Sage Research Methods

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

For the most optimal reading experience we recommend using our website.
A free-to-view version of this content is available by clicking on this link, which
includes an easy-to-navigate-and-search-entry, and may also include videos,
embedded datasets, downloadable datasets, interactive questions, audio
content, and downloadable tables and resources.

Author: Kerry E. Howell

Pub. Date: 2015
Product: Sage Research Methods
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473957633
Methods: Critical realism, Theory, Methodology
Keywords: knowledge, law, social science, natural sciences, truth, sensation
Disciplines: Business and Management, Counseling and Psychotherapy, Education, Political Science and
International Relations, Social Policy and Public Policy, Social Work, Sociology
Access Date: October 14, 2024
Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd
City: London
Online ISBN: 9781473957633

© 2015 SAGE Publications Ltd All Rights Reserved.

Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Empiricism, Positivism and Post-Positivism

Introduction

Research involves understanding the relationship between theory, philosophy (ontology and epistemology),
methodology and methods. Any research project whether this be a dissertation, thesis or research paper
requires some understanding and explanation of the relationships between these areas. This text explains
these relationships through a discussion of rationalist arguments in Chapter 1, theory in Chapter 2 and em-
piricist, positivist and phenomenological positions in this and the following chapter. It is useful to have some
knowledge of these positions when undertaking research projects because the paradigms of inquiry and sub-
sequent methodological approaches and methods of data collection extend what may be considered valid
knowledge generation or accumulation actually entails. Based in empiricism, positivism provided an important
and relevant addition to our conceptualisation of how knowledge may be measured, defined and accumulat-
ed.

In a bid to fully explain the relationship between methodology and the philosophical and scientific underpin-
nings of specific paradigms of inquiry, this chapter analyses the differentiations between empiricism, pos-
itivism and post-positivism each of which, it may be argued, exemplifies a certain modernist approach to
knowledge generation. However, this demarcation can become problematic when a close analysis is under-
taken. For instance, as noted above, the falsification process and the distaste for grand theory apparent in
post-positivism in some contexts render it postmodernist.

The modernist/postmodernist debate picks up on a number of issues identified in Chapters 1 and 2 in terms of
ongoing debates regarding the nature of reality, truth, knowledge and theory. That is, whether or not the world
has a real existence beyond human thought? Positivists consider an external reality exists that can be under-
stood completely whereas post-positivists argue that even though such a reality can be discerned it may only
be understood probabilistically. Empiricists consider that scientific truth and reality are based on experience
and observation and that ‘human consciousness which is subjective is not accessible to science, and thus not
truly knowable’ (Polkinghorne, 1989: 23).

This chapter considers that positivism is based on aspects of empiricism and identifies how this involves an
adherence to natural science perspectives of reality and methodology. In addition, the chapter goes on to

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 2 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

identify how this adherence to empiricism provided a number of problems for positivism when it attempted to
understand social existence. Indeed, initially through the work of Popper (1969, 1994, 2002, 2002a) positivism
was challenged by post-positivism and a more amenable and less entrenched methodological approach de-
veloped. However, post-positivism still adhered to the idea of an external reality and dualist objectivity, which
was questioned by phenomenologist philosophers in terms of the level of interaction between self and the
world and solipsistic positions.

Chapter 3 deals with these issues in more detail and covers an assessment of empiricism and a short discus-
sion of thinkers in the empiricist tradition. Positivism is analysed in relation to how it uses ideas initially de-
vised for empiricism and how these were challenged through post-positivism. Overall, this chapter identifies
the distinction between positivism and post-positivism and considers the implications this has for knowledge
generation and research in general.

Reflection Box: Solipsism

Solipsism comes from the Latin for solus (alone) and ipse (self) and involves the idea that only the individual
mind certainly exists; all else could be a figment of one's imagination. The world beyond the individual mind
cannot be known and there is a chance that it as well as other people may not exist. Furthermore, even if
an independent reality does exist how may an individual know this reality in an objective fashion? Knowledge
is the content of the individual mind and no necessary link exists between experience and thought. Method-
ological solipsism argues that mind and thought is independent of environment or facts regarding this envi-
ronment; mind content is determined by facts about the thinking object.

Consider the following statements in relation to the requirements for your research project and the notion that
objective knowledge can be attained and accumulated.

• Nothing can exist.

• If something does exist nothing can be known about it.
• Even if something does exist and we are able to know something of it communication of this knowl-
edge is impossible.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 3 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Empiricism: Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume

Empiricism considers that knowledge is dependent on the five senses and that through experience knowledge
can be derived and accumulated. Empiricism is based on the belief that we can only know what the world
tells us; through objective or neutral observation true knowledge may be realised and understood. The hu-
man mind is a blank sheet on which sense-based information is transmitted. Sense data is provided or ‘giv-
en’ pre-interpretation, then the mind becomes active and manipulates sense data in numerous ways; that is,
through abstraction and synthesised interpretations of sense-data which give understanding and knowledge
as well as building relationships between ideas and providing the basis for further observation. The search
for immutable laws since has been accepted as the norm for scientific inquiry from the 17th to the 21st cen-
turies. Science carries out controlled experiments and makes measured observations at a designated point
between the known and the unknown. Findings are recorded and published then further reliable data accu-
mulated. Eventually general elements emerge and hypotheses are formulated (law-like statements which fit
with the accumulated reliable data and portray causality). Hypotheses are then tested with the intention of
proving these correct. Verification or proof formulates a scientific law and is used to excavate new informa-
tion and enhance the stock of human knowledge. Through procedures labelled induction (data accumulation)
and deduction (hypothesis testing), human ignorance is gradually eliminated. Knowledge accumulation is pro-
gressive and benefits humanity. Natural science justified its view of knowledge on the basis of observation
and experiment, that is, an empiricist view of knowledge. Empiricist philosophers return the compliment and
considered that natural science embodied the highest form of genuine knowledge. For example Ayer (1946)
was keen to draw a distinction between genuine knowledge (science) and belief systems like religion, meta-
physics and Marxism. In fact, he labelled these belief systems pseudo-sciences that had little if any claim to
knowledge embodiment. However, the difficulty here was that the reasons for excluding Marxism or psycho-
analysis in many instances ruled out a great deal of established natural science. Overall, the empiricist view
of science can be characterised on the basis of the following doctrine (see Definition Box).

