The Structure And Function Of The Human Brain

The brain structure is composed of three

main parts: the forebrain, midbrain and hindbrain, each with multiple parts.

Forebrain
The Cerebrum: Also known as the cerebral cortex, the cerebrum is the largest part of
the human brain, and it is associated with higher brain function such as thought and
action. Nerve cells make up the gray surface, which is a little thicker than our thumb.
White nerve fibers beneath the surface carry signals between nerve cells in other parts
of the brain and body. Its wrinkled surface increases the surface area, and is a six-
layered structure found in mammals, called the neocortex. It is divided into four
sections, called “lobes”. They are; the frontal lobe, the parietal lobe, the occipital lobe

and the temporal lobe.

Functions Of The Lobes:
Frontal Lobe – The frontal lobe lies just beneath our forehead and is associated with our
brain’s ability to reason, organize, plan, speak, move, make facial expressions, serial
task, problem solve, control inhibition, spontaneity, initiate and self-regulate behaviors,
pay attention, remember and control emotions.
Parietal Lobe – The parietal lobe is located at the upper rear of our brain, and controls
our complex behaviors, including senses such as vision, touch, body awareness and
spatial orientation. It plays important roles in integrating sensory information from
various parts of our body, knowledge of numbers and their relations, and in the
manipulation of objects. Portions are involved with our visuospatial processing,
Language comprehension, the ability to construct, body positioning and movement,
neglect/inattention, left-right differentiation and self-awareness/insight.
Occipital Lobe – The occipital lobe is located at the back of our brain, and is associated
with our visual processing, such as visual recognition, visual attention, spatial analysis
(moving in a 3-D world) and visual perception of body language; such as postures,
expressions and gestures.
Temporal Lobe – The temporal lobe is located near our ears, and is associated with
processing our perception and recognition of auditory stimuli (including our ability to
focus on one sound among many, like listening to one voice among many at a party),
comprehending spoken language, verbal memory, visual memory and language
production (including fluency and word-finding), general knowledge and
autobiographical memories.
A deep furrow divides the cerebrum into two halves, known as the left and right
hemispheres. And, while the two hemispheres look almost symmetrical, each side
seems to function differently. The right hemisphere is considered our creative side, and
the left hemisphere is considered our logical side. A bundle of axons, called the corpus
callosum, connects the two hemispheres.

Midbrain
The midbrain is located below the cerebral cortex, and above the hindbrain placing it
near the center of the brain. It is comprised of the tectum, tegmentum, cerebral
aqueduct, cerebral peduncles and several nuclei and fasciculi. The primary role of the
midbrain is to act as a sort of relay station for our visual and auditory systems. Portions
of the midbrain called the red nucleus and the substantia nigra are involved in the
control of body movement, and contain a large number of dopamine-producing
neurons. The degeneration of neurons in the substantia nigra is associated with
Parkinson’s disease. The midbrain is the smallest region of the brain, and is located
most centrally within the cranial cavity.
Limbic System – the limbic system is often referred to as our “emotional brain”, or
‘childish brain’. It is found buried within the cerebrum and contains the thalamus,
hypothalamus, amygdala and hippocampus.
Thalamus – the primary role of the thalamus is to relay sensory information from other
parts of the brain to the cerebral cortex
Hypothalamus – the primary role of the hypothalamus is to regulate various functions
of the pituitary gland and endocrine activity, as well as somatic functions e.g.body
temperature, sleep, appetite.
Amygdala – the primary role of the amygdala is to be a critical processor for the
senses. Connected to the hippocampus, it plays a role in emotionally laden memories
and contains a huge number of opiate receptor sites that are implicated in rage, fear
and sexual feelings.
Hippocampus – the primary role of the hippocampus is memory forming, organizing and
storing information. It is particularly important in forming new memories, and
connecting emotions and senses, such as smell and sound, to memories.
Pituitary Gland – the primary role of the pituitary gland is an important link between
the nervous system and the endocrine system. It releases many hormones which affect
growth, metabolism, sexual development and the reproduction system. It is connected
to the hypothalamus and is about the size of a pea. It is located in the center of the
skull, just behind the bridge of the nose.

Hindbrain
The Cerebellum – The cerebellum, or “little brain”, is similar to the cerebrum with its
two hemispheres and highly folded surface. It is associated with regulation and
coordination of movement, posture, balance and cardiac, respiratory and vasomotor
centers.
Brain Stem – The brain stem is located beneath the limbic system. It is responsible for
vital life functions such as breathing, heartbeat, and blood pressure. The brain stem is
made of the midbrain, pons, and medulla.
Pons – The primary role of the pons is to serve as a bridge between various parts of the
nervous system, including the cerebellum and cerebrum. Many important nerves that
originate in the pons, such as the trigeminal nerve, responsible for feeling in the face,
as well as controlling the muscles that are responsible for biting, chewing, and
swallowing. It also contains the abducens nerve, which allows us to look from side to
side and the vestibularcochlear nerve, which allows to hear. As part of the brainstem, a
section of the lower pons stimulates and controls the intensity of breathing, while a
section of the upper pons decreases the depth and frequency of breaths. The pons is
also associated with the control of sleep cycles, and controls respiration and reflexes. It
is located above the medulla, below the midbrain, and just in front of the cerebellum.
Medulla – The primary role of the medulla is regulating our involuntary life sustaining
functions such as breathing, swallowing and heart rate. As part of the brain stem, it
also helps transfer neural messages to and from the brain and spinal cord. It is located
at the junction of the spinal cord and brain.
Brain injury referred to as traumatic brain injury (TBI), is defined as an alteration in
brain function or other evidence of brain pathology caused by an external force.
Acquired brain injury (ABI), is defined as an injury to the brain which is not hereditary,
congenital, degenerative or induced by birth trauma. This sometimes causes confusion.
Today, any traumatic brain injury is an acquired brain injury, defined as any acquired
disruption of brain function. Strokes are a form of brain injury.

Brain injury does not diminish a person’s intelligence, it merely alters how the brain
performs tasks. It can be described as mild, moderate or severe, but no matter what
the severity, every brain injury is serious and must be treated as such. And, brain
injury does not show prejudice. A person’s gender, age, race, culture, religion or
socioeconomic background makes no difference.

The good news is that brain injury can be prevented 90% of the time with proper
training, equipment and attention. Therefore, it is the goal of Northern Brain Injury
Association to to keep children, families and communities healthy and safe by fostering
brain injury prevention, education and awareness in every community in
NorthernBritish Columbia.

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Nervous System
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Nervous System Anatomy

Nervous Tissue
The majority of the nervous system is tissue made up of two classes of cells: neurons
and neuroglia.

Neurons

Neurons, also known as nerve cells, communicate within the body by transmitting
electrochemical signals. Neurons look quite different from other cells in the body due
to the many long cellular processes that extend from their central cell body. The cell
body is the roughly round part of a neuron that contains the nucleus, mitochondria,
and most of the cellular organelles. Small tree-like structures called dendrites extend
from the cell body to pick up stimuli from the environment, other neurons, or sensory
receptor cells. Long transmitting processes called axons extend from the cell body to
send signals onward to other neurons or effector cells in the body.

There are 3 basic classes of neurons: afferent neurons, efferent neurons, and
interneurons.

1. Afferent neurons. Also known as sensory neurons, afferent neurons transmit

sensory signals to the central nervous system from receptors in the body.
2. Efferent neurons. Also known as motor neurons, efferent neurons transmit
signals from the central nervous system to effectors in the body such as
muscles and glands.
3. Interneurons. Interneurons form complex networks within the central nervous
system to integrate the information received from afferent neurons and to direct
the function of the body through efferent neurons.

Neuroglia

Neuroglia, also known as glial cells, act as the “helper” cells of the nervous system.
Each neuron in the body is surrounded by anywhere from 6 to 60 neuroglia that
protect, feed, and insulate the neuron. Because neurons are extremely specialized cells
that are essential to body function and almost never reproduce, neuroglia are vital to
maintaining a functional nervous system.

Brain

The brain, a soft, wrinkled organ that weighs about 3 pounds, is located inside the
cranial cavity, where the bones of the skull surround and protect it. The approximately
100 billion neurons of the brain form the main control center of the body. The brain
and spinal cord together form the central nervous system (CNS), where information is
processed and responses originate. The brain, the seat of higher mental functions such
as consciousness, memory, planning, and voluntary actions, also controls lower body
functions such as the maintenance of respiration, heart rate, blood pressure, and
digestion.

Spinal Cord

The spinal cord is a long, thin mass of bundled neurons that carries information
through the vertebral cavity of the spine beginning at the medulla oblongata of the
brain on its superior end and continuing inferiorly to the lumbar region of the spine. In
the lumbar region, the spinal cord separates into a bundle of individual nerves called
the cauda equina (due to its resemblance to a horse’s tail) that continues inferiorly to
the sacrum and coccyx. The white matter of the spinal cord functions as the main
conduit of nerve signals to the body from the brain. The grey matter of the spinal cord
integrates reflexes to stimuli.

Nerves

Nerves are bundles of axons in the peripheral nervous system (PNS) that act as
information highways to carry signals between the brain and spinal cord and the rest
of the body. Each axon is wrapped in a connective tissue sheath called the
endoneurium. Individual axons of the nerve are bundled into groups of axons called
fascicles, wrapped in a sheath of connective tissue called the perineurium. Finally,
many fascicles are wrapped together in another layer of connective tissue called the
epineurium to form a whole nerve. The wrapping of nerves with connective tissue
helps to protect the axons and to increase the speed of their communication within the
body.

 Afferent, Efferent, and Mixed Nerves. Some of the nerves in the body are
specialized for carrying information in only one direction, similar to a one-way
street. Nerves that carry information from sensory receptors to the central
nervous system only are called afferent nerves. Other neurons, known as
efferent nerves, carry signals only from the central nervous system to effectors
such as muscles and glands. Finally, some nerves are mixed nerves that contain
both afferent and efferent axons. Mixed nerves function like 2-way streets
where afferent axons act as lanes heading toward the central nervous system
and efferent axons act as lanes heading away from the central nervous system.
 Cranial Nerves. Extending from the inferior side of the brain are 12 pairs of
cranial nerves. Each cranial nerve pair is identified by a Roman numeral 1 to
 12 based upon its location along the anterior-posterior axis of the brain. Each
nerve also has a descriptive name (e.g. olfactory, optic, etc.) that identifies its
function or location. The cranial nerves provide a direct connection to the brain
for the special sense organs, muscles of the head, neck, and shoulders, the heart,
and the GI tract.
 Spinal Nerves. Extending from the left and right sides of the spinal cord are
31 pairs of spinal nerves. The spinal nerves are mixed nerves that carry both
sensory and motor signals between the spinal cord and specific regions of the
body. The 31 spinal nerves are split into 5 groups named for the 5 regions of
the vertebral column. Thus, there are 8 pairs of cervical nerves, 12 pairs
of thoracic nerves, 5 pairs of lumbar nerves, 5 pairs of sacral nerves, and 1 pair
of coccygeal nerves. Each spinal nerve exits from the spinal cord through the
intervertebral foramen between a pair of vertebrae or between the C1 vertebra
and the occipital bone of the skull.

Meninges

The meninges are the protective coverings of the central nervous system (CNS). They
consist of three layers: the dura mater, arachnoid mater, and pia mater.

 Dura mater. The dura mater, which means “tough mother,” is the thickest,
toughest, and most superficial layer of meninges. Made of dense irregular
connective tissue, it contains many tough collagen fibers and blood vessels.
Dura mater protects the CNS from external damage, contains the cerebrospinal
fluid that surrounds the CNS, and provides blood to the nervous tissue of the
CNS.
 Arachnoid mater. The arachnoid mater, which means “spider-like mother,”
is much thinner and more delicate than the dura mater. It lines the inside of the
dura mater and contains many thin fibers that connect it to the underlying pia
mater. These fibers cross a fluid-filled space called the subarachnoid space
between the arachnoid mater and the pia mater.
 Pia mater. The pia mater, which means “tender mother,” is a thin and
delicate layer of tissue that rests on the outside of the brain and spinal cord.
Containing many blood vessels that feed the nervous tissue of the CNS, the pia
mater penetrates into the valleys of the sulci and fissures of the brain as it
covers the entire surface of the CNS.

Cerebrospinal Fluid
The space surrounding the organs of the CNS is filled with a clear fluid known as
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). CSF is formed from blood plasma by special structures
called choroid plexuses. The choroid plexuses contain many capillaries lined with
epithelial tissue that filters blood plasma and allows the filtered fluid to enter the
space around the brain.

Newly created CSF flows through the inside of the brain in hollow spaces called
ventricles and through a small cavity in the middle of the spinal cord called the central
canal. CSF also flows through the subarachnoid space around the outside of the brain
and spinal cord. CSF is constantly produced at the choroid plexuses and is reabsorbed
into the bloodstream at structures called arachnoid villi.

Cerebrospinal fluid provides several vital functions to the central nervous system:

1. CSF absorbs shocks between the brain and skull and between the spinal cord
and vertebrae. This shock absorption protects the CNS from blows or sudden
changes in velocity, such as during a car accident.
2. The brain and spinal cord float within the CSF, reducing their apparent weight
through buoyancy. The brain is a very large but soft organ that requires a high
volume of blood to function effectively. The reduced weight in cerebrospinal
fluid allows the blood vessels of the brain to remain open and helps protect the
nervous tissue from becoming crushed under its own weight.
3. CSF helps to maintain chemical homeostasis within the central nervous system.
It contains ions, nutrients, oxygen, and albumins that support the chemical and
osmotic balance of nervous tissue. CSF also removes waste products that form
as byproducts of cellular metabolism within nervous tissue.

Sense Organs

All of the bodies’ many sense organs are components of the nervous system. What are
known as the special senses—vision, taste, smell, hearing, and balance—are all
detected by specialized organs such as the eyes, taste buds, and olfactory epithelium.
Sensory receptors for the general senses like touch, temperature, and pain are found
throughout most of the body. All of the sensory receptors of the body are connected to
afferent neurons that carry their sensory information to the CNS to be processed and
integrated.

Nervous System Physiology

Functions of the Nervous System
The nervous system has 3 main functions: sensory, integration, and motor.

1. Sensory. The sensory function of the nervous system involves collecting

information from sensory receptors that monitor the body’s internal and
external conditions. These signals are then passed on to the central nervous
system (CNS) for further processing by afferent neurons (and nerves).
2. Integration. The process of integration is the processing of the many sensory
signals that are passed into the CNS at any given time. These signals are
evaluated, compared, used for decision making, discarded or committed to
memory as deemed appropriate. Integration takes place in the gray matter of
the brain and spinal cord and is performed by interneurons. Many interneurons
work together to form complex networks that provide this processing power.
3. Motor. Once the networks of interneurons in the CNS evaluate sensory
information and decide on an action, they stimulate efferent neurons. Efferent
neurons (also called motor neurons) carry signals from the gray matter of the
CNS through the nerves of the peripheral nervous system to effector cells. The
effector may be smooth, cardiac, or skeletal muscle tissue or glandular tissue.
The effector then releases a hormone or moves a part of the body to respond to
the stimulus.

Unfortunately of course, our nervous system doesn’t always function as it should.

Sometimes this is the result of diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease. Did
you know that DNA testing can help you discover your genetic risk of acquiring
certain health conditions that affect the organs of our nervous system? Late-onset
Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s disease, macular degeneration - visit our guide to DNA health
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Divisions of the Nervous System

Central Nervous System

The brain and spinal cord together form the central nervous system, or CNS. The CNS
acts as the control center of the body by providing its processing, memory, and
regulation systems. The CNS takes in all of the conscious and subconscious sensory
information from the body’s sensory receptors to stay aware of the body’s internal and
external conditions. Using this sensory information, it makes decisions about both
conscious and subconscious actions to take to maintain the body’s homeostasis and
ensure its survival. The CNS is also responsible for the higher functions of the
nervous system such as language, creativity, expression, emotions, and personality.
The brain is the seat of consciousness and determines who we are as individuals.
Peripheral Nervous System

The peripheral nervous system (PNS) includes all of the parts of the nervous system
outside of the brain and spinal cord. These parts include all of the cranial and spinal
nerves, ganglia, and sensory receptors.

Somatic Nervous System

The somatic nervous system (SNS) is a division of the PNS that includes all of the
voluntary efferent neurons. The SNS is the only consciously controlled part of the
PNS and is responsible for stimulating skeletal muscles in the body.

Autonomic Nervous System

The autonomic nervous system (ANS) is a division of the PNS that includes all of the
involuntary efferent neurons. The ANS controls subconscious effectors such as
visceral muscle tissue, cardiac muscle tissue, and glandular tissue.

There are 2 divisions of the autonomic nervous system in the body: the sympathetic
and parasympathetic divisions.

 Sympathetic. The sympathetic division forms the body’s “fight or flight”

response to stress, danger, excitement, exercise, emotions, and embarrassment.
The sympathetic division increases respiration and heart rate, releases
adrenaline and other stress hormones, and decreases digestion to cope with
these situations.
 Parasympathetic. The parasympathetic division forms the body’s “rest and
digest” response when the body is relaxed, resting, or feeding. The
parasympathetic works to undo the work of the sympathetic division after a
stressful situation. Among other functions, the parasympathetic division works
to decrease respiration and heart rate, increase digestion, and permit the
elimination of wastes.

Enteric Nervous System

The enteric nervous system (ENS) is the division of the ANS that is responsible for
regulating digestion and the function of the digestive organs. The ENS receives
signals from the central nervous system through both the sympathetic and
parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic nervous system to help regulate its
functions. However, the ENS mostly works independently of the CNS and continues
to function without any outside input. For this reason, the ENS is often called the
“brain of the gut” or the body’s “second brain.” The ENS is an immense system—
almost as many neurons exist in the ENS as in the spinal cord.

Action Potentials

Neurons function through the generation and propagation of electrochemical signals

known as action potentials (APs). An AP is created by the movement of sodium and
potassium ions through the membrane of neurons. (See Water and Electrolytes.)

 Resting Potential. At rest, neurons maintain a concentration of sodium ions

outside of the cell and potassium ions inside of the cell. This concentration is
maintained by the sodium-potassium pump of the cell membrane which pumps
3 sodium ions out of the cell for every 2 potassium ions that are pumped into
the cell. The ion concentration results in a resting electrical potential of -70
millivolts (mV), which means that the inside of the cell has a negative charge
compared to its surroundings.
 Threshold Potential. If a stimulus permits enough positive ions to enter a
region of the cell to cause it to reach -55 mV, that region of the cell will open
its voltage-gated sodium channels and allow sodium ions to diffuse into the
cell. -55 mV is the threshold potential for neurons as this is the “trigger”
voltage that they must reach to cross the threshold into forming an action
potential.
 Depolarization. Sodium carries a positive charge that causes the cell to
become depolarized (positively charged) compared to its normal negative
charge. The voltage for depolarization of all neurons is +30 mV. The
depolarization of the cell is the AP that is transmitted by the neuron as a nerve
signal. The positive ions spread into neighboring regions of the cell, initiating a
new AP in those regions as they reach -55 mV. The AP continues to spread
down the cell membrane of the neuron until it reaches the end of an axon.
 Repolarization. After the depolarization voltage of +30 mV is reached,
voltage-gated potassium ion channels open, allowing positive potassium ions to
diffuse out of the cell. The loss of potassium along with the pumping of sodium
ions back out of the cell through the sodium-potassium pump restores the cell
to the -55 mV resting potential. At this point the neuron is ready to start a new
action potential.

Synapses
A synapse is the junction between a neuron and another cell. Synapses may form
between 2 neurons or between a neuron and an effector cell. There are two types of
synapses found in the body: chemical synapses and electrical synapses.

 Chemical synapses. At the end of a neuron’s axon is an enlarged region of

the axon known as the axon terminal. The axon terminal is separated from the
next cell by a small gap known as the synaptic cleft. When an AP reaches the
axon terminal, it opens voltage-gated calcium ion channels. Calcium ions cause
vesicles containing chemicals known as neurotransmitters (NT) to release their
contents by exocytosis into the synaptic cleft. The NT molecules cross the
synaptic cleft and bind to receptor molecules on the cell, forming a synapse
with the neuron. These receptor molecules open ion channels that may either
stimulate the receptor cell to form a new action potential or may inhibit the cell
from forming an action potential when stimulated by another neuron.
 Electrical synapses. Electrical synapses are formed when 2 neurons are
connected by small holes called gap junctions. The gap junctions allow electric
current to pass from one neuron to the other, so that an AP in one cell is passed
directly on to the other cell through the synapse.

Myelination

The axons of many neurons are covered by a coating of insulation known as myelin to
increase the speed of nerve conduction throughout the body. Myelin is formed by 2
types of glial cells: Schwann cells in the PNS and oligodendrocytes in the CNS. In
both cases, the glial cells wrap their plasma membrane around the axon many times to
form a thick covering of lipids. The development of these myelin sheaths is known as
myelination.

Myelination speeds up the movement of APs in the axon by reducing the number of
APs that must form for a signal to reach the end of an axon. The myelination process
begins speeding up nerve conduction in fetal development and continues into early
adulthood. Myelinated axons appear white due to the presence of lipids and form the
white matter of the inner brain and outer spinal cord. White matter is specialized for
carrying information quickly through the brain and spinal cord. The gray matter of the
brain and spinal cord are the unmyelinated integration centers where information is
processed.

Reflexes
Reflexes are fast, involuntary responses to stimuli. The most well known reflex is the
patellar reflex, which is checked when a physicians taps on a patient’s knee during a
physical examination. Reflexes are integrated in the gray matter of the spinal cord or
in the brain stem. Reflexes allow the body to respond to stimuli very quickly by
sending responses to effectors before the nerve signals reach the conscious parts of the
brain. This explains why people will often pull their hands away from a hot object
before they realize they are in pain.

Functions of the Cranial Nerves

Each of the 12 cranial nerves has a specific function within the nervous system.

 The olfactory nerve (I) carries scent information to the brain from the
olfactory epithelium in the roof of the nasal cavity.
 The optic nerve (II) carries visual information from the eyes to the brain.
 Oculomotor, trochlear, and abducens nerves (III, IV, and VI) all work
together to allow the brain to control the movement and focus of the eyes.
The trigeminal nerve (V) carries sensations from the face and innervates the
muscles of mastication.
 The facial nerve (VII) innervates the muscles of the face to make facial
expressions and carries taste information from the anterior 2/3 of the tongue.
 The vestibulocochlear nerve (VIII) conducts auditory and balance
information from the ears to the brain.
 The glossopharyngeal nerve (IX) carries taste information from the
posterior 1/3 of the tongue and assists in swallowing.
 The vagus nerve (X), sometimes called the wandering nerve due to the fact
that it innervates many different areas, “wanders” through the head, neck, and
torso. It carries information about the condition of the vital organs to the brain,
delivers motor signals to control speech and delivers parasympathetic signals to
many organs.
 The accessory nerve (XI) controls the movements of the shoulders and
neck.
 The hypoglossal nerve (XII) moves the tongue for speech and swallowing.

Sensory Physiology

All sensory receptors can be classified by their structure and by the type of stimulus
that they detect. Structurally, there are 3 classes of sensory receptors: free nerve
endings, encapsulated nerve endings, and specialized cells. Free nerve endings are
simply free dendrites at the end of a neuron that extend into a tissue. Pain, heat, and
cold are all sensed through free nerve endings. An encapsulated nerve ending is a free
nerve ending wrapped in a round capsule of connective tissue. When the capsule is
deformed by touch or pressure, the neuron is stimulated to send signals to the CNS.
Specialized cells detect stimuli from the 5 special senses: vision, hearing, balance,
smell, and taste. Each of the special senses has its own unique sensory cells—such as
rods and cones in the retina to detect light for the sense of vision.

Functionally, there are 6 major classes of receptors: mechanoreceptors, nociceptors,

photoreceptors, chemoreceptors, osmoreceptors.HONcode standard for trustworthy
healthverify here.

