Equivalent Citations

1991 COMPCAS DELHI 70 388 . 1990 DLT 41 633 . 1991 ILR DEL 2 172 . 1991 AIR DEL
25 . 1990 SCC ONLINE DEL 65 . 1991 COMPCAS 70 388 . 1991 AIR DELHI 25 . 1990 ACC
2 289 . 1990 DL 3 11 . 1991 CC 70 388 .

M/S Nibro Limited v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

Delhi High Court (Mar 6, 1990)

CASE NO.

SUIT NO. 933/83

ADVOCATES

For the Plaintiff : Mr. S.C Malik, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Pramod Aggarwal & Ms. Vasuda
Indukar, Advocates.
For the Defendant : Mr. P.P Malhotra with Mr. A.K Malhotra, Advocates.
JUDGES

Ms. Justice Sunanda Bhandare

SUMMARY

Claim: The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 7,40,606.65 together with costs and
interest against the defendant.
Facts:
A fire broke out in the factory of the plaintiff on the morning of 2nd June 1982 at about
10.30/10.40 A.M.

The defendant sent a surveyor who assessed the loss at Rs. 2,72,458.71.

The defendant denied that the factory of the plaintiff was being insured since 1973 and
alleged that the factory of the plaintiff was insured from 1978 till 29th December, 1981.

The plaintiff claimed that the factory was insured and that the defendant was liable to
pay the loss suffered by the plaintiff in the fire.

The plaintiff filed a replication reiterating the claim made in the plaint.

The plaintiff relied on the Visitor's Register maintained in the factory to prove the visit
of Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee on 31st May 1982.

The defendant denied that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee visited the plaintiff on 1st June

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 1982 as alleged by the plaintiff and alleged that the plaintiff tried to obtain insurance
after the fire had already taken place.

Issues:
1. Whether there was a concluded contract of insurance between the parties?

2. Whether Shri G. Jhajharia was authorized to institute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff
company?

3. Whether the defendant company is liable to pay the loss suffered by the plaintiff in the
fire?

Decision:
The court held that there was no concluded contract of insurance between the parties.

The court held that Shri G. Jhajharia was not authorized to institute the suit on behalf of
the plaintiff company.

The court held that the defendant company is not liable to pay the loss suffered by the
plaintiff in the fire.

Reasoning:
The court held that there was no concluded contract of insurance between the parties since
the cover notes were not given to the plaintiff and were still with the defendant. The court
also held that Shri G. Jhajharia was not authorized to institute the suit on behalf of the
plaintiff company since there was no evidence on record to show that he was conversant
with the facts of the case or that he was specifically empowered to institute the suit. The
court further held that the defendant company is not liable to pay the loss suffered by the
plaintiff in the fire since there was no concluded contract of insurance between the parties.
Case Laws:
The court relied on the following case law:
Life Insurance Corporation of India v . Smt. Asha Goel (2001) 2 SCC 160

Disposition:
The suit was dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT

Sunanda Bhandare, J.:— This suit for recovery of Rs. 7,40,606.65 together with costs and
interest has been filed by the plaintiff against the defendant — National Insurance
Company Limited . The plaintiff is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies
Act, 1956 having its registered office at E-5 Hauz Khas, New Delhi. The plaint has been

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signed and instituted by one Shri G. Jhajharia who claims to be the Director and principal
officer of the plaintiff company authorised to sign the plaint and institute the suit. The
defendant is a nationalised company.
2. The plaintiff has a factory at Delhi Road, Gurgaon, Haryana. It is stated in the plaint that
the factory of the plaintiff was insured by the defendant since 1973 against, theft, fire,
damages etc. from time to time under the policies taken by the plaintiff. The plaintiff with
a view to re-insure its factory requested Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee, the Development Officer
of Division No. II of the defendant to visit and inspect the premises. Accordingly, Shri
Dilip Bhattacharjee visited the factory of the plaintiff on 31st May 1982 and agreed to
insure the factory building, goods and raw- material against theft, fire, damages etc. He
further agreed to issue the cover- note on the next day. According to the plaintiff, on 1st
June 1982 Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee collected a cheque for Rs. 12,324/- which included Rs.
6,364/- towards fire insurance premium, Rs. 5,400/- towards burglary and Rs. 516/-
towards traders combined risk. It is alleged in the plaint that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee
signed the cover- note in the presence of Shri A.K Jhajharia, however, Shri Dilip
Bhattacharjee said that he will issue the insurance policy very soon and took away the
cover- note with him to do the needful in the matter. According to the plaintiff Shri
Bhattacharjee issued insurance cover-notes under cover-notes no. 614129 and 591291 on
1st June 1982 itself for an aggregate sum of Rs. 40,60,000/-. It is alleged that the plaintiff's
proposal and the cheque were duly accepted by the insurance company through Shri Dilip
Bhattacharjee, the Development Officer and the above-mentioned cover-notes were issued
on 1st June, 1982 to convey the acceptance.

