10 15 20 25 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA [CORAM: KATUREEBE, CJ; KISAAKYE, ARACH-AMOKO, OPIO-AWERI AND TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JJSC] CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 07 OF 2015 BETWEEN MUBANGIZI ALEX..... ..APPELLANT UGANDA....... (An appeal arising from the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Mwangusya, Buteera and Kakuru JJA) dated 15‘ September, 2014 in Criminal Appeal No.0012 of 2012.) JUDGMENT OF THE COURT This is a second appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal confirming the conviction and sentence of 30 years imprisonment imposed by the High Court on the appellant, Mubangizi Alex, for the offence of rape c/s 123 and 124 of the Penal Code Act. Briefly, the facts which gave rise to this appeal as have concurrently been found by the two lower courts were that on the 224 February, 2009 at about 10 am in the morning, at Kasambya village in Lyantonde District, Nassimbwa Maria Josepher (PW2), a 60 year old woman, who was taking care of her sick daughter who was admitted in Lyantonde Hospital, went into a nearby eucalyptus forest to collect firewood. As she was bending to pick firewood, a stranger whom she identified as the appellant, (23 year old young man) approached her from behind a10 15 20 25 and held her by her clothes. When she turned, she saw a man wearing black trousers, a sweater and a cap on his head. He asked her why she was gathering firewood from his plantation and threatened to arrest her. She told him that she was gathering the firewood as others had been doing and asked for forgiveness. He told her that he had never caught those other people but he had caught her. He instead held her hand and dragged her deeper into the forest where there were no people and demanded for sex in exchange for his forgiveness. She refused and told him that he was like her own son. Thereafter, he threw her down and they started struggling. He overpowered her and lifted her clothes comprising of a gomesi and a petticoat up to her chest and neck, Then he used one hand to hold her by the neck and the other, to remove his trousers. She tried to raise an alarm but he held her mouth and neck and tried to strangle her. Then he proceeded to have sex with her. After he had finished, he ran away. PW2 returned to the hospital without the firewood that she had gathered. She was feeling bad and was bleeding from her private parts and felt weak. She told her daughter about the incident but she could do nothing as she was too sick to assist her. She then told the nurse at the hospital who gave her tablets to relieve the pain, but PW2 never improved. When her son Yuda Tadeo Kasibante (PW3) visited them in the hospital three days later, she narrated to him the entire ordeal. PW3 reported the matter to Police. PW2 was examined and treated at Lyantonde hospital. PW3 got information that a man who was raping women had been arrested and was being detained at Lyantonde Police Station. 210 15 20 25 ‘Thereafter, PW3 took his mother to the Police station. An identification parade was conducted at the Police station where PW2 identified the appellant twice from among other suspects as the man who had raped her that fateful morning. Consequently, the appellant was charged with the offence of rape c/s 123 and 124 of the Penal Code Act. In his unsworn statement, the appellant denied the charges. He was tried, convicted and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment by the High Court. As earlier stated, his appeal against the conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Representation The record indicates on the 15% February 2017, a pre-hearing conference was conducted by Justice Tibatemwa- Ekirikubinza. Mr. Henry Rukundo appeared on behalf of the appellant on State brief while the Respondent was represented by Principal State Attorney Okello Richard. The appellant’s counsel was given up to the 224 February 2017 to file submissions and the respondent was given up to 28th February to file a reply. Thereafter, the appellant’s counsel was given up to the 7** March 2017 to file a rejoinder, if any. However, Mr. Rukundo did not comply with the above schedule. He instead filed both the Memcrandum of Appeal and submissions on the 28% February 2017 to which Mr. Okello filed a reply on the 3" March, 2017. This was followed by a rejoinder that Mr. Rukundo filed on 10 March 2018.15 20 25 It appears that the appellant threafter withdrew instructions from Mr. Rukundo and instead instructed the firm of M/s Asiimwe, Namawejje & Co, Advocates who filed another set of Memorandum of Appeal together with written submissions on his behalf of on the 10% March 2017. Mr. Okello then filed a supplementary reply to the said submissions. On 14% March 2017, Ms. Susan Wakabala from the said law firm appeared on behalf of the appellant on a private brief. Mr. Okello represented the Respondent. They adopted their written submissions. The grounds of Appeal In the Memorandum of Appeal filed by Ms. Wakabala, the appellant raised two grounds, namely that: 1. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to adequately re-evaluate all material evidence relating to the uncorroborated evidence of PW1. (sic) 2. