German Politics

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fgrp20

Greece, Germany and the Eurozone Crisis:

Preferences, Strategies and Power Asymmetry

Georgios Maris & Panagiota Manoli

To cite this article: Georgios Maris & Panagiota Manoli (2022) Greece, Germany and the
Eurozone Crisis: Preferences, Strategies and Power Asymmetry, German Politics, 31:2, 281-301,
DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2022.2026928

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2026928

Published online: 28 Jan 2022.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 831

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fgrp20
GERMAN POLITICS
2022, VOL. 31, NO. 2, 281–301
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2022.2026928

Greece, Germany and the Eurozone Crisis:

Preferences, Strategies and Power Asymmetry
Georgios Maris and Panagiota Manoli

ABSTRACT
This paper shares the premises that it is the power asymmetry factor that has
framed Greece’s preferences and strategies in EMU governance and reform.
Still, Greece’s shifting negotiation tactics during the eurozone crisis have
been heavily influenced by the overriding policy-making model and political
leadership in the country. As power asymmetry deepened during the crisis
years and while standing on the brink of economic collapse and eurozone
exit, Greece did not have a viable fall-back position in pursuing its
preferences. This paper explains why Athens pursued a fence-sitting strategy
in EMU reform with, however, instances of foot-dragging primarily when
negotiating the bailout programmes, reflecting the absence of an alternative
and viable crisis-exit strategy tabled by Athens. The persuasion-based
interaction between Athens and Berlin is also discussed. The paper shows
that domestic politics can be indispensable to adequately explain specific
small state strategies and players’ interaction in the context of EMU governance.

Introduction
Greece’s membership in the European Union (EU) has been marked by
many tensions. Despite the often cited ‘Greek exceptionalism’ referring to
Greece’s diverse Europeanisation path, Athens’ pro-integration preference
has remained strong as its presence in the core of the EU (i.e. Schengen,
economic & monetary union, common security & defense policy) indicates.
Since 1981 and Greece’s accession to the European Union (EU), the coun-
try’s political and economic vulnerabilities have affected its policy prefer-
ences, strategies, and negotiating power in a series of salient issues such as
the design of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Greece has
usually been on the policy recipient side, downloading rather than uploading
EU policy as a manifestation of its confined negotiating power. Germany, by
contrast, holds such a structural power in the EU, both in terms of its
material and ideological basis that its preferences weigh decisively in EU
policy making, especially in EU economic governance (Pisani-Ferry 2006).
Indeed, not least due to Germany’s powerful role, the main European
actors agreed to create an ‘asymmetrical’ EMU, where only monetary
policy is delegated to supranational actors, namely the ECB, whereas econ-
omic and fiscal policy remains at the national level (Verdun 1996).
© 2022 Association for the Study of German Politics
282 GERMAN POLITICS

Though this paper shares the premises that it is the ‘power’ factor that has
defined negotiating outcomes within the EU, it is often the case that bargain-
ing strategies are heavily influenced by political leadership – as it is often the
case in small countries where the role of individual leaders is decisive
(Byman and Pollack 2001). For example, former Prime Minister Andreas
Papandreou who governed Greece for a long period since Greece’s EU mem-
bership in 1981 not only influenced Greek strategy towards Europe but also
shaped EU perceptions in Greece (Nafpliotis 2018). The role of political
elites’ personality and ideology became more recently evident during the
Greek crisis and its handling by the Alexis Tsipras government. Nevertheless,
Greece’s European policy and Greek – German European interaction
especially within the EMU context have been decisively conditioned by
power asymmetry. Indeed, asymmetric positions of power significantly
determine strategies and alliances between European states especially
within the EMU (Maris and Sklias 2020) which deepen further by politico-
economic conditions and the political culture differences between them.
Accordingly, Berlin’s belief in supranational rules and Athens utilitarian
economy approach led to different positions regarding issues of fiscal disciple
like the no-bailout clause and the need for austerity.
Hereafter, we discuss the interaction between these two EMU members
which has been mostly commented during the Eurozone crisis as the two
countries often found themselves on the opposite sides of the negotiating
table; Greece, whose sovereign debt crisis became a catalyst of EMU
reforms, and Germany, the key architect of the austerity programmes and
EMU reform between 2010 and 2015. An Athens focus is kept in providing
an analysis of the policy preferences and strategies of Greece in EMU govern-
ance vis-à-vis Germany pointing to the reasons for the choices made. Hence,
we seek to answer the following questions in line with the analytical frame-
work discussed in this special issue: What have been the preferences of
Greece in EMU governance and reform and how do they relate to those of
Germany? What strategies does Greece use to influence or circumvent
Germany? What explains the choice of strategies and how is this conditioned
by Athens’ relationship to Berlin?
In order to deal with these questions, we use the analytical framework put
forward in this special issue building on power asymmetry between Greece
and Germany (Schoeller and Falkner, this issue). We test the following
hypotheses: First, a small state’s choice of strategies, such as Greece,
depends on the distance between its preferences and the status quo (SQ)
each time, ranging from ‘foot-dragging’ (if preferences coincide with SQ)
via ‘fence-sitting’ and ‘co-shaping’ through to ‘pace-setting’ (by those who
suffer highest costs from SQ). Second, Greece as a small state forms its strat-
egy on persuasion-based (rather than bargaining based) strategies due to its
asymmetrical relations with the hegemon, i.e. Germany. Third, Greece’s
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 283

strategy to influence Germany during the Eurozone crisis was shaped by the
institutional fabric of their relations.

Power Asymmetry in Greek-German Relations

Power asymmetry between Greece and Germany – as reflected primarily in
the key macroeconomic indices associated with the Greek debts – has
influenced not only the countries’ ability to negotiate within the EMU but
also policy preferences and strategic behaviour. Despite significant growth
rates in the 1990s, Greece’s accumulating economic and political vulnerabil-
ities built since the 1980s drove the country into a deep crisis (Sklias and
Maris 2013; Karyotis and Gerodimos 2015). The inability to reduce fiscal
deficits and public debt, combined with the deterioration of the international
competitiveness of the Greek economy, confirmed a self-fulfilling prophecy
not only for Greece but also for the eurozone (De Grauwe and Ji 2013; De
Grauwe 2016). Power asymmetry deepened further during the eurozone
crisis as it was framed in a creditors-debtors narrative. During economic
crisis, power asymmetry between creditor (non-distressed) and debtor (dis-
tressed) states determined the final outcome of the negotiations and shaped
power politics in Europe (Dyson 2014, 2010). Since 2009, Greece has been
par excellence a small, ‘distressed’ economy whose main European creditor
has been Germany.
The EU provides a unique laboratory of state interaction at various levels
of policy where some of the largest economies of the world (e.g. Germany,
France and Italy) interact with small economies (e.g. Malta, Cyprus and
Estonia). Especially after the 2004/2007 EU enlargement, a series of scholarly
publications were launched discussing EU small states’ standing in legislative
bargaining (Schure and Verdun 2008); policy responses, challenges and
opportunities (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010); structural disadvantages (Panke
2010a, 2010b); participation in EU negotiations (Panke 2011); usefulness
of ideational power (Panke 2012a); participation in international nego-
tiations (Panke 2012b); behaviour as agenda-setters in the Council of Minis-
ters (Panke and Gurol 2018; Björkdahl 2008; Bunse 2009) and decision
making process (Grimaud 2018). As Schoeller and Falkner in the introduc-
tory article assume, the asymmetry of power relations among a small state
(Greece) and the hegemon (Germany) plays a decisive role on the small
state’s strategic choices (bargaining or persuasion strategies). Indeed, asym-
metric interdependence and power is arguably the most important factor
that drives European integration (Moravcsik 1998; Maris and Sklias 2020).
Greece’s capabilities linked to its intrinsic power (population, territory,
GDP and military strength) are relatively small within the European
context. Greece’s size, in terms of population and territory is respectively 8
and 2.7 times smaller than that of Germany. According to Eurostat,
284 GERMAN POLITICS

