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Encounters Japan
From Perry to MacArthur
William L. Neumann
AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN:
FROM PERRY TO MAC ARTHUR
 AMERICA
Encounters
JAPAN
From Perry to MacArthur

BY WILLIAM L. NEUMANN

The Goucher College Series

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

BALTIMORE AND LONDON
Copyright © 1963 by The Johns Hopkins Press
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America

The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., London

Standard Book Number (clothbound edition) 8018-0485-X

Standard Book Number (paperback edition) 8018-1093-0

Originally published, 1963

Second printing, 1969

Johns Hopkins Paperbacks edition, 1969

To Arnold R. Verduin, 1905-1960,
a great teacher.
 Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2018 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation .

https://archive.org/details/americaencounterOOOOneum
 PREFACE

The ideas and attitudes which shaped and influenced

American foreign policy in respect to Japan and the Far
East over the past century and a half are the primary con¬
cern of this book. It is not a diplomatic history in the
traditional sense, devoted to detailed summaries of diplo¬
matic negotiations. Japanese policy is treated only sec¬
ondarily and when necessary for the understanding of
American reactions. Particular emphasis is given to those
ideas, attitudes, and events which are related to the com¬
ing of war in 1941.
This is a critical history; critical in the sense that the
writer does not hold the view that what happened had to
be. There were alternatives possible which merit discus¬
sion. As the late C. Wright Mills reiterated so vigorously,
history is not the product of Fortune, Chance, or Fate. To
the extent that historical events are understandable, they
are the result of human decisions, small and large. To ex¬
plain the course of American relations with Asia in terms
of destiny or inevitability is to abdicate a major intellectual
task. Accidents have their place in the course of human
affairs and accidents affected the Japanese-American ex¬
changes, but fundamentally this relationship was shaped
by leaders and active elements among the people of Japan
and the United States.
The research upon which this history is based has been
carried on for over a decade in a great diversity of mate¬
rials; to footnote all sources and quotations would distract
••
Vtl
via PREFACE
too many readers. For the benefit of students and other
interested readers, a critical bibliography is appended
which can open the way to further reading. Scholars will
find the chapter bibliographies a guide to the sources
drawn upon. Japanese names are presented in the western
forms.
Arthur A. Ekirch, Walter Scholes, Percy L. Greaves Jr.,
Robert W. Tucker, Gerald Wheeler, and Kenneth O.
Walker have all been generous enough to read all or part
of the manuscript and to help me prune out some of the
judgments most difficult to defend. For those which re¬
main, the onus is mine alone.
I am indebted to the William Volker Fund and to
Goucher College for financial assistance in completing my
research and writing.

William L. Neumann
Timonium, Maryland
 CONTENTS

Preface vii
L The First Arrivals 1
II. Trade, Religion, and National Mission

III. Japans Wall Crumbles 36

IV. Warship Diplomacy and “Curios” 51
V. Arming with American Aid 72
VI. Ventures in Imperialism 87

VII. The First Abrasions 107

VIII. Reluctant Allies 135
IX. A New Asian Policy 161
X. Non-Recognition and Navalism 184
XI. The Yellow Trade Peril 212
XII. The China Commitment 228
XIII. The Wanted, Unwanted War 256
XIV. A New Sun Rises 290
Appendix: Bibliographic Essay 315
Index 345
AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN:
FROM PERRY TO MAC ARTHUR
Chapter I

THE FIRST ARRIVALS

T OKYO’S REACTION to Americans began with panic. Ter¬

rified families gathered their household goods and fled to
the hills as news spread of a foreign invader. Four black ships
had sailed into the Bay of Tokyo, two of them belching black
smoke, the first steamships to visit Japan. At their masts was
the flag of the United States. The date was July 8, 1853. Com¬
modore Matthew C. Perry had arrived to open Japan to the
commerce and culture of the western world.
Some 80 years later, far across the Pacific, another city ex¬
perienced a wave of fear and again men fled to the hills to
await an invader. A deadly attack had surprised Honolulu’s
neighboring naval base at Pearl Harbor. Squadrons of alien
bombers roared out of the western skies, their wings marked
with the Rising Sun of Japan, bringing death and destruction
to the men and ships of the United States Pacific Fleet. The
date was December 7, 1941. A westernized Japan was striking
at the outpost of American power in the Pacific. The attack
was planned by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and his aides. He
had enlisted in the Japanese Navy as a boy because, he saidx
“I wanted to return Commodore Perry’s visit.”
Between these two points in time many Americans and
i
2 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Japanese crossed the Pacific and mingled on friendly terms.

American sea captains and merchants, naval officers and diplo¬
mats, missionaries and engineers came to Japan's shores. Japan
sent diplomats and military men, businessmen and students to
the United States. Thousands of Japanese came to Hawaii and
to the Pacific Coast to settle and prosper.
Trade flourished as Japanese silk graced the legs of Ameri¬
can women and American cotton fed the spindles of Japanese
textile mills. Communications and cultural contacts multiplied
and expanded. Hollywood movies brought visions of occidental
ways of life to Japan. Japanese prints found a place on the
walls of American homes and Japanese architecture left its
mark on the American landscape. Baseball was played within
sight of Fujiyama and judo was introduced into the White
House by Theodore Roosevelt.
Each country formed vague images of and attitudes toward
the other. For many decades these concepts were predomi¬
nantly benevolent as Japan recovered from the trauma of the
Perry mission and subsequent western imperialism. Feelings
of friendship and respect were cultivated in both nations by
lecturers and official missions. Organizations and authors on
both sides of the Pacific devoted themselves to the reinforce¬
ment and perpetuation of friendly relations between the two
countries. Japanese xenophobia was submerged by a wave of
enthusiasm for things western, while America’s initial dis¬
regard for Japan’s culture was tempered by a growing respect
for oriental art and crafts.
But suspicion and animosity also grew with time. By the
first decade of the twentieth century anti-Japanese feelings
erupted among west coast Americans, and anti-Americanism
was openly voiced in Tokyo. In the second decade of this
century the American Navy moved its major strength to the
Pacific. Japanese warships, sliding off the ways in increas¬
ing numbers, threatened America’s drive for Pacific hegemony.
Professional propagandists sounded the cry of “Yellow Peril”
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 3
for American ears, and “Asia for Asiatics” was proclaimed by
Japanese nationalists.
In the decade, 1931-1941, animosities drowned amities.
Anger toward Japan was no longer limited to west coast Amer¬
icans. The caricature of the toothy, ruthless Japanese was in
standard usage in the American political cartoon and became
the common image held by many Americans. The Land of the
Rising Sun evoked the labels of “aggressor” and “militarists.”
For many Japanese the United States had become the “white
peril,” challenging Japan’s Monroe Doctrine and plans for
Asian leadership.
The last stage of animosity began with war in 1941. For
three and one half years a gigantic struggle of steel and blood
was waged across the Pacific. “Japs” became a hate word for
Americans, evoking an image of treacherous little yellow men.
Loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry were ordered out of
their homes and concentrated behind barbed wire in remote
camps. Even the famous cherry blossoms of Washington’s
Tidal Basin bowed before the wartime temper and concealed
their ancestry as “Oriental” cherry trees. In Japan and the
United States history was rewritten to prove that the relation¬
ship begun by Perry was doomed from the beginning by the
malevolence of the other nation.
The actual story of the relations of the two peoples cannot
be related in blacks and whites nor diagrammed as the steady
convergence of two national forces, meeting at Pearl Harbor.
Even its beginning cannot be ascribed to Matthew Perry.
Americans had already met Japanese on many occasions when
the bluejackets of Perry’s fleet watched the Japanese officials
climb over the railing of the flagship Susquehanna in 1853.
Perry’s achievement was to regularize and expand a relation¬
ship which had previously been limited to a series of isolated
contacts.
The Japanese-American association was bom out of an
American faith in destiny. From the earliest days of the Re-
4 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

public, some Americans were confident that their nation’s

future was to be fulfilled in the Far East. Yankees were not
only to be the heirs of Columbus with ready access to the
wealth of the Indies, but also to the fabled island of Chipangu
(Japan) which the Great Navigator had sought in vain. Ameri¬
can goods were destined to stock the markets of the Orient
and Yankee ships to return laden with gold and the rarities of
another world.
Commercial gain was not the only component of the Ameri¬
can dream of the national future in Asia. As a Christian nation
with messianic-minded preachers and laymen, its ships were
also to carry the Gospel to the yellow pagan and rid him of
his idolatry. The young American republic had another ex¬
port upon which it placed high value, the ideals of 1776. The
republican form of government with its obvious superiorities
was to spread across the Pacific, overthrowing oriental tyran¬
nies and tradition-bound political systems. From this happy
identity of gain, religion, and political progress came the faith
which moved Americans and their ships confidently into the
Far East.
The economic interest was the most obvious. “The first
Americans went to Asia because they had to go—they had to
go everywhere” said Tyler Dennett in his pioneering work,
Americans in Eastern Asia. Despite its agricultural and mineral
potential the new nation was commercially poor. Unable to
satisfy even their tastes in food and drink from their own soil,
Americans had to find means of paying for their imports. A
merchant fleet and a carrying trade was a ready answer for
men who lived along the seacoast and who could build their
ships from the timber of their own forests. Ranging the seas,
Yankee skippers could not only dispose of their own country’s
raw materials, but could earn good profits in carrying the
manufactures of Europe to distant lands.
“Geography points us to China, Persia, India, Arabia, Felix
and Japan,” said a hopeful New Englander, Congressman
THE FIRST ARRIVALS S
fames Elliott of Vermont in 1803. His fellow congressmen had
reason to accept Iris optimism, since by that date American
ships were not only engaged in a lucrative trade with China,
but were also trading with Japan under Dutch charters. Amer¬
ican trade with Asia was launched in 1785, when the Empress
of China unloaded its Canton cargo on the docks of New
York’s East River. Before the Revolution American colonists
knew of Asia’s products through British imports, but the ar¬
rival of the Empress of China opened tire direct trade and
created a sensation in shipping circles. The voyage netted a
respectable 30 percent profit and sent other ships on the same
quest. Special tariff privileges, extended by the states and later
by the federal government, helped to make larger profits pos¬
sible. The Betsy returned to New York from Canton in 1798
with a cargo that brought the owners a profit of $53,000 on an
investment of little more than $7,000. Risks were high; wrecks
and unstable markets ruined many a merchant, but the high
profits for the fortunate few assured a flow of capital into the
China trade. In 1819 the administration of President Monroe
recognized the importance of the Asian trade by dispatching
the frigate Congress to Chinese waters to protect American
ships from pirates.
For those Americans who had read Marco Polo, trade with
Japan offered even more exciting prospects. The travelling
Venetian had assured his readers that Chipangu was a land
of riches to satisfy the dreams of the hungriest of gold-seeking
westerners.
And I can tell you the quantity of gold they had is end¬
less; for they find it in their own islands and the king
does not allow it to be exported. Moreover, few mer¬
chants visit the country because it is so far from the main
land, and thus it comes to pass that their gold is abun¬
dant beyond all measure.
Among the wonders of Japan described by Polo was the palace
of the emperor, “entirely roofed with gold” while the floors
6 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

were paved with gold slabs “a good two fingers thick.” Skeptics
five centuries later could point out that the glib Venetian had
never visited Japan and that the few Occidentals who had
penetrated the isolated land did not confirm Polo’s tales. There
remained, nevertheless, enough mystery about the country’s
wealth to stir western curiosity and cupidity.
When the first American ships finally anchored in Japanese
waters, that country’s foreign trade had been a Dutch and
Chinese monopoly for over 150 years. First encountered by
Portuguese sailors in 1542, Japan was visited by Spanish,
Dutch, and British traders in the next century. With the
traders came Christian missionaries, attacking the traditional
faiths of the Japanese and intriguing against each other for
special advantages. The religious disturbances created by the
missionaries and the avarice of the traders led to the curtail¬
ment of relations with the West. A series of government edicts
culminated in the expulsion of foreigners from Japan by 1639.
Only the Chinese and the Dutch who had refrained from
proselytizing were allowed to continue their trade and under
narrow restrictions. Japan remained subsequently almost com¬
pletely isolated from the outer world, the Land of Great Peace,
in the centuries when dynastic wars raged in Europe.
American whalers and traders had sighted the islands in
cruising the North Pacific, but it was not until 1791 that an
American ship entered Japan’s closed waters. The brigantine.
Lady Washington, under Captain John Kendrick and the sloop,
Grace, entered a convenient Japanese harbor that year, claim¬
ing shelter from a storm. Attempts were also made to trade,
but the local officials were firm in their adherence to the law.
The Americans left, but not without grasping the uniqueness
of their exchange. Captain Kendrick left behind a note in
Chinese and Dutch, explaining the circumstances of his visit
and calling attention to the fact that his ship belonged to “the
Red Hairs from a land called America.” The Lady Washington
sailed eastward across the Pacific, and in 1794 Captain Ken-
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 7
drick visited Hawaii where he was, fittingly enough, the first
American to fly his country’s flag in the harbor formed by
Pearl River, the site of America’s future naval base.
The Napoleonic Wars provided the next opportunity for
Americans to visit Japan. When the Netherlands fell into the
hands of France, Dutch ships were driven from the seas by the
British Navy. Dutch East Indies Company officials chartered
neutral Yankee ships in order to maintain their monopoly by
sending an annual cargo to Nagasaki. Between 1797 and 1809
Americans were frequent visitors to the Dutch warehouses on
the small island of Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki, where
other foreigners were forbidden to enter.
A New Yorker of great persistence, William R. Stewart, was
the first American to sail under a Dutch charter. His adventures
illustrate the courage and ingenuity of the pioneer traders.
Stewart entered the Pacific as an officer on the Eliza of New
York, rose to her command, and began trading between the
Dutch East Indies and the ports of British India. After losing
two ships to creditors, he entered Nagasaki under Dutch
charter in the summer of 1797. When the Japanese officials
noted that his crew spoke English and not Dutch, they sus¬
pected a British ruse to open trade, but they were assured that
these men were “a different kind” of English-speaking peoples.
Stewart won the favor of the Dutch and Japanese officials
and was commissioned to bring a second cargo from Dutch
Batavia in 1799. On leaving Japan with a cargo of copper and
camphor wood, his Eliza struck a reef and sank while being
towed back to Nagasaki. Stewart and the crew were saved but
left destitute. He appealed to the Japanese authorities for help
and was given men and equipment without charge to raise the
Eliza. Their efforts to salvage the sunken ship were a failure,
and two Japanese divers were reported to have died from the
effect of the dissolving cargo of camphor. A wealthy local fish¬
erman then offered his services to Stewart and by an ingenious
system of floats raised the American vessel. Succeeding where
8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

his government had failed, the fisherman asked no reward and

went further to repair the ship without billing Stewart for the
expenses. This act of generosity came to the attention of the
prince of the province. He conferred a noble’s rank on the
fisherman, giving him the privilege of wearing the two doubled-
edged swords. For his coat of arms the new noble is reported
to have chosen the marks of an American, the beaver hat and
two crossed tobacco pipes.
Bad luck or poor seamanship continued to harass Stewart and
he again lost the Eliza on his southward voyage off the coast of
the Philippines. Landing on the Spanish islands, the destitute
Stewart by some act of legerdemain managed to raise money
for his fourth ship. Naming it the Emperor of Japan, out of
gratitude—or for diplomatic reasons—Stewart returned to
Nagasaki in 1800, claiming to be the Dutch chartered vessel
for that year. While he was in the harbor, the Massachusetts
of Boston arrived, not only carrying the Dutch charter papers
but also a new Dutch director for Deshima. Stewart was ar¬
rested for flying Dutch colors without authorization, his ship
and cargo confiscated, and he was sent back*to Batavia for
trial. Even this misfortune failed to crush the New Yorker; on
reaching Java he escaped and fled to India on an American
ship. One contemporary charges him with stealing this ship
while its captain was on shore.
In India Stewart again found financial backing and was able
to return to Japan in 1803 in a vessel he had hopefully named
the Nagasaki Maru, and with papers declaring that he had
been commissioned by “Prince Thomas Jefferson, the Shogun
of the United States.” Unusual gifts were carried for high
Japanese officials, a camel, an Indian buffalo and a donkey.
With these bribes and a bogus official commission, Stewart
asked permission to open an American trading post. To avoid
arousing the opposition of the Dutch by competing for Japa¬
nese copper and camphor, he proposed purchasing dried sea-
slugs and seaweed which he would sell in Canton. Despite the
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 9
skilled staging, the Japanese saw this bid for unusual cargoes
as a ruse by which to slip in the door in the hopes of future,
more profitable cargoes. Stewart’s request was rejected, and
this clever second American attempt to break through Japan’s
isolation failed.
For the duration of the Napoleonic Wars, American ships
continued to come to Nagasaki under Dutch charter. Each
entrance was accompanied by an elaborate ritual in which the
East Indies Company officials instructed their American con¬
tractors. When the ship entered the Japanese harbor, a table
was to be prepared on deck with cushions ready for the Japa¬
nese officials when they came on board to examine the ship’s
manifests. All books, particularly those of religious nature, were
to be sealed in a cask and deposited on shore along with all
firearms until the ship was ready to leave. A series of salutes—
49 guns in all—were to be fired on making anchorage. The
Dutch flag was to be flown on entering the harbor, but once
moored the ship could be dressed with any colors except the
Spanish and Portuguese, since these nations still remained in
disgrace for their misbehavior in Japan two centuries earlier.
American ships were able to take this opportunity to fly their
own flags.
The first of the chartered vessels to bring Japanese goods
back to the United States was the Franklin of Boston. Stopping
in the Dutch East Indies in 1799 to acquire a cargo of Java
coffee, the captain could not turn down a lucrative offer to
make the charter run to Nagasaki before returning home. When
the Franklin unloaded its cargo at Deshima—cotton goods,
sugar, tin, pepper, cloves, and 2,000 pounds of elephant teeth—
the captain not only filled his hold with the Dutch cargo of
copper and camphor but also some Japanese articles for busi¬
ness of his own. In May of 1800 the Franklin reached Boston,
123 days out of Batavia, with coffee and spices along with the
first Japanese goods brought directly to the United States. Ad¬
vertisements drew attention to this unique collection of goods
IO AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

for sale, “Mats, Kuspidors, Nests of Pans” and a variety of

Japanese lacquered goods.
The Netherlands resumed trade in its own ships in 1813,
after giving Americans their first glimpses of Japan as official
guests. Captain Stewart was not the only one to enjoy the
friendliness of pre-Perry Japan. George Cleveland, a clerk on
the Margaret of Boston, recorded in his journal a visit to
Nagasaki with the officers of his ship in 1801. At the home of a
Japanese merchant they dined sumptuously on “pork, fowls,
meso, eggs, boiled fish, sweetmeats, cake, and various kinds of
fruits,” as well as on “saky and tea.” After visiting local temples,
they ended the day at a local tea house where they were
entertained by dancers and acrobats. Western faces were such
a rarity that when the Margaret’s officers returned to the
harbor in the evening, they found the streets jammed with
Japanese trying to get a glimpse of the visitors.
Despite this friendliness, Japan held strictly to the terms of
the Dutch monopoly. When the Eclipse of Boston appeared in
Nagasaki harbor in June of 1807 under Russian colors, having
been chartered in Canton by the Russian-Ameripan Company,
the Dutch advised Captain Joseph O’Cain to put away the
Russian flag and to hide the Russian supercargo. The Japanese
were bitter over Russian raids on the northern islands and
wanted no dealings with this expanding neighbor. When the
Dutch advice was followed, the Japanese officials supplied the
Eclipse with fish, hogs, vegetables, and water, without cost,
but asked the captain to leave the closed waters as soon as
possible.
Official American interest in establishing treaty relations with
Japan lagged behind the traders. When the Rebecca of Balti¬
more left Nagasaki in 1809, a period of almost 30 years began
without recorded American visits to Japan’s harbors. In 1832
the Department of State authorized an executive agent, Ed¬
mund Roberts, to visit the Far East and to negotiate commer¬
cial treaties with a number of nations, including Japan. Roberts
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 11

succeeded in concluding a treaty with Siam and the Sultan of

Muscat, but lacked the funds to visit Japan. In 1835 he was
again authorized to visit Japan, but contracted a disease in
Bangkok and died before his ship sailed for the northern
islands. Britain and Russia both failed to secure trading privi¬
leges in Japan in the 1830’s, and there is nothing to suggest
that Roberts would have been more successful. After a few
unpleasant experiences with foreign ships which threatened to
bombard Japanese ports, the Japanese government closed the
door still further in 1825 by issuing an edict which ordered
coastal batteries to fire upon any foreign vessel—Dutch and
Chinese excepted—which came within their range.
It was zeal for the conversion of pagans which combined
with business interests to promote the next American attempt
to enter Japan. If the average American mind had any im¬
pressions of Japanese religion they were negative in character.
One of the earliest and most widely read American geography
texts, first published in 1784, spoke of the Japanese as the
“grossest idolaters and irreconcilable to Christianity.” The urge
to remedy the situation may have come to many evangelical-
minded American Christians, but the first to act upon it was
David W. C. Olyphant, head of Olyphant & Company, a lead¬
ing commercial house trading in the Far East and well known
for its supp.or.t-nf Protestant missionary work in China. Oly¬
phant had helped to finance the first American missionaries to
reach Canton in 1830 and was noted for his refusal to take part
in the opium trade which earned rich dividends for many
American traders.
In 1837 an Olyphant ship arrived in Canton too late to ac¬
quire a cargo for that season, and a member of the Company,
Charles W. King, proposed that it be used to send an expedi¬
tion to Japan. Olyphant welcomed the idea and several Amer¬
ican missionaries were enlisted, including S. Wells Williams
who was later to accompany Perry. The ship was fittingly
named for Robert Morrison, a pioneer British missionary to
12 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

China, and Williams stated that the expedition's purpose was

to “cultivate a friendly intercourse with the Japanese, heal
their diseases if they are willing to be operated upon, and
trade a little.” The cargo was made up of British and Dutch
goods which were then unsalable in China. It was thought ex¬
pedient not to carry any Christian books which might arouse
Japanese suspicions. The intermediaries were to be seven ship¬
wrecked Japanese sailors who had been left stranded at Macao
and whose return, it was hoped, would win the gratitude of
Japanese officialdom.
Avoiding the Dutch at Nagasaki, the unarmed Morrison
sailed for the Japanese capital, Tokyo, then called Yedo, and
anchored below the city. Two of the Japanese were landed with
letters to the Japanese officials. While the visitors waited for a
reply, the Japanese hastily erected shore batteries and, in
accordance with the 1825 edict, began cannonading the in¬
truder. The Morrison fled without injury to its crew and sailed
southward, where another attempt was made on the coast of
Satsuma. Again the exclusion edict was upheld, shots were
fired at the American vessel, and the missionaries returned to
Canton.
This affront to a Christian effort to rescue the Japanese from
their pagan gods aroused the ire of the expedition’s leader,
Charles King. In' 1839 he appealed to the crusading fervor of
his countrymen with the first American book to be devoted
extensively to Japan, The Claims of Japan and Malaysia Upon
Christendom. King called for an official expedition to open
Japan, using force if necessary. The blockade of the Japanese
capital by preventing fishing junks from supplying the city was
one mode of attack, while a secessionist movement was to be
promoted in the Ryukyu Islands by cutting off their line of
communications with Japan. The American government at the
time of publication was occupied with the appeals of the Texas
secessionists for American annexation, and King’s proposals
went unheeded. But the cannonading of an unarmed vessel
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 13

roused some American tempers. Commodore Perry later

charged that the Prince of Satsuma had “decoyed” the Mor¬
rison into one of his ports in order to fire upon it.
In 1842 the order to fire on all foreign ships was modified and
official approval given to a less hostile reception for chance
visitors. News had reached Japan of the tremendous military
superiority of the westerners, demonstrated in China’s crush¬
ing defeat by the British in the Opium War. A British naval
survey vessel was treated with great courtesy when it entered
a Japanese port in 1845. That same year a whaler from Sag
Harbor, New York, the Manhattan, rescued 22 Japanese sailors
from two storm-wrecked junks adrift at sea. Captain Mercator
Cooper turned his ship to the nearest Japanese coast and
landed some of the castaways to request permission that the
rest be repatriated at the Japanese capital. The request was
considered by a high court which decided that the sailors could
only be returned by the Dutch or Chinese, but the Shogun
overruled his advisers and the Manhattan was welcomed in the
Bay of Yedo. The officers and crew were not permitted ashore,
but they received generous gifts of food, while the Japanese
carefully studied the construction of the Yankee vessel. Among
the Manhattan’s crew were eight American Negroes, perhaps
the first the Japanese had seen, and these dark skins received
special attention from the inquisitive officials who boarded the
vessel.
Several groups of Americans landed on Japan’s shores in the
years following the departure of the Manhattan and found
themselves treated with friendship or hostility depending upon
the circumstances of their arrival and their behavior as guests.
In 1848 fifteen deserters—seven Americans and eight Hawai-
ians—fled to Japan from a New Bedford whaler, Lagoda, and
claimed to be survivors of a shipwreck. They were a quarrel¬
some group of rebels and the Japanese, finding them trouble¬
some, treated them roughly. The oriental diet and close con¬
finement led to the death of several of these men before they
14 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

were repatriated. By contrast, a group of genuine survivors from

the wreck of the Lawrence, a Poughkeepsie whaler, were well
cared for when their ship foundered off the Kurile Islands in
1846. They were repatriated by the Dutch in 1847 and given
presents of rice on their departure.
The story of Ranald Macdonald, a daring adventurer who
came voluntarily to Japan to take up residence in 1848, illus¬
trates the mixture of suspicion and friendship with which the
Japanese received the foreigner. Macdonald was the son of a
Hudson’s Bay Company official and a Chinook Indian mother.
He became an American citizen under the Oregon Treaty of
1845. Raised by a stepmother, Macdonald’s mixed origin was
concealed from him until a love affair was blighted by the
revelation of his Indian blood. Hurt and angry over this re¬
action of white society, he determined to go to Japan where
he believed American Indians had originated. Amongst these
people, his ancestors, he hoped to achieve a respected status
and spread knowledge of the western world.
Whatever Macdonald’s weakness as an anthropologist, his
sense of mission remained strong. In 1845 he went to sea from
New York to learn navigation. The summer of 1848 found him
on a whaler off the coast of Hokkaido. By arrangement with
the captain he was set adrift in a small sailboat which he had
stocked with an English dictionary, a grammar, and geography
and history books. His first encounter was with some Ainu
fishermen who at once seemed to confirm his theory by their
resemblance to the American Indian of the Northwest, His
cordial manner won the friendship of these people who cared
for him until Japanese officials had him transported to Nagasaki
for repatriation by the Dutch.
Macdonald remained almost a year in Nagasaki, awaiting
the arrival of the next chartered vessel. Although closely con¬
fined, he was treated with respect and given a number of pupils
who had been studying English. While he corrected their pro-
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 15

nunciation, he managed also to learn Japanese. Fearing that he

might be a missionary, the Japanese forced him to go through
a denial of faith by the customary trial, placing his feet upon
the Cross. After this he was allowed free use of the Bible,
which he had included in his library. The U.S.S. Preble repatri¬
ated Macdonald in 1849 and he returned to Oregon to write a
history of his great adventures.
While adventurous and luckless Americans were landing on
Japan’s shores, unfortunate Japanese fishermen were finding
themselves stranded on the eastern shores of the Pacific. Fish¬
ing junks and freighting vessels were limited by Japanese law
to a size which discouraged visits to foreign lands, but storms
sometimes stripped these tiny boats of their sails and sent them
drifting helplessly across thousands of miles of the Pacific.
Some crewmen survived the hunger and thirst to be rescued
by western ships at sea. A few even lived to land on the North
American coast. In 1833 three Japanese landed in British
Columbia, the survivors of a crew of 17, after drifting for 17
months across the Pacific. Some shipwrecked Japanese were
picked up by homeward bound American ships and carried
back to the United States. Some of these men remained for
months and years, learning English and successfully adapting
themselves to an occidental way of life.
The most famous of these waifs was Manjiro Nakahama,
known also as John Mung. He was found in 1841 with four
other fishermen stranded on a tiny Pacific islet. A boy of 14,
Manjiro was befriended by Captain William Whitfield of the
whaler, John Howland, who rescued him and took him to his
New England home. Manjiro became a part of the family and
Captain Whitfield left the local church when the deacon asked
that Manjiro, having a pigmented skin, be seated in the Negro
section rather than in the Whitfield family pew. Enrolled in
school in Fairhaven, Massachusetts, Manjiro proved an apt
pupil of both English and navigation. In 1846 he went to sea
i6 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

on a whaler which brought him to California in time to make a

small fortune in the gold rush. With this money Manjiro
booked passage in 1851 on a merchant ship which passed close
to Japanese shores and, like Macdonald, he reached home in a
small boat. The Japanese government was initially suspicious
of this Americanized homecomer, but in time his worth was
recognized and he was given an official post. He not only in¬
troduced sponge cake to his country, but translated Bowditch’s
Practical Navigator into Japanese, a valuable contribution to
Japan’s first naval ventures.
This series of contacts in the pre-Perry years had its effects
on both peoples. In the United States Japan became more of a
reality, and the accounts of the efforts to establish relations or
of the treatment and mistreatment of American sailors stimu¬
lated the interests of a westward moving people. In Japan there
was an increased awareness and even the accumulation of
knowledge by scholars about these English-speaking peoples
across the Pacific.
When Captain Kendrick drew Japanese attention to the
existence of his nation in 1791, it was known by only a few
scholars. A brief description of America was offered in a
Japanese geography as early as 1708, but the information
about the New World which had reached Japan through the
Dutch was scanty. Yankee pride was affronted in 1800 when a
visiting seaman was asked by a Japanese whether America
was as large as Nagasaki. This seaman, William Cleveland,
wrote in his journal that it was “astonishing what a low opin¬
ion the Japanese have of America.” Great strides were made
in the next 50 years, and Perry’s crew were equally astonished
to have Japanese point out not only New York and Washington
on a map of the United States but some western cities as well.
The visits of American ships under Dutch charter led the
Japanese government in 1809 to order its interpreters to study
English. By 1811 a phrase book had been compiled with such
THE FIRST ARRIVALS 17

unique pronunciations as “Watto we-doru isu itto?” for “What

weather is it?” In response to official Japanese requests in 1809,
the Dutch had transmitted an account of the American Revolu¬
tion and of the establishment of the new nation. By 1847
Japanese scholars were well enough informed to present a
detailed description of the United States when they published
a world atlas. Included were such items as a short biography
of George Washington, a description of the United States
Navy, a detailed street plan of Washington, D.C., and a flatter¬
ing judgment in regard to American politics: “There are no
kings or lesser rulers, however, in every state a number of wise
men are chosen as government functionaries instead.”
Along with the growth of historical and geographical knowl¬
edge, increased attention was given to the study of the English
language. A lengthy English grammar, based on Dutch studies,
was published by Japanese scholars in 1840-1841. The Shogun
in 1850, while maintaining the exclusion policy, ordered the
compilation of a comprehensive English-Japanese dictionary.
Commander Glynn, visiting Japan in 1849, found that the Japa¬
nese interpreter “spoke tolerably good English, but understood
only as much as he wanted to.”
The crowning work of pre-Perry Japanese studies was a five-
volume New Account of America which was published on the
eve of the Perry mission in 1853. Over 50 pages were devoted
to maps and drawings of American historical events in which
the artist was given unscholarly license. One drawing pre¬
sented George Washington paying an unexplained visit to
Amerigo Vespucci whose death had preceded Washingtons
birth by 200 years. Attention was drawn to the democratic
character of the United States:

In the New Country, there is no distinction of ruler and

subject, only the difference between noble and base,
high and low. The heads of the national, state and county
governments are different men, but they are all sover-
i8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
eigns in their respective positions. Now, their homes,
their doings, their food and drink, and their clothing
are not different from those of the common people.

The attitude of the Japanese student of the United States was

expressed in the preface to a General Account of America
which appeared in 1854. The author stated that it was the duty
of Japanese scholars “to enlighten the people and show them
that the barbarians should be respected, but not feared/’
Within the next few years Japan’s experience with the western¬
ers suggested that they should be both respected and feared.
Chapter II

TRADE, RELIGION, AND

THE NATIONAL MISSION

W HEN THAT WELL-TRAVELLED Irish bishop, George

Berkeley, wrote “Westward the course of empire takes
its way” in the 1720’s, he might have made the same comment
about the eastward movement. Europeans were not only mov¬
ing across the Atlantic to the New World, but the expanding
forces of merchant capitalism were showing a growing interest
in the Far East. As the trader sought new worlds, the increas¬
ing technical superiority of western weapons and ships made
possible a successful assault on the closed markets and riches
of India and Asia. The opening of Japan to the trade and cul¬
ture of the West by American initiative was but a phase of this
larger historical movement.
British seamen and merchants took the lead. Portugal, Spain,
and the Netherlands had pioneered in penetrating the Far East
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but their total im¬
pact was small and their holdings peripheral. The Portuguese
and Spanish were expelled from Japan in the early seventeenth
century and by the end of the eighteenth century they had de¬
clined, like the Netherlands, to the level of minor colonial
powers. England, on the other hand, after defeating the Span-
19
20 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

ish Armada in 1588 advanced in the next two centuries to the

mastery of the oceans of the world. With that mastery came
access to the shores and hinterland of Asia.
The creation of the British India Company in 1600 was fol¬
lowed by two centuries of conquest during which the sub¬
continent of India came piecemeal into British control. Madras,
Bombay, and Calcutta became in turn the outposts of an ex¬
panding empire. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815
British power was pressing against the gates of China. Through
the vision of the energetic Sir Thomas Raffles the Union Jack
was raised over Singapore in January of 1819, and a base of
growing importance for British power came into being. From
the Straits of Malacca British warships could reach the China
Seas with little difficulty.
By 1819 Britain’s European competitors were weakened to
the point at which they could offer no serious rivalry in Asia.
Spanish sea power was destroyed with finality at the Battle of
Trafalgar in 1805. The French Navy was crippled in the same
battle, and the French had failed to secure a base beyond the
Indian colony of Pondicherry. Indo-China was* yet to fall into
French hands. Portugal continued to cling to the port of Macao
on the Chinese coast, while the Netherlands retained a series
of posts in the East Indies along with the trading concession
with Japan. Neither of these countries had the resources with
which to oppose Britain and to expand their own holdings.
Only Russia was to make great gains, but the Tsarist operations
were too far north to give Britain great concern.
“I set no value on objects strange or ingenious and have no
use for your country’s manufactures,” Emperor Ch’ien Lung
had told the British envoy in 1793. But Britain’s demands for
Chinese teas and silks could be best filled by a two-way trade,
and a solution was found in the sale of opium. The Chinese
found this narcotic, growing in British India, a source of escape
from the grimness of life, and the value of its sales soon rose
beyond the level of British purchases from China. When im-
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 21

perial edicts banned the importation of the drug, smuggling

became an apparent necessity for many British and American
merchants. Corrupt Chinese officials were only too willing to
co-operate in this profitable but illegal trade. When the Chinese
government took drastic action—executing opium dealers be¬
fore the residences of the foreign traders and seizing large
supplies of the drug—relations between British traders and
China were disrupted.
The first Anglo-Chinese War began in 1839 with the opium
trade as the major issue. Chinese antagonism had also been
stirred by the activities of the British missionaries, while the
British resented the arrogance with which the Chinese govern¬
ment refused to recognize the foreign barbarians as equals.
Britain, with superior technology and organization of power,
was an easy victor. The Treaty of Nanking in 1842 not only
exacted a $21 million indemnity from the Chinese, but brought
under British possession the island of Hong Kong and opened
four additional ports to British trade. The Chinese wall was
crumbling. Other western nations hastened to use the British
victory to their own advantage.
Public sentiment in the United States was critical of Britain’s
“Opium War” and “imperialist immorality.” But the significance
of Britain’s action for future American interests did not escape
astute observers. John Quincy Adams from his seat in Congress
defended Britain’s action on the grounds that the war was
fought for tlie rights of all nations to be treated as equals by
China. Years later, Matthew Perry was to speak of the opening
of the Chinese ports by war as “one of the most humane and
useful acts” which Britain had ever taken. Perry predicted that
it would accomplish more in Christianizing China and elevat¬
ing social conditions than years of actual missionary work.
Although such a viewpoint was in the minority, American
traders at Canton lost no time in pressing Washington to seek
additional privileges for ships flying the American flag. Ap¬
peals to Congress by commercial interests led to the appoint-
22 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

ment of Caleb Cushing, Massachusetts congressman, as com¬

missioner to China in 1843.
Cushing arrived at Macao on an American warship and
found the chastened Chinese government unwilling to recog¬
nize another western barbarian at the gates. Firmness and a
reminder to the Chinese that refusal to receive envoys was
considered by western nations as a just cause of war, coupled
with the announcement of the imminent arrival of the Ameri¬
can Pacific squadron, brought Cushing success. The Chinese
agreed to sign a treaty giving the United States all the privi¬
leges accorded the British and more, including extraterritorial¬
ity. The latter concession freed smugglers from punishments
under Chinese law.
Following the British victory, American tonnage in Chinese
ports had doubled between 1842 and 1843. Ratification of the
Cushing Treaty in 1845 gave further opportunity for trade, and
the total value of cargoes carried under the American flag rose
from $9 million in 1845 to over $22 million by 1860. This was
still only a tiny percentage of the total foreign trade of the
United States, but it brought rich returns to an influential
group of American families. For these Americans, predomi¬
nantly New Englanders, China continued to be the center of
dreams which envisioned a great commercial future for their
nation.
The growth of the China trade contributed directly to in¬
creasing interest in Japan. As the sailing ship began to be
replaced by the steamer, coaling stations became of great
importance. The crude and inefficient boilers of the early
steamers consumed large quantities of coal which in turn cut
down on valuable cargo space. The trans-Pacific voyage re¬
quired refueling and coal dumps were established in the Chi¬
nese ports, supplied by colliers from American Atlantic ports
or from Britain. When a rumor spread in the 1840’s that Japan
had large deposits of coal, this appeared to be a boon to
American plans for a Pacific steamship line. Secretary of State
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 23

Daniel Webster spoke of these coal deposits as “a gift of

Providence, deposited by the Creator of all things in the depths
of the Japanese Islands, for the benefit of the human family.”
The annexation of California in 1848, bringing American
harbors thousands of miles nearer to the trade of the Orient,
heightened interest in both China and Japan. “Asia has sud¬
denly become our neighbor with a placid, intervening ocean
inviting our steamships upon the track of a commerce greater
than that of all Europe combined,” proclaimed Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Walker in 1848. American ships, no longer
forced to make the long voyage from the Atlantic around Cape
Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, could now cut costs and com¬
pete on better terms with their European rivals. The rise of
Shanghai, outstripping Canton as a trading port, cut the dis¬
tances to American harbors by almost another thousand miles.
Plans for a transcontinental railroad to carry the goods of the
eastern and midwestern states to Pacific ports made the out¬
look even brighter. “This, sir, is the road to India! This is the
great western passage for which contending nations have
struggled for centuries,” a Pacific railroad enthusiast an¬
nounced in 1847.
The American whaling industry, driven into the North
Pacific by a paucity of whales in other waters, also looked to
Japan for convenient harbors in which to provision and refit on
the long cruises. This interest won some support from a public
which frequently read exaggerated stories of the cruelty in¬
flicted by Japanese on shipwrecked Americans and looked with
approval on any measures which could protect these unfortu¬
nates. President Millard Fillmore, when he won cabinet ap¬
proval of the Japan mission, offered the plight of the stranded
seamen as a major justification. In the letter which was drafted
for the Japanese Emperor by the State Department the Japa¬
nese were told, “We are very much in earnest about this.” But
critics of the Japan expedition, like the editors of the Washing¬
ton Union, claimed that the seaman issue was only “an opening
24 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
wedge” for more vital commercial considerations. The Demo¬
cratic Review went further in criticizing the proposals made
by the Whigs for the trans-Pacific expedition and said that the
seaman issue was “a mere flimsy cloak to a matter-of-fact
business-like design.”
The commercial appeals of a venture which would open
trade with Japan were obvious, but some Americans looked to
broader and more noble ends. In an age when commerce and
civilization were treated as almost synonymous, the beneficial
effects of trade with the West on the Orient were seldom ques¬
tioned. A New Jersey senator, speaking in behalf of govern¬
ment support for a Pacific steamship line, proclaimed that it
was “the mission of commerce to civilize the world ... to
carry those principles of liberty and enterprise which have
given this country its prominence and its glory throughout
the world to the other races and nations of mankind.”
Politically the American expedition was seen as a liberating
agent. One image of Japan offered frequently in the press was
that of a people living restlessly under a harsh, dictatorial
regime which crushed their natural instincts for freedom and
individuality. The Japanese government, said an American
writer in 1830, is an iron despotism, “controlled almost as per¬
fectly as the wheels in a manufactury.” Two decades later the
Democratic Review repeated the image, claiming that the
Japanese were “so completely controlled by a despotic system
as to be little more than automata in every affair of life.”
People who could live under these conditions, said the Whig
Review in 1852, ranked “about on a level with the Feejees of
the South Seas or the Esquimeaux.” A Boston newspaper con¬
cluded that it was “time the Yankee schoolmaster was sent” to
peoples who were the victims of this “inveterately vicious ab¬
surdity.” “We could convert their selfish government into a
liberal republic in a short time” argued Commander Glynn
after his visit to Japan in 1849.
Religion and morality were further ends to be served by
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 25

opening American relations with Japan. In both respects, ac¬

cording to American writers, the Japanese were in a deplorable
state. Their religion was “the grossest paganism”; it was “desti¬
tute of joy and remarkable only for those austerities which
render worship a rarity and a penance.” From early youth
Japanese “revel in the luxury of suicide.” But their greatest
vice was incontinence; DeBow’s Review, noted for its concern
for economic statistics, stated that prostitutes were found in
Japan “in greater numbers than in any country of Asia except
Hindustan.” To balance this indictment, the Japanese were told
in 1851 by the repatriated John Manjiro that Americans were
“lewd by nature, but otherwise well-behaved.” This resident
of Fairhaven, Massachusetts, seems to have reached his con¬
clusions by observing the character of the American marriage;
“Americans merely make a proclamation to the gods” and then
they “go on a sight-seeing trip to the mountains.”
A few writers were willing to recognize that Japan had long
ago had its experience with Christianity only to reject it. The
Democratic Review gave history a twist by claiming that Japan
had once been “a half Christianized nation” only to be “forced
back by tyranny and persecution into barbarism and idolatry.”
Others explained Japan’s adverse reaction to sixteenth century
Christianity by pointing out that this religion had come from
monarchy-ridden Spain and had been Roman Catholicism. The
anti-Catholic feelings of mid-century America were appealed
to as an additional argument for Protestant missionary work.
When the Perry expedition returned, one writer commented
that it was “Jesuitical ambition which closed Japan to the
world and Protestant energy that has now opened it.” Many
could agree with the learned Chinese missionary, S. Wells
Williams, who concluded that the self-imposed isolation of
Japan was “not according to Gods plan of mercy to these
peoples.”
Economics, a sense of national mission, and religion—three
of the most powerful forces which move men to action—
26 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
combined to support an armed expedition to pry open the
doors of Japan. An expansionist-minded naval officer. Captain
David Porter, hero of the War of 1812, was the first to propose
an official landing operation on the shores of Japan. Writing
to President Madison in 1815, Porter argued that the time was
favorable and the feat ‘would be a glory beyond that acquired
by any other nation ... to beat down their rooted prejudices,
secure to ourselves a valuable trade, and make that people
known to the world.” Porter played on the right themes, but
he was still too far in advance of his time and his plea went
unanswered.
Official support for an expedition was eventually obtained by
the work of a few score of Americans vitally interested in the
Far East. They set themselves to the task of convincing Con¬
gress and the administration that the destiny and duty of their
nation pointed at the Land of the Rising Sun. In speeches, in
newspaper editorials, and in letters to congressmen and govern¬
ment officials, the case was argued for taking up the task in
Asia. Dollars, the Bible, and the American Flag were all waved
as incitements to action. In the mood of expansionism which
reigned in the 1840’s these arguments brought results.
Aaron H. Palmer, a New York commission merchant, was the
unofficial leader of this campaign. A vigorous propagandist,
he made frequent appeals to Congress and to the Secretary of
State, calling for missions to all oriental nations with whom no
treaty relationship had been established. On his own initiative
Palmer circulated in the Orient thousands of promotional pieces
dealing with American manufactures. Beginning in 1842 he was
able to send his packets into Japan through the Dutch traders,
accompanied by files of New York City newspapers, book
catalogues, and the latest almanacs. The information on Japan
which Palmer gathered in return was sent to the Department
of State. After the conclusion of the Perry mission, Palmer was
credited by Secretary of State John M. Clayton with having
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 27

contributed more to the dispatch of the mission than any other

man.
One of the first fruits of Palmer’s work was a resolution of¬
fered in the House of Representatives in 1845 asking for the
establishment of commercial treaties with Japan and Korea.
The resolution was tabled, but action soon followed. Alexander
H. Everett, the first Commissioner sent to China under the
Cushing Treaty, left for his post in June of 1845 with authority
to carry on treaty negotiations with Japan. Everett fell ill en
route and his mission was postponed. His escort, Commodore
James Biddle of the 90-gun U.S.S. Columbus, decided to go to
Japan alone. Biddle and the U.S.S. Columbus reached Tokyo
Bay in July of 1846, but a stay of ten days netted him little.
Without an interpreter who could speak Japanese, Biddle was
handicapped in making proposals and his orders were to avoid
exciting “a hostile feeling, or a distrust of the government of
the United States.” Unable to even set foot on shore without
forcing his way, Biddle sailed away.
At the end of the Mexican War another official expedition
visited Japan, but it originated in Asia rather than in Washing¬
ton. An American whaler was wrecked on the Japanese coast,
and word reached Canton that the survivors as well as the
deserters from another whale ship were being held in Japan.
At the request of the American commissioner to China, the
U.S.S. Treble under Commander James Glynn was sent to re¬
patriate the American citizens. Glynn reached Tokyo Bay in
April of 1849, determined to take a much firmer position than
had Biddle three years earlier.
When the Japanese dallied in returning the seamen, Glynn
gave them an impressive picture of the strength of the Ameri¬
can Navy and set a deadline on the negotiations. The time
limit was honored and the men returned. When the seamen
reached the United States, they received wide publicity for
their tales of extreme maltreatment, saying nothing of their
28 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
own obstreperous behavior. Their accounts, exaggerated or not,
added to the argument for a large naval expedition to settle
the matter of hospitality for shipwrecked Americans.
Commander Glynn pressed the proposal on President Fill¬
more as well as upon American businessmen interested in a
trans-Pacific steamship line. He was certain that Japan would
open its ports “if the business was properly managed” so that
American right and might countered Japanese “imbecility and
injustice.” Aaron Palmer supported Glynn; instead of negotia¬
tions he proposed an ultimatum to be enforced by a blockade
of Japan’s major ports. Victory would be a certainty since
Japan had no warships of its own.
Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, later Lincoln’s vice pres¬
ident, became a recruit in Palmer’s cause in 1850. As chairman
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, he pushed through
two resolutions which called on the Secretary of State to report
on the maltreatment of American seamen in Japan and on the
prospects of American trade in Asia. Palmer was employed by
the Department of State to prepare a trade report and used
his position to submit a plan for opening relations directly to
President Fillmore in January of 1851. A few months later Fill¬
more announced that his administration had approved the
formation of a naval expedition to visit Japan.
Expansionist-minded Americans acclaimed the news. The
continent had been “finished up,” there was nothing to hope
for in Europe, but Asia and the Pacific beckoned. “Hurray for
the Universal Yankee Nation, Commodore Perry and the new
prospective State of Japan” said the Daily Alta Californian.
American Pacific expansion will be “but an extension of popu¬
lar virtue, republican simplicity and world-teaching example”
cheered a Pennsylvania congressman, Joseph R. Chandler. The
rich gains of the Mexican War checked the opposition of most
of the critics of military expansionism.
The command of the naval forces was initially given in May
of 1851 to Commodore John Aulick, who sailed for the Far East
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 29

the next month with the East India squadron at his command,
a steam frigate, the U.S.S. Susquehanna, and two sloops-of-war.
Over a dozen shipwrecked Japanese had been collected in San
Francisco and shipped on to meet Aulick in Hong Kong as
entry tickets to Japan. These men pleaded, however, that if
they were returned to their homeland on a western warship
rather than on an unarmed Chinese or Dutch ship that they
and their families would be severely punished. Three of the
men preferred to return to California. Before Aulick could
settle the fate of the remaining Japanese, he received orders
from the Secretary of Navy, dismissing him from his command
and ordering him to await a replacement. Charges had been
made against Aulick’s conduct during his voyage and although
they were subsequently dismissed, they lost him the oppor¬
tunity to go to Japan. The Secretary of Navy and the Secretary
of State agreed on the appointment of Commodore Matthew
Calbraith Perry in his stead.
Perry was a member of a distinguished naval family, brother
of Oliver Hazard Perry, and a veteran of 40 years of naval
service. His major command had been in the Mexican War,
when he was in charge of the largest task force that had ever
been assembled under the American flag and which he led in
the attack on Vera Cruz. Perry was known as a strict and harsh
disciplinarian who spurned the cat-o-nine-tads as effeminate
and preferred regular lashings with the butt end of a stout
rope. On occasion he had been known to knock down his men
with his own fists for infractions of the ship’s rules. In 1852
Perry had coveted the Mediterranean Squadron command and
was initially disappointed over his Asian assignment. But in the
official Narrative of the expedition, Perry claimed to have been
urging a move on Japan before the Fillmore administration
acted.
The new commander attacked his problems with great vigor.
He conferred with Aaron Palmer and others who knew some¬
thing of Japan and, according to his own account, “mastered
30 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
all that he could derive from books.” Perry did not need to be
convinced of the rightness and desirability of his mission.
Aside from his condemnation of the treatment of American
Indians, there is no evidence that he entertained any strong
doubts about the expansionist urges of his time. American
expansion was to Perry, as to many of his contemporaries, in¬
evitable and equivalent to the progress of mankind. “Our
people must naturally be drawn into the contest for empire,
whether for good or for evil, and it will be wise to anticipate
and prepare for events inevitable in themselves,” he wrote in
the spring of 1852.
Entrusted with writing his own instructions, Perry noted that
every nation had “undoubtedly the right to determine for itself
the extent to which it will hold intercourse with other nations.”
But every nation, he believed, had a duty to provide hospitable
care for shipwrecked individuals upon her shores. Failure to
carry out that duty, as in the case of Japan, meant for Perry
that such a nation might “justly be considered as the common
enemy of mankind.” By conferring this status upon Japan,
Perry deprived the Japanese of the right of self-determination.
That Japan was beyond the pale and had no right to expect
the treatment normally given civilized nations was the con¬
clusion reached by a number of other Americans. The reasons
offered for Japan’s excommunication varied. Commander Glynn
believed that refusal to permit foreign trade was in itself justi¬
fication for using force against Japan. Secretary of Navy John P.
Kennedy put another burden on Japan when he wrote in 1852
that its government must recognize “its Christian obligation
to join the family of Christendom.” A California newspaper.
The Pacific, demanded even more:

Japan must be compelled to contribute her share into

the great treasury of knowledge. She must give some¬
thing more than her meagre mite of lacquered ware,
elaborately carved images and similar specimens of
curious manufacture.
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 3i

But this attitude toward Japan was not exclusively American.

A British writer of the same period, Charles MacFarlane,
argued that “the instincts of nature” and “the natural law” im¬
pelled mankind to invade Japan and end its exclusion. Or, as
a New Orleans paper put it bluntly, “The world cannot stand
still to accommodate a nation in night caps.”
Perry also expressed a common attitude which assumed that
since the Japanese were racially and culturally different from
the western peoples they must be inferior peoples. He wrote
of the Japanese as “a weak and semi-barbarous people,” a
people “vindictive in character,” and a “deceitful people” with
whom the pursuance of the ordinary rules of diplomacy would
not have the least effect. Therefore “extraordinary” diplomacy
was in order. Senator Willie Mangum of North Carolina in
supporting the Perry mission in a Senate debate proclaimed
that “You have to deal with barbarians as barbarians.”
The differences between the culture of Japan and the United
States in 1853 was actually more profound than Perry realized.
The American way of thinking, based on Greco-Roman con¬
cepts, Christian ethics, and Anglo-Saxon political institutions,
had little in common with that of the Japanese. To Americans
with a strong faith in equality, the Japanese concepts of hier¬
archy and station in life were almost totally incomprehensible.
For the Japanese the western concept of law and legal “fact”
were also difficult to grasp, since in Japan law was a transitory
expression of opinion, subordinate to the individuals who made
it. A fact, in the western sense of an unchanging reality, had
no place in an oriental universe of thought where permanence
was found only in the relationship of man to man and of man
to his gods. Projected into international relations, these cul¬
tural differences were to breed major misunderstandings.
These philosophic subtleties were of no concern to Matthew
Perry who, faced with an attitude which was largely incom¬
prehensible, placed his faith in a universal instrument, force.
In his instructions the Commodore wrote that from past ex-
32 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
perience it was apparent that arguments or persuasion would
be unavailing with the Japanese unless they were seconded
with “some imposing manifestation of power.” There were
some fears in Washington that Perry would be too quick to
turn his guns on the Japanese; Secretary of the Navy James C.
Dobbin wrote to Perry in November of 1853 to remind him
that his mission was one of peaceful negotiations, “Congress
alone has the power to declare war, too much prudence can
not be exercized even in the great work in which you are
engaged.” Others expected that a conflict would result. The
New York Times, in commenting on the congressional debate
on the Japan mission, summarized the issue as a question of
whether or not Congress had lost the constitutional power over
war, since Congress had not been asked to approve of the
venture. The New York Herald went further and reminded its
readers of the good effects of Britain's Opium War on China
and called the Perry mission a filibustering venture, “tanta¬
mount to a declaration of war.”
Although Perry called for the largest squadron possible with
the maximum of firing power, he did not devote his attention
to his guns alone. With the co-operation of American manu¬
facturers, he collected a great many products intended to im¬
press the Japanese with Yankee ingenuity. Among these items
were a quarter size steam locomotive, railroad cars and a half-
mile of track, a telegraph set with 15 miles of wiring, tele¬
scopes, clocks, and a thousand dollars worth of small arms,
provided by Samuel Colt with an eye to future business. In
another category were eight gift baskets of Irish potatoes.
History has failed to record their fate among a rice-eating
people. There is evidence, however, that the generous quanti¬
ties of whisky, champagne, and wines taken abroad had little
difficulty in competing against the national drink of saki for
Japanese favor.
The Navy was slow to fill Perry’s demands for the size
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 33
squadron he considered necessary, in part because the new
steam warships were in early stages of development and sub¬
ject to frequent breakdowns. Rather than delay his departure,
the Commodore finally sailed from Norfolk on November 24,
1852, with only one steam frigate, the U.S.S. Mississippi,
hoping that others would soon follow. On board were only
regular naval personnel, since Perry rejected Aaron Palmer’s
suggestion that a number of civilian specialists be included to
gather information about Japan. The objectives of the expedi¬
tion were stated in the final orders as three: to make some
permanent arrangement for the protection of shipwrecked sea¬
men and their property, to open one or more Japanese ports
for use as coal depots and sources of provisions, and to open
one or more ports for the disposal of goods by American
merchant ships.
Perry was determined to control the news given to the world
of the course of his squadron. Once the Mississippi left the
South Atlantic for the Pacific by rounding the tip of South
Africa, the Commodore forbade all correspondence by the
crew which mentioned the ships’ movements. Private notes or
journals kept by crew members were declared the property of
the Navy Department, and no accounts were to be permitted
to compete with the official narrative of the expedition. Fortu¬
nately for the historian, several members of the expedition
evaded these restrictions and a number of unofficial reports
eventually reached the public.
The Mississippi arrived at Hong Kong in early April of 1853
and was soon joined by other ships of the squadron. Perry
transferred his flag to the U.S.S. Susquehanna, a larger steam
frigate than the Mississippi, and broke his ruling by taking on
board two civilians. One of these was Wells Williams, a mis¬
sionary and a veteran of the Morrison expedition of 1837, who
claimed some rudimentary knowledge of the Japanese lan¬
guage. The other was Bayard Taylor, a well-known newspaper-
34 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
man and correspondent for the New York Tribune, who signed
up as a master’s mate and agreed to submit all his dispatches
to the Commodore for clearance.
Perry had decided during the voyage to establish one or
more bases in islands south of Japan. If the Japanese used
force and succeeded in driving away their visitors, the ex¬
pedition would have a retreat for reorganization of their
strength. The bases might also have use in the future for other
American ships. For this purpose Perry selected first one of the
Ryukyu or Luchu Islands, a chain extending southwest from
Japan almost to Formosa, and it was on the largest island of this
chain, Okinawa, that the expedition landed in late May. The
people and the governor were, however, reluctant to co-operate
with the Americans, since they too were governed by the
exclusion orders of Japan.
The Commodore made his first use of threat, landing two
field pieces and an imposing escort of marines and marching
on the capital of Naha. The Okinawans, unarmed, bowed to
the inevitable. Hospitality was provided and a base estab¬
lished. Perry wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that if it were
not for their fears of Japan, the Okinawans would have been
“delighted at our coming” and he felt it his duty to protect
them against their “unnatural rulers,” the Japanese. Wells Wil¬
liams saw Perry’s action in a different light; “A more high¬
handed piece of aggression has not been committed by any¬
one,” he confided to his journal.
On June 9, 1853, Perry left for his second base in the Bonins,
a small island group 600 miles south of Tokyo, which had po¬
tential use as coal depots for a Pacific steamship line. Peel
Island in this group had a good anchorage and was populated
by a small group of Americans and Hawaiians who traded
with visiting whalers. A British claim had been made for these
islands, but Perry was contemptuous of “the annexing govern¬
ment” of Britain. He wrote Washington that “as a measure of
positive necessity” he was establishing a foothold for the
TRADE, RELIGION, THE NATIONAL MISSION 35
United States. A piece of land was purchased and a plan for¬
warded to the Navy Department for further colonization.
After a short return visit to the Ryukyus, the expedition left
on July 2 for Japan. The Commodore considered his squadron
—the U.S.S. Susquehanna, the U.S.S. Mississippi and two
sloops, the Saratoga and Plijmouth—to be a poor show in con¬
trast to the 12 vessels he had asked for. Nevertheless, he pre¬
pared to do his best with what he had. The crews were well
drilled as military units, the marine and howitzer groups had
practiced landing operations, and the squadron was prepared
to land with 17 small boats, five of which carried small cannon.
On July 8 the expedition sailed boldly into Tokyo Bay. Some
60 years of infrequent contacts between the two nations were
ended, and a new era of relationships was to begin.
Chapter III

JAPAN'S WALL CRUMBLES

P ERRY CAME to Japan self-assured and defiant. His squad¬

ron pushed past the fleet of small Japanese boats sent out
to intercept him and into Tokyo Bay, where he anchored a mile
closer to the capital than any foreign ship before him. His decks
were cleared for action, the guns manned and ready to repel
any attack. When the guard boats closed in and .tried to secure
their lines to the American ships, the fines were cast off and
the boats ordered to disperse before they were fired upon.
Japanese officials of apparent high rank finally appeared, and
the Americans consented to their approaching close enough
for conversations. Wells Williams’ grasp of the Japanese lan¬
guage proved insufficient for the task of communicating with
the officials, and an impasse threatened. But the Japanese
brought along an interpreter skilled in Dutch; Perry had also
acquired a Dutchman who spoke English, and Japanese-Amer-
ican communication began through the medium of a third
language. The Japanese were told that a high American official
had come to their shores, bearing a letter which he would
deliver to their Emperor in person.
The Japanese officials urged the Americans to take their
communication to Nagasaki where the Dutch could serve as
36
JAPAN'S WALL CRUMBLES 37
intermediaries. But Perry firmly rejected this suggestion and
threatened to sail directly to Tokyo if necessary, to carry out
his mission. His only concession was to agree to deliver a
duplicate copy of the letter to a suitably high personage who
would arrange for the delivery of the original. Since Tokyo was
undefended and had already been thrown into a panic by the
arrival of foreign warships so close to the sacred capital, the
Japanese agreed to arrange a landing in the vicinity at which
a representative of the Emperor would be present.
Perry remained in seclusion throughout the preliminary talks
in an effort to impress the Japanese with the greatness of their
visitor. He insisted that he be referred to as an “Admiral/’ The
Japanese in turn deceived the Americans by giving false titles
to their negotiators. Unwilling to submit any high officials to
the humiliation of dealing with the foreigners, they gave the
titles of “governor” and “vice-governor” to the prefect of police
and his assistant from the small town of Uraga where Perry
was to land. It was these two lowly officials, prompted by
representatives of the Shogun who remained in the back¬
ground, who met Perry when he finally set foot on the sacred
soil of Japan.
The delivery of the letter to the “governor” took place on
July 14, six days after the American squadron anchored in the
closed waters. Both sides used their resources to provide an
impressive pageant. Perry landed to the music of two bands,
accompanied by over a hundred marines in full uniform, and
with a personal escort of two tall, muscular Negroes, armed to
the teeth. Offshore the American squadron swung at anchor,
guns primed and aimed, ready for any treachery. The Japanese
erected a special building for the ceremony and provided it
with several arm chairs for Perry and his aides. The leaders
of the Japanese delegation sat on camp stools, while the rest
of the delegation sat on mats in oriental fashion. Around the
building were several thousand Japanese soldiers, armed with
swords, spears, and brass-mounted muskets, and each of their
38 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

units flying the flag of their feudal prince. At a respectful

distance was a large gathering of civilians, curious and anxious
to see the behavior of the foreign intruders.
The ceremonies were completed in half an hour. Perry was
introduced to an official who was called the “First Councilor
of the Empire,” actually a provincial governor who had docu¬
ments authorizing him to receive the American letter in behalf
of the Emperor. Perry delivered both the original and dupli¬
cate of the message which President Fillmore addressed to his
“Great and Good Friend,” the Japanese Emperor. The “Ad¬
miral” then re-embarked, warning that he would return the
following spring with an even larger naval squadron to receive
the reply to the President’s request. It was to be some years
before American knowledge of the Japanese political system
revealed the misconceptions on which the appeal to the Em¬
peror was based. Actual political power was held by an
oligarchic group of feudal lords, headed by a shogun whom
the Americans called “tycoon” of the House of Tokugawa. The
Emperor was a figurehead, not even to be consulted about the
policy crisis which the American expedition provoked.
Perry was asked to leave Japanese shores at once when the
ceremonies were over, but the Commodore was curious and
believed that further defiance of the exclusion laws was im¬
portant. After permitting several Japanese on board the Susque¬
hanna to observe its engines, he steamed into the inner bay
of Tokyo and came almost within sight of the capital itself.
Anchoring, he launched a number of small boats to survey the
bay and even sent one some distance up one of the Japanese
rivers. When he had gathered his information and was satis¬
fied that he had impressed the authorities with his determina¬
tion to travel where he pleased, Perry left Japan for Okinawa
with the major part of his squadron. The Saratoga was sent
back to Shanghai to prepare for the return of the expedition.
In Okinawa Perry was so encouraged by his preliminary sue-
JAPANS WALL CRUMBLES 39
cess with the Japanese that he requested land from the Oki¬
nawans for the establishment of a coal depot at the harbor.
He also demanded that his men be left free to travel and trade
among the Okinawans without official surveillance. The Regent
of Naha in a delaying action offered a number of reasons why
it was impossible for him to make these concessions. Perry
responded with an ultimatum. If his demands were not met by
noon on the next day, he would land a force of 200 men and
take over the Regent’s palace until his needs were satisfied.
The threat worked, and it gave added assurance to Perry of
the effectiveness of the fear of force in dealing with oriental
peoples.
Back in the United States the new Democratic administration
of President Franklin Pierce was receiving the news of the
success of Perry’s first effort. The expedition had been initiated
by the Whigs, and the Democrats had denounced it in the
1852 election campaign as an effort to gather in the votes of
American expansionists. But expansionist-minded Democrats
were not ready to disavow a venture which might well bring
further glory to the flag. Secretary of Navy Dobbin sent Perry
word of the President’s gratification with the progress of his
efforts. But Perry was also warned of the President’s convic¬
tion that the end should be attained “not only with credit to
the United States, but without wrong to Japan.” The Pierce
administration strongly rejected Perry’s aspirations to annex
the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. The tremendous gains of the
Mexican annexations of 1848, to be followed late in 1854 by
the Gadsden Purchase, satisfied for the time being the land
hunger of many expansionists. Perry was informed that Presi¬
dent Pierce was “disinclined” to retain possession of distant
islands whose defense would be “inconvenient and expensive.”
The general public reaction to the news of Perry’s first visit
was very favorable. Wells Williams, the missionary-interpreter,
was one of the rare few to sound a sour note in regard to the
40 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

historic significance of this contact between Japan and the

United States. Writing to his brother, Williams said that the
event was:

. . . the meeting of the East and West, the circling of

the world’s intercourse, the beginning of American inter¬
ference in Asia, the putting of the key in the door of
Japanese seclusion, the violation of the sanctity of Japa¬
nese soil, and to me alone, a full revenge for the un¬
provoked firing on the defenseless Morrison . . .
But Wells’ taste for revenge did not quiet his concern about
the goals of Perry’s effort. Its “real reasons,” he wrote, are
“glorification of the Yankee nation and food for praising our¬
selves.”
Back in Japan the members of the Shogunate, the Shogun’s
Council, were facing a harsh dilemma. The policy of seclusion
had been initiated for the defense of Japan and had the sanc¬
tion of over 200 years of ancestral law. But for some decades
before the arrival of Perry, Japanese leaders had been debating
the adequacy of the exclusion policy as a means of continuing
to defend the interests and security of the nation. From the
north Russia was advancing and establishing trading posts in
the Kurile Islands; from the south the British, having defeated
the Chinese, were pushing their commercial and whaling
operations closer to Japan’s shores. The Opium War had dem¬
onstrated clearly that any military opposition to the European
advance would require great efforts and great sacrifices.
Two general schools of thought developed. The advocates
of joi, “expel the barbarians,” favored a policy of all-out re¬
sistance. They recognized that Japan had much to learn from
the West in military matters, and some favored the introduc¬
tion through the Dutch of the weapons and skills which would
remove some of the inequalities. But these Japanese patriots
believed that their nation must fight, if necessary, rather than
be humbled by the foreign demands. The other school, kaikoku,
“open the country,” was pessimistic about the possibilities of
JAPANS WALL CRUMBLES 41

military success, and favored temporary concessions to the

westerners. At the same time this group favored using the
opened ports to westernize rapidly Japan’s military force by
introducing foreign instructors and sending students abroad.
Both schools agreed that the western powers represented a
threat to Japan’s independence and that western military tech¬
niques must be imported to meet that threat. Their differences
centered on the tactics to be used in meeting the immediate
threat.
Faced with this division of opinion, the head of the Sho-
gunate’s Council of State circulated copies of Perry’s letter
among all the feudal lords of his domain and solicited their
views about the policy to be followed in dealing with Perry
when he returned. There was no unanimity in the replies. One
strong minority favored total rejection of the American over¬
ture and preparation for the defense of Japan. Others accepted
what appeared to them to be the inevitability of trade and the
curtailment of the exclusion policy. A third group urged a
policy of delay and conciliation of the foreigners, while pre¬
paring militarily for the day when Japan could deal with the
westerners as equals.
It was the latter view which provided the basis for the
Shogunate’s policy. A realistic appraisal was made of Japan’s
technological inferiority in the art of war, and the patriotic
dream that the two-sworded samurai could easily drive the
foreigners into the sea was dismissed. One opinion of ignorant
people even held that foreign feet had no heels, since western
shoes all had leather heels to prop up their wearer. From this
it was concluded that it would be a simple matter to tip over
the invaders and leave them helpless on their backs. But on
the level of the Shogunate, it was realized that Perry’s cannon
could vent great destruction on Japan’s coastal cities, while
the ancient cannons of the defenders would drop their shots
far short of the targets. “Despise not the lessons of the Chinese
opium war,” Lord Mito warned the Shogun.
42 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Some of the Shogunate’s advisers even urged an alliance
with Russia as the least aggressive of the western nations, in
the hope of effective Russian aid against the Americans, British,
or French. In the fall of 1853, a few months after Perry’s
departure, a Russian squadron under Admiral Evfimii Putiatin
arrived at Nagasaki. Secretary of Navy Dobbin had informed
Perry of the dispatch of a Russian naval expedition to the
Far East, “probably in the laudable pursuit in which the
squadron under your command is now engaged.” But Perry
was anxious to maintain a monopoly of this “laudable pursuit,”
and had tried to block the Russians by buying up all the coal
in Shanghai, knowing that they needed to refuel in order to
reach the Japanese coasts. The American in charge of the
naval stores proved susceptible to Russian entreaties, how¬
ever, and when Admiral Putiatin begged for the loan of 20
tons, it was given. Perry was furious when he learned of this
aid, but the Russians did not beat him in getting a treaty. The
Japanese told the Russians that the Shogun had died, and that
they would be unable to transact any business for a year. With
this news the Russian expedition returned to Shanghai, where
it sought the loan of more American coal as well as permission
to join forces with the Perry mission.
From his public statements Perry seems to have been a con¬
vinced Russophobe, believing in the eventual struggle of “the
Saxon and the Cossack” for the domination of the shores of
eastern Asia. “The antagonistic opponents of freedom and
absolutism,” he argued in 1856, would fight a mighty battle
and “on its issue will depend the freedom or slavery of the
world—despotism or rational liberty must be the fate of civil¬
ized man.” He was, therefore, unwilling to do anything which
would give the Russians the slightest encouragement, and he
strongly rejected their overtures. The outbreak of the Crimean
War early in 1854, making Russia the enemy of Britain and
France, was a further setback for the Tsar’s expedition.
The Japanese had informed Perry through the Dutch of the
JAPAN’S WALL CRUMBLES 43
death of the Shogun and of the suspension of public business
during the period of mourning, but the Commodore was de¬
termined to avoid any further delay. On February 12, 1854,
the American expedition returned to Tokyo Bay. The squadron
was now at full strength with nine ships, including three steam
frigates. The Japanese received their returned guests politely,
but remained as firm as ever in trying to limit the American
area of operations. More than two weeks were consumed in
negotiating over the location at which Perry was to receive
the answer to President Fillmore’s letter. According to Japa¬
nese sources, Perry repeatedly threatened to use force, warn¬
ing that he would return with an even larger squadron if the
answer was unsatisfactory and boasting of the American mili¬
tary power in the defeat of Mexico. A site was finally agreed
upon near Yokohama and considerably closer to Tokyo than
the first point on which the Americans had landed. On March
8, 1854, Perry again stepped on shore, this time to reach a
definite agreement about future Japanese-American relations.
After serving the Americans tea, the Japanese presented
Perry with a long scroll on which the Shogun’s answer was
written. Two of the American requests were granted. Hos¬
pitality was henceforth to be offered to ships and their crews in
distress; one harbor, Nagasaki, was to be opened to enable
American ships to secure coal, wood, water, and provisions.
But Perry was quite dissatisfied with the reply, and refused the
offer of Nagasaki because of the Dutch tradition of subser¬
vience in that port. Wells Williams commented critically on the
subsequent negotiations:

