Philosophy 341

Critiquing Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex Through the Eyes of Frantz Fanon

Lenka Steinhauser
8/30/2024
26060027
Dr Azille Coetzee and Prof Louise du Toit
Excerpt from The Second Sex:

I hesitated a long time before writing a book on woman. 1 The subject is irritating, especially
for women; and it is not new. Enough ink has flowed over the quarrel about feminism; it is
now almost over: let’s not talk about it anymore. 2 Yet it is still being talked about. And the
volumes of idiocies churned out over this past century do not seem to have clarified the
problem. Besides, is there a problem? And what is it? Are there even women? 3 True, the
theory of the eternal feminine still has its followers; they whisper, ‘Even in Russia, women
are still very much women; but other well-informed people—and also at times those same

1
Fanon would likely point out that this mirrors the effects on blackness due to colonial oppression, a reflection
of the internalised distrust within the oppressed of themselves and their own abilities. This hesitation to claim
one’s voice, reveals the difficulty to take up the uncomfortable task of liberation. According to Fanon, writing
about the oppressed is a political act that challenges established systems of power and control (Fanon, 1952, p.
3). Writing about women means addressing the patriarchal systems that have historically labelled them as
different, similar to how colonialism treats colonized individuals. Remaining complacent is much easier than
undertaking the tremendous task of dismantling systems of oppression. Which according to Fanon require a
radical confrontation with the internalised beliefs that uphold them (Fanon, 1952, p. 92). He would argue her
reluctance is from the fear that every marginalised group feels to undertake such a monumental task.
2
De Beauvoir reflects on the exhaustion felt in discussions of feminism. She feels here as if the conversation of
feminism is endless, because the underlying structures that perpetuate the fundamental exclusion of women in
society continues to remain unaddressed and unchanged. Fanon might relate this to the conversation surrounding
racial inequality and disagrees with the notion that the debates relating to feminism are nearing their end. He
might argue they must continue to struggle against oppression until the issues are resolved until there are
fundamental changes in society. Fanon believes the colonizer refuses to acknowledge the violence of these
hierarchies and does not consider the implications of granting full freedom and autonomy to the oppressed
(Fanon, 1952, p. 103). From a Fanonian point of view the struggle against oppression is never completely over
as long as the certain structures of power remain in place there is a need for decolonization. He states that the
process of liberation is one that is continuous and that must be actively maintained and re- evaluated. To suggest
that there is no longer a need for resistance or discourse is to silence the voices of the oppressed (Fanon, 1952,
p. 4). Fanon might highlight that this thought process is a reflection of a broader issue where there is a tendency
to view liberation movements as linear processes with clear conclusions instead of seeing them as ongoing
struggles that need to continuously assert themselves against constantly changing forms of subjugation (Fanon,
1952, p. 102).
3
This rhetorical question posed by De Beauvoir parallel’s Fanon’s own question about the existence of a black
identity outside of colonial constructs. In his own work Black skin White masks Fanon confronts this idea of an
imposed identity of blackness and its relation as the antithesis to whiteness (Fanon, 1952, p. 84). It is strikingly
similar to how De Beauvoir questions whether women can be defined independently from the patriarchal
identification imposed on them. Both of these identities are plagued by the ideals of a dominant power that
overwrites their own stories to create a narrative that favours the oppressor. It is designed in such a way to
dehumanise the non- dominant groups and exercise control and authority over them. For Fanon he does not
believe that blackness is a self-determined identity but rather one that is imposed upon him, by a colonial and
racist society that seeks to dehumanize (Fanon, 1952, p. 86). Labels such as “blackness” and “woman” reduces
people to a single aspect of themselves, completely stripping them of their otherwise complex individuality.
These constructs serve as a means to limit their agency and subjectivity by confining them to predetermined
roles (Fanon, 1952, p. 85). The confusion and ambiguity in defining these categories reflect their arbitrary
nature, which are designed to dehumanize and control. Both Fanon and De Beauvoir advocate for a form of
liberation that transcends the confines of these imposed identities.
ones — lament, “Woman is losing herself, woman is lost.’ It is hard to know any longer if
women still exist, if they will always exist, if there should be women at all, what place they
hold in this world, what place they should hold. “Where are the women?’ asked a short-lived
magazine recently. But first, what is a woman? ‘Tota mulier in utero: she is a womb,’ some
say. Yet speaking of certain women, the experts proclaim, “They are not women, even though
they have a uterus like the others. Everyone agrees there are females in the human species;
today, as in the past, they make up about half of humanity; and yet we are told that
‘femininity is in jeopardy’; we are urged, ‘Be women, stay women, become women.’

