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Making the Nation Safer National Research Council
Digital Instant Download
Author(s): National Research Council, Division on Engineering and Physical
Sciences, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism
ISBN(s): 9780309084819, 0309084814
Edition: None
File Details: PDF, 6.57 MB
Year: 2002
Language: english
 MAKING
THE NATION
SAFER
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS

Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the
National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the
committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for
appropriate balance.

Support for this project was provided with institutional funds.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Making the nation safer : the role of science and technology in countering terrorism /
Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, National Research Council.
p. cm.
ISBN 0-309-08481-4 (perfect)
1. Terrorism—Prevention—Technological innovations. 2. Terrorism—United
States—Prevention. I. National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Science and
Technology for Countering Terrorism.

HV6431 .M354 2002

363.3′2′0973—dc21
2002011495

Copies available from:

Naval Studies Board The National Academies Press

National Research Council 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W.
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Box 285
Washington, DC 20418 Washington, DC 20055
800-624-6242
202-334-3313 (in the Washington
metropolitan area)

Copyright 2002 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of
distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the
furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the
authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate
that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr.
Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the
National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is
autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the
National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government.
The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at
meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior
achievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of
Engineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences
to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination
of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the
responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to
be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of
medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute
of Medicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in
1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s
purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in
accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the
principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the
scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both
Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are
chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

www.national-academies.org
 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR
COUNTERING TERRORISM
LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB, Harvard University, Co-chair
RICHARD D. KLAUSNER, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Co-chair
JOHN D. BALDESCHWIELER, California Institute of Technology
BARRY R. BLOOM, Harvard School of Public Health
L. PAUL BREMER III, Marsh Crisis Consulting
WILLIAM F. BRINKMAN, Lucent Technologies (retired)
ASHTON B. CARTER, Harvard University
CHARLES B. CURTIS, Nuclear Threat Initiative
MORTIMER L. DOWNEY III, PB-Consult
RICHARD L. GARWIN, Council on Foreign Relations
PAUL H. GILBERT, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc.
M.R.C. GREENWOOD, University of California, Santa Cruz
MARGARET A. HAMBURG, Nuclear Threat Initiative
WILLIAM HAPPER, Princeton University
JOHN L. HENNESSY, Stanford University
JOSHUA LEDERBERG, Sackler Foundation at the Rockefeller University
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, University of Maryland
MAXINE F. SINGER, Carnegie Institution of Washington
NEIL J. SMELSER, University of California, Berkeley (retired)
PHILIP M. SMITH, McGeary & Smith
P. ROY VAGELOS, Merck & Co., Inc. (retired)
VINCENT VITTO, Charles S. Draper Laboratory, Inc.
GEORGE M. WHITESIDES, Harvard University
R. JAMES WOOLSEY, Shea & Gardner

Staff
RONALD D. TAYLOR, Study Director
ELIZABETH L. GROSSMAN, Program Officer
MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer
SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant
IAN M. CAMERON, Project Assistant

v
 Foreword

This report reflects the commitment of the U.S. scientific, engineering, and
health communities to help our country respond to the challenges made evident
by September 11. It is a contribution from the National Academies—the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medi-
cine, and National Research Council—which initiated this critical effort and paid
for it. But this report is also a contribution to the nation from many distinguished
individuals, each of whom dedicated a great deal of time to the production of the
report. In all, there were 24 members of the main committee, 94 additional
individuals who served on its eight subpanels, and 46 expert reviewers who
provided critical feedback on the committee’s draft report. These 164 individuals
were motivated solely by a commitment to public service, and all of them made
personal sacrifices to do their part on a very tight schedule.
The great enthusiasm and dedication with which the above groups ap-
proached their tasks are but one indication of the strong interest that Americans
have shown in contributing to counterterrorism efforts. The vigorous science and
technology community in our nation is ready, willing, and able to be called into
service, and this report focuses on strategies for harnessing the vast talent and
energy available.
This report is about the contributions of science and technology to counter-
ing terrorism, but we recognize that they are only one element of a broad array of
important responses. These must include, for example, diplomacy, military ac-
tions, intelligence, and an understanding of how terrorism originates and is sus-
tained.
Because of the fast-track nature of this effort, it has necessarily focused on
the homeland security of the United States. But we must not forget that, with

vii
viii FOREWORD

respect to terrorism, the nations of the world share a common set of enemies.
Many of the technical solutions that we develop in the United States to make our
nation safer will also be useful for protecting the citizens and facilities of other
nations. And the efforts of the scientists, engineers, and health professionals in
many nations will be important for bringing the best of science and technology to
bear on the world’s counterterrorism efforts.
The National Academies have built strong relationships of trust over the
years with colleagues around the world. Whether these colleagues are in the
United Kingdom, Brazil, Russia, China, India, or elsewhere, we all share the
same perspectives and hopes for a better world. This report therefore represents
only the first step in what must become a long and continuing global effort to
spread peace and prosperity to every nation.

Bruce Alberts Wm. A. Wulf Kenneth I. Shine

President President President1
National Academy National Academy Institute of Medicine
of Sciences of Engineering

1Through June 30, 2002.

 Preface

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States galvanized the
nation to strengthen its homeland defenses and to pursue those responsible for the
terrorist acts. The United States now leads a global effort against terrorism. The
aim is to eliminate worldwide terrorist networks and reduce the effectiveness of
terrorist threats. Success will depend not only on the leadership, initiative, and
capabilities of the United States, but also on the cooperation and capabilities of its
international partners and allies.
Immediately following the events of September 11, the presidents of the
National Academy of Sciences (Bruce Alberts), the National Academy of Engi-
neering (Wm. A. Wulf), and the Institute of Medicine (Kenneth I. Shine) collec-
tively wrote to President George W. Bush. Stating that the new war against
terrorism would “demand a focus on the complex interplay between technologi-
cal, sociological, and political issues,” they offered to provide the nation with the
advice and counsel of the National Academies (which includes the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of
Medicine, and the National Research Council).
Historically, the National Academies have long recognized the important
role of science and technology in helping the nation meet its security needs. The
ability to create, maintain, and draw from a reservoir of science, engineering, and
medical knowledge has underpinned many of the nation’s efforts to combat ad-
versaries. Such a reservoir was the basis for the great science, engineering, and
medical contributions made during World War II. It must be recognized, how-
ever, that successful application then required dedicated financial resources, sci-

ix
x PREFACE

entists, engineers, and physicians who directed themselves to the tasks at hand,
and organization and leadership to effectively deploy both knowledge and people
in the wartime science effort. The science and engineering community responded
in a similar way to the shock of Sputnik and the growing technical capability of
the USSR, then our adversary, and the Cold War required a sustained effort by
this community over four decades. More recently, the national and international
response to AIDS by scientists and physicians has demonstrated once again that
science can mobilize to respond to a threat. The response has benefited from a
reservoir of knowledge accumulated through two decades of sustained biomedi-
cal science that has been well supported financially in the United States and other
industrialized nations. A successful response to the threat of catastrophic terror-
ism will require the same type of long-term dedication and focus.
The security threat the nation now faces affects every phase of domestic life
and demands that technical solutions that might be deployed relatively quickly be
readily accessible to local and state entities, as well as to the federal government.
The challenge is to identify the threats (and the nation’s vulnerabilities), to iden-
tify responses to those threats, and to organize properly the nation’s immense
science and engineering capabilities to meet both short- and long-term needs.
The scientific enterprise is enormously complex—consisting of universities,
industry, government, professional societies, and such. Although capable of
meeting the research and development challenges posed by the threat of terror-
ism, it is highly fragmented. The institutional, managerial, and public policy
problems that must be solved are daunting. They include (1) defining criteria for
setting the nation’s research priorities, (2) identifying those research priorities,
and (3) proposing new institutional arrangements and entities that will enable a
stronger interaction between the nation’s science and technical enterprise and its
security apparatus.
From its vantage point as an adviser to the nation on science, engineering,
and medicine, the National Academies have been working diligently since Sep-
tember 11 to marshal a substantial number of the most knowledgeable experts to
address how the scientific and technological capabilities of the United States can
best be harnessed for the many challenges ahead.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
In December 2001, the National Academies, using institutional funds, initi-
ated this project. The aim was to help the federal government—and, more spe-
cifically, the Executive Office of the President—to enlist the nation’s and the
world’s scientific and technical community in a timely response to the threat of
catastrophic terrorism. A committee of distinguished scientists and engineers
was established to help the government develop an integrated science and tech-
nology program plan and a research strategy for combating terrorism.
PREFACE xi

The terms of reference called for the following three tasks to be completed
within 6 months: (1) prepare a carefully delineated framework for the applica-
tion of science and technology for countering terrorism, (2) prepare research
agendas in nine key areas, and (3) examine a series of crosscutting issues. More
specifically,

• The framework should characterize the range of threats to the nation’s

security (in terms of targets, weapons, and delivery systems, and the possible
points of intervention).
• Research agendas should be developed in areas of vulnerability related to
biological sciences; chemical sciences; nuclear and radiological sciences; infor-
mation technology and telecommunications; transportation; energy facilities; cit-
ies and fixed infrastructure; behavioral, social, and institutional issues; and sys-
tems analysis and systems engineering. For each area, the research agenda should
identify highly leveraged opportunities for using science and technology in coun-
tering terrorism.
• Multidisciplinary research topics that cut across the above domains and
the threats that arise from the interdependence of these areas should be consid-
ered in developing the final program plan and research strategy.

The objective of this study has been to strengthen the government’s ability to
use science and technology for combating terrorism. Critical questions also exist
about how a comprehensive national counterterrorism effort involving research,
development, and deployment can be planned and executed. Many of these
questions remain to be addressed, but this study did define a number of the
important issues in this area.