The letter last year asked for one port; now Perry wants
five. . . . What an inconsistency is here exhibited, and
what conclusions can they draw from it except that we
have come on a predatory excursion.
The Commodore went further and pressed the Japanese to
sign a commercial treaty modeled on that made with China
shortly after the conclusion of the Opium War. The Japanese
44 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

were firm in rejecting the opening of trade relations, and

pleaded that the Americans must accept gradual change; it was
impossible, they said, to discard the laws and customs of three
centuries at once. Perry accepted this point with reluctance
and instead secured the opening of two ports for the provision¬
ing of American ships, with the further proviso that an Ameri¬
can consul would become a resident of one of the treaty ports.
The negotiators affixed their signatures to a treaty on March
31, 1854, and Perry’s mission was formally concluded.
The negotiations were accompanied and perhaps even facili¬
tated by a great deal of feasting and drinking; the Japanese
exhibited a fondness for the American liquors and the Ameri¬
cans developed some facility with chopsticks. There was also
an exchange of presents. The American gift which most de¬
lighted the Japanese was a quarter-sized railroad which was
operated in a loop of over a hundred yards. The Americans
in mock fashion pretended to sell tickets to the major Japa¬
nese cities and ports, while the Japanese crowded on top of the
cars and were whirled around at a speed of 15 miles an hour.
In addition the Japanese were presented with, a telegraph, a
number of mechanical devices, and copies of G. W. Kendall’s
The War Between the United States and Mexico and R. S.
Ripley’s War with Mexico with grim, grisly illustrations which
impressed the Japanese with the realities of western warfare.
Several members of the expedition believed that the Colt
revolvers were the individual gifts most coveted by the Japa¬
nese.
The presents of Japan to the Americans marked the differ¬
ences of the cultures, consisting mainly of artistic products
such as lacquer ware, porcelains, and fine cloth. Some of
Perry’s men felt that the gifts the expedition received were a
poor exchange in terms of the monetary value of the American
manufactures given Japan. The Japanese in turn were to learn
quickly that western nations placed far greater value on
Samuel Colt’s products than on artistic creations. The Ameri-
JAPAN’S WALL CRUMBLES 45
cans admired the Japanese muskets for their fine handwork but
laughed at their firing power. Once they grasped the value of
weapons, the Japanese became so bold as to ask Perry for four
howitzers from his ships’ armament. The Commodore was
at first indignant, but finally gave the Japanese a single howitzer
and forwarded the request for more to Washington.
The new treaty was sent off to Washington on the Saratoga
on April 4. It was given Senate approval in July and signed by
President Pierce on August 7, 1854. Perry remained at his
anchorage for several weeks; before leaving he took his ships
close enough to Tokyo to assure himself that the city could
be destroyed by a few heavily armed, shallow-draft steamers.
Then he set off to inspect the new treaty ports of Shimoda and
Hakodate.
The Japanese negotiators had made greater concessions than
the Shogunate had expected would be necessary to avoid war
with the Americans. When the news of the treaty spread to
the feudal lords, it aroused strong opposition among those
who believed that the end of exclusion jeopardized Japan’s
sovereignty. Perry’s visit to the treaty ports created additional
hostility and provided a sample of the type of friction which
was to characterize Japanese-American relations for several
decades. The Japanese, from their point of view, found many
of the Americans to be unpleasant guests. The sailors com¬
plained about the Japanese prices and the drunkards among
them rowed with the local population. One of Perry’s chaplains
began missionary activities—carefully avoided before the treaty
was signed—by leaving Christian tracts in a Japanese temple.
The Americans, in turn, complained that the Japanese officials
continued to spy on them when they travelled on shore and put
many obstacles in the way of what were considered normal
Yankee business transactions. There was also some shocked
reaction to what appeared to be Japanese immorality; mixed
nude public bathing, display of phallic symbols, and an open
interest in sex.
46 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
While these initial problems of the new relationship were
disturbing the Japanese, Washington was expressing its elation
over the news of Perry’s success. The text of the treaty was to
be a secret until signed by the President, but it was reproduced
in the New York Times two days after it received Senate ap¬
proval in executive session. When charged with releasing
official secrets, the Times claimed the existence of a corre¬
spondent in Japan, allegedly the favorite of the Emperor, who
had rushed a translation of the Japanese version to New York.
But this was a minor incident amid the general rejoicing in
which the limits of Perry’s treaty were commonly overlooked.
The Times Washington correspondent went so far as to claim
that “the hand and blessing of God can be seen in the degree
and privileges and freedom which has been obtained.” Praise
for the Japanese was widely accorded. The New York Herald
which had spoken with some contempt of this oriental people
now characterized them as “enlightened, free and tolerant.”
American evaluations of the significance of the treaty ex¬
pressed the viewpoint of a nation with unlimited optimism and
faith in its destiny. Trade with the Far East was expected to
skyrocket. The treaty, according to the Daily Alta California,
was “the entering wedge that will, ere long, open to us the
interior wealth of these unknown lands, which shall pour their
riches in our lap.” On the other side of the continent, the
Baltimore Sun reported rumors of the impending purchase of
Alaska and the Russian lands across the Bering Sea to give the
United States a predominantly land route to Japan, China,
and India which would “knock the Isthmus of Suez into a
cocked hat.” Secretary of Navy Dobbins, in presenting the
treaty to the President, stated his faith that it would “advance
the cause of civilization, liberty and religion.”
The editors of the North American Review were almost
alone among Americans in voicing some fears as to the future
of Japan after the western impact. “We trust,” they said,
“Japan may acquire that skill in the use of European arms
JAPAN’S WALL CRUMBLES 47
which shall protect her seaports from the insults of lawless
seamen, and her territory from the covetousness of any foreign
power.” An Irish editorialist, thinking of the fate of his own
nation, suggested in the Dublin Nation that the American ex¬
pedition might be for the Japanese “the fatal parent of their
subjugation and destruction.” And Perry's British counterpart,
Lord Elgin, after negotiating the Anglo-Japanese treaty, ex¬
pressed his fears to his journal, “God grant that in opening
their country to the West, we may not be bringing upon them
misery and ruin.”
While Perry was being feted in the United States and
granted a $20,000 bonus voted by Congress, the new treaty was
being put to the test by the early birds among the American
traders. In May of 1854, before the treaty was even ratified,
an American clipper, the Lady Pierce, entered Tokyo Bay.
Fitted out as a pleasure craft by its owner, Silas Burrows, the
Lady Pierce came from San Francisco, and carried on board
a shipwrecked Japanese who had drifted across the Pacific.
The reception given to Burrows was very cordial. As a Japa¬
nese official told him, “Commodore Perry brought with him
too many large guns and fighting men to be pleasing to us;
but you have come in your beautiful ship to visit us without
any hostile weapons.” In return the Americans opened the ship
to hundreds of curious Japanese who were permitted to make
careful drawings of the clipper which were later used to pro¬
duce two Japanese duplicates. When Burrows inquired about
the possibilities of trade, he was referred to the treaty port of
Shimoda.
American commercial interests were prone to equate the end
of exclusion with the opening of trade and to ignore the strict
limitations of the treaty. Burrows found the prospects of trade
at Shimoda disappointing, but the Lady Pierce was succeeded
in Shimoda by another trading ship, the Caroline E. Foote.
This latter ship brought home to the Japanese the elastic in¬
terpretation which some Americans were prepared to give the
48 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

shipwreck convention. On board were a number of Americans

with their wives and children, prepared to establish residence
at Shimoda and to open a ships’ chandlery. Another ship ar¬
rived shortly after with two more American entrepreneurs
who planned to open a grog shop to cater to the whaling ships’
crews. More than 40 American whalers were expected to visit
Shimoda in 1855. Unprepared for this rapid expansion of
foreign enterprise, the Japanese officials ordered the Ameri¬
cans to leave, claiming with some justification that such activi¬
ties were not contemplated by the treaty with Perry. Article
VIII, referring to the procurement of provisions and goods by
the American ships, stipulated that these should be handled by
Japanese officers appointed for that purpose and in no other
manner. The Americans argued in reply that “when a treaty
gives a thing, it gives everything which is necessary to the
enjoyment of the thing given.”
At this point in the dispute another American naval squadron
arrived in Japanese waters, the Ringgold-Rodgers expedition.
Authorized by Congress shortly before Perry left on his mission,
this expedition was ordered to survey and chart Far Eastern
waters for future steamship routes as well as to test the treaty
which Perry was expected to negotiate. The expedition’s com¬
mander in Japanese waters, Lieutenant John Rodgers, was a
worthy successor of Perry in ability and aggressiveness.
Rodgers visited the Okinawan port of Naha in November of
1854 and found the Okinawans unwilling to meet his demands
for food, pleading the meagerness of their resources. Repeat¬
ing Perry’s methods, Rodgers issued an ultimatum, landed a
force of 100 men with a cannon, and marched on the capital.
The Okinawans granted all that was demanded.
Rodgers then sailed for Shimoda, where he arrived at the
high point of contention between the Japanese officials and the
American ship chandlers and groghouse keepers. After hearing
the arguments, Rodgers decided that the Japanese were un¬
willing to honor the Perry treaty. He wrote Washington that
JAPAN S WALL CRUMBLES 49
Japan’s acceptance of Perry’s proposals seemed to have been
“dictated by apprehension of some greater evil.” Only a repeti¬
tion of Perry’s methods would be effective, since “words with¬
out authority of many cannon will avail little” in Japan. But
Rodgers had no authorization to use force, and restricted him¬
self to verbal protests in behalf of the ship chandlers. For
the purveyors of alcohol he had little sympathy, since they
contributed to the drunkenness of his own crew and had no
proof of American citizenship.
The disappointed traders left Japan after threatening to
return with a filibustering expedition. When they reached
California, they organized the first anti-Japanese lobby. Claims
were filed against the Japanese government in federal courts
for business losses, and a protest sent to the Secretary of State.
The California press took up their cause, and responded with
a number of anti-Japanese editorials. One newspaper de¬
nounced the Perry treaty as “a miserable abortion,” while an¬
other called for the bombardment of Japan’s coastal towns
as proper punishment for the perfidious Orientals. In the east,
James Gordon Bennett’s belligerent New York Herald took
up the cause of the businessmen and demanded action from
the Pierce administration.
The departure of the Rodgers expedition in June of 1855
gave Japan a year’s respite from the visits of American war¬
ships and a brief breathing space in which to review their rela¬
tions with the western intruders. Despite their continued ex¬
changes with the Dutch, the Japanese were commercially naive.
The Shogunate’s original proposals to Perry had been to supply
American ships with such things as food, wood, water, and
coal free of charge for a trial period of three to five years.
The Commodore had insisted that the Americans could not
accept goods without payment, and article VII provided that
the Americans could exchange gold and silver coins or other
articles for the provisions which they received. This was un¬
doubtedly an opening wedge for trade. A hundred years later.
50 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
on the anniversary of the Perry treaty, a Moscow radio com¬
mentator was to denounce the Commodore as having come to
Japan as “a colonialist to build a bridgehead with the gun and
bayonet so that the American capitalist could convert Japan
into an American colony.” Perry’s imperialist visions fell far
short of the Russian charges, but he had won concessions which
were to press Japan into coping not only with the technology
of the West but its economy as well.
Chapter IV

WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND "CURIOS”

W HEN GENERAL U. S. GRANT visited Japan in 1879,

he was shocked by what had happened in the quarter
century following the Perry visit. “I have seen things that
made my blood boil in the way the European powers attempt
to degrade the Asiatic nations,” he told Japan’s emperor. Be¬
lieving themselves incapable of effective resistance to the de¬
mands of the western naval squadrons which followed in
Perry’s wake, the Japanese made concession upon concession.
Rights which “no European nation, no matter how small,
would surrender,” Grant complained, were denied to Japan
and China. The former President, like other American ob¬
servers, feared that Japan, like China, was to be carved up as
the victim of European imperialism.
The British were first in line after Perry, a fitting order since
it was Britain’s coercion of China which had softened up Japan
for the Americans. The news of the dispatch of an Ameri¬
can mission to Japan had been welcomed in London. Foreign
Secretary Lord Malmesbury said that it was ‘Letter to leave
it to the Government of the United States to make that ex¬
periment; and if that experiment is successful, Her Majesty’s
Government can take advantage of its success.” Less than
5*
52 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

three months after Perry’s departure, Sir James Stirling, Com-

mander-in-Chief of Britain’s China squadron, arrived at Naga¬
saki with four warships. After weeks of negotiation, Stirling
secured a convention which opened Nagasaki and Hakodate to
British ships for repairs and supplies. The convention also in¬
cluded a most-favored-nation clause, granting to Britain any
privileges henceforth granted to other nations. This device,
subsequently written into other western treaties, extended each
concession squeezed from Japan to all other treaty powers.
Like Perry, Stirling threatened to sail to Tokyo when the
Japanese stalled on signing his treaty. When the British ad¬
miral returned to secure ratification of the treaty, he again
followed Perry’s example and to impress the Japanese in¬
creased the size of his squadron to 11 vessels. The Russians
followed the British and gained a treaty which expanded
relations further by entitling them to pay for their ships’ sup¬
plies in either goods or cash. Russian citizens also secured
freedom of action in the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate.
France and Holland followed the Russians. France obtained its
first treaty, and Holland expanded upon the existing treaty re¬
lationship.
The arrival of Townsend Harris, the first American consul,
at Shimoda on the U.S.S. San Jacinto in August of 1856 was to
be followed by an even greater widening of Japan’s contacts
with the West. A prominent New York merchant, Harris was
appointed by President Pierce with the recommendation of
Commodore Perry and given authority to negotiate a com¬
mercial treaty. Persistent, righteous, and unyielding, Harris
overcame all Japanese objections to further negotiations and in
1857 won an expansion of the Perry treaty and a broad com¬
mercial treaty in 1858. A leading scholar of American diplo¬
macy in the Far East, Tyler Dennett, called Harris’ feat “the
most brilliant diplomatic achievement of the United States in
Asia for the entire century.”
Before coming to Japan, Harris travelled in Asia and shared
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND <‘CURIOS,> 53
with other Americans the moral indignation aroused by Euro¬
pean treatment of China. But he was not opposed in practice
to using warship diplomacy. In Siam Harris made a treaty
which permitted American merchants to bring opium into
Siamese ports duty free and which granted American mission¬
aries freedom to seek converts. These major concessions were
the product of long and tedious bargaining. By the time the
Siamese treaty was concluded, Harris confided to his journal
that the dispatch of two or three men-of-war was the “'proper”
way to negotiate with these “false, base and cowardly people.”
At Shimoda Harris threatened to sail to Tokyo when the
governor failed to receive him, and again the technique worked.
A temple was set aside for his residence, and Harris raised the
first consular flag to fly in Japan. A persistent Japanese legend
links Harris with the “Madame Butterfly” story of a geisha who
entered his household as a lady attendant and who later com¬
mitted suicide when she was ostracized by the local popula¬
tion. Harris’ journal contains no hint of such a romantic inter¬
lude and instead is marked by his complaints against the in¬
adequacy of the local diet, his frequent illnesses, and the
harassments of the local officials who made life unpleasant for
their unwelcome visitor. Less than a year after his arrival,
however, Harris obtained from the Japanese the right to use
Nagasaki as a port of supply, permanent residence rights for
Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate, and the grant of extra¬
territoriality, making American violators of Japanese laws sub¬
ject only to their own consular courts.
With no American warships in the harbor during his nego¬
tiations, Harris had to rely largely on persuasion, helped on
one occasion by threat of future action. Difficulties developed
over the rate of exchange between Japanese and American
coinage. Perry, in his ignorance of Japanese coinage, had ac¬
cepted equal exchange with a silver coin which contained only
one-third the silver of its American equivalent. Harris pro¬
posed that coins be exchanged, gold and silver, weight for
54 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
weight. The Japanese were agreeable but wanted to discount
the American coins by 25 percent, the amount they claimed it
would cost them to melt and remint the foreign coins. Harris
stood firm on 5 percent discount. When the Japanese were slow
to compromise, Harris asked that the conference room be
cleared of all but the most important officials. According to his
journal, he then read a paragraph from his instructions saying
that if the Japanese did not meet “reasonable expectations”
his country was ready to use arguments of the sort that Japan
could not resist. Harris recorded the results of his remarks:
“the fluttering was fearful—the effect strong.” The Japanese
settled for a 6 percent discount.
After negotiating his first commercial convention, Harris
broke precedent by securing an audience at the Shogun’s court
in Tokyo and asking for a comprehensive commercial treaty.
In September of 1857 he wrote to Secretary of State Lewis
Cass to inform him that a display of American naval force
would secure his new treaty at once, but that he also rec¬
ognized that another humiliation of the proud Japanese would
not fail to leave “a sore feeling in their minds4.” Lacking war¬
ships to back his demands, Harris argued that the Japanese
should make a model treaty with the Americans which could
then be given to the concession-hungry European powers.
When he played upon the rumors of the impending arrival of
new British and French squadrons from China, the Japanese
complied and gave Harris his commercial pact.
Four additional ports were opened for trade and the tariff
set low enough to favor American imports. American residents
were permitted the free exercise of their religion, but pledged
not to excite religious animosity. In turn Japan was promised
that the President of the United States would act as “a friendly
mediator” on request in any differences arising between Japan
and the European powers. Provision was made for Japanese
purchase in the United States of warships, cannons, and muni¬
tions as well as for the hiring of scientists, naval, and military
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 55
men for Japanese service. There was no reluctance about aid¬
ing the Japanese to arm; already in October of 1856 an Ameri¬
can merchant ship had tried to dispose of a cargo of ammu¬
nition in Japan, but it turned out to be too old to be sal¬
able.
Less than two weeks after the Japanese signed Harris’ treaty,
a British naval squadron arrived to seek more commercial con¬
cessions. Japan agreed to a treaty which followed closely the
American model, except that the British secured a cut on the
textile tariff from 20 to 5 percent to favor their exporters.
Russia, France, and the Netherlands again followed on Britain’s
heels and by the end of 1858 were enjoying similar advantages.
The Japanese capital was now opened to foreign representa¬
tives, and in the summer of 1859 Harris moved from Shimoda
to take up residence at the court of the Shogun with the min¬
isters of the other treaty powers.
The new network of treaties which Harris had initiated
was revolutionary in its impact upon Japan. An influx of for¬
eigners where for centuries no alien had intruded and the re¬
sulting destruction of traditional patterns was a shock to
Japan’s institutions. The Japanese officials were unable to
foresee the changes which the foreigners would introduce. The
American commercial agent at Hakodate wrote Harris that the
American sailors demanded that they be supplied with rum
and women or they would seize the port. Harris in turn pressed
the demands upon the Japanese officials who agreed to make
these provisions as “a health measure.” Seamen brawls with the
local populace created other difficulties. One of the officers of
the Ringgold-Rodgers expedition boasted in his memoirs that
on several occasions he and his fellows turned on the samurai
and kicked them when they were unable to dissuade the Japa¬
nese from watching their activities. This same officer com¬
plained after a stay in Japan that “natural depravity and im¬
purity of taste is perceptible at almost every turn.” But to the
popular Japanese mind the foreigner was looked upon as a
56 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

desecrator of Japan’s sacred soil and blamed for an extraor¬

dinary succession of earthquakes, floods, fires, and storms.
With more reason foreigners could be viewed as the source of
new diseases which spread quickly among a people long
isolated and without the normal immunities.
Japan’s economy was also greatly disrupted. Japanese gold
coins were exchanged for the silver coins at a rate of 3 to 1
rather than at the world rate of 16 to 1. Foreigners were quick
to take advantage of this situation and to make large profits
by exchanging foreign silver for Japanese gold coins at the 3
to 1 ratio and then shipping the gold to China where it com¬
manded its full value on the world market. Harris profited
by this device and saved $6,000 out of his first year’s salary of
$5,000, as well as making an additional $2,500 by taking for¬
eign gold coins from the Japanese at one-third their market
value. Within a year Japan’s gold supply was seriously de¬
pleted, the cost of living rose rapidly and brought economic
distress to many Japanese.
The anti-foreign leaders among Japan’s feudal lords began
to concentrate their strength at the Imperial Court at Kyoto.
Here the Mikado lived with only nominal political power,
while the Shogun ruled. This Imperial Court began to grow in
strength while the Shogunate was weakened by its policy of
conceding to foreigners. The Emperor refused to give his sanc¬
tion to the 1858 series of treaties and in 1859 took the initiative
in asking the Shogun to revert to the policy of exclusion as
soon as possible. The Harris treaty, said the Imperial Edict,
was “a blemish on our Empire and a stain on our divine land.”
There was recognition, however, by both the Imperial Court
and the Shogunate that action could only be taken after Japan
had advanced technically to the point of being able to match
the military power of the westerners. In the meantime the
policy of procrastination and hedging was the only means of
checking the extension of foreign influence.
The officials who negotiated with Harris appealed fre-
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 57
quently for delay and caution in expanding the areas of con¬
tact between the Japanese people and foreigners. Harris dis¬
missed their pleas as an effort to evade responsibility. When he
was warned of the existence of dangerous groups of ronin
pledged to strike down the intruders, he assured the Japanese
that their fears were exaggerated. Harris was personally, how¬
ever, far more judicious in his public appearances than many
of his fellow Americans and other westerners. Many of the
traders came to Japan from China, where they had habitually
been contemptuous of the Oriental and his customs, and these
men saw no need to change their behavior patterns in Japan.
In the summer of 1859 attacks began on foreigners as well
as on Japanese who worked for foreigners. Three Russian
sailors were the first to be assaulted, followed by employees
of the French, British, and Dutch ministers. The Shogunate
made some effort to provide protection, but the police system
was inadequate. Among the assassins were samurai retained by
powerful lords of the “Expel the barbarians” faction, and these
attackers were protected by their employers. The anti-foreign
outburst was a part of the general turbulence produced by the
rapid economic changes in which violence was used by peas¬
ants and samurai against Japanese leaders as well. The price
of rice rose more than tenfold between 1860 and 1867, and
some other necessities of life became increasingly scarce.
In January of 1861 the Dutch interpreter who had served
Harris since 1856 was assassinated. The murderer was not ap¬
prehended, although Harris was convinced that the police
were searching diligently. In May of 1861 Secretary of State
William Seward, despite the more immediate concern of war
with the southern states, proposed a joint naval demonstration
in Japanese waters to suppress anti-foreign activities. The pro¬
posal was strongly opposed by Harris who did not believe
that with the best of intentions the Japanese could secure
prompt administration of justice with the existing police sys¬
tem. He was disturbed by the inability of the western govern-
58 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

ments to understand the situation and wrote to his British col¬

league, Sir Rutherford Alcock:

I had hoped that the page of future history might record

the great fact that in one spot in the Eastern world the
advent of Christian civilization did not bring with it its
usual attendants of rapine and bloodshed; this fond hope,
I fear, is to be disappointed. I would sooner see all the
Treaties with this country torn up, and Japan return to its
old state of isolation, than witness the horrors of war
inflicted on this peaceful people and happy land.
When the other western ministers withdrew to Yokohama
for the protection of their naval forces, Harris remained un¬
molested, the lone foreign representative in the Japanese
capital. Anti-foreign feeling was not all-pervading, since an
American vessel, the Cheralie, wrecked on the Japanese coast
in 1862, demonstrated that hospitality was still freely offered.
The American consul who reached the stranded crew reported
that the local population, the local officials, and the officials
sent from Tokyo all vied in administering to the needs of the
shipwrecked men.
The years 1863 and 1864 saw the most extreme use of
western warship diplomacy. An attack on the British legation
in 1862 and the subsequent murder of a British subject who
had crossed a travelling procession of a high Japanese official
led London to lay plans for a new naval demonstration in
1863. In the spring of that year a Japanese Imperial Edict pro¬
claimed that intercourse with the West would end the follow¬
ing June. The Shogunate notified the powers that the termina¬
tion of exclusion had been only an experiment; it had failed
and treaty privileges were therefore being withdrawn. The re¬
action of the powers, led by Britain, was to insist on the main¬
tenance of the rights they had acquired. As Sir Rutherford
Alcock, the British minister, stated bluntly:

All treaties made with Japan have been forced upon it;
and it is in vain to expect that Treaties so entered into
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND tlCURIOS” 59
can be maintained by a religious abstinence from the use
of force as a means. All diplomacy in these regions which
does not rest on a solid substratum of force must of
necessity fail in its object.

For the United States the showdown came at a most in¬

auspicious time, since the nation was torn in two by the Civil
War and there was little naval power available for warship
diplomacy in Asian waters. But circumstances led the United
States into firing the first shots. In June of 1863 an American
merchant ship, the Pembroke, en route from Yokohama to
Nagasaki and Shanghai was fired upon in passing through the
Strait of Shimonoseki which led out of Japan’s Inland Sea. One
side of the Strait was held by the Lord of Choshu who took the
initiative in trying to enforce the edict to rid Japan of the
foreigner. The American ship escaped unharmed, but within a
month damage was inflicted on French and Dutch vessels
using the Strait. When the news of the first attack reached
Tokyo, a six-gun American sloop, the Wyoming, was anchored
in the harbor of Yokohama. Robert Pruyn, Townsend Harris’
successor as American minister, had been given discretionary
power in the use of naval forces by Secretary of State Seward
and ordered the Wyoming to take punitive action against the
Choshu lord. While losing six men as a result of shots from the
shore batteries, Commander McDougal of the Wyoming suc¬
ceeded in sinking two of the Choshu ships. In Tokyo Minister
Pruyn presented the Japanese government with a claim for
$10,000 to compensate the crew and owners of the Pembroke
for the dangers they had faced and the losses occasioned by
delaying their voyage.
A month after the American punitive expedition, a seven-
ship British squadron attacked the city of Kagoshima, the seat
of power of the Lord of Satsuma, whose clan had been re¬
sponsible for the killing of the British subject in 1862. When
their demand for an indemnity of over a hundred thousand
dollars was refused, the British destroyed the city’s forts and
6o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

reduced the city itself to ashes. The Satsuma leaders then paid
the indemnity and began negotiations for the purchase of a
modern warship from Britain.
In September of 1864 the treaty powers combined on a new
attack on the Choshu lord who was attempting to close the
Strait of Shimonoseki. Although no British ship had been at¬
tacked, Britain took the lead and furnished nine ships, while
France and the Netherlands supplied a smaller naval con¬
tingent. The only American naval vessel in Japanese waters
was a sailing ship, the Jamestown, which would have ham¬
pered the movement of the steamers. The British were anxious
to secure American participation and offered to tow the ship
to the conflict. A solution was found when the Americans
rented a small, unarmed steamer and transferred a gun and
crew from the sailing ship to carry the United States flag into
battle. The joint expedition successfully destroyed the forts of
Shimonoseki and opened the Strait to western traffic again.
The ministers of the western powers then decided to impose
a heavy indemnity on the Shogunate with the proviso that it
would be remitted if another port was opened to foreign trade.
The Japanese economy was already under some financial strain,
and Robert Pruyn had only collected the $10,000 asked for the
Pembroke after he brought a token force of some 60 seamen
and marines from the Jamestown to Tokyo to impress the
Japanese. A figure of approximately $2 million was first set as
the cost of the joint punitive expedition, but the French min¬
ister persuaded his colleagues to raise it to $3 million to make
it even more likely that the Shogunate would take the alter¬
native of opening anodier port. The money was paid, never¬
theless, and the United States received $785,000 as its share
of the indemnity. When the State Department Examiner of
Claims pronounced the whole affair an act of extortion, Sec¬
retary of State Seward put the money aside in a frozen fund.
The Shimonoseki expedition and the indemnity contributed
to the weakening of the power of the Shogun who had failed
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 61

to carry out the exclusion policy. Political factions turned to

the support of the Emperor, and the military efforts of the
Shogun, begun in 1866, to maintain power were unsuccessful.
In 1868 the Emperor was restored to his ancient position as
the sole source of power. Although many of the supporters of
the new government, the Meiji Restoration, favored the ex¬
pulsion of the westerners, they knew that Japan was far too
impotent to carry out this action. Only through westernization
of the military forces could such an end be achieved.
In 1866 the western powers, with the help of a strong naval
demonstration, collectively negotiated a new set of commercial
treaties which fastened additional bonds on Japan. Import and
export taxes were set at a maximum of 5 percent of the value
of the goods and many items placed on a free list, preventing
Japan from regulating foreign trade and increasing its revenue
through tariffs. The 1866 pact was “one of the most thoroughly
un-American treaties ever ratified by the American govern¬
ment,” Professor Tyler Dennett concluded in his review of
American diplomacy in Asia. Unable to meet its revenue needs
from the tariff, Japan turned to oppressively high taxes on
land as a source of capital to be used in westernizing the
nation.
While American policy was following a course which closely
paralleled that of the often condemned European “imperial¬
ism,” the American image of Japan was becoming an increas¬
ingly favorable one. Many Americans had their first oppor¬
tunity to view these mysterious island people in 1860. In that
year Japan sent its first embassy to the United States to ex¬
change ratifications of the Harris treaty. A party of 77 individ¬
uals headed by two ambassadors travelled on board a vessel
provided by the American Navy, the U.S.S. Powhatan. The
Japanese sent along as an escort a war vessel which became
the first to carry the flag of the Rising Sun across the Pacific.
The party landed at San Francisco in the spring of 1860,
where they were treated to the first of an intensive series of
62 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

receptions and entertainments which characterized American

hospitality. After a tour of the city which gave the curious
the opportunity to see the oriental guests and comment on
their dress and appearance, they were feted at a large banquet
held at Job’s Saloon where they met more than a hundred of
San Francisco’s leading citizens. After a week in the California
city they went south by steamer, crossed the Isthmus of
Panama by railroad, and were conveyed by American naval
vessels to Washington.
The arrival of the oriental guests via the Potomac drew
huge crowds, and even the roofs were jammed as they were
driven up Pennsylvania Avenue from the Navy Yard and
lodged at the Hotel Willard. For the next three weeks there
was an almost steady round of receptions in which they visited
the White House and Congress and were entertained by the
leading citizens. Crowds of curious gathered at times outside
of their hotel and even jammed the corridors. Hundreds of chil¬
dren gathered outside of their windows and chanted, “Jappy-
knee! Jappyknee! Give me a fan, won’t you; give me a pipe;
give me a cent, etc.” The obliging guests tossed coins to the
children and obliged hundreds of collectors, young and old, by
writing something for them in Japanese.
From Washington the party travelled by train to New York,
visiting Baltimore and Philadelphia en route. The same curi¬
osity that moved Washingtonians brought out large crowds in
the other cities, some crude individuals even leaping on to
the party’s carriages to peer inside at these strange creatures
from another world. The guests took this behavior without
complaint and often equalled the Americans in curiosity over
some of the sights. So different were Yankee customs that the
Japanese often laughed at what they saw and their hosts took
this as evidence of good spirits. In their first view of the United
States, the embassy was shocked at the social equality granted
women and refused to permit them to visit their ship while in
San Francisco harbor. But in time they came to accept the;
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND t(CURIOS,y &3
presence of women at receptions, shook hands with them
heartily, and one New York matron even claimed that a Japa¬
nese had kissed her hand at a reception given by General
Lewis Cass, President Buchanan’s Secretary of State.
The press reception to the Japanese visitors was overwhelm¬
ingly favorable. Their activities were given full treatment in
newspapers and magazines. Those Americans who did not see
the embassy in person could see sketches of the visitors in the
illustrated magazines. Observers commented on the ease and
dignity with which the Japanese conducted themselves in the
many situations which were so alien to their experience. That
they remained courteous and affable even when besieged by
curiosity seekers was also noted in their favor. The Japanese
civilization was obviously not the crude and unsophisticated
one which had often been presented in American writings
about Japan in the previous decades. Japan possesses “a higher
degree of culture and organization than prevails in any other
of the Asiatic races,” Frank Leslies Illustrated Newspaper told
its readers in reporting on the embassy. They should not be
confounded with the Chinese, so “degraded a race as the birds-
nest and puppy-dog eaters,” said the same magazine. The
Japanese are “the British of Asia,” said Harpers Weekly, “civil¬
ized as we boast of being, we can learn much of the Japanese.”
Comments were also made on Japanese generosity in leaving
behind $20,000 to be distributed in tips to those who had
served them in the various hotels in which they had resided.
The American image of Japan was also changed by the slow
growth of the appreciation of Japanese art and architecture.
The lacquered boxes and other Japanese products introduced
by traders were looked upon at first as mere curios, but soon
observant American eyes began to see in them unique aesthetic
qualities. When the embassy visited President Buchanan in
the White House, they noted that the wares given to Com¬
modore Perry as presents to the American President were
“tastefully displayed” in the President’s home. Americans also
64 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

began to appreciate Japanese prints, although recognition of

the quality of this art reached the United States largely
through Europe. A French artist, Felix Bracquemond, in 1856
discovered the great Japanese artist, Hokusai, by means of
some prints used as wrapping paper in packing oriental china.
Bracquemond’s excitement over this art form spread and by
1862 a shop for the sale of “japonaiseries” had opened in Paris.
The American artist, James Whistler, who had come to Paris
to study became an enthusiastic collector of Japanese art.
Whistler brought his enthusiasm to London and to Dante
Gabriel Rossetti, who became a leading collector. The 1860’s
saw the beginnings of a cult of British admirers of Japanese
prints, screens, fans, and other artistic objects. Some of the
qualities of Japanese painting were introduced to the United
States through Whistler’s own painting, and slowly through
those circles of artists and art lovers who learned of British
and French enthusiasm.
A display of Japanese “curios” at the Philadelphia Exhibi¬
tion in 1876 aroused so much interest that the following year
Tiffany & Company offered Americans a large selection of
articles purchased for this new market. Also in 1877 a Japa¬
nese company devoted to the encouragement of native arts
opened a branch office in New York to cater to the American
connoisseurs who had developed a taste for Japanese creations.
In 1878 a Harvard-trained scholar, Ernest Fenollosa, was
appointed to a chair in political economy and philosophy at
the University of Tokyo. Fenollosa, who came initially to teach
English, became interested in Japanese art at a time when the
Japanese were indulging in an orgy of “foreignism” in which
some extremists went so far in their acceptance of western
aesthetic cultural standards as to discard their fine collections of
Japanese art. The American professor fought this uncritical
westernization; he organized Japanese groups to encourage the
indigenous art forms and helped to organize a National Art
Museum. In 1887 he was given official support by the Japanese
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 65
government and headed a commission of specialists in making
an inventory and registry of Japan’s art treasures. Fenollosa
himself acquired a fine collection which he sold in 1886 to the
Boston Museum of Fine Arts. This became the first major col¬
lection of Japanese art in the United States, and Fenollosa re¬
turned to Boston in 1890 to be the curator of the Museum’s
Department of Oriental Art. Before his departure his contribu¬
tion to the preservation of Japanese art forms was recognized
by an Imperial decoration and an audience with the Emperor.
In the United States he lectured from coast to coast on Japa¬
nese art. Some Americans now recognized that Japan’s civiliza¬
tion stood with those long respected in the West as achieving
the highest levels in sensitivity to beauty and artistic creativity.
Japanese architecture also began to receive some attention in
the United States by the end of the nineteenth century. Japan
was the only oriental nation to participate in the Philadelphia
Centennial Exhibition in 1876, and the Japanese pavilion drew
more visitors than any other national exhibit. Much attention
was given to the display of bronzes, porcelains, lacquer ware,
and screens, but there was also great interest in the building
itself. Shipped across the Pacific and by train from California,
the Japanese pavilion was a two-story U-shaped building,
largely of cedar, which introduced a number of novel features
to American attention. Four years later an American architec¬
tural magazine pictured a small summer house built in Maine
under clearly discernible Japanese influence. In 1886 Edward
S. Morse published a comprehensive volume, Japanese Houses
And Their Surroundings, with copious illustrations and detailed
technical data for the use of American architects. Interest in
this volume led to the issuance of a second edition in 1889. A
Japanese pavilion was also constructed for the World Colum¬
bian Exposition in Chicago in 1893, a building which remained
on display until it burned in 1943. The Chicago pavilion in¬
fluenced a great many Amercan architects, including Frank
Lloyd Wright who built an American home on Japanese lines
66 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

shortly after seeing the exhibit. In San Francisco the Japanese

went further for the International Exposition of 1894 and built
a Japanese village which created a sensation. Some of the
buildings in this village remained permanently on display,
providing ideas for many architects.
American respect for Japan also grew as Americans watched
with amazement the speed with which Japan was able to adopt
and refine western technology. Already in 1861 the American
Annual Cyclopaedia wrote of Japanese attainments in the
“useful arts” as “extraordinary, surpassing in some particulars
those of the nations of the West. . . . They imitate perfectly
our manufactures.” The same publication noted that the Japa¬
nese were Mongols, but possessed “greater mental activity and
capacity for the acquisition of knowledge than any other na¬
tions belonging to that race.” In the annual edition for 1869 the
Cyclopaedia concluded that the Japanese “have already far
outstripped the Chinese in progress toward Western civiliza¬
tion.” Two years later this American review reported that the
transformation of Japan into a “thoroughly-civilized country”
was progressing with “a rapidity which challenges universal
admiration.” By 1871 approximately 500 Japanese students had
been sent to the United States to complete their studies and
further the westernization process. That same year Americans
could congratulate the Japanese on the great changes in their
attitudes toward women when 21 young ladies from the Japa¬
nese aristocracy were sent to the United States to be educated.
The rise in Japan’s status in the eyes of many Americans was
accompanied by and probably encouraged the changes in at¬
titude with which the United States dealt with Japan in diplo¬
macy. Co-operation with the European powers in militantly
upholding the one-sided treaty provisions began to weaken in
the 1870’s. In 1875 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish made it
clear that Americans on Japanese soil were required to observe
and obey the laws of that empire, with the United States re¬
taining only the power of “trying and punishing.” By contrast
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 6/

Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister, denied the binding

effect of Japanese law on British citizens and even claimed the
right to be consulted before any laws were enacted by Japan
which would affect foreigners. An American adviser to the
Japanese Foreign Office, Eli T. Sheppard, pointed out that the
British minister was “assuming the right to control the law¬
making power of this Empire.” When Japan in 1878 passed
laws requiring all vessels to pass through quarantine to avoid
the introduction of diseases, Parkes asserted that this legisla¬
tion would not be observed by British ships. In 1879 a German
ship, coming from a port in which cholera was raging, fol¬
lowed the British example and refused to pass through the
Japanese quarantine. Ex-President U. S. Grant, then visiting
Japan, believed the Japanese government would have been
legally justified in sinking the offending vessel.
American sympathies and encouragement were also given to
Japanese efforts to secure a revision of the unequal treaties.
The second article of the 1866 treaty stated that it was “subject
to revision on the first day of July 1872.” Guido Verbeck, an
American missionary who advised the Japanese government,
suggested in 1869 that they anticipate this date and send a
mission abroad to begin discussions on the revision. Because
of the growing friendliness of the United States this was the
first country selected for the mission. The Japanese Minister
to Washington, Arinori Mori, wrote in 1871 that “while the
British government may deem it wise to use force in its dealings
with the eastern nations, the American policy appears to ad¬
here resolutely to the principles of peace, justice and equal
rights to all.” The only exception the Japanese Minister noted
was the “unwarrantable operations” which the American Navy
was conducting that year off the closed coast of Korea in a
poorly prepared effort to “Perryize” that country.
In December of 1871 a diplomatic mission, headed by Prince
Tomomi Iwakura, Minister of Foreign Affairs, left Japan to
sound out the treaty powers on revision of the 1866 treaty. The
68 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

mission came first to the United States, crossing the continent

from San Francisco by the new transcontinental railroad, and
stopping in Chicago where a gift of $5,000 was given to the
mayor to aid in the relief of the many victims of the great
Chicago fire. Congress appropriated $50,000 for the entertain¬
ment of the visitors; like the 1860 mission, they were received
with great cordiality. The American Board of Commissioners
for Foreign Missions, anxious to improve relations with Japan
and to extend its religious work, presented a memorial to
President Grant, urging a favorable revision of the treaties.
This seems to have been the first of a long series of efforts by
religious lobbies to influence American policy toward Japan.
Secretary of State Fish showed his willingness to negotiate
with the mission, but found that it lacked authority to con¬
clude a new treaty. Fish urged prompt action before the next
Congress convened, and one of the Japanese was hurriedly
sent back to Japan to secure fuller powers. Negotiations moved
on in the meantime, and the United States proposed a relin¬
quishment of extraterritoriality in exchange for a satisfactory
Japanese legal code and a system of courts. Tariff revision was
also discussed favorably, provided Japan opened up all of its
ports and the interior to foreigners. But when the envoy re¬
turned from Japan he brought orders that no revisions should
be concluded outside of a general conference to be held with
the other treaty powers in Europe. The Japanese were afraid
that separate negotiations would weaken their position, since
any individual concessions would have to be extended to all
because of the most-favored-nation clause. On the other hand.
Secretary Fish did not feel that it comported with the dignity
of the United States to send a delegation to carry on negotia¬
tions in Europe after receiving the Japanese mission in Wash¬
ington.
The Iwakura mission left for London in mid-summer of 1872,
where they learned to their disappointment that the British
Foreign Office was unwilling to revise the 1866 treaty if it
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 69
meant giving up any advantages. The other European treaty
powers took a similarly discouraging position. Disappointed,
the Japanese returned home in 1873, having received one more
lesson in western diplomacy. Work was begun on revising
Japan’s penal code to bring it closer to western standards, in
order to remove one major objection to the relinquishment of
extraterritoriality.
A number of Americans continued to be concerned about the
injustices involved in the western treaties and to agitate for
their revisions. An American newspaperman wrote to Town¬
send Harris in 1875 to solicit his views on the treaty structure
which he had himself inaugurated. Harris replied that he had
expected that the treaties would be revised as soon as the
Japanese had enough experience to suggest changes. “I never
for a moment claimed a right which purely belonged to the
municipal affairs of a nation. Such interference is the result of
absolute conquest and not of any international right. The
provision of the Treaty giving the right of extra-territoriality
was against my conscience,” said Harris. Judge John Bingham,
American minister to Tokyo, 1873-1885, opposed the discrimi¬
natory practices of the other treaty powers at many points and
in 1878 negotiated a treaty with Japan which restored tariff
autonomy. But to prevent American traders from being placed
at a disadvantage in competition with other western nations
the treaty contained a “joker clause,” postponing implementa¬
tion until all other western treaty powers would similarly re¬
store the tariff-making power to Japan. Even so, the British
strongly criticized the Americans for breaking with the co¬
operative policy by which the western powers stood united in
fighting for their privileges. When it was known that both
Italy and Russia also looked with favor on treaty revision,
Britain made an agreement with Germany to block any general
revision.
The United States made other moves to demonstrate a
friendship for Japan based on the principle of equality. In
7o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
1889 a convention was negotiated by the outgoing administra¬
tion of Grover Cleveland and Secretary of State Bayard which
placed Americans under the jurisdiction of Japanese courts
when they were travelling outside of the treaty ports. President
Harrison’s Secretary of State, James Blaine, failed, however,
to present the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Of far greater
significance was the action of the United States in remitting the
Shimonoseki indemnity. The final Japanese payment on the
$785,000 was made in 1874, at which time President Grant
asked permission of Congress to use the money to finance a
student exchange with Japan. Grant’s request was the work of
an organized campaign begun in 1870 and led by Professor
Joseph Henry of the Smithsonian Museum and Professor David
Murray of Rutgers University. Some 400 American college
presidents, faculty, and school superintendents petitioned Con¬
gress in 1872 to return the money to Japan without qualifica¬
tion. A number of Chambers of Commerce with interest in
Japanese trade joined in the campaign. Bills were introduced
and passed one house of Congress on several occasions, but it
was not until 1883 that the legislation finally reached the
White House. In view of the injustice which seemed to have
been done Japan in collecting the money, it was decided that
the United States had no claim to it and could not stipulate its
use. On receiving the money, the Japanese government decided
to make some long needed improvements to the harbor of
Yokohama in order to facilitate foreign trade.
None of the other recipients of the Shimonoseki money re¬
stored the funds to Japan. Sir Harry Parkes, the British min¬
ister who had sponsored the punitive expedition, expressed his
contempt of the American concern for returning the money.
Parkes was also the chief opponent of treaty revision in the
1880’s, when a series of efforts were made by the Japanese
government. Some Japanese also opposed revision in view of
the price which would likely have to be paid for the concessions
from the western nations. As Viscount Tateki Tani, Minister
WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS” 71

of Commerce and Agriculture, stated the case in 1887, it would

be better for Japan to “wait for the time of confusion in
Europe” when Japan’s rapidly growing navy and army might
hold the balance of power in the Far East. Then, by throwing
its weight toward one side or the other, Japan could unburden
itself of the treaty restrictions without supplication and addi¬
tional concessions.
Recognition of Japan’s growing power as well as the com¬
mercial importance of her good will finally led Britain in 1894
to negotiate a revised treaty, granting Japan limited tariff
autonomy and ending the consular courts. The treaty was to
go into effect by 1899. By that date Japan had demonstrated
her rank as a naval and military power by a decisive defeat of
China in 1895, an event which hastened the treaty revision
process. Some Japanese noted with some touches of bitterness
that an impressive array of force was the most effective way of
securing concessions from the West as it had been in securing
concessions from Japan. This lesson was not forgotten in sub¬
sequent Japanese diplomacy. Baron Kentaro Kaneko sum¬
marized this Japanese point of view for Americans in 1904:

In the region of world diplomacy, where reason fails,

there is but one course left. That course Japan was com¬
pelled and determined to follow by devoting herself to
the completion of her compulsory educational system,
to the fostering of her industry, and to the reorganization
of her army and navy by modern scientific methods.
At last came the event [The Sino-Japanese War] in con¬
sequence of which Japan was no longer compelled to beg
for a revision of the extra-territorial treaty, but could
force upon the Western nations a recognition of her com¬
petence to abolish that treaty.
Chapter V

ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID

M ANY JAPANESE leaders drew one major lesson from

their experience with the West. To end the bombard¬
ments, the payment of indemnities, and the chain of conces¬
sions, they must build their own counter-power. To equal or
surpass the might of the foreigner they must adopt western
technology. Only when Japan could meet the westerners on
their own terms would Japan once more be the master of its
own house. To the men of the Meiji Restoration this meant
not only adopting the weapons of the West, but a major re¬
organization and westernization of Japan’s political and eco¬
nomic life. This task had to be accomplished quickly if Japan
was not to collapse under the combined pressures of the west¬
ern trader and diplomat, of the missionary and merchant.
“They had to build with sword in one hand and trowel in the
other,” wrote E. H. Norman in his description of the almost
miraculous feats accomplished by the Meiji pioneers.
Since the threat to national integrity came from across the
seas, it was naval power which had priority in building Japan’s
defense. For some 200 years prior to Perry’s arrival the Japa¬
nese had been forbidden to venture on the high seas. Ships
were limited to one mast and to a size which made ocean
navigation hazardous. But the nautical skills were not lost;
72
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID 73
coastal shipping continued throughout the period of isolation.
Japanese fisherman were able mariners and the ancient naval
tradition was quickly revived.
A few farsighted feudal lords and their advisers had seen
the need for a Japanese navy even before the arrival of Perry.
When in 1850 Dutch traders brought news of expeditions
preparing to end Japan’s exclusion, the Lord of Satsuma pe¬
titioned the Shogun for permission to construct a warship. But
fear of a hostile invasion did not shake the ancient ban and
the request was denied. Only after Perry’s visit in 1853 was
the ban lifted.
The Shogunate turned first to the Dutch for help in building
a modern navy. With no knowledge of costs, the Japanese
talked at first of the purchase of 50 or 60 warships in Europe.
When the Dutch pointed out the vast amount of money re¬
quired, the order was scaled down to two ships. The outbreak
of the Crimean War in 1854, making naval vessels a com¬
modity in great demand, made it impossible for the Netherlands
to act on even this small commission. To retain Japan’s favor,
the Dutch sent one of their own paddle-wheel steamers, the
Soembing, to train some Japanese naval officers in steam
operation. In 1855 it was decided to present this ship to the
Shogun as a gift. Armed with six guns and renamed the Kanko,
the Dutch ship became the first vessel in the new Japanese
Navy.
Other western nations were quick to follow the Dutch in
helping Japan build a naval force. The Japanese, in turn,
showed remarkable aptitude in quickly learning how to oper¬
ate these instruments of power. The British minister. Sir
Rutherford Alcock, recorded his fears in 1863 that Japan’s
aspiration for naval power boded ill for the West, but Alcock’s
was a unique warning voice. Westerners knew that the effec¬
tiveness of their diplomacy was due to Japan’s weakness, but
at the same time they competed in their eagerness to con¬
tribute to the new might.
74 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
The Russians, who in 1904-1905 were to see their naval
forces smashed by Japan, were a half century earlier supplying
their future enemy with naval ordnance. A Russian frigate, the
Diana, was wrecked on the Japanese coast, but her batteries
were salvaged and the 56 cannon presented to the Shogun by
the Russian commander in 1856. Japanese carpenters were em¬
ployed under Russian direction to build ships to return the
shipwrecked crew to their homeland. When the job was fin¬
ished, the workmen began to build the same type ships for
Japan.
The British were also influential in making contributions to
Japan’s power. At the suggestion of Rear Admiral James Stir¬
ling, £10,000 was voted by Parliament for a ship to be given
Japan. The presentation of a four-gun steamer was made in
1857 in the name of Queen Victoria, and the new vessel was
commissioned as the Hanriu. In the same year the two steamers
purchased from the Dutch arrived, creating a squadron of
four steamers. The naval training school, opened in 1855 with
Dutch instructors, supplied many of the officers.
Americans who commented on these naval developments
viewed them favorably. The first contributions to Japan’s re¬
armament had been the variety of weapons presented to the
Emperor by Commodore Perry. The American commander had
demurred when the treaty commissioners asked that he give
each of them a launch equipped with a brass howitzer, but
only because he considered the boats and guns as essential to
his squadron. He finally made a gift of one launch and howitzer
from the Saratoga and recommended to the Navy Department
that they send out two more. These gifts, Perry wrote, would
be ‘returned a hundred-fold” on some future occasion. A young
Japanese officer had asked members of the Perry expedition for
the “recipe for percussion caps.” The editors of an influential
journal. The North American Review, urged officials to meet
all such requests, since they saw no reason for the United States
ever going to war with Japan while the Japanese needed west-
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID 75
ern arms to protect themselves against European imperialism.
American anti-imperialist sentiments and the fear that Japan,
like China, would be exploited by the European nations to the
disadvantage of American commercial interests provided the
major justification for aid to Japan. Yankee pride was also
flattered when Americans rather than Europeans were chosen
to play the role of teachers in bringing skills. And for many
Americans the opportunity to work in Japan was a lucrative
venture in an exotic land which has ever exercised its fascina¬
tion for westerners.
The dispatch of an embassy across the Pacific to San Fran¬
cisco and Washington in 1860 was an opportunity to help the
young Japanese Navy. An American naval vessel was delegated
to carry the members of the embassy, but Japan decided to
send one of its own ships, the Dutch-built Kanrin Maru, across
the Pacific as an escort. This was to be the first long training
cruise for the men who only six years before were barred from
travelling the high seas. Japanese navigators had as their guide
Nathaniel Bowditch’s Practical Navigator, the American classic
which Nakahama Manjiro had introduced into Japan before
Perry’s arrival. For this pioneering voyage, however, the Japa¬
nese government requested some American aid. An American
lieutenant, John M. Brooke, stranded in Japan by the loss of
his own ship, was assigned to the Kanrin Maru along with an
American engineer, a surgeon, and four or five sailors who
were to instruct the Japanese seamen. With this help a stormy
voyage to San Francisco was accomplished without serious
difficulties. Brooke and his fellows received official commenda¬
tion from the Japanese government, the first Americans to serve
under the Japanese flag. Brooke later made more history during
the American Civil War by joining the Confederate govern¬
ment as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and preparing plans
for the redesign of the Merrimac as a pioneering ironclad.
Members of the Japanese embassy gathered a great deal of
information in the United States for use in their naval establish-
 76 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
ment. They studied the operations of the Navy Yard and the
casting of cannon in Washington. They made careful sketches
and recorded the operational procedures of all the American
ships which furnished them transportation. In Washington they
presented their hosts with a beautiful rifle, constructed by
Japanese craftsmen in the pattern of the Sharpe rifles brought
by Perry, but now improved by Japanese invention which made
it possible to cock, prime, and cut the cartridge in one opera¬
tion. To Japan went gifts from the War and Navy Departments;
a hundred muskets, four howitzers, shells, and machines for
filling shells and making bullets. American officers were sent to
teach the Japanese the uses of these gifts, but the skills were
quickly learned and their services dispensed with. According
to Townsend Harris, the Shogunate thought it unwise to em¬
ploy foreigners who might learn too much about the weak state
of Japan's defenses.
American ships were purchased to join those of Dutch and
British construction under Japan’s flag. The 1858 treaty with
the United States provided for the right of purchase of war¬
ships, munitions, and arms of all kinds as well as for the en¬
gagement of American military and naval experts. In 1861 a
Connecticut entrepreneur, Captain Elbert Stannard, sold his
merchant ship and cargo to the Lord of Choshu to be converted
into a warship. But it was the fate of this vessel, the Daniel
Webster, to be sunk in 1863 by another American vessel, the
Wyoming, during Commander McDougal’s reprisal raid for
the Japanese effort to close the Strait of Shimonoseki to the
Pembroke. In 1862 the Shogunate requested the American
minister, Robert Pruyn, to act as purchasing agent to procure
three steam warships, a field battery, and a quantity of small
arms and naval equipment. Pruyn placed the orders with
friends in the United States, earning himself the wrath of a
number of congressmen. The Secretary of War barred the arms
sale as interfering with the Union war effort, but the Secretary
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID 77
of Navy approved the sale of three ships to Japan for a total
of $860,000.
The first ship to be constructed was the Fujiyama, a steam
corvette with twice the power of any ship then under Japanese
command. The ship was finished in December 1864, but Presi¬
dent Lincoln stopped delivery when news reached Washington
of the Choshu attack on the Pembroke. The American Minister
cabled from Tokyo to ask the immediate release of the Fuji¬
yama. Pruyn reported that the British were doing a lively and
lucrative business in ships and arms, but Washington refused
to lift the restraining order. It was not until after Lincoln’s
death that the Fujiyama was released in June of 1865 and de¬
livered to the Shogun in January of 1866.
The Japanese still had a large credit, having paid Pruyn an
advance of $600,000, and he suggested that they use the money
to purchase captured Confederate ships rather than await new
construction. The battle between the Monitor and the Merri-
mac had dramatized the role of ironclads and it was not to
Japan’s interest to purchase additional wooden vessels. So a
purchasing mission was sent to Washington in 1867. After being
presented to President Johnson and given a state dinner by
Secretary of State William Seward, they were escorted to the
Navy Yard where their eyes fell upon the Stonewall. An iron¬
clad ram built in France for the Confederacy, this ship reached
American waters only after the Union victory and was taken
over by the federal government. One hundred and seventy-two
feet in length compared to the Fujiyama’s 180 feet, the Stone¬
wall had a 500 horsepower engine of the latest design. The
Japanese bought the ship for $400,000 and asked the American
captain who pointed it out to them to take it to Japan. With
the remaining money in their account they purchased naval
ordnance and equipment for their expanding squadron.
When the Stonewall reached Tokyo in April of 1868, the
civil conflict between the forces of the Shogunate and the
78 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Emperor was at a crucial stage. Remaining neutral, the Ameri¬
can commander refused to deliver the ship to the government
of the Shogun, an act which in effect favored the forces of the
Emperor. The Shogun’s forces were finally badly defeated on
land, but led by a daring naval officer, Kamajiro Enomoto, a
group of officers stole a major part of the Japanese fleet under
cover of night and sailed northward. On the island of Hokkaido
they captured and established their base at one of the early
treaty ports, Hakodate. With the American-built Fujiyama in
the possession of the enemy, the Imperial forces badly needed
the Stonewall to put an end to the rebellion. After receiving
many protests over the delay, the new American minister, Gen¬
eral Robert R. Van Valkenburgh, delivered the Stonewall in
January of 1869. As the Azuma the ship was commissioned and
inspected personally by the Emperor, the first time Japan’s
sacred ruler had set foot on shipboard.
The Azuma led the Imperial forces northward to crush the
last forces of the Shogunate. While anchored in a harbor en
route, the pride of the Imperial forces was suddenly attacked
by Admiral Enomoto who tried to sink the new vessel by ram¬
ming, only to find her construction so stout tha‘t the ramming
vessel was more damaged than the Azuma. On reaching Hako¬
date the enemy ships were destroyed, and the land fortifica¬
tions leveled by the guns of the Azuma. The last rebels sur¬
rendered and the Meiji regime triumphed, with the former
Confederate vessel a significant factor in the victory.
The new government looked at its young navy with some
sense of security and pride. Before the year of victory was over
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish was warned by the American
Minister that such was the growth of confidence that the Japa¬
nese “perhaps entertained the conceit that they were strong
enough to defy our government.” The Japanese Navy, reported
Charles E. DeLong, the fourth American minister, “has been
rapidly increased into quite a large and serviceable one, while
our own is in fact unrepresented here with anything that could
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID 79
for a moment live in a conflict with such a vessel as the Stone¬
wall. . . .” Minister DeLong’s fears were premature by many
decades, but it was obvious that the days when Japan could be
easily coerced by a foreign naval demonstration were over.
Japan's neighbors, China and Korea, began to look upon the
island kingdom with respect and even fear when their relations
with the Meiji government were strained in the 1870's. A
Britisher employed as a spy by Japan reported in 1874 that the
possession of the former Stonewall alone made the Japanese a
formidable opponent in the eyes of the Chinese. He claimed
that Chinese sailors had deserted rather than face possible
battle with the ironclad, since the Chinese government was
unwilling to send its navy to sea while the Azuma cruised the
coast.
The sale of the Stonewall was the last direct contribution by
the United States to the Japanese fleet for some years. In 1875
the first modem warship was built in national shipyards, and
from that date increased emphasis was placed on meeting the
Navy’s needs with Japan’s own skills. Britain was the chief
source of foreign-built ships. When in 1893 the Japanese
Imperial Navy reported 28 ships in commission, ten were listed
as having been built in British shipyards, while 10 were of
Japanese construction.
The United States did play a leading role in Japan’s develop¬
ment of a submarine fleet. When the John Holland submarine
was demonstrated for the American Navy in 1900, a Japanese
officer was among the observers. Although the United States
government was reluctant to invest in the new underseas
craft, Japan ordered five submarines for their own forces. Pre¬
fabricated in Massachusetts, these vessels were shipped to
Japan and reassembled there by American workmen. Com¬
pleted and tested in the summer of 1905, the boats went to sea
on a long cruise without a mishap and without a single Ameri¬
can on board, again demonstrating Japan’s remarkable ability
at quick assimilation of western technical skills. Within a year
80 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
the Japanese Navy had built two submarines of its own and
was on its way to the formation of an undersea fleet.
The United States was selected by Japan as the center in
which to train its naval officers in the techniques and traditions
of foreign navies. But when the request was made in 1861 the
Naval Academy at Annapolis was closed by the exigencies of
the Civil War and Japanese students were sent to Holland in¬
stead. At the end of the war the request was renewed. Congress
by joint resolution in 1868 authorized the admission of Japa¬
nese students to the Naval Academy at no expense to the
United States. The first student, Jenno Matsumura, arrived the
next year to face the hurdles of the English language and a
formidable academic program. Two more students arrived the
following year, 1870. The three first entrants found that their
English was inadequate to complete the program, and the
sending of students was suspended for several years while pro¬
visions were made in Japan to see that applicants received a
more intensive language training.
The first Japanese ensigns to graduate from Annapolis were
two members of the class of 1877. Although there were more
than a dozen enrollments, only six survived the difficulties of
adjustment to the life of an American midshipman to gradu¬
ate. The outstanding Naval Academy contribution to the Im¬
perial Navy was Sotokichi Uriu of the class of 1881, who rose
to the rank of rear-admiral and whose brilliant performance
in the Russo-Japanese War was surpassed only by the British-
trained Admiral Heihachiro Togo. Uriu studied in New Haven
for two years before entering the Academy and while in Con¬
necticut became a Christian. After the Russo-Japanese War he
was made a baron and later became a member of the House
of Peers.
By 1906 American fears of Japan reached a point at which
Congress became concerned with espionage and closed the
Naval Academy to Japanese and other foreigners. But to help
counter the ill-feeling which this action created, Admiral Uriu
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID 81
was feted officially when he came to the United States in 1909
to attend his class reunion. In Washington the Admiral and his
wife, a Vassar graduate who came to the United States at the
age of nine, were given a dinner attended by President Taft. At
the conclusion of the Admiral’s speech, Taft’s geniality burst
forth and he shouted, “Banzai!” and offered a toast to the
Emperor of Japan.
The Naval Academy also made a contribution to Japan’s
forces through its American graduates who served Japan in a
number of capacities. The outstanding member was Henry
Walton Grinnell, a New Yorker who attended City College as
well as the Naval Academy and had a distinguished record in
the Civil War. When he was discharged in 1868. Grinnell took
a commission as a captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy and
was soon raised to the rank of rear admiral for his services as
director of the new naval school at Hiogo, where many of
Japan’s officers were trained. For more than two decades Grin¬
nell served Japan before concluding his career by again serving
in the American Navy during the Spanish-American War.
Although Japan concentrated on the Navy, there was no
neglect of the land forces which had long been restricted to
ancient weapons and organization. A Nagasaki youth, Shunhan
Takashima, had appealed to the government in the 1830’s to
modernize the national defenses in order to maintain exclusion.
When he failed to secure action, he used his own funds to buy
guns and military books from the Dutch. He gathered a num¬
ber of pupils who wanted to learn western military science and
by 1840 had trained small infantry and artillery companies in
western methods.
In 1842 Takashima was arrested and jailed for casting a can¬
non with the help of western specifications. After Perry’s initial
visit, the Shogun released Takashima and he was ordered to aid
in the construction of harbor fortifications. By 1855 concern for
the production of modern weapons reached a point at which
the government ordered the bells of Buddhist monasteries
82 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
melted and cast into cannon and muskets. Religious opposition
forced the abandonment of this emergency measure to collect
metals, but the drive for arms manufacture continued. In 1868
an arsenal was established in Tokyo and by 1880 Japan was
able to supply most of its infantry with muskets manufactured
in its own factories.
The American military experience in the Civil War drew the
attention of Japanese; students and official missions carefully
collected data on American weapons and tactics. One of the
teachers of the first two Japanese college students in the United
States, enrolled at Rutgers in 1866, recalls that they told him
they had come to learn “how to make big cannon so as not to
be conquered by Russia.” Appeals were made for the admis¬
sion of Japanese cadets to the Military Academy at West Point,
and a bill authorizing the admission of the first six students was
reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1872. In the debate which followed, a number of Senators
spoke of the commercial and other advantages which would
come from training Japanese youth and indoctrinating them in
American sentiments. It was pointed out that there were al¬
ready more than 300 Japanese students in American schools and
only 225 in all of Europe. From this educational relationship it
was hoped would come a friendship which would insure
Japan’s trade for the United States rather than its rivals. Pro¬
ponents of the bill submitted a letter from the superintendent
of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, reporting on the fine char¬
acter of the Japanese midshipmen in attendance and arguing
that “the common cause of Christian civilization” was advanced
by the admission of Japanese students to military schools.
The opposition to admitting Japanese cadets was led by
Senator Eugene Casserly of California, an Irish immigrant who
had graduated from Georgetown College in Washington, a
lawyer and a journalist. The Senator favored the opening of
American schools to the Japanese, but he drew the line at the
military academies with a burst of oratory:
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID S3
You may impart all other art of your civilization to a
foreign Power without injury to yourself; but not your
art of war. . . . You may sell to other nations even your
arms of precision, your engines of war . . . but you can¬
not admit any foreign Power into the partnership of the
military training of your youth . . . without loss of that
power and prestige which are necessary to the main¬
tenance of this country as a great nation upon the earth.

Even though the Californian criticized the Pembroke affair and

the naval conflict at the Strait of Shimonoseki as examples of
the danger of strengthening Japan, the measure was approved.
In the House the Foreign Affairs Committee reported the
Senate measure with approval, but opposition developed on
the floor. Congressman Pierce Manning Young of Georgia, a
West Pointer who had resigned two months before graduation
to enter the Confederate Army, made a strong argument that
the admission of yellow-skinned cadets was a threat to national
security. The bill was tabled by a vote of 78 to 55. Although
the measure was again introduced, authorization was never
given for Japanese cadets. Some 30 years later, in 1905, Con¬
gress opened the Academy to another oriental people, the
Chinese, with many supporters of the measure hoping to
strengthen China against Japan. Japan had in the meantime
turned to other nations, particularly the French for technical
advice in modernizing the army. When in the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870-1871 the French forces were badly defeated,
Japan replaced French advisers with Germans.
The rapid change in Japan’s power status was reflected al¬
most immediately in foreign policy and diplomacy. The first
end of foreign policy was the restoration of full sovereignty
and the termination of the special privileges granted in the
years of greatest weakness. While the Iwakura mission went
abroad in 1872 to seek a revision of the unequal treaties, a
new foreign minister, Taneomi Soeshima, began work at home.
Taking advantage of the absence on home leave of the im-
84 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
perious British minister, Harry Parkes, Soeshima refused to
confer with any diplomat who insisted on the Japanese stand¬
ing while the westerner sat and talked. The Japanese Foreign
Office also began to insist on treatment in all areas in ac¬
cordance with the standard diplomatic practices of the western
world. International law was studied and western diplomats
began to find their own authorities quoted to them in disputes.
The acquiescence of the ignorant and weak was over.
In informing the Japanese of their legal rights and normal
diplomatic procedures, American advisers played the major
role. Soeshima studied under Guido Verbeck, a man who called
himself an “Americanized Dutchman” and who had studied
engineering and theology in the United States before coming
to Japan in 1859 as a missionary. Verbeck was soon called upon
to teach English in a government college where he used the
United States Constitution as well as the New Testament for
his texts. Many Japanese leaders learned about western law
from Verbeck, and it was he who proposed and helped the
government plan the Iwakura mission in 1872 to secure equal
legal treatment. The college grew in size and by 1871 Verbeck
had over a thousand students. He sent the first Japanese to
study in an American college, Rutgers, in 1866, and in 1870
imported from Rutgers William E. Griffis to teach the physical
sciences at the new Imperial University at Tokyo. Griffis also
had a distinguished career in Japan and became the first Amer¬
ican scholar to write extensively in the field of Japanese-Amer¬
ican relations. Verbeck became an unofficial attache to the
Japanese Cabinet and served Japan until 1898.
The Japanese Foreign Office was quick to see the value of
more American specialists in law and diplomacy and applied
to the Department of State for help. Erasmus Peshine Smith,
an examiner of claims for the State Department, was appointed
in 1871 as the first official foreign adviser to the Foreign Office.
Smith had graduated from Columbia College and the Harvard
Law School and had written a textbook on political economy.
ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID &5
He brought to the Japanese a sophisticated approach to inter¬
national relations and technical knowledge in drafting treaties.
Smith’s work was soon supplemented by the appointment of Eli
T. Sheppard, a former American consul in China and a special¬
ist in international law. Sheppard became the opponent of
Britain’s Harry Parkes who fought Japan’s efforts to attain full
sovereignty, even defying the quarantine laws. One of Shep¬
pard’s drafts given to Parkes by the Japanese Foreign Office
stated that the British Minister’s claims “tend only to
strengthen the unpleasant conviction that you assume the right
to control the law-making power of this Empire.” Smith and
Sheppard were followed in 1880 by the appointment of Henry
W. Denison as Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office. A Vermont
lawyer who served in the United States consulate in Yokohama,
Denison held his post with the Japanese until his death in 1914.
He received high honors for his work in the Sino-Japanese War
of 1894-1895, for his part in the negotiation of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty of 1902 and the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905,
and for his role in representing Japan at The Hague Court.
Engineers and agricultural experts, missionaries and edu¬
cators poured into Japan from the United States in the last
three decades of the nineteenth century. Some met with re¬
sistance and failure, some were incompetents seeking only the
high financial rewards offered by the Japanese government.
Critics of the Grant administration charged that often the men
recommended and sent to Japan by the United States govern¬
ment were chosen for their political loyalties rather than their
abilities. But there were also competent and dedicated indi¬
viduals who left a permanent mark on the character of Japan’s
westernization. Many of their contributions had little to do
with military or naval power and they brought to Japan many
things besides guns and the arts of war. McIntosh apples, Con¬
cord grapes, and baseball were all imported to take root in
Japan’s soil at the same time that the Japanese were acquiring
the instruments of western power. By 1905 a Japanese baseball
86 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
team, coached by a University of Chicago pitcher, made a
successful tour of the United States. The Meiji Restoration had
launched a new Japan on a broad scale, and in creating this
new Japan Americans took a leading part.
Chapter VI

VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM

A S JAPAN STRUGGLED to build militarily and to free

i itself from foreign encroachments, national consciousness
grew apace. Loyalty to the new government was stimulated on
all levels of society by the institutions introduced by the Meiji
Restoration. Conscription, introduced in 1873, a national edu¬
cation system, and improved communications and transporta¬
tion knitted the provinces together. The Sun cult of Shinto
was raised to the level of a state religion and the central gov¬
ernment, aided by a growing press, spread the symbols of na¬
tional allegiance across the land. The youngest school boy in
the remotest province soon learned to raise his loyalties be¬
yond his village and clan.
The elements for the creation of Japanese nationalism had
long existed. Long periods of isolation from other peoples, a
common language, a belief in ethnic unity and widespread
myths about the divine origin of the islands provided a base
upon which to build a vigorous society of patriots. Yet until
1868 Japan was so divided geographically into fiefs governed
almost as sovereign states by the heads of the hereditary clans
and so stratified socially that nationalism as known in the West
was almost non-existent.
87
88 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Japanese nationalism was in large part the outgrowth of

westernization. At the close of the eighteenth century and in
the early nineteenth when the exploratory activities of Russia,
England, and France created a threat of domination by foreign
barbarians, national consciousness began to rise. Fear proved
to be a unifying emotion, a fear marked by hostility toward
intruders. But even by the middle of the nineteenth century
these fears and their effects were still confined largely to the
ruling classes, the clan leaders, and the samurai. The common
people in their contacts with foreigners frequently displayed a
friendly curiosity which contradicted the stereotyped view of
a natural oriental antagonism toward westerners.
Nationalism in the western world has historically had many
forms, perhaps even stages, ranging from relatively harmless
glorification of the national culture to the extreme xenophobia
which often combines with a sense of mission to produce a
drive for the conquest and domination of neighboring lands.
Japanese nationalism as it developed during the Meiji Restora¬
tion had many potentialities. Anti-foreign feelings declined in
the early years of the new regime as the nation reached out to
draw upon the intellectual resources of the West in many
fields. Westernization for more than a decade became almost a
cult. Some Japanese discarded their valuable prints and porce¬
lains for mediocre western art and put aside their comfortable
oriental clothes for western garb. But Japan’s new leaders seem
to have kept always in mind the end of westernization; the
creation of the strength necessary to withstand the West and to
achieve full sovereignty.
There were in Japan’s history the elements with which to
create the most disruptive aspect of western nationalism, the
aggressive mood which pushes for expansion and the develop¬
ment of empire. There were ancient aspirations for land be¬
yond the sea which were revived with the new national con¬
sciousness. Chauvinist writers began to urge that the growing
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 89
strength of the nation be tested on foreign shores. Shoin
Yoshida, a young Choshu military teacher, was already preach¬
ing expansion at the time of Perry’s arrival. He believed that
expansion was the health of the state and called for a course
of conquest which included not only Korea and Formosa, but
the Philippines and Manchuria as well. Since western knowl¬
edge was essential to build a force capable of imperialist suc¬
cesses, Yoshida tried himself to reach the outer world by hiding
aboard one of Perry’s ships. The Americans refused to abet an
evasion of Japanese law prohibiting foreign travel, and Yoshida
and a companion were turned over to the authorities and jailed.
But a decade later the writings of this pioneer expansionist
began to appeal to a wide audience.
Japanese expansionism focused first on Formosa and Korea.
The most dynamic and colorful of the many Americans to visit
Japan, Charles LeGendre, gave the expansionists hearty sup¬
port. Born in France, LeGendre migrated to the United States
and made a distinguished record in the American Civil War,
reaching the rank of Brigadier General and sacrificing an eye
to the Union cause while serving under General Grant in the
Battle of the Wilderness. A born adventurer, he sought an
overseas post at the end of the war and was rewarded in 1866
with an appointment to the post of consul at Amoy, a treaty
port on the South China coast opposite Formosa.
In March of 1867 the bark, Rover, out of New York, was
wrecked on the Formosan coast and its captain, his wife, and
crew murdered by primitive tribesmen. The news reached
LeGendre who protested to the Chinese government. The
ferocity of these aborigines was well known to the Chinese and,
although they claimed a sovereignty over the island, they re¬
fused to send a punitive expedition. Commodore H. H. Bell
in command of the China squadron then sent a force of almost
200 seamen and marines on the U.S.S. Hartford and Wyoming
to capture the murderers. The expedition landed on the For-
90 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
mosan coast in June of 1867, but when they pushed into
aboriginal territory they were ambushed and forced to retreat
after losing one of their commanders.
LeGendre, whose jurisdiction extended to Formosa, took the
rebuff of the naval expedition as an opportunity to act on his
own. With the co-operation of the Chinese authorities he se¬
cured a military force and sailed for Formosa in a Chinese
gunboat flying the Stars and Stripes. Some friendly tribes were
enlisted to join the Chinese ranks and to march into the terri¬
tory held by the guilty natives. Their leaders were impressed
by the size of the invading force and agreed to meet with
LeGendre on a peaceful basis. The murders were defended as
reprisals for the many injustices done the tribesmen by white
men, but promises were made that in the future protection
would be given to all castaways. With this assurance and after
collecting the effects of the dead seamen, LeGendre returned
to Amoy.
LeGendre’s feat brought him a commendation from the
British government and stirred his interest in Formosa. He
visited the island again in 1868 and 1869 to collect materials
on the history and culture of the primitive peoples who in¬
habited the interior. China’s failure to deal with this area also
led him to write a pamphlet in 1869, Is Aboriginal Formosa a
Part of the Chinese Empire? But the consulship was too small
a post for the ambitious military man, and in 1872 he received
an appointment from President Grant as Minister to Argentina.
Then the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
refused to recommend a confirmation of the appointment be¬
cause of LeGendre’s French birth.
Disappointed, LeGendre decided to return to Washington on
leave. After first re-visiting Formosa, he reached Japan en route
home in October of 1872. It was an appropriate time since the
Japanese government was at this moment discussing sending its
own expedition to Formosa. A number of shipwrecked sailors
from the Ryukyu Islands had been killed in Formosa and some
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 91

Japanese officials not only wanted to demonstrate their pro¬

tectorate over the Ryukyu peoples but also to test China's
claims to Formosa. The American Minister to Japan, Charles
DeLong, introduced LeGendre to Foreign Minister Taneomi
Soeshima, as a man who knew something of Formosa. The
Japanese were impressed by the swaggering and energetic
general and particularly by the fact that he had not only maps
and charts of Formosa, but an intimate knowledge of the
aborigines. After some negotiations in which the American
minister gave his support, LeGendre was hired by the Foreign
Office as an officer of second rank with a salary equal to that
of the American minister, $12,000 yearly. He resigned his post
as consul with a promise of a general’s commission in the
Japanese Army if the Formosan venture led to war with
China.
In a pamphlet published in 1871, How to Deal with China,
Japan’s new foreign adviser had hoped to provide western
nations with a guide. He was a believer in the efficacy of force
in achieving diplomatic goals: “I hold that lex talionis adapts
better than any other to an Eastern race.” In his new position
LeGendre was given the responsibility of guiding the Japanese
government in dealing with China and sent to Peking as ad¬
viser to the Japanese Foreign Minister. The ostensible purpose
of the mission was to exchange treaty ratifications, but Japan
was also determined to secure a clarification from China as to
its claims to Formosa and Korea. A secondary issue was the
question of securing an audience with the Chinese Emperor,
a privilege denied to all treaty powers. LeGendre had recom¬
mended in his pamphlet that the western powers insist on this
Chinese concession. His career as an American diplomat
blocked by the Senate, the proud and ambitious general was
determined to prove his brilliance in the service of Japan.
When the embassy left Japan in March of 1873, its strategy
was well worked out. The Chinese must be impressed with the
fact that they were no longer dealing with the old Japan, con-
92 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
tent to accept a secondary place in the shadow of the Celestial
Kingdom. They must be shown the new, westernized Japan,
capable and ready to use western techniques to back its diplo¬
macy. Two warships, one of them the former Stonewall, ac¬
companied LeGendre and Foreign Minister Soeshima, to
implement Japan’s first venture in gunboat diplomacy.
Anxious to check the quest for an audience at Peking, the
Chinese met the mission at Shanghai to present the treaty
ratifications. The first surprise came when the embassy rejected
the oriental residence provided them and instead rented a
western-style house which they furnished with western-style
furniture. When the Chinese viceroy, Li Hung-chang, visited
the mission, he complained not only of the presence of a west¬
ern adviser, hitherto unnecessary in the dealings of Asians with
Asians, but also he spoke with contempt of the other forms
of westernization. To LeGendre he said, “This house is well
calculated to answer your purpose, but I cannot see how it can
be comfortable for a Japanese ambassador.” Soeshima was
quick to point out that some of the fine lacquered chairs made
in western style had come from his own home. And when the
viceroy complained of the ugliness of the western clothes the
Japanese Foreign Minister, as LeGendre recalled, made the
perfect pointed reply:

If, Your Excellency, the dress of foreigners is not beauti¬

ful, it is quite useful, especially on board our men of war
which are also of foreign style. With our ancient costume
our men could not have thought of working in the rigging
or at the guns. But since we have changed our dress,
we get along very well, so well, in fact, that in the iron¬
clad and corvette which we brought with us to China
there is not a single foreigner.