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they upheld an illegal sentence of the lower court which was reached basing on hearsay evidence. Submissions of Counsel Submitting on ground one, Ms. Wakabala contended that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal had failed to properly evaluate the evidence on record as was required of them by law and as a result, they wrongly confirmed the decision of the trial judge when there was no other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the victim,PW2. Had they10 15 20 25 done their duty properly, they would not have upheld the decision of the trial Judge. Counsel gave the following reasons for her contention: Firstly she argued that the evidence of PW3 concerning the arrest of the appellant was clearly hearsay since there was no one else who had claimed to have been raped by the appellant. She referred to the evidence of PW3 where he stated that: “Then I took the matter to Lyantonde police and to one Mugisha whom I found near the forest. He told me that he was looking for @ man who was raping women. When I mentioned to him he was told to go to the police and report as they had arrested one man on rape charges.” She argued that it is not clear from the above quoted statement who Mugisha is and why PW3 was even reporting to him. Secondly, Ms. Wakabala submitted that the manner in which the identification parade was carried out did not comply with the laid down procedure in Justice B. Odoki’s Book entitled, “A Guide to Criminal Procedure in Uganda”. The conditions include the presence of an advocate or a friend of the accused during the identification parade; the officer in charge of the parade should not conduct the identification parade; the witness should not see the accused before the parade; the accused should be placed among at least 8 persons as far as possible cf a similar age, height and general appearance, among others. Counsel submitted that in this case, PW3 took PW2 to the Police station where an identification parade was carried out. PW2 stated clearly that she was seeing the appellant for the 1s time. The other condition 525 30 mentioned is that the appellant was placed among only 5 people for identification, yet the law requires 8. Thirdly, Ms. Wakabala argued that the prosecution had deliberately refused to summon the officer who had conducted the identification parade to testify in court. The prosecution did not even attempt to identify Police Form 69 in court in the absence of the said Police Officer in counsel’s view, the prosecution was hiding flaws in its case and this cast doubt on the prosecution case which should have been held in favour of the appellant. The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal quoted the decision of court in the case of Sentale vs. Uganda, Criminal Appeal No.56 of 1968 where it held that an identification parade was essential since the robbery had taken place at near midnight although there was moonlight as well as street lights and the assailant was never known to the complainant prior to the incident. The Learned Justices also referred to the case of Ssenoga Sempala Jafari vs. Uganda Criminal Appeal Number 34 of 2005 which followed Sentale, where the court emphasised that failure to observe one or two of the laid down conditions for identification does not render the identification a nullity as long as there is much more evidence pointing to the guilt of the appellant. She argued that the above finding was erroneous, since there was no other evidence at all on how the identification parade was conducted. Based on the foregoing, Ms. Wakabala contended that apart from the evidence of PW2, there is no other evidence at all pointing to the guilt of the appellant. The medical evidence merely confirmed rape but did not prove the appellant’s participation in the offence. Therefore, for the 610 15 Court of Appeal to conclude that there was overwhelming evidence pointing to the guilt of the appellant was erroneous. In support of her submissions on this point, Counsel relied on the holding of this Court in the case of Oketcho Richard vs. Uganda Criminal Appeal No.26 of 1995(SC) where Court held that: “Where the prosecution calls evidence barely adequate and it appears that there are other witnesses available who are not called, the court is entitled under the general law of evidence to draw an inference that the evidence of those witnesses if called would have been or tended to be adverse to the prosecution’s case. In the present case, the prosecution failed or refused to call the doctor that examined the complainant immediately after the alleged assault and this should have caused the court to draw an adverse inference that if the doctor was called, he might have given evidence adverse to that of the prosecution.’ Counsel submitted that in that case the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside conviction of the appellant who had been sentenced to 13 years for defilement by the High Court. For the above reasons, Counsel prayed that the appeal be allowed, the conviction be quashed and ihe appellant be released. Mr. Okello on the other hand, supported the conviction of the appellant by the learned trial judge. He submitted that the record shows that the Learned Justices of Appeal properly re-evaluated the evidence on record and correctly found the appellant guilty of the offence of rape. He pointed out that the main issue in this appeal was corroboration of 715 20 25 30 PW2’s evidence with particular reference to the participation of the appellant. Counsel submitted that the victim at trial explained the whole circumstance under which the appellant had raped her and she had enough time to observe him. He submitted that the trial judge properly evaluated the evidence and the laws applicable there under. Likewise, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were aware of the crucial nature of this case and scrutinised it at length while cautioning themselves and being mindful of the conditions regarding the evidence of a single identifying witness set out in Abdulla Nabulere & Anor vs. Uganda, Cr.App No. 9/78, before rightly agreeing with the trial judge that the appellant was properly identified by PW2. Counsel further submitted that the learned trial judge had analysed the evidence and demeanour of the appellant which was corroborative evidence to PW2’s evidence regarding the appellant’s participation in the commission of the offence. In addition, the evidence of fleeing by the appellant from the arresting officers was also corroborative. He relied on the case of Sewanyana Livingstone vs. Uganda, Cr.App No. 19/2006(SC) and R vs. Manilal Ishwerlal Purohit (1942) 9 EACA 61 in support of his submissions. Regarding failure by the prosecution to call the arresting officer as a witness, counsel submitted that the evidence of arrest was not the only piece of evidence the prosecution needed to corroborate the evidence of PW2. He argued the fact that that the arresting officer did not testify, did not adversely affect the prosecution case against the appellant as the lower courts found. Moreover, the record shows that both parties had consented that the issue of arrest was not in contention.10 15 20 25 Counsel however conceded that the evidence of the officer who conducted the identification parade and the identification report was not produced in court, but contended that the omission did not occasion a miscarriage of justice to the appellant. He argued that the identification was merely carried out as a matter of course. PW2 in her mind had a clear appearance of the person who ravished her and that was why she easily picked the appellant out of the five participants. Lastly, Counsel asserted that the trial judge did not rely on hearsay evidence to convict the appellant as alleged by the appellant’s counsel, neither did the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal in arriving at their decision. Therefore, this ground lacked merit and it ought to fail. Ground two: Sentence Ms. Wakabala submitted that although this ground was not raised in the Court of Appeal, nonetheless, it raised an important issue and prayed that this court considers it. In support of this submission, she relied on the case of Euchu Michael vs. Uganda Criminal Appeal No.54 of 2000 (SC). Counsel argued that the testimony of PW3 was based on hearsay evidence which could not affect the appellant since PW2 was the only complainant and no other woman had brought the charge of rape against the appellant. She further contended that in passing the sentence, the trial judge did not consider the fact that the appellant was a first offender but was influenced by PW3’s statement that the appellant was a “serial rapist” which biased the trial judge’s mind and misled him to hand out an illegal sentence based on hearsay. Counsel5 faulted the learned Justices for upholding the decision of the trial judge based such evidence. In the alternative and without prejudice to her prayers in ground one, counsel invited this Court to set aside the sentence and substitute it with a lawful and lenient sentence of 12 years based on the mitigating 10 factors that were raised by the appellant before court. Mr. Okello supported the decision of the Court of Appeal and argued that the issue of illegality of sentence was not raised in the Court of Appeal and as such the same is irregular before this Court. He further submitted that although the appellant did not appeal against sentence 15 in the Court of Appeal, nonetheless, the learned Justices addressed it and found that the sentence was neither illegal nor irregular and confirmed it. Counsel further contended that in passing the sentence, the trial judge did not refer to the appellant as a serial rapist nor did he base his 2 conviction on that fact as alleged by the appellant’s counsel, The allegations of bias are therefore farfetched and should not be entertained by this Court. Regarding irregularity, counsel submitted that the trial judge took into consideration the fact that the appellant was a first offender and given 2s that the maximum penalty for the offence of rape is death, he sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment. Therefore, there was no irregularity regarding the appellant's sentence. Counsel further contended that this ground hinges more on evaluation of evidence which has been fully addressed in the first ground and 1010 20 Court should consider his response under that ground in determining the issue of sentence. Counsel prayed that this ground should also be disallowed and the appeal dismissed. Consideration of the grounds by Court. The above arguments of counsel raise the issue of the role of a second appellate court. This