RF04: THEORIES OF MATHEMATICS EDUCATION

Lyn English Bharath Sriraman

Queensland University of Technology The University of Montana

The purpose of this Forum is to stimulate critical debate in the area of theory use and
theory development, and to consider future directions for the advancement of our
discipline. The Forum opens with a discussion of why theories are essential to the
work of mathematics educators and addresses possible reasons for why some
researchers either ignore or misunderstand/misuse theory in their work. Other issues
to be addressed include the social turn in mathematics education, an evolutionary
perspective on the nature of human cognition, the use of theory to advance our
understanding of student cognitive development, and models and modelling
perspectives. The final paper takes a critical survey of European mathematics
didactics traditions, particularly those in Germany and compares these to historical
trends in other parts of the world.

INTRODUCTION
Our conception and preference for a particular mathematics education theory
invariably influences our choice of research questions as well as our theoretical
framework in mathematics education research. Although we have made significant
advances in mathematics education research, our field has been criticized in recent
years for its lack of focus, its diverging theoretical perspectives, and a continued
identity crisis (Steen, 1999). At the dawn of this new millennium, the time seems ripe
for our community to take stock of the multiple and widely diverging mathematical
theories, and chart possible courses for the future. In particular, we need to consider
the important role of theory building in mathematics education research.
Issues for consideration include:
1. What is the role of theory in mathematics education research?
2. How does Stokes (1997) model of research in science apply to research in
mathematics education?
3. What are the currently accepted and widely used learning theories in
mathematics education research? Why have they gained eminence?
4. What is happening with constructivist theories of learning?
5. Embodied cognition has appeared on the scene in recent years. What are the
implications for mathematics education research, teaching, and learning?
6. Theories of models and modelling have received considerable attention in the
field in recent years. What is the impact of these theories on mathematics
research, teaching, and learning?

2005. In Chick, H. L. & Vincent, J. L. (Eds.). Proceedings of the 29th Conference of the International
Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Vol. 1, pp. 170-202. Melbourne: PME. 1- 170
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7. Is there a relationship between researchers’ beliefs about the nature of

mathematics and their preference for a particular theory?
8. How do theories used in European mathematics didactics traditions compare
with those used in other regions of the world? Do European traditions reveal
distinct theoretical trends?
There are several plausible explanations for the presence of multiple theories of
mathematical learning, including the diverging, epistemological perspectives about
what constitutes mathematical knowledge. Another possible explanation is that
mathematics education, unlike “pure” disciplines in the sciences, is heavily
influenced by cultural, social, and political forces (e.g., D'Ambrosio, 1999; Secada,
1995; Skovsmose & Valero, 2002). As Lerman indicates in his paper, the switch to
research on the social dimensions of mathematical learning towards the end of the
1980s resulted in theories that emphasized a view of mathematics as a social product.
Social constructivism, which draws on the seminal work of Vygotsky and
Wittgenstein (Ernest, 1994) has been a dominant research paradigm ever since. On
the other hand, cognitively oriented theories have emphasized the mental structures
that constitute and underlie mathematical learning, how these structures develop, and
the extent to which school mathematics curricula should capture the essence of
workplace mathematics (e.g., see Stevens, 2000).
Stokes (1997) suggested a new way of thinking about research efforts in science, one
that moves away from the linear one-dimensional continuum of "basic, to applied, to
applied development, to technology transfer." Although this one-dimensional linear
approach has been effective, Stokes argued that it is too narrow and does not
effectively describe what happens in scientific research. In Pasteur's Quadrant, Stokes
proposed a 2-dimensional model, which he claimed offered a completely different
conception of research efforts in science. If one superimposes the Cartesian co-
ordinate system on Stokes’ model, the Y -axis represents "pure" research (such as the
work of theoretical physicists) and the X-axis represents "applied" research" (such as
the work of inventors). The area between the two axes is called "Pasteur's Quadrant"
because it is a combination (or an amalgam) of the two approaches. If we apply
Stokes’ model to mathematics education research, we need to clearly delineate what
is on the Y-axis of Pasteur's quadrant if we are to call our field a science. Frank
Lester elaborates further on this issue in the opening paper of this Forum. Steve
Lerman extends the discussion initiated in Lester’s contribution on the pivotal, albeit
misunderstood role of theories in mathematics education, and presents theoretical
frameworks most frequently used in PME papers during the 1990-2001 time period.
Lerman’s analysis reveals that a wide variety of theories are used by PME
researchers with a distinct preference for social theories over cognitive theories. An
interesting avenue for discussion is whether the particular social theories used in this
time period reveal a distinct geographic distribution, and if so why? Luis Moreno-
Armella presents an evolutionary perspective on the nature of human cognition,
particularly the evolution of representations, which he aptly terms pre-theory, as it

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serves as a foundation for the present discussion. John Pegg and David Tall compare
neo-Piagetian theories in order to use the similarities and differences among theories
to address fundamental questions in learning. Lyn English and Richard Lesh present
a models and modeling perspective which innovatively combines the theories of
Piaget and Vygotsky to pragmatically address the development and real life use of
knowledge via model construction. The Forum concludes with a review by Günter
Törner and Bharath Sriraman on European theories of mathematics education, with a
focus on German traditions. Eight major tendencies are highlighted in 100 years of
mathematics education history in Germany; these tendencies reflect trends that have
occurred internationally.
References
D'Ambrosio, U. (1999). Literacy, Matheracy, and Technoracy: A trivium for today.
Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 1(2), 131-154.
Ernest, P. (1994). Conversation as a metaphor for mathematics and learning. Proceedings of
the British Society for Research into Learning Mathematics Day Conference, Manchester
Metropolitan University (pp. 58-63). Nottingham: BSRLM.
Secada, W. (1995). Social and critical dimensions for equity in mathematics education. In
W. Secada, E. Fennema, & L. Byrd Adajian (Eds.), New directions for equity in
mathematics education (pp. 147-164). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skovsmose, O., & Valero, P. (2002). Democratic access to powerful mathematics ideas. In
L. D. English (Ed.), Handbook of international research in mathematics education:
Directions for the 21st century. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Steen, L. (1999). Review of Mathematics Education as research domain. Journal for
Research in Mathematics Education, 30(2) 235-4.
Stevens, R. (2000). Who counts what as mathematics? Emergent and assigned mathematics
problems in a project-based classroom. In J. Boaler (Ed.), Multiple perspectives on
mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 105-144) Westport: Ablex.
Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur's quadrant: Basic science and technological innovation. New
York: Brookings Institution Press.

THE PLACE OF THEORY IN MATHEMATICS EDUCATION

RESEARCH
Frank K. Lester, Jr., Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
As most, if not all, of you know, the current emphasis in the United States being
placed on so called scientific research in education, is driven in large part by political
forces. Much of the public and some of the professional conversation has begun with
an assumption that the purpose of research is to determine “what works,” and the
discourse has focused largely on matters of research design and methods. One
consequence has been the rekindling of attention to experimental designs and

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quantitative methods that had faded from prominence in education research over the
past two decades or so. Far less prominent in recent discussions about educational
research has been the place of theory.
Scholars in other social science disciplines (e.g., anthropology, psychology,
sociology) often justify their research investigations on grounds of developing
understanding by building or testing theories. In contrast, the current infatuation in
the U.S. with “what works” seems to leave education researchers with less latitude to
conduct studies to advance theoretical goals. It is time for a serious examination of
the role that theory should play in the formulation of problems, in the design and
methods employed, and in the interpretation of findings in education research. In this
brief presentation, I speculate about why so many researchers seem to misunderstand
or misuse theory and suggest how we might think about the goals of research that
might help eliminate this misunderstanding and misuse.
Why is so much of our research atheoretical?
Mathematics education research is an interesting and important area for such an
examination. Although math ed research was aptly characterized less than 15 years
ago by Kilpatrick (1992) and others as largely atheoretical, a perusal of recent
articles in major MER journals reveals that theory is alive and well: indeed, Silver
and Herbst (2004) have noted that expressions such as “theory-based,” “theoretical
framework,” and “theorizing” are common. In fact, they muse, manuscripts are often
rejected for being atheoretical. The same is true of proposals submitted for PME
meetings. However, the concerns raised decades ago persist; too often researchers
ignore, misunderstand, or misuse theory in their work.
We are our own worst enemies
In my mind there are two basic problems that must be dealt with if we are to expect
theory to play a more prominent role in our research. The first has to do with the
widespread misunderstanding of what it means to adopt a theoretical stance toward
our work. The second is that some researchers, while acknowledging the importance
of theory, do not feel qualified to engage in serious theory-based work. I attribute
both of these problems to: (a) the failure of our graduate programs to properly equip
novice researchers with adequate preparation in theory, and (b) the failure of our
research journals to insist that authors of research reports offer serious theory-based
explanations of their findings.
Writing about the state of U.S. doctoral programs, Hiebert, Kilpatrick, and Lindquist
(2001) suggest that mathematics education is a complex system and that improving
the process of preparing doctoral students means improving the entire system, not
merely changing individual features of it. They insist that “the absence of system-
wide standards for doctoral programs [in mathematics education] is, perhaps, the
most serious challenge facing systemic improvement efforts. . . . Indeed, participants
in the system have grown accustomed to creating their own standards at each local
site” (p. 155). One consequence of the absence of commonly accepted standards is