THE COMMITTEE’S APPROACH

A committee of 24 of the nation’s leading scientific, engineering, medical,
and policy experts conducted the study described in this report. The range of
expertise on the committee reflected the broad array of scientific and technical
topics to be covered under its charge. The committee also included members
with the expertise necessary to address issues related to the context in which the
research priorities would be set and implemented (e.g., experts in science and
technology policy, national security, and public health). Finally, many of the
committee’s experts were or are active advisers to federal agencies, and they
brought to this project an awareness of ongoing governmental counterterrorism
efforts. Biographies of the committee are provided in Appendix A.
To supplement the committee’s own expertise, eight panels were separately
appointed and asked to provide input on the specific topical areas identified in the
committee’s charge. The panels were (1) Biological Sciences, (2) Chemical
Issues, (3) Nuclear and Radiological Issues, (4) Information Technology, (5)
xii PREFACE

Transportation, (6) Energy Facilities, Cities, and Fixed Infrastructure, (7) Behav-
ioral, Social, and Institutional Issues, and (8) Systems Analysis and Systems
Engineering. Each panel was chaired by a member of the committee. The panels
brought the expertise and experience of approximately 90 additional scientists,
engineers, and medical professionals (supported by approximately 15 NRC se-
nior staff) to the study. These study participants are listed in Appendix B.
The focus of the committee’s work was on making the nation safer from
emerging terrorist threats that would seek to inflict catastrophic damage on the
nation’s people, its infrastructure, or its economy. The committee’s approach
was to identify current threats to the nation, understand the most likely vulner-
abilities in the face of these threats, and identify highly leveraged opportunities
for science and technology contributions to counterterrorism in both the near
term and the long term. Such contributions—including intelligence and surveil-
lance, prevention, protection, interdiction, response and recovery, attribution,
and analysis—can be made at any point along a time line that extends from
before a terrorist act to its aftermath. The committee organized its approach by
considering the issues in nine areas: nuclear and radiological threats; human and
agricultural health systems; toxic chemicals and explosive materials; informa-
tion technology; energy systems; transportation systems; cities and fixed infra-
structure; the response of people to terrorism; and complex and interdependent
systems. Within each of these areas, the relevant panel was tasked with the
following:

• Outline current capabilities for countering terrorist threats and describe

priorities and time frames for developing additional capabilities. Develop, for
each domain, a research strategy that identifies highly leveraged opportunities for
science and technology to contribute to counterterrorism. Identify the areas
within the framework of terrorist acts and responses to which the panel’s techni-
cal domain is relevant, evaluate the current state of knowledge and capacity for
dealing with the most significant threats, and identify significant barriers to the
use of technology, as well as areas in which knowledge may be available but
underutilized.
• Consider policies or activities that might be required to reduce any new
technologies to practice and facilitate their deployment. Where possible, simul-
taneously address domain-specific issues and identify needs that either cut across
domain lines or are not readily described within the traditional domains.
• Focus on science and technology applications that are relevant to the most
pressing issues and/or that would yield the most generic solutions. Identify short-
term opportunities and pay special attention to ideas, admittedly some with un-
certain outcomes, that might arise from new scientific discoveries and new inven-
tions, even if they might not emerge for 5 years or more. Take note of any
opportunities that were identified in earlier studies or that are currently planned
or under way at federal agencies.
• Consider how the proposed research agendas could be implemented.
PREFACE xiii

Accordingly, each panel developed a set of recommendations that ranged

from long-term research and development to immediate- or near-term deploy-
ment of existing technologies or application of available knowledge. The moti-
vation for these recommendations was to illustrate how knowledge gained, capa-
bilities developed, and actions taken could mitigate specific problems. These
recommendations do not answer many critical questions for the federal govern-
ment, to which the majority are addressed. Nor do they provide a single priori-
tized list of threats, vulnerabilities, or solutions. Neither the panels nor the
committee knew of a clear methodology to create such lists, especially since the
committee did not access classified intelligence information about the capabili-
ties and intentions of terrorists.
During the course of this fast-track project the committee met four times:

• December 19-20, 2001, Washington, D.C. At this organizational meeting

the committee received its charge from the presidents of the National Academy
of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
It then developed a preliminary outline of the report, devised a plan for complet-
ing its work, and reviewed the membership rosters of the panels and the
committee’s charge.
• January 31-February 1, 2002, Washington, D.C. The committee reviewed
the initial work of the panels on threats, vulnerabilities, and responses and pro-
vided feedback to the panel chairs.
• April 8-9, 2002, Washington, D.C. The committee reviewed the work of
the panels and discussed issues in the specific areas covered by the panels, as well
as the overarching themes for the report.
• May 13-14, 2002, Washington, D.C. At its final meeting the committee
reviewed the draft report and finalized its agreement on the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations.

The committee also held a number of teleconferences over the course of the
study period to review the work status and findings of the panels. Most of the
panels met three times between January and March 2002, and they received
scores of briefings from federal officials and other experts in the field to inform
their judgment and contribute to the base of information (see Appendix C). Writ-
ten panel inputs were submitted to the committee on March 31, 2002.
The work of the panels informed the committee and provided the basis for
Chapters 2 through 11 of the report. The committee also used the work of the
panels to motivate the discussions and recommendations on general issues re-
lated to the implementation of science and technology for countering terrorism
(see Chapters 12 and 13).
Overall, the committee believes that it has identified scientific and techno-
logical means by which the nation may reduce—but not eliminate—the vulner-
abilities of its society to catastrophic terrorist acts and mitigate the consequences
of such acts when they occur. It outlines some research and development priori-
xiv PREFACE

ties that will be needed to make the nation safer and improve its ability to succeed
in the war on terrorism. But most importantly, the committee outlines a national
strategy by which the strengths of U.S. science and engineering can most effec-
tively be brought to bear on the defense of our nation on a continuing basis.

FINAL NOTES
Although this study is based on the extensive work of the panels and the
input that they provided in their domains of expertise, the authorship responsibil-
ity for this report rests solely with the committee.
While traditional procedures for an independent NRC study, including re-
view of the report by independent experts, were followed, it is important to note
that trade-offs were made in order to accommodate the rapid schedule. For
example, the report does not provide extensive references to the scientific litera-
ture nor does it marshal detailed evidence to support its findings. Rather, it
largely presents the consensus scientific views and judgments of the committee
members, based on the knowledge that these individuals have accumulated
through their own scholarly efforts and professional experience, through formal
and informal interactions with the nation’s science, engineering, and medical
communities, and through the efforts of the supporting panels.
The committee was deeply aware of the difficulty of writing a report that was
sufficiently specific about terrorist threats to explain how science and engineer-
ing might be helpful, without providing information that might aid terrorists in
determining new means of attack. In many cases, quite specific information that
was available to the committee is presented in the report in a more generic form.
In the area of nuclear and radiological threats, the relevant panel accessed classi-
fied information in the course of this study and has produced a classified annex to
this report. An unclassified discussion of the issues related to nuclear and radio-
logical threats is provided in Chapter 2 of this report.
 Acknowledgments

The Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism wit-

nessed firsthand the scientific, engineering, and medical community’s unstinting
commitment to join with the rest of the civilized international community in the
global effort against terrorism. Without hesitation the members of the eight
panels supporting this study, the individuals asked to brief the panels, those who
spoke informally with committee and panel members, and the National Research
Council staff supporting the study shared their expertise and insights and offered
their best ideas on short notice to inform the committee, the technical community,
and the federal government. The committee extends its sincerest gratitude to the
many individuals who provided valuable information and support during the
course of this study.
The panel members are listed in Appendix B. Their work provided much of
the intellectual base for the study. The panels in turn received inputs from many
briefers on a wide array of topics related to counterterrorism activities across a
number of disciplines and infrastructures; these inputs to the panels are acknowl-
edged in Appendix C, “Panel Activities.”
Ronald D. Taylor, study director, and Elizabeth L. Grossman, program of-
ficer, both of the National Research Council, managed this study and contributed
significantly to the ideas and their expression in this report. Without their leader-
ship and dedication, it would not have been possible for this project to achieve its
objectives on an exceptionally tight schedule with an unusually broad scope of
technical and policy content. The committee is immensely grateful to both of
them. The committee also appreciates the support it received from the project
staff, Susan G. Campbell, Mary G. Gordon, and Ian M. Cameron, over the course
of this fast-track study.

xv
xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The committee is also grateful to have been able to draw on resources from
across the National Academies. Individual program staff members from five
divisions1 played a vital role in supporting the work of the panels, as listed with
the panels in Appendix B. Thanks are also due to Douglas C. Bauer for undertak-
ing research and gathering background information on some of the issues related
to the structure of the federal government as well as the government’s interaction
with industry. His tireless work in support of the committee is greatly appreci-
ated.
The committee was fortunate to engage the services of a highly professional
and experienced editorial staff, including Steven J. Marcus (a nationally known
technical editor) and Elizabeth Fikre and Susan Maurizi, both of the National
Research Council staff.
The National Academies gratefully acknowledge David and Katherine Brad-
ley for their financial support of the dissemination of this publication.

1Program staff from the Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, Division on Earth and
Life Studies, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Institute of Medicine, and
Transportation Research Board participated in this study.
 Acknowledgment of Reviewers

This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their
diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures ap-
proved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The
purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments
that will assist the institution in making the published report as sound as possible
and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evi-
dence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft
manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:

John F. Ahearne, Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society,

Alfred V. Aho, Lucent Technologies,
Norman R. Augustine, Lockheed Martin Corporation (retired),
Mark Y. Berman, BP America,
Steven M. Block, Stanford University,
Floyd E. Bloom, The Scripps Research Institute,
Lillian C. Borrone, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (retired),
Norman M. Bradburn, National Science Foundation,
John I. Brauman, Stanford University,
Donald E. Brown, University of Virginia,
George Bugliarello, Polytechnic University,
Richard F. Celeste, Cleveland Heights, Ohio,
Robert R. Everett, MITRE Corporation (retired),
Stanley Falkow, Stanford University,
Robert A. Frosch, Harvard University,

xvii
xviii ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS

Richard A. Gaggioli, Marquette University,

Bobby R. Gillham, Conoco, Inc.
Ralph E. Gomory, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation,
Andrew J. Goodpastor, Atlantic Council of the United States,
Robert J. Hermann, Global Technology Partners, LLC (retired),
Robert L. Hirsch, RAND Corporation,
Lester A. Hoel, University of Virginia,
John P. Holdren, Harvard University,
Anita K. Jones, University of Virginia,
Thomas J. Kelly, Sloan-Kettering Institute,
William Klemperer, Harvard University,
Steven E. Koonin, California Institute of Technology,
Leslie B. Lamport, Microsoft Research,
James S. Langer, University of California, Santa Barbara,
Nathan S. Lewis, California Institute of Technology,
Barbara H. Liskov, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Richard G. Luthy, Stanford University,
Harley W. Moon, Iowa State University,
Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University,
Thomas D. O’Rourke, Cornell University,
George W. Parshall, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (retired),
William H. Press, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Henry W. Riecken, University of Pennsylvania (emeritus),
James R. Schlesinger, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Lucy Shapiro, Stanford University,
Harrison Shull, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (retired),
Jeffrey J. Siirola, Eastman Chemical Company,
William Y. Smith, Institute for Defense Analyses (emeritus),
Joseph M. Sussman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Alvin W. Trivelpiece, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired), and
Harold E. Varmus, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center.

Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments

and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions and recommen-
dations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review
of this report was overseen by R. Stephen Berry, University of Chicago (emeri-
tus), and Gerald P. Dinneen, Honeywell, Inc. (retired). Appointed by the Na-
tional Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an inde-
pendent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional
procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsi-
bility for the final content of this report rests solely with the authoring committee
and the institution.
 Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

1 INTRODUCTION 25
Context of the Study, 25
Content and Structure of This Report, 30

2 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 39

The Nuclear and Radiological Threat Matrix, 39
Homeland Security Challenges, 49
Reducing Vulnerabilities, 51
Concluding Discussion, 63
References, 64

3 HUMAN AND AGRICULTURAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 65

Introduction, 65
Intelligence, Detection, Surveillance, and Diagnosis, 69
Prevention, Response, and Recovery, 79
Policy and Implementation, 96
Concluding Remarks, 102
References, 104

4 TOXIC CHEMICALS AND EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS 107

Inroduction, 107
Background: Chemicals as Weapons, 108
General Capabilities Needed to Help Mitigate Vulnerabilities, 113

xix
xx CONTENTS

Mitigating Vulnerabilities of Specific Systems, 121

Responding to Attacks, 127
A Strategy to Develop Economically Viable
Counterterrorism Technologies, 132
References, 132
Recommended Reading on Food Safety, 133

5 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 135

Introduction, 135
Threats Associated with IT Infrastructure, 136
Short-Term Recommendations, 144
Long-Term Recommendations: Investing in IT Research, 146
Privacy and Confidentiality, 170
Planning for the Future, 171
Implementation, 172
References, 175

6 ENERGY SYSTEMS 177

Introduction, 177
Electric Power, 180
Oil and Natural Gas, 196
References, 208

7 TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 210

Introduction and Overview, 210
Transportation System Characteristics, 212
Implications for Security Strategies, 214
Research and Technology Needs, 223
Advice to the Transportation Security Administration on
Strategic Research and Planning, 231
Concluding Observations, 235
Dedication, 236
References, 236

8 CITIES AND FIXED INFRASTRUCTURE 238

Introduction, 238
Emergency Management and Emergency Operations Centers, 239
Water Supply and Wastewater Systems, 245
Electrical Supply Interruption, 252
Information Technology Systems and Communications, 252
Transportation and Distribution Systems, 252
Major and Monumental Buildings, 252
Stadiums and Other Places for Large Public Gatherings, 258
CONTENTS xxi

Underground Facilities, Including Tunnels, 262

References, 265

9 THE RESPONSE OF PEOPLE TO TERRORISM 267

Human Populations as Targets of Terrorism, 268
The Universality of Human Responses, 270
Anticipation and Preparedness, 271
Warnings, 273
The Occurrence of Attack, 274
Recovery, 279
References, 286

10 COMPLEX AND INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEMS 287

Introduction, 287
A Framework for a Systems Approach to Counterterrorism, 288
Systems Management Issues, 290
Counterterrorism Threat Modeling, 294
Infrastructure Modeling, 300
Modeling Challenges for Counterterrorism, 305
Implications for Education, 309
References, 310

11 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CROSSCUTTING CHALLENGES 313

AND TECHNOLOGIES
Introduction, 313
Systems Analysis and Modeling, 315
Integrated Data Management, 317
Sensors and Sensor Networks, 320
Autonomous Mobile Robotic Technologies, 325
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems, 327
Biometrics, 329
Human and Organizational Factors, 330
Coordination of Programs on Crosscutting Technologies, 331
Conclusions, 332

12 EQUIPPING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO COUNTER 335

TERRORISM
Introduction, 335
Managing the Federal Government’s Program of Science and
Technology for Countering Terrorism, 338
The Role of the Federal Agencies in Developing and Using
Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 350
References, 355
xxii CONTENTS

13 ESSENTIAL PARTNERS IN A NATIONAL STRATEGY: 357

STATES AND CITIES, INDUSTRY, AND UNIVERSITIES
States and Cities, 357
Industry, 359
Universities, 364
References, 371

BIBLIOGRAPHY 372

APPENDIXES

A COMMITTEE AND STAFF BIOGRAPHIES 377

B PANEL MEMBERS AND STAFF 389

C PANEL ACTIVITIES 394

D ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 399

INDEX 405
MAKING
THE NATION
SAFER
 Executive Summary

In the war against terrorism, America’s vast science and technology base provides us with
a key advantage.
— President George W. Bush, June 6, 20021

CONTEXT AND CONTENTS OF THE REPORT

Terrorism is a serious threat to the security of the United States and indeed
the world. The vulnerability of societies to terrorist attacks results in part from
the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruc-
tion, but it also is a consequence of the highly efficient and interconnected sys-
tems that we rely on for key services such as transportation, information, energy,
and health care. The efficient functioning of these systems reflects great techno-
logical achievements of the past century, but interconnectedness within and across
systems also means that infrastructures are vulnerable to local disruptions, which
could lead to widespread or catastrophic failures. As terrorists seek to exploit
these vulnerabilities, it is fitting that we harness the nation’s exceptional scien-
tific and technological capabilities to counter terrorist threats.
This report describes many ways in which science and engineering can con-
tribute to making the nation safer against the threat of catastrophic terrorism. The
report identifies key actions that can be undertaken now, based on knowledge and
technologies in hand, and, equally important, describes key opportunities for
reducing current and future risks even further through longer-term research and
development activities. However, science and technology are but one element in

1From the President’s June 6, 2002, address to the nation. The text of this speech is available
online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-8.html>.

1
2 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

a broad array of potential approaches to reducing the threat of terrorism. Diplo-

macy, international relations, military actions, intelligence gathering, and other
instruments of national policy well beyond the scope of this study all have critical
roles to play.
Our society is too complex and interconnected to defend against all possible
threats. As some threats are diminished others may arise; terrorists may change
their goals and tactics. While this report describes what in the committee’s best
judgment are the top-priority actions and research objectives for harnessing sci-
ence and technology to meet today’s threats, its most important conclusion is that
the nation needs a well-organized and disciplined ability to respond as circum-

BOX ES.1
Fourteen of the Most Important Technical Initiatives

Immediate Applications of Existing Technologies

1. Develop and utilize robust systems for protection, control, and accounting
of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials at their sources.
2. Ensure production and distribution of known treatments and preventatives
for pathogens.
3. Design, test, and install coherent, layered security systems for all transpor-
tation modes, particularly shipping containers and vehicles that contain large quan-
tities of toxic or flammable materials.
4. Protect energy distribution services by improving security for supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and providing physical protection
for key elements of the electric-power grid.
5. Reduce the vulnerability and improve the effectiveness of air filtration in
ventilation systems.
6. Deploy known technologies and standards for allowing emergency respond-
ers to reliably communicate with each other.
7. Ensure that trusted spokespersons will be able to inform the public promptly
and with technical authority whenever the technical aspects of an emergency are
dominant in the public’s concerns.

Urgent Research Opportunities

1. Develop effective treatments and preventatives for known pathogens for
which current responses are unavailable and for potential emerging pathogens.
2. Develop, test, and implement an intelligent, adaptive electric-power grid.
3. Advance the practical utility of data fusion and data mining for intelligence
analysis, and enhance information security against cyberattacks.
4. Develop new and better technologies (e.g., protective gear, sensors, com-
munications) for emergency responders.
5. Advance engineering design technologies and fire-rating standards for
blast- and fire-resistant buildings.
6. Develop sensor and surveillance systems (for a wide range of targets) that
create useful information for emergency officials and decision makers.
7. Develop new methods and standards for filtering air against both chemicals
and pathogens as well as better methods and standards for decontamination.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

stances change. In that sense this is not an enduring plan for technical work, but
rather a starting point from which the nation can create defenses-in-depth against
the new threat. For that reason it is especially important that strengthening the
national effort in long-term research that can create new solutions should be a
cornerstone of the strategy for countering terrorism.

TOP-PRIORITY TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Key elements or infrastructures of society can be means of attack, targets,
and means of response. While some systems and technologies can be classified
roughly in one or another of these categories (i.e., nuclear weapons are primarily
means of attack; energy systems are primarily targets), most systems and tech-
nologies can fit into multiple categories. For example, air transportation is both
a target and a means of attack, and information and telecommunications systems
are both targets and means of response. The Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy for Countering Terrorism considered nine areas, each of which is discussed
in a separate chapter. The areas are nuclear and radiological threats, human and
agricultural health systems, toxic chemicals and explosive materials, information
technology, energy systems, transportation systems, cities and fixed infrastruc-
ture, the response of people to terrorism, and complex and interdependent sys-
tems.
The chapters on these nine areas each contain a number of recommendations,
all describing what the committee believes are critical ways to make the nation
safer from terrorism. The actions and research opportunities described in the
chapters cover a wide assortment of approaches, fields, and systems; they range
from immediate applications of existing technology to development and deploy-
ment efforts to long-term basic research programs. Based on an understanding of
the difficulty of launching particular kinds of attacks and the feasibility of limit-
ing the damage of such attacks and of recovering from them, the committee was
able to prioritize within each area in order to determine the topics covered below
in this executive summary, which describes the committee’s top-priority con-
cepts and actions in each area.2 To definitively determine the most important
actions within and across all nine areas would require knowledge of the relative
likelihood of threats and information about the intent and capability of terrorists.
However, based on information in prior major studies and commission reports
about the current threat, the committee provides a short list of important technical
initiatives that span the areas (see Box ES.1). This list includes seven ways to

2The bold-faced sentences in this executive summary are not necessarily reproductions of the
recommendations in the succeeding chapters but instead are meant to emphasize important conclu-
sions and high-priority actions. Several recommendations from different parts of a chapter may be
combined or paraphrased here to communicate an important overall point clearly and briefly; the
expanded discussions in the chapters provide a more comprehensive picture.
4 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

immediately apply existing knowledge and technology to make the nation safer
and seven areas of research and development in which it is urgent that programs
be initiated or strengthened. These initiatives illustrate the types of actions rec-
ommended by the committee throughout this report.3

General Principles and Strategies for How Science and Technology

Can Help Protect the Nation
In this report, the committee provides a broad range of recommendations
designed to demonstrate how science and engineering can contribute to counter-
terrorism efforts. The suggested actions include support for all phases of counter-
ing terrorist threats—intelligence and surveillance, prevention, protection, inter-
diction, response and recovery, and attribution—as well as ways to improve our
ability to perform analysis and invent new technologies. Different phases have
varying importance in each of the nine areas examined in the report. For example,
the nuclear threat must be addressed at the earliest stages, when intelligence and
surveillance based on international cooperation are critical for preventing the
manufacture and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. For biological threats, the
situation is reversed: An attack is relatively easy to initiate and hard to prevent,
but there are many opportunities for technological intervention to mitigate the
effects. In other cases, such as an attack on the electrical power system, it is
possible both to make the attack more difficult and to ameliorate its effects after
it has been initiated.
Despite such fundamental differences in the approaches needed for counter-
ing different classes of terrorist threats, some general principles and strategies
underlie recommendations presented in all of the areas:

• Identify and repair the weakest links in vulnerable systems and infra-
structures.
• Use defenses-in-depth (do not rely only on perimeter defenses or fire-
walls).
• Use “circuit breakers” to isolate and stabilize failing system elements.
• Build security into basic system designs where possible.
• Build flexibility into systems so that they can be modified to address
unforeseen threats.
• Search for technologies that reduce costs or provide ancillary benefits to
civil society to ensure a sustainable effort against terrorist threats.

3These important technical initiatives do not mirror individual recommendations in the executive
summary or the chapters, but instead indicate actions or needs identified in several chapters or
provide brief descriptions of key technology applications or research programs.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Following is a synthesis of the key findings and recommendations in each of

the nine areas examined by the committee.

