MANU/MH/0179/2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Interim Application No. 1958 of 2024 in First Appeal (ST.) No. 3056 of 2024
Decided On: 14.01.2025
The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement Vs. The Branch Manager, The Goa
State Co-op Bank Ltd.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Colabawalla and Somasekhar Sundaresan, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Ashish Chavan and Yash Palan, Advs.
JUDGMENT
B.P. Colabawalla, J.
1 . The above Appeal is filed under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 [for short the "PMLA, 2002"] by the Assistant Director, Directorate of
Enforcement, challenging the order dated 4th July 2018 passed by the Appellate
Tribunal [constituted under the provisions of the PMLA, 2002], in FPA-PMLA-
2178/AHD/2018. By the impugned order, the Appellate Tribunal allowed the Appeal
filed by the Respondent-Bank against the order of the Adjudicating Authority confirming
the Provisional Order of the Attachment levied [under Section 5 of the PMLA, 2002] by
the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Surat.
2. Since there is a delay in filing the Appeal, the above Interim Application is also filed
seeking a condonation of delay. Though in the Interim Application, the period of delay
is not mentioned, on the basis of the lists of dates and events tendered to this Court on
9th December 2024, the delay mentioned is 132 days.
3 . As recorded in our order dated 9th December, 2024, we had noted that the issue
involved in the present case is whether the Court has the power to condone the delay
beyond the total period of 120 days [sixty days being the prescribed period and a
further period of sixty days being the grace period] as stipulated in Section 42 of the
PMLA, 2002, read with its proviso. In order to decide the aforesaid issue, it would be
apposite to refer to certain admitted facts which are relevant for the present purposes.
4 . The present Applicant/Appellant is working as the Assistant Director, Directorate of
Enforcement, Surat, Sub-Zonal Office, Surat. The Joint Director of the Directorate of
Enforcement, Ahmedabad Zonal office, Ahmedabad, had filed Original Complaint No.
805 of 2017 [under Section 5(5) of the PMLA, 2002] in respect of Provisional
Attachment Order No.4 of 2017 dated 17th July 2017. This provisional attachment was
also levied under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, 2002.
5 . It is the case of the Appellant that after going through all the documents and
evidence, the Adjudication Authority confirmed the Provisional Attachment Order [dated
17th July 2017] vide its order dated 28th December 2017. This confirmation was done
under Section 8 of the PMLA, 2002.
6 . Being aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 28th December
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2017, the Respondent-Bank, on 15th February 2018, preferred an Appeal before the
Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of the PMLA, 2002. This Appeal filed by the
Respondent-Bank was heard on 4th April 2018 and the Judgment was pronounced by
the Appellate Tribunal on 4th July 2018. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the Appeal filed
by the Respondent- Bank and inter-alia set aside the order of the Adjudicating Authority
dated 28th December 2017 and the Provisional Attachment Order dated 17th July 2017.
7 . Being aggrieved by this decision of the Appellate Tribunal, the Appellant herein
initially preferred an Appeal under Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002 before the High Court
of Gujarat, Ahmedabad, being First Appeal No. 4151 of 2018. Since there was a delay of
approximately five days [beyond the initial period of sixty days] in preferring the
Appeal, the Appellant herein also filed an application for condonation of delay. The
delay was accordingly condoned by the Gujarat High Court vide its order dated 28th
June 2019.
8. Eventually, when the Appeal was being argued before the Gujarat High Court, it was
realized that by virtue of the Explanation (ii) of Section 42, the Appeal would lie before
the High Court of Bombay. In these circumstances, on 20th September 2023, the
Appellant withdrew the Appeal before the Gujarat High Court with liberty to approach
the appropriate High Court. Thereafter, the above First Appeal was lodged in this Court
on 30th January 2024.
9. It is the case of the Appellant [in the list of dates and events tendered to the Court
on 9th December 2024] that there is a delay of 132 days in approaching this Court after
the Appellant withdrew its Appeal from the Gujarat High Court. It is in these
circumstances that the Appellant has prayed for condonation of delay. From the list of
dates, it is clear that the Gujarat High Court was approached on 7th September 2018
challenging the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal dated 4th July 2018. As per
Section 42, the Appeal had to be filed within a period of sixty days from the date of
communication of the said order. Since the Appeal was filed after 65 days from the date
of the communication of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, an application for
condonation of delay was also filed before the Gujarat High Court, and which was
allowed. Thereafter, once the Appeal was withdrawn from the Gujarat High Court and
filed in this Court, there has been further delay of about 132 days in filing the above
Appeal.
