INFO FLASH AUGUST 2023

FINABEL - THE EUROPEAN ARMY INTEROPERABILITY CENTRE

FEBRUARY 2024

WRITTEN BY EDITED BY
CATARINA SILVIA, JONAS HERTL ALEX MARCHAN

SUPERVISED BY
EMILE CLARKE
Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 immeasurably disturbed the European security landscape
greatly fuelling fear of Russia's neo-imperialistic ambitions, particularly in the former Soviet sphere of
influence. In Eastern Europe, especially in the Baltic states and Poland, these fears have grown
steadily since Russia's hybrid forms of aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In particular, Poland has
felt threatened by various hybrid threat scenarios since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including a potential attack on its own territory. Poland's response to the
war in Ukraine has been and continues to be influenced by both geographical and historical
considerations (Żęgota& Mironyuk, 2022). With a border shared with Russia's exclave, Kaliningrad,
and the escalating tensions since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the fear of a Russian
invasion through the Suwalki Gap, a crucial Polish-Lithuanian border, emerged as a concerning
potential contingency since the collapse of the Eastern bloc (Szeptycki, 2023). As a result, Poland has
decided to act decisively. In concrete terms, this has materialised as the massive expansion of its
defence forces and staunch support for its attacked neighbour. This emerging security environmentis
analysed in further detail within this InfoFlash, as it has the potential to produce far-reaching
consequences across the continent for the European security architecture in the long term.

The Polish Situation – Boundaries and the Historical Factor

Poland’s foreign policy has been greatly influenced by the goal of bringing Ukraine closer to Western
institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Andrzej Szeptycki
(2021),Professor of Strategic Studies and International Security at the University of Warsaw, stated
that “given the danger of Russian imperialism […] the creation of an independent Ukraine […] is, for
Poland, a matter of capital significance”. Moreover, Russia has historically been a persistent threat to
Poland’s sovereignty, with Poland being occupied by Russia at different times during the 19th and
20th centuries (Zarobny, 2020). Particularly, the Soviet Union’s indirect control of the country from
1945 to 1989 is still very present in Polish collective memory (Rodkiewicz, 2023). It is therefore not a
surprise that Poland is feeling sensitive to the threat of a Russian invasion given the backdrop of the
war in Ukraine. In addition to a direct attack, fears in Poland also centre on hybrid threat scenarios.
After all, Russia began destabilising and undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine long before
the outbreak of full-scale war through its annexation of Crimea and support for the separatists in
Donbas. The threat of hybrid warfare, outlined by prominent Polish territorial defence researcher
Ryszard Jakubczak (2020), is integral to understanding the evolving security landscape (Jakubczak,
2020). The realisation that hostile actors can, indeed, exert control over foreign territory without
deploying official operational forces has led states, including Poland,to recognise the need to address
threats below the traditional threshold of all-out war. Subsequently, Poland has realised that it
cannot exclusively rely on its conventional armed forces but that it must also emphasise the role of
territorial defence forces in countering internal threats resulting from indirect external interventions,
such as disinformation and propaganda.

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The Polish Reaction to the Russian Invasionof Ukraine - Military Aid and
Rearmament

Poland is one of the primary and staunchest supporters of Ukraine. The aid has primarily been of a
military nature as, since the beginning of the war, Poland has provided Ukraine with military aid
worth €3.04 billion (Bomprezziet al., 2023). Although this puts Poland well behind countries such as
the U.S. (43.9 billion euros) in absolute terms, many of the countries sending aid to Ukraine have
more economic power at their disposal and therefore much more room to manoeuvre. In reality,
Poland spends a larger percentage of its GDP on military aid to Ukraine than its U.S. counterpart
(Bomprezziet al., 2023). Poland is also well ahead of other European countries such as the
Netherlands, France, and Italy in absolute terms. Regarding the nature of Poland’s military aid, Poland
has not only supplied Ukraine quantitatively with hundreds of Soviet tanks (T-72 and PT-91s) and
qualitatively with western Leopard 2 A4 main battle tanks, but it is also one of the few countries to
have supplied helicopters (Mil Mi 24) and combat aircraft (Mig 29).This marks Poland out, as Ukraine
has a considerable shortage of such aircraft and few other countries have opted to provide such
equipment (Oryx, 2022). In addition, Poland has provided countless other light and heavy weapon
systems, including infantry fighting vehicles, howitzers, armoured vehicles, ammunition, air defence
systems, and infantry equipment (Oryx, 2022).

Polish support for Ukraine also plays an important role in public perception. While other countries,
such as Germany, have often been accused of acting too hesitantly, Poland has acted much more
directly. For instance, Poland has all too often been the first country to provide new weapon systems
and pressure other countries to follow their lead. This could be observed particularly at the
beginning of 2023 when the Polish initiative to deploy German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine led
to numerous other countries sending Western battle tanksas well (BBC, 2023).

