Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 65

TRANSFORMATION OF IDEOLOGY AS FAULT LINE IN STATE

STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN
*
Saleem Raza Baig

Abstract

The development of ideologies in re-construction and transformation of the Indian sub-

continent during and after its division into new nation states in 1947emerged as the fault
lines in its structural and organizational imbalances, which is an interesting phenomenon
and at times led to the violent and radical political discourses. This ideological
transformation became imbalanced, due to the exploitation by opportunists in state and
political elements, through consciously planned attitude especially in dogma, religious
traditions, ethnicity and political/state governance thereby fulfilling ulterior motives.
Resultantly, violence and conflicts emerged in both the fragile states of the Indian sub-
continent besides undergoing a series of dictatorship, one party rule, manipulation of
elites, and ethnic or national polarization ultimately leading to the weak governmental
structure. This research was aimed at ascertaining both at theoretical and practical
levels, the causes of intricacies involved in transformation of religious ideology into a
fault line besides suppressing ethnic and identity markers of traditional society like
Pakistan, exploiting the structural organization of political governments through
state/bureaucratic regimes. It was discovered that this transformation became such due
to the indulgence of state elements and their practices besides illiberal democratic
governments, which were also leading to the violence and militancy where
ideology/religion has been used for parochial political interests embodied in desires to
hang on to power. Henceforth, the power made the dismemberment of joint Pakistan in
post-1971era, whereas continuously challenged the fragile integrity after 1971.

Keywords: Ideology, religion, ethnicity, partition, organizational and structural

imbalances, violence, power, fragile integrity

Introduction

The emergence of imagined community1of Pakistan on world map with a religious

philosophy since its inception on August 14, 1947, was interacting with the flawed
sharing of the ideological ownership confused with its rich traditional culture intertwined
in the ethnicity. It was also used as anti-patriotism and against the national harmony or
proclaimed volatility in nature and character both at inter and intra state levels. The
recent wave of extreme militancy under the name of Islamic Jehad (Holy War) and war
on terror created a new dimension of associating the ideology of dialectical linkage of
Islam, Pakistan and patriotism. This conflict gave new dimension to the research,

*
Saleem Raza Baig, Ph.D., Department of International Relations, University of Karachi
1
A concept coined by Benedict Anderson in his scholarly master piece ‘Imagined Communities’, surfaced
initially in 1983, which referred to an imagined community may construct itself to a non-existent nation with all
the facets of new modern nation may occupy or try to create a sovereign state.
66 Transformation of Ideology as Fault Line in
State Structure of Pakistan

particularly in finding a gap between the non-violent teachings of violence in almost all
religions with specific reference to Islam its ownership with reference to Pakistan first
approach and the old tied knot of respective ethnic identity of la longue durree.2

The Islamic ideology played a distinct role in maintaining public opinion of the Pakistani
society in state functioning as highlighted by its founder Quiad e Azam Muhammad Ali
Jinnah3 but it was not the only factor that out rightly negated all other supporting or
contributing factors even while continuing to claim religious inspiration for politics
especially in its emergence as new nation-state.4 The problem is complicated once the
interpreters of the religious values including the government, state elements and/or
religio-political parties used Islamic values to ulterior motives while transforming the
masses from radical irritants into charged militants besides, making state elements as the
constructors of foreign and associated policies instead of instrument to government
planners.5

The emergence of Pakistan moreover, embodied with an interesting question of, how a
mismatch of fitting ideological construction of imagined community 6 over modern
secular democratic nation-state could over-lap or compromise the governance system.
Moreover, continuation of dynastic populist leadership, frequent dictatorships and
borrowed flawed democracy of First Past the Post (FPTP) may temporarily involve
nation states into despotic rule as well as inapt and incompetent political institutions, as it
is the case of Pakistan.