Definition Box: Empiricism

Empiricism incorporates the idea that genuine knowledge can be tested by experience and that claims of
knowledge must be observable. Scientific laws involve statements of recurring patterns of experience and a
scientific explanation is an instance of a scientific law. Prediction is achievable and science is objective as it

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 4 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

separates testable factual statements from value judgements (Benton and Craib, 2001).

This doctrine incorporated the underpinnings of positivism and is based on the assertion that human science
should be treated as natural science and anything that failed to adhere to such a presupposition and process
was not knowledge.

Definition Box: Immutable Laws

Immutable can be defined in terms of continuation and permanence; an entity is not susceptible to change.
Law derives from the Norse term lagu, which means that something is fixed; however, laws are linked with le-
gal systems and rights which are subject to historical and social change. Immutable laws are laws that cannot
be challenged; they have been tested and found to be true. Newton's Law of Gravity was one such law. Such
may also be known as natural laws or laws of nature that are universal (that is they stand in all contexts).

Francis Bacon

In Novum Organum (1620), Francis Bacon (1561–1626) outlined his belief in the accumulative creation of
knowledge, which could be derived through divine revelation or sensory experience. Bacon said little about
divine revelation and most knowledge, it would seem, is formulated through the senses. Sensory interaction
with the world allows the development of knowledge, which Bacon divided into three types: knowledge of
humanity; God; and nature. However, Bacon was unhappy with the state of knowledge and considered that
most treatises and texts were repetitions and entailed the same arguments, they may vary in method, which
provides a mirage of plenty, but on closer examination proves to be illusory.

Francis Bacon may be considered as outlining an embryonic interpretation of inductive scientific method be-
cause he argued that inductive procedure rather than deductive reasoning should incorporate the basis of
knowledge generation. He argued that on the basis of observation and experience, logical statements could
be uttered and scientific generalisations made based on the logical ordering of empirical observations and
experiences. However, nowhere does Bacon use the term scientific method but his ideas may be considered
as the basis or starting point for such a perspective of scientific procedure.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 5 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Bacon argued that the human mind was prone to weaknesses (idols of the mind) and these required attention
before inductive reasoning could proceed. Indeed, these idols of the mind distorted the truth, so needed to be
eradicated. Idols of the mind included; those of the tribe, mental weaknesses held by humanity in general and
idols of the den or cave that involved a preponderance to assess everything from a subjective standpoint or
through the prioritisation of one's own interest or perspective. The idols of the market incorporate the misuse
and meaninglessness of language and idols of the theatre the misuse of power. The idols formed a falsity
and impinged human capability for seeing things as they truly are; humanity is capable of perceiving truth but
only once these vagaries (idols) were negated. Human potential for knowledge generation and understanding
was beyond question, however, through laziness, avarice or over-confidence in our abilities, our capabilities
and capacities have largely been misused. Through the scientific method humanity may be liberated from its
erroneous ways and mistake free truth or an approximation of true knowledge realised. In his utopian state
called New Atlantis, knowledge is uncovered and nature interpreted in the House of Solomon. Humanity ben-
efits from the continued development and practical application of science and knowledge; through inductive
reasoning knowledge is developed and the human condition improved. Bacon identified objectivity and the
non-biased accumulation of knowledge; the very basis of all rigorous research.

Thomas Hobbes

In Objections (1641), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) reiterated that philosophy and knowledge accumulation
had remained stunted and advocated that people should ignore pointless attempts at philosophy and concen-
trate on daily experience and common sense. For Hobbes, philosophy was more than the knowledge of cause
and effect and sensory experience and was rather the product of rationalisation. Philosophy is different from
knowledge by sense because sensory knowledge is formed through ‘motions’ or events that are associated
and ordered in the mind. Experience and history provide foresight and prudence; they lead to the formation of
expected outcomes. However, this does not incorporate philosophical knowledge or true science; sense and
memory are common to all living creatures and are a form of knowledge but because they are simply given
and not formed through rationalisation they are not philosophy. For Hobbes knowledge began with sense-
perception, consequently the initial step for developing understanding was to comprehend what sense-per-
ception actually entailed. Sense-perception involved motions in matter; sensory ideas were motions in matter.
Indeed, everything involved matter in motion. The pressure of objects, for example, sounds, shapes, colours,

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 6 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

are not part of the object but caused by sensations; they are the qualities that emerge through interaction
between thing or the observed and sensations of the mind (they are in motion).

Table 3.1 Empirical knowledge

Francis
Unimpressed with the stock of human knowledge and considered the mind and human thought to be weak and limited.
Bacon

Thomas Knowledge is based in sense-perception. Causation involves matter in motion which sees knowledge as either effects developed

Hobbes through understanding, general causes or causes determined through general effects.

If all things came from experience then how can we deal with generalisation when we may not experience every occurrence? Under-
John
standing not given by experience alone because all wholes or totalities in relation to generalisation cannot be accounted for by expe-
Locke
rience alone.

David Perceptions of the mind appear twice (as reflections of each other, on the one hand as an impression and on the other as a corre-

Hume sponding idea of sensation. Consequently, any idea must be associated with some experienced impression.

Hobbes identified the concept of causes and effects or appearances of things that incorporated their ordinary
observable qualities and causes are broken down into two types; efficient causes which bring about effects
and entire causes which involved a combination of causes and effects. Causation involves matter in motion
which sees knowledge as either effects developed through understanding general causes or causes deter-
mined through general effects. However, philosophical knowledge is not simply based on cause and effect
but the idea of ratiocination (a process of logical thinking and knowledge of phenomenon through understand-
ing what generated it). Consequently, knowledge is not simply derived through sense but by sensory images
(referred to as external phenomenon) that when repeated through motion become imprinted on our minds.
Indeed, sequence recollection identifies and orders our experiences. History incorporates a general or social
sequence recollection which enables prediction, foresight and prudence. However, because history depends
on sense, and memory is dependent on wide experience and not reached through ratiocination, it does not
encompass philosophy. Knowledge derived through ratiocination is different from experiential knowledge but
both begin with history and this is essential for philosophy. History informed philosophy but long epic historical
accounts were not a necessity for total ratiocination as they can inform the initiation of the methodology but
can be quickly peripherised once one begins to excavate the area studied.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 7 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Ratiocination is a form of methodology that understands complexity through simplification or breaking matter
down into constituent parts and determining how these parts fit with each other. Subsequently, causes or the
observable variables are initially made distinguishable (made known), then through synthesis of these vari-
ables the original effect can be identified. Effects are directly known through nature and in any study we must
begin with effects when we investigate concealed causation. However, even though we initially experience
effects, they actually come second to the concealed causes. Indeed, in Hobbes we have the basis of dis-
covering theory and incorporated inductive procedures whereas a methodological approach that begins with
identifying causation and consequent effects is more deductive and based in proving hypotheses. Hobbes
labels causation to effect composition or synthesis and effect to causation resolution or analysis.

