Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

BERND MARTIN

Agriculture and food supply in Japan

during the Second World War

Originalbeitrag erschienen in:

Bernd Martin (Hrsg.): Agriculture and food supply in the Second World War.
Ostfildern: Scripta Mercaturae Verl., 1985, S. 181 - 205
 ~ ~ r i c u l t u rand
e ~ o o suppIy
d in Japan
during the Second World War * )
von Bernd Martin
F o t imperial Japan the Second World War began with the illfamed "China
incident" in July 1937 and was ended by unconditional surrender o n Septem-
ber 2nd, 1945. The development o f agriculture during these eight years can only
be understood if one studies the natural geographical factors of this island
country, its social structures, and not least the political and historical precon-
ditions.
The forced opcning of Japan b y the Americans in 1853 was followed b y the
Meiji-Restoration (1868) with Its national remvery Programme. This 'revolu-
tion from above' was concentrated o n modernizing industry as well as the struc-
ture of the government and of the military. The backward-looking intentions
underlying this transforrnation were dictated by a small reactionary elite stem-
rning from the ranks o f the lowet samurai. This traditional military group fol-
lowed dual and, in the last analysis, mutually exclusive airns. In order t o equal
the k h i t e ' powers, Japan was t o d o p t superior western technologies. Yet a t
the same time the Japanese people were t o remain isolated from the western
world, culturally independent and subservient to the divine Emperor. In the end
Japan's vertically structured society was t o be strengthened in o d e r t o preserve
the Imperial systern as well as the privileges o f the ruling oligarchy. This o u t -
ward modernization was determined by the idea of preserving the traditional
social structure in o d e r t o defend the country. against
- the c h a l l e-n ~fro'm the
West. However, with rapid industrialization the gulf between the modern tatio-
nale of technology and the static norms o f social behaviour in a hicrarchical
society widened. Growing social tensions, resulting from t h t artificial and hasty

+ ) The present article is connected with two previous studies on social and economic
conditions in Japan during the last war: Bernd Mutin. Japans Kriegswirtschaft 1941-1945.
in: Friedlich Forstmeier und Hans-Erich Volkmann (Eds.), Kriepwirtschaft und Rüstung
1939-1945 (Wsseldorf, 1977), pp. 256-286 and Bemd Martin, Sozider Wandel in Japm
und seine Folgen für die Nachkriegszeit, in: Wacraw h g u b o r s k i (Ed.). Zweiter Weltkrieg
und Sozider Wandel. Achsenmächte und besetzte Länder (Göttinpn. 1981), pp. 364-384.
Adequate references may be found in these articles, so footnotes t o this essay are limited
t o details of exact figures. For western books On wartime Japan. too. See the bibliographicd
survey by Bernd Martin, J a p n und der Ktieg in Ostmien. Kommentierender Bericht über das
Schrifttum, in: Sondcrheft 8 der Historischen Zeitschrift, München 1980, pp. 79-220.
For the problem of Japanese imperidism from 1868 until the period afrer the Second
World War See Bernd Martin, The Politics of Expansion o f the Japanese Empire: Neoim-
perialkm or Pan-Asiatic Mission?, in: Wolfgang Mommsen und Jürgen Osrerhammel (Eds.),
Imperialism and After (London, 1985). -. ,- .. . ..

Univeintuu+
Bibliothek
rnodcrnization, could only be overcorne b y an increasing social imperialisrn, as
was t h e case aftcr China's defeat by rnodernizcd Japanese miiitary forces i n
1895. By further expanding o n thc Asian mainland Japan succcssfully irnitated
Western imperialism. There Japanese modern industries could obtain those raw
rnaterials they lacked o n t h e horne islands a n d , a t the Same time, thcy could
build up a tnatket for those pmducts which, d u e t o the litnited purchasing power
o f a traditional village socicty, could n o t be sold a t hornc. The ptospect of
Japan's manifest destiny as the Leader o f the Asian peoples appealed t o both the
urban rnasses disturbed b y thc technical Progress and t o the paupcrized farrners.
After the world economic crisis, which hit the country severely in thc early
1930s 1) nationalist agitation could play
- . . o n t h e fcars and utopian dreains o f the
t o propagate ü prograinme o f 'national libcration'.
T h e village rnicrocosm o f a h i e r a r ~ h i c a l lstructurcd
~ and vertically stratified
society o f srnall groups served as t h e niodel for all ncw forrns o f sociaiisation 2)
in governrnent circles, in the t o p ranks o f thc arrny and in t h e big industrial
firms. The peasantry was therefore regarded as the foundation of Japanese
society and was excluded frorn rnodernization. While patriotic propaganda pro-
moted thc farrncrs t o the rank o f defenders o f the fatherland and t h e productive
foundation o f the nation t h e agricultural population actually had t o endurt
hardships a n d poverty t o a n incornparably ]arger dcgree than farmers i n westcrn
countries.
Japan's peasants had t o bear t h e burden o f industrialization. A high tax rate
o n land, approximately 18 percent o f thc valuc o f the crop, brought in half of
the nation's revenue until the First World War 3l.Afterwards newly introdu-
ccd purchase taxes and the traditional land t a x , both t o be paid by t h e lower
classes, togcther accourited f o r t w o thirds o f thc statc's revenut 4). With t h e
cxccption o f a short p e r i d o f prosperity in the First World War 5 ) . Japanese

1) kriid Martin, Wirtschaftliche Konzentration und sozinle Konflikte in J a p n , in: Dietrnar

Rotherniund (Ed.), Die Peripherie in der Weltwirtschaftskrisc: Afrika. Asien urid Lateiri-
amerika 1929-1939 (Paderborn, 1983), pp. 197-224.
2) The Standard work on the structure of Japanese socicty, Chie Nakanc, Japanese
Society (Berkeley, 1970); sec also two recent studies in German: Tatsuo Oguro,Die rätsel-
hafte Natiun - Mentnlität und Denkweise der Japaner (Stuttgart. 1982) and Takeo Doi,
Amae - Freiheit in Geborgenheit. Zur Struktur japanischer Psyche (FrankfurtlM, 1982).
3 ) Three percent of thc assessed value of the land. from 1876 two and a haif percent
plus one percent of local tnxes, from 1876 altogcther 3.5 percent. Bruce F. Johnston,
"Agticultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan", in: Journal of Political
Economy 1951, pp. 498-513; Takehzu Ogura (Ed.), Agricultural ikvelopment in Modern
Japan (Tokyo, 1967), p. 23 and 43 ff.
4) For the tax reforrn of 1940 nnd wartime taxatioti sec Saburo Shiorni,Japan's h n c e
and Taxation 1940-1956 (Ncw York, 1957).
5) Ogura, Agriculturnl Develupment, p. 27 ff.; Ann Wnswo, Japanese landlords. The
Dccline o f a Rural Elite (Berkeley, 1977). p. 87 f.
farm households, which rnade u p half the population, rernaincd o n t h e lowest
incorne level despitc the apparcnt wcalth o f t h c capitalist classcs and the tradi-
tional clitc. Modcrnizcd Imperial Japan stiick t o t h e rule o f t h e forrner Toku-
gawa fcudal systeni o f squeezing peasants t o such an e x t e n t that "thcy could
neither live nor die".
On the land, intensive cultivation was impedcd b y natural barriers as well as
b y thc preriiodern structure o f tenant rclations and property rights in agrarian
society. The area o f land cultivated rernaincd t h e sarnc bctwcen the t w o great
wars 6). Lack o f investnicnts and t h e low level o f mechanisation werc serious
barricrs t o an increüse i r i agricultural o u t p u t . Thc production o f rice, t h c basic
food o f tlie Japanese, increascd b y o n l y 24 pcrccnt bctween 1 9 0 0 and t h e out-
break o f the Pacific War in 1941 7 ) . In lmpcrial Japan, bccausc o f structural
deficits and traditional antirriodern attitudes the agrarian half o f t h e nation was
unable t o fccd t h c o t h c r half, not even at the lowest level o f consumption.

