
40, the French 100, Europeans, and proved not less than
the first the superior generalship of the English leader,
and the higher morale of his soldiers. It is difficult to
imagine conduct more imbecile than that exhibited by
Brennier. He allowed himself to become the dupe of the
most transparent stratagem, and its success so confounded
him that he seemed incapable of giving any orders until
 THE FRENCH REINFORCED. 391

it was too late to retrieve his vanished fortunes. It is not chap.

surprising that the French soldiers should display their .—ix:_.
want of confidence in such a leader. 1753-
Meanwhile, after the action, the French concentrated
in Weyconda threw up intrenchments, as though prepared
to defend it. Lawrence, whose supply of provisions had
become again exhausted, advanced, a few days later,, to
the Five Locks, and on September 4 made as if he would
attack IVeyconda. Brennier, totally demoralised, did not
even attempt the defence of the place, but retreated hur¬
riedly and in disorder to Mootachellinoor, on the banks
of the Cauveri, a position which assured his communica¬
tions with Seringham. Here, to his surprise, he was
joined by an important reinforcement of 400 Europeans,
2,000 sepoys, and six guns, under M. Astruc, and 3,000
tried Mahratta cavalry. Astruc at once re-assumed the
command of the French force.
This reinforcement ought to have changed the fortune
of the campaign. The French soldiers, of which- it was
partly composed, were men who had but recently arrived
from the Isle of France, and who had been engaged
during the few subsequent weeks in overrunning the Car¬
natic. They were free from the discouragement that had
fallen on the others, and should have been employed on
the offensive before they had become inoculated by the
despondency that reigned in the camp. But ill-success
had made Astruc over-cautious. The third day after the
junction he led the combined force towards the south, and
took possession of the Five Eocks, and the Golden and
Sugarloaf Eocks, recommencing that system of blockade
which had twice before brought the English to such straits.
Lawrence on his part moved towards Elmiseram, alike
with a view to cover his convoys, and to effect a junction
with a fresh reinforcement of Europeans then shortly
expected. In such a position it was the policy of the
French to avail themselves of their superior numbers to
attack the English.' The occasion was favourable; Morari
392 THE PALL OF DUPLE1X.

CHAP. Eao in particular urged it upon them ; but their councils

IX. were divided, and Astruc himself was averse to appeal to
1753. the arbitrament of the sword. He confined himself, there¬
fore, to intercepting supplies and attacking convoys, whilst
he hurried on the defences he was throwing up at the
Golden and Sugarloaf Eocks. This was acting the policy
of Lawrence. This officer remained in the open plain,
amusing the French by feigned attacks, till September 27.
On that date he was joined by 237* Europeans and. 300
sepoys. As bold as his adversary was cautious, he at once
determined to attempt the storm of the French intrench-
ments before they should be quite finished. Astruc had,'
like Brennier before him, placed the greater part'of his
force on the Sugarloaf Bock, the intrenchments of which
had been completed on three sides; to the Golden Eocls
he had detached 100 Europeans, 600 sepoys, and two
guns, intending to fortify that also. The space between
the rocks and all around them was occupied by the Mah-
■ rattas and Mysoreans. Astruc hoped, by holding an im¬
pregnable position here, to blockade the English on three
sides, whilst Dupleix should induce the Eajah of Tanjore
to renounce their affiance. This would 'Complete the
investment, and insure the fall of Trichinopoly.
Such was the state of affairs when,- On September 27,
■ the detachment under Captains Bidge and Calliaud joined
Lawrence. That officer resolved to attack with as little
delay as possible. Moving, accordingly, on the morning
of October 1 to the Fukeer’s Tope, he drew up his men
and offered battle. Astruc, however, having declined it,
he encamped on the ground on which he was drawn up.
But before break of day on the following morning, he ad¬
vanced at the head of 600 Europeans, six guns, and 2,000
sepoys towards the Golden Eock, assaulted it in three
columns before he had been perceived, and carried it
without giving the French leisure to fire their two guns,
* One of tie officers -with the quently famous in Anglo - Indian
was Captain Calliaud, a man subs warfare.
 lawbekce’s thied victoey. 393 •

which were captured loaded. Only waiting to re-form, ciup.

Lawrence' then advanced quickly towards the Sugarloaf -——
Eock, his men shouting and drums beating, the Mysoreans 1753.
fleeing before them. • Here, however, in front of the un¬
fortified face, the French were drawn up to receive him,
with a strong body of sepoys on their left. These men,
however, would appear to have been disheartened by the
sight of the fugitive Mysoreans escaping from the English,
as well as by the shouts of the latter, for they gave way
without striking a blow. The right division of the Eng¬
lish, following them up, discovered the left flank of the
French unguarded. They therefore wheeled to the left,
and took their line in flank at the same moment that the
two other divisions charged it in front. Stationary as
they were, the French could not stand this double attack.
In vain did Astruc exert himself to restore the battle.
The English pressed on so hotly that rallying was impos¬
sible. Broken and divided, fleeing in disorder and dismay,
the scattered remnants of the French force made no halt
till they had placed’the waters of the Oauveri between
themselves and their pursuers.
This great victory,- gained by the superior boldness and -
daring of the English leader, was decisive. Eleven pieces
of cannon, 111 prisoners—amongst whom were M. Astruc
and ten officers, 200 killed and wounded, testified to its
importance. On their side the English lost but 40 men.
Eor were its results on Trichinopoly less favourable to the
English. That city was at once delivered from the horror
of scarcity. For whilst the main body of the French took
refuge, cowed and paralysed, in Seringham, Major Law¬
rence, sweeping their detachments from the country south
of. the Cauveri, poured supplies into the city, and then
moved himself with the main body of his troops to
Coiladdy* on the north bank of the Cauveri, within the
territories of Tanjore. In this position we must leave the
hostile parties—the French baffled and humiliated, with- ■
out confidence in themselves or in their leaders; the English
394 HIE FALL OP DUPLEIX.

chap, proud of themselves, proud of the general who had three

times led them to decisive victory, proud likewise of their
1758. achievements, confident and secure as to the future ; here
we must leave them, to return once again to the action of
the Governor whose great plans had thus been so strangely
baffled.
Whilst these tremendous conflicts were going on in the
vicinity of Trichinopoly, Dupleix, continuing to feed and
to strengthen his armies before tliat place, had been exert¬
ing himself to the utmost to restore peace to the Carnatic.
To this course he had been moved by several concurring
reasons. The Directors of the Company of the Indies and
the French Ministers had never ceased to. urge it upon
him. The continued warfare, from which so much had
been expected, drained the pockets of the shareholders, a
result ill calculated to satisfy those who looked only for
dividends. The contest which Dupleix had declared over
and over again could not possibly last long, and could not
end but in the elevation of France to a pitch of unprece¬
dented glory, seemed to the Directors likely to be spun
out indefinitely, and to end in humiliation rather than in
advantage. In that august body, the want of immediate
success on the part of Dupleix had produced the usual
results. Those who had long been envious of his success
now joined the faction that was really alarmed, to agitate
for an end to such a state of things. The longer the war
lasted, the more powerful and persistent became the ad¬
herents of the party in favour of peace at any price.
But that was not the only reason. Dupleix was him¬
self most anxious for peace with the English, if only to
give him time to consolidate his arrangements with the
native powers, to obtain from his European rivals an
acknowledgment of his right to the territories conceded
to him by the representatives of the Mogul. *He had
previously, in February 1752, addressed Mr. Saunders
with this object, but the answer he received not having
been of a nature to encourage him in the hope of a sue-
 DUPLEIX DESIKES PEACE. 395

cessful result, lie had allowed the subject to drop. la the °hap.
July of the following year, however, urged by the con- ■—.—
siderations to which we have adverted, as well as by the im¬
pressing solicitations of Bussy, who, by an engagement to
become his stepson, had but just acquired a fresh right to
advise him, he attempted to renew the negotiation.
Saunders met him in what may be termed a conciliatory
spirit, if we have regard only to the main object pro¬
posed to be attained. But the course of their correspon¬
dence soon showed that, though they equally wished for
peace, the rival powers held very different ideas as to the
conditions on which that peace was alone attainable.
Dupleix insisted on the recognition by the English of
himself as Nawab of the Carnatic, an office which had
been bestowed upon him by the Subadar, and been con¬
firmed, he asserted, by the Mogul Emperor. The English
Governor, on the other hand, loudly asserted the claims
of Mahomed AJi. Under these circumstances it would
appear that whilst both Governors continued to negotiate,
they felt alike strongly that the terms of the treaty would
be decided, not by their arguments or protests, by the
validity of the parchments they displayed or of the patents
promulgated in their favour, but by the armies which
were then contending for the possession of Trichinopoly.
This fact alone is sufficient to aecount for the perse¬
verance, constancy, and energy displayed by Mr. Saunders
in sending reinforcements to Lawrence, and by Dupleix
in the despatch of every available soldier to strengthen
the forces of Brennier and Astruc.
It will readily be conceded, we think, that having
regard to the number of European troops he despatched
to the scene of action, and the largely preponderating
force and superior excellence of his native allies, Dupleix
had good reason to hope for a decided success before
Trichinopoly. He at least had strained the resources of
Bondichery to assure himself of such a result, and it was
not for him to anticipate that a fatality would continue to
 THE PALL OP DTJPLEIX.

chap, be inseparable from the operations of the French leaders

IX1 - before that place. He was not a man to be easily dis-
1753. couraged. He had replied to the first and second battles
of the Golden Hock by pouring in fresh reinforcements,
and urging his generals to renewed exertions. When
even the news reached him of the third and most fatal
defeat on that fatal ground he did not despair. That in¬
telligence, on the contrary, only nerved him to make
another vigorous effort, conducted with more subtlety,
more daring, than any of the others. His plan was,
whilst still continuing to negotiate with Saunders, to send
secretly to Seringham the last reinforcements he had re¬
ceived from Europe, with instructions to their commander
to use them at once to attempt the storm of Trichinopoly,
whilst Lawrence was resting, with the main body of his
forces, at Coiladdy, fifteen miles distant.
In pursuance of this determination, 300 Europeans and
1,200 sepoys were despatched from Pondichery early in
November under the command of M. de Mainville.* They
arrived at Seringham on the 21st. The better to conceal
his intentions Mainville endeavoured, and very success¬
fully, to keep his arrival secret from the English garrison
and from Lawrence. He did not even endeavour to in¬
tercept the supplies of the garrison, but employed his
whole time in preparing for the meditated enterprise. At
- length, on December 8, all his arrangements having been
made, without any suspicion existing on the part of the
English, Mainville determined to put his plan into execu¬
tion. His orders were clear and precise ; 600 Europeans
supported by 200 more and the sepoys, were to attack
and carry the work covering the gateway known as Dal¬
ton’s battery. As there were here but fifty sepoys, Main¬
ville anticipated that this could be accomplished easily
and without firing a shot. He therefore gave the strictest

i* A*1.?1® ,E"^ writers state oaly after tlie arrival of Godeheu was
that M. jVIaissin commanded on this the command made over to Maissin.
occasion; but the records show that
 MAl.YVlLUi’s FAILUIIE. 307

orders to abstain from firing. This work canned without chap.

alarming the garrison, it was determined to dash round ——-
the traverses, of which there were two, and apply a petard 1753.
to the gate of the town, or should that fail, to attempt to #
escalade—the walls here being but eighteen feet above
the rock ;—for this purpose ladders had been prepared.
Following this arrangement Mainville crossed the Cau-
veri at 3 o’clock on the morning of the 9th, and succeeded
in reaching the base of the outwork without having been
perceived. The 600 Frenchmen escaladed this place and
surprised the sepoys, whom they found mostly asleep.
Had they then but pushed forward, had' they obeyed
Mainville’s instructions to abstain from firing, nothing
could have saved Trichinopoly. But instead of thus act¬
ing, their evil genius prompted them to turn two of the
12-pounders which they had captured and found loaded
against the walls of the town. They accompanied this
fire by a volley of small arms and by shouts of Vive
le Roi.
The effect of this fire was to rouse the garrison. Under
orders received from Captain Kilpatrick, the commandant,
detachments instantly proceeded to their respective alarm
posts ready to receive the enemy. Meanwhile the French,
after their insane and useless volley, pressed along the
passage round the traverses, and under the guidance of
an English deserter followed closely by two men carrying
petards, had arrived within a short distance of the gate_
the exact locality of which, however, was known only to
the deserter. Whilst they were advancing, the English
had hurried to the gate, and had commenced an indis¬
criminate fire into the passage leading up to it. The
night was dark, and they could take no aim; neverthe¬
less, their first fire killed the English deserter and the two
petardiers when within a few paces of them. The others,
not knowing exactly what had happened, began after
some little confusion consequent on the darkness to at¬
tempt the escalade. Their ladders, however, had suffered
398 THE FALL OXi' DUPLEIX.

chap, so much from the enemy’s fire and from other causes, that
they had but a small number available. Those that they
1753. had Were nevertheless boldly planted, and an officer pre¬
ceded by a drummer and followed by his men led the
way up one of them. The drummer however was killed,
the officer pulled into the town, and the ladder thrown
back. Others were similarly treated, until, having lost
all their ladders, without ropes or any means to retreat
down the rock they had ascended, exposed to the fire of
the enemy without being able to return it, the French
were driven to despair. They coukl not even make
known to the garrison their wish to surrender. For some
hours longer, hiding themselves as best they could, still
exposed on the least movement to a continued fire, they
■were left in the most pitiable position. When at last day
' dawned it was only that the greater part of this large
force, which had set out with such hopes of victory, which
had had victory within its grasp, might surrender, en masse,
prisoners of war. Of the entire body of 600 men, eight
officers and 364 men were taken prisoners, many were
wounded, one officer and 40 men were killed; the re¬
mainder, nearly 200 in number, jumped down from the
rock into the ditch, and though several of them were
maimed in the attempt, were carried off by their com¬

) rades.
It would seem, in sober truth, that a fatality did attend
all the French operations against T~;,il”""]m17 1 en¬
terprise, well planned, up to a cerfampoint well executed,
certain then under the conditions of ordinary prudence to
succeed—why did it fail F What was it that prompted
that ill-timed and useless volley? The second query is
an answer to the first; to the second itself it is beyond

I
our power to reply. We must content ourselves with
remarking that that foolish act of a few foolish men
changed entirely the face of events. It not only by its
consequences took away from the French the hope of ever
 LESSOR TAUGHT BY THE REPULSE. 399

gaining Tfichinopoly ;* it not only gave all the triumphs chap.

of the campaign to the English, but it was the main .—^—
cause of that humiliating treaty, in which, but a few 1758-
months later, France gave up the labour of years, re¬
nounced the right even to aspire to dominion in the terri-"
tories of Hindostan. What a lesson does not this story
convey to soldiers—what a lesson to mankind in general!
What a lesson never to turn, when in the pursuit of a
great end, either to the right or to the left, to allow no
lighter thoughts, no ideas of vain glory, to move us off
the direct path by following which with singleness of pur¬
pose we can alone hope to reach the desired goal!
To the views of Dupleix, the author of the plan, al¬
though not responsible for any part of its execution, the
blow was fatal. Nor had it, unfortunately for him, come
entirely unaccompanied by other disasters : Mortiz Ali
had a little before been defeated before Trinomalee, and
Mahomed Eomal, another French partisan, before the
pagoda of Tripetti. But this was the finishing stroke;
this it was that convinced Dupleix of' the necessity of at
least entering into negotiations with the English Governor.
Far better for him to come to terms, even though they
might be disadvantageous, than to see his best-laid plans
thwarted and ruined by the want, on the part of those
who were to execute them, of ordinary prudence and the
commonest self-command.
Accordingly, and with the hope rather than the expec¬
tation that som$ practical result might arise from the
meeting, Dupleix proposed that commissioners should be
appointed, armed with full powers, to treat regarding an
accommodation. To this the English Governor acceded,

* Major Lawrence -writes : ‘ Tile Triekinopoly to the greatest risk it

scheme was well laid, and had not had run during the war.’ Colonel
French petulance made them too Wilks: 1 If the orders prohibiting It
soon discover themselves, they per- firing had been obeyed, the plate //
imps might have had time to exe- must in a few minutes have been in ’
cute their designs.’ Mr. Orme writes possession of the French.’
that the assault 'exposed the city of
400 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap, and the little town of Sadras belonging to the Dutch,

•—nearly equidistant from Madras and Pondichery, was
1753. fixed upon as the seat of conference.
The English commissaries, Messrs. Palk and Vansittart,
’arrived at this place on the 30th December ; the French
—M. de Kerjean, M. Bausset, and Father Lavaur, the
principal of the Jesuits—delayed by the non-arrival of
passports from the English Governor—not till the 21st of
January. The next day the conference held its first sit¬
ting. The English commissaries began by declaring that
they had no propositions to make, and none to listen to,
which did not comprehend the acknowledgment of Ma¬
homed Ali as sole and legitimate master and Nawab of
the Carnatic, or which did not guarantee to the Kajah of
Tanjore the full and entire possession of his kingdom.
The proposals of the French commissaries were, in
words, much more moderate. They suggested that Ma¬
dras should be quit of the annual ground-rent due to
the government of the Carnatic; that Pondemaly and
its dependencies should be ceded to the English Com¬
pany ; that all the expenses of the war on the part of
the English should be defrayed ; that the French
Company should give to the English Company the ne¬
cessary secnrities for freedom of commerce; and that
in consequence of these cessions, the English Company
should evacuate the countries and fortified places de¬
pendent on the Carnatic; that for Mahomed Ah there
should be provided a suitable governorship in some part
of the Dekkan under the mutual guarantee of the French
* and English Companies; that he should be considered
quit of all monies due by him to the treasury of the Dek¬
kan ; and that theBajah of Tanjore should be maintained
in the possession of his territories under the guarantee of
the two Companies. Such were the French propositions,
extremely moderate, even conciliatory, in their outward
form, but in reality no less favourable to French, than
were the counter-proposals to English, interests. The
 CLAIMS OF-BOTH XATIOXS IRRECONCILABLE. 401

French scheme, in fact, must be examined rather with chap.

reference to what it omitted than to its contents. We ,—-
find in it no mention of the Subadar of the Dekkan, none 1754-
of the Nawab of the Carnatic. But, the rival candidate
for the last-named appointment being in it provided for,
the intention was clear to take it for granted that .Salabut
Jung would be acknowledged as Subadar, and his nomi¬
nee, Dupleix, as Nawab of the Carnatic. Exactly then as
the English proposition claimed all that the English had
been contending for, so did this of the French ask every¬
thing that Dupleix had demanded from the very begin¬
ning. The English commissaries received the French
propositions in silence, but at the next meeting of the
conference they declared that their instructions forbade
them even discussing any articles, until the two which
they themselves had presented should have been sub¬
scribed to by the French deputies. To this the French V;
would by no means agree. They challenged Mr. Vansit-H>
tart and Mr. Palk to show them any patent conferring *'
upon Mahomed Ali the office of Nawab of the Carnatic ;
they showed them that it was not an hereditary office ;
that the father of Mahomed Ali had been appointed by the
Subadar of his day; aud that his successors had, on his '
demise, given the office, originally to Chunda Sahib, and
secondly to Dupleix: and they produced several patents
granted to the latter, and a letter from the Great Mogul
confirming all that Salabut Jung had granted in favour of
Dupleix. The English to this replied, that Mahomed Ali
had received his appointment from Nazir Jung, and after¬
wards from Ghazee-ood-deen, but that the patents were
at Trichinopoly; the letter from the Great Mogul they
treated as a forgery. Something more was said, but little
to any purpose. That meeting was the last held by the
conference. Finding it impossible to agree even upon V
V
preliminaries, the English commissaries left on February 5
for Madras; the French, three days later, for Pondichery. )
D D
402 THE PALL OP DUPLEIX.

chap. ^Dupleix was the less inclined to abate any of his pre-
tensions on this occasion, for whilst the conference was
175-1. /sitting he received from Bussy the intelligence of that gift
J of the four Circars to the French Company, the history of
which we have already recorded. The possession of these
rich provinces rendered him quite independent of English
wishes. Better, he argued, to maintain war than to give up
one iota of his just claims. He opposed no obstacle, there¬
fore, to the breaking up of the conference, but throughout
the Avritten communications which followed, he adhered,
without renouncing a single article, to the rigid pro¬
gramme he had dictated to his agents at that assembly.
When Saunders even yielded so far on his side as to con¬
cede in substance every claim of the French, with the
exception of that which referred to the Hawabship of the
Carnatic; when even he agreed so to modify his claims
in this respect, as to leave that office vacant, on the under¬
standing that Mahomed Ali should be appointed to it,
under the protection of the two Companies, by Salabut
Jung, whom the English would then acknoAvledge, Dupleix
I haughtily rejected the proposal, and insisted only the more
! strenuously on the validity of his own titles.
In the course of our history we have had many occa¬
sions to point to the versatility of intellect, the untiring
energy, the varied resources under all circumstances, the
self-denial, the persistence, the patriotic devotion of this
illustrious Frenchman. All these qualities he united in¬
deed to an extent such as is seldom found in one man.
But the same candour, which has forced us to admit and
to admire these great virtues, compels us to lament the
fatal obstinacy which influenced his conduct throughout
this memorable negotiation. Too clear it is, alas! that
i on this occasion he was guided, not by his genius, but by
};his passions. His pride would not allow him to take
that one retrograde step which he, more than most men,
Avould have known how to make the prelude of a further
advance. He had fought so long and so openly, so per-
 FATAL EKROK OF DUPLEIX. 403

sistently for this empty title, therefore he -would not lower c^-p-
himself by giving it up now—now especially, when the ■—L—-
influence of Bussy at Hydrabad and the possession of the 1754=-
four Circars seemed to make him virtual master of the -
Dekkan. Blind and fatal reasoning! His successes in
the north ought to have made him more compliant, more
yielding, more anxious to conciliate. He should have
been content to bide his time. There would not always
be a Saunders and a Lawrence at Madras. England had
had its Morses, its Ployers, its Copes, and its Gringen, and
might have them again. He too, who had influenced *
every native with whom he had come in contact, who
had so bent to his will a Mozuffer Jung, a Chunda Sahib,
a Mortiz Ah, as to make them like clay in the hands of
the potter, who had won the daring spirit of Morari Bao,
was he to despair of gaining a Mahomed Ali P Once in¬
dependent, free from the clutches of the English, as by
this treaty he would have become, and Mahomed Ali
would speedily have fallen under the sway of that potent
influence, that irrefragable will. Whilst then, as English¬
men, we cannot but rejoice at the unyielding pride which
preferred to risk everything rather than to yield one small
portion of its pretensions, we cannot but lament, regarding
the question abstractedly, that so vast a genius should
have been marred by this one great failing. In similar
circumstances Napoleon acted similarly. In 1813-14 he
too preferred the risk of the sacrifice of his throne to the
certain sacrifice of the smallest of his pretensions. The
reason which prompted both these great rulers was the
same. It was simply, we repeat, this, that on an occasion
requiring peculiarly a cool judgment and clear discrimina¬
tion, they were both alike influenced by their passions!
Meanwhile, hostilities did not. cease in the Carnatic.
Even before Trichinopoly the temporary success of the
Preach arms seemed almost to justify Dupleix in his
policy of haughty persistence.
After the failure of his attempt to surprise Trichinopoly,
404 THE FALL OF DUPLEIi.

chap. Mainville had withdrawn his parties within Seringham,

■—and there awaited reinforcements. These Dupleix, with
1754. pis usual promptitude, had sent him. On their arrival,
Mainville resolved to strike another blow at his enemy.
He had observed that the guards which escorted convoys
periodically sent into the city had gradually become
smaller. . Formerly Lawrence had made a point of at¬
tending them with his whole army, but, satisfied appa¬
rently of the inaction of the French, he had latterly
remained himself in camp, sending only a much smaller
party with the convoys. Having noted this, Mainville
determined to surprise and attack the next convoy re¬
garding which he might receive tidings. Intelligence
having reached him very soon afterwards, that a parti¬
cularly large convoy, escorted by only 180 Europeans,
800 sepoys, and four guns, would endeavour to make its
way into the city, from Killahcottah, a small fort on the
south of the Cauveri, about twelve miles from Trieki-
nopoly, on the early morning of February 26, he made
the following preparations to intercept them. Between
Killahcottah and the village of Coutapara, a distance of
five miles, the ground, covered with trees and underwood,
afforded cover for a large body of men ; here accordingly
he sent 12,000 horse under Morari Eao and Innis Khan,
with instructions to lay in ambush about two miles be¬
yond Coutapara, and not to attack the convoy until at
least half its length should have passed them, and it should
have been attacked in front by the French. He himself,
with 400 French and 6,000 sepoys, took post in front of
t Coutapara, at the point where the wood debouches into
the plain. These dispositions having been made on the
evening of the 25th, he anxiously watched the result.
The morning of February 26 had already dawned,
and yet no convoy had appeared. Half an hour later,
however, a small platoon was seen advancing, followed by
the carts and bullocks in single file, the soldiers marching,
also singly and unsuspicious of danger, on either side.
 TRANSIENT SUCCESS OF THE FRENCH. 405

They reached the point where Morari Eao was posted, chap.
they passed it even, not making, though they had seen -—^—■
some native horsemen in the woods, any change in their in¬
disposition. The French, however, were still two miles
oil', and Morari Eao, anxious that the surprise should be
complete, noting too the negligent manner of marching,
and fearing lest something might occur to give the alarm
before the convoy should reach the French, determined
to anticipate his orders. He accordingly sent to the
parties he had posted in the wood to hold themselves in
readiness to charge. He then gave the signal. The effect
was electric. The English, without order or cohesion,
then small body stretched along a long line of carts, could
offer no effectual resistance. They could only die at
their posts. , The Mahrattas, galloping amongst them,
attacked all who opposed them. The English still re¬
sisted, however, until the French troops arriving, offered
them quarter. This was accepted; of the whole force 50
were killed, 138, of whom 100 were wounded, were taken
prisoners.*
This, however, was but a transient gleam of success.
On May 23, a French force, 700 strong, supported
by a large body of sepoys and Mahrattas, was repulsed
near the Sugar-loaf Eock by a body of English, much
inferior in numbers, on one of those occasions when a
victory on the part of the French would have terminated
the war in those parts. Again, however, the tide turned.
Mainville, prompted by Dupleix, took the sudden reso¬
lution of abandoning his position before Trichinopoly, and
of carrying the war into the enemy’s country. Moving
eastward, accordingly, he attacked and took Killahcottah,
then possessed himself of Coiladdy. Here he caused the
waters of the Cauveri to be diverted into the channel of
the Coleroon, with the view to distress the people of

* Amongst these men was the had borne the hrunt of all Lawrence’s
famous battalion of grenadiers which battles.—Lawrence.
 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap. Tanjore. Having seen this done lie moved back to

_Tricbinopoly, and took np the position at the Five Eocks,
3754. -whence he could best intercept the supplies destined for
that city. Morari Eao, about the same time, completely
defeated the army of the Eajah of Tanjore. To cover
the capital of that country, Major Lawrence had left his
position near Tricbinopoly, leaving it feasible for Mainville
to make the movement we have recorded. He was, at the
time we are writing, wistfully watching from Tanjore the
movements of Mainville at the Five Eocks, whilst—such
is Oriental diplomacy—the secret agents of Dupleix had
more than half succeeded in detaching the Eajah whose
country he was protecting from the English alliance!
It will be seen then that Dupleix had at least some
reason for maintaining his pretensions in his^ negotiations
with the English. Had he been an absolute prince we
can scarcely doubt but that in the end his policy would
have triumphed. The last ally of the English, the Eajah
of Tanjore, was ready to abandon them, and notwith¬
standing the reverses of 1753, he still held a stronger
position than ever before Trichinopoly in the middle of
1754. The famous grenadiers, who had borne the brunt
of ah the victories of Lawrence, had been killed or made
prisoners, and his own troops, resuming the offensive, and
victorious in more than one skirmish, were threatening
the possessions of the English and their allies on every
vulnerable point. It had become, in fact, a question
with the latter whether the English alliance was worth
maintaining at so great a risk to themselves, at the cost
of so heavy a drain on the resources of their country.
But when the state of affairs was thus favourable, there
came into action those other circumstances upon which
Dupleix ought to have, but had not, sufficiently counted.
The success of Bussy in the north, of Mainville and his
partisans towards the south-west, were of little moment
so long as he did not also possess the confidence of his
masters in France. In those days, when a communication
 INTRIGUES AGAINST DUPLEIX. 407

to the Home Government could, not reach Prance in a less chap.

period than six or eight months, Dupleix ought to have •—
been prepared for the effect which the disasters of the 1754.
previous year would probably* have on a corporation in
which a large minority was, as he well knew, already
hostile to himself. It was the consideration of the com
sequences likely to follow a long record of disasters, all
burdensome to the finances of the Company, that should
have powerfully influenced him in his dealing with the
English Governor. It is the more strange that he should
have neglected to allow such a consideration to weigh,
with him, because he well knew the jealousy to which
his proceedings had given birth, and he was aware that
by success alone in India he could maintain his position
with the Directors in France. Perhaps it was that he
felt—and of this policy we have a memorable example in
our own day—all the scorn of a great Genius for men so
inferior to him in all respects; perhaps also he did not
reckon to its fullest extent the extreme length to which
human meanness and human ingratitude would not hesi¬
tate to have recourse. He, evidently, conscious of his
own deserving, did not fear the result of any scrutiny.
He had to deal however, as we shall see, with men to
whom consciousness of deserving was but a phrase, when
the conduct which accompanied it did not exactly dovetail
with their own paltry notions and petty ideas.
A party amongst the Direction in France had, indeed,
been endeavouring for some time to compass his downfall.
So far back as 1752 the complaints of Governor Saunders
and his friends to their own Company, regarding the
boundless ambition and enormous views of Dupleix, had
found an echo in the heart of the French Direction. It
was in consequence of this that it had that same year
despatched M. Duvalaer to London, charged with full
powers to negotiate, in concert with the French ambas¬
sador at the Court of St. James’, with the English Minis¬
ters, regarding a basis upon which to settle affairs in the
408 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap. East. Both parties vehemently declared that they wished

for peace; that their one aspiration was to engage in
175-t. commercial operations, to abstain from all interference in
the affairs of the natives||£India.
In the course of these Negotiations, the English Minis¬
ters, instructed by the India House, which again received
its inspiration on this point from Governor Saunders and
his friends, never ceased to attribute all the evils of which
the two Companies complained to the one man who ruled
at Pondichery. But for him, they declared, there would
have been no contests, no ruinous expenditure, no inter¬
ference with commercial undertakings. He alone was re¬
sponsible for all. These complaints, constantly repeated,
could not fail to work upon the credulity of certain mem¬
bers of the Prench Company’s Direction. These were
simple enough to believe that their most deadly enemies
and rivals were capable of giving them purely disinter¬
ested advice; that they wished for the removal of Dupleix
as much for the advantage of the French as of their own
Company. We need scarcely observe that those tactics
ought to have made the French more reluctant to part
with the man whom their rivals would have removed.
Passion, however, never reasons; it seeks rather excuses
whereby to give a cloak to its own darling plans. In
this instance it so worked upon the French Directors, that
a majority was gradually brought round to the idea that
French and English interests would be alike consulted by
removing from his post the man who was the firmest
supporter of the former, the most determined foe of the
latter.
It was not, however, all at once that they fell into this
snare. For a long time, indeed, Duvalaer continued to
defend Dupleix and to retort against Saunders the accu¬
sations which they piled upon the head of the French
Governor. But not the less insidiously did the poison
work. Not the less did the impression gradually become
disseminated, that Dupleix was the sole obstacle to a good
 DUPLEIX RECALLED. 409

understanding. The prudent boldness of the English chap.

Ministry favoured this vigw. Without actually declaring ■—^—•
that they saw no hope of a cessation of hostilities so long 1754.
as Dupleix should remain Governor, yet letting it plainly
appear that such was their belief, they equipped four
ships of war, embarked a full regiment on board, and
despatched them ostentatiously under the orders of Ad¬
miral Watson to the East Indies.
Well would it have been for Dupleix, well for France i
herself, if the Company of the Indies had been able to i
answer this demonstration by an assurance that peace had 1
already been concluded between the two Governments on I
the.'spot; that there was no need for further negotiations. Y
At any moment from July to December, 1758, it had been 1
in the power of Dupleix to have expedited such a mes¬
sage. None however came, and the French Directors )
were brought at last to the determination to sacrifice this
one man for, they professed to believe, the benefit of the
whole nation. They accepted, therefore, a proposition /
made by the English Commissioners, to the effect that
both the Governors, English as well as French, should be
recalled, and that in their place two Commissaries should
be nominated, one by each nation, to proceed direct to
India, there to place matters on such a footing that future
warfare between the two settlements, so long as their
principals remained at peace, should be impossible. In
consequence of this resolve, the French Ministry nomi¬
nated M. Godeheu, at one time member of Council at
Chandernagore, to be Commissary of the King to con¬
clude peace, and to verify and examine the accounts of
his predecessor. From the Directors the same Godeheu
received likewise his commission as Governor-General of t.
the French settlements. The English, more astute, made \
no fresh nomination, but sent out the necessary powers ■
to Governor Saunders and the members of his Council.
The first intelligence received by Dupleix of these pro¬
ceedings was contained in a letter from Godeheu hipiself
410 THE PALL OP DUPLEIX.

chap, from the Isle of Prance, announcing his early departure

^ - from that place to co-operate -with him as commissary of
1754. the King and of the Company in India. The letter was
written in a modest and submissive tone, the writer la¬
menting his own inexperience, and expressing his earnest
desire to be guided by the experience of his old friend.
Whatever may have been the feeling of Dupleix on re¬
ceiving this communication, it can scarcely be doubted
but that its friendly tone and his personal knowledge of
the writer must have tended to re-assure him. He had
known Godekeu since his early youth, and had ever be¬
friended him. He had been his superior at Chanderna-
gore, where he had ever been treated by the'young coun¬
cillor with marked deference and respect. He had even,
on one occasion, been the means of saving his life. After
his departure from Chandernagore, Godeheu had become
a Director of the Company of the Indies, and in that
capacity had corresponded closely and intimately with
Dupleix. He had ever evinced towards him a devotion
and an admiration that were quite unbounded.
The appointment of a man so befriended, so devoted,
to act—as Dupleix then believed—solely as Commissioner
to bring about peace, could have in it nothing to alarm
the French Governor. He did not know—in fact he had
had no opportunity of knowing—that this man, seemingly
so devoted, was one of those miserable vermin who seek
to raise themselves by fawning on and flattering great
men. He did not Jpiow that all the time this Godeheu
had been writing to him letters full of the most fulsome
professions of friendship,, he had been intriguing amongst
the Directors for his downfall, in the hope to be himself
appointed his successor. He did not know that so far
from desiring to aid him, or to profit by his advice, this
Godeheu had asked for authority to send him home in
disgrace and arrest, but had been overruled by the Di¬
rectors, who had especially forbidden him to use force or
restraint, except in the improbable event of the resistance
 BASENESS 0J? GODEHEB. 411

on the part of Dupleix to lawful authority. How could chap.

he lmow such things; how, even, could he divine them ? -—A—
A noble and generous nature invariably revolts from the 1754.
very suspicion of baseness. It appears to him too horrible,
too unnatural, a degradation of intellect below the range
of even the animal creation! Endowed himself with a
lofty sense of honour and a warm sympathising nature,
how could Dupleix imagine that one whom he had treated
as a friend and as a confidant could use that friendship
and that confidence but to betray him P
But Dupleix was not suffered to remain long in his
self-deception. On August 1, the ship ‘ Due de Bour¬
gogne,’ having Godelieu on board, arrived in the road¬
stead of Pondichery. A letter was at once sent off to
Dupleix announcing his arrival, and intimating that one
other ship was accompanying him, and that three more
•with -2,000 troops on board, would follow in a few days.
Dupleix at once went to meet his ancient comrade. His
reception, however, was most frigid. Godelieu declined
to become his guest, or even to land until a house should
have been fitted up for him. He made over to Dupleix,
however, three documents :—the first a letter from him¬
self containing profuse professions of anxiety to make his
situation as little painful as possible; the second a demand
for a full report bn the state of affairs in French India;
the third an order from the King containing his recall.
The first letter was probably written with the intention
of diverting Dupleix from offering, as Jie feared he might,
armed resistance to his authority, for on landing the next
day in great pomp and splendour, received with all defer¬
ence by Dupleix on the quay, he curtly informed him that
he expected him to sail at once with his family for Europe.
He then proceeded to the Council Chamber, and had his
commission read out. The silence which followed this
reading was interrupted by Dupleix himself, not indeed
by querulous complaints or undignified protests, but by
the loyal cry of Vive le Roi!
412 THE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap. It -was on August 2,1754, that Dupleix made over to

1X- . Godeheu the command of that vast extent of territory on
1754. inciian soil5 which partly in actual tenure, partly by means
of the influence he exercised, he had gained for his coun¬
try. Ten weeks later, October 14, Dupleix and his family
bade a last adieu to the land to which he had devoted a
lifetime. The public acts by which that interval was dis¬
tinguished belong to the career of M. Godeheu, and we
shall treat of them under that head. Of the conduct of
Dupleix during that period we will merely state that it
was distinguished by a loyalty, an abnegation of self, a
devotion to the interests of the Company which had cast
him off, of which the history of the world gives few
examples. It was replied to, on the contrary, on the
part ■ of Godeheu, by a spiteful arrogance, an anxious
desire to wound and annoy ; a determination, if possible,
to ruin and dishonour the ex-governor, such as could only
have emanated from a mean and paltry spirit. Not only
did Godeheu, as we shall see when discussing his public
acts, reject advice by following which he would have
established French domination on a secure basis, but he
ordered his commanders to preserve an inaction which
saved the enemy from destruction, simply because action
would have justified the long-pursued policy of Dupleix.
But it was in his treatment of the pecuniary claims of
Dupleix on the Company, that he showed the greatest
malevolence. Unable to detect a single flaw in his ac¬
counts, finding that even the private invitation on his part
of accusations against the ex-governor failed to bring
against him a single tenable charge, disappointed hi the
hope he had indulged of sending him home in chains, he
resolved at all events to ruin him in his private fortune,
and to dismiss him a dependent and a beggar. To a man
so utterly unscrupulous the means were not wanting.
The examination of the accounts of the Company at Pon-
dichery showed an amount due by it to Dupleix of
between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000 francs (£240,000 to
 HIS EFFORTS TO RUIX DUPLEIX. 413

£280,000). As soon as Godelieu ascertained this fact, chap.

lie forbade the commissaries he employed to proceed with -—
the question of accounts, compelling them merely to sign 1754.
a certificate to the effect that the vouchers produced hy
Dupleix had reference to. the public accounts. By this
subterfuge he avoided placing on record an acknowledg¬
ment of the sums due to Dupleix. But this was not all.
We have before stated that Dupleix had been in the habit
of advancing to his native allies his own private fortune for
the expenses of the war. These advances had been made
on the security of certain districts in the Carnatic, from
the revenues of which they were repayable. In fact, the
agent of the native princes, by name Papiapoule, had at
this time in his possession an order to make over to
Dupleix the revenues of those districts, in p'ayment of the
sums due to him. At the time of Godeheu’s arrival, some
of these advances had been repaid ; others, however, to
the amount of 22,000,000 francs (£880,000), were still
standing over. At the rate, however, at which they were
. then being paid in, this sum would have been reimbursed
during the following year, 1755. But Godelieu, seeing
in this a means of enriching the State at the expense of
Dupleix, chose to consider these advances as sums irregu¬
larly laid out by his predecessor for his own private ad¬
vantage, and not for the benefit of the State. He there¬
fore suddenly seized Papiapoule in his own private house, ‘
placed him in confinement* under circumstances most
insulting to Dupleix, deprived him of all his papers, and
farmed the revenues of the districts to another native for
the sole benefit of the Company. In addition to this, he
refused to allow a bill drawn by the Company itself in
favour of Dupleix, to the amount of 422,606 francs
(£16,904), to be cashed in Pondichery. Having, thus
effectually ruined him, having exposed him to the claims
of those who were his creditors, solely because on the

* He remained in irons till released by Lally, in 1758.

