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14/10/2024

AIR 2023 SUPREME COURT 3699

HON'BLE JUDGE(S): J. B. PARDIWALA, MANOJ MISRA , JJ

Special Leave Petition (Civil)- 5263 of 2023,, decided on 26/07/2023

(A) Constitution of India , Art.136— Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986) , S.21(a), S.23—
Consumer Protection Act (35 of 2019) , S.58, S.67— Leave to appeal - Maintainability of
petition - Appeal to Supreme Court is maintainable against orders passed by National
Commission ( NCDRC ) in its original jurisdiction or as court of first instance - No further
appeal lies against orders passed by National Commission in exercise of its appellate or
revisional jurisdiction - Appeal to Supreme Court against Order of National Commission in
exercise of appellate jurisdiction dismissing appeal was not maintainable.
A plain reading of the provisions of the Act, 1986 and Act 2019, respectively would indicate
that the remedy of appeal to the Supreme Court is available only with respect to the orders
passed by the NCDRC in the exercise of its powers conferred by S. 21(a)(i) of the Act, 1986
and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, 2019. In other words, both the Acts provide for the
remedy of appeal to this Court only with respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC
in its original jurisdiction or as the court of first instance (original orders) and no further appeal
lies against the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate or revisional
jurisdiction.
Thus, an appeal against the order passed by the NCDRC to the Supreme Court would be
maintainable only in case the order is passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred
u/S. 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986. No further appeal to the Supreme Court is provided against the
order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred u/S. 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986.
There is no provision for filing any further appeal against the order passed on the appeal filed
against the order of the SCDRC. (Para 17, 18)
(B) Constitution of India , Art.136, Art.226— Special leave to appeal - Grant of - Jurisdiction
of Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal can be invoked in very exceptional
circumstances - Question of law of general public importance or a decision which shocks
SC3700conscience of Court are some of the prime requisites for grant of special leave - When
party aggrieved has alternative remedy to go before High Court, invoking its writ
jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction as the case may be, Supreme Court would not
entertain petition seeking special leave and thereby short-circuit the legal procedure
prescribed.
(Para 24)
Case Referred : Chronological Paras

AIR 2022 SC 2363 : AIROnline 2022 SC 716 (Rel. on) Para No.( 26, 34, 35, 36, 37 )
AIR 2022 SC 422 : AIROnline 2022 SC 27 Para No.( 37 )
AIR 2001 SC 3295 : 2001 AIR SCW 3544 Para No.( 37 )
AIR 1997 SC 1125 : 1997 AIR SCW 1345 : 1997 Lab IC 1069 (SC) Para No.( 32, 37 )
AIR 1993 SC 1991 : 1993 AIR SCW 2004 Para No.( 23 )
1986 Lab IC 863 (SC) Para No.( 22 )
AIROnline 1978 SC 12 Para No.( 21 )
AIR 1970 SC 668 Para No.( 19 )
AIR 1965 SC 1595 Para No.( 32, 35 )
AIR 1961 SC 1106 Para No.( 25 )
AIR 1950 SC 169 : 1950 Cri LJ 1270 Para No.( 19 )
AIR 1955 SC 65 Para No.( 20 )
AIR 1954 SC 520 Para No.( 35 )

Name of Advocates

Rajat Khattry, Varadarajan, Abhay Kumar, AOR, for Petitioner; S. K. Verma, AOR Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, AOR Anil Kumar Singh, for Respondent.

1. J. B. PARDIWALA, J. :-This petition seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution is at the instance of M/s Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited,
Original appellant before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, 'the
NCDRC') in the First Appeal No. 376 of 2016 by which the NCDRC dismissed the appeal filed by
the petitioner herein thereby affirming the order passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission (for short, 'the SCDRC') of Delhi, holding that the respondent No. 1 /complainant was
entitled to receive the claim amount and appropriate compensation from the petitioner and its joint
venture partner viz. Allahabad Bank (respondent No. 2) for the goods stolen from the premises in
question.
FACTUAL MATRIX

2.It appears from the materials on record that the respondent Bank, acting as an intermediary
issued a Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy dated 05.12.2011 in favour of the complainant
through the petitioner herein. Similarly, a Burglary Insurance Policy was also issued in favour of
the complainant dated 08.12.2011. Both the policies covered a sum of Rs. 50 lakh for the risk of
fire and burglary. The policies were for the period between 25.11.2011 and 24.11.2012.