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that there is a very wide range of requirements of different programs. At one end of
the continuum of requirements are a few programs that focus on the preparation of
researchers. At the other end are those programs that require little or no research
training beyond taking a research methods course or two. In general, with few
exceptions, doctoral programs are replete with courses and experiences in research
methodology, but woefully lacking in courses and experiences that provide students
with solid theoretical underpinnings for future research. Without solid understanding
of the role of theory in conceptualizing and conducting research, there is little chance
that the next generation of mathematics education researchers will have a greater
appreciation for theory than is currently the case. Put another way, we must do a
better job of cultivating a predilection for theory within the mathematics education
research community.
During my term as editor of the Journal for Research in Mathematics Education in
the early1990s, I found the failure of authors of research reports to pay serious
attention to explaining the results of their studies one of the most serious
shortcomings. A simple example from the expert-novice problem solver research
illustrates what I mean. It is not enough simply to report: Experts do X when they
solve problems and novices do Y. Were the researcher guided by theory, a natural
question would be to ask WHY? Having some theoretical perspective guiding the
research provides a framework within which to attempt to answer Why questions.
Without a theoretical orientation, the researcher can speculate at best or offer no
explanation at all.
Many mathematics educators hold misconceptions about the role of theory
Time constraints prevent me from providing a detailed discussion of what I see as the
most common misconceptions about theory, so I will simply list four and say a few
words about them.
1. Theory-based explanation given by “decree” rather than evidence. Some
researchers (e.g., Eisenhart, 1991) insist that educational theorists prefer to address
and explain the results of their research by “theoretical decree” rather than with solid
evidence to support their claims. That is to say, there is a belief among some
researchers that theorists make their data fit their theory.
2. Data have to “travel.” Sociologist and ethnographer, John Van Maanen (1988),
has observed that data collected under the auspices of a theory has to “travel” in the
sense that (in his view) data too often must be stripped of context and local meaning
in order to serve the theory.
3. Standard for discourse not helpful in day-to-day practice. Related to the previous
concern, is the observation that researchers tend to use a theory to set a standard for
scholarly discourse that is not functional outside the academic discipline.
Conclusions produced by the logic of theoretical discourse too often are not at all
helpful in day-to-day practice. Researchers don’t speak to practitioners! The theory is
irrelevant to the experience of practitioners (cf., Lester & Wiliam, 2002).

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4. No triangulation. Sociologist, Norman Denzin (1978) has discussed the

importance of theoretical triangulation, by which he means the process of compiling
currently relevant theoretical perspectives and practitioner explanations, assessing
their strengths, weaknesses, and appropriateness, and using some subset of these
perspectives and explanations as the focus of empirical investigation. By using a
single theoretical perspective to frame one’s research, such triangulation does not
happen.
There is no doubt that rigid, uncritical adherence to a theoretical perspective can lead
to these sorts of offenses. However, I know of no good researchers who are guilty of
such crimes. Instead, more compelling arguments can be marshaled in support of
using theory.
Why theory is essential
Again, time constraints for this presentation prevent me from elaborating on the
reasons why theory should play an indispensable role in our research. Let me mention
a few of the most evident. (In the following brief discussion I borrow heavily from an
important paper written about 15 years ago by Andy diSessa [1991])
1. There are no data without theory. We have all heard the claim, “The data speak for
themselves!” Dylan Wiliam and I have argued elsewhere that actually data have
nothing to say. Whether or not a set of data can count as evidence of something is
determined by the researcher’s assumptions and beliefs as well as the context in
which it was gathered (Lester & Wiliam, 2000). One important aspect of a
researcher’s beliefs is the theoretical perspective he or she is using; this perspective
makes it possible to make sense of a set of data.
2. Good theory transcends common sense. In the paper mentioned above, diSessa
(1991) argues that theoretical advancement is the linchpin in spurring practical
progress. He notes that, sure, you don’t need theory for many everyday problems—
purely empirical approaches often are enough. But often things aren’t so easy. Deep
understanding that comes from concern for theory building is often essential to deal
with truly important problems.
3. Need for deep understanding, not just “for this” understanding. Related to the
above, is the need we have to deeply understand some things—the important, big
questions (e.g., What does it mean to be intelligent? What does it mean to understand
something?)—not simply find solutions to immediate problems and dilemmas.
Theory helps us develop deep understanding. (I say more about understanding in the
next section.)
A different way to think about the goals of research and the place of theory
In his book, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation,
Donald Stokes (1997) presents a new way to think about scientific and technological
research and their purposes. Stokes begins with a detailed discussion of the history of
development of the current U.S. policy for supporting advanced scientific study (I

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suspect similar policies exist in other industrialized countries). He notes that from the
beginning of the development of this policy shortly after World War II there has been
an inherent tension between the pursuit of fundamental understanding and
considerations of use. This tension is manifest in the, often radical, separation
between basic and applied science. He argues that prior to the latter part of the 19th
Century, scientific research was conducted largely in pursuit of deep understanding
of the world. But, the rise of microbiology in the late 19th Century brought with it a
concern for putting scientific understanding to practical use. He illustrates this
concern with the work of Louis Pasteur. Of course, Pasteur working in his laboratory
wanted to understand the process of disease at the most basic level, but he wanted
that understanding to be applicable to dealing with silk worms, anthrax in sheep,
cholera in chickens, spoilage in milk, and rabies in people. The work of Pasteur
suggests that one could not understand his science without knowing the extent to
which he had considerations of use in mind as well as fundamental understanding.
Stokes proposed a model for thinking about scientific research that blends the two
motives: the quest for fundamental understanding and considerations of use.
Adapting Stokes’s model to educational research in general, and mathematics
education research in particular, I have come up with a slightly different model (see
Figure 1). In the final section of this short paper, I describe the relationship between
my model and the place of theory in mathematics education research.
Existing understanding Existing products*

Pure, Use- Pure,

basic inspired, applied
research basic research
research

Improved understanding Improved products*

* “Products” include such things as instructional materials, professional development
programs, and district educational policies.

Figure 1. Adaptation of Stokes’s model to educational research

A bricolage approach to theory in mathematics education research

Even if there is no need to make a case for the importance of theory in our research,
there is a need to suggest how researchers, especially novices, can deal with the

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almost mystifying range of theories and theoretical perspectives that are being used.
In a chapter to appear in a forthcoming handbook of research in mathematics
education, Cobb (in press) considers how mathematics education researchers might
cope with the multiple and frequently conflicting theoretical perspectives that
currently exist. He observes:
The theoretical perspectives currently on offer include radical constructivism,
sociocultural theory, symbolic interactionism, distributed cognition, information-
processing psychology, situated cognition, critical theory, critical race theory, and
discourse theory. To add to the mix, experimental psychology has emerged with a
renewed vigor in the last few years. . . . In the face of this sometimes bewildering
array of theoretical alternatives, the issue . . . is that of how we might make and
justify our decision to adopt one theoretical perspective rather than another.1
Cobb goes on to question the repeated (mostly unsuccessful) attempts that have been
made in mathematics education to derive instructional prescriptions directly from
background theoretical perspectives. He insists that it is more productive to compare
and contrast various theoretical perspectives in terms of the manner in which they
orient and constrain the types of questions that are asked about the learning and
teaching of mathematics, the nature of the phenomena that are investigated, and the
forms of knowledge that are produced. To his recommendation, I would add that
comparing and contrasting various perspectives would have the added benefit of both
enhancing our understanding of important phenomena and increasing the usefulness
of our investigations (c.f., Lester & Wiliam, 2002).
I propose to view the theoretical perspectives we adopt for our research as sources of
ideas that we can appropriate and modify for our purposes as mathematics educators.
This process of developing tools for our research is quite similar to that of
instructional design as described by Gravemeijer (1994). He suggests that
instructional design resembles the thinking process characterized by the French word
bricolage, a notion borrowed from Claude Levi–Strauss. A bricoleur is a handyman
who invents pragmatic solutions in practical situations and is adept at using whatever
is available. Similarly, I suggest, as do Cobb and Gravemeijer, that rather than
adhering to one particular theoretical perspective, we act as bricoleurs by adapting
ideas from a range of theoretical sources to suit our goals—goals that should aim not
only to deepen our fundamental understanding of mathematics learning and teaching,
but also to aid us in providing practical wisdom about problems practitioners care
about. If we begin to pay serious attention to these goals, the problem of theory is
likely to be resolved.
References
Cobb, P. (in press). Putting philosophy to work: Coping with multiple theoretical
perspectives. In F. Lester (Ed.), Handbook of research on teaching and learning
mathematics (2nd edition). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.
1
Because Cobb’s paper is currently in draft form and is not yet publicly available, no page numbers are provided.

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Denzin, N. (1978). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods.

