Economic Feasibility of the Stiegler’s Gorge Hydropower Project, Tanzania

Joerg Hartmann PhD

Independent Consultant
Accredited Lead Assessor, Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 2
Direct Costs ................................................................................................................................. 2
Indirect Costs .............................................................................................................................. 4
Direct Benefits............................................................................................................................. 6
Indirect Benefits .......................................................................................................................... 9
Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................................... 10
References ................................................................................................................................ 11
Introduction
According to Tanzania’s 2015 National Energy Policy, availability, affordability, reliability and
access to modern energy services are key ingredients towards socio-economic development.
Current power generation capacity is approximately 1,500 MW, which is very low for a country
with 59 million people. The largest single potential generation project in Tanzania is a
hydropower project at Stiegler’s Gorge on the Rufiji River, which would expand generation
capacity by 2,100 MW. In the latest update of the Power System Master Plan (PSMP) from
2016, this had not been seen as a priority, and was only included as an option for the long term,
to come online in 2035/2036. In a surprise decision, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) is now
planning to build Stiegler’s Gorge rapidly. It would be the costliest investment in the history of
Tanzania, and has been criticized for its location, in one of Africa’s most significant protected
areas, the Selous Game Reserve, which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The project would also
affect the downstream Rufiji-Mafia-Kilwa Marine and the upstream Kilombero Valley Ramsar
sites, which are wetlands of international importance. This briefing paper reviews the economic
justification for the investment.

Direct Costs
Direct costs are the costs that a project developer has to bear to bring a power generation
project online.
Odebrecht, an experienced developer, produced cost estimates for Stiegler’s Gorge at 2012
prices, which were then updated by GoT for the 2016 PSMP:
 US$ 2.457 million for the first stage (1,048 MW, 9 years construction)
 US$ 1.217 million for the second stage (1,048 MW, 3 years construction)
 US$ 877 million for interest during construction
 US$ 166 million for 400 kV transmission line
 Total of US$ 4.717 million, excluding costs for environmental & social mitigation
The expenditures for environmental and social mitigation depend on the level of ambition of
the developer and the GoT. They can be quite low if only impacts in the immediate project area
are mitigated, especially as land is largely owned by the GoT and does not need to be acquired,
and few (if any) people need to be resettled. If all longer distance impacts were to be
compensated (for example, impacts on the livelihoods of upstream and downstream
fishermen), expenditures could be significantly higher. As a benchmark, it is assumed that 5%
(as in Odebrecht’s estimate) are added for environmental and social costs.1

