075-WP 21029 of 2017
075-WP 21029 of 2017
2024:APHC:21084
Between:
And
…. Respondents
___________________________________
% 18.06.2024
Between:
And
…. Respondents
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
APHC010090512017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3310]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
PRESENT
Between:
AND
1. HARINARAYANA K
ORDER :
This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
“……to issue order or orders or writ more particularly in the nature of writ of
mandamus declaring the action of the Respondent No.1 in attaching the prosperities
at SI. No.23, 24, 25, 26, 31 and 44 of Annexure to the G.O.Ms.No.13 Home (General)
dated 17.02.2016 under The Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial
Establishments Act 1999 (Act 17/1999 ) belonging to Respondents No 2 and 3
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mortgaged in favour of the petitioner bank as arbitrary, illegal, subject to the first
charge of the petitioner bank being the mortgagee violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution of India violation of constitutional guarantee under Article 300A of
the Constitution of India contrary to the provisions of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act
2002 and permit the petitioner to proceed against the above referred properties under
the provisions of SARFAESI Act 2002 for the recovery of debt in the interest of
justice”
Society availed Term Loan-I facility of Rs.480.00 lakhs under loan account No.
EMT of land and building situated at Sy No 568, 569/A, 570 & 749A, ward No
78, Kallurpanchayath bearing D No 78/128 under sale to M/s Saraswathi
Educational Society admeasuring 2640 sft valued Rs 1,22,60,000/- as per
valuation report dt 14.01.2016.
availed Term Loan facility of Rs. 300.00 Lakhs under loan account No.
committed in maintaining the account in its true perspective and the demand
together with interest at the rate of 19.0% per annum from 29/05/015 till the
It is further stated that the sale notice was also published in Eenadu,
Sakshi and The Hindu news papers fixing the date of sale on 29.02.2016, but
the sale was not successful for want of bidders. Similarly, tin case of M/s Sri
together with interest at the rate of 19.20% per annum from 01/05/2015 till the
date of full and final payment, but the same was returned. Accordingly, paper
Possession notice was also published in Hans India, Sakshi and Andhra
Jyothi on 06.08.2015. Sale notice was published in Sakshi and Hindu news
papers on 01.03.2016 fixing the e-auction on 06.04.2016, but the sale was
unsuccessful for want of bidders. In view of the above release notice was
published in Eenadu and Hindu on 03.07.2016 and the auction was fixed
again on 10.08.2016.
dated 17.02.2016 confirming the attachment of all the properties including the
properties which are mortgaged in favour of the bank. Once the proceedings
are initiated under SARFAESI Act 2002, the question of Respondent No.1
proceeding against the security interest of the mortgaged property shall not
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arise. In the event, the Respondent No.1 intends to proceed against the some
under Section13(2) of the SARFAESI Act 2002, after the possession is taken
over by the petitioner bank under section13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The
Respondent No.1 also can invoke the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Debts
Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act 2002. The action of
bank. The Respondent No.1 is proceeding with the attachment and sale of
the properties belonging to Respondent No. 2 and 3. If the secured assets are
auctioned and the sale proceedings are appropriated by the Respondent No.1
providing the loan facilities on the security of the properties mortgaged with
the bank will be defeated and the public interest shall be put to jeopardy.
3. Counter affidavit has been filed by 1st respondent and denied all the
1999 (Act No.17 of 1999), the Government have the power to pass orders of
further contended that, the petitioner bank filed the present petition to release
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the mortgaged property i.e., 6 properties mentioned as Sl.No.23, 24, 25, 26,
17.02.2016 enabling the bank to take necessary steps for recovery of the
Reddy @ Keshava Reddy raised mortgage loans by depositing the title deed
depositors. The object of the act is to protect the interest of the depositors.
The petitioner has no right over the properties, which are already attached
under G.O.Ms.No. 13. Moreover, The CID filed a Criminal appeal petition vide
pertaining to the properties in Sl. Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 31 and 44.
proceed against the security interest for the recovery of the debt in respect of
that, Sec.6(4) of the APPDFE Act, 1999 states that the Special Court shall on
depositors of the money realized from out of the property attached. Further,
the Writ Petitioner instead of raising his claim over the attached properties
before the special court approached this Hon'ble Court challenging the
depositors.
4. Reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit
filed by the 1strespondent. While denying all the contents made in the counter
the Respondent No. 1, when they moved an application to make the interim
attachment made over all the properties (which includes the mortgaged
that the Hon'ble Principal District and Sessions Judge, at Kurnool in Crl.M.P.
application/petition (a) interim attachment made over S.No.2 to 10, 12, 14, 15,
of S.No.16,22, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 (mortgaged properties
in favour of SBI) are released to SBI and (C) the rest of the properties i.e.,
been made absolute by the Hon'ble Special Court. So it is clear that the
and the said interim attachment made over them by Respondent No. 1 was
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purchased out of finance from the petitioner Bank and much earlier to the
appeal against the said order dated 31-10-2018 of the Hon'ble Special Court
vide CRL.A. No. 343/2020 before this Honourable court make any difference
in this regard since even on the above said facts and documents clearly
establish the said mortgaged properties not created out of funds collected
from public by accused and also these properties not created and/made out of
5. The counter affidavit has been filed by the 4th respondent denying all
the allegations made in the petition. While reiterating the contents made in
partly and passed the order, dated.31.10.2018 that Sl.No. 2 to 10, 12, 14, 15,
17, 18 to 20 in Annexure-I are hereby made absolute. Sl.No. 16, 22, 27, 28,
30, 33, 35, 37,38,39,40 and 42 are hereby released to SBI. The Hon'ble court
cannot be made as absolute rest of the properties i.e., Sl.Nos.1, 11, 13, 23,
24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 41, 43 and 44 in Annexure-I and Sl. Nos. 1, 2,
of Andhra Pradesh seeking a relief to set aside the order dated 31.10.2018
dismissing the petition in respect of properties in SI.Nos.1, 11, 13, 23, 24, 25,
26, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 41, 43 and 44 in Annexure-I and SI.Nos.1, 2, 3, and 4
Government has examined the matter carefully in the light of the Act and
pertains to Nagireddy Keshava Reddy @ Keshav Reddy, his wife, his family
Financial Establishments Act, 1999 (Act No.17 of 1999) the Government has
interests of the depositors. Hence, the G.O.M.S No.13 of 2016 passed by the
1st respondent is justifiable. It is further stated that, the petitioner bank filed
No.13 from the order of attachment dt.17.02.2016 enabling the bank to take
raised mortgage loans by depositing the title deed of the properties already
purchased from the funds deposited by the depositors. The object of the act is
to protect the interest of the depositors. It is further stated that the petitioner
has no right over the properties which are already attached under
AP which is pertaining to the properties in Sl.Nos.23, 24, 25, 26, 31 and 44.
proceed against the security interest for the recovery of the debt in respect of
that, Sec.6(4) of the APPDFE Act, 1999 states that the Special Court shall on
may be necessary for the equitable distribution among the depositors of the
money realized from out of the property attached. It is mainly stated that, the
Writ Petitioner instead of raising his claim over the attached properties before
the special court approached this Hon'ble Court challenging the G.O.M.S
6. Reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner Bank to the counter
affidavit filed by the 4th respondent. The petitioner bank while denying all the
contents made in the counter affidavit of the 4th respondent, reiterated the
contents made in the petition. It is stated that the contention that after careful
examination of the matter the subject interim order under section 3 of Act 17
of 1999 was passed as per the powers conferred etc., are absolutely false and
not tenable and the respondent No. 1 is put to strict proof of the same. When
the police during investigation approached the petitioner Bank the above
clearly discloses that there is no nexus between the assets purchased out of
public funds by fraudulent means, which are the subject matter of this writ
petition, and assets mortgaged to the writ petitioner created out of financed
granted by the Bank that too much earlier to the said collection of
deposits/funds from the public, still the respondent No.1, arbitrarily, illegally
question and thus the powers given under the said Act 17 of 1999 were not
exercised diligently and properly. It is further stated that the contentions that
loans by depositing the title deed of the properties already purchased from the
funds deposited by the depositors and the petitioner has no right over the
properties, which are already attached under G.O.Ms.No.13 and the writ
petitioner has to raise its claim before the special correct are not incorrect and
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not tenable and false and denied and the respondent no. 4 is put to strict proof
the same. As detailed above, these assets purchased out of the banks'
finance much earlier to the alleged collection of funds from the public and
attachment order made under section 3 of the Act 19 of 1999 and the in fact
Further if the respondent No. 1 and/4 has got any grievance they have to
said central Act and make their claim. Further the properties are located in
of this Honourable High court is appropriate and apt especially now as the
High court. Under the above circumstances, it is prayed this Court the writ
Y.L.SivaKalpana Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for CID appearing for the
respondents.