So not every female human being is necessarily a woman; she must take part in this
mysterious and endangered reality known as femininity. 4 Is femininity secreted by the
ovaries? Is it enshrined in a Platonic heaven? Is a frilly petticoat enough to bring it down to
earth? Although some women zealously strive to embody it, the model has never been
patented. It is typically described in vague and shimmering terms borrowed from a
clairvoyant’s vocabulary. In St Thomas's time it was an essence defined with as much
certainty as the sedative quality of a poppy. But conceptualism has lost ground: biological
and social sciences no longer believe there are immutably determined entities that define
given characteristics like those of the woman, the Jew or the black; science considers
characteristics as secondary reactions to a situation. If there is no such thing today as
femininity, it is because there never was. Does the word ‘woman’, then, have no content? It is
what advocates of Enlightenment philosophy, rationalism or nominalism vigorously assert:
women are, among human beings, merely those who are arbitrarily designated by the word

4
Femininity is a socially manufactured concept that women are expected to pursue, this is criticized by Simone
De Beauvoir. She questions this elusive idea of femininity that evades women, is deliberately formulated as
something obscure to uphold patriarchal structures. This mystification is deliberately vague; it is rigid enough to
preserve power dynamics but elusive enough to be used in a variety of ways. The idea that femininity is
"mysterious" suggests that it is unknown and thus unchangeable, which keeps women in a state of inferiority
and uncertainty. It posits that these intrinsic characteristics contribute to women's societal submission to men.
The same reasoning is applied to how racial identities are constructed under colonial rule, being black is
portrayed as a necessary, inherent characteristic that both defines and restricts the colonized (Fanon, 1952, p.
90). Similarly to how racial otherness limits the identity and agency of colonized peoples, this construction puts
women in a situation where they are both defined by and subject to an arbitrary and restricted ideal. For Fanon,
the "othering" process is a key component of colonial power. In Black Skin, White Masks, he analyses how
oppressors construct an image of the "Black Other" as inherently different and inferior to the "White Self"
(Fanon, 1952, p. 86). This othering process entails attributing negative characteristics onto black people, such as
being mysterious, dangerous, and primitive. The colonized individual is both dehumanized, while
simultaneously they justify their own dominance through ambiguous concepts (Fanon, 1952, p. 85). The
qualities that are given to both women and other marginalized groups are defined in such a way to be vague
notions, of an essence that defines them. This is then a tool for domination to legitimise the authority of the
oppressor. The patriarchal system, like the colonizer, creates myths about the "primitive" nature of the colonized
to justify their rule over them (Fanon, 1952, p. 99). In both cases, these myths help to keep the oppressed in a
posture of perpetual otherness and reliance, preventing them from exercising their agency.
‘woman’; American women in particular are inclined to think that woman as such no longer
exists. If some backward individual still takes herself for a woman, her friends advise her to
undergo psycho- analysis to get rid of this obsession. Referring to a book — a very irritating
one at that — Modern Woman: The Lost Sex, Dorothy Parker wrote: ‘I cannot be fair about
books that treat women as women. My idea is that all of us, men as well as women, whoever
we are, should be considered as human beings.’ But nominalism is a doctrine that falls a bit
short; and it is easy for anti-feminists to show that women are not men. Certainly woman like
man is a human being; but such an assertion is abstract; the fact is that every concrete human
being is always uniquely situated. Rejecting the notions of the eternal feminine, the black
soul or the Jewish character is not to deny that there are today, Jews, blacks or women: this
denial is not a liberation for those concerned, but an inauthentic flight. 5 Clearly, no woman
can claim without bad faith to be situated beyond her sex. 6 A few years ago, a well-known

5
Simone de Beauvoir criticizes essentialist ideas that characterize women, blacks, and Jews in rigid and
simplistic terms. She argues that discarding these essentialist categories does not negate their existence, but
rather questions the static, restrictive meanings that have been imposed upon them. Essentialism reduces the
individual to a set of fixed characteristics that ignore the complexity of their experiences. It is a problematic
viewpoint in that it disregards the lived realities, and socio- political context that shapes an individual. Fanon
would agree with her rejection of the Essentialist viewpoint that reduces identities to a set of imposed roles
(Fanon, 1952, p. 89). However, he would be critical of the dangers that universalizing oppression may bring
such as erasing specific experiences of marginalized groups. For Fanon oppression is not something that
remains consistent but varies between different races, genders and classes. His approach emphasizes the
importance of recognizing the unique intersectionality in which forms of oppression manifest. That
acknowledging the struggles that Jews, blacks or women face does not mean reducing this experience to a single
narrative (Fanon, 1952, 92). Fanon is heavily against a homogenizing view that treats all forms of oppression as
interchangeable. Recognizing the distinct and interconnected ways in which power and oppression emerge is
vital for a sophisticated understanding of social justice and developing effective solidarity among different
struggles (Fanon, 1952, p.101).
6
According to De Beauvoir, women are not really free from the restrictions imposed by their gender,
particularly when those restrictions are found in the repressive framework of a patriarchal society. Women
cannot escape their womanhood; they are defined by their otherness. She holds the notion that woman by
definition is only identified by how they are not men. They are the opposite of men deviations of the norm, the
qualities that make them women in society also make them inferior to men. It is similar to the quote from
Margaret Atwood “Even pretending you aren't catering to male fantasies is a male fantasy”, to think that you can
escape the constraints placed on you by men is deluding yourself with a false sense of freedom (Atwood, 1993).
As a woman you are constantly confronted with your secondary status, you are constantly made to feel
objectified something other than human. From birth it is society that tells you how you must position yourself as
subordinate to men. Even Religion is a tool to keep women under the domination of men “Wives, be submissive
to your own husbands as unto the Lord.” (Ephesians 5:22-33) as if to say that their oppression is ordained by
God himself. The patriarchal ideology is an infestation that worms its way into every aspect of a woman’s being
even their own internal thoughts become reflections of their position in society. Whether you choose to take part
in Feminist discourse, the objectification and dehumanization is an inescapable aspect of womanhood. Even
rejecting your own gender to try to win the favour of your oppressor does not lead to liberation, you are still
under the same metaphorical boot that all women find themselves. To claim to be "beyond" one's sex without
admitting these limitations is to ignore the systematic structure of gender oppression. All of this is my own
interpretation of Simone De Beauvoir’s point, Fanon would have likely extended this notion to what he calls the
colonized intellectual (Fanon, 1952, p. 101). This is someone who attempts to distance themselves from their
culture or heritage in order to achieve a form of acceptance within the colonizer’s framework. Distancing can
manifest as an attempt to conform to the values and norms of society, which ultimately goes against their natural
state of being. It alienates them from their own people severing the connection between them and their history.
woman writer refused to have her portrait appear in a series of photographs devoted
specifically to women writers. She wanted to be included in the men’s category; but to get
this privilege, she used her husband’s influence. Women who assert they are men still claim
masculine consideration and respect. I also remember a young Trotskyite standing on a
platform during a stormy meeting, about to come to blows in spite of her obvious fragility.
She was denying her feminine frailty; but it was for the love of a militant man she wanted to
be equal to. The defiant position that American women occupy proves they are haunted by
the feeling of their own femininity. And the truth is that anyone can clearly see that humanity
is split into two categories of individuals with manifestly different clothes, faces, bodies,
smiles, movements, interests and occupations; these differences are perhaps superficial;
perhaps they are destined to disappear. What is certain is that for the moment they exist in a
strikingly obvious way. If the female function is not enough to define woman, and if we also
reject the explanation of the ‘eternal feminine’, but if we accept, even temporarily, that there
are women on the earth, we then have to ask: what is awoman?