414 THE FALL OF DTJPLEIX.

CHAP, credit of his character they had lent their money to the
- State, Godeheu allowed to depart—beggared though not
1754. dishonoured, blasted in his fortune, cheated out of the
» fruits of his then ripening labours—this by far the most
1 illustrious of the illustrious men whom the France of
I Louis XV. produced, only to show how unworthy she
|- was, in her then degraded state, of a progeny so de¬
serving.*
‘England,’ says a recent French writer,f ‘has been
much admired and often cited for having resolved that
great problem of how to govern, at a distance of 4,000
leagues, with some hundreds of civil functionaries and
some thousands of military employes, her immense posses¬
sions in India. If there is much that is wonderful, much
that is bold and daring, much political genius in this idea,
it must be admitted that the honour of having inaugurated
it belongs to Dupleix, and that England, which in the
present day reaps from it the profit and the glory, has
had but to follow the paths which the genius of France
opened out to her.’ Yes, indeed! Now that the lapse
of a century has cleared away the passions and prejudices
of that exciting period; now that from the basis of accom¬
plished facts we can gaze at the ideas and conceptions
of the men who were the pioneers of European conquest
on Indian soil, there lives not a candid Englishman who
will deny to the great French Governor the credit of
having been the first to grasp the necessity of establishing
j European predominance in Hindostan—to show practi-
y rally bow that predominance could be established .and
v/maintained. The work of Dupleix did not indeed last,
y because it was his misfortune to be born at a season when
n his country was sunk in the lowest abyss of profligacy
■ ( and misgovemment; when all the offices of the State had
'Mjecome the patronage of a licensed harlot; when virtue

* The account of the

Dupleix by Godeheu is
official report of the
 GREAT QUALITIES OF DUPLE1X. 415

and honour and truth were openly scoffed at and derided. ceap.
• It did not last, because the besotted Government he served --
‘ recalled him at the beck of the immemorial enemies of
! France, just at the moment when his schemes were about
[to blossom into golden fruit. But the effect of those
schemes survived him. The ground he had so well
watered and fertilised, the capabilities of which he had
proved, was almost immediately after his departure occu¬
pied by his rivals, and occupied with the immense result
Which is one of the wonders of the present age.
Nor can we doubt that if Dupleix had had but twof
years more to mature his great schemes, the rich heritage!
of Bengal would have fallen to him instead of to his rivals.!
The possession of the Circars gave him an excellent basis
from which to operate with the Nawab Nazim of Bengal.
Who can doubt but that had Chandernagore been under
his control in 1757, he would have hesitated to unite with
Suraj-ood-dowlali to crush the English settlement on the
Hooghly, or that he would have crushed it ? Clive acted
then as Dupleix with the prior opportunity would have
acted before him. In this as on many subsequent occa¬
sions the spirit of the great Frenchman ruled in the camp
of his rivals and successors.
It is impossible to deny to Dupleix the possession of
some of the greatest qualities with which man has ever
been endowed. He was a great administrator, a diplo-j
matist of the highest order, a splendid organiser, a man !
who possessed supremely the power of influencing others.!
He had an intellect quick and subtle, yet large and ca-i
pable of grasping ; an energy that nothing could abate;!
a persistence, a determination, that were proof against!
every shock of fortune. He possessed a noble, generous, i
and sympathising nature; he was utterly incapable of;
envy or jealousy;* and was endowed besides with that

* We have, we would fain believe, pleix and La Bourdonnais, and have

placed in its true light the real vindicated the character of the for-
rcason of the quarrel between Du- mer from all the charges which the
416 TIIE FALL OF DUPLEIX.

chap, equanimity of temper that enabled him to bear the greatest

, reverses, the most cruel injustice towards himself, with
1754. resignation and composure. He was not indeed a general.
He did not possess the taste for leading armies into the
field. Yet he showed on many occasions—notably on the
occasion of the siege of Pondichery by Boscawen—that
he could not only stand fire, but could defeat by his un¬
assisted and natural skill, all the efforts of the enemy.
The character of his government and the influence of his
own presence are attested to by the English historian of
that epoch, writing,, as he was, under the spell of the
/ rprejudices of the period. ‘ All his countrymen,’ writes Mr.
r ? Onne, ‘ concurred in thinking that his dismission from the
1 Government of Pondichery was the greatest detriment
j^that could have happened to their interests in India.’
When we think indeed how much he had accomplished
—how he had built up the Erench power, how he had
gained for it an unparalleled influence and an enor¬
mous extension of territory;—when we reflect that with
half the two thousand men that Godeheu brought out
with him, he could have crushed the English, already re¬
duced to extremities at Trichinopoly—we cannot but
marvel at the blindness, the infatuation, the madness, that
f recalled him. The primary cause was, no doubt, as we
/ have stated, the degraded condition of the France of
. Louis XV. But there was yet, we believe, another reason,
not entirely dependent upon the state of his country, for
we have seen it act under other rulers than Louis XV.,
j and under other Governments than France. To borrow
yf the words of the Erench historian,* ‘Dupleix had against I j
him that crime of Genius, which so many men have ex- J
piated by misery, by exile, and by death.’ '

latred and prejudices of tie hour greater influence than La Bourdon-

had heaped against him, and -which nais.
subsequent writers had repeated, * mdoire de la Conpiete ile I'lnde
without examining them. No one par VAm/ldeiTe, par le Baron Bar-
ever charged him with being jealous chou de Penhoen.
of. Buss}-; yet Bussy haa a far
 IIIS TREATMENT IN FRANCE. 417

It was on October 14,1754, that Dupleix bade adieu to chap.

the country of his greatness. Baffled, as he had been in ■—-A—
his large schemes, ruined as he was known to have been
by the measures of Godeheu, he was yet, in spite of the
declared hostility of that personage, followed to the place
of embarkation by the principal officers and employes of
Pondichery, and by all the common people. Their gene¬
rous hearts spoke out in the universal feeling of regret at
his departure. Their grief was far more eloquent, infi¬
nitely more expressive, than would have been the smiles
of a Pompadour!
Very briefly we propose to follow the disgraced Go¬
vernor to his last hour. Before he had landed in France,
the minister, Machault, fearing, in the then state of
European politics, the result in India of the recall of
Dupleix, and hoping it might not have been actually ac¬
complished, had sent to Dupleix a despatch in which he
affected to treat him as Governor, Godeheu merely as
Commissary of the King to make peace. This despatch
reached Pondichery after Dupleix had left it, though it
had been expedited by the Minister in the hope that it
would prevent his departure. His arrival, therefore, in
Prance was looked upon in the fight of a misfortune, and
it appeared for some time not improbable that he might
even be re-instated in his post. He was, therefore, well
received and flattered with hopes of a settlement of his
claims. As soon, however, as the intelligence of the dis¬
graceful peace made by Godeheu—to which we shall
presently refer—reached France, and the disagreements
with England were consequently regarded as settled, the
Ministry at once began to treat Dupleix as a man from
whom nothing more could be hoped, but who, on his
part, would importune them with claims. They therefore,
or rather, acting with them, the Directors of the Company,
at once changed their manner towards him, and absolutely
refused to take his accounts into consideration. In vain
did he remonstrate. In vain did he point out that he
418 THE PALL OF DUFLEIX.

chap, -was persecuted by creditors who were simply creditors,

lxv . because, on his security, they had advanced their funds
1754. - to the Government of Pondichery. In vain did he write
a memoir, setting forth, in a modest but graphic style,
all he had done, the sums of money he had advanced.
For seven years he urged and pressed his claims, support-
i ing them by incontestable proofs. He received not even
the shadow of redress. Hay, more. Many of those whom
he had befriended in his prosperity, and who had advanced
sums to the Pondichery Government, sued him for repay¬
ment. Even Bussy, who was to have been his stepson,
deserted him in his extremity, broke off the marriage, and
appeared in the list of claimants against him. To such a
state of misery was he reduced, that, three months before
he died, his house was in the occupation of bailiffs. Three
days before that sad event, he thus wrote in his memoir:
‘ I have sacrificed my youth, my fortune, my life, to en¬
rich my nation in Asia. Unfortunate friends, too weak
relations, devoted all their property to the success of my
projects. They are now in misery and want. I have
submitted to all the judiciary forms; I have demanded, as
the last of the creditors, that which is due to me. My
services are treated as fables; my demand is denounced
as ridiculous; I am treated as the vilest of mankind. I
am in the most deplorable indigence; the little property
that remained to me has been seized. I am compelled to
ask for decrees for delay in order not to be dragged into
prison.’ Thus wrote, three: days before he died, the man
who had done for Erance more than all her Elings, beside
whose exploits the deeds of her Concle, her Villars, her
Turenne, sink into insignificance. The founder of an
empire treated as the vilest of mankind, his just claims
unattended to then, unsettled even to this day; * the man
* Strange it is that, considering the Restoration, the Orleanists, the se-
jnutations France has herself gone cond Republic, and the second Em-
through, she should still have allowed pire, must divide with the Bourbons
these claims to remain unsettled, the shame of this great scandal. We
The Republic, the first Empire, the append an extract from the letter of
 nis PLACE IX HISTORY. 419

■who acquired for France territories in the East larger than chap.
France herself, treated as an importunate impostor! Hot •—^—-
long could even his brave spirit endure such a contest. 17?4'
He died on November 10,1764.* ; ,
Not the less will he rank with posterity as one of the
greatest of Frenchmen; not the less will even the descend- \
ants of his rivals in Hindostan place him on the same •
pedestal as the greatest of their own heroes—on the
pedestal of Clive, of Warren Hastings, and of Wellesley! j

the Paris correspondent of the Globe rupees ; and the faithless agent
of May 17, 186(3, showing that even charged hy him. with the settlement
up to the time of his last descendant of the perpetual fund for the ,good
these claims had been neglected: work of which he had been dream-
1 Another death, which is worthy ing for years beneath the hot scorch -
of record, is that of the last descen- ing sun of India, and amid the strife
dant of the great Nabob Dupleix, the and bloodshed by which he was sur-
celebrated Governor of Pondichery. rounded, never having sunk the
The coat of arms granted him hy money, the celebration of the ono
Louis XV., for the diplomatic tri- glorious souvenir of his life, that too
umphs gained by him over the Eng- has passed away, and his very name
lish in India, glittered for the last is now no more. When the MiniM'ere
time over the portal of Saint Plii- des Finances was entered by the mob
lippe du Roule, as the modest coffin in 1830, the last appeal of Dupleix
which contained the remains of the imploring a settlement of his claim
last Dupleix was home out to the of 13 millions against the Govern-
cemetery. Of the great siege of ment, was thrown out amongst other
Pondichery, of the glory, and magni- papers scattered to the winds. It ,
licence* of Dupleix, of his riches and fell into the hands of the professor of
his disgrace, of his humiliation, his philosophy at the college Louis le
poverty and miserable death, nothing Grand, who had it framed and glazed,
is remembered now. Even the fete and hung up in his class-room, where
which he had instituted at Pernan, it afterwards served as illustration to
his native place, to celebrate the many and many a lesson on the
raising of the siege of Pondichery, vanity of riches and the varied con-
has long been discontinued for want formation of the wings they make to
of the funds which he had intended themselves when they flee away.’
to he annually devoted to the dowry * He died in a house iu the Rue
of one of the village maidens. He Neuve des Capucines, on the site till
died in the most abject poverty, after recently occupied hy the Foreign
having hud at his command whole office, within a few doors of the offi-
multitudes of men and millions of cial residence of the Company.
 GODEHEU AND DE LEYBIT.

OHAPTEE X.

GODEHEU AND DE LEYRIT.

Before Bis departure from Pondichery, Dupleix had laid

before his successor a detailed account of the military and
other operations that had taken place in the Dekkan, in
the "Carnatic, and before Trichinopoly, and had indicated
at great length the measures which he, had he continued
at the head of affairs, would have adopted, in order to insure
the triumph of the French arms. He advised him to
maintain Bussy at the court of the Subadar, Moracin in the
ceded districts, Mainville at the head of the army before
•Trichinopoly. He counselled that to this last the rein¬
forcements then landing should be sent without delay, and
that he should be instructed to use them effectually be¬
fore Admiral Watson’s fleet, then shortly expected, should
arrive off Madras. He laid special stress on the retention
of Mainville at the head of the army, not only because
he had shown energy and capacity, but likewise because
he had gained the complete confidence of the French
allies,—the Eegent of Mysore and Morari Eao.
For some time Godeheu made no sign. To Governor
Saunders, indeed, he forwarded proposals of accommoda¬
tion, and as an earnest of his sincerity, restored to him,
that they might be used against France, the Swiss soldiers
captured by Dupleix during the previous year. But
neither to Bussy, to Moracin, nor to Mainville, did he
give the smallest indication of his policy. He contented
himself with cutting off from Mainville those supplies of
money with which he had been till then liberally furnished
by Dupleix for the maintenance of his army.
 EFFECT OF THE RECALL OF DUPLEIX. 421

This policy of negation, if indeed it was a policy at all, chap.

and not, as we believe it to have been, the natural inaction .—_
of an undecided mind, had the worst possible effect. The 17M-
air was at once filled with rumours, all injurious to the
French. The English, flushed with joy at the recall of
Dupleix, made no secret as to the means by which that
recall had been obtained, and as to the consequences that
were to follow from it. Their stories, spread everywhere
by their agents, were universally credited, and their
effect exaggerated tenfold. The partisans of the French
alliance were everywhere overwhelmed with shame, with
mortification, and with fear.
At the court of the Subadar these feelings showed
themselves in the fullest strength. ‘ Tour nation,’ wrote
Salabut Jung * to Bussy, on the arrival of messengers
from Pondichery informing him of the assumption of
authority by Godeheu, ‘ your nation has supported and
succoured me till now. I have recognised to the utmost
of my power the services it has rendered me. I have
given to my uncle, M. Dupleix, the government of the
Carnatic, and I have ever hoped that he would gain the
upper-hand over his enemies. It is with the greatest
chagrin that I have heard of his recall. To the messen¬
gers who were intrusted with my letters for him the new
Governor said: “ Tell the Subadar, your master, that I
am sent here by my sovereign, who has forbidden me to
interfere with the Mogul Government, and that he must
defend himself as best he can.” They have also reported
that the prisoners have been restored to Mahomed Ali,
that Morari Bao and the Mysoreans have abandoned you.
All this proves to me that the English have gained com¬
pletely the superiority over your nation.’ The Dewan,
Shah Nawaz Khan, writing to the Mahomedan governor

* The correspondence quoted in and of Grant Dutf, on the narrative of

this chapter has been translated from Colonel Lawrence, and on the Seir
the originals appended to the memoir Mutakherin, the other statements
of Dupleix. On that correspondence, contained in it are based,
on the histories of Orme, of Wilks,
422 GODEHEU AND DE LEYRIT.

chap, of Hydrabad, thus expressed himself: ‘Icannot recover

x- . from the surprise which the news of the recall of the
1751 Governor Bahadoor has caused me. I cannot imagine what
the French are at; but by that act they will lose their
honour and their territories. I cannot conceal from you
that we can arrange nothing with the new Governor, who
has not the least knowledge of our affairs. Besides, it
appears that the French are neither so powerful nor
so generous as they would have us believe, and that the
English have the absolute mastery over them. I will not
hide from you then that I am about to negotiate with the
English and Mahomed Ah.’
The letters of the French officers themselves were not at
all more cheerful. ‘ I foresaw,’ wrote Moracin to Bussy,
from Masulipatam, ‘ in the same sense as yourself, what
would be the effect of the arrival in India of the Xing’s
Commissary. I wrote to him a fortnight ago, and I be¬
lieve I gave him an opinion similar to your own. It is
fit that I should inform you of the contents of the letters
from Madras which our native bankers have shown me.
In these it is stated that the King of England has forced
the King of France to recall M. Dupleix from Pondichery,
under a threat of war ; and that the King of France, in
sending out the new Governor, said to him : “ go and
make peace in India ; restore to the Kawab the terri¬
tories which he has given to the Company; I will not keep
them, because to do so would annoy my brother, the King
of England.” ’ Both Bussy and Moracin felt at this time
the utter hopelessness of their position so completely, that
nothing but the earnest exhortation of Dupleix to them to
continue to serve France, no matter by whom she was
represented, induced them to remain at their posts. The
answer of Bussy to this earnest exhortation deserves to
be recorded. ‘ I reply,’ he wrote, under date August 23,
‘ to the letter with winch you favoured me on the 4th.
Tour departure for Europe is a thunderbolt which has
confounded and alarmed me. You, who are leaving,
 OPINION OP BUSSY. 423

exhort me to continue to serve the nation, and to support chap.

a work which is on the brink of destruction. Do you .—^—-
sincerely believe that I shall not be enveloped in the same 175i-
disgrace as yourself ? The blow is perhaps deferred, or
suspended only to be struck with the greater force. But
however that may be, I have ever considered it my duty
to defer to your counsels, and to follow your reasoning.
Under no circumstances shall I ever depart from that
respectful and inviolable attachment, which has been till
now my happiness and my glory, and which will always
remain so. I await M. Godeheu’s replies to determine
myself, although, like you, I am persuaded that I ought
to await in India the replies of M. de Oonflans. If,
nevertheless, in the post which I occupy I am not to be
allowed liberty to act, if they shall endeavour to fetter me
by the ideas of ignorant people and men without expe¬
rience, my work will perish in my hands; and it will be
concluded, either that I have destroyed it in pique, or
that it was neither so splendid nor so well established as
you and I have declared it to be. On the one side I
declare that if the confidence with which you have
honoured me is continued by M. Godeheu, I shall not
refuse to devote myself to the service of the nation and
the Company; it is not that I expect that my services
will be recognised or even acknowledged; but I shall
have, like yourself, the advantage of having served my
country, without any emolument but the glory of having
been useful to it, and the consolation of attributing its
neglect and ingratitude only to the factiousness of the
envious, themselves too wanting in merit not to seek
to obscure that of others.Do me the favour to
inform me if you can of the views of M. Godeheu re¬
garding the Dekkan. Personally I am disposed to aban¬
don all and to retire to Prance. But I wait your answer
and your advice. I am so overwhelmed that I cannot
apply myself to business. The army is crying out from
hunger ;—no one pays,—and I am forbidden to act.’
424 GODEHEU AHD DE LEYRIT.

CHAP. Such was the state of matters in the Dekkan and in the
x- . ceded districts. Before Trichinoply it was worse. We
1754. left the French army under Mainville occupying the Five
Bocks, completely shutting in the city; Lawrence absent
at Tanjore, with the king of which country Dupleix con¬
tinued up to the last to be in secret communication.
Very shortly after the arrival of Godeheu, the 2,000 troops
that sailed with him from France landed at Pondichery.
These should have been sent, as Dupleix strongly urged,
to reinforce Mainville, who could then have made sure of
the city for which the French had been so long struggling.
But, far from so acting, Godeheu sent only petty reinforce¬
ments; he cut off also from his army the supplies of
money it had been in the habit of receiving ; he stopped
the transport of provisions ; he sent no orders; the letters
and remonstrances of Mainville he left unanswered. The
consequence was that a portion of the army mutinied, and
the revolt was only suppressed by the loyal exertions of the
officers. The letter written by Godeheu to Dupleix on
hearing of this outbreak serves to illustrate the character
of the new Governor,—to show in a striking light the
crime committed by the French Government in sending
out such a man to supersede Dupleix. ‘ What resources
would you have,’ wrote he, ‘in the same case? You
were in a position to make advances from your purse and
on your credit; I can do neither one nor the other.’
/But this was not all. The new Governor seemed de-
j/fermined to sacrifice not only the territories acquired by
Dupleix but even the honour of France to the one great
object of making peace with England. So transparent
was this intention, so patent to all, that it produced in the
French settlement and in the French army, a discourage¬
ment and a despondency fatal to the life of a people. It
is not too much to affirm that, had Governor Saunders
himself been appointed successor to Dupleix he could not
have more effectually injured French interests than did
this nominee of the French Direction and the French
 POLICY OP GODEHEU. 425

Croivri. He began by changing the superior command chap.

of the army. Mainville having been recommended by .—^—-
Dupleix as the most capable officer, as the man of all 1754-
others the most acceptable to his native allies, Godeheu
took an early opportunity of superseding him, appointing
in his stead H. de Haissin,—a man remarkable for his
little capacity and his want of resolution. Not the less,
however, did he suit the purposes of Godeheu. It would
not be credited were there not evidence to prove it,* that,
at a moment when the English garrison at Trichinopoly
was sorely pressed by famine; when the French army
had only to hold the position at the Five Eocks and
the dependent posts to prevent the possibility of the
ingress of any convoy; Godeheu instructed his new gene¬
ral to connive at its revictualment, to offer no real obstacle
to the retention by the English of that all-important
city. As at this time, as before, the result of the nego¬
tiations with the English still depended on the fortunes of
the campaign, we can easily conceive how the interests of
France suffered in the hands of her representative. To
that campaign we purpose now to refer.
Mainville made over the command of the French army
to Maissin on August 16,1754. It had long been known
that the English commander, Major Lawrence, had been
waiting only the conclusion of an arrangement for native
assistance with Maphuz Elian, elder brother of Mahomed
Ali, to endeavour to escort supplies into Trichinopoly. Of
the movements of this convoy Mainville had had the most
certain intelligence, and he had made all his arrangements
to cut it off. Only three days after he had delivered up his
command to Maissin he learned that the convoy, escorted
by 1,200 English troops, 3,000 sepoys, and fourteen field-
pieces, with a native contingent of 5,500 men and several
guns, had arrived at a village six miles to the east of
Elmiseram, and that it would endeavour to force its way

’ Mainville’s Report, ‘ Letter from Agent, at Pondichery.’ Vide also

Nunderaj, Eegent of Mysore, to Ms Orme.
 G0DEHEU AND DE LEYRIT.

chap, tlie next morning between the Sugar-loaf and the French
x- . Eocks. Mainville, who had employed the previous two
1754. months in reconnoitring this ground, at once informed
his successor of the intended movement, and strongly
urged Mm to move out at' once and take possession of a
watercourse running out of the Cauveri, the nearer bank
of which commanded the country beyond. He indicated
to Mm also the names of two officers, MM. Gaudart and
Aumont, who were thoroughly acquainted with the
country, and to whom Mainville himself, when in com¬
mand, had confided his intentions. Maissin listened to
the communication with apparent pleasure, and set out
with the avowed invention of putting it into execution.
Ho sooner, however, had he reached the Sugar-loaf Eock,
than, obedient to his secret instructions, he drew up his
army close to a tank in front of it, and, leaving the water¬
course unguarded, waited the approach of the enemy.
When Lawrence did appear,—his convoy defiling on' his
right,—marching as much at ease as on a field day, and
opened fire from a battery he had erected on the high
bank of the watercourse, Maissin declined an action, and
retired without even firing a shot.* Whilst this was
going on, a Mysorean officer, named Hyder Naik (the
Hyder Ali afterwards so famous), moving round the Eng¬
lish force, fell upon the rear of the convoy, and captured
thirty-five carts all laden with supplies and stores. This
attack diverted the attention of Major Lawrence from the
French, and offered them a good opportunity to assault
with advantage. In varn did the Eegent urge Maissin to
use it; in vain did he point out that one charge would
firnsh the campaign; MaissM was deaf to every represen¬
tation ; reposing on the secret instructions of his superior,
he moved quietly back to Ms position at the Five Eocks.
Meanwhile, not only Lawrence’s convoy, but others from
different parts of the country, poured into Trichonopoly.

b £0 sa73J ‘ ^ se Ietira sans <ju’il y eat une amoice de fusil

 RESOLVES ON PEACE AT ANY PRICE. 427

A few days later, Maissin retired to Mootachellinoor on chap.

the Cauveri, abandoning his posts around Trichinopoly. ■—A—-
He had not the firmness to remain even here when, some 1754-
few days later, Lawrence appeared before the place—
which nevertheless was strongly fortified—but retreated
precipitately into Seringham. The English, satisfied with
this success, proceeded to house themselves for the rainy
season in the Warriore pagodas, nearly due west of
Trichinopoly.
Meanwhile, Godeheu, by his unskilful efforts to bring
about peace at any price, had been working the most
effectual damage to French interests in the eyes of the
native powers. His lieutenants were everywhere left in
a state of the most painful uncertainty. After wavering
long as to whether he should withdraw his support from
Salabut Jung, or leave Bussy with diminished influence
and restricted powers at his court, he wrote on Sep¬
tember 16, that he was convinced of the necessity of not
abandoning the Subadar. To Moracin, however, he
threw out hints in the same letter regarding his projected
renunciation of. the territorial acquisitions of the Company,
on the ground that ‘he preferred a safe and extended
commerce to any other advantage.’ * It was in vain that
Moracin assured him in reply, that whoever had persuaded
him that the peace and security of one part of the French
possessions would be best maintained by the abandonment
of another part, could know nothing either of the map of
the country, the locality, or the interests of the Company.
It was to no purpose that he warned him that such an
act would be but the prelude ‘ to our total and proximate
expulsion from this part of the Dekkam’f Godeheu’s
mind was made up. To undo the work of Dupleix, to
make peace with the English, the honour and interests of
France were but fight sacrifices.
Negotiations had, meanwhile, been pending with the

* Letter to Moracin. September f Reply of Moracin, dated Octo-

16, 1754. her 9, 1754.
428 GODEHEU AND DE LEYEIT.

chap, government of Madras. Mr. Saunders had indeed been

. x- . recently reinforced by the arrival of Admiral Watson’s
1754. fleet, having on board Her.Majesty’s 49th regiment, and
several recruits for the Company. This advantage -was,
however, to a certain extent counterbalanced in the mind of
Mr. Saunders by the fact that Colonel Adlercron, who com¬
manded the 49th, superseded the tried and gallant veteran
who had so often led the English forces to victory. As
the French had just before received reinforcements cer¬
tainly not inferior in number, it was still a question as to
which of the contending parties, in the event of a con¬
tinuation of the war, would have the advantage. But the
folly of Godeheu had given Saunders a moral superiority,
of which he did not fail to make the fullest use. The
wise forethought, likewise, of the English Government, in
despatching a fleet to influence the negotiations for peace,
produced a wonderful effect. Saunders was not insen¬
sible, however, to the advantages to be derived from the
feverish impatience of Godeheu, and he readily acceded,
on October 26, to a truce for three months, during which
commissioners should meet at Pondichery to discuss the
conditions of a permanent peace. The principal articles
of this truce declared, that, till January 11, 1755, no
act of hostility should ensue between the French and
English, or between their allies; that commerce should
be free to both nations in the Carnatic; that there should
be a mutual, but ad valorem, exchange of prisoners; and
that commissaries should be appointed on both sides to
. see that the conditions of the truce were not infringed.
Two months later, a treaty of peace was agreed to, so
far only provisional, that it required the ratification of the
East India Companies of France and England. The first
condition of this treaty laid down that the two Companies
should ‘renounce for ever all Mogul dignities and govern¬
ments, and should never interfere in the differences that
might arise among the princes of the country; ’ the second
and third, that the English should possess Fort St. George,
 HIS TREATT. 429

Fort St. David, and Devicotta; the French, Pondichery chap.

and a limited settlement at Nizampatnam, it being ar- . x~ .
ranged, that to the French should be allotted either a ter-
ritory between Nizampatnain and the river Gondecama,
to compensate for the inferiority of Karical to Devicotta;
or that the districts of Pondichery should be made equal
to those of Fort St. George and Fort St. David, the French
in that case abandoning the country about Nizampatnam.
The fourth clause abandoned for the French their claims
on the ceded districts, it being arranged that equal terri¬
tories should be there assigned to the rival Companies.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses regulated the naviga¬
tion of certain rivers, and the possession of certain other
minor territories, on the same principle. The eighth
provided for the prolongation of the truce till the con¬
firmation of the treaty should arrive from Europe. The
ninth, for the non-building of any ports or obtaining any
new grants of territory during the truce. The tenth, for
the principle of uti possidetis till the treaty should be con¬
firmed from Europe; and the eleventh, for some future
plan of indemnification for the expenses of the war.
When we commented on the conditions of peace which
the agents of Dupleix submitted to the Conference of
Sadras in the autumn of the previous year, we noticed
that the French proposals were remarkable more for their
omissions than for what they contained. The same obser¬
vation is applicable, in one particular point, to the treaty
of which we have here given an outline. No mention is j|
made of Mahomed Ali; not a single reference to the i
Nawabship of the Carnatic. It was not, however, the
less clear from this omission, that the English had
gained, in this particular, all for which they had beenij
contending. The clause which forbade either nation to '
accept office or government from the native authorities
was an unmistakable renunciation on the part of Godeheu
of all the dignities and governments which the Subadar
had conferred upon his predecessor. The French com-
430 GODEHEU AND DE LEYRIT.

CHAR, petitor for the office of Nawab having thus resigned his
x- . claims, on whom but on the rival competitor, Mahomed
1784. would the vacated government devolve? For five
years had the French and English battled for this single
point; to maintain the French view, Dupleix had risked
and lost his semi-regal seat in the Council of Pondichery,
he had refused substantial offers of territory which did
not include this concession. His successor tamely re¬
nounced it, without, however, obtaining those substantial
advantages which alone could make it palatable.
^ I But the third and fourth clauses, and especially the
\! fourth, contained concessions not only damaging to French
:' .interests but disgraceful to French honour. The third,
1 under the pretext of giving to each nation equal posses¬
sions on the Coromandel coast, kept indeed ‘ the word of
promise to the ear,’ but only ‘ to break it to the hope.’
Karical was not the equivalent of Devicotta as a place of
commerce. But—what was worse, what was even insult¬
ing—to bring about on another part of the coast this
declared equality, the English proposed, and the French
agreed, to take a‘district which actually belonged to the
French, which was their own, their property, and to give
them only a small portion of it, restoring the rest to the
native powers. We allude to the agreement to form a
-settlement to be confined rigidly to the country between
Nizampatnam and the river Gondecama, at a time when
the entire coast from Hizampatnam to Juggernath was'
French—French by gift, French by actual possession.
The alternative proposal, to make the districts of Pondi¬
chery equal to those of Fort St. George and Fort St. David
together, was even more dishonouring and insidious, for
the effect of it would be, to agree to abandon for ever,
though without special mention of them, those ceded
districts or Circars which the genius and policy of Dupleix
had gained for his country.
But of all the clauses, the fourth was the most directly •
inj urious Jo-French interests. - This actually proposed that
 ITS SHAMEFUL PROVISIONS. 481

the city of Masulipatam, -with certain districts round it,' chap.

and the island of Divi, both actually French property, —-
should be divided between the*rival powers. The carry- 175i'
ing out of this proposition would alone entail a sacrifice,
on the part of the French, of a fixed annual revenue of
4,000,000 francs (160,0001.). The-fifth, sixth, and seventh
articles dealt likewise with French territory to the advan¬
tage of their rivals.
The remaining articles of the treaty,' especially those
which referred to the native allies of the two powers, were
equally one-sided. The English had but one ally, the
Bajah of Tanjore; for Mahomed Ali was but their help¬
less tool, the puppet in whose name, and under the shadow
of whose usurped authority they had endeavoured to
overthrow French influence. The French, on the contrary,
had the Mahrattas, the Mysoreans, and the Subadar.
These knew not a word of the treaty. The effect of it,
therefore, was to impose English law, not alone upon the
French, but upon the independent princes of Lidia; to
force Salabut Jung to accept, as Nawab of the Carnatic, a
man whom he had frequently declared to be a rebel and
an outlaw; to compel the Mysoreans and Mahrattas to
desist from their views on the city which they already
regarded as their own. As a climax to this condition,
the French, the allies of these Princes, were to guarantee
that they would execute it.
Such was Godeheu’s treaty—a treaty in which he re¬
nounced all that the French had been contending for.
He gave up the Nawabship of the Carnatic; he gave up
the Circars ; he gave up his .allies; he gave up French
influence and French honour. Could there have been a
greater contrast to Dupleix ? To him the English had
offered to guarantee the possession of all his territories,
provided he would resign the position and office of Nawab
of the Carnatic. His successor not only renounced that
office, but with it those material advantages which France
had secured, the undisputed possession of which would
 QODEHEU AND DE LEYEIT.

still have left her, under any circumstances, infinitely

more powerful than her rival. It is certainly not too
severe a sentence, not too extravagant a criticism, to pro¬
nounce such a treaty to have been, in a French point of
view, disgraceful. It was disgraceful to France, disgrace¬
ful to the man -who made it. To his timorous love of
peace, fostered by the mean and unworthy desire to undo
the work of his predecessor, Godeheu sacrificed—and
..sacrificed knowing what- he was sacrificing—the very
foundations of an Indo-French empire.
For, indeed, great as were the material advantages given
up, they were less important than the abnegation of
moral influence, of the prestige of superiority which
their renunciation implied. The treaty, in fact, was ail
announcement to the native princes of Southern India,
that thenceforth France was not strong enough to
contend with 'England on the soil of Hindostan; that
she gave up the struggle; that she abandoned her,allies
to their fate. The impression produced by the arrival of
Godeheu upon the bankers of Masulipatam has been
already quoted. Damaging as that was, this'confirmation
of the views then entertained, and declared by Moracin
and others to be exaggerated, was a hundred times more
injurious. We shall see, as we prpceed, th& fatal effects
produced upon the Princes of'lndia by this policy of
abnegation.
In striking contrast to the conduct of the French
Governor was the action of the Englishman, Saunders.
If the empire of Hindostan is an. appanage of which the
English have reason to be proud; if the possession of
India has brought with it solid advantages to Great
Britain, then do his countrymen still owe to the memory
of Mi\ Saunders a debt which was never fully acknow¬
ledged to himself. It was his constancy and resolution,
his determination, when the English fortunes were at then-
lowest, to support Mahomed Ali, in order that through
him he might stop the progress of Dupleix; that, more
 GREAT MERITS OP SAUNDERS. 433

than any other circumstances, changed the face of events; chap.

that tended, by a slow but certain procedure, to lower the .—^—-
pride of France, to exalt the fortunes of England. Never 1754-
did he despair, never did he hesitate in his determination
to oppose those.pretensions which, if submitted to, would,
he felt, have overwhelmed the English settlement in ruin.
True it is that he was fortunate; true, that he enjoyed
the rare advantage of having a Clive and a Lawrence
under his command. But it is not too much to affirm,
that but for his stubborn policy even these advantages
would have availed nothing; that but for his promptitude
in recognising and employing merit, Clive might even have
languished in obscurity. Nor was his tact inferior to his
determination. He would have treated with Dupleix,
DupleiS* being absolute master of his Presidency—on
better terms than he offered Godeheu ; for he could not
but feel that if France were to support Dupleix, a pro¬
longation of hostilities must end in an increase of French
. territory. He was prepared, therefore, to give up every¬
thing but that one point he considered necessary to thews'''
safety^ of the English, viz. that the Nawab of the Carnatic
should not be a French nominee. But with Godeheu he'
pursued a different treatment: he saw that from the fear
and malice of such a man he could wring almost anything;
he squeezed him, therefore, to an extent that left him
powerless and exhausted.
That, whilst doing justice to the merits of Saunders,
^and vindicating the policy of Dupleix, we have not
/ wronged the memory of Godeheu, is clear from the re- ,
corded sentiments of that functionary. What, indeed, |j/
but a feverish desire for peace at any price, and a mean j j
ef jealousy of Dupleix, could have prompted him, on -
"" January 11, to sign the ignominious treaty to which we
have referred, when, on December 17 preceding, the
terms of the treaty having been virtually settled, and
the truce still existing, he had written these words to
Moracin at Masulipatam: ‘ Prepare everything with all
434 GODEHEU AND DE LEYEIT.

CHAP, promptitude to the extent of your ability, so as-to make

x- , yourself safe from a coup-de-main, for it is quite possible
1754. y0U may be attacked before the end of January. Ht
is by such sudden enterprises that the English begin
to declare war! ’ * He thus prepared Moracin for an
attack on the Circars at the end of December; and yet,
on January 11 following, virtually resigned them up to
the English!
1755. Hot long did he remain in India to watch the working
of his treaty. On 'February 16, 1755, after holding
office little more than six months, he embarked for
Europe, leaving the affairs of the French settlement to be
administered by a secret committee, composed of MM.
Barthelemy, Boileau, and Guillard, until the arrival of the
officer nominated to be his successor, M. Duval d# Leyrit.
His departure was hailed by the colony as a national
benefit. That alone, of all his acts, produced a good
effect for French interests throughout Southern India, for
it gave rise to the rumour, artfully encouraged by Bussy,
that it was but the prelude to the return of Dupleix.
But the recall of that statesman had had more than a
transient effect. The members of the secret committee,
having before them his example, and ignorant of the
political views. of M. de Leyrit, would do nothing.
Writing to Bussy, who pressed the Pondichery Govern¬
ment for instructions as to the course of conduct he
should adopt in the difficult circumstances we shall have
to record, they could only reply that they had received
all the letters he had addressed to M. Godeheu; that he
himself had not answered them, because certain points
in them were of too delicate a nature to allow him to
arrive at a fixed decision ; but that M. de Leyrit, on his
arrival, would probably explain himself fully upon all
the questions at issue, f The same conduct was pursued
in every other subject of importance, the consequence
* This correspondence is attached f M. BartMemy to Bussy, Fehru-
to the memoir of Dupleix. aTy 28,1766,
 CHARACTER OP DE LEYRIT. 435

being, that from February 16, the date of the departure chap.
of Godelieu, to the arrival of de Leyrit on March 25 of —^—
the same year, the government of French India was but 1765-
a blank.
De Leyrit, though a very ordinary man, was an im¬
provement *on the secret committee. He too had been
trained in India in the civil branch of the service, and
had been a contemporary of Dupleix. At the time of
the expedition of La Bourdonnais, he had been the
French agent at' Mahe, and he had succeeded Dupleix as
Director-General of Chandernagore in 1741. He would
have made probably an exaellent head of a purely trading
corporation, for he was well versed in mercantile' ope¬
rations ; but he was most unfit for the conduct of the
delicate *policy by which the relations of Pondichery with
the native chiefs required to be guided ; equally was he
wanting in the firmness of purpose and determination of
will by which alone the aggressive policy of the English
could be stayed. In a word, though well-meaning and
laborious, he was slow, undecided, wanting in forethought
and energy.
Yet at that time, if at any, French India required other
qualities in her chief ruler? Godeheu had not even
quitted the scene of his inglorious labours, scarcely dry
was the ink with’ which he and the English Commissioners
had signed the treaty,—one clause of which provided
that the English and French ‘ should never interfere in
any difference that might arise between the princes of
the country,’—when the English began to equip a force
to assist their ally, Mahomed Ali, in his endeavours to
coerce the Polygars of Madura and Tinivelly, his right
over whom was simply the right of the strongest.
Although the English were actuated in this policy by
purely mercenary motives, hoping to obtain from those
districts the means of re-couping themselves for the
expenses of the war just closed, there can be no doubt
but that it was a glaring infraction of the treaty. . That
m GODEHEU AND DE LETEIT.

chap. it was attempted is a clear proof of the contempt with

x- . which the power of the French on the Coromandel coast
1755. pac] come to be regarded.
In the beginning of-February, under orders received
from Madras, an English force under Colonel Heron, of
H.M.’s 49th foot, was detached from Trichinopoly on this
service. Whatever might have been the apparent success
of this enterprise—and Colonel Heron did succeed in
occupying both Madura and Tinivelly—it must not the
less be regarded as a failure. The English soldiers,
commanded by an officer ignorant of the country, were
allowed to insult the religion aad to deride the prejudices
of the people; the money gained in the foray was not
sufficient to pay the expenses of the expedition; * and,
worse than all, an example was given of the little respect
entertained by the Government of Fort St. George for the
most solemn engagements when its own interests were con¬
cerned. De Leyrit had not been an inattentive spectator
of this action on the part of the English. Ho sooner had
he landed than he addressed to the Madras Government
a strong remonstrance on the infraction- of the treaty. It
was replied to him, however, that Colonel Heron’s expe¬
dition was not an act of war in any sense of the word;
that the Nawab was simply engaged in the collection of
his rents. However specious this reply might have
appeared, de Leyrit was for the moment forced to be
content with it; for Admiral Watson was on the coast,
and de Leyrit, new to the scene, felt that it would be
impolitic to inaugurate his career as Governor by a
renewal of hostilities. He determined, therefore, to rest
satisfied with his protest, inwardly resolving, however, to
follow the example so imprudently set him. Accordingly
when, some few weeks later, he found that the rents due
from the lands west of Ootatoor and south of the Yalaru
river, known by the name of Terriore, and in which the
* Colonel Heron, on his return to Madras, tried there hy a court mar-
Trichonoply in June, was ordered to tial, ana found guilty of malversation.
 NOJr-IJTTEBPERENCE IMPOSSIBLE. 437

French had been empowered to act as agents of the chap.

Bajah of Mysore, were not paid into the Pondichery —A-
treasury, he sent Maissin at the head of 500 Europeans 1755‘
and 1,000 sepoys to make arrangements which should be
satisfactory for the future. The English made no opposi¬
tion to this movement. But when the French, succeeding
in Terriore, were tempted to move against the more
eastern lands nearer Palamcottah, stretching almost from
the Valaru to the Ooleroon, and which the English
chose to regard as feudally dependent on the Nawab,
orders were sent to Calliaud to oppose the movement, if
necessary, by force. If the French had persisted in their
pretensions, war was then inevitable. But de Leyrit, still
unprepared, yielded and withdrew his troops. Never¬
theless a precedent of interference had been established
on both sides, and before Godeheu reached Europe,
the treaty which he carried with him had been violated
in that part which was alike its main principle and its
only possible justification—by the English in acting as
allies of Mahomed Ali, by the French as agents of the
Mysoreans.
De Leyrit indeed had not been long at Pondichery
before he became convinced that the theory of non-inter¬
ference, on which Godeheu had based his policy, was, in
the actual state of India, simply impossible. Both the
rival powers on the Coromandel coast having armies and
strong places, both brought constantly into contact with
possessors of territory whose weakness they had proved,
and who were continually tempting them with offers, it
was impossible that either should have the virtue on
every occasion to abstain, always to restrain its hands.
Excuses were to be found to justify, at least to their
Directors in Europe, every infraction of the treaty. It
is clear from the correspondence of de Leyrit with Bussy
and with Dupleix,* that this feeling on his part grew

* De Leyrit to Bussy, July 29 and August 17, 1755; to Dupleix, October

16, and other letters.
438 GODEHBU AND DE LEYEIT.

chap, stronger. every day, and that he became more and more
x- convinced of the insensate folly of Godeheu in consenting
1755. ctiyide a portion of the Circars -with the English. Of
these, however, the Frqpch still held possession, and were
empowered to hold possession, till the ratification of the
treaty should arrive, that is, till about the middle of
1756. As de Leyrit saw clearly that war would then be
inevitable, all his foreign policy was directed to nurse
the resources of Pondichery, to avoid committing himself
to a contest, until his own private knowledge of the con¬
firmation of the treaty should render it advisable for him
to provoke hostilities on other grounds. Should the
treaty not be confirmed, war would naturally ensue.
This exposition of the views of de Leyrit will enable us
to comprehend and account for the cautious policy he con¬
tinued for some time to follow. We shall understand why
it was he continued to support Bussy at Hydrabad, why,
when the English again infringed the treaty, he confined
himself to threats and to protests, until, learning that the
treaty had been confirmed by his Directors, he made the
aggression of the English a pretext for renewing hostili¬
ties, endeavouring thus to retain for France permanent
possession of the ceded Circars. It was undoubtedly, in
theory, a sagacious and able policy, but to succeed it
required the possession of greater energy and vigour in
action than de Leyrit and his subordinates, always except¬
ing Bussy, possessed.
Opportunities for protesting were never wanting to
either party. In the autumn of the same year, 1755, the
French having taken possession of some lands' contiguous
to Sadras, midway nearly between Pondichery and Fort
St. George, the English remonstrated, and the dispute only
terminated by an equal division of the contested terri¬
tory.* But in the following year affairs took a turn
which could not fail to embroil the two nations.