Nuclear and Radiological Threats (Chapter 2)

Science and technology are essential ingredients of a multilayered systems
approach for defending the United States against terrorist attacks involving sto-
len nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, and radiological dispersion
devices. The first line of homeland defense is robust systems for the protection,
control, and accounting of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material at their
sources. The United States has made a good start on deploying such systems
in Russia, which possesses large stockpiles of weapons and special nuclear
material, but cooperative efforts must be pursued with new urgency. The
United States should accelerate its bilateral materials protection, control,
and accounting program in Russia to safeguard small nuclear warheads and
special nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium. The United
States also should increase the priority and pace of cooperative efforts with
Russia to safeguard its highly enriched uranium by blending down this ma-
terial to an intermediate enrichment of less than 20 percent U-235 as soon as
possible.
Systems to detect the movement of illicit weapons and materials could be
most effectively deployed at a limited number of strategic transportation choke
points such as critical border transit points in countries like Russia, major global
cargo-container ports, major U.S. airports, and major pinch points in the U.S.
interstate highway system. A focused and coordinated near-term effort should
be made to evaluate and improve the efficacy of special nuclear material
detection systems that could be deployed at strategic choke points for home-
land defense. Research and development (R&D) support also should be
provided for improving the technological capabilities of special nuclear ma-
terial detection systems, especially for detecting highly enriched uranium.
Responses to nuclear and radiological attacks fall into two distinct categories
that could require very different types of governmental actions: attacks involving
the detonation of a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device, and attacks
involving radiological dispersion devices. Planning has been minimal at the
federal or local levels for responding to either class of attack. Immediate steps
should be taken to update the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan or to develop a separate plan, to respond to nuclear and radiological
terrorist attacks, especially an attack with a nuclear weapon on a U.S. city.
As the history of the Cold War shows, the most effective defense against
attacks with nuclear weapons is a policy of nuclear retaliation, but retaliation
requires that the perpetrator of an attack be definitively identified. The technol-
ogy for developing the needed attribution capability exists but has to be as-
sembled, an effort that is now under way by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
6 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

but is expected to take several years to complete. Given the potential impor-
tance of attribution to deterring nuclear attacks, the Defense Threat Reduc-
tion Agency’s efforts to develop an attribution capability should continue to
declared operability as quickly as practicable.
Physical and operational changes may have to be made to some of the
nation’s nuclear power plants to mitigate vulnerabilities to attacks from the air
with a large commercial airliner or a smaller aircraft loaded with high explosives
and possibly to attacks from the ground using high-explosive projectiles. The
technical analyses that are now being carried out by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and industry to understand the effects of such attacks on reactor
containment buildings and essential auxiliary facilities are critical to understand-
ing the full magnitude of this threat. These analyses should be carried to
completion as soon as possible, and follow-on work to identify vulnerabilities
on a plant-by-plant basis should be undertaken as soon as these initial stud-
ies are completed.
The likely aim of a terrorist attack with a radiological dispersion device
would be to spread fear and panic and cause disruption. Recovery from an attack
would therefore depend on how the attack is handled by first responders, political
leaders, the media, and general members of the public. A technically credible
spokesperson at the national level who is perceived as being outside the
political arena should be prepared to provide accurate and usable informa-
tion to the media and public concerning public health and safety risks and
appropriate response actions in the aftermath of a nuclear or radiological
attack.
Although radiological attacks would be unlikely to cause large numbers of
casualties, the potential for inflicting economic loss and causing terror or panic
warrants increased attention to the control and use of radiological sources by
regulatory agencies and materials licensees. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and states having agreements with this agency should tighten regu-
lations for obtaining and possessing radiological sources that could be used
in terrorist attacks, as well as requirements for securing and tracking these
sources.
Important progress is being made by the R&D and policy communities on
reducing the nation’s vulnerability to nuclear and radiological terrorism. There is
not much evidence, however, that the R&D activities are being coordinated, that
thought is being given to prioritizing these activities against other national
counterterrorism needs, or that effective mechanisms are in place to transfer the
results of these activities to applications. A single federal agency should be
designated as the nation’s lead research and development agency for nuclear
and radiological counterterrorism. This agency should develop a focused and
adequately funded research and development program and should work to ensure
that effective mechanisms are in place for the timely transfer of results to the
homeland defense effort.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

Human and Agricultural Health Systems (Chapter 3)

Just a few individuals with specialized scientific skills and access to a labo-
ratory could inexpensively and easily produce a panoply of lethal biological
weapons that might seriously threaten the U.S. population. Moreover, they could
manufacture such biological agents with commercially available equipment—
that is, equipment that could also be used to make chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
foods, or beer—and therefore remain inconspicuous.
The attacks of September 11 and the release of anthrax spores revealed
enormous vulnerabilities in the U.S. public-health infrastructure and suggested
similar vulnerabilities in the agricultural infrastructure as well. The traditional
public health response—surveillance (intelligence), prevention, detection, re-
sponse, recovery, and attribution—is the paradigm for the national response not
only to all forms of terrorism but also to emerging infectious diseases. Thus,
investments in research on bioterrorism will have enormous potential for applica-
tion in the detection, prevention, and treatment of emerging infectious diseases
that also are unpredictable and against which we must be prepared.
The deciphering of the human genome sequence and the complete elucida-
tion of numerous pathogen genomes, our rapidly increasing understanding of the
molecular mechanisms of pathogenesis and of immune responses, and new strate-
gies for designing drugs and vaccines all offer unprecedented opportunities to use
science to counter bioterrorist threats. But these same developments also allow
science to be misused to create new agents of mass destruction. Hence the effort
to confront bioterrorism must be a global one.
First, new tools for the surveillance, detection, and diagnosis of bio-
terrorist threat agents should be developed. Knowledge of the genome se-
quences of major pathogens allows new molecular technologies to be developed
for the sensitive detection of pathogens. These technologies offer enormous
possibilities for surveillance of infectious agents in our environment, the identifi-
cation of pathogens, and rapid and accurate diagnoses. For these new technolo-
gies to be used effectively to provide early warnings, there is a need to link
information from the doctor’s office or the hospital’s emergency room to city and
state departments of health, thereby enabling detection of an outbreak and a
rational and effective response. These capabilities will be important both for
responding to attacks on agricultural systems (animals and crops) and for protect-
ing humans, and they will require careful evaluation and standards. There is an
urgent need for an integrated system to protect our food supply from the farm to
the dinner table.
To be able to respond to current and future biological threats, we will
need to greatly expand research programs aimed at increasing our knowl-
edge of the pathogenesis of and immune responses to biological infectious
agents. The recent anthrax attacks revealed how little is known about many
potential biological threats in terms of dose, mechanisms of disease production,
8 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

drug targets, and requirements for immunity. It is clear that development of

therapeutics and vaccines will require more research on pathogenesis and protec-
tive host responses, but financial incentives, indemnification, and regulatory
changes may be needed to allow the pharmaceutical industry to pursue such
efforts. Because markets are very limited for vaccines and drugs for coun-
tering potential bioterrorist agents, special institutes may have to be estab-
lished for carrying out research on biohazards and producing drugs and
vaccines. The Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) should investigate strategies—including the
modification of regulatory procedures—to encourage the development of
new drugs, vaccines, and devices to address bioterrorist threats.
Research efforts critical to deterrence, response, and recovery—par-
ticularly decontamination and bioterrorism forensics—should be strength-
ened. Appropriate scientific expertise should be integrated into the govern-
ment agencies with principal responsibilities for emergency response and
postevent investigations. Modeling tools for analyzing the health and economic
impacts of bioterrorist attacks are needed in order to anticipate and prepare for
these threats. Techniques for protection of individuals and buildings should be
developed, together with methods of decontamination in the event that such
defenses are breached. In addition, multidisciplinary research in bioterrorism
forensics is necessary to enable attribution of a weapon to its source and the
identification of persons involved in a bioterrorist act.
Preparedness for bioterrorist attacks should be improved by creating a pub-
lic-health reserve system and by developing surge capacity to deal effectively
with such terrorist attacks as well as with natural catastrophes. Additionally, new
strategies must be developed and implemented for assuring the security, usabil-
ity, and accurate documentation of existing stocks of supplies at research facili-
ties, hospitals, veterinary facilities, and other host sites. The potential for a major
infectious threat to kill and disable thousands of citizens requires a level of
preparedness that we currently lack—a surge capacity to mobilize the public-
health response and provide emergency care in a health system that has been
somewhat downsized in an effort to cut costs. There are immediate needs and
opportunities for training first responders, medical, nursing, and health profes-
sionals, and communities as a whole in how to respond to biological threats. Also
needed is a well-trained, professional public-health reserve, including laborato-
ries and health personnel, that can be mobilized. Standardized protocols for such
purposes will be critically important.

Toxic Chemicals and Explosive Materials (Chapter 4)

The toxic, explosive, and flammable properties of some chemicals make
them potential weapons in the hands of terrorists. Many such chemicals (e.g.,
chlorine, ammonium nitrate, and petroleum products) are produced, transported,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9

and used in large quantities. Chemical warfare agents (such as nerve and blister
agents) developed to have extremely high toxicities have been incorporated into
a variety of military weapons. These chemical weapons could become available
to terrorists through purchase or theft. Some of the chemical agents themselves
are not difficult for individuals or organized groups to make.
In principle a number of technologies can be brought to bear for the rapid
detection and characterization of a chemical attack, or for detecting explosives
before they are used. Large investments have been made in research on sensor
technologies, but to date the number of effective fielded systems developed re-
mains comparatively small. If sensor research is to move forward efficiently,
mechanisms to focus and exploit the highly fragmented array of existing research
and development programs will be needed. A new program should be created
to focus and coordinate research and development related to sensors and
sensor networks, with an emphasis on the development of fielded systems.
This program should build on relevant sensor research under way at agen-
cies throughout the federal government.
Research programs on sensor technologies are needed to continue the search
for promising new principles on which better sensors might be based. For ex-
ample, mass spectroscopy offers the possibility of very rapid and specific identi-
fication of volatile agents. Also, basic research on how animals accomplish both
detection and identification of trace chemicals could yield new concepts that
allow us to manufacture better sensor systems and reduce our dependence on
trained dogs, which currently are the best broad-spectrum high-sensitivity sen-
sory systems.
Toxic chemicals (or infectious agents) could be used by terrorists to contami-
nate food production facilities or water supplies. Although a good deal of atten-
tion has been paid to ensuring safety and purity throughout the various stages of
food production, processing, and distribution, protecting the food supply from
intentional contamination has not been a major focus of the U.S. food industry.
The FDA should develop criteria for quantifying hazards in order to define
the level of risk for various kinds of food-processing facilities. The results
could be used to determine the minimal level of protection required for making
each type of facility secure. The FDA should also act promptly to extend the
current quality control approach (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point methodology) so that it might be used to deal effectively with deliber-
ate contamination of the food supply.
One of the best ways to secure the safety of the water supply is to ensure an
adequate residual concentration of disinfectant (usually chlorine) downstream of
water treatment plants, although more information is needed to be able to do this
well. The Environmental Protection Agency should direct additional re-
search on determining the persistence of pathogens, chemical contaminants,
and other toxic materials in public water supplies in the presence of residual
chlorine.
10 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

Once a release of toxic chemicals occurs, proper protection of people and

buildings can do a great deal to reduce injury and facilitate cleanup and recovery.
Universities, companies, and federal agencies need to work together to ad-
vance filtering and decontamination techniques by both improving existing
technologies and developing new methods for removing chemical contami-
nants from air and water. Research is especially needed on filter systems
capable of treating large volumes, novel media that can help prevent toxic mate-
rials from entering facilities through ventilation equipment and ducts, and meth-
ods to contain and neutralize clouds of airborne toxic materials. In addition,
exploratory programs should be initiated in new approaches to decontamination,
including hardened structures, protective systems for microelectronics and other
expensive equipment, and environmentally acceptable ways of disposing of con-
taminated material that cannot be cleaned.
New technologies that offer significant advances should be constantly evalu-
ated. But the process of evaluating different sensor systems, for example, is
difficult because their effectiveness depends on the operational environment and
on who will be using them. Because a bewildering array of counterterrorism
technologies (including various kinds of sensor systems, filters, and decon-
tamination methods) are being developed, programs to determine standards
and to support technology testing and performance verification are needed.
These programs should be designed both to help guide federal research
investments and to advise state and local authorities on the evolving state of
the art.