1
As an example for the level of ambition influencing mitigation costs, hypothetically Tanzania could offset the loss
of protected land (reservoir surface area of 1,300 km2) by acquiring equivalent other land and expanding the
Selous Game Reserve. The average land price in the southern zone of Tanzania was US$ 342/acre in 2012/2013
(Wineman and Jayne 2017), resulting in a rough cost estimate of US$ 110 million for land compensation. However,
This adds US$ 236 million, raising the total to US$ 4.953 million. This is above the global
average for hydropower (US$ 1,780 per installed kW in 2016, or US$ 3.738 billion for a 2,100
MW project), but well within the global range of costs reported by IRENA (2018).
Financing costs (interest during construction) for a large hydropower project add approximately
one quarter to the construction costs. This depends on interest rates, the construction and
disbursement schedules. If the project is built in two consecutive stages, the construction
schedule would be longer but disbursements would also occur later.
Odebrecht (2012) and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (2016) have calculated construction
schedules of nine years for Stage 1 and three years for Stage 2. This is close to the average
reported by Ansar et al (2014) with 8.6 years, and appears realistic given the remoteness of the
location. Much faster completion times (such as 36 months recently reported in the press) are
unheard of and practically impossible for a major hydropower project.
Costs are generally estimated on the basis of recently completed projects. Between 2010 and
2017, costs for newly commissioned hydropower projects rose by 31%, according to IRENA
(2018), or at a compound annual rate of 3.93%. If construction would start in 2019 and both
stages would be built concurrently, the project could be commissioned at the end of 2027, 11
years after the 2016 PSMP cost estimate. At an annual escalation rate of 3.93%, costs would
have escalated by 53% since 2016, resulting in 2027 costs of US$ 7.578 million.
A majority of hydropower projects suffer from schedule and cost overruns, compared to initial
estimates at the time of the investment decision. Such overruns are a more significant problem
for hydropower than for any other power technology, except nuclear power. Not even the most
experienced countries can avoid overruns, as multiple recent examples in Canada show. Three
empirical studies2 have calculated global average cost overruns of 62%, 71% and 96% and
average delays of 28, 32 and 43 months. These results are influenced by outliers with
particularly poor outcomes.3
If a cost overrun of 30% is conservatively assumed for Stiegler’s Gorge, total 2027 cost rises to
US$ 9.852 million. We assume no schedule overrun, as the original schedule estimate appears
realistic. Delays would further increase costs because of increased interest payments during
construction and increased payments to contractors to maintain presence on site.
On the basis of their 2012 cost estimate of US$ 3.600 million, Odebrecht reported a levelized
cost of electricity (LCOE) of US$ 0.0425/kWh. This is an indication for the wholesale cost of
power, to which transmission and distribution costs need to be added. The LCOE for a
hydropower project is heavily influenced by the initial capital expenditures, as operation and
maintenance costs are low (approximately 2% of capex per year). At an updated 2027 cost

there are multiple practical difficulties, including finding land with an equivalent ecological and touristic value, and
replacing lost food production.
2
Ansar et al (2014), Sovacool et al (2014), EY (2016)
3
For example, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was started in 2011 and is currently 65% complete. Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed has said that at the current pace of construction the dam might not be completed in the next
10 years (BBC 2018), to which several years have to be added for the filling of the reservoir before full operations
can begin.
estimate of US$ 9.852 million, the LCOE for Stiegler’s Gorge would be approximately 2.7 times
higher, or US$ 0.1163/kWh. This would also be higher than the current average retail price of
electricity,4 implying that electricity rates or government subsidies would have to be raised
significantly to recover Stiegler’s Gorge’s costs.
Initial capital expenditure can be reduced by building the project in stages. However, there are
significant fixed costs to a project of this kind. For example, most of the civil works such as the
dam and the transmission line would need to be built already in the first stage. If only a first
stage is built, the cost of the civil works is spread over a smaller amount of generation. The
2016 PSMP assumes a generation for the first stage of 4,559 GWh/year, at a generation cost of
US$ 0.0615/kWh. Again, this would need to be escalated by a factor of approximately 2.7, to
account for estimated cost increases until 2027 and estimated cost overruns.
Another factor which increases the costs is that neither the Tanzanian grid nor export markets
can absorb the power from Stiegler’s Gorge without further investments into transmission and
distribution infrastructure. If Stiegler’s Gorge were to operate at full capacity, all other
components of the Tanzanian grid would have to be approximately doubled to deliver the
power to domestic consumers, or interconnections to neighboring countries with a power
deficit would have to be strengthened. Again, building the project in stages defers some of
these additional costs.

Indirect Costs
In addition to the direct costs, which are born by the developer (and ultimately the ratepayers),
hydropower projects generate indirect costs which are born by third parties. These are also
called negative externalities. Examples would be a farmer losing some of his land to
downstream erosion, a household in the delta having to pay more for fish, or a nature tourism
operator losing some of his clients.
To quantify indirect costs requires (1) an estimate of a physical change and (2) an estimate of
the unit value of that change. Both steps are complex. In most cases, a certain change cannot
be clearly attributed to the project, and the valuation of the damage is also difficult. For
example, tourists may stay away for other reasons, such as an increase in flight costs, and the
value of a tourist should be calculated as a net value, taking into consideration the costs for the
tour operator.
In general, environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs) are the key source regarding
step 1, the attribution of changes to a project. However, the 2018 EIA for the Stiegler’s Gorge
project (University Consultancy Bureau 2018) cannot be used for this purpose, as it contains
hardly any quantitative predictions of positive or negative impacts. In many cases, not even the
direction of change is clear – for example, regarding the impact on tourism and fisheries, where
positive and negative influences are described, but no attempts are made to model the