Two distinct phases of Pakistani state's ideological construction i.e. Pre-1971 and Post-
1971 era are interesting to probe into the transformation of ethnicity preceding over
religious ideology in former period whereas in later era religion suppressing the ethnicity
or la longue duree in power sharing game amongst the troika of centers of the power in
Pakistani polity7. Contrarily, besides the fragile construction of ideology of the former era
indulged into a more confusing phenomenological transformation in Musharraf regime in
the beginning of new millennium and Post- 9/11 that hinged over strong Pakistanism
ideological stance suddenly divorced from religious ideology. Presently, after two
consecutive but fragile democratic governments the tilt is again diverting to and fro
between Islamism and Pakistanism or ethnic diversity.

This research is focused over the construction of ideology of Pakistan, it’s unfortunate
ulterior usage by the elite and myopic leadership transforming the fluid ethnicity and
religiosity into a fault line besides, probing into the inherent weaknesses inbuilt in this
social construction that drifted the society and state into subjective structural and

2
A phenomenological concept coined by Françoise Simiand, Marc Bloch and Fernand Braudel that refers to old
relations based on ethnic indicators including race, tribe, nation, language and/or any particular reference in the
past history making it a reason for its existence, survival or cause to unite in the form of a nation.
3
Khan, Hamid, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.
34-5.
4
Jahan, Rounaq, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp.2-
3.
5
Ibid.
6
A concept coined by Benedict Anderson in ‘Imagined Communities’, surfaced in 1983.
7
Troika of power in Pakistan is referred to powerful executive leadership of parliament, judiciary and military.
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 67

conservative organizational imbalances instead of the progressive and prosperous modern

nation state.

Methodology

The research was focused on both primary and secondary sources in detail. However, the
main thrust of research remained confined to qualitative theory intertwined in empirical
analysis based on logical reasoning from the historical documents. The primary methods
of research also included the visits/interviews to the scholars and dignitaries of political
leadership who participated in statecraft and state analysis of Pakistan. Moreover, the
primary research was also inclined to consult the authentic speeches, statements and
autobiographies or write ups compiled in this field of ideological construction of states
particularly the post-colonial states and imagined communities like Pakistan. Similarly,
the secondary source was also extensively used that was available in scholarly work and
published from print and mass media by the concerned personalities who were actively
involved in statecraft of Pakistan.

Literature Review

Theoretically, the research revolves around the conceptual framework of statecraft and
state making process illustrated in the scholarly efforts while discussing the process of
post-colonial state making enjoined statism by Max Weber, Rousseau, Micheal Mann,
Barry Buzan, Machiavelli, David P Gauthier, Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newham, Robert
Jackson, Dwayne N Hunt and Charles Tilly. The focus of research for state practical
manifestation remained restricted to the government, bureaucracy, military and
intertwined political cum societal factors thereby limiting the important factor of
economic problems because of its lengthy separate subjective/objective reasons.

The states emerged after the departure of colonial masters from the Indian sub-continent
under the enormous violent phenomenon and segmentation of nations over religion as
highly charged ideology, ethnic cleavages, and conflicting social stratification bringing
this region as extremely volatile. The concepts highlighted above and their analytical
reasons have been researched in detail analyzing the master pieces by the scholars like
Cohen, Buzan, Haroon, Varsheney, Iftakhar, Saeed Shafqat, Hassan Abbass, Hassan
Askari and Rasul Bakhsh Rais. However, the statecraft and its construction was consulted
from the scholarly efforts of various scholars including Weber, Buzan, Benedict
Anderson, Mann, Francis Fukuyama, Dr. Moonis Ahmar, Dr. Farhan Hanif and Alex
Roland. Besides the research articles, interviews of many scholars and dignitaries have
been benefitted in undertaking this research. The researcher bridging the gap of linking
state, military, political leadership and the general masses particularly welcoming the
dictatorship as their last hope and after a tenure of ten years or so rejecting them
altogether while preferring the almost same corrupt political elite derived all the valuable
analytical arguments developing a wholesome picture of the structural faults in statecraft
and state structure of Pakistan, proved as an evidence of this variance.
68 Transformation of Ideology as Fault Line in
State Structure of Pakistan