Merely stating the problem suggests an immediate answer to me. It is significant that I pose
it. It would never occur to a man to write a book on the singular situation of males in
humanity. If I want to define myself, I first have to say, ‘I am a woman’; all other assertions
will arise from this basic truth. A man never begins by positing himself as an individual of a
certain sex: that he is a man is obvious. 7 The categories ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ appear as

Fanon contends that attempting to transcend oppression without confronting its realities avoids confronting the
systematic and structural aspects of oppression (Fanon, 1952). Both De Beauvoir and Fanon both advocate for
solidarity among the oppressed, that it is essential for them to work together in challenging the inequalities that
plague them. This requires them to enter a state of awareness where they actively work towards dismantling
white colonial male domination.
7
This line captures the idea that maleness is treated as if it is the default or universal standard of society. De
Beauvoir emphasizes that men are seen as the "absolute human type," while women are seen as "other," defined
only in relation to men. Men’s identity is seen as the neutral, it is the baseline, the standard to which everyone
else must conform to. Women must contort themselves in order to not disrupt, they must try to find position
themselves in relation to men as not disrupt the supposed natural order. Women are not given the same status as
men, they are seen as the deviations of the male norm, they are categorized by their differences. According to
De Beauvoir women are seen as secondary beings that are defined by not being men instead of beings in their
own right. This is evident by the fact that women have rarely been included in clinical trials until 1993, despite
the fact that women account for nearly half of the global population (Balch, 2024). Another example is the fact
that car crashes can prove more fatal to women that to men simply due to the fact that crash dummies are
predominantly built to simulate the dimensions of a male body (Beighton, 2022). Male bodies have been seen as
the norm where women are seen as the atypical other that does not warrant consideration. This bias towards men
puts women in a disadvantage in most areas of life, simply put the world is not designed with women in mind.
They are forced to adjust themselves in world that is catered toward male bodies. There are plenty more
examples that highlight De Beauvoir’s point where men are usually considered the default Fanon explains in a
similar way how Blackness is viewed as a deviation from the norm in society and Whiteness as the standard.
Whiteness is treated as the standard for humanity, white men are not required to explain their whiteness or
defend it against scrutiny they are awarded the unique position of simply existing as they are (Fanon, 1952, 84).
This othering of anything that does not align with this standard reinforces racial and gendered hierarchies that
symmetrical in a formal way on town hall records or identification papers. The relation of the
two sexes is not that of two electrical poles: the man represents both the positive and the
neuter to such an extent that in French hommes designates human beings, the particular
meaning of the word vir being assimilated into the general meaning of the word ‘homo’.
Woman is the negative, to such a point that any determination is imputed to her as a
limitation, without reciprocity. I used to get annoyed in abstract discussions to hear men tell
me: “You think such and such a thing because you’re a woman.’ But I know my only defence
is to answer, ‘I think it because it is true,’ thereby eliminating my subjectivity; it was out of
the question to answer, ‘And you think the contrary because you are a man,’ because it is
understood that being a man is not a particularity; a man is in his right by virtue of being
man; it is the woman who is in the wrong. In fact, just as for the ancients there was an
absolute vertical that defined the oblique, there is an absolute human type that is masculine.
Woman has ovaries and a uterus; such are the particular conditions that lock her in her
subjectivity; some even say she thinks with her hormones. Man vainly forgets that his
anatomy also includes hormones and testicles. He grasps his body as a direct and normal link
with the world that he believes he apprehends in all objectivity, whereas he considers
woman’s body an obstacle, a prison, burdened by everything that particularises it. “The
female is female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities,’ Aristotle said. ‘We should regard
women’s nature as suffering from natural defectiveness.’ And St Thomas in his turn decreed
that woman was an ‘incomplete man’, an ‘incidental’ being. This is what the Genesis story
symbolises, where Eve appears as if drawn from Adam’s ‘supernumerary’ bone, in Bossuet’s
words. Humanity is male, and man defines woman, not in herself, but in relation to himself;
she is not considered an autonomous being. ‘Woman, the relative being,’ writes Michelet.
Thus Monsieur Benda declares in Uriel’s Report:' ‘A man’s body has meaning by itself,
disregarding the body of the woman, whereas the woman’s body seems devoid of meaning
without reference to the male. Man thinks himself without woman. Woman does not think
herself without man.’ And she is nothing other than what man decides; she is thus called ‘the
sex’, meaning that the male sees her essentially as a sexed being; for him she is sex, so she is
it in the absolute. She determines and differentiates herself in relation to man, and he does not
in relation to her; she is the inessential in front of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the
Absolute. She is the Other.

reinforce colonial and patriarchal domination.

