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China US Relations Transformed Perspectives Strategic
Interactions 1st Edition Suisheng Zhao Digital Instant
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Author(s): Suisheng Zhao
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China–U.S. Relations Transformed

“This book tackles a most complex subject, one that is critical to the United
States in the 21st Century. The rise of China is fraught with contradictions, from
a successful superpower to a huge nation state bogged down by domestic prob-
lems. Of particular interest in the book are the views of the Chinese scholars with
their unique insights and their cultural predispositions. It is a valuable work and a
must read for those who care about the most important bilateral relationship in
the world.”
James R. Lilley, Former American Ambassador to China and South Korea

China’s emergence in the twenty-first century to the status of great power has
profoundly transformed its relationship with the U.S.A. and compelled leaders
in both countries to redefine their positions towards each other. This book,
written by leading scholars and policy analysts from both the U.S.A. and China,
explores the transformation and multifaceted nature of U.S.–China relations,
including how the political elite in both countries have defined their strategic
objectives in response to China’s rise and managed their relations accordingly. It
provides an up-to-date analysis on the policy adjustments and strategic interac-
tions during the last decade, and covers the most important issue areas, including
security, nuclear deterrence, military modernization, energy, trade and economic
interaction, and Asia-Pacific power reconfiguration. It does not seek to confirm
either an alarmist or optimistic position but presents different perspectives and
assessments by foreign policy specialists with the hope that leaders in Washing-
ton and Beijing may make positive adjustments in their policies to avoid con-
frontation and war. It will also be an invaluable resource for students and
scholars of U.S. and Chinese politics, international relations and comparative
politics.

Suisheng Zhao is Executive Director of the Center for China–U.S. Cooperation

and a Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of
Denver, U.S.A. A founding editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, he is
the author and editor of eight books, including Debating Political Reform in
China: Rule of Law versus Democratization and A Nation-State by Construc-
tion: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism.
Routledge contemporary China series

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16 SARS 23 Hong Kong, China

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Chinese State security
Historical transformations and the Edited by Guoguang Wu and
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From Marx to the market 27 China–U.S. Relations
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China–U.S. Relations
Transformed
Perspectives and strategic interactions

Edited by Suisheng Zhao

First published 2008
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2008 Selection and editorial matter, Suisheng Zhao; individual chapters,
the contributors
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-93478-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-43867-5 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-93478-4 (ebk)

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ISBN13: 978-0-203-93478-4 (ebk)
To William S. Jackson, Jr.
for his support to my efforts of building bridges between the U.S.A. and
China
and
to Lillian, Sandra, Justinian, and Yi
for their love that has sustained my search for a better world
Contents

List of illustrations xi
About the editor and contributors xii
Acknowledgments xvi

PART I
Introduction 1

1 Implications of China’s rise for U.S.–China relations 3

SUISHENG ZHAO

2 China rising: geo-strategic thrust and diplomatic

engagement 20
SUISHENG ZHAO

PART II
Perspectives of Chinese scholars 43

3 Learning to live with the hegemon: China’s policy toward

the U.S.A. since the end of the Cold War 45
QINGGUO JIA

4 Complexity and transformational structure of China–U.S.

relations 58
DONGXIAO CHEN

5 Comparing security concepts of China and the U.S.A. 75

JIAN XU

6 Nuclear deterrence and the Sino-U.S. strategic relationship 85

BAOHUI ZHANG
x Contents
7 China–U.S. economic relations and the trade imbalance
issue 103
WEI LI

PART III
Perspectives of U.S. based scholars 117

8 Managing a multifaceted relationship between the U.S.A.

and China 119
PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS

9 The domestic political game behind the engagement

strategy 141
JEAN A. GARRISON

10 Chinese military modernization and energy security:

conflict or cooperation? 159
BERNARD D. COLE

11 The rise of China and Sino-American energy cooperation 176

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

12 China’s economic rise: implications for the U.S.A. 188

PIETER BOTTELIER

13 China, the U.S.A., and Japan: reconfiguring relations in

Southeast Asia 210
ELIZABETH ECONOMY

Index 228
Illustrations

Chart
12.1 U.S. manufacturing employment share 203

Tables
7.1 Bilateral trade between China and the U.S.A. 103
7.2 U.S. export growth among its top 15 export markets
2001–2006 104
7.3 U.S. trade deficit with China 105
7.4 U.S. ten chapters of products with the largest trade deficit
with the world and China 2006 107
7.5 U.S. top ten chapters of products with the largest trade
deficit with China 2006 108
7.6 Share changes of U.S. trade deficit sources in East Asia 109
7.7 China’s trade deficits with East Asian economies 110
12.1 Responses by USCBC members to questions about problems
of doing business with China 197
12.2 U.S. GDP and manufacturing value added (trillions of constant
2000 dollars) and the share of manufacturing in GDP 202
12.3 Share of global manufacturing output 203
About the editor and contributors

The editor
Suisheng Zhao is Professor and Executive Director of the Center for China–
U.S. Cooperation at Graduate School of International Studies, University of
Denver. He is founder and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China and
a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Committee of the Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. A Campbell National Fellow at
Hoover Institution of Stanford University, he was Associate Professor of
Political Science/International Studies at Washington College in Maryland,
Associate Professor of Government/East Asian Politics at Colby College in
Maine. His most recent books are Debating Political Reform in China: Rule
of Law versus Democratization (M. E. Sharpe, 2006), A Nation-State by Con-
struction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford University
Press, 2004), and Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behav-
ior (M. E. Sharpe, 2003). His articles have appeared in Political Science
Quarterly, The Wilson Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, International
Politik, The China Quarterly, World Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Affairs,
Journal of Democracy, Pacific Affairs, Communism and Post-Communism
Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Issues and Studies, and elsewhere.

Contributors
Baohui Zhang is an Associate Professor of Politics at Lingnan University,
Hong Kong. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin.
His research interests include democratization, U.S.–China relations, and
political reform in Hong Kong. He has published in journals such as Compar-
ative Political Studies, Democratization, Theory and Society, and Asian
Perspective.
Pieter Bottelier is a visiting Associate Professor at the School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. He was an
Adjunct Lecturer at Harvard University (KSG) and at Georgetown Univer-
sity. He has authored many articles on China’s economy. Bottelier worked
for the World Bank as the Senior Advisor to the Vice President for East Asia;
 About the editor and contributors xiii
Chief of the World Bank’s Resident Mission in Beijing; consecutive director
for Latin America and North Africa; Division Chief for Mexico; resident
Chief Economist in Jakarta, Indonesia; and had various assignments as desk
economist for East and West African countries. He received Drs degree
(M.A. equivalent) from the University of Amsterdam and attended M.I.T.
Ph.D. program.
Bernard D. Cole is Professor of International History at the National War
College in Washington, D.C., where he concentrates on the Chinese military
and Asian energy issues. He previously served 30 years as a Surface Warfare
Officer in the Navy, all in the Pacific. He commanded USS Rathburne
(FF 1057) and Destroyer Squadron 35, served as a Naval Gunfire Liaison
Officer with the Third Marine Division in Vietnam, as Plans Officer for Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and as special assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations for Expeditionary Warfare. He has written numerous articles and
four books: Gunboats and Marines: The U.S. Navy in China; The Great Wall
at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century; Oil for the Lamps of China:
Beijing’s 21st Century Search for Energy; and Taiwan’s Security: History
and Prospects, published in January 2006. Dr. Cole earned an A.B. in History
from the University of North Carolina, an M.P.A. (National Security Affairs)
from the University of Washington, and a Ph.D. in History from Auburn Uni-
versity.
Dongxiao Chen is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Department of American
Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). Prior to this
position, he was director of Department of International Organizations and
International Law, and deputy director of Dept. of American Studies. He spe-
cializes in studies on American foreign policy and international collective
security regimes.
June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at the University of
Miami. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. In addi-
tion to energy issues, her research interests include China’s ethnic minorities,
Sino-Japanese relations, and cross-Strait relations. She is a senior fellow of
the Foreign Policy Research Institute. From 2001 through 2005, Dreyer
served as commissioner of the congressionally-established U.S.–China Eco-
nomic and Security Research Commission.
Elizabeth Economy is C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies
at the Council on Foreign Relations. She has published extensively on both
Chinese domestic and foreign policy, including The River Runs Black: The
Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Cornell University Press,
2004); articles in foreign policy and scholarly journals such Foreign Affairs
and Survival; and op-eds and book reviews published in The New York
Times, The Washington Post, The International Herald Tribune and others.
She serves on several China-related boards and consults frequently for the
U.S. government. Dr. Economy received her Ph.D. at the University of
xiv About the editor and contributors
Michigan, her M.A. at Stanford University and her B.A. at Swarthmore
College.
Jean Anne Garrison is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Univer-
sity of Wyoming. She is the author of two books, Making China Policy:
From Nixon to G.W. Bush (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2005) and Games
Advisors Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), and several book
chapters and journal articles (including publications in the International
Studies Review, Political Psychology, Cooperation and Conflict, Asian
Affairs, and Asian Perspective. In 2003, she was the recipient of a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship and several months in
2004 posted with the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian Pacific Affairs
working on the China desk. She received her Ph.D. and M.A. in political
science from the University of South Carolina.
Jian Xu is Vice President of Institute of International Studies in Beijing and a
senior research fellow. He received his B.A. and M.A. degrees in history
from Peking Normal University and a M.A. degree in law from University of
Sussex and a Ph.D. in law from University of Bristol. From 1993 to 1999,
Mr. Xu worked in the International Studies Center of the State Council. He
joined CIIS in 1999. Before taking the current position, he was Director of
Division of International Politics. His research areas cover international poli-
tics, Asia-Pacific security and globalization.
Phillip C. Saunders is a Senior Research Professor at the National Defense
University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies since January 2004. He
previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where
he served as Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies and taught courses on Chinese politics, Chinese
foreign policy, and East Asian security. Saunders has conducted research
and consulted on East Asian security issues for Princeton University, the
Council on Foreign Relations, RAND, and the National Committee on
U.S.–China Relations. Saunders has published numerous articles on
China and Asian security in journals including International Security, China
Quarterly, The China Journal, Survival, Asian Survey, Pacific Review, and
Orbis. Saunders attended Harvard College and received his M.P.A. and Ph.D.
in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton
University.
Qingguo Jia is Professor and Associate Dean of the School of International
Studies of Peking University. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University
in 1988. He was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution between 1985
and 1986. He has taught in University of Vermont, Cornell University, Uni-
versity of California at San Diego, University of Sydney in Australia as well
as Peking University. He has published extensively on U.S.–China relations,
relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, Chinese foreign policy
 About the editor and contributors xv
as well as Chinese politics. He is a member of the editorial board of Journal
of Contemporary China (U.S.A.), Political Science (New Zealand), Inter-
national Relations of the Asia-Pacific (Japan) and China Review (Hong
Kong). He is also Vice President of the China Association for Asia-Pacific
Studies, a board member of the China Association of American Studies, and
a board member of the National Taiwan Studies Association.
Wei Li is an Associate Research Fellow and Director of the Department of
American and Oceanian Studies at the Chinese Academy of International
Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC). Before joining the Department
of American and Oceanian Studies, he was Deputy Director of the
Academy’s Department of Asian and African Studies, and his fields of
specialization were East Asian economic cooperation, especially trade and
economic cooperation between ASEAN and China. He has served as a
member of China–ASEAN Economic Cooperation Expert Group.
Acknowledgments