Greece is the seventeenth-largest economy in the EU representing 1.2 per

cent of EU’s GDP in total, while Germany represents 21.1 per cent (year
2016). Though Greece’s defense expenditures are among the highest in
NATO countries as a ratio of GDP ranging from 2.1 to 2.5 per cent
(2015–2017), in absolute terms Germany spends more than 29 billion
euros (1.38 per cent of GDP) per year or nearly 16 per cent of the EU expen-
diture on defense. Greece’s vulnerability to external threats, augmenting in
the post-Cold War environment, has had a long term impact of public
expenditures and external debt contributing to the country’s deficits and
its economic crisis (Dimitraki and Kartsaklas 2017).
Greece’s intrinsic power as per the size of its economy is relatively low
within the EU, being placed in the 51st place globally in GDP terms
(World Bank 2019). In the pre-crisis period, the ratio of Greek GDP to
German GDP increased from 7.4 per cent (in 2002) to 8.1 per cent (in
2003), and then to 9.7 per cent (in 2009) (Table 1). Thus, following its acces-
sion to Eurozone, the Greek economy marked significant growth rates, as
despite the inefficiencies of the EMU design the adoption of the single cur-
rency created enabling fiscal conditions and permitted easy access to
financial markets. But, since 2009, a sharp decline in economic activity in
Greece took place with the ratio of Greece’s to German GDP collapsing
from 9.7 per cent to 5.5 per cent between 2009 and 2018. Much of this
sharp decline can be attributed to the profound austerity measures that led
to the contraction of the Greek economy. In the same period, the German
economy did better than any other Eurozone economy being among the
least affected by the crisis.
Another factor that underlined power asymmetry was the general govern-
ment gross debt and deficits. From 2002 to 2009 the ratio of German to
Greek general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP varied from
56.9 per cent to 57.6 per cent (Table 1). As debt conditions in Greece dete-
riorated, the Greek debt rose from 104.9 per cent (2002) to 126.7 per cent
(2009) and to 181.2 per cent (2018). The relevant ratio of German to
Greek debt declined from 57.6 per cent (2009) to 34.2 per cent (2018). In
the pre-crisis years, general government deficits were an actual problem
for both countries, with the Greek deficit rising from 6 per cent in 2002 to
15.1 per cent in 2009. Furthermore, the Greek current account deficits
increased from 6.8 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 12.3 per cent of GDP in
2009. On the other hand, Germany’s surpluses increased from 1.9 per cent
of GDP in 2002 to 5.8 per cent of GDP in 2009. It is also worth mentioning
that the biggest surpluses and deficits for Germany and Greece can be
observed in 2007 reaching 6.9 per cent and 15.2 per cent of GDP respectively.
In the post-crisis period, the current account balance significantly improved;
in Germany, surpluses were higher than in the pro-crisis years, highlighting
the dynamics of the German economy while in Greece deficits shrunk as a
Table 1. Main power indicators, Germany and Greece (2002–2018).
General Government
Gross Domestic Product General Government Gross Deficit/Surplus per cent of
Year at Market Prices Debt per cent of GDP GDP Current Account per cent of GDP
Germany Greece Germany Greece Germany Greece Germany Greece
2002 2,198,120.0 163,460.8 59.7 104.9 −3.9 −6.0 1.9 −6.8
2003 2,211,570.0 178,904.9 63.3 101.5 −3.7 −7.8 1.4 −8.5
2004 2,262,520.0 193,715.8 65 102.9 −3.3 −8.8 4.5 −7.7

GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS

2005 2,288,310.0 199,242.3 67.3 107.4 −3.3 −6.2 4.7 −8.9
2006 2,385,080.0 217,861.6 66.7 103.6 −1.7 −5.9 5.8 −11.5
2007 2,499,550.0 232,694.6 64 103.1 0.3 −6.7 6.9 −15.2
2008 2,546,490.0 241,990.4 65.5 109.4 −0.1 −10.2 5.7 −15.1
2009 2,445,730.0 237,534.2 73 126.7 −3.2 −15.1 5.8 −12.3
2010 2,564,400.0 226,031.4 82.4 146.2 −4.4 −11.2 5.7 −10
2011 2,693,560.0 207,028.9 79.8 172.1 −0.9 −10.3 6.2 −8.6
2012 2,745,310.0 191,203.9 81.1 159.6 0.0 −8.9 7.1 −3.5
2013 2,811,350.0 180,654.3 78.7 177.4 0.0 −13.2 6.6 −1.4
2014 2,927,430.0 178,656.5 75.7 178.9 0.6 −3.6 7.2 −0.7
2015 3,030,070.0 177,258.4 72.1 175.9 0.9 −5.6 8.6 −0.8
2016 3,134,100.0 176,487.9 69.2 178.5 1.2 0.5 8.5 −1.7
2017 3,244,990.0 180,217.6 65.3 176.2 1.2 0.7 8.1 −1.9
2018 3,344,370.0 184,713.6 61.9 181.2 1.9 1.0 7.4 −2.8
Source: Eurostat.