The category of Other is as original as consciousness itself. The duality between Self and
Other can be found in the most primitive societies, in the most ancient mythologies; this
division did not always fall into the category of the division of the sexes, it was not based on
any empirical given: this comes out in works like Granet’s on Chinese thought, and
Dumézil’s on India and Rome. In couples such as Varuna—Mitra, Uranos—Zeus, Sun—
Moon, Day-—Night, no feminine element is involved at the outset; neither in Good-Evil,
auspicious and inauspicious, left and right, God and Lucifer; alterity is the fundamental
category of human thought. No group ever defines itself as One without immediately setting
up the Other opposite itself.8 It only takes three travellers brought together by chance in the
same train compartment for the rest of the travellers to become vaguely hostile ‘others’.
Village people view anyone not belonging to the village as suspicious ‘others’. For the native
of a country, inhabitants of other countries are viewed as ‘foreigners’; Jews are the ‘others’
for anti-Semites, blacks for racist Americans, indigenous people for colonists, proletarians for
the propertied classes. After studying the diverse forms of primitive society in depth, Lévi-
Strauss could conclude: “The passage from the state of Nature to the state of Culture is
defined by man’s ability to think biological relations as systems of oppositions; duality,
alternation, opposition, and symmetry, whether occurring in defined or less clear form, are
not so much phenomena to explain as fundamental and immediate givens of social reality.’
These phenomena could not be understood if human reality were solely a Mitsein‘ based on
solidarity and friendship. On the contrary, they become clear if, following Hegel, a
fundamental hostility to any other conscious- ness is found in consciousness itself; the subject
posits itself only in Opposition; it asserts itself as the essential and sets up the other as
inessential, as the object.

8
This line emphasizes the fact that the process of othering is not only a means of defining and oppressing the
other, but also it is used as a way to define that which is doing the othering in the first place. The way in which
men and colonizers position marginalized groups as the other is a fundamental mechanism through which their
power is maintained. Fanon describes in his book “Black skins White masks” how the identity of the colonizer
is constructed through the subjugation and othering of the colonised. The colonizer constructs his identity as the
rationalised and superior being by placing the other as primitive and inferior (Fanon, 1952, p. 86). The othering
not only serves to dehumanize the colonised but also reinforces the colonisers sense of superiority justifying
their domination and exploitation. Fanon argues that there is a mutual dependency between the identity of the
oppressor and the oppressed. The coloniser requires the other in order to maintain the hierarchy upon which they
place themselves as above the other in some way (Fanon, 1952, p. 82). Without the other to be contrasted
against the identity of the oppressor loses its position, the power dynamic becomes destabilized. The only way
for them to maintain their superiority is to create an inferior other which they can contrast themselves against.
Their dependence draws attention to the fact that oppressive regimes constantly require an "other" to establish
their legitimacy and power, they are always unstable and contingent. The oppressor's identity is endangered if
the "Other" starts to question the labels that are placed upon them or if they attain a degree of similarity or
equality that calls into question the oppressor's assertions of dominance. De Beauvoir and Fanon actively
encourage the oppressed to assert their own subjectivity to undermine these systems of oppression.
But the other consciousness has an opposing reciprocal claim: travelling, a local is shocked to
realise that in neighbouring countries locals view him as a foreigner; between villages, clans,
nations and classes there are wars, potlatches, agreements, treaties and struggles that remove
the absolute meaning from the idea of the Other and bring out its relativity; whether one likes
it or not, individuals and groups have no choice but to recognise the reciprocity of their
relation. How is it, then, that between the sexes this reciprocity has not been put forward, that
one of the terms has been asserted as the only essential one, denying any relativity in regard
to its correlative, defining the latter as pure alterity? Why do women not contest male
sovereignty? No subject posits itself spontaneously and at once as the inessential from the
outset; it is not the Other who, defining itself as Other, defines the One; the Other is posited
as Other by the One positing itself as One. But in order for the Other not to turn into the One,
the Other has to submit to this foreign point of view. Where does this submission in woman
come from?