Most of the chapters in this book are selected from papers presented at two inter-
national symposiums on U.S.–China relations that I organized as the executive
director of the Center for China–U.S. Cooperation (CCUSC) at the Graduate
School of International Studies (GSIS), University of Denver in 2005 and 2006.
More than 30 papers were presented and a group of outstanding scholars and
government officials engaged in dialogue at these symposiums to explore
various aspects of the implications of China’s rise for U.S.–China relations. I
would like to thank all participants for their contribution to the success of these
symposiums. In particular, I would like to thank the contributors to this book for
their willingness to make revisions and updates in a timely manner. I would also
like to thank Dean Tom Farer at GSIS for the support that I have always been
able to count on. My staff at the CCUSC provided the most professional assis-
tance, for which I am extremely grateful. Finally, I would like to thank Bill
Jackson for his friendship and his generosity in pledging an endowment to par-
tially fund the CCUSC annual conference and speaker series and also thank
Diana Lee for introducing Bill Jackson to me and launching the endowment,
which has sustained me in pursuing my dream of building an eminent China
Center at the University of Denver.
Part I

Introduction
1 Implications of China’s rise for
U.S.–China relations
Suisheng Zhao

An ancient empire, China was one of the most powerful nations in the world
before the spread of the Industrial Revolution that gave rise to modern European
powers, the U.S.A., and Japan. A mid-kingdom, accounting for about one third
of the world output as recently as the early nineteenth century, China began a
steady decline thereafter as it plunged into war, famine, isolation, and revolu-
tion. After about 200 years of struggle for national independence and modern-
ization, China reemerged as a global power in the twenty-first century. If China
is able to sustain the momentum of the recent decades, it will ultimately regain
the glorious position it enjoyed two centuries ago. The Summer Olympics of
2008 is a symbol of this national resurgence from a dark cocoon of decline and
isolation into the light of international recognition.
China’s rise certainly poses a serious challenge to public policy-makers
everywhere in the world, particularly to policy-makers in the U.S.A., the sole
superpower in the post-Cold War world. While some Americans welcome
China’s rise as creating new opportunities for great power cooperation, others
worry about a “China threat” to U.S. security and economic interests as China
now demonstrates its rapidly rising power as a counterweight to U.S. influence.
Has China’s rise led U.S.–China relations toward a vicious conflict for war or
toward a convergence of interests for cooperation? Can the two countries
manage their rivalry and competition to preserve peace by exploring areas in
which China’s national interests overlap U.S. interests and where cooperation
brings mutual benefits? This book represents a modest effort by leading scholars
and policy analysts from the U.S.A. and China to examine the dynamics of
transformation and multifaceted nature of U.S.–China relations. Focusing on
how the political elite in both countries define their strategic objectives in
response to China’s rise and manage their relationship accordingly, this book
looks at strategic issues facing policy-makers in the U.S.A. and China and
explores where this crucially important bilateral relationship is heading.

