Zacharoula Petraki

The Poetics of Philosophical Language

 Sozomena
Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts

Edited
on behalf of the Herculaneum Society

by
Alessandro Barchiesi, Robert Fowler,
Dirk Obbink and Nigel Wilson

Vol. 9

De Gruyter
 Zacharoula Petraki

The Poetics
of Philosophical Language
Plato, Poets and Presocratics in the Republic

De Gruyter
 ISBN 978-3-11-026097-7
e-ISBN 978-3-11-026216-2
ISSN 1869-6368

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Petraki, Zacharoula A.
The poetics of philosophical language : Plato, poets and
presocratics in the “republic” / Zacharoula A. Petraki.
p. cm. ⫺ (Sozomena. Studies in the recovery of ancient
texts ; v. 9)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-3-11-026097-7 (hardcover : acid-free paper)
1. Plato. Republic ⫺ Criticism, Textual. I. Title.
PA4279.R7P48 2011
3211.07⫺dc23
2011020280

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 Acknowledgments

This book stems from work I conducted for my PhD Thesis under the
supervision of Professor Andrew Barker at the Institute of Antiquity and
Archaeology at Birmingham. I owe more than I can say to Professor
Barker for his kindness, generosity of mind and spirit and his expert
criticism throughout my postgraduate studies. Professor Barker measures
up to the best standards of academic mentorship; his supervision over
the years has always been a source of inspiration, insight and illumina-
tion. His help and support has been invaluable in more ways than he
will ever know.
I owe another debt to my teachers at the University of Crete at Re-
thymno. I cannot thank enough Professors Lucia Athanassaki and Yan-
nis Tzifopoulos for the inspiration they stirred in me and for their gen-
erous support throughout my undergraduate studies. I owe a special
gratitude to Professor Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi who first sparked off
my interest in Plato at Rethymno and has always been kind and gener-
ous with her guidance and advice.
In addition, many friends and scholars have offered me valuable help
in bringing this book to the world; for the book’s shortcomings I alone
am responsible. I wish to thank Professors Penelope Murray and Ken
Dowden, the examiners of my PhD Thesis, for their valuable comments
and constructive criticism. I am deeply grateful to Professor Stelios Vir-
vidakis for labouring over versions of this manuscript as well as for our
several stimulating conversations on Plato. I am especially indebted to
the following scholars for their incisive criticisms: Elton Barker, Kyriaki
Konstantinidou, Costas Makris, Penelope Skarsouli, Cedric Hugonnet,
Xanthippe Bourloyanni and Eirene Visvardi. I would also like to say a
special thank you to my students at the Universities of the Peloponnese
and Crete for the very interesting and stimulating discussions we had on
Greek philosophy. Thanks are also owed to the anonymous reader at De
Gruyter for his valuable comments. I am especially grateful to the Series
Editor, Professor Dirk Obbink, for the help and encouragement he ge-
nerously gave me while I was preparing this book. Many thanks are due
to the staff of De Gruyter who have dealt with my typescript with both
efficiency and skill, as well as to Dr Andrew Farrington and John Ra-
VI Acknowledgments

nells Stephens, both of whom laboured over the manuscript and saved
me from numerous errors as regards the English language.
The Hardt Foundation at Geneva provided the ideal intellectual at-
mosphere for writing this book; I am deeply grateful to the Foundation
for their generous research grant and to its director, Mr Pierre Ducrey,
and Scientific Secretary, Monica Brunner, for their generosity, kindness
and support. During my stay at the Foundation I had the privileged op-
portunity to exchange views and ideas with the fellows there. I wish to
thank, in particular, Vyara Kalfina, Valentina Garulli and Peggy Le-
caudé.
During the preparation of the book for publication I have been
privileged to have the generous support of good friends. I wish to
thank, in particular, Dr Katerina Ladianou for standing by me with pa-
tience and unending generosity when things were difficult. Special
thanks are also due to my very good friends Christos and Nikos. Finally,
this book is dedicated to my parents, Anastasios and Euaggelia Petrakis
and to my brother, George. This is but a small tribute; my debt to them
cannot be repaid in words or deeds.

Piraeus 2011
 Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Plato and the Presocratics: Old and new problems . . . . . 1
1.2 The language problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 The literary and the philosophical in Plato:
Philosophy against poetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 The poetics of philosophical language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 The Republic’s main motifs: Mixture, diversity and purity 15
1.6 Philosophy, poetry, painting and the poikilia-motif . . . . . 18
1.7 The Republic’s interlocutors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.8 Plato and Post-Platonic problems about language . . . . . . 30

Section One: The Theory

1. Aims and perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2. Poetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3. Mythos and eikõn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4. Imagistic discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1 Poikilia and images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Eikones in Gorgias’ Helen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Definition of Platonic imagery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and

metaphoric language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.1. Platonic Eikones: A homoiõsis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2 Dramatization of language: the theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 Metaphoric language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Section Two: The Republic

1. Human nature and philosophical style in the Republic Book 5 . 109
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
1.2 The “two waves” of the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
VIII Contents

1.2.1 The first wave of argument: women in the

guardians’ agelẽ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
1.2.2 The second wave of argument:
the guardians’ mixis and class purity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
1.2.3 The third wave of argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 . 142

2.1 Glaucon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2.2 The third wave again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
2.2.1 Part one: the mixed style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
2.2.2 Part two: the cleansed style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
2.2.3 Part three: the imagistic style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

3. Verbal Images in the Republic Books 2 and 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

3.1 The poets’ eikones in the Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
3.2 Plato’s eikones in the Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
3.2.1 Images of human nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
3.2.2 The way to the Form of the Good . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
3.2.3 Plato’s eikones: The Image of the Sun . . . . . . . . . . 200

4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic . 215

4.1 Adeimantus’ philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
4.2 Human nature, “true” philosophers and
“false” philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
4.3 The poetics of the unjust in Books 8 and 9 . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.4 The Language of Democracy and Tyranny . . . . . . . . . . . 239
4.4.1 Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
4.4.2 Tyranny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
‘Viewing’ the skiagraphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
 1. Introduction
1.1 Plato and the Presocratics: Old and new problems
In his Republic, Plato ventures a wholesale examination of a broad range
of issues that preoccupy his philosophical thought. The dialogue’s main
theme is the definition of the ethical concept of justice and its preva-
lence over injustice, but in the course of the discussion Plato examines
a series of further issues, the most prominent being his demonstrating
that the just life is the happiest form of life for humans (344e;
578c5 – 7). Plato bases his investigation into the nature of justice and in-
justice on the analogy of city and soul and defines justice in both
(402b – c; 434b). He argues for the division of the human soul in
three parts – the appetitive, the spirited and the rational – and he also
creates in speech an ideal city consisting of three classes: the economic
class, the guardian class and the philosopher-kings. He then argues that
justice in both city and soul is to be found in “each part performing its
own task” and discusses the way in which this can be achieved in the
city and the soul (443d – e).
For Plato, Socrates’ main thesis in the dialogue is that correct edu-
cation is the only way towards the harmonisation of the tripartite soul
and the preservation of the ideal polis once this is created by the city
founders. He then devotes a great part of his discussion to laying out
the guidelines and the specific characteristics of this type of education
which is directed to the guardians (Books 2 and 3) and the philoso-
pher-kings of the ideal polis (Book 7).
Plato’s educational programme in the Republic is essentially a refor-
mation (or “cleansing”) of current education in contemporary Athens
(399e; 411d – e). In Books 2 and 3 of the Republic, Socrates condemns
the poets for “not lying well” to their audience for the things that matter
most in life, namely the gods and the heroes (376e-377c). In this view,
the poets also fail to present correctly the “simple character” of humans
(392a – b; Cp. Critias 107a-108b). In Book 10 (604e-605a), Plato’s Soc-
rates informs us that the poets fail to depict or convey a correct (re)pre-
sentation of ethical values as regards gods, heroes and simple people be-
cause they lack true knowledge of these values (Cp. Rep. 392b – c).
Contrawise, in the Republic’s terms, the knowledge of our earthly ethical
2 1. Introduction

values, which are manifested in the actions of humans as much as they

are represented in the actions of gods, heroes and simple people in myth
and poetry, is inextricably linked with a new type of philosophical
knowledge (Epistẽmẽ), namely, one’s acquaintance with the Platonic
Forms (517d – e).
According to Socrates in the Republic Book 5, this is a type of
knowledge that the majority of people lack, since only very few “be-
lieve” in the existence of the Forms, and even less have the intellectual
ability and strength of character to undergo the hard and strenuous ed-
ucation that finally leads to grasping these Forms. Yet, ethical values
such as courage, moderation or justice cannot be fully identified in
their earthly manifestation unless one knows the Forms which make
the very many particular things or actions bear the qualities that people
ascribe to them. For Plato in the Republic, the Forms differ from their
visible or sense-perceptible earthly manifestation in that, contrary to
the doings in our own mundane sphere of human action, the Forms
are transcendent, unaltering and unchanging, eternal, pure and thus
truly Real (see Jowett II [1894: 316]). Socrates’ assigns knowledge of
this type of Reality only to the Republic’s philosopher-kings. From
this point of view, the poets’ knowledge and ability to educate the peo-
ple is then placed very low in this cognitive hierarchy, and on that very
basis the poets are finally expelled in Book 10 from the ideal state. Pla-
to’s main accusation against them is that their compositions endanger
the formulation of a correct ethical character. As a result, they must
be banished.
The above summary of the Republic hardly does justice to the rich-
ness of this dialogue and to the many and complex problems posed
therein. Nevertheless, this sketchy account of the main themes that
Plato treats in this dialogue has led us to the core issue of his philosophy
and, possibly, to the most important philosophical problem that preoc-
cupied Plato in his writings at large. Standing at the end of Presocratic
thought, Plato’s newly-founded philosophy has been deeply influenced
by the innovative ideas of these early thinkers.1 It has long been ac-

1 The influence that Presocratic thought exercised on Platonic philosophy is

well-documented. Lloyd (1966) and (1987); Cherniss (1951: 333 and 337 –
339); Cohen (1969/70: 111 – 141); Kahn (1979); Fontaine (1988) and Graham
(2006). For Heraclitean influences on Plato, see Irwin (1977). Palmer’s analysis
(1999) of Plato’s reception of Parmenides addresses in detail Parmenides’ influ-
ence on Plato. See also Rist (1970: 221 – 229).
 1.1 Plato and the Presocratics: Old and new problems 3

knowledged that in his dialogues Plato tried to reconcile the character-

istics that Heraclitus assigned to our earthly world of sense-perception,
which is a world of continuous flux and conflict of opposite elements,
with the changelessness and unity that Parmenides’ On Nature identified
in the so-called way of Being. According to Parmenides’ Fr. 8, Being
eschews change, multiplicity, opposition and conflict, and can be grasp-
ed only intelligibly. Plato adapted to his own ends both Parmenides’
metaphysics of unity and changelessness and Heraclitus’ portrayal of
the conflicting information that sense-perception communicates to
human intellect.2
In the course of his writings, Plato developed various ways of solv-
ing or reconciling the tension between the two. In the Republic, in par-
ticular, this is most tellingly manifested in the way he treats the various
conflicting pairs of opposites that surround us. Plato thus poses the
Forms and distinguishes between Being and Becoming. The immutable
Forms belong to the transcendent and changeless Reality, whereas the
contingent and unstable particulars find their place in the cognitive
sphere of Opinion (Doxa). This immediately creates a contrast between
eidetic unity and stability on the one hand, and conflict, polymorphy
and multiplicity on the other. Thus in trying to reconcile alternation
with permanence and changelessness, Plato follows Parmenides in cre-
ating two “different orders of reality” (Lloyd 1966: 23). The pure
realm of Forms is thus freed from polar oppositions and colourful ver-
satility. These characteristics become prominent features in the realm of
Becoming, which never stops changing and for which no true knowl-
edge can be reached on firm grounds.
But, while Parmenides refrained from bridging the gap between his
two realms by demonstrating the transition from the way of Opinion to
the way of Being, Plato views this challenge as remarkably significant.
Viewing anew the philosophical problems that the Presocratic thought
bestowed upon him, he undertakes to show to his audience how a cor-
rect distinction between the world of multiplicity and opposition (Be-
coming) and the world of true reality (the Forms) can be, and has
been, mishandled by poets and other thinkers so that appearance

2 I use here and throughout in this study the terms metaphysics and ontology to
talk about Plato’s transcendent Forms both anachronistically and as a matter of
convenience. I am aware of the fact that both terms are post-Presocratic and
post-Platonic in origin.
4 1. Introduction

(Doxa in Rep. Book 2) is presented deceptively under the guise of true

Being.
The influence of Parmenides on Plato is also evident in his assess-
ment of sense-perception. In distinguishing between Being and Becom-
ing (or between Forms and the many particulars), Plato also distin-
guishes between the intelligible grasp of the invisible Forms and the sen-
sible perception of the various earthly visible particulars. In specific
terms, according to Plato, when turning to the eidetic level, the pure
and immutable Forms can be known only intelligibly. In addition, fol-
lowing the Presocratic tradition on the unreliability of our senses,
Plato also reminds us that no true, stable or fixed knowledge can ever
come from relying exclusively on them to understand the conflicting
and ever-changing level of Becoming. Yet, it is at this point exactly
that Plato departs from Parmenides’ thought as regards the importance
of sense-perception in attaining true Knowledge. In my view, in
Plato, and in the Republic in particular, sense-perception (and most im-
portantly sight) must be trained so as to assist the intellect in grasping
true Reality. Human senses then must be put into the service of the in-
tellect and function as a stepping-stone to one’s ascent to higher cogni-
tive levels of grasping true Reality. I believe that this is for Plato a major
epistemological problem which he treats and seeks to solve in his Repub-
lic. This process is enacted by having Socrates educating his interlocutors
in this dialogue on how to view anew the conflicting information they
receive from their senses and how they should redirect their senses so
that they may make a good start in ascending the different levels of
human cognition described in the images of the Line and the Cave in
Books 6 and 7 of the Republic. This allows Plato to educate the Socratic
interlocutors in ethical matters and address the way opposite ethical con-
cepts, such as justice and injustice, are constantly confused by the major-
ity of people.
In this study, I argue that in order to meet this difficult epistemolog-
ical challenge, Plato appropriates in his Republic the poets’ language and
invents insightful methods so that poetry and its distinctive features are
put into the service of his newly founded philosophy. In this way, Plato
achieves the following in the Republic: firstly, he has Socrates demon-
strate to his audience the way in which poetry and its performance
has failed in presenting correctly the various ethical values; secondly,
by appropriating several of the characteristics of poetic discourse to ed-
ucate the Socratic interlocutors in matters of ethics and politics, Plato
shows how a knowledgeable “lover of poetry” (philopoiẽtẽs Book 10)
 1.1 Plato and the Presocratics: Old and new problems 5

can competently use traditional linguistic stock and turn it into an inno-
vative philosophical dialect so as to reach out to the philosophically un-
sophisticated people who have not been trained in Platonic philosophy
nor believe in the existence of the immaterial and transcendent Forms;
and, thirdly, by adapting heavily imagistic poetic speech to speak about
elusive concepts such as the human soul, modes of thinking about true
Reality (Forms) and ethical values, Plato addresses anew the confusing
character of sense-perception and redirects human senses so that these
support the intellect in its effort to understand the invisible, transcendent
and immaterial.
These cardinal philosophical issues in Plato are inextricably inter-
twined with the problem of the dynamics of language as a means to ex-
amine and communicate the intricate relation of human cognition with
the Real. A number of Presocratics, as well as certain sophists – Gorgias
of Leontini (c. 483 – 375 B.C.) being the most prominent among them
– were the first to address this problem explicitly in developing their ex-
planations of the world (Lesher, in Long A.A. [ed.] [1999: 225 – 248]).3
From this perspective, language as such became a new field of philo-
sophical analysis and speculation as thinkers often had to stretch stock
linguistic resources to their limits, or invent new diction and discursive
modes to express their innovative doctrines and ideas.4 How human
thought can be correlated with the world at large, and how the dynam-
ics of words can create a satisfying and perhaps faithful representation of
reality, became major puzzles in philosophical Presocratic and Platonic

3 As regards Gorgias’ On Not-Being, we lack the original work and what has come
down to us are the two paraphrases, of Sextus Empiricus in Against the Professors
and that of the anonymous author of MXG (Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias)
included in the Aristotelian corpus. The bibliography on Gorgias is vast. See
Gagarin (1997: 38 – 40). On Gorgias’ On Not-Being (B3) see also Consigny
(2001); Gains (1997: 1 – 12) Hays (1990: 327 – 337); Kerferd (1955: 3 – 25);
(1981a) and Kerferd (ed.) (1981b); Mansfeld (1985: 243 – 271); Mourelatos
(1985: 637 – 638); Schiappa (1997: 13 – 30); Segal (1962: 99 – 155); Woodruff,
in Long A. A. (ed.) (1999: 290 – 310).
4 Note, however, that both the Iliad and the Odyssey are remarkably sophisticated
on the communicative effects of language. On the Iliad, in particular, see Mar-
tin (1989). As regards the Tragedians, see Long (1968) on the use of abstract
language in Sophocles. On language in Thucydides, see Allison (1997). As re-
gards the concept of alẽtheia, see esp. 206 – 237. See also Goldhill, in Rutter,
N. K. and Sparkes, B. A. (eds.) (2000: 161 – 179).
6 1. Introduction

thought.5 In raising these issues, Plato is admittedly engaged in a philo-

sophical dialogue with both his predecessors and his rivals whose influ-
ence can be marked throughout his writings, and in the course of devel-
oping his own insights Plato both settled old problems and raised new
ones.

1.2 The language problem

In this work I examine Plato’s stance towards language as a thought-
structuring and communicative medium in his Republic. For Plato, lan-
guage poses remarkable philosophical and epistemological intricacies
that require painstaking analysis and reflection.6 Time and again in his
dialogues Plato draws attention to the medium of language as a two-
edged sword. Being our main (if not only) instrument for putting across
our conflicting sense-perceptions, language, if employed correctly, can
help us fight against the confusion that our world generates. However,
if treated erroneously, language can intensify the diversity that our
senses communicate and create even more confusion for humans.
From this perspective, and unless treated with caution, language does
not differ much from the deceptive character that Plato attributes to
our senses as a means to approaching Reality.
My choice of the Republic as my field of investigation is far from in-
cidental. There has long been an established consensus among ancient
and modern scholars that Plato’s dialogues are exceptional in their com-
bination of literary vividness and philosophical vigour.7 Nonetheless,

5 Havelock (1963), (1966), (1978), and (1982) has addressed in detail the issue of
formation of philosophical language. See also Vegetti, in Long, A.A. (ed.)
(1999: 271 – 289) and Morgan (2000: 39 – 45).
6 This is not to argue, along with Gorgias, that even if an ‘external’ reality truly
exists, it cannot be communicated (see discussion in Caston, in Caston, V. and
Garham, D. W. [eds.] [2002: 205 – 232]). Nor do I argue for an esoteric inter-
pretation of the Platonic dialogues, such as is proposed by Gaiser and Kraemer,
who placed the true doctrines on ontology and on metaphysics outside the dia-
logues and argued that what is said about the Form of the Good in Republic
Book 6 can become fully meaningful only in the light of Plato’s unwritten doc-
trines. In my view, Plato treats problem of this sort variously in his writings. For
a detailed analysis, see Gaiser (1963) and (1980: 5 – 37); Krämer (1959); Szlezak
(1999). But cf. Sayre (1983). In addition, see Cornford (1950) and Gadamer
(1980: 124 – 156). See also the discussion in the Introduction further below.
7 On the ancient recognition of Plato’s literary art, and especially on Dionysius of
Halicarnassus’ evaluation of Plato’s style, see Walsdorff (1927: 9 – 24). Gordon
 1.2 The language problem 7

the bifurcation of the two – the literary and the philosophical – and
their correlation in the dialogues, has raised significant interpretative
problems for scholars in the field.8 Plato as a highly literary or poetical
author cannot be easily reconciled with the pioneer philosopher. Not so
much because of the uneasiness that this would bring upon the tradi-
tional neat genre divisions,9 but due to Plato’s own thesis repeatedly
presented throughout the corpus that, despite its authoritative status in
Greek society, poetry is utterly incapable of bringing out the Real
when framing the world. Plato’s attitude then towards poetry in the Re-
public cannot be seen separately from the broader problems that language
raises as philosophy’s medium for investigating reality and communicat-
ing its findings.10 Settling the problem becomes even more urgent in the

(1999: 64 – 71) offers an illuminating discussion of the tradition which saw Plato
as a poet and dramatist. See also Percy Bysshe Shelley (A Defence of Poetry) cited
in Brett-Smith, H. F. B. (ed.) (1972: 29): “Plato was essentially a poet – the truth
and splendour of his imagery, and the melody of his language, are the most intense that
it is possibly to conceive. He rejected the measure of the epic, dramatic and lyr-
ical forms, because he sought to kindle a harmony in thoughts divested of shape and
action, and he forbore to invent any regular plan of rhythm which would include under
determinate forms, the varied pauses of his style” (emphasis added). See also Sidney
(1973: 107).
8 In the early 19th century, Friedrich Schleiermacher was the first to note that the
contextual specificities (characters and dramatic setting) of each dialogue were
of cardinal import to the understanding of the arguments. In Schleiermacher’s
most quoted words, “spectators of the analysis [will] fail altogether to attain to a
knowledge of the philosophy of Plato, for in that, if in anything, form and sub-
ject are inseparable, and no proposition is to be rightly understood, except in its
own place, and with the combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned
to it”. See Schleiermacher (1973 trans. William Dobson). See detailed discus-
sion in Tigerstedt (1977); and Press, in Hart, R. and Tejera, V. (eds.) (1997:
13 – 14).
9 Plato’s demarcation of philosophy from rhetoric and poetry has been discussed
by Andrea Nightingale in her influential (1995) study of Plato’s dialogues. In
this study I concur with Nightingale that Plato appropriates several of the char-
acteristic features of poetry and rhetoric in order to construct the identity of his
own philosophical discourse. Nonetheless, in doing so, he also demonstrates the
way in which his own work and approach to the world differs from that of the
poets and the rhetoricians. See also the discussion in Goldhill (2002: 80 – 110)
and Nehamas (1990: 3 – 16). See also a further detailed discussion in the meth-
odological part of this study in Section Two below.
10 Henri Joly (1974: 299 – 300) links Plato’s treatment of language to investigate
the Real, or ethical concepts such as justice, with the discoveries that took
place at the time in the field of mathematics and geometry. See also his obser-
8 1. Introduction

Republic, as in this dialogue Plato puts into this work a number of lin-
guistic and stylistic features that can be immediately recognised by his
contemporaries as lying in the field of ancient Greek poetry, which
he severely criticised in Book 3 and ultimately rejected in Book 10.
Consequently, upon promoting his own philosophic ideas in the Repub-
lic, Plato appears to be engaging in a dialogue not only with the various
thinkers of the pre-Platonic era, but also with another highly influential
strand of ancient Greek thought and culture: the poets and their much-
performed productions.11 But, if language in general, and philosophical
language in particular, becomes itself a field of scrupulous analysis and
experiment so that it may communicate reality to the audience of the
Platonic works, why is Plato being so ‘poetic’ in his Republic? In
other words, why incorporate in his philosophic discourse vehemently
rejected methods such as poetic techniques and diction when these
are recognised as detrimental to the way people think about all the im-
portant matters in life?

1.3 The literary and the philosophical in Plato:

Philosophy against poetry

Several works in Plato studies have thrown light on the philosopher’s

rejection of poetry in the Republic and elsewhere, offering articulate
and perceptive explanations of the vehement attacks that he mounts
against poetry in Books 2, 3 and 10.12 At the same time, several Plato

vations about the impact of geometry on Plato’s philosophical thought in 191 –

207.
11 Note that the same interpretative approach has also been followed for the last
few decades as regards the Presocratic philosophy. See, for example, Most, in
Long, A. A. (ed.) (1999a: 335): “If it is a truism, proven most incontrovertibly
by these four figures [Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, Heraclitus] that
there is no ancient (or even modern) philosopher whose discursive form can
safely be neglected if his thought is entirely to be understood, all the same it
is particularly true in the case of the early Greek thinkers as a group that no ac-
count of their philosophy that considers only the structure of their arguments,
and not also the form in which they chose to communicate those arguments to
their public, can be considered fully satisfactory”.
12 The relevant literature is vast. See Collingwood (1925: 154 – 172); Edmundson
(1995) Ferrari (1990); Moravcsik, J. M. E. and Temko, P. (eds.) (1982); Nad-
daff (2002); Nehamas (1999: 279 – 299); Nussbaum (1986); Halliwell (1988)
 1.3 The literary and the philosophical in Plato: Philosophy against poetry 9

scholars have built their interpretations on the thesis that there is noth-
ing philosophically superfluous or redundant in the literariness of the
Platonic dialogues, and that their dramatic or stylistic versatility cannot
be seen separately from the formulation of the philosophical thought
and the argumentation that the dialogues promote. On the contrary,
this is absolutely essential to the construction of Plato’s philosophical
discourse.13 Thus, several scholars have shown how Plato’s choice of
the dialogue form, with all its dramatic colourings and variegated stylis-
tic modalities, has remarkable philosophical relevance.14 In the same line

and (2002); Levin (2001); Rosen (1988: 271 – 289); Rutherford (1995: 228 –
238) and Vernant (1975: 133 – 160).
13 Scholars’ contribution to this strand of Plato interpretation has significantly in-
creased in the last two decades. (See, however, Webster’s insightful article pub-
lished in [1939: 166 – 79] which brings together issues of philosophy and liter-
ature.) Relevant publications can be classified in two main categories: on the
one hand, there are articles compiled in volumes which aim to demonstrate
the diverse character that Plato interpretation has taken in the last few years:
Charles L. Griswold’s compilation (1988) is a characteristic example of a schol-
arly attempt to present in one single volume Plato readings which confront each
other. Andrew Barker’s and Martin Warner’s volume (eds.) (1992) questions
traditionally fixed boundaries in Platonic studies and find a common ground
between literature and philosophy. See also Press (ed.) (1993) and (2000) as
well as Francisco Gonzalez’s volume (ed.) (1995) which attempts to find an in-
terpretative “third way” to the traditionally doctrinal or sceptic readings of the
dialogues. See also Fendt, G. and Rozema, D. (eds.) (1998); Scott, G. A. (ed.)
(2007). Recent literature that seeks to bring together the literary and the phil-
osophical in Plato also includes detailed readings of dialogues by a single schol-
ar: see Miller (1980); Tejera (1984); Gilead (1994); Sayre (1995); Cook (1996)
and Schmid (1998). In addition, see Annas (1999: 9 – 30); Rosen (1986: 271 –
289); Rowe (1993: 159 – 182); and Rowe (2006: 7 – 24). On the relation of
philosophy and literature, see also Iris Murdoch, in Magee, B. (ed.) (1978: 265).
14 For an illuminating discussion of the different modes of philosophical writing
see Klagge, in Klagge, J. C., and Smith, N. D. (eds.) (1992: 1 – 12). See also
Cherniss, in Taran, L. (ed.) (1977: 14 – 35) and Merlan (1946/7: 406 – 430).
But cf. Robb, in Hart, R., and Tejera, V. (eds.) (1997: 29 – 63). Ludwig Edel-
stein’s ‘Platonic Anonymity’ (1962: 1 – 22) is an indispensable reading on Plato’s
use of the dialogue form and has significantly influenced ensuing discussions. In
addition, see Hyland (1968: 38 – 50); Benson, in Benson, H. H. (ed.) (2006:
85 – 99); McCabe, in Benson, H. H. (ed.) (2006: 39 – 54) and Ford, in Goldhill,
S. (ed.) (2008: 29 – 44). On the relation of form and content in pre-Platonic
philosophical compositions and on the birth of the dialogue form, see Tejera
(1997b: 63 – 80) and Kahn (1996: Ch. 1). Particularly helpful in this direction
is Christopher Gill’s (in Annas, J. and Rowe, C. [eds.] [2002: 162 – 163]) assess-
ment of the ancient Greek testimonia to cast light on the reception of Plato’s
10 1. Introduction

