DIGNITY - CUI B0N0?

volume ii

A special edition of Kritika & Kontext

 EDITΟR IN CHIEF

Jakub Tlolka, Student, London School of Economics and Political Science

BΌΆRD MEMBERS

Arnold Kiss, Student, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Mgr. Dagmar Kusá, PhD, Professor of Political Science, BISLA
Andrej Kurucz, Student, Cevro Institut
Stanislas Richard, Student, London School of Economics and Political Science

he Liberal Herald Email [email protected]

Kritika & Kontext Email [email protected]
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The Liberal Herald was made possible by the generous support of the following

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 CONTENTS

KEYNΟΤE CΌNTRIBUTIΟΝS

“A Relective Age Devoid of Passion”: On Kierkegaard’s heory

of Modern Levelling 3
Mgr. Mgr. Peter Šajda, PhD

Locating Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction

Strategies and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 11
Gregory Fabian, PhD

Honor Among hieves: he EU’s troubles to enforce

its own values 37
Simon Gruber, PhD

STUDENT ESSAYS

Limitations of Dignity as an Instrument to Preserve

Dominance 53
Nora Babalová
Lost In Translation? : Dignity as a Fundamental Human
Right in Slovakia 60
Katarína Kvačková

Justice as Dignity: A Hybrid of Suiciency, Democratic

Equality, and the Diference Principle 68
Lena Muhs

Riding the Tiger: Evola and Dignity in the Age of Modernity 78

Adam Petrikovič

Rousseau: Keeping Dignity in Disputation 87

Jakub Štulajter

Killers With Borders: Grasping Killer States’ Modus Operandi 94

Rodrigo Vaz

Less Developed Countries and Foreign Direct Investment:

Do We Use Dignity to Cover up Self-Interest? 103
Emma Jasmin Viskupic
 KEYNOTE
CONTRIBUTIONS
“A Relective Age Devoid of Passion”:
On Kierkegaard’s Theory of
Modern Levelling
Mgr. Mgr. Peter Šajda, PhD
Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences

Introduction

hroughout the 20th and 21st centuries Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855)

has been invoked as a prophetic thinker who early on identiied some of
the crucial trends of modernity. One of Kierkegaard’s key contributions
to the criticism of modernity was his theory of the individual.
Kierkegaard pointed out that the age which claimed to have liberated
the individual devised new ways of neutralizing the individual. Many
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers saw modern society as
an environment that naturally empowered the individual to ind him- or
herself. heir optimistic visions, however, oten downplayed the fact that
the same society set in motion new processes that made the individual
lose him- or herself again. Kierkegaard paid close attention to these
complex and oten latent processes and in his diagnosis of the age laid
bare the dynamics of the modern neutralization of the individual.
In this essay I am going to focus on Kierkegaard’s theory of levelling
which is an important component of his critique of the negation of the
individual in modernity. In the 20th and 21st centuries this theory has
attracted the attention of numerous thinkers, such as Ferdinand Ebner
(1882–1931), heodor Haecker (1879 –1945), Karl Jaspers (1883–1969),

3
4 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), heodor W. Adorno (1903–1969) and

Hubert L. Dreyfus (1929–) (Adorno, 1939; Dreyfus, 1999; Haecker,
1914, Jaspers, 1932). I believe that Kierkegaard’s observations can provide
inspiration also for our present debate, as dignity is inextricably linked
to the question of the individual. My paper is intended as an
introductory relection on the situation of the modern individual and
can serve as a backdrop against which deliberations on modern
conceptions of dignity can be developed.

From Passionlessness to the Media: Kierkegaard’s heory of Levelling

In 1846 Kierkegaard published the work Two Ages: he Age of Revolution

and the Present Age. A Literary Review, in which he presented an
insightful analysis of contemporary social processes and their impact on
the existential situation of the individual.1 Although he developed his
relections with a view to a particular historical and geographical
context, he phrased them in a general way without any reference to
speciic events or igures. In this way he presented an analysis whose
applicability transcended its immediate social-historical context.
Kierkegaard focused on the features of the present age. his term can be
interpreted in the strict sense as denoting the Danish society of the
1840s, but it can also be interpreted as denoting a broader reality, such
as modern Europe. Later commentators tended to interpret the term in
the latter sense: they viewed Kierkegaard’s analysis as a contribution to
a more general understanding of modernity.

1. he work is a reaction to the anonymously published novel Two Ages by the

Danish author homasine Gyllembourg-Ehrensvärd (1773–1856). Kierkegaard’s analysis
of social developments is found in the third chapter of the work. For my treatment of
Kierkegaard’s critique of modern society and its later echoes in Slovak see the following
studies: Šajda, P. (2013). Søren Kierkegaard: kritika spoločnosti a jej neskoršia recepcia.
In: Novosád, F., Smreková, D. (eds.): Dejiny sociálneho a politického myslenia. Bratislava:
Kalligram 2013, pp. 447–467; Šajda, P. (2014). Haeckerova kritika liberálnej tlače
inšpirovaná Kierkegaardom. In: Filozoia, vol. 69, no. 5, 2014, pp. 379–388.
 “A Relective Age Devoid of Passion”: Kierkegaard on Levelling 5

I would like to highlight four points of Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of the

present age which I consider fundamental to his understanding of the
nature of modernity: 1. excessive relection, 2. the spread of levelling, 3.
the rise of the phantom of the public and 4. the support of this phantom
by the press.
1. Kierkegaard characterised the present age as “a sensible, relecting
age, devoid of passion, laring up in supericial, short-lived enthusiasm
and prudentially relaxing in indolence” (Kierkegaard, 1978, p.68).
Relection, which under normal circumstances serves as a basis for
prudent decision making, has in the present age reached such an extreme
intensity that it has paralyzed resoluteness and the will of individuals to
accept long-term existential commitments. he result is not so much
inactivity but rather the creation of the appearance that the present
generation attempts to accomplish something essential. Seeing as this
endeavour lacks genuine passion and radicalism, the created appearance
evaporates and is replaced by an apathy legitimised by relection. his
apathy is interrupted by episodes of enthusiasm which do not last and
the vicious circle of boundless relection repeats itself.
he oscillation between leeting interest and lack of dedication
renders the present generation unable to identify with greatness and
eminence which require long-term passionate commitment. he present
generation defends its attitude with the help of trivialization: it
concludes, on the basis of relection, that under favourable
circumstances, exceptional deeds could be accomplished by anyone
(Ibid.). his generation does not realise that its antagonism towards
eminence is rooted in implicit envy directed against passionate and
resolute individuals. Conscious envy of eminence has disappeared due
to the trivialisation of eminence, but relection does not eliminate envy
altogether, it only transforms it. In its latent form envy becomes all the
more powerful. It becomes a key social determinant: “envy becomes the
negatively unifying principle in a passionless and very relective age”
(Ibid., p. 78). At the level of social interaction latent envy manifests itself
in the process of levelling.
6 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

2. Among the characteristic features of levelling are the growth of

ambiguity and the vanishing of qualitative diferences. Boundless
relection introduces ambiguity into oppositions which previously
required an unequivocal choice. Existential decision making on the basis
of the qualitative disjunction either-or loses its relevance, since the
conlict of the opposites has been called into question. Good and evil,
morality and immorality are no longer in radical conlict which would
prompt the individual to choose one and dismiss the other. It is
characteristic of the present generation that “[n]o one is carried away to
great exploits by the good, no one is rushed into outrageous sin by evil
[…] for ambiguity and equivocation are titillating and stimulating and
have many more words than […] joy over the good and the loathing of
evil” (Ibid., pp. 77-81).
he vanishing of qualitative diferences has an impact on traditional
roles which have been essential in helping determine the place of the
individual in interpersonal and social relations. Qualitative diferences
in family, education or government lose their clear-cut character but the
passionless age neither eliminates nor replaces them. he diferentiation
of roles remains formally valid but its content is so weakened that it does
not motivate individuals to adopt dedicated stances. Complex
structures of authority, such as the monarchy or the church, continue to
function according to the usual rules, but the content of the roles
constitutive for their proper operation is neutralised (Ibid.). Excessive
relection enhances the individuals’ conviction that they can be
whatever they want but at the same time eliminates their motivation to
adopt existential commitments to something or somebody. he
emptying out of the content of qualitative diferences is accompanied by
a decline in long-term existential commitments.
Modern levelling is a social process which is not controlled by
concrete leaders and does not happen under the auspices of identiiable
lobby groups. To be sure, it has its supporters and certain groups have
made it their agenda, but in its essence levelling is “abstraction’s victory
over individuals” and “a relection-game in the hand of an abstract
 “A Relective Age Devoid of Passion”: Kierkegaard on Levelling 7

power” (Ibid., pp. 84, 86). Pre-modern societies had their own
experience with levelling, but always in a limited measure, because
levelling was realised by a concrete group of people. Only modernity
with its means of communication and its vicious circle of passionless
relection can facilitate the spread of levelling in an uncontrolled and
unchecked manner.
3. he environment in which levelling unfolds unimpeded is the
public. his indeterminate collective is not a real community; rather, it
is an anonymous abstraction which lourishes when community life is in
decay. Although the public does not constitute a space in which
individuals essentially encounter each other and unite with one another,
it attempts to create the illusion that it is a legitimate community. In
reality it is an undemanding space for unessential interaction, in which
communication is carried out without personal commitment. An
individual, in order to become a participant in the public, must become
a nobody – a third party (Ibid.). In order to “ind” him- or herself in the
public he or she must lose him- or herself as the single individual. he
participation in the public eliminates, or at least diminishes, the
individual’s sense of personal responsibility. Responsibility is delegated
to the collective; in this act, responsibility virtually disappears. As it is
unclear who constitutes the anonymous collective of the public, it is
impossible to hold it accountable for its deeds.
he indeterminacy, amorphousness and the phantom-like character
of the public are clearly manifested in its abrupt changes of attitude. In
contrast to a concrete community of individuals who adhere to concrete
values and principles, the public does not have a continuous axiological
identity. From one moment to another it can completely change its
opinion, and still, it is impossible to claim that it has betrayed itself. he
public is a space for relection without commitment in which ambiguity is
a welcome stimulus. It is meaningless to reproach it for being
unprincipled, since it has never conceived of itself as principled. he
hybrid nature of the public is the natural element of levelling: “For
levelling really to take place, a phantom must irst be raised, the spirit of
8 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

levelling, a monstrous abstraction, an all-encompassing something that

is nothing, a mirage―and this phantom is the public. Only in a
passionless but relective age can this phantom develop” (Ibid., p. 90).
he modern individual inds the opinion of the public attractive, but
not so much for its content as for the fact that it seems to belong to
everyone. Public opinion is, however, “an inorganic something, an
abstraction” (Ibid., p. 106) which can in any moment turn against the
individual who has appropriated it.
4. he rise of the abstraction of the public is closely connected with
the activity of the press which in modernity “itself becomes a phantom”
(Ibid., p. 90) he public, which is the main proponent of the expansion
of levelling, is born thanks to the press and subsequently uses it to
accomplish its objectives. he public views the press as an ideal
instrument for the propagation of various forms of levelling. he fact
that the press becomes a servant to the public is typical of a relective and
passionless age, in which the press reacts to the weakening of community
ties by “replacing” them with the phantom-like community of the
public. In other ages the bond between the press and concretion can be
stronger.
An excessively relective society of the present age, which is
increasingly pervaded by the spirit of levelling, supports such forms of
communication which conform to its inner dynamic. he press is the
main instrument for the promotion of levelling with its aim of
neutralizing eminence. he present age does not promote those actions
of individuals which were prompted by passion and inwardness; rather,
it is “an age of publicity” (Ibid., p. 70) based on the disinterested judging
of the lives of individuals. he object of reporting is not the ethical core
of the individuals’ agency, but the external details of private lives which
can be turned into gossip without much efort. Essential speaking as well
as essential silence are replaced by incessant chatter and extensive
talkativeness. he fact that the orientation ad intra has been suppressed
by the orientation ad extra gives rise to a conversation without ideality
and commitment. In such one-sided externality there is nothing to
 “A Relective Age Devoid of Passion”: Kierkegaard on Levelling 9

essentially connect individuals (Ibid.).

Although Kierkegaard’s descriptions of the levelling carried out by
the public and the press are phrased in a general way in some instances
they relect his personal experience with Danish journalism. Shortly
before the publication of Two Ages: he Age of Revolution and the Present
Age. A Literary Review Kierkegaard had become the target of a mockery
campaign in the satirical periodical he Corsair. his conlict, which
lasted for several months, had a profound impact on both Kierkegaard
and the publisher of he Corsair, Meïr Goldschmidt (1819–1887), who
subsequently sold the journal and let Copenhagen.

Concluding Remarks

Kierkegaard’s provocative meditation on the modern neutralization of

the individual can be used as a mirror for the societies of the 20th and 21st
centuries. His idea that excessive relection extinguishes passion and
leads the individual irst to indecision and then to a latently envious
antagonism towards those who act upon passionate existential
commitments is a challenge to every age that sees itself as an age of reason.
Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s claim that the weakening of community life
leads to the rise of the phantom community of the public, which is
promoted by the mass media and which prompts individuals to
renounce their singularity in order to participate in an abstraction, is a
challenge to societies in which mass media enjoy a high level of
authority. And last but not least, Kierkegaard’s point that modern
levelling introduces ambiguity where an existential either-or disjunction
is needed elucidates the way in which communication without ideality
is born. his nuanced critique can serve as a litmus test for societies
which claim to have created good conditions for individuals to ind
themselves.
10 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. (1939-40). On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love. In: Studies in

Philosophy and Social Science, vol. 8.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1999). Kierkegaard on the Internet: Anonymity vs
Commitment in he Present Age. In: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook
Haecker, T. (1914) Nachwort. In: Søren Kierkegaard, Kritik der
Gegenwart. Innsbruck: Brenner-Verlag.
Jaspers, K. (1932). Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, 3rd ed. Berlin / Leipzig:
Walter de Gruyter.
Kierkegaard, S. (1978). Two Ages: he Age of Revolution and the Present
Age. A Literary Review. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Šajda, P. (2013). Søren Kierkegaard: kritika spoločnosti a jej neskoršia
recepcia [Søren Kierkegaard: On the Critique of Society and the
Later Acceptance hereof ]. In: Novosád, F., Smreková, D. (eds.):
Dejiny sociálneho a politického myslenia [History of Social and
Political hought]. Bratislava: Kalligram.
Šajda, P. (2014). Haeckerova kritika liberálnej tlače inšpirovaná
Kierkegaardom [Haecker’s Critique of the Liberal Press as Inspired
by Kierkegaard]. In: Filozoia, vol. 69, no. 5.
Locating Dignity at the Intersection of
Poverty Reduction Strategies and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Gregory Fabian, JD
International Human Rights Consultant

Introduction

Although the word “dignity” is used in international human rights

instruments, there is no set deinition of this word in international
human rights law. hus it is necessary to compare various aspects of
international human rights law with a dictionary deinition of word
“dignity” in order to deine the word in a “human rights” context. he
Oxford Dictionary provides two deinitions of dignity which are useful
in determining human rights characteristics of the word. he irst is „the
state or quality of being worthy of honour or respect: the dignity of
labour” and the second is “a sense of pride in oneself; self-respect: it was
beneath his dignity to shout.”
he Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1, states that
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. hey
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.” his implies that one’s rights are the
responsibility of others in society and vice versa. Further, governments,
in particular, are responsible to respect, protect and fulil rights in
compliance with their legal obligations under international human
rights treaties to which they have voluntarily obligated themselves.

11
12 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

hus it is proposed that if individuals and governments respect,

protect and fulil the human rights of a person, then that person will
have been treated in a manner which airms his or her worthiness of
honour and respect, simply because he or she is a human being. Further,
that person will enjoy a sense of a sense of pride in him or herself, or self-
respect.
Also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22, states that
“everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is
entitled to realization, through national efort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his
DIGNITY and the ree development of his personality.” his latter point
– “the free development of his or her personality” is an important one.
When a person is able to realise his or her human rights, that person is
also able to realise his or her potential as a human being, and in doing
so, gains a sense of DIGNITY and self-respect.

he Particular Importance of ESC Rights

Certainly all human rights i.e. civil, cultural, economic, political and
social, are important to promoting respect for the dignity and worth of
every human being. In the development of international human rights
law since the end of World War II, though, there has been a classiication
of civil and political rights as irst generational, and as such enjoying a
priority status over economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights which
have been classiied as second generational.
his secondary classiication of ESC rights has evolved because ESC
rights are seen as programmatic, non-justiciable, non-enforceable,
aspirational, and non-implementable. As they are oten resource
dependent, it is argued that they should be, in a democratic society, the
province of the legislative rather than the judicial and executive branches
of government.
Further, because ESC rights were emphasised by the Eastern bloc
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 13

during the Cold War while the US and the West placed more emphasis
on civil and political rights, their development has been limited. In
efect, because they have been politicised, distorted and abused by
authoritarian governments during the Cold War, they have been
relegated by some to a secondary, less relevant status. One commentator
has dubbed them an “orphan of the Cold War.”
But it is proposed that this should not be a justiication for
minimizing their importance. Rather, given the increasing levels of
income inequality globally, ESC rights should be and are being
developed, particularly in cases in national courts throughout the world,
as well as in IGO, INGO, and CSO advocacy globally.
here are many arguments against this relegation of ESC rights to a
secondary status compared to civil and political rights. For example, one
commentator has stated “But clearly, what is the right to life without the
right to health, food, water or adequate housing? Without an education,
how is there a right to meaningful ree speech? What is the value in the
right to work if individuals are not permitted to assemble and associate in
groups to discuss the conditions of work?” (Ssenyonjo, 2009, p.13).
In the last twenty years, though, the status of ESC rights has
advanced upholding the United Nations position that all human rights
are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. For example “it is less
satisfactory to have a guarantee of a right to vote if one is too sick to lit
the ballot paper, too poor to aford the costs of healthcare and the
underlying determinants of health, or too illiterate to make an informed
choice. Conversely it is not meaningful to have a right to health or
education if your freedom to speak out on the lack (or inadequacy) of
these rights is muzzled. Also it makes no diference whether one dies due
to a lack of access to healthcare facilities or to a lack of underlying
determinants of health (a violation of ESC rights) or from torture (a
violation of a civil and political right)” (Ibid., p. 13). he consequence is
still the same.
hus it is proposed that all international human rights, as they are
enshrined in international human rights law are important indicators of
14 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

the extent to which one enjoys human DIGNITY, and further, that a
human rights based approach to governmental poverty reduction
strategies can serve to promote recognition of the dignity and worth of
every person in society.
And while governmental respect for civil and political rights is
important to human DIGNITY, it is emphasised that respect for, and
protection and fulilment of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights
in particular, when measured, can indicate the extent to which state
authority honours human DIGNITY in a de facto sense.
Further, it is proposed that determining whether state poverty
reduction strategies are compliant with the state’s ESC rights
obligations under international human rights law can provide a useful
framework for measuring the extent to which individuals and groups of
individuals are treated by government with human DIGNITY.