4
https://www.statista.com/statistics/503727/retail-electricity-prices-in-africa-by-select-country/
outcome. Compared to international good practice in hydropower, this is an unacceptably
superficial level of information.
There are two reasons to quantify indirect costs. Firstly, the GoT should be fully aware of the
magnitude of these costs before taking an investment decision. There are cases when the
indirect costs are very large, possibly larger than the direct costs, and make a project
undesirable from an economic point of view. Secondly, even if the project should still be viable
after accounting for indirect costs, the quantification provides guidance for the compensation
of negatively affected individuals, businesses and communities.
In the absence of reliable quantitative predictions, this paper will make no attempt to estimate
indirect costs, but only provide a list of negative impacts that should be quantified before an
investment decision is taken. These are impacts after mitigation, i.e. impacts that cannot be
avoided. Only their magnitude can be partially reduced by appropriate environmental and
social mitigation and compensation measures (the costs of which were included above under
direct project costs):
 Reduced habitats for wildlife: The Selous is a uniquely rich area for wildlife. A census in
1986 found 750,000 large mammals of 57 species in the reserve. The inundated area as
well as other areas needed for the dam, temporary and permanent camps, quarries,
access roads, transmission lines etc. will be lost to wildlife, and there will also be
interruptions to wildlife migration routes, increased risks of poaching, and other
disturbances. The main economic consequence of this will be reduced photographic
and hunting tourism. The total contribution of travel and tourism to Tanzania’s GDP is
approximately 13-14%,5 and the Selous (as well as the lower Rufiji and the coastal
islands and coral reefs) are prime destinations. The Stiegler’s Gorge project is expected
to have negative direct impacts as well as reputational impacts, for example through
loss of the World Heritage status of the reserve.
 Geomorphological changes downstream. As the reservoir will trap all of the bedload
sediment and much of the suspended sediment (which would normally replenish the
downstream river channel, floodplains, and coastline), the river bed will deepen,
riverbanks will collapse, natural features such as sand rivers will disappear, floodplain
lakes will no longer be connected to the river and dry out, and the delta and beaches
will be subject to erosion. This is a particular problem as the coastline is already under
pressure from sea level rise.
 Reduced biological productivity downstream. Together with the sediment, nutrients
will be trapped in the reservoir, which will reduce the fertility of seasonally flooded
fields (requiring substitution by mineral fertilizer) and the productivity of riverine and
coastal waters, thus reducing biodiversity as well as the catch of shrimp and fish.
 Changing flood regime. As the reservoir will hold back smaller floods and augment
flows in the dry season, the downstream flows will be more stable. This will encourage

5
World Travel and Tourism Council (2018)
 people to move into the floodplain and develop farms, housing and infrastructure. This
will expose them to larger floods, which the reservoir has to pass through. The changed
flows will also impact salinity intrusion into the Rufiji delta, possibly affecting aquatic
and agricultural productivity. with unknown impacts.
 Blocking of migratory fish. There are no practical options for passing fish through a dam
and reservoir of this size, which will lead to losses in biodiversity and catch.
 Social disruption. The presence of a large project with the related traffic, noise and air
pollution, workforce recreation, land requirements, increased prices of goods and
services, etc. will have significant impacts on cultural traditions, public health, local
services, safety and security, and livelihoods in the access corridors as well as
downstream.
 Dam safety. This is always an issue especially during construction, first filling of the
reservoir, and during major floods. Stiegler’s Gorge would have saddle dams; a similar
saddle dam in the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy project in Laos recently failed, leading to
hundreds of people missing and thousands displaced.
 Greenhouse gas emissions. Although hydropower projects have a lower greenhouse
gas profile than fossil fuels, they still generate significant emission from the reservoir
directly, as well as through deforestation and construction activities.
 Evaporation. The large surface area of the reservoir will cause significant evaporation
losses, contributing further to reduced water resources in the lower Rufiji.