The transformation of U.S.–China relations

In spite of theoretical equality and anarchy in the modern nation-state system,
a hierarchical structure often exists among states, reflecting variations in their
4 S. Zhao
relative power status. Hegemonic states command dominant positions over other
states, resting on a robust economic base and military capabilities, supplemented
and solidified by soft normative power. The hegemonic states have a vested
interest in maintaining the established international system because their values
and interests are often universalized to the point where they largely conform to
the rules, values, and institutions of the system. Rising powers, however, often
demand a change in the power hierarchy and become challengers to the estab-
lished system. Historically, the rise of great powers has always been associated
with a transformation in the relationship between the rising powers and their
more established counterparts. Sometimes this rise has even produced a restruc-
turing of the hierarchy, i.e. a power transition from dominant states to chal-
lengers in the international system.1 Whether or not a systemic power transition
took place, the inevitable power competition often caused disruptive conflicts
and even large-scale wars. During the twentieth century, except for the competi-
tion between the U.S.A. and the U.K. that resulted in a more or less peaceful
power transition from a hegemonic Pax Britannica to a Pax Americana, all other
great power competitions were violent and disruptive. For example, the rivalry
between Germany and the U.K. was one of the causes leading to World War I;
the emergence of Germany and Japan was followed by World War II; and
the competition between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. caused a prolonged
Cold War.
Now China is rising and its rising power status is recognized by many Ameri-
cans. A 2006 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Asia
Society shows that “60% of Americans believe that China’s economy will grow
to be as large as the US economy within two decades or so.”2 Utilizing its rising
economic power in foreign affairs, China’s diplomatic activism has been
increasingly observed well beyond its neighboring Asian countries into Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Although China has not reached
the position of parity with American power, its rapid rise has profoundly trans-
formed the Sino-U.S. relationship and made the bilateral relationship increas-
ingly strategic and globally significant. Consequently, a profound debate about
the implications of China’s rise for U.S.–China relations has taken place among
scholars and policy-makers in both the U.S.A. and China.
Liberal optimists believe that globalization has produced growing strategic
interdependence among great powers. This strategic interdependence constrains
the U.S.A. and China from pursuing zero-sum strategies toward each other. As a
result, China’s rise has increased the common stakes for these two countries to
expand cooperation on almost all important international issues, such as trade
and investment, fighting terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, trade liberalization, environmental protection, energy, transnational crime,
and pandemic diseases. As an American scholar has argued, globalization is
reshaping the international strategic environment, in which the interests of the
U.S.A. and China will limit strategic competition and compel closer cooperation
in response to shared strategic threats and challenges. Although this high-level
common interest does not preclude sharp differences over specific issues, it is
 Implications of China’s rise 5
likely to create pressure on both countries to cooperate in many areas to defend,
maintain, and strengthen the international system and to restrain them from pur-
suing containment or confrontational strategies.3 Strategic and economic interde-
pendence thus become positive forces for integrating China into the established
international system in which self-interests and growing networks of inter-
national involvement will impose their own constraints and help ensure its emer-
gence as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. This view is
echoed by another American scholar: “Fortified by both globalization and its
economic policies, China has thus become an ardent supporter of the existing
international economic order.”4 A Chinese scholar also suggests that although
China is not a fully satisfied power in the international system because of its
historical grievances against the Western powers and unresolved issues such as
Taiwan, China is basically a status quo power, eager to be part of the inter-
national community because China has benefited enormously from the inter-
national political and economic system since the late 1970s. “China’s
development is shaped by the international system and, most significantly, as an
important participant, China is also helping to shape the changing international
system at the beginning of the twenty-first century.”5 China’s search for a
greater role in world affairs, in this case, will not necessarily threaten U.S. inter-
ests in the non-zero-sum game.
Realist alarmists, in contrast, argue that “there will be no win-win situation in
conflicts among international political entities accompanying the rise of China”
because “the rise of a state’s power status indicates an expansion of its political
power. This in turn causes the fall of other states’ power status and political
power.”6 By this logic, China’s rise will inevitably alter the international status
quo as a rising China will want to define its interests more expansively and seek
a greater degree of influence. If successfully fulfilling its expected potential,
China will join a select group of modern great powers, including Great Britain in
the nineteenth century, Germany and Japan during World War II, and the Soviet
Union and the U.S.A. during the Cold War. Each of these rising great powers
expanded their influence and pursued some form of hegemony to protect its
interests or even launched aggressive warfare against rival states. A rising China
is likely to engage in an intense security competition with the U.S.A. to maxi-
mize its share of world power. This may consequently upset the balance of
power and spark realignments particularly in East Asia as well as the rest of the
world because most of China’s neighbors and other powers will have to decide
whether to join the U.S.A. or China in a new round of power competition. It is
not difficult for alarmists to find evidence in an unsatisfied China which suggests
that China’s rise is being fraught with tensions with the U.S.A. For example,
America’s accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and
China’s capture of an American spy plane in 2001 provoked extreme nationalis-
tic responses from both the Chinese public and government. In response to the
U.S. policy toward Taiwan, China has determined to prevent U.S. intervention
should China have to use force in its efforts towards unification with Taiwan.7 In
addition, China has forged links with the anti-American government in
6 S. Zhao
Venezuela and conducted business with the Sudan’s genocidal government,
which the U.S.A. has been trying to isolate. In these cases, China is challenging
U.S. interests, raising the specter of great power rivalry.
In addition to theoretical debate, the rise of China has profoundly trans-
formed the strategic thinking of policy-makers in both Washington and Beijing.
For about a century before China’s recent emergence, the U.S.A. either engaged
or confronted China for various purposes, but it always regarded China as sec-
ondary in significance – important simply in the context of rivalry with other
powers, such as imperial Japan during the Pacific War and with the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. China’s rise has changed the strategic thinking of
China in the U.S.A. from “a weak China” to “a strong China.”8 The U.S.A., for
the first time, has to deal with China for its own sake and is anxious to see
whether or not the latter will challenge U.S. predominance in world affairs. This
change has given rise to a sense of fear among some in the U.S.A. that a rising
China could become a post-World War II Soviet Union or a nineteenth-century
Germany. The Pentagon’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR), a geopolit-
ical blueprint issued right after the events of September 11, took a capacity-
based approach to define enemies and believed that “[a] military competitor with
a formidable resource will emerge in the region” and become the long-term
threat to the U.S.A. Although the report did not mention the name of China,
everyone recognized who was being identified.9 The 2006 QDR states explicitly
that: “Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to
compete militarily with the U.S.A. and field disruptive military technologies that
could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter
strategies.”10
Consequently, many Americans have begun wondering how China as a great
power will use its influence globally and regionally. At the global level, China
has gone around the world in search of raw materials and has been trying to lock
up energy supplies, including pursuing deals with countries under U.S. sanctions
or with U.S. security concerns, such as Venezuela, Sudan, and Iran. This devel-
opment has caused a suspicion that China is not only challenging the U.S.A.’s
historic dominance in many parts of the world but also undermining Western
efforts to promote transparency and human rights, damaging U.S. interests and
values. This suspicion has been intensified by the lack of transparency in
China’s rapid military modernization program. China has striven to modernize
its military forces but has not made its purposes clear nor indicated how far the
military modernization program has gone and will go. The 1996 QDR expressed
concern: “secrecy envelops most aspects of Chinese security affairs. The outside
world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of
key capabilities supporting its military modernization.”11
At the regional level, China’s resurgence has raised some questions about its
aspiration in Asia-Pacific. Will it seek to restore the position of ancient domi-
nance and develop a sphere of influence over its periphery for security if
Chinese capacities enable Beijing to pursue a regional dominance? Will China
challenge U.S. strategic alliances in East Asia and diminish U.S. strategic
 Implications of China’s rise 7
presence? For nearly every Asia-Pacific economy in recent years, China has
replaced the U.S.A. as the largest foreign-trade partner and has become an
increasingly more important source of economic growth. With the emerging
Asia-Pacific regional manufacturing system, China has served as the main point
of final assembly for parts and components produced throughout the region for
export to North America and Europe.12 In the security arena, China has pursued
an active regional diplomacy, reflected in the growing bilateral security ties and
an increasing activism in multilateral regional organizations. In contrast,
although the U.S.A. has vital interests in Asia-Pacific, it has been preoccupied
by the war on terror, particularly the Iraq War in recent years, and its influence
has declined in the Asia-Pacific region. The contrast between China’s active
engagement in the region and the U.S. preoccupation somewhere else makes it
easy to conclude that China is beginning to replace the U.S.A. as the region’s
hegemon. These contentious economic and security issues have made the
U.S.–China relations in Asia-Pacific extremely complicated.
In addition, the rise of popular nationalist sentiments and China’s reluctance
to open domestic political competition to build a liberal democracy has exacer-
bated the sense of unease among some Americans about an increasingly power-
ful China. Many have concerns about China’s aspirations for great power status
drawing upon strong nationalism linked with the victim’s conviction of a
“century of shame and humiliation” at the hands of imperialist powers. A rising
China, driving such nationalist sentiments, would be anything but peaceful;
China’s international behavior would be irrational and inflexible. The lack of
progress toward democracy is another concern: many Americans have worried
that if China’s authoritarian governmment sustains its rapid economic growth,
China will challenge the “Washington consensus” concerning free markets and
liberal politics with a “Beijing consensus” promoting authoritarian governments
producing rapid economic growth and social stability. In addition, many in the
West believe that authoritarian governments are more prone to plunge into wars
than democracies.
In the late 1990s, the Clinton administration carried out an engagement
policy. Its rationale was that because China’s rise was inevitable, the goal of
U.S. policy should ensure that China’s greater role did not threaten American
interests by facilitating and perhaps accelerating the changes that China brings
about in its domestic affairs and pursues in its international interests. When the
Bush administration took over in the early 2000s, it criticized Clinton’s engage-
ment policy and came out in favor of a containment policy that interpreted
China’s rise as a serious threat to the U.S.A., its friends, and the Western way of
life and sought to prevent, or at least delay, China’s emergence as a peer com-
petitor. The September 11th terrorist attacks softened Bush’s position since he
had to work with Beijing to deal with the urgent danger of terrorism. However,
the Bush administration has never stopped struggling to define its stance on the
critically long-term issue facing the U.S.A.: whether to view China as a strategic
threat and plan accordingly, or to see it as a strategic partner and work with it to
shape a future international system. This is particularly challenging while the
8 S. Zhao
Bush administration is preoccupied internationally with military engagements in
Iraq and Afghanistan and concerns about Iranian and North Korean nuclear
developments.
Going through swings, Bush finally came to the realization that the
U.S.–China relationship is a complex one with a mix of cooperative and
competitive interests. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick elaborated the
complexity of the relationship in a September 2005 speech. On the one hand, he
raised the concern about how China will use its power, criticized China’s
“involvement with troublesome states” and its “mercantilist” attempts to “lock
up” energy resources, and urged China to adopt democratic reforms. On the
other hand, he disagreed with those who view China solely through “the lens of
fear” and encouraged China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” working
with the U.S.A. to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.13
The Bush administration has hence settled on a policy of hedging against pos-
sible China challenges but cooperating with China on many strategically import-
ant issues. This is a two-pronged strategy toward China: “America is heavily
engaged with China economically, diplomatically, and culturally, but at the
same time is trying to contain its regional and global ambitions.”14
Similarly, Beijing’s position toward Washington has experienced some
important changes in recent decades. Before the 1990s, as a relatively weak
power unable to seriously compete with the U.S.A., China positioned itself as
one of the developing countries in a collective struggle against the superpower
hegemony. Although China gained some diplomatic weight in the strategic tri-
angle of Beijing, Moscow and Washington during the 1980s, as the weakest pole
among the three, China’s main diplomatic thrust was to retain as much strategic
leverage as possible in its relationships with the two superpowers. Since the
mid-1990s, China’s rising power status has given it more leverage in its relation-
ship with the U.S.A., but, as a Time magazine article indicates: “The most
immediate priority for China’s leadership is less how to project itself interna-
tionally than how to maintain stability in a society that is going through the sort
of social and economic change that, in the past, has led to chaos and violence.”15
In a speech to an American audience, Zheng Bijian, a senior policy adviser to
the Chinese leadership, emphasized the difficult challenges at home, including
what he called “a series of paradoxes in the process of economic and social
development, such as uneven development between the coastal areas and the
hinterland, the contradiction between fairness and economic returns, rural–urban
disparity, the wealth gap, and the tension between reform and stability.”16
Facing difficult challenges at home, China has cautiously kept a low profile in
international affairs while making an effort to “cultivate good relations with the
outside world” in order to create a favorable international environment for its
modernization programs.17 Aware that “the U.S. strategic goal is to maintain and
perpetuate its primacy in the world, protect and expand its strategic and eco-
nomic interests around the world, and keep on exporting American values and
political system,”18 Chinese leaders have tried to avoid confrontation and
enhance cooperation with the U.S.A. For this purpose, Beijing abandoned the
 Implications of China’s rise 9
old position against the superpower hegemony and proposed to build “construc-
tive strategic partnerships” with the U.S.A. as well as with many other major
powers. Holding that its relationship with Washington is the most important
bilateral relationship, Beijing has envisioned the China–U.S. relationship as
within a framework of strategic partnerships with a group of great powers to
balance against one another in a multipolar world that it has perceived and pro-
moted in order to prevent any potential U.S.-led coalitions to contain China.19
In response to the China policy debate in the U.S.A., some Chinese political
and intellectual elites have called for a tougher position against the U.S.A. and
are forcefully pressing for China’s rising power status. However, Beijing’s
leaders have taken a pragmatic position to maintain a cooperative relationship
because they realize that China’s continuing rise rests on the maintenance of a
favorable international environment, the most important element of which is a
cooperative relationship with the U.S.A., the unwieldy superpower holding the
key to China’s rise. Articulating a strategy of peaceful development and insist-
ing that China’s rise will not be a threat to the U.S.A., Chinese leaders have wel-
comed Zeollick’s invitation for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in
the international system. A China Daily commentary suggests that the invitation
indicates that the Bush administration, just as the previous six U.S. administra-
tions, has come to see China as a “strategic partner.” Chinese leaders particu-
larly welcome Zoellick’s remarks that the “China of today is simply not the
Soviet Union of the late 1940s: it does not seek to spread radical, anti-American
ideologies; it does not see itself in a twilight conflict against democracy around
the globe. It does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism; it does not
seek to overturn the fundamental order of the international system.”20
From a pragmatic perspective, Chinese leaders believe that: “In the long
term, the decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multi-polar
world are inevitable, but in the short term, Washington’s power is unlikely to
decline, and its position in world affairs is unlikely to change.” Admitting that:
“The Chinese–U.S. relationship remains beset by more profound differences
than any other bilateral relationships between major powers in the world
today,” and that there exists a gap between the two countries in national
power,21 China has set a policy priority to prevent U.S. actions from harming
China’s vital national interests. Taking advantage of its increasing strategic and
economic assets as a rising power, China has tried to defend its interests by
both cooperative and coercive means. As one Chinese scholar indicates, while
China has utilized its strategic assets to cooperate with the U.S.A. on issues of
mutual interest, thereby exchanging benefits and altering the U.S.A.’s negative
impression on China, it has also utilized its strategic assets to thwart U.S.
objectives, including using or threatening to use force, forming alliances to
curb U.S. power and voting against proposals favorable to the U.S.A. in inter-
national organizations. In the meantime, China has used its economic
resources, such as market access, not only to meet the economic needs of the
U.S.A. but also to undermine U.S. economic well-being through trade embar-
goes, trade barriers, etc.22
10 S. Zhao
It is revealing to see that the Chinese foreign minister joined foreign mini-
sters of India and Russia two years in a row to discuss how to build a “more
democratic multi-polar world” in 2006 and 2007. Their formal agenda at the
2007 meeting covered issues ranging from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle
East, and North Korea to energy security, nuclear nonproliferation, and trade.
An observer commented that the subtext of the conference agenda was: “how to
use their growing economic and political muscle to prevent Washington from
tackling such issues alone.” These three countries account for 40 percent of the
world’s population, a fifth of its economy, and more than half of its nuclear war-
heads. According to this observer, although it is premature to talk about a stra-
tegic axis between the world’s largest country and the two most populous
nations because they still have more in common with the West than with each
other, “they appear to be forming a partnership to challenge the U.S.-dominated
world order that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.”23
In this case, the U.S.–China relationship has become extremely complicated
and difficult to manage during this period of China’s rise. In retrospect, the
U.S.–China relationship has never been an easy one. Harry Harding called it a
“fragile relationship” in the 1980s and David M. Lampton used “same bed dif-
ferent dreams” to characterize the relationship in the 1990s.24 The U.S.A. and
China in the recent decade have cooperated more and more often on many fronts
but have also found themselves in sharp disagreement over many contentious
issues, such as how to deal with the Taiwan independence, China’s military
modernization, the U.S. unilateralism, energy security, the trade deficit, and the
Korean nuclear crisis. China’s rise in the twenty-first century has brought about
a new dimension of mutual suspicion about each power’s long-term strategic
intentions. Concerned that rapid increase in economic and military capacities
may produce inflated Chinese ambitions and lead to more conflicting rather than
cooperative behavior, some Americans have become anxious about China’s rise.
Equally, many Chinese have been concerned about the implications for China in
a world dominated by the U.S.A. and that the U.S.A. might overreact to per-
ceived threat from China’s rise and try to keep China down by taking preemp-
tive actions to preserve its supremacy. These mutual suspicions have given rise
to perceptions of a “China threat” in the U.S.A. and a perception of a “U.S.
threat” in China.
The perpetuation of suspicion about each other’s long-term intentions is dan-
gerous because it could lead to the conclusion that a U.S.–China conflict is
inevitable. In a discussion of U.S.–China relations, Joseph S. Nye reminds us of
Thucydides’ warning more than two millennia ago that “belief in the inevitabil-
ity of conflict can become one of its main causes. Each side, believing it will end
up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations which then are
read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears.”25
Consequently, it is crucially important that leaders in both Beijing and Wash-
ington do not let mutual suspicion dictate their policy. A dangerous confronta-
tion is neither in the interest of China nor the U.S.A. Aaron Friedberg, a former
senior adviser to U.S. vice president Dick Cheney, indicates that “whether for
 Implications of China’s rise 11
good or ill, the most significant bilateral international relationship over the
course of next several decades is likely to be that between the U.S. and the
PRC.”26 As far reaching as it is, the transformation of the U.S.–China relation-
ship has profound implications for the world of the twenty-first century. A
cover-page article in the January 2007 issue of Time magazine described
China’s rise as the “dawn of a new dynasty” and called the twenty-first century
“the China century,” but it concluded that “China’s rise to global prominence
doesn’t have to lead to the sort of horror that accompanied the emerging power
of Germany or Japan. There need be no wars between China and the U.S., no
catastrophes, no economic competition that gets out of hand.”27 For this purpose,
leaders in both Washington and Beijing have to demonstrate their wisdom by
helping to overcome the pervasive mutual suspicions and use their political skill
to communicate with each other on sensitive issues in order to assure that
China’s growing power produces cooperation instead of confrontation in the
years to come.
In this case, it becomes profoundly important to understand how foreign-
policy analysts in both countries have perceived the transformation of
U.S.–China relations. This book serves this purpose by presenting views and
assessments of foreign policy specialists from both countries. It does not seek to
confirm either an alarmist or optimistic position but to demonstrate that the
transformation has provided opportunities for both confrontation and coopera-
tion, with the hope that leaders in Washington and Beijing will make positive
adjustments toward cooperation and avoiding confrontation.

