9. Can the umma replace the nation?

Salafism and deterritorialised

citizenship in Lebanon and Kuwait
Zoltan Pall

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines how participating in the Salafi movement might

influence the individual’s relationship to the state and his/her belonging to
a political community defined by the modern concept of ‘nation’. Salafism
on the discursive level offers a deterritorialised version of citizenship in the
global umma where membership is based on the purity of one’s adherence
to Islam rather than territorial and/or ethnic belonging. This chapter looks
at how this idea of deterritorialisation translates in two localities where
Salafism has gained significant foothold.
In this chapter I examine the relationship between Salafis and citizen-
ship that is defined by belonging to nation states. For Salafis, the modern
nation state as a form of political organisation lacks legitimacy because
it bounds the loyalty of citizens to the nation instead of religion and the
umma. Yet, the majority of Salafis do not attempt to violently overthrow
the nation state, but rather coexist with it. Salafis participate in parlia-
mentary elections in a number of states such as Kuwait, Egypt, Tunisia
and Yemen. Despite the pragmatism of Salafis, the participants of the
movement are actively looking for ways to bypass the boundaries of the
nation state and recreate the circumstances in which the Salafi concept of
deterritorialised citizenship can be lived. This chapter inquires how this
happens in the case of Salafi groups that reject violence as a means to
change reality.
The first section of the chapter discusses the Salafi notion of citizen-
ship and explains how this notion is based on the utopian outlook of
the members of the movement. My discussion here is based on quotes
from the most renowned religious authorities of Salafism and personal
observations. The second and third sections present two case studies from
Lebanon and Kuwait. In Lebanon, Salafis claim to be the vanguard of the

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Sunni community. Therefore, they need to negotiate how they envision the
place of Sunni Muslims as constituents of a multi-sectarian state and as
parts of the deterritorialised umma. Kuwaiti Salafis regard their country
as a centre of Islam whose material wealth can be used to unify the umma
through spreading the uncorrupted form of Islam. A faction of Salafis here
allies with the ruler in an attempt to ‘Salafise’ the official practice of Islam
in Kuwait. Furthermore, Salafis also emphasise the need of allegiance to
the Emir rather than a modern Kuwaiti nation.

SALAFISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

Salafism is best known as a proselytisation movement that intends to

change the religious identity of other Muslims. Salafis intend to imitate
the religious practices and morality of the first three generations of Islam
(al-salaf al-salih – righteous ancestors), and to do so they adopt a literal
understanding of the scripture. The ultimate aim of Salafism is to make
other Muslims accept that their version of Islam is the orthodox one and
leave other interpretations that are seen as distorted from the pure form
of religion.1
Salafis claim that all aspects of life are codified in the foundational texts
of Islam, the Qurʾan and the Sunna (prophetic tradition). Literal reading of
these texts, without ‘distorting’ their meaning by logical and metaphorical
interpretations provides guidance for all aspects of human life. This means
that by careful reading of the Qurʾan and the Sunna, it is possible to discern
clear instructions not only about practising religion but also mundane
aspects of life such as how to behave, speak or dress.2 By this, Salafis detach
Islam from the local cultural context. In other words, believers should not

1
Salafi doctrines and practices have been discussed extensively. See for
example, Bernard Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, in Global
Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009); Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006) 2: 216–34; Richard Gauvain, Salafi
Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).
2
As a young Salafi shaykh, whom I interviewed in Lebanon, explained to me,
the shariʿa fulfils a similar role for humans as the ‘operating instructions’ for an
electronic device. As he said, ‘when you follow what is written in the instructions
your device functions perfectly, when you do not do that then it might break. When
people follow the rules of Islam exactly as God has revealed them they are always
happy, their life goes well and they are pure in both their soul and their body. When
someone disregards the shariʿa things often go wrong for him and he feels anxiety
because his soul is not clear.’ Interview, Tripoli, Lebanon, 13 October 2009.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 205

act or live according to the cultural codes of a given locality, but rather
should go back to the scripture that supposedly replaces the former.3
By this, Salafis intend to recreate the ideal community of Muslims
as, according to their belief it used to be during the time of the Salaf. In
many respects, Salafism resembles what Price et al. call ‘grounded utopian
movements’ (GUMs).4 GUMs create strong utopias in order to counter
different types of oppression and injustice (real and perceived). In other
words, the followers of such a movement create a parallel reality to escape
from the conditions present in the surrounding world. ‘Grounded’ here
means ‘that the identities, values, and imaginative dimensions of utopia
are culturally focused on real places, embodied by living people, informed
by past lifeways, and constructed and maintained through quotidian inter-
actions and valued practices that connect the members of a c­ ommunity’.5
For Salafis, these practices try to imitate the Prophet and his companions
in most aspects of life: praying exactly like the Prophet as informed by
the Hadith, dressing accordingly, interacting with others based on Hadith
narrations about how the first Muslims interacted with each other and
also with non-Muslims.6
Salafis differ from most other GUMs, such as the Rastafari movement,
in one crucial aspect. While the main goal of the former is to maintain an
autonomous, alternative lifestyle for their participants, it is equally impor-
tant for Salafis to convince others to adopt their worldview and practices.
In other words, their end-goal is to export their utopian vision to the larger
society. Doing so they follow different methodologies (sing. manhaj/pl.
manahij). Most of the Salafis actively engage in various preaching activities
such as holding religious lessons in mosques. Salafis are extremely active on
the web and maintain thousands of websites and Internet forums in order
to spread their ideas on how the Muslim should act, behave and what his/
her rights and obligations are towards others. Yet, some go further than
that and participate in institutions and public debates, or intend to impose
the utopia on the wider society by launching armed jihad.
Understanding this utopian aspect is crucial in order to discuss the

3
Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst,
2004).
4
Charles Price, Donald Nonini and Erich Fox Tree, ‘Grounded Utopian
Movements: Subjects or Neglect’, Anthropological Quarterly 81 (2008) 1: 130–35.
5
Ibid., 128. The authors give examples of GUMs such as the Rastafari move-
ment, or Mexico’s Zapatistas.
6
According to Salafis, acts and deeds of the Prophet should not be interpreted
in the given historical context, but most of the time should be imitated exactly
regardless of time.