Direct Benefits
Traditionally, the financial benefits of a power generation project are simply estimated as the
revenues, while its economic benefits are estimated as the avoided costs from the next-best
available project. For example, if hydropower project A is the cheapest source of power and gas
project B is the next-cheapest, then the benefits of project A equal the costs saved by not
generating from project B.
The financial structuring of a hydropower project has to ensure that all participants
(developers, equity investors, lenders, contractors) have sufficient financial incentives to
participate. The easiest part of structuring the Stiegler’s Gorge project will be the selection of
contractors, which reportedly is already ongoing. However, even once contractors are selected,
they will not start construction until financial closure is achieved and payment is ensured.
Typically, one quarter to one third of hydropower project costs are financed by equity
investors, and the rest by lenders. Equity investments could in principle come from the GoT or
TANESCO; in fact, a majority of large hydropower projects worldwide are developed and owned
by the public sector. However, the equity investment required for Stiegler’s Gorge is out of
reach for the GoT and TANESCO, which has substantial financial problems. Thus, the GoT has to
attract external investors, including developers, other equity investors, and lenders. Revenues
have to be high enough to offer these investors a sufficient risk-adjusted return on capital
employed in the project.
In any case, from an economic point of view the relevant question is not whether the project
can make a profit and reach financial closure, but whether it can deliver power at a lower cost
than alternative options.
Power to be generated from Stiegler’s Gorge has certain characteristics, which have to be kept
in mind when defining alternative options. The ‘counterfactual’ (alternative option) has to have
similar characteristics, to be a valid comparison. Many large storage projects like Stiegler’s
Gorge are designed for baseload supply, but because of insufficient flows in the Rufiji River, the
firm energy expected from Stiegler’s Gorge (stages 1 and 2) is only 6,000 GWh per year, which
is equivalent to approximately 1/3 of the generation capacity at full load.6 No information on
the intended operational regime of Stiegler’s Gorge is publicly available, but it can be assumed
that the plant would largely be run in load-following or peaking mode, at least during the dry
seasons and in dry years.
The traditional alternative to a load-following hydropower plant is a natural gas plant, which is
also the main type of power plant in Tanzania’s grid. The LCOE of a natural gas plant depends
on its location, technology and assumptions about the future cost of fuel. Specifically for
Tanzania, the LCOE of CCGT it has been estimated at just under US$ 0.1/kWh in 2015, and at
US$ 0.08/kWh in 2018.7 This is close to the LCOE of Stiegler’s Gorge, at US$ 0.1163/kWh,
suggesting that the project could only become competitive with natural gas if (1) cost escalation
could be controlled and (2) if the hydrology is as good or better than expected. However,
hydrology is subject to large uncertainties, as East Africa is subject to periodic droughts,
exacerbated by climate change, and there is increasing abstraction of water upstream, which
the GoT so far has not been able to reverse and which might become larger over time.
Thus, even in a simple comparison with a CCGT plant the direct economic benefits of Stiegler’s
Gorge are probably negative or at best, marginally positive. The indirect costs of the two
alternatives are not yet included in this analysis. The greenhouse gas emissions from a CCGT
plant would be larger than from Stiegler’s Gorge, but this is most likely balanced out by the
multiple indirect costs of Stiegler’s Gorge, as listed above.
In fact, the economic benefits of Stiegler’s Gorge look even less convincing if additional factors
are considered.
Firstly, Stiegler’s Gorge has a certain fixed size, even if built in stages, which is very large for the
domestic market and requires complex export and financing arrangements. Most power
technologies can be scaled to smaller sizes without significant increases in costs, to more
closely reflect power demand growth in the medium term. Solar power in particular, can be
built from the largest utility-sized farms to the smallest size serving mini-grids, and is