is not a new point. It is an issue which has received judicial consideration in several cases that have come before this Court including Kifamunte Henry vs. Uganda, Cr. Appeal No. 10 cof 1997 (SC) and Bogere Moses & Kamba vs. Uganda Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1997, (SC), to the effect that except in the clearest of cases where the Court of Appeal has failed in its duty, this Court as a second appellate court, is not required to re-evaluate the evidence like a first appellate court. Further, it is also settled that the Supreme Court, when considering a second appeal, will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts, unless there is no evidence to support them (See: Nyanzi vs. Uganda [1999] EA 228 followed in Bwefugye Patrick And Anor vs. Uganda, Criminal Appeal No.52 of 2016{unreported). We shall follow these principles in determining the two grounds of appeal. Ground 1: The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to adequately re-evaluate all material evidence relating to the uncorroborated evidence of PW1. ‘The complaint in this ground is that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal failed to adequately re-evaluate all material evidence relating a25 to the uncorroborated evidence of PW2 and thereby arrived at a wrong decision. We have carefully perused the record of proceedings and read the judgment of the Court of Appeal particularly in respect of evaluation of evidence. We have also considered the submissions by learned counsel and the authorities relied on. We note that the three grounds raised before the Court of Appeal were that: 1. The learned trial Judge erred in fact and in law when he convicted the appellant basing on evidence of a single identifying witness without it being corroborated. 2. The learned judge erred in fact and in law when he failed to adequately consider the circumstances under which the appellant was arrested simply because there was no contention about it. 3. The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to adequately evaluate the entire evidence and as a result came to a wrong conclusion. In their judgment, the learned Justices, first of all summarised the background facts of the case and the submissions of counsel, Before delving into the resolution of the appeal, the learned Justices reminded themselves of their duty as a first appellate court under rule 30(1) (a) of the Court of Appeal Rules, that is to re-appraise the evidence and arrive at their own conclusion. Then they proceeded to handle all the grounds of appeal together since they all hinged on the proper evaluation of evidence and the handling of the evidence of a single 220 25 30 identifying witness. They found, rightly in our view, that the critical clement of the case was the issue of identification of the appellant as the person who committed the offence. The Learned Justices then re-stated the law and principles regarding the evidence of a single identification witness as stated in Abdalla Nabulere & Anor vs. Uganda Criminal Appeal No.9 of 1978 in the following passage that: “Where the case against an accused Person depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence disputes, the judge should warn himself and the assessors of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. The reason for the special caution is that there is a possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one, and that even a number of witnesses can be mistaken. The judge should then examine closely the circumstances in which the identification came to be made particularly the length of time, the distance. the light, the familiarity of the witness with the accused. All those factors goto the quality of the identification evidence. If the quality is good, the danger of a mistaken identity is reduced but the poorer the quality the greater the danger. When the quality is good, as for example, when the identification is_made after a long period of observation or in satisfactory conditions by a person who knew the accused before, a court can safely convict even though there is no other evidence to support 1310 15 20 25 the identification evidence, provided court adequately warns itself of the special need for caution.” ( the underlining is added for emphasis) The learned Justices rightly pointed out that: “In dealing with the evidence of identification by a single witness in criminal matters, the starting point is that the court ought to satisfy itself from the evidence whether the conditions under which the identification is claimed to be made were favorable or were difficult, and to warn itself of the possibility of mistaken identity,” After evaluating the evidence, the learned Justices came to the conclusion that: “On the facts of the instant case all the conditions favouring correct identification are present. The incident was at 10.00 am in broad daylight. The appellant and PW2 spent a long time together talking and then a struggle ensued. All this time the victim was very aware of the person who was trying to rape her. During this time the hat he was putting on fell off and his face was fully exposed. He went ahead to rape her. There is no basis for saying that identification was poor. All the conditions favoured correct identification much as the victim had never met the appellant before.” Regarding