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 206 The Middle East in transition

Salafis’ concept of ‘citizenship’. For Salafis, only this utopian community

can be fully legitimate as this is the one which is described in the scripture.
The existence of nation states leads to the fragmentation of the community
of Muslims (juzʾiyya) as it defines the individual’s identity as Algerians,
Kuwaitis, and other nationalities, not chiefly as Muslims. The modern
nation state derives its legitimacy from the electoral participation of citi-
zens and/or a social contract between rulers and ruled (such as the case of
Kuwait). Therefore, according to Salafis, the state demands the individual
to be loyal to something else other than God.
This concern is voiced by many mainstream Salafi authorities such
as the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz
(1910–1999), often in subtle ways. He issued a fatwa explaining that if
a country is an Islamic one but some of the fellow citizens disobey the
rulings of Islam (mukhalif li-l-din), then the Muslim individual cannot
show loyalty towards him/her as he/she should be regarded as an enemy.7
Another contemporary Salafi authority Salih bin ʿUthaymin (1925–2001)
remarked that ‘the Muslim’s homeland is where his religion is practised
(watan al-muslim ma huwwa yastaqim bihi dinuhu)’.8 Therefore, there is no
reason for a believer to distinguish himself according to nationality.
Yet, the majority of Salafis in one way or another coexist with the nation
state and even cooperate with it. Most Salafis in many respects live a normal
life just like anyone else. They pay taxes (where taxation exists) and carry
a passport and identity documents issued by the authorities of the nation
state. Some Salafis actively engage in public debates and participate in
institutional politics by voting and standing as candidates in parliamentary
elections. This has become increasingly apparent during the Arab Uprisings
when Salafi political parties emerged in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. In
Kuwait, Salafis have been part of the political process since 1981. While
all Kuwaiti Salafis justify their political participation arguing that they use
state institutions to spread the daʿwa, Salafi MPs often engage in debates
over mundane issues such as the distribution of social benefits by the state,
or even the question of who is included or excluded as a Kuwaiti citizen.9
However, for Salafis, at least in theory, the nation state is always a tempo-
rary solution. Here I have to note that for most Salafis, the existence of terri-

7
http://www.binbaz.org.sa/fatawa/2071, accessed 25 May 2017.
8
Salafis widely regard the Saudi scholar Muhammad bin ʿUthaymin as one
of the greatest specialists in jurisprudence and his website is widely consulted. See:
http://binothaimeen.net, accessed 12 June 2017.
9
Kuwaiti Salafis are divided over the issue whether to grant citizenship to the
over 100 thousand stateless people in Kuwait commonly called bidun (the Arabic
word means without).

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 207

torial states is not a problem per se. Very few Salafi groups pursue an agenda
of unifying Muslims in one political entity in the same way as Hizb al-Tahrir
does, for example.10 Perhaps the only noteworthy Salafi exception is the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Most Salafis have no problem with
the existence of a territorial state ruled by a Muslim ruler in a way the shariʿa
legitimises it. In this respect, however, Salafis differ. A faction of Salafis
calls for acceptance of and obedience to a ruler (hakim) who is Muslim and
has been able to secure his rule over a territory either through the choice of
his subjects or by force (hakim mutaghallib). Others accept the ruler only if
Muslim inhabitants of the territory pledge allegiance (bayʿa) to him.11
What Salafis generally do not accept is the kind of citizenship that
the modern nation states offer based on equality and sovereignty of the
people. As I already indicated above, for participants of the movement
the loyalty of Muslims can only be towards God. For this reason, many
of the Salafis reject citizenship that is granted due to birth within the
boundaries of a given nation state. Instead, the citizenship should be
granted according to religious belonging, and Muslims and non-Muslims
living in the same territory should have different rights and obligations
as described in the scripture. For example, the Egyptian Shaykh Yasir
Burhami, the spokesperson of the country’s largest Salafi organisation,
al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya (Salafi Call) from which the Salafi political party
Hizb al-Nur (Nour Party) has emerged, called for the reformulation of
the citizenship law in Egypt according to the example of the Prophet’s
contract with the Jews in Medina. This, according to the Shaykh, would
prevent the country’s Coptic minority holding jobs that would grant them
authority over Muslims (such as politicians, army officers, etc.).12 Others,
such as the Kuwaiti ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq argue that granting
national citizenship regardless of religious belonging is acceptable since
Islamic states that implement the shariʿa do not exist yet. Yet, according
to the Shaykh, this citizenship circumscribed by man-made law should

10
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party). ILP was founded by
Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1910–1973) in 1952 in East Jerusalem. The party’s main
message is the necessity of the unification of the Muslim world through the re-
establishment of the Caliphate. It spreads its message mostly through publications,
lectures, conferences and reading groups.
11
On the typologies of Salafism see Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafism between
the Gulf and Europe: Development, Fractionalization and Transnational Networks
of Salafism in Lebanon (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 22–8.
12
Emin Poljarevic, ‘The Ambiguity of Citizenship in Contemporary Salafism’,
in The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World, eds. Roel Meijer and Nils Butenschøn
(Leiden: Brill, 2017), 353. See also: http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmkt​
ba=71984, accessed 19 June 2017.