Brain Injury
There Are Six Primary Causes Of Acquired Brain Injury
1) Trauma
There are different types of traumatic injuries that can occur:
Penetration – the skull and brain are penetrated by a hard object, such as a bullet or
knife
Crushed – the skull and brain are crushed between two hard surfaces
Open – the skull is fractured with an opening, causing the brain to be exposed
Closed – there may be a skull fracture but there is no opening, so the brain remains
covered by the skull. This is the most common type of brain injury.
2) Stroke
A stroke can be caused in two different ways:
Blocked Artery – this occur when a blood clot or other substance fills the artery and
blocks the blood from getting through. The tissue does not get its necessary oxygen,
which causes the cells to become damaged or die. This is the cause of 80% of all
strokes.
Bleeding – the artery may have a damaged or weak spot from birth which is called an
aneurysm. This aneurysm may get weaker over time and suddenly burst, causing the
blood to flow out into the tissues and form a blood clot. The blood is toxic to brain
tissue and the clot can put pressure on the surrounding tissues causing them to
malfunction.
3) Anoxia
This simply refers to an absence of oxygen. The brain is very sensitive to lack of oxygen
and cell damage will start to occur after only three minutes. Examples of this type of
injury are near drowning, hanging, cardiac or respiratory arrest (no heart beat or
breathing) or excessive bleeding somewhere else in the body causing the body to not
have enough blood to go around.

4) Infection
Severe infection of the brain (Encephalitis) or of the membranes (Meningitis) can cause
damage to brain cells and their ability to function.

5) Tumor
A tumor will act much like a blood clot, as it compresses surrounding tissue causing
malfunction. Or it might grow outward consuming the brain cells as it goes.

6) Surgery
Surgery of the brain is often necessary to remove a tumor or to stop seizures.
Unfortunately, damage may be caused by the unavoidable cutting and/or removal of
pieces of brain tissue.

Types of Brain Injury

 A. Diffuse Axonal
B. Concussion
C. Contusion
D. Coup-Contrecoup
E. Shaken Baby Syndrome
F. Anoxic
G. Hypoxic
H. Penetrating or Open
I. Closed
J. Toxic
K. Stroke
L. Infection
M. Tumor
N. Second Impact Syndrome Brain Injury

A. Diffuse Axonal
Diffuse axonal injuries can be caused by shaking or strong rotation of the head, as with
Shaken Baby Syndrome, or by rotational forces, such as those in a car accident. Injury
happens because the unmoving brain does not keep up with the movement of the skull,
which causes extensive tearing of nerve tissue throughout the brain. This can cause
brain chemicals to be released incurring additional injury.

The tearing of the nerve tissue disrupts the brain’s regular communication and chemical
processes, and can produce temporary or permanent widespread brain damage, coma
or death. A person with a diffuse axonal injury could present a variety of functional
impairments, depending on where the shearing (tears) occurred in the brain.

B. Concussion
A concussion is the most common type of traumatic brain injury, and it is caused by
direct blows to the head or body, including both closed and open head injuries like
wounds, violent shaking, whiplash or violent blows to the body. A concussion is caused
when the blood vessels in the brain stretch and cranial nerves are damaged. A person
may or may not experience a brief (not more than 20 minutes) loss of consciousness.
The injured may remain conscious, but act or state that they feel feel “dazed” or “punch
drunk”. Most concussion happens at a microscopic scale, and may or may not show up
on a diagnostic imaging tests such as CAT scans. Concussion is sometimes defined by
exclusion, and is considered a complex neurobehavioral syndrome, because skull
fracture, brain bleeding, and/or swelling may or may not be present. Concussions can
cause diffuse axonal type injury, which may result in permanent or temporary damage.
Recovery from concussion may take from a few months to a few years to heal.

C. Contusion
A contusion is a bruise (bleeding) on the brain, and is usually the result of a direct
impact to the head.
Because blood kills brain cells, large contusions may require surgical removal.

D. Coup-Contrecoup
Coup-Contrecoup injuries are contusions that happen both at the site of the impact, and
on the complete opposite side of the brain, occurring when the force impacting the
head and slamming the brain against the skull in one direction, also causes it to slam
into the opposite side of the skull, which causes an additional contusion.

E. Shaken Baby Syndrome

Shaken Baby Syndrome is a violent criminal act that causes brain injury. Shaken Baby
Syndrome occurs when the perpetrator aggressively shakes a baby or young child. The
forceful whiplash-like motion causes Coup-Contrecoup injuries to the child’s brain. The
violent movement causes blood vessels between the brain and skull rupture and bleed,
and the accumulation of blood causes causes the brain to swell and compress brain
tissue, damaging brain cells. Shaken Baby Syndrome can cause irritability, changes in
eating patterns, tiredness, difficulty breathing, dilated pupils, seizures, migraine
headaches, vomiting, lifelong disability, coma and death. Children experiencing the
preceding symptoms need immediate emergency medical attention.

F. Anoxic:
Cells in the brain need oxygen to survive and function. Anoxic Brain Injury occurs when
the brain does not receive oxygen.

Types of Anoxic Brain Injury:

Anoxic Anoxia – Brain injury resulting from no oxygen being supplied to the brain
Anemic Anoxia – Brain injury from compromised blood that can not carry enough oxygen
to the brain.
Toxic Anoxia – Brain injury from toxins or metabolites that prevent oxygen in the blood
from being used.

G. Hypoxic Anoxia
Brain injury from when the brain receives some, but not enough, oxygen. Also called
Stagnant Hypoxia, or Ischemic Insult, it occurs because of a critical reduction in blood
flow, or low blood pressure, leading to a lack of blood flow to the brain.
H. Penetrating Or Open Injury:
Penetrating injury to the brain is a skull fracture that occurs from the impact of a bullet,
knife or other sharp object that forces hair, skin, bone and fragments from the object
into the brain. A “through-and-through” injury occurs if an object enters the skull, goes
through the brain, and exits the skull. Through-and-through traumatic brain injuries
include the effects of penetration injuries, plus additional shearing, stretching and
rupture of brain tissue. Objects traveling at a low rate of speed through the skull and
brain can ricochet within the skull, which widens the area and degree of damage.

Types of skull fractures:

Depressed Skull Fracture – The broken piece of skull bone moves in towards the brain.
Compound Skull Fracture – The scalp is cut and the skull is fractured.
Basilar Skull Fracture – The skull fracture is located at the base of the skull (neck area),
and may include the opening at the base of the skull. This can cause damage to the
nerves and blood vessels of the spinal cord and brain stem.
Petrous Bone Fracture – The fracture is located at the ear’s petrous bone, which produces
large “black and blue” areas below the ear, on the jaw and neck, and may include
damage to the nerve for hearing.
It is commonly known as ‘Battle’s Sign’. If blood or cerebral spinal fluid leaks from the
ear, it is called “CSF Oterrhea” and needs immediate attention.
Anterior Cranial Fossa Fracture – The skull fracture is located in the anterior cranial fossa
and produces “black and blue” mark looking areas around the eyes known as ‘Raccoon
Eyes’. Nerve damage to the sense of smell, or eye function, may occur. Cerebral spinal
fluid may leak into the sinuses, and is termed “CSF Rhinorrhea.” Again, this is serious
and needs immedicate attention.
Diastatic Skull Fracture – The skull is composed of jigsaw-like segments (cranial fissures)
which are connected together by cranial sutures. This is the separation of the cranial
sutures in children prior to the closing of the cranial fissures of the skull are termed
“diastatic skull fractures.”
Cribiform Plate Fracture – The cribiform plate is a thin structure located behind the nose
area.
If the cribiform plate is fractured, cerebral spinal fluid can leak from the brain area out
the nose. If untreated, it can lead to an infectious injury of the brain, and may result in
death.

I. Closed Head Injury:

When a person receives an impact to the head from an outside force, but the skull does
not fracture or displace, it is termed a “closed head injury”. With a closed head injury,
when the brain swells, the brain has no place to expand. This can cause an increase in
intracranial pressure, which can cause brain tissues to compress, causing further injury.

As the brain swells, it will try to expand through any available opening in the skull,
including the eye sockets. When the brain expands through the eye sockets, it can
compress and impair the functions of the eye nerves. For instance, if an eye nerve,
Cranial Nerve III, is compressed, a person’s pupil (the dark center part of the eye) will
appear dilated (big). This is one reason why medical personal may monitor a person’s
pupil size and intracranial pressure. The only other way to expand, is through the small
hole in the base of the skull where the brain stem passes through. When the brain
expands through the base of the brain, it is called ‘coning’, and it is usually fatal.

J. Toxic brain injury:

Toxic brain injury, or toxic encephalopathy, is exposure of the brain to toxic substances.
This can lead to a variety of symptoms, characterized by an altered mental status,
memory loss and visual problems. Toxic encephalopathy can be caused by various
chemicals, many commonly used in everyday life. Toxic brain injury is usually
permanent damage the brain, and currently, treatment is mainly for its symptoms.

K. Stroke:
A brain injury from a stroke can be caused in two different ways:
Blocked Artery – this occur when a blood clot or other substance fills the artery and
blocks the blood from getting through. The tissue does not get its necessary oxygen,
which causes the cells to become damaged or die. This is the cause of 80% of all
strokes.
Bleeding – the artery may have a damaged or weak spot from birth, which is called an
aneurysm. The aneurysm may get weaker over time and suddenly burst, causing the
blood to flow out into the tissues and form a blood clot. The blood is toxic to brain
tissue and the clot can put pressure on the surrounding tissues causing them to
malfunction. Strokes are also considered a ‘closed’ brain injury.

L. Infection
Severe infection of the brain (Encephalitis) or of the membranes (Meningitis) can cause
damage to brain cells and their ability to function.

M. Tumor
A tumor will act much like a blood clot, as it compresses surrounding tissue causing
malfunction. Or, it might grow outward consuming the brain cells as it goes.

N. Second Impact Syndrome or “Recurrent Traumatic Brain Injury”

Second Impact Syndrome, also termed “recurrent traumatic brain injury,” can occur
when a person sustains a second traumatic brain injury before the first traumatic brain
injury has healed. The second injury may occur from days to weeks following the first.
The second impact is much more likely to cause brain swelling and widespread damage.
Because death can occur rapidly, emergency medical treatment is needed as soon as
possible. The long-term effects of recurrent brain injury can be muscle spasms,
increased muscle tone, rapidly changing emotions, hallucinations, and difficulty thinking
and learning.
NERVE CELL

The core component of the nervous system in general, and the brain in particular, is
the neuron or nerve cell, the “brain cells” of popular language. A neuron is an
electrically excitable cell that processes and transmits information by electro-chemical
signalling. Unlike other cells, neurons never divide, and neither do they die off to be
replaced by new ones. By the same token, they usually cannot be replaced after being
lost, although there are a few exceptions.

The average human brain has about 100 billion neurons (or nerve cells) and many
more neuroglia (or glial cells) which serve to support and protect the neurons
(although see the end of this page for more information on glial cells). Each neuron may
be connected to up to 10,000 other neurons, passing signals to each other via as many
as 1,000 trillion synaptic connections, equivalent by some estimates to a computer
with a 1 trillion bit per second processor. Estimates of the human brain’s memory
capacity vary wildly from 1 to 1,000 terabytes (for comparison, the 19 million volumes
in the US Library of Congress represents about 10 terabytes of data).

Diagram of a neuron
Picture from Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuron)
Information transmission within the brain, such as takes place during the processes
of memory encoding and retrieval, is achieved using a combination
of chemicals and electricity. It is a very ??? Did You Know ???
complex process involving a variety of
interrelated steps, but a quick overview can Unlike other body cells, most neurons in the
be given here. human brain are only able to divide to make
new cells (a process called neurogenesis)
during fetal development and for a few months
A typical neuron possesses a soma (the after birth.
bulbous cell body which contains the cell These brain cells may increase in size until the
nucleus), dendrites (long, feathery filaments age of about eighteen years, but they are
attached to the cell body in a complex essentially designed to last a lifetime.
branching “dendritic tree”) and a Interestingly, the only area of the brain where
neurogenesis has been shown to continue
single axon (a special, extra-long, branched throughout life is the hippocampus, an area
cellular filament, which may be thousands of essential to memory encoding and storage.
times the length of the soma).

Every neuron maintains a voltage gradient across its membrane, due to metabolically-
driven differences in ions of sodium, potassium, chloride and calcium within the cell,
each of which has a different charge. If the voltage changes significantly, an
electrochemical pulse called an action potential (or nerve impulse) is generated. This
electrical activity can be measured and displayed as a wave form called brain
wave or brain rhythm.

This pulse travels rapidly along the cell's

axon, and is transferred across a
specialized connection known as
a synapse to a neighbouring neuron, which
receives it through its feathery dendrites. A
synapse is a complex membrane junction or
gap (the actual gap, also known as
the synaptic cleft, is of the order of 20
nanometres, or 20 millionths of a millimetre)
used to transmit signals between cells, and
this transfer is therefore known as
a synaptic connection. Although axon-
dendrite synaptic connections are the norm,
other variations (e.g. dendrite-dendrite,
axon-axon, dendrite-axon) are also
possible. A typical neuron fires 5 - 50 times
every second.

Each individual neuron can form thousands

of links with other neurons in this way,
giving a typical brain well over 100 trillion Synaptic transmission
synapses (up to 1,000 trillion, by some Picture from Wikipedia
estimates). Functionally related neurons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_synapse)
connect to each other to form neural
networks (also known as neural nets or assemblies). The connections between
neurons are not static, though, they change over time. The more signals sent between
two neurons, the stronger the connection grows (technically, the amplitude of the post-
synaptic neuron’s response increases), and so, with each new experience and each
remembered event or fact, the brain slightly re-wires its physical structure.

The interactions of neurons is not merely electrical, though, but electro-chemical. Each
axon terminal contains thousands of membrane-bound sacs called vesicles, which in
turn contain thousands of neurotransmitter molecules each. Neurotransmitters are
chemical messengers which relay, amplify and modulate signals between neurons and
other cells. The two most common neurotransmitters in the brain are the amino
acids glutamate and GABA; other important neurotransmitters
include acetylcholine, dopamine, adrenaline, histamine, serotonin and melatonin.

When stimulated by an electrical pulse, ??? Did You Know ???

neurotransmitters of various types are
released, and they cross the cell membrane During childhood, and particularly
into the synaptic gap between neurons. during adolescence, a process known
These chemicals then bind to as "synaptic pruning" occurs.
Although the brain continues to grow and
chemical receptors in the dendrites of the develop, the overall number of neurons and
receiving (post-synaptic) neuron. In the synapses are reduced by up to 50%, removing
process, they cause changes in the unnecessary neuronal structures and allowing
permeability of the cell membrane to specific them to be replaced by more complex and
ions, opening up efficient structures, more suited to the demands
of adulthood.
special gates or channels which let in a
flood of charged particles (ions of calcium, sodium, potassium and chloride). This
affects the potential charge of the receiving neuron, which then starts up a new
electrical signal in the receiving neuron. The whole process takes less than one five-
hundredth of a second. In this way, a message within the brain is converted, as it moves
from one neuron to another, from an electrical signal to a chemical signal and back
again, in an ongoing chain of events which is the basis of all brain activity.

The electro-chemical signal released by a particular neurotransmitter may be such as

to encourage to the receiving cell to also fire, or to inhibit or prevent it from firing.
Different neurotransmitters tend to act as excitatory (e.g. acetylcholine, glutamate,
aspartate, noradrenaline, histamine) or inhibitory (e.g. GABA, glycine, seratonin), while
some (e.g. dopamine) may be either. Subtle variations in the mechanisms of
neurotransmission allow the brain to respond to the various demands made on it,
including the encoding, consolidation, storage and retrieval of memories.

As has been mentioned, in addition to neurons, the brain contains about an equal mass
of glial cells (neuroglia or simply glia), the most common types
being oligodendrocytes, astrocytes and microglia. Because they are so much
smaller than neurons, there are up to 10 times as many in number, and different areas
of the brain have higher or lower concentrations of glia. It used to be thought that the
role of glial cells was limited to the physical support, nutrition and repair of the
neurons of the central nervous system. However, more recent research suggests that
glia, particularly astrocytes, actually perform a much more active role in
brain communication and neuroplasticity, although the extent and mechanics of of
this role is still uncertain, and a substantial amount of contemporary brain research is
now focused on glials cells.

Stages of Sleep
LEARNING OBJECTIVES

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

 Differentiate between REM and non-REM sleep
 Describe the differences between the four stages of non-REM sleep
 Understand the role that REM and non-REM sleep play in learning and memory

Sleep is not a uniform state of being. Instead, sleep is composed of several different
stages that can be differentiated from one another by the patterns of brain wave activity
that occur during each stage. These changes in brain wave activity can be visualized
using EEG and are distinguished from one another by both the frequency and amplitude
of brain waves ([link]). Sleep can be divided into two different general phases: REM
sleep and non-REM (NREM) sleep. Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep is characterized
by darting movements of the eyes under closed eyelids. Brain waves during REM sleep
appear very similar to brain waves during wakefulness. In contrast, non-REM
(NREM) sleep is subdivided into four stages distinguished from each other and from
wakefulness by characteristic patterns of brain waves. The first four stages of sleep are
NREM sleep, while the fifth and final stage of sleep is REM sleep. In this section, we will
discuss each of these stages of sleep and their associated patterns of brain wave
activity

. A lot happens in your body while you sleep. When you get your ZZZs, you cycle between REM
and non-REM sleep.
REM stands for rapid eye movement. During REM sleep, your eyes move quickly in different
directions. That doesn't happen during non-REM sleep.
First comes non-REM sleep, followed by a shorter period of REM sleep, and then the cycle starts
over again. Dreams typically happen during REM sleep.

What Happens During Non-REM Sleep?

There are three phases of non-REM sleep. Each stage can last from 5 to 15 minutes. You go
through all three phases before reaching REM sleep.
Stage 1: Your eyes are closed, but it's easy to wake you up. This phase may last for 5 to 10
minutes.
Stage 2: You are in light sleep. Your heart rate slows and your body temperature drops. Your
body is getting ready for deep sleep.
CONTINUE READING BELOW

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Stages 3: This is the deep sleep stage. It's harder to rouse you during this stage, and if someone
woke you up, you would feel disoriented for a few minutes.
During the deep stages of NREM sleep, the body repairs and regrows tissues, builds bone and
muscle, and strengthens the immune system.
As you get older, you sleep more lightly and get less deep sleep. Aging is also linked to shorter
time spans of sleep, although studies show you still need as much sleep as when you were
younger.

What Is REM Sleep?

Usually, REM sleep happens 90 minutes after you fall asleep. The first periodof REM typically
lasts 10 minutes. Each of your later REM stages gets longer, and the final one may last up to an
hour. Your heart rate and breathing quickens.
You can have intense dreams during REM sleep, since your brain is more active.
Babies can spend up to 50% of their sleep in the REM stage, compared to only about 20% for
adults.

After a sleepless night, you likely feel sluggish the next morning, and a small new study
suggests why: Your brain cells feel sluggish, too. And when those brain cells are tired,
you may be more likely to be forgetful and get distracted more easily, the research
found.

In the study, the researchers found that sleep deprivation makes it difficult for brain cells
to communicate effectively, which, in turn, can lead to temporary mental lapses that
affect memory and visual perception.
In other words, the findings offer clues as to why a sleepless night makes it so hard to
think and concentrate the next day. [The Spooky Effects of Sleep Deprivation]
"We discovered that starving the body of sleep also robs neurons of the ability to
function properly," senior study author Dr. Itzhak Fried, a professor of neurosurgery at
the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), said in a statement. "This paves the
way for cognitive lapses in how we perceive and react to the world around us."
To study the effects of sleep deprivation, the researchers recruited 12 patients
with epilepsy who, as part of a preparation for surgery unrelated to the study, had
electrodes implanted into their brains.These electrodes allowed the researchers to
monitor hundreds of individual brain cells.
The people in the study then had to stay up for an entire night. During this time, the
researchers measured the participants' brain activity as they carried out certain tasks.
For example, the patients were asked to categorize various imagesof faces, places and
animalsas fast as possible. Each image caused cells in areas of the brain to produce
distinctive patterns of electrical activity. Specifically, the researchers focused on cell
activity in the temporal lobe, which regulates visual perception and memory.
The researchers found that as the patients got tired, it became more challenging for
them to categorize the images, and their brain cells began to slow down.
"We were fascinated to observe how sleep deprivation dampened brain cell activity,"
lead study author Yuval Nir, a sleep researcher at Tel Aviv University in Israel, said in the
statement. "Unlike the usual rapid reaction, the neurons responded slowly, fired more
weakly and their transmissions dragged on longer than usual."
In addition, the researchers found that sleep deprivation affects some areas of the brain
more than others. Regions of the brain that experienced sluggish brain cell activity also
exhibited brain activity normally seen when a person is asleep, the researchers said.

"This phenomenon suggests that select regions of the patients' brains were dozing,
causing mental lapses, while the rest of the brain was awake and running as usual,"
Fried said.

In addition, the findings suggest that a lack of sleep can interfere with the ability of
neurons in the brain to encode information and translate visual input into conscious
thought, the researchers said. For example, when a sleep-deprived driver sees a
pedestrian stepping in front of his car, it may take longer for the driver to realize what he
or she is seeing because "the very act of seeing the pedestrian slows down in the
driver's overtired brain," Nir said.

The researchers compared the effects of sleep deprivation to those of drunk driving.

"Inadequate sleep exerts a similar influence on our brain as drinking too much," Fried
said. "Yet no legal or medical standards exist for identifying overtired drivers on the road
the same way we target drunk drivers.
Do you often forget things that you’re sure you know? Is it hard to concentrate on complex
assignments? Do you get less than six hours of sleep a night?
If so, you’re probably not getting enough sleep. That’s right; lack of sleepcan hinder you from
thinking clearly and keeping your emotions at an even keel. Studies show that excessive
sleepiness can hurt work performance, wreak havoc on relationships, and lead to mood problems
like anger and depression.

Why Don’t People Value Sleep?

Most people who don’t get enough sleep don’t recognize
the toll that it takes on their cognitive and mental health.
Many people think of sleep simply as a luxury -- a little
downtime. They know they feel better when they get a
good night’s sleep and worse when they don’t. But sleep
actually improves learning, memory, and insight.

Brainwave activity changes dramatically across the different stages of sleep. (credit “sleeping”: modification of
work by Ryan Vaarsi)

NREM STAGES OF SLEEP

The first stage of NREM sleep is known as stage 1 sleep. Stage 1 sleep is a transitional
phase that occurs between wakefulness and sleep, the period during which we drift off
to sleep. During this time, there is a slowdown in both the rates of respiration and
heartbeat. In addition, stage 1 sleep involves a marked decrease in both overall muscle
tension and core body temperature.

In terms of brain wave activity, stage 1 sleep is associated with both alpha and theta
waves. The early portion of stage 1 sleep produces alpha waves, which are relatively
low frequency (8–13Hz), high amplitude patterns of electrical activity (waves) that
become synchronized ([link]). This pattern of brain wave activity resembles that of
someone who is very relaxed, yet awake. As an individual continues through stage 1
sleep, there is an increase in theta wave activity. Theta waves are even lower frequency
(4–7 Hz), higher amplitude brain waves than alpha waves. It is relatively easy to wake
someone from stage 1 sleep; in fact, people often report that they have not been asleep
if they are awoken during stage 1 sleep.

Brainwave activity changes dramatically across the different stages of sleep.

As we move into stage 2 sleep, the body goes into a state of deep relaxation. Theta
waves still dominate the activity of the brain, but they are interrupted by brief bursts of
activity known as sleep spindles ([link]). A sleep spindle is a rapid burst of higher
frequency brain waves that may be important for learning and memory (Fogel & Smith,
2011; Poe, Walsh, & Bjorness, 2010). In addition, the appearance of K-complexes is
often associated with stage 2 sleep. A K-complex is a very high amplitude pattern of
brain activity that may in some cases occur in response to environmental stimuli. Thus,
K-complexes might serve as a bridge to higher levels of arousal in response to what is
going on in our environments (Halász, 1993; Steriade & Amzica, 1998).

Stage 2 sleep is characterized by the appearance of both sleep spindles and K-complexes.