3. A fire broke out in the factory of the plaintiff on the morning of 2nd June 1982 at about
10.30/10.40 A.M It is alleged that the officers of the plaintiff present in the factory
immediately informed the Fire Brigade, Gurgaon on the telephone as well as by deputing
representatives and the fire was brought under control by the Air Force Fire Station and the
Gurgaon Municipal Fire Station at about 2.30 P.M However, the said fire cause substantial
damage to the main building, its installations, raw-materials, semi-finished/finished goods
and to the goods lying in the customs bonded warehouse etc. It is further alleged that the
plaintiff on 3rd June 1982 informed the Senior Divisional Manager of the defendant about
the fire and requested the defendant to depute its surveyor immediately to survey the
damage. Accordingly, a surveyor was deputed by the defendant who assessed the loss at
Rs. 2,72,458.71. The surveyor however had not calculated the loss caused to the goods
lying in customs bonded warehouse because the customs authorities were not available for
inspection at the relevant time. It is alleged that the plaintiff time and again requested the
defendant to depute a surveyor to inspect the loss suffered by the plaintiff in the customs

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bonded warehouse and pay the claim but despite that the defendant neither paid the claim
nor sent the surveyor to assess the loss at the customs bonded warehouse. The plaintiff,
therefore, issued a notice on 22nd January, 1983 through its Advocates M /s Gagrat & Co .
calling upon the defendant to get the survey done in the customs bonded warehouse and
for payment of Rs. 2,72,458.71 with interest @ 18 per cent per annum within 15 days of
the said notice. It is alleged that the said notice issued by M / s . Gagrat & Co . was
received by the office of the defendant on 25th January, 1983. Since the defendant neither
made the payment nor sent the surveyor, the plaintiff assessed the loss at Rs. 6,27,632.76.

4. The defendant controverted the allegations made by the plaintiff in the plaint. In the
written statement filed on behalf of the defendant, the defendant challenged the authority
of Shri G. Jhajharia and denied that he is competent to sign the plaint and institute the suit,
engage the counsel and do all necessary acts for due prosecution of the case. It is alleged
that the plaintiff company has not passed any resolution for filing the present suit or
expressing its intention to file the suit. The suit thus being unauthorised is not
maintainable. The defendant in its written statement further alleged that though the
defendant insures the property through its officers and agents for various kinds of risks, the
contract of insurance only matures when a proposal submitted by the insured is finally
accepted by the company and documents evidencing contract of insurance are issued by
the company. It is alleged that a contract is not completed by mere tender of proposal for
insurance or by tendering money. The defendant denied that the factory of the plaintiff
was being insured since 1973 and it is alleged that the factory of the plaintiff was insured
from 1978 till 29th December, 1981. This insurance expired on 29th December, 1981 and
thereafter the plaintiff did not obtain any insurance in view of the dispute between the
plaintiff and its bankers, namely United Bank of India, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The
bank had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 66 lacs against the plaintiff and the bank had
refused to advance any money to the plaintiff and thus the plaintiff was unable to obtain
the insurance . The defendant has admitted that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee visited the factory
of the plaintiff company on 31st May, 1982, however the defendants denies that there was
any agreement to insure the factory of the plaintiff against theft, damage, fire of the
building, goods in stock lying in the factory and raw-material as alleged by the plaintiff in
the plaint. It is alleged in the written statement that the plaintiff did not give any proposal
for insurance , nor made any payment as stated in the plaint and Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee
did not agree to insure the factory or give the cover notes as alleged in the plaint it is stated
that the plaintiff had in fact asked Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee to visit the factory on 2nd May,
1982. The Defendant has denied that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee visited the plaintiff company
on 1st June, 1982 and collected a cheque for Rs. 12,324 on that day as alleged in the plaint.

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The defendant has alleged in the written statement that investigation carried out by the
defendant revealed that the plaintiff tried to obtain and ante dated insurance after the
incident of fire on 2nd June, 1982. The defendant has further alleged that Shri Dilip
Bhattacharjee at the instance of the plaintiff company tried to impress the defendant that he
had accepted the risk on 1st June, 1982 subject to the approval of the company although in
his statement before the defendant on 3rd June, 1982 he did not mention anything about
the preparation of cover-note. The defendant has further alleged that the plaintiff also tried
to obtain ante dated insurance through another agent of the company namely Shri P.
Sengupta but failed in that attempt. It is alleged that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee did not accept
the proposal or the cheque on 1st June, 1982 but received them later on subject to
acceptance and approval by the defendant- insurance company. The defendant company
has stated that if the plaintiff had given the cheque on 1st June, 1982 and the proposal had
been accepted by Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee there was no occasion for Shri Bhattacharjee not
to issue the cover- note and hand it over to the plaintiff right away. It is stated that the
alleged premium of Rs. 12,324 does not represent the correct figure of the premium for the
two alleged cover notes stated to be prepared by the defendant-insurance company. It is
stated that the cover note no. 591291 does not even mention the sum assured. The
defendant has alleged in the written statement that the two alleged cover- notes were got
prepared in great haste after the fire in an attempt to get an ante dated insurance from Shri
Dilip Bhattacharjee, however the insurance company saw through the game and did not
accept the insurance . The defendant has stated in its written statement that the Senior
Divisional Manager was informed of the fire on 4th June, 1982 though the letter bears the
date of 3rd June, 1982. It is further alleged that this letter did not mention the cover note or
the number of the certificate of insurance which shows that no such cover note or
certificate was issued prior to that date and an attempt was being made to ante date the
insurance cover. It is stated that the surveyor was appointed by the defendant without
prejudice to the rights of the parties. The defendant has also denied that the loss assessed
by the surveyor did not include the goods lying in the customs bonded warehouse. The
defendant has referred to the investigation report of Shri M.P Bakshi of the National
Institute of Surveyors to show that an attempt was being made to obtain the insurance
after the fire. The defendant has thus denied the contract of insurance and consequently
denied the liability.