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 208 The Middle East in transition

not enjoy preference over the system of rights and obligations of Muslims
towards each other that are codified in the scripture.13
Most Salafis intend to recreate the utopia of the first Muslims not by
dissolving nation states but rather by bypassing them. In this deterritorial-
ised community regardless of geographical location, the same standards,
codified in the scripture, would organise the life of Salafis. It means that
regardless of whether they live in Egypt, Indonesia, or Germany, Muslims
should follow the same rules and enjoy the same rights in the realm of
interaction with other Muslims, non-Muslims or relationships between
men and women. Wherever they can, Salafis make an effort to create
spaces in order to live such a deterritorialised citizenship.
Salafis put this in practice where they are able to dominate a neigh-
bourhood or establish a separate village. For example, after the end of
the conflict in the Moluccas in Indonesia in 2002, members of the Salafi
militia Laskar Jihad took over an entire neighbourhood in the middle of
the city of Ambon, called Kampung Muhajirin. When I visited the area in
2014, it stood in sharp contrast with other parts of the city. Men, almost
without exception sported untrimmed beards, dressed either in Gulf-style
dishdasha’s or trousers that do not reach beyond the ankle, and wore shirts
that covered the arm until the elbow. Instead of wearing the usually col-
ourful dresses women wear in the Moluccas, most women were covered in
black clothes and niqabs covered their faces. Restaurants and shops of the
district were prohibited to play music, and in the grocery shops photos of
human faces on the boxes of consumer products were covered with black
adhesive tapes. Secular education is banned and most children of this
neighbourhood go to local Salafi schools that only teach Islamic subjects.
Encounters with the Indonesian justice system are avoided, and inter-
community disputes are internally resolved through mediation (sulh).
What is especially interesting is the district’s inhabitants’ relationship
with outsiders. Most of the Salafis of Kampung Muhajirin usually behave
in a rather reserved and formal way with non-Salafis who enter the area.
Non-Salafis are not allowed to buy property, rent houses and settle in
the neighbourhood, while Salafis who come from abroad are welcomed.
This was the case with participants of the Salafi movement in Yemen,
Egypt and Europe, who were able to rent houses and as full members of
Kampung Muhajirin were allowed to stay as long as they wanted.14
This practice is encouraged by Salafis in the Gulf, who aim to unite

13
Interview, Kuwait, 11 March 2012.
14
Interview with a leader of the community, Ustaz Abdussalam, 2 November
2014.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 209

the umma under one utopian community whose members share the
Salafi concept of deterritorialised citizenship. Saudi, Kuwaiti and Qatari
charities try to achieve these goals by setting up networks of schools in
various Middle Eastern and Asian countries where the curriculum is based
on the same Salafi books and interpretations of Islam. Redirecting the
Muslim individual’s sense of belonging from the nation state to a universal
understanding of Islam is another way to unify the Islamic Nation. The
following two case studies will elaborate on this.

LEBANON

In this small, multi-confessional Mediterranean country, Salafis strive to

transform the symbols of the evolving Lebanese Sunni sectarian identity.
Often, highly popular Salafi shaykhs intend to connect ‘Sunniness’ (or the
notion of Sunnism) to the Salafis’ understanding of Islam. They also try
to divest Lebanese Sunnis from their sense of belonging to the Lebanese
nation state which is based on a political compromise to share power
between the three largest confessions: Maronites, Sunnis and Shiʿis. This is
done by emphasising the Sunnis’ belonging to the wider umma on the basis
of their doctrinal belief (ʿaqida).
Salafism in Lebanon appeared at the end of the 1980s in the country’s
Sunni majority areas after dozens of graduates of the Islamic University
of Medina returned home and engaged in proselytisation activities. In the
course of the 1990s, a vast network of Salafi religious colleges (maʿahid
sharaʿiyya), charity endowments and mosques emerged in the north, the
southern city of Sidon and the Western Biqaʿ Valley. Despite the multiple
security crackdowns by the Lebanese authorities and the occupying
Syrians, the movement preserved its influence.15 When the Syrian army,
due to international pressure following the murder of the former Prime
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 withdrew, the ensuing vacuum was
filled by Salafis who took the opportunity to increase their influence on
Lebanese Sunnis.
Salafism in Lebanon has been multi-faceted and diverse and reflects the
global fragmentation of the movement.16 Many Lebanese Salafis, whom
I call purists, exclusively focus on preaching and performing rituals in a

15
For a detailed account on the historical development of Lebanese Salafism, see
Zoltan Pall, Salafism in Lebanon: Local and Transnational Resources (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018).
16
Ibid.

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 210 The Middle East in transition

correct manner and neglect public affairs. Others, however, believe that
Islam extends its rulings to every domain of life. It is therefore a duty for
Salafis to reflect and respond to issues that concern the vagaries of the
umma. In the post-2005 Lebanese religious and political landscape, this
haraki or activist faction of Salafis became more visible. The influence of
prominent haraki shaykhs based in the North Lebanese city of Tripoli,
such as Salim al-Rafaʿi, Zakariyya al-Masri and Daʿi al-Islam al-Shahhal,
rapidly expanded in the decade following the assassination of Hariri.17
Al-Rafaʿi and al-Masri attracted thousands of followers to their Friday
sermons and slowly became among the most prominent religious authori-
ties in Lebanon’s Sunni community.
The political context explains why a lot of haraki Salafis managed to
extend their popularity. After the withdrawal of the Syrians, the main
power-brokers of Lebanon’s sectarian politics, tensions emerged between
the country’s Shiʿi and Sunni communities. The former started to demand
a larger share of the political decision-making.18 In turn, Sunnis became
frustrated with the military might and political influence of Hizbullah, the
Shiʿi militia and political party. Under the pretext of resistance to Israel,
Hizbullah maintained stronger armed forces than the Lebanese Army and
controlled large areas in the Biqaʿ, Southern Lebanon, and Beirut. The
movement even managed to enforce its will on the Lebanese government.
This situation led to a continuous political crisis, which culminated in the
2008 military takeover of Beirut by Hizbullah.19
The political turbulences translated into a Sunni–Shiʿi sectarian rift.
A strong sense of marginalisation and victimhood developed among the
Sunnis, with many of my respondents commenting that the Shiʿis were
imposing their will on the rest of the country by relying on Hizbullah’s
superior military force. Many Sunnis suspected that Hizbullah had its
hand in the Hariri murder, which made them feel as if the whole Sunni