of investigation, scholars have also interpreted the diversity of discursive

modes as the fruit of Plato’s strategy to demarcate his newly-founded
philosophy from other contemporary literary genres such as oratory
and Greek Drama (Nightingale 1995). In constructing his philosophic
logos then, Plato makes full use of traditional linguistic material which
he then reshapes to meet his own philosophic ends (Morgan 2000).
I believe, however, that there is still more to be said about the phil-
osophically pertinent reasons that may have motivated Plato to weave
into the fabric of his philosophical prose several features that have
been traditionally associated with the genre of poetry. The highly ver-
satile and colourful text of the Republic examined in this study is the
ideal environment to raise questions about Plato’s idiosyncratic authorial
relation to poetry and poetic discourse and the dynamics that regulate it,
as almost every other Stephanus page seems to reverberate with poetic
echoes of one sort or another (Halliwell 2000a: 94 – 112).
Plato both rejects and uses poetry’s stylistic features to argue his phil-
osophic ideas almost in the same breath. I will leave aside for the mo-
ment the impressive images of the Sun, the Line and the Cave,
which scholars in the past have associated with poetry.15 In his investi-
gation of justice at Cephalus’ house in Piraeus, Plato’s Socrates employs
several themes and motifs that can be easily recognised as belonging to
the poets’ thematic and discursive stock. He uses the motifs of illumina-
tion, light and darkness, sleep and dreaming to describe the characteristic
features of the cognitive level of Opinion in Book 5. He compares the

use of dialogue by his ancient readers, particularly the Stoics. A crucial point
must be made here concerning the relationship between the so-termed ‘dialog-
ical’ and the ‘literary’ approaches as regards Plato. Although the dialogical
movement remains in its basics a non-doctrinal one, for, as Press tellingly argues
(in Hart, R., and Tejera, V. [eds.] [1997: 4 with n. 5]), “it does not presuppose
that in the dialogues Plato solely or primarily communicates or teaches us doc-
trines”, the same cannot be claimed about the interpretative and philosophical
aims of the proponents of the literary approach. The adoption of a literary per-
spective in the reading of the dialogues does not entail adherence to a non-doc-
trinal stance; in other words, the attitude of a Platonic interpreter can be literary
with a view to discovering doctrines and dogmas within the dialogues. The
most characteristic example of such a stance can be found in the Platonic inter-
pretations of the Straussian interpreters and the Tubingen school. See also Blon-
dell (2002: 19). Note, however, that not all Plato scholars are convinced by the
dialogical character of Plato’s dialogue: see Griswold (ed.) (1988); Kraut, in
Kraut, R. (ed.) (1992: 25) and Long, in Goldhill, S. (ed.) (2008: 45 – 60).
15 For a more detailed discussion see Section Two, Chapter Three below.
 1.3 The literary and the philosophical in Plato: Philosophy against poetry 11

construction of arguments (logos) to treading on a “path”; he likens the

interlocutors’ progress in argumentation to an (intellectual) “ascent” that
leads to a “clear view of justice”. At the same time, as the discussion on
just and unjust souls and states unfolds, numerous lines and poetic quo-
tations are tossed back and forth by Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates,
especially in Books 2, 8, 9. In Books 8 and 9 in particular, Plato’s Soc-
rates employs, either in thick clusters or sporadically in his discourse, po-
etic lines and themes, which consist, for example, of rich animal image-
ry, to present the characteristics of the unjust souls and polities (Adam
1963 [1902] vol. 2). The subhuman, beast-like image of the tyrant, in
particular, has well-rooted origins in poetry. By means of this imagery,
Plato identifies baseness, injustice and civic and psychic imbalance with
a multi-headed beast, thus appropriating the well established Hesiodic
image of Typhon to his own ends (Too 1998: 19 – 22).16
The inconsistency that arises from Plato’s attacks on poets in Books
1, 2, 3 and 10 of the Republic, and his own simultaneous inclusion of
poetic stylistic effects of one sort or another to talk, among other things,
about the Ideas or the just and unjust souls and polities, can be settled, I
argue, if we shift the boundaries of our perspective on Plato’s philo-
sophic aim in this work and consider its place within the writings of
the fourth century B.C.17
Perhaps a few preliminary remarks on the topics that will receive
fuller treatment later on are in order here. In re-addressing Plato’s aim
in the dialogue, I am not arguing against the long-received and well-es-
tablished interpretation of the dialogue as demonstrating the thesis that
justice is better than injustice and that it pays more; I am rather claiming
that to understand how Plato’s argumentation works several other phil-
osophically significant questions must also be considered.
In this study, I will venture a close analysis of the Republic’s language
in order to throw new light on the author’s decision to construct phil-
osophic discourse and argumentation by remoulding and adapting poet-
ic diction and techniques. According to the interpretation proposed

16 Note that Pindar too appropriates this motif in Pythian I. 13 – 30 in order to

refer to Zeus’ complete omnipotence and sovereignty.
17 Socrates’ conversation in the Republic takes place at Piraeus in 422 B.C., that is,
during the Peace of Nicias. The Republic is written around 375 B.C. There is,
then, a lapse of fifty years between the so-called dramatic date of the dialogue
and its actual writing. This is a common technique in Plato which aims to high-
light the fictional character of the dialogues. On this technique as regards the
Republic, see Pappas (1995: 15 – 16) and Ferrari (2000).
12 1. Introduction

here, Plato’s treatment of poetry in the Republic (that is both its rejection
and its deployment in the text) is fully integrated within the broader
philosophical conception of how language should work in order to
communicate the Truth and the Real. The rich stylistic diversity of
the dialogue reflects the innovative steps Plato is taking towards training
his contemporary audience about how philosophic language should be
properly used to fight the confusing and highly ambiguous stimuli
that our deceiving senses generate. This important philosophical issue
is woven into the same fabric as Socrates’ definition of justice, and is
also intertwined with his criticism of poetry as using its dynamics
(music, motifs and diction) inaccurately when presenting the gods, her-
oes or the simple man. In other words, Plato repeatedly draws attention
to the fact that our investigation of important ethical and ontological
matters is not separate either from the language we use to inspect
them or from the method we apply in our investigation.18
In my view, Plato then is far from being inconsistent when he first
rejects the various poetic modalities and then incorporates them in his
text, for by doing so, he first fashions his theory as to the reasons
why it is seriously wrong to put your trust in the various poetic accounts
of the world (Books 2 and 3), and then re-addresses and re-organises the
poetic themes and motifs that are familiar to his audience to drive his
own arguments home (Books 3 to 10). This results in the construction
of a poeticized philosophic prose that serves as the most appropriate di-
alect for conveying highly complicated and elusive ethical, ontological
and epistemological concepts to people who have not been properly
educated in Platonic philosophical thought, such as Socrates’ interlocu-
tors at Cephalus’ house (328b1 – c4).

1.4 The poetics of philosophical language

It should be evident from the above that to bring out the intricacies of
the Republic’s poeticized prose a microcosmic analysis of the work’s lin-
guistic texture is in order. In Section One of this study I clarify my
methodological distinction between ‘macrocosmic’ and ‘microcosmic’

18 On the text ‘performing’ its meaning, see Austin (1962). See also discussion the
in Goldhill and von Reden, in Goldhill, S. and Osborne, R. (eds.) (1999: 257 –
289); and Goldhill, in Sullivan, J. P. and de Jong, I. (1994: 51 – 73).
 1.4 The poetics of philosophical language 13

level analyses of Plato’s literary/dramatic stylistic techniques.19 Although

a clear-cut distinction between the two cannot be easily maintained (for
the two levels are in constant interplay) Plato’s treatment of diction and
image-building would fall under what I call ‘microcosmic’ interpreta-
tion.20 Section One also seeks to define the poeticized character of
the Republic’s philosophic discourse. As a result, in Section One I raise
questions regarding definitions. In what ways is Platonic language poet-
ic? How does poetry transform into poetics in the Republic, and how
does this transformation pay any philosophic dividends to the Republic’s
audience? 21 To understand the philosophical ramifications of this influ-
ence we must place Plato’s work in its cultural and literary context.22
In my view, the Republic’s discourse turns manifestly poetic on two
accounts. Firstly, and for specific reasons that I will come to in this
study, Plato either embeds in his text direct quotations from the com-
positions of leading poetic figures (mostly Homer and the Dramatists)
or he adopts recognisable themes and motifs (for example, the motifs
of katabasis and anabasis, or the “route” [hodos] motif) to construct his
discourse. This authorial strategy takes place on what I call a microcos-
mic level of discourse. But Plato’s philosophic endeavour in the Republic
is poetic from another point of view as well, and this time is a macro-
cosmic one. In Republic 376d, Plato has Socrates call their entire enter-
prise of constructing a theoretical city, and tracing justice in it and in the
soul, a “myth” (mythos). Yet, myths were traditionally recognized as
being closely linked with, or falling under, poetry. Several studies on
Platonic myth-making have shown how Plato in his dialogues also ap-

19 Literary and dramatic interpretations of the dialogues interpenetrate but are not
identified. The literary mode of interpretation takes full consideration of “ob-
jective literary characteristics of the dialogues” such as word-choice, syntax and
grammar, style, imagery and metaphors, humour and irony, as well as quota-
tions and references. The ‘dramatic approach’, on the other hand, focuses pri-
marily on character building, dramatic settings or narratological frameworks. So
Press, in Hart, R., and Tejera, V. (eds.) (1997: 4). Nonetheless, as I shall show
in Section Two below, the two approaches become intertwined as the dia-
logue’s drama often requires specific literary features.
20 His appropriation and treatment of myth, for example, would follow under the
‘macrocosmic’ level. On the distinction, see my detailed discussion in Section
One below.
21 In this study, I use the term poetics in a non-Aristotelian sense. I discuss in detail
this term in the methodological part of this study, in Section One below. See
also above n. 11.
22 See detailed discussion in Section One below.
14 1. Introduction

propriates this well-established mode of poetic discourse towards his

own philosophic ends.23
But, as is always the case with Plato, his incorporation of poetic fea-
tures in his dialogues is neither straightforward nor can it be easily ex-
plained away. The Republic’s language is a hotchpotch of different styles;
an arena of some kind where diverse diction and images/motifs from
various literary strands meet and clash to construct philosophical argu-
mentation.24 Thus, we should draw a distinction between Socrates’
usage of familiar (or traditional) poetic language and imagery on the
one hand, and his simultaneous introduction of novel modes of linguis-
tic arrangement, which aim to shape the philosophic language of the
Socratic interlocutors, on the other.
Plato draws on various discursive and stylistic modes and invents
new ones to construct his arguments. Thus a tension between different
linguistic styles pervades the Republic throughout. There is a clash be-
tween ‘more concrete’ and ‘less concrete’ (even ‘abstract’) language.
That is to say between highly colourful images of complex poetic met-
aphors, and another type of language which strives to eschew imagery
that echoes its poetic origins.25 There are also contexts (as, for example,
in Books 8 and 9) where Plato’s entire argumentation seems to be con-
structed out of thickets of poetic quotations. Lastly, there are other con-
texts in the dialogue where poetic language is absent altogether and
complex mathematics emerge to explain how the ideal city is doomed

23 See Phaedo, 61b – e. See Morgan (2000); Brisson, trans. Naddaf (1998) and Bris-
son (2004).
24 See Thesleff (1967). Thesleff lists ten classes of style in the Platonic works: col-
loquial, semi-literary, conversational, rhetorical, pathetic, intellectual, mythic
narrative, historical, ceremonious, legal and Onkos; cf. review of Thesleff by
Hathaway (1969/1970: 202 – 6) who finds that Platonic style could be divided
into two broader classes, intellectual and Onkos, both “resting on the surface of
everyday conversational style” (204). Thesleff’s rigid distinction of styles will
not be followed in the present study; on the contrary, I agree with Hathaway’s
remark that Plato’s own criteria for good prose involved no strict separation of
style modes (204). On the Onkos class (denoting the variegated, interlaced
“word-music” found in the dialogues) see also Denniston (1952: 54). On Pla-
to’s prose, Denniston observes: “Plato writes not in one style, but in several, but
with such subtle play on the changes that the break is nowhere apparent” (17, em-
phasis added).
25 A characteristic example of this is Socrates’ exposition of Knowledge and
Opinion at the end of Book 5. See my discussion in Section Two, Chapter
Two below.
 1.5 The Republic’s main motifs: Mixture, diversity and purity 15

to failure due to people’s inability to calculate, or how much less happy

(eudaimn) is the unjust man when compared to the just.

1.5 The Republic’s main motifs: Mixture, diversity and purity

In my view, this tension between Plato’s various linguistic styles in the
Republic is not by chance. As I intend to show in this study, the pivot
around which Plato’s linguistic concerns hinge is itself a prominent
pair of opposites of documented Presocratic and poetic origins. In this
study I argue that throughout this work Plato’s treatment of philosoph-
ical language is organised around the polar opposition of “mixture” (hẽ
mixis – hẽ krasis) and “purity” (to katharon).26 At the same time, the an-
tithetical pair of mixture and purity is also interconnected with another
related binary opposition: “variety” (poikilia) in contrast to what is “sim-
ple” (to haploun), unified and “unmixed” (to akraton).27
These concepts play a prominent role in Presocratic thought and in
poetry, yet the pre-Platonic literature that has come down to us does
not treat the notion of diversity (poikilia) or mixture (mixis) in the
same way. As a leading characteristic of poetic craftsmanship, the
poet’s skill in mixing his thematic and linguistic stock is integral to com-
posing beautiful poetry.28 In the Presocratics on the other hand, the no-

26 This antithetical pair also regulates Socrates’ proposals about the organisation of
the ideal city: see, for example, Rep. 460c6 – 7: jahaq¹m t¹ c]mor t_m vuk\jym
(“the class of the guardians should be pure.”)
27 The semantics of simplicity are rendered in the Republic in the combination of
the two pronouns auto kath’ auto (this in itself). This phrase also constitutes Pla-
to’s watchword in this dialogue for the Forms.
28 The idea is most prominent in Pindar; see, for example, Fr. 194. 1 – 3: jejqºtg-
tai wqus´a jqgp·r Reqa?sim !oida?r7 / eWa teiw¸fylem Edg poij¸kom / jºslom
aqd²emta kºcym ; cf. Nem. 5. 42. Note that the word poikilia has strong pictorial
connotations. It is used to denote colour diversity in weaving (and painting) and
diversity at large (see LSJ sv I, II and II). The shifting evaluation given to poikilia
in the arts can be vividly exemplified by the positive references to it in Pindar
and the negative uses of the term in criticisms of the so-called ‘new music’ of
the later fifth century. Criticisms of the New Music’s complexity and diversity
are recurrent in the texts, especially in comedy, but often without using the
word poikilia or its cognates themselves. See, especially, Pherecrates fr. 155
(= ps-Plutarch De musica 1141D-1142 A), Aristophanes Thesm. 50 – 69, Birds
1373 – 90; see also Plato Rep. 399d. Relevant uses of poikil- itself turn up several
times in Plato (Rep. 399e, 404e, Laws 812e, and for similarly critical but non-
musical uses, see Rep. 557c, 561e, Laws 704e: ẽthẽ kai poikila kai phaula). Neg-
16 1. Introduction

tion of mixture becomes the main motif in their discussions of the pol-
ymorphy of our surrounding environment both in terms of cosmology
and physiology.29 This easily prompts the emergence of the counterpart
motif of “decipherment” (hẽ krisis): the exercise, that is, of correct krisis
on the part of humans to comprehend the world which entails grasping
its mixture and diversity and being able to dissolve it into its constitu-
ents.30 Plato adapts the motifs of poikilia, mixis and krisis to his own

ative uses of diverse (poikilos) appear with reference to the New Music also in a
passage paraphrased (or quoted) from Aristoxenus at ps-Plutarch De musica
1142C. Plato despised this musical progress and its innovative complex varia-
tions. For an extensive discussion see Barker (1984: 93 – 98) and West (1992:
356 – 372). On poikilia in Pindar, in particular, see Steiner (1986).
29 Poikilia is also used for painting and the painters’ mixing of colours to denote
diversity in colours; see Emp. Fr. 23 (in Simpl. Phys. 159, 27): ¢r d’ bp|tam
cqav]er !mah^lata poij_kkysim / %meqer !lv· t]wmgr rp¹ l^tior ew deda_te,/
oVt’ 1pe· owm l\qxysi pok}wqoa v\qlaja weqs_m, / "qlom_, le_namte t± l³m
pk]y, %kka d’ 1k\ssy,/ 1j t_m eUdea p÷sim !k_cjia poqs}mousi /[…] ovty
lµ s’ !p\tg vq]ma jaim}ty %kkohem eWmai/ hmgt_m, fssa ce d/ka cec\jasim
%speta, pgc^m,/ !kk± toq_r taOt’ Ushi, heoO p\qa lOhom !jo}sar. (“As
when painters are decorating offerings , men through cunning well skilled in
their craft – when they actually seize pigments of many colours in their
hands, mixing in harmony more of some and less of others, they produce
from them forms resembling all things […]: so let not deception overcome
your mind and make you think there is any other source of all the countless
mortal things that are plain to see, but know this clearly, for the tale you
hear comes from a god” (trans. Kirk, Raven and Schofield). On Empedocles’
reference to painting in these lines, see Ierodiakonou, in Cleland, L., Stears,
K. and Davies, G. (eds.) (2004: 91 – 95) and (2005: 1 – 37). See also Ierodiako-
nou (2009: 119 – 130) and Skarsouli (2009: 165 – 177 and esp. 168 – 71). Skar-
souli focuses on Empedocles’ use of pharmakon (colour) and apatẽ (deceit) in
these lines and investigates the association of colours and deceitful words in Em-
pedocles, Gorgias (Helen) and Plato (the Cratylus). On Empedocles’ use of poi-
killsin, see Bollack (1969: 121): “Une seule fois chez Homère (S 590), où il
signifie varier par les forms, modeler. Ici, appliqué au travail des peintres, il a
le sens de varier les couleurs, colorier. Mais la diversité est la notion principale,
non la couleur. Aussi le mot pourrait-il reprendre !kkoiyp\ de la fin 63 (B21,
Simpl. Phys. 159, 13) et announcer l’idée principale de 64 (B23) (vers 5 – 9)”.
On poikilia as “varietas colorum, diversité de coulerus” and poikilos as “versicol-
or, coloré de couleurs vives” (synonym to polychrous), see Mugler (1964: 309 –
310), with examples. Poikilia carries its meaning as “diversity in colours” in
Pseudo-Aristotle’s De Coloribus: see Ferrini (1999). Note that in Aristotle the
word haplous is an established opposite of poikilos. See also Bonitz sv. poikilia/
poikilos.
30 The motif of mixture (mixis and krasis) permeates the Presocratic explanations
of the world and of human nature: see Parm. fr. 16: ¢r c±q 2j\stot’ 5wei jq÷sir
 1.5 The Republic’s main motifs: Mixture, diversity and purity 17

ends in the Republic and contrasts them to purity which, in the Republic,
becomes his watchword for ethical and metaphysical orderliness and ho-
mogeneity.31
However, in Plato’s usage, these binary oppositions become flexible
enough to take on a variety of manifestations. Thus, whereas the motif
of mixture (meignumi), which in poetry is also used to refer to sexual re-
lations, in Plato is often assigned negative connotations,32 the same
image of sexual mingling is employed elsewhere to describe the true
philosopher’s rapport with the ultimate Platonic Idea, the Form of
the Good, which Socrates presents to his interlocutors in Book 6.
Plato also makes full use of this motif and links it with diversity (poikilia)
in Books 8 and 9, where the “diverse” and “polymorphic” status (poiki-
lon ẽthos) of the unjust souls receives a very vivid and highly poeticised
description. In these two Books, the “variegated character” (poikilon
ẽthos) of the most unjust soul – that of the tyrant – is intended to contrast
to the “simple and unmixed character” (akratos and haplous) of the just
and “well-attuned” (sphrn) person, as described in Books 4 and 5.

lek]ym pokupk\cjtym, t½r m|or !mhq~poisi paq]stgjem (“as is at any moment

the mixture of the wandering limbs, so mind is present to men”), Emp. fr. 17.
.
16 – 26: d_pk’ 1q]y 4m gqn^hg l|mom eWmai/ 1j pke|mym, t|te d’aw di]vu pk]om’ 1n
2m¹r eWmai (“A twofold tale I shall say: at one time they [the roots] grew to be
one alone out of many, at another again they grew apart”); fr. 22. 3 – 8: ¢r
d’autyr fsa jq/sim 1paqj]a l÷kkom 5asim (“but in the same way all that are fit-
ted rather for mixture”); see also fr. 61. The motif is particularly prominent in
Anaxagoras: see fr. 1, fr. 4, fr. 17, fr. 12 where the Mind is “mixed with noth-
ing (l]leijtai oqdem_) but is all alone by itself (aqt¹r 1v’ 2autoO)” (trans. Kirk,
Raven and Schofield). See Arist. Phys. A4, 187a23. See Kirk, Raven and Scho-
field 1983 (2nd ed.). On Anaxargoras, see the excellent discussion in Schofield
(1980).
31 The words katharos (pure) and katharmos (purification) have strong religious
connotations, and their origins are traced back to the Orphics and their rituals,
and to the Pythagoreans with which in the Phaedo and in other dialogues Plato
seems to be well familiar. See Guthrie (1975 IV: 338 – 340); and (1965 II: 244 –
245); Burkert (1972: 211 – 213) with further bibliography; Burkert ([1977]
1985: 296 – 300); Vöhler, M. and Seidensticker, B. (eds.) (2007); Thom
(1995). On the religious aspects of rites of purification, see Hoessly (2001).
The notion of contamination stands in stark contrast to purity and purification.
On purification and the philosopher’s vision of the colourless Being, see also
Rohde ([1925] 2000: 467 – 472). See also Parker (1983). Plato adopts this reli-
gious terminology and adapts it to argue new ideas in the Republic.
32 See, for example, Socrates’ proposals in relation to the city guardians’ sexual re-
lations in Book 5. I discuss in detail Plato’s treatment of this motif and its phil-
osophical significance in Section One, Chapter One below.
18 1. Introduction

Thus this binary opposition is used throughout the Republic to refer

to human nature as well since for Socrates human nature seems to be the
very embodiment of mixture and contamination. As Reeve (1988:
220 – 230) has rightly argued, Plato’s severe criticism against the poetry
and music of his time stems from his belief that this type of cultural ed-
ucation is responsible for people’s corruption ethically. Poetry achieves
this primarily by portraying gods, heroes and humans as embodying di-
verse and conflicting ethical characteristics. In the Republic’s terms, the
purification of human nature can be achieved only by means of philo-
sophic education. Socrates undertakes to reform his contemporaries’ ed-
ucation in music and poetry in Books 2 and 3. At the same time in Book
7 he offers a list of five subjects (number theory, geometry, stereometry,
harmonics and dialectic) for the philosopher-kings of his ideal city
which are intended to free them gradually from the confusing reliance
on the senses so that they can then grasp the Platonic Forms. Thus, Pla-
to’s appropriation of the contrasting concepts of mixture and purity in
the Republic is versatile enough to articulate ideas about the complex na-
ture of humans, the deceptive and confusing character of poetry, the di-
versity of musical forms (rhythms and harmoniai) and about the various
levels of human cognition as described in the images of the Line and the
Cave.