The Chinese had a glimpse of the New Japan in this state¬

ment and put no barrier in the way of the embassy’s visit to
Peking. But when the question of the audience was raised,
they used the same delaying tactics which the Japanese had
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 93
attempted to use in dealing with the West. Foreign Minister
Soeshima replied by threatening to leave Peking and hinting at
the dire consequences which would follow. The audience was
then granted to Japan as well as to the representatives of the
western powers who were also threatening. The Japanese
minister further broke Chinese tradition by wearing his sword
in the presence of the Emperor and refusing to kneel in
homage. LeGendre wrote triumphantly to friends in Washing¬
ton of the success of the embassy and claimed credit for the
Perry-like firmness which he had urged on Soeshima.
The Japanese mission returned home from Peking, claiming
to have received verbal approval for the dispatch of a punitive
expedition to Formosa in behalf of the murdered Ryukyu
islanders. LeGendre was transferred to the Department of
Colonization which was to operate the expedition and he took
a leading part in its organization. A number of other ad¬
venturous Americans were recruited as military and naval
assistants. Lieutenant Commander Douglas Cassel secured a
year’s detachment from the U.S.S. Ashelot to join the Japanese
Navy and Major James R. Wasson, a West Point graduate who
had resigned from service, was recruited to act as the expedi¬
tion’s military engineer. All three Americans were honored by
an audience with the Emperor. The steamship New York was
chartered from the Pacific Mail Steamship Company to trans¬
port the expedition, and LeGendre hired a former British naval
officer to keep Japan informed of China’s reaction to this mili¬
tary venture.
Before the Formosan expedition sailed, the Chinese govern¬
ment rejected Japan’s claim to having Chinese approval for
their punitive measures. Any Japanese military action in For¬
mosa, said the Chinese, would be an act of war against China.
Since LeGendre was viewed by the Chinese as being the evil
genius behind Japan’s plans, an effort was made to buy him off.
He was offered a post in the Chinese customs service for ten
years at the generous salary of $20,000 yearly. LeGendre
Q4 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
refused the offer and the Chinese then appealed to American
officials in China.
This approach was effective. When LeGendre visited Amoy
in connection with preparations for the expedition, he was ar¬
rested and held at the orders of the American Consul-General
for China, George Seward. Since diplomatic status with associ¬
ated immunities had been given to LeGendre, a Japanese naval
commander in Amoy offered to land marines and free him. The
offer was rejected and the former consul was taken to Shanghai,
charged with having violated American neutrality laws. The
indictment was so weak, however, that it was dropped when
LeGendre landed and he was freed. Seward’s action had the
support of some other members of the American diplomatic
service in China and in particular Perry’s translator, S. Wells
Williams, but it was without the approval of Washington.
When the news of Seward’s action reached the Secretary of
State, he reprimanded him for his zeal in behalf of China and
pointed out that neutrality laws could not be violated before
a state of belligerency existed. Americans, said Hamilton Fish,
were as free to hold military posts under Japan as those who
then held posts in the service of China.
Seward’s action, taken with the interests of China as one of
its ends, illustrated a point of view which was to be held by
many Americans in the following decades. Other Americans
held equally strongly to a contradictory viewpoint. Should
American policy in Asia play favorites and support China
against Japan or was it to be a policy of no favorites? Or did
American national interests call for a policy friendlier to Japan
than China? Affirmative views on all three questions were held
by influential State Department officials and segments of Amer¬
ican opinion down to the 1930’s, often producing a vacillating
and indecisive policy.
In Tokyo the new American Minister, John A. Bingham, was
also converted to action in defense of China. He succeeded in
forcing the cancellation of the charter of the American steam-
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 95
ship, but the Americans in the service of Japan refused his
requests to resign. Without LeGendre, but with his plans and
advice, the expedition sailed under a Japanese commander. In
Formosa the friendly tribal leaders known to LeGendre were
used to recruit native fighting men to supplement the Japanese
forces. War was then waged on the barbaric Botan tribe guilty
of the massacre.
One of the Americans who accompanied the expedition was
a newspaperman and close friend of LeGendre, E. H. House,
whose dispatches were carried in the New York Herald. House
reported that despite the vaunted samurai tradition the new
Japanese Army was an undisciplined and unskilled fighting
force. They were unprepared for jungle fighting and the casual¬
ties inflicted by surprise attacks, by heat, and disease were
high. But at the cost of over 500 lives Japan was victorious and
the offending Botan tribesmen were beaten.
While the fighting was in progress, LeGendre was sent to
Peking as a special commissioner along with the Japanese
Home Minister to reopen the negotiations over Formosa. The
Chinese insisted on their ownership of the island and the
Japanese insisted on compensation for the lives of the mur¬
dered Okinawans as well as payment for the costs of the
punitive expedition. LeGendre was urging war if the Chinese
refused to meet the Japanese position. But even S. Wells
Williams, while denouncing LeGendre as “an evil counselor,”
urged the Chinese to make concessions.
After some delay, China agreed to the financial claims and
when the final payments were made in December of 1874 the
Japanese forces left Formosa. The two chief military advisers,
Cassel and Wasson, were highly commended for their services
by the Japanese commander and rewarded with a bonus at the
termination of their contract. When Cassel died in Pennsyl¬
vania a year later from a tropical disease contracted in For¬
mosa, the Japanese government sent an additional payment to
his heirs.
96 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
The significance of Japan’s first military adventure overseas
was not lost on some western observers. Consul-General
Seward in Shanghai wrote Washington that Japan ‘lias been
to all appearance the winner. This has happened because she
has been the bolder and more active.” For some Americans in
the Far East the Japanese victory was a tribute and gain for
the West. As one Shanghai merchant wrote LeGendre when
the conflict was in progress, “If Japan cuts the Chinese Gordian
knot, she will have paid the debt of gratitude which she owes
to Western Nations for having started her on the path of
progress and reform.” But the British Ambassador to Japan,
Harry Parkes, complained that the Japanese had been “led
away by their own conceit and by advice which filled in exactly
with that conceit which has been chiefly supplied by that man
named LeGendre!” The British-owned Japan Daily Herald
took the same scolding position and warned the Japanese that
while China submitted to Russian encroachments on her west¬
ern frontiers, “she is scarcely likely to tolerate it from such a
petty and feeble power as Japan.”
LeGendre resigned from Japanese service in July of 1875 and
became the first foreigner to be decorated with the Order of
the Rising Sun. Before he resigned he spent two months pre¬
paring a lengthy memorandum to guide Japan’s future rela¬
tions with Formosa. During his two years service he also urged
other projects upon his employers. One was the sale of Japa¬
nese claims to the northern island of Sakhalin to Russia in order
to strengthen Japan’s international position. In 20 or 30 years,
the General argued, Japan could handle Russia, but at present
the conflict over Sakhalin weakened the ties with the Tsar.
Russian friendship was essential, LeGendre believed, to coun¬
ter British power in Asia. In the long run, Britain would re¬
main Japan’s greatest enemy, not only because Japan would
become a rival maritime power, but because in time he pre¬
dicted that Japan would compete with Britain for the markets
of Asia.
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 97
Much of Japanese territory was thinly populated and Le-
Gendre turned his attention to the colonization of the thinly-
settled island of Hokkaido for economic and strategic purposes.
In an early memorandum he urged the importation of Chinese
as colonists, but later he withdrew this suggestion on the
grounds that Chinese made good colonists but poor soldiers.
He finally concluded that Japan must import Mormons from
the United States where this group was having difficulties over
their practice of multiple marriages. By giving approval to
polygamy, LeGendre believed that Japan could draw thou¬
sands of Mormons who would multiply rapidly to provide good
farmers and soldiers for their adopted nation. Hokkaido was
subsequently developed with the help of American agricultural
advisers, but LeGendre’s suggestion in regard to the Mormons
was never implemented.
Korea was another area which attracted LeGendre’s atten¬
tion, as he recognized its strategic importance for Japan. In the
centuries before Japan turned to self-containment, Korea had
played a role in relation to the island kingdom in some respects
similar to that of the Low Countries for England. Control of
Korea by a strong mainland power was like a loaded pistol,
pointed at the heart of Japan, said Japanese nationalists. In
1874 LeGendre urged the dispatch of an expeditionary force to
the Korean capital, utilizing the prestige which Japan had
gained from its successes at Peking and Formosa, and fore¬
stalling any Russian venture. A year earlier military elements
had almost succeeded in winning government approval for such
an operation, but the peace forces won out. The American
general’s proposal had, therefore, a sympathetic reception in
some circles.
Like pre-Perry Japan, Korea refused to trade with the west¬
ern world and resisted foreign intrusions. An American trading
ship, the General Sherman, had disregarded warnings in 1866
and pushed into the interior by means of one of the North
Korean rivers. When the ship became stranded on a sandbar
98 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
a conflict began with the local Koreans which resulted in the
killing of the crew and the burning of the ship. French ships
had suffered a similar fate, and the rumor reached Washington
that France was contemplating an expedition to occupy Korea.
To block exclusive French control, Secretary of State William
Seward suggested a joint punitive operation. France decided
against such a venture at the moment and American efforts
were limited to attempts at securing further information as to
the fate of the General Sherman.
The Grant administration decided to reconsider the Korean
situation in 1871 and to send a joint diplomatic-naval mission
to seek treaty guarantees for the protection of American sea¬
men and to open trade. The American Minister to China,
Frederick P. Low, and a naval squadron of five ships under
the command of Admiral John Rodgers set out from Nagasaki
to repeat Perry’s feat. While engaged in surveying the Han
River before moving up to Seoul, the expedition was “treach¬
erously attacked,” President Grant told Congress. The Ameri¬
cans returned the fire and succeeded in silencing the Korean
forts. When no apology came for the attack after waiting ten
days, Rodgers landed his forces to storm the fortifications. At
the cost of three American lives the forts were destroyed and
several hundred Koreans killed. But it was still a considerable
distance to the Korean capital, and with neither the authoriza¬
tion nor an adequate force, only 1,200 men for such a large
scale military operation, the American commander withdrew.
“Our little war with the heathen,” as the New York Herald
called it, ended without producing the desired results. Presi¬
dent Grant’s message spoke of American action “having thus
punished the criminals and having vindicated the honor of the
flag,” but it was clearly an unsuccessful venture compared to
the Perry mission 18 years earlier. “It now becomes the duty
of all civilized and Christian governments to carefully consider
what their rights are, and their duty to their citizens and sub¬
jects” in respect to Korea, Minister Low wrote the Secretary
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 99
of State. But a major military-naval operation in Korea would
have encountered strong political opposition in the American
climate of the 1870’s. “Probably nothing will be done at
present. Our navy is too small to do much so far from home,”
a confidant of President Grant’s wrote LeGendre in Japan.
Japan took up the challenge of a closed Korea a year after
LeGendre completed his memorandum. Three missions to
Seoul in 1868, 1869, and 1871 had failed to secure recognition
from the Korean king. In 1875 a Japanese naval vessel was sent
to the Korean coast and was fired upon when it attempted to
land boats to secure water and provisions. The fire was re¬
turned and a landing party destroyed the fortifications from
which the Koreans had attacked.
As in the case of the earlier American expedition, no apology
was offered for the attack and the Japanese government de¬
cided to send a punitive force in reprisal. A force of two war¬
ships and three troop transports carrying 800 men was as¬
sembled early in 1876 under the command of Kiyotaka Kuroda,
a capable national leader who had visited the United States
in 1871 to recruit technical specialists.
Kuroda studied and carefully adapted Perry’s tactics in his
approach to Korea. He paraded his forces in the most impos¬
ing manner, even painting gun ports on his unarmed trans¬
ports, and finally landing his troops with the maximum of
bustle and pageantry, all officers in full dress uniform. The de¬
struction inflicted by the American forces five years earlier led
the Koreans to reconsider the utility of resistance and Kuroda’s
tactics succeeded. The Koreans were given the choice of pay¬
ing Japan a large indemnity for their previous assault or of
signing a commercial treaty. The treaty was accepted without
Japan firing a shot. Little more than two decades after Perry’s
first visit, Japan was successful in “Perryizing” its neighbor
Korea.
Japan’s treaty with Korea was in western form, opening up
three ports and granting Japan extraterritorial privileges. The
lOO AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
United States was the first to follow up Japan’s success. Some
State Department officials were convinced, as a result of Japan’s
facility in dealing with Peking and Seoul, that Japan held the
key to successful diplomacy in Asia. The American com¬
missioned with the task of estabhshing treaty relations with
Korea, Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, was sent first to Japan in
1880 to enlist official help in his task. But although the Japa¬
nese urged the Koreans to deal directly with the Americans,
their urgings produced no results.
The American efforts were next transferred to Peking with
more success and through Chinese intervention a Korean-
American treaty was signed in 1882. The Chinese government
still claimed Korea as a vassal in the old Confucian hierarchy
of relations. The United States was unwilling to recognize a
relationship which had no parallel in western law, but ac¬
cepted a letter from China along with the treaty claiming
Korea as a dependency. Other western powers followed the
United States. Britain and Germany made treaties with Korea
in 1883, Italy and Russia in 1884, each dealing with the Korean
monarch as an independent sovereign.
Korea was not the only territory which drew the interest
of the growing numbers of Japanese nationalists and expan¬
sionists. In 1875 Japan affirmed its claim to the Bonin (Oga-
sawara) Islands, once claimed by both Perry and the British.
Neither western power had supported its claim by action, and
Japan by occupying, colonizing, and forbidding the residence
of foreigners took complete control. By a treaty with Russia
in 1875 the Japanese obtained undisputed possession of the
Kurile Islands in return for recognition of Russian claims to
southern Sakhalin. And in 1879 Japan formally declared its
control of the Ryukyu Islands despite China’s protest that the
islands were still tributary vassals. The Chinese appealed to
former President Grant to intervene in their behalf when he
visited the Far East in 1879. The commission he suggested met
and reached agreement on division of the area, but China
never implemented its claim.
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 101

The new overseas responsibilities provided an additional

argument for the expansion of Japans naval and military
forces. Naval expenditures more than tripled between 1870 and
1880. Total military expenditures which were still less than a
quarter of the national budget in 1880 were over half of the
total in 1890, jumping from approximately $9 to $24 million.
Naval tonnage almost tripled in the same decade as Japanese-
built ships supplemented those purchased from Britain.
Japanese commercial and political interests expanded in
Korea in the years following treaty relations. The peninsula
was a rice producer with growing potential as a supplier of
food for Japan, while iron ore and other minerals offered addi¬
tional potential value to an industrializing nation. But the in¬
troduction of Japanese capital and industry along with western
ideas created in some Koreans the same adverse reactions they
had produced a few decades earlier in Japan. In 1882 a po¬
litical uprising was the occasion for anti-foreign elements to
vent their resentments on the Japanese, storming and burning
the Japanese legation at Seoul, while the Japanese officials fled
and fought their way to the seacoast where they were rescued
by a British ship.
The Japanese government followed the western pattern in
dealing with oriental outbursts of mob violence. They sent
their embassy back to the Korean capital, accompanied by
some 700 soldiers and with demands for a large indemnity
for the outrage. The Chinese government also sent a large
military force, claiming still to control Korea’s foreign relations.
War was averted, but the two nations spent the next decade
competing for the control, each supported by one faction of
the Koreans.
War broke out in 1894 after Japan secured control of the
Korean government and secured its authorization to expel the
Chinese troops. By this date China had also made some efforts
at modernizing its fighting forces with the help of foreign
advisers, and by the purchase of British and German-made
warships. An Annapolis graduate, Philo McGiffin, was second
102 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
in command on a Chinese battleship when the historic battle
of the Yalu River took place in September of 1894. But China
had not responded as quickly and with thoroughness to west¬
ernization, and Japanese forces won smashing victories on sea
and land. At the peace conference in 1895 the Chinese negoti¬
ators were assisted by John W. Foster, former American Sec¬
retary of State, while Henry W. Denison aided the Japanese.
The victory was so clear cut that China was forced not only
to recognize the independence of Korea, but to accept the de¬
mands of Japanese expansionism and cede the island of For¬
mosa and the Liaotung peninsula of southern Manchuria to
Japan.
Before the Japanese were able fully to savor the fruits of
victory, they were forced to submit to one more act of intimida¬
tion by the West. The Russians, supported by France and
Germany, were determined not to permit the Japanese to gain
a foothold on the continent. Russia’s Far Eastern Fleet was
alerted and Japan was advised to return the Liaotung penin¬
sula, including Port Arthur, to China. Faced with a new war
aganst three strong western nations, Japan was left with no
alternative but a humiliating submission. China paid an addi¬
tional indemnity for Japan’s retrocession, but Japan’s bitterness
was increased when in 1898 Russia intimidated the Chinese
into leasing them the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula
including Port Arthur.
Proponents of a bigger Japanese army and navy had no lack
of winning arguments following Russia’s action. But they wel¬
comed fresh support from the United States in the form of
the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Preaching a doctrine
which approved war and expansion as the mark of a healthy
nation, Mahan also attacked contentment with the existing
frontiers as a sign of national decay. A progressive nation
must expand, and a large naval force was an essential factor
in expansion. Mahan’s first important volume, The Influence
of Sea Power upon History, published in the United States in
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 103

1890, was soon translated into Japanese. By 1897 it had been

adopted as a textbook in the Naval and Military College of
Japan, and the Japanese government had placed copies in the
libraries of all the high schools and normal schools. Mahan
had also some popular appeal and several thousand copies
were sold in the first two days his book was available. The
philosophy of imperialism expressed more than a half century
earlier by Shoin Yoshida was available again in a westernized
form.
Growing power, diplomatic and military victories, and a
spreading pride in the gains of the new, westernized Japan
rapidly transformed a national consciousness into a vigorous
nationalism. With this nationalism came a new anti-foreignism.
By the end of the 1880’s a “Japan for Japanese’’ sentiment had
become apparent to western observers. The Japanese were still
willing to adopt ideas and techniques from the western world,
but at the same time anxious to free themselves from tutelage
as rapidly as possible. Japanese students who had studied in
the western world replaced foreign specialists in important
posts.
Even such a friend of Japan as Charles LeGendre no longer
found the atmosphere a sympathetic one. The General had
remained in Japan for some years after resigning his position
in 1875, and in 1878 had published a volume entitled Progres¬
sive Japan. In it he discussed Japan’s destiny “to form the ad¬
vanced post of a transformed superior civilization,” and spoke
glowingly of the island nation’s future. From Japan LeGendre
drifted to Korea where he was able to obtain high government
posts. In 1891 he returned to Japan in the service of Korea in
an effort to secure a favorable revision of trading regulations.
But he found the Japanese unwilling to make concessions to
the weaker nation. In a pique he wrote to a friend, “Japan has
become perfectly hateful to me,” only to reconsider and scrawl
instead, “Japan has ceased to be what it used to be.”
If the unpleasant side of Japanese nationalism was becom-
104 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
ing apparent to some foreign residents in the decades of the
eighties and nineties, it was slower in changing Washington’s
official view of Japan. Reports reaching the State Department
from Tokyo still presented glowing pictures of Japan’s eco¬
nomic, military, and political progress. Minister John Bing¬
ham, writing in 1880 of the reigning Mikado, said, “seldom,
if ever, in the history of civil administration, has any other
ruler done so much within so brief a period for the reformation
and well-being of a people. . . .” The State Department’s in¬
structions to Bingham’s successor, Richard Hubbard, in 1885
said that the first principle of American policy was to see that
Japan achieved sovereign equality “in view of her steady
progress toward sound principles of self-government.” On re¬
tiring from Tokyo after four years’ duty, Hubbard assured
Washington in 1889 that he was convinced that Japan’s pro¬
gress “is not a short-lived or experimental thing, nor a thin
veneering of Western civilization . . . but rather a proof of a
solid and permanent triumph over the past of her history. . . .”
The treatment of Japan in the America^ press and peri¬
odicals echoed the admiring note of official evaluations. Japan’s
foreign policy gave no cause for alarm nor criticism. Although
diplomatic and territorial gains were for the most part at the
expense of China, there was no large body of Sinophiles sway¬
ing American opinion in behalf of that country. A series of
major outrages against Christian missionaries made it difficult
for the American churches interested in China to commend the
cause of the pagan Manchu government. Beginning in the
1870’s the rise of hostility toward Chinese immigrants on the
west coast also helped to create an attitude unsympathetic to
China’s fate in Asia. Chinese in America were condemned as
immoral heathens, racially inferior and threatening the liveli¬
hood of white Americans. Some of this contempt was trans¬
ferred to China itself.
When the Sino-Japanese War began in 1894, opinion ran
strongly in favor of Japan. Most interested Americans would
VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM 105

probably have accepted the description of the issues as pre¬

sented by a former American foreign service officer who had
served in Peking. Writing in the North American Review,
Howard Martin stated:

. . . the success of Japan in Korea means reform and

progress—governmental, social and commercial—in that
unhappy country. . . . The success of the Chinese means
the forcing back of the Koreans to Oriental sluggishness,
superstition, ignorance, and anti-foreign sentiment. It is
a conflict between modern civilization, as represented by
Japan; and barbarism, or a hopelessly antiquated civil¬
ization, by China.

An equally one-sided position was taken by the American

minister to China, Charles Denby, who had served ten years
at Peking. In a report to the Secretary of State, Denby said
that Japan “is now doing for China what the United States
did for Japan. She has learnt western civilization and she is
forcing it on her unwieldy neighbor.”
The official American position was one of neutrality, but a
benevolent neutrality evidenced by Secretary of State Walter
Gresham’s firm rejection of all suggestions for American co¬
operation with the other western powers to discuss joint in¬
tervention. The Secretary understood that such an intervention
might demand “a settlement not favorable to Japan’s future
security and well-being.” When in November of 1894 the
United States extended its good offices to the belligerents, even
that move was criticized in the American press as being to the
advantage of China since the Japanese had not as yet won com¬
plete victory. “Let China herself appeal to Japan for peace,”
said the New York Herald. There seems to have been a con¬
viction that China would be awakened only by utter defeat.
It is “to the interest of the world at large,” said a Philadelphia
editorialist, “that the war shall not cease until Japan has in¬
flicted a decisive and destructive blow and brought the Chinese
Government to confess its helplessness.”
106 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Japan’s smashing naval victories increased American admira¬
tion for the former pupil and testimonials were offered by
many prominent Americans. “Japan has leaped, almost at one
bound, to a place among the great nations of the earth,” said
Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy. Rear Admiral
Stephen B. Luce, founder of the Naval War College, praised
the quality of Japan’s naval strategy and tactics, and Charles
Cramp, a leading American ship builder, concluded that Japan
was exceeded only by Britain in the quality of its naval con¬
struction.
The American press reported on the tremendous upsurge
of nationalist fervor which the war and final victory brought
Japan. To the American correspondents in Japan it was a
matter of some concern. Even as sympathetic a resident as
Lafcadio Hearn described these developments with some
alarm. Popular histories uncritically lauding Japan’s victories
were poured out to the reading public, while even the illiterate
Japanese could catch the chauvinist spirit through the fanciful
color prints depicting the feats of the military and naval
heroes. War plays filled the theaters, while a wide variety of
articles ranging from textiles to note paper were imprinted
with war scenes. One ingenious Japanese merchant produced
chop sticks, each inscribed with a poem recalling a specific de¬
feat of the Chinese.
A few Americans saw danger signs. Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge warned his colleagues in Congress after Japan signed
the peace that they “have just whipped somebody and they
are in a state of mind when they think they can whip any¬
body.” Secretary of the Navy Herbert emphasized the potential
threat of rising Japanese naval power and urged more money
for American construction. But these were the voices of a small
minority. Japan’s first ventures in imperialism did little to
change the image of a progressive, democratizing nation, fol¬
lowing in the footsteps of the nation which first opened Japan’s
ports to the western world.
Chapter VII

THE FIRST ABRASIONS

W HAT IS THE OCCASION for all this militant insanity

we do not know,” complained the New York Journal
of Commerce in 1895. “This rage of displaying the flag in
season and out of season, this remarkable fashion of hanging
the flag over every schoolhouse and of giving boys military
drill, and this passion for tracing one’s ancestry to somebody
who fought in the Revolutionary War or the War of 1812, or
at least against the French and Indians, all help to create a false
spirit of militarism.” The editors of this New York journal were
describing with some accuracy the mood of the decade. The
United States in the 1890’s was experiencing the extreme
manifestations of full-blown nationalism.
Like that of Japan, American nationalism as a widely dis¬
seminated sentiment was a recent historical development. The
colonial period had seen the growth of a national consciousness
which became a vigorous nationalist spirit in the struggle with
Britain for independence. But even after the ratification of the
Federal Constitution this emotion and its accompanying ide¬
ology characterized a minority of Americans. Many residents
of the United States still felt closer to their states than to the
new national government. Wars have been noted for their
107
io8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
effect in creating national unity, but neither the War of 1812
nor the Mexican War were fought by a united people. A large
minority, if not a majority of Americans, viewed these con¬
flicts with indifference or actively opposed the policies of the
national administration. The tremendous territorial gains of
the Mexican War, won at small cost, did much to stir patriotic
enthusiasm and to set on foot ventures for further national ex¬
pansion. But again the sectional conflict of 1861-1865 demon¬
strated the dominance of regional and state loyalties in the
hearts of many Americans.
It was the decade of the 1890’s which saw the expression
of a vigorous nationalism which now extended to all sections
of the nation and to all strata. Great stress was placed on the
symbols of patriotism. Historians have noted the rapid rise in
the number of patriotic societies in this decade, the growing
concern for the “Americanization” of immigrants, and the pas¬
sage of state laws requiring for patriotic purposes the teaching
of American history in the schools. As in Japan, the improve¬
ment of transportation through the railroad, the decline in il¬
literacy through better schooling, and the expansion of the
popular press made possible the dissemination of nationalism
to the prairie farmer as well as to the factory worker of the
cities.
When the nationalist spirit creates a mood of self-confidence
touching on arrogance, when new lands and markets seem
available for the strong, and when troublesome domestic prob¬
lems harass those who restrict their vision to the homeland,
a milieu is formed in which expansionist ideas can flourish
and in which dynamic expansionist leaders can gain political
strength. In the United States in the last decade of the nine¬
teenth century, as in some degree in Japan, these conditions
prevailed. The destiny of America, the dreams long blurred
by the sectional strife of the Civil War and the decades of re¬
construction, once more became clear. In 1895 the American,
Magazine of Civics asked a group of distinguished Americans
THE FIRST ABRASIONS log

the question, “Ought we to annex Cuba?” Ethan Allen, a New

York lawyer, expressed the expansionist spirit in full measure:

Of course Cuba should be annexed as a part of the

United States. Geographically she belongs to us. . . .
Canada will come in time; Mexico will follow Texas and
California, and drop into her niche under the Stars and
Stripes when we are ready. But we want Cuba now. . . .
The great spirits which gave us this Republic, and who
now watch impatiently that it shall not fail in any step
that advances its destiny, beckon to us.
It was only a few years later that a young Kansas editor,
William Allen White, proclaimed that it was the Anglo-Saxon’s
“manifest destiny to go forth as a world conqueror. He will
take possession of all the islands of the sea.”
This expansionist spirit with its catch phrases to describe
America’s mission to civilize and Christianize was not new.
Much that was said echoed the mood of confidence of the
1840’s and early 1850’s. But what was new was the widespread
support which it gained at the end of the century. The little
band of expansionists who retained their dreams through the
Civil War found themselves for decades working against strong
public apathy. When Secretary of State Seward purchased
Alaska from the Russians in 1867, proponents of annexation
hailed his action as giving the United States the key to the
possession of the Pacific and the control of trade with China.
But these bold claims brought no enthusiastic response in Con¬
gress. It was only Seward’s skillful lobbying coupled with
bribery that secured the ratification of the annexation treaty
and squeezed the money out of Congress to pay for the pur¬
chase. Seward also negotiated a treaty with Hawaii in 1867
which he hoped would be a preliminary to annexation. He
then had to wait three years for Senate action, only to have
the treaty rejected in 1870.
In examining the “artificial patriotism” of the nineties, the
Journal of Commerce concluded that “undoubtedly the recon-
no AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
struction of the Navy has done much in this direction.” The
change in attitude toward the Navy took place in the 1880’s.
The Republicans took the initiative in 1884 with a plank in
their national platform which demanded the restoration of the
United States Navy to “its old-time strength and efficiency.” The
same year the Democrats condemned the Republicans for
squandering money on the decrepit fleet. But the Democrats
were soon converted to the new outlook and in 1889, at the
close of Grover Cleveland’s presidency, this party took credit
for having “set on foot the reconstruction of the American
Navy.”
In little more than a decade congressional appropriations
changed the Navy from a collection of rotting hulks to a
modern fighting force capable of supporting a more dynamic
foreign policy. Wooden vessels were scrapped as their repair
costs mounted, and beginning in 1883 Congress authorized the
construction of four steel vessels. Three of these were pro¬
tected cruisers, later to provide the basis for the famous White
Squadron. By 1890 Congress had authorized some 25 modem
vessels, including fast cruisers which were still called “coast¬
wise vessels” with a stipulated limit on their cruising range
in order to secure the votes of the anti-expansionists.
The growth of the Navy provided an audience for the writ¬
ings of Alfred Thayer Mahan who in turn reached through his
books and articles a wider circle of Americans who became
enthusiastic for a bolder foreign policy. Mahan’s The Influence
of Sea Power Upon History made this naval officer a national
figure whose doctrines were widely publicized. He attacked
the “coast defense” and “commerce destruction” concepts of
naval strategy which had limited the range of American war¬
ships and concentrated naval strength in home waters. The
new Navy was to be freed of its traditional tasks of coastal
protection and instead range the high seas, attacking the
enemy and protecting trade routes.
Mahan offered more than a strategy, he gave aggressive
THE FIRST ABRASIONS m

expansionists a theory to support their demands. He saw “no

aggressive action in our pious souls,” but he urged Americans
at the same time to fix their energies on areas where youthful
vigor would find an outlet in conquest and exploitation. Naval
growth and commercial expansion would go hand in hand. The
alternative was national decay.
Mahan looked westward to Hawaii as a starting point. From
there American naval power would move on to the western
Pacific to defend Anglo-Saxon supremacy. Absorbing the cur¬
rent ideas of racial conflict, Mahan argued that the only alter¬
native to the conquest of the West by Oriental peoples was
American assimilation of India, China, and Japan. But in his
early writings there was a tendency to show special favor to
Japan. Even after Japan had shown its strength in the defeat
of China in 1895, Mahan wrote in praise of the Japanese as
“willing converts” to western civilization. According to his
predictions, Japan as an island sea power would follow a line
of co-operation with the other two great sea powers, Britain
and the United States, and even join with them in an alliance
against the major land powers.
Mahan’s arguments were supplemented by other pleas for
an expansionist policy. “We must have a market or we shall
have revolution,” a Maine senator warned in 1898, putting in
concise form the economic justification for the extension of
American power. The theme of markets and profits was
strongly stressed in regard to the Far East, and there were
some genuine fears that the expanding American economy
would soon be choked by a surplus. But an economic inter¬
pretation falls far short of explaining in full the motives of the
men who called for a “larger policy.” Leaders like Theodore
Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert J. Beveridge, John Hay,
and their associates had succeeded in identifying their own
expansive egos with that of the nation and saw the new course
of America as the road to personal power. Some were also
touched with visions of Destiny and Duty, believing them-
112 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

selves to be chosen men leading a chosen people to world

greatness. A previous generation had found satisfaction in
building a political empire or one built out of steel, oil, or rails;
the dynamic leaders of the nineties hungered for a real empire
across the seas.
The Hawaiian Islands were proclaimed as the first Ameri¬
can stepping stone to Asia and their annexation a strategic
necessity. As early as 1872 the Secretary of War had sent a
military mission to the islands to survey the capabilities of
the various ports for use in the event of war between the
United States and “a powerful maritime nation.” The mission
reported that the harbor of Honolulu would be difficult to de¬
fend, but that the Pearl River harbor could be developed
into a useful base. In 1884 when renewal of the 1875 treaty
with the Hawaiian Kingdom was under consideration, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee added an amendment
giving the United States exclusive rights to the use of Pearl
Harbor as a repair and coaling station. In January of 1893 a
group of white residents, led by American annexationists, over¬
threw the Hawaiian monarchy and called upon Washington to
act.
When news of the revolution reached Tokyo, the British-
built cruiser, Naniwa, was sent to Hawaii to furnish protec¬
tion for the more than 20,000 Japanese residents, a colony
more than ten times as large as the American settlement. On
arrival in February of 1893, the Naniwa s commander, Hei-
hachiro Togo, found the harbor of Honolulu already occupied
by the Japanese Kongo, en route home from San Francisco, a
British warship, and the American cruiser, Boston. At the
request of the American Minister, John L. Stevens, the Boston
had landed a force of marines to protect American lives and
property and, as an official investigation later pointed out,
to maintain order in behalf of the pro-American revolutionists.
Japan did not look with favor upon the projected American
annexation of the islands, jeopardizing the treaty rights of
THE FIRST ABRASIONS H3

the oriental residents, and Tokyo withheld recognition from

the new republican government. Although cordial visits were
exchanged between the officers of the American and Japanese
warships, rumors quickly spread among the American residents
of impending trouble. The Japanese, it was said, were planning
to seize control of Hawaii. The American commander of the
Pacific Station reported to Washington the rumor that the
Naniwa had brought a cargo of arms for the Japanese resi¬
dents, many of whom were allegedly former members of the
Japanese army. An incident then took place. A Japanese con¬
vict escaped from a Honolulu penitentiary and swam to the
Naniwa, asking protection. Since the Japanese government
had no treaty relations with the new Hawaiian government
and no extradition agreement existed. Captain Togo refused
the requests for his return. The Hawaiian Star published a
report that American forces would be used to support the
Hawaiian request and that Togo had boasted of his ability to
blow the American ships out of the water if any attempt was
made to recapture the convict. The Japanese consul denied the
story and arranged the transfer of the convict to the Hawaiian
authorities. The ominous incident was over, and the Secretary
of the Navy received a dispatch in April of 1893 which re¬
ported that the officers of the Boston were “on pleasant and
visiting terms” with the officers of the Naniwa.
The first occasion on which a modern Japanese warship
faced an American warship had with historical appropriate¬
ness taken place only a few miles from Pearl Harbor. For the
next half century Hawaii was to play an important part in
Japanese-American relations. President Grover Cleveland
blocked the expansionists’ plans by withdrawing the treaty of
annexation from the Senate, but this was only a temporary set¬
back for the proponents of the new Pacific policy. Theodore
Roosevelt in 1897 denounced Cleveland’s action as “a colossal
crime” and claimed that only by taking the islands promptly
could trouble be avoided with Japan. “I am fully alive to the
H4 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

danger from Japan,” he wrote his friend, Mahan. Before the

year was out, Roosevelt, now Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
saw war as an immediate possibility.
In January of 1897 the Japanese consul general in Hawaii
announced that the Naniwa was again going to call at Hono¬
lulu, but that the visit had no relation to the Japanese govern¬
ment’s grievances against the Hawaiian government, Never¬
theless, shortly after this announcement the cruiser Phila¬
delphia was also ordered to Honolulu and Assistant Secretary
Roosevelt began to survey the American ships in the Pacific
available for emergency dispatch to Hawaii. In March of 1897
a dispute developed between the captain of a Japanese trans¬
port and the Hawaiian government over a thousand Japanese
laborers who had come to work and were turned back by im¬
migration authorities.
Some American expansionists saw the Japanese-Hawaiian
dispute as the occasion for a war involving the United States.
Theodore Roosevelt called upon the Naval War College to pre¬
pare war plans and agreed with his friend Alfred Mahan that
the Hawaiian Islands should be seized and explanations made
afterwards. With the Japanese Navy smashed, Roosevelt be¬
lieved that any Japanese army in Hawaii could then be sent to
American prisons.
Fortunately for Japan, Roosevelt was only Assistant Secre¬
tary of the Navy and his superior, Secretary John D. Long,
was less excitable and not inclined to force an issue, the very
existence of which was questionable. But when the Naniwa
finally passed Diamond Head and anchored in Honolulu
harbor in May of 1897, the Philadelphia was on hand to greet
the new arrival. The anti-Japanese press, as in 1893, printed
rumors of a coming battle off Waikiki Beach, but the conduct
of the Japanese was in no way threatening. Agreement was
reached to arbitrate the dispute over the rejected laborers
and the Japanese shipping company involved was eventually
indemnified for its losses.
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 115

Before the Naniwa raised anchor, the news reached Tokyo

that a new treaty of annexation had been signed by the white-
dominated Hawaiian government. On the grounds that acquisi¬
tion by the United States of the islands would upset the status
quo in the Pacific and endanger the residential and commercial
rights of the Japanese residents, a protest was sent to Washing¬
ton. No threats or hint of force accompanied the protest, but
Japan’s action was a new cause for alarm in some Washington
circles. The Navy Department sent warnings to Pacific com¬
manders to be ready for emergency action. Rear Admiral
Lester Beardslee, commander of the Philadelphia, was ordered
in July to land forces and to assume a provisional protectorate
over the islands if Japan used force against the Hawaiian gov¬
ernment. The Rear Admiral had already informed Washington
that he was “fully persuaded” that no expectation of trouble
with Japan existed on the part of the Hawaiian government.
But it was not until the Naniwa steamed westward for its home
port in September of 1897 that all apprehensions ceased.
Although this encounter in Hawaiian waters took place with¬
out any scare headlines in the American press, naval circles
now looked upon the Japanese Navy in a different light.
In the fall of 1897 Captain Albert Barker, commander of the
U.S.S. Oregon in Pacific waters, prepared a significant intel¬
ligence report for the Secretary of the Navy. It was the first
of many such reports which were to stress Japanese expansion¬
ism and to view the new Oriental Navy as a threat to the
United States. “Forty million people cannot be kept within her
present limits, she must expand,” wrote Captain Barker. As
long as Russia barred the way to the mainland of Asia, he saw
Japan pushing southward and eastward across the Pacific.
Mexico was already being infiltrated by Japanese immigrants,
Captain Barker reported, and the Japanese were prepared to
seize Magdalena Bay in Lower California on the outbreak of
war. Unfortified, Puget Sound would quickly fall and from the
north and south the Japanese would sweep the Pacific coast,
n6 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

capturing Los Angeles and raiding San Francisco to destroy

its naval facilities. If neither Britain nor Russia interfered, the
western American states would fall into Japan s hands.
With some variation in detail, this alarming picture of the
Japanese conquest of American soil was to become a stock
argument in the early twentieth century of those who came to
view Japan as the major enemy. Americans were presented
this frightening future as propaganda for a variety of ends. It
was used initially as an argument for the annexation of Hawaii,
in order to prevent the use of the islands as an advance base
for the projected invasion. The picture was presented to Con¬
gress by the proponents of a larger navy and by the opponents
of Japanese immigration. The Japanese threat was also an ad¬
ditional reason for pushing action on the construction of an
inter-oceanic canal. Former Secretary of the Navy Herbert,
in a magazine article appearing as early as January of 1897,
pointed out that the Japanese Navy could reach the Hawaiian
Islands from their home waters in two weeks. The American
fleet, with full strength in the Atlantic in preparation for the
war with Spain, would, without a canal, take three months to
come to the defense of the future American islands.
The expanding American Navy—six battleships and one
armored cruiser were authorized in the years 1891 to 1898—
came out of the Spanish-American War with a tremendous in¬
crease in its popular and congressional support. The smashing
defeat of the obsolete Spanish forces and the feats of Admiral
George Dewey and other heroes created a pride in the Ameri¬
can ships which overcame traditional resistance to a large
naval force. Congress in 1899 specified that all new construc¬
tion should have “great radius of action” and the following
year the term, “coastline battleship” was dropped. The new
Navy was no longer tied to defensive action in American
waters, but was to emulate Admiral Dewey and apply the
theories of Mahan, carrying the war to the enemy across the
seas. The new overseas possessions, Hawaii annexed during
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 117

the war, and Guam and the Philippines, acquired in the treaty
of peace with Spain, had to be defended. The major burden
of their defense rested on the American Navy.
The annexation of the Philippines in 1899 created a new
source of Japanese-American tension. The expansionists called
for the islands’ acquisition as stepping stones to the valuable
trade of China and sounded the appeals of “manifest destiny”
and the duty of carrying Christianity and civilization to the
heathen. The anti-imperialists raised the traditional Ameri¬
can arguments against the acquisition of an empire, but lost
their cause by a narrow margin when the Senate approved the
annexation treaty by two votes. Although few naval and
military experts believed that the Philippines could be suc¬
cessfully defended against an Asian naval power, the possi¬
bility that this area would become a strategic liability re¬
ceived little attention in the debate over the treaty. It was
a British admiral, P. H. Colomb, writing in the North American
Review in 1898, who gave Americans the clearest warning.

The United States is for the first time giving hostages

to fortune, and taking a place in the world that will
entail on her sacrifices and difficulties of which she has
not yet dreamed. ... So long as the Empire of the
United States was contained in a ring fence of land and
sea frontiers, she had in all international disputes the
enormous advantage of unattackableness. . . . But with
outlying territories, especially islands, a comparatively
weak power has facilities for wounding her without
being wounded in return.

For a growing Japan the fate of the Philippines was of

great importance. If a feeble Spain in Cuba was considered by
some Americans to have been a threat to their coast, a vigorous
America in the Philippines was easily seen as a threat by Japan.
Warnings appeared in the Japanese press that American ex¬
pansion had upset the balance of power in the Far East and
that Formosa, lying close to the northern Philippines, must
ii8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

now be fortified. American efforts at the defense of the Phil¬

ippines called for a larger naval force in the Pacific. An Ameri¬
can force large enough to protect the newly acquired islands
was also capable of carrying offensive action into Japan’s home
waters. A Japanese fleet capable of meeting the new defensive
needs of that country was also capable of attacking the
Philippines. Naval building on both sides of the Pacific was
henceforth caught in this narrow relationship by which de¬
fensive naval construction became for the other party a threat
calling for counter-construction. By 1907 Theodore Roosevelt
had glimpsed something of this new dilemma and wrote of
the Philippines as “our heel of Achilles,” which cramped any
freedom of action in dealing with Japan.
In 1899, the year the Stars and Stripes were raised over
the Philippines, a new effort was made to advance American in¬
terests in China. John Hay issued the first of his Open Door
notes to the powers. Hay announced, in effect, his country’s
concern for its share in the trade and economic development
of the Chinese Empire. Since the first American treaty with
China in 1844, the most-favored-nation clause had been used
to guarantee equal commercial advantages with the European
treaty powers. Any advantages wrung from China and written
into a treaty were thus automatically extended to the United
States. But by the close of the nineteenth century Russia,
Britain, Germany, France, and Japan had all secured leases to
sectors of China’s coastal territory and had developed spheres
of interest in the hinterland. Traditional anti-imperialist senti¬
ment still inhibited American participation in this partitioning
process, but, unless something was done, the United States was
in danger of being squeezed out of markets.
Under British prompting and with the support of American
business interests, Hay sought to commit the imperialist powers
to the principle of equal trading opportunities for all within
their holdings. The answers to the American note were gen¬
erally evasive, but Hay pretended to find an agreement with
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 119

his principle. In 1900 he went further and appealed to the same

powers for the preservation of the territorial and administrative
integrity of China.
The Open Door notes and particularly that of 1900 were
to become of historical importance in later decades. But in
their inception they lacked support even within the McKinley
and Roosevelt administration. The Navy Department preferred
to join Europe in the partitioning process and to secure an
American base on the China coast. The General Board of the
Navy suggested three sites as possibilities, two on the Fukien
coast opposite Japan’s new territory of Formosa. Hay accepted
the Navy’s position and within six months of his appeal in be¬
half of China’s territorial integrity he cabled the American
Minister to China to open negotiations to secure an American
leasehold. Japan had already concluded an agreement with
China, barring any leaseholds on the Fukien coast, so an ap¬
proach was made to Japan as well. The Japanese government
quickly reminded Secretary Hay of his contradictory position,
as well as of their non-alienation agreement with China.
Although Hay withdrew his proposal, the Navy Department
continued to press for a Chinese base. The Navy’s General
Board made plans for the seizure of a base on the Fukien coast
in the event of a general war. In 1900 the Pacific Mail Steam¬
ship Company’s lease on a coaling depot at Yokohama was
taken over by the Navy for the use of the Asiatic squadron. In
1903 a harbor was selected for a base on Kiska Island, where
the Aleutians stretch far across the North Pacific. But it was not
until 1906, after the destruction of Russia’s Far Eastern squad¬
ron and the withdrawal of the major strength of other western
nations to European waters, that the Navy ceased asking for a
naval station on the China coast.
More important than naval bases in the expansion of Ameri¬
can strength in the Pacific was the contribution made by Theo¬
dore Roosevelt as President to the growth of fighting power.
When Roosevelt took office in 1901, the American Navy ranked
120 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

fifth among the world’s fleets. When he left office in 1909, the
Navy was outranked only by Great Britain. The Pacific Fleet
by that date consisted of eight armored cruisers and seven
protected battleships, while 20 battleships and two cruisers
operated in the Atlantic. Work had begun on the dredging and
fortification of Pearl Harbor and on the strengthening of naval
installations in the Philippines.
Japan’s sea power also grew during the Roosevelt years. By
1908 the flag of the Rising Sun floated over eight battleships
and ten armored cruisers. In the same year Japan’s naval spend¬
ing reached approximately a third that of the United States. An
alliance with Great Britain, made in 1902 and renewed in 1905,
gave Japan the additional support of the world’s greatest fleet
in the event of a war with two or more powers. After the
Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the British reorganized
their Far Eastern forces, withdrew their battleships to Europe,
and reduced their Pacific squadron to little more than a police
patrol. A British observer pointed out that his government by
this action “virtually gave its adherence to a Japanese political
principle in the Far East equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine
of the United States.”
With Russia’s Far Eastern squadron smashed in the war, the
United States was the only potent challenger of Japan. Ameri¬
cans were in the Philippines and American commercial and
missionary interests in Asia expanded in the first decade of the
twentieth century. But the image of Japan as the enemy was
still slow to grow in the minds of responsible American officials
and in the press. The possibilities of a future clash were
glimpsed on both sides of the Pacific, but, more often than not,
pushed aside in the United States by other considerations. The
major exception to this generalization was to develop on the
west coast of the United States.
Theodore Roosevelt took a major part in shaping the Ameri¬
can relationship with Japan. He saw more clearly than most
the great growth of Japanese power and its significance for
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 121

Asia. As a militarist he admired and respected Japan for its

ability to adopt and use effectively western weapons and mili¬
tary techniques. When he was at his cool-headed best he ad¬
mitted that war with Japan would be an expensive folly; it
would mean the loss of the Philippines and even an American
victory would not guarantee the national interests in Asia. But
on other occasions Roosevelt’s personal belligerency and love
of battle led him to consider a Pacific war with relish.
Fortunately the President’s warlike moods led to only a few
dangerous actions in the Pacific. If he had not been forced to
carry the heavy burden of the anti-Japanese agitation on the
west coast, he might have succeeded in greatly extending the
life of Japanese-American friendship. Roosevelt recognized
Japan as an important counterweight in Asia, balancing the
ambitions of Europe. In this situation the United States could
wisely remain little more than a spectator. If the balance was
to be tipped, Roosevelt preferred to see it tipped in the direc¬
tion of Tokyo rather than St. Petersburg or Berlin. Astute
diplomacy would see to it that Japan’s gains were American
gains too. And without the uncritical attachment to China of
some of his successors, Roosevelt was not tempted into any
quixotic ventures in behalf of that disintegrating empire.
Although not many Americans were as clear in their grasp
of the power politics of Asia as Mr. Roosevelt, his concern for
the friendship of Japan was typical of his countrymen. The
strength of the favorable image of the former pupil was clearly
demonstrated during the crucial period of the Russo-Japanese
War. From the beginning of this conflict to the signing of the
peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in September of 1905,
the great preponderance of expressed opinion favored Japan.
The war had its origin in the struggle over the control of
Korea where Russia continued to block Japan’s efforts to reap
the fruits of the 1895 victory over China. When Japan began
the fighting with a daring and successful surprise attack on
Port Arthur before formally declaring war, the American press
122 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

treated this act as a brilliant stratagem. A European scholar,

lecturing at one of the Ivy League universities, found the
academic community delighted at Japan’s initiative. As the war
moved on from one Japanese victory to another, American
cheers for the former pupil were loud and frequent.
Japan benefitted to some extent from the anti-Russian senti¬
ment found in the United States. For decades Americans had
read tales of Tsarist brutality, and this checked any sympathy
for the Emperor of All the Russias and his officials. The plight
of the Russian peasant also marked the country as decadent.
“Any country in which a poor man has no chance to become a
millionaire is condemned in American opinion,” said one
foreign commentator. Russian anti-Semitism and pogroms had
also aroused the antagonism of many American Jews and some
Christians. This Russian bigotry may have been responsible for
Kuhn, Loeb & Company, a New York banking house of Jewish
partners, taking the initiative and joining British bankers in
raising the first of a series of war loans for Japan.
The cause of Japan is “not only her own cause, but the cause
of the entire civilized world,” wrote Jacob Schiff, president of
Kuhn, Loeb & Company, in the war years. “Civilization,”
“progress,” and other glowing generalities were frequently as¬
sociated with the victory of Japan by many writers. Those who
thought more concretely of American economic interests also
favored the defeat of Russia. Japan stands as “the champion of
commercial rights,” said the New York Journal of Commerce,
while Russia’s policy in Asia was one of monopoly and closing
the open door. Occasionally a minority view was expressed
that Japan’s ideal was “Asia for the Asiatics—under Japanese
hegemony,” but such disturbing thoughts were uncommon.
The American cartoonists pictured the Japanese soldier as a
heroic figure and there were no traces of the ape-like cari¬
cature of the toothy, threatening Japanese so commonly used
in the 1930’s. Instead Japan was frequently viewed as a noble.
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 123
samurai warrior, defeating the Russian bear; an underdog
winning against odds by virtue of bravery.
Theodore Roosevelt was astute enough to realize that in the
flush of victory Japan, as he wrote Henry Cabot Lodge, “will
have her head turned to some extent,” but he said that the
same would be true of the United States if it had accom¬
plished such historic feats. He did not feel that the national
interests of the two countries were necessarily incompatible
and he was ready to make compromises. In the summer of 1905
through Secretary of War William Howard Taft’s exchange
with Prime Minister Taro Katsura, Roosevelt accepted Japan’s
control of Korea and received a disavowal of Japanese aspira¬
tions for the Philippines. Whatever the value of Japan’s prom¬
ise, Roosevelt paid nothing for it. The Korean independence
movement was small and helpless, and the President merely
recognized a fait accompli. Great Britain also accepted Japan’s
hegemony in Korea.
The American offer of mediation was accepted by both bel¬
ligerents, and the delegates came to New Hampshire to write
a peace. Russia ceded to Japan the southern half of die north¬
ern island of Sakhalin, recognized Japan’s position in Korea,
and turned over the rights and concessions in southern Man¬
churia. Japan’s claims to an indemnity were dropped “with a
magnanimity which seems ‘Quixotic,’” said the New York
World. When the Japanese minister to London had been told
that the American public expected Japan’s demands to be very
moderate, he had warned, “The public evidently mistakes the
Japanese for angels.” It was a surprise to many Americans to
find that the peace was bitterly criticized when its terms
reached Tokyo, and riots led to the resignation of the Prime
Minister.
Theodore Roosevelt not only received the Nobel Peace Prize
for his work at Portsmouth, but he bore with the Japanese
government some of the bitter resentment expressed by Japa-
124 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
nese mobs against all those associated with the peacemaking.
The last three years of his administration saw Roosevelt even
more deeply involved in relations with Japan. But this was a
byproduct of a domestic development as Japanese immigrants
in the United States became the victims of racial hostility.
Japanese laborers began slowly to move from Hawaii to
California in the 1870’s. There were less than 200 in the United
States by 1880, but the flow increased in the next two decades,
reaching more than a thousand a year in the early 1890’s. The
shortage of cheap labor, in part the result of the Chinese Ex¬
clusion Act of 1882, provided ample opportunities for a hard¬
working Japanese to make his way in the American West. The
success of these immigrants as agriculturalists, the apparent
threat which they posed for white labor, and the fact that they
had a different culture combined to make them a minority
group singled out by racialist elements. Anti-Japanese voices
were heard in California as early as 1887, but it was not until
1905 when the Asiatic Exclusion League was organized in
San Francisco that the movement wielded political power.
In October of 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education
ordered Japanese and Chinese children excluded from the
regular schools and sent to segregated classes. The purpose
was to relieve crowding and to see that white children would
not have “their youthful impressions” affected by association
with the Orientals. The first reason given was of dubious
validity, since there were less than a hundred Oriental students
in the whole school system.
News of the San Francisco action reached Washington by
way of Tokyo where the Japanese press received the action as
a national insult. A protest was made to Washington, charging
violation of the 1894 treaty which guaranteed to Japanese resi¬
dents of the United States “the same privileges, liberties and
rights” accorded to Americans or residents of the most-favored-
nation. Japanese newspapers took a critical tone. Cartoonists
pictured Lincoln breaking up the Statue of Liberty and Ameri-
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 12$

can missionaries hurrying home to try to convert their fellow

Americans. Extreme nationalist organs took on a belligerent
tone.
Both governments were anxious to avoid trouble. The Japa¬
nese cancelled the projected visit of a naval training squadron
to California ports to avoid incidents. Theodore Roosevelt went
to work with vigor, first trying to intimidate and then to per¬
suade the San Francisco School Board to rescind their action.
Secretary of State Elihu Root admitted in private that the
segregation of Japanese children appeared to be a treaty viola¬
tion and was therefore unconstitutional. The California Su¬
preme Court justices reportedly held the same views, but legal
action would have involved the politically explosive issue of
states rights. Roosevelt took the more successful approach of
winning concession by removing California’s fears of the grow¬
ing numbers of Japanese immigrants. Japan had already taken
some steps to limit migration and accepted in February of
1907 a Gentlemen’s Agreement by which the flow of laborers
to America would be stopped. The next month the School
Board withdrew its order. Feeling against Japanese was still
strong and in May of 1907 Washington was further embarrassed
by anti-Japanese riots in San Francisco.
Sensation-seeking journalists and anti-Japanese propagan¬
dists used the San Francisco difficulties to preach the immi¬
nence of a Pacific War. Rumors were spread about an attack
to be made on the Philippines. Richmond P. Hobson, a Span-
ish-American war hero and a favorite of the Hearst press,
proclaimed that he had seen an ultimatum sent to Washington
from Tokyo and that “Japan could whip us in the Pacific with
ease.” Fuel was added by reports from the German press where
an effort seems to have been made to embarrass Great Britain
over the prospect of an attack on the United States by her ally,
Japan. But the war-scare mongers were in the minority. The
eastern press in particular took a more critical attitude toward
California and the New York World went so far as to say, “If
126 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

somebody has to fight Japan, why not let California bear the
whole burden of the war?”
The Roosevelt administration was not without its qualms
over the situation, although the President himself retained a
measured perspective which contrasted with some of his bel¬
ligerent outbursts on other occasions. Shortly after the first
Japanese protest was received in October of 1906, Roosevelt
asked the Navy about its preparations for a war with Japan.
He was assured that American command of the Pacific would
be achieved within 90 days from the time that the fleet left the
Atlantic coast. Three months later in January of 1907, the Army
and Navy began to undertake joint studies on the conduct of
a possible war with Japan. The Navy also decided to turn down
the Japanese offer, made six months earlier, to establish closer
relations and to exchange information as Japan was doing
with its British ally.
Settlement of the school issue did not end American fears.
In June of 1907 Roosevelt decided to shift the fleet to the
Pacific and again informed himself about the state of the war
plans. When news of the fleet move reached the public, it gave
proof for some that war was on its way. The Navy tried to
convince the country that the move had no international impli¬
cations, and Admiral Mahan gave his word that the cruise was
only a practical training operation. But now even the New
York papers, the Times, the Tribune, and the Sun, published
articles which assumed that war was impending. Japan, by
comparison, remained relatively calm, although Ambassador
Luke Wright cabled the Department of State that the fleet
move would have an unfavorable effect on the mind of the
average Japanese.
The Great White Fleet left Hampton Roads in December
of 1907 and its course was reported along with frequent rumors
of its impending destruction. Before the fleet sailed, Rear Ad¬
miral H. N. Manney predicted to the President that the
Japanese fleet would appear in the Atlantic to terrorize the
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 127

East coast once the American fleet reached the Pacific. Naval
intelligence received a report from Paris that the fleet would
be blown up in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. Rumor also spread
that a Japanese destroyer squadron would be waiting to tor¬
pedo the American ships when they passed through the nar¬
row Straits of Magellan.
The 16 American battleships weathered all the rumors.
When they reached the West coast in the spring of 1908, Roose¬
velt announced that they would cross the Pacific and continue
the voyage on a round-the-world cruise. The President felt
that the display of American might would be a deterrent to
any Japanese thought of war and accepted the invitation to
visit Tokyo en route. The American forces reached Tokyo in
October of 1908 and received an enthusiastic welcome from
the people of the capital. Special precautions were taken in
regard to shore leave for the crews, and the visit was ended
without any unpleasant incidents. The occasion was marked
with a great deal of oratory about Japanese-American friend¬
ship, but the realities could not be ignored by the Japanese.
Roosevelt had demonstrated the reach of American power and
like Perry had anchored within gunshot of the national capital.
For the Australians whose ports were also visited, the presence
of the American fleet was “a demonstration of white solidarity
against the yellow races,” as a government official phrased it.
But for the Japanese it was a reminder of the strength of what
Japanese journalists were beginning to call “the white peril.”
President Roosevelt had remained relatively calm during the
early stages of the fleet cruise, but the war rumors seem to
have had a cumulative effect upon his equanimity. In April of
1908 while the fleet was still on the West coast, he wrote to
his son Kermit that the military party in Japan was “inclined
for war with us” and confident that they could land an army in
California. The same month he urged the Secretary of the
Treasury to move the gold from San Francisco to Denver. His
warnings about possible war continued into the summer of
128 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

1908 when the ardent Japanophobe and Roosevelt supporter,

Richmond Hobson, rose in the Democratic convention to quote
the President as saying that war was “probable.” Roosevelt
denied the statement, but continued to show his concern over
the threat of Japan to the close of his administration in 1909.
To some extent, he also used the fear of Japan in these months
to push his naval building program upon Congress. In 1908
the Navy General Board came out for a two-ocean navy; an
Atlantic fleet pointed at what appeared to be the growing
threat of Germany and a Pacific fleet to meet Japan.
The return of American naval forces to the Atlantic in the
spring of 1909 was accompanied by cries from the West coast
about the defenselessness of that shore and pleas for permanent
stationing of battleships in the Pacific. A series of books were
offered the public in 1909 which set about to change the Amer¬
ican image of Japan. The most sensational was The Valor of
Ignorance by Homer Lea, a Californian who returned from
military adventures in China to devote himself to awakening
Americans to the Japanese threat. Tramping up and down the
California beaches. Lea was convinced by his survey that
Japan could effect a successful landing and conquer the entire
Pacific coast. The westward movement of the American Army
would be hampered by the Great Plains and Rockies, leaving
Japan in possession of large parts of the United States. Lea was
also a believer in racial theories, arguing that European im¬
migration to the United States had left too few native-born
Americans to compose a fighting force valiant enough to expel
the Japanese. “A story which every American would do well to
ponder,” said the Literary Digest in its review.
Before going out of print in 1922, Leas first book sold 18,000
copies, figures which made it a steady seller on the West coast
for over a decade. Editions also appeared in Japan, where the
militarists found it a useful argument for the success of their
cause. After the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, Lea s book was
reissued and he was hailed as a great seer. But little attention
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 129

was given to his argument that it was the action of his fellow
Californians which would bring on the war as a result of
treating Japanese immigrants as a “nation of lepers.”
Lea’s volume was the most popular of a number of books
which sought to stir American fears. E. H. Fitzpatrick’s The
Coming Conflict of Nations, or the Japanese-American War,
published the same year, was an exciting account of Japan’s
use of a secret weapon, a smoke screen, to defeat American
naval and land forces. Only the intervention of Great Britain
saved the United States from complete defeat and brought
about an Anglo-American union. Thomas Millard’s America
and the Far Eastern Question, also a 1909 title, claimed that
Japan was too weak to attack California, but called for an
aggressive American policy in China and Manchuria where
the Japanese were allegedly robbing Americans of the rich
profits of trade. Like others who looked with fear upon Japan,
Millard favored a major expansion of the Pacific naval forces, a
rapid completion of a base at Pearl Harbor, and the develop¬
ment of strong bases in the Philippines.
Wallace Irwin whose humorous writings probably created
the most widely-held stereotype of the immigrant Japanese
also published his first book in 1909. A San Francisco news¬
paperman, Irwin created a character, Hashimura Togo, a 35-
year-old schoolboy who spoke a comic pigeon English and
worked for an American family. Togo’s comments on life about
him so amused Americans that he was hailed as the successor
of Peter Finley Dunne’s “Mr. Dooley.” Togo was pictured as a
buck-toothed, ever-smiling, ultra-polite, but crafty “Jap.” The
stories first appeared in Colliers and soon spread to such di¬
verse publications as the New York Times and Good House¬
keeping. The first collection. Letters of a Japanese Schoolboy,
followed by Mr. Togo: Maid of All Work in 1913, and several
subsequent volumes, introduced millions of Americans to a
face and a type which was to become the standard for Ameri¬
can cartoonists for the next generation.
!3o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

The Japanese-peril books were supplemented in their work

by an important segment of the press. Led by William Ran¬
dolph Hearst, a sensational press treated each Japanese spy
rumor as important news and whipped minor incidents into
war-scare headlines. Much of this was not journalism based on
any real convictions as to the nature of Japanese policy, but
went on the assumption that scare stories sold papers. The
impact on American opinion was more regional than national,
but the journalist’s image of a threatening Japan combined
with the facts of that nation’s rapid rise to power began to
corrode the links of friendship. A Harvard scholar with a grasp
of realities, Archibald Coolidge, predicted in his United States
as a World Power (1908) that the two countries would never
return to the amicable reciprocity of a decade earlier. The
change was a product, he wrote, not only of Japan’s maturation
and zest for expansion, but of the expansion of American inter¬
ests in Asia. He believed that the two nations were fated to
become active commercial rivals and possibly political enemies.
President William Howard Taft continued Roosevelt’s naval
building program and the annual naval expenditures of his
administration topped those of the previous administration.
But Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, were less
cautious in invading areas in which Japan considered its own
interests vital. The banker, E. H. Harriman, had a vision of a
round-the-world rail system and headed a group of investors
interested in building and controlling lines in Manchuria and
China as links in this system. The Taft administration had
proclaimed its belief in “dollar diplomacy” and the State De¬
partment sought to aid the bankers’ schemes.
Since Manchuria and its railroads were divided north and
south between the Japanese and Russian spheres, Secretary
Knox suggested neutralization of these lines as a preliminary to
American participation in ownership. Harriman hoped to go
further and by buying up the Russian lines to force the Japa¬
nese to sell out in the south. Neither Japan nor Russia were
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 131

willing to admit a new rival in Manchuria and the two nations

joined to block American penetration. Instead of dividing his
rivals Knox had, in the words of A. Whitney Griswold, ‘'nailed
that door closed with himself on the outside.” Taft had dis¬
regarded the warning Roosevelt had given him in December
of 1910 that it was to the interest of the United States “not to
take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give Japanese
cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to
them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their in¬
terests.” As a result Japan henceforth looked upon any display
of American interest in Manchuria as evidence of new plans
for winning control for American capitalists.
Although Roosevelt's Gentlemen’s Agreement had sharply
cut Japanese migration, Taft’s administration was marked with
continued demonstrations of anti-Japanese hostility on the
West coast. The war talk of 1907 and 1908 had left its mark
on some Americans who now began to see Japanese plots be¬
hind many harmless activities. In 1911 an American company’s
leasehold on Mexico’s Magdalena Bay in Lower California was
offered to a group of Japanese fishermen in San Francisco. The
Navy, which on occasion used the Bay for target practice,
learned of the possibility and passed on the news to the State
Department which discouraged the sale. But before any
transfer could take place the Hearst press learned of the
negotiations and saw the hand of the Japanese government
making an effort to secure a naval base in the western hemi¬
sphere. Magdalena Bay became by sensational journalism the
place from which Japan would invade California and destroy
the nearly completed Panama Canal. Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge of Massachusetts introduced a resolution in the Senate
which stated the grave concern of the United States over the
acquisition of any harbor in this hemisphere by a foreign
corporation which would give another country practical con¬
trol. Taft gave the resolution no support, but its passage in
August of 1912 was hailed by some as a corollary to the Monroe
132 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Doctrine. Japan had officially disavowed interest in Mexico,

but the Magdalena Bay affair established a long-lived myth
that the Japanese had plotted to secure a base in North
America.
Before President Taft left office, another outbreak of hostility
developed in California which introduced his Democratic suc¬
cessor to the relationship between domestic affairs and foreign
policy. The California legislature began work early in 1913 on
an alien land law to bar Japanese from owning land or leasing
it longer than three years. One of the framers of the law stated
that its basis was “race undesirability” and its intention was to
limit die Japanese in their remarkable success as farmers.
In the 1912 campaign Woodrow Wilson had written to a
former mayor of San Francisco that he stood for the policy of
excluding Japanese immigrants from the United States because
they could not “blend with the Caucasian race.” As President
he seems to have viewed California’s anti-Japanese efforts with
sympathy, merely suggesting that the law be so worded as to
avoid a direct conflict with the existing treaty protection pro¬
vided for Japanese aliens.
The Alien Land Act passed the California Assembly on April
16, 1913, setting off belligerent mob reactions in Japan. Presi¬
dent Wilson became concerned at this point and made belated
efforts to check final passage in the Senate. Secretary of State
Bryan was sent to California to speak directly to the legislature
and Wilson made a public appeal to the people of the western
state to exclude Japanese from land ownership only by means
which did not raise embarrassing legal questions for the federal
government. Neither effort was effectual and on May 9th the
California Senate passed the Webb-Heney Alien Land Act.
The Japanese government sent a protest to Washington
which Wilson read to the Cabinet on May 13. Their reaction,
as noted by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, was that
the protest implied nothing “except a very earnest desire to
secure the same rights for the Japanese in California that are
THE FIRST ABRASIONS 133
given to other aliens.” Admiral Bradley Fiske, however, urged
that preparations be taken for a possible war and three ships
moved from China to the Philippines. Fiske pointed to Japa¬
nese population pressures as a cause of a war to acquire
Hawaii and the Philippines and warned that Japan “can and
does make war effectively without previous warning when she
considers that her interests demand it and justify it.” Wilson
and Secretary Daniels opposed ship movements as inflam¬
matory, and an American naval vessel in Yokohama was or¬
dered to restrict shore leave and to find a plausible excuse for
sailing if the situation grew tense.
The Army and Navy Joint Board decided unanimously on
May 16 that naval power should be shifted to the Philippines
and Hawaii. When the White House vetoed any moves, the
Joint Board leaked their recommendations to the press in an
effort to force the hand of the new President. Wilson was angry
when Daniels brought him the news; “They will be abolished,”
he said and the Joint Board was officially dissolved.
The news leak set off, nevertheless, a war scare in newspaper
headlines. In the Philippines an alert was ordered which kept
the gunners of Corregidor at their posts day and night. Manila
Bay was mined, and alarmists predicted the arrival of Japanese
invaders daily. American newspapers discovered secret Japa¬
nese Army activity in Mexico. The Japanese press reported the
imminent movement of American troops to Hawaii and the
Philippines, along with the assurance of American authorities
that such activity was not for “any warlike purposes.”
The crisis simmered down by the end of May, but not with¬
out some permanent effects. Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Franklin D. Roosevelt told the press that war scares like this
had value in educating Americans as to their military resources.
Secretary of Navy Daniels reviewed Japanese-American rela¬
tions under Theodore Roosevelt and decided that the Taft ad¬
ministration should have moved the American fleet to the
Pacific. Bryan told the Japanese Ambassador that Wilson might
134 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

recommend to Congress an appropriation to compensate Cali¬

fornia Japanese for financial losses. But as World War I began
in Europe in the fall of 1914, the treatment of Japanese na¬
tionals in the United States still remained a major issue be¬
tween Washington and Tokyo.
Chapter VIII

