(Ebook) The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda Under The Successors by Albert Brian Bosworth ISBN 9780198153061, 0198153066
(Ebook) The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda Under The Successors by Albert Brian Bosworth ISBN 9780198153061, 0198153066
https://ebooknice.com/product/biota-grow-2c-gather-2c-cook-6661374
ebooknice.com
https://ebooknice.com/product/sat-ii-success-
math-1c-and-2c-2002-peterson-s-sat-ii-success-1722018
ebooknice.com
https://ebooknice.com/product/matematik-5000-kurs-2c-larobok-23848312
ebooknice.com
(Ebook) Master SAT II Math 1c and 2c 4th ed (Arco Master the SAT
Subject Test: Math Levels 1 & 2) by Arco ISBN 9780768923049,
0768923042
https://ebooknice.com/product/master-sat-ii-math-1c-and-2c-4th-ed-
arco-master-the-sat-subject-test-math-levels-1-2-2326094
ebooknice.com
(Ebook) Cambridge IGCSE and O Level History Workbook 2C - Depth Study:
the United States, 1919-41 2nd Edition by Benjamin Harrison ISBN
9781398375147, 9781398375048, 1398375144, 1398375047
https://ebooknice.com/product/cambridge-igcse-and-o-level-history-
workbook-2c-depth-study-the-united-states-1919-41-2nd-edition-53538044
ebooknice.com
(Ebook) Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction by Bosworth, A.B and
Baynham, E.J.
https://ebooknice.com/product/alexander-the-great-in-fact-and-
fiction-36457668
ebooknice.com
(Ebook) The library. Books 16-20: Philip II, Alexander the Great, and
the successors by the Great Alexander;Siculus Diodorus;King of
Macedonia Philip II;Waterfield, Robin ISBN 9780191078064,
9780198759881, 0191078069, 0198759886
https://ebooknice.com/product/the-library-books-16-20-philip-ii-
alexander-the-great-and-the-successors-11974876
ebooknice.com
https://ebooknice.com/product/media-propaganda-and-the-politics-of-
intervention-56107578
ebooknice.com
https://ebooknice.com/product/music-piety-and-propaganda-the-
soundscapes-of-counter-reformation-bavaria-5152266
ebooknice.com
The Legacy of Alexander
This page intentionally left blank
The Legacy of Alexander
Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under
               the Successors
A. B, Bosworth
            OXFORD
            UNIVERSITY PRESS
    This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification
                    in order to ensure its continuing availability
                               OXFORD
                                UNIVERSITY PRESS
                      Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
         Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford,
     It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
                      and education by publishing worldwide in
                                   Oxford New York
            Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
              Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
                        New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
                                     With offices in
           Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
           Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan South Korea Poland Portugal
             Singapore Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
                              ISBN 978-0-19-815306-1
                          Preface
This book has had a long gestation. The idea was implanted
long ago when I was an undergraduate, wading through the
first chapter of Tarn and Griffith's Hellenistic Civilisation
with its dense and abbreviated summary of events after
Alexander. My friend Richard Hawkins remarked that there
had to be a more extended and lucid introduction to the
period, and the comment has been in the back of my mind
for nearly 40 years. I engaged more closely with the period
when I wrote my early article on the death of Alexander the
Great, and discovered to my chagrin, that I knew virtually
nothing about the Babylon Settlement and its aftermath. A
long learning process ensued, and 1 became more and more
convinced that there was an urgent need for a full historical
coverage of the half century after Alexander, something that
did not exist, and still does not, despite the series of biograph-
ies which have been published over the last decade, devoted
to the careers of individual dynasts. There still remains the
difficult task of integration and collation, drawing out the
general trends and exploring the complex interrelations of
ruler and subject, city and empire.
   The present work is a prelude to the larger project. There
is a strong narrative core, dealing with the conflict between
Eumenes and Antigonus the One-Eyed, which probably did
more than anything to define the shape of the Hellenistic
world but has been astoundingly ignored in modern scholar-
ship. The central chapters amount to a history of the period
318—311, which saw the formation of the Antigonid and
Seleucid monarchies, and the Introduction provides an
analysis of developments in the five years after Alexander's
death. The early chapters set the scene. An intensive analysis
of the Babylon Settlement sheds new light on the power
groups as they emerged in 323 and the political interplay
which resulted in the overriding problem of the period, a
central monarchy with token kings, nominally exercising
vi                          Preface
authority over powerful regional satraps but with almost no
practical control over their supposed subjects. The political
setting leads to the main social issue, the practical dismem-
berment of what had, been the Macedonian national army.
A close investigation of the sources (often misinterpreted)
illustrates the gradual dissipation of the central army group
as it had served under Alexander. As early as 319 the bulk of
the Macedonian troops had been transferred from the royal
court, now in Pella, to serve under Antigonus (and provide
the foundation for his future empire). As the army dispersed
and Macedonians became less important, the kingship itself
lost any authority it may have had, and a new type of dynast
emerged. The final chapter accordingly addresses the prob-
lem of legitimation and explores the means by which power
was maintained or—equally important—lost.
   Source analysis bulks large in my work. The period is
dominated by a shadowy literary colossus, Hieronymus of
Cardia, who by common consent lies behind the narrative of
the most detailed extant narrative, that of Diodorus Siculus.
It is heady material, a colourful, well-documented exposi-
tion from a contemporary of events and a friend of success-
ive kings. Information there is in plenty, as is generally
acknowledged, but there must also be disinformation—as is
increasingly realized to be the case with Hieronymus' closest
counterpart, Thucydides. Chapter 5 is a historiographical
investigation into the famous ethnographic digressions in
which Hieronymus subtly intrudes his own social and per-
sonal commentary. That is paralleled by the discussion of
the Babylon Settlement where (in the Latin account of
Curtius Rufus) we have a counter-tradition embellished with
late rhetoric and also affected by the political interests of the
court of Ptolemy. Almost all our literary evidence comes
from the entourage of the great dynasts, and propaganda is
pervasive. There is little documentary evidence. What there
is comes predominantly from Babylonia, in a large and varied
corpus of cuneiform tablets that still awaits full investigation.
I have tried to address this evidence throughout the work,
and I must admit frankly that it would have been, impossible
without the help of two gifted young Assyriologists. Cornelia
Wunsch worked with me as a Research Associate, funded
                            Preface                           vii
by the Australian Research Committee and explained the
multiple ambiguities of interpretation, 1 also had a very
informative correspondence with Tom Boiy, whose compre-
hensive doctoral thesis has become an indispensable research
tool. I am conscious that some of my chronological conclusions
are not welcomed by cuneiform specialists, but they are the
product of integrating the Hellenic and Babylonian evidence,
and such dialogue is essential if there is to be progress in
the field,
   1 have many other obligations. In 1998 I was a visiting fel-
low at All Souls College, enjoying its unparalleled hospitality
and exploiting the resources of the Bodleian and Ashmolean
libraries. Robert Parker suggested that I give a number of
seminars on the post Alexander period, and with that stimulus
I was able to write the first drafts of chapters 2, 3 and 6. 1 am
grateful for the invitation and for the helpful comments made
on those occasions by him, Robin Lane Fox, Robin Osborne,
John Ma, and many others. An invitation to Stanford
University in 1999 resulted in the final chapter. For detailed
advice and guidance on the complexities of things Nabataean
I am indebted to David Graf of Miami and to my colleague
David Kennedy. I should also acknowledge the support of my
university and department, for generous leave and financial
support for travel. I am particularly grateful to Pat Wheatley
for almost literally working through the manuscript with me
and injecting much of his considerable enthusiasm, and also to
Honours students in Perth and Newcastle who have been
inflicted with working drafts of the individual chapters.
Finally, and most importantly, I must pay tribute to my part-
ner, Elizabeth Baynham, who has lived through the work
from its outset, read and criticized the successive drafts, and
been an unfailing source of encouragement and inspiration.
I owe her more than I can say,
                                                         A.B.B.
September 2001
This page intentionally left blank
                      Contents
Abbreviations                                 x
1. Introduction                               I
2. The Politics of the Babylon Settlement    29
3. Macedonian Numbers at the Death of
   Alexander the Great                       64
4. The Campaign in Iran: Turbulent
   Satraps and Frozen Elephants              98
5. Hieronymus' Ethnography: Indian
   Widows and Nabataean Nomads              169
6. The Rise of Seleucus                     2IO
7. Hellenistic Monarchy: Success and
   Legitimation                             246
Introduction
i. A PERIOD OF DECLINE?
    4
        See the historical sketch below, pp. 17—19,
    5                                                 6
        Described in full in Ch. 4, pp. 112—68,           See below, Ch. 7, p. 458.
                               Introduction                                 3
all the glamour and charisma of Alexander his conquests
could not be repeated.
   In this respect the period can be regarded as one of crea-
tion rather than disintegration. The successor dynasts had
to build their courts, recruit their armies and maintain an
adequate economic base. Talented individuals, mostly of
Greek origin, were attracted to the new courts to operate as
'friends', i.e. as advisers, administrators and commanders. At
a humbler level, fighting men were recruited from the entire
Mediterranean world, to be enlisted into the new armies or
settled as colonists with the obligation to serve in person if
called upon. Large-scale recruitment of this nature required
considerable finance and, apart from booty acquired in war,
the revenues were preponderantly gained through fiscal
exactions, such as land and poll tax and dues on sales, and for
the system to be operative it was necessary for the native
population to accept its rulers and support, with resignation,
if not enthusiasm what was in effect an occupation army.
Hence the adoption of native institutions and native titu-
lature in Egypt and Babylonia. The new dynasts proclaimed
themselves the successors of the previous rulers, blessed by
the native gods, whether Ahura Mazda, Bel Marduk, or
Amon Re, and the indigenous population to some degree
identified with the new regimes. When Ptolemy took to the
field in 312 to attack the Antigonid armies in Syria, the
majority of his troops were native Egyptian, not merely bag-
gage handlers and camp followers, but front-line fighters
'useful for combat'.7 Graeco-Macedonian settlers, however
numerous, were not sufficient for a grand army, and all major
battles from the death of Alexander were fought with an
exotic blend of troops: Macedonians, natives trained in
Macedonian style, mercenaries of all nationalities. Alexander
may have won his major battles without using troops other
than his Macedonians, but the situation had changed even
before his death. Iranian cavalry were used in front-line
situations as early as the battle of the Hydaspes (326), and
after the dismissal of 10,000 Macedonian veterans in 324
  7
    Diod. 19.80.4. On the use of native troops trained in Macedonian style see
Ch. 3, pp. So, 83 and Ch. 4.