6
If a 2,100 MW facility could run at 100% capacity for a full year (8,760 hours), it would produce 18,369 GWh.
Typical hydropower plants produce about half of their theoretically possible generation level. Firm energy is
calculated as the energy generated in 90% or 95% of all years, reflecting hydrological variability. Thus in most years
additional (sometimes called surplus or secondary energy) can be generated. However, there is no information
available how much additional energy could be expected from Stiegler’s Gorge, and because additional energy is
not reliably available, it has a lower value.
7
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2015), WWF (2018)
competitive at all scales. In contrast, a smaller size hydropower project at Stiegler’s Gorge
would have a higher LCOE, making it less competitive.
Secondly, dependency on one technology and one large source of power increases the
probability of supply interruptions, compared to a more diversified and distributed generation
system. The calculation of ‘firm energy’ in the Stiegler’s Gorge project documents is probably
based on historic hydrological data, and may underestimate future hydrological uncertainties.
Thirdly, because of rapid changes in the costs of different technologies, the assumption that a
CCGT plant is the next-cheapest alternative is probably no longer correct. As new renewable
technologies are rapidly becoming more competitive, even lower cost alternatives are
becoming available. The chart below (IRENA 2018) shows costs of four new technologies that
are all reaching a point where neither hydropower nor natural gas can compete.

In some countries, as in India, solar costs have dropped so drastically that the government is
now considering subsidies to hydropower (Bloomberg 2018). WWF (2018) estimates future
LCOE’s for Tanzania for a number of renewable sources (solar PV, wind, biomass, geothermal,
and small hydropower) of US$ 0.05-0.06/kWh.
Strictly speaking, the costs of dispatchable sources (hydropower and natural gas) cannot be
directly compared to the costs of intermittent sources (solar and wind). So-called system costs
or integration costs have to be added for solar and wind. Fortunately, as Tanzania’s current
generation system largely consists of flexible hydropower and natural gas plants, the
integration costs are initially very low. For example, if Tanzania decided to invest in large-scale
solar PV, which would generate consistently during the day-time, it would need to re-operate
some of its natural gas and hydropower fleet to generate primarily during evening peak hours
and during the night-time. Additional electricity storage and peaking capacity would only
become necessary at a high percentage of intermittent capacity in the grid. Even then, the costs
would be manageable. At the most recent electricity auctions in Chile, a solar PV project even
won the auction for night-time supply, indicating that even after accounting for storage costs
solar was more competitive than any other technology.8
Tanzania has an excellent solar and wind potential,9 located close to load centers and
transmission infrastructure, and there are no reasons why low costs as in other countries could
not be achieved in Tanzania. Already in 2016, Zambia attained solar costs of US$ 0.06/kWh in
an auction backstopped by the World Bank.10 As other countries, Tanzania could benefit from
the intense competition between manufacturers and developers, which is driving prices down.
Fourthly, the assumption that all alternative options are directly comparable because they
deliver additional power at the same time, is not correct. In reality, if an investment decision
was taken today, Stiegler’s Gorge would deliver power years later than other alternatives.
While waiting for the commissioning of Stiegler’s Gorge, Tanzania would continue to suffer
from inadequate electricity services. As most hydropower projects, Stiegler’s Gorge could be
delayed beyond the 9 years estimated construction time. In contrast, solar PV farms can be
implemented in less than a year.
Achieving a much faster and earlier electrification of Tanzania would deliver a significant
economic boost. While this boost could only be quantified with macro-economic modeling, it is
widely agreed that the cost of unserved power is much higher than the cost of delivered power,
from almost any source. In developed countries, power is generally only unavailable for a few
hours per year, but supply interruptions can generate significant losses to production, as few
consumers have backup power. In developing countries, permanently unreliable power supply
leads to lack of competitiveness, underinvestment, damage to machinery, and significant
spending on inefficient self-generation, as well as multiple other social and environmental
problems. For example, in Zambia the cost of unserved power has been estimated at US$
0.67/kWh, so that the installation of each 100 MW of solar PV plants would benefit the
economy by about US$ 140 million annually.11