Stage 3 and stage 4 of sleep are often referred to as deep sleep or slow-wave sleep
because these stages are characterized by low frequency (up to 4 Hz), high
amplitude delta waves ([link]). During this time, an individual’s heart rate and
respiration slow dramatically. It is much more difficult to awaken someone from sleep
during stage 3 and stage 4 than during earlier stages. Interestingly, individuals who
have increased levels of alpha brain wave activity (more often associated with
wakefulness and transition into stage 1 sleep) during stage 3 and stage 4 often report
that they do not feel refreshed upon waking, regardless of how long they slept (Stone,
Taylor, McCrae, Kalsekar, & Lichstein, 2008).
(a) Delta waves, which are low frequency and high amplitude, characterize (b) slow-wave stage 3 and stage 4
sleep.

REM SLEEP

As mentioned earlier, REM sleep is marked by rapid movements of the eyes. The brain
waves associated with this stage of sleep are very similar to those observed when a
person is awake, as shown in [link], and this is the period of sleep in which dreaming
occurs. It is also associated with paralysis of muscle systems in the body with the
exception of those that make circulation and respiration possible. Therefore, no
movement of voluntary muscles occurs during REM sleep in a normal individual; REM
sleep is often referred to as paradoxical sleep because of this combination of high brain
activity and lack of muscle tone. Like NREM sleep, REM has been implicated in various
aspects of learning and memory (Wagner, Gais, & Born, 2001), although there is
disagreement within the scientific community about how important both NREM and
REM sleep are for normal learning and memory (Siegel, 2001).
(a) A period of rapid eye movement is marked by the short red line segment. The brain waves associated with
REM sleep, outlined in the red box in (a), look very similar to those seen (b) during wakefulness.

If people are deprived of REM sleep and then allowed to sleep without disturbance, they
will spend more time in REM sleep in what would appear to be an effort to recoup the
lost time in REM. This is known as the REM rebound, and it suggests that REM sleep is
also homeostatically regulated. Aside from the role that REM sleep may play in
processes related to learning and memory, REM sleep may also be involved in
emotional processing and regulation. In such instances, REM rebound may actually
represent an adaptive response to stress in nondepressed individuals by suppressing
the emotional salience of aversive events that occurred in wakefulness (Suchecki, Tiba,
& Machado, 2012).

While sleep deprivation in general is associated with a number of negative

consequences (Brown, 2012), the consequences of REM deprivation appear to be less
profound (as discussed in Siegel, 2001). In fact, some have suggested that REM
deprivation can actually be beneficial in some circumstances. For instance, REM sleep
deprivation has been demonstrated to improve symptoms of people suffering from
major depression, and many effective antidepressant medications suppress REM sleep
(Riemann, Berger, & Volderholzer, 2001; Vogel, 1975).

It should be pointed out that some reviews of the literature challenge this finding,
suggesting that sleep deprivation that is not limited to REM sleep is just as effective or
more effective at alleviating depressive symptoms among some patients suffering from
depression. In either case, why sleep deprivation improves the mood of some patients
is not entirely understood (Giedke & Schwärzler, 2002). Recently, however, some have
suggested that sleep deprivation might change emotional processing so that various
stimuli are more likely to be perceived as positive in nature (Gujar, Yoo, Hu, & Walker,
2011). The hypnogram below ([link]) shows a person’s passage through the stages of
sleep.

A hypnogram is a diagram of the stages of sleep as they occur during a period of sleep. This hypnogram illustrates
how an individual moves through the various stages of sleep.

Link to Learning
View this video that describes the various stages of sleep.

Dreams

The meaning of dreams varies across different cultures and periods of time. By the late
19th century, German psychiatrist Sigmund Freud had become convinced that dreams
represented an opportunity to gain access to the unconscious. By analyzing dreams,
Freud thought people could increase self-awareness and gain valuable insight to help
them deal with the problems they faced in their lives. Freud made distinctions between
the manifest content and the latent content of dreams. Manifest content is the actual
content, or storyline, of a dream. Latent content, on the other hand, refers to the hidden
meaning of a dream. For instance, if a woman dreams about being chased by a snake,
Freud might have argued that this represents the woman’s fear of sexual intimacy, with
the snake serving as a symbol of a man’s penis.
Freud was not the only theorist to focus on the content of dreams. The 20th century
Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung believed that dreams allowed us to tap into the collective
unconscious. The collective unconscious, as described by Jung, is a theoretical
repository of information he believed to be shared by everyone. According to Jung,
certain symbols in dreams reflected universal archetypes with meanings that are similar
for all people regardless of culture or location.

The sleep and dreaming researcher Rosalind Cartwright, however, believes that dreams
simply reflect life events that are important to the dreamer. Unlike Freud and Jung,
Cartwright’s ideas about dreaming have found empirical support. For example, she and
her colleagues published a study in which women going through divorce were asked
several times over a five month period to report the degree to which their former
spouses were on their minds. These same women were awakened during REM sleep in
order to provide a detailed account of their dream content. There was a significant
positive correlation between the degree to which women thought about their former
spouses during waking hours and the number of times their former spouses appeared
as characters in their dreams (Cartwright, Agargun, Kirkby, & Friedman, 2006). Recent
research (Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, & Kamitani, 2013) has uncovered new
techniques by which researchers may effectively detect and classify the visual images
that occur during dreaming by using fMRI for neural measurement of brain activity
patterns, opening the way for additional research in this area.

Recently, neuroscientists have also become interested in understanding why we dream.

For example, Hobson (2009) suggests that dreaming may represent a state of
protoconsciousness. In other words, dreaming involves constructing a virtual reality in
our heads that we might use to help us during wakefulness. Among a variety of
neurobiological evidence, John Hobson cites research on lucid dreams as an
opportunity to better understand dreaming in general. Lucid dreams are dreams in
which certain aspects of wakefulness are maintained during a dream state. In a lucid
dream, a person becomes aware of the fact that they are dreaming, and as such, they
can control the dream’s content (LaBerge, 1990).

Summary

The different stages of sleep are characterized by the patterns of brain waves
associated with each stage. As a person transitions from being awake to falling asleep,
alpha waves are replaced by theta waves. Sleep spindles and K-complexes emerge in
stage 2 sleep. Stage 3 and stage 4 are described as slow-wave sleep that is marked by
a predominance of delta waves. REM sleep involves rapid movements of the eyes,
paralysis of voluntary muscles, and dreaming. Both NREM and REM sleep appear to
play important roles in learning and memory. Dreams may represent life events that are
important to the dreamer. Alternatively, dreaming may represent a state of
protoconsciousness, or a virtual reality, in the mind that helps a person during
consciousness.
 SELF CHECK QUESTIONS

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Freud believed that dreams provide important insight into the unconscious mind. He
maintained that a dream’s manifest content could provide clues into an individual’s unconscious.
What potential criticisms exist for this particular perspective?
2. Some people claim that sleepwalking and talking in your sleep involve individuals acting out
their dreams. Why is this particular explanation unlikely?
Personal Application Question
3. Researchers believe that one important function of sleep is to facilitate learning and memory.
How does knowing this help you in your college studies? What changes could you make to your
study and sleep habits to maximize your mastery of the material covered in class?

ANSWERS

1. The subjective nature of dream analysis is one criticism. Psychoanalysts are charged with
helping their clients interpret the true meaning of a dream. There is no way to refute or confirm
whether or not these interpretations are accurate. The notion that “sometimes a cigar is just a
cigar” (sometimes attributed to Freud but not definitively shown to be his) makes it clear that
there is no systematic, objective system in place for dream analysis.
2. Dreaming occurs during REM sleep. One of the hallmarks of this particular stage of sleep is
the paralysis of the voluntary musculature which would make acting out dre

GLOSSARY

alpha wave type of relatively low frequency, relatively high amplitude brain wave that
becomes synchronized; characteristic of the beginning of stage 1 sleep
delta wave type of low frequency, high amplitude brain wave characteristic of stage 3
and stage 4 sleep
collective unconscious theoretical repository of information shared by all people
across cultures, as described by Carl Jung
K-complex very high amplitude pattern of brain activity associated with stage 2 sleep
that may occur in response to environmental stimuli
latent content hidden meaning of a dream, per Sigmund Freud’s view of the function
of dreams
lucid dream people become aware that they are dreaming and can control the dream’s
content
manifest content storyline of events that occur during a dream, per Sigmund Freud’s
view of the function of dreams
non-REM (NREM) period of sleep outside periods of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep
rapid eye movement (REM) sleep period of sleep characterized by brain waves very
similar to those during wakefulness and by darting movements of the eyes under closed
eyelids
sleep spindle rapid burst of high frequency brain waves during stage 2 sleep that may
be important for learning and memory
stage 1 sleep first stage of sleep; transitional phase that occurs between wakefulness
and sleep; the period during which a person drifts off to sleep
stage 2 sleep second stage of sleep; the body goes into deep relaxation; characterized
by the appearance of sleep spindles
stage 3 sleep third stage of sleep; deep sleep characterized by low frequency, high
amplitude delta waves
stage 4 sleep fourth stage of sleep; deep sleep characterized by low frequency, high
amplitude delta waves
theta wave type of low frequency, low amplitude brain wave characteristic of the end of
stage 1 sleep

or a long time, researchers weren’t quite sure why we sleep. There are a number
of different theories. Some are evolutionary: For instance, sleep keeps us out of
trouble at night and away from animals who wake up and hunt after the sun goes
down. Some are physiological: Sleep lets us conserve precious energy. And
some are anecdotal: Parents joke that they’d go nuts if sleep didn’t exist, since it
affords them a much-needed break from their kids. But the reality is that the brain
does a lot of work while we’re sleeping—even though we’re unconscious, this
doesn’t at all mean the brain is “off.” In fact, in many ways, it's incredibly "on."

The RAND research group just came out with a 100-page analysis of how sleep
affects us and what sleep deprivation can do to us—and to the economy. They
estimate that between lost work and poor performance at work from lack of
sleep, the U.S. alone loses $411 billion each year. Though businesses and policy
makers may be interested in the financial repercussions of sleep deprivation,
these repercussions stem from people being unwell because of it, which
underlines the very real consequences of sleep deprivation.

Recent research has laid out some of the reasons why we need sleep, and all
the functions the brain seems to perform while we’re sleeping. There's more to
figure out, but here are a few reasons why the brain needs sleep, and why things
tend to go downhill without it.

Forbes image

Sleep helps solidify memory

One of the central functions of sleep is that it helps consolidate long-term

memory—it seems to do this, not only through strengthening certain neural
connections, but also through pruning back unwanted ones. The brain makes a
lot of connections during the day, but not all of them are worth saving; so sleep is
a time in which the brain streamlines the connections it “needs.”
Most people have probably observed the phenomenon whereby sleep helps us
remember things we’ve learned during the day. And studies have borne this out.
In one study, participants had to learn a motor routine (tapping buttons in a
certain order). When learning the task and recalling the task were separated by a
night of sleep, rather than the same amount of time during waking hours, the
participants did much better. The theory is that the brain consolidates the
memories it needs, but prunes back the ones it doesn’t. And research has shown
that the brain tends to weaken the connections that form the memories that the
brain deems unimportant.

One thing to be aware of is that sleep also seems to nail down negative
memories, which probably plays a role in PTSD and depression. A very
recent study showed that once negative emotional memories are consolidated
during sleep, they’re less likely to be suppressed. And this means that bad
memories in addition to the good ones more likely to stick around, and less likely
to be forgotten.

Toxins, including those associated with Alzheimer’s disease, are cleared

during sleep

One of the most illuminating discoveries in the last few years is that the brain
clears out toxins much more rapidly while we’re asleep than when we’re awake.

“I think some of the most exciting work is on the glymphatic system,”

says Michael Thorpy, director of the Sleep-Wake Disorders Center at Montefiore
Health System and professor of clinical neurology at Albert Einstein College of
Medicine. “There’s a lot of new research in this area in the last few years. The
lymphatic system of the brain opens up at night, and removes toxins while we’re
asleep.”

The space between brain cells expands significantly during sleep, which
facilitates the clearing of the "gunk” through cerebrospinal fluid. And perhaps
most astonishing is that much of this gunk is the β-amyloid protein, which is a
precursor to the plaques in Alzheimer’s disease. These proteins and other toxins
seem to accumulate during the day, and are cleared during sleep. Another
incredibly strong reason to make sure we get enough.

Sleep is necessary for cognition

It doesn’t take a study to tell us that a lack of sleep affects our cognitive
capacities, but luckily, there are a lot of them. Sleep deprivation can affect
everything from cognition to attention to decision-making.
“We know that sleep is necessary for higher cortical function, the most important
of which is multi-tasking” says Thorpy. "Sleep deprivation will definitely affect
one’s ability to multitask. Driving is the most intensive multitasking activity we
do—it uses hands, feet, vision, awareness of what’s going on. When you’re
sleep-deprived, it strongly affects your ability to multitask. That’s why we have so
many accidents with cars, and of course trains. Sleep deprivation drains your
executive function.”

Sleep deprivation has also been shown to have a negative impact on cognitive
functions like attention and working memory. One study found that just a little
sleep deprivation—the loss of 2 hours of sleep per night for 14 nights—left
participants with poorer performance on certain neurobehavioral tasks that
involved attention and short-term memory.

Creativity needs sleep

Sleep seems to beget creativity—and sleep deprivation strips it away. We know

this from anecdotes and from evidence. When people are sleep-deprived, certain
types of thought seem to be affected more than others: For
instance, divergent thinking—thinking outside the box, in new and imaginative
ways—seems to be the first thing that goes when one is sleep-deprived, whereas
convergent thinking—being able to figure out the correct answer, as on
standardized tests—stays intact. One study deprived participants of sleep for 32
hours and tested them on various aspects of thinking. People who were sleep-
deprived for the 32 hours performed significantly worse on most types of
divergent thinking, including fluency, flexibility and originality. And they had the
tendency to perseverate on verbal memory tests: In this case, to come up with
the same answer again and again, cross it out, and try again, which is a sign that
the creative mind isn’t doing so well.

On the flipside, sleep seems to promote creativity: One study had participants
learning a task involving numbers, in which they had to detect a pattern hidden in
the questions. People who got a night of sleep were much more successful at
figuring it out than people who were sleep-deprived.

And aside from the studies, experiencing creative insights during sleep, or just as
one is waking up from it, has been documented for many hundreds of years.

Sleep loss and depression are intertwined

Depression and sleep problems are intimately connected. People with

depression often have a hard time sleeping, or, on the flipside, they may sleep a
lot. It also seems to be true that sleep deprivation can, if not cause depression,
certainly worsen it. So it’s a bit of a chicken-or-egg relationship. Studies have
found that people who sleep less than six hours per night or more than eight
hours per night are more likely to be depressed than people in the middle. And
people with insomnia are many more times likely to have depression and anxiety.
Part of the explanation for these connections may come from the fact that the
part of the brain that governs circadian rhythm (daily sleep-wake cycle, and all
the body functions that depend on it) is disrupted in depressed people. Which
may partly explain why depression and sleep problems go hand-in-hand.

Physical health and longevity

Although the body doesn’t technically need sleep in the same way the brain
does, there are a number of physical diseases and disorders it seems to affect. A
new study presented at the Radiological Society of North America’s annual
conference found that when health professionals (radiologists) got an average of
three hours of sleep during a 24-hours shift, their hearts suffered for it. The
participants had increases in contractility of their hearts, blood pressure, heart
rate and levels of thyroid hormone and the stress hormone cortisol.

Other studies have linked lack of sleep to overweight and obesity, and poorer
glucose control. Lots have studies have linked poor sleep to mortality—but there
seems to be a sweet spot, where people getting under six hours are at greater
risk, and those getting nine or more hours per night are at risk. The effects of
sleep deprivation likely have to do with its effects on hormones, mentioned
above, which can increase heart and diabetes risk, as well as inflammation,
which itself may increase one’s risk of cancer.

“The sleep-wake cycle has an important impact on all organ systems,” says
Thorpy. “We can’t minimize the fact that the sleep-wake pattern has effects on
the whole body, not just the brain. The most direct function of sleep does seem to
be its effects on the central nervous system. But I wouldn’t ignore the fact that
body organs are affected as well.”

Kids need their sleep

If you have kids, you know that without sleep, they can be a tad difficult. Sleep
deprivation in children has lots of short-term ramifications, and over the long
term, it may even affect brain development. Sleep is especially important for the
growing brain, which is why babies, kids and teens sleep so much.

Some studies have reported that kids who are sleep-deprived because of
nighttime breathing problems are significantly more likely to have ADHD
symptoms than kids who sleep well. Others have found that a little extra sleep
can make a significant difference in school performance: Just 18 more minutes
per night was linked to better grades in math and English in elementary school
kids.

And sleep deprivation seems to have slightly different effects in kids vs. adults.
One recent study found that the brain changes that a half-night of sleep
deprivation affects the back regions of the brain instead of the front regions, as it
does in adults. It’s not clear exactly what this means for brain development, it just
points to a fundamental difference that needs more exploration.

Some schools, having kept an eye on the research, have begun shifting their
school day so that it starts later, to accommodate the need for sleep for the
developing brain. Hopefully more will follow suit as more research helps us
understand what the brain is doing while you’re asleep.

***

Sleep can feel like an indulgence, especially when we’re busy or stressed; and
it’s often the first thing to go at these times. But as the research shows, sleep
isn’t a luxury—it’s a necessity, and brain will probably rebel if it doesn’t have
enough. So it may be time to change our attitudes about sleep and give it a little
more attention than it usually gets.

Sleep Disorders Treated by 7HourSleep

7HourSleep specialises in Sleep and Fatigue Management Solutions. Our Sleep Health
Solution addresses a variety of Sleep Disorders, which include:

 Insomnia
 Sleep Breathing Disorders
 Restless Leg Syndrome
 Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease
 Circadian Rhythm Sleep Disorder
 Shift Work Disorder
 Jet Lag

A sleep disorder, or somnipathy, is a medical disorder of a person’s sleep patterns.

Some sleep disorders are serious enough to interfere with the physical, mental, and
social well-being of a person. For more information and to discuss your specific needs,
 CONTACT US

Insomnia
Insomnia occurs when one struggles to fall or stay asleep or when one wakes up too
early in the morning. Acute insomnia lasts from a few days up to 4 weeks, while chronic
insomnia may last more than 4 weeks.

Symptoms of insomnia include:

 Excessive daytime sleepiness

 Impaired daytime performance
 Loss of concentration
 Loss of motivation
 Moodiness or irritability

Insomnia is a condition where medical intervention is needed. It is usually treated by

practicing good sleep hygiene with the help of a medical professional specializing in
sleep disorders. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) for Insomnia, which is an
approved method for treating insomnia without medication, has proved successful. If
you have insomnia, remember that it is a very common sleep disorder which can be
successfully treated. It is possible to enjoy a peace full, stress less night's rest and
awake refreshed the next morning.
Learn more about causes, symptoms and treatment of chronic and acute
insomnia.
Contact us to speak to a sleep consultant for advice on how we can help you.

Sleep Breathing Disorders

Sleep Disordered Breathing is a very common sleep disorder. It includes
snoring, Obstructibe Sleep Apnea, Central Sleep Apnea, Mixed Sleep Apnea,
and Upper Airway Resistance Syndrome. Obstructive Sleep Apnea is the most common
form of breathing disorder. It is characterised by frequent breathing pauses during sleep
and can lead to complications such as high blood pressure, cardiovascular problems,
type 2 diabetes, obesity, and stroke.
Signs and symptoms of sleep apnea are:

 Snoring
 Tiredness during the day
 High blood pressure
 Poor quality sleep
 Poor concentration
 Morning headaches

Treatment for sleep breathing disorders include:

 Positive Airway Pressure Therapy

 A mandibular advancement device that pulls the lower jaw forward in an attempt to
open the airway. This may help for mild to moderate sleep apnea
 Surgical intervention may be indicated in selected cases

Restless Leg Syndrome

Restless Leg Syndrome is a disorder that causes an urge to move the legs. It causes
uncomfortable 'pins and needles' feelings in the legs which might be worse when sitting
still or lying down. It usually feels better when moving the legs or walking around. It may
return during bedtime and may cause people to struggle to fall asleep.
If you struggle with pins and needles or suspect restless leg syndrome, please consult
with your healthcare practitioner or contact us for more information.

Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease (GERD)

Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease GERD is a condition where the oesophagus
becomes irritated or inflamed due to acid build-up from the stomach. It is especially
prevalent in people suffering from Sleep Apnea. The closure of the airway causes a
vacuum effect in the throat resulting in the flow of stomach acids from the stomach into
the oesophagus.
If you struggle with an irritated or inflamed oesophagus or suspect you suffer from
GERD, please consult with your healthcare practitioner or contact us for more
information.
Circadian Rhythm Sleep Disorder
Cicadian Rhythm Sleep Disorder is a problem with the body's internal clock. It can
influence sleep-wake cycles, hormonal release, eating habits, body temperature and
other important bodily functions. Two common Circadian Rhythm Disorders are Shift
Work Disorder and Jet Lag.

Shift Work Disorder

Shift Work Disorder is characterised by Insomnia and excessive sleepiness affecting
people whose work hours overlap with normal sleep hours. It includes early morning
shifts, overnight shifts, shifts that carry on into the night and rotating shifts.

Shift Work Sleep Disorder may lead to increased risk of work-related accidents or costly
mistakes due to fatigue. Symptoms include:

 Morning headaches
 Fatigue
 Irritability
 Excessive daytime sleepiness

Increased long-term health complications include:

 Colds and flu or other immune system complications

 Heart disease
 Overweight and obesity
 Different forms of cancers
 Increased cholesterol levels

Treatment usually includes special sleep hygiene training in how to handle changes in
shifts and sleep-wake scheduling. Feel free to contact us if you wish to find out more.

Jet Lag
Jet Lag occurs when a person travels over multiple time zones and has trouble
adjusting to the new time zone. It can be worsened by sleep loss due to travel; stress,
caffeine and alcohol use and sitting uncomfortably for long periods of time.

Symptoms include:

 Difficulty in falling asleep

 A decrease in daily performance
 Mild feeling of illness
 Tiredness

Treatment includes exposure to sunlight at the destination; planning ahead and

exercise.
141 Meditation BenefitsFAQTestimonialsOrder NowContact

Tw
TMtt

our body has far more power to heal itself than we know. The experience of
transcending creates the ideal condition to activate the body's innate healing power.
Fortunately this is a lot easier than previously thought, as confirmed by 600 scientific
research studies, 6 million people practicing TM worldwide. It only requires the right
technique and proper training.

True meditation is easy. Anyone can learn it, it’s enjoyable, natural and very
effective. Most people think that meditation involves some kind of mind control, forcing
the mind to be quiet through some kind of concentration (on the breath, a sound, or
“being in the now”). Concentration goes against the nature of the mind, and is hardly
enjoyable. TM however is extremely easy and pleasant.

A simple mental techniquewith profound physical effects

Changing lives: Why more and more celebrities, scientists and governments are supporting

TM
Transcending = Much more than
relaxation
Meditation is becoming more and more popular to manage stress, but the true
experience of transcending has a far more profound effect than just relaxation.
Unfortunately, the knowledge of how to easily transcend had been lost to the world until
recently. The ancient texts from the oldest tradition of knowledge describe transcending
as the highest human experience, essential for our full human development. Today we
can confirm this through modern science, by measuring what happens in the body and
the brain during the practice of Transcendental Meditation:

1. A profound state of rest: much deeper than ordinary relaxation, even deeper than
sleep.
2. Inner peace and happiness: significant decrease of stress hormones and increase
of happiness hormones
3. Wholistic brain development: measurable through EEG brain wave coherence
measurements.

All these together make the TM practice so effective for all areas of life.

Transcending = Deep Rest

When the mind transcends the finest impulse of thought, it comes into a state of
complete inner silence. This happens in a completely natural and effortless way. We
can’t try to make the mind silent, nor do we have to. With the right technique the mind
will go there by itself. When the mind transcends, the body spontaneously comes into a
very deep state of relaxation as well, far deeper than sleep.

This can be objectively measured by monitoring oxygen consumption.Ref.,Ref. This

graph, from a Harvard Medical School research study, shows that during TM, the body
comes into a state of rest that is twice as deep as even the deepest rest during sleep.
More than 30 studies around the world have confirmed the deep rest during TM
practice.
This deep rest activates the inner healing power in our own bodies.