Research Question

The research will be undertaken to unearth the question of statecraft, its evolution from
imagined ideology with an over-riding clause of its fitment of religious form of
governance onto Westminster or more particularly secular form of governance brought
practical implications over de-colonial state of Pakistan, with particular focus over power
sharing dilemma at executive tiers:-

o Why the disparity in ideological religious construction of unity in statecraft of

Pakistan occurred fragile developing into frequent violent and radical phases with a
crosscutting power sharing dilemma amongst the military, bureaucracy and political
leadership?

Sequence of the Research

The study has been divided into two sub parts, each focused over its emergence and
analysis of resultant conclusions i.e. the religious ideological construction of state making
and its fallouts; second, the ulterior use of the charged phenomenon of religious ideology
and its effects particularly in de-colonial states like Pakistan.

Emergence of Pakistan and Construction of Religion as Ideology

Creation of Pakistan was though a continuous process of decolonization in the world of

political uprising after World War II but a moderate Muslim in westernized appearance,
Mohammad Ali Jinnah was also embedded to raise the slogan of Islam for creation of
new homeland for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent with the persuasion of two-nation
theory.8 The reason of this intricate relationship of Islam, two nation theory and
independent homeland for Muslims was hinged over three essential factors. These
include, first in the separation or likely division of the Indian sub-continent on religious
ideologies, second due to the failure of Muslim League initially in 1937 elections because
of without the pronounced strong religious agenda of imagined community, and finally
the developed threat in the minds of UP/CP (United Provinces/Central Provinces)
Muslims against Hindu entropy resistant cultures prominently perceived in state
functioning and social or economic alienation.

Indeed, the basic question of emergence of Pakistan over religious unity suppressing
traditional identity markers besides a series of dictatorships with consecutive intervals
highlight the conceptual dichotomy and practical mismatch between modern nation-state
based on secular democratic political governance and Islam, political Islam and tenants of
functional Islamic state adopted by a society on former ideology. Or the answer of this
intricate question lays in twisted divergence by the elite to fit in ulterior motives in
prolonging or attaining the political or populist power in Pakistan. The dichotomy of
above mentioned fault line continued in the state functioning as well as in society until
today however, the present day two continuous tenures of political governance
proportionally concealed the tribulations while diverting these into new discourse of

8
Khan, Hamid, op.cit., pp. 34-5.
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 69

fragile power sharing dilemma amongst aforementioned power troika. The sequential
identified inherited imbalances in both pre and post 1971 period are as under:-

Transformation of Religious Ideology as Fault Line

The de-ontological research leads to a conclusion of initial divide of the people of the
Indian sub-continent over the religions as a source of power attainment procedure
through a popular representation and voting which later culminated over partition of the
region on the basis of the fearful religious estrangement. The Doctrine of Lapse,9 separate
representative electorates10, Minto-Morley reforms and separation/annexation of Sindh
and Bombay11 evidently represented the conceptualization differences of people of India
over religions. Conversely, the development of one nation against British Raj to two
nations of pre-partition, while setting forth new Islamic and modern imagined community
nation-state of two non-contiguous halves as one. Moreover, this fragile status was
porously filled with an elite not compromised to create a balance of share in central
authority/powers and custodianship of ideology, besides striking equilibrium in executive
institutions, governance elements and legislative bodies.12

The religious divide of the Indian sub-continent created Pakistan inheriting the
ideological fault line under the massive genocide due to this partition. The fault line of
constructed ideology of religion or imagined community was exploited further to
accentuate the problem of governance making it a continuous source of confusion
resultantly oscillating between dictatorial or populist rule instead of mix match of
theocracy (Khilafat) and democracy through Shura (consensus assembly or parliament),
consociationalism and/or federalism, as suggested by various scholars and/or think tanks.
This gap visibly under nourished the Parliamentary government with simple First Past the
Post (FPTP) being a prima-facie of legislation with a lack of democratically educated
masses on one hand and unwilling populace to accept the practical bounds of Islam
resting on Quran/Hadith/Ijtehad/Ijma, the basic sources of Islamic legislation, on the
other hand.

