EN BANC

[G.R. No. 260374. June 28, 2022.]

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P.

HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND
JOSEPHINE LASCANO,petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR.,THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Senate President, THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives,respondents.

[G.R. No. 260426. June 28, 2022.]

BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO CUNANAN OCAMPO,

MARIA CAROLINA PAGADUAN ARAULLO, TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO,
JOANNA KINTANAR CARIÑO, ELISA TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA
MAZA, DANILO MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA MENDOZA
FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBACUB ABAYA, JR.,ERLINDA NABLE
SENTURIAS, SR. ARABELLA CAMMAGAY BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M.
IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR. SUSAN SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR
RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES CARWYN
CANDILA, and JONAS ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA,petitioners,vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS,
JR.,THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Senate President,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives,respondents.

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J : p

After all, we must submit to this idea, that the true principle of a republic is, that the
people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect, in
proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government,
popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed.1
The words of Alexander Hamilton, in his speech before the New York Ratifying Convention
on 21 June 1788, may have been spoken in another country and in another century, but the same
sentiments still ring true for us today.
Even as we acknowledge that elections are the cornerstone of democracy, we also recognize
that an overwhelming mandate, as reflected in the votes cast for one candidate cannot, by itself, he
the sole basis, nor is it the most compelling reason, to declare one fit for public office.
 In every election, citizens put the fate of the nation on their shoulders and carry the burden of
establishing a functioning government. The outcome of an election, in turn, endows the elected
officials with authority to lead.
The 31,629,783 votes, or 58.77% of the votes cast, do, however, lend more gravity to the
Court's exercise of its constitutional power to settle the present controversy. And in situations such as
this case, where there is opposition or doubt on the fitness of a candidate to run for the highest
political office in the land, it is the Court's duty to step in and be the final arbiter on the matter. The
Court must tread with deliberate care in its resolution: any misstep may unravel the very expression
of the people's will. Consequently, it is in the interest of our democracy that any doubts on the
outcome of the elections be dispelled with a proper and definitive ruling.
Thus, it is not enough for the candidate to obtain the highest number of votes, said candidate
must hold the requisite qualifications and abide by the required standards set by law to file for
candidacy. In the same vein, to undo an election, there must be compelling and unequivocal
evidence of the candidate's disqualification or failure to meet the requirements for filing a certificate
of candidacy.
Upon a careful and deliberate study of the issues raised, the Court resolves to dismiss the
consolidated petitions. Respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (respondent Marcos, Jr.) possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to run for president. Furthermore, his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) contains no false material representation and is, therefore, valid. CAIHTE

The Cases
G.R. No. 260374 is a Petition for Certiorari 2 with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) (Buenafe Petition).Petitioners Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, Fides M. Lim, Ma.
Edeliza P. Hernandez, Celia Lagman Sevilla, Ronald C. Vibal, and Josephine Lascano (petitioners
Buenafe, et al.) seek to annul and set aside the Resolution 3 dated 17 January 2022 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division and the Resolution 4 dated 10 May 2022 of
the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 21-156 (DC) entitled, Fr. Christian B. Buenafe, et al. v.
Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr.
G.R. No. 260426 is a Petition for Certiorari 5 with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Injunction (Ilagan Petition).Filed by petitioners Bonifacio Parabuac Ilagan, Saturnino
Cunanan Ocampo, Maria Carolina Pagaduan Araullo, Trinidad Gerlita Repuno, Joanna Kintanar
Cariño, Elisa Tita Perez Lubi, Liza Largoza Maza, Danilo Mallari dela Fuente, Carmencita Mendoza
Florentino, Doroteo Cubacub Abaya, Jr.,Erlinda Nable Santurias, Sr. Arabella Cammagay Balingao,
Sr. Cherry M. Ibardaloza, CSSJB, Sr. Susan Santos Esmile, SFIC, Homar Rubert Roca Distajo,
Polynne Espineda Dira, James Carwyn Candila, and Jonas Angelo Lopena Abadilla (petitioners
Ilagan, et al.),the petition assails the Resolution 6 dated 10 February 2022 of the COMELEC Former
First Division and Resolution 7 dated 10 May 2022 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 21-212
(DC).
The Facts
On 2 November 2021, petitioners Buenafe, et al., filed before the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel the COC of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 881, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). 8
Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,identified themselves as Filipinos of legal age, registered voters, and
officers of various non-government organizations and civic groups. 9 They claim that respondent
Marcos, Jr. made false material representations under oath when he filed his COC for President in
the 2022 National Elections with the COMELEC. 10
 Subsequently, on 20 November 2021, petitioners Ilagan, et al., filed before the COMELEC a
Petition for Disqualification of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 12, Article I of the OEC. 11
Petitioners Ilagan, et al.,identified themselves as Filipinos of legal age who are martial law victims
and rights advocates. 12
Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,and Ilagan, et al., referred to the same set of criminal cases for the
violation of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended (1977 NIRC), involving
respondent Marcos, Jr. 13
On 27 June 1990, the Special Tax Audit Team (audit team) created by then Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Jose U. Ong (Commissioner Ong) commenced an investigation of the internal
revenue tax and estate tax liabilities of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
as well as his alleged "associates and cronies." 14 The audit sought to determine whether the
taxpayer: (1) earned income; (2) filed the required income tax; and (3) made the corresponding tax
payment. 15 The audit team submitted its findings to Commissioner Ong, which prompted him to
file a letter complaint dated 25 July 1991 with the Secretary of Justice. 16
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213, and Q-92-29217, respondent
Marcos, Jr. was charged with violation of the 1977 NIRC for failure to file his income tax returns for
the years 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985. 17 In Criminal Case Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-
29214, and Q-91-24390, respondent Marcos, Jr. was charged with violation of the 1977 NIRC for
failure to pay income taxes due, exclusive of surcharges and interests, in the amounts of P107.80 for
1982, P3,911.00 for 1983, P1,828.48 for 1984, and P2,656.95 for 1985. 18
Respondent Marcos, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment. 19 The eight cases
were tried jointly.DETACa

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC) declared that respondent
Marcos, Jr. was elected Vice-Governor, and later Governor, of the province of Ilocos Norte from 03
November 1982 up to 31 March 1986. 20 On 27 July 1995, after trial, the RTC ruled in this manner:
In view of the foregoing, and after a thorough and careful examination of the evidence
presented, this Court believes that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
However, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29217, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213, Q-92-
29216, Q-92-29215 and Q-92-29214, the imposable penalty must be based on Section 73
since the violations occurred before the effectivity of PD 1994 and the former is favorable to
the accused. In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-24391 and Q-91-folded page the imposable penalty
as to imprisonment must be based on Section 288 per amendment under PD 1994 which
renumbered Section 73 folded page since the violation occurred after the effectivity of the
Presidential Decree.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II guilty
beyond reasonable doubt [of violation of] the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended, and sentences him as follows:
1. To serve imprisonment of six (6) months and pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge
in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212, and Q-92-29217 for failure to file income
tax returns for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984;
2. To serve imprisonment of six (6) months and pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, and Q-92-29214 for failure to pay income
taxes for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984;
3. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and pay a fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax return for the year 1985; and
 4. To serve imprisonment of three (3) years and pay a fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24390 for failure to pay income tax for the year 1985; and,
5. To pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the taxes due, including such other penalties,
interests, and surcharges.
SO ORDERED. 21
Respondent Marcos, Jr. proceeded to appeal the RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals
(CA).In a petition docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, he questioned the RTC's finding that the
failure of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to comply with existing laws, 22 which required
prior notice to him, did not derogate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
23
In a Decision dated 31 October 1997 (CA Decision),24 the CA agreed with respondent
Marcos, Jr. that there was insufficient notice from the BIR. It further declared that respondent
Marcos, Jr. should not have been held to answer for the criminal charges filed against him for non-
payment of deficiency income tax liabilities. 25 On the other hand, even as the stipulation on
deficiency income taxes between the BIR and respondent Marcos, Jr. should still be satisfied since
his acquittal does not amount to extinction of the civil liability, the surcharges should not be imposed
because these presuppose notice and demand. 26 Ultimately, respondent Marcos, Jr. was not able to
prove that the charges for non-filing of the required income tax returns were incorrect. 27 ATICcS

The CA ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the charges for violation of Section 50
of the NIRC for non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-29216 n , Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214, and Q-91-24390; and
FINDING him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 45 of the NIRC for
failure to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213, and Q-92-29217;
2. Ordering the appellant to pay to the BIR the deficiency income taxes with
interest at the legal rate until fully paid;
3. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-29217 for failure to file income tax returns for
the years 1982, 1983, and 1984; and the fine of P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391
for failure to file income tax return for 1985, with surcharges.
SO ORDERED. 28
Respondent Marcos, Jr. intended to appeal the CA Decision before this Court. However, he
later filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw his Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review. 29 We granted his motion to withdraw in a Resolution dated 08 August 2001. 30 Our Entry
of Judgment was made on 31 August 2001. 31 The CA made an Entry of Judgment on 10 November
1997. 32
On 02 December 2021, the RTC released a certification stating that there is no record on file
of respondent Marcos, Jr.'s compliance of payment or satisfaction of its Decision dated 27 July 1995
or that of the CA's Decision dated 31 October 1997. 33 Neither was there any entry in the criminal
docket of the RTC Decision dated 27 July 1995 as affirmed and modified by the CA. 34
Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,also cited this Court's ruling in Ferdinand R. Marcos, II v. Court of
Appeals.35 In that case, We affirmed the Decision dated 29 November 1994 of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 31363, which stated that the deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessments,
amounting to P23,292,607,638.00, are already final and unappealable. Further, We held that the levy
of real properties is a tax remedy permitted by law.
The COMELEC Resolutions
In SPA No. 21-156 (DC),petitioners Buenafe, et al.,argued before the COMELEC that
respondent Marcos, Jr. committed false material representation when he stated in his COC that he is
eligible to run for President. 36 They maintained that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s prior conviction
carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, to
vote, and to participate in any election. 37
The COMELEC Second Division issued Summons with Notice of Preliminary Conference
dated 11 November 2021 and directed respondent Marcos, Jr. to file a verified Answer within a non-
extendible period of five days from receipt. 38 He filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer on 16 November 2021, which the COMELEC Second Division granted on 18 November
2021. 39 The Answer was filed on 19 November 2021 and included a prayer for Face-to-Face Oral
Arguments. 40 On the same date, petitioners Buenafe, et al.,moved to reconsider the Order dated 18
November 2021 and insisted that the period to file an Answer was non-extendible. 41 Citing its
authority to suspend the reglementary periods in the interest of justice, the COMELEC Second
Division denied petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s motion for reconsideration. 42
TIADCc

Prior to the preliminary conference scheduled on 26 November 2021, petitioners Buenafe, et

al.,filed the following: (1) Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum on 19 November
2021; (2) Compliance Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam with Ex Parte Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum on 23 November 2021; (3) Summary of Documents, also on 23 November
2021; and (4) Bill of Exceptions on 24 November 2021. 43
Both petitioners Buenafe, et al.,and respondent Marcos, Jr. appeared through counsel during
the preliminary conference on 26 November 2021. 44 Neither party offered any stipulation of facts.
45 In his Memorandum dated 17 December 2021, respondent Marcos, Jr. objected to petitioners
Buenafe, et al.'s marking of exhibits. 46
In its Order dated 13 December 2021, 47 the COMELEC Second Division denied the
following: (1) petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum;and (2) respondent Marcos, Jr.'s Prayer for
Face-to-Face Oral Arguments.
Both parties submitted their Memoranda on 20 December 2021. 48 In its Resolution dated 17
January 2022, 49 the COMELEC Second Division denied the petition for lack of merit. It considered
the issue of whether respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC should be denied due course or canceled under
Section 78 of the OEC on the ground that it contains false material representations. 50 It went on to
discuss the merits of the case even as it declared that the petition should be summarily dismissed for
invoking grounds of disqualification in a petition for cancellation and/or denial of due course of a
COC. 51
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s material representations
are not false, i.e.,that he is eligible for the position of President and that he is not perpetually
disqualified from public office. 52 It underscored that the CA Decision did not mete out the penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 53 It also found, as a matter of judicial
notice, that respondent Marcos, Jr. ceased to be a public officer when he and his family were forced
to leave the Philippines on 25 February 1986. 54 The penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office under Section 286 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1994, which amended Section 286
(c) of the 1977 NIRC, thus cannot apply to respondent Marcos, Jr. since he was already a private
individual when he failed to file his 1985 income tax return. 55 The COMELEC Second Division
also concluded that respondent Marcos, Jr. had no intention to deceive the electorate about his
qualifications for public office. 56
The COMELEC Second Division reiterated this Court's declaration in Republic v. Ferdinand
Marcos II and Imelda R. Marcos 57 that failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving
moral turpitude. 58 Moreover, failure to file income tax returns is not tax evasion. 59
Commissioner (now a Member of this Court) Antonio T. Kho, Jr. filed a Separate Opinion 60
where he agreed with most of the points of the Resolution. However, he opined that, unlike its usage
in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty of perpetual disqualification in the 1977 NIRC is a
principal penalty, which must be expressly specified in the judgment of conviction. Thus, he
concluded that there is no legal justification to deny due course to or cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s
COC because his representations are not false.
On 20 January 2022, petitioners Buenafe, et al.,filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
with the COMELEC En Banc.61 Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to file
Comment/Opposition with attached Comment/Opposition on 25 January 2022. 62
In a Resolution dated 10 May 2022, 63 the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners Buenafe,
et al.'s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and affirmed the Resolution dated 17 January 2022 of the
COMELEC Second Division. It held that the Motion for Partial Reconsideration failed to raise new
matters or issues that warrant the reversal of the questioned Resolution.
Commissioners Socorro B. Inting (Commissioner Inting) and Marlon S. Casquejo
(Commissioner Casquejo) wrote Separate Concurring Opinions. Commissioner Inting emphasized
that petitioners Buenafe, et al., deliberately misquoted the applicable law, noting that the penalty of
imposing both a fine and imprisonment only became mandatory on 11 December 1998 with the
passage of Republic Act No. (RA) 8424, or the 1997 NIRC. Therefore, the CA cannot apply the
penalty of imprisonment without violating the constitutional proscription on ex post facto laws. 64
On the other hand, Commissioner Casquejo maintained that the COMELEC does not have
jurisdiction to determine whether the judgment handed down by a court of law on a tax-related case
is void. As such, the COMELEC does not have the power to review nor amend decisions of the CA.
65 AaCTcI

Meanwhile, in the Resolution 66 dated 10 February 2022, the COMELEC Former First
Division resolved the Petition for Disqualification filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al.,docketed as SPA
No. 21-212 (DC),as well as the two other Petitions for Disqualification, that of Akbayan, et al.,in
SPA No. 21-232 (DC),and of Abubakar Mangelen (Mangelen) in SPA No. 21-233.
Petitioners Ilagan, et al., argued that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office should rightfully be imposed upon respondent Marcos, Jr. since he was a public official when
he violated the 1977 NIRC. 67 Further assailing the validity of the CA Decision, they insisted that
the unlawful deletion of the penalty of imprisonment rendered the judgment void and produced no
legal effect. 68 They also alleged that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction amounts to moral
turpitude. 69 Finally, petitioners Ilagan, et al.,asserted that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false
material representation when he stated in Item No. 22 of his COC that "he has not been found liable
for an offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office, which has become final and executory." 70
The COMELEC Former First Division issued the following on 20 December 2021: (1)
Notices and Summons with Notice of Preliminary Conference and requested the City Election
Officer of 1st District of Pasay City and Election Officer of Batac, Ilocos Norte to serve the
Summons to respondent Marcos, Jr.;and (2) Notice and Order to inform the counsel of petitioners
Ilagan, et al.,to submit the requisite proof of service. 71 The following day, Notices and Summons
were personally served to respondent Marcos, Jr. at his address in Pasay City. 72
The parties marked their documentary exhibits during the preliminary conference on 07
January 2022. 73 They were then directed to submit their memoranda within forty-eight (48) hours.
74 Petitioners Ilagan, et al.,submitted via email their Memoranda on 09 January 2022. 75
At the scheduled preliminary conference on 06 January 2022, respondent Marcos, Jr.
manifested that he would not be able to personally appear before the COMELEC. 76 He stated that
he was in mandatory isolation after being in close contact with an individual who tested positive for
COVID-19. 77 He confirmed this by submitting a medical certificate issued by his attending
physician. 78
On 11 January 2022, petitioners Ilagan, et al.,filed an Opposition with Manifestation and
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Opposition with Manifestation. 79 They alleged that
the documents submitted by respondent Marcos, Jr. should be stricken off the records because his
Memorandum lacked a formal offer of evidence. 80 Respondent Marcos, Jr. submitted a
Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence on 13 January 2021. 81
The COMELEC Former First Division considered the following issues whether respondent
Marcos, Jr.:(1) is perpetually disqualified from running for public office; (2) has been sentenced by
final judgment to a penalty of more than eighteen months of imprisonment; (3) has been convicted
by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude; and (4) is qualified to be elected President of
the Philippines. 82
In a Resolution dated 10 February 2022, 83 the COMELEC Former First Division dismissed
all three petitions for lack of merit.
First, the COMELEC Former First Division held that the failure to file income tax returns
was not originally penalized with perpetual disqualification under the 1977 NIRC. 84 It came into
force only upon the effectivity of its amending law, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1994, on 01
January 1986. 85 Moreover, the penalty of perpetual disqualification was never imposed by the RTC
nor by the CA. 86 It is a principal penalty, not merely accessory, for violation of the 1977 NIRC. 87
Thus, the imposition of that particular penalty should be included in the dispositive portion of the
decision. 88EcTCAD