5. The plaintiff filed a replication once again reiterating the claim made in the plaint and
further stated that the moment the money is tendered and the same is accepted by the
insurance agent of the insurance company, the contract of insurance is complete. It is
alleged that the formal documents are drawn at much later stage but the insurance starts

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operating from the date on which the money — tendered and accepted by the insurance
agent. It is stated in the replication that the plaint has settled its dispute with the bank. The
plaintiff has denied the knowledge of any investigation that might have been undertaken by
the defendant and thus denied that there was any attempt by the plaintiff to ante date the
insurance as alleged by the defendant. It is stated in the replication that since the
defendant has failed to disclose the details of investigation and the plaintiff was not made a
party to the investigation, the investigation has to be disregarded. The plaintiff has denied
that the insurance was accepted by Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee subject to the approval of the
defendant. The plaintiff has also denied that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee did not mention
about the issuance of cover note in his statement dated 3rd June, 1982 and denied that the
plaintiff tried to obtain ante date insurance through another agent Shri P. Sengupta as
alleged by the defendant. The plaintiff has reiterated that a cheque for insurance premium
of Rs. 12,324 was given on the basis of the calculations made by Shir Bhattacharjee and
contended that non-acceptance of the insurance by the defendant is without any cause or
reason only to avoid the liability. The plaintiff has alleged that the non- mention of the
cover note number or certificate of insurance number in letter dated 3rd June, 1983 does
not in any manner affect the claim of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has further reiterated in the
replication that the defendant did not assess the loss in the customs bonded warehouse
house and denied the investigation report of Shri M.P Bakshi. The plaintiff has thus denied
the case of the defendant that no insurance was issued or that there was not completed
contract between the parties.

6. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:—

1. Was the factory of the plaintiff alongwith the goods and machinery therein insured with
the defendant company on 2nd June, 1982?

2. Did a fire took place in the factory premises of the plaintiff on 2nd June, 1982? If so,
what damage was suffered by the plaintiff in the fire and of what value?

3. In case issue no. 1 is proved, is the defendant company not liable to pay the loss suffered
by the plaintiff in that fire subject to the conditions of the insurance ?

4. Has the suit been instituted on behalf of the plaintiff company by an authorised person
and the plaint signed and verified by a competent person?

5. Relief.

7. Only two witnesses were examined by the plaintiff. P.W 1 is the Bank official, a
representative of the Untied Bank of India and PW 2 Shri Ashok Jhajharia, Director of

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plaintiff company.

Issue No. 4:

8. The plaint has been signed by Shri G. Jhajharia as principal officer of the plaintiff
company. The plaintiff however did not examine Shri G. Jhajharia but examined Shri
Ashok Kumar Jhajharia, Director of the plaintiff company, who stated that Shri G.
Jhajharia is his elder brother. He has stated that Shri G. Jhajharia was the Director of the
plaintiff company from 1975 to 1987. Shri G. Jhajharia ceased to be a director after his
retirement in 1987 and thus his statement could not be recorded in court. Shri Ashok
Kumar Jhajharia has identified the signatures of Shri G. Jhajharia since he has seen him
writing and signing. He has proved Ext. PW 2/1 which is the resolution of the Board of
Directors re-appointing Shri G. Jhajharia as Director and stated that he continued to act as
Director from 7th July, 1983 till he retired. Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia has further stated
that he himself was handling day to day management of the plaintiff company including
the insurance of the factory. The plaintiff however in the plaint has stated that Shri G.
Jhajharia had instituted the suit as director and principal officer of the company. The
plaintiff has not filed any resolution of the plaintiff company authorising either Shri G.
Jhajharia or Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia to institute the present suit.

9. It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that under Order 29 Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure the pleadings can be signed and verified on behalf of the
Corporation by the Secretary or by any Director or other principal officer of the
Corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case. Thus, since Shri G. Jhajharia
was the director of the plaintiff company he was authorised to sign and verify the plaint on
behalf of the plaintiff company and thus no separate resolution of the plaintiff company
was necessary authorising him to institute the suit. Learned counsel relied on the judgment
of this Court in Suit, No. 11/67 dated August 10, 1973 (Mercantile Bank Limited v . M /s
Phool Chand Fatesh Chand & Others ) and submitted that a principal officer of the
company is competent to sign and verify the plaint under the provisions of Order 29 Rule
1 of the Code of Civil Procedure without his being specifically empowered by a
resolution to institute the suit. Learned counsel submitted that Shri G. Jhajharia who was
the director of the company was in a position to depose to the facts of the case and thus
competent to file the suit. Learned counsel further submitted that non-filing of resolution
of the Board of Directors authorising Shri G. Jhajharia is a mere technicality which must
be ignored. He relied on S.B Narohnah v . Prem Kumari Khanna , AIR 1980 SC 193
(para 6)(1) and Bhagwan Swaroop & Others v. Mool Chand & Others, AIR 1983 SC 355
(2 ) in support of this submission. Learned counsel further submitted that under Order 3

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Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the suit can be presented either by a party in
person or by his recognised agent or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting as the case
may be on his behalf. Thus, since the advocate had filed the suit in whose favour Shri G.
Jhajharia has given the power of attorney, no further resolution was required. He relied on
Mst. Barkate v . Ferod Khan & Others, 1944 P.L.R 96 (page 98) (3) in support of this
contention.

10. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant that
signing and verifying the suit is one thing whereas having the authority to institute the suit
is another. There is nothing on record to show that the Director Shri G. Jhajharia was
authorised by the Board of Directors of the plaintiff company to file the suit. The plaintiff
has failed to place on record any such resolution. Institution of a suit is different than filing
of a suit. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show that Shri G. Jhajharia was able to
depose to the facts of the case or that he was conversant with the facts of the case. In fact,
Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia in his statement has himself stated that he was handling day
to day management of the plaintiff company including the insurance part. Thus, it cannot
be said that Shri G. Jhajharia was conversant with the facts and was in a position to depose
to the same. Learned counsel referred to Sections 14, 26, 28 Schedule I and Table A and
Section 291 of the Companies Act and contended that all powers of the company are with
the Board of Directors and individual director cannot, without a specific resolution of the
Board, institute a suit. The power to institute a suit vests with the Board and an individual
director can institute a suit only if he is specifically empowered. Learned counsel relied on
the judgments of this Court is M /s Oberoi Hotels (India) Pvt. Ltd . v . M /s . Observer
Publications (P) Ltd . & Others (Suit No. 469 of 1966 decided on 26-11-68(4) South
India Insurance Company Limited v . Globe Motors & Other (Suit No. 68 of 1969
decided on 19-4-74), (5) the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in National
Fertilisers Limited v . M.C Bhatinda (C.R 1406 of 1981 decided on 26-2-82) (6) and
Jaipur Jaipur Udyog Limitedv. Union Of India, AIR 1972 Raj. 129 (7) in support of this
contention. Learned counsel further submitted that Shri G. Jhajharia has signed the plaint
as principal officer but there is no evidence on record that he was the principal officer nor
there is any evidence to show that he was conversant with the facts of the case. Learned
counsel referred to Chapter IV of Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules and submitted
that Sh. G. Jhajharia had no authority to present the suit under these Rules as well. Learned
counsel submitted that Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure only talks about
signing and verification of the pleadings on behalf of the corporation but does not talk
about institution of suits. Learned counsel relied on Notified Area Committee, Okara v .
Kidar Nath & Others, AIR 1935 Labore, 345(8), Delhi and London Bank Limited v . A