* A truly European mode of set- having belonged to native princes

1j tling a dispute, the lands in question who were parties to thd treaty.
 CLIVE RETURNS TO INDIA. 439

The English had always b'een jealous of the position v chap.

held by Bussy at the court of -the Subadar. The influence .—^—-
which thus accrued to the Erench could not fail to make 1756-
itself felt on both sides of the continent of Hindostan, at
the court of the Peshwa, as well as with the various
petty chieftains in the Carnatic, In the treaty concluded
with Godeheu, no special mention had been made of
Bussy, and there had been a tacit understanding that it
had no reference to the affairs of the Subadar, who
indeed had never committed hostilities against the Eng¬
lish. Unable, then, to demand as a right the expulsion
of Bussy, the English were yet desirous to weaken the in¬
fluence he was able to exercise by Ijis position at Hydra-
bad, either by undermining him with the Subadar, or by
gaining new possessions for themselves on the western
coast. The manner in which the first was attempted,
and how it succeeded, will be related when we have
to refer to the operations of Bussy. But, before that,
the return to India of Clive, with the commission of
Lieutenant-Colonel and Governor of Fort St. David, gave
the English an opportunity of trying the second. Clive,
under orders from the Court of Directors, had been sent
in the first instance to Bombay, in order that he might
be ready to co-operate in an expedition which they con¬
templated in .concert with the Peshwa against the
northern parts of the Dekkan. Colonel Scott, the officer
appointed to command the English contingent, dying in
Bombay, his place was at once occupied by Clive, and it
needed but the orders of the Bombay Government to
enter upon the contemplated movement. The members
of that Government, however, regarding Godeheu’s
treaty as prohibitory of any such undertaking, hesitated
to embark in it, until at least they should have received
the opinion on that point of the Madras authorities.
These had no such scruple. And, although they were
ignorant of the views of the Home Government regarding
the disposal of Clive’s force ; although, indeed, they were
440 GODEIIEU AND DE LEYRIT.

chap, not destined, at the time, to be enlightened—the ship

x- . which conveyed the despatches of the Bombay Govern-
1756. ment having been wrecked—yet no sooner had they
heard of the arrival of Clive at Bombay, than they sent
to suggest the mode in which his force could be best used
—a mode almost identical with the plan of the Court of
Directors. But before their despatch could reach Bom¬
bay, the Government of that Presidency, more cautious
than that of Madras, had determined to employ Clive’s
force and Admiral Watson’s fleet,' for the reduction, in
conjunction with the Mahrattas, of the fort of Gheriah,
the principal stronghold of the famous pirate Angria.
It forms no part of this history to give the details of
this expedition, unconnected as it was with French in¬
terests. It will suffice to say that it was attended with
complete success; that Gheriah was taken, Angria’s fleet
destroyed, and the ten lacs of prize-money captured
divided on the spot amongst the English—the Mahrattas
being excluded* from all participation therein, notwith¬
standing that it was to them, and not to the English, that
Angria surrendered.
This expedition terminated, Clive and Watson re¬
turned to the coast of Coromandel, the former taking up
his Government at Fort St. David, the latter repairing to
Madras. He reached this place on the 16th May, and
began at once to concert with Governor Pigottf a scheme
which the expulsion of Bussy by Salabut Jung seemed
to facilitate for replacing French by English influence in
the Dekkan. But just two months after his arrival,
accounts were received of the capture of Kassimbazar,
and, three weeks later, of the taking of Calcutta by the

* Before the expedition left Bom- the Mahrattas, the English deter-
bar, the English had agreed amongst mined to keep it. This -was not
themselves that the Mahrattas were perhaps the most effectual mode of
to he excluded from all participation inducing a heartv co-operation against
in the prize-money; nay more, al- the Subadar.—Grant Duff.
though it had been previoiisly agreed f Governor Pigott succeeded Go-
that Gheriah should, he given up to vernor Saunders at Madras in 1755.
 MILITARY MOVEMENTS CONTINUE. 441

Nawab Nazim of Bengal. Clive was instantly summoned chap.

from Fort St. David to take part in the deliberations .—^—
having for their object .the recovery of the English 1756-
settlement in that province. In the presence of such a
calamity it appeared advisable to give up the projected
expedition into the Dekkan, even to allow Madras to shift
for herself, in order to concentrate the undivided energies *
of the Presidency on the recovery of Calcutta and the
punishment of the Nawab Nazim. After some discus¬
sion, Clive was appointed to the command, with inde¬
pendent and practically unlimited powers. . On the 16th
October he sailed, having with him 900 Europeans and
1,500 sepoys on that enterprise to which, in so far as
relates to its connexion with Chandernagore, we shall
have presently to refer.
Meanwhile the English had not been idle in the Car¬
natic. Their protege, the Nawab, being still in want .of
funds, and being thus unable to settle the claims they
had against him, it was determined at Madras to make
another attempt to extract money from some of the sub¬
ordinate princes of the Carnatic. Mortiz Ali, Governor of
Vellore, was selected for this purpose. It will be re¬
collected that Mortiz Ali had been set up by Dupleix,
on the renunciation of his claims by Chunda Sahib, as
Nawab of the Carnatic. As soon, however, as the fall
of Dupleix appeared imminent, Mortiz Ali had hastened
to disclaim all pretensions to the title, and had made his
submission to Mahomed Ali. By this means he hoped-
to be allowed to remain unmolested in his possessions.
But it was not to be. He suffered under the great
misfortune of passing for the richest man in the Carnatic,
a crime that could only be atoned for by the surrender
of his property. It was easy to find a pretext to attack
him. Some old story about arrears of tribute was raked
up; and, almost without warning, a force of 500 Euro¬
peans and 1,500 sepoys, under Major Bjllpatrick, appeared
before Vellore on the 30th January.
442 GODEHEU AND DE LEYEIT.

chap. Vellore had the reputation of being the strongest

_fortress in the Carnatic. Its walls were built of large
l?56- stones, and were strengthened by bastions and towers.
It was surrounded by a deep and wide ditch cut out of
the rock, and • always filled with water swarming with
alligators. It commanded 'the high road to Mysore, and
* was in other respects the most important position in the
upper Carnatic. De Leyrit would have been weak, in¬
deed, had he allowed such a place to fall into the hands
•of the English. Nor did he. No soon then had he heard
of the movements of Killpatrick, than he despatched a
messenger to Madras to intimate that he would regard
an attack upon Vellore as an infraction of the treaty,
and that he should oppose it with all his available force.
Not content with that, he ordered 300 Europeans and
300 sepoys to march instantly in the direction of that
fortress, supporting them two days later by a reinforce¬
ment of 400 of the former and 1,200 of the latter, the
whole taking up a position between Gingee and Chitta-
put. This demonstration so far succeeded that it pre¬
vented an attack upon Vellore. There was no Dupleix,
however, at Pondichery, to improve the occasion to the
advantage of France; no persuasive eloquence to induce
Mortiz Ali to admit French troops into Vellore. That
chieftain indeed feared his allies probably as much as his #
enemies; and, after a negotiation of three weeks, he was
glad to purchase the retirement of the latter by the pay¬
ment of 400,000 rupees.
The departure in the following October of the English
armament for Bengal, and of 320 French to aid Bussy in
the July preceding, the circumstances relating to which
belong properly to the account of that officer’s proceed¬
ings, left the rival powers in the Carnatic almost too
powerless to cause one another effectual injury. The
English however experienced, to its fullest extent, the
inconvenience of having placed at the head of the affairs
of the Carnatic a man such as Mahomed Ali, without
 DE LEYRIT’s GREAT COUP. 443

personal resources and -without ability. In January, 1757, chap.

they found themselves once more compelled to levy con- ._—
tributions from Madura and Tinivelly; and Calliaud, who 1757-
then commanded at Trichinopoly, was directed to proceed
with the greater part of the garrison into those districts.
He accordingly marched at the head of 180 Europeans,
1,000 sepoys, and six pieces of cannon to Tanjore, to *
endeavour to obtain from the Rajah succours for his pur¬
pose. The Rajah, however, and his ministers, tired of
contributing to successes which brought only advantage
to his allies, practically refused his aid; whereupon
Calliaud, hearing that some of the insurgent Polygars
were ravaging the district, moved without delay to Tini¬
velly. Here he was detained for some time by diffi¬
culties regarding supplies and money, and it was not till '
April 10 that he was able to march towards Madura.
At three o’clock on the morning of May 1, he at¬
tempted to take this city by surprise, but, being repulsed,
took up a position on the south-east face of the town,
there to await the arrival of two 18-pounders he had sent
for from Trichinopoly. Instead of these guns, however,
he received at three o’clock in the afternoon of the 11th
the startling intelligence that the whole French army,
taking advantage of his absence, was attempting Trichino¬
poly ! • Intelligence of the same nature recalled to Madras
Colonel Forde, who at the head of 100 Europeans, 56
Africans, 300 sepoys, and 10,000 auxiliaries, had, till then
unsuccessfully, been attempting the reduction of Hellore
held against Mahomed Ali by his brother.
The time had indeed arrived when de Leyrit felt him¬
self empowered to put into execution the schemes he \.
had been long meditating. On May 17,17 56, war, which
for two years previously had been impending between T
France and England, was formally declared. Intelligence {
of this event reached de Leyrit at the end of 1756, ;i
accompanied, however, by the intimation, that France was /1
about to make a tremendous effort to recover her waning '
444 " GODEHEU AND DE LEYRIT.

char, influence in India, and that he was to attempt nothing till

- . the armament then fitting out should arrive. But de
1767- Leyrit, knowing that the few English troops in the Pre¬
sidency were occupied before Madura and ISTellore, having
. himself, too, just welcomed the annual detachment from
1 Europe, under the command of the veteran d’Auteuil,
: thought the moment too opportune to be neglected. On
the 6th April, therefore, 200 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys
were despatched into the interior, their commander,
d’Auteuil, having secret instructions to feign to be entirely
occupied by an attack upon the fort of Elvasanore,—a
few miles north of the river Punar, and on the high road
between Gingee and Trichinopoly,—and other strongholds
in its vicinity, whilst he should secretly collect all his
forces for a combined attack •upon the city which had so
long bade defiance to French arms. De Leyrit justly
argued that the English, engaged with their own plans,
would care little about so unimportant a place as Elvasa¬
nore ; that they would the rather on that account believe
that no intention existed to attack Trichinopoly.
It turned out as de Leyrit had imagined. D’Auteuil
was allowed, unmolested, even unsuspected, to capture
Elvasanore and other places in its vicinity. His action
there tended, as de Leyrit had hoped, to make the English
feel all the more secure regarding Trichinopoly. Sud¬
denly, however, d’Auteuil massed his forces, amounting
to 1,150 Europeans, 3,000 sepoys, and ten field-pieces,
and on the 12th May occupied the island of Seringham.
To enable him to collect so large a force of Europeans,
.not a single soldier, fit for duty, had been left in Pon-
dichery.
The garrison of Trichinopoly at this time consisted of
but 165 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and 1,000 native auxili¬
aries, the whole commanded by Captain Joseph Smith.
But guarded within the walls were 500 French prisoners,
and d’Auteuil naturally hoped that these, if they cotdd not
openly aid him, would, at all events, draw off the atten-
 d’auteuil’s gouty warfare. 445

tion of a great part of the garrison. On the morning of chap.

the 14th, the French leader, crossing the river, took up a .—^—
position at the Warriore pagodas, nearly three miles west 1757-
of the city; from this place, he opened a fire of shot and
shell, and continued it to the 20th, when he sent a sum¬
mons to Smith to surrender. This summons was, how¬
ever, answered by defiance.
It had been the intention of d’Auteuil to attempt an
assault on the morning of the 21st, but he received during
the day intimation that Calliaud, at the head of 120
Europeans and 1,200 sepoys, was in full inarch from
Madura to relieve Trichinopoly. He deemed it, therefore,
advisable to defer his attack in order the better to intercept
this force. Instead, however, of massing the greater por¬
tion of his troops, leaving a few only to watch Smith,
and moving out to crush Calliaud on the road, he resolved
to follow the old plan,—dear, we must suppose, from its
repeated failure,—of occupying the strong places to the
south and east of the town. Like Astruc and Brennier
before him, he marched to take up a position stretching
from the Five Eocks to the French Bock, occupying,
besides those two, in considerable force, the Fakeer’s Tope
and the Golden and Sugar-loaf Eocks. He thus shut out
Calliaud from Trichinopoly on the only side on which he
could hope to gain it; should the English attempt to
force in their way between any of the rocks indicated, it
would, he calculated, be in his power to crush them at a
blow. The better to acquaint himself with the move¬
ments of the enemy, he had arranged that several spies
should join them, and with these he had settled an efficient
mode of communication.
But this was, after all, but a gouty mode of carrying on
war. To sit still, and to depend on spies for information,
was to give full play to the activity of an enemy who had
liitherto^shown himself not wanting in expedients. If
d’Auteuil thought at all on the subject, he could not have
believed that Calliaud was so wanting in ordinary percep-
446 GODEHEU AND DE LEWKIT

chap, ticra. as to run his head against the positions he occupied.

. A strong reconnaissance on the Madura road would have .
1757- compelled Calliaud' to fight. But if Governments will
intrust the command of their armies to gouty octogena¬
rians, they must refrain from expecting that activity of
movement, that watchful and daring vigour, which are
almost synonymous with success.
D’Auteuil, meanwhile,, well satisfied with his arrange¬
ments, received information, early on the evening of the
2'5th, that Oalliaud had just reached Aour, a village ten
miles south-east of Trichinopoly, and that he intended, a
few hours later, to force his way between the Five Bocks
and the Sugar-loaf Bock under cover of the darkness of
the night. He instantly massed Iris forces about half a
mile in front of the Golden Bock, denuding even the
other positions in order to concentrate every available
man against the enemy. All night long he remained in
a state of anxious expectation; day dawned, yet there was
no appearance of an enemy; at last, the sun itself appeared
gilding the horizon; still not a soldier was to be seen;
but scarcely had the entire disk become visible to the still
expectant d’Auteuil, when a triumphant feu de joie from
the walls of Triclnnopoly announced to him the terrible
fact, that he had been out-witted and out-manoeuvred, and
that Trichinopoly was relieved!
It was too true. Fortunately for the English, their
commander was still young, hale, and active, fully.im¬
pressed with the necessity of using all his faculties, mental
an"d bodily, when he had a great end to pursue. Break¬
ing up from Madura on the 11th-, Calliaud had marched
at the head of the small force we have indicated, without
tents, baggage, or artillery. On the morning of the 25th,
arriving at Eliapore, nineteen miles from Trichinopoly, he
had learned from Captain Smith tjie disposition made by
d’Auteuil. The same evening, he marched, as4ruly re¬
ported by the spies, to Aour. Here he halted, giving out ■
that he intended in half an hour to force Ms way through
 calliaud's triumph. 447

the space between the Five Socks and the Sugar-loaf chap.
t Sock. The time fixed for this march being so close, the ._^_
spies instantly made their way to the French camp, and 1757-
reported it to d’Auteuil with the result we have seen.
Calliaud, half an hour later, did actually commence his
march, but on arriving within two miles of the Five Socks,
he struck off to the right till he came opposite Ekniseram.
The ground here being entirely under water on account
of the rice cultivation, the French had supposed it irn- •
passable for troops, and had neglected to guard it. It
was indeed heavy and swampy; but it was Calliaud’s
best chance, and, strictly enjoining silence, he attempted
it. The distance was about nine miles. In seven hours,
he had accomplished only seven. But by this time the
day had dawned, and the sight of the city inspired the
gallant band to new efforts. Still struggling on, Calliaud
himself supported by two grena* hers, they entered Trichi-
nopoly in time to be welcomed by the rising sun. A
salute was at once fired to convey to the Frenchman the
notification of the defeat of his plans.
We will not stop to dwell on the mortification of
d’Auteuil. So badly had his position been taken, all his
troops concentrated upon one narrow point, that it would
have been possible, as it turned out, for Calliaud to have
marched in under the very shadow of the Sugar-loaf
Bock. A body of sepoys he had sent to make a false
march in that direction, in the hope to persuade the
French that he himself was moving that way, were able
to convert it into a real one, advancing under the lee of
the rock without once having beSn challenged. The course
followed by d’Auteuil after this check was not inspired by
greater wisdom than his previous strategy. It is, however,
always useless to endeavour to analyse the motives of a
man who is himself incapable of thinking. Had he been
other thaa he was, d’Auteuil would have recollected that
notwithstanding the reinforcement brought by Calliaud,
he still outnumbered the English with his Frenchmen by
448 GODEHETJ AND DE LEYKIT.

chap, four to one. But it would not appear that -such a thought
. x~ . ^ occurred to him. Utterly discouraged, he crossed the
1757- Cauveri the same evening, and proceeded next day to
Pondichery.*
Meanwhile the Madras authorities, not trusting entirely
to the efforts of Oalliaud, bad ordered every available
man into the field. These, forming a force of 430 Euro¬
peans and 800 sepoys under Colonel Adlereron, had
already reached and captured Outramatore when they
heard of the relief of Trichinopoly. As the French
garrison of Outramatore had thrown itself into Wande-
wash, one of the most important towns in the Carnatic,
sixty-four miles south-west of Madras, Colonel Adlereron
marched forward with the apparent intention of besieging
that. also.
Meanwhile, de Leyrit had been neither unskilfully nor
unsuccessfully employed in other-parts of the coast. No
sooner had the news of the fall of Chandernagore—the
account of which will appear in its proper place—reached
him, than he ordered Moracin to take possession of the
English factories on the Godavery, and sent instructions
to Bussy to attack that of Vizagapatam. Both these offi¬
cers acquitted themselves of this service without any diffi-
' culty—the garrison of Vizagapatam surrendering to Bussy
on June 25. Whilst thus satisfying himself regarding
his territories in the north, by a policy which gave him
uninterrupted possession of the coast from Ganjam to
Masulipatam, de Leyrit was not neglectful of the south.
He had hoped to avenge the fall of Chandernagore by
the capture of Trichinopoly; and though disappointed
of that by d’Auteuil’s unaccountable strategy, he still
endeavoured to use the troops he commanded to some
satisfactory purpose. On the return of d’Auteuil to
Pondichery, therefore, he removed him from the com¬
mand, and replaced him by M. Saubinet, ^man of
capacity and energy. To him he gave instructions at
* Vide Onne and Lawrence.
 SAUBIXET CLEAKS THE CARXATIC. 449

once to concentrate his army, which lay scattered at chap.

Gingee, at Tiruvadi, and at Pondichery, and to march to —A—
the relief of Wandewash, then threatened by Adlercron. 17a7-
When Saubinet, at the-head of 600 Europeans and
about 200 sepoys, arrived before this place on June 1,
he foiind Adlercron in possession of the town, and pre¬
paring to batter the fort. The approach of the French,
however, combined with orders he received from his own
Presidency to return, induced Adlercron at once to quit
this enterprise and to retreat towards Madras. Before
doing this he very barbarously„and very unnecessarily set
fire to the town, thereby injuring only the unoffending
inhabitants. Saubinet instantly followed him upon the
Chingleput road, whilst he despatched 200 Europeans
and 500 sepoys to attack Conjeveram, a most important
town with a strongly fortified pagoda, only forty-six
miles from Madras. . This detachment was, however, '
repulsed from Conjeveram, and retired after following the
example of the English, by burning the town. The main
body, after recapturing Outramatore, retired to. Wande¬
wash, and intrenched themselves about a mile in front of
that town. Here they were followed to within four miles
by Adlercron, under whom Lawrence, now a lieutenant-
colonel, had consented to serve as a volunteer. Por six
weeks the two armies, nearly equal in numbers, remained
facing one another, the English ■ anxious for a decisive
action before the expected reinforcements of the French
should arrive, the French on that account desirous to
avoid it. Finding their efforts to force a battle unavail¬
ing, the English army broke up on July 26, retiring,
the greater part to Conjeveram, the remainder to Chingle¬
put and Carangoly. Saubinet, thus left master of the
campaign, remained at Wandewash till the middle of
September. Learning then that a considerable squadron,
having on board the Chevalier de Soupire with the regi¬
ment of Lorraine, fifty artillefy men and twenty siege
guns,—the advanced guard of the force destined for the
G G
 GODEHEU AND DE LEYRIT.
450

CHAP, conquest of India under the Count de Lady—had reached

Pondidaery. Saubinet made a sudden attack upon Ohitta-
"i757T put Capturing this after a desperate resistance, he moved
against Trinomalee. Not this only, hut several other
forts in the Carnatic fell into the possession of the French,
who were thus enabled to collect contributions from all
1758 parts of the province. It was not, however, until the
arrival of Count Lally, on April 28 in the following
year, that the French ventured to carry out the scheme
originally intended to be commenced by de Soupire
_a scheme beginning ^rith the intended capture of
Fort St. David, as a preliminary to the entire rooting out
of the English from the Carnatic. We shall see, when
we come to. that exciting portion of our history, how it
was that de Soupire delayed this attack ; we shall notice
likewise the prompt and energetic action inaugurated by
* Lally himself. We leave the Carnatic, on the eve of his
arrival, overrun by French troops ; all its strong places,
with the exception of Arcot, Vellore, Conjeveram, Chingle-
put, and the two English seats of government on the coast,
in their hands; the English shut up in Madras and
Trichinopoly, sensible of the storm about to burst over
their heads, and conscious of having no efficient means to
protect themselves against its downpouring. We leave
them thus, whilst we proceed to trace, on the one side,
the fate of the French settlement in Bengal; on the other,
the still eventful action of Bussy, ever gathering new
triumphs, till recalled by the new Lieutenant-General of
the armies of France from the scene of his brilliant suc¬
cesses to take part in the enterprise that, he fondly hoped,
was to sweep the English into the sea.
 451

CHAPTER XI.

CHANDEENAGOBE AND THE DEKKAN.

Ciiaxderxagoee, after the departure of Dupleix in 1741 °saP-

to take up the Governor-Generalship of French India, ■—^—
had not long continued under the influence of the impulse 1756‘
which he had given to it. Whether it was that his suc¬
cessors were restricted in their powers, or were too indo¬
lent ; that the duties on commercial enterprise amounted
almost to a prohibition of trade; that it was neglected by
the Home Government; or, more probably, from a com¬
bination of all these causes; it is certain that its once
nourishing trade had decreased, that it was burdened
with debts, and that it was being maintained at a loss.
In 1756, the Chief of the settlement was M. Renault de
St. Germain, whilst the dependent factory of Eassimbazar
came early in the year under the charge of M. Law.
The garrison in the former place consisted of 146 Eu¬
ropeans and 300 sepoys.* Law had with him about a
score of European and sixty native soldiers.

* All the English historians give monstrate the absolute necessity of

the number of the French garrison as sending us such assistance as would
at least 300 Europeans and 300 place this settlement beyond the
natives. That Clive and Watson be¬ chance of similar misfortunes1 (such
lieved these to have been their num¬ as had happened to the English).
bers we cannot doubt, nor equally, ‘We received 67 sepoys and a de¬
that the same impression prevailed tachment of 61 Europeans, of whom
amongst the English in India gene¬ 45 were invalids, which added to the
rally. It is nevertheless incontestable 85 Europeans we then had, made 146
that the numbers given by us in tbe Europeans. We expected then every
text are correct. In the official des¬ day to leam that war had been
patch sent by M. Renault to Count declared against England, and there
Lally regarding the events connected was preparing at the time a consider¬
with’ the loss of Ohandemagore we able armament to re-take Calcutta.’
find the following statement:—‘In This extract is decisive as to the
every letter we used the strongest number of Europeans.
and most touching language to de¬
452 CHANDERNAGORE AND THE DEKKAN.

CHA3P. The calamity which had overwhelmed Calcutta in

XI- - 1756 had left Chandemagore uninjured. When the first-
1756. named city was threatened by.Suraj-ood-dowlah in that
year, the English, despairing of assistance from their own
people, had invited the Dutch of Chinsurah and the French
of Chandemagore to mate common cause with them
against the enemy. Whilst the Dutch had positively re¬
fused, the French, more courteous, had offered the English
protection within the walls of Chandemagore. This offer,
which would seem to have been made in good faith, was
however regarded as an insult by the English, and de¬
clined. Certain it is that when themselves threatened
with the full weight of the Nawab’s anger in case they
should refuse to assist him in his operations against the
English, the French resolutely declined to aid him,—and
this, although they knew well that the extermination of
the English, if unavenged, would probably be only a pre¬
lude to an attack upon their own settlement. It hap¬
pened, indeed, that after the capture of Calcutta and the
flight of the surviving English to Fulta, the Nawab, re¬
cognising the loss of revenue caused by their expulsion,
appeared disinclined to take hostile measures against the
other European settlements on the Hooghly. Contenting
himself with quelling the disaffection which had appeared
in other parts of his government, he apparently forgot
his European enemies, and lulled himself into a too con¬
fident security.
Such was the state of Bengal, when the fleet and army
under Watson and Clive, which had arrived at Fulta
at intervals between August 2 and November 20, left
that place on December 27 with the intention of recover¬
ing Calcutta by force .of arms. But the instructions
given to these two leaders permitted them to look to
something more than the mere recovery of Calcutta.
They were directed, should they deem it necessary, to
attack the Nawab in his own capital; especially were
they exhorted, in case the news of the declaration of war
 clivb’s difficulties. 453

between France and England, then expected, should reach chap.

them whilst they had so strong an armament in Bengal, ■—c—
not to fail to use it for the destruction of the rival settle- 17°7,
nient of Chandernagore.*
The surrender of Calcutta on January 2, 1757, and
the capture and sack of Hooghly eight days later,
are incidents which belong solely to the history of the
English settlements ; it will therefore be sufficient here to
record the bare facts. But it was during the march to
Hooghly that Clive received the long-looked-for intima¬
tion of the declaration of war’by France against England.
To him and to all the members of the Calcutta Council it
seemed that this intelligence reached them at the most
opportune moment. They could not but congratulate
themselves that the French had not learned it before the
success of the operations of Clive and Watson against
Calcutta had been assured. It came to them just after
the difficulties of the river navigation had been overcome,
when Calcutta had surrendered, and when they did not
doubt that the attack upon Hooghly would produce a
strong moral effect on the natives of Bengal.
Still, however, the situation of Clive, in itself one of
great difficulty, could not bear to be compromised by a
too early manifestation of hostile intentions against the
French settlement in Bengal. He could not but feel that
the Hawaii would not leave unavenged the expulsion of
his troops from Calcutta, and that he would not easily
pardon the raid against one of the principal stations of
his province. He could not shut his eyes to the possi¬
bility that the French, learning that war between the two
nations had been declared, might yet unite with the
Hawaii, and, by this union, not only baffle his designs on
themselves, but crush the attempt permanently to re-

* Orme. The account here given from the public records, communi-
of the fall of Chandernagore is based cated to the -writer by M. Derussat,
uponthehistoriesofOrmeandBroome, presentcbief oftheFrencb establish-
tbe journal of Dr. Ives, the official ments in Bengal,
report of M. Renault, and the extracts
454 CHAXDEBNAGOHE AND THE DEJKKA1T.

CHAP, occupy Calcutta. It was foot, therefore, the time to pub-

- X1, . lisli to his enemies all that he had in his heart. It was
1757. pjg parf; rather, under such circumstances, to temporise,
to watch carefully the course of events, and to suffer no
opportunity to. escape him.
The Nawab, meanwhile, furious at the loss of Calcutta
and the destruction of the town of Hooghly, hastily
assembled an army of 10,000 foot and 1.5,000 horse, and
marched to recover the retaken city of the English. He
sent at the same time to the French chief, M. Eenault,
and invited him in the most pressing terms to join with
him in crushing the nation that was as much the enemy
of the French as of himself.
Eenault, for his part, was in a situation of very great
perplexity. He too knew well that war had broken out,*
but it was a question, and a most difficult one, whether
with his 146 Europeans, of whom 45 were invalids, he
should aid the Hawab, or endeavour to arrange a treaty
of neutrality with the English. The former course would
lead, in the case of the Nawab’s failure, to the certain
capture of Chandernagore; he had, besides, received the
most positive orders from de Leyrit in no case to attack
the English. Would it not then, he argued, be a sounder
policy to endeavour to win from the fears of the English,
who bad then a great respect for the power of the Nawab,

* Professor H. H. Wilson conjec¬ things remained till the beginning of

tures that the French may not have January, 1757. Then M. Renault and
known that war had been declared. his council, burning that war had hem
His conjecture, however, is entirely declared between France and England,
unfounded. Through the courtesy of
M. Derussat, the present chief of the
French establishments in Bengal, we
r
fearing to he attacked and to lose the
e by means of the church and
parsonage which commanded it,
are able to present to our readers the assembled a council of war on Janu¬
translation of an extract from the ary 2, in which it was resolved and
registers of the proceedings of the decreed to begin the demolition of
‘Conseil de Fabrique’ for 1757, which both on that very day, and that until
is decisive as to the fact that the the new house and the new church
French knew of the declaration of should he fit for use, they would,’
war on January 2, 1767, the date &c. &e. There cannot then he the
on which it was first known to the shadow of a doubt ihat the French
English. The minutes of the pro¬ knew of the declaration of war on
ceedings run as follows : ‘Thus January 2, 1757.
 HE ACCEDES TO RENAULT'S PROPOSAL. 455

and greatly dreaded his junction with the French, the ghap.
neutrality which should place Chandernagore beyond the .—
reach of danger? After much deliberation, feeling keenly 1757-
the loss of the opportunity which the indolence and want
of enterprise on the part of de Leyrit* compelled him to
forego, Benault sent a proposition for neutrality during
the European war to the Council in Calcutta.
To Clive and Watson, believing as they did that the
European troops at Chandernagore amounted to 300 men,
and that Law had nearly 100 at Ehssimbazar, this pro¬
position was like a messenger from Heaven. From their
previous experience in forcing their way up the river
Hooghly, they had been inclined to rate the soldiers of
the Nawab as infinitely superior, in fighting capabilities,
to the levies of Mahomed Ali and Chunda Sahib. They
knew that the Eawab, full of anger, was marching against
them, and they looked upon the result of a battle with
him alone as by no means certain. Were he to be re¬
inforced by the 300 French soldiers whom they believed
to be at Chandernagore, they would have but little hope
of success. Great, therefore, was their relief when they
received this message from Benault, proposing neutrality
during the war with Europe.
Instantly they acceded to it; the French Chief was even
requested to send deputies to Calcutta to arrange regard¬
ing the conditions. This was at once complied with. The
French deputies earner to Calcutta; the conditions were
discussed and agreed upon ; the treaty itself was written
out fan- and was ready for signature, when, instead of
signing it, Clive and Watson intimated their intention of
proceeding with their whole force for the reduction of the
settlement whose representatives they had been thus -
amusing. Events, in fact, had effaced from the minds of

* De Leyrit excused liimself his 61 Europeans, who did not leave

vaguely by asserting the difficulty of the ceded provinces till November or
sending reinforcements into Bengal December, arrived there in safety;
at a time when he expected the arri- why then could not 300 ?
val of an English fleet: yet Law with
456 chandernagore and the dekkan.

chap, the English commanders all fear of the Nawab, and had
. xl- . left them free to act as they wished.
1757. There can be no question, in fact, that Clive had ac¬
cepted the proposition of M. Kenault in the first instance,
solely because he saw in that a means of preventing .the
dreaded junction of the French with the Nawab. But,
on February 4, he attacked the army of the Nawab
before Calcutta, and inflicted upon it a blow that utterly
disheartened its leader; on the 9th he concluded with him
a treaty. Thus free from his principal enemy, the thought
came into his mind that such an opportunity for crushing
those French at Chandernagore would probably never
occur again; that it would be feeble policy to neglect it;
that there was yet time to do it, as notwithstanding that
he and they were mutually agreed upon the terms of the
treaty, the treaty itself had not been signed. There was
but one obstacle. He did not deem himself strong enough
to attack Chandernagore whilst there should yet remain a
chance of his being assailed by the Nawab. He there¬
fore, on various pretexts, detained the French deputies in
Calcutta, whilst he should endeavour to obtain the per¬
mission of the Nawab to attack their settlement.
The Nawab refused it. Nevertheless Fortune favoured
Clive. Satisfied by the Nawab’s refusal that an attack
upon Chandernagore would be too dangerous to attempt,
he prepared to sign the treaty. When, however, on the
point of so doing, he met with an unexpected scruple on
.the part of Admiral Watson, who declined to sign on the.
ground that the settlement of Chandernagore not being
an independent settlement, but under the orders of the
Pondichery authorities, the. treaty would require ratifica¬
tion at that city. The Calcutta Government, he argued,
was an independent Presidency. For it to agree to a
treaty with a dependent settlement was to agree to a
treaty liable to he upset. He therefore refused to sign.
Clive placed before him the only other alternative, that
of attacking Chandernagore. This, however, he refused
to attempt without the consent of the Nawab.
 RESOLVES TO ATTACK CHANDERNAGORE. . 457

But it” was written that Chandemagore was to fall. chap.

The veiy next day a messenger reached the Nawab with .—^—
the news that Ahmed Shah Abdalli had taken Delhi. 1757,
Seeing in his own mind the Afghans marching upon
Bengal, the terrified Nawab at once wrote to Clive offer¬
ing him 100,000 rupees a month if he would nfarch to
Ids assistance. Two days later a boat from Hidgellee
arrived off Calcutta with the intelligence, that three English
ships of war with three companies of infantry and one of
artillery were at its mouth, and that another, the ‘ Cum¬
berland,’ was off Balasore. These two items of intelligence
removed any apprehensions that Clive might have had
regarding an attack from the Nawab’s army; they ap¬
peared likewise to silence the scruples of Watson.* Was
it considered that in giving them this increased force, and
in paralysing for the time the movements of the Nawab,
the voice of Providence had spoken out too clearly to be
misunderstood ?
Meanwhile Benault, having heard from his agents the
acceptance of the terms of the treaty, had regarded the
matter as settled, and had ceased to disquiet himself as
to the possible movements of the English. His surprise
then may be imagined when his deputies, returning,
brought him, instead of a signed treaty, the terrible intel¬
ligence that the English fleet and army were on their way
to Chandemagore. However indignant he might have
felt, however much he may have reproached his superior
at Pondickery for exposing him to such a danger, Benault
yet prepared, on its approach, to meet it with courage
and vigour. Chandemagore possessed many capabilities
of defence. The square fort, called Fort d’Orleaus, situ¬
ated at an equal distance from either extremity of the

* We are aware that Watson based day from the Nawab, positively for-
his final acquiescence on a letter from bidding him to attach Chandema-
the Nawab, abounding in Oriental gore, whilst it revealed to him the
imagery, and which was interpreted real mind of the Nawab, did not
as a permission to act as he chose, stop his preparations.
But the receipt of a letter the next
458 CHANDERNAGOBE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap, town, immediately on the river bank, mounted ten 32-

—pounders ou each of its bastions. On the ramparts, at
1757‘ regular intervals between the bastions on the river and
southern faces, were 24-pounders; the south-western
curtain angle was covered by a ravelin, on which were
eight 32-pounders; whilst the flat terrace of the high
church within the fort, and which over-topped its walls,
had been converted into a battery and armed with six
guns. An outer ditch and glacis were being constructed,
though all the houses on the proposed glacis had not been
demolished at the time. Beyond this glacis, however,.
especially on the river and southern face, several batteries
had been thrown up, commanding all the approaches to
the fort. The garrison consisted, as we have said, of 146
European troops and BOO sepoys, but nearly 300 Euro¬
peans were collected from the inhabitants and sailors, and
were armed for the defence. Prominent among these
last was Captain de Yigne, the commander of one of the
French ships, to whom the defence of the bastions had
been consigned by Renault.
But it was not alone in their fortifications that the
French confided. Tile river Hooghly at Chandernagore
was not, even in those days, easily navigable by ships of
heavy burden. There was in fact but one practicable
channel, and this could be blocked up fey sunken ships.
Here, accordingly, Renault ordered several ships to be
sunk, about a hundred and fifty yards south of the fort,
and on this point the guns of one of the batteries outside
the fort were directed. In this operation an- artillery
officer named Terraneau co-operated.
The English force, numbering 700 Europeans and
1,500 natives, marched from Howrah on March 7, 150
artillery men with their guns following in boats, escorted
by Admiral Watson’s fleet* On the 14th, Clive came

x.-of— (The Salisbury/ 60 guns,

< The Kent/ 64 guns, Capt Speke; Knowler. and other smaller vei
(The Tiger/ 60 guns, Capt Latham;
 TEKRANEAU’S TEEACHEKY. 459

with his little force in sight of »Chandernagore. Avoid- chap.

ing the batteries in front of the western and southern ,—
faces, he took possession of the high road on its northern 1757-
side, and then changing direction towards the fort, occu¬
pied the houses on the north-west, the French skirmishers
retiring, as he approached, to a battery on the road com¬
manded by the north-west bastion. From the houses he
kept up all night a strong fire, which compelled the
French to evacuate the battery and retire within the fort.
The abandonment of this battery necessitated the aban¬
donment of all the' batteries, except those on the river
face. The following day the English strengthened their
position in the houses, suffering but little from the fire of
the fort. On the 16th, the guns were landed, and for the
next five days a mutual cannonade was kept up, on the
whole to the advantage of the garrison, the fire from
whose heavy guns told with tremendous effect on the
brick-built houses which the English had improvised as
batteries.
It was not however, Renault well knew, on the shore,
that the fate of Chandernagore was to be decided. Could
lie but beat off those powerful men of war, who were
making their way slowly and cautiously through the in¬
tricate channels of the Hooghly, he would care but little
for all the efforts of the English troops on the mainland,
lie could at least hope that the Nawab,—to whom he
had sent a pressing appeal for assistance, and part of
whose army was then marching towards the town of
Hooghly,—would speedily operate on their rear. Meau-
while, however, the English ships approached. On the
20th, they neared the place where the ships had been
sunk. This however did not stop them. The French
artilleryman, Terraneau, to whom we alluded as co¬
operating in this work, had in consequence of some
quarrel with Renault, deserted to the English, and had
sold them the secret that the channel had not been
entirely closed by the ships, but that there was way for a
460 CHANDERNAGOBE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap, passage round them.* This information proved to be

—correct. The task was then easy. On the morning of
1757• the 24th, the ‘ Tiger,’ having Admiral Pocock on board,
sailing up till opposite the ravelin, compelled its evacua¬
tion ; she then proceeded on and anchored opposite the
north-east bastion. Admiral Watson’s ship, the ‘ Kent,’
was not so fortunate. Assailed by a tremendous fire
from the south-east bastion when about to anchor oppo¬
site the ravelin, her captain was killed, and the ship,
drifting down, anchored, stern foremost, below the bastion.
One consequence was that the ‘ Salisbury ’ was unable to
come up, and could exercise but a slight influence on the
attack.
The Trench, by this time, had abandoned all their out¬
side batteries and were concentrated within the fort.
Here they were under the orders of de Vigne. But
with a limited garrison, many of them civilians, exposed '
for the first time to fire; having, too, to defend the land
face against Clive, whilst he returned the fire of the ships
from the river front, even his energy and courage were of
but little use. It very soon became apparent that resist¬
ance was hopeless. After defending the place with great
spirit f for three hours, and having lost 110 men, includ¬
ing the inhabitants, in killed and wounded, Eenault de¬
termined to surrender. The white flag was therefore

* It mM- not 1)6 generally known t Dr. Edward Ives, surgeon of

that this Terraneau sent a portion of Admiral Watson’s ship, and who was
the price of his treason to Franco, for present at the attach, writes thus in
the use of his father, who was poor his journal regarding the behaviour
and old. It reached the old man of the French:—1 It must he acknow-
safely, hut as soon as he learned the ledged that theFrench made a gallant
means by which it had been acquired, defence; for they stood to their guns
he refused to touch or to make use as long as they had any to fire. We
of it. This information is on record never could learn how many of their
at Chandernagore. The same story men were killed and wounded on the
is also related by the translator of the whole, though they confessed they
SSir Mvtakherin, who adds that, in had forty dead carried from the south-
despair at the style of his father’s east bastion. The north-east bastion
letter, Terraneau hanged himself at was also cleared of its defenders
his own door with his own handker- twice.’
chief.
 PALL CHAKDEBNAQOBE. 461

hoisted, the filing at once ceased, and at 8 p.m. conditions chap.

of capitulation were agreed upon. • •—~r—
. By these it was arranged that the chief of the settle- 1757‘
ment, his councillors and civil officers, should go where
they would, taking with them their effects; the Jesuits
were permitted to take away their chureh ornaments, but
the garrison remained prisoners of war. A few days
after, the party at Kassimbazar under the command of
Law, reinforced by some fifty of the garrison of Chander-
nagore, who had managed to escape when surrender was
no longer doubtful, retired to Bhagulpore. Thenceforth
they may be regarded rather as adventurers taking ser-.
vice under native princes than as an integral portion of
the French power in India. It will be sufficient only to
state that, to the last, Law remained true to his character
for feebleness; that he remained at Bhagulpore whilst
Plassy was being fought; that when a forward movement
after that battle would have saved Suraj-ood-dowlah, he
did not make it; and that, finally, he was taken prisoner
after the battle of Gyah in 1761, fighting gallantly it is
true, atoning to some extent by his personal valour for
his many faults as a general and a leader.
The capture of Ohandernagore was not less a seal to
French dominion in Bengal, than it was the starting-point
of British supremacy in that province. It was necessary
for the schemes of Olive. With the example he had had
before him of the constant warfare between the French
and English in the Carnatic, he dared not hesitate, when
he had the means in his power, and when the occasion
was propitious, to prevent for ever the possibility of simi-.
lar contests in Bengal. He crushed Ohandernagore, just
as, we believe, had Dupleix been at that settlement,
Dupleix uniting with the Nawab would have striven to
crush him. It was unfortunate for France that at such a
crisis her interests were so feebly appreciated, that her
representative at Pondichery possessed neither the fore¬
sight nor the energy to provide Ohandernagore against a.
462 CHANDERNAGORE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap, contingency that was aPvvays possible. The misfortune

XL . was fatal to her. Clive, freed from apprehension as to
1757. French rivalry, speedily overthrew the native powers in
the country, not pausing till he had completed the con-.
quest of the richest province of Hindostan; till, from
Calcutta to Allahabad, the law of the English ruler was
undisputed. Chandernagore, on the Contrary, received
her death-wound. Though restored to France, it has only
been that she might drag out an existence replete with
memories of former greatness; that she might witness,
powerless to prevent it, the exaltation and supremacy of
the nation with which, for eighty-one years, from 1676 to
1757, she had contested the trade of Bengal. This was
but one result of the policy of a nation which could
remove a Dupleix to replace him by a man who suc¬
ceeded too surely in infusing his timid and feeble spirit
into his subordinates.
1754. ' We left Bussy at Masulipatam, engaged in settling the
affairs of those four Circars, which the policy of Dupleix
and his own great ability had added to the districts
, previously ceded to the French. There he was, and
there he continued till the close of that year (1754).
Godeheu, after many hesitations, had resolved to walk in
the steps of Dupleix so far as to maintain Bussy and the
French contingent at Hydrabad. ‘ I feel,’ he said in a
letter to Moracin,* ‘ all*the necessity of not abandoning
Salabut Jung in the position in which he now is, and I
have, therefore, ordered M. de Bussy to rejoin him as
soon as possible.’ It was in consequence of these instruc¬
tions that Bussy, after settling the revenue administration
of the ceded districts, and seeing French authority en¬
forced from their most northern to their southern point,
returned to Salabut Jung, and resumed his old position at
his court.
* The narrative of Bussy’s achieve- official correspondence attached to the
raents in the Dekkan, from 1764 to memoir of Dupleix, and the Seir
1768, is based upon the histories of Mutcikherin.
Orme, Wilks, and Grant Duff, the
 EFFECT OF GODEHEU’S POLICY. „ 463

It very soon appeared, how'ever, that the "recall of chap.