The structure of this book

This book is composed of three parts. Part I includes two overview chapters.
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines China’s geo-strategic
thrust and diplomatic engagement in the light of China’s rise. It addresses some
important concerns of many Americans: How has China defined its national
security objectives? What role has China played on the global stage and in the
Asia-Pacific region? Has it sought to advance interests that undermine the global
economic and security system or help to promote peace and prosperity around
the world? Has China used its rising influence in ways that are compatible with
U.S. interests? Is China rising to become a “responsible stakeholder” or a
vicious challenger to the established international system? The author finds that
in setting economic modernization and political stability as overarching goals
while worrying about potential ideological and structural conflict with the
U.S.A. and resource vulnerability, Beijing has developed a pragmatic engage-
ment strategy to promote multipolarization at the same time that China recogniz-
ing the reality of a unipolar world dominated by the U.S.A. Developing strategic
partnerships with all major powers, China has set other foreign policy priorities
for pursuing China’s national interests, including searching for energy security,
diffusing tension along its immediate borders, and working within the frame-
work of multilateralism.
12 S. Zhao
Perspectives of Chinese scholars
Part II presents five Chinese scholar’s views on the changing strategic relation-
ship between China and the U.S.A. Chapter 3 by Qingguo Jia, a leading foreign-
policy scholar in Beijing, analyzes China’s efforts to adapt to the post-Cold War
world and the underlying factors that have shaped such efforts. Jia characterizes
China’s behavior as “learning to live with the hegemon,” i.e., adapting and
adjusting policy to the U.S. dominance in the international system. He attributes
the behavior to the following three factors. First, gradually accepting the post-
Cold War international reality, the Chinese government has decided that it is not
in China’s interests to challenge the most powerful country unless China’s own
core national interests are involved. Second, facing a whole array of tough
domestic challenges to its political stability brought about by modernization,
systemic transformation from a central planned economy to a market economy,
and leadership transition from a generation of charismatic leaders to one of
techno-bureaucrats, China badly needs a peaceful international environment to
maintain political stability. Since relations with the U.S.A. are critical in order
for China to manage these in an international environment, the Chinese govern-
ment naturally does all it can to seek improvement of its relations with the
U.S.A. Third, as China’s influence continues to grow, the Chinese government
has begun to appreciate the fact that China’s rise will have serious implications
for other countries, and China is likely to confront growing suspicion and even
resistance on the part of some countries, especially the U.S.A. Under the circum-
stances, China needs to do all it can to alleviate such concerns through cultivat-
ing understanding and trust between China and other countries.
Chapter 4 by Dongxiao Chen, a Shanghai based foreign-policy analyst,
makes a case for long-term Sino-U.S. cooperation by examining the structural
transformation of Sino-U.S. relations in the following three aspects: mutual per-
ceptions, interest-based interactions, and institutionalized management. Accord-
ing to Chen, the transition of mutual perception has led both Chinese and
American governments to reorganize bilateral relations for constructive coopera-
tion. Globalization and interdependence have increased efforts by both countries
to pursue their mutual interests. In particular, the common threat about terrorism
has weakened or diverted U.S. concern about “China’s geo-strategic challenge.”
Dialogues for building regional and global orders have become an important
aspect of bilateral relations. In the meantime, the institutionalization of Sino-
U.S. relations has involved building crisis management mechanisms and
regional and global multilateral mechanisms. These complex mechanisms have
provided a certain degree of institutional guarantee to the health and stability of
these relations, helping the two countries build up confidence, dispel suspicion,
and prevent and manage crises. Specifically, these mechanisms have served to
reduce and avoid trivial disputes that might divert from the overall development
of bilateral relations.
While Chen is optimistic about the transformation of Sino-U.S. relations,
Chapter 5 by Jian Xu, a Beijing based government think-tank analyst, takes a
 Implications of China’s rise 13
more pessimist position due to his concern over the consequences of U.S. uni-
lateralism. Xu starts from China’s new concept of cooperative security, which,
according to him, advocates mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coopera-
tion among nations because it places emphasis not only on China’s comprehen-
sive security but also on cooperative security as against the Cold War mindset
of a zero-sum game. In comparison, Xu criticizes U.S. neo-conservative secur-
ity concepts of “preemptive” war, unilateralism, and “neo-interventionism.” He
argues that a “preventive” war like the Iraq War is illegitimate and may damage
the existing international security system since the use of military force in
international relations by any country has to be in accordance with international
law and with the authorization of the United Nations. The new-interventionist
rhetoric of “human rights above sovereignty” is misleading because protection
of human rights must facilitate the comprehensive and coordinated develop-
ment of all economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights; this is only
possible when state sovereignty is respected and intact. In spite of his criticism
of U.S. security attitudes, Xu agrees with the pragmatic position of the Chinese
leadership in building a cooperative relationship with the U.S.A. He claims that
there are no fundamental conflicts between the two countries since China does
not have the political will nor the capability to challenge the paramount
objective of U.S. foreign policy, i.e. maintaining the dominant role in the world
and various regions. In addition, China does not seek to challenge the current
international system. The common “stake” of the two sides covers a wide
range, including cooperation in economic and cultural fields, anti-terrorism,
upholding international non-proliferation regimes, and the management of
certain regional hot spots, such as the nuclear issues in Iran and on the Korean
Peninsula.
Chapter 6 by Baohui Zhang, a Hong Kong based Chinese scholar, examines
U.S.–China relations in the context of China’s modernization of its nuclear
capability and evolving related doctrines. Zhang indicates that due to the
concern about the ability of its small nuclear force to withstand a first strike in
the event of a military confrontation with the U.S.A. over Taiwan, China has
been modernizing and enlarging its nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear moderniza-
tion will lead to a secure second-strike capability in the next decade. Although it
is unlikely that China will change its “No First Use” doctrine, the U.S.A. should
not discount the possibility of China exercising nuclear deterrence in the Taiwan
Strait. Zhang argues that although the growing Chinese nuclear capability may
open up a new front for Sino-U.S. competition, it will also bring greater stability
to the strategic relationship between the two countries as it will generate import-
ant incentives for bilateral strategic cooperation. In particular, a more robust
Chinese nuclear deterrence will make it less likely for the two sides to mishan-
dle a crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait because a nuclear showdown would
force the decision makers on both sides to exercise maximum caution. Without
sufficient mutual deterrence, the current situation in the Taiwan Strait has the
potential to drag the two countries into a major powers’ war that is in neither
side’s interest. From this perspective, he urges the U.S.A. to welcome a more
14 S. Zhao
robust Chinese nuclear deterrent and suggests that China engage the U.S.A. in
strategic dialogues for assurance purposes.
In addition to security issues, China’s rise has also transformed U.S.–China
economic relations and brought about trade and other economic disputes with
important political implications. Chapter 7 by Wei Li, a Beijing based econo-
mist, analyzes the complex U.S.–China economic relations, focusing on the
trade imbalance issue. Li acknowledges that the U.S. trade deficit with China
has become a prominent problem in the bilateral relationship because some U.S.
politicians complain that the huge deficit threatens the U.S. economy and has
robbed the U.S.A. of job opportunities. Li, however, disagrees with the view that
attributes the trade deficit to unfair trade practices by China, such as exchange
rate policy and market access obstacles. Instead, Li attributes to variables such
as the difference in economic structure and trade structure between the two
countries; the large inflow of FDI to China; and China’s special processing trade
feature in which China is only used as an assembly platform while the overseas
investors or contractors get the bulk of the money and China’s trade surplus is
expanded. From a Chinese position, Li argues that the trade deficit is only a
parameter in a statistical sense and does not fully reflect the actual benefits to
both countries achieved through trade. From an economic perspective, a trade
deficit might not be too big a problem. The current uproar on this issue in the
U.S.A. is based to a great extent on political considerations.