17
Shaykh Salim al-Rafiʿi, the imam of Tripoli’s Taqwa mosque is one of the
most popular Sunni preachers in Lebanon with also a significant transnational
audience (especially in Germany where he lived until 2006 when he was expelled).
Zakariyya al-Masri is a renowned Salafi scholar and the imam of the Hamza
mosque of Tripoli, who wrote dozens of books most of which contain conspiracy
theories common among Salafis, such as a global conspiracy involving Iran and
the West against Sunnis. Shaykh Daʿi al-Islam al-Shahhal established the institu-
tional infrastructure of Salafism in Lebanon in the 1990s using his access to Gulf
funds. See Pall, Salafism in Lebanon.
18
Amal Hamdan, ‘The Limits of Corporate Consociation: Taif and the Crisis
of Power-Sharing in Lebanon Since 2005’, in Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution,
eds. A. Knudsen and M. Kerr (London: Hurst, 2012), 46–50.
19
Ibid, 53.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 211

community was being targeted by the Shiʿis. Against this backdrop,

conspiracy theories, claiming that Shiʿis intended to dominate the whole
Middle East, starting with Lebanon, became widespread. The dire socio-
economic conditions of several Sunni areas and the weakness of the Sunni
political leadership added to the frustration of many in the community.20
The current Syrian conflict has greatly amplified the Sunni–Shiʿi sectar-
ian tensions in Lebanon. Hizbullah was formerly supported by the Syrian
regime, so the militia has provided military support to help Syria fight
its own opposition. Sunnis, however, tend to generally be sympathetic
to the predominantly Sunni Syrian rebels and believe that the fall of the
Assad regime would lead to the weakening of Hizbullah and the Shiʿis. On
several occasions, Sunni militants from Lebanon have found themselves
opposing Hizbullah’s fighters on the Syrian battlefields.21
In this socio-political context, Salafi discourse resonated well. Prominent
Salafi shaykhs, such as Shaykh Salim al-Rafaʿi or Zakariyya al-Masri
framed the current inter-communal tensions in Lebanon into a cosmic
struggle between good and evil. Salafis see the world as a place of struggle
between good and evil, or truth and falsehood (siraʿ bayn al-haqq wa-l-
batil). The good side is represented by Sunni Islam. Those who follow
whatever is codified in the scripture belong to this side (muʿaskar al-iman –
the side of belief).
According to the rhetoric of Tripoli’s Salafi shaykhs, Sunnis represent
muʿaskar al-iman in Lebanon. Therefore, they are targeted and oppressed
by those who belong to the realm of taghut (unbelief, anything that
opposes Islam). Salafis identify the Shiʿi community and Hizbullah as the
most dangerous enemies of the Sunnis. Shiʿis are outside of the realm of
al-iman because of their deviations from the right tenets of Islam and their
conspiracy against Sunnis throughout history.22
However, Salafi shaykhs, especially after the Arab Uprisings often point
out that this Manichean struggle transcends the borders of Lebanon and
encompasses the globe. Shaykh Salim al-Rafaʿi reminded his followers in
one of his postings on Twitter that it is not possible to deal separately with

20
Pall, Salafism in Lebanon.
21
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/archive/two-lebanese-men-die-in-al-qusayr-
battles, accessed 21 December 2014.
22
Shaykh Zakariyya al-Masri published dozens of polemical writings where he
articulates (mostly unfounded) criticism on Shi‘i theology. Among his most severe
accusations is that the Shiʿis believe that the Qurʾan was altered (muharraf) by the
first three caliphs and that part of it is missing. Al-Masri also regards the Shiʿi belief
in the infallible imamate as major shirk (shirk akbar), Zakariyya al-Masri, Dawr
al-Imbaraturiyya al-shiʿiyya al-shuyuʿiyya (Tripoli: Markaz Hamza, 2007), 67–9.

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the bomb attacks against Tripoli’s Salafi mosques in 2013 and the siege of
Aleppo between 2012 and 2016.23 As the Shaykh argued, the ‘perpetrator
is the same . . . and [both events are parts of the] same project’.24 In the
Shaykh’s worldview, this project aims to subdue the Sunnis. In another
tweet in which he discusses the dire socio-economic conditions of Tripoli,
he tells that it is happening because Tripoli is a Sunni majority city, and
‘East and West [are] conspiring against it’.25
Shaykh Salim, as do the majority of the Lebanese haraki Salafis, sees the
solution against this anti-Sunni global conspiracy in the unification of the
umma. However, unlike other Islamic movements such as Hizb al-Tahrir
or the Islamic State, this unity, at least initially, should not be based on
abolishing the borders of the nation states. Instead, it should be achieved
through creating uniformity in Sunni theology and religious practices.
According to Shaykh Salim, the taqlid of the madhahib, speculative theol-
ogy (kalam) and Ashʿari creed26 should be erased from Sunni orthodoxy.
The same applies to Sufi practices such as the visiting of the graves of
saints and asking them for mediation to God (tawassul), and dhikrs in
which Sufi shaykhs use ‘sorcery (sahr)’.27
This kind of religious uniformity would create a transnational solidarity
among Sunnis with the aim of facing the common enemy, the taghut,
represented by the alliance of Shiʿis, the West and Russia.28 To stand
strong against this danger, Sunnis should feel a new solidarity based on
a common creed. As Shaykh Khalid, an associate of Salim al-Rafaʿi told
me, Sunnis should stop regarding themselves as members of a confes-