Dupleix and the substitution in his place of one so im- .——•
bued with doctrinaire principles as was Godeheu, had 1764-
made a profound impression upon the Mahomedan nobles
in the Dekkan. To them, up to this point, the very name
of Dupleix had had a magic sound ; they had regarded
him with respect, with veneration, with a sort of dread.
He had combined in their eyes all the energy and daring
of the Northern race with the tact, the subtlety, the
management , of the Eastern. ' Eeeling that he was their
master, they yet had not chafed under the yoke. Affec¬
tion was mingled with their respect, and reverence with
their dread. The. Subadar himself had always addressed
and spoken of him as his uncle. By all he was regarded
as the leader who could not fail. And now, suddenly,
he was dismissed—dismissed too with every mark of ig¬
nominy—dismissed to be replaced by one who openly
declaimed against warlike enterprises, and declared that
the mission of the French nation in Hindostan was purely
commercial! This declaration sounded strange, indeed,
in the ears «of the proud nobles of the Dekkan,—the
descendants of the men who had followed Akbar, who
regarded commerce as the pursuit of an inferior race and
of inferior men. Little likely were they to consent to
remain subordinate for long to the representatives of such
a policy! When we recollect -too that with these ac¬
counts came also details of the triumphs of the English
both on the field and in negotiation, we shall be able to
understand how it was that a feeling of doubt arid dis¬
trust began to undermine the confidence and regard which
Bussy till then had known how to evoke towards himself
and his nation.
Nor was this feeling lessened by the communication 1755.
made by Bussy to the Subadar, almost immediately after
his return to Hydrabad in January, 1755, of the details
of the treaty concluded between Godeheu and Saunders
at the end of that month. In the course of an inteiview
464 CHANDEBNAGtOBE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap, granted foS the purpose? of hearing this communication,

XI- . the Subadar, instructed beforehand. by his advisers, in-
1755. veighed bitterly against the new policy that had been
inaugurated at Pondichery. ‘ Tour sovereign,’ said he,
‘ promised to support me against my enemies, to establish
my authority, and to make it respected. Of this you
yourself have given me assurances on which I have
always depended. Yet I now hear everywhere that it is
the King of England who specially concerns himself with
the affairs of India, even with those which affect me.’
Bussy endeavoured to put the best possible gloss upon
the proceedings of Godeheu. The Subadar and his mi¬
nisters heard him but without being convinced. They
were indignant that the fate of the Carnatic should have
been settled without reference to the Subadar, its liege
lord. ‘ You have put me,’ said Salabut Jung, 1 in the
balance against Mahomed Ali; you have allowed to be
placed at the head of one of my tributary provinces a
man‘whom I have never employed, who has always
rebelled against my authority. Nay more, if I were to
proceed to the Carnatic to drive him out of it, the Eng¬
lish would support him, and you, on account of this truce,
would hold back ; you, who are engaged to support me
on all occasions, would aid me neither against the Eng¬
lish nor against Mahomed Ah.’ The Subadar concluded
with these significant words—words the more significant
in that they were prophetic; in' that the necessity for the
ruler of the Dekkan to lean upon a stronger power,
clearly seen then, has been admitted by all his successors,
and has shaped the policy which has preserved to the
province they have governed a vitality and a force, such
as has rarely been witnessed when those conditions have
been neglected. ‘You know,’ he said, ‘ that the state of
my affairs necessarily demands the support of a European
power; on this condition I am able to govern; either
you must remain here, or I must enlist the English in my
interest. Are you disposed to render me the services
 EMBARRASSMENT OF BUSSV. 465

which you have rendered hitlferto ? I musf do you the chap.

justice to say that I am grateful for them; but it would . XL .
appear now that you have neither the power nor the 1755.
inclination.’
To these questions, the natural result of the impressions
produced on the native mind by the abnegation policy of
Godeheu, Bussy could only reply generally. He declared
that the French nation possessed the power, and would
ever be influenced by the ardent desire, to be of use to
him ; and that he would promise him beforehand that he
would be as much satisfied with the future services of
the French, as he had been with those he had so cordially
acknowledged. An opportunity soon presented itself to
Bussy of giving a practical indication of his sincerity,
endeavouring by these means to chase from the mind
of Salabut Jung the thoughts regarding the English to
which he had given utterance. As representative of the
Mogul, the Subadar of the Dekkan possessed, in theory,
feudal authority over all the countries south of the Yindya
range. This authority never embraced, and never was
intended to embrace, more than the right of levying
an annual tribute, the token of the supremacy of the Delhi
Emperor. Its execution, even its recognition, depended
solely on the power of coercion in the hands of the
Subadar. Thus, theoretically, the rights extended over
the Mahratta country; yet, so far from being exercised
in any of the territories occupied by them, that freebooting
people not only kept their own revenues to themselves,
but were in the habit of extorting one-fourth of the yearly
revenue due to the Mogul government from many villages
and districts in the Dekkan. Mysore was equally liable
in theory to the imposition, yet it was never acknowledged
or paid, except when the Subadar was able to enforce it.
For many years prior to the date at which we have arrived,
Mysore, aided by the Mahrattas, had been comparatively
strong, whilst the Dekkan, torn by internal factions and
foreign invasions, had been powerless for aggression. But
H H
466 CHANDERNAG011E AND THE DEKKAN.

CHAP, in 1755, Salabut Jung found himself undisputed master,

at peace with his neighbours, and with a body of French
1755. in his pay. Mysore, on the contrary, had sent all her
available forces to Trichinopoly, which her Eegent had
pledged herself to reduce. It was nothing to the Subadar
that the Mysoreans were also allied with the French;
Bussy was bound to support him in all his enterprises.
The opportunity likewise was too tempting to be foregone.
A. few days, therefore, after the interview we have recorded,
the Subadar intimated his plans to the French'leader,
adding that he should require his cooperation.
Bussy felt all the difficulty of the situation. To inarch
against the Mysorean? might be to dissolve their alliance
with the French; to augment immensely, by throwing
them into their hands, the influence of the English. To
refuse to march, would be to annihilate French influence
at Hydrabad, to impel the Subadar to summon the Eng¬
lish to his aid. But in this crisis, the tact and ability for
which Bussy had ever been remarkable did not fail him,
He entered with apparent heartiness into the scheme of
the Subadar, whilst he wrote at the same time to the Eegent
of Mysore, warning him of the danger, and advising him
to satisfy the claims urged against him. Meanwhile, the
army marched, Bussy, at the head of his 500 French, really
directing the operations.
Deo Eaj, brother of Hunderaj—the Eegent who was
conducting the operations of the Mysorean army before
Trichinopoly—would willingly have paid the tribute de¬
manded by Salabut Jung, but his treasury was empty, and
he was unable even to promise compliance. Trusting,
therefore, to the anticipated slowness of the movements
of the Mogul army, he despatched a messenger to his
brother before Trichinopoly, requesting him to take the
enemy in flank whilst they should be marching upon
• Seringapatam. The celerity of Bussy’s movements, how¬
ever, rendered such a manoeuvre impossible. His very
name struck terror into the Mysore soldiers, and disposed
them to regard opposition as hopeless. The only fort that
 THE SUBADAR MOVES OS' MYSORE. 467

did not at once open its gates to him, Kongul, lie stormed, chap.
Between that place and Seringapatam, a distance of fifty-
four miles, there was nothing to oppose his progress. He 1755.
rapidly traversed it, and appearing before Seringapatam
on the third day, summoned it to surrender'. It deserves
to be recorded, that throughout this march, rapid as it
was, he carefully guarded the interests of the Mysoreans,
protecting them as much as possible from plunder and
damage ; the main object he had in view being to
paralyse, by the celerity of his march, all chance of oppo¬
sition, and to bring the operations to a close with the
least possible delay.
An event happened soon after his arrival at Seringa¬
patam, which tended very much to bring about this
desirable result. The Peshwa, Ballajee Bajee Bao, had
not witnessed unmoved the Mahometan invasion of My¬
sore, but he had deemed it more advisable to endeavour
to share in the spoils of that country, rather than to send
his squadrons to be repulsed by the invincible Bussy.
He accordingly invaded Mysore from the side of Poona.
Ho sooner did intelligence of this invasion reach Deo Eaj,
than, to avoid the danger of being entirely swallowed up,
lie determined to agree to the demands of Salabut Jung.
After some discussion, it was arranged that the Eajah of
Mysore should - acknowledge himself a tributary of the
Mogul, through his agent, the Subadar of the Dekkan,
and that he should pay to that officer, as arrears of tribute,
fifty-two lakhs of rupees. Salabut Jung, on his side,
engaged to rid Mysore of its Mahratta invaders. To
carry out his part of the contract, his treasury being
empty, Deo Eaj was compelled to strip the Hindoo tem¬
ples of their ornaments, and to give up ah the jewels of
the royal family. Even then he collected but one-third
of the amount demanded; for the remainder tlie Subadar
was forced to accept bills* Bussy, on his side, persuaded

* These hills -were never paid; the mostly languished and died in prison,
hankers who were securities for them —Wilks,
 CHANDEEXAGOSE AND THE DEKK.AH.

chap. Ballajee to retire with the booty he had collected. The

. XL . army then quitted Seringapatam, in April, and returned
1755. to Hydrabad in the July following.
For the remainder of that year peace and quietness
reigned in the Dekkan. Whilst de Leyrit was occupied
in endeavouring to maintain in the manner we have de¬
scribed, and not wholly unsuccessfully, French influence in
the Carnatic, Moracin in the ceded districts, and Bussy at
Hydrabad, found their position easier than at the begin¬
ning of the year they had dared to anticipate. This was
no doubt owing to the success that had attended the
French arms against Mysore. In a letter* to Dupleix,
alluding to Bussy’s conduct on this occasion, de Leyrit
had written as follows :—1 The position of M. Bussy in
the Dekkan is as brilliant as ever. It may even be
affirmed that since the expedition to Mysore his influence
has increased. He escorted Salabut Jung into that
country, and he managed matters so well between him
and the Bajah of Mysore, who was also our ally, that even
whilst extorting fifty-two lakhs of rupees from the latter,
he satisfied both. He is even now in correspondence with
the Grand Vizier, and has lately received very flattering
letters from the Great Mogul.’ In the same letter may be
traced the determination of de Leyrit to have recourse to
any expedient rather than carry out the partition system
agreed to by Godeheu. Nevertheless, notwithstanding
this determination and these favourable reports, it soon
became evident that the recall of Dupleix, the triumph of
the English, as evinced by the installation of Mahomed
Ali as Nawab, and the policy of non-interference announced
by Godeheu, had been working with a fatal effect on the
minds of the proud Mahomedan chieftains of the Dekkan.
Of those who regarded the late occurrences as surely in¬
dicating the predominance of the English, the most
considerable was the Prime Minister, Shah Nawaz Khan,

Dated 10th October, 1755.

 ACUTENESS OE MORARI RAO. 469

a man who owed his elevation "to Bussy, and upon whom char '
Bussy believe^ he might surely counf. But this chieftain -_^—,
had another reason for his action. Like Syud Luskhur 1755.
before him, he had become jealous of the influence exer¬
cised by Bussy in the councils of his master; he could
not but see that in all important matters the wishes of the
French were consulted, their advantage was mainly
studied. In his quiet oriental manner he took care that
every transaction tending to bring out this feature should
come under the notice of the Subadal, nor were insinua¬
tions wanting as to the drift of all the public measures
proposed by the French statesman.
An opportunity soon offered which enabled him to 1756.
confirm in the mind of the Subadar the vague impressions
to which his insinuations had given birth. In the month
of February 1756, the Hydradad Government resolved to
send an expedition against the Nawab of Savanore, the
successor of one of the four Affghan chiefs who had con¬
spired against Nazir Jung at Gingee, and against Mozuffer
Jung at Kuddapah. This Nawab had steadily refused to .
acknowledge the supremacy of Salabut Jung, relying on
the friendship of the Mahrattas. At the same time Mo¬
ran Kao, the Mahratta, had occupied the state of Gooti,
and maintained it against his superior, the Peshwa, relying
upon the protection of Salabut Jung. But in 1756, the
Subadar and the Peshwa, being on good terms, resolved
each to renounce the protection of the dependents of the
other, and to compel them to submission to lawful au¬
thority. In accordance with these views, the armies of
both nations, Bussy accompanying the Subadar, moved
against Savanore.
Morari Kao showed on this occasion that he united to
the capacity of a warrior the spirit of a statesman. Know¬
ing that an attack on Gooti would inevitably follow the
reduction of Savanore, he resolved to make common cause
with the Nawab, and to defend his own possessions behind
the walls of the chief city of his Mahomedan ally. He
470 CHANDERNAGOKE AND.THE DEKKAN.

chap, accordingly threw himself1 into Savanore. But he no

. XI' . sooner beheld Bussy. and his French, backed up by the
1756. army of Salabut Jung, with that of the Peshwa ready to
follow, than he recognised the futility of resistance.
Having made his own terms with the Hawab, he secretly
opened negotiations with Bussy. It happened that for his
services before Trichinopoly he had received from the
French authorities a bond which the policy of Godelieu
had deprived them of the power of redeeming. In his
communication to Bussy, he now proposed to give up
this bond, on condition that Bussy would use his good
offices to obtain for him from the Peshwa the cession in
perpetuity of the district of Gooti, in subordination, how¬
ever, to the chief of the Mahrattas—the Nawab of Sava¬
nore at the same time acknowledging the supremacy of'
the Subadar. Bussy, who had received from Salabut
Jung full powers to treat, accepted these conditions, and
did effectually carry them out—he, according to the
secret agreement, receiving back the French bond. It
was impossible, however, to keep such an arrangement
long concealed from the watchful enemies of the French
leader. The transaction had scarcely been concluded,
before all the details connected with it were in the pos¬
session of Shah Nawaz Khan. The Dewaninstantly commu¬
nicated them to Salabut Jung ; he painted in its blackest
colours the ‘ crime ’ committed by Bussy; pointed out
that he had deprived the Nawab of the treasures which
the capture of Savanore would have gained for him,
merely to put this bond into his own pocket; called
. attention to the fact that notwithstanding that a French¬
man had been appointed Nawab of the Carnatic, no rents
had been received from the French ; he intimated that
now was the time for their expulsion, now, when he was
at peace with the Mahrattas, when Ballajee himself would
support him in his action, now, when Bussy was on the
borders of the Mahratta country, cut off from the ceded
provinces, from Hydrabad, and Pondichery. All these
 BUSSY DISMISSED. 471

arguments, artfully inflamed,, and supported by a large. chap.

party amongst the nobility, so worked upon the feeble •—H—
mind of Salabut Jung, that he was at last prevailed upon 1756.
to sign an order dismissing Bussy and his corps from his
service, and directing them to quit his territories without
delay: to this was added a proviso, not intended to be
kept, that they should not be molested on their way,
except in case of then’ commencing hostilities.
The blow once struck, Shah Nawaz prepared to follow
it up effectually. He instantly despatched a special mes¬
senger to the Madras Government, giving full details of
the operation, and requesting that the English would at
once send a body of troops to aid in the expulsion of the
French; to the Peshwa the proposition was of a different
nature—he suggested the assassination of Bussy.
Both these applications failed, though from different
causes. The English, who had nothing more at heart than
the expulsion of the French from the JDekkan, who, in the
early part of this very year, had sent a force to the Bombay
coast with the hope that it would be employed with
Ballajee against the Subadar, received, indeed, the ap¬
plication of Salabut Jung and his Minister with extra¬
ordinary pleasure, and at once transmitted to him a most
favourable reply. A force of 300 Europeans and 1,500
sepoys was ordered into the field; it was .on the point
even of setting out, when there arrived from Bengal that
disastrous intelligence of the capture of Calcutta, which
compelled them to send every available man in that
direction. From the English, therefore, Shah Nawaz
received no aid.
Nor was he more successful with the Peshwa. Ballajee,
indeed, received the project for assassination with disdain;
but he did not the less, for his own secret ends, encourage
Shah Nawaz to procure the dismissal of Bussy. He felt,
in fact, that as long as the Subadar should have in his
service a leader so capable and troops so brave and disci¬
plined, so ^ng would the Dekkan be proof against the
472 CHANDERNAGOEE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap, ambitious designs lie had farmed upon it. He was anxious,
. XI- . therefore, not only that the Subadar should dismiss Bussy,
1756. but that, the dismissal having been effected, he might
secure his services for himself. He, therefore, urged on
the Subadar up to the point of dismissal, but aided him
no further.
The conduct of Bussy on receiving this abrupt and
contemptuous dismissal from the service of the Subadar
deserves to be studied and admired,. Of all the courses
open to him, he chose the wisest and most prudent, that
which marked him as a man who knew thoroughly how
to keep all his passions under efficient control. He was
, well aware of his own strength. He knew that with the
600 European infantry, 200 European cavalry, and the
5,000 drilled sepoys of whom his force was composed, he
could bid defiance to all the efforts of the Subadar; that'
he could force him to dismiss from his service, and sub¬
mit to condign punishment, all those who had plotted
against him; he knew that it needed but the faintest
whisper to Ballajee to pour a Mahratta army into the
Dekkan. But lie was guided by other considerations than
by a mere desire for vengeance, or by an anxiety to re¬
place himself by force. He could not forget, in fact, that
his position at Hydrabad had been the consequence of the
earnest requests of the Subadar ; that he .had thus ever
been regarded, at least by the outer world, as conferring
a favour by his stay ; he could not forget that, though he
•might forcibly reinstate himself, the very resort to force
would entirely change his position : that from being the
invited protector, he would become the hated subjugator ;
nor that, sooner or later, under such circumstances, his
fall would become inevitable. He knew, on the other
hand, the facile disposition of the Subadar; lie knew that
he was acting merely from the influence of others; that
in a little time he would feel the want of the counsels to
which he was accustomed, the worthlessness of his new
advisers. Under these circumstances he felt that it was
 HE SETS OUT FOR HYDERABAD. 473

his policy to act, as he had ever before acted, as the .chap.

faithful servant of the Subadar; to obey his orders and -—
instructions, leaving it to time to bring about that change 1756.
which he distinctly saw looming in the future. Fo sooner
then had he received the order dismissing him, than he
prepared to march to Hydrabad, there to await the course
of events.
No sooner had he set out (the 25th May), than he re*
ceived a messenger from Ballajee, conveying his congratu¬
lations on having quitted ‘ so perfidious and ungrateful *
a nation as the Moguls,' and offering him at his own court
the same position, the same emoluments, and the same
allowances to his troops that had been granted at the court
of the Subadar. But Bussy knew well the difference
between acting as auxiliary to an able and capable leader,
the head of the rising power of India, and being the
moving spring of all public matters in the Dekkan: to
have accepted it would have been to isolate himself from
his own people at Pondichery, and to throw the Subadar
definitively into the hands of the English. Pleading, there¬
fore, the necessity of first obtaining orders from Pondi¬
chery, Bussy, though with many expressions of friend¬
ship and good-will, declined the proffered alliance and
continued his march. Ballajee, however, to ingratiate
himself still more with one whpm he so highly honoured,
knowing too the hopes and intentions of Shah Nawaz
Khan, despatched 6,000 horse under the command of
one of the greatest of the Mahratta leaders, Mulhar Rao
Holkar, to escort the Preach troops until they should be
out of reach of pursuit on the part of the Subadar. In
this, doubtless, he had a double object, for any attack made
on the French whilst Mulhar Rao should be with them,
would give him just grounds for interfering in the affairs
of the Dekkan, and he would then find himself fighting
side by side with the. French.

* Orme, who nys, ‘ these were Iris expressions.’

474 CHANDERNAGORE AND IE DEK.KAN.

chap. But Bussy was not to be entrapped into hostilities. He

- X1, . accepted the escoi't, but at the end of eight days he dis-
1756. missed it with many presents and protestations of regard.
Scarcely, however, had the intelligence of this occur¬
rence reached the camp of the Subadar, than Shah Nawaz,
who, from the fear of embroiling himself with the
Mahrattas, Ij^d hitherto restrained his longing desires,
despatched 25,000 men, under the command of one of
his best generals, Meer Jaffier Ah, with orders to attack,
and destroy the French. Instructions were, at the same
time, expedited to all the governors and officers of the
provinces to obstruct in every possible manner the retreat
of the French; to hover around them; to remove all
supplies from their path : to make, in fact, their march
through the disturbed country, with an enemy hanging on
their rear, absolutely impossible.
The position of Bussy had thus become both difficult
and dangerous. From the south-Vest extremity of the
Dekkan, he had to make his way to Hydrabad in its
centre, thence, possibly, to the ceded districts on the
western coast; this too, through a hostile population, in a
difficult country, with the Kistna to cross, and pursued by
a large army! He was not, however, appalled by any
one of these considerations. His great object was to
push on so as to reach tjie Kistna whilst it should be
fordable. He did not doubt then that he would gain
Hydrabad.
Fortune favoured him, as she always does favour those
who are bold, self-reliant, and courageous. Arriving on
• the banks of the Kistna, though after many skirmishes
with the levies that sprung up on the order of the Minister
all around him, he found that the rains, though threaten¬
ing, had not fallen, and that the river was fordable. No
sooner, however, had he crossed it than the waters com¬
menced to swell, and for fifteen days imposed an impas¬
sable barrier between himself and his pursuers. At ease
regarding his men he marched them leisurely to Hydrabad.
 HIS PRUDENT MEASURES. 475

There he resolved to make a stand. Policy counselled no chap.

further retreat. At Kydrabad, he was in the centre of •—.—
the kingdom, at no impossible distance from Pondichery, 1756-
within easy communication with Masulipatam; to have
retreated to that place would have been to abandon the
Dekkan. Time also was with him; for he could not
doubt that the Subadar, a man of a fearful and timid
nature, surrounded by men whom he distrusted, would
soon feel the want of that firm support that had never
failed him in the time of need. Urged by these varying
considerations, he resolved to await at Hydrabad the
reinforcements which, he doubted not, would be sent him
from Pondichery. As, however, the city was in itself too
extensive to be defended by so small a force, he took post
in the viceregal garden of Char Mahal, a walled enclosure
about 500 yards square in the north-west angle of the
town, on the banks of the river Moussi. This garden
contained buildings capable of lodging his soldiers, it had
a tank in its centre, and Bussy had well supplied it with
provisions. It is a signal proof of the influence he pos¬
sessed 'with the natives of the city, that, before even lie
entered it, when the Governor had notified everywhere
his hostility to the French, and when it u7as known he
was being hunted out of the province by order of the
Subadar, he Avas able to raise from the native bankers, on
his own credit, a sufficient sum to settle the arrears of his
army, and even to have a supply in hand. It deserves to
be noted, that upon his sepoys, even thus early, he found
he could place little dependence, for they began, after his
arrival at Hydrabad, to desert him in great numbers.
Bussy, nevertheless, remained in the open plain near the
city, continually skirmishing with the enemy, whose
detachments arrived fifteen days after him, till he
had completed his arrangements regarding the Char
Mahal. He then moved into it, but slightly molested, on
July 5.
Four days after his entry into the Char Mahal, Jaffier
476 CHANDEENAGOKE AND THE 5KKAN.

CHAP. All and the bulk of his army arrived, and for the following
XL . five weeks Bussy was exposed to their incessant attacks.
175g. His sepoys almost entirely abandoned him. Shah Nawaz
TChnn had hired a native soldier of fortune, one Murzuffer
Beg—who in previous campaigns had commanded the
sepoys under Bussy, and who had obtained over them very
great influence—to debauch them from their allegiance.
He succeeded only too well; on the occasion of every
sortie, whole bodies of them went over to the enemy. Their
conduct at length determined Bussy, notwithstanding that
he had gained several brilliant successes in the field, to
confine himself to the defence of the garden.
Meanwhile, intelligence of some of these events had
reached de Leyrit at Pondichery and Moracin at Masuli-
patam. The action of both of these officers was prompt
and energetic. De Leyrit at once detached 320 Europeans,
400 sepoys, and six field-pieces in the ship ‘ Favourite ’ to
Masulipatam. But before they could arrive Moracin had
collected the scattered garrisons of the ceded districts,
amounting in all to 160 Europeans and 700 sepoys, and
placing them under the orders of M. Law, had directed
him to force his way to Hyclrabad, there to effect a junc¬
tion with BusSy.
This was the same Law* whom we met, six years
earlier, combating against Clive and Lawrence before Tri-
chinopoly, and forced, through his own bad generalship
and incapacity, to.yield himself and his force prisoners of
war. Exchanged in due course by the English, Law was
at once placed under arrest for his conduct pending orders
from Prance ; but he was ultimately released, though with
the intention of not employing him again in important
military commands. On the arrival of Godeheu, he had
been sent into the Dekkan to act under the orders of
Bussy, who, on his own departure for Savanore with the
Subadar, had sent him to Moracin. It thus strangely
* The reader ivill observe that the prior to that on which Law sur-
events here recorded are of a date rendered at Gvah.— Vide p.'101.
 MARCHES TO RELIEVE HIM. 477

happened that the measures which had been taken to chap.

prevent his being employed in command, were the actual —L—
cause of his being placed at the head of so important an 1756-
expedition as the relief of Bussy.
Law set out from Masulipatam at the head of his
160 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and five guns, on July 16,
and reached Beizwarra, a town on the north bank of the
Kist.ua, on the 20th. The excessive rains and the inunda¬
tions of the Kistna fortunately detained him here several
days, for, meanwhile, the ‘Favourite’ had arrived at Masu¬
lipatam, and the troops she brought with her, under the
command of 1VI. d’Arambure, a most capable officer, were
able to join him before he was in a position to move
forwards. Law, as the senior officer, at once assumed
command of the whole party, and leaving Beizwarra on
the 3rd, arrived on the 10th at Mognapara, about fifty-
two miles from Hydrabad.
TJp to this point Law had met with no enemies. But
his troubles were only now to commence. Salabut Jung
himself had reached Hydrabad on August 1st, and it
Avas believed by the French in the Char Mahal that his
arrival would be celebrated by an attempt to storm their
position. Wiser counsels, however, prevailed near the
Subadar; and it was resolved, instead of storming the
place, to adopt the surer plan of intercepting and destroy¬
ing the party marching to the relief of Bussy. This, it
was believed, would render his destruction inevitable.
Under ordinary circumstances, due consideration being
had to the character of the officer commanding the re¬
lieving party, this might have been quite possible; and
considerable credit is due to Shah Nawaz Khan for pre¬
ferring such a plan to the more showy scheme of an
assault upon the Char Mahal. But in dealing with Bussy
he had to do with a man who was not accustomed to be
foiled, and whose resources were inexhaustible. It must
not be supposed that when Shah Nawaz persuaded the
Subadar to dismiss Bussy, he was supported by the entire
478 CHANDEJRNAGOBE AXD.THE DEKKAX.

CHAP, voice of the nobility of Dekkan. He had, indeed, at the

XL . moment, from various causes, a considerable party at his
1756. back, probably a numerical majority, but there were
many, some of them very considerable men, who had
remained thorough partisans of the French connexion.
These were unable at the time to show their sentiments
in any other manner than by communicating to Bussy all
that passed in the camp of the Subadar. But there were
others who were able to render him still greater service.
In the employ of Salabut Jung were two Mahratta chief¬
tains, tributaries bound to follow him in the field,
Bamckunder Jadow and Janojee Nimbalkur; they com¬
manded 6,000 horse, and, up to the time of which we are
writing, had been conspicuous for the efficiency and gal¬
lantry of their action. On one occasion, indeed, Janojee had
intercepted a corps of 600 Arabs and Abyssinians on their
way to join Bussy from Surat, and, killing fifty, had made
the rest prisoners. But with both these men Bussy had
come to an understanding. He arranged with them that
in the projected attack upon Law, they should only feign
to take a part, and they had promised to hang out dis¬
tinctive banners as an indication to the French leader
that from them he had nothing to fear. Due intimation
of this was at'once despatched to Law.
Meanwhile, that officer, ignorant as yet of the means
taken by Bussy to save him, had moved on the 11th from
Mognapara, and entered a country, hilly and wooded, full
of defiles, offering abundant opportunities to an enemy to
retard his progress. In advance were 400 sepoys, under
the command of Mahmood Khan; then came the main
body of the French, with the remainder of the sepoys in
the rear. After marching nine miles, some parties of the
enemy appeared on the road, upon which the 400 French
sepoys, who had been already corrupted by the intrigues
of Murzuffer Beg, went over to them in a body. The
French were immediately attacked by the enemy, who
harassed them by constant firing and desultory charges as
 HIS VACILLATION. 479

they threaded their way through the defile. At length, chap.

however, they came to an open plain, in which the French •——
drew up and halted for the night. The enemy, whose ' 1756.
powder had been damped by a heavy rain that had fallen,.
retreated to a little village at the foot of a hill. Before
daybreak, the French marched against this village, and,
though surrounded by the Mahratta cavalry, they pushed on
—the body of horsemen commanded by Janojee and Bam-
chunder acting against them only in appearance. Another
chieftain, however, not in league with Bussy, made a sweep
upon their cattle and baggage-carriage, and carried them
all off. This was a serious loss; nevertheless, as their
only hope lay in advancing, Law pushed on to the village,
and resting there all day, forced his way in the night to
Meliapore, through a very difficult country, every inch of
which he had to contest by the enemy. During the day
he received from Bussy the letter sent to inform him of
the arrangements made with the Mahratta chiefs. At
Meliapore, which was about seventeen miles from Hydra-
bad, he put up in a ruined mud-fort near the town.
Hitherto Law had shown an amount of dash and energy,
such as those who had studied his previous career would
not have given him credit for. So long as he was moving
on, the mere action of advancing, and the example set by
his lieutenant drArambure, sustained him. But he had
scarcely seen his men safely within the mud-fort of Melia¬
pore before the old Seringham spirit came over him.
Hot that his losses had been heavy, only two men. had
been killed and but three wounded; but they were all
exhausted by fatigue; the Mahratta cavalry had swept off
their bullocks, and their carriage had been rendered
nearly useless. The next march, too, was more difficult
than any of the former.* Law decided, therefore, to halt
where he was, till at least the men should have recovered
from their fatigue. It was not a wise resolve. ■ Asiatic

Orme, from whom tlie details of this march are mainly taken.
480 CHANDERXAGORE AND THE EKKAX.

chap, troops can bear anything but the onward march of

Europeans, that at once unnerves them ; but let the
1756. Europeans halt, and the power of the Asiatic is increased
by one-half—let the Europeans falter or show a disposi¬
tion to retire, then, man for man, the Asiatic is his equal.
The greatest European generals who have served in India
have succeeded because they understood this—because
they never hesitated to act upon it. Law, who was not a
great general, neither understood nor conformed to it.
Law halted. With that halt, the clangers of his position,
on which, in action, his mind would have had no time to
dwell, became exaggerated tenfold to his mental vision.
He began by degrees to lose sight of the great end for
which he had set out from Masulipatam. His mind fell
gradually under the conviction that it was for Bussy to
relieve him, not for him to relieve Bussy. Ilis situation
assumed the most deplorable hues; all’appeared lost.
The other officers caught the infection from their leader;
and, in a council of war, it was resolved to send a letter
to Bussy, intimating the impossibility of further advance.
Bussy received this letter on the night of the 12th of
August, on his return from a successful night attack on
the enemy’s camp, made solely by his Europeans. It
perplexed him exceedingly; but knowing that the detach¬
ment was strong enough to force its way to Hydrabad,
'neutralised as had been the opposition of two of the
Mahratta chieftains, he sent Law a despatch, conveying,
‘ in the name of the King,’ a categorical order to march
forward at once and under all circumstances. At the
same time, to paralyse' any further movement on the part
of the enemy, he marched out of the Char Mahal at the
head of 150 Europeans and 800 sepoys, crossed the bridge
over the Moussi, and pitching his own tent, known to
every one in the Dekkan, on the other side, encamped
there.
This single act on the part of Bussy showed not less
courage and daring than a profound and intimate know-
 481

ledge of the native character.”' He knew the impression- chap.

able minds, the light and credulous nature, of the people •—L—
of the Dekkan. He knew that the fact of his tent being 1756.
pitched outside the Char Mahal would of itself be sufficient
to magnify tenfold the number of men by whom he was
accompanied; that it would keep the entire force of the
enemy on the qiti vine, expecting an attack, not daring
to make one. He knew that it would have the effect of
preventing a single man being sent to reinforce the party
that had been detached against Law. The result proved
the clearness and excellence of his judgment. Hot only
did Shah Hawaz Khan make every preparation against
attack, but he even recalled the troops that he had de¬
tached the previous day to assist in the destruction of
Law.
Meanwhile, that leader, on receiving Bussy’s letter, had
given the order to march. At 9 o’clock on the evening
of the 14th, he set out, leading the advance himself;
leaving the rear, the post of honour, to d’Arambure.
The country between Meliapore and the little river Cin-
goram consisted of a long and difficult defile of four
miles in length, which, during their four days’ rest at
Meliapore, the enemy had considerably strengthened.
This defile led into a thick copse, between which and the
river the country was comparatively open; between the
river and the town of Hyatnuggur, a distance of six
miles, the country bore the same open character. Once
arrived at that place, nothing could prevent their effecting
a junction with Bussy.
During that long night the French laboured vigorously
to burst through the four miles of defile. In endeavour¬
ing to effect this movement, the brunt of the action fell
upon d’Arambure; for Kandagla, the Mahratta chieftain
who had not been gained over, entering the pass with his
cavalry and infantry, took every opportunity of harassing
and charging their rear-guard, whilst the party in advance,
482 CHANDEENAGOEE AND TIIE DEKKAN.

chap, slowly and with difficulty," surmounted the obstacles in

. XI' .' front of them. These obstacles consisted of felled trees,
1756. strong positions occupied by the enemy,. sharp turns in
the rock round which the guns had to be moved amid
a continued fire; so great were they, that when day
• dawned, the French had advanced but three miles.
There remained now only one mile more of the defile.
But with break of day the sfttacks of the enemy re¬
doubled in intensity. D’Arambure plied the two field-
pieces he had with him, no less than the small arms of
his Europeans, with unabated vigour, but the enemy rode
right up to the muzzle of his guns, and attacked with
unwonted daring. At last, as the sun rose, the French
emerged from the defile into the plain. Then, forming
up, they allowed a party of the Mahrattas to follow them,
but no sooner had these appeared in sufficient numbers,
than they opened out a heavy fire from all their pieces
in the direction of the mouth of the defile. This had the
effect of dispersing the greater part of the cavalry. Many,
however, rode round to gain the river before the French,
to dispute with them its passage. This little river runs in
a deep clift between two high banks, the further of which
was occupied by the enemy. It was necessary, therefore,
that Law should keep the. nearer bank in his own pos¬
session, till with a part of his men he should have driven
the enemy from the further. It was arranged, accordingly,
that whilst he crossed with the infantry, dArambure, with
all the guns, should at the same time cover his passage
and keep off the enemy, who were collecting in large
bodies in the rear. This service was performed by
d’Arambure with great skill and gallantry. From the
eastern bank of the river he maintained a simultaneous
fire on the enemy on the western bank, and on the enemy
behind him. Having thus ensured Law’s safe passage, he
crossed his guns, one by one, still keeping up a fire on
the enemy; the guns as. they crossed being placed in
position on the other side to cover his final movement.
 ARRIVES AT HTDHABAD. 483

In this manner he effected the passage in safety, the chap.

Mahrattas never daring to come very near him. >—
The river crossed, the way was comparatively easy. 1756.
Hydrabad was in view, and the sight cheered the hearts
of the tired soldiers. Though surrounded and harassed,
they pushed on, favoured considerably by the merely
feigned action of Janojee and Ramchunder. It was not,
however, till 5 p.ar. that they reached the town of Hyat-
nuggur, having thus marched twenty-two hours without
intermission, overcoming obstacles which alone were most
difficult, but which were increased tenfold by the unceas¬
ing attacks of the enemy. Their losses had not been .
light: 25 Europeans, two of them officers, had been
killed, 65 wounded; the sepoys, who were more in num¬
ber, had likewise suffered more. Of the enemy it was
calculated that upwards of 2,000 were killed: no wonder,
when we find that the Trench fired 40,000 musket cart¬
ridges, besides them field-pieces.*
Four hours later, Bussy heard of the arrival of the
detachment at Hyatnuggur. He at once sent out a party
he had before organised, consisting of 140 Europeans,
1,000 sepoys, with a large proportion of carriage for the
sick and wounded, and with provisions, to bring them in.
To prevent any attack being made upon this party, he
availed himself of the opportunity to beat up the Subaclar’s ■
camp with his remaining forces. Everything turned out
as he had wished, and at ten o’clock the next morning
Law’s detachment entered Hydrabad, without having seen
an enemy between that place and Hyatnuggur.
The arrival, an hour later, of a messenger from the
Subadar with proposals for an accommodation, showed
Bussy that he had not ventured in too sanguine a spirit
to maintain his post at Hydrabad. He felt again, as he
had felt before, at Aurungabad in 1753, that he was
absolute master of the situation. Again, too, he evinced

* Orme. Vide also the 'Seir Mutaldierin.’