4                                Introduction
Alexander was increasingly turning to Iranian infantry which
had been trained in Macedonian weaponry and tactics. He
even experimented with a mixed phalanx of Macedonians
and Iranians, each using their traditional weapons.8 His
successors had no alternative but to follow his example. The
last army that was wholly or almost wholly Macedonian was
the expeditionary force which Craterus and Antipater led
into Asia in 321. Four years later, in the great campaign
of Paraetacene, both sides deployed composite armies with
Macedonians, both infantry and cavalry, in a minority.
This had an important consequence. The new rulers were
Macedonians, commanders under Alexander, but their courts
were more cosmopolitan, their friends recruited from the
entire Greek world and their armies still more heterogeneous.
And the entire structure rested on an agrarian population
which had little or no part in the political and military estab-
lishment. These natives might be coerced into subjection by
the military settlements created in their territory; but it was
economical to attract their good will. In other words, the
rulers were all things to all men. To their native subjects they
were the legitimate kings, the successors of indigenous rulers,
who like their predecessors had their power sanctioned by
the local gods. For their armies they were naturally com-
manders, who proved their legitimacy by success in the field
and by gaining spoils and land to reward their troops. For
their courts they were benefactors, rewarding good service
with material honour and wealth. The new regimes had no
tradition, no established customs; rather they encountered
a multiplicity of traditions which they absorbed and modi-
fied. For the populations of Egypt and Babylonia they were
pharaohs or kings of the four corners of the earth. For Greek
cities in their ambit they used the diplomatic language that
had evolved to transact business between city-states and hege-
monial powers.9 The rulers had absolute power over these
communities, but they courteously heard the representations
of city embassies and gave grants of freedom, autonomy,
    s
    Arr. 7.23.3, 24.1 (FGrH 139 F 58). See Ch. 3, pp. 79—81
 ** See now the subtle discussion by John Ma, Antiochus III and the Cities of Asia
Minor, esp. 179—242.
                           Introduction                       5
exemption from tribute or garrison, and graciously received
acclamations of saviour, benefactor, or even god manifest.
This is in effect the relation of fifth-century Athens to her
subjects, but the autocracy is less bluntly expressed than we
find with the sovereign demos— and the gratitude of the
subjects is more fulsome.
   The new regimes were essentially the creation of indi-
viduals, who exploited the absence of any effective central
power. It could be a relatively gradual process, when a more
powerful satrap expelled or absorbed his neighbours, as
Antigonus did in Asia Minor between 315 and 313. There
were also what one might describe as defining moments, the
most important of which was the winter of 317/16 when two
warring coalitions of satraps fought it out in the Iranian
plateau. Antigonus emerged victorious from the campaign,
promptly outnian<KUvred his fellow generals, Peithon and
Seleucus, and became in effect master of a vast territory
from Persis to the Hellespont. At Alexander's death there
were twenty or so satrapies, in constant interplay with each
other, and by 308 they had effectively severed contact with
Macedon and coalesced into three separate groupings, under
Antigonus, Seleucus and Ptolemy. The reality was recog-
nized in 306, when Antigonus solemnly assumed the diadem,
the insignia of kingship, and took the title of Basileus for all
official purposes.10 He gave his son Demetrius the same
trappings, and his example was followed by Ptolemy and
Seleucus, by Cassander in Macedon, and even by Agathocles
in Sicily. It was the end of a charade. The new rulers had in
theory received their original power base from the king of
Macedon, from Alexander himself or the regents governing
in the name of the two incapable kings who succeeded him.
They recognized it in their public protocol. In Egypt and
Babylon Ptolemy and Seleucus represented themselves as
satraps, and even Antigonus merely styled himself 'royal
commander' (mh uqi) when he was master of Babylonia.
They were technically subordinates, but since Alexander's
death there had been no effective power to impose discipline
from above. The fatal step probably came in 319, when the
                 10
                 n ^j1js sce t|1£ eXpOSiti<)n jn Ch, 7.
6                               Introduction
regent Antipater returned to Macedon with the two kings,
effectively renouncing the empire in Asia and delegating
most of the royal army to Antigonus. It gave Antigonus the
means to extend his power throughout Asia Minor and
defeat the satrapal coalition in Iran.
   This process, the unravelling of central authority and the
creation of new monarchies, is the context of my book. It is
in no sense a formal history of the period but a series of
studies which explore the political and military background
and lay some of the groundwork for a more comprehensive
treatment. Some preliminary discussion is necessary, for the
events of the period were tumultuous and confused. For the
non-specialist they are frankly baffling, a kaleidoscope of
exotic individuals engaged in complex military and diplo-
matic manoeuvres on several fronts simultaneously. Some
basic points of reference are clearly desirable, and I hope it
will be of assistance to my readers if I now sketch in the early
stages, the division of the empire and the first bout of
internecine warfare which came close to defining the shape of
the Hellenistic world. Subsequent events, in particular the
period from 318 to 311, are covered in the central chapters
(4—6) of the book. T also provide a chronological appendix
correlating key events in Europe and Asia.
2. HISTORICAL ORIENTATION
    u
     What follows is a summary of the conclusions which I reach in Ch. a, where
sources and bibliography arc fully cited.
                                Introduction                                   j
He had been recalled by Alexander a year before the latter's
death and commissioned to lead reinforcements into Asia, but
neither he nor any military forces had moved, and he was still
the dominant figure in Europe. We have evidence only for
events in Babylon, where, it seems, the marshals were disin-
clined to make any radical decision. The first proposal was to
await the birth of the child who would be born to Alexander's
wife, Rhoxane, and in the unlikely event of its proving male
and surviving it would have four guardians, two of the Body-
guards at Babylon, Perdiccas and Leonnatus, and Craterus
and Antipater in the west. This cautious delaying of the issue
was sabotaged by the infantry at. Babylon, which demanded
a present, living king and proclaimed the half-brother of
Alexander, Arrhidaeus. He was mentally impaired and could
not rule without a guardian, but that was no deterrent to the
Macedonian rank-and-file or to their leader, Meleager, who
saw himself as the king-maker. A tense period of confronta-
tion between the infantry and cavalry eventually ended in
compromise, with the cavalry accepting Arrhidaeus and the
infantry agreeing to the child of Alexander as a second king.
The key players retained their positions. Perdiccas remained
as chief of staff (chiliarch), the position he had held under
Alexander: Antipater was confirmed in Macedonia, while
Craterus had a roving commission to promote the royal
interests wherever he thought fit.
   The situation changed a little later, when Perdiccas was
able to dispose of Meleager and execute the chief mutineers
in the Macedonian infantry. He felt strong enough to assume
the regency, and he was hailed guardian of the kingdom by
his troops and authorized to decide on the satrapies as he
saw fit. It was in effect a coup. Antipater could do nothing
about it. Once reports of Alexander's death had been authen-
ticated in Greece, the Athenians and Aetolians made an
alliance against Macedon and called the rest of the Greek
world to the cause of liberty.12 Within a matter of weeks
Thermopylae was occupied by the insurgent forces, while
   " For general bibliography on the Lamian War see J. Scibert, Das Zeitaller der
Diadochen 92—8, and the extremely useful dissertation of Oliver Schrmtt, Der
L&mtsche Kneg. For a short, recent account of the war see Christian Ilabichf,
/ithews t?om Alexander to Antony 36—42.
8                                   Introduction
Antipater himself, deserted by his crack Thessalian cavalry,
suffered the first defeat experienced by Macedonian arms in
30 years and took refuge in Lamia. There was nothing he
could do to effect events in Babylon, and Craterus also chose
to remain in Cilicia and await the outcome of events. For
the moment Perdiccas was the dominant personality, and he
distributed the satrapies with a view to entrenching his dom-
ination. The most powerful of Alexander's marshals disap-
peared from court and were assigned to remote satrapies,
where they had very limited forces at their disposal, too weak
at all events to challenge the power of the centre. However,
if the centre were to be weakened, then there was the oppor-
tunity for expansion. The monarchs-to-be had the bases for
their future power. Ptolemy occupied Egypt, where he found
a useful war chest of 8,000 talents, amassed by its adminis-
trator, the astute and unscrupulous Cleomenes of Naucratis.13
Another Bodyguard, Lysimachus, occupied Thrace, where
he was to hold sway for the rest of his long life. Yet another
of the main actors in the period, Antigonus, was confirmed
in Phrygia, where he had been installed by Alexander long
ago in 334 and had distinguished himself by repelling the
Persian counter-offensive after Issus.14 Seleucus was the
only future dynast who did not receive a satrapy in the dis-
tribution. He remained in Babylon, second in command
to Perdiccas with Perdiccas' old position of chiliarch. 15 That
left Perdiccas without a rival at the royal court: he was the
guardian of Arrhidaeus (who now changed his name to
Philip), commander of the army at Babylon, and the unchal-
lenged head of a group of subordinate commanders who
included his own brother Alcetas.
   By the end of 323 the balance of power had changed.
Antipater was in desperate straits, defeated and under siege at
Lamia. He was awaiting reinforcements but it was uncertain
  13
      Dirid. 18.14,1; Just, 13.6,18—19; Arr. Slice. V la; Paus, 1.6,3, t)f> the career of
Cleomenes see Berve no. 431; Seibert, Utitersuchwigen 39—51; H, Kloft, G,B 15
(1988) 191—222; G. Lc Rider, BCH. izi (1997) 71-93.
  14
      On Antigonus' career under Alexander see briefly Hosworth, Conquest and
Empire 52, 62—3, 231; and at greater length Briant, Antigone le Borgne 53—74;
Billows, Anfig&w&s 36—48,
  5:5
      Oiod. 18.3,5; J^st, 13-4- 1 7> See the discussion irs Ch. 2, p. 56 with n. 10.2.
                                  Introduction                                      g
who, if anyone, would come to his rescue. Craterus remained
in Cilicia and made no move towards Macedonia. He may
have been in genuine doubt what to do, and he was presum-
ably aware that Antipater had also made overtures to
Leonnatus in Hellespontine Phrygia.' 6 In the event he was
prepared to cede the glory of intervention. In Babylon
Rhoxane at last bore a son, who received his father's name
but not (at first) the kingship.17 It was prudent to wait until
he had survived the first year of infancy. But Perdiccas
had the acknowledged king (Arrhidaeus) in his power and
acted in his name. He also had an army at his disposal and
proceeded to use it. The pretext was given by another of the
powerful actors in our drama, Eumenes of Cardia. Eumenes
was a Greek who had acted as chief secretary for both Philip
and Alexander. As events were to show, he had a very consid-
erable strategic genius, and in the last years of Alexander he
commanded a unit of the elite Companion cavalry. At
Babylon he was given the satrapy of Cappadocia, which had
escaped conquest under Alexander and was dominated by an
Iranian noble, Ariarathes, None of the other commanders in
Asia Minor gave him military assistance, as they had been
instructed, and Perdiccas took the royal army to break the
power of Ariarathes and install Eumenes as satrap. In this he
was strikingly successful. Ariarathes was defeated in a full-
scale pitched battle and executed along with his family;
Eumenes immediately took over the provincial organization
of Cappadocia. Perdiccas, it would seem, now had the infant
Alexander formally proclaimed king.