Deining Poverty rom a Human Rights Perspective

he OHCHR has stated that “from a human rights perspective, poverty

can be described as the denial of a person’s rights to a range of basic
capabilities—such as the capability to be adequately nourished, to live in
good health, and to take part in decision-making processes and in the
social and cultural life of the community. In the language of rights, one
may say that a person living in poverty is one for whom a number of human
rights remain unfulilled—such as the rights to food, health, political
participation and so on” (OHCHR, 2012, p. 1).
A famous proponent of this “human rights” deinition of poverty is
Amartya Sen, the Indian economist and Nobel laureate. OHCHR has
also stated that “the human rights approach underlines the
multidimensional nature of poverty, describing poverty in terms of a
range of interrelated and mutually reinforcing deprivations, and drawing
attention to the stigma, discrimination, insecurity and social exclusion
associated with poverty. he deprivation and INDIGNITY of poverty
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 15

stem rom various sources, such as the lack of an adequate standard of

living, including food, clothing and housing, and the fact that poor
people tend to be marginalised and socially excluded” (Ibid., p. 4).
hus in deining poverty from a human rights perspective, a key
focus is on the identiication of those in society who are socially
excluded, i.e. those who are the most vulnerable, disadvantaged, and
marginalised individuals and groups in society. Further ater identifying
the poor, it is also important to identify those individuals and groups of
individuals among them who are in most dire need i.e. the poorest of the
poor.

Developing Poverty Reduction Strategies

Governments, national and international development agencies, CSOs

and many other actors could contribute to developing national poverty
reduction strategies. Further, such strategies come in many diferent
forms. For example, he World Bank oten works with developing
countries to help them formulate Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) which are development plans for a state over a period of years.
PRSPs are formulated for each sector such as employment,
education, housing, healthcare, social protection, justice, etc. Further,
the drating of PRSPs involves the participation of many diferent
experts from government, academia, the private sector, and civil society.
For example, the chapter of a national PRSP on social protection might
be the work of private and governmental technical experts on social
protection, experts from CSOs who work in the ield of social
protection, and even independent regional and international social
protection experts.
PRSPs are important as they identify the most important problems
in a particular sector, and then propose benchmarks (i.e. goals set to be
achieved over a certain period of time) in order to address the problems
and to move forward with development in the sector. hus PRSPs are
helpful to all persons in society in informing them of current problems
16 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

in a sector and then proposing solutions to overcome the obstacles.

hese solutions may include indicators to measure success in
achieving a particular benchmark or goal, as well as other
recommendations on how to address obstacles. hese statements of
problems and solutions are written in non-technical language and thus
are accessible to all in society as a source of information on problems and
solutions in advancing development in the state.
But while PRSPs are more oten seen in developing states, there are
many other forms of development strategies such as government drated
national development plans, Ministerial work plans for a speciic period
of time, and more generally, law, policies and procedures which if
enacted may expedite development of particular sectors.

Using a Human Rights based Approach in the Formulation of Poverty

Reduction Strategies

But what is a human rights based approach and why is it important to

the formulation of poverty reduction strategies? OHCHR deines
a human rights based approach as “a conceptual framework for the
process of human development that is normatively based on
international human rights standards and operationally directed to
promoting and protecting human rights. It seeks to analyse inequalities
which lie at the heart of development problems and redress
discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede
development progress” (OHCHR, 2006, p. 15).
“It is now generally understood that poverty is a result of
disempowerment and exclusion. Poverty is not only a lack of material
goods and opportunities, such as employment, ownership of productive
assets and savings, but the lack of physical and social goods, such as
health, physical integrity, freedom from fear and violence, social
belonging, cultural identity, organizational capacity, the ability to exert
political inluence, and the ability to live a life with respect and
DIGNITY. Human rights violations are both a cause and a consequence
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 17

of poverty” (Ibid., p. 9).

Mere charity is not enough rom a human rights perspective. Under a
human rights-based approach, the plans, policies and processes of
development are anchored in a system of rights and corresponding
obligations established by international law. his helps to promote the
sustainability of development work, empowering people themselves—
especially the most marginalised—to participate in policy formulation and
hold accountable those who have a duty to act (Ibid.).

“he following elements are necessary, speciic, and unique to a human

rights-based approach:
 (a) Assessment and analysis in order to identify the human
rights claims of rights-holders and the corresponding human
rights obligations of duty-bearers as well as the immediate,
underlying, and structural causes of the non-realization of
rights.
 (b) Programmes assess the capacity of rights-holders to claim
their rights, and of duty-bearers to fulil their obligations. hey
then develop strategies to build these capacities.
 (c) Programmes monitor and evaluate both outcomes and
processes guided by human rights standards and principles.
 (d) Programming is informed by the recommendations of
international human rights bodies and mechanisms” (Ibid., p.
37).
“he essential idea underlying the adoption of a human rights approach
to poverty reduction is that policies and institutions for poverty
reduction should be based explicitly on the norms and values set out in
international human rights law” (OHCHR, 2012, p. 4).
18 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Measuring whether a Poverty Reduction Strategy is Human Rights

Compliant

We have considered the relationship between human dignity and human

rights and in particular between the realizations of ESC rights through
poverty reduction strategies which are human rights compliant. But
how do we measure whether a poverty reduction strategy is human
rights compliant?
In recent years human rights professionals in the United Nations and
from national and international non-governmental human rights
organizations worldwide have begun to develop methods by which for
example, the progressive realization of human rights can be measured
both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Earlier, human rights professionals merely measured ESC rights
realization by determining whether the twin human rights legal
principles of equality and non-discrimination had been violated. But
over the last two decades other measurement methodology has been
developed.

A. Measuring compliance of Poverty Reduction Strategies

with ESC Rights Principles

States, under their international human rights treaty commitments, have

certain legal obligations regarding ESC rights, and there are various
principles which govern their interpretation. hese principles, known as
the Limburg Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines were established
by groups of international human rights legal experts. While they are
technically not legally binding with regard to states, they serve as
interpretive standards for the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights which is the UN treaty body which measures each
country’s compliance.
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 19

hese Guidelines have established the following principles regarding

ESC rights:

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATE PARTIES UNDER THE

ICESCR

Minimum core obligations

Violations of the ICESCR occur when a State fails to satisfy what the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has referred to as
“a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights (e.g. where any
signiicant number of individuals is deprived of essential food stufs, of
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most
basic forms of education, there is a prima facie violation of the
Covenant).

Lack of resources no defence to the failure to fulil minimum core obligations

Note: Availability of resources: “lack of inancial resources is not a

justiication for a failure to fulil minimum core obligations”.

Sometime the State’s full realisation of the right may depend on

availability of adequate inancial and material resources. But note that
the minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of
resources of the country or any other factors or diiculties.

Progressive Realisation

Unlike civil and political rights, ESC rights are not simply a “yes” or “no”
proposition. States are obligated to take immediate steps to promote
their progressive realisation. Speciically, under Article 2 (1) of the
ICESCR, States are required:
20 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

1. to take steps individually and through international assistance

and cooperation, especially economic and technical,
2. to the maximum of its available resources,
3. with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of
right which is its international human rights obligation,
4. by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures.

“Appropriate means” of implementing rights include:

 Legislative: he enactment of legislation designed to
implement ESC rights. Such legislation should include
implementation and enforcement mechanisms to ensure its
efectiveness.
 Administrative: For example, making sure that the various
government bodies, such as social security agencies, hospitals,
agricultural bureaus and regulatory commissions respect the
rights when they deal with people, e.g. clients or beneiciaries.
 Judicial: For example, recognising, either within or through the
adjustment of domestic law, the importance of economic and
social rights by the provision of judicial remedies for violations
of them.
 Economic: For example, adopting economic policies, such as
exchange rates, minimum wage provisions, and protections in
trading agreements and in the privatisation of public services.
 Social: For example, the adoption of public holidays, funding
community centres, adoption of social security legislation, and
possibly support for civil society organisations that monitor
and assist the realisation of the rights.
 Educational: For example, the dissemination of the
information required by people in order for them to vindicate
their rights (e.g. legal literacy for agricultural workers),
education of children, and public education in general. he
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 21

enactment of legislation will not be suicient alone; it must be

supported by policies and training of duty-bearers.

Which ESC obligation(s) referring to progressive realisation are

governmental duty-bearers not in compliance with?

 “Respect” is a negative obligation, which requires the State to

refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons to
the enjoyment of the rights. his also means that the State
should abstain from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any
practice, policy or legal measure which violates the integrity of
the individual, or which in any way interferes or limits his/her
right to pursue the enjoyment of the rights in the international
human rights instruments to which BiH is obligated, e.g. to
refrain from arbitrary forced evictions;
 “Protect” places a positive obligation on the State to prevent the
violation of any individual’s rights by a third party, e.g. private
employers interfering with the right to work or rights at work
by non-compliance with basic labour standards;
 “Promote” places a positive obligation on the State to create a
conducive atmosphere in which people can exercise their rights
and freedoms by promoting awareness of their rights through
public education, e.g. measures to promote tolerance and
prevent discrimination in access to rights;
 “Fulil” places a positive obligation on the State to institute
active measures that enable each individual to access
entitlements to the right and which cannot be secured through
exclusively personal eforts. State parties are also obliged to
provide a speciic right when an individual or group is unable,
for reasons beyond their control, to realise the right themselves
by the means at their disposal, e.g. people in disaster situations
or those in dire need. Further, States are required to take the
22 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, and

other measures towards the full realisation of ESC rights.

Obligation of developing states to seek international assistance

Where a developing state party to the ICESCR considers that taking

steps to realise core obligations in respect of ESC rights is beyond the
maximum resources available to it, it is appropriate for such a state to
actively seek assistance to fulil its core obligations.

Obligation of developed states to provide international assistance

“It has further been argued that although there is clearly an obligation
to cooperate internationally, it is not clear whether this means that
wealthy States Parties are obliged to provide aid to assist in the realisation
of the rights in other countries” (Ssenyonjo, 2009, p. 77).
But on furnishing technical assistance “the CESCR considered this
provision for furnishing technical assistance to involve virtually all United
Nations organs and agencies involved in any aspect of international
development cooperation, . . . agencies such as the World Bank and IMF,
and any of the other specialised agencies such as ILO, FAO, UNESCO
and WHO” (Ibid., p. 83).

Obligations of conduct

Obligations of conduct require action reasonably calculated to realise the

enjoyment of a particular right. (e.g. re: right to health: the adoption of
a plan to reduce infant mortality).

Obligations of result

Obligations of result require States to achieve speciic targets to satisfy a

 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 23

detailed substantive standard (e.g. re: the right to health: obligation of

result requires States to reduce maternal mortality to levels agreed to at
the 1994 Cairo International Conference on population and
Development and the 1995 Beijing fourth World Conference on
Women).

Margin of discretion

States enjoy a margin of discretion in selecting the means for

implementing their respective obligations. However, they are still
obligated to take certain steps immediately and others as soon as
possible. hus the burden is on the State to demonstrate that it is making
measurable progress towards the full realisation of the right in question.

State violations of the Covenant through omission or commission

Violations of the Covenant can occur through both omission of the

State (i.e. failure to take the necessary measures stemming from legal
obligations) and through commission (i.e. the direct action of States or
other entities insuiciently regulated by the State).

Retrogression referring to the levels of rights must be justiied

he burden of proof is on the government to justify any retrogression in

the level of realisation of a right (e.g. budget cuts must be justiied by
government).

Limitations on ESC rights

Note: Under Art. 4, ICESCR, ESC Rights can only be limited under
the following conditions:
 “limitation must be determined by law”,
24 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

 “only insofar as this may be compatible with the nature of these

rights”,
 “it must promote the general welfare”,
 “in a democratic society”.

No discrimination permitted for any reason

Where resources, no matter how limited, are available for government

to achieve some progress in the realisation of a right, there can be no
justiication for discrimination in access to and enjoyment of the right.
Furthermore, as noted above, a lack of resources is not a justiication for
the failure to fulil minimum core obligations of rights.

Limburg Principles, Para 72 re: State party violations:

“A State party will be in violation of the Covenant, inter alia, if:
 it fails to take a step which it is required to take by the
Covenant;
 it fails to remove promptly obstacles which it is under a duty to
remove to permit the immediate fulilment of a right;
 it fails to implement without delay a right which it is required
by the Covenant to provide immediately;
 it wilfully fails to meet a generally accepted international
minimum standard of achievement, which is within its powers
to meet;
 it applies a limitation to a right recognised in the Covenant
other than in accordance with the Covenant;
 it deliberately retards or halts the progressive realization of a
right, unless it is acting within a limitation permitted by the
Covenant or it does so due to a lack of available resources or
force majeure;
 it fails to submit reports as required under the Covenant.
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 25

Immediate Obligations

Certain obligations regarding ESC rights are not subject to progressive

realization or resource availability and are thus immediately legally
binding on states. hose obligations are as follows:

Note: Obligations which are immediate and not subject to resource

availability and progressive realisation:

Non-discrimination

he ICESCR, the CRC and the CRPD all impose an immediate

obligation to guarantee that ESCR are enjoyed without discrimination.
Accordingly, measures towards the progressive achievement of rights
must be guided by the basic requirement of non-discrimination.

Many ICESR provisions are capable of immediate implementation:

 the right to equality between men and women in the enjoyment
of rights – article 3;
 the right to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value – article 7(a)(i);
 the right to form trade unions that can function reely; the right
to strike – article 8;
 the right of children and young people to special measures of
protection and assistance, to be taken without discrimination –
article 10(3);
 the right to ree compulsory primary education for all – article
13(2)(a);
 the right of parents or legal guardians to choose for their children
schools other than public schools to ensure religious and moral
education in conformity with their convictions – article 13(3);
26 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

 the right of individuals and bodies to establish and direct

educational institutions in conformity with legal standards –
article 13(4);
 the reedom indispensable for scientiic research and creative
activity – article 15 (3).

he immediate obligation to take steps

While Article 2.1 of the ICESCR and the equivalent articles of the CRC
and the CRPD allow for a gradual realisation of some ESCR, the
obligation, in itself, to undertake measures towards such progressive
realisation is of immediate efect.

he immediate presumption against retrogressive measures

According to the CESCR, the immediate obligation to take steps

towards the full realisation of rights implies a strong presumption of
avoiding retrogressive measures. hus the burden of proof is on the state to
prove why retrogression of a right is necessary.

B. Measuring ESC rights compliance of poverty reduction

strategies with human rights indicators

In recent years, the OHCHR has done ground-breaking work to

establish human rights indicators for many civil, cultural, economic,
political and social rights.

Categories of Indicators

“What is an Indicator? What is a human Rights indicator? (OHCHR,

2013, p. 15-20)
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 27

 An indicator may be deined as “information that indicates a

state or level of an object, event or activity. It provides an
indication of prevailing circumstances at a given place and a
given point in time. Oten based on some form of
quantiication (e.g., proportion of children immunised) or
qualitative categorization (e.g., a treaty ratiied/not ratiied).
 In the context of this work, an indicator can be considered as a
human rights indicator if
 it can be related to human rights norms and standards,
 it addresses and relects human rights principles and concerns,
 and is used to assess and monitor the promotion and
implementation of human rights.”

Indicators can be either

 quantitative e.g. those that deal with quantities such as statistics,
numbers, percentages, indices, etc. or
 qualitative e.g. those that deal with checklists, sets of questions,
etc. which elaborate on and evaluate information beyond the
quantitative phase.

hey can also be performance indicators or compliance indicators.

 Performance indicators are established to evaluate progress on a
project, plan, policy, etc. hey oten are established using an
“input-output-outcome-impact” or similar type of analysis.
 Compliance indicators measure the extent to which there is
compliance with a particular law or standard.
 Human rights indicators are generally compliance indicators i.e.
they measure governmental compliance with international
human rights treaties which the government has voluntarily
signed or ratiied and thus legally bound itself.
28 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Categories of Human Rights Indicators

Human Rights Indicators can be either

 quantitative or
 qualitative,
and either
 fact-based or
 judgement-based

Examples of Quantitative Human Rights Indicators

 Fact based, objective indicators which are quantitative in nature
e.g. the number of forced evictions recorded in the country in
2012
 Judgement based, subjective indicators which are quantitative in
nature e.g. the average opinion of NGOs nationally on the state
of the freedom of association determined on the basis of
surveys

Examples of Qualitative Human Rights Indicators

 Fact based, objective indicators which are quantitative in nature
e.g. the number of forced evictions recorded in the country in
2012
 Judgement based, subjective indicators which are quantitative in
nature e.g. the average opinion of NGOs nationally on the state
of the freedom of association determined on the basis of
surveys

A Conceptual Framework for Human Rights Indicators

here are three types of human rights indicators:

Structural indicators help in capturing the acceptance, intent
and commitment of the State to undertake measures in keeping
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 29

with its human rights obligations.

Some common structural indicators are:

 International human rights treaties, relevant to the right to
adequate housing, ratiied by the State;
 Time frame and coverage of national policy on vocational and
technical education; and
 Date of entry into force and coverage of formal procedure
governing the inspection of police cells, detention centres and
prisons by independent inspection entities.
Process indicators help in assessing a State’s eforts, through its
implementation of policy measures and programmes of action,
to transform its human rights commitments into the desired
results.

Some common process indicators are:

 Indicators based on budget allocations;
 Coverage of targeted population groups under public
programmes;
 Human rights complaints received and the proportion
redressed;
 Incentive and awareness measures extended by the duty bearer
to address speciic human rights issues; and
 Indicators relecting functioning of speciic institutions (e.g.,
NHRI, legal system).
Outcome indicators help in assessing the results of State eforts
in furthering the enjoyment of human rights.