23
Fernande van Tets, ‘Lebanon: Death Toll in Twin Mosques Bombings in
Tripoli Rises to 47’, Independent, 24 August 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/lebanon-death-toll-in-twin-mosques-bombings-in-tripoli-
rises-to-47–8782812.html, accessed 13 November 2016. Syrian government forces
with Russian help besieged Aleppo for four years until they captured most of the city
from the rebels by December 2016. David Sim, ‘The Fall of Aleppo Timeline: How
Assad Captured Syria’s Biggest City’, International Business Times, 16 December
2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/fall-aleppo-timeline-how-assad-captured-syrias-bi​
ggest-city-1596504, accessed 7 January 2017.
24
Tweet of Shaykh Salim al-Rafaʿi, 23 August 2016.
25
Ibid.
26
Ashʿarism, named after its founder Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿari (874–936), one
of the major theological schools of thought, gave space to metaphorical interpreta-
tion of certain attributes and features of God.
27
Salafis often accuse Sufi orders for practising sorcery during dhikrs, which is
strictly prohibited by most schools of thought in Islam. Remke Kruk, ‘Harry Potter
in the Gulf: Contemporary Islam and the Occult’, British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 32 (2005) 1: 47–74.
28
Khutba of Shaykh Salim al-Rafaʿi, 10 February 2012.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 213

sion (taʾifa). ‘No, we aren’t a taʾifa in the same way as the Maronites
or the Druze. We are umma with “legs and arms” across the globe . . .
from China to Morocco and America.’29 In a public lecture in al-Taqwa
mosque in Tripoli’s Bab al-Tabbana district Shaykh Salim al-Rafaʿi called
Sunni institutions, organisations and movements across the globe to
overcome their differences and cooperate on the basis of shared religious
principles.30 He advised young people to socialise with fellow Sunnis and
study fiqh together, instead of spending time with non-Muslims who adopt
Western lifestyle.31
Haraki Salafis also stress that the rights and obligations of Muslims
towards each other should not just exist in theory but also in practice.
Obviously, it could not be expected from the secular state to uphold the
rights of Muslims as it is codified in the shariʿa. Muslims should make
use of the current political crisis and create new forms of solidarity.
Prominent Salafi shaykhs often call upon Sunni Muslims in the North
of Lebanon not to consider the Syrian refugees as foreigners. They are
fellow Sunnis who fled from the very same enemy that is trying to crush
the Sunnis in Lebanon.32 In the first half of 2012, haraki shaykhs under the
leadership of Salim al-Rafiʿi and Zakariyya al-Masri initiated a weekly
shura (council)33 in the Taqwa mosque in which shaykhs, leading figures
of local families and a number of young committed Salafis participated.
The event provided a forum to discuss the affairs of the communities in
different city districts, solve disputes between families and even make
decisions in matters of security.34 In the absence of state institutions, the
shura council decided to take matters into their own hands. As part of this
new transnational solidarity, I saw, among the participants, a number of

29
Casual conversation, 7 July 2012.
30
Public lecture, Tripoli, 7 February 2016. See tweet of Shaykh Salim ar-Rafiʿi
on 7 February 2016.
31
Ibid.
32
Khutba of Zakariyya al-Masri.
33
The shura (consultation in Arabic) is rooted in Arab tribal traditions and
refers to a consultation body. In early Islamic history it was the advisory body
of the Rashidun Caliphs. Later it was reinterpreted several times. In the Arab
Gulf, the advisory bodies of the rulers are also called shura, as are the different
decision-­making councils of Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood
or Hezbollah. See, ‘Shura’, in Bossworth, Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill,
1960–2005); Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse and New
York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 45–8.
34
Security matters could include whether Sunnis should fight the Alawites in
Jabal Muhsin and organise a militia against them, or whether they should instead
rely on the Lebanese Army and the government’s other security forces.

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 214 The Middle East in transition

Syrians who had fled to Tripoli. They were granted the same opportunity
to voice their concerns and vote on the basis that they were Muslims
and local residents who rented properties in Tripoli. Therefore, Salafi
shaykhs no longer considered them as guests but as citizens of the Sunni
community.35
The above shows that Salafis intend to redirect the Lebanese Sunni
community’s sense of belonging to the Sunni transnational umma rather
than to the Lebanese nation state. In this narrative, Sunnis cease to be
a confession or religious community among others in a sectarian state.
Instead, they are parts of the umma that is not defined by territory. They
distance themselves from the non-Sunni Lebanese, as the latter belong to
the realm of taghut. My observations during my fieldwork in Lebanon
demonstrate that such discourses appeal to many of the Sunni Muslims of
Lebanon. The reason is that Lebanon never developed a unified national
ideology.
Rather, there have been competing concepts of national identity.
Maronite Catholics, who constituted the dominant community in Lebanon
until the end of the 1975–1990 civil war, were the main proponents of a
narrative that stressed the existence of a unique Lebanese identity that
sets the country apart from the rest of the Arab world.36 The majority of
the Sunnis, however, considered themselves as part of the Arab world.
Historically, Lebanese Sunnis have always been attracted to Pan-Arab
movements that proposed the reunification of Lebanon in some form with
their Arab brethren either as parts of a larger Arab nation or an Islamic
Nation.37 As in the course of the twentieth century Arab Nationalism
and Muslim Brotherhood type Islamism lost much of their credibility in
the eyes of Lebanese Sunnis, Salafism has become an alternative form of
transnational solidarity.38

35
Personal observation, July–August 2012.
36
Roshanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shiʿite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and
the Making of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008),
20–21.
37
Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002), 113–14; Sune Haugbolle, War and Memory in Lebanon
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 35.
38
Arab Nationalists were militarily defeated during the Lebanese civil war,
and scattered into multiple small groups. The Brotherhood experienced resurgence
in the 1990s but they could not translate this into political capital due to the
oppression they experienced from the occupying Syrian forces, internal secessions
and the personal ambitions of the movement’s cadres. Pall. Salafism in Lebanon.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 215