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Oldham & Others , ILR (21) Calcutta 60(9), State of Jammu and Kashmir v . Mrs.
Shree Karn Singh , AIR 1960 J&K 47 (10) and Food Corporation of India v. Sardarni
Baldev Kaur & Others , AIR 1981 P&H 113 (11 ) and submitted that the judgments
referred to by the learned counsel for the plaintiff only deal with the question of signing
and verification of the plaint and on totally different facts.

11. It will be useful to re- produce the two provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure;
namely Order 3 Rule 1 and Order 29 Rule 1 on which the plaintiff relies.

12. Order 3 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:—

“Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be

made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by
any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his
recognized agent or by a pleader appearing applying or acting, as the case may be, on his
behalf:

Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in
person.”

Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus:—

“In suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of
the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the
corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case.”

13. Order 3 Rule 1 provides that any appearance, application or act in or to any Court
required or authorized by law can be made or done by the party in person or by his
recognized agent or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be on his
behalf. Provided of course, such an appearance, application or act in or to any Court is
required or authorized by law to be done or done by a party in such Court. Where however,
there is an express provision of law, then that provision will prevail. Thus, if an authority is
given to a pleader or a recognised agent as provided by law, the recognized agent or
pleader can file an appearance or file a suit in court if the party himself is not in a position
to file it. In my view, if a party is a company or a corporation, the recognized agent or a
pleader has to be authorized by law to file such a plaintiff. Such an authority can be given
to a pleader or an agent in the case of a company by person specifically authorized in this
behalf. In other words a pleader or an agent can be authorized to file a suit on behalf of a
company only by an authorized representative of the company. If a director or a secretary
is authorised by law, then he can certainly give the authority to another person as provided

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under Order 3 Rule 1.

14. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for subscription and
verification of pleadings and states that in suits by or against the corporation, any
pleadings may be signed and verified on behalf of the Corporation by the secretary or by
any director or other principal officer of the Corporation who is able to depose to the facts
of the case.

15. This Court in Oberoi Hotels (India) Pvt. Ltd . (supra) while dealing with the scope of
Order 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure has observed as follows:—

“Learned counsel for the plaintiff lastly argued that Shri Ram Lal Chaudhary had stated
that he had authority to file the suit as a principal officer of the plaintiff company even
apart from the resolution marked ‘A’. He did not say so. But how does that help? The
authority of a principal officer of a company in relation to suits filed on behalf of limited
companies does not extend beyond what is laid down in Order 29 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. That provision does not entitle the principal officer of a company to file a suit
on its behalf for that the authority has to be found either in the Articles of Association of
the Company or in the resolution of its Board of Directors. In the Articles of Association
of several companies provision is generally made authorising their Managing Directors
and other officers to file and defend suits on their behalf. Similarly, the Board of Directors
of a company can authorise the institution of a suit on behalf of the company by a
resolution. In the case of some companies the Articles empower the Managing Director or
Directors to appoint General Attorneys and General Managers and give them authority to
institute suits on behalf of the company. But in the absence of any proof in regard to any
such power having been conferred on Shri Ram Lal Chaudhary it is not possible to accept
his statement that he was authorised to file the suit as the principal officer of the plaintiff
Hotel.

I, therefore, hold that although the plaint has been signed and verified by a person duly
authorised to do so on behalf of the plaintiff company, it has not been proved that the suit
has been instituted by any such person. The issue is consequently decided against the
plaintiff.”

Similarly, in South India Insurance Company Limited (supra) this Court has dealt with a
similar objection as raised by the defendant in this case and observed that a company being
a corporate body or a juristic person has to act through somebody and that person has to be
specifically authorized to institute the suit. In Notified Area Committee (supra) the Lahore
Bench considered the scope of Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it

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has been observed thus:—

“Similarly Order 29, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code, also does not help the appellant. It
merely defines the person who is authorised to sign or verify the pleadings on behalf of the
corporation (in this case the Committee). It therefore comes into operation only after the
proceedings have been validly started and cannot be utilized to authorized an unauthorized
person to institute suits on behalf of the corporation.”

In Kirpal Chand v. The Traders Bank Limited , AIR 1954 J&K 45(12 ) the Court while
dealing with the question that though there is no original authorization, a subsequent
ratification could render it legitimate has approved the view taken by the Division Bench
of the Lahore High Court in Notified Area Committee (supra) and observed thus:

“Here the initiative to institute the suit could be property transferred to the Manager under
Article 105 of the Articles of Association and, therefore, the subsequent ratification of
the act of the agent by the principal could cure the original defect.”

Thus, the Division Bench accepted the view that there should be a specific authorization in
favour of a person permitting him to institute a suit.