Second,respondent Marcos, Jr. was not penalized with imprisonment of more than eighteen
months. 89 The COMELEC First Division stressed that the CA correctly removed the penalty of
imprisonment meted by the RTC and imposed only a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge of failure to
file an income tax return. It held that such modification is best left to the sound discretion of the CA
and is not within the power of the COMELEC to review. 90
Third,failure to file an income tax return is not a crime that involves moral turpitude. 91 It is
not inherently wrong in the absence of a law punishing it. 92 There is no fraud involved as it is a
mere omission on the part of the taxpayer. 93 Failure to file an income tax return is not a form of tax
evasion. 94 The COMELEC Former First Division found no evidence that respondent Marcos, Jr.
voluntarily and intentionally violated the law. 95 It noted the BIR certification that stated the
compliance by respondent Marcos, Jr. with the CA Decision and the payment of deficiency taxes and
fines. 96
Fourth,respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be elected as President of the Philippines. 97 His
sentence to pay fines does not fall under any of the instances when a person may be disqualified to
hold public office as provided in Section 12 of the OEC, namely: (1) declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent; (2) sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months; or (3) sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. 98
Commissioner Casquejo wrote a Separate Concurring Opinion, 99 underscoring petitioners'
lack of standing to question the CA's judgment. He further averred that the COMELEC will not
exercise its jurisdiction to modify a decision that has long been final. 100 Commissioner Casquejo
also asserted that the amendment introduced by Section 252 (c) of the 1997 NIRC shall not be
retroactively applied to respondent Marcos, Jr. Finally, non-filing of income tax returns does not
equate to moral turpitude. 101
Petitioners Ilagan, et al.,along with the two other sets of petitioners, filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. 102
In its Resolution dated 10 May 2022, 103 the COMELEC En Banc denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by petitioners Ilagan, et al.,as well as those filed by Akbayan, et al.,and
Mangelen. The COMELEC En Banc held that all three motions failed to raise new matters that
would warrant a reversal of the COMELEC Former First Division's Resolution. 104
Commissioner Casquejo again wrote a Separate Concurring Opinion, 105 asserting that
respondent Marcos, Jr. met the requirements for a candidate for President. Hence, there was no
reason to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr. 106 He likewise reminded the public that the COMELEC
will not be used to declare as void a judgment that has long attained finality. 107
The Elections and the Present Petitions
The National Elections proceeded on 09 May 2022, as scheduled. Respondent Marcos, Jr.
garnered 31,629,783 votes, or 58.77% of the votes cast. 108
The Buenafe Petition, which also sought the issuance of a TRO to enjoin Congress from
canvassing the votes cast for President and from proclaiming respondent Marcos, Jr. as the duly
elected President of the Philippines, was filed on 18 May 2022. 109 Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed a
Manifestation to the Buenafe Petition the next day where he argued that canvassing of both Houses
is mandatory. 110
This Court required respondent Marcos, Jr. to file his Comment to the Buenafe Petition on 19
May 2022. 111 The Comment was filed on 31 May 2022, 112 or before the deadline on 03 June
2022.
In the meantime, Congress convened as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) in a joint
session on 24 May 2022. 113 Respondent Marcos, Jr. was proclaimed as the winning presidential
candidate on 25 May 2022. 114
The Ilagan Petition was also filed on 18 May 2022. 115 However, petitioners Ilagan, et
al.,were further required by this Court to comply with certain procedural requirements. In an Order
dated 30 May 2022, We ordered the following to submit their respective comments: COMELEC;
respondent Marcos, Jr.;Senate of the Philippines, represented by the Senate President; and House of
Representatives, represented by the Speaker of the House. 116 The Court further directed the
consolidation of the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions. 117HSAcaE

Respondent Marcos, Jr. filed his Comment on the Buenafe Petition on 19 May 2022. 118
Subsequently, he manifested that he was adopting said Comment to the Ilagan Petition insofar as the
arguments therein are applicable, averring thus:
xxx xxx xxx
 5. The Buenafe Petition is a Petition to Cancel or to Deny Due Course
[Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s] Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC while the
Ilagan Petition is a Petition for Disqualification under Section 12. While there are stark
differences between these two (2) kinds of election cases, viz.,they have different grounds,
different periods, and different effects, both the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions are based on the
Court of Appeals Decision in People of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.,CA-G.R.
CR No. 18569, October 31, 1997. 119
Issues
Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,raise the following issues:
I. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to cancel the subject COC of Respondent Marcos, Jr. and
ruling that:
A. The Petition to Cancel COC should be summarily dismissed for
allegedly combining grounds for disqualification and cancellation of COC,
supposedly in violation of the COMELEC Rules.
B. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s material representations, i.e.,that he is eligible
for the position of President and that he has not been convicted of a crime
punished with the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office, are
not false;
C. The accessory penalty of Perpetual Disqualification is not deemed
imposed by operation of law in the judgment of conviction of respondent
Marcos, Jr.;
D. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s status as a public officer at the time of the
commission of the offense he was convicted of is not a conclusive and
incontrovertible fact; [and]
E. Respondent Marcos, Jr. did not deliberately attempt to mislead,
misinform, or deceive the electorate.
II. Whether the subject COC of respondent Marcos, Jr. should be cancelled and the
respondent declared as not having been a candidate in the 2022 National Elections. 120
Meanwhile, petitioners Ilagan, et al.,make the following assignment of errors:
[The] COMELEC (En Banc) acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion for
reconsideration and affirming the COMELEC (Former First Division) Resolution:
A. x x x in ruling that petitioners failed to raise new matters that would warrant the
reversal of the COMELEC (Former First Division) Resolution.
B. x x x in ruling that petitioners failed to raise issues and provide grounds to prove that
the evidence is insufficient to justify the COMELEC (Former First Division) Resolution.
C. x x x in ruling that the petitioners failed to raise issues and provide grounds to prove
that the COMELEC (Former First Division) Resolution is contrary to law:
1. Respondent convicted candidate Marcos, Jr. was perpetually
disqualified from running for public office.
2. Respondent convicted candidate Marcos, Jr. was meted a penalty of
imprisonment of more than eighteen (18) months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude. HESIcT

3. Failure to file income tax returns for four (4) consecutive years is
inherently wrong and constitutes moral turpitude. 121
 Respondent Marcos, Jr.,for his part, asserts the following:
Issues
1. Whether the Supreme Court still has jurisdiction to rule upon the eligibility of
[respondent Marcos, Jr.].
2. Whether the temporary restraining order sought for by petitioners [Buenafe, et al.]
shall be issued.
3. Whether the [COMELEC] committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
[respondent Marcos, Jr.] did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC.
Arguments
I. The "Petition" must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. At this point, it is only the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal which may inquire into the eligibility of [respondent].
II. The Honorable Court is without jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order
("TRO") and/or enjoin and restrain Congress from canvassing the votes cast for
[respondent].In addition, the request for a temporary restraining order has become moot.
III. Assuming without conceding that the Supreme Court still has jurisdiction, the
Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.
a. The Decision of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC
En Banc on the absence of any false material representation in the COC of
[respondent] is a finding that is entitled to great weight and must be accorded
full respect.
b. [The] COMELEC correctly ruled that the petition for cancellation was
subject to summary dismissal.
c. [Respondent Marcos, Jr.] did not commit any material misrepresentation
in his COC.
1. None of the grounds alleged by Petitioners is MATERIAL.
2. [Respondent] did not commit any false representation in his COC because
the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification was never imposed
against him.
i. Section 252 (c) of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, is not ipso facto imposed upon the mere fact of
conviction.
ii. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC finds no application in the case at bar.
iii. The Court of Appeals did not impose the penalty of perpetual
disqualification against [respondent Marcos, Jr.].
iv. [Petitioner Buenafe, et al.'s] claim that the status of [respondent
Marcos, Jr.] as a public officer at the time of the commission of
the offense is a "conclusive and incontrovertible fact" is bereft of
basis.
3. [Respondent Marcos, Jr.] had no intention to mislead, misinform, and
deceive the electorate. 122
The COMELEC, meanwhile, argues for the dismissal of both the Buenafe and Ilagan
Petitions. We identify the grounds it raised as follows: caITAC

[For both Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions]

I. The petition does not present an actual case or controversy since it has been rendered
moot and academic by the proclamation made by Congress acting as NBOC that x x x
respondent [Marcos, Jr.] is the duly elected President of the Philippines. 123
II. In any event, the petition raises the matter of x x x respondent [Marcos, Jr.'s]
qualifications which now falls under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
124
III. x x x Respondent [Marcos, Jr.] is an eligible candidate, and his COC is valid.
Therefore, the candidate with the next highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed as
President. 125
[For the Buenafe Petition]
IV. Even assuming that the Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the instant case, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions.
A. The petition failed to impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC,
thus, the Honorable Court should uphold the decision of the administrative body created by
the Constitution with the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge on the issue.
B. The petition for cancellation of COC filed before the COMELEC included grounds for
disqualification of a candidate, in violation of Section 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
C. x x x Respondent [Marcos, Jr.'s] act of signing and subscribing to the COC that he is
eligible for office under Item 11 thereof does not constitute material misrepresentation of his
eligibility.
D. x x x Respondent [Marcos, Jr.'s] checking of the "No" box in question no. 22 in the
COC does not constitute false material representation as he was never convicted of an offense
which imposed the penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
E. The accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification was not deemed imposed by
operation of law in the judgment of conviction of x x x [respondent Marcos, Jr.]:
i. Perpetual disqualification did not attach as an accessory penalty considering that
the principal penalty of imprisonment was deleted by the CA.
ii. The failure to file an ITR does not amount to a crime involving moral turpitude
which carries the penalty of perpetual disqualification.
iii. x x x respondent [Marcos, Jr.'s] status as a public officer at the time of the
commission of the offense is not a conclusive and incontrovertible fact. 126
[For the Ilagan Petition]
V. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
A. The evidence of x x x respondent [Marcos, Jr.] is sufficient to justify the Resolution of
the COMELEC Former First Division.
B. The Honorable Court should sustain the decision of the administrative body with the
presumed expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce.
C. The conviction of x x x respondent [Marcos. Jr.] for failure to file his [income tax
returns] did not disqualify him from holding any public office.
D. x x x [R]espondent [Marcos. Jr.] is qualified to be elected as President of the
Philippines.
i. The CA Decision is not void and has already attained finality.
 ii. x x x [R]espondent [Marcos, Jr.] has been sentenced by final judgment to a
penalty of more than 18 months of imprisonment.
iii. x x x [R]espondent [Marcos, Jr.] has not been sentenced by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude. TCAScE

VI. Petitioners [Ilagan, et al.] are not entitled to the issuance of a TRO/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. 127
The Senate filed a Manifestation 128 in lieu of Comment. It stated that the Senate and the
House of Representatives have duly approved to proclaim respondent Marcos, Jr. as the duly elected
President of the Philippines.
The House of Representatives, on the other hand, filed an Opposition Ad Cautelam 129 in lieu
of Comment. It argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain Congress in its
functions as the NBOC for the positions of the President and Vice President. Even assuming
arguendo that this Court has the jurisdiction or authority to issue the TRO prayed for in the Buenafe
Petition, the acts sought to be enjoined are fait accompli.
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The Court holds that respondent Marcos, Jr. is
qualified to run for President, and that his COC is valid.
This Court is well-aware of its singular responsibility. This is not the first time that We are
asked to decide whether a candidate for President is qualified after elections have been conducted,
votes have been counted, and winners have been proclaimed. There is precedent to declare this case
moot had respondent Marcos, Jr. not garnered the highest number of votes. 130
In the cases where the qualifications of a presidential candidate were questioned, the issues
sought to be determined involved questions on citizenship, 131 and both citizenship and residency.
132 These issues were definitively decided before the conduct of the elections.
The cases involving the winners of the two highest positions in the Executive branch that
were decided after the conduct of the elections did not question the qualifications of the candidates
or the validity of their COCs. All of these cases were election protests, 133 adjudicated by this Court
acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET),where the second placers questioned the number
of votes of the proclaimed winners and sought to be proclaimed in their stead.
This Court, in all the cases involving controversies over the candidacies or election of the
President or Vice-President, has always asserted its jurisdiction to decide the cases brought before it
under the authority vested upon it by the Constitution. We take the same stance here and decide on
the issues raised in the present Petitions.
We deem it necessary to state at the outset that the qualifications for the candidates for
President are not limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. Section 2, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election.
Additionally, a candidate for President may also find his or her COC canceled under grounds
found in statutes such as the OEC. Specifically, Section 69 of the OEC has laid down the
requirements to weed out nuisance candidates for elective positions, including those for President.
134 It reads:
 Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates.— The Commission may motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of
the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
I. A petition to deny due course or to
cancel a COC is distinct from a
petition for disqualification
We acknowledge that there are distinctions between the remedies sought by the petitioners in
these consolidated cases. The present petitions stem from two cases before the COMELEC: (1) SPA
Case No. 21-156 (DC),filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al.,which sought to deny due course to or
cancel respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC; and (2) SPA No. 21-212 (DC),filed by petitioners Ilagan, et
al.,which sought to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr. as a candidate for President.
A petition to deny due course to or cancel COC is governed by Section 78 in relation to
Section 74, of the OEC, to wit:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.— A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.— The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office;if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge. x x x (Emphases supplied.) cSaATC

On the other hand, a petition for disqualification may be filed pursuant to Sections 12 or 68 of
the OEC. 135 The provisions under the OEC state, in relevant part:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications.— Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
These disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85 and 261, paragraphs
d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
A. A petition to deny due course or to
cancel a COC shares similarities with
a petition for disqualification
Apart from having the same respondent, these consolidated petitions share further
similarities. For one, they are both pre-election remedies with a similar objective: to prevent a
purportedly ineligible candidate from running for an elective position. 136 In addition, they can be
filed by any registered voter or any duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of
political parties. 137
On this score, and based on our examination of the records, there appears to be no real
disagreement on the matter of petitioners' standing to file these cases. The records show that the
present Petitions were filed by petitioners Buenafe, et al.,and Ilagan, et al.,in their capacities as
citizens, registered voters,martial law victims and rights advocates. 138 Although the COMELEC
did not appear to have any issues on the matter initially, it now contests petitioners' standing, on the
theory that the instant petitions have been rendered moot by respondent Marcos, Jr.'s supervening
proclamation. 139 The COMELEC maintains that since the issues raised against respondent Marcos,
Jr.'s qualifications are essentially election contests, which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
PET, 140 petitioners, to have standing, must show proof that they were either a registered candidate
for the presidency who received the second or third highest number of votes, or a voter who voted in
the May 2022 elections. 141
We will discuss the questions of mootness and jurisdiction in another part of this Decision.
Nevertheless, and for purposes of settling the issue of standing, suffice to state that petitioners, as the
parties aggrieved by the denial of their respective petitions before the COMELEC, are allowed under
the Rules of Court to assail the judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 142 Significantly, respondent
Marcos, Jr. never challenged petitioners' standing in any of the pleadings he filed before the
COMELEC and this Court. 143 cHDAIS