New York: McGraw Hill.
diSessa, A. A. (1991). If we want to get ahead, we should get some theories. Proceedings of
the 13th annual meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the
Psychology of Mathematics Education (vol. 1, pp. 220 - 239). Blacksburg, VA.
Eisenhart, M. A. (1991). Conceptual frameworks for research circa 1991: Ideas from a
cultural anthropologist; implications for mathematics education researchers. Proceedings
of the 13th annual meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for
the Psychology of Mathematics Education (vol. 1, pp. 202 – 219). Blacksburg, VA.
Kilpatrick, J. (1992). A history of research in mathematics education. In D. A. Grouws
(Ed.), Handbook of research on mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 3-38). Reston,
VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics.
Gravemeijer, G. (1994). Educational development and developmental research. Journal for
Research in Mathematics Education, 25, 443-471.
Hiebert, J., Kilpatrick, J, & Lindquist, M. M. (2001). Improving U.S. doctoral programs in
mathematics education. In R. Reys, & J. Kilpatrick, One field, many paths: U.S. doctoral
programs in mathematics education (pp. 153-159). Washington, DC: Conference Board
of the Mathematical Sciences.
Lester, F. K. & Wiliam, D. (2000). The evidential basis for knowledge claims in
mathematics education research. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 31,
132-137.
Lester, F. K. & Wiliam, D. (2002). On the purpose of mathematics education research:
Making productive contributions to policy and practice. In L. D. English (Ed.),
Handbook of international research in mathematics education (pp. 489 – 506). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Silver, E. A. & Herbst, P. (2004, April). “Theory” in mathematics education scholarship.
Paper presented at the research presession of the annual meeting of the National Council
of Teachers of Mathematics, Philadelphia, PA.
Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur’s quadrant: Basic science and technological innovation.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Van Maanen, J. (1988). Tales of the field: On writing ethnography. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

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THEORIES OF MATHEMATICS EDUCATION: A PROBLEM OF

PLURALITY?
Stephen Lerman, London South Bank University, UK
Today, in many countries around the world, constraints on the funding of Universities
are leading to restrictions on educational research. In some countries national policy
is also placing constraints on the kinds of research that will be funded (e.g. the effects
of No Child Left Behind policy in the USA). At the same time we see research in
mathematics education proliferating, not just in quantity but also, as in the concerns
of this Research Forum, in the range of theories that are drawn upon in our research.
In my contribution I want to ask: is this surprising, or unusual, and is it necessarily a
hindrance to the effectiveness of educational research in mathematics?
In discussing this, I would argue that we need a specific language that enables an
analysis of intellectual fields and their growth, a language that will not be provided
by mathematics or by psychology. I will draw on some of the later work of the
sociologist of education, Basil Bernstein, in particular his 1999 paper on research
discourses (Bernstein, 1999). Following that, I will make some remarks about the use
of theory.
A Language of Research Fields
Bernstein draws on two notions: hierarchy and verticality. Discourses are described
as hierarchical where knowledge in the domain is a process of gradual distancing, or
abstraction, from everyday concepts. Hierarchical discourses require an
apprenticeship; they position people as initiated or apprenticed. Clearly academic and
indeed school mathematics are examples of hierarchical discourses. Research
(Cooper & Dunne, 2000) shows that setting mathematics tasks in everyday contexts
can mislead some students, namely those from low socio-economic background, into
privileging the everyday context and the meanings carried in them over the abstract
or esoteric meanings of the discourse of academic mathematics.
His second notion, verticality, describes the extent to which a discourse grows by the
progressive integration of previous theories, what he calls a vertical knowledge
structure, or by the insertion of a new discourse alongside existing discourses and, to
some extent, incommensurable with them. He calls these horizontal knowledge
structures. Bernstein offers science as an example of a vertical knowledge structure
and, interestingly, both mathematics and education (and sociology) as examples of
horizontal knowledge structures. He uses a further distinction that enables us to
separate mathematics from education: the former has a strong grammar, the latter a
weak grammar, that is, with a conceptual syntax not capable of generating
unambiguous empirical descriptions. Both are examples of hierarchical discourses in
that one needs to learn the language of linear algebra or string theory just as one
needs to learn the language of radical constructivism or embodied cognition. It will
be obvious that linear algebra and string theory have much tighter and specific

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concepts and hierarchies of concepts than radical constructivism or embodied

cognition. Adler and Davis (forthcoming) point out that a major obstacle in the
development of accepted knowledge in mathematics for teaching may well be the
strength of the grammar of the former and the weakness of the latter. Where we can
specify accepted knowledge in mathematics, knowledge about teaching is always
disputed.
As a horizontal knowledge structure, then, it is typical that mathematics education
knowledge will grow both within discourses and by the insertion of new discourses in
parallel with existing ones. Thus we can find many examples in the literature of work
that elaborates the functioning of the process of reflective abstraction, as an instance
of the development of knowledge within a discourse. But the entry of Vygotsky’s
work into the field in the mid-1980s (Lerman, 2000) with concepts that differed from
Piaget’s did not lead to the replacement of Piaget’s theory (as the proposal of the
existence of oxygen replaced the phlogiston theory). Nor did it lead to the
incorporation of Piaget’s theory into an expanded theory (as in the case of non-
Euclidean geometries). Indeed it seems absurd to think that either of these would
occur precisely because we are dealing with a social science, that is, we are in the
business of interpretation of human behaviour. Whilst all research, including
scientific research, is a process of interpretation, in the social sciences, such as
education, there is a double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1976) since the ‘objects’ whose
behaviour we are interpreting are themselves trying to make sense of the world.
Education, then, is a social science, not a science. Sociologists of scientific
knowledge (Kuhn, Latour) might well argue that science is more of a social science
than most of us imagine, but social sciences certainly grow both by hierarchical
development but especially by the insertion of new theoretical discourses alongside
existing ones. Constructivism grows, and its adherents continue to produce novel and
important work; models and modelling may be new to the field but already there are
novel and important findings emerging from that orientation.
I referred above to the incommensurability, in principle, of these parallel discourses.
Where a constructivist might interpret a classroom transcript in terms of the possible
knowledge construction of the individual participants, viewing the researcher’s
account as itself a construction (Steffe & Thompson, 2000), someone using socio-
cultural theory might draw on notions of a zone of proximal development.
Constructivists might find that describing learning as an induction into mathematics,
as taking on board concepts that are on the intersubjective plane, incoherent in terms
of the theory they are using (and a similar description of the reverse can of course be
given). In this sense, these parallel discourses are incommensurable.
There is an apparent contradiction between the final sentences of the last two
paragraphs. If I am claiming that there is important work emerging in different
discourses of mathematics education research, but I also claim that discourses are
incommensurable, within which discourse am I positioning myself to write these

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sentences? Is there a meta-discourse of mathematics education in which we can look

across these theories? I will make some remarks about this position in the next
section.
Theories in Use in Mathematics Education
First I will make some remarks drawn from a recent research project on the use of
theories in mathematics education. Briefly we (Tsatsaroni, Lerman & Xu, 2003)
examined a systematic sample of the research publications of the mathematics
education research community between 1990 and 2001, using a tool that categorised
research in many ways. I will only refer here to our findings concerning how
researchers use theories in their work as published in PME Proceedings.
Our analysis showed that just over 85% of all papers in the proceedings had an
orientation towards the empirical, with a further 5% moving from the theoretical to
the empirical, and this has changed little over the years. A little more than three-
quarters are explicit about the theories they are using in the research reported in the
article. Again this has not varied across the years. The theories that are used have
changed, however. We can notice an expanding range of theories being used and an
increase in the use of social theories, based on the explicit references of authors, in
some cases by referring to a named authority. These fields or names represent
theories used, not the frequency of their occurrence in papers.
Year Theoretical fields other than educational psychology and/or
mathematics
1990 Brousseau
1991 Philosophy of mathematics
1992 Vygotsky
1993 Vygotsky
1994 Brousseau, Chevellard, Poststructuralism
1995 Embodied cognition, Educational research
1996 Vygotsky, Situated cognition, Philosophy of mathematics
1997 Situated cognition, Vygotsky, Philosophy of mathematics
1998 Situated cognition, Vygotsky, Philosophy of mathematics
1999 Socio-historical practice
2000 Chevellard
2001 Semiotics, Bourdieu, Vygotsky, Philosophy

Table 1: Theoretical fields

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We might suggest that there is a connection here with creating identities, making a
unique space from which to speak in novel ways, but we would need another study to
substantiate and instantiate this claim.
We can say that there has been a substantial increase in the number of fields from
1994, although it is too early to say whether this trend will continue, as 1999 and
2000 showed a dropping off. What is clear is that the range of intellectual resources,
including sociology, philosophy, semiotics, anthropology, etc., is very broad.
In our analysis of how authors have used theories we have looked at whether, after
the research, they have revisited the theory and modified it, expressed dissatisfaction
with the theory, or expressed support for the theory as it stands. Alternatively, authors
may not revisit the theory at all, content to apply it in their study. We have found that
more than three-quarters fall into this last category, just over 10% revisit and support
the theory, whilst four percent propose modifications. Two authors in our sample
ended by opposing theory. This pattern has not changed over the years. Further
findings can be found in Tsatsaroni, Lerman and Xu (2003).
The development and application of an analytical tool in a systematic way, paying
attention to the need to make explicit and open to inspection the ways in which
decisions on placing articles in one category or another, enables one to make all sorts
of evidence-based claims. In particular, I would argue that one can observe and
record development within discourses and the development of new parallel
discourses because of the adoption of a sociological discourse as a language for
describing the internal structure of our intellectual field, mathematics education
research.
Conclusion
Finally, I will comment on concerns about the effectiveness of educational research
in a time of multiple and sometimes competing paradigms, described here as
discourses. ‘Effectiveness’ is a problematic notion, although one that certainly figures
highly in current discourses of accountability. It arises because by its nature
education is a research field with a face towards theory and a face towards practice.
This contrasts with fields such as psychology in which theories and findings can be
applied, but practice is not part of the characteristic of research in that field. Research
in education, in contrast, draws its problems from practice and expects its outcomes
to have applicability or at least significance in practice. Medicine and computing are
similar intellectual fields in this respect.
However, what constitutes knowledge is accepted or rejected by the criteria of the
social field of mathematics education research. Typically, we might say necessarily,
research has to take a step away from practice to be able to say something about it.
Taking the results of research into the classroom calls for a process of
recontextualisation, a shift from one practice into another in which a selection must
take place, allowing the play of ideology. To look for a simple criterion for
acceptable research in terms of ‘effectiveness’ is to enter into a complex set of issues.