Iftakhar argues that the advent of religion biased political power in South Asia was
embedded with number of factors including the absence of a strong, central authority in
the Indian sub-continent,13 but the use of religion for ulterior motives instead of peaceful
preaching and prosperity as highlighted by Alavi 14 was the eventually invented

9
Hamid in agreement with C Brad Faught highlighted the controversial law passed by the Lord Dalhousie
referred as ‘Law of Dalhousie or Doctrine of Lapse’, the then viceroy of British India from 1848 to 1856, to
include any princely states into British control/custody, which would not have a legal heir or any prince if
would prove to be incompetent to rule/govern the state’, so as to bring almost complete India under their rule.
10
These reforms were aimed at the divide and rule policy of the Indian sub-continent , however became the
basis of religious divide in the times to come.
11
Harron ,Ullah K, Vying for Allah’s vote:Understanding Islamic Parties,Political Violence , and Extremism in
Pakistan, (Baltimore: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 7, 16-7 and 52.
12
Cohen, Stephen P, The Idea of Pakistan, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,2004), pp. 161-3 and
183-6.
13
Malik H ,Iftakhar, The History of Pakistan (Westpoint, USA: Greenwich Press, 2008), p. 49.
14
Hamza, Alavi, Social Forces & Ideology in the Making of Pakistan, (Lahore: Democratic Action, Research &
Education, 2002), pp. 45-61.
70 Transformation of Ideology as Fault Line in
State Structure of Pakistan

phenomenon of elites’ creation for ulterior motives. Alavi also blamed this
phenomenological usage of Islam became the source of power grabbing in almost all the
historical evolutionary phases of the Indian sub-continent history.15

The religious ideology permeably made the unity and social structure of the Muslims
weak and fragile, that is why the Muslim scholars like the practicing Islamist leaders of
Ulema of Deoband16and likeminded scholars even of Aligarh Muslim foundation did not
opt to lead this ideologically constructed political movement besides, apprehending the
division of Muslim power/unity in case of the partition of the Indian sub-continent.
However, the aforementioned leadership also misjudged the Muslim alliance with Hindu
religious ideology as coveted threat like the custodians of Shudhi and Sanghaten
extremism.17

Haroon’s argument of both, alienation of religious elements to independent Pakistan and

unmerging of League to religious scholars, lies in the formation of League. 18Haroon
highlights the formation of League as hierarchical and clientelist leading to alienate
common Muslims entry into the party by quoting the example of appointment of Agha
Khan, the Ismailia leader, as the first president of the League. 19 The division and further
sub-division over religious ideology started shaping the structural imbalance that forced
the westernized secular minded Jinnah to break the ties with Congress and fight from the
platform of Muslim League with new religious outlook.

Indeed, the initial development of an ideology for ‘Pakistan’ was the brain child of
students, namely Chaudhary Rehmat Ali, of Cambridge University in 1930s. 20 In its
essence, these students gave a concept of a separate Indian Muslim political entity
including a federation of Ten Muslim States within the union of India. The details of this
union is highlighted by Cohen as the Muslim majority areas of Punjab, Afghanistan,
Kashmir, and Baluchistan resulting into Pakistan, spearheading the movement for the