Information Technology (Chapter 5)

The three counterterrorism-related areas of highest priority in information
technology (IT) are information and network security, information technologies
for emergency response, and information fusion and management. In particular,
immediate actions should be taken on the critical need to improve the telecom-
munications and computing infrastructure of first responders and to promote the
use of best practices in information and network security, especially by emer-
gency response agencies and telecommunications providers.
All of the research areas outlined here and in Chapter 5 are critically relevant
to the nation’s counterterrorism effort, but it should be noted that progress in
them could also be applied to a wide range of other important national endeavors,
such as responses to natural disasters.
Attacks on information technology can amplify the impact of physical at-
tacks and diminish the effectiveness of emergency responses. Reducing such
vulnerabilities will require major advances in computer security, with the objec-
tive of consequently improving information and network security. Furthermore,
reliance on the Internet as the primary networking entity means that severe dam-
age through cyberattacks is more likely. The administration and Congress
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11

should decide which agency is to be responsible for promoting information

security in the federal government through the adoption and use of what is
currently known about enhancing security practices. To the extent that the
federal government is successful in improving its procedures, it should make
these best practices available to other elements of government and to the private
sector.
Command, control, communications, and information (C3I) systems for
emergency responders are critical for coordinating their efforts and increasing the
promptness and effectiveness of response. Unfortunately, such systems are
extremely vulnerable to attack; currently many of them do not even use state-of-
the-art mechanisms for security and reliability. Since emergency-response or-
ganizations often do not have the expertise to review and revamp the tele-
communications and computing technologies used for emergency response,
it is necessary to provide them with authoritative knowledge and support. In
addition, designated emergency-response agencies should use existing tech-
nology to achieve short-term improvements in the telecommunications and
computing infrastructure for first responders.
All phases of counterterrorism efforts require that large amounts of informa-
tion from many sources be acquired, integrated, and interpreted. Given the range
of data sources and data types, the volume of information each source provides,
and the difficulty of analyzing partial information from single sources, the timely
and insightful use of these inputs is very difficult. Thus, information fusion and
management techniques promise to play a central role in the future prevention,
detection, and remediation of terrorist acts.
Unlike some other sectors of national importance, information technology is
a sector in which the federal government has little leverage. Thus, constructively
engaging the private sector by emphasizing market solutions seems a desirable
and practical way for the government to stimulate advances that can strengthen
the nation’s information technology infrastructure. The challenge for federal
policy makers is to change the market dynamics by encouraging the private
sector to pay more attention to security-related issues and by facilitating the
adoption of effective security (e.g., through federally supported or incentivized
research that makes better technologies available and reduces the costs of imple-
menting security-related functionality).
Within the federal government, numerous federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense (and especially the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST), and the Department of Energy (DOE) national
laboratories, all play important roles in funding and performing telecommunica-
tions and computing research, and many other agencies are major users of IT. A
strategic long-term research and development agenda should be established
to address three primary counterterrorism-related areas in IT: information
and network security, the IT needs of emergency responders, and informa-
12 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

tion fusion. The R&D in information and network security would include but
not be limited to approaches and architectures for prevention, identification, and
containment of cyberintrusions and recovery from them. The R&D to address IT
needs of emergency responders would include but not be limited to ensuring
interoper-ability, maintaining and expanding communications capacity in the
wake of a terrorist incident, communicating with the public during an emergency,
and providing support for decision makers. The R&D in information fusion for
the intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency response communities should
include but not be limited to data mining, data integration, language technologies,
and processing of image and audio data.
The federal government’s efforts should focus on multidisciplinary problem-
oriented research that is applicable to both civilian and military users, yet is
driven by a deep understanding and assessment of vulnerabilities to terrorism. To
achieve long-term advances, the research must extend beyond improving existing
systems and investigate new approaches to secure and reliable operation that do
not directly evolve from the information technology of today.

Energy Systems (Chapter 6)

Energy systems include the country’s electrical supply system and its oil and
gas facilities. The electrical system warrants special attention in that a prolonged
loss of service to a region would probably cause extensive hardships, economic
loss, and many deaths. Outage of an entire regional transmission grid might
occur if the damage or destruction of important components of that grid were
followed by a cascading failure of interconnected components. To reduce near-
term vulnerability to such a loss, those parties responsible for critical compo-
nents of the electric-power grid should be urged to install physical barriers,
where they do not already exist, to protect these components. In the longer
term, technology should be developed, tested, and implemented to enable an
intelligent, adaptive electric-power grid. Work under way at the Electric Power
Research Institute would provide a basis for such an effort, and the Department of
Energy national laboratories would also be key participants in the work. Such an
intelligent grid would provide the system with the ability to fail gracefully, mini-
mizing damage to components and enabling more rapid recovery of power. A
key element would be adaptive islanding, a concept employing fast-acting sen-
sors and controls to isolate parts of the power system. Operations models and
intelligence would be needed to differentiate between failure of a single compo-
nent and the kind of concurrent or closely coupled serial failures, at several key
nodes, that could indicate the onset of a concerted attack.
Another vulnerability of the power grid is its extra-high-voltage transform-
ers, for which the country stocks limited numbers of replacements. Replacement
of a seriously damaged or destroyed unit could take months or even years. To
counter this vulnerability, research and development should be undertaken by
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13

DOE and the electric power industry to determine if a modular, universal,

extra-high-voltage transformer might be developed to provide temporary
replacement when key components are damaged. These replacement trans-
formers would be relatively small, easily transported, and capable of being used
individually or in sets to replicate the unit being replaced.
Yet another challenge is the vulnerability of the power grid’s control systems
to cyberattack. In particular, the supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems pose a special problem. As a result, the manner in which
data are transmitted between control points or SCADA systems used in the
grid should be reviewed. Encryption techniques, improved firewalls, and
cyberintrusion-detection technologies should be used to improve security
and reduce the potential for hacking and disruption. Because oil and gas
systems (and nonenergy systems) are similarly vulnerable, this recommendation
applies to those facilities as well.
The country’s electric-power transmission grids and oil and gas pipelines
extend over thousands of miles and in many cases are quite remote, thus compli-
cating observation and supervision. Therefore existing surveillance technolo-
gies developed for defense and intelligence applications should be investi-
gated for their usefulness in defending against terrorist attacks, as well as
against simple right-of-way encroachments, on widely distributed oil, gas,
and electrical transmission assets.
The dependence of major infrastructural systems on the continued supply of
electrical energy, and of oil and gas, is well recognized. Telecommunications,
information technology, and the Internet, as well as food and water supplies,
homes, and worksites, are dependent on electricity; numerous commercial and
transportation facilities are also dependent on natural gas and refined oil prod-
ucts. These and many other interdependencies need to be better understood in
order to determine which nodes of the various energy systems should be given the
highest priority for increased security against terrorism. Simulation models of
interdependent infrastructures may help provide such understanding and also
prove vital to postevent recovery. Therefore new and improved simulation-
design tools should be developed to model and analyze prevention, response, and
recovery for energy systems under a variety of terrorist-threat scenarios. These
efforts would include simulations of the interdependencies between the energy
sector and key infrastructures such as the communication, transportation, and
water-supply systems.

Transportation Systems (Chapter 7)

Transportation security is best achieved through well-conceived security sys-
tems that are integrated with transportation operations. A layered security sys-
tem, in which multiple security features are connected and provide backup for
one another, has particular advantages. Defeating a single layer cannot breach
14 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

such systems, and the difficulty of calculating the overall odds of success may
thus deter as well as impede terrorist attacks. Moreover, layered security features
that are well integrated with operations and confer multiple benefits, such as
enhanced safety and operating efficiency, are likely to be maintained and im-
proved over time.
Many actions are now being taken by the federal government to strengthen
air transportation security—from the deployment of explosives-detection sys-
tems for checked baggage to the strengthening of cockpit doors to the use of air
marshals. Some of these measures are providing much-needed security layers,
although not yet as part of a preconceived system designed to address multiple
threats and ensure continued improvement over time. Likewise, new security
approaches are being considered for marine shipping containers, particularly the
possibility of moving inspections out from the U.S. ports of entry and farther
down the logistics chain. For these two critical parts of the transportation sector
well-conceived security systems must be put in place soon, and research and
development are essential for further improving these systems.
Many of the areas recommended for R&D in this report—such as improved
sensors, the ability to mine data more effectively, and especially a capability for
unconventional, broad-based thinking on terrorist threats and responses—will
also be of great value in boosting security for transportation and distribution.
However, the most critical need in the transportation sector is a systematic
approach to security. The new Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) is positioned to help meet this need by serving as a focal point of
responsibility for devising effective and coherent security systems for each
transportation mode and by supporting and marshaling relevant R&D. TSA
presents an unprecedented opportunity to build security into the nation’s trans-
portation sector in a more methodical way; indeed, Congress has chartered TSA
to take on such a strategic role.
Compelled to act quickly in enhancing civil aviation security, TSA is now
beginning to examine the security needs of all transport modes and to define its
own role in meeting them. To help meet its obligation to strengthen security
in all transportation modes, TSA should create a multimodal strategic re-
search and planning office. Further, to increase the utility of sensing, decon-
tamination, screening, and other security-related technologies being developed,
TSA must have its own research capacity as well as the ability to work with and
draw on expertise from both inside and outside the transportation community. By
working constructively with the Department of Transportation’s modal agencies
(such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration), other federal entities, state and local government, and the private sector,
this recommended office can serve as a focal point for research, planning, and
collaboration. It will be positioned to identify and evaluate promising security-
system concepts as well as to promote the development of knowledge, technolo-
gies, and processes for implementing them.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15

Within the Department of Transportation, the individual modal agencies and

the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center offer important resources for
systems-level research and for technology development. TSA can help guide
their investments to better leverage the transportation sector’s own R&D invest-
ments and ensure their strong security relevance. By making the needs and
parameters of transportation-security systems more widely known, especially to
the much larger R&D community and sponsoring agencies in government, TSA
can help to identify and shape the efforts that are most promising and relevant.
Because the identification of appropriate security systems is essential to
guiding related technology development and deployment, TSA should take the
lead in devising and evaluating a set of promising security system concepts
for each transportation mode. The diverse operators, users, and overseers in
the transportation sector—public and private alike—must ultimately deploy and
operate the security systems; however, their disparate venues and interests can
hinder cooperation in the development of alternative system concepts. TSA,
through the recommended strategic research and planning office, is particularly
well placed to encourage and orchestrate such cooperation.
By working with transportation system owners, operators, and users in ex-
ploring alternative security concepts, TSA will be better able to identify opportu-
nities for conjoining security with other objectives, such as improving shipment
and luggage tracking. Such multiuse, multibenefit systems have a greater chance
of being adopted, maintained, and improved.
The agency will also become more sensitive to implementation issues—from
technological and economic factors to political and societal challenges—as evalu-
ations help gauge the need for changes in laws, regulations, financial incentives,
and divisions of responsibility among public and private entities. Some of these
indicated changes may be practical to achieve; others may not. The prospects of
deploying many new technologies and processes in support of security systems,
from biometric identification cards to cargo- and passenger-screening devices,
will also raise many difficult social issues—concerns over legality, personal
privacy, and civil rights, for example. Concerns that may constrain or even
preclude implementation must be appreciated early on, before significant re-
sources are devoted to furthering impractical or undesirable concepts.
As TSA seeks to develop and deploy security system concepts, consideration
of human factors will be critical. Human factors expertise is necessary for craft-
ing layered security systems that, as a whole, increase the perceived risk of
getting caught and maximize the ability of security personnel to recognize un-
usual and suspicious patterns of activity and behavior. Recognition of human
factors is important for ensuring that the role of people in providing security
is not determined by default on the basis of what technology promises, but
rather as a result of systematic evaluations of human strengths and weak-
nesses that technology can both complement and supplement. TSA can take
the lead in making sure that human factors are fully considered in all secu-
rity initiatives and at the earliest possible stages.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
longue, délicate, que l’on voudrait toucher, entre les doigts de
laquelle une fleur est éclose…
Une œuvre d’art… je n’y pensais plus ! L’art vient encore une fois
à mon secours !… Je m’interromps de jouer.
Qu’arrive-t-il ? Les fauteuils s’éventrent, les femmes s’enfuient,
rappelées sans doute par de pressants devoirs. Jérôme baise sa
toupie bariolée et le piano s’ouvre tout entier, puis, comme un
paravent, se replie contre le mur.
Je prends Madeleine par la taille et nous sortons.
« Allons voir, lui dis-je, le panneau du milieu, celui du bon roi
Melchior. M’accompagneras-tu, ma chérie ?
— De grand cœur, Michel ! »
Et Madeleine me tend ses lèvres.
 XXII

