Rohingya Conflict Mapping - Conflict Wheel

Participants: Maryo Nicolae - Introduction, Issues, Conclusion

Francine Matchop - Causes and consequences

Aleksander Melts - Dynamics

Katherine Gootkind - Actors and Relations

Berna Ela Ertas and Anne-Louise van de Poll - context and structures and options and
strategies

Introduction

Focusing on events starting with 1982 until the present, this paper seeks to examine the
Rohingya Crisis using a suitable conflict mapping tool. This approach will allow us to
analyze and discuss the conflict comprehensively, while also highlighting specific aspects
while systematically organizing the information. In order to do so, the paper will be
structured according to the Conflict Wheel model, which serves as a fundamental tool,
coordinating the other tools (EHZ Zürich, n.d, p.3). Moreover, it contains six crucial sections
of conflict analysis: actors, issues, dynamics, context/ structures, causation, options/
strategies, that will be argued in the following sections, while building the framework of this
paper (ibid)

Different Actors and Relations

The Rohingya are Sufi-influenced Sunni Muslims that once occupied ⅓ of Rakhine
state in Myanmar (Albert et al., 2020). Their identity differs from the majority Buddhist
Myanmar, which has always placed them at odds with that government (ibid). Since
Burma/Myanmar gained independence, the Rohingya have not been recognized as an ethnic
group from the region and were seen as recent immigrants with no national identity (ibid).
Today, over one million Rohingyas have fled or been forcibly displaced (Far from the
Headlines: Myanmar – The Rohingya crisis, 2024). About six hundred-thousand Rohingya
remain in Myanmar, where they are subjected to persecution and poor living conditions by
the Myanmar government. (Myanmar: Rohingya at Risk in Rakhine Fighting, 2024). The
legal persecution started when the government refused to include the Rohingya as an ethnic
group in Myanmar when they first achieved independence from Britain in 1948 (Albert et al.,
2020). Again, in 1989, they unfairly denied them citizenship, leaving them completely
stateless (ibid). Many of the conflicts between Rohingya people and the government occurred
through their respective armies.
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), is a resistance group that focuses on
liberation of the Rohingya people and the Rakhine region (Albert et al., 2020). In 2017
ARSA claimed responsibility for attacks on the Myanmar government, which led to a brutal
response and campaign against the innocent Rohingya people that was justified by naming
ARSA a terrorist organization (ibid). Another militant group is the Arakan army (AA). The
AA represents the people of the Rakhine state and fights for their rights (Myanmar: Rohingya
at Risk in Rakhine Fighting, 2024). Their fighting with the Myanmar military has caused a lot
of harm to civilian populations, especially the Rohingya (ibid). More than one hundred-
thousand people have had to relocate in the past year due to this fighting (ibid). The AA has
promised that under a free Rahkine state, the Rohingya would be safe (ibid). Still, this
process shows little regard for the safety of the Rohingya and furthers Rohingya casualties
(ibid). Both the AA and ARSA fight against the Myanmar Military which operates under the
instruction of the junta government. Recently they were accused by civilians in the Rakhine
state of not only going after the AA but also targeting Rohingya homes under the guise of
warfare; this behavior aligns with many of their past actions as well(Myanmar: Rohingya at
Risk in Rakhine Fighting, 2024). The junta has also started forced military conscription,
which has caused further unrest in all of Myanmar (UN rights expert urges global action to
halt Myanmar junta atrocities, 2024). Furthermore, they are restricting any aid from reaching
the civilians, a war crime, which is referred to as “collective punishment” by the Human
Rights Watch and punishes all the Rakhine people for the actions of the few (ibid).
Because of the ongoing violence and persecution, more than nine hundred-thousand
Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh (Albert et al., 2020). The foreign minister in Bangladesh
referred to this violence as genocide, reprimanding the Myanmar government for their
violence(ibid). Bangladesh is the largest destination of fleeing Rohingya and Malaysia
follows behind. As of 2019, there are over one hundred-thousand Rohingya refugees in
Malaysia, with no legal national identity that are denied work. Together Malaysia and
Indonesia called for Myanmar to stop its violence against the Rohingya (ibid). Many
immigrant affected countries have at least discussed repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar, a
country that does not claim them; hosting these refugees strains these country's limited
resources, and many want to stop providing them refuge (ibid). In India this deportation of
what they consider “illegal immigrants” has occurred which puts those victims at dire risk
(Ganguly, 2019).