the identification parade, the Learned Justices stated correctly, that: 45 15 20 “... Identification Parades are held as a means of corroborating the identification claim made by a witness. As a matter of fact there is overwhelming evidence that the appellant was properly identified at the scene. It would be an affront to justice to acquit him... We are therefore convinced by the authority above that indeed failure to observe one or two of them does not render the identification a nullity because there was overwhelming evidence Pointing to the guilt of the accuse.” The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal also addressed the appellant's contention regarding the failure to call the arresting and investigating officers as witnesses and we share their view that although: “It would have been proper to call the arresting and investigating police officers to testify but their failure to testify would not have been fatal to the case as there was other sufficient evidence available that the trial judge appropriately considered and reached a decision we find correct”. The Court of Appeal based the above conclusion on the decision of the Supreme Court in Alfred Bumbo vs Uganda, Criminal Appeal No.28 of 1994 which vs. followed in Okwonga Anthony vs, Uganda SCCA No. 20 of 2000 reported in [2000] KALR 24, in which it held: “While it is desirable that the evidence of a police investigating officer, and or re-arrest of an accused person by the police, should always be given where necessary, we think that where other 1515 20 evidence is available and Proves the prosecution case to the required standard, the absence of such evidence would not, as a tule, be fatal to the conviction of an accused Person. All must depend on the circumstances of each case whether police evidence is essential, in addition, to prove the charge. In the instant case we are satisfied that the absence of Police evidence did not weaken the prosecution witnesses and from the appellants unsworn statements clearly indicating how and when they were arrested. Other evidence also clearly proved the prosecution case.” In this case, we agree with the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal that although the officers Were not called to testify, there was other evidence which proved the prosecution case. We also note that the appellant at trial did not challenge the narrative of the victim regarding his arrest and his identification. The appellant confirms part of the evidence of PW2 when he narrated that: “Late that evening, we were called for another identification Parade, we were 5 suspects as said by PW2, and then I was surprised when PW2 pointed at me as her rapist...” This corroborates the evidence of PW2 as to his identification at the identification parade that was carried out at the Police station, that she identified the appellant twice with his shirt on and without it. Therefore, the failure to call the officer who conducted the identification parade was not prejudicial at all to the prosecution case as was rightly found by the Justices of the Court of Appeal. 1610 20 25 Further, on the question of arrest the record of proceedings also indicates as follows: “Resident State Attorney: The counsel for the accused says the arrest of the accused is not in contention. Kamuganda: It is true we are not disputing the circumstances of the accused’s arrest.” Thereafter, the learned Resident State Attorney closed the case for the prosecution. This in our view explains why the state did not call the arresting officer. The lower courts were therefore right to find that there was no contention regarding the appellant’s arrest. Rather, the contention was on the appellant’s participation which the victim PW2 had vividly described in her testimony. As stated earlier, there is no law that prohibits a conviction based on the evidence of a single identifying witness, except that the court must take the greatest care to eliminate the possibility of mistaken identity especially when the conditions for identification were difficult. Where conditions were unfavorable for correct identification what is needed is other evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused in order for court to be satisfied that it is safe to convict. See: Abdulla Nabulere (Supra) and Lutwama David vs. Uganda Cr.App. No.4 of 2003 (SC) In addition, we wish to point out that the law is clear. Under 8.133 of the Evidence Act cap. 6, there is no particular number of witnesses required to prove any fact. The section reads as follows: “133, Number of witnesses15 20 25 Subject to the provisions of any other law in force, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact.” Courts may therefore determine and base a conviction on the evidence of a single identifying witness. As the two courts below rightly found, there are a number of factors which give credence to the victim’s story. Both parties were never acquaintances but this does not mean she could not identify her attacker given that, the time of commission of the offence was in broad day light and there was a long struggle between the parties. The offence was therefore committed face to face. The time lag between the commission of the offence and the identification at the identification parade was short, so the memory of the accused was fresh in