contents made in the petition and in the reply affidavits, contended that the
respondents No.2 and 3 to the extent mortgaged with the petitioner bank is
override other laws and that the provisions of this Act shall have effect,
the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such
law. He further contended that the petitioner bank has first charge over the
properties which are mortgaged in favour of the bank and hence the petitioner
do have the authority to proceed against the security interest for the recovery
of the debt. He further submits that, any action of the Respondent No.1 to
proceed against the Security Interest under The Andhra Pradesh Protection of
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further submits that
the SARFAESI Act 2002 has overriding affect over The Andhra Pradesh
and hence the right of the petitioner to proceed against the security interest
under the SARFAESI Act 2002 shall prevail. He further submitted that unless
1999 (Act 17/1999) is stayed, the purpose of filing this writ petition will be
relied upon a catena of decisions reported in (i) A.S Prasad vs A.P. State
Financial Corporation1, wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that:
I express my inability to accept the submission made by learned Counsel for the
petitioner for the reason that the A.P. Protection of Depositors of Financial
Establishment Act, 1999 is obviously an enactment made in exercise of the legislative
power conferred on the State Legislature referable to some entry either in List II or
List III of VII Schedule of the Constitution. The question as to under which entry the
said enactment is made is not examined as no arguments in this behalf are submitted
by the learned Counsel for the petitioner but he proceeded on the assumption that
the said enactment is validly made by the State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh. But
the fact remains that the 1st respondent came into existence under the provisions of
the SFC Act, an enactment passed by the Parliament in exercise of the power
conferred on it under Article 246(1) of the Constitution with reference to the legislative
field indicated in Entry 43 of List-I of VII Schedule of the Constitution. The legislative
field is exclusively assigned to the Parliament by the Constitution, therefore
irrespective of the source of the legislative authority under which the State enactment
is made, the said law made by the State Legislature is required to give way to the
mandate of the law made by the Parliament in exercise of the power conferred on it
under Article 246(1) of the Constitution because within the field assigned to it, the law
made by the Parliament is supreme and overrides any other law made by the State
Legislatures if there is anything repugnant or inconsistent in such law made by the
State Legislature.
A.P and others2, wherein the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at
16. Here in this case, a case has been registered against the 2nd respondent under
Sections 3 and 5 of the A.P. Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishment Act,
1999, which is a State Enactment. There has been no provision envisaged under the
Act for confiscation of the properties. The Act inter alia provides for attachment of the
properties of the Financial Establishments when there is infraction of d any of the
provisions of the said Act. In this case, the applicability of the said Act is quite
doubtful, in view of the fact that t the petitioner herein is the company having nt been
duly incorporated under the provisions d of the Companies Act. That apart, the e
1
2003(1) ALD 6387 AP
2
2002(1) ALD (Crl.) 189 (AP)
18
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petitioner is not seeking permission to sell away the vehicles once for all and to e
appropriate the sale proceeds towards d realisation of the loans due to him. On the
other hand, he seeks permission for sale of the vehicles and to deposit the sale
proceeds s into the Court till the disposal of the case, which would eventually for the
benefit of at the successful party. I, therefore, see no embargo whatsoever either
under the A.P. of Protection of Depositors of Financial es Establishments Act, 1999 or
under the of provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or 10 under the terms of the Hire
Purchase Agreement. The request of the petitioner d therefore, appears to be
genuine and can de be considered.
(iii) In Indian Overseas Bank versus The State of Tamil Nadu and
“……6. In support of the contention, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Indian Bank v. The Chief Judicial
Magistrate and Others, (2006) 4 LW 535. Wherein, this Court has been pleased to lay
down as under:
31. It may so that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the criminal court has
got jurisdiction and powers to attach any property in status quo for the purpose of
completing investigation and to adduce evidence at the time of trial. It is equally so
that the Government is also well within their powers to pass an enactment,
Pondicherry Protection of Interests of Depositors in Financial Establishment Act,
2004, Act 1 of 2005, to protect the interests of the gullible depositors and to order
attachment of the property under such enactment. However, in view of the clear
language of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, the proceedings initiated by the bank in
respect of the property in question under the SARFAESI Act will have the overriding
effect against the impugned orders of attachment in sofar as they are related to the
property in question. The orders of attachment passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate and the Government of Pondicherry are inconsistent with the proceedings
initiated under the SARFAES Act. Act 1 of 2005 came into force on 24.03.2005
whereas the proceedings under SARFAESI AC were initiated much earlier and
completed on 24.03.2005. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the said
property is to be excluded from the impugned orders of attachment Accordingly, the
attachment in respect of the said property is lifted. To this limited extent, the
impugned orders of attachment passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the
Government of Pondicherry insofar as it related to the said property are set aside.
Needless to mention, it a open to the depositors or their association and/or the
competent authority appointed by the Government of Pondicherry under the Act
passed to protect the interests of the depositors to file appeal, if they so desire, under
section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.”