Some common examples of outcome indicators are:

 Proportion of labour force participating in social security
scheme(s);
30 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

 Reported cases of miscarriage of justice and proportion of

victims who received compensation within a reasonable time;
and
 Educational attainments (e.g., youth and adult literacy rates) by
targeted population group.”

Developing Attributes of a Right

An important step has been taken by international human rights experts

to enable the translation of international human rights laws and
standards into human rights indicators, i.e. the development of
attributes of a right.

Examples of Attributes of the Right to Equality and Non-discrimination

For example, four attributes of the right to equality and non-

discrimination under various international human rights instruments
have been identiied.

hey are:
 Equality before the law and protection of person
 Direct or indirect discrimination by public or private actors
nullifying or impairing access to an adequate standard of living,
health and education
 Direct or indirect discrimination by public or private actors
nullifying or impairing equality in livelihood opportunities
 Special measures, including for participation in decision-
making
Each of these attributes is then broken down into structural, process and
outcome indicators with the recommendation that “all data should be
disaggregated by prohibited grounds of discrimination, as applicable
and relected in metadata sheets.”
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 31

Establishing Benchmarks

What is a benchmark?
 Benchmarks are related to indicators. A benchmark is deined
as “a predetermined value of an indicator against which
progress can be measured.
 Benchmarks can provide the loor value for an indicator or be a
target (aspirational) value.
 Benchmarks can be based on normative or empirical
considerations.

Deriving Benchmarks for Human Rights Indicators

For human rights indicators, benchmarks can be derived from:

 International and national norms (e.g., obligation to adopt a
plan of action for the progressive realization of compulsory
primary education, stipulated in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 14);
 Targets set by States and policies at country level (e.g., national
goals, Millennium Development Goals, indicator-benchmark-
scoping-assessment (IBSA) procedure);
 Benchmarks derived rom comparisons of indicator values over
time, territories or for diferent population groups; and
Recommendations rom the United Nations and other
organizations (e.g., World Health Organization’s guidelines on
child immunization, International Labour Organization’s
guidelines and standards on decent work).”
32 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

C. Rights-based Budget Analysis of Poverty Reduction

Strategies to Advance ESC Rights Realization

Using Budgets to Promote the Progressive Realisation of ESC Rights

CSO participation in the budget planning process in coordination with

budget experts can be a key factor in advancing progressive realisation of
ESC rights. Various types of human rights budget analyses may be used
to measure the progressive realisation of ESC rights such as those
summarised below.

Examples of rights-based budget analysis (Diokno, 1996):

 Expenditure mix. Examine whether allocations respect, protect,
promote and fulil ESC rights by analysing expenditure mix,
geographical and spending level patterns, municipal programs,
categories of current expenditures and compensatory measures
 Progressive Realisation of Rights. Examine whether allocations
fulil the obligation of municipal oicials to take steps by all
appropriate means including particularly the adoption of
legislation to achieve progressively ESC rights to the maximum
of available resources, individually and through international
assistance and cooperation
 Fulilment of Benchmarks. Examine whether the municipality
has appropriated funds to meet the benchmarks which it has set
in order to achieve progressive realization of ESC rights (e.g. a
municipal program to provide housing to traicking victims, or
to fulil a PRSP obligation)
 Improvement of Rights. Examine whether allocations are geared
towards the realisation of ESC rights by comparing them to the
current status and condition of such rights.
 International Standards for Rights Expenditures. Examine
whether public allocations fulil international standards for
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 33

rights expenditures such as BiH’s commitments regarding the

PRSP and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
 Actual Spending. Determine whether expenditures are made for
the purposes for which they were ear-marked in the budget,
whether they are spent at all or only spent in part, and why.
 Monitoring year to year spending. Budgets may be monitored
from year to year to measure the progressive realization or
retrogression of ESC rights.

D. Measuring Compliance of Poverty Reduction Strategies

with Basic Human Rights Principles

he following standards should be applied to assess any policy proposed

by governmental authorities:
1. Accountability i.e. the Rule of Law: Requires that laws, policies,
institutions, administrative procedures and practices, and
mechanisms of redress are in place
2. Empowerment: Providing people with capacities, capabilities
and access with respect to changing, improving, and
inluencing their livelihoods and that of their communities
3. Participation and Inclusion: Related to the objective of
empowering people, but also includes access to development
processes, institutions, information, and redress or complaint
mechanisms. his also means situating development project
mechanisms in proximity to partners and beneiciaries.
QUESTION: How and to what extent are non-governmental
actors involved in governmental anti-poverty initiatives?
4. Non-discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups:
Determining who is the most vulnerable, disadvantaged or
marginalised locally, through the use of disaggregated
development data in particular. NOTE ESC PRINCIPLE:
there can be no discrimination at any time in granting access to
34 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

and enjoyment of rights to the extent that they have been

realised
5. Adequate Progress: Committing resources and efort to the
priority of rights. QUESTIONS: How will progress be
measured by duty-bearers? Will they set goals, outputs,
activities and performance indicators for poverty eradication
for example? What is the process for determining progress in
relation to other rights i.e. will other rights regress because of
resources dedicated to other rights?
6. Efective Remedy: Ensuring redress when rights are violated.
7. Transparency: he World Bank observed that their challenge of
transparency is “to design institutions and systems that cut
down both the incentive for, and the capability of, public
oicials to engage in corrupt activity.”

Conclusion

While this presentation has emphasised the importance of ESC rights,

and the manner in which their implementation can be assessed, it by no
means is meant to underestimate the importance of civil and political
rights. In fact the exercise of civil and political rights in combination
with ESC rights provide an efective means of controlling one’s destiny
and realising one’s full potential as a human being. hus government (all
branches) must ensure human rights not only in a de jure sense, but more
importantly in a de facto sense. hey are legal obligations of the state.
When a person enjoys her or his human rights, including all civil,
cultural, economic, political or social rights, it is an indicator of the
government’s recognition, in a de facto sense, of their DIGNITY and
worth as a human being. Further, when poverty reduction strategies are
human rights based, they promote the progressive realization of
economic, social and cultural rights, especially for those in society who
are the most vulnerable, disadvantaged, and marginalised.
ESC rights, and human rights in general, are not a matter of charity.
 Dignity at the Intersection of Poverty Reduction and Rights 35

Rather, they are legal entitlements and rights holders have the right to
participate in securing them, and to access efective legal and
administrative remedies to uphold their rights if they are violated.
Finally, when a human rights based approach is used by government
in the formulation and implementation of law, policy and procedures, as
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson has
said, it empowers a person to participate in securing the human rights to
which they are entitled simply because they are a human being. And if
they are so empowered, then it is an indicator of genuine, de facto
governmental respect for that person’s DIGNITY and worth as a human
being.

REFERENCES

Diokno, M. S. I. (1999). A Rights-Based Approach towards Budget

Analysis [PDF File]. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org.kg/en/
post-2015/article/document-database/un-system-in-kyrgyzstan
/human-rights-and-human-rights-based-approach/129-budget-
inance/1893-a-rights-based-approach-towards-budget-analysis-
1999-eng
Oice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Indicators. Retrieved from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues
/Indicators/Pages/HRIndicatorsIndex.aspx
Oice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2006).
Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to
Development Cooperation [PDF File], Retrieved from:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf
Oice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2012). Principles
and Guidelines for Human Rights based Approach to Poverty
Reduction Strategies [PDF File]. Retrieved from
36 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategies
en.pdf
Ssenyonjo, M. (2009). Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
International Law. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing.
Honor Among Thieves: The EU’s
Troubles to Enforce its Own Values
Simon Gruber, PhD
Professor of International Relations, Bratislava International School of
Liberal Arts

Introduction

Historically, the European Community, and its successor, the European

Union (EU), have been conceived as clubs of stabilised liberal
democracies striving for economic integration. Adherence to certain
values including human dignity has been taken for granted – it was not
particularly emphasised, not monitored, and there were no sanctions.
hat started to change in the 1990s in connection with the upcoming
Eastern enlargement and with the increasingly political nature of the EU
ater Maastricht (Sadurski, 2010). However, despite today’s rhetorical
prominence of the EU’s values, it remains doubtful whether the Union
is actually capable of enforcing them within its own territory. he main
reason, it will be argued in this paper, is the Member States’ reluctance
to risk any interference with their internal orders, especially with their
domestic balance of power.

1. Human dignity as a fundamental value of the EU

In the founding Treaties dating back to the 1950s, there was no reference
to human dignity. he Treaties concentrated on the economic side of
European integration. In fact, the concept of human dignity was

37
38 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

incorporated into the Treaties only very recently, but at prominent

places. Article 1 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (proclaimed
on 7 December 2000) states: “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be
respected and protected.” he Treaty of Lisbon (in force since 1
December 2009) amended the list of the EU’s values by including
human dignity on the irst place. Article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) now declares that “the EU is founded on the values of
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging
to minorities.”
he high symbolical standing of human dignity in recent years is
linked to the EU’s development from a predominantly economic
community into a more political union and has been described as a basic
pillar of a developing European identity (Meyer, 2003, p. 30). Human
dignity probably is of little practical signiicance as an individual
fundamental right, but it is seen as the guarantee of human rights and it
is visible in many special rights (EU Network of Independent Experts
on Fundamental Rights, 2006, p. 23). In the last couple of years, the
European Court of Justice referred to human dignity in dozens of cases.
Most cases fall into the area of freedom, security and justice (minimum
standards for asylum seekers, the rules governing the movement of
persons across borders, the return of illegally resident third-world-
country nationals etc.), others were linked to the equal treatment of male
and female workers, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation, equal treatment of persons irrespective of racial or ethnic
origin, the legal protection of biotechnological inventions etc.
here is also a relationship between human dignity and democracy,
because, as the European Court of Human Rights pointed out, tolerance
and respect for human dignity are the basis of a democratic and
pluralistic society. It is therefore no surprise that the concept of human
dignity gained importance when the EU moved to adopt the
Constitutional Treaty. he reference to human dignity was obviously
inspired by Article 1 § 1 of the German Constitution, the Grundgesetz.
Although the Constitutional Treaty didn’t come into force ater the
 Honor Among hieves: EU’s Troubles to Enforce its Own Values 39

failure of the referenda in the Netherlands and France, human dignity

made it into the TEU through its amendment by the Lisbon Treaty.

2. he protection of the EU’s fundamental values

But what does it mean that the EU is “founded” on respect for human
dignity and for the other values mentioned in Article 2 of the TEU?
How is the protection of those values guaranteed against violations by
the Member States?
When it comes to its external relations, the EU has a long tradition
in advocating and promoting human rights and other values. So-called
human rights conditionality is a well-established feature of many of the
EU’s contacts with the outside world. When the states of Central and
Eastern Europe strived for EU membership, they had to comply with
values like democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of
minorities (the “Copenhagen Criteria”) that were systematically
monitored. Once inside the EU, there is no such kind of conditionality
any more – a situation that is known as the “Copenhagen dilemma”
(Reding, 2013).
he wording of Article 2 of the TEU implies that not only the EU’s
institutions are bound by those values, but also the Member States. hey
have to comply with those values not only when implementing EU law,
but, in general, also when it comes to purely domestic matters. However,
according to the prevailing legal opinion, Article 2 of the TEU is not
suited for jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice. Instead, for
sanctioning violations of the EU’s key values, Member States agreed in
the Treaty of Amsterdam (in force since 1 May 1999) on a curious
procedure laid down in Article 7 of the TEU. If the European Council
determines the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member
State of the values referred to in Article 2, the Council may decide to
suspend certain rights of the Member State in question, including its
voting rights in the Council. In determining the breach, the European
Council has to act by unanimity, and it has irst to obtain a proposal by
40 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

one third of the Member States or by the Commission, and the consent
of the European Parliament.
One might think that this provision, which seems relatively clear on
the irst glance and which entails a sanction that really hurts (suspension
of voting rights) will deter any Member State from breaching any of the
EU’s fundamental values. However, the opposite is true. In practice, the
provision has never been used and is unlikely to be used in the
foreseeable future. Here’s why.

3. Why is Article 7 of the TEU not used?

3.1 Lack of gradation

First, there is a lack of gradation in the proposed sanctions. he

suspension of membership rights is a serious thing. As we notice for
example in the practice of the Council of Europe, it will be applied only
in the case of the most outrageous violation of an organization’s
fundamental values. But real life is rarely clearly black or white; there
will be nuances, trends, piecemeal developments. In such cases Article 7
does not ofer the possibility to react to such developments in an equally
piecemeal fashion. Member States tried to tackle this problem in the
Nice Treaty (in force since 1 February 2003) by introducing the
competence for the Council to determine that there is a “clear risk of a
serious breach” by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2.
his preventive action, a mere statement without sanctions, requires a
reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European
Parliament or by the European Commission. he Council has to act by
a majority of four iths.
he provision was introduced as a consequence of the so-called
Haider Afair in Austria. When the far-right Freedom Party entered the
Austrian government in the year 2000, the other Member States wanted
to send a signal that they deemed the presence of such a party in the
government unacceptable and dangerous. However, they understood
 Honor Among hieves: EU’s Troubles to Enforce its Own Values 41

that Article 7 (and the suspension of membership rights) was no viable

option because the Austrian government had not actually breached any
values. he Member States organised diplomatic “sanctions” against
Austria (suspension of political contacts, no support for Austrian
candidates seeking positions in international organizations, etc.) that
turned out to be a failure. Recognizing the insuicient wording of
Article 7, they complemented it by the possibility of preventive action
in the form of the above-mentioned statement about the risk of a
violation of the EU’s values. However, it is obvious that in the case of
Austria, a “clear risk of a serious breach” did not exist, because the danger
posed by the Freedom Party was too abstract and hypothetical – the
provision would have been useless if it had existed at that time.
Article 7 remained an unwieldy weapon. When some Member States
considered the triggering of Article 7 because of concerns about
developments in Hungary in 2012, they eventually decided not to do so
as they were afraid of devaluing the provision. “If we use Article 7 at this
stage then we don’t have much in our arsenal if something goes badly
wrong in a member state,” one diplomat explained (euobserver,
16.2.2012).

3.2 Unrealistic majorities and party politics

Second, the required majorities are almost impossible to obtain. For the
preventive action a majority of four iths in the Council is required, for
the punitive measures it is unanimity – excluding, of course, the vote of
the afected Member State. Especially the requirement of unanimity
makes the provision extremely diicult to handle. Every Member State
has at least some allies and friends in the EU, every government is close
to some other government, be it because of “kinship” along party lines
or because of personal acquaintances or close cooperation on issues of
mutual interest.
In addition, party politics has been heavily felt in the cases where the
use of Article 7 was at least contemplated by various groups. he
42 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

assessment of the development was dependent on the political ailiation

of the observer. he actions of the socialist Victor Ponta in Romania
seemed outrageous to the conservatives in the European Parliament,
whereas the socialists kept a low proile (euobserver, 6.7.2012). On the
other hand, for many socialists, Hungary under Viktor Orbán is no real
democracy any more, whereas many conservatives do not show too
much concern. When the socialists and liberals in the European
Parliament passed a resolution threatening the use of Article 7 of the
TEU against Hungary, the conservatives “reacted angrily” (euobserver,
16.2.2012).

3.3 Member States don’t punish Member States

Lastly, and most importantly, Member States are reluctant to punish

other Member States. here is honor among thieves, or, in other words,
an element of “not throwing stones when one’s own structure may be
made of glass” (euobserver, 16.2.2012). For example, in the case of
Hungary, the independence of data protection authorities was an issue
also for several Member States. he European Commission had in the
past taken Germany to court on just this issue. he resulting “habit of
mutual indulgence” (Bugaric, 2014) among Member States is a well-
known phenomenon. In the framework of the Council of Europe,
Member States only very rarely use the possibility to take other Member
States to the European Court of Human Rights. In the EU, they rarely
use Article 259 of the TEU to initiate infringement procedures against
other states. he reluctance of Member States to take action against
other Member States is already apparent in purely technical issues. But
in the case of Article 7, the fundamental values of the EU are at stake.
he triggering of Article 7 against a Member State would imply a grave
reproach, because the question is not about correct or incorrect
implementation of some directive, but about the “moral” quality of the
internal order of the afected Member State. he whole matter becomes
extremely politicised. Not because of the drastic sanctions, but because
 Honor Among hieves: EU’s Troubles to Enforce its Own Values 43

of the politicization of the whole process, Article 7 is oten called the

“nuclear option” (euobserver, 9.2.2012).
In fact, Member States are caught in a dilemma. For the sake of future
cooperation in the EU, they need Article 7, because cooperation in a
spirit of trust is impossible if some Member State indeed systematically
violates the EU’s values. At the same time, future cooperation with this
Member State will run into trouble exactly by the use of Article 7, as the
recourse to this provision threatens to shatter the Union based on
mutual trust. “Ater all, member states must cooperate daily on complex
policy issues and are therefore unlikely to take disruptive measures
against one of their own” (Meyer-Resende, 2013).

3.4 hreshold not crossed?

One might argue that Article 7 hasn’t been used so far because the
threshold of “a clear risk of a serious breach” of the EU’s values hasn’t
been crossed. However, this question is impossible to answer. On the
one hand, there is a problem with the deinition of concepts like “human
dignity”, “democracy”, and “the rule of law”. Article 4 paragraph 2 of
the TEU obliges the Union to respect the Member States’ “national
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional”. A signiicant degree of tolerance for idiosyncrasies of
the legal orders of Member States is therefore inevitable and appropriate.
However, the judicial practice of the European Court of Justice, the
European Court of Human Rights, and also the EU’s experience with
the monitoring of the Copenhagen Criteria in the process of
enlargement, have helped to clarify the meaning of those concepts. he
more salient problem is the lack of systematic assessment of disturbing
developments in the Member States against the backdrop of the EU’s
values. Pondering the use of Article 7, which information has to be taken
into account, which experts have to be heard, which bodies have to be
consulted? here are no rules. he Member States are free to draw on
whichever sources they deem appropriate and there is no lack of
44 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

information. But, as the example of Hungary shows, the lack of

systematically collected data makes the step from difuse uneasiness to
political action diicult. In the case of Hungary, the European
Parliament (2012), the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe
(2011), and other organizations like Human Rights Watch (2013)
produced gloomy reports, while world-famous intellectuals like György
Konrád and Agnes Heller rang the alarm bells. Does this indicate that
the threshold of “a clear risk of a serious breach” of the EU’s values was
crossed in Hungary? hat remains unclear, because such a statement is
up to the Member States, and there are no provisions on how they have
to proceed to reach such a conclusion.