285
286 GERMAN POLITICS

result of the fiscal disciple measures (Table 1). Overall, the current account
balances capture not only the real competitiveness of Germany and
Greece, but also the high complementarity between the two eurozone
economies.
TARGET 2,1 on the one hand, provides evidence on transaction balances
that are directly related to the current accounts, while, on the other hand, it
provides information on the intra-Eurozone balances of payments by reallo-
cating the ECB’s net refinancing credit (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012). For
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012, 468) the main eurozone problem has been
that ‘by replacing stalling capital imports and outright capital flight,
TARGET credit financed substantial portions, if not most, of the current
account deficits of Greece and Portugal during the first three years of the
crisis … ’. Thus, large creditor countries such as Germany and the Nether-
lands have financed the deficits of the debtor states in the Eurozone burden-
ing governments and individuals. However, for other scholars, this is a
temporary issue that will be automatically corrected once confidence in
the banking sector returns (Ulbrich and Lipponer 2012). Indeed, as it is
argued, TARGET 2 ‘merely reflects the long-term lending and collateral pol-
icies of the ECB and the relative strength of national economies within the
Eurosystem’ (Lubik and Rhodes 2012, 5). As it follows, based on Figure 1,
one can observe a massive increase of German surpluses from 115.3 in
2008 to 966.2 in 2018 while in the same period Greek deficits slowly
decreased until the year 2019 when the lowest deficits (25.7) are observed.
Table 1 is also telling about Greece’s improvement on public deficits and
current account balances, and the dynamism of the German economy.

Figure 1. Target 2 Germany/Greece performance. Source: European Central Bank.

 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 287

Greece’s Evolving Policy Preferences

Hereafter, we look into the formation of Greece’s preferences on EMU gov-
ernance with regard to its distance from the status quo or what Frieden and
Walter describe as the ‘reversion point’ (Frieden and Walter 2018). There has
been a decisive parameter that dictated Greece’s preferences on EMU reform,
which was none else but the country’s imminent bankruptcy. Thus, the fact
that Greece was negotiating far beyond the restructuring of the European
economic and monetary governance, ways and means of its own economic
survival defined both its preferences and negotiating power.
How were Greece’s preferences regarding its own financial assistance
programmes formed? Though maintaining the status quo was actually out
of the table for Greece when negotiating the financial assistance (bailout)
programmes, Greek governments often preferred a ‘foot dragging’ attitude
pursuing a brinkmanship strategy to push for concessions at the last
moment (a negotiation tactic followed by other players as well including
Germany) while reluctantly accepting to implement the agreed reforms.
How is ‘foot-dragging’ explained when status quo preservation isn’t a real
option? First, Greek governments, especially at the early stage of the crisis,
indeed entertained the idea of maintaining the ‘status quo’ in terms of the
continuation of the same growth model for the country and the denounce-
ment of austerity measures while not opting for a Eurozone ‘exit’ scenario.
‘Foot dragging’ thus aimed at delaying painful domestic reforms that were
nevertheless unavoidable. Furthermore, a communication strategy of rhe-
torical resistance to Brussels imposed change, targeting primarily the dom-
estic electorate was often followed by Greek governments. A ‘chicken
game’ tactic was followed par excellence by SYRIZA-ANEL as rhetorical con-
struction (Schimmelfennig 2015). Second, as the crisis deepened, successive
Greek governments preferred the status quo ante to harder adjustment
measures. Third, policy-making in Greece has fitted to an ‘incremental’
model reflecting a process of muddling through and of incremental
changes that build upon already existing institutions and policies (Ladi
2013, 73). According to this policy-making model, ‘It is easier to continue
with the status quo, rather than to proceed with radical transformations’
(Ladi 2013, 73). Finally, and most importantly, it reflected the absence of a
viable crisis-exit strategy tabled by Greece. Greece didn’t have an exit strategy
other than implementing painful austerity measures in exchange for
financial assistance. It thus delayed the implementation of reform and
austerity measures trying to muddle through as long as possible.
The Eurozone crisis actually started with the declaration of the then Greek
Prime Minister, George Papandreou, in December 2009 that ‘our country is
in intensive care … for the first time since 1974 Greek sovereignty is under
threat by a fiscal deadlock’ (Kathimerini 2009). A few months later followed
288 GERMAN POLITICS

the downgrading of Greece’s long-term debt by rating agencies to BBB+ and

eventually to BB+, a rating for ‘junk’ bonds. On top of the dire financial situ-
ation that inflated power asymmetries, the frail credibility of the political elite
– especially after the falsification of Greek data on public statistics was
exposed – framed Athens’ bargaining power in adverse conditions. That’s
the time when the sarcastic name PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain)
made headlines to label national economies under fiscal risk indicating
their economic weakness. Greek government was then in a deer need to
access credit, and, as Keohane and Nye (1977) have argued, the more a gov-
ernment needs an agreement to be reached during negotiations, the less bar-
gaining power it has. While, timewise, the sooner an agreement is necessary,
the more quickly a government needs action and the weaker its position is
(Frieden and Walter 2018, 8).
As the sovereign debt crisis erupted in the south, brining Greece’s
financial system at the edge of collapse, German – and other northern –
banks found themselves greatly exposed while their governments were
facing the prospect of having to bail them out. This negative financial inter-
dependence provided the background for the state preferences at the outset
of the crisis (Schimmelfennig 2015, 7) and at the same time underlined the
common interest of Greece and Germany in avoiding the cost of disinte-
gration. At this stage, the preservation of the status quo – an imperfect
and unstable EMU – seemed impossible as it could lead to a breakup of
the Eurozone and financial chaos. Despite the urgency of the crisis,
neither Greece nor Germany pursued a ‘pace-setting’ policy creating
further distress.
At the initial stage of the crisis, the Papandreou government followed a
‘soft’ strategy (Zahariadis 2016, 9). While recognising that the preservation
of the status quo (or doing nothing) was not a viable preference amidst a
looming sovereign default, the Greek Prime Minister unilaterally undertook
a series of austerity measures while seeking to access private markets. A
policy of ‘foot dragging’ was followed for a short period between October
2009 and March 2010 where while dismissing talks on a bailout, the Greek
government aimed at a eurozone political commitment to provide
financial assistance upon request if needed. Thus, both Athens and Berlin
considered, for different reasons each, that the handling of the Greek crisis
could be confined to the national level with some European support, a pos-
ition that was soon to prove unrealistic. As access to private financing was
barred, G. Papandreou had to turn to European governments for financial
assistance and pursue transnational coalitions shifting to ‘fence siting’
policy options with the Greek authorities officially requesting support
from the EU on 2 May 2010. At this point, differences between Berlin and
Athens became apparent. In early 2010, Germany was the most reluctant
EU country to commit to a bailout for Greece (Jones 2010).
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 289