(iv) In Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., ARD, 6th Floor, Vinay Bhawya
Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd.,4, wherein the Madras High Court held that :
3
Law Finder Doc.Id # 1147429
19
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On the basis of the above said submission made by the learned senior counsel for
the petitioner and first respondent and considering the fact that the petitioner and
third respondent are the Banking Companies as per the Banking Regulation Act,
1949, which have been specifically exempted from the purview of financial
establishment under Act 1 of 2005, the writ petition is disposed of with direction to the
first respondent to lift the attachment made in respect of Serial Nos.13 and 14 in
Schedule I of G.O.Ms.No.12 dated 18.02.2006, in so far as it relates to the said items
of properties alone to enable the petitioner to take suitable action for recovery under
the concerned Act in respect of due from the second respondent to the third
respondent. It is made clear that in such an event, the first respondent would be
entitled to the residuary amount in respect of said items, viz., Serial Nos.13 and 14
and to proceed with attachment and further auction in respect of other properties as
per Act 1 of 2005.
It is seen from the materials placed on record that while Pondicherry Nidhi Limited
was a registered financial establishment under the provisions of the Reserve Bank of
India Act, M/s.PNLNidhi Limited is an unregistered financial establishment. Both the
financial establishments are carrying on their business activities in the very same
address, viz.189, Mission Street, Pondicherry. M/s. V. Kannan and V. Bhaskaran and
their close relatives/associates are major shareholders of PNL Nidhi Limited. It is also
pertinent to note that the said persons are also major shareholders/Directors of New
Horizon Sugar Mills Limited and Arunachalam Sugar Mills Limited and as such they
are persons interested in the management and affairs of the said companies and the
financial establishment. Though these companies and the financial establishment are
separate legal entities, as contended by the learned counsel for the parties
concerned, and, therefore, the properties standing in the names of the respective
companies and the individuals are distinct and independent from each other, but real
beneficiaries behind the corporate mask are one and the same persons. It is also
pleaded in the counter-affidavits filed by the Government of Pondicherry that M/s. V.
Kannan and V. Baskaran, who are said to be the major shareholders and Directors of
Pondicherry Nidhi Limited/PNL Nidhi Limited as well as Directors of New Horizon
Sugar Mills Limited and Arunachala Sugar Mills Limited, have misappropriated huge
sums of money deposited by the general public in PNL Nidhi Limited and diverted the
said amount to their own trade and business of the said sugar mill companies. In
such circumstances, when the very object and purpost of Act 1 of 2005 is to protect
the interests of the depositors of the financial establishment and particularly
when Sec.4(2) empowers the Government to order attachment of properties not only
standing in the name of the financial establishment, but also the personal assets of
the persons in charge of the management and affairs of the financial establishment, I
find no illegality in the impugned notification dated 18-02-2006. However, in view of
my discussions and findings in the Civil Revision Petition and the connected writ
petitions, the impugned order of attachment passed vide G.O. Ms. No.12 dated 18-
02-2006 is interfered with only to the limited extent in so far as it related to the
properties against which proceedings under SARFAESI Act has already been
initiated. Therefore, the attachment in respect those properties alone are lifted and in
other respects, the impugned notification stands legally valid. Accordingly, the writ
4
Law Finder Doc Id # 1163033
5
2006(52) R.C.R(Civil) 553
20
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petitions challenging the validity of Act 1 of 2005 and the impugned G.O. Ms. No.12
dated 18-02-2006 are dismissed.
(vi) InHarbanslalSahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., and
So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to
arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed
by the appellants was liable to be dismissed, suffice it to observe that the rule of
exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of
discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case in spite of availability of
the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least
three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or, (iii)
where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act
and is challenged [See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai
and Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 11. The present case attracts applicability of first two
contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread
and butter came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such
circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the
High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration
proceedings.
It may be true that in a given case when an action of the party is de'hors the terms
and conditions contained in an agreement as also beyond the scope and ambit of
domestic forum created therefor, the writ petition may be held to be maintainable; but
indisputably therefor such a case has to be made out. It may also be true, as has
been held by this Court in Amritsar Gas Service (supra) and E.
Venkatakrishna (supra), that the arbitrator may not have the requisite jurisdiction to
direct restoration of distributorship having regard to the provisions contained
in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; but while entertaining a writ petition
even in such a case, the court may not loose sight of the fact that if a serious
disputed question of fact is involved arising out of a contract qua contract, ordinarily a
writ petition would not be entertained. A writ petition, however, will be entertained
when it involves a public law character or involves a question arising out of public law
functions on the part of the respondent.
But in a case of this nature, while exercising a plenary jurisdiction, we must take the
supervening circumstances into consideration. The parties admittedly invoked the
arbitration agreement before the arbitrator. They entered into a settlement. Pursuant
6
AIR 2003 SC 21320
7
Appeal (Civil) 7337 of 2004 dated 15.09.2005
21
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to or in furtherance of the said settlement, the Appellant herein was to pay a sum of
Rs.4,64,586/- unto the Respondent in five installments with interest. The Appellant
herein for violation of the terms of contract presumably prayed for award of damages
but no reference thereto has been made in the award. In any event such claim of
damages could have been made before the Arbitrator on the ground of alleged
breach of contract.