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Indeed ‘effectiveness’ itself presupposes aims and goals for, in our case, mathematics
education. To ignore the complexity is to lose the possibility of critique and hence I
am not surprised by the multiplicity of theories in our field and the debates about
their relative merits, nor do I see it as a hindrance.
References
Adler, J. & Davis, Z. (forthcoming). Opening Another Black Box: Researching
Mathematics for Teaching in Mathematics Teacher Education.
Cooper, B., & Dunne, M. (2000). Assessing Children' s Mathematical Knowledge
Buckingham, UK: Open University Press Bernstein, B. (1999) Vertical and Horizontal
Discourse: an essay, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 20(2), 157-173.
Giddens, A. (1976). New Rules of Sociological Method. London: Hutchinson.
Lerman, S. (2000). The social turn in mathematics education research. In J. Boaler (Ed.)
Multiple Perspectives on Mathematics Teaching and Learning (pp. 19-44). Westport,
CT: Ablex.
Steffe, L. & Thompson, P. W. (2000). Interaction or Intersubjectivity? A Reply to Lerman.
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 31(2), 191-209.
Tsatsaroni, A. Lerman, S. & Xu, G. (2003). A sociological description of changes in the
intellectual field of mathematics education research: Implications for the identities of
academics. Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Educational Research
Association, Chicago. ERIC# ED482512.

THE ARTICULATION OF SYMBOL AND MEDIATION IN

MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
Luis Moreno Armella, Cinvestav, Mexico.
I describe some basic elements of a pre-theory of Mathematics Education. Our field
is at the crossroad of a science, mathematics, and a community of practice, education.
The interests of this community include the people whose learning takes place at
schools and the corresponding intellectual offer from the institutional sides. But as
soon as we enter the space of mathematics, we discover a different discipline from
the natural sciences. It is the strictly symbolic nature of mathematics that makes a big
difference and gives to mathematics education, as a research field, its characteristic
features that distinguishe it from similar endeavours with respect to other scientific
fields, such as biology for instance. I am not implying, of course, that there is no
abstraction or concept development involved in those other fields.
More recently, the presence of computers has introduced a new way of looking at
symbols and mathematical cognition and has offered the potentiality to re-shape the
goals of our whole research field. The urgency to take care of teaching and learning
from the research activities has resulted in practices without corresponding theories.
Again, I must make clear I am not dismissing the considerable and important results
this community has produced. I simply want to underline that institutional pressures

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can result more frequently than desirable, in losing track of research goals. Perhaps
this is a motive to re-consider the need to enter a more organized level of reflection in
our community. There is nothing bad in having the chance to look at educational
phenomena from different viewpoints but it is better if we can generate a synergy
between those viewpoints that, eventually, has as its output a new and stronger
theory. Nevertheless the tension between the local and the global also comes to
existence here. Being an interested observer and modest participant in the field, I
have come to think that only local explanations are possible in our field. Local
theories might be the answer to the plethora of explanations we encounter around us.
But even if local, a mathematics education theory must be developed from
scaffolding that eventually crystallizes in the theory. In our case, part of that
scaffolding is constituted by mathematics itself, and by a community of practice, as
already mentioned.
What sort of machine is the human brain, that it can give birth to mathematics? – an
old question that Stanislas Dehaene has aptly posed anew in his book The Number
Sense (1997). This is the kind of question that, in the long run, must be answered in
order to improve the understanding of our field. Nevertheless, trying to answer it will
demand an interdisciplinary and longitudinal effort. At the end of the day, we will
need to understand why we are able to create symbolic worlds (mathematics, for
instance) and why our minds are essentially incomplete outside the co-development
with material and symbolic technologies. Our symbolic and mediated nature comes to
the front as soon as we try to characterize our intellectual nature. Evolution and
culture have left its traits in our cognition, in particular, in our capacity to duplicate
the world at the level of symbols.
Diverging epistemological perspectives about what constitutes mathematical
knowledge modulate multiple conceptions of learning and the present theories of
what constitutes mathematical education as a research discipline. Today, however,
there is substantial evidence that the encounter between the conscious mind and
distributed cultural systems has altered human cognition and has changed the tools
with which we think. The origins of writing and how writing as a technology changed
cognition is key from this perspective (Ong, 1988). These examples suggest the
importance of studying the evolution of mathematical systems of representation as a
vehicle to develop a proper epistemological perspective for mathematics education.
Human evolution is coextensive with tool development. In a certain sense, human
evolution has been an artificial process as tools were always designed with the
explicit purpose of transforming the environment. And so, since about 1.5 millions
years ago, our ancestor Homo Erectus designed the first stone tools and took profit
from his/her voluntary memory and gesture capacities (Donald, 2001) to evolve a
pervasive technology used to consolidate their early social structures. The increasing
complexity of tools demanded optimal coherence in the use of memory and in the
transmission, by means of articulate gestures, of the building techniques. We witness
here what is perhaps the first example of deliberate teaching. Voluntary memory

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enabled our ancestors to engender a mental template of their tools. Templates lived in
their minds, resulting from activity, granting an objective existence as abstract
objects even before they were extracted from the stone. Thus, tool production was
not only important for plain survival, but also for broadening the mental world of our
ancestors –introducing a higher level of objectivity.
The actions of our ancestors were producing a symbolic version of the world: A
world of intentions and anticipations they could imagine and crystallize in their tools.
What their tools meant was the same as what they intended to do with them. They
could refer to their tools to indicate their shared intentions and, after becoming
familiar with those tools, they were looked as crystallized images of all the activity
that was embedded in them.
We suggest that the synchronic analysis of our relationship with technology, no
matter how deep, hides profound meanings of this relationship that coheres with the
co-evolution of man and his tools. It is then, unavoidable, to revisit our technological
past if we want to have an understanding of the present. Let us present a substantial
example.
Arithmetic: Ancient Counting Technologies
Evidence of the construction of one–to–one correspondences between arbitrary
collections of concrete objects and a model set (a template) can already be found
between 40000 and 10000 B.C. For instance, hunter-gatherers used bones with marks
(tallies). In 1937, a wolf bone dated to about 30000 B.C. was found in Moravia
(Flegg, 1983). This reckoning technique (using a one-to-one correspondence) reflects
a deeply rooted trait of human cognition. Having a set of stone bits or the marks on a
bone as a modeling set constitutes, up to our knowledge, the oldest counting
technique humans have designed. The modeling set plays, in all cases, an
instrumental role for the whole process. In fact, something is crystallized by marking
a bone: The intentional activity of finding the size of a set of hunted pieces, for
instance, or as some authors have argued, the intentional activity of computing time.
The modeling set of marks, plays a role similar to the role played by a stone tool as
both mediate an activity, finding the size, and both crystallize that activity. Between
10000 and 8000, B.C. in Mesopotamia, people used sets of pebbles (clay bits) as
modeling sets. This technique was inherently limited. If, for instance, we had a
collection of twenty pebbles as modeling set then, it would be possible to estimate the
size of collections of twenty or less elements. Nevertheless, to deal with larger
collections (for instance, of a hundred or more elements), we would need increasingly
larger models with evident problems of manipulation and maintenance. And so, the
embodiment of the one-to-one technique in the set of pebbles inhibits the extension
of it to further realms of experience. It is very plausible that being conscious of these
difficulties, humans looked for alternative strategies that led them to the brink of a
new technique: the idea that emerged was to replace the elements of the model set
with clay pieces of diverse shapes and sizes, whose numerical value were

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conventional. Each piece compacted the information of a whole former set of simple
pebbles ––according to its shape and size. The pieces of clay can be seen as
embodiments of pre-mathematical symbols. Yet, they lacked rules of transformation
that allowed them to constitute a genuine mathematical system.
Much later, the consolidation of the urbanization process (about 4000 B.C.)
demanded, accordingly, more complex symbol systems. In fact, the history of
complex arithmetic signifiers is almost determined by the occurrence of bullae. These
clay envelopes appeared around 3500-3200 B.C. The need to record commercial and
astronomic data led to the creation of symbol systems among which mathematical
systems seem to be one of the first. The counters that represented different amounts
and sorts ––according to shape, size, and number–– of commodities were put into a
bulla which was later sealed. And so, to secure the information contained in a bulla,
the shapes of the counters were printed on the bulla outer surface. Along with the
merchandise, producers would send a bulla with the counters inside, describing the
goods sent. When receiving the shipment, the merchant could verify the integrity of
it.
A counter in a bulla represents a contextual number –– for example, the number of
sheep in a herd; not an abstract number: there is five of something, but never just five.
The shape of the counter is impressed in the outer surface of the bulla. The mark on
the surface of the bulla indicates the counter inside. That is, the mark on the surface
keeps an indexical relation with the counter inside as its referent. And the counter
inside has a conventional meaning with respect to amounts and commodities. It must
have been evident, after a while, that counters inside were no longer needed;
impressing them in the outside of the bulla was enough. That decision altered the
semiotic status of those external inscriptions. Afterward, instead of impressing the
counters against the clay, scribes began using sharp styluses that served to draw on
the clay the shapes of former counters. From this moment on, the symbolic
expression of numerical quantities acquired an infra-structural support that, at its
time, led to a new epistemological stage of society. Yet the semiotic contextual
constraints, made evident by the simultaneous presence of diverse numerical systems,
was an epistemological barrier for the mathematical evolution of the numerical
ideographs. Eventually, the collection of numerical (and contextual) systems was
replaced by one system (Goldstein, La naissance du nombre en Mesopotamie. La
Recherche, L’Univers des Nombres (hors de serie),1999). That system was the
sexagesimal system that also incorporated a new symbolic technique: numerical
value according to position. In other words, it was a positional system. There is still
an obstacle to have a complete numerical system: the presence of zero that is of
primordial importance in a positional system to eliminate representational
ambiguities. For instance, without zero, how can we distinguish between 12 and 102?
We would still need to look for the help of context.
Mathematical objects result from a sequence of crystallization processes that, at a
certain level of evolution, has an ostensible social and cultural dimension. As the