B. A petition to deny due course to or to

cancel a COC and a petition for
disqualification are different remedies
Ultimately, however, a petition to deny due course to or to cancel COC and a petition for
disqualification are "different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different
eventualities." 144
First,the two remedies are anchored on distinct grounds: whereas an action under Section 78
of the OEC is concerned with the false representation by a candidate as to material information in
the COC, 145 a petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or
lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the elective position said candidate is seeking. 146 To
prosper, the former requires proof of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact 147
relating to the candidate's requisite residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification
necessary to run for elective office; 148 the latter, possession of a disqualification as declared by a
final decision of a competent court, or as found by the Commission. 149
Second,they have different prescriptive periods:a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
COC may be filed within five days from the last day of filing of COCs, but not later than 25 days
from the filing of the COC sought to be canceled; a petition for disqualification may be filed any day
after the last day of the filing of COC, but not later than the date of the proclamation. 150
Third,both have markedly distinct effects:a disqualified person is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, while the person whose certificate is canceled or denied due course is not
treated as a candidate at all. 151 Moreover, a disqualified candidate may still be substituted 152 if
they had a valid COC in the first place. However, one whose COC was denied due course or
canceled cannot be substituted because the law considers him or her to not have been a candidate at
all. 153
While the grounds for a petition for disqualification are limited to Sections 12 and 68 of
the OEC, and, for local elective officials, Section 40 of the LGC, the same grounds may be
invoked in a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC if these involve the representations
required under Section 78.
The case of Chua v. COMELEC 154 (Chua) is instructive on this point. In Chua, a Petition to
Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel COC was filed against Arlene Chua on the date of her
proclamation as councilor based on the allegation that she was a dual citizen and a permanent
resident of the United States of America (U.S.). Notwithstanding the caption of the petition, the
COMELEC considered the same as one for Disqualification since the ground cited falls under
Section 40 of the LGC. As such, the COMELEC found that the petition was timely filed pursuant to
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended. The Court, faced with the issue of
whether the petition was for disqualification or to deny due course to or cancel COC, elucidated that
the choice of remedy lies with the petitioner, to wit:
It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their
certificates of candidacy declare that they are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country. Therefore, a petition to deny due course [to] or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may likewise be filed against a permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an
elective post in the Philippines on the ground of material misrepresentation in the certificate
of candidacy.
What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If the
false material representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for
disqualification, the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course
[to] or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the
petition filed complies with the requirements under the law. ISHCcT

Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing
either a petition to deny due course [to] or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy or a
petition for disqualification. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
As in Chua, Section 12 of the OEC may likewise be invoked as a ground for a petition to
deny due course to or cancel COC since Section 74 of the OEC requires a person filing a COC to
declare that he is eligible for office. Thus, in Ty-Delgado v. HRET 155 (Ty-Delgado), We found that
therein petitioner committed false material representation in his COC as to his eligibility given that
he had been convicted by a final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, which is a ground
for disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC.
II. This Court has jurisdiction over the
present petitions
A. The petitions are not moot
A case is moot when a supervening event has terminated the legal issue between the parties,
such that this Court is left with nothing to resolve. It can no longer grant any relief or enforce any
right, and anything it says on the matter will have no practical use or value. 156 This is not the
scenario We have here.
The issues raised in both the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions — whether respondent Marcos, Jr.
is guilty of material misrepresentation of his eligibility and whether he suffers any of the grounds for
disqualification — are not rendered moot by his receipt of the highest number of votes or by his
subsequent proclamation. The petitions raise fundamental questions as to whether respondent
Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be a candidate for President. These are actual and justiciable controversies
that the Court must resolve in the exercise of its judicial power. We cannot stress enough that the
qualification of the candidate is not waived by his or her subsequent election to the office. A
candidate may obtain 99% of the votes cast, but if he or she is found to possess any of the grounds
for disqualification, our laws prohibit such candidate from occupying public office.
In its Comment, the COMELEC argues that the case was mooted by the completion of the
electoral process, where respondent Marcos, Jr. obtained an overwhelming number of votes, and his
proclamation as the President-elect. 157
However, the cases relied upon by the COMELEC are not on all fours with the present
Petitions. In Perez v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,158 We ruled that a provincial fiscal is
deemed ipso facto resigned from office upon his filing of a COC for Mayor of Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile, in Morelos v. Dela Rosa,159 We dismissed a petition to annul the election
of barrio officials for being moot due to the expiration of their term of office.
The COMELEC's use of Our pronouncement in Quizon v. COMELEC 160 (Quizon) should
likewise be clarified. To justify overlooking irregularities in the COC, We explained:
As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is
important to note that this Court has repeatedly held that provisions of the election law
regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the
information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections.
Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of the people. In the
instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of votes. Technicalities should not be
permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable
from the ballot itself, as in this case. 161 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
We underscore, however, that Our pronouncement in Quizon is limited to technical
irregularities in the COC (such as signing and swearing on the same and information required to be
stated) and not the eligibility of a candidate.
B. The conditions for the filing of
petitions before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal have not been met
Respondent Marcos, Jr. and the COMELEC argue that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
Petitions since exclusive jurisdiction now lies with the PET. 162
 The last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests, relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate rules for the
purpose." This is echoed in Rule 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC, or the 2010 Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, which reads:
Rule 13. Jurisdiction.— The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.CAacTH

1. An election contest is initiated

through a petition against a
winning candidate who has assumed
office
The 1987 Constitution mandates the creation of Electoral Tribunals for only four offices:
President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. It is recognized
that Section 4, Article VII, which refers to the President and Vice-President, is similarly worded to
Section 17, Article VI, which refers to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. Both
provisions describe the respective Electoral Tribunals as being the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective subjects. The rulings on the
trigger point for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are thus instructive for identifying when the
jurisdiction of the PET should be invoked.
Our ruling in Reyes v. Commission on Elections 163 (Reyes) painstakingly described the
conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the HRET:
First,the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly
filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members.
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.(Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v.
COMELEC,the Court ruled that:
 The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath,and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,wherein
the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-à-vis the HRET, held that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath,and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,to wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by
Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions
regarding the conduct of election and contested returns — were transferred to
the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. 164 (Citations omitted)
Applying the ruling in Reyes to the present petitions, this Court, sitting En Banc,can only take
cognizance of an election contest if the following requisites concur: (a) a petition is filed before it;
and (b) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who has been validly
proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office. SaCIDT

These conditions are not present here. The Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions are filed under Rule
65 assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc.While respondent Marcos, Jr. has been
proclaimed as the Presidential candidate with the highest number of obtained votes, he has yet to
take his oath and assume office. As Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez astutely pointed out, the term
of office begins at noon on the 30th day of June following the election. Hence, as long as the
petitions remain with this Court before 30 June 2022, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve them. 165
2. No petition has been filed before the
PET
Based on current records, no petition for an election contest has been filed before the PET. An
election protest should be filed within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner. 166 On the
other hand, a petition for quo warranto should be filed within ten days after the proclamation of the
winner. 167
The petitioner in an election protest is limited to the registered candidate for President or
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes. On the
other hand, a quo warranto case may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election
concerned.
An election protest is anchored on allegations of electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities
in the protested precincts, while a petition for quo warranto attacks the protestee's ineligibility or
specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. 168
In any case, the proclamation, oath-taking, and assumption of the President result in removing
from the jurisdiction of this Court any pre-proclamation remedy elevated to the Court from the
COMELEC.
C. The PET is a function of the Supreme
Court En Banc
The peculiar scenario availing here is that the present Petitions are pending before Us after
the same were elevated from the COMELEC after the conduct of the elections. The PET, which is
this Court sitting en banc,has to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the issues of election, returns,
and qualifications upon the assumption to office of respondent Marcos, Jr. The question then is:
should We dismiss these petitions and wait for the same petitions to be filed before Us sitting as the
PET?
To arrive at the answer, We revisit the history of the PET and its relation to the Court as
elucidated in Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,169 thus:
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The
precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested
upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections — from the
canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-
president elect, and even the determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such
proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating an institution
that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a defeated
candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved or to
challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-
presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.
The omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by
the absence of a similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of the United States.
Rather, the creation of such tribunal was left to the determination of the National Assembly. x
xx
To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No.
1793, establishing an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election
of President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court were tasked to sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was
extended to retired Supreme Court Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may
be appointed as substitutes for ill, absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members. aTHCSE

The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its
proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding presidential and vice-presidential
contests and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon courts of justice,
including the issuance of subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their
appearance, production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish
contemptuous acts and bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and
employees necessary for the efficient performance of its functions.
R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which
replaced the bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a
parliamentary government.
With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the
President was not directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the
National Assembly, while the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.
In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive
power was restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive
Committee was formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties.
 Eventually, the Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was
installed anew.
These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on
December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the
Office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while
the six were divided equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in
the Batasang Pambansa.
Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was
permitted to recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private
individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the
canvassing and/or accomplishing of election returns.
The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific
budget from the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It
was empowered to appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the
subordinate officers were strictly employees of the judiciary or other officers of the
government who were merely designated to the tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed
the then statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional
nomenclature:
FR. BERNAS.
xxx xxx xxx
...So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we
have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an
infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the
Supreme Court is a judicial power.
xxx xxx xxx
Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court,
sitting en banc.x x xIDSEAH

The "constitutionalization" of the PET has been described as independent but not separate
from the Judiciary. As such, the PET cannot be considered distinct from the Supreme Court, thus:
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc.In the same vein, although the method by
which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme
Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e.,the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET),which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.
 Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the
parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable
conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the
PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government —
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary — but not separate therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG.
Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
MR. AZCUNA.
It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG.
If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA.
It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG.
I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino,77 Phil.
192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled
that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government.
Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA.
Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments
are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are
constitutional bodies. aCIHcD

The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna and Regalado E. Maambong is schooled
by our holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:
"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal ...which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the
Philippines."
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest
judicially the election of the President-elect or Vice-President-elect and to
demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation, as
well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected president or
vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume
the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the
other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon
such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that
courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those
of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the
 situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises
its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or
municipal court) is only one,although the functions may be distinct and,
even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of
its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct
and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration
or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the
authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such
municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when
hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of
courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court,although it may
perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some
characteristics different from those of the others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first
instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate
jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts and, appellate
courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court,
one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to
discharge said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the
functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of
juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of
a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter,
for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is
not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the
functions peculiar to the said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by
Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the
President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the
Members of the Supreme Court. ScHADI

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the
Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the
PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies — not unlawfully defies — the constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal's functions as a special electoral court.
170 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
When the Court acts as the PET, it is not a separate and distinct body from the Court itself.
The constitutional provision refers to the same "Supreme Court sitting en banc." However, it should
be recognized that the proceedings before the PET require a distinct set of rules of procedure owing
to the very specific nature of its functions. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court En Banc as
the PET is likened to the characterization of specialized courts in relation to the then Courts of First
Instance. They are the same courts having the same jurisdiction, only that specialized courts are
intended for practicality. Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution therefore should not be
considered as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court over the pending petitions.
III. Respondent Marcos, Jr. possesses all
of the qualifications and does not
 possess any of the grounds for
disqualification
Any person intending to run for public office needs to have the qualifications required under
the law for the position he or she intends to hold. 171 At the same time, he or she must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law and the relevant regulations. 172
We reiterate that the qualifications for President and Vice-President are prescribed in Section
2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. These qualifications are also found in Section 63 of the OEC.
There is no question that respondent Marcos, Jr. has all the qualifications of a candidate for
President as provided under the Constitution and the OEC. Notably, neither the Buenafe Petition nor
the Ilagan Petition alleges that respondent Marcos, Jr. lacks any of these qualifications: natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election.
Petitioners Ilagan, et al.,instead argue that respondent Marcos, Jr. has been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude and is thus disqualified from being a candidate and holding any
government office under Section 12 173 of the OEC.
Notably, Section 68 of the OEC, which provides additional grounds for disqualification,
namely, being found to have committed an election offense, 174 or being a permanent resident of, or
an immigrant in, a foreign country, is not being invoked in the present case. Hence, We limit Our
discussion to the alleged disqualification of respondent Marcos, Jr. under Section 12 of the OEC.
A. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file
income tax returns is not a crime
involving moral turpitude
The CA found respondent Marcos, Jr. guilty of failing to file income tax returns for the
taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-92-
29217. 175 Petitioners Ilagan, et al.,argue that this amounts to a conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, which has the effect of disqualifying respondent Marcos, Jr. from being a candidate
and from holding any government office. Failure to file income tax returns may or may not be a
crime involving moral turpitude. We explain this below. HSCATc

Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, nor do they necessarily have to be heinous.
Moral turpitude has been often understood to mean acts that are "contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general." 176 It does not include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited. 177
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, in his separate concurring opinion in Teves v.
COMELEC,178 laid down the historical roots of moral turpitude. He explained:
I. Historical Roots
The term 'moral turpitude' first took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration
laws. Its history can be traced back as far as the 17th century when the States of Virginia and
Pennsylvania enacted the earliest immigration resolutions excluding criminals from America,
in response to the British government's policy of sending convicts to the colonies. State
legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe was deliberately exporting its human
liabilities. In the U.S.,the term 'moral turpitude' first appeared in the Immigration Act of
March 3, 1891, which directed the exclusion of persons who have been convicted of a felony
or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; this marked the first time
 the U.S. Congress used the term 'moral turpitude' in immigration laws. Since then, the
presence of moral turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including
legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of medical licenses.
Moral turpitude also has been judicially used as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching
witnesses, in determining the measure of contribution between joint tortfeasors, and in
deciding whether a certain language is slanderous.
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the term 'moral
turpitude' in Jordan v. De George.The case presented only one question: whether conspiracy
to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime involving moral turpitude within the
meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1919 (Immigration Act).Sam de George,
an Italian immigrant was convicted twice of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government of
taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered de George's
deportation on the basis of the Immigration Act provision that allows the deportation of aliens
who commit multiple crimes involving moral turpitude. De George argued that he should not
be deported because his tax evasion crimes did not involve moral turpitude. The U.S.
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinzon, disagreed, finding that 'under an unbroken
course of judicial decisions, the crime of conspiring to defraud the U.S. is a crime involving
moral turpitude.' Notably, the Court determined that fraudulent conduct involved moral
turpitude without exception:
Whatever the phrase 'involving moral turpitude' may mean in
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud
was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.
...Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged. ...We therefore
decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory
consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is deportation.
Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never exactly defined what amounts to a 'crime
involving moral turpitude.' The legislative history of statutes containing the moral turpitude
standard indicates that Congress left the interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and
administrative agencies. In the absence of legislative history as interpretative aid, American
courts have resorted to the dictionary definition — 'the last resort of the baffled judge.' The
most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one found in the early editions of
Black's Law Dictionary:
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social
duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. ...Act
or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards
of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some
criminal offenses as distinguished from others. ...The quality of a crime
involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as
distinguished from statutory mala prohibita." 179 (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the concept of "moral turpitude" can be traced back to
the immigration laws of the U.S. It is thus not surprising that in determining whether a crime
involves moral turpitude, this Court has earlier used definitions from U.S. cases as reference. DaIAcC