10. In these facts, and considering the provisions of Section 42, we inquired from the
learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant as to how we would have the power to
condone the delay beyond the maximum period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42
of the PMLA, 2002. In answer to this query, the learned Counsel submitted that the
provisions of Section 42 do not preclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. In this regard the learned Counsel submitted that Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 clearly stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes
inter-alia for any appeal, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by
the Schedule of the said Act, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for such appeal by any special or local law, the provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 [inclusive] shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. He submitted that if one reads
the language of Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002 there is no express exclusion of Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore, we would have the power to condone the
delay even beyond the period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 of the said Act.
The learned Counsel also took us through certain other provisions of the PMLA, 2002,
namely, the definition of the words "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) as well
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as Section 47. The learned Counsel submitted that the PMLA, 2002 is a hybrid statute
which has civil as well as criminal consequences and when one reads all these
provisions, it becomes clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not expressly
excluded by the language employed by the legislature in Section 42. To buttress this
argument, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant strongly relied upon a
decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Faizal Hasamali Mirza alias
Kasib Vs. State of Maharashtra and another [MANU/MH/3702/2023]. The learned
Counsel submitted that in this decision, a Division Bench of this Court was considering
the provisions of Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 [for short
"NIA Act"] and came to the conclusion that even beyond the period stipulated in Section
21 of the NIA Act, the Court has the power to condone the delay. He submitted that the
provisions of Section 21 of the NIA Act are very similar to the provisions of Section 42
of the PMLA, 2002, and therefore, even we would have the power to condone the delay
beyond the total period of 120 days. For all these reasons, the learned Counsel
submitted that we ought to condone the delay and allow the above Interim Application.
11. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant. Before we deal
with this issue, it would only be apposite to set out the provisions of Section 42 of the
PMLA, 2002 as well as Sections 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 42 of the
PMLA, 2002 reads as under:
"42. Appeal to High Court.-Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of
the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty
days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the
Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such
order:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the
appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a
further period not exceeding sixty days.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means-
(i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party
ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain;
and
(ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High
Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case
where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents,
ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain."
(emphasis supplied)
12. As can be seen from the aforesaid provision, any person aggrieved by any decision
or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days
from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on
any question of law or fact arising out of such order. The proviso to Section 42, and
which is important for our purposes, stipulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied
that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the
initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding
sixty days. What can be discerned from these provisions is that an appeal has to be
filed within sixty days [the initial period], and if not done so, then, on sufficient cause
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being shown, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period of sixty days.
The question that arises in the present case, is whether by virtue of the said proviso,
the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded. As mentioned
earlier, to understand this issue, one will also have to note the provisions of Section 5
and Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as well. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
reads thus:-
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-Any appeal or any
application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within
such period.
Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any
order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the
prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
13. Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:-
"29. Savings.-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 25 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed
by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining
any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to
24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which,
they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with
respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or
other proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not
apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882
(5 of 1882), may for the time being extend."
(emphasis supplied)
14. Section 29(2) basically stipulates that where any special or local law, for any suit,
appeal or application, prescribes a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963, then, for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed [for any suit, appeal or application] by
any such special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive),
shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded
by such special law or local law. After perusing the provisions of Section 42, we are
clearly of the view that when the said Section is read as a whole, the inescapable
conclusion is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked for condoning
the delay beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 read with its
proviso. If the legislature had in fact intended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
would apply to an appeal to be filed under Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, the legislature

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would not have inserted the proviso to Section 42 which [after the initial period of sixty
days to file an appeal under Section 42 has expired], gives power to the High Court to
condone the delay for a further period not exceeding sixty days. The legislature would
have stopped by simply saying that any person aggrieved by the decision or an order of
the Appellate Tribunal, may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the
date of the decision or order. If that is all that was said by the legislature, the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not have been construed as
being expressly excluded because a mere provision of a period of limitation [in a
special or local law], in howsoever peremptory or imperative language, is not sufficient
to displace the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 [which includes Section 5] of the
Limitation Act, 1963. However, the proviso to Section 42 basically stipulates that the
High Court shall, after the initial period of sixty days, have the power to condone the
delay for a further period not exceeding sixty days. This would most definitely amount
to an express exclusion to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to
an appeal to be filed under Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002. To hold that the High Court
can entertain an appeal even beyond the extended period [as stipulated in the proviso
to Section 42] would render the words "not exceeding sixty days" wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result. We are unable to agree with the
learned Counsel that an express exclusion only means that Section 42 ought to
expressly mention the exclusion of Section 5. An express exclusion would mean that the
language of the statute clearly indicates that the applicability of Section 5 has been
excluded. The words used in the proviso to Section 42 "within a further period not
exceeding sixty days" clearly therefore exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. If we were to hold otherwise, as mentioned earlier, would render
the said words otiose and would be against all principles of interpretation.