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levels of reference are hierarchical the crystallization process is a kind of recursive

process that allows us to state:
Mathematical symbols co-evolve with their mathematical referents and the induced
semiotic objectivity makes possible for them to be taken as shared in a community of
practice.
In what follows, we should try to articulate some reflections regarding the presence
of the computational technologies in mathematical thinking. It is interesting to notice
that even if the new technologies are not yet fully integrated within the mathematical
universe, their presence will eventually erode the mathematical way of thinking. The
blending of mathematical symbol and computers has given way to an internal
mathematical universe that works as the reference fields to the mathematical
signifiers living in the screens of computers. This takes abstraction a large step
further.
Acknowledgement. This writing has benefited from discussions, along the years, with
my friends Jim Kaput and Steve Hegedus, both from the University of Massachusetts
at Dartmouth.
References
Dehaene, S. (1997). The Number Sense: How the mind creates mathematics. New York:
Oxford, Univ. Press.
Donald, M. (2001). A mind so rare. New York/London, W.W. Norton & Company.
Flegg, G. (1983). Numbers: Their history and meaning. Portland, OR: Schocken Books.
Goldstein, C. (1999). La naissance du nombre en Mesopotamie. La Recherche, L’Univers
des Nombres (hors de serie),1999.
Ong, W. (1988). Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word. London:
Routledge.

USING THEORY TO ADVANCE OUR UNDERSTANDINGS OF

STUDENT COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
John Pegg David Tall
University of New England (Australia) University of Warwick (UK)

INTRODUCTION
Over recent years, various theories have arisen to explain and predict cognitive
development in mathematics education. Our focus is to raise the debate beyond a
simple comparison of detail in different theories to move to use the similarities and
differences among theories to address fundamental questions in learning. In
particular, a focus of research on fundamental learning cycles provides an empirical
basis from which important questions concerning the learning of mathematics can

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and should be addressed.To assist us with this focus we identify two kinds of theory
of cognitive growth:
• global theories of long-term growth of the individual, such as the stage-
theory of Piaget (e.g., Piaget & Garcia, 1983).
• local theories of conceptual growth such as the action-process-object-schema
theory of Dubinsky (Czarnocha et al., 1999) or the unistructural-
multistructural-relational-extended abstract sequence of SOLO Model
(Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes, Biggs & Collis, 1982, 1991; Pegg,
2003).
Some theories (such as that of Piaget, the SOLO Model, or more broadly, the
enactive-iconic-symbolic theory of Bruner, 1966) incorporate both aspects. Others,
such as the embodied theory of Lakoff and Nunez (2000) or the situated learning of
Lave and Wenger (1990) paint in broader brush-strokes, featuring the underlying
biological or social structures involved. A range of global longitudinal theories each
begin with physical interaction with the world and, through the use of language and
symbols, become increasingly abstract. Table 1 shows four of these theoretical
developments.
Piaget Stages van Hiele Levels SOLO Modes Bruner
(Hoffer,1981) Modes
Sensori Motor I Recognition Sensori Motor Enactive
Preoperational II Analysis Ikonic Iconic
Concrete Operational III Ordering Concrete Symbolic
Formal Operational IV Deduction Symbolic
V Rigour Formal
Post-formal
Table 1: Global stages of cognitive development
What stands out from such ‘global’ perspectives is the gradual biological
development of the individual, growing from dependence on sensory perception
through physical interaction and on, through the use of language and symbols, to
increasingly sophisticated modes of thought. SOLO offers a valuable viewpoint as it
explicitly nests each mode within the next, so that an increasing repertoire of more
sophisticated modes of operation become available to the learner. At the same time,
all modes attained remain available to be used as appropriate. As we go on to discuss
fundamental cycles in conceptual learning, we therefore need to take account of the
development of modes of thinking available to the individual.
LOCAL CYCLES
Our current focus is on ‘local’ theories, formulated within a ‘global’ framework
whereby the cycle of learning in a specific conceptual area is related to the overall
cognitive structures available to the individual. A recurring theme identified in these
theories is a fundamental cycle of growth in the learning of specific concepts, which
we frame within broader global theories of individual cognitive growth.

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One formulation is found in SOLO. This framework can be considered under the
broad descriptor of neo-Piagetian models. It evolved as reaction to observed
inadequacies in Piaget’s formulations and shares much in common with the ideas of
such theorists as Case, Fischer, and Halford.
In particular, SOLO focuses attention upon students’ responses rather than their level
of thinking or stage of development. It arose, in part, because of the substantial
décalage problem associated with Piaget’s work when applied to the school learning
context, and the identification of a consistency in the structure of responses from
large numbers of students across a variety of learning environments in a number of
subject and topic areas. While SOLO has its roots in Piaget’s epistomelogical
tradition, it is based strongly on information-processing theories and the importance
of working memory capacity. In addition, familiarity with content and context
invariably plays an influential role in determining the response category.
At the ‘local’ focus SOLO comprises a recurring cycle of three levels referred to as
unistructural, multistructural, and relational (a UMR cycle). The application of
SOLO takes a multiple-cycle form of at least two UMR cycles in each mode where
the R level response in one cycle evolves to a new U level response in the next cycle.
This not only provides a basis to explore how basic concepts are acquired, but it also
provides us with a description of how students react to reality as it presents itself to
them. The second cycle then offers the type of development that is most evident and a
major focus of primary and secondary education.
Another formulation concerns various theories of process-object encapsulation, in
which processes become interiorised and then conceived as mental concepts, which
has been variously described as action, process, object (Dubinsky), interiorization,
condensation, reification (Sfard) or procedure, process, concept (Gray & Tall).
Theories of ‘process-object encapsulation’ were formulated at the outset to describe a
sequence of cognitive growth. Each of these theories, founded essentially on the ideas
of Piaget, saw cognitive growth through actions on existing objects that become
interiorized into processes and then encapsulated as mental objects.
Dubinsky described this cycle as part of his APOS theory (action-process-object-
schema), although he later asserted that objects could also be formed by
encapsulation of schemas as well as encapsulation of processes. Sfard (1991)
proposed an operational growth through a cycle she termed interiorization-
condensation-reification, which she complemented by a ‘structural’ growth that
focuses on the properties of the reified objects formed in an operational cycle.
Gray and Tall (1994) focused more on the role of symbols acting as a pivot, switching
from a process (such as addition of two numbers, say 3+4) to a concept (the sum 3+4,
which is 7). The entity formed by a symbol and its pivotal link to process or concept
they named a procept. They observed that the growth of procepts occurred often (but
not always) through a sequence that they termed procedure-process-procept. In this
model a procedure is a sequence of steps carried out by the individual, a process is

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where a number of procedures ( 0) giving the same input-output are regarded as the
same process, and the symbol shared by both becomes process or concept.
The various process-object theories have a spectrum of development from process to
object. The process-object theories of Dubinsky and Sfard were mainly based on
experiences of students doing more advanced mathematical thinking in late
secondary school and at university. For this reason their emphasis is on formal
development rather than on earlier acquired forms of thinking such as associated with
Piaget’s sensori-motor or pre-operational stages. Note too that Sfard’s first state is
referred to as an ‘interiorized process’, which is the same name given in Dubinsky’s
second, however, both see the same main components of the second stage:– that the
process is seen as a whole without needing to perform the individual steps.
We now turn to the cycles of development that occur within a range of different
theories. These have been developed for differing purposes. The SOLO Model, for
instance, is concerned with assessment of performance through observed learning
outcomes. Other theories, such as those of Davis (1984), Dubinsky (Czarnocha et al.,
1999), Sfard (1991), and Gray and Tall (1994) are concerned with the sequence in
which the concepts are constructed by the individual).
SOLO of Biggs & Davis APOS of Gray & Tall
Collis Dubinsky
[Base Objects]
Unistructural Procedure (VMS) Action Procedure
Multistructural Integrated Process Process Process
Relational Entity Object Procept
Unistructural Schema
Table 2: Local cycles of cognitive development
As can be seen from table 2, there are strong family resemblances between these
cycles of development. Note that Davis used the term ‘visually moderated sequence’
for a step-by-step procedure. Although a deeper analysis of the work of individual
authors will reveal discrepancies in detail, there are also insights that arise as a result
of comparing one theory with another as assembled in table 3.
SOLO Davis APOS Gray & Tall
Base Object(s)
Unistructural VMS Action
Procedure Procedure
[Multi-Procedure]
Multistructural
Relational Process Process Process
Unistructural Entity Object Procept
(Extended Schema
Abstract)
Table 3: The fundamental cycle of conceptual construction