It may be worth noting that under the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual, the following are
considered common crimes involving moral turpitude:
(a) crimes committed against property — making false representation, knowledge of such
false representation by the perpetrator, reliance on the false representation by the
person defrauded, intent to defraud, actual act of committing fraud, arson, blackmail,
burglary, embezzlement, extortion, false pretenses, forgery, fraud, larceny (grand or
 petty),malicious destruction of property, receiving stolen goods (with guilty
knowledge),robbery, theft (when it involves the intention of permanent
taking),transporting stolen property (with guilty knowledge),animal fighting, credit
card/identity fraud, damaging private property (where intent to damage is not
required),breaking and entering (if the statute does not require a specific or implicit
intent to commit a crime involving moral turpitude),passing bad checks (where intent
to defraud is not required by the statute),possessing stolen property (if guilty
knowledge is not essential for a conviction under the statute),joy riding (where the
intention to take the vehicle permanently is not required under the statute),and juvenile
delinquency;
(b) crimes committed against government authority — bribery, counterfeiting, fraud
against revenue or other government functions, mail fraud, perjury, harboring a
fugitive from justice (with guilty knowledge),and tax evasion (willful);and
(c) crimes committed against person, family relationship, and sexual morality —
abandonment of a minor child (if willful and resulting in the destitution of the
child),assault with intent to kill, assault with intent to commit rape, assault with intent
to commit robbery, assault with intent to commit serious bodily harm, assault with a
dangerous or deadly weapon, bigamy, contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
gross indecency, incest (if the result of an improper sexual relationship),kidnapping,
lewdness, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter (where the statute
requires proof of recklessness generally will involve moral turpitude),mayhem,
murder, pandering, possession of child pornography, prostitution, and rape (including
statutory rape).180
In 1955, the Supreme Court of California, in Call v. State Bar of California,181 characterized
moral turpitude as one that involves fraud, and must be distinguished from mere neglect or
unintended failure, viz.:
"The term moral turpitude includes fraud and has been said to mean dishonesty and
conduct not in accordance with good morals; being based on moral guilt, it implies an
intentional breach of the duty owed to a client as distinguished from an unintended failure to
discharge his duties to the best of his ability." 182
In the 1990 case of In Re Grimes,183 it was ruled that willful commission of a crime does not
automatically mean fraudulent, hence, it does not per se involve moral turpitude. In said case,
petitioner attorney pleaded guilty to three (3) counts of willfully failing to file a tax return. The
Supreme Court of California found that petitioner's misconduct did not involve moral turpitude, but
it did warrant discipline.
In the Philippines, we can trace the term moral turpitude as far back as 1901 in Act No. 190
(Code of Civil Actions and Special Proceedings). This law provided that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Subsequently, moral turpitude found its way in statutes governing
disqualifications of notaries public, priests and ministers in solemnizing marriages, registration to
military service, exclusion and naturalization of aliens, discharge of the accused to be a state
witness, admission to the bar, suspension and removal of elective local officials, and disqualification
of persons from running for any elective local position. 184
We first had occasion to characterize moral turpitude in the 1920 case of In Re Basa.185 This
involves an interpretation of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a
lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted
of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question presented was whether the crime of
abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral
turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes, turned to Bouvier's Law Dictionary
for guidance and held: TAacHE

'Moral turpitude,' it has been said, 'includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.' (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous
courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot
admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the
act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. 186
Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general dictionary
definition to interpret the concept of moral turpitude.
In subsequent cases, We continued borrowing definitions established in U.S. jurisprudence. In
the 1959 case of Tak Ng v. Republic,187 We cited U.S. cases defining moral turpitude to pertain to an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties that a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and man 188 or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. 189
Twenty years later, in 1979, in Zari v. Flores,190 We added that moral turpitude implies
something immoral in itself, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely
be mala prohibita,the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, establishes moral turpitude. 191 Moral turpitude does not, however, include
such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being
positively prohibited. 192
Meanwhile, in other cases, We examined the existence of moral turpitude based on the
fraudulent intent of the offender. The Court in its 1964 decision in Ao Lin v. Republic 193 explained:
We hold that the use of a meter stick without the corresponding seal of the Internal
Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in business for a. long time, involves moral
turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a meter stick, not necessarily because the
Government is cheated of the revenue involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it
manifests an evil intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him
in respect to the measurement of the goods purchased. 194
Then, in 1975, in the case In Re Lanuevo,195 We declared that it is for the Supreme Court to
determine what crime involves moral turpitude. 196 This became the foundation of the
jurisprudential doctrine holding that whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute. 197
Over the years, We adjudged the following as crimes involving moral turpitude:
1. Abduction with consent 198
2. Bigamy 199
3. Concubinage 200
4. Smuggling 201
5. Rape 202
6. Estafa through falsification of a document 203
7. Attempted Bribery 204
 8. Profiteering 205
9. Robbery 206
10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted 207
11. Estafa 208
12. Theft 209
13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker 210
14. Violation of BP Blg. 22 211
15. Falsification of Document 212
16. Intriguing against Honor 213 HDICSa

17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law 214

18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing) 215
19. Perjury 216
20. Forgery 217
21. Direct Bribery 218
22. Frustrated Homicide 219
23. Adultery 220
24. Arson 221
25. Evasion of income tax 222
26. Barratry 223
27. Blackmail 224
28. Criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium 225
29. Dueling 226
30. Embezzlement 227
31. Extortion 228
32. Forgery 229
33. Libel 230
34. Making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract 231
35. Mutilation of public records 232
36. Fabrication of evidence 233
37. Offenses against pension laws 234
38. Seduction under the promise of marriage 235
39. Falsification of public document 236
40. Estafa thru falsification of public document 237
Indeed, in Zari v. Flores,238 We said that tax evasion is a crime involving moral turpitude. On
whether an act or omission constitutes tax evasion, We certainly agree that it depends on the totality
of circumstances. As such, it must be clarified that failure to file income tax return does not
always amount to tax evasion.Tax evasion connotes fraud through the use of pretenses and
forbidden devices to lessen or defeat taxes. 239 The fraud contemplated by law is actual and not
constructive. It must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately done or
resorted to in order to induce another to give up some legal right. Negligence, whether slight or
gross, is not equivalent to the fraud with intent to evade the tax contemplated by law. It must amount
to intentional wrong-doing with the sole object of avoiding the tax. 240 Furthermore, tax evasion
connotes the integration of three factors: (a) the end to be achieved, i.e.,the payment of less than that
known by the taxpayer to be legally due, or the non-payment of tax when it is shown that a tax is
due; (b) an accompanying state of mind, which is described as being "evil," in "bad faith," "willful,"
or "deliberate and not accidental";and (c) a course of action or failure of action that is unlawful. 241
On the other hand, failure to file income tax return may be committed by neglect, without any
fraudulent intent and/or willfulness. In fact, under Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC, the law treats
"failure to file any return" differently from "willful neglect to file the return." The former is meted
with a surcharge of 25%, while the latter, 50%. 242 The 50% rate is referred to as the fraud
penalty.243 Previously, under Section 72 of the 1939 NIRC, a taxpayer may be excused from the
25% surcharge if the taxpayer subsequently files the return despite absence of BIR notice and the
earlier failure is due to a reasonable cause. Section 248 of the 1997 NIRC and Section 72 of the 1939
NIRC respectively state: ASTcaE

Sec. 248. Civil Penalties.—

(A) There shall be imposed, in addition to the tax required to be paid, a penalty
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount due, in the following cases:
(1) Failure to file any return and pay the tax due thereon as required
under the provisions of this Code or rules and regulations on the date
prescribed; or
(2) Unless otherwise authorized by the Commissioner, filing a return with
an internal revenue officer other than those with whom the return is required to
be filed; or
(3) Failure to pay the deficiency tax within the time prescribed for its
payment in the notice of assessment; or
(4) Failure to pay the full or part of the amount of tax shown on any return
required to be filed under the provisions of this Code or rules and regulations,
or the full amount of tax due for which no return is required to be filed, on or
before the date prescribed for its payment.
(B) In case of willful neglect to file the return within the period prescribed by this Code
or by rules and regulations, or in case a false or fraudulent return is willfully made, the
penalty to be imposed shall be fifty percent (50%) of the tax or of the deficiency tax, in case,
any payment has been made on the basis of such return before the discovery of the falsity or
fraud: Provided, That a substantial under-declaration of taxable sales, receipts or income, or a
substantial overstatement of deductions, as determined by the Commissioner pursuant to the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, shall constitute prima
facie evidence of a false or fraudulent return: Provided, further, That failure to report sales,
receipts or income in an amount exceeding thirty percent (30%) of that declared per return,
and a claim of deductions in an amount exceeding (30%) of actual deductions, shall render the
taxpayer liable for substantial under-declaration of sales, receipts or income or for
overstatement of deductions, as mentioned herein.
Sec. 72. Surcharges for Failure to Render Returns and for Rendering False and
Fraudulent Returns. — The Collector of Internal Revenue shall assess all income taxes. In
 case of willful neglect to file the return or list within the time prescribed by law, or in case a
false or fraudulent return or list is willfully made, the Collector of Internal Revenue shall add
to the tax or to the deficiency tax, in case any payment has been made on the basis of such
return before the discovery of the falsity or fraud, or surcharge of fifty per centum of the
amount of such tax or deficiency tax. In case of any failure to make and file a return or list
within the time prescribed by law or by the Collector or other internal revenue officer, not due
to willful neglect, the Collector of Internal Revenue shall add to tax twenty-five per centum
of its amount, except that, when a return is voluntarily and without notice from the
Collector or other officer filed after such time, and it is shown that the failure to file it
was due to a reasonable cause, no such addition shall be made to the tax.The amount so
added to any tax shall be collected at the same time and in the same manner as part of the tax
unless the tax has been paid before the discovery of the neglect, falsity, or fraud, in which case
the amount so added shall be collected in the same manner as the tax. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing discussion illustrates that omission to file a tax return is not fraudulent per se.
As Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier eloquently declared, taken in its proper context,
the failure to file a compensation income tax return is far from being "everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general." 244
Although petitioners suggest that We reexamine the totality of circumstances surrounding
respondent Marcos, Jr.'s non-filing of an income tax return, We deem it unnecessary to go through
the same exercise because of this Court's Decision involving the same facts. In Republic v. Marcos
II,245 We already declared that respondent Marcos Jr.'s non-filing of an income tax return is not a
crime involving moral turpitude, viz.: cDSAEI

The 'failure to file an income tax return' is not a crime involving moral turpitude
as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or
willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as
well as previous Court decisions which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax
return, the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return
with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return.
The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which reads:
(b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax — x x x
In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time prescribed by law, or
makes willfully or otherwise, false or fraudulent return or list x x x.
Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,this Court observed:
To our minds we can dispense with these controversial arguments on
facts, although we do not deny than the findings of facts by the Court of Tax
Appeals, supported as they are by very substantial evidence, carry great
weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of Section 332 of the NIRC. We
believe that the proper and reasonable interpretation of said provision should
be that in the three different cases of (1) false return, (2) fraudulent return with
intent to evade tax, (3) failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without
assessment, at any time within ten years after the discovery of the (1) falsity,
(2) fraud, and (3) omission. Our stand that the law should be interpreted to
mean a separation of the three different situations of false return,
fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return is
strengthened immeasurably by the last portion of the provision which
 segregates the situations into three different classes, namely, "falsity,"
"fraud" and "omission."
Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar, the filing of a 'fraudulent
return with intent to evade tax' is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness
and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for
'failure to file a return' where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this
Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not
being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.
(Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Republic v. Marcos II involved the same Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569
and considered the same act of non-filing of income tax returns at issue in the present Petitions. We
held in the said case that respondent Marcos, Jr. is not disqualified from being an executor of his
father's will since the crime of failure to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.
Thus, consistent with our earlier pronouncement, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file income tax
returns does not involve moral turpitude.
The foregoing militates against the notion that non-filing of income tax return by an
individual taxpayer receiving purely compensation income involves moral turpitude, or is against
good morals and accepted rule of conduct. 246 It is not in itself immoral, and neither does it
constitute an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 247 Thus, We sustain the COMELEC's ruling that the
omission of respondent Marcos Jr. to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude.
As We sustain COMELEC's ruling, We, however, address and state Our disagreement with
the argument that the omission to file income tax returns does not involve moral turpitude because
the offense has already been decriminalized by RA 10963, otherwise known as the Tax Reform for
Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law.
At this juncture, We clarify that non-filing of income tax returns has not been decriminalized
under the 1997 NIRC and its subsequent amendments. Rather, what our current tax laws introduced
are classifications of taxpayers who are not required to file an income tax return and who may file a
tax return under the substituted filing system. cDCEIA

This clarification starts with a distinction between taxpayers who are not required to file
income tax returns from taxpayers who file tax returns under the substituted filing system. Under
Section 51 (A) (2) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, a minimum wage earner is exempt from income
tax and is not required to file an income tax return. On the other hand, an individual earning purely
compensation income from a single employer whose income tax has been correctly withheld by said
employer is not required to file an annual income tax return. 248 Over the years, the BIR recognized
the need to simplify the filing of individual income tax returns. It introduced the substituted filing
system in Revenue Regulations (R.R.) No. 3-2002, 249 which was further amended by R.R. No. 19-
2002. 250 Substituted filing took effect in taxable year 2001 and was made mandatory starting the
taxable year 2002.
The substituted filing system made it easier for pure compensation earners to file their income
tax returns because the relevant information is more accessible to their employers. In substituted
filing, the employer's annual return for the employee is considered as the employee's income tax
return because they contain identical information. Employers, or other persons who are required to
deduct and withhold the tax on compensation, furnish their employees with a Certificate of Income
Tax Withheld on Compensation,or BIR Form No. 2316. 251 After the issuance of a joint certification
by the employer and the employee, the employee who is qualified for substituted filing is no longer
required to file an Annual Income Tax Return,or BIR Form No. 1700. 252
 "Substituted filing" was distinguished from "non-filing" of income tax returns in Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 1-2003. RMC No. 1-2003 further clarified the provisions of R.R.
No. 3-2002, as amended by R.R. No. 19-2002.
Under "substituted filing," an individual taxpayer although required under the law to
file his income tax return, will no longer have to personally file his own income tax return but
instead the employer's annual information return filed will be considered as the "substitute"
income tax return of the employee inasmuch as the information in the employer's return is
exactly the same information in the employee's return.
"Non-filing" is applicable to taxpayers who are not required under the law to file an
income tax return. An example is an employee whose pure compensation income does not
exceed P60,000, and has only one employer for the taxable year and whose tax withheld is
equivalent to his tax due. 253
The substituted filing system did not dispense with the requirement of filing income tax
returns for pure compensation earners. Neither did it exempt qualified taxpayers from filing income
tax returns as required by Section 51 of the 1997 NIRC.
Prior to the enactment of the TRAIN Law in 2017, an individual whose pure compensation
income is derived from sources within the Philippines exceeds P60,000.00 is still mandated to file an
income tax return. 254 Hence, even if an individual taxpayer is qualified to avail of the substituted
filing of income tax return, he or she is still not excused from filing an income tax return. The
TRAIN Law, in amending the 1997 NIRC, added a new Section 51-A, to incorporate the substituted
filing system established by BIR practice into law. 255
Sec. 51-A. Substituted Filing of Income Tax Returns by Employees Receiving
Purely Compensation Income.— Individual taxpayers receiving purely compensation income,
regardless of amount, from only one employer in the Philippines for the calendar year, the
income tax of which has been withheld correctly by the said employer (tax due equals tax
withheld) shall not he required to file an annual income tax return. The certificate of
withholding filed by the respective employers, duly stamped 'received' by the BIR, shall be
tantamount to the substituted filing of income tax returns by said employees.
Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao states 256 that, in adopting the system of substituted
filing under Section 51-A of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended by the TRAIN Law, Congress did not
decriminalize the non-filing of income tax returns. It merely ordained, for the convenience of
individual taxpayers, a practice already established and observed by the BIR. What is clear, however,
is that the non-filing of income tax returns by those who have not duly met the requirements and
conditions may still be penalized under both the 1997 NIRC and the TRAIN Law.
In any event, as discussed above, the COMELEC concluded that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s
failure to file income tax returns does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. And We
affirm the COMELEC's conclusion.
B. Conviction for non-filing of income tax
returns is not a ground for disqualification
The RTC convicted respondent Marcos, Jr. and meted out the penalty of imprisonment and
fine. However, the CA modified this ruling and limited the penalty to the payment of fine. 257
In arguing that Section 12 of the OEC should still apply to disqualify respondent Marcos, Jr.,
petitioners Ilagan, et al., asserted before the COMELEC that the CA Decision is void for failing to
follow the penalty provided under Section 254 of the 1977 NIRC, which expressly imposes the
penalty of both imprisonment and a fine. TEHIaD
 Further, petitioners Ilagan, et al., insist that, even if the CA did not err in deleting the penalty
of imprisonment in resolving the case against respondent Marcos, Jr., he is still perpetually
disqualified on the basis of the unequivocal language of PD 1994, which amended the 1977 NIRC.
They argue that a mandatory accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification is imposed by PD 1994
in addition to the penalties provided under the 1977 NIRC. 258 For their part, petitioners Buenafe, et
al.,assert that the consequence of perpetual disqualification applies to all convictions of crimes
under the NIRC, regardless of the imposed penalty. 259
We agree with the COMELEC, that the introduction of the penalty of both imprisonment and
fine in Section 254 only became effective in 1998 when the 1997 NIRC was passed. Consequently,
this cannot be retroactively applied to the prejudice of respondent Marcos, Jr., who was convicted
for failure to file the required tax returns for the years 1982 to 1985. Well-settled is the rule that
penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, unless favorable to the accused. 260
Following the doctrine on immutability of judgments, 261 the CA Decision has long attained
finality and can no longer be modified in any respect. Nevertheless, We deem it necessary to restate
and clarify which laws apply to the different violations.
For respondent Marcos, Jr's. failure to file income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1984,
what should apply instead is Section 73 of the 1977 NIRC, which states: DETACa