RELUCTANT ALLIES

W ORLD WAR I was European in origin and it was Europe

which provided the major battlefields. Despite this geo¬
graphic focus the conflict had profound repercussions in the
Far East. In the beginning of the war the European fleets were
withdrawn from the Western Pacific to the Atlantic and Medi¬
terranean. This action destroyed the rough balance of naval
power and left the Japanese Navy dominant in the coastal
waters of Asia. A major European nation, Germany, was then
driven out of Asia by Asians themselves. This Japanese suc¬
cess, like that of 1905, once more demonstrated the weakness
of the white man’s rule. The dreams of the Asian nationalist
for the final expulsion of the western interloper were brought
a step closer to reality. At the war’s end Japan sat in the
councils of Europe as a victor and equal. Asians were no longer
the pawns of Europe, but were moving to a new status.
For the United States World War I was as important in
relation to the Far East as it was in respect to the American
role in Europe. Although the issue which ostensibly drew
Americans into the conflict was one of maritime rights in the
Atlantic, by the time the peace was signed, the Pacific had
replaced the Atlantic as the ocean of greatest strategic con-
135
136 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
cern. The American people, inclined after Versailles to turn
their backs on Europe, found their government increasingly
involved in the affairs of Asia.
For Japan the European struggle was a grand opportunity.
Capable and ambitious leaders had learned that the code of
international politics permitted one nation’s troubles to be
another nation’s gain. “When there is a fire in a jewelry shop,
the neighbors cannot be expected to refrain from helping them¬
selves,” a Japanese diplomat told the American Minister to
China. While Europeans killed each other over their differ¬
ences, Japan’s interests could thrive. The engagement of vast
armies on the periphery of Germany was an invitation to
Japan’s soldiers and sailors to hoist the Rising Sun over Ger¬
many’s holdings in Asia and the Pacific. Russian participation
in the Triple Intervention at Shimonoseki in 1895 was avenged
in 1904; German participation in that intervention was avenged
in 1914.
Few Japanese foresaw in 1914 the extent to which their
ambitions would be countered by the expanding interests of
the United States. The victory of the Democratic Party and
the election of Woodrow Wilson as President in 1912 were
interpreted by the Japanese press as a rejection of the vigorous
“dollar diplomacy” of the Taft administration. The party of
Wilson was believed to be dominated by the agricultural south
and not to be the servant of the exporters of American capital
and goods. The new President strengthened this belief by
publicly repudiating the foreign policy of his predecessor. But
the forces which had promoted a bolder Far Eastern policy
since the 1890’s were not eliminated by the Democratic vic¬
tory. The continuity between Wilson’s evaluation of national
interests in Asia and that of his Republican opponents was
greater than contemporaries expected.
Asian-minded Americans could cite figures to support their
claim that this area had become of far greater importance to
their country. American investments in government securities
RELUCTANT ALLIES 137
and business in China had grown from approximately $20 mil¬
lion in 1900 to $50 million in 1914. Annual exports to China
ranged between $25 and $35 million in the years before the
war. Japan had become an even more important market and
in 1914 bought $54 million of American goods, almost twice
the purchases of China.
The American role in missionary work in Asia had also
grown rapidly in the first decades of the twentieth century.
The Chinese government had been pressed in 1858 to recog¬
nize the principles of Christianity “as teaching men to do good
and to do to others as they would have others do to them.”
The same treaty included Chinese pledges to protect the for¬
eign agents of Christianity and their converts from harassment.
British and French missionaries were from the beginning most
numerous, but by 1900 there were approximately a thousand
Americans working in this field in China. By 1914 their num¬
bers had grown to 2,500, while American mission holdings
in property rose to $10 million, double that of 1900.
The number of converts remained small and some, the “rice
Christians,” were suspected of joining the faith to reap its
material benefits. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the more
favorable attitude taken by the new Chinese government en¬
couraged some American church leaders to believe that a new
day was dawning in which the Chinese would turn en masse to
Christianity. Sherwood Eddy, a prominent churchman and
writer, travelled through China in 1913 and reported unprece¬
dented audiences of more than 2,000 nightly flocking to hear
the Christian message. On his return to the United States he
presented a hopeful picture of a future Christian China.
American missionaries in Japan were fewer in number than
in China, and Japanese resistance to the Gospel checked opti¬
mism about immediate gains. “Japan is Christianity's ‘Port
Arthur in the Far East,” said Sherwood Eddy. “If it cannot
win Japan it cannot win and hold China.” It was the American
businessman who saw the expansionist possibilities in Japan.
138 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Industries were spawned in greater numbers and expanded

quickly to open markets for raw materials and machinery.
American exports to Japan mounted rapidly, and the textile
industry was beginning to consume sizable quantities of Amer¬
ican cotton.
As the two major Far Eastern countries grew in importance
to the United States, their relative favor in American eyes be¬
gan to change. When Japan first incurred the hostility of west
coast Americans in the first decade of the twentieth century,
China did not benefit. The continued evidences of the deca¬
dence of the Manchu dynasty and the periodic display of anti-
foreign feelings, combined with the resistance to western ideas
and technology, checked any compensating feelings of friend¬
ship for China. A vigorous Chinese boycott of American goods
in 1905, partly in retaliation for the ban on migration of Chinese
to the United States, became a serious issue between the two
nations. By 1906 anti-American manifestations reached the
point at which President Roosevelt felt it necessary to order
additional troops sent to the Philippines. The boycott ended,
but not without some Chinese resentment at what appeared to
be an effort at intimidation.
The overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of the
republic in 1911 not only changed the course of Chinese his¬
tory but began a shift in American opinion in favor of China
as against Japan. The American press greeted the revolution
with great optimism. The Chinese are “the most democratic
people in the world,” said the New York Tribune. The Wash¬
ington Times claimed that the deliberations of the first legis¬
lature “demonstrated a striking aptitude for employing the
machinery of parliamentary government.” By January of 1912
the Literary Digest was predicting that Japan would “no longer
be the most Occidental nation in the Orient.” The anti-foreign
character of Chinese nationalism was generally overlooked in
the enthusiasm for the belated awakening of the long-sleeping
giant.
RELUCTANT ALLIES 139
The change in American attitudes toward China can be
noted in official circles as well as in the press. Changes in per¬
sonnel in the State Department had already begun to effect a
more favorable approach to China before the Revolution. Wil¬
lard Straight, appointed acting chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs in 1908, was a great believer in the economic
future of American capital in China. He had served the
Chinese government before entering the American diplomatic
service and resigned to return to China as the agent of Ameri¬
can bankers. Straight had become anti-Japanese while at a post
in Korea, and it was he who interested Secretary of State Knox
in a venture in dollar diplomacy in Manchuria. Under Presi¬
dent Taft, William Rockhill, Roosevelt’s Far Eastern adviser,
was sent to St. Petersburg, while Edward T. Williams, a former
missionary to China who had served the Chinese government,
became the assistant chief of the Division of Far Eastern
Affairs. More personnel changes took place under the Wilson
administration.
President Wilson’s views on Asia seem to have been in large
part the product of impressions gained from his associations
with missionaries from China. As head of Princeton University,
the future President had interested himself in his institution’s
charitable work with the Young Men’s Christian Association in
Peking, and he brought to his campus some of the Chinese
students who were financed by the Boxer Indemnity Fund. He
talked with many missionaries and corresponded with a cousin
who edited a missionary journal in Shanghai. Shortly after
entering the White House, Wilson told his Cabinet that he felt
“keenly the desire to help China.” He considered the role of
Protestant Christianity to be so important in China that he told
one applicant for the post, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., that he be¬
lieved that the American Minister to Peking should be “an
evangelical Christian.” American interest in China, he ex¬
plained, was “largely in the form of missionary activities.”
Wilson was also optimistic about the political developments
140 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

and commented in 1913 that he saw “the democratic leaven”

working in China.
Wilson’s first Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was
like the President an exponent of what has been aptly called
“missionary diplomacy.” He believed that America’s mission
was to carry Christianity and democracy across the seas. In his
Letters to a Chinese Official, published in 1906, Bryan had
written that a man “if he has no mission at all, he is not a man.”
At the same time the future Secretary of State had praised
Japan highly, in contrast to China, for its rapid westernization,
reminding the Chinese that they “used to look down upon this
little nation with ill-concealed disdain.” After the establishment
of the Chinese Republic, Bryan’s optimism about the spread of
Christianity on the Asian mainland was unrestrained.
The new Chinese government was astute enough to realize
that the evangelical hopes of the Christian world could be used
to their advantage. When in the spring of 1913 the Republic
was still unrecognized because of its instability, an official
world appeal was sent to Christian churches to dedicate a day
of prayer for the welfare of the new government and for its
recognition by the powers. American churches responded en¬
thusiastically to what seemed to be a victory for Christianity.
A Sunday in April of 1913 was set aside for this act of devotion.
President Wilson told his cabinet that he did not know when
he had been so deeply stirred as he was by China’s call for
prayers. When one of the cabinet suggested that it was a play
for political support, Wilson rejected the idea. Secretary Bryan
said, “It is an extraordinary tribute to Christianity.” Whatever
the sincerity of the appeal, it brought results. Less than a
month after the prayers the United States recognized the new
government. The appeals for divine support had also been
supplemented by petitions to Wilson from American business
interests, chambers of commerce, and many church organiza¬
tions.
Toward Japan President Wilson never exhibited the same
RELUCTANT ALLIES 141

sympathy and tolerance with which he viewed and treated

China. Standards of international morality which he held so
highly were often waived in judging China, but applied rigidly
and without insight in dealing with Japan. The second Secre¬
tary of State, Robert Lansing, and the President’s unofficial
adviser, Colonel Edward House, were usually more equitable
in dealing with the two major oriental nations, but the Presi¬
dent’s pro-Chinese bias was not easily countered.
The role of the mission boards and their supporting Ameri¬
can churches became an increasingly important one in building
an American opinion favorable to China. There were about 26
mission boards active by 1913, and through their letters and
fund-raising activities many American churchgoers were kept
informed, usually in a most hopeful way, of the progress of
evangelical work in China. The co-operation which the new
Chinese government gave this movement converted it fre¬
quently into a most effective lobby in arousing American opin¬
ion in behalf of China’s cause. The failure of the Chinese
people to be converted in large numbers in no way seems to
have weakened the strength of this movement’s appeal to
Americans. When issues developed between China and Japan,
most churches could be counted upon to present China’s case
effectively.
The major effort to develop an equally effective opinion in
behalf of Japan was that of the Japan Societies. The first of
these organizations was founded in San Francisco in 1905 and
was composed largely of businessmen interested in commercial
relations with Japan. Similar organizations were formed in
other major cities; the most important of which was the Japan
Society of New York, founded in 1907. A number of important
financial leaders took part in the formation of the New York
organization, including Jacob H. Schiff who had played the
leading role in raising the American loan to Japan during the
Russo-Japanese War. The Societies gave annual dinners and on
occasion feted prominent Japanese visitors to the United States.
142 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Encouragement was given to cultural exchange and efforts

were made to create a favorable climate for Japan. But mem¬
bership remained small and without the large constituencies
provided by the churches the pro-Japanese lobby never moved
any significant segment of American opinion.
A more effective job in putting Japan’s case before the
American people was done by K. K. Kawakami, an immigrant
who came to the United States from Japan in 1901. After gradu¬
ate work in political science in several American universities,
Kawakami turned to a career of journalism in 1905. From that
date until the coming of Pearl Harbor, he poured out a steady
stream of newspaper and magazine articles as well as books
on the major issues of Japanese-American relations. Never
completely uncritical of the country of his birth, Kawakami
at the same time provided Americans with the viewpoint of the
best-informed Japanese leaders. His appeal was, however, to
the scholar, the publicist, and to the well-read minority and
he probably never succeeded in affecting the stereotypes
formed by the popular press.
It was within this framework of conditioning factors that
news of Japan’s entry into World War I was received in the
United States. Japan went to war at the request of its ally.
Great Britain, welcoming the opportunity to destroy German
power in the Far East. The British urged the Japanese to fight
only a limited war, destroying German naval vessels, but tak¬
ing no action against the German holdings in China. The
Japanese rejected this request and agreed to fight only as a
full belligerent. An ultimatum was sent to Germany in August
of 1914 to withdraw from the Kiaochow leasehold on China’s
Shantung Peninsula and to disarm or withdraw its forces from
the Pacific. When the ultimatum went unanswered, Japan
moved. By the end of 1914 with British help the Japanese
forces had captured Tsingtao, the chief port of the Kiaochow
leasehold, as well as the German-held islands in Micronesia.
The western reaction to Japan’s success varied. Britain and
RELUCTANT ALLIES *43
France had a firm grip on their Far Eastern empire and did
not consider Japan’s expansion as a threat. There were also
some Americans who did not see the replacement of Germany
in Asia by Japan as a threat to their nation’s interests. “There
is war in China purely because there has been no Asiatic
Monroe Doctrine and because Japan finds the presence of
Germany a menace to itself,” Theodore Roosevelt wrote a
friend in November of 1914. But in Washington circles and
particularly within the Navy, Japan’s gains were evaluated as a
blow to American strength in the Pacific. Admiral Mahan wrote
from retirement to a kindred thinker, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and urged that an appeal be made
to Britain to block her ally’s gains. “It is one thing,” wrote
Mahan, to have the Pacific islands “in the hands of a power
whose main strength is in Europe, and quite another that they
should pass into the hands of one so near as Japan.” No Ameri¬
can action was taken. Britain had already joined with Japan
in an agreement to share the spoils; the German islands below
the Equator were marked for British possession. But American
concern was shown by the reports of large shipments of am¬
munition and fuel to American bases in Hawaii and the Philip¬
pines, following the news of Japan’s victories.
Japan’s success in ousting the Germans from Shantung and
in establishing what appeared to be a new protectorate brought
charges in Congress that this was a violation of the Open Door
policy. Even before Japan went to war two resolutions were
introduced in the House, warning the Japanese against acquir¬
ing any holdings in China as a result of military operations.
Both resolutions were tabled but the pro-Chinese sentiments
of a small group of Congressmen continued to be heard. In
Peking the American Minister, Paul Reinsch, went so far in
his opposition to Japan’s gains that Acting Secretary Lansing
warned him in November of 1914 that to embroil the United
States in international difficulties over China’s territorial in¬
tegrity would be “quixotic in the extreme.”
144 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

In January of 1915 Japan took advantage of the war to com¬

municate the “Twenty-one Demands” to China. Divided into
five groups, the first three called for official Chinese sanction
for Japanese economic activities in the Shantung Peninsula,
southern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and in the mining areas
of the Yangtse Valley. Japan claimed that this meant for the
most part only a formalization of a de facto situation. The
fourth group called upon China to pledge never to alienate any
coastal areas to a third power by cession or lease, giving the
Japanese assurance against the return of the German leasehold
or the establishment of an American naval base if that pro¬
posal was ever renewed. The last group, expressed as “desires,”
were of a different character in calling for Chinese co-operation
in ways which would have extended Japan’s political influence
over the mainland.
Japan delivered the demands in a peremptory manner, char¬
acteristic of European dealings with an inferior oriental state.
When the news reached Washington from Peking, there was
great alarm on the part of the friends of China. Without wait¬
ing for instructions, Reinsch strongly urged the Chinese to
make no concessions, implying American support in the event
of a showdown. E. T. Williams, Chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs, supported Reinsch, but Secretary Bryan was
more cautious. An effort was made to secure British action to
check her Japanese ally, but other considerations took priority
in British policy. Some thought was given by the State Depart¬
ment to seeking a quid pro quo from Japan in return for
Chinese acceptance of the first four groups of demands. Japan
might pledge to refrain from complaints over any future Amer¬
ican legislation directed at Japanese immigrants and also re¬
affirm the principles of the Open Door. But President Wilson
was opposed to seeking any compromises and instead two
notes were sent to Japan, protesting the demands made on
China. The second note, sent after China had agreed to fulfill
the first four groups of demands, stated that the United States
RELUCTANT ALLIES 145
would never recognize any agreements with China which im¬
paired American treaty rights or violated the Open Door
policy.
A policy limited to diplomatic protests was viewed as too
passive by some of the pro-Chinese sectors of American opin¬
ion. Church bodies were vehement in their denunciations of
Japan and called for American intervention. Congressional
advocates of naval expansion grasped the opportunity to call
for an accelerated program of battleship construction. In the
House, Alabama’s Congressman, Richmond Hobson, offered
a resolution branding Japan’s China policy as unfriendly to the
United States; in the Naval Affairs Committee, he called for
immediate construction of a two-ocean navy.
Japan’s action in China was linked with the hostility toward
Japanese immigration to promote a new hate-japan campaign
in the press. The Hearst newspapers published a series in 1915
entitled, “JaPans Plans to Invade and Conquer the United
States.” The articles claimed that Japan had issued a military
manual preparing for the attack and pictures were shown of
Japanese troops practicing landing operations for a future
assault on the California coast. Investigation disclosed that the
source of the articles was a distorted version of a cheap Japa¬
nese novel, while the illustrations were retouched pictures of
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Many other journalists
joined in exploiting the new source of hostility toward Japan.
An article published in the respectable North American Review
in May of 1916 propagated the myth that Japan had answered
the American protests over the Twenty-one Demands by as¬
sembling a threatening naval force in Mexican waters. A Japa¬
nese naval vessel in pursuit of German ships had grounded on
the coast of Lower California in January of 1915 and had landed
its guns and ammunition in order to refloat. This incident was
quickly used in a variety of forms remote from the facts as
proof of Japan’s hostile intentions.
American missionary groups with centers in Japan and the
i46 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Japan Societies made an effort to counter this new wave of

hostility. The Japan Society of New York published volumes of
essays in 1914 and 1915 on Japanese-American friendship.
Judge Elbert H. Gary, the steel magnate, visited Japan in 1916
and returned to lecture to business leaders on the common
economic interests of the two countries and to dispel war
rumors. If these efforts won few new friends for Japan, they
served to alarm the anti-Japanese forces on the West coast. In
1917, The Japanese Conquest of American Opinion by Monta-
ville Flowers attacked as villainous the work of the Japan
Society of New York and of the Federal Council of Churches
in trying to give the Japanese a good name in the United States.
The files of government intelligence agencies in the early
years of the European war reveal the variety of Japanese
threats which rumor produced. In May of 1916 the State De¬
partment was informed by an allegedly reliable source in
Hong Kong that Japan was preparing to declare war on the
United States that fall. The same year Army intelligence agents
investigated reports of Japanese troop landings in Lower Cali¬
fornia, and one agent reported that Mexicans had actually
seen Japanese landing on remote beaches in military forma¬
tion. In September of 1918 Naval intelligence reports reached
the White House of the landing of several hundred Japanese
Army officers in the Philippines, disguised as workmen, to start
an uprising which would divert American troops from Siberia.
President Wilson found the report “exceedingly disturbing, if
true,” and asked for a thorough probe.
Fear of Japan joined with the growing concern over German
submarine warfare in the Atlantic to support a major naval
building program. In October of 1915 the General Board of
the Navy made a clean break with the anti-imperialist tradition
of a coastal and defensive navy and proposed building a force
equal to that of the most powerful navy in the world. The
Senate Naval Affairs Committee gave its enthusiastic support
and urged that the program be speeded up to reach its goal
RELUCTANT ALLIES 147

in three rather than five years. President Wilson in August of

1916 signed the bill which launched the largest naval construc¬
tion program undertaken by a nation at peace. The new ships
were ostensibly to meet the threat of war on the Atlantic as a
result of Germany's submarine campaigns, but many of the
men in Congress who voted for the naval bill saw it also as a
counter to the threat of Japan. In Japan the naval propagan¬
dists played up the American program as a direct challenge
and claimed that the new United States Navy would be twice
the size of Japan’s.
With American entry into World War I in April of 1917,
Japan became in official language an “associated power,” and
in effect an ally, in the struggle against Germany. Alignment
against a common enemy did little, however, to ease the rising
tensions. The American declaration of war was received with
some suspicion in Japan. The issue of submarine warfare
seemed insufficient cause for American action and ulterior
motives were sought. Fears were expressed in the Japanese
press that the war would be used to expand American naval
bases in the Philippines. Tokyo hinted to Washington that as¬
surances against such developments would be welcome and
that Japan would be willing to buy the islands.
Congressional debate on the question of Philippine inde¬
pendence in 1916 demonstrated that many Democrats saw the
islands as a military liability and an irritant to Japanese-
American relations. Secretary of State Lansing wrote to Presi¬
dent Wilson, “If we could only let go, what a blessing it would
be.” But neither Wilson nor Congress were willing to go so far
as to favor a transfer to Japan.
Despite his deep concern for what he saw as the vital issues
of the European war, Woodrow Wilson at times seems to have
believed that Asia might have an even higher priority. Two
months before the President asked Congress for a declaration
of war against Germany, he told the cabinet his fears about
Asia. If, he said, neutrality was necessary in order to keep the
 148 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

white race strong enough to meet the yellow race, he would

keep the United States neutral despite any imputations of
cowardice or weakness made against him. This race threat he
envisioned as coming from Japan, dominating China in alliance
with Russia.
Once the United States was at war with Germany, the Presi¬
dent recognized the need for easing tensions and improving
relations with Japan. When an anti-Japanese film was shown
in Washington in 1917, depicting an Oriental military invasion
of the United States, Wilson asked the producers to withdraw
it from circulation as unfair to Japan and calculated to stir up
hostility. Japan was also interested in more cordial relations
with the United States and hinted at willingness to send a high
level diplomatic mission to Washington. Wilson approved of
Secretary Lansing’s positive response and in August of 1917
Viscount Kikujiro Ishii arrived to open conversations.
The Lansing-Ishii negotiations which followed were devoted
principal^~tQ" questions concerning the mainland of Asia.
Japan, in 1912 and again in 1916, had by secret" treaty secured
Russian recognition of her special interests in southern Man¬
churia and eastern Inner Mongolia. Viscount Ishii had been
briefed on American history and hoped now to secure Ameri¬
can recognition of Japan’s “paramount interests” in China, a
phrase used by Secretaries of State in describing American
interests in Mexico. Wilson and Lansing on the other hand
wanted a new declaration from Japan, pledging respect for the
1\ American concept of the Open Doonin China. Neither country
)# \ was willing to offer the other anything substantial in the form
oka quid pro quo and no substantiaTground for agreement was
found. To maintain the appearance of unity in the face of the
Central Powers an ambiguous formula was agreed upon. The
( United States recognized that Japan’s geographical relationship
A to China created “special relations” and “special interests.”
Japan, in turn, agreed to a secret protocolMn jwhich jdie two
governments stated their accord in not seeking special rights
RELUCTANT ALLIES 149
or privileges in China abridging the rights of “other friendly
states.”
Both governments hoped to give to the words of the agree¬
ment a content favorable to their own interests. The pro-
Chinese elements in the United States were quick to charge
the Wilson administration with a “sell-out” to Japan. Unable
to quote the secret protocol in its defense, the State Depart¬
ment claimed that it had made no concession to Japan. The
United States had only recognized “the self-evident truth of
the mutual interest of neighboring nations in the welfare of
each other.” In the next two years Japan did launch an eco¬
nomic program which made capital available to China and
attempted a partnership in Chinese economic development.
The program was not generous enough, however, to win full
support of the Chinese government and Chinese internal dis¬
unity was a further obstacle to its success.
Despite the underlying conflict over China, the United States
and Japan were pressed by wartime exigencies into naval
co-operation. Both promised to inform the other of their ship
movements in the Pacific. In October of 1917 Japan was asked
to detail a cruiser to Honolulu to patrol the waters left un¬
guarded by the transfer of American ships to convoy duty in
the Atlantic. In May of 1918 Secretary Lansing sounded out
the Japanese Ambassador on a further step, the dispatch of
two cruisers to patrol the Atlantic coast of the United States.
The Navy Department, concerned about possible German at¬
tacks on coastal shipping, had asked for four Japanese cruisers.
Japan replied that only two of its cruisers had the speed neces¬
sary for this patrol duty and one of these was damaged. The
Armistice came before any ship transfers were accomplished.
The last months of the war saw no perceptible gains in im¬
proved understanding as a result of the manage de convenance.
Japan remained wary of growing American power and, when
not completely bewildered by Wilson’s oratory, Japanese
looked for ulterior meanings in his grandiose proclamations.
i5o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Even the issuance of the Fourteen Points in January of 1918

was viewed by some Japanese with suspicion, while the pro¬
posed League of Nations was denounced by chauvinists as a
new device for extending American influence in Asia. Dr. Inazo
Nitobe, Japan’s leading interpreter of America, wrote many
articles which affirmed the friendly intentions of the postwar
plans coming from Washington, but Wilson remained an
enigmatic figure in Tokyo.
American expectation of future trouble with Japan seems to
have been demonstrated in the first weeks following the sign¬
ing of the Armistice in November of 1918. Secretary of the
Navy Josephus Daniels appeared before the House Naval
Affairs Committee and asked for a new three-year building
program which would add ten battleships, six battle cruisers,
and 140 smaller vessels to existing naval strength. President
Wilson gave his blanket endorsement to this program in his
message to Congress. Daniels explained that the new navy
would be a contribution to the new League of Nations as a
“tremendous police power of prevention.” Unofficially, how¬
ever, there was considerable discussion of the importance of
the new ships in relation to Japan.
The Asian orientation of the naval expansionists was demon¬
strated early in 1919 when Secretary Daniels announced that
the main body of American naval forces would be transferred
to the Pacific. When Daniels greeted the fleet off San Diego
in August of 1919, he said that he had been acting on a hunch
when he ordered the geographical shift. Some naval spokes¬
man explained the move as an attempt to stimulate rivalry
within the Navy by building up the Pacific forces to compete
with the Atlantic. There were also charges that the Wilson
administration had made the decision in order to win Demo¬
cratic votes in the western states for the 1920 elections. Stra¬
tegic considerations were doubtless an important factor in the
decision whatever the truth of the other reasons offered.
Fourteen of the newest and heaviest battleships were con-
RELUCTANT ALLIES 151

centrated in the Pacific. The total tonnage of the American

Pacific forces was now approximately equal to the entire Japa¬
nese Navy, and Japan’s unchallenged dominance of Pacific
waters during the war years was ended. In 1919 a new dry
dock was opened at Pearl Harbor, capable of handling battle¬
ships and this Hawaiian naval yard became the major advance
base of American power. The Navy Department requested the
expansion of Pearl Harbor facilities to handle “any movement,
offensive or defensive, across the Pacific.” Secretary Daniels
also asked Congress—without success—for funds to fortify
Guam and expand naval facilities in the Philippines.
The publicity given in Japan to the American moves helped
to counter the anti-military spirit which developed after the
peace. In July of 1920 the Japanese Diet voted to construct 16
new capital ships, the same number authorized by Congress
in 1919, but to be completed in eight years rather than in four
as in the American program. Japan’s naval expenditures for
1921 were triple those of 1917, but the Admiralty claimed that
the new ships would only raise Japanese strength to about half
that of the United States. Japan’s air enthusiasts also used fear
of the United States to promote their demands for expansion.
A film sponsored by the Imperial Aviation Association propheti¬
cally pictured Tokyo in ashes as a result of an attack from
across the ocean.
The burgeoning naval race was accompanied by—and stimu¬
lated by—a new series of political conflicts' following the
collapse of the Central Powers. When the Paris Peace Con¬
ference opened in January of 1919, Japanese and American
viewpoints clashed almost immediately. Before sailing from
New York, President Wilson confided to the Chinese Ambassa¬
dor that Asia was “the only part of the world” where there
was any possibility of future trouble. At Paris the President
soon concluded that the integrity of China, the Open Door,
and the orderly processes of change in Asia were all threatened
by Japan’s ambitions. The Japanese delegates also came early
152 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

to the conviction that the only major obstacle to the achieve¬

ment of their rightful gains was the American policy of “med¬
dling” in Asia.
The President generally sought little advice from his staff of
experts at the peace conference, but when he did his anti-
Japanese frame of thought found ample support. E. T. Williams
and Stanley K. Hornbeck, the Far Eastern experts, were both
determined that the United States should act as China’s
guardian and their arguments were reinforced by messages
from Paul Reinsch in China. Only Colonel Edward House was
willing at Paris to suggest areas of compromise with Japan.
Two years earlier he had pointed out that politically the United
States was unable to meet Japan half-way on the issues of land
ownership and immigration. Therefore, “unless we make some
concessions in regard to her sphere of influence in the East,
trouble is sure sooner or later to come.”
Whereas Wilson came to Paris with predominantly negative
objectives in regard to Asia, i.e., the blocking of Japan’s gains,
the Japanese had three clearly defined goals. The first two
merely required confirmation by the peace conference of
Japan’s claims to the German holdings in Shantung and to the
former German islands in the Pacific. China had granted Ger¬
many in 1898 a 99-year lease to the port of Tsingtao plus
several hundred square miles of hinterland with the right to
exploit the mines and develop the railroads of the area. In the
Pacific, Germany had acquired the Marshall Islands by an¬
nexation in 1885 and the Marianas and Carolines by purchase
from Spain in 1898. During the war Japan drove the Germans
out of all these areas and had no doubts about its right to
inherit the rewards of military victory.
Japan’s claims had been recognized during the war by a
series of notes exchanged with Britain, France, Italy, and
Russia, and the British had joined in the program of annexation
by taking as a reward the former German islands below the
Equator. China had recognized the Japanese claims to Shan-
RELUCTANT ALLIES 153
tung in 1918 and accepted an advance payment of $20 million
in the form of a railway loan to sweeten the agreement. For
Japan the islands offered an outer ring of bases, valuable for
defense or an offense into the South Pacific, while the Shantung
Peninsula could contribute valuable resources to Japan's ex¬
panding economy.
The third objective of the peace delegates from Tokyo was
the achievement of an equal social status with other great
powers. This meant the eradication of the white man's open
racial discrimination against the yellow-skinned Oriental. In
the era of mass migration of Europeans to other parts of the
world, Japan found its immigrants barred in most directions by
‘whites only'' signs. For a nation which had demonstrated twice
its ability to defeat Europeans in military combat, this was an
affront which periodically aroused strong public resentment.
For some, Japanese immigration also offered the best solution
for economic problems. As one member of Japan's House of
Representatives stated the argument:

Territorial gains may be welcome for the purpose, but as

territorial aggrandisement can be accomplished only by
militarism, which is not compatible with the general
world trend, Japan must avoid following such aggressive
policies. ... As an alternative, it becomes imperative
for Japan to obtain freedom of residence for her people
in all and any territory in and on the Pacific.
This meant, according to Representative Etsujiro Uyehara, an
“Open Door" principle applied to Japanese immigrants by
Australia, Canada, the Americas, and India. Not all Japanese
were as hopeful about the value of migration, but many felt
that the new world organization to be formed at Paris should
give some recognition to the principle of racial equality. Con¬
trol of immigration was a matter for domestic legislation, but
an international recognition of racial equality was expected to
discourage inequity in favoring white immigrants over oriental.
President Wilson initially encouraged the Japanese in their
154 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

desire for a statement of racial equality in the League Cove¬

nant. Colonel House helped the Japanese delegates to draft
two resolutions, one asking for a maximum and the other a
minimum recognition of the principle of non-discrimination.
It was the minimum which was finally offered as an amend¬
ment to the Covenant, a general endorsement of the “principle
of equality of Nations” and of “just treatment of their na¬
tionals.” The League of Nations Commission voted 11 to 0 for
the amendment, with the United States and British delegations
abstaining. But Wilson, as chairman of the meeting, ruled that
the amendment had failed for lack of unanimous support.
There was some technical argument that could be made for
the Presidents ruling, but Japan was bitter over the negative
attitude of the British and Americans.
The strongest opponent to any racial concessions to Japan
was Premier William H. Hughes of Australia, whose govern¬
ment held strongly to the “whites only” policy, an approach to
immigration which remained a persistent Australian theme.
Hughes’s threat to reject the League cowed the other British
delegates into refraining from voting. Wilson was also afraid
of Australia’s rejection of the League, but his opposition to the
League acceptance of racial equality was supported by other
reasons. The President was not himself without racial preju¬
dices, but he also had to consider the possible opposition to
the ratification of American membership in the League by
race-conscious southern senators and west coast exponents of
the Yellow Peril. Whatever the President’s reasons, the Japa¬
nese delegates had cause to feel betrayed by the man who
stood publicly on such a high point of international idealism.
Wilson’s decision on the racial amendment followed his fight
against Japans two other objectives. American naval advisers
believed that Japan’s acquisition of the former German islands
would be a threat to the line of communications between
Hawaii and the Philippines. They urged internationalizing the
island groups and compensating Japan by offering a free hand
RELUCTANT ALLIES *55
in Siberia, where a revolution-weakened Russia could not make
an effective protest. But the President did not want to give
Japan a free hand anywhere and was reluctant to compromise
when he believed principle was involved. Japan’s delegates, on
the other hand, claimed that the island groups were far more
than mere souvenirs of the war, but essential to the defense of
their home islands.
Since Japan was already in possession of the islands when
the peace conference met, and since the British and French had
already agreed to their disposition, the American delegation
had to try to undo a fait accompli. This proved impossible. The
only compensation offered the United States was to give Japan
the islands as Class C mandates under the League. Although
the mandate system has been aptly called “an elaborate fig leaf
for imperialism,” it had some value in prohibiting Japan from
using the islands as military bases by erecting fortifications or
building naval installations.
Japans claims to the German rights in Shantung aroused
even greater opposition on the part of the American delegation
than the other two issues. To Wilson and some of his advisers
this claim was a step toward a new partition of China. It
brought forth anguished cries from the American missionaries
and their supporters in the United States. The delegations from
China’s rival governments, Peking and Canton, had stood with
Japan on the racial equality issue, but appealed for American
support against Japan on Shantung. Wilson was fully in accord
with the Chinese and viewed his position as the protector of
the weak and beyond reproach.
The Japanese delegation also felt strongly about their claims
to Shantung, recalling the territorial gains made by western
powers since the triple intervention of 1895. Japan of 1919 was
a far more powerful nation than it had been in 1895 and was
determined not to be excluded this time from the club of
imperialist nations because of coming late to the penetration
of China. The Peking government had reluctantly given its
156
AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

legal support to the Shantung cession by treaty in 1918. None

of the European powers was in a strong position to oppose
Japan in principle, and Japan was determined to push Wilson’s
obstructions aside. When Italy set a precedent by walking out
of the conference because of Wilson’s obstinacy, Japan threat¬
ened to follow. The President gloomily gave in. Japan gave
him a small consolation by promising orally that full sover¬
eignty of the Peninsula would be restored to China and that
only economic privileges would be retained.
The pro-Chinese elements in the United States berated
Wilson for his final action. He wrote to a missionary friend
in response to his complaint:

What would you propose that we should do? To refuse

to concur in the Treaty with Germany would not alter
the situation in China’s favor, unless it is your idea that
we should force Great Britain and France to break their
special treaty with Japan, and how would you suggest
that we do that? By the exercise of force?

But the defeat was still painful despite its apparent inevita¬
bility. House tried to comfort the President by saying that
while the Japanese settlement was “all bad,” it was still neces¬
sary to clean up “a lot of old rubbish with the least friction
and let the League of Nations and the new era do the rest.”
Wilson consoled himself along these fines; he believed that he
had gotten the best settlement possible “out of a dirty past.”
Several of the strongest of the pro-Chinese advisers in the
American delegation resigned in protest. From Peking, Paul
Reinsch sent the President a bitter letter and left the American
foreign service to take a position with the Chinese government.
In the United States, Wilson’s political opponents cried “be¬
trayal” as they concluded that the Shantung settlement was
the most vulnerable aspect of the Versailles Treaty. American
sentiment in behalf of China was played upon by congressional
orators whose prime aim was to block American entry into the
RELUCTANT ALLIES 157
League. Ex-President Taft was courageous enough to point
out the insincerity of many of these professions of love for
China by fellow Republicans. In compromising, Wilson had
taken the only “statesmanlike course/’ said Taft.
Taft’s position was not taken by Henry Cabot Lodge, chair¬
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and major
critic of the decisions taken at Paris. Lodge not only expressed
his ire against Wilson but against Japan as well. He charged
the Land of the Rising Sun with having become “the Prussia
of the East,” and with adopting Prussian culture and ambitions.
When his Committee dealt with the Versailles settlement, he
amended the treaty text by substituting “China” for “Japan”
in the articles dealing with the disposition of German rights in
Asia. This crusade against the decisions hammered out at the
peace table won him a flood of approving letters from mis¬
sionaries and church groups. When news of Lodge’s action
reached Tokyo, it was taken as an affront that the issue should
be reopened on the domestic level. Marquis Shigenobu Okuma,
former premier, claimed that Senator Lodge was blighting
future relations with Japan by his display of spite, while the
influential Osaka Mainichi assailed Lodge’s action as “a pro¬
vocative act.” The Massachusetts senator was able to block
American ratification of the Versailles Treaty, but its provisions
for the disposal of German holdings remained, of course, in
effect.
Wilson’s failure to block Japan’s gains at Paris was only one
aspect of his broader failure to establish a victory without
spoils. At one point in his fight with Japan he considered asking
all nations to give up their extraterritorial rights and privileges
in China. The reaction of London and Paris to such a move
would have been similar to that provoked by an Allied request
that the United States restore Hawaii to the Hawaiians or
Puerto Rico to Spain. German colonies in Africa and Turkey’s
holdings in the Middle East were all parcelled out among the
158 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

victors under the mandate system. To expect Japan to renounce

the fruits of victory in Asia without other compensations was to
expect a miracle.
Before the bitterness created in Japanese-American relations
at Paris had time to subside another clash of interests took
place in Siberia. The Russian Revolution of November 1917
and the Russo-German peace was followed by a series of
Allied interventions in Russia—interventions whose motiva¬
tions are still a matter of scholarly debate. Britain and France
asked the United States to send troops along with Japan into
revolution-torn Siberia. Wilson was faced with another chal¬
lenge to his principles. One of his Fourteen Points had prom¬
ised Russia “an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity
for the independent determination of her own political develop¬
ment.” A military occupation of Siberia was an obvious incon¬
sistency. Yet Wilson feared that Japanese troops acting without
partners would establish permanent claims.
In July of 1918 the President overcame his reluctance and
ordered a force of approximately 7,000 landed at Vladivostok.
An effort was made to bind Japan to the same size force, but
the Japanese followed their own course and sent ten times as
many men as the Americans. For Japan, Siberia was of strategic
importance as a possible outpost of future Russian power on
the Pacific and of economic importance for the market it of¬
fered Japanese exports. For the United States, Siberia also
represented a market, particularly for agricultural equipment,
with the International Harvester Company maintaining over
200 Siberian outlets. Both countries were interested in the
trans-Siberian railroad which E. H. Harriman had viewed as a
vital link in his plans for a round-the-world rail system.
For 17 months American troops remained on Russian soil.
When they withdrew in April of 1920, they had failed either
to oust the Japanese or to provide permanent safeguards for
American economic interests. Japan withdrew some two years
later in the face of the advancing Communist Russian state,
RELUCTANT ALLIES 159
having also failed to stabilize its economic interests. Both
Japan and the United States were henceforth confronted with
the Soviet Union as a factor in the affairs of Asia. The joint
occupation not only sharpened antagonism toward each other,
but added to the hostility of their relations with the new Soviet
state.
Woodrow Wilson believed himself a man of peace and an
advocate of international understanding. Yet when he left
office in March of 1921, his administration had gone beyond
that of the belligerent Theodore Roosevelt’s in crossing swords
with Japan and creating mutual misunderstanding. Japan’s
view of the United States was expressed in 1920 by a member
of the Japanese Diet:

America appears to think she is divinely appointed to

rule the world with a big stick! What is the purpose
of her colossal Navy if it is not to make her power su¬
preme in every part of the Pacific? American states¬
men profess an undying devotion to peace, and mean¬
while they are building warships on a scale unparalleled
in history. They preach the doctrine of racial equality
and equal opportunity and yet refuse to admit educated
Japanese immigrants to American citizenship. They dis¬
claim all intention of meddling with foreign politics,
and at the same time continue to bombard us with ar¬
rogant notes about our policy in Manchuria, Siberia and
Saghalien. In these circumstances America has only her¬
self to blame if sober Japanese are beginning to suspect
her of designs upon their country and its most cherished
interests.

This Japanese indictment was an extreme one, marked by a

nationalistic bias in some respects akin to that which was being
indicted. But it was contained more than a little truth.
The Wilson administration had expressed the old faith in
America’s Manifest Destiny in a new framework. The United
States was to lead the world in establishing a new international
iGo AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

order, based on the highest morality. Touched with a sense of

national omnipotence, the President disregarded the harsh
truth that nations and national behavior change but slowly.
More than the fiat of the head of one nation was necessary to
remake the world on ideal terms in Europe and Asia. As ap¬
plied to Japan, Wilson’s ideals demanded a selflessness of the
national leaders not yet found in his own country. A nation
which, after defeating Spain, had taken the Philippine colony
and crushed its independence movement could hardly pro¬
claim some 20 years later that other nations should not use
victory to expand, without being charged with hypocrisy or a
short memory. Nor did Wilson’s faith that he spoke for world
interests alone conceal from others that his goals often coin¬
cided with the expanding economic and strategic interests of
his own country. Japan, like many other nations, would hence¬
forth assume that professions of idealism coming from Wash¬
ington were actually a shield to conceal the normal nationalistic
ambitions of a growing country. And sometimes this assump¬
tion was valid.
Chapter IX

A NEW ASIAN POLICY

H ISTORIANS’ CLAIMS to the contrary, men often learn

more from the present about the past than from the past
about the future. Common versions of the recent past have fre¬
quently proved deceptive guides to the future. Journalistic
seers who wrote about Japanese-American relations in the first
years after World War I were prone to predict a Pacific War as
“inevitable” within a few years. The conflicting interests of the
two nations were clashing at many points. Tensions appeared
to be rising to a level at which war would erupt. Technology
was making it possible to envision aerial and naval battles
across the thousands of miles of Pacific waters.
Apocalyptic books flourished in both countries, picturing the
horrors of the imminent conflict. Distinguished naval experts
like Hector C. Bywater of Britain and a retired Russian gen¬
eral, Nicolai Golovin, produced lengthy analyses of the strate¬
gies which the Japanese and American navies would follow
in the great Pacific War. “The only means of averting war with
Japan in the twentieth century would be for the United States
to evacuate the Philippines and to renounce her interests in
Eastern Asia,” warned General Golovin, while dismissing as
politically impossible any such American retreat. Few writers
161
162 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
could counter these prophecies, since there were no discernible
“trends” which pointed in directions other than war.
Within American military and naval circles—and possibly
in Japan as well—the belief in imminent war was widespread.
A secret memorandum was issued by the Office of Naval In¬
telligence in February of 1920 entitled “Evidence of Japan's
Preparation for War.” It reported on the problems of Japanese
population growth in relation to limited natural resources,
and on the conviction of Japanese government officials that
expansion on the Asian mainland was the only solution. The
United States support of China was viewed as the only major
obstacle to this expansion. Three months later another Naval
Intelligence report found Chinese officials convinced that the
Japanese-American war was “bound to come within five years.”
A Navy General Board report in September of 1921 concluded
pessimistically that American interests in Asia could not be
maintained without war.
In Japan a retired general, Kojiro Sato, published a volume
in 1920 which quickly ran through three printings, warning his
countrymen to prepare for an air attack and invasion by
American forces. His vision was not entirely fantasy, since by
1921 the U.S. Army had begun to plan landing operations for
the final stages of a future war after Japan’s defenses had been
destroyed by bombing planes. Landing maneuvers were subse¬
quently held in the Caribbean to prepare for the Pacific
eventuality. A Japanese invasion of the United States was also
treated as a genuine threat by some Americans. Early in 1920
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard sensational
testimony in regard to a Japanese-Mexican liaison in which
Japan promised support for a Mexican invasion of the United
States. The Hearst press headlined the testimony as evidence
of the reality of the Japanese threat to national security.
A decade after the close of World War I, the Pacific picture
seemed to have changed radically. Japanese-American issues
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 163
which once appeared crucial had by 1928 melted away. “Ir¬
reconcilable” conflicts of interest were submerged under pro¬
fessions of friendship and mutual commitment to the goal of
peace. Only a few observers remained skeptical of the prospects
of continued Pacific amity. The threat of war, the majority
agreed, was in the past rather than in the future.
The optimistic outlook on trans-Pacific relations was the
product of events as well as of changes of attitudes and policies
in both countries. Although the United States made only minor
sacrifices in the European war, peace was followed by a wide¬
spread popular aversion to war itself. The bitterness which
many Americans felt over the realities of the postwar world
contributed to the anti-war feeling. President Wilson's idealism
and the slogans, “peace without victory,” “no annexations,” and
the faith that this was really “a war to end war” contrasted
strongly with the actual settlements hammered out of the
nationalistic conflicts by the victors at Paris. The great crusade
for which Americans had crossed the Atlantic to fight on Euro¬
pean soil for the first time in their history began to be viewed
as another of the balance of power conflicts in which the
United States presumably had no vital interest. This cast of
American thought left little reserve of militant idealism on
which to draw for a belligerent policy in the Pacific.
Economics also discouraged American militancy. After some
initial readjustments, the postwar years brought a new pros¬
perity to the United States. Getting and spending the wealth
produced by greater productivity became almost a national
obsession. The business of America was business and not war.
Political leaders not only understood this mood but had to
work with the demands for budget-cutting and the pressures
to shrink the national government to pre-World War I propor¬
tions. A bold foreign policy could not be maintained in the face
of this shrinking process. The military and naval power which
survived economy programs was fully involved in defending
164 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
American economic interests in Latin America. Developments
in the Pacific had to be evaluated in terms of a pacifistic scale
of national priorities.
The course of events in Asia did little to disturb and much
to reinforce the Far Eastern policies based on the new Ameri¬
can mood. Disenchantment with Europe was paralleled by a
waning of enthusiasm for the new Chinese Republic. Its gov¬
ernment appeared for many years incapable of ruling that vast
empire, while de facto power was exercised in many areas by
predatory war lords. Banditry, nationalist fervor, and Com¬
munist intrigue combined to produce assault after assault on
western residents and interests. American citizens were killed
and kidnapped and American property destroyed. Protests sent
to Peking from Washington were seldom answered by effective
action. Those Americans who argued for a tougher policy in
the Far East were moved to direct their animosity at China
rather than Japan.
Japan in the same years experienced internal changes and
produced external policies which shaped a more favorable
American image of the wartime rival. Some of the idealism
expressed by President Wilson had its echoes in Japan and
seemed to be evidenced in popular demand for more demo¬
cratic institutions. In September of 1918 the first commoner
was appointed premier, Kei Hara, and in 1925 agitation
brought about the introduction of manhood suffrage. A view
of Japan's future tinged with a little optimism could easily pre¬
dict the development of a stable democratic state with which
American interests in Asia could co-exist.
The economic dislocations which the aftermath of the war
brought to Japan’s economy speeded the rise of labor unions
and political radicalism. The military cliques became a popular
target of the liberal and radical elements. Militarism appeared
on the decline. As early as the spring of 1920 an American
intelligence report concluded that "the old traditions of duty
to the state, loyalty and self-denial are rapidly passing away,
A NEW ASIAN POLICY i6$
and commercialism and half-baked ideas of Socialism are the
successors/' The morale of Japan's armed services was de¬
scribed a year later by American Army intelligence agents as
low and discipline becoming shockingly lax. The lack of mili¬
tary spirit had reached a point where the services had difficulty
in recruiting men for the officers' schools.
The foreign policy of the new Japan reflected some of the
changes which had submerged the former expansionist spirit.
Most important in the eyes of American commentators was the
conciliatory attiude shown toward China even when the ex¬
cesses of that country's nationalism tried American patience.
Good business relations with China, the Japanese govermnent
believed, could be best secured by non-intervention policies.
With few exceptions this conciliatory policy was maintained
for almost a decade.
This fading of the Japanese "threat,” the confused picture
Americans received of Chinese developments, the disturbing
indications that pro-American feelings in China were no longer
universal and the stay-at-home mood of the American people
were the developments with which a new American Far
Eastern policy had to be reconciled. President Harding's Secre¬
tary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, set the new course.
Warren Harding had little interest in foreign affairs and was
content to give Hughes a free hand even though the former
Supreme Court Associate Justice had no experience in this field.
But it was not long after Hughes took office in March of 1921
that he began a major reorientation of American policy in Asia.
The situation facing Hughes was not a favorable one for
American interests. Japanese troops still remained in Siberia,
although the American forces had been withdrawn in the
spring of 1920. Shantung still remained in Japanese hands
despite American protests. Japan's insular acquisitions from
Germany included the island of Yap in the Carolines, an im¬
portant station for trans-Pacific commercial cables. The signif¬
icance of this control became apparent in 1920. American com-
i66 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
mercial expansion in Asia, said the New York Times, required
a line of communication not under the control of “any compet¬
ing nation.” Some business interests took the same position and
the new Republican administration could not ignore the Yap
issue. The beginning of a naval building race directed at
supremacy in the Pacific seemed to foretell an eventual settle¬
ment of some of these issues by arms.
The new Secretary of State understood that his country
had made a reappraisal of its interests in Asia. His policy ac¬
cepted that reappraisal. In contrast to the Wilsonian outlook,
at times prepared to risk war in the Far East in support of
some proclaimed ideal, the new mood was a bluntly economic
one. Each policy was measured in terms of the dollars involved
and on a balance sheet basis of profits and losses for the Ameri¬
can businessman and taxpayer. This outlook was illustrated by
Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana who in congressional hear¬
ings pressed spokesmen for larger naval appropriations to pre¬
pare a balance sheet in which the cost of a future war with
Japan could be totalled up against the value of whatever trade
that war was intended to protect. Hughes himself said in 1921
that he acted on the assumption that “this country would never
go to war over any aggression on the part of Japan in China.”
The House Military Affairs Committee in 1922 expressed the
same outlook when it reported an Army appropriation bill with
a proviso that no money could be used for troops stationed in
China except in time of emergency, nor could payments be
made for more than 5,000 troops stationed in Hawaii. The
proviso was removed from the bill on the floor as an uncon¬
stitutional restraint upon the President, but it indicated the
temper of a substantial number of congressmen.
Secretary Hughes’ understanding of the prevailing priority
system of national interests led him to respond readily to at
least one congressional initiative based on this system. Budget-
minded representatives joined with anti-war congressmen in
attacking the naval arms race in which the United States was
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 167
running against Japan and Britain. Senator William E, Borah
of Idaho assumed congressional leadership of this movement
and in December of 1920 introduced a joint resolution request¬
ing the President to open negotiations with these two com¬
peting powers to cancel the race. Borah used as one of his
arguments the Japanese view expressed by Count Ishii that his
country was forced to build more ships because of the Ameri¬
can naval construction program.
Incoming President Harding resented what appeared to him
to be congressional interference in the management of foreign
affairs, but the Borah resolution passed in the spring of 1921.
Political pressures increased from a well-organized disarma¬
ment movement and in July Harding sent an invitation to the
four leading naval powers to meet in Washington to discuss
arms limitation. The British, pressed for funds to keep their
fleet on a par with the United States and seeing the conference
as a possible solution to the problems raised by their alliance
with Japan, accepted the American move. At British sugges¬
tion the conference call was broadened to include a general
discussion of Far Eastern questions on the agenda. Invita¬
tions were sent to all nations with Pacific interests.
Japan accepted Washington’s call reluctantly. The inclusion
of political matters on the agenda suggested to Tokyo a new
western effort to limit Japan’s freedom of operation in Asia.
The Japanese press also hinted that the conference might be
used to terminate the British alliance which had been in opera¬
tion since 1902. Nevertheless the Japanese Cabinet decided to
co-operate and a capable Japanese delegation arrived in Wash¬
ington in time for the opening meeting of the conference on
November 12, 1921.
Many criticisms have been directed at the achievements of
the conference which was concluded in February of 1922.
Naval expansionists in all the major participants complained
that the limitations placed upon their fleets seriously weakened
their national power. After the Japanese-American War began
168 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
in 1941, some American critics even attributed the Pearl Har¬
bor disaster to the debilitating effect on the United States
Navy of the treaty limitations which terminated in 1936. Such
criticisms are, however, based on hypotheses which can only
be upheld by ignoring many of the salient facts. The main
American objective at the conference was to check the naval
race and to benefit from the by-products of reduced interna¬
tional tensions and lowered naval expenditures. This objective
and these benefits were achieved for more than a decade.
Without the 1922 agreements it is still unlikely that Congress
would have voted money to build beyond the limits set by
treaty, while both Japan and Britain would have been unre¬
strained by other than domestic factors.
The major credit for the achievements of 1921-1922 must
go to Secretary of State Hughes. He startled the delegates in
his opening speech by claiming that disarmament should be
achieved by disarming. He went on to present a bold plan
which included a ten-year holiday in the building of battle¬
ships and aircraft carriers, fixing Japanese strength in these
categories at approximately 60 percent of the tonnage of the
United States and Britain. Japans delegates, like those of
Britain, France, and Italy, were stunned at the enormity of
the American proposal. When they recovered, a move was
made to secure a 70 percent tonnage ceiling, even though
chauvinistic Japanese newspapers denounced this level of
limitation as a national dishonor. After some concessions on
specific ships and weeks of negotiations, Japan accepted the
proposed 60 percent tonnage level. France and Italy accepted
35 percent as their capital ship strength.
In addition to limiting total capital ship tonnage, the negotia¬
tors agreed to set a limit of 10,000 tons on the size of cruisers
and to increase the area of non-competition by a measure
of disengagement in the Pacific. The three major Pacific powers
pledged to freeze the status quo of their fortifications in a
quadrangular area of the Pacific. For the United States, this
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 169
excluded Hawaii but included Guam, the Aleutians, and the
Philippines. Britain excluded Singapore, but included Hong
Kong while Japan was barred from further fortification of any
but the home islands. The offensive power of all three nations
was thus limited by banning the development of well-fortified
advance bases.
Some British evaluations of the Washington Conference
emphasized its benefits in substituting for the Anglo-Japanese
alliance a Four-Power Treaty which pledged consultation by
Britain, the United States, Japan, and France over conflicts
of interest. Britain had allied with Japan when Russian expan¬
sionism seemed about to jeopardize the British position in
China, but the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 and the
hiatus produced by the Soviet revolution and civil war had
removed that threat. The termination of the alliance, although
a shock to Japan, gave the British greater freedom of action.
Termination also gave Japan greater freedom of action by
breaking the intimate relationship with the British Foreign
Office, a relationship which might have exerted a strong
modifying influence on Japanese policy in the difficult decade
of the nineteen thirties.
The five major Pacific powers were joined by Portugal,
Belgium, and the Netherlands as well as China in signing a
Nine-Power Treaty on China. The signatory powers agreed to
respect the “sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial
and administrative integrity of China” as well as to refrain
from seeking special rights or privileges in China. The Chinese
delegates in return pledged their government not to lease or
alienate territory to any power and to refrain from using the
railways of China to discriminate economically in respect to
any nation.
Some optimistic Americans hailed the Nine-Power Treaty as
“a Magna Charta for China,” and as a new international
affirmation of the Open Door Notes. But like the earlier state¬
ments, the new treaty made no reference to the existing vested
17o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
interests and leased territories. If a situation arose which
seemed to any nation to involve the treaty stipulations, the
signatories were only pledged to enter into “full and frank com¬
munication” with each other.
An obvious weakness of the Washington Conference was its
failure to extend the tonnage limitations to all categories of
naval vessels. Due largely to French obduracy, no agreement
was possible on total tonnages for cruisers, submarines, and
auxiliary craft.
American naval critics were correct in pointing out that
tonnage limits along with the check on further fortification
of the Philippines did mean effective hegemony for the Japa¬
nese Navy in Asian waters north of Singapore. But American
acceptance of this hegemony involved no sacrifice for a nation
whose system of cost accounting had ruled out a war with
Japan over China and rejected any large military expenditures
in an effort at defending the Philippine Islands. Independence
and freedom of action for these islands was considered to be
only a matter of time. The United States was not bereft of all
power in dealing with Japan. Some 40 percent of Japans ex¬
ports and imports travelled across the North Pacific to Canada
and the United States through the zone of American naval
hegemony, while another 30 percent travelled southward within
striking range of Singapore-based British naval power.
Such arguments for the wisdom of the Washington agree¬
ments had little effect on the admirals of the American Navy
who saw their forces weakened. Japan remained in their plan¬
ning the Number One Enemy, a nation some day to be faced
in a Pacific showdown. A vigorous campaign was waged by
the Navy, supported by naval expansionists in and out of Con¬
gress, to counter the public enthusiasm for disarmament. “We
are preparing now for the shock of the next Congress and you
cannot send too much information about the Japanese Navy,”
the naval attache at Tokyo was informed by Washington in
the spring of 1923. In addition to the traditional technique of
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 171
scaring larger appropriations out of Congress, a public rela¬
tions program sought to impress the taxpayer with the im¬
portance of a strong Navy for national defense. The establish¬
ment of Navy Day was the most successful publicity measure;
Theodore Roosevelt’s birthday on October 27 was the chosen
date for the first celebration held in 1922. This move, so
shortly after the closing of the Washington Conference,
brought some national criticism, and at least two states, Maine
and Wisconsin, refused to co-operate in celebrating Navy Day.
A professional propagandist, William B. Shearer, was at¬
tached to the staff of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in
1925 by Senator William King of Utah, and Shearer soon be¬
came a major source of news stories designed to alert Ameri¬
cans to the Japanese naval threat. After making a personal
“survey” of American naval strength in the Pacific, Shearer re¬
leased sensational stories on the state of American weakness
which were widely printed by the Hearst and other news¬
papers sympathetic to Shearer’s cause. He found the Panama
Canal defenses “totally inadequate” and the Canal open to
capture from the Pacific. The American air force was rated by
Shearer as only 16 percent of the fighting strength of the Japa¬
nese air force, while American battleships in the Pacific were
said to be outranged by Japanese guns by 3,000 yards. Be¬
fore he was attached to the Senate Committee, Shearer had
gained national publicity by his effort to bring a taxpayer’s
suit against Secretary of Navy Wilbur to restrain him from
sinking one of the American battleships decommissioned as a
result of the Washington Treaty.
Japanese patriots who viewed the Washington Conference
with similar hostility to their American counterparts also cam¬
paigned against the naval limitations. The ratio of capital ship
tonnage 5-5-3 was charged with stigmatizing Japan as an in¬
ferior, and the three figures were chalked on walls and printed
on posters to remind Japanese citizens of their alleged humilia¬
tion. The expansionists won the approval of the Diet for ship-
172 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
building in the categories not covered by treaty; five cruiser
keels were laid down in 1922 and construction begun on an¬
other five in 1924. Congress responded in December of 1924
by authorizing the construction of eight new cruisers.
Faced with a new and expensive naval race in the un¬
limited cruiser category, the same forces which earlier pressed
for the Washington Conference urged President Calvin Cool-
idge to seek a new treaty to eliminate the loopholes left by
the 1922 negotiations. The President acted in February of 1927
with invitations to the signatories to meet in Geneva the fol¬
lowing summer. France and Italy, both determined to com¬
pensate for the inferiority which they felt had been imposed on
them in capital ships at Washington, refused to attend. By
extensive building in the unlimited categories, their naval
leaders hoped to maintain their status and pride as major naval
powers.
The other three powers met in 1927 with delegations domi¬
nated by strong-minded, high-ranking, naval officers capable
of overruling the civilian advisers in decisions ‘affecting what
they considered to be national security. The American proposal
to extend the Washington Conference tonnage ratios to all
categories met with strong objections. The Japanese asked for
cruiser stabilization on the basis of existing tonnage, which
would have given their Navy approximately 70 percent of
American tonnage. The British claimed that the needs of their
empire required a minimum of 70 cruisers with a total tonnage
of more than twice that proposed by the Americans. The differ¬
ences were further complicated by British insistence that
cruiser tonnage be set in the 7,500 ton class with six-inch guns,
while the Americans claimed that only 10,000 ton ships with
eight-inch guns filled their needs.
The Geneva Conference foundered on the cruiser issue, de¬
spite Japanese efforts to mediate in the British-American con¬
flict. The press of Japan and the United States found some
agreement in putting the blame for failure on Britain. The
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 173
Stanley Baldwin Cabinet had debated the question of parity
in cruisers with the United States, but had finally accepted
Winston Churchills arguments in support of a much larger
tonnage. American opinion directed some of the blame for
failure on the vested interests of the shipbuilders and steel
companies who profited from naval construction. This em¬
phasis was the result of later revelations made by the pro¬
fessional lobbyist, William B. Shearer, who was sent to Geneva
on the payroll of several American companies to work against
any agreement limiting naval building. Shearer had, in the
words of President Hoover, “organized zealous support for in¬
creased armament” and worked to “create international dis¬
trust and hate.” A congressional investigation of Shearer’s ac¬
tivities noted that he had worked to stir anti-British feeling
as well as anti-Japanese sentiment, and in the tradition of twen¬
tieth-century propagandists had accused his opponents of
treason, tagging them as “internationalists and communists.”
The reaction to the failure of Geneva was strong in Washing¬
ton, and the Coolidge administration was favorable to carry¬
ing on the cruiser building program. As former Assistant Secre¬
tary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt saw the situation in 1928,
“ 'All right,’ we seemed to say, If you can’t agree to our pro¬
posed methods of reducing warship building, we’ll show you
what we can do. We have all the money and resources in the
world. We will build the kind of navy that no other power
can equal. . . .’ Naval competition today is the result of our
bungling diplomacy.” Roosevelt’s criticism is a partisan over¬
simplification, but the Coolidge administration did approve a
five-year building program in December of 1927 which included
the construction of 26 cruisers and three aircraft carriers.
Japanese navalists were quick to charge the United States
with launching a new arms race, ignoring their own cruiser¬
building program. Congress, however, was reluctant to support
the financial outlay which the construction program called for,
and it was legislatively curtailed in 1928 wth the proviso that it
174 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
would be suspended in the event of a new naval limitations
treaty.
When Herbert Hoover assumed the presidency in 1929, he
lost little time in making a new effort to extend the Washing¬
ton Treaty. Britain’s new Labor Premier, Ramsay MacDonald,
made a visit to the new President, and an invitation was sub¬
sequently extended to the naval powers to meet in London
early in 1930. Ambassador Hugh Gibson suggested that the
Geneva impasse be broken by the use of a “yardstick” by
which naval strength could be measured in more inclusive
terms than tonnage alone. The age of vessels and their gun
caliber were two factors which also affected their battle effi¬
ciency. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated among dis¬
armament advocates for this new approach, but it all came to
nought when the Navy Department professionals refused to
commit themselves to any formula.
The London Conference made some progress using only the
tonnage approach. A ceiling was set on cruiser tonnage which
assigned Japan 60 percent of American tonnage in heavy cruis¬
ers and 70 percent in light cruisers. Japan had already built
enough cruisers to reach more than parity with the United
States, and the new ratios required additional building by the
United States to reach the assigned superiority. Japan was
assigned 70 percent of British and American strength in other
ship categories with the exception of submarines, where equal¬
ity was granted with the two rival nations. France and Italy
refused to enter the tonnage-fixing treaty and an escalator
clause was included to meet their potential rivalry. If either
France or Italy expanded its tonnage, Britain was allowed to
build beyond treaty limits to meet this challenge, while Ameri¬
can and Japanese levels would be permitted to rise accordingly.
Since battleship construction was a major financial burden,
agreement was reached by the three powers to extend the
capital ship building holiday until 1936.
As in 1922 supporters of large navies in all three coun-
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 17 S

tries protested the London agreements as endangering their

nations security. In the United States more than 20 naval
officers testified before the Senate committee on the dangers
of the new ceilings assigned, but the Senate ratified the London
treaty with only nine “nays.” In Japan a vigorous military-
civilian conflict was fought, involving the larger issue of civilian
dominance over the Navy and Army General Staffs. The gov¬
ernment and Foreign Office triumphed, but it was to be one
of the last victories of the liberal Japanese forces over the mili¬
tarists. The Navy General Staff had to be placated with a
major replenishment program within the new tonnage ratios.
London in 1930 saw the last of the naval limitations con¬
ferences in which the conferees parted in substantial agree¬
ment, and it was the last Japanese-American negotiation to be
conducted without mutual recriminations. When the Washing¬
ton Treaty came up for renewal in 1936, Japan's drive to ex¬
tend control over Manchuria and American determination to
block Japan's expansion by political and economic measures
had created tensions too great to tolerate naval limitations.
Each power resumed building at a pace and to tonnage levels
which national leaders hoped would provide security in a
world of competitive rearmament.
The Washington and London treaties did not in themselves
fail, but the United States and Japan failed to use the period
of reduced naval tension to eliminate latent conflicts of in¬
terest. The relaxation of tension may have been responsible
for some minor amicable settlements. Japan promised in the
course of the Washington negotiations to remove the last of the
occupation troops from Siberia and carried out its promise at
the end of the conference. As a result of negotiations in which
the good offices of Secretary of State Hughes were influential,
Japan also agreed with the Chinese government to restore its
leasehold at Shantung, acquired from the Germans in 1915.
Britain took parallel action in promising to restore its leasehold
at Weihaiwei, an action subsequently postponed until 1930.
1?6 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
The Chinese delegates took heart at these promises and asked
for the return of all leased territory, but Britain and France
were no more willing to return their other leaseholds than
Japan was to restore Port Arthur.
Another achievement related to the Washington Conference
was the settlement of the Yap Island controversy. The United
States compromised to the extent of recognizing the Japanese
mandate in return for equal rights on the island for American
nationals operating the trans-Pacific marine cables. Japan also
granted American missionaries the right to erect religious build¬
ings and schools in other mandated islands acquired from Ger¬
many.
Subsequent to the Washington Conference, Hughes suc¬
ceeded in getting the Japanese to cancel the Lansing-Ishii
agreement of 1917. By a series of clever diplomatic maneuvers
the Japanese were put in a position of either terminating the
1917 agreement or consenting to the publication of the secret
protocol by which they had pledged not to seek special rights
or privileges in China. Cancellation strengthened the political
position of the Harding administration in dealing with its pro-
Chinese critics, but in no way did the elimination of the ex¬
ecutive agreement change the relationship of Japan to China.
Hughes’ great successes were countered in 1924 by an ac¬
tion which he complained had "undone the work of the Wash¬
ington Conference and implanted the seeds of an antagonism
sure to bear fruit in the future.” He was referring to the work
of Congress in passing the 1924 Immigration Act with an
amendment which unilaterally abrogated the Gentlemens
Agreement of 1907 and banned future Japanese immigration.
The quota system applied to European states by the legislation
would have legalized less than 150 Japanese admissions yearly.
Under the 1907 arrangement, voluntary exclusion did not
apply to the parents, wives, and children of Japanese aliens
resident in the United States. About 4,000 individuals were
admitted yearly, 1921-1924, under this provision, a number
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 177
which some West coast racists viewed as a genuine “Yellow
Peril.” When complete exclusion was called for, the Japanese
had few defenders in Congress. Even so, Japan might have
been treated as were the European nations but for a blunder
which was exploited by the exclusionists.
Secretary Hughes was opposed to an exclusion amendment
which he knew would be considered insulting in Japan. In dis¬
cussing the pending legislation with the Japanese Ambassador,
the Secretary encouraged the dispatch of an official note stat¬
ing how seriously Japan would look upon exclusion. Ambas¬
sador Masanao Hanihara delivered such a note, deploring the
“grave consequences” which would result in contrast to the
present “happy and mutually advantageous relations.” The
State Department forwarded the note to Congress where it was
published in the Congressional Record. Leading exclusionists,
including Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, used the words “grave
consequences” to charge Japan with threatening the legisla¬
tive body. With nationalist pride aroused the exclusion amend¬
ment was voted by both houses with only a small group of
dissenters.
President Coolidge asked that the bill be changed by the
Conference Committee to postpone exclusion for two years,
while he negotiated a treaty with Japan to eliminate the im¬
migrant flow which exclusionists wanted to check by action
offensive to Japan. The Committee recommended delay for one
year only, but enough southerners joined with the western
exclusion bloc to reject delay. President Coolidge then signed
the bill, though deploring the exclusion provisions.
The seriousness of congressional action was recognized
by Americans who knew of Japanese sensitivity to insult on the
racial issue. An American humor magazine caustically awarded
each member of Congress voting for exclusion a certificate for
service “in furthering the cause of war.” The expected reac¬
tion took place in Japan where a wave of anti-Americanism
rolled across the country. Boycotts were proclaimed against
i78 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
American manufactures, a patriotic Japanese committed hari-
kari in front of the American embassy, Viscount Kentaro
Kaneko, Harvard 78, resigned as president of the Japanese-
American Society, and the hapless ambassador, Hanihara, re¬
signed his post. To add to the resentment, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in the spring of 1925 that Japanese who
had served in the American Army during World War I were
not included under the legislation which granted citizenship
to all aliens in service.
Both American and Japanese observers attest to the pro¬
found and lasting impact of the exclusion legislation on the
relations of the two peoples. An American military attache,
returning to Tokyo in the spring of 1926 after an absence of
two years, commented on the disappearance of American
prestige, “we have a people grievously hurt and bitterly resent¬
ful.” “An explosive force has been lodged in the Japanese
mind” wrote a Japanese scholar in 1926 while visiting the
United States.
Japan’s anger created new expressions of hostility in the
United States. Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur was
quoted by newspapers as saying in September of 1924 that
there was “nothing so cooling to hot temper as a piece of cold
steel,” a remark reprinted in Japan where it cooled no tempers.
President Coolidge disavowed Wilbur’s statement and criti¬
cized other belligerent American talk coming from naval
circles. Nevertheless the Navy announced in December 1924
that battleship maneuvers would be held in the next year in
waters west of Hawaii and culminating in a cruise to Australia.
Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt
criticized the “flamboyant public announcement” of the ma¬
neuvers as tactless, since both the American and Japanese
public could easily draw the wrong conclusions. The sober
Osaka Mainichi, one of Japan’s largest newspapers, feared that
the trans-Pacific cruise would make the breaking out of war
“inevitable.” The Navy did not change its plans, and a war
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 179
game was conducted between Hawaii and Samoa in July of
1925. It demonstrated that the Hawaiian Islands could be
taken by an enemy force willing to take heavy casualties.
The year 1925 was also one in which troubles in China
began to overshadow and outweigh Japanese-American con¬
flicts. Both countries were affected unfavorably by China’s in¬
creasing hostility to foreign residents and interests; their com¬
mon difficulties soon contributed to more harmonious ex¬
changes.
Chinese nationalism was greatly stimulated as a result of
the Shanghai incident of May 30, 1925. When a hostile Chinese
mob demonstrated before one of the police stations in the In¬
ternational Settlement, a British officer ordered his men to
fire into their midst. A number of Chinese were killed and be¬
came martyrs and inspiration for anti-foreign outbreaks in
other cities, which resulted in loss of lives and destruction of
foreign properties. The privileged position of the white man
must be overthrown, the nationalists proclaimed, and the signs
which banned dogs and Chinese from European enclaves must
be torn down forever.
Even before the Shanghai incident the increase of Chinese
militancy and the spread of civil disorders forced some Ameri¬
can reappraisals of the traditional relationship with that nation.
Ambassador Jacob Schurman, a few months after his arrival
in Peking, reported to Secretary Hughes in December of 1921
that “We are universally regarded by the Chinese people as
their special friend.” But by the spring of 1922, following the
outbreak of civil war and increased banditry, Schurman was
advising American tourists not to visit China. A year later
in the spring of 1923, he was complaining of the “growing dis¬
regard” of the Chinese for foreign life and property and urging
that the American military garrisons be strengthened to cope
with the increased threat. Thomas W. Lamont, the financier,
advised Hughes that military intervention was both “necessary
and wise” in view of the breakdown of the central government.
i8o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Hughes moved cautiously in regard to military involvement,
but by 1924 recognized that protection of American nationals
in China’s interior would soon be impossible without it. Small
American armed units were landed on China’s coast to defend
lives and property more than a half a dozen times between
1922 and 1925.
Hughes’ successor, Frank B. Kellogg, had an even more
difficult time, as Chinese nationalism was reinforced by Russian
Communist advisers and as anti-foreign activities were di¬
rected not only at businessmen but at American missionaries
as well. ‘‘Old China hands” began to press for more militant
action. A policy “strong enough to put the fear of America in
the heart of every Chinese bandit” was the plea of one China
specialist in an appeal to the American public in 1923. By
1927 a widely read American Far Eastern expert, Nathaniel
Peffer, concluded that “only a miracle” could prevent the
United States from drifting into war with China. Major Gen¬
eral William Crozier argued in Current History the following
year that a few American divisions could effect complete oc¬
cupation of China and crush all guerrilla warfare. Philosopher
John Dewey called the General to task for ignoring the strength
of Chinese nationalism, while historian Charles Beard pleaded
that before a “new children’s crusade” was launched into China
some calculation be made of the cost. The advocates of the
“hard policy” continued to press for militant action, while the
reluctant Coolidge administration used military demonstra¬
tions only when they seemed absolutely necessary to protect
American lives.
Within Japan there were also advocates of a belligerent
response to civil disorders and to Chinese nationalism, but for
most of the decade the government maintained a conciliatory
policy which included some sympathetic understanding of
Chinese resentment of western imperialism. Foreign Minister
Kijuro Shidehara who took office in 1924 was a strong believer
in Sino-Japanese co-operation as a means of advancing Japan’s
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 181

economic interests on the mainland. On several occasions he

refused to join the western powers in naval demonstrations
against China. The government of Premier Giichi Tanaka,
which took office in the spring of 1927, returned to a more
militant defense of Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria and
Mongolia, but still tried to preserve the friendly relationship
of the Shidehara period. This proved in the end impossible and
Japanese military clashes with the Chinese earned them the
enmity accorded the European powers.
During the period of Japan’s conciliatory policy, Ameri¬
cans who followed Far Eastern developments were able to read
in their periodicals favorable reports on Japan, in contrast to
the disillusioned and often hostile interpretations of Chinese
nationalism. As early as the spring of 1924 the diplomatic his¬
torian, A. L. P. Dennis, warned that Japan’s friendship for
China might mean major trade gains in competition with the
United States. By 1926 a well-known Far Eastern specialist,
Harold S. Quigley, concluded that Japan had given the world
“an amazing proof of her civilization in her temperate con¬
duct. . . . No State today calls Japan enemy, not even China.”
In 1929, seven years after the close of the Washington Con¬
ference, a former attorney general, George Wickersham, ex¬
pressed his belief that the conference had “ended all question
in the minds of any reasonable men of future antagonism be¬
tween the United States and Japan.” During the naval ap¬
propriations debate in Congress that year, Britain rather than
Japan seemed to be the major rival to be feared. A Foreign
Policy Association report by T. A. Bisson as late as October of
1930 concluded that there was “every indication” that Japan’s
foreign policy of moderation was “solidly established.”
Japan was also viewed by American writers as coming
closer to the United States in its political institutions. The ex¬
tension of male suffrage to local elections in 1927 was hailed
as “a turning point in Japanese history as great as was the
Magna Charta’s in England” by a writer in the Century Maga-
182 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
zine. The question posed by a Harpers article in 1929, “Is
Japan Going Democratic?” was answered strongly in the
affirmative.
There were voices which continued to pose Japanese ex¬
pansionism as the major threat to American interests in Asia,
but they were in the minority and often dismissed as propa¬
gandists for race prejudice or expanded naval budgets. Most
Americans probably dismissed the Far East completely from
their thoughts. As an astute American diplomat, Nelson T.
Johnson, wrote to a friend in 1926, the American public was
only interested in this area “when it is served up highly spiced
with statements concerning future war, the trickiness of the
Japanese and the necessity of our being sympathetic toward a
suppressed China.” Since none of these elements could be
easily exploited by the popular press in the face of current
Asian developments, only a minority of the public were aware
of the new orientation.
A number of minor developments attested to the detente
between Washington and Tokyo. In 1924 the first American
loan to Japan since the Russo-Japanese War was negotiated by
New York bankers, $150 million for a 30 year period. American
dollars also flowed to Japan with American tourists who
averaged over 5,000 annually and reached peak proportions of
over 8,000 in 1929 and 1930.
Peace groups, encouraged by these developments, turned
their efforts to cementing Japanese-American friendship. One
such effort, sponsored by prominent American women, was the
“doll diplomacy” begun in 1927. Dolls were collected in both
the United States and Japan and sent across the Pacific to
tour schools, giving numerous speakers the opportunity to dis¬
seminate platitudes about international friendship. This pro¬
gram continued until 1935, when New York’s Mayor La Guardia
sent two full-sized dummies as “Mr. and Mrs. America” to
Japan. They were returned in due time to the United States,
A NEW ASIAN POLICY 183

dressed in Japanese clothes, and with this final absurdity the

cultural exchange was ended.
The American stock market crash of 1929 and the world
economic crisis were not long in making an impact on for¬
eign policies. The effects were different on each side of the
Pacific. For Japan the curtailment of silk exports and the drop
in silk prices produced unemployment, strikes, and bank¬
ruptcies. A restless people found leadership in a young mili¬
tarist-nationalist elite who were to give Japanese foreign policy
a more aggressive character. In the United States the same
social unrest led to a questioning of the merits of a capitalist
economy and an inward turning of national thought. The
priority system of national interests which placed domestic
considerations ahead of international seemed likely to be re¬
inforced. The character of American political leadership, how¬
ever, gave a different turn to American policy.
Chapter X

NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM

A CCORDING TO one view of human history, nations drift

i unaware and irresistibly down the broad river of their
destiny. National leaders may from time to time dip their
paddles in this stream, slowing down or speeding up move¬
ment, but never overcoming the currents of history. If this is
the true story behind the behavior of men’s political units, the
prophets of an inevitable Japanese-American war were right in
the predictions they made in the early 1920’s. They merely
overestimated the speed of the currents which would sweep
the two nations into an unavoidable collision. The efforts of
Secretary of State Hughes and Foreign Minister Shidehara
were then futile attempts to stop the flow of forces beyond the
control of man.
But there is no rational proof that nations have destinies.
Men in positions of power can make influential decisions, even
if they are sometimes unaware of their full import. Whole
peoples can be lead slowly and sometimes painfully to accept
new directions and to work toward new goals. The war which
erupted at Pearl Harbor in 1941 can be best described as the
product of a number of decisions. The most important of these
were made in Tokyo and Washington. These decisions were in-
184
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 185

fluenced by, and in turn inSuenced, decisions made in London

and in the capitals of China.
Japan began a new course in 1931 with the launching of a
war of conquest and paciScation in Manchuria. The United
States began a new course in 1931-1933 with the refusal to
recognize the changes which Japan was making in the status
quo of Asia. Vigorous militarists set Japan's new policy, while
in the United States the energetic leadership of Henry L. Stim-
son and Franklin D. Roosevelt was chieSy responsible for the
innovations in Far Eastern policy.
The American change of course defied the inclination of a
depression-ridden citizenry to concentrate on domestic ills and
to dismiss claims for “responsibilities” in other areas of the
world. When the major national concern was overwhelmingly
economic, a foreign policy was initiated based on legal and
moralistic assumptions. It pointed toward eventual military in¬
volvement in an area of the world where the United States had
only a minor economic stake.
The sources of the new policy are not to be found in the
public mood of the 1930's nor in that of the previous decade.
The ideas on which the policy was based can be found in the
militant idealism of Woodrow Wilson and in the viewpoints
of men like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge.
These men shared the belief that foreign affairs must take
precedence over domestic concerns and that for many reasons
the United States must play a larger role on the world stage.
The drastic change in Japanese-American relations began
in what Arnold Toynbee called the “Annus Terribilis,” 1931.
Throughout the western world that year men began to doubt
that their civilization would survive, since the economic sys¬
tem no longer seemed capable of providing a livelihood for a
large segment of the population. The masses were ready for
charismic leaders, having lost faith in their old institutions and
their defenders. Men looked for new systems and programs
which promised to eliminate large scale unemployment and
i86 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
restore faith in human progress. To a substantial degree Japan
and the United States shared this predicament.
The American stock market crash in the fall of 1929 had
an almost immediate impact upon Japan. As the best customer
of the Japanese, the United States was absorbing that year
over 40 percent of Japan’s exports. By the end of the year the
New York silk market collapsed, and the price of Japan’s major
export, raw silk, dropped by one-half. With one-third of
Japan’s agricultural households depending upon cocoon raising
as a secondary source of income, the farmer’s cash returns
dwindled. Tenant farmers, unable to meet their rents, were
dislodged and joined the discontented unemployed in the
cities. As cottons and rayon replaced silk, the important Ameri¬
can market seemed lost permanently. The tariff act signed
by President Hoover in June of 1930, while keeping raw silk
on the free list, made advances of from 5 to 200 percent on
other Japanese products and further curtailed exports to the
United States.
The economic crisis strengthened the hand of a group of
Japanese nationalists and militarists who were allied in a na¬
tional reconstruction movement. Their goal was the elimina¬
tion of economic distress and social unrest at home and the
re-establishment of Japan’s honor overseas. To achieve this end
they aimed at the replacement of the civilian government
which had curtailed army and navy spending and at the in¬
stallation of a government dominated by military men. The
movement viewed as futile Foreign Minister Shidehara’s policy
of diplomacy and compromise in coping with rising Chinese
nationalism. Japan’s Asian destiny was being betrayed by
civilian appeasers.
The reconstructionists moved boldly in September of 1931.
Members of the Kwantung Army headquarters staff, stationed
by treaty along the route of the Japanese-owned South Man¬
churian Railway, provoked a clash with Chinese troops near
Mukden. By pushing forward as the Chinese were driven back,
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 187
local military commanders succeeded in launching a successful
campaign for the conquest of Manchuria. Cabinet members in
Tokyo, including the Minister of War, were taken by surprise
and failed to bring the Kwantung Army under control. The
contributions of Foreign Minister Shidehara to Sino-Japanese
friendship were quickly wiped out, while the military victories
strengthened the position of the Army in the Japanese govern¬
ment. In September of 1932, a year after the conflict began, the
Army pressed the government into recognizing Manchuria as a
separate sovereign state under the name of Manchukuo. Rec¬
ognition was extended despite the objections of the Japanese
Foreign Office and the Elder Statesmen who knew that the
new state was the puppet of the Kwantung Army.
When Japan began its conquest, the Chinese government ap¬
pealed to the League of Nations for action under Article XI
of the Covenant. That article provided that in case of war or
threat of war the League should take “any action that may be
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”
One result of the Chinese appeal was the establishment of a
Commission of Enquiry composed of a British, French, Ger¬
man, Italian, and American representative. The Commission
was headed by Lord Lytton and its findings generally referred
to as the Lytton Report.
The Commission’s findings were made public in October of
1932 and began with a consideration of general developments
in China. The role of Chinese nationalism which intensified
bitterness toward foreigners was viewed as important in stimu¬
lating Japanese action. Chinese nationalism was said to be
“permeated by memories of former greatness, which it desires
to revive” and demanding the end of the “unequal treaty
privileges” which Chinese public opinion viewed as humiliat¬
ing. China, an historian might have noted, was beginning to
express the same spirit shown by Japanese nationalism more
than a half century earlier. The Commission took some note of
the rise of Chinese communism, but it was viewed as a menace
188 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

to the Kuomintang rather than an important threat to the treaty

powers.
More than any European nation, Japan was now regarded
by the Chinese as the most serious challenge to national aspira¬
tions, because of repeated intervention in behalf of Japanese
nationals and their property. Chinese nationalist propaganda,
the Commission said, was particularly effective in Manchuria
where over 200,000 Japanese were living along the South Man¬
churia Railway and in the Kwantung leased territory.
The Commission recognized the importance of Manchuria to
Japan, not only economically, but also as a patriotic symbol
of the sacrifice of a hundred thousand Japanese lives in 1904-
1905 in checking the encroachments of Russia. For the majority
of Japanese, Manchuria was still of great strategic importance
in respect to the continued threat of Russia. In view of the
economic, strategic, and sentimental interest Japan had in
Manchuria, the Commission concluded that it was not un¬
reasonable of Japan to demand the establishment of a stable
government in the area, one capable of maintaining the order
essential for economic development. But that government must
represent the people of Manchuria, said the Commission.
Japan was advised, therefore, to seek a new treaty arrangement
with China to protect its interests in the area, while China was
urged to facilitate the development of a stable government in
an autonomous and eventually demilitarized Manchuria.
Whether the Kuomintang was capable of the task of keeping
order in Manchuria is a moot point. W. Cameron Forbes,
American Ambassador to Japan, reported to Washington in
January of 1932 that only the “exceptional exercise of force of
some kind” could establish and maintain order in Manchuria.
The Japanese government was unwilling to give China the
opportunity of acting on the Lytton recommendations by re¬
storing the status quo ante bellum.
The Japanese representatives at the League of Nations
argued that the Lytton Report failed to go far enough in
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 189
recognizing the abnormal conditions in China which because
of internal anarchy could not be treated as an “organized
State.” Too little weight, the Japanese complained, was given
to the unique character of their national interests. “Japan’s in¬
terests in China are vital, British interests in China are sub¬
stantial, American interests in China are sentimental,” said one
Japanese diplomat. Skepticism was expressed in regard to the
possibility of a strengthened Chinese government; “Japan
cannot idly wait for such an uncertain eventuality in order to
solve the Manchurian question.” The League of Nations failed,
therefore, to induce the Japanese to change their position and
to return to a policy of diplomacy rather than force to defend
its interests.
Viewed with perspective, it is clear that Japan not only
violated its commitments to the League of Nations Covenant,
but also misjudged the long-range effects of its use of force
in China. Manchuria conquered still failed to provide ade¬
quately for Japan’s excess population and raw material needs,
while Manchurian industries drained investment capital and
technical personnel, much of which could have been better
used in home developments. The military effort stirred Chinese
nationalism to even greater intensity and provoked a national
resistance which slowly sapped Japan’s energies. A program
of conquest which had as one of its ends the blocking of
Russian influence in Manchuria and North China ended in
Communist control of all of China.
Japan’s reconstructionists made another blunder in failing
to foresee the effect of their military conquests on Britain and
the United States. Slowly these two countries realigned their
Far Eastern policies as their leaders reached the conviction
that Chinese nationalism was a lesser threat to their interests
than the new expansionism of Japan. Not all British and Ameri¬
can leadership agreed on the wisdom of an Anglo-American
front against Japan, and movement in this direction was fre¬
quently marked by two steps forward and one step back. In
igo AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

less than a decade, however, Japanese policies turned China’s

critics into China’s allies.
When Anglo-American opposition formed, Japanese nation¬
alists refused to admit error in the choice of their means. An
air of injury was added, instead, to a sense of mission. Patriotic
leaders became convinced that Japan alone must assume the
“responsibility” for peace and order in Eastern Asia. “Japan
must act and decide alone what is good for China,” said Am¬
bassador Hirosi Saito in Washington in April of 1934. In the
United States a similar sense of “responsibility” was develop¬
ing in regard to Asia. Veteran diplomat Hugh R. Wilson ex¬
pressed a view common in some circles when he wrote to a
friend in 1933, “It so happens that the Lord made the world
in such a way that in dealing with the Far East or the Ameri¬
can Continents, the voice of the United States must be pre¬
dominant.” These conflicting views were to be tested in a
decade; in two decades both were found wanting.
The news of the Mukden affair in September of 1931 was
received in Washington with annoyance. Domestic problems
were imposing a heavy burden on the Hoover administration,
while the State Department was concerned with preparations
for the Geneva Disarmament Conference to open in 1932 and
with the many ramifications of the international economic col¬
lapse. An election campaign was soon to be fought in which
the Democrats could be expected to indict the Republicans for
failing to check the rising unemployment and bankruptcies.
Whatever the Hoover administration did in foreign affairs,
there could be little hope that any policy would attract mass
political support. Foreign crises have been used for domestic
political advantage, but in 1931 to attempt to make the cause
of Manchuria, China, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact one over
which the average voter could forget his more immediate prob¬
lems was probably impossible.
Neither Herbert Hoover nor his Secretary of State Henry
L. Stimson was capable, however, of viewing the disruptive
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 19*

events in Asia with philosophical detachment while they

tackled more manageable problems. Both had what Hoovers
fellow Quakers spoke of as a “concern” for the orderly course
of international affairs and for the American future in Asia.
Hoover had been forced to accept a breakdown of normal
standards of international economics, but he was reluctant to
watch, without protest, a breakdown in the political realm.
Unlike his Secretary of State, Hoover had qualms, nevertheless,
about taking any action which might lead to a war and sought
to find some way by which “moral pressures” could be enlisted
in China’s cause.
Henry L. Stimson was a younger member of the generation
of Theodore Roosevelt; like that President he generally held
the view that any vigorous action was better than no action.
At times he seemed convinced that militant action was the
only language which could be used with the desired effect in
international relations. He had served as Secretary of War
under President Taft and commanded troops in World War I.
His record had been a good one, and he prided himself on his
“combat psychology.” Stimson’s ideal world was one of ordered
and disciplined relations between states according to standards
set by a stern Christianity and an Anglo-Saxon sense of proper
procedures. He was not a man given to doubts about his under¬
standing of the world. As a result of his service as Governor
General of the Philippines he believed that he also compre¬
hended what the westerner calls the “Oriental mind.” More
than any other peoples, it seemed to him, the Oriental had to
be faced with firmness, a show of force and a demonstrable
willingness to use it. Recognizing and respecting his superiors,
the Oriental would then bow and retreat. This interpretation
of the “Oriental mind,” regardless of its dubious validity, had
a respectable American tradition to support it, stretching back
to Commodore Matthew Perry.
Secretary Stimson demonstrated his approach to the Far
East a few months after he took office in March of 1929.
192 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Chinese nationalism had led to the seizure of the Russian-
operated Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria in July of
1929. The Russians retaliated in November by moving in troops
and taking control of two Chinese border towns. When Stimson
first heard of the Russo-Chinese conflict, he called together
the ambassadors of the major powers in Washington and pro¬
posed intervention in the form of an international commission
to rule on the dispute. The experienced diplomats recognized
the unwanted complications in which such an action would in¬
volve their respective countries and unanimously rebuffed the
Secretary’s initiative.
When the news of Russian military occupation of Chinese
border towns reached the Department of State, Stimson de¬
cided to act unilaterally. Casting about for some legal grounds
on which to act, he decided to use the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
In 1928 and 1929 most of the governments of the world had
signed this agreement which renounced war as an instrument
of national policy. To a great extent the signatures represented
a gesture for the benefit of the peace movements of the western
world which hoped to establish peace by outlawing war. Dis¬
claimers were generally made to provide for the use of war in
the defense of vital national interests; provision for enforce¬
ment of the vague pledges was carefully excluded.
Stimson knew that the United States had not been appointed
guardian of the Kellogg Pact and in a frank moment admitted
that it and other European treaties no more fitted the Asian
situation than “a stovepipe hat would fit an African savage.”
He decided, nevertheless, to invoke the Kellogg Pact as a
means of calling the Russians to task for military action. Since
the United States in 1929 did not recognize the existence of a
legal government in Russia, the American note had to be for¬
warded by France. By the time it arrived at Moscow the Rus¬
sians and the Chinese had patched up their difficulties. The
Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, used the occasion
to send Stimson a stinging rebuke. The American Secretary of
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 193
State was charged with trying to intervene in a non-existent
conflict and to reprimand a government which his country did
not recognize.
If the Secretary of State was chastened by this venture, he
had fully recovered two years later when he confronted the
Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria. He did for a time accept
the counsel of his State Department advisers to be cautious
and not play into the hands of the militarists in their struggle
with liberal civilian elements. President Hoover was also re¬
luctant to call Japan to task for treaty violations when the
American notes could be so easily ignored. The President was
willing, however, to accept Stimson’s suggestion that an Ameri¬
can observer be permitted to sit in on the deliberations of the
League of Nations when it considered China’s appeal. Stimson,
like Hoover, hoped that some sort of expression of “world
opinion” as represented in the League would be sufficient to
check the Japanese military and strengthen the civil authorities.
As the Japanese continued to advance and by December of
1931 took virtual control of Manchuria, Secretary Stimson grew
impatient. Seeking more effective action he began to consider
the possibility of joint economic sanctions. The Far Eastern
Division chief, Stanley K. Hornbeck, assured the Secretary that
Japan would collapse within a few days or at the most weeks
after its trade was cut off. The idea of sanctions as a means of
enforcing peace had considerable popularity in this period
among League supporters in the United States, since it ap¬
peared to be a relatively simple way to coerce sovereign states
without the use of war. President Hoover, however, was not
convinced that sanctions would not involve the nation in dan¬
gerous complications; he spoke of it as a policy of “sticking
pins in tigers” which could easily lead to war.
Blocked in taking economic measures by the President’s
attitude, Stimson found in January of 1932 a legalistic device
which expressed his lawyer and law-giver outlook. Actually
suggested first by Hoover and reinforced by a letter from
194 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Walter Lippmann, Stimson’s move was the issuance of the non¬
recognition doctrine popularly identified with his name. Like
Secretary of State Bryan who in 1915 responded to Japanese
expansion with a statement refusing to recognize any changes
in China construable as treaty violations, Stimson proclaimed a
similar statement on January 7, 1932. Notice was sent to Japan
and China that the United States would not “admit the
legality” nor recognize any treaty which impaired its rights in
China or which was brought about by a violation of the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact.
None of the European powers with interests in China was
consulted in the issuance of the non-recognition note and none
of them responded to the American action with any enthusiasm.
When the Japanese naval attack on Shanghai followed Stim¬
son’s warning, Hoover agreed to the transfer of a regiment of
Marines from the Philippines to Shanghai to demonstrate some
determination as well as to provide protection for American na¬
tionals. But Japan’s only overt response to the non-recognition
doctrine was to dispute its legal basis.
Britain had been a signatory to the Nine Power Washington
Treaty of 1922, and Stimson sought to enlist London’s co¬
operation on this basis. Article 7 of the treaty called for “full
and frank communication between the Contracting Powers”
when a situation involving the sovereignty and territorial in¬
tegrity of China arose. If Japan refused to take part in such
discussions when the Treaty was invoked by Britain and the
United States, the Secretary of State hoped for an Anglo-
American initiative in launching collective economic sanctions.
Great Britain in 1932 was facing severe economic problems
of its own, and the British public was no more willing than
that of the United States to become embroiled in a Far Eastern
conflict. In large part as a result of Chinese nationalist boy¬
cotts, British exports to China had been drastically cut in the
previous decade, and the Foreign Office had no sentimental
attachment to the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM *95
Kai-shek. Some British Far Eastern specialists also viewed
Japan in China as the chief obstacle to an undesirable spread
of Soviet influence and opposed action which might serve Rus¬
sian ends. Stimson found London, therefore, disappointingly
cool to any suggestions for a joint policy in policing Japan.
Some American scholarship has blamed Sir John Simon, the
British Foreign Secretary, in particular for refusing to stand up
to Japan at the side of the United States. Such charges must be
balanced, however, with the recognition that Stimson, as Lon¬
don understood, was unable to move beyond further note-writ¬
ing, due to the attitudes of President Hoover.
In the face of the timidity, as Stimson saw it, of London and
the White House, he was still determined he said to “put the
situation morally in its right place/’ The Secretary of State
decided to state the American position in the form of an open
letter which would receive wide publicity and yet avoid what
he called “yellow-bellied responses” from other powers. The
letter was addressed to Senator William E. Borah, chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and dated Febru¬
ary 23, 1932. The text of the letter reviewed the importance of
the Open Door policy, the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact and without naming Japan specifically it
made clear that these principles of American policy were being
violated. An appeal was made to other nations to follow the
non-recognition doctrine and thus place a “caveat” on Japan’s
gains which would effectively bar the legality of any titles or
rights acquired. Further American action was hinted at in the
suggestion of reconsideration of the 1922 limitations on Ameri¬
can battleship construction and on the fortification of Guam
and the Philippines.
The Borah letter was reprinted in the Japanese press and
stirred anti-American responses. Both the French and British
ambassadors to Tokyo believed that the letter had “done a
great deal of harm.” At the League of Nations the letter had a
more favorable reception; the Assembly voted in March of 1932
196 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
that it was incumbent upon members not to recognize any
situation or treaty achieved by violation of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. After the League received the Lytton Commission report,
Japan’s course was condemned as a violation of the League
Covenant by a vote of the Assembly. But rather than chasten¬
ing the erring member state, the League action was followed a
month later, in March of 1933, by Japan’s withdrawal from this
international organization.
Henry Stimson’s approach to Japan in 1931-1932 failed. If
threat and a clear readiness to go to war could have deterred
Japan’s expansionists and strengthened the moderates, the
American position was too weak. Neither the President nor
Congress were ready for such a sacrificial effort in behalf of
issues which seemed peripheral to the nation’s major interests.
When the Borah letter drew belligerent support from some
Americans, Hoover was moved in the other direction. The best
that Stimson was able to do in defense of his position was to
stave off until May of 1932 a statement, which the President
issued through Undersecretary of State William R. Castle, re¬
nouncing any intention of an economic boycott against Japan.
Stimson did succeed in putting up some “bluff of force” by
keeping the Fleet based at Hawaii for some months in 1932
after it had completed its Pacific maneuvers. This action led
some Japanese chauvinists to harangue against the American
threat, and Stimson felt that it was probably useful as a re¬
straint.
The Borah letter had been intended to warn Japan, encour¬
age Britain and the League to take a stronger stand, and to
educate Americans. In 1947 Stimson looked back and wrote,
“The lines of division laid down so clearly in February, 1932,
led straight to Pearl Harbor.” Although the historical path was
far from “straight” and would be better represented in terms
of zigs and zags, advances and retreats, Stimson’s statement
was a basically sound generalization. But how did a lone Secre¬
tary of State, working with an unsympathetic President and
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 197
a public and Congress absorbed in other issues, make such a
great impact on American Far Eastern policy? In part the
answer is to be found in Stimson’s success in transmitting his
viewpoint to the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. In part
the answer lies in Stimson’s leadership and encouragement of
an educated and influential elite who believed that their coun¬
try was called to set foot on a new path in the direction to
which Stimson pointed.
Stimson’s supporters were largely made up of individuals
who were convinced that the establishment of the League of
Nations in 1919 had created a new international order. Moral
judgments could and should be made about the behavior of the
member states of this new order and these judgments should
form a basis of national action. As the leading peace-loving
nation in the world, it was America’s duty to judge and act and,
in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute, to support the Chinese
underdog. The United States was “naturally destined for a
leader in the promotion of peace throughout the world,” said
Stimson in October of 1932. No nation in the world, he felt,
had been so well provided by “Providence” with a secure posi¬
tion from which to promote good relations among nations. This
was a twentieth century version of the “chosen people” concept
which many great nations had held in the past in forms noble
and ignoble.
In an American society which was still reacting to the bar¬
renness of the results of participation in World War I and in
which the quest for peace was still considered the highest
ideal, Stimson’s program with its emphasis on legality and
morality had strong appeal. Few saw that it carried the impli¬
cation of another war in behalf of peace. Few saw that the
Sino-Japanese relationship was too complex for a simple moral
judgment by western nations with a stake in the Asian status
quo, acquired by methods in the nineteenth century similar to
those of Japan in the twentieth century. Stimson’s major op¬
position came instead from apathy and the simplified tradi-
198 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
tional view that any American intervention in international
affairs was not in the national interest.
His supporters were strong in academic circles where a pe¬
tition was circulated by the presidents of Harvard, the Uni¬
versity of Michigan, and the University of Minnesota. Long lists
of signatures were collected on campuses in favor of American
co-operation with the League if economic sanctions were ap¬
plied against Japan. The petition’s goal was also supported by
some prominent congressmen and newspapers. The American
Committee on the Far Eastern Crisis was established with
Communist support to rally religious and labor groups for the
same ends. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia
University, headed a third group, the Committee on Economic
Sanctions with an impressive list of sponsors which issued a
call for a conference of Kellogg-Briand Pact signatories to
adopt a supplementary protocol to the Pact on economic sanc¬
tions. Chinese propagandists joined in the effort to stir Ameri¬
can opinion with an appeal from “Chinese Women to the
Women of America” for a feminine boycott on Japanese goods.
Despite these efforts it was only a small vocal minority of
Americans who in 1932 concerned themselves with Japan’s
actions in Manchuria. Of these it was probably a minority who
would have supported condemnation if they had foreseen that
Stimson’s path led to war. Even one of the initiators of the non¬
recognition doctrine, Walter Lippmann, wrote in February of
1932 that “The idea of war should be renounced clearly and
decisively” in respect to Asia. Both presidential candidates in
the summer and fall of 1932 concentrated on domestic issues
which seemed likely to dominate the voters’ thinking.
The defeat of Herbert Hoover and the election of Franklin
D. Roosevelt was generally viewed as favorable to the improve¬
ment of Japanese-American relations. Roosevelt was not ex¬
pected to permit the Far East to divert him from recovery
measures. His new Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was known
principally for his interest in low tariffs, a policy which boded
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 199

no ill for Japan. The '"brain-trusters” in the President’s en¬

tourage were almost entirely men who held traditional views
about the primacy of domestic over foreign affairs. In Japan
the press and informed public took an optimistic view of the
changes in Washington. “No more Stimson” was the remark
gleefully made to Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo by an
embassy chauffeur and an embassy maid.
There were two qualities of the new President, little noted,
which were to prove very influential in the course of future
relations with Asia. The first was the strong, sentimental tie
which Roosevelt had to China; the second was his love of the
Navy and admiration for seapower. Both qualities were rooted
deeply. His reactions to any discussion which touched these
two areas had emotional overtones. As close associates learned,
his rationality was easily swayed when either China or the
Navy awakened in him a chain of associations from which he
derived warm satisfactions.
Roosevelt’s attitude toward China was literally acquired at
his mother’s knees. Her father, Warren Delano, was a New
England sea captain who had made a substantial fortune in the
Canton trade. Sara Delano was taken to China as a small child
by her father, an adventure which seems to have provided her
with many tales with which to later entertain her only child.
The fascination and lure of the Orient, so common to many
Americans of earlier generations, was accentuated in young
Franklin. Stories of his grandfather’s career were recalled on
many occasions for the benefit of the President’s associates.
That his family had gained so much from the China trade
seemed to leave Roosevelt with some sense of personal respon¬
sibility for China’s future.
Henry Stimson discovered the Roosevelt soft spot when the
two men met to discuss foreign policy issues during the inter¬
regnum of 1932-1933. Their first encounter took place in
Washington with President Hoover a few weeks after the elec¬
tions and was not a favorable one from Stimson’s point of view.
200 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
But on January 9,1933, Stimson accepted Roosevelt’s invitation
and spent a day with the President-elect at the latter’s Hyde
Park estate. The retiring Secretary of State used much of the
time speaking in support of his Far Eastern policy. He found
that Roosevelt had what Stimson called “a personal hereditary
interest” in China.
Stimson returned to New York assured that there would be
no break in Asian policy. Several days later he secured Roose¬
velt’s approval of a phone call to London to assure the British
that the American position would not change on March 4.
“That is one place where I think the two administrations will
be entirely in accord,” Stimson told the American embassy in
London, referring to his non-recognition statement and the
Borah letter. On January 17, Roosevelt made a guarded state¬
ment to the press, saying that he believed in policies which
“upheld the sanctity of international treaties.” This was gen¬
erally viewed as an indirect endorsement of Stimson’s doctrine
and created some consternation among the New Deal support¬
ers who were critical of Stimson’s position. Two of Roosevelt’s
closest advisers, Raymond Moley and Rexford Tugwell, has¬
tened to point out the dangers of commitment to what appeared
to be a futile and legalistic policy. Roosevelt responded by tell¬
ing them of his deep sympathy for the country with which his
grandfather had traded. “How could you expect me not to go
along with Stimson on Japan,” he asked Moley.
Secretary of State Hull may have had views on the Sino-
Japanese affair similar to those of the President, albeit without
the family background. As Hull remembered it in 1948, he had
entered the State Department with two convictions about the
Far East. One was that it was in the American interest to block
the extension of Japanese power, and the other was his con¬
viction that Japan could not be trusted to uphold any treaties.
Hull retained as his Far Eastern Division chief, Stanley K.
Hornbeck, who had held that post since 1928 and who had
been influential in interpreting Japanese policy for Stimson.
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 201

Although Hornbeck was initially reluctant in respect to the

non-recognition program, he was one of those who believed
that Japan could be forced to change course under the pressure
of a boycott.
Some historians have concluded that the Stimson-Roosevelt
conversations were of no significance for future American
policy and did not influence the New Deal. Roosevelt, it is
pointed out, failed to follow the logic of the Stimson position
and made no effort to apply sanctions to Japan. Shortly after
taking office the new President refused to fight in Congress for
the type of arms embargo legislation which would have given
him one means of exerting pressure on Japan. Nor was Roose¬
velt, any more than Hoover, willing to face the strong protests
which the cotton industry and the silk industry would have
made over any curtailment of trade with Japan.
The new administration did, however, continue to refuse
recognition to Manchukuo although it was sympathetic to a
de facto recognition policy in Latin America. American non¬
recognition did not substantially interfere with Japan's de¬
velopment of its satellite state, but it was an issue between
the two nations which the Japanese were not allowed to forget.
When in the winter of 1933-1934 rumors spread of a possible
change of American policy, Stanley Hornbeck made a speech,
widely reported in Japan, in which he was quoted as saying
that his government would continue to refuse to recognize
“governments made by swords.” Ambassador Grew warned
that such statements tended to undo efforts being made to
ease trans-Pacific tensions. Franklin Roosevelt may not have
needed Stimson to convince him that it was to America's inter¬
est to support China’s cause, but to commit his administration
in advance to a particular policy unpopular with many of his
own supporters may well have been a tribute to Stimson's pow¬
ers of persuasion.
Non-recognition of Manchukuo in time turned out to be a
less important policy of the new administration than the impact
202 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
upon Japanese-American relations of Roosevelt’s navalist out¬
look. Love of ships and an interest in seapower, like his attitude
toward China, can be traced to Roosevelt’s formative years.
His family owned a sailing yacht and even as “a little mite,”
according to his mother, he declared himself “a seafaring man.”
During Roosevelt’s adolescence the writings of Alfred Thayer
Mahan stirred the minds of many outward-looking Americans.
For a Groton schoolboy with nautical interests, Mahan’s ideas
had an added attraction. The fact that they were also ex¬
pounded by an admired relative, Theodore Roosevelt, in¬
creased their appeal. As a Christmas present in 1897 Franklin
received a copy of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History, 1660-1783 and, according to his mother, he pored
over this volume “until he had practically memorized the whole
book.” A month later, on his sixteenth birthday, the future
president received a copy of Mahan’s The Interest of America
in Sea Power, Present and Future. Other volumes of Mahan
followed and were added to a growing Roosevelt library of
naval histories and naval prints.
When Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the
Navy in 1913, he “embraced the Tig Navy’ cause” with a
wholeheartedness which startled Secretary Josephus Daniels,
according to Roosevelt’s 1931 campaign biographer, Ernest
Lindley. As Assistant Secretary, Roosevelt also opened a cor¬
respondence with the retired Admiral Mahan and found that
he shared with him a strong concern over Japan as a major
threat in the Pacific. There is also some evidence that Franklin
saw himself playing the same dynamic role that Theodore had
in pushing the Navy into a state of readiness. “You remember
what happened the last time a Roosevelt occupied a similar
position,” Franklin told a reporter shortly after he took office
in 1913.
After World War I, however, Franklin Roosevelt showed a
sense of balance in his thinking not found in other big Navy
boosters. When it was most impolitic for a Democrat to do so.
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 203
he supported Secretary Hughes and his achievement in the
Washington Naval Limitations Treaty. He criticized Coolidge
in 1927 for talking of an expanded cruiser building program
and retained a belief, even after he became president, that the
Washington Conference had made an important contribution
to peace in the Pacific.
For his Secretary of Navy Roosevelt selected Claude B,
Swanson, a man known for his faithful support of increased
naval appropriations as chairman of the Senate Committee on
Naval Affairs. At his first press conference in March 7, 1933,
the new Secretary stated that his policy was to build as quickly
as possible to the London Treaty limits set in 1930. On June
16, 1933, Roosevelt issued an executive order allotting $238
million of the National Recovery Administration’s funds to a
naval building program. Construction plans included four new
cruisers, two aircraft carriers, sixteen destroyers, four sub¬
marines, and a number of auxiliary vessels.
Although the new ships would not bring American tonnage
beyond the 1930 limits, Tokyo and some European capitals
viewed the American program as again starting the world on a
naval race. Naval construction had declined as national budgets
were trimmed under the stress of the world depression. Japan’s
appropriations for new ships declined from $40.8 million in
1930-1931 to $33.5 million in 1931-1932 and were cut further
to $26.9 million in 1932-1933. The American building program
was the largest single construction undertaken by any nation
since the end of World War I. There was some basis for critics,
both foreign and domestic, charging that the Roosevelt ad¬
ministration was taking the initiative in reopening competition.
The Japanese press viewed the American expansion as being
directed across the Pacific. The Osaka Asahi, one of the least
chauvinistic papers, charged that the program “betrays the
spirit of the London Treaty.” Japanese naval expansionists,
jealous of the large Army appropriations as a result of the
Manchurian victories, used the American move as propaganda
204 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
for their own budgets. The new American ships, they claimed,
would upset the uneasy balance of power in the Pacific and
pose a threat to the security of the Japanese homeland. This
argument, spread through the Japanese press, helped the naval
propagandists to win an additional appropriation of over a
hundred million dollars from the Diet. In December of 1933
Japan announced plans to build 22 new ships to meet treaty
strength.
London also viewed the American building program with
concern. Britain feared a reopened naval building race which
they would be regretfully forced to enter if Japan followed the
American example. In September of 1933 the British Foreign
Office approached Washington to ask if the United States
would suspend laying down its new cruisers if the British could
persuade the Japanese to do the same. Hull replied by stressing
the economic function of the American program and denying
that it had any relation to Japan or to Japanese building. There
was ‘nothing to take us to the Orient, much less to induce us
to make preparations for a naval conflict on abcount of any
Oriental considerations,” he said. When Prime Minister Ramsay
MacDonald and Foreign Secretary John Simon raised the same
proposal with Norman Davis, the State Department again re¬
fused to consider a moratorium in view of the need to “round
out” the Fleet.
Was President Roosevelt thinking of a possible war with
Japan when he acted to expand the American Navy in 1933?
Harold Ickes whose New Deal agency handled the building
funds boasted in 1943 that “we did start girding our loins for
war early in 1933.” Ickes doubted, however, that the President
was looking forward to actual war and suggests that the build¬
ing was begun because Roosevelt was “congenitally as well as
by choice, Navy-minded.” Another cabinet member, James
Farley, writing in 1948, states that the President took up the
issue of a possible war with Japan on March 7th, three days
after taking office. Although the cabinet agreed that no action
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 205
should be taken which might result in hostilities, Roosevelt
reportedly lectured the cabinet on how the war could be
fought. He recognized the problem of distance in a trans¬
pacific conflict, but considered it possible to starve out Japan
by a blockade in three to five years. He anticipated the
temporary loss of the Philippines and the launching of bombing
attacks on the Japanese islands from the Aleutians.
In the midst of the great banking crisis of March 1933 the
President was probably not giving serious consideration to war.
More likely he was indulging himself by playing naval strate¬
gist and demonstrating what he considered to be his compe¬
tence in this area. But his building program does seem to have
been directed at Japan. When a friend wrote to him in the
summer of 1933 to express his concern about the impact of
American naval expansion on Japan, Roosevelt stated his own
concern about Japanese strength. He wrote to the Reverend
Malcolm Peabody that he had discovered to his “dismay” that
the Navy “was and probably is actually inferior to the Japanese
Navy.” He also defended his action by stating that “the whole
scheme of things in Tokyo does not make for an assurance of
non-aggression in the future.”
In January 1934 the Roosevelt administration announced its
intention of bringing naval strength up to the limits set by the
London Treaty. Congress quickly passed an authorization for
the construction of over a hundred ships to be built over a
period of years at an estimated annual cost of $76 million. No
battleships were planned, but the 1935 construction was to
begin with an aircraft carrier, two light cruisers, 14 destroyers,
and six submarines.
When the President signed the naval bill he assured Ameri¬
cans that it was not a law for the construction of any additional
ships, but merely congressional approval for a tentative future
program. His administration, said Roosevelt, still favored the
limitation of naval armaments. Although it clearly involved
considerable ambivalence on his part, Roosevelt, was genuinely
206 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
interested in naval limitation as well as in expanding the fleet.
Norman Davis, the American disarmament specialist, visited
Roosevelt in late April of 1933 and advised that the United
States and Britain go it alone in their building programs, since
Japan could not be trusted. But the President insisted on an¬
other naval conference at the expiration of the London Treaty.
He told Davis that he hoped to see a new ten-year treaty, keep¬
ing the present tonnage ratios between Britain, the United
States and Japan, but making a 20 percent reduction in total
tonnage. If Japan refused to accept this, Roosevelt spoke of
extending the present treaty for another five years. When the
preliminary conversations for a new treaty began, Roosevelt
took a strong personal interest in their conduct, often bypass¬
ing his Secretary of State in setting the course of the negotia¬
tions.
In its Far Eastern policy, the Roosevelt administration
dropped the note-writing program of Stimson, characterized
by some contemporaries as “international nagging,” but gave
no other evidence of a change of position in regard to Japanese
activities in China. Not only did naval construction strengthen
the American position in the Pacific, but additional diplomatic
strength was gained from the recognition of the Soviet Union
in November of 1933. There were other important considera¬
tions which favored reopening of diplomatic relations with the
Russians, but it was also clear to Tokyo that it cleared away a
major obstacle to common action between Washington and
Moscow to block Japanese influence in northern China. The
Japanese military were particularly concerned over possible
Soviet-American co-operation in view of the rumors of a new
Russo-Japanese war. A month before recognition of Russia was
announced, Ambassador Grew was approached by the Japa¬
nese with the suggestion that a good-will mission be sent to
the United States. The Ambassador felt that there was no need
for such a venture at that time and the State Department
backed him up in rejecting Tokyo’s suggestion. The United
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 2.0J

States quickly discouraged another Japanese initiative the same

month, when the Foreign Office sent up some trial balloons in
behalf of a Japanese-American arbitration treaty. It was not a
“propitious time” for such a treaty, Grew believed.
The Roosevelt administration was also opposed to any British
rapprochement with Japan. A coolness had developed between
London and Tokyo after the British supported the Lytton Com¬
mission report and refused to recognize Manchukuo. But the
rise of Adolf Hitler and talk of German rearmament led some
members of the MacDonald government to consider a new
course. A new Anglo-Japanese alliance or even a non-aggres¬
sion pact with Japan would strengthen Britain’s hand in Europe
by permitting naval and military concentration against future
German strength. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Ex¬
chequer, argued in the fall of 1934 that the United States could
not be counted upon to support Britain in Asia and would only
go to war against Japan if Hawaii was attacked.
How seriously London considered a rapprochement with
Japan must await further publication of British records before
final determination. A rumor of negotiations was sent from
Tokyo by Grew in May of 1934. Stanley Hornbeck thought the
rumor a serious one and urged that it be countered by pushing
ahead with the naval building program and by giving publicity
to the progress made in warship construction. When Roosevelt
heard the rumor, he was angry. He wanted Norman Davis to
tell the British Foreign Minister that “If Great Britain is even
suspected of preferring to play with Japan to playing with us,”
the United States would go over London’s head and appeal di¬
rectly to Canada and other Dominions for support. This was a
bold threat which would have very likely backfired and, for¬
tunately for the Roosevelt administration, was never attempted.
It illustrated, however, the President’s determination to main¬
tain a diplomatic front of opposition to Japan’s China policy.
In the atmosphere of “no war, but yet no peace” in the
Pacific which characterized the first Roosevelt administration.
208 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
chauvinists and rumor-spreaders again became active in add¬
ing to the tensions. Spy stories became common in both coun¬
tries as in the early twenties. Japan expressed what later ap¬
peared to be a clairvoyance in its fears of American bombing
planes, but which at the time could be dismissed as almost
sheer fantasy. When in 1932 the National City Bank of New
York asked its Japanese branch offices to collect photographs
of the business sections of the cities in which they were located,
a bombing scare ran through the press. Instead of being used
as an indication of economic growth, Japanese newspapers
charged that the photographs were wanted by the United
States government to aid in planning bombing raids. Innocent
American travellers taking pictures in Japan frequently found
themselves detained by police as spies, while their films were
confiscated.
Fears were stirred throughout Japan by press reports which
gave exaggerated significance to the flight of six U.S. Navy
flying boats from San Francisco to Honolulu early in 1934.
The same treatment was given later in the year to a mission of
ten Army bombers to Alaska. More concrete reasons for fear
were provided by the public testimony of the pioneer air force
enthusiast, Brigadier General William Mitchell, who in October
of 1934 stated that, “Japan is our most dangerous enemy, and
our planes should be designed to attack her.” Mitchell called
for the construction of dirigibles and planes with a range of
more than 6,000 miles in order to bomb Japan. Cordell Hull
also reminded the Japanese Ambassador of the increasing vul¬
nerability of his home cities when he lectured the diplomat on
the need of a changed foreign policy in May of 1934. Hull
pointed out that an American flier had flown from the United
States to Japan and around the world in eight days. Using
Britain as an island which once had security, Hull told the
Japanese that a fleet of 2,000 bombing planes from any western
European capital could now wipe out London. It is under¬
standable that Grew could report from Tokyo that same year
NON RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 209
that the Japanese people were “extraordinarily apprehensive
of attack from the air” and thus quite concerned about the
reported growth of Soviet air power and the building of Ameri¬
can airplane carriers.
The American sensational press did its part to keep fear of
Japan alive among its readers. A common rumor told of im¬
minent Japanese conquest of the Philippines, helped by Japa¬
nese agents in the islands. Secret fortification of the mandated
Pacific islands was another frequent report which was given
credence in some American government circles, due to Japa¬
nese reluctance to authorize visits of American naval vessels
to this area of the Pacific. Questions were frequently raised
about “mysterious” Japanese in Mexico or about the loyalty of
Hawaiian and Californian Japanese. When the future Secretary
of the Navy, Frank Knox, returned from a visit to Hawaii in
March of 1933, he wrote to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army in alarm. American security was being threatened
by the growth in numbers and political power of “Japanese,
Chinese and Philippino citizens [sic] who dictate to the politi¬
cal government.” He suggested that the first move to take was
to “intern every Japanese resident before the beginning of
hostilities threatens.”
Senator Arthur Robinson of Indiana warned Americans, in
a popular magazine in March of 1934, that Japan was looking
greedily at Alaska and that the Japanese Navy was more
familiar with Alaskan waters than the Americans. Support was
given this story by Representative William Sirovich of New
York who told his fellow congressmen that while in Moscow he
was shown Japanese documents, captured by Soviet spies,
showing plans for the seizure of the Aleutian Islands.
In this atmosphere there was little hope for continued
Japanese-American agreement on naval strength. Preliminary
talks for the London naval conference began in October of
1934 and continued through to the end of the year without
progress. Japanese delegates held that the 1922 ratio of 60
2IO AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
percent of American tonnage in capital ships no longer pro¬
vided adequate security, due to the increased range of ships
and planes. The United States was unwilling to agree to sub¬
stantial modifications in the tonnage ratio, since this would
only increase the odds against conducting a successful naval
war in Far Eastern waters.
On December 29, 1934, Japan gave the stipulated two years’
notice to the Washington Treaty signatories of the termination
of the agreement. The same day that Japan gave notice, the
U.S. Navy announced that the 1935 naval maneuvers would be
held west of Hawaii. The timing of the Navy’s announcement
was viewed in Japan as a direct effort at intimidation, although
the Navy Department claimed that it was mere coincidence.
President Roosevelt regretted the timing when Japan’s reaction
was called to his attention, but when the Undersecretary of
State suggested that the naval maneuvers be moved to the
Atlantic or at least closer to the Pacific coast, the President
refused to modify the Navy’s planning. Before the maneuvers
took place a petition signed by a number of prominent Ameri¬
cans as well as by more than 200 American missionaries to
Japan appealed to the President to suspend this operation in
the interest of easing the Pacific tensions which they seemed
to be stimulating. National organizations such as the Federal
Council of Churches joined in the appeal. The war games took
place, however, directed at blocking an attempt to invade the
American mainland, but using about 400 planes based princi¬
pally in Hawaii, an aspect fully noted in Japan.
As Roosevelt completed his first four years of office, diplo¬
matic relations with Japan were in a state of stasis as Stimson
had left them, while the naval relationship was becoming a
competitive one as it had been before 1922. Roosevelt’s biog¬
rapher, Ernest Lindley, summed up the situation in 1936 in his
Half Way With Roosevelt. He praised the President for putting
a stop to “inflammatory note-writing” to Japan and approved
the naval building program as a deterrent, “a pointed hint to
NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM 211

Japan to go slow.” But Roosevelt’s Far Eastern policy was

viewed as dangerous since it fell between two poles. One in¬
volved a staged withdrawal from Asia, done with as much
dignity as possible, leaving the Japanese to set their course
with China unhampered by American protests. The other
meant a decision to face war and to seek definite commitments
from Britain in order to utilize British bases and sea power to
nullify the disadvantages of distance. The Roosevelt admin¬
istration in 1936 seemed unwilling to opt clearly for either
course.
Chapter XI

THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL

E CONOMICS AFFECTS the behavior of men and nations

in circuitous ways. The pursuit of gain does not always
produce logical acts directed toward realistic ends. Dreams
may outweigh realities; a market in hand may be worth less
than two seen dimly in the future. Decisions made in respect
to national economic interests may involve very little objective
weighing of the pros and cons.
The Americans who were willing to fight Japan on the issue
of the Open Door in China knew that war and the destruction
of the Japanese economy meant for some years the elimination
of their country’s best customer in Asia and the third largest
purchaser of American exports. The Japanese who decided on
war with the United States knew that this meant an end to
trade with the largest buyer of Japanese goods as well as
closing off the source of many important imports. Yet the lead¬
ers of both countries made their decisions at a time when
foreign trade was regarded as vital to economic recovery and
good customers were in themselves a major national interest.
For both Washington and Tokyo it was China that wyas the
center of interests more important than their existing economic
relations with each other or the preservation of peace in the
212
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 213

Pacific. “Security” and “responsibilities” were the words with

which these interests were more often described than in terms
of yen or dollars. Chinese communism did pose an ideological
threat to Japan, while a powerful Soviet Union expanding in
Asia might in time take revenge for the military defeat of 1905.
Spokesmen for Japan’s national mission also claimed for their
country as the leading power in Asia the responsibility of
guiding a chaotic China to stability and prosperity, free from
western imperialist influences. But Japan’s material investment
in this area and China’s importance as a source of raw materials
also added up to a substantial economic interest.
For the United States it is easy to make a plausible case for
more important non-material and material interests in Japan
itself than in China. By the 1930’s Japan had fully demon¬
strated its susceptibility to western technology and other
aspects of American culture. Jazz, baseball, Hollywood movies,
and American novels had all penetrated the language barrier
and become a part of life in the major cities. Far more than
the Chinese, the Japanese seemed open to the assimilation of
American behavior patterns, although not always the most
desirable ones. Optimists who still viewed the national mission
as the Americanization of Asia could easily center their hopes
on Japan.
For the more hard-boiled appraisers of American material
interests, Japan provided an expanding market during decades
when the Chinese consumption of American exports was in¬
significant. Both as an area for profitable investment and for
trade, it was difficult to subordinate Japan, whose standard of
living edged upward, to a China seemingly doomed to an
eternity of poverty intensified by civil wars. In the depression
years of the thirties, American sales to Japan ran four to seven
times as large as the sales to China. Japan was also a more at¬
tractive center for American business to invest speculative
capital. By 1936 American holdings in Japanese bonds and
stocks reached over $164 million. The Philippines came second.
214 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

despite its tiny population, compared to China which ranked

third with a total investment amounting to about $100 million.
With a population about four-fifths agricultural compared to
Japan’s approximate one-fourth, China imported less than
three-fourths as much as Japan despite a population over seven
times as large.
Despite these disparities in existing economic realities as
well as in future prospects, the American view of China was
almost completely impervious to the rival attractions of Japan.
A thorough exploration of the sources of this persistent national
bias would involve a broad and deep study of collective na¬
tional attitudes and soon draw the investigator into areas
where neither data nor generalizations exist to provide a basis
for inquiry. At best a few hypotheses can be offered which
seem to have some historical support from scattered data.
George Kennan once suggested that Americans have a tend¬
ency to create “hazy and exalted dreams of intimacy with other
peoples,” and this appears, prior to the disillusionments of
1949-1950, to have been most true of the Chinese. Despite the
nineteenth-century west coast hysteria, in the twentieth
century racial fears of the “yellow peril” variety were short¬
lived in their focus on Chinese. Japan easily became the sub¬
stitute for nativist hostility. One obvious reason seems to have
been the early termination of perceptible Chinese immigration,
whereas anxiety was expressed over what seemed a dangerous
influx of Japanese right down to the passage of the exclusion
act in 1924.
Chinese immigrants and their children also seem to have con¬
centrated in occupations or in the kinds of businesses—restau¬
rants, laundries, import shops—which seem to have presented
far less of a threat to white Americans. The Japanese-American
farmer and businessman often operated in areas where he
competed with previous generations of immigrants from Eu¬
rope. He was attacked, usually with little or no justification,
as an unscrupulous and vicious competitor demonstrating traits
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 215

also attributed to the nation of his origin. This animosity, while

regional in origin, was disseminated widely by the mass media.
A book like Pearl Buck's The Good Earth, published in 1931,
and the subsequent movie based on the book, disseminated a
warmly sympathetic view of the Chinese peasant. No domesti¬
cally produced counter-images were strong enough to nullify
its impact. To present Japanese peasants to the American
public with the same favorable view and with such widespread
success would have been difficult if not impossible. In novels
as well as in Hollywood films the Japanese was more likely to
be portrayed as an internal or external threat.
The American impressions of the Chinese and Japanese re¬
sponse to Christian missionary efforts also helped to create a
bias in favor of the former. Evangelical activity did create a
minority of believers in Japan which included some distin¬
guished individuals, but the island empire never appeared to
be as fertile a field as China. The nominal conversion of Chiang
Kai-shek to Christianity and the role of the Christianized Soong
family in Kuomintang politics and finances were without a
parallel in Japan. Probably by coincidence, the returned mis¬
sionaries from Japan and their children seem not to have played
such an influential part in American life as did such disparate
individuals as Henry Luce, Walter Judd, and Pearl Buck.
In the economic realm, a more easily measurable set of
factors worked against Japan. While the dream of China's
profitable markets persisted in the minds of export interests,
Japan was increasingly viewed not merely as a market, but as
a tough competitor, threatening American overseas markets
and pushing American-made goods off the shelves in the United
States.
As in the case of military and naval development, the growth
of Japan’s export economy was aided by Americans. After the
Meiji Restoration in 1868, a variety of economic prohibitions
were removed and exports encouraged. As in China it was the
British who led in handling this business, but it was the Ameri-
2l6 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

cans who became consumers of Japan s exports to a total value

far exceeding the British. Japanese green tea was preferred by
Americans to the black tea of China, and almost all tea exports
were consumed in the United States along with increasing
quantities of raw silk and small items like fans, bric-a-brac,
and lacquer ware. By 1880 the United States was buying over
40 percent of Japan’s exports, compared to 10 percent by
Britain. Japan’s imports, however, at this date were still pre¬
dominantly British, totalling over 50 percent, compared to
the American share of approximately 7 percent.
From the earliest years Americans were optimistic about
Japan’s commercial and industrial prospects. Already in 1864
the Annual Cyclopedia informed Americans that foreign com¬
merce had “struck deep roots and is acquiring influence” in
Japan. President Grant in his annual message to Congress in
1869 mentioned Japan as one of the markets which should
receive “our special attention.” The American Minister to
Tokyo, R. B. Van Valkenburgh, sought to guide Japan’s eco¬
nomic course when in 1867 he advised the Foreign Minister
to turn to the manufacture of silk goods for the American
market rather than export raw silk alone.
When General Charles LeGendre was advising on Japan’s
foreign policy, he also gave thought to expanding the market
for Japan’s exports. Furniture made in European styles by
cheap Japanese labor could, he believed, undersell all com¬
petitors on the American market. At his request samples of
Japanese chairs were sent to the Philadelphia Exhibition in
1876 to attract buyers. Tea sets also interested the busy general
who found that a 27-piece set, made and painted by hand cost
only $2.75 in Japan, but could be sold in San Francisco for
$15.00 to $20.00. He urged the Japanese to use machinery to
give regularity of shape and size to these sets and to use litho¬
graphic processes for the design, cutting costs in half. He ad¬
vised the Home Department Minister that a $40 million market
for pottery existed in the United States, which could be domi-
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 217

nated by Japan. He also sketched out ambitious plans for the

conquest of the markets of Mexico and South America.
As the Japanese cotton textile industry began to increase the
number of spindles in operation, a growing market opened
for American cotton. The cotton sales were eventually to be a
major factor in balancing American raw silk imports, but by
1890 imports from Japan were still totalling several times the
value of Japan’s purchases from the United States. Total trade
figures, however, surpassed by this date the Chinese-American
exchange.
The first fears that Japan was going to give the experienced
Yankee some serious competition in the business world were
expressed in the 1890’s. The San Francisco Chronicle which
took the lead in the attack on the Japanese immigrant also was
the first to raise the economic issue. In an editorial in February
of 1890, the Chronicle questioned the wisdom of allowing
Japanese youth to be educated in the United States. Returning
home, these individuals carried technical and business skills
which the Chronicle feared would eventually produce a flood
of cheap goods on the American market. Three years later a
minority report of the House Committee on Ways and Means
called for tariff raises to protect the silk industry from Japa¬
nese products produced by labor paid one-tenth of the wages
of their American counterparts. But Van Valkenburgh’s advice
of some 20 years earlier that Japan produce its own silk textiles
rather than export raw silk never produced a serious com¬
petitor.
In 1894 a Senate committee heard another of a long series of
pleas from American producers for protection, this from the
refiners of camphor who attacked the cheaply produced Japa¬
nese product.
As fears increased, fantasy began to produce wild rumors of
new Japanese trade invasions. In 1896 business circles from
New York to San Francisco discussed reports of the imminent
onslaught of thousands of Japanese bicycles which were to sell
2l8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

for $12.00 each and drive the American-made product off the
market. A similar story spread about the flood of Japanese
buttons which were going to destroy all competitors by their
low prices. Investigation of these stories showed that Japan had
no bicycle plant capable of turning out more than 150 wheels
yearly and these were of a quality far inferior to the American
product. Austrian and German-made buttons were successfully
competing on Japan’s domestic market, and no shipments were
being made to the United States.
In the atmosphere which pervaded some circles in the 1890’s,
it seems to have been sufficient for a few Japanese imports to
arrive in any competitive field to stir fear. The ingenious
Oriental, it appeared, had now learned how to get the best
of his western mentor. An illustrative comment made in 1896
complained that:

In early days of missionary work, the missionary wives

used to hem moral handkerchiefs for the little heathen.
Today the heathen Japanese have turned the tables on
the Christian nations and cornered the world’s markets
for silk handkerchiefs, exporting within the last few years
one hundred thousand of these useful articles.

The National Association of Manufacturers were concerned

enough by 1896 to send a specialist to Japan to survey the areas
of future competition. A report entitled Commerce and In¬
dustries of Japan was published by the envoy, Robert Porter,
which warned that nothing short of absolute protection could
exclude some Japanese products. These Orientals, Porter said,
were completely dedicated to industrialization and determined
to make their way in the international trade world. Their low
wage scales in particular made them unbeatable. But a con¬
gressional committee established in 1896 to study the “alleged
invasion of the markets of the United States” could still find no
made-in-Japan manufactures of any quantity in American
stores. Most of the imports consisted of handmade goods of a
type which were unlikely to attract American producers.
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 219

If some American businessmen feared Japanese competition,

others were anxious to profit from increasing the flow across the
Pacific. These individuals occupied the role of middlemen,
stimulating Japan's production of the most salable items, giv¬
ing help in securing capital and machinery from the United
States and in setting up wholesale networks to distribute the
products. In time Japanese businessmen also learned many of
the tricks of this trade and displaced many of these individuals,
but the most capable were still able to profit from their role
as agents of the feared competitor.
By the turn of the century, as the Japanese immigration ques¬
tion aroused hostility, fears of Japanese imports were used
by the exclusionists to promote their own ends. The underpaid
Japanese factory worker was equated with the immigrant who
showed that hard work and a low standard of living made him
a serious competitor to the white fruit and vegetable farmer
even though the Japanese was forced often to develop the most
arid and least fertile of the Pacific coast lands. Other interests
also used the fear of trade competition to promote their ends.
Protectionists of all varieties used Japan as they did Europe to
promote a higher tariff policy with the American people and
Congress. Even the free silver advocates found the Japanese
issue a useful one. They held that Japans price advantages
came from paying labor in silver and selling on a gold market.
An American bi-metalism was urged as an answer to the trade
menace.
Hostility to Japans economic growth was not characteristic
of all business circles. Many importers welcomed Japanese
goods and materials while exporters were happy over the ex¬
panding market. When a trade delegation from Tokyo visited
the United States in 1904, it was enthusiastically received by
export interests in New York and in other east coast cities.
When the American Asiatic Association was founded, it viewed
the “Muscovite” as the true peril of Asia and all the world,
while Japan was the good customer.
220 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

After Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 when the island em¬

pire’s military and naval strength became a new matter of
concern for American interests in the Pacific, the trade peril
became more closely entwined with political fears and animosi¬
ties. Economic growth was recognized as an important aspect
of growth in power. The development of a Japanese merchant
marine to compete for the carrying trade of the Pacific was
seen as an aspect of naval power. A Senate Committee in 1900
reported that Japan’s ambition for the creation of a big navy
would not concern Americans half as much if it had not been
paralleled by the declaration of some Japanese businessmen
in behalf of “a big fleet of merchant ships competing for the
transportation business of the world.” An American writer
warned in 1905 in the North American Review, “John Bull, be
it remembered, drove the American merchantman from the
Atlantic; and Japan may capture the carrying business of the
Pacific.” A survey of the growth of Japan’s merchant marine
in 1909 saw it as much of a power factor in the commercial
world as the army and navy had demonstrated themselves to
be in the military world.
As Japanese businessmen became sophisticated in competi¬
tive methods and learned how little ethics applied to the
western capitalist world, frequent complaints were raised
against the techniques used to sell. Products were sold using
well-known American trade names or deceptively similar
names. Badly copied American labels were put on products
produced for the Japanese or Asian market in order to profit
from the goodwill these American-made goods had among
customers. Colgate’s toothpowder was found by one corre¬
spondent in Manchuria in 1905 with a crude replica of the
American label to which was added the claim that this powder
relieved “teethache.” Disregard for copyrights and patents be¬
gan to create a stereotype of Japanese businessmen as un¬
scrupulous traders, ready to steal the reputations and designs
of the West. This was coupled with a stereotype of the Japa-
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 221

nese workman, described by a Brooklyn newspaper in 1905 as

"‘ingenious, artistic, inventive, industrious and intelligent, wear¬
ing almost no clothes and living on less than would support a
mechanic’s dog in this country.”
Between 1910 and 1920 American exports to Japan jumped
from approximately $21 million to over $450 million, while
imports rose from $66 million to $527 million. A survey of the
trade relationship prepared by an American businessman for
the State Department in 1921 pointed out that Japan had
"drifted into an unexpected dependence upon the United
States.” The latter country provided much of the raw material,
machinery, and technical knowledge on which Japan’s export
economy was based. "We are their bankers, who finance their
trade and with whom their surplus government and bankers
balances are principally carried,” the survey concluded. Henry
Morgenthau, Sr., returning from a good-will trip to Japan a
few years later, reaffirmed this trade relationship by pointing
out that Japan was now buying more than 80 percent of its
autos and lumber from the United States, over 70 percent of
the building materials, and 50 percent of the needs for oil
and machinery. In turn Americans bought over 90 percent of
Japan’s raw silk exports, over 50 percent of the brushes, and
almost 40 percent of the pottery and toy exports.
In comparison Chinese-American trade still remained small.
Sales to China’s 400 millions were approximately half the value
of those to Japan. Efforts at industrialization by tire Chinese
nationalists were feeble and hampered by the political strife.
Yet the allure of the potential Chinese market remained strong.
At the National Foreign Trade Convention held in San Fran¬
cisco in 1920, a Japanese representative pointed out that his
country’s purchases of American goods amounted to $4.50 per
capita compared to 10# per capita for China. But optimistic
exporters were fond of thinking of what China’s consumption
would be if raised to the per capita level of Japan. Tobacco
exporters pointed out that cigarette sales to China had grown
2.2.2 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

from an average of only one smoke per Chinese per year in

1900 to 19 per year in 1920. If this trend could be encouraged
to the point where adult Chinese averaged a cigarette a day,
the market would obviously be gigantic. The keynote speaker
at the Oriental trade session in 1920 used the time-honored
phrases in speaking of the ‘‘undeveloped trade” of China as
“beyond all bounds,” and called upon exporters to be “re¬
awakened to the vastness of its opportunities.” The Irving
National Bank issued a guide, Trading with the Far East:
How to Sell in the Orient, in 1920 with a description of the
China market as “potentially the greatest in the world” with an
“almost limitless field for the sale of foreign goods” in the next
50 years.
The world depression gave the arguments of economic na¬
tionalists a new urgency when the prosperous decade of the
twenties came to an end. As unemployment figures rose and
factories closed, every foreign-made item on the shelves was
construed as taking work away from American workers and
business away from American businessmen.^ “Buy American”
became a popular slogan, held to be the duty of every loyal
citizen and directed at imports from any foreign supplier.
Even if the political tensions which followed Japan’s Man¬
churian venture had not affected the American scene, Japan
would have still come in for a major share of these attacks.
Much, if not all, of the economically-produced animosity was
unjustified. A United States Tariff Commission report in 1934
found only 8 percent of the total imports from Japan to be
substantially competitive. The great bulk of American pur¬
chases were items which would not be produced in this coun¬
try or raw materials which were used for domestic production.
The competitive imports, however, were items which came
quickly to public attention as they were displayed in 5-and-10-
cent stores or in other shops dealing wtih the cheapest com¬
modities. Matches, cotton rugs, cheap cotton cloth, pottery,
glassware, brushes, pencils, toys, electric bulbs, and small
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 223

rubber items like boots and balls were typical imports in this
category. Many reached the markets through the initiative of
Americans. When prices fell under the weight of the depres¬
sion, buyers for chain stores carried samples to Japan which
they invited producers to copy and to submit bids upon.
Sometimes capital and machinery for production came from
the United States. The first imported toothbrushes, for ex¬
ample, were produced in Osaka by an American-owned factory
which shipped its entire product back across the Pacific in
order to profit from the cheap labor of Japan.
In another respect the attack on Japanese imports was an
outdated one. In 1932 the balance of trade which had long
been in Japan’s favor shifted to the United States and remained
so for the rest of the decade. American sales to Japan increased
steadily in a period of fading foreign trade. By 1937 they
passed in value the pre-depression peak of 1928. American
imports on the other hand declined from over $400 million in
1929 to half that figure in 1937. With the reopening of war in
China, increased sales of oil, scrap metal, and other materials
used by the Japanese war machine added to the favorable
American trade balance.
Such statistics did not soften the attacks of the producers and
interests who were hurt or believed they were hurt by Japan.
This was particularly true of the cotton textile industry which
watched importation of Japanese cottons move up from one
million yards in 1933 to over 75 million in 1936.- This was still
a small fraction of the total market, where domestic produc¬
tion was of over seven billion yards in 1936. But in certain
categories of cheap cottons, Japan supplied about half of the
amount consumed in the United States.
The effort to counter this yellow trade peril took many
forms. In newspapers and magazines, as well as on the floor
of Congress, frequent alarms and calls to action were pre¬
sented to the public. “Give a Japanese product an inch and it
takes a mile,” proclaimed a typical attack in the Saturday
224 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Evening Post in 1934. Congress and the President received

appeals to preserve the American economy. “If nothing is done
to stop the flood of these imports it will mean that hundreds of
American workmen will be thrown out of employment,” a vice
president of the American Lead Pencil Company wrote to
Roosevelt in the fall of 1933. The loss of Latin American
markets as well was predicted, as Japanese businessmen were
accused of using strategically placed colonies of nationals to
take over this trade.
Late in 1934 a concerted drive was launched by the National
Association of Manufactures, the Cotton Textile Institute, and
the Toy Manufacturers of America to bring together representa¬
tives of all suffering industries to pressure Congress and the
President for action. Fifty members of New England Chambers
of Commerce joined in the call. Some saw import quotas as
the solution, but the manufacturers of matches, cotton rugs,
pottery, and glassware #wanted virtual exclusion. Representa¬
tives of these latter industries formed a “Made in America
Club” in the spring of 1935. With the help of‘the Hearst news¬
papers, they publicized their demands for closing the door on
Japanese goods. Some groups, such as the National Potters
Association went further and actively supported the boycott
movements which originated out of political motives.
Not all business groups dealing with Japan joined in the
trade war. When a United States Steel Products Company
representative complained about Japanese competition at the
1934 National Foreign Trade Convention, he was answered by
a spokesman of the New York Cotton Exchange. The latter
pointed out that Japan had increased its purchases by 60 per¬
cent in the past five years of otherwise declining sales, “the one
vividly bright spot in the cotton trade picture.” A representative
of the Department of Commerce also reminded the convention
that Japan was then buying more than was sold to the United
States, and that this trade balance was not countered by un¬
favorable invisible expenditures such as American tourists in
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 225

Japan or payments to Japanese shippers. A former member of

the Tariff Commission pleaded for a balanced view, since the
complaints were largely over petty items. “I think we should
try to bring emphatically to the minds of the American people
that Japan is a good buyer,” he said.
That goal was not achieved; China remained a more popular
and attractive prospect. The opening address of the National
Trade Convention in 1932, like that of 1920, dwelt on China’s
possibilities when “untold millions will be delivered into the
laps of those whose foresight will have established the avenues
that lead to her shores.” In 1935 the National Foreign Trade
Council joined the Asiatic Association in sending an 18-man
economic mission to China for two months. When invited to
Japan, they stayed only two weeks and returned with a report
which advocated an extension of American political and eco¬
nomic commitments to China. During the thirties China also
began to serve as a useful dumping ground for surplus Ameri¬
can commodities. By extending credits, beginning with a $50
million Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan in 1933, the
United States disposed of some 6% million bales of surplus
cotton and over 35 million bushels of surplus wheat by 1939.
President Roosevelt took a broader view of the situation than
that of the special interests and refused at first to be pushed
into extreme acts of economic warfare against Japan. He recog¬
nized the validity of the words of Ambassador Saito that “inter¬
national trade cannot operate only one way.” If a nation will
sell, said the Ambassador, “it must also buy.” American action
was also hampered by the terms of the 1911 Japanese-American
Treaty of Commerce which accorded Japan most-favored-
nation treatment. With the co-operation of the State Depart¬
ment, representatives of some affected industries negotiated
“gentlemen’s agreements” with their Japanese rivals whereby
voluntary quotas were set on exports to the United States. The
threat of more drastic action was used to press the Japanese^
into these self-imposed restrictions.
226 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Although some quotas were successfully established, the

match and chinaware industry complained that they were still
too high. American importers complained that quotas were set
too low and crippled their operations. And as one southern
congressional representative said in 1936, “We’ve got to sell
our cotton somewhere and I will not be one to endeavor to
drive away the best foreign customer the Texas cotton farmer
has left.”
When an effort to set a quota on imports of bleached and
colored cotton cloths failed, President Roosevelt finally took
direct action. In May of 1936 he invoked the flexible provisions
of the tariff law and ordered an average increase of 42 percent
in the duty on these categories of imports. By this date Japan’s
cotton goods had begun to suffer from restrictive measures
taken by more than half of their other markets. Japanese
xenophobia was further stimulated as tariff barriers against
Japanese goods, like earlier barriers against Japanese immi¬
grants, and presented a convincing picture of western en¬
circlement. The most secure markets were those which Japan
could control politically; an argument for further political
expansion.
Momentum and the outbreak of war in China carried Japa-
nese-American trade to a new peak in 1937, when American
sales to Japan topped those of 1928 and American purchases
almost reached the level of 1931. But the turn came in 1938
when Washington began to take a series of restrictive measures
which culminated in the virtual embargo of Japan in the sum¬
mer of 1941.
The extension of Japanese control over North China begin¬
ning in the summer of 1937 created another economic griev¬
ance. \merican exports to the Japanese-held areas were not
seriously affected in 1938 and 1939, with some areas even show¬
ing an increase in imports from the United States. But resident
American businessmen found themselves facing increasing
Japanese competition while the Japanese government elimi-
THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL 227

nated the special privileges which western businessmen had

once enjoyed. American Chambers of Commerce in the major
Chinese ports joined in urging the United States government
to make a vigorous defense of treaty privileges in the Japanese-
held areas and to protest the favoritism shown Japanese busi¬
nessmen. Resident businessmen formed the American Informa¬
tion Committee which distributed propaganda in the United
States, such as a booklet entitled Japans War on Foreign
Business in China as well as sending anti-Japanese press re¬
leases to American news services.
Did the clamor against Japanese goods in the United States
and the complaints of business interests in China influence the
Roosevelt administration in moving against Japan? A direct
relationship would be difficult to prove, but that there was at
least indirect influence seems likely. Public opinion was not
immune to the reiterated attacks on the Japanese economic
menace, while the occasional pleas of the cotton exporters re¬
ceived little attention. Hostility produced by Japan’s exports
blended easily with hostility aroused by Japan’s foreign policy.
The economic measures taken against Japan from 1938 on¬
ward hurt some American interests, but the rise of exports to
Britain and France as these nations began to rearm was ample
compensation. Protests could be answered with the argument
that the salvation of China offered a great reward for tempo¬
rary losses in trade with Japan. A war against America’s best
customer in Asia was also a war for potentially the greatest
future customer.
Chapter XII

THE CHINA COMMITMENT

AT PRESENT there is clearly no support in American public

,/\ opinion for territorial possessions in the Far East,” con¬
cluded Tyler Dennett, in 1936. “We are in a mood to get out,
not to get in,” he believed. Lack of interest in Asian issues
was also demonstrated by the presidential campaign in 1936.
Neither of the major party platforms mentioned Far Eastern
policy. Foreign affairs were treated briefly in cliches; the
Democrats pledged the maintenance of “a true neutrality,”
while the Republicans used the traditional phrase in promising
to avoid “entangling alliances.”
In the campaign oratory of the summer and fall of 1936,
domestic issues were discussed to the almost total exclusion
of all else. President Roosevelt and his opponent, Governor
Alfred M. Landon, fought over the ground of unemployment
and the state of the national economy. In one major speech
devoted to foreign policy, made at Chautauqua, New York, in
August, Roosevelt ignored the Far East to speak of his Good
Neighbor policy in the Americas and of his determination to
keep this nation isolated from European wars. Both candidates
recognized that any hint of a stand in Asia or Europe which
might lead to American involvement would lose votes.
228
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 229

In an oblique fashion the Roosevelt administration did

prepare to take a position in the Far East by its decisions on
naval construction. When the Japanese delegate withdrew from
the London Conference in January of 1936, hopes for extending
the naval limitations were dimmed. Future construction would
depend on each nation’s assessment of its security needs and
the willingness of legislatures to make appropriations.
Some thought had been given as early as the fall of 1934 to
the possibility that Japan would refuse to negotiate a new
naval limitations treaty. Roosevelt at that date was adamant
in opposing any agreement which would increase treaty ton¬
nage, even if an increase was the only means of extending the
life of the treaty. Roosevelt was unwilling, however, to meet
Japan’s demands for parity by promising not to maintain in
peace time a stronger fleet in the Pacific. Admiral William H.
Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, told the President that
such a promise carried no serious consequences for the defense
of the United States; Japanese strength would still be inade¬
quate for operations outside of Asian waters. Peacetime parity
in the Pacific, Roosevelt knew, meant, nevertheless, limited
ability to exert diplomatic pressure backed by naval strength,
and the maintenance of such a capacity he considered im¬
portant.
Norman Davis read an opening message to the London Con¬
ference early in 1935 in which the President spoke of the 1922
Washington Treaty as “a milestone in civilization” and warned
of the dangerous consequences of a return to competitive
building. Davis proposed initially that all three navies reduce
their tonnage by 20 percent, while keeping the old ratio sys¬
tem. Rut the Japanese had come to London to end an arrange¬
ment which carried implications of national inferiority. The
5-5-3 ratio of 1922 now seemed to mean “Rolls Royce—Rolls
Royce—Ford,” said Ambassador Saito. Since their economy
was not favorable to the construction of a “Rolls Royce” navy,
the Japanese were interested in scaling down British and Amer-
2So AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

ican tonnage to a level closer to their own. Another aspect of

the Japanese program was the elimination of aircraft carriers
and battleships from all three forces, making each almost in¬
vulnerable in home waters.
Acceptance of either or both of Japans proposals would
still have left an Anglo-American naval force far greater than
that of Japan. But in actuality such a naval force was unlikely
to exist in the Pacific. Even if London and Washington could
agree to function as allies vis-a-vis Japan, the growing concern
of Britain for the strength of the Italians and Germans would
tie considerable naval tonnage to European waters. Anglo-
American forces might be then incapable of conducting an
offensive in the Far East or of backing up diplomatic moves.
Attempts to check future Japanese moves in China would be
ineffective. Although neither London nor Washington had any
intention in 1936 of conducting such a restraining operation in
China, neither was willing to accept a treaty which would
prevent such action if at some future date their national inter¬
ests seemed to call for it.
There seemed to be no bridge between Japans view of its
security needs and the British and American view of their
potential future role in Asia. After the Japanese delegates
withdrew, Britain and the United States concluded a new
treaty which stressed qualitative rather than quantitative limi¬
tations on new naval construction. The London Treaty of 1936
did little to hamper either signatory, since it contained ample
escape provisions to permit both to build to meet new Japanese
construction. The Roosevelt administration was now free to
consider a building program which met national needs.
Two schools of thought were apparent in Washington as to
the course of future naval construction. The first was exempli¬
fied by Stanley Hornbeck, chief of the Far Eastern Affairs
Division. Already in the fall of 1934 Hornbeck had argued that
the United States might be better served by a breakdown in
the treaty negotiations than would Japan. A new treaty, he
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 231

feared, might hamper naval reinforcement of diplomatic policy.