1.6 Philosophy, poetry, painting and the poikilia-motif

Plato’s severe censorship of poetry is then ethical in character. This has
been treated extensively in the literature, yet what has passed unob-
served is the manner in which this approach to ethics regulates Plato’s
treatment of philosophical discourse in the Republic. Plato’s stance to-
wards excessive variety (whether in emotions or in music) is well-
known. He is a strong advocate against it. However, nowhere in the Re-
public does Plato propose any straightforward guidelines as to the way
language should be organised to regulate how humans handle the poly-
morphic world (poikilia) and the various ideas about it, or indeed about
their place in it.33

33 On language in Plato’s dialogues in general, see Burnyeat (1976: 29 – 51). The

limitations and instability of human language is also examined in Morgan
(2000: 181 – 184). Morgan draws on Timaeus (29b3-c1) and Cratylus
(408c2 – 3) and finds that “words are embedded in the sensible realm and
 1.6 Philosophy, poetry, painting and the poikilia-motif 19

It would appear that the closest Socrates gets to formulating a thesis

concerning the use of language is in his censorship of certain poetic frag-
ments in Books 2 and 3. Yet, these are criticisms of the poetic content
(logos, 392c6) rather than of language structuring per se (that is, the selec-
tion of diction and motifs) to put across the content. At the same time,
in his famous passage on mimẽsis in Book 3, Plato also levels attacks
against the poets’ lexis (392c6 – 8) on the basis that imitative poetry is
bad for humans who in general enjoy submerging themselves in various
characters and who like to experience conflicting emotions.34
Plato then does not theorise in his Republic on how language may be
structured so as not to be detrimental to our ẽthos or to our perception of
reality. On the contrary, it is at this point that one could trace an incon-
sistency on Plato’s part in the Republic as regards his use of various lin-
guistic styles and imageries. When we turn to the language he employs
in the Republic to put across his own ideas, Plato becomes quite versatile
and colourful in his motifs himself. In other words, he appropriates the
diction and motifs of poetic discourse. Yet, what is not literally overt, as
is so often the case in Plato’s writings, is stylistically implicit.35 In my

they cannot shake that taint” (183 – 184). Morgan’s reading supports my inter-
pretation in this study which views language as a two-edged sword. On this
characteristic of language, see Ferrari (1987) on the Phaedrus. Socrates himself
in the Cratylus asserts the double nature of language and proposes that speech,
which signifies “everything” (to pan) can be compared to the goatish divinity
Pan (408c2 – 3). According to the Platonic image, the true part is the upper
part (which is smooth and sacred), whereas the lower part (corresponding to
the lower limbs of the god) is the false part. Myths and falsehoods are found
to belong to this lower part. In 432b – d Socrates suggests that words are images
that can represent the realities only through resemblance and fall always short of
their prototype. Cf. also Sayre, in Griswold. C. L. (ed.) (1988: 93 – 109), who
suggests that a careful reading of the Seventh Letter exemplifies how all language
is too much entangled with sensible imagery to express true philosophical nu-
ances. Sayre argues that this assertion is further confirmed in the Republic, the
Phaedrus, the Sophist and Theaetetus. But cf. Gill (1992: 159 – 160) and Stewart
(1989: 274 – 275). On Platonic language see also Jowett II (1894: 316 – 317)
and Sedley, in Benson, H. H. (ed.) (2006: 214 – 227). Also, see my discussion
in the Introduction further below.
34 See Partee (1981: 20), who also argues that Plato’s attack on poetry is primarily
on an ethical basis. For an extensive discussion see Nussbaum (1986: 1 – 21 and
122 – 135); Halliwell (1993: 1 – 17); Annas, in Moravcsik, J. and Temko, P.
(eds.) (1982: 1 – 27); Moravcsik (1986: 35 – 47) and Cook (1996: Ch. 4).
35 Cook (1996: 158 – 162) remarks that Plato “never discusses the dialogue form as
writing”, [but] “he does, however, in various contexts, discuss language, and he
20 1. Introduction

view, the Republic’s diverse discursive styles – the Socratic elenchus, ar-
gumentative passages, myths, images and thick clusters of poetic quota-
tions – are woven artistically together into a unified, though sometimes
incongruent, whole.
This attitude towards thematic and stylistic incongruence does not
equate Plato with the poet whom he repeatedly condemns in the Repub-
lic. As I will show in this study, there is a pattern in this alternation of
styles which accounts for the sometimes conflictual relations between
the different discursive modes and styles. By adapting traditional material
and inventing new techniques, Plato undertakes to examine complex
ideas and simultaneously educate his audience on how to reorganise po-
etic language so as to avoid its misrepresentation of reality. Thus, the Re-
public’s discourse disrupts well-established patterns of thinking and
speaking about the gods, the world, human nature and knowledge,
while, at the same time, it serves to bring home Plato’s innovative phil-
osophical thinking.
No discussion of Plato’s language in the Republic should be ap-
proached without relation to Socrates’ intra-dramatic audience and in-
terlocutors. As a narrator, Socrates offers us ample information about the
cultural and dianoetic profiles of the people gathered in Cephalus’s
house at Piraeus.36 With one exception – in Book 1 Cephalus abandons
the dialogue early – all are intrigued by the fruits that Socrates’ investi-
gation of justice and injustice might bear and they happily spend the en-
tire night enraptured by the intricacies of the conversation. These are
people of various backgrounds including metics, democrats, Athenian
aristocrats and foreigners, who, more or less, seem to share cultural
bonds. They are at Piraeus to attend a religious festival of a newly intro-
duced deity; they have been raised and educated by the poets, whose
compositions they seem to know by heart;37 they are acquainted with

also varies his use of it, especially when he moves away from elenctic presentation
into myths” (158, emphasis added). Cook focuses on the Cratylus, but his sug-
gestions about Plato’s discussion of language through variations in style, accord
with my reading of the Republic’s ‘dramatization of language’ which I discuss in
Section One below.
36 On the importance of contexts in Plato’s dialogues, see esp. Henderson (2000:
287 – 324). In relation to the Republic, see Annas (1981: Ch. 2); Ferrari (2000);
and (2003); Dorter (2006: 14 – 22 and Ch. 1).
37 On Nicẽratus’ education in the Homeric epics, see Xenophon’s Sym. 4.3.3.
Nicẽratus takes pride in having memorised the whole epics. On the interlocu-
 1.6 Philosophy, poetry, painting and the poikilia-motif 21

current sophistic ideas (– Thrasymachus’ presence in the company seems

to work in this direction);38 they frequent the wrestling schools (palae-
stra), and they also seem to be familiar with male homoerotic love. In
other words, there is nothing particularly extraordinary in the people
that Plato has brought together as Socrates’ audience and interlocutors
in the Republic. Although the dialogue takes place in Piraeus and not
in Athens, we are still transferred to the heart of fifth century Athenian
culture or, as commentators of the Republic often remind us, to the
depths of Plato’s Cave.39
With this said, there seems to be nothing unsettling in Socrates’
philosophic language that builds so much on the diction or the motifs
of poetry. But things are not as simple as that. For in employing various
discursive modes and styles Plato undertakes to do much more than just
reach out to the non-philosophically sophisticated by means of familiar
poetic themes and motifs. The change of styles and diction in the Repub-
lic is intended to draw the audience’s attention to the fundamental prob-
lems that arise from formulating incorrect and ethically wrong antithet-
ical thought-patterns which originate from the erroneous and confusing
constant mixture of different pairs of opposites. Thus, the Republic re-en-
acts or dramatizes the interlocutors’ training in matters of Platonic philos-
ophy and epistemology by mounting a constant attack on the way that
poetry has been built upon antithesis and multiplicity to educate and en-
tertain its receivers.40
From Plato’s philosophic perspective, poetry has failed. Not only
because it is imitative and far removed from the truth, but also because
it reproduces all important things in the wrong way: the good is mixed
with the bad; the just with the unjust; the beautiful with the ugly; the
courageous with the cowardly; the true with the false. The list is as end-
less as the various combinations (poikilia) of pairs of opposites in our pol-
ymorphic world. Poetry then reproduces a distorted version of the real
by bringing together opposite ethical concepts in what only appears to be

tors’ citation of poetic lines in Book 1, see the discussion in Halliwell (2000a:
94 – 112).
38 So Annas (1981: Ch. 2); Blondell (2002: 165 – 190) and Reeve (1988: 35 – 42).
39 Sinaiko (1965: 177); Clay (2000: 231 – 240).
40 In this study, I call Plato’s alternation of style and discursive modes ‘dramatiza-
tion of language’. For a detailed discussion on how the text dramatizes or re-
flects its meaning to problematize issues of language see Section One Below.
See also above n. 18.
22 1. Introduction

a unified whole. In other words, in Platonic terms, poetry produces an

unfaithful verisimilitude of the Real.
Plato’s response is to adopt poetry’s own characteristic features and
techniques and re-apply the “colours” (words and motifs, 601a4 – b4) in
line with the way that he sees the world and reality. Plato preserves the
poets’ thematic poikilia that his audience is used to taking so much pleas-
ure in, but he reserves this only for depicting the bad, the ignorant and
the unjust. Even if Books 8 and 9 of the Republic are full of poetic quo-
tations and motifs, they are, nonetheless, appropriately adopted because
they depict as faithfully as possible Plato’s notion of injustice, which in
Book 4 has been equated with strife and division. On the same interpre-
tative lines, the most unjust soul, that of the tyrant, is also the most di-
verse (poikilẽ) as he is in Plato’s poetics a many-headed beast that nothing
can nurture or restrain. Against this framework, Plato also finds the
means to develop his ideas about justice, the Forms and the Form of
the Good by creating his own philosophical imagery in the dialogue.
Sometimes poetic language is amalgamated with new ways of using
common words in order to do so. And, sometimes, Plato can even be
said to become a “lover of poetry” (philopoiẽtẽs) in the full sense in
the way he invents new diction, motifs and discursive modes to present
his theses.41
This approach to philosophical language is further clarified if we fol-
low the parallels that Plato draws between Socrates’ philosophic task in
the Republic and the painters, who, although criticised in Book 10 for
deception, are treated far more favourably earlier in the text.42 Plato’s
treatment of painting in his explanations of the philosopher’s task pro-
vides a strategy well adapted to the task of tackling matters of method-
ology in his Republic. I am here primarily referring to the methodolog-
ical parallels that can be drawn between the confusing visual effects of
the technique of skiagraphia (literally shadow painting or shading), to
which Plato refers for the first time in his corpus in the Republic, and
to the way language – and, more specifically imagistic philosophical lan-

41 Plato’s diction in the image of the Sun is a characteristic example of this: hẽlio-
eidestaton (508b3), agathoeidẽ, helioeidẽ (509a1 and a3). On philopoiẽtẽs see Rep.
Book 10. See my detailed discussion in Section Two, Chapter Three below.
42 See, for example, Rep. 484c – d, 500e and 501a – c. The parallel is also observed
by Stephen Halliwell, in Rutter, N. K. and Sparkes, B. A. (eds.) (2000b: 99 –
116) who, however, examines different issues from the ones I raise here in re-
lation to philosophical language.
 1.6 Philosophy, poetry, painting and the poikilia-motif 23

guage – should be organised so that it expresses clearly and faithfully

what matters most to people.
In my view, Plato in his Republic associates the visual illusions of the
technique of skiagraphia with the deceptive character of poetry. As a ver-
bal painter himself, he then draws a number of stylistic distinctions in his
Republic. On the one hand, there is the language carelessly employed
(mixed) by poets and sophists in order to portray the world, the gods
and the humans, and on the other the type of language that Plato’s Soc-
rates constructs (or mixes together) to communicate with this audience,
whose members have been raised listening to the poets and quoting
their lines, or through spending time in the company of sophists.43 In
employing this authorial technique, Plato attacks the illusionary effects
of poetic skiagraphia, which in pictorial terms is the par excellence result
of mixture.
Yet, Plato’s treatment of the mixture motif in the Republic is idio-
syncratic. He can reject the poets’ incorrect and incongruent thematic
and linguistic diversity (poikilia), but he cannot easily trade it for purity
in his own speech, for this is not fully attainable in our earthly world of
Becoming. Instead, poetic diversity is traded for an alternative philo-
sophically correct type of mixture (mixis), which seeks to educate us
in the complex nature of the world of Becoming to which humans be-
long.
Thus in Book 5 of the Republic, the motif of mixture is used inno-
vatively to speak about human nature and how this can be moulded in
accordance with the characteristics of the transcendent Forms. This al-
ternative Platonic mixis is also the most appropriate way to speak to the
Republic’s sight-lovers about their own reduced level of cognition, since

43 Plato puts to practice this method most expressly in Rep. 488a – b. In these lines
Socrates constructs the image (eikn) of state as an ill-governed ship to explain to
Adeimantus why philosophers in their society appear “useless”. In constructing
this image, Socrates makes the most of the language of pictorial representation,
thus drawing comparisons between painters, poets’ fashioning of images and his
own image creation. See, for example, Rep. 488a1 – 2: %joue d’owm t/r eQj|mor,
Vm’ 5ti l÷kkom Ud,r ¢r ck_swqyr eQj\fy (“In any case, listen to my image, and
you’ll appreciate all the more how strained my images are”) and 488a4 – 7:
!kk± de? 1j pokk_m aqt¹ sumacace?m eQj\fomta ja· !pokoco}lemom rp³q
aqt_m, oXom oR cqav/r tqacek\vour ja· t± toiaOta le_cmumter cq\vousim. (“I
must construct it from many sources, just as painters paint goat-stags by com-
bining the features of different things”). In this study I use Burnet OCT edition
of Plato’s Republic ([1902] 1978). I have also consulted Slings’ (2003) OCT ed-
ition. The translation used is Grube and Reeve’s (1992) unless otherwise stated.
24 1. Introduction

in the dialogue’s three well-known images of the Sun, the Line and the
Cave, Plato rests his discussion about the clarity of true Knowledge and
its distinction from the level of Opinion (Doxa) on the well established
polar opposition of light and darkness. In effect, the generation of shad-
ows, which is the direct result of the mixture of light and darkness, is
fully exploited in all three Platonic images to describe the distinctive
characteristics of Doxa. The Socratic interlocutors have been raised to
take “shadows” (that is doxastic thought patterns) for “true knowledge”.
By both mixing and analysing the mixture of light and darkness in
his epistemological images, Plato deciphers between different levels of
knowledge in terms of different grades of mixture of light and darkness.
In doing so, Plato demonstrates in the Republic how the way towards the
Knowledge of the Forms presupposes one’s finding his way through and
out of antithesis and conflict before one achieves a clear view of the
light of the Sun. As I have shown elsewhere (Petraki 2009: 27 – 67), Pla-
to’s treatment of the polar opposites of light and darkness, and of the
reflections of prototypes in mirrors and puddles in the images of the
Line and the Cave, becomes a well adapted technique in the dialogue
to talk about the different levels of distortion of the various ethical val-
ues. The good is mixed with the bad and the just with the unjust in an
assortment of ways in our earthly world of human actions. In his phil-
osophical imagery of the Sun, the Line and the Cave, Socrates offers to
the sight-lovers a clear view of this mixture and simultaneously paves
the way out of it by speaking about the ultimate Form as the Good
par excellence which can only be linked with the light of the Sun as such.
Yet, in my view in this study, Plato’s imagistic techniques in the
middle books of the Republic cannot be fully grasped unless they are
seen in relation to his portrayal of the character (ẽthẽ) of the bad and
the unjust in Books 8 and 9. Plato’s language there makes the most of
the language of dramatic and iambic poetry to present the diverse, mul-
tifarious and conflictual ẽthẽ of the base. The rejected language of poetry
is being appropriated here in line with Socrates’ thesis that poikilia is
physical disease and psychic baseness (404e).
Yet, against this background of linguistic and thematic diversity,
stands also a third type of language, one used exclusively by Socrates
in the text, which seems to be completely devoid of poetic themes
and motifs of any origin or of imagery in general. This linguistic style
is brought up only very infrequently in the dialogue, probably because
 1.6 Philosophy, poetry, painting and the poikilia-motif 25

Socrates’ interlocutors completely fail to understand it.44 This seems to

be an alternative type of philosophic discourse (one is even tempted to
associate it with the purity of the Forms and call it also ‘pure’) whose
dynamics are not fully exploited in the text. Socrates’ interlocutors are
offered only fleeting glimpses of this type of language. From my inter-
pretative point of view, I take this to be a different philosophical dialect
that is not promoted in the Republic for the specific reason that it would
require different co-speakers who, unlike Socrates’ interlocutors in the
Republic, have been trained in strict philosophical thinking. (One cannot
help thinking here, for example, of the Sophist or the Parmenides).
This idiosyncratic type of language differs then not only from the
poets’ colourful discourse, but even from the approved linguistic styles
and discursive modes that Socrates employs throughout the Republic to
communicate with his co-speakers. Is this an alternative, ideal philo-
sophical dialect which Plato refrains from fully exploiting in this dia-
logue because of the interlocutors’ inability to follow it? 45 This question
leads us directly to Plato’s comments in the Seventh Epistle about wheth-
er philosophical language can support us all the way in our intellectual
venture to grasp the Platonic Forms.46 In his Republic Plato raises this
vexed linguistic and philosophical problem by offering us glimpses of
this type of colourless or abstract language but does not solve it. On
the contrary, it is almost evident that this imageless type of language,
which consists of pronouns and various cognates of the verb to be
(auto to, toiouto, einai, to on, hekaston or hẽ ousia), cannot support the in-
terlocutors’ communication and becomes fully meaningful only when
seen in juxtaposition to the Platonic imagery and imagistic language.
In this way Plato, having treated in various insightful ways the imagistic
effects of both poetic and philosophical language, raises new questions,

44 See, for example, Rep. 585c1 – 5. Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 354) finds these
sentences “among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or indeed
in the whole of Plato’s writings” (emphasis added). Further complications arise
from the fact that the reading of the MSS is corrupt. I will discuss the possible
reasons that may have dictated Plato’s adoption of this difficult style in Section
Two unless otherwise stated.
45 I treat this complicated issue in Section One and in Chapter Four of Section
Two of this study.
46 Plato treats this problem in relation to the use of writing to do philosophy in his
Phaedrus (274c3 – 276e5). See Ferrari (1987) and Derrida (1981: 61 – 172). On
dialectic in the Seventh Epistle, see Gonzalez (1998: 245 – 274) with further bib-
liography.
26 1. Introduction

not about the dynamics of the poets’ discourse to depict the truth, but
about the ability of language in general to investigate and express truth
and reality as faithfully and objectively as possible. I have already sug-
gested that one may turn to the Platonic Parmenides and investigate
here the way the three philosophers, Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates
treat the dynamics of philosophical language to present the Forms.
The treatment of this issue extends beyond the scope of this book
yet, even in the Parmenides, or in the Sophist for that matter, Plato ‘dram-
atizes’ the problems inherent in language at large, namely the medium’s
inability to avoid the implication of sense-perception which, in linguis-
tic terms, is coupled with different types of imagery. (See also Gadamer
[1980: 99 – 122]; Smith [2007: 3 – 14] and Gordon [2007: 212 – 237].)

1.7 The Republic’s interlocutors

And this brings us back to the Republic’s interlocutors. Recent studies
have shown how the various personae of the Platonic dialogues do not
only enhance the drama of the works, but are absolutely essential to
the way Plato constructs his philosophy.47 Indeed, the interlocutors’ in-
tervention at specific points of the Republic often paves new ways for its
development. Thus, Socrates trades one discursive mode and linguistic
style for another as a response to his interlocutors’ inability to follow
the development of his thought.
Far from viewing the personae of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the
Republic as permissive “Yes-Men” (Arieti [1991: 232 – 234]) who offer
little to the construction or the progress of Socrates’ argumentation,
my analysis will seek to show, firstly, how their intervention is signifi-
cant for the development of Socratic thought in the dialogue, and sec-
ondly, how the differences between the two brothers are philosophically
essential to Socrates’ choice of specific discursive modes and linguistic
styles in doing philosophy. According to this interpretative line, my ap-

47 See Arieti (1991); and Arieti, in Gonzalez, F. (ed.) (1995: 119 – 132); Gill
(1985: 1 – 26); Stokes (1986); Coventry, in Pelling, C. (ed.) (1990: 174 –
196); Beversluis (2000: 1 – 37); Hart, R. and Tejera, V. (eds.) (1997); Rowe
(2006: 7 – 12 with n. 8). As regards the Republic specifically, see Bloom
(1968: 337 – 344, esp. 342 – 343); Blondell, in Press, G. A. (ed.) (2000: 127 –
146); and Blondell (2002: 1 – 80); see also Shields, in Santas, G. (ed.) (2006:
63 – 83); and Weiss, in Ferrari G. (ed.) (2007: 90 – 115). See also my detailed
discussion in Section Two Chapter Two below.
 1.7 The Republic’s interlocutors 27

proach to the Republic’s main Socratic interlocutors will deviate from the
treatment they have received in most studies of the dialogue. Although I
agree with those interpreters that argue that Glaucon and Adeimantus
share common cultural and dianoetic characteristics that make them
the most appropriate Socratic interlocutors, I do not concur with inter-
pretations that seek to equate their philosophical import in the dialogue
or treat them interchangeably.48 A close reading of the text will show
that Plato uses these two characters – as well as the participants in
Book’s 1 dialogue – to differentiate between the members of Socrates’
audience in the Republic and demonstrate how different interlocutors re-
quire different styles and discursive modes to address them in a philo-
sophical dialogue (cf. Ferrari [2003: 16] and Strauss [1964: 90 – 95]).
Thus through different speakers Plato investigates different routes of
enquiry, some erroneous, others very promising. This also has important
bearings on the way that the external audience is engaged with the ideas
that Plato’s Socrates propounds in the work, as it opens out to include
all different kinds of responses to his philosophy.49 What is most signifi-

48 For a similar line of enquiry, see also Blondell (2002: 199 – 228), and in Press
(ed.) (2000: 127 – 146) who also discusses in detail the significance of Glaucon’s
persona in the Republic. Blondell too emphasizes the importance of Glaucon’s
tripartite division of agatha in Book 2 and draws attention to his usage of the
auto pronoun (Blondell [2000]). However, although our starting points meet,
in our ensuing interpretations we draw different conclusions. Blondell’s analysis
of Glaucon’s character (2002) supports my line of argumentation here. My anal-
ysis of Glaucon’s use of (philosophic) language, however, leads me to different
interpretative directions and suggestions (but cf. Blondell [2002: 210]: “at no
point do Glaucon and Adeimantus show any talent for constructive thinking. Despite
their putative role as “co-founders”, it is Sokrates, almost exclusively, who con-
ceives the vision of a new society…” [emphasis added]). Blondell’s analysis is
designed to highlight the potentialities of Glaucon’s persona (which she too ex-
plicitly differentiates from Adeimantus’) but does not show how these dynamic
is realized, if at all, within the linguistic environment of the Republic.
49 See also Gordon (1996a 259 – 277); Blondell (2002); and Rowe (2006: 10).
From this point of view, one cannot avoid mentioning Bakhtin’s theory in con-
nection to the literary form adopted by Plato. Bakhtin’s distinction into mono-
logical and dialogical discourse appears to accord with literary interpretations of
the significance of the dialogical environment created within the Platonic cor-
pus. Press (2000: 5) emphasises the affinities and highlights the influences that
Bakhtin’s theory has on modern Plato interpreters: “as literary texts the dia-
logues are ‘dialogical’ in Bakhtin’s sense; texts in which different characters
see the world and speak from their own well grounded point of view rather
than being controlled by the ‘monological’ point of view of the author”. On
Bakhtin’s distinction between dialogical and monological viewpoints, see Bakh-
28 1. Introduction

cant from that point of view is that Glaucon and Adeimantus seem to
work as models in the text of how one should engage with Platonic phi-
losophy constructively. The Republic then portrays certain speakers as
being philosophically more competent when compared to others in
the sense that they elicit less help from Socrates. But again, in this hier-
archy of Socratic interlocutors, Glaucon, for reasons we are going to see
in Section Two, Chapter Two, takes first place.
Plato’s diverse discursive modes in the Republic are therefore closely
linked with his speaking personae, but they are also related with the var-
ious topics discussed. Thus, at a crucial point in the text, Socrates admits
to Glaucon that he cannot give him a direct account of the Form of the
Good.50 He certainly shows no confidence in his own ability to do so,
and he is sure that Glaucon and the others would not be able to follow
him even if he tried. He opts instead for the famous image of the Sun.
One way of viewing these complex cognitive and linguistic tensions in
the text is in close relation to the four-level epistemological classification
that Socrates presents in Books 6 and 7 in the images of the Line and the
Cave.51 According to Socrates, there are four distinct levels of cognition
that mortals inhabit. These are the planes of eikasia (Image-thinking),

tin (1981) and (1986). According to Bakhtin, discourse is considered monolog-

ical when a single style is employed to express a single worldview. The dialog-
ical type of discourse, nevertheless, involves the simultaneous co-usage by the
author of many styles in order to express diverse worldviews. In this direction,
the author/crafter of a dialogical textual environment refrains from promoting a
unified textual interpretation. See also discussion by Press, in Press, G. A. (ed.)
(1993: 17). On modern Bakhtin readings, see the discussion by Branham, in
Branham, R. B. (ed.) (2002). For a comparative reading of Plato and Bakhtin
which illuminates elusive Platonic issues pertaining to human nature and differ-
ent ‘worlds’, see Nightingale, in Branham, R. B. (ed.) (2002a: 220 – 249). In
addition see also Zappen (1996: 66 – 83), and Harris (1988: 168 – 176). For
an illuminating discussion of the dialogical character of Plato’s writings play
in philosophical discourse, see also Cossuta (2003: 48 – 76).
50 See Miller, in Ferrari, G. (ed.) (2007: 310 – 344).
51 As regards the Sun-Line-Cave correspondence, in this book I follow the ‘tradi-
tional’ interpretation, according to which all three consequent similes should be
interpreted as complementing each other and constituting a unifying whole.
See Irwin (1977: 220 – 224). But cf. Robinson (1953: 180 – 201).The literature
on these three Platonic images is vast. See Nettleship (1901: 238 – 263); Adam
(1963 [1902] vol. 2: 88 – 95); Annas (1981: 254 – 257); Ferguson (1963: 188 –
193); Raven (1953: 22 – 30); Smith (1996: 25 – 45). I discuss these images in
Petraki (2009: 27 – 67), focusing, in particular, on the level of eikasia. A detailed
discussion and bibliography is provided in the appendix on pages 60 – 62.
 1.7 The Republic’s interlocutors 29

pistis (Belief), dianoia (Thought) and noẽsis (Knowledge or Intelligence).

Are these cognitive levels linked with different ways of using language as
well? A number of problems emerge from this complicated matter as,
for example, the grade Platonic interlocutors inhabit and to which
level the Republic at large is to be classified.52 Alternatively, does Socra-
tes’ philosophical project in the work leave behind the realm of the
sense-perceptive and the visible to enter the sphere of the intelligible
(noẽton), or does the conversation remain fully entangled in the earthly
world of intellectual confusion and wandering (planẽ)? How would this
change of level be borne out in the text? In this work I shall refrain from
classifying different speakers according to different levels of cognition,
although I do believe that Plato dramatizes for us in Book 1 how
human cognition works at the level of eikasia and that the rest of the
Republic, from Glaucon’s intervention in Book 2 onwards, signifies a
great philosophical effort to argue in favour of the Belief (pistis) dis-
played by Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates that Justice pays more.
As a result of all this, in Book 1 and in the first part of Book 2 Plato
initially introduces his readership to what appears to be their ‘natural’
ethical and dianoetic environment: one full of confusion and inconsis-
tency as regards the definition of justice. He then paves the way out of
this confusion towards the adoption of a mode of thinking and speaking
that will indirectly acquaint them with the Platonic Real (Sinaiko [1965:
12 and 122 – 123]). Their acquaintance remains only indirect and limit-
ed for nowhere in the Republic do we actually witness a direct encounter
with the Idea of the Good. However, in my view, this does pay phil-
osophical dividends because through his stylistic and discursive alterna-
tions Plato has Socrates demonstrating in the dialogue his own defini-
tion of education (paideia) – namely, how it is to “turn someone’s

52 I do not endorse Raven’s (1965: 151) suggestion that the whole lower part of
the Divided Line is purely illustrative and is “included only for the sake of the
upper”. See also Annas (1981: 242 – 271) who accepts that the Line presents us
with a progressive “move from image to original” (254), but finds problematic
the claim that mortals can actually live in such a state, “simply looking at shad-
ows” (255); cf. Notopoulos (1933: 193 – 203). Literature on the Line’s levels of
eikasia and pistis is rich. I have given a detailed treatment of both levels in Pet-
raki (2009: 27 – 67), and shown how our following closely the philosophical
ramifications of Plato’s language of reflections created in water, mirrors and
other shiny material in the Republic, the Timaeus and the Sophist casts new
light on our understanding of Socrates’ dialogue with Thrasymachus and Glau-
con in the Rep. Books 1 and 2. For further literature on the subject, see the ap-
pendix and bibliography in Petraki (2009).
30 1. Introduction

eyes to the Sun”, as well as how it is to be blind to it (508c-509c). From

this perspective, Plato’s Republic is also a work about philosophic educa-
tion.
This type of education is performed or re-enacted in the text as Soc-
rates’ narrative develops and must be differentiated from the educational
programme that Socrates prescribes for the guardians and the philoso-
phers of the ideal city in Books 3, 4 and 7. It is obviously apparent
that those present at Cephalus’ house have not been raised according
to Socrates’ educative prescriptions, and this inevitably bars them
from being identified with the intellectually vibrant class of guardians.
Nonetheless, as I argue in this study, Plato has ready an educational
plan for those representative of contemporary Athenian society. These
two types of education co-present in the text implement each other,
as it is only by looking at Socrates’ prescriptions about the guardians
and the philosopher-kings that we can really follow him in educating
his own interlocutors at Cephalus’ house.