Sec. 73. Penalty for failure to file return or to pay tax. — Any one liable to pay
the tax, to make a return or to supply information required under this Code, who refuses or
neglects to pay such tax, to make such return or to supply such information at the time or
times herein specified in each year, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, PD 1994 is the applicable law for respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file
his 1985 income tax return. Section 288 of said law imposes the penalty of a fine or imprisonment
or both:
Sec. 288. Failure to file return, supply information, pay tax, withhold and remit
tax. — Any person required under this Code or by regulations promulgated thereunder to pay
any tax, make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay
such tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, or withhold or
remit taxes withheld, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than five
thousand pesos nor more than fifty thousand pesos, or imprisoned for not less than six
months and one day but not more than five years, or both.
Any person who attempts to make it appear for any reason that he or another has in
fact filed are turn or statement, or actually files a return or statement and subsequently
withdraws the same return or statement after securing the official receiving seal or stamp of
receipt of an internal revenue office wherein the same was actually filed shall, upon
conviction therefor be fined not less than three thousand pesos or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the CA had the discretion to impose the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both,
upon respondent Marcos, Jr. The CA's Decision imposing only the penalty of a fine is valid.
Consequently, respondent Marcos, Jr. cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was sentenced by
final judgment to a penalty of more than eighteen months under Section 12 of the OEC.
Similarly, as will be expounded later on, We agree with the COMELEC's finding that
respondent Marcos, Jr. was not imposed with the penalty of perpetual disqualification from running
for public office. 262
 The said accessory penalty was not originally provided for in the 1977 NIRC, as this was
only imposed upon the effectivity of PD 1994 in 01 January 1986. 263 Hence, again, respondent
Marcos, Jr. may be imposed with the accessory penalty only for his failure to file his income tax
return for the year 1985.
However, a perusal of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision 264 would reveal that the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification was not imposed on respondent Marcos, Jr.
Evidently, this this CA Decision has long attained finality, and can no longer be touched upon by this
Court. 265 To alter the same would be extremely prejudicial to respondent Marcos, Jr.,and would
create a precedent contrary to the basic principle that all doubts should be construed against the State
and in favor of the accused. 266
IV. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in refusing to deny due
course to or to cancel respondent
Marcos, Jr.'s COC
Respondent Marcos, Jr. raises the argument that petitioners Buenafe, et al., violated Section 1,
Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, which states: aHSTID

Sec. 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy.—

xxx xxx xxx
A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds other
than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a separate
remedy, shall be summarily dismissed. 267
Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,counter that their petition before the COMELEC did not violate the
cited provision since it only raised grounds relating to the falsity of the material representation of
eligibility in respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC. 268 Thus, the COMELEC erred in ruling that their
petition was susceptible to summary dismissal for invoking grounds for disqualification. 269
For their part, respondent Marcos, Jr. and the COMELEC claim that the petition may be
summarily dismissed for raising grounds for disqualification, such as respondent Marcos, Jr.'s
conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude and a crime that carries the penalty of
imprisonment of more than eighteen (18) months. 270
However, these arguments are neither decisive of, nor relevant to, the present controversy.
The COMELEC did not dismiss the petition on the ground of violating Section 1, Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the substantive issues raised and
denied the petition for lack of merit. 271 The pertinent portion of the COMELEC Second Division's
Resolution dated 17 January 2022 reads:
Despite summary dismissal being warranted in the case at bar, We shall nevertheless
relax compliance with the technical rules of procedure and proceed to discuss the merits if
only to fully and finally settle the matter in this case because of its paramount importance. 272
The COMELEC En Banc further noted that "despite the finding that the Petition may be
summarily dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements under the law, the Commission
(Second Division) relaxed compliance with technical rules and proceeded to discuss the merits of the
case." 273 Given that, there is no need to belabor the procedural correctness of petitioners Buenafe,
et al.'s submissions before the COMELEC. Whether petitioners Buenafe, et al.,raised arguments
more appropriate for a petition for disqualification 274 is now irrelevant to this Court's resolution of
the present petitions.
 Moreover, the Court has ruled that, even without a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, "the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction." 275 Thus, even procedural defects in petitioners Buenafe, et al.'s
COMELEC petition will not save respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC from scrutiny.
In passing upon the merits of these petitions, We are mindful that the scope of Our review in a
petition for certiorari is limited. Pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court,
petitioners Buenafe, et al.,must show that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 276
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." 277 Thus, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. 278 The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 279
Unless it is firmly established that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, We would
not interfere with its decision. 280 Findings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by substantial
evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. 281 CDHaET

We find no grave abuse of discretion in this case. The COMELEC's ruling is amply supported
by law, jurisprudence, and the evidence on record.
As previously mentioned, Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC govern the cancellation of, or denial
of due course to, COCs on the ground of false material representation. Under Section 74, a person
filing a COC must state therein that "he is eligible for said office," among other information. On the
other hand, Section 78 expressly provides that the denial of due course or cancellation of a COC
may be filed exclusively on the ground that the information the candidate provided under Section 74
is false.
Notably, not every false representation warrants the denial of due course to or cancellation of
a COC. It must be shown that the false representation pertained to material information and was
made with an "intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office." 282
Thus, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not, in and of itself, justify the
cancellation of his or her COC. 283 The requisites of materiality and intent must be present.
A. Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s representations
that are subject of the Petitions are material
Section 78 does not specify the parameters of a "material representation." Nonetheless, this
Court has had numerous occasions in the past to expound on the concept.
In Villafuerte v. COMELEC,284 We held that, for a representation to be material, it must
"refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks to hold." Thus, facts
pertaining to a candidate's residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification are considered
material under Section 78 of the OEC. 285
Further, in Salcedo II v. COMELEC,286 the Court explained the rationale behind the
requirement of materiality, and concluded that the law should not be interpreted to cover innocuous
mistakes:
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by
Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having
made a false representation in his [or her] certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the
 candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him [or her] for violation
of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such
a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake. (Citation omitted.)
In this case, petitioners Buenafe, et al.,assert that respondent Marcos, Jr. made a false material
representation when, in his COC, he certified under oath the statement, "I am eligible for the office I
seek to be elected to." 287 Respondent Marcos, Jr. also allegedly misrepresented his eligibility when
he checked the box "No" in response to the question, "[h]ave you ever been found liable for an
offense which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office,
which has become final and executory?" 288 Petitioners Buenafe, et al., claim that respondent
Marcos, Jr.'s conviction for violation of the NIRC carried with it the penalty of perpetual
disqualification, thereby rendering the two statements false. 289 TaCEHA

The assailed representations pass the test of materiality because they pertain to respondent
Marcos, Jr.'s eligibility to hold elective office. In Dimapilis v. COMELEC 290 (Dimapilis),We ruled
that perpetual disqualification is a material fact because it directly affects a person's capacity to be
elected and to hold public office, thus:
A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC
provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for
the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his
knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected
to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal
incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a
person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.
In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final
judgment,and punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including
perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to
hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC
void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the
same. (Emphases and underscoring in the original; citations omitted.)
When respondent Marcos, Jr. declared that he has not been convicted of an offense that
carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold office, he made a material
representation regarding his eligibility to run for and hold elective office. This representation, if
proved false, would fall within the ambit of Section 78 of the OEC. EDCTIa

Similarly, respondent Marcos, Jr. made a material representation when he signed and
subscribed to his COC, which states that, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to." 291 In
Aratea v. COMELEC 292 (Aratea), the Court emphasized that disqualification to run for office is an
ineligibility. Consequently, a statement in the COC that one is eligible, when such is not the case, is
a false material representation constituting ground for the application of Section 78 of the OEC:
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility,which means that
the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74
requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections,the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or
eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for
public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly
 required under Section 74,then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation
of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted
that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to
the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility
for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law,
is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for
quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis
and italics in the original; citations omitted.)
The Court came to the same conclusion in the cases of Ty-Delgado,293 cited earlier, and
Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC 294 (Jalosjos, Jr.).In these cases, the Court ruled that petitioners therein,
who had filed their respective COCs, made false material representations when they declared
themselves eligible to hold public office, despite prior convictions that rendered them ineligible.
Dimapilis involved a candidate found guilty by a final judgment of the administrative offense
of Grave Misconduct. Meanwhile, in Aratea,Jalosjos, Jr. and Ty-Delgado, the candidates seeking to
run for public office had criminal convictions under the RPC. None of these cited cases pertains to a
conviction under the NIRC, specifically the application of Section 286, as amended by PD 1994.
Nonetheless, We find no reason to depart from these cases' ruling on the effect of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office on a person's representation of eligibility in his or her COC.
Accordingly, We hold that the assailed representations in this case are material for the purpose of
applying Section 78 of the OEC.
Respondent Marcos, Jr. claims that his alleged perpetual disqualification to hold public office
does not bear on his eligibility because it does not pertain to any of the requirements under Section
2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 295 He argues that these requirements are exclusive. 296
Hence, in determining his eligibility to run for President, only the requirements under this
constitutional provision must be considered, to the exclusion of any other grounds for
disqualification under other laws. 297
The Court has ruled that, as used in Section 74 of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having
"the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities to run for the public office." 298 Perpetual disqualification is an ineligibility.
Necessarily, therefore, it directly affects one's eligibility to run for office. Equally established is that
the enumeration of qualifications in the 1987 Constitution, as reiterated in Section 63 of the OEC, is
not exclusive. Other pertinent laws lay down requirements for qualification and eligibility to run for
and hold elective office. These considerations are sufficient to meet the requirement of materiality
under Section 78 of the OEC.
Having established that the subject representations are material, We now resolve whether they
are false, i.e.,whether respondent Marcos, Jr. misrepresented himself to be eligible and not
disqualified from running as president. Relevant to its resolution is whether respondent Marcos, Jr.
was indeed perpetually disqualified from holding public office in light of the CA Decision. ADCIca
 B. In the Philippines, disqualification from
public office is a long-established penalty
The concept of disqualification from public office has been present in Philippine laws for
more than a century. It figured several times in the various Acts enacted by the First Philippine
Commission between 1900 to 1907. Under Act No. 5, 299 disloyalty to the U.S. as the supreme
authority in the Islands was declared a ground for complete disqualification for holding office in the
Philippine civil service. 300
Act No. 1126 301 empowered the Civil Governor not only to remove any municipal officer
from office, but also, in his discretion, declare such official either temporarily or permanently
disqualified thereafter from holding office.
Moreover, Act No. 1582, or the Election Law of 1907, 302 which governed the country's very
first national elections through popular votes, 303 provided that "x x x no person who has been
convicted of a crime which is punishable by imprisonment for two years or more shall hold any
public office, and no person disqualified from holding public office by the sentence of a court x x x
shall be eligible to hold public office during the term of his disqualification." 304 Prior to this,
persons who meet the minimum age, residence and literacy requirements 305 can become municipal
officers, unless they are ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from
provincial, departmental, or governmental funds, contractors for public works of the municipality,
306 or someone who habitually smokes, chews, swallows, injects, or otherwise consumes or uses
opium in any of its forms. 307
In addition, Act No. 1582 provided for a penalty of disqualification from any public office,
for a period of five years, upon certain officials who shall "aid any candidate or influence in any
manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election." 308
Under Section 11 of Act No. 1450, 309 which amended Act No. 136, 310 the penalty of
disqualification from holding office may also be meted by the Governor General upon justices of the
peace found "not performing his duties properly" or "unfit for the service." A person may also be
disqualified from running from office by reason of the non-payment of taxes, which disqualification
can be removed by paying the delinquent taxes after election and before the date fixed by law for
assuming office, but not afterwards. 311 Persons convicted of offenses connected with
administration of the then Bureau of Audits (such as embezzlement or malversation in office) were
likewise "ipso facto forever disqualified from holding any public office or employment of any nature
whatever within the Philippine Islands." 312
Further back in history, disqualification from public office was already recognized as a
penalty even before the American occupation. The Penal Code for the Philippine Islands (old Penal
Code), which was promulgated in 1884 under the Spanish Constitution, 313 state in pertinent part:
Art. 31. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall produce
the following effects:
1. The deprivation of all honors and of any public offices and employments which
the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for any honor, office, or public employment, and for the
exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
4. The loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held, but without prejudice to any allowance for living expenses which the Government may
 see fit to grant the defendant for any distinguished service.
The provisions of this article shall not affect any rights acquired at the time of the
conviction by the widow or children of the offender.
Art. 32. The penalty of temporary absolute disqualification shall produce the
following effects:
1. The deprivation of all honors and of any public offices and employments which
the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office, during the term of the sentence.
3. The disqualification for any of the honors, employments, offices, and rights
mentioned in paragraph one hereof, during the term of the sentence. HCSAIa

Art. 33. The penalty of perpetual special disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office or employment thereby affected and of the honors
thereto appertaining.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments.
Art. 34. The penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the right of
suffrage shall forever deprive the offender of the right to vote at any election for the public
office in question or to be elected to such office.
Art. 35. The penalty of temporary special disqualification for public office
shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office or employment in question and of all honors
appurtenant thereto.
2. The disqualification for holding any similar office during the term of the
sentence.
Art. 36. The penalty of temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender, during the term of the sentence, of the right
to vote in any election for the office to which the sentence refers or to be elected to such
office.(Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
It was then considered both an afflictive 314 and accessory penalty. As a stand-alone penalty,
disqualification from public office can be imposed for a duration of six years and one day to twelve
years. 315 On the other hand, when imposed as an accessory to other penalties, 316 its duration was
as provided by law. 317
In 1930, the old Penal Code was repealed by Act No. 3815, or the RPC. Although the
provisions relating to disqualification from public office were essentially retained, there were still
notable changes: first, from six separate Articles under the old Penal Code, the provisions on
disqualification were thereafter compressed into two provisions, which now read:
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification.— The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for
public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to
be elected to such office.
 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise
of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification,such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage.— The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the
right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such
office.Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the
period of his disqualification.(Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
The Court, in Lacuna v. Abes,318 clarified the distinction between the different kinds of
disqualification as distilled in these two provisions:
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict
for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of
the sentence x x x
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually,as
distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the
sentence x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the
perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence"
refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging
their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said
penalty" — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary
special disqualification.
Second,in addition to being classified as an accessory penalty, the penalty of disqualification
from public office 319 is also specifically imposed by the RPC as a penalty for the commission of
the following crimes:
a. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment (Art. 204);
a. n Judgment rendered through negligence (Art. 205);
b. Direct bribery (Art. 210);
c. Other frauds (Art. 214);
d. Malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217);
e. Illegal use of public funds or property (Art. 220);
f. Conniving with or consenting to evasion (Art. 223);
g. Evasion through negligence (Art. 224);
h. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents (Art. 226);
i. Officer breaking seal (Art. 227); IaHDcT
 j. Opening of closed documents (Art. 228);
k. Revelation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229);
l. Open disobedience (Art. 231);
m. Disobedience to Order of Superior Officer, when said order was suspended by inferior
officer (Art. 232);
n. Refusal of Assistance (Art. 233);
o. Maltreatment of Prisoners (Art. 235);
p. Prolonging performance of duties and powers (Art. 237);
q. Usurpation of Legislative Powers (Art. 239);
r. Disobeying request for disqualification (Art. 242);
s. Abuses against chastity (Art. 245);
t. Corruption of minors (Art. 340);
u. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons entrusted with the
custody of the corrupted/abused minor (Art. 346);
v. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or
abandonment of a legitimate child (Art. 347).
Third, under the old Penal Code, accessory penalties must be explicitly imposed. 320 Thus, in
People v. Perez,321 this Court held: CcSTHI