16. In University of Kashmir v . Ghulam Nabi Mir, AIR 1978 NOC 114 (J & K) (13) the
Court has observed that signing and verification of the plaint is different from filing the
suit by a competent person.

17. In the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) while considering the issue whether an
application was filed by a competent person, the Court has observed that Order 29, Rule 1
does not empower an officer to conduct the case on behalf of the Corporation. Only the
limited power to sign and verify the pleadings has been conferred upon the officer.

18. I find that the judgments on which the plaintiff has relied upon namely; Mercantile
Bank Limited (supra), S.B Narohnah (supra), Bhagwan Swaroop & Others (supra) and
Mst. Barkate (supra) deal with the question of signing and verification of the plaint and not
institution of the plaint.

19. In Mercantile Bank Limited (supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court was dealing
with the question whether the person who had signed the pleadings was a principal officer
and constituted attorney of the plaintiff. The learned Judge held that Mr. Carey was the
principal officer of the plaintiff company who was able to depose to the facts of the case
and thus under Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure could validly sign,
verify and file the plaint. The question whether the company is required to specifically
pass a resolution empowering Mr. Carey to institute the suit was not for consideration of

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the court. The issue that was raised in the suit was:

“Is the plaint, signed and verified by a duly authorised person?”

Since the Court found that Mr. Carey was the principal officer, it was observed that under
Order 29, Rule 1 he could sign, verify and file the plaint.

20. Learned Single Judge while deciding Mercantile Bank's case (supra) had relied on the
case of Jaipur Udyog Limited (supra). I find that the facts of the case in Jaipur Udyog
Limited (supra) were totally different. The preliminary objection raised in that case by the
respondent was that the petitions were filed by unauthorized persons as they were not
signed by the secretary or the director of the company concerned and, therefore, the
petitions were not maintainable. On the facts of the case, the Court observed that the
evidence clearly showed that the petitions were signed and verified on behalf of the
company by their principal officers who were able to depose to the facts of the case and as
such were entitled to sign the petitions and present them in the court. After this case as
well, no objection was raised regarding the validity and power of the principal officer to
institute the petitions.

21. In the case of National Fertilisers Limited (supra) the question whether the person
who had signed the plaint had the authority to institute the suit was not for consideration
before the court and, therefore, the Court held that the revision petition filed by the
advocate on the basis of the Vakalatnama signed by the Estate Officer of the National
Fertilisers Limited was competent.

22. On the analysis of the judgments, it is clear that Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure does not authorise persons mentioned therein to institute suits on behalf of the
Corporation. It only authorises them to sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the
Corporation.

23. In my view, the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and particularly Sections 14, 26,
28 Schedule I, Table A and Section 291 are very clear.

24. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express
provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be
exercised by the company in general meeting—in all others cases the Board of Directors
are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are
vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not
unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute
a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often

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affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is
specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on
behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of
Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.

25. Chapter IV of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules deal with the question of
presentation of suits. Under this Rule, suit can be presented by a duly authorised agent or
by an advocate duly appointed by him for the purpose. This authorization, in my view, in
the case of a company can be given only after a decision to institute a suit is taken by the
Board of Directors of the company. The Board of Directors may in turn authorise a
particular director, principal officer or the secretary to institute a suit.

26. The plaintiff has not placed on record any resolution passed by the company
authorising Shri G. Jhajharia to institute the suit. Shri G. Jhajharia did not come forward to
make a statement that he was in a position to depose to the facts of the case. In the plaint
signed by him, he claims to be a principal officer and director, but there is no evidence on
record to indicate that he had the authority to institute the suit. The Memorandum and
Articles of Association of the plaintiff company are also not placed on record. Even after
the suit was instituted by Shri G. Jhajharia, no resolution was passed by the company
ratifying this action. No such decision of the Board of Directors is placed on record in the
present case. The plaintiff has examined Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia. He has placed on
record Ext. PW 2/1 which is the resolution of the Board of Directors re-appointing Shri G.
Jhajharia as the Director but this resolution does not empower Shri G. Jhajharia as a
Director to institute the present suit. Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia has stated that he was
handling day-to-day management of the plaintiff company including the insurance part of
it. He however, does not state that Mr. G. Jhajharia was handling day-to-day management
or was incharge of the insurance claim.

27. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that Shri G. Jhajharia had the authority to institute
the present suit.

28. Issue no. 4 is thus decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant.

Issue No. 2:

29. It is the case of the plaintiff that the fire broke out at the factory of the plaintiff on 2nd
June 1982. The plaintiff has placed on record a copy of the letter dated 3rd June 1982 Ext.
PW 2/6 and copy of letter dated 3rd June 1982. Ext. 2/7 addressed to the defendant
informing about the fire. Ext. 2/7 contains the rubber stamp of the defendant company
acknowledging the receipt of the said letter though there is no signature of any

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representative of the defendant on the said letter. Ext. PW 2/5 is a copy of the letter dated
2nd June 1922 sent by the plaintiff to the Station House Officer, Police Station (City)
Gurgaon. The defendant has not disputed that a fire took place in the factory of the plaintiff
on 2nd June 1982 inasmuch as a Surveyor was appointed by the defendant to assess the
damage caused by the said fire and the Surveyor gave his report assessing the loss at Rs.
2,72,458.71. This is evident from the copy of the letter dated 21st July 1982 Ext. PW 2/9
addressed by the plaintiff to the defendant. Thus, it can be safely inferred that the fire did
take place in the factory premises of the plaintiff on 2nd June 1982. The Surveyor has
assessed the damage of Rs. 2,72,458.71 which, as stated hereinabove, is indicated by letter
dated 21st July 1982. According to the plaintiff, this damage did not cover the loss suffered
by the plaintiff because of the damage caused to the goods lying at customs bonded
warehouse. The plaintiff has relied on the correspondence entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendant for getting the loss in the customs bonded warehouse also
surveyed. It is not disputed by the defendant that after Mr. M.P Bakshi had surveyed the
loss, no further survey was ever conducted by the defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, got
the loss surveyed by their own surveyor. Plaintiffs surveyor, Shri Darshan Indar Singh
Kohli gave his report on June 28, 1983 Ext.. PW/20. The loss suffered according to this
Surveyor's Report, is Rs. 3,55,174.05. The defendant has not challenged this report of the
Surveyor. Therefore, the damage suffered by the plaintiff in the fire would have to be taken
as per the two Surveyor's Reports i.e Rs. 2,72,458.71 and Rs. 3,55,174.05.