A peine avons-nous marché un quart d’heure que nous arrivons

à l’église. L’instant est vraiment exquis.
« Mais laissez-moi donc tranquille ! Je n’ai nul besoin que l’on me
rende des forces ! Allez-vous-en, docteur, vous m’ennuyez ! Je me
promène avec ma femme ! »
Oui, l’instant est vraiment exquis : l’aube a presque paru, elle fait
pressentir une radieuse aurore. Je retrouverai la lumière élue pour
ma décoration. Le ciel me donne un avertissement sévère. Voilà les
tons qu’il me faudra considérer souvent, avec scrupule, avec
patience, si je veux en transposer les finesses et l’éclat à demi-voilé.
« Je compte sur ton aide, Madeleine. Il t’arrive parfois de me
blaguer parce que je dors, dis-tu, comme un paysan. Eh bien, à toi
de m’en empêcher désormais ! Tu me tireras, chaque jour, du
sommeil, quelque temps avant le début de ce glorieux spectacle. Je
t’offrirai même un réveil-matin, à cet effet. Mais dépêchons-nous !
Allons voir le roi Melchior qui va s’agenouiller devant la crèche. Il a
précédé les deux autres Mages… Non ! regarde d’abord la
splendeur du ciel. Tâche de comprendre ce que je devrai suggérer…
Ce ne sera pas facile, avoue-le !
— C’est entendu, Michel ! Nous viendrons ici tous les matins : les
couleurs du ciel se poseront d’elles-mêmes sur ta palette ou
s’offriront à ton choix !… Ah ! le beau peintre à qui, je le sais, il suffit
de tremper le bout de son pinceau dans un rayon, dans un reflet,
dans une buée, pour trouver le ton juste qu’il cherchait ! »
Elle me parle, je ne sais pourquoi, tout bas, tout près de l’oreille,
et sa voix est la plus douce des musiques.
« Entrons à l’église, ma chérie, puisque ton ami, le curé t’a confié
un double de la clef. »
Nous ouvrons les deux portes toutes grandes. Voilà le panneau
central qui m’occupera, aujourd’hui : le plus important, de beaucoup.
La Vierge, l’Enfant, saint Joseph, le bœuf et l’âne, Gaspard et
Balthazar, le groupe des bergers, sont en place, bien qu’à peine
indiqués, mais il suffit que je me les représente. Seul, Melchior me
donnera encore grand mal, à cause toujours de l’éclairage. En
prenant au dehors des esquisses nombreuses, je finirai sans doute
par y parvenir !
Voici le roi : il entre à notre suite. Je pense qu’il désire reprendre
la pose que nous avions déjà décidée. Il la retrouvera tout de suite.
« Salut, roi Melchior, lui dis-je, votre attention me touche
beaucoup ; vous êtes, sans contredit, le plus gracieux des rois et
votre aimable visite va faciliter mon travail.
— Tu devrais avoir honte, Michel, dit Madeleine : prends-tu ce
bon roi pour un paresseux de ton espèce ? Lui, se lève tôt et trouve
tout naturel de t’aider ainsi à mieux peindre !
— Non, mes amis, répondit Melchior, vous me remerciez sans
raison ! Vous étiez mécontent, Michel, des vitraux de notre église,
qui sont assurément fort laids : du vilain Saint-Sulpice, tout au plus !
Mais, avant qu’on ne les remplace, les anges assez piteux qui s’y
trouvent représentés, se sont offerts à chanter une dernière fois. Ils
exécuteront un petit concert, ce matin même. Oh ! je sais, ma chère
Madeleine, que vous détestez la musique en vase clos ! De la place !
de l’air ! voilà qui vous convient ! Nous irons donc sur le parvis : le
paysage que l’on y découvre est beau. En levant le nez, nous
pourrons admirer, quelques instants, les couleurs que le ciel nous
gardera et le chœur choisi par les anges : ce chœur d’Ambroise
Thomas, s’il vous plaît ! (hélas ! tous les goûts sont dans la nature)
saura bien nous ravir par les portes ouvertes… Venez, mes
enfants ! »
Cette petite place de l’église, encore tout aérée par la brise
matinale, quelles délices elle dispensait !
« Et surtout, Michel, reprit-il, je voulais vous dire que,
décidément, je refuse de participer à ce panneau : j’entends, d’y
faire figure. Le voisinage du bœuf et de l’âne me déplaît par trop,
n’est pas digne de ma personne, et puis… et puis, j’en veux aux
deux autres Mages qui ont dû prendre une auto en cours de route
pour arriver avant moi, une auto de complaisance ! C’est pas de jeu,
mes amis ! N’ayez pas l’air furieux, Michel : ça n’en vaut pas la
peine !… et, maintenant, petits anges des vitraux, chantez ! »
Ils chantèrent, nous les entendions bien… Que chantaient-ils ?
De l’Ambroise Thomas ? Allons donc ! Un air, un air qui m’est connu ;
j’ai l’impression de plaquer son premier accord sur les touches d’un
piano. (Je ne joue de l’orgue, ni d’aucun instrument céleste !) C’est
tout juste si je tapote… Ils chantent ! Ils chantent !…
Et voilà que Gaspard relève les pans de son grand manteau de
cour et se met à danser, sans souci des dalles, dures et sévères à
ses bottes, du parvis. Il danse d’une façon qui me déplaît. Dans les
temps très anciens cette danse eût été dénommée chahut. Il danse,
il fait des entrechats. Il me rappelle certaine affiche de Lautrec pour
le Moulin-Rouge.
Ah ! ceci est pire : l’esquisse que je méditais m’échappe : l’aurore
s’est muée en jour ; les tons de la robe du roi Mage ont changé…
Jamais je ne peindrai le panneau du centre ! Ce Mage qui fait le pitre
me donne le frisson ! Madeleine supportera-t-elle un pareil
spectacle ? Elle se gêne ! Madeleine rigole ! Madeleine va danser
aussi. Elle pointe un pied en l’air, pousse des cris, excite le danseur
à se dépouiller de son manteau, à s’arracher la barbe, à semer ses
bijoux, à jeter surtout cette noble tiare dont j’espérais tirer un beau
parti, à ne plus se ressembler du tout ! Et les anges des mauvais
vitraux s’en donnent à cœur joie, ils ne chantent plus, ils gueulent
leur chanson d’une voix éraillée. On se dirait dans un café-concert
de bas-étage, en province ! A la sortie, on leur donnera tout au plus
cent sous.

C’est fini : le roi Mage s’est calmé ; Madeleine de même. Alors

ma femme s’approche de Melchior et son altesse, qui a dû vendre
des sucreries sur les quais, lui dit d’une petite voix doucereuse,
pateline, où passe un accent d’orient :
« Ma chère, je tiens à vous offrir un petit cadeau, un cadeau de
rien du tout, un simple souvenir… Vos façons d’agir sont depuis
quelque temps ridicules : il les faut réformer. Je sais que la cocaïne
vous est chère, que vous en usez tous les jours, mais, croyez-moi,
ne vous piquez plus ! Ce moyen, d’ailleurs mauvais, est passé de
mode et vos deux cuisses, ma bonne Madelon, sont dans un état !
« Prenez cette mignonne boîte en argent, qui contient une
poudre blanche, mais ne la montrez pas à votre médecin, à moins
que vous ne soyez son amie intime ; en ce cas, il vous fournirait de
quoi la remplir. Au fait, ne se nomme-t-il pas Jérôme Devilliers ?…
« Une pincée seulement : vous la humerez comme un parfum, et
toute piqûre sera inutile. Vous preniez même le soin de stériliser la
seringue ! Quelle sottise et que de temps perdu ! Retournez, vous
dis-je, aux habitudes de votre défunte aïeule qui prisait tout
simplement du tabac. Ce tabac blanc est plus joli, meilleur aussi.
Glissez la boîte dans votre petit sac et veuillez agréer mes
hommages.
« Quant à vous, Michel, je vous le répète : cette grande machine
décorative m’ennuie. Je m’arrangerai avec le curé de la paroisse
pour la faire ôter, une fois en place. Balthazar est tout à fait de mon
avis, quant à Gaspard, quelle importance peut avoir le jugement
artistique d’un nègre ?
« Au revoir ou, plutôt adieu ! Je vous ai assez vus, l’un et
l’autre… Cependant, merci pour la danse ! »
Madeleine est à jamais perdue ! l’art me dédaigne pour toujours !
Madeleine et mon art sont tous deux avilis…
Alors… que me reste-t-il ?
 XXIII

Que me reste-t-il ?…
Une aide qui, certes, ne se refusera pas : celle de la Camarde.
Il faut crever, mais encore crever rapidement, sans nul délai, en
vitesse et loin de tout secours. Voyez-vous si quelqu’un s’ingéniait à
me rendre la vie, cette vie d’aujourd’hui ?… Ah ! j’aime mieux pas !
Je dois m’abattre de manière aussi sûre que j’eusse abattu
l’autre. Maintenant, Jérôme peut vivre ; je lui en offre le loisir, mais
avec une arrière-pensée.
Jadis, il ne manquait pas de conscience ; je l’ai connu
scrupuleux. Pourvu que ces beaux sentiments lui reviennent ! Je lui
souhaite, le mois prochain, une conscience bien armée, prête au
combat et qui, très patiemment, lui inflige un joli tourment aussi gros
que son ventre, aussi solide que ses épaules, plus aigu, si possible,
que son esprit… Le voilà pourvu.
D’elle, je ne parlerai pas. Si je ferme les yeux, c’est pour ne plus
la voir.