Relaxation means relaxing tensions. The body has a completely natural way to remove
all the tensions it accumulates. This is what we do during sleep, but the rest during
sleep doesn’t go deep enough to remove the deeply rooted traumatic stresses.
Transcending will do exactly that.
 The results are most obvious with those who need it most. A recent study with Iraq

war veterans showed a 50% reduction in PTSD and depression after only 8 weeks of
TM practice.Ref.The results were so spectacular that CNN did a feature on it on US
Veteran’s Day. (Watch the CNN video.)
This was just another confirmation of earlier research with Vietnam war veterans that
was done 25 years ago.

In this study the TM group saw such significant reductions (in PTSD, anxiety,
depression, insomnia, etc.) that after only 3 months of practice, 70% of the war veterans
required no further treatment. The control group that received standard psychotherapy
showed no improvement.Ref.
These people have problems that go far deeper than ours. If TM can help them, even
when nothing else that has ever been tried works, we can imagine that it can help
anybody.

The video below shows several more examples of just how powerful TM can be for
those who are suffering from traumatic stress. It also shows why more and more
scientists, educators, celebrities and governmental institutions are supporting the TM
technique.

Stress disturbs the normal functioning of the brain, causing among other things, a
decrease in the production of the “happiness hormone,” serotonin. A lack of serotonin
influences not only our inner sense of happiness, but is also associated with migraines,
sleep disorders, anxiety, anger outbursts, Alzheimer’s, eating disorders, addictions and
many others. One can try to influence serotonin artificially (as antidepressants do), but
this only treats the symptoms, not the real problem itself.

The experience of transcending on the other hand activates the body’s own healing

ability, so that the brain can function normally. The result? An increase in serotonin
production completely naturally during the TM practice, and eventually during the rest of
the day.Ref. This has implications in all areas of life, as you can discover on this site.

Transcending = Measurable Brain

Development
Transcending not only has an effect on our health, our well-being, our self-esteem and
our relationships, but it also influences our brain development, even in adults, whose
brains are supposedly already fully developed. How can a simple experience effect the
brain in a way that was considered impossible, (such as disappearance of ADHD,
increase IQ and creativity in adults etc)? This requires a little more explanation.

But the effects themselves are clearly measurable, for example through EEG
coherence.

Every time a part of our brain is active, the electrical activity can be measured

through an electroencephalogram (EEG) and the results can be displayed as a

waveform. Nowadays, one can send two of these waveforms from different parts of the
brain to a computer and mathematically calculate the extent to which these waves are
similar, or coherent. A high coherence means that these different parts of the brains
work together as one whole.

Transcending is essentially the experience of unity. This is directly measurable in the

brain. Here’s a video where you can see how EEG coherence rises to a maximum
during the TM practice in real-time.

The more someone has this experience of high EEG coherence, the more the brain
gets used to optimal functioning, after which the EEG coherence outside of the TM
practice rises as well. A higher EEG coherence is associated with higher IQ, more
creativity, more emotional stability, better reflexes, and more ethical thinking, etc.

How can I learn to transcend?

Real meditation is effortless and pleasant to do, it can be learned by anyone, and
gives immediate results.

The experience of transcending can be achieved only in a completely natural and

effortless way. It is an experience of complete, inner silence; that can not be achieved
by trying to be quiet. The more you try, the more it keeps the mind active. This is why
most current meditation methods that require concentration have little effect.

The Transcendental Meditation technique is taught individually, by a professionally

trained teacher who is able to lead anyone in a completely natural way to the
experience of transcending.

If one has had this experience once, then the mind remembers it and afterwards it can
go back there spontaneously, in a totally natural and effortless way, provided that one
uses the correct technique. This technique is taught step by step, during four
consecutive meetings. This initial training course is followed by a extensive program of
follow-up meetings to ensure continued correct practice.
Do you have 1 hour to discover how
everything can change?
Through these links, you can find more information on what TM is and how it
works and how you can learn TM. The first step, however, is simply to attend a free, no-
obligation information seminar. These seminars are organized in various locations in
Switzerland on a regular basis (See dates and locations of the free introduction
seminars.) During these seminars, you’ll hear in more detail how the TM technique
actually works and what you can expect from it. You’ll receive information and answers
to all your questions so you can decide whether you’d like to learn the technique.

141 Benefits of Meditation

Please click on the article links below to learn more about that particular meditation benefit.

Physical Benefits Of Meditation

Mental Benefits Of Meditation

Emotional Benefits Of Meditation

Spiritual Benefits Of Meditation

 Master Stress

Great Sleep

Lose Weight

Calm Neurotransmitters

Beat Addiction

Relieve Pain

Extinguish Inflammation

Boost Endorphins

Build Bigger Brain

Boost Serotonin
 Growth Hormone

Faster Healing

Super-Antioxidant

Deep Relaxation

Boost GABA

Boost DHEA

Boost Melatonin

Whole Brain Synchronization

Less Cortisol

Stress Response

Need Less Sleep

 Have More Energy

Increase Libido

Strengthen Immunity

T Cells & Antibodies

Endorphins (Cancer)

Gene Expression

Longevity

Lengthen Telomeres

Boost Telomerase

Chronic Inflammation (Health)

 Gut-Brain Axis

Healthy Chemicals

Fortified Brain

Healthy Heart

Healing Sleep

Become Superhuman

Aid Digestion

Pregnancy

Younger Skin

Life Extension Gene

Cure Headaches
 Lower Cholesterol

Help PMS

Better Endocrine System

Relaxed Nervous System

Less Muscle Tension

Help Senior Health

Lower Respiratory Rate

Better Breathing

Better Circulation

Help Infertility
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, the writing of books on consciousness has become a minor
intellectual industry. From philosophers to computer scientists, from psychologists to
biologists to physicists, everyone seems to feel the need to publish their opinion on
consciousness! Most of these works are reductionistic in focus: one complex
mechanism after another is proposed as the essential "trick" that allows us to feel and
experience ourselves and the world around us.

On the other hand, Nicholas Humphrey, in his Natural History of the Mind, has taken
a somewhat different perspective. He argues that consciousness is something
tremendously simple: that it is nothing more or less than raw feeling. Simply feeling
something there. According to this view, consciousness exists beneath the level of
analysis: it is almost too simple to understand. This view ties in nicely with Eastern
mysticism, e.g. with the Hindu notion that at the core of the mind is the higher Self
or atman, which is totally without form.

I like to think there is value in both of these approaches. Raw awareness is present in
every state of consciousness, but different states of consciousness have different
structures; and, possibly, there are some universals that tie together all different states
of consciousness.

The mechanistically-oriented consciousness theorists are getting at the structure of

states of consciousness. Some of these theorists, such as Daniel Dennett in his
celebrated book Consciousness Explained, have made the error of assuming
this structure to be the essence, of ignoring the subjective facts of experience. Other
theorists, however, are looking at biological and computational mechanisms of
consciousness structure in a clearer way, without confusing different levels of
explanation. This is the category into which I would like to place myself, at least for
the purposes of the present chapter. I am concerned here mainly with structures and
mechanisms, but I do not confuse these structures and mechanisms with the essence of
subjective experience.

Three Questions of Consciousness

In my view, there are three questions of consciousness. The first is, what is raw
feeling, raw awareness? What are its qualities? The second is, what are the structural
and dynamical properties of different states of consciousness? And the third is: how
does raw feeling interface with the structural and dynamical properties of states of
consciousness? Each of these is an extremely interesting psychological question in its
own right.

I will focus here on the second question, the question of structure. This is where
scientific and mathematical ideas have a great deal to offer. However, I do not
consider it intellectually honest to entirely shy away from the other questions. Thus,
before proceeding to describe various structures of consciousness, I will roughly
indicate how I feel the three questions fit together. One may, of course, appreciate
may analysis of the various structures of consciousness without agreeing with my
views on the nature of raw awareness, on the first and third questions.

I prefer to answer the first question by not answering it. Raw consciousness is
completely unanalyzable and inexpressible. As such, I believe, it is equivalent to
the mathematically random. Careful scrutiny of the concept of randomness reveals
its relative nature: "random" just means "has no discernible structure with respect to
some particular observer." Raw awareness, it is argued, is random in this sense. It
is beyond our mental categories; it has no analyzable structure.

As to the third question, the relation between raw consciousness and the structure of
consciousness, I prefer to give an animist answer. As Nick Herbert affirms
in Elemental Mind (1988), awareness, like energy, is there in everything. From this
position, one does not have to give an explanation of how certain states of matter give
rise to trans-material awareness, and others do not.

However, animism in itself does not explain how some entities may have more
awareness than others. The resolution to this is, in my view, provided by the idea of
"consciousness as randomness." Entities will be more aware, it seems, if they open
themselves up more, by nature, to the incomprehensible, the ineffable, the random.
This observation can, as it turns out, be used to explain why certain states of
consciousness seem more acutely aware than others. But I will not attempt to push the
theory of consciousness this far here; this topic will be saved for elswhere.

The Structure of Consciousness

So how are states of consciousness structured? The most vivid states of

consciousness, I will argue here, are associated with those mental system that
make other mental systems more coherent, more robustly autopoietic. These mental
systems involve extreme openness to raw awareness. This view fits in naturally with
all that is known about the neuropsychology of consciousness. Consciousness is a
perceptual-cognitive loop, a feedback dynamic, that serves to coherentize, to make
whole, systematic, definite.
Pushing this train of thought further, I will argue that, in particular, the most vivid
states of consciousness are manifested as time-reversible magician systems. It is the
property of reversibility, I believe, that allows these thought-systems their openness to
the random force of raw awareness.

In David Bohm's language, to be introduced below, reversibility means that

consciousness manifests "proprioception of thought." In terms of hypercomplex
algebras, on the other hand, reversibility means that states of consciousness
correspond to division algebras. This turns out to be a very restrictive statement, as
the only reasonably symmetric finite-dimensional division algebras are the reals, the
complexes, the quaternions and the octonions. The octonions, which contain the other
three algebras as subalgebras, will be taken as the basic algebraic structure of
consciousness. This abstract algebraic view of consciousness will be seen to
correspond nicely with the phenomenology of consciousness. Octonionic algebras
result from adjoining a reflective "inner eye" to the perceptual-cognitive loop that
coherentizes objects.

As this summary should make clear, this chapter (even more than the rest of the book)
is something of a potpourri of innovative and unusual ideas. No claim is made to solve
the basic problem of consciousness -- which, insofar as it is a "problem," is certainly
insoluble. Rather, the psynet model is used to make various interrelated forays into the
realm of consciousness, centered on the question of the structure of conscious
experience.

8.2 THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Before presenting any original ideas, it may be useful to review some relevant
experimental work on the biology of consciousness. For decades neuropsychologists
have shunned the word "consciousness," preferring the less controversial, more
technical term "attention." But despite the methodological conservatism which this
terminology reflects, there has been a great deal of excellent work on the neural
foundations of conscious experience. In particular, two recent discoveries in the
neuropsychology of attention stand out above all others. First is the discovery that, in
Dennett's celebrated phrase, there is no "Cartesian Theater": conscious processes
are distributed throughout the brain, not located in any single nexus. And next is the
discovery of the basic role of this distributed consciousness: nothing esoteric or
sophisticated, but simply grouping, forming wholes.

According to Rizzolati and Gallese (1988), there are two basic ways of approaching
the problem of attentiveness. The first approach rests on two substantial claims:
1) that in the brain there is a selective attention center or circuit independent of
sensory and motor circuits; and

2) that this circuit controls the brain as a whole.... (p. 240)

In its most basic, stripped-down form this first claim implies that there are some brain
regions exclusively devoted to attention. But there are also more refined
interpretations: "It may be argued ... that in various cerebral areas attentional neurons
can be present, intermixed with others having sensory or motor functions. These
attentional neurons may have connections among them and form in this way an
attentional circuit" (p.241).

This view of attention alludes to what Dennett (1991) calls the "Cartesian Theater." It
holds that there is some particular place at which all the information from the senses
and the memory comes together into one coherent picture, and from which all
commands to the motor centers ultimately emanate. Even if there is not a unique
spatial location, there is at least a single unified system which acts as if it were all in
one place.

Rizzolati and Gallassi contrast this with their own "premotor" theory of attention, of
which they say:

First, it claims that ... attention is a vertical modular function present in several
independent circuits and not a supramodal function controlling the whole brain.
Second, it maintains that attention is a consequence of activation of premotor neurons,
which in turn facilitates the sensory cells functionally related to them.

The second of these claims is somewhat controversial -- many would claim that
the sensory rather than premotor neurons are fundamental in arousing attention.
However, as Rizzolati and Gallassi point out, the evidence in favor of the first point is
extremely convincing. For instance, Area 8 and inferior Area 2 have no reciprocal
connections -- and even in their connections with the parietal lobe they are quite
independent. But if one lesions either of these areas, severe attentional disorders can
result, including total "neglect" of (failure to be aware of) some portion of the visual
field.

There are some neurological phenomena which at first appear to contradict this
"several independent circuits" theory of consciousness. But these apparent
contradictions result from a failure to appreciate the self-organizing nature of brain
function. For instance, as Rizzolatti et al (1981) have shown, although the neurons in
inferior Area 6 are not responsive to emotional stimuli, nevertheless a lesion in this
area can cause an animal to lose its ability to be aware of emotional stimuli. But this
does not imply the existence of some brain-wide consciousness center. It can be better
explained by positing an interdependence between Area 6 and some other areas
responsive to the same environmental stimuli and also responsive to emotional
stimuli. When one neural assembly changes, all assemblies that interact with it are
prodded to change as well. Consciousness is part of the self-structuring process of the
brain; it does not stand outside this process.

So consciousness is distributed rather than unified. But what does neuropsychology

tell us about the role of consciousness? It tells us, to put it in a formula, that
consciousness serves to group disparate features into coherent wholes. This
conclusion has been reached by many different researchers working under many
different theoretical presuppositions. There is no longer any reasonable doubt that, as
Umilta (1988) has put it, "the formation of a given percept is dependent on a specific
distribution of focal attention."

For instance, Treisman and Schmidt (1982) have argued for a two-stage theory of
visual perception. First is the stage of elementary feature recognition, in which simple
visual properties like color and shape are recognized by individual neural assemblies.
Next is the stage of feature integration, in which consciousness focuses on a certain
location and unifies the different features present at that location. If consciousness is
not focused on a certain location, the features sensed there may combine on their own,
leading to the perception of illusory objects.

This view ties in perfectly with what is known about the psychological consequences
of various brain lesions. For instance, the phenomenon ofhemineglect occurs
primarily as a consequence of lesions to the right parietal lobe or left frontal lobe; it
consists of a disinclination or inability to be aware of one or the other side of the
body. Sometimes, however, these same lesions do not cause hemineglect, but
rather delusional perceptions. Bisiach and Berti (1987) have explained this with the
hypothesis that sometimes, when there is damage to those attentional processes
connecting features with whole percepts in one side of the visual field, the function
of these processes is taken over by other, non-attentional processes. These specific
consciousness-circuits are replaced by unconscious circuits, but the unconscious
circuits can't properly do the job of percept-construction; they just produce delusions.
And this sort of phenomenon is not restricted to visual perception. Bisiach et al
(1985) report a patient unable to perceive meaningful words spoken to him from the
left side of his body -- though perfectly able to perceive nonsense spoken to him from
the same place.

Psychological experiments have verified the same phenomenon. For instance,

Kawabata (1986) has shown that one makes a choice between the two possible
orientations of the Necker cube based on the specific point on which one first
focuses one's attention. Whatever vertex is the focus of attention is perceived as in
the front, and the interpretation of the whole image is constructed to match this
assumption. Similar results have been found for a variety of different ambiguous
figures -- e.g. Tsal and Kolbet (1985) used pictures that could be interpreted as either
a duck or a rabbit, and pictures that could be seen as eithr a bird or a plane. In each
case the point of conscious attention directed the perception of the whole. And, as is
well known in such cases, once consciousness has finished forming the picture into a
coherent perceived whole, this process is very difficult to undo.

Treisman and Schmidt's division of perception into two levels is perhaps a little more
rigid than the available evidence suggests. For instance, experiments of Prinzmetal et
al (1986) verify the necessity of consciousness for perceptual integration, but also
point out some minor role for consciousness in enhancing the quality of perceived
features. But there are many ways of explaining this kind of result. It may be that
consciousness acts on more than one level: first in unifying sub-features into features,
then in unifying features into whole objects. Or it may be that perception of the
whole causes perception of the features to be improved, by a sort of feedback process.

8.3 THE PERCEPTUAL-COGNITIVE LOOP

In this section I will abstract the neuropsychological ideas discussed above into a
more generalized, mathematical theory, which I call the theory of the Perceptual-
Cognitive Loop. This is not a complete theory of the structure of consciousness -- it
will be built on in later sections. But it is a start.

Edelman (1990) has proposed that consciousness consists of a feedback loop from the
perceptual regions of the brain to the "higher" cognitive regions. In other words,
consciousness is a process which cycles information from perception to cognition, to
perception, to cognition, and so forth (in the process continually
creating new information to be cycled around).

Taking this view, one might suppose that the brain lesions discussed above hinder
consciousness, not by destroying an entire autonomously conscious neural assembly,
but by destroying the perceptual end of a larger consciousness-producing loop, a
perceptual-cognitive loop or PCL. But the question is: why have a loop at all? Are the
perceptual processes themselves incapable of grouping features into wholes; do they
need cognitive assistance? Do they need the activity of premotor neurons, of an
"active" side?

The cognitive end of the loop, I suggest, serves largely as a tester and controller. The
perceptual end does some primitive grouping procedures, and then passes its results
along to the cognitive end, asking for approval: "Did I group too little, or enough?"
The cognitive end seeks to integrate the results of the perceptual end with
its knowledge and memory, and on this basis gives an answer. In short, it acts on the
percepts, by trying to do things with them, by trying to use them to interface with
memory and motor systems. It gives the answer "too little coherentization" if the
proposed grouping is simply torn apart by contact with memory -- if different parts of
the supposedly coherent percept connect with totally different remembered percepts,
whereas the whole connects significantly with nothing. And when the perceptual end
receives the answer "too little," it goes ahead and tries to group things together even
more, to make things even more coherent. Then it presents its work to the cognitive
end again. Eventually the cognitive end of the loop answers: "Enough!" Then one has
an entity which is sufficiently coherent to withstand the onslaughts of memory.

Next, there is another likely aspect to the perceptual-cognitive interaction: perhaps the
cognitive end also assists in the coherentizing process. Perhaps it proposes ideas for
interpretations of the whole, which the perceptual end then approves or disapproves
based on its access to more primitive features. This function is not in any way
contradictory to the idea of the cognitive end as a tester and controller; indeed the two
directions of control fit in quite nicely together.

Note that a maximally coherent percept is not desirable, because thought, perception
and memory require that ideas possess some degree of flexibility. The individual
features of a percept should be detectable to some degree, otherwise how could the
percept be related to other similar ones? The trick is to stop the coherence-making
process just in time.

But what exactly is "just in time"? There is not necessarily a unique optimal level of
coherence. It seems more likely that each consciousness-producing loop has its own
characteristic level of cohesion. Hartmann (1991) has proposed a theory which may
be relevant to this issue: he has argued that eachperson has a certain characteristic
"boundary thickness" which they place between the different ideas in their mind.
Based on several questionnaire and interview studies, he has shown that this is a
statistically significant method for classifying personalities. "Thin-boundaried" people
tend to be sensitive, spiritual and artistic; they tend to blend different ideas together
and to perceive a very thin layer separating themselves from the world. "Thick-
boundaried" people, on the other hand, tend to be practical and not so sensitive; their
minds tend to be more compartmentalized, and they tend to see themselves as very
separate from the world around them. Hartmann gives a speculative account of the
neural basis of this distinction. But the present theory of consciousness suggests an
alternate account: that perhaps this distinction is biologically based on a difference in
the "minimum cohesion level" accepted by the cognitive end of consciousness-
producing loops.
The iterative processing of information by the perceptual-cognitive loop is what
enables the same object to be disrupted by randomness again and again and again.
And this, I claim, is what gives the feeling that one is conscious of some specific
object. Without this iteration, consciousness is felt to lack a definite object; the object
in question lasts for so short a time that it is just barely noticeable.

And what of the old aphorism, "Consciousness is consciousness of consciousness"?

This reflexive property of consciousness may be understood as a consequence of the
passage of potential coherentizations from the cognitive end to the perceptual end of
the loop. The cognitive end is trying to understand what the perceptual end is doing; it
is recognizing patterns in the series of proposed coherentizations and ensuing
memory-caused randomizations. These higher-order patterns are then sent through the
consciousness-producing loop as well, in the form of new instructions for
coherentization. Thus the process that produces consciousness itself becomes
transformed into an object of consciousness.

All this ties in quite nicely with the neural network theory of
consciousness proposed by the British mathematician R. Taylor (1993). Taylor
proposes that the consciousness caused by a given stimulus can be equated with the
memory traces elicited by that stimulus. E.g. the consciousness of a sunset is the
combination of the faint memory traces of previously viewed sunsets, or previously
viewed scenes which looked like sunsets, etc. The PCL provides an analysis on a level
one deeper than Taylor's theory; in other words, Taylor's theory is a consequence of
the one presented here. For, if the PCL works as I have described, it follows that the
cognitive end must always search for memory traces similar to the "stimulus" passed
to it by the perceptual end.

What is Coherentization?

There is a missing link in the above account of the PCL: what, exactly, is this
mysterious process of "coherentization," of boundary-drawing? Is it something
completely separate from the ordinary dynamics of the mind? Or is it, on the other
hand, an extension of these dynamics?

The chemistry involved is still a question mark, so the only hope of understanding
coherentization at the present time is to bypass neuropsychology and try to analyze it
from a general, philosophical perspective. One may set up a model of "whole objects"
and "whole concepts," and ask: in the context of this model, what is the structure and
dynamics of coherentization? In the Peircean perspective, both objects and ideas may
be viewed as "habits" or "patterns," which are related to one another
by other patterns, and which have the capacity to act on and transform one another.
We then have the question of how a pattern can be coherentized, how its "component
patterns" can be drawn more tightly together to form a more cohesive whole.

Here we may turn to the psynet model, and propose that: To coherentize is to make
something autopoietic, or more robustly autopoietic. What consciousness does, when
it coherentizes, is to make autopoietic systems. It makes things more self-producing.

From a neural point of view, one may say that those percepts which are most likely to
survive in the evolving pool of neural maps, are those which receive the most external
stimulation, and those which perpetuate themselves the best. External stimulation is
difficult to predict, but the tendency toward self-perpetuation can be built in; and this
is the most natural meaning for coherentization.

In this view, then, what the perceptual-cognitive loop does is to take a network of
processes and iteratively make it more robustly self-producing. What I mean by
"robustly self-producing" is: autopoietic, with a wide basin as an attractor of the
cognitive equation (of magician dynamics). Any mathematical function can be
reproduced by a great number of magician systems; some of these maps will be
robustly self-producing and others will not. The trick is to find these most robustly
self-producing systems. There are many possible strategies for doing this kind of
search -- but one may be certain that the brain, if it does this kind of search, certainly
does not use any fancy mathematical algorithm. It must proceed by a process of
guided trial-and-error, and thus it must require constant testing to determine the basin
size, and the degree of autopoiesis, of the current iterate. The consciousness, in this
model, is in the testing, which disrupts the overly poor self-production of interim
networks (the end result of the iterative process is something which leads to fairly
little consciousness, because it is relatively secure against disruption by outside
forces).

So, "coherentization" is not a catch-word devoid of content; it is a concrete process,

which can be understood as a peculiar chemical process, or else modeled in a system-
theoretic way. Thinking about neuronal groups yields a particularly elegant way of
modeling coherentization: as the search for a large-basined autopoietic subsystem of
magician dynamics. This gives a very concrete way of thinking about the
coherentization of a complex pattern. To coherentize a pattern which is itself a
system of simpler patterns, emerging cooperatively from each other, one must replace
the component patterns with others that, while expressing largely the same
regularities, emerge from each other in an even more tightly interlinked way.