John Locke

Both Bacon and Hobbes were empiricists in that they recognised the primacy of sensory experience but it is
also evident they saw the need for rational thought and the mind in the formulation of knowledge. Conversely,
in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke (1632–1704) questioned how the mind is
given ideas and knowledge. Indeed, he resoundingly answers through experience! For Locke the mind was a
blank sheet and all knowledge derived through sensory experience. If all things came from experience then
how do we know that a whole is equal to its parts? How do we deal with generalisation when we may not
experience every occurrence? Locke realised that such is not given by experience alone because all wholes
or totalities in relation to generalisation cannot be accounted for by experience alone. However, he rejects
the very basis of this argument and considered that no dichotomy between experiential and innate knowl-
edge existed. Indeed, he considered that all knowledge is found through experience or the senses but it did
not necessarily follow that all emanated from this. Experience provided the materials of knowledge or ideas
but once these have been determined we are able to make generalisations and recognise that wholes are
equal to the sum of their parts. Through observation and experience the senses provide the building blocks
of knowledge (ideas). Experience is divided into sensation and reflection which involves the latter taking into
consideration how the mind operates, that is how it thinks, constructs beliefs or perceives when dealing with
sensation. Locke claimed that pre-experience the mind was a blank sheet and all ideas emanated from this
source; experience involves a dual source of ideas ‘void of all characters without any ideas; how comes it to
be furnished? … To this I answer in one word from experience: in that all knowledge is founded and from that

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 8 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

it ultimately derives itself’ (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chap I, Sec 2). Some ideas
emerge through interaction with the external world or sensation while others develop through reflection or
perception (activity or operation of the mind). The mind reflects on ideas reached through experience; how-
ever, no matter how abstract or removed from experience this reflection becomes the source exists in inter-
action with the world. Ideas for Locke involved mind-dependent entities and can involve internal sensations
as well as external perceptions. Bottom-line, ideas can be simple or complex; that is ideas clearly derived
from experience incorporate simple ideas and even though complex ideas need not be derived from expe-
rience but constructed through component parts experienced directly. That is not to say that complex ideas
cannot be experienced directly, for example, time, space and infinity, may be experienced directly and these
are not simple ideas. Locke uses the distinction between simple and complex ideas to underpin his claim that
all ideas are found in experience. However, Locke failed to deal with the dichotomy between empiricism and
rationalism. Indeed a solution to the problem between knowledge derived from experience or externality and
the relationship with mind or thought continues to exist as a difficulty today.

David Hume

In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume (1711–1776) reasserts the hypothesis
that all ideas are derived from experience but considers there to be a relationship between perceptions and
ideas. He argued that perceptions of the mind appear twice or are reflections of each other; on the one hand
as an impression and on the other hand as a corresponding idea of sensation. So any idea must be asso-
ciated with some experienced impression. However, unlike Locke, for Hume reflection involves secondary
impressions which are determined through pleasure and pain and involve feelings such as anxiety and ex-
pectations.

David Hume concerned himself with extending the realm of science beyond the natural world and developed
a human science or an embryonic social science. He argued that the bedrock of understanding involved a
comprehension of humanity and society; knowledge regarding human nature was a necessary premise for a
clear perception of science in general. The relationship between human nature and science is clearer when
dealing with issues relating to morality, logic or politics than it is when investigating the natural world. Howev-
er, even though the natural world is not about humanity, it is studied by it, that is, it is studied by individuals
who display a specific human nature. Indeed in Hume's writing we witness the very basis of social science

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 9 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

and the idea that understanding human nature is central to our comprehension of anything else; he argued
that through explaining human nature we develop the foundations of all human endeavours. He built on the
work of Francis Bacon and proposed that as natural science had been based on experimentation and obser-
vation such should also be the foundation for human science. His text An Enquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing was sub-titled An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects
where he argued for the use of experimental philosophy for developing understanding of human beings.

Experience and observation were considered the basis of understanding but Hume did not consider that ob-
servations should simply be accumulated and knowledge derived from this, rather he proposed that because
appearances were deceptive hypotheses should be constructed and experimentation undertaken. Hume de-
velops his argument through perceptions that he breaks down into impressions and ideas; ideas involve faint
images of more vibrant impressions. Impressions involve the feeling of pain or happiness whereas the idea
involves a recollection of these emotions; the difference between the two is one of intensity or degree rather
than kind. In such a way all ideas are derived through experience; they are the faint image of something ex-
perienced. However, certain ideas exist that do not have impressions, for example, a different life form on
another planet or a fourth dimension in which life could be very different. Hume subsequently distinguishes
between the ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ where he accepts that one may have ideas about entities that have not
been experienced completely but these are based in relevant partial experiences. For example, it is easier to
imagine a different planet and life form than to conjure up exactly what a fourth dimension would encompass.
Our existence on this planet and images of others in our solar system gives experiences that can be extrap-
olated to other unseen planets and our ideas of aliens are usually based in life-form seen here on Earth, for
example, insects or reptilian. However, a fourth dimension is difficult because no experience exists outside
of the three dimensions we exist within. Consequently, the correspondence between impressions and ideas
is limited to simple cases; overall to have meaning an idea must be associated with something experienced.
Hume argued that the correspondence between ideas and impressions formed the basis of human nature
and that such would be useful in further investigating matters relating to human existence.

Question: Empiricism

Provide an assessment of the empiricists identified above and compare and contrast their distinct perspec-
tives. Which thinker's understanding or philosophical position most clearly describes empiricism?

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 10 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Positivism: Auguste Comtè

Positivism was initially identified during the mid-19th century and was closely linked with certain perspectives
of empiricism and fitted well with the idea of progress that typified this period. In A General View of Positivism
(1844/1856), Auguste Comtè (1798–1857) developed a hierarchy of knowledge which put human science
at the apex and emphasised the science of humanity or sociology. He argued, that human thought evolved
through three distinct stages; the religious, metaphysical and scientific. The scientific stage was the most im-
portant but both the religious and metaphysical stages had their value and were not to be discarded as prim-
itive or useless.