In addition to providing military and political aid to the neighbouring country under attack, Poland
has also begun to massively increase its defence capabilities to prepare itself for worst-case scenario
contingencies on its own territory. Poland's rearmament plans include the procurement of new state-
of-the-art weapons systems of NATO standards including 366 Abrams tanks, 96 Apache helicopters,
HIMARS missile launchers, Patriot air defence systems and F-35 aircraft (Jones, 2023). Cost-effective,
readily available high-tech weapons from South Koreaare also on the Polish radar, including 980 K2
tanks, 648 K9 self-propelled how it zers and 48 FA-50 fighter jets (Smith, 2022). At the same time,
Poland is planning an increase in troop strength to 300,000 soldiers (Chancellery of the Prime
Minister Republic of Poland, 2023). The cost of implementing these ambitious plans runs into the
hundreds of billions and, in order to raise those funds, Poland's already relatively high defence
budget will have to increase to over four per cent of GDP by 2023, a number higher than that of the
United States (Jones, 2023).

This is precisely where restrictions arise, as Poland faces major challenges in realising its plans. It is
not certain that the Polish economy will be able to cope with such high defence spending in the long
term, even if there is strong public support for this policy (Carbonaro, 2023). Moreover, demographic
decline is jeopardising the increase in troop numbers (Kopka, 2019) and some of the plans are also
potentially dependent on a stable political environment.

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For example, the plan to expand militarily dates back to when the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Party(PiS)
was in government. However, at the end of 2023, PiS was defeated in the last elections and it is yet to
be determined how consistently and comprehensively the new Polish government will continue to
implement the plans even though rearmament currently remains a bi-partisan issue in Poland
(Davies & Jung-a & Minder, 2023). Thus, regardless of governmental change, Poland will inevitably
continue to invest in its military to some extent and will hence soon have one of the most
formidablearmed forces in Europe.

Realisation and Implications of New Polish Defence Policy

This new direction for Polish defence policy raises the question of how Poland sees its ambitions and
how they are perceived by other countries. This begs the question: to what extent will Poland’s
growing military power translate into political influence on the international stage?

Poland's primary strategic goal is to protect Ukraine's sovereignty while promoting its alignment with
Western institutions. To achieve this, Poland has worked to shield Ukraine from external interference
while also actively campaigning for its integration into Western organisations. By employing this dual
strategy, Poland aims to foster positive relations with Ukraine and pave the way for Ukraine’s
alignment with Western values after the war. As Poland's President Andrzej Duda (2023) stated,
“Ukrainians want to politically join the Western community and we should help them reach this goal.”
Success in this endeavour would not only enhance Poland's geopolitical standing but also mitigate
the risk of a Russian incursion into Poland, given the presence of a pro-Western Ukraine as not only a
partner but a buffer between Poland and Russia.

Following the Russian invasion, Poland promptly bolstered its military capabilities to a formidable
extent. Witold Rodkiewicz, Assistant Professor of East European Studies at the University of
Warsaw(2023), claims that this initiative aims to “make Russians think twice before they attack.”
Meanwhile, this strategy also enhances Poland’s relative power on the continent. Although Western
European and Polish interests have fundamentally converged since Vladimir Putin ordered the full-
scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some voices in Poland remain sceptical at complete
reliance on Western European support, such as Roman Kuźniar, Professor of Strategic Studies and
International Security at the University of Warsaw, who affirmed in a formal interview that “Poland
cannot trust [the Germans and French], [and] how they will behave once the war is over” (Kuźniar,
2023). Likewise, some political scientists have suggested that, by achieving its goal of becoming the
strongest army in Europe, Poland could “put an end to the German military hubris” (Dupuy, 2023).

Some authors, such as Thomas Pitney (2023), claim that in addition to balancing Franco-German
influence in Europe, Poland aims to hinder any potential improvement in EU-Russia relations
following the conflict. This stance aligns with Poland's broader objective of preventing European
cooperation with Russia. Pitney (2023) claims that despite the threats posed by the war in Ukraine,
Poland sees an opportunity to advance its strategic goal of the warting European-Russian
rapprochement. Thus, Poland's efforts to enhance its military strength serve a dual purpose:
deterring Russian aggression and bolstering its position within Europe.