Issues

Furthermore, it is important to note that for many years, the Rohingya have endured
significant suffering due to a variety of issues, including: violence and persecution, refugee
crisis, humanitarian crisis, statelessness, international response, military actions and much
more. Next, this paper will bring together those issues, briefly arguing the role they’ve played
in the Rohingya Crisis.

The first issue to be addressed is represented by the violence and persecution of the Rohingya
Muslim minority in Myanmar. According to Human Rights Watch, the Rohingya crisis is
characterized by severe violence and persecution against the Rohingya Muslim minority in
Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State (n.d). The violence has resulted in widespread
displacement, human rights abuses, and loss of life (ibid). Next, the Refugee Crisis could
represent an other major issue in the discussed case. The Rohingya crisis has led to a massive
refugee exodus, with hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fleeing to neighboring countries
like Bangladesh, India, and Malaysia in search of safety and security (UNHCR, 2023).
Furthermore, UNHCR states that a large majority of the Rohingya refugees are currently
being placed in 33 Camps situated in Cox’s Bazar, the world’s biggest refugee camp (ibid).
Moreover, it has been reported that the living conditions in the overcrowded camps are
extremely poor, especially for women and children who are at risk of violence, exploitation,
and trafficking (ibid). It is important to mention that by providing a secure environment for
refugees, which involves safeguarding them from natural disasters, fires, and environmental
damage, has been and continues to be a significant challenge (ibid). Moreover, The
humanitarian crisis affecting Rohingya represents another aspect that has led to a major
humanitarian emergency, with refugees facing dire conditions in overcrowded camps, lacking
access to basic necessities such as food, water, shelter, and healthcare (UNHCR, 2023).
Additionally, the international response regarding the situation in Rohingya, has significantly
influenced how the crisis has been managed over the years. The international community has
been criticized for its inadequate response to the Rohingya crisis, with calls for more robust
action to hold criminals accountable, provide humanitarian aid, and support long-term
solutions (Amnesty International, 2018). Last but not least, statelessness and military actions,
currently represent two of the most significant issues concerning the Rohingya Crisis. Firstly,
due to their lack of nationality, the Rohingya have frequently experienced violations of their
rights, such as government-imposed limitations on movement (even within their own
communities), limited economic opportunities, as well as rules on employment and
compulsory labor (Lee, 2012, p.78). Furthermore, regarding the military actions, Amnesty
International has extensively recorded how the military operation resulted in ethnic cleansing
(2018). This involved the deliberate burning of Rohingya villages, the deployment of
landmines, and the perpetration of crimes against humanity such as murder, rape, torture,
forced starvation, forced deportation, and various other severe human rights violations
against the Rohingya (ibid).

Dynamics of Rohingya Conflict

The Myanmar Civil War started in 1948, but the Rohingya Conflict started almost 40 years
later in 1982, when the Myanmar Government passed a citizenship law that excluded the
Rohingya as one of the 135 official ethnic groups in Myanmar and barred them from
citizenship, effectively rendering them stateless (Duggal, 2022). Apart from citizenship,
Rohingya lost rights to education, healthcare, freedom of movement, and government
employment (ibid).

In 1991, the Myanmar government initiated Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation, a military
campaign designed to displace the Rohingya population forcibly (Akbar, 2012). This
operation resulted in the displacement of over 250,000 Rohingya, many of whom sought
refuge in Bangladesh, and despite the fact that some were eventually repatriated, they
returned to increasingly repressive conditions that severely restricted their movements and
rights, perpetuating their socio-economic isolation (ibid).