Perspectives of U.S. based scholars

Part III of the book includes six chapters by U.S. based scholars. Chapter 8 by
Phillip C. Saunders, a Washington based foreign-policy analyst, explores a
range of U.S. concerns that may give rise to cooperation but are more likely to
cause tensions and potential conflicts. These issues include China’s domestic
developments, Taiwan, China’s nuclear modernization, Chinese influence in
Asia, and China’s potential to become a strategic rival. Depending on the issue,
he proposes four different instruments for U.S. involvement with China. One is
cooperation in the areas with shared interests such as maintaining stability in the
Asia-Pacific region, fostering a global system that supports trade and economic
development, pursuing a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and counter-terrorism.
The second is engagement to alter Chinese thinking about interests and prior-
ities, producing changes in Chinese behavior and creating a basis for longer-
term, cooperation in the areas where common interests may exist but not be
recognized or when the two countries may have differing priorities. These issues
include nonproliferation, protection of intellectual property rights, human rights,
the Chinese role in multilateral institutions, economic policy, and environmental
protection. The third instrument is deterrence for dealing with immediate chal-
lenges and to prevent China from undertaking certain actions such as invading
or attacking Taiwan or using force to pursue Chinese claims in territorial and
resource disputes. The fourth is discussion to deal with future conflicts of inter-
est by shaping China’s strategic choices in either a narrow technical sense, such
 Implications of China’s rise 15
as efforts to discourage China from developing anti-satellite weapons, or in a
broader strategic sense, such as efforts to discourage China from challenging the
U.S. global position. Some of these are compatible with the U.S. hedging strat-
egy, especially those that work indirectly by influencing the costs and benefits of
Chinese strategic choices. All these activities are taking place within a broader
context where the U.S.A. is attempting to influence China’s political evolution
and long-term strategic choices in positive directions. This complexity does not
mean that the two countries are fated to be enemies, but it does mean that a
degree of ambivalence and tension is unavoidable.
How well the U.S.A. copes with both cooperative and competitive dimen-
sions of relations with China depends to a great extent on whether domestic con-
sensus can be built in response to China’s rise. Chapter 9 by Jean A. Garrison, a
university professor in Wyoming, outlines the parameters of domestic politics
with regard to U.S. policy toward China. According to her, the U.S. domestic
debate over China policy since Tiananmen Square has undermined U.S. biparti-
san engagement policy and made it difficult for presidents to forge a China
policy consensus. Single interests with an axe to grind with China have flour-
ished and the domestic debate emphasizing China’s many threats to U.S. pros-
perity continues to recapture the China policy agenda. Congress has gained a
great degree of direct influence over Sino-American relations to the extent that
coalitions of unlikely allies from the political left and right continue to challenge
presidential prerogatives in China policy-making. As a consequence, China
policy appears more volatile than stable. Although engagement remains the
default policy orientation, this concept represents a convergence around a broad
range of discrete policy choices rather than a coherent policy consensus. The last
three presidents have all oversold the opportunities in their engagement policy
and painted a rosy future for U.S.–China relations in order to overcome their
domestic critics. Part of the problem is that U.S. engagement policy rests on the
notion that placing China into a web of interdependency will lead to liberal
reforms, an unrealistic view that assumes the U.S.A. will maintain the top posi-
tion in the relationship thus having the means to influence it directly. China’s
rise and U.S. dependence on its economy should belie this belief. Domestically
this situation has led to a deep gap between American expectations and the
reality of what can be accomplished in the relationship. The sooner the U.S.A.
closes the gap between its rhetoric and its expectations for China policy to fit the
pragmatic political reality, the sooner a truly “normal” relationship that openly
acknowledges areas of shared interest and disagreement can flourish.
Chapter 10 by Bernard D. Cole, a Washington based scholar, examines
China’s military modernization in the context of its search for energy security
and the implications for U.S.–China relations. He defines “energy security” as
including three primary elements: energy availability, affordability, and military
capability to secure the required energy supplies. Focusing on the third element,
Cole finds that Beijing faces two major problems in securing the energy sup-
plies: locating and procuring those supplies and then distributing them through-
out the enormous Chinese hinterland. To resolve these problems, China has
16 S. Zhao
made a huge investment in energy exploration and production overseas and
become concerned about its reliance on the sea lanes for importing petroleum
supplies. Therefore, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is entrusted to
defend China’s search for energy security through its mission of securing sea
lanes and ocean bed energy fields, the latter of which the U.S.A. views as the
most likely threat. In this context, Cole explores China’s military modernization
program with a focus on the modernization of the PLAN. Cole concludes that
although Chinese leaders view energy issues and maritime interests as vital ele-
ments in their nation’s economic health and their own political legitimacy,
China’s concern for the security of its overseas energy supplies does not domi-
nate its national security policy process. The most important aspects of energy
security for Beijing are economic and political, not military. In this case,
Beijing’s energy security concerns will not necessarily lead to an armed conflict
with the U.S.A.
Chapter 11 by June Teufel Dreyer, a university based scholar, agrees with
Cole that the conflict between the U.S.A. and China over energy supplies is not
imminent because the two countries face serious common challenges that
include increasing dependence on foreign sources, higher energy costs, and
intensifying environmental impacts. Since the U.S.A. is a leader in many fields
of energy research and technology, and China has achievements of its own in
such fields as high-energy physics, coal sequestration, and next-generation
nuclear reactors, the energy security of both countries can be enhanced through
cooperation. A policy of active engagement between China and the U.S.A. can
prevent harm to common economic interests. For the U.S.A., it can also dimin-
ish China’s incentive to take bilateral relations with energy suppliers to the level
of security relationships, which would challenge American military superiority.
Cooperative efforts include the establishment of extensive bilateral energy dia-
logues at both policy and working levels. The two sides have worked together
on “smart buildings.” There are proposals for joint hydrogen development.
Potential for further progress exists in these and other areas, including air pollu-
tion and control, water treatment, solid waste treatment and disposal, renewable
energy, pollution control, and energy efficiency equipment. Nonetheless, sover-
eignty issues remain, and both sides continue to desire energy independence.
Chapter 12 by Pieter Bottelier, a U.S.-based European scholar, focuses on the
economic implications of China’s rise. Presenting a complex picture of bilateral
economic interaction, Bottelier urges the U.S.A. and China to resolve disputes
using economic rather than political logic. He finds that the bilateral disputes
over economic issues have been caused by the difference in economic growth
patterns of these two countries. China’s growth is primarily investment-driven,
promoting investment to create jobs. In contrast, the U.S.A. relies more on con-
sumption growth to protect employment. Consequently, while the latter has
spent more than it earned for many years, China typically has a current account
surplus and even financed part of the U.S. current account deficit. As China
becomes competitive in a wide range of industries and is rapidly moving up the
value chain, China’s economic growth and influence on global markets have
 Implications of China’s rise 17
unavoidably affected the U.S.A. and other countries linked through trade.
According to Bottelier, the reasons for China’s current competitiveness go well
beyond low wages and an undervalued currency as some U.S. officials have sug-
gested. Analyzing U.S.–China economic disputes over China’s WTO com-
pliance, trade unbalance, U.S. job loss and related Chinese currency value,
Bottelier argues that these issues are more complicated than many American
politicians have recognised.
Although China is aspiring to become a global power, its greatest influence
largely focuses on the Asia-Pacific, a region where China’s most important eco-
nomic and political interests are located. As a result, the implications of China’s
rise for U.S.–China relations in this region are one of the focused concerns of
many observers. To address this concern, Chapter 13 by Elizabeth Economy, a
New York based think-tank analyst, examines the implications of China’s rising
influence in Southeast Asia for the reconfiguration of regional power relations in
the Asia-Pacific. She points out that China’s aggressive engagement with Asia-
Pacific countries contrasts starkly with a policy of relative neglect by the U.S.A.
While U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, as with most of the world, seemed to
develop common purpose in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, over
time, much of this shared sense of purpose has dissipated. The Bush administra-
tion’s doctrine of preemption, unilateralism, and the invasion of Iraq led to a pre-
cipitous decline in the U.S.A.’s reputation among much of the public in Southeast
Asia. Moreover, President Bush’s singular focus on security issues, such as the
war on terror and the North Korea nuclear threat, did little to persuade many
regional leaders that the U.S.A. understood the region’s priorities of domestic
economic development and political stability. In this context, Economy presents
three scenarios to help understand the long-term implications of China’s rise in
the region. The best case scenario is that a more active China will share leader-
ship with the U.S.A. and Japan, helping forge consensus within a more active and
integrated region to address its political, security, and economic challenges. This
scenario is likely to have a better chance of either pressuring or inducing change
in some of the more recalcitrant actors in the region and also provide an
opportunity for regional actors to relieve the U.S.A. some of the burden of leader-
ship by assuming a more proactive role in responding to regional crises.
The second scenario, less attractive from the U.S. perspective, suggests a
traditional balancing act, in which the nations of Asia use China to ignore the
U.S.A. on selective issues, developing alternative approaches to security, polit-
ical and economic affairs in ways that perhaps more directly serve their
domestic interests. The worst case scenario is that as China assumes a more
dominant economic, political, and even security role in the region, the U.S.A.
will confront an Asia less likely to respond favorably to U.S. security initiatives,
less dependent on U.S. economic leadership and U.S.-run financial institutions,
and potentially less open to the full range of U.S. diplomatic initiatives on issues
such as human rights and terrorism. She concludes that although China is in no
position to displace either the U.S.A. or Japan in the near future, China’s greater
presence and activism suggest at the very least that the U.S.A. and Japan cannot
18 S. Zhao
remain complacent about the status quo that has governed political, economic
and security relations for the past few decades. Shared leadership within South-
east Asia will likely include China in the near future, with all the potential bene-
fits and challenges that such leadership will entail.

Notes
1 There is a rich literature on power transition in international relations. Among them,
see R. J. L. Tammen and J. Kugler, eds, Power Transition: Strategies for the 21st
Century, New York: Deven Bridge Press, 2000; J. Kugler and D. Lemke, Parity and
War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledges, Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1996; and B. Bueno de Mesquita and D. Lalman, War and Reason:
Domestic and International Imperatives, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1992.
2 The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Asia Society, The U.S.A. and the Rise
of China and India: Results of a 2006 Mutination Survey of Public Opinion, Chicago,
IL: 2006, p. 15.
3 Banning Garrett, “US–China Relations in the Era of Globalization and Terror: A
Framework for Analysis,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 15, no. 48, August
2006, pp. 389–416.
4 David, M. Lampton, “The Faces of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1,
January/February 2007, p. 117.
5 Zhiqun Zhu, US–China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace,
London: Routledge, 2006, p. 173.
6 Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China and Its Power Status,” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics, vol. 1, no. 2006, p. 13.
7 Eric A. Posner and John Yoo, “International Law and the Rise of China,” Chicago
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, no. 127, The Law School, the Univer-
sity of Chicago, May 2006, pp. 2, 5.
8 David M. Lampton, “Paradigm Lost: The Demise of ‘weak China’,” National
Interest, Fall 2005, pp. 67–74.
9 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Report, September 30, 2001,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Report, February 6, 2006, p. 29,
http://www.qr.hq.af.mil/pdf/2006%20QDR%20Report.pdf
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Report, February 6, 2006, p. 29,
http://www.qr.hq.af.mil/pdf/2006%20QDR%20Report.pdf
12 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Why the US Malaise over China?” YaleBlobale Online, January
19, 2006, http://yaleblobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6842
13 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” NBR
Analysis, vol. 16, no. 4, December 2005. pp. 5–14.
14 Dan Blumenthal, “America and Japan Approach a Rising China,” Asian Outlook,
No. 4, December 2006, p. 1.
15 Michael Elliott, “The Chinese Century,” Time, January 22, 2007, p. 35.
16 Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi xingdaolu yu zhongmei guanxi” (China’s
new road of peaceful rise and Sino-US relations), Zhongguo Zhanlue Guancha (China
strategic review), July, 2005, p. 4.
17 Jia Qingguo, “China’s New Leadership and Strategic Relations with the U.S.A.,”
paper presented at International Conference on Challenge to China: Foreign Policy
and the Implications to Macao,” Macao, May 28–29, 2006, p. 3.
18 Yang Jiemian, “International Environment and Sino-US Interactions,” China Inter-
national Studies, Winter 2005, p. 63.
19 Suisheng Zhao, “Beijing’s Perception of International System and Foreign Policy
 Implications of China’s rise 19
Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident,” in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Chinese Foreign
Policy, Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003,
pp. 140–150.
20 Xue Fukang, “Hedging Strategy Won’t Do Relationship Good,” China Daily,
November 21, 2005, p. 4.
21 Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84,
no. 5, September/October, 2005, pp. 40, 46.
22 Sun Xuefeng, “The Efficiency of China’s Policy towards the U.S.A.,” Chinese
Journal of Internaitonal Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, p. 59.
23 Jermy Page, “Giants Meet to Counter US Power,” The Times, February 15, 2007.
24 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: the U.S.A. and China since 1972, Washington
D.C., Brookings Institution, 1992; David M. Lampton, Sam Bed Different Dreams:
Managing US–China Relations, 1989–2000, Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 2001.
25 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of US–China Relations,” PacNet, 10, March 16, 2006.
26 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US–China Relations, Is Conflict Inevitable,”
International Security, Nov. 30, no. 2, Fall 2005, p. 8.
27 Michael Elliott, “The Chinese Century,” Time, January 22, 2007, p. 42.
2 China rising
Geo-strategic thrust and diplomatic
engagement
Suisheng Zhao