Le plus commode serait, en somme, de finir ici même. J’ai

remarqué que mes forces reviennent, que je n’ai plus de fièvre. A la
rigueur, je pourrais me lever. On s’en est aperçu ; il y a quelques
instants, le médecin parlait de fauteuil roulant, de béquilles, de je ne
sais quoi !
Néanmoins il y a des inconvénients.
Dans la pièce voisine, je trouverais facilement du poison.
J’entends souvent ouvrir une petite armoire. On en tire des flacons
étiquetés de rouge dont quelques gouttes me sont offertes, avec
parcimonie, dans le fond d’un verre d’eau. Cependant, il y a des
femmes qui font la garde. On les appelle des gardes : le terme est
juste. Elles interviendraient, pousseraient des cris, m’arracheraient
des mains la drogue espérée… « Michel Duroy livré aux
bacchantes » : beau sujet de tragédie !
Me jeter dans la rue ? Un troisième étage suffit… Même
obstacle : mon poste de police serait alerté, avant même que je n’aie
ouvert la fenêtre.
Une lame d’acier ?… Je me charcuterais inutilement.
Un revolver ?… Où le trouver ? et il y aurait toutes les chances
pour qu’il ne fût pas chargé. Nous sommes ici dans une clinique où
je parie que l’on se suicide peu.
Me pendre ?… Je ne vois ni corde, ni ficelle solide.
Quel ennui !
Cherchons ailleurs… Vous m’aiderez, n’est-ce pas ? Ne
m’abandonnez pas méchamment et je vous promets que nous
réussirons bientôt.
Les autos, les autobus, je les écarte tout de suite. Un de mes
plus chers amis a glissé, un soir où il pleuvait, sous une camionnette
militaire et s’en est tiré avec une écorchure au genou : quinze jours
de lit. Je ne veux pas souffrir.
On vous repêche de la Seine. On vous surveille, en haut de la
tour Eiffel : les balustrades y sont hautes et ne croyez pas que je
puisse encore faire de l’acrobatie… Pourtant, une acrobatie
modeste, en m’efforçant beaucoup… Essayons de la tour Eiffel.
Me voici devant le guichet. J’allais passer, quand une vieille
femme, à genoux, couverte d’un châle en loques (il fait froid,
aujourd’hui) me tend la main. Son bras gauche me barre l’entrée. Je
lui donne vingt sous. Elle ne veut pas partir. Quel étrange regard,
suppliant et malsain, tout ensemble ! Non, ce bras de mendiante
m’arrête ; de plus, il y a trop de monde : un dimanche ? un jour
férié ?…
Ah ! j’ai fait une trouvaille ! Le chemin de fer de ceinture… Je
m’arrangerai : mon projet est assez malin. Un train a passé ;
j’attends l’autre. Je me couche sur les rails, la tête posée de façon à
ce que l’accident se produise bien, et presque sans douleur.
J’entends le second train. Je compterai jusqu’à 55, un gentil chiffre
qui me donne de l’espoir…
Quelqu’un me tire par le bras. Suis-je découvert ?… Ah ! la vieille
mendiante ! Est-elle si vieille ? Son regard m’hallucine ! Je me relève
et fais le geste de lui donner vingt sous. Elle dit : « Merci,
Monsieur ! » Le train a profité de ce court instant pour passer, sans
nul dommage. Mon aumône était stupide.
La Seine encore, mais, cette fois, avec des précautions… Je suis
sur le Pont-Neuf. Personne, alentour, que des ouvriers occupés à
leur besogne : ils dépavent, en vue de futurs travaux. Ils ne feront
nulle attention : dépaver un pont leur suffit. Je prends donc, un à un,
des pavés et les fourre dans mes poches. Mon veston s’alourdit,
mon gilet pèse et c’est à peine si je puis empêcher mon pantalon de
me tomber sur les pieds.
J’ai placé douze pavés ; je dois ressembler à l’image d’un journal
communiste, représentant un financier cousu d’or… Moi, je suis
cousu de pierres, de pierres très précieuses. Quels reproches me
ferait mon tailleur ! « Du tissu anglais, Monsieur Duroy ! »
Maintenant, il reste à enjamber le parapet. Vous n’ignorez pas
que je nage bien, mais le meilleur nageur coulerait, portant une
surcharge de douze pavés ; par conséquent… Personne n’a même
tourné la tête. La veine, enfin ! je touche au but. Je lève un pied
facilement. Mon pantalon est moins lourd que je ne pensais, mon
gilet et mon veston de même. L’étoffe anglaise aurait-elle craqué ?
Non, quelqu’un vient de me délester habilement de mes pierres.
C’est encore elle, la mendiante qui me tend la main. Je me trompais
tout à fait : elle n’est pas vieille, mais son visage semble ravagé et,
toujours, ses yeux m’épouvantent. Elle a dû même être belle… Oh !
ces yeux !
« Partez ! lui dis-je.
— Oui, Monsieur, tout de suite, mais je vous demande une petite
aumône. J’ai faim, mon bon Monsieur ! ne me renvoyez pas ainsi ! »
Que voulez-vous ! je me laisse faire : je lui donne vingt sous.

Voyez ! à Paris nous n’aurons que des échecs. Allons plus loin,
dans un pays dont je connais les ressources : Hyères, par exemple.
Je vous jure que là…
Et puis, une idée surgit…
Chut ! je ne vous dirai rien encore. Attendons d’être là-bas, sur
place et je vous garantis que nous y serons débarrassés de toute
mendiante. Le voyage, même en troisième classe, est assez cher.
On ne mendie pas à Paris pour aller ensuite faire le même métier
sur la Côte d’Azur, à Nice, peut-être, ou Monte-Carlo, à la sortie du
casino. Non, je n’y ai jamais vu de mendiants et cette femme-là,
toute déguenillée qu’elle soit, attire trop l’attention. Le Prince
viendrait en personne la prier de repasser la frontière.
Entrez dans le jardin. Vous pouvez encore beaucoup m’aider. Je
sors à l’instant de la boutique d’un marchand de la ville, un vieil ami,
qui m’a vendu une bonne corde, souple, solide, facile à nouer, car je
suis revenu à l’un de mes anciens projets auquel je n’ai fait
qu’ajouter un peu de poésie… Exactement ce qu’il faut… Il ne reste
plus qu’à choisir un pin convenablement fourchu, bien robuste…
Je n’ose pas vous avouer mon idée poétique… Bast ! puisque
vous m’avez accompagné, mes chers amis, dans un instant, je
divulgue le secret.
Ce pin, je le connais ; il est vieux, sans doute, mais résistant. Il
n’a rien perdu de sa vigueur. Il est fourchu ; sa maîtresse branche
quitte le tronc assez haut et s’en écarte. On dirait qu’il fut créé pour
le but même que je poursuis… Mais je n’ai pas tout dit !
Courage ! quelques mots encore : écoutez bien ! je ne résiste
plus : vous vous êtes montrés trop gentils !

Eh bien, ce pin, ce pin sauveur, est placé devant la fenêtre de

Madeleine, la jeune personne qui fut mon épouse et qui l’est, peut-
être, à cette heure. Affaire d’habitude ! Ce matin même, elle se
promenait en face de la clinique, rue de la Baume, sur son balcon, et
tenait un mouchoir serré contre son nez, car le froid augmente. Or je
savais que, dans ce mouchoir, elle cachait une mignonne petite
boîte en argent (un cadeau ?…) où elle venait de prendre une
pincée de poudre blanche. C’est tout naturel ! Madeleine a bien le
droit de se promener sur son balcon lorsqu’il fait froid.
Ah ! vous êtes vraiment complaisants : vous avez jeté la corde
par-dessus la grosse branche… Préparez le nœud, je vous prie :
mes doigts sont un peu gourds.
Et, lorsque ma chère Madeleine sera venue rendre ses devoirs à
madame sa mère (demain, peut-être !) en ouvrant ses persiennes,
un beau matin comme celui-ci, elle verra monsieur Michel Duroy
assez congestionné, les jambes tordues, le sang aux yeux et, pour
tout dire, pendu, pendu haut et court, et se balançant poussé par la
brise…
Mais je conserverai, sur ma bouche gonflée, une façon de sourire
un peu narquois, dont elle se souviendra.
Oui, c’est parfait, ainsi. J’abuse de votre amabilité. Je passe le
nœud coulant à mon cou, je le serre, sans qu’il me gêne cependant,
et vais monter sur vos épaules. Ce sera dur !… Pas tant que cela ?
J’y monte. Le sport eut le bénéfice de me maintenir un poids normal
pour mon âge et pour ma taille. Attendez ! Je ne vous gêne pas
trop ? Merci… Au moment où cet oiseau bleu se sera posé…
Quoi ? Elle encore !
 « Non ma bonne dame, vous arrivez trop tard ! Soit : je me
pendrai sous vos yeux, sous vos terribles yeux !… »
Ah ! je déraisonne ! je deviens fou ! ce sont les yeux de
Madeleine ! la bouche de Madeleine, son corps ! C’est Madeleine
devenue mendiante ! Ce châle râpé, c’était son châle vert de
Manille, semé de roses !
« Vous êtes venue, mon ancien amour, sans que je vous appelle.
Quand je vous appelais vous ne paraissiez pas ! Eh bien, vous
entrez dans la salle pour les trois coups : le rideau va se lever.
Comme dernier adieu, je vous offre la seule pièce de vingt sous qui
reste en mon gousset !… Prenez ! c’est une aumône… Quand ce bel
oiseau bleu qui vole au-dessus de nos têtes se sera posé… Il se
rapproche… Il est tout près… Il se posera sur mon épaule !… Il s’y
pose !…
« Attention ! Je vais sauter… Je saute !
« Ah ! c’est fini ! »
 XXIV

Je ne puis dire avec certitude ce qui s’est passé. Je ne suis sûr

que de l’extrême dureté de mon lit. On a donc glissé des planches
sous le matelas ?
L’oiseau bleu venait de se poser sur mon épaule. J’ai sauté, la
corde au cou, (pas de bien haut, il est vrai), pour me pendre. J’ai
senti une terrible secousse à la nuque… et me voilà, de nouveau !
Si Madeleine était, par malice, montée dans le pin fourchu, pour
couper l’autre bout de la corde, je serais tombé par terre
maladroitement en me faisant très mal aux jambes, car je m’aperçois
qu’elles sont toutes deux bandées, mais cela n’expliquerait pas ma
douleur à la nuque.
Aurais-je sauté en rêve ? Quel divertissement !
Peut-être un trop violent effort ?… Non, non, la vérité est tout
près de moi ; elle rôde dans mes alentours et ne veut pas se laisser
voir.
Cependant, l’oiseau bleu s’est posé sur mon épaule ; je vous en
décrirais le vol et l’approche avec minutie ; j’ai même senti son
poids, un instant, mais, bien entendu, il s’est envolé aussitôt, avec
un grand bruit d’ailes.
Quant à Madeleine…
Soit : parlons un peu de Madeleine : il me semble qu’à son
propos j’ai commis de grossières erreurs. Cette pauvre intoxiquée,
vieillie, sordidement vêtue, et qui s’obstinait à me poursuivre, pour
mon bien, pour ce qu’elle imaginait être mon bien, ne me représente
pas, en dépit de ses velléités charitables, ne saurait me représenter
Madeleine.
J’ai dû rêver : encore un de ces affreux cauchemars qui me
mettent la tête à l’envers. Ah ! cela doit être facile de me soigner !
Les pauvres gens ! Dès que le médecin viendra, je tâcherai de
causer avec lui, ou plutôt l’écouterai-je, s’il me parle de son plein
gré.
Toutes ces abominations seraient donc fausses ? inexistantes ?
inventées… et par moi ?
Douce joie qui m’exalte, qui me livre à l’autre torture d’où je ne
sortais plus et que m’infligeait l’absence de ma femme ! Car
Madeleine, à l’heure qu’il est, me paraît aussi belle, aussi tendre,
aussi bonne… Elle a ces mêmes yeux gris au tout puissant regard,
ces mêmes mains fraîches qu’elle posait sur mon front, quand je
souffrais d’une migraine.
Il me semble que, ce matin, très tôt, avant que je m’éveille, elle
faisait ainsi, son adorable corps penché vers moi et… Oui ! elle s’est
penchée davantage, la main toujours posée sur mon front, et m’a
baisé la bouche !
Concevez comme c’est terrible de ne pouvoir ainsi démêler le
vrai du faux et d’en arriver à me refuser un exquis souvenir parce
que d’autres souvenirs, hélas, trop véridiques ! s’y rattachent
toujours.
J’accepterais volontiers, je savourerais ma torture avec
reconnaissance, si Madeleine était venue, ce matin, me rafraîchir le
front, me baiser la bouche, et si je ne pouvais en douter !
J’arrive à nier l’évidence pour que ce geste adorable devienne
vrai.