"Too rriany pcople on t o o little land" - this popular expression characteriscs

the agrarian situation i n Japan and reflects t w o basic facts: only 16 <70 o f t h e t o -
tal area o f Japan is cultivable, and there were t o o rnany pcasant füniilies, a b o u t
5.5 rriillion farrn houscholds altogethcr 8 ) . Climatic conditions favour rice culti-
vation, b u t are also suitable for o t h e r typcs o f grain and root crops. A ternpc-
rate clitnate in tlic n o r t h , o n Hokkaido, is conducive t o pasture, while t h c sub-
tropical zones o f South-Honshu, Kiushu and Shikoku perrnit t h e growing o f cit-
rus fruits. Since in the mild clirnatic regions winter grain crops can be plantCd
after the ricc harvcst, thc harvested area is a quarter t o a third larger than the
arable land 9).
Because o f tlie lirnited cultivablc land arable land arriounted t o 95 O/o o f t h c
total area. Cattle breeding and dairy farrning rernained insignificant 10). Evcn
the cultivation o f fodder crops and o f raw material crops for industrial purposcs
did not exceed 17 % of the total yield 11). Above all Japanese agriculture sup-
plied food for thc agrarian population, t h c urban rnarkets being o f secondary
irnportance. Intensive rice cultivation had priority. It accounted f o r 71 % o f the
production o f the six rnajor staplcs and rnade u p o n l y 4 9 1 o f t h e total harvc-
sted area o f all food crops 12). A t t h c beginning o f t h e Pacific War in 1941, a

6) Hruce F. Johnston, Japanese Food Management in World War TI (Stanford, 1953),

P. 9 .
7) Kbid p. 28.
8) Ibid p. 6.
9 ) lbid p. 10.
10) fiid p. 9 and Tahle V o n p. 247.
11) Ibid p. 10.
12) Ibid p. 24.
division o f t h e cultivated area according t o crops shows the following percen-
tages: rice 52 %, wheat 13,s T,', vegetables 9,2 %, naked-barley 7,7 %, badey
5,9 %, sweet potatoes 5 , l %, soyabeans 5,l %, potatoes 2,9 %, fruits 2,2 %,
oats 2,2 % 13).
By intensifying the cultivation o f rice and by enlarging t h e area o f the paddy
fields it would have been possible t o incrcase t h e production o f Japan's rnost
irnportant staple food. However, there were obstacles t o this scherne. Problems
o f irrigation and o f field cleanng could not be solved uniier the prevailing
tenancy System. Furthermore, intensifying cultivation required farrning in larger
units o f landholding and sufficient usc o f fertilizer, neither o f which could be
achieved because o f existing property rights and because o f the decrease in the
production o f artifical fertilizer during t h e war.

Legal and Property Rights

In 1 8 7 2 the Meiji reforrns abolished feudal tenure and released t h e village
cornrnunities frorn the obligation o f paying taxes in kind t o the dairnyo-landlord.
F o r the first time Japanese farrners wcre free to move from the native villages
and t o grow whatever they wanted in their fields. By these new laws land be-
carne salable o n the Open rnarket and thereby a n object o f capital investment.
But the new owner-farmers had t o pay t h e sarne heavy taxes, now in cash rather
than in kind. This high rate o f land taxation ruined a lot o f farrncrs and in thc
later Meiji period feudal dependencies were renewed, now between tenants and
large estate owners. T h e middle t o large size land-owners, w h o had already been
favoured in thc land review in 1 8 7 3 , succeeded in enlarging their ptoperty a t
t h e expense o f the small ownerfarrners. D u e t o lack o f capital rnany o f these
srnallholdcrs had t o sell off their land and were forced t o work as tenant farrners.
This shift in ownership was completed a b o u t 1910. ßy then t h e original number
o f 7 0 percent o f landowning peasants was reduced t o a share o f 3 0 percent 14).
This distribution o f landed property remained unchanged throughout t h c Pa-
cific War until t h e forced land reforrn b y t h e Arnerican occupirrs took place in
1946.
i n 1 9 4 1 t h e ownership o f agricultural property was divided as follows: Out o f
5.5 million peasant-households, 1.7 million (31,2 %) tilled their own soil, 1.2
million (20,7 %) were owners and tenants w i t h a rnajor share in ownership,
1.1 rnillion ( 2 0 1)tenants and owners with a rnajor share in tenancy, and the

13) United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Volume VIII, T h e Effects of
Strategic ßombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington, 1946), Reprint Ncw York,
1976), Table C-198, p. 237. (Altogether 106.4 % plus 17 % of industrial crops = 123 %,
i.C. the difference betwecn harvcstcd and cultivated arca.)
14) Waswo, o p . cii., p. 1 2 ff.; E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence AS A Modem State,
in: John W . Dower (Ed.), Origins of the Modern Japanese Stak. Selected Writings of E. R.
Norman (New York, 1975), pp. 243-273. Thomas R. H. k v e n s , Farm and Nation in Mo-
dem Japan. Agrarim Nationalism, 1870-1940 (Princeton, 1974). p. 32 ff.
rest, 1.5 rriillion (27.7 %), were landless tenants 15). Of thc total acreage 4 6 %
belonged t o tenant farrners and 54 % was cultivatcd b y owners 16). These pro-
portions, o f Course, varied considcrably according to repion and type o f culti-
vation. Only 46 % o f the ricelands, which were the most intensively cultivated
regions with the highest yields, were farrned b y landowning farrners, while the
less fertile soils in mountainous areas, which werc uscd for othcr crops, were
cultivatcd b y 62.7 ?,'G owner farrncrs 17).
With a total area o f 6 rnillion hectares o f agricultural land, and about 5.5
rnillion farrn households the fictional average size was about 1.1 hectares (2.7
acrcs) per farriily. in reality, this average size was not achieved until the land
reform after the war. In 1941 the real avcragc size o f a field plot was 0.06 cho,
i. e. approxirnately 6 AI or 720 Square yards 18). The Japanese farmer whether
owner or tenant had to cultivate a scattcrcd arca split u p in 1 0 o r 2 0 Geld Strips,
according t o thc size of his farrn. Thc total acreage of a farm whether owned b y
the proprietor, rcntcd, or in rnixed owncrship, was as follows in 1942:
Table 1 19):
Farm Households b y Area cultivated - (1 c h o approximately 1 hectare)
Up to 0,49 O/o cho 4 1 O/o o f all farm households = 2.450.000
0,99 % cho 31 % o f all farm households = 1.830.000
1-49 'X) cho 1 6 O/n o f all farrn households = 920.000
1,99 O/u cho 6 % o f all farm households = 360.000
2,99 % cho 4 ',?G o f all farrn houscholds = 210.000
4,99 % cho 1 % o f all farrn households = 740.000
Over 5.0 % cho 1 % o f all farrn houscholds = 490.000

Therefore 7 2 O/n o f all Japanesc farrn-households were cultivating an area less

than 1 hectarc and even this was brokcn u p into scattered fields.
O n such srnall cultivable arcas mechanisation was impossible. Altogether only
3.000 rnechanizcd agricultural machines, aniong theni 99 tractors, were available
for use, depending on the petrol supply, during the war. In the intcrwar period
the number of irrigation purnps had increased remarkably. But thcsc 300.000
purnps wcrc rnainly used t o supply the larger farrns and hardly allcviated the lot
of the srnall Japanese peasants at all. Even draught anirnals for ploughing etc.
wcre lacking; statistically spcaking, thcrc was 1 o x pcr 2 112 farm-households20).

15) Keginald Peter 1)orc. Land Reform in Japan (Oxford, 1959), p. 176.
16) Johnston,Japanesc Food Mumagement, p. 18; Ogura, op. cit.. p. 26.
17) Dorc, op. cit., p. 175.
18) lbid p. 26.
19) lbid p. 27; figures rcfer to the post-war census of August 1947, when the number
of farm households had increased to a total of 5.9 Million.
20) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 10 f. and Table XIX on P. 259. Thc number
of tractors is to be foutid in Jcrome B. Cohen. Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction
(Minneapolis, 1949, Reprint New York, 19731, p. 364.
 During t h e Second World War (1943. - 1945), Japancsc agriculture was still
therefore in a pre-industrial state. Its production was bascd cntircly on man-
power and labour. T h e pre-modern distribution o f landownership whichprevent-
cd any form o f modcrnisation was supplemented .. b y a 'fcudal' tenancy system.
T h u s the social o d e r o f t h c village comrnunity and general agrarian poverty
rctriained unchangcd until t h e final collapse of t h c old order in 1945.
Tenancy arrangenicnts were made orally and n o t regulatcd b y law 21). Up t o
t h e war with China in 1937 all parliamcntary initiatives t o legalizc tenancy
agrccmcnts were either blockcd b y tlic uppcr house, t h e tnost loyal pillar o f t h e
imperial ordcr o r turned d o w n in t h e asscmbly b y the powerfiil coalition o f large
estate owners and industrialists. Only 30 O/o o f t h e tenants had ariy legal agree-
m e n t at all which gave them a t least five years o f protcction against foreclosure.
T h e rents, writtcn o r oral, were fixed a t 60 O/o o f the harvest and despite thc
Meiji reforms were payable in k i n d , n o t in cash 22). T h e landlord payetl t h c Iünd-
t a x t o t h e state and was o b l i g d t o providc investment capital for improvcmcnts
such as irrigation purnps and -Systems. Howcvcr, t h e tenant had t o provide
labour and fertilizers, as wcll as maintain the farm buildings.
The larger number o f lessors wcre small- and mediuni-sized farmers, w h o manag-
ed t o dcrive a regular source o f income froni the leased land in order t o earn
some cxtra money. T h e averagc 4 z e o f leased g o u n d was half a cho (about half
a hectare). The numbcr o f really large estate holders o t big landowncrs with
50 c h o o r more in the land-rep;istcr numbered only 3.000 persons 23).
Even when t h e 46.000 households which in t h e census o f 1930 had claimcd
t o live off ground rents 24) are includcd the Japanese landed gentry was a very
small group, lcss than 1 percent o f t h c agrarian population. Howevcr, t h e poli-
tical influence behind t h e policy o f p r e s c ~ n gt h e traditional village order as
the nucleus o f Japanese society lay w i t h t h c big estate owners. T h c y formcd one
o f the rnost influcntial pressure groups in thc Lower House a n d always rnanaged
t o get elected in Open votcs with t h e help o f bribcs and otlier tnanipulations.
As rnernbers o f t h e ruling class thcsc few thousand landlords flatly refused t o
inaugurate social rcforrns in the countryside 25). ~ i i e r e f o r eit is this group which
must bc held mainly responsible for t h e militant agrarian socialism advocated in
t h c 1930s b y the rniddle tanking ürmy officers, w h o themselves werc o f petty
rural origin. T h e agricultural lob by in parliament, together with its complcmen-
tary partncr t h e industrialists, (in 1930 approximatcly 32 percent o f all M P S ) ~ ~ ) ,

21) Dore,op. cit., p. 28 f.