   Meanwhile, in Macedonia Leonnatus had at last brought
forces from Asia and Europe, to the relief of Antipater.
Leonnatus arrived early in the spring of 322, and lost his life in
a cavalry battle against the Thessalians. His infantry phalanx
was untouched, however, and joined forces with Antipater,
who was content to avoid another battle and return to
Macedon. Now Craterus at last made his move. He led his
10,000 veterans from Cilicia across Asia Minor. There is no
  lh
       Diod. 18,12.1; Plut. Eum. 3.6—8; just. 13.5,14-15,
  !7
       Art". Succ, F ia. r , On the chronology see Bosworth, f70 43 (1993) 423—6.
io                                Introduction
record of his meeting Perdiccas, and it is most likely that the
regent had invaded Cappadocia from the east, via Armenia
where his lieutenant Neoptolemus is attested operating with
a force of Macedonians.'8 These two principal actors in the
drama seem to have avoided each other, and it appears that
there was a real danger of conflict if they met in person. In
Macedonia Craterus decisively shifted the military equilib-
rium. His veterans brought the forces at Antipater's disposal
to over 40,coo,'9 far outnumbering the Hellenic coalition,
which was hamstrung by the absence of the Aetolians, pre-
occupied by their own concerns in the west.30 The Athenians
and their allies had no chance against this new army, led by
arguably the ablest of Alexander's marshals. At the Battle of
Crannon, late in July 322, the Macedonian phalanx proved
its superiority yet again over Greek hoplite infantry, and
almost simultaneously at sea Craterus' fleet won a series of
victories over the Athenians, culminating in the Battle of
Amorgos. The Lamian War now ended, as Athens surren-
dered and Antipater and Craterus dictated their terms
to the Greek alliance. It was the (temporary) end of demo-
cracy in the city of Pericles, which now came under a res-
tricted oligarchy, supervised by a Macedonian garrison in
Peiraeus. 2 '
   Craterus had ostentatiously deferred to Antipater, the
older man and friend of Philip II, But there had clearly been
some friction, as Craterus dressed himself as a clone of
Alexander (without the diadem) and his soldiers compared
him very favourably with the small, unprepossessing figure
   18
      Pint. Kum, 4.1-4 (cf, IJriant, RTF 30-41; Husworth, ORBS 19 (1978) 132-3),
Armenia, like Cappadocia, w'as not under Macedonian control at the time of
Alexander's death, and its subjugation was unfinished business. Perdiccas could
have stamped his authority there on his way to Cappadocia, and after the defeat of
Anarathcs be sent Neoptolemus to complete the conquest. He rnoy have imposed
Orontes as satrap before the outbreak of the first coalition war. See Ch. 4, n. 93,
   19
      IJiod, 18.16.4-17.2. On the numbers see Ch. 3, p. 79.
   20
      I>iod. 18.13.3, IS-*- On the murky evidence for war in the west see my
forthcoming article, 'How did Athens lose the Lamian War?', in 0, Palagia and
S. V. Tracy (cds.), The Macedonians in Athens ^22-22g B.C. (Oxford 2003).
   31
      Diod. 18.18.4—5; Pint. Phoc. 27.5—28.7. On the settlement see Hammond,
//iM'iit.i 14—15; Habieht, Aihens from Alexander to Ant$n\' 44—6; L, Tritle, Phvciiyfl
the Oood 1.29—37, and most recently E. Poddighe, T)HA. 23/2 (1997) 47—82 and
K. J. Baynha.m, 'Antipater and Athens', in Paiagia and. Tracy (above, n. 20).
                                  Introduction                                     11
                  22
of Antipater. He married Phila, Antipater's eldest daugh-
ter, and prepared to return to Asia. That would have been a
reversal of Alexander's instructions, which were to have
Craterus replace Antipater as regent, as it was of the final set-
tlement at Babylon, which not only distributed the satrapies
but assigned Macedon to Craterus and Antipater together,23
That was hardly an attractive prospect for either, and it is not
surprising that Craterus was preparing for a return to Asia,
where he might coexist or—more likely—conflict with
Perdiccas. By the summer of 322 Perdiccas appeared domin-
ant. He followed his defeat of Ariarathes with a punitive
expedition against two cities of Lycaonia (Laranda and
Tsaura), which had resisted Macedonian rule and killed
Balacrus, satrap of Cilieia under Alexander.34 They were
ruthlessly destroyed, to deter resistance elsewhere. It was
at this peak of success that Perdiccas married Nicaea, a
daughter of Antipater, whom he had requested shortly after
Alexander's death. But she was not the only lady who had an
interest in him. The queen mother Olympias wrote, propos-
ing that he marry her own daughter, Cleopatra, Alexander's
full sister; and there is a tradition of disagreement in the
Perdiccan camp, Eumenes arguing that Olympias' offer
should be explored and Alcetas insisting that the marriage
agreement with Antipater should stand.25 A third princess,
Cynnane (also a daughter of Philip II), also entered into
contention. She evaded Antipater's custody and fled to
Asia Minor with her daughter. There she was killed in mys-
terious circumstances by Alcetas, apparently with Perdiccas'
  " This was emphatically stated in Arrian's History of events after Alexander
(below, p. 22): cf. Arr. Sncc. ¥ rtj (sec also the pew Goteborg palimpsest) with Plut.
Phoc. 29,3.
  z:<
      The planned return to Asia is attested by Diod. 18.18.7. The division of
.Vjaeedon at Babylon is attested only m Arr. Succ, ¥ ia-7 (see Ch. 2, pp. 58—9).
  24
      Oiod. 18.22.i. Balacrus appears to have been the tirst husband of Phila,
daughter of Antipater and wife of Craterus (WelirJi, Historia 13 (1964) 141; Heckel,
ZPE 70 (1987) 161-2; Badian, ZPE 72 (1988) 116; Bosworth, CQ 44 (1994) 60). He
bad been a Bodyguard of Alexander (Arr. 2.1.2.2), and was clearly a noble of the
highest distinction, whose death cried out tor vengeance.
  25
      Arr. Succ. F 1.21; cf. Just. 1.3.6.4—7. According to Diodorus (18.23,1) Cleopatra
came in person to Lycaonia.. That is unlikely; the intrigue would have been too obvi-
ous, Ferdiccas later invited her to Sardes, where she had established herself by early
321 (Arr. Succ, I" 1.26, 25.2—6). That was a prelude to tormal marriage.
12                                 Introduction
                 26
connivance. It is clear that she was deeply estranged from
Antipater, and neither Perdiccas nor his brother wished to
cause a provocation by giving her sanctuary and support.
However, her death was found intolerable by the troops, who
came close to mutiny, and to calm the situation Cynnane's
daughter was married to King Philip, his mental disability
notwithstanding, and like her husband (and uncle) she
assumed a royal name, Eurydice. This was a woman of a very
different mould from her husband, deeply ambitious, calcu-
lating and hostile to Antipater; she was no cipher, to be
manipulated at will.
   This complex situation became even more entangled when
Perdiccas intrigued against Antigonus, the long-standing
satrap of Phrygia, who had kept up friendly relations with
Antipater throughout Alexander's reign. Perdiccas is said to
have been suspicious of his ambitions and summoned him to
answer charges of conspiracy.27 Antigonus accordingly fled
to Europe, where he joined Antipater and Craterus in
Aetolia. It was the winter of 322/1, and they were crushing
the last of the insurgent powers. Antigonus 5 arrival saved
Aetolia for the moment. He brought news, or rumours, of
the intrigues for the hand of Cleopatra, and it was sufficient
to push the two dynasts into open war.28 At the same time
Perdiccas had sent Eumenes to negotiate with Cleopatra in
her residence at Sardes, and his arrival was duly passed on to
Antigonus by Menander, the sympathetic satrap of Lydia. 29
That consolidated the impulse to war, and the spring of 321
saw Antipater and Craterus at the Hellespont at the head of
a Macedonian army which could compare, in numbers at
least, to Alexander's expeditionary force of 334. But Perdiccas
had fatally overreached himself by alienating Ptolemy in
Egypt. Late in 322 the immensely lavish catafalque which
contained the enbalmed body of Alexander began its
   zf>
       Arr. Slice. V 1,22—3; Polyaen. 8.60; cf. Diod. 19,52.5. Bee particularly
E, Carney, Women and Monarchy ??? Macedonia 29—31, arguing that Cyrmane
intended her daughter to marry Philip Arrbkiaeus; there is no warrant for this in the
sources.
   27
       Arr. Succ. F i.zo; Diod. 18,23.3—4; cf. Billows, Antigonos 58—9,
  2
    ^ Dtod, 18.25.3—5; An\ Succ. F 1.24. ! rake the winter of Diod. 18,25,1 to be
                                                      2l>
that of 322/1.                                            Arr. Succ. F 1,26; cf. F 25.2.
                                  Introduction                                     13
journey west from Babylon, Perdiccas, it would seem,
intended to take control of the mortal remains, whether to
keep them with him for the moment or to escort them to
their final destination.30 But. he was forestalled by Ptolemy
who met the cortege near Damascus and escorted it south to
Egypt.3' Perdiccas had lost, the body with all the mystique it
invested upon its owner, and he was set on recovering it.
That meant war, not merely with Ptolemy but also the city
kings of Cyprus who had allied themselves with him.
   Perdiccas had to engage on several fronts, and he chose
to concentrate his own efforts on Egypt. In Asia Minor
Eumenes was commissioned to co-ordinate the defence
against Antipater and Craterus. Unfortunately the other com-
manders in the area refused to co-operate. Alcetas, slighted
at being passed over by his brother, stayed in Pisidia with
his Macedonian forces, while Neoptolemus fought a pitched
battle against Eumenes, losing the engagement thanks to the
superior cavalry that Eumenes had recruited in Cappadocia.
In the confusion Craterus and Antipater crossed the Hellespont
unopposed. Despite the disarray in his camp Eumenes com-
bined his and Neoptolemus' armies and faced Craterus in
battle in the early summer of 321.32 This battle was militar-
ily inconclusive. The two phalanxes failed to engage (it
would have pitted Macedonian against Macedonian) and the
fighting was restricted to the cavalry on the wings. Here the
great casualty was Craterus who died heroically; Eumenes on
the other wing killed his bitter enemy Neoptolemus in single
combat and routed his cavalry. The defeated force remained
together, and Eumenes did not risk attacking its infantry.