J’étais à Hyères, je suis à Paris. Pourquoi et comment ? Qu’il y

ait un intervalle entre ces deux séjours, je l’explique : il me paraît
court, il a dû être assez long.
Pensez donc ! transporter d’Hyères à Paris un bonhomme à demi
pendu, mal pendu, pendu de travers, cela ne se fait pas en un
instant ! Je n’ai plus, du temps qui passe, une idée juste.
Mais me suis-je pendu ? D’ailleurs ne m’a-t-on pas sorti de mon
lit pour me panser, ce matin ? J’ai le sentiment de m’être presque
réveillé et que l’on m’a fait une piqûre…
Ce serait donc cette piqûre ou les précédentes qui
m’engageaient à échafauder ce roman infâme où j’admettais la
déchéance d’une femme adorée ?
J’entends le médecin et lui parlerai sans délai.
« Ah ! dit-il, que je vous plains, cher monsieur, et quelle secousse
vous a donnée l’accident de cette nuit ! »
Il sait donc, celui que je nommais l’homme au nez pointu et que
je détestais si fort, bien qu’il eût la figure d’un brave garçon ? D’autre
part, s’il ne sait pas, de quoi me plaint-il ?
« Ce fut une nuit agitée comme bien d’autres. Nous nous
efforçons d’être prudents avec vous, dans l’emploi des drogues qui
devraient vous calmer : elles ne vous calment pas, ou si peu !
— Qu’est-il donc arrivé, docteur ?
— Ah ! la bonne voix que vous avez ce matin ! Elle me
tranquillise… Ce qui vous est arrivé ? Vous avez sans doute fait un
faux mouvement, au cours d’un de vos cauchemars, vous vous êtes
soulevé dans votre lit que, d’ailleurs, nous avions dû éloigner du
mur, pour mieux vous maintenir pendant votre délire, puis
brusquement, ayant dépassé vos forces, vous êtes retombé contre
la barre de cuivre où s’appuient vos oreillers. Le choc s’est produit à
l’endroit précis de la nuque, endommagé par votre premier accident.
Souffrez-vous beaucoup ?
— Ma tête entière me fait très mal, docteur.
— Ne parlez pas trop, Monsieur Duroy. Je vais changer vos
pansements avec l’aide de Mlle Blancheney votre garde. Ne m’en
veuillez pas si je vous couvre le visage. C’est… c’est pour nous
rendre la tâche plus aisée.
— Mademoiselle Blancheney, venez, » ajouta-t-il d’une voix très
posée.
Il entre quelqu’un et, à ce moment, je suis sûr d’avoir entendu
une autre voix d’homme, dans la pièce voisine, qui disait tout bas :
« D’ailleurs, sa femme en est bouleversée. »
Sa femme… La femme de qui ?… Voyons ! je ne suis pas le seul
malade que l’on soigne dans cette clinique ! N’exagérons pas !… et,
cependant, il faut m’en assurer.
Je me hâte d’interjeter quelques mots :
« Docteur ! un moment, je vous prie ! Je voulais vous parler de
Madeleine, ma femme…
— Tout va bien, Monsieur Duroy, et je vous promets qu’après un
léger repos, vous serez autorisé, cet après-midi même, à recevoir
une visite. Sitôt votre pansement fini, je vous donnerai une potion
calmante, la seule que vous supportiez bien ; peut-être ferez-vous
une sieste, je l’espère, et vous vous sentirez beaucoup plus calme,
la tête moins douloureuse. Comme je ne manque jamais à ma
parole, vous pouvez être certain d’en profiter pour causer ensuite
librement.
— Merci, Mademoiselle Blancheney, tout semble prêt : aidez-
moi. »
Je suis certain que tous les deux me cachent quelque chose.
Madeleine est « bouleversée ». Encore une parole de médecin ! Si
« bouleversée » qu’elle fût, rien, dans le temps, ne l’aurait éloignée
de moi !
« Monsieur Duroy, de grâce, ne vous agitez pas. Songez que, cet
après-midi… »
« Bouleversée ! »
 XXV

Il me faut prendre une drogue de plus !… Prenons-la sans

protester, puisque, dit-on, j’ai besoin de repos. Mlle Blancheney
(j’ignorais son nom), me la prépare studieusement dans un coin de
ma chambre, puis elle vient me l’offrir avec un de ces gestes
avenants, arrondis, comme on tâche d’en avoir pour que le gâteau
offert à l’enfant lui paraisse meilleur.
J’avale et ne dis mot.
N’ayant aucune envie de dormir, je réfléchis un peu. Ces paroles
touchant Madeleine m’inquiètent, car il s’agit assurément de
Madeleine. « D’ailleurs, sa femme en est bouleversée… » cela ne
signifie-t-il pas qu’elle est malade, ma pauvre chérie, et que seule
cette maladie l’empêche de venir ? Je l’imagine chez nous, dans
notre lit, souffrant de son éloignement, fiévreuse, agitée… Une rue
nous sépare, mais quand on est brisé par de fortes températures,
recru de fatigue et la tête brouillée, une rue, c’est large ! c’est très
large !
J’ai la terreur d’apprendre que sa maladie est grave, qu’elle a pris
froid, qu’elle souffre d’une bronchite, d’une congestion pulmonaire,
d’une pleurésie… Que sais-je ? Ou bien n’a-t-elle pas, durant un
séjour chez sa mère, fait l’imprudence de manger à Toulon, des
coquillages ?…
La fièvre typhoïde !
 Mon cher Jérôme s’est vu alité pendant plusieurs semaines
parce qu’il avait cédé à sa gourmandise habituelle et succombé (lui,
un médecin !) aux charmes d’un étalage de moules apportées par
certain pêcheur dont on pouvait être « parfaitement sûr » !
Sans faire une sottise pareille, Madeleine se sera laissé tenter
par les coquillages qu’elle aime, servis à une table d’amis. On
affirme que ces moules furent pêchées tout au loin, sur des roches
saines, par les soins du fils de la maison, qui jamais ne commettrait
une imprudence. Le résultat est le même, néanmoins.
Madeleine m’appelle, et c’est moi qui ne viens pas ! Durant que
j’étais malade, elle l’était davantage et n’a pas voulu m’inquiéter. Il
n’y a nul autre mystère et toute son absence en est expliquée. Je
sais bien que Jérôme est auprès d’elle, qu’il la soigne, qu’il ne la
quitte guère ! Cet homme surchargé de besogne, s’est encore une
fois sacrifié : la femme de son ami le plus intime passe avant tout !
Je le reconnais bien ! L’un de nous lui demanderait d’aller décrocher
la lune avec ses dents (ses dents sont excellentes), qu’il se
procurerait sans tarder une échelle et grimperait dessus, jusqu’au
dernier échelon.
« Jérôme ! fais attention !… »
J’ai cru que Jérôme allait tomber !

Mais pourquoi cette escalade vers la lune rappelle-t-elle le

souvenir d’une autre escalade plus modeste, contre le mur de la
petite église d’Hyères. Étais-je attiré aussi par quelque lune, moins
haute et rouge à son coucher ?… ah ! le beau rouge de cette lune
imaginaire !
Ayant atteint l’avant-dernier échelon, je m’installe de mon mieux.
Le soleil entre par les portes grandes ouvertes de l’église.
Madeleine, debout sous le porche, me parle d’en bas ; la lumière
joue dans ses cheveux d’or. Je tiens des papiers à la main et tâche
de mettre en place, d’après ces esquisses au crayon, l’un des
panneaux de la décoration que je peindrai selon le vœu de
Madeleine. Je baisse la tête, pour mieux voir, et me voilà soudain
pris de vertige : l’église entière se met à tourner autour de moi… et
je tombe. Depuis lors, je ne me souviens de rien, sauf de cris de
douleur, de réveils lourds suivant des sommeils abrutissants, de
séances sur une table d’opération.
J’avais dû me mettre en bouillie et c’est encore à Jérôme, je le
parie, qu’est échu l’agréable devoir de me rendre une forme
humaine. Où ça ?… A Hyères, probablement : sur place. Enfin, je
me suis trouvé ici, mis à la torture, chaque jour, de façons très
diverses, mais j’ai trop souffert de la tête pour me rappeler autre
chose que des abominations. Suis-je devenu fou ? je ne le crois pas,
me sentant, aujourd’hui, raisonnable, mais cela prouve-t-il
grand’chose ?… Attendons : on me le dira plus tard.
Je crois que si je fermais, un instant, les yeux, je me laisserais
encore prendre par le sommeil. Eh non ! j’ai trop envie de penser à
Madeleine.
Elle est chez nous, le visage rouge, le regard brillant, en pleine
crise de fièvre. Elle s’agite, des pensées absurdes lui dansent dans
la cervelle, elle s’imagine de folles aventures, elle voit des paysages
qui ne tiennent pas debout et se sent assourdie par ce
bourdonnement continuel qui fait croire que la chambre est pleine de
frelons.
Jérôme ou le fils de Jérôme lui a peut-être donné un
soporifique… Je n’avais pas encore pensé au fils de Jérôme dont la
photographie me fut montrée pendant la guerre. Il est, à coup sûr,
interne maintenant… Une gentille petite frimousse au petit nez… Je
me la rappelle…
Ce soporifique… Ah ! qu’il serait doux de dormir en même temps
que Madeleine et de rêver que nous dormons tous deux !
 XXVI

Si je dormais, je descendrais l’escalier de la clinique ou, plutôt,

mes jambes étant faibles, je prendrais l’ascenseur. Ensuite, je
traverserais la rue de la Baume, j’irais demander des nouvelles de
Madeleine, chez nous.
Va-t-elle s’endormir ? Si bien soignée qu’elle soit, on ne sait
jamais ce qui peut arriver quand on a très, très envie de dormir. On a
l’air de sommeiller, et puis…
J’ai traversé la rue ; j’aperçois la porte de ma maison. Quelle
porte sinistre ! Ces draperies noires et les deux initiales M. D.
Madeleine Duroy ! C’est cela : je ne me trompais pas ou, plutôt,
j’avais bien deviné : elle est morte ; Madeleine est morte… Vous
l’aviez compris, je pense.
J’entre chez la concierge :
« Madame Lebrun, ma femme est-elle morte ?
— Eh oui, mon pauvre monsieur ! mais vous pouvez aller la voir,
la chère dame ! Je viens de faire une petite prière au pied de son
lit. »
Je monte par l’ascenseur qui est très lent. J’ouvre avec mon
passe américain : Madeleine a la manie (faut-il dire : avait la
manie ?) des serrures très modernes. Les deux bonnes sont en
deuil ; elles pleurent et se tamponnent les yeux. Quelques phrases,
puis on me conduit chez Madeleine.
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