15
Ibid.
16
These scholars included AbulKalam Azad, HussainMadani, Anwar Shah Kashmiri and other likeminded
religious scholars who thought it a division of Muslims making them dysfunctional in assisting each other in
future. The same concept was explained by Stephan P Cohen about the ‘Paired Minority Complex’ in non-
resolution and dysfunctional help against Kashmiri Muslims under their oppressive tyranny in Indian occupied
Kashmir.
17
Shudhiand Sanghatan were the mass movements as highlighted by Gene R Thursby, which was aimed at
transformation of complete India into Hindu religion and converting all impure to pure Hindu’vata’ or
Hindu’asthan’(Hindu mythology believers) . Besides, the aforementioned reason, the Indian National Congress
after winning almost all the seats in the British Indian elections of 1937 brought drastic changes of hoisting the
flag with Hindu religious identity marker of ‘Chakar’, compulsory singing of BandeMa’taramin schools and
promotion of Hindu mythology more pronouncedly, which created fear in the minority(s) in general and
Muslims in particular.
18
Haroon, Ullah K, op.cit, pp. 55-6.
19
Ibid.
20
Remat, Chaudhry Ali, in 1933 wrote a master piece for the solution of possible division of the Indian sub-
continent under a title, ‘Now or Never, Are We to Live or Perish for Ever’. The document was focused over the
role of Muslims in legislative assembly formulating a federal constitution to be governed under the union of
states of Pakistan(comprised of NWFP, Kashmir, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan), Osmanistan (comprised of
Hyderabad Deccan and surrounding princely states) and Bengistan(Bengal, Assam and surrounding areas) as
Muslim governed areas within the union of India. For complete document refer to ‘Rehmat Ali: A Biography’,
by Vanguard Publications, Lahore, 1987.
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 71

political reconfiguration of Indian Muslims and suggested Bengistanfor Muslims in

eastern Bengal also. Their counterparts in southern India, especially those living in the
princely state of Hyderabad ruled by the Nizam, were advised to group themselves as
Osmanistanas the third and final portion of this federation. Whereas, the Southern, South
Eastern and South Western areas of Hindu majority were dedicated to the Hindus as
Dravidia, Maharashtra and Hindoostan respectively. 21

In a nutshell, the religious ideology may distinctly now be further sub-divided into four
segmented phases of two pre and post 1971 Pakistan. The division may be given a title
of, Pre-1971 and Post-1971, and Pre and Post-9/11 state structure of Pakistan. The
summarized analysis of each phase may be elaborated as under:-

1. Pre 1971 Pakistan. The diversity of ethnic political rearrangement of India on the
eve of the expected British departure and ethnic or religious divide in already
segmented society was turning into a major identity marker for the most pluralistic
region in the world.22 Similarly, an interesting argument of Varshney focused the
attention of creation of Pakistan on three fold narratives of the Muslim ideology or
the Islamic ideology in formation of Pakistan as fragile to Hindu community. His
argument of division of the Indian sub-continent revolves around three themes, to
which he called as master narratives.23 The concepts of three narratives were derived
to get independence from the British as well as the autonomy of that particular
region. The first master narrative was based over the secular ideology that included
the political parties24 like All India Congress and Muslim religious scholars of
Deoband school of thought vis-à-vis Aligarh Muslim Foundation. This theme was
declined by Jinnah and his aides under the fearful conceptualization of alienation of
Muslims of India besides being sidelined and transformed into ethnic minority. The
second ideology was religious,25 which was developed by All India Muslim League
and partly by Aligarh School of thought but sidelined by major Muslim scholars like
AbulKalam, Anwar Shah Kashmiri and Hussain Ahmed Madani, while Shabbir
Usmani and Maududi initially supported but later joined Muslim League against this
narrative. Finally, the third theme was based on Hindu class system26 like Bhartiya
Jana Sangh (later Bhartya Janata Party), Rashtrya Swayam Sewak Singh (RSS), later
converted to Hindu religious nationalism involving minor fanatic religious parties.
Ironically this theme was rejected by almost all the major parties but later in new
millennium almost after sixty years or so, the same narrative overshadowed the
Indian politics in the success of Narendra Modi or especially after Ajodhya Mosque
and Gujarat Massacre cases.