For some time since the end of the Cold War, two often contradictory self-
images of a great power and a developing country constantly tested China’s
foreign-policy makers.1 While they cherished a rising power status and wanted
to play a role accordingly, China kept a low profile in international affairs and
played down its pretense to being a global power because of its concern that “the
existing gap between China and the developed countries, and the U.S.A. in
particular, is enormous in terms of national wealth, standard of living, education,
and science and technology.”2 In this case, although China’s great power aspira-
tion sparked anxieties and hot debate in almost all world capitals, the topic
remained delicate in China’s media at least until a 12-part TV series with an
explicit title, The Rise of Great Powers, was broadcast twice by China’s Central
Television during the last two months of 2006. The series looks closely at the
ascendance of nine great powers – including Britain, Germany, Japan, and the
U.S.A. – and the lessons that China can draw from their rise. The message is
that “China is on the verge of the same historic rise.”3 Whether or not the broad-
cast signaled that the dual-identity syndrome of great power versus poor country
finally diminished along with the rapid growth of China’s national power, it was
interpreted as meaning that Chinese people were encouraged “to discuss what it
means to be a major world power” and the Chinese leadership “has largely
stopped denying that China intends to become one soon.”4 This observation was
supported by a 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Asia Society
survey, which found that 87 percent of Chinese respondents thought that China
should take a greater role in world affairs. Most Chinese believed that China’s
global influence would match that of the U.S.A. within a decade.5 Consequently,
a Western reporter observed that although the Chinese leaders still coyly insist
that China is merely a developing country, “a growing number of Chinese schol-
ars and commentators are discarding the old bashfulness and beginning to talk
openly of China’s rising power.”6
China’s rise to great power status has prompted politicians in some Western
capitals and its Asian neighbors to wonder whether an increasingly strong and
assertive China would become a rational, peaceful, and pragmatic power or an
irrational, bellicose, and expansionist state. In a speech on U.S.–China relations,
Robert Zoellick, former U.S. deputy secretary of state, raised the question he
 China rising 21
considered essential for the U.S.A. and the world – how will China use its influ-
ence? Uncertain himself about an answer, he urged China to become a “respons-
ible stakeholder” in the international system.7 Is China rising to be a
“responsible stakeholder” or a vicious challenger to the established international
system? This chapter seeks answers to this question by examining China’s
national security objectives and its geo-strategic engagement in recent years.

National security objectives

In the debate about the prospects and implications of China’s rise as a great
power, a perception gap has often existed between Chinese officials and many
Western observers. As Robert Zoellick indicated, while many Americans are
anxious about China’s rise, “the overwhelming priority of China’s senior offi-
cials is to develop and modernize a China that still faces enormous internal chal-
lenges. . . . Therefore, China clearly needs a benign international environment
for its work at home.”8 Indeed, Chinese leaders have set economic moderniza-
tion and political stability as the twin overarching national objectives and
pursued them enthusiastically since China decided to open up to the outside
world in the late 1970s. At the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress
in October 2002, the Hu Jintao leadership reconfirmed these objectives by pre-
senting the goal of quadrupling the 2000 GDP by 2020 and transforming China
into a xiaokang society, where the Chinese people would enjoy a much more
abundant and comfortable life. Pursing these objectives, China has boasted the
world’s fastest-growing economy in recent decades. An OECD country survey
said that China’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades “represents
one of the most sustained and rapid economic transformations seen in the world
economy in the past 50 years.” 9
After two decades of phenomenal growth, China is recognized as a rising
global power and certainly feels more secure and confident in the international
arena. Other than the dispute over the status of Taiwan, it has not seen any
issues that might result in an imminent conflict with foreign powers directly
threatening China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. It has
also generally dismissed the possibility of a new Cold War against China, espe-
cially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which prompted the
U.S.A. to engage China in its global war on terrorism rather than pick a fight
with her.
However, China does have a peculiar and persisting sense of insecurity or
vulnerability, driven mostly by the following three factors. First, Chinese polit-
ical leaders are very concerned about the possible threat to China’s moderniza-
tion program as a result of a potential ideological conflict between China and the
Western powers, particularly the U.S.A. Since the collapse of the communist
regimes in Europe, China has been left as one of very few “communist” coun-
tries in the post-Cold War world. Given the growing problems of political legiti-
macy and governance in an increasingly pluralistic society, the Chinese
leadership has a fear of domestic unrest supported by foreign forces that would
22 S. Zhao
threaten China’s political system and the survival of the CCP regime. Con-
sequently, Chinese leaders have a deeply rooted sense of political insecurity and
concern for the regime’s survival.
Second, many Chinese analysts have talked about a structural conflict
between China as a rising power and the U.S.A. as the sole superpower in the
post-Cold War world. Although China enjoys the status of a rising power, a per-
sistent sense of frustration and even victimization still colors the feelings of
many Chinese elites in relations with Western powers, particularly the U.S.A.
and Japan. They worry that the U.S.A. has a hidden agenda to prevent China
from rising as a peer power and feel the anxiety of unsatisfied nationalistic
aspirations. They have called for completing the historical “mission” of national
unification, restoring past glory, and making contributions to the peace and pros-
perity of the world. Paradoxically this aspiration has led many Chinese elites to
feel less powerful and secure when they see many of China’s aspirations are
increasingly scrutinized by the Western powers, particularly the U.S.A.10 This
frustration was revealed by a Chinese analyst, Pan Zhengqiang, at a forum held
by a foreign affairs magazine in Beijing: “Although China is developing rapidly,
its development prospects remain uncertain. China has been making large efforts
to merge into the international community, but it has still not been fully accepted
by the international system dominated by the Western countries.”11
Third, rapid economic growth has brought China to an unprecedented
resource vulnerability that could threaten China’s sustainable development.
Zheng Bijian, a senior adviser to Chinese president Hu Jintao, listed the shortage
of resources, particularly energy, as the first of three fundamental challenges to
China’s rise in the twenty-first century. According to him, China’s per capita
water resources are a quarter of the world average, and its per capita areas of
cultivatable farmland are 40 percent of the world average. China’s natural gas,
copper, and aluminum resources in per capital terms are around 8.3 percent, 4.1
percent, 25.5 percent, and 9.7 percent of the world average respectively.12 China
overtook Japan as the second largest oil consumer next to the U.S.A. in 2003
and overtook the U.S.A. as the world’s biggest consumer of grain, meat, coal,
and steel in 2004. This massive appetite for resources, however, has met with
what China has perceived as “unfair” competitive pressure from the U.S.A.
Chinese scholars often cite the example of China having had to abandon an
$18.5 billion takeover bid for California-based oil firm Unocal Corp in early
2005 because of unusual political intervention from the U.S. Congress.
This sense of insecurity has sustained the frustration among the Chinese
people and their leaders at a time when the nation is rapidly rising. At the
popular level this frustration was revealed by outbursts of public feeling – from
the numerous best-selling anti-American tabloids published in the mid-1990s to
the stoning of the American Embassy by college students avenging the U.S.
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. It was a shock to many in
the West to witness more than 20 million Chinese signatures gathered on the
Internet in early 2005 to oppose Japan’s bid to join the United Nations Security
Council, and thousands of Chinese protesters marched through major Chinese
 China rising 23
cities, shouting slogans and throwing rocks, bottles, and eggs at the Japanese
consulates, protesting against Japan’s approval of history textbooks – which
they say whitewashed Japanese wartime atrocities – and Japan’s pledge to help
the U.S.A. defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by Beijing. A rather broadly
based nationalist sentiment, longing for a greater China, is on the rise. While the
Chinese public have eagerly sought stature, acceptance, honor, and respect on
the world stage, serious Chinese scholars have openly argued for a more
assertive and more demanding Chinese foreign policy.13 Holding high expecta-
tions for the government to fulfil its promise to safeguard China’s national inter-
ests, popular nationalists have routinely charged the Chinese government as
being “too chummy” with Japan and “soft” in dealing with the U.S.A. in recent
years.
At the state level, Chinese leaders have taken a pragmatic position regarding
the popular nationalist outburst. On the one hand, they have tolerated and
encouraged the popular expression of nationalism to make their own policy
positions more credible to the U.S.A. and Japan on issues involving China’s
vital interests. On the other hand, pragmatic leaders have been very cautious to
prevent the nationalist sentiment of Chinese people from getting out of hand and
cause a backlash in both domestic and foreign affairs. Although there is a
popular call for the government to take a hard line against what they perceive as
provocations from the U.S.A. and Japan, leaders are aware that China’s eco-
nomic success depends heavily upon integration with the outside world and,
particularly, upon cooperative relations with advanced Western countries.
Chinese leaders have emphasized the principles of peaceful co-existence, peace-
ful orientation, peaceful rise, and peaceful development as China rises to the
status of a great power.
In response to perceived insecurity and vulnerability, China’s foreign policy
objectives have been set to create and maintain a stable and favorable inter-
national environment, staying alert to any threats at home and abroad that could
subvert its modernization program. Chinese leaders believe that although the
U.S.A. needs cooperation with China in its war against terrorism, it still sees
China as a “potential threat” to its ultimate strategic objective of world hege-
mony. To avoid confrontation with the U.S.A. while China is still in a weaker
position, Chinese leaders have made a preemptive effort to build an image of a
rising China as a peace-loving and responsible power by promoting the new
concepts of “peaceful rise/development” and “a world of harmony.”
The concept of “China’s peaceful rise” was put forward saliently for the first
time by Zheng Bijian at the April 2003 Boao Forum – an annual high level gath-
ering of political and business leaders from Asia-Pacific countries on China’s
Hainan Island. Premier Wen Jiabao endorsed this concept in his New York City
speech in December 2003. Since then, however, many Chinese scholars and offi-
cials have expressed their concerns that using the word “rise” might intimidate
some of China’s Asian neighbors since “the word ‘rise’ implies attaining super-
power status.”14 As an alternative, President Hu Jintao used the words “peaceful
development” in his speech at the 2004 Boao Forum. In a way to reconcile
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 7.