1.8 Plato and Post-Platonic problems about language

In conclusion, a few remarks are in order here about the contextualisa-
tion of my proposed analysis of the poetics of Plato’s philosophical dis-
course and how this applies to broader discussions about the relation of
philosophical language to truth. Plato’s vehement attacks against poetry
and its representation of the world (and indeed his simultaneous adap-
tation of its techniques, motifs and diction to investigate the ethical
and metaphysical order that he assigns to that world) raise an assortment
of questions about philosophy’s task to discover truth by means of ra-
tional, or strictly logical, thought. Questions too are raised about the de-
ployment of a type of philosophical language that must do away with
multifarious literary ornaments as these may be considered secondary
or external to a philosophical understanding and linguistic formulation
of the world’s strict order.53 Questions of this order become particularly
pressing once we adopt a panoramic viewpoint that seeks to embrace
the development of western philosophical thought and its linguistic

53 See Nussbaum, in Moravcsik, J. M. and Temko, P. (eds.) (1982: 79 – 124) (re-

printed in Nussbaum [1986: 200 – 233]). See also Halperin in Klagge, J. C. and
Smith, N. D. (eds.) (1992: 128 – 129); Kosman, in Klagge, J. C. and Smith,
N. D. (eds.) (1992: 73 – 92).
 1.8 Plato and Post-Platonic problems about language 31

styles.54 In specific terms, these concerns become particularly prominent

in post-Platonic theorisations about linguistic style(s) appropriate to phi-
losophy, surfacing as early as in Aristotle’s categorisation of the Platonic
dialogues in his Poetics, and including modern discussions about the abil-
ity of words to relate to the world and to form meaningful and true
statements about it.
Thus, from the anachronistic perspective of the philosophy of lan-
guage, Plato’s works constitute a particularly interesting case study for
two, largely interrelated, reasons. Firstly, the Platonic corpus exemplifies
a wide range of linguistic styles, all of which fall within, or comprise,
Plato’s wide spectrum of doing philosophy. This stylistic versatility in
fact permeates, in various ways, the entire corpus. Secondly, it has
also given rise to an assortment of interpretative problems for scholars
in the field, the most prominent being the chronological ordering of
Plato’s dialogues, which for a long time was treated as an indispensible
tool that could solve inconsistencies found both at the level of style and
at the level of the ideas argued in the texts.55 Nonetheless, as several
scholars have recently acknowledged, the developmental approach to
Plato’s thought has not been successful in solving the multiple and di-
verse exegetical problems raised in the corpus.56
However, Plato’s discourse raises questions concerning the elabora-
tion of a type of philosophical language apposite to the discovery of
truth due to the philosopher’s comments, found in various dialogues,
about the reduced epistemological value of certain linguistic modes
for the promotion of rational thought and strictly logical argumentation.
The corpus seems then to constitute a patchwork of different styles and
methods supposedly serving philosophical truth and reflecting the order
of Plato’s ontology and metaphysics. Thus, it is natural for the reader to
ask whether Plato gives precedence to one linguistic style over others or
if he shows an explicit preference to this end. Such methodological and

54 See de Man (1979: 103). See also Lang (1982: 19 – 46 and 84 – 99).
55 For an inspection of the diverse interpretational approaches to the Platonic dia-
logues, see the compilation of articles in Press (ed.) (1993); Gonzalez, in Gon-
zalez, F. (ed.) (1995: 155 – 187); Tigerstedt (1974) and (1977); Griswold (1980:
530 – 546); Wolsdorf (1999: 13 – 25) and Corlett (2005).
56 For discussions of the traditional distinction between early, middle, and late Pla-
tonic writing periods, see Annas, in Annas, J. and Rowe, C. (eds.) (2002: 1 –
25); and Kahn in the same volume (2002: 93 – 129). See also Krämer (1964:
69 – 101), reprinted in Gaiser, K. (ed.) (1969: 198 – 230). For objections against
the developmental approach to Plato’s dialogues, see also Reale (1990: 28 – 29).
32 1. Introduction

philosophical concerns can generate further problems too. Namely,

should we even apply these anachronistic questions to the corpus? I
have refrained from endorsing or ascribing to particular methodological
approaches that draw clear-cut and anachronistic divisions between the
philosophical and the literary in Plato. My interpretation of the Republic,
although primarily philological, inevitably takes into consideration the
various philosophical problems Plato is confronted with in dramatizing
Socrates’ discussion about justice and injustice in Piraeus.
The conclusions I reach in relation to the Republic’s poetical features
and the function of diverse linguistic modes aim to make clear, I hope,
Plato’s concerns in this dialogue with the capacity of language to bring
out the truth about reality. Plato accommodates and puts poetic speech
to the service of this end too. Yet, against this colourful and diverse lin-
guistic background that echoes with poetic resonances of all kinds, Plato
also sporadically experiments with an alternative type of philosophical
mode – a colourless type of language that can compete with, and
even surpass, mathematics in seeking to investigate or render as faithfully
as possible the strict order and the purity of the Real. As suggested
above, this type of philosophical style is not fully developed in this dia-
logue. We should not fail to note, nevertheless, that it becomes Plato’s
main, albeit not only, philosophical dialect in some of his so-called late
dialogues, such as the Parmenides or the Sophist. 57 However, problems
with philosophical styles and methodology are not solved there either
as Plato continues to investigate the potentialities and dynamics of phil-
osophical language in the service of the truth, only he now changes his
cast of co-speakers as well as the topics under discussion and the discur-
sive modalities. With that said, I believe he remains aware of the limits
of any such attempts to forge an appropriate philosophical tool for ex-
pressing what is bound to remain ineffable.58

***

57 See the collection of articles in Klagge, J. and Smith, N. D. (eds.) (1992), espe-
cially Frede’s insightful discussion of the Sophist in this volume (201 – 219).
58 The much-debated Seventh Letter and the Phaedrus have been discussed from this
perspective. On the so-called Plato’s unwritten doctrines, see above notes 6, 14
and 46 and Krämer (1990).
 1.8 Plato and Post-Platonic problems about language 33

In this introduction I have tried to bring together into a unified whole

the ideas and insights that regulate my analysis of the Republic. To do this
I have deliberately avoided strict definitions of the several terms that I
have employed to talk about the Republic’s versatile philosophical
prose. A detailed analysis of my methodology and terminology in this
work and of broader issues of Platonic interpretation has been kept
for Section One.
In Section Two, I turn to the interpretation of the text itself and try
to see how a close reading of the Republic bears out my suggestions. In
Chapter One, I discuss Plato’s appropriation and innovative treatment
of the motif of mixture in his socio-political proposals about the guard-
ians’ lifestyle in Book 5. Plato’s new approach to this traditional poetic
and Presocratic motif allows him to fashion in the Republic one of the
least adorned Platonic images in the dialogue – that of the polis as a sin-
gle body. This employment of the mixture motif also allows Plato to
introduce diction and create visual effects that pave the way for the Re-
public’s Forms. Thus an analysis of the imagistic language in Book 5
shows that it is Plato’s intention that the social, political and metaphys-
ical proposals are to be understood in the light of the Forms’ homoge-
neity and as such constitute a unified whole.
Chapter Two expands on the analysis of Book 5 in Chapter One
and addresses the importance of Glaucon as Socrates’ main interlocutor
in the Republic’s most critical and philosophically tantalizing moments.
My analysis of Glaucon’s input in the conversation with Socrates at
the end of Book 5 addresses the issue of Plato’s formulation of a distinct
philosophical dialect in the dialogue, one which allows Socrates to com-
municate his epistemological ideas to the so-called sight-lovers. In
Chapter Two I also investigate the poetics of this type of philosophical
language and account for Plato’s incorporation and adaptation of poetic
diction and motifs.
In Chapter Three I turn to Plato’s assessment of the poets’ images
(eikones) in the Republic and discuss the reasons that lie behind their cen-
sorship by Plato. I then investigate the reasons that make Plato construct
images himself in order to investigate the concept of justice and injustice
in the Republic. My discussion focuses particularly on the Platonic im-
agery that is intended to depict human nature (the animal imagery of
the dogs) in the dialogue as well as on Plato’s imagery of the Sun in
Book 6. In both cases, Plato’s creation of philosophical imagery ques-
tions the way poetry has so far portrayed, on a linguistic, thematic,
and performative level, what matters most to humans. The creation of
34 1. Introduction

the image of the Sun, in particular, casts new light on the perils of poetic
diversity (poikilia) and at the same time shows how philosophy can em-
ploy knowledgeably vividly imagistic language so as to offer a correct
and truthful representation of the truly Real (the Form of the Good).
In Chapter Four, I examine the persona of Adeimantus in the dia-
logue and investigate the reasons why he should be differentiated
from Glaucon. I thus investigate the type of imagery that Socrates cre-
ates as a response to Adeimantus’ remarks and expand on Plato’s discus-
sion and depiction of human philosophical nature. In my view, Socra-
tes’ discussion of the unjust souls and cities in Books 8 and 9 in the Re-
public forms part of his investigation of human nature at large. Thus in
Chapter Four, I also examine Plato’s creation of imagery in these two
Books and seek to account for the poetics of Plato’s language in this
context. I argue that in accumulating easily recognisable poetic imagery,
diction and motifs in order to describe the unjust, Plato makes Socrates,
firstly, demonstrate the perils of poetry as regards people’s ethical edu-
cation and, secondly, show that poetic poikilia is allowed only to depict
the unjust and the base which is also multifarious and diverse.
In the conclusion to this study, I turn to Plato’s references to the
technique of skiagraphia and propose that these help us grasp his philo-
sophical and educational aim in the Republic – namely, his attempt to ad-
dress directly and attack poetry’s deceitful confusion of opposite and
conflicting ethical values in the depiction of gods and humans. By sep-
arating the good from the bad, and the just from the unjust, in his own
philosophical imagery in the Republic, Plato undertakes to unveil this de-
ception. I then turn to Plato’s so-called pure or colourless language (ka-
tharẽ) and examine its philosophical value as an alternative type of phil-
osophical discourse.
Section One: The Theory
 1. Aims and perspectives

The aim of this book is to investigate the poetical character of Platonic

language by means of a detailed analysis of the motifs, poetic diction and
imagery used in the Republic. I was led to choose the Republic as a case
study in view of the widely-held opinion that this work’s thematic and
linguistic texture is so versatile and varied that it may be the ideal lin-
guistic environment for the analysis of Plato’s poeticized philosophical
prose.1 In this section I examine issues of methodology and define my
use of a) poetics, b) the relation between myths and images, c) imagistic
discourse, d) dramatization of language and e) metaphorical language in
the Republic.
Studies on the poetic aspects of the Platonic dialogues have offered
analyses on a variety of features, and attention has been drawn to a va-
riety of aspects of the dialogues. They have been seen as dramas, with

1 Gordon (1999: 157): “The Republic is perhaps the dialogue singly most responsi-
ble for the condemnatory view of images and image-making imputed to Plato.
Ironically, it is also the source of the most vivid and memorable images Plato created”
(emphasis added). See Robinson’s criticism of Plato’s use of vivid imagery in
the dialogues (1953: 220 – 221): “On the face of it, then, there is an inconsis-
tency between Plato’s principles and his practice about images. According to
what he says about them, he ought never to use them; yet his works are full
of them”. Of the Republic in particular Robinson says: “A dialogue which em-
phatically condemns imitation (595c – 597e), and demands a form of cognition
that uses no images at all (510 – 511, cf. eikones 510e), is itself copiously splashed
with elaborate images explicitly called ‘images’ by the speakers” (ibid.). Cf.
criticism by Gallop (1965: 113 – 117). Halliwell (2000a: 94) has also argued
that Plato’s “engagement with the culturally powerful texts and voices of poetry
is so evident, so persistent, and so intense as to constitute a major thread running
through the entire fabric of his writing and thinking”; Halliwell comments on
the dialogues’ containing “hundreds of places in which extracts from poetry are
quoted or paraphrased” (94) and argues for a subjection of mythos to logos which
should be seen from philosophy’s vantage point which allows such incorpora-
tion as long as these poetic utterances can be subject to judgement, rather than
be a priori accepted as authoritative (107 – 108). On the same topic, see in addi-
tion Tarrant (1946: 107 – 117) and (1958: 158 – 160). For a detailed collection
of poetic citations in the Platonic dialogues, see Brandwood (1976: 991 – 1003).
For an ancient treatment of the same issue, see Longinus, On the Sublime (187r).
38 Section One: The Theory

such a view relying a great deal on the vividness of the rhetoric or irony
employed by the various participating personae. Attention has been
drawn too to the settings of the dialogues, which are varied enough
to include vividly coloured natural landscapes, gymnasia, Socrates’ pris-
on, or the houses of the Athenian aristocracy. Emphasis has been laid on
the dialogues’ complex narratological frameworks, which are intended
to raise questions about the tension between oral and literary means
of transmitting philosophic conversations.2 Likewise, thought has been
given to Plato’s appropriation of myth and his insightful use of it along-
side lengthy arguments, and to the transformation of myth into a broad-
er narratological framework that structurally incorporates the philosoph-
ic logos, thereby blurring the boundaries between the two.3 Lastly, the
unique authorial interplay with other contemporary literary genres,
such as poetry and rhetoric, has formed the focus of other investigations.
These aspects of the Platonic dialogues have formed an idiosyncratic
form of discourse that opposes any facile division between the literary
and the philosophical.4
Nonetheless, from my own methodological perspective such inter-
pretations have thrown light on the literary or poetic character of the
dialogues at a macrocosmic level. In this work I have taken the view

2 See, for example, Halperin’s insightful treatment of the multiple narratological

frameworks of Plato’s Symposium (in Klagge, J. C., and Smith, N. D. [eds.]
1992: 93 – 129).
3 On the distinction between mythos and logos that treats them as two separate
modes of thought and discourse, see Cornford (1912) and Nestle (1940); see
also Most’s criticism of Nestle, in Buxton, R. (ed.) (1999b: 27 – 47). Bruno
Snell’s The Discovery of the Mind (1953) is an indispensable reading for these is-
sues (see esp. 45 and 191 – 226). See also Kirk, in Lee, E. N., Mourelatos,
A. P. D., Rorty, R. M. (eds.) (1973: 61 – 70); Lincoln (1997: 363). In Plato
mythos and logos are regarded as labels that speakers apply to their modes of
speech and often the criteria on which one mode of discourse is selected
over the other are not easy to distinguish. On this, see detailed discussion in
Zaslavsky (1981). According to Morgan (2000: 32 – 37), the transformation
of myth into philosophical myth and its incorporation in the Platonic works
is intended to problematize the dynamics of language as a means to grasp and
communicate reality; see also Detienne (1981); Brisson (1982); Klagge, in
Klagge, J. C., and Smith, N. D. (eds.) (1992: 1 – 3). For a different approach
to the mythos-logos polarity, see discussion in Halliwell n. 1 to this Chapter;
McCabe, in Barker, A. and Warner, M. (eds.) (1992: 47 – 68).
4 On Plato’s treatment of poetry in Book 3, see Dyson (1988: 42 – 53); Night-
ingale (1995: 19 with n. 15 and 60 – 67); Hwang (1981: 29 – 37); Belfiore
(1983: 39 – 62); Ferrari (1989: 92 – 148); Naddaff (2002); Crotty (2009: 3 – 29).
 1. Aims and perspectives 39

that Plato’s idiosyncratic relationship with poetry is not to be fully an-

alysed by examination of these features or techniques alone. More re-
mains to be said on the dialogues’ poeticity5 at a microcosmic plane and,
in particular, more remains to be said on Plato’s treatment of different
types of poetic motifs and imagery in his works. I should make it
clear at this point that the division I propose here between microcosmic
and macrocosmic analysis is for methodological reasons only, as the two
levels, far from being separate, clearly constantly interact. It will help us,
however, to focus on one fundamental aspect of Platonic poeticity
which is so subtle that if almost passes undetected in any interpretation
of the dialogues, namely Plato’s incorporation of vivid poetic imagery in
contexts where the intra-dramatic speakers (mostly Socrates) develop
highly strenuous philosophical argumentation. Such cases in the Republic
would include, for example, two of Plato’s probably most tantalising
lines of philosophical reasoning, namely his exposition of the Forms
at the end of Book 5 and his discussion of hẽdonẽ in Book 9. Usually,
the poeticity of these Platonic contexts remains unobserved and thus
unexplained.6
A number of tentative answers can be offered to explain this choice
on the part of Plato. Thus it is possible to argue that Plato is being poetic
in these contexts for rhetorical or aesthetic reasons only. One might also
dismiss the various images as mere metaphors adding colour to the lan-
guage of the difficult argumentation and then seek to substitute this with
a more neutral type of diction (a choice for which, it should be noted in
passing, Plato himself did not opt) in order to unravel the argument.7

5 I use the term ‘poeticity’ in this study to refer to the poetical features of Plato’s
prose.
6 To give some examples: One may draw a distinction between the linguistic
styles of Book 5 and the myth of Er in the the latter part of Book 10 or the
myth of Gyges in Book 2. Their difference lies in the method that Socrates em-
ploys to drive certain ideas home. Book 5 is of an argumentative character, as it
were, that is, the story of Er and that of Gyges’ ancestor, on the other hand, is
mythological, despite its philosophical significance in the specific context.
Tackling questions about images and imagistic language, however, can bridge
the gap created by such a rigid distinction. The fifth Book of the Republic,
which offers important information as regards metaphysics and ontology, also
makes use of a distinctive kind of imagistic language. It is thus instructive to in-
vestigate the poetic ramifications of this imagistic linguistic style and its philo-
sophical significance.
7 For metaphors in Plato, see Pender (2000). I discuss metaphor in relation to
Plato in detail in this Section further below.
40 Section One: The Theory

Although there is value in such approaches, the reasons, I think, behind

the fluctuation of the poeticity in Platonic language throughout the dia-
logue – that is, the reasons why Platonic language becomes markedly
poetic or imagistic in some contexts and less so in others – are remark-
ably significant for several reasons. They are of importance, firstly, for
the understanding of certain aspects of Platonic argumentation; second-
ly, for revealing the reasons that cause Plato to adopt the poetic language
that he elsewhere rejects; thirdly, for the appreciation of his use of the
dialogue form and the various dramatic personae as a means for express-
ing his philosophy in concrete form. As a result, any investigation of
Platonic imagery, which in most studies is examined merely as part of
the construction of myth in the dialogues rather than as a separate
and distinctive mode of philosophic discourse, potentially presents us
with interesting findings regarding both the blending of poetry and phi-
losophy in the Platonic corpus and the philosophical reasons that may
have dictated such an amalgamation.8
The examination of Platonic images is also necessitated by the fact
that, rather than being located in any specific section of a dialogue (as
is the case with myths), they evidently permeate the language of the dia-
logue throughout. They turn up in contexts where arguments are being
shaped and they are often used to advance the argumentation itself.9 In

8 On Plato’s use of eikones as metaphors for gods and the human soul, see Pender
(2000). Pender shows how the Platonic term eikn constitutes a distinctive
mode of philosophic discourse, but does not embark on a full-scale analysis
of their use in the Republic. In order to test her view of images as metaphors,
she analyses the Politicus and Plato’s use of “models” (paradeigmata), which she
associates with analogy and likeness (43 – 60). Pender’s findings will be further
discussed below. On the philosophical value of imagery usage, see also Patter-
son (1997: 136 – 145); Tecusan, in Barker, A., and Warner, M. (eds.) (1992:
69 – 88); and Murray, in Theodorakopoulos, E. (ed.) (2003: 1 – 19). Vasiliu,
in Dahan, G. and Goulet R. (eds.) (2005: 149 – 93, esp.177 – 178, with n.1).
See also detailed discussion on images (eikones) below.
9 See Havelock (1963: 5 and 11 – 12): After considering the explicit inconsistency
between Plato’s condemnation of poetry and his employment of strong poetic
techniques and features in the Republic, Havelock recommends that the dialogue
be examined as a whole. His question gets to the heart of the problem: “What
is the overall role which poetry plays in this treatise? Is it confined to the pas-
sages so far reviewed, which give analytic attention to what the poet says? No it
is not. The formal thesis which is to be demonstrated and defended in the body
of the Republic is proposed for discussion at the opening of Book Two…” (11 –
12). A similar stance is also adopted by Penelope Murray in her insightful anal-
ysis of issues of myth and myth-making in Plato’s works (in Buxton, R. [ed.]
 1. Aims and perspectives 41

other words, they would seem to draw on the language of the fifth cen-
tury B.C. Platonic speakers themselves, but they also look back to the
literary tradition, given that most of such images were also part of the
discourse of poets. Thus Plato’s adoption of imagistic discourse, rather
than being either subsidiary or merely ornamental in character, raises
important questions about how Plato adapts it to his needs. In my dis-
cussion so far I have used tentatively for this type of diction the term
imagery. More will be said by way of definition shortly. Before setting
out on a detailed analysis on Plato’s treatment of images in the Republic,
however, some discussion of my use of the term poetics and its relation
to the Platonic dialogue is needed.

[1999: 251 – 262]). Murray, in questioning the rigidity that has traditionally
characterized the identification of myth-sections in the Platonic dialogues, en-
capsulates with great accuracy a thesis which forms the backdrop to the present
study: “I would argue therefore that the mythical element in Plato’s writing is
evident not only in the so-called Platonic myths, but also in his general mode of
narration. Imagery of one sort or another pervades the Republic: the ship of
state, the sun, the line, the cave, the tyranny of desire, the soul as many-headed
beast and so on… So how much of the dialogue should we regard as muthos
and how much as logos? The closer we look the more difficult it becomes
to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the two, for the philosophy of
the Republic cannot be separated from the mode in which it is expressed”
(259). See also Rowe, in Buxton, R. (ed.) (1999: 263 – 278).
 2. Poetics

Several studies have suggested that the Platonic corpus, thanks to its var-
ious idiosyncratic characteristics, may be used to investigate the transi-
tion from orality to literacy which seems to have culminated in the
late fifth century B.C.10 Plato’s dialogues, it is suggested, would then
be particularly fruitful for any such investigation, firstly because al-
though composed in the fourth century B.C., they were designed to re-
produce the culture of the fifth century, and, secondly, because of their
vehement comments regarding the reduced philosophical value of the
medium of writing. Nonetheless, from my methodological angle this
so-called tension between the two mediums may in fact prove fruitful
in any interpretation of Plato’s imagery. In my view, traditional (oral
or performative) thought-patterns, themes and motifs, whose origins
are to be traced as far back as Homer and Hesiod, are re-organized by
Plato and re-employed in the dialogues in line with new authorial strat-
egies. This, however, results not so much in a clash, as an interaction:
what has been hitherto regarded by a fifth B.C. audience as traditional
or poetic can be now objectified, criticized and reviewed by Plato in
order to put it to new purposes.11

10 A strong advocate of this thesis is Eric Havelock. Havelock has linked the
Greeks’ philosophical thought with the passage from an “oral state of mind”
to a “literate” one and has investigated the ramifications of this idea in the Pre-
socratics and Plato. See Havelock (1963); and (1982); see also notes 11 and 12
below.
11 See Morgan (2000: 29): “It is not only a matter of objectification of the text
leading to perceptions of system in language and hence in nature, nor of a dis-
satisfaction with the poverty of technical language. Objectification of a text does
not lead straight to a system; rather objectification leads to critique, examination of
and dissatisfaction with others’ texts, to an analysis of this dissatisfaction and a
desire to do better, to a redeployment of language and a concurrent redeploy-
ment of myth” (emphasis added). Morgan’s comments highlight one further
feature of the philosophic attempts with language; Morgan speaks of “critique”,
“dissatisfaction” and “re-examination” of language resources and deployment
of mythological material as the critical stage before any consolidated statements
can be made. Philosophic attempts which present this attitude also exemplify an
exploratory character which is self-referential and self-reflexive. By questioning
 2. Poetics 43

Even a cursory glance at fifth and fourth century B.C. prose discus-
sions on poetry and poetic discourse reveals the writer’s preoccupation
both with clarifying how the genre of poetry is distinct from prose and
with investigating the manner in which these two types of discourse in-
teract. Since poetry enjoyed a well-established authority in Archaic and
Classical Greek society, prose writers of the period who discuss their
own authorial strategies cannot but reproduce in their prose composi-
tions the tension that clearly characterizes the relationship of these
two modes of discourse.12
My use of the word poetry here is a straightforward translation of
the Greek poiẽsis as it was used in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.
to denote the composition of song (to be translated as poiẽma as well
as aoidẽ).13 Matters, however, are more complicated in the case of the
term poetics, which I here employ in two main ways. It denotes both
the poet’s art and the exploration of characteristic features inherent in
the architectonics of poetic productions (ho poiẽtikos and hẽ poiẽtikẽ).
This immediately brings to mind Aristotle’s treatment of poetics, the
first methodical and logically organized assessment of poetry in our his-
tory of literary criticism. In this work, however, I shall refrain from
adopting any Aristotelian viewpoint in my treatment of poetics in
Plato, as such an approach as this would probably result in an anachron-
istic interpretation of the Republic’s poetics. It is far safer, I think, to re-

previous endeavours, both philosophical and literary, any new efforts investigate
both new and old linguistic and thematic paths, not necessarily by discarding the
past, but by building on it. See also Snell (1953: 223): “Since Plato was the first
to try to erect an integral system of philosophy, to combine into one system the
scattered beginnings of earlier writers, he betrays the inherent difficulties more clear-
ly than his followers. Through his writings we learn how those elements which
in nave speech are painlessly merged in images and similes, in metaphors and grammat-
ical transformations, become separated by the catalyst of conscious reflexion. We also
recognise the strenuous labour which went into the separation of the various
strands which make up the complex and ill-defined forms of our speech and thought;
for it was necessary to separate them one by one before they could be reunited to
form a clear whole”. See in addition Naddaf’s introductory remarks to Brisson’s
Plato, the Myth-Maker (1998: xi – xxvi).
12 See Havelock (1983: 15 and 21); Morgan (2000: 27 – 28 and Ch.3), who right-
ly finds that “common to both [Heraclitus and Xenophanes] is the realisation
that language is not guaranteed by nature and cannot be considered an unexa-
mined given”. See also discussion in Ferrari (1984: 201 – 202); and Ford (2002:
229 – 249).
13 For the transition from song to poem (aoidẽ to poiẽma), see detailed discussion in
Ford (2002: 131 – 157).
44 Section One: The Theory

flect on Plato’s own terminology and ideas concerning these issues, since
in his discussion of poiẽsis and the poiẽtikoi in Republic Book 10 he does
provide us with some clues in this direction. From this perspective, what
Socrates says in the Phaedrus will also be particularly instructive.
In Republic Book 10 Plato, in mounting his final attack, excludes
from his ideal polis all poetry except praise of gods and good men.14
The poiẽtiktatos Homer is obviously the first to go (607a2 – 3): “If
you go further and admit the honeyed muse (tµm Bdusl]mgm LoOsam
paqad]n,) in epic or in lyric verse (1m l]kesim C 5pesim), the pleasure
and pain will usurp the sovereignty of law and of principles always rec-
ognized by common consent as the best” (607a5 – 8). Only a few mo-
ments later, however, Plato allows for the possibility of taking back
the rejected muse. In these passages he employs some interesting termi-
nology:
flyr d³ eQq^shy fti Ble?r ce, eU tima 5woi k|com eQpe?m B pq¹r Bdomµm
poigtijµ ja· B l_lgsir, ¢r wqµ aqtµm eWmai 1m p|kei eqmoloul]m,, ûslemoi
#m jatadewo_leha, ¢r s}misl]m ce Bl?m aqto?r jgkoul]moir rpû aqt/r7
!kk± c±q t¹ dojoOm !kgh³r oqw fsiom pqodid|mai. (607c3 – 8)
None the less, be it declared that, if the dramatic poetry whose end is to
give pleasure can show good reason why it should exist in a well-governed
society, we for our part should welcome it back, being ourselves conscious
of its charm; only it would be a sin to betray what we believe to be truth.
(trans. Cornford)
In these famous lines, Plato faces up to the possibility that poets may be
able to compose poems that might meet the criteria that Plato has set out
in the Republic. However, it is what he says immediately afterwards that
is particularly interesting from my perspective:
oqjoOm dija_a 1st·m ovty jati]mai, !pokocgsal]mg 1m l]kei E timi %kk\
l]tq\; p\mu l³m owm. Do?lem d] c] pou #m ja· to?r pqost\tair aqt/r,
fsoi lµ poigtijo_, vikopoigta· d] , %meu l]tqou k|com rp³q aqt/r eQpe?m,
¢r oq l|mom Bde?a !kk± ja· ¡vek_lg pq¹r t±r pokite_ar ja· t¹m b_om t¹m

14 There is a comprehensive and full literature on Plato’s rejection of poetry in

Rep. Book 10: see Collingwood (1925: 157 – 159); Tate (1928: 16 – 23); and
(1932: 161 – 169); Webster (1939: 166 – 179); Murdoch (1977); Nehamas, in
Moravcsik, J.M and Temko, P. (eds.) (1982: 47 – 78); Nehamas (1988: 214 –
234); Asmis in Kraut, R. (ed.) (1992: 338 – 364); Annas (1981: 336 – 354); Bel-
fiore (1984: 121 – 146); Halliwell (1988) and (2002); Rosen (2005: 352 – 376);
Moss, in Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.) (2007: 415 – 444). In addition see Crotty (2009:
Ch. 4).
 2. Poetics 45