21
Haroon, Ullah K, op.cit, pp. 55-6.
22
Ibid , p. 20; and Cohen, Stephen P, The Idea of Pakistan, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,2004),
pp. 24-29.
23
Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 55-6.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
72 Transformation of Ideology as Fault Line in
State Structure of Pakistan

2. The ideological disparity overshadowing demographic division persisted after the

partition as expected predominantly in East Pakistan as Bengali-speaking region of
smaller size, but with slightly more inhabitants than its western counterparts. A total
of 75.6 Million population is recorded in 1951 after settlements of Muhajreen
(migrants) was still in progress, out of which 41.9 was in East whereas 33.7 million
were in West Pakistan.27 The population reached to 93.7 million in the year 1961 in
both East and West portions with having 50.8 and 42.9 million respectively28. Cohen
comparing the demographic statics of Pakistan narrates that its Demographic trends
shaped the state in a remarkable increase in population because of the highest birth
rates as compared to its mortality ratio over 2 percent a year, doubling the
demographic percentage to roughly every thirty to thirty-five years29. Hence the
religious sovereignty of imagined community is the prime motive leading to its
growth or decline, was a questioning factor in newly emerged part nation-state
according to Buzan’s model. 30Buzan explaining the model asserts that the strong
states like USA, UK and Germany besides monopoly of strong pressure over
legitimate violence would cater for extreme welfare, freedom and liberty of its
citizen, whereas weak states would lack both ingredients formerly mentioned.
Contrarily, the partly fragile in any of aforementioned ingredient would besides
fulfilling the requisite of nation state lack the fitment of either of the weak or strong
state, which would be termed as the part nation state, and Pakistan including many
other falls in same category.

3. Henceforth, Punjab’s healthier share in politics and economy, lack of a proper

constitutional framework, adoption of Urdu as the national language relegating
Bengali language and over-riding clause of banning Rabendernath Tagore’s poetry
caused major resentment within the eastern wing, besides numerous East Bengalis
registered a sense of cultural alienation right after partition in Pre-1971 era. Besides,
this cultural rift or denial of rich history as argued by Akbar Zaidi, the state or West
Pakistan was also in a conflicting position with religious ideology, forces and parties,
and above all masses in the pretext of two-nation theory verses modern nation-state
theory of single nation united in ethnic community. Resultantly, the ideology was
overtaken by the ethnicity and cultural traditionalism of the imagined community.
This factor not only suppressed ethnic national identities ignoring the la longue
duree cultural differences encompassed in two geographical locations of East and
West wings divided in almost thousand miles apart but also shattered the ideological
bondage within twenty-five years of its construction. Though the newly born nation-
state besides enormous problems faced demise of the founder of the nation and
murder of first prime minister besides enormous volume of violence and martial laws
by bureaucratic-military alliance duly supported by the judiciary transformed the

27
Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs ,Population Consensus of Pakistan, 1961, in Rounaq, Jehan, Pakistan:
Failure in Nation Integration, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 11-16.
28
Ibid.
29
Cohen, Stephen P,(eds), The Future of Pakistan, (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 2011) pp. 14-
15.
30
Buzan, Barry, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War
Era,(Susex:Whetshelf, 1982), pp. 43-47 and 96-107.
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 73

future political discourse, state structure and history of Pakistan engulfed into
turmoil.