21) Dore, op. cit., p. 3 5 ; Johnston, Food Manu~ement,p. 18.
22) Dore, op. cit., p. 28 f.
23) Dore, op. cit., p. 29.
24) Dore, op. cit., p. 21.
25) Waswo,op. cit.. p. 121 f.; Havens. Farm und Nation. p. 1 1 4 f.
26) Arthur E. Tiedctnan, Big Business und Politics in Prewar Japan. in: Jarnes W.Morley
seconded the efforts t o continuc t h c established social order which had worked
so well in both agriculture ;ind industry. As in t h e Gcrman Keich, so in Japan,
t h e tacit agrcerncnt betweeri the big industrialists and the big estatc holders had
incrcased social tensions which finally Icd t o thc abolition o f t h e parliamentary
systerri in L o t h countries. T h i ~process o f deniocratic crosion startcd in J a p a n in
1932 when parliamcntary governrnent was übolished a n d cnded u p i n a national
chauvinistic war o f aggression against China in 1937.
Labour Murket und Agricultural l-lf-oduction
Mobilisation o f manpower for the arrried forces, for t h e arrnament industry
and last b u t n o t least for agriculturül production was much slower ;tnd less
cfficicnt in Japan than in o t h c r belligerent countries. T h e Japanese armarnent
industry whcn conipared with its Arncrican countcrpart looked likc a n industrial
dwarf, its o u t p u t did not evcn rcach 1 0 percent o f t h e Arrierican one 27). Like
t h e bückward agrarian sector rriodern industries, t o o , were n o t prcparcd for the
total organisation o f all rcsources requiretl for modern warfare ;tnd thus could
only be mobilized o n ü vcry rnodcst scale. The existing economic potential was
ncither sufficient for cquipping arrried forccs which would be compürüble in
sizc witli those in westcrn countries, nor was agricultural production sufficicnt
to supply such ü giant arrny. When in J u n e 1945 J a p a n had t o defend the h o m c
islands and wanted t o mobilize thc nation for total warfare this could o n l y be
donc o n pre-modern Patterns. T h c naining o f a homcguard army with bamboo-
spears instead o f rifles can b e regardcd as a symbol o f t h e complcte collapse
o f tlie rriodern econornic systern. T h e daily cxodus o f Iiundreds o f thousands of
townspeoplc in search o f food rnust bc counted as a further proof that rnost o f
t h c urban population lived below t h e rriinirnuni for existencc during t h c last
ycar o f t h e war. t3y fighting the western nations Japan t o o k u p a burden t o o
heavy for a country which had undergone only a partial and very superficial
modcrnisation. Imperial Japan, therefore, was bankrupt, cven bcfore t h e c o u n t r y
had t o endure the devastating cffccts o f modern warfare.
In view o f the I h i t e d industriül and agrarian resources Japanese rnilitary lea-
ders, like their Gertrian countcrparts, Iiad t o rely o n t h e strategy o f Blitzkrieg.
Japan achieved even greater successcs in thc initial stagc o f t h e Pacific War than
her Gerrnan ülly had achieved in Europe. But the unexpectcd Allied countcr-
offensive found Japan's cconomy rnore helpless than that o f t h e German Reich.
The military situation did not cause greütcr shifts eit her o n the labour-market
o r in industrial and agticultural production. Only b y concentrating available
resources o n special branches o f t h e armament industry like t h e shipyards, could
remarküble rcsults bc achieved o u t o f which t h c postwar econornic iniraclc ernerg-
ed. Rut in general b o t h t h e productivity o f labour and o u t p u t levels decreased

(Ed.),Dilemmas of Growth i n Prewar Japan (Pnnccton. 1971). pp. 267-319, hcre p. 281.
27) USSBS Vlll p. 2.
in industry as weil as in agriculture b y t h e cnd o f 1942, after only onc year o f
war against t h c Allicd powers.
At t h e last ccnsus taken before t h e Pacific War o n 1 October 1940
t h e total horneland population and Japanese soldiers serving abroad togcthcr
numbercd 73.1 million 28). Imperial Japan was t h e only belligerent country
where rnarriage- and birth rates rernained constant thmughout t h e war. T h u s
t h e population had increased b y 3.9 rnillion w h e n t h c ncxt ccnsus was taken o n
22 February 1944 29). Tt was d u e t o this phcnomcnon and not t h e result o f
draft labour that t h e total number o f employed persons, i n c l u d i q rnilitaty
pcrsonncl rosc frorn 34.2 t o 37.4 rniUion during these four war ycars 30). In
October 1940 13.8 rnillion werc ernployed in a p i c u l t u r e , i. e. 42.6 O/u o f t h c
econornically active F o u r years later it was half a rnillion lcss, b u t
the share was still 42.2 % 31). But d u n n g t h e war years fernale labour and old
peoplc gained a dominant position in agriculture.
Table 2 32):
Distribution o f t h e Agtarian Labour Force
1 October 1940 6.6 niio niale (47.8 % o f all pcrsons eniployed
i n agriculture, 33.5 % o f the eco-
nornically active male
7.2 mio fcmalc (52.2 O/n resp. 56.5 %)
22 February 1944 5.7 mio rnalc (41.6 % resp. 30.3 %)
7.7 rnio fernalc (58.4 O/n resp. 59 %)
Thus, a t t h e beginning o f 1944 less than one in three male workers had retain-
e d their eniployment in t h e agricultural sector, while about t w o thirds o f thc
t o t a l fcrnale labour force now wotked in agiculture. T h e burden o f Japancse
peasant paddyfield work was born b y rnarricd wornen with children t o bruig up
and grandmothets t o help with t h e work.
T h e shift in the proportion o f rnen t o women working in agriculture is diie
t o the movernent o f t n d e labour, and also i n part o f younger wornen, from t h e
land t o better paid and easier j o b s in industry, and also t o men being recruited
f o r t h e armed forces. ßetween 1937 and 1944 a b o u t t w o rnillion workcrs left
t h e land t o live in t h e cities, about one third o f them young unmarricd wo-
nien 33). This niigration o f labour from t h e land t o urban arcas rcachcd its pcak
i n 1942, the first year o f t h e war. T h e arnazing victories, heralding a new cra

28) Johnston, Food Supply, Table I1 on p. 245.