3.5 Inringements as alternative?

Does the EU have any other means to enforce its values, apart from
Article 7 of the TEU? he most efective option in this regard is the use
of infringement procedures by the European Commission against
Member States that have failed to fulil a Treaty obligation (Dawson,
Muir, 2013). In the case of Hungary, the European Commission has
launched three infringement procedures in recent years. he irst case
concerned the forced early retirement of judges, prosecutors and
notaries. In the eyes of the European Commission, the Hungarian law
constituted a breach of the EU’s rules prohibiting discrimination on the
ground of age, as it introduced a special retirement age for certain
professions compared to others. he European Court of Justice agreed
with the Commission’s view. In the other cases, the European
Commission proceeded in a similar way. In other words, the
Commission didn’t base its argumentation on the values of the EU,
although, for example, the rule of law is evidently at stake when the
independence of the judiciary is threatened. Instead, the Commission
looked for special provisions in the EU law that were violated by
Hungary. his indirect and narrow approach proved to be eicient in
the sense that Hungary was not able to defend itself successfully. he
 Honor Among hieves: EU’s Troubles to Enforce its Own Values 45

approach also brought a depoliticization of the issues at stake. However,

the overall question of the heading of the Hungarian political and legal
system could not be addressed in this way. Infringement procedures
therefore have the potential to correct some excesses in the Member
States, if the States’ actions are connected to the implementation of EU
law, but they are probably not suicient to cause a Member State to
change course. his is also true concerning the protection of human
dignity. Although human dignity, in contrast to democracy and the rule
of law, is a human right covered by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the European Court of Justice can only act if human dignity is
violated through the implementation of EU law – cases outside the
scope of EU law are not relevant for the Court.

3.6 Sovereignty and power are at stake

Infringement procedures don’t change the fact that the EU has limited
capacities to involve itself and intervene in the internal orders of its
Member States. It comes down to the fact that Member States didn’t
wish a more workable provision than Article 7 of the TEU, which
supposes that Member States deal with other Member States according
to a provision written by Member States. he EU’s values touch on issues
that are considered the “holy grail of national sovereignty” (Meyer-
Resende, 2013). Even more importantly, the domestic equilibrium of
power would be threatened if the EU started to interfere in questions
like democracy, rule of law, and minority rights. hose values deal with
the domestic rules of the game, the rules of the domestic power struggle.
Solutions of a simply technical character are rare. External interference
will strengthen some domestic players and weaken others.
In recent years, Member States have put in place impressive legal and
political machinery with the task of ensuring inancial and economic
discipline. Nothing of that kind exists with regard to the EU’s values.
he degree of external surveillance and interference that Member States
face in today’s European Union regarding their iscal and economic
46 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

policies is much higher than that regarding their democratic credentials

and their respect for the rule of law. In this area, sovereignty remained
untouched. he introduction of Article 7 into the TEU through the
Treaty of Amsterdam retrospectively fulilled a twofold objective. On
the one hand, it sent a signal to the future Member States from Central
and Eastern Europe that the EU is not indiferent to the way they deal
with questions of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. On the
other hand, Member States made sure that they would remain the
masters of this core area of sovereignty. It is not surprising that the
European Council is the most reluctant among the EU’s institutions
when it comes to remind the Member States to live up to the EU’s values.
For example, the European Parliament noted “with disappointment that
the European Council is the only EU political institution that has
remained silent, while the Commission, Parliament, the Council of
Europe, the OSCE and even the U.S. administration have voiced
concerns over the situation in Hungary” (European Parliament, 2013).
Article 7 was not intended for actual use – it was inserted into the Treaty
precisely with the objective of making its use unnecessary. It is therefore
naïve to expect any dramatic changes in the enforcement of the EU’s
values in the near future.

4. Conclusion: Reform ahead?

Still, mainly the developments in Hungary, but also in Romania,

Bulgaria, and France (expulsions of Roma) led to rather intense
discussions about possible improvements in the enforcement of the EU’s
key values. From what has been said so fair it is clear that the debate is
not dominated by the Member States, even if in 2013 Germany, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Finland wrote a letter to the Commission
President calling for a mechanism to foster compliance with
fundamental values in the Member States. Most of the pressure stems
from civil society groups, the academic sphere, the European Parliament,
and the European Commission. Jan-Werner Müller from Princeton
 Honor Among hieves: EU’s Troubles to Enforce its Own Values 47

University called for a “Copenhagen Commission”, an independent

body, which would monitor compliance with the EU’s values (Müller,
2013). he European Parliament recommended to the EU institutions to
“set up a new mechanism to efectively enforce Article 2 TEU”
(European Parliament, 2013) that should regularly monitor respect for
fundamental rights, the state of democracy and the rule of law in all
Member States, and issue warnings at an early stage. Recently, the
European Commission has come up with a proposal dealing with
systemic threats to the rule of law in Member States. he Commission
focuses on the gap between the standard infringement procedure on the
one side and on the “nuclear option” of Article 7 of the TEU on the
other. In the proposed three step procedure the Commission would get
the right, ater identifying a problem with the rule of law in a particular
Member State, to issue “rule of law opinions” and “rule of law
recommendations”. If the Member State did not implement the
recommendation, the Commission would still have the possibility to
invoke Article 7 TEU (euobserver, 12.3.2014). Obviously, the
Commission’s proposal in itself doesn’t resolve the lack of political will
to enforce the EU’s values. Particularly, it remains to be seen, if the
recent discussions and proposals will increase the commitment to the
protection of the EU’s values by the Member States.

REFERENCES

Bugaric, B. (2014). Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law in the

European Union: he Hungarian Challenge. Retrieved from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257935
Dawson, M., Muir, E. (2013). Hungary and the Indirect Protection of
EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law. German Law Journal,
14, 1959 – 1980.
EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (2006).
Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
48 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Union. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf

/index_en.htm
Euobserver (9.2.2012.). Kroes threatens nuclear option against Hungary.
Retrieved from http://euobserver.com/justice/115209
Euobserver (16.2.2012). MEPs voice ‘serious concern’ on Hungary’s
democracy. Retrieved from http://euobserver.com/political/115286
Euobserver (6.7.2012). EU warns Romania on rule of law. Retrieved from
http://euobserver.com/political/116896
Euobserver (12.3.2014). EU oicials seek new powers to protect rule of law.
Retrieved from http://euobserver.com/justice/123434
European Parliament (2013). Report on the situation of fundamental
rights: standards and practices in Hungary, Rapporteur: Rui Tavares,
24.6.2013 (A7-0229/2013).
Gammelin, C., Löw, R. (2014). Europas Strippenzieher: Wer in Brüssel
wirklich regiert. [Europe’s Puppetmaster: Who Really Rules in
Brussels]. Berlin: Ullstein.
Human Rights Watch (2013). Wrong Direction on Rights: Assessing the
Impact of Hungary’s New Constitution and Law. Retrieved from
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/iles/reports/hungary0513_For
Upload.pdf
Meyer, J. (2003). Kommentar zur Charta der Grundrechte der
Europäischen Union [Commentary on the Basic Laws Charter of the
European Union]. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Meyer-Resende, M. (2013). Preventing more Hungarys – a stronger
human rights architecture for the EU. Retrieved from
http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/michael-
meyer-resende/preventing-more-hungarys-%E2%80%93-stronger-
human-rights-architectu
Müller, J.-W. (2013). Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU. Brussels
and the Future of Liberal Order. Retrieved from
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/iles/publicatio
ns/Muller_SafeguardingDemocracy_Feb13_web.pdf
 Honor Among hieves: EU’s Troubles to Enforce its Own Values 49

Reding, V. (2013). Hungary and the Rule of Law - Statement of the

European Commission in the Plenary Debate of the European
Parliament. European Commission - SPEECH/13/324, 17.4.2013.
Sadurski, W. (2010). Adding a Bite to a Bark? A Story of Article 7, the EU
Enlargement, and Jörg Haider. Sydney Law School, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 10/01, January 2010.
Venice Commission (2011). Opinion on the New Constitution of
Hungary. Retrieved from http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms
/documents/CDL-AD(2011)016-E.aspx
STUDENT ESSAYS
Limitations of Dignity as an
Instrument to Preserve Dominance
Nora Babalová
Charles University in Prague

What is the cost of a human being today? I wish my question had a

historical background, although in reality, the opposite is true. Human
beings have been one of the most proitable and universal commodities
for hundreds and thousands of years. However, real slavery, whether in
the sense of forced labour, hazardous child labour industry, or human
traicking, has never gone away and is still present in almost every
country. Paradoxically, slavery has been illegal everywhere across the
globe since the nineteenth and twentieth century, but nevertheless still
occurs in most world regions. he vital purpose of my essay is to bring to
attention an issue known under the term modern slavery and to
highlight a story of numerous labourers who are hidden behind most of
the products that we use every day. „Just because a person spends her time
making a piece of something does not mean that she becomes that, a piece of
somethingˮ (Chang, 2012, 04:35).
Today, almost 30 million people are trapped in slavery around the
world and that is double the number that came out of Africa during the
whole transatlantic slave trade in sixteenth to nineteenth century.
Nowadays, the same number of people is equal only to slaves living in
China, India and Pakistan alone. Moreover, the estimated number of
children currently entrapped in the child labour industry is
approximately 168 million, which represents almost 11 per cent of the
total child population globally. hese 30 million people and many more

53
54 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

are sufering as forced child or adult labourers, prostitutes, child soldiers

or as child brides in forced marriages. All forms of human rights abuses
mentioned above are frequently associated with the term modern slavery
or contemporary forms of slavery as a consequence of the intensive market
demand for cheap labour force, and the increase of global materialism.
he highest density of cheap and illegal child labour force occurs in
Southeast Asia, where the largest age group of child labourers is made
up of children between 5-11 years old, and that is represented by 44
percent of the total working child population. he Indian subcontinent
is the most signiicant intermediary for people who are traicked mainly
for forced labour as future slave labour force. Indeed, populous groups
of these children as well as all other forced labourers are strongly
dependent on their employers because of the necessity to have a job and
to get paid in order to feed their starving families, and that makes them
much vulnerable and tractable social group. “he combined elements of
coercion, fear, restrictions on reedom of movement and complete
dependence on the employer exhibit characteristics which amount to
contemporary forms of slaveryˮ (FI, 2012, p. 23).
Two types of employers are recognised in developing countries:
employers who completely enslave people without paying them any
money, and employers who pay the labourers, but only as much as the
latter need for their survival. De facto, people do not enslave other
people for rational reasons. Stronger individuals enslave vulnerable
individuals for the prospect of great inancial proit, and because of the
ineicient rule of law in speciic regions of the world alicted by
permanent poverty. he only way to escape poverty successfully is
undoubtedly the accumulation of wealth, although the only way to
reach this stage is to get paid more than is the cost of living; therefore,
an ininite cycle of misery is created and controlled by certain superior
rulers who act in favour of massive market demand.
Individuals, mostly in developing countries, are gradually losing their
inherent value, dignity, and self-esteem due to many current factors,
although it is the economic factor that plays the most signiicant role.
 Limitations of Dignity as an Instrument to Preserve Dominance 55

Historically, slave trade and the overall colonial era was a fundamental
factor in the rise of capitalism in Western Europe and America in the
sense of increased trade, export of goods to Africa and India, and the
development of agriculture and manufacture. Slavery was and still is
primarily an economic category which has existed during the whole
human history. Today, citizens of postcolonial countries are free de jure,
although they are de facto still economically and technologically
dependent on the Western powers.
One indication is novel and conspicuous about slavery today, and
that is the rapid collapse in the price of a human being. An average cost
of a single human being capable of work on the black market is about 90
dollars, and that is an almost negligible sum compared to the past. In
India, for instance, it is possible to buy a person for somewhere between
10 and 100 dollars. his ridiculous factor explains why slave based
business is on a persistent rise today. “[he] fall in the price of slaves has
had numerous results outside the slave/slaveholder relations as well. In
particular, it has dramatically increased the proits of some slaveholders. Yet
paradoxically, because these proits are lodged within a general context of
illegality, they do not serve as a stimulus to national economies. In fact,
slavery today can be thought of as a drag on economies, preventing
development… A key assertion is that even with signiicantly increased levels
of proit, even with a new orientation to the exploitation of slaves, even with
the transformation of slaves rom capital investments to disposable inputs in
an economic process, the relationship remains one that confounds and
hinders economic developmentˮ (Bales, 2006, p. 2).
Overpopulation is one of the key reasons which accelerate the
process of enslavement of vulnerable people living in poverty, and
poverty is the main reason responsible for choosing a life of an unworthy
slave because there is no viable alternative. Population explosion caused
a rapid increase in the supply of potential slave labour mainly in
developing countries and for this reason the rapid collapse in prices
inluenced the costs of a single human being.
56 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Modern slavery is probably the biggest contemporary economic

crime, and because of the insuicient strength of the rule of law in many
countries, there is a high assumption of future growth. Slaves, people
who are forced to work in drastic conditions seven days a week without
any chance of escape and of getting paid, are deined by the same
characteristics as the ones deported out of the African continent a few
centuries ago. How is it possible for a human being in the 21st century to
be treated like property? Surprisingly, the reason is very trivial. “When
extreme economic, social and political vulnerability in one part of the
population is matched by the ability of another part of the population to
mobilise the means of violence and the “right” to exercise it with impunity,
the result can be slavery. In many countries in the developing world, the
oicial organs of potential violence, the police and army, are themselves for
sale or rent, and can be used to maintain control over enslaved personsˮ
(Bales, 2006, p. 4).
In addition, as the consumer world demands low cost and higher
quantity of various sorts of products, child labour and many other forms
of forced labour continue. Our demanding Western society is indirectly
supporting the enlargement of the enslaved due to a system based on the
principle of minimum wage and maximum possible output from a cheap
labour force. Hence, I ask a question: Is it relevant to understand Western
dignity as fully virtuous if the West’s superiority over other societies allows
it to manipulate the dignity of people who are trapped in the hands of a
unilateral system of exploitation? Western consumerism divides modern
society into two major layers: superior rulers and their slaves. According
to the speciic economic factors I have mentioned, the gradual
enlargement of the bottom layer is easily predictable in near future.
On the other hand, many followers of the classical utilitarian
philosophy would not react negatively to the actual issue of modern
slavery because of the fundamental axiom of this philosophical and
demanding theory: everything useful to reach the highest stage of our
happiness or pleasure is good. In other words, the maximization of
 Limitations of Dignity as an Instrument to Preserve Dominance 57

happiness is the main and the only goal of the utilitarian philosophy.
he invention of a cheap and lexible workforce in the eastern
hemisphere in order to supply the Western market was probably the
most ideal solution that would bring enough satisfaction to most of our
material requirements. In that case, the use of slave labour in the 21st
century does not seem very barbaric to large groups of consumers in view
of low costs, broad diversity of choice, and an enormous surplus of any
goods we can imagine. Another diferent aspect is, of course, the
misinterpretation of the issue of modern slavery in world media by
replacing the word slavery by semantically diferent terms.
However, in utilitarian theory occurs a substantial fault uncovered
by several critical philosophers. Immanuel Kant criticised the principle
of utilitarian consequentialism, which judges the ‘good’ in view of the
happiness of the largest number. For this reason, as far as utilitarians are
concerned, there is no universal referee responsible for deciding whether
an act was morally right or wrong. However, what if the satisfaction of
our material desires can only be achieved at the expense of someone else’s
sufering, how u are fulilled at the expense of someone’s sufering?
Where, then, is the utility? Karl Popper explained that by the principle
of negative utilitarianism: “…pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure, and
especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the
greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more
modestly, the least amount of avoidable sufering for all…” (Popper, 1966,
p. 284-285).
In conclusion, the notion of dignity in developing countries is
represented by a completely diferent translation than in most fully
developed Western parts of the world. Millions of labourers are brutally
forced to work in terrible conditions to respond quickly to our rising
market demands. he crucial fact about slavery today is that our
demanding society is not prepared to take the responsibility to either
stop the enlargement of slave-based business or to largely limit it. For
this reason, the essential problem of this bottomless situation can be
termed a crisis of humanity. he solution must be discovered primarily
58 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

in every person individually through the rehabilitation of the necessity

for tolerance, freedom, and for moral values. On the other hand, the
actual issue of modern slavery should by highlighted through a rising
political awareness of human rights violations, concrete policies and
legislation on the national and international levels. As a rational society,
we should grant the right to individuality and self-determination to
every human being without diference or exception. I would like to
conclude my thoughts on the meaning of individual dignity with a quote
by Immanuel Kant: “Always recognise that human individuals are ends,
and do not use them as means to your end” (Kant, 1990, p. 140).

REFERENCES

Bales, K. (2010). How to combat modern slavery. Retrieved from

http://www.ted.com/talks/kevin_bales_how_to_combat_modern
_slavery?utm_source=email&source=email&utm_medium=social
&utm_campaign=ios-share
Bales, K. (2006). Testing a heory of Modern Slavery. Retrieved from
http://www.yale.edu/glc/events/cbss/Bales.pdf
Chang, L. T. (2012, June). he Voices of China’s Workers [Video ile].
Retrieved from http://www.ted.com/talks/leslie_t_chang_the_
voices_of_china_s_workers?utm_source=email&source=email&ut
m_medium=social&utm_campaign=ios-share
Franciscans International (2012). Modern Slavery in India: Cases of
Bonded Labour. Geneva.
International Labour Oice, International Programme on the
Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) (2013). Marking progress
against child labour - Global estimates and trends 2000-2012. Geneva:
ILO.
Kant, I. (1990). Základy metafyziky mravů [Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals]. (2nd Ed.) Prague: Svoboda.
 Limitations of Dignity as an Instrument to Preserve Dominance 59

Mill, J. (2011). Utilitarismus [Utilitarianism]. (182 s.). Prague: Vyšehrad.

Popper K. R. (1966). he Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 1: he
Spell of Plato. (Fith revised edition). London: Routledge.
Lost in translation? : Dignity as a
Fundamental Human Right in
Slovakia
Katarína Kvačková
Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

Introduction

I would like to concentrate on the importance of dignity as the principle

which underlies a truly democratic society. his principle needs to be
understood by each member of society so that it may become an integral
part of everyone’s attitudes and behaviour. I will illustrate my points by
describing how this occurs, or more accurately, how it fails to occur in
the reality of modern Slovakia.

