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Pinochet s Economists The Chicago School of Economics
in Chile Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics 1st
Edition Valdes Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Valdes, Juan Gabriel
ISBN(s): 9780521064408, 0521064406
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 7.18 MB
Year: 2008
Language: english
This book tells the extraordinary story of the Pinochet regime's economists,
known as the "Chicago Boys." It explores the roots of their ideas and their
sense of mission, following their training as economists at the Department of
Economics at the University of Chicago. After their return to Chile, the
"Chicago Boys" took advantage of the opportunity afforded them by the
1973 military coup to launch the first radical free market strategy
implemented in a developing country. The ideological strength of their
mission and the military authoritarianism of General Pinochet combined to
transform an economy that, following the return to democracy, has stabilized
and is now seen as a model for Latin America.
This book, written by a political scientist, examines the neo-liberal
economists and their perspective on the market. It also narrates the history of
the transfer of ideas from the industrialized world to a developing country,
which will be of particular interest to economists.
Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics

PINOCHET'S ECONOMISTS
Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics

General Editor: Prefessor Craufard D. Goodwin, Duke University

This series contains original works that challenge and enlighten historians of
economics. For the profession as a whole it promotes better understanding of
the origin and content of modern economics.

Other books in the series:

William]. Barber: From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and
American Economic Policy, 192/-1933*
M.June Flanders: lnternationa/Morwtary Economics, 1870-/950
LarsJonung (ed.): The Stockholm &hoot of Economics &vi.sited
Kyun Kim: Equilibrium Business Cycle Theory in Historical Perspective
Gerald M. Koot: English Historical Economics, 1870-1926: The Rise of Economic
History and Mercantilism
Philip Mirowski: More Heat th.an Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as
Nature's Economics*
Mary S. Morgan: The History ofEconometric Ideas*
Takashi Negishi: Economic Theories in a Non-vValrasian Tradition*
Malcolm Rutherford: Institutions in Economics: The Ola and the
New Institutionalism
Karen I. Vaughn: Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition
E. Roy Weintraub: Stabili:;;ing fynamics: Constructing Economic Knowledge

Titles available in paperback are marked with an asterisk.

Pinochet's econonusts

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN CHILE

JUAN GABRIEL VALDES

MCAMBRIDGE
. , , UNIVERSITY PRESS
Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 !RP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY IOOJ J-4211, USA
IO Stamford Road, Oakleigh, lvlelboume 3166, Australia

© Cambridge University Press 1995

First published 1995

Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

A catawgue recordfor this book is avai/abl,ft= th, British Library

Library ef Congress catawguing in publication data

Pinochet's economists: the Chicago School in Chile/Juan Gabriel Valdes.
p. cm. - (Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics)
Based on the author's thesis (doctoral) - Princeton.
ISBN O 521451469
I. Chile - Economic conditions - 1973-1988.
2. Chile - Economic policy.
3. Chicago School of Economics.
I. Title. II. Series.
HCI92.VJ8 1995
338.983 - dc20 94-28011 CIP

ISBN O 521 45146 9 hardback

CE
To Antonia
 Contents

Preface and acknowledgments page x

Introduction

I Authoritarians without a project 16

2 Ideological transfer 38
3 The Chicago School of Economics 52
4 The actors of ideological transfer 81
5 The contracts between ICA, Chicago, and the Universidad
Cat61ica 109
6 The Chile Project and the birth of the Chicago Boys 127
7 The implantation of the Chicago School in Chile 162
8 The export of the Chicago tradition 181
9 In search of politics 201
10 The elusive hegemony 218
11 Under the Unidad Popular 241

Conclusion 253

Not,es 281
Index 323

ix
 Preface and acknowledgxn.ents

The research that has led to this book stems from a series of issues that have
held a particular fascination for me throughout my intellectual development.
The first of these concerns the generation, spread, and influence of ideas and
ideologies. I probably became interested in this immense theme when,
during my childhood, I was told that the notions underpinning our
independence arrived on Chilean shores aboard ships bringing French wines
and cloth. Books by Rousseau and Montesquieu were brought in clandesti-
nely, hidden amongst candles and rigging, and subsequently passed from
hand to hand along a growing, anonymous trail that eventually arrived at a
collective sentiment. This tale stimulated my imagination, channeling it
towards an issue that has been with me ever since. And it led, almost
naturally, to curiosity about the groups formed around such concepts:
namely, the ideas in people's minds, the goals, emotions, choices, insights,
and all manner of projects that came to symbolize a collective identity -
projects to transform society itself.
My generation yearned to eradicate all that had gone before and to secure
a radically distinct starting point. The ideological phenomenon of the 1960s,
once described as a "world time," knew no bounds of nationality. Across
practically the entire globe, thousands of groups, enlightened by often
contradictory ideas and vested with the convictions of the vanguard,
embarked on a mission to change the established order. But how did these
ideas and beliefs spread? How can we explain the surging ideological tides
sweeping vertiginously through very different cultures, histories, and circum-
stances and advancing across frontiers - part of the always incomplete process
of internationalization? The explanation is to be found in people, in the
encounter between individuals across countries, in the creation of trans-
national networks of communication and in the casual or deliberate transfer
of ideas.
Hence when, at the end of the 1970s, I chanced upon the "Chile Project
Reports" among the archives of the Agency for International Development
(AID) library in Washington DC, I immediately resolved to reconstruct the

x
 Preface and acknowledgments xi

past. There, admirably detailed, lay the theoretical principles and the
organizational details behind a deliberate process of transferring ideas from
one country to another. But this was not the sole, nor even the main, reason
for my interest in the affair. The documentation dating from the late 1950s
described the transmittal of a well-known American tradition to a group of
Chilean students. Remarkably, even as I read through the records, these very
same students were using their posts as ministers and under-secretaries in a
dictatorial regime to carry out the most radical change the Chilean economy
has ever known.
Later on, once I had met the great names of the Chicago School of
Economics and read Henry Simons and Frank Knight, I was able to pinpoint
the roots of this economic vanguard's startling and all-encompassing
discourse, which had provided the Pinochet regime with a revolutionary
project. In truth the essentially political discourse of state, so much a part of
Chilean democratic culture, had been replaced by an analytical matrix that
propounded economic and market solutions for practically all problems in
society. Shortly after returning to Chile in the early 1980s, I came to share the
sense of confusion of a society - or at least of a social majority - which had
felt its national identity to be linked to political democracy and to
development defined as a form of social integration. The Chilean political
elite felt itself stifled by an ideology that, shielded by the enforced silence of
military repression, declared political activity irrelevant, heralded an individu-
alism regulated only by free market forces and did not shrink from imposing,
in the name of science, a penance for the historic errors of statism. It did so
even though the poorest and least sheltered sectors of Chilean society might
bear the brunt of the economic costs.
Isaiah Berlin has noted that not all forms of liberalism are pluralist. The
type of neo-liberalism that emerged in Chile under military rule was
intolerant, accepting neither the reconciliation of interests nor of values. This
was an obsessive concept, dogmatically pursued. I am openly critical both of
its social manifestations and of its imposition by an authoritarian state. Let
me again seek sustenance in Berlin, who declared that the history of
ideological stances can be correctly interpreted only by those who are
themselves able to think in ideological terms and who are conscious of doing
so. Now that democracy and tolerance have been restored in Chile, it is
possible to sharpen the desire for reconciliation by looking back at the
absolutist ideas which rose to the fore on both left and right during the
1960s and 1970s. In the new democratic framework economics cannot, as a
science, be impervious to the ethical imperatives of a pluralist society.
Economic practice must be guided by the force of argument, because the
final determinant of its success lies in the political ability of society to
reconcile creative and productive efforts.
xn Preface and acknowledgments

This book originates in a doctoral thesis submitted to the Department of

Political Science at Princeton University. I would therefore like to thank the
department's professors, particularly Paul E. Sigmund for his constant
encouragement to continue work on the manuscript during the quite extensive
periods that I devoted to non-academic tasks motivated by the obligation to
contribute to the restoration of democracy in my country.
Similarly, I wish to acknowledge all the remarks, criticisms, and comments
that have enriched my work. Much of the actual research took place while the
author belonged to the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies
(Instituto Latinoamericano de £studios Transnacionales, !LET), based in
Santiago, Chile. My friends Juan Somavia, Guillermo Campero, Hector
Vera, Alejandro Foxley Tapia, and Paulo Hidalgo contributed v.ith their
ideas or, more directly, with the results of their own research. Subsequently,
in J985, I was fortunate enough to receive an invitation from the Kellogg
Institute of International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, which
enabled me to continue the research and editing process in the excellent
surroundings of its campus. The Ford Foundation in New York, the
Rockefeller Foundation in Pocantico Hills, the AID Library in Washington
DC, and the School of Economics at the Universidad Cat6lica in Santiago,
Chile, allowed me generous access to their archives, for which I am extremely
grateful.
Many others deserve thanks for their cooperation and interest. Among
them, my special appreciation to Ronald G. Hellman for unselfishly putting at
my disposal his own research work on Chilean schools of economics. Similarly,
I thank Paul E. Sigmund, Johan Galtung, Patricio Meller, Ricardo Ffrench-
Davis, Alejandro Foxley, Anibal Pinto, and Ignacio Walker, all of whom read
and commented upon parts of the book or discussed with me the issues
broached therein. Looking back on this extensive and interrupted research,
perhaps the most enjoyable moments were my two long afternoons of
conversation with Dr. Albert Hirschman. Like so many other Latin American-
ists, I am indebted to him for his wisdom and ideas on economics and politics.
While it is impossible to mention here all those who assisted with my work by
granting personal interviews in Chile and the United States, I am grateful to
all of them.
This edition, published by Cambridge University Press, would not have
been possible without the interest and support of Professor Craufurd
Goodwin, general editor of this economics studies series. I offer him my
sincere thanks. Equally, I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Francis
X. Sutton, the former director of the Bellagio Study and Conference Center
of the Rockefeller Foundation, for indulging my desire for seclusion in this
wonderful place. I thank the Bellagio Center and its current director, Pasquale
Pesce, for the period of some weeks during which I was able to revise and
 Preface and acknowledgments Xlll

rewrite important sections of the original text for the present edition. I cannot
fail to mention, lastly, the enthusiasm and dedication of my secretary at the
Embassy of Chile in Madrid, Magdalena Figueroa, who has managed to
combine her work and our diplomatic agenda with the pendulum-like
suspension and resumption of work on this book.
 INTRODUCTION

Chile: the outstanding exa:mple

Over the past twenty years, Chile has frequently been cited as a political and
economic example for developing nations. Following the return to democracy,
there has been unanimous approval of, and great regard for, the continued
economic growth in Chile. The country has been held up as a model of
balance, democratic prudence, and efficient economic management. There
was a time, however, when the Chilean "example" attracted sharply divided
opinions. Both the "revolution in freedom" of Christian Democrat president,
Eduardo Frei (1964-70), and the "legal route to socialism" undertaken by
President Salvador Allende (from 1970 to 1973) attracted a great deal of
attention, albeit from distinct sets of people, at different times and in separate
areas of the world. Both were championed as "models" to be imitated, or to
be avoided. After the military takeover, and the abuse of human rights on a
massive scale that it engendered, Chile retained the curiosity of diverse
political and intellectual circles. The tragic example of a shattered democracy
provided the spark for heated discussions and controversies in various
countries. Chile's sudden shifts in orientation yielded a relentless supply of
fascinating political and economic phenomena and fueled the wider debate on
development, democracy, and social change. Luckily for Chileans, the
recuperation of democracy rid the nation of its condition as a permanent
laboratory. Henceforth, Chile's controversial recent history became more the
stuff of historians and specialists. Even today, however, some continue to stress
the exemplary nature of one particular experiment conducted in Chile's
polemic past, which they see as an ideal model for other developing countries
or nations in the process of modernizing their economies: the neo-liberal
revolution implemented after General Pinochet seized power.
It will be recalled that, in September 1973, a military junta overthrew the
socialist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, thereby provoking a worldwide
wave of outrage at the destruction of Chile's longstanding democracy.
General Pinochet and his brutal methods of government inspired near
universal rejection. Nevertheless, and almost from the beginning, the
economic transformation carried out in Chile acquired enormous prestige
2 Pinochet's economists