Issue nos. 1 and 3:

30. The whole case of the plaintiff is that on 31st May 1982 Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee, the
Development Officer of the defendant visited the factory of the plaintiff and agreed to
insure the factory against theft, damage, fire etc. The plaintiff has relied on the Visitor's
Register maintained in the factory to prove the visit of Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee on 31st
May 1982. The photo copy of the entry in the Visitor's Register is Ext. PW/2. As per the
plaint, Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee collected a cheque for Rs. 12,324 on 1st June 1982 towards
the premium. He signed the cover notes in the presence of Shri A.K Jhajharia but took
away the cover notes with him on the promise that he will be giving the insurance policy
very soon. The particulars giving the number of the cover notes are mentioned in the
plaint. PW 2 Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia in his examination-in-chief has stated that the
said cover notes were in his possession for about 10 minutes and it is thereafter that Mr.
Dilip Bhattacharjee took back the cover notes.

31. The defendant on the other hand has denied that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee visited the
plaintiff on 1st June 1982 as alleged by the plaintiff and has, in fact, alleged that the

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plaintiff tried to obtain insurance after the fire had already taken place. The defendant has
denied that any cover notes were issued by Mr. Dilip Bhattacharjee to the plaintiff. The
case of the defendant is that Mr. Dilip Bhattacharjee himself also tried to convince the
company, however in his statement on 3rd June 1982 did not mention anything about the
preparation or issuance of cover notes. Thus, the defendant contends that Mr. Dilip
Bhattacharjee did not accept the proposal or the cheque on 1st June 1982 but he received
them later on subject to acceptance and approval by the defendant company. The defendant
has alleged that the plaintiff had also tried to obtain an ante dated insurance through
another agent of the company namely Shri P. Sengupta but had failed in that attempt.

32. It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant has not
specifically denied in the written statement that cover notes were prepared by Mr. Dilip
Bhattacharjee, thus the defendant having failed to produce these cover notes inspite of the
fact that notice under Order 12 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure was given by the
plaintiff to the defendant, adverse inference must be drawn against the defendant. Learned
counsel submitted that since the plaintiff had acted in good faith with an employee of the
defendant, the plaintiff cannot be penalised simply because the employee was part of a
bigger fraud. Learned counsel submitted that Bakshi Committee Report is also not placed
on record by the defendant and, therefore, must be inferred that the proposal was accepted
by Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee. Learned counsel further submitted that the moment a cover
note is issued by the insurance company the contract of insurance is complete and the
insurance company is bound to make the payment for the loss suffered though the regular
policy may not have been issued. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in General Assurance Society Limited v . Chandmull Jain & Another, AIR 1966
SC 1644 (14) and submitted that the legal status of a cover notes in their possession,
adverse inference is to be drawn submitted that since the defendant failed to produce the
cover notes in their possession, adverse inference is to be drawn against the defendant.
Learned counsel submitted that if a party fails to produce the best evidence in its
possession, adverse inference should be drawn. Learned counsel relied on Bawa Singh v .
Jagdish Chand & Others , AIR 1960 Punjab 573 , (15) Ram Murty Gupta v. Suresh
Chandra Agrawal, AIR 1973 Allahabad 582 (16) Gurnam Singh & Others v. Surjit Singh
& Others , AIR 1974 SC 2367, (17) Irudayam Ammal & Others v. Salayath Mary , AIR
1973 Madras 421 (18 ) and Bharat Bhushan… v. Ved Prakash…. , AIR 1978 Delhi 199
(19) in support of this contention.

33. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the cover notes
were not given to the plaintiff and thus there was no concluded contract between the
parties. He submitted that the alleged cover notes were got prepared by plaintiff in great

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haste after the fire in an attempt to wrongfully cover the insurance ante dated and since
the defendant company did not accept the insurance , Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee did not
issue the cover notes. Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff had shown Shri Dalip
Bhattacharjee in the list of witnesses but this witness was given up later on by the plaintiff.
Learned counsel further submitted that mere preparation of the cover notes was not
conclusive unless the cover notes had been given by the Development Officer of the
defendant to plaintiff. Learned counsel submitted that the cheque was given by the plaintiff
to Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee after the fire and was never encashed. The proposal was never
accepted by the defendant and thus there was no concluded contract between the parties.
Learned counsel submitted that for constituting a concluded contract meeting of minds is
important and since in the present case there was no meeting of mind between the plaintiff
and the defendant there was no valid contract between the parties. Learned counsel relied
on Haslbury Volume 25 Fourth Edition para 398 at page 221, Section 46- VB of the
Insurance Act read with Rule 58 of the Insurance Rules and Life Insurance
Corporation of India v. Raja Vasireddy Komalavalli Komba & Others , 1984 (2) SCC
719(20) in support of the contention.