484 CHANDERNAGORE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap. Ms unsurpassed tact and" judgment, in not insisting too

. XL . strongly on concessions, which Ms position as master
1756. would have enabled him to enforce. He wished to return
to his post on the invitation of the Subadar, to efface by
his own dutiful conduct every recollection of the past
three months; that alone excepted which fixed in the
mind of the Subadar the conviction of French invincibility,
of the absolute necessity of their presence as supporters
of the viceregal throne. He therefore imposed no terms
beyond the abandonment of Murzuffer Beg and the de¬
serter Mahmood Khan; he did not even stipulate for the
removal of Shah Nawaz Khan; he himself was to be
received only in his former position, as the officer in the
Deklcan whose authority was second only to that of
Salabut Jung himself. On these conditions a reconcilia¬
tion was effected, and on August 20th, just three months
after Ms dismissal, Bussy was publicly reinstated by the
Subadar in all his titles, dignities, and honours.
Hever, perhaps, had any statesman been subjected in a
similar period to a harder trial. It is scarcely too much
to say that one false step would have ruined him. Yet,
however narrowly we may examine all the movements of
Bussy in this critical period, we shall be unable to detect
the faintest impress even of a turn in the wrong direction.
From the very first he did what was right, though ex¬
posed to numerous temptations to do what was wrong.
His refusal alike of the Mahratta alliance and the Mah-
ratta aid; his march on Hy drab ad; his determination to
wait there instead of moving on to the ceded provmces ;
his requests to the governments of Pondichery and
Masulipatam to order the reinforcements, not to cover
his retreat to the latter , place, but to meet him at Hydra-
bad; his positive order to Law to move on; his own choice
of the Char Mahal; the means he adopted to employ the
main army while Law should be approaching, Ms firm
consistency in refusing every offer to treat, except upon
the condition of absolute reinstatement—all these acts
 EFFECT OF HIS DISMISSAL. 485

stamp him as a general’and a- statesman of the very first .chap.

order. We can no longer wonder at his great influence, his -—
greater reputation; we cease to be surprised that his name 1756-
should have been invoked by all the principal opponents of
English progress in Bengal as the name of one who was
invincible, who would paralyse their onward march, and
at some unexpected moment hurl them into the sea. We
can but admire the tact, the judgment, the coolness, the
address, and the valour displayed, not in the heyday of
prosperity, but under circumstances most difficult and
most trying—not when he had leisure to deliberate, but
when the pressure of events was at its strongest, when
upon the decision of the moment depended glory or
shame.
Yet, successful as he was, triumphing as he did over dif¬
ficulties almost unexampled and dangers apparently over¬
whelming, it is impossible that a critical observer should
fail to remark the immense importance to England of the
events of those three months. When we recall to mind ,
that the English were at that very time preparing for the
re-conquest of Bengal; that their operations against
Calcutta did not have effect till the end of December,
nor against Chandernagore till the middle of the following
March ; that meanwhile Madras was denuded of troops,
and many of the strong places in the Presidency were
left to fall into the hands of the Erench ; that the news
of the declaration of war reached Pondichery in Novem¬
ber ; we can easily imagine • the effect which Bussy,
trusted by the Subadar and his court, secure of his
position at Hydrabad and in the ceded provinces, could
have produced either in Bengal or at Madras. There
would have been nothing to prevent him from co¬
operating with the Pondichery authorities against Madras
itself, or from moving rapidly with 800 or 1,000 veteran
Europeans through Orissa into Bengal. From making one
or other of these attempts he was prevented by this three
months’ campaign in the heart of the Dekkan, and by
 CHANDERNAGORE AND THE DESK AN.

chap, that alone. Though victorious in* that campaign,.his con-

. XL . fidential intercourse with the Subadar and his ties with
1756. the other chiefs had been, in the interval, rudely shaken;
and not only that, but the officials established by himself
in the ceded provinces, seized the opportunity to en¬
deavour to rid themselves of the rule of France, and to
establish their independence. Instead, therefore, of ope¬
rating against the chief possessions of the English, and
of crushing them in Bengal or at Madras, the events con¬
sequent upon his sudden dismissal from the service of the
Subadar compelled Bussy to forego' that grand opportunity,
in order to devote all his efforts to the re-establishment
of French power in the provinces ceded to Pondichery.
Who shall say then how much the English aim not in¬
debted to that abortive effect of Shah Nawaz Khan P
From the 26th August to the 16th November Bussy
continued at Hydrabad, interfering as little as possible
with the affairs of the Subadar, but engaged in arranging
for the prevention of the possibility of being subjected in
any future time to a similar danger. Having effected
this, so far as it was possible for him to effect it, he pro¬
ceeded on the last-mentioned date towards the ceded
provinces, at the head of 500 Europeans and 4,000 sepoys,
there to re-establish his authority. With the Subadar,
who was.about to proceed to Aurangabad, he left 200
Europeans and 500 sepoys under a trusted officer.
It is unnecessary to enter into minute details regarding
the successful march of Bussy throughout these provinces.
His principal object was to reward those who had re¬
mained faithful to the French in them hour of difficulty,
to punish the chiefs who had evinced disaffection or who
had rebelled. Nowhere, except at Bobilee, did he meet
with any real opposition. At this place, however—the
Bajah of which had a private quarrel with one of Bussy’s
most trusted feudatories—the resistance was so determined,
that the defenders stabbed their wives and children, and
then threw themselves on the bayonets of the French,
 RECONQUERS THE CIRCAES. 487

ratlier than surrender.' From these districts, by order,of ckap,

de Leyrit, he had despatched Law with 61 men into .—
Bengal, to strengthen the garrisons at Ohandernagore and 175G.
at Kassimbazar. It had been his own intention to follow
him as soojj as the pacification of the ceded districts had
been concluded. This, however, could not be brought 1757.
about until April; he was then preparing to set out, when
the fatal tidings reached him of the surrender of the
French settlement on the Hooghly.* Considering it too
late then to start upon such an expedition, he proceeded
to the reduction of the English factory of Yizagapatam.
This he accomplished, the garrison surrendering at dis¬
cretion on the 25th June. The English factories of
Madapollam, Bundermalanka, and Ingeram, situated on
the three arms of the Godavery, near its mouth, sur¬
rendered likewise to his detachments. Whilst thus en¬
gaged, however, the intrigues of Shah Nawaz Khan had
once more brought the affairs of the Dekkan to the verge
of a revolution. Intelligence of this reached Bussy at the
end of the year, just after he had completed the pacifica¬
tion of the ceded provinces, and forced him to set out,
without any delay, for Aurangabad. It will be necessary,
before we accompany him, to give a brief outline of the
events which' thus called him from his post. •
It will be recollected that the former Dewan, Syud
Luslikur Khan, had endeavoured to instil into the mind
of the Subadar suspicions of Bussy, and had persuaded
him to imprison his two brothers, thinking that the French
leader, interceding on their behalf, would convert these
suspicions into certainty. We have seen likewise how
the conduct of Bussy completely frustrated tins intrigue.
The confinement of the princes did not long follow the
fall of Syud Lushkur, for the Subadar, completely re-

* It is clear from this that hut for to Bengal in time to prevent the cap-
the three, months’ campaign, the ture of Ohandernagore by the English,
events of which we have recorded, The struggle for empire would then,
and their consequences in the ceded in all probability, have taken place
provinces, Bussy would have marched in Bengal.
488 IANDEHNAGOEE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap, assured as to Bussy, and'following his advice, almost

>. ...?,L_. immediately released them, giving them each a liberal
1757. income, but without any administrative or political power.
Thus they continued till the period of Bussy’s dismissal in
May 1756. Then it was that Shah Nawaz Khan, dread¬
ing the facile character of Salabut Juqg, and fearing that
he would recall the French, hoping more from the deter¬
mined character of the next brother, Nizam Ali, persuaded
the Subadar to confide to him the government of Berar,
and to Bussalut Jung, the younger, the government of the
province of Adoni. The possession of some power would
not fail, he knew, to induce them to aspire to more.
The success of Bussy at Hydrabad delayed for some
time the plans that Shah Nawaz had formed, but as the
French leader did not interfere after his own reinstatement
with the arrangements made by Salabut Jung regarding
his brothers, Shah Nawaz took advantage of the subse¬
quent march of Bussy to the ceded districts to renew them.
In the month of May following, affairs appeared to him
ripe for a movement. He took advantage, then, of the
death of his predecessor,* Syud Lushkur, to summon
the fortress of Dowlutabad, in which the treasures of
the deceased Minister, computed at nearly a million sterling,
and which of right reverted to the Subadar, were stated
to be concealed, and which the Governor refused to deliver
up. At the end of a month Dowlutabad surrendered, and
was immediately taken possession of by Shah Nawaz, the
office of Governor being bestowed upon a dependent of
his own. His object was to take an early opportunity of
confining the Subadar in Dowlutabad, of then proclaiming
Nizam Ali, and of expelling the French from the Dekkan.
The more effectually to carry out this plan he invoked
the assistance of the Mahrattas,f who, the better to aid
him, were to appear under their ordinary guise of enemies.
No sooner was it known that the Mahrattas under the
* Ma that the Peshwa himself designed
t Gri it probable the plot.
 AFFAIRS AT AURUN’GrABAD. 489

son of the Peshwa, Wiswas" Eao, were approaching chap.

Aurungabad, than Shah Nawaz, under the pretext of -—A—'
massing all the forces of the province to oppose him, 1757.
summoned Nizam Ali to that city.* Bussalut Jung had
preceded him. Immediately there was let loose a whole
network of intrigue, which, balancing now to one side now
to the other, ended in the investiture of Nizam Ali with
the administrative work of the province, the title of Sub-
adar only being left to Salabut Jung. Bussalut Jung was
at the same time appointed keeper of the great seal. So
entire was the transfer of power that but for the presence
of the 200 French troops, the life of Salabut Jung would
probably have been sacrificed ; certainly he would have
been effectually deprived of his liberty.
Such was the state of affairs when Bussy, marching 1758.
quickly from the ceded provinces, arrived at Aurungabad. Eebiuaoy,
Nizam Ali in command of the army, Bussalut Jung his
nominated Minister, Salabut Jung a cypher, Shah Nawaz
Khan in possession of the fortress of Dowlutabad—all
waiting for the movement which should deprive Salabut
Jung of even the shadow of power. It is curious to
notice how all these intrigues- were disconcerted by the
presence of Bussy. Having by a stratagem possessed
himself of Dowlutabad, he imposed his law upon the
brothers of'the Subadar. Bussalut Jung he proposed to
attach, as Ipnister, to the interests of Salabut Jung, Nizam
Ali to invest with the government of Hydrabad, where he
would be easily accessible to the French. All these ar¬
rangements had been concluded, when, on the eve of his
departure for Hydrabad, Nizam Ali enticed the Dewan of
M. Bussy, by name Hyder Jung, into his own tent, and
caused him to be assassinated. In the tumult that fol¬
lowed, Shah Nawaz Khan was killed, whilst Nizam Ali
fled for his life to Burhanpore, one hundred and fifty
miles north of Aurungabad.

December, 1757.
490 CHAKDERNAGOHE AND THE DEKKAN.

chap. The flight of Mzam Ali simplified the arrangements

XI- . that had been proposed, and which were in no other way
1758. altered than by his removal from the government of
May-, Hydrabad. An attempt, indeed, was made to pursue him,
but it was speedily countermanded, and Bussy, more
secure than ever in his position, prepared to accompany
the Subadar and his new Minister to Hydrabad. Here
. he arrived on July 15, and found waiting for him a letter
from the Count de Lally, dated June 13, ordering him to
repair at once to Arcot, leaving no French with the Sub¬
adar, and only so many in the ceded provinces as would
be sufficient to maintain them. He was instructed to
make over the command of these troops to M. de Conflatts,
an officer recently arrived from Europe, and who had but
just joined him on the march, and to bring with him
Moracin, who had hitherto* administered the affairs of
Masidipatam.
This letter was like a thunderbolt to Bussy as well as
to Salabut Jung. It called upon the former to renounce
at once the work of the past seven years and a half, to
give up the province to maintain which Dupleix had
not hesitated to risk the loss of the Carnatic, and
Bussy had devoted, to an extent bordering on the super¬
human, his never-tiring energies. He had however only
to obey.* But the Subadar, who had leant so long upon
Bussy, who had so recently experienced the advantage of
his alliance, could not but regard it as a fatal blow. ‘He
.took leave of Bussy,’ Writes Mr. Orme, ‘ with the utmost
despondency, called him the guardian angel of his life
and fortune, and foreboded the unhappy fate to which he

* In his reply, dated the 15th July, orders throw me into the greatest
Bussy -writes:—‘ I reply at once to perplexity, considering the fearful
the letter you have done me the situation in which I am, I proceed to
honour to write to me on the 13th execute them with the utmost promp-
June last, which I received yesterday titude.’ The remainder of his letter
evening at 9 o’clock. There is one is taken up in explaining the state of
thing, Sir, which I have always known affairs as they affected him and the
how to do "better than anything else 5 projected movement.—MSmoire pour
it is to obey; and although your Bussy,
 ORDERED TO JOIN LALLY.

should be exposed by his departure.’ But there was

no help for it. Bussy endeavoured, indeed, to cheer him
up by the promise of a return in which he himself, at the
time, really believed. Five days later, at the head of all
his troops, he set out, and reached Weyoor on the north
of the Kistna on August 3. Here having been joined by
Moracin, he made over the government of Masulipatam
to M. de Conflans, then turned for ever his back on the
provinces he had gained for France, to join, with 250
Europeans and 500 sepoys, the new commandef whose
exploits we purpose to record in our next chapter.
492 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

CHAPTEE XII.

THE LAST STRUGGLE EOR EMPIRE.

chap. The new commander, Thomas Arthur, Count de Tally

and Baron de Tollendal, upon whom the hopes of Trance
1758. in her struggle with England for supremacy in the East
now rested, was regarded at.the time of his appointment
as the most eminent and promising of all the younger
officers of the armies of Louis XY. The son of an Irish
exile, Sir Gerard O’Lally, who had entered the service of
France after the capture of Limerick in 1691, Lally,born
nine years later, had, from his earliest days, been initiated
in war. When a mere youth he had served under his
father at Gerona and Barcelona, and he was not yet
nineteen when he obtained the command of a company
in the regiment of Dillon, one of the regiments of the
Irish Brigade. During the French-Austrian war of 1734,
he distinguished himself greatly at Eehl and Philipsburg.
JSTor, when peace followed, did he sh6w himself less
capable of achieving diplomatic success. Sent into Kussia
to negotiate a secret alliance between France and that
country, he acquitted himself so well as to gain the favour
of the Czarina, though the timid policy of Cardinal Fleury
rendered his mission resultless. On the breaking out of
the war of the Succession, Tally served with distinction,
but it was at Fontenoy that he gained his spurs. To
him, it is said, was due the idea of that famous charge
on the flank of the English column, terribly galled by
the artillery in its front, which decided the day. Certain
it is that for his conduct on this occasion he was ap¬
pointed by Louis XY., on the field of battle, Colonel
 CHARACTER OF LALLY. 493

of the regiment of Dillon, and" that he was personally chap.

thanked by Marshal Saxe. Prom this time his reputa- •—tui¬
tion was made. Passing over to England after Fontenoy, 1758.
he exerted himself to the utmost to aid the cause of
Charles Edward, but, sent to the south after the battle of *
Falkirk, in which he had served on the Prince’s staff, he
was compelled, mainly in consequence of the despair
and denunciations that followed Culloden, to return to
France. He there rejoined the army in the Netherlands';
was present at Laffeldt, and at Bergen-op-Zoom, where
he was taken prisoner. He was, however, soon released,
and was rewarded by his Sovereign for his services in
that campaign -with the rank of Major-General.
The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle restored peace to Europe,
and deprived Dally of any further opportunity of dis¬
tinction on thb field of battle. He was nevertheless
regarded as a man destined to a brilliant career; as
certain to occupy a very prominent position, in the event
of future complications. He was looked upon as a man
with respect to whom ‘ it needed only that success should
be possible for him to succeed.’ Voltaire, who recorded
this opinion regarding him, added that he had worked
with him by the desire of the Minister for nearly a month,
and had ‘found in him a stubborn fierceness of soul,
accompanied by great gentleness of manners.’ . It is
beyond question that his reputation at this period was
very great, that his influence with the Ministry on
military questions was unbounded; that to him the
Government looked for suggestions as to the conduct
they should pursue in case of war.
When, seven years after the conclusion of the peace of
Aix-la-Ohapelle, complications of no ordinary character
ensued between France and England ; when, in reprisal
for French aggression in Canada, the English captured
two French merchantmen off Newfoundland, and persis¬
tently refused to restore them, it appeared to the French
Ministry that war was inevitable, Dally was, therefore,
494 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, called upon for liis opinion. His advice was charac-
teristic. ‘There are,’ he said, ‘three courses open to
1758. you: the first, to fit out a sufficient fleet and army, and
taking Charles Edward on board, to make a descent upon
England; the second, to chase the English out of Canada;
the third, to drive them out of India; but,’ he added,
‘whatever course you adopt, it is primarily necessary
that you should think and act at the same time.’ The
Erench Ministry did not at the time accept this advice,
but when, a year later, they saw three-fourths of their
merchant navy swept from the seas, they concluded
an alliance with Austria, Eussia, and' Sweden, and on
May 17, 1756, the King of France declared war against
England. Very soon after the issue of this declaration
of war, it was resolved to make a great effort to drive
the English from India, and Lally was appointed to the
command of the expedition destined for this purpose.
It had been originally intended that this expedition*
should consist of 3,000 men and three ships of war ; but
before it could set sail, it had become evident to the
Erench Ministry that the English, more ready and more
vigorous in action than they were, had appropriated to
themselves one of Lally’s plans, and were bent upon
making a great effort to drive the Erench out of Canada.
Almost at the last moment, therefore," they withdrew
from Lally one-third of the force intended to act under
him, and deprived him of two of Ms men-of-war. The
order for the diminution of his force would, however,
have arrived too late—for the expedition had already
sailed—but that Count d’Ache, who commanded the
fleet, insisted, against the advice of all his captains, on
returning to the port of Brest on account of some trifling
repairs he considered necessary for two of his vessels.
Whilst he w_as lying there, the order for the reduction
* The account of French India, and Moracin, upon those memoirs,
under Lally, is based upon the official upon the histories of Orme, ‘Wilks,
correspondence attached to the Me- and Broome, and upon the ‘ SeirMu-
muira of Lally, Bussy, de Leyrit, takherin,’
 HIS ASSOCIATES. 495

reached -him. It happened, therefore, that whilst one chap.

half the force, under Chevalier de Soupire, left D’Orient •—
■ on December 30, 1756, the other half, under Daily in 17o8>
person, was not able to sail till May 2 of the following
year.
Those who have accompanied us thus far in our history
of the attempts of the French to form an empire in India,
cannot fail to have been struck by the remarkable fact
of the incongruous character of the various leaders who
ought to have acted together. There is, perhaps, in the
entire story, no more striking example of this peculiarity
than that afforded-by Dally and his associates. He him¬
self was apparently a man of hasty temper, yet possessing
a ready mind, fertile in resources, and quick to appre¬
hend ; one who feared no responsibility, prompt in action,
a daring soldier, fully impressed with the conviction, that,
in Eastern warfare, he wins who strikes quickly and with
all his force ; he had too a proper idea of the point at
which his blows should be directed—the expulsion of the
English from the Coromandel. He was a man who, had
he enjoyed the advantage of some slight Indian training
and experience, would, have been invaluable as a leader
at Pondicliery; but, not having had that, and having
imbibed a supreme contempt for all who had acquired
that experience,-he was destined to fall into errors more
than sufficient to neutralise his other many shining qua¬
lities. The second in command, de Soupire, was a man
the very opposite of his chief. Indolent,, unenterprising,
and incapable, he was just the man to waste the time
which Dally would have employed, and to lose oppor¬
tunities which the other would have eagerly seized.
D’Ache was even worse. It is impossible to assert that
if the French armament which accompanied Dally had
been commanded by a Suffren, it might not have achieved
a temporary success. Suffren himself, some five and
twenty years later, did maintain on the seas the supe¬
riority which in 1758 would have enabled Dally to carry
496 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, out his designs on shoTfe" But d’Ache was the feeblest,
- the. weakest, the most nerveless of men; the very last
1758. officer to whom the command of a fleet should have
been intrusted, the most unfit man in the world to be
the colleague of Lally.
The Chevalier de Soupire, sailing with nearly a thousand
men of the regiment of Lorraine, 50 artillerymen, and
two millions of livres (about 80,OOOZ.) on December 30,
1756, anchored off Pondichery on September 9 of the
following year. He arrived at a moment, which, had he
been a man of action, might have been made decisive.
It was at the time when the English had retired from all
their conquests in Southern India—Trichinopoly, Arcot,
Chingleput and Conjeveram alone excepted; when
Madras was still unfortified; when Fort St. David, almost
in ruins, was garrisoned by but 60 invalids; when
Saubinet was retaking the places which his predecessors
had lost, unopposed by the English in the field, and
caring little for the undisciplined levies of Mahomed Ali.
It was just such a moment which Dupleix, or La Bour-
donnais, or Bussy, or Lally himself would have used to
the. complete expulsion of the British from the Carnatic.
For the French were not only masters on land: they
were, up to the end of the month of April of the follow¬
ing year, masters also at sea.
It is obvious that in this crisis the Government of
Pondichery should have directed the combined forces
of Saubinet and de Soupire to proceed against the
cardinal points of the English possessions—Fort St.
David and Fort St. George. The first would most cer-;
tainly have fallen without a blow, and its fall would
have so shaken English influence in the Carnatic that
it would not have been difficult—in fact, under an
efficient leader, it would have been easy—to strike a
decisive blow at Madras itself. For all the English
troops, except those actually necessary for purposes of
defence, had been despatched to assist Clive in Bengal,
 DE LEYEIX’S OPPOETUSITIES. 497

whilst the English fleet still remained in the waters of the chap.
Hooghly. “
But neither de Leyrit, nor de Soupire, nor Saubinet, !758.
was equal to the occasion. De Soupire indeed was a
stranger to the country, and being a man of weak and
facile character, he suffered himself to be guided by the
Governor. Saubinet was simply a brave soldier in the
field, and he too was entirely under the authority of de
Leyrit. At this important crisis, therefore, of the fortunes
of France, everything depended upon the decision arrived
at regarding military operations by the civil Governor,
a man sufficiently well-meaning, but utterly deficient in
those higher qualities which mark the practical statesman.
To de Leyrit, indeed, it occurred, as it occurred to all
around him, that in the advantageous position in which
he found himself, consequent upon the arrival of de
Soupire’s reinforcements,* an expedition against Fort St.
David presented the most tempting opportunity. But
other considerations crowded themselves at the same
time into his mind. He could not forget that Fprt St.
David had successfully resisted all the attacks made upon
it by Dupleix, and that the repulses received before that
place had given to the English the encouragement which
had enabled them gradually to attain a position of at least
equality in the •Carnatic. Then again, the reported cha¬
racter of Lally, described as haughty, imperious, violently
prejudiced against all Franco-Indians, influenced him not
a little. He could not foresee that Lally would be nearly
twelve months on his way; he did not even know that he
had put back; he believed, on the contrary, that he had
left France six weeks after de Soupire, and he thought
therefore that it might be regarded as presumptuous on
his part, and that it would certainly be rash, were he to
attempt any considerable object before the arrival of the

* Col. Lawrence, in Ms Memoirs, French) should remain inactive for

states that the English authorities so many months after the taking of
were ' surprised that they (the CHttaput.’
K K
498 THE LAST STRUGGLE POE EMPIRE.

chap. Commander-in-chief. A'third reason * likewise weighed

. x^1-. with him: he dreaded lest the English fleet in the Hooghly
1758. should at any moment bear down upon the Coromandel
coast and regain the superiority at sea. He could not
then know the great things to which the conquest of
Chandemagore had given birth in the heart of Clive.
Instead, therefore, of attempting to strike at either of
the vital points of the English position, de Leyrit resolved
to content himself with the reduction of the various forts
in the Carnatic, and with subjecting the country under
the influence of those forts to the sway of men devoted
to the Pondichery Government. In this view he joined
the soldiers of de Soupire' to Saubinet, and employed
them, in the interval between the arrival of the former
and the close of the year, in the capture of Trinomalee
and other places in the vicinity of Chittaput and Gingee.f
But from the beginning of the following year till the
arrival of Lally on April 28th, the precious moments
were frittered away in inactivity, in delusive negotiations
with Hyder Ali, or in abortive attempts to induce a rising
amongst the French prisoners in Trichinopoly.
Meanwhile d’Ache’s squadron had been slowly pursuing
its 'course. Throughout the whole voyage the Admiral
himself had never ceased to display his weakness and
folly, to show how utterly unfit he was for such a com¬
mand. He had picked up on the way a small English
merchant ship, and, to preserve this ship, which was not
worth 1,6001, he had not hesitated, despite the remon¬
strances and even the threats of Lally, to lie to every
night. More than that, arriving at Bio de Janeiro, he
actually remained sis weeks in port in order to dispose of
the cargo of that vessel, and to re-load her; to avoid the
Cape during the equinox, he steered for six weeks out of
his course; to avoid the second equinox he took the
longest course from the Isle of France to Pondichery.

t Chapter XI.
 d’aches dilatoriness. 499

So timid was he, that on the appearance of a sail in the chap.

daytime he altered his course by night, and took in Ms -—
sails whenever there was the smallest gust of wind. He 1758.
took a course, in fact, which—to use Mr. Orme’s graphic
expression—it would be useful to know, in order, to avoid
it. And this, whilst the English fleet was following in his
wake ; whilst the possession of India depended upon the
rapid movements of those ships whose course he was ;
thus hindering. If, indeed, there is one person than
another more responsible for the fatal result of Lally’s
expedition, that individual is undoubtedly Count d’Ache.
A little more haste on his part, the curtailment of the
delays with the merchant ship and of the long sojourn in
Rio de Janeiro, and Lally, with the cold weather before
him, with d’Achd’s squadron unopposed to' aid him, could
not have failed to capture both Port St. David and
Madras. He himself was sanguine that under such cir¬
cumstances he would have been able to expel the English
from Bengal.
At length, on April 28th, the fleet anchored oil Pondi-
chery, and Lally with some of his principal officers arrived.
Amongst these were the representatives of some of the
great aristocratic families of monarchical Prance. There
were under his command a ‘ d’Estaing, descended from
him who saved-the life of Philip Augustus at the battle of
Bovine, and who transmitted to Ms family the coat of
arms used by the Kings of Prance ; a Crillon, great-grand¬
son of Crillon, surnamed the brave, worthy of the love of
the great Henry IV. ; a Montmorency; a Conflans, of
ancient and illustrious family; a La Pare, and many others
of the first rank.’* Besides these there were Breteuil,
Verdiere, Landivisiau, and other officers of good family
and of the highest merit. A singular circumstance, which
occurred before the landing, did not fail to be regarded
by many, especially by the sailors, as of very evil omen.

* Voltaire’s Fragments.
500 THE LAST STRUGGLE POE EMPIRE.

chap. On the arrival of Lally in.the Pondichery roads becoming

known to the authorities of that city, it was directed that
1758. a salute should be fired in his honour. By accident—it
could hardly have been by design—some of the guns set
apart for firing the salute were loaded; by a greater
chance still, five shots fired struck the ‘Comte de Pro¬
vence,’ the vessel on board of which was Lally, three of
which went right through the hull and two damaged the
rigging. It was a strange greeting for the new Com¬
mander-in-chief, and gave him, it would appeal’, some
impression of the hostility he might expect to meet from
the authorities.
Lally had come out armed with very extensive powers.
He was appointed Commander-in-chief and Commissary
of the King for all French possessions in the East; he was
to command as well the inhabitants of Pondichery and the
other French settlements as the officers and clerks of the
Company ; ‘ likewise the governors, commanders, officers
of the land and sea forces of the Company who now are,
or who hereafter may be there, to preside in all the
Councils, as well superior and provincial, both those that
are already, and those that may be hereafter, without
making any innovation, however, in the settled order for
collecting the votes.’ All the governors, counsellors,
commanders, officers, soldiers, land and sea forces and all
servants of the Company, and all the inhabitants of the
French settlements, were directed to recognise Lally as
Commissary of the King and Commander-in-chief, ‘ and
to obey him in everything he may command, without any
contravention whatever.’'* It will thus be seen that Lally
in a way superseded de Leyrit, the latter, however, still
retaining the rank and position of Governor. This
position, combined with his local influence, and added to
the restriction relative to the votes, gave him, as Lally was
destined soon to discover, very considerable power.
* This order is dated December 81, 1766; signed by Louis XV., and
counter-signed by the Minister Machault.
 LALLY LAjST)S AT PONDICHERY. 501

Dally had sailed prepared toffind fault. Before he left chap.

France, the Directors had themselves placed in his hands .—
a memorandum, in which their principal officers on the 1758.
Coromandel coast, Bussy alone excepted, were painted in
the most unfavourable colours. But this was not all. It
had been likewise intimated to him, as well by the Direc¬
tors as by the Ministers of the Crown, that corruption
was rampant at Pondichery, and that they looked to him
to check it. He had been informed that the farming out’
of lands, the supply of artillery cattle, the provisioning of
the sepoys, the purchase and re-sale of goods drawn from
the magazines of the Company, and—the most important
of all—the conducting of treaties with native princes,
were matters which required thorough and searching in¬
vestigation, inasmuch as it was believed that they were
made the means of enriching private individuals to the
great. injury of the shareholders of the Company. To
such an extent had these points been pressed upon Ms
attention whilst in Paris; so incontestable apparently were
the proofs that had been placed before him—that Dally
had left France with the conscientious conviction on his
mind that he was coming out to uproot a nest of robbers
and extortioners. He had, he believed, a double mission
—to root out those robbers, and to throw the English
into the sea. •
He landed, as we have stated, with a few of his offi¬
cers, on April 28. He at once set himself to work to
inquire as to the condition of Madras and of Fort St.
David, regarding the fortifications of Cuddalore, and the
number of English troops on the coast of Coromandel.
To his surprise, de Leyrit could give him precise answers
to none of these questions ; nor could he even afford him
any definite information as to the route to Cuddalore or
the number o'f rivers to be crossed; he could only offer
guides. Dally, impatient for action, was not, however,
deterred by this ignorant and apparent want of interest
from following the policy, which, in his belief, ought to
502 LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

CHAP. have been attempted eight months earlier, but sent off,
XII.
that same evening, a detachment of 750 Europeans and
1758. some sepoys, under the command of the Count d’Estaing,
to Cuddalore, following himself the next day. Whilst
on his way to join, he learned to his mortification one of
the first results of the slowness and unfitness for command
of his naval colleague. Commodore Stevens, who had
left England three months after d’Ache had left France,
had, by pursuing a direct course, arrived at Madras five
weeks before d’Ache reached Pondichery. Uniting him¬
self there to Admiral Pocoek, who had returned from
Bengal on February 24, the two squadrons had sailed
from Madras on April 17 to intercept the French fleet,
and had come up with it at noon on April 28 off
Negapatam.
The English fleet consisted of seven ships of war*
ranging from fifty to sixty-six guns each. These ships,
all belonging to the Royal Navy, had just been placed in
the best condition possible for sea,f and were unencum¬
bered by troops. In this respect they had a consider¬
able advantage over the French squadron, -which had
arrived that very day after a long voyage, crowded with
soldiers, and but one of. the ships composing which
belonged to the Royal Navy of France. At the tune he
was seen by the English Admiral, dAche'J was standing
* These were: The Yarmouth 64 guns, Captain John Harrison
„ Elizabeth 64 „ „ Kempenfelt,
„ Cumberland 66 „ „ Brereton,
„ Weymouth 60 „ „ Vincent,
„ Tiger 60 „ „ Latham,
„ Newcastle 50 „ „ Legge,
„ Salisbury 50 „ „ Somerset,
* ’ ' to store ships.
-- -- 74 guns, of the Erench Navy.
” Ken AimS 68
„ Oonde 44
„ Saint Louis 60 pany of the Indies, and
„ Moras 44 built to serve, when re¬
„ Sylphide 36 quired, as men-of-war.
„ Due d’Orteans 60 „
„ DucdeBourgogneCO „ J
 SEA-PIGHT OFF NEGAPATAM. 503

up towards Pondichery from* Negapatam, seven of his chap.

ships being in line, and two cruising in the offing. The ■—bA—
English Admiral at once formed his line, between three 1758.
and four o’clock in the afternoon, bore down on the
‘Zodiaque,’ and, as soon as he came within half-musket
shot, made the signal to his captains for close action.
Meanwhile the ships of d’Acke’s squadron had opened a
hot fire on the approaching enemy, though without receiv¬
ing any in return. About four o’clock, however, the action
became general, the two admirals sailing close to, and
directing their fire at, one another. But the French ships
experienced in this sort of engagement all the disadvan¬
tage of want of regular training and of overcrowding.
Their fire was slow and badly directed, whilst the well-
aimed discharges of the English made terrible havoc on
their crowded decks. It is due, however, to d’Ache to
state that he fought his ship, the ‘ Zodiaque,’ with great
skill and gallantry, and it was only after the ‘ Sylphide,’
the ‘ Conde,’ the ‘ Due de Bourgogne,’ the ‘ Bien Aim A’
and the ‘ Moras,’ had been forced to quit the line, that
d’Aclid, with the remainder of the squadron, bore up to
follow them. Meanwhile the ‘ Comte de Provence ’* and
the ‘ Diligente ’ had come out from Pondichery to assist
the French. Towards them therefore d’Ache directed
his course, intending, with their aid, to renew the engage¬
ment. But the rigging of the English ships had been so
shattered by the ill-directed fire of the French, that
Admiral Pocock, anxious as he was to complete his
victory, was forced to renounce the pursuit, and to haul
down the signal for action. The French squadron, there¬
upon, with the exception of the' ‘ Bien Aime,’ which, by
the parting of her cable, was driven on shore, ran into
the roadstead of Alumparva, and five or six days later
reached Pondichery. The English Admiral bore up to
Madras to refit. „
Such was the intelligence that reached Dally on April 29,
* Carrying 74 guns, the Diligente, 24.
504 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, whilst on his way to join* the detachment he had sent

. XIL . towards Cuddalore, the previous evening, under Count
1758. d’Estaing. He was little, if at all, daunted by it, resolving
to atone, so far as was possible, for a defeat at sea, by
the celerity of his movements on land. The detachment
under d’Estaing, though misled by its guides, appeared
before Cuddalore on the 29th ; it was followed the next
day by a portion of the regiment de Lorraine and some
heavy guns: on May 1, Lally himself appeared before
the place, and summoned it to surrender.
To such an extent had the spirit of neglect and un¬
concern made way in the Pondichery Government since
the departure of Dupleix, that, although a year and more
had elapsed since it was known that war between France
and England had been declared ; although the question
of attacking Cuddalore and Fort St. David had, in that
interval, been considered by de Leyrit and his colleagues,
not one of them had taken the trouble to ascertain the
military condition of those places, or the provision, if any,
that had been made for defending them. Lally was
compelled, by this culpable indifference on the part of
the Franco-Indian authorities—strongly confirmatory as
it was in his mind of the character he had received of
them from their own Directors in Europe—to find out
everything through his own officers. Count d’Estaing,
who first appeared before Cuddalore, found it fortified on
three sides; he did not know, nor did anyone in the
force know, although the Pondichery authorities ought
to have known, that it was open .towards the sea. Lally,
on his arrival, was no better informed. He agreed there¬
fore to accept the capitulation offered by the garrison for
the third day, although had intimation been given him
of its defenceless state on the fourth side, he would pro¬
bably have forced its surrender at once.*

* Cuddalore was garrisoned ly SO lascais. Tire garrison was allowed

European infantry, 25 European ar¬ to retire to Port St. David.
tillerymen, 400 sepoys, and some
 DIFFICULTIES ESTCOUOTEEED ET LALLY.

Still, on May 4, Cuddalore' 'surrendered. With that

surrender began Lally’s first difficulties—none of them, it
is proper to observe, of Ms own creation. Surely he
had a right to expect that de Leyrit, who for eight
months had postponed the expedition against Fort St.
David on the main plea that it was proper to await the
arrival of the Commander-in-chief, would in the mean¬
while have taken the precaution to procure carriage Tor
movements he must have known to be inevitable. The
two finest regiments of the French army, still less the
most rising of all the generals in the French service, had
not come out to Pondichery, merely to sit there at their
ease. De Leyrit was well aware of this, yet up to the
hour of the landing of the new General he had not made
a single preparation. Although large sums were charged
in the Pondichery accounts, for carriage cattle, none were
available; there were no coolies, no means of transport,
not even guides. The difficulty was not so much felt in
the first march to Cuddalore, though even then Daily,
determined to move, and left entirely unaided by de
Leyrit, had not hesitated to impress the native inhabitants
of the town. It was when Cuddalore was taken, when
the siege of Fort St. David was imminent, when it had
become necessary for the army to sit down before that
place, dependent upon Pondichery for supplies, and for
the carriage of supplies, that the culpable indifference of
de Leyrit and his colleagues began to make itself keenly
felt.
Daily, seeing the utter impossibility of carrying on a
siege until he had first organised a system of supply,
aware also, in consequence of the presence of the victorious
English fleet at Madras, of the absolute necessity of
promptitude, returned, immediately after the taking of
Cuddalore, to Pondichery, with a view to rouse the
authorities there to a sense of their duties and of their
position, and to make, at all costs, proper arrangements
for supplies. At Pondichery, however, Dally found
50G THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, nought but apathy and -indifference. To every request

that he preferred he was answered by an ‘ impossible.’
1758. He did not find there, although he had sent 100,000
francs to make preparations, resources that were worth
100 pence.* It can scarcely be wondered at if Lally
attributed this conduct to something more than indo¬
lence or apathy. He says himself, in his Memoirs, that
he “6aw very clearly how ill-will lay at the bottom of it
all. It is little marvellous then, if he, ignorant of India,
knowing nothing of the distinction between castes, left
to himself by those who should have aided him, and
whose duty it was to have prevented this necessity,
should, rather than abandon his enterprise, have insisted
on a wholesale conscription of the native inhabitants to
carry the loads necessary for his army. True it is that
such a course was a blunder no less than a crime; true it
is that it would have been wiser far to have abandoned
his enterprise, to have re-embarked even for Europe,
than to adopt a line of action so repugnant to the feelings
and the ideas of the class without whose hearty coopera¬
tion nothing of permanent importance could be achieved;
but whilst we blame him for that, let us not forget the
wilful neglect of the Pondichery authorities, his own igno¬
rance of Indian customs, the grounds he had for dis¬
believing all the assertions of the Pranoo-Indians. He
was doubtless culpable, but they were ten thousand times
more so.
Some sort of a system having been established by these
unwise means, and by others, more legitimate, to which
the employment of these compelled de Leyrit and his col-

* The extent to which Lally felt money at your disposal in prepara-

this is shown hythe following extract tions for an enterprise of which you
of a letter he addressed, to de Leyrit, had had eight months’ warning. I
dated the 15th May, and which rifts sent you 100,000 francs of my money
thus:—‘ The Minister (at Paris) will to aid in the necessary expenses; I
find it difficult to believe that yon have not found on my arrival, re¬
awaited the disembarkation of the sources of 100 pence in your purse
troops on hoard the first vessel of our or in that of your Council.’— Official
squadron, before you employed the Correspondence in Lady's Memoirs.
 ATTACKS FORT ST. DAVID. 507

leagues to have recourse, Tally returned to Cuddalore, chap.

and on May 16 opened fire on Fort St. David. This fort -—
is situated at the southern angle of an island nearly three 1758.
quarters of a mile long and about half the breadth. On
two sides of that angle it was guarded by the river of
Tripopalore and the sea. On the third side it was pro¬
tected by four small masonry forts, nearly a quarter of a
mile from the covered way, each supporting the other.
It was necessary to take these before trenches could be
opened. The garrison of the fort consisted of 619 Euro¬
peans,* of whom 83 were pensioners, and of about 1,600 *
sepoys and lascars. The fortifications, especially those
of the two exterior forts, had been repaired and greatly
strengthened during the eight months that had intervened
between the arrival of de Soupire and the investment.
The troops under the command of Tally consisted of
1,600 Europeans and 600 natives of all arms.
The four forts already alluded to were the first objects
of Tally’s attack. These were stormed—notwithstanding
that the guns and mortars sent him from Ponclichery, and
on winch he depended for success, unaccountably failed
him—sword in hand, on the night of the 17th. On the
evening of the following day trenches were opened at a
distance of less than 400 yards from the glacis. From
this date to Jane 2 the siege continued, under great
difficulties on both sides. In the French camp there was
a scarcity of money, of provisions, of guns, of ammunition,
and of carriage ; the most angry letters passed between
Tally and de Teyrit, the one accusing and threatening,
the other constantly asserting that his resources were ex¬
hausted. In the fort, on the other hand, discipline was '
relaxed, desertions were frequent, and defence had be¬
come hopeless, unless it were from the English fleet.
Under these circumstances the feelings of Tally may be
imagined when on May 28th he received intimation that

Of these 250 • sailors.—Or me.