among international financial institutions, as well as in certain conservative

academic circles whose economic (and social) views were, at the time,
indistinctly termed "neo-conservative," "neo-liberal," or "neo-classical."
From the mid-1970s onwards, the country enjoyed privileged treatment by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the commercial banks. Chile was
doubtless the country most visited and commented upon by journalists from
the international conservative press, as well as by a distinguished list of
academics headed by the most prominent members of the Chicago School of
Economics, including Milton Friedman himself. The reason for this interest is
easy to comprehend: Chile had become the first and most famous example of
applying the rules of economic orthodoxy to a developing country. Foreign
trade was liberalized, prices were freed, state companies were privatized, the
financial sector was deregulated, and state functions were drastically reduced.
Outside interest in Chile was sharpened by another element, which
attracted both attention and a degree of professional solidarity. The group of
economists appointed by General Pinochet to the main economic posts in his
government had been known for some time in academic and business circles
as the "Chicago Boys," since most of them had pursued postgraduate studies
at that particular US university. Their status as former Chicago alumni
apparently explains not just the audacity of their economic revolution, but
also their limitless faith in economic science as the legitimizing basis for their
draconian decisions, and in the market's ability to resolve the bulk of the
problems faced by society. It was equally manifest in their complete and utter
rejection of an active state role in the development process. The Chilean case
thus became a model, a unique phenomenon that did not stem from any
historical experience. Rather, it originated directly from what the Chicago
Boys termed "economic science": a science to be found mostly in their
textbooks.
These reforms and, to a certain extent, the drastic and radical fashion in
which they were applied, continue to be regarded by some observers as the
tough, but nonetheless admirable, groundwork underlying current Chilean
success. The economic rigor to which Chile was subjected after Allende's
failed experiment is thought to have laid the foundations for the free and
balanced economy that, some twenty years later, distinguishes Chile's fledgling
democracy. For several years, the IMF and other bodies closely linked to the
financial heart of the industrialized world recommended the Chilean example
as a model for the rest of Latin America. From the viewpoint of these
organizations, for good or ill, Chile had stolen a march on a now universal
current of economic liberalization, the privatization of public holdings and
reduction of the state's social role as well as the rise in, and plight of, financial
capitalism - a current that forced a change in course not just in the most
developed nations, such as the United States and Great Britain, but also in
 Introduction
3

the developing regions. In Latin America, Chile anticipated by over ten years
the stabilization, adjustment, and liberalization processes that are now a
generalized feature of the continent. 1 More remarkable still is that these ultra-
liberal economic reforms came before analogous change in the United States
and the United Kingdom. With a sense of anticipation that may perplex those
who regard the developing world as mechanically dependent on events taking
place in the central nations, Chilean economists appeared to foresee the final
shift in the Keynesian era, as well as the rise to prominence of monetarist
policies aimed at correcting the monetary imbalance fostered by "statism"
during the preceding period. Their policies anticipated a fashion - financial
abundance, assaults on the state, the denigration of government intervention,
the celebration of rapid enrichment, the "yuppie" boom, and wmplete
disregard for social policies - a fad that some neo-liberal intellectuals and
especially economists felt would distinguish western "modernity" in the
closing years of the century. It should therefore come as no surprise that the
Chilean example has been cited as a prototype for the "shock therapies" that
are to be used to combat productive chaos in the midst of uncontrolled
inflation, such as in Russia or in parts of Eastern Europe. History is indeed
capable of the strangest twists. These references to Chile seem to bow to the
inevitability that, in such cases, the economic ills are so serious as to demand
drastic remedies, even if they require draconian political strategies. As in
Chile twenty years ago, some observers may be confusing the inevitable cost
of economic normalization with the deliberate pursuit of ideological purifica-
tion. 2
It is precisely such controversial elements, however, that have sustained
outside interest in the Chilean case during all these years. This, in fact, allows
us to address a series of issues covering a vast area of concerns common to
econotnists, political scientists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
The economics profession has extracted copious quantities of data from Chile
during its research into inflation, adjustment policies, and economic opening
in developing nations. Nonetheless, discussion of the relationship between
political authoritarianism and the structural economic change championed by
neo-Liberals has been equally popular, and may even have eclipsed the strictly
economic analysis of Chile. The Chilean case has frequently been cited by
sceptics, who doubt that it is truly possible to combine democracy with neo-
liberal economic adjustment. Structural reforms prescribed for Latin America
by the cluster of public and private institutions that regulate international
finance, which one author terms the "Washington consensus for developing
countries," would seem to render impossible the preservation of personal
freedoms. 3 Clearly, this whole question has been a principal argument of
those opposed to the application of orthodox economic measures in the
developing world. Indeed, this rationale is not restricted to these nations: the
4 Pinochet's economists

current, grave economic and social situation in Europe and North America
has revived criticism of the impact of neo-liberalism on the domestic political
and social order.
Something similar has befallen the issue of transforming the stare through
privatizations and the curtailment of its regulatory and distributive functions.
As in all else, Chile in the 1970s seemed to be the most radical case: the state
literally dismantled itself. Privatizations and the reduction of the state did not
arise, as with later instances in Latin America, from IMF pressure. Nor did
this process produce tension between the political sectors and economic
specialists within the state. Rather, it seived to illustrate the understanding
between economists and the military to act together to change the type of
state historically present in Chile. State emasculation in the economic and
social arenas was conducted by its own institutions, backed by those who ran
them.
From this stems, in turn, a further crucial point in the general debate: one
stressing the negative impact of cuts in the state on the living conditions of
the poorest in society. Chile also constitutes a very interesting case study in
trying to assess the likely social costs of orthodox economic reforms in a
developing context. Although large sectors were always marginalized from
economic development and modernization, by the early 1970s Chilean
society had become one of the most egalitarian in Latin America. The
introduction of the neo-liberal model caused a significant fall in real wages, a
dramatic rise in unemployment, and a decade-long deterioration in social
services, particularly health and education. The huge gap driven between
rich and poor during this period is today the most onerous legacy for
democracy in Chile. That said, however, for many it remains an open
question whether the current positive situation of the Chilean economy is
really due to the radical reforms carried out in the early years of the
Pinochet regime. The question could be posed roughly as follows: do the
economic growth and the "liberal consensus" that characterize Chilean
society today stem from the Chicago Boys' audacious and brutal imposil'ion
of market policies in the mid-1970s? Or, would it be more accurate to
ascribe them to the more regulated and complex evolution of economic
policy in the closing years of the dictatorship and during the first three years
of democratic government? Some argue that the progressive economic
stability and growth enjoyed by Chile could not have taken place without
the initial reforms. They believe that these measures should be judged on
their own merits and on their long term effects. For them, the Chicago Boys
episode remains a positive and praiseworthy "example." Others, however,
stress the catastrophic consequences of these policies and the dogmatic
fashion in which the reforms were applied, despite the fact that they could
have been accomplished in very different ways, with less costly results for the
 Introduction
5
majority of the population. From this viewpoint, the Chicago Boys' measures
are exactly the type of economic policy that must be avoided.
Obviously, then, there are no easy answers to the issues raised by the
Chilean case. Such issues require a comparative approach and, more often
than not, lead reflection down new paths and raise further questions. This is
particularly true given that the issues of neo-liberalism and a market-regulated
society are today matters of universal concern. Interest in the Chilean case no
longer derives from its peculiarity, but because it contained elements of neo-
liberal logic at its most extreme and paradigmatic. Many of the matters
originally present in the Chilean process have reappeared in each of the
subsequent neo-liberal experiences. For this reason, discussion of the Chilean
case actually alludes in great measure to universal problems and ideological
currents. These factors reflect a fresh mode of understanding society and
economic development that rose to prominence in the 1980s and that is now
present - in mild form - in many of the reasoning and decision-making
processes in both developed and industrialized nations. It is not possible to
refer here to each and every one of these factors, yet it is necessary for them to
"filter through" as the central concern of this book unfolds. Let us now
introduce the subject for the first time.
The most prominent aspect of the phenomenon that concerns us here was
the neo-liberal ideological wave that inundated the United States, following
the election of Ronald Reagan, and Great Britain, under the Thatcher
government. It began in Chile in 1974 not simply as a set of economic
measures, but rather as a broad, revolutionary ideology. In Chile, neo-liberal
economic thought became an all-pervading framework of ideas. In a context
of violent change in the political power structures, it was used by the new
military rulers as the requisite substance for a radical transformation of the
state. Those that proclaimed these ideas argued, persuasively, that the
establishment of a free market necessitated an authoritarian regime. A "free
society," regulated by the market, had to be forcefully imposed. The reasons
were very simple: Chilean society had been molded over the previous half
century by a powerful and interventionist state. Indeed this had been
characteristic of Chile since its origins as an independent nation. Moreover,
for fifty years, influential organizations - including political parties on the left
and center as well as the Catholic church - promoted a political process and
social climate marked by a pronounced egalitarian bent towards "social
justice," the fight against social marginalization and support for national
integration. The political democracy that formed part of Chile's very identity
this century, moreover, seemed to have been built largely on the capacity of
the state to distribute and to mediate between antagonistic social groups. It
should not seem strange, then, that those who advocated a society regulated
fundamentally, if not exclusively, by the market should decide that the only
6 Pinochet's economists

way to achieve this was by force, and in the briefest time period possible. This
fateful decision, and the lucid blueprint adopted to carry it out, lead us to
focus our analysis on the "revolutionary" elite - the group of economists -
behind this experience.
They introduced into Chilean society ideas that were completely new,
concepts entirely absent from the "ideas market" prior to the military coup.
This elite posited, first and foremost, the concept of economic science -
equivalent to the exact sciences - as the motor behind the organization of
society. The Chicago Boys immediately converted a set of economic objectives
into the sole determinant of all that was socially desirable. Economic analysis
was subsequently extended to other areas of social activity, including a
proposed ideal "modern individual": competitive and acquisitive, he was
supposed to spawn a culture in tune with his own reproduction and the
creation of a "nation of owners." The Chicago Boys introduced the concept
of a minimal state, concerned solely with public order: in other words, a state
limited to repressive duties and dealing with extreme poverty. Above all, they
introduced into the "public debate" (which during the years of dictatorship
became a mere monologue) a self-sustaining economic discourse, whose
variables formed part of a theoretical framework that excluded ethical,
cultural, political, or social considerations. Indeed, it did not even acknowl-
edge the presence of such considerations. On the contrary, those who dared
to criticize this logic once it was made public found themselves dismissed as
persons ignorant of economic science and who, therefore, were incapable of
understanding what was suitable for Chilean society.
Where did these ideas come from? To find out, we need to look at the
economic training of the Chicago Boys, to explore the creation of this elite,
the origin of their attitudes, and the way they defined their role as economists.
This book deals with the story of an economic elite that attempted to utilize a
military coup, and the extended period of political repression that accom-
panied the takeover, to carry out a neo-liberal revolution. In the remainder of
this introduction, we will attempt to gain a better understanding of the truly
revolutionary impact that these ideas had on Chilean society, and of the
technical and political guidance exercised by this elite. It is useful, in so doing,
to compare, albeit summarily, the revolutionary events of the Unidad Popular
period under Salvador Allende with what followed, which we have termed the
"neo-liberal revolution."

The two revolutions

In the course of a few brief and violent years, Chilean society was subjected to
two completely contradictory projects. From 1970 to 1973, the Allende
government implemented its "anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchical and anti-
 Introduction 7

monopolistic" program, deciding to nationalize the financial and productive

sectors of Chile, to expropriate large chunks of rural property, and to replace
the market with far-reaching price controls. From 1974 to 1978, the military
regime of General Pinochet developed a radical economic liberalization
program based on the indiscriminate use of market mechanisms the
dismantling and reduction of the state, deregulation of the financial s~ctor,
and a discourse that ascribed to market forces the ability to solve practically
any problem in society. One extreme of radical ideology was immediately
followed by its very opposite. Chilean society was twice called upon to begin
its history from scratch. A brief comparison between these projects, as well as
the attitudes of those that directed them, might prove useful as a more precise
introduction to the objectives ofthis study. Let us now highlight the similarities
and contrasts between the changes carried out and the elite that imposed
them.
The first important affinity is that both projects intended to bring about
radical reform. Socialists and neo-Liberals alike claimed that their principal
aim was structural change, although in one case this referred to redistribution
and economic reactivation and, in the other, to the battle against inflation. In
the language of the Allende period, both wished to bring about "irreversible
reform." Hence, if we include a reference to the anti-inflation goal in the
quote below, then the conclusion reached by Larrain and Meller on the
intentions of the Uni.dad Popular appears equally valid for the neo-liberal
experiment: "there is no doubt," they say, "that the fundamental goal [of the
Uni.dad Popular] was radical change and not simply better income distribution
and higher economic growth." 4 For this very reason, both the Socialists and
the neo-Liberals were prepared to carry through their reforms at any price
and as rapidly as possible. One year after taking office, the Unidad Popular
Treasury Minister could proudly announce: "the nationalization of the
banking system is practically complete. The state now controls . . . 90 percent
of all credit." 5 Four years after the military coup, Pinochet's Treasury
Minister was able to solemnly declare that the "new economic order" based
on the trilogy of economic opening, financial liberalization, and state
privatization had been completed. His report on the state of public finances
began: "virtually all fundamental measures in this respect have already been
adopted." 6
Secondly, for this same reason both experiments were comparable with
respect to the magnitude of the change that they contemplated. Their
discourse went far beyond normal measures, or the strictly economic. Rather,
they posited an inclusive ideology that sought to modify the way that Chilean
society was organized and functioned. The goal was nothing less than the
transformation of the state, of customs, and of culture. In this sense, the
"construction of socialism" and the military junta's proposed Declaration of
8 Pinochet's economists