Comtè considered it possible to build social science based on the same principles as those in natural sci-
ences, for example, physics or chemistry. He further argued that if we used the same methods as the natural
sciences a ‘positive science of society’ could be achieved. Consequently, based on empiricism this attempt
to mimic the principles outlined for the natural sciences within the social sciences was coined as positivism.
Through empirical observations immutable laws would illustrate that that humanity was governed by cause
and effect. Based on Hume's empirical position in terms of the theory of regularity, he argued that the only
content of causal laws involved the set of events that have been or will be observed. Events are identified by
their temporal proximity to later occurrences and the probability that events precede specific types of occur-
rences. Agency activity or other mechanisms are irrelevant; to indicate causality is simply to say that an event
of a certain type regularly precedes an occurrence of a certain kind.

Through studying case numbers positivism assesses the correlations and confidence levels that events pre-
cede occurrences. Such negates complications involved in the study of individual and collective action re-
garding internal processes of institutions. Through causality laws would be as immutable as those displayed
by the natural sciences. In such a way, Comtè believed that the behaviour of humanity could be measured
in exactly the same way as matter; that human behaviour could be objectively quantified. It was becoming
clear that people (at least as masses) were suitable phenomenon for scientific study, a realisation that led to
humanity being studied through positivist methodologies in developing institutions.

Following Comtè there was less emphasis on the categorisation of human development; the emphasis on
the centrality and all embracing perspective of science remained but metaphysics and religion were denied.
Positivism was both descriptive and normative; it described how human thought had evolved and prescribed
norms for how it should develop. It had an axiological perspective, which argued that human duty was to fur-

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 11 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

ther the process that existed, though positivism was more concerned with methodological approaches than
prescribing ethical norms. However, there was an emphasis on furthering the inevitable, a trait which it shared
with Marxism in terms of dialectics and economic determinism.

Positivism became a critical approach to what social science actually was and what it could achieve. Social
science should be based on observation alone, and no appeal should be made to the abstract or invisible.
There should be no recourse to metaphysical debate, all should be simplified and prediction pursued. Con-
sequently, positivism emphasised observation of human behaviour and argued that things that could not be
observed such as feelings or emotions were unimportant and may undermine or mislead the study. Emphasis
on observation relates to a belief that through causality human behaviour can be explained in the same way
as the behaviour of matter. As with the natural sciences there was little reason to investigate the meanings
and purposes of matter; matter reacts to external stimuli and so did human beings. The task of the scientist
whether social or natural was to observe, measure and explain.

Positivism ‘has been based upon the principle that only reliable knowledge of any field of phenomena reduces
to knowledge of particular instances of patterns of sensation’ (Harre, 1987: 3). Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2,
for positivism such patterns are immutable laws, which enabled prediction of future events. Theoretical frame-
works are logically structured amalgamations of laws and used to enable prediction.

Ontologically, positivism considered that an external reality existed, which could be discovered and totally un-
derstood; a comprehension of reality that is sometimes labelled ‘naïve realism’. The positivist epistemological
position is one where the investigator and the external world (or what could be discovered) are totally sep-
arate and objectivity sought through scientific procedure; truth can be found. Methodologically, this could be
achieved by attempts to prove hypotheses through scientific experiments and the manipulation of confound-
ing conditions. For positivism, theory provides sets of immutable laws, which enable prediction. However, im-
mutable laws and prediction are difficult enough in the natural sciences, but in the social sciences, in most
instances, almost impossible. This was one of the major criticisms levelled at positivism by post-positivists
who argued that reality or truth existed, however it could only be understood imperfectly or probabilistically.

Question

Identify the difficulties for social science when dealing with:

• immutable laws;

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 12 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

• prediction;
• objectivity.

Inductive Procedure and Deductive Inference

Popper (1994) asserted that developing knowledge through inductive procedure is questionable because the
validity of induction and science assumes and accepts clockwork regularity in nature. Only if we assume the
future will be like the past can we accept that natural laws exist. However, how can the future be verified
through observation? Such is impossible as is verification through deduction and rational argument because
we cannot truly establish that future futures will continue to mirror past pasts. David Hume dealt with this
dilemma by accepting that inductive validity is difficult to verify but may be accepted psychologically; we see
them work in practice so accept the logic of induction. However, scientific laws or truth cannot be verified
through induction or deduction so have no secure rational foundations. ‘Deductive inference may be said to
be valid if and only if it invariably transmits truth from premises to the conclusion; that is to say, if and on-
ly if all inferences of the same logical form transmit truth. One can also explain this by saying: a deductive
inference is valid if and only if and no counterexample exists’ (Popper, 1992: 143). Popper argued that de-
ductive inference is absolute and objective; it is a truth. That said there was a caveat here and even though
we cannot always identify the objectivity or validity of deductive inference there are number we can prove to
be true. However, ‘we cannot have a general criterion of truth’ (Popper, 1992: 144). Such would necessitate
omniscience, which is presently beyond human endeavour.

Popper (1992) further argued that he is not a ‘belief philosopher’; just because some statement or inference
has strong support and is believed in does not mean it is valid. For deduction or a theory of truth, beliefs are
meaningless; truth is not about belief but about fact, argument and critical debate. However, we may question
this position and ask whether Popper is here propagating a belief? Induction bases general statements about
the world or theoretical frameworks on accumulated observation. For many years inductive procedure in both
natural and human science (social science) indicated true scientific endeavour. Observation and experimen-
tation provided scientific statements based on fact that encompassed truth, knowledge or reality. However,
David Hume raised some disturbing questions regarding this status quo when he argued that accumulated
singular observations can never provide a general statement or prove a theory. Just because one event fol-

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 13 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

lows another on one occasion it does not automatically follow that such will occur again. Indeed, such would
be the case if there had been 10,000 observations; we might expect the same occurrence but this is not cer-
titude.

Reflection Box: Recurring Observations

A regularly used example of the uncertainty of recurring observations involves laws of physics and the rising
sun; that is, based on the laws of physics we can predict the sun will rise tomorrow morning. Hume argued
that this prediction may be disputed through two arguments. First, simply because the laws of physics have
in the past been immutable this does not mean this will be the case tomorrow. Second, as noted the laws
of physics are general statements, which cannot be proved by observations (no matter how many times an
activity occurs).

Consider recurring observations and the implications for natural and social science.