  *° The consensus of the sources is that the body of Alexander was originally
intended to be buried at Siwah (Diod. 18,3.5; Curt. 10,5,4; Just. 12.15,7; 13-4.6)- It"
Pausanias (1.6.3) 's correct, Arrhidacus was instructed to take the body to the
Macedonian capital of Aegae. That rmght have been a decision made through
mutual consultation by Perdiccas, Craterus, and Antipater in the year after the
king's death. In that case Perdiccas would have been unwilling to let the body pass
into the control of Antipater and Craterus once hostilities had broken out, and he
would have been eager to intercept it and dispose of it at hm leisure after he had won
the war.
  31
      Arr. Succ. F 1.25, 24,1; Diod, 18.28,2-5; Strabo 17.1.8 (794); Parian Marble,
FGrH 239 R n. See in particular Badian, HSCP 72 (1967) 185-9; Seibert,
Untersuckwigeii 96—102, 110—12.
  ^ On this campaign sec Ch. 3 f pp. 8 i > 84—5.
14                                 Introduction
The troops agreed to an armistice, but then withdrew by
night and joined Antipater, who had gone ahead to Cilicia.
Meanwhile there had been a resolution of the crisis. Perdiccas'
invasion had misfired, like so many previous invasions of
Egypt. He failed to break the coastal defences at Pelusium,
and he sustained an unacceptable number of casualties when
he attempted to cross the Nile near Memphis.33 Alienated by
his autocratic savagery,34 his chief lieutenants, notably Peithon
and Seleucus, conspired to kill him, and the war in Egypt
ended,
   Ptolemy immediately entered the enemy camp and made
his peace. Subsequently a council of senior officers resolved
to appoint two regents in place of Perdiccas, and the choice
fell on Peithon and Arrhidaeus. 35 The murderer of Perdiccas
and the organizer of Alexander's cortege were associated
in the care of the kings, and, given equal, power, each, would
be a check on the other's ambitions. Ptolemy remained in
Egypt, in all probability with a contingent of Macedonians
to strengthen his satrapal forces. At the same time the army
passed a sentence of death on the most prominent members
of Perdiccas' faction. Those who had turned against him
were of course exempt, but Eumenes was condemned, as
were Alcetas in Pisidia and Attalus, who commanded the
Perdiccan fleet, still intact after the Egyptian campaign.36
In all some fifty Macedonians were sentenced, mostly in
absentia, and between them they controlled a significant
armament. It would not be easy to suppress them. And there
was an additional factor, Antipater. The commanders at
Memphis had acted independently of him, just as Perdiccas
had done at Babylon, and there was no guarantee that he
   33
      The campaign is vividly described by Diodorus (18.33.1—35.6), on which see
Seibertj Utitcrsuchungen 114—28. What particularly incensed Perdtecas5 troops was
the needless losses by drowning and crocodile attacks (36.2—3).
   34
      This is attested by Arr. Sitcc. F 1.28 and Diod. 18.33.3. It is a stereotype, con-
trasting with Ptolemy's magananimity and moderation, but there is likely to be
some truth behind the contrast of characters.
   35
      According to Diod, 18.36-6 Ptolemy might have beet) given the regency but
did not canvass it. There is no hint of this in Arrian's parallel account of the
meeting (Sure. F 1.29-30).
   -^ Arr. SMCC. 1.30; Diod. 1.8.37,2—4: Pint. Ewn. 8.1—4; -^P- £*?«//, 5.1; just.
13.8.10.
                                   Introduction                                     15
would accept the new dispensation. He had a united army,
little weaker than when it crossed the Hellespont and with-
out doubt containing more Macedonians than the army in
Egypt. There is no record of his reaction to the new regents,
but he certainly held aloof for some time, maintaining his
army in the natural fortress of Cilicia, exactly as Craterus
had done in 323.37
   Meanwhile the royal army, with two regents, two kings
and a queen, moved north from Memphis and continued up
the Syrian coast to the great triple game park named
Triparadeisus, near the sources of the River Orontes, to the
north of the Bekaa Valley.38 Antipater had been summoned
to court, as had Antigonus, who had been operating in
Cyprus, but neither, it seems, had arrived when the army
reached Triparadeisus. By then the royal army had become a
mutinous rabble. The Macedonians, particularly the elite
Silver Shields, demanded the donatives which Alexander
had promised them at Opis, long ago in 324, and their truc-
ulent mood was exacerbated by Queen Eurydice who agitated
against the regents and demanded to share the decision-
making with them.39 Antipater now appeared with his army.
He was evidently well aware of the situation at court, and
entered the stage when it had become uncontrollable. Even
before he arrived, he had been proclaimed regent by the
troops after Peithon and Arrhidaeus had abdicated. On
arrival he pitched camp on the bank of the Orontes opposite
to the royal army, and attempted to restore order. However,
he faced the determined opposition of Eurydice who stirred
up the royal troops to fresh demands. Their mood was
hardly sweetened by the appearance of Craterus' veterans
who had already been handsomely rewarded. Accordingly
  •^ This delay is not' explicitly attested, but it must have occurred. At the time of
Craterus' death in Asia Minor Antipater was well on his way to Cilicia (Diod.
18.29.7, 33-0- After the new regents were appointed, Antipater was summoned to
the kings, hut when the royal party reached Triparadeisus, it was still some days
before he arrived m camp (Oiod. 18.39.3), The royal army had at least three tirp.es
the disfa.nee to cover frorn .Viemphis, Antipater was certainly not hurrying fo meet it.
  38
      Strabo 16,2.19 (75°)- 't is usually assumed that Strabo's Faradeisus is the same
as Diodorus' Triparadeisus, So K. Dussaud, Topogrophie historique de la Syrie
antique et medievede 112, accepted in the new Barriegton Atlas,
  :
   " Arr. Slice. F 1.31—2; Diod. 18.39.3. See further Ch. 3, p. 87,
16                              Introduction
Antipater was nearly lynched when he tried to address the
mutinous troops of the royal army and was only saved by
the intervention of Antigonus and Seleucus (who had
commanded the Silver Shields under Alexander). What
happened next is obscure. It is attested that Antipater was
able to calm the unrest and intimidate Eurydice, and it is
most likely that he threatened to use his army, which was
comparatively fresh, against the mutineers. The tension
must have recalled the crisis at Babylon when infantry and
cavalry came close to open hostility. At Triparadeisus the
threat was enough, and Antipater was acclaimed regent a
second time by both armies. Now his powers had a legit-
imacy that Perdiccas could never claim, endorsed as they
were by practically all the Macedonians under arms.
   Like Perdiccas, Antipater supervised another distribution
of satrapies. There were few surprises. Most satraps, particu-
larly in the east, were confirmed in office. Otherwise the adher-
ents of Craterus or murderers of Perdiccas were rewarded.
The previous regents received strategic areas: Arrhidaeus
succeeded Leonnatus in Hellespontine Phrygia, while Peithon
was assigned to his former satrapy of Media, probably with an
overriding command in the Iranian highlands. 40 Elsewhere
Seleucus received Babylonia, the nucleus of his future king-
dom; Craterus' admiral, Cleitus, replaced Menander in Lydia,
while the king's brother, Amphtmachus, was appointed to
Mesopotamia.41 The military arrangements are interesting.
Antipater clearly wished to be separated from the mutineers
who had threatened his life, and transferred the 3,000 Silver
Shields to Susa, where they were to relocate the royal treasury
to the coast. The war against the Perdiccan forces in Asia
Minor was assigned to Antigonus, who, as satrap of Phrygia,
was most strategically placed for the campaign, and he
was given charge of the rest of the royal army, which now
predominantly comprised non-Macedonian troops. The
position of chiliarch was retained, and Antipater named
Cassander in place of Seleucus, to command the elite cavalry
         40
              Diocl 19.14.1. See Ch. 4, n. 27,
         41
              Arr. Sure. F 1.35; Diod. 18.39.6. See Ch. 4, pp. 113-14.
                               Introduction                                17
                                                           42
squadron and be head of protocol at court. The regent
retained his own army, and along with the kings he accompan-
ied Antigonus into Asia Minor.
   The year was now 320, and events at Triparadeisus had
been fatefully protracted. The outlawed commanders in Asia
Minor had been given time to consolidate and recruit local
forces. There were two foci. In Pisidia Alcetas attracted a
number of refugees from the east. The most important was
Perdiccas' admiral and brother-in-law, Attalus, who brought
his fleet from Egypt via Tyre, which he turned into a bas-
tion against the new regime, and brought a considerable
army to Pisidia to reinforce Alcetas. From Babylon Docimus,
appointed satrap by Perdiccas, made his way to Asia Minor,
and by the end of the year he was operating in Alcetas'
camp.43 Eumenes meanwhile had consolidated his own
army, strengthening the loyalty of the Macedonians he had
acquired from Neoptolemus and the formidable contingent of
Cappadocian cavalry that he had levied in 322. Unfortunately
for him, Alcetas and his fellow Macedonian commanders
refused to co-operate, out of jealousy for his success, and the
two groups fought separately against the royal armies. Even
so, Eumenes was no easy target. For the latter part of 320 he
held his own against Antipater and Antigonus. He began
operations in Lydia, in close contact with Cleopatra, but then
moved to occupy Phrygia, outmanoeuvring Antipater and
Antigonus, and the winter of 320/19 saw him in Antigonus'
capital, Celaenae.44 This campaign is very poorly attested and
difficult to follow, but it is clear that there was some discord
between Antipater and Antigonus. Antipater's military per-
formance was dismal; during the winter Eumenes was able to
plunder localities supposedly under his protection without
his intervening. The troops were not impressed, and the
Macedonian veterans had little stomach for fighting their
old comrades serving under Eumenes. Some 3,000 of them
  42
     Arr, Succ, ¥ 1.38, T'fie chiliarchy was renewed the following year at
Antipater's deathbed (Diod. 18.48.4-5; Plut. Phor.. 31,1).
  43
     Arr, SIKC. F 24.3—5; Plut. Bum. 8.8; Diod. 18.45,3. ^ec also the Goteborg
palimpsest (Ch. 3, p. 88). Cf, Billows, A.ntigonos 382—3, no. 35.
  44
     Plut. Ettm. 8.7. I have attempted to reconstruct this campaign in my essay
'History and Artifice' 56—89.