Principles - to bring about a "prolonged and profound operation to change

Chilean mentality" - derive from an identical revolutionary purpose.
Consequently, socialist and neo-liberal intellectuals proclaimed to their most
receptive constituencies - workers for one, a new technocratic and business
class for the other - two behavior "models" to be imitated: the "new man"
popularized by "Che Guevara" and the horrw economi.cus present in the classical
writings on economics. The former represented the ideals of solidarity and
generosity, the fight for justice and equality; the latter stood for the cult of
rationality and individual liberty, the quest for equal opportunities to compete
in a free market. 7
Thirdly, both groups of "revolutionaries" were thus equally critical of
Chile's past. Their diagnoses categorically condemned the type of state
historically present, which historians have labeled the "mediatory state." This
point requires a brief explanation. Since the great depression of 1929, Chilean
development had revolved around expanding the state's role in the economy.
The state carried out functions as the promoter of business activity in the
private sector, as a major propellant of the industrialization process, and as an
important economic agent in its own right. By the early 1960s, state
intervention in, and management of, the economy had become tra,litional
and was accepted to a greater or lesser degree by all economic actors,
including private entrepreneurs. Business organizations participated in
negotiating the complex web of regulations laid down by the administration to
govern economic activity, competing to obtain the choicest share of state
largesse. The state's role arose, however, from factors that were not strictly or
exclusively economic. As with the welfare state developed in Europe under
the influence of Keynesian theory, the "mediatory state" arose from the need
to reformulate the dominant coalitions as a result of the process of
incorporating the organized popular sectors, who acquired an important
degree of influence in the political system through the political parties on the
left. These groups, and those that represented the interests of the middle and
upper segments of society, competed for shares in the power that the state was
able to administer and distribute. Consequently, the state's role in the
economy was a consubstantial element of the historic, if rather fragile,
democratic political system that distinguished Chile from other countries in
the region.
The "mediatory state" model and its economic policies, however, declined
into severe crisis at the end of the 1960s. The international crisis of those years
imposed restrictions beyond the reach of national authorities. Moreover,
Chile's import substitution policies tended to provoke severe distributive
conflicts that, in tum, degenerated into recurrent inflationary crises, balance
of payments difficulties, and intra-sectoral disputes. Towards the end of the
Christian Democrat government of President Frei some economists warned
 Introduction 9

that the cycle of industrial expansion through import substitution was

exhausted, calling for a radical shift towards a strategy based on exports. By
then, however, certain political problems were present. These would end by
upsetting the balance of mutual confidence upon which the mediatory state
had been established.
This was the state that both experiments tried to destroy, for reasons that
were not wholly different. Some (the Unulad Popular) sought to do so because
"the state role had always been to favor the basic interests of monopoly
capitalism." Others (the neo-Liberals) believed that the state was, by
definition, inefficient, favored monopolistic groups and, worst of all, hindered
market freedoms. It was thus a major obstacle to the formation of a "free
society." In the preceding decades, there had been increasingly frequent
attacks on the state, its inefficiency and its penchant for interventionist and
protectionist policies. Such assaults were launched from all ideological sectors,
including the "structuralists" and the "monetarists," the two traditionally
opposing economic groups. Yet, this current of criticism had never before
reached the crescendo of the neo-Liberals and Socialists. For the first time,
these groups considered the radical and definitive cancellation of the state in
all its facets, including the political democracy that was an inseparable part of
it. In effect, those responsible for these policies, both the Socialists and neo-
Liberals, adopted a similar attitude of discredit and disdain towards what had
hitherto constituted the country's democratic history. The democratic
tradition that had distinguished Chile in Latin America was never deemed
worthy of contributing to reform. Quite the contrary, it was rejected as a
distorting element; an allegedly corrupt farce concealing either class domina-
tion or a political caste's use of the state for personal gain. In this manner, the
intellectual authors of change were determined to reduce or simply to destroy
the institutions they took to symbolize either "bourgeois democracy" or
"statist political dabbling," as the case may be.
For a time, however, both sides were determined to exploit these same
institutions. The ideologists of the Unulad Popufur thought that the "bourgeois
state" could be dismantled from within: its institutions would serve to foster
greatly expanded democratic participation, to the point of altering the very
nature of the institutional system and transforming bourgeois dominance into
a true, popular democracy. The neo-Liberals employed the power of the state
to cut it to a minimum. They believed, until the financial crisis of 1982, that
the process was "irreversible"; that the state would never again interfere in
the economy, and would restrict itself to enforcing the rules of the game and
to caring for the most impoverished in society.
There was, however, a significant difference in the conduct of both groups
when in control of state institutions, and this needs to be stressed. The
attempt to construct a socialist economy was carried out in a framework of
lO Pinochet's economists

total respect for public liberties and democratic rights. Although, as stated
above, most of the socialist ideologues cared very little for "bourgeois
democracy," the fact is that the freedom of the press as well as the rights to
assembly and expression (including the right to attack the government with
practically any means at one's disposal) were more than meticulously
preserved. The "end" objective for the Socialists of combining populist and
socialist measures, which Allende referred to as "red wine and pies," was,
despite the chaotic expropriation and nationalization policies, more present
in the voluntarist ideological discourse of some of its architects and
intellectuals than in reality. Socialism committed errors. It faced the
opposition of business elements as well as of conservative political sectors,
enjoying strong support outside Chile. The construction of socialism finally
turned into a pitched battle. A politically exhausted government completely
lost control over the economy and found itself devoured by the chaos that it
had helped to create.
The neo-liberal revolution that followed was carried out quite differently.
It went through two phases, clearly dilferentiated by the crisis and economic
depression of 1982. The first period can be termed, in the words of one
author, the "naive phase" of Chilean neo-liberalism. This was undoubtedly
the most radical. The reforms faced neither criticism nor opposition since
they were carried out in a framework of total deprivation of public liberties
and citizen's rights. A military dictator set the context in which economic
policy could advance regardless of the social costs incurred, or retrace its
steps to correct apparent errors before resuming its path. The neo-liberal
revolution was, in this sense, a true revolution. This elite conducted,
organized, and exercised state power with great resolve: the group of
"Chicago Boys" gradually occupied all the main state economic posts; it
exercised increasing control over the intellectual reproduction process of its
own theories, dispatching disciples to the various institutions of higher
education for economics, thus imposing its particular view of "economic
science" and marginalizing all others. The group built a system of links and
personnel transfers between the public sector and Chile's main centers of
financial and industrial power. It participated in an active press and
television campaign to spread its own message on economic science .µid to
reject views that had influenced the discussion on economic development in
previous decades, including a radical critique of Chilean democratic
traditions and the proposal for a "new, modem, authoritarian and
technified" democracy.
A second phase followed the failure of economic adjustment in 1982, and
the consequent departure of the most famous Chicago Boys from office. This
period was distinguished by the "on the job training" of a second generation
of Chicago-educated economists. They found themselves forced to conduct a
 Introduction II

process of state-led corrections to the economy that would finally yield positive
results. During this second period, running from 1983 to the end of the
military regime in 1989, the Chicago Boys continued to enjoy the advantages
of decision-malcing conferred by twin control over both economic and political
variables. In all, the Chicago Boys remained in government for almost
seventeen years.
There is a further, vital distinction between the socialist and neo-liberal
projects - the ability each showed when it came to stimulating Chilean
economic growth. With the benefit of historical hindsight, the first project
appeared fated to fail. The second, despite its limitations, was brave enough
to incorporate the dominant world economic trends into the Chilean
economy. Briefly put, the Allende government changed "pacted" state
interventionism into a scheme whereby the state excessively appropriated all
economic activity - a project that finally proved politically and economically
unsustainable. The Chicago economists, on the other hand, radically altered
the Chilean economic paradigm, bringing it into line not just with military
self-interest in retaining control but also with the general tendencies of the
world economy. Analysis of this point is a recurrent theme in the book. Suffice
it to say here that the neo-liberal revolution contained certain basic elements
which could have provided Chile with a viable pattern of development. But,
due to the Chicago Boys' own dogmatism, these factors were rejected or
postponed: they were condemned to await both less ideologically oriented
economic policymakers and a stable democratic polity, without which the
model could never acquire true legitimacy. The recent history of Chile
demonstrates, then, that only flexibility and a combination of political and
economic measures, based on consensus through persuasion, can result in a
viable development model.
This is not, however, the main issue to be addressed here. Rather, we are
most concerned with the ensemble of ideas and attitudes that defined the
Chicago Boys as economists, and that appear definitive of their role in
contemporary Chilean history. As we shall see, particularly in the final
chapter of the book, economic development under the Chicago Boys can be judged
in various and quite complex ways. Yet, their behavior as econmnists is surprising
for its simplicity and transparency. By their own definition, this role is
radically distinct from any notion of economics as an "art of persuasion." Far
from accepting the plurality of economic viewpoints, or even the complexity
of decision-making in matters affecting millions of people, the Chicago Boys
conceived the economy in an entirely dogmatic fashion: as a science that
needed to be imposed for the economy's own good and, therefore, for that of
society. This issue renders the study of the Chicago Boys a relevant exercise
and justifies reviewing the intellectual antecedents and behavioral patterns
that contributed to their appearance.
l2 Pinochet's economists

Foreign ideas
General Pinochet's repeated rejection of "alien ideas" during his years in
power, in reference to Marxist thought and, in general, to anything that
smelled remotely of socialism, was rather paradoxical: the only concepts that
had no known antecedent in Chilean political culture were precisely the neo-
liberal viewpoints so enthusiastically embraced by his regime. It is clear that
the ideas of Allende's Unidad Popuwr, for their part, had a long history of
evolution in Chilean society. Their origin may go back to the introduction of
Marxist socialism at the end of the last century and to the organization of
Socialist Workers' parties between the early 1900s and the 1930s. Subse-
quently, the Frenl,e Popular of l 936 - uniting in government the centrist Partido
Radical with Communists and Socialists - prefigured the type of political
alliance headed by Allende in the 1970s. The genealogy and trajectory of
leftist ideas were thus easily recognizable in Chile. They formed part of
national political culture and expressed themselves at all levels of social
organization.
Something similar, albeit on a lesser scale, occurred with the conservative
ideas representative of several of the more enthusiastic smaller groups that
supported the military coup. In particular, the so-called gremialistas (young
conservatives with pronounced corporatist and authoritarian tendencies)
reflected a series of influences running from "Hispanism" and Spanish
Francoism, to the conservative Catholic ideas of De Maistre and Bonald. It
also included some of the Catholic church's traditional social thought,
although it rejected Vatican II just as it rejected democratization in Chilean
society and the socializing tendencies expressed, right from the beginning, by
its major rival, the Partido Demo'crata Cristiano. Gremialista thought, confined to
the Universidad Cat6lica de Chile during the period prior to Allende, was
revitalized by the extremism of the socialist experience. Scant popular support
for gremialista ideas should not, however, be taken to negate the movement's
deep roots in national political culture. In reality, it reflected a conservative
Catholic tradition going right back to the origins of the republic. Other
conservative groups, seeing themselves principally as "nationalists," revered
the role of the armed forces in Chilean history and showed vestiges of past
sympathies for German nazism and Italian fascism. But even their ideas
clearly derived from known itineraries in the ideological debates of recent
decades. The same is true of liberal doctrines. Although divided into several
broad currents, they retained a democratic and occasionally progressive bent,
reflecting in part the influence and traditions of British liberalism. Chile's
appetite for economic liberalism, in ascent at certain moments and in decline
at others, was restricted to economic aspects: it absorbed neither from business
discourse nor from the rightwing political parties any overall view of society
 Introduction 13

that was antagonistic to democratization or to the pivotal role of the state.