the victim’s mind. These in our view gave the victim a great opportunity not to be mistaken as to the identity of her assailant. The record further shows that the learned trial judge critically considered the demeanour of the witnesses during trial and found that PW2 was a truthful witness. He also made a critical analysis of the circumstances under which the victim was able to identify the accused. The law is that the trial judge must adopt the impression on the demeanour of the witness by testing it against the evidence given by the witness in the case as a whole. See: Livingstone Sewanyana vs. Uganda No. 19 of 2006 (SC). In this case, the trial judge did so. In the circumstances, even if there was no evidence corroborating the evidence of PW2 as alleged by counsel for the appellant, which is not 1810 15 20 25 30 the case, the trial judge still rightly based his conviction on her evidence as a truthful witness after observing her when she testified before him in court. Lastly, we also note that the case of Oketcho Richard vs. Uganda (supra) which Counsel for the appellant relied on, is distinguishable from this case. As stated earlier, it is true that court will draw an inference that the evidence of uncalled witnesses would have tended to be adverse to the prosecution case in circumstances where the evidence before it is inadequate. In the Present case, the whole case hinges on the victim’s identification of the appellant which evidence in our view is firm and cogent. The circumstances of correct identification were not difficult at the material time of the offence, she picked him out twice in the identification parade and this is further corroborated by evidence of PW3 and DW1 who confirm that he was identified by her. We are therefore satisfied that the learned Justices of Appeal properly evaluated the evidence on record and came to the right conclusion that the evidence of identification of the appellant was sufficient and the failure to call other witnesses did not adversely affect the prosecution case. This ground fails, accordingly. Ground Two: The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they upheld an illegal sentence of the lower court which was reached basing on hearsay evidence. The law is clear and settled. Unless the trial court in exercising its discretion came to a wrong sentence, an appellate court will not 1925 interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court. This legal principle was stated in the case of Kiwalabye Bernard vs. Uganda (supra). Although this ground was not raised in the Court of Appeal, counsel for the appellant contended that it raised an important legal issue which warranted consideration by this court. Counsel relied on the case of Euchu Michael vs. Uganda (supra) where this Court considered a ground that had not been raised in the lower court on the basis that it raised an important legal issue. In that case, the appellant had raised the ground that the learned Justices of Appeal had erred in law in upholding the decision of the trial Judge where the Judge had erred by arriving at a conclusion that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had participated in the murder of Emolu, the deceased, before considering the defence of alibi, that the appellant had put forward. Court allowed the ground to be argued because it raised an important point of law. In the instant case, we find no important legal issue that has been raised in this ground, therefore, the case of Euchu Michael (Supra) does not apply. We further agree with counsel for the respondent that the reasoning of the trial judge was misconstrued. As he rightly submitted, the learned trial judge did not base the appellant's conviction on the evidence of PW3 but on the evidence of the victim and the circumstances of identification which in our view was proper. Secondly, we find that the trial judge took into consideration all the mitigating factors raised by the appellant in arriving at the sentence. In 205 10 25 Particular, he considered the fact that the appellant was a first offender and exercised leniency as pleaded by the appellant. He also weighed this against the aggravating factors especially the advanced age of the victim, the humiliation and the HIV positive status of the appellant. Thereafter, he exercised his discretion and convicted the appellant to 30 years for an offence that carries a death penalty under section 124 of the Penal Code Act. This, in our view was a border line case which could have even attracted a sentence of life imprisonment. We find that 30 years imprisonment was actually very lenient considering the seriousness of the offence which the appellant was convicted of In the premises, we find that the sentence was lawful and we find no Teason to interfere with the exercise of that discretion by the lower courts. For the foregoing reasons, this ground also fails. In the result this appeal is accordingly dismissed. Dated at Kampala this Aa filet ——_t (ON. JUSTICE KATUREEBE CHIEF JUSTICE HON. JUSTICE KISAAKYE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 210 20 25 HON. JUSTICE ARACH-AMOKO JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT HON.JUSTICE OPIO-AWERI JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT HON. JUSTICE TIBATEMWA- EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2