Who tooke to wife as yee shall vnderstand

A mayden of a noble house and olde,
Raulfe Neuil’s daughter, earle of Westmerland,
Whose sonne earle Richard, was a baron bolde,
And had the right of Salisbury in holde,
Through mariage made with good earle Thomas heyre,
Whose earned prayses neuer shall appayre.

8.

The duke my father had by this his wife

Four sonnes, of whom the eldest Edward hight,
The second Eadmund, who [in youth] did loose his life,
[1174]
At Wakefielde slayne by Clyfford cruell knight:
I George am third, of Clarence duke by right:
The fourth, borne to the mischiefe of vs all,
Was duke of Glocester,[1175] whom men did[1176]
Richard call.

9.

Whan as our sire in sute of right was slaine,

(Whose life and death himselfe declared earst)
My brother Edward plyed his cause amayne,[1177]
And got[1178] the crowne, as Warwicke hath rehearst:
The pride whereof so deepe his stomacke pearst
That hee forgot his friendes, dispisde his kin,
Of oth or office passing not a pyn.[1179]

10.

Which made the earle of Warwicke to maligne

My brother’s state,[1180] and to attempt a way
To bring from prison Henry, seely king,
To helpe him to the kingdome[1181] if hee may,
And knowing mee to bee the chiefest stay
My brother had, hee did mee vndermine
To cause mee to his treasons to encline.[1182]

11.

Whereto I was prepared long before,

My brother had beene to mee so vnkinde:
For sure no cankar fretteth flesh so sore,[1183]
As vnkinde dealing doth a louing minde:
Loue’s strongest bandes vnkindnes doth vnbinde,
It moueth loue to malice, zeale to hate,
Chiefe friendes to foes, and brethren to debate.

12.

And though the earle of Warwicke, subtile sire

Perceiude I bare a grudge against my brother,
Yet toward his feate to set mee more on fire,
Hee kindled vp one firebrand with another:
For knowing fancy was the forcing rother
Which stirreth youth to any kinde of strife,
Hee offered mee his daughter to my wife.

13.

Where through, and with his crafty filed tongue,

Hee stale my heart that earst vnsteady was,
For I was witlesse, wanton, fond and yong,
Whole bent to pleasure, brittle as the glasse,
I can not lye, In vino veritas:
I did esteeme the bewty of my bryde
Aboue my selfe, and all the world beside.

14.

These fond affections ioynd with lacke of skill,

(Which trap the heart, and blind the eyes of youth,
And pricke the minde to practise any ill)
So tickled mee, that voyde of kindly truth,
(Which if it want all wretchednes[1184] ensueth)
I stinted not to persecute my brother,
Til time hee left his kingdom to another.

15.

Thus carnall loue did quench the loue of kinde,

Till lust were lost through fancy fully fed:
But whan at length I came vnto my minde,
I saw how lewdly lightnes had mee led,
To seeke with payne the perill of my heade:
For had king Henry once beene setled sure,
I was assurde my dayes could not endure.

16.

And therefore, though I bound my selfe with[1185] oth

To help king Henry all that euer[1186] I might,
Yet at the treaty of my brethren both,
Which reason graunted to require but right:
I left his part, whereby hee perisht quite:
And reconcilde mee to my brethren twayne,
And so came Edward to the crowne agayne.

17.

This made my father[1187] in law to fret and fume,

To stamp and stare, and call mee false forsworne,
And at the length with all his power, presume
To help king Henry, vtterly forlorne:
Our friendly proffers still hee tooke in scorne,
Refused peace, and came to Barnet fielde,
And there was kild, because hee would not yeelde.
 18.

His brother also there with him was slayne,

Whereby decayed the keyes of chiualrye:
For neuer liu’d the matches of them twayne,
In manhood, power, and martiall pollecy,
In vertuous thewes, and friendly constancy,
That would to God, if it had bene his will,
They might haue tournde to vs and liued still.

19.

But what shalbe, shall bee: there is no choyse,

Thinges needes must driue as desteny decreeth,
For which wee[1188] ought in all our haps reioyce,
Because the eye eterne all things foreseeth
Which to no ill at any tyme agreeth,
For ills, to ill to vs, be good to it,
So far his skill’s exceede our reach of wit.

20.

The wounded man which must abyde the smart

Of stitching vp, or searing of his sore,
As thing to bad, reproues the surgeon’s art
Which not withstanding doth his health restore.
The childe likewise to science plied sore,
Counts knowledge ill, his teacher to be wood,
Yet surgery and sciences be good.

21.

But as the pacient’s griefe and scholer’s payne,

Cause them deme bad such things as sure be best,
So want of wisdome causeth vs complaine
Of euery hap, wherby we seme opprest:
The poore doe pine for pelfe, the rich for rest,
And when as losse or sicknesse vs assayle
 We curse our fate, our fortune we bewayle.

22.

Yet for our good, God worketh euery thing:

For, through the death of these two noble peres,
My brother liu’d and raynde a quiet king,
Who, had they liued, perchaunce in course of years
Would haue deliuered Henry fro the breres,
Or holpe his sonne t’[1189]enioy the carefull crowne,
Wherby our line should haue bene quite put downe.

23.

A carefull crowne it may be iustly named,

Not onely for the cares thereto annext,[1190]
To see the subiect well and duly framed,
With which good care few kings are greatly vext,
But for the dred wherwith they are perplext,
Of losing lordship, liberty, or life:
Which wofull wracks in kingdoms happen ryfe.

24.

The which to shun while some to sore haue sought,

They haue not sparde all persons to suspect:
And to destroy such as they gilty thought,
Though no apparaunce proued them infect.
Take me for one of this wrong punisht sect,
Imprisonde first, accused without cause,
And done to death, no processe had by lawes.

25.

Wherin I note how vengeaunce doth acquite

Like yll for yll, how vices vertue quell:
For as my mariage loue did me excite
Agaynst the king my brother to rebell,
So loue to haue his children prosper well,
Prouoked him, agaynst both law and right,
To murder me, his brother, and his knight.

26.

For by his queene two princelyke sonnes he had,

Borne to be punisht for their parent’s synne:
Whose fortunes kalked made the father sad,
Such wofull haps were found to be therin:
Which to auouch, writ in a rotten skin,
A prophesie was found, which sayd, a G
Of Edward’s children should destruction bee.

27.

Mee to bee G, because my name was George,

My brother thought, and therefore did mee hate,
But woe be to the[1191] wicked heads that forge
Such doubtfull dreames to breede vnkinde debate:
For God, a gleue, a gibbet, grate, or gate,
A Gray, a Griffeth, or a Gregory,
As well as George, are written with a G.

28.

Such doubtfull riddles are no prophesies:

For prophesies, in writing though obscure,
Are playne in sence, the darke be very lies:
What God foresheweth is euident and pure,
Truth is no harold nor noe sophist sure:
She noteth not men’s names, their shieldes, nor
creasts,
Though she compare them vnto byrds and beasts.

29.

But whom she doth forshewe shall rayne by force,

She tearms a wolfe, a dragon, or a beare:
A wilfull prince, a raynlesse ranging[1192] horse:
A bold, a lion: a cowarde much in feare,
A hare or harte: a crafty, pricked eare:
A leacherous, a bull, a goate, a foale:
An vndermyner, a moldwarpe, or a mole.

30.

By knowen beastes thus truth doth playne declare

What men they be of whom shee speakes before:
And who so can men’s properties compare
And marke what beast they doe resemble more:
Shall soone discerne who is the griesly bore:
For God by beastes expresseth men’s condicions,
And not theyr badges, haroldes supersticions.

31.

And learned Merlyne, whom God gaue[1193] the sprite

To know and vtter princes actes to come,
Like to the Iewish prophets, did recite
In shade of beastes, theyr doings all and some,
Expressing plaine by maners of the dome,
That kinges and lordes such propertyes should haue
As haue the beastes whose name he to them gaue.

32.

Which while the foolish did not well consider,

And seeing princes gaue, for difference
And knowledge of theyr issues mixt together,
All maner beastes for badges of pretence,
There tooke those badges to expresse the sence
Of Merlyne’s minde, and those that gaue the same,
To bee the princes noted by theyr name.

33.
And hereof sprang the false namde prophesies,
That goe by letters, siphers, armes, or sines:
Which all bee foolish, false, and crafty lyes,
Deuisde by gesse, or guiles vntrue deuines:
For whan they saw that many[1194] of many lynes
Gaue[1195] armes alyke, they wist not which was hee
Whom Merlyne ment the noted beast to bee.

34.

For all the broode of Warwicke’s gaue the beare,

The Buckinghams doe likewise gieue the swan:
But which beare bearer should the lyon teare
They were as wise as Goose the fery man:
Yet in theyr skill they ceased not to scan,
And to bee deemed of the people wise,
Set forth theyr gloses vpon[1196] prophesies.

35.

And whome they douted openly to name

They darkely tearmed or by some letter ment,
For so they thought, how euer the world did frame,
Preserue themselues from shame, or being shent:
For, howsoeuer contrary it went,
They might expound their meaning otherwise,
As haps in things should newely still arise.

36.

And thus there grewe of a mistaken truth,

An art so false as made the true suspect:
Whereof hath come much mischiefe, more the ruth
That errours should our mindes so much infect,
True prophets[1197] haue fowly beene reiect:
The false, which breede both murder, warre, and strife,
Beleeued to the losse[1198] of many a good man’s life.
 37.

And therefore, Baldwine, teach men to discerne,

Which prophecies be false and which bee true:
And for a ground this lesson let them learne,
That all bee false which are deuised newe:
The age of thinges are iudged by the hue:
All riddels made by letters, names or armes,
Are yong and false, far worse then witche’s charmes.

38.

I knowe thou musest at this lore of mine,

How I, no studient, should haue learned it:
And dost impute it to the fume of wine
That stirs the tongue, and sharpneth vp the wit:
But harke, a friend did teach mee euery whit,
A man of mine, in all good knowledge rife,
For which hee guiltlesse lost his learned life.

39.