Finally, the military demonstrated, in addition to their professional, nation-
alist, and conservative nature, support for the principles of the National
Security Doctrine and the hemisphere-wide defense strategy against com-
munism - concepts that were only too well known even then.
In sharp contrast, the ensemble of neo-liberal ideas that evolved in Chile
after 1975 had no antecedent in the nation's public life. As is well known,
these concepts represented a radical break with the ideas of social change and
distributive justice that had won a huge electoral majority in 1970. But, more
importantly, they also differed from the ideology that had characterized
Chilean capitalist classes and traditional rightwing sectors up until the Allende
period. Indeed, such ideas had never appeared in the economic development
programs presented by political parties, nor in the proposals of the main
conservative economists during the thirty years prior to the Unidad Popular
government. They definitely did not represent military ponderings on the
economy. So where did these ideas come from?
The answer is to be found in the education of around one hundred Chilean
economics students at the University of Chicago from 1957 to 1970. While
not sufficient in itself, this training process was certainly a necessary condition
for subsequent events. It constitutes a striking example of an organized
transfer of ideology from the United States to a country within its direct
sphere of influence. Unlike other processes involving the mere "culturaliza-
tion" of local elites abroad, the education of these Chileans derived from a
specific project designed in the 1950s to influence the development of Chilean
economic thinking. Such thinking was regarded by a number of influential
Americans as responsible for Chile's serious economic problems. This
academic and political exercise clearly had an extraordinary impact on
Chilean society. Its subsequent influence in Latin America, and indeed on the
recent experiences in Eastern Europe, shows its particular relevance as a case
of educational policy.
This book analyzes the organized transfer of economic ideas from the
United States to Chile that culminated in the neo-liberal revolution of the
Chicago Boys. It deals specifically with the origin and evolution of the
agreements between the Universidad Cat6lica de Chile and the University
of Chicago; the cultural background of, and the belief transmitted to, the
economists who trained under that program; and the way in which their
perception of their own professional role evolved from the moment they
finished their education at Chicago until the 1973 military coup. The book
intends to show: (a) that a decisive element in the formation of the
principles which later guided the economic team was the organized transfer
of specific concepts, attitudes, values, and world-view;8 (b) that this transfer
resulted from a deliberate attempt by Chilean and US groups to combat
14 Pinochet's economists

the "nationalistic" and "structuralist" standpoints on the economy in vogue

across Latin America both then and later; and (c) that the transferal or
transmittal of concepts and attitudes was duplicated in the training
provided to younger generations of economists at the Universidad Cat6lica
de Chile.
The historical reconstruction contained in the book is not an attempt to
reveal a conspiracy. There was no such conspiracy. But this does not mean
that the process through which economic concepts and world-view were
transferred was accidental, nor that it lacked explicit goals. Quite the contrary,
the transfer was implemented as part of a calculated bid to implant previously
absent notions in the Chilean "ideological market" - concepts that, if they did
exist, had long been discarded as impractical or politically inapplicable. This
deliberate endeavor aimed, quite explicitly, to influence economic views and,
potentially, to influence government decisions on the course of the economy.
Nevertheless, it was an open and public process: the actors were convinced
that they were engaged in a legitimate undertaking that they considered to be
positive and extremely valuable for Chilean developmenr. Hence, although
the venture was a concerted and intentional act, it lacked an essential element
of conspiracy: secrecy.
At first sight, the inter-university agreements seem to be similar to hundreds
of other scientific and cultural accords between the United States and Chile,
the sole apparent difference being the political impact that the agreement's
implementation would produce fifteen years later. However, as we shall see
further on, the subject (economics), the "issuing" entity (Chicago University),
and the circumstances of the "recipients" (the Universidad Cat6lica de Chile
and Chilean rightwing economic circles) combined to mold the agreement
into a veritable "mission." The process reflected efforts by a group of Chicago
professors to defend true economic science (i.e. neo-classical orthodox theory)
against contamination by Keynesianism or socialism. At that time, local
capitalist groups were undergoing a profound hegemonic crisis. The
transmittal of this "mission" gave Chicago-trained Chilean economists the
strength to undertake the revolutionary assignments that they felt compelled
to undertake.
From this standpoint, the study also analyzes, in more generic terms, the
part played by technocratic, modernizing elites in developing countries. More
specifically, it assesses the role of economists acting as conveyors for a theory
that seeks preeminence over political and moral issues, which they dismiss as
mere "ideological factors." In doing so, the book begs a series of questions
concerning the ability of our political democracies to withstand the inevitable
onslaught of transnational cultural, financial, and political forces. In their
quest for "modernity," these forces harness a range of ideologies, all coated
with the veneer of science, and cherish above all else the advantages
 Introduction 15

supposedly inherent to the "application of science," regardless of the means

and whatever the cost.
The book is divided into an initial chapter, which describes the rise to
prominence of the Chicago Boys in the Pinochet government, and three
longer sections. Section one, covering chapters 2 to 5, deals with ideological
transfer - the process and the actors involved. It begins by offering certain
theoretical considerations on the transfer of ideas. Chapter 3 defines and
evaluates the "Chicago tradition of economics." The following chapter
addresses the actors who conceived and promoted the university agreements,
looking at their interests and motivations: the US government's International
Cooperation Administration (ICA), Chicago University, and the Universidad
Cat61ica de Chile. Chapter 5 gives a detailed account of the background to
the agreements signed by the two universities.
Section two, comprising chapters 6 to 8, deals first with the training of
Chilean students at the University of Chicago. Chapter 7 covers the
implantation of the Chicago School in Chile and, finally, chapter 8 examines
the export of the Chicago tradition to other Latin American countries.
The third and last section, containing chapters 9 to 11, considers what
might be termed the "radicalization" of the Chilean context and the creation
of power opportunities for the Chicago Boys. It commences by describing the
reform process in Chilean universities and the dangers this entailed for the
Chicago Boys based at the Escuela de Economfa of the Universidad Cat6lica
de Chile. Chapter 10 analyzes the radicalization of business and rightwing
sectors in general, in reaction to the increasingly threatening clouds on the
political horizon. Section three ends by looking at the Chicago front-line and
the business world: their role during the Allende administration and in
drawing up an alternative economic program for an eventual military
government. The book's conclusion addresses events following the 1982 crisis:
the Chicago Boys' second phase in power, progress towards a stable economy,
and the return to democracy.
 CHAPTER I

Authoritarians without a project

The junta of generals and admirals that seized power in Chile in 1973 lacked
a definite government project. 1 The national security doctrine to which the
junta constantly referred was but a mere "substitute for a political project or
model." It could not provide the blueprint for an efficient relationship
between the state and "civil society." 2 The Chilean armed forces lacked
experience in government and they acted compelled, not by a predetermined
plan to impose a military administration on the state, but rather in reaction to
something they regarded as a grave threat to national security and to their
own institutional survival - the Allende administration and the ever more
radical political and social situation.
The military's decision to overthrow the constitutional government,
moreover, had initially enjoyed support from a vast, transient coalition,
made up of groups, trade unions, and political organizations representing
very diverse social interests, which professed varying degrees of sympathy
and enthusiasm for the military intervention. The major conservative party,
the National Party (Partido Nadonal, PN), extreme rightwing groups, business
associations, and the newspaper El Mercurio (probably far more influential
than the others mentioned) welcomed the new government enthusiastically
and without reservations. The majority, centre-oriented Christian Demo-
cratic Party (Partido Demo'crata Cristiano, PDC) offered lukewarm support for
the coup. However, a group of noted PDC leaders distanced themselves
from the bulk of their fellow party members, condemning the overthrow of
the constitutional president and regretting his death.. The persecution,
assassination, incarceration, and/ or disappearance of leftwing party leaders
immediately after the coup quickly prompted the concern of the Catholic
church and, subsequently, of the PDC. It soon became apparent, however,
that the military did not feel the need for political advice before making
decisions. Above all, the armed forces wished to demonstrate their
independence from any political grouping. This desire for autonomy, and
the variety of the support they received, made the situation much more
complex: it became difficult for the junta to adopt a unified and coherent
 Authoritarians without a project 17

strategy for the type of regime that should replace the one that had just been
overthrown.
This deficiency was particularly evident in the field of economics. The navy
which initially took charge of the economy, shared the general awareness of
the gravity of the situation. Indices of wholesale prices showed that inflation
exceeded 800 percent; goods were in short supply and industry was paralyzed
as a result of prolonged social conflict. The new authorities however lacked a
technical background in economics. Prior to the milita~ coup, ~oreover,
they had not established political links with any specific Chilean interest group
that might then have led them to select a given group of economists.
Naturally, this does not mean that they did not have an overall ideological
position. Given their middle- and upper-class roots and conservative
traditions, Chilean naval officers instinctively favored liberal economic policies
and loathed the socialist project represented by the Popular Unity (Unidad
Popular, UP) administration.
Thus, one of the first steps taken by the new economic authorities was to
attempt to form an emergency economic team, consisting of those they
considered to be technical experts. Sergio Molina, Minister of Finance in
President Eduardo Frei's PDC administration ( l 964--1970), was among the
first to be approached. Admiral Gotuzzo, the newly appointed Minister of
Finance, offered him the post of Undersecretary for Finance. Molina
declined the offer. 3 Gotuzzo then approached other experts linked to the
PDC, including Carlos Massad, president of the Chilean Central Bank
under Frei. Massad, who had a PhD from Chicago University, was then
with the World Bank. Raul Saez, another minister in the Frei government,
was also approached. Saez possessed great prestige in international financial
circles and subsequently joined the regime as Minister of Finance and the
Economy.
Links to figures connected with the PDC soon abated, ending completely
when the party conditioned its participation - in a political or technical
capacity - on the fulfilment of certain political and human rights criteria. The
final break in relations was hastened by the military regime's decision to opt
for a political strategy more in tune with the aspirations of the most radical
rightwing groups. In fact, immediately following the coup, the debate on
economic policy became closely linked to the dilemma surrounding the new
regime's self-definition: a choice between a "restoration" scheme, which
merely required "repressive pacification," or a "foundational scheme," which
implied the need for a revolution. 4 The first option presupposed that the
armed forces, having restored constitutional rule and public order, would
provide a bridge to the next civilian administration. The "foundational"
approach implied that the military junta would direct a transformation
project. As stated in the military government's Declaration of Principles, this
18 Pinochet's economists

required nothing less than "profound and prolonged actions to change

Chilean mentality. " 5

The arrival of the Chicago Boys

One of these naval "probes" would be decisive in defining the initial debate
mentioned above, and would provide the regime with its "revolutionary"
credentials - the contacts with Heman Cubillos, then president of the advisory
board of El Mercurio, Chile's most influential newspaper. El Mercurio
commanded the respect of the military as one of the main actors in the
campaign against the UP government. Cubillos was trusted by the navy, with
which he was connected through family ties. Cubillos and Roberto Kelly, a
newspaper employee and former naval officer, were fully aware of a plan
secretly devised since 1972 by a group of economists, mostly from the
Universidad Cat6lica de Chile in preparation for possible military interven-
tion. The plan, and the economic team behind it, were warmly recommended
to the naval authorities by the newspaper's executive staff. 6
The program prepared by the team formed part of an overall strategy
aimed at destabilizing and overthrowing the leftist regime. 7 The semi-
dandestine work undertaken during 1972 intended to provide opponents of
Allende particularly in Congress with the information and economic guidance
they needed. But it also entailed a program to be applied if the UP
administration were overthrown. The team received generous funding from
Chilean business organizations themselves financially backed by Latin
American business groups. At least part of the monies channeled to Chile
came from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 8
Rolf Luders, a prominent member of the Chicago group, but who was not
in the country at that time, described this technical "shadow team" as follows:
the work group's existence and success was probably made possible by their common
educational background. In the mid-fifties, Chicago University and the Universidad
Cat6lica de Chile initiated a program for educational exchange. Uncle:- this
agreement, Chicago University sent professors to Chile to do research and accepted
Chilean graduate students. Through this program and in combination with
supplementary scholarships, approximately one hundred students had completed
graduate studies at Chicago University by the early seventies ... Up to 1973, on their
return to Chile, many of these economists became professors at local universities.
Others worked for the government, particularly during Frei's administration. The rest
joined the main firms in Chile. But they all formed a single community - incremented
annually by new generations of economists graduating from Chilean universities -
sharing the same technical language, a rationalistic approach to problem solving and
the eagerness to contribute, through their efforts, to creating a prosperous, fair and
free society. Most of these economists are currently known - whether they like it or not
- as Chicago Boys. 9
 Authoritarians without a project 19

The group's principal figures were: Sergio de Castro, a former dean of the
School of Economics at the Universidad Catolica, whose strong personality
made him the natural leader of the group; Pablo Baraona, ex-director of the
same economics faculty; Sergio Undurraga, also an economist with the
Universidad Catolica; Emilio Sanfuentes Manuel Cruzat and Juan Braun
linked to business groups; Alvaro Bardo~, J. L. Zabala, Andres Sanfuentes:
and Juan Villarzu, economists from the Universidad de Chile who had
studied at Chicago and were linked to the PDC.
Approximately two years later, Sergio de Castro, Pablo Baraona and
Alvaro Bardon, together with Rolf Luders, Miguel Kast (who in 1973 was
studying in Chicago), and Sergio de la Cuadra, would become the main
figures in what El Mercurio labeled the "Chilean economic revolution." Sergio
de Castro was Minister of the Economy from April 1975 to December 1976,
at which time he was appointed Finance Minister - a portfolio he held until
April 1982. Pablo Baraona was Minister of the Economy from December
1976 to December 1978, a position later held by Rolf Luders (August 1982-
February 1983). Alvaro Bardon became Undersecretary for the Economy
under Baraona while Miguel Kast was Minister of Planning from April to
August 1982. Other lesser known Chicagoans occupied various posts at the
Central Bank, the Budget Office and in the government planning divisions.
They included Juan Carlos Mendez, Alvaro Donoso, Ernesto Silva Bafalluy,
Jorge Selume, Alvaro Saieh, etc. The Chicago group's ideological positions
were shared by other prestigious economists previously connected to the
Christian Democrats. Among them, the most notable were:Jorge Cauas, who
headed, as Finance Minister, the group just mentioned, and under whose
authority "shock" treatment was applied to the economy; and Jose Pinera,
who as Labor Minister carried out the labor plan and several other social
reforms, collectively known as the modernizations. However, the latter were
not Chicago alumni. Cauas took graduate courses at Columbia University
and Pinera at Harvard.