34. The Supreme Court in General Assurance Society Limited (supra) has observed as
follows:—

“A contract of insurance is a species of commercial transaction and there is a well-

established commercial practice to send cover notes even prior to the completion of a
proper proposal or while the proposal is being considered or a policy is in preparation for
delivery. A cover note is a temporary and limited agreement. It may be selt-contained or it
may incorporate by reference the terms and conditions of the future policy. When the cover
note incorporates the policy in this manner, it does not have to recite the terms and
conditions, but merely to refer to a particular standard policy. If the proposal is for a
standard policy and the cover note refers to it, the assured is taken to have accepted the
terms of that policy. The reference to the policy and its terms and conditions may be
expressed in the proposal or the cover note or even in the letter of acceptance including the
cover note. The incorporation of the terms and conditions of the policy may also arise from
a combination of references in two or more documents passing between the parties.
Documents like the proposal, cover note and the policy are commercial documents and to
interpret them commercial habits and practice cannot altogether be ignored. During the
time the cover note operates, the relations of the parties are governed by its terms and
conditions, if any, but more usually by the terms and conditions of the policy bargained for
and to be issued. When this happens the terms of the policy are incipient but after the
period of temporary cover, the relations are governed only by the terms and conditions of

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the policy unless insurance is declined in the meantime. Delay in issuing the policy makes
no difference. The relations even then are governed by the future policy if the cover notes
give sufficient indication that it would be so. In other respects there is no difference
between a contract of insurance and any other contract except that in a contract of
insurance there is a requirement of uberima fides, i.e good faith on the part of the assured
and the contract is likely to be construed contra proferentem that is against the company in
case of ambiguity or doubt. A contract is formed when there is an unqualified acceptance
of the proposal. Acceptance may be expressed in writing or it may even be implied if the
insurer accepts the premium and retains it. In the case of the assured, a positive act on his
part by which he recognises or seeks to enforce the policy amounts to an affirmation of it.”

35. It was contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that the above- mentioned
observations of the Supreme Court were made after considering totally different facts
inasmuch as the Supreme Court was considering whether an insurance cover could be
cancelled by the insurance company.

36. The Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) has observed as
follows:—

“When an insurance policy become effective is well-settled by the authorities but before
we note the said authorities, it may be stated that it is clear that the expression ‘underwrite’
signifies ‘accept liability under’. The dictionary meaning also indicates that (See in this
connection. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Sixth Edition, P. 1267). It is true that normally
the expression ‘underwear’ is used in marine insurance but the expression used in Chapter
III of the Financial Powers of the Standing Order in this case specifically used the
expression ‘underwriting and revivals’ of policies in case of Life Insurance Corporation
and stated that it was the Divisional Manager who was competent to underwrite policy for
Rs. 50,000 and above. The mere receipt and retention of premium until after the death of
the applicant or the mere preparation of the policy document is not acceptance. Acceptance
must be signified by some act or acts agreed on by the parties or from which the law raises
a presumption of acceptance. See in this connection the statement of law in Corpus Juris
Secundum, Vol. XLIV, page 986 wherein it has been stated as:

The mere receipt and retention of premiums until after the death of the applicant does not
given rise to a contract, although the circumstances may be such that approval could be
inferred from retention of the premium. The mere execution of the policy is not an
acceptance; an acceptance, to be complete, must be communicated to the offeror either
directly, or by some definite act, such as placing the contract in the mail. The test is not
intention alone. When the application so requiries, the acceptance must be evidenced by

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the signature of one of the company's executive officers.

Though in certain human relationships silence to a proposal might convey acceptance but
in the case of insurance proposal, silence does not denote consent and no binding contract
arises until the person to whom an offer is made says or does something to signify his
acceptance. Mere delay in giving an answer cannot be construed as an acceptance, as,
prima facie, acceptance must be communicated to the offeror. The general rule is that the
contract of insurance will be concluded only when the party to whom an offer has been
made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his acceptance to the person making
the offer. Whether the final acceptance is that of the assured or insurers, however, depends
simply on the way in which negotiations for an insurance have progressed. See in this
connection statement of law in Mac Gillvray & Parkington on Insurance Law, Seventh
Edition, page 94, paragraph 215.”

37. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the observations of the
Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) cannot be relied upon by
the defendant because in that case the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of life
insurance and not general insurance .

38. In my view, on reading the observations of the Supreme Court in the two authorities
cited hereinabove whether the case relates to general insurance or life insurance makes
no difference. As observed by the Supreme Court itself in Life Insurance Corporation of
India (supra) the general rule is that the contract of insurance will be concluded only when
the party to whom an offer has been made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his
acceptance to the person making the offer. Whether it is done by giving a cover note or by
issuing a letter depends or, the facts of each case. In order to hold that there was a binding
contract of insurance , there must be an offer put-forward by one party to the contract and
acceptance of it by another. As observed in Mac Gillvray and Parkington on Insurance
Law, Eighth Edition, Chapter-2 page 87 para 212 , the material terms of a contract of
insurance are: the definition of the risk to be covered, the duration of the insurance cover,
the amount and mode of payment of the premium and the amount of insurance payable in
the event of a loss. As to all these there must be a consensus ad idem, that is to say, there
must be either an express agreement or the circumstances must be such as to admit of a
reasonable inference.

39. In the present case, admittedly the factory of the plaintiff was insured by the bank only
till 29th December, 1981 for a period between 1978 to 29th December, 1981. From 30th
December, 1981 till 1st June, 1982 the factory was not insured. It is admitted by the
plaintiff that no policy was issued by the defendant. It is also admitted that the cheque

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which was allegedly given by the plaintiff was never encashed by the defendant. The short
question, therefore, to be determined is whether Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee issued cover
notes and whether the same were received by the plaintiff on 1st June, 1982 as alleged.
Admittedly, the case of the plaintiff is that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee took away the cover
notes on 1st June, 1982 itself. Rather PW 2 Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia in his statement
has stated that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee handed over the cover notes to him on 1st June,
1982 and were in his possession for 10 minutes and Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee immediately
took them back with the promise that he will issue the policy shortly. Thus, admittedly the
cover notes are not in possession of the plaintiff.