The Rohingya conflict intensified in 2012 after the rape and murder on May 28, 2012, of a
28-year-old Arakanese woman by three Muslim men (HRW report, 2012, p. 7). The rape, in
turn, led to a new wave of structural violence between ethnic Arakanese Buddhists and
Rohingya Muslims in early June 2012 in Burma’s Arakan State (ibid). That began as
sectarian clashes in four townships (HRW report, 2012, p. 4). When violence resumed in
October, it engulfed nine more townships and became a coordinated campaign to relocate or
remove the state’s Muslims forcibly (ibid). The October attacks were against Rohingya and
Kaman Muslim communities and were organized, incited, and committed by local Arakanese
political party operatives, the Buddhist monkhood, and ordinary Arakanese, at times directly
supported by state security forces (ibid). During these attacks, at least 125,000 Rohingya and
other Muslims were displaced to internally displaced person camps (HRW report, 2012, p. 6).

The crisis escalated on August 25, 2017, when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
(ARSA) launched coordinated attacks on Myanmar security forces (UN Report, 2018, p. 8).
This triggered a large-scale military response from the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) that
quickly expanded in scope, targeting the entire Rohingya population under the pretext of
eliminating ARSA threats (ibid). These "clearance operations" involved severe human rights
violations, including mass killings, widespread sexual violence, and the destruction of
villages, leading to the displacement of nearly 725,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh by mid-2018
(ibid).

The report mentions the disproportionate and systematic nature of the violence, describing
deliberate actions by the Tatmadaw to instill terror, destroy Rohingya communities, and drive
them out of the country (ibid). Tatmadaw soldiers reportedly attacked villages in the early
hours, using gunfire, explosions, and arson to maximize fear and destruction (UN Report,
2018, p. 9). This operation extended to burning homes, mosques, and schools, leaving only
non-Rohingya settlements intact (ibid). The scale of the destruction and the presence of
military assets indicate significant pre-planning and orchestration at high levels within the
military hierarchy (UN Report, 2018, p.10).

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military arrested the civilian leaders of the national and
state governments and announced a one-year “state of emergency” (HRW, 2021). The
military arrested leader Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and several dozen other
senior officials in early morning raids in the capital, Naypyidaw (ibid). The officials were in
Naypyidaw for the lower house of parliament to convene after the November 2020 national
elections, which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won by a large margin (ibid).
The military also detained NLD officials and civil society activists in other parts of Myanmar
and cut telecommunications and the internet (ibid).

Over three years after the military takeover in 2021, Myanmar faces a dire humanitarian
crisis, affecting one-third of its population – approximately 18.6 million people – who
urgently require humanitarian assistance (UN, 2024). This staggering figure represents nearly
nineteen times the pre-military takeover estimates, underscoring the severity of the situation
(ibid). The military coup and subsequent violent repression have exacerbated the suffering of
minority communities, including the Rohingya Muslims, plunging the nation into deep social,
political, and economic turmoil (ibid).

Since October 2023, clashes between the military and armed opposition factions have
escalated and spread throughout Myanmar, intensifying the human rights emergency (ibid).
The military’s actions, including the targeting of civilians and forced recruitment campaigns,
have led to widespread displacement, with over 2.8 million people now displaced nationwide,
over 1 million of whom are Rohingya (ibid). In Rakhine State, the escalation of violence
between the Myanmar military and the ARSA has reached an unprecedented intensity,
aggravating existing vulnerabilities (ibid).