As the sovereign debt contamination to the rest of the Eurozone was

imminent, Berlin had to reluctantly step back and agree on a rescue pro-
gramme for Greece in May 2010 but not without the involvement of the
IMF. Following the agreement on a bailout, Greece and Germany found
themselves diverging over the role of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) with Greece siding with France on keeping the IMF at a distance
and calling for an immediate European response. Christine Lagarde, then
France’s finance minister, shared ‘the hope that the Europeans could put
together enough of a package, enough ring-fencing, enough of a backstop
so as to show that Europe could sort out its own affairs’ (Wroughton, Schnei-
der, and Kyriakidou 2015). German Chancellor Merkel, however, shared
another view, seeing the ECB and the European Commission as vulnerable
to political influence, insisting thus that the involvement of the IMF was a
non-negotiable precondition for a Greek bailout.
For Greece, given the economic conditions in 2010 – a € 67 billion loan
was required to serve public debt and a €18 billion bond should be paid
on 16 May 2010 – it was clear that the country did not have any real
option to negotiate (Stournaras 2014). The other alternatives, such as to
borrow from non EU countries or to sell the Greek islands were obviously
to put pressure on the Greek side. Thus, at the ECOFIN’s meeting on 9
May, it was decided to create a comprehensive package of measures to pre-
serve financial stability in Europe, including the European Financial Stability
Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).
Other alternatives supported by the Greek government such as the Euro-
bond, Tobin Tax, the Carbon Tax and the creation of a Marshall Plan for
Green and Sustainable Development for Europe (Prime Minister Speech at
the Hellenic Parliament, 22 December 2010) were simply rejected.
In all key issues in the first bail-out programme (i.e. the initiation of the
first bailout programme, the involvement of the IMF and the ad hoc or sys-
temic nature of the Greek Loan Facility), Greek and German policy options
were diverging. Since March 2010 Athens developed a fully-fledged ‘fence
sitting’ policy siding with the south led by France, keeping a low profile.
An issue that emerged at the demise of the first bailout programme was
the restructuring of the public debt. Though this became a matter of
intense contest between the IMF and the Europeans, the Greek government
adopted a passive, fence-sitting policy, siding rather with the European
Central Bank (ECB) which was against any type of debt restructuring as
the survival of the national banking system was at the hands of the ECB
liquidity. It was German persistence that led to an initial haircut of Greek
debt (held by private sector) agreed in October 2011 and then to the
‘world’s biggest debt-restructuring deal in history’ involving around 206
bn euro of bonds in early 2012 on a ‘voluntary’ basis opening the way for
the Second Bailout Programme of Greece (March 2012–June 2015). The
290 GERMAN POLITICS

full dependence of the Greek banking system on ECB rather than any stra-
tegic divergence from Berlin’s preferences defined the Greek stance and
undercut any leading role for Athens in negotiating the terms of its debt
restructuring. Although the Greek government publicly opposed debt
restructuring because it feared that it would heavily damage small private
holders of Greek debt (which actually happened), it actually followed a
soft bargaining strategy (Zahariadis 2016, 10).
After an initial period of delaying tactics until May 2010, both Athens and
Berlin favoured moving beyond the status quo and evading disintegration
(for Athens as a means of economic survival, for Berlin as a means of
Euro survival) but profound differences emerged on how the distributional
effects (costs) of further integration would be managed. Greece, under the
threat of collapse and given the high interdependence with other EMU
members had a strong incentive for more integration as it would produce
lower losses than inactivity or even disintegration. But national preferences
on the terms of integration depended on the fiscal position of each state
embedded in ideational differences on EMU governance, with creditor
northern countries (Germany) preferring national adjustment and heavily
indebted southern countries (Greece) preferring mutualised adjustment
(Schimmelfennig 2015, 7).
During the second bailout programme (March 2012–June 2015), Greek
authorities focused on the implementation of the agreed reform and austerity
measures under the threat of expulsion from the eurozone and the EU, the
so-called Grexit. The Grexit threat was waved by both Germany and
France for the first time in 2011 when G. Papandreou in an instance of a
failed ‘pace setting’ attempt announced the decision to put to a referendum
the fiscal austerity measure. The ‘blackmail’ of France and Germany that
such a unilateral action would lead Greece not only out of the Eurozone
but also out of the EU lasted for a whole decade becoming more credible
as the years passed and the Eurozone developed crisis management tools.
The uncertainty of the Grexit kept Greeks on their toes and Athens bound
to soft rather than hard bargaining (Luka 2020).
Though the predominance of the creditors’ agenda as pushed forward by
Germany and the failure of Greece to pursue the mutualisation of distri-
bution costs was clear throughout the negotiations of all three austerity pro-
grammes, the case of EMU reforms told a different story. Though the
outcome of negotiations on EMU reform was closer to the preferences of
Germany, Greek preferences were also mirrored, as in the case of the
enhancement of EFSF capacity. In sixteen out of twenty-four selected
EMU contested issues where Athens had a clear preference, its initial
policy preferences were met in the bargaining outcome. In seven cases,
Greek and German initial preferences were aligned (Table 2). In twelve
cases Greece had a clear pro-integration position. Târlea et al. (2019, 26)
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 291

Table 2. Selected EMU contested issues and initial policy preferences of Greece and
Germany.
Negotiated
Contested Issue Greece Germany Outcome
The IMF involvement in the First Greek Programme 0 50 100
Debt relief in the Second Greek Programme 50 50 50
Preparedness to issue loan guarantees 100 0 100
The enhancement of the EFSF’s effective capacity 100 0 100
Changing EU treaties 20 60 20
The size of the ESM 100 0 0
Private sector involvement 0 100 0
The support instruments of ESM/EFSF 100 0 20
The financing of the ESM 100 20 0
The role of supranational institutions in the ESM 40 40 40
Withholding EU Funds to deficit countries 0 100 0
Six-pack rules on \good’ and \bad’ debts 0 100 0
The asymmetry of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure 0 100 0
Redemption fund in two-pack 100 0 0
Pre-approving budgets by the Commission 0 100 0
Independent macroeconomic forecasts 0 0 0
The adoption of the Fiscal Compact 100 100 50
The legal form of the debt brake 0 100 50
The role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Fiscal 0 0 0
Compact
Tax policy coordination 100 100 0
EU cap on bank bonuses (legal or shareholder-approved) 100 100 100
Capital buffers (centralisation or flexibility) 0 100 50
The scope of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) (all 70 0 70
banks or some banks)
SSM implementation deadlines 100 0 50
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) decision-making powers 100 0 70
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) fiscal backstop 100 0 0
Note: The most extreme position that implies less integration is coded as 0, and most integration as 100.
Source: EMU positions dataset in ‘EMU CHOICES’ Project, https://emuchoices.eu/data/emup/ (Accessed
30 May 2020).

argued that financial exposure shaped the national preferences in EMU

negotiations irrespective of whether one was creditor or debtor during the
crisis arguing that ‘Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries
with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions
involving high degrees of European integration’. Though Greece favoured
more integration, it did not follow an active policy on EMU reforms, pursu-
ing passive coalition or siding with the preferences of EU institutions on a
case by case basis. Passive coalition with regard to EMU reform was pre-
ferred due to Athens’ weak bargaining power (coercive and ideational), the
high cost of negotiations and its scarce resources which were exclusively
absorbed in negotiations on the implementation of the bailout programmes.
During the second bailout period, the Greek side pursued the relaxation of
the arduous austerity measures, the protection of its banks and the mutuali-
sation of the debt. Germany on the other hand pursued successfully the con-
tinuity of austerity and the preservation of the terms of the initial 2010
bailout agreement. It also recognised the need for meeting distributional
292 GERMAN POLITICS

cost through a combination of public and private sector involvement.