40. On perusal of the various documents which have been placed on record by the plaintiff
I find that in the letters issued by the plaintiff immediately after the fire broke out on 2nd
June, 1982, no reference is made to the cover notes or the insurance policy. The plaintiff
examined only two witnesses on 5th September, 1988; one was Shri R.P Sharma, Manager,
United Bank of India, Connaught Circus Branch, New Delhi as PW 1 who has stated that
the last policy taken out by bank for the factory of the plaintiff expired on 29th December,
1981; and the other was Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia himself as PW2. PW 1 has stated that
the letter dated 2nd June, 1982; Ext. PW1/1 was written by the plaintiff to the bank. Ext.
PW1/1 indicates that the Accounts Officer of the plaintiff company had informed the bank
on 2nd June, 1982 that the cover notes would be sent by the insurance company directly
to the bank. This witness however does not state when this letter was received by bank and
in fact a suggestion was made by the counsel for the defendant that Ext. PW1/1 was
manipulated between plaintiff and the bank. In any event, the letter does not give the
particulars as to who gave the cover notes and also does not give the details of the
insurance cover. This letter only states that the cover notes would be sent by the defendant
to the bank directly. Thus, even as per this letter, the cover notes were not with the plaintiff
on 2nd June, 1982 and were still with the defendant. On perusal of this letter I find that
though rubber stamp ‘RECEIVED’ is stamped on this letter, it does not bear any signature
of the bank official. In my opinion, this letter does not help the plaintiff in any manner,
PW2 Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia in his statement has admitted that the plaintiff had tried
to obtain insurance from another agent Shri P. Sengupta of National Insurance Company,
Division No. V in respect of the same factory and had in fact obtained the cover notes
from Mr. P. Sengupta on 1st June 1982. According to this witness, these cover notes bore
the date of May 1982 and also June, 1982. It is not clear from the evidence of PW2 as to
how the plaintiff was able to obtain cover notes from Mr. P. Sengupta though the plaintiff
had not obtained a policy from Mr. P. Sengupta. In fact, this witness himself says that
initially the plaintiff was trying to get a policy of insurance from Division No. V i.e Mr. P.

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Sengupta but it was later on decided to shift to Division No. II i.e the defendant company.

41. Now I find that though the plaintiff has proved the visit of Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee to
the plaintiff's factory on 31st May 1982 by referring to a copy of the entry in Visitor's
Register Ext. PW2/2, there is no document to prove the visit of Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee on
1st June 1982. The plaintiff could prove his visit and the receipt of cover notes by Shri
Ashok Kumar Jhajharia for 10 to 5 minutes by examining Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee himself.
But the plaintiff has not chosen to do that and the plaintiff only relies on the statement of
PW 2 Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia for that purpose. I find that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee
was summoned by the plaintiff and he in fact appeared before the Deputy Registrar on 18th
December 1987. The plaintiff had however not given the particulars of the documents
which Shri Dalip Bhattacharjee was required to produce. The plaintiff later on gave the
particulars of the required documents and this witness was again summoned for the dates
of trial fixed from 2nd September 1988 to 6th September 1988. The plaintiff examined
PW1 and PW2 on 5th September 1988 and closed the evidence. The plaintiff did not insist
on examination of Shri Dalip Bhattacharjee.

42. In was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee
was in the employment of the defendant and the cover notes were also in the possession of
the defendant, it is the defendant who should have examined Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee and
produced the cover notes.

43. I do not find any force in this contention. It is the plaintiff who asserted that cover
notes were issued by Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee and were received by Shri Ashok Kumar
Jhajharia for 10 to 15 minutes on 1st June 1982. Thus, the onus of proving this fact was
entirely on the plaintiff. It would have been a different matter if Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee
was not summoned by the plaintiff and if he had come after receipt of summons, but that is
not the case. Even though Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee was summoned and the came, the
plaintiff did not choose to examine him. No doubt, as submitted by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff himself, adverse inference must be drawn because Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee
was not examined, but in the circumstances of the case as narrated hereinabove, adverse
inference has to be drawn against the plaintiff for not examining Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee.
The case of the defendant all through out has been that no cover notes were issued by the
defendant to the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff has not been able to prove the receipt of the
cover notes, there was no necessity for the defendant to produce the cover notes even if
they were written and prepared and may have been available in the office of the defendant.

44. In my view, even if Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee had written and prepared the cover notes,
since the cover notes remained in the office of the defendant and is not proved to have

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been given to the plaintiff, the contract between the parties cannot be held to be concluded.
The facts to, my mind, show that there may have been a proposal for insurance but it was
not accepted by the defendant company before the fire.

45. Great emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the plaintiff on the fact that the
defendant sent the surveyor to assess the damage caused because of the fire. I do not
consider this fact relevant for deciding whether there is a valid and completed contract
between the parties or not. Obviously, in the present case, the Surveyor had assessed the
damage at the instance of the plaintiff without prejudice. The correspondence between the
parties Ext. PW2/8 to PW2/16 is ample evidence for this fact.

46. In my view, the circumstances in this case do not admit of a reasonable inference that
there is a binding contract of insurance between the parties.

47. The plaintiff having failed to prove the receipt of the cover notes allegedly prepared by
Shri Dilip Bhattacharjee and has failed to prove that there was a contract of insurance
between the plaintiff and the defendant, issue No. 1 is decided against the plaintiff and in
favour of the defendant.

48. Since issue No. 1 is not proved by the plaintiff, the defendant company is not liable to
pay the loss suffered by the defendant in the fire. Thus, issue No. 3 is also decided against
the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant.

49. The plaintiff is thus not entitled to the relief sought and the suit is dismissed with costs.

I.K Suit Dismissed.

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