508 THE EAST STRUJGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, the English fleet had appeared before Ponclichery, making

apparently for Port St. David, whilst the French sailors
1758. had unanimously refused to embark on board their ships,
on the pretext that faith had not been kept with them
regarding their pay, and that d’Achd had thereupon an¬
nounced his intention to moor his ships in the roadstead
of Pondichery under the protection of the place.
However much Lally felt that his presence before Port
St. David was necessary for the carrying on of the siege,
this intelligence of the determination to yield the sea to
‘the English forced him to return at once to Pondichery,
taking with him 400 Europeans and 200 sepoys. Assem¬
bling, on arrival, a council, he ordered 60,000 francs to
be paid out of his own funds to the sailors, embarked
them and the 600 men he had brought with him on
board the ships of the fleet, and persuaded d’Ache to
proceed at once to sea. He then returned to his post be¬
fore Port St. David. The result corresponded to his anti¬
cipations. The French fleet, putting to sea, effectually
prevented any commuuication between the English Admi¬
ral and the besieged fort; the latter, thus left to itself,
and hardly pushed by Lally, capitulated on June 2, the
garrison surrendering as prisoners of war. The fortifica¬
tions were immediately razed to the ground.
Thus, in less than five weeks after Ms landing, had
Lally, notwithstanding difficulties unheard of and almost
inconceivable, certainly entirely unexpected, carried out
one part of Ms programme. He had driven the English
from one of their principal settlements—from that one in¬
deed which for a long time had remained their seat of
government, which had defied the efforts of Dupleix, and
whence Lawrence and Clive had sallied to baffle the
French arms at Trichinopoly. But he did not stop here.
The very day of the surrender, the Count d’Estaing was
detached to Devicotta, which the English garrison, count¬
ing only 30 Europeans and 600 sepoys, did not care to
defend, but abandoned on his approach. Whilst this ex-
 D’ACHE refuses to support him. 509

pedition was in course of progress, d’Achd landed at Fort cpffip-

St. David, and dined with. Lally, who seized the occasion >—.—
to open to him his new designs. Now was the time, he 1758'
said, to attack Madras. The place was unfortified, the
garrison weak, the Council discouraged by the capture of
Fort St. David. Let but d’Ache agree to act with him,
to take his army on board, and to land it either at Madras
itself or at least on the high land of Alumparva, already
occupied by the French, and success, he said, was certain.
But, to his chagrin, d’Ache refused him his support.
Acting in the same spirit which had animated him when
he had delayed his vojgige to India in order to keep and
dispose of the little merchant ship which he had captured,
d’Ache now alleged that it devolved upon him to cruise
off Ceylon to intercept the stray merchant ships of Eng¬
land. To all the remonstrances of Lally he replied only
by urging the deficiency of provisions and the sickness of
his crews—reasons which appeared equally to apply to
their cruising off Ceylon. Unable to shake his resolution,
Lally, rejoined by the detachment under d’Estaing, re¬
turned to Pondichery, into which he made a triumphant
entry—a Te Deum being celebrated in honour of the
capture of Fort St. David. Still, however, bent more
than ever on the practical, he lost no time in vain rejoic¬
ing, but summoned a council to which he invited d’Achb.
Again he urged his reasons for instant action against
Madras, but again was he met by the dogged and obsti¬
nate refusal of his naval colleague. It was a hard trial to
see the fruits of his victory thus snatched from his grasp
by the stolid stupidity of the man whose indecision and
delays had already cost him so much, and who happened
to be the only official not subjected to his orders. But
hard as it was, Lally was forced to bear it, and to see the
fleet that might, he believed, have carried him in triumph
to Madras, leave the roadstead of Pondichery, on an un¬
certain and profitless cruise, carrying with it the 600
troops he had lent its commander
510 THE LAST STEUGGLE POE EMPIEE.

chap. Still, notwithstanding-tlie defection of d’Ache, Lally

was very unwilling to renounce his designs on Madras.
1758. With the coup <2ceil of a real soldier he saw, as La Bour-
donnais had seen before him, that there the decisive blow
was to be struck. Yet he was helpless. He had not the
money to equip his army, and de Leyrit and his colleagues
persisted in declaring that it was impossible for .them to
raise it. Out of this difficulty, the local chief of the
Jesuits, by name Father Lavaur, one of the most influen¬
tial of the residents at Pondichery, suggested an escape.
It so happened that amongst the prisoners taken at Fort
St. David was that same Sahoojge, ex-king of Tanjore,
who had been twice expelled from that country in 1739,
and who, taken up by the English for their own purposes,
in 1749, and thrown aside when no longer of use to them,
had continued ever since a pensioner on their bounty*
The arrival of Sahoojee in Pondichery suggested to the
mind of the Jesuit that he might be made use of to
frighten the Eajah of Tanjore, his nephew, upon whom
the French had a claim for fifty-five lakhs of rupees in
consequence of a bond given to Chunda Sahib, and made
over by Ms son, Piajah Sahib, to Dupleix. 1 Thus,’ added
Lavaur, to Lally, ‘ you will obtain, at easy cost, the means
of equipping your force for Madras, and gaining at the
same time a considerable augmentation of influence.’
Lally did not like the plan. His mind was bent upon
Madras. Any object that would delay the movement
against that place was to him unpalatable. The Tanjore
expedition was a diversion from the direct line he had
marked out for himself, and of which he never once lost
sight—the expulsion of the English from India. But he
. was helpless. Unsupported by the authorities of Pondi¬
chery and by cl’Ackd he could not march towards Madras.
Unwillingly, therefore, and solely as a means whereby he
could eventually carry out his own plans, he consented to
move upon Tanjore.
* Chapters HI. and VI.
 FATALITY ATTENDING D’ACHfi. 511

Meanwhile dAche had sailed on his projected cruise, chap.

and had arrived on the 16th (June) off Karical, which it -—r—
had been his intention to leave the next day. But a H58.
curious fatality attended all the counsels of the French at
this epoch. Had dAche left Karical, as he intended, on
June 17, he would almost certainly have intercepted two
English ships which were conveying to Madras a portion
of the annual supplies of specie from England. This
supply would have been more than sufficient to enable
Lally to equip his army and to march to Madras. Un¬
fortunately for him, however, and for the French cause,
the members of the .Council of Pondichery were so
alarmed at the idea of being left exposed, by the contem¬
plated absence of Lally, to an attack from the English
fleet, that they .sent a pressing message to dAche to re¬
turn. This message reached him on the 16th. More
pliable to the wishes of the Council than to those of
Lally, he suffered himself to be persuaded, renounced his
intended cruise, and returned to Pondichery. The two
English vessels, which could not have escaped him. had
he proceeded in a southerly direction, arrived safely at
Madras.
On the following day Lally started for Tanjore, at the
head of 1,600 European troops and a proportion of
sepoys, leaving £00 Europeans and 200 sepoys under de
Soupire in an intrenched camp between Alumparva and
Pondichery. So powerful a force in point of numbers
had never before invaded the dominions of a native prince,
but it was wanting in every particular which tends to
make an army useful and efficient.
It marched without organised carriage, without provi¬
sions, without money, without even a sufficiency of ammu¬
nition. All these supplies were to be obtained on the
road, an arrangement which could not be carried into
effect without relaxing to a dangerous extent the disci¬
pline of the army, and, what was of even more' import¬
ance, alienating the people of the country. It is difficult
512 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, to exaggerate the sufferings the soldiers endured.* At

-—Devicotta they had nothing to eat but rice in the husk,
1758' and it was not till they reached Karical, 100 miles by the
road from Pondichery, that they really had a meal. Even
here L ally found only twenty-eight oxen and a small
.quantity of meal, the remainder of the supplies having
been consumed by the squadron. But he received the
next day from the Dutch at Tranquebar and Negapatam
both ammunition and food.
The difficulties of his march, the suffering of his troops,
and the obstacles thrown in his way upon every occasion,
had affected the disposition of Tally to such an extent,
that, from the moment of his entering into the Tanjore
territory,' he began to indulge in acts of harsh and un¬
reasoning severity, most detrimental to his cause. He
plundered the town of Hagore, ransacked all the Brah-
minical temples he met with on his route, and finding six
Brahmins lingering about his camp, he blew them away
from guns. Such was the license he allowed his army,
and so wide was the terror caused by his approach, that
we cannot wonder that he should have written that he
met with scarcely an inhabitant on his route, and that the
country through which he marched was ‘ like a barren'
desert.’ f
At length, on July 18th, the French army found itself
close to Tanjore. Tally had previously sent a requisition
to the King requiring payment of the fifty-five lakhs of
rupees, but to this he had received an evasive reply, it
being the object of the Eajah to delay him until assistance
could be obtained from the English. In the negotiations
* Erom Devicotta, which, they quelque prix que ce soit: voila, a la
reached on the second day, without lettre, l’horreur de la situation dans
finding wherewith to satisfy their laquelle vous nous avez mis, et le
hunger, Lally wrote thus to de Ley- danger auquel vous exposez une
Tit: 'J’attends dans la nuit les bceufs armde, que je ne serais jjoint surpris
qui trainent l’artillerie afin de les de voir passer a l’ennemi pour eher-
fairetuer.J’ai envovd a Trin- cher & manger.’—Lally’s Correspon-
quehar pour y acheter tous les chiens deuce loith, Pondichery.
marrons et bceufs que l’on pourra f Mdmoire pour Lally, page 67.
rencontrer, ainsi que la raque A
 LALLY BAFFLED AT TAJVJOEE. 513

that followed it is probable that Lally might eventually chap.

have reaped some advantage had he conducted himself __r_
■with ordinary prudence. But the violence of Ms temper 1758’ ’
ruined him. "When he had brought the Rajah to an un¬
dertaking to pay five lakhs of rupees and the value of
three or four lakhs in the shape of supplies, Ms suspicions
induced him to regard an accidental failure in the fulfilment
of one of the stipulations into a deliberate breach of faith.
Completely carried away by his violence, he at once sent
the Rajah a message in which he threatened to transport
him and all Ms family as slaves to the Isle of France. This
was too great an indignity to be endured, and the Rajah,
supported by the promises of the English and some trained
sepoys sent him by Captain Calliaud from Tricbinopoly,
bade defiance to his enemy. Lally upon this determined
to try the effect of an assault. Two batteries were opened
on August 2nd, a breach was effected on the 7th, and the
attack ordered for the 8th. On the morning of that day,
however, intelligence reached the camp that d’Achd had
been attacked by the English, been beaten and driven off
the coast, and that the English were threatening Karical,
which formed the base of the French operations against
Tanjore. At the same time advices were received from
de Soupire to the effect that Ponclichery was threatened
by a corps of ,800 English from Madras, and that he,
having only 600, was preparing to evacuate Ms position.
When this intelligence reached Lally, he had in camp
supplies for but two days, and the Tanjorean cavalry
effectually prevented him from procuring any more; his
small arm ammunition was almost entirely exhausted, and
for cannon-shot he' depended on those fired by the enemy.
Still the breach had been effected, and both d’Estaing
and Saubinet were eager that the assault should be de¬
livered. But'the consideration that after the fort was
taken it would be necessary to attack the town, which
was itself strongly defended, that the attack upon the fort
would exhaust all his ammunition, and, if that attack
514 THE LAST STRUGGLE POE EMPIRE.

chap, were unsuccessful, -his rpen would be, as it 'were, an

. X11' - unarmed multitude, determined Lally, on tbe advice of
1758. the council of war he assembled, to- retreat. Instead,
therefore, of delivering the assault on the 8th, he sent off
a detachment of 150 men, escorting the sick, the wounded,
and the siege stores, in the direction of Karical, on the
9th, intending to follow himself with the main body on
the evening of the 10th.
Early on that morning, however, the Tanjoreans,
gaining courage from the reported intentions of Lally,
attacked his camp suddenly. They were repulsed, indeed,
with considerable loss on their side, but, meanwhile, a
Jemadar and fifty horsemen had ridden up to the pagoda
in which Lally was sleeping, giving out that they were
deserters. Lally, who was still in his nightdress, went,
on hearing of their approach, to the door of the pagoda,
but they had no sooner come up, than their leader, instead
of making his submission, struck at Lally with his sabre.
The French General warded off the blow ■ with a stick,
but it was about to be repeated, when the Jemadar was
shot dead by one of Tally’s followers. The conspirators
then made successive charges on the French guard, which
had turned out on witnessing these events, but they were
each time repulsed, twenty-eight of their number being
killed. Disheartened by this loss, the, remainder en¬
deavoured to escape, but galloping by mistake into a
tank, they were destroyed to a man. The general attack
made on the other part of the camp was, as we have said,'
easily repulsed. ■
That night Lally broke up from before Tanjore, having
subsisted for two months on the country. Of specie, his
great want, he had succeeded in wringing from the Kajah
but little. The three pieces of heavy cannon which had
constituted his siege battery he spiked, breaking up their
carriages for want of cattle to drag them. He then
marched in two columns, the baggage and carriage for
the sick being in the interval between them, two pieces
 EETUKNS TO POEDICHEEY. 515

of artillery preceding and two ‘being 'in rear of the force, chap.
The retreat was executed in the finest order. Lally left —.
nothing behind him but the three spiked guns. TJnfor- 1758.
tunately, however, hunger was the constant attendant of
his camp. He had exhausted all his supplies, and the
Tanjorean cavalry effectually prevented him from gaining
any from the country. Arriving at his first halting-place,
after marching from midnight till nine o’clock in the
morning, he could serve out to his soldiers nothing hut
water. Hungry and faint, they marched on to Trivalore,
where provisions had been sent for them from Karical.
From this place the enemy, abandoning the pursuit, re¬
turned to Tanjore; from here, too, Count d’Estaing was
sent to Pondichery to endeavour once more to persuade
d’Ache, who had signified his intention of returning to
the Isle of France, to make a combined attack on Madras.
After a halt of three days at Trivalore, the army continued
its retreat, and arrived on the 18th at Karical, which they
found blockaded by the English fleet. A few days later
Lally marched with part of his force to Pondichery,
arriving there on the 28th.
Meanwhile d’Ache, leaving the Pondichery roadstead
on July 28th, had encountered the English fleet off
Tranquebar on August 1st, and after a severe engagement
of about two hours, in which he lost many men and was
himself wounded, had been completely worsted, and had
saved himself only by the superior sailing qualities of his
ships. Bearing up for Pondichery he arrived there the
next day, and learning that the Dutch at Negapatam had
allowed a French ship to be captured in then roadstead
by the English squadron, he seized, in reprisal, a Dutch
vessel lying in the Pondichery roads, on board of which
were three laklis of rupees in gold and merchandise. He
then brought to his squadron under the guns of the town,
apprehensive of an attack from the English.
He was in this position when Lally, oh August 28th,
arrived. Great was the indignation of the French General
516 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, at what he considered the pusillanimous position taken

XIL . up by. his naval colleague; greater still his fury, when
1758. he found that all the remonstrances of .d’Estaing had
availed nothing, and that d’Achd was resolute, not only
to decline all further contests with the English, but to
abandon the coast. In vain did Lally offer to strengthen
his fleet with as many of his soldiers as he might require,
with a view to his again encountering the English, whilst
Lally himself should march upon Madras: in vain did
the Council, for once unanimous, urge upon him the ne¬
cessity of at least remaining some time longer on the coast.
He was obstinate to run no further risk ; the utmost he
would do, and that he did, was to land 500 of his sailors
to augment the land forces of the settlement. He then—
on September 2nd—sailed for the Isle of France. The
English squadron, now without an opponent, remained for
three weeks longer before Pondichery, and then sailed for
Bombay.
The capture of the Dutch vessel, however indefensible
in itself, had at least supplied Lally with money. He
employed the time, therefore, after his return to Pon¬
dichery in making preparations for his darling design
upon Madras. As a preliminary to this expedition he
despatched Saubinet to retake Trinomalee—which had
been recaptured by the adherents of the English—de
Soupire against Carangoly, de Orillon against Trivatore,
appointing all these detachments to meet him at Wande-
wash. Here, too, Bussy, to whom, as we have seen, he
had written on June 13th,* joined him, having preceded
his troops left under the orders of Moracin. The three
expeditions having been successful, and the troops having
reunited, Lally marched towards Arcot, which the native
commandant, who had been gained over, surrendered to
* In that letter Lally had. opened either by land or by sea. ... I
his -whole heart to Bussy. After "confine myself now to indicate to you
stating his designs upon Madras he my policy in these five words; no
had added—‘ I will not conceal from more English in India’ (pirn I Anglais
you, that, Madias once taken, I am dam le Peninsula).
determined to proceed to the Ganges,.
 RESOLVES TO ATTACK MADRAS. 517

him at once. There now remained between the French chap.

and Madras, in occupation of the English, the posts of -A—-
Chingleput and Conjeveram, neither of them adequately 1758.
garrisoned, and both almost inviting attack. Upon these,
more especially upon Chingleput, the position of which
on the Palaur made it of great importance to the English,
it was his obvious duty to march without delay. He
himself declares that he could not move because his
money was exhausted, and the sepoys refused to march
unless they were paid. But it is difficult to believe that
he could not have detached the divisions of Saubinet or
d’Estaing to besiege a place which, at the time of his entry
into Arcot (October 4th), was guarded only by two
companies of sepoys, and the capture of which would
have ensured him at least supplies. It would appear that
it was not until the English had strengthened the place
considerably, and supplied it with an adequate garrison,
that he became sensible of its importance. But it was
just at that moment that, in the view of the chance of a
protracted siege, the absolute necessity for a further supply
of money came home to him. Unable to procure that
supply by means of a letter to the Council, he left his
army in cantonments, and proceeded with Bussy and other
of his officers to Pondichery, in the hope to be able to
come to some definite arrangement by means of which
the expedition, not only against Chingleput, but against
Madras itself, might be made feasible.
The deliberations at Pondichery succeeded better than
Lally had dared to hope. At a meeting of a mixed
council the expedition against Madras was resolved upon,
the military and some of the civil members expressing
their opinion that it was better to encounter the risk of
dying from a musket-ball on the glacis of Madras than of
hunger in Pondichery. De Leyrit alone dissented, alleging
that he had no money whatever. But this article was
not altogether wanting. Moracin had brought with him
not only 250 European troops and 500 sepoys, but
100,000 rupees; the superior officers and members of
•518 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap. Council, instigated by the example of Lally himself,*

added contributions from their private purses. Still not-
1758. -withstanding the considerable sum thus raised, it was very
much reduced by the necessary preparations, and when,
on November 2nd, Lally started to join his army, his
treasure-chest contained but 94,000 rupees, whilst the
monthly expenses of the army alone were not less than
40,000.
The meeting between Lally and Bussy had been ap¬
parently friendly. Lally had not only expressed his
sense of the advantage he would derive from the great
Indian experience of his subordinate, but on their arrival
at Ponclichery, had paid him the compliment of inviting
him to a seat in the Supreme Council. Nevertheless the
secret feelings of the two men for one another were far
from cordial. Lally, whose one great idea was the expul¬
sion of the English, could not enter into the plan of a
Breach Empire in the heart of the Dekkan, dependent
on English weakness and English forbearance. Aware
besides that Bussy, whilst maintaining the fortunes of
France at Hydrabad, had gained not only a great name
but au enormous fortune, he could not forbear from con¬
necting the one circumstance with the other, nor from
secretly including Bussy amongst the self-seekers f whom
he had found so numerous at Pondichery. • Ou the other
hand, Bussy, distrusting Lally’s capacity from the first,
and noticing the dislike which the other could not con¬
ceal, bound too by ties of friendship and long service
with the de Leyrits and Desvaux and other councillors of
Pondichery, gradually and insensibly fell into opposition.
Nor were his first proceedings calculated to make matters
better. He used every effort in his power to induce
Lally to send him back to the Dekkan with increased

* Lally subscribed 144,000 lines, more than once impressed upon Lally,
Count d’Estaing and others 80,000 that in India, the officials worked for
livres in plate. According to Lally, something more than the glory of
Bussy gave nothing. the King.
t The Jesuit, Father Layaur, had
 ?OSITE OPINIONS OP BUSSY. 519

forces; every day lie presented to him letters from the chap.
Subadar to the same effect. This was the course best
calculated to confirm the suspicions and sharpen the in- 1758.
dignation of Lally. A mind constituted as was his, bent
eagerly upon one point, could not tolerate a proposition,
which so far from tending to aid him, went precisely in
the opposite direction, and instead of strengthening, would
have weakened, his force. He came therefore to regard
the requests of Bussy and Moracin as part of the general
plan to thwart him, as sure and certain proofs that they too
regarded only their own interests and not the interests of
France. So far from giving in to them he the more firmly
insisted that Bussy should accompany him. All this time
he treated him with outward politeness, but in reality he
regarded him as a most ordinary and over-rated man*
But if Lally had this opinion of Bussy, far different was
the impression made by the trusted lieutenant of Dupleix
on the officers under his command. They were not slow
in recognising his ability, his large views, his acquaintance
with the country and the true mode of managing the
people. To such an extent did they display their con¬
fidence in his talents and his devotedness, that on the eve
of the expedition to Madras, six of their number,f in¬
cluding the chivalrous d’Estaing, who had already made a
reputation, signed a request to the Commander-in-chief,
that Bussy, the Company’s general, might be placed over
their heads, and occupy the position next to de Soupire.
Lally was unwilling to comply; he attributed even this
request to the effect of Bussy’s money; $ but he could not
well refuse, and the order was issued accordingly.
* The Memoirs of Lally and Bussy d'Estaing, 100,000 crowns; to the
abound with proofs of the little es- Chevalier de Crillon,2,000 louis d’ors.
timation in which each, in his heart, Crillon, however, refused them,
held the other. Lally adds that Bussy offered him
t These were MM. d’Estaing, 400,000 livres to he sent hack to the
Crillon, de la Fare, Verdi&re, Breteuu, Delckan, and stated that he was
and de Landivisiau. ready to advance 240,000 livres for
f Lally asserts that to secure the the service of the Company, provided
good offices of some of these noble- Lally would be his surety. Lally
men Bussy lent or gave , or offered to declined both offers.—Mimmn pour
them the following sums: to Count Lally.
520 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap. At length, in the beginning of November, Lally collected

■——- his forces, amounting to 2000 European infantry, 300
1758. cavalry, and 5,000 sepoys, and inarched upon Madras.
These were divided into four brigades, commanded by de
Soupire, d’Estaing, Grillon, and Saubinet. Bussy held no
actual command, but he was present with the force as
Brigadier, with an authority superior to that of all the
other officers, de Soupire and Lally excepted. Taking
possession of Conjeveram on the 27th, the army marched
from that on the 29th, and reached the plain in front of
Madras on December 12th. The strong position of Chin-
gleput, which, two months before, Lally might have taken
with little loss, he now, with regret, left in his rear. Be-
taining that, the English had been, and were still, able to
procure abundant supplies from the surrounding country.
The English garrison of Madras consisted of 1,758
Europeans, 2,220 sepoys, and 200 horses; there were
besides within the walls 150 Europeans, who were likewise
employed in various ways in the defence. The Governor
was Mr. George Pigott, afterwards Lord Pigott, a man
of ability and discrimination, and who had the good sense
to make over all the arrangements of the defence to the
veteran Colonel Lawrence, who found himself within the
walls. Under Lawrence were Lieutenant Colonel Draper,
the conqueror of Manilla,* Major Calliaud of Trichinopoly
renown, Major Brereton, and other good officers. Chin-
gleput was garrisoned by 100 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys,
commanded by an active leader, Captain Preston. It will
thus be seen that in the number of Europeans—the back¬
bone of an army in India—the French did not possess a
very overwhelming advantage over the enemy that they
had come to besiege. The defence was confined mainly
to Port St. George, although three fortified posts were left
in the Black Town.
Lally, as we have seen, reached the plain in front of

* The same who engaged in a controversy with Junius.

 THE BLACK TOWN CAPTURED. 521

Madras on the 12th. The van of his little force was chap.
commanded by the chivalrous d’Estaing, and consisted of >—A—
300 European infantry, 300 cavalry and two guns, he 1758.
himself following with the main body. On the 13th the
army encamped in the plain, whilst Tally employed the
day in reconnoitring the Eort and the Black Town.
Having done this to his satisfaction, he detached the
Chevalier de Crillon with the regiment of Lally to take
possession of the Blaek Town, an enterprise which suc¬
ceeded with but little loss on the side of the French, the
posts being evacuated as they advanced. The conquest,
however, gave rise to great relaxation of discipline, for
the town was rich, and the camp-followers, of whom there
were 10,000, would not be restrained, nor had Lally a
sufficient number of troops to enforce obedience, in this
respect, to his orders. An indiscriminate pillage' was
consequently the result; the value of the property seized
being computed at 15,000,000 of francs (600,0001).*
To the military chest, however, there resulted from the
capture' of the town a gain of but 92,000 francs or less
than 3,7001, being the contributions of an Armenian whom
Tally had saved from plunder, and of the Hindoo chief
of Arnee.
The town having been occupied, the Lorraine brigade
and the brigade of Company’s troops were posted on its
right near the sea, the brigade of Tally and the sailor bri¬
gade establishing themselves in some buildings belonging
to the Capuchins on the rising ground on the left of the
town. About ten o’clock on the following morning, whilst
Lally, accompanied by Bussy and d’Estaing, was engaged
in reconnoitring on the left of the Black Town, intimation
was brought him that the English were making a strong
demonstration against his right—an intimation quickly
confirmed by the firing of small arms. Though separated
from the brigades which formed the right by a marshy

* MSinoixe pour Lally.

522 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, plain about 200 yards ifr width and by a little stream,
.. ^ d’Estaing at once started in full haste to join in the com-
1758, bat. He had approached the scene of action, when,
noticing some troops dressed in scarlet, he rode up to put
himself at their head, believing them to be the volunteers
of Bourbon, who wore uniform of that colour. It was
not until he found himself a prisoner amongst them that
he discovered them to be English. Bussy, who had fol¬
lowed him, returned, on noticing his misfortune, to the
regiment of Lally, whilst the General, accompanied by his
aide-de-camp and orderly officer, succeeded in gaining the
scene of action. They found that the officers of the regi¬
ment of Lorraine had duly noticed the approach of a body
of 500 men under Colonel Draper, supported by 150 under
Major Brereton, with two guns, but, mistaking them, as
d’Estaing afterwards did, for their own men, had made
no dispositions to oppose them. They had only become
aware of their error when the English guns opened on
their left flank. Completely surprised, they had fallen
into confusion, and, abandoning their guns, had sought
refuge under cover of some houses that were near. Had
the English then advanced the guns might have been
carried off and the siege ended that very day. But their
troops likewise fell into confusion amongst the houses,.and
their native buglers having run away, a part of the force
became separated from the rest. Two officers of the regi¬
ment of Lorraine, Captains Guillermin and Sdcati, noticing
this, rallied their men with great spirit, and advanced with
fixed bayonets to support their guns. It was now the
turn of the English to fall back. Their position was a
dangerous one; not only were they in the presence of a
superior force, recovered from its surprise, but to regain
the fort they had to cross the marshy plain and the small
bridge of which we have spoken, and to which the regi-.
ment of Lally, burning for action, was nearer than they
were. It will thus be seen that the fate of the English
depended on the conduct of the officer who commanded
that regiment.
 BUSSY MISSES AST OPPORTUNITY. 523

There are some critical moTitents decisive of the fate chap.

and fortunes of individuals and nations; moments which ■—
offer golden opportunities not to be flirted with, but to be 1758.
seized at once if success is to be achieved. This was one
of them. The regiment of Tally had but to advance, and
the fate of Madras would have been sealed. Tor not only
would these 650 men have been slain or captured, but the
effect upon their comrades within the walls would, accord¬
ing to the testimony of their commandant, have been deci¬
sive.* It was a great opportunity—let us see how the
Trench used it.
We have said that after the capture of d’Estaing, Tally
had proceeded to the right of the position, where the action
was going on, whilst Bussy galloped back to his post on
the left. Tally arrived at the scene of action after Guil-
lermin and Secati had rallied their men, and the English
in their turn had begun to retreat. He at once directed
a movement whereby eighty of the latter were cut off
from their comrades and made prisoners, at the same time
ordering a vigorous pursuit of the remainder; on the
other side the Chevalier de Crillon, who commanded the
Tally brigade, saw. the English retreating towards the
bridge, in disorder, and pursued by the Torraine and
Indian brigades. The thought at once came into his
mind that by Occupying the bridge on which that detach¬
ment was retreating, he might cut it off to a man. As,
however, he did not command in that part of the field,
Bussy being on the spot, lie went up to that officer, and
asked his permission to make the movement with his
corps. To his intense mortification Bussy refused. In vain
did other officers crowd round him; he was obstinate and

* Colonel Lawrence states in his store the spirits of the garrison.’

Memoirs that the previous retrograde Had the men composing the sortie-
movements of the English had party been hilled or taken, it would
greatly discouraged his men, and undoubtedly have tended to the still
that tliis sortie had been determined further discouragement of those re-
upon, because‘it appeared necessary maining within the walls,
to do something immediately to re-
524 THE LAST STEUGGLE FOE EilPIEE.

chap, obdurate* So sensible, Il’owever, was Crillon of the im-

- mense value of the opportunity, that he started forward
1758. himself with fifty volunteers and gained the bridge. Such
a force was not, however, sufficiently strong to prevent the
passage of the enemy, which soon became an accomplished
fact, though with a loss at the bridge itself of several killed
and thirty-three prisoners.
Thus was the opportunity suffered to escape, and the
remains of the English party succeeded in regaining the
fort. Their loss, however, was heavy. It amounted, by
their own statement, to more than 200 men and six officers,
103 of whom were taken prisoners. The loss of the
Trench was, however, even more severe. It is true that
in actual killed and wounded they did not lose more than
200 men; but two of their best officers were placed hors
de combat One of these, as we have seen, was the gallant

* Tie conduct of Bussy on this come to fight with him; further, that
occasion has been hotly contested. he had never heard of the story until
The following points, however, are after he had left India.
clear. 1st:—that if the bridge had The statement of Bussy seems,
been occupied by the regiment of however, inconsistent with the facts
Lally, the retreat of the English that he had rank in the army next
■would have been cut off; 2nd, that to de Soupire, that rank having been
the regiment of Lally could easily conferred upon him before leaving
have occupied the bridge; 3rd, that Pondiche'ry; that having that rank,
Bussy was with that regiment or near it became his duty to exercise its
it at the time. We have adopted in functions; that the statement of
the text the account given by Lally Lally was confirmed, on his trial, by
himself. To this account, Bussy, the Chevalier de Crillon, the witness
in his lifetime, demurred, stating, who was best qualified to speak. In
1st, that he had no command, the state of feeling between Lally
beinjf a simple volunteer; 2ndly, and the Pondichery Council the
that he was thanked for his conduct thanks of the latter are of little
by the Pondichery Government ; weight; whereas the conferring the
3rdly, that on the field of battle command of the regiment on the
Lally conferred on bim the command field of battle may be accounted for
of the Lorraine brigade vacant by on other grounds. Certainly the
the capture of d’Estaing. He also balance of evidence is against Bussy.
added that he remembered on pass¬ Mr. Orme states that Bussy gave
ing by tbe LaEy brigade after the other reasons for his conduct. Bussy
capture of d’Estaing, he recommended does not, however, state them in his
them to bring up two pieces of field Memoirs. Mr. Orme gives them.
artillery, as the enemy had none, They are, however, so little satisfac- *
that he then passed on to the bri¬ tory, that were they really Bussy’s,
gade commanded by the Chevalier de they would but confirm our opinion
Poete, to whom he said that having of his conduct on this occasion.
neither rank nor command, he had
 THE SIEGE BEGUN. 525

d’Estaing, the other the no less, flaring Saubinet, who was chap.
mortally wounded. He was an officer in the service of .—A—
the Company of the Indies, of great and improving talents, 1758.
ever foremost in danger. The loss of these two able
officers far outweighed in importance the loss of the rank
and file.
The same day Lally established his head-quarters in
the Black Town, and waited impatiently for his heavy
guns. But before they arrived the expenses of the cam¬
paign had begun to exhaust the sums raised by the cap¬
ture of the town. At this -crisis, however, the frigate
‘ La Fidele ’ arrived at Pondichery having on board one
million of francs (40,0001). She ought to have brought
to Pondichery two millions, but, having touched at the
Isle of France about the time of the arrival there of
d’Ache from Pondichery, that unpatriotic and inefficient
officer had appropriated one million for the servicd^bf his
squadron, sending the frigate on with the remainder. She
arrived at her destination on December 21st, just in time
to determine Lally, not merely to content himself with
devastating the country round Madras, but to besiege
that place in form. The arrival of his heavy guns about
the same time enabled him to complete his arrangements.
His artillery then consisted of twenty pieces of 12, 18,
and 24-pounclers, and of ten mortars, 8 and 12-pounders.
These were soon placed in position, and a fresh parallel
opened at a distance of 500 yards from the place. He
had decided to attack the fort on the side immediately
opposite the position he had taken up, although in ap¬
pearance it was the strongest. He satisfied himself partly
on the ground that though the fort might be the stronger
on that side, the approaches to it could be more easily.
made; and partly, because, as had been proved on the
14th, the intricacies of the Black Town afforded a means
of defence against sorties, such as bade defiance to an
enemy.
But Lally soon found how impossible it was to effect
526 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, anything great -with officers the majority of whom were

. 3^'.- bad, and with an army disorganised and disaffected. The
1758. difficulties and obstacles which he had to encounter during
the first twenty days of the siege were sufficient to
break the spirit of any ordinary man. Very many of the
soldiers,'instead of working in the trenches, employed
themselves in searching for treasure in the deserted houses
of the Black Town and in making themselves drunk with
the proceeds. Several of the officers, far from checking
their men, or doing their duty in the field, were them¬
selves engaged in guarding the contents of the shops
which they had appropriated. Multitudes from Pondi-
chery swarmed into the Black Town, many of them
forging the General’s signature in order to obtain boats
wherewith to carry off their plunder. Even the artillery
cattle were employed by some officers in conveying fur¬
niture and property to Pondichery. It was impossible for
Lally alone to put a stop to this state of things. In fact,
the paucity of skilled officers rendered it necessary for
him to be always in the trenches. Of five engineer officers
who had come out with him from Erance but two re¬
mained ; one of these, the senior, was idle and useless;
the other had, under Lally, the charge of the trenches.
Of six officers of artillery, three were killed in the first
three weeks of the siege; of the others, two. were with
the artillery park, and the third was a boy. The supe¬
rior officers of the army were engaged with their several
brigades. Upon Lally, therefore, devolved the main
charge of directing the operations of the siege, and he
devoted himself to it with a zeal and energy that could
not have been surpassed. For he had, it must be remem¬
bered, other matters to attract and engage his attention.
The English had not been slow to use the advantages
offered to them by the possession of Chingleput. The
force that guarded that post issued frequently into the
field to attack the French in their flanks and rear, and to
disturb their communications with -Pondichery; and not
 lally’s difficulties. 527

only this,'* but Major Calliaud, sent to Tanjore, succeeded chap.

in obtaining from the Bajah, ancl bringing into the field,
600 men, one half of whom were cavalry. Mahomed 1758.
Isoof, a partisan, brought 2,000 more. These various
parties, hovering about Lally’s position, kept him in a
continual state of alarm. They might be driven away,
but, like wasps, they returned to annoy. Lally’s diffi¬
culties were still further increased by the fact that even
the powder necessary for carrying on the siege had to be
brought from Pondichery, through a country swarming
with partisans, who carried their depredations to the very
gates of that city. Besides these outer enemies there were
within the walls of Madras 200 French deserters. These
constantly mounted the ramparts, holding in the one
hand a bottle of wine, and in the other a purse, and call¬
ing out to the French soldiers to follow their example. •
Scarcely a day passed but missives from these men were
discharged by arrows into the besieging camp, all tempt¬
ing the soldiers to desert. At length, on January 2nd, after 1759.
overcoming innumerable trials and conquering difficulties
seemingly insuperable, two batteries, called from the
brigades to which they belonged, the Lally and the Lor¬
raine, opened their fire. This they continued almost
incessantly for forty-two days, a great portion of the army
being at the same time engaged with varying success
almost daily with the enemy’s partisans, with the troops
under Calliaud from Tanjore and under Preston from
Chingleput, and with the numerous sorties from the gar¬
rison. At length the crisis approached. The garrison
received intimation, early in February, that Admiral
Pocock’s fleet was on its way from Bombay, and would
infallibly arrive off Madras in a few days. On the other
hand, a breach had been effected in the walls, and Lally,
who knew how much depended on the promptitude of his
proceedings, determined to deliver the assault. At this
moment, however, he found all his designs shattered by
the backwardness of his officers. Those of the engineers
528 TIIE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, and artillery-declared th^f. although the breach Vas quite

• practicable, yet that, ‘having regard to the situation of
1759. things, to our force compared with that of the enemy,’ an
assault would cause the destruction of a great many
soldiers, and would end in nothing. These officers, not
content with writing this to the General, made no secret
of their opinion in the camp, intimating that to try an
assault would be to march to certain death. But Tally,
though disappointed at this opinion, sensible how great
was the responsibility of acting on such an occasion
against the written advice of his scientific officers, yet
feeling persuaded that they were wrong, and that his
soldiers would follow him, did not renounce his deter¬
mination. He waited only for the wane of the moon to
deliver the assault, and had intimated to Orillon, charged
with the chief attack, that he was to hold himself in
. readiness to make it on the evening of February 16th, when,
to his intense disappointment, he saw Admiral Bocock’s
squadron sail into the roadstead on the afternoon of that
very day.
The situation of the besieging army was now desperate.
For the past twenty days the troops had had no pay, and
the officers had been on soldiers’ rations; there remained
but 20,000 lbs. of powder in the artillery park, and only
a similar supply at Pondichery. For three weeks not a
single bomb had been fired, that species of ammunition
having been exhausted; the native troops, unpaid, had
melted away, and even the European cavalry threatened
to go over to the enemy. Pondichery too had but 300
invalids left to guard it. Under these circumstances, the
arrival of the English fleet, at once relieving Madras and
threatening Pondichery, made the raising of the siege
inevitable. *
On the night of February 17 th, this operation took place.
Sending all the wounded who could be moved from St.
Thome by sea, and burying his cannon-shot, he left in the
trenches, from want of cattle to take them away, five
 FORCED TO RAISE THE SIEGE. 529

pieces of’cannon, and in the pagoda used as a hospital, chap.

thirty-three wounded incapable of being moved, and a
surgeon in charge of them. These he commended in a 1759.
letter to the care of the Governor of Madras, then, taking
with him all his baggage, he retired unmolested, but full
of rage * and mortification, by way of St. Thome to Con-
jeveram.
Thus failed the great enterprise on which Tally had set
his heart—to which he had devoted every energy of mind
and body. It has been said, indeed, that that failure was
owing as much to his own infirmities of temper, to the
manner in which he trampled on the cherished feelings of
others, as to any other cause. But, after a careful ex¬
amination of the facts of the case, as shown in the corre¬
spondence between himself and de Leyrit, we cannot
resist the conclusion, that great as were those infirmities of
temper, violent and excitable as was his manner towards
others, those who allowed themselves to be betrayed by
that behaviour on his part into a neglect of their duty
towards Prance were, infinitely more than Tally, the
authors of the failure. Tally at least behaved like a sol¬
dier ; he gave every thought, every exertion to his country.
But the Council of Pondichery did the reverse. Mortified
and enraged at the rough hand with which Tally had un¬
veiled and exposed abuses, as well as at the style in which
he had pointed out to them that their first duty was to

* The rage of Lally was directed Pondichery, laden with sugar, pepper,
against those whose self-seeking and and other goods; as for the coolies,
corruption, hy hindering and alto- they have been employed on the
gether keeping hack the supplies of same account ever since we have been
which he stood in need, had con- here.’ In concluding the letter he
tributed to the unfortunate result of renounced all interference with the
lus expedition. In a letter to de civil administration of Pondichery,
Leyrit, dated February 14, he thus ‘for,’ he added, ‘ I would rather go
recounted some of the iniquities that and command the Cadres of Mada-
were taking place under his eyes, and gascar, than to rernaiu ill that Sodom
forcibly expressed his own opinion of (Pondichery), which the iire of the
the conduct of some of his officers: English, in default of the iire of
' Of 1,1500 sepoys,’ he said, ‘ who are Heaven, will, sooner or later, inevi-
with our army, I calculate that nearly tably destroy.’
800 employed on the road to
530 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOB EMPIRE.

chap, their country, they gaverhim no assistance; the money

r—- sent out to them for the purpose of the war, they squan-
1759. dered on themselves. More than that, they took a pleasure,
which they scarcely attempted to conceal, in thwarting his
designs. To such an extent did they carry their ill-feeling,
that they allowed their hatred of the individual so far to
conquer the remnants of their patriotism, that the retreat
from Madras was the signal for the manifestation in Pon-
dichery of the most indecent joy. Is it credible that men
who thus rejoiced over the reverses of the French arms,
because those reverses humiliated Tally, would have made
the smallest self-sacrifice to attain an opposite result P On
them therefore, mainly, and not on Tally, must rest the
responsibility of the failure of the siege.
Meanwhile in another part of the coast reverses had
likewise attended the French arms. We have seen how
Tally, immediately after his arrival in Pondichery, had
recalled Bussy and Moracin from tire Dekkan and the
ceded provinces, and how these two, unwillingly obeying,
had made over the government of Masulipatam and the
ceded provinces to the Marquis de Conflans in the month
17gg_ of August, 1758. The troops left with Conflans consisted
of about 500 men, a number which under a commander
so experienced as Bussy would have been sufficient to
keep the entire country in subjection. But Conflans had
neither the ability, the tact, nor the knowledge, of his
predecessor. He was ignorant of the country, and of the
mode of dealing with its feudal lords. Many of these
latter, no longer sensible of a master’s hand, and noting
the diminution in the number of European troops, deter¬
mined to strike a blow to rid themselves of the French
yoke, not calculating that by so doing they would in all
probability exchange it for the English. It is possible,
indeed, that looking at the balanced state of both powers
in the Carnatic, they deemed it might not be an imprac¬
ticable policy to play one against the other. However
this may have been, it is certain that, three mont^after
 olive’s daring genius. 531

the departure of Bussy from th&Dekkan, Eajah Anunderaj, chap.

ruler of Cliicacole and Eajamundry, raising the stan- —
dard of revolt, took possession of Yizagapatam, plundered 1758.
the factory, confined the French agent, hoisted English
colours, and wrote to Madras for assistance. Threatened
as Madras then was by Lally, aid from it was impossible ;
whereupon the Eajah appealed in despair to Olive. No
one knew better than Clive how to seize an opportunity,
no one was more acquainted than he with the advantages
which the possession of the Oil-cars would infallibly bring
in its train. Overruling the advice of his Council, who
regarded interference in that quarter as little short of
madness, he wrote to the Eajah promising speedy support,
and despatched by sea, on October 12, Colonel Forde at -
the head of 500 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and eighteen
guns. The fact that, by the despatch of this force, he left
himself in Bengal with little more than 300 Europeans at
a time when a hostile feeling had risen in the court of
Meer Jaffier, and when Behar was threatened by the united
forces of the son of the Emperor of Delhi and by the
Nawab of Oudh, testifies in no slight degree to the strong,
fearless, and intrepid character of the founder of the
British empire in India.
Meanwhile, Conflans was acting in such a manner as to
facilitate the plans of the English. Instead of marching
rapidly upon Yizagapatam and crushing the rebellion in
its bud, Before the rebels could receive assistance from
outside, he contented himself with sending repeated appli¬
cations to Lally for support, whilst he moved leisurely
against Eajamundry. He occupied that town, and was
still encamped on the northern bank of the river of the
same name, when intelligence reached him that an English
force had, on October 20, landed at Yizagapatam. To
him intelligence of that nature ought not to have been
very alarming. The troops under his command were the
most seasoned and the best disciplined of all who served
the Brench Company in Southern India. They were the j
 532 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, men before whom the famed Mahratta cavalry had been
- — scattered, and who, but a short year before, had forced
1758. their way through opposing hosts to relieve Bussy at
Hydrabad. 'They had never yet shown their backs to a
foe, and they might well have been counted upon, under
efficient leadership, to defend the ceded provinces against
even a larger force than that which then threatened it.
Under these circumstances, and as they were supported
by about 4,000 trained sepoys, and by many of the native
princes of the country, it would seem that it should have
been the_policy of Conflans to advance, to give to his men
that spirit of self-confidence which a movement to the
front always inspires; by that he would undoubtedly also
have encouraged his native allies. It is the more strange
that he did not clo this, as a rumour had reached him, in
which he entirely believed, that Colonel Forde’s force was
composed of raw troops, whom therefore it would be good
policy to attack. He preferred, however, to adopt the
course, which, in India, has but rarely proved successful—
of waiting the attack of the enemy in the position he had
chosen. He accordingly moved his force to the village
of Condore, forty miles north Eajamundry. Hear this
he was encountered, on December 8, by Colonel Forde,
enticed out of his strong position, out-manoeuvred, and
completely defeated—losing his camp, his guns, and se¬
veral of his men. He himself, fleeing on horseback, found
refuge in Masulipatam that same night.* Forde, pursuing
his victory, occupied Eajamundry with a part of his force
on the 10th.
1759. His difficulties, however, were not over. The long
connexion of the French with Salabut Jung, the intelli-

* A detailed account of tliis gal- lias collected and arranged, tlie pro-
lant, and, on the side of the English, fessional knowledge by which it is
skilfully conducted action, is to be marked, we do not hesitate to pro¬
found in Colonel Broome’s History of nouuce to be the most valuable con-
the Bengal Army,—a work which, tribution to Anglo-Indian historical
whether we regal’d its clear and vigo- literature of the present century
rous style, the moss of information it
 FORDE’S splendid audacity. 533

gence tliat the principal settlement of the English was CHAP.