We are further of opinion that in this matter no case has been made out for grant of a
relief of restoration of the dealership. The contract stood terminated on the death of
the Appellant's partner. No case of novation of contract has been made out. It is also
not the case of the parties that any other or further agreement between the parties
came into being. The arrangement was an ad hoc one. The Appellant did not derive
any legal right to continue the business for an indefinite period. Moreover, she
allegedly violated the terms of the contract.
Company Ltd. And ors.,8,wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
Under clause (1) of Article 254, a general rule is laid down to say that the Union law
shall prevail where the State law is repugnant to it. The question of repugnancy
arises only with respect to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List as both the
Parliament and the State Legislatures have concurrent powers to legislate over the
subject-matter in that List. In such cases, at times, conflict arises. Clause (1) of Article
254 states that if a State law, relating to a concurrent subject, is “repugnant” to a
Union law, relating to that subject, then, whether the Union law is prior or later in time,
the Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy,
be void. Thus, Article 254(1) also gives supremacy to the law made by Parliament,
which Parliament is competent to enact. In case of repugnancy, the State Legislation
would be void only to the extent of repugnancy. If there is no repugnancy between
the two laws, there is no question of application of Article 254(1) and both the Acts
would prevail. Thus, Article 254 is attracted only when Legislations covering the same
matter in List III made by the Centre and by the State operate on that subject; both of
them (Parliament and the State Legislatures) being competent to enact laws with
respect to the subject in List III. In the present case, Entry 7 of List III in the Seventh
Schedule deals with the subject of “Contracts”. It also covers special contracts.
Chitties are special contracts. Thus, the Parliament and the State Legislatures are
competent to enact a law with respect to such contracts. The question of repugnancy
between the Parliamentary Legislation and State Legislation arises in two ways. First,
where the Legislations, though enacted with respect to matters in their allotted
spheres, overlap and conflict. Second, where the two Legislations are with respect to
matters in the Concurrent List and there is a conflict. In both the situations, the
Parliamentary Legislation will predominate, in the first, by virtue of non-obstante
clause in Article 246(1); in the second, by reason of Article 254(1). Article
254(2) deals with a situation where the State Legislation having been reserved and
having obtained President’s assent, prevails in that State; this again is subject to the
proviso that Parliament can again bring a legislation to override even such State
Legislation.
8
MANU/SC/0445/2012
22
2024:APHC:21084
In order to examine and adjudicate the issues in the present writ petition, it would be
highly apposite and appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 26E of the Act
and Section 31B of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 26E of the Act, which deals with the
priority to secured creditors and which came into force w.e.f. 24-01-2020 by way of a
Gazette Notification, reads as under:-
Section 26 E : Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force, after the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured
creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses
and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or local
authority.
Explanation:- For the purpose of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or after the
commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,1016, in cases where
insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending in respect of secured assets of the
borrower, priority to secured creditors in payment of debt shall be subject to the
provisions of the Code."
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or after the
commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy proceedings are pending in
respect of secured assets of the borrower, priority to secured creditors in payment of
debt shall be subject to the provisions of that Code
10. A reading of the above provisions of law makes it abundantly clear that the said
provisions are analogous though under two different legislations. Section 26E of the
Act, which came into force w.e.f 24-01- 2020 begins with 'non obstante' clause and
stipulates that after registration of the security interest, the debts due to any secured
creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses
and other rates payable to the Central or State Governments or local authority.
Section.31B of the Bankruptcy Act is also to the same effect. When the language of
the provisions of law is very lucid and clear, no other interpretation is possible.
9
WP No.23312 of 2020, dated 08.12.2020
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11. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent created mortgage over the subject
property by way of a registered deed in favour of Andhra Bank as long back as on 16-
03-2013 and as the account of the loanee became NPA on 31-07-2016, the Bank
authorities initiated action under the provisions of the Act by issuing notices
under Section 13(2) and (4) of the Act. It is absolutely not in controversy that the
petitioner herein clearly falls under the definition of "secured creditor"
as defined under Section 2(zd) of the Act, since the petitioner herein is an Asset
Reconstruction Company in whose favour Andhra Bank assigned the debt by way of
registered document on 26-09-2017. In fact, the material available on record further
reveals that on 18-11- 8 AVSS,J& KSR,J W.P.23312_2020 2020 i.e., immediately
after the sale notice came to be issued by the 2nd respondent, the petitioner herein
brought to the notice of the Office of the 2nd respondent about the existence of the
security interest in favour of the petitioner herein. In fact, when the provisions
of Section 26E of the Act and 31B of the Bankruptcy Act fell for consideration of this
court in W.P.No.43841 of 2018, when the registering authority failed to register the
sale certificate, a Division Bench of this court, while holding that the secured creditor
would have the priority of the charge over the mortgaged property, allowed the said
writ petition directing the registering authority to register the sale certificate. In the
said judgment, the Division Bench also held that the revenue has no priority of charge
over the mortgaged property in question. Having regard to the language employed
in Section 26E of the Act and 31B of the Bankruptcy Act, the contention of the
learned Government Pleader that mortgage in favour of the petitioner herein should
yield to crown debt coupled with charge cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the
2016 of the Principal Sessions Judge, Kurnool, wherein it was held that :
“On perusal of the contents of the above said G.O, it is evident that
properties are listed Item Wise which belong to Kurnool, Nandyal and other
districts. It is relevant to mention here that this court has territorial jurisdiction
over the properties situated within the limits of Kurnool District and interim
attachment of the properties, which was ordered in the above said G.O which
are within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, can only be made absolute,
but not the other items of properties which are outside the territorial limits of
jurisdiction of this court.