4. Post 1971 and Pre 9/11 Pakistan. In the process of crisis in identity recognition
between religion and ethnicity after 1971, the religious ideology was once again
getting extra ordinary attention with a certificate of patriotism in suppressing the
ethnic, cultural and traditional markers as secondary or negligible identity factors
duly owned by state elements. Moreover, the use/involvement and regular takeovers’
of state elements based on illegitimate powers by the elite of both political and state
elements, using the masses under the pretext of modernization of Islam and Pakistan
in uniformed as well as civilianized role in 1958 and 1999, whereas the authoritarian
regime of 1977 had purely covered the veil of Islamization in the country in
uniformed role throughout the tenure. Contrarily, the religious parties/elements
remained focused over attainment of power in an intermittent role of friends and
foes, which created a vacuum in masses to trust them as reliable stake holders of
ideological implementers of Pakistan. However, the emergence of Islamization and
Islamic Jehad transformed the ideology of Pakistan a renewed life with Indian
animosity as the trump card in the hands of the state elements. This phenomenon
brought enormous volume of violence in Pakistan whereas the territory became
home of non-state actors shaping the domestic and international political discourse
into its new generation state structure.

5. Post 9/11 Pakistan. The ideological stance of Post 9/11 period is quite interesting
once the Pakistani state became under limelight as frontline state of international
world order against the Islamization ideology proving the clash or ignorance of
civilization theories. During this period also Pakistan was viewed acceptable to
international as well as domestic public opinion under the dictator, which created
either his own favorite political parties or privileged the opportunist politicians/elite
for the political survival. The coalition of government and state illegitimacy
supported the dictator's legislature process equally supported by both politicians and
judiciary to keep the illegitimate ruler in the arena. The conflicting position of
benevolent or noble savage dictator was warmly accepted by the public opinion of
masses against the hype of politically weak leadership in illegitimate dismissal of
elected governments due to vicious cycle of morally corrupt political government.
Contrarily, the same morally corrupt government used to be again elected politically
under FPTP after the departure of the dictatorship at equally welcome note by the
same masses highlighting the democratic mindset of Pakistani society. However, the
process of prolonging the dictatorial regime despite the gigantic economic and
administrative reforms under realist paradigm to support international world as well
as public opinion inherently led to violence, radicalism and militancy in political and
masses of Pakistan. The transformation of the religious ideology was beautifully
carried out in the favor of ‘Pakistan First Policy’, which was confusingly engulfed
between the religion that was progressive and modern, while the political state
structure as conservative yet bringing common citizens to political power through
rearrangements at grass-root level under the dictatorship.
74 Transformation of Ideology as Fault Line in
State Structure of Pakistan

6. The Post 9/11 phenomenon besides developing or continuing the fragile construction
of imagined community led to a model of survival of Pakistan led by military
ideological narratives of Turkish secularism. This model was neither acceptable to
masses nor let flourished by political leadership for obvious reasons. The
crosscutting segmentation has now more pronounced between Deo-bandi or Jehadi
school and secular or military power that gave a chance of benefit to opportunist
leadership in terms of exploitation weakening the ideology manifolds.

a. Effects of Ulterior Use of Religious Ideology against State Structure. The

development of ideologies and their vehicular tools besides effecting public
opinion and mass political process, transform state structure both domestically
as well as internationally. Fuller highlighting the progressively modern
adaptability of political Islam yet backward looking in de jure governance, is the
most powerful ideology in Muslim world from Africa to South East Asia on one
hand. Whereas on the other hand, the Muslim states also hark back to modern
state governance of democratization evolved through Magna Carta, American
and French Revolutions for political solutions. 31 Pakistan being no exception to
this phenomenon, fragile state structure verses strong political ideology or vice
versa remained under the focus of this analogy. Indeed, the Fuller's argument of
religious ideology faced threefold threats in Pakistani society. First, from the
local political scene, second from international politics and finally threats of
own grievances against the policies and forces of contemporary world. 32 The
identified set of these factors put the Pakistani state structure weak and fragile
due to the vicious circle of dissatisfaction amongst masses, leading to repression
and revolution against political set up and intervention from state elements duly
supported by international world, and again dissatisfaction of the masses from
the state elements thereby handing the government to the almost same political
set up. Rais argues that the dictatorship in Pakistan may not be classically
termed as Authoritarian regime33 being in conformity to the concept of 'Illiberal
Democracy' in controlled Authoritarian regime by Fareed Zakaria. This aspect
was particularly visible in the dictators’ later stage generally and transition to
hybrid form of democracy or a military authoritarian regime in a civilianized
role particularly. In its essence, however the broken promises of authoritarian
regimes and inept political governments gave birth to violence and radicalism in
Pakistan. The chronological events of violence, radicalization and militancy
emerged as expected during the dialecticism of state elements as the ultimate
necessity, brought following summarized effects in the Pakistani society and
state:-