Acquiring power
From the beginning, the Chicago team had to struggle for control in a
"coalition" of economists that did not necessarily agree with their views on the
content and timing of the measures to be taken. More importantly, the
remainder of the coalition did not share their radical, neo-liberal views, which
advocated structural change to drastically alter Chile's existing pattern of
development. In fact, right from the start, it was clear that the Chicago Boys
"preferred a liberal economic organization." In this early phase, however,
"economic policy focused mainly on correcting the imbalances created during
the previous period." 10 Thus, military personnel in charge of the economy
20 Pinochet's economists

saw their main task as balancing the budget and curbing inflation. They
supported the measures suggested by the tei:nicos (as they were called by the
High Command). Later on, the first predominantly civilian economic team
reiterated that its intention was to "gradually curtail inflation" through
moderate cuts in fiscal spending, fearing that "drastic solutions would produce
catastrophic results." 11 InJuly 1974, almost a year after the coup, the newly
appointed and prestigious Finance Minister, Jorge Cauas, reaffirmed that the
goal was to create "a modern, mixed economy'' and to reestablish order,
given the severe disequilibria inherited from the previous regime. Official
declarations stipulated that market laws should determine the allocation of
productive resources, although accompanied by "adequate general guidance
provided by government in order to increment its social scope." 12 Therefore,
initial measures "did not aim, not even implicitly, at producing radical
changes in the economic system that Chile had had up to the 1970s, but only
attempted to 'normalize' its operation and introduce gradual reforms in parts
of the system." 13
In fact, official declarations, added to some spectacular measures against
inflation, obscured the implementation of discreet, but nonetheless radical,
structural reforms by the vast number of Chicago economists appointed to
official posts by Sergio de Castro. From 1975 onwards, as Minister of the
Economy (a post he assumed at the same time as former Christian Democrat
Jorge Cauas became Minister of Finance), de Castro intensified the attempt to
bring about profound structural change in the Chilean economy. He acted
with the liberty furnished by a traditionally subordinate post, under the
protection of a man like Cauas who was more flexible and receptive to
publicity than he was. The prevalence of the Chicago team was simultaneous
to the introduction of "shock" treatment. Carrying on the anti-inflation policy
begun in 1974 with the elimination of price controls (except for wage rises,
which remained tightly restricted), the group of economists derided in 197 5 to
attack the public deficit through "fiscal shock" measures. After a controversial
period in which the Chicago Boys flaunted their academic qualifications and
contacts with well-known US economists, supporters of a "gradual" anti-
inflation strategy were defeated. The Chicago group proceeded to bring
about a drastic cut in public spending through the reduction of state
employment and the elimination of agricultural subsidies. The result was a
12.9 percent drop in GDP. In a single year, these economists had managed to
restore Chile's historical level of fiscal deficit. Control of inflation, however.
was an elusive goal: in the first year of military rule, and in spite of the abov~
measures, inflation declined only slightly, from 376 percent to 340 percent.
The objectives of shock treatment were, however, wider than the mere fight
against inflation. As Arnold Harberger stated in an article published a year
later: "public debate has focused so intensely on the twin problems of inflation
 Authoritarians without a project 21

and unemployment that important structural changes introduced into

economic policy have gone practically unrecognized." 14 Thus, almost
imperceptibly, the most profound transformation of the Chilean economy this
century had begun. At first, Chilean public opinion failed to comprehend the
reasons underlying such change. El Mercurio stated, during the four-year
period, that Chile and its economy were governed "by a small and select team
that seldom explains its reasons and ... does not communicate its decisions in
advance." 15

The economic measures

Table 1, developed by Meller, shows exactly which structural changes were
introduced during the first phase of the Chicago Boys' command over the
Chilean economy. 16 The measures that characterized the economic model
can be classified into three general areas: "liberalization of the price system
and the market; an open regime on foreign trade and external financing
operations; and reduced government involvement in the economy." 17 These
measures corresponded to a theoretical model that "might be defined as a
capitalist model of private firms, operating under laissez faire and completely
integrated into the world economy; i.e. a private economic system of free
markets, trade and capital movements, along with neutral rules and automatic
mechanisms that supposedly resolved any economic problem." 18 Let us first
briefly examine the measures adopted.
From 1973 to 1980, virtually all government controls on retail prices were
eliminated. As of 197 4, the internal capital market was liberalized and private
financing companies other than banks were authorized to operate. This was
followed by the return to the private sector of banks nationalized by the
previous administration. In 1975, once the neo-liberal economic team gained
control of economic policy, the State Corporation for the Promotion of
Production (Corporacio'n de Fomento de l,a Produccw'n, CORFO) transferred
86 percent of its bank stock to private citizens. 19
The labor market, however, was kept "under strict restrictions and control"
during the regime's first six years in power. This control was justified as
necessary to avoid cost-push pressures. 20 It was only in 1979, and due mainly
to international pressure coordinated by the AFL-CIO (the American
Federation of Labor) and the US Department, that a "labor plan" was
devised. Although it authorized collective bargaining between workers and
management in each firm so that workers could improve their salaries, it also
imposed a restrictive framework carefully defined by the government.
The process of "opening the market" to foreign operations was equally
swift. Almost from the start, the regime tended to ease restrictions on the
import of foodstuffs. Average import duties were successively reduced, first
22 Pinochet's economists

Table I: Structural change under the Chicago Bqys (first phase)

Situation in 1972-73 Post-1973

I. Prices Generalized price control Freed prices (excluding wages and

the exchange rates)
2. Privatization The state controls over 500 firms In 1980, twenty-five companies
and banks (including a bank) belong to the
public sector
3. Trade regime Multiple exchange rates; import Unified exchange rate; uniform
quotas and bans; high tariffs tariff of 10 percent; no other
(average of 94 percent, maximum barriers to trade
of 220 percent); prior deposits on
imports (10,000 percent)
4. Fiscal regime Taxes on buying and selling; Value added tax (20 percent); cuts
swollen public employment; high in public employment; focal surplus
focal deficit (1979-81)
5. Domestic capital Controls on interest rates; Market-set interest rates;
market nationalization of the banking privatization of the banb;
sector; credit controls liberalization of the capital market
6. Capital account Absolute control on capital Gradual liberalization of capital
movements; the government is movements; the private sector is the
the main external debtor main external debtor
7. Labor regime Powerful unions with strong Atomized unions with no
bargaining power; law of bargaining power; simple dismissal
permanence; obligatory salary procedure; drastic fall in real
increases; high proportion of non- salaries; low proportion of non-
salary labor costs (40 percent salary labor costs (3 percent
equivalent of salaries) equivalent of salaries)

Source: Meller, Patricio, "Revision de! proceso de ajuste chileno de la decada de! 80,"
0,/eccio'n d, Estudios C/EPIAN 30, December 1990, Santiago de Chile, p. 7.

from 92 percent to 52 percent and then seeing even more drastic reductions
after 1975. From 1975 to 1977, they fell from 52 percent to 22 percent, finally
levelling off at 10 percent in 1977. 21 Together with reductions in customs
duties and tariffs, all import restrictions were eliminated in late 1976,
following negotiations undertaken by the Finance Minister (although this task
formally corresponded to the Foreign Ministry). Chile withdrew from the
Andean Pact. The Pact had hitherto formed part of the foundations for
Chile's future industrial development. The schedule of customs duties for
member states and the restrictions imposed by the Cartagena Agreement on
foreign investments in the subregional integration area were incompatible
with the modernization of the economy. 22 Chile's new foreign investment
regime, approved as soon as it had left the Pact, gave "national treatment" to
foreign capital operating in any economic sector. 23
Mechanisms regulating foreign capital movements were also modified.
 Authoritarians without a project 23
Foreign investors were authorized to bring capital into Chile without
restrictions and, should they decide to withdraw, were given guaranteed
access to foreign exchange. Further, banks were authorized to borrow directly
from abroad and regulations on offering loans in local currency based on such
foreign borrowing were gradually relaxed. 24
Nevertheless, the overall goal of this policy was to reduce and reorient
government involvement in the economy. There were three main objectives:
"to reduce the magnitude of the public sector; to minimize the government's
regulatory influence on the economy; and to eliminate the role played by the
government in direct production and as a body charged with promoting
development." 25 Government spending was reduced from 40 percent to
26 percent of GDP from 1973 to 1979. These reductions, aimed at cutting
the fiscal deficit and inflation, were continued even when the deficit had been
eliminated. Government employment fell by almost 20 percent in less than
four years, the total number of civil servants declining from 360,000 (1974) to
290,000 (1978).
At the same time, government mechanisms for regulating the economy
were discarded. As already mentioned, price controls (excluding those on
wages) were eliminated, together with all other administrative measures which
regulated certain economic activities. It became mandatory for public firms
and other state organizations (such as universities and TV channels) to be self-
supporting.
However, the most radical change was the elimination of the government's
role as a producer. In this respect the radical thrust of the Chicago team was
most intense: in 1975 alone, CORFO transferred to private hands the stocks
and rights of more than 110 firms and 86 percent of its bank holdings. 26

It is estimated that, from a total of more than 400 government-owned companies,

which were up for bids or had been returned to their prior owners up to 1978, the sale
of only forty-five firms (including four banks) represented a patrimonial transfer in
excess of $730 million in 1978. This amount is equivalent to two-thirds of gross
geographical investment for that year. Land reform was also reversed. In the first
quarter of 1979, around 30 percent of expropriated land had been returned to its
previous owners. Although an additional 35 percent was distributed to 35,000
individual peasants, it is estimated that by the end of the decade almost half ofthis land
had to be sold or rented out because the peasants lacked government support enabling
them to became small farmers.

In the financial services and banking sectors, of nineteen banks in which the
government was the major stockholder in 1973, only four were still held by
CORFO in 1977 and by early 1981, only two remame · d .27
Denationalization affected all productive activities, including mineral
deposits, urban property owned by public utilities, and even companies that
24 Pinochet's economists

had been set up at goverrunent initiative some thirty or more years previously,
for example, the Pacific Steel Company (Compani'a de Acero def Pacifico, CAP).
These activities were turned over to the private sector, which would become
the main and eventually (this was the end objective) sole producer. Import
substitution industrialization was condemned as "exhausted" and" artificial."
The Chilean economy would henceforth concentrate on activities which
offered "comparative advantages" in the world market. Therefore, industrial-
ization was rejected in favor of activities such as mining, agriculture, forestry,
and fishing. 28 Government officials declared that, "within the scope of
economic activities which exist in Chile, none are forbidden to private
enterprise; conversely the goverrunent is precluded from participation in
almost all productive activities." 29
CORFO gradually reduced its involvement in promoting economic
activity, to the detriment of small and medium scale mining, agriculture, and
industrial companies. Thus, the goverrunent was now confined to dealing with
"extreme poverty," the sole sector that the Chicago "model" considered to be
a government responsibility. In this respect, a budget line was set aside for
specific mother-infant programs, covering nutrition and maternal education,
as well as an increase in the number of homes with running water and proper
drainage systems. These programs, far from diminishing the enormous social
cost of the whole experience, provided a group of young people linked to
rightwing groups (including members of the "second generation" of Chicago
Boys) with a degree of political notoriety. 30
In de Castro's January 1978 report on the "state of public finances" -
termed the "new economic order" - he introduced the second section
stating that "virtually all fundamental measures in this respect have already
been adopted." This categorical phrase was charged with connotations, the
consequences of which few Chileans understood at the time. Together with
the measures indicated above, the economic team had decided to retain the
nominal fixed exchange rate ($39/US$) in force from July 1979 until June
1982. This was not a measure without importance, as Meller points out:
"this fixed nominal exchange rate was not regarded as an instrument, but
rather as an economic goal; it was the nominal anchor of the entire
economic system and the symbol of the success, confidence in, and continuity
of the model." The principle of a fixed dollar parity, adopted by the
Chicago Boys as part of their support for the so-called "monetary approach
to the balance of payments," was totally backed by the entire military
goverrunent, to the point that General Pinochet categorically stated that "to
devaluate would be suicide." 31 The fixed exchange rate was the principal
factor behind the catastrophic conclusion to the Chicago Boys' "naive
phase" in economic power: in 1982 the "model" was confronted by the
foreign debt shock. Before that, and without yet trying to evaluate the
 Authoritarians without a project 25
model, let us briefly consider the overall economic and social impact of the
reforms.