8.4 SUBVERTING THE PERCEPTUAL-COGNITIVE LOOP

The perceptual-cognitive loop is important and useful -- but it does not go far enough.
It explains how we become attentive to things; or, to put it differently, how
we construct "things" by carrying out the process of conscious attention. But as
humans we can do much more with our consciousness than just be attentive to things.
We can introspect -- consciously monitor our own thought processes. We can
meditate -- consciously fixate our consciousness on nothing whatsoever. We can
creatively focus -- fix our consciousness on abstract ideas, forming them into wholes
just as readily as we construct "physical objects." How do these subtle mental
conditions arise from the "reductionistic" simplicity of the perceptual-cognitive loop?

Sketch of a Theory of Meditation

Let us begin with meditation -- in particular, the kind of meditation which involves
emptying the mind of forms. This type of meditation might be called "consciousness
without an object." In Zen Buddhism it is called zazen.

The very indescribability of the meditative state has become a cliche'. The Zen
Buddhist literature, in particular, is full of anecdotes regarding the futility of trying
to understand the "enlightened" state of mind. Huang Po, a Zen master of the ninth
century A.D., framed the matter quite clearly:

Q: How, then, does a man accomplish this comprehension of his own Mind?

A: That which asked the question IS your own Mind; but if you were to remain
quiescent and to refrain from the smallest mental activity, its substance would be seen
as a void -- you would find it formless, occupying no point in space and falling neither
into the category of existence nor into that of non-existence. Because it is
imperceptible, Bodhidharma said: 'Mind, which is our real nature, is the unbegotten
and indestructible Womb; in response to circumstances, it transforms itself into
phenomena. For the sake of convenience, we speak of Mind as intelligence, but when
it does not respond to circumstances, it cannot be spoken of in such dualistic terms as
existence or nonexistence. Besides, even when engaged in creating objects in response
to causality, it is still imperceptible. If you know this and rest tranquilly in
nothingness -- then you are indeed following the Way of the Buddhas. Therefore does
the sutra say: 'Develop a mind which rests on no thing whatever.'

The present theory of consciousness suggests a novel analysis of this state of mind
that "rests on no thing whatever." Consider: the perceptual-cognitive loop, if it works
as I have conjectured, must have evolved for the purpose of making percepts
cohesive. The consciousness of objects is a corollary, a spin-off of this process.
Consciousness, raw consciousness, was there all along, but it was not intensively
focused on one thing. Meditative experience relies on subverting the PCL away from
its evolutionarily proper purpose. It takes the intensity of consciousness derived from
repeated iteration, and removes this intensity from its intended context, thus
producing an entirely different effect.

This explains why it is so difficult to achieve consciousness without an object. Our

system is wired for consciousness with an object. To regularly attain consciousness
without an object requires the formation of new neural pathways. Specifically, I
suggest, it requires the development of pathways which feed the perceptual end of the
perceptual-cognitive loop random stimuli (i.e., stimuli that have no cognitively
perceivable structure). Then the perceptual end will send messages to the cognitive
end, as if it were receiving structured stimuli -- even though it is not receiving any
structured stimuli. The cognitive then tries to integrate the random message into the
associative memory -- but it fails, and thus the perceptual end makes a new
presentation. And so on, and so on. What happens to the novice meditator is that
thoughts from the associative memory continually get in the way. The cognitive end
makes suggestionsregarding how to coherentize the random input that it is receiving,
and then these suggestions cycle around the loop, destroying the experience of
emptiness. Of course these suggestions are mostly nonsense, since there is no
information there to coherentize; but the impulse to make suggestions is quite strong
and can be difficult to suppress. The cognitive end must be trained not to make
suggestions regarding random input, just as the perceptual end must be trained to
accept random input from sources other than the normal sensory channels.

This is not an attempt to explain away mystical experience -- quite the opposite. It is
an attempt to acknowledge the ineffable, ungraspable nature of such experience. As
argued in detail in The Structure of Intelligence, there is no objective notion of
"randomness" for finite structures like minds and brains. Random is defined only
relative to a certain observer (represented in computation theory as a certain Universal
Turing Machine). So, to say that the meditative state involves tapping into
randomness, is to say that the meditative state involves tapping into some source that
is beyond one's own cognitive structures. Whether this source is quantum noise,
thermal noise or the divine presence is an interesting question, but one that is not
relevant to the present theory, and is probably not resolvable by rational means.

Creative Inspiration

Finally, let us peek ahead to the final chapter for a moment, and have a look at the role
of the perceptual-cognitive loop in the process of creative inspiration.

As will be observed in detail later, many highly creative thinkers and artists have
described the role of consciousness in their work as being very small. The biggest
insights, they have claimed, always pop into the consciousness whole, with no
deliberation or decision process whatsoever -- all the work has been done elsewhere.
But yet, of course, these sudden insights always concern some topic that, at some
point in the past, the person in question has consciously thought about. A person with
no musical experience whatsoever will never all of a sudden have an original, fully
detailed, properly constructed symphony pop into her head. Someone who has never
thought about physics will not wake up in the middle of the night with a brilliant idea
about how to construct a unified field theory. Clearly there is something more than
"divine inspiration" going on here. The question is: what is the dynamics of this subtle
interaction between consciousness and the unconscious?

In the present theory of consciousness, there is no rigid barrier between consciousness

and the unconscious; everything has a certain degree of consciousness. But only in the
context of an iterative loop does a single object become fixed in consciousness long
enough that raw consciousness becomes comprehensible as consciousness of that
object. The term "unconscious" may thus be taken to refer to those parts of the brain
that are not directly involved in a consciousness-fixing perceptual/cognitive loop.

This idea has deep meaning for human creative process. In any creative endeavor, be
it literature, philosophy, mathematics or science, one must struggle with forms and
ideas, until one's mind becomes at home among them; or in other words, until one's
consciousness is able to perceive them as unified wholes. Once one's consciousness
has perceived an idea as a coherent whole -- then one need no longer consciously mull
over that idea. The idea is strongenough to withstand the recombinatory, self-
organizing dynamics of the unconscious. And it is up to these dynamics to produce
the fragments of new insights -- fragments which consciousness, once again entering
the picture, may unify into new wholes.

So: without the perceptual-cognitive loop to aid it, the unconscious would not be
significantly creative. It would most likely recombine all its contents into a
tremendous, homogeneously chaotic mush ... or a few "islands" of mush, separated by
"dissociative" gaps. But the perceptual-cognitive loop makes things coherent; it
places restrictions on the natural tendency of the unconscious to combine and
synthesize. Thus the unconscious is posed the more difficult problem of relating
things with one another in a manner compatible with their structural constraints.
The perceptual-cognitive loop produces wholes; the unconscious manipulates these
wholes to produce new fragmentary constructions, new collections of patterns. And
then the perceptual-cognitive loop takes these new patterns as raw material for
constructing new wholes.

And what, then, is the relation between the creative state and the meditative state?
Instead of a fixation on the void of pure randomness, the creative condition is a
fixation of consciousness on certain abstract forms. The secret of the creative artist
or scientist, I propose, is this: abstract forms are perceived with the reality normally
reserved for sense data. Abstract forms are coherentized with the same vigor and
effectiveness with which everyday visual or aural forms are coherentized in the
ordinary human mind. Like the meditative state, the creative state subverts the
perceptual-cognitive loop; it uses it in a manner quite different than that for which
evolution intended it.

One may interpret this conclusion in a more philosophical way, by observing that the
role of the perceptual-cognitive loop is, in essence, to create reality. The reality
created is a mere "subjective reality," but for the present purposes, the question of
whether there is any more objective reality "out there" is irrelevant. The key point is
that the very realness of the subjective world experienced by a mind is a consequence
of the perceptual-cognitive loop and its construction of boundaries around entities.
This means that reality depends on consciousness in a fairly direct way: and, further, it
suggests that what the creative subself accomplishes is to make abstract forms and
ideas a concrete reality.

8.5 THE EVOLUTION OF THE PERCEPTUAL-COGNITIVE LOOP

Julian Jaynes, in The Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, has argued that
consciousness evolved suddenly rather than rapidly, and that this sudden evolution
occurred in the very recent past. He believes that the humans of Homeric times were
not truly conscious in the sense that we are. His argument is based primarily on
literary evidence: the characters in the Odyssey and other writings of the time never
speak of an "inner voice" of consciousness. Instead they refer continually to the voices
of the gods. Jaynes proposes that this "hearing of voices," today associated with
schizophrenia, was in fact the root of modern consciousness. Eventually the voice was
no longer perceived as a voice, but as a more abstract inner guiding force, in other
words "consciousness."

Jaynes' theory is admirable in its elegance and boldness; unfortunately, however, it

makes very little scientific sense. Inferring the history of mind from the history of
literary style is risky, to say the least; and Jaynes' understanding of schizophrenia does
not really fit with what we know today. But despite the insufficiency of his arguments,
I believe there is a kernel of truth in Jayne's ideas. In this section I will use the theory
of the perceptual-cognitive loop to argue that the idea of a sudden appearance of
modern consciousness is quite correct, though for very different reasons than those
which Jaynes put forth.

The perceptual-cognitive loop relies on two abilities: the perceptual ability to

recognize elementary "features" in sense data, and the cognitive ability to link
conjectural "wholes" with items in memory. A sudden jump in either one of these
abilities could therefore lead to a sudden jump in consciousness. In EM I argue that
the memory, at some point in early human history, underwent a sudden structural
"phase transition." I suggest that this transition, if it really occurred, would have
caused as a corollary effect a sudden increase in the intensity of consciousness.

The argument for a phase transition in the evolution of memory rests on the idea of
the heterarchical subnetwork of the psynet. From the view of the heterarchical
network, mind is an associative memory, with connections determined by habituation.
So, suppose that, taking this view, one takes N items stored in some organism's
memory, and considers two items to be "connected" if the organism's mind has
detected pragmatically meaningful relations between them. Then, if the memory is
sufficiently complex, one may study it in an approximate way by assuming that these
connections are drawn "at random." Random graph theory becomes relevant.

Recall the theory of random graph thresholds, introduced in Chapter Seven. The
crucial question, from the random graph theory point of view, is: what is
the chance that, given two memory items A and B, there is a connection between A
and B?

For instance, if this chance exceeds the value 1/2, then the memory is almost surely a
"nearly connected graph," in the sense that one can follow a chain of associations
from almost any memory item to almost any other memory item. On the other hand, if
this chance is less than 1/2, then the memory is almost certainly a "nearly
disconnected graph": following a chain of associations from any one memory item
will generally lead only to a small subset of "nearby" memory items. There is a "phase
transition" as the connection probability passes 1/2. And this is merely one among
many interesting phase transitions.

The evolutionary hypothesis, then, is this. Gradually, the brain became a better and
better pattern recognition machine; and as this happened the memory network became
more and more densely connected. In turn, the more effective memory became, the
more useful it was as a guide for pattern recognition. Then, all of a sudden, pattern
recognition became useful enough that it gave rise to a memory past the phase
transition. Now the memory was reallyuseful for pattern recognition: pattern
recognition processes were able to search efficiently through the memory, moving
from one item to the next to the next along a path of gradually increasing relevance to
the given object of study. The drastically increased pattern recognition ability filled
the memory in even more -- and all of a sudden, the mind was operating on a whole
new level.

And one consequence of this "new level" of functioning may have been -- an effective
perceptual-cognitive loop. In a mind without a highly active associative memory,
there is not so much need for a PCL: coherentization is a protection against
reorganizing processes which are largely irrelevant to a pre-threshold memory
network. In a complex, highly interconnected memory, reorganization is necessary to
improve associativity, but in a memory with very few connections, there is unlikely
to be any way of significantly improving associativity. Furthermore, even if the pre-
threshold memory did have need of a PCL, it would not have the ability to run the
loop through many iterations: this requires each proposed coherentization to be
"tested" with numerous different connections. But if few connections are there in the
first place, this will only very rarely be possible.

So, in sum, in order for the cognitive end of the loop to work properly, one needs a
quality associative memory. A phase transition in associative memory paves the way
for a sudden emergence of consciousness.

In this way one arrives at a plausible scientific account of the sudden emergence of
consciousness. It is a speculative account, to be sure -- but unlike Jaynes' account it
relies on precise models of what is going on inside the brain, and thus it is falsifiable,
in the sense that it could be disproved by appropriately constructed computer
simulations. Consciousness of objects emerging out of raw consciousness as a
consequence of phase transitions in the associative memory network -- certainly, this
picture has simplicity and elegance on its side.

8.6 HALLUCINATIONS AND REALITY DISCRIMINATION

The theory of the Perceptual-Cognitive Loop may seem excessively abstract and
philosophical. What does it have to say about the concrete questions that concern
clinical or experimental psychologists? To show that it is in fact quite relevant to these
issues, I will here consider an example of a psychological phenomenon on which the
psynet model and PCL shed light: hallucinations.

Hallucinations have proved almost as vexing to psychological theorists as they are to

the individuals who experience them. A variety of theories have been proposed, some
psychological, some neurobiological, and some combining psychological and
physiological factors (for reviews see Slade and Bentall, 1988; Slade, 1994). Jaynes,
mentioned above, believed hallucinations to be the evolutionary root of
consciousness! However, none of the existing theories has proved entirely
satisfactory.

Perhaps the most precise and comprehensive theory to date is that of Slade and
Bentall (1988; Slade, 1994), which holds that hallucinations are due to a lack of skill
at "reality-testing" or reality discrimination. According to this theory, individuals
prone to hallucinate do not generate internal stimuli differently from the rest of us;
they merely interpret these stimuli differently.

The Slade and Bentall theory provides a good qualitative understanding of a variety of
clinical observations and experimental results regarding hallucinatory experience.
However, the direct evidence for the theory is relatively scant. There are experiments
which show that individuals with high Launay-Slade Hallucination scores have a bias
toward classifying signals as real, instead of imagined (Slade and Bentall, 1988;
Feelgood and Rantsen, 1994). But these experiments only indicates
a correlation between poor reality discrimination and hallucination. They do not
establish a causal relationship, which is what Slade (1994) and Slade and Benthall
(1988) posit.

Taking up the same basic conceptual framework as Slade and Benthall, I will argue
that, in fact, poor reality discrimination and hallucination produce one another, given
their initial impetus by the cognitive trait that Hartmann (1991) calls "thin-
boundariedness." In short, certain individuals place particularly permeable boundaries
around entities in their minds, including their self-systems. This is a result of
individual differences in the nature of consciousness-embodying Perceptual-Cognitive
Loops. The tendency to construct permeable boundaries, it is argued, encourages both
hallucination and poor reality discrimination, which in turn are involved in positive
feedback relationships with each other.

These ideas are an alternate and, I suggest, more psychologically plausible

explanation of the data which Slade and Bentall take in support of their theory of
hallucinations. They are a simple, nontechnical example of how the psynet model
encourages one to take a longer, deeper look at the mind than conventional
psychological theory requires.

Six Possible Explanations

Before embarking on our analysis of hallucination, some methodological clarifications

may be in order. It is well-known that "correlation does not imply causation."
However, attention is rarely drawn to the full realm of possible explanations for a
correlation between two variables. Given a correlation between A and B, there are at
least six distinct possible explanations, all of which must be taken seriously.

The three commonly-recognized explanations of a correlation between A and B are as

follows:

1) A may cause B
2) B may cause A

3) A and B may both be caused by some other factor C.

The three additional explanations ensue from dynamical systems theory (Abraham
and Shaw, 1991; Goertzel, 1994), which indicates that two variables may in fact
"cause each other" due to positive feedback. They are as follows:

4) A and B may cause each other (with no initial prompting

other than random fluctations)

5) A and B may cause each other, once initially activated

by some other factor C

6) A and B may cause each other, in a process of mutual

feedback with some other factor C

These possibilities are all observed in connectionist models on a routine basis

(Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), and in fact have a long history in Oriental
psychology, going back at least to the notion of "dependent causation" in Buddhist
psychology (Crook and Rabgyas, 1988).

Let us now consider all six of these possibilities in the context of reality
discrimination and hallucination.

First, there is the possibility that unreliable reality discrimination causes

hallucinations; i.e. that, as has been claimed, "hallucinations result from a dramatic
failure of the skill of reality discrimination" (Slade and Benthall, 1988).

Then there is the possibility that things work the other way around: that
hallucinations cause unreliable reality discrimination. This hypothesis is also quite
plausible. For, consider reality discrimination as a categorization problem. One might
reason as follows. In ordinary experience, there are substantial differences between
internally generated-stimuli and externally-generated stimuli. Thus, it is easy to
"cluster" stimuli into two categories: real versus imaginary. But, in the experience of a
person prone to hallucinations, there is more of a continuum from internally-
generated to externally-generated stimuli. The two categories are not so distinct, and
thus categorization is not such an easy problem. Quite naturally, for such individuals,
skill at distinguishing the two categories will be below par.
Third, there is the possibility that both hallucinations and unreliable reality
discrimination are caused by some other factor, or some other group of factors. This
of course raises the question of what these other factor(s) might be.

Fourth, there is the possibility that hallucinations and unreliable reality

discrimination cause each other. In other words, the two may stand in a positive
feedback relation to each other: the more one hallucinates, the worse one does reality
discrimination; and the worse one does reality discrimination, the more one
hallucinates. This possibility is inclusive of the first two possibilities.

Finally, there are combinations of the third and fourth options. The fifth possibility is
that an external factor prompts a slight initial propensity toward poor reality
discrimination and hallucination, which then blossoms, by positive feedback, into
more prominent phenomena. And the sixth possibility is that poor reality
discrimination and hallucinations to emerge cooperatively, by positive feedback, in
conjunction with some other factor.

Here I will argue for the fifth possibility. My argument is perhaps somewhat
speculative, but no more so than the arguments of Slade (1994) and Slade and
Benthall (1988). It represents a much more natural interpretation of the data which
they adduce in favor of their theory.

Consciousness Creates Reality

The first key conceptual point to remember, in discussing hallucinations, is that even
in the normal (non-hallucinating) individual, the role of consciousness is to create
percepts and concepts from stimuli, or in other words, to create subjective
reality. And the second key point is that not everyone creates reality in the same
way; not only do the contents of subjective reality differ from one person to the other,
but the internal parameters of the reality-creating process also differ. Hallucinations
are a matter of confusing internally generated stimuli for external reality.

The relation between hallucinations and consciousness has been discussed in the past.
In particular, Frith (1979) has used the limited channel capacity of consciousness to
explain the occurence of hallucinations. Because of the limited capacity of
consciousness, it is argued, only one hypothesis regarding the nature of a given
stimulus can be consciously entertained at a given time. Hallucinations occur when
preconscious information about a stimulus is not filtered out, so that consciousness
becomes crowded with information, and the correct hypothesis (that the stimulus is
internally rather than externally generated) is pushed out. It is worth emphasizing that
the ideas presented here are quite different from these. Here we are arguing that
individual differences in conscious information processing are crucial for
hallucination. Frith, on the other hand, posits that the nature of conscious processing is
invariant with respect to the propensity toward hallucination, while the type of
information fed into consciousness varies.

How do individuals prone to hallucination differ in their creation of subjective reality?

According to the PCL approach, the key stage is judgement of "enough." The PCL
coherentizes thought-and-percept-systems, and it keeps going until they are coherent
enough -- but what is "enough"? A maximally coherent percept is not desirable,
because thought, perception and memory require that ideas possess some degree of
flexibility. The individual features of a percept should be detectable to some degree,
otherwise how could the percept be related to other similar ones? The trick is to stop
the coherence-making process at just the right time. However, it should not be
assumed that there is a unique optimal level of coherence. It seems more likely that
each consciousness-producing loop has its own characteristic level of cohesion.

And this is where the ideas of Hartmann (1991) become relevant. Hartmann has
argued that each person has a certain characteristic "boundary thickness" which they
place between the different ideas in their mind. Thick-boundaried people perceive a
rigid division between themselves and the external world, and they create percepts
and concepts which hold together very tightly. Thin-boundaried people, on the other
hand, perceive a more permeable boundary between themselves and the external
world, and create more flexible percepts and concepts. Thin-boundaried people are
more likely to have hallucinations, and also more likely to have poor reality
discrimination (Hartmann, 1988). Thin-boundariedness, I suggest, is the third major
factor involved in the dynamics of reality discrimination and hallucination.

Based on several questionnaire and interview studies, Hartmann has shown that
boundary thickness is a statistically significant method for classifying personalities.
"Thin-boundaried" people tend to be sensitive, spiritual and artistic; they tend to blend
different ideas together and to perceive a very thin layer separating themselves from
the world. "Thick-boundaried" people, on the other hand, tend to be practical and not
so sensitive; their minds tend to be more compartmentalized, and they tend to see
themselves as very separate from the world around them. The difference between thin
and thick-boundaried personalities, I suggest, lies in the "minimum cohesion level"
accepted by the cognitive ends of PCL's. Hartmann himself gives a speculative
account of the neural basis of this distinction, which is quite consistent with these
ideas.

A Theory of Hallucination

Now we are ready to tie together the various threads that have been introduced, into a
coherent theory of the interrelation between reality discrimination, hallucination, and
boundary-drawing. I will argue that thin-boundariedness provides the initial impetus
for both poor reality-discrimination and hallucination, which then go on to support
and produce each other via a relation of positive feedback (Goertzel, 1994).

First, consider the thin-boundariedness for reality discrimination. As compared to an

average person, an exceptionally thin-boundaried individual will have PCL's that
place less rigid, more flexible boundaries around mental entities. This implies that
external, real-world information will be stored and conceptualized more similarly to
internal, imagined information. Such a person will naturally have more difficulty
distinguishing real stimuli from non-real stimuli -- a conclusion which is supported by
Hartmann's data. Thin-boundariedness is bound up with poor reality discrimination in
a direct way.

Next, to see the direct relationship between thin-boundariedness and hallucination, it

is necessary to consider the iterative nature of PCL's. The key point is that a PCL
does not merely classify data, it constructs data. It is responsible for developing
stimuli into percepts in particular ways. Thus, if it has judged a certain stimulus to be
"real," it will develop it one way; but if has judged the stimulus to be "imaginary," it
will develop it another way. In a thin-boundaried person, there is less likely to be a
rigid distinction between different ways of developing stimuil into percepts; so it is
much more likely, that as a perceptual-cognitive loop iterates, internal stimuli will be
developed as if they were external stimuli. What this means is that thin-boundaries
people will be more likely to have internal stimuli that are as vividly and intricately
developed as external stimuli -- i.e., as suggested by Hartmann's data, they will be
more likely to hallucinate.

So, thin-boundariedness has the ability to lead to both hallucination and poor reality
discrimination. We have already suggested, however, that the latter two traits have the
propensity to support each other by positive feedback. Poor reality discrimination
causes hallucination, according to the mechanisms identified by Slade and Bentall.
And hallucinations may cause poor reality discrimination, by giving the mind a more
confusing data set on which to base its categorization of internal versus external
stimuli.

The view which emerges from these considerations is consistent with the fifth
possible relationship listed in Section 2: "A and B may cause each other, once initially
activated by some other factor C." Thin-boundariedness sets off a process of mutual
activation between the traits of poor reality discrimination and hallucination.

One might wonder whether the sixth relationship is not the correct one. Perhaps thin-
boundariedness is itself produced, in part, by hallucinations or poor reality
discrimination. But this conclusion does not seem to hold up. There is no clear
causative link between hallucination and thin-boundariedness. And the polarity of the
influence of poor reality-discrimination on boundary-drawing seems quite open. In
some individuals, poor reality discrimination might cause excessive thin-
boundariedness; but in others, it might instead cause excessive thick-boundariedness.
In yet others, it might do neither. The question is whether an individual tends to err on
the side of making external stimuli "loose" or making internal stimuli "tight" -- or errs
in a non-biased, neutral way.

Conclusion

I have used the PCL and the notion of mental-process intercreation to propose a new
explanation of the correlation between hallucination and reality discrimination. My
explanation differs from that of Slade and Bentall (1988) in that it posits a circular
causality between the two factors, initiated by a third factor of thin-boundariedness.
While the Slade and Bentall theory is simpler, the present theory is psychologically
more plausible, and does greater justice to the complexity of the human mind.

The question arises whether the present theory is empirically distinguishable from the
Slade and Bentall theory. Such a distinction, it seems, could be made only by a study
of the development of hallucinations in individuals prone to hallucinate, say
schizophrenic individuals. The Slade and Bentall view, in which poor reality
discrimination causes hallucination, would predict that poor reality discrimination
should precede hallucinations, and should not increase proportionately to
hallucinations. The present theory predicts that the two factors should increase
together, gradually, over the course of development.