3.By way of letter dated 28.03.2012, the complainant informed the respondent Bank that the
construction of his new premises at Bawana, Delhi had been completed and he had transferred his
stock to the above premises situated in Bawana from the premises situated in Rajgarh Ext., Gandhi
Nagar, Delhi and Bhagirath Palace, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. In this letter the complainant had also
instructed the Bank to inform the petitioner.

4.The respondent Bank acknowledged the aforesaid intimation and claims to have informed the
petitioner by way of letter dated 31.03.2012. The Bank claims to have also forwarded the letter
dated 28.03.2012 of the complainant to the petitioner.
5.On 29.06.2012, a theft took place at the Bawana premises and for that FIR No. 213/2012 was
lodged on 30.06.2012 at the PS Bawana. Both, the petitioner and the Bank were also informed
about the theft. A surveyor was appointed by the petitioner to inspect the premises and on
01.07.2012, a formal complaint was lodged by the complainant with the petitioner.

6.After the theft, the complainant informed that a fire had also broken out in the

premises at Bawana on 18.10.2012, and the status report in that regard was issued by the fire
department. Subsequently, the complainant filed claims for both, theft and fire amounting to Rs. 49
lakh. The petitioner repudiated the theft claim vide letter dated 22.08.2013 and the fire claim was
closed on account of non- submission of documents by the complainant.

7.On 03.06.2013, the complainant aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the petitioner
approached the SCDRC, Delhi under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short,
'the Act 1986'), by way of Complaint No. 357/2013. He prayed for his claim of Rs. 49 lakh to be
processed along with compensation of Rs. 20 lakh and interest at the rate the respondent Bank was
charging from the complainant, with costs of the complaint.

8.By order dated 18.03.2016, the SCDRC partly allowed the complaint holding that the petitioner
and the respondent bank were jointly and severally liable for the deficiencies in providing services
to the complainant and the complainant was entitled to be compensated for the theft of goods
worth Rs. 41,31,180/- @ 12 % interest per annum from the date of the claim. The petitioner and
the bank were also directed to pay Rs. 2 lakh to the complainant towards compensation for mental
agony, harassment and deficiency in providing services. The petitioner was further directed to
finalise the fire claim of Rs. 4 lakh of the complainant.

9.The petitioner herein feeling aggrieved with the order passed by the SCDRC challenged the
same before the NCDRC by filing the First Appeal No. 376 of 2016 under Section 19 of the Act
1986. The petitioner prayed before the NCDRC to set aside the SCDRC's order in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction and grant costs against the complainant in favour of the petitioner.

10.By order dated 16.01.2023, the First Appeal filed by the petitioner herein came to be dismissed.

11.In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is here before this Court with the present
petition, seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
DISCUSSION

12.In the course of the hearing of this matter, manyfold contentions were raised on either side.
However, the moot question that falls for our consideration is whether we should entertain this
petition seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution directly against the
order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or relegate the petitioner to
avail the remedy of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a petition
invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution?

13.Before, we proceed to answer the aforesaid question, we must look into the few relevant
provisions of the Act 1986.
14.Section 21(a) of the Act 1986 is titled 'Jurisdiction of the National Commission'. The same
reads thus:
"21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. - Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the
National Commission shall have jurisdiction -
(a) to entertain -
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds
rupees one crore; and
(ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission; ...."

15.Section 23 of the Act 1986 provides for an 'Appeal'. The same reads thus:

"23. Appeal.- Any person, aggrieved by an order made by the National Commission in exercise of
its powers conferred by
sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 21, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme
Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the order:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of
thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order
of the National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless that person has
deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount or rupees fifty thousand,
whichever is less."
(Emphasis Supplied)

16.The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stood repealed on 20.07.2020 (Section 106, the Act 1986)
and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (for short, 'the Act 2019') came into force. In the instant
case, the complaints were instituted under the Act 1986. However, we must highlight the relevant
provisions of the Act 2019, which are pari materia to the provisions of the Act 1986.
"58. Jurisdiction of National Commission.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the
National Commission shall have jurisdiction-
(a) to entertain-
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration exceeds rupees ten
crore:
Provided that where the Central Government deems it necessary so to do, it may prescribe such
other value, as it deems fit;
(ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of goods or services paid as consideration
exceeds ten crore rupees;
(iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;
(iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority;........
Xxx xxx xxx
67. Appeal against order of National Commission. - Any person, aggrieved by an order made by
the National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub- clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a)
of sub-section (1) of section 58, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme Court
within a period of thirty days from the date of the order:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of
thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order
of the National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless that person has
deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed."