29) Cohen, op. cit., p. 288; Thomas R. H. Havens. Valley of Darkness. T h e Japanese
People und World War Two (New York. 1978). p. 134 f. For marriagc and fcrtility ratcs
See lrenc B. Tacubcr, 7he IJopu&tion uf Japan (Princcton, 1958).
30) Cohen, op. cit.. p. 288, Johnston. Food Supply, Table I on p. 244.
31 ) Cohcn, op. cit., p. 290 and p. 292.
32) Ibid.
33) Johnston, Food Supply, p. 95.
o f prosperity, causcd the trünsfer o f p r o f c ~ s i o n a l lqualified
~ staff from t h e
Japancsc cities t o t h e 'newly conqucrcd tcrritorics, where they took over the
local adrninistration and ecoriorri y. T h e resultant gaps in J apanese Iioinc indu-
stries were filled by younger labourcrs frorn agricultural areas.
Until the end o f I944 recruitrnent i n t o t h c arrncd forces hardly üffected t h e
labour mürket a t all, certainly not t h c agricultural sector. A t the outbrcak o f
t h c war with China in 1937, thc Japancsc arrncd forces numbered 634.000.
They increased t o 2.4 miilion men before t h e üttack o n Pearl Harbour. A t t h e
time o f t h c census in F e b m a r y 1944 they had reached a strength o f 3.7 triillion
rnen which was about 10 % o f t h c total male population 34). Cornpared w i t h
these figures, in Germany 28 % o f the rnale population had becn called t o t h e
colours by March 1943 35). With a sitiiilar population strength the Japanese
armed forces drafted only half the number o f rccruits called u p for military
service in Gerniany. Japanese cornbat losses were only lcss than half a rnillion
altogether 361, just about o n c fifth o f t h e German losses 37). While German mili-
tary authorities tended t o r e ~ r u i tsoldicrs frorn the peasant farrriing class ünd
often spared skilled workers in J a p a n it was t h e o t h c r w a y r o u n d ; although the
peasant class rnadc u p half t h e population, it only provided 23 '%of all recruits
between the ycars 1937 - 1945. F o r service i n thc rncchanized forces and in the
navy the Japanese prcfcrrcd young workers froni industry, w h o provided 4 3 %
o f all drafted men. The rcrnaining 34 o f the r e a u i t s wcrc called u p from com-
merce, transport and civil adrninistration 38). In J a p a n i t was uncomrnon t o
defer skilled labour or administrative specialists from military service, since
bearing arms f o r the country had the highest ideological priority. However, the
low q u o t a o f agricultural workers can only be explained b y their lack o f
technical ability. Above all f o r ideological reasons - the peasantry was regardcd

34) Figures are based on Tacubcr, op. cit., p. 333; they are higher in Cohcn. op. cit.,
p. 288 and lower in USSBS,V111 p. 167.
35) The strength of the Cern~anarmed forces reached its peak in 1943 wich 9.480 Million
mcn scrving (Ploetx, Ccschichte der Weltkriege, ed. by ~ n d r e a sHillgruber and Jost Dülffer,
Freiburg, 1982, p. 114).
36) It is impossible to givc an exact figure for combat losses since dl the records were
bumt by the responsiblc rninistries just before unconditional surrender took placc. Only
thc number of civilian losses has bccn worked outexactly; 299 485 (Cohen, op. cit., p. 408).
Estiniatcs made by American officcrs after interrogations of high-ranking Japanese rnilitary
personcl give the figure of 459 000 combat losses, official Japancse postwar statistics
however claimed a total of about 2.1 rniiiion dead. Three quarters of the deaths in the
arincd forces wcre due to factors othcr than battle, such as disease, rnalnutrition and star-
vation (Taeuber. op. cif.,p. 334 f.).
37) Gcrman combat losses until 31 January 1945 (wheri the sbtistics end) rar1 a t 1.8
rniilion soldicrs. Combat losses in thc last rrionths of the war aiid the nurnber of soldiers
missing in action or dying in captivity account for a further 2.2 million. Total losses of the
Cerman arrned forces, thereforc, were about 4 miilion.
38) Cohen, np. cit.. p. 294 f.
as the basis of society - the farrners were not to bleed to death like the industrial
classcs. After final victory the size o f the industrial sector would anyhow be
reduced and, as in G e m a n y , the Japanese nation would return to an agricultu-
ral Pattern of socicty. In addition the quota o f recruits from the peasant class
classified as fit for rnilitary service was lower than that o f urban groups, owing
t o the formers' poor standard of health.
Thus, labour shortage in agriculture, which is often rnade responsible for the
fall in production, did not in fact exist. Even the drafting of 4.5 rnillion rnen
during the last 1 112 ycars o f the war 391, which was more than the number of
called-up persons during the previous seven years, had but Iittle effcct on agri-
culture. From mid-1944 until surrender the nurnber of townspcople returning
t o live o n the land in order t o escape from the heavily bombcd cities vastly
outnumbered the called-up sons o f ~ e a s a n t s40).
Furtherrnore, at the end of 1944 owing t o the heavy bombing o f citics, the
evacuation of industrial plants t o the countryside began. Thus seasonal workers
for harvesting could easily be supplied, since Japanese factories no longer ran at
full capacity. In addition t o this out of the total nurnber of 3 million students
and school pupils drafted for public service in 1945, rnore than 1 million were
ernployed in food supply 41 ).
In the last years of the war farming became attractive. Therefore the total
number of fatms rose b y 5.3 % during the war 42). Jn 1 9 5 0 there were still 16.1
million persons working in agriculture 43), far rnore people, in total and as
a percentage, than were ernployed in farrning either at the beginning or the cnd
o f the war. In agriculture there was no need for foreign workers t o be recruited
frorn the conquercd Asiatic tcrritones or prisoner of war Camps. Even in indu-
stry only 667.684 Korean workers and about 31.000 Chinese had contracts and
rnore than half of thcrn were forccd t o d o slave-work in the dangcrous coal
rnines of Hokkaido 441. There was a rnore than sufficient labour force available
in Japan. The problern was how to employ it in the most efficient way in a rctro-
grade industrial production structure, as well as in an equally inefficient agri-
culture. The per capita productivity of Japanes industrial workers was much
lower than in Gcrmany or thc United States of America, where factories were
bctter equipped with modern rnachinery. In terrns o f agricultural output the
comparison with Western countries was even more detrimental to Japan.

39)Taeuber, op. cit., p. 333.

40) Approximately 10 Million pcopie left the cities in thc find stage of the war (Havens,
Volley of Darkness, p. 154 ff.).
41)USSBS V111 p. 105.
42) Ogura, op. cit.. p. 62.
43) Taeuber, op. cit., p. 87.
44) USSBS VIII P. 103 and Cohen. op. cit., p. 325.
Table 3 51):
Yield. per Hectare i n Metric Tons
Ycür Kicc Whcat Hark y
1939 3.6 2.2 2.3
1941 2.9 1.7 2.0
1942 3.5 1.G 1.8
1943 3.4 1.3 1.5
1944 3.3 1.6 1.8

T o t a l Production in Millions o f Me tric T o n s

1939 11.5 1.7 0.8
1941 9.2 1.5 0.7
1942 11.1 1.4 0.7
1943 10.5 1.1 0.6
1944 9 -0 1.4 0.8
1945 6.6 0.9 0.5
i n 1945, t h e year o f thc final militüry a n d cconorriic collapsc, t h e situation was
aggrüvüted b y a n unusually hard winter; t h e harvest turned o u t t o b e tlie worst
since 1909. U p t o t h e winter o f 1944145 the delivery quotas for rice set b y the
p v c r n m e n t b y and large had bccn fulfilled.
Altogrther t h e percentage o f t h e rice harvest sold t o governmcnt agcncies
rose frorri 52.5 % ' in 1944 t o 63.7 % in t h c last ycar o f the war 5 2 ) . Wich X
o f 74 million in 1941, t h e statistical avcrage per d a y was 336 grarn-
mcs o f rice Per capita; b y 1945 with a population o f 77 rnillion tlie ration was
o n l y 234 grammes per head pcr day. As the peasants wcrc allowed t o keep 450
grammes per cupita 53) for their fütnilies t h e domcstic production o f ricc t o -
würds the cnd o f t h e war was totally insufficient t o guarantcc a n adcquate ra-
tion for t h c urban rriasses and the expanding arrried forces.
In order t o sustain t h e supply o f basic staple foods in the years o f normal
harvcsts bcfore t h e war u p t o 20 % o f the rice consuriied in Japan had hücl to
be irnported. Sugar was 95 % dependent o n iniports, soyabcüns 50 O/o 54). T h c
requued comrnoditics wcrc niostly iniported from t h c Japanese colonics, For-
niosü (sugar), Korea (ricc), and frorri the puppet-statc Manchukuo (soyübeans)
and, o f Course, extorted froni t h e native population a t further cost t o their
low standard o f living. Recause o f bad harvests i n - K o r e a from 1940 onwürds
J a p a n started t o import rice from South-East Asia. About two ycars lüter tlie
Japanese, üs t h e occupying power, were üble t o exploit and plunder t h e ricc

51) USSBS V111, Appendix Tahle C-199, p. 238 and Cohrn. up. cii., p. 368.
52)Johnston, Japanese Fuod Management, p. 21 0.
53)Ibid p. 192.
54)Ibid p. 45 f.; Cohen, op. cit.. p. 368.
stocks of this region and to ship luge quantities t o their homeland. By 1943,
about three quarters of the rice irnports originatcd frorn South-East-Asia. But
the following year, whcn Anierican subrriarines took cornrnand of the seas, the
import figure went down drarnatically t o a niere 9.4 % 55). The redirection of
rice irnports t o Korea and Forrnosa in 1 9 4 3 could not balance the drop in total
rice irnports, which dccreased frorn 2.6 rnillion tons in 1942 to 1.2 rnillion tons
in 1944 56).
As the American navy controlled the coastal waters o f Japan, only 268.000
tons of rice from Formosa and Korea 57) reached the starving home islands b y
sca from November 1944 t o September 1945, although food imports had abso-
lute priority. The collapse of the inland supply system of the cities WS not
averted by this meagre supply.
Even before the war Japan had provcd unable t o supply itself with basic
foodstuffs and during the war the goal o f self-sufficiency was never reached
dcspitc govcrnrncnt encouragement o f agriculture. The supply gap h x l t o be
filled with irnports froni the colonies and after 1941 with rcquisitions frorn the
conqucred territories. Anierican cornrnand o f the seas, and the insufficiency o f
Japanese merchant shipping together prevented an adequate supply frorn reach-
ing the Japanese frorn 1 9 4 3 onwards. The catastrophic food
supply situation in 1944 was not only d u e to war ernergencies but also to struc-
tural weaknesses and incfficiencics in Japanese doniestic production, b o t h of
which wcrc thc rcsults o f a pre-modern agrarian ideology stubbornly upheld
b y the rulinR oligarchy.
Supply uf the 130pulation
- - -