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2024:APHC:21084
prosecution to prove that Accused No.1 has purchased the properties with the
Institutions, which can be proved by the prosecution only after full-fledged trial.
by the State Bank of India for releasing some of the properties mentioned in
the said G.O from attachment, on the ground that those properties were
mortgaged by Keshava Reddy in their banks and huge amounts were taken
from them towards loan and they have first charge over the said properties
Keshava Reddy, also find plate column of Vendee. But for the reasons best
known to the prosecution, the said Educational Institutions are neither made
issue notices to the said Educational Institutions. It is the prime duty of this
Court to follow the principles of natural justice before passing any order for
shown at Sl.Nos. 1, 11, 16, 21, 22, 23 to 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38
Crl.M.P.No.665/2016.
clauses of the special Acts to be given effect to fell for consideration before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Bank of India vs. Ketan Parekh
&Ors 10 . She submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was comparing the
effect of the non obstante overriding clause contained therein in the Special
Courts Act, 1992 and Section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The Hon'ble
Court observed that where both the enactments have a non-obstante clause
then one has to see the subject and the dominant purpose for which the
special enactment was made. She submits that the fields of legislation in
15. Learned Standing Counsel also submits that the dominant purpose
the accused under attachment. The dominant purpose of the SARFAESI Act
10
(2008) 8 SCC 148
26
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is to expedite the recovery of the debts due to the banks and financial
institutions. Thus, the objectives and purpose of each of the Acts are distinct
and there is no overlapping of the same much less any conflict between the
of the absolute orders, some of the individuals interested persons over the
approached this Hon'ble court by way of filing the Criminal Appeals under Sec
court set aside the Crl.MP.No.665 of 2016 and remanded the matter directing
the Special Court to decide the claim of the appellants in the Crl. M.P.NO.665
of 2016.
16. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that, the writ petitioner,
who filed the writ petition challenging the G.O.Ms.No.13 in the year 2017, and
not approached the Special court raising his claim, and further similarly
situated Banks, SBI approached the Special court raising a claim of first
charge over the mortgaged properties was decided by the court below but the
Writ petitioner not vigilant about his rights seeking the indulgence of this
Hon'ble court, when the alternative remedy is available before the Special
of 2017 and batch. She also relied upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
27
2024:APHC:21084
Act, 1985-Ss. 15, 22(1) (as amended in 1994) and 32(1) - Impact on of Interest on
Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993,
Ss. 6(2) a sick company ) and 10 Proceedings for rehabilitation of On a reference
made under S. 15 of the 1985 Act, the appellant Company declared a sick unit
Proceedings for rehabilitation initiated, whereupon rehabilitation scheme sanctioned
In the meanwhile, proceedings initiated against the appellant by the respondent
industry supplying products to the appellant, claiming before Industry Facilitation
Council in terms of provisions of the 1993 Act Plea of the appellant before the Council
that as it had been declared a sick company, the matter should not proceed further,
not accepted Council adjudicating award in favour of the respondent which was put in
execution Writ petition filed by the appellant dismissed - Letters patent appeal
preferred thereagainst also dismissed - High Court in the impugned judgment
proceeded on the premise that the 1993 Act could prevail over the 1985 Act - Held,
the 1993 Act was enacted to provide for and regulate payment of interest on delayed
payments to small-scale industries - A situation for framing a scheme for revival of a
sick company was not envisaged by the said Act Further, execution of award of the
Council would attract the provisions of S. 22 of the 1985 Act which bars any
proceedings inter alia for execution, distress, etc. against any of the properties of the
industrial company and no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any
security shall lie or proceed further except with the consent of the Board - The
adjudicatory process of making an award under the 1993 Act may not come within
the purview of the 1985 Act - But once the awarded amount is sought to be executed,
the 1985 Act shall come into effect - Held, once the awarded amount has been
included in the scheme, S. 22 of the 1985 Act would apply - Further held, if the
liabilities of the appellant are covered by the scheme framed under S. 22 of the 1985
Act, the High Court erred in concluding that provisions thereof are not attracted
only….”