17.A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act 1986 and Act 2019, respectively would
indicate that the remedy of appeal to this Court is available only with respect to the orders passed
by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986 and 58(1)(a)
(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 2019. In other words, both the Acts provide for the remedy of appeal
to this Court only with respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in its original
jurisdiction or as the court of first instance (original orders) and no further appeal lies against the
orders which are passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.

18.Adverting to the case at hand, the appeal before the NCDRC was against the order passed by
the SCDRC under Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Act 1986. Such appeal to the NCDRC was
maintainable, as provided
under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. As per Section 23 of the Act 1986, any person, aggrieved
by an order made by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i), may
prefer an appeal against such order to this Court. Therefore, an appeal against the order passed by
the NCDRC to this Court would be maintainable only in case the order is passed by the NCDRC in
exercise of its powers conferred under Section 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986. No further appeal to this
Court is provided against the order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred
under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. There is no provision for filing any further appeal against
the order passed on the appeal filed against the order of the SCDRC. In such circumstances, the
petitioner has come before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
SCOPE AND GRANT OF SPECIAL LEAVE UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION

19.This Court has held in Pritam Singh v. State reported in 1950 SCC 189 : 1950 SCR 453 : (AIR
1950 SC 169) at p. 459: "Generally speaking this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is
shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has
been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review
of the decision appealed against". It was also said in that case that the view that once an appeal has
been admitted by special leave the entire case is at large and that the appellant is free to contest all
the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court is wrong. Only
those points can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the
preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for. This principle was stated, it is true, in a
criminal case but it is of as much significance in civil cases as in the trial of criminal appeals. [See:
Murtaza and Sons and Another v. Nazir Mohd. Khan and Others reported (1970) 3 SCC 876 :
(AIR 1970 SC 668)].

20.A Constitution Bench of this Court in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in (1955) 1 SCR 941 : AIR 1955 SC 65 made the following
observations:
"7. ... It is not possible to define with any precision the limitations on the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in article 136.
The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power itself. It
being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with
caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter the
exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that can be said is that the Constitution
having trusted the wisdom and good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that itself is a
sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power will only be used to advance the cause of justice,
and that its exercise will be governed by well established principles which govern the exercise of
overriding constitutional powers. It is, however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion
that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal within the territory of India
has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the finality of
finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power because the whole
intent and purpose of this article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice is not
perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of Courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the
decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and conclusive. ..."
(Emphasis supplied)

21.In Ujagar Singh and Another v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in (1979) 4 SCC 530 :
(AIROnline 1978 SC 12), Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Bench observed as under:
"1. ... There is hardly a case, civil or criminal, which does not raise some question of law or the
other. But no question of law of general public importance is involved in these petitions. It is time
that it was realised that the jurisdiction of this Court to grant special leave to appeal can be invoked
in very exceptional circumstances. A question of law of general public importance or a decision
which shocks the conscience of the Court are some of the prime requisites for the grant of special
leave. ...''
(Emphasis supplied)

22.In the case of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes
Trading Limited and Another, (1986) 2 SCC 624 : (1986 Lab IC 863 (SC), this Court observed in
para 6 as under:
"6. The Union has directly come to this Court in appeal against the said order of the Industrial
Court without first approaching the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution for the
purpose of challenging the said order. The powers of this Court under Article 136 are very wide
but as clause (1) of that article itself states the grant of special leave to appeal is in the discretion of
the court. Article 136 is, therefore, not designed to permit direct access to this Court where other
equally efficacious remedy is available and where the question is not of public importance...."
(Emphasis supplied)

23.This Court in Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi and Others, reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 389 :
(AIR 1993 SC 1991) observed in para 16 as under:
"16. It is true that the finality clause contained in Section 245- I does not and cannot bar the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or
under Article 136, as the case may be. But that does not mean that the jurisdiction of this Court in
the appeal preferred directly in this Court is any different than what it would be if the assessee had
first approached the High Court under Article 226 and then come up in appeal to this Court under
Article 136. A party does not and cannot gain any advantage by approaching this Court directly
under Article 136, instead of approaching the High Court under Article 226. This is not a limitation
inherent in Article 136; it is a limitation which this Court imposes on itself having regard to the
nature of the function performed by the Commission and keeping in view the principles of judicial
review...."
(Emphasis supplied)

24.Thus, what is discernible from the aforesaid decisions of this Court is that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal can be invoked in very exceptional circumstances.
The question of law of general public importance or a decision which shocks the conscience of the
Court are some of the prime requisites for the grant of special leave. The provisions of Article 136
of the Constitution as such are not circumscribed by any limitation. But when the party aggrieved
has alternative remedy to go before the High Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction or supervisory
jurisdiction as the case may be, this Court should not entertain petition seeking special leave
thereby short-circuit the legal procedure prescribed. The limitation, whatever, they be are implicit
in the nature and character of the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power,
naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in very exceptional situations.
The power will only be used to advance the cause of justice and its exercise
will be governed by well- established principles which govern the exercise of overriding
constitutional powers.