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CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this brief paper is not so much to attempt to produce a unified theory
incorporating these perspectives. Instead, it is to advocate an approach that seeks to
understand the meanings implicit in each broad theory and to see where each may
shed light on the other, leading to theoretical correspondences and dissonances.
While at first glance there may appear to be irreconcilable differences between the
theoretical stances (e.g., van Hiele is concerned with underlying thinking skills and
SOLO with observable behaviours), a closer examination can reveal there is much to
consider. A synthesis provides a fresh perspective in considering student growth in
understanding.
A primary goal of teaching should be to stimulate cognitive development in students.
Such development as described by these fundamental learning cycles is not
inevitable. Ways to stimulate growth, to assist with the reorganisation of earlier levels
need to be explored. Important questions about strategies appropriate for different
levels or even if it is true that all students pass through all levels in sequence.
Research into such questions is sparse. Nevertheless, the notion of fundamental
cycles of learning does provide intriguing potential for research.
References
Biggs, J. & Collis, K. (1991). Multimodal learning and the quality of intelligent behaviour.
In H. Rowe (Ed.), Intelligence, Reconceptualization and Measurement. New Jersey.
Laurence Erlbaum Assoc.
Biggs, J., & Collis, K. (1982). Evaluating the Quality of Learning: the SOLO Taxonomy.
New York: Academic Press.
Bruner, J. S. (1966). Towards a Theory of Instruction, New York: Norton.
Case, R. (1992). The Mind's Staircase: Exploring the conceptual underpinnings of children's
thought and knowledge. Hillsdale, NJ. Erlbaum.
Czarnocha, B., Dubinsky, E., Prabhu, V., Vidakovic, D., (1999). One theoretical perspective
in undergraduate mathematics education research. Proceedings of PME 23
Davis, R.B. (1984). Learning Mathematics: The cognitive science approach to mathematics
education. Norwood, NJ: Ablex
Fischer, K.W., & Knight, C.C. (1990). Cognitive development in real children: Levels and
variations. In B. Presseisen (Ed.), Learning and thinking styles: Classroom interaction.
Washington. National Education Association.
Gray, E. & Tall, D. (1994). Duality, ambiguity and flexibility: a proceptual view of simple
arithmetic. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 26, 2, 115-141.
Lakoff, G. & Nunez, R. (2000). Where Mathematics Comes From. New York: Basic Books.
Lave, J. & Wenger E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate peripheral participation.
Cambridge: CUP.

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MacLane, S, (1994). Responses to Theoretical Mathematics, Bulletin (new series) of the

American Mathematical Society, 30, 2, 190–191.
Pegg, J. (2003). Assessment in Mathematics: a developmental approach. In J.M. Royer
(Ed.) Advances in Cognition and Instruction. pp. 227- 259. New York: Information Age
Publishing Inc.
Piaget, J. & Garcia, R. (1983). Psychogenèse et Histoire des Sciences. Paris: Flammarion.
Sfard, A. (1991). On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions: Reflections on
processes and objects as different sides of the same coin, Educational Studies in
Mathematics, 22, 1–36.
Van Hiele, P.M. (1986). Structure and Insight: a theory of mathematics education. New
York. Academic Press.

TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF MODELS & MODELING

PERSPECTIVES ON MATHEMATICAL LEARNING AND
PROBLEM SOLVING
Richard Lesh Lyn English
Indiana University (USA) Queensland University of Technology
(Australia)

Models and modeling (M&M) research often investigates the nature of

understandings and abilities that are needed in order for students to be able to use
what they have (presumably) learned in the classroom in “real life” situations beyond
school. Nonetheless, M&M perspectives evolved out of research on concept
development more than research on problem solving; and, rather than being
preoccupied with the kind of word problems emphasized in textbooks and
standardized tests, we focus on (simulations of) problem solving “in the wild.” Also,
we give special attention to the fact that, in a technology-based age of information,
significant changes are occurring in the kinds of “mathematical thinking” that is
coming to be needed in the everyday lives of ordinary people in the 21st century – as
well as in the lives of productive people in future-oriented fields that are heavy users
of mathematics, science, and technology.
In modern knowledge economies, systems – ranging from communication systems to
economic or accounting systems - are among the most important “things” that impact
the lives of ordinary people. Some of these systems occur naturally, while others are
created by humans. But, in any case, mathematics is useful for making (or making
sense of) such systems precisely because mathematics is the study of structure. That
is, it is the study of systemic properties of structurally interesting systems.

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In future-oriented fields that range from design sciences to life sciences, industry
advisors to university programs consistently emphasize that:
The kind of people we most want to hire are those who are proficient at (a) making sense
of complex systems, (b) working within teams of diverse specialists, (c) adapting rapidly
to a variety of rapidly evolving conceptual tools, (d) working on multi-staged projects
that require planning and collaboration among many levels and types of participants, and
(e) developing sharable and re-useable conceptual tools that usually need to draw on a
variety of disciplines – and textbook topic areas.
Both of the preceding trends shift attention beyond mathematics as computation
toward mathematics as conceptualization, description, and explanation. But, they
also raise the following kinds of questions that lie at the heart of M&M research in
mathematics education.
• What is the nature of the most important classes of problem-solving situations
where mathematics, science, and technology are needed for success in real life
situations beyond school?
• What mathematical constructs or conceptual systems provide the best
foundations for success in these situations?
• What does it mean to “understand” these constructs and conceptual systems?
• How do these understandings develop?
• What kinds of experiences facilitate (or retard) development?
• How can people be identified whose exceptional abilities do not fit the narrow
and shallow band of abilities emphasized on standardized tests – or even school
work?
Related questions are: (a) Why do students who have histories of getting A’s on tests
and coursework often do not do well beyond school? (b) What is the relationship
between the learning of “basic skills” and a variety of different kinds of deeper or
higher-order understandings or abilities? (c) Why do problem solving situations that
involve collaborators and conceptual tools tend to create as many conceptual
difficulties as they eliminate? (d) In what ways is “mathematical thinking” becoming
more multi-media - and more contextualized (in the sense that knowledge and
abilities are organized around experience as much as around abstractions, and in the
sense that relevant ways of thinking usually need to draw on ways for thinking that
seldom fall within the scope of a single discipline or textbook topic area). (e) How
can instruction and assessment be changed to reflect the fact that, when you
recognize the importance of a broader range of understandings and abilities, a
broader range of people often emerge as having exceptional potential?
M&M perspectives assume that such questions should be investigated through
research, not simply resolved though political processes - such as those that are
emphasized when “blue ribbon” panels of experts develop curriculum standards for
teaching or testing. Furthermore, we believe that such questions are not likely to be
answered through content-independent investigations about how people learn or how
people solve problems, and they are only indirectly about the nature (and/or the

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development) of humans - or the functioning of human brains. This is because they

are about the nature of mathematical and scientific knowledge, and they are about the
ways this knowledge is useful in “real life” situations. So, researchers with broad and
deep expertise in mathematics and science should play significant roles in
collaborating with experts in the learning and cognitive sciences.
Theoretical perspectives for M&M research trace their lineage to modern descendents
of Piaget and Vygotsky - but also (and just as significantly) to American Pragmatists
such as William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Oliver Wendell Holmes, George
Herbert Mead, and John Dewey. And partly for this reason, M&M perspectives
reflect “blue collar” approaches to research. That is, we focus on the development of
knowledge (and conceptual tools) to inform “real life” decision-making issues –
where (a) the criteria for success are not contained within any preconceived theory,
(b) productive ways of thinking usually need to draw on more than a single theory,
and (c) useful knowledge usually needs to be expressed in the context of conceptual
tools that are powerful (for some specific purpose), sharable (with other people), and
re-useable (beyond the context in which they were developed). Thus, M&M research
often focuses on model-development rather than proceeding too quickly to theory
development and hypothesis testing; and, before rushing ahead to try to teach or test
various mathematical concepts, processes, beliefs, habits of mind, or components of a
productive problem solving personae, we conduct developmental investigations about
the nature of what it means to “understand” them.
One way that mathematics educators have investigated questions about what is
needed for success beyond school is by observing people “thinking mathematically”
in everyday situations. Sometimes, such studies compare “experts” with “novices”
who are working in fields such as engineering, agriculture, medicine, or business
management - where “mathematical thinking” often is critical for success. Such
ethnographic investigations often have been exceedingly productive and illuminating.
Nonetheless, from the perspectives of M&M research, they also tend to have some
significant shortcomings. For example, we must be skeptical of observations which
depend heavily on preconceived notions about where to observe (in grocery stores?
carpentry shops? car dealerships? engineering firms? Internet cafés?), whom to
observe (street vendors? shoppers? farmers? cooks? engineers? baseball fans?), when
to observe (when they’re estimating sizes? calculating with numbers? minimizing
routes? describing, explaining, or predicting the behaviors of complex systems?), and
what to count as “mathematical thinking” (e.g., planning, monitoring, assessing,
explaining, justifying steps during multi-step projects, or deciding what information
to collect about specific decision-making issues). Consequently, in simple
observational studies, close examinations of underlying assumptions often expose
unwarranted prejudices about what it means to “think mathematically” - and about
the nature of “real life” situations in which mathematics is useful.
A second way to investigate what’s needed for success beyond school is to use multi-
tier design experiments (Lesh, 2002) in which (a) students develop models for

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making senses of mathematical problem solving situations, (b) teachers develop

models for creating (and making sense of) students’ modeling activities, and (c)
researchers develop models for creating (or making sense of) interactions among
students, teachers, and relevant learning environments. We sometimes refer to such
studies as evolving expert studies (Lesh, Kelly & Yoon, in press) because the final
products that are produced tend to represent significant extensions or revisions in the
thinking of each of the participants who were involved. Such methodologies respect
the opinions of diverse groups of stake holders whose opinions should be considered.
On the one hand, nobody is considered to have privileged access to the truth –
including, in particular, the researchers. All participants (from students to teachers to
researchers) are considered to be in the model development business; and, similar
principles are assumed to apply to “scientific inquiry” at all levels. So, everybody’s
ways of thinking are subjected to examination and possible revision.
For the preceding kind of three-tiered design experiments, each tier can be thought of
as a longitudinal development study in a conceptually enriched environment. That is,
a goal is to go beyond studies of typical development in natural environments to also
focus on induced development within carefully controlled environments. Finally,
because the goal of M&M research is to investigate the nature and development of
constructs or conceptual systems (rather than investigating and making claims
students per se), we often investigate how understandings evolve in the thinking of
“problem solvers” who are in fact teams (or other learning communities) rather than
being isolated individuals. So, we often compare individuals with groups in
somewhat the same manner that other styles of research might compare experts and
novices, or gifted students and average ability students.
Investigations from an M&M perspective have led to the growing realization that, in
a technology-based age of information, even the everyday lives of ordinary people
are increasingly impacted by systems that are complex, dynamic, and continually
adapting; and, this is even more true for people in fields that are heavy users of
mathematics and technology. Such fields include design sciences such as engineering
or architecture, social sciences such as economics or business management, or life
sciences such as new hyphenated fields involving bio-technologies or nano-
technologies. In such fields, many of the systems that are most important to
understand and explain are dynamic (living), self-organizing, and continually
adapting.
M&M research is showing that it is possible for average ability students to develop
powerful models for describing complex systems that depend on only new uses of
elementary mathematical concepts that are accessible to middle school students.
However, when we ask What kind of mathematical understandings and abilities
should students master? attention should shift beyond asking What kind of
computations can they execute correctly? to also ask What kind of situations can they
describe productively? ... This observation is the heart of M&M perspectives on
learning and problem solving.