Although the negotiated outcome was closer to the German preferences,
Greek preferences were also met in terms of the protection of Greek
banks. One could argue that during the second bailout programme the
two countries were at their closest (Lim, Moutselos, and McKenna 2019).
Greece just like Germany was in favour of further integration but for
Greece this should go through the Europeanisation of sovereign debt, a
goal pursued by a the group of ‘distressed’ EMU economies led by France
(including Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain) who also favoured soft adjust-
ment policies and opposed automatic sanctions for high deficit countries
(Schild 2013). Given its fiscal weakness, Greece placed its preferences in
favour of the establishment of rescue funds, bond purchases by the European
Central Bank (ECB), a bank license for the EFSF and ESM, the direct Euro-
pean recapitalisation of banks, and the introduction of Eurobonds. One of
the key contested issues at the outset of the crisis where Greece had a clear
preference was the establishment and later on the enhancement of the
EFSF mechanism by issuing loan guarantees from the member states. On
both issues Greece pursued a pro-integration stance which was fully
echoed in the negotiation’s outcome (with the decision to increase the
EFSF capacity from 250 to 440 billion Euro).
At the demise of the second bailout programme and following the coming
into power of a new, Eurosceptic government in Greece led by SYRIZA in
early 2015, Greece attempted a repositioning. The current status quo (i.e.
austerity-based loan agreements) was loudly denounced and Prime Minister
Alexis Tsipras attempted co-shaping policies mixed with unilateral steps,
frustrating the European institutions and the creditors. That’s the period
when Greek-German relations hit their lowest. Greek preferences reflected
a ‘garbage can’ decision-making model (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972) fea-
turing unpredictability and vagueness of specific policy goals. Decisions were
taken in a random way based on unclear and changeable preferences reflect-
ing diverge views on Greece’s eurozone and EU membership within the gov-
ernment (i.e. pro and against Eurozone/EU membership) as well as diverge
views of negotiation tactics (i.e. between Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and
Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis). During the first six months of SYRIZA-
ANEL governance, Athens pursued the revision of the bailout programme
taking various steps in a brinkmanship strategy. In an attempt to strengthen
its bargaining power, a nation-wide referendum on the terms of the offered
bailout programme was unilaterally announced in summer 2015. While the
outcome of the referendum clearly supported the government’s policy in
favour of opposing the bailout terms, Greece’s negotiating position dramati-
cally worsened in the aftermath of the referendum. The referendum wea-
kened Greece’s bargaining position further as it exposed the government’s
bluffing (Frieden and Walter 2018, 10). Although Tsipras openly argued
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 293

for the rejection of the creditors’ terms, he didn’t have any alternatives other
than accepting the bailout rules, nor could he move on with Grexit. The ‘last
bluff’ of 2015 was built on the assumption that the Europeans would step
back and accept the Greek demands when confronted with a real Grexit pro-
spect (Varvitsioti and Mendrinou 201, 367). Thus, despite the victory of ‘no’
in the referendum (i.e. rejecting the bailout rules), a ‘yes’ policy was immedi-
ately followed by the Greek government. When Athens was confronted with
either accepting a tough(er) bailout package or leaving the eurozone, the
Greek government complied with the creditors’ terms because while the
majority of Greeks were against the austerity terms, they were even more
opposed to Grexit from the Eurozone (Walter et al. 2018). The referendum
ended abruptly the co-shaping attempts of Athens.

Greece’s Persuasion Based Strategies and Interaction with

Germany
Persuasion based strategies rather than hard bargaining were the rule in
Greek strategy with the exception of the first semester of 2015 when on 25
June 2015 Greece abandoned negotiation talks only to return a few weeks
later. The deepening of the crisis, limited resources and a worse Best Alterna-
tive to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) had prompted successive Greek
governments to pursue a soft negotiation strategy based on persuasion.
Domestic constraints nevertheless, kept elected governments from pursuing
a completely soft strategy (Zahariadis 2016, 10) as shown previously. A
repeated pattern was the adoption of hard bargaining rhetoric prior to
coming into power and a U turn in negotiation tactics within the first
months of any newly elected Greek government (more known is the U
turn of Alexis Tsipras, but former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras also
abandoned strong anti-austerity rhetoric upon coming to power). Under
fierce domestic opposition to austerity, it took a transitional government
headed by a technocrat, Lucas Papademos, to negotiate and agree the
terms of the second bailout.
At the initial stage of the crisis, Greece’s EMU membership corrected
some of the power asymmetry effects. While EMU membership might not
have given Athens additional negotiating or coercive power, it did turn the
Greek sovereign debt crisis from a national matter to one of global systemic
importance as it put the eurozone at high risk. However, by 2015 the threat of
crisis contamination within the eurozone had weakened. Lacking coercive
power, indebted Athens framed the sovereignty crisis as a European and pol-
itical issue. The framing of the Greek crisis as a solidarity issue that required
a political rather than technical solution by the EU leadership was a view that
emerged early across the entire spectrum of the Greek political leadership. As
Evangelos Venizelos, Greece’s finance minister in 2011, said, the problem
294 GERMAN POLITICS

was a political one, as ‘They (the IMF and Europe) insisted on measures that
were acts of cruelty to make us prove to them that we were prepared to pay
the political cost’ (Wroughton, Schneider, and Kyriakidou 2015). During the
first bailout period, public statements by Greek political leaders were target-
ing mainly the financial markets rather than national governments. An
exception to that was the claim by the then Deputy Prime Minister Theo-
doros Pangalos that German banks and exporters were profiting from the
crisis and that Germany owed war reparations. Such comments did not
however, initially attract significant attention in Germany (Lim, Moutselos,
and McKenna 2019).
Coalition building was persistently pursued, with Greece being primarily
concerned with restoring its credibility in Brussels, thus seeking support
beyond the southerners as well. A segmented southern coalition, however,
never emerged as differences between e.g. France and Italy, or Italy and
Spain emerged. Athens aligned with EU institutions (e.g. the ECB on private
debt restructuring in 2011) or the IMF (on debt relief in 2017) and with
France in several cases. Greek attempts to apply hard-bargaining strategies
vis-à-vis its creditors, primarily Germany (e.g. Varoufakis’ pursued ‘chicken
game’)2 failed. This is the time when active ‘counter-coalition building’ was
shortly employed, as in the hosting of a mini-summit in Athens in September
2016 gathering southern European leaders (from Cyprus, France, Italy, Malta,
Portugal and Spain), calling for growth and employment instead of austerity.3
Seeking support for debt swaps and less austerity bore no results. Not only
were the creditors afraid of moral hazard, but even southern economies such
as Spain or Italy were not in favour of a special treatment of Greece. Other
Central European countries with less GDP/capita were also critical of debt
relief for Greece. Attempts to seek alternatives outside the EU – as when
Alexis Tsipras visited Moscow in April 2015 – ended also in failure,
further exposing Greece’s isolation. SYRIZA’s attempts to consolidate a het-
erogeneous alliance abroad, merging European left-radicals, Eurosceptics,
anti-austerity Keynesians, and even far-right populists did not produce
any credible alliance. Hard bargaining embedded in rhetorical acts of persua-
sion aimed at turning a coercive power game into an ideational one.4 Persua-
sion attempts were centred on framing EMU governance as a democracy
issue, presenting the Troika as disrespectful in its refusal to comply with
the choice of the Greek constituency that had given the mandate to an
anti-austerity government (Price-Thomas and Turnbull 2017). During the
stalemate in negotiations in May 2015, Alexis Tsipras argued that ‘It is due
to the insistence of certain institutional actors on submitting absurd propo-
sals and displaying a total indifference to the recent democratic choice of the
Greek people’ (Smith and Wearden 2015).
Scapegoating and ‘issue linkages’ tactics were also employed as persuasion
technics by politicians fuelling a negative climate in the media and public
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 295