This text recognises the difficulty in giving precise definitions of induction and deduction and the point where
the former begins and the latter ends (and vice versa) and acknowledges the grey area between the two.
Alfred Marshall argued that ‘(y)ou make all your contrasts rather too sharply for me. You talk of the inductive
& deductive methods: whereas I contend that each involves the other & that historians are always deducing,
& that even the most deductive writers are always implicitly at least basing themselves on observed facts’
(Marshall, cited in Coase, 1995: 169). Ultimately, Marshall wished to emphasise the mutual dependency of
induction and deduction; this text recognises the difference and necessary interdependency. Indeed, this is a
good point to develop when dealing with a research project that involves either theory development or theory
testing. In general the former would be considered more deductive whereas the latter inductive; the reality is
that no one is able to enter the field with no pre-conceptions and hypotheses are generated through some
understanding of the subject consequently a continuum exists with variable levels of a synthesis between de-
ductive and inductive approaches utilised in research projects.

Differentiating Post-Positivist Approaches

Positivists argued that social science should establish laws and as with the natural sciences such laws should

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 14 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

be beyond challenge. Such an approach to knowledge generation and the realisation of truth undermined
the critical aspect of positivism and in many instances became a barrier to scientific discovery. If laws could
not be challenged then progress was restrained; positivism omitted and alienated many approaches to gen-
erating theoretical frameworks that reflected understanding and knowledge and was eventually challenged
by post-positivism. Indeed, the relationships between positivism, post-positivism and critical theory exist on a
sliding scale and there is more of a continuum between them rather than hard and fast demarcations. That
said, even though much criticism of positivism from positions more closely linked with critical theory emerged
between the 1950s and 1970s, one of the first to deliver a broadside was Karl Popper. Later post-positivists
include: Toulmin, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Kuhn and Bhaskar (each of these researchers is covered in greater
detail below).

Falsification and Karl Popper

Popper (1994) considered that immutable laws led to the stagnation of theory and that theory development
should be open to criticism. Through falsification ‘we can get rid of a badly fitting theory’ before it overrides
investigation and undermines objectivity (Popper, 1994: 4). In Popper (2002a, 2002b) falsification offers a so-
lution to the problem of immutable laws and rational foundations. He argued that no matter how many times
a white swan is observed we can never universally state that ‘all swans are white’. However, one observation
of a black swan allows the statement ‘not all swans are white’. In such a way even though generalisations
are not verifiable they are falsifiable. Consequently, scientific laws can be tested because even though they
cannot be proved they can be falsified. The methodology for the post-positivist position is about falsifying
standing scientific laws and the ontology concerned with criticising existing reality. If a single case exists that
refutes a given law then as long as the case is reported correctly a scientific law is refuted. However, the re-
ported case may have been reported incorrectly so we can always doubt the evidence; for instance the black
swan may not have been a swan or because it is black we may decide not to label it a swan. In such a way
all falsifiable evidence could be rejected.

Popper suggested that ‘progress in science … based on a revolutionary use of trial and the elimination of
error by criticism which includes severe examinations or tests – that is, attempts to probe into the possible
weaknesses of theories, attempts to refute them’ (2002: 7). Popper (2002a) argued that because of varied
and divergent human behaviour if we looked for confirmation then verification was easier to realise in the so-
cial sciences. Every test of a theory should be an attempt to falsify it, ‘testability is falsifiability: but there are

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 15 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation than others they take, as
it were, greater risks’ (Popper, 2002a: 48). However, Popper indicated that complete or conclusive falsifica-
tion was also difficult if not impossible to achieve. ‘If you insist on strict proof (or disproof) in the empirical
sciences, you will never benefit from experience and never learn from it how wrong you are’ (2002b: 28).

Definition Box: Theory Falsification

• If confirmation or verification of theory is pursued then the confirmation or verification of the said the-
ory is simplistic and straightforward.
• Sound theory prohibits certain events and occurrences; the more entities forbidden then the sounder
the theory.
• Scientific theory is refutable; non-refutability is a vice not a virtue.
• Falsification is the only genuine test or refutation of theories.
• Theories display levels of falsifiability or refutation; some theories are more testable than others.
• Confirmation of theory should only be accepted if it has been subject to an attempt to be falsified and
continued to retain validity.
• When theory is refuted falsification needs to be accepted. Reinterpretation and auxiliary assumptions
should be avoided.

Falsification uncovers new arguments, perspectives and experiences which should be taken into consider-
ation even if they bring into question the most relied upon or recent theoretical explanations. Because con-
clusive falsification is difficult at the methodological level, refutation should not be evaded through re-inter-
pretation. Outcomes of refutation require acceptance and uncomfortable outcomes integrated with our under-
standing. However, scientific laws should not be given up lightly and defended stoutly in the face of competing
theoretical frameworks.

A certain level of dogmatism is required for progress to occur. If old theories are not defended and do not
struggle for survival, the newer theories cannot be robustly tested for levels of truth and explanatory power; an
evolutionary survival of the fittest environment should exist. Intolerant dogmatism, however, is one of the main
obstacles to science. Indeed, ‘we should not only keep alternative theories alive through discussing them, but
we should systematically look for new alternatives. And we should be worried when there are no alternatives
– whenever a dominant theory becomes too exclusive. The danger to progress in science is much increased

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 16 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

if the theory in question obtains something like monopoly’ (Popper, 1994: 16).

However, Popper (1969) indicated that certain theories were still upheld even when they were found to be
false. Through manipulating confounding variables or re-interpretation theory may be rescued from refutation,
but only at the price of losing its credibility as a bona fide scientific theory. By making interpretations of the
theory vague anything that may refute the theory can be explained away: if prediction is vague and unclear
it becomes irrefutable. For instance, the ‘Marxist theory of history, in spite of serious efforts of some of its
founders and followers, ultimately adopted this soothsaying practice’ (Popper, 1969: 49). Popper (2002a) ar-
gued that Marx historical materialism or dialectics of history that predicted the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Popper (1969) thought highly of Marx idealism but considers him a false prophet. ‘He was a prophet of the
course of history and his prophecies did not come true; but this is not the main accusation. It is much more
important that he misled scores of intelligent people into believing that historical prophecy is the scientific way
of approaching social problems’ (Popper, 1969: 82). Even though Marx historicism had been refuted by data
or events, Marxists re-interpreted the theory and empirical data in order to deal with the refutation. ‘In this
way they rescued the theory from refutation … (but) destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status’
(Popper, 2002a: 49).