The economic and social impact

As already indicated, the main stated aim behind the transformation of the
Chilean economy was to defeat inflation. The measures adopted in this regard
yielded paltry results. In 1980, seven years after the reforms began, inflation
still stood at 35.1 percent. Only in 1981 did the rise in prices fall below
10 percent. To achieve the anti-inflation goal, the Chicago Boys first
eliminated price controls, then reduced the fiscal deficit, and later introduced
a trade opening, arguing that once the Chilean economy functioned at
international prices, inflation would cease. Finally, in 1979, financial liberal-
ization began. It induced a massive influx of foreign credit, pennitting the
exchange rate to be fixed at $39 to the US dollar. Through this mechanism,
the Chicago economists managed to repress - or, rather, to disguise -
inflationary pressures and to reduce the level of price increases to international
levels (9.5 percent). The debacle of 1982, which would force a devaluation,
led to a fresh outbreak of inflation.
A number of Chilean economists have noted with surprise that an
economic team as extraordinarily well prepared as the Chicago Boys should
have taken eight years to reduce inflation to acceptable levels. Pinto 32 has
underlined the unprecedented advantages enjoyed by the regime's economic
team: strict control over salaries; a tight grip on fiscal and monetary policy;
complete freedom to manipulate the exchange rate; being able to safely
ignore rising unemployment; the complete suppression of union and political
pressures; and, a total monopoly on political power, as well as absolute
control over the compilation of official statistics on the economy. However, it
failed to achieve something that, even for a less powerful economic team,
should not have been so difficult. As Meller has indicated, "the Chicago Boys'
team had the power not solely to act on the most important variables, but also
influence directly or indirectly other variables in the ceteris paribus. " 33 The most
obvious question is, then, why did it take so long to control inflation? Foxley34
and Tironi 35 have argued that the explanation resides in the fact that the
Chicago group actually sought to stress not the fight against inflation, but
rather to carry out structural reforms that, in tune with a preconceived
theoretical framework, were considered essential under any circumstances. In
this way, the neo-Iiberal and monetarist economists became the new
"structuralists": any economic measure required a transformation in the
organizational basis of the Chilean economy. The fight against inflation thus
became simply a very useful pretext for a project with goals well beyond the
economic growth required of a new economy, which, in turn, necessitated a
26 Pinochet's economists

new form of social organization - one that put individual economic freedom
at the heart of social activity.
Economic growth during this phase of the military regime was subject to
great ups and downs. The huge inflows of foreign capital at the end of the
1970s permitted high growth rates, reaching 8 percent in 1977 and 1979. Yet,
there were also great falls, such as 17 percent in 1975. Hence, average GDP
growth for the 1974-81 period was barely 2.6 percent. As stressed by Ffrench-
Davis, the reason for scant economic growth must be sought in the low level
of investment - under 15 percent - during these years. 36
However, the effects of the decisions made by the Chicago Boys had their
most immediate impact, and long term consequences, in the treatment of the
state and its reduction. We have referred to the cuts in state spending. The
magnitude of these decisions can be appreciated if one considers that the 197 5
fiscal shock redressed in only a year the fiscal deficit inherited from the
Allende government, cutting it from 10.5 percent of the GDP in 1974 to 2.6
percent in 197 5. In 1980, public spending on health had decreased by I 7.6
percent compared to 1970, and education by 11.3 percent. Salary levels in
1980 were 16. 7 percent below those of a decade previously. Family benefits
collapsed by over 30 percent from 1973 to 1983, well above the 6 percent
average for the 1960s. Clearly, then, the Chicago model had a regressive
impact and significantly widened the existing gap between rich and poor in
Chile.
Similarly, the privatization process carried out in the first phase demon-
strated the economic team's indifference to a greater concentration of
ownership. From 1974 to 1978, state shares in 197 companies were sold. The
conditions of sale were extremely favorable, since only a minimal part of the
purchase price had to be paid in cash (10-20 percent). The remainder could
be provided through long term credits at real interest rates of 8-12 percent.
Buyers were even allowed to use shares in the firms they purchased as
collateral. 37 Obviously, public enterprises were in a dreadful state following
the Allende period and urgently needed substantive reform. Nevertheless, the
sell-offs took place amidst recession in the private sector - with a distinct lack
of government interest - and thus led to serious losses for the Chilean state.
Foxley estimated the implicit subsidy at around 30 percent of the firms' book
value. 38 According to Muiioz, most serious of all was the fact that these sales
"facilitated the creation of extremely concentrated financial groups, through
indebtedness, without sufficient guarantees and sheltered by the financial
liberalization then being implemented." None of this seemed to be discerned
at the time. The "economic groups" established close ties with the
government through the transfer of personnel in either direction, particularly
young economists, followers of de Castro and Baraona, who were mostly
former Chicago students. 39
 Authoritarians without a project 27
Again, the underlying intention was not to generate business for the state,
nor to provide a set of rules for the behavior of the new, private groups. In
Meller's analysis, there were to be only three basic rules governing the private
sector. First, a "Darwinian" law: producers had to be efficient and to
compete. Only efficient firms would remain in the market. Uncompetitive
enterprises would disappear; indeed it was healthy for the economy that they
went to the wall. Second, the profits and the losses of companies would be
"private": under no circumstances would the state come to the rescue of
private firms in financial difficulties. Finally, the private sector could take on
as much debt as it wished, domestically and abroad, since this was the
exclusive responsibility of the borrower. When, and for what purpose, should
the state intervene? "If a private enterprise borrowed abroad, it knew what it
was doing, and had incorporated the cost of the credit into its calculations on
the yield of the investment to be financed by the loan. Thus, external
indebtedness in the private sector was not a matter for preoccupation. Rather,
it was concrete evidence of the great number of viable projects in Chile, which
Chilean businesses were now exploiting." 40
The brief and decisive story of the 1982 Chilean economic crisis was not
simply a tale of the impact of international economic contraction on a
developing nation. It was also the result of an ideological adventure
undertaken by the Chicago team that, draped in supposedly scientific criteria,
stood on nothing more than the simple logic expounded above. The crisis
seemed to be preceded by a process of recovery in the macro-economic order.
From 1976 to 1981, GDP rose by an annual 7.2 percent and there was even
some optimism over inflation. The fixing of the dollar at 39 pesos stabilized
the price of imported inputs and products, arriving in massive quantities and
which, according to the economic authorities, had a positive impact in
obliging domestic firms to compete at these prices. To the government's mind,
the public accounts were kept in order. There was a fiscal surplus and a
positive balance in the non-financial public sector. Besides, until 1981, the
state sector (including state firms) had very restricted access to external
financing. For this reason, the public external debt rose (in current dollars)
only from $5.2 billion to $5.6 billion during 1978-81. In the meantime,
however, private debt rocketed from under $2 billion in 1978 to over
$10 billion by 1981, and some $14 billion in 1982. Measured in GDP terms,
the sums on the current account and in term deposits rose from 9.3 percent in
197 4 to a peak of 25. 7 percent in 1982. This situation was deemed to be the
exclusive responsibility of the private sector. The government made no
judgments and neither was it to intervene.
In 1981 there were clear signs of an approaching international recession.
The Chicago Boys "explicitly made clear that a 'do nothing' policy was the
best choice, since: (!) the international recession would be short; and (2), all
28 Pinochet's economists

the basic problems had been taken care of." 41 Such passivity derived from a
dogmatic, theoretical concept - the monetarist approach to the balance of
payments, which was used to argue that the Chilean economy possessed an
automatic adjustment mechanism - the interest rate. 42 In 1982, Chile
plunged into crisis. The contraction in the world economy hurt Chilean
exports. Copper prices collapsed from 99 US cents per pound in 1980 to
67 cents in 1982. The deterioration in the trade balance was unsustainable. In
consequence, GDP fell 15 percent; industry and construction contracted by
over 20 percent (in 1982). Effective unemployment hit 30 percent (in 1983).
Bankruptcies tripled in 1982 alone. The private financial system suffered
losses of, on average, twice its capital. The Central Bank lost over 45 percent
of its international reserves. Chile had gone into its worst recession since the
1930s. On 16 April 1982, General Pinochet invited de Castro to resign,
marking the end of the Chicago Boys' "naive" phase in power.

Ideological expansion
From 1976 onwards, the ideological basis for the technical measures described
above began to become more explicit. 43 The model seemed to be working,
and this was apparently enough to be able to proclaim an "economic
miracle." The economists in charge of the process spoke plainly of their
theoretical beliefs. They granted interviews, contributed to newspaper
columns and magazine articles, as well as many of El Mercurw's editorials. In
all these writings, they demonstrated a shared, coherent ideology - which was
also evident in their manner of speech and in their actions. Thanks to the
media publicity they received, and the triumphant discourse surrounding
them, from that point on, the economists became the regime's central
protagonists. They also acquired mythical status for a dominant social sector,
which desperately needed an ideology capable of helping them come to terms
with the trauma of the Allende administration. 44 The group's loyalty to
Pinochet was total and their influence on the ruling military team's discourse
notorious. Thus, the shape of an "alliance between the military and the
economists," later trumpeted by El Mercurio, began to emerge. According to
the newspaper, the military were charged with ensuring "order, security and
confidence" while the economists provided "the new ideas needed to lift Chile
from its current dejection and to liberate the energy needed to begin the swift
course towards economic growth." 45
The following section includes a brief outline of various aspects of the
group's ideological discourse, wherever possible in their own words - the
acceptance of, and adherence to, political authoritarianism as a necessary
condition, the use of science to legitimate power thus acquired, and the
attempt to replace politics with technology.
 Authoritarians without a project 29
Firstly, the Chicago Boys undertook a radical and critical examination of
Chilean history over the preceding half century, reducing it to the UP period.
According to the economists, the economic advances made over the past four
to five decades were not worth preserving, not even in part. Their disapproval
focused mainly on the economy: "a detailed analysis of that three-year
administration," said de Castro, "leads us to conclude that economic policies
prevailing at the time were not actually modified, but rather that existing
policies were merely applied more intensely. This led to the full development
of a crisis that had been brewing for half a century." 46 Enlarging on this
criticism, El Mercurio considered that in order to make Chile a modern nation,
it was necessary to move away from a paternalistic, dirigist,e, and slightly feudal
economy towards a market-oriented economy, open to foreign exchange flows
and free from unnecessary government interference. 47 Thus, attacks on the
previous decades were finally and unambiguously extended to the political
field. In 1978, Pablo Baraona reached the conclusion that inefficient and
corruptive growth was ultimately due to a malady masked by the government
and which fed on statism: namely, politics. The most prominent features of
the forty-year period prior to 1973, he said, were "the quest for power for its
own sake and increasingly unrestrained demagogy. " 48 This explained the
eagerness to nationalize and was the ultimate reason for state expansion, since
"whoever struggles to gain power, and is successful, becomes an ardent
supporter of the irresistible urge to nationalize, favors ever greater and wider
powers, promotes the creation of as many public companies as possible
because this creates electoral, political and economic power of, quite simply,
prestige." In this way, politicians, as a class, were necessarily statist and
interventionist, since these tendencies were imbued into their very nature. It
followed that no type of social organization built on a "political" base was of
any value. Thus, in Alvaro Bard6n's words, Chile had only a "pseudo-
democracy", a "perverted" system laced with "undemocratic features"; a
democracy that, "thanks to excessive economic centralization," became a
"mere formula." 49 Further, Chilean democracy was indistinguishable from
dictatorship: "former members of Parliament were exempt from responsibility
and, in fact, political majorities in Congress exercised an absolute, un-
restrained dictatorship, and were not held accountable for their acts."50
Therefore, the fact that Chile was now under an authoritarian regime
should not have come as a surprise. On the contrary, it was a positive and
necessary situation. It allowed the historic vices of statism to be corrected,
without attention to the social cost this implied. The economists and their
media apologists did not hesitate to admit that it was precisely the
authoritarian nature of the regime that allowed the reforms to take place. As
El Mercurio acknowledged, "the current experience would not have been
feasible if exceptional conditions had not existed in politics and in labor." 51 In
30 Pinochet's economists