!mhq~pim|m 1stim7 ja· eqlem_r !jous|leha. jeqdamoOlem c\q pou 1±m lµ

l|mom Bde?a vam0 !kk± ja· ¡vek_lg. (607d6 – e2)
Therefore, isn’t it just that such poetry should return from exile when it has
successfully defended itself, whether in lyric or any other metre? Then
we’ll allow its defenders, who aren’t poets themselves but lovers of poetry,
to speak in prose on its behalf and to show that it not only gives pleasure
but is beneficial both to constitutions and to human life. Indeed, we’ll listen
to them graciously, for we’d certainly profit if poetry were shown to be not
only pleasant but also beneficial.
After everything that Plato has said in this dialogue against poetry, it will
probably seem a little far-fetched to include him among the group of the
prostatai or the philopoiẽtai who might wish to stand up for poetry and
defend it. Plato, however, is well-known for his irony and one should
be somewhat cautious before taking his various statements here at face
value (Nehamas 2000: Chapters 1 and 2). In fact, it is often the case
with Plato that one has to gather together material from various different
contexts before one is in a position to tease out his views.
Such, so I argue, is also the case in Book 10. The passages I cite
above should be seen in relation to two more important passages in
Book 10. In a crucial passage in 604e – 605c, Plato attacks poetry for
the way it portrays humans. His main argument in these pages is that
mimetic poets opt for versatile dramatic representations (oqjoOm t¹ l³m
pokkµm l_lgsim ja· poij_kgm 5wei, 604e1) of versatile characters, as this
type of character is far easier to represent and more appealing to the au-
dience (t¹ !camajtgtij|m te ja· poij_kom Ghor di± t¹ eql_lgtom eWmai,
605a5 – 6). In other words, poetry can apply a wide variety (poikilia)
of motifs and images, along with its numerous musical modes, to portray
the multifarious (604e1 – 6). In Book 10 attention is given mostly to the
mimetic character of poetry. Poetry is thus dismissed on the grounds
that it does not portray the real or reality as it truly is. In lines
604e1 – 6, however, Plato makes another point of considerable philo-
sophical import. He explicitly links mimẽsis with variety and multiplicity
and criticizes poetry for not applying its techniques to portray or imitate
the simple character:
t¹ d³ vq|mil|m te ja· Bs}wiom Ghor, paqapk^siom cm !e· aqt¹ art`, oute
Nõdiom lil^sashai oute liloul]mou eqpet³r jatalahe?m, %kkyr te ja·
pamgc}qei ja· pamtodapo?r !mhq~poir eQr h]atqa sukkecol]moir7
!kkotq_ou c\q pou p\hour B l_lgsir aqto?r c_cmetai. (604e2 – 6)
whereas the calm and wise character in its unvarying constancy is not easy
to represent, nor when represented is it readily understood, especially by a
46 Section One: The Theory

promiscuous gathering in a theatre, since it is foreign to its own habit of

mind. (trans. Cornford)
In Book 10, then, it is not merely the mimetic nature of poetry that
Plato attacks (603a10 – c9). Plato’s main complaint in this passage is di-
rected against the characters or souls that poetry takes upon itself to rep-
resent (Hobbs [2000]; Crotty [2009: 3 – 29]). On these grounds, one
might argue that for Plato poetry would become phelimẽ were it to em-
ploy its artistic techniques in a manner beneficial to society. That is to
say, if it were to depict the unvarying and the homogenous nature of the
good (chrẽstos) and to contrast it with the incongruent and the polymor-
phous nature of the bad (kakos, 608b4 – 8). Plato’s Socrates states this ex-
plicitly in 498d8 – 499a2:
Oq c±q p~pote eWdom cem|lemom t¹ mOm kec|lemom, !kk± pok» l÷kkom
toiaOt’ %tta N^lata 1nep_tgder !kk^koir ¢loi~lema, !kk’ oqj !p¹ toO
aqtol\tou ¦speq mOm sulpes|mta. %mdqa d³ !qet0 paqisyl]mom ja·
¢loiyl]mom l]wqi toO dumatoO tek]yr 5qc\ te ja· k|c\, dumaste}omta 1m
p|kei 2t]qô toia}t,, oq p~pote 2yq\jasim, oute 6ma oute pke_our.
[However, it is no wonder that most people have no faith in our proposals]
for they have never seen our words come true in fact. They have heard
plenty of eloquence, not like our own unsteadied discourse, but full of balanced
phrases and artfully matched antithesis; but a man with a character so finely bal-
anced as to be a match for the ideal of virtue in word and deed, ruling in a society
as perfect as himself – that they have never yet seen in a single instance.
(trans. Cornford)
These lines also make explicit the criticism on Plato’s part that we also
encounter in Book 10, although Plato’s complaint is directed here
against the rhetoricians, whom he repeatedly links with poets. Accord-
ing to Socrates, their well-wrought style does not match the content of
their works. They seek stylistic balance merely (exepitẽdes) irrespective of
the content of their speech, which should likewise be equally balanced,
since form and content cannot be separated. At this point Plato parts
company with the poets and orators, for Platonic style cannot but
match its content, and this happens effortlessly (!p¹ toO aqtol\tou).
As we will see in the following section of this work, this is the point
on which Plato’s discussion of the just and unjust souls and cities hinges
in his Republic. Throughout the work, Plato takes upon himself to dis-
tinguish the good from the bad and show how the simple and just char-
acter differs from the varying and unjust. In so doing, he employs tradi-
tional motifs (mixis and poikilia) around which he weaves complex po-
etic imagery. Yet he reserves for the unjust only the images and diction
 2. Poetics 47

that poetry deploys indiscriminately, thereby portraying the good and

the bad in similar ways. The Republic offers an artistic depiction of the
poikilon ẽthos, but it also offers us an image of the true and just philoso-
pher and of the just city (Book 5) and, in these contexts, Plato does his
best to eschew multiplicity and variety, for the style cannot support this
content. In these contexts, he thus does away with the multifariousness
of the poetic images and in that he differs greatly from the poets.
Nonetheless, to the extent that he uses poetic features where neces-
sary to serve his philosophical aims, Plato presents himself as a philopoiẽtẽs
of some sort, who accommodates some of poetry’s characteristics in the
Republic and in line with his principles. Yet, Plato is not a poiẽtikos prop-
er, for he has dispensed with metre (607d6 – 9). In the Republic’s philo-
sophical curriculum, music is assigned a rather different role (Book 7).15
In relation to his prose, however, Plato proves himself a great ironist,
when he has Socrates claim that, when a poem is stripped of its poetic
colouring, its plain prose “looks like a face which has lost the fresh
bloom of youth, a face that was never really handsome” (601b2 – 7).
This claim is verified in Socrates’ narration of the opening of the Iliad
in Book 3. His trading of the Homeric hexameter for plain prose in
this context confirms the point made much later in Book 10, although
the artistry of Plato’s prose as a whole in the Republic points in a com-
pletely different direction. It may lack (sonorous) metre, rhythm and
harmonia (which in the text are reserved for the portrayal of the just
soul or for Plato’s discussion of harmonics (harmonia-symphnia) in
Book 7), but its aesthetics is far from being impaired. As we will see,
Plato has taken on the poets in their own field and has done so success-
fully, for, as Socrates states in Book 10, the Republic has been composed
as a powerful counter-charm to poetry’s kẽlẽsis:
6yr d’ #m lµ oVa t’ × !pokoc^sashai, !jqoas|leh’ aqt/r 1põdomter Bl?m
aqto?r toOtom t¹m k|com, dm k]colem, ja· ta}tgm tµm 1p\d^m, eqkabo}le-
moi p\kim 1lpese?m eQr t¹m paidij|m te ja· t¹m t_m pokk_m 5qyta.
Ás|leha d’ owm ¢r oq spoudast]om 1p· t0 toia}t, poi^sei ¢r !kghe_ar
te "ptol]m, ja· spouda_ô, !kk’ eqkabgt]om aqtµm cm t` !jqoyl]m\,
peq· t/r 1m art` pokite_ar dedi|ti, ja· molist]a ûpeq eQq^jalem peq· poi^-
seyr (608a2 – b2).

15 For Plato, in Rep. Book 7, music is strictly linked to mathematics: see Anderson
([1966] 1997); Lippman (1964); Burkert (1972); Barker (1984) and (1989). On
the philosophical ramifications of Plato’s conception of mathematics in the Re-
public, see Joly (1974: 200 – 204 and 247 – 267).
48 Section One: The Theory

But if it isn’t able to produce such a defense, then, whenever we listen to it,
we’ll repeat the argument we have just now put forward like an incantation
so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into the childish passion for
poetry which the majority of people have. And we’ll go on chanting that
such poetry is not to be taken seriously or treated as a serious undertaking
with some kind of hold on the truth, but that anyone who is anxious about
the constitution within him must be careful when he hears it and must con-
tinue to believe what we have said about it.
So far I have focussed on Plato’s remarks regarding poetry and its char-
acteristic features in his Book 10 and have argued that, if we follow the
distinction that he makes in 607d – e between poiẽtai and poiẽtikoi, on the
one hand, and philopoiẽtai or prostatai, on the other, Plato may be seen to
belong to the latter category, in the sense that his composition eschews
versification and rhythm.16 According to this line of thought, the Repub-
lic appropriates poetic motifs, diction and direct quotations from various
poetic compositions, and both reshapes and enhances them to draw a
correct distinction between just and unjust souls and cities. In adopting
this authorial stance, Plato demonstrates how poetic language may final-
ly be seen to be phelimẽ when employed to depict the incongruence
and polymorphy of bad souls and bad institutions. This stance, of course,
makes Plato a philopoiẽtẽs of a peculiar type, for in adapting certain of its
characteristics and techniques, he strikes the final blow against poetry.
Let us now see how these observations above square with the cul-
tural changes that occur in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. As we tra-
verse the period from the sixth to fourth century B.C., the changes in
literary culture are great and rapid. Although a full-scale assessment lies
beyond the scope of this study, revisiting the way the Greeks viewed or
how they theorized about their own creative attempts in prose and its
relation to poetry will help us clarify the way we are using the term po-
etics here.
In his study on the origins of literary criticism, Andrew Ford exam-
ines the birth of poetics and poetic theory, which he takes to “refer to
self-conscious attempts to give systematic accounts of the nature of po-
etry in the most scientific terms available”. In his view, the emergence

16 From this interpretative perspective, Plato meets Adeimantus’ challenge in

Rep. 366e – 367a: oqde·r p~pote out’ 1m poi^sei out’ 1m Qd_oir k|coir 1pen/khem
Rjam_r t` k|c\ ¢r t¹ l³m l]cistom jaj_m fsa Uswei xuwµ 1m art0, dijaios}mg
d³ l]cistom !cah|m. [“No one, whether in poetry or in prose, has adequately
argued that injustice is the worst thing a soul can have in it and that justice is
the greatest good”]. See my detailed discussion in Chapter Four.
 2. Poetics 49

of theorisation regarding the nature of poetry and its distinctive features

cannot be seen separately from “the fundamental and broad shift from
early responses to singing as a form of behaviour regulated by social, po-
litical, and religious values to a conception of poetry as a verbal artefact, an
arrangement of language subject to grammatical analysis” (Ford 2002: 8
emphasis added). This passage from singing and song to the composing
of poetry was not short and takes up a good part of two centuries, the
sixth and the fifth centuries B.C., before we reach the fourth century,
when concepts and systematic definitions have been consolidated. This
transition was both instigated by, and instantiated in, the compositions
of the fifth century composers of prose, who strove to differentiate
their productions from the aims and ways of song-composition.17 It is
in the texts of the fifth century B.C. that we first come across references
to those who compose songs as makers (or poets). The poiẽtai are clearly
distinguished from the aoidoi who perform rather than compose the poems
(Ford 2002: 131). As Ford tellingly explains, the emergence of this new
vocabulary also signalled a fundamentally new conception of ‘verbal art’
in Classical Greece. It signalled the treatment of poetry as an objectified
artefact, which was, in essence, a ‘rhetorical’ approach.18
In the fifth century B.C., reflection on the language of poetry is set
in a broader context of concerns regarding the function of language in
general, its psychological sway and its structural arrangement for achiev-
ing persuasion. Sophists as well as philosophers and scientists of the pe-
riod are credited with enlightened inquiries into the nature of language
and its influence on the human soul. One immediately thinks here of
Gorgias’ Helen, a highly representative example of fifth century theori-
sation into the power of language at large and poetry as one of its sub-

17 Ford (2002: 46): “The late archaic age was a time in which those who were
ambitious to be thought ‘wise’ had to find a place within a wide range of dis-
cursive modes and a broad variety of authoritative styles”. See also discussion by
Martin, in Dougherty, C. and Kurke, L. (eds.) (1998: 108 – 128, esp. 115 –
119); and Lloyd (1987: 83 – 88).
18 Ford (2002: 11): “Beginning in the fifth century, rhetorical criticism created
new abstract genres that answered less to archaic practice than to the needs
of formal classification”. Ford cites as an example the employment of the
Greek term hymnos, at root meaning simply song. In the Archaic and early Clas-
sical period the noun and the verb do not appear to have any particular conno-
tation of hymn in the sense “song for a god”. Plato’s later use of the word as a
genre-term to encompass all songs to divinities was immensely influential on
later arrangements of the texts of archaic songs into classes (Ford 2002: 12
with bibliography in n. 27).
50 Section One: The Theory

sets. Thus investigation on the part of the Greeks into matters of lan-
guage cannot be fully appreciated unless it is set in the broader cultural
and intellectual context, that is, in the context of an era that saw the rise
of important breakthroughs in science and philosophy. Against this
background, attention also needs to be drawn to the tension between
literate and oral techniques for the dissemination of knowledge and
the subsequent birth of new forms of paideia that implemented or modi-
fied traditional ones. The transition from orality to literacy, in particular,
seems to have influenced the so-called objectification of poetic lan-
guage. In Ford’s words, “conversion of the Greek heritage of song
into fixed and tangible forms that could be studied, analysed, and revised,
assisted the development of technical, structural criticism as the most ad-
equate account of song” (Ford 2002: 157, emphasis added). The so-
called objectification of poetic language, however, does not necessarily
presuppose a wide-spread use of the techniques of writing.19 Ford offers
here as an example the ‘literary criticism’ scene in the Platonic Protago-
ras, which he rightly interprets as indicative of how oral and the literate
mediums may in practice interact: although coming from one of the
“most literate of fourth-century authors, nothing in principle prevents
an orally circulating song from being carefully quoted and studied”
(Ford 2002: 154). Several of our sources (Plato’s dialogues being only
one of them) attest to the fact that in the fifth century B.C. a new
mode of examination of the language of poetry emerged. Poetic pro-
ductions, traditionally immersed in music, could now be broken
down into their distinctive ingredients, music and language, both
being of equal gravity, but also both being now eligible for separate
analysis and investigation.20 Music apart, poetry was now easily diag-
nosed in terms of diction, structure and patterns of thought, all of
which were to form the central technical elements of rhetorical criti-
cism. In Ford’s words:
Language in turn was conceived in rhetorical terms as if it were inert raw
material that the poet ‘put together’ (commonly syn-tithenai, Latin com-pos-
itio) and shaped by artistic skill. Because one of the most noticeable and
easily demonstrable formal qualities of song was its organized rhythm, we

19 Ford (2002: 154 – 155); see Morgan (2000: 26): “It is the availability of writing,
rather than its widespread diffusion among the population, that is significant”.
On the issue, see extensive discussion by Thomas (1992).
20 For an extensive analysis of the ancient Greek ‘music culture’, see Herington
(1985: Ch. 1); Barker (1984: 1 – 18, 47 – 55); Gentili, trans. by Cole (1988);
and West (1992).
 2. Poetics 51

find attached to the ‘make’ words a fifth century view that poetry is essen-
tially speech (logos) in metrical form. This formalist perspective was extend-
ed to other quantifiable linguistic features of song, from diction to struc-
ture, and so the rise of ‘poetry’ expressed a conception of song that was es-
pecially susceptible to rhetorical analysis. Expertise in poetry did not re-
quire knowing how to sing or compose; it would focus on breaking
down a poem as a verbal construct, the product of intelligible design, rather
than as a speech act by, within, and for members of a community (Ford
2002: 132).
In his Criticism in Antiquity, Russell remarks that verse always remained a
crucial parameter that drew the line between prose and poetry.21 When
it comes to the language of poetry, however, Russell (1981: 149) also
submits that “verse apart, the main characteristic of the poet was his ‘li-
cence’ (exousia), the liberties of language and fancy granted him, it could
be said, in compensation for the restriction of form”. Thus, the objec-
tification of poetic language led to evaluations of its distinctive features,
but it also meant that it could be abstracted from its original socio-cul-
tural environments in order to be analysed and, if needed, transplanted
into hitherto alien literary contexts.22 It is only when reaching this stage
in the history of ancient Greek poetry and literature at large that certain
notions about the poetics of language can be brought into focus.23
My use of Platonic poetics in this work should be seen against these
social, intellectual and literary changes, which commence in the late

21 Russell (1981: 149 with n. 2): “It might be possible to occasionally call a prose-
writer a poet – Plato for the fire of his language, the historian Ctesias as a ‘crafts-
man of vividness’ – but this was little but an instructive hyperbole” (emphasis
added). Russell has here in mind Cicero’s characterisation of Platonic language
in his Orator 67 and Demetrius’ comments on Ctesias (215, ALC 219). Still,
there is much left to be said about the reasons behind a prose writer’s meticu-
lous choice of poetic diction.
22 Note that this is what Halliwell calls Plato’s “subjection of mythos to logos” in
the Republic: see above n. 1 to this Chapter. See also (Ford 2002: 4): “Setting
criticism within ‘musical’ culture will help us observe that something like the
eighteenth-century notion of literature was formulated in the fourth century
B.C.E., when that part of musical culture that was song was examined in iso-
lation from the rest: once the further step was taken of separating the words of
songs from the music and actions they had accompanied, the particular effects of
poetic language could be studied in a form of criticism one may call ‘literary’
insofar as it was specific to the poetic art”.
23 Ford (2002: 22): “Song became poetry, and poetry was a special art of using
language, the paradigmatic example of what we have called since the eighteenth
century ‘literature’”.
52 Section One: The Theory

sixth century B.C. and are consolidated by the fourth. In his definition
of the term, Ford observes that “any poetics depends, logically and ety-
mologically, on a unitary term for poetry simply to circumscribe the
field of study. But such a central term will also define what is specific
to such works that demands poetics’ special analyses” (Ford 2002:
4 – 5). This is obviously a significant caveat. One cannot talk about po-
etics unless the field of poetry is well-defined,24 and to attempt a defi-
nition of poetics is a perilous affair for fifth and early fourth century
Greek literature when boundaries between genres are crossed and re-
crossed and literary frontiers are shifted by prose-writers, who in com-
posing their works also construct literary genres.25 Andrea Nightingale
has investigated in detail this aspect of Plato’s idiosyncratic authorial at-
titude and has shown that to draw neat boundaries between the genres
of poetry, rhetoric and Platonic philosophy is not always effective for
our understanding of Plato’s works. In her analysis, Nightingale
(1995: 5) identifies Platonic intertextuality in “the sustained use of dis-
course, topoi, themes, or structural characteristics of a given genre” and
shows how Plato’s works define the boundaries of philosophy by entering
into a dialogue with both poetry and rhetoric. Thus, in shaping the
frontiers of his philosophical discourse, Plato, time and again, appropri-
ates and adapts characteristics and techniques that prima facie may seem
alien to this literary environment.
In contrast to the Republic, where Plato becomes polemical against
poetry and rhetoric but refrains from theorising about how certain fea-
tures that traditionally belonged to these types of discourse may be use-
ful for his own philosophical agenda, the Platonic Phaedrus is more in-

24 Note that poiẽtikẽ is an elusive term in the Platonic Ion 532c5 – 10 (poigtijµ c\q
po} 1stim t¹ fkom. C ou ;) Socrates employs it in his discussion with Ion to trap
him into accepting that if he can “speak of” (perform and interpret) competent-
ly Homer, he should be able to do the same with other poets too, to the extent
that they are all poets and treat the same subjects in their compositions.
Through his use of poiẽtikẽ in this dialogue Plato blurs the boundaries between
poetry and rhapsody and investigates their relation to technẽ. The concept of
technẽ aside, however, the term’s usage should be seen also in relation to
what Socrates says in 531c – e, namely that poetic compositions share common fea-
tures that someone with knowledge of the field should be able to judge (#m 1ngc^saio,
531a7, oX|r t’ Gsha 1ngc^sashai, 531b8, cm~setai d^pou tir t¹m ew k]comta,
531d13). On poiẽtikẽ in the Ion, see Murray (1996: 108 – 109) Janaway (1992:
1 – 23).
25 See Russell (1981: 144); Cole (1991); and extensive discussion in Nightingale
(1995).
 2. Poetics 53

formative, as Socrates makes some interesting comments about the na-

ture of poetic and rhetorical language and its treatment by the philoso-
pher. In particular, Socrates’ grouping together of the language of po-
etry and rhetoric in this dialogue casts light on the deployment of the
language of poetry in prose compositions.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates proposes the ‘purification’ of rhetoric and
prescribes certain principles for the rhetoricians. A thorough reading of
the Phaedrus lies outside the aims of the present study, but the work is
significant for my discussion of Platonic poetics. The Phaedrus is usually
seen as Plato’s palinode on the blessings of the various forms of mania,
but it also gives important information on how rhetoric and its techni-
ques, once purged according to (Platonic) truth, may be used by the di-
alectician.26 When poets learn how to serve reality, says Socrates, they
will rightfully deserve the title, not of sophoi, but of philosophoi – a
most honourable title in Platonic philosophy. Thus the perspective
adopted in the Phaedrus blurs the boundaries between poetry and rhet-
oric and philosophy as distinct discursive genres and I shall follow its ex-
ample in my treatment of poetics in this work. I will not then promote a
strict division of genres here (poetry and rhetoric). Instead, I will talk of
alternative modes of discourse, which, despite their many differences (in
performance for one thing), do share essential stylistic characteristics and com-
mon ways of structuring and organising language. 27 This is explicitly dealt
with in the Phaedrus. Lysias, a well-known orator, is identified by Soc-
rates as a poet (¢r t± d]omta eQqgj|tor toO poigtoO).28 Nonetheless, the
main passage that links rhetoricians and poets is found in the concluding
scene of the Phaedrus (278b7 – d1). Phaedrus has to deliver a message to
Lysias and to all those who have composed speeches (k]ceim Kus_ô te ja·
eU tir %kkor sumt_hgsi k|cour, ja· jl^qy ja· eU tir %kkor aw po_gsim

26 Dodds (1951) and Ferrari (1987). On the interpretative complications that arise
from trying to draw a clear distinction between literature and philosophy or
philosophical logos in the Phaedrus, see Nussbaum (1986: Ch. 7).
27 See also (Ford 2002: 1 – 23). On Plato’s blurring the boundaries between ‘gen-
res’ in the Phaedrus and his drawing of a new distinction between divine and
mortal song, see Ford’s comments at 260 – 261: “but the Muse is now philos-
ophy, and the rules for ‘what befits us’ to sing are not derived from social prac-
tices or even from literary conventions, but from Plato’s philosophical vision of
reality and his determination to refer all distinction to the divine” (at 261). See
also Walker (2000: 17 – 41); Svenbro (1984: 231 – 232); and Denniston ([1952]
1979: 17 – 18).
28 Phdr. 234e6; cf. 236d4 – 5: )kk’ § laj\qie Va?dqe, ceko?or 5solai paq’ !cah¹m
poigtµm Qdi~tgr aqtoswedi\fym peq· t_m aqt_m.
54 Section One: The Theory

xikµm C 1m ¡d0 sumt]hgje, tq_tom d³ S|kymi ja· fstir 1m pokitijo?r

k|coir m|lour amol\fym succq\llata 5cqaxem). The message is clear:
they can claim the eponymia of the philosophoi, if, and only if, they can
prove by way of a thorough elenchus that their compositions rest on
a basis of knowledge and bear the seal of the truth. From a Platonic per-
spective, the standards here are high for poets and rhetoricians if we
consider Socrates’ definition of truth in the central books of the Republic
and elsewhere, but the penalty is equally high if they do not meet these
criteria, as Socrates reminds us in Republic Book 10:
L]car c\q, 5vgm, b !c~m, § v_ke Cka}jym, l]car, oqw fsor doje?, t¹ wqg-
st¹m C jaj¹m cem]shai, ¦ste oute til0 1paqh]mta oute wq^lasim oute !qw0
oqdeliø oqd] ce poigtij0 %niom !lek/sai dijaios}mgr te ja· t/r %kkgr !qe-
t/r (608b4 – 8).
Yes, for the struggle to be good rather than bad is important, Glaucon,
much more important than people think. Therefore, we mustn’t be tempt-
ed by honour, money, rule, or even poetry into neglecting justice and the
rest of virtue.
If I am correct in my general interpretation, Plato’s message to poets and
rhetoricians in the Phaedrus can also throw light on the reasons for
which Plato incorporates poetic thought-patterns, motifs and diction
in his Republic. Leaving verse itself aside, Plato argues in the Phaedrus
that prose can be wrought and syntactically arranged so that it accom-
modates features that are predominately found in the field of poetry.
Words can be organized in rhythmically patterned units with rhyming
effects.29 Elements of poetic diction can also be selected to build up
vivid imagery.30 In Phaedrus 267b10 – c3, Socrates also refers to the art
of eikonologia (imagistic discourse) and links it with rhetoric. The Phaed-
rus and the Republic are thus united by the common assumption that
poets do not speak the truth about important matters (Rep. 377d), but
the Phaedrus takes the argument further when it links poetry with artistic
prose and claims that poets and rhetoricians may too be called philoso-
phers if they place their highly adorned prose at the service of (Platonic)
truth.31 Yet this would also suggest that Plato’s philosopher or dialecti-

29 Gorgias’ rhyming effects in his Helen are an illustrative (and much-cited) exam-
ple of this stylist effect. See also Rep. 498d8 – e: on Gorgias’ style, see de Ro-
milly (1975: 8 – 11). On Plato’s reference to the homoiomena in this contextual
environment see discussion in this Chapter further below.
30 Cf. Havelock, in Kelly (ed.) (1984: 76 – 79).
31 The distinction between philosopher and sophist is not fixed at the time. See
Ford (1993: 31 – 47).
 2. Poetics 55

cian too may deploy artistic poetic prose as, according to Socrates in the
Phaedrus, evidently only philosophers are capable of actually bringing to-
gether psychaggia, alẽtheia and technẽ in their discourse (Phdr. 271a –
273a). This is informative for the way we are to interpret the poetics
of Plato’s discourse in the Republic, which is a highly artistic prose,
woven into the texture of which are vibrant images, poetic motifs
and diction that all sway the souls of these particular interlocutors at
Cephalus’ house in line with Plato’s notion of philosophical truth. 32
In the Phaedrus (267b10 – c3), Plato links imagistic discourse (eikono-
logia) with rhetoric. In his Republic, he constructs some of the most
memorable images (eikones) in his corpus. I have suggested above that
it is this authorial stance, along with his adoption of quotations from po-
etry and his adaptation of poetic diction and motifs, which renders his
discourse poetic. However, since Aristotle, Plato’s imagistic discourse
has been inextricably connected with metaphor due to the inherent ten-
dency of Platonic eikones to produce comparisons between two different
thematic environments and discuss one subject by way of the other.33 In
fact, the rhetorician Isocrates, in the fourth century B.C., is the first to
use the term metaphora and to suggest that it constitutes a prominent po-
etic stylistic device (kosmos). In his introduction to the Evagoras (190D),
Isocrates links metaphora only with poetry and, in a passage that evokes
Socrates’ remarks on poetry in the Republic (601b), Isocrates explains