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Traditionally, problem solving in mathematics education has been defined as getting

from givens to goals when the path is not obvious. But, according to M&M
perspectives, goal directed activities only become problematic when the "problem
solver" (which may consist of more than an isolated individual) needs to develop a
more productive way of thinking about the situation (given, goals, and possible
solution processes). So, solutions to non-trivial problems tend to involve a series of
modeling cycles in which current ways of thinking are iteratively expressed, tested,
and revised; and, each modeling cycle tends to involve somewhat different
interpretations of givens, goals, and possible solution steps.
Results from M&M research make it clear that average ability students are indeed
capable of developing powerful mathematical models and that the constructs and
conceptual systems that underlie these models often are more sophisticated than
anything that anybody has tried to teach the relevant students in school.
However, the most significant conceptual developments tend to occur when students
are challenged to repeatedly express, test, and revise their own current ways thinking
- not because they were guided along a narrow conceptual trajectory toward
(idealized versions of) their teachers ways of thinking (Lesh & Yoon, 2004). That is,
development looks less like progress along a path; and, it looks more like an inverted
genetic inheritance tree - where great grandchildren trace their evolution from
multiple lineages which develop simultaneously and interactively.
In general, when knowledge develops through modeling processes, the knowledge
and conceptual tools that develop are instances of situated cognition. Models are
always molded and shaped by the situations in which they are created or modified;
and, the understandings that evolve are organized around experience as much as
around abstractions. Yet, the models and underlying conceptual systems that evolve
often represent generalizable ways of thinking. That is, they are not simply situation-
specific knowledge which does not transfer. This is because models ( and other
conceptual tools) are seldom worthwhile to develop unless they are intended to by
powerful (for a specific purpose in a specific situation), re-useable (in other
situations), and sharable (with other people).
References
Lesh, R. & Doerr, H. (2003) Beyond Constructivist: A Models & Modeling Perspective on
Mathematics Teaching, Learning, and Problems Solving. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Lesh, R. (2002). Research Design in Mathematics Education: Focusing on Design
Experiments. In L. English (Ed.) International Handbook of Research Design in
Mathematics Education (pp.27-50). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kelly, A., & Lesh, R. (Eds.).(2000) The Handbook of Research Design in Mathematics and
Science Education. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lesh, R., Kelly, A. & Yoon, C. (in press) Multi-tier Design Experiments in Mathematics,
Science, and Technology Education. In Kelly, A. & Lesh, R. Eds. Design Research in
Mathematics, Science & Technology Education. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

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ISSUES AND TENDENCIES IN GERMAN MATHEMATICS-

DIDACTICS: AN EPOCHAL PERSPECTIVE
Günter Törner Bharath Sriraman
Duisburg-Essen Universität (Germany) The University of Montana (USA)

It is a positive sign that an international discussion on theories of mathematics

education is taking place especially in the wake of TIMMS and PISA. It is laudable
of PME to take the initiative to closely examine specific geographic trends in
mathematics education research in comparison with trends that are concurrently
occurring (or occurred) elsewhere (as reported in English et al., 2002; Schoenfeld,
1999, 2002). In doing so we can reflect and hypothesize on why certain trends seem
to re-occur, sometimes invariantly across time and geographic location. Numerous
reviews about the state of German mathematics didactics are available in German
(see [1], Hefendehl et al., 2004; Vollrath et al., 2004). However there are no extant
attempts to trace and analyze the last hundred years of “mathematics didactic” trends
in Germany in comparison to what is happening internationally. This is our modest
attempt to fill this void.
Some preliminary remarks on terminology and history: It has become standard
practice for researchers writing in English to use the term “Mathematikdidaktik”
when referring to mathematics education in Germany. However, there is no real
comprehensive English equivalent for the term "Mathematikdidaktik". Neither
"didactics" nor "math-education" describes the full flavor and the historical nuances
associated with this German word. Even the adjective “German” is imprecise since
educational research approaches in Germany splintered in the aftermath of World
War II, with different philosophical schools of thought developing in the former East
(GDR) and the west (FRG) on research priorities for university educators, until the
reunification which occurred in 1990. Currently the 16 states in Germany reveal a
rich heterogeneity in the landscape of mathematics teaching, teacher training and
research methods, which manifests itself to insiders who microscopically examine the
TIMSS- and PISA-results. However the reasons for this heterogeneity remain a
mystery to outsiders. Given the page limits we outline in macroscopic terms the
historical reasons for this heterogeneity. In doing so we do not differentiate explicitly
between the alignment (or misalignment!) of theories preferred by university
educators in comparison to practices of mathematics instruction in schools. The
mutual dependencies between the two is certainly an interesting research question
which brings into focus the system wide effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of
educational research (see for example Burkhardt & Schoenfeld, 2003).
1. The Pedagogical tradition of mathematics teaching-Mathematics as
Educational Value: Reflections on the processes of mathematics teaching and
learning have been a long-standing tradition in Germany. The early proponents of
these theories of teaching and learning are recognizable names even for current

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researchers. Chief among these early theorists was Adam Reise “the arithmetician”
who stressed hand computation as a foundational learning process in mathematics.
This emphasis is found in the pedagogical classics of the 19th century written by
Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), Hugo Gaudig (1860-1923), Georg
Kerschensteiner (1854-1932) (see Jahnke, 1990; Führer, 1997; Huster, 1981). The
influence of this approach echoed itself until the 1960’s in the so-called didactics of
mathematics teaching in elementary schools to serve as a learning pre-requisite for
mathematics in the secondary schools.
2. Mathematician-Initiators of traditions in didactics research (20th Century): In
the early part of the previous century, mathematicians like Felix Klein (1849-1925)
and Hans Freudenthal (1905-1990) (who was incidentally of German origin) became
interested in the complexities of teaching and learning processes for mathematics in
schools. The occasionally invoked words “Erlangen program” and “mathematization”
are the present day legacy of the contributions of Klein and Freudenthal to
mathematics education. Klein characterized geometry (and the teaching of it) by
focussing on the related group of symmetries to investigate mathematical objects left
invariant under this group. The present day emphasis of using functions (or
functional thinking) as the conceptual building block for the teaching and learning of
algebra and geometry, is reminiscent of a pre-existing (100 year old) Meraner
Program. During this time period one also finds a growing mention in studying the
psychological development of school children and its relationship to the principles of
arithmetic (Behnke, 1950). This trend was instrumental in the shaping of German
mathematics curricula in the 20th century with the goal being to expose students to
mathematical analysis at the higher levels. The most notable international
development in this time period was the founding of the ICMI in 1908, presided by
Felix Klein. One of the founding goals of ICMI was to publish mathematics
education books, which were accessible to both teachers and their students. We see
this as one of the first attempts to “elementarize” (or simplify) higher level
mathematics by basing it on a sound scientific (psychological) foundation.
Mathematics educators like Lietzmann (1919) claimed that “didactic” principles were
needed in tandem with content to offer methodological support to teachers. This
approach mutated over the course of the next 50 years well into the 1970’s. The over-
arching metaphor for mathematics education researchers during this time period was
to be a gardener, one who maintains a small mathematical garden analogous to
ongoing research in a particular area of mathematics. The focus of research was on
analyzing specific content and using this as a basis to elaborate on instructional
design (Reichel 1995, Steiner, 1982). This approach is no longer in vogue and is
instrumental in creating a schism between mathematicians and “mathematics-
didakters,” partly analogous to the math wars in the United States.
3. “Genetic” Mathematics Instruction: Ineffectual Visionary Bridges (1960 –
1990): The word “genetic” was used to exemplify an approach to mathematics
instruction to prevent the danger of mathematics taught completely via procedures