discourse(Tzogopoulos 2015, 2012). Criticism targeting Berlin had two inter-

connected aspects, the first was Berlin’s unwillingness to support Greece at
the beginning of 2010 and act pre-emptively and the second was the per-
ceived tenacity of Berlin in agreeing on a growth strategy to help Greece
escape further recession (Tzogopoulos 2012, 7). As with ‘issue linkages’
tactics, the war reparations issue was also featured very prominently in
SYRIZA-ANEL negotiations in 2015 with the Greek parliament voting on
17 April 2019 to give a mandate to the government to seek reparations
from Germany for the Nazi occupation during World War II (Tidey
2019). In a symbolic action of defiance to the German government, Alexis
Tsipras, on his first day in office, visited a war memorial to pay tribute to
Greek resistance fighters killed by Nazi forces during WW II.
Berlin, being the main creditor of Greece, was placed at the centre of
Greece’s persuasion strategy. Multilateralism is the preferred interaction
mode for a small power when negotiating with larger powers in an
attempt to partly correct asymmetrical relations, address the information
problem and monitor compliance. The European and eurozone institutions
(especially the Eurogroup) provided the main, regular room for constant
Greek-German interaction, with bargaining remaining predominantly inter-
governmental in nature.
Prior to the crisis, during German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to
Athens in July 2007 the status of bilateral relations was described as ‘excel-
lent’.5 The Bavarian Rule at the establishment of modern Greek state and
the German occupation during the Second World War had set the historical
basis of Greek-German relations shaping German perceptions in Greece
while in the post war period significant Greek labour migration in
Germany created new linkages between the two peoples. The institutionali-
sation of bilateral relations has remained low, but economic, defense and
society links have deepened while Germany has become the largest tourist
market for Greece. Despite the ideal preference of both sides to frame
their negotiations in a multilateral context, resorting to bilateral interaction
became unavoidable at crisis times. The deepening of preference divergence
between Athens and Berlin contributed to this shift towards bilateralism as
the bailout agreements had to be approved by the German parliament,
making German government’s support essential. Each meeting between suc-
cessive Greek prime ministers and German Chancellor Angela Merkel
acquired particular importance and public attention, presented as a revel-
ation of forthcoming Eurogroup decisions. The intergovernmental mode
of European economic governance where Germany played the leading
role, especially in the Eurogroup (dominated by the strong views of
German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble) also pushed Athens to directly
engage with Berlin. Although German officials insisted that all decisions were
taken by the institutions, the management of the Greek crisis was
296 GERMAN POLITICS

predominantly framed as a Greek-German competition6 over economic

ideas. Alexis Tsipras wrote in Le Monde in May 2015 that the issue of
Greece ‘ … is the very epicenter of conflict between two diametrically oppos-
ing strategies concerning the future of European unification’ (Irwin 2015).
The official visit of Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras to Berlin on 24
August 2012 and his meeting with Merkel gave a boost to bilateral inter-
actions and marked the beginning of a short-lived rapprochement. It
became evident by both sides that a lift in parapublic diplomacy was
needed to facilitate a smoother collaboration. Such tools included the cre-
ation of the Greek-German Assembly to promote cooperation between the
municipalities and regions, and of a ‘Greek-German Fund for the Future’
– with a yearly budget of 1 million Euros – to finance bilateral reconciliation
programmes. Other examples are common education projects worth of 10
million Euros per year and the establishment of a Greek-German Youth
Office (Tzogopoulos 2015). The ‘reconciliation’ agreement that was signed
on 12 September 2014 between the ministries of education included a
variety of activities like school and youth exchanges, internships and visits
to places that suffered Nazi atrocities (Michalopoulos 2014). An Action
Plan on Bilateral Cooperation was signed on 4 December 2016 by the two
Ministries of Foreign Affairs intensifying bilateral relations on several
levels and areas – politics, economy, science, education, culture, and
media as well as between the civil societies of both countries. Subsequently,
bilateral contacts at the highest political level also intensified. Merkel’s visit
to Athens on 8 October 20127 was followed by three significant visits of
German politicians; that of finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble on 17 July
2013, that of German President Joachim Gauck on 7 March 2014 and
again of Chancellor Merkel on 11 April 2014.
The reset of Greek-German bilateral relations was shaken as tensions
between Athens and Berlin peaked following the coming into power of the
SYRIZA party with the then prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, accusing
Germany of employing ‘tricks’ to escape war reparations and suggesting
the confiscation of German assets in Greece (Tagaris 2015). Nevertheless,
Angela Merkel invited Tsipras to Berlin on 23 March 2015 to ease relations
and address the public. Merkel was apparently positive to bilateral meetings
but not at the cost of lower-level negotiations. Pursuing bilateral negotiations
was also indicative of the political solution that Greek governments,
especially SYRIZA-ANEL government, sought each time that there was an
impasse in bailout talks between Athens and its creditors.