an earlier editorial the newspaper had stated that the regime "firstly, has the
virtue of being long-lasting; secondly, it can confer on the authorities an
efficiency denied to deliberative democratic systems; and thirdly, it can
enforce a model conceived by experts, without yielding nor attending to - at
least for a period of time - the social reactions produced by its implementa-
tion. "52 For some of the economists, however, authoritarianism was not
simply a circumstantial characteristic that was convenient for a given period
of time. On the contrary, they openly considered it to be an ideal regime,
guaranteeing the market's neutrality: "because an authoritarian government
is a strong government which defends equal standards for all," declared
Bardon. 53 De Castro was even more explicit: "A person's actual freedom can
only be ensured through an authoritarian regime that exercises power by
implementing equal rules for everyone. " 54
Authoritarianism in Chile, however, was not a simple executive mechanism
through which the demands of interest groups were denied. For almost a
decade, it constituted a system of institutionalized terror, directed against the
traditional parties, of the left, the unions, social organiza.tions, _and the
opposition in general. Proof of this resides in the disappearance of over 2,000
people, whose whereabouts remain unknown even today, the forced exile of
hundreds of thousands of Chileans, as well as the frequent and massive arrest
of people who were then subjected to brutal torture, in secret camps. The
defenselessness of citizens hauled before courts that shamefully refused to
grant the right to habeas corpus, brutal police repression of protest marches,
espionage networks, and intimidation campaigns directed against moderate
political leaders: these were the true characteristics of the Chilean author-
itarian regime. It was not the authoritarianism of which the Chicago Boys
spoke so enthusiastically. They, along with many of those with "technical"
roles during the military regime, tried to draw a distinction between an
authoritarianism that they regarded as necessary - "technical firmness in
decision-making" - and that which the opposition and human rights
organizations showed to be taking place in Chile. The Chicago Boys labeled
the latter type as "inevitable," "unfortunate," and restricted only to isolated
abuses, for which they were anyway not responsible. State terrorism - which
has been fully documented since Chile's return to democracy - served to unify
and make coherent both "mild" and "severe" authoritarianism. Scientific and
technical authoritarianism was protected by physical force and wholesale
intimidation of the population. The authoritarian system refused either to
discuss the measures if implemented, or to amend them in line with their cost,
while physically threatening all those who tried to organize protest or demand
their rights. Seen in this light, authoritarianism was indeed an efficient
mechanism for the drastic transformation of the Chilean economy.
Neo-liberal groups supported this style of regime not simply, as has
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
Daubigne. See Dunbar
Davenant, Sir William, 232 note, 239
Denbigh, Earl and Countess of, 93
Denham, Sir John, 228 note
Deptford, 12, 13, 21, 23, 192, 198, 257, 303
⸺ Church, 215, 216, 228
Derby House, Westminster, 142
De Ruyter, 269
Desborough, John, 232, 234
Desmond Rebellion, the, 4, 6
⸺, Earl of, 179
Desmonds, the, 8
Devil of Mascon, The, 288
Devonshire, Earl of, 243, 258, 259
De Witt, 270
Dieppe, 85
Digby, Sir Kenelm, 242, 245
⸺, Robert, Lord, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 59
⸺, Sarah Boyle, Lady, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27 and note, 79
⸺ family, the, 31
Diodati, Charles, 129
⸺, Diodato, 88, 106
⸺, Dr. John, 82 note, 88, 124, 128, 130
⸺, Dr. Theodore, 128, 129
⸺ family, the, 88, 127, 128, 129, 130
Discourse of Things above Reason, 299
Donne, John, 45
Dowch, Mr., the Parson, 65, 68, 72, 134
Drummond of Hawthornden, 8
Drury Lane, 258
Dryden, 242
Dublin, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 17, 25, 26, 27, 29, 33, 35, 36, 37, 55, 57,
59, 74, 75, 115, 171, 183, 185
⸺ Castle, 24, 29
Duke’s Theatre, the, 280
Du Moulin, Lewis, 210 note
⸺, Peter, 210 note, 288
Dunbar, Earl of, 108 note
Dungarvan, Lord and Lady. See Burlington
“Dunkirkers,” 19, 23, 85
Durdans, 260 note
D’Urfé, Marquis, 87
Durie, John, 128, 150 note, 194, 209, 294

East India Company, 297

Edict of Nantes, 301
Edinburgh, 43, 198, 212
Egham, 141
Eikonoklastes, 235
Elizabeth, Princess. See Bohemia, Queen of
⸺, Queen of England, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 165
Elephant in the Moon, The, 251 note
Encænia, the, 189, 192, 282
Ent, Sir George, 263
Epitaphium Damonis, 129, 239
Epithalamium, Spenser’s, 7, 9
Epsom, 260 and note
Erskine, Sir James, 30
Escheator-General, 6
Essex, Earl of (Elizabeth’s), 9, 44
⸺, Robert Devereux, 3rd Earl of, 132, 144 and note
Eton, 34, 39, 40, 65, 66, 129, 134
Eugenius, 153, 156
Eusebius, 153
Evelyn, John, 88, 103, 137, 166, 174, 178, 189, 190, 192 and
note, 193, 195, 206, 213, 214, 215, 216, 220, 222, 223,
224, 225, 226, 232, 233, 236, 242, 244, 245, 248, 249, 250
note, 254, 257, 267, 272, 273, 276, 277, 282, 283, 288,
291, 292, 293, 294, 296, 303, 304, 305
Evelyn, Mrs., 190, 192, 193, 214 and note, 215, 216, 221
Exchange, the, 256, 257, 266
Exeter Chapel, 216
Experiment, The, 226, 255
Experimenta observationes physicæ, 300
Experiments of Light, 277

Faerie Queene, The, 6, 7, 8

Fairfax, Sir Thomas, 126, 160, 167
Farnham, 140, 141
Faversham, 3
Fell, John, Dean of Christchurch, 193
⸺ John, son of the Dean, 193, 194, 283 note
⸺, Mrs., wife of the Dean, 193, 194
Fenton, Sir Geoffrey, 11, 13, 24
⸺, Katherine. See Cork, Countess of
⸺, Lady, 13, 18, 25
Ferabosco, the, 273
Fermoy, 112
Ferrara, 103
Fielding, Lady Elizabeth. See Kynalmeaky
Fire of London, 246, 261, 265, 269, 294
Fish Street, 242
Fleet Street, 213
Fleetwood, Charles, 182, 232, 234
Florence, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 115
Foster, Professor of Astronomy, 148
“Four Miles Water,” 35
Free Discourse against Customary Swearing, A, 154
French, Dr., 190, 192
⸺, Mrs., 192
Fry, Mr., tutor, 26

Galbaly, 9, 11
Galileo, 104
Galtee Hills, 6
Gaunt, Elizabeth, 300
Geneva, 82 and note, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101,
102, 106, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 133, 137, 144,
145, 147 note, 148, 194
Genoa, 83, 106
Genorio, 153
Gibbon, Mr., the musician, 191
Gifford, Dr., 22
Glanville, the lawyer, 20
⸺, Mr. (Royal Society), 288
Goddard, Dr., 148, 189, 196, 198, 208, 241, 250, 263
Goodwin, John, 235, 237 and note, 238
Goring, George, 21, 24, 26, 31, 65 and note, 76, 78, 107, 134,
135, 239 note
⸺, Lettice Boyle, wife of George Goring, 13, 16, 19, 21, 24,
31, 49, 50, 65, 73, 78, 121 and note, 134, 239 and note
⸺, Lord, 110, 239, 296
Grammont, Comte de, 280, 286
Grandison, Lord, 19, 25 note
Graunt, John, 243
Gravesend, 270
Greatrakes, Valentine, 264, 265
Grenoble, 99
Gresham College, 148, 161, 188, 226, 240, 241, 248, 249, 250,
251, 256, 263, 266, 271, 272, 273, 294, 308
⸺, Sir Thomas, 240 note
Grisons, the, 103
Guildhall, 266
Gulliver’s Travels, 156, 157 note
Gwynne, Nell, 232 and note, 287

Haak, Theodore, 148, 243

Hague, the, 31, 134, 158, 225 and note, 228, 301
Hales, John, 45, 46, 66
Halkett, Anne, Lady. See Murray
Hall Barn, 202, 262 and note
Hamilton, Marquis of, 93, 160, 167
⸺, Mr. James. See Clanbrassil
Hamlet, 231
Hampton Court, 110, 111, 159, 218, 260 note
Hanworth in Middlesex, 78
Harrison, Mrs. Frances, 93, 94, 95, 109
⸺, John, 40, 41, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 65, 67, 68
⸺, Major-General, 235, 236
Hartlib, Samuel, 128, 133, 148, 149, 153, 154, 161, 173, 174,
183, 188, 202 and note, 203, 209, 214, 216, 217, 232, 236,
249
⸺, Mrs., 153
Haselrig, Sir Arthur, 234
Hastings, Lady Mary, 283, 284
Hatfield, 112
Hatton Gardens, 291
Haymarket, 286
Henrietta-Maria, Queen, 19, 58, 78, 79, 83, 93, 160
Henry VIII, 191
Hereford, 7
Hermione, 176, 179
Herringman, the publisher, 257
Hibernia Pacata, 10
Higgins, Mr., 60
Hill, Mr., 241
Hinchinbroke, Anne Boyle, Lady, 228, 229 and note, 230
⸺, Lord, 228, 229 and note
History of Cold, The, 254
History of the Reformation, 298
Hobbes, Dr., 197, 202, 305
Hodge, Little. See Boyle, Roger
Holborn, 110, 131, 160, 161, 162, 207, 240
Holmby House, 159
Hooke, Robert, 200, 201, 243, 249, 250, 254, 256, 260, 296 and
note, 297, 308
Horton, 66
Howard, Lady Ann, 112, 120, 136, 137, 138
⸺, Charles. See Carlisle, 1st Earl of
⸺, Lord Edward, of Escrick, 112, 136, 138, 139, 141 note
⸺, Mr. (son of Lord Edward), 138
⸺, Mr. Henry, 272
⸺, Lady Mary, 287
⸺, Stuarta, 227 note
⸺, Mr. Thomas, 93, 94, 95, 109
Hudibras, 251
Huntingdon, Earl of, 283
Hurst Castle, 167
Hussey, Mrs., 174
Huygens, 249
Hyde, Anne, Duchess of York, 275, 276
⸺, Dr., 200
⸺, Laurence, son of Clarendon, 229, 275, 276, 277
⸺, Henrietta Boyle, wife of Laurence Hyde, 228, 229 note,
261 and note
Hydrostatical Paradoxes, 265

Ianthe, 231, 232 and note

Ilfracombe, 40
Inchiquin, Earl of, 145 and note, 160
Indemnity and Oblivion, Bill of, 234, 236, 237, 238
Inns of Court, 32
Invisible College, the, 127, 148, 149, 189, 196, 243
Invisibles, the, 168, 174, 188, 196, 200, 241, 242
Ireton, Henry, 160, 183, 233 note
Irish Bible, the, 298
Isle of Wight, 159, 167

James I and VI, 12, 43, 44, 45, 165

⸺, Duke of York, James II, 160 and note, 226, 228, 229, 254,
256, 275, 276, 277, 284, 300, 301
Jeffreys, Judge, 300
Jewin Street, 240
Joliffe, Sir William, 284
Jones, Arthur. See Ranelagh, 2nd Viscount
⸺, Catherine. See Mount-Alexander, Lady
⸺, Elizabeth. See Melster, Mrs.
⸺, Frances, 211 note, 258, 280, 281
⸺, Inigo, 32
⸺, Richard. See Ranelagh, 3rd Viscount and 1st Earl of

“Kemb,” a minister, Admiral of revolting ships, 161

Kepler, 44, 67, 68
Kilcolman, 6, 8
Kildare, George Fitzgerald, 16th Earl of, 21, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37,
65, 76
⸺, Joan Boyle, Countess of, 13, 16, 19, 21, 30, 31, 32, 37, 65,
154
Killigrew, Mrs. Elizabeth. See Shannon, Viscountess
⸺, Katharine, 110
⸺, Sir Robert, 78
⸺, Susan. See Barrymore
⸺, Thomas, 78, 86, 96, 97, 102, 227
Kimbolton, 262
King, Sir Edmund, 291, 308
⸺, Edward, 129
King’s Head Tavern in Fleet Street, 20 and note, 242 and note
⸺ ⸺, the, in Pall Mall, 286
⸺ School, Canterbury, 3
⸺ Theatre, the, 277
Kinsale, 9, 10, 59, 171
Knight, Mrs., 286
Knockbrack, 173
Kynalmeaky, Lewis Boyle, Lord, 14, 25, 26, 31, 36, 37, 39, 57,
58, 65, 70, 71, 72, 81, 82 and note, 83, 88, 89, 93, 107,
111, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 162
⸺, Elizabeth Fielding, Lady, 93, 113, 114