Dorncstic agricultural output and the import of foodstuffs together sufficed

t o rnaintain a minimal Standard o f living in pre-war times. The average per cupita
food supply bctwccn 1911 and 1931 was about 2.200 calories per day 58). This
figure is a little bclow the average numbcr o f calories required for light work
(2.300 calories). Heavy work likc tilhg thc soil rcquircs 4.000 calories; in a
rcsting positioti the notrnal metabolic rate for an adult Person is about 1.600 -
1.700 calories.
The low food consurription in Japan, whcrc thc diet consisted 6 0 '8, o f ricc 59).
irriplies that a considerablc pcrccntage o f tlic population was aLeady living be-
low the minimurn subsistence level before the war in the Pacific beRan.- Under-
nourishrnerit and rnalnutrition wcre widespread among the poorest classes in
the cities and, o f Course, aniong thc pauperized srnall farrners and tcnants. Be-

55) USSBS VIII, p. 195.

56) Cohcn, op. cit., p. 369
5 7 ) lbid.
58)Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 7 2 .
59) Ibid P. 24.
causc o f hcavy taxation or high rents a lot o f small farmcrs would pawn their
crop in advance and would then havc nothing t o live On. T o e a t p a s s and root
vcgetables was quite cornmon in pre-war Japancse villages 60). The tnisery o n
the land reached its during the 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 1 world economic crisis, when
only every third farm household recorded a small ~ r o f i and t when t h e averagc
annual d e b t per household was 77 yen 61). This caused the peasant families
t o sell their daughtcrs cithcr t o industry o n a contract basis o r t o thc brothels
o f the tnilitary o r the red light districts o f the towns. Tt h ~ been
q calculated that
at the beginning o f thc ninctcen-thirtics practically one in tcn o f t h e young
women was working in such plrices o f entcrtainment. Prostitution in prc-war
Japan had bccome a new form o f feudal tenure among t h e starving classes o f
srnall peasants 62). Infant mortality was high and tubcrculosis as a result o f mal-
nutrition, far more widespread than in Westcrn countrics 63). Thus in thc casc
o f a protracted war the food supply o f thc population would becomc a priority
factor, if not a decisive one, for the o u t c o m e o f the war.
Contrary t o the situation in Germany. Japanese.
authonrics had not concerned
themselves with the organisation o f food stocks 64), although industrial raw
materials had been stock-piled before the war bcgan . The cabinet planning-
board, a k i n d o f suprerne coordination agcncy for rcarmamcnt, did n o t consi-
d e r t h e basic needs o f the lnstcad thcy had confidence in t h e loyalty
and selfdenial of the Japanese population whose d e e p devotion towards the god-
like Emperor would certainly sec them throuRh t h e darkest hours. After t h e
"National General Mobilisation Law" o f 1 April 1 9 3 8 651, complete control o f
t h c country's economy was transferred t o the - governtiient in ordcr t o increasc
armament production for a Iong war in China and t o provide for a probablc
conflict with the Westcrn powers. However, the speeding u p o f armament pm-
duction, forced mergers o f industrial firrris, and high inflation rates negatively
affected the supply o f civilian consumer goods. Uctail prices began t o rise,
real income stagnated 66), and many goods entirely disappearcd from the shel-
ves o f t h e Stores. Speaking in Rcneral terms Japan's overstrained industry was
ruined, as had bcen the c a x with agriculture after the First World War, beforc
American embargo measures entirely c u t o f f t h e supply o f urgently needed raw
materials in mid-1941.

60) FOT the everyday life of farmets and agrarian poverty see Misiko Hane, Pemmts,
Rebe& and Outcasts, 7'he ünderside of Modem Japan (New York, 1982), esp. pp. 102 ff.
61) Havens, Valley of Darkness, p. 136 f f .
62) Hane, op. cit., pp. 206-225 (Stuvation and prostitution).
63) Johnston, Japanese Food Mmiagement, p: 91. p: 163.
64) USSBS VIII, Appendix Table C-202, p. 238. The food stock of rice in 1941 (1.1
Million tons) was only 10 percent of the annuai dornestic harvest.
65) Cohen, o p . cit., p. 11.
66) USSBS VIII, Appendix Tables on pp. 226-228.
 Kationing startcd as early üs 1940. Sugar, flour, charcoal and matches were
supplied only in fixed quotas; wool and c o t t o n textiles were replaced b y sub-
stitute fibres 67). T h c govcrnrncnt started to control staple food comrnoditics
in 1 9 3 9 when the "Rice Distribution Control Law" was passed a n d the state-
owned "Japancse Rice Corporütion" was sct up 68). Rice was rationed in the
country's six triajor citics froni April 1941 onward 69). Whcn the war b m k e o u t
in Europe wholes;~le prices for consurner goods, especially for staplc foods,
rose alaririingly, so that the Japanese government ordcrcd a general price s t o p
for rice on 19 Septeiribcr 1939 70). But neither the state distribution systcm for
ricc n o t price control functioncd pmperly. Big-business and the traditional
agrarian lobby, both o f which t h c govcrnmcnt entirely depended o n , wcrc t o o
intetested in rriaking a o u t o f t h e war t o bc conccrned with the well-
bcing o f thc inajority o f the population.
Thc "Japanese Rice Corporation" founded as a monopoly organisation f o t
buying a n d selling could d o nothing b u t control t h e distribution o f rice irnports.
~ f f i c i a l l y ,ricc-cxchan~eswete closed d o w n and individual transactions made
illegal, biit those prcviously engaged in the rice business now worked in the semi-
public organisation and found it easy t o continue their business as usual. T h c
corriplicated system o f governmcnt purchasing agencies and a similar state-con-
trolled rctail system never succeeded in c o n t r o l l i n ~the small rice dcalers and
thetefore was already proving itself ineffcctivc during the first nionths o f t h c
war. Finally, o n the 1 July 1942 thc "Central Foodstuffs Management Corpora-
tion" was founded a n d placed under thc dircct c o n t m l o f t h e Ministry o f Agri-
cultute and Forestry. With the help o f this organisation the state was üble t o
control the buyinR and selling o f staple food cornrnodities and successfully dis-
placcd o f the deülers and their profits 71).
As early as October 1940 farmers were obliged b y law t o sell all o f their rice
crop t o statc controlled a g n c i e s 72) cxccpt the ainount needcd f o r thcir o w n
consuniption. Betwccn 1 9 3 9 to 1942, a morc sophisticated system o f quotas
for dclivcry and distribution t o thc cities was worked o u t and finally centrali-
zed under statc control 73). Ftoni thcn onwards. the Ministry o f Agriculture
and Forestry laid down approximate yuotüs o f staple food required frorn t h c
Prcfcctures. Afterwards thc administration o f thc Prefectures decidcd o n t h c
final quotas, which were thcn subdivided at the regional lcvcl o f the village corn-