In January of 1936, after Japan had withdrawn from the Con¬
ference, Hornbeck welcomed the return to unrestricted naval
competition. The United States could now begin to build a big
Pacific fleet whereas Japan, he believed, could not afford to
enter a naval race and would be forced to take the initiative
in asking for a new treaty. American delegates would be in a
far better bargaining position at this point to secure continued
treaty superiority to Japan. Hornbeck argued for his policy on
the assumption which he had made earlier in advising Stimson
on economic boycotts; Japan’s economy had a precarious exist¬
ence and was incapable of withstanding severe strains.
The Hornbeck point of view had many active supporters in
addition to the expansionists within the Navy itself. Cordell
Hull reached the conviction by 1935 that the United States
should hasten the construction of a large Navy and that peace
could not be secured through disarmament. In Congress naval
expansion had the enthusiastic support of influential members
like Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. After the Japanese withdrew from the London
Conference, Pittman made such a vigorous attack on then-
foreign policy that Hull was led to send Tokyo an official dis¬
avowal of having been consulted by the belligerent senator.
Norman Davis was for a time the spokesman of another
school of thought. He accepted as valid the statements of the
Japanese in withdrawing from London that they had no inten¬
tion of initiating a new naval race. Despite rising Japanese
nationalism, the 866 thousand ton Japanese fleet of July, 1936,
had only grown since 1930 in ships built and building by 2.6
percent. This compared with a 2.3 percent growth for the
American fleet of 1,368 thousand tons in mid-1936. Davis felt
that continued restraint on American and British building
would encourage similar action in Tokyo.
President Roosevelt, while continuing to express his hopes
for a return to naval limitations, supported a construction
232 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

program which inclined toward the Hombeck school. The

naval appropriation bill introduced by the administration in
the spring of 1936 asked for over $500 million, the largest
peacetime appropriation to date. Replacements were provided
for over-age submarines and destroyers and authority was
requested for the construction of two battleships, if the Presi¬
dent determined that either Japan or Britain was engaging in
similar construction.
A lively discussion took place in both houses of Congress in
1935 over the wisdom of continuing naval expansion. In 1936
Roosevelt’s request for funds went through with little debate
or questioning of fundamental naval policy. Senator Gerald
Nye, supported by a few associates, raised the issue of the im¬
pact of new ships on relations with Japan, but his voice was
that of a tiny minority. The President had set a useful prece¬
dent in 1933 by making naval construction a domestic recovery
measure, and the interests of congressmen from seaboard and
industrial constituencies in naval construction were primarily
economic rather than concerned with foreign policy. Repre¬
sentatives from agricultural states were more likely to question
naval expenditures, but in 1936 the need for a united front in
a presidential election year was probably adequate to stifle
Democratic criticism. A public opinion poll in December of
1935 also supported congressional action with figures showing
that more than 70 percent of the individuals sampled favored
a larger navy. This did not mean, however, that these indi¬
viduals favored a stronger foreign policy in the Pacific; over
70 percent also viewed a stronger navy as more likely to keep
the United States out of future wars.
By the end of 1936 the Secretary of the Navy was able to
speak of “an unparalleled renaissance” of naval building with
three aircraft carriers, 11 cruisers, 63 destroyers, and 18 sub¬
marines under construction. The Japanese nationalists viewed
this expansion as a future threat in Far Eastern waters, and it
served to spur their own building program. Admiral Osami
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 233

Nagano, Minister of the Navy, warned the Diet of a dangerous

future after Congress passed the 1936 appropriation bill. Un¬
less Japan expanded its construction program, Nagano esti¬
mated that fighting strength would shrink from approximately
80 percent of that of the United States to below 60 percent by
1941. He proposed an annual addition of 50,000 tons to keep
a ratio of strength against the estimated 70,000 tons which the
United States was going to build annually.
With the termination of the naval limitations treaty on the
last day of 1936, Japan’s building plans were no longer made
public. Rumor quickly reported that super-battleships were to
be constructed which far exceeded the old treaty ships of
35,000 tons and 14-inch guns. In January of 1937 President
Roosevelt announced that he was approving the construction
of two battleships to balance new construction in Britain, where
two battleship keels were laid down the same month. In April
of 1937 Congress voted a half billion dollars to continue the
naval expansion according to the schedule set in 1934. The
Navy shortly after requested additional funds to modernize
aircraft carriers. In Japan keels were laid in 1937 for two battle¬
ships which were to be the largest and most heavily armed in
the world. The naval race which had been checked in 1922 was
on once more.
In the summer of 1937 political developments in the Far East
gave new significance to the naval competition. Japan’s eco¬
nomic situation failed to improve as exports struggled against
an iron ring of tariffs. Militant nationalism continued to weaken
the old political structure. Relations with China were marked
with incidents which periodically aroused the chauvinists. In
early July a minor brush took place between Japanese troops
on maneuvers and Chinese forces stationed near the Marco
Polo bridge in the vicinity of Peking. The Japanese had much
larger forces in the Chinese capital to protect their embassy
and nationals than did any of the western powers. Now addi¬
tional troops were brought in as the Chinese refused to yield.
*34 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Chinese nationalism had also reached a point where compro¬

mise was no longer politically tenable. Full-scale but unde¬
clared war spread through northern China.
American residents and American interests in China were
roughly treated by the warring Japanese armies and a flow of
protests began from Washington to Tokyo. On December 12,
1937, Japanese naval fliers bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay
on the Yangtze River above Nanking and also bombed three
Standard Oil tankers nearby. The American naval vessel was
clearly marked and the action of the Japanese in machine-
gunning the survivors suggested a deliberate attack. Three
American lives were lost. Headlines brought the news of
Japan’s action to American homes, while movie theaters height¬
ened American feeling by showing a film record of the attack
captured by an alert newsreel cameraman on board the Panay.
In Tokyo Ambassador Grew, who had found hope in the
lack of enthusiasm for war among the Japanese people and
government, now prepared for a break in diplomatic relations.
The Japanese government quickly apologized, however, and
paid an indemnity of over $2 million dollars. The genuineness
of Japanese concern was also demonstrated by the action of
thousands of citizens in sending contributions to the American
embassy to aid the survivors of the attack and the families of
the dead.
Hardly had the Panay incident left the headlines when
Japanese invasion and occupation of Nanking brought new
protests over damage to American property and mistreatment
of American residents. The Japanese war machine was clearly
not going to be hampered in its action by concern for the rights
of Americans and Europeans in China, nor be chastened by
the protests of foreign governments relayed through Tokyo. In
Washington it was clear that in northern China, if not in all
of China, Japanese power was jeopardizing the status of the
United States, Britain, and other European powers. American
dreams for the political future of China and American ambi-
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 235
tions for the expansion of economic interests in Asia were being
destroyed.
Calls for a re-evaluation of Far Eastern policy became com¬
mon in 1937 and 1938. Some Americans claimed that Washing¬
ton had no rational and consistent policy based on a clear
assessment of national interests in Asia. Continued non-recog¬
nition of Manchuria and protest notes to Japan, possibly backed
by an expanding American Navy, did not add up to a Far East¬
ern policy. “A combination of drift and bluff means disaster,”
historian Allan Nevins warned. In the Navy and in the State
Department the need was felt for a statement of American
goals and a selection of means in dealing with the turbulent
Orient. The Navy believed that the enlarging Pacific Fleet was
still too small to fight a successful war with Japan over China.
“If we are going to back down, do it now when not challenged
rather than later,” Hull was advised by Admiral Standley.
The Secretary of State saw that his country was at what he
called later “the Oriental cross roads of decision.” One alterna¬
tive was “to withdraw gradually, perhaps with dignity, from
the Far East.” But Hull felt that this meant the nullification of
all American treaty rights, the abandonment of American citi¬
zens in China, the closing of the Open Door, and the relin¬
quishing to Japan of an area in which lived nearly one-half the
population of the world.
Other Americans did not see the consequences of withdrawal
in such a dire light. “Little or no harm will come to us if we
await the outcome for the initiative lies with China,” Ambas¬
sador Nelson T. Johnson wrote from Peking in 1936. He told
Hull that he was opposed to the use of force to save China
from probable Japanese conquest. “It all seems so stupid to
me,” Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes wrote in his diary
after a cabinet meeting in September of 1937 in which armed
protection for American businessmen in China was discussed.
Investment in foreign enterprises ought to be at the risk of
the investor, Ickes believed. Pleading for “A Clarifying Foreign
236 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Policy/’ historian Samuel F. Bemis claimed that the Open Door
policy was itself “a protean error.” Bemis believed that Ameri¬
can trade would have been greater with a China partitioned or
under British or Japanese protection, and that it was time to
abandon the Open Door policy.
A policy of withdrawal and accommodation had both po¬
litical and ethical strength in 1937 and 1938, since it repre¬
sented the point of view of the great majority of Americans.
Americans wanted a lien on the Chinese market, the chief of
the State Department’s Western European Division wrote to
Norman Davis in the spring of 1937, if persuasion was the
only price. “But if the price seems to involve a fight, the Ameri¬
can people are patently unwilling to assume the risk for a
possible profit,” he concluded. Public opinion polls taken at
this time gave ample support for this conclusion. In September
of 1937, 55 percent of the people polled refused to express
sympathies for either side in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Al¬
though in a month this neutrality had declined to 40 percent,
over 60 percent stated that their sympathy for China was still
not strong enough to keep them from buying Japanese goods.
After the Panay affair, 70 percent of those polled believed that
Americans in China should be warned to leave and the armed
forces withdrawn from Chinese soil. A State Department study
of public sentiment in late 1937 and early 1938 concluded that
there was “a growing sympathy for China, but the controlling
feeling of the country was the desire to keep out of war.”
Even those elements of society like veterans’ organizations
which were free from any pacifist taint and tended to express
nationalist belligerency were opposed to Asian involvement.
The annual American Legion convention declared for a policy
of “absolute neutrality” in 1937 and 1938, while the Veterans of
Foreign Wars in November of 1937 launched a campaign to
secure 25 million signatures to a “Keep America out of War”
petition.
Congress reflected the attitude of the general public. The
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 237
Panay sinking which some feared would produce the same
belligerency and results as the Maine in 1898 was discussed
with restraint in both houses. The chief concern of congress¬
men was the maintenance of neutrality. Some pointed to the
earlier loss of American lives as a result of blunders of Chinese
fliers and argued for complete withdrawal of American resi¬
dents.
One display of the concern of Congress for the avoidance
of war was the strong fight made for the Ludlow resolution.
Introduced by Congressman Louis Ludlow of Indiana in 1935,
the resolution called for a constitutional amendment which re¬
quired the approval of the voters in a national referendum
for a declaration of war in cases other than an actual invasion
of American territory. For three years the Ludlow proposal
had remained stalled in a House committee, but the Panay
sinking quickly won for it 218 signatures, a majority of the
House necessary for a vote on the discharge of the resolution.
Even if discharged, the resolution still required a two-thirds
vote of both houses of Congress plus ratification by 36 states.
The enthusiasm for the move was so great, however, that the
Roosevelt administration decided to try to block initial con¬
sideration. Alfred Landon and Henry L. Stimson were enlisted
to appeal to Republicans, while Postmaster General James
Farley warned Democrats that they would cut themselves off
from patronage by supporting Ludlow. The administration
won, but only by a narrow margin of 209 to 188, with 111
Democrats deserting the White House to vote for discharge.
Even President Roosevelt’s great popularity was challenged by
the drive to keep domestic considerations before foreign.
Popular sentiment for withdrawal and non-involvement in
Asia was largely based on traditional isolationism and the sim¬
ple argument that the way to avoid war was to stay at home.
Withdrawal was also supported by more sophisticated argu¬
ments made by those claiming to be realists. By the mid-thirties
the Soviet Union had demonstrated marked recovery from the
238 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

economic and political chaos left by the Revolution of 1917

and was again a factor to be reckoned with in Europe and Asia.
There was evidence of a renewal of old Tsarist interests in
northern China, with new allies in the form of the Chinese
Communists. The strength of this movement was easily noted
by observers who did not limit themselves to Chiang Kai-shek
in their analysis of Chinese politics. Any protection of Ameri¬
can interests which looked beyond day-to-day policies in¬
volved a return to the balancing technique which Theodore
Roosevelt had attempted when he supported Japanese power
as an essential counterweight to Tsarist influence.
The State Department was warned of this consideration in
a brilliant memorandum prepared in 1935 by John V. A. Mac-
Murray, former Chief of the Far Eastern Division, who acted
on an official request. One of the conclusions was that:

The defeat of Japan would not mean her elimination

from the problem of the Far East. ... It would merely
create a new set of stresses and substitute for Japan,
the U.S.S.R. as the successor of Imperial Russia as a
contestant (and at least an equally unscrupulous and
dangerous one) for the mastery of the East. Nobody ex¬
cept perhaps Russia would gain from our victory in such
a war.

MacMurray discussed the contents of his report briefly with

Stanley Hornbeck when it was delivered, but it was pushed
aside and not circulated in the Department until January of
1938, when it was dusted off at the request of Ambassador
Grew. How seriously its argument was considered at this date
is not ascertainable from the documents.
Recognition of the importance of Russia and rising Chinese
Communism was not confined to official circles. A widely
praised study, published in New York and London in 1937
by a British scholar, issued the same warning as did Mac¬
Murray. The destruction of Japanese power, said G. F. Hudson
in The Far East in World Politics, meant “the return of Russia
THE CHINA COMMITMENT *39
and a new upsetting of the trembling balance of China’s do¬
mestic politics with world wide repercussions.” Whereas
Japan’s imperialist activity was circumscribed geographically,
Hudson advised that “the triumph of Communism in China
would stimulate anew the revolutionary forces in every coun¬
try.” The British Navy, Hudson believed, would not be used
against Japan to facilitate the rise of Communist power in
China.
Another argument for withdrawal which claimed considera¬
tion was that which evaluated the importance of Chinese
nationalism. In the decade before 1931, this movement had
given ample demonstration of its determination to end the
privileged position of the West in political and economic life.
“China for the Chinese” was a slogan not to be forgotten
because of the rise of Japan’s claims of “Asia for Asians.”
American policy had recognized this factor in the 1920’s and
it was not forgotten completely in the next decade.
Secretary of State Hughes had “the sanest conception of
America’s real interests in Asia,” Samuel Bemis wrote in 1936,
supporting Hughes’ action in preparing for “a face-saving re¬
treat.” It was a “delusive hope,” John MacMurray concluded, to
hope that the elimination of Japan would make for closer
understanding with China. “If we were to 'save’ China from
Japan and become the ‘Number One’ nation in the eyes of
her people, we should thereby become not the most favored,
but the most distrusted of nations,” said MacMurray in 1935
with a clear view of developments a quarter of a century in
advance.
Even if American interests in Asia might be worth fight¬
ing for, the strategic problems dissuaded others from consider¬
ing war. The Philippines were scheduled to receive their in¬
dependence, and many felt that they should make their own
adjustments to their Asian neighbors. The elimination of Manila
as an American naval base would leave Guam and Samoa as
the major outposts of American power west of Hawaii and
240 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

neither had prospects of being secure bastions. Even with the

retention of bases in the Philippines, the weight of opinion
among American strategists in the thirties was that these
islands could not be held against a major Japanese attack. A
successful war with Japan over China required a larger navy
and more bases than dreamt of by even the most ardent naval
expansionist. More than a few hundred American lives would
be expended to protect American interests and this was an
equation few dared to attempt to support in the mid-thirties.
An alternative which appealed to those who did not want
to face up to a retreat or major sacrifice of lives and money
was to protect American interests by measures “short of war.”
Japan, it was believed, could be pressured into giving due re¬
gard to American rights and even into withdrawing from China
itself by a variety of pressures, chiefly economic. Peace and
stability in Asia did not require war but the use of new tech¬
niques. This was a viewpoint which had great appeal for
peace-minded Americans who did look beyond their borders
and hoped that a contribution could be made to world affairs
without adding to the existing amount of violence.
One category of opinion relied on “moral pressures.” World¬
wide condemnation of Japan’s policies in China would, it was
hoped, move the saner elements to check the excesses of their
government and modify policies. The League of Nations was
viewed as one important forum for chastening Japan; Hull’s
frequent lectures on the “sanctity of treaties” given to the
Japanese Ambassador or sent to Tokyo in diplomatic pouches
were viewed as another means. Japan should be made to see
that its future lay in following the “orderly processes” of in¬
ternational relations and in preserving the Open Door in
China.
A vigorous group of Americans viewed moral lectures as
meaningless unless accompanied by economic pressures. The
outbreak of war in 1937 led, as in 1932, to appeals for a private
boycott of Japanese goods. A few days after the sinking of the
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 241

Panay two major 5-and-10-cent chains announced that they

had stopped buying goods from Japan. The American Federa¬
tion of Labor and the Committee for Industrial Organization
both voted in their October 1937 conventions to boycott im¬
ports from Japan. Some 600 delegates of the American Student
Union at Vassar College in January of 1938 took part in a
mass burning of silk stockings and silk ties, chanting, “Make
lisle the style, wear lisle for awhile.” Peace groups, civic or¬
ganizations, and manufacturers joined in the call to stop pur¬
chase of the products of the “Oriental aggressor.”
When the boycotters expressed more than mere animosity
they claimed that their actions would produce benefits in the
Far East. Curtailment of overseas sales would make it difficult
for Japan to secure the foreign exchange necessary for the pur¬
chase of materials with which to carry on the war in China. An
effective boycott, it was estimated, would cut the market for
40 percent of Japan’s exports and require a parallel cut in
imports, hampering the war effort. The damage done to export
industries and the resulting unemployment should bring home
to the Japanese people the hostility which their government
was creating all over the world.
It was even claimed by some that enough economic pres¬
sure would lead to a virtual collapse of the Japanese economy.
This argument was supported by Freda Utley’s Japans Feet
of Clay, which appeared in the spring of 1937. Admiral Yarnell,
after reading this volume, advised Admiral William Leahy,
Chief of Naval Operations, that it contained much material of
value in planning moves against Japan. The message of the
book was that Japan was putting up a big bluff to the world as
to its economic strength. Without silk sales to the United
States, cotton sales to the British empire, and credits from the
western nations, the economy would collapse within a few
weeks. Since Japan could not attack either the United States
or Britain, the author assured her readers that “there is no
reason at all why economic sanctions need lead to war.”
242 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Some believers in the utility of economic pressure saw

private action as inadequate and called for an official embargo
to do the damage necessary for the proper results. Henry L.
Stimson was one of the best-known proponents of this view
outside of government circles. In a letter to the New York
Times in October of 1937, he appealed for government action
to ban trade with Japan; a personal appeal to the same end
was made directly to the President. Stimson did not believe
in using American soldiers in the final resort, he said, since
they would ‘'do much more harm than good.”
Another means of pressuring Japan which had some popular
support was direct aid to China’s effort to drive the island in¬
vaders off the mainland. This approach, it was claimed, was
less likely to create hostile reactions in Japan and had the ad¬
vantage of doing no harm to the American economy. Although
the Neutrality Acts forbade the sale of arms and munitions
or the lending of money to belligerent nations, this legislative
ban was inapplicable, since neither China nor Japan were
officially at war.
An alternative or supplementary method of putting pressure
upon Japan was the continued and rapid expansion of the
United States Navy. The threat of force spoke far more effec¬
tively, some argued, than economic pressures or lectures on
international morality. Naval expansion did not mean, as Con¬
gress was frequently assured, that tho United States was pre¬
paring for a war in the western Pacific. A large force in the
Pacific was the best means of avoiding war by bringing the
Japanese to their senses, and meant that American protests
would be heard and acted upon.
The number of Americans who favored using the last resort
of nations, war, as a means of defending their interests in Asia
was very small in 1937 and 1938. Senator Key Pittman issued
a personal declaration of war against Japan and Germany in
December of 1938, but the erratic Democrat from Nevada
represented no body of opinion in the Senate. In the Navy
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 243

there were a few admirals who saw war as inevitable and

wanted to fight Japan as soon as possible, but they seem to
have been a minority. Secretary of the Navy Swanson, accord¬
ing to Ickes, called for war at the time of the Panay sinking,
and some claims were made by the Navy that this was the
best time for a quick victory with Japan preoccupied with
China. Other than Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgen-
thau, Jr., no other member of the cabinet is reported to have
supported war in 1937.
All of the measures suggested as a basis of American policy
had support among some members of the Roosevelt administra¬
tion. Ambassador Joseph Grew for a long time represented
the approach which probably came closest to that of the
American public. Although policy was made in Washington
and not in Tokyo, Grew had the friendship and respect of
Roosevelt as well as the weight of his long years of diplomatic
service in expressing his views in the State Department.
Grew’s reluctance to see the United States involved in what
he conceived to be a dangerous effort to pressure Japan was
in large part a result of his evaluation of the situation as seen
from long residence in Tokyo. The war in China was not a
popular war, the Ambassador frequently reported, but it was
an effort to defend what Japanese considered to be their vital
interests and rights on the mainland. Patience, sympathetic un¬
derstanding, and occasional reminders of the ill effects of the
military path to power in Asia would eventually strengthen
the moderate elements, Grew hoped, and enable them to re¬
strain or even oust the militarists from control.
The Ambassador was not opposed to the maintenance of a
strong American position, but he was concerned that strength
not be used in such a way as to stir needlessly Japanese
chauvinism and cut the lines of communication. As early as
1934 he had advocated building up the American naval forces
in the Pacific as a means of earning respect in Tokyo. He ob¬
jected, however, when that force was brandished in such a way
244 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

as to evoke a similarly belligerent response from bellicose

Japanese. Even verbal threats such as he construed to be con¬
tained in Roosevelt’s October, 1937 “Quarantine” speech cut
the ground from under diplomatic efforts. Roosevelt’s action
left him depressed and he wrote in his diary that he felt “my
carefully built castle tumbling about my ears.”
Grew’s opposition to and warning against economic pres¬
sures probably served to postpone a decision on their use in
Washington. Unlike some American analyses of the Japanese
economy, Grew saw that it had great psychological strength in
the patriotism of a people who were willing to make almost
endless sacrifices in the interests of national security. It would
not be a simple matter to cripple the war machine by cutting
off its supply lines; further efforts to isolate economically a
people who still resented discrimination against them as im¬
migrants might only spur new efforts to expand by force. Grew
came to Washington in the early summer of 1939 and warned
Roosevelt that sanctions once begun would have to be carried
through to the end and that could mean war. Sanctions lifted
without achieving their end would “bring in their wake a loss
of prestige and influence to the nation declaring them.” Cutting
Japan’s supply of oil, he told the President, would probably
lead the militarists into an attack on the Dutch East Indies
in order to secure control of these petroleum resources.
On his return to Tokyo in the fall of 1939 Grew carried
with him a message to the Japanese people which he de¬
livered publicly to the America-Japan Society under the title,
“Straight from the Horse’s Mouth.” It was an effort, supported
by the President, to make clear the extent to which the Ameri¬
can people had been alienated and aroused by the use of force
in China. The Japanese Foreign Office requested that the text
be released to the press and the Ambassador felt that he had
made progress in educating the people and encouraging a re¬
appraisal of foreign policy.
The events of the next year led the Ambassador to lose
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 245
hope. The fall of France and the jeopardy in which Britain
was placed by German successes seem to have convinced
Grew that the status quo in the Pacific deserved preservation
until the European war was over. Not just private American
interests were at stake in Asia, but “vital” national interests,
he wrote. In September of 1940 Grew sent a long memorandum
to Washington which the Far Eastern Division called his
“Green Light” message. Some form of economic sanctions now
seemed worth the risk. Whether or not they resulted in war
would depend, he believed, upon the “do or die” temper of the
Army and Navy who might act suddenly without the prior
knowledge of the political leadership. Grew’s change of posi¬
tion probably strengthened the arguments of the sanctionists
in the State Department.
Stanley K. Hornbeck was one of the most influential be¬
lievers in economic pressure as an instrument of American
policy in Asia. Relieved of his position as Chief of the Far
Eastern Division, Hornbeck was appointed Adviser on Po¬
litical Relations to the Secretary of State in August of 1937.
This promotion did not seem to change his perspective and
three years later an associate, J. Pierrepont Moffat, described
him as regarding “Japan as the sun around which her satellites,
Germany and Italy, were revolving.” An experienced and at
times a cautious diplomat, Hornbeck in 1935 believed that
war with Japan was in no sense inevitable. An Anglo-Japanese
war, a Russo-Japanese war, or a civil upheaval might weaken
Japan enough to make possible adjustment of relations with
the United States. The best policy, he believed, was to develop
a strong military machine, but avoid giving China any hope for
armed assistance in settling relations with Japan.
When war broke out in July of 1937, Hornbeck at first
warned against “saying those things which may tend to inflame
the parties directly in conflict.” He assumed that neither the
United States nor Britain would intervene with force and told
the Chinese Ambassador on August 2 that his country must
246 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

stop expecting foreign powers to fight her battles or even take

sides in the controversy with Japan. But the same month
Hornbeck reported favorably on a Chinese request for an
Export-Import Bank loan, although the Office of Arms and
Munitions Control felt that such an action would violate the
spirit of neutrality legislation.
A year later, in the fall of 1938, Hornbeck had become a
proponent of economic warfare. In a series of memoranda for
Secretary Hull he advocated action and argued that moral
suasion had failed, leaving no alternative. In December of
1938 he proposed the denunciation of the 1911 commercial
treaty with Japan in order to clear away legal difficulties.
The American public now favored bold action, he said, which
would deter Japan from going to extremes. The formulation
and adoption of “a diplomatic ‘war plan’,” henceforth engaged
Hornbeck’s energies.
Secretary of State Hull stood somewhere between Grew’s
original position and the economic sanctionists. Possessed of
the spirit of a Tennessee mountain feudist, Hull’s animosity
toward Japan seemed limitless. Ickes accused him in the spring
of 1938 of deferring unduly to Hitler and Mussolini, but said
that he “all but rattles the saber when it comes to Japan.”
But despite the vehemence of his verbal attacks on the “in¬
ternational bandits” of Asia, Hull was slow to join the camp
of those calling for economic action. He even sympathized with
Grew’s objections to the “Quarantine” speech and wrote that
it set back the State Department’s efforts at educating the
public in favor of international action by six months.
If it was not just temperament which restricted Hull to a
faith in moral suasion, economic considerations were probably
also important. Even if sanctions were applied in co-operation
with Britain, Hull pointed out that the major burden on con¬
sumers and producers would be borne by the American
economy. The blow which sanctions would deal to the south¬
ern cotton industry was probably a major consideration since
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 247

the Secretary kept in close touch with his former colleagues

in Congress from the southern and border states. His first
major action was not taken until July of 1938 when an appeal
for a “moral embargo” was made to American manufacturers
and exporters of planes and aeronautical equipment. In view
of the strong press coverage of Japanese bombings of Chinese
cities, the exporters were asked not to sell to nations which
engaged in air attacks on civilian populations.
President Roosevelt was an eclectic, and in his approach
to foreign as in domestic policy he frequently took positions
with little consistency or logical continuity. American economic
recovery had a serious setback in 1937, and the political prob¬
lems which continued to engage his administration in 1938
usually had top priority. Roosevelt was also fully aware of the
strength of public feeling against military involvements and
his public statements frequently did not correspond with his
actions. He appears to some scholars to have moved far ahead
of public opinion in foreign affairs, to others he seems to have
lagged behind and overrated the unwillingness of Americans to
take a stand. Navalism and a benevolent attitude toward
China continued to form the basic framework of his thinking
when he approached Far Eastern issues.
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 seems to
have put an end to the President’s interest in naval limita¬
tion. On July 20, 1937, his specialist in this area, Norman
Davis, gave Roosevelt notice that he was now ready “to ad¬
vocate a temporary increase in expenditures in naval arma¬
ments.” Davis suggested the construction of two or three addi¬
tional battleships, while still rejecting the theory that the best
way to preserve peace was to prepare for war. A bigger navy,
Davis said, would mean more influence for disarmament.
These views may have only reinforced Roosevelt’s own con¬
victions about the future of the United States Navy. On
November 26, 1937, three weeks before the Panay sinking, the
President advised Admiral Leahy to ask for four new battle-
248 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

ships rather than the scheduled two in the next naval ap¬
propriations request.
The House of Representatives passed in January of 1938
the annual naval appropriations which provided, in accordance
with the 1934 schedule, for the construction of two battleships,
two light cruisers, eight destroyers, and six submarines. A week
later Roosevelt delivered a special message on rearmament and
appealed for an increase of 20 percent over the construction
just authorized. Two more battleships and two more cruisers
were included in the request. Admiral Leahy had advised that
the United States was so superior in aircraft carriers to Japan
and Rritain that there was no need for additional tonnage.
Like the "Quarantine” speech three months earlier, the Presi¬
dent’s message aroused strong protests from those who viewed
the new ships as preparation for further action in the Pacific.
By coincidence, or more likely by plan, Roosevelt’s rearma¬
ment appeal followed by one day the publication of a strong
State Department protest to Japan, actually sent 11 days earlier,
over disrespect for the American flag and rights in China.
In congressional committee hearings Admiral Leahy as¬
sured the critics of additional appropriations that it would re¬
quire three times the projected increases to prepare for aggres¬
sive action in the Far East. The Navy was being built, Leahy
said, strictly for defense against an attack on American shores.
Advocates of the bill also pointed out that labor eventually
received 85^ out of every construction dollar spent and that
the new ships required materials from every state of the union.
Skepticism was not eliminated by these claims, and the number
of negative votes in the House rose from 15 on the first ap¬
propriation bill to 100 on the second. The expansionists were
still strong enough to make the President’s recommendations
for 3,000 naval planes the minimum rather than the maximum
goal. Congress has been “exceedingly generous to the sea
defenses in both money and authorization,” Admiral Leahy
THE CHINA COMMITMENT *49
wrote Admiral Harry Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet. Leahy believed that the Navy would soon be
strong enough “to take care of any foreseeable difficulties.”
A year later after Germany had occupied Czechoslovakia,
preparedness was far more acceptable to Congress and the
naval appropriation in the spring of 1939 jumped from $644
million the previous year to over $900 million. There were
still strong fears expressed when there was any suggestion that
the Fleet might be used for anything but the defense of Ameri¬
can soil. An effort to include a small appropriation for the
dredging of the harbor at Guam for a submarine base was
knocked out of the 1939 appropriation by a House vote of
205 to 168.
While the growth of the Navy gave support to the Presi¬
dent’s thinking about the use of this instrument of power
against Japan, his political actions were cautious when com¬
pared to the steps urged upon him by some of his advisers.
The “Quarantine” speech of October 5, 1937, had led his sup¬
porters and critics alike to expect some bold action. The bulk
of the speech was devoted to a condemnation of war, prob¬
ably directed as much at Germany and Italy as at Japan.
What aroused the press was his use of the word “quarantine”
in discussing the need to keep war from spreading to America.
When a reporter the next day suggested that the President
was thinking of economic sanctions, he responded, “Look,
sanctions is a terrible word to use. They are out the window.”
Further questioning revealed that conferences were also “out
the window.” But the President claimed to have some method
in mind.
One student of Roosevelt’s foreign policy, William L. Langer,
claims that Roosevelt was thinking of “an extreme form of
sanctions.” In a cabinet meeting the following December,
after the Panay sinking when economic action was being con¬
sidered, Roosevelt said, “We don’t call them economic sane-
250 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

tions, we call them quarantines.” But the “get tough” elements

failed to win any immediate support from the White House for
their programs.
A good example of the unwillingness of Roosevelt to take
any economic initiative was his approach to the Brussels Con¬
ference held in November 1937. The United States and Britain
co-operated in calling this meeting of all powers interested
in the Far East after a similar proposal had been made in
the League of Nations. Norman Davis, the chief American
delegate, conferred with Roosevelt a week after the delivery
of the Quarantine speech. Davis told the President of the two
schools of thought which existed in the State Department:

One was that if Japan conquers China she would not

only later on take everything that the British and Dutch
have in the Far East, but also the Philippines, and that
war with Japan would become inevitable. The other
school believes that while Japan can divide China, she
can never conquer her, and that she will so exhaust her¬
self in the effort that she would not become a menace
to the United States. Furthermore, even if she does suc¬
ceed, it would not make any great difference to the
United States because she would have to trade with us,
and that she could never successfully attack us in this
hemisphere and that we have no interests in the Far East
that would justify war.

Hearing of these two extremes, the President told Davis that

he agreed with the first school of thought.
When it came to acting at Brussels on this assessment of
the situation, the President advised that the major effort should
be devoted to bringing about a truce between China and Japan
and working out a permanent agreement. Hull asked, what if
this effort failed? Should Davis come home or seek concerted
effort in pressuring Japan? Hull and Davis both reminded
Roosevelt that neither Britain nor Holland would be willing
to join in any coercion of Japan unless the United States was
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 251

willing to pledge to protect their possessions with the U.S.

Navy. Roosevelt answered by saying that if Japan refused to
be reasonable he was sure that public opinion in the world
and in the United States would most probably demand that
something be done.
Just before leaving for Brussels, Davis showed Roosevelt
some proposals, one of which used the word “sanctions”; this
drew an immediate presidential objection. Roosevelt did men¬
tion the possibility of supplying arms to China, although this
would conflict with the Neutrality Acts. He also raised the
possibility of having all neutrals break off relations and ostra¬
cize Japan. But the chief message to Davis seems to have been
that in any co-operative effort, “we must avoid getting out in
front alone.”
The Japanese refused to come to Brussels and Davis was
left in a dilemma. He was enjoined to see that something con¬
structive was done, but at the same time to avoid leadership.
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, would support
anything the United States would do, Davis reported to Roose¬
velt, but the British had no enthusiasm for an embargo. The
European situation also prevented the British Navy from
moving to the Pacific in force to join in an anti-Japanese naval
demonstration. Davis suggested that the President request a
suspension of the Neutrality Act as something to alarm Japan
and hearten the Chinese, but the White House ducked away
from tackling such a difficult political task.
Only the Soviet delegate, Maxim Litvinov, talked strongly
for collective action so the Conference closed after issuing
a weak, face-saving statement. The principles of the Washing¬
ton Nine Power Treaty of 1922 were reaffirmed and an appeal
made to China and Japan to cease fighting. Sumner Welles re¬
ports that Davis returned to Washington disgruntled and found
that any thought of a trade embargo, unilateral or collective,
had been put aside.
After the Panay sinking, Roosevelt again talked of eco-
252 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

nomic action against Japan. Welles recalls that for several

months the idea of extending American territorial waters some
90 miles out to sea, off the coast of Washington and Oregon,
interested the President. By this means Roosevelt felt he could
exclude Japanese fishermen from the salmon catch and curtail
Japan’s foreign exchange. No action was taken; some realist
may have described for the President the legal complications
involved in making such a claim to the High Seas and the
relatively insignificant role this fishing area played in the Japa¬
nese economy.
One of the most vigorous and belligerent of the presidential
advisers was Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
who urged war at the time of the Panay incident. What was
in effect an economic warfare division was established in the
Treasury Department and from it the Secretary derived many
ideas to press upon Roosevelt. On September 7, 1937, Morgen¬
thau suggested to the State Department that the United States,
Britain, and France refuse to accept Japanesq yen or gold in
exchange for dollars, sterling, and francs, with no explanations
offered. The international financial chaos which such a move
would create was recognized by the State Department and
Morgenthau was rebuffed.
Before the Japanese paid the Panay indemnity, Roosevelt
asked Morgenthau to see how, with or without legal authority,
he could seize Japanese assets in the United States. Morgen¬
thau found that these assets ran between $100 and $200 million
and that a legal basis for seizure could be found by declaring
an emergency and using legislation passed in 1933. Agreement
was reached on the indemnity, but the President still con¬
sidered seizing Japanese property to compensate for the loss
of American property in China due to military “looting.” Hull
now cautioned Roosevelt that he could do this only to nations
designated as “enemies” after the United States became a
belligerent.
The Treasury Department next turned to an effort to aid
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 253

China’s war with American credits and with expectation of

White House support. The Treasury had authority under the
Silver Purchase Act of 1933 to buy foreign silver in order to
keep up the price earned by American mines. China, in August
of 1937, requested a loan of $50 million from the Export-Import
Bank. Although the State Department favored this action, the
Bank decided to postpone action, possibly because of fear of
congressional ire over loans to a belligerent power. Morgen-
thau decided to meet the situation by buying Chinese silver.
Hull disapproved, but Roosevelt was willing in this case to
risk congressional attack and the purchases were made.
After this decision was made in December of 1937, credits
were extended to China in a variety of ways. Some were car¬
ried out in the guise of normal commercial transactions such
as the arrangement completed in December of 1938 to give
China a $25 million credit for shipments of tung oil to be de¬
livered over a period of years. Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the
Far Eastern Affairs Division, argued against the project. China
would probably be unable to deliver due to Japanese control
of export centers; the project violated the intent of Congress
in regard to American neutrality; it involved a dangerous com¬
mitment to China without vitally affecting the outcome of the
hostilities, and it would be sure to worsen relations with Japan.
Hamilton’s arguments were also supported by Hull who op¬
posed the project as an invitation to Japanese retaliation, point¬
ing out that Tokyo would see through the alleged commercial
character of American action. But again Morgenthau, with
Hornbeck supporting him, won over the President and the
credit was made.
Roosevelt’s willingness to bypass neutrality legislation in
aiding China was not immediately paralleled by a readiness
to take direct action against Japan. Throughout 1938 the sub¬
ject of economic sanctions was studied and discussed in the
State Department, but no action was taken beyond Hull’s
request in July for a “moral embargo” on planes and aviation
254 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

supplies. It was a year later, on July 26, 1939, that Hull finally
informed Tokyo that the United States intended to abrogate
the 1911 Commercial Treaty, six months from that date, the
warning period required by the treaty itself. The sanctionists
had won their argument, and the Japanese could now expect
a variety of economic blows.
The occasion for American action, according to the Secre¬
tary of State, was a British move which suggested a willing¬
ness to come to terms with Japan over China. When the Japa¬
nese took control of the city of Tientsin, they surrounded a
British concession with an investment reputedly in excess of
$46 million. Conflict soon developed over British insistence on
maintaining the rights granted them by the Chinese. After
some harsh exchanges the Chamberlain government signed an
accord, released on July 24, 1939, which “fully recognized” that
the Japanese had special requirements for the security of their
armed forces while war was on with China. Britain contracted
not to countenance any acts prejudicial to these requirements.
The text of the accord was ambiguous and Japan claimed that
it applied to all of China.
Fears had been frequently expressed in the State Depart¬
ment that Britain might accept major compromises in a set¬
tlement with Japan in order to have a freer hand in Europe.
Roosevelt now moved to stiffen the British position and with
the knowledge that a resolution had been introduced in the
Senate by a Republican leader, Arthur Vandenberg, calling for
the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty. A public opinion poll taken
the same month also suggested that a bare majority of Ameri¬
cans now favored stopping the shipment of war materials to
Japan in an effort to protect national interests in China. A
quarter of those polled still favored doing nothing, 18 percent
were willing to rely on protests and only 6 percent were ready
to go as far as war.
Aid to China continued to expand in 1939. In March Horn-
beck had advised Hull that it was “easier to give assistance to
THE CHINA COMMITMENT 255
China than to place obstacles directly in the way of Japan.”
In the fall of the year, after the outbreak of war in Europe,
Roosevelt instructed Morgenthau to “do everything we can
that we can get away with” in the form of help to China.
As 1940 opened the Commercial Treaty expired and the
Roosevelt administration was at last in a position to begin
full scale economic war against Japan. Public opinion had
been moved to the point where 4 measures short of war” against
Japan seemed to have majority support. Serious questions no
longer were raised within the Administration as to whether
national interests in Asia were worth the growing risk of war.
The opening of a potential front in the Atlantic, as British
and French forces stood behind the Maginot Line at war with
Germany, does not appear to have led to any tempering of at¬
titudes toward the Pacific. The movement of Administration
thought had been from nominal neutrality to actual involve- -
ment. A course of action was launched with a potential on
which both Grew and Hornbeck agreed; if it did not succeed
the most likely result was war.
Chapter XIII

THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR

W HILE SOME AMERICANS watched the flow of events

in Asia, many more were preoccupied with Europe. Two
traditionally great military powers, Britain and France, ex¬
perienced their “Annus Terribilis” in 1940. After the speedy
conquest of Poland in 1939, Hitler's armies faced the Allies, en¬
trenched in their supposedly unassailable Maginot Line from
which they did little more than stare across at the German
enemy. This alleged “phony war” or sitzkrieg ended suddenly
in early April of 1940 when German forces invaded Denmark
and Norway. A month later, on May 10, Hitier’s armies poured
across the borders of Holland and Belgium to attack France on
a weakly defended frontier. By late June the French had asked
for peace, while the British retreated hastily across the Chan¬
nel, leaving most of their arms behind them. An invasion was
generally expected as the Home Guard drilled to repel the first
wave of Nazis to come by sea or air.
Traditional American neutrality seemed to President Roose¬
velt to be inadequate to defend the security of the United
States. He had proclaimed neutrality on September 5, 1939, but
appealed for changes in the neutrality legislation which he
claimed operated “unevenly and unfairly.” At a specially called
256
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 257

session of Congress, a revised Neutrality Act was pushed

through both houses by early November after six weeks of
debate. The new law repealed the embargo on sale of arms
and munitions to nations at war which threatened to cancel
almost $100 million in sales to Britain and France. The arms
trade was put upon a cash-and-carry basis which permitted
Britain and France to import their purchases only in their own
ships. With British control of the surface of the seas, sales to
Germany were impossible.
When the Nazi forces entered Holland and Belgium, Prime
Minister Churchill appealed to Roosevelt to take part in the
defense of Ireland, assume full responsibility for checking
Japan, and to give military supplies rather than sell them. The
President responded on May 22, 1940, by making available
hastily declared “surplus” War Department arms and muni¬
tions, while his legal aides searched for some constitutional and
legal basis for such an unprecedented action. On June 10,
President Roosevelt went further in a speech at Charlottesville,
Virginia, to make what Professor William Langer has called
the “Great Commitment.” Henceforth the material resources
of the United States were pledged to “the opponents of force.”
Transfers of planes, destroyers, guns, and munitions followed,
too late, however, to check the fall of France.
What was the meaning of German victory and the “Great
Commitment” for American policy in the Far East? The bal¬
ance of power in Europe, tipped to the advantage of Britain
and British allies for more than a century, was destroyed.
While the Soviet Union honored its Non-Aggression Pact with
Berlin, German dominance of Europe was only matched his¬
torically by that of Napoleonic France. If peaceful coexistence
was impossible with the German “New Order”—and this was
the assumption of the President and many of his advisers—a
great sacrifice of American manpower and resources was to be
expected. For American war planners, Hitler had been des¬
ignated “Enemy #1” with presidential approval even before
258 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

the outbreak of war in Europe. Allocation of American re¬

sources favored maintaining only a “strategic defensive” in the
Pacific; this was the military consensus. But in April of 1940
the main body of the American Fleet had been moved to the
advanced post of Hawaii, where the President decided it should
remain.
A substantial segment of American opinion favored taking
strong economic measures against Japan. One poll taken in
1940 before the fall of France recorded 75 percent in favor
of a ban on sales of arms and munitions to Japan. The great
majority remained, nevertheless, unwilling to risk war with
Japan in order to aid China. In July, 1940, only 12 percent
agreed that the United States should take that risk to prevent
the Japanese from conquering China.
The desire for a ban on arms’ sales was in part the product
of years of newspaper headlines, “JAPS BOMB . . .” with pic¬
tures of the resulting destruction. In the pre-television era news
reels also helped stir American feeling against traffic in arms
with Japan. A Japanese visitor stated his case against American
movie houses in 1937.

First comes Pearl Buck’s “The Good Earth,” which shows

the Chinese at their best—polite, diligent and honest.
Then comes the bombing of the Cathay Hotel [in Shang¬
hai]. The bodies of the Chinese are seen strewn about
the streets. The captions tell of the ravages of war and
Japanese aggression.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer’s The Good Earth, made on the basis
of the best-selling novel in 1936, was a great boon to the
Chinese cause. The first major film to bring a favorable image
of Chinese peasants to the American screen, it was estimated
to have been seen by some 23 million Americans. “March of
Time” newsreels added to the anti-Japanese feeling. After
viewing one of these reels in September of 1937, Admiral Wil¬
liam Leahy noted that the shots were so arranged as to be
“powerful publicity in favor of the Chinese.”
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 259
The word “Jap” began to mean “cruelty” and “treacherous
little yellow men” to many Americans. Hollywood recognized
this attiude in 1938, when it dropped a series of detective films
starring “Mr. Moto,” played by Peter Lorre. Audiences no
longer appreciated courage and astuteness displayed on the
screen by a Japanese character. Hostility to Japan seemed more
directed toward the people than the government, while the re¬
verse seemed to be true when Americans were asked about their
attitudes toward Germany. This difference, noted in a poll in
February, 1939, persisted even after the United States went to
war with both countries. In March of 1942 about 41 percent
of Americans polled believed that “the Japanese people will
always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as
possible.” Only 21 percent believed that the Germans were
naturally militaristic.
Although the White House was conscious of the weight of
opinion against arms trade with Japan by the spring of 1940,
Roosevelt supported the arguments of Ambassador Grew and
the hesitancy of Secretary Hull in not expanding the “moral
embargo.” Economic considerations were still important enough
to reinforce this position. Despite the spurt which sale of arms
and munitions to Britain and France had given to the Ameri¬
can economy, full prosperity was still “around the corner.” In
an election year with an unprecedented third-term bid for
office, Roosevelt could not disregard the effect of a cut in ex¬
ports on employment and business levels. Any ban on sales to
Japan might also mean a cut in Japan’s purchases of American
cotton. Although sales of this commodity had declined since
1937, the disposal of more than a million and a half bales
in 1940 was estimated to account for the employment of
350,000 Southerners with almost a million and a half depend¬
ents. Loss of tobacco sales to Scandinavia and to Belgium,
Holland, and France after the German conquest gave cotton
exports an even greater importance for some southern states.
The fall of France stirred some new talk of the value of a
260 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

settlement in the Pacific. Some suggestions came from isola¬

tionists and critics of Roosevelt’s foreign policy in aiding
Britain. Others came from well-informed supporters of that
policy who felt that it called for reconsideration of the Ameri¬
can role in Asia. As France went down to defeat, Walter Lipp-
mann in his widely-read newspaper column condemned the
thought of war with Japan as “suicidal madness” and argued
against the provocative attitudes expressed by some members
of Congress. “There is no conflict between Japan and the
United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy,” Lipp-
mann advised. He urged immediate “friendly and conciliatory
and candid negotiations.” Financial circles with interests in
Japan added another voice in support of a settlement. A
mission to Tokyo in the summer of 1940, sponsored by a New
York investment house and headed by Major General John F.
O’Ryan, returned home to urge concessions to Japan or at least
a passive attitude in regard to events in Asia until Hitler was
defeated.
Within the Roosevelt administration opinions differed in re¬
gard to future relations with Japan. Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles frequently raised his voice against new pro¬
posals to pressure Japan further by stopping exports of oil and
scrap metal. Welles argued, as did Admiral Harold Stark and
General George Marshall on occasion, that an embargo on oil
would only encourage a southward Japanese move, in order
to compensate by acquiring the oil resources of the Dutch
East Indies. Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs, supported Welles.
Ambassador Grew raised the possibility of a settlement in
China secured by offering some financial aid to Japan. Grew’s
idea found some reinforcement in an approach made by a “Mr.
X,” a prominent Japanese industrialist. The latter suggested to
the State Department that a victorious Germany would seek
to extend its power to Indo-China and the East Indies; to meet
this threat the United States and Japan should join together
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR z6i
for “mutual safety.” There were ample opportunities for in¬
vestment of American capital in Manchuria, the industrialist
pointed out, where credits would be used to purchase heavy
machinery and equipment from the United States needed for
the long-range industrialization program.
While some skepticism was being expressed in Washington
over the strength of “Mr. X” ’s views in Japanese governmental
circles, a shock was given American strategic thinking by the
British. On June 27, 1940, the British embassy informed the
Department of State that it could no longer risk a war in order
to maintain the status quo in Asia. Completely absorbed by
the German threat, the Winston Churchill government sug¬
gested two courses to Washington. Either the United States
could attempt to maintain the status quo alone, by war if
necessary, or try to “wean Japan from aggression” by con¬
crete offers of negotiation. If a decision was made in favor of
the latter course, Ambassador Lord Lothian said that his gov¬
ernment was willing to “throw some material contribution into
the pot.”
British realism about their helplessness was seconded by
the representations made to Washington by the Australian
government at the same time. Ambassador Richard Casey told
the State Department on June 26 that concessions to Japan
would necessarily involve not “merely a shoestring, but some¬
thing substantial, something according the Japanese what they
want in China.” The United States was frankly urged to take
the initiative in a Far Eastern settlement which would free
the fleet to move to the Atlantic. Whatever the concessions
made, the Australians believed that they would “very likely be
considerably less than Japan will be able to take by war.”
The British Chiefs of Staff had informed His Majesty’s gov¬
ernment on June 25 that defense needs made it now impossible
to send a fleet to the Pacific or to draw troops from the Near
East for service in Asia. Yet Britain was committed to come to
the defense of Australia and New Zealand in exchange for
262 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
troop contributions to other fronts. British strategists felt that
there was no alternative to sacrificing all outposts north of
Malaya and to concentrating remaining strength on that area
and Singapore in the hope of deterring any Japanese move¬
ment south of the Philippines and Indo-China.
As an initial step in readjusting relations with Japan, Lon¬
don accepted Tokyo’s demands on July 12, 1940, to close the
Burma Road to shipments of arms and munitions to China.
Japanese forces by this date controlled all major Chinese ports
and only three routes were left to supply the forces of the
Kuomintang in the interior. One was the long, northern over¬
land route from the Soviet Union which by the spring of 1940
was supplying the bulk of China’s military imports. The other
two routes went through British Burma from Rangoon to
Kunming and through French Indo-China from Hanoi to
Kunming. The defeated French had already agreed in late
June to close the route through their Asian colony and had
opened the way for Japanese penetration by agreeing to admit
Japanese inspectors to enforce the ban. British action, taken
for a trial three months, left Chiang Kai-shek with only the
Soviet Union as a supply center over a route of limited
capacity. Japan hoped that this shrinking of material aid would
press China into negotiating a peace.
Meanwhile in Washington strong differences were expressed
over the question of normalizing economic relations with Japan
as a means to a political settlement. The expiration in January
of the 1911 Commercial Treaty also made it possible to take
further punitive economic action. In December of 1939 the
State Department had asked American businesses to stop all
deliveries on planes, manufacturing rights, or equipment for
the production of aviation gasoline to “certain countries” bomb¬
ing civilian populations. By this date the “moral embargo”
had already stopped the sale of planes and aviation equipment
to Japan.
The chief proponent of a “hard” policy in the State Depart-
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 263
ment was Hull’s Political Adviser Stanley Hornbeck. On May
24 he argued that the possibility for a dissolution of the Japa¬
nese war effort had increased; the Sino-Japanese conflict would
“solve itself,” he wrote, if the United States continued to assist
China and withhold supplies to Japan. On June 12 he advised
that the menacing events across the Atlantic did not “dissolve-
*out our interests and concern” with the Far East. He did con¬
cede that while German armies were consolidating their
victory in France it was a time to “speak gently to Japan” to
avoid giving chauvinists grounds for calling for new conquests.
On June 26 he attacked the British and Australian proposals
for the Far East as “appeasement policies” which had no more
virtue in that area than when practiced in Europe in 1938.
Ten dire results were listed in his memorandum for the Secre¬
tary of State, following any concessions to Japan as suggested
by Britain. By July 19 he seems to have felt that the time to
speak softly was past and he urged the cutting of aviation gas
exports to Japan. On the 24th of the same month he advised
strongly against withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii where it
could be used to back up the imposition of “substantial em¬
bargoes.”
Hornbeck’s faith in a “get-tough” program had strong sup¬
port from Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau and two new
cabinet appointees who took their seats in the White House in
July of 1940, Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank
Knox as Secretary of the Navy. This addition of two prominent
Republicans strengthened Roosevelt’s hand in his third term
electoral campaign and replaced two cabinet members who
were out of sympathy with some of the measures the President
was taking to aid Britain.
Henry Stimson, now in his seventies and with the experi¬
ence and prestige of his earlier cabinet service under Taft and
Hoover, was quick to add his weight to discussions of foreign
policy. He had deep and firm convictions already expressed in
frequent consultations with Hull and Hornbeck before he
264 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
joined the Roosevelt administration. Less than a year earlier
he had advised the State Department “to begin a frank attack
in Asia instead of Europe” since he had “always found the
American people much more willing to take an affirmative
policy in Asia than in Europe.” Now as Secretary of War he
advised Lord Lothian in August of 1940 that “to get on with
Japan one had to treat her rough, unlike other countries.” “She
doesn’t understand any other treatment,” he assured the British
Ambassador and complained about British “timidity” in Asia.
To a nation receiving the “rough” treatment from Germany’s
Luftwaffe with their daily load of bombs, Stimson’s remarks
may have seemed ill-timed, but the Secretary of War noted in
his journal that Lord Lothian “agreed with me.”
In cabinet meetings and in talks with the President, Stimson
urged further embargoes on oil and iron and steel scrap ship¬
ments to Japan. To support his arguments on the effectiveness
of “rough” treatment he cited a number of what he believed
to be pertinent historical examples. The historian reviewing
them can only hope that this use of the past, as remembered
by policy makers, is not typical. In a long letter to Roosevelt
in October, 1940, Stimson recollected an incident which was
supposed to have taken place in Manila Bay in May of 1898
during the Spanish-American War. When a German naval
squadron threatened the American forces under Commodore
George Dewey, a British squadron moved alongside the Ameri¬
cans and between them and the German forces, forcing a
German retreat. This legend which originated in a newspaper
story in 1898 was subsequently thoroughly discredited by his¬
torical research, but it remained alive in Stimson’s mind as an
example of what would happen if the American Fleet would
move from Hawaii to Singapore to prevent any union between
the Japanese and Axis naval forces from the Mediterranean.
Repayment for the kind act of 1898 would boost British mo¬
rale, Stimson believed, and give the United States in Singapore
an excellent base for defensive or offensive action in dealing
 ,
THE WANTED UNWANTED WAR 265
with Japan. After the fall of Singapore in 1942 and the loss
of Britain’s newest battleship operating from that supposedly
secure base, Stimson admitted that his potentially disastrous
excursion into naval strategy had been based on an ignorance
of Japanese air power.
Another seemingly pertinent historical analogy used by
Stimson was Japan’s good behavior, 1921-1931, which the
Secretary said was the result of American strength gained in
World War I. A third example of an effective “get-tough”
policy was offered Stimson by the president of the American
Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. Ac¬
cording to two memoranda which were subsequently sent to
Roosevelt, the United States in 1919 “demanded” that Japan
get out of Shantung and Siberia. Cotton sales and silk pur¬
chases were stopped by the War Trade Board, and Japan
pulled back her troops “like whipped puppies.” From this ex¬
ample the Secretary of War drew a “moral” for Roosevelt to
the effect that Japan has:

. . . historically shown that when the United States in¬

dicates by clear language and bold actions that she in¬
tends to carry out a clear and affirmative policy in the
Far East, Japan will yield to that policy even though
it conflicts with her own Asiatic policy and conceived
interest.

Although this version had more of a kernel of truth than the

Manila Bay story in that the War Trade Board with the sup¬
port of one of its aides. Major John Foster Dulles, did stop
granting licenses for silk and cotton shipments for a few weeks
in October and November, 1918, the claims for results were
far-fetched. Japan made no such reversal of policy as claimed,
and in his memoirs Stimson later admitted that the theory of
his memoranda was not borne out by events.
Roosevelt’s power to implement a “hard” policy was widened
when on July 2, 1940 he signed “An Act to Expedite the
266 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Strengthening of National Defense” which Congress had passed
with little public attention. One provision of the new law
gave the President authority to regulate all exports of com¬
modities essential to the American military effort. By licensing
measures exports could be limited or stopped entirely. Secre¬
tary Morgenthau pressed the President to use this device to
stop all oil and scrap iron and steel shipments to Japan. In
a cabinet meeting Sumner Welles, then Acting Secretary of
State, fought the move. Roosevelt faced with the division re¬
fused to rule and asked the two men to work out a compromise
which would then receive his approval. Morgenthau, Stimson
noted in his diary, won “in substance.” On July 26 aviation
fuel and the highest quality of iron and steel scrap were
brought under licensing control and shipments subsequently
stopped.
Opponents of any compromises in the Far East strengthened
their case, as the issues between Washington and Tokyo ex¬
tended beyond the territorial confines of China and the settle¬
ment of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The fall of France and the
Netherlands left their Asian colonies as inviting prizes for
Japan. In early September, 1940, Japan took advantage of
French weakness to secure an agreement under which troops
were sent into parts of Indo-China. But by this date the State
Department, with White House approval, had begun to give
diplomatic support to the preservation of the colonial status
of these areas. The Dutch East Indies with direct American
interest in the oil and rubber resources was of some material
importance, but the issue in Indo-China seems to have been
a matter of principle alone. American concern for the French
colony contrasted strongly with Britain's. On July 1, 1940, the
British Ambassador told Sumner Welles that his government
had no intention of fighting to preserve Indo-China for France
and might be prepared to agree to its seizure by Japan. Lon¬
don believed at this point that France would soon have a gov-
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 267
ernment completely subservient to Germany and that colonial
areas would have to fend for themselves.
The second issue which broadened the conflict with Japan
was Tokyo’s signature on September 27, 1940, of a Tripartite
Pact with Germany and Italy. Each recognized the other’s
geographical spheres of leadership and agreed to assist the
other with “all political, economic and military means” if any
power was attacked by a nation not involved in the European
War or the Sino-Japanese conflict. In effect this was a defensive
alliance intended to deter American entry into either war.
Since it still did not seem that the United States would take
the first aggressive step to initiate open hostilities, either in the
Atlantic or Pacific, the use of the term “attacked” gave each
signatory some flexibility in its commitment.
The thesis that Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan con¬
stituted an inseparable unit was well set forth by Stanley
Hornbeck in June of 1940:

. . . there is at present going on in the world one war, in

two theaters; . . . there are two countries today oppos¬
ing force to force, China which has been fighting for
three years, and Great Britain which has been fighting
for nine months.

Six months later in January of 1941, the President stated a

similar thesis in a letter to Ambassador Grew. “The hostilities
in Europe, in Africa and in Asia, are all parts of a single world
conflict,” the President wrote. He believed that “our strategy of
self-defense must be a global strategy.”
Postwar examination of German and Japanese records re¬
veals that the political and ideological ties of the two regimes
were far weaker than assumed in Washington. Conflicts of
national interests between Tokyo and Berlin, dating back to
World War I, were not obliterated by the prospect of facing
common enemies. In addition the term “global strategy”
268 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
needed further definition. Often it assumed that national in¬
terests were involved to the same degree wherever military
expansion took place. This assumption which influenced Ameri¬
can policy for the next two decades was a dangerous one
since it ignored the logic imposed by the limits of national
manpower and resources. If men and material were not to be
dispersed thinly and ineffectively, priorities were necessary.
In the Army and Navy where assessments had to be made
of national potential, the idea of a global war created consider¬
able uneasiness. While the invasion of Britain seemed im¬
minent in the summer of 1940, the War Plans Division had
dropped all preparations for a war with Japan to concentrate
on RAINBOW 4, the code name for plans for the defense of
the Western Hemisphere. On September 25, 1940, when the
survival of the British Isles looked more favorable, the War
Plans Division still warned against a major military venture in
the Far East for which “we are not now prepared and will
not be prepared for several years to come.” Two months later
General George Marshall suggested that “we avoid dispersions
that might lessen our power to operate effectively, decisively,
if possible, in the principal theater—the Atlantic.”
As early as the summer of 1939 work had begun on the
possible invasion of Europe, RAINBOW 5, “to effect the de¬
cisive defeat of Germany or Italy or both.” The events of the
spring and summer of 1940 made it obvious that the defeat
of these two nations would require a gigantic effort and the
organization of an expeditionary force far larger than ever
before contemplated. As late as September, 1941, when the
German armies were involved in war with Russia, war planners
assumed that if the 2 to 1 attack ratio were maintained it
would take 700 American divisions or 22 million men under
arms to invade Europe. Such a mobilization of American
manpower was considered impossible and it was hoped that
machines might compensate for failure to outnumber the
enemy 2 to 1.
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 269
These realistic considerations seem to have been treated
lightly by members of the Roosevelt cabinet and even by the
President himself. While aid to Britain expanded, Roosevelt
responded to a Japanese move into Indo-China by embargoing
on September 26, 1940, all shipments of iron and steel scrap
to Japan. Herbert Feis, State Department Economic Adviser,
believed later that this was the “crossing of the bridge from
words to deeds.” The same month a new credit was extended
to China; shortly after, Chiang Kai-shek was promised 50
modern pursuit planes. Help was also given American citizens
wishing to join the Chinese Air Force.
By the end of 1940 licensing had stopped the flow of all
war materials to Japan other than petroleum. In the next six
months, Morgenthau, using devious measures, managed to
progressively diminish the flow of oil. Appeals continued to
be made to the President, from within the Administration and
without, to squeeze Japan harder; this meant no oil and little
else.
On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt acted abruptly to launch full-
scale economic war against Japan. All Japanese assets in the
United States were frozen. Britain, the Dominions, and British
colonies followed suit. The Dutch East Indies put oil under
export control and soon ended all shipments to Japan. With no
source of substantial imports other than China, Japanese for¬
eign trade came to a virtual standstill. Pressing the point home,
oil continued to be sent to the Soviet Union via Vladivostok in
American tankers which passed through Japanese waters.
The “get-tough” policy went into effect and Japan’s economy
received a serious, surprise blow. Tokyo viewed the joint action
of the Americans, British, and Dutch as the final link in an
encirclement effort which many believed was aimed at reduc¬
ing Japan to the state of a minor power in Asia. In Washington
it was now a matter of waiting and watching as Japan’s re¬
serves of essential materials dwindled away. Numerous intel¬
ligence estimates were made as to how long it would take
270 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
before Japan surrendered or acquired new sources by moving
southward.
The President’s sudden consent to all-out action was stimu¬
lated in part by news of fresh Japanese troop movements into
southern Indo-China. His original intent was that the freezing
order would be followed by a release of some funds in order
to resume a limited but easily controlled trade. When no strong
domestic pressures developed for relaxing the freeze and while
a vociferous minority was prepared to denounce any renewed
trade as “appeasement,” the order remained total. Only bril¬
liant diplomacy or war seemed likely to change the American
posture toward Japan.
The negotiations which culminated in the final break be¬
tween the two nations began in February, 1941 and lasted
until November 26. Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura was sent to
the United States as ambassador in February because of his
well-known American sympathies and an acquaintanceship
with President Roosevelt which went back to his service in
Washington during World War I. In the last weeks of negoti¬
ations Nomura was aided, at his request, by a skilled profes¬
sional diplomat, Saburo Kurusu, who had an American wife
and was well informed about American affairs. For the United
States, Secretary Hull personally handled the bulk of the dis¬
cussions, which were frequently carried on in the evening in
the Secretary’s apartment.
The exchanges were many and detailed. Genuinely intent
upon avoiding a war with the United States, the Japanese took
the major initiatives. After the freezing of assets in July, the
tempo of the discussions was increased as Tokyo sought an
American position which left Japan some alternative other than
surrender or fighting. Hull, on the other hand, seemed confident
of a position of superior strength as the talks dragged on while
Japans oil and steel reserves dwindled. The State Department
was also in a position of tremendous advantage as the result
of an American technical achievement. In the fall of 1940 a
 ,
THE WANTED UNWANTED WAR 271

device was constructed which broke the Japanese diplomatic

cipher. Purple, and by means of this electronic masterpiece,
known as MAGIC, some 20 top officials were able to read daily
the messages which passed between Tokyo and other diplo¬
matic posts, including Washington, Berlin, and Rome. This
flow of intercepts not only provided Hull with a report on his
and other conversations as presented to the Japanese govern¬
ment, but enabled him to know the instructions given to the
Japanese negotiators. It was a poker game in which both sides
had a substantial number of chips, but in which one side was
able to read most of the other’s cards.
Between the first Japanese proposals in February and the
final exchanges in November, there were no great changes in
positions. Close study of the many notes and conversations
shows some stiffening of the American attitude, while the
Japanese, as time ran out, offered a little more in the way of
concessions. The Tripartite Pact and the Japanese troops in
Indo-China entered into the discussions, but the hard core of
the differences between the two countries was still in China.
After four years of fighting on the mainland with no victory
in sight, Japan was anxious to end the war with China. To get
Japan out of China and Manchuria was the major American
goal. Negotiations revolved around the circumstances and
terms on which both parties were willing to accept a settlement
with the Chinese government. Japan felt that the United States
must end its aid to the Kuomintang in order to make a peace
in which Japanese interests were protected. While making no
demands for annexations or indemnities, Japan insisted on two
conditions; protection of their national economic interests in
China and “cooperative defense against communistic activities.”
Stability in China required the stationing of Japanese troops
for an indefinite period in northern China where Communist
strength was greatest. Troops were also to be stationed in Inner
Mongolia where a number of border skirmishes were fought
with Russian troops in 1938 and 1939. The United States was
2.72. AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
also asked to regularize its relationship with Japan’s satellite
state, Manchukuo.
Hull was skeptical of the possibility of reaching a satisfactory
set of terms with Japan from the very beginning. At times the
negotiations seem to have been chiefly an opportunity for him
to lecture the Japanese Ambassador on how nations should
behave. Wary in regard to Japanese intentions, his suspicions
knew few bounds. Although the Secretary was personally
violently anti-Russian, he seems to have dismissed completely
Japan’s concern over Communism and Russian influence in
China. Security for Japan’s economic stake in China for Hull
meant only “imperialism” which would jeopardize the Open
Door policy. Repeatedly he insisted that any agreement must
begin with Japan’s commitment to four general principles:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of

each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principles of equality, including equality
of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as
the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

These were standards of conduct which could arouse the sup¬

port of most Americans, but which had been violated by every
major power. The result was a curious one. The Americans,
known for their pragmatism and tradition of hard-bargaining
in domestic affairs, met the Orientals on a plane of abstraction,
hesitant to deal with any concrete situation which might call
for realistic compromises.
At the Atlantic Conference, held off the coast of Newfound¬
land, August 9-12, 1941, Churchill asked for a joint American-
British-Russian ultimatum to Japan, threatening war if Japa¬
nese forces entered Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. Roosevelt
 ,
THE WANTED UNWANTED WAR 273
was unwilling to go that far in committing the United States to
a war which many congressmen would vote against as a de¬
fense of the British and Dutch Empires. But he did agree, as
he later reported to Secretary of the Navy Knox, to "do some
plain talking to Japan—not an ultimatum but something that
very closely approximates that and can easily lead to it later if
the Japanese do not accept our demands.”
When Roosevelt returned to Washington, he called in the
Japanese Ambassador and read him a prepared statement. Any
further military advances by Japan, he warned, would mean
that the United States would be "compelled” to take "any and
all steps which it may deem necessary. . . .” Ambassador
Nomura responded with an invitation from Premier Fumimaro
Konoye for a personal meeting in which the two heads of state
could talk directly. Roosevelt seems to have been initially
receptive and began to explore the possibilities of such a meet¬
ing in Alaska or the Hawaiian Islands.
Secretary Hull viewed this Japanese initiative coldly. Any
conference, he argued, could not be held until the terms of the
settlement had been worked out in advance through the normal
diplomatic channels. Roosevelt, who on many other occasions
was to go over the head of his Secretary of State, accepted
Hull’s objections and by mid-October the idea of the confer¬
ence was killed. The Konoye Cabinet which had the support
of the Army and Navy in its last-ditch effort at diplomacy fell
when the meeting failed of arrangement. Konoye was replaced
as premier by General Hideki Tojo who was subsequently to
represent for many Americans all that was evil about Japan.
The second attempt at a fresh approach was initiated in
Washington almost at the end of the negotiations in November.
Secretary Morgenthau offered Roosevelt and Hull some far-
reaching proposals prepared for him by his brilliant aide, Harry
Dexter White, whose pro-Soviet activities later made him a
center of political controversy. White and Morgenthau seem
to have agreed that it was essential that the American Fleet be
274 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
moved into the Atlantic to fight Hitler’s submarines and that
this goal called for a grandiose settlement with Japan. On the
one hand radical concessions were asked of Japan; the with¬
drawal of all troops from China and the sale of three-fourths
of the annual production of war materials to the United States
for use against Germany. In return the United States would
withdraw the Fleet from the Pacific, work for the removal of
old grievances such as the repeal of the Oriental Exclusion Act
and meet Japan’s economic needs by a 20-year credit of $2
billion.
Maxwell Hamilton, Far Eastern Affairs division chief, who
apparently chafed under Hull’s inflexibility, found the White
proposal “the most constructive one which I’ve yet seen,” and
reworked it with some minor revisions into a more presentable
diplomatic proposal. The same day, November 17, that he
worked on White’s terms, Hamilton also turned out a sug¬
gestion that the United States secure Japanese merchant ships
and possibly warships by providing Japan with funds to pur¬
chase any number of territories including Manchuria, northern
Indo-China, and northern Sakhalin from Russia and New
Guinea. Hamilton’s proposal seems to have been dismissed, but
the White-Morgenthau plan was reviewed by both Admiral
Stark and General L. T. Gerow, acting for General Marshall,
and found generally satisfactory, although a number of re¬
visions were requested.
Possibly stimulated by this radical effort, Roosevelt jotted
down a four-point modus vivendi by which the United States
would release funds for oil and rice purchases during six
months and “introduce” the Japanese to the Chinese for peace
talks. Japan was to agree to send no more troops to Indo-China
or to the Manchurian border and to disavow the Tripartite
Pact. Both drafts were then reworked and toned down by other
individuals in the State Department. The suggestion for a six
months’ trial was cut to three, the unfreezing of assets was
hedged with qualifications and instead of “introducing” the
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 275
two belligerents to begin peace talks, the United States only
pledged to “not look with disfavor” on such discussions. The
White-Morgenthau plan was even more drastically revised so
that it remained but a shell of the original. The new modus
vivendi was then submitted to the British, Chinese, and Dutch
for their consideration. Chiang Kai-shek responded quickly
with an angry denunciation of any relaxation of the freezing
order. Chiang’s brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, launched an im¬
mediate campaign among administration officials and in the
Washington press against “appeasers” who were being black¬
mailed by Japan. London’s response was no more favorable
and Prime Minister Churchill wired the White House that it
left “a very thin diet” for Chiang.
In the meantime Japan had on November 20 submitted a
final modus vivendi. In return for a restoration of oil shipments
and suspension of aid to China while peace talks were in
progress, Japan promised no further armed advances south¬
ward and to withdraw troops in Indo-China to the north.
Washington learned that Nomura was warned that “in name
and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last.”
Failure to reach a quick agreement, Tokyo said, would mean
that the relations of the two nations would be “on the brink
of chaos.”
The British embassy on November 25 informed Hull that the
Japanese final proposals were “clearly unacceptable.” Roose¬
velt and Hull, on the other hand, decided to drop the modus
vivendi as a reply which would have attempted to prolong
negotiations. The attacks made on this proposal by Chiang Kai-
shek and Churchill, plus the charges within the administration
that it constituted “appeasement,” probably led to this crucial
decision. After all the thought and time spent on this last-
minute effort at a truce, Japan was presented instead with a
drastic ten-point proposal which Tokyo viewed as an ulti¬
matum. The framework for this final offering was the White-
Morgenthau plan with the major concessions removed, while
276 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Japan was asked for the equivalent of surrender on six of the
ten points. This document was given to the Japanese on No¬
vember 26.
Hull knew that the exchanges had come to an end. On
November 27 he called Stimson and told him that he had
washed his hands of the whole affair and that it was now a
matter to be handled by the Army and Navy. Admiral Stark
the same day sent a warning to the Pacific outposts that “an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days.” An intercept decoded by MAGIC removed any doubt
about Tokyo’s reaction; on the twenty-eighth Nomura and
Kurusu were advised that in two or three days negotiations
would be “ruptured” in response to this “humiliating proposal”
from Washington. Another intercepted message ordered the
destruction of Japanese code machines on American and British
soil.
Within the Roosevelt administration there was considerable
speculation as to exactly when and where Japan would make
its next move. Roosevelt had been reassured by his cabinet
early in November that an American declaration of war would
be supported by Congress and the people, even if Japan at¬
tacked British or Dutch colonial territory rather than American
soil. But the President also knew that under these conditions
the country would remain disunited and that the war would
be unpopular with those who would see it as shedding Ameri¬
can blood in defense of disintegrating European empires. This
probably was one consideration which led him to his discussion
of November 25 with Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark. The
President, as Stimson noted in his diary, raised the question of
how to maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot without
too much danger to the United States. That first shot would
by preference be directed against American soil or against
American military forces.
The same consideration may explain the President’s direct
intervention in Far Eastern naval operations. On December 2,
THE WANTED , UNWANTED WAR 277
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, re¬
ceived a presidential order to charter three small vessels under
the American flag as “a defensive information patrol.” The
President stipulated that these ships were to be stationed off
the Indo-China coast in the path of any Japanese advance on
Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. Since Admiral Hart was
already conducting what the Navy Department considered
adequate reconnaissance by planes and submarines, this un¬
usual request for picket ships suggested to one of their com¬
manders that they were being sent out to provide an inex¬
pensive casus belli. Due to difficulties in purchasing and dis¬
patching these ships, none had reached their assigned posts
before the Pearl Harbor attack provided a far less disputable
casus belli.
The decoded Japanese intercepts gave many indications that
a naval move was imminent. On December 2 Roosevelt told
an aide, Donald Nelson, that he would not be surprised if war
came by Thursday, December 4. In London where there was
a British-operated MAGIC decoder, Ambassador John G.
Winant decided on December 6 that the end was near and
that he wanted to be with Prime Minister Churchill when the
war began. He was dining with Churchill the next day when
the news of the Pearl Harbor attack reached them by radio.
Outside of the small group of top officials who read the
Japanese intercepts, there was also a belief that war was about
to begin. One Honolulu newspaper on November 30 carried
the headline, “Japanese May Strike Over Weekend,” missing
its warning by one week. “Pacific Zero Hour Near” was another
Honolulu deadline on December 4. A high degree of prescience
and overconfidence was demonstrated by the writers of Time
magazine who filed their copy by December 1. The lead story
in the issue dated December 8 began:

Everything was ready. From Rangoon to Honolulu, every

man was at his battle station. And Franklin Roosevelt
had to return to his. This was the last act of the drama.
278 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
. . . One nervous twitch of a Japanese trigger finger,
one jump in any direction, one overt act might be
enough. A vast array of armies, of navies, of air fleets
were stretched now in the position of track runners, in the
tension of the moment before the starters gun.