Context and structures:

structural violence/ Legislation:

Structural violence is a form of violence that is caused by unjust structures created within a
society. These structures can be social, economic, and political systems that create
disadvantages and risks for certain populations by preventing them from reaching their basic
needs and/ or full potential. (S. Chefalo 2023)
In a Paper written by Galtung he clarifies structural violence: “There may not be any person
who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and
shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.” (Galtung, 1969)
The most predominant form of structural violence committed against the Rohingya
population is the Burma citizenship law legislated in 1982. The law divides citizenship in
three categories; citizenship, associate citizenship, and naturalized citizenship. To gain
citizenship you need to either be born there, be a part of a recognised national race or provide
evidence that your family’s ancestors Settled in Myanmar/Burma before 1823.
One of the clauses of his law is that ’the council of state may decide if any ethnic group is
national or not.” (Pyithu Hluttaw Larv No 4 of 1982, page 2 number 4)
The government of Myanmar does not recognize the Rohingya population as a national race
therefore denying them citizenship and are classified as resident foreigners.
The formal legal status of the Rohingya population as resident foreigners subjects them to
restrictions on their freedom of movement, are denied access to higher education, and are
restricted from holding public office, denying them their basic needs and preventing them
from reaching their full potential. (HRW, 2000)
UNHCR has criticized the citizenship law stating: “Myanmar’s current legal framework for
acquiring, retaining, and conferring citizenship does not comport with international
standards.” (UNHCR 2021)
Another law that is restricting the human rights of not only the Rohingya population but the
entire nation is the Printing and Publishing Law (2014, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 13) this
law constitutes that Publishers should apply for acknowledgement from the ministry for their
businesses. The Ministry shall give out the business certificate during the fixed time to the
person who applied after he/she has paid the nominated fees. The Military can withdraw or
suspend their certificate by a time- limit if an investigation found that the certificate holder
applied dishonestly to get the certificate. The person whose certificate was withdrawn or
suspended can apply to the Ministry for re-investigation within a fixed period. The Ministry
can accept or reject the original decision after re-investigating the application.
This law not only demands people to register to be able to publish anything but it also decides
what is acceptable to publish. the law stipulates that publishers must not publish under any of
the following conditions:
- Expressing things which can racially and culturally do violence to each other among
ethnic people or citizens.
- Showing things which can harass national security, rules of law, public order or the
rights of every citizen such as equality, freedom and balance of law.
- Illustration of obscene literature. (Obscene Literature refers to the expression of
Sexual things directly or indirectly, illustrations, writings, photographs and paintings
which stimulate the sensual desire to lose the moral behavior and the expression of
harsh and obscene usages and pictures)
- Instigating to commit criminal case, pitilessness, terrorization, gambling case and the
act of committing crimes using opium and abusive drugs; (ibid)

This law was originally created in 1962 and updated in 2014 after criticism. There is no
longer prior censorship and the oversight over the printing and publishing sector has been
partly transferred from the government to the courts. (Article 19 page 3) Also the
punishments, if necessary, are less severe, reducing to only fines instead of prison time. It
does however still restrict freedom of speech, In 2021 after the military coup, Myanmar’s
military Junta started revoking publishing licenses of many publishing houses and bookshops
for being a threat to the Military regime. Dozens of journalists were arrested, forcing
publishing media to close. The military junta also issued arrest warrants for bookshop owners
for publishing books that give information about the atrocities committed against the
Rohingya people. For example; “Lwin Oo bookstore in Yangon’s Hledan neighbourhood,
after it produced a Myanmar translation of Dr Ronan Lee’s Myanmar’s Rohingya Genocide:
Identity, History and Hate Speech.” (Frontier, 2022)