18                              Introduction
deserted, and forced their repatriation to Macedonia.45
Added to that there was discord between Cassander and
Antigonus, which was resolved by Antipater's decision to
withdraw to Macedon with the kings and leave the campaign
in Asia Minor exclusively with Antigonus, For that he gave
him the bulk of the army which had crossed with him into
Asia, no less than 8,500 Macedonian infantry and half the
cavalry and elephants,
   Together with the remnants of the royal army which fell
under his command at Triparadeisus, these forces gave
Antigonus an overwhelming superiority over both the enemy
camps. For all his tactical genius Eumenes was forced into
two battles early in 319, and lost most of his army by death
or desertion. By the end of spring he was undergoing siege in
the fortress of Nora, in southern Cappadocia, and capitula-
tion was only a matter of time. The defeat of Alcetas followed,
as Antigonus stormed west into Pisidia and overwhelmed the
modest army there. Alcetas fled to Termessus, where he was
eventually killed and his body surrendered to Antigonus; his
lieutenants were for the most part taken alive and sent to close
confinement in a mountain fortress in the Taurus,
   By the summer of 319 Antigonus was by far the most power-
ful figure east of Macedonia, with an army that comprised
most Macedonian troops who were serving in Asia. It is
hardly surprising that the sources allege he already had
designs on supremacy, for in military terms he was already
supreme.46 Antipater had virtually abandoned Asia, now
that he was back in Pella with the kings in his power, and he
had returned weakened from the chequered campaign he had
fought. By the autumn of 319 he was dead, and before his
death he had nominated his friend Polyperchon to succeed him
as regent, passing over his own son, Cassander, who remained
chiliarch. It was a controversial decision, bitterly resented
by Cassander, and within a few months he had fled from
Macedonia, taking refuge with Antigonus, who was happy
enough to support his feud with Polyperchon. Antigonus him-
self deployed his massive army to expel Arrhidaeus from
            45
                 Poiyacn, 4.6.6. See Ch. 3, p. 90,
           46
                 Set Diod, 18.41,4—5, 47.5, 50.2; Plut. Earn. 12.1.
                                Introduction                                  ig
Hellespontine Phrygia and Clcitus from I^ydia. This he
achieved in the summer of 318, Since Caria was in the hands
of his friend and ally Asander, he effectively controlled Asia
Minor from the Hellespont to the Cilician Gates. He had the
resources to invade Europe, and the pretext to do so in the
person of Cassander. Eumenes had become an irrelevant
nuisance, and Antigonus came to terms with him at Nora,
releasing him from the siege in return for acknowledgement
of his supremacy. As a free agent, Eumenes was open to
offers of employment from early 318, and he was approached
by Polyperchon to act as royal general and to take command
of the Silver Shields. Three distinct theatres of war were now
developing: Polyperchon was espousing the cause of demo-
cracy and attempting to remove the oligarchies in southern
Greece that remained loyal to Cassander; in Asia Antigonus
was occupied by land and sea in the Propontis and Lydia; and
Eumenes was gathering forces in Cappadocia.
   Here we may leave this outline sketch. The scene is set for
the more detailed discussion in the central chapters of the
book, which amount to a history of the period between 318
and 311. The epic duel between Antigonus and Eumenes is
treated at length in Chapter 4, and the story is taken further in
Chapter 6, which covers events between 316 and 311, when
Seleucus established his regime in Babylon.
3, THE BASES OF K N O W L E D G E
  4S
      See Ch. 6, pp. 241-2.
  49
      The principal Babylonian documents are the Uruk king list (Ba.V! Beih, 11
88= Del Monte 207), a list from Babylon (Iraq id, pi, 53 = Del Monte 208-9) and
the so-called Saros Canon (ZA 10 66—7 —Z,.j8/f T 1428). The relevant fragments of
Porphyry arc most easily consulted in /*'GV.£f 240 F z (1—2), 3 {1—9}. They come
from the Armenian version of Kusebius' Chronicle (on the test and its history see
A. A, Mosshammer, The Chronicle of Eusebius ewW Greek Oht'vnQgraphic Tradition
(ILondon 1979} 41—65); jacohy uses the German translation of Josef Karst
(Mosshammcr 58—60).
   50
      The most convenient text is that of jacoby, in FGrfi 239: translations with
brief annotation are to be found in M, \I. Austin, The Hellenistic World from
Alexander to the Rom&n Conquest (Cambridge 1981) 8—9, 39—41 and Phtlhp Harding,
From the End of the Peloftonnesictn War /<> the Battle of Ipsus (Cambridge 1985} T—6.
                                 Introduction                                   21
                                                             51
the so-called Chronicle of the Successors, This is con-
tained on a fragmentary cuneiform tablet now in the British
Museum, and lists events between the fourth year of Philip III
(320/19) and the eighth year of Alexander IV (309/8). Like
the Parian Marble this is a fragmentary text, and its inter-
pretation is extraordinarily difficult. Much of the detail
concerns internal events in Babylon, for which the Chronicle
provides the only evidence, and the references to events in
the west are brief and enigmatic. The tablet becomes more
informative on the reverse, which deals with the period
between 311 and the late summer of 309. Between these
dates the tablet documents a major war in Babylonia between
Antigonus and Seleucus which has left practically no trace in
the Greek tradition, 52 a melancholy indication of how defect-
ive our historical knowledge must be.
   The contextual, framework for these years is provided by
the narrative histories of the period. Of these by far the most
important are Books 18—20 of Diodorus Siculus. These give
a continuous record of events from the death of Alexander to
the eve of the Battle of Ipsus at the end of the archon year
302/1. Book 18 is unusually expansive and cohesive. It deals
with the period between 323 and 318, and is devoted entirely
to events in Greece and the east; there is no reference
to Sicilian affairs, which only resume in book 19 with
Agathocles* rise to power in Syracuse. From that point the
narrative regularly switches from west to east, as is the case
elsewhere in Diodorus, but in the separate theatres of action
his narrative remains detailed and lucid.53 It is universally
acknowledged that these books are a high point for Diodorus.
They contrast with the rhetorical, sensational treatment of
Alexander's reign in Book 17, and present a wealth of detail:
troop numbers and dispositions, satrapal appointments,
miserable diction and including such diverse figures as Phylarchus and his prm™
eipal critic, Polybius.
  /a
      Richard Billows ha.s recently argued that there was an introductory section,
giving a coverage of Alexander's reign, 'no doubt fuller for the later years' (Al. in
Pact and Fiction 300-5).
  7<
      Pays. 1.9,8 — jPGVH 154 ¥ 9: Hteronymus 'has the reputation5 (^xKi- §o^«£<) of
hostility to other kings and of unjustly favouring Gonafas. Ct. Ilornblower,
Hieronymus 246—8.                              "z I explore this topic fully in Ch. 5,
  7
    ^ On his techniques and his personal contribution see Kenneth S. Sacks, in
Simon 1 iombfower (ed.), Greek Histori&graphv 213—32,
  ?
    * On the hypothesised Ptolemaic source see R. Schubert, Die Quellen zur
Geschichte der Diadochenzeit 184—7; Scibert, Untersuchungen 82-3; Uornblower,
Hiei'ftny-mus 50—6, A Hhodian source has also heen posited; 1 liller von Gaertringen,
SKBerlin 36 (191.8) 752—62; Uornblower, Hieronvmus 56—60, 280—1. For the
encomiastic biography of Kurnenes see K. A. Itadley, Hutona 50 (2001) 3—33. In
                                     Introduction                                         27
resumes Hieronymus directly, his choice of material can he
capricious. His narrative may become excessively contracted,
an inevitable danger when boiling down a much longer work;
one need only compare the detail in the palimpsest remains of
Arrian's History of the Successors. There are also startling
omissions, almost a whole year of action, for instance, after
the conference at Triparadeisus, and events may be reported
out of context, like the single enigmatic sentence on the
naval engagements of the Lamian War which comes in with-
out, any report of the preceding campaign and ignores the
sequel.73 None the less, when we can compare his narrative
with other sources, he appears to have been conscientious in
repeating the substance of what he chooses to excerpt. As a
result Hieronymus has come down to us as a far more
rounded figure than any other historian of the period, and
we know infinitely more about his work than any other
attested history of the Successors.
   Historians other than Hieronymus are on record and were
certainly used by some of out extant sources, but it is almost
impossible to track down more than the occasional indirect
citation. Duris of Samos is known to have written a universal
history beginning in 370/69 with the death of Amyntas I I I of
Macedon and continuing until the death of Lysimachus.76
Athenaeus used him as a source of exotic detail like the
personal habits of Demetrius of Phalerum or the famous
Athenian ithyphallic which hymns the godhead of
Demetrius,77 Plutarch refers to him in a number of Lives,
including the Eurnenes,7® but the bulk of the references come
from the Alexander period.79 There are traces in the
contrast, I. lj, .Vlerker, A.HB 2 (lyHS) 90—3, argues that Diodorus worked directly
from Hieronymus alone.
   7S
         Diod. 18. i5,9. On this passage see my discussion in my article cited above, n, 20.
   ~'i'* Diod. 15.60.6 = /"'&'*•// 76 T 5. On the work of Duris see (in brief) Mcister (above,
n. 55) 96-100. There are monographs by R. B, Kebric, In the Shadow of Macedon:
Duris of Santos and L. Torraca, Duride di Santo La ntaschera scenica nella storiografia
elletmttc®.                      "^ Athcn. 12. 542 B—E™FGi'H 76 ¥ 10; Athen. 6.253 ^)~~^-
   7
     * Emu. i.i (paternity of EumcnesJ—FGrH 76 I753> FjO-i conic from the. Phaeton,
   79
         It has recently been argued that Duris along with Cleitarchus was a primary
source for Diodorus fj (L. Prandt, Fnrtuna e realta dell'opera di CKtarco 125—6,
138—40. It has often been maintained that Duns' work, including his monograph
on Agafhocles (F r(>-2r, 56—9) was the source ot much of the Sicilian history in
Diodorus 19—20.
28                                Introduction
                0
Demetrius^ but one can hardly prove that he was a major
source for Plutarch. His use of sources is so eclectic that
without a control it is impossible to track down material that
is not explicitly identified. Duris, we feel, must have made an
impact on the extant tradition, but we have no way of defin-
ing it. The same may be said of the Athenian historians
Diyllus and Demochares. Diyllus is known to have written a
general history of the period 356 to 297, and the 26 books
of it must have given a generous coverage of the generation
after Alexander's death. As for Demochares, the nephew of
Demosthenes, it is known that he wrote a general history
which dealt with Demetrius' second regime at Athens
(294-288) in Books 20-21.8z Polybius attests that he was bit-
terly hostile to Demetrius of Phalerum, and Athenaeus
details his criticism of the honours offered to Demetrius the
Besieger. But that is the almost the sunn of it.8;i Our know-
ledge of the period from Alexander's death down to Ipsus
comes predominantly from Hieronymus, as digested by
Diodorus. Our debt to him becomes apparent when we look at
the period after 301 when we know his work only from sparse
extracts. The half-light of Books 18—20 fades into almost total
eclipse, and what knowledge we have is based on Plutarch,
Justin, and Pausanias supplemented by considerable but
capricious inscriptional evidence. If we have any sort of
history of the years after Alexander (and many other periods),
we owe it to Diodorus, who has arguably contributed more to
our knowledge than any historian of antiquity.