Government of Andhra Pradesh and others12, wherein the Apex Court held
that:
11
(2006) 8 Supreme Court Cases 677
28
2024:APHC:21084
Statute Law – PariMateria Provisions – Andhra Act, held is in pari material with Tamil
Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act 1977;
Maharashtra Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act 1999
and Pondicherry Protection of Interests of Depositors in Financial establishments Act 2004 –
A.P. Protection of depositors of Financial Establishments Act 1999 (17 of 1999) – Sec 2(c ) ,
3, 5 to 9 - validity, upheld … . We notice in New Horizon Sugar Mills Ltd.’s case (supra), this
Court held that the objects of the Tamil Nadu Act, Maharashtra Act and the Pondicherry Act
are the same and/or of similar nature. In our view, the object and purpose as well as the
provisions of the Andhra Act are parimateria with that of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and
Pondicherry Acts, the constitutional validity of those legislation has already been upheld. We
also fully concur with the views expressed by this Court in those Judgments and uphold the
constitutional validity of the Andhra Act.
18. Learned Standing Counsel while relying upon the above decisions,
has also placed an order of a learned Division Bench of this Court dated
the said writ petition directing the 2nd respondent therein to register the
property in favour of the auction purchasers. Further, it was held that on the
sale of subject property, if any amount is left over, after the entire loan of the
borrower with interest and other charges are adjusted, it shall be made
available to the Deputy Commissioner, Income Tax for its adjustment to the
12
(2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 677
13
(2014) 8 Supreme Court Cases 768
29
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learned Standing Counsel requests this Court the present writ petition may be
dismissed.
The Additional Director General of Police, Crime Investigation Department, has also
stated that during the course of investigation, it is established that in the year 1983, Sri
NagireddyKesavareddy had started his life as English Teacher and worked with
different educational institutions for 10 years. In June 1993, he started a school in the
name and style of Keshava Reddy School in a rented building at Sanjeeva Nagar,
Nandyal town with 193 students. His school students got State ranks in public
examinations. At that time, he hatched a plan and introduced a new scheme with an
offer to the parents that if they deposit lump-sum amount for one student at the time of
joining in his school, he will provide free education, lodging, boarding, books and
uniform etc. and after completion of education 1.e., 10th class or otherwise leaving the
school in any manner, he will return the deposited amount to the parent of the student.
He collected a deposit amount of Rs.1 lakh initially and he increased the deposit
amount up to Rs.3 to 5 lakhs. Many parents were attracted to this scheme and started
joining their children. As it proved to be more profitable for Keshava Reddy, he started
expanding his establishment by opening schools at various places. He also expanded
his education business and established 11 associated educational societies viz. (1) Sri
Mahanandeshwara Educational Society, (2) Sri Venkateshwara Educational Society,
(3) N.Keshava Reddy Educational Society, (4) Sri Surya Educational Society, (5) Sri
KanakaDurga Educational Society Keshava Reddy Educational Society, Swamy
Educational So Shava Reddy Educational Society) Bharath Reddy Educational
Society, (10) kheshava Reddy Educational Trust and (11) Saraswathi Educational
Society. Likewise, around 50 schools were established Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana states.
Thus, for the past 2 years, the Chairman has not refunded the deposited money to the
parents.
legislations viz. (i) the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and (ii) the DRT Act, 1993(after
amendment titled as the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993), the
amended provisions give overriding effect over any other law and priority to
the secured condition for the time being in force including the provisions of AP
other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the
Central Government or State Government or local authority.
Explanation : For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or
after the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of
2016), in cases where insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending in
respect of secured assets of the borrower, priority to secured creditors in
payment of debt shall be subject to the provisions of that Code.
(ii) Section 31B of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 :
Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, after the words "the
date of the application", "and includes any liability towards debt securities
which remains unpaid in full or part after notice of ninety days served upon the
security interest is created for the benefit of holders of debt securities or;" is
added which makes the said amendment or the 1993 Act applicable to all the
22. Thus, it is very clear from above that the secured creditor, get a
priority over the rights of Central or State Government or any other Local
Authority.
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23. It is also to be noted that, the madras High Court in a case of The
We are of the view that if there was at all any doubt, the same stands
resolved by view of the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of
Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 2016, Section
41 of the same seeking to introduce Section 31B in the Principle Act, Which
reads as under:- ―
31B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, the rights of secured creditors to realize secured debts due and payable
to them by sale of assets over which security interest is created, shall have
priority and shall be paid in priority over all other debts and Government dues
including revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due to the Central Government,
State Government or local authority.