This man abode my seruaunt many a day,

And still in study set his whole delight:
Which taught mee more then I could beare away
Of euery arte: and by his searching sight
Of thinges to come hee would foreshew as right,
As I rehearse the pageants that were past:
Such perfectnes God gaue him at the last.

40.

He knew my brother Richard was the bore,

Whose tuskes should teare my brother’s boyes and me,
And gaue me warning therof long before:
But wyt nor warning can in no degree
Let thinges to hap, which are ordainde to bee:
Witnesse the painted lionesse, which slue
 A prince imprisoned, lyons to eschewe.

41.

He told me eke[1199] my yoke fellow should dy,

(Wherin would God he had bene no deuyne)
And after her death I[1200] should woo earnestly
A spouse, wherat my brother would repine,
And finde the meanes she should be none of[1201] mine:
For which such malice should among vs ryse,
As saue my death no treaty should decise.

42.

And as he sayd, so all things came to passe:

For whan king Henry and his sonne were slaine,
And euery broyle so throughly quenched was
That the king my[1202] brother quietly did raygne,
I, reconciled to his loue agayne,
In prosperous health did leade a quiet lyfe,
For fiue yeares space with honours laden rife.

43.

And to augment the fulnesse of my blisse,

Two louely children by my wife I had:
But froward hap, whose maner euer is
In chiefest ioy to make the happy sad,
Bemixt my sweete with bitternes too bad:
For while I swam in ioyes on euery side,
My louing wife, my cheifest iewell dyed.

44.

Whose lacke whan sole I had bewaylde a yeare,

The duke of Burgoine’s wife, dame Margarete,
My louing sister willing me to chere,
To mary[1203] agayne did kindely me intreate:
And wisht me matched with a mayden nete,
A step daughter of her’s, duke Charles’ hayre,[1204]
A noble damsell, yong, discrete and fayre.

45.

To whose desire because I did enclyne,

The king my brother douting my degree
Through prophesies, against vs did repyne,
And at no hand would to our wills agree:
For which such rancoure pearst both him and mee,
That face to face we fell at flat defiaunce,
But were appeased by frends of our aliaunce.

46.

Howbeit my mariage vtterly was dasht:

Wherin because my seruant sayd his minde,
A meane was sought wherby he mought[1205] be lasht:
And, for they could no crime agaynst him fynd,
They forgde a fault the people’s eyes to blinde,
And told he should by sorceries pretend
To bring the king vnto a spedy ende.

47.

Of all which poynts he was as innocent

As is the babe that lacketh kindely breth:
And yet condemned by the king’s assent,
Most cruelly put to a shamefull death:
This fierd my hart, as foulder doth the heath:
So that I could not but exclame and cry,
Agaynst so great and open iniury.

48.

For this I was commaunded to the tower,

The king my brother was so cruel harted,
And when my brother Richard saw the hower
Was come, for which his hart so sore had smarted,
He thought it best take time before it parted:
For he endeuoured to attayne the crowne,
From which my life must nedes haue held him downe.

49.

For though the king within a while had died,

As nedes he must, he surfayted so oft,
I must haue had his children in my guyde,
So Richard should besyde the crowne haue coft:
This made him ply the while the wax was soft,
To finde a meane to bring me to an ende,
For realm-rape spareth neyther kin nor frend.

50.

And whan hee sawe how reason can asswage

Through length of time my brother Edward’s ire,
With forged tales hee set him newe in rage,
Till at the last they did my death conspire:
And though my truth sore troubled their desire,
For all the world did knowe mine innocence,
Yet they agreede to charge mee with offence.

51.

And, couertly, within the tower they calde

A quest, to geue such verdite as they should:
Who what with feare and what with fauour thralde,
Durst not pronounce but as my brethren would:
And though my false accusers neuer could
Proue ought they sayd, I guiltlesse was condemned:
Such verdites passe where iustice is contemned.

52.
This feate atchiued, yet could they not for shame
Cause mee bee kild by any[1206] common way,
But like a wolfe the tyrant Richard came,
(My brother, nay my butcher I may say)[1207]
Unto the tower when all men were away,[1208]
Saue such as were prouided for the feate:
Who in this wise did straungely mee entreate.

53.

His purpose was with a prepared string

To strangle mee: but I bestird mee so,
That by no force they could mee therto bring,
Which caused him that purpose to forgo:
Howbeit they bound mee, whether I would or no,
And in a but of malmesey standing by,
Newe christned mee, because I should not cry.[1209]

54.

Thus drownde I was, yet for no due desert,

Except the zeale of justice bee a crime:
False prophecies bewitcht king Edward’s hart,
My brother Richard to the crowne would clime:
Note these three causes in thy rufull rime,
And boldly say they did procure my fall,
And death of deaths most straunge and hard of all.

55.

And warne all[1210] princes prophecyes to eschue,

That are to darke and doubtfull to be knowen:
What God hath sayd, that cannot but ensue,
Though all the worlde would haue it ouerthrowne:
When men suppose by fetches of theyr owne
To fly[1211] theyr fate, they furder on the same,
Like quenching blastes which[1212] oft reuiue the flame.
 56.

Will princes therefore, not to thinke by murder

They may auoyde what prophecyes behight,
But by theyr meanes, theyr mischiefes they may furder,
And cause God’s vengeaunce heauier to alight:
Woe worth the wretch that striues with God’s foresight:
They are not wise, but wickedly do arre,
Which thinke yll deedes due destenies may barre.

57.

For if wee thinke that prophecyes be true,

We must beleue it cannot but betyde,
Which God in them foresheweth shall ensue,
For his decrees vnchaunged doe abide:
Which to be true my brethren both haue tryed,
Whose wicked warkes warne princes to detest,
That other’s harmes may keepe them better blest.[1213]
 [By that this tragedy was ended, night was so nere come that
wee could not conueniently tary together any longer: and therefore
sayd maister Ferrers: “It is best my maisters to stay here. For wee be
come now[1214] to the end of Edward the fourth’s raigne.[1215] For
the last whom wee finde vnfortunate therein, was the duke of
Clarence: in whose behalfe I commend much that which hath bene
noted. Let vs therefore for this time leaue with him, and this day
seauen nights hence, if your busines will so suffer, let vs all meete
here together[1216] agayne. And you shall see that in the meane
season I will not only deuise vpon this my selfe, but cause diuers
other of my acquayntance, which can doe very well, to helpe vs
forwarde with the rest.” To this euery man gladly agreed. “Howbeit,”
sayd[1217] another, “seing we shall end at Edward the fourth’s end,
let himselfe make an ende of our daye’s labour, with the same
oration which maister Skelton made in his name, the tenour whereof,
so far as I remember, is as foloweth.”][1218]
 Howe King Edward the fourth[1219]
through his surfeting and
vntemperate life, sodaynly dyed in the
middest of his prosperity, the nynth of
Aprill, Anno 1483.
1.

Miseremini mei yee that bee my frendes,

This world hath formed mee downe to fall:
How may I endure whan that euery thing ends?
What creature is borne to be eternall?
Now there is no more but pray for mee all,
Thus say I, Edward, that late was your king,
And twenty-two[1220] yeares ruled this imperiall,[1221]
Some vnto pleasure and some to no lyking:
Mercy I aske of my misdoyng,
What avayleth it frendes to bee my foe?
Sith I cannot resist, nor amend your complayning,
Quia ecce[1222] nunc in puluere dormio.

2.

I sleepe now in mould as it is naturall,

As earth vnto earth hath his reuerture:
What ordayned God to bee terrestriall,[1223]
Without recourse to the earth by nature?
Who to liue euer may himselfe assure?
What is it to trust to mutability?
Sith that in this worlde nothing may endure:
(For now am I gone that was late in prosperity)
To presume thereuppon it is but[1224] vanity:
Not certayne, but as a chery fayre full of wo:
Raigned not I of late in great prosperity?[1225]
Et ecce in nunc puluere dormio.

3.

Where was in my life such an one as I,

While lady fortune had with me[1226] continuaunce:
Graunted not shee mee to haue victory,
In England to raigne and to contribute Fraunce?
Shee tooke mee by the hand and led me a daunce,
And with her sugred lips on mee shee smyled,
But what for dissembled countenaunce,
I could not beware till I was beguyled:
Now from this world shee hath mee exiled,
Whan I was lothest hence for to goe,
And am in age as[1227] (who sayth) but a childe,
Et ecce nunc in puluere dormio.

4.

I had enough, I held mee not content,

Without remembraunce that I should dye:
And moreouer to encroch redy was I bent,
I knew not how long I should it occupye,
I made the towre strong, I wist not why:
I knew not to whom I purchased Tartersall:
I mended Douer on the mountayne hye:
And London I prouoked to fortify the wall:
I made Notingham a place full royall:
Windsore, Eltam, and many other mo,
Yet at the last I went from them all,
Et ecce nunc in puluere dormio.

5.
Where is now my conquest and victory?
Where is my riches and royall array?
Where be my coursers and my horses hye,
Where is my myrth, my solace, and my play?
As vanity to nought all[1228] is wythered away:
O lady Bes long for mee may you call,
For I am departed vntill dome’s day:
But loue you that lord that is soueraine of all:
Where bee my castles and buildings royall?
But Windsore alone now haue I no moe,
And of Eton the prayers perpetuall,
Et ecce nunc in puluere dormio.

6.

Why should a man bee prowde or presume hye?

Saint Bernard thereof nobly doth treate,
Saying a man is but a sacke of stercory,
And shall retourne vnto wormes meate:
Why, what became of Alexander the great?
Or else of strong Sampson, who can tell?
Were not wormes ordaynde theyr flesh to freate?
And of Salomon that was of wit the well,
Absolon preferred his hayre for to sell,
Yet for his bewty wormes eate him also,
And I but late in honoures did excell,
Et ecce nunc in puluere dormio.

7.

I haue played my pageant, now am I past,

Yee wot well all I was of no great elde:
Thus all thing concluded shalbe at the last,
When death approcheth then lost is the fielde:
Then seing this world me no longer vpheld,
(For nought would conserue mee here in this place)
In manus tuas Domine my spirit vp I yeelde,
Humbly beseeching thee, O God, of thy grace,
O you courteous commons your heartes embrace,
Beningly now to pray for mee also,
For right well you[1229] know your king I was:
Et ecce nunc in puluere dormio.[1230]
 [Whan this was sayd, euery man for that[1231] time tooke his
leaue of other, and departed (for then it waxed darke) appointing a
new day of meeting, which being come, we met all together againe.
And whan we had saluted one another, then one tooke the booke,
and began to read the story of king Edward the fifte: (for there wee
left) and when hee came to the apprehending of the lord Riuers:
“Stay there I pray you,” sayd I, “for here is his complaint. For the
better vnderstanding whereof, you must imagine that he was
accompanied with the lord Richard Gray, Hawt, and Clappam,
whose infortunes hee bewaileth after this maner.”]
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