Indirect Benefits
Proponents of hydropower often argue with additional, indirect benefits; however on closer
inspection many of these do not stand up to scrutiny.
Hydropower projects do not depend on fuel imports (or reduce the potential for fuel exports),
but the same is true for all other renewable sources. Hydropower projects have lower
greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels, but not lower than solar and wind projects.
Larger reservoirs can serve multiple purposes, for example for flood control, water supply,
irrigation, fisheries and recreation. However, such additional purposes require additional
investments and operational adaptations, often reducing the generation of power. Specifically:

8
Deign (2017)
9
World Bank (2015)
10
Sargsyan (2016)
11
Subbiah (2015)
  Flood control benefits, as described above, are doubtful as the downstream area
remains vulnerable to the largest floods, and in fact flood damages can increase as more
values are exposed.
 Water supply from the Stiegler’s Gorge reservoir, for example to Dar es Salaam, is most
probably more expensive than from other sources.
 Irrigation supply in the downstream area could benefit from higher releases in the dry
season or from direct delivery from the reservoir, but (1) the latter is not planned and
would reduce power generation, (2) irrigation infrastructure would remain vulnerable to
floods, (3) incision of the river bed would make irrigation more difficult, both in terms of
water intakes for new irrigation systems, and in terms of reduced non-technical
irrigation, through seasonal flooding of fields in the floodplain.
 The fisheries yield of the reservoir is expected to be low, compared to other inland
fisheries options in Tanzania; permanent populations of fishermen may not be desirable
as they add to the impacts on the protected area; and the net effect on fishing may be
negative, with larger reductions in yield elsewhere.
 Recreation on the reservoir is not likely to be attractive, especially in the dry season
when hundreds of km2 of mudflats would be falling dry.
Employment during construction would be significant, but (1) many workers would likely be
skilled foreign workers brought in by their construction companies, (2) hydropower is very-
capital intensive, and employment during construction would probably be less than for
alternative technologies of the same capacity, such as solar farms, and (3) there is very little
employment during operations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Just within the year 2017, China installed 53 GW of solar and 20 GW of wind capacity, and India
installed 6 GW of solar and 4 GW of wind. New renewables are no longer niche products for
distributed generation, but they are major players at the utility scale, and no longer require any
subsidies. Many countries are reconsidering and updating their power generation master plans,
to take these new opportunities into account. As solar and wind are bringing down power
prices worldwide, the dream of universal access to electricity is becoming much more realistic.
Because of a lack of publicly available data, this brief could not provide a full cost-benefit
analysis of the Stiegler’s Gorge project. But the conclusions appear robust, even without being
able to quantify indirect costs and benefits. Stiegler’s Gorge has become unnecessary, and
would be a significant economic burden for Tanzania. The country now has a chance to
accelerate its industrialization and improve standards of living by bringing more generation
capacity online much earlier, and at lower costs than previously thought. In combination with
existing gas and hydropower resources, solar in particular can provide reliable baseload power,
much less exposed to hydrological uncertainty.
Compared to the financial, social and environmental risks posed by the Stiegler’s Gorge project,
the challenges to rapid upscaling of solar power appear manageable. They are not any bigger
than in other countries that are already rapidly expanding their solar and wind capacity.
Furthermore, by going in this direction, instead of international reputational damage and
potential conflicts with donors, Tanzania would be able to enjoy the full support of the
international community, financially, technically and politically. WWF (2018) lays out a realistic
pathway for Tanzania, which is more feasible economically and environmentally than the
outdated Stiegler’s Gorge project.

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