25.Almost six decades back, this Court speaking through M. Hidayatullah, J. in the case of the
State of Bombay v. M/s Ratilal Vadilal and Bros., reported in (1961) 2 SCR 367 : (AIR 1961 SC
1106) observed as under:
"3. ... We have frequently noticed that all the remedies which are open to an appellant are not first
exhausted before moving this Court. Ordinarily, this Court will not allow the High Court to be
bypassed in this manner, and the proper course for an appellant is to exhaust all his remedies
before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. ..."
(Emphasis supplied)

26.We shall now look into a very recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Ibrat Faizan v.
Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited reported in 2022 INSC 573 : (AIR 2022 SC 2363). In the said
case, the appellant had booked a flat in the project floated by the respondent. The appellant paid
the entire amount of consideration but the respondent did not hand over the flat within the time
stipulated in the agreement. Therefore, the appellant filed a consumer complaint before the
SCDRC on 10.08.2013, alleging deficiency of service on the part of the respondent. The SCDRC
allowed the complaint filed by the appellant vide its order dated 16.10.2020. The SCDRC directed
the respondent to hand over the flat to the possession of the appellant subject to their meeting the
requirements. The SCDRC further directed the respondent to pay compensation for the deficiency
of service of the respondent in the form of nine per cent simple interest till the date of delivery of
the flat in possession of the appellant.

27.The appellant filed an execution and contempt petition against the respondent since he did not
comply with the order of the SCDRC. Vide its order dated 12.03.2021, the SCDRC directed the
respondent to produce the details of bank accounts or properties for the purpose of attaching the
same and to implement the order passed by the SCDRC.

28.The respondent filed an appeal before the NCDRC. On 30.03.2021, the NCDRC stayed the
order of SCDRC subject to the deposit of the cost of entire flat along with nine per cent interest on
the amount paid till date in the Registry of the SCDRC.

29.The respondent, being aggrieved against the order of NCDRC filed a writ petition before the
High Court, challenging the order passed by the NCDRC. Before the High Court the respondent
contended that the NCDRC ought not to have directed the respondent, the builder, to deposit the
entire cost of the apartment along with the compensation awarded by the SCDRC. The High Court
stayed the order of National Commission, vide its order dated 25.05.2021. The said stay order was
issued subject to the condition that the respondent is to deposit with the State Commission fifty per
cent of the amount directed to be deposited by way of interest towards compensation, within four
weeks from the date of stay order issued by the High Court.

30.In the meantime, the NCDRC passed the final order, confirming the order passed by the State
Commission, vide its order dated 09.12.2021. The respondent also filed a writ petition before the
High Court, challenging the final order passed by the NCDRC. The High Court, in this petition,
also granted interim stay vide its order dated 22.12.2021. Against this order the appellant filed an
SLP before this Court. This Court vide its order dated 21.03.2022 directed the High Court to
decide the jurisdictional issue under Article 227 of the Constitution against the order passed by the
NCDRC on or before 18.04.2022 and intimate the outcome to this Court. The High Court vide its
order dated
31.03.2022 held that the writ petition before the High Court against the order of NCDRC was
maintainable. This order was challenged by the appellant before this Court.

31.The appellant submitted the following before this Court:

(a) Against the order of NCDRC, a petition before the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution is not maintainable.
(b) Only appeal is maintainable before this Court against the order of NCDRC as per the
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.
(c) Without exhausting the appellate remedy, the High Court ought not to have entertained the
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.
(d) The High Court ought not to have stayed the order passed by the NCDRC in the limited
jurisdiction available under Article 227 of the Constitution.

32.The respondent submitted the following before this Court:

(a) The provisions of the Act 2019 do not have appeal provisions against the order of NCDRC
passed in exercise of appellate/revisional jurisdiction and therefore writ petition under Article 226
or petition under Article 227, as the case may be, is maintainable before the High Court against the
order of NCDRC.
(b) For the aforesaid purpose the respondent relied on the following judgments:
- Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595; and
- L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : (AIR 1997 SC 1125).
33.This Court considered the question for its decision as to whether against the order passed by the
NCDRC in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the Act 2019, petition before the High Court
under the Article 227 of Constitution of India would be maintainable.