KUWAIT

In Kuwait Salafis gained prominence starting from the 1970s as a result

of the proselytisation of a number of preachers who arrived in the country
from abroad. Due to the relatively wide margins of freedom as compared
to other Gulf countries, Salafis quickly extended their activities beyond
organising religious lessons and delivering the Friday sermon. The move-
ment appeared and took important positions in the country’s public
sphere. Salafis gained seats in Kuwait’s professional syndicates and won
the elections of several of the so-called cooperative societies (jamaʿiyyat
taʿawuniyya) that have been the backbones of Kuwait’s civil society since
the 1960s.39 Furthermore, Salafis also established media presence by
getting a weekly column in the country’s largest daily paper al-Watan.
The Salafis’ main religious authority, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd
al-Khaliq40 justified the movements in Kuwait’s institutional system by
arguing that this way they could reach a wider audience for their daʿwa
and could also prevent corruption in the syndicates and cooperative
societies.41
Since 1981 Kuwaiti Salafis participate in parliamentary politics as well,
usually forming rather significant blocs in the legislature. Unlike most
other Gulf monarchies, Kuwait has a constitution and a functioning and
rather influential Parliament.42 ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq urged
Salafis to participate in the elections in order to have the ability to stand
up against the powerful Arab Nationalist and Leftist movements in the
country.43 Since then Salafis have been among the main constituents of
Kuwait’s political map often delegating ministers to cabinet. Yet, long
term political participation has led to serious disagreements among the
participants of Salafism in Kuwait.
The purist and haraki factions that I mentioned above appeared in

39
Kuwait’s cooperative societies comprise retail stores and board members
are elected by the shareholders. Board members are usually affiliated to one of the
political groups in Kuwait, therefore an election in the jamaʿiyyat often foretells
the expected results of the next elections.
40
ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq (b. 1939), and Egyptian, is regarded as one
of the most important founders and leaders of Kuwaiti Salafism. He is one of the
most influential ideologues of haraki Salafism alive.
41
Interview, Kuwait, 11 March 2012.
42
On the Kuwaiti Parliament see, Jane Kinninmont, ‘Kuwait’s Parliament:
An Experiment in Semi-democracy’, Chatham House Briefing Paper, August
2012.
43
Michael Herb. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the
Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 162–5.

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 216 The Middle East in transition

the 1990s and tore apart the, until then, quite united movement.44 Purist
Salafis, who are the focus of this case study, continued their participation
in the political process, and most of the time in the 1990s and 2000s they
constituted the most influential Salafi political groups.
Unlike the harakis, purists emphasise the necessity of unconditional
obedience to the ruler (hakim, wali al-amr) of a Muslim country provided
he is not openly apostate. This means forbidding all kind of demonstra-
tions, public criticism and political opposition.45 While most of the time
purist Salafis refrain from political participation, in Kuwait they justified
continuing their presence in the legislature and the government by ‘defend-
ing the ruler’ against his opposition.46 Furthermore, Kuwaiti purists also
wanted to preserve their positions in the state institutions in order to keep
political support for their transnational charity activism.
The purist Salafi faction in Kuwait is centred around one of the largest
Islamic charities of the world, the Society for the Revival of Islamic
Heritage (Jamaʿiyyat Ihyaʾ al-Turath al-Islami – SRIH). SRIH has
presence in more than 50 countries from Europe to Southeast Asia, and
counts as one of the major bankrollers of Salafism worldwide. The sources
of the charity’s funds are not only individual donors, but Islamic banks,
members of the ruling family, sponsorship of the Ministry of Awqaf
and Religious Affairs and Bayt al-Zakat (House of Zakat).47 Therefore,
it is no wonder that purist Salafis intend to strengthen their presence in
the state institutions. Their political grouping, the Salafi Islamic Group
(al-Tajammuʿ al-Salafi al-Islami – SIG), an officially independent entity
but in reality intrinsically linked to SRIH, most of the time sided with
the government against other political factions that took an oppositional
stance.48
The unity of purists fell apart in the wake of the Arab Uprisings. The

44
I have discussed this in several publications in length. See, for example,
Zoltan Pall, ‘Salafi Dynamics in Kuwait: Politics, Fragmentation and Change’, in
Salafism after the Arab Awakening: Contending with People’s Power, eds. Francesco
Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (London and New York: Hurst, 2017), 171–80.
45
In forming this argument purist Salafis refer to a number of Hadith narra-
tions. See, Pall, Salafism in Lebanon.
46
Pall, ‘Salafi Dynamics’, 177.
47
Bayt al-Zakat was established in 1985 by the Kuwaiti government to
collect religious taxes (voluntarily) and donations. It works as a charity launching
humanitarian projects across the globe.
48
Purist Salafis often face internal criticism due to maintaining a secret
organisational structure that in many ways is similar to the Muslim Brotherhood.
See, Zoltan Pall, ‘The Development and Fragmentation of Kuwait’s al-Jamaʿa
al-Salafiyya: Purity over Pragmatism’, Unpublished working paper.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 217

latter also affected Kuwait and prompted mass demonstrations that led
to the resignation of Prime Minister Nasir Muhammad al-Sabah in the
summer of 2011.49 These events led to the emergence of a broad opposi-
tion movement encompassing both secular and Islamic forces, which
demanded major reforms in the political system.50 A number of MPs and
leading politicians of SIG sided with the opposition, arguing that such a
move does not count as a disobedience to the ruler, as the latter permits
political opposition.51
Those who remained within the ranks of SIG stood with the govern-
ment and opposed the demonstrations. This rift mirrored the existing
ideological differences within SRIH. Similarly to the case of SIG, many
of the charity’s employees resigned and some of the prominent ʿulama
such as Nasir Shams al-Din left it, leaving SRIH under the control of a
conservative purist faction.52 The time for the conservative purist faction
of Salafis to exert more influence on the state and state–society relations
than before came after the Emir dissolved the Parliament in December
2012. Those purists who left SIG, along with other members of the opposi-
tion boycotted the next elections. As a result, SIG’s conservative members
became the only Sunni Islamic force in the Kuwaiti legislature between
2013 and 2016.53
The members of the conservative faction of the purists were rewarded
by the government for their loyalty. SIG member ʿAli al-ʿUmayr received
ministerial positions, and others became high ranking officials in other
ministries.54 Furthermore, Salafis close to SRIH were allowed to gain
more influence and take over the Muslim Brotherhood’s dominant posi-
tion in Kuwait’s Islamic institutions, such as the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, the Bayt al-Zakat, Kuwait’s main authority for the handling of
religious taxes, and formerly Muslim Brotherhood dominated t­ hink tank,