67) Cohen, op. cit., p. 362. (Petrol had been rationed since March 1938, Havens, Valley
of Uarkness, p. 16.)
68) Johnstori, Japanese Food Management. P. 187.
69) Cohen, op. cit., p. 375.
70) Johnston, Japanese 1:ood Management, p. 171.
71) lbid p. 181.
72) Ibid p. 191 and p. 200.
73) Ibid p. 19l:"Food Managfment Law" February 21, 1942.
munities (buraku). At the village level the "Agricultural Association" then de-
cided how t o allocate t h c delivery quotas for each individual fartning household.
These local societies had been founded by the state t o effect a partial rnodcrni-
zation o f Japanese agrjculture, and during the wartirne years becarne the organis-
ing committees for harvesting, con trol o f manpower and allocation o f machi-
nery and draught anirnals. However, the purch;ise o f the harvests was left to the
"Agricultural Cooperative Society", which was a privately owned producers'
cornpany o f the viilagc cornmunity. It ensured that delivery quotas and any
excess amounts were purchascd b y the branches o f t h e "Central Foodstuffs
Management Corporation". Farmers were free t o join these t w o administrative
bodies, which, however, caused a lot o f confusion and had bad effects on the
agricultural output. In March 1943, thcrefore, both organisations were atnalga-
mated i n t o one, known as the s t a t c ~ o n t r o l l e d" ~ ~ r i c u l t u r üCooperativc
l Asso-
ciation 74)". When t h e Ministry o f Agriculture and Porestry took coniniand o f
the civilian industrial sector in November 1943 for the first time in t h e war an
effectivc central authority now bccanie rcsponsiblc for thc supply o f food as
wcll as o f other civilian commoditics. But these belated efforts to h p r o v c the
adrninistration could n o t stop the increasing difficulties o f supply w h i c l ~in , the
second year o f the war against the west, were felt everywhere.
Just as delivering the quotas was a collectivc effort o f the village corntriunity
and thereforc in accordance wit h thc traditional Japanese social structure, s o
was the distribution o f food rations. This proccdure was not bascd on t h e indi-
vidual b u t rather o n family needs, Families wcre orKanised i n t o neighbourhood
cornrnunities 75). As a wartime measure, t h e Ministry o f lnterior ordered these
traditionally structured communities t o b e re-erected in September 1940 in the
cities below thc level o f t h e modern administrative network. About tcn t o
twenty households formed a neighbourhood association, a kind o f large family
group, and 20 t o 30 o f these units madc u p thc superior comrnunity council.
Both organisations elccted representatives w h o had t o bc confirmed in office
by t h e Ministry o f Interior. T h e neighbourhood associations were held respon-
sible for all wartirne social security matters, such as fireservicc, crime preven-
tion, political education and information, all matters which the Japanese per-
manent civil Service h d provcd unable t o deal with.
When in February 1942 rationing o f staple foods and o f private comrnoditcs
was introduced throughout thc country 761, this was carried o u t in the cities
on the basis o f the neighbourhood associations, while in the countryside the
traditional village community (baruku) becatne responsible for the distribution
o f goods. This revival o f traditional collective norms o f behaviour ~ t r e n ~ t h e n e d
74) Ibid p. 180 f.
75) Havens, Vallty of Darkness. p. 37 ff. and 76 ff. See the contribution by Erich Pauer
in this volume pp. 219-241.
76) See note 73.
the coinmunity spirit aniongst the population and tied d i e individual b o t h in
his poiitical thought and Standards o f personal conduct t o t h e group. Thus in-
dividual profitccring as well as the abusc o f food ration cards werc prevented.
T w o or three tirnes a rnonth staple food was distributcd t o t h e neighbourhood
association whose warden passed it on t o the individual househoids and saw
t o it t h a t tempotary hardships wcre dealt with b y extra rations. This flexiblc
systern psychologicaiiy fulfdled the Japanese citizens' dcsire f o r collective har-
m o n y , while o n thc cconomic side the parasitic srnall dcalers were swept away.
This cottibination o f group fccling w i t h self-responsibility in ncighbourhood
areas lightened all kinds o f wartirnc burdens and enorrnously hclped people
t o bear the hardships o f rncagre rations. The normal ration f o r a male adult
(age tange 1 1 t o 60 years) doing p n e r a l work was 330 gr o f ricc pcr d a y , which
liad a caloric value o f 1158. This sliare increased t o 5 7 0 gr ( 2 0 0 1 calories) pcr
day f o r people engaged in heavy work. Women however, doing the sarne hard
work, only receivcd 4 2 0 gr (1474 calories) a d a y 77). These rationing q u o t a s
for thc civilian were, a t least o n Paper, maintained throughout t h c
Pacific War. Aftcr 1 9 4 4 , however, rations could only b e kept u p by providing
substitiites for rice and b y t h c surrinier of 1 9 4 5 the system collapsed altogether.
Members o f the armed forces were better off: soldiers received 600 gr o f ricc
and 1 8 7 gr o f whcat flour claily, more than twicc t h c civilian ration, searnen g o t
a bit less, 5 4 0 gr rice and 1 8 7 gr wheat-flour daily 78). The discrirnination against
the working woman a n d the preferenccs given t o soldiers, even t o thosc o n gar-
rison duties in the horneland, rnirrors the traditional classification o f t h e social
Strata. Japanese wornen were rcgardcd as cheap a n d temporary labour while
the soldiers were the pillar o f t h e imperial Systcm.
Bccausc the rneagre rations f o t industrial workers further decreased the already
low productivity, from 1 9 4 3 onwards extra rations wcrc delivered t o plants
where the rnanagernent looked after the distribution. Thus t h e highest ration
for heavy workers rose t o 7 3 0 gr, and f o r wotnen doing t h e sarne work 560 gr
o f rice per day 79). Since t h e Japanesc navy had requisitioned nearly all thc
rnotor-driven fishing boats the supply «f marine products, which made u p 7 5 O/o
o f the total protein, w e n t d o w n t o half o f thc pre-war aniount $ 0 ) . Many fac-
tories thercfore bypasscd thc insufficient rationing systern and strirted buying
their supplics dircct frorn the o r alternatively resortcd t o t h e black
market. It was n o t until May 1 9 4 5 , w i t h full niobilisation o f the horne countries
for the final strugglc that the injustices in the rationing scherne were ironed
o u t 8'). The military ration had bccn rcduced cven bcfore, despite a n increase

77) Cohen, op. cit., p. 375; Johnston, Japanese Food Management. P. 201.
78) Cohen, op. cit., p. 380.
79) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 203.
80) Ibid p. 84 and 127 ff.
81) Cohen, op. cit., p. 376.
in the nurnber o f rncn under arms. A fair ration systcrn was then introduced,
irrespective o f profession o r sex, but only o n papcr. The drastic reduction o f
domestic food production as well as t h c cessation o f overseas imports as a
result o f action b y the US-navy rcduced per capita supplics t o a level far below
the niinirnurn sustenance level. T h e supply o f food and consumer goods was so
ciisastrous f o r thc b y February 1 9 4 5 that Prince Konoye, t h e formet
Prime Minister w h o had instigated the war against China, submitted a peace
niemorandurn t o the throne, in order t o warn His Majesty o f the danger o f a
cornrnunist revolution if the situation did n o t improve 82).
Bccausc real wages o f the workcrs rosc more rapidly during thc Pacific War
t h m prices 83) and becausc consumer goods became scarce, there was an cxcess
o f purchasing powcr that could be absorbed only b y t h e black tnarket. Of all
the major powcrs in thc war Japan's rationing systcm was the most ineffcctive
and h e r black niarkct thc rnost flourishing; thanks t o t h c latter t h e population
was a t least able t o survive.
Table 4 84) :
Developrnent o f Prices o n the Black Market
Official Pricc Black Market Prices
Dec 1 9 4 3 Nov 1944 J uly 1945

Rice 1 Sho (1 112 kg) 0 , 5 Yen 3.0 Yen 22,O Yen 35,O Ycn
Soyabcans 1 S h o 0,4 Ycn 3,O Yen 7,O Yen 12,O Ycn
Sweet Potatoes 1 Kan (3,75 k g ) 0 , 4 Yen 4,O Yen 8,O Yen 9,O Yen
Reer (Rottie) 0,9 Yen 2,O Yen 9,5 Yen 15,O Yen
Sugar 1 Kan 2,2 Yen 50,O Yen 220,O Yen 520,O Yen
Box o f Matches 0 , 4 Yen 1,O Ycn 30,O Yen 80,O Yen
The Jzp;rnese market for consumcr goods collapsed in 1 9 4 4 and thc supply
o f f o o d , which h d been rnorc o r less adequate until the end o f 1 9 4 3 , collapsed
completely a t the beginning o f 1945. Cotnpared with the other belligcrent nations
the Japanese population had t o suffer t h c greatest reduction in privatc consurnp-
tion a n d had t o endure the worst shortages in food supply. The decline was
more than 30 % ' frorn 1 9 4 0 t o 1 9 4 4 in Japan, in G r m a n y it was only 2 4 a/o.
whereas in the USA consumption increascd b y 1 6 O/u within the saiiie period 85).

82) Karl H. Peter (Ed.), Hriefe zur Weltgeschichte (Stuttgart. 1961). pp. 469.474 (Icttcr
from Konoye to the Emperor. February 14.1945.).
83) The Index of workers' real wages (July 1937 = 100) was at an average level of
about 200 in 1943 with miners even higher, the average retail price level was abuut 168.
(USSBS VIII, p. 106 and p. 224.).
84) Cohen, op. cit., p. 363; slightly different figures: USSRS VIII, p. 225.
85) Cohen, op. cit.. p. 354 and p. 416.
Manchuria and North-China, whereas a t home a prospcring. agriculture would
-

guarantee a decent living for t h c rcrnaining fartners.