XII.
being besieged, combined to render the position of Forde
dangerous and difficult. To the incapacity of his adver¬ 1759.
sary was it alone due that it was not made fatal. Though
virtually abandoned by his native allies, Eorcle, who tho¬
roughly understood the conditions of Indian warfare, con¬
tinued to advance towards Conflans, and notwithstanding
that the French leader was enabled, by recalling, troops
from his garrisons, to bring a superior force of Europeans
into the field, he actually besieged him in Masubpatam.
Rightly judging of the importance of moral force in war,
he would not allow himself to be moved from this position
even by the recapture of Rajamundry, nor by the intelli¬
gence that Salabut Jung was marching with 15,000 horse
and 20,000 foot to overwhelm him.. Nevertheless, as
time advanced, his position became such as would have
tried the nerves of the strongest leader. In the beginning
of April it even seemed desperate. Before him was Con¬
flans with a superior force, occupying Masulipatam, which
he was himself besieging; on his right, at Beizwarra,
forty miles distant, was the army of the Subadar, ready
to overwhelm him; on his right rear, a French corps of
200 men under M. du Rocher, prepared to cut off his
communications. Under such circumstances, a weak leader
would probably have endeavoured to retreat, though re¬
treat would have been' disgraceful and fatal; but Forde,
being a strong man, preferred the chance of death in the
attempt at assault to such a movement. Not knowing
even that the breaches were practicable, but only in the
hope that they might be so, he ordered his troops under
arms at 10 o’clock on the night of the 7th, and delivered
the assault in three divisions at midnight. He met with
the success which a daring dashing leader can always look
forward to over an unenterprising and hesitating adver¬
sary, for, after a fierce struggle, he not only captured the
fort, but forced Conflans with his whole army to surrender.

id
The consequences of this unsurpassed act of cool and
534 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, resolute daring were most'important. Less than a week

. XIL . after, Moracin,* ordered to Masulipatam by Lally on re-
1759. ceiving the first message from Oonflans, arrived with three
hundred troops off the place. Finding it occupied by the
English, he proceeded to Ganjam. There, however, he
effected nothing : indeed, the place was abandoned, and
his whole party dispersed by the end of the year. But
the most important result was the treaty concluded with
Salabut Jung. Struck by the unexpected defeat of the
French, and annoyed at the time by the pretensions of
Nizam Ali, that protege of Hussy and of Dupleix hastened
to conclude with Forde a treaty whereby he renounced
the French alliance, agreed never to allow a French con¬
tingent in the Dekkan, and ceded to the English a terri¬
tory yielding an annual revenue of four lakhs of rupees.
Before the end of the year, those ceded districts, the
possession of which constituted one of the triumphs of
the administration of Dupleix, passed entirely into the
hands of the English, and'thenceforth the fate of French
India was sealed.
Meanwhile Lally, retreating from Madras, had taken
post at Conjeveram. Thence, leaving his troops under
the command of de Soupire, he set out for Arcot to
arrange for the provisioning of the army. At Arcot he
received a strange account of the proceedings of de
Leyrit. Profiting by the absence of Lally with the army,
de Leyrit had summarily, and against the protest of four
members of his Council,f put a stop to an inquiry ordered
. to be instituted by Lally into the accounts of M. Desvaux,
the head of the department of excise at Pondichery, and
who had been accused of embezzlement. Other abuses,
* Moracin was indeed at once
ordered to Masulipatam, and had he the order, and did actually delay so
obeyed, he would hare arrived in long, that he only arrived in time to
time to have placed Forde in a posi¬ share in the ruin in which the force
tion from which even his skill and of Confluns was involved.
daring could with difficulty have ex¬ t The names of the protesters were
tracted his force; but, the ally of the MM. Barthdlemy, Boileau, La Selle,
French intriguers at Pondichery, he and Nicholas.
 DE SOUPIRE OUT-MAXCEUVRED. 535

tending ’to the individual profit of the servants of the chap.

Company,* to the great detriment of the Company itself, -P-—
which Lally had ordered to be abolished, had been 1750.
restored. On March 8, therefore, Lally left Arcot for
Pondichery, with a view to put a stop to these disorders,
as well as to make new plans for a campaign.
During his absence, the French army under de Soupire
had been followed to Conjeveram by an English force of
about equal numbers, under Major Brereton, who had
succeeded to the command which the gallant Lawrence
had but then resigned. De Soupire’s orders restricted
him to fight only if attacked, and as he occupied a strong
position, the English leader was careful not to risk a
defeat by assailing him at a disadvantage. For three
weeks the armies remained in face of one another, when
Brereton, rightly conjecturing that to threaten his com- *’
munications would be the surest mode of dislodging the
enemy, broke up from before Conjeveram, and, passing
it, moved on Waudewash, and opened ground before it.
De Soupire, pressed for money and supplies, inarched
then to Arcot, twenty miles from Wandewash, and took
up a position on the Palaur. This was the opportunity
Brereton had wished for. He hastily decamped from
Wandewash, marched rapidly on Conjeveram, and stormed
it before de Soupire had any idea that it was in danger..
This was the intelligence that reached Lally, whilst,
after a stormy altercation with the Council of Pondichery,
he was on bis way at the head of 350 men, to rejoin
his army. It was his desire to proceed at once to re¬
take Conjeveram, but the low state of Ms military chest,
the absolute want of all resources, and the bad spirit
* For instance: the members of for 20 francs in cash. The members
the administration were in the habit of the administration, after paying
of issuing treasury hills, instead of the troops and the subordinate fane-
cash, in payment of their liabilities; tionaries in these notes, set to work
hut they purposely issued these in to buy them up for their own profit,
such numbers, that they became thus realising more than eighty per
greatly depreciated in value, and a cent.—AftmmVa pour Lolly.
bill for 100 francs was purcbaseable
536 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, evinced by many of liis officers, would not permit him

_S— to attempt any forward movement. He was compelled,
1759. therefore, to place his army in cantonments on the Palaur,
until the arrival of d’Ache, then shortly expected with
supplies of money and stores, should place him in a posi¬
tion to resume the offensive. The English army followed
his example. Tally himself returned to Pondichery, hut
he had scarcely arrived there, when the fatigue and ex¬
citement to which he had been exposed combined with the
disappointment he had suffered to bring on a serious ill¬
ness. This, however, did not prevent him from carrying
out an enterprise which he had designed against Elmi-
seram; succeeding in this, the leader of the party, M.
Mariol, moved suddenly against Thiagar, a strong fortress
about fifteen miles distant. The English guarding this
' were surprised, and the fort was captured on July 14.
Amongst the prisoners were forty English soldiers.
But although planning such enterprises as these, Tally
was unable from the state of his army to undertake any¬
thing really great. Ho doubt his soldiers had to submit
to very great hardships, but these they would readily
have borne, had they been left alone. The spirit of
personal dislike to Tally, however, •which prevailed in
the Council Chamber of Pondichery, had penetrated to
the Franco-Indian section of his forces—those in the im¬
mediate service of the Company of the Indies—and the
example set by these had not been without its effect on
the royal troops. Matters were brought to a very dan¬
gerous crisis by a measure which in itself was a matter of
the most ordinary detail. It happened, that after the
raising of the siege of Madras, the English and French
Governments agreed upon an exchange of 500 soldiers
on each side. Most of those received by the French, in
virtue of this agreement, were the men belonging to the
French Company’s forces, who had been taken before
Trichinopoly when serving under Astruc, Brennier, Main-
ville, and Maissin. Some of these had been five years in
 BAD SPIRIT AMONGST THE FRENCH. 537

confinement, well fed and well <aared for. To fill up the CHAP.
XII.
gaps in the .regiment bearing his name, Lally transferred
to it two hundred of these men. But, by them, the scanty 1759.
fare, the rigorous discipline, and the hard work of camp-
life, were, after their five years of idleness and inaction,
scarcely to be borne. They made no secret of their dis¬
content, and even endeavoured to spread it among their
comrades. The first result of this baneful influence ap¬
peared on July 7, when the small French force occupying
the stone fort of Covrepauk, well capable of being de¬
fended, evacuated it on the first summons of the English
army. But, four weeks later, the grand explosion took
place. Instigated by the two hundred ransomed prisoners,
the Regiment de Lally, with the exception of its officers,
its sergeants and corporals, and about fifty old soldiers,
suddenly mutinied, and marching out of Chittaput, de¬
clared that they were going over to the English. On hear¬
ing this, their officers instantly went after them, and by
threats, entreaties, by the payment of some of their arrears,
and the promise of more, persuaded all but sixty to re¬
turn to their allegiance. These sixty, all belonging to
the Trichinopoly prisoners, persisted in going over to the
enemy.* Lally, meanwhile, was making every possible
exertion to collect provisions and stores. Despairing of
every other means, he had despatched one of the Pondi-
cliery councillors to Karical with 36,000 francs belong¬
ing to himself to purchase rice for the troops. When,
however, his hopes were at the lowest, his spirits were
cheered by the arrival of the frigate, ‘ La Gracieuse,’ con¬
veying the hopeful intelligence that she was but the herald
of the arrival of Count d’Ache’s fleet, reinforced by three
ships-which had joined him at the Isle of France. The
frigate also brought instructions to the French commander
to exercise a still tighter hand over the financial adminis¬
tration of Pondichery — instructions which had the ill
* TVe have preferred Laliy’s own account of this mutiny to that given
by Oriiie.
538 TIIE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, effect of still more embittering the feeling between him-

self on the one side, and De Leyrit and the other mem-
1759. bers of the Council on the other.
At length, on September 10, d’Ache arrived. Since
leaving the coast on September 3 of the previous year,
this officer had been to the Isle of France, had there met
the three ships under M. d’Eguille, from whom, as- we
have seen, he had taken, for the service of his own squad¬
ron, one million of the two million francs d’Eguille was
bringing out for the colony. The rest of the time d’Ache
had employed in re-fitting, re-arming, and re-victualling
the ships of his squadron. Having accomplished this, he
sailed from the Isle of France on July 17, and arriving
on September 10 off Fort St. David, found himself sud¬
denly in sight of the English fleet, which likewise had
been strengthened and reinforced.'
D’Ache, who possessed at least the merit of physical
courage, showed no inclination to decline the combat
which Admiral Eocock at once offered him. He had
eleven ships, though but four of them belonged to the
French navy, whilst Pocoek had nine ships of the Eoyal
navy, two Company’s vessels, and a fire-ship.* About a

The Yan
The Grafton Kempenfelt
The Elizabeth Tiddeman
The Tiger
The Sunderland Colville All King’s
The Weymout’ Sir W. Baird ships.
The Cumberland 66 Somerset
The Newcastle 50
The Salisbury 50 „ „ Dent
And two Company’s ships, the number of whose guns
The French had—.
Le Zoditupue 74 guns. (Name unknown, hilled)"
L’lllustre 64 „ M. de Ruis French
L’Actif 64 „ M. Beauehaire Royal Navy.
La Fortune 64 „ M. Lobiy
Le Centaur 74 „ M. Survilla
Le Comte de Provence 74 „ M. La Chaise
Le Vengeur 54 „ M. Palliere
Le Due d’OrlSaus 50 „ M. Surville Jr. Company’s
Le Saint Louis 50 „ M. Johanne I
Le Due de Bourgogne 60 „ M. Beuvet
Le Minotaur 74 „ M. d’Eguille J
 THE FEENCH BEATEN AT SEA. 589

quarter past two o’clock in the afternoon, the action took chap.
place, the crews of both fleets standing manfully to their •—
guns and cannonading one another with great fury. For 1759.
two hours the battle was undecided. By that time several
of the ships on both sides were greatly crippled, and some
of those of the French leaving the line for the purpose of
refitting, the officer who commanded the ‘ Zodiaque,’ her
captain having been killed, put his helm up to follow
them. tl’Ache, running to reverse the order, was struck
in the. thigh by a grape shot, and fell senseless. There
was no one left to correct the error, and the other ships
of the French. squadron following what they believed to
be then’ Admiral’s order, hauled out of action, and made
sail to join their consorts, the English being too crippled
to follow them. On the 16th,’d’Ache anchored in the
Pondichery roadstead. He had brought with Mm a sea¬
sonable supply of between three and four lakhs of rupees
in diamonds and piastres, but he sensibly diminished the
pleasure which his arrival had caused by the startling an¬
nouncement of his intention to return at once to the Isle
of France. Knowing well what must result from such a
desertion, the English fleet being still on the coast, Bally,
unable from sickness to move himself, sent MM. de Leyrit,
de Bussy, and de Landivisiau, accompanied by other coun¬
cillors, to remonstrate with the admiral. But d’Ache,
brave iu action, had neither moral courage nor strength of
character. He could not dismiss from his mind the idea
that he had been beaten in the late action, and that he
would infallibly be beaten again. He had done, he be- ■
lieved, his duty, by bringing to Pondichery the supplies of
•which it stood in need, and he would do no more. It was
in vain that the Commissioners, that Lally himself, pointed
out to him in writing that the English fleet had suffered
more than his, and that his departure would inevitably
lead to the fall of Pondichery; in vain did they beg him
to stay at least till the movements then going on in the *
neighbourhood of Wandewask should have been con- M
540 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, eluded; in vain did the^Council send to him "a protest

-iEJL— signed by every one of its members, fixing upon him the
1759. responsibility for the loss of Pondichery, and threatening
to make his conduct the subject of a special representation
to the Crown. In vain. D’Ache, usually so irresolute and
doubting, was firm on this point, and despite their repre¬
sentations, sailed, never to return.* Meanwhile, the Eng¬
lish, reinforced by the arrival of 300 men belonging to the
battalion of Colonel Eyre Coote, then being conveyed out
in four ships commanded by Rear-Admiral Cornish, de¬
termined to beat up the French cantonments on the Palaur.
With tins object, Major Brereton, massing about 2,000
Europeans, made a dash on September 16 at Tripatore,
captured in it thirty men, and then moved quickly on
Wandewash. M. Geoghegan, an officer of Irish extraction
who commanded there, on learning the first movements of
Brereton, hastily collected 1,100 men, and posted them in
such a manner as best to meet any attack that might be
delivered. On the night of the 29th, Brereton, bringing
up his men, made a gallant attempt to carry the place, and
had at first some success. Soon, however, as Geoghegan
had anticipated, his troops became entangled in the narrow
streets which lay between the town and the fort, and were
exposed to a heavy fire from the latter, as well as from the
French troops under cover. They being' thus checked,
Geoghegan determined to turn the repulse into a defeat.
At daybreak, therefore, he assaulted the English in the
positions they had gained in the nighttime, and after a
fight of two hours’ duration, drove them completely out,
with a loss of eleven officers and 200 men. The French
loss was scarcely less severe in' point of numbers ; amongst
their dead was M. de Mainville, the whilom commander

* lie sailed, as he said he would, Lolly mentions that the day after his
on the 17th, but the protest was sent return, the English fleet passed Pon¬
after him, and reached him at sea. dichery in disorder, giving d’AchiS a
Upon this he returned to Pondichery, good opportunity of attaching it, but
but after staying there five days, he that he abstained.
again set off as stated in the text.
 BTJSSY SENT TO BUSSALUT JUNO. 541

before Trifchinopoly. The victory might have had impor- chap.

tant results, but the illness of Lally, the indiscipline of the •—A—-
army, the absence of cl’Ache, not less than the early arri- 1769--
val of Colonel Coote with the remainder of his regiment,
combined to render it abortive. After the repulse, the
English cantoned themselves in the neighbourhood of
Conjeveram, there to-wait the expected reinforcements.
Meanwhile Lally, hopeless of aid from any other
source, had felt himself impelled to seek alliances in the
quarter in which he had at first laughed them to scorn.
Ever since the departure of Bussy from the Dekkan, affairs
had taken a turn in that locality most unfavourable to
French interests. In the first instance, Nizam Ah', the
brother next in order to Salabut Jung, had once more re¬
sumed his pretensions, and was again grasping at supreme
power. Salabut Jung, faithful, so long as the French
possessed the ability to aid him, to his old alliances, had,
as we have seen, marched into the ceded provinces to
assist them, only on their defeat to transfer the right to
those provinces to the English, and to conclude with them
a solid treaty. Nizam Ali, having ever shown himself a
hater of the French, and the force of circumstances neu¬
tralising more and more the power of Salabut Jung,* the
importance of endeavouring to attach the third surviving
brother, Bussalut Jung, to French interests, was not over¬
looked by Lally. Bussy therefore, who by the recent
orders from Europe had received a commission as second
in command of the army, proposed to Lally to tempt Bus¬
salut by the offer of the Nawabship of the Carnatic. Lally
was at first unwilling, as he had already conferred the
appointment on the son of Chunda Sahib, but, very desi¬
rous not to lose a chance in his then distressed circum¬
stances, he directed Bussy to proceed at once to Wande-

* It maybe interesting to those ment.of t ,e French alliance. He

•who have so far followed the for- was irnpri oned by Nizam Ali in
tunes of Salabut Jung, to know that 1761, and aurdered by his order in
he did not long survive the abandon- 1763.
I
542 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

CHAP, wash, and to make the„best arrangement in his power

—A—- with Bussalut Jung.
1759. Ever since the siege of Madras, Bussy had remained at
Pondichery, suffering from various disorders. On receiv¬
ing, however, Lally’s instructions, he started for Wande-
wash, where he arrived the day after the repulse of the
English. His orders were to cause himself to be received
at Wandewash as second in command of the forces, to
remain there only four-and-fwenty hours, then, taking
with him all the European cavalry and three companies
of infantry, to go to the camp of Bussalut Jung, there to
arrange with him the terms of an alliance. But the
account of the repulse of the English reached Mm on
arrival, and caused him to deviate somewhat from these
instructions. He thought that the English might possibly
be disposed to meet him in the open plain, and he hailed
the prospect of thus operating against them on his own
account. Collecting, then, all his forces, he marched, the
third day after his arrival, on Tripatore, and took it.
But as he soon discovered that the English had retired to
Conjeveram, he sent back the army to Wandewash, and
proceeded with his appointed escort to Arcot. But here
the rains and other causes detained him another week,
and when, at last, he did set out for the camp of Bussalut
Jung, who all this time had been anxiously awaiting his
arrival, it was only to be recalled by the distressing intel¬
ligence that the army at Wandewash had mutinied. It
was too true. At daybreak, on October 17, the European
portion of the French army, at a given signal, took pos¬
session of the field artillery, and, leaving their officers and
colours, marched six miles in the direction of Madras.
Here they halted, and elected officers from amongst their
sergeants, in the place of those they had abandoned, one
La Joie, Sergeant-Major of the regiment of Lorraine, being
appointed Commander-in-Ckief. The new officers, having
first made every disposition for the order and defence of
the camp, then drew up and despatched a letter to Tally,
 MUTINY OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 543

in which1 they expressed their .willingness to allow him chap.

four days for reflection, and for the payment of the arrears 1—>
due to them ; on the expiration of that time, should these 1759.
demands not be complied with, they would proceed to
extremities.
The fact was that the soldiers, themselves ten months
in arrear, had been deceived by the reports, industriously
circulated, as to the amount hoarded by Tally himself,
and despatched by him in a frigate to France. It fortu¬
nately happened, however, that the Sergeant-Major La
Joie was himself thoroughly well-disposed towards his
general, and had only accepted the office with a view to
bring the revolters promptly to their duty. His endea¬
vours in this respect were seconded by the prudent con¬
duct of Tally. As soon as the intelligence of the revolt
reached him he assembled the Council, and appealed to
the patriotism of its members to assist him in this urgent
need by their subscriptions, he himself heading the list
with a donation of 20,000 rupees. Many of those present,
including Father Tavaur, M. Boileau, and the Chevalier
de Crillon, responded heartily to the call. De Leyrit, not
content with holding back himself, affirmed that the pub¬
lic funds could supply nothing, because the diamonds and
piastres, brought by d’Acke, had not then been converted
into silver. Nevertheless, a sufficient sum to distribute
six months’ pay was collected, and with this sum the
Adjutant-General of the army, Viscount de Fiunel, was
sent to negotiate with the troops. As, however, the re¬
volted soldiers would not listen to this officer, Tally sent
Crillon, whose influence over them had always been very
great, in his place. After some conversation, the soldiers
agreed to accept six months’ pay down, and the balance
on November 10 ; they demanded at the same time a
complete amnesty for the past, and requested that their
officers would come and place themselves once again at
their head; they added that ‘ they were one and all im¬
bued with sentiments entirely French, and that they were
i
544 THE LAST STSUGGLE FOE EMPIEE.

chap, ever ready to fight for their country and for the honour of
-—A— their king, and to submit to their superiors.’ * Thus did
1759. the troops return to their duty. Their revolt, however,
had had the effect of dissipating any hopes that might
have been- formed from the combined action of Bussalut
Jung. For this chieftain, already impatient of waiting for
Bussy, retreated, on hearing of the revolt, in the direction
whence he had comer Bussy indeed followed him, after
appeasing the discontent which had already arisen amongst
his own troops, but, by the time he arrived in his camp,
the turn French affairs had taken had entirely indisposed
Bussalut Jung to the alliance. Bussy therefore contented
himself with raising money and troops amongst his former
friends, and with these he returned on December 10 to
Arcot, with what effect will be seen.
Meanwhile Daily, on the mutiny being quelled, deter¬
mined to put in force a project which nothing but the
direst necessity could have justified. This was to divide
his force and to send a portion of it to alarm the English
for Trichinopoly. It seemed, indeed, a rash measure to
weaken the force with which he would have to encounter,
in the then ensuing cold weather, the re-inforced army of
the English, and as such it was considered by de Leyrit
and others of the Council. But Dally was in very great
perplexity. He had not money enough do pay all his
troops, and he had a very strong idea that a certain por¬
tion of them—the Europeans in the service of the Com¬
pany—were not worth paying. He conceived, ..then, that
he would facilitate his own movements by sending away
troops in whom he had no confidence, at the same time
that he alarmed the English for the safety of a city they
had held so long, and confined their garrison within its
walls. Taking advantage of a repulse sustained by the
■/ English before Devicotta, he despatched Crillon at the
head of the battalion of India, and three companies of

* Memoire pour Lolly, p. 142.

 THE LAST CAMPAIGN. 545

grenadier's, to Seringham. OriU,on carried this island by chap.

assault on November -21, then leaving the battalion of —
India to keep the garrison in alarm, he rejoined Lally 1759.
-with his grenadiers.
Whilst Crillon -was engaged on 'this expedition, lally,
recovered from his illness, had proceeded to Wandewash,
and had marched thence with his army to Arcot. Here,
on December 10, he was joined by Bussy, at the head of
350 Europeans and 2,000 native irregulars. The com-
- mandant of these last had, however, fortified himself with
claims-upon the French Government for considerable
sums of arrears of pay. These he lost no opportunity of
presenting, and did so to such an extent—that, to use the
expression of Lally, he and his followers resembled more
a troop of creditors than a troop of auxiliaries. To pro¬
vide himself with native cavalry indispensable to his
campaign, Lally succeeded, after some negotiation, in
making an arrangement with Morari Eao for 2,000
horse.*
The campaign on which the rival nations were now
about to enter, promised to decide for a time the pos¬
session of the Carnatic. A defeat in the field would be
fraught with disaster to either, but more especially to the
French, who had not the command of the sea, and whose
resources were almost exhausted, whilst it was in the
power of the English to fall back upon Bengal, or at all
events to await the certain return of their feet after the
monsoon. Under these circumstances, it would have
seemed to be the policy of Lally to waif; to avoid an
engagement; and to* harass the communications of the
English, compelling them, if they were determined to
fight, to fight at a 'disadvantage. This at least was the
opinion of Bussy. But Lally was scarcely in circum¬
stances to act according to the rules of war. Owing to
546 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

CHAP, been compelled to witness, without being able to prevent

. XIL . it, the capture of Carangoly and Wandewash by the
1759. English. This inaction had produced its natural effect on '
the minds of his men. To follow, too, the other course,
it was necessary that lie should have supplies and money,
and he had neither. It was absolutely indispensable,
it appeared to him, that he should act with decision
and vigour. No sooner then had he been joined by
1760. Crillon from Seringham, on January 10, than feigning
a retiring movement in the direction of Pondichery, he
divided his army into two columns. Placing himself at
the head of one, lie changed its direction during the night,
crossed the Palaur, and moved rapidly upon Conjeverani.
Without attempting the pagoda, lie plundered the town,
captured 2,000 bullocks and other stores, and rejoining •
the other column, which had moved to support him,
marched the next day to Tripatore. Having by this
movement drawn Colonel Coote and a portion of his army
to Conjeveram, and obtained supplies for his men, he set
out on the 14th at the head of 600 Europeans and some
native troops to recover Wandewash, leaving the bulk of
the army under Bussy at Tripatore.
The fort of Wandewash was surrounded by the town
of the same name, and this was protected by a wall
flanked by small towers, and bordered by a hedge, a
great part of it being further protected by a ditch. It
was Lally’s plan to surprise and gain the town, then,
under cover of the narrow streets, to plant a battery
within a short’ distance of the fort, so that it might he
breached and carried before the English, whom he had
lured off to Conjeveram, could come up. It was a plan,
bold, well-considered, and feasible, but it required in its
execution the utmost promptitude and daring. These
qualities, it will be seen, were not exhibited. On the
night of the 12th he divi&e'd his tioops into two columns,
one under M. de Genlis to make a false attack, whilst he
should make a real one. But de Genlis’ party, consisting
 LALLY ATTEMPTS WAXDEWASII. 547

mostly of sailors, having beeru,seized with a panic, fell chap.

back upon the other column, the soldiejs of which, mis- . X1L .
taking them for enemies,-tired into them. The night 176°-
attack thus failed. Its failure, however, only made Lally
more furious. ‘ Since,’ he said, ‘ they had failed in the
night, he would teacl). them to carry it by day.’ Re¬
placing de Genlis by de Verdiere, he ordered the same
dispositions as on the previous evening. One party he
despatched close to the wall, and made them lie on their
faces, whilst Colonels de Orillon and de Poete ran in front
to fathom the water in the ditch. The fire, however,
was so hot, that the men of the column hesitated to
follow them, until Lally, who came up at the moment,
waving his sword, and telling them that now was the time
to show their good will towards him, dashed forward into
the ditch. His soldiers followed him and carried the
town.
Now was the time for despatch. To establish a battery
en barbette, and to open a fire as soon as it should be con¬
structed—this was Tally’s design. But his chief engineer,
M. Durre, insisted on proceeding as if he had been en¬
gaged in a regular siege. ‘ The soldiers,’ wrote Lally,
‘ said openly, that it seemed as though they were about to
attack Luxemburg.’ It resulted from these methodical
tactics, that four days were wasted in the construction of
batteries; two more in rectifying its defects; on the
seventh day, the English appeared advancing to the relief
of the place.
The great blow, well contrived, having thus failed in
consequence of the absence of the two qualities essential
to its success, there but remained now to Lally the chances
of a battle. By the arrival of Bussy, rvho joined him on
the evening of the 20th, he was able, after leaving 150
Europeans and 300 sepoys in the batteries, to bring into
the field 1,350 European infimtry, about 200 of whom .
were sailors, and 150 cavalry. He had besides about ^
1,800 sepoys, and 2,000 Mahratta cavalry; but of the JH
548 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, former, all but 800 refused to be led into the field, whilst
—2^—^ but sixty of the JHahrattas were present, the remainder
1760- being engaged in foraging for the army. The force led
by Colonel Coote, on the other hand, consisted of 1,900
Europeans, of whom eighty only were cavab’y, and 8,350
natives* On hearing from the Mghratta scouts that the
English wfere approaching, Tally hastened to draw up his
men in a single line. His left, thrown forward, resting
on a tank, and supported by an intrenchment on therother
side of it, formed an obtuse angle with his line, and com¬
manded the ground over which the enemy must pass.
This intrenchment was manned by the sailors and armed
with a couple of guns. His centre rested on nothing, but
about 400 yards in its rear were two defiles, protected by
a dyke, and guarded by fifty men and two guns. These
fifty men were drawn up in front of the head of the de¬
files, so as to have the appearance of a reserve destined to
support the first line. Between the intervals of the regi¬
ments were posted the guns, sixteen' in number. The
cafalry were on the right. Hally himself commanded in
the centre, and Bussy on the left.,
Meanwhile Coote, who by a series of able manoeuvres
had obtained a position which enabled him to force an
action, no sooner beheld the disposition made by the
Erench than he drew up his men in orderr of battle and
advanced. He himself led the first line, consisting of his
own regiment and a battalion of sepoys; the two Com¬
pany’s regiments came next, Colonel Draper’s regiment
on the left. As he approached the French, to whose'
position his own was oblique, the guns from the intrench¬
ment near the tank opened upon him, and Hally, thinking
he noticed some confusion in the English left, in conse¬
quence of this fire, deemed the moment opportune to
charge with his cavalry. He galloped up, therefore, to

* The number of the French here reports: that of the English has been
given has been adopted from Lally’s taken from Orme.
 BATTLE OF WANDEWASH. 549

the right! of the line, and placing himself at the head of chap.
his horse, gave the order to charge. Not a man, how- —cl¬
ever, stirred. Attributing this to the ill-feeling of the 1760.
commanding officer, Lally displaced him on the spot, and
ordered the second in. command, M. d’Aumont, to follow
him. But d’Aumont jjpving likewise refused, Lally placed
him under arrest, and addressing himself to tire men in. a
body, ordered them to charge. M. d’Heguerty with the
left squadron at once advanced, and Cornet Bonnessay
calling out that it would be shameful thus to abandon
their general, 'the others followed. Lally, having thus
induced them to move, made a detour so as to sweep
dowu on the left flank of the English force. He had
already arrived within 100 yards of it, driving the English
horse before him, when Draper, whom the delay caused
by the refusal of the French cavalry to charge had warned
of the danger, brought up two pieces of cannon loaded
with grape, and opened them on the French horse. The
fire was so well directed, that about fifteen men in the
front line were disabled, and, although had the enemy
persisted, the English would not have had time to reload,
the effect was to infuse a panic amongst them. They
therefore fled, leaving their leader alone. Lally, thus
deserted, galloped towards the infantry in the centre,
upon which the English guns in the other part of their
, line had already opened. He found them eager for an
advance. Placing himself at their head, he formed them
in column and marched against the English line. Be-
gardless of the fire which thinned its ranks as it advanced,
the French column charged, and by its superior weight
broke that part of thS English line which it attacked.
The unbroken part of the English line, however, imme¬
diately formed up on its flank, and threw the column into
disorder. The men on both sides becoming then mingled
together, a hand-to-hand contest ensued, which was yet
undecided, when a fatal occurrence on the left of the
French line determined the fate of the day.
550 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap. The extreme left of the French constituted the point

_XI?—- d’appui of Lully’s position. It rested, as we have said,
1760. on a tank, in front of which and forming an obtuse angle
with his line, was an intrenchment, from which two pieces
of cannon played on the advancing English. So long as
Lally held this firmly, the occurreiices in the other part
of the line were of secondary importance, for the English,
even if successful, could not follow up an advance without
exposing their flank. But it happened, unfortunately for
him, that whilst his centre was engaged in desperate con¬
flict with the English centre, a shot from the artillery on
the enemy’s right blew up a tumbril in the intrenchment,
killing the Chevalier de Poete, and placing eighty men
hors de combat. For was this the extent of the damage
it occasioned; for such was the panic caused by the ex¬
plosion, that the sailors ran out of the intrenchment,
abandoning the guns, and not stopping till they had taken
refuge behind the right. Coote, noticing this, ordered
Brereton to carry the intrenchment. But, before he could
reach it, Bussy, who commanded on the French left,
hastily collected some fifty or sixty men of Lally’s regi¬
ment, and led them into the intrenchment. They reached
it just in time to fire a volley at the advancing English,
which mortally wounded Brereton, but did not stop his
men, who coming on with a rush, carried the"post. Whilst
the key of the French position was thus carried, the Eng- 4
lish left, freed from the hostile cavalry, had marched to
the aid of its centre and fallen on the right of the Lorraine
brigade. This body, attacked in front and on both flanks,
and noticing the loss on the left of the position, fell back
in disorder, not, however, till it had lost its commandant
and many officers, and had covered itself with glory.
Bussy, meanwhile, after the loss of the intrenchment, had
brought up the Lally brigade to recover it, and if possible
to restore the battle. But whilst leading on his men to a
bayonet charge, his horse was shot, and he, falling to the
ground, -was taken prisoner. The brigade having thus
 DEFEAT OF THE FEENCH. 551

lost its leader, opposed in front>by a superior force, whose chap.

artillery then played upon it, threatend also ou its right -—A—-
flank by the victorious centre-and left of the enemy, fell 1700.
back in its turn, and abandoned the field. At this con¬
juncture, the cavalry, recovered from its panic, advanced
to the front, and interposing itself between the retiring
infantry and the advancing English, effectually' put a stop
to pursuit. The Trench were thus enabled to rally at a
distance of less than a mile from the field of battle, and
to carry off also the party they had left before the fort
of Wandewash.
Such was the battle of Wandewash—a battle which,
though the numbers on each side were comparatively
small, must yet be classed amongst the decisive battles
of the world, for it dealt a fatal and decisive blow to
Trench domination in India. It shattered to the ground
the mighty fabric which Martin, Dumas, and Dupleix had
contributed to erect; it dissipated all the hopes of Daily;
it sealed the fate of Pondiohery. By it, the superiority
in the field, which during that war had rested mainly
with the Trench in the Carnatic, was transferred entirely
to the English. It was the proximate cause why Dally,
who had himself acted as besieger before Madras, should,
in his turn, suffer the misfortune of being himself besieged
in Pondichery.
The«conduct of Dally in this action, the dispositions
that he made, the fact of his fighting a battle at all, have
been severely condemned by his enemies. The candid
military critic is, however, Hound to do him justice on
all these points. His plan was the best he could have
adopted. Drawing Coote by a skilful manoeuvre from the
line of the Palaur, he assaulted Wandewash, took the
town, and had he been well served, would have taken the
fort also. Baffled in this, he determined to accept a
battle on ground which he had reconnoitred and chosen.
No doubt to deliver a battle, defeat in which must be
ruin, is very dangerous policy. But with Dally it was
552 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, unavoidable. He had nof,,the means of attemptifig a war

•—of manoeuvres. Straitened as were his resources, such a
1760. policy must have resulted-in a retreat to Pondichery to
be followed by a siege there. This result being unavoid¬
able, he was surely right in attempting to ward it off by
a direct blow. #
Then, again, as to his conduct in the action. He, at
least, is not to be blamed for the behaviour of his cavalry.
Had they followed him, he would, he says, have thrown
the left of the English force into disorder so great that
an advance of the infantry must have changed it into an
overthrow. He is not to be blamed for, he could not have
foreseen, the accident in the intrenchment which caused
its evacuation, and lost him the battle. His disposi¬
tions were good. The intrenchment served as the pivot
whereon to move his army; had that been held, he could
not have been beaten. Accidents not very dissimilar have
before this decided the fate of greater battles, without
that prejudice and passion have fixed the blame on the
commander!
The remainder of the campaign may be told in a few
« words. The next day Tally fell back to Chittaput, taking
with him all his wounded; thence, sending the Mahrattas
and native troops to Arcot, he retreated to Gingee, but
as at that point the English were nearer than himself to
Pondichery, he made a cross-march to Valdaur,« fifteen
miles from that city. In this position he was able to cover
Pondichery, and to receive supplies'from the south. He
was fortunate in being able' to do so much, for had the
English only followed up their victory with vigour, they
would* have reached Pondichery before Tally, and that
place, destitute of provisions and of troops, would pro¬
bably have surrendered on the first summons. The
English leader, however, preferred the slower method of
reducing the subordinate places held by the French—•
a policy which the absence of d’Achd and the utter
abandonment of Pondichery by the mother-country al-
 FRENCH INDIA OVERRUN. 553

lowed him to carry out unmolested. In pursuance of this chap-

resolution, Coote carried Chittaput on January 28, and —
Arcot on the 9th of the following month. Timery, Devi- 1760.
cotta, Trinomalee, and Alamparva. fell about the same
time; Earical surrendered on April 5 ; on the I5tb, Dally
was constrained to retreat from Valdaur to within the
hedge that bounded Pondichery; and on the 20th, Chil-
lumbrum, and a few days later Cuddalore—the last im¬
portant place except Thiagar and Gingee held by the
Drench in the Carnatic—fell into the hands of the Eng¬
lish. It is not to be supposed that all these places were
lightly given up. Some of them, indeed, Dally would
have done well tq evacuate, so as to carry with him the
garrisons; but Earical, so long in the possession-of the
Drench, their second seaport, he made a great effort to
preserve.* But what could he do ? He found the enemies
he met with inside the walls of Pondichery worse than
those he had to combat without; he found self-interest
everywhere, patriotism nowhere. The inhabitants re¬
fused even to don the soldiers’ uniform, though only for
the purpose of making a show before the enemy. Sedi¬
tion, cabals, and intrigues—everyone striving to cast upon
Dally the discredit of the inevitable ruin that awaited
them —everyone thwarting his wishes, and secretly coun¬
teracting his t>rders—each man still bent on saving for
himself -what he could out of the wreck—this was the
internal condition of Pondichery—these the men with
respect to whom it might be said that an appeal to pa¬
triotism was an appeal to a feeling that, long deadened,
had now ceased entirely to exist. ! From this time,’ says
Dally, ‘Pondichery, without money, without ships, and
without even provisions, might be given up for lost.’ Yet
though he could not be blind to the impending result,

* The commandant at Karical -was poor and faint a resistance, that he

M. Renault de St. Germain, the same was brought to trial, and sentenced
who had surrendered Chandemagore to he cashiered. Lally says he de-
to Clive. At Karical he made so served death.

4
554 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap. Lally himself used everyr-effort to avert the catastrophe.

He treated with the famous Hyder Ali, then commander
1760. of the Mysore armies, for the services of 10,000 men, one-
half of them horse, transferring at once to Hyder the
fortress of Thiagar, and promising him, in case of a favour¬
able issue of the war, to make over to him Trichinopoly,
Madura, Tinivelly, and all the places he might conquer
in the Carnatic. In pursuance of this agreement, Mukk-
doom Ali arrived at Thiagar on June 4, and at Pondichery
a few days later. The intrigues of the Councillors ren¬
dered this treaty partially abortive, but this did not pre¬
vent Muklidoom Ali from attacking, on July 18, a corps
^ of 180 English infantry, 50 hussars, and nearly 8,000
native troops, inflicting upon them a severe defeat, and
forcing the survivors to take refuge in Tiruvadi.* But it
was not alone by such attempts at native alliances that
Lally endeavoured to turn the tide of misfortune setting
in so strongly against him. Weak as he was in European
infantry, he determined to make one bold stroke to rid
himself of the besieging enemy. To understand the plan
he adopted it will be necessary to state that, after the re¬
tirement of the French within the bound-hedge which
forms the limits of Pondichery, the English had taken up
a -position, their right resting on the fort of Villenour, and
their left at the base of the hill of Perimbe,' the space be¬
tween covering an extent of about a mile and a half. In
front of Perimb4 they had, moreover, thrown up a redoubt,
armed with three pieces of cannon, whilst the centre was
covered by a house in a garden surrounded by a hedge,
connected by a tree avenue with the town. The plan
which Lally arranged, and which was so skilfully devised
as to deserve success, provided that, whilst his right column
should surprise the redoubt in front of Perimbe, and the
centre the hedge-bound house, the left, which was sta¬
tioned on the other side of the river Ariancopan, should

* Wilks; Orme.
 LALLY PAILS IN A SOKTIE. 555

cross that river, and fall upon* the rear of the enemy, chap.
who, it was calculated, would be thrown into utter con- —-
fusion by the diversity of the attacks. To guard against 1760.
mistakes, Tally the clay previous accompanied the com¬
mander of the left column, M. d’Arambure, over the
ground he was to take, indicating the point at which he
was to cross the river, and the exact direction he was
then to pursue.
But a fatality seemed to attend all the operations of Sept. 4.
Tally. The surprise indeed was complete—for having
given no intimation of the intended movement to his coun¬
cillors they were unable to betray him ? the right assault
completely succeeded, the redoubt being quickly carried ;
the centre attack was desperately contested. The Trench
never fought better. Colonel Co'ote, on his side, seeing
the importance of the place, brought up his best troops to
defend it. But notwithstanding all his efforts, the Trench,
though in the regiment of Tally alone they had lost eight
sergeants besides several privates, still persisted, hoping
to hear every. minute the sounds of the assault on the
enemy’s rear. Just as these hopes were at their highest,
d’Arambure and his men appeared, not in the rear of the
enemy, but between the assaulting columns and the town!
This officer, who on other occasions had behaved so well,
would appear to have lost his head; he crossed the river
at a far lower point than had been pointed out to him,
and brought his men to the attack in exactly the opposite
direction to that indicated by Tally. By this false move,
he rendered impossible a success which, if attained, would
have deferred, if it had not altogether prevented, the
catastrophe that was to follow.
The end was now near at hand. On September 16,
Monson, who had succeeded Coote in the command of the
English force, delivered an assault on the Oulgarel post,
and compelled the Trench to quit the defence of the bound-
hgdge, and to retire under the walls of the place. This
attack, however, cost the English many men, and Monson
556 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

chap, -was sp severely wounded? that Colonel Coote returned to

—take up his command. Notwithstanding this movement,
1760. which shut out all supplies frdm Pondichery, Lally deter¬
mined to continue the defence, and prohibited all mention
of surrender. Every measure that could be adopted to pro¬
cure sustenance for the troops was taken; contributions
were levied ; grain was dug out of places where it had
been buried for concealment; taxes were imposed; * the
idle sections of the native inhabitants were turned adrift:
no precaution in fact was neglected to prolong the defence
of the town till the arrival of d’Achfi, whose squadron was
even then daily expected!
But, on December 24, there remained in the magazines
but eight days’ full rations for the soldiers. It had become’
necessary to reconsider the position. Under these circum¬
stances, Lally, who for the three weeks preceding had been
confined to his bed by sickness, directed the assembly of a
mixed council to take into consideration the terms which
should be offered to the English. The members of the
party opposed to Lally, unwilling to take upon themselves
any share in the responsibility of a capitulation, evaded
this order. But an event occurred which rendered their
evasion of the.less consequence. On the 31st the road¬
stead of Pondichery was visited by one of those storms not
uncommon at that season on the Coromandel coast. The
effect of this on the English fleet was most disastrous.
Three large ships were driven on shore two miles below
Pondichery; three others, having on board 1,100 Euro¬
peans, foundered; all the remainder were severely injured.
Nor did the siege works escape. All the batteries and
redoubts raised by the army were destroyed. Soldiers,
unable to carry their muskets, had thrown them away in
despair; all the ammunition, except that in store, was ren¬
dered useless; every tent had been blown clown; so great

* From tie operation of these lat- town were sptcially exempted by fte
ter the European inhabitants of the Council, de Leyrit presiding. *
 THE LAST CHANCE THROWN AWAY. 557

was the’confusion that had a^ortie been made by the chap. '
garrison, not a hundred men could have been collected to --Xf-.-
resist it.. The question of & sortie was indeed mooted in 1760. _
Pondichery, and though such a movement would, owing
to the still raging wind and the inundation caused by the
storm, have been attended with great difficulties, it ought
certainly, even as a last despairing blow, to have been
attempted. But who was there to organize such a move¬
ment ? Tally lay helpless in his bed; his orders canvassed
and cavilled at rather than obeyed. With the enemy at
their gates, the citizens of Pondichery thought more of
combining to thwart the general they hated, than of
effectually opposing the foe, who threatened them with
destruction. JSTo sortie, therefore, was made.
Nevertheless, the storm had at least the effect of re- 1761.
opening the door of hope to Lally and the garrison. If
d’Ache, or, failing d’Ache, if even five French ships were
to arrive, the damaged English fleet could be destroyed.
With the destruction of that fleet, deliverance, and with
it the command of the seas for at least twelve months
could be obtained.* .It became, therefore, an object with
Lally to provide subsistence for his men for another fort¬
night longer. To effect this, he sent to the Jesuit, Lavaur,
and informed him of his intention to search his convent
for grain, which he had reason to believe was stored there.
The reply to this was an agreement on the part of Lavaur
to subsist the garrison till January 13.
How terribly each day passed, how the expectation of
the arrival of d’Ache, eager and stimulating to action at

* There is no stronger proof of the instantly. Thus, on the strength of

incapacity of the Government of a mere rumour, the French Ministry
Louis Xtr., than that offered by the did not hesitate deliberately to sacri¬
idleness of d’Achd at this conjunc¬ fice India. They withheld the fleet
ture. On the mere rumour that the from the point threatened by an army
English Government were debating and ships of war, to heep it in the
a plan for an attach upon Bourbon, quarter that was menaced only by
the Cabinet of Versailles sent orders report. — Memoirs of Count Lully;
to d’Achd not to leave that island, or
should he have left it, to return to it
Voltaire’s Fragments.