Explanation. – for the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or
after the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in
cases where insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending in respect of
secured assets of the borrower, priority to secured creditors in payment of
debt shall be subject to the provisions of that Code.‖ ―
3 There is, thus, no doubt that the rights of a secured creditor to realize
secured debts due and payable by sale of assets over which security interest
is created, would have priority over all debts and Government dues including
revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due to the Central Government, State
Government or Local Authority. This section introduced in the Central Act is
with ―notwithstanding‖ clause and has come into force from 01.09.2016‖
―4 The law having now come into force, naturally it would govern the rights of
the parties in respect of even a lis pending.‖ ―
5 The aforesaid would, thus, answer question (a) in favour of the financial
institution, which is a secured creditor having the benefit of the mortgaged
property.“
that:
“For instance, if LIC Housing Finance Limited, which has advanced money to
the petitioner in the first writ petition and which consequently has a right over
the property, is able to satisfy the Adjudicating Authority that the money
advanced by them for the purchase of the property cannot be taken to be the
proceeds of crime, then, the Adjudicating Authority is obliged to record a
finding to that effect and to allow the provisional order of attachment to lapse.
Otherwise, a financial institution will be seriously prejudiced. I do not think that
the Directorate of Enforcement or the Adjudicating Authority would expect
33
2024:APHC:21084
25. The High Court of Madras in “State Bank of India Vs. The
Circle and Ors.”, while upholding the Amendment Act, 2016 to Section
26E of the SARFAESI Act and reaffirming the view of the Full Bench of
Assessment Circle (supra) lifted the attachment entry and held that ―
In other words, not only should the amendment apply to pending lis, but the
declaration that the right of a secured creditor to realise the secured debts,
would have priority over all debts, which would include, Government dues
including revenues, taxes, etc., should hold good qua 2002 Act as well.”
were purchased much prior to the period when the facility of loan sanctioned
to the borrowers. The banks while rendering the facilities were boanfide
parties. It is not the case of the respondent that the attached properties were
purchased after the loan was obtained. The mortgaged of the properties were
offence.
27. This Court further observed that, in this case, the CBCID has also
filed the copies of the sale deeds of the properties which shows the date of
acquisition of all the properties. The petitioner Banks are having the mortgage
34
2024:APHC:21084
charge over the properties. It is to be noted that, in the present case, all the
mortgaged with the petitioner Bank much prior to the date of alleged offence
which shows that no proceeds of crime are involved in the abstention of these
properties and hence the same cannot be attached by the CID because the
same would result in hampering the interest of the petitioner Bank.Thus, in the
present case, even though the Learned Adjudicating Authority had all the
Bank and that the petitioner Bank had prior charge over the subject matter;
order of the Respondent No. 1 and thus causing huge loss to the petitioner
Bank.Thus, making the petitioner Bank the rightful owner of the said
properties which are already in the possession of the petitioner Bank under
the SARFAESI Act. The origin of the funds is not illegal or unlawful in any
manner. The funds were only deposited in the accounts with the petitioner
28. So, this Court finds that the petitioner Bank is liable to recover huge
amounts in the above loan accounts and the bank being the
dues with the sale of the properties. It is even not the allegation of respondent
no. 1 that the accused has acquired the mortgage properties with the
proceeds of crime. Furthermore, the petitioner Bank has already filed the Suit
for recovery and has also had taken the action under SARFAESI Act.
35
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regards the origin of funds or the title of the properties. As far as the bank is
concerned, the bank had to recover its outstanding dues by taking over the
possession of the mortgaged properties in case the Respondents are not able
to pay back the credit facilities availed by the Respondents and by way of the
petitioner bank so that recovery can be made from the accounts which have
become NPA. Moreover, normally, the Banks are innocent party. They are
not involved in any criminal proceedings. If they are asked to await till the trial
is over, the systems in these types of cases, the economy would collapse.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that, it
is very clear that the decision of the respondent No.1 in proceeding against
the properties of respondents No.2 and 3 to the extent mortgaged with the
observed that, the SARFAESI Act has overriding affect over the Andhra
17/1999) and hence the right of the petitioner to proceed against the security
that, once the Central Act has been given an overriding effect, then the State
36
2024:APHC:21084
Act, has to give way. In view of the overriding effect of SARFAESI Act, the
31. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and for
the reasons stated above, this Court is inclined to allow the present writ
petitioner bank, are hereby quashed. Further, the petitioner Bank is permitted
to proceed further against the above referred properties under the provisions
closed.
______________________________
Date : 18-06-2024
(b/o)Gvl
37
2024:APHC:21084
Date : 18 .06.2024
Gvl