In reality, however, the reforms initiated b y t h e state destroycd t h e patriar-
chical order in the countryside and pavcd t h e way for t h e developrncnt o f a
modern industrial society, But as a consequence o f wartimeindoctrination tra-
ditional norms o f social behaviour prevailcd in post-war Japan. O n 1 April 1938
the Japanese parliament, b y voting for the Mobilisation Laws handed over all
legislative rights t o the govcrnment. F r o m then o n parliarnent could n o longcr
block reforms which t h c statc rcgarded as essential for t h c Progress o f the war
cconomy. As the cost o f artificial fertilizers made for t h c highest percentagc
(45,7 '%) o f t h c farrners' budget 87), thc govcrnrnent ordcred che dissolution o f
t h e relevant cartel and in 1938 fixed prices 88)which remained constant through-
o u t the war. Howcver, as arniaments had t h e first priority and nitrogenl
production wasrequired for explosives, the proportion allocated t o
t h e manufacture o f fertilizcrs h d t o be reduced steadily frorn 1937 onward.
Thus in 1944 only one-sixth o f t h c prcivar o u t p u t o f artificial fertilizcr was
avaiiable t o agriculture 89). T h e first protcctive law for agriculture could not bc
effectivc bccause military dernands had absolute priority ovcr civilian needs.
Howcver, reforms in t h e health service proved very cffcctive and helped in
opening t h e way t o a modern welfare statc. T h c Ministry o f Welfare, founded
i n 1938 90), immediately inaugurated a " ~ e a l t hlnsurancc Law" that was pri-
marily concerncd with thc sanitary a n d health conditions o f the agrarian popu-
lation. With t h e foundation o f local health insurance offices in towns and villa-
ges, the erection o f public hcalth ccntres and not lcast a more extensive training
Programme f o r doctors, health conditions improved reinarkably during t h e war.
In 1939 sailors and white-collar workcrs wcre includcd in t h e systetn; t h e rest o f
the popuiation had t o enter the compulsory health insurancc scrvicc 3 years
later in 1942. In t h e last year o f t h e war 41 million Japancsc wcrc insurcd
against illness and accident and registered a t altogether 10.500 local Hcalth-
Insurance offices 91). T h e old patriarchal obligation o f big-landowncrs and big-
industrialists t o care for thcir ernployees had t o give way t o a rnodern systeni
o f employer and ernployec b o t h cqually protected b y social security.
T h e foundations o f all the ;igricultural reforms were laid in 1938 with the
"Agricultural Land Adjustrncnt Act". T h e main aim o f t h e law was t o provide
a lcgal status for tcnancy. Frorn thcn On the tenant'farnier, even if he h d n o
written contract, had a right t o keep tlie leased land. He could only be expelled
b y the landowner if t h e latter claimed that he intended t o cultivate thc land

87) Johnston, Japanese Food Management, p. 1 5 .

88) Ogura, op. cit.. p. 226 ff.
89) Cohen, op. cit., 366; USSHS V l l l p. 146.
90) Havens. Valley ofDarkness, p. 47 ( 1 . July 1938).
91) Ibid.
himsclf. Cornpulsory arbitration o f tcnancy disputcs diminishcd t h e nurnbcr o f
conflicts, which reached their pe& with 6.800 court cases in 1936, t o half that
fgure 92). During t h e Pacific War these cases dwindled t o an insignificant num-
ber 93). Furtherrnore, this Agricultural Act ensured that local villagc organisa-
tions took care o f land left b y the tenants w h o were called u p for rnilitary ser-
vice o r migrated t o the industrial centres, rather than allowing t h e landlords
t o have jurisdiction over this land. In ordcr t o stabilize t h e economic situation
i n the countryside a new structural plan for land ownership was set up. With
the help o f a governrrient fund o f 1 million yen tenants could now purchase
land frotri the owner in instalments spread over 25 years. T h c p k n n e d changc in
ownership o f 410.000 hectares o f land marked thc bcginnings o f a radical shift
iti agrarian property rights.
When war broke out in Europe 1939 world agricultural prices soared m d
prices in Japan followed suit, with the result that t h c govcrnrncnt irnposcd a
price-stop on rice 94) which rcduccd t h c profit-margins o f t h e landlords still
further. In ß e c e m b c r 1939 t h c "Farm Kcnt Control o r d i n a n c e 95)" froze land
rents at the level o f Scptcrnbcr 1939 and left it t o the lncal authorities t o fix
ncw maxirnum limits for rents. It now became a rule t o lower the rent t o 40 %
o f t h e Iiarvest value, rather than t o 60 % as had bcforc becn customary. When
land pnces for rice pacldyfielcls still went u p and reached a pcak in 1941 t h c
government intervened and Set fmed price ratcs 96). A t t h e samc time a n ordi-
nance forbade the use o f cultivatcd land for o t h c r purposes than tiliing 97)
in order t o prevent speculative transactions with the scarce land urgently needed
for the supply o f the population.
T h e start o f thc war with t h e USA in 1941 necessitated further government
intervention. T o limit t h e rnigration o f farmers t o industry and t o forestall t h e
danger o f land being wastcd, t h e "Agricultural Production Control 0rdinance98)"
o f 21 Decernber 1941 laid d o w n that 40 % o f the total population should re-
main in the countrysidc. Only with the permission o f the local "Agricultural
Association" was it a t all possible for those peasant farmers w h o cultivatcd
less than 0,3 hcctares t o leave t h e v i l l a v corntnunity. T h e aim o f this rcgula-
tion was also t o protect the owner farmers and ,to liberate seasonal land-workers
for industrial work. Even so, n o matter how many regulations and decrees were
issucd, migration t o t h e towns continued.

92) Johnston, Japanese Food Management. p. 121 .

93) Ibid p. 121; Dore, o p . dt., p. 72: Saburo Ienaga. Japan's Lact War. World WarIIand
the Japmiese, 1931-1945 (Oxford. 1978). p. 209.
94) See above footnote 70.
95) Oguri, o p . cit., p. 139.
96) Dore, o p . cit., p. 112.
97) Johnston,Japanese Food Management, p. 120.
98) Ibid P. 95 f.
 From 1938 onwards, the government's agrarian policy foiiowed the guideline
that it should Support a rniddleclass of peasant-farmers at the expense of the
landlords o r estate owners. This trend was accclcrated when the system of dual-
pricing for rice was established in 1941. Thc actual cultivator of thc land was to
be stimulated to higher production by the payment of statc-prcmiums, while
at the samc time the big-landowncrs wcre t o be encouraged to hand over their
land to thc tcnant farmers.
Table 6 99):
Farm Prices o f Kice (Yen per koku)
Tenant-farmer's
Bonus on Rice
paid in Rent to
Landlord the Landlord Owner-Cultivator

1941 44 Yen + 5 Yen 49 Yen total

1942 4 4 Ycn + 5Yen 49 Yen
1943 47 Yen + 15.50 Yen 62,50 Yen
1944 47 Yen + 15,50 Yen 62,50 Yen
1945 (Planned) 55 Yen + 37,50 Yen 92,50 Ycn
1945 (Actual) 55 Yen + 245,OO Yen 300,OO Yen
Thc systcm of state subsidies for cultivator-producers was further irnpmved
in 1944, t o aUow a special bonus o f 55 yen per koku t o bc paid for thc last
1 0 % of the dclivcry quotas and for excess production an additional premium
of 175 yen per koku. In 1944 whcn the estate owner had to seii his rice to the
state for 4 7 yen per koku the tenant received a prernium o f 15,50 yen per koku
while the cultivator was allowed the sum o f the prices paid to thc two formcr
groups, namcly 62,50 yen. With thc additional prcmiums thc cultivator could
rcccivc as much as 162,50 yen per koku 100).
The dual-price system used b y the governtiient in buying rice led to a tirastic
rcduction in rcnts and rcduced the incomc of the big landowncrs. As thc rents
had bcen frozen and the tenant cultivators carncd cxtra moncy, the farmers prc-
fcrrcd to pay thcir rents in cash rather than in kind. Mcasured by the
accruing t o thc tcnants landowncrs' incomc steadiiy dcclincd during thc war.
Thc cffcctivc lcvcl o f rcnt sank drastically from 4 5 O/o in 1941 to 38 O/o in 3943
and in 1945 cvcntuaiiy camc down t o 9 % of the total harvcst 101). For the first
time in modern history the real income of Japanese farmers improved. The ave-
rage incomc o f a farm of 1,2 hcctarcs rose from 233 yen in 1937 (p. a.), by
430 % to 1001 yen surpiiis in 1944 lo2).
99) Dore, op. c i t . , p. 114; slightly different figures: Cohcn, op. cit.. p. 383.
100) Ibid p. 383 f.
101) Ogura, op. cit., p. 101.
102) Ibid p. 58.
 ßecaiise rcal wages o f itidustrial workers did n o t increase o n t h e sartie scalc
and bccause the price indcx remained lower than thc wage index, for t h e Erst
tirrie sincc the etiforccd industrialisation o f the Meiji era t h e Japancsc peasant
w u l d make a dccent living. In t h e final ycars o f t h e war t h e farnier actually
had a better incomc than ever bcfore and agriculture, üs in formcr days, bccamc
t h c basis o f t h c national economy.
T h e agrarian reforrn o f t h c American occupiers aitcr 1945 had thus becn well
prcpared by Japancse wartirne rcgulations altering tlie traditional social ordcr in
thc villages. The American reform 103) t o o k u p the basic idcas o f t h e reforrn
programrrie o f 1938 but its itriplementation was more drastic than the former
cautious elitc had proposed. Alrnost 7 0 % o f the total arable area was affected
and 30 Y, o f thc total population was directly invulvcd in the changeover. The
rnaximum sizr of landownership was lirnited t o 2 hectüres (3 hectares o f pasture-
land in Hokkaido); rented Iünd was limited t o 112 hectarc only. On t h c complc-
tion o f the reforms in 1 9 5 0 the distribution o f owncrship had radically changed:
Table 7 104):
Farm Household by Ownership S t a t u s in 1950
61,8 % o f land areü, i. e. 3,8 mio households, owners and cultivators
25,8 O/u o f land area, i. e. 1,6 mio households, owners a n d tenants w i t h
a major share in ownership
6,7 Yo o f land area, i. e. 4 1 1.000 households, tenants and owners w i t h
a rnajor share in tenancy
5,O '70 o f land arca, i. e . 312.000 households, tenants only
Insteüd o f rc-agriculturalizing thc nation, as the traditional elite had intended,
the Arricrican reforrri produccd an economically and politically stable peasant-
farmcr class; it dcstroyed the p r e m o d e r n feudal elitc o f big landlords b u t i t
also released labour for industry. Retwccn thc wars Japan had never bcen ablc
t o supply herself with food and had reached the state o f physical exhaustion
arid collapse at thc cnd o f the Pacific War. R u t in t h c post-war era the country
became self-sufficient in staple foods and started t o export rice.