4
558 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

• chap, the outset, became gradjjally more and more faint, till it
finally disappeared, can be better imagined than described.
1761. The English on their part were not idle. One week after
the storm they had nine ships in the roadstead ready for
action, and they had erected new batteries in the place of
those that had been destroyed. Further defence was
then impossible.- The French had but one day’s supply
of food remaining. On January 14, therefore, Lally
summoned a council of war, to debate regarding the
terms of surrender; whilst de Leyrit, though invited to
that council, assembled in opposition the Council of Pon-
dichery to draw up articles of capitulation for the in¬
habitants.
On the following day, the 15th, a deputation from Pon-
dichery was sent to the English camp. The terms pro¬
posed by Lally were virtually terms of unconditional
surrender, for although he declined to give up the town,
as not having authority to do so, and because arrange¬
ments between the two Crowns placed Pondichery, as he
pretended, out of risk of capture, yet he declined further
to defend it, and agreed to yield himself and his troops as
prisoners of war, stipulating only for the proper treatment
of the inhabitants, the religious houses, and for the safety
of the mother and sister of Eajah Sahib. In reply to
these propositions, Colonel Coote, declining 4o discuss the
question of the agreement between the two Crowns,
offered the French commander terms identical with those
offered by Admiral Watson to M. Kenault at Chander-
nagore, and by Lally himself to the commandant of Fort
St. David. These provided that the garrison and in¬
habitants should surrender, unconditionally, as prisoners
of war. Coote would only promise, in addition, to give
the family of Bajah Sahib a safe escort to Madras, and to
treat the garrison favourably.
On the following morning the English troops entered
the Villenour gate of the town, and in the evening took
possession of the citadel. The scene immediately pre-
 POXDICIIEEY SUEEENDEKS. 559

ceding that last act is thus described by the English his¬ CHAP.
XII.
torian of the war, himself a contemporary and a member
of the Madras Council. ‘ Jn the afternoon,’, writes Mr. 1761.
Orme, ‘ the garrison drew up under arms on the parade
before the citadel, the English troops facing them. Colonel
Coote then reviewed the line, which, exclusive of commis¬
sioned officers, invalids, and others who had hid themselves,
amounted to 1,100, all wearing the face of famine, fatigue,
or disease. The grenadiers of Tally and Lorraine, once
the ablest-bodied men in*the army, appeared the most
impaired, having constantly put themselves forward to
every service; and it was recollected that from their first
landing, throughout all the services of the field, and all
the distresses of the blockade, not a man of them had
ever deserted to the English army. The victor soldier
gave his sigh (which none but banditti could refuse) to
this solemn contemplation of the fate of war, which might
have been his own.’
The scenes that followed the surrender were little
creditable to the Eranco-Indian officials of Pondichery.
When Lally, directed by the victorious General to pro¬
ceed-under an escort of English soldiers to Madras, was
leaving the town in a palanquin, he was insulted by a
mob of some eighty of the principal adherents of de
Leyrit, two -of them members of his Council. These
ruffians, who had openly avowed their wish to despatch
him, were only prevented from executing their design by
the presence of the escort. But when, two minutes later,
Dubois, the intendant of the French General, and who
had in possession some most valuable documents, proving
the corruption that had reigned within the town, attempted
to follow his chief, he was assailed with the most furious
menaces. Dubois, who, though almost seventy years old
and nearly blind, was a man of spirit, turned round to
reply to these in'vectives, drawing his sword as he did
(
4
so. He was immediately attacked by one Defer, and
run through the body. His papers were at once secured
560 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOB EMPIEE.

chap, by the conspirators. "W|&11 might the French historian,*

—relating this incident—this crossing of the two French
1761. swords on the threshold of the city that had been lost to
France by French dissensions—forcibly describe it as la
fit image and striking resumi of the history of the last
three years of the French in India.’
We may be pardoned if for a few short sentences we
leave the direct thread of our history to follow Lally to
his last end. Sent from Madras to England, he found on
arrival there, that the hatred and fury with which he had
been regarded in India had followed him to France.
Allowed by the English Government to proceed to Paris
on his parole, he attempted to bring home against de
Leyrit and his Councillors the charges with which he had
threatened them in India. This movement on his part
had the effect of uniting against him all the different
parties criminated by his statement. Bussy and d’Ache,
de Leyrit and Moracin, Father Lavaur and the Councillors
of Pondichery—all made common cause against him. So
great was the effect of the converging assertions of these
different partisans, that even the Due de Clioiseul, one of
the most powerful noblemen in France, advised Lally to
seek safety in flight. But he, conscious of innocence,
preferred to meet all the charges against him before the
tribunals of his country. The proceedings were yet lan¬
guishing, when, in 1768,' Father Lavaur died. This
intriguing monk, to make sure of his own position, had
written two memoirs of the events that had happened at
Pondichery, the one favourable, the other inveterately
hostile, to Lally. His .papers, however, having fallen into
the hands of the promoters of the accusation against the
General, the favourable memoir was suppressed, and the
other given to the world, f Strange as it may seem in
the present day, this memoir was actually received by the
Parlement of Paris as evidence agains't Lally, and was

* M. Xavier Raymond. t Voltaire; Orme.

 TIIJ5 FATE OF LALLT. 561
mainly "decisive of his fate. Refused all legal aid by his chap.
judges, he was, after three years of lingering, agony—fit . XIL .
sequel to his struggles in Ihdia—convicted, by a majority, 1761.
of having betrayed the interests of the King and of the
Company, and sentenced to be beheaded. A request,
made by Marshal de Soubise ‘ in the name of the Army,’
for commutation of the sentence, was coldly refused, and
on May 9, 1766, transferred from his prison to a dung-
cart, gagged and guarded, Lally was led forth to the
scaffold—a striking example of the fate which, in the
France of Louis XV., awaited those who, though they
had given all their energies to their country,* and whose
faults were faults natural to humanity, had the misfortune
to be unsuccessful. Revolutionary France annulled the.
sentence which the France of the Bourbons passed upon
Lally, and restored to him his place in the annals of his
country. Whilst there are few, who, whilst they regret a
fate so untimely and so undeserved, do not recognise the
justice of the reversal of the sentence pronounced upon
Lally, none care to inquire after those whose combined
incapacity, corruption, and malevolence forged the bolt
by which he was struck down. No memoir records the
last hours of the palsied de Leyrit, or of the irresolute,
mindless d’Ache. Of Bussy—Bussy who promised so
well, whose performances up to a certain point were so
splendid—yet who deserted Dupleix in his misfortunes,
and who joined in the cabal against Lally—-of Bussy it is
only known that, after living luxuriouslyf on the enormous

* ‘No one,’ wrote Colonel Coote the time from Madras:—‘It is a con¬
after the capture, ‘ has a higher vincing proof of his abilities, the
opinion of Lally than myself. He managing so long and vigorous a de¬
has fought against obstacles which I fence in a place where he was held in
"believed invincible, and he has con¬
quered them. There is not another f Not only Bussy, hut de Leyrit
man in all India, who could have and all the Councillors of Pondichery,
kept on foot for the same length of took home with them'large fortunes.
time an army without pay, and re¬ Even that arch-intriguer, the Jesuit
ceiving no assistance from any quar¬ Lavaur, carried off with him 1,250,000
ter.’ francs, besides diamonds and hills of
Another English officer wrote at exchange to a large amount. Yet
0 0
I
562 THE LAST STRUGGLE FC EMPIRE.

CHAP, wealth he had acquired -in India, he returned' twenty

—years later, at the head of a fine army, to the Carnatic,
1761. there to lose his reputation and to die! The very Company
which had connived at his fate—which had shown itself
on every occasion timorous, narrow-minded, and unjust—
which had ruined and persecuted to death the most illus¬
trious of the proconsuls it had sent out to India—the
Company did not long survive the execution of Tally. It
died in 1769 1
The fall of Pondichery was the natural precursor of the
capture of the other places yet remaining to the French
in Southern India. On February 4, Thiagar surrrendered
to Major Preston, and on the 13th, Mahe to Major Munro.
Gingee presented greater difficulties than either of those
places to an attacking force, but on April 5, the garrison,
seeing the helplessness of its condition, surrendered on
favourable terms to Captain Stephen Smith. Of the
French troops in the service of the Company, 300 who
were on detached duty at the time of the siege, under
MM. Alain and Htigel, took service with Hyder All; 100
were embodied in the English army, in which, however,
they showed themselves as mutinously disposed as when
commanded by their own countrymen; the remainder
became prisoners of war.
We have now brought to a conclusion ‘the history of
that stirring episode, adorned with so many brilliant
names, and boasting of some of the most original and
striking achievements ever performed on Eastern soil.
Beginning with small means, then suddenly astonishing
the world by its dazzling promise, the venture of the
French in India was destined to end, thus early, in humili¬
ation and failure. It was the sad fate o£ France, in this,
the most unfortunate of her wars, to be disgraced on the
Continent, and to lose simultaneously her possessions in
 REFLECTION'S OS' BOURBON RULE.

the EaSt and in the West. Fkst, in endeavouring to save

Canada, she lost the best chance she ever had of con- '■
quering Southern India, for it cannot be doubted, but that
the troops, the ships, and the money, which .the 'French
Government diverted at the last moment from Lally’s
expedition, would have sufficed to make him victorious
everywhere on the Coromandel coast, might possibly even
have enabled him to carry out his meditated designs upon
Bengal. The diversion, whilst it caused the failure of the »
blow struck at English India, did not save Canada. After lj
Canada had fallen, sound policy would have dictated the
strengthening of Lally’s hands in the Carnatic, but the
troops and the money which might still have enabled
him to carry out his original designs, were frittered upon
the armies of the nominees of Madame de Pompadour—
the Soubises, the Bichelieus, the Contades, and the
Broglios, with their legions of opera-dancers and hair¬
dressers.* To keep up those costly armies—which never¬
theless were barely able to make head against a lieutenant
of the King of Prussia—and their more costly contingents,
French India was left without money sufficient to carry
on a campaign, without reinforcements, without even the
few ships that might have sufficed to save her. However
much, then, the candid Frenchman of the present day
may lament "the corruption that was rampant amongst
the officials of Pondichery—however he may mourn over
the want of unanimity in her Council, and the intrigues
of her Councillors—however much he may condemn the
absence of patriotic devotion that contributed to her fall—
he will still be forced to lay the chief blame at the door
of France, on the shoulders of the sensual monarch under
whose rule the 'resources of the kingdom were so lavishly
wasted and misdirected. Whilst English India received
plentiful supplies of men and ships in abundance, and

I
thought herself hardly used, because, in the last year of
* The reader is referred to Carlyle’s of the armies of Soubise and Riche-
graphic description of the followers lien, given in his F>-eclenek the Great.
564 the last struggle for empire. -

chap, the war, she did not alscvreceive her annual sifpply of
. xri: - money, French India, after the arrival of Lally’s troops,
176L received from the mother-country scarcely more than two
millions of francs! There could be but one result to such
a mode of supporting a colony, and that result appeared
on January 16, 1761.
We do not hesitate thus to fix the date of the final
failure to establish a French Empire in India, because up
to the moment of the actual capitulation, it was always
possible that the fall of Pondichery might be delayed,
and a chance afforded to the French of again asserting
their supremacy. United counsels and energetic action
so late even as January 1, 1761, might have caused the
annihilation of the besieging army; the arrival of d’Ache
up to the 6th would have forced the English to raise the
siege, and might even have insured the destruction of
their fleet. But" the events of January 16 made French
supremacy in the Carnatic for ever impossible. It is true
that the Peace of Paris restored to France, in 1763, Pon-
i dichery and her other dependencies in Southern India;
j but they were restored dismantled and defenceless, with
l their trade annihilated, with their influence gone, with
the curse of defeat and failure stamped upon their habita¬
tions ; they were restored at a time when England, using-
well the precious moments, had rooted herSelf firmly in
the soil. The difference in the power and position of the
rival settlements was shown clearly in 1778, when on the
breaking out of war between France and England, Pon¬
dichery was at once invested and captured by a British
• army.* It is true, indeed, that during that war, the
French made a desperate effort to profit by the misfortunes
of England in America, by sending out 3,000 men under
Bussy and a fleet under Suffren to assist Hyder Ali, then
alone almost a match for the few English in Madras. But

* Pondichery was restored to Peace of Amiens, captured again in

Prance by the Peace of 1783, cap- 1803, and finally restored in 1814 and
tured again in 1793, restored by the 1815.
 DIFFERENT CHARACTERS OF THE RIVALS. 5£5

whilst, *on sea, the splendid achievements of the greatest chap.

of French admirals covered with a halo of glory this last —
effort on the part of France to expel the English from the 17614
Carnatic, on land the campaign was productive of little
but disaster. Thenceforth the attempt was renounced,
and partisans and adventurers represented France at the
courts of native princes, and endeavoured, though in vain,
to accomplish by their means the result, which, at the
period we have described, had been indeed possible, but
which, after January 16, 1761, was for ever illusory and
hopeless.
But was there not, it may be asked, something due to
the different characters of the rival nations, that con¬
tributed to a result so disastrous to France P Much, very \
much, in our opinion. England, doubtless, in the greater (
wealth of her East India Company, in the greater influence
of its Directors with the Government, and in her free Par¬
liamentary system, possessed advantages which were denied
to France. We believe that the fact that the Directors of
the East Lidia Company were often members of Par¬
liament, and as such possessed considerable influence
with the Ministry of the day, tended not a little to that
prompt action of the latter, to that despatch of royal fleets
to defend the Company’s possessions, which acted so favour¬
ably for English interests. Under the despotic system of
France such action was but seldom taken; the Company
was, except in rare instances,, left to defend its possessions
with its own -ships alone. Whilst England, working in uni¬
son with its East India Company, saw clearly that imperial
interests required her to use imperial means to defend
the settlements of the Company, the France of Louis XV.,
throughout the epoch of which we have written, but once
raised herself to the height of regarding India from an im¬
perial point of view, and then, as we have seen, from her
own want of a resolute and decided policy, with the very
worst success. But, though this circumstance mainly
caused the fall of French India, there were other circum-
5<j6 THE LAST STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE.

CHAP.^tances dependent on. the eharacter_o£jbe agents' on the

spot, that contributed muchtcTthe same result. We con-
17(31. fess that before we had studied the public documents
which form the basis of this history, we could not under¬
stand how it was that characters so brilliant, so energetic,
so enterprising, as Dupleix, La Bourdonnais, Bussy, and
Lally, should have failed,.opposed as they were by men,
who, with the exception of Clive, must be regarded as
inferior to them in capacity. But the solution of the
question becomes after examination easy. Those four
Trench names shine out as bright lights from among a_
crowd of flickering satellites. It is they, or rather—for
he stands out far above the others—it is Dupleix, who
^/reflects the lustre of his great name upon the struggles of
his countrymen for empire in the East. He did it all.
He was unsupported except by Bussy. He it was who
caused the fame of the French nation to resound in the
palaces of Delhi, who carved out a policy which his rivals
^ seized and followed. He did not succeed, because he was
j not properly supported at home, because he was alone
i amongst his countrymen in India. Those contests for the
j possession of Trichinopoly showed that, even under the
j most favourable circumstances, his soldiers would not win

Ij battles. He could do everything but imbue them with his

own spirit. He was in fact alone—in everything supreme,
except as a soldier in the field.
If we examine, on the other hand, the conduct of the
English, we shall see numberless instances of the dogged
.•character of the nation. Not counting Clive, who was
but for a short time on the scene, there was not a man in
I the English settlements equal in genius to Dupleix. But,
1 again, there were many, very many among them, far
* superior to any of the subordinates of Dupleix, Bussy
alone excepted. The daring of Lawrence, the dogged
I pertinacity of Saunders and his Council, the vigour and
/ ability of .Calliaud, of Forde, of Joseph Smith, of Dalton,
j and of many others, stand out in striking contrast to the
 EDIT DUE TO DUPLEIX. 567

/feebleness, the incapacity, thg indecision, of the £aws, chap.

/ the d’Auteuils, the Brenniers, the Maissins, and others
i.wliom Dupleix was forced to employ. Never was Eng- 1761.
land better served than during that struggle. Never was
there more apparent, alike amongst her civil and military
agents, that patriotic devotion to duty, which ought to be
the highest aim of every servant of his country. In the
Prench settlement this feeling burned far less brightly.
The efforts of the greatest amongst her leaders were s/“.
marred and thwarted by the bickerings and jealousies of
subordinates. We see La Bourdonnais sacrificing the
best interests of Prance to his jealousy of Dupleix; Godei
heu, owing to the same feeling, undoing the brilliant work',
of his predecessor; Maissin refusing to annihilate the)
English atTrichinopoly; deLeyrit and his Council thwart-1
ing Daily; the very Councillors scrambling for illegal J
gains, and dabbling in peculation; those energies which 5
should have been united against a common enemy em¬
ployed to ruin one another. Under such circumstances
the result could not have been long deferred: sooner or
later it was inevitable. But for one man- the stake for
which the two countries played would never have been
so great. It was Dupleix who made French India, it
was Prance who lostjt. , If, in the present day, there
exist amongst her citizens regrets at the loss of an Empire
so vast, so powerful, so important, inhabited by a people
who were civilised when we were naked savages, and who
possess so many claims to the sympathy and attachment
of every intelligent European, it will be impossible for
Prance herself—however much she may condemn the
action of her Government of those days, and may lament
the infatuation and misconduct of her countrymen—to
suppress a glow of pride at the recollection that it was a
child of her soil who dared first to aspire to that great
dominion, and that by means of the impulse which he
gave, though followed out by his rivals, the inhabitants
of Hindostan have become permanently united to their
long-parted kinsmen—the members of the great family
of Europe.
 INDEX.

r*ss
 INDEX.

French*on, 202. French repulsed at, 40 note. Holds the appointment again
211. Taken by Lally, 504. Betaken
by the English,.553 Dumas, M?, appointed Governor of Pon¬
dichery, 69. His earlier career, 69.
Obtains permission to coin money, 71.
E ALTON, Captain, tries to rally the
English, 282. Joins Lawrence be¬
Aids Sahocrjee, 74. Is deceived by him,
75. Sends troops to occupy Karical,
fore Trichinopoly, 306. Beats up Law’s 77. Obtains a grant of it from Pertab
quarters, 311. Captures Elmiseram, Singh, 78. Prepares to defend Pon¬
313. Sent to attack d’Autenil, 317. dichery, 80. Receives the families of
In command at Trichinopoly, 377. Dost Ali and Chunda Sahib, 82. His
Fails in an attempt to drive the French replies to Raghojee Bhonsla, 83. Re-
out of Seringham, 379. Operates on ceives Sufder Ali and Chunda Sahib,
the fears of Viraua, 379. Applies to 86. Applies for aid to the Isle of
Lawrence for relief, 379. Observes France, 88. His wise behaviour to¬
the movements of the French, 389 wards Raghojee, 90. The honours
Daood Khan, Nuwab of the Carnatic, his showered upon him, 90-91. Character
- 1 m Mr. Pitt, 138. Enforces it, of his administration, 91
139 Dupleix, M., his early career, 65. Ap¬
Dauphinc, I-le, pointed chief of Chandernagore, 67.
Improves its trade, 68. Succeeds
Day, Mr., founds Madras, 138 Dumas as Governor of Pondichery, 91.
Dekkan, the, description of, 338 Its state on his arrival, 93. His policy
Deo Raj, his helplessness against the of ostentation, 95. Is crippled by the
French, 466. Pacifies the Subadar, 467 Company, 95. His bold and self-reliant
Desforgos, M., appointed councillor at measures, 96. Is thanked for his dis¬
Madras, 154 obedience, 97. Proposes to Mr. Morse
Despr&nosnil, M., appointed to command to be neutral during the war, 99. His
at Madras, 160. Protests against La. defenceless position, 100. Applies to
Bourdonnais’ usurpation of authority, Anwaroodeen, 103. His friendly cor¬
161. Beplies to La Bourdonnais, 164. respondence with La Bourdonnais, 127.
Succeeds him at Madras, 177. Threat¬ States his views regarding Madras,
ened by Maphuz Khan, 188. Sends a 129. Protests against the plan of La
detachment to drive him off, 190. Be- Bourdonnais, 132. Sends intimation
ealled to Pondichery, 195 to him at Madras, 142. Again, 143.
Devicotta, the English retreat from, 239. His agreement with Anwaroodeen, 147.
Stormed by them, 239. Taken hy the Intimates the same to La Bourdonnais,
French, 508. Betaken by the English, 147. The reasons for his policy, 151.
Writes sharply to La Bourdonnais, 153.
Dordelin, JVI., senior naval officer at Pon¬ Sends him a touching letter, 161. Ap¬
dichery, 178. Ordered to Pulicat, 178. points an executive commission to carry
Succumbs to La Bourdonnais, 178. out his orders, 162, His feelings on
Sails with four ships to Acheen, 181. learning the arrest of the deputies, 165.
Arrives at Pondichsry, 202. Proceeds He protests, 165. Receives overtures
to Goa, 202. Thence to the islands, from La Bourdonnais, 167. His di¬
209 lemma, 168. Is strengthened by the
Dost Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic, grants arrival of a squadron, 168. The instruc¬
permission to Dumas to coin [money, tions he received, 169, and note. Offers
71. Is defeated and slain, 79 conditions to La Bourdonnais, 171.
Draper, Colonel, the conqueror of Manilla, His disinclination to attend to the new
520. Heads a sortie against the French, proposals of La Bourdonnais, 179.
522. Is repulsed, 522. His able con¬ Reasons for supposing him to have
duct at Wandcwash, 549 been sincere, 186. His difficulties re¬
Dubois, M., Intendant of theFrench Army, garding Madras, 188. Resolves to re¬
is assassinated, 559 tain it, 189. Sends instructions to
Dulaurent, M., appointed Councillor at Despr^mesnil, 190. -Orders Paradis to
Madras, 154. Protests against La relievo Madras, 191. Appoints Paradis
lourdon: Governor of Madras, 194. Resolves to
drive the English from Fort St. David,
196. Is forced to appoint de Bury to
576 INDEX.

258. Beat Nazir Jung, 264. Obtain,

great increase of territory, 269. Beat Restores the Swiss soldiers to the
the English at Volconda but fail to English, 420. Cuts off supplies from
follow up their -victory, 281. Shut up tfee army, 424. Replaces Mainville by
the English in Trichinopoly, 282. Are Maissin, 425. Whom he instructs to
beaten by Clive, 297. Again, 298. connive at the English movements, 425.
Retreat into Seringham, 313. Surrender Resolves on peace at any price, 427.
to the English, 322. Beat the English Obtains one, 428. Its disgraceful con¬
at Vicravandi, 327. Beaten by them ditions, 429. He abandons all the
at Balioor, 331. Defeat the Mahrattas, 1 431. His strange
t. Again, 354. Again, 355.^ Driven w 2,433. Embarks for
Europe, 434. Good effect of his de¬
>f four provinces, 3 parture, 435
. . fit Captain Chaco at Tiruvadi, 381. Goens, Commodore Eyckloff van, drives
Are defeated at the Golden Rock, 385. tho Erench from Trincomalce, 20. Or¬
Again, 390. Again at tho Sugarloaf dered to attack St. Thom6, 20. Takes
Rock, 393. Take refuge in Seringham,
393. Are repulsed at Trichinopoly,
398. Causes of the repulse, 398. Sur¬
prise the English at Coutapara, 404.
Repulsed near the Sugarloaf Rock, 405. Goupil, M., commands.a Erench detach¬
Make peace with the English, 427. ment, 245. Acts for Bussy at Hydra-
Refuse to aid Suraj-ood-Dowla against bad, 3 62. His weakness and indecision,
the English, 452. Beaten off Nega- 362. Consents to divide his forces, 365
503. Take Cud( >, 505. Griffin, Admiral, arrives with his fleet oil
■t St. David, 508. Repulsed Cuddalore, 207. Outwitted by M.
from xanjore, 514. Beaten off Tran- Bouvet, 210. Returns to England, 216
quobar, 515. Beaten at Condore, 532. Guillard, M., appointed member of tho
Beaten off Eort St. David, 539. Army
mutinies, 542. Returns to its duly,
544. Beaten at. Waudewash, 550. Sur¬
render Pondichcry, 558. Reflections on TTALLYBURTON, Mr, offers to treat
the character of,in India, 565,566. The H for the surrender of Madras, 143.
consolation that remains to them, 566 His part in the surrender, 146 note
Hebert, M., Governor of Pondichory, 40
f\ EOGHEHAH, M., repulses Breretou
\J at Wandewash, 540 «'ca
_.-airy, 649
Ginger, taken by Sevajee, 25. Attacked Henri III. invitos his subjects to trade, 6
by Aurungzebe, 27. Its strength, 257. Henri IV. forms a company to trade to
Stormed by the Erench, 257. Sur¬
renders to tho English, 562
Gingen, Captain, cooperates with Mahomed
All’s levies, 279. Marches to intercept
Chunda Sahib, 280. Is repulsed from
Volconda, 282. The panic of his men,
282. His little self-confidence, 296.
Is left in command of the troops, 327
Ghazee-ood-een, eldest son of Hizam-ool-
Moolk, prefers to remain at Delhi, 231.
Allies himself with the Mahrattas, 343.
Threatens the Dekkan, 358. Arrives TNNIS KHAN, is disgustod with Cap-
at Aurungabad, 358. Is poisoned, 359. 1 tain Gingen, 296. Aids in si
Godeheu, M., commissioned by Dupleix to the English at “
explain his case, 92. Appointed to
succeed Dupleix, 409. His real cha¬
racter, 410. His meanness towards TANOJEE, Rajah, makes overtures to
Dupleix on landing, 411. Refuses to J Mahomed Ali, 271
settle the accounts of- Dupleix, 413. Janojee, Bhonsla, invades tho Circars and
His importunate spite, 416. The ad-
 INDEX. 577

Janojee, Niqsbalkur, gained oyer by Bussy, irresolution, 131. Cruises olfKarical,

478. Feigns action against Law, 479 ’ 132. Contrasts the ships of the King
Janville, M. de. commands the escort of with those of the Company, 133. Ap¬
the Subadar, 365 peals to the Council, 133. The burden
of all his letters, 135. Orders the
squadron to leave, 136. Sets out for
'J^'AXDAGXA, harasses the French, Madras, 137. Attacks Madras, 142.
His alarm, 143. Forces the place to
Karieal, taken by the French, 76. Made surrender, 144. Writes to Dupleix
over to them, 78. Description of, 78 regarding the capitulation, 145. De¬
note. Lally rotreats on, 615. Surren¬ clares that ho had been authorised to
ders to the English, 553 dispose of the place, 145. Explains
Kasshnbazaar, lodge at, founded, 32. his reasons to Dupleix, 148. Gives
Law stationed at, 451 Dupleix credit for his success, 150.
Kerjean, M. de, accuses La Bourdonnais His real position, 151. His anger at
of being bribed, 157 note. Defeats the the assumption of authority by Dupleix,
English at Vicravandi, 329. Is sent to 154. Disavows his subordination and
blockade Fort. St. David, hut retreats Madras, 154. The
towards' Pondieliery, 330. Is outma- . His
n centered and beaten, 332. Commis¬ acceptance of a bribe, 157 note. Other
sioner at the conference, 400 reasons that prompted him, 158. His
Killpatrick, Captain, moves to assist difference with Paradis, 160. Receives
Clive at Arcot, 291. Repulses the the deputation from Pondichery, 163.
French from Tricliinopoly, 397.. Ap¬ Replies to the letter of the Council,
pears before Vellore, 441. Retires, 442 163. Assembles a council of war, 164.
Kimieer, Major, sent to 'attack Gingee, Repulses the Pondichery deputies, 164.
327. Is wounded and defeated, 329 Gets rid of the Pondichery contingent
Kuddapah, Natvab of, the intrigues of by a ruse, 165. Arrests the deputies
Dupleix with, 243. Shoots Nazir Jung, and denounces Paradis, 165. His real
264. Conspires against MozufferJung, feelings, 166. Makes overtures to Du¬
273. Is wounded and flies, 276 ' pleix, 167. Sneers at the instructions
Kurnool, Nawab of, is gained over by of Dupleix, 170. Receives his reply,
Dupleix, 251. His treachery towards
173. His losses, 174. Announces his
intention to leave the coast, 176. Signs
the treaty and sends it to Pondichery,
Kurnool, Fort of, stormed, 275 176. His energy, 177, Leaves Madras,
178. Influences Dordelin, 178. Ar¬
rives at Pondichery, 179. Makes pro¬
AIS, M. de, his early posals to Dnpleix, 179. Refusestoland
___s attack on Mah6, 64. hut obeys tho Council, 180. Leaves
His subsequent proceedings, 105. Ap¬ Pondichery, 181. Brief review of his
pointed Governor of the Isles, 105. His * proceedings, 182. Proceeds to the isles
energetic proceedings, 108. He returns and thence to Martinique, 183. His
to France, 110. His proposals to reception in England, his treatment in
Floury, 112. His departure for the France, and his death, 183, 184
isles, 113. The reversal of his orders, Lakaye, Admiral, commands the fleet
115. He relieves MahA 115. Sends against Galle and Trincomalee, 17. De¬
back his ships, 116. Resigns, hut re¬ clines a contest with the Dutch, 18.
signation not accepted, 117. Prepares Besieged in St. Thomd, 21. Visits
‘to conquer the impossible,’ 118. His Martin at Pondichery, and returns to
difficulties, 119. Sails for Pondichery, Surat, 22 note
120. His losses and their repair, 121. La-Joie, Sergeant Major, appointed com¬
Meets the English off Ceylon, 123. mander-in-chief by the mutineers, 542.
Fights Commodore Peyton, 124. Re¬ His prudent conduct, 543.
pulses him, 125. Offers battle again, Lally, Count de, orders Bussy to Arcot,
125. Anchors off Pondichery, 127. 490. His antecedents, 492. His advice
Friendly correspondence with Dupleix, to the French Ministry, 494. Is or¬
127. His designs regarding Madras, dered to India, 494. His character,
129. Applies for more guns, 130. His 495. His strange greeting on arriving
ms
 INDUS.

• feated "by the French, 191. His mi 252. Resolves to join tlPe English,
terly movements afterwards, 191. 292. Concerts measures with Dupleix,
beaten by Paradis, 192. Attacks' I 376. Harasses Lawrence, 377. Covers
radis and is repulsed, 197. Surpris $ie French retreat, 385, Surprises the
de Bury, 200. Visits Dupleix ** 73 Pon- the English at Coutapara, 405. Is
diekery, 202. Taken prisoner hi aiu- threatened by the Subadar, 469. En¬
boor, 234 ters into a secret understanding with
Mamira, M., associated with Caron, 15. Bussy, 470. Allies himself with Lally,
Proceeds to Golconda, 15. Esta¬ 545
blishes a factory at Masulipatam, 15. Morse, Mr., Governor of Madras, rojec.ts
Quarrels with Caron, 16. Is supported the proposal of Dupleix for neutrality,
by Colbert, 17. Goes to Java, 17 note 99. His character, 139. Applies for
Mariol, M., takes Tliiagar and Elrniso- aid to restrain tho French, but is re¬
ram, 536 fused, 141. Is abandoned by tho fleet,
Martin, Francois, his early career, 19. 142. Signs a convention with La
Sent to tho province) of Gingoe, 20. Bonrdonnais, 154. And a capitula¬
Buys a plot of land on tho coast, 20. tion, 177
Baturas to St. Thoiu6, 20. Proceeds Mortiz Ali, his lineage, 71, 72. Murders
with sixty mon to his plot of land, 22. Sufder Ali, 102. Floes to Vellore,
Lends money to Shore Khan Lodi, 22. 102. Engaged in the murder of Seid
Founds Pondichery, 23. Describes it Mahomed Khan, 103. Appointed to
to tho Directors, 23. Applies to bo act under Dupleix, 330. -Makes some
allowed to have native soldiers, 24. captures in the Carnatic, 881. De¬
Obtains further cessions from Shore feated at Trinomalco, 399. Renounces
Khan, 26. Is allowed to fortify Pon¬ liis title and submits to Mahomed Ali,
dichery, 26. Is attacked by tho Dutch 441. Threatened by the English, 442.
and surrenders, 28. Retires to France, Buys them off, 442.
33. Returns and strengthens Pon- Mozuffer Jung, nominated successor to
dichery, 34. Dies, 30. His system, Nizam-ool-Moolk, 231. Meets and
•36, 37. alii os himself with Clmnda Sahib, 232.
Masulipatam, factory of, founded, 15, Appointed Subadar of tbo Dokkan, 235.
31. Seized by Nazir Jung, 252. Re¬ Turns off towards Tanjore, 242. Sur-
covered by Dupleix, 253. French pos¬
sessions there increased, 274. Taken
by Forde, 533. Pondiche^26L ^howThis gratitude
Mauritius, see Isle of France. to Dupleix, 269. Applios for a con¬
Meer Aasud, taken prisoner, 79. His tingent of French troops, 271. Con¬
advice to Sufder Ali, 83. His enmity spiracy against him, 272. Is killed,
to Clninda Sahib, 401 note 274
Meer Jaffier Ali, detached to attack Mukhdoom Ali, ft a corps of Eng-
Bussy, 474. Arrives at Hyrabad, 476
Mensem, Mr., offers to treat for the sur¬
render of Madras, 143
Monson, Colonel, assumes command bo- Accompanies’Bussy, 473
fore Pondichery, aud is wounded, 556 Murzuffcr Beg, a soldier of foi
Moracin, M., appointed to command in by Shah Nawaz Khan, 4*1
the ceded districts, 372. His alarm at
the recall of Dupleix, 422. Remon¬
strates with Godeheu, 427. Receives Mysore, Rajah of, h .
a strange warning from him, 433. Jung, 264. Generals of, enter into ne
His position easier than he had antici¬ gotiations with Duploix, 326. Wavei
pated, 468. Detaches men to aid 332. Finally join the Fronch, 332
Bussy, 476. Joins Bussy, 491. His Mysore, Regent of, see Nunderaj.
disobedience and '*
Morari Rao, accompanies Raghojee ^pVRSAPORE, acquired by the French,
Blionshi, 78. Appointed Governor of
Trichinopoly, 88. Joins Nazir Jung, Nazir Jung, siicceeds Nizam-ool-Moolk ir.
245. Attacks the French in their re¬ the Dekkan, 231. Mores an army
treat, 248. Surprised by de la Touche, towards Pondichery, 245. Appoints
 \
INDEX. 581

Mahorfed Ali Nawab of the Carnatic, Pertah Singh, his lineage, "f£. Becomes
250. Loads Mozuffur Jung with irons, Rajah of Tanjore, 78. Makes over
250. Refuses the terms proposed by Karical to the French, 78. And Dcvi-
Dupleix, 2.51. Surprised by the French, cotta to the English, 240. Attacked
retires to Arcot, 252. Seizes MSsuli- by Chunda Sahib, 243. His wiliness,
patam and Yanoon, 252. Reinforces 243
Mahomed Ali, 253. His carelessness, Peyton, Commodore, fights La Bourdon-
256. He takes the field, 261. Nego¬ nais and is repulsed, 124. Sails to
tiates with Dupleix, 262. The con¬ Trincomalee, 124. Abandons Madras,
spiracy against him, 263. Is surprised 142
Pigott, Mr., succeeds Saunders as Go¬
Nets, Commodore de, commands an expe¬ vernor of Madras, 440. Appoints
dition to the East, 7 Colonel Lawrence to command during
Nizam Ali, younger brother of Salabut the siege, 520
Jung, 359. Invested 'with the admi¬ Pitt,, Mr. Thomas, Governor of Madras,
nistration of the Dekkan, 488. Mur¬ demand made upon, 138. Forced to
ders Hyder Jung and flees, 489. Ob¬ comply, 139
tains the upper hand over his brother, Pocoek, Admiral, engaged in the opera¬
541. Deposes and causes him to be tions against Chandernagore, 460. Sails
from Madras, 502. Beats d’Aehe, 503.
Nizam-ool-Moolk, confers honours on M. Again, 515. Again, 539
Dumas, 91. Enters the Carnatic, 102. Pondichery, founded by Martin, 23.
Enters Trichinopoly, 102. Lies, 181 Threatened by Sevajee, 25. By the
' Nizampatnam, acquired by the French, Dutch, 26. Captured, 28. Restored,
275 34. Fortified, 34. Becomes the seat
of the French Government, 35. De¬
scription of, 36. Its declension under
the successors of Martin, 40. Reduced
to financial extremities, 56. Further
ORLEANS, Due d’, Regent of France,
41. Patronises Law, 42
account of, 59. Its fortifications
strengthened, 180. Visited by Sufder
Orry, M., Controller General, authorises Ali and Chunda Sahib, 85. Its state
La JBourdonnais to retain his fleet, 116. on the arrival of Dupleix, 96. Its new
Succeeded by Machault, 168 defences, 214. Besieged by Admiral
Boscawen, 219. "Who raises the siege,
221. Grand Durbar held at, 268. Be¬
PALE, Mr., Commissioner at the con¬
ference, 400. Leaves it, 401
sieged by Colonel Coote, 553. Storm
in the roadstead of, 556. Surrender
Paradis, M., commands at Karical, 133. of, 559. Fate of the garrison of, 562.
Is the bearer of a letter from Dupleix Its surrender the doom of the French,
150. “Appointed Councillor at Madias 564
154. His difference with La Bout Pondichery, Council of, how constituted,
donnais, 160. Appointed a Commit 60. Appealed to by La Bourdonnais,
sioner under de Bury, 162. Denounced -- 134. Serves a
and arrested, 165. Liberated and sent urdonnai
to sound Dupleix, 167. Sent towards points a Council for I
Madras, 191. Defeats Maphuz Khan Supersedes La Bourdonnais by Despre-
at St. Thome, 192. Appointed Go¬ mesnil, 161. Replies to La Bourdon¬
vernor of Madras, 194. Escorts the nais’ letters, 172. Sends sealed orders
plunder of Madras to Pondichery, 196. to Dordelin, 178. Refuses to entertain
Repulses Maphuz Khan, 197. Jea¬ the new scheme of La Bourdonnais,
lousy entertained regarding, 198. Ap¬ 180
pointed General, 204. Marches against PortebarrG, M. do la, takes the French
Ouddalore, 205. Is forced to retire, semadron to Madras and returns, 136.
207. Sent to fortify Arianeopan, 213. His want of skill, 141
Appointed chief engineer at Pondichery, Preston, Captain, commands at Chingle-
214. Heads a sortie and is killed, 219 pnt, 520. Operates against the French
Pardaillan, M. de, attacks JVIuhe, 62. before Madras, 527
takes it 64 Provostiere. M. de la, Governor of Pon¬
Peroira, M„ his operations at Karical, 77 dichery, 55