Definition Box: Situational Analysis

Situational analysis involves:

• physical entities with elements of properties and states;

• certain social institutions and their properties;
• certain aims;
• certain elements of knowledge.

Positivistic immutable laws hold up scientific inquiry and provide false prophets. Post-positivism challenges
positivism and through Popper identified a critical method of falsification and refutation. Russell (1980) iden-
tified the link between this philosophical position and methodology when he considered that one begins with
a body of knowledge or data which is complex, vague and confusing. ‘By analysis we reduce them to propo-
sitions which are as nearly as possible simple and precise … These initial propositions are premises (which)

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 17 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

are … quite different from data – they are simpler, more precise, and less infected with logical redundancy
(Russell, 1980: 214).

Popper (1994) argued that because falsification is extremely difficult to achieve, explanations in the social sci-
ences required the analysis of social situations. This he labelled ‘situational logic’, which based on ‘situational
analysis’ incorporated information or knowledge that was relevant to the situation. Indeed, ‘situational analy-
sis’ turned the entity under analysis into a generalised anyone or anything that shared the relevant situation.
It reduced individual aims of personal knowledge to a typical/situational model that in principle is able to ex-
plain a number of structurally similar events. In such a way we are able to comprehend a social event which
is animated through replacing individual consciousness and situation with abstraction and an assumption that
the agent will act, appropriately or adequately, in accordance with the situation (rational agent).

The situation should attempt to involve all relevant aims, complete relevant knowledge regarding these aims
and the agent should act appropriately or rationally in relation to the situation. This is sometimes referred to as
the ‘rationality principle’, which states that once the model is constructed it is assumed that agents act within
the terms and realms of the model. Furthermore, because all variables are not involved in the understanding
of motivations, the situations and agents are explained in ideal terms. Through ‘situational analysis’ it is pos-
sible to discuss, criticise and in some situations test models and if the test fails then learn from the flaws in the
models and comprehend how they are over simplifications. The ‘rationality principle’ does not assume that
human beings will always adopt a rational attitude. However, it is a methodological device which conjures a
minimum principle ‘which animates all our explanatory situational models, and which, although we know that
it is not true, we have some reason to regard as a good approximation of the truth’ (Popper, 1994: 181).

Kuhnian Paradigm Shifts

Kuhn (1970) argued that falsification did not actually occur in the research process. Indeed, two types of re-
search existed; normal research which involved the on-going research within a given paradigm and research
that is brought about through paradigm shifts. Normal science involves ‘the activity in which most scientists
inevitably spend almost all of their time (and) is predicated on the assumption that scientists know what the

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 18 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

world is like’ (Kuhn, 1970: 5). To ensure successful outcomes it is possible that normal science stifles innova-
tion and remains within the realm of tried and tested techniques.

Normal sciences are based on observation and experiment in different fields, for example, physics, biology,
chemistry, which is identified as a paradigm because they encompass a group of followers or individual ad-
herents and leave numerous difficulties for following generations of practitioners to deal with (Kuhn, 1970).
That is accepted practice in terms of laws, theories and applications provide the basis of scientific research
(a certain belief system about how research should be conducted and what knowledge entails). Indeed, re-
quired paradigm norms are learned by students in specific scientific areas where they will eventually become
a practitioner and join those who also learned the same required norms prior to full membership. Conse-
quently, practice within the community seldom invokes dissent with given fundamentals; scientists with similar
backgrounds and rule orientations are unlikely to challenge the paradigm or normal science practice and pro-
cedures.

Table 3.2 Falsification and paradigm shifts

If a case exists that refutes a given law then as long as the case is reported correctly the said scientific law is refuted. However,

the reported case may have been reported incorrectly so we can always doubt the evidence; for instance in the case of the black
Falsification
swan, it may not have been a swan or because it is black we may decide not to label it a swan. In such a way all falsifiable evi-

dence could be rejected.

Scientific theory does not evolve through the accumulation of facts but through historical process. Change happens through the
Paradigm
emergence of different intellectual circumstance and possibilities (different paradigm). This involves a range of ideas available at
shift
a given time and the discourse and terminology for a given epoch.

Adherence to the paradigm norms ensures the continuation of normal science procedures and the research
tradition related to this. However, a moment occurs when tried and tested techniques do not provide the ex-
pected results and the normal way of doing things is challenged and a paradigm shift occurs. ‘Led by a new
paradigm scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important during revolutions
they see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before’
(Kuhn, 1970: 111). Kuhn (1970) argued that scientific theory did not evolve through the accumulation of facts
but through historical process. Change occurred through the emergence of different intellectual circumstance
and possibility. Such involved the range of ideas available at a given time and the discourse or terminology
for a given epoch.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 19 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Analysis of the history of electricity provides an example of the way science develops. In the early 18th centu-
ry there existed many conceptual perspectives regarding electricity but all ‘were partially derived from one or
another version of the mechanic-corpuscular philosophy that guided all scientific research of the day’ (Kuhn,
1970: 13–14). Furthermore, each theoretical perspective was considered scientific because it had been de-
rived through scientific method in terms of observation and experimentation (Kuhn, 1970). However, even
though researchers in this area would have read each other's results and all experimentation was electri-
cal the theoretical perspectives that emerged only accorded slight resemblance. It was not until the work of
Franklin and his successors that some unity could be formed that provided ‘a subsequent generation of “elec-
tricians” with a common paradigm for … research’ (Kuhn, 1970: 15). Kuhn (1970) argued that similar long
term disagreements and discourse occurred before a paradigm and ‘somewhat arbitrary’ name emerged in
terms of Aristotle and motion, Newton and gravity, Boyle and chemistry or Hutton and geology. Given this one
can see that the formation of a research paradigm is a long-term and difficult route. Indeed, for example as-
pects of biology paradigms, such as heredity, are quite recent and so ‘it remains an open question what parts
of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all’ (Kuhn, 1970: 15).