The first question that presents itself for consideration is whether or not by virtue of the
judgment imposing two years, four months and one day of prision correccional upon the
accused in the aforesaid criminal case for assault against a person in authority, the appellant
became disqualified from assuming said office of municipal president.
If we confine ourselves to the field of the Penal Code now in force, our answer would be in
the negative for two reasons: First, because in said judgment, whose disposing part is set out
hereinabove, he is not expressly sentenced to be disqualified, which disqualification would
have been an accessory penalty in the form of suspension from office and from the right of
suffrage during the life of the sentence, according to article 61 of the Penal Code. Article 90
of this Code provides that the accessory penalties are to be imposed upon the convict
expressly, and, according to Viada, they are not to be presumed to have been imposed x x x
In contrast, Article 73 of the RPC categorically provided for a presumption regarding the
automatic imposition of accessory penalties, thus:
Art. 73. Presumption in Regard to the Imposition of Accessory Penalties. —
Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it
must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.
(Emphases supplied.)
To be sure, disqualification from public office has also been provided as a principal penalty
for the commission of crimes identified and defined under special laws. These include, among
others:
(1) RA 9165 322 imposes maximum penalties for the unlawful acts provided for in this
law, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office,if those
found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees;
(2) RA 10845, 323 which provides that government officials or employees found guilty of
large-scale agricultural smuggling shall be meted the maximum of the penalty
 prescribed, in addition to the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office,to
vote and to participate in any public election;
(3) RA 10863 324 states that if a public officer or employee commits any of the acts
proscribed therein, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed in addition to the
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office,disqualification to vote and to
participate in any public election; and
(4) RA 11479, 325 which declares that public officials or employees found guilty of any
act punished under said law shall be charged with the administrative offense of grave
misconduct and/or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino people
and meted with the penalty of dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties
of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual absolute disqualification from running for any elective office or holding any
public office.326
Disqualification from public office may also be imposed as a penalty in administrative cases.
Section 51 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 327 for example,
specifically provides that the grave administrative offense of fixing and/or collusion with fixers in
consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage shall be penalized by dismissal and
perpetual disqualification from public service.
Generally, however, perpetual disqualification from holding public office is among the
disabilities considered inherent in, and follows as a consequence of, the penalty of dismissal. 328
Such penalties are, in turn, imposed for the commission of acts constituting grave misconduct, that
is, misconduct attended by any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
law or disregard of established rules:
x x x This gravity means that misconduct was committed with such depravity that it justifies
not only putting an end to an individual's current engagement as a public servant, but also the
foreclosure of any further opportunity at occupying public office.AacCIT

xxx xxx xxx

One who commits grave misconduct is one who, by the mere fact of that misconduct, has
proven himself or herself unworthy of the continuing confidence of the public. By his or her
very commission of that grave offense, the offender forfeits any right to hold public office.
329
1. Respondent Marcos, Jr. was not
imposed the principal penalty
of perpetual disqualification from
public office
Petitioners Ilagan, et al., maintain that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. was not disqualified from running for public office for the
following reasons: (1) PD 1994 clearly and unequivocally imposed a mandatory penalty of perpetual
disqualification as an accessory penalty on top of the penalties provided by the 1977 NIRC; 330 (2)
respondent Marcos, Jr. was a public official until 1986 and there was no abandonment of office that
would justify his failure to file the required income tax returns; 331 (3) the CA Decision imposing
only the penalty of fine is void as it completely ignored a mandatory directive to impose the
maximum penalty prescribed, as well as the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office; 332 (4) in any case, since respondent Marcos, Jr. never filed the required income tax
returns, he is, to date, considered to be in continued violation of the NIRC. 333
 As the foregoing issues are interrelated, this Court shall address them jointly.
Section 45 334 of the 1977 NIRC required every Filipino citizen having a gross annual
income of at least P1,800.00, whether residing in the Philippines or abroad, to file an income tax
return on or before the fifteenth day of March of each year, covering income of the preceding taxable
year. Failure to so file was originally punished, under Section 73, by "a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both."
On 05 November 1985, PD 1994 was issued, introducing substantial amendments to the 1977
NIRC. These amendments included Section 286, to wit:
Sec. 286. General provisions. — (a) Any person convicted of a crime
penalized by this Code shall, in addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be
subject to the penalties imposed herein: Provided, That payment of the tax due after
apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution for violation of any
provision of this Code or in any action for the forfeiture of untaxed articles.
(b) Any person who willfully aids or abets in the commission of a crime penalized
herein or who causes the commission of any such offense by another, shall be liable in the
same manner as the principal.
(c) If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported
immediately after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation. If he is a
public officer or employee, the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be
imposed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed from the public service and perpetually
disqualified from holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election. If
the offender is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified public account shall,
upon conviction, be automatically revoked or canceled.
(d) In the case of associations, partnerships, or corporations, the penalty shall be
imposed on the partner, president, general manager, branch manager, treasurer, officer-in-
charge, and employees responsible for the violation. (Emphases supplied.)
We agree with petitioners Ilagan, et al., that Section 286 clearly provides for the imposition of
disqualification from public office as a penalty upon public officials or employees found guilty of
violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC, as amended by PD 1994. It is, however, not disputed that
the fallo of the CA Decision 335 adjudging respondent Marcos, Jr.'s guilt for non-filing of the
required income tax return makes absolutely no mention of said penalty. We again quote the
dispositive portion for emphasis:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows: TacSAE

1. ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the charges of violation of Section 50 of

the NIRC for non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982 to 1985
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-92-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214 and Q-92-24390;
and FINDING him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 45 of
the NIRC for failure to file income tax returns for the taxable years 1982 to 1985
in Criminal Cases No. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213 and Q-92-29217;
1. n Ordering the appellant to pay to the BIR the deficiency income taxes due with
interest at the legal rate until fully paid;
2. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of P2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-92-29217 for failure to file income
tax returns for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984; and the fine of P30,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file income tax return for 1985,
with surcharges.
SO ORDERED."
 Petitioners Ilagan, et al., advance the view that the imposition of disqualification from public
office as an accessory penalty is mandatory and that, since courts have no power to impose a lower
penalty than what is authorized by law, the CA Decision is void as it "completely ignored the
mandatory directive of Section 286 of PD 1994." 336
However, it must be emphasized that in criminal cases, the party affected by the dismissal of
the criminal action is the State. The interest of the private offended party, if any, is restricted only to
the civil liability. 337 Thus, in Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes,338 We sustained the
dismissal of the petition for the annulment of a decision of acquittal on the ground that the same
would "necessarily require a review of the criminal aspect of the case and, as such, is prohibited. x x
x [O]nly the State, and not herein petitioner, who is the private offended party, may question the
criminal aspect of the case."
The offense of non-filing of income tax returns does not conceivably implicate any private
interests, much less those pertaining to petitioners Ilagan, et al. As in malversation of public funds or
property, tax evasion, or violations of RA 3019, the government is the offended party that sustained
actual and direct injury as a result of the commission of the offense in question and the one entitled
to the civil liabilities, if any, of the accused. 339 On this score alone, petitioner Ilagan, et al.'s
contentions should be rejected.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti standing in petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s favor, the CA
Decision has long become final and executory as in fact Entry of Judgment was issued more than
twenty (20) years ago, on 31 August 2001. 340 It can no longer be modified, even by this Court.
Finally, in Estarija v. People,341 We upheld the erroneous penalty imposed by the RTC upon
Estarija for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019. The trial court imposed upon Estarija a straight
penalty of seven years, without any accessory penalty. The correct penalty under the law, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Act, would have been imprisonment ranging from six
years and one month, as minimum, to nine years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from
public office. However, the decision of the RTC had already become final and executory because
Estarija mistakenly appealed his conviction with the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan. In resolving
the case, We held: EDATSI

[The RTC Decision] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law, and whether or not made by the highest court of the land.The reason is grounded
on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by
law.
The RTC imposed upon Estarija the straight penalty of seven (7) years. This is
erroneous. The penalty for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is
imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, and
perpetual disqualification from public office. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punished by a special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law, and the
minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same. Thus, the correct
penalty should have been imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month, as
minimum, to nine (9) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public
office. However, since the decision of the RTC has long become final and executory, this
Court cannot modify the same.342 (Emphasis supplied.)
In another case, Tan v. People,343 We set aside the amendatory judgment of the trial court
increasing the penalty imposed on petitioner for bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment,
on the basis of which petitioner had applied for probation, foreclosing his right to appeal and
rendering the previous verdict to lapse into finality. Thus, even if the trial court erred in the penalty
imposed, the decision can no longer be amended after it has attained finality.
This is not to say, however, that there was, in fact, error or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA when it saw fit to modify the conclusions reached, and penalties imposed, by the trial
court.
In the landmark case of People v. Simon,344 We have already settled the matter of treatment
of penalties found in special laws and the RPC:
x x x [W]here the penalties under the special law are different from and are
without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no
suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under
the Code.In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No.
5639. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is
virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such
technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping.
Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in
the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore,
cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects
thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and
applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the
former Republic Act No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612
and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder
are those provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to
give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding
application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in
these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation
of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could
never have been the intendment of Congress. 345 (Emphases supplied.) TaDSCA

Here, petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s theory that perpetual disqualification was automatically
imposed with the mere fact of conviction finds basis from jurisprudence involving disqualifications
under the RPC.Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s conviction, on the other hand, is for the non-filing of
income tax return under the 1977 NIRC. Whereas the RPC contained a system of penalties
categorized between principal or accessory penalties, 346 as well as an express presumption in
regard to the imposition of certain penalties upon the mere fact of conviction, 347 the 1977 NIRC
did not.
People v. Silvallana,348 the case cited by petitioners Ilagan, et al.,to support their argument
that the accessory penalty need not be written in the judgment of conviction, clearly states that the
presumption on the automatic imposition of accessory penalties applies only to Articles 40, 349 41,
350 42, 351 43, 352 44, 353 and 45 354 of the RPC, in relation to Article 73 355 thereof. In that case,
We explained:
The defendant must suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification,
not because article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases persons guilty of
malversation shall suffer perpetual disqualification in addition to the principal penalty, but as
a consequence of the penalty of prision mayor provided in article 171. In accordance with
article 42 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty of prision mayor carries with it that of
 temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, and article 32 provides that during the period of his disqualification the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office. Moreover, article 73 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by
provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of articles 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be understood that the
accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict. It is therefore unnecessary to
express the accessory penalties in the sentence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, a more careful reading of Section 286 would also show details that militate against
petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s reading of automatic imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office. We refer to the following portion of Section 286:
[c] If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be deported immediately
after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation. If he is a public officer
or employee, the maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be imposed and, in
addition, he shall be dismissed from the public service and perpetually disqualified from
holding any public office, to vote and to participate in any election. If the offender is a
certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified public account shall, upon conviction,
be automatically revoked or canceled.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As correctly pointed out by respondent Marcos, Jr.,356 while Section 286 (c) specifies that
the revocation or cancellation of a certified public accountant's certificate is automatic upon
conviction, the same is not true with respect to the imposition of the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office. If indeed the legislative intent is such that a public officer or
employee found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC is automatically perpetually
disqualified from holding public office, then the law could have so easily stated. It, however, did not
do so.
In dubiis reus est absolvendus — all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. 357
This Court thus holds that, unless explicitly provided for in the fallo, the penalty of
disqualification from public office under Section 286 (c) is not deemed automatically imposed
on a public officer or employee found to have violated the provisions of the 1977 NIRC. We
find this interpretation to be more in keeping with the intention of the legislators, as well as being
more favorable to the accused. 358 EADSIa

Applying the same principle, petitioners Ilagan, et al.'s claim of a continuing violation on the
part of respondent Marcos, Jr. also lacks merit. There is nothing in either the 1977 NIRC or PD 1994
that speaks of the continuing nature of the offense of non-filing of income tax returns. In fact, in case
a person fails to make and file a return at the time prescribed by law, the law allows the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make the return from his own knowledge and from such
information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise.Such return shall be prima facie
good and sufficient for all legal purposes, unless the taxpayer can prove the contrary under proper
proceedings. 359
2. Respondent Marcos, Jr. served the
penalties for his convictions
We reiterate that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. 360 Indeed, penal
statutes are strictly construed against the State and all doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of
the accused. 361 Additionally, We stress that execution must always conform to that decreed in the
dispositive part of the decision, because the only portion thereof that may be subject of execution is
that which is precisely ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. 362
 Further, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any
of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. 363 To be
sure, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable in accordance with the
principle of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law and
whether it may have been made by the court that rendered it or by the Supreme Court itself. Any act
that violates this principle must be immediately struck down. 364
We emphasize that the CA Decision 365 has long attained finality. A plain reading of the said
decision would reveal that the penalty was limited to the imposition of the payment of fines, and
respondent Marcos, Jr. was neither sentenced to imprisonment nor meted the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. Verily, this Court cannot add to, nor modify, the penalties
imposed therein. Moreover, as discussed above, respondent Marcos, Jr.'s failure to file an income tax
return is not an offense involving moral turpitude.
At any rate, respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines imposed in
the CA Decision.
To prove payment of the deficiency taxes and fines, respondent Marcos, Jr. presented a BIR
Certification and a Landbank Official Receipt dated 27 December 2001. 366
This notwithstanding, petitioners Ilagan, et al.,assert that these are insufficient to prove
satisfaction of the deficiency taxes and fines, as an order of payment must first come from the court
before payment may be made. 367 Further, they argue that nowhere in the BIR Certification does it
state that the payments were made in satisfaction of the imposed penalties rendered by the court. To
support their submissions, petitioners Ilagan, et al.,presented a Certification issued by the RTC
stating that there is no record on file of: (1) compliance of payment or satisfaction of its Decision
dated 27 July 1995 or the CA Decision dated 31 October 1997; and (2) entry in the criminal docket
of the RTC Decision dated 27 July 1995 as affirmed/modified by the CA Decision. 368
On the other hand, the COMELEC Former First Division found as sufficient the BIR
Certification and a Landbank Official Receipt presented by respondent Marcos, Jr. Specifically, as
regards the Landbank Official Receipt, the COMELEC Former First Division concluded that the
payment was indeed for the deficiency taxes and fees as evidenced by the amounts indicated therein,
and the writing of the number "0605." 369 It was explained that BIR Form 0605 is a payment form
used by taxpayers to pay taxes and fees that do not require a tax return, including deficiency taxes.
370 Moreover, the COMELEC Former First Division considered that the breakdown of amounts
indicated in the Landbank Official Receipt already includes the payment of fines ordered to be paid
by the CA. 371 Consequently, it ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency
taxes and fines in the total amount of P67,137.27, in compliance with the CA Decision.
We agree with the COMELEC. TIEHSA