  50
      Set" Ch. S> >">• 132.
  51
      DioO. 16,14.5, 7bA, 21.5 (fr'GtH 73 '1* 1-3). Only three fragments of Diyllus
survive and give no hint of the character of his work. The fact that Diodorus records
most of what we know of it encouraged Hammond to identify Diyllus as a major
source for Diodorus' narrative of Alexander (J'/ir^e Historians of Alexander the
Great, esp. 160-5).
   8~ We do not know7 the dimensions of the work. Not surprisingly, Demochares
dealt with the death of his uncle in 322 (Pint. Dem. yo.^^FGfH 75 p 3), and he
treated the events of 291 in Book 3,1 (Athen. 6.253 n—1> = F2). It reached at least to
the death of Agathocies ([Luc.] Macr. io = F 5).
   83
      There is little point pursuing even more shadowy figures stich as Nyniphis of
1 leracleia (FGrH 153), who is alleged to have written an extensive (22-book) history
of Alexander, the Diadochi and the Kpigoni f Suda* s.v. Nvji$is = T i). Of this only-
one dubious fragment survives (Ae1. NA 17,3 — F 17), discoursing upon the
mammoth vipers and tortoises in the land of the Troglodytes.
                                           2
           The Politics of the Babylon
                   Settlement
  1
      The older bibliography is summarized in J. Seibert, 0tf,« ZeitalU'r der
Dtddochen 84—9, Hit'1 most useful items arc: R. M. Krnngton,jfffS 90 (1970) 49—77;
Schachcrmeyr, Al. in Babylon. Newer contributions include: Billows, Antigonos
esp. 49-59; A. B. Bosworth, CO 43 (1993) 420-7; K. M, Krrtngton, A History of
.Hfticcdon'ia 1.14—20; N. €*. L. libifrnnond, Tin.' Macedonian Stale. 237—43.; S1!fc" «^so
HM 01.98-107; K. M. Martin, AJAH 8 (1983 [1987]) 161-90; ~E. M. Anson,
CPh 87 (1992) 38-43; P, McKcclinie, Historia 48 (1999) 44-60,
   2
      Died. 14.37.6 (vats tar)', he was promptly murdered by his guardian, Acropus.
   •^ Arnyntas 111, for instance, left three sons by his wife Eurydice, and three more
by a second wife, Gygaea, All three sons by iBurydtee were to reign in their own
right: one of the sons of Gygaea was executed by Philip 11 and the other two fled to
Olynthus (just. 8.3.10; cf, J. R. Ellis, Historia 22 (1973) 350-4; G. T. Griffith in
HM 11.699—701). There were other Argeads in contention (Argaeus and Pausanias),
who emerged to challenge Philip I! in the tumultuous year after his accession
(HM ii.2o8).
   4
      These included his cousin, Amyntas son of Perdiccas, and two Lyncesttan
princes (cf. Arr, 1.25.1—2; Curt. 7.1.5—6; just. 11.2.1—3). ^or background see
Bosworth, (.'Gnguffst and Empire 25—8: Badian, in AL in l^cict and Fiction 54—6,
3<3             The Politics of the Babylon Settlement
matter of weeks. The only serious problem of distance involved
the expeditionary force in Asia Minor. Alexander had to
resort to the diplomacy of treachery to dispose of his chief
enemy, Attalus.5 In 323 those problems must have seemed
insignificant. There was no direct issue to the deceased king.
His wife was six (or eight) months pregnant.6 There was no
guarantee that the offspring would be male, still less that
it would survive and thrive. An object lesson had already
been given late in 326 when a son born to Rhoxane had died
shortly after birth, 7 and, given the prevailing infant mortal-
ity, few people would have had any confidence that the preg-
nancy would result in a healthy male child. There remained
Alexander's surviving son, Heracles, but he was not regarded
as a legitimate heir, given that his mother, Barsine, was never
more than a royal concubine.8 The only other Argead in
contention was the surviving son of Philip 11, Arrhidaeus,
but his attested psychiatric disorder meant that he could
never rule as a king in his own right.9
   The paucity of acceptable Argeads was exacerbated by
problems of distance. When Alexander died, his court was
   ^ Oiod. 17.2-4—6, 5.2; Curt, 7.1.3. Alexander's Bgcnt, Heeataeus, colluded with
Atiiilys' Ujl!(>w general mitt lathiT-in-lnw, the great Parmenion,
   6
     Curt. 10,6.9 (six months); Just. 13.2.5 (eight months).
   ^ Meiz EpiL 30, 'ilits is the only source, but the information is credible enough,
See Bosworth, in /I/, in Fact and Fiction t \~-tz.
   8
     On the status of Barsine see Plut. Al. 21.8—9, citing Aristobulus (FGrti 139 K 11);
Emu, 1,7. Ac Alexander's death she and her son wen; in residence at Pergamum
(just, 13.2.0; Diod, 20.20,1),
   9
     There is no point in attempting a diagnosis (see, most recently, Elizabeth
Carney, AHB 15 (2001) 63-89, arguing at length that Arrhidaeus suffered 'mild"
retardation, requiring intermittent support in social interaction). The ancient
sources are vague: Oiott, 18.2.2 speaks vaguely of incurable psychiatric disorders,
and other sources are no more specific (App. Syr. 52.261; Porphyry, .KGW/ 260
P 3.2), The Heidelberg Epitome (FGrff 155 F i .2) terms him 'sluggish, and further-
more epileptic". Justin's reference at 13.2.11 to his 'valetudo maior' has also been
interpreted as epilepsy since Freinsheim's day (cf. Apul. Apol. 50; Kestus 268.14
(Mndsay); Cels, /}<? wied. 3.23,1)), f IcAvever, the one description of him in action
suggests a disturbance more complex than simple epilepsy (Plut, Phoc. 33.5—7),
which in itself would have been unlikely to disqualify him from the kingship.
Plutarch's allegation (Al. 77,8) that Olympias destroyed bis mind with drugs falls in
the same category of doubt as other anecdotes about malevolent stepmothers,
but presupposes serious mental disorder. But Arrhidaeus* psychological condition
became the subject of political propaganda (see below, pp. 41 t'f.), and that has
irredeemably polluted the source tradition. We can no more tell whether he was
clinically mad. or simply retarded ttvan we can whether Alexander was poisoned.
                The Politics of the Babylon Settlement                           31
located in Babylon along with a majority of marshals, includ-
ing the seven known Bodyguards. But that was not the only
centre of power. In Macedon the regent Antipater adminis-
tered the kingdom and controlled the armed forces which
remained there. Little or nothing is known of his court and
the figures of influence (other than his numerous sons), but
there must have been a coterie of powerful nobles who had
remained in Macedon throughout the reign, many of them
survivors from Philip's day, and they will have had their
views on the succession. But the most important single
group outside Babylon was based in Cilicia. This was led
by Alexander's senior general, Craterus, the most successful
commander on the staff and phenomenally popular with his
men.10 With him were over 10,000 veterans destined for
repatriation in Macedonia, who formed the most efficient
fighting force in the empire, superior in numbers at least to
the Macedonian troops left in Babylon." Craterus had
a commission to replace Antipater as regent in Macedonia
and also had written instructions to operate in Cilicia,12
where a vast armament was being assembled in anticipation
of Alexander's campaigns in the west; and the necessary
resources had been concentrated in the treasuries of the area,
in particular the fortress of Cyinda.' 3 If, then, Craterus had
wished to fight for the kingship (and we are told that he
affected regal dress),14 he'd got the ships, he'd got the men,
he'd got the money too, not to mention legitimation from the
dead king, if he wished to establish himself in power in
Macedon. He had his lieutenants, a mini-court which could
almost challenge the constellation at Babylon. With him
   E0
       On Craterus' career see Hecfeel 107—33. ^s popularity is strikingly attested
(Arr, Succ. V ig = Suda s,v. Kparepos; Pfut. Rum. 6.1—3, Demetr. 14.2-3). After his
death in 3*1 his bones were carefully preserved by Kumcncs (as a talisman?) and
surrendered to IMS wife Phiia for buna! in 315 (Diod. 19,59.3—6).
   " Pot" the figures and their implications see below, pp. 73—5.
   " Diod. 18.4.1, 12.1. For discussion see Boswortli, From Arrian to Alexander
208—10.
   1
     3 PQT J£S history and importance see j. B. Bing, Hist&ria zz (1973) 346—50. Even
after Kumeries had exploited its resources in 318 (Diod. 18.63,2; Strab. 14.5.10
(672)) some 10,000 talents remained for Antigonus in late 316 (Diod. 19.56.5).
Later still Antigonus paid, his army for three months out of the money he took from
Cymda for the campaign of Ipsus (Diod. 20.108.2).
   14
       Arr. Succ. F 19.
32              The Politics of the Babylon Settlement
was a senior cavalry commander, Cleitus the White, and at
least three commanders of phalanx regiments: Folyperchon,
Gorgias and Antigenes.15 Given this dispersion of com-
manders, men, and resources it would be fatuous to imagine
that any provision for the succession that was made in
Babylon would necessarily command assent or would remain
unchanged. Why for instance should arrangements brokered
at Babylon by Perdiccas and the Bodyguards be thought to
be binding in Macedon? They might be approved by the
Macedonian forces there, at a pinch, but both Antipater and
Craterus had their own Macedonians who might give vocal
support to alternative arrangements presented to them. For
all we know, they did so. Our evidence is limited to events in
Babylon, and nothing has survived of any description of the
reception of Alexander's death in either Macedon or Cilicia.
As always, we have only a fragment of the jigsaw.