bangladesh situation:
The Rohingya Population has been suffering persecutions in Myanmar for decades but after
an increase of violence (largely by the Myanmar military) hundreds and thousand of People
fled the country (Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021).While some fled to different
countries ( Thailand and Indonesia) the vast majority fled to Bangladesh (about a million
have been living in refugee camps there since) (ibid). While Myanmar and Bangladesh have
made several agreements (for a safe return) to reintegrate the Rohingya People that fled, not a
single person has gone back to Myanmar because of a lack of trust that they will be able to
live a peaceful life there (trust deficit) (ibid). Bangladesh and other countries tried to find
other solutions with different proposals to Myanmar, which they did not respond to any
(ibid). “The solution [...] lies with Myanmar” (Foreign Minister Momen of Bangladesh)(ibid).
The history of Myanmar and Bangladesh ( it has happened several times that Bangladesh
took Rohingya refugees) shows that Myanmar only acts when there are sanctions and/or
pressure otherwise they do not respond to proposals (ibid).
Bangladesh still tries for a peaceful repatriation of the Rohingya though and continues to
hope for more support/help from more powerful countries (Gambia started a case but is not
powerful enough alone) which some of the leaders of human rights are not doing while
instead trading and investing in Myanmar took place (ibid). The issue might not be just
Myanmar's refusal to act then, but also the fault of the countries who are able to put sanctions
and pressure, which are not doing so (ibid).

UN involvement
The UN is and has been a part of the situation in Myanmar and many of the member
countries have raised concerns about the worsening situation in Myanmar towards civilians
(HRW, April 2024). While the Security Council has once stepped in and taken action
(mentioned in the next part regarding options and strategies), they have stayed silent since
(ibid). Even after ideas of resolutions have been brought up at the Security Council meeting
(meeting in April 2024), there is little that can be done when vital countries like China and
Russia dispute that the Situation in Myanmar is an issue to be authorized by the Security
Council (ibid).

What is the purpose of ASEAN?

The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was created in 1967, some of the
member countries followed in later years, but all of the member countries had/have similar
goals.
“ASEAN’s purpose is to promote economic and cultural exchange among its member
countries, maintain peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and establish relationships with
foreign powers with similar aims. ASEAN formed during the Cold War to promote stability
and cooperation in a politically turbulent region.” (Britannica, 2024)

ASEAN involvement
Many of the Member countries of the ASEAN are trading partners with Myanmar (Time,
Koh Ewe, October 2023). Their economic and political connections and interests seem more
important than the ongoing situation in Myanmar (ibid). By those connections many of the
countries silently and not so silently support the actions happening in Myanmar (ibid). The
ASEAN members are divided on what measures have to be taken. While there have been
strategies like the Five-Point consensus (further explained later on in options and strategies),
those have been relatively weak because of the failed inaction of Myanmar to the consensus
(ibid). After that not much has been done because of the before mentioned division, which
alternates with the ASEAN’S traditional consensus based decision making (ibid). As long as
they continue to not act/respond collectively regarding Myanmar, there is little to be expected
by the ASEAN regarding the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, except continued Disappointment
by others recognising their involvement and inaction (ibid).

Options and strategies: ASEAN and UN Strategies:

While the UN Security Council has since mostly been silent on the topic, they did step in in
December 2022, after the coup in Myanmar in February 2021. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 2669, which “called on the military to release political prisoners [including
President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi], restore democratic
institutions, and engage in dialogue”(John Sifton, Asia Advocacy Director).
(Human Rights Watch, April 2024)
At the same meeting the Resolution was presented at, they also mentioned a few other points
that should take place.
The council called for an implementation of the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, and also
reiterated its support for the ASEAN's Special Envoy to engage with all relevant parties.
It also underlined the continuing need for humanitarian assistance for all people in Myanmar
and to address the root causes of the crisis to create peaceful conditions (breaking the trust
deficit). ( United Nations, December 2022)

At a UN meeting in April 2024 many Speakers spoke about the situation in Myanmar,
including their frustration at the inaction of the Council (United Nations, April 2024).
The following will summarize what some of the speakers said should be done concerning the
conflict (ibid). The speaker for the US “called for measures to restrict the flow of arms to the
military and its access to jet fuel” (ibid). The representative of the Republic of Korea
underlined the need for a UN Special Envoy in Myanmar (many other representatives agree)
(ibid). Lisa Doughten, Director, Financing and Partnerships Division, Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, called on Member States to ensure continuing
humanitarian support in Myanmar to reach all people in need (ibid). The representative of
Algeria “underscored the importance of dialogue between all protagonists and urged them to
cease all acts of violence” (ibid). Furthermore many representatives agree that the ASEAN
plays a central role in the solutions and support the implementation of the Five point
consensus (ibid).