Subscribers received this report on the situation on December

4 and 5.
“Japan will commit national suicide, if necessary, to pursue
her plan of establishing peace in the Far East,” Ambassador
Hirosi Saito told American newspapermen as early as 1934. His
nation would fight, he said, even if it meant war with both
Britain and the United States. Japanese naval strategy through¬
out the 1930s in considering such a war was primarily de¬
fensive, concerning itself with holding the western Pacific
against what might be overwhelming Anglo-American naval
superiority.
In January of 1941 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto conceived
the bold plan of beginning the war with a lightning strike
across the Pacific in the tradition of Port Arthur and 1904.
Yamamoto was pessimistic about Japan’s chances of winning
such a war, but he believed that the quick destruction of the
American forces at Pearl Harbor would long delay American
movement across the Pacific and make possible a compromise
peace. His plan remained a tightly held secret, while he fought
bureaucratic conservatism in order to get planners and re¬
sources allocated to his strategy. Ambassador Grew reported
to Washington that Japan was contemplating a Pearl Harbor
strike the same month Yamamoto put forth his plan, but there
is little likelihood that Grew’s source was a real leak. In Wash¬
ington Grew’s message was dismissed as a fantasy.
Aside from some extremely chauvinistic elements there was
little enthusiasm in Japan for a new war by a people who for
four years had been drained of lives and resources by the con¬
flict in China. The war potential of the United States was esti-
 ,
THE WANTED UNWANTED WAR 279
mated as seven to eight times that of Japan. A long conflict
promised the defeat of Japan’s forces regardless of their bravery
and devotion to Emperor and nation. But many of Japan’s
leaders saw the American position as leaving no honorable
alternative to such a disaster. Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo
stated in the fall of 1941 that if Japan accepted American de¬
mands “all that had been achieved since the Manuchuria in¬
cident would have evaporated. . . . Japan would be compelled
ultimately to withdraw entirely from the continent.”
After the American freezing of assets in July, oil purchases
were cut off and Japan’s reserves dwindled by some 12,000
tons daily. As one Japanese expressed it, his country felt like a
fish in a pond from which the water was being gradually
drained away. Whether to try to seize the oil resources of the
Dutch Indies only, risking an American counterattack, or to
try to also knock out the American Fleet, was debated by
Japan’s military leaders through the summer. On September 6
an Imperial Conference approved full-scale preparations for
war with the United States if diplomatic negotiations failed.
But it was not until mid-October that hesitance over Yama¬
moto’s proposal was finally overcome and the Pearl Harbor
attack plan given formal approval.
On November 7 the date of the offensive blow against the
United States was tentatively set for a month later. Shortly
after, units of the Pearl Harbor Striking Force sailed north to
assemble in the Kuriles and to await the outcome of the negoti¬
ations with Washington. Other forces moved to their bases and
trained for their assigned strikes. Some 29 separate targets,
including six on the island of Oahu, were to be hit at ap¬
proximately the same time. Guam, Wake, the Philippines,
British Malaya, and Hong Kong were all to hear the exploding
Japanese bombs like a string of firecrackers. On November 26
the negative outcome of the diplomatic exchanges seemed
certain enough with the American rejection of a modus vivendi.
28o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
The Pearl Harbor Striking Force was ordered to begin its move
across the Pacific, still under orders to await the final word
from Tokyo before launching its planes.
After a review of the diplomatic negotiations on December 1,
the Japanese cabinet voted for war. The next day Admiral
Nagumo, far out in the Pacific, received the message, “Climb
Mount Niitaka,” final approval of the Pearl Harbor strike. His
mission could still be called off within 24 hours of the attack
if there was an unexpected break of importance in the diplo¬
matic impasse. A fourteen-point note, reviewing and ending the
negotiations, was sent to Washington on December 6. At mili¬
tary insistence the Japanese envoys were not to deliver it to
Secretary Hull until 1:00 p.m., Washington time, on Sunday,
December 7, only a half hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor
was scheduled to begin.
The surprise of the Hawaiian base was complete and the
bombing brilliantly executed. Americans had demonstrated the
theoretical soundness of the Japanese tactic in war games in
1932 and 1936. As late as March of 1941 this type of attack was
described with accuracy in a defense plan prepared by the
commanders of the Army and Navy air forces at Pearl Harbor.
Launching some 300 planes from six carriers over 200 miles to
the north, the Japanese caught the battleship fleet at rest and
most of Pearl Harbor enjoying an inactive Sunday. At the loss
of less than 30 planes, five American battleships were sunk and
two more badly damaged; almost two hundred Army and Navy
planes were destroyed and many damaged. The only unfavor¬
able break was the absence of two aircraft carriers at sea which
thus escaped attack.
Due to the later sunrise in the western Pacific, planes were
scheduled to bomb Philippine bases some five hours after the
Hawaiian attack. By jamming radio communications between
Honolulu and Manila it was hoped to prevent a warning. The
jamming failed and a heavy fog prevented Japanese planes
from reaching their targets until nine hours after the news of
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR z8i
the outbreak of war reached General Douglas MacArthur in
Manila where he commanded the Army forces. American
planes had looked for the Japanese and then returned to their
air fields, where the attack caught bomber and fighter squad¬
rons in neat lines. With one strike Japan was able to virtually
eliminate American air power in the Far East.
In the south the British fared little better at the great Singa¬
pore base. Japanese soldiers, brought from Formosa and forti¬
fied by a meal of dried eels, landed in the dark and without
detection on the Malayan coast. From there they moved south
to take Singapore from its unprotected land side. Japanese
planes on December 10 sank Britain’s latest battleship. Prince
of Wales, which Churchill had boasted a month earlier could
“catch and kill any Japanese ship.”
A shocked Congress voted on December 8 for the declara¬
tion of war after hearing Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” speech,
condemning Japanese treachery. One lone dissent was entered
by Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin who had also voted
against a declaration of war in 1917. Although the nation was
now virtually united and Roosevelt’s critics silenced by patriotic
ethics, the problem of allocating American resources presented
the administration with a most difficult situation. Germany,
Enemy No. 1, still remained at peace with the United States,
while the setback in the Pacific created pressures for a pre¬
dominantly westward movement of men, ships, and munitions.
The President seems to have been unwilling to ask Congress
for a declaration of war, and Hitler hesitated in supporting
Japan. Although there had been open warfare between Ameri¬
can destroyers and German submarines in the Atlantic, the
Germans chose not to make that war legal. But unless war with
Germany became official, the Lend-Lease supply line would be
pinched by the demands of active warfare against Japan. On
Pearl Harbor day the former ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Joseph Davies, was lunching with Ambassador Maxim Litvinov
who had just arrived from the Soviet Union via Hawaii. When
2g2 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

news of the attack reached them, Davies was elated since it

was now ‘all for one and one for all.” But Litvinov did not
receive the news as good tidings, expressing fear that it would
mean cutting the delivery of vital war materials to Britain and
Russia.
Adolf Hitler saved the situation on Thursday, December 11,
by joining with Italy in a declaration of war on the United
States. The military planners were then freed to go ahead with
their original plans for first priorities to the European war,
while the Pacific could be reduced to second priority. German
action also confirmed the view which Secretary of Interior
Harold Ickes had confided to his diary in October of 1941,
seeing the Pacific as the backdoor to war in Europe. Ickes
wrote:
For a long time I have believed that our best entrance
into the war would be by the way of Japan. . . . Japan
has no friends in this country, but China has. And of
course if we go to war against Japan, it will inevitably
lead us into war against Germany.
Even for a nation with lavish resources and substantial man¬
power, a policy needs be criticized which resulted in simul¬
taneous involvement in wars with major nations across two
oceans and which failed to prevent one of these wars from
beginning with the loss of military outposts and substantial
naval strength. Investigations into the limited field of the Pearl
Harbor disaster were made by Army, Navy, White House, and
congressional committees. Although individuals were selected
to receive the major blame, chiefly the two commanding of¬
ficers at Hawaii, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major
General Walter C. Short, many investigators recognized that
the charge, “dereliction of duty” could be extended to military
and political leadership in Washington as well.
For a number of questions raised, there are still partial or
inadequate answers within the restricted framework of the
Pearl Harbor disaster. Why was a MAGIC device not sent to
THE WANTED , UNWANTED WAR 283

Honolulu as well as Manila? If one of these devices could not

be spared for this major outpost, why was there not speedier
decoding of the materials in Washington and the quick dis¬
patch of at least the gist of the intercepts to Hawaii? These
technical questions have particular bearing on the last 24 hours
before Japan’s attack. Saturday evening President Roosevelt
was given the first 13 parts of the intercepted final Japanese
message. Reading it, the President told his White House aides
that it meant war, but no fresh warning was sent to the Pacific.
The next morning the 14th and final part stipulated that the
message was to be delivered at 1:00 p.m., Washington time.
Assuming that something would happen then, at least one
official, Col. Rufus Bratton, pointed out that the only place in
the Pacific where dawn would be breaking at that hour was
Hawaii. When this special threat to Hawaii was called to
Admiral Stark’s attention, he considered a direct phone call to
Honolulu but then failed to carry out his action. General
Marshall also considered a special warning to General Short,
but sent it by a cable which used commercial lines and reached
its destination only when the bombs were falling. Once news
of the attack reached Washington direct phone communication
was quickly established with Hawaii.
The usual defenses offered for these failures is the great con¬
cern for avoiding any leak which would suggest to the Japanese
the existence of a successful decoding device, an asset which
seems to have added little to the quality of American policy.
Various war warnings had already been sent to Pacific com¬
manders, and some fear was expressed of too frequently crying
“wolf.” Assaying the validity of these claims and the assump¬
tions which lay behind them is made difficult by conflicting
testimony, the disappearance of some documents and the se¬
curity restrictions which prevent the use of others, leaving the
story of Pearl Harbor still open to contradictory conjectures.
The historian can with more assurance raise broader criti¬
cisms of the policies which contributed to a war which in
284 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

China, at least, brought results as undesirable as some who had

opposed the conflict predicted. Here the widely prevalent over-
confidence in American power and underestimation of Japan’s
power and importance in the Far Eastern power structure ex¬
plains a great many analyses which time has proven mistaken.
Power breeds products other than corruption and, perhaps, the
most important of these for America at peak power was an
optimism which prevailed against all contradictory facts.
President Roosevelt exemplified the limits which this opti¬
mism and assurance imposed on the thinking of many Ameri¬
cans when they looked westward across the Pacific. Long be¬
fore the Pearl Harbor attack he seems to have believed that it
was the mission of the United States to stop Japanese expansion
in Asia. In 1934 he told Henry Stimson that he had known
about the Japanese threat since 1902 when a Japanese student
at Harvard had confided in him his nation’s hundred year plan
of conquest drafted in 1889. Thirty years later the President
remembered the details for Stimson and said that it included
the annexation of Manchuria, a protectorate in northern China,
the acquisition of British and American possessions in the
Pacific, including Hawaii, and finally bases in Mexico and Peru
to check the United States. By 1934 the President felt that
many of the particulars of this plan had been verified by events.
If Roosevelt took this “plot thesis” interpretation of Japanese
foreign policy seriously, it explains his efforts from his first
months in office to build up the Navy. Along with his convic¬
tion that he grasped the secret goals of Japan was another, that
he had the knowledge and competence to direct the naval
operations necessary to counter Japan’s policy. Like Winston
Churchill who chose the code name of “Former Naval Person”
in his correspondence with Roosevelt, looking back to his
service during World War I as First Lord of the Admiralty,
Roosevelt had a basis for his conviction in his service as As¬
sistant Secretary of the Navy during the same period. He could
also pride himself on having been an early student of the
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 285

writings of the great Admiral Mahan, the brilliant theorist who

had warned so strongly against a two-ocean war.
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt had sketched in 1913 a plan for
war with Japan by which a picket line of American ships across
the Pacific supply routes would starve that country into sub¬
mission. Nothing that happened technologically, particularly
in the field of air power, seems to have shaken that conviction
about naval strategy in the next quarter century. In July of
1937 the President explained to Sumner Welles how such a
blockade could be used in peacetime against Japan. In De¬
cember 1937, after the Panay incident, he told his cabinet that
with British co-operation such a blockade would be “a com¬
paratively simple task,” not requiring a great fleet, and would
bring Japan to her knees within a year.
While arguing for American naval needs in the Pacific, the
President must have been informed about the growth of Japa¬
nese strength. Since he does not seem to have given considera¬
tion to that growing strength in his own thinking about a future
war, he was either misinformed or selected that information
from his briefings which best fitted in with his own optimistic
assumptions. But one item noted by Henry Stimson even sug¬
gests that Roosevelt took no time to keep informed about the
Japanese Navy. Early in September of 1940 the Secretary of
War asked the President whether he had “any real knowledge”
as to what Japan had been doing in the way of secret fleet
building. Roosevelt told Stimson that he did not, but suggested
getting in touch with Secretary Knox and J. Edgar Hoover of
the F.B.I. to see if such information could be obtained. Stimson
left no record in his diary as to whether his quest was success¬
ful.
If the President only noted reports of Japan's naval weak¬
ness, he was probably able to find ample support for such an
illogical basis for optimism. Since Japan had built a cruiser in
the early thirties which had capsized, it was frequently claimed
by Americans that the Japanese vessels were top-heavy. A
286 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
common American cliche about Japanese having bad eyesight
was used to deprecate their naval gunnery. Japans abilities in
the air were also generally underrated. Army intelligence esti¬
mates in late 1941 in regard to the Zero fell short as to its speed,
range, and maneuverability. Even Japanese production of
planes which was over 400 a month for combat types in De¬
cember of 1941 was reported by American intelligence to be
only 200.
There were more realistic assessments of Japan’s fighting
abilities in Washington files, but these may have been disre¬
garded as inconsistent with general evaluations of Japan. Ad¬
miral Harry E. Yarnell, in command of the Asiatic Fleet, 1936-
1939, had opportunity to watch the Japanese in action against
the Chinese. Yarnell’s Fleet Intelligence officer submitted a
report in January of 1938 which should have demolished some
illusions. Japanese naval officers and men were found to be
“hardworking, studious, well-trained” and drilled in all weather
and under the most adverse conditions. Naval vessels, guns,
ammunition, and fire control were all rated “very good,” not
inferior to the U.S. Navy. While Japanese ships were not found
to be as smart and clean as American, they were in good
working condition with more hours devoted to combat drill
than routine painting and polishing. Japan’s naval aircraft were
already considered “as good as planes in general service in
the United States Navy” with bombing accuracy good, flight
tactics very good, and aggressive action noted as “excellent.”
Yarnell s evaluations were not kept from other commanders.
In January 1938 he warned Admiral C. C. Block, the new
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, then stationed in San
Diego, against any attempt to move his forces to the Philippines
after war began. The Japanese, he said, had a large force of
submarines and aircraft which could operate from Formosa
against any point in the Philippines. In December 1938, six
months before he was relieved of his command in preparation
for retirement, Yarnell wrote to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, then
 ,
THE WANTED UNWANTED WAR 287
chairman of the General Board. The Japanese Navy, he said,
was "a force which should not be despised,” their cruisers and
destroyers were “distinctly superior to ours in design,” and
operations were carried out “just as skillfully as we do.”
Through Admiral Leahy, Yarnell attempted to get his views
on the Japanese Navy and the problems of future war read in
the White House. On one occasion, Leahy reported back to
Yarnell that Roosevelt had taken one of his memoranda along
with him to be read while on a southern cruise.
Realistic evaluations like Yarnell’s had some impact on naval
circles, where there were no claims that a war with Japan
would result in a quick and easy victory. As Secretary Stimson
wrote the President in October of 1940, he found the heads of
the Navy, “rather cautious—unusually cautious men.” This
caution came in conflict with Roosevelt’s optimism when the
President decided to keep the fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than
on the Pacific coast. A temporary movement had been made to
Hawaii in April 1940 to conduct war games, but when prepa¬
rations were made for return in early May, orders came from
Washington to postpone that return for two weeks. When that
period expired, orders were received to remain indefinitely.
When Admiral J. C. Richardson strenuously objected to Ad¬
miral Stark that the fleet was unprepared to maintain fighting
efficiency at Pearl Harbor, he was informed that the orders
came from the President himself.
In October of 1940 Richardson came to Washington to talk
with the President who told him that the move 2,500 miles
further west was made to deter possible Japanese moves south¬
ward. The fleet commander raised a number of objections to a
political use of naval force which seemed to place it in jeop¬
ardy, but the President said he would “sit tight” on his decision.
In March of 1941 Richardson was relieved of his command and
replaced by Admiral Kimmel. Secretary of Navy Knox, Rich¬
ardson reported, told him he was detached because he had hurt
the President’s feelings with his objections. In the congres-
288 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
sional hearings Richardson charged that Stanley K. Hornbeck
was exerting more influence over the disposition of the fleet
than its commander.
The disposal of the fleet again came up for discussion in
April and May of 1941. German submarines were operating in
the Atlantic at such cost to the British supply lines that Stimson
and Knox proposed to the President that the fleet be moved
entirely to the Atlantic. The argument made by the two Secre¬
taries was that Japan knew that the fleet in Hawaii was no real
threat, since it could not be used offensively without ample
warning. Roosevelt countered that the battleships were needed
in Pearl Harbor for the defense of Hawaii itself. General Mar¬
shall was enlisted in support of Stimson and Knox and told
Roosevelt that Hawaii was impregnable whether there were
any ships there or not. The Army Air Force stationed in the
islands was so strong, said Marshall, that Japan would not
dare to attack such a long distance from home bases. Knox also
claimed that Hawaii was unassailable even without the fleet,
and this view, Stimson noted in his diary, “completely exploded
the President’s reason” for resisting the shift. Roosevelt then
dropped back to the deterrent argument and said that the
“mere presence” of the ships at Pearl Harbor protected the
southwestern Pacific, including Singapore and the Dutch East
Indies.
In the debate on this issue Roosevelt was not only torn be¬
tween his “Europe-first” military and political commitments
and his commitments to China, but he avoided talking with his
war chiefs about the significance of increasing naval involve¬
ment in the Atlantic. Any force in the Atlantic, he told Stimson,
“was merely going to be a patrol to watch for any aggressor
and to report to America.” Stimson reminded him that the real
purpose was to report the presence of German naval forces to
the British fleet. “I wanted him to be honest with himself ”
Stimson noted in his diary, stating his own willingness to recog¬
nize Atlantic patrols as hostile acts and to take the responsi-
THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR 289
bility for them. The Secretary of War felt that Roosevelt was
trying to hide his action by calling it “a purely defensive action
which it really is not.”
Secretary Hull opposed the naval movement to the Atlantic
and the British supported his viewpoint in part. Some ships
needed to be kept at Pearl Harbor, London said, to act as a
makeweight against Japan moving freely on Singapore. The
President compromised and sent approximately one-fourth of
the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, including three battleships
and one aircraft carrier. The remainder of the fleet was still
based at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
“Uncle Sam and Britannia,” Winston Churchill wrote in 1950,
“were the godparents of the new Japan.” By 1941 the godchild
had grown up. No longer was it possible to win concessions
with tactics which had been so effective 70 and 80 years earlier.
And no longer could the defense of American and European
interests in the Far East be achieved without regard to rising
Asian nationalism and the rising human costs imposed by the
spread of western military technology.
Six months after the war began, a Far Eastern publicist who
supported the President’s policy, Nathaniel Peffer, wrote that
Pearl Harbor was “neither an accident nor a coincidence, but
wholly in the logic of American history. Pearl Harbor was an
effect, not a cause.” That historical verdict seems likely to
stand. Nor from an American viewpoint can there be much
dispute about the cause as stated by Henry Stimson in 1948:
“. . . it was American support of China—American refusal to
repudiate the principles of Hay, Hughes, Stimson, and Hull—
which proved the final cause of the breakdown of negotiations
and the beginning of war.” Aside from questioning the in¬
clusion of Hughes in this list, the historian can only ask whether
these principles, proclaimed to protect American interests, had
not already been shown to be irrelevant in the face of rising
Asian nationalism and the shifting balance of power in the
Far East.
Chapter XIV

A NEW SUN RISES

T HE KILLING of Americans and Japanese which began

with the attack on Pearl Harbor lasted for three and a half
years. Japan’s decision to seek a military solution cost that
nation over a million lives in its armed forces. In addition over
a half million civilians died as American bombs levelled the
major Japanese cities and destroyed the industrial strength on
which the military effort was based. The end came on August
10, 1945, one day after the United States dropped the second
atomic bomb wiping out a major part of Nagasaki. General
Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied
powers accepted the formal surrender and began the work of
occupying the Japanese islands and disarming a defeated
people.
The price in human lives was also great for those Americans
directly affected, although less than a tenth of that paid by
Japan. Battle casualties in the Army alone ran over 3,000 a
month through 1944 and rose to over 12,000 a month in the
final drives to oust the Japanese from the islands which blocked
the road to Tokyo. Total battle deaths for the Pacific, however,
were roughly 50,000, about a sixth of the total American losses
in World War II.
290
A NEW SUN RISES 291
To this cost in lives must be added the political costs of a
serious blow to constitutional liberties in the United States and
the deleterious effect of the war against Japan on American
war aims in Europe. This first cost involved over a hundred
thousand individuals of Japanese ancestry living in California,
Washington, and Oregon. In February of 1942 President Roose¬
velt conceded to West coast political clamor and the claim of
military necessity and authorized the Army to conduct a mass
evacuation of these individuals, aliens and citizens, children
and adults alike, to concentration centers behind barbed wire
in isolated areas of the inter-mountain West. Among these
individuals were many whose sons were fighting in the Ameri¬
can armed forces and a few who were veterans of World
War I.
The old racial antagonisms were heightened by the Pearl
Harbor attack and a variety of false rumors. One, given some
support by the Roberts Commission report on the Pearl Harbor
attack, claimed that there had been widespread acts of espio¬
nage by the Japanese residents of Hawaii. This further stimu¬
lated wild stories of treasonable activities among the Japanese-
Americans of California, although no proved instance of sabo¬
tage or of espionage after Pearl Harbor among the West coast
Japanese was ever uncovered. Economic interest groups anx¬
ious to rid themselves of their competitors of Oriental an¬
cestry added to the hysteria which accompanied fears of a
military invasion of the United States. Pressure from West
coast congressmen and a false assessment of military necessity
moved a pliable administration and War Department into
ordering a mass evacuation.
Uncharged with any crime, some American citizens and their
Japan-born parents remained behind barbed wire for the dura¬
tion of the war. In 1944 the Supreme Court upheld the consti¬
tutionality of this mass abrogation of the rights of Americans
to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Deprived of access to the War Department records which
2Q2 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
would have shown that Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt,
commander of the Western Theater of Operations, did not
consider a mass evacuation a military necessity, the Court justi¬
fied its decision on grounds that “military urgency” and “proper
security measures” demanded that all citizens of Japanese an¬
cestry be “segregated.” But with due perspective, this action
appears to have been the greatest single violation of civil
liberties in the history of the United States. The precedent
established was incorporated in the Internal Security Act of
1950 which authorized the Attorney General to “detain” those
persons in any future war “as to whom there is reasonable
ground to believe they will probably engage in sabotage or
espionage.”
For the proclaimed aims of the United States in the war
against the Nazi domination of Europe, the decisions to stand
firm against Japan in Asia meant what may have been a crucial
diversion of effort. Whatever the public statements about a
global effort against one enemy, December 7, 1941 did not
change the commitment and military plans of the Roosevelt
administration which gave first priority to the defeat of Hitler.
Winston Churchill had welcomed the entry of the United States
into a common front against Germany by the way of the events
of the Pacific. But when he visited Washington in late De¬
cember of 1941 he was shocked to find “the extraordinary
significance of China in American minds.” Even at the top
levels, he wrote, it was “strangely out of proportion.” For
Britain with the enemy but a few miles across the English
Channel, it was difficult to grant equal status to the threat of
Japan, thousands of miles from either Britain or the American
mainland. Yet the fall of the Philippines and other defeats so
moved the American public that opinion polls in 1942 and 1943
found twice as many individuals designating Japan as the
major enemy as those who looked first to the defeat of Hitler.
This national orientation with its political pressures combined
A NEW SUN RISES *93
with the strong demands of the Pacific commanders and the
lack of a major front against Germany to counter the official
priority system. In 1942 and 1943 about as many fighting men
were sent to the Pacific as were sent across the Atlantic to face
Germany.
A near-equal division of men and materiel between the two
wars gave strength to the dominant British school of strategy
which pressed for peripheral campaigns rather than opening
a second front in France, as General George Marshall initially
proposed. As a result, until June of 1944, American forces
fought ground campaigns in North Africa and southern Italy
while bombing German cities in an effort to weaken the Ger¬
man economy. Meanwhile the burden of coping with the bulk
of German fighting forces was left to the Russians who slowly
pushed the battle line off Russian soil and into eastern Europe.
When the war ended a year after American and British forces
landed in France, it found the Russian forces in possession of
most of eastern Europe and a major segment of Germany.
Soviet leaders, having paid the highest price in blood for Ger¬
man defeat, were determined to maintain their hegemony far
beyond their 1941 frontiers. For many Americans this meant a
defeat for major objectives of the European war. A Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Hungary freed from Nazi rule
to become Communist nations was viewed as severe a blow to
the freedom of small nations and to the balance of power in
Europe as was German rule.
It is impossible, of course, to state with any certainty what
would have been the course of the European war if the United
States had entered the conflict directly in 1941 or 1942 with a
compromise keeping peace in the Pacific. But since the shortage
of materiel and manpower is frequently cited in the studies of
the decisions to defer the cross-Channel invasion, an earlier and
fuller engagement of German power seems very probable with¬
out the drain of the Pacific. A war which ended on the eastern
2Q4 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

frontiers of Germany, while exacting a greater price in Ameri¬

can and British lives, would also have shitted the geographic
balance in the postwar struggle for Europe.
Another price paid in connection with the Pacific War led to
angry political recriminations in the United States. At the Yalta
Conference in February of 1945 the American negotiators
agreed that Russia’s 1905 losses to Japan should be restored
in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan. The
Soviet Union subsequently entered the Pacific War on August
8, 1945, just before its close, and was rewarded with the
restoration of the southern half of the island of Sakhalin and
adjacent small islands. The lease to Chinas Port Arthur and
the cession of the Kurile Islands were also included in Russian
gains. The subsequent presence of Soviet power in the Kuriles
as well as in southern Sakhalin increased the threat to Japanese
security from the north as well as jeopardized American
hegemony in the northern Pacific. A further result of Soviet
participation was the role assigned to Russian, forces in taking
the surrender of the Japanese army in northern Korea. Com¬
munist government was then installed in this area, leading to
the division of Korea and to the costly Korean War which
broke out in 1950.
Some broad outlines of the future peace with Japan had been
laid down in wartime agreements of the Allies. At the Cairo
Conference in November, 1943, Britain, China, and the United
States stated that they were fighting to “restrain and punish
the aggression of Japan” and agreed to demand “unconditional
surrender.” The defeated nation was to be stripped of the
Pacific islands “seized or occupied” since 1914, of territories
“stolen” from China, and of all other territories taken by “vio¬
lence and greed.” At Potsdam in July of 1945 it was agreed
that Japan would be subject to military occupation until “a
peacefully inclined and responsible government” had been cre¬
ated by the “freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” The
objectives of the Occupation were stated as including the
A NEW SUN RISES *95
elimination from power of the war leaders, the punishment of
war criminals, the dismantling of the war industries, and the
establishment of respect for fundamental human rights.
As the fighting came to an end in the Pacific another battle
raged in Washington over how these aims were to be carried
out. One group of specialists, identified by some as “the China
crowd” and including many writers and scholars associated
with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the journal Amerasia,
argued for a rigorous and thorough reconstruction of Japan.
They favored a complete purge of the ruling class and also of
the zaibatsu, the great industrial and business families who
were charged with being the allies of the militarists. In general
this group favored a “hard peace,” an end which had strong
public support as a result of the bitter fighting and mounting
casualties in the final months of the war.
The other group, called “the Japan crowd” by their op¬
ponents, was headed by former Ambassador Joseph Grew,
director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the last year
of the war. Grew and his supporters believed that Japanese
traditions and institutions retained values and forms which
were worthy of preservation and which could be used in re¬
constructing a peaceful nation. The Emperor was seen as an
asset in securing acceptance of the surrender and in easing the
task of the new military rulers. The ousting of Hirohito, at¬
tacked by some of the “China crowd” as “War Criminal Num¬
ber One,” was viewed as opening the way for political chaos
which would present endless problems for the Occupation
authorities.
Neither school succeeded in making a deep imprint on Oc¬
cupation policy. General MacArthur and his aides viewed with
suspicion men who had special knowledge of Japan and the
Far East. The General disregarded almost completely the Far
Eastern Commission of the Allied powers and paid little atten¬
tion to the advisers and directives sent from Washington. He
set about to democratize Japan with the help of the men he
296 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
relied upon, men who had been trained in war and experienced
in military operations rather than in government. If the Oc¬
cupation had any comprehensive theory as a guide, it was that
"what was good for the United States must be good for Japan.”
The Meiji Constitution by which Japan had begun parlia¬
mentary government was put aside, and the Occupation au¬
thorities wrote a new constitution which was adopted by the
Japanese Diet. Guarantees were provided for a number of
democratic rights, including a free press and free speech. To
prevent re-militarization an article was included in the con¬
stitution by which Japan renounced forever the right to make
war and banned the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces.
The Occupation then functioned by means of directives
which were dutifully incorporated into law by the Japanese
Diet and carried out by the Prime Minister. By such means
the police force was decentralized in the hope of preventing
future political control; the same was done for the school
system which had been so effectively used as a means of in¬
doctrination. Large landholdings were broken up, and some
effort made to curtail industrial combines and to collect repa¬
rations from the Japanese economy. Political parties along
American models were strongly encouraged.
By the spring of 1947 General MacArthur and his aides
could look back upon an imposing list of laws and decrees.
The General thought that he had completed his task and spoke
of the spiritual revolution which had taken place in Japan as
probably the greatest the world had ever known.” Democracy,
he believed, was firmly implanted in Japan, and this nation
would henceforth be "the Switzerland of the Pacific,” Mac¬
Arthur told newspapermen.
The Occupation continued, however, long after MacArthur
believed that his work was completed due to the unwillingness
of both Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek to sign the peace treaty
proposed by the United States. The outbreak of the Korean
War in the summer of 1950 turned the Pacific Commander to
A NEW SUN RISES 297
military tasks, and it was his successors who saw the Occupa¬
tion terminated in 1952, after President Truman removed Mac-
Arthur from his post. The optimistic view of American achieve¬
ments in rebuilding Japan which characterized communiques
issued from Tokyo has remained the official version of the
seven years’ accomplishments. When the Crown Prince and
Crown Princess visited Washington in September of 1960, Pres¬
ident Eisenhower spoke of Japan as a proud country which
“with us believes in the democratic ideal of life.” The Presi¬
dent’s gracious greeting ignored the fact that he had been
prevented from paying an official visit to Tokyo by anti-
American riots in May and June which contrasted with his
friendly reception in Seoul, Manila, and Taipeh.
It is too early to appraise the permanent effects of indirect
American rule, but it also is obvious that the character of the
changes in Japan falls short of the official American and Japa¬
nese claims. If Anglo-Saxon political institutions are transfer¬
able to another culture they are slow to root and in growing
take forms produced by mutations. More than a century’s effort
at transplanting the North American political forms to Carib¬
bean and Central American states strongly suggests that it is
very difficult if not impossible to disseminate the Bill of Rights
and the two-party system among peoples of radically different
cultures and living conditions.
Some of the Occupation’s work has been undone since
Japan recovered full sovereignty, while the Occupation itself
retreated from some of its goals before withdrawing. The
primary influence in the change of course was the growth of
Russian-American and American-Chinese antagonism. The first
effect was to make Japan’s Communists and left wing parties,
originally tolerated and even encouraged by the Occupation, a
threat to the model Japan which Americans hoped to create.
General MacArthur agreed to the curbing of some democratic
freedoms which were used excessively by the Communists; the
Japanese conservatives who dominated the post-Occupation
2q8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

governments went further. Civil servants and teachers, for ex¬

ample, had been guaranteed political freedom to prevent their
becoming the helpless tools of the party in power. But when
many of these individuals took part in Communist-led strikes
and demonstrations, they found their freedom of political ac¬
tion withdrawn. Both the police system and the educational
system have been recentralized since the restoration of sover¬
eignty.
Some positive influences remain in effect. Many of the Oc¬
cupation’s critics grant that the American-sponsored land re¬
form program went far in eliminating rural indebtedness and
farm tenancy. Rural discontent was one of the major sources of
the strength of the militarists. The change in the status of the
Japanese woman also seems likely to remain one of the major
accomplishments effected by the Occupation legislation and
further facilitated in indirect ways by association with the
thousands of lonely male Americans serving and working in
Japan.
The presence of large numbers of Americans, both military
and civilian, along with their dependents, may in time be seen
to have exerted an even greater influence on Japan than the
directives of the Supreme Commander. The mass culture of
America—the juke box with its 'pop tunes,” television with
its serials, the teenage set with its many fads—came to Japan.
Those American cultural imports which existed in pre-war
Japan were reinforced by the Occupation. Change also brought
social disorganization; juvenile delinquency, theft, violence,
sexual assault, which some of the older generation view as the
evil products of Americanization and the destruction of tradi¬
tional Japanese values. These complaints seem unlikely, how¬
ever, to promote a successful purge of the imported elements
which have fused in a variety of patterns with the indigenous
culture.
One major goal of the Occupation, the creation of a neutral,
unarmed nation without military leaders, has been almost com-
A NEW SUN RISES 299
pletely discarded. The shift from a drastic demilitarization
policy was begun by MacArthur. Faced with what seemed
increasingly powerful Communist and Socialist demonstrations,
the Occupation authorities began to fear an attempt at revolu¬
tion. The Japanese government had only a minimal police force
to protect itself and the Occupation leaders were hesitant
about using American troops against Japanese civilians. Gen¬
eral MacArthur agreed in 1950 to the establishment of a Na¬
tional Police Reserve of 75,000 men to cope with threatened
subversion and public disorder. Trained and equipped initially
by the American Army, this force soon rose to over 100,000
and drew its officers from the old Japanese Army. Renamed the
National Security Force and expanding its arsenal of weapons
to include tanks, this organization became the nucleus of a new
army. Socialists challenged this development as a violation of
the constitutional ban on armed forces, but the Japanese courts
twice upheld the constitutionality of the new force.
American policy changed even further when it favored the
growth of Japan’s armed forces beyond the level needed for
internal policing. The new goal was the creation of military
forces which would once more make Japan a factor in the
politics of the Far East. Following the ratification of the peace
treaty a “Self-Defense Air Force” and naval force were created.
The Air Force was equipped initially with American planes
and trained by American pilots. The first class to graduate in
the operation of jet aircraft included a lieutenant colonel who
had taken part in the bombing of Pearl Harbor. By 1960 the
new force had grown to include a thousand fliers and was
headed by an airman who had played a key role in planning
the successful air strikes of 1941.
The new navy began as it had almost a century before with
American vessels. With congressional approval, the U.S. Navy
in 1954 loaned Japan a number of small ships, including two
destroyers. New vessels were soon built in Japan’s own ship¬
yards; by 1960 the flag of the Rising Sun flew again over 14
3oo AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

new destroyers and was painted on the fuselages of a small

naval air force. In January of 1959 the new navy paid its first
visit to Pearl Harbor, greeted this time with grass-skirted hula
girls. Stirring of unpleasant memories was avoided as much as
possible during the two-weeks’ visit to the Hawaiian Islands;
the Japanese reportedly firing their salutes outside the entrance
to the harbor to avoid even ceremonial exchange of guns within
the harbor. A tribute was paid to the hulk of the battleship
Arizona which rests on the bottom, where it was sent in 1941
by Japanese bombs.
The nationalist forces of the older Japan have given their
support to the development of military power on the founda¬
tions laid by the former enemy. The decision to give Japan a
role in the Cold War and to use the islands as bases off the
coast of Communist China cannot help but reinforce the belief
of extreme nationalists that the nation’s mistake was not the
course adopted in 1931, but the failure to create enough
strength to carry it out. The same developments add to the
resentments created by the Japanese War Crimes Trials at
which 25 major war leaders, led by General Tojo, were sen¬
tenced to death or life imprisonment by a tribunal created by
the victorious allies. Tojo and six others were hanged. In
August of 1960 a national monument was unveiled to these
“Seven Martyrs” with an inscription charging that their execu¬
tion had been by “ex post facto law after the nation was com¬
pelled to surrender when the United States used atomic
weapons and the Soviet Union violated its non-aggression
pact.” The monument was built on a mountain side facing the
United States and bears the pointed charge, “Let us cast our
eyes far in the direction of the Pacific and probe who was
responsible for the war.”
Hostility toward the United States, which before the war
was largely the expression of conservative and reactionary
parties, became a major characteristic of the Socialist and
Communist parties. Their hostility was chiefly directed at the
A NEW SUN RISES 301

security pact negotiated in 1951 which gave the United States

the exclusive right to retain military bases on Japanese soil
for mutual defense. A year after the Occupation was formally
terminated, there were still over 150,000 American soldiers
and their dependents on Japanese soil. The growing sense of
national independence was constantly confronted with the
foreign troops and strengthened the argument of the govern¬
ment’s critics that it was the puppet of the Americans. The
retention of Okinawa as a major base, granting Japan only
“residual sovereignty,” added to this political hostility. Al¬
though American ground forces were withdrawn in 1958 and
the security pact renegotiated in 1960 on a more favorable
basis for Japan, the provisions for continued American air and
naval bases set off the massive anti-American demonstrations
of May and June of 1960 which led to the cancellation of
President Eisenhower’s visit.
The growth of Communist China’s prestige as a world power
also strengthened those who claim that only the United States
influence prevents a closer relationship between Tokyo and
Peking. The existence of an even greater Chinese market than
was available in the 1930’s moved some conservative Japanese
businessmen to join with their political opponents in favoring
recognition of China. The prosperity which Japan gained in
the 1950’s and early 1960’s was based on marketing outlets in
the United States, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Any curtailment
of these markets through an American recession or restrictive
trade practices would make the pressure for the expansion of
relations with China almost irresistible for even a conservative
Japanese government.
The future of American relations with Japan within the Cold
War framework is not likely to be a stable one. The strength
of the Socialists and Communists has been greatest in the
ranks of urban youth, organized workers, and the educated
classes, sectors of the population growing faster than those
elements such as farmers and older age groups who vote con-
302 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

servative. Unless Japan’s prosperity can be maintained and ex¬

tended in such a way as to weaken or reorient the parties on
the left, the likelihood is great that they will in time have an
influence on foreign policy which will disrupt the American
security pact. A pro-Chinese or even a neutral Japan, insisting
on the evacuation of bases in Japan and of Okinawa, would
mean a major setback to American military strategy in the
western Pacific.
The possibility of a new clash between the national interests
of Japan and those of the United States does not seem to have
been given serious consideration by American policy makers
in the second decade following Japan’s surrender. An attitude
of forgive and forget, while assuming permanent partnership
in the future, seems to mark American opinion as well. In
April of 1962 the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff awarded a Legion of Merit medal to General Minoru
Genda for his outstanding services as Chief of Staff of the
Japanese forces since 1959. Genda was the brilliant naval air
officer who was consulted by Admiral Yamamoto in 1941 and
who convinced the Admiral that an air attack on Pearl Harbor
was feasible technically. Interviewed in 1961, Genda expressed
his regret as a tactician that the attack had not been bigger
and more destructive so as to eliminate the American carrier
forces as well. The honors given to such an influential former
enemy evoked no outcry from even the most extreme chauvin¬
ist elements in American society.
The available data on the rapid change in the attitude of the
American public toward Japan in the post-Hiroshima decades
suggests a continued close correlation with official American
policy. In the last year of the war public opinion polls showed
a rising hostility toward Japan, possibly produced by accounts
of the savage last-ditch efforts to hold Pacific islands which
also were dramatized by rising American casualties. But once
the Japanese authorities surrendered and the peaceful occupa¬
tion began this antagonism quickly subsided. Asked early in
A NEW SUN RISES 303

1946 which nation would still most like to dominate the world,
Americans picked their former allies, Russia and Britain. Japan
ranked fourth after Germany and was suspected of retaining
expansionist ambitions by only 9 percent of the respondents.
In December of 1944 a majority of Americans felt that the
Japanese would always be a warlike people; by 1946 this view
was held by less than a third.
Even the old hostility of the West coast states seems to have
been neutralized when comparisons are made with other
regions of the United States. In a poll in early 1953, 64 percent
of the respondents on the West coast expressed unequivocally
friendly feelings toward Japan. This was 8 percent higher than
the national average in the same poll. It was the South, perhaps
influenced by the competition of Japanese textiles or by racist
associations, which expressed the highest percentage of ill-
will toward Japan.
Other aspects of the pre-Pearl Harbor stereotypes of Japan
seem to have disappeared in the face of official sponsorship
of the new Japan. The buck-toothed, grinning but threatening
Japanese has been removed from the American political
cartoonists' standardized portrayals. The renewed Japanese
trade competition with American products failed to produce
the type of “scare articles" which were a favorite stock piece
of American magazines and Sunday newspaper supplements
in the 1930’s. Articles about Japan were more likely to be titled,
“Land of Strangeness and Charm," “The Exquisite Enigma,"
“The Quiet Beauty of Old Japan" or even “Cool Cats and
Samurai,” to select a few titles from the 1960’s. Even the
amazingly rapid growth of Japan’s economy was viewed more
with wonder and admiration than fear of future competition.
“Japan’s Miracle,” “Prosperity Unlimited” and “Free and Easy
Trade" were typically friendly titles used in describing this
economic transformation.
For a new generation of Americans who know World War II
as a set of pages in history texts, the image of Japan is almost
3o4 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

completely free of the older, hostile stereotypes. The word,

“Japanese,” evoked such adjectives as “exotic,” “graceful,”
“picturesque,” and “polite,” from college students in the 1960’s
far more than it did, “sinister,” “fanatic” “slant-eyed,” and
“treacherous.”
Some of these changes in attitudes can be ascribed to what
appear to have been obvious influences in the postwar decades.
A series of exceptionally fine art films exported by Japan made
circuits throughout the United States; Hollywood also found
the new Japan with films which featured beautiful gardens,
temples, and geisha girls; a renewed interest in Japanese art;
the great interest in some circles in Zen Buddhism; an Ameri¬
can tour by a kabuki troupe—all these may have strengthened
impressions of Japan as the center of a great and attractive
culture. Many Americans also came to know Japan personally
during the Occupation, more than had ever visited Japan in
previous periods as visitors. Their letters to friends and rela¬
tives, their personal accounts when they returned frequently
added to the image of Japanese as a polite, co-operative, and
likeable people. Of some 400 business and professional leaders
who visited Japan in the postwar years, only 2 percent, accord¬
ing to a 1959 poll, returned with a bad impression of their
hosts.
In the framework of American foreign policy the changed
view of Japan has been as complete. An Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, addressing the Japan-America
Society in 1961 on “The American Image of Japan,” said that
the romantic post-Perry view had been dropped at the close of
World War I. Americans now regarded Japan, he said, as a
democracy, a major world industrial power, a center of cul¬
ture, a leader in Asia, and a partner of the United States.
Japan has changed in many ways in the more than a century
and a half of its relationship with the United States. The na¬
tional character and the national outlook have not, however,
changed as drastically and as frequently as have American
A NEW SUN RISES 305

impressions of that character and outlook. Nor can the changes

in American views be closely related to increased information
and knowledge of Japan. Ignorance and superficial acquaint¬
ance have produced some unrealistic judgments, but knowledge
and close contact have not prevented equally unrealistic
images from gaining currency. The experience with Japanese
immigrants was no doubt a formative influence for Pacific
coast Americans. But overriding all these considerations seems
to have been the official relationship between Washington and
Tokyo. When Japan's foreign policy is harmonious with Ameri¬
can aspirations and interests in Asia, the Japanese people were
seen as exotic but peaceful and hard-working individuals, lov¬
ing beauty and nature. When interests have clashed seriously,
all Japanese energies seem to have been directed at aggrandize¬
ment and the national pride in cultural achievements has been
seen as Oriental arrogance. There is some evidence to suggest
that a Japanese study of national stereotypes of the Americans
might also find some rough correlation between the character
of the relationship of the two powers on a governmental level
and the Japanese image of the American national character. In
both instances there are probably some residual attitudes which
have gone deeper in the national consciousness and which
change very slowly. The polling techniques in use, however,
do not seem to probe successfully into this lower layer of bias
and prejudgment.
The development of stereotypes, even though they seem flexi¬
ble enough to change with the shifts in the character of trans¬
pacific relations, still contributes to the production of unwanted
results in foreign policy. To the extent that stereotypes are
unrealistic and blot out contradictions and diversities, they are
obstacles to objective analysis. In the post-Hiroshima decades
they have supported the assumption of American policy that
the new Japan is a natural and permanent ally. The obvious
generalization that Japan has a set of national interests, pro¬
duced by a geography, economy, history, and culture different
3o6 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

from that of the United States, and that these differences will
produce a clash of interests, seems to be frequently ignored.
Clashing interests need not create new enmities but they do
prevent a long-term alliance, more to the interests of one nation
and possibly even against the interests of one partner. As an
insular power Japan can no more turn her back upon the Asian
mainland than can Britain disregard the countries lying across
the English Channel. Jet planes and missiles have cut the
distance between Washington and Tokyo, but they have not
eliminated the proximity of Tokyo to Shanghai and Vladi¬
vostok. To hold to an image of Japan which bars the possi¬
bility of neutrality or alignment with the new nationalisms of
Asia invites a blow to American confidence comparable to that
suffered in 1949 when Chinese Communists completed their
mainland defeat of the Kuomintang.
The flight of Chiang Kai-shek to Fonnosa was an even
greater disaster for American policy than Pearl Harbor, a dis¬
aster which nullified the military victories of American power
in the Pacific, 1942-1945. The American policy which led up
to Pearl Harbor, it must be recalled, was not directed at achiev¬
ing the transmission of American values to Japan nor at con¬
verting that nation from an opponent to an ally. The political
end of the war was that proclaimed in 1941, the maintenance
of a favorable balance of power in Asia in the interests of
preserving the Open Door. The preservation of the treaty sys¬
tem, of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and of the orderly processes
of change, whatever their desirability as general goals of na¬
tional policy, were also means for the maintenance of a status
quo which seemed most favorable to the continuance of the
Open Door. This term in itself had become almost a meaning¬
less catch-all, at bottom, said Walter Lippmann in 1944, “a
short name for the American way of life, projected abroad/*
Few Americans ever pointed out that the doors were to be
kept open for the advantage of foreign interests, not primarily
Chinese interests. Implicit in the Open Door concept was the
A NEW SUN RISES 307

assumption that China, unlike other sovereign nations, had no

right to bargain and to close or open its doors to whatever
nations seemed to China’s best advantage. The rise of Chinese
nationalism in the 1920’s clearly pointed to the time when
China would close its doors to special privileges for Europeans
and deny the United States its self-assumed role of protector.
Only the growth of Japanese interests permitted this develop¬
ment to be ignored as a consideration of American policy.
The closing of the Open Door came, ironically, at a time
when that great market of four hundred million impoverished
customers had grown to over six hundred million who were at
last promised that they would become, like Europeans, sub¬
stantial consumers. Whatever the limitations of the “Great Leap
Forward” led by Mao Tse-tung with its totalitarian-minded-
ness, China has begun its industrialization and its quest for a
higher material standard of living. At the point when this turn
came, the United States, embittered by the defeat of Chiang
and Communist anti-Americanism, turned its back upon the
trading possibilities which the new China might offer. Secretary
of State Dean Acheson stated the new position in the spring of
1950 when he warned China’s new rulers that their market for
American goods was now viewed as so small that it could not
be used to win political concessions. Exports to China, said
Acheson, were “less than 5% of our total exports and our
purchases from China were a mere 2% of all that we bought
abroad.” The United States was willing to leave it to the test of
experience, according to the Secretary of State, to prove to the
Chinese how little it depended on that trade.
In 1890 Henry Adams wrote to his friend, Henry Cabot
Lodge, “On the whole I am satisfied that America has no future
in the Pacific.” Neither Lodge nor his successors who supported
the larger American policy would consider Adams’ statement
as anything but unrealistic pessimism. But to Americans of the
1960’s, looking back on the chastening experience with China,
the Korean War with its limited victory, and the difficulties in
3oS AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

maintaining friendly governments in Vietnam and Laos, there

was more reason to examine Adams’ views. Was Americas
great empire of influence, prestige, trade, and power to decline
in Asia as drastically as have those earlier territorial empires
of Britain, France, and the Netherlands? Was the United
States, which always felt that it was holding out a helping
hand to Asians, to fare no better than the European rivals
whose ends seemed clearly to be crassly exploitive?
Fear that the answer to these questions might be in the
affirmative raised cries of “What went wrong?” Had this coun¬
try, as some charge, been betrayed by enemies in its midst?
Had the key to China been turned over to Moscow or to Mao
Tse-tung by American Communists and fellow-travellers?
Were good intentions and good deeds to be swept off the bal¬
ance by an evil spawned by Karl Marx and exported across
Siberia to Peking? Such simple questions led, unfortunately,
to oversimplified answers. Demonology rather than historical
analysis was too readily used to give explanations which could
be grasped without too much thought.
Any probing for an answer should initially see the American
debacle as a segment of the broader story of the downfall of
the European and of his efforts to rule and shape the future of
Asia and Africa. It must note that the forces of nationalism
which the European introduced and stimulated by his presence
become in their development resistant to outside control. The
intensity of the xenophobia which the nationalists, Communist
and non-Communist, propagate is also related to historic griev¬
ances, real or imagined. In China and Japan the Taiping and
Boxer rebellions and the “Expel the barbarians” movement
attest to the nineteenth-century grievances. Even the most
impeccable behavior by the European powers in the twentieth
century may have been ineffective in diverting this nationalist
hostility without curtailment of major interests.
Whatever the differences in aim and method, the United
States was generally identified by Asians with the old order
A NEW SUN RISES 309

and European imperialism. As early as 1922 that percipient

student of Far Eastern policy, Tyler Dennett, warned of this
relationship in his classic work.

Each nation, the United States not excepted, has made its
contribution to the welter of evil which now comprises
the Far Eastern question. We shall all do well to drop for
all time the pose of self-righteousness and injured in¬
nocence and penitently face the facts.

These historic factors circumscribed the scope for successful

advancement of American political and economic interests; the
performance of recent American foreign policy and diplomats
must be judged against estimates of the limited rather than
unlimited possibilities of success.
Within these limits it is very probable that a wise policy
could have avoided war with Japan without national humili¬
ation and surrender of vital national interests. Wise policy
ought also to have been able to have avoided the state of near
war, the breakdown of political and economic relations with
China after 1949. Avoidance of both of these two critical de¬
velopments might have made possible the preservation of a
minimum of economic interests in China and checked the anti-
Americanism of Japan which poses difficulties for the future.
The affairs of men are manageable to this extent by wise
leadership and it is the failure to achieve these limited ends
which provides a legitimate field for post hoc inquiry.
The inability of leaders to recognize and work within the
limits of power to achieve the achievable seems to be a com¬
mon psychological weakness of men who direct the behavior
of nations. Although it is a well-known adage that a coat must
be cut to fit the cloth, in the process of tailoring national policy
the assumption tends to be that there is unlimited cloth. This
is particularly true as a nation grows in strength and when
the early, essential caution of a weak power begins to be lost.
The result of this lack of caution, of unlimited optimism is
31Q AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

always overextension; the establishment of national interests

and policies which are incompatible with existent national
strength. Even when overextension is belatedly recognized, it
is still difficult to effect a strategic retreat or change of course
before being challenged and routed. Prestige and national
pride frustrate the efforts of prudent heads to trim commit¬
ments and pare off untenable policies. The history of interna¬
tional relations is a grim gallery of this sort of failure to act
before being routed in what may be a heroic but futile gesture.
The defeat of France in Indo-China and of the French efforts
to retain Algeria offer only a well-known recent example.
In the second century of its national history the United States
seems to have become as susceptible as older nations to this
flaw of character. The first hundred years saw new territory
added to the holdings of 1789 at the rate of over 60 square
miles daily. The total cost of these tremendous acquisitions
was only a few thousand battle deaths and some $70 million
in purchase payments. The men who planned the acquisition
of the Philippines and who proclaimed the Open-Door policy
could look back at the successful conquest of the continent
against British, French, Spanish, and Mexican rivals without
straining the national treasury or the national will to sacrifice
blood and energy. But to conduct a war in China and to de¬
fend the Open-Door policy across the Pacific required an es¬
calation of expenditure which could not be considered of the
same order as fighting a war against a backward Mexico or
enforcing the Monroe Doctrine against Maximilian’s French
troops in Mexico.
The defense of the Philippines and the maintenance of
American economic interests in China against all rivals, in¬
cluding the Chinese, might have been possible with a surplus
population used to create military outposts and with a ruling
class willing to send their sons into colonial service for the
greater part of their fives. Lacking these components of the
Roman and British empires, the defense of the new trans-
A NEW SUN RISES 3ii

Pacific interests still required a militarized nation, willing to

maintain a large peacetime army and navy. Theodore Roose¬
velt, Elihu Root, and young Henry Stimson worked to this end.
They met with the resistance of a public which preferred the
pursuit of private gain and happiness to sacrificing for an
empire in which they did not believe and for a world role
which they only half wanted. These limits on the national will
to sacrifice placed a check on national power as real as the
lack of steel mills and a large population of conscript age
places on small, less well-endowed nations.
Theodore Roosevelt by 1907 seems to have glimpsed the
state of overextension in his well-known reference to the Philip¬
pines as the American heel of Achilles. None of Roosevelt's
successors dared face the dilemma boldly, either by calling for
the high taxes necessary to build and maintain a large army
and navy or by renouncing the commitments which could not
be adequately supported. The realistic retreats of the 1920's
were never drastic enough and easily nullified by the Stimson
Doctrine in 1931.
Neither Stimson nor Franklin Roosevelt dared say what they
seem to have believed at some stages, that a policy of preserv¬
ing the Open Door against Japan would quite likely call for a
war for which major sacrifices ought to be made in advance.
Such a statement in the 1930's would have had tremendous
political repercussions and might have meant the loss of con¬
trol over Congress in the next elections, if not of the White
House itself. It was far easier to stick to the policy without
spelling out its costs. If war came there was always hope for
victory “on the cheap.” Even Roosevelt’s policy of building up
the Navy had to be disassociated from a forward policy in the
Pacific. The same reluctance to jeopardize political popularity
by straining the nation persisted once the United States was in
the war, with both the White House and Congress insisting on.
“guns and butter” while fighting a global war.
World War II should have been an object lesson in the iirr-
312 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
possibility of doing everything everywhere at the same time,
but the lesson seems to have been quickly forgotten by the
policy makers. The atomic bomb, “the ultimate weapon as
it was quickly named, in the sole possession of the United
States again gave rise to an extension of the range of national
interests” abroad on a vast scale which exceeded the boldest
of the nineteenth-century expansionist dreams. The “American
Century” envisioned by Henry Luce in 1940 seemed about to
open, any voices of caution were easily dismissed as vestigial
“isolationism” or “neo-isolationism.” National interests were
by many identified as being also the interests of the rest of the
world in such a way that American expansionism and idealistic
internationalism were fused. The containment policy inaugu¬
rated in 1947, determined to counter Communist pressure
wherever it was exerted and without explicit priorities, was in
conception again a policy which assumed unlimited national
power, endless cloth for infinite coats.
The beginning of a reassessment and a recognition of the
limits of American power came in 1949. First came the an¬
nouncement of the explosion of a Soviet Russian atomic
weapon, ending the security and advantages which the United
States had had as sole possessor of this devastating force. Later
the same year came the flight of the Kuomintang to Formosa
and the Communist victory on the mainland of China, as the
American government with public support refused to send an
expeditionary force to fight in the civil war. The next year
saw the opening of the frustrating Korean War, the first
“limited war” fought by the United States with a limited vic¬
tory. Optimism still died slowly and the presidential campaign
of 1952 was marked by claims for “containment plus” or
“liberation” by which the Communist forces were not only to
be checked in their expansion but rolled back to earlier bound¬
aries. Recognition seems to be coming, however, of the real
limits of national power in an age of missiles which range half
way across the globe. It is this belatedness of recognition by
A NEW SUN RISES 313
three or four decades which was of first importance in the un¬
doing of American policy in Asia.
Given the wreckage left by mistakes of the past, what is
left for the American role in Asia? In 1950 Dean Acheson at¬
tempted a fresh statement of American aspirations:

. . . we are interested in the people of Asia as people.

. . . we do not want to use them for any purpose of
our own. . . . we want to help them in any sensible way
we can to achieve their own goals and ambitions in their
own way.

Within this framework, and probably in this framework alone,

the United States can still establish a constructive relationship
with the new Asian governments and their restless peoples.
Years of exaggerated claims and misuse of American values
and culture traits does not nullify forever any universal im¬
portance they may have. A twentieth-century Matthew Perry,
seeking to reopen the closed doors of China, could find within
the multiplicity of American thought, technology, and folkways
a substantial cargo from which Asian peoples might benefit.
Although American production techniques are based on ma¬
terial plenty rather than scarcity, there may be many which,
with adaptations, are still suited for the task of expediting
Asia’s drive for the elimination of scarcity. And when the level
of the Asian masses begins to rise above that of mere survival,
the American concepts of the individual, embedded in the Bill
of Rights, may still make their way across the Pacific.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

T HERE IS NO COMPREHENSIVE and scholarly study of

Japanese-American relations which covers the period from the
earliest contacts down through the postwar American occupation.
Payson J. Treat’s Diplomatic Relations Between the United States
and Japan (3 vols., Stanford, 1932-1938) covers the period from
1853 to 1905 on the basis of manuscript materials in the Depart¬
ment of State. Although a pioneering study, these volumes suffer
from a narrow concentration on diplomatic exchanges, describing
many trees but never the forest. There are a number of brief, pop¬
ular studies of Japanese-American relations which aim at a broader
perspective. The best of these is by an able populizer, Foster Rhea
Dulles, Forty Years of American-]apanese Relations (New York,
1937), although now out-dated in many respects, still worth reading.
Edwin A. Falks From Perry to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1943) is
marked by wartime animosities. Kosaku Tamura’s Genesis of the
Pacific War (Tokyo, 1944) is a Japanese effort written in the same
nationalistic framework and using chiefly American materials. L. H.
Battestini’s Japan and America From Earliest Times to the Present
(New York, 1954) suffers from superficiality and faulty scholarship.
For the broader picture of American policy in Asia as well as
chapters on Japan, the reader is well advised to return to Tyler
Dennett’s Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 1922) and A.
Whitney Griswold’s The Far Eastern Policy of the United States
3i5
316 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
(New York, 1938). Many monographs have subsequently expanded
or modified these classic works on specifics, but they both remain
outstanding pieces of scholarship, rich in wise judgments.
For the other side of the Pacific, George Sansom’s Japan: A
Short Cultural History (New York, 1943) is an excellent introduc¬
tion to its subject, while the same author’s The Western World and
Japan (New York, 1950) presents a broad picture of Japan’s reac¬
tions to western culture down to the late nineteenth century. Chi-
toshi Yanaga’s Japan Since Perry (New York, 1949), while relying
on secondary sources for American relations, uses a great many
Japanese monographs to provide a solid, factual history of Japan.
Hugh Borton’s Japans Modern Century (New York, 1955) offers
a more interpretive account of the same period as well as the best of
recent American scholarship. Edwin A. Reischauer’s The United
States and Japan (2nd ed., New York, 1950) deals primarily with
Japan despite its title and is a useful, brief volume with a good
bibliography. Further reading on Japan now has a fine guide in
John W. Hall’s Japanese History (Washington, 1961), a pamphlet
in the American Historical Association’s series for teachers.

Chapter I: THE FIRST ARRIVALS

The most comprehensive study of pre-Perry relations between

Japan and the United States is that of Shunzo Sakamaki, Japan and
the United States, 1790—1835 (Tokyo, 1939), with major emphasis
on Japanese sources and an appendix listing all western ships enter¬
ing Japanese waters in this period. An earlier and still valuable
account using American naval records is included in Charles O.
Paullin’s Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers,
1778-1883 (Baltimore, 1912), dealing only with official contacts.
There are a number of accounts of individual commercial voy¬
ages to Japan. H. W. S. Cleveland, Voyages of a Merchant Nav¬
igator (New York, 1886), tells the story of the visit of the Massa¬
chusetts; Amasa Delano, Narrative of Voyages and Travels (Bos¬
ton, 1817) includes an account of the amazing William Stewart. In
the Historical Collections of the Essex Institute, “The First Voyage
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 317
to Japan,” Vol. II (June, 1860), pp. 166-69 presents the journal of
George Cleveland of the Margaret in 1800 and 1801, while “The
First Voyage to Japan” in the same publication, Vol. II (Dec.,
1860), pp. 287-92 is a record of the visit of the Franklin in 1800.
Henry F. Graff summarizes the early American interest and knowl¬
edge of Japan in the introduction to his Bluejackets with Perry in
Japan (New York, 1952).
Ranald Macdonald’s story, based on his 1888 manuscript, was
finally published by William S. Lewis and Naojiro Murakami,
Ranald Macdonald (Spokane, 1923). Nakahama Manjiro’s visit to
America has been the subject of a number of volumes. Masuji Ibuse,
John Manjiro: The Castaway (Tokyo, 1941) is a fictionalized ac¬
count; Hisakazu Kaneko, Manjiro: The Man Who Discovered
America (New York, 1956), and Emily Warriner, Voyager to
Destiny (New York, 1956), utilize the scanty materials to recon¬
struct his life. A readable survey of Japan’s early relations with
foreigners down to the 1860’s is provided by Harry E. Wildes’
Aliens in the East: A New History of Japans Foreign Intercourse
(Philadelphia, 1937).
Admiral Yamamoto recalled his boyhood wish in a 1915 inter¬
view according to Willard Price, “America’s Enemy No. 2, Admiral
Yamamoto,” Harpers, Vol. 184 (April, 1942), pp. 449-58. Con¬
gressman Elliott made his expansionist statement in a debate over
the Louisiana Purchase, Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Vol. XIII, p. 451. The economics of the voyage of the Empress of
China are described by Clarence L. Ver Steeg, “Financing and Out¬
fitting the First United States Ship to China,” Pacific Historical Re¬
view, Vol. XXII (Feb., 1953), pp. 1-12.

Chapter II: TRADE, RELIGION, AND

THE NATIONAL MISSION

Good surveys of the European penetration of the Far East can be

found in the opening chapters of G. F. Hudson’s The Far East in
World Politics (New York, 1937) and in E. R. Hughes, The Invasion
of China by the Western World (New York, 1938). The American
 3*8 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

role is well summarized in Tyler Dennett’s volume mentioned in

the introduction, while China’s response is described by Earl
Swisher, ed., Chinas Management of the American Barbarians,
1841- 1861 (New Haven, 1953), the bulk of which consists of
translations of Chinese documents of the period. Chief attention
is given to the British role in John K. Fairbank’s Trade and Di¬
plomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports,
1842- 1854 (2 vols., Cambridge, 1953), a major work which in¬
cludes some material on the United States as well.
The first proposal for a Japanese expedition is treated by Allan
Cole, “Captain David Porter’s Proposed Expedition to the Pacific
and Japan, 1815,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. IX (March,
1940), pp. 61-65. Aaron Palmer publicized his own role in his
Documents and Facts Illustrating the Origin of the Mission to
Japan (Washington, 1857).
The various documents produced by congressional interest in
Japan remain uncollected and must be sought in their original
prints. Congressman Pratt’s resolution in behalf of an expedition to
Japan is to be found in House Document 138, 28th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
and Palmer’s letter to President Buchanan in House Document 96,
29th Cong., 2nd Sess. Documents on the pre-Perry visits were
published in House Executive Document 84, 31st Cong., 1st Sess.,
and Senate Executive Document 59, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess.
The official account of the Perry mission was edited by Francis
L. Hawks, Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to
the China Seas and Japan (3 vols., Washington, 1856). Additional
materials are printed in Executive Document 34, 33rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. Some corrections of the official account are made by Hunter
Miller in Volume VI of Treaties and Other International Acts of
the United States of America (8 vols., Washington, 1931-1948).
A well-written and entertaining account, based on recent scholar¬
ship, is Arthur Walworth’s Black Ships Off Japan: The Story of
Commodore Perms Expedition (New,,York,
^bibliography. There are a number of additional first-hand records
of the expedition; Allan B. Cole has edited A Scientist, with Perry
in Japan: The Journal of Dr. James Morrow (Chapel Hill N.C.
1947) and With Perry in Japan: The Diary of Edward Yorke Mc-
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 319
CQtiletiJ^Pxinceton, 1942). Shio Sakanishi edited A Private Journal
of John Glendy Sproston, U.S.N. (Tokyo, 1940), and two seamens
journals are published by Henry F. Graff in Bluejackets With Perry
in Japan (New York, 1952). One of the most critical participants
was S. Wells Williams, "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Ja¬
pan,” Asiatic Society of Japan Transactions, Vol. 37 (1910), pp.
1-260, with some supplementary materials in Frederick Wells
Williams, The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams (New
York, 1889).
A unique Japanese account of the Perry mission, “Diary of an
Official of the Bakufu” is printed in Asiatic Society of Japan
Transactions, Series II, Vol. VII (Dec., 1930), pp. 98-119.
Perry’s visit to Okinawa was recorded in the diary of a British
missionary and published by William L. Schwartz, “Commodore
Perry at Okinawa,” American Historical Review, Vol. LI (June,
1946), pp. 262-78. A pioneering biography of Perry still worth
reading is William E. Griffis, Matthew Calbraith Perru (Boston,
............... .....'(SW—..J

1877).