49
Christian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Politics and Opposition in Kuwait: Continuity
and Change’, Journal of Arabian Studies 4 (2014) 2: 214–30.
50
Mohammad Alwuhaib, ‘Kuwait: The Crisis and its Future’, Arab Reform
Bulletin, 2012, No. 63.
51
Interview with former MP ʿAbd al-Latif al-ʿUmayri, Kuwait, 11 November
2013.
52
See Pall, ‘Salafi Dynamics’.
53
After the November 2016 elections the situation changed. All purists lost
their seats while the harakis and the Muslim Brothers returned to the Parliament.
Khalid al-Khalidi. ‘Mufajaʾat intikhabat al-Kuwait: al-ikhwan wa-l-shabab ala hisab
al-salafiyyin wa-l-sabaʾil’, al-ʿArabi, 27 November 2016, https://www.alaraby.co.
uk/politics/2016/11/27/,‫والقبائل‬-‫السلفيين‬-‫حساب‬-‫على‬-‫والشباب‬-‫اإلخوان‬-‫الكويت‬-‫انتخابات‬-‫مفاجآت‬
accessed 28 November 2016.
54
First he became oil minister, then minister of public work.

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 218 The Middle East in transition

a­ l-Wasatiyya Centre. SRIH used its increased influence in the state institu-
tions to ‘salafise’ the official religious discourse of the state, and gain more
resources to extend its transnational networks. The ruling family gave its
blessing, as the purist Salafis’ stress on the obligation of Muslims to be
loyal to the ruler provided additional legitimacy to Al Sabah.
After capturing positions in the state’s institutions SRIH put forward its
vision on the state–society relationship and the Muslim individual’s rela-
tions to politics and the ruler. The Ministry of Religious Affairs became
perhaps the most important vehicle for purist Salafis to do this. The
ministry since the 1970s has been dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Most of the ministers and the majority of the staff were linked to the move-
ment. After the political organisation of the Brotherhood, the Islamic
Constitutional Movement (al-Haraka al-Dusturiyya al-Islamiyya – ICM)
boycotted the political process along with other opposition parties, the
government fired many of its cadres from the ministry and replaced
them with members of SRIH.55 Between 2012 and 2013 the Minister of
Religious Affairs was a leading Salafi figure from SRIH’s conservative
faction, Sharayda al-Muʿsharji.56
Since 2013 the ministry has been publishing books and letters that very
often focus on the role of the hakim and the obligations of his subject to
him.57 These publications largely mirror the purist Salafis’ concept of
state–society relationships. An international conference, organised by the
ministry in January 2013 on Shariʿa Politics (al-siyasa al-sharaʿiyya), and
in which most of the participants were purist Salafis shows clearly this
turn. The conference statement was published in the Kuwaiti press, and
summarised the main points of the discussion.58 First, the participants
criticised the contemporary political systems of the world because they
build on the individual as the main component of the state, instead of
a group of people. The too wide margins of individual freedoms lead to

55
Series of interviews and informal talks with officials from the Ministry of
Religious Affairs and Bayt al-Zakat between January and June 2016. Interview with
Muhammad al-‘Umar, a retired chief of department at the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, Kuwait, 29 March 2016 and Interview with ‘Abdullah Haydar, former head
of the international projects’ department at Bayt al-Zakat, Kuwait, 5 May 2016.
56
Later he was replaced by Yaqub al-Saniʿ, who is not affiliated to any Islamic
movement, but close to the ruling family.
57
See, for example, Bandar bin Nayif al-Mihyani al-ʿUtaybi, Wa jadaluhum
bi-ma hiyya ahsan: Munaqasha ʿilmiya hadiyal-18 shubha mutaʿallaqa bi-hukkam
al-muslimin (Kuwait: Sada al-Khayr li-l-Khadamat al-Islamiyya, 2013).
58
al-Awqaf ikhtatamat fiʿaliyyat mustajiddat al-fikr al-islami, al-An, 27 November
2013, http://www.alaan.cc/pagedetails.asp?cid=33&nid=161359, accessed 7 January
2014.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 219

‘selfishness’ and ‘chaos in criticism’. As a result, people might criticise

the ‘high ethics’ (akhlaqiyyat ʿaliya) of society that might lead to violent
reactions from others.
To avoid these shortcomings, according to the conference’s statement,
Islam provided an alternative concept of state–society relations. In an
ideal society the centre of the state is the Muslim ruler, who provides secu-
rity for his subjects. In turn, the latter obey him. The conference statement
elaborates on the conditions of criticism towards the ruler. According to
this, only religious scholars can raise any kind of criticism towards the
ruler. If this criticism is direct, i.e. targets specific actions of the ruler, it
needs to be articulated in secret and only in person. Indirect criticism can
be voiced openly but it should not mention the ruler or any of his specific
actions. The statement also mentions that those who are not well versed
in religious sciences should stay away from criticising the ruler, even if the
latter is unjust and oppressive. Instead they should be patient and practice
their religion.
One of the main ideologues of the purist Salafis, Dr. ʿAbdullah
al-Shurayka, the current head of al-Wasatiyya Centre, told me that he
considers even criticising the members of the government forbidden
as they are appointed by the Emir. Therefore, such questioning of the
actions of ministers is equal to disobeying the ruler.59 He also thinks that
the Kuwaiti Parliament should be a purely advisory body that proposes
and discusses policies, but does not launch attacks on high ranking
government officials.
The purist Salafis’ views completely negate what the Kuwaiti nation
state as a quasi-constitutional monarchy has been built on. Unlike the
other Gulf countries, in Kuwait the ruling system gains its legitimacy from
power sharing between the ruling family and ordinary Kuwaiti citizens.
Even the foundational myth of the country reflects that Kuwait’s rulers
are not supposed to have absolute power. According to this myth, Al
Sabah was appointed to administer the affairs of the state by stronger
and richer clans. In this way the latter could focus on trade. However,
decisions are supposed to be made by consulting the heads of the most
important families of the country.60
According to purist Salafis, Kuwait’s political system gives a relatively
wide platform to debate, and its relatively free media leads to the waste of
the possibilities and riches of the country. According to a leading opinion