Lambert, Colonel John, 160, 232, 234, 237

Lambeth Hill, 242
Langham, Sir James, 283, 284
Langley Park, 22
Laud, William, Archbishop of Canterbury, 28, 30, 31, 37, 63, 64,
102, 125, 133, 134, 191
Lawrence, President, 172 note, 234, 235 note
⸺, Henry, son of President, 172 note, 209, 234, 235 note
⸺, Martha. See Barrymore
Leeke, Sir John, 17, 23, 70, 74, 75
Leeze, in Essex, 111, 112, 131, 166, 167, 206, 207, 208, 223,
253, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 293, 295
Leicester, Robert Sidney, 2nd Earl of, 102
Le Monde, 89
Lenthall, William (Speaker), 234
Lichfield, 12, 20
Limerick, 6, 7, 9, 11
Lincoln’s Inn Fields, 250, 259
Lindamor, 153, 156 and note, 166
Linus, Franciscus, 202, 306
“Lion Whelps,” fleet of, 22
Liscarrol, battle of, 119, 120 and note, 227
Lisle, Mrs., 300
Lismore, 14, 15, 16, 22, 37, 39, 59, 111, 114, 171, 296
⸺, Church of, 120
⸺, the House of, 1, 2, 17, 18, 19, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 113, 182
Lismore Papers, the, 1, 2
Livorno, 106
Loftus, Sir Adam, 16, 23 note
⸺, Arthur, 16, 18, 21, 26, 64
⸺, Dorothy Boyle, wife of Arthur Loftus, 14, 16, 26, 31, 64
⸺, Lord Chancellor, 23 and note, 26
Lombard Street, 20
Lombardy, 103
Londonderry, siege of, 202
Long Acre, 110, 165 note
⸺ Parliament, 107
Longe, Jacob, 59
Ludlow, Colonel Edmund, 234
Luther, 45
Lycidas, 129
Lyons, 87, 88, 117

Maccabees, 280
Machina Boyleana, 201, 248
Magdalen College Chapel, Oxford, 191
Magdalene College, Cambridge, 149 note
Mall, the game of, 29 and note, 284, 285, 286
Mallet, John, 154, 181, 290
⸺, Lady, 154
⸺, Sir Thomas, 154
Mallow, 7
Manchester, Edward Montagu, 2nd Earl of, 126, 132, 239, 259
Manwood, Sir Richard, 3
Marcombes, M., 57, 58, 65, 71, 72, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86,
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102,
104, 105, 106, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 123, 127, 134, 135,
143, 144, 145, 146, 147 and note, 148, 154, 159, 162
⸺, Madame, 82, 101, 103
Marseilles, 106, 115, 116
Marsh, Narcissus, 297, 298
Marston Bigot, 112, 113, 154, 168, 252, 253
Marston Moor, battle of, 126, 165
Martyrdom of Theodora and of Didymus, The, 176, 179, 299
Marvell, Andrew, 206, 237, 239
Mary II, Queen, wife of William III, 303
⸺ of Modena, wife of James II, 301
⸺ Queen of Scots, 301, 302
Masques, 32
Maynooth, 32
Meath, 5
Medicina Hydrostatica, 299
Mellifont, 5
Melster, Elizabeth Jones, Mrs., 211 and note, 258, 280, 281,
307
Memoirs of the Natural History of the Human Blood, 299
Mentone, 106
Meredith, Dr., 261
Merton College, Oxford, 189, 194, 198
Middlesex, Lionel Cranfield, 1st Earl of, 58, 162
Middle Temple, 3, 4, 5, 9, 20
Middleton, Earl, 179
⸺, Mrs., 257
Milton, John, 66, 74, 128, 129, 130, 133, 146 note, 161, 162,
172 and note, 209, 210, 211, 212, 217, 234, 235, 236, 237,
238, 239, 240, 294
Minehead, 40
Miraculous Conformist, The, 264
Morus, Alexander, 124 and note
Monaco, 106
Monk, General. See Albemarle, Duke of
Monmouth, Duke of, 300
⸺, Robert Cary, 1st Earl of, 165
⸺, Henry Cary, 2nd Earl of, 165, 174, 175, 178
⸺, Countess of, wife of 1st Earl, 165
⸺, Countess of, wife of 2nd Earl, 162, 163, 164, 165, 175,
178, 179
Montagna di Morbegno, la, 103
Montague House, 296 note
Montrose, Marquis of, 173 note
Moor, Dr., 22
Moore, Sir Edward, of Mellifont, 3
⸺, Lady, of Mellifont, 15
⸺ Park, in Hertfordshire, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 175, 176
Moray, Sir Robert, 240, 243, 250
Morrice, Dr. Chaplain, 275, 276, 278, 279
Morrice, Sir William, 239
Moulins, 87
Mount-Alexander, Catherine Jones, Lady, 211 note, 280.
See also Parsons, Lady
⸺, Lord, 211 note
Mountmorris, Lord, 55
Munster, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 37, 63, 113, 145, 146, 168, 171, 173,
182, 224, 227, 264, 275, 278, 301
Murray, Thomas, Provost of Eton, 44, 138
⸺, Mrs., widow of Provost, 138
⸺, Anne (Lady Halkett), daughter of Provost, 138, 139, 160
and note
⸺, Tom, 134, 135, 144
Mustapha, 231
Nag’s Head Tavern, in Cheapside, 20 note, 111, 112, 127, 130
Naseby, battle of, 135, 198
Naseby, The, 271
Naylor, Joan, mother of the 1st Earl of Cork. See Boyle, Mrs.
Roger
⸺, Peter, lawyer, 20, 112, 127, 136
⸺, Robert, father-in-law of the 1st Earl of Cork, 3
⸺, Robert, chaplain, 15
Neile, Sir Paule, 240, 241
Newcastle, 70, 140
⸺, Duchess of, 272, 273
⸺, Marquis of, 126
New College Chapel, Oxford, 191
New Experiments, 201, 202
New Fish Street, 20
Newington, 263
New Inn, 112, 127, 136
“New Model,” The, 140, 162
Newton, Isaac, 203, 218, 288, 289, 290
⸺, Lady, 138
Nice, 106
Ninth Whelp, The, 22, 23, 26, 31, 32, 61
Nonsuch, 20, 260 and note
Northall, 20, 21
Northampton, 2nd Earl of, 42
⸺, 3rd Earl of, 243
Novum Organum, 44, 68

Obstructors of Justice, The, 237 note

Occasional Reflections on Several Subjects, 140, 153, 154, 155,
156, 157, 158, 164 note, 166, 196 and note, 257, 261
Offaley, 31
Of the High Veneration Man’s Intellect Owes to God, 299
Old Mall, The. See Pall Mall
Oldenburg, Henry, 209, 210, 211, 217, 232, 237, 242, 244 and
note, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 260, 261, 263, 264,
265, 268, 269, 273, 274, 277, 289, 293, 294, 295
⸺, Rupert, 295
O’Neil, Shan, 4
Origin of Forms, The, 265
Ormonde, James Butler, Marquis and 1st Duke of, 145, 160,
239, 278, 280
Orrery, Lady Margaret Howard, Countess of, 94, 108, 109, 112,
113, 114, 120, 136, 146 note, 154, 168, 170, 253, 279, 280,
296, 303
⸺, Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, 1st Earl of, 14, 25, 36, 37, 39,
57, 58, 65, 70, 71, 72, 77, 81, 82 and note, 83, 89, 93, 94,
107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 115, 135 and note, 140, 141 and
note, 145 and note, 146 and note, 147 and note, 154, 162,
168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 179, 184, 206, 212, 215, 219, 224,
227, 228, 233 and note, 239, 247 and note, 252, 253, 264,
275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 295, 296, 303
Osborne, Dorothy, 234
Owen, John, 190
Oxford, 21, 126, 132, 140, 148, 187, 188, 189, 190-205, 210,
211, 220, 232, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 261, 262, 269, 271,
 274, 277, 281, 282, 283, 284, 290

Padua, 103
“Painted Chamber,” The, 287
Palatine, Prince, 196, 197
Pall Mall, 38, 131, 170, 188, 207, 209, 224, 237, 259, 260, 265,
271, 281, 284, 285, 286, 287, 293, 295, 297, 300
“Papin’s Digestors,” 297
Paradise Lost, 217, 239
Paris, 85, 86, 106
Parkhall, 262
Parliaments. See Short, Long, Rump, and Barebones.
Parsons, Sir Lawrence and Lady, 18
⸺, Sir William, 211 note
⸺, Lady, wife of Sir William. See Mount-Alexander
Parthenissa, 168, 170
Pavement, the. See Pall Mall
Pays de Forest, 87
“Pegg,” Lady. See Orrery, Countess of
Pembroke, Shakespere’s Earl of, 164
Pennington, Isaac, 234
Pepys, Samuel, 73, 139, 226, 228, 229, 230, 236, 245, 246,
249, 255, 256, 257, 258, 261, 263, 267, 271, 272, 273, 277,
278, 280, 284, 285, 286
⸺, Mrs., 230, 280
Perkins, Mr., the London tailor, 19, 23, 31, 47, 50, 53, 58, 59,
106, 114, 115, 116, 127, 134
Perugia, 106
Peterborough, 1st Earl of, 41, 42
Peters, Hugh, 235
Petition and Advice, 215
Pett, Sir Peter, 195, 243
Petty France, Westminster, 209, 210, 211, 217, 235, 237, 240
Petty, Sir William, 148, 183, 184, 185, 226 and note, 241, 245,
260, 291, 294
Philaretus, 1, 2, 15, 34, 35 note, 49, 55, 97, 99, 100, 122
Philosophical College. See Invisible College
Physick Garden, Oxford, 191
Physiological Essays, 211 note, 246, 288
Piazza, Covent Garden, the, 255
Piccadilly, 228, 276, 277, 293, 303
Pilgrim, The, 9
Pisa, 106
Pistoia, 106
Piur, 103
Plague, the Great, 246, 257, 260, 261, 262, 263
Pococke, Dr., 200
Portsmouth, 21, 65 note, 160
Povy, 250 and note
Powell, Mary, 209
Poynington, 154, 290
Prayer Book, abolition of the, 132
Preston, in Kent, 3, 20, 22
⸺, battle of, 167
Pro Populo Defensio Anglicano, 235
Pudding Lane, 269, 270
Pyrophilus, 211 and note, 280, 303

Queen Street, Covent Garden, 108

Quintus Curtius, 51

Raleigh, Sir Walter, 6, 9, 10, 44, 113

Raleigh-Desmond Estates, 10, 11
Ranelagh, 1st Viscount, 75
⸺, Arthur Jones, 2nd Viscount, 25, 37, 38, 65, 74, 75, 76,
131, 212, 280, 302, 307
⸺, Katherine Boyle, Viscountess, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 31, 37,
38, 39, 65, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81, 83, 111, 127, 130, 131, 132,
135, 136, 139, 143, 147, 150, 154 and note, 159, 162, 168,
170, 174, 175, 188, 192 and note, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211, 212, 217, 219, 224, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239,
240, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 268, 271, 280,
281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 294, 295, 300, 301, 302, 303,
306, 307, 308, 309
Ranelagh, Richard Jones, 3rd Viscount and 1st Earl of, 130,
210, 211 and note, 212, 217, 232, 237, 242, 257, 280, 303
⸺ Gardens, 303 note
Rathfarnham, 16, 26, 31
Real Character: An Essay towards a, 203 and note
Rebellions, Irish, 4, 8, 113, 302
Regii Sanguinis Clamor, 210 note
Relation d’un Voyage en Angleterre, 251 and note
Rich, Charles. See Warwick, 4th Earl of
⸺, Mr. Robert, son of 3rd Earl of Warwick, 215, 216
⸺, Lord, son of Charles and Mary Rich, 4th Earl and
Countess of Warwick, 258, 259
Richard II, 159
Rhodes, Mrs., Lady Wentworth, 29, 55
Rhone, the, 88
Rickmansworth, 164, 165, 179
Rochester, Dean of, 268
Rome, 102, 105, 106
Rooke, Mr., 241
Roscommon, 25, 280
⸺, Wentworth Dillon, Earl of, 229 note
Rouen, 85, 86
Royal Charles, The, 271, 258 note.
See also Naseby
Royal Mines, the Company of the, 255
Royal Society, the, 127, 148, 201, 211, 226-245, 246, 248, 249,
256, 260, 261, 263, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 277, 281, 283,
288-291, 294, 297, 300, 307
Rump Parliament, the, 182
Rupert, Prince, 126, 197, 248, 264, 295
Russell, Lord William, 142 note, 300
Rydowt, servant, 68
Rye, in Sussex, 85

St. Bartholomew the Less, parish of, 128

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