32 Harvey too (in Ferrari, G. R. F. [ed.] [2007: 1 – 26]) takes the view that the Re-
public has a “protreptic” character but follows a different line of interpretation
from mine.
33 Aristotle, Metaphysics 13.5, 1079b25. The severe criticism is directed at the
Forms. On Aristotle’s discussion of Plato’s poetic prose, see also Gordon
(1999: 64 – 66). On imagistic language traditionally considered as part of
style, see Thesleff with further discussion (1967: 26). Plato does not use the
term metaphora in his dialogues; he opts instead for the rather elusive term
eikn to which he assigns manifold epistemological connotations, but see his
use of metnomasmen in Theaetetus 180a6: !kk’ %m tim\ ti 5q,, ¦speq 1j
vaq]tqar Nglat_sjia aQmiclat~dg !masp_mter !potone}ousi, j#m to}tou
fgt0r k|com kabe?m t_ eUqgjem, 2t]q\ pepk^n, jaim_r letymolasl]m\. (“But
if you ask any of them anything, they send off shots as if they were drawing
up enigmatic shaftlets from a quiver, and if you seek to get an account (logos)
of this, as to what he has said, you’ll be struck by another freshly altered
name”, trans. Benardete (1986). I discuss metaphor in relation to Plato’s Republic
below.
56 Section One: The Theory

that metaphora can be employed to embroider poems (p÷si to?r eUdesi

diapoij?kai tµm po_gsim) but not logoi (compositions in prose):34
to?r l³m c±q poigta?r pokko· d]domtai j|sloi … ja· peq· to}tym dgk_sai
lµ l|mom to?r tetacl]moir am|lasim, !kk± t± l³m n]moir, t± d³ jaimo?r, t± d³
letavoqa?r, ja· lgd³m paqakipe?m, !kk± p÷si to?r eUdesi diapoij?kai tµm
po_gsim. (190D)
For to the poets is granted the use of many embellishments of language […]
and they can treat of these subjects not only in conventional expressions,
but in words now exotic, now newly coined, and now in figures of speech, ne-
glecting none, but using every kind with which to embroider their poesy.
(trans. Van Hook)
Plato brings about the dramatization of language in the Republic to
which I referred in the introduction by making full use of almost all
of the kinds of discourse (pasi tois eidesi) that Isocrates attributes here
to the genre of poetry. Yet one should obviously be very cautious
here; we need not impose Isocrates’ ideas on the text of Plato I am ex-
amining here in order to gauge the poeticity of the latter’s prose. Rath-
er, we should keep in mind that in the early part of the fourth century
B.C. philosophers and rhetoricians are both debating and experimenting
with the dynamics of their prose-writing and, in so doing, are laying
down and defining boundaries between genres and shifting literary fron-
tiers. As Ford has shown, in attributing certain embellishments to the
genre of poetry, Isocrates in the Evagoras offers at the same time a “de-
fense of prose literature, as artistic speech that makes no claims to the
charm of poetry but is yet worth writing down and preserving so it
may be read, studied, and discussed among readers now and in the fu-
ture” (Ford 2002: 235 and 248). In the Republic, however, Plato takes a
different stance. He criticizes poetry for “not lying well” but he none-
theless adapts its embellishments to fashion a philosophical incantation
that is also faithful to Platonic reality. This is to fight poetry from within
and to use its characteristics, albeit now with a new purpose.
In my discussion of Platonic poetics so far I have stressed the tradi-
tional character of the images, motifs and diction that Plato employs in
his dialogue. But they are traditional only to a certain extent. Plato does
indeed organize his discussion on justice and injustice around traditional
motifs, such as those of mixture and versatility (mixis and poikilia). Yet
when it comes to imagery, he is both traditional and innovative.
Thus Plato is consistent in his philosophical use of images, but he

34 See Ford (2002: 235 – 240).

 2. Poetics 57

does not use all images in the Republic in the same manner. As I have al-
ready suggested, traditional images and poetic quotations play an integral
role in his discussion of injustice in Books 8 and 9. However, he be-
comes more creative and innovative in his use of images to explain,
for example, his metaphysics and ontology in the central books of the
Republic. There are also times when he builds images in order to sum
up previous argumentation – here Platonic images clearly function as
a form of reprimand to the forgetful interlocutor (who is Adeimantus)
and afterwards the discussion moves quickly in new and different direc-
tions. Platonic images will take up the rest of my discussion in this sec-
tion. As we shall see, imagery in the Republic becomes a distinctive fea-
ture of how philosophical language per se (pedestris oratio, rather than po-
etic language alone) may be moulded to investigate new thought-pat-
terns. In this sense, his construction of imagery acquires philosophical
significance.
 3. Mythos and eikõn

Scholars have dealt with Plato’s myths in detail.35 In this section I will
focus on the relation of myth to the Republic’s eikones and imagistic lan-
guage, since Platonic imagery would appear to have certain affinities to
philosophic myth-making, although it also differs in certain respects. In
her analysis of Plato’s myths, Katherine Morgan has defined philosoph-
ical myth as “the methodologically self-conscious use of mythological
material to problematize issues of language and communication”. Mor-
gan departs from Burkert’s definition of myth as “a traditional tale with
secondary, partial reference to some matter of collective importance”
and shows that the myths constructed by either Plato, or Parmenides,
“are not traditional even though they may contain traditional ele-
ments”.36 These traditional elements involve well-established mytholog-

35 On Plato’s mythmaking in the Republic, see discussion in Segal (1978: 315 –

336); Murray in Buxton, R. (ed.) (1999: 251 – 262); and Rowe, in Buxton,
R. (ed.) (1999: 263 – 278). The literature on Plato’s use of myth in the dia-
logues concentrates on its problematic distinction from logos: see above n. 3.
See also Stewart ([1905] 1960); Tate (1933: 159 – 161), and (1936: 142 –
145); Taylor (1933: 158 – 159); Moors (1982: 9 – 13, 59 and 96); Tarrant
(1990: 19 – 31); in addition cf. Nightingale’s (1996: 65 – 91) suggestion that
one of the aims of myth is to juxtapose hypothetical states of the universe in
order to explore the character of human free will. Cp. Smith (1986: 20 – 34),
who suggests five functions for myths: a) they are playful in a way crucial to
philosophy, b) they present us with hypotheses for investigation, c) they rein-
force the undogmatic character of the dialogues, d) they draw our attention to
the Forms, and e) they organize the different themes of the dialogue.
36 See Morgan (2000: 15 – 45, here at 37); cf. Burkert (1979: 23); see also Brisson
(trans. Naddaf, G. 1998), who links Platonic mythos with oral literature trans-
mitted from one generation to another. In the view of Brisson, it is in this
sense that Plato treats poets as myth-makers par excellence. The reasons given
by Morgan for the non-traditional character of the “philosophical” myth are
twofold (16). On the one hand, the myths constructed by the philosophers
are designed to fit a specific philosophical context, and, from this point of
view, there can be no possibility of allowing a multiplicity of versions of the
same myth-story. On Morgan’s reading, the very incorporation of myth in a
philosophical environment is designed to function as an “implicit criticism of
the tales told by the poets” and of the way the mythological corpus was handled
by poetic tradition. On the other hand, Morgan finds that the role of philo-
 3. Mythos and eikõn 59

ical material: “story patterns (such as quest, anabasis, and katabasis), motifs,
or narrative characters, which transgress the format of standard philosophical
argument and explanation” (Morgan 2000: 37, emphasis added).
From this perspective, philosophic myth and imagery in Plato share
a common point of departure: their traditional origins. In building his
myths and rich imagery, Plato draws his material from a long literary tra-
dition that goes back to poets, sophists and Presocratic philosophers – a
tradition which treated myth and its features in an assortment of ways
and towards different ends. In Plato, the sharing of a common literary
background by using myth and imagery creates yet further connections
between them. Platonic myths often contain, or introduce, many of the
motifs and thought patterns that the author re-deploys elsewhere, either
in his eikones – the Cave eikn, for example, develops in new directions
the motif of the katabasis, which was first introduced in Glaucon’s myth
of Gyges’ ancestor in Book 2 – or in his arguments. As a result, tradi-
tional motifs, such as these of the katabasis or wandering (planẽ), may
form the backbone of a Platonic myth, but they can also constitute
the main idea around which Plato weaves a multiplicity of other images
of poetic origin. Such is the case, as I will show later, with Plato’s treat-
ment of the motifs of poikilia and mixis. 37 The philosopher adopts these
traditional motifs in the Republic and enhances them with a rich variety
of imagery to portray, among other things, the unjust soul and to dem-
onstrate its unhappiness.

sophic myth cannot be treated as “secondary or partial”. In fact, the myth’s in-
clusion is intended to have a serious philosophical intent, a fact that renders the
myth’s character “collective” as well (“collective” to the extent that it is crucial
for the intellectual health of the community that the philosophical work ad-
dresses).
37 Note, for example, that the versatile dynamics of the motif of mixis are treated
differently by poets and have given birth to an assortment of myths. The motif
is usually exploited to describe mortals’ sexual mingling with the divine. See,
for example, Pindar’s Pythian 2 (25 – 48), where Ixion’s departure from the met-
ron assumes the form of mingling or mixing sexually with the divine (Nqa
ft’1q\ssato, t±m Di¹r eqma· k\wom/pokucah]er, 27 – 8). Ixion’s punishment is
his subsequent mixing with a nephela (1pe· mev]kô paqek]nato xeOdor ckuj»
leh]pym %idqir !m^q, 36 – 7). The child of this affair will embody and represent
his father’s defective judgment and misperception of order (43 – 4). Such, too, is
the case of Coronis in Pindar’s Pythian 3. See also Crotty (1980). On Plato’s
adaptation of this motif in the Republic, see discussion below, Section Two,
Chapter One.
60 Section One: The Theory

It is at this point that a clear distinction can be drawn between Pla-

tonic myth-making and imagistic language. Platonic myths use tradi-
tional material to tell a new story of particular narratological length. Pla-
to’s speaker usually signals his change of discursive mode before starting
to narrate the story. He also indicates to his audience the point when the
myth is complete. From a narratological perspective then, Platonic myth
is a thread that stands out in the dialogues’ thickly woven fabric. As we
will see, this is not always the case with the Republic’s imagery, which is
scattered throughout the text and found in various contexts.38 Some Pla-
tonic images (eikones) are indeed identified by the speakers as specific
discursive modes of various narratological stretches with explicit visual
and imagistic bearings. (The famous eikones of the Sun, the Line and
the Cave are the lengthiest in the Republic.) There are also others
which are narratologically shorter as, for example, the “torturing and
beating of the strings” in Republic Book 7, where Socrates’ discussion
of music with Glaucon borrows vocabulary from the torturing and beat-
ing of the slaves. It is also the case with the eikn of philosophy as a
poorly wedded bride to an undeserving man in Book 6 (495b – 496a)
and Socrates’ eikn of the ship as a state steered by a highly ambitious,
but completely incompetent, crew that has usurped the power from
the skilled, but deaf captain (487e – 489c). There is also the famous
image of the tyrant as a many-headed beast in Book 9, among numerous
others. Plato seems to have a particular liking for images in the Republic.

38 I am aware that in Plato’s dialogues this narratological distinction between ei-

kones and mythoi is not always maintained, since, more often than not, Plato
himself ensures that the distinction between mythos and logos is dropped, blurred
or questioned (see the Protagoras 320c – 328c: see discussion in Brisson, trans.
Naddaf [1998]; and Brisson [1975: 7 – 37]; see also Taylor [1976]). Thus, in
the Republic, for example, Plato has Socrates characterize as a mythos his entire
philosophical endeavour of building the theoretical just city. From this perspec-
tive, mythos becomes a broad framework which includes all various types of
philosophical discourse, argumentation, images and other mythical stories, for
example, the myth of Er, or Gyges’ ancestor. (Particularly relevant in this direc-
tion is Plato’s use of eiks mythos in the Timaeus: see Smith [1985: 24 – 42]; see
also Rowe [2003, 21 – 31]). Nonetheless, I have overstated this difference be-
tween mythos and eikones because, in contrast to his treatment of mythoi, irre-
spective of how these are structurally defined, when it comes to imagistic lan-
guage, Plato is not always consistent in notifying his intra-dramatic audience
that the speaker’s language will turn imagistic or, according to some scholars,
‘metaphoric’. This, from my interpretative viewpoint, is methodologically sig-
nificant for inspecting the reasons and manner in which Plato’s Socrates alter-
nates his style in the dialogue. See discussion in this Section further below.
 3. Mythos and eikõn 61

However, the Republic is also laden with imagery that is not labelled as
eikones in the dialogue. These images are introduced by means of certain
linguistic markers (such as ¢r or ¦speq), demonstrating the author’s in-
tention of bringing together into a single conceptual environment two
different themes or ideas. Finally, there is also one last category of im-
agery which the term ‘imagistic diction’ describes most accurately.
From a structural perspective, these can be identified as shorter linguistic
units, often restricted to short sentences or even mere words, also of tradi-
tional poetic origin, whose adoption and adaptation in the Republic re-
quires that the audience be fully engaged in a constant act of visualisa-
tion and comparison. This is exactly what the two last categories of im-
agery mentioned above would seem to share with the Platonic eikones,
that is, their requirement that the audience be engaged in their homoiosis
and proceed to untangle it.
In line then with my approach in this work, I will treat the Republic’s
images as building units of different linguistic length, starting from mere
words and short phrases (whose various combinations may also produce
further, more complex, imagery) and stretching as far as to incorporate
longer narratives (in Plato’s vernacular eikones). Traditional motifs and
imagery of this sort permeate the dialogue’s philosophical language
and often regulate the construction of the ideas proposed in the work
in question. As we will see, Platonic imagery in the Republic is not in-
tended to tell a story whose origins are lost in mists of time, or to narrate
experiences in spatio-temporal spheres that are inaccessible to humans,
in the way myth-narratives are intended to do.39 On the contrary, Pla-
tonic imagery is employed in such a way that it re-addresses and possibly
re-organizes our everyday experience of a world of incongruent sense-
perceptive and intellectual stimuli and phenomena. It helps us, that is,
re-view our world and our place in it from a Platonic perspective.
More than that, it generates what the Republic’s interlocutors are intend-
ed to ‘see’ (or visualize) in their dialogue with Socrates. Being scattered
through the language that Socrates uses to address his audience in mat-
ters of ethics, metaphysics, and ontology, Platonic imagery thus forms to
a remarkable extent the interlocutors’ philosophic vernacular in the dia-
logue.
Before turning to a detailed examination of Plato’s imagery, a few
more words are in order about my use of the terms themes and motifs.
Both Classical scholars and other literary critics resort to these terms in

39 See Nightingale, in Branham, R. B. (ed.) (2002a: 224 – 249).

62 Section One: The Theory

order to identify and classify recurrent thought patterns that permeate

literary compositions and, as is often the case with early Greek poetry
and philosophy, which frame or regulate their structure. Thus, to
name only a few, Greek poetic and philosophic compositions are
laden with a variety of themes or motifs, such as those of weaving (sto-
ries or lies), of routes, journeying, wandering and nostos, of mixture and
contamination, or of physical and/or intellectual imprisonment. The
early Greek literature that has come down to us makes full use of
these patterns in various ways for different intellectual purposes. In
this work, rather than using the terms themes and motifs interchangea-
bly, I will follow Mourelatos (1970: 11) in the distinction that he draws
in defining them. In the introductory pages of his Route of Parmenides,
Mourelatos notes that it is the art historians “who employ the terms
‘motifs’ and ‘themes’ with the greatest precision”, and, in his discussion
of the Parmenidean imagery, he adopts Erwin Panofsky’s (1955: 26 –
54) three-level system for the study of art. At level (a) (pre-iconograph-
ical description), the interpreter focuses on the different forms and con-
figurations, thereby recording and identifying a number of styles. At
level (b), that of iconographical analysis, the different themes or con-
cepts are identified for which the forms and shapes at level (a) function
as a vehicle. At level (c), the interest is in “total meaning” or “symbolical
values”.
In Parmenides’ proem, then, the Chariot of Helios, which, being a
theme, belongs to level (b), functions as a symbol of enlightenment.
Panofsky calls the discipline associated with this third level iconology.
Mourelatos associates level (a) of pre-iconographical description with
the concept of motif; the concept of theme is linked with level (b),
the level of iconography. In this interpretation, the concept of motif
precedes that of the theme. At the same time, a single motif may func-
tion in two different themes (Mourelatos 1970: 11 – 12). Such an inter-
pretative scheme is particularly helpful when employed in our examina-
tion of the traditional imagery that has been appropriated and re-shaped
in the Republic. It also prevents us from failing to appreciate the impact
that the appropriation and transformation of traditional motifs and dic-
tion may have had on the audience. In specific terms, one must not lose
sight of the fact that, while the audience may be very familiar with the
various motifs it encounters, the reception of different themes can be a
quite interesting and challenging experience for them.
An example is illuminating here. The chariot motif was received in
various ways. In the literature that has come down to us, it appears for
 3. Mythos and eikõn 63

the first time in the Iliad 23 (301 – 348), when Nestor explains to his son
Antilochus how vigilant charioteering can defeat long experience. The
chariot then becomes prominent in the proem of Parmenides’ poem as a
vehicle of enlightenment. It then becomes a recurrent image to denote
poetry and poetic composition in Pindar’s victory odes and is also em-
ployed by Plato in his famous portrayal in the Phaedrus of the human
soul. In its reception from the eighth to the fourth century B.C., the
chariot motif preserved its significance, but becomes conceptualized
in new ways (Slavena-Griffin 2003: 227 – 253). This obviously has an
impact on the manner in which the various audience(s) now had to fol-
low its transformation in different contexts, as it had developed previ-
ously and was currently evolving at the time. The audience becomes in-
volved in an act of re-interpretation, since familiarity with the tradition-
al aspects of a particular motif or image also means that the audience
now has to interpret the innovation. Yet if a motif or thought-pattern
passes from one literary or philosophical composition to another to
serve different purposes in new thematic environments, then this may
also be informative in regard to the reasons that necessitate its adaptation
to the new context. This passage of an image from one context to an-
other will prove of remarkable philosophical value later when we move
to Plato’s treatment of traditional poetic motifs and images.
 4. Imagistic discourse
4.1 Poikilia and images
For Plato in the Republic, sight becomes a method that can pay rich div-
idends in philosophical thinking. However, this entails some hard phil-
osophical training in the way mortals exercise their capacity for perceiv-
ing and assessing things visible and invisible. From this interpretative
angle, humans’ vision in the dialogue turns into visualisation, as the par-
ticipants in the conversation are invited to picture several images that
Socrates constructs in speech. Integral to this process in the Republic is
the philosopher’s appropriation of the poetic poikilia and the notion
of mixis, which Presocratic philosophic literature discussed in various
ways, thereby bringing out the multifariousness of our surrounding visi-
ble and invisible environment.40 Around these two motifs Plato weaves

40 Pindaric athletes, heroes and demi-gods are also distinguished by their ability to
fight poikilia in all its diverse manifestations. It should be noted that in Pindar’s
odes mortal confusion is the direct result of two types of behaviour. The first
involves mortals who have been completely identified with the poikilon of
their own nature. These creatures (Typhon is one example) are presented in
the odes as having become themselves the very embodiment of poikilia. The sec-
ond type of mortal feebleness involves their unsuccessful or incompetent man-
agement of intellectual, discerning capacities. From this point of view, the lan-
guage of vision becomes prominent in denoting confusion and deception.
However, these two types of erroneous behaviour are not always distinctly div-
ided. It is often the case that incapability to use one’s intellect correctly is dram-
atized in one’s entanglement in the ‘fetters’ of confusion that poikilia has
weaved. However, the word poikilos in Pindar does not always have negative
connotations: see, for example, Nem. 4. 14. In fact, poetic art is judged by
the poet’s ability to handle his multiplicity of themes and poetic language cor-
rectly. From such a point of view, Parmenides’ poem is closer to the Platonic
perspective. The poem’s linguistic architecture is designed to exemplify the ar-
guments it conveys. The choice of diction and arrangement of language in frag-
ment 8 rejects multiplicity through the adoption of a linguistic style that seeks to
guide the intellect out of perplexity and along the correct path of reasoning. Fu-
tile “wandering” (planẽ) and “colorfulness” are projected in the rejected realm
of Doxa. On Parmenides, see Mourelatos (1970: 94 – 135). On the motifs of
mixis and poikilia in the Presocratic fragments, see the Introduction n. 29 and
n. 30; See also discussion below, Chapter One, Section Two.
 4. Imagistic discourse 65

a multiplicity of images that build a great deal on poetic language and

imagery. Plato constructs images to discuss the just city, the Forms,
the innermost depths of the human soul, its disposition, and its lack
of virtues. His treatment of these images has a twofold aim. Firstly, as
Socrates makes clear in the opening lines of the Cave eikn, his interloc-
utors have not been brought up to deal successfully with sense-percep-
tive and ethical multiplicity in its multifarious forms. Plato then has Soc-
rates capitalize on the discerning powers of human cognition by con-
structing verbal images that depict both a faithful image of ontological
reality (the Sun as the Good) and the epistemological point that the
process of coming to understand true reality cannot be broken into sep-
arate parts, one for each mode (the Line and the Cave). For Plato in the
Republic, this entails re-ordering the interlocutors’ familiar poetic lan-
guage by re-arranging its imagery and diction for new purposes, thereby
amending the way in which poetry has so far (re)presented, primarily by
means of performance, the most significant matters, which mean not
only the gods and the afterlife, but also human conduct and its ethical
qualities. Plato’s methodology here is based on the idea that humans
can learn to control polymorphy and can battle against confusion if
they change their perspective on the world, both sense-perceptible
and invisible. Plato’s linguistic images in the Republic attempt exactly
this.41

4.2 Eikones in Gorgias’ Helen

Most of the issues examined in relation to Platonic imagery converge in
Gorgias’ short rhetorical work Helen of the fifth century B.C. Gorgias
sets out to acquit the greatest adulteress in Greek history of the charges
customarily brought against her, and in doing so he constructs a series of
arguments that bring together language (logos) and poetry (poiẽsis) as its
subcategory (§9), various technai (magic and sorcery), images and sight
(eikones and opsis), and the susceptibility of human psychẽ and love

41 So Gordon (1999: 8 – 10). See also Lear, in Santas, G. (ed.) (2006: 25 – 43). In
this study I do not examine in detail Book 10 of the Republic because Plato does
not create eikones in it (the story of Er is a mythos, rather than an eikn). Al-
though Plato discusses in detail the mimetic character of poetry, an analysis
of this aspect of Plato’s attack on poetry extends beyond the scope of this
study. On Book 10, see discussion in Annas (1980: 335 – 343). In addition
see Halliwell (1988) and (2002). See also Crotty (2009: Ch. 4).
66 Section One: The Theory

(eros).42 Gorgias treats poetry as a subcategory of logos and argues that po-
etry derives its great power (dynamis) from language in general:
EQ d³ k|cor b pe_sar ja· tµm xuwµm !pat^sar, oqd³ pq¹r toOto wakep¹m
!pokoc^sashai ja· tµm aQt_am !pok}sashai ¨de. K|cor dum\stgr l]car
1st_m, dr slijqot\tyi s~lati ja· !vamest\tyi hei|tata 5qca !poteke?
d}matai c±q ja· v|bom paOsai ja· k}pgm !veke?m ja· waq±m 1meqc\sashai
ja· 5keom 1paun/sai. (§8)
If speech persuaded and deluded her mind, even against this it is not hard to
defend her or free her from blame, as follows: speech is a powerful master
and achieves the most divine feats with the smallest and least evident body.
It can stop fear, relieve pain, create joy, and increase pity. (trans. Gagarin
and Woodruff 1995)
Tµm po_gsim ûpasam ja· mol_fy ja· amol\fy k|com 5womta l]tqom7 Hr to»r
!jo}omtar eQs/khe ja· vq_jg peq_vobor ja· 5keor pok}dajqur ja· p|hor
vikopemh^r, 1p’ !kkotq_ym te pqacl\tym ja· syl\tym eqtuw_air ja·
duspqac_air Udi|m ti p\hgla di± t_m k|cym 5pahem B xuw^. (§9)
Poetry as a whole I deem and name speech with meter. To its listeners po-
etry brings a fearful shuddering, a tearful pity, and a grieving desire, while
through its words the soul feels its own feelings for good and bad fortune in
the affairs and lives of others. (trans. Gagarin and Woodruff 1995)
In his Origins of Criticism, Andrew Ford (2002: 161 – 87) has shown how
Gorgias’ treatment of logos and poiẽsis should be seen in the light of fifth
century philosophical discussions that promote a “scientific reduction of
speech to language as substance with inherent properties and powers”
(here at 161). Gorgias’ materialist poetics in Helen is not only illustrated
in the way he views logos as “a great potentate with a miniscule, invisible
body” that is able to cause many great things on human souls. It is also
reflected in the way he pairs speech with images, thus stressing the per-
vasive psychological influence of the physical environment on the
human mind.43 It is in this context that we come across the single oc-
currence of the word eikn in Helen. Having explained the effect of
logos on psychẽ, Gorgias moves on to show that Helen should be also ac-
quitted if indeed she surrendered to the doings of Eros (eQ c±q 5qyr Gm b
taOta p\mta pq\nar §15). The rule of Eros is closely associated with the
power of sight and Gorgias argues that “by seeing the mind is moulded even

42 A detailed analysis of Gorgias’ Helen lies outside the scope of this work. See
Rosenmayer (1955: 225 – 260); Segal (1962: 99 – 155); Wardy (1996: Ch. 2);
Ford (2002: 161 – 187).
43 Ford has discussed these aspects of Gorgias’ Helen very informatively (2002:
176 – 182).
 4. Imagistic discourse 67

in its character” (Di± d³ t/r exeyr B xuwµ j!m to?r tq|poir tupoOtai
(§15); transl. Gagarin and Woodruff 1995).
This argument that seeks to exonerate Helen on the basis of the
power of opsis offers a number of examples, all of which are designed
to stress the vulnerability of the soul to images produced by sight.
The lengthy narration of how sight may instigate fear, which “shakes
the mind” and “extinguishes and expels thought” (1taq\whg ja·
1t\qane tµm xuw^m §16, and ovtyr !p]sbese ja· 1n^kasem b v|bor t¹
m|gla §17), concludes with a statement that contains the single occur-
rence in the work of the word eikn: ovtyr eQj|mar t_m bqyl]mym
pqacl\tym B exir 1m]cqaxem 1m t_i vqom^lati (“so thoroughly does
sight engrave on the mind images of things that are seen” §17). In
these paragraphs, Gorgias’ approach to the impact (typoutai) of vision
on the soul is similar to his earlier treatment of the effects of logos. 44
In discussing the psychological influence of sight and language, Gorgias
builds heavily on contemporary scientific discussions about the mind’s
relation to its physical environment. Against this background Gorgias’
arguments about logos and sight rest on the psychẽ’s submissiveness and
passivity: the “irresistible, almost mechanical impact” of logos and
sight is something the human soul cannot escape from (Ford 2002:
177 – 9, at 179). Thus Helen cannot but be acquitted.
Gorgias’ deployment of the word eikn in this context is an artisti-
cally expressed synopsis of the manner in which images of any sort con-
stantly bombard the soul that receives them. And against this barrage of
images and sights the human soul, according to Gorgias, can do very lit-
tle, if anything at all. What is interesting here is that, in his deployment
of the term eikn, Gorgias seems to have divested it completely of its in-
herent semantics of resemblance (homoiosis). Being etymologically con-
nected with the verb eoika (to be like), the noun obliquely emphasizes
the similarity between two objects or concepts. Plato will exploit this
nuanced term in the Republic, building both philosophical argumenta-
tion and epistemological gradation on its manifold dynamics. Nonethe-
less, Gorgias’ materialist way of viewing the soul’s perception of reality
by means of sight or language does not mean that it is necessary for him
to explore notions of resemblance between eikones and their prototypes,
which inevitably generates issues of comparison as a means to investigat-
ing some further reality. For Gorgias, eikones are what the mind (psychẽ)