Conclusion
How did Greek policy preferences and strategies evolve during the Eurozone
crisis? As a small and crisis hit, in debt, Eurozone member, Greece developed
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 297

its policy preferences and negotiation strategy under the imminent threat of
economic collapse and Grexit. Power asymmetry within the Eurozone
underwrote a ‘fence setting’ strategy for Athens in key EMU governance
issues (including ESM and debt restructuring) built on passive coalition.
Passive coalition was Athens’ preferred option due to the latter’s weak bar-
gaining power (coercive and ideational) and the high cost of negotiations.
Still, instances of ‘foot dragging’ specifically with regard to the bailout pro-
grammes were also to be observed despite understanding that the mainten-
ance of the status quo was not a real option for Athens. The latter strategy
reflected the absence of an alternative, viable, crisis-exit strategy offered by
Athens, whose goals were to win concessions (package deals on austerity,
debt relief or repayment rules) or compensation (side payments).
Persuasion based rather than hard bargaining strategies targeting Berlin
were followed by successive Greek governments. Greece’s short-lived repo-
sitioning with respect to bargaining behaviour in 2015 and its failed hard
bargaining attempts cannot be attributed to power changes. It rather
reflected an incremental decision-making model where decisions were
taken in a random way based on unclear and changeable preferences, reflect-
ing diverge views on Greece’s Eurozone and EU membership within the gov-
ernment (i.e. pro and against Eurozone/EU membership) as well as diverge
views of negotiation tactics.
In concluding, this paper shares the premises that it is the power asymme-
try factor that has framed Greece’s preferences and strategies in EMU gov-
ernance and reform. Nevertheless, Greece’s shifting negotiation tactics
during the eurozone crisis have been heavily influenced by the overriding
policy-making model and political leadership in the country.

Notes
1. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer
System.
2. The negotiation of the third bailout programme by Greece’s SYRIZA-ANEL
government in summer 2015 topped Harvard Law School’s List of ‘Worst
Negotiation Tactics of 2015’. It was however replaced in a later revised
version. Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20160115231916/https://www.
pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/top-10-worst-negotiation-
tactics-of-2015/ (accessed 30 May 2020)
3. https://www.ft.com/content/18332c14-78f0-11e6-a0c6-39e2633162d5
4. At this point, it has to be mentioned that for the first time during the crisis
years, all key opposition forces in the Greek parliament (New Democracy; Pan-
hellenic Socialist Movement; To Potami) were in favour of continuing the
status quo established by the ousting government of Antonis Samaras rather
than backing SYRIZA’s revisionism.
5. The only issue of controversy prior to the outbreak of crisis was the faulty
operation of a set of submarines Athens received from Berlin in 2000.
298 GERMAN POLITICS

6. E.g. both Germany and the small states want to depart from the status quo (i.e.
they are not in direct opposition), but they have different preferences on the
type or design of change, and/or they use different strategies of realising it.
7. During a rally in Lesvos island prior to the May 2014 European elections,
Alexis Tsipras, leader of SYRIZA incited the crowds saying ‘There is one
message Greece should send [to the rest of Europe] … Go back, Madame
Merkel; Go Back, Mr. Schauble; Go Back, Europe’s conservative establishment;
Go Back, you people from the troika’ (Kokkinidis 2019).

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Magnus Schoeller, Gerda Falkner and two anonymous
reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

About the author[s]

Georgios Maris is Associate Professor at the Department of Mediterranean Studies,
University of the Aegean.
Panagiota Manoli is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and
International Relations, University of Peloponnese.

ORCID
Georgios Maris http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2459-1178

References
Björkdahl, Annika. 2008. “Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the
EU.” Journal of European Public Policy 15 (1): 135–154.
Bunse, Simone. 2009. Small States and EU Governance: Leadership Through the
Council Presidency. St Antony’s Series. Basingstoke, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. “Let us Now Praise Great Men:
Bringing the Statesman Back in.” International Security 25 (4): 107–146.
Cohen, Michael, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model
of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1): 1–25.
De Grauwe, Paul. 2016. “The Legacy of the Eurozone Crisis and How to Overcome
it.” Journal of Empirical Finance 39: 147–155. doi:10.1016/j.jempfin.2016.01.015.
De Grauwe, Paul, and Yuemei Ji. 2013. “Self-fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An
Empirical Test.” Journal of International Money and Finance 34: 15–36.
Dendrinou, Victoria, and Eleni Varvitsioti. 2019. The Last Bluff: How Greece Came
Face-to-Face with Financial Catastrophe and the Secret Plan for its Euro Exit.
Athens: Papadopoulos.
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 299

Dimitraki, Ourania, and Aris Kartsaklas. 2017. “Sovereign Debt, Deficits and Defence
Spending: The Case of Greece.” Defence and Peace Economics, 1–16.
Dyson, Kenneth. 2010. “Norman’s Lament: The Greek and Euro Area Crisis in
Historical Perspective.” New Political Economy 15 (4): 597–608. doi:10.1080/
13563467.2010.492853.
Dyson, Kenneth H. F. 2014. States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in
European History and Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frieden, Jeffry, and Stefanie Walter. 2018. “Analyzing Inter-State Negotiations in the
Eurozone Crisis and Beyond.” European Union Politics 20 (1): 134–151. doi:10.
1177/1465116518813450.
Grimaud, Jean Micallef. 2018. “Small States and EU Governance: Malta in EU
Decision-Making Processes.” In Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics.
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Irwin, Neil. 2015. “How Germany Prevailed in the Greek Bailout.” The New York
Times. Accessed 20 May 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/
europe/how-germany-prevailed-in-the-greek-bailout.html.
Jones, Erik. 2010. “Merkel’s Folly.” Survival 52 (3): 21–38.
Karyotis, Georgios, and Roman Gerodimos. 2015. “The Politics of Extreme Austerity:
Greece in the Eurozone Crisis.” In New Perspectives on South-East Europe.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kathimerini. 2009. “G. Papandreou: Greece in Intensive Care.” 10 December (in
Greek). Accessed 10 June 2020. http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/10967/?ctype
= ar.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown.
Kokkinidis, Tasos. 2019. Remembering When Tsipras Todl Merkel to ‘Go Back’.”
Greek Reporter, 10 January (video). Accessed 30 May 2020 https://greece.
greekreporter.com/2019/01/10/remembering-when-tsipras-told-merkel-to-go-
back-video/.
Ladi, Stella. 2013. “Evidence-Based Policy Making in Greece.” In Greece’s Horizons:
Reflecting on the Country’s Assets and Capabilities, edited by Pantelis Sklias and
Nikolaos Tzifakis, 71–78. Berlin: Springer.
Lim, Darren J., Michalis Moutselos, and Michael McKenna. 2019. “Puzzled Out? The
Unsurprising Outcomes of the Greek Bailout Negotiations.” Journal of European
Public Policy 26 (3): 325–343. doi:10.1080/13501763.2018.1450890.
Lubik, Thomas A., and Karl Rhodes. August 2012. TARGET2: Symptom, Not Cause,
of Eurozone Woes. (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond).
Luka, Elli. 2020. The Global Economic Order: The International Law and Politics of
the Financial and Monetary System. Cheltenham: Elgar.
Magnus, Schoeller, and Gerda Falkner. This issue. “Acting in the Shadow of German
Hegemony? The Role of Smaller States in the Economic and Monetary Union
(Introduction to the Special Issue).” German Politics.
Maris, Georgios, and Pantelis Sklias. 2020. “European Integration and Asymmetric
Power: Dynamics and Change in the EMU.” European Politics and Society.
doi:10.1080/23745118.2019.1710998.
Michalopoulos, Sarantis. 2014. “Germany and Greece Sign ‘Reconciliation’
Agreement.” Euractiv. Accessed 24 July 2020. https://www.euractiv.com/section/
social-europe-jobs/news/germany-and-greece-sign-reconciliation-agreement/.
300 GERMAN POLITICS