8.7 PROPRIOCEPTION OF THOUGHT

Now let us return to more fundamental issues -- to the qeustion of the nature of
consciousness itself. Raw awareness, I have said, is essentially random. The structure
of consciousness, which exploits raw awareness, is that of an iteratively coherentizing
perceptual-cognitive loop. Is there any more that can be said?

I believe that there is. One can make very specific statements about the types
of magician systems involved in states of consciousness. Before we can get to this
point, however, some preliminary ideas must be introduced. Toward this end, we will
draw inspiration from a somewhat unlikely-sounding direction: the philosophical
thought of the quantum physicist David Bohm, as expressed (among other places) in
his book Thought as a System (1988).

Bohm views thought as a system of reflexes - - habits, patterns - - acquired from

interacting with the world and analyzing the world. He understands the self-
reinforcing, self- producing nature of this system of reflexes. And he diagnoses our
thought- systems as being infected by a certain malady, which he calls the absence of
proprioception of thought.

Proprioceptors are the nerve cells by which the body determines what it is doing - - by
which the mind knows what the body is doing. To understand the limits of your
proprioceptors, stand up on the ball of one foot, stretch your arms out to your sides,
and close your eyes. How long can you retain your balance? Your balance depends on
proprioception, on awareness of what you are doing. Eventually the uncertainty builds
up and you fall down. People with damage to their proprioceptive system can't stay up
as long as as the rest of us.

According to Bohm,

... [T]hought is a movement - - every reflex is a movement really. It moves from one
thing to another. It may move the body or the chemistry or just simply the image or
something else. So when 'A' happens 'B' follows. It's a movement. All these reflexes
are interconnected in one system, and the suggestion is that they are not in fact all that
different. The intellectual part of thought is more subtle, but actually all the reflexes
are basically similar in structure. Hence, we should think of thought as a part of the
bodily movement, at least explore that possibility, because our culture has led us to
believe that thought and bodily movement are really two totally different spheres
which are no basically connected. But maybe they are not different. The evidence is
that thought is intimately connected with the whole system. If we say that thought is a
reflex like any other muscular reflex - - just a lot more subtle and more complex and
changeable - - then we ought to be able to be proprioceptive with thought. Thought
should be able to perceive its own movement. In the process of thought there should
be awareness of that movement, of the intention to think and of the result which that
thinking produces. By being more attentive, we can be aware of how thought
produces a result outside ourselves. And then maybe we could also be attentive to the
results it produces within ourselves. Perhaps we could even be immediately aware of
how it affects perception. It has to be immediate, or else we will never get it clear. If
you took time to be aware of this, you would be bringing in the reflexes again. So is
such proprioception possible? I'm raising the question....

The basic idea here is quite simple. If we had proprioception of thought, we could feel
what the mind was doing, at all times -- just as we feel what the body is doing. Our
body doesn't generally carry out acts on the sly, without our observation,
understanding and approval. But our mind (our brain) continually does exactly this.
Bohm traces back all the problems of the human psyche and the human world --
warfare, environmental destruction, neurosis, psychosis -- to this one source: the
absence of proprioception of thought. For, he argues, if we were really aware of what
we were doing, if we could fully feel and experience everything we were doing, we
would not do these self-destructive things.

An alternate view of this same idea is given by the Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh
(1985), who speaks not of proprioception but of "mindfulness." Mindfulness means
being aware of what one is doing, what one is thinking, what one is feeling. Thich
Nhat Hanh goes into more detail about what prevents us from being mindful all the
time. In this connection he talks about samyojama - - a Sanskrit word that means
"internal formations, fetters, or knots." In modern terminology, samyojama are
nothing other than self- supporting thought- systems:

When someone says something unkind to us, for example, if we do not understand
why he said it and we become irritated, a knot will be tied in us. The lack of
understanding is the basis for every internal knot. If we practice mindfulness, we can
learn the skill of recognizing a knot the moment it is tied in us and finding ways to
untie it. Internal formations need our full attention as soon as they form, while they
are still loosely tied, so that the work of untying them will be easy.

Self- supporting thought systems, systems of emotional reflexes, guide our behaviors
in all sorts of ways. Thich Nhat Hanh deals with many specific examples, from
warfare to marital strife. In all cases, he suggests, simple sustained awareness of one's
own actions and thought processes - - simple mindfulness - - will "untie the knots,"
and free one from the bundled, self- supporting systems of thought/feeling/behavior.

Yet nother formulation of the same basic concept is given by psychologist Stanislaw
Grof (1994). Grof speaks, not of knots, but rather of "COEX systems" - - systems of
compressed experience. A COEX system is a collection of memories and fantasies,
from different times and places, bound together by the self- supporting process
dynamics of the mind. Elements of a COEX system are often joined by similar
physical elements, or at least similar emotional themes. An activated COEX system
determines a specific mode of perceiving and acting in the world. A COEX system is
an attractor of mental process dynamics, a self- supporting subnetwork of the mental
process network, and, in Buddhist terms, a samyojama or knot. Grof has explored
various radical techniques, including LSD therapy and breathwork therapy, to untie
these knots, to weaken the grip of these COEX systems. The therapist is there to assist
the patient's mental processes, previously involved in the negative COEX system, in
reorganizing themselves into a new and more productive configuration.

Reflexes and Magicians

Before going further along this line, we must stop to ask: What does this notion of
"proprioception of thought," based on a neo-behaviourist, reflex-oriented view of
mind, have to do with the psynet model? To clarify the connection, we must first
establish the connection between reflexes and magicians. The key idea here is that, in
the most general sense, a habit is nothing other than a pattern. When a "reflex arc" is
established in the brain, by modification of synaptic strengths or some other method,
what is happening is that this part of the brain is recognizing a pattern in its
environment (either in the other parts of the brain to which it is connected, or in the
sensory inputs to which it is connected).

A reflex, in the psynet model, may be modelled as the interaction of three magicians:
one for perception, one for action, and one for the "thought" (i.e. for the internal
connection between perception and action). The "thought" magician must learn to
recognize patterns among stimuli presented at different times and generate appropriate
responses.

This view of reflexes is somewhat reminiscent of the triangular diagrams introduced

by Gregory Bateson in his posthumous book Angels Fear (1989). I call these diagrams
"learning triads." They are a simple and general tool for thinking about complex,
adaptive systems. In essence, they are a system-theoretic model of the reflex arc.

Bateson envisions the fundamental triad of thought, perception and action, arranged in
a triangle:

THOUGHT

/\

PERCEPTION -- ACTION

The logic of this triad is as follows. Given a percept, constructed by perceptual

processes from some kind of underlying data, a thought process decides upon an
action, which is then turned into a concrete group of activities by an action process.
The results of the actions taken are then perceived, along with the action itself, and
fed through the loop again. The thought process must judge, on the basis of the
perceived results of the actions, and the perceived actions, how to choose its actions
the next time a similar percept comes around.

Representing the three processes of THOUGHT, PERCEPTION and ACTION as

pattern/process magicians, the learning triad may be understood as a very basic
autopoietic mental process system. Furthermore, it is natural to conjecture that
learning triads are autopoietic subsystems of magician system dynamics.
The autopoiesis of the system is plain: as information passes around the loop, each
process is created by the other two that come "before" it. The attraction is also
somewhat intuitively obvious, but perhaps requires more comment. It must be
understood that no particular learning triad is being proposed as an attractor, in the
sense that nearby learning triads will necessarily tend to it. The claim is rather that
the class of learning triads constitutes a probabilistic strange attractor of magician
dynamics, meaning that a small change in a learning triad will tend to produce
something that adjusts itself until it is another learning triad. If this is true, then
learning triads should be stable with respect to small perturbations: small
perturbations may alter their details but will not destroy their basic structure as a
learning mechanism.

Pattern, Learning and Compression

We have cast Bohm's reflex-oriented view of mind in terms of pattern/process

magicians. A reflex arc is, in the psynet model, re-cast as a triadic autopoietic
magician system. In this language, proprioception of thought -- awareness of what
reflexes have produced and are producing a given action -- becomes awareness of the
magician dynamics underlying a given behaviour.

In this context, let us now return to the notion of pattern itself. The key point here is
the relation between pattern and compression. Recall that to recognize a pattern in
something is to compress it into something simpler - - a representation, a skeleton
form. Given the overwhelmingly vast and detailed nature of inner and outer
experience, it is inevitable that we compress our experiences into abbreviated,
abstracted structures; into what Grof calls COEX's. This is the function of the
hierarchical network: to come up with routines, procedures, that will function
adequately in a wide variety of circumstances.

The relation between pattern and compression is well-known in computer science, in

the fields of image compression and text compression. In this contexts, the goal is to
take a computer file and replace it with a shorter file, containing the same or almost
the same contents. Text compression is expected to be lossless: one can reconstruct
the text exactly from the compressed version. On the other hand, image compression
is usually expected to be lossy. The eye doesn't have perfect acuity, and so a bit of
error is allowed: the picture that you reconstruct from the compressed file doesn't have
to be exactly the same as the original.

Psychologically, the result of experience compression is a certain ignorance. We can

never know exactly what we do when we lift up our arm to pick up a glass of water,
when we bend over to get a drink, when we produce a complex sentence like this one,
when we solve an equation or seduce a woman. We do not need to know what we do:
the neural network adaptation going on in our brain figures things out for us. It
compresses vast varieties of situations into simple, multipurpose hierarchical brain
structures. But having compressed, we no longer have access to what we originally
experienced, only to the compressed form. We have lost some information.

For instance, a man doesn't necessarily remember the dozens of situations in which he
tried to seduce women (successfully or not). The nuances of the different womens'
reactions, the particular situations, the moods he was in on the different occasions --
these are in large part lost. What is taken away is a collection of abstracted patterns
that the mind has drawn out of these situations.

Or, to take another example, consider the process of learning a tennis serve. One
refines one's serve over a period of many games, by a process of continual adaptation:
this angle works better than that, this posture works better so long as one throws the
ball high enough, etc. But what one takes out of this is a certain collection of motor
processes, a collection of "serving procedures." It may be that one's inferences
regarding how to serve have been incorrect: that, if one had watched one's serving
attempts on video (as is done in the training of professional tennis players), one would
have derived quite different conclusions about how one should or should not serve.
But this information is lost, it is not accessible to the mind: all that is available is the
compressed version, i.e., the serving procedures one has induced. Thus, if one is asked
why one is serving the way one is, one can never give a decent answer. The answer is
that the serve has been induced by learning triads, from a collection of data that is
now largely forgotten.

The point is that mental pattern recognition is in general highly lossy compression. It
takes place in purpose-driven learning triads. One does not need to recognize all the
patterns in one's tennis serving behavior -- enough patterns to generate the full
collection of data at one's disposal. One only wants those patterns that are useful to
one's immediate goal of developing a better serve. In the process of abstracting
information for particular goals (in Bohm's terms, for the completion of particular
reflex arcs), a great deal of information is lost: thus psychological pattern recognition,
like lossy image compression, is a fundamentally irreversible process.

This is, I claim, the ultimate reason for what Bohm calls the absence of proprioception
of thought. It is the reason why mindfulness is so difficult. The mind does not know
what it is doing because it can do what it does far more easily without the requirement
to know what it is doing. Proceeding blindly, without mindfulness, thought can wrap
up complex aggregates in simple packages and proceed to treat the simple packages as
they were whole, fundamental, real. This is the key to abstract symbolic thought, to
language, to music, mathematics, art. Intelligence itself rests on compression: on the
substitution of packages for complex aggregates, on the substitution of tokens for
diverse communities of experiences. It requires us to forget the roots of our thoughts
and feelings, in order that we may use them as raw materials for building new
thoughts and feelings.

If, as Bohm argues, the lack of proprioception of thought is the root of human
problems, then the only reasonable conclusion would seem to be that human problems
are inevitable.

8.8 THE ALGEBRA OF CONSCIOUSNESS

With these philosophical notions under our belt, we are now ready to turn to a most
crucial question: if the purpose of consciousness is to create autopoietic systems, then
what sorts of autopoietic systems does consciousness create? The answer to this
question might well be: any kind of autopoietic system. I will argue, however, that
this is not the case: that in fact consciousness produces very special sorts of systems,
namely, systems with the structure of quaternionic or octonionic algebras.

In order to derive this somewhat surprising conclusion from the psynet model, only
one additional axiom will be required, namely, that the autopoietic systems
constructed by consciousness are "timeless," without an internal sense of
irreversibility (an "arrow of time"). I.e.,

In the magician systems contained in consciousness, magician operations are

reversible

In view of the discussion in the previous section, an alternate way to phrase this axiom
is as follows:

At any given time, proprioception of thought extends through the contents of

consciousness

Bohm laments that the mind as a whole does not know what it is doing. I have argued
that, on grounds of efficiency, the mind cannot know what it is doing. It is immensely
more efficient to compress experience in a lossy, purpose-driven way, than to
maintain all experiences along with the patterns derived from them. However, this
argument leaves room for special cases in which thought is proprioceptive. I posit that
consciousness is precisely such a special case. Everything that is done in
consciousness is explicitly felt, in the manner of physical proprioception: it is there,
you can sense its being, feel it move and act.

Of course, physical proprioception can be unconscious; and so can mental

proprioception. One part of the mind can unconsciously sense what another part is
doing. The point, however, is that conscious thought-systems are characterized by
self-proprioception. I will take this an an axiom, derived from phenomenology, from
individual experience. This axiom is not intended as an original assertion, but rather
as a re-phrasing of an obvious aspect of the very definition of consciousness. It should
hardly be controversial to say that a conscious thought or thought-system senses itself.

In the context of the psynet model, what does this axiom mean? It means, that, within
the scope of consciousness, magician processes are reversible. There is no
information loss. What is done, can be undone.

Algebraically, reversibility of magician operations corresponds to division. For, if

multiplication represents both action and pattern recognition, then the inverse under
multiplication is thus an operation of undoing. If

A*B=C

this means that by acting on B, A has produced this pattern C; and thus, in the context
of the cognitive equation, that C is a pattern which A has recognized in B. Now the
inverse of A, when applied to C, yields

A-1 * C = B

In other words, it restores the substrate from the pattern: it looks at the pattern C and
tells you what the entity was that aa recognized the pattern in.

For a non-psychological illustration, let us return, for a moment, to the example of

text compression. A text compression algorithm takes a text, a long sequence of
symbols, and reduces it to a much shorter text by eliminating various redundancies. If
the original text is very long, then the shorter text, combined with the decompression
algorithm, will be a pattern in the original text. Formally, if B is a text, and A is a
compression algorithm, then A * B = C means that C is the pattern in B consisting of
the compressed version of a plus the decompression algorithm. C-1 is then the process
which transforms C into B; i.e., it is the process which causes the decompression
algorithm to be applied to the compressed version of A, thus reconstituting the
original A. The magician a compresses, the magician A-1 decompresses.

So, proprioception of thought requires division. It requires that one does not rely on
patterns as lossy, compressed versions of entities; that one always has access to the
original entities, so one can see "what one is doing." Suppose, then, one has a closed
system of thoughts, a mental system, in which division is possible; in which mental
process can proceed unhindered by irreversibility. Recall that mental systems are
subalgebras. The conclusion is that proprioceptive mental systems are
necessarily division algebras: they are magician systems in which every magician has
an inverse. The kinds of algebras which consciousness constructs are division
algebras.

This might at first seem to be a very general philosophical conclusion. However, it

turns out to place very strict restrictions on the algebraic structure of consciousness.
For, as is well-known in abstract algebra, the finite-dimensional division algebras are
very few indeed.

Quaternions and Octonions

The real number line is a division algebra. So are the complex numbers. There is no
three-dimensional division algebra: no way to construct an analogue of the complex
numbers in three dimensions. However, there are division algebras in four and eight
dimensions; these are called the quaternions and the octonions (or Cayley algebra),
see e.g. Kurosh, (1963).

The quaternions are a group consisting of the entities {1,i,j,k} and their "negatives" {-
1,-i,-j,-k}. The group's multiplication table is defined by the products

i*j=k

j*k=i

k*i=j

i * i = j * j = k * k = -1,

This is a simple algebraic structure which is distinguished by the odd "twist" of the
multiplication table according to which any two of the three quantities {i,j,k} are
sufficient to produce the other.

The real quaternions are the set of all real linear combinations of {1,i,j,k}, i.e., the
set of all expressions a + bi + cj + dk where a, b, c and d are real. They are a four-
dimensional, noncommutative extension of the complex numbers, with numerous
applications in physics and mathematics.

Next, the octonions are the algebraic structure formed from the collection of entities q
+ Er, where q and r are quaternions and E is a new element which, however, also
satisfies E2 = -1. These may be considered as a vector space over the reals, yielding
the real octonions. While the quaternions are non-commutative, the octonions are also
non-associative. The octonions have a subtle algebraic structure which is rarely if ever
highlighted in textbooks, but which has been explored in detail by Onar Aam and
Tony Smith (personal communication). The canonical basis for the octonion algebra is
given by (i,j,k,E,iE,jE,kE). Following a suggestion of Onar Aam, I will adopt the
simple notation I = iE, J = jE, K = kE, so that the canonical basis becomes
(i,j,k,E,I,J,K).

Both the real quaternions and the real octonions have the property of allowing
division. That is, every element has a unique multiplicative inverse, so that the
equation A * B = C can be solved by the formula A = B-1 * C. The remarkable fact is
that these are not only good examples of division algebras, they are just about
the only reasonable examples of division algebras. One may prove that all finite
division algebras have order 1, 2, 4 or 8. Furthermore, the only division algebras with
the property of alternativity are the real, complexes, real quaternions and real
octonions. Alternativity means that subalgebras consisting of two elements are
associative. These results are collected under the name of the Generalized Frobenius
Theorem. Finally, the only finite algebras which are normable are -- the reals,
complexes, real quaternions and real octonions.

What these theorems teach us is that these are not merely arbitrary examples of
algebras. They are very special algebras, which play several unique mathematical
roles.

Several aspects of the quaternion and octonion multiplication tables are particularly
convenient in the magician system framework. Perhaps the best example is the
identity of additive and multiplicative inverses. The rule A-1 = -A (which applies to all
non-identity elements) says that undoing (reversing) is the same as annihilation.
Undoing yields the identity magician 1, which reproduces everything it comes into
contact with. Annihilation yields zero, which leaves alone everything it comes into
contact with. The ultimate action of the insertion of the inverse of A into a system
containing A is thus to either to reproduce the system in question (if multiplication is
done first), or to reproduce the next natural phase in the evolution of the system (if
addition is done first).

Compare this to what happens in a magician system governed by an arbitrary algebra.

Given a non-identity element A not obeying the rule A2 = -1, one has to distinguish
whether its opposite is to act additively or multiplicatively. In the magician system
framework, however, there is no easy way to make this decision: the opposites are
simply released into the system, free to act both additively and multiplicatively. The
conclusion is that only in extended imaginary algebras like the quaternions and
octonions can one get a truly natural magician system negation.

Consciousness and Division Algebras

The conclusion to which the Generalized Frobenius Theorem leads us is a simple and
striking one: the autopoietic systems which consciousness constructs are quaternionic
and octonionic in structure. This is an abstract idea, which has been derived by
abstract means, and some work will be needed to see what intuitive sense it makes.
However, the reasoning underlying it is hopefully clear.

The notion of reversibility being used here may perhaps benefit from a comparison
with the somewhat different notion involved in Edward Fredkin's (Fredkin and
Toffoli, 1982) theory of reversible computation. Fredkin has shown that any kind of
computation can be done in an entirely reversible way, so that computatinoal systems
need not produce entropy. His strategy for doing this is to design reversible logic
gates, which can then be strung together to produce any Boolean function, and thus
simulate any Turing machine computation. These logic gates, however, operate on the
basis of redundancy. That is, when one uses these gates to carry out an operation such
as "A and B," enough information is stored to reconstruct both A and B, in addition to
their conjunction.

The main difference between these reversible computers and the reversible magician
systems being considered here is the property of closure. According to the psynet
model, mental entities are autopoietic magician systems. In the simplest case of fixed
point attractors, this implies that mental entities are algebraically closed magician
systems: they do not lead outside themselves. Even in the case of periodic or strange
attractors, there is still a kind of closure: there is a range of magicians which cannot be
escaped. Finally, in the most realistic case of stochastic attractors, there is a range of
magicians which is unlikely to be escaped. In each case, everything in the relevant
range is producible by other elements in that same range: the system is self-producing.
Fredkin's logic gates do not, and are not intended to, display this kind of property. It is
not in any way necessary that each processing unit in a reversible computing system
be producible by combinations of other processing units. The contrast with reversible
computers emphasizes the nature of the argument that has led us to postulate a
quaternionic/ octonionic structure for consciousness. The simple idea that
consciousness is reversible does not lead you to any particular algebraic structure.
One needs the idea of reversible conscious operations in connection with the psynet
model, which states that mental systems are autopoietic subsystems of process
dynamical systems. Putting these two pieces together leads immediately to the finite
division algebras.

Next, a word should be said about the phenomenological validity of the present
theory. The phenomenology of consciousness is peculiar and complex. But one thing
that may be asserted is that consciousness combines a sense of momentary
timelessness, of being "outside the flow of time," with a sense of change and flow.
Any adequate theory of consciousness must explain both of these sensations. The
current theory fulfills this criterion. Consciousness, it is argued, is concerned with
constructing systems that lack a sense of irreversibility, that stand outside the flow of
time. But in the course of constructing such systems, consciousness carries out
irreversible processes. Thus there is actually an alternation between timelessness and
time-boundedness. Both are part of the same story.

Finally, let us move from phenomenology to cognitive psychology. If one adopts the
view given here, one is immediately led to the conclusion that the Generalized
Frobenius Theorem solves an outstanding problem of theoretical psychology: it
explains why consciousness is bounded. No previous theory of consciousness has
given an adequate answer for the question: Why can't consciousness extend over the
whole mind? But in the algebraic, psynet view, the answer is quite clear. There are no
division algebras the size of the whole mind. The biggest one is the octonions.
Therefore consciousness is limited to the size of the octonions: seven elements and
their associated anti-elements.

The occurence of the number 7 here is striking, for, as is well-known, empirical

evidence indicates that the capacity of human short-term memory is about 8. The
figure is usually given as 7 +/- 2. Of course, 7 is a small number, which can be
obtained in many different ways. But, nevertheless, the natural occurrence of the
number 7 in the algebraic theory of consciousness is a valuable piece of evidence. In
no sense was the number 7 arbitrarily put into the theory. It emerged as a consequence
of deep mathematics, from the simple assumption that the contents of consciousness,
at any given time, is a reversible, autopoietic magician system.

8.9 MODELLING STATES OF MIND

The quaternionic and octonionic algebras are structures which can be concretized in
various ways. They describe a pattern of inter-combination, but they do not specify
the things combined, nor the precise nature of the combinatory operation.

Thus, the way in which the algebraic structures are realized can be expected to depend
upon the particular state of mind involved. For instance, a state of meditative
introspection is quite different from a state of active memorization, which is in turn
quite different from a state of engagement with sensory or motor activities. Each of
these different states may involve different types of mental processes, which act on
each other in different ways, and thus make use of the division algebra structure quite
differently.

As the quaternions and octonions are very flexible structures, there will be many
different ways in which they can be used to model any given state of mind. What will
be presented here are some simple initial modelling attempts. The models constructed
are extremely conceptually natural, but that is of course no guarantee of their
correctness. The advantage of these models, however, is their concreteness. Compared
to the general, abstract quaternion-octonion model, they are much more closely
connected to daily experience, experimental psychology and neuroscience. They are,
to use the Popperian term, "falsifiable," if not using present experimental techniques,
then at least plausibly, in the near future. They also reveal interesting connections
with ideas in the psychological and philosophical literature.

But perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the ideas in this section is to
adopt a Lakatosian, rather than Popperian, philosophy of science. According to
Lakatos, the "hard core" of a theory, which is too abstract and flexible to be directly
testable, generates numerous, sometimes mutually contradictory "peripheral theories"
which are particular enough to be tested. The hard core here is the quaternionic-
octonionic theory of consciousness, clustered together with the psynet model and the
concepts of thought-proprioception and reversible consciousness. The peripheral
theories are applications of the algebras to particular states of consciousness.