Dignity: Deinition and Concept

I will focus primarily on the understanding of dignity as a full

implementation of human rights. As stated in Article 22 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it is not only civil and political rights that
are indispensable for the achievement of full human dignity. Social,
cultural, and economic rights need to be recognised as well.
If we use a strictly procedural deinition of democracy as being
deined by Huntington, “fair, honest, and periodic elections”, then
Slovakia, like many other countries, meets the criteria of a formal
democracy (Huntington, 1991, p. 5). But we need a broader picture of
the implementation of human rights in society than that previously
60
 Lost in Translation? : Dignity as a Human Right in Slovakia 61

used. “he absence or deprivation of certain capabilities or real

opportunities – as well as the denial of political and civil liberties – are
relevant to the characterisation of freedoms and rights” (Vizard, 2001,
emphases added). For a better idea of what could happen under social,
cultural and economic rights, I will introduce Amartya Sen’s concept of
human rights in his work Development as Freedom (1999). Instead of
looking merely for economic indicators such as Gross National Product
or Income per Capita, we should place these indicators prominently into
the full range of other freedoms which we accept as necessary for the full
realization of human potential. Take, for example, Sen’s “freedom of
individuals to live long and live well”, child care, presence or absence of
corruption, inequality between women and men and many others (Sen,
1999, p. 5).
Economic growth is, without a doubt, one of the most important
pillars of democracy. However, in order to create an environment for
sustainable growth, in its broadest sense, we need to ensure the existence
of opportunities for people to fulil their potential. Otherwise, we can
expect undesirable consequences leading to social unrest. In the same
spirit, we can tackle another point elaborated by Amartya Sen:
“Unemployment is not merely a deiciency of income; unemployment
contributes to the ‘social exclusion’ of some groups, and it leads to losses
of self-reliance, self-conidence and psychological and physical health”
(Sen, 1999, p. 21). Sen’s approach describes human development in terms
of the expansion of valuable human capabilities. He says: “[t]he Human
Development Index captures the importance of three critical human
capabilities – achieving knowledge, longevity and a decent standard of
living” (Vizard, 2001, p. 2).
We must always bear in mind, however, that such monitoring must
not rely solely on quantitative data but also on qualitative measurements
and feedback – human behaviour is too complex to be condensed into
and represented by simple numbers. Individual freedom should no
longer be measured just by political and civil freedom, but by the quality
of life that people enjoy - it is based upon many factors other than just
62 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

economic growth. Sen writes: “While economic prosperity helps people

to have wider options and to lead more fulilling lives, so do more
education, better health care, iner medical attention, and other factors
that causally inluence the efective freedoms that people actually enjoy”
(Sen, 1999, p. 295).

Formal Implementation of Human Rights agenda in Slovakia

As I have suggested already, from a purely formal point of view, nothing

indicates non-democratic tendencies in the political processes in
Slovakia. his country does have democratic legislation, institutional
frameworks and participatory procedures, but the structures and
institutions do not possess the necessary habits, attitudes, and value
orientations by the elites or by the people for required the
implementation of human rights in everyday life. We should bear in
mind the communist heritage of Slovakia and the persistence of the
same old approaches and the bad habits of the past supericially dressed
up in modern names and structures which seem to be “the only game in
town” also when it comes to human rights.
One of the key problems is peoples’ perception of human rights in
our society. Most visibly we can recognise the poor understanding of
dignity in our political life by the inadequate implementation of human
and civil rights which underpin dignity itself.
Slovakia has adjusted its legislation to comply with the core concepts
of accepted political practice for human dignity in accordance with
fundamental human rights. his was easy because the basic requirements
for human rights appeared to have been met already at a desirable
standard; the constitutional design, too, complied with the
international covenant on human rights. Ater all, the institutional
design of the relevant governmental bodies for a human rights agenda
and their implementation was inspired by “he Paris Principles”
(OHCHR, 1993). hese principles were intended to promote and
secure the human rights agenda in the national constitution and the
 Lost in Translation? : Dignity as a Human Right in Slovakia 63

institutional design. However, the implementation of these rights in

everyday reality just did not work.
he freedoms guaranteed in the constitution are not enforceable
without an efective administrative apparatus. he appropriate
legislation is present, but enforcement of these laws is almost non-
existent. Not only that, the legislation creates a false supericial
impression that all is well with Human Rights in our country. he lack
of cross-societal discussion on this issue is alarming. he Human Rights
agenda is certainly complicated by the use of technical language but this
means that the responsible authorities need to introduce and explain the
issues to the public. Otherwise human rights will remain a remote issue,
and they will not be perceived as one of the cornerstones of democracy,
in either legal or practical terms.
One of many examples of the lack of follow-through is that, although
Slovakia signed the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s
Rights (1996), it does not follow the criteria to the fullest - the absence
of a public defender for children is just one of the many shortcomings.
Another issue is anti-discrimination, one of the key problems in
Slovak society on all levels. We established a Slovak National Centre for
Human Rights (1994), a Public Defender of Rights (2001) and the
Centre for Legal Advices (2005). heir main purpose was to establish
and observe standards of equal treatment. he 20-year existence of the
Slovak National Centre for Human Rights may indicate a well-
established organisation that should have a solid reputation in this area.
But the opposite is true, as claimed by Fridrich: “he normative
deinition of the Centre’s competencies causes its actual potential to be
overshadowed by appearing to only function as a ‘research institute’”
(Fridrich, p. 81). his is common to other institutions besides the
Centre.
he reason for such an approach may not be lethargy or lack of will.
It may be due to low inancial support and poor competencies,
connected with the perception of the Centre by other institutions with
stronger political positions. hese factors pose obstacles to those
64 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

individuals who are willing to approach their work responsibly. he

whole potential of the Centre is lost because, rather than engaging in
anti-discrimination actions and making progress in this area, in reality it
merely conducts “research activities” (Fridrich, p. 81).
Even the Government’s Council of the Slovak Republic for Human
Rights is constantly pointing out the incompetence of the Slovak
National Centre for Human Rights.

he Application of Human Rights into Slovak society.

he weak position of national institutions automatically creates a weak

position of the state towards Human Rights in legalistic terms: “Human
rights impose three types or levels of obligations on State Parties: the
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulil. In turn, the obligation to
fulil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to
provide” (Asbjørn, 2006, p. 175).
What should the State and its citizens do in order to protect, to
respect, and to fulil Human Rights? I would like to add “to promote”
Human Rights, because one of the most crucial problems in Slovak
society is the widespread ignorance surrounding this very concept. he
protection of human rights is inextricably linked to respect therefor,
seeing as we cannot protect something which we do not consider worthy
of our respect.
We claim that the principle of equality is central to the human rights
agenda, but it would seem that this principle does not apply to everyone.
Consider Slovakia’s immigration policies and general unfriendliness.
Even as a “bad joke”, we can perhaps recall a cartoon in one of Slovakia’s
leading newspapers, SME, in which the country’s Minister of Internal
Afairs, Mr. Kaliňák, was depicted saying: “We had 4 asylum seekers
from Ukraine, but when they saw our hospitality, they decided they had
better ask for asylum in Russia!” (Shooty, 2014).
We can further mention another well-known Slovak case – that of
Hedviga Malinová – which remains unconcluded ater 8 years of judicial
 Lost in Translation? : Dignity as a Human Right in Slovakia 65

failures, in spite of the fact that the European Court for Human Rights
ruled in favour of Mrs. Malinová in 2012 (MTI, 2014).
We may have ambivalent feelings towards all these cases but under
each of these challenges to the system we can see the perfusion of
corruption in the judiciary, the legislative process, the educational
sphere and in civic engagement, all of which are underdeveloped in
Slovakia.
All these cases have in common a basic disrespect for the rule of law
which we claim is a fundamental principle in Slovakia.
he fulilment of Human Rights in Slovakia ultimately rests on the
political will to engender a culture which incorporates these values into
every part and level of everyday life. his involves educational reform,
promotion of public awareness, and adherence to the rule of law. In the
irst place it requires a basic consensus among political elites about the
desirable end of protecting, promoting, fulilling and respecting Human
rights as a principle and a way of life.
he not very enthusiastic approach to these issues by the political
elites, of whatever political orientation, leads to the polarization of
society and deeper fragmentation to a point where almost no further
dialogue is possible. We can hear the loud voices of these fragmented
forces nowadays calling for action with greater vehemence than ever
before.
I would like to conclude with a comment by Martin Šimečka on a
recent event in Slovakia. “A hundred years from now it will have become
completely irrelevant that two weeks prior to the 2014 Slovak
presidential elections, the let wing (!) Prime Minister and presidential
candidate Robert Fico needed to make himself attractive to conservative
voters. He formed a union with his ideological arch-enemy (Christian
Democrats) and, in a glorious gesture, promised the people that, in line
with President Putin, he would protect the country from the
homosexual lobby and the moral decay of the West” (Šimečka, 2014).
hat just showed how deep the political fragmentation of elites is on
all levels, even ater 25 years of formal democracy. Instead of cultivating
66 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

a mature political culture which would educate Slovaks toward

accepting a diverse society, we are closing our eyes in the hope that, if we
cannot see a problem, it simply ceases to exist. And this concerns each
Slovak citizen. he problem discussed here is too important to be
ignored if we desire progress and further development in Slovak politics
and culture.

Conclusion

In order to improve the situation and the circumstances of everyday life,

there is a need for formal structures in addition to the informal
participation of all individuals in the democratic process.
If we believe in the enlightenment of reason, the only way to achieve
it in a community is through education at all levels of society. Learning
to know each other is a task for a lifetime, so we should never give up the
ambition to know each other better for our own sake as individuals, as
well as for the good of the whole.

REFERENCES

Asbjørn, E. (2006). Economic, social, and cultural rights as human

rights. In: P. Rochard, B. H. Weston, & C. Weston, Human Rights in
the World Community. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Fridrich, B. (n. a.). Právne aspekty rovnakého zaobchádzania v slovenskej
realite [he Legal Aspects of Equal Treatment in Slovakia]. (M. Filčík,
Ed.) Slovenská republika: EQUILIBRIA, s.r.o.
Huntington, S. P. (1991). he hird Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman
Publishing.
 Lost in Translation? : Dignity as a Human Right in Slovakia 67

MTI. (2014, May 01). Case of ethnic Hungarian beaten in Slovakia is

human rights issue, deputy PM says. Retrieved May 01, 2014, from
politics.hu: www.politics.hu
OHCHR. (1993, December 20). Principles relating to the Status of
National Institutions (he Paris Principles). Retrieved January 09,
2014, from United Nations Human Rights: www.ohchr.org
Sen, A. (1999). Development as reedom. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Shooty. (2014, April 17). Shooty. SME.
Šimečka, M. M. (2014, Marec 03). Slovensko v předvečer války [Slovakia
on the night before a war]. In: Respekt
Vizard, P. (2001). Economic heory, Freedom and Human Rights: he
Work of Amartya Sen. Overseas Development Institute.
Justice as Dignity: A Hybrid of
Suficiency, Democratic Equality and
the Difference Principle
Lena Muhs
University College Maastricht

Introduction

Justice is an extremely appealing concept. It is a concept that is

inherently and by deinition good. However, the question of what justice
is constituted of, in this case distributive justice, seems to divide the
supporters of this idea. Some argue that justice is equality, others fancy
desert, while again diferent people prefer the notion of suiciency.
Under closer consideration all of these theories prove to produce some
interpretations that go against our intuition. Egalitarianism is unable to
respond to the levelling-down objection, and while suiciency does not
face this problem, it does not pay attention to any inequalities above or
below a certain threshold, leaving us with the unpleasant task of deining
a threshold itting this interpretation. Desert, following a diferent
approach of distributing resources, does not care for those untalented or
handicapped and therefore does not share the humanitarian appeal of
the before mentioned theories. Neither of these theories
unconditionally produces outcomes that satisfy our intuitions of what
justice is. his may suggest that we are not looking for one theory of
justice, but that a hybrid would be more suitable to produce just
outcomes in all cases. his paper therefore combines diferent
approaches and tries to merge their appealing implications, while

68
 Justice as Dignity: Suiciency, Equality and Diference 69

avoiding the unjust outcomes. In order to do this a theory of when to

apply which theory is needed, which is provided in section 2.1 to 2.3.
Furthermore it seems to me that all the approaches share a
commitment to avoiding inhumane outcomes, however these are
deined. hese outcomes would be inequality in egalitarianism,
insuiciency in the theory of suiciency, and undeserved beneits or
burdens in desert. his suggests that human beings all have some sort of
worth that makes a certain treatment of them unjust. his worth shall
be called dignity in this paper. Following from this shared commitment,
dignity will serve as the basis for this theory of justice. As dignity seems
to be another concept receiving very few objections linked to the fact
that no one really knows what it is, I start my argument by introducing
this concept, trying to point out the aspects of it that make this idea so
appealing.
Lastly I show how the here developed hybrid creates a society
respecting every person’s dignity. Given that justice is universal respect
for dignity, this leads to the conclusion that the here presented hybrid is
just. It should be noted, however, that I am striving for principles of
justice, which does not entail the notion of practicality. Objections
stating that explained provisions cannot be practically introduced
therefore do not reject this theory of justice, but merely show problems
in applying it in society, which should be addressed in a diferent
account.

Dignity as the Basis of Justice

Dignity is deined here as an inherent value of all human beings. It is a

value that is equal to all people independent of their actions and that
cannot be taken away from anyone. It furthermore inherently condemns
any inhumane treatment as this violates the dignity of human beings. I
will now try to elaborate on this connection between dignity and its
prescriptions on how to treat humans, in order to create a basis for a
theory of justice as dignity.
70 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Accepting the idea that every human being has dignity essentially
means to acknowledge their ability to make informed choices. his is
linked to moral agency, which is thought to also be a capability of all
human beings. Both of these terms are based on the idea of self-
determination, which requires a person to be able to make informed
choices and to have moral agency. hese ideas are therefore circularly
connected to each other, meaning that once one accepts the idea of self-
determination, one also has to accept the other two as human
capabilities. here is no logical reasoning behind the claim that all
human beings are self-determined, able to make informed choices and
have moral agency. However, I claim that this is a widely shared
intuition, since many societies rely on the ideal of a collective decision-
making process, which is based on a trust in the appropriateness and
value of the judgments and decisions of all human beings. Hence if one
agrees that justice means respecting the dignity of all human beings this
means that one should respect the ability to make informed and self-
determined decisions and the moral agency of every human being.
here are certain conditions that do not respect dignity and that
therefore should be prevented by a theory of justice. First of all, people
need to be able to make informed decisions which presupposes a certain
freedom or absence of domination. Anderson (1999) does not only
consider violent suppression or the socially imposed disadvantages of
handicaps a form of domination, but also extreme inequalities. I would
agree with her, since I also believe that enormous inequalities lead to the
evolvement of hierarchies, which constitute a certain form of
domination over those who have less. Consider, for example, the case of
the owner of a company and his or her employee. Even though they both
have dignity, their interaction will not be coined by their common
worth, but will be based on the hierarchy created by the fact that the one
owns a company, while the other owns nothing but his labour that he or
she can sell to the irst one. A theory of justice should therefore not only
prevent the violent suppression of free and independent decision
making, but also avoid more subtle forms of domination. By doing this
 Justice as Dignity: Suiciency, Equality and Diference 71

it allows human beings to be self-determined and shows respect for their

dignity. Secondly people should not impose their own beliefs or
opinions on others, since this means that they do not respect the others’
capability of forming own beliefs and opinions. Again this does not only
include the violent imposition of beliefs as was done during the crusades
or missionary times, but also more subtle ways like paternalism.
Paternalism, as it is referred to here, means that rules aim at doing
something good for the subjects of their rule, which these subjects may
not perceive as beneiting them. Paternalist laws are therefore always
intended to be good for the people, but nevertheless deny the capability
of these people to know what is good for them themselves. his
contradicts the moral agency of people, which claims that they are able
to make value judgments and act accordingly. Hence, it contains the
danger of powerful people imposing their values under the cloak of
paternalism. Similarly a theory of justice built on pity relies on
judgments of another person’s situation, which only they themselves
should be able to judge. Furthermore the feeling of pity again creates
hierarchies between the one feeling pity and the one to be pitied, which
possibly leads to the domination of the pitied.
Apart from these morally wrong denials of dignity, it remains a
question whether one can lose his/her dignity. Consider the case of a
mass murderer who cold bloodedly killed a number of people. Many
people would argue here that by committing this horrible ofence he
efectively has lost his dignity. However, I argue that it is the nature of
dignity that one cannot lose it, and therefore also the mass murderer is a
digniied human being. However, this does not mean that he cannot lose
his claim to the enjoyment of the set of rights citizens have on the basis
of their dignity. his problem will be discussed again in section 3.2.

he Hybrid

he dignity of a person has an absolute value. It does not change due to

one’s own actions or the actions of others. A theory of suiciency
therefore seems suitable for establishing justice as dignity. However, a
72 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

traditional theory of suiciency as is postulated by Frankfurt (1987)

judges all distributions below and above the suiciency threshold the
same. Even though there is only one absolute level of dignity, there seem
to be diferent levels of respecting the dignity of a person. Consider two
cases of the repression of freedom of speech, which is a clear violation of
the dignity of human beings. In the irst situation citizens are not
allowed to publish anti-government statements. If they do, they will be
arrested and tortured to deter them from further publications. In the
other situations people oicially have freedom of expression, but if they
do drat critical statements, they will not be published as all the
publishers belong to the government. It seems implausible here not to
make a distinction of the level of goodness between these two situations.
In order to deal with this objection I introduce two lines of suiciency,
a low one and a high one. his allows us to diferentiate between
resource distributions that are worth distinguishing in terms of their
goodness and those that are not. Furthermore I will introduce a third
aspect of the hybrid, which aims at avoiding the domination through
evolving inequalities in resources and therefore creates a sustainable
theory of justice. his hybrid of three theories of justice then provides
the conditions needed for respecting others’ dignity.