   The situation, then, was constitutionally unique and polit-
ically complex. In that light it comes as quite a shock to read
much of the traditional literature on the Settlement. It pre-
supposes that there was something akin to statute law, with
fixed positions and procedures for a regency, and deals with
a single definitive settlement, which was reached at Babylon
and agreed by all the diverse players in the dynastic game.16
In fact there was constant intrigue, constant negotiation, and
constant compromise. We have evidence for that process
within the narrow context of Babylon, and there is every
reason to assume that it continued after Perdiccas achieved
predominance there. Negotiations would have continued
between Perdiccas, Craterus, and Antipater, and they are
fairly well attested.1'7 We hear of Perdiccas' marital overtures
   15
       Arr. 7.11.4; Just, 12,12.8. Justin also mentions a Polydamas, who may well
have been the Polydamas responsible for the murder of Parmenion (Berve ii
no. 648; 1 ieckel 359—61), Alexander had every reason to he quit of him. There is no
record of any senior command that he may have held in the last years of the reign.
   sff
       See Seibert's bibliography (above, n. i). The most clear-cut recent defence of
'constitutionalism* is presented by N. G. L. I lammmxl, in HM )h.g$—iGb (see aJso
The J^iacadonia'n State 237—43). I have studied the complex views of Fritz
Schachcrmcyr and the development of his views on the Succession in AJAH 13
(1988)57-9."
   17
       One very important intermediary may have been Cassander, Antipater's eldest
son. There is no record of his presence at Babylon at the time of Alexander's death,
                The Politics of the Babylon Settlement                             33
to Antipatcr, designed to reconcile the regent in Macedonia
to Ferdiccas* de facto usurpation of power in Asia.'8 There
will also have been a diplomatic traffic between Perdieeas and
Craterus, and for this we have indirect evidence, Antigenes,
a phalanx commander sent off with Craterus in 324, is later
attested in the entourage of Perdieeas. He commanded the
elite Silver Shields during the invasion of Egypt and was
instrumental in Perdieeas' murder.'9 The name is rare,20 and
it looks as though we are dealing with a single individual.
Antigenes, then, acted as an emissary of Craterus, but was
tempted to remain in Babylon, assuming the command of
the most prestigious infantry group in the Macedonian
army.21 This is a hypothetical reconstruction, but, if correct,
it is interesting corroboration of the diplomatic contacts and
the political opportunism that the crisis generated.
   The Babylon Settlement, then, is a misnomer. What we
are dealing with is the first stage of a complicated process
of political bargaining. It is the compromise between the
conflicting factional groups at Babylon which entrenched
Perdieeas as the dominant figure—the dominant figure at
and if there is any truth in the highly coloured and partisan story of the .Alexander
Romance, he left court a little before the king's death and lingered a while around
Cilicia (Melz Epit, 100; Ps. Call. 3.32.3). If so, he can hardly not have met Craterus,
and carried messages back to Antipater in Maeedon.
   18
      Diod, 18.23.1; Arr. Slice, V 1.21; just, 1.3.6.5—7. A papyrus of the Hellenistic
period, purporting to represent an altercation between Dcmadcs and Dcinarehus at a
judicial hearing in Pella, claims that Nicaea was betrothed to Perdtceas by Alexander
himself (PBerl 13045 = K. Kunst, Berliner Klassikitrtexte V I I (Berlin 1923)).
   "' Arr, Succ. F 1.35, 38; Diod. 18.39,5, 59>3> 62.4—7 etc.; Pint. Bum. 13.3;
cf. Hosworth, 'History and Artifice* 66—70; Hcckcl 312-16. Antigenes had
briefly commanded a phalanx regiment under Alexander, and he was attached to
Craterus on the return march from India {Arr. 6.17.3} and later at Opis (Just.
12.12.8).
    20
       There is possibly one other Antigenes, the one-eyed Macedonian veteran who
falsely listed himself as a debtor early in 324 (Plut. A,le,\'. 70.3—6; cf, Mor. 3390,
where he is conflated with Atarrbias). He was clearly not oi high status, and can
hardly be identified with the phalanx commander, although he may be the
'Antigenes* (the \1SS read Antigonis) who received a minor hypaspist command in
late 331 (Curt. 5.2.5 with Atkinson's commentary ad loc.). See also Billows,
/ijitigowos 57—9, who revives Tarn's hypothesis (AL 11,314) that Plutarch's story is a
garbled version of a tradition relating to the most famous monopfithalmos of the age,
Antigonus himself.
    21
        Heekel 312 (after SO 57 (1982) 57—67) argues that Antigenes was left in Cilicia
as Craterus' lieutenant, and deserted to Perdieeas when he moved on Egypt.
34             The Politics of the Babylon Settlement
Babylon. We have no idea how it was received by Craterus
or Antipater, or even whether they accepted the authority of
the officers and rank-and-file at Babylon, It is the story
of Perdiccas' success, interesting enough in itself, but only
part of the political mosaic. Even here we are plagued with
defective evidence. Most of the sources are the briefest of
epitomes. Photius' excerpts of Arrian and Dexippus are dom-
inated by the catalogue of satrapal appointments; they are
practically uninformative about the events which led to the
settlement. The same can be said of Diodorus, who is at
his most laconic when describing the political conflict at
Babylon, Our chief authorities, at least the most expansive,
are Justin and Curtius Rufus. They do give a summary of
events, but they are mutually contradictory. Are they using
different sources, or do they have different agendas? Justin is
excerpting Trogus' Historiae Philippicae in a notoriously
capricious and slapdash manner, whereas Curtius is explicitly
looking to the present, contrasting the dissolution produced
by the division of powers at Babylon with the state of felicity
achieved at Rome by the uncontested elevation of the cur-
rent emperor. Justin may have mutilated the sense of his ori-
ginal beyond reconstruction, while Curtius, to put it crudely,
may be indulging in historical fiction.22 Can we establish
any firm principles of criticism, or is the truth beyond human
elucidation?
   I shall begin with what is arguably the best attested
episode, the first meeting after Alexander's death and the
acclamation of Arrhidaeus. After a gloomy description of the
mourning by Persians and Macedonians alike, exacerbated
by the ritual quenching of all fires overnight,2-' Curtius gives
a detailed description of a gathering of senior officers in the
royal palace. It is meant to be private, but it is infiltrated by
rank-and-file who refuse to be excluded (10.6.1—3). As a
result it turns into a strange blend of council and assembly,
   11
      So, most dogmatically, McKcchnic (above, n. i), following and intensifying
the arguments of Martin.
   3?
    - dirt. 10.5.16. Some months before Alexander had ordered the quenching of
fires after the death of Hcphaestion, an honour exclusive to the King and seen as
prophetic of his own death (Diod. 17.114.4—5; cf. Schachermeyr, Al, in Babylon
46—8). Curtius interprets the custom as a sign of ge?ieral demoralisation: 4nec
qmsquam lumina audebat accendere'.
                 The Politics of the Babylon Settlement                             35
consilium, and contto. Various proposals are canvassed inconclus-
ively, until Meleager, a senior infantry commander, objects vio-
lently to the prospect of Perdiccas as regent for Alexander's
unborn child, and bursts out of the meeting (10.6.20-4). At
that stage an unknown infantryman speaks out for Arrhidaeus,
who has not hitherto been mentioned (10.7.1-3), and
Arrhidaeus is then introduced to the meeting by Meleager
and hailed as king by the infantry (10.7.7), Justin's account is
significantly different. The initial debate is confined to the
senior commanders.24 The infantry is excluded, and objects
to the fact;25 it then spontaneously declares for Arrhidaeus.
Meleager only appears as a delegate sent alongside Attains to
reconcile the rank-and-file to the decision of the marshals—
at which point he deserts his mission and sides with the
mutineers. That is essentially the story of Diodorus,26 and it
comes from a common tradition.
   By contrast, Curtius' account is a confused pot pourri, and
it has been argued that it has been carefully shaped to draw
an analogy between the proclamation of Arrhidaeus and the
accession of Claudius in January, AD 41.2? The description of
the meeting is based on the senatorial debate during the night
after Caligula's assassination, when (so Josephus claims) a
common praetorian drew attention to the fact that they had
Claudius ready at hand, an emperor in waiting.28 Arrhidaeus
   24
       Just. 13.2.5—3.1; the commanders first meet and confirm Perdiccas' proposal,
They swear allegiance to the four guardians, as then do the cavalry (3.1). Only then
does the infantry enter the equation.
   z
     > just. 13.3.1: 'indignati nullas sibi consilionim partes relictas.'
   26
       Diod. 18.2.2—3. "is account begins with the phalanx opting for Arrhidaeus;
the preliminary council ol the marshals is (.knitted, as it is m PhiHius' miserable
summary of Arrian's }fhtoiy oj the Successors (V ta. 1—2).
   "7 So, in primis, Martin (above, n. i) 176—84. Sec also Atkinson, 1.36—8;
11. Bodefeld, Unte.rsuchungen stir Datierurig der Alexandergeschichte des O. Curtius
Rujits 2j—6. For a rather different interpretation, stressmg Perdiceas' dissimulation,
see .Atkinson, in Al. in Fact and Fiction 321—3. A. M. Devinc (Phoenix 33 (1979)
153-4) had already compared Tiberius and Alexander as masters of deception. For
a compendium of Roman echoes see Baynham, Alexander the Great. The Unique
Htstorv of Quintus Oui'ljus 215,
   35
       Jos.BJ 2,211—12. There is no counterpart in the more extensive version in AJ
19.248-53. In it the soldiers collectively call upon the senate to choose a ruler (249),
and there is no dramatic gesture by any individual. It seems prima facie likely that
Josephits' account ID BJ is rhetorically shaped to echo the events of 323, See below,
n- 33-
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
  Resolved, That the National Association of Retail Druggists
request its members to refrain from using this insignia to
designate their places of business.
    THE STORY OF THE RED CROSS
                           V.
                 SOCIETIES SUGGESTED.
  “Why did I write ‘Un Souvenir de Solferino’”? M. Dunant asks
himself, and replies:
   “That societies, like those suggested, with a permanent existence
should be organized so that they could be ready to act the moment
war was declared. They should receive official recognition from their
respective governments, with permission and facilities for continuing
their noble work to the end. Among their officials should be the most
honorable and esteemed men. In our century of egotism what an
attraction for generous hearts and chivalrous characters to brave the
same danger as the soldier, with a voluntary mission of peace and
consolation! History proves there is nothing chimerical in counting
upon such devotion. Two facts especially confirm this. While the
Sisters of Charity cared for the sick and wounded of the French army
in the Crimea, the Russian and British armies witnessed the arrival
from the north and the west of two legions of noble women nurses.
The Grand Duchess, Helene Paulowna, of Russia, widow of the
Grand Duke Michael, engaged nearly 300 ladies of St. Petersburg
and Moscow, provided them with supplies, and sent them to the
hospitals in the Crimea, where these good women were blessed by
thousands of the soldiers.