An Octonionic Model of Short-Term Memory

Consider now a state of consciousness involving memorization or intellectual thought,

which requires holding a number of entities in consciousness for a period of time, and
observing their interactions. In this sort of state consciousness can be plausibly
identified with what psychologists call "short-term memory" or "working memory."

The most natural model of short-term memory is one in which each of the entities
held in consciousness is identified with one of the canonical basis elements
{i,j,k,E,I,J,K}. The algebraic operation * is to be interpreted as merely a sequencing
operation. While all the entities held in consciousness are in a sense "focuses of
attention," in general some of the entities will be focussed on more intensely than
others; and usually one entity will be the primary focus. The equation A * B = C
means that a primary focus on A, followed by a primary focus on B, will be followed
by a primary focus on C.

This model of short-term memory that implies the presence of particular regularities
in the flow of the focus of consciousness. The nature of these regularities will depend
on the particular way the entities being stored in short-term memory are mapped onto
the octonions. For instance, suppose one wants to remember the sequence

PIG, COW, DOG, ELEPHANT, FOX, WOMBAT, BILBY

Then, according to the model, these elements must be assigned in a one-to-one

manner to the elements of some basis of the octonion algebra. This need not be the
canonical basis introduced above, but for purposes of illustration, let us assume that it
is. For convenience, let us furthermore assume that the identification is done in linear
order according to the above list, so that we have

pig, cow, dog, elephant, fox, wombat, bilby

ijkEIJK

Then the theory predicts that, having focussed on PIG and then COW, one will next
focus on DOG. On the other hand, having focussed on DOG, and then on
the absence or negative of COW, one will next focus on PIG.

Of course, the order of focus will be different if the mapping of memory items onto
basis elements is different. There are many different bases for the octonions, and for
each basis there are many possible ways to map seven items onto the seven basis
elements. But nevertheless, under any one of these many mappings, there would be a
particular order to the way the focus shifted from one element to the other.

This observation leads to a possible method of testing the octonionic model of short-
term memory. The model would be falsified if it were shown that the movement from
one focus to another in short-term memory were totally free and unconstrained, with
no restrictions whatsoever. This would not falsify the general division algebra model
of consciousness, which might be applied to short-term memory in many different
ways; but it would necessitate the development of a more intricate connection
between octonions and short-term memory.

This octonionic model of short-term memory may be understood in terms of chaos

theory -- an interpretation which, one suspects, may be useful for empirical testing.
Suppose one has a dynamical system representing short-term memory, e.g. a certain
region of the brain, or a family of neural circuits. The dynamics of this system can be
expected to have a "multi-lobed" attractor similar to that found by Freeman in his
famous studies of olfactory perception in the rabbit. Each lobe of the attractor will
correspond to one of the elements stored in memory. The question raised by the
present model is then one of the second-order transition probabilities between
attractor lobes. If these probabilities are all equal then the simple octonionic model
suggested here is falsified. On the other hand, if the probabilities are biased in a way
similar to one of the many possible octonion multiplication tables, then one has found
a valuable piece of evidence in favor of the present model of short-term memory and,
indirectly, in favor of the finite division algebra theory of consciousness. This
experiment cannot be done at present, because of the relatively primitive state of
EEG, ERP and brain scan technology. However, it is certainly a plausible experiment,
and there is little doubt that it will be carried out at some point over the next few
decades.

Learning Triads

The previous model dealt only with the holding of items in memory. But what about
the active processing of elements in consciousness? What, for example, about states of
consciousness which are focussed on learning motor skills, or on exploring the
physical or social environment?

To deal with these states we must return to the notion of a "learning triad," introduced
above as a bridge between the psynet model and Bohm's reflex-oriented psychology.
The

first step is to ask: how might we express the logic of the learning triad algebraically?
We will explore this question on an intuitive basis, and then go back and introduce
definitions making our insights precise.

First of all, one might write

THOUGHT = PERCEPTION * ACTION

ACTION = THOUGHT * PERCEPTION

PERCEPTION = ACTION * THOUGHT

These equations merely indicate that a perception of an action leads to a revised

thought, a thought about a perception leads to an action, and an action based on a
thought leads to a perception. They express in equations what the triad diagram itself
says.

The learning triad is consistent with the quaternions. It is consistent, for example, with
the hypothetical identification

PERCEPTION THOUGHT ACTION

ijk

But the three rules given above do not account for much of the quaternion structure. In
order to see how more of the structure comes out in the context of learning triads, we
must take a rather unexpected step. We must ask: How does the activity of the
learning triad relate to standard problem-solving techniques in learning theory and
artificial intelligence?
Obviously, the learning triad is based on a complex-systems view of learning, rather
than a traditional, procedural view. But on careful reflection, the two approaches are
not so different as they might seem. The learning triad is actually rather similar to a
simple top-down tree search. One begins from the top node, the initial thought. One
tests the initial thought and then modifies it in a certain way, giving another thought,
which may be viewed as a "child" of the initial thought. Then, around the loop again,
to a child of the child. Each time one is modifying what came before -- moving down
the tree of possibilities.

Viewed in this way, however, the learning triad is revealed to be a relatively weak
learning algorithm. There is no provision for "backtracking" -- for going back up a
node, retreating from a sequence of modifications that has not borne sufficient fruit. In
order to backtrack, one would like to actually erase the previous modification to the
thought process, and look for another child node, an alternative to the child node
already selected.

An elegant way to view backtracking is as going around the loop the wrong way. In
backtracking, one is asking, e.g.: What is the thought that gave rise to this action? Or,
what is the action that gave rise to this percept? Or, what is the percept that gave rise
to this thought? In algebraic language, one is asking questions that might be framed

THOUGHT * ACTION = ?

ACTION * PERCEPT = ?

PERCEPT * THOUGHT = ?

In going backwards in time, while carrying out the backtracking method, what one
intends to do is to wipe out the record of the abandoned search path. One wants to
eliminate the thought-process modifications that were chosen based on the percept;
one wants to eliminate the actions based on these thought modifications; and one
wants to eliminate the new percept that was formed in this way. Thus, speaking
schematically, one wants to meet PERCEPT with -PERCEPT, ACTION with -
ACTION and THOUGHT with -THOUGHT. Having annihilated all that was caused
by the abandoned choice, one has returned to the node one higher in the search tree.
The natural algebraic rules for backtracking are thus:

THOUGHT * ACTION = - PERCEPT

ACTION * PERCEPT = - THOUGHT

PERCEPT * THOUGHT = - ACTION

Backtracking is effected by a backwards movement around the learning triad, which
eliminates everything that was just laid down.

The view of learning one obtains is then one of repeated forward cycles, interspersed
with occasional backward cycles, whenever the overall results of the triad are not
satisfactory. The algebraic rules corresponding to this learning method are consistent
with the quaternion multiplication table. The division-algebra structure of
consciousness is in this way seen to support adaptive learning.

In this view, the reason for the peculiar power of conscious reasoning becomes quite
clear. Consciousness is sequential, while unconscious thought is largely parallel.
Consciousness deals with a small number of items, while unconscious thought is
massive, teeming, statistical. But the value of conscious thought is that it is entirely
self-aware, and hence it is reversible. And the cognitive value of reversibility is that it
allows backtracking: it allows explicit retraction of past thoughts, actions and
perceptions, and setting down new paths.

In the non-reversible systems that dominate the unconscious, once something is

provisionally assumed, it is there already and there is no taking it back (not
thoroughly at any rate). In the reversible world of consciousness, one may assume
something tentatively, set it aside and reason about it, and then retract it if a problem
occurs, moving on to another possibility. This is the key to logical reasoning, as
opposed to the purely intuitive, habit-based reasoning of the unconscious.

Thought Categories and Algebraic Elements

We have posited an intuitive identification of mental process categories with

quaternionic vectors. It is not difficult to make this identification rigorous, by
introducing a magician system set algebra based on the magician system algebra
given above.

To introduce this new kind of algebra, let us stick with the current example. Suppose
one has a set of magicians corresponding to perceptual processes, a set corresponding
to thought processes, and a set corresponding to action processess. These sets are to be
called PERCEPTION, THOUGHT and ACTION. The schematic equations given
above are then to be interpreted as set equations. For instance, the equation

PERCEPTION * THOUGHT = ACTION

means that:
1) for any magicians P and T in the sets PERCEPTION and THOUGHT respectively,
the product P*T will be in the set ACTION

2) for any magician A in the set ACTION, there are magicains P and T in the sets
PERCEPTION and THOUGHT respectively so that P*T=A

"Anti-sets" such as -PERCEPTION are defined in the obvious way: e.g. -

PERCEPTION is the class of all elements R so that P = -R for some element P in
PERCEPTION.

In general, suppose one has a collection of subsets S (S1,...,Sk) of a magician system

M. This collection may or may not naturally define a set algebra. In general, the
products of elements in Si and Sj will fall into a number of different classes Sm, or
perhaps not into any of these classes at all. One may always define a probabilistically
weighted set algebra, however, in which different equations hold with different
weights. One way to do this is to say that the tagged equation

Si * Sj = Sk pijk

holds, with

pijk = qijka rijk2-a

where qijk is the probability that, if one chooses a random element from Si, and
combines it with a random element from Sj, one will obtain an element from Sk is qijk;
and rijk is the probability that a randomly chosen element from Sk can be produced by
combining some element of Si with some element of Sj.

It is easier to deal with straightforward set algebras than their probabilistic

counterparts. In real psychological systems, however, it is unlikely that an equation
such as

PERCEPTION * THOUGHT = ACTION

could hold strictly. Rather, it might be expected to hold probabilistically with an high
probability (making allowances for stray neural connections, etc.).

Finally, suppose one has a collection of subsets S and a corresponding set algebra.
One may then define the

relative unity of this set algebra, as the set 1S of all elements U with the property that
U * Si is contained in Si for all i. The relative unity may have an anti-set, which will
be denoted -1S. These definitions provide a rigorous formulation of the
correspondence between thoughts, perceptions and actions and quaternionic vectors,
as proposed in the previous section.

Note that the set algebra formalism applies, without modification, to stochastic
magician systems, i.e. to the case where the same magician product A*B may lead to
a number of different possible outcomes on different trials.

Octonions and Second-Order Learning

Quaternions correspond to adaptive learning; to learning triads and backtracking. The

octonionic algebra represents a step beyond adaptive learning, to what might be called
"second-order learning," or learning about learning. The new element E, as it turns
out, is most easily interpreted as a kind of second-order monitoring process, or "inner
eye." Thus, in the linear combinations q+Er, the elements q are elementary mental
processes, and the elements Er are mental processes which result from inner
observation of other mental processes.

The three quaternionic elements i, j and k are mutually interchangeable. The

additional octonionic element E, however, has a distinguished role in the canonical
octonionic multiplication table. It leads to three further elements, I=ie, J=je and K=ke,
which are themselve mutually interchangeable. The special role of E means that, in
terms of learning triads, there is really only one natural interpretation of the role of E,
which is given by the following:
PERCEPTION THOUGHT ACTION

ijk

INNER EYE PERCEPTION' THOUGHT' ACTION'

EIJK

The meaning of this correspondence is revealed, first of all, by the observation that the
systems of elements
(1,i,E,I), (1,J,E,J), (1,k,E,K)

are canonical bases of the subalgebras isomorphic to the quaternions generated by

each of them. These quaternionic subalgebras correspond to learning triads of the
form
INNER EYE
/\

PERCEPTION -------- PERCEPTION'

INNER EYE

/\

THOUGHT --------- THOUGHT'

INNER EYE

/\

ACTION ----------- ACTION'

The element E, which I have called INNER EYE, can thus act as a kind of second-
order thought. It is thought which treats all the elements of the first-order learning
triad as percepts: thought which perceives first-order perception, thought and action,
and produces modifies processes based on these perceptions. These actions that
second-order thought produces may then enter into the pool of consciously active
processes and interact freely. In particular, the new perception, thought and action
processes created by the inner eye may enter into the following learning triads:
THOUGHT'

/\

PERCEPTION' -- ACTION

THOUGHT

/\

PERCEPTION' -- ACTION'

THOUGHT'

/\

PERCEPTION -- ACTION'
These are genuine, reversible learning triads, because the sets (1,i,K,J), (1,I,j,K), and
(1,I,J,k) are canonical bases for the subalgebras isomorphic to the quaternions which
they generate. These, together with the basic learning triad and the three triads
involving the INNER EYE, given above, represent the only seven quaternionic
subalgebras contained within the octonions.

It is well worth noting that there is no loop of the form

THOUGHT'

/\

PERCEPTION' -- ACTION'

within the octonion algebra. That is, complete substitution of the results of the inner
eye's modifications for the elements of the original learning triad is nota reversible
operation. One can substitute any two of the modified versions at a time, retaining one
of the old versions, and still retain reversibility. Thus a complete round of second-
order learning is not quite possible within the octonion algebra. However, one can
attain a good approximation.

And, as an aside, the actual behavior of this "complete substitution" loop {I,J,K} is
worth reflecting on for a moment. Note that IJ = -k, JK = -i, KI = -j. Traversing the
complete substitution loop forward, one produces the anti-elements needed for
backtracking in the original learning triad. Thus the INNER EYE has the potential to
lead to backtracking, while at the same time leading to new, improved learning triads.
There is a great deal of subtlety going on here, which will only be uncovered by deep
reflection and extensive experimentation.

In order to completely incorporate the results of the inner eye's observations, one
needs to transcend the boundaries of reversible processing, and put the new results
(I,J,K) in the place of the old elementary learning triad (i,j,k). Having done this, and
placed (I,J,K) in the role of the perceptual-cognitive-active loop, the octonionic
process can begin again, and construct a new collection of modified processes.

What is permitted by the three triads generated by (1,i,K,J), (1,I,j,K), and (1,I,J,k) is a
kind of "uncommitted" second-order learning. One is incorporating the observations
of the inner eye, but without giving up the old way of doing things. The results of
these new, uncommitted triads cannot be externally observed until a committment has
been made; but the new triads can be used and progressively replaced, while the
observing-eye process goes on.
8.10 MIND AS PREGEOMETRY

In The Structure of Intelligence I discussed the quantum theory of consciousness --

meaning the theory that the act of consciousness is synonymous with the collapse of
the wave packet in a quantum system. I viewed this as a viable alternative to the
theory that consciousness is entirely deterministic and mechanistic. However, I
realized and stated the limitations of the "quantum theory of consciousness" approach.
Merely to link awareness and physics together on the level of nomenclature is not
good enough. There has to be a more fundamental connection, a connection that
makes a difference for both physics and psycholoyg.

Toward the end of Chaotic Logic I tried to push the same idea in a different direction.
I discussed Feynman path integrals, the formalism according to which, in quantum
theory, the amplitude (the square root of the probability) of a particle going from point
A to point B is given by the sum of the amplitudes of all possible paths from A to B.
Certain paths, I proposed, were algorithmically simpler than others -- and hence
psychologically more likely. Perhaps the sum over all paths should be weighted by
algorithmic simplicity, with respect to a given mind. Perhaps this would solve the
renormalization problem, the famous "infinities" plaguing particle physics. I tried to
solve the mathematics associated with this hypothesis, but in vain -- it just remained
an abstract speculation.

That particular section of Chaotic Logic attracted no attention whatsoever. However, a

number of readers of the book did remark to me that the magician system model
reminded them of particle physics. This parallel did not occur to me at the time I
conceived the magician system model -- perhaps because at the time I was reading a
chemist (George Kampis) and collaborating with an algebraist (Harold Bowman) --
but in fact it is rather obvious. The combination of two magicians to form a third is
similar to what happens when two particles collide and produce another particle.
Antimagicians are like antiparticles. In addition to the common tool of abstract
algebra, there is a strong conceptual similarity.

This idea remained vague for a while but finally began to come together when I began
communicating with F. Tony Smith, a physicist at Georgia Tech. Tony has developed
an original, elegant and intriguing theory of fundamental particle physics, which is
based entirely on finite algebras acting on discrete spaces (Smith, 1996). The basis of
all his algebras is the octonionic division algebra -- the octonions are "unfolded" to
yield Clifford algebras and Lie algebras, which give the fundamental symmetry
groups of all the different kinds of particles. Tony's theory was based on discrete
algebraic entities living on the nodes of a graph (an eight-dimensional lattice)-- it was,
in fact, a graphical magician system!
The correctness or incorrectness of this particular physics theory is not the point -- the
point is the placing of physical and psychological models on a common mathematical
ground. If both can reasonably be viewed in terms of discrete algebras living on
graphs, then how difficult can it be to understand the relation between the two? This is
a subject of intense current interest to me; the present section merely describes a few
thoughts in this direction. While still somewhat rough-shod, I feel that these ideas
indicate the kind of direction that fundamental physics must take, if it is to go beyond
the mathematical confusions in which it is currently mired. The connection between
the conscious mind and the physical world is there, it is active, and it cannot be denied
forever.

Approaches to Quantum Measurement

I will begin by reviewing the puzzle of quantum measurement -- a puzzle that has
drawn the attention of a great number of physicists, beginning with the foundation of
quantum physics and continuing to the present day. I will not attempt a systematic
review, but will only mention a few of the best-known theories, and then turn to the
more radical thought of John Wheeler, which will serve as a springboard for the main
ideas of the section.

The key fact here is that a quantum system does not have a definite state: it lives in a
kind of probabilistic superposition of different states. Yet somehow, when we
measure it, it assumes a definite state.

The standard "Copenhagen interpretation" of quantum measurement states that, when

a measurement is made, a quantum system suddenly collapses from a probabilistic
superposition of states into a definite state. This nonlinear "collapse of the wave
function" is an additional assumption, which sits rather oddly with the linear evolution
equations, but poses no fundamental inconsistency. The act of measurement is defined
somewhat vaguely, as "registration on some macroscopic measuring device." The fact
that macroscopic measuring devices are themselves quantum systems is sidestepped.

London and Bauer (XX), Wigner (XX), Goswami (XX), Goertzel (XX) and others
have altered the Copenhagen interpretation by replacing the macroscopic measuring
instrument with consciousness itself. According to this view, it doesn't matter whether
the photoelectric emulsion blackens, it matters whether the blackening of the emulsion
enters someone's consciousness. The weak point here, of course, is that consciousness
itself is not a well-defined entity. One is replacing on ill-defined entity, measurement,
with another.

The interpretation of the measurement process that comes closest to a direct

translation of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory is the many-
universes theory, which states, that every time a measurement is made, universes in
which the measurement came out one way are differentiated from universes in which
it came out another way. This interpretation does not add an extra step to quantum
dynamics, nor does it appeal to extra-physical entities. It is, in David Deutsch's
phrase, short on assumptions but long on universes. The ontological status of the
alternate universes is not quite clear; nor is it clear when a measurement, which splits
off universes from each other, should be judged to have occured.

John Wheeler has taken a somewhat different view of the problems of quantum
physics, one which is extremely relevant to the ideas of the present paper. While
acknowledging the elegance and appeal of the many-universes theory, he rejects it
because

[T]he Everett interpretation takes quantum theory in its present form as the currency,
in terms of which everything has to be explained or understood, leaving the act of
observation as a mere secondary phenomenon. In my view we need to find a different
outlook in which the primary concept is to make meaning out of observation and,
from that derive the formalism of quantum theory.

Quantum physics, in Wheeler's view, has uncovered the fundamental role of the
observer in the physical world, but has not done it justice. The next physics
breakthrough will go one step further, and place the observer at the center.

Wheeler also believes that the equations of quantum theory will ultimately be seen to
be statistical in nature, similar to the equations of thermodynamics:

I believe that [physical] events go together in a higgledy-piggledy fashion and that

what seem to be precise equations emerge in every case in a statistical way from the
physical of large numbers; quantum physics in particular seems to work like that.

The nature of this statistical emergence is not specified; except that, preferably, one
would want to see physical concepts arise out of some kind of non-physical substrate:

If we're ever going to find an element of nature that explains space and time, we
surely have to find something that is deeper than space and time -- something that
itself has no localization in space and time. The ... elementary quantum phenomenon
... is indeed something of a pure knowledge-theoretical character, an atom of
information which has no localization in between the point of entry and the point of
registration.

This hypothetical non-physical substrate, Wheeler has called "pregeometry." At one

point, he explored the idea of using propositional logic as pregeometry, of somehow
getting space and time to emerge from the statistics of large numbers of complex
logical propositions (Wheeler, 19XX). However, this idea did not bear fruit.

Wheeler also suspects the quantum phenomenon to have something to do with the
social construction of meaning:

I try to put [Bohr's] point of view in this statement: 'No elementary quantum
phenomenon is a phenomenon until it's brought to a close by an irreversible act of
amplification by a detection such as the click of a geiger counter or the blackening of
a grain of photographic emulsion.' This, as Bohr puts it, amounts to something that
one person can speak about to another in plain language....

Wheeler divides the act of observation into two phases: first the bringing to close of
the elementary quantum phenomenon; and then the construction of meaning based on
this phenomenon. The accomplishment of the first phase, he suggests, seems to
depend on the possibility of the second, but not the actual accomplishment of the
second. A quantum phenomenon, he suggests, is not a phenomenon until it
is potentially meaningful. But if, say, the photoelectric emulsion is destroyed by a
fire before anyone makes use of it, then the elementary quantum phenomenon was
still registered. This is different from the view that the quantum phenomenon must
actually enter some entity's consciousness in order to become a phenomenon.

Regarding the second phase of observation, the construction of meaning, Wheeler

cites the Norwegian philosopher Follesdal that "meaning is 'the joint product of all the
evidence that is available to those who communicate.'" Somehow, a quantum
phenomenon becomes a phenomenon when it becomes evidence that is in principle
available for communication.

In the end, Wheeler does not provide an alternative to the standard quantum theories
of measurement. Instead, he provides a collection of deeply-conceived and radical
ideas, which fit together as elegantly as those of any professional philosopher, and
which should be profoundly thought-provoking to anyone concerned with the future
of physical theory.

The Relativity of Reality

A particularly subtle twist to the puzzle of quantum measurement has been given in
Rossler (19XX). Rossler describes the following experiment. Take two particles --
say, photons. As in the Aspect experiment (19XX), shoot them away from each other,
in different directions. Then, measure the photons with two different measuring
devices, in two different places. According to special relativity, simultaneity is not
objective. So, suppose device 1 is moving with respect to device 2, and event A
appears to device 1 to occur before event B. Then it is nonetheless possible that to
device 2, event B should appear to occur before event A.

Then, in the Aspect experiment, suppose that device 1 measures photon A, and device
2 measures photon B. One may set the devices up so that, in the reference frame of
device 1 photon A is measured first, but in the reference frame of device 2 photon B is
measured first. In the reference frame of each of the measuring devices, one has
precisely the Aspect experiment. But one also has a problem. The notion of
a measured state must be redefined so that it becomes reference-frame-dependent.
One cannot say in any "objective" way whether a given probabilistic superposition of
states has collapsed or not; one can only say whether or not it has collapsed within
some particular reference frame.

Aharanov and Albert (19XX), discussing a similar experiment, conclude that the
notion of a single time axis is inadequate for describing physical reality. They
conclude that each observer must be considered to have its own "personal" time axis,
along which probabilistic superpositions gradually collapse into greater definiteness.

And if time is multiple, what about space? The verdict here is not quite so clear, but
on balance, it seems probable that we will ultimately need subjective spaces to go
along with subject time axes. This idea comes from the study of quantum theory in
curved spacetime (19XX). In this theory, one arrives at the remarkable conclusion
that, if two observers are moving relative to one another, and both look at the same
exact spot, one observer may see a particle there while the other does not. This
means that, in curved spacetime, particles have no real existence. Of course, it is
difficult to interpret this result, since quantum physics in curved spacetime is not a
genuine physical theory, just a sophisticated mathematical cut-and-paste job. But
nonetheless, the result is highly suggestive.

These results suggest new troubles for the quantum theory of measurement -- troubles
beyond the mere collapse of the wave packet, splitting of universes, etc. In the many-
universes picture, instead of the whole human race living in a universe which
periodically splits off into many, one must think of each observer as living in his own
individual universe, which splits up periodically. These ideas sit rather oddly with
Wheeler's concept of observation as having to do with the communication and the
collective construction of meaning. Suppose something is only measurable when it
can, potentially be communicated throughout a community of minds. One must now
ask: in whose universe do these community of minds actually exist?