44 The parallel drawn is also pursued by Ford (2002: 179 – 187 esp. 180 – 181); see
also (181 with n. 76).
68 Section One: The Theory

absorbs in life and our vivid pictorial surroundings. In the concluding

section of Helen, Gorgias exploits this thought further still when he par-
allels the impact that paintings and statues have on the human psychẽ
with the influence of Alexander’s body (t¹ toO )ken\mdqou s~lati
§19) on Helen’s soul (§18 – 19). From this environment of artistic rep-
resentation, a context that could easily accommodate notions of resem-
blance and the reproduction of prototypes, the eikn word is absent.
Gorgias’ use of common vocabulary in this context violates the
boundaries between reality and artistic reproductions of it. In his discus-
sion of psychological susceptibility to the physical environment, Gorgias
joins together into one whole beautiful physical bodies, eikones, agalmata
and paintings, fusing images and reality together and, in his assessment of
the impact they make upon the eye of the beholder, he attributes equal
power to both.45 At the same time, the power of sight on the human
soul is similar to that of logos, since language, too, stamps and sways
the soul with images of which we may have no experience or knowl-
edge (§13):
fti d’ B peih½ pqosioOsa t` k|c\ ja· tµm xuwµm 1tup~sato fpyr 1bo}-
keto, wqµ lahe?m pq_tom l³m to»r t_m leteyqok|cym k|cour, oVtimer d|nam
!mt· d|ngr tµm l³m !vek|lemoi tµm d’ 1meqcas\lemoi t± %pista ja· %dgka
va_meshai to?r t/r d|ngr ellasim 1po_gsam…
To see that persuasion, when added to speech, indeed molds the mind as it
wishes, one must first study the arguments of astronomers, who replace
opinion with opinion: displacing one but implanting another, they make
incredible, invisible matters apparent to the eyes of opinion. (trans. Gagarin
and Woodruff 1995)
Ford has argued that in his discussion of the effects of the environment
on the human soul, Plato has adopted the materialist poetics of Gorgias
and Democritus. Indeed, in his Republic, Plato rests his arguments on the
power of vision and the use of eikones as a means for examining the na-
ture of justice and its difference from injustice. Yet in doing so, as we
shall see, Plato also departs from Gorgias’ view that sight is an uncon-
trollable, all-absorbing, indiscriminating faculty that implants images of
any sort on the human soul. In fact, in his own treatment of images
and vision throughout the Republic, Plato blends logos and images in a

45 Cf. the image of the enemy army that he constructs as an illustrative example of
his argumentation (§16). Corporeality in this section is again prominent: the po-
lemia smata are juxtaposed with the vibrant gleam of bronze and iron. See Ford
(2002: 180 – 182).
 4. Imagistic discourse 69

unique way (eikones) and, whilst acknowledging their authoritative

power on the human soul, he also proposes new ways as to how we
should control their domination by questioning the truthfulness of the
incongruent and deceptive stimuli provided by sight and logos’ errone-
ous organising of them. From this perspective, the Republic’s images,
that is, eikones and imagistic language, acquire an epistemological signif-
icance and become tightly woven into Plato’s handling of the education
of Socrates’ interlocutors. As we will see, language continues to be
strongly pictorial, even outside the limits of the so-called Platonic ei-
kones, as if Plato were trying to capture the eye of the mind and to
‘stamp’ (cf. the Gorgianic tupoutai) it with images of his reality.46

4.3 Definition of Platonic imagery

The terms image and imagery are generally employed in two ways (Pen-
der 2000: 7). On the one hand, image has become a generic term to
epitomize figures of speech in general, whilst, on the other, imagery re-
fers to the whole class of verbal comparisons. Silk’s definition here is en-
lightening: “By imagery I mean primarily metaphor, simile, and the var-
ious forms of comparatio” (Silk 1974: 5). His definition will prove useful
here in this work, firstly because it brings out (and thus is faithful to)
Plato’s marked intention in the text of investigating similarities and dif-
ferences between concepts by means of his use of eikones, and, secondly,
because such a definition pays rich methodological dividends in untan-
gling Plato’s different forms of comparison, since not all imagery is of
the same form or plays the same philosophical role in the Republic.
As I stated above, the Republic’s images can be divided into two
broader categories. In the course of his dialogue, Socrates constructs
several eikones, short stories, whose main characteristic is that they im-
plant strong visual impressions on his audience’s minds.47 These eikones
are identified by the intra-dramatic interlocutors as a distinctive mode of
discourse, and, in terms of my methodology, they constitute one cate-

46 See discussion below, Section Two, Chapter Three.

47 Notice that it is almost a linguistic topos that the speaker who uses an eikn in his
speech invites his interlocutor to visualize the story to be narrated. It is interest-
ing to note that this is not the case when the launch of a myth-narrative is an-
nounced to the interlocutor(s). The typical introductory formula in this case, as
Murray notes, is “listen rather than imagine, picture or visualize” this: Murray,
in Buxton, R. (ed.) (1999: 255 – 256).
70 Section One: The Theory

gory of what has been identified here as Platonic images. A second cat-
egory of images, however, involves a different type of imagistic config-
uration also woven into the Republic’s texture. These pictorial linguistic
environments, however, differ from the eikones in that they are not iden-
tified by the interlocutors, either as eikones proper, or as bearing any notable
methodological or semantic import. Their importance, nonetheless, in-
creases, once we pay close attention to the selected diction of these im-
agistic structures and to the way the diction and the structures fluctuate
in intensity and increase in complexity over the dialogue’s long stretches
of argumentation, which they do because of particular philosophical-
methodological needs.
It should be stated that Plato has Socrates be aware of this latter cat-
egory of image-building, for which I will use the term imagistic language
here, and this is how Plato’s dramatization of language is in effect ach-
ieved in the Republic, for it is Socrates who both synthesizes and orches-
trates the employment of this type of discourse. The interlocutors’ in-
ability, on the other hand, to discern the significance of this second
type of imagery should not necessarily suggest that this is common lan-
guage. It certainly is common to them and the stylistic manifold nature of
Socrates’ discourse is intended to point in this direction. However, in
order to grasp the philosophical value of this second category of Platon-
ic images, we will need to shift our perspective on the Republic’s images.
In the view of Silk, images, in the form of similes and metaphors, are an
important means for drawing comparisons in speech. This is crucial for
monitoring their function in the dialogue, since Socrates constantly
compares various concepts and ideas.
It is primarily in this direction that the emergence or insertion of
imagery, often restricted to single words only, will be of most signifi-
cance for the reading I propose here. In highly critical moments in
the Republic, pictorial phraseology deriving from traditional poetic ori-
gins blends with wording that eschews sense-perception, thus resulting
in the creation of an idiosyncratic type of discourse. Thus, to take only a
few characteristic examples from the Republic: (the many beautiful
things) “roll around” (kulindeitai) between “what is not” (toO te lµ
emtor) and “what purely is” (ja· toO emtor eQkijqim_r, 479d 4 – 5);
“true philosophical natures will always love this lesson that reveals to
them the ousia that always is and does not wander (ja· lµ pkamyl]mgr)
because of coming to be and decaying” (485b2 – 3); the nature of a
“true (alẽths) philosopher is to be contrasted to that of a peplasmenos
one” (478d 12 – 3); Doxa is explained as “ darker (skotdesteron) than
 4. Imagistic discourse 71

knowledge but clearer (phanoteron) than ignorance” (487c 13 – 14); the

polis under construction must be “cleansed” or “purified” (diakathair-
ontes), in the same way that harmoniai and rhythms should be “purified”
for the city’s guardians (kathairmen) (399e 5; 399e 8; 527d); progress in
the argument is portrayed as an anabasis that may lead us closer to a cor-
rect “view” of justice and injustice (445c1 – 7). The ẽthẽ of the demo-
cratic city are as “diverse” and “colourful” (pepoikilmena) as “a many-
coloured garment diversified with every shade of colour” (¦speq
Rl\tiom poij_kom p÷sim %mhesi pepoijikl]mom, 557c – d).48 The citizens
of this city are also “diverse” (pantodapoi, 557c1), but so is the beast-
like soul of the tyrant (hgq_ou poij_kou ja· pokujev\kou, 588c7 – 8,
pamtodap¹m hgq_om, 588e5).49 We have pointed out above that these
linguistic combinations occur in the conversation without attention
being drawn to them by either Socrates or his interlocutors. This is re-
markable, especially in the light of Socrates’ clear concern with matters
of methodology and language usage elsewhere in the Republic. Why
then should our attention be drawn to this type of discourse? In what
way is this discourse distinctive? A meticulous examination of this dic-
tion requires firmly fixed criteria on the basis of which it can be desig-
nated as stylistically atypical or distinctive in the Republic’s discourse, as it
may easily lead us to highly complex questions about its metaphoric
character. Disentangling this problem is critical for understanding how
Socrates handles his philosophic language. This is perilous ground that
we are traversing here and so I shall now attempt to construe Plato’s
methodology in more precise terms.
Shifting the boundaries of our reception of imagery in the Republic
necessarily leads us to reconsider how far it is indeed traditional. Certain
diction in the Republic is traditional to the extent that it immediately
evokes its well-established literary background. Yet Plato is doing
much more than merely embedding this type of imagery in the text:

48 Anthos denotes “especially bright colours” (des couleurs particulièrement vives),

see Mugler (1964) sv %mhor (35); see also LSJ sv II.
49 See also Plato’s mixing of the language of mathematics with the young guard-
ians’ education, in Rep. 534d1 – 6 (to}r ce sautoO pa?dar, otr t` k|c\ tq]veir
te ja· paide}eir, eU pote 5qc\ tq]voir, oqj #m 1\sair, ¢r 1cçlai, !k|cour emtar
¦speq cqall\r… [“Well then, if you should ever be charged in actual fact with
the upbringing and education of these imaginary children of yours, you will not
allow, I suppose, to bear rule in your polis so long as their minds are, as a math-
ematician might say, irrational quantities, not commensurate with the highest
responsibilities”]. See Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 143 and 193 – 194).
72 Section One: The Theory

the philosopher breaks the link with any traditional literary past, as he
refrains from transforming customary motifs into new themes. In fact,
traditional story-patterns are now encapsulated in mere words (cf. for
example, planatai and kulindeitai), which, while evoking traditional
thought-patterns and ideas, are intended to play a new (philosophical)
role in an innovative environment.
On the principle that one cannot make any sound advance in phil-
osophical reasoning unless one uses language appropriately, the Republic
employs strict Platonic philosophic criteria in order to enact and drama-
tize this language-cleansing and restructuring. Plato’s use of the second
category of images in particular serves this philosophical purpose. As I
will show in detail in the following pages, this process is particularly no-
ticeable in specific textual environments where Socrates submits highly
complex philosophical ideas about ontology and epistemology, the vir-
tues (aretai) of souls, various unjust souls, or human pleasure (hẽdonẽ). It
is at these crucial philosophic moments that Plato’s employment of im-
agistic language becomes striking, since diction that is readily recognized
as belonging to the genre of poetry is transplanted in certain argumen-
tative environments, thereby creating marked and innovative poetic-
philosophical imageries that function as a philosophic dialect which
opens up to the Republic’s wide-ranging intra-dramatic interlocutors.
In these highly colourful contexts, the dialogue’s imagistic language is
not intended as an ornament and is not dictated only by reasons of aes-
thetics, although, of course, Plato’s language in these instances is indeed
unsurpassed from an aesthetic perspective.
One can thus go further and argue against Aristotle that this mixture
of well-recognized imagistic and philosophical diction is not metaphor-
ical. Of course metaphor is present in these contexts, in the sense that
Plato has transferred to a new environment traditional poetic diction or
quotations from the genre of poetry and mingled them with another
type of diction far more easily recognized as ‘philosophical’. Yet this in-
novative Platonic amalgamation serves fundamental needs in the work.
Plato adapts and re-organizes poetic language because, once ‘cleansed’ in
this way, its connotations are integral both to the expression of specific
ideas and to the Republic’s philosophically unsophisticated audience at
whom these are directed. In these places, to identify this type of lan-
guage as metaphorical or ornamental, and to seek to trade it for an al-
ternative (possibly more neutral), would involve changing the Republic’s
epistemology altogether, its intra-dramatic audience, and Plato’s educa-
tional aims.
 4. Imagistic discourse 73

I will discuss in detail Plato’s treatment of this type of language in

Section Two, in Chapters Two, Three and Four. However, an example
of how this imagistic or pictorial linguistic style functions may be helpful
here. In Book 7, Socrates discusses with Glaucon the characteristics and
educational aims of the five subjects (mathẽmata) that the philosopher-
kings will have to undertake in order to grasp the Forms. The ideas
that he tries to bring home about number theory, plane and solid geom-
etry, astronomy and harmonics at this stage of the dialogue are highly
complex and intellectually demanding, even for Glaucon, who as we
shall see in Chapter Two is the only interlocutor in the dialogue
whose thought and language exhibits signs of quasi-abstraction. In this
context, Socrates ventures to demonstrate how the study of these sub-
jects is intended to direct the mind towards the investigation of realities
that are not perceptible through the senses and are intelligible alone.
The aim of each mathẽma is the removal from reliance on sense percep-
tion, so that the mind, now unobstructed, will come to understand the
immaterial Forms and achieve the final theria of the Good. Glaucon
cannot easily follow Socrates’ argumentation here regarding the manner
in which thought may be dissociated from sense-perception, and he
therefore often interrupts the presentation of the subject to raise ques-
tions and ask for further elucidation. However, in his interruptions of
Socrates, he repeatedly associates the five lessons (mathẽmata) with
sense-perception.
Plato’s language in this context is designed to dramatize the tension
that results from one’s inability to “ascend to problems” and consider
numerical relations in abstraction. In these Stephanus lines, imagistic
language intensifies in certain places and recedes in others, depending
on Glaucon’s inability to grasp Socrates’ argumentation regarding the
philosophical aims of each branch. Thus Plato has Socrates express his
main complaint against the musical theorists’ inability to dissociate the
mathematics of concordant numbers from their sense-perceptive, sono-
rous manifestation by means of the vividly pictorial language of an eikn
that exploits vocabulary drawn from the torturing and beating of slaves
(531a – c). In terms of the interpretation I offer in this study, Plato’s im-
agistic style in contexts such as that of Book 7, rather than being meta-
phorical, works towards contrasting the intelligible with the corporeal
and sense-perceptible, thus seeking to link erroneous modes of ap-
proaching the latter with rhetoric and poetry.
Thus, in addition to the image of the tortured strings, Plato also uti-
lizes further imagistic diction that is transplanted to this new context
74 Section One: The Theory

from his eikones of the Sun and the Cave (fsa !macj\fei xuwµm eQr 1je?-
mom t¹m t|pom letastq]veshai 1m è 1sti t¹ eqdailom]statom toO emtor
[“anything has that tendency if it compels the soul to turn itself around
towards the region in which lies the happiest of the things that are”,
526e2 – 4], 1jjaha_qeta_ te ja· !mafypuqe?tai !pokk}lemom ja· tuvko}-
lemom rp¹ t_m %kkym 1pitgdeul\tym [“in every soul there is an instru-
ment that is purified and rekindled by such subjects”, 527e1 – 2]). In the
same context of the discussion of astronomy, the versatile word poikilia is
also deployed to address the problem of how sense-perceptual variety
can deceive the mind or obstruct its intellectual ascent.50
Nonetheless, as is often the case with Plato, things are not always as
straightforward as they may appear prima facie. The Republic’s intra-dra-
matic audience is not homogeneous and thus neither is Socrates’ lan-
guage. The dialogue’s educational character is built on the different in-
tellectual and ethical qualities that its dramatic personae represent, and
Plato links their distinctive characteristics to the manifoldness of discur-
sive modes. Glaucon’s persona is significant from this perspective because
it is through him, that is, in Socrates’ dialogue with this interlocutor,
rather than with his brother Adeimantus, that Plato offers alternative
ways of approaching philosophic language and argumentation. This is
manifested in two critical points in the Republic: at the end of Book
5, where the Forms are for the first time (explicitly) broached in the
conversation, and in Book 9, where Socrates discusses the tyrant’s rela-
tion to pleasure (hẽdonẽ). In both instances, Plato exploits the distinctive
dynamics of Glaucon’s persona to experiment with different styles of
constructing philosophic argumentation regarding the same ideas. And
in both instances, with Glaucon as his main interlocutor, Socrates
moves from a less coloured and poeticized type of language, which
probably would not appeal to the Republic’s sight-lovers (475d – e), to
a vividly imagistic type of discourse with which both sight-lovers and
hedonists are most at ease. There is of course both philosophic and ed-
ucational value in this authorial strategy as Plato’s architectonics dram-

50 Rep. 529c7 – 8: taOta l³m t± 1m t` oqqam` poij_klata, 1pe_peq 1m bqat`

pepo_jiktai (“we should consider the ornaments that brighten the sky”…);
529b – 530a: t0 peq· t¹m oqqam¹m poijik_ô paqade_clasi wqgst]om t/r pq¹r
1je?ma lah^seyr 6meja (“we should use the embroidery in the sky as a model
in the study of these other things”). On Plato’s eikn here see Adam (1963
[1902] vol. 2: 134 – 135 and 183 – 190). On his criticism of the Pythagoreans
and the so-called musical empiricists, see Burkert (1972: 335 and 370 – 374);
see also Barker (1978: 337 – 341); and (1989: 46); Petraki (2008: 147 – 170).
 4. Imagistic discourse 75

atize most vividly the way in which correct philosophical reasoning is

entirely reliant upon both the cautious use not only of poetic language,
but of language in general, and on the capacity of the participants in the
Republic to handle philosophic dialogue. In this respect, Plato’s philo-
sophic discourse differs profoundly from that of the poets and the ora-
tors, as do also their respective viewpoints as regards ethics.
Plato’s alternation of stylistic modalities in the Republic is therefore
related to Socrates’ co-speaker and to the ideas discussed. If we follow
Socrates’ management of poetic imagery throughout the Republic close-
ly, we see that Plato’s main speaker refrains from using poetic parlance
fortuitously.51 There is a pattern behind Plato’s uses of eikones and im-
agistic discourse in the dialogue, which, when traced, casts new light
on his construction of philosophical discourse. Such a line of reasoning
implies Plato’s incorporation of thick clusters of poetic diction and im-
agery in specific environments, rather than being merely ornamental or
even foreign to the content, and is absolutely essential to bringing out
the intrinsic qualities of the idea discussed. To give only a few examples
in line with such an interpretation, Socrates’ use of the poetic kulindeitai
at the end of Book 5 is a most realistic dramatization of things “rolling
around between Being and non-Being” because the word, now trans-
planted into the new philosophic environment, carries with it a long
history of poetic imagery of negative connotations.52 Socrates does not
need to add much to his argumentation at this point in order to describe
the negative character that he attributes to Doxa. His interlocutors, well-
educated in poetry as they are, cannot have missed the implications.
The depiction of the tyrant’s soul in Book 9 functions similarly
(588c – 589c). Plato is building here on a long tradition of poetic image-
ry that identifies disorder with mythical many-headed beasts or hetero-
geneous creatures whose power is often subdued in grand battles with
gods.53 Traditional imagery is thus well-suited to illustrating the true na-
ture of the tyrant’s soul which, more often than not, passes undetected,

51 In this way the logos mirrors not only the thoughts of the person speaking but
also the nature of the subject-matter.
52 The word kulindoumai bears only negative connotations in poetry. In the Repub-
lic and the Phaedrus Plato makes the most of them adapting the word to his own
ends. See discussion in Section Two, Chapter Two below. See also Pender
(1999: 75 – 107).
53 On the mythical many-headed beasts and their suppression by Zeus, see Too
([1998] 2004: 19 – 22).
76 Section One: The Theory

for human cognition has not been trained correctly to discern what
seems to be invisible to common vision.
The Republic’s text is thus woven in order to exemplify the incon-
gruence and multiplicity (poikilia and mixis) that pervades humans and
the world, visible and invisible, and demonstrate how cognition must
battle against multiplicity and diversity by way of sound philosophical
thinking. Plato speaks to us mostly through images as Socrates weaves
together a number of shorter or longer eikones in order to communicate
with his interlocutors.54 Yet this is not the only linguistic style that Plato
explores. There are short moments in the dialogue when his language
becomes as ‘cleansed’ and devoid of colouring as can be – his use of
the reflexive auto to expression and other similar types of wording high-
lights in the Republic the instances when language is freed from the col-
ourful vividness of linguistic poikilia. Such moments when a new type of
diction is tested in the dialogue are few and, most importantly, are not
followed easily by Socrates’ speakers. Although speaking in eikones is not
philosophically satisfactory to them, they cannot keep up with language
when it is completely purified of poetic colourings and images either.55
I therefore suggest that the language of the Republic constitutes a
highly composite mosaic in which images predominate and in which
different modes of linguistic configuration meet. This results not so
much in the creation of a prototype kind of language best fitting the dis-
tinctive needs of philosophical enunciation in general, as in the high-
lighting of the difficulties inherent in thought and in the language
used to talk about issues that matter most to humans. Plato’s treatment
of the various ideas investigated in the text both underscores the capa-
bilities and inadequacies of these particular Socratic interlocutors and
dramatizes the multiplicity of cognitive paths that humans may follow
over the long journey of philosophy. Unlike Parmenides’ youth, Pla-
tonic interlocutors in the Republic never reach their destination, the
Forms. In Platonic parlance, they never leave the Cave completely de-
spite Socrates’ use of an assortment of techniques to help them catch a
representative glimpse of the Platonic Real. Against this ontological

54 For ancient criticism, see Aristotle, Metaphysics 13.5, 1079b2; for modern criti-
cism, see Robinson (1953: 220); and for intra-dramatic criticism, see Adeiman-
tus in Rep. 487e6 – 488a6: all types of audience appear too ambitious intellectu-
ally to settle on this mode of communication.
55 On poikillein as diversity in colour see Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 235) and the
Introduction above n. 29.
 4. Imagistic discourse 77

background, Plato’s Socrates has done his best to demonstrate how jus-
tice differs in all respects from injustice and how absolutely essential it is
to preserve the correct distinction between the two in leading a happy
(eudaimn) life.
5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language
and metaphoric language

The second category of images in the Republic (which I have called im-
agistic language) raises a number of methodological questions. Firstly, is
there a relation between the two categories of images I distinguished
above, namely between the well-documented eikones and the so-called
imagistic language? And, secondly, how justified are we in arguing
against Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic language that it is merely meta-
phoric? The analysis of both questions will take up the rest of my dis-
cussion here.

5.1. Platonic Eikones: A homoiõsis?

Pender, in her analysis of the term eikn in the Platonic corpus, inter-
prets it to mean illustration, image, comparison, simile and metaphor.56
In particular, the term and its various cognates (eikaz, apeikaz) can be
used both rhetorically to mean “metaphors, similes and other types of
verbal comparisons and illustrations” and, in non-rhetorical contexts,
to denote “a statue or portrait or figures in paintings” and the likenesses
achieved by artistic representations or reflections. Within the broader
context of art, the term is also used to refer to representation in
music (Rep. 402c6 and Laws 668c) or the likeness created by actors on
stage (Laws 935e, and Philebus 49c). In the Republic, the word is em-

56 See Pender (2000: 1 – 27); cf. Stanford (1972: 3 – 20), who in his examination
of ancient Greek metaphor, observes (4): “It is much to be regretted that Plato
does not advance any discussion of metaphorical language in the Cratylus.
Therein he confines himself mainly to etymological problems, and depicts Soc-
rates as preferring to theorize on the origins and meanings of single words rather
than on phrases in colloquial or literary use, that is, he discusses vocabulary and
not speech, so that the dialogue interests the lexicographer and philologist more
than the student of rhetoric and literature. Otherwise, if so inspired a master of
imagery and imagination had focused his brilliant faculties on the perplexities of
our subject, what an illumination might there have been to guide explorers
of the d\sjioi p|qoi of metaphor” (emphasis added).
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 79

ployed in representations of bad and good characters as depicted in po-

etry (Rep. 401b5; cf. 401b8). Outside the context of art, the term can
also denote reflection or shadow.57 In Plato’s ontology and metaphysics,
eikn is “an established term for the relationship between the phenom-
enal world and the ultimate reality”.58 In this last category Pender places
one of the most celebrated dramatic instances in the Republic (533a1),
where Socrates refrains from speaking to Glaucon about the nature of
dialectic because this would immediately require Socrates to abandon ei-
kones as a discursive mode and to adopt an alternative method that,
however, cannot be followed in the context.
Pender rightly observes that despite the similarities between proto-
type and image as reflection, copy or representation, Plato is always
consistent in drawing our attention to the point that the copy is defi-
cient.59 She cites several examples from the Platonic corpus that high-
light the epistemological distance that separates the original from its
copy. In the form of a rhetorical question at Cratylus 432d, it is stated
that the eikones are very far from (endeousin) possessing qualities which
are the exact counterparts of the things of which they are eikones. 60 In Cra-
tylus 439a7 – b3, Socrates states again that the images and the names of
things are distinct from the things themselves and asks: “Which is likely
to be the nobler (kallion) or clearer (saphestera) way – to learn of the
image (1j t/r eQj|mor) whether the image and the truth of which it is
an image have been portrayed accurately (eikastai), or to learn of the
truth whether the truth and the image of it have been well-constructed
(pq]pomtor eUqcastai)?”61 The reply is not surprising. The ambitious
interlocutor opts for learning based on the truth. Plato thus condemns
image-building in language on the grounds that it is inferior and
holds second place to the original it seeks to portray by means of illus-
tration or comparison. This process, however which Plato rejects here is

57 Phaedo 99e and Rep. 402b, 509d and 510e.

58 Pender makes reference here to the Timaeus 29b – c and 37d5 – 7.
59 Several scholars have discussed the reasons behind this authorial deliberation
and I will return on this complex issue later. See Gallop’s insightful comments
in (1964/65: 113 – 131); and Gallop, in Anton, J.P and Kustas, G. L. (eds.)
(1972: 187 – 201); Vernant (1991: 182). In relation to the Sophist, see also No-
tomi (1999: 122 – 134 and 156 – 162); Blondell (2002: 365 – 377).
60 Pender cites Jowett’s translation: “… having qualities which are the exact coun-
terparts of the realities which they represent”. A translation closer to the text is
proposed here.
61 Cf. Laws 668a – b.
80 Section One: The Theory

adopted elsewhere so that it becomes all-pervasive in the Republic with

the result that dense thickets of imagery build many more comparisons
than are usually noticed by scholars of Plato (Lloyd 1966: 229).
Eidla and eikones are coupled together and criticized for their re-
duced epistemological value in the Republic’s three most well-known
images of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave in Books 6 and 7. Until
this point in the text, it has been the Socratic interlocutors, rather
than Socrates himself, who have expressed dissatisfaction with Socrates’
selection of this particular mode of speech.62 However, the image of the
Line, in which Socrates focuses on the classification of different levels of
the distortion of reality and states of cognition, is now laden with the
eikn noun and its various linguistic cognates. The divided Line
comes after the image of the Sun, which has drawn a distinction be-
tween the visible (horata/hormena) and the intelligible (noẽta/nooumena).
In the image of the Line, Socrates elaborates on this distinction further
(Adam 1963 [1902] vol. 2: 156). The visible level is subdivided into two
sections. The lower one is comprised of eikones, which are said to be
phantasmata and skies, shadows and dim reflections on various surfaces.
Water is offered as an example, as well as other shiny (phana, 510 a 2)
materials which easily generate reflection. The upper part of the visible
contains the various originals of these reflections (eikones), animals, nat-
ural and manufactured objects. Having dealt with the lower segment of
the Line, Socrates turns to the corresponding divisions of the intelligi-
ble:
Pi t¹ l³m aqtoO to?r t|te lilghe?sim ¢r eQj|sim wqyl]mg xuwµ fgte?m !mac-
j\fetai 1n rpoh]seym, oqj 1p’ !qwµm poqeuol]mg !kk’ 1p· tekeut^m, t¹ d’ aw
6teqom – t¹ 1p’ !qwµm !mup|hetom – 1n rpoh]seyr QoOsa ja· %meu t_m peq·
1je?mo eQj|mym, aqto?r eUdesi di’ aqt_m tµm l]hodom poioul]mg (510 b4 – 9).
In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before,
is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle
but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a
first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but
without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and
making its investigation through them.
These lines are dense with complex epistemological ideas. Glaucon is
now at a loss (510b10) and Socrates has to resort to examples to explain
his distinction between dianoia (Thought) and noẽsis (Knowledge). The
lines are important for our understanding of the philosophical value of