Chapter III: JAPAN’S WALL CRUMBLES

Contemporary evaluations of the Perry mission are to be found

in the work of an early American scholar, Richard Hildreth, Japan
As It Was And Is (Rev. ed., Boston, 1860). A British view is pre¬
sented by Charles MacFarlane, Japan: An Account. Geographical
and Historical (2nd ed., Hartford, 1856), and by Talbot Watts,
Japan and the Japanese (2nd ed., New York, 1852), reprinting
some European editorials on the authorization of the American
expedition. An early interpretation by a Japanese scholar is to be
found in Inazo Nitobe’s The Intercourse Between the United States
and Japan (Baltimore, 1891). Nitobe, (1862-1932), was one of
the first Japanese scholars to do graduate work in the United States,
and his later work with the League of Nations made him one of
Japan’s leading emissaries to the West. The work of the Ringgold-
Rodgers expedition and their records are collected by Allan B.
320 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Cole in Yankee Surveyors in the Shoguns Seas (Princeton, 1947).
A valuable contribution to the understanding of the politics be¬
hind the Japanese reactions to Perry has been made by W. G.
Beasley in his introduction to Select Documents on Japanese
Foreign Policy, 1853—1868 (London, 1955).

Chapter IV: WARSHIP DIPLOMACY AND “CURIOS’

General Grant’s visit to Japan is reported by John Russell Young,

Around the World With General Grant (2 vols., New York, 1879).
According to Tyler Dennett, “American Good Offices in Asia,”
American Journal of International Law, Vol. XVI (1922), pp. 1—
24, Grant recommended the formation of a Sino-Japanese alliance
against the western imperialists.
British diplomatic activity in Japan down to 1858 is ably treated
by W. G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan (Lon¬
don, 1951). The negotiation of the first British treaty is described
in Laurence Oliphant’s Narrative of the Earl of Elgin s Mission to
China and Japan (2 vols., New York, 1860). Other basic sources
for British diplomacy are Sir Rutherford Alcock’s revealing The
Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of Three Years’ Residence in
Japan (2 vols., New York, 1863), a fine memoir in the nineteenth-
century imperial tradition and the second volume of Stanley Lane-
Poole’s Life of Sir Harry Parkes (2 vols., London, 1894). Alcock
was the British Minister, 1858—1861 and 1864-1865, while Parkes
served from 1865-1882. Sir Ernest Satow’s A Diplomat in Japan
(London, 1921), covers the period 1862-1869 and is the work of
the first outstanding British student of Japan.
Townsend Harris left behind a journal covering the period,
1855-1858, edited by Mario E. Cosenza, The Complete Journal of
Townsend Harris (Rev. ed., Rutland, 1959). Harris has also had
two biographers. The first was William E. Griffis, Townsend
Harris: First American Envoy to Japan (Boston, 1885) and the
second Carl Crow, He Opened the Door of Japan (New York,
1939). An amusing Japanese view of Harris is presented by a
drama written by Kido Okamoto, The American Envoy (Kobe,
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 321

1931). Harris’ negotiation of treaties is covered in detail by Hunter

Miller in his treaty series, op. cit., Vol. VII.
Interesting glimpses of Harris and other westerners are to be
found in Harold S. Williams’ Shades of the Past or Indiscreet Tales
of Japan (Tokyo, 1959); by an anonymous writer, “An American
in Japan in 1858,” Harpers, Vol. 18 (Jan., 1859), pp. 223-31; and
by two seamen, Alexander W. Habersham, My Last Cruise (Phil¬
adelphia, 1857) and Lt. James D. Johnston, China and Japan: A
Narrative of the Cruise of the Steam Frigate Powhatan (Philadel¬
phia, 1861). Harris’ letter to Alcock was printed in Parliamentary
Papers, 1861, Lords, Vol. 18, pp. 43-44.
Of the formal histories of this period, the most rewarding are
those of westerners who knew the Japan of the late nineteenth
century through residence. James Murdoch’s History of Japan (3
vols., London, 1903-1926) was the work of a Scot who came to
Japan in 1889 as a teacher, with the third volume covering the
Tokugawa epoch. M. Paske-Smith, Western Barhariatis in Japan
and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603-1868 (Kobe, 1930) is the
product of a British consul, while William E. Griffis who wrote.
The Mikado's Empire (2 vols., 1st ed., New York, 1876) was an
American who came as a teacher in 1870. E. M. Satow translated
Kinse Shiriaku: A History of Japan (Yokohama, 1876), which
deals with the period 1853-1869.
The first official Japanese visit to the United States is entertain¬
ingly described by the America-Japan Society’s The First Japanese
Embassy to the United States of America (Tokyo, 1920), a volume
which includes the journals of a Japanese member of the mission
and one of the American naval officer escorts, along with contem¬
porary newspaper comments. Additional views are presented in
Chitoshi Yanaga’s “The First Japanese Embassy to the United
States,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. IX (June, 1940), pp. 113-
38, in “The Private Journal of Henry A. Wise, U.S.N.,” edited by
Allan B. Cole, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XI (Sept., 1942),
pp. 319-29; and more recently with additional local color by E.
Taylor Parks, “The First Japanese Diplomatic Mission to the
United States, 1860,” Dept, of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII (May 9,
1960), pp. 744-53. Some of the highlights of the second venture
to the West, the 1862 mission to Britain, are told by Carmen
322 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
Blacker, “The First Japanese Mission to England,” History Today,
Vol. VII (Dec., 1957), pp. 840-47.
The story of other Japanese who came to America, usually as
students, and returned to distinguished careers was written by
Charles Lanman, The Japanese in America (New York, 1872) and
reissued in Tokyo in 1926. Lanman, who was a Washington news¬
paperman and librarian, included in his volume some delightful
essays on America written by these students. An edition edited by
Y. Okamura under the title, Leaders of the Meiji Restoration in
America (Tokyo, 1931), includes some biographical notes on the
later careers of the individuals mentioned. James Murdoch edited
The Narrative of a Japanese by Joseph Heco (2 vols., Tokyo,
1895) which tells the story of Hekozo Hamada who reached San
Francisco in 1851 after a shipwreck, attended college and became
a naturalized American in 1858, and in 1865 started the first Amer¬
ican newspaper in Japan. Jerome D. Davis’ A Sketch of the Life
of Rev. Joseph Hardy Neesima (New York, 1894) deals with an
immigrant who reached Boston in 1864, attended Andover The¬
ological Seminary and returned to Japan to become a Christian
leader. Bradford Smith’s Americans from Japan (New York, 1948)
is a popular treatment largely devoted to the later migration, but
with some material on the pioneers.
The argument over the Shimonoseki expedition and the use of
Japan’s indemnity can be followed in a group of pamphlets; E. H.
House, The Shimonoseki Affair (Tokyo, 1875), David Murray, Jap¬
anese Indemnity and Joseph Morrison, Comprehensive Statement
of the Circumstances Surrounding the Exaction of the Japanese
Indemnity (Washington, 1880) which supplement the materials
in the Department of State archives.
The question of treaty revision is handled in detail by Payson
Treat in the work mentioned earlier, with some scattered references
to the American position to be found in the diary of Hamilton Fish
in the Library of Congress. A strong plea was made for Japan by
James K. Newton, Obligation of the United States to Initiate
a Revision of the Treaties Between the Western Powers and Japan
(Oberlin, Ohio, 1887).
Japan’s cultural impact upon the United States is treated in
part by Robert S. Schwantes in Japanese and Americans: A Century
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 323
of Cultural Relations (New York, 1955), along with the biograph¬
ical sketch of Ernest F. Fenollosa in his Epochs of Chinese and
Japanese Art (Rev. ed., New York, 1921) and in Van Wyck
Brooks, Fenollosa and His Circle (New York, 1962). Clay Lan¬
caster, “JaPanese Buildings in the United States before 1900,”
The Art Bulletin, Vol. XXXV (Sept., 1953), pp. 217-25 deals
with the impact on architecture.
Some parts of this chapter draw on the papers of William E.
Griffis in the Rutgers University library, particularly the materials
collected for a book on Americans in early Japan which Griffis
never wrote, although he completed and published several in¬
dividual biographies.

Chapter V: ARMING WITH AMERICAN AID

The standard work of western scholarship on the Meiji Restora¬

tion is E. H. Norman’s Japans Emergence as a Modern State
(New York, 1940), although some of its interpretations are being
revised by recent scholarship. Along with George Sansom’s The
Western World and Japan (New York, 1950), it still provides a
basic picture of this period.
There is no substantial work in western languages on the history
of the Japanese Navy. Gustav Jensen’s Japans Seemacht (Berlin,
1938) is a German doctoral dissertation with some materials on
the nineteenth century. Short surveys of the navy’s origins are pro¬
vided by the chapter written by Admiral Makoto Saito in Japan
and the Japanese, edited by Alfred Stead (London, 1904); the
chapter by Hironori Mizuno in Western Influences in Modern
Japan, edited by Inazo Nitobe (Chicago, 1931); and the chapter
in Fifty Years of New Japan, edited by Count Shigenobu Okuma
(2 vols., London, 1909-1910) which was written by Count Gom-
bey Yamamoto. Additional materials are found in John R. Black’s
Young Japan: Yokohama and Yedo (2 vols., London, 1881), the
work of an English newspaperman who edited English language
papers in Japan. The economic aspects of Japan’s militarization
are treated by U. Kobayashi, Military Industries of Japan (New
York, 1922).
324 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

American contributions are dealt with specifically by Capt. J. M.

Ellicott’s “Japanese Students at the United States Naval Academy,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 73 (March, 1947), pp.
303-15, and in the same journal, Lt. Commander Robert H. Barnes,
“Japan’s First Submarines,” Vol. 69 (Feb., 1943), pp. 201—4. The
Naval Academy’s leading Japanese graduate is the subject of
Katsunobu Masudo’s Recollections of Admiral Baron Sotokichi Uriu
(Tokyo, 1933). Edwin A. Falk’s biographical work, Togo and the
Rise of Japanese Sea Power (New York, 1936) deals with the
origins of the new navy in the opening chapters. H. W. Loweree,
“Long Islander Started the Japanese Navy,” Long Island Forum,
Vol. II (March, 1948), pp. 43-57, is a brief note on the work of
Capt. Elbert Stannard.
A survey of American technical aid to Japan is included in Merle
Curti and Kendall Birr, Prelude to Point Four: American Technical
Missions Overseas, 1838-1938 (Madison, Wise., 1954). The same
subject is dealt with by Robert S. Schwantes, “Perspectives on
Point IV: The Case of Japan,” Far Eastern Survey, Sept. 1953 and
in the same author’s broader work on cultural exchanges cited
earlier.
William E. Griffis wrote a biography of his friend, Verbeck of
Japan: Citizen of No Country (New York, 1900). Eli Sheppard and
Henry W. Denison are without published biographies, but glimpses
of Sheppard’s role in Japan can be obtained from his papers in
the Library of Congress which include some memoranda he drafted
for the Japanese Foreign Office.
Some materials in this chapter have been taken from the Annual
Reports of the Secretary of Navy for the period and from Senate
Executive Document 33, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess., dealing with the
sale of American ships in 1862.

Chapter VI: VENTURES IN IMPERIALISM

The factors leading to the development of the nationalist spirit

are well analyzed by Delmer M. Brown’s Nationalism in Japan
(Berkeley, 1955) which utilizes a rich variety of sources. Also
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 325

of value are Hilary Conroy’s ‘'Japanese Nationalism and Ex¬

pansionism,” American Historical Review, Vol. LX (July, 1955),
pp. 818-29; “Government vs. Patriot: The Background of Japan’s
Asiatic Expansion,” by the same author, Pacific Historical Review,
Vol. XX (Feb., 1951), pp. 31-42, and his very thoughtful volume,
The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910 (Philadelphia, 1960).
Charles LeGendre deserves a biography, but the published ma¬
terials include only fragments which appeared in The Far East,
Vol. Ill (Oct.-Nov., 1877), pp. 87-94, 96-101 and the brief sketch
in the Dictionary of American Biography. The best source remains
the LeGendre manuscripts in the Library of Congress. Edward H.
House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa (Tokyo, 1875) is an
American eye-witness account which appeared in part in the New
York Herald. Of interest are LeGendre’s How to Deal with China
(Amoy, 1871) and his Progressive Japan: A Study of the Political
and Social Needs of the Empire (New York and Yokohama, 1878).
By the 1880’s and 1890’s the growth of American interest in the
Pacific encouraged much fuller journalistic treatment of Japan, and
the many articles in American periodicals reflect a common image
of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Chapter VII: THE FIRST ABRASIONS

The rise of American nationalism has been described in a series

of essays by Merle Curti, The Roots of American Loyalty (New
York, 1946). Curti’s work has been supplemented in its ideological
aspects by Edward M. Burns, The American Idea of Mission (New
Brunswick, 1957). One of the most interesting efforts to analyze
the expansionist nationalism of the 1890’s is Richard Hofstadter’s
essay, “Manifest Destiny and the Philippines,” in America in Crisis,
edited by Daniel Aaron (New York, 1952). Mahan’s views and
his contribution to the expansionist ideology are treated fully by
William E. Livezy, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, 1947). Some
material was also taken from the Mahan papers at the Library of
Congress. The political background of conflict is fully treated by
Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868—1898
326 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

(Berkeley, 1953). The first naval encounters in Hawaii are de¬

scribed by Ernest K. Wakukawa, A History of the Japanese People
in Hawaii (Tokyo, 1938). The general story of American naval
expansion in this period is admirably told by the latter chapters of
Harold and Margaret Sprout’s The Rise of American Naval Power,
1776-1918 (Princeton, 1946) and by Donald W. Mitchell’s History
of the Modern American Navy (New York, 1946). The period is
treated in more detail by Gordon C. O’Gara’s Theodore Roosevelt
and the Rise of the Modern Navy (Princeton, 1943). William R.
Braisted’s United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897—1909 (Austin,
Texas, 1958) is a significant contribution in pointing out the way
and extent to which Far Eastern interests began to affect military
planning. Some of the same ground is covered by an earlier vol¬
ume, Outten J. Clinard’s Japans Influence on American Naval
Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, 1947), but without the benefit of the
naval archives materials used by Braisted. Some additional details
in this chapter have been gleaned from the Naval Intelligence files
in the National Archives.
For the diplomacy of this period Pay son Treat’s third volume
has now become outdated in most respects. Thomas A. Bailey’s
Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises (Stanford,
1934) has become a standard work along with the masterful con¬
tributions of the chapters dealing with Far Eastern issues in How¬
ard K. Beale’s Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World
Power (Baltimore, 1956).
The literature on the Open Door policy is substantial and the
interpretations widely divergent. Tyler Dennett’s John Hay: From
Poetry to Politics (New York, 1934) is a good introduction, along
with the pertinent pages in A. Whitney Griswold’s The Far Eastern
Policy of the United States (New York, 1938). Paul A. Varg has
written a life of W. W. Rockhill who was influential in the writing
of the original note, Open Door Diplomat (Urbana, Ill., 1952). A
different view of the origins of the policy is offered by George F.
Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. The economic factor
is described by Charles S. Campbell Jr., Special Business Interest
and the Open Door Policy (New Haven, 1951). An even stronger
economic interpretation is given to the policy by William A. Williams
in his iconoclastic volume. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 3*7
(New York, 1959). The Navy’s disregard for the notes is described
by Seward W. Livermore, “American Naval-Base Policy in the Far
East, 1850-1914,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XII (June, 1944),
pp. 113-35. Raymond A. Esthus, “The Changing Concept of the
Open Door, 1899-1910,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
Vol. XLVI (1959), pp. 435-54, initiates the sort of evolutionary
study which needs further extension.
The Japanese question in the United States itself has produced
a voluminous literature of which the most recent is J. tenBroek, E.
Barnhart, and F. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution
(Berkeley, 1954) with a fine historical treatment. A French view is
to be found in Louis Aubert’s Americains et Japonais (Paris, 1908),
Prew Savoy, La Question Japonaise aux Etats-Unis (Paris, 1924),
and Jean Pa jus, The Real Japanese California (Berkeley, 1937).
All three see the economic and ethnic threat as exaggerated. The
same conclusion was reached by Sidney L. Gulick who presented a
pro-Japanese account, The American-Japanese Problem: A Study
of the Racial Relations of the East and West (New York, 1914),
based on first-hand investigation. Still valuable as an introduction
is Raymond Leslie Buell’s “The Development of the Anti-Japanese
Agitation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
37 (Dec., 1922), pp. 605-38.
There is need for a general study of the development of Jap¬
anese-American war scares. One contribution is that of Eugene K.
Chamberlin, “The Japanese Scare at Magdalena Bay,” Pacific His¬
torical Review, Vol. XXIV (Nov., 1955), pp. 345-59. Japan in
American Public Opinion by E. Tupper and G. McReynolds (New
York, 1937) is a broad survey of limited value, since it makes little
effort to evaluate its materials or to provide a valid sample. The
dangers of accepting general impressions of public opinion are
illustrated by Winston B. Thorson’s “American Public Opinion
and the Portsmouth Conference,” American Historical Review,
Vol. LIII (April, 1948), pp. 439-64 which disposes of the widely-
held belief that American opinion became pro-Russian during the
course of the negotiations. Sidney L. Gulick’s Anti-Japanese War-
Scare Stories (New York, 1917) is a rich collection of wild rumors.
President Taft’s Far Eastern policies are treated by Henry
Pringle in The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols.,
328 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
New York, 1939), Vol. II, and by Charles Vevier, The United States
and China, 1906-1913 (New Brunswick, 1955). Wilson’s first en¬
counter with the Japanese problem is described in detail by Arthur
S. Link’s Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, 1956). Roger
Daniels’ The Politics of Prejudice (Berkeley, 1962) is a brief but
richly detailed analysis of the anti-Japanese agitation in California.

Chapter VIII: RELUCTANT ALLIES

After many years without fresh analyses, the foreign policy of the
Wilson administration is now the subject of a number of solid
monographs using the Wilson papers and archival materials. Fur¬
ther knowledge of this period can be expected with the projected
publication of the Wilson letters and the completion of a major
biography begun by Arthur S. Link. Tien-yi Li’s Woodrow Wilsons
China Policy, 1913—1917 (New York, 1952) presents an interesting
view of the pre-war years. Roy W. Curry’s Woodrow Wilson and
Far Eastern Policy, 1913—1921 (New York, 1957) is a useful
doctoral dissertation. Arthur Link’s third volume, Wilson: The
Struggle for Neutrality, 1914—1915 (Princeton, 1960), has some
materials on the Far East which supplement his chapter on “mis¬
sionary diplomacy” in his Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive
Era, 1910-1917 (New York, 1954).
Josephus Daniels’ two volumes. The Wilson Era (Chapel Hill,
1944-1946) are useful on naval policy. Paul S. Reinsch’s An
American Diplomat in China (Garden City, 1922) presents the
strong views of a well-informed China-firster.
The question of the Twenty-one Demands was treated from a
strongly pro-Chinese view by G. Zay Wood, The Twenty-One
Demands (New York, 1921) and in the same author’s The Chinese-
Japanese Treaties of May 25, 1915 (New York, 1921). The fullest
treatment is the work of an Italian scholar, Mario Toscano,
Guerra diplomatica in Estremo Oriente (2 vols., Rome, 1950).
The best Japanese work in English of this period remains
Tatsuji Takeuchis War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire
(Garden City, 1935). A more recent contribution is that of Mar-
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 329

ius B. Jansen, “Yawata, Hanyehping and the Twenty-one De¬

mands,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XXII (Feb., 1954), pp.
31-48.
The Lansing-Ishii negotiations were treated by Julius Pratt in
his chapter on Robert Lansing in The American Secretaries of
State and Their Diplomacy, edited by S. F. Bemis (10 vols.. New
York, 1927—1929), Vol. X. Lansing has found a strong defender
in Burton F. Beers’ Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing’s Attempt
to End the American-Japanese Rivalry (Durham, N.C., 1962),
a study which finds the Secretary of State more realistic about
Far Eastern interests than the President. The best American study
of the Lansing-Ishii negotiations is an unpublished doctoral dis¬
sertation by Francis C. Prescott on this subject (Yale, 1949).
Viscount Ishii presented his views of the negotiations in Diplo¬
matic Commentaries (Baltimore, 1936). The French diplomatic
scholar, Pierre Renouvin, views the Japanese effort at a treaty as
the first timid attempt to establish an Asian Monroe Doctrine in
his La Question d’Extreme-Orient, 1840—1940 (Paris, 1946), a
valuable study of the power struggle in Asia. Japan’s subsequent
policy is treated by Frank C. Langdon, “Japan’s Failure to Estab¬
lish Friendly Relations with China in 1917—1918,” Pacific Historical
Review, Vol. XXVI (Aug., 1957), pp. 245-58.
Japanese-American issues at Paris are fully treated by Russell H.
Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the
Shantung Question (New York, 1952). Typical of the journalistic
polemics which that question aroused is Thomas F. Millard’s The
Shantung Case at the Conference (Shanghai, 1921). A defense of
the peace conference decision was made by Kenneth S. Latourette,
“An Unpopular View of the Shantung Question,” Atlantic Monthly,
(Nov., 1919), pp. 708-13 and again by the same scholar in
“Two Years After Paris,” Pacific Review, Vol. II (Sept., 1921),
pp. 287—98. The debate in Washington is touched on by Robert E.
Hosack, “The Shantung Question and the Senate,” South Atlan¬
tic Quarterly, Vol. XLIII (1944), pp. 181-93.
A great deal of scholarly energies have recently been turned on
the subject of the Siberian intervention. Betty M. Unterberger,
America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918—1920 (Durham. N.C., 1956)
330 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

and John A. White’s The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1950)

both point to the anti-Japanese aspects of American participa¬
tion. James W. Morley’s The Japanese Thrust into Siberia (New
York, 1957) rejects the older thesis that Japan was eager to seize
this Russian territory. George F. Kennans The Decision to Inter¬
vene (Princeton, 1958) puts the Siberian affair in the framework
of Russian-American relations. Christopher Lasch, “American Inter¬
vention in Siberia: A Reinterpretation,” Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. LXXVII (June, 1962), pp. 205-23 argues for a return to the
original claim for the expedition as being directed in some vague
manner against the Germans.
The role of the missionary which seems of importance in this
period is studied by Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and
Diplomats for the period, 1890—1952 (Princeton, 1958). An ear¬
lier study still of great value is John W. Masland’s “Missionary
Influence upon American Far Eastern Policy,” Pacific Historical
Review, Vol. X (Sept., 1941), pp. 279-96. The missionaries also
had their American opponents, one example is B. W. Williams,
The Joke of Christianizing China (New York, 1927), which scoffs
at claims of great successes.

Chapter IX: A NEW ASIAN POLICY

The part played by Secretary of State Hughes in shaping

Japanese-American relations is discussed by two recent biogra¬
phers, Merlo J. Pusey and Dexter Perkins. Pusey’s two volume,
Charles Evans Hughes (New York, 1951), written with the co¬
operation of Hughes and using his papers, is unfortunately quite
uncritical and lacking in fresh interpretations of Hughes’ diplo¬
macy. Perkins’ Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic
Statesmanship (Boston, 1956) is a more thoughtful evaluation
although underrating Hughes’ contribution.
The Washington Conference has produced considerable litera¬
ture, but as yet nothing approaching a definitive study. The or¬
ganized campaign which preceded the conference itself has been
studied by C. Leonard Hoag, Preface to Preparedness (Washing-
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 33*
ton, 1941), while two journalists provided contemporary ac¬
counts which catch the spirit of the times, Mark Sullivan’s The
Great Adventure at Washington (New York, 1922) and Ray¬
mond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (New York, 1922).
Captain Dudley W. Knox wrote a strong criticism of the con¬
ference from the point of view of the U.S. Navy, The Eclipse of
American Sea Power (New York, 1922). A Japanese view was
offered by Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After
(Stanford, 1928), but without access to classified Japanese ma¬
terials. The best recent account is to be found in Harold and Marga¬
ret Sprout’s Toward a New Order of Sea Power (Princeton, 1946),
using materials unavailable to previous writers. John C. Vinson
has studied the Senate’s ratification of the final treaty in The
Parchment Peace (Athens, Ga., 1956). An interesting French
view which sees the treaty as a major defeat for Japan is that of
Pierre Renouvin in the relevant section of his La Question
dExtreme-Orient, 1840-1940 (Paris, 1946). The official docu¬
ments released at the time of the conference have now been
greatly supplemented by the 1922 volume of Foreign Relations.
One specialized study which merits attention is Russell H. Fifield’s
"Secretary Hughes and the Shantung Question,” Pacific Historical
Review, Vol. 23 (Nov., 1954), pp. 373-85. Another is J. Chal
Vinson’s "The Annulment of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement,” Pacific
Historical Review, Vol. XXVII (Feb., 1958), pp. 57-69. Herbert
Yardley, The American Black Chamber (New York, 1931), reveals
the story of American code-cracking at the Washington Conference.
The Geneva and London Conferences of 1927 and 1930 still
await thorough study, but they are well summarized on the basis
of the published materials in Benjamin H. Williams, The United
States and Disarmament (New York, 1931). Further details on
the basis of unpublished materials are added by Robert Ferrell’s
chapter on the London Conference in his American Diplomacy in
the Great Depression (New Haven, 1957) and by Raymond
O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The U.S. and the London Naval
Conference of 1930 (Lawrence, Kan., 1962).
The American Navy’s orientation to Japan is discussed by Gerald
E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The U.S. Navy and the Far
332 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

East, 1921-1931 (Columbia, Mo., 1963), and by Louis Morton,

“War Plan ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy,” World Politics, Vol.
XI (Jan., 1959), pp. 221-50.
The passage of the Oriental Exclusion Act still awaits detailed
study based on the archival materials and congressional debates,
but two older studies are useful, W. Rodman Paul, The Abroga¬
tion of the Gentlemens Agreement (Cambridge, 1936) and R. D.
McKenzie, Oriental Exclusion (Chicago, 1928). The chapter on
“Immigration” in A. Whitney Griswold’s The Far Eastern Policy
of the United States (New York, 1938) still remains a good sum¬
mary of the diplomatic background.
American reactions to Chinese developments have been de¬
scribed for part of this period in Dorothy Borg’s American Policy
and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York, 1947). A
unique interpretation of this period in American Far Eastern policy
is that of William A. Williams, “China and Japan: A Challenge
and a Choice of the Nineteen Twenties,” Pacific Historical Re¬
view, Vol. XXVI (Aug., 1957), pp. 259-79.
Some materials in this chapter have been drawn from the peri¬
odicals of the period, the most useful being Current History,
which in this decade achieved a high level of journalistic report¬
ing on international affairs.

Chapter X: NON-RECOGNITION AND NAVALISM

Henry L. Stimson has been the subject of fine quasi-official bi-

ography which, while uncritical of his political decisions, provides
excellent insights on the nature of the man, Turmoil and Tradi¬
tion: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson by Elting
Morison (Boston, 1960). Supplementary are Stimson’s own The
Far Eastern Crisis (New York, 1936) and an autobiographical
volume written with McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service (New
York, 1948). Richard N. Current’s Secretary Stimson: A Study in
Statecraft (New Brunswick, 1954), is a valuable critical survey
of the major decisions. Robert H. Ferrell’s American Diplomacy
in the Great Depression (New Haven, 1957) deals with Stimson’s
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 333
Far Eastern policy in the broad setting of the period and has a
bibliographical essay of great value to students. Reiman Morin’s
East Wind Rising (New York, 1960) is a journalistic account of
relations with Japan which benefits from the use of the diaries of
Stimson and William R. Castle and contains some perceptive
sketches of Stimson. Richard N. Current’s “The Stimson Doctrine
and the Hoover Doctrine,” American Historical Review, Vol. LIX
(April, 1954), pp. 513—42, attempts to distinguish between the
views of the President and his Secretary of State.
The Japanese-Chinese conflict is described by G. R. Storry, “The
Mukden Incident of Sept. 18-19, 1931,” in Far Eastern Affairs
edited by G. F. Hudson (London, 1957), using Japanese materials
to trace the origins of the first exchange to the officers of the
Kwantung Army. Japan’s subsequent successes and failures in
the occupation of Manchuria are analyzed by F. C. Jones, Man¬
churia Since 1931 (New York, 1949). The case for Japan is made
by K. K. Kawakami, Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis
(New York, 1932) and in his sequel, Manchukuo: Child of Con¬
flict (New York, 1933). Hirosi Saito, Japans Policies and Pur¬
poses (Boston, 1935) is a collection of addresses given by the Jap¬
anese Ambassador to Washington in 1934—1935.
A detailed analysis of British public and press reaction to the
Far Eastern crisis was made by R. Bassett, Democracy and For¬
eign Policy: A Case History, The Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-
1933 (London, 1952). The controversy at the League of Nations
was studied in detail by W. W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese
Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore, 1935). Sara R.
Smith with little supporting evidence argues that strong Ameri¬
can support for the League would have checked Japan, The Man¬
churian Crisis, 1931-1932 (New York, 1948).
The American mood of the thirties is discussed by Selig Adler,
The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New
York, 1957) and by Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality
(Chicago, 1962). The same outlook is defended by Charles and
Mary Beard in the final chapters of The American Spirit (New
York, 1942).
The transition of the Stimson Doctrine from the Hoover to
Roosevelt administrations is treated by Robert Ferrell in the vol-
334 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

ume mentioned above and more recently by Bernard Stemsher,

“The Stimson Doctrine: F.D.R. versus Moley and Tugwell, Pa¬
cific Historical Review, Vol. XXXI (Aug., 1962), pp. 281-90, an
article which emphasizes the opposition of Roosevelt’s two advisers.
The background of Roosevelt’s navalism is scattered through
the first two volumes of Frank Freidel’s thorough biography, The
Apprenticeship (Boston, 1952) and The Ordeal (Boston, 1954),
and pointed up in two monographs by William L. Neumann,
“Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 78 (July, 1952), pp. 712-19;
and “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japan, 1913—1933,” Pacific His¬
torical Review, Vol. XXII (May, 1953), pp. 143-53. A clear
contemporary view of Roosevelt was published by Ernest K.
Lindley, Half Way with Roosevelt (New York, 1936). The reopen¬
ing of the naval building race is described in the final chapters of
George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New York, 1940) and
brilliantly analyzed in a pamphlet written by Walter Millis, The
Future of Sea Power in the Pacific (New York, 1935).
Diplomatic relations with Japan in this period can be viewed
through the eyes of the American Ambassador, Joseph Grew, Ten
Years in Japan (New York, 1944), as well as retrospectively
through the self-righteous eyes of the Secretary of State, The
Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York, 1948). Bits of in¬
terest are to be found in other New Deal memoirs; Raymond
Moley’s After Seven Years (New York, 1939), James A. Farley,
Jim Farley’s Story (New York, 1948) and Harold Ickes Autobiog¬
raphy of a Curmudgeon (New York, 1943).
Two special studies are pertinent, Robert P. Browder’s, The
Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton, 1953) with a
chapter on the role of the Far East in respect to recognition of the
Soviet Union and Gerald E. Wheeler’s “Isolated Japan: Anglo-
American Diplomatic Cooperation, 1927-1936,” Pacific Historical
Review, Vol. XXX (May, 1961), pp. 165—78, which concludes
that by 1935 the United States was committed to parallel action
with Britain.
Interesting contemporary analyses and descriptions of the events
of this period are to be found in the annual volumes of The United
States in World Affairs, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Re-
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 33S
lations, along with the annual British volumes of the Survey of
International Affairs edited by Arnold Toynbee. Foreign Relations
of the United States becomes more and more voluminous in these
years and has to be read in conjunction with the two volumes,
Japan, 1931—1941, published by the Department of State in 1943.
This chapter has also drawn on the unpublished materials in
the Department of State archives, the papers of Frank Knox, Nel¬
son T. Johnson, William D. Leahy, and Norman Davis in the
Library of Congress, the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park and the
Stimson papers at Yale University. Julius Pratt’s Cordell Hull (2 vols.,
New York, 1964) is a valuable, if seldom critical, supplement to
Hull’s memoirs.

Chapter XI: THE YELLOW TRADE PERIL

The economic history of Japan has been well surveyed by west¬

ern scholars and most recently by William W. Lockwood’s The
Economic Development of Japan, 1868-1938 (Princeton, 1954)
and G. C. Allen and A. G. Donnithorne’s Western Enterprise in
Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan (New
York, 1954). But the financial and trade relations with the United
States deserve study by an economic historian competent in both
languages.
Some treatment of the earliest trade is to be found in Inazo
Nitobe’s The Intercourse between the United States and Japan
(Baltimore, 1891). Charles F. Remer, Foreign Investments in
China (New York, 1933) and Ethel B. Dietrich, Far Eastern
Trade of the United States (New York, 1940) are both useful.
Fears of Japanese competition are noted in E. Tupper and G.
McReynolds, Japan in American Public Opinion (New York, 1937).
Some valuable data was collected by Philip G. Wright, The
American Tariff and Oriental Trade (Chicago, 1931).
Two well-written but unpublished doctoral dissertations were
used in this chapter; Richard A. Thompson’s “The Yellow Peril,
1890-1924” (University of Wisconsin, 1957), and John W. Mas-
land, Jr., “Group Interests in American Relations with Japan”
(Princeton, 1938). Some of the results were published by Masland
336 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
in “Commercial Influence upon American Far Eastern Policy,
1937-1941,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XI (Sept., 1942), pp.
281—99 which sees no direct commercial influence in these years.
This chapter drew upon the Congressional Record, tariff hear¬
ings, and American periodical literature.

Chapter XII: THE CHINA COMMITMENT

American foreign policy during Roosevelt’s second term is

treated in detail and with substantial attention to the Far East
by W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation,
1937-1940 (New York, 1952), a work based on extensive archival
research and free access to classified materials. Written to prevent
the disillusionment and “confusion of mind” which took place
over American entry into World War I, its judgments of the
Roosevelt administration are seldom critical, and then implied
criticism rather than direct. At the other extreme is Charles C.
Tansill’s Back Door to War (Chicago, 1952), utilizing the State
Department archives but not the collections of *• papers at the
Roosevelt Library. Tansill’s book, which begins detailed treat¬
ment of foreign policy in 1931, is in the muck-raking tradition of
the “disillusionist” books of the 1930’s with a hypercritical tone
that frequently produces non sequiturs from its very substantial
documentation. Two other volumes dealing with Roosevelt’s for¬
eign policy which belong to what Professor W. A. Williams has
called the “Era of Violent Partisanship” are Charles A. Beard’s
American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940 (New Haven,
1946) and a reply by Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to
Pearl Harbor (New York, 1950). Beard’s volume contrasts Roose¬
velt’s words with his actions, while Rauch’s work largely defends
Roosevelt’s actions as being in the best national interest.
In addition to Hull’s memoirs and Ambassador Grew’s diary
mentioned earlier, materials on Far Eastern policy are scattered
through John M. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of
Crisis, 1928-1939 (New York, 1959) and Nancy H. Hooker, ed.,
The Moffat Papers (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), which contain in¬
teresting sidelights on the attitudes of Hull and Hombeck by
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 337
J. Pierrepont Moffat, and in Harold Ickes’ Secret Diary: The In¬
side Struggle (New York, 1954), covering 1936-1939. Sumner
Welles’ Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1951)
contains a chapter on Far Eastern policy, 1937-1941.
By the time Roosevelt began his second term, a considerable
literature had begun to accumulate on the coming naval war for
the conquest of the Pacific. Hector Bywater’s The Great Pacific
War (New York, 1932) was the work of a British naval authority.
Tom Ireland, War Clouds in the Skies of the Far East (New York,
1935), was critical of the American role. S. Denlinger and C. Gary,
War in the Pacific (New York, 1936) was an imaginative Ameri¬
can study, while Tota Ishimaru, The Next World War (London,
1937), predicted its outbreak by 1940. Gregory Bienstock’s The
Struggle for the Pacific (New York, 1937) was a geopolitical
study of the major power conflict.
F. C. Jones, Japans New Order in East Asia (New York, 1954),
deals with Japanese policy for the period 1937—1945, as well as
the American actions, and is the work of a British scholar. David J.
Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor (Washington,
1962) is a study of Japan’s road to war based on Japanese materi¬
als. The role of the militarists in their rise to power is studied by
Y. C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-
Military Rivalry, 1930—1945 (Berkeley, 1957), and by an able Eng¬
lish scholar, Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Jap¬
anese Nationalism (New York, 1958). Still of value for its em¬
phasis on the background economic factors is Albert E. Hindmarsh,
The Basis of Japans Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass., 1936).
In addition to the manuscript and archival materials drawn on for
Chapter X, this chapter benefited from the papers of Admiral
Harry E. Yarnell in the Library of Congress for the period 1936-
1939, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Chapter XIII: THE WANTED, UNWANTED WAR

The two years before Pearl Harbor are covered in the second
volume of W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Undeclared War,
338 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

1940-1941 (New York, 1953), with all the value and limitations
of the previous volume. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor
(Princeton, 1950) begins in 1937, but becomes more ample in
handling 1940 and 1941. A work based on the State Department
archives it also benefits by Mr. Feis’s long years in the Depart¬
ment, but is similarly restrained in pointing out any errors in
diplomacy or statesmanship other than those committed by Jap¬
anese. Charles Tansill’s volume, mentioned earlier, also treats in
detail these years, but presents the obverse side of Feis in center¬
ing its many criticisms on the Roosevelt administration alone.
Two more detached studies which focus on the weakness of the
Tokyo-Berlin axis are Frank W. Ikle, German-]apanese Relations,
1936-1940 (New York, 1956) and Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis
Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.,
1958). The latter volume argues that Japan’s ties with Berlin
were so weak that they should not have prevented an American
compromise with Japan over the Chinese issues.
Major emphasis is put upon Japanese diplomacy in the final two
years by David J. Lu in the volume mentioned in the previous
chapter and by F. C. Jones’s section in The Initial Triumph of the
Axis (New York, 1958), edited by Arnold and Veronica Toynbee.
A number of Japanese memoirs have contributed to the story of
the final years of peace. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Des¬
tiny (New York, 1958) is the work of a diplomat and foreign
minister; Shigenori Togo, The Cause of Japan (New York, 1956)
was written by a man who served as foreign minister at the time
of Pearl Harbor. Tohikazu Kase’s Journey to the ‘Missouri (New
Haven, 1950) is by an American-educated Japanese diplomat who
also writes of the war years. Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Mem¬
oirs (Boston, 1962) is the work of a postwar prime minister.
Frederick Moore, With Japans Leaders (New York, 1942) pre¬
sents the views of a man who served as counsellor to the Japanese
Foreign Office for over 14 years. Robert Butow’s Tofo and the
Coming of the War (Princeton, 1961) is replete with details from
Japanese sources on the role of the wartime prime minister.
Tetsuma Hashimoto’s Untold Story of J apanese-American Nego¬
tiations (Tokyo, 1946) deals with the private efforts in behalf of
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 339
peace in 1941. More details are added by Mitsu Kakehi’s “Nine
Years After,” Contemporary Japan, Vol. XIX (July-Sept., 1950),
pp. 389-402. Takeshi Haruki, “Matsuoka and the Japanese-Ameri-
can Negotiations, 1941,” Aoyama Keizai Ronshyu, Vol. X (March,
1959), pp. 1-31 (in English), uses Japanese materials to de¬
scribe the role of this foreign minister who is also studied by
John Huizenga, “Yosuke Matsuoka and the Japanese-German Al¬
liance,” in The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, 1953), edited
by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. An official wartime view
of the causes of the conflict, largely based on American materials,
was produced by the Greater East Asia Inquiry Commission, The
American-British Challenge Directed Against Nippon (Tokyo,
1943).
The literature on the Pearl Harbor disaster itself and the de¬
cisions of the last few weeks is becoming voluminous. One guide
is that of Louis Morton, “Pearl Harbor in Perspective: A Bibli¬
ographical Survey,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 81
(April, 1955), pp. 462-69. The same scholar’s “Japan’s Decision
for War,” in Command Decisions (New York, 1959) is a good
short survey of Japan’s moves which should be read with Mark S.
Watson’s Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Preparations (Wash¬
ington, 1951) for the American military planning.
The official Navy view of the attack and the moves preceding
it are presented by Admiral S. E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the
Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston, 1948), a volume in the U.S.
Naval Operations History. Walter Lord’s Day of Infamy (New
York, 1957) is a dramatic account of the events of December 7,
while Walter Millis, This is Pearl! (New York, 1947) extends his
account over the final year.
Two specialized studies of the diplomacy of the last weeks are
Richard N. Current’s “How Stimson Meant to ‘Maneuver’ the Jap¬
anese,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XL (June,
1953), pp. 67-74, and C. Y. Immanuel Hsu, “Kurusu’s Mission to
the United States and the Abortive Modus Vivendi,” Journal of
Modern History, Vol. XXIV (Sept., 1952), pp. 301-7.
A very interesting effort to analyze the failure of the intelligence
system is that of Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning
34o AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

and Decisions (Stanford, 1962). In the same framework is Benno

Wasserman’s “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction,” Political
Studies, Vol. VIII (June, 1960), pp. 156-69.
The effort to counter the black and white wartime picture of
the causes of the war began with two pamphlets, John T. Flynns
The Truth about Pearl Harbor (New York, 1944) and William L.
Neumann’s The Genesis of Pearl Harbor (Philadelphia, 1945), with
the latter making the first use of the two volumes, Japan, 1931-
1941, published by the State Department in 1943. The Pearl
Harbor congressional investigation at the end of the war threw
the question of responsibilities into the area of domestic politics
and produced George Morgenstern’s polemical Pearl Harbor: The
Story of the Secret War (New York, 1947) and a counter-attack
on this volume by S. F. Bemis “The First Gun of a Revisionist
Historiography for the Second World War,” Journal of Modern
History, Vol. XIX (March, 1948), pp. 55-59.
Charles A. Beard published his second volume, President Roose¬
velt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven, 1948), again
contrasting the President’s campaign pledges and political speeches
with the diplomatic and military story opened tip by the Pearl
Harbor hearings. Admiral Morison fired a number of shots in re¬
turn, “Did Roosevelt Start the War?”, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 82
(August, 1948), pp. 91-97. The debate was heightened by the
publication in 1953 of a number of critical articles collected and
edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace
(Caldwell, Idaho), one of which by Percy L. Greaves, Jr., dis¬
cusses the various investigations and inquiries into the disaster
by government boards. Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald de¬
fended the role of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel in The Final Se¬
cret of Pearl Harbor (New York, 1954) and Kimmel offered
his own defense the following year, Admiral KimmeVs Story (Chi¬
cago, 1955). A reply to the various charges was presented by
Herbert Feis, “War Came at Pearl Harbor: Suspicions Considered,”
Yale Review, Vol. XLV (Spring, 1956), pp. 378-90.
Examination of some of the principal documents bearing on the
controversy has been facilitated by two collections, The Puzzle of
Pearl Harbor, edited by P. S. Burtness and W. U. Ober (Evanston,
Ill., 1962) and What Happened at Pearl Harbor (New York, 1958),
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 34i
edited by H. L. Trefousse. Another collection, Pearl Harbor:
Roosevelt and the Coming of the War (Boston, 1953), edited by
G. M. Waller consists of articles by historians on this issue.
An interesting recent contribution to the total picture is Rear
Admiral Kemp Tolley’s “The Strange Assignment of U.S.S. Lani-
kai,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 88 (Sept., 1962), pp.
71-83. Tolley was commander of one of the picket ships sent off
the coast of Indo-China under presidential orders.
For scholars, the 40 volumes entitled Pearl Harbor Attack must
remain a basic source, particularly as important Army and Navy
files remain classified along with some White House files. These
volumes contain the reports of previous investigations, along with
a great many materials collected by the Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack of the 79th Congress.
Since good historical writing is always revising views of the past,
whether on the basis of new materials or new perspectives and
insights, “revisionist” histories of the road to war in 1941 will con¬
tinue to find their way into print.

Chapter XIV: A NEW SUN RISES

The military history of the Japanese-American conflict, 1941-

1945, is outside the scope of this volume, but John Toland’s But
Not In Shame (New York, 1961) must be cited as an excellent
journalistic account of the disasters and human suffering which fol¬
lowed Pearl Harbor as American strategy wrote off the Philippines
and other areas of the Pacific as expendible under the burdens of a
two-ocean war. The problems created by the Pacific in respect to
commitments in the war against Germany are discussed by several
volumes in the official series, United States Army in World War II,
in R. M. Leighton and R. W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strat¬
egy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1956); M. Matloff and E. M. Snell,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washing¬
ton, 1953); and the companion volume, Strategic Planning for Co¬
alition Warfare, 1943-1944 by M. Matloff (Washington, 1960).
The end of the war and the decision to use the atomic bomb
34z AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

are the subjects of a rapidly expanding literature, but two basic

studies are Robert J. Butow’s Japans Decision to Surrender (Stan¬
ford, 1954) and Louis Morton’s “The Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb,” in Command Decisions (Washington, 1959) with ample
footnotes to provide a full bibliography to the date of publication.
The other controversial and disgraceful decision, the intern¬
ment of Japanese-Americans, has also produced a number of
books. One of the earliest efforts to publicize the plight of these
individuals was published in wartime, Carey McWilliams, Preju¬
dice: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance (Boston,
1944). Two thorough postwar studies are Morton Grodzins, Ameri¬
cans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago,
1949) and J. tenBroek and others, Prejudice, War and the Consti¬
tution (Berkeley, 1954).
A lively study of the Occupation is Harry E. Wildes, Typhoon
in Tokyo (New York, 1954). A more thorough study, but less
critical, is Kazuo Kawai’s Japans American Interlude (Chicago,
1960). Robert B. Textor’s Failure in Japan (New York, 1951)
centers on the work in education. One of the Occupation prime
ministers in his memoirs is critical of some aspects; but considers
the effort on the whole as a success, The Yoshida Memoirs (Bos¬
ton, 1962). The process of peacemaking was studied by Bernard
C. Cohen, Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Japanese
Peace Settlement (Princeton, 1957), with an excellent survey of
American public opinion for which this chapter is greatly indebted.
General MacArthur’s personal role is treated in two pietistic
biographies, both written by Occupation officials: Charles A.
Willoughby, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York, 1954), and Court¬
ney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York,
1955).
Of the many studies of postwar Japan’s politics and foreign
policy orientation especially valuable for this chapter were Sir
Esler Dening’s Japan (New York, 1961), a British study with two-
thirds of the pages devoted to the period after 1945. Douglas Men¬
del, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1961)
contains the results of many polls of opinion since 1952. I. I. Mor¬
ris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan (New York, 1960)
is a disturbing study. An analysis of the 1960 riots is made by
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 343
Herbert Passin, “The Sources of Protest in Japan,” American Po¬
litical Science Review, Vol. LVI (June, 1962), pp. 391-403. With¬
out the Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Jean Stoetzel (New
York, 1955) is the product of a French and Dutch sociologist’s
study of the changing Japanese youth. Two works of American
scholarship are Japan Between East and West by Hugh Borton
and others (New York, 1957) and Harold S. Quigley and John
Turner, The New Japan: Government and Politics (Minneapolis,
1956), the latter a solid text. An assessment of Japan’s role in the
seas in the future is offered by Walmer E. Strope, “On Japanese
Naval Rearmament,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 82
(June, 1956), pp. 575-84.
The fall of China is still a subject largely in the area of journal¬
istic speculation, but a beginning of scholarly study was launched
by Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), covering
the period from Pearl Harbor down to 1946. An analysis which
goes much further is Tang Tsou’s America’s Failure in China,
1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963). William L. Neumann’s After Victory
(New York, 1967) deals with the planning for the postwar status of
Japan and the Pacific.
INDEX

Acheson, Dean, Sec. of State, 307, Beveridge, Albert J., Ill

313 Biddle, James, U.S.N., 27
Alcock, Sir Rutherford, 58-59, 73 Bingham, John A., American Min¬
Allen, Ethan, 109 ister to Japan, 69, 94, 104
Amerasia, 295 Bisson, T. A., 181
American advisers: in China, 101- Blaine, James G., Sec. of State, 70
2; in Japan, 54-55, 67, 75, 80- Block, C. C. U.S.N., 286
81, 84-86, 90-95 Bonin Islands (Ogasawara): used
American destiny in Asia, 3-4, by Perry, 34-35; claimed by
46-47, 108-9, 159-60, 197 Japan, 100
American images of Japan, 2-3, Borah, William E., 167, 195, 196
5-6, 24-25, 30-31, 63-64, 66, Bowditch’s Practical Navigator,
115-16, 122-23, 128-30 164- 16, 75
65, 181-82, 214-15, 25B-59, Bratton, Rufus, U.S.N., 283
303-4, 305 Brooke, John M., U.S.N., 75
American Magazine of Civics, 109 Bryan, William Jennings, Sec. of
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 120, 142 State, 140
Asiatic Exclusion League, 124 Buchanan, James, 63
Aulick, John H., U.S.N., 28-29 Buck, Pearl, 215, 258
Burrows, Silas, 47
Butler, Nicholas M., 198
Barker, Albert, U.S.N., 115 Bywater, Hector C., 161
Bayard, Thomas F., Sec. of State,
70
Beard, Charles A., 180 California: effect of annexation,
Bell, H. H., U.S.N., 89 23; first anti-Japanese lobby,
Bemis, Samuel F., 236, 239 49; anti-Japanese sentiment,
Berkeley, Bishop George, 19 124—25; anti-Japanese legisla-
345
 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN
346
California (continued) ritoriality treaty, 70; and re¬
tion, 132; and mass evacuations, construction of U.S. Navy; and
291 Hawaiian annexation, 113
Caroline E. Foote, 47-48 Cleveland, William, 16
Casey, Richard, Australian Am¬ Colomb, Admiral P. H., 117
bassador, 261 Colt, Samuel, 32
Cass, Lewis, Sec. of State, 54, 63 Communist China: predicted by
Cassel, Douglas, U.S.N., 93, 95 MacMurray and Hudson, 238—
Casserly, Eugene, 82-83 39; feared by Japan, 271-72;
Castle, William R., 196 and Japanese-American rela¬
Chamberlain, Neville, 207, 254 tions, 301; and the Open Door,
Chandler, Joseph R., 28 307
Cheralie, 58 Congress: U.S., and Asian trade,
Chiang Kai-shek: and American 27; grants bonus to Perry, 47;
missionaries, 215; denounces and Japanese naval cadets, 80;
modus vivendi, 275; flight to opposes Japanese at West Point,
Formosa, 306 82-83; and Shantung, 143; and
China Trade: first American, 5; troops in China, 166; and Lud¬
and conflict with Britain, 20- low resolution, 237; and naval
21; expansion after 1842 with appropriations, 205, 248
U.S., 22; promoted by A. Pal¬ Coolidge, Archibald, 130
mer, 26-28; and European Coolidge, Calvin: and Geneva
competition, 118; in 1914, 137; Conference, 172-73; and Japa¬
significance to U.S., 212-14; nese Exclusion Act, 177-78
compared with Japanese, 221- Cushing, Caleb, American Minis¬
22; in 1930’s, 225; insignificance ter to China, 22
in 1950, 307
Chinese-American relations: Cush¬
ing treaty, 21-22; and immigra¬ Daniels, Josephus: and 1913 war
tion to U.S., 104; naval base scare, 132-33; transfers Fleet
negotiations, 119; under W. to Pacific, 150; and Franklin
Wilson, 138-41; in 1920’s, 179- Roosevelt, 202
80; American loans, 253; and Davis, Norman H.: supports naval
military aid, 269; and Com¬ limitation, 231; delegate to
munist success, 306-8 Brussels Conference, 250-51;
Chinese nationalism, 138, 164, mentioned, 204, 207, 229
179-80, 187, 307 DeBow’s Review, 25
Churchill, Sir Winston: opposes DeLong, Charles E., American
naval parity with U.S., 173; and Minister to Japan, 78-79
negotiation with Japan, 261; at Democratic Review, 24, 25
Atlantic Conference, 272-73; Denby, Charles, American Minis¬
opposes modus vivendi, 275; on ter to China, 105
the new Japan, 289; on Ameri¬ Denison, Henry W., 85, 102
can concern for China, 292 Dennett, Tyler: on Asian trade, 4;
Cleveland, George, 10 on Townsend Harris, 52; on
Cleveland, Grover: and extrater¬ 1866 Japan treaty, 61; on 1936
INDEX 347
mood, 228; on American re¬ Gentlemen’s Agreement, 125, 131,
sponsibility in Far East, 309 176
Dennis, A. L. P., 181 Germany: defies Japanese quar¬
Dewey, George, U.S.N., 116, 264 antine, 67; opposes treaty re¬
Dewey, John, 180 vision, 69; trains Japanese
Dewitt, General John L., 292 Army, 83; treaty with Korea,
Dobbin, James C., 32, 39 100; loses China holdings, 135—
Dulles, John Foster, 265 36, 142; effect of Nazi expan¬
Dutch East Indies Company, 7- sion on Asia, 256, 257, 260;
10 pact with Japan, 267
Gerow, General L. T., 274
Gibson, Hugh, 174
Eclipse, 10
Glynn, James, U.S.N., 24, 27, 28,
Eddy, Sherwood, 137
30
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 297
Golovin, Nicolai, 161
Eliza, 7-8
Grant, U. S.: visits Japan, 51; re¬
Elliott, James, 4-5
mits Shimonoseki indemnity,
Empress of China, 5
70; on Korean expedition, 98;
Enomoto, Kamajiro, 78
on Ryukyu claims, 100; on
Japanese market, 216
Farley, James A., 204, 237 Great Britain: enters Asian trade,
Feis, Herbert, 269 20-21; war with China, 21;
Fenollosa, Ernest, 64-65 follows Perry mission, 51-52;
Fillmore, Millard, 23, 38 attacks Kagoshima, 59-60; re¬
Fish, Hamilton, Sec. of State, 66, jects Iwakura mission, 68-69;
68, 78, 94 aids Japanese Navy, 74; treaty
Fiske, Bradley, U.S.N., 133 with Korea, 100; alliance with
Fitzpatrick, E. H., 129 Japan, 120; and Washington
Flowers, Montaville, 146 Conference, 169; and Geneva
Forbes, W. Cameron, 188 Conference, 172-73. See also
Formosa: and LeGendre expedi¬ Churchill, Sir Winston
tion, 89-90; and Japanese ex¬ Gresham, Walter, Sec. of State,
pedition, 91, 93-95; ceded to 105
Japan, 102; and Chiang Kai- Grew, Joseph C., Ambassador to
shek, 306 Japan: warns in re non-recog¬
Foster, John W., 102 nition statement, 201; opposes
France: follows Perry to Japan, good-will mission, 206-7; on
53; follows Harris treaty, 55; Panay incident, 234; views on
in Shimonoseki expedition, 59- American policy, 243-45; and
60; aid to Japanese Army, 83 “Mr. X,” 260-61; warns of
Franklin, 9-10 Pearl Harbor, 278; views on
Japanese peace, 295; men¬
tioned, 199, 259, 267
Genda, Minoru, 302 Griffis, William E., 84
Geneva Naval Conference, 172- Grinnell, Henry Walton, U.S.N.,
73 81
348 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Griswold, A. Whitney, 131 Hoover, J. Edgar, 385

Guam: annexed, 117; included in Hornbeck, Stanley K.: at Ver¬
freezing of fortifications, 169; sailles, 152; supports sanctions,
submarine base rejected by 193, 245-46; on naval diplo¬
Congress, 249; in Japanese at¬ macy, 207, 230-31, 288; sup¬
tack, 279 ports non-recognition, 200, 201;
on aid to China, 254-55; for
“get-tough” program, 263, 267,
Hamilton, Maxwell, 253, 260, 288
274 House, Colonel Edward M., 152,
Hamlin, Hannibal, 28 154
Hanihara, Masanao, Japanese Am¬ House, E. H., 95
bassador, 177 Hubbard, Richard, American Min¬
Harding, Warren G., 165, 167 ister to Japan, 104
Hari, Kei, Premier, 164 Hudson, G. F., 238-39
Harriman, Edward H., 130, 158 Hughes, Charles Evans, Sec. of
Harris, Townsend: negotiates State: faces reorientation of
treaty, 52-55; profits on ex¬ policy, 165-66; and Washing¬
change, 56; criticizes treaty sys¬ ton Conference, 168, 175; and
tem, 69; on state of Japan’s Japanese exclusion, 176-77;
defenses, 76 mentioned, 179, 184, 239, 289
Hart, Thomas C., U.S.N., 277, Hughes, William H., 154
286 Hull, Cordell, Sec. of State: in¬
Hawaiian Islands: visited by Cap¬ terest in low «, tariffs, 198-99;
tain Kendrick, 7; importance to initial views on Japan, 200,
Mahan, 111; plans for naval 208; on naval diplomacy, 231,
base, 112; source of conflict with 235; on sanctions, 246-47, 259;
Japan, 112-15; mentioned, 109, on aid to China, 252-53; in
116, 143, 166, 258 final Japanese negotiations,
Hay, John, Sec. of State, 111, 270-73
118-19
Hearn, Lafcadio, 106
Hearst, William Randolph: source Ickes, Harold, 204, 235
of anti-Japanese propaganda, Irwin, Wallace, 129
130; and Hearst press, 131, Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro, 148
145, 162, 224 Iwakura, Prince Tomomi, 67-68
Henry, Joseph, 70
Herbert, Hilary A., Sec. of Navy,
106, 116 Japan Societies, 141-42, 146
Hobson, Richmond P., U.S.N., Japanese-American cultural ex¬
125, 145 changes, 2, 44, 63-66, 85-86,
Holland, John, 79-80 213, 298
Honolulu: see Hawaiian Islands Japanese-American trade: under
Hoover, Herbert C.: and naval Dutch charter, 7—10; expands,
limitation, 174; and Manchuria, 22-24; promoted by Palmer,
190-91, 193, 194, 195 26-28; first post-Perry efforts,
INDEX 349
47-49; promoted by Harris, 53- Kellogg-Briand Pact, 190, 192,
54; in 1930’s, 213-14, 216-19; 195, 306
220-24; and boycotts, 241-42, Kendrick, Captain John, 6-7
259, 262-63 Kennan, George F., 214
Japanese-Americans: and mass Kennedy, John P., Sec. of Navy,
evacuation, 291-92 30
Japanese architecture, 65-66 Kimmel, Husband E., U.S.N., 282
Japanese Exclusion Act, 176-77 King, Charles W., 11-12
Japanese Government: reactions King, William H., 171
to first Americans, 6-15; re¬ Knox, Frank, Sec. of Navy: on
action to first Perry visit, 40- Japanese in Hawaii, 209; ap¬
42; impact of Harris treaty, 55- pointed by Roosevelt, 263; on
57; mission to U.S. in 1860, Fleet move to Adantic, 288;
61-63; sends students to U.S., mentioned, 285
66, 82; Iwakura mission, 67- Knox, Philander, Sec. of State,
68; expedition to Formosa, OS- 130
OS; at Versailles, 151-56; Konoye, Fumimaro, 273
changes in 1920’s, 164-65, Korea: and American expedition,
180-81; changes in 1930’s, 67, 97-99; and Japanese ex¬
185-87; under U.S. Occupa¬ pedition, 99-100; and Russian-
tion, 296-98 American conflict, 294
Japanese images of U.S., 2-3, 16- Kuhn, Loeb & Company, 122
18, 25, 41, 44, 55, 159, 305 Kuroda, Kiyotaka, 99
Japanese immigrants: in Hawaii, Kurusu, Saburo, 270, 276
112-15; in California and West
coast, 124-26, 129, 132-34, Lady Pierce, 47
176-77, 214-15, 291-92 Lady Washington, 6-7
Japanese nationalism, 56-58, 71— Lamont, Thomas W., 179
72, 87-89, 103-4, 106, 135- Langer, William L., 249, 257
36, 144-45, 186-88 Lansing, Robert, Sec. of State,
Japanese Navy: first foreign ships, 141, 148
73; Perry’s contributions, 74; / Lansing-Ishii Agreement: con-v
American contributions, 75- eluded, J-48; cancelled, 176
83, 79; expansion, 101, 120, Lea, Homer, 128-29
151, 204, 231, 233; postwar League of Nations, 154-55, 187-
reconstruction, 299-300 88, 240
Johnson, Nelson T., 182, 235 Leahy, William, U.S.N., 241, 248,
Journal of Commerce, 107, 109, 258
122 LeGendre, Charles, 89-97, 103,
216-17
Kagoshima affair, 59-60 Lindley, Ernest, 202, 210
Kaneko, Kentaro, 71, 178 Lippmann, Walter, 198, 306
Katsura, Tar6, 123 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 106, 111,
Kawakami, K. K., 142 123, 131, 157, 177, 185, 307
Kellogg, Frank B., Sec. of State, London Conference: of 1930,
180 174-75; of 1935: 229-30, 231
350 AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Long, John D., Sec. of Navy, 114 mission, 45; support treaty re¬
Low, Frederick P., Am. Minister vision, 68; in China, 104;
to China, 98 China and Japan compared,
Luce, Henry, 215, 312 137-38; influence on Wilson
Luce, Stephen B., 106 administration, 139-41; oppo¬
Ludlow, Louis L., 237 sition to Shantung cession, 157;
Lytton Commission, 187-88, 195- influence on American outlook,
96 215
Mitchell, William: on air threat
to Japan, 208
MacArthur, General Douglas, Moffat, J. Pierrepont, 245
281, 290, 295-97, 299 Moley, Raymond, 200
MacDonald, Ramsay, 174 Monroe Doctrine: Lodge corol¬
Macdonald, Ranald, 14-15 lary, 131—32
MacFarlane, Charles, 31 Morgenthau, Henry, Jr.: supports
MacMurray, John V. A., 238, 239 war in 1937, 243; urges seizure
Magdalena Bay, 115, 131-32 of Japanese assets, 252; on aid
MAGIC, 271, 276, 277, 282 to China, 253; supports “get-
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, U.S.N.: tough” policy, 263, 266, 269;
influence on Japan, 102-3; offers modus vivendi, 273-74
ideas on Pacific, 110-11; on Morgenthau, Henry, Sr., 139, 221
round-the-world cruise, 126; Mori, Arinori, Japanese Minister
and Franklin Roosevelt, 143, to U.S., 67
202, 284-85 Morrison, ll-12t
Malmesbury, James Harris, 515 Morse, Edward S., 65
Manchuria, 130-31, 175, 185-89 Mung, John: see Manjiro, Naka¬
Mandated Pacific Islands, 152-53, hama
154, 176, 209 Murray, David, 70
Mangum, Willie, 31
Manhattan, 13 Nagano, Admiral Osami, 233
Manila: see Philippines Netherlands: early Far Eastern
Manjiro, Nakahama (John Mung), ventures, 19-20; charters Amer¬
15-16, 25, 75 ican ships, 7-10; follows up
Manney, H. N., U.S.N., 126 Perry treaty, 52; and Harris
Marshall, General George, 260, treaty, 55; aid to Japanese Navy,
268, 283, 288, 293 73; and East Indies, 260, 269
Martin, Howard, 105 New York Herald, 32, 49, 95, 98,
Matsumura, Jenno, 80 105
Meiji Restoration, 72, 77-78, 87, New York Times, 32, 46, 166
88 New York Tribune, 138
Mexico: 133, 162, .209; see also New York World, 123-24
Magdalena Bay Nitobe, Inazo, 150
Millard, Thomas, 129 Nomura, Admiral Kichisaburo,
Missionaries: interest in Japan, 4, 270, 276
11, 25; sponsor Morrison mis¬ Non-recognition policy, 193-95,
sion, 11-12; activities in Perry 198, 201
INDEX 35i
Norman, E. H., 72 Pierce, Franklin, 39
North American Review, 74, 105, Pittman, Key, 231, 242
117, 145 Polo, Marco, 5-6
Nye, Gerald P., 231 Porter, David, U.S.N., 26
Propaganda: anti-Japanese, 116,
125, 128-30, 145-46, 148, 171,
Okinawa: first visited by Perry,
173, 208-9, 214-15, 217-18,
34— 35; second visit, 38-39;
258; pro-Japanese, 141-42, 146,
visited by Ringgold-Rodgers ex¬
182-83
pedition, 48
Pruyn, Robert H., American Min¬
Okuma, Shigenobu, 157
ister to Japan, 59-60, 76-77
Olyphant, David W. C., 11-12
Public opinion polls, 232, 236,
Open Door policy: initiated by
254, 258, 292, 302-3
Hay, 118-19; and Woodrow
Putiatin, Admiral Evfimii, 42
Wilson administration, 143-44,
148, 151; viewed by Japan,
153; in Stimson letter to Borah,
Quigley, Harold S., 181
195; in postwar American pol¬
icy, 306-7
Opium War, 21, 40, 41
Racism: in U.S., 124-25, 128-29,
O’Ryan, General John F., 260
132, 147-48, 153-54, 176-77,
291, 303
Pacific Fleet: see U.S. Navy Rankin, Jeannette, 281
Palmer, Aaron H., 26-27, 28, 29 Reinsch, Paul, American Minister
Panay incident, 234, 251-52 to China, 143-44, 156
Parkes, Sir Harry, 70, 84, 85, 96 Ringgold-Rodgers expedition, 48-
Pearl Harbor, 1, 112-13, 129, 151, 49, 55
277-80, 282-84, 287 Roberts, Edmund, 10-11
Peffer, Nathaniel, 180, 279 Robinson, Arthur R., 209
Perry, Matthew C., U.S.N.: on Rodgers, John, U.S.N., 48-49, 98
Anglo-Chinese War, 21; given Roosevelt, Franklin D.: forma¬
command of Japan expedition, tive influences, 199, 202; as As¬
29; on American destiny, 30; sistant Secretary of Navy, 133,
on use of force, 31-32; visits 143; on naval expansion and
Ryukyus, 34-35; lands in Japan, strategy, 202—4, 205-6, 229,
35- 38; second visit, 43-45; re¬ 231-33, 287-88; on naval limi¬
turns to U.S., 47 tation, 173, 178, 203; views on
Philippines: conquest urged on Far East, 198-201, 204, 210-
Japan, 89; annexed by U.S., 11, 247-53, 259, 265-66, 267,
117-18; and 1913 war scare, 269-72, 273-77, 281, 283-85
133; in World War I, 143, Roosevelt, Theodore: and Japan,
146-47; war loss anticipated, 113-14, 118, 126-21, 123-28;
205; fears of Japanese con¬ and naval expansion, 119-20;
quest, 209; effect of independ¬ mentioned, 2, 111, 138, 142,
ence, 239; mentioned, 129, 161, 185, 311
279, 280, 286 Root, Elihu, Sec. of State, 125
35* AMERICA ENCOUNTERS JAPAN

Russia: sends expedition to Japan, 180-81; over Manchuria, 186-

42; follows Perry mission, 52; 89; Marco Polo bridge conflict,
and Japanese Navy, 74; treaty 233-34
with Korea, 100; and tripartite Sirovich, William I., 209
intervention, 102; war with, Smith, Erasmus Peshine, 84
Japan, 120-23. See also U.S.S.R. Soeshima, Taneomi, 83-84, 91-92
Ryukyu Islands: annexation ad¬ Standley, William H., U.S.N.,
vocated, 12; visited by Perry, 229, 235
34, 33-39; sailors shipwrecked Stannard, Captain Elbert, 76
on Formosa, 90-91; claimed by Stark, Harold, U.S.N., 260, 274,
Japan, 100 276, 283
Stevens, John L., 112
Stewart, Captain William R., 7-9
Saito, Hirosi, Japanese Ambas¬ Stimson, Henry L.: as Secretary
sador to U.S., 190, 225, 229, of State, 191-98; and Franklin
278 Roosevelt, 199-201; and sanc¬
Sanctions against Japan, 193, 198, tions in 1937, 242; appointed
227, 241-42, 244-47, 249, 253- Sec. of War, 263; favors “get-
54, 259, 262-66, 269 tough” policy, 264-65; on Pearl
San Francisco School Board in¬ Harbor, 276; on naval strategy,
cident, 124-25 287, 288
Sato, General Kojiro, 162 Stirling, Sir James, 52, 74
Schiff, Jacob, 122, 141 Straight, Willard, 139
Schurman, Jacob, American Min¬ Swanson, Claude B., 203, 243-45
ister to China, 179 Submarines: purchased by Japan,
Seward, George, 94 79-80
Seward, William, Sec. of State,
57, 59, 77, 109
Shantung Peninsula, 142-43, 152, Taft, William H., 81, 123, 130
155-57, 165, 175-76 Takashima, Shunhan, 81
Shearer, William B., 171, 173 Tanaka, Giichi, 181
Sheppard, Eli T., 67, 85 Tani, Viscount Tateki, 70-71
Shidehara, Kijuro, 180, 184 Taylor, Bayard, 33-34
Shimoda, 47-48, 52, 53 Togo, Hashimura, 129
Shimonoseki Strait incident: SO¬ Togo, Heihachiro, 112-13
SO; indemnity remitted, 70 Togo, Shigenori, 279
Short, Walter C., 282, 283 Tojo, General Hideki, 273, 300
Shufeldt, R. W., U.S.N., 100 Toynbee, Arnold, 185
Siam, 10-11, 53 Trade: see China trade, Japanese-
Siberia, 155, 158, 165 American trade
Singapore, 264-65, 281 Treaties: China-U.S. (1844), 21-
Sino-Japanese relations: in re 22; China-Great Britain (1842),
Formosa, 91-95; war in 1894- 21; Japan-U.S. (1854), 43-46;
95, 101-2; during WAV. I, Japan-U.S. (1858), 52-56; ef¬
144—45; at Versailles, 155-56; forts at revision, 67-69; Japan-
during Shidehara regime, 165, U.S. (1911), 254-55, 262-63;
INDEX 353
Korea-U.S. (1882), 100; Korea- War scares: in 1893, 112-13; in
Japan (1876), 99-100; Nine 1897, 114-15; in 1907-1908,
Power (1922), 169, 194, 195, 125-28; in 1913, 132-33; in
251 1920-21, 162
Tugwell, Rexford, 200 Washington Conference, 1921-22,
Twenty-one Demands, 144—45 167-72
Wasson, James R., 93, 95
Webster, Daniel, 23
U.S.S.R.: views on Perry mission,
Welles, Sumner, 251-52, 260,
49-50; conflict with China, 192;
266, 285
recognized by U.S., 206; men¬
Whaling: in the Pacific, 6, 13-14,
tioned, 238, 293, 294. See also
15, 23, 27
Russia Whig Review, 24
United States Naval Academy, Whistler, James, 64
80-81 White, Harry Dexter, 273-74,
United States Navy: first Japan
275
expeditions, 27-29; base in
White, William Allen, 109
Bonins, 34-35; Ringgold-Rodg-
Whitfield, Captain William, 15
ers expedition, 48-49; in Wilbur, Curtis D., Sec. of Navy,
Shimonseki expedition, 59-60;
178
in Korea, 67, 98-99; round-the- Williams, Edward T., 139, 144
world cruise, 126-28; and Williams, S. Wells: on Morrison
China bases, 119-20; shift to mission, 11-12; on Japanese
Pacific, 150-51; expansion, 110- isolation, 25; with Perry, 34,
11, 116-17, 119-20, 130, 146- 36, 39-40; on Formosa and
47, 150, 203, 205-6, 230-32, LeGendre, 95
248-49; Pacific maneuvers, 178- Wilson, Hugh R., 190
79, 210 Wilson, Woodrow: and 1913 war
Uriu, Admiral Sotokichi, 80-81 scare, 132—33; views on China,
Utley, Freda, 241 139-40; on Japan, 140-41,
Uyehara, Etsujiro, 153 147—48; and Versailles, 152-57;
and Siberia, 158-59
Vandenberg, Arthur H., 254 World War I: effects on Far East,
VanValkenburgh, Robert B., 135-36
American Minister to Japan, Wright, Frank Lloyd, 65-66
78, 216, 217
Verbeck, Guido, 67, 84
Versailles Treaty, 151-58 Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 1,
278, 280
Yap Island, 165, 176
Walker, Robert, 23 Yarnell, Harry E, U.S.N., 241,
Walsh, Thomas J., 166 249, 286-87
War Plans, U.S., 119, 126, 204-5, Yoshida, Shoin, 89, 103
240, 268, 285 Young, Pierce Manning, 83
 .

*
History JOHNS HOPKINS PAPERBACK JH-63

William Neumann brings together intellectual and diplomatic

history in this examination of America’s one-hundred-year
encounter with Japan. American policy and action, he contends,
were closely related to assumptions about the nature of national
interest in the Far East. His conclusions are controversial and
stimulating.

“This modest-sized volume is a survey—and much more—of

American relations with Japan during the past century. ... It
will be difficult for a reviewer to find serious flaws in this truly
admirable account. There is a judiciousness about the general¬
izations that betokens intimate reading and understanding of
manifold secondary works. . . . All in all this is a first-class
account that should pass quickly into a paperback edition.”
—American Historical Review
\
\

“William L, Neumann has written more than a good diplomatic

history. He has produced a detailed, balanced and very readable
account of the changes in American attitudes to Japan covering
more than a century. . . .’’—Pacific Affairs

“Dr. Neumann tells the story of modern Japan well and aptly.”
—National Preview

“Professor Neumann’s book is well-written. His views are

provocative and certain to arouse controversy. His approach is
new and his research extensive.”—Historian

William L. Neumann is Professor of History at Goucher

College.
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