Conclusion
A refotin o f agriculture in Japan was an essential prerequisite for all further
rcforms. The final liberation o f thc Japancse peasant from feudal obligations
whicli had already begun during t h c last years o f the war, sounded the d e a t h -
knell o f the village community as the nucleus o f the lmperial System. T h e in-
efficiency o f Japanese agriculture and the disastrous food situation i n t h c cities
a t the e n d o f the war were both inevitable results of an outdated ownership
structiire and a setni-feudal tenancy System. Reforms initiated by t h e Japanese

103)Dore, op. cit., p. 174.

104)Ibid p. 176.
themselves during the wat showed thc right way, whicli the Anicricans later
followcd. Hut under thc old ordcr all teforms temaincd stiick in ideological
premiscs, which were intended to stabilize thc ethnic entity of the Japanese
and to re-agriculturalize socicty. Japan failcd in thc war prirriarily because o f
an unfortunate experiment, attempting to combinc thc standards o f Western
industtialisation and urban life with village conimunity life bascd on a backward-
looking ideology. Pattcrns o f a ~ i l l a ~ e a r i e n t a t esociety
d still prevail in the Ja-
pan of today, b u t the political and structural framework, as in Germany, has
becn decisively transformed. By destroying the big estates the formcr powcrful
agrarian elite o f the landed gentty was ruined. Their backward-looking idcology,
once the cotner-stone of the Iniperial System, crumbled and with it went the
old o d e r .
Zusammenfassung * )
Die Entwicklung der japanischen Landwirtschaft im Zweiten Wcltkricg ist von
den natürlichen Kahmenbedingungen dieses ~nselstaatcs und dcn historischen
Voraussetzungen, einer vorrnodernen , hai bfeudalen Gesellschaftsordnung dcs
damaligen Kaiserlichen Japari, nicht zu trennen. Von der gcsamtcn Landfläche
sind nur etwa 16 Prozent, das entspricht 5,9 Miiiiorien Hektar, für landwirt-
schaftliche Produktion nutzbar. Die wichtigste Kultur stellte zu öcginn dcs P u i -
fischen Krieges der Keisanbau dar, der 52,5 Prozent dcs nutzbaren Landes bean-
spruchte. Etwa 5,5 Millionen Bauernhaushältc, von dcncn lediglich ein knappes
Drittel Eigncr des von ihnen bebauten Bodens waren, hatten im Durchschnitt
etwas mehr als einen Hektar zur Verfügung, der jedoch in der k R e l in zahlrcichc
kleine Feldstreifen aufgeteilt wat. Die Hälfte des Bodens wurde von Pächtcrn
oder Halbpächtern bearbeitet, die als Pachtleistung bis zu 60 % d e r Erntcerträgc
abliefern mußtcn. Eine klcinc Anzahl von 3.500 Croßgrundbcsitzern, dic übcr
50 Hektar und meht besaßen, beherrschte den Agrarsektor - und sperrte sich als
einflußreichste Gruppe, zusamrnen mit den Vertretern der Industrie, im Untet-
haus bis 1937 vehement g e g n alle Reformen.
Die Zahl der in der 1,andwirtschaft beschäftigten Arbeitskräfte betrug während
des Krieges etwa konstant 4 2 Prozent (ca. 13,5 Millionen) aller Erwerbstätigen,
d a der Bevölketungsüberschuß von vier Millionen Menschen von dcr Rüstungs-
industrie und den erst irr1 letzten Kriegsjahr kräftig expandierenden Streitkräften
absorbiert wurde. Eine Verschiebung ergab sich lediglich inncrhalb dcr landar-
beitenden Bevölkerung durch dic Abwandcrung junger Männer in die Industrie,
so daß Landarbeit währcnd des Kricgcs vornehmlich von Fraucn und ältcren
Personen ausgeübt wurdc. Dic Arbeitskräfte in dcr Landwirtschaft reichten daher
im Grunde aus, so daß keine asiatischcn Gastarbeiter oder Kriegsgefangene auf
dem Lande eingesetzt wurden. Auch blieb die Iändlichc Bevölkerung von den

* ) Die deutsche Fassung des gcsamten Aufsatzes, indcs ohric Fußnoten, erschieti iri "Stu-
dia Historiae Oeconorniac" 17 (1983). S. 129-151.
Kriegseinwirkungen weitgehend verschont. Dennoch sank die Produktion zwi-
schen 1939 und 1944 bei den Grundnahrungniitteln um mehr als 10 Prozent ab,
Der Rückgang der Anbaufläclie und Mangel an Kunstdünger sowie landwirt-
schaftlicheni Gerat waren dafür hauptverantwortlicli. Da zudem in Friedens-
zeiten etwa 15 - 20 O/o des Nahrungsmittelbedürfs irnpottiert wurden, entstand
während des Krieges, als diese Importe wegfielen, cin akutes L)efizit in dcr Ver-
sorgung der Bevölkerung.
Dic staatliche Administration zeigtc sich außcrstandc, dcn Mangel zu vcrwal-
ten, so daß die bereits 1939 begonnenen Rationierungen ab 1942 auf der Grund-
lage von Nachbarschaftsverbänden, etwa 10 bis 20 Familien, erfoigten. Die Rasis-
Ration betrug 330 gr Reis pro Person und Tag, doch das ungerechte System be-
vorzugte Soldaten, die das Doppelte erhielten, und diskriminierte die Frauen.
Die Minimalvcrsorgung konnte bis etwa Ende 1943 aufrechterhalten werden,
ab 1944 brach jedoch der Markt für Vcrbrauchsgüter zusammen. Von allen
kriegführenden Großmächten mußten die Japaner ihren Konsum am drastisch-
sten einschränken und vermochten nur dank des prosperierendsten Schwarz-
marktes überhaupt zu überleben.
S t a ~ t l i c h eReformmaßnahrnen karncn zu spät und crfolgten überdics unter den
ideologischen Prämissen, das Dorf als Urzelle der japanischen Gesellschaftsord-
nung zu erhalten und etwa 40 T, dcr Uevölkerung auf dem Lande zu belassen.
Lediglich die schlcichende ökononiische und politische Entmachtung der Groß-
grundbesitzcr durch ein vom Staat ab 1943 verfügtes doppeltes Preissystem fIir
Reis, bei den1 der Eignkultivator einen beträchtlichen Bonus erhiclt, bereitete
die von dcr amcrikanischen Besatzungsmacht ab 1946 radikal vollzogene Agrar-
rcform vor. Die strukturelle Incffizicnz der japanischen Landwirtschaft während
dcs Krieges war durch die traditionelle, vormodcrne Sozialordnung bedingt.
Erst der Zusammenbruch des Kaiserlichen Japans beseitigte die alte Ordnung
und als deren wcsentlichen Bestandteil den Großgrundbesitz, so da13 der Durch-
bruch zum modernen Industriestaat mit cincr, nach den ~ e f o r m e n prosperie-
,
renden ~andwittschaftcrfolgcn konnte.