Suiciency

he low suiciency threshold is deined in objective biological terms. It

is the suiciency of resources needed to survive. hese may include
nutrition, shelter and basic healthcare. I introduce this as a ixed
threshold, as there is no sense in distinguishing between levels below this
threshold of survival. A situation is not better if it provides people with
resources that bring them close to survival than one that provides them
with no resources at all. hey will die either way. When it comes to
distributing the resources in a society, this threshold has absolute
priority since survival is a prerequisite to all other theories of justice.
With justice being a social concept, there can be no justice if there is no
one to embrace it. his also shows that there is no pity in the
 Justice as Dignity: Suiciency, Equality and Diference 73

humanitarian appeal of this threshold; it simply is a logical condition for

justice that people are alive. It thus also excludes the danger of
paternalism in deining the exact characteristics of this threshold as there
are objective conditions of what qualiies as alive and as dead. However,
this threshold alone would not be exhaustive, since simply being alive is
not equal to leading a digniied life. It is important therefore to
introduce a second threshold, for which this irst one serves as a
precondition.

he Dignity hreshold

In contrast to the low threshold discussed before, this high threshold is

aimed at providing the conditions of respecting the dignity of every
human being. hese conditions therefore need to enable people to make
informed decisions and to act as moral agents through abolishing any
kind of domination as discussed in section 2. As mentioned before, it is
worth distinguishing between diferent degrees to which domination is
abolished. he high threshold is therefore a diferent kind of threshold
than the low one and much more ambiguous when it comes to
deducting principles of distribution. It seems at least harder than before
to determine who is to be prioritised to get closer to the dignity
threshold. Having said that, it remains the question of how this
threshold is constituted. In her essay “What is the Point of Equality”
(1999) Anderson introduces the idea of democratic equality, which I
refer to here. Similar to her I also have a list of rights and obligations in
mind when I construct the high threshold. hese would, among others,
include the freedom of speech, the right to active participation in
society, and the education needed in order to make informed decisions.
However, the construction of such a list through Anderson or me would
not only be arbitrary, but also paternalistic and not appropriate for all
times. Ater all, the list needs to establish provisions for all kinds of
domination possible.
In order to tackle this objection I also introduce a way of how this
threshold is to be determined which should not be done once for all
74 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

times, but should rather be a continuous process. By reinventing the

threshold in a regular fashion, it is possible to not only approve its
legitimacy, but also to adapt it to societal developments. A possible
example of this might be the introduction of online voting in general
elections. Assuming that this could once be the only way of voting, the
threshold should then include the access to the internet of all, and the
provision that all members of society are suiciently capable of
conducting an online voting process. Furthermore, one can avoid the
paternalism objection by introducing a method of collective willing that
determines this threshold. I therefore propose an original position-like
tool of inding consent on a regular basis. he reasoning here is that
paternalism can only be a problem if some decide for the well-being of
others. However, if all people collectively decide, which is deined here
as all agreeing in contrast to a decision of the majority, the issue of
paternalism cannot arise. Unlike the low threshold, this threshold will
always be arbitrary in some ways, since it is not based on objective
criteria, but rather on the opinions of the people themselves.
Nevertheless, this arbitrariness is no real objection, since it does not
lessen the democratic legitimacy of the threshold.
Coming back now to the case of the mass murderer, we may be more
adequately equipped in order to deal with his or her case. As mentioned
before, the mass murderer still is a digniied human being, since one
cannot simply be rid of one’s dignity. However, based on the fact that
the mass murderer did in no way respect the dignity of his or her victims,
it seems plausible to also restrict the respect for his or her dignity to some
extent. One should be aware of the danger of committing a similar
ofence as the criminal here. here needs to be some sort of safe-guard
like a set of minimum rights that one cannot lose even in the case of such
a horrible ofence. We therefore need to introduce a further distinction
here, a third threshold. On the basis of one’s intuitions, in a similar
procedure as the one described above, one could agree for example that
freedom of movement can be restricted in cases where violence was
committed. By doing this, society will still be just, as it will respect the
 Justice as Dignity: Suiciency, Equality and Diference 75

dignity of all exactly by means of restricting the rights of those who

actively violate the dignity of other members. he possible compatibility
of this theory of distributive justice with a dignity-based notion of
retributive justice should be further developed elsewhere. For now it is
merely important to notice that it is possible to combine a dignity-based
theory of justice with the punishment of criminals.

Reinventing the Diference Principle

Having developed conditions for the dignity threshold, it is my next

concern that the realization of this threshold will lead to an enduring
society of respect for everyone’s dignity. he basic idea of the
inalienability of dignity should be recalled here. As dignity
unchangeably belongs to the human being, the respect for this inherent
value cannot be a starting gate principle, but has to be life-long. While
the two thresholds discussed lead to equality of opportunity, they still
allow enormous inequalities of resources. As discussed in section 2, such
enormous inequalities can easily lead to the domination of the one worse
of. One should therefore rather consider the dignity threshold as a
starting point for creating a just society, while there needs to be a second
principle enabling this to endure. In her essay, Anderson introduces an
incentive system, which she deems consistent with justice (1999).
However, I oppose this claim. A system of incentives is just another form
of paternalism, since it aims at triggering a certain behavior in people
that is supposedly good for them. It is therefore an even more subtle
form of domination as it provokes a feeling of being able to make an
independent decision, while in fact the incentive-creator inluences this
decision to a huge part. I therefore refrain from introducing an incentive
system to make the just society described above durable.
Instead I will adapt Rawls’ theory of justice to the idea of dignity. Just
as the original position produces characteristics of the dignity threshold,
it can also provide for a method of making this just society last. his can
be in form of a reformulated diference principle. his diference
principle of a theory of justice as dignity would say: Inequalities are only
76 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

justiied if they produce no domination of those worse-of. It remains a

practical problem of how to establish whether an inequality actually
produces a situation of domination. As this problem also applies to the
original diference principle proposed by Rawls, I will not discuss this
practicality here. However, it should be noted that the original position
once again seems an appropriate method to test this. As stated before
this article does not give a solution for how to apply the original position
to practice, but rather determined that the original position is a
paternalism- and domination-free tool to make decisions which
therefore respect the dignity of all involved.
Employing this reformed version of the diference principle, it does
not follow that all inequalities are unjust. Furthermore they are only
unjust if they harm the dignity of anyone, which shows that this theory
of justice is independent of envy or desert considerations. It is only based
on a concern for the dignity of all human beings. Furthermore, strict
equality of resources would lead to a considerable amount of unfreedom
and would not pay due attention to the ability of everyone to make
informed decisions for oneself as this could lead to an inequality of
resources.

Conclusion

Putting the parts of justice as dignity together as they were explained in

the sections before, one develops a three-step theory. he irst priority is
to be given to the suiciency of resources necessary to survive. his is
plausible as all other theories of justice rest on people’s being alive.
Secondly, the threshold of dignity has to be reached in order for a society
to be just. his threshold is determined by the collective willing of the
members of that society and does not imply that all levels below are
equally good. Furthermore, there is a third principle of justice as dignity,
which ensures the life-long respect towards the dignity of all. his
reformulated diference principle stipulates that inequalities are only
justiied if they do not produce any domination.
Combined, these three principles provide the conditions of a society
 Justice as Dignity: Suiciency, Equality and Diference 77

that equally respects the dignity of all members. Also, the theory itself
does not harm this dignity as it is not built on paternalism in any way.
his is due to the fact that all principles should be formed by collective
willing apart from the suiciency of survival, which is an objective one
in the sense that there is no arbitrariness in the distinction of the living
and the dead. Furthermore, it follows from this focus on people’s own
moral agency that this theory of justice does not only apply in the public
realm, but also in the private lives of the members of society. his
therefore leads to an overall justice in all human interaction.

REFERENCES

Anderson, E. S. (1999). What is the Point of Equality? In: Ethics, 109

(2), pp. 287-337.
Frankfurt, H. (1987). Equality as a Moral Ideal. In: Ethics, 98 (1), pp.
21-43.
Riding the Tiger: Evola and Dignity in
the Age of Modernity
Adam Petrikovič
Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

I. he crisis of modernity

Nowadays, a tendency prevails to establish the individual as a lone

subject of international law, and thus a direct member of the
international community; to make one simultaneously a citizen of the
world, as well as a citizen of a state. By the privilege of being human,
everybody is free, everybody is equal, and all people are said to be born
with inalienable Human Rights, which supersede the laws and traditions
of particular societies, where rights have traditionally been viewed as
privileges tied to particular responsibilities.
When it comes to humanity as such, it either designates a biological
category in terms of a species, or a philosophical category, stemming from
the tradition of Western thought. However, from the socio-historical
viewpoint, man as such does not exist, for one’s position in society is
always mediated by a particular cultural disposition. We all share the
same human nature and thus the essential human aspirations. Without
these shared aspirations we would be unable to understand each other.
Nevertheless, these tend to crystallise in diferent forms according to a
diferent time and place, which is why, in this sense, humanity is
essentially plural and diversity is part of its very essence.
To borrow from Nietzsche, we now live in times when “God is dead!”
We live in times when nothing is true and all is permitted. When justice

78
 Riding the Tiger: Evola and Dignity in the Age of Modernity 79

is always relative – seen as a mere advantage of the stronger. We live in

times when the concept of dignity, as well as the conception of the “good
life”, are dictated by a state of afairs that—ironically enough, despite the
elaborate rhetoric and sophistry—instead of uniting nations into a true
community, tries to introduce universal standards of ‘humanity’ and
force an authoritative, normative, prescriptive, universalist,
homogenous view of the world order onto an essentially heterogeneous
world.
We now live in times when people enjoy unprecedented advantages
stemming from the progress of technology and the global triumph of
inancial capitalism. We live in times when the majority of human
population is spiritually dead. In pursuit of an ininite growth (and
pleasure), people have become slaves to the interest that, rather than the
one of a proper human being, resembles an ideology of a cancer cell
(quote).
Our contemporary era is a product of modernity—a political and
philosophical movement of the last three centuries of Western history.
It is characterised primarily “by ive converging processes:
individualisation, through the destruction of old forms of communal
life; massiication, through the adoption of standardised behaviour and
lifestyles; desacralisation, through the displacement of the great religious
narratives by a scientiic interpretation of the world; rationalisation,
through the domination of instrumental reason, the free market, and
technical eiciency; and universalisation, through a planetary extension
of a model of society postulated implicitly as the only rational possibility
and thus as superior” (Benoist & Champetier, 2012, p. 12).
his work does not attempt to provide solutions for reforming either
the political or the economic system. It does not attempt to bring about
the revival of humanity either. Following on the work of Julius Evola,
this work sets to examine the ‘survival manual for the aristocrats of the
soul’ (Riding the Tiger) and appeal to those in pursuit of the ‘good life’,
who, despite the opposition, facing profound outward decadence and
spiritual emptiness, choose, or more accurately, feel constrained to live a
80 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

life of dignity, turning the destructive forces surrounding them into

inner liberation.
However, it is most essential to note that Evola’s “survival manual”
does not concern the ordinary man of our day. “On the contrary”, he has
“in mind a man who inds himself involved in today’s world, even at its
most problematic and paroxysmal points; yet he does not belong
inwardly to such a world, nor will he give in to it”.

II. Dignity

he concept of dignity is used in moral, ethical, and legal discussions in

order to demonstrate that a being has an innate and inalienable
entitlement to be valued and to receive ethical treatment. Many people
associate the concept of dignity with struggle. On this planet, struggle is
a norm rather than an exception; people turn their attention to the
human being and its dignity in the face of struggle, for they believe that,
in his sufering, the individual becomes rid of his dignity.
While in some disciplines and schools of thought dignity is a
concept that can indeed be measured, in philosophy, and especially in
moral philosophy, dignity is seen as a universal attribute. It stems from
the human capacity for self-consciousness and practical reason. he
English word comes from Latin dignitas by way of French dignité. It
denotes respect in ordinary language and could be used to suggest either
that someone is not receiving proper respect, or that they are failing to
treat themselves with proper self-respect.
I believe that the majority of people would agree that, in general, the
respect of other people—setting aside the reverence which one might
receive due to holding particular oices or hereditary positions that are
of no interest to us here—has to be earned by the exercise of virtue; i.e.
respect for a particular individual, or the lack of thereof, should be based
on the actions of that particular individual.
he problem, however, lies in the realm of perception. For, in terms
of respect, it seems to be the case that the very exercise of virtue is only
 Riding the Tiger: Evola and Dignity in the Age of Modernity 81

secondary to the way it is actually demonstrated and perceived in the

public realm. he phenomenon was neatly described by Nicolló
Machiavelli, who argued that “men in general judge by their eyes rather
than by their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch,
[whereas] few are in a position to come in close touch with you.
Everyone sees what you appear to be, [yet] few experience what you
really are” (Machiavelli, 2003, p. 58).
Now, when it comes to the sphere of instrumentality, this inherent
human law of perception might work either to your advantage or
against it. But in general, it holds that the respect you incur is of a
relective nature, i.e. dependent on other people. he respect of other
people, or the lack thereof, insofar as it is based on evaluating one’s
actions, could provide some beneits and a sense of importance to the
individual, as does the respect one holds for particular oices and
hereditary positions. Nevertheless, it is not accurate at all when it comes
to assessing one’s true worthiness, nor does it serve as a reliable indicator
of the ‘good life’.

III. Being Oneself

In the era of fragmentation and dissolution of all superstructure—as

discussed above with regard to our contemporary era—in order to ind
integrity, Evola, much like Nietzsche and many existentialists, turns to
the concept of ‘discovering’ and ‘being’ oneself. In order to discover
oneself and be true to oneself, one has to become acquainted with one’s
“true nature”. Which is why “Know thyself”—the inscription that was
allegedly in the forecourt of the Temple of Apollo in Delphi—serves as
an essential maxim to guide ones perspective in life.
Like Nietzsche, for Evola, “the only actions that can be valid for this
purpose are those that arise from the depths. Peripheral or emotional
reactions do not qualify, for those are like relex movements provoked
by a stimulus, arising long before the depth of one’s own being has been
touched or questioned” (Evola, 2003, p. 60). He continues by saying that
82 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

“the problem of being oneself has a particular and subordinate solution

in terms of uniication. Once one has discovered through experiment
which of one’s manifold tendencies is the central one, one sets about
identifying it with one’s will, stabilizing it, and organizing all one’s
secondary or divergent tendencies around it” (Evola. 2003, p. 61). his
is what, according to Evola, means to give oneself a law, one’s own law.
However, as we shall see later on, for Evola, this process does not lead to
individualism.

IV. It Is Not Relative

Based on these statements, some people would wrongly make the

assumption that everything is relative. hey would say that there could
be no such thing as the ‘good life’. In modern society, morality is
considered to be independent from theology and metaphysics. Divorced
from the absolute, devoid of transcendence and spirituality, it is founded
almost exclusively on the authority of reason. his ethical rationalism
prevalent in our contemporary society is deined by utilitarian ethics.
‘Renouncing any intrinsic or absolute basis for “good” and “evil,” the
justiication proposed for what is let of moral norms is whatever suits
the individual for his own advantage and for his material tranquillity in
social life’ (Evola, 2003, p. 17).
hroughout more recent history, the discourse considering human
dignity has been shiting towards socio-economic issues and the
assumption that existential misery could be reduced to uneven
distribution of resources and sufering from material want caused by a
given socio-economic system. However, Evola emphasises that these
assumptions are based on the “socio-economic myth” for there is no
correlation between material and spiritual misery and the meaning of
existence can be lacking as much in one class as in the other (Evola, 2003,
p. 29).
 Riding the Tiger: Evola and Dignity in the Age of Modernity 83

V. he Man of Tradition

Unlike Nietzsche—and existentialists in general—Evola is interested in

a special human type, a “diferentiated man”, whose character consists in
facing the problems of modernity without being a “modern man”
himself – a type belonging to a diferent world, preserving within
himself a diferent existential dimension. A type for whom
considerations of pain and pleasure do not enter as motives when “one
must do what must be done”. A type that acts from a perspective of being
that obeys a “duty” which supersedes the natural impulses of the
individual (Evola, 2003, p. 69).
He illustrates the point by emphasizing the distinction between
person and individual. He sees in the concept of an individual an
abstract, formless, numerical unity that has no quality of its own and
nothing to distinguish itself from the masses. Considered simply as
individuals, all men are equal, have equal rights and responsibilities, and
presumably equal “dignity” as “human beings” – a concept that is but a
“digniied” version of the individual.
Evola emphasises the insigniicance and absurdity of the defence of
personality on any individual basis by exploring the etymological
meaning of the term persona that originally signiied mask: a mask worn
by actors when “playing a given part, in incarnating a given personage.
hereby the mask possessed something typical, non-individual,
especially in the case of divine masks and even more clearly when used
in many archaic rites” (Evola, 2003, p. 109). Similarly, a person “is that
which the man presents concretely and sensibly in the world, in the
position he occupies, but always signifying a form of expression and
manifestation of a higher principle in which the true center of being is to be
recognised, and on which falls, or should fall, the accent of the Self”
(Evola, 2003, p. 109, emphases added).
Unlike the individual, the person is thus not closed to the above. “he
personal being is not himself, but has himself (like the relation between
84 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

the actor and the part): it is presence to that which he is, not coalescence
with that which he is. Moreover, a kind of antinomy is brought to light:
in order to be truly such, the person needs a reference to something more
than personal. When this reference is absent, the person transforms itself
into an ‘individual’, and individualism and subjectivism come to play…
It would be better to deine the situation in question as that of being in
which the supra-individual principle—the Self, transcendence—
remains conscious, and gives to the developing ‘part’ (the person) the
objective perfection corresponding to a given function and a given
meaning” (Evola, 2003, pp. 109, 110).
he concept of dignity is something that we attribute exclusively to
human beings. As discussed above, it stems from the human capacity for
self-consciousness and practical reason. However, dignity is not a given.
It is related to one’s capacity to know oneself, improve oneself, and
overcome oneself. It is achieved by employing one’s capacities of self-
consciousness and reason. It is achieved by identifying one’s “part” (the
person), and in doing so, relating oneself to the supra-individual
principle and participating in the absolute.
Dignity is a concept that is independent of other people. It is deined
by control over oneself. It stems from inner, personal acquaintance with
oneself, with authenticity and integrity. We attribute it exclusively to
human beings, yet not everybody qualiies by default. A person that fails
to identify her main tendency fails to identify one’s part, and thus fails
to be authentic and fails to participate in the supra-individual principle.
Such a person is a mere individual. It cannot be true to oneself for it does
not know what it means to be oneself. Similarly, if the central tendency
of an individual is of an exclusively sensual character, if the “part”
consists solely of the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure, this
“role” ceases to resemble the one of a human being. It starts to resemble
more the one of an animal, for it negates precisely that what is human –
self-consciousness, practical reason, and the “power to supersede”.
 Riding the Tiger: Evola and Dignity in the Age of Modernity 85

VI. Riding the Tiger

Life is a path. It is a journey – a trial. Struggle, and even sufering, are

inherent to the whole process, and are the essential factors that allow one
to know oneself.
In order to lead a “good life”—a life of dignity—the “diferentiated
man” of tradition, who inds himself situated in the modern, corrupt
world, should (in fact has no other option, but to) “Ride the Tiger”. his
principal metaphor of the whole book—that is, at the same time, its
title—comes from a Far Eastern saying. It expresses the idea that “if one
succeeds in riding a tiger, not only does one avoid having it leap on one;
but if one can keep one’s seat and not fall of, one may eventually get the
better of it” (Evola, 2003, p. 8).
When it comes to the application to the external world and
environment, Evola summarises the signiicance of the principle of
“riding the tiger” as follows: “When a cycle of civilization is reaching its
end, it is diicult to achieve anything by resisting it and by directly
opposing the forces of motion. he current is too strong; one could be
overwhelmed. he essential thing is not to let oneself be impressed by
the omnipotence and apparent triumph of the forces of the epoch. hese
forces, devoid of connection with a higher principle, are in fact on a
short chain. One should not become ixated on the present and on
things at hand, but keep in view conditions that may come about in the
future. hus the principle to follow could be that of letting the forces
and processes of this epoch to take their own course, while keeping
oneself irm and ready to intervene when the tiger, which cannot leap on
the person riding it, is tired of running” (Evola, 2003, p. 10).