59
Interview, Kuwait, 27 April 2016.
60
Mary Ann Tétreault, Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary
Kuwait (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 33.

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 220 The Middle East in transition

maker of SRIH’s conservative faction, Dr. Khalid Sultan al-Sultan (not

identical to the Salafi politician Khalid Sultan bin ʿIssa), the Kuwaiti
government focuses its energies on defending itself from attacks coming
from the opposition. According to him, due to the wide margins of
freedom, ‘whenever Kuwaitis are bored, [they] write an opinion piece,
curse their leaders and launch demonstrations’.61 Furthermore, the wide
margins of freedom allow ideologies that oppose Islamic values to spread,
such as liberalism. As he told me, ideally Kuwait should be a state which
is controlled by the Emir, who is advised by the ‘ulama and the country’s
material resources could be used to expand the Salafi da‘wa to Asia and
Europe. In this way instead of being an ‘insignificant country (duwayla
tafiha)’ which makes the news whenever the opposition is making dem-
onstrations crippling the government, Kuwait could be an international
centre of Islamic charity and proselytisation and could work in order to
reconnect the umma.
In fact, purist Salafis utilised their increased influence in the state
institutions to bring Kuwait a step forward to becoming such a global
centre of Salafi activities. For example, the director of Bayt al-Zakat,
ʿAbd al-Qadir al-ʿAjil retired in 2014, and his successor became an SRIH
member, Ibrahim Salih. Salih hired a number of purist Salafi employees
who utilised their access to the funds of Bayt al-Zakat to build their
transnational networks. As one of the employees of the institution told
me, Salafis from Europe and Southeast Asia made visits more frequently
to Bayt al-Zakat when they knew what changes had occurred in it. Most
often they managed to secure funds to their charity and proselytisation
projects due to their personal connections with the new Salafi employees.62
SRIH also could exploit its presence in the Ministry of Religious Affairs
to strengthen its already very extensive transnational links. In 2013 the
ministry held another international conference in which Salafis played a
dominant role. Similarly to the one I mentioned above, the main discus-
sion of the meeting revolved around the role of the ruler and the speakers
voiced very similar arguments.63 The more interesting aspect of this
conference is that the organisers received a huge budget from the ministry
which they used to invite dozens of Salafi scholars and preachers from
Europe, Australia and North Africa, who seemed to have similar lines of
thinking as SRIH, but who had not been connected to the organisation
previously. As one employee of SRIH told me, they used the opportunity

61
Interview, Kuwait, 29 April 2016.
62
Interview, Kuwait, 5 May 2016.
63
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HodznN8pEEI, accessed 7 May 2016.

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 Can the umma replace the nation? 221

to become familiar with these people, and if they appear to have the ‘right
mindset’ SRIH would discuss future cooperation with them.64

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have shown that Salafis strive to recreate a utopia that is
based on the perceivably ideal community of Muslims during the lifetime
of the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims. They intend to
imitate the practices of the first Muslims by the archaeology and literal
interpretation of the scripture. By this, the Qurʾan verses and Hadith
narrations become a system of codes that cover all aspects of human life,
including the relationship of Muslims to each other, to non-Muslims
and to the state with often clear-cut rights and obligations. According to
Salafis, for Muslims only one community exists, which is the umma, in
which inclusion and exclusion are defined by religious belonging.
This line of thinking conflicts with the concept of the nation state and
citizenship defined by belonging to a territorial nation state. Yet, Salafis,
unlike some other movements, like Hizb al-Tahrir, generally do not want
to abolish territorial states. Rather, they intend to unify the umma, bypass
state borders, and reorient the Muslim individual’s loyalty towards the
transnational community of Muslims. At the same time, as I have espe-
cially shown in the case of Kuwait, Salafis observe national identities and
characteristics of political systems. For Kuwaiti purists, the ideal political
system is centred around a Muslim ruler obeyed by his subjects. Lebanese
harakis do not share these views, but they also question the legitimacy of
the nation state based on a social contract between different religious com-
munities, and instead stress the Lebanese Sunnis’ belonging to the umma.
At the moment it is hard to tell the extent in which Salafis might
influence the sense of belonging of Sunni Muslims both in Lebanon and
in Kuwait. In the former, Salafism has dramatically grown in the past
decade, and as I have shown elsewhere, the impact of the movement is
traceable in the discourse of ordinary Muslims.65 Yet, it remains to be
seen how this might influence the attitudes of ordinary Sunnis towards
the Lebanese nation state. In Kuwait it is not certain whether the current
influence of purist Salafis in the state is a sign of a long term relationship
with the ruling family or whether eventually SRIH will be dropped as hap-
pened with the Muslim Brotherhood. At the moment, purist Salafis could

64
Interview, Kuwait, 5 May 2016.
65
Pall, Salafism in Lebanon.

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 222 The Middle East in transition

preserve their positions in the Islamic institutions of the state despite the
electoral failure of SIG in November 2016. Yet, this might eventually lead
to the decrease of their constituency as popular sentiments seem to favour
the opposition, at least according to the result of the polls.

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