There are other cases where, for a shorter or longer time, one category has managed to
dominate another absolutely. It is often numerical inequality that confers this privilege: the
majority imposes its law on or persecutes the minority. But women are not a minority like
American blacks, or like Jews: there are as many women as men on the earth. Often, the two
opposing groups concerned were once independent of each other; either they were not aware
of each other in the past or they accepted each other’s autonomy; and some historical event
subordinated the weaker to the stronger: the Jewish diaspora, slavery in America, or the
colonial conquests are facts with dates. In these cases, for the oppressed there was a before:
they share a past, a tradition, sometimes a religion, or a culture. In this sense, the parallel
Bebel draws between women and the proletariat would be the best founded: proletarians are
not a numerical minority either and yet they have never formed a separate group. However,
not one event but a whole historical development explains their existence as a class and
accounts for the distribution of these individuals in this class. There have not always been
proletarians: there have always been women; they are women by their physiological
structure; as far back as history can be traced, they have always been subordinate to men;
their dependence is not the consequence of an event or a becoming, it did not happen. Alterity
here appears to be an absolute, partly because it falls outside the accidental nature of
historical fact. A situation created over time can come undone at another time — blacks in
Haiti for one are a good example; on the contrary, a natural condition seems to defy change.
In truth, nature is no more an immutable given than is historical reality. If woman discovers
herself as the inessential, and never turns into the essential, it is because she does not bring
about this transformation herself. Proletarians say ‘we’. So do blacks. Positing themselves as
subjects, they thus transform the bourgeois or whites into ‘others’. Women — except in
certain abstract gatherings such as conferences — do not use ‘we’; men say ‘women’ and
women

adopt this word to refer to themselves; but they do not posit themselves authentically as
Subjects. The proletarians made the revolution in Russia, the blacks in Haiti, the Indo-
Chinese are fighting in Indochina. Women’s actions have never been more than symbolic
agitation; they have won only what men have been willing to concede to them; they have
taken nothing; they have received.9 It is that they lack the concrete means to organise
themselves into a unit that could posit itself in opposition. They have no past, no history, no
religion of their own; and unlike the proletariat, they have no solidarity of labour or interests;
they even lack their own space that makes communities of American blacks, or the Jews in
ghettos, or the workers in Saint-Denis or Renault factories. They live dispersed among men,
tied by homes, work, economic interests and social conditions to certain men — fathers or
husbands — more closely than to other women. As bourgeois women, they are in solidarity
with bourgeois men and not with women proletarians; as white women, they are in solidarity
with white men and not with black women. The proletariat could plan to massacre the whole
ruling class; a fanatic Jew or black could dream of seizing the secret of the atomic bomb and
turning all of humanity entirely Jewish or entirely black: but a woman could not even dream
of exterminating males. The tie that binds her to her oppressors is unlike any other. The
division of the sexes is a biological given, not a moment in human history. Their opposition
took shape within an original Mitsein and she has not broken it. The couple is a fundamental

9
This reflects a critical disposition of how marginalised groups are often guilty of engaging in systems in power
and unintentionally perpetuating them by not actively condemning them. De Beauvoir has held the position that
true liberation requires active revolutionary efforts that disrupt the existing power structures, rather than simply
accepting the transgressions granted by the dominating group. Change does not come passively it is in nature
something that must be forced especially when there are those that cling to their control so violently. When de
Beauvoir refers to the efforts of women as "symbolic agitation," she draws attention to the shortcomings of
reforms and adjustments that do not radically alter the balance of power between men and women. Thus, the
changes that are achieved are merely superficial they do not involve true liberation. This illustrates a dynamic in
which the dominant group still holds the majority of power, and any advancement depends on their willingness
to "allow" it. Women are still subject to the whims of those in positions of power, it is an unstable sense of peace
that can be revoked at any time. According to Fanon, colonial liberation movements that function inside the
boundaries of the colonial system face similar restrictions. Better conditions inside the colonial system are not
enough for true decolonization; the colonial system itself must be destroyed (Fanon, 1952, p. 4). The colonised
are expected to be grateful for these concessions, but the coloniser still remains in power and reinforces the idea
that the colonised are subordinate to them. In order for true equality to exists the oppressed must demand a seat
at the table so to speak (Fanon, 1952, p. 4). The act of taking power is crucial, because it asserts their agency
and autonomy, challenging the notion that subordinate to the dominant power.
unit with the two halves riveted to each other: cleavage of society by sex is not possible. This
is the fundamental characteristic of woman: she is the Other at the heart of a whole whose
two components are necessary to each other.

One might think that this reciprocity would have facilitated her liberation; when Hercules
spins wool at Omphale’s feet, his desire enchains him. Why was Omphale unable to acquire
long-lasting power? Medea, in revenge against Jason, kills her children: this brutal legend
suggests that the bond attaching the woman to her child could have given her a formidable
upper hand. In Lysistrata, Aristophanes light-heartedly imagined a group of women who,
uniting together for the social good, tried to take advantage of men’s need for them: but it is
only a comedy. The legend that claims that the ravished Sabine women resisted their
ravishers with obstinate sterility also recounts that by whipping them with leather straps, the
men magically won them over into submission. Biological need — sexual desire and desire
for posterity - which makes the male dependent on the female, has not liberated women
socially. Master and slave are also linked by a reciprocal economic need that does not free the
slave. That is, in the master-slave relation, the master does not posit the need he has for the
other; he holds the power to satisfy this need and does not mediate it; the slave, on the other
hand, out of dependence, hope or fear, internalises his need for the master; however equally
compelling the need may be to them both, it always plays in favour of the oppressor over the
oppressed: this explains the slow pace of working- class liberation, for example. Now woman
has always been, if not man’s slave, at least his vassal; the two sexes have never divided the
world up equally; and still today, even though her condition is changing, woman is heavily
handicapped. In no country is her legal status identical to man’s, and often it puts her at a
considerable disadvantage. Even when her rights are recognised abstractly, long-standing
habit keeps them from being concretely manifested in customs. Economically, men and
women almost form two castes; all things being equal, the former have better jobs, higher
wages and greater chances to succeed than their new female competitors; they occupy many
more places in industry, in politics, and so on, and they hold the most important positions. In
addition to their concrete power they are invested with a prestige whose tradition is rein-
forced by the child’s whole education: the present incorporates the past, and in the past all
history was made by males. At the moment that women are beginning to share in the making
of the world, this world still belongs to men: men have no doubt about this, and women
barely doubt it. Refusing to be the Other, refusing complicity with man, would mean
renouncing all the advantages an alliance with the superior caste confers on them. Lord-man
will materially protect liege-woman and will be in charge of justifying her existence: along
with the economic risk, she eludes the metaphysical risk of a freedom that must invent its
goals without help. Indeed, beside every individual’s claim to assert himself as subject — an
ethical claim — lies the temptation to flee freedom and to make himself into a thing: it is a
pernicious path because the individual, passive, alienated and lost, is prey to a foreign will,
cut off from his transcendence, robbed of all worth. But it is an easy path: the anguish and
stress of authentically assumed existence are thus avoided. The man who sets the woman up
as an Other will thus find in her a deep complicity. Hence woman makes no claim for herself
as subject because she lacks the concrete means, because she senses the necessary link
connecting her to man without positing its reciprocity, and because she often derives
satisfaction from her role as Other.