It bears stressing that BIR Form 0605 is accomplished every time a taxpayer pays taxes and
fees that do not require the use of a tax return such as second installment payment for income tax,
deficiency tax, delinquency tax, registration fees, penalties, advance payments, deposits, and
installment payments, among others. 372 The same has also been considered by the Court as proof of
payment of deficiency taxes. 373 We likewise reiterate that the best evidence for proving payment is
by evidence of receipts showing the same. 374 Thus, We agree that respondent Marcos, Jr. has
indeed submitted sufficient evidence to prove the payment of the deficiency taxes and fines imposed
upon him.
 In contrast, the RTC Certification presented by petitioners Ilagan, et al.,is insufficient to
establish that respondent Marcos, Jr. did not pay the deficiency taxes and fines because it merely
establishes that there is no record on file showing compliance with the RTC and the CA Decisions.
Basic is the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by means other than mere
allegations. 375 Here, petitioners Ilagan, et al.,failed to substantiate their allegations through this
mere RTC Certification, especially when weighed against the evidence presented by respondent
Marcos, Jr.
On this note, We stress that the 1977 NIRC provides that the failure to file return or to pay tax
shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment or both. There is therefore no merit to the allegation
that the CA, by limiting the penalty to the payment of fines in its Decision, failed to correctly apply
the provisions of the law effective at the time of the offense. The CA imposed a penalty that is within
the range of penalties provided by law. Thus, it is erroneous to say that respondent Marcos, Jr. has
yet to serve his penalty. Respondent Marcos, Jr. has already paid the deficiency taxes and fines
imposed upon him.
Pertinently, it bears noting that respondent Marcos, Jr. was a government employee for the
years 1982 to 1985. The COMELEC Former First Division considered the Certification issued by
the Local Finance Committee of the Province of Ilocos, 376 which stated that taxes were withheld
from his compensation received for the years 1982 to 1985. There is basis to conclude that any
deficiency taxes due from his compensation should be attributable to the provincial government as
the withholding agent, and not to respondent Marcos, Jr. 377
In any case, non-payment of fines is not a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the
OEC, which contemplates only three instances when a person may be disqualified to hold public
office, thus:
1. Declared by competent authority insane or incompetent; or
2. Sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months; or
3. Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Verily, whether or not respondent Marcos, Jr. satisfied the payment of fines and penalties with
the lower courts is immaterial since his sentence did not fall within the purview of Section 12 of the
OEC.
V. Conclusion
"In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case: In these, the will of the people makes
the essential principle of the government; and the laws which control the community, receive
their tone and spirit from the public wishes." 378
Vox populi, vox Dei — In the 09 May 2022 elections, over half of the electorate chose to stake
the fate of the entire nation on respondent Marcos, Jr. Only time can unravel the wisdom behind the
overwhelming support given to him. In the meantime, no one can argue that the electoral exercise is
an essential part of our democracy.
Equally important to the life of our Republic is the acknowledgement that it is founded upon
the rule of law. Thus, even the will of the majority cannot subvert what the law has made obligatory.
Candidates are expected to abide by the procedural and substantive requirements for running for
public office.EHACcT

As such, inquiring upon a candidate's qualifications and compliance is not just a right but a
responsibility of every citizen. Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,and petitioners Ilagan, et al.,have exercised
such responsibility which, in turn, brought these cases to light. In resolving these Petitions, the Court
also made its own determination not only as part of its constitutional duty, but in its role as a pillar of
our democracy.
This Decision was never intended to validate the 31,629,783 who expressed their faith on
respondent Marcos, Jr. Instead, this Decision aims to confirm the eligibility and qualifications of
respondent Marcos, Jr. for the highest position of the land. After much scrutiny, We come to the
conclusion that our laws do not support the position taken by petitioners Buenafe, et al.,who
declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false material representations as to his eligibility, nor the
assertions of petitioners Ilagan, et al.,who put doubt on respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications by
alleging that he is perpetually disqualified from running from public office and convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Indeed, the exercise of this Court's power to decide the present controversy has led to no
other conclusion but that respondent Marcos, Jr. is qualified to run for and be elected to public
office. Likewise, his COC, being valid and in accord with the pertinent laws, was rightfully upheld
by the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426 are
hereby DISMISSED.The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 21-156 (DC)
dated 17 January 2022 and 10 May 2022, and in SPA No. 21-212 (DC) dated 10 February 2022 and
10 May 2022 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J.,Hernando, Rosario and Marquez, JJ.,concur.
Leonen, Dimaampao and Singh, JJ.,see separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa, * J.,is on official leave but left his vote. See separate opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J.,with concurrence.
Inting ** and Kho, Jr., *** JJ.,took no part.
M.V. Lopez and Gaerlan, JJ.,pls. see separate concurring opinion.
J.Y. Lopez, J.,with separate concurring.

Footnotes

* On Official Leave.

** J. Inting took no part due to the prior participation of Commissioner Socorro B. Inting in the assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections.

*** J. Kho, Jr. took no part due to his prior participation as a former Commissioner of the Commission on
Elections.

1. 2 JOHN C. HAMILTON, ed.,THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 444 (1850). (visited 13 June
2022).

2. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 3-71.

3. Id. at 94-125; signed by Presiding Commissioner Socorro B. Inting, Commissioner — Senior Member
Antonio T. Kho, Jr. (now a Member of this Court),and Commissioner — Junior Member Rey E. Bulay.
Then Commissioner Kho, Jr. had a Separate Opinion.
4. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 72-82; signed by Chairman Saidamen B. Pangarungan, Commissioners Marlon
S. Casquejo, Socorro B. Inting, Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey E. Bulay, and Aimee S. Torrefranca-Neri.
Commissioner George Erwin M. Garcia took no part. Commissioners Casquejo and Inting had Separate
Concurring Opinions.

5. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 3-57.

6. Id. at 198-238; signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioner Aimee P.
Ferolino. Presiding Commissioner Casquejo had a Separate Opinion.

7. Id. at 285-299; signed by Chairman Saidamen B. Pangarungan, Commissioners Marlon S. Casquejo,

Socorro B. Inting, Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey E. Bulay, and Aimee Torrefranca-Neri. Commissioner
George Erwin M. Garcia took no part. Commissioner Casquejo had a Separate Concurring Opinion.

8. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 133-185.

9. Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,identified themselves as officers of their respective organizations: (1) Fr. Christian
B. Buenafe, Co-Chairperson of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP);(2) Fides Lim,
Board Chairperson of the Kapatid-Families & Fiends of Political Prisoners (KAPATID);(3) Ma. Edeliza
P. Hernandez, Executive Director of the Medical Action Group, Inc. (MAG);(4) Celia Lagman Sevilla,
Secretary General of the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance, Inc. (FIND);(5) Roland C.
Vibal, Luzon Representative, Council of Leaders of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights
Advocates, Inc. (PAHRA);and (6) Josephine Lascano, Executive Director of Balay Rehabilitation
Center, Inc. (BALAY).

10. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 163-164.

11. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 58-117.

12. Id. at 61.

13. Petitioners Buenafe, et al.,attached to their petition the following: (1) the 27 July 1995 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-24390 and Q-91-
24391, Q-92-29212 to Q-92-29217; (2) the 31 October 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 18569; (3) the 31 August 2001 Entry of Judgment by this Court in G.R. No. 148434; (4)
the 02 December 2021 Certification issued by the RTC that there was no satisfaction of the decision;
and (5) the 14 December 2021 Certification issued by the RTC that there was no record of payment.
Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 217-245.

Petitioners Ilagan, et al.,attached to their petition the following: (1) the 31 October 1997 Decision of
the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569 and (2) the 02 December 2021 Certification issued by the RTC that
there is no record on file of compliance of payment and entry in the criminal docket. Rollo (G.R. No.
260426),pp. 168-183.

14. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 217-218.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id. at 217.

18. Id. We refer to the cases collectively as the RTC Decision.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 219-220.

21. Id. at 223-224; penned by Judge Benedicto B. Ulep.

22. Respondent Marcos, Jr. referred to the NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, Sec. 51 (b),
Memorandum Circular No. 12-85, and Revenue Memorandum Order Nos. 28-83, 38-88, and 10-89.

23. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),p. 225.

24. Id. at 225-239; penned by Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras and concurred in by Associate Justices Lourdes
K. Tayao-Jaguros and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili.

25. Id. at 234-236.

26. Id. at 238.

27. Id.

28. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 238-239; penned by Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras and concurred in by
Associate Justices Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili.

29. Id. at 240.

30. Id.

31. Id. at 241.

32. Id. at 242.

33. Id. at 243.

34. Id. at 243; signed by Officer-in-Charge Rowena Sto. Tomas-Bacud.

35. 339 Phil. 253 (1997).

36. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 133-185.

37. Id.

38. Id. at 246-248.

39. Id. at 249-251, 248-259.

40. Id. at 306-312.

41. Id. at 260-269.

42. Id. at 276-278.

43. Id. at 279-305.

44. Id. at 98.

45. Id.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 348-352; signed by Presiding Commissioner Socorro B. Inting.

48. Id. at 99.

49. Id. at 94-125.

50. Id. at 99.

51. Id. at 102.

52. Id. at 105-114.

53. Id.

54. Id. at 110-111.

55. Id.

56. Id. at 114-116.

57. 612 Phil. 355 (2009).

58. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 117-123.

59. Id.

60. Id. at 126-132.

61. Id. at 191-216.

62. Id. at 76.

63. Id. at 72-82.

64. Id. at 83-87.

65. Id. at 88-93.

66. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 198-238.

67. Id. at 204-207.

68. Id.

69. Id.

70. Id. at 207.

71. Id. at 209.

72. Id.

73. Id. at 214-215.

74. Id. at 216-217.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 213-214.

77. Id.

78. Id.

79. Id. at 216.

80. Id.

81. Id.

82. Id. at 217.

83. Id. at 198-238.

84. Id. at 217-222.

85. Id.

86. Id.

87. Id.

88. Id.

89. Id. at 223-227.

90. Id.

91. Id. at 227-235.

92. Id.

93. Id.

94. Id.

95. Id.

96. Id.

97. Id. at 235-237.

98. Id.

99. Id. at 240-250.

100. Id.

101. Id.

102. Id. at 251-279.

103. Id. at 285-299.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 300-311.

106. Id.

107. Id.

108. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 661-662.

109. Id. at 3.

110. Id. at 496-501.

111. Id. at 478-480.

112. Id. at 526-576.

113. Id. at 655.

114. Id.

115. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),p. 3.

116. Id. at 323-325.

117. Id.

118. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 526-576.

119. Id. at 830.

120. Id. at 33.

121. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 15-16.

122. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 540-542.

123. COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260374),p. 9; (G.R. No. 260426),p. 10.

124. Id.

125. COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260374),p. 11; (G.R. No. 260426),p. 11.

126. COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 9-11.

127. COMELEC's Comment (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 10-11.

128. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 582-591.

129. Id. at 637-649.

130. See Pormento v. Estrada,643 Phil. 735 (2010).

131. Tecson v. COMELEC,468 Phil. 421 (2004).

132. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC,782 Phil. 292 (2016).

133. Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,PET Case No. 001, 13 February 1996, 323 Phil. 665 (1996);Poe v.
Macapagal-Arroyo,PET Case No. 02, 29 March 2005, 494 Phil. 137 (2005);Legarda v. De Castro,PET
Case No. 003, 18 January 2008, 566 Phil. 123 (2008);Roxas v. Binay,PET Case No. 004, 16 August
2016, 793 Phil. 9 (2016);Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo,PET Case No. 005, 15 October 2019.

134. This Court decreed Eddie Conde Gil (Gil v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 162885, 27 April 2004),Rizalito Y.
David (David v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 221768, 12 January 2016),Simeon de Castro (De Castro, Jr. v.
COMELEC,G.R. No. 221979, 02 February 2016),and Rev. Elly Velez Lao Pamatong (Pamatong v.
COMELEC,470 Phil. 711 (2004)) as nuisance candidates for President.

135. See Republic Act 7160, Sec. 40, or the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (LGC), for grounds for
disqualification for candidates to local elective positions.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications.— The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

136. Munder v. COMELEC,675 Phil. 300 (2011).

137. COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rules 23 and 25, as amended by Resolution No. 9523.

138. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 8-9; rollo (G.R. No. 260426),p. 61.

139. Id. at 664-669.

140. Id. at 672.

141. Id. at 672-674.

142. RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, Sec. 2.

143. See Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 306-312.

144. Dela Cruz v. COMELEC,698 Phil. 548 (2012),citing Fermin v. COMELEC,595 Phil. 449 (2008).

145. Munder v. COMELEC,supra.

146. Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC,655 Phil. 467 (2011).

147. Hayundini v. COMELEC,733 Phil. 822 (2014).

148. Maruhom v. COMELEC,611 Phil. 501 (2009).

149. Francisco v. COMELEC,831 Phil. 106 (2018).

150. Munder v. COMELEC,supra.

151. Fermin v. COMELEC,supra.

152. Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.— If after the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate
of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of
election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by
the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

153. Miranda v. Abaya,370 Phil. 642 (1999).

154. 783 Phil. 876 (2016).

155. 779 Phil. 268 (2016).

156. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. v. AZ Communications, Inc.,G.R. No. 196902, 13 July 2020, citing
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory Administration,728 Phil. 535 (2014).

157. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 665-666.

158. 198 Phil. 572 (1982).

159. 190 Phil. 562 (1981).

160. 569 Phil. 323 (2008).See also Sinaca v. Mula and COMELEC,373 Phil. 896 (1999).

161. Id.

162. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 542-543 and 669-672.

163. 712 Phil. 192 (2013).

164. Id.

165. See J. J.Y. Lopez's Reflections, p. 4.

166. The 2010 RULES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Rule 15.

167. Id. at Rule 16. See also J. Brion's Dissent in Reyes:

In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction (because Reyes,
although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office), the majority effectively emasculates the
HRET of its jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto only
after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e.,on June 30 in the usual case).To illustrate using the
dates of the present case, any election protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more
than fifteen (15) days from Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall certainly be dismissed outright
by the HRET for having been filed out of time under the HRET rules.
168. Id. at Rule 17.

169. 650 Phil. 326 (2010).

170. Id.

171. Chua v. COMELEC,supra.

172. Id.

173. Sec. 12. Disqualifications.— Any person who x x x has been sentenced by final judgment x x x for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. x x x

174. (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;

(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or

(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.

175. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 225-238.

176. Teves v. COMELEC,604 Phil. 717 (2009),citing Soriano v. Dizon,515 Phil. 635 (2006).

177. Id.

178. Teves v. COMELEC,supra.

179. Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in Teves v. COMELEC,supra.

180. US Foreign Affairs Manual available at (visited 24 May 2022).

181. Call v. State Bar of Cal.,45 Cal. 2d 104, 287 P.2d 761 (1955).

182. Supra.

183. 51 Cal. 3d 199, 270 Cal. Rptr. 855, 793 P.2d 61 (1990).

184. Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in Teves v. COMELEC,supra.Citations omitted.

185. 41 Phil. 275 (1920).

186. Id.

187. 106 Phil. 727 (1959).

188. Tak Ng v. Republic,supra,citing Traders 7 General Ins. Co. v. Rusell, Tex. Civ App.,99 S.W. [2d] 1079.

189. Supra,citing Marah v. State Bar of California,210 Cal. 303, 219 P. 583.

190. 183 Phil. 27 (1979).

191. Supra,citing 41 C.J. 212.

192. Supra,citing State Medical Board v. Rogers,79 S. W. 2d 83.

193. Ao Lin v. Republic,119 Phil. 284 (1964).

194. Supra.

195. In Re: Lanuevo,160 Phil. 935 (1975).

196. Supra.

197. Dela Torre v. COMELEC,327 Phil. 1144 (1996),citing IRRI v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97239, 12 May 1993,
citing In Re: Lanuevo, supra.

198. Id. citing In Re Basa,supra.

199. Id. citing In Re Marcelino Lontok,43 Phil. 293 (1922).

200. Id. citing In Re Juan C. Isada,60 Phil. 915 (1934);Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,468 Phil. 148 (2004),citing
Laguitan v. Tinio,259 Phil. 322 (1989).

201. Id. citing In Re Atty. Rovero,92 Phil. 128 (1952).

202. Id. citing Mondano v. Silvosa,97 Phil. 143 (1955).

203. Id. citing In the Matter of Eduardo A. Abesamis,102 Phil. 1182 (1958).

204. Id. citing In Re Dalmacio De Los Angeles,106 Phil. 1 (1959).

205. Id. citing Tak Ng v. Republic,supra.

206. Id. citing Paras v. Vailoces,111 Phil. 569 (1961).

207. Id. citing Can v. Galing,239 Phil. 629 (1987),citing In Re Gutierrez,Adm. Case No. L-363, 31 July
(1962).

208. Id. citing In Re: Atty. Vinzon,126 Phil. 96 (1967).

209. Id. citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC,248 Phil. 655 (1988).

210. Id.

211. Id. citing People v. Tuanda,A.M. No. 3360, 30 January 1990; Paolo C. Villaber v. COMELEC,420 Phil.
930 (2001);Lao v. Atty. Medel,453 Phil. 115 (2003).

212. Id. citing UP v. CSC,284 Phil. 296 (1992).

213. Id. citing Betguen v. Masangcay,308 Phil. 500 (1994).

214. Id. citing Dela Torre v. COMELEC,327 Phil. 1144 (1996),citing Zari v. Flores,supra.

215. Id. citing OCA v. Librado,329 Phil. 432 (1996).

216. Id. citing People v. Sorrel,343 Phil. 890 (1997).

217. Id. citing Campilan v. Campilan Jr.,431 Phil. 223 (2002).

218. Id. citing Magno v. COMELEC,439 Phil. 339 (2002).

219. Id. citing Soriano v. Dizon,supra.

220. Id. citing Zari v. Flores,supra.

221. Id.

222. Id.

223. Id.

224. Id.

225. Id.

226. Id.

227. Id.

228. Id.

229. Id.

230. Id.

231. Id.

232. Id.

233. Id.

234. Id.

235. Id.

236. Id.

237. Id.

238. Supra.

239. JUSTICE JAPAR B. DIMAAMPAO, TAX PRINCIPLES AND REMEDIES 174 (2021);Yutivo Sons
Hardware Co. v. CTA,110 Phil. 751 (1961).