   “Miss Florence Nightingale, having received from the Minister of
War a pressing appeal to help the sick and wounded English
soldiers, left for Scutari in November, 1854, with 27 other women. In
1855 Miss Stanley, with 50 more women, went out. The image of
Florence Nightingale, her little lamp in hand, passing at night down
the vast wards of the military hospitals and taking note of each of the
sick and wounded will never be effaced from the hearts of the men
who were the objects of her noble charity, and the story of her work
will remain forever engraved in history.
   “In many cases of similar devotion, ancient and modern, how
many proved of little value because they were isolated and were not
supported by the sympathy of others intelligently associated together
for a common end? Had trained nurses and hospital orderlies been
at Castiglione those terrible days of June 24, 25, and 26, how many
human lives would have been saved? The sight of so many brave
young soldiers crippled by loss of arm or leg returning disconsolately
to their homes must arouse a feeling of remorse that no measures
had been taken beforehand to prevent such consequences of
wounds which would have healed had proper care been given them
at first.
   “For the accomplishment of such a work help must be immediate,
for he who can save the wounded to-day can not save them to-
morrow. Why could not such humane work be organized, permanent,
and universal, instead of desultory, temporary, and restricted? It
appeals to the men of all countries and all ranks, from the monarch
to the workingman, for all may take their part in this good work, from
the high-born lady to the simple housewife—all who desire to
contribute to their neighbor’s welfare. It appeals to the general, to the
marshal, the minister of war, the writer, who by his publications may
plead for a cause that interests all humanity.”
  Dunant also urged the calling of special conferences to formulate
an international treaty for the protection of the sick and wounded and
the hospital personnel in time of war.
  The result of these reflections was the formation in 1863 of the
universal work of the Red Cross, which should not only be useful on
the battle field in war time, but also in time of epidemic, floods, fires,
and catastrophes generally, and in 1864 the first treaty of Geneva,
since accepted by all the civilized countries of the world, was signed.
  The Bishop of Orleans pronounced this “a beautiful and Christian
idea of M. Dunant’s,” observing that “he who does good is the
compatriot of all, and deserves a universal passport.”
      TUBERCULOSIS DEPARTMENT
  AMERICAN RED CROSS CHRISTMAS STAMPS
 Terms and Conditions Governing their Sale and Disposition of
                       the Proceeds.
                                                  Practical experience
                                                in the Red Cross
                                                Christmas         stamp
                                                campaign in the season
                                                of 1908, and in the
                                                distribution   of    the
                                                proceeds from stamp
                                                sales, has shown the
                                                necessity of certain
                                                changes in conditions
                                                and methods. The rules
                                                which will govern in the
                                                sale of stamps and
                                                disbursement          of
                                                proceeds from July 1,
1909, until further notice are as follows:
  Rule 1. The American Red Cross will appoint agents to sell the
stamps and dispose of the proceeds. The stamps will not be sold to
agents but will remain the property of the Red Cross until sold at
retail by the agents. Agents will be such State branches and sub-
divisions of the Red Cross and such anti-tuberculosis societies or
other organizations as may be appointed.
  Rule 2. Before entrusting the sale of Christmas stamps to any
society, the Red Cross will require satisfactory evidence of the
reliability and standing of the society and its ability to creditably carry
out the Red Cross purposes in the expenditure of the proceeds from
stamp sales.
   Every State branch or subdivision and every other society desiring
to sell Christmas stamps is required to first submit to the Central
Committee a statement of the particular anti-tuberculosis work which
it proposes to support or promote with the proceeds from the stamp
sales. If the organization desiring to sell stamps intends to expend
the money itself, the statement should make plain the exact
character of the work proposed to be carried on. If it intends to turn
the money over for expenditure to one or more other societies or
agencies, the names of such other societies or agencies and the
kind of work for which the money will be expended by them should
be explicitly stated.
   All the information called for in rule 2 should reach the National
office of the Red Cross during the summer in order that there may be
no delay in the appointment of agents or the forwarding of stamps
when the selling period arrives.
   Rule 3. The appointment of agents will be for the period ending
March 1, 1910. During the term of its appointment an agent shall
have the exclusive right to sell Red Cross stamps within the city
(including suburbs) in which such agent is situated and the
expenditure of the proceeds of the sale of stamps will be under the
immediate direction of such agent, in accordance with the general
plan approved by the Red Cross.
  Rule 4. The American Red Cross will supply Christmas stamps to
agents free of charge. It will also supply, free of charge, posters and
printed matter intended to assist in the sale of stamps.
   Rule 5. When the stamp sale is ended the agent will return all
unsold stamps to the National office of the Red Cross. The Red
Cross must pay for all stamps printed whether they are sold or not.
Unsold stamps returned are a total loss. In view of this all agents are
requested to order stamps with the utmost care. It is expected that
all orders can be promptly filled. There will, therefore, be no
necessity for trying to make a first order large enough to cover all the
demands for the entire season. This advice is especially urged upon
agents who have not heretofore sold the stamps.
  Rule 6. All express charges and all postage required in forwarding
shipments of stamps or in returning unsold stamps will be paid by
the Red Cross.
  Rule 7. Christmas stamps are to be sold at the uniform price of
one cent each. The stamps will be printed in sheets of 100 each and
shipped in packages of 10,000 stamps or multiples of 10,000. No
broken packages will be shipped. Stamp books will not be issued in
1909.
  Rule 8. In ordering stamps as Christmas approaches, it is
important to consider the congested condition of business with the
express companies and post offices, and the distance which the
shipment must travel. By careful forethought it will usually be found
possible to estimate needs early enough for orders to be filled in
good time. The Red Cross will respond promptly, but cannot prevent
express and postal delays.
  Rule 9. On or before February 1, 1910, every agent which has
sold Red Cross Christmas stamps shall pay to the American Red
Cross an amount of money equal to one-third of the face value of all
stamps sold by such agent. Any expenses incidental to the sale
incurred by the agent will be paid from the two-thirds retained by the
agent and the remainder will be applied to local anti-tuberculosis
work in accordance with the plans previously approved by the Red
Cross.
  Societies which sold Red Cross Christmas stamps in 1908 will
note that the plan of selling stamps and disposing of the proceeds
described above marks a considerable departure from the plan of
last year.
  This change is the result of careful thought and is believed to be in
the direction of better business method and greater justice to all
concerned. It seems eminently fair that the important direct work of
the Red Cross should in some measure profit from the sale of
stamps. The loyal and generous support which the American people
have given to the Red Cross leads to the belief that the buyers of
stamps will be pleased to know that a portion of the money comes
direct to its great work.
  In making the societies which sell the stamps its agents the Red
Cross is giving them certain concessions which are extremely
important. They will require no cash capital or initial expenditures.
The provisions for a free supply of posters and printed matter and
the payment of express and postal charges by the Central
Committee will assure every agent against loss. If all the work of
selling stamps is carried on by volunteers, there will be no expense
to the agents connected with the campaign. In any event the
necessary expenses will be trifling and there is no risk of loss
involved in undertaking the agency for the stamps.
   The total cost to the National office of the Red Cross of printing
and handling of Christmas stamps in 1908 was about $13,000. This
amount was repaid from the proceeds of the wholesale price at
which the Stamps were sold to agents. In 1909, under the proposal
set forth in the rules above, the expenditures by the National office of
the Red Cross will include not only the printing and handling of the
stamps but the printing and distribution of posters, circulars, etc., and
the payment of all express and postal charges upon shipments of
stamps and other supplies. Instead of charging these expenses
directly to the agents, as in 1908, they will be covered by the one-
third share of the proceeds of stamp sales reserved by the Red
Cross, as described in rule 9 above.
   With a double incentive to the purchase of stamps on the part of
the public, an absolute absence of risk or initial expense on the part
of agents, and the great favor of the public established last year, the
campaign for the Christmas season of 1909 should bring a generous
return to all concerned.
                  DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
                        By Miss I. L. Strong.
   The second season of the Red Cross Day Camp for Tuberculosis
began the first of April. Several improvements were made on last
year’s camp. We now have two visiting physicians, Dr. Norcross and
Dr. Lawson; a caretaker in charge (who is also “taking the cure”), two
large tents loaned by the War Department, and our own kitchen and
cook. One of the instructive visiting nurses is both Superintendent
and nurse. The patients are ambulatory cases in the first and second
stages. A few advanced cases have been admitted, but most of
these have been referred to the hospital. The Camp draws its
patients largely from the dispensaries.
  The patients arrive about 9 a. m., and are given a lunch of milk
and eggs. After having their temperature and pulse taken they
wander out under the trees, where the hammocks and reclining
chairs are found. Here they stay reading and sleeping till noon, when
a hot dinner is served. This consists of meat, potatoes, one
vegetable, milk, bread and butter, and a dessert, usually made of
milk and eggs. After an hour’s rest the children generally play
croquet or visit the spring in the woods. Lately they have been much
interested in seven puppies found in the woods. Of course they have
been promptly adopted. A setting hen is also a member of the family.
Another lunch of milk and eggs is served at 4, the afternoon
temperatures recorded, the car tickets given out, and preparations
made to “break camp” at 5.30 p. m. The Camp is ideally situated
among the trees high up behind the new Municipal Hospital. On the
list to-day there are 19 patients—5 white men, 3 white women, 2
white boys, 5 colored men, 1 colored woman, and 3 colored children.
Of the cases thus far treated 2 have been discharged cured, 3
improved and continue the out-door treatment in the country, 7 have
been transferred to the hospital, 3 have died, and 9 are at home,
either at work or unable to attend, thus giving a total of 43 patients
admitted, with an average attendance of 14. Of the patients now on
the list 9 are making constant progress, and 10 are holding their
own. We feel sure that though the camp has hardly as yet made a
beginning, yet the results thus far justify its continuance. The camp
life is educational as well as beneficial. Fresh air, cleanliness and
carefulness are constantly being taught, and each patient becomes a
little center to spread the knowledge of the cause and prevention of
tuberculosis. Now that it is started the District of Columbia cannot
afford to be without its Red Cross Day Camp.
                             INDIANA
                        By Rowland Evans,
           Secretary Indiana Branch American Red Cross.
   “Whether tuberculosis will be finally eradicated is even an open
question. It is a foe that is very deeply intrenched in the human race.
Very hard it will be to eradicate completely, but when we think of
what has been done in one generation, how the mortality in many
places has been reduced more than 50 per cent., indeed, in some
places 100 per cent., it is a battle of hope, and so long as we are
fighting with hope the victory is in sight.”—Dr. William Osler.
 ADMINISTRATION BUILDING OF INDIANA RED CROSS TUBERCULOSIS
                            CAMP.
                          NEW YORK
                     Ferryboat for Red Cross.
Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
ebooknice.com