But a question immediately arises: how did this whole story begin? It is understandable that
the duality of the sexes, like all duality, be expressed in conflict. It is understandable that if
one of the two succeeded in imposing its superiority, it had to establish itself as absolute. It
remains to be explained how it was that man won at the outset. It seems possible that women
might have carried off the victory, or that the battle might never be resolved. Why is it that
this world has always belonged to men and that only today things are beginning to change? Is
this change a good thing? Will it bring about an equal sharing of the world between men and
women or not?

Footnotes
1. “I hesitated a long time before writing a book on woman.”

Fanon would likely point out that this mirrors the effects on blackness due to colonial
oppression, a reflection of the internalised distrust within the oppressed of themselves and
their own abilities. This hesitation to claim one’s voice, reveals the difficulty to take up the
uncomfortable task of liberation. According to Fanon, writing about the oppressed is a
political act that challenges established systems of power and control (Fanon, 1952, p. 3).
Writing about women means addressing the patriarchal systems that have historically labelled
them as different, similar to how colonialism treats colonized individuals. Remaining
complacent is much easier than undertaking the tremendous task of dismantling systems of
oppression. Which according to Fanon require a radical confrontation with the internalised
beliefs that uphold them (Fanon, 1952, p. 92). He would argue her reluctance is from the fear
that every marginalised group feels to undertake such a monumental task.

2. “Enough ink has flowed over the quarrel about feminism; it is now almost over: let’s
not talk about it anymore.”

De Beauvoir reflects on the exhaustion felt in discussions of feminism. She feels here as if
the conversation of feminism is endless, because the underlying structures that perpetuate the
fundamental exclusion of women in society continues to remain unaddressed and unchanged.
Fanon might relate this to the conversation surrounding racial inequality and disagrees with
the notion that the debates relating to feminism are nearing their end. He might argue they
must continue to struggle against oppression until the issues are resolved until there are
fundamental changes in society. Fanon believes the colonizer refuses to acknowledge the
violence of these hierarchies and does not consider the implications of granting full freedom
and autonomy to the oppressed (Fanon, 1952, p. 103). From a Fanonian point of view the
struggle against oppression is never completely over as long as the certain structures of power
remain in place there is a need for decolonization. He states that the process of liberation is
one that is continuous and that must be actively maintained and re- evaluated. To suggest that
there is no longer a need for resistance or discourse is to silence the voices of the oppressed
(Fanon, 1952, p. 4). Fanon might highlight that this thought process is a reflection of a
broader issue where there is a tendency to view liberation movements as linear processes with
clear conclusions instead of seeing them as ongoing struggles that need to continuously assert
themselves against constantly changing forms of subjugation (Fanon, 1952, p. 102).

3. “And what is it? Are there even women?”

This rhetorical question posed by De Beauvoir parallel’s Fanon’s own question about the
existence of a black identity outside of colonial constructs. In his own work Black skin White
masks Fanon confronts this idea of an imposed identity of blackness and its relation as the
antithesis to whiteness (Fanon, 1952, p. 84). It is strikingly similar to how De Beauvoir
questions whether women can be defined independently from the patriarchal identification
imposed on them. Both of these identities are plagued by the ideals of a dominant power that
overwrites their own stories to create a narrative that favours the oppressor. It is designed in
such a way to dehumanise the non- dominant groups and exercise control and authority over
them. For Fanon he does not believe that blackness is a self-determined identity but rather
one that is imposed upon him, by a colonial and racist society that seeks to dehumanize
(Fanon, 1952, p. 86). Labels such as “blackness” and “woman” reduces people to a single
aspect of themselves, completely stripping them of their otherwise complex individuality.
These constructs serve as a means to limit their agency and subjectivity by confining them to
predetermined roles (Fanon, 1952, p. 85). The confusion and ambiguity in defining these
categories reflect their arbitrary nature, which are designed to dehumanize and control. Both
Fanon and De Beauvoir advocate for a form of liberation that transcends the confines of these
imposed identities.