1. Divide over political representation on religious basis i.e. Hindu-Muslim

religions, of separate electorates due to the inherited British colonization
created political insecurity in the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent

31
Fuller, Graham E. 'The Future of Political Islam', in,,Essential Readings in World Politics, ed. Karen A
Mingst and Jack L. Synder in ( New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001), pp.173-180.
32
Ibid.
33
Rais, RasoolBakhsh, in an interview conducted by the author at LUMS Lahore, on 14 October 2015.
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 75

forcing them to adapt Islamization fallacies alive in post-independence era

as well. This insecurity of political divide on religious lines persistently
continued and used by elite for their ulterior motives after the independence
of Pakistan, thereby relegating public opinion and democratic norms in
legislation and governance over fragile ideological abstracts leading to
authoritarianism of state elements in instrumentalising the policies.

2. The political insecurity remained evident in politicians besides enormous

confusion in ideological changed stance after the 9/11 era as Pakistanis
irrespective of religion, ethnicity and/or linguistic diversity under a
dictatorial regime. The political elite confusingly accentuated this ‘Pakistan
First Policy’ as invented in dictatorial regime but in the process nourished
the under development of political institutionalism and fragile civil society
besides a cultural segmentation. This unnatural forced official patriotism of
one-nation became the basis of ethnic and religious divide corrupting the
political parties by developing militant wings in their set ups, ignoring the
rich traditional culture besides a confusing status of ideological foundation
in the masses of Pakistan.

3. Power struggle in inept and non-pragmatic political leadership of Pakistan

including the ulterior motives added weak governance to the political
institutional discourse in all above mentioned phases. The undesirable role
of politicians/political parties in weakening the institutions, the intermittent
role of judiciary and religious elements as friends and foes simultaneously
on doctrine of necessity tarnished the image of religion not only in
ideological framework of Pakistan but created a hopeless situation from this
great religion as inability to provide solution to this menace. Moreover, the
recent increased momentum of religious militancy has further accentuated
the already problematic situation.

Conclusion

The de-colonial states almost in all the cases world over with no exception to Pakistan,
was generally struck by broken promises of development, poverty, disease, illiteracy and
bitter hopelessness that led to being a soft target of violence, along-with a series of
dictatorial/populist regimes. These brittle governance imbalance are enhanced many folds
with the political oppression, inaptness, incompetence, corruption and nepotism which
multiplied geometrically. Moreover, this process of fragile structure of statecraft
enhances if marginalization by its state elite in creating confusion amongst masses by
using the fluidity of social construction of ideology to hide their ulterior motives of
grabbing power visibly occurs by the stakeholders.

The failing governance by the illegitimate populist or authoritarian regimes on one hand,
with the intermittent relation of opportunist elite enjoining state elements developing
clientelism on the other hand, was important contributing factor of enormous mushroom
growth of radicalism in Pakistani society. Unfortunately, the aforementioned flaw of
ideological fragile construction with organizational imbalance of power sharing dilemma
76 Transformation of Ideology as Fault Line in
State Structure of Pakistan

in state elements and practically poor governance resulted in a fragile state structure.
Religion being an emotionally highly charged ideology was continuously involved in
statecraft. This dilemma besides being a fragile theme exploited by opportunist leadership
transforming it into a fault line with crosscutting cleavages in the intermittent relationship
of state, society and governance system of Pakistan.

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