REFERENCES

Benoist, A. de., Champetier, Ch. (2012). Manifesto for a European

Renaissance. London: Arktos Media Ltd.
86 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Evola, J. (2003). Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for the Aristocrats of
the Soul. Vermont: Inner Traditions Rochester.
Machiavelli, N. (2003). he Prince. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
Rousseau: Finding Dignity in
Disputation
Jakub Štulajter
Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

In order to understand, judge, or condemn a person for his opinions, we

must irst try to understand the person’s circumstances. Oten, such
views are expressed under the inluence of emotion, an embarrassing
situation, or simply as a vain defence. he outworn deinition of dignity
is that it is a state or quality of being worthy of honour or respect. If we
were to follow this deinition, the respectability of our identity would
conditionally surface in our dealings with other people, and it would
have been formed principally by our past interactions. But what exactly
are the attributes one should obtain in order to be a respected, digniied
person? Perhaps the way one treats his environment, the gratitude one
holds towards the people who have helped him become who he is, one’s
credibility, or the successes and failures of one’s professional life. hese
answers may constitute the most common conditions by which people
identify dignity. In my view, however, these will difer from person to
person.
Dignity seems to be an abstract assumption of the value of a human
being, even of ourselves, based on the shaky grounds of opinion and
double standards. In order to develop an understanding of Rousseau’s
philosophy, we need to examine the episodes which had inspired him to
dedicate his life thereto. His works oten revolve around two sentiments:
self-love and love of self. heir essence, as well as their inluence on society,
need to be explained in order to reveal the goal Rousseau strove for in

87
88 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

his philosophy. If we can reconcile these sentiments, it will be easier for

us to understand the motives of Rousseau’s work and what it can teach
us about dignity.
Jean Jacques Rousseau was born in June 28, 1712 in Geneva,
Switzerland. His mother died soon ater he was born; his father was
forced into an exile when Rousseau reached the age of 10. Having thus
been deprived of an ordinary family life, Rousseau was apprenticed to
the city clerk, and later to an engraver. He enjoyed venturing out of the
city for walks in the magniicent Swiss countryside. His master warned
him several times to return before the city gates closed. One time ater
he had been locked out, young Rousseau decided to take his life into his
own hands and departed to Turin where he converted to Catholicism.
During the next fourteen years he dedicated himself to an uneasy task of
self-instruction, education, and the study of music. Much of this was due
to his relationship with Madame de Warens, who was his irst love, and
who motivated him to continue his studies. He then moved to Paris
where he continued studying music, literature, philosophy, mathematics,
and the natural sciences.
Within three years of his stay in the capital of France, he passed from
relative obscurity to the summit of fame and controversy. His
breakthrough was due to his irst philosophical treaty named Discourse
on the Arts and Sciences, or the First Discourse, and the following release
of his irst opera, he Village Soothsayer. Both of these works were very
well received and won Rousseau immediate attention in 1750
(Buttersworth, 1992). he First Discourse became famous because,
contrary to the sentiments prevalent in his time, Rousseau held that the
arts and sciences were rendering human beings weaker and more
insincere. Rather than bringing them closer to understanding each other
in their set environment, the sciences just forced men apart and rendered
them unable to relate to one another (Rousseau, 2002). Apart from these
works, Rousseau also wrote an epistolary novel; Julie, or the New Heloise,
which quickly became a sensation and made Rousseau a household name
having great insight into people’s sentiments.
 Rousseau: Finding Dignity in Disputation 89

By the time he wrote his Second Discourse, the Discourse on the Origin
and Foundations of Inequality among Men, he began to consider
withdrawing from Parisian society. he French King ofered Rousseau a
pension because he had greatly enjoyed he Village Soothsayer.
Rousseau’s extremely surprising rejection of this pension, combined
with his comments in the latter part of he Second Discourse1, and his
association with certain aristocratic opponents of the king, led some to
believe that he opposed the monarchy. His decision to reject the pension
marked the start of Rousseau’s declining reputation. Ostracised, he
began his travels through Europe. Some of this ostracisation was due to
his having insulted the encyclopédistes, as well as to his passage in Émile
called he professions of faith of the Savoyard Vicar, where Rousseau
defends religious indiferentism (Rousseau, 2009). His friends, his
former admirers, the church, and even his home country turned their
backs on Rousseau, accusing him of hypocrisy and deceit. he
publication of Émile spurred great controversy among French society,
and on the night of June 8, 1762, the French government issued an arrest
warrant against him. Trying to escape these accusations, Rousseau led
to Switzerland. Seeing as he was considered a criminal in France, the
government of Bern asked him to leave Swiss territory immediately,
forcing him to take refuge in England. He was brought in to the UK by
his acquaintance David Hume, with whom he soon had a bitter quarrel,
which was followed by his departure for France, where, in 1772, he wrote
his Confessions. In his last book, he Reveries of the Solitary Walker,
Rousseau seems to have made peace with the unjust accusations that had
been mounted against him, and appears to seek repentance2 for
whatever wrong he had done. Never being able to inish these
contemplations, he died on the 2nd July of 1778, alone, disrespected by
the community to which he tried to bring happiness until the very end.

1. See pp. 42-43.

2. See Fourth Walk, esp. pp. 51-52.
90 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

In the Second Discourse, Rousseau classes two major sentiments that

are central to his writings: the love of self [amour de soi-même], and self-
love [amour propre]. Self-love is a sentiment that undermines man’s
honest attempts at achieving happiness in society. All his actions are
aimed at creating an image that invents his identity in the minds of
others. he efect of self-love causes people to confuse true values with
the ones which society has subjected them to. A person of self-love acts
as though he were superior to others, but his obsession with attaining this
superiority by adapting his act to impress them shows that he is actually
a slave to others’ opinions. We compare ourselves with others in society
in order to determine our social value. We judge whether we are doing
any better than the people around us. Self-love helps us create an identity
that we can manipulate, and with which we can compete. In a society
where self-love prevails, such an identity can play a more important role
than the actual essence of a man (Rousseau, 2006).
On the contrary, love of self is very self-centred, concerned with
one’s own well-being, but for that very reason, it is not obsessed with
being better than others. We naturally feel repugnance at the sufering of
another sentient being, but this still does not mean we need to help
them. his love only becomes properly humane when reason directs it to
relieve the pain of others, not sellessly, but, on the contrary, because we
can take some satisfaction in simple acts of kindness. Experiencing love
of self gives us a taste of happiness through the understanding that we
can achieve completeness by aiding others (Ibid.).
Defending the claim that one of these sentiments is better than the
other would be a mistake. Our efort to live in accordance with only one
of these, and expect that it will bring us satisfaction, would end up in a
vain attempt. To get our hot-air balloon of the ground, we need the
burner as much as we do the basket. If all our actions were to be
determined by an external condition—self-love becoming the sole
master of all our activity—we would never be able to live in
correspondence with our own desire. On the other hand, in order for
love of self to reveal itself in bloom and bring about the completeness we
 Rousseau: Finding Dignity in Disputation 91

seek, we need a tool by which we can unveil the wound that the
sentiment could heal. Hence, we can continue being occupied with the
diferences and the similarities we share with others so that we can be
able to identify the behavior that beneits them, as much as it beneits
us.
Can the distinction between love of self and self-love actually teach us
anything about dignity? Perhaps it shows that dignity does not rest in
our constant defending it, but rather in acting in such a way that ighting
is not necessary. Put another way, we do not need to ight for respect
because such a ight always implies proving our worth to others; rather
it just means not sufering disrespect, so we can simply enjoy our lives
and ind that core of our being from which we can take pleasure in simple
kindness. I have not heard of anyone who would return an honest
compliment with an ungrounded insult. “How many embarrassing
discussions we could easily extricate ourselves from by saying: let us
always be truthful, whatever comes from it” (Rousseau, 1992, p. 47).
Being truthful to the one we engage with in conversation is always more
helpful (even if it causes him short-term pain) than revealing our
knowledge of him behind his back. Nevertheless, such honesty can turn
against us if it is directed at someone whose dignity is solely rooted in
self-love: when it is informed by the views of others. his person could
turn to counter-attacks and threaten to get ofended because he sees the
defense of his opinions as a duty: not because they are his, but because
he absorbed them from the people he respects. Now, one that questions
could argue that, to respect someone is to accept one’s views, and I
totally agree, but let us not confuse accepting with adopting. Rousseau
himself had the opportunity to realise the danger of turning an idea into
a possession when the pastor of Môtiers excommunicated3 him from the
church, and even the territory for his Letters Written rom the Mountain.
he ability to bring these sensibilities to balance is the main objective
of Rousseau’s book Émile, one he took to be his best, and one for which

3. See Confessions, Book XII, pp. 624-631.

92 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

he was most condemned. In the book, Rousseau invents a governor who

educates an imaginary pupil in a natural way. Does Rousseau choose
Émile to be educated by someone other than his biological parent
because he himself never had the opportunity? Perhaps. But, in any case,
numerous passages of the book seem to advocate that the upbringing
should be let to the parent. A diferent reason could be his desperate
attempt to redeem himself of the guilt from sending his children away
to be raised in an orphanage, which he tried to justify in his Confessions
(Rousseau, 1951).
Can we question which of these sentiments compelled Rousseau to
write his philosophy? Would one dedicate his whole life to writing his
thoughts under the intention of bloating his ego, or demonstrating how
much better he was than the rest of his fellow citizens? Or did he write
because he pitied the destructive way of life so cherished among his
fellows? I hesitate if one can suspect him of a crime he so precisely
depicted in his own works. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau explains
that it is too late for him to return to “original simplicity.” (Rousseau,
2002, p. 56) Perhaps both depictions of him, the Rousseau ceaselessly
concerned with the lot of his fellow human beings, and the Rousseau
ceaselessly lattering his own vanity are true to an extent. Perhaps it is the
intensity of the conlict between these two sides that makes him such an
interesting igure and one with so much insight into the human
condition.

A discussion over a cup of tea might require that we subject our opinions
to the scrutiny of our friend. If these opinions are rooted deeply enough,
we may be hurt if our friend were to mock them. Would our dignity
compel us to defend ourselves, or would it instead compel to let the
situation pass? Would our friend have any dignity if he were to mock the
knowledge we had gathered from our subjective experience? Rousseau
took that risk, but his thoughts were not discussed over a dinner table
with friends; they were ofered up to the public. Let us imagine the
dignity of a man trampled by the very society he tried to enlighten. My
 Rousseau: Finding Dignity in Disputation 93

point here was not to depict Rousseau as a martyr. But do we not go too
far by condemning a person for the opinions he voices? Is it necessary to
violate one’s dignity by imposing our standards on him? Perhaps the
deinition of dignity at the beginning was not so far from the truth ater
all. he person who is able to respect opinions diferent from his own
because he can imagine the variety of experience which has lead other
people to diferent conclusions is one who is worth honouring. Yet, he
does not need our prostrations to realise his own worth.

REFERENCES

Butterworth, C. E. (1992). Preface. In C. E. Butterworth (Ed. and

Trans.), he Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company. (Original work published 1782)
Rousseau, J. J. (1953). he Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. (Cohen,
J. M. Trans). London: Penguin Books. (Original work
published 1782)
Rousseau, J. J. (1992). Reveries of the Solitary Walker. (Butterworth C. E.,
Trans.). Rousseau, J. J. (2006). Discourse on the Origin and the
Foundations of Inequality among Men. ( Johnston, I. Trans.).
Canada, VA: Vancouver Island University. (Original work published
1755)
Rousseau, J. J. (2002). he Discourse on the Sciences and Arts. (Dunn, S.
Trans). New York, Yale University Press. (Original work published
1750)
Rousseau, J. J. (2009). Émile: or on Education. Kelly C., Bloom, A. (Ed.).
(Bloom, A. Trans.). New England, MA: Dartmouth College Press.
(Original work published in 1762)
Killers with Borders: Grasping Killer-
States’ Modus Operandi
Rodrigo Vaz
Institute for Political Studies, Catholic University of Portugal

Introduction

he main function of a state is to protect the individuals that comprise

them. Every theory about the state and its core functions from Ancient
Greece to Contemporaneity converge on this point1. How, then, is it
possible that “during the XX Century, more people have been killed by
their own governments rather than by foreign armies”? (Liotta & Owen,
2006, p. 43).
he Universal Declaration of Human Rights features a long list of
rights that human beings are entitled to by the mere fact of being human
beings. However, murder of citizens by their own state continues in a
hurried fashion. While the irst half of the XX Century was indeed the
bloodiest period of our history (Ferguson, 2006), the second half did
not bring the slowing down of conlicts that would have been expected.
Until the last decade of the XX Century, some states kept on killing their
own citizens, following a modus operandi which in some cases can be
labelled as genocide.
his paper aims at drawing a proile of the states which massively

1. here are surely conceptual diferences: the criteria to be considered a citizen, for
instance, changed extensively throughout the centuries. However, one can easily argue
there is no known theory about the state that argues anything opposite to the idea of the
state as protector of its citizens.
94
 Killers with Borders: Grasping Killer-States’ Modus Operandi 95

execute their citizens – and the leitmotiv behind these executions. I aim
to identify the modus operandi of these states and to ind whether they
belong to any speciic political regime. I will also analyse whether they
are conined to any geographical area, whether the killings are due to any
cultural reason or if, on the contrary, these deaths are transversal to
cultural values. I will draw elements from several disciplines such as
political philosophy, international relations, and history. In order to
better emphasise my point, I will allude to speciic historical cases, such
as Hitler’s Nazi Germany or Stalin’s USSR, but also the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and inally the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda.

Nazi Germany

he long and profound economic crisis Weimar Germany had been

going through since the 1920s played a great role in the rising popularity
of Adolf Hitler and his ideas. he Jews were portrayed by Hitler as a
symbol of evil and the cause of Germany’s misfortunes. Once in power,
Hitler promised to “get rid of unemployment and seek peace […] in
order to do that, it was necessary that a new law was passed giving the
government all power to approve the legislation it considered necessary
without needing a parliamentary majority” (Gilbert, 2010, p. 207-208).
Following that, Hitler applied increasingly repressive measures towards
Jews, and later towards communists, socialists, social democrats,
homosexuals, and the Roma. he repression grew further until a
macabre “inal solution”: the extermination of the Jewish race and a
predominance of the Aryan ethnic group – “a forged ethnic concept,
based in falsely claimed scientiic theories of racial purity” (Ibid.)
The outcome is well known. For the purposes of this essay, however, I
will only focus on the number of German civilians killed by Germany during
the War: 2 400 000, according to Ferguson (2010). Hitler left a much bigger
‘legacy’, however: “at least ten million civilians had been murdered in a
deliberate fashion – among them six million Jews” (Ibid., p. 210).
96 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

USSR

Ater the October 1917 Revolution in Russia, a civil war broke out the
following year and lasted until 1922. According to Steven Smith, “the
population of the to-be Soviet Union decreased by 12.7 million between
1917 and 1922” (Smith, 2002, p. 47).
Following the death of Lenin in 1924, Stalin came to the forefront of
the Communist Party. From 1928 onwards, he began gaining the lead
mainly by sidelining his rivals2. his process would only conclude
following the deaths of many of many high-ranking party members,
most famously Trotsky in 1940.
Stalin even established some ‘goals’ regarding the number of
executions: in 1937, 72,950 executions should have been carried out,
according to Gilbert (2010, p. 235). According to Ferguson, “only in
1937-8 the quota of ‘enemies of the people’ to be executed was set to
356105 people, although the real amount of people who lost their lives
would be more than its double.” (Ferguson, 2010, p. 179). Hunger was
also used as a politically orchestrated way of killing by Stalin, most
notably in the Ukraine, as a response to the Ukrainian resistance to
agricultural collectivization. Helen Rappaport (1999) sets the death toll
near the 7 million mark.
Until 1953, when Stalin died, the Soviet government did not limit the
executions to those members who could challenge his leadership. he
number of victims of Stalinism kept steadily rising year ater year. he
government had been responsible, according to an estimate by Norman
Davies, for killing approximately 50 million people, excluding the deaths

2. According to Gilbert (2010), Stalin shited sides within the party several times,
aiming at galvanising support against his rivals. “Ater eliminating the let opposition as
a political force within the USSR, Stalin moved on to destroy the right opposition,
composed of high-proile party members that the year before had supported Stalin
against Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev (...) When the Politburo met in April 1928,
Stalin accused Bukarine, Rikov and Tomski, his three main allies in the previous year of
lack of party discipline. Bukarine, he said, was guilty of ‘treasonous behaviour’” (Gilbert,
2010, p. 172).
 Killers with Borders: Grasping Killer-States’ Modus Operandi 97

resulting from the Second World War. Davies splits these deaths into
two groups: the irst one, which counts 33 million people killed before
the war, and the second one, which counts a further 17 million people
who were killed ater the war (Davies, 1996).