ASEAN’s Five point consensus

The five-point consensus was created to help Myanmar overcome conflicts (setkab, January
2023). Many Speakers often point back to the consensus when speaking about options for the
conflict and what to support (ibid). Explained shortly “The five points of consensus are: an
immediate end of violence, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy,
allowing humanitarian assistance by ASEAN,
and allowing an ASEAN special envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties”
(Bernama, July 2024). While the military junta in Myanmar first agreed to the 5 point
consensus, they later refused to meet the consensus commitments and instead violations and
abuse rose (HRW, April 2024). Proving that the Consensus is not enough to stop the violence
of Myanmar's military (ibid). Therefore just supporting it and not doing further is not going
to be enough to solve the conflict (ibid).
The causes and consequences of the situation of Rohingyas in Myanmar.

The Rohingya minority, “the most persecuted in the world” according to the UN, has long
suffered repeated violence: political exclusion, economic marginalization, repeated
displacement, denial of their right to citizenship, religious and ethnic discrimination. In order
to facilitate the understanding of the long-lasting conflict, we must delve into its most salient
causes.

Political exclusion:

Due to systematic discrimination, Rohingyas live in horrible conditions. Totally separated

from the rest of the population, they have no freedom of movement and limited access to
healthcare, schools, and employment (Mahmud, Khaled, & Fariba., 2019). For instance,
Galtung (1969, p.171) argues that violence occurs anytime there is a discrepancy between
what could be done with the resources and technology at hand and the actual realization of
development. Frequently, unequal power arrangements reinforce this difference. When
groups experience structural violence—the systemically imposed disparities that limit their
access to opportunities, resources, or human rights—they may turn to violence. This
institutional violence frequently leads to direct, human violence (ibid).

Military Control and Nationalism:

Cultural violence is utilized in this context to validate both direct and structural violence by
perpetuating harmful beliefs against certain minority groups in the society. For example, if
certain Muslim ethnic groups are tolerated (Chinese Hui, Indian Muslims and Zerbadees,
from mixed Indo-Burmese couples), the potential for racial hatred is concentrated on the
Rohingyas, Muslims from Arakan State, which borders Bangladesh (Maizland 2022). The
government calls them “Bengalis” to highlight their non-native character and, supported by
extremist Buddhist monks, denies them Burmese citizenship (Mahmud et al., 2019). In this
way, the Rohingya and their religion are portrayed as a threat to the widely Buddhist culture
of the country. In the same vein, the military also known as “Tatmadaw” justifies its actions
under the disguise of defending Myanmar’s sovereignty, national security, and Buddhist
identity, often using the Rohingya as sacrificial lambs to consolidate power (ibid).
Moreover, the army overthrew the government in 1962 because of the instability that tore
apart the newly independent Burma, which was fighting a civil war on several fronts. The
military forbids the building of new mosques, destroys Muslim cemeteries, shuts down
Koranic schools, and even constructs Buddhist pagodas in place of mosques after this coup
d'état. (Mushtaq et al., 2019).

Ethnic and Religious Discrimination: Rohingya Muslims are ethnically different from
Myanmar’s majority Buddhist Bamar population, and anti-Muslim sentiment is widespread.
Discrimination and oppression are the load of the different minorities in Myanmar, namely
the Christians Karen in the North and in the North-West, the Muslim Rohingya (Forino et al
2017).