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The war in Ukraine also allows Poland to reinforce its ties with NATO. Poland's historical and
geopolitical context has compelled the country to prioritise a strong relationship with the United
States since gaining independence in 1989. The memory of the United States' role in liberating
Poland from Soviet influence remains deeply ingrained in Polish collective consciousness.
Recognising the United States as its most effective deterrent against Russia, Poland has strategically
utilised the war in Ukraine to enhance its position as America's key ally. Zbigniew Rau, former Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs, made it clear that through vocal support for Ukraine and actions like
increased military spending and NATO reaffirmation, Poland aims to deepen its relationship with the
United States and secure significant security guarantees(Rau, 2022).

Poland's initiatives to play a greater role in the defence of its territory and that of the EU and NATO
have not gone unnoticed by its partner countries and Russia. Perception of Poland has changed
significantly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. NATO and the EU have never been so
unanimous in the belief that the greatest threat to their security comes from Vladimir Putin’s Russia,
and Poland has a key role to play in this dynamic for a number of reasons. Firstly, Poland’s
geographical position is of paramount importance as most Western military aid reaches Ukraine via
Poland. Secondly, should open conflict erupt, troops must be able to be deployed quickly through
the Suwalki Gap to defend the Baltic states and the Polish border with Kaliningradand Belarus. In the
words of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the “centre of Europe is moving eastward” (Nolan, 2022),
thereby recognising the increasingly important role of Poland. Thus, the European West, especially
the Germans, have a great interest in Poland growing into a reliable bulwark, shielding Europe from
threats emanating from the East.

The Polish initiative have also been perceived very positively in the United States. For a long time, the
U.S. demanded invain that its European NATO partners increase defence spending to two per cent of
GDP so that it would not have to bear the costs of security in Europe alone. While still falling short of
this target, Poland is a prime example of the opposite in this respect. Consequently, a senior U.S.
Army official in Europe stated in 2022 that “Poland has become our most important partner in
continental Europe” (Karnitschnig&Kość, 2022).

Poland's reputation within the EU and NATO has improved significantly thanks to its active role in
security policy and the change in the threat situation. This process is also supported by the outcome
of the elections in Poland in 2023. Previously, Poland's reputation, regardless of its security efforts,
had suffered in the EU and the U.S. alike after it was charged several times in the European Court of
Justice for the erosion of democratic principles and violations against the rule of law
(Karnitschnig&Kość, 2022). If under a new government Poland presents itself as a reliable political
partner in the future, there is a good chance that Poland's growing reputation as a result of its
armament and support for Ukraine will also translate into greater political influence within the EU
and NATO (Jones, 2023).

In addition to the political effects and the reputation of Poland on the international stage, Poland's
endeavours in security policy also have an impact on the operational and tactical levels.

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The new weapons that Poland wants to procure in large numbers meet NATO standards and are
largely produced in the West, especially in the USA, or are modelled on them, as in the case of the
South Korean systems. This simplifies interoperability and cooperation with other land forces during
exercises due to overlap in ammunition models and communication systems, the potential access to
spare parts, the know-how for repairs and maintenance, and the same requirements for transport
and supply. At the same time, the procurement of these new systems frees up old Soviet systems
that have been decommissioned paving the way for their delivery to Ukraine. Furthermore, with a
larger army, Poland can fulfil more tasks within NATO and the EU and provide more troops for
exercises and missions. Additionally, there are also long-term consequences. Despite the direct
delivery of various weapons systems, some of the deals with South Korea also include contracts for
the licensed construction of the systems directly in Poland (Smith, 2022). This eliminates the
dependence on the long transport route of the systems and creates another production site for
modern high-tech weapons in line with NATO standards in Europe. As the South Korean systems are
much cheaper than American, German or British models with comparable performance, this
emerges as an intriguing development for European military industry (Smith, 2022). Other
economically less well-positioned Eastern European NATO and EU states could also push ahead with
the modernisation of their own armed forces with a lower budget and increase interoperability
between the European armed forces by using the new systems that meet Western requirements and
are designed for interaction in coordinated processes.

05
Conclusion

Poland's reaction to the war in Ukraine was decisive. At the same time, it became one of Ukraine's
most vigorous supporters and suppliers of weapons and began the comprehensive modernisation
and armament of its own armed forces, showing more willingness to invest than any other European
state. Poland primarily wants to increase its own security with these measures, but they also entail
far-reaching consequences for the security architecture in Europe and the balance of power within
the EU and NATO. Secured militarily and most likely also politically, Poland will play a more important
role in the future. NATO can count on a highly armed, militarily strong land power ina strategically
important sphere that includes Russia and Ukraine, which is increasingly growing into the role of a
bulwark on NATO's eastern flank. The EU hopes that Poland will once again become an important
and reliable political partner in the future and that the increase in military strength will go hand in
hand with the desire to assume a leading role within the EU in the future, a trajectory that Poland
itself seems very intent on.

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