1 5 . We must note that we have taken this precise view in the case of Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar and Others [Interim
Application No.13254 of 2024 in First Appeal (ST) No.24058 of 2024 decided on 7th
January 2025]. In this decision, what this Court considered were the provisions of
Section 74(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [for Short "the 2013 Act"]. Section 74 of the
2013 Act also stipulated that the Requiring Body, or any person aggrieved by the award
passed by the Reference Authority under Section 69 of the 2013 Act, may file an appeal
to the High Court within sixty days from the date of the Award. The proviso to Section
74(1) stipulated that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty
days, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. For the sake
of convenience, Section 74 (1) the 2013 Act and its proviso are reproduced hereunder:-
"74. Appeal to High Court.-(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by
the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the
High Court within sixty days from the date of Award:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said
period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty
days.
1 6 . As can be seen from this provision, it is almost identical to the provisions of
Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002. This Court, in the case of Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai (supra), after reviewing the law laid down by the Supreme Court in (i)
Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company [MANU/SC/0613/2001 : (2001) 1 SCC
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470]; (ii) Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission and others [MANU/SC/0252/2010 : (2010) 5 SCC 2023]; (iii) Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. and
others [MANU/SC/0259/2017 : (2017) 5 SCC 42]; and (iv) Bengal Chemist and
Druggists Association Vs. Kalyan Chowdhary [MANU/SC/0099/2018 : 2018:INSC:91 :
(2018) 3 SCC 41], came to the conclusion that beyond the stipulated period of 120
days, this Court would have no power to condone the delay. We are clearly of the view
that the decision rendered by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
(supra) would apply with full force to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, have
no hesitation in holding that after the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section
42 of the PMLA, 2002, read with its proviso, the High Court would have no power to
condone the delay in preferring the Appeal.
17. Before concluding, it would only be fair to refer to the decision of another Division
Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Faizal Hasamali Mirza alias Kasib Vs. State
of Maharashtra and another (supra). We have carefully gone through the aforesaid
decision. In this decision, another Division Bench of this Court was considering the
provisions of Section 21 of the NIA Act. Section 21 of the NIA Act reads as under:-
"21. Appeals. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an
appeal shall lie from any judgement, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on
law.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges
of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of
three months from the date of admission of the appeal.
(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any
judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the
Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court
granting or refusing bail.
(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty
days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of
the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty
days.
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the
expiry of period of ninety days."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Whilst construing this provision, the Division Bench of this Court held that the word
"shall" appearing in the proviso to Section 21(5) should be read as "may" and hence
would be directory in nature. We fail to understand how this decision can be of any
assistance to the Appellant. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Faizal Hasamali Mirza alias Kasib Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra), came
to this finding taking into consideration that an appeal filed by the accused under

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Section 21 of the NIA Act would be a part of the right to life and liberty as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is in these facts that the Division Bench in the
case of Faizal Hasamali Mirza alias Kasib Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra)
came to the conclusion that the word "shall" in the proviso to Section 21(5) has to be
read as "may" and hence directory in nature. What is important to note is that in this
decision, the Division Bench has not come to the conclusion that although the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are excluded by the language of
Section 21 of the NIA Act, yet the Court has the power to condone the delay. As can be
seen from the provisions reproduced by us above, the language used in Section 21 of
the NIA Act and that in Section 42 of the PMLA 2002 are materially different. In these
circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the reliance placed by the learned
Counsel on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Faizal
Hasamali Mirza alias Kasib Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (supra) is wholly
misconceived and misplaced.
1 9 . There is one other facet - and this would need comment only to underline the
extent of the delay. The Appellant was already five days late in approaching the Gujarat
High Court, and this delay had been condoned. After the Gujarat High Court ruled that
the jurisdictional High Court is the Bombay High Court, the Appellant took another 132
days to approach this Court. In short, the Appellant had already been condoned for a
delay of five days in preferring an appeal. That the Appellant was found to have
approached the wrong forum would not reset the clock for computing limitation from
scratch. The Appellant ought to have approached this Court within 55 days of the
outcome at the Gujarat High Court, and evidently, the Appellant was late by a long
distance of time.
20. In view of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that beyond
the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 [read with its proviso] of the
PMLA, 2002, this Court has no power to condone the delay. Since admittedly, in the
facts of the present case, the application seeking a condonation of delay is beyond the
total period of 120 days, the above Application seeking condonation of delay is hereby
dismissed. Consequently, so is the above First Appeal. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, there shall be no order as to costs.
21. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/ Personal Assistant of
this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed
copy of this order.
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