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(Lenné, 1969). Several theorists stressed that mathematics instruction should be

focussed on the “genetic” or a natural construction of mathematical objects. This can
be viewed as an earlier form of constructivism. This approach to mathematics
education did not gather momentum. The word “genetisch” occurs frequently in the
didactics research literature until the 1990’s.
4. The New Math (1960 – 1975): Parallel to the new math movement occurring in
post-Sputnik United States, an analogous reform movement took place in Germany
(mostly in the West, but partly adopted by the East, see [1]). A superficial inspection
seems to point to a realization of Klein’s dream of teaching and learning mathematics
by exposing students to its structure. This reform took on the dynamic of polarizing
scientists (mathematicians) to work in and with teacher training, the resulting
outcome being a lasting influence on mathematics instruction during this time period.
Unlike the United States teachers were able to implement a structural approach to
mathematics in the classroom. This can be attributed to the fact that during this time
period there was no social upheaval in Germany, unlike the U.S where the press for
social reform in the classroom (equity and individualized instruction) interfered with
this approach to mathematics education. The fact that German “new math” did not
survive the tide of time indicates that there was difficulty in implementing it
effectively.
5. The birth of didactics as a research discipline (1975): While the new
mathematics movement was subject to a host of criticisms, one positive outcome was
the founding of the Gesellschaft für Didaktik der Mathematik (German Mathematics
Didactics Society), which stresses that mathematics didactics was a science whose
concern was to rest the mathematical thinking and learning on a sound theoretical
(and empirically verifiable foundation). This was a radical step search for
mathematics education research in Germany, one that consciously attempted to move
away from the view of a math educator as a part-time mathematician (recall Klein’s
garden). Needless to say, we could easily write an entire book if we wanted to spell
out the ensuing controversy over the definition of this new research discipline in
Germany (see Bigalke, 1974; Dress, 1974; Freudenthal, 1974; Griesel, 1974,
Laugwitz, 1974; Leuders, 2003; Otte, 1974; Tietz, 1974 Wittmann, 1974; 1992).
However, the point to be taken from the founding of this society and a new scientific
specialty is that the very debate we have undertaken here, that is, to globally define
theories of mathematics education has in fact many localized manifestations such as
in Germany.
6. Mathematical Teaching and Learning- A Socialistic and an Individualistic
Process (1980 – today): One of the consequences of founding a new discipline of
science was the creation of new theories to better explain the phenomenon of
mathematical learning. The progress in cognitive science in tandem with
interdisciplinary work with social scientists led to the creation of “partial” paradigms
about how learning occurs. Bauersfeld’s (1988,1995) views of mathematics and
mathematical learning as a socio-cultural process within which the individual

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operates can be viewed as one of the major contributions to theories of mathematics

education.
7. An Orientation Crisis - The Conundrums posed by new Technology (1975 –
today): Weigand’s (1995) work poses the rhetorical question as to whether
mathematics instruction is undergoing yet another crisis. The advent of new
technologies opened up a new realm of unimagined possibilities for the learner, as
well as researchable topics for mathematics educators. The field of mathematics
education in Germany oriented itself to address the issues of teaching and learning
mathematics with the influx of technology. However the implications of redefining
mathematics education, particularly the “hows” of mathematics teaching and learning
in the face of new technology poses the conundrum of the need to continually re-
orient the field, as technology continually evolves (see Noss / Hoyles (1995) for an
ongoing global discussion).
8. TIMMS and PISA -The Anti-Climax (1997 – today): The results of TIMMS and
PISA brought these seven aforementioned “tendencies” to a collision with
mathematics educators and teachers feeling under-appreciated in the wake of the poor
results. These assessments also brought mathematicians and politicians back into the
debate for framing major policies, which would affect the future of mathematics
education in Germany. Mathematics education is now in the midst of new crisis
because the results of these assessments painted German educational standing in a
poor global light. A detailed statistically sieved inspection of the results indicated that
poor scores could be related to factors other than flaws in the mathematics
curriculum, and/or its teaching and learning, that is to socioeconomic and cultural
variables in a changing modern German society. Thus mathematics education in
Germany would now have to adapt to the forces and trends creating havoc in other
regions of the globe (see Burton, 2003; Steen, 2001).
Conclusions
Epochal viewpoints: The eight major tendencies that we have highlighted in the 100
years of mathematics education history in Germany reflect trends that have occurred
internationally. Each epoch is characterized by an underlying metaphor that shaped
the accepted theories of that time period. Felix Klein’s view of a mathematics
educator was that of a mathematician-gardener tending to all aspects of a specialized
domain within mathematics, including its teaching and learning. This shifted to a
focus on the structure of modern mathematics itself and partly to the teacher as a
“transmitter” of structural mathematics in the 1960’s during the New Math period.
This was followed by an epoch where the science of mathematics education and the
student (finally!) came into focus and brought forth attempts to delineate theories for
this new science such as Bauersfeld’s socio-cultural theories. New technologies
shifted the focus of theories to accommodate how learning occurs in the human-
machine interface. Finally TIMMS and PISA brought into focus assessment issues
along with societal and political variables that are changing conceptions of

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mathematics education as we speak. In a sense we have come full circle because we

still haven’t defined what mathematics didactics is. However, in the search through
history for the answer, we have understood the epochal nuances of this interesting
term. Perhaps it is time we finally defined it!
References
[1] http://www.didaktik.mathematik.uni-wuerzburg.de/history/meg/index.html
Bauersfeld, H. (1988). Interaction, construction, and knowledge: alternative perspectives for
mathematics education. In D.A. Grouws, T.J. Cooney & D. Jones (Eds.), Perspectives on
research on effective mathematics teaching (pp. 27 - 46). Reston, VA: National Council
of Teachers of Mathematics.
Bauersfeld, H. (1995). Theorien im Mathematikunterricht. Mathematica Didactica 18 (2),
3--19.
Behnke, Heinrich. (1953). Der mathematische Unterricht und die Schulreformen. Math.
Phys. Semesterberichte 3, 1 - 15.
Behnke, Heinrich. (1961). Felix Klein und die heutige Mathematik. Math. Phys.
Semesterberichte 7, 129 - 144.
Burkhardt, H.; Schoenfeld, A. (2003). Improving Educational Reseach: Toward a more
useful, more influential, better-funded enterprise. Educational Researcher 32 (9), 3--14.
Burton, L. (2003). Which Way Social Justice in Mathematics education? Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers.
English, L.D. (2002). Priority themes and isssues in international research in mathematics
education. In English, L.D. (Ed.). (2002). Handbook of international research in
mathematics education. (p. 3 - 15). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ.
English, L.D. et al. (2002). Further issues and directions in international mathematics
education research. In English, L.D. (Ed.). (2002). Handbook of international research in
mathematics education. (p. 787 - 812). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ.
Führer, L. (1997). Pädagogik des Mathematikunterrichts. Wiesbaden: Vieweg.
Freudenthal, Hans. (1978). Vorrede zu einer Wissenschaft vom Mathematikunterricht.
München: Oldenbourg.
Hefendehl-Hebeker, L.; Hasemann, K.; Weigang, H.-G. (2004). 25 Jahre Journal für
Mathematik-Didaktik aus der Sicht der amtierenden Herausgeber. Journal für
Mathematikdidaktik 25 (3/4), 191--197.
Huster, L. (1981). Dokumentation zur Entwicklung der Mathematik-Didaktik im 19.
Jahrhundert; Ergebnisse der Pilotphase zum KID-Projekt; Heft 14. Bielefeld: Institut für
Didaktik der Mathematik.
Jahnke, H. N. (1990). Mathematik und Bildung in der Humboldtschen Reform. Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Lenné, H. (1975). Analyse der Mathematikdidaktik in Deutschland. Stuttgart: Klett.
Lietzmann, W. (1919). Methodik des mathematischen Unterrichts. 1. Teil. Leipzig: Quelle
& Meyer.
Lietzmann, W. (1950). Felix Klein und die Schulreform. Math. Phys. Semesterberichte 1(3),
213 - 219.

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Noss, R. & Hoyles, C. (1996). Windows on Mathematical Meanings. Dordrecht: Kluwer

Academic Publishers.
Reichel, H.-Chr. (1995). Hat die Stoffdidaktik Zukunft? Zentralblatt für Didaktik der
Mathematik 27 (6), 178 - 187.
Schoenfeld, A. (1999). Looking toward the 21st century: Challenges of educational theory
and practice. Educational Researcher 28 (7), 4 - 14.
Schoenfeld, A.H. (2002). Research methods in (mathematics) education. In English, L.D.
(Ed.). (2002). Handbook of international research in mathematics education. (p. 435 -
487. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ.
Steen, L. A. (2001). Mathematics and Democracy: The Case for Quantitative Literacy.
National Council on Education and the Disciplines.
Steiner, H.-G. (1982). Eine Entgegnung zu Herbert Zeitlers "Gedanken zur Mathematik".
Didaktik der Mathematik 10 (3), 233-246.
Vollrath, H.-J.; Fischer, R.; Kirsch, A. (2004). Zur Entstehung des Journals - Erinnerungen
der ersten Herausgeber. Journal für Mathematikdidaktik 25 (3/4), 183--190.
Weigand, H.-G. (1995). Steckt der Mathematikunterricht in der Krise? Mathematica
didactica 18 (1), 3-20.

CONCLUDING POINTS
The diversity in the perspectives presented in the six contributions parallel
conundrums recently elicited by Tommy Dreyfus at the 4th European Congress in
Mathematics Education (Spain, February 2005). In his concluding report about the
working group on mathematics education theories, Dreyfus stated that although
theories were a vital aspect of mathematics education, they were much too wide of a
topic. However the field can take solace from the fact that although contradictions
exist, there are also connections and degrees of complementarities among theories.
The coordinators of this particular Forum have reached a similar conclusion. Many of
the points we make here echo the recommendations of Tommy Dreyfus. Although it
is impossible to fully integrate theories, it is certainly possible to bring together
researchers from different theoretical backgrounds to consider a given set of data or
phenomena and examine the similarities and differences in the ensuing analysis and
conclusions. The interaction of different theories can also be studied by applying
them to the same empirical study and examining similarities and differences in
conclusions. Last but not least, although it is impossible to expect everybody to use
the mathematics education “language,” a more modest undertaking would be to
encourage researchers to understand one or more perspectives different from their
own. This will ensure that the discussion continues as well as creates opportunities
for researchers to study fruitful interactions of seemingly different theories. We
consider such work vital to help move the field forward.

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