Minds and Physical Systems

The next step is to tie these physical ideas in with the psynet model. But first, before
we can do this, we must remind ourselves how the abstract process systems posited in
the psynet model relate to physical systems.

This question might seem to be a restatement of the basic puzzle of the relation
between mind and reality. For the moment, however, we are dealing with something
simpler. We are merely dealing with the question of how one type of dynamical
system (magician systems) deals with another type of dynamical system (physical
systems). Or, to phrase it more accurately, we are dealing with the question of how
one level of dynamical system relates to another levelof dynamical system. For, after
all, it is quite possible that physical systems themselves are magician systems -- as we
shall see in the following section, there are models of particle physics which say just
this.

Following previous publications, I will take a pragmatic approach to the relation

between minds and brains. Invoking the theory of algorithmic information, we will
assert that minds are minimal algorithmic patterns in brains. A magician system is a
minimal pattern in a physical system P if:

1) the magician system is more "simply given" than the brain

2) the structure of the magician system, at a given time and in evolution over time, is
similar to the structure of the system P

3) no part of the magician system can be removed without making

the magician system less structurally similar to the

system P

These two criteria may be quantified in obvious ways. A mind associated with a
physical system P is a magician system which is a pattern in the system P, in this
sense.

This approach intentionally sidesteps the question of the basic nature of awareness. In
this respect, it is perhaps wise to reiterate the distinction between raw awareness and
consciousness. Awareness, considered as the basic sense of existence or presence in
the world, is not analyzed here, and is perhaps not analyzable. Consciousness,
however, is considered as awareness mediated by mental structures. Different states of
consciousness involve different mental structures. Thus, mind affects consciousness,
but does not necessarily affect awareness.
In terms of quantum measurement, we may say that an elementary quantum
phenomenon becomes a phenomenon, from the point of view of a given mind, when it
enters that mind. Thus, an elementary quantum phenomenon becomes a phenomenon
to a given mind when it becomes a part of a minimal algorithmic pattern in the system
supporting that mind. Taking an animist view, one may say that, when a quantum
phenomenon registers on a photoelectric emulsion, it becomes a phenomenon from
the point of view of that emulsion. It becomes a part of the "mind" of that emulsion.
On the other hand, when a person views the emulsion, the quantum phenomenon
becomes a phenomenon from the point of view of that person.

This subjectivistic view may seem problematic to some. Given the thought-
experiments described above, however, it seems the only possible course.
Psychologists have long understood that each mind has its own subjective reality;
quantum physics merely extends this subjectivity in a different way. It shows that
physical phenomena, considered in a purely physical sense, do not have meaning
except in the context of someone's, or something's, subjective reality.

The Mental-Physical Optimality Principle

Now let us get down to business. Recall Wheeler's assertion that quantum mechanics
should arise from the statistics of some underlying, pregeometric domain. He selected
propositional logic as a candidate for such a "pregeometry." From a psychological
point of view, however, propositional logic is simply a crude, severely incomplete
model of the process of intelligent thought (see SI and CL). It represents an isolation
of one mental faculty, deductive logic, from its natural mental environment. Instead of
propositional logic, I propose, the correct pregeometry is mind itself. Physics, I
propose, results from the statistics of a large number of minds.

Suppose that, as the psynet model suggests, minds can be expressed as hypercomplex
algebras, and that mental process can be understood as a nonlinear iteration on
hypercomplex algebras. In this context, we can raise the question "How might a
collection of minds give rise to a physical reality?" in a newly rigorous way. The
question becomes: How might a collection of hypercomplex algebras, and the
attractors and meta-attractors within these algebras under an appropriate nonlinear
dynamic, give rise to a physical reality?

Given that minds themselves are understood as patterns in physical systems, what is
being proposed here must be seen as a kind of circular causation. Physical reality
gives rise to physical systems, which give rise to minds, which in turn combine to
produce physical reality. We know how physical reality gives rise to minds -- at least,
to structured systems, which interact with awareness to form states of consciousness.
We do not know how minds give rise to physical reality.
My answer to this question is a simple one: Minds sum up to form physical reality.
This sum takes place in an abstract space which may be conceptualized as a space of
abstract algebras.

The nature of this summation may be understood by analogy to Feynman integrals in

quantum physics. In the simplest example, a Feynman integral is a sum over all
possible paths from one point to another. One assigns each path a two-dimensional
vector, the angular coordinate of which is given by the energy of the path, divided by
the normalized Planck's constant. Then one adds up these vectors, and divides the sum
by an overall normalization factor. The sum is the amplitude (the square root of the
probability) of the particle in question going from the first point to the second. The
key is that nearly all of the paths cancel out with each other. The vectors are pointing
in a huge number of different directions, so that ultimately, the only vectors that make
a significant contributions are the ones that are bunched together with a lot of other
vectors, i.e., the ones that are near local extrema of the energy function. The
amplitude of the transition is thus approximately given by the local extrema of the
energy function. As Planck's constant tends to zero, the cancellation of alternative
paths becomes complete, and the "optimal" path is entirely dominant. As Planck's
constant is increased, the cancellation of the alternative paths increasingly fails, and
there is more of a "random" flavor to the assignment of amplitudes.

When adding together minds, we are not working in a two-dimensional complex

space, but rather in an n-dimensional space of abstract algebras. Here the dimension n
is large, and will vary based upon the number and size of minds involved -- one could
speak of an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, with the understanding that only a
finite number of dimensions will be involved in any particular calculation. Despite the
increase in dimensionality, however, the principle is the same as with Feynman
integrals. We are adding together a huge variety of n-vectors, which are spreading out
in all different directions. Mainly, these vectors will cancel each other out. But certain
substructures common to a great number of the algebras will remain. These
substructures will be ones that are "optimally efficient" in the sense that a significant
percentage of the minds in the universe have evolved so as to possess them. My claim
is that these optimal substructures are precisely physical reality. This is what I call
the Mental-Physical Optimality Hypothesis.

This, finally, is the basic concept of my reduction of physics to psychology: that

physical structures are precisely the most efficient and hence common structures of
mind, so that when one sums together a vast number of minds, it is the precisely the
physical structures which are not cancelled out.

Note that, in this theory, the process of summation does not eliminate the summands.
Individual minds maintain their individual existence; but at the same time, they sum
together to produce the collective physical reality, from which they all emerge. Mind
and physical reality create each other, on a recurrent and ceaseless basis.

One might wonder whether, once mind has gone ahead and created a new physical
reality, the old one entirely disappears. But this is a philosophical extravagance. One
might as well suppose that physical entities have a certain lasting existence, a certain
tendency to persist, and that they fade from existence only if their component parts are
not re-created after a certain amount of time has lapsed. In this way one retains the
fundamental continuity and consistency of the universe, and also the idea that mind
and reality create each other. One has a kind of "illusory continuity" emerging from an
underlying discrete dynamic of mind-reality intercreation. The kind of "tendency to
persist" being invoked here has a venerable history in philosophy, for instance in the
work of Charles S. Peirce (19XX).

The Efficiency of Finite Division Algebras

If one accepts a discrete theory of physics such as that of (Smith, 1996), then physical
systems and psychological systems live in the same space, so that minds can indeed
be summed together to yield physical realities. In order to make this abstract idea
convincing, however, we must give some concrete reason to believe that
the specific algebraic structures involved in thought have something to do with
the specific algebraic structures involved in the physical structure of the universe.
This might be done in any number of different ways: the general mental-physical
optimality principle, and the concept of mind as pregeometry, do not rely on any
particular algebraic structure. At present, however, only one particular psychological-
physical correspondence has presented itself to us, and this is the octonionic algebra.
The octonions appear in the magician system of model of consciousness, and also in
the discrete theory of physics. In both cases they represent the same intuitive
phenomenon: the structure of the present moment.

One might well wonder why such a correspondence should exist. Why should
physically important structures also be psychologically important structures? The
answer to this question lies, we believe, in mathematics: Certain mathematical
structures possess an intrinsic efficiency, which causes them to arise time and time
again in different circumstances.

In this case, the efficient algebraic structure in question is the octonionic algebra. The
reason for the importance of the octonions is very simple: There is a theorem which
states that the only finite-dimensional division algebras are one, two, four and eight-
dimensional. Among these, the only algebras with reasonable algebraic properties are
the real numbers, the complex numbers, the quaternions and the octonions. The
octonions are the largest reasonably structured algebra with the property of unique
division. And the property of unique division is, one suspects, crucial for efficient
functioning, both in physics and in psychology.

This is, as yet, not a scientific idea. It is a philosophical idea which takes
mathematical form. I have not found any way to put the idea to empirical test. It
should be remembered, however, that many widely accepted notions in particle
physics are equally distant from the realm of empirical test. String theory is the best
known example. In fundamental physics, as in theoretical cognitive science,
experimentation is difficult, so that conceptual coherence and fecundity emerge as
crucial criteria for the assessment of theories. I believe that, judged by these standards,
the "mind as pregeometry" idea excels.

8.11 CONCLUSION

Richard Feynman said, "Whoever tries to understand quantum theory, vanishes into a
black hole and will never be heard from again." The same might be said about
consciousness -- and doubly for those who try to understand the relation between
quantum theory and consciousness! The phenomenon of consciousness, like the
elementary quantum phenomenon, displays layer after layer of complexity: one can
keep unfolding it forever, always coming to new surprises, and always dancing around
the raw, ineffable core.

The treatment of consciousness given here surpasses the one I gave in Chaotic Logic;
and my own research on consciousness has extended significantly beyond the ideas of
this chapter. But yet even this more extensive research is still in many ways
incomplete. What I hope to have accomplished here, if nothing else, is to have
illustrated some of the ways in which consciousness can be investigated in the context
of the psynet model.

The concept of the dual network leads to the perceptual-cognitive loop, which is a
useful abstraction of diverse neurobiological data. The concept of mental systems as
magician systems leads to the division algebra theory of consciousness, which again
provides a useful way of synthesizing different psychological observation. Division
algebras connect many seemingly disparate things: Bohm's proprioception of thought,
the magic number 7 +/- 2, the relation between mind and quantum reality,.... The
psynet model does not, in itself, solve any of the puzzles of consciousness. But it does
provide a useful and productive framework for thinking about the various issues
involved.

Scientific paradigm
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a paradigm as "a pattern or model, an exemplar; a typical
instance of something, an example".[8] The historian of science Thomas Kuhn gave it its
contemporary meaning when he adopted the word to refer to the set of concepts and practices that
define a scientific discipline at any particular period of time. In his book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (first published in 1962), Kuhn defines a scientific paradigm as: "universally recognized
scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of
practitioners,[9] i.e.,

 what is to be observed and scrutinized

 the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relation to this
subject
 how these questions are to be structured
 what predictions made by the primary theory within the discipline
 how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted
 How an experiment is to be conducted, and what equipment is available to conduct the
experiment.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn saw the sciences as going through alternating
periods of normal science, when an existing model of reality dominates a protracted period of
puzzle-solving, and revolution, when the model of reality itself undergoes sudden drastic change.
Paradigms have two aspects. Firstly, within normal science, the term refers to the set of exemplary
experiments that are likely to be copied or emulated. Secondly, underpinning this set of exemplars
are shared preconceptions, made prior to – and conditioning – the collection of evidence.[ These
preconceptions embody both hidden assumptions and elements that he describes as quasi-
metaphysical;[11] the interpretations of the paradigm may vary among individual scientists.
Kuhn was at pains to point out that the rationale for the choice of exemplars is a specific way of
viewing reality: that view and the status of "exemplar" are mutually reinforcing. For well-integrated
members of a particular discipline, its paradigm is so convincing that it normally renders even the
possibility of alternatives unconvincing and counter-intuitive. Such a paradigm is opaque, appearing
to be a direct view of the bedrock of reality itself, and obscuring the possibility that there might be
other, alternative imageries hidden behind it. The conviction that the current paradigm is reality tends
to disqualify evidence that might undermine the paradigm itself; this in turn leads to a build-up of
unreconciled anomalies. It is the latter that is responsible for the eventual revolutionary overthrow of
the incumbent paradigm, and its replacement by a new one. Kuhn used the expression paradigm
shift (see below) for this process, and likened it to the perceptual change that occurs when our
interpretation of an ambiguous image "flips over" from one state to another.] (The rabbit-duck
illusion is an example: it is not possible to see both the rabbit and the duck simultaneously.) This is
significant in relation to the issue of incommensurability (see below).
An example of a currently accepted paradigm would be the standard model of physics. The scientific
method allows for orthodox scientific investigations into phenomena that might contradict or disprove
the standard model; however grant funding would be proportionately more difficult to obtain for such
experiments, depending on the degree of deviation from the accepted standard model theory the
experiment would test for. To illustrate the point, an experiment to test for the mass of neutrinos or
the decay of protons (small departures from the model) is more likely to receive money than
experiments that look for the violation of the conservation of momentum, or ways to engineer
reverse time travel.
Mechanisms similar to the original Kuhnian paradigm have been invoked in various disciplines other
than the philosophy of science. These include: the idea of major cultural
themes,[14][15] worldviews (and see below), ideologies, and mindsets. They have somewhat similar
meanings that apply to smaller and larger scale examples of disciplined thought. In addition, Michel
Foucault used the terms episteme and discourse, mathesis and taxinomia, for aspects of a
"paradigm" in Kuhn's original sense.
Paradigm shifts
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn wrote that "the successive transition from one
paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science" (p. 12).
Paradigm shifts tend to appear in response to the accumulation of critical anomalies as well as the
proposal of a new theory with the power to encompass both older relevant data and explain relevant
anomalies. New paradigms tend to be most dramatic in sciences that appear to be stable and
mature, as in physics at the end of the 19th century. At that time, a statement generally attributed to
physicist Lord Kelvin famously claimed, "There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All
that remains is more and more precise measurement."[16] Five years later, Albert Einstein published
his paper on special relativity, which challenged the set of rules laid down by Newtonian mechanics,
which had been used to describe force and motion for over two hundred years. In this case, the new
paradigm reduces the old to a special case in the sense that Newtonian mechanics is still a good
model for approximation for speeds that are slow compared to the speed of light. Many philosophers
and historians of science, including Kuhn himself, ultimately accepted a modified version of Kuhn's
model, which synthesizes his original view with the gradualist model that preceded it. Kuhn's original
model is now generally seen as too limited[citation needed].
Some examples of contemporary paradigm shifts include:

 In medicine, the transition from "clinical judgment" to evidence-based medicine

 In social psychology, the transition from p-hacking to replication[17]
 In software engineering, the transition from the Rational Paradigm to the Empirical Paradigm [18]
Kuhn's idea was, itself, revolutionary in its time. It caused a major change in the way that academics
talk about science; and, so, it may be that it caused (or was part of) a "paradigm shift" in the history
and sociology of science. However, Kuhn would not recognize such a paradigm shift. Being in the
social sciences, people can still use earlier ideas to discuss the history of science.

Paradigm paralysis [
Perhaps the greatest barrier to a paradigm shift, in some cases, is the reality of paradigm paralysis:
the inability or refusal to see beyond the current models of thinking.[19] This is similar to what
psychologists term confirmation bias. Examples include rejection of Aristarchus of
Samos', Copernicus', and Galileo's theory of a heliocentric solar system, the discovery
of electrostaticphotography, xerography and the quartz clock.[

Incommensurability [
Kuhn pointed out that it could be difficult to assess whether a particular paradigm shift had actually
led to progress, in the sense of explaining more facts, explaining more important facts, or providing
better explanations, because the understanding of "more important", "better", etc. changed with the
paradigm. The two versions of reality are thus incommensurable. Kuhn's version
of incommensurability has an important psychological dimension; this is apparent from his analogy
between a paradigm shift and the flip-over involved in some optical illusions.[13] However, he
subsequently diluted his commitment to incommensurability considerably, partly in the light of other
studies of scientific development that did not involve revolutionary change.[20] One of the examples of
incommensurability that Kuhn used was the change in the style of chemical investigations that
followed the work of Lavoisier on atomic theory in the late 18th Century. In this change, the focus
had shifted from the bulk properties of matter (such as hardness, colour, reactivity, etc.) to studies of
atomic weights and quantitative studies of reactions. He suggested that it was impossible to make
the comparison needed to judge which body of knowledge was better or more advanced. However,
this change in research style (and paradigm) eventually (after more than a century) led to a theory of
atomic structure that accounts well for the bulk properties of matter; see, for example,
Brady's General Chemistry.[ According to P J Smith, this ability of science to back off, move
sideways, and then advance is characteristic of the natural sciences, but contrasts with the position
in some social sciences, notably economics
This apparent ability does not guarantee that the account is veridical at any one time, of course, and
most modern philosophers of science are fallibility. However, members of other disciplines do see
the issue of incommensurability as a much greater obstacle to evaluations of "progress"; see, for
example, Martin Slattery's Key Ideas in Sociology.

Subsequent developments
Opaque Kuhnian paradigms and paradigm shifts do exist. A few years after the discovery of the
mirror-neurons that provide a hard-wired basis for the human capacity for empathy, the scientists
involved were unable to identify the incidents that had directed their attention to the issue. Over the
course of the investigation, their language and metaphors had changed so that they themselves
could no longer interpret all of their own earlier laboratory notes and records

Imre Lakatos and research programmes

However, many instances exist in which change in a discipline's core model of reality has happened
in a more evolutionary manner, with individual scientists exploring the usefulness of alternatives in a
way that would not be possible if they were constrained by a paradigm. Imre Lakatos suggested (as
an alternative to Kuhn's formulation) that scientists actually work within research programmes.[27] In
Lakatos' sense, a research programme is a sequence of problems, placed in order of priority. This
set of priorities, and the associated set of preferred techniques, is the positive heuristic of a
programme. Each programme also has a negative heuristic; this consists of a set of fundamental
assumptions that – temporarily, at least – takes priority over observational evidence when the two
appear to conflict.
This latter aspect of research programmes is inherited from Kuhn's work on paradigms,[citation needed] and
represents an important departure from the elementary account of how science works. According to
this, science proceeds through repeated cycles of observation, induction, hypothesis-testing, etc.,
with the test of consistency with empirical evidence being imposed at each stage. Paradigms and
research programmes allow anomalies to be set aside, where there is reason to believe that they
arise from incomplete knowledge (about either the substantive topic, or some aspect of the theories
implicitly used in making observations.

Larry Laudan: Dormant anomalies, fading credibility, and research

traditions[
Larry Laudan[28] has also made two important contributions to the debate. Laudan believed that
something akin to paradigms exist in the social sciences (Kuhn had contested this, see below); he
referred to these as research traditions. Laudan noted that some anomalies become "dormant", if
they survive a long period during which no competing alternative has shown itself capable of
resolving the anomaly. He also presented cases in which a dominant paradigm had withered away
because its lost credibility when viewed against changes in the wider intellectual milieu.

In social sciences [
Kuhn himself did not consider the concept of paradigm as appropriate for the social sciences. He
explains in his preface to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that he developed the concept of
paradigm precisely to distinguish the social from the natural sciences. While visiting the Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1958 and 1959, surrounded by social scientists, he
observed that they were never in agreement about the nature of legitimate scientific problems and
methods. He explains that he wrote this book precisely to show that there can never be any
paradigms in the social sciences. Mattei Dogan, a French sociologist, in his article "Paradigms in the
Social Sciences," develops Kuhn's original thesis that there are no paradigms at all in the social
sciences since the concepts are polysemic, involving the deliberate mutual ignorance between
scholars and the proliferation of schools in these disciplines. Dogan provides many examples of the
non-existence of paradigms in the social sciences in his essay, particularly in sociology, political
science and political anthropology.
However, both Kuhn's original work and Dogan's commentary are directed at disciplines that are
defined by conventional labels (such as "sociology"). While it is true that such broad groupings in the
social sciences are usually not based on a Kuhnian paradigm, each of the competing sub-disciplines
may still be underpinned by a paradigm, research programme, research tradition, and/ or
professional imagery. These structures will be motivating research, providing it with an agenda,
defining what is and is not anomalous evidence, and inhibiting debate with other groups that fall
under the same broad disciplinary label. (A good example is provided by the contrast
between Skinnerian radical behaviourism and personal construct theory (PCT) within psychology.
The most significant of the many ways these two sub-disciplines of psychology differ concerns
meanings and intentions. In PCT, they are seen as the central concern of psychology; in radical
behaviourism, they are not scientific evidence at all, as they cannot be directly observed.)
Such considerations explain the conflict between the Kuhn/ Dogan view, and the views of others
(including Larry Laudan, see above), who do apply these concepts to social sciences.
Handa,[29] M.L. (1986) introduced the idea of "social paradigm" in the context of social sciences. He
identified the basic components of a social paradigm. Like Kuhn, Handa addressed the issue of
changing paradigm; the process popularly known as "paradigm shift". In this respect, he focused on
social circumstances that precipitate such a shift and the effects of the shift on social institutions,
including the institution of education. This broad shift in the social arena, in turn, changes the way
the individual perceives reality.
Another use of the word paradigm is in the sense of "worldview". For example, in social science, the
term is used to describe the set of experiences, beliefs and values that affect the way an individual
perceives reality and responds to that perception. Social scientists have adopted the Kuhnian phrase
"paradigm shift" to denote a change in how a given society goes about organizing and
understanding reality. A "dominant paradigm" refers to the values, or system of thought, in a society
that are most standard and widely held at a given time. Dominant paradigms are shaped both by the
community's cultural background and by the context of the historical moment. Hutchin [30] outlines
some conditions that facilitate a system of thought to become an accepted dominant paradigm:

 Professional organizations that give legitimacy to the paradigm

 Dynamic leaders who introduce and purport the paradigm
 Journals and editors who write about the system of thought. They both disseminate the
information essential to the paradigm and give the paradigm legitimacy
 Government agencies who give credence to the paradigm
 Educators who propagate the paradigm's ideas by teaching it to students
 Conferences conducted that are devoted to discussing ideas central to the paradigm
 Media coverage
 Lay groups, or groups based around the concerns of lay persons, that embrace the beliefs
central to the paradigm
 Sources of funding to further research on the paradigm

Other uses[
The word paradigm is also still used to indicate a pattern or model or an outstandingly clear or
typical example or archetype. The term is frequently used in this sense in the design professions.
Design Paradigms or archetypes comprise functional precedents for design solutions. The best
known references on design paradigms are Design Paradigms: A Sourcebook for Creative
Visualization, by Wake, and Design Paradigms by Petroski.
This term is also used in cybernetics. Here it means (in a very wide sense) a (conceptual)
protoprogram for reducing the chaotic mass to some form of order. Note the similarities to the
concept of entropy in chemistry and physics. A paradigm there would be a sort of prohibition to
proceed with any action that would increase the total entropy of the system. To create a paradigm
requires a closed system that accepts changes. Thus a paradigm can only apply to a system that is
not in its final stage.
Beyond its use in the physical and social sciences, Kuhn's paradigm concept has been analysed in
relation to its applicability in identifying 'paradigms' with respect to worldviews at specific points in
history. One example is Matthew Edward Harris' book The Notion of Papal Monarchy in the
Thirteenth Century: The Idea of Paradigm in Church History.[31] Harris stresses the primarily
sociological importance of paradigms, pointing towards Kuhn's second edition of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Although obedience to popes such as Innocent III and Boniface VIII was
widespread, even written testimony from the time showing loyalty to the pope does not demonstrate
that the writer had the same worldview as the Church, and therefore pope, at the centre. The
difference between paradigms in the physical sciences and in historical organisations such as the
Church is that the former, unlike the latter, requires technical expertise rather than repeating
statements. In other words, after scientific training through what Kuhn calls 'exemplars', one could
not genuinely believe that, to take a trivial example, the earth is flat, whereas thinkers such as Giles
of Rome in the thirteenth century wrote in favour of the pope, then could easily write similarly
glowing things about the king. A writer such as Giles would have wanted a good job from the pope;
he was a papal publicist. However, Harris writes that 'scientific group membership is not concerned
with desire, emotions, gain, loss and any idealistic notions concerning the nature and destiny of
humankind...but simply to do with aptitude, explanation, [and] cold description of the facts of the
world and the universe from within a paradigm'.[32]