EDEN ETINO v. PEOPLE, GR No.

206632, 2018-02-14

Facts:

The above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm

of unknown caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot JESSIEREL LEYBLE with said unlicensed
firearm he was then provided at the time, hitting and inflicting
upon the victim gunshot wounds on the different parts of ills
body, thus performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of homicide as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause or
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the
timely medical attendance rendered to the said Jessierel Leyble
which prevented his death.

During the trial, Leyble testified that, "at about 4:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of November 5, 2001, while he and his
companions[,] Isidro Maldecir and Richard Magno[,] were
walking on their way home to Bgy. [sic] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he
was shot with a 12 gauge shotgun by the [petitioner,] Eden
Etino[,] hitting the back portion of his right shoulder and other
parts of his body."
The defense presented the testimonies of Bautista Etino,
Wenifred Besares, Joeseryl Masiado and of petitioner himself
to prove his alibi.[15]The witnesses testit1ed that, "at about
4:30 in the afternoon of November 5, 2001, [petitioner] was
with Bgy. [sic] Captain Manuel Bomejan, Wenifredo Besares
and [Bautista Etino at] the house of the latter which was
situated about one kilometer away from where they heard
shots that afternoon."[16] They also alleged that the filing of
the criminal complaint was precipitated by a pending
Comelec[17] gun-ban case before the RTC filed against Leyble,
wherein petitioner was the witness.[18]... the RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
frustrated homicide. It ruled that petitioner was positively
identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged against him,
especially so, when the complainant, Leyble, was alive to tell
what actually happene

On appellate review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC

Decision in that, it ordered petitioner to pay Leyble the
amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
temperate damages.[22]

Evaluation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

amply [showed] that Jessierel Leyble succinctly but clearly
narrated how he w
The CA ruled that "the trial court did not err in giving full weight
and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Evaluation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
amply [showed] that Jessierel Leyble succinctly but clearly
narrated how he was shot and he also categorically identified
[petitioner] as his assailant.

The CA also rejected petitioner's claim that Leyble filed the case
against him because he testified against the latter in the
Comelec gun-ban case. It explained that "[e]ven assuming that
there was a grudge between Leyble and [petitioner], that [did]
not automatically render the testimony of Leyble unbelievable.
Moreover, considering that Leyble had positively identified
[petitioner], whom he [knew] from childhood, as his assailant,
motive [was] no longer essential or relevant."[25]

Issues:

First, whether the CA erred in holding that his guilt for the
charged crime of frustrated homicide was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, since the physician who examined the victim
was not presented in court;
Second, whether the CA erred when it found the testimonies of
petitioner and his witnesses to be incredible and unbelievable;
and,... Third, whether the CA erred when it disregarded
petitioner's defenses, i.e., the lapse of unreasonable time for
Leyble to file the complaint against him, the failure of Leyble to
positively identify him as the assailant, and Leyble's motive in
filing the case against him.

RULING:

In Palaganas v. People,[31] the Court outlined the distinctions

between a frustrated and an attempted felony:1.) In frustrated
felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in
attempted felony, the offender merely commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution.2.) In frustrated felony, the
reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand,
in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own
spontaneous desistance.

In addition to these distinctions, the court have ruled in several

cases that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on
whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present.

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present

evidence to prove that the victim would have died from his
wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical
Certificate alone, absent the testimony of the physician who
diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that matter, is
insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. This is
especially true, given that said Medical Certificate merely
stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital, the
location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received,
and his period of healing.

Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that

the victim sustained enters the realm of doubt, which the Court
must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.

The assailant's intent to kill is the main element that

distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is
proven."[39] The intent to kill must be proven "in a clear and
evident manner [so as] to exclude every possible doubt as to
the homicidal intent of the aggressor."[40]

Under these circumstances, we cannot reasonably conclude

that petitioner's use of a firearm was sufficient proof that he
bad intended to kill the victim. After all, it is settled that
"[i]ntent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere
fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life."[50] Rather,
"[a]nimus interficendi must be established with the same
degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the
crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt."[51]

This is not to say that petitioner is without any criminal liability.