Notably, violence against Rohingyas is particularly visible and has been traced back to the
colonial past. For instance, Michalon (2018), argues that during the British domination,
Myanmar was part of the Indian Empire, easing movements from the Bengal Deltas to the
rice -growing plains of Rakhine. The Rakhine ethnic group has always been at odds with the
predominant ethnic Burman group known as the Bamar and the central government. Even
today, the Arakanese denounce the control of the Bamar over their territory and its resources
as well as the policy of cultural “Bamarization” which has long prevailed. This resentment of
the Arakanese, who consider themselves an oppressed minority, plays a significant role in the
“Rohingya question” ( Michalon, 2018, Maizland, 2022). Additionally, Anas (2017), goes
further to ascertain that British mismanagement and exploitation of communal differences in
its colonies to further its own agendas are the core causes of the current problem.

Economic Marginalization: Rakhine State, where the majority of Rohingya live, is one of
the poorest regions in Myanmar. Conversely, it is highly endowed with natural resources
which attracts the interest of the central government (Mushtaq et al., 2019) Hundreds of
thousands of Rohingyas have been displaced in Myanmar as a result of widespread land grabs
carried out in the name of development projects such as military base expansion, resource
exploitation, infrastructure, agricultural projects, and tourism (Forino et al., 2017). The
brutality against the Rohingya people was further exacerbated by Myanmar's strategic
location on the international map. Since the 1990s, China has been plundering the northern
state of Shan's forests, rivers, and minerals (Mushtaq et al., 2019). In order to transfer its oil
and gas to Guangzhou, China, China has also constructed a transnational pipeline that links
Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine, to Kunming (Dhaka Tribune 2017 as cited in Mushtaq et al.,
2019).

Citizenship and Statelessness:

The Rohingyas have been living in Myanmar for generations, but the sitting government
insists that they are undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh. They refuse to acknowledge
them as citizens, thereby making them stateless.(Mohajan 2018)

Citizenship is a fundamental human right that facilitates other rights. According to Article 15
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), “everyone has the right to a
nationality” and “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality (UN 2015). The
refusal on the part of the authorities to register the Rohingya at birth and to provide them with
certificates of marriage and other official documents attesting to their civil status, violates
their fundamental rights, amongst others freedom of movement and access to health care.
Moreover, without legal status, they are also unable to pursue education or pursue formal
employment opportunities, and therefore remain vulnerable to exploitation and other risks
relating to their protection (Mushtaq et al., 2019). Indeed, the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship
Law effectively rendered the Rohingya stateless, denying them citizenship and basic rights
and leaving them vulnerable to abuse. This constitutes a structural violence which, blended
with cultural violence, allows for direct violence on the Rohingya minority with all impunity.

Conclusion:

In summary, this paper seeks to examine the Rohingya Crisis, while making use of the
Conflict Wheel’s dimensions of conflict analysis. The paper asserts that the Rohingya Crisis
is not a recent conflict, arguing that its origins can be traced back many decades. The
Myanmar Civil War began in 1948, while the Rohingya Conflict emerged nearly four
decades later, in 1982 (Duggal, 2022). This development occurred when the Myanmar
government enacted a citizenship law that excluded the Rohingya from the list of 135 official
ethnic groups in the country, denying them citizenship and effectively rendering them
stateless (ibid). Over the years, the situation just got worse for the Rohingya, with marking
events such as the Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation, a military campaign designed to
displace the Rohingya population forcibly, the rape and murder on May 28, 2012, of a 28-
year-old Arakanese woman by three Muslim men, the military operations resulted in ethnic
cleansing , involving the deliberate burning of Rohingya villages, the deployment of
landmines, and the perpetration of crimes against humanity such as murder, rape, torture,
forced starvation, and those are just a couple of examples of notorious crimes against the
Rohingya. (Duggal, 2018; Akbar, 2012; HRW Report,2012, p. 7; Amnesty International,
2018). To conclude with, recently, there have been attempts such as ASEAN and UN
Strategies, meant to prevent or diminish such atrocities from happening, but there is still a
long way to go until Rohingya’s people will be able to live a decent life, where their basic
human rights are going to be respected (United Nations, December 2022)

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