240. CIR v. Spouses Magaan,G.R. No. 232663, 03 May 2021, citing CIR v. Javier, Jr.,276 Phil. 914 (1991).

241. CIR v. Toda,481 Phil. 626 (2004).

242. THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, Sec. 248.

243. ERIC R. RECALDE, A TREATISE ON TAX PRINCIPLES AND REMEDIES 465 (2016).

244. Citing Teves v. COMELEC,supra.

245. 612 Phil. 355 (2009).

246. In Re Basa,supra.

247. Teves v. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 180363, 28 April 2009, citing Soriano v. Dizon,supra.

248. SECTION 51. Individual Return.—

xxx xxx xxx

(2) The following individuals shall not be required to file an income tax return:

(a) An individual whose gross income does not exceed his total personal and additional exemptions for
dependents under Section 35: Provided,That a citizen of the Philippines and any alien individual
engaged in business or practice of profession within the Philippines shall file an income tax return,
regardless of the amount of gross income;

(b) An individual with respect to pure compensation income, as defined in Section 32 (A) (1),
derived from sources within the Philippines, the income tax on which has been correctly withheld
under the provisions of Section 79 of this Code:Provided,That an individual deriving compensation
concurrently from two or more employers at any time during the taxable year shall file an income tax
return: Provided, further,That an individual whose pure compensation income derived from sources
within the Philippines exceeds Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000) shall also file an income tax return;

(c) An individual whose sole income has been subjected to final withholding tax pursuant to Section 57
(A) of this Code; and

(d) An individual who is exempt from income tax pursuant to the provisions of this Code and other
laws, general or special. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

249. Amending Section 2.58 and Further Amending Section 2.83 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-98 as
Amended, Relative to the Submission of the Alphabetical Lists of Employees/Payees in Diskette Form
and the Substituted Filing of Income Tax Returns of Payees/Employees Receiving Purely
Compensation Income from Only One Employer for One Taxable Year Whose Tax Due is Equal to Tax
Withheld and Individual-Payees Whose Compensation Income is Subject to Final Withholding Tax.

250. Amending Revenue Regulations No. 3-2002 and Further Amending Section 2.83 of Revenue Regulations
No. 2-98 as Amended, Relative to Substituted Filing of Income Tax Return of Employees Receiving
Purely Compensation Income from Only One Employer for One Taxable Year Whose Tax Due is Equal
to Tax Withheld and Individual-Payees Whose Compensation Income is Subject to Final Withholding
Tax.

251. Revenue Regulations No. 19-2002, Sec. 2.

252. No. 11, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 1-2003.

253. No. 2, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 1-2003. The threshold amount is now P250,000.00 under the
TRAIN Law.

254. NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, 51 (A) (2) (b).

255. Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on the Disagreeing Provisions of HB No. 5636 and SB No.
1592 Re: Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion, 01 December 2017, KMS/VIII-3, p. 35.

256. J. Dimaampao's Reflections, p. 3.

257. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 168-182.

258. Id. at 35.

259. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),p. 42.

260. Nasi-Villar v. People,591 Phil. 804 (2008).

261. Taningco v. Fernandez,G.R. No. 215615, 09 December 2020.

262. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 217-222.

263. Sec. 286. General provisions. — (a) Any person convicted of a crime penalized by this Code shall, in
addition to being liable for the payment of the tax, be subject to the penalties imposed herein: Provided,
That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution
for violation of any provision of this Code or in any action for the forfeiture of untaxed articles.

(b) Any person who willfully aids or abets in the commission of a crime penalized herein or who causes
the commission of any such offense by another, shall be liable the same manner as the principal.

(c) If the offender is not citizen of the Philippines, he shall be adopted immediately after serving the
sentence without further proceedings for deportation. If he is a public officer or employee, the
maximum penalty prescribed for the offense shall be imposed and, in addition, he shall be dismissed
from the public service and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office, to vote and to
participate in any election. If the offender is a certified public accountant, his certificate as a certified
public account shall, upon conviction, be automatically revoked or cancelled.

(d) In the case of associations, partnerships, or corporations, the penalty shall be imposed on the
partner, president, general manager, branch manager, treasurer, officer-in-charge, and employees
responsible for the violation.

264. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 181-182.

265. LBP v. Arceo,581 Phil. 77 (2008).

266. De Leon v. Luis,G.R. No. 226236, 06 July 2021.

267. As amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, entitled "In the Matter of the Amendment to Rules 23,
24, and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure for purposes of the 13 May 2013 National, Local and
ARMM Elections and Subsequent Elections."

268. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 35-38.

269. Id. at 35.

270. Id. at 547-549 and 684-687.

271. Id. at 125.

272. Id. at 102.

273. Id. at 78.

274. See rollo (G.R. No. 260374), p. 171 (Petition dated 02 November 2021 filed before the COMELEC):
"Respondent Marcos, Jr. was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying him
under the Omnibus Election Code to be a candidate and to hold any public office." (Capitalization
omitted); See also id. at 179: "The conviction of Respondent Marcos, Jr. in the tax evasion cases carries
 the mandatory penalty of imprisonment of more than 18 months as imposed by law, disqualifying him
under the Omnibus Election Code from running for any public office." (Capitalization omitted).

275. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC,696 Phil. 601 (2012).

276. RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, Sec. 2, in relation to Rule 65, Sec. 1.

277. Varias v. COMELEC,626 Phil. 292 (2010).

278. Suliguin v. COMELEC,520 Phil. 92 (2006).

279. Peñas v. COMELEC,UDK-16915, 15 February 2022.

280. Pagaduan v. COMELEC,548 Phil. 427 (2007).

281. RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, Sec. 5.

282. Salcedo II v. COMELEC,supra.

283. Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC,supra.

284. G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014.

285. Id.

286. 371 Phil. 377 (1999).

287. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 21-22.

288. Id. at 22-23.

289. Id. at 23.

290. 808 Phil. 1108 (2017).

291. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 21-22.

292. 696 Phil. 700 (2012).

293. Supra.

294. 696 Phil. 601 (2012).

295. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),p. 551.

296. Id. at 550-551.

297. Id. at 551.

298. Aratea v. COMELEC,supra.

299. "Establishment and Maintenance of an Efficient and Honest Civil Service," 19 September 1900.

300. Section 15 of Act No. 5.

301. "An Act for the Purpose of Empowering Provincial Boards to Subpoena Witnesses and to Require
Testimony under Oath in Conducting Certain Investigations, and for Other Purposes," 28 April 1904.
302. "An Act to Provide for the Holding of Elections in the Philippine Islands, for the Organization of the
Philippine Assembly, and for Other Purposes," 09 January 1907.

303. "The History of the Philippine Assembly (1906-1916)," <https://nhcp.gov.ph/the-history-of-the-first-

philippine-assembly-1907-1916/> (visited 10 June 2022).

304. Section 12, Act No. 1582. See also the case of Topacio v. Paredes,23 Phil. 238 (1912),where the Court
had the occasion to discuss the qualifications and disqualifications of elective provincial and municipal
officers based on the laws in effect at the time.

305. THE MUNICIPAL CODE or Act No. 82, Sec. 15.

306. Id. at Sec. 14.

307. Act No. 1768, "An Act to Amend Act Numbered Fifteen Hundred and Eighty-Two, Known as 'The
Election Law,' as Amended by Acts Numbered Seventeen Hundred and Nine and Seventeen Hundred
and Twenty-Six, by Disqualifying Habitual Users of Opium from Holding Provincial or Municipal
Officers," 11 October 1907.

308. Act No. 1582, Sec. 29. This provision, among others, was subsequently amended by Act No. 1709 (31
August 1907) which expanded the list of public officers who may be disqualified from holding public
office if found to have committed the offenses proscribed under said Act.

309. An Act Amending Certain Sections of Acts Numbered One Hundred and Thirty-Six, One Hundred and
Ninety, and One Hundred and Ninety-Four, and Making Additional Provisions so as to Increase the
Efficiency of Courts of Justices of the Peace, 03 February 1906, as amended by Act No. 1627,
"Amending General Orders No. 58, s. 1900 and Act Nos. 82, 136, 183, 190, 194, 787 and Repealing
Act Nos. 590, 992 and 1450," 30 March 1907.

310. An Act Providing for the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands, 11 June 1901.

311. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Act No. 2657, Sec. 504.

312. Id. at Sec. 2662.

313. U.S. v. Balcorta,25 Phil. 273 (1913).

314. THE PENAL CODE, Article 25.

315. Id. at Article 27.

316. Art. 53. The death penalty, when it shall not be executed by reason of the pardon of the offender, shall
carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and subjection to the surveillance of the
authorities during the lifetime of the offender, unless such accessory penalties shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

Art. 54. The penalty of cadena perpetua carries with it the following:

1. Degradation, in case the principal penalty of cadena perpetua be imposed upon any public employee
for any official misconduct, if the office held by him be such as to confer permanent rank.

2. Civil interdiction.

3. Subjection to the surveillance of the authorities during the lifetime of the offender.
 Even though the offender be pardoned as to the principal penalty, he shall suffer perpetual absolute
disqualification and subjection to the surveillance of the authorities during his lifetime,unless these
accessory penalties shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon granted with respect to the
principal penalty.

Art. 55. The penalties of reclusion perpetua,relegación perpetua and extrañamiento perpetuo shall
carry with them the penalties of perpetual absolute qualification and subjection to the surveillance of
the authorities for the lifetime of the offender,which penalties he shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been remitted in the pardon.

Art. 56. The penalty of cadena temporal shall carry with it the following penalties:

1. Civil interdiction of the convict during the term of the sentence.

2. Perpetual absolute disqualification.

3. Subjection to the surveillance of the authorities during the lifetime of the offender.

Art. 57. The penalty of presidio mayor shall carry with it those of temporary absolute
disqualification to its full extent and subjection to the surveillance of the authorities for a term equal
to that of the principal penalty; the term of the latter accessory penalty shall commence upon the
expiration of the principal penalty.

Art. 58. The penalty of presidio correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling and from the exercise of the right of suffrage.

Art. 59. The penalties of reclusion temporal,relegación temporal and extrañamiento temporal shall
carry with them the penalties of temporary absolute disqualification to its full extent and subjection
to the surveillance of the authorities during the term of the sentence, and for another equal period to
commence at the expiration of the term of the principal penalty.

Art. 60. The penalty of confinamiento shall carry with it those of temporary absolute disqualification
and subjection to the surveillance of the authorities during the term of the sentence, and for another
equal period to commence at the expiration of the term of the principal penalty.

Art. 61. The penalties of prisión mayor,prisión correccional and arresto mayor shall carry with them
suspension of the right to hold public office and the right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.

317. THE PENAL CODE, Article 29.

318. 133 Phil. 770 (1968).

319. THE REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC), Article 25, 08 December 1930. It is considered as an accessory to
the following penalties: Death (Article 40), Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal (Article
41),Prision Mayor (Article 42),Prision Correccional (Article 43),and Arresto Mayor (Article 44).See
also Article 58 (on Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories).

320. Art. 90. Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, according to the provisions of Section III of the next preceding chapter, they shall also
expressly impose upon the convict the latter penalties.

321. 47 Phil. 984 (1924).

322. Also known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," 07 June 2002. See Sec. 28.
323. Also known as the "Anti-Agricultural Smuggling Act of 2016," 23 May 2016. See Sec. 4.

324. Customs Modernization and Tariff Act, 30 May 2016. See Sec. 1431.

325. "The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020," 03 July 2020.

326. Sec. 15.

327. Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 1701077, 03 July 2017.

328. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 58. See also Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 1101502, Sec. 52, or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, 08 November 2011; Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 991936, Secs. 57 and 58, or the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 14 September 1999.

329. Office of the Ombudsman v. Regalado,G.R. Nos. 208481-82, 07 February 2018.

330. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 23-24.

331. Id. at 28-29.

332. Id. at 34-36.

333. Id. at 25-27.

334. Sec. 45. Individual returns.— (a) Requirements. — (1) The following individuals are required to file an
income tax return, if they have a gross income of at least P1,800 for the taxable year:

(A) Every Filipino citizen, whether residing in the Philippines or abroad and,

(B) Every alien residing in the Philippines, regardless of whether the gross income was derived from
sources within or outside the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) When to file. — The return of the following individuals shall be filed on or before the fifteenth day
of March of each year, covering income of the preceding taxable year:

(A) Residents of the Philippines, whether citizens or aliens, whose income have been derived solely
from salaries, wages, interest, dividends, allowances, commissions, bonuses, fees, pensions, or any
combination thereof.

(B) The return of all other individuals not mentioned above, including non-resident citizens shall be
filed on or before the fifteenth day of April of each year covering income of the preceding taxable year.

xxx xxx xxx

335. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426),pp. 181-182.

336. Id. at p. 35.

337. JCLV Realty & Development Corp. v. Mangali,G.R. No. 236618, 27 August 2020.

338. G.R. No. 236686, 05 February 2020.

339. Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,487 Phil. 384 (2004);Andaya v. People,526 Phil. 480 (2006).
340. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),p. 241.

341. 619 Phil. 457 (2009).

342. See also People v. Paet,100 Phil. 357 (1956),where the Court refused to modify the decision of the trial
court (which has already become final) to include the accessory penalty of confiscation or forfeiture, of
the undeclared dollars, in favor of the government.

343. 430 Phil. 685 (2002).

344. 304 Phil. 725 (1994).

345. See also Cahulogan v. People,828 Phil. 742 (2018);Quimvel v. People,808 Phil. 889 (2017);AAA v.
People,G.R. No. 229762, 28 November 2018; People v. Molejon,830 Phil. 519 (2018).

346. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 25.

347. Id. at Article 73.

348. 61 Phil. 636 (1935).

349. Art. 40. Death — Its Accessory Penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.

350. Art. 41. Reclusión Perpetua and Reclusión Temporal — Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of
reclusión perpetua and reclusión temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

351. Art. 42. Prisión Mayor — Its Accessory Penalties.— The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that
of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

352. Art. 43. Prisión Correccional — Its Accessory Penalties.— The penalty of prisión correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment
shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.

353. Art. 44. Arresto — Its Accessory Penalties.— The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension
of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

354. Art. 45. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.— Every penalty
imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime
and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government,
unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not
subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
355. Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalties. — Whenever the courts shall
impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions
of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are
also imposed upon the convict.

356. Rollo (G.R. No. 260374),pp. 555-557.

357. People v. Sullano,827 Phil. 613 (2018).

358. See David v. People,675 Phil. 182 (2011).

359. NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, Sec. 51 (b).See also id. at Sec. 16 (b), after
amendment by PD 1994.

360. People v. Sullano,supra.

361. De Leon v. Luis,supra.

362. NPC v. Tarcelo,742 Phil. 463 (2014).

363. Peralta v. De Leon,650 Phil. 592 (2010).

364. FGU Insurance Corporation v. RTC of Makati City, Branch 66,659 Phil. 117 (2011).

365. Rollo (G.R. No. 260426) pp. 168-182.

366. Id. at 232-233.

367. Id. at 22.

368. Id. at 183.

369. Id. at 233.

370. Id.

371. Id. at 232-233.

372. See <https://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/bir-forms/payment-remittance-forms.html> (visited 23 May 2022).

373. See Kepco Philippines Corp. v. CIR,G.R. Nos. 225750-51, 28 July 2020.

374. Towne & City Development Corp. v. CA,478 Phil. 466 (2004),citing PNB v. CA,326 Phil. 326 (1996).

375. SSS v. COA,G.R. No. 243278, 03 November 2020.

376. Rollo (G.R. 260426),p. 231.

377. Id.

378. Alexander Hamilton, First Speech, New York Ratifying Convention, 21 June 1787 (visited 17 June 2022).

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from official document.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from official document. Irregular slphsbetical sequence.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from official document. Irregular numerical sequence.