When the intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are shown to
have been inflicted upon the victim, as in this case, the crime is
not frustrated or attempted homicide but physical injuries only.
[52] Since the victim's period of incapacity and healing of his
injuries was more than 30 days - he was confined at the
hospital from November 5 to 25, 2001, or for 20 days, and his
period of healing was "two (2) to four (4) weeks barring
complications"[53] - the crime committed is serious physical
injuries under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[54]
We reject petitioner's contention that the prosecution failed to
identify him as the victim's assailant, given that he "was not
identified and never mentioned [in the police blotter] as the
one who shot the victim" even though it was the victim himself
who personally reported the incident to the authorities.[55]...
ased on the Police Blotter dated January 18, 2002, the victim
had identified petitioner and his companions as his assailants
during the November 5, 2001 shooting incident, viz.:

In addition, the prosecution's witnesses never wavered in their

positive identification of petitioner as the victim's assailant. The
pertinent portion of the victim's testimony is quoted below:...
first, the manner of attack was done at close-range,[58] and the
victim was able to turn around right after the shot was fired;
[59] second, the shooting incident happened in broad daylight
(at around 4:30 in the afternoon)[60] in an open field,[61] so
the assailant could clearly be seen; and third, the victim could
readily identify petitioner as his assailant because they had
known each other since childhood.[62]

Given these circumstances, we find petitioner's identification as

the victim's assailant to be positive and conclusive. As a result,
the defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioner must
necessarily fail. After all, "[a]libi and denial are inherently weak
defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has
sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the
accused. And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony
prevails over negative testimony."[63]

The victim's initial reluctance to file the complaint is not

uncommon, considering "the natural reticence of most people
to get involved in a criminal case."[66] Fear of reprisal, too, is
deemed as a valid excuse for the temporary silence of a
prosecution witness (or in this case, the victim) and has been
judicially declared to not have any effect on his credibility.[67]

Finally, we find no sufficient evidence on record to support

petitioner's claim that the victim had ill motives to falsely
institute the complaint and testify against him. Even assuming
arguendo that the victim held a grudge against petitioner for
having testified against him in another case,[68] the existence
of such grudge would not automatically render his testimony in
this case false and unreliable.[69] "In the absence of any
showing that a witness was actuated by malice or other
improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on
the witness stand under a solemn oath deserve full faith and
credence."[70]

Eden etino is found guilty of the crime of serious physical injury.

Petitioners: Benjamin M. Oliveros, Jr., Oliver M. Oliveros, and
Maximo Z. Sotto.
Charge: Frustrated Murder.
Date and Location: October 30, 2013, public market of
Poblacion, Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Victim: Glenn F. Apostol.
Incident:
Glenn and his father, Virgilio, were at the market to buy fish.
They encountered Benjamin, who followed them and gave
Glenn dagger looks.
A confrontation ensued, leading to Glenn being punched,
hacked, and mauled by the petitioners.
Lower Court Rulings:
The RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69, found the
petitioners guilty of Frustrated Murder.
The CA affirmed the decision with modifications to the
damages awarded.
Appeal:
Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
wounds sustained by Glenn were not fatal and should only
constitute Attempted Murder.
ISSUE: whether the wounds sustained by Glenn were not
fatal and should only constitute Attempted Murder.

RULING:
The Supreme Court partly granted the petition.
Conviction modified from Frustrated Murder to Attempted
Murder.
Sentencing:
Petitioners sentenced to imprisonment from six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Damages:
Petitioners ordered to pay Glenn F. Apostol Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each as civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exem...
Ratio:
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the wounds sustained by Glenn were fatal.
Testimony:
Dr. Manaois, the medico-legal officer, stated that the injuries
might cause blood loss or infection, potentially leading to
death, but did not categorically state that the wounds were
fatal.
Legal Standard:
For a conviction of Frustrated Murder, the nature of the
wounds must be proven to be fatal.
Conclusion:
Due to the lack of conclusive evidence on the fatality of the
wounds, the Court resolved the doubt in favor of the accused,
reducing the conviction to Attempted Murder.