4. “She must take part in this mysterious and endangered reality known as femininity.”

Femininity is a socially manufactured concept that women are expected to pursue, this is
criticized by Simone De Beauvoir. She questions this elusive idea of femininity that evades
women, is deliberately formulated as something obscure to uphold patriarchal structures. This
mystification is deliberately vague; it is rigid enough to preserve power dynamics but elusive
enough to be used in a variety of ways. The idea that femininity is "mysterious" suggests that
it is unknown and thus unchangeable, which keeps women in a state of inferiority and
uncertainty. It posits that these intrinsic characteristics contribute to women's societal
submission to men. The same reasoning is applied to how racial identities are constructed
under colonial rule, being black is portrayed as a necessary, inherent characteristic that both
defines and restricts the colonized (Fanon, 1952, p. 90). Similarly to how racial otherness
limits the identity and agency of colonized peoples, this construction puts women in a
situation where they are both defined by and subject to an arbitrary and restricted ideal. For
Fanon, the "othering" process is a key component of colonial power. In Black Skin, White
Masks, he analyses how oppressors construct an image of the "Black Other" as inherently
different and inferior to the "White Self" (Fanon, 1952, p. 86). This othering process entails
attributing negative characteristics onto black people, such as being mysterious, dangerous,
and primitive. The colonized individual is both dehumanized, while simultaneously they
justify their own dominance through ambiguous concepts (Fanon, 1952, p. 85). The qualities
that are given to both women and other marginalized groups are defined in such a way to be
vague notions, of an essence that defines them. This is then a tool for domination to
legitimise the authority of the oppressor. The patriarchal system, like the colonizer, creates
myths about the "primitive" nature of the colonized to justify their rule over them (Fanon,
1952, p. 99). In both cases, these myths help to keep the oppressed in a posture of perpetual
otherness and reliance, preventing them from exercising their agency.

5. “Rejecting the notions of the eternal feminine, the black soul or the Jewish character
is not to deny that there are today, Jews, blacks or women.”

Simone de Beauvoir criticizes essentialist ideas that characterize women, blacks, and Jews in
rigid and simplistic terms. She argues that discarding these essentialist categories does not
negate their existence, but rather questions the static, restrictive meanings that have been
imposed upon them. Essentialism reduces the individual to a set of fixed characteristics that
ignore the complexity of their experiences. It is a problematic viewpoint in that it disregards
the lived realities, and socio- political context that shapes an individual. Fanon would agree
with her rejection of the Essentialist viewpoint that reduces identities to a set of imposed
roles (Fanon, 1952, p. 89). However, he would be critical of the dangers that universalizing
oppression may bring such as erasing specific experiences of marginalized groups. For Fanon
oppression is not something that remains consistent but varies between different races,
genders and classes. His approach emphasizes the importance of recognizing the unique
intersectionality in which forms of oppression manifest. That acknowledging the struggles
that Jews, blacks or women face does not mean reducing this experience to a single narrative
(Fanon, 1952, 92). Fanon is heavily against a homogenizing view that treats all forms of
oppression as interchangeable. Recognizing the distinct and interconnected ways in which
power and oppression emerge is vital for a sophisticated understanding of social justice and
developing effective solidarity among different struggles (Fanon, 1952, p.101).

6. “No woman can claim without bad faith to be situated beyond her sex.”

According to De Beauvoir, women are not really free from the restrictions imposed by their
gender, particularly when those restrictions are found in the repressive framework of a
patriarchal society. Women cannot escape their womanhood; they are defined by their
otherness. She holds the notion that woman by definition is only identified by how they are
not men. They are the opposite of men deviations of the norm, the qualities that make them
women in society also make them inferior to men. It is similar to the quote from Margaret
Atwood “Even pretending you aren't catering to male fantasies is a male fantasy”, to think
that you can escape the constraints placed on you by men is deluding yourself with a false
sense of freedom (Atwood, 1993). As a woman you are constantly confronted with your
secondary status, you are constantly made to feel objectified something other than human.
From birth it is society that tells you how you must position yourself as subordinate to men.
Even Religion is a tool to keep women under the domination of men “Wives, be submissive
to your own husbands as unto the Lord.” (Ephesians 5:22-33) as if to say that their oppression
is ordained by God himself. The patriarchal ideology is an infestation that worms its way into
every aspect of a woman’s being even their own internal thoughts become reflections of their
position in society. Whether you choose to take part in Feminist discourse, the objectification
and dehumanization is an inescapable aspect of womanhood. Even rejecting your own gender
to try to win the favour of your oppressor does not lead to liberation, you are still under the
same metaphorical boot that all women find themselves. To claim to be "beyond" one's sex
without admitting these limitations is to ignore the systematic structure of gender oppression.
All of this is my own interpretation of Simone De Beauvoir’s point, Fanon would have likely
extended this notion to what he calls the colonized intellectual (Fanon, 1952, p. 101). This is
someone who attempts to distance themselves from their culture or heritage in order to
achieve a form of acceptance within the colonizer’s framework. Distancing can manifest as
an attempt to conform to the values and norms of society, which ultimately goes against their
natural state of being. It alienates them from their own people severing the connection
between them and their history. Fanon contends that attempting to transcend oppression
without confronting its realities avoids confronting the systematic and structural aspects of
oppression (Fanon, 1952). Both De Beauvoir and Fanon both advocate for solidarity among
the oppressed, that it is essential for them to work together in challenging the inequalities that
plague them. This requires them to enter a state of awareness where they actively work
towards dismantling white colonial male domination.