Khun thought that paradigms incorporated a specific mode of thinking, provided a certain perspective regard-
ing the history of science and what these modes of thinking entailed. For example, the existing positivistic par-
adigm as the main mode of scientific discovery provided the dominant paradigm or normal science for many
years until it was challenged and usurped by post-positivism. Indeed post-positivism did not completely fulfil
the requirements for social science research and analysis and was consequently challenged through critical
theory and constructivism. Indeed, paradigm shifts can take place in relation to ontology and epistemology
as well as theoretical perspectives. Such then determines a new basis for our comprehension of knowledge
truth and theory as a generic concept. For its continuation a certain consensus within the research community
regarding the core normal science is essential. It is the consensus regarding the core theories or methodolog-
ical approaches of normal science that break down and brings about a paradigm shift. However, what would
maintain such a consensus and what would this entail? Khun argued that on the one hand a paradigm incor-
porates a universal perspective or ‘shared commitments’ of a scientific community whereas on the other hand
it identifies a particular sub-set of the community with a specific particular commitment within the more gener-
ic community. The initial community is broad and entails a broader conceptualisation of the theory employed
in the philosophy of science. Indeed, in explaining the more generic idea of the paradigm, Kuhn uses the term
‘disciplinary matrix’ ‘disciplinary because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular
discipline; matrix because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further spec-

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 20 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

ification’ (1996: 182). The key elements of a disciplinary matrix incorporate: symbolic generalisations which
involve ‘expressions deployed without question or dissent by group members … they are formal or the ready
formalised components of the disciplinary matrix’ (Kuhn, 1996: 182), for example, general laws of nature and
their underpinning definitions. A second part of the disciplinary matrix involves ‘the shared commitment’ to
metaphysical beliefs in specific models that would include a more heuristic type of model. A heuristic model
consists of experiential techniques which enable discovery and learning, and which provide generic compre-
hension and rapid means of problem solving, for example, intuition, common sense, trial and error. Funda-
mentally, models exist on an ontological/heuristic continuum and the commitment to these models vary; mod-
els provide accepted community discourse and identify acceptable puzzle solutions and the pecking order of
puzzles that require solutions in the designated area of research. Linked closely to the models and discourse
developed in defining problems and solutions is the idea of values. Though values are apparent at all times
their importance becomes explicit when members of a community are involved in disputed discourse, fissure
and eventually incompatibility within the discipline. Even though commitment to models exist within communi-
ties and values are widely and deeply shared by members, values can be subjective and ‘affected by the fea-
tures of individual personality and biography that differentiate the members of the group’ (Kuhn, 1996: 185).
So shared values determine group behaviour even though all members do not hold the values with the same
voracity or consistency and this differentiation identifies distinctions and challenges norms within a communi-
ty. A further aspect of a paradigm involves the basic education that students of scientific communities require
before full membership is granted; this Kuhn argued involved the dissemination of exemplars through accept-
ed textbooks, examinations and other forms of assessment, for example, dissertations and doctoral studies.
Indeed, by undertaking a higher degree one is learning the norms identified in the specific discipline; such will
consequently be applied in a practitioner and theoretical context and the disciplinary matrix reinforced. Modes
of normal science are reinforced until challenged and a paradigm shift realised.

Through ‘research programmes’ Lakatos (1970) attempted to resolve the discrepancy between Popper and
Kuhn. Lakatos argued that theory may be considered as a number of theories strung together in a succession
T1, T2, T3, each of which share some central common idea that he labelled ‘hard core’ and such a succes-
sion of theories may be considered a ‘research programme’. Indeed, through ‘research programmes’, the the-
oretical core of the theories may be protected or shielded from falsification by a ‘protective belt’ of ‘auxiliary
hypotheses’, that is the scientist may manipulate hypotheses so the core of the theories is not challenged.
The main point propagated by Lakatos involved a judgement regarding the quality of the theory; what was
important was whether one theory was more applicable than another not whether or not it was true or false.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 21 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

Toulmin (1953), who pre-dated both Kuhn and Lakatos, argued that rather than tested, theories should be
considered in relation to their usability. Theories can be compared with sets of rules; that a general limited set
of rules may be identified in the context of a domain and entities toward which the rules apply clarified. In-
stances that do not relate to the rules are determined. Consequently, the rules do not need to stand or reflect
every context or in all cases but outline an area where the rules apply (area of application). Normally society
would respect individual liberty but incarcerate someone who had committed a crime. Usually it is wrong to
take a life but this action is accepted when in the name of the state when fighting in a war. Theory relates to
reality through a set of rules some of which correspond and others which do not; the analysis involves deter-
mining which rules apply in a given domain or situation and which are redundant. Overall, on different levels
each of these thinkers existed on an ontological continuum between critical realism and historical realism in
terms of falsification on the one hand and a historical transformation of knowledge and how this is reflected
through theoretical transformation on the other hand. Indeed such a synthesis of ontology may be perceived
in the less naive and more in-depth understanding of critical realism developed by Roy Bhaskar.

Critical Realism: Roy Bhaskar

A post-positivist ontology perceives reality as external to humanity but considers our intellectual capabilities
unable to fully understand opaque and confounding truth. On an ontological level this has been identified as
‘critical realism’ (Bhaskar, 1975; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 2000, 2005). Critical realism involves a distinc-
tion between the production of knowledge by human beings (as a social product) which can change in the
same way that any human product may and knowledge that is of things (that is ground within them). The lat-
ter knowledge is not produced by humanity but discovered (it is knowledge that does not depend on human
activity), for example, gravity, light propagation. If humanity ceased to exist, light would continue to travel and
the moon would circle the Earth in exactly the same way; even though there would be no one to know this.

Bhaskar labels the latter ‘the intransitive objects of knowledge’ and the former the ‘transitive objects of knowl-
edge’, which include facts, theories, paradigms and models. In terms of Darwin's theory of evolution the tran-
sitive objects involved ‘facts of natural variation, the theory of natural selection and Malthus’ theory of popu-
lation’ (1975: 21). Indeed he used these to discover and illuminate what had been occurring for eons. If we
imagine a world without humanity but containing similar intransitive objects (in such a situation there would
be no science to explain phenomenon so things would not be explained but still exist). Natural events and

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 22 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

processes would continue to occur whether or not someone was able to understand and or explain them (os-
mosis would continue and atoms would still amalgamate). Consequently events are not ‘dependent on our
knowledge nor perception they are the intransitive, science dependent, objects of scientific discovery and in-
vestigation’ (Bhaskar, 1975: 22).

For social science or the social world the situation is a little more problematic. The social world is a social
construction that does not exist completely independent of human theory and discourse so does not clearly
illustrate an intransitive dimension of knowledge. However, this knowledge is likely to be historical or under-
standings ground in the past rather than that posed by present day researchers.