34.After due analysis of the provisions of the Act 2019, which are pari materia to the provisions of
the Act 1986, this Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra) held as under:
"11. ....Therefore, an appeal against the order passed by the National Commission to this Court
would be maintainable only in case the order is passed by the National Commission in exercise of
its powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or under Section 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act. No
further appeal to this Court is provided against the order passed by the National Commission in
exercise of its powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or under Section 58(1)(a)(iv) of the
2019 Act. In that view of the matter, the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party
against the order passed by the National Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or
Section 58(1)(a)(iv) would be to approach the concerned High Court having jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India."
xxx xxx xxx
14. ....while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise
the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required
to be exercised."
(Emphasis supplied)

35.In Ibrat Faizan (supra), this Court took notice of its earlier decision in the case of Associated
Cement (supra), wherein, a Constitution Bench held as under:
"9. ... Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they
share with the Courts one common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals are "constituted
by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive
functions",
(vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, 1955 1 SCR 267 at p. 272: (AIR 1954 SC 520 at p.
522). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between
parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly
prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to
conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so
strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially
the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the
case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been
transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which they
discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign
State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly
to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State,
by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by
entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is
really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are
common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic
and the fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they
discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign
State.
Xxx xxx xxx
44. An authority other than a Court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely
different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define
exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the
powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the
State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by
the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any
matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial
powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136. Such a
power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute
by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant
law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other
bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the
power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body
deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a
tribunal acting under S. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a
tribunal within Art. 136. It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings
of a Court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a Court, so
also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under S. 10 A of the Act with many
of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals.
45. The word "tribunal" finds place in Art. 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also
the word has the same meaning as in Art. 136."
(Emphasis supplied)

36.Having regard to the aforesaid, this Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra) observed as under:

"12. ... Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be a 'Tribunal' which is vested by
Statute the powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with
regard to any matter in controversy between them. Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the
aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State
and therefore may be regarded as a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the
Constitution of India. ..."
(Emphasis supplied)

37.This Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra), while explaining the importance of approaching the High
Court, more particularly when a remedy is available by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution or by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution (supervisory
jurisdiction) observed as under:
"12. ....Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party
before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as it is
appropriate that aggrieved party approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Xxx xxx xxx
13. Now so far as the remedy which may be available under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the remedy by way of an appeal by special leave
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India may be too expensive and as observed and held by
this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy can be said to be inaccessible
for it to be real and effective. Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India before the concerned High Court is provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the
right of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a complainant, to approach the concerned
High Court at a lower cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
Xxx xxx xxx
14.1. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by
this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 : (AIR 2001 SC
3295), which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in
the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 29) : (AIR 2022 SC
422). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court
has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It
goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited
jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting
any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order
passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigour of the powers
to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India."
(Emphasis supplied)

38.In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion that we should not
adjudicate this petition on merits. We must ask the petitioner herein to first go before the
jurisdictional High Court either by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution
or by invoking the supervisory
jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after
the High Court adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either of the parties to
thereafter come before this Court by filing special leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution.

39.We take notice of the order passed by this Court dated 29.03.2023 which reads thus:

"2. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the impugned judgment and order, subject to deposit of
50 per cent of the awarded amount in this Court."

40.However, in the aforesaid context, it is also necessary for us to look into the office report dated
03.07.2023, which reads thus:
"It is further submitted that Dr. S.K. Verma, Advocate for respondent No.1 has on 28.06.2023 filed
an application for release of deposited amount made by the Petitioner. However, the same is
defective as original property papers are not filed. Also, the documents relating to valuation of
property are not filed as in the lease papers the amount mentioned is Rs. 6,30,000/-. Hence, the
amount was not disbursed to the respondent No.1."

41.It appears from the aforesaid that the complainant was not in a position to withdraw the fifty
percent amount deposited by the petitioner herein. It further appears that the amount deposited by
the petitioner herein is still with the Registry of this Court. Since we are not entertaining this
petition on merits, we direct the Registry to refund the amount to the petitioner after due and
proper verification.

42.In the result, this petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach the
jurisdictional High Court and challenge the order passed by the NCDRC, in accordance with law.

43.It is needless to clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The
merits of the case shall be looked into by the jurisdictional High Court.
Order Accordingly