China

he next case study I will focus on is the Chinese Cultural Revolution,

which lasted from 1966 to – oicially – 1969.3 Gilbert describes it as an
“era of internal destruction.” he aim of the Cultural Revolution was to
abolish the “four olds – old ways, old habits, old culture and old way of
thinking”. he Cultural Revolution brought a new impulse to the
Chinese Revolution which, according to Mao, had lost some
momentum. To that end, contingents of the “Red Guard” were formed
– young university students who would receive red armbands as mantels
of identiication. Besides that, as Gilbert mentions, “every Christian
church was closed in Beijing and red lags were hoisted on the Catholic
cathedral” (Gilbert, 2010, p. 425). Needless to point out, this Revolution
had a very anti-Western rhetoric. An intense wave of radicalism swept
throughout China, which took a quasi-religious form: “every morning
and every evening people had to stand in front a Mao portrait say: ‘that
the great leader President Mao live for ten thousand years” (Ferguson
2010, p. 534). he estimates of the number of deaths due to the Cultural
Revolution vary between four hundred thousand and one million. In
the “Great Leap Forward”, a program to reform the agricultural sector
and to promote a large-scale industrialization reform, approximately
twenty million people died, largely due to the bad policy decisions
regarding the agricultural sector and the mismanagement of the
industrialization process.

3. Mao declared the Cultural Revolution oicially concluded in April 1969, during
the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. However, several historians argue
that the Cultural Revolution inished only with the arrival to power of Deng Xiaoping
in 1976.
98 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Cambodia

Another case study I shall refer to is Cambodia, 1975-1979. In 1975, ater

a long period of civil strife, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh.
Immediately ater, they moved on to implement a radically new societal
model4. he regime of the Khmer Rouge was responsible for “a total
number of one and a half million deaths, out of a population of eight
million” (Gilbert, 2010, p. 483). his means more than 20% of
Cambodia’s population were killed in four years.

Rwanda

In August 4th, 1993, ater growing international pressure, a ceaseire

between the opposing Hutu-dominated government forces (Rwanda
Government Forces, RGF) and the Tutsi-majority rebel movement
(Rwanda Patriotic Front, RPF) was signed in Arusha, Tanzania. he
agreement predicted the creation of a ‘Broad-Based Transitional
Government’ (BBTG) formed by the RGF, the RPF and other
opposition political parties (Meredith, 2005). However, this agreement
faced great suspicion from the Hutu extremists in power, who saw the
Tutsi minority as a threat, and who did not desire the power-sharing deal
that the agreement was trying to enforce. As a result, these extremists
created young militias who quickly got armed and either iniltrated the
existing political parties or created new ones, such as the CDR.5 hey
also set up a radio station, the RTLMC6, responsible spreading hate
messages and encouraging the killing of Tutsis.
On April 6th, 1994, a plane transporting President Habyarimana
lying back to Kigali ater attending a conference was shot down as it was

4. As Benjamin A. Valentino explains, “Agricultural production was transigured.

Major cities were emptied. Money, markets, and virtually all private property were
eliminated. Former elites were stripped of power, and organised religion was abolished.”
5. Coalition pour la Défense de la République.
6. Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
 Killers with Borders: Grasping Killer-States’ Modus Operandi 99

approaching the airport. he Tutsis accused the Hutus; the Hutus

accused the Tutsis. While it is unclear who was responsible for the
attack, it unleashed a particularly violent conlict between Hutus and
Tutsis immediately ater.7 One hour ater the plane was shot down, the
irst roadblocks were already set up in Kigali. he roadblocks would
stand as one of the ‘trademarks’ of a conlict of genocidal proportions:
in the 100 days of the mass killings, approximately 800,000 people were
killed.

Synthesis

Ater analysing all these case studies of states who executed their own
people by such large amounts, a irst common pattern is immediately
clear: all of them, with no exception, were authoritarian regimes. It is in
fact inconceivable that any democratic regime could be capable of
committing such acts as they would need expressed popular support.
he second aspect is related to the conjectural situation of the State
that commits such mass killings: they all face serious economic struggles.
In the German case the correlation between the German economic
decline and Hitler’s popularity is nearly perfect. When the German
economy reaches its lowest point, particularly in unemployment terms,
Hitler was elected. While elections did not take part in the other case
studies, the USSR, China, Cambodia, and Rwanda all faced severe
economic problems at one point or another. In this context, there is also
a clear rhetorical pattern: the rhetoric in all these examples – and others
– targeted a certain group as the one to blame for the diiculties the
respective country faced. I would establish a two-fold distinction: these
regimes ind these groups either guilty by class or guilty by ethnic group,
i.e. by origin. he irst ones are usually found in communist regimes:

7. “Within minutes, the airport and the palace perimeter were sealed of by a cordon
of troops from a nearby military barracks. Militias threw up road blocks across the city.
News of Habyarimana’s death was broadcast by Radio Mille Collines. he killing began”
(Meredith, 2005, p. 507).
100 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

whether in the USSR, in China, or in Cambodia, the ones to blame were

labelled as ‘the enemies of the people’, ‘capitalists’, ‘the bourgeoisie’. In
Germany or Rwanda, the ‘guilty’ group was associated with an ethnic
background and not necessarily with a social status: being Jewish or
Tutsi was, per se, reason enough to be considered the public enemy of
that society.
he third pattern is related to the behaviour of these states and the
way they justiied their actions. In this context, there are two
fundamental concepts required to understand their behaviour: state of
exception and positive liberty. he irst one is connected with the
suspension of juridical norms for an undeined period of time and the
consequent concentration of powers in one body (usually the executive
power) or one political actor. As Agamben (2010) states, one example of
this state of exception is the Decree for the Protection of the People and the
State, promulgated in February 28th, 1933, by Hitler, right ater he had
assumed oice. hat leads Agamben to conclude that “the hird Reich
can be considered (…) a state of exception that lasted twelve years”.
Agamben extends his conclusion to all totalitarian regimes of the 20th
Century – and therefore also to the Soviet regime. “In this sense, modern
totalitarianism can be deined as the installation, by the state of
exception, of a legal civil war, that allows the physical elimination not
only of political rivals but of whole categories of citizens”.
As regards the concept of positive liberty, that derives as we know
from the “desire of part of the individual to the master of himself”, as
Isaiah Berlin put it. Master in what way? Who knows what is best for
me? My ‘real being’ or my ‘true being’? As Berlin explains in his essay
Two Concepts of Liberty, this latter entity, the ‘true being’ “can assume
the shape of a supra-personal entity – a state, a class, a national or the
very march of history (…) the consequences of distinguishing between
the two being becomes clearer if we consider the two main forms that
self-directed desire – directed by the true being – has historically taken:
the irst is a self-disconnection to reach independence; the latter is self-
realization or complete identiication with a speciic ideal or principle
 Killers with Borders: Grasping Killer-States’ Modus Operandi 101

aiming at a similar end”. Now, this second way became a “trademark” of

totalitarianism – the demand for the “true self” – a state of complete
identiication of a citizen with state ideology. It happened in Germany;
it happened in the Soviet Union, and it happened in Maoist China.
Whereas this last concept is not a mandatory condition to a “killer-
state” proile, all of them do show the same traits: authoritarian regimes
in a negative socioeconomic situation and a narrative that aims at solving
that by the elimination of the “guilty” group.

REFERENCES

Agamben, G. (2009). Estado de Excepção [State of Exception], Lisbon:

Edições 70.
Berlin, I. (1969). Two Concepts of Liberty in Four Essays on Liberty,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dallaire, R. (2004). Shake Hands with the Devil, the Failure of Humanity
in Rwanda, London: Arrow Books/Random House.
Davies, N. (2004). Europe: A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ferguson, N. (2006). A Guerra do Mundo [War of the World], Porto:
Civilização Editora.
Gilbert, M. (2010). História do Século XX [A History of the 20th
Century], Lisbon: Publicações D. Quixote.
Liotta, P. H., Owen, T. (2006) “Why Human Security”, he Whitehead
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring
2006: 37-54.
Meredith, M. (2006). he State of Arica, London: Simon & Schuster.
Rappaport, H. (1999). Joseph Stalin: A Biographical Companion, Abc-
Clio.
Smith, S. (2002). he Russian Revolution: A Very Short Introduction,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
102 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

Valentino, B. A. (2004). Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in

the Twentieth Century, New York: Cornell University Press.
Foreign Direct Investment and Less
Developed Countries: Do we use
Dignity to Cover Self-Interest?
Emma Jasmin Viskupic
Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

Before starting to go deeper into this topic, I would like to introduce the
Webster Dictionary deinition of dignity to demonstrate its general
meaning. he ordinary deinition of dignity is “the quality or state of
being worthy, honoured or esteemed”. Dignity is understood in terms of
leading a good life, not losing one’s face, and living in peace with oneself.
But can this be achieved in today’s society? Can a person truly exercise
dignity in the current political and economic situation without being
somehow hypocritical? Is ignorance of other’s injustice a way to achieve
dignity and can we even liberate ourselves from being ignorant?
Ignorance is bliss they say, but I believe that one cannot achieve a blissful
life with such an attitude.
he concept of dignity is inevitably connected to leading a good life
has been an issue for humanity since the times of Aristotle. But what is
dignity in personal terms; does it difer from understanding dignity in
terms of society? Do these two collide, and if so, how do they afect each
other? One must face the diicultly to preserve self-dignity (as a means
to manifest personal beliefs in pursuit of one’s own betterment) within
a society where he is ultimately surrounded by inequality, exploitation,
and forms of efacement. I would like to look into these topics and then
bridge to a speciic problem in society which may not seem very obvious
to us in everyday life, but which is nonetheless present and crucial. It is
103
104 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

the base of globalization and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Less

Developed Countries (FDI). In this matter, the exploitation itself is
essential, as well as its direct efects, but both are inevitable for the
functioning of global society. A question therefore arises, bridging
dignity from the personal to the societal level: Can one lead a good life in
a bad life? – considering the fact that one is aware of the ultimate
drawbacks of social life. Inspired by Judith Butler’s speech about this
dilemma, I will argue that one can lead a good life in a bad life,
depending on the level of ignorance, tolerance, and understanding of
today’s society. I will examine this matter in terms of moral conduct with
respect to social conditions.

As I have already mentioned, my inspiration came from Judith Butler’s

speech on the occasion of her receiving Adorno Prize in 2012. Here is a
short quote from that speech, which relects an inconvenient truth
about leading a good life:

Many have identiied the good life with economic well-being,

prosperity, or even security, but we know that both economic
well-being and security can be achieved by those who are not
living a good life (Butler, 2012).

Automatically, this brings me to Plato’s Republic where justice was

deined by the sophist hrasymachus as the advantage of the stronger. But
the quote seems too black and white, as if saying that society was
exclusively bad, and that the providers of welfare in a state use unethical
measures to provide for their citizens. On the other hand, it is perfectly
accepted by society itself that such behavior exists and everyone seems
to naturally accept that, without some unjust administration, no greater
good for the whole society can be achieved.
Coming to the case of FDI and exploitation of the host countries, we
shall be more self-relective and critical when it comes to how we are
provided with goods and services. We claim equality in rights for
 Foreign Direct Investment and Less Developed Countries 105

genders, ethnicities, and nations, and we feel great furore thinking about
the fact that slavery was still dominant only a few decades back. We
criticise the past, but we don’t see how the current society functions. In
fact, things haven’t changed much. We may perceive Athenian
democracy as highly undemocratic in today’s liberal terms, inasmuch as
it was heavily dependent on slaves. To be able to live a decent life, setting
and seeking virtues, developing their culture and philosophy with other
sciences, Ancient Greeks, some might argue, simply required a slave
class. Do we do the same nowadays? Do we pursue technological growth
in spite of the exploitation of those without a voice? Do we only give
rights and votes to those that don’t threaten society and its rapid
development? Do we cover up this pursuit by using the label “dignity”?
his essay is not about statistics and accurate numbers showing the
level of exploitation of the less privileged. I simply want to demonstrate
how hypocritical our society is, lamenting about the past but supporting
the current situation which, in reality, is not much better. “If we rely on
ordinary language to tell us what the good life is, we will become
confused, since the phrase has become a vector for competing schemes
of value” (Butler, 2012). he perception of what is good and what is bad
has changed throughout the time, and we must adapt to the new
conventional understanding of language and to the changing
connotations of some crucial terms, such as dignity, justice or morality.
And that would be the answer for the ignorance of inequality within our
society. he language is changing, words receive new meanings and
everything is ambiguous. “Anything that we can call morality today
merges into the question of the organization of the world [...] we might
even say that the quest for the good life is the quest for the right form of
politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lay within the realm of
what can be achieved today” (Butler, 2012).
Today’s society is heavily dependent on globalization and the
international market. Capitalism boosted the rate of consumption, and
it is diicult to keep up with the pace of this trend while simultaneously
preserving dignity. he majority of what we daily purchase has travelled
106 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

through continents until it reached the inal destination. his process

decreases the costs, but does it increase eiciency? I would say it does
not, but igures show it does and on top of that, it would seem this
process contributes to the economic growth of the less developed
countries. here have been numerous studies on how much the
international trade contributes to the global betterment of GDP, even in
the less developed countries in regions of Africa, Latin America and
South-East Asia.

Now, the important thing to understand is the diference between

economic growth and economic development. Economic growth is
simply increasing the GDP, together with the betterment of technology
within the country and sometimes also increasing rates of international
trade. his all is almost guaranteed by the FDI, locked down by
numerous agreements from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
Trade Unions. Bilateral or multilateral agreements are being signed in
less developed countries all over Africa, Latin America and South-East
Asia. hese countries are then exporting raw materials to the developed
countries through those FDIs that bring machinery and managerial
capital to the host country.
Nonetheless, the development of LDCs should be the priority of any
foreign investment. For an individual but also for the society, the
important and non-hypocritical thing to do would be to bring better
conditions to problematic countries. Promoting a better quality of life
would be the moral thing to do; further, it would allow us to exploit the
country with dignity. But now, we only cover up our interests with cheap
props of economic growth that does not contribute to the wealth or
development of the host country as far as the machinery and the
managerial intelligence remain a property of the investing country.
But the problem with my criticism occurs when the exploitation is
accepted by the host country. his mainly happens in South America
and Africa, as well as in Asia. here are two types of exploitation: one is
discretionary, which is usually considered the worse case, where the
 Foreign Direct Investment and Less Developed Countries 107

worker chooses to work in bad conditions and for a low wage. he other
options bring even lesser income, and pertain mostly to agriculture or
scavenging. he less devastating type of exploitation is structural
exploitation, which allows indirect exploitations due to unfair laws and
regulations. he living standards are so bad that citizens cannot aford
not to take the job, however bad the conditions are. “Hours are long.
Wages are pitiful. Workers go there voluntarily, which means—hard as
it is to believe—that whatever their alternatives are, they are worse of,
says Tim Harford the Undercover Economist” (Krong, I.,2011, p. 1). Karl
Marx would view the whole society nowadays as purely exploitative. A
new question arises now, whether to call this exploitation or
opportunity, and I believe dignity plays a great role here. But not dignity
on the societal level, but on a level purely personal. It is like a puzzle,
individual choices compose the structure of the society itself.
Now I will be bridging those two concepts into each other, as far as I
distinguished between them: dignity in personal terms, or how to lead a
good personal life, how to make the correct decisions, and how to be an
honoured citizen within this society, and dignity in societal terms, i.e.
how a society in general promotes dignity, especially when it comes to
consumption and investment.

So the decision here lies with an individual. Coming back to the

deinition of dignity as being worthy, honoured and esteemed, I don’t
see either of these to apply to a person that has to take an underpaid job
in terrible conditions. Such person is receiving a message from society
that he is neither honoured nor worthy when, in order to feed his family,
he must take a job below his dignity. So why does he do that? Because it
is a way to preserve his dignity as a care taker. Or he does not know any
better, therefore he would not question his dignity while taking such
depriving job, and would think of it as highly honourable and respected.
I do not know what an average underpaid worker in Mexico thinks, but
the fact that he still exists under the label of underpaid overworked
worker means that those that provide him with this label misuse his
108 he Liberal Herald: Dignity – Cui Bono?

dignity in order to forge a picture of him as a respected citizen and

caretaker, therefore abusing his beliefs and cultural traditions. he
standards in his country are being kept low, so he and others like him
don’t have, and are not even aware of any other options. his is what
happens in Cuba, where wages are so low that people cannot aford cars,
even though they have been available on the market. But it is normal that
nobody can aford cars; low standards are universal for everyone in
Cuba.
A good question would be now, who sets these standards, who allows
for such low standards to exist, and why. he answer is very obvious.
Society. And why? Society is an unstoppable carrousel fueled by
capitalism, constant consumption and overproduction, growing
population; it is unthinkable to change the status quo. Only a paradigm
shit in the running of the society could stop the exploitation of those
whom we label as third world countries, so we in the irst world countries
can maintain the lifestyle we are accustomed to.
When it comes to dignity, there is nothing such as the dignity of a
society, because at the end of the day, everyone keeps his or her dignity
at any cost, simply to measure up the standards that their society has set.
If society had a sort of shared universal grasp of dignity, there would be
no less developed countries, because every country would want every
other country to have the possibility of being prosperous. But that is not
the case of today’s society. I don’t want to sound Marxist or anything
near that, but the overconsumption of today’s society has led us all into
one big competition. “Ater examining exploitation, I think that low wage
factories deinitely are not an opportunity for people. With globalization of
capitalism, there is no stop to exploitation. People in the developing
countries are forced to modernise; they are economically forced to work in
such factories, so really they don’t have options” (Krong, I., 2011, p. 1).
A inal word at the end, the dignity of the labourers in less developed
countries is a way to cover up self-interest, but the question that remains
is, how selish that interest is.
 Foreign Direct Investment and Less Developed Countries 109

REFERENCES

Butler, J. (2012, September 11). Can One Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life.
In: Radical Philosophy. Adorno Prize Lecture. Published Nov/Dec
2012. Retrieved from: http://www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler
/articles /can-one-lead-a-good-life-in-a-bad-life
Krong, I. (2011). Exploitation or Opportunity [PDF File]. Retrieved
from: http://www.uncommonthought.com/mtblog/archives/2011
/06/12/exploitation-or.php
Novak, J. (2014, May). he Panel: homas Pikkety’s Capital, he
Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2014/may/01/piketty-capital-panel
Plato (1992). he Republic. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing
Company.