Social science could reject the critical realist position and argue that no independent or intransitive knowledge
exists in this domain. Since social science includes theories that are transitive and these have an impact on
practice, the social world is unable to reflect an intransitive dimension: fundamentally, an independent knowl-
edge of the social sciences cannot exist. However, if one is to contend that the critical realist position does
exist in the social science some form of distinction between transitive and intransitive knowledge is required.
In addition, with more researchers employing reflexivity this recognition of subject influence makes it increas-
ingly difficult to test social theory against independent social reality. Reality becomes multi-faceted with differ-
ent facets reflecting on each other and confronting themselves in different forms and ways. Indeed, as with a
hall of mirrors they reflect upon themselves and the clear distinction between subject and object diminishes
(ontology becomes epistemology).

Reflection Box: Intransitive and Transitive Knowledge

Intransitive knowledge incorporates the objects of study or science in terms of physical processes or social
phenomenon. Transitive knowledge involves the human dimension in terms of theories and discourses (how-
ever, as elements of the social world they may be seen as intransitive). Rival theories and discourses are
competingtransitive perspectives whereas intransitive perspectives are continuous.

Consider the possibility of intransitive knowledge for the social sciences.

Reflection Box: Reality

A tree falls in the middle of the desert but no one is there to witness this; does it make a noise when it hits the

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 23 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

ground?

Conversely, one could consider reflexivity as a useful if not necessary element of critical theory in the social
sciences because it provides critical examination of different standpoints and perspectives. Indeed, reflexivi-
ty may guard against levels of projection and selection that could misrepresent the objective reality. Realists
are always in a position that relates to the objective reality; reflexivity enables a critical comprehension of
this position and the extent to which this affects the study. Self exists in relation to history and social exis-
tence; contemporary theory can be considered transitive and historical theory and interpretation intransitive.
Fundamentally, knowledge is always gathered or derived though a selection process and reflexivity uncovers
the mirage of total separation of researcher and researched. Social science involves multi-faceted reflections
where theories both direct and confront perspectives. (For further on Reflexivity see the Methods chapter.)

Question

• Explain the differences between transitive and intransitive knowledge.

• Identify the difficulties this distinction may have for social science.

Conclusion

Empiricism is an idealised term coined in the 19th century to illustrate distinctions between those thinkers
who considered experience as the route to knowledge and those who considered the mind as the starting
point, that is, rationalists. As noted in Chapter 1, philosophers, such as Kant and Schopenhaur, outlined the
relationship between internal and external worlds and how understanding, truth, reality, theory and knowledge
involved a synthesis of the two. In this chapter we identified a number of empiricists and outlined how each
dealt with the difficult relationship between experience of the external world and thought or rationalisation.
However, the main point for Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume was that experience and observation was the
starting point. This is the premise positivism embraced and provided the basis for social science knowledge
accumulation throughout the 19th century.

The objective of both positivism and post-positivism is explanation, control and prediction; positivism looked

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 24 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

for the verification of hypotheses, facts and laws whereas post-positivism pursued falsification. Consequently
theory, knowledge or truth for the former involves verified laws and the latter non-falsified laws that were prob-
ably true. In this way knowledge is accumulated through law, building and adding to the stock of knowledge
through cause and effect and generalisation. Indeed, knowledge is intrinsically valuable and an end in itself.
Any action relating to the research is minimised; it is limited and highly controlled as involvement is perceived
as subjective and a threat to objectivity and validity. The quality or criteria of knowledge is measured through
internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity; value is denied and scientists are removed from the
research. However, there is a distinction here as the positivist acts as advisor for policymakers and change
agents whereas the post-positivist is involved in policymaking and is a change agent through activism and
advocacy. Both use technical qualitative and quantitative techniques, develop substantive theories, formula-
ic text and the researcher is the main voice. That said, for post-positivist critical theory, reflexivity, may be
utilised but for positivists this technique or method impinges on objectivity.

Positivism mimicked methodologies set out for the natural world and wished to form immutable laws that en-
abled prediction. If new theory did not adhere to the given immutable laws it was usually discarded. This had
implications for scientific progress and the development of new knowledge. Indeed, it provided an authori-
tarian modernist approach to knowledge creation and dissemination. Post-positivist epistemology abandons
the ideal of complete separation between the investigated and investigator, however objectivity and distance
are still pursued. This leads to a methodology that deals with multiple modified scientific experimentation and
hypothesis falsification. Theory is not about the discovery of immutable laws but approximations of truth. A
new theory may deal with some difficulties but will invariably open many new problems. If the theory provides
significant progress then ‘the new problems will differ from the old problems: the new problems will be on a
radically different level of depth’ (Popper, 1994: 4). Theory development is open to criticism. Consequently,
through falsification ‘we can get rid of a badly fitting theory’ before it overrides investigation and undermines
objectivity (Popper, 1994: 4).

Post-positivism gave greater scope for human endeavour. Popper noted that the ‘future is open. It is not pre-
determined and thus cannot be predicted … the possibilities that lie in the future are infinite’ (1994: xiii). How-
ever, the future depends on humanity, we are responsible for our future. ‘It is our duty to remain optimists, this
includes not only the openness of the future but also that which all of us contribute to it by everything we do:
we are all responsible for what the future holds in store. Thus it is our duty, not to prophesy evil but, rather, to
fight for a better world’ (Popper, 1994: xiii). However, the very nature of post-positivism throws up new prob-
lems for research and phenomenology forms criticisms of both positivism and post-positivism. Indeed, even

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 25 of 26
Sage Sage Research Methods
© Kerry E

though phenomenology was defined by Hegel (1977) and more specifically for our purposes by Husserl in the
19th century, it is not until Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in the 20th century that the phenomenologi-
cal approach began to challenge the (by then) dominant position of post-positivism. Chapter 4 explores these
different phenomenological perspectives and outlines the main distinctions between the influential thinkers in
this area.

Further Reading

Bhaskar, R. (1975) A Realist Theory of Science. London: Version.

Blackburn, S. (1994) The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (1994) The Handbook of Qualitative Research, 1st edn.Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
Publications.

Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (2000) The Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edn.Thousand Oaks, CA:
SAGE Publications.

Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (2005) The Handbook of Qualitative Research, 3rd edn.Thousand Oaks, CA:
SAGE Publications.

Honderich, T. (1995) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuhn, T.S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Popper, K. (2002) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge.

https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473957633

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

Page 26 of 26