7. "A man never begins by positing himself as an individual of a certain sex: that he is a
man is obvious."

This line captures the idea that maleness is treated as if it is the default or universal standard
of society. De Beauvoir emphasizes that men are seen as the "absolute human type," while
women are seen as "other," defined only in relation to men. Men’s identity is seen as the
neutral, it is the baseline, the standard to which everyone else must conform to. Women must
contort themselves in order to not disrupt, they must try to find position themselves in
relation to men as not disrupt the supposed natural order. Women are not given the same
status as men, they are seen as the deviations of the male norm, they are categorized by their
differences. According to De Beauvoir women are seen as secondary beings that are defined
by not being men instead of beings in their own right. This is evident by the fact that women
have rarely been included in clinical trials until 1993, despite the fact that women account for
nearly half of the global population (Balch, 2024). Another example is the fact that car
crashes can prove more fatal to women that to men simply due to the fact that crash dummies
are predominantly built to simulate the dimensions of a male body (Beighton, 2022). Male
bodies have been seen as the norm where women are seen as the atypical other that does not
warrant consideration. This bias towards men puts women in a disadvantage in most areas of
life, simply put the world is not designed with women in mind. They are forced to adjust
themselves in world that is catered toward male bodies. There are plenty more examples that
highlight De Beauvoir’s point where men are usually considered the default. Fanon explains
in a similar way how Blackness is viewed as a deviation from the norm in society and
Whiteness as the standard. Whiteness is treated as the standard for humanity, white men are
not required to explain their whiteness or defend it against scrutiny they are awarded the
unique position of simply existing as they are (Fanon, 1952, 84). This othering of anything
that does not align with this standard reinforces racial and gendered hierarchies that reinforce
colonial and patriarchal domination.

8. "No group ever defines itself as One without immediately setting up the Other
opposite itself,"

This line emphasizes the fact that the process of othering is not only a means of defining and
oppressing the other, but also it is used as a way to define that which is doing the othering in
the first place. The way in which men and colonizers position marginalized groups as the
other is a fundamental mechanism through which their power is maintained. Fanon describes
in his book “Black skins White masks” how the identity of the colonizer is constructed
through the subjugation and othering of the colonised. The colonizer constructs his identity as
the rationalised and superior being by placing the other as primitive and inferior (Fanon,
1952, p. 86). The othering not only serves to dehumanize the colonised but also reinforces the
colonisers sense of superiority justifying their domination and exploitation. Fanon argues that
there is a mutual dependency between the identity of the oppressor and the oppressed. The
coloniser requires the other in order to maintain the hierarchy upon which they place
themselves as above the other in some way (Fanon, 1952, p. 82). Without the other to be
contrasted against the identity of the oppressor loses its position, the power dynamic becomes
destabilized. The only way for them to maintain their superiority is to create an inferior other
which they can contrast themselves against. Their dependence draws attention to the fact that
oppressive regimes constantly require an "other" to establish their legitimacy and power, they
are always unstable and contingent. The oppressor's identity is endangered if the "Other"
starts to question the labels that are placed upon them or if they attain a degree of similarity
or equality that calls into question the oppressor's assertions of dominance. De Beauvoir and
Fanon actively encourage the oppressed to assert their own subjectivity to undermine these
systems of oppression.

9. “Women’s actions have never been more than symbolic agitation; they have won only
what men have been willing to concede to them; they have taken nothing; they have
received.”

This reflects a critical disposition of how marginalised groups are often guilty of engaging in
systems in power and unintentionally perpetuating them by not actively condemning them.
De Beauvoir has held the position that true liberation requires active revolutionary efforts that
disrupt the existing power structures, rather than simply accepting the transgressions granted
by the dominating group. Change does not come passively it is in nature something that must
be forced especially when there are those that cling to their control so violently. When de
Beauvoir refers to the efforts of women as "symbolic agitation," she draws attention to the
shortcomings of reforms and adjustments that do not radically alter the balance of power
between men and women. Thus, the changes that are achieved are merely superficial they do
not involve true liberation. This illustrates a dynamic in which the dominant group still holds
the majority of power, and any advancement depends on their willingness to "allow" it.
Women are still subject to the whims of those in positions of power, it is an unstable sense of
peace that can be revoked at any time. According to Fanon, colonial liberation movements
that function inside the boundaries of the colonial system face similar restrictions. Better
conditions inside the colonial system are not enough for true decolonization; the colonial
system itself must be destroyed (Fanon, 1952, p. 4). The colonised are expected to be grateful
for these concessions, but the coloniser still remains in power and reinforces the idea that the
colonised are subordinate to them. In order for true equality to exists the oppressed must
demand a seat at the table so to speak (Fanon, 1952, p. 4). The act of taking power is crucial,
because it asserts their agency and autonomy, challenging the notion that subordinate to the
dominant power.

2527 words

Bibliography
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Balch, B. (2024). Why we know so little about women’s health. [online] Association of
American Medical Colleges. Available at: https://www.aamc.org/news/why-we-know-so-
little-about-women-s-health.
Beighton, R. (2022). In car crashes, women are more likely to die than men. This new crash
test dummy could help save lives. [online] CNN. Available at:
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Fanon, F. (1952). Black Skin, White Masks. London: Penguin Books.