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power
from Messina to Maastricht. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Nafpliotis, Alexandros. 2018. “From Radicalism to Pragmatism via Europe: PASOK’s
Stance vis-à-vis the EEC, 1977-1981.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18
(4): 509–528. doi:10.1080/14683857.2018.1519686.
Panke, Diana. 2010a. Small States in the European Union: Coping with Structural
Disadvantages. Farnham, VT: Ashgate.
Panke, Diana. 2010b. “Small States in the European Union: Structural Disadvantages
in EU Policy-Making and Counter-Strategies.” Journal of European Public Policy
17 (6): 799–817. doi:10.1080/13501763.2010.486980.
Panke, Diana. 2011. “Small States in EU Negotiations.” Cooperation and Conflict 46
(2): 123–143. doi:10.1177/0010836711406346.
Panke, Diana. 2012a. “Being Small in a Big Union: Punching Above Their Weights?
How Small States Prevailed in the Vodka and the Pesticides Cases.” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs 25 (3): 329–344. doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.
710579.
Panke, Diana. 2012b. “Dwarfs in International Negotiations: How Small States Make
Their Voices Heard.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25 (3): 313–328.
doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.710590.
Panke, Diana, and Julia Gurol. 2018. “Small States as Agenda-Setters? The Council
Presidencies of Malta and Estonia.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
56: 142–151. doi:10.1111/jcms.12767.
Pisani-Ferry, Jean. 2006. “Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective
on the Debate Over the Economic Governance of the Euro Area*.” JCMS:
Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (4): 823–844. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.
2006.00664.x.
Price-Thomas, Gareth, and Nick Turnbull. 2017. “Thickening Rhetorical Political
Analysis with a Theory of Distance: Negotiating the Greek Episode of the
Eurozone Crisis.” Political Studies 66 (1): 209–225. doi:10.1177/
0032321717708764.
Schild, Joachim. 2013. “Leadership in Hard Times: Germany, France, and the
Management of the Eurozone Crisis.” German Politics and Society 31 (1): 24–
47. doi:10.3167/gps.2013.310103.
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2015. “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Area
Crisis.” Journal of European Public Policy 22 (2): 177–195. doi:10.1080/
13501763.2014.994020.
Schure, Paul, and Amy Verdun. 2008. “Legislative Bargaining in the European
Union. The Divide Between Large and Small Member States.” European Union
Politics 9 (4): 459–486. doi:10.1177/1465116508095146.
Sinn, Hans-Werner, and Timo Wollmershäuser. 2012. “Target Loans, Current
Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility.” International
Tax and Public Finance 19 (4): 468–508. doi:10.1007/s10797-012-9236-x.
Sklias, Pantelis, and Georgios Maris. 2013. “The Political Dimension of the Greek
Financial Crisis.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14 (1): 144–164.
doi:10.1080/15705854.2012.732392.
Smith, Helena, and Graeme Wearden. 2015. “Alexis Tsipras Lambasts ‘Absurd
Proposals’ for Greece Debt-Deal Failure.” The Guardian. Accessed 20 May
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/31/greece-alexis-tsipras-
lambasts-absurd-proposals-creditors-for-debt-deal-failure.
 GREECE, GERMANY AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS 301

Steinmetz, Robert, and Anders Wivel. 2010. Small States in Europe: Challenges and
Opportunities. Farnham, VT: Ashgate Pub. Company.
Stournaras, Giannis. 2014. “We Had no Chance to Negotiate”. Proto Thema, 6
January. [Στουρνάρας, Γιάννης. 2014. “Δεν είχαμε δυνατότητα
διαπραγμάτευσης.” Πρώτο Θεμα, 6 Ιανουαριου, 2014]. Accessed 3/04/2020.
https://www.protothema.gr/economy/article/342054/stournaras-eduposiaki-i-
prosarmogi-tis-ellinikis-oikonomias/.
Tagaris, Karolina. 2015. “Greece Just Threatened to Seize German Assets Over World
War II.” Business Insider. Accessed 30 May 2020. https://www.businessinsider.
com/greece-just-threatened-to-seize-german-assets-over-world-war-ii-2015-3.
Târlea, Silvana, Stefanie Bailer, Hanno Degner, Lisa M. Dellmuth, Dirk Leuffen,
Magnus Lundgren, Jonas Tallberg, and Fabio Wasserfallen. 2019. “Explaining
Governmental Preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform.”
European Union Politics 20 (1): 24–44. doi:10.1177/1465116518814336.
Tidey, Alice. 2019. “Greece Parliament Demand Germany Pay WWII Reparations.”
Euronews. Accessed 20 May 2020 https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/19/greece-
parliament-demand-germany-pay-wwii-reparations.
Tzogopoulos, George. 2012. “It’s Germany Stupid! The Greek-German
Misunderstanding.” In Germany as Viewed by Other EU Member States, edited
by Almut Möller and Roderick Parkes. EPIN Paper 33 (June): 6–9.
Tzogopoulos, George. 2015. Greek-German Relations in times of Crisis. Notes du
Cerfa 126. Paris and Brussels IFRI.
Ulbrich, Jens, and Alexander Lipponer. 2012. “Balances in the TARGET2 Payments
System – a Problem?” CESifo Forum 13: 73–76.
Verdun, Amy. 1996. “An “Asymmetrical” Economic and Monetary Union in the EU:
Perceptions of Monetary Authorities and Social Partners.” Journal of European
Integration 20 (1): 59–81. doi:10.1080/07036339608429045.
Walter, Stefanie, Elias Dinas, Ignacio Jurado, and Nikitas Konstantinidis. 2018.
“Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the
Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum.” International Organization 72 (4):
969–994. doi:10.1017/s0020818318000255.
World Bank. 2019. “Gross Domestic Product 2018.” World Bank. Accessed 30 May
2020 https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
Wroughton, Lesley, Howard Schneider, and Dina Kyriakidou. 2015. “How the IMF’s
Misadventure in Greece is Changing the Fund.” Reuters. Accessed 20 May 2020.
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/imf-greece/.
Zahariadis, Nikolaos. 2016. “Bargaining Power and Negotiation Strategy: Examining
the Greek Bailouts, 2010–2015.” Journal of European Public Policy 24 (5): 675–694.
doi:10.1080/13501763.2016.1154977.