62 See Rep. 375d5; 396d4; 401b2; 401e1; 402b5; 402c6; 464b2; 536a6.
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 81

the term eikn as a method for approaching Plato’s eidetic level. At the
stage of dianoia, however, progress to the !mup|hetom !qw^m requires the
dismissal of eikones. Thus in broaching the four levels of cognition in the
Line, Plato has Socrates emphasize the procedural continuity of the first
three levels by underscoring the mimetic ramifications of the word eikn
(to?r t|te lilghe?sim ¢r eQj|sim wqyl]mg xuwµ fgte?m, 510b4).63 The no-
tion of resemblance is thus stressed in the present context. However,
Socrates’ coinage of the word eikasia to identify his lowest level of cog-
nition assigns negative characteristics to the rhetorical use of images (ei-
kones) with which it is etymologically connected.64 The Republic Book 6
then signals an important change as, almost in the same breath, Socrates
emphasizes the methodological value of using eikones to aid one’s ascent
to the Forms and stresses their deceptive epistemological character at the
Line’s bottom level.
On the basis of what Socrates says by means of the image of the
Line, the majority of humans must settle for ‘copies’ or ‘representations’
and some of them may even hover between the two, when what is truly
important for the mind to grasp is the prototype.65 The image of the
Line makes the epistemological point that the sense-perceptible cannot
be separated from the intelligible and that images are a necessary inves-
tigational method for approaching Forms, for images can be dropped
only at the eidetic level of noẽsis. When viewed in relation to the
image of the Line, however, the image of the Cave makes a further sig-
nificant epistemological point. Not everyone grasps the methodological
value of images, for most people spend their entire life deceived as to

63 On mimẽsis see Belfiore (1984: 129 – 132). McKeon (1952: 147 – 175); see also
Halliwell (1988) and (2002).
64 Note that in the literature the word eikn has been linked with the term eikos,
see Synodinou (1981); Kalligas (2003: 141 – 169) has linked the Line and Cave’s
level of eikasia with the term eikos (rather than with eikn) and argued that Pla-
to’s Dialectic is intended to oppose sophistic modes of argumentation, as these
are exercised at the two lower epistemological levels (eikasia and pistis).
65 See Morgan (1990: 151); Freydberg (1997: Ch. 3), makes a similar point but
follows an interpretative line different from mine: “Why is the doctrine of in-
tellectualism, which proclaims the intelligibility of all being, presented by Plato
in images? Why is the doctrine presented in terms of the lowest rung on the ladder?”
Freydberg calls this a “Platonic play” and finds that “the dialogue does not per-
mit any answer which claims a merely pedagogical use of the images, according
to which the sapient soul somehow leaps from the visible to the intelligible
realm, from images and things to their eidetic originals” (40). See also Petraki
(2009: 55 – 62).
82 Section One: The Theory

their epistemological status and the ontological value of the things they
‘see’.66 Thus the use of eikones, too, is for Plato a two-edged sword.67
One cannot but see affinities between Plato’s self-conscious em-
ployment of diverse verbal imagery and his discussion of eikones in the
divided Line. While it is difficult to think of people who “spend their
lives looking only at phantasmata and reflections of objects in water”,68
things change when we turn to the rest of the Republic to examine
the ways in which Socrates converses with his friends. He repeatedly re-
sorts to verbal eikones in accord with specific methodological principles,
and, despite his interlocutors’ openly expressed dissatisfaction, refuses to
abandon this mode of speech for an alternative one. Socrates’ comments
about the use of eikones that take place in the context of the Line and the
Cave, I argue, cannot be seen separately from the modes of discourse
that the speakers use in their dialogue. In fact, when viewed in the
terms of my line of argument, these remarks are designed to draw the
interlocutors’ attention to their own methodology in discussing not
only ontology and metaphysics, but justice and injustice in the city
and the soul.
After this short detour on the semantics of the word eikn, we are
now in a better position to offer an answer to the question posed
above regarding the relation between the two types of imagery in the
Republic. Plato’s eikones differ from what I have identified above as im-
agistic language in that the former are intended to clarify the various
methodological and linguistic difficulties of the philosophical dialogue
that Socrates holds with Glaucon and Adeimantus in Piraeus. From
this perspective, different eikones tackle different methodological com-
plications, but what is important for my purposes here is that on the
whole they work self-referentially by thematizing the methodology

66 See, for example, Rep. 588b10. Plato makes full use of this idea in his treatment
of the democratic man and the tyrant in Books 8 and 9. See Chapter Four
below.
67 On this see excellent discussion by Gallop (1964/65: 113 – 131).
68 On a literal reading of the Cave and the Line, the levels of eikasia and pistis take
on a “dream-like character and their inhabitants seem like figures in a fable”.
Annas (1981: 250) has therefore argued that eikasia is cognitively non-existent
and invented by Plato to maintain his analogy between the visible and intelli-
gible levels. See also Smith (1996: 25 – 46). In Petraki (2009) I have argued that
Socrates’ remarks about the prisoners’ epistemologically reduced understanding
at the distorted level of eikasia is intended to problematize our grasp of ethical
qualities and their treatment in speech. See also discussion in Chapters One and
Four below.
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 83

on which Socrates’ philosophical discussion about justice and injustice

will hinge.
Thus the Sun and the Line also establish the boundaries that delimit
Socrates’ exposition of the most important Form, the Form of the Aga-
thon, and the most important method, Dialectic. Beyond this, for rea-
sons that he explains within the context of these eikones, Socrates refuses
to go. The narrative form of the eikn of the Cave, on the other hand,
makes a strong psychological impact through its motifs of lifelong im-
prisonment in bondage and the constant infliction upon man of unalter-
ing shadows and dusk. It gives tangible form to the reduced epistemo-
logical status of human nature and accords with the cultural character-
istics of Socrates’ audience in the dialogue, who have been trained in
listening to myths and poetry. All three images taken together are in-
tended to highlight the methodological problems that human thought
must handle at different epistemological levels. Socrates’ use of the
word eikn in both rhetorical and non-rhetorical contexts also draws at-
tention to the problems inherent in the medium of language as a means
to investigate and communicate reality. From this perspective, Socrates’
approach to verbal images is an integral part of his broader educational
project in the dialogue. The image of the Cave obliquely communicates
the point that to shake customary beliefs in the way we use language
may also change the view of our own nature and force us to re-focus
on our cognitive shortcomings and capabilities. Socrates thus moves
from the Form of the Agathon to the various complex epistemological
problems that people must tackle in their long course of philosophical
training. As a result, the Republic’s three images are crucial self-referen-
tial moments that reveal as much about Plato’s epistemology in general
as about his strategy in the Republic.
If, however, in his eikones Plato clarifies issues of methodology for
the Socratic interlocutors, in the rest of his Republic he develops and
dramatizes these prescriptions by means of imagistic and pictorial lan-
guage. I have already discussed the poeticized character of this type of
language above and explained its relation to the genre of poetry.
More, however, remains to be said on my use of the term imagistic
in order to bring out its relation to the Platonic eikones. As I have
said above, the Republic’s eikones are identified with specific narratolog-
ical instances in which a speaker constructs a short and vividly pictorial
story. From a narratological perspective then, the eikones have a specific
beginning and end. Yet Plato’s construction of imagery in the dialogue
transgresses his eikones. On this interpretation, the term imagery can be
84 Section One: The Theory

stretched to include certain linguistic and stylistic effects that Socrates

fashions in places outside the demarcated eikones. Thus, in the image
of the Sun, for example, Socrates articulates the similarity between
the sun and the agathon by way of other sub-images (b Fkior jatak\lpei
– jatak\lpei !k^hei² te ja· t¹ em, or (B xuw^ !peqe_setai) t¹ t`
sj|t\ jejqal]mom).69 As a result, certain words that are employed within
the narratological framework of the eikn and linguistically accord with
this thematic environment are also selected and re-employed outside the
eikn to articulate a new idea in another environment. Lloyd (1966) has
shown that this technique is used to construct arguments by way of anal-
ogy. More often than not, however, in the Republic the language of var-
ious Platonic eikones becomes an essential part of the construction of Pla-
tonic arguments, thereby introducing in the new environment seman-
tics and marked pictorial features also used elsewhere in the text. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, words of these types turn into full im-
agistic units in themselves. They promote the building and proliferation
of imagery in that they are dispersed here and there throughout Socra-
tes’ stretches of argumentation, and so add vivid pictorial ‘colours’ to
this type of language.
Nonetheless, we have not yet offered a satisfactory answer to my in-
itial question. In what sense are these types of linguistic units pictorial or
imagistic? Are we methodologically entitled to use this terminology,
which also seems to function in some way as a substitute for our Aris-
totelian metaphors and similes? I suggest that the answer to this meth-
odological problem can again be found in Plato’s Republic. The dialogue
broaches ground-breaking ideas in all spheres of Platonic philosophy,
ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology. In particular, Socrates’
discussion of the just soul and his creation of a polis in speech raise highly
complex ethical and epistemological questions regarding humans’ rela-
tions to Forms and their ability to grasp what is invisible or incorporeal.
As Socrates often says, this necessarily affects their investigational
methodology in the dialogue. Socrates speaks of “drawing a polis on a
clean canvas”. This, however, is obviously not possible and thus com-

69 See also Rep. 431e7 – 8, where wording customarily used for music is also de-
ployed to define sphrosyne. In addition, see Socrates’ diction at Rep. 531b;
the eikn is discussed by Pender (2000: 38 – 40), who sees a Platonic metaphor
there and McCall (1969: 16), who refrains from identifying any such trope in
the Platonic works. On my interpretation, Plato’s use of common diction to
discuss different topics is intended to create philosophically significant semantic
networks in the text. See also discussion on metaphor below.
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 85

parisons are repeatedly drawn between current polities and the Socratic
one, or different types of souls and the just soul. This necessarily brings
about a comparison between Socrates’ own philosophic and educational
agenda and the poets’ representation of gods and heroes, humans, and
the world in general, as described in Books 2 and 3. At the same
time, in the light of Socrates’ epistemology in Books 5, 6, and 7, atten-
tion is also drawn to the tension that underlies his discussion of highly
complex new philosophical ideas with these specific interlocutors. This
crucial methodological problem also raises several other questions in the
Republic regarding the ability of the dynamics of language in general to
investigate the Forms and their relation to our world of incongruent
sense-perceptive stimuli. I have already suggested that this line of rea-
soning regulates Socrates’ severe accusation of poetry as “not lying
well” in Books 2 and 3. Yet it is important to bear in mind here that
Socrates’ criticism of poetry and rhetoric in the Republic is not limited
to content only. Poetic content cannot be severed from style or diction,
and so Socrates’ criticism in Books 2 and 3 also questions the language,
that is, motifs and imagery that poets employ in speaking of the most
significant ethical matters to their audiences.70
I argue, then, that Socrates’ criticism of poetry is also directed at its
linguistic and stylistic techniques, but that this attack cannot be severed
from his drawing the polis and the soul on a cleansed canvas, and that
therefore in his dialogue with Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates inves-
tigates how familiar (and poetic) language can be cleansed and adapted
to function as a philosophic dialect.71
This ‘cleansing’ and restructuring of language is a continuous proc-
ess put to work immediately after Plato’s main speaker announces his
methodology in their investigation of justice. In Rep. 368c7 – d7, Socra-
tes says:
T¹ f^tgla è 1piweiqoOlem oq vaOkom !kk’ an» bk]pomtor, ¢r 1lo· va_metai.
1peidµ owm Ble?r oq deimo_, doj_ loi, Gm d’ 1c~, toia}tgm poi^sashai f^tg-
sim aqtoO, oVampeq #m eQ pqos]tan] tir cq\llata slijq± p|qqyhem !ma-
cm_mai lµ p\mu an» bk]pousim, 5peit\ tir 1mem|gsem, fti t± aqt± cq\llata
5sti pou ja· %kkohi le_fy te ja· 1m le_fomi, 6qlaiom #m 1v\mg oWlai 1je?ma
pq_tom !macm|mtar ovtyr 1pisjope?m t± 1k\tty, eQ t± aqt± emta tuc-
w\mei.

70 Rep. 392c6 – 396e10: see the illuminating and detailed discussion in Murray
(1996). See also discussion below, Section Two, Chapters Three and Four.
71 See Rep. 454a1 ff.
86 Section One: The Theory

The investigation we are undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen
eye-sight. Therefore, since we aren’t clever people, we should adopt the
method of investigation that we’d use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were
told to read small letters from a distance and then noticed that the same let-
ters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We’d consider
it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to read the larger ones first and then to
examine the smaller ones, to see whether they really are the same.
This passage, which also launches the Republic’s famous analogy between
city and soul, also hints at the method that Socrates will assume in his
investigation of justice and at the reasons that necessitate the use of
this approach. As I mentioned above, sight and vision become for
Plato the principal point on which his entire methodology in the dia-
logue hinges. From this point onwards in the dialogue, Socrates repeat-
edly refers to the importance of vision in comprehending the most sig-
nificant matters in this world.72 After discussing in the first part of the
dialogue well-established views of education, Socrates dismisses them
and in Book 7 argues that “true paideia” is the “turning of the eye of
the soul towards the Sun”. His language at this point in the text is
not merely metaphorical, for in his Republic he does indeed turn the
eye of the soul towards the Sun in that he draws the interlocutors’ at-
tention to images that he has wrought in speech and which bring out
best the essential qualities of things invisible to regular sight: the
Forms, the Form of the Agathon, the just and unjust souls, and even
the nature of the good guardian (the deployment of pedigree dogs to
investigate the guardians’ nature is called an eikn in 375d5). Neverthe-
less, this passage, in also drawing attention to the impaired status of the
company’s visual capabilities (1peidµ owm Ble?r oq deimo_), introduces in
addition the notion of keen cognitive eye-sight (!kk’ an» bk]pomtor),
which cannot be always taken for granted when important matters are
being investigated. Acute vision is then coupled with the notion of dis-
tance (cq\llata slijq± p|qqyhem !macm_mai lµ p\mu an» bk]pou-
sim… t± aqt± cq\llata 5sti pou ja· %kkohi le_fy, 368d), which
also depicts in the Republic the relationship of humans to the Forms; a
distance, as it were, that only Dialectic can bridge.
This idea of distance is first broached in the dialogue by Thrasyma-
chus in Book 1, when in one of his most aggressive moments, which is
also in one of the most ironic instances in our text, he accuses Socrates
of being “so far (ja· ovty p|qqy eW) from understanding justice and

72 On vision in the Republic, see also discussion in Baracchi (2002: 62 – 69).

 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 87

what is just and injustice and what is unjust that [he] does not realize
(agnoeis) that justice is really (t` emti) the good of another (!kk|tqiom
!cah¹m)” (343c1 – 4). In Book 1, Plato has already started to dramatize
humans’ compromised ethical and cognitive status by highlighting their
inability to understand and externalize in their behavior ethical qualities
which, far from being distant from the individual, in reality, when pres-
ent, are internal, since they dwell in the soul. The dialogue in Book 1
has demonstrated how far Thrasymachus and the others are from recog-
nizing the true essence of justice. In Platonic terms, the interlocutors’
diminished ethical status necessitates the construction of vivid imagery
that will best suit their cognitive need to grasp the true distinction be-
tween justice and injustice. From this point of view, Socrates’ method-
ology initially allows for the idea that justice is something external to us,
a quality that other simple-minded (euẽtheis) people would wish to pos-
sess. He employs vivid linguistic colours on his tabula to show his inter-
locutors what true justice and injustice look like when represented in
speech and in action correctly and incorrectly. In adopting this method-
ology in his philosophical investigation, Socrates becomes a verbal
painter par excellence, and so competes with the other verbal painters,
the poets. The only difference is that his is a correct representation of
reality.73
The influence of vision and images on human souls is also presented
in greater detail by means of vivid imagery in Book 3 (401b1d2) after
Socrates has concluded his cleansing of poetry, music and rhythms (dia-
jaha_qomter p\kim Dm %qti tquv÷m 5valem p|kim, 399e5; and Uhi d^,
5vgm, ja· t± koip± jaha_qylem, 399e8). As Ford has tellingly shown,
this passage clearly shows the influence of Democritus and Gorgias’ ma-
terialist poetics on Plato:
üq’ owm to?r poigta?r Bl?m l|mom 1pistatgt]om ja· pqosamacjast]om tµm
toO !cahoO eQj|ma Ehour 1lpoie?m to?r poi^lasim C lµ paq’ Bl?m poie?m,
C ja· to?r %kkoir dgliouqco?r 1pistatgt]om ja· diajykut]om t¹ jaj|gher
toOto ja· !j|kastom ja· !meke}heqom ja· %swglom l^te 1m eQj|si f]ym
l^te 1m oQjodol^lasi l^te 1m %kk\ lgdem· dgliouqcoul]m\ 1lpoie?m, C b
lµ oX|r te £m oqj 1at]or paq’ Bl?m dgliouqce?m, Vma lµ 1m jaj_ar eQj|si

73 See also Reeve (1998: 220 – 231). For a different, but illuminating, discussion of
the poets’ distance from the truth that also takes account of Socrates’ distinction
between mimẽsis and haplẽ diẽgesis, see Baracchi (2002: 91 – 106). Although she
follows a different line of argumentation (100 – 106), Baracchi too makes the
connection between philosophical-imagistic speech and painting, rightly argu-
ing that Socrates’ imagistic speech is imitative.
88 Section One: The Theory

tqev|lemoi Bl?m oR v}kajer ¦speq 1m jaj0 bot\m,, pokk± 2j\stgr Bl]qar

jat± slijq¹m !p¹ pokk_m dqep|lemo_ te ja· mel|lemoi, 6m ti sumist\mter
kamh\mysim jaj¹m l]ca 1m t0 art_m xuw0, !kkû 1je_mour fgtgt]om to»r
dgliouqco»r to»r eqvu_r dumal]mour Qwme}eim tµm toO jakoO te ja·
eqsw^lomor v}sim, Vma ¦speq 1m rcieim` t|p\ oQjoOmter oR m]oi !p¹
pamt¹r ¡vek_mtai, bp|hem #m aqto?r !p¹ t_m jak_m 5qcym C pq¹r exim
C pq¹r !jo^m ti pqosb\k,, ¦speq auqa v]qousa !p¹ wqgst_m t|pym
rc_eiam, ja· eqh»r 1j pa_dym kamh\m, eQr bloi|tgt\ te ja· vik_am ja·
sulvym_am t` jak` k|c\ %cousa ; (401b1 – d3)
It is, then, only poets we have to supervise, compelling them to make an
image of a good character in their poems or else not to compose them
among us? Or are we also to give orders to other craftsmen, forbidding
them to represent – whether in pictures, buildings, or any other works –
a character that is vicious, unrestrained, slavish, and graceless? Are we to
allow someone who cannot follow these instructions to work among us,
so that our guardians will be brought up on images of evil, as if in a mead-
ow of bad grass, where they crop and graze in many different places every
day until, little by little, they unwittingly accumulate a large evil in their
souls? Or must we rather seek our craftsmen who are by nature able to pur-
sue what is fine and graceful in their work, so that our young people will
live in a healthy place and be benefited on all sides, and so that something
of those fine works will strike their eyes and ears like a breeze that brings
health from a good place, leading them unwittingly, from childhood on, to
resemblance, friendship, and harmony with the beauty of reason?
These lines blend together, to produce a powerful image drawn from
botany, most of the themes that Plato will discuss later in his work,
and can be fully understood only if seen in comparison with Plato’s
broader thesis regarding the impact of mimẽsis on the human soul.
Ford rightly observes that “the ‘mimicking’ aspect of Platonic mimẽsis
is an archaism resurrected with the support of the most advanced scien-
tific outlook of his day,” and goes on to stress Plato’s debt here to De-
mocritus and Gorgias and to medical ideas that “the natural environ-
ment determines the health and function of living things” (Ford
2002: 217). The passage is particularly dense, for Plato here has already
started to weave various kinds of thematic strands and wording in order
to argue for the idea that the bad eikones of the ignorant demiourgoi are
equally disastrous to the soul’s health as the consumption of unhealthy
food and drink. The physical and the cognitive are here inextricably in-
tertwined with neither of the two taking precedence over the other. Of
course, Plato is also adamant elsewhere in his writings that an agathẽ soul
and healthy body should form a unified harmonic whole.74

74 See the Charmides 156d – 157c.

 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 89

Furthermore, if we follow Ferrari’s view (1989: 92 – 149) that Plato

is also attacking the performative aspects of Greek poetry in his criticism
in Books 2 and 3, it is not difficult to understand the distractive reper-
cussions of mimetic poetry on the viewer. Music and dance can also
transfigure the body of the auditor, who subconsciously internalizes
the ẽthẽ that they represent. On this view, Plato assigns equal signifi-
cance to the dangers that stem from copying unsuitable behavior repre-
sented in poetry (eikones) and from mimicking bad models drawn from
real life, so proposing on these grounds that poets should be compelled
to observe the city founders’ prescriptions, with the result that they de-
pict only images of noble characters. As Lear (1992: 186 – 190) has
rightly observed, the botanical aspect of Plato’s imagery here is partic-
ularly suitable for underscoring people’s automatic response to poetic
representation (eikones). One cannot restrain humans’ immediate and
subconscious reaction to various images, but one can, nonetheless, con-
trol the ‘images’ themselves. Socrates’ prescriptions in Books 2 and 3
clarify the criteria by which these images are regulated, so that during
the years of their education the young phylakes will view only approved
representations of reality. The prescriptions of Book 2 and 3 dictate that
the young guardians will not be given the chance to indulge in viewing
images of badness (Vma lµ 1m jaj_ar eQj|si tqev|lemoi Bl?m oR v}kajer
¦speq 1m jaj0 bot\m,), for these will have been eliminated from the
environment that nurtures them.
This is not the case, however, with Socrates’ interlocutors in the Re-
public. These have been brought up in the educational manner that Soc-
rates criticizes and rejects so sharply, surrounded by poetic images that
repeatedly mix goodness and badness. And this is the crucial point at
which Plato’s double educational scheme in the Republic starts to be-
come clear. The Socratic interlocutors cannot be ‘fed’ the same type
of eikones as the young guardians, as they have been exposed far too
much to representations of injustice, evil, and licentiousness in their life-
time, and they now seek them out. Plato then has Socrates stress in the
dialogue the importance of sight as a philosophical means for investigat-
ing justice and, in adopting this methodological approach, he has him
construct a multiplicity of images of various forms in order to external-
ize (apeikaz), this time correctly, the inner qualities of concepts ill-con-
ceived and mistreated in their representation in poetry. In the process,
Plato in the Republic creates a remarkable imagistic type of discourse
in which, in contrast to poetry, the form, often poetic and openly pic-
torial, always externalizes the content in the most natural manner pos-
90 Section One: The Theory

sible. This authorial technique, however, is only one part of Socrates’

philosophic education of his interlocutors, for on the canvas of the Re-
public not all topics can be accommodated by means of the same lan-
guage, nor can they be discussed with all people. These changes of sty-
listic modalities, whose repercussions are both philosophical and educa-
tional, bring about what I have called above Plato’s dramatization of
language.

5.2 Dramatization of language: the theory

In this section, I expand on Plato’s dramatization of language and discuss
how the proposed interpretative approach is instructive for grasping the
philosophical issues that arise from the dialogue’s imagery. In the final
part of the discussion in this section I turn to the complex issue of met-
aphor and metaphoric language in post-platonic discussions and investi-
gate how this actually accords with Plato’s imagistic language. My inter-
pretation of the dialogue hinges on the thesis that Plato’s language is so
constructed that it brings out in a most natural way the tension that ex-
ists between our evaluation of the world and the various ethical qualities
and their representation in speech. Thus Plato’s use of language – the
selection of diction, the arrangement and combination of wording,
the fashioning of images – is designed to reproduce what is invisible
by means of dramatization and re-enactment. In the Republic, the asso-
ciation of the world and the word is transformed into what in contem-
porary terms would be an identification of form and content. From this
interpretative angle, the correspondence requires certain language func-
tions that render the word reflexive rather than descriptive. Thus, in Plato,
form and content are so firmly tied that the selection of the form – lit-
erary/poetic devices or types of philosophical argumentation – is de-
signed not to adorn the content but create and shape it. Dramatic im-
mediacy is thus achieved through a meticulous selection of diction
and organisation of styles that is intended to remove any potential mis-
matches between what is said and how it is said. From this perspective,
language is not used to describe reality (abstract qualities or transcendental
onta), but to (re)-produce it in the most naturalistic way possible.
H. S. Thayer, whose interpretation of Platonic style has significantly
influenced my analysis here, observes:
A dramatic interpretation does not have as its sole objective to awaken or
increase our appreciation of the dramatic and esthetic qualities of the dia-
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 91

logues… if there is anything that can be reasonably described as the mean-

ing in or of the dialogue, it cannot be attained by extraction or abstraction
from the dramatic context. Such, I take it, is one main tenet of dramatic
interpretation” (Thayer, in Press, G. A. [ed.] 1993: 48).
To demonstrate his theory of dramatic immediacy in Plato’s language,
Thayer takes as a typical example Plato’s usage of the auto to, a word
which I will also examine in my discussion of the Republic. The word
has been variously regarded by Plato scholars and has often been inter-
preted as operating as “an abstract formula or catchword of a theory [of
Forms]” (48 – 51). Thayer rightly notes (51) that in the linguistic context
of the Symposium the reference auto to kalon (the beautiful in itself) is not
abstract: “There is something very concrete, compressed, and immedi-
ate being expressed. We are directed to it itself, to something not exist-
ing anywhere in another thing such as an animal, or in earth, or in the
sky, or anything else, but is itself with itself forever one form (Symposi-
um, 211B).
Complex questions about concreteness and abstraction in language
obviously arise here. On the one hand, as Thayer argues, the term es-
tablishes something specific, a linguistic designator of a unique referent,
but one, nonetheless, which is beyond sense perception. From this
angle, the term functions concretely. Plato employs it to identify a spe-
cific referent. Nonetheless, in the Republic’s terms, the pronoun avoids
the implication that sense perception is used. This makes the term
auto to within its specific linguistic context, and in relation to its imme-
diate environment, idiosyncratic and, from this viewpoint, abstract.
Thus Thayer argues that Diotima’s exposition appeals to the audien-
ce’s faculty of vision: “We are brought as close as language can come to the
beautiful. We can almost ‘see’ it. The function of auto to in this context
is to produce the effect of direct sight and immediate presence” (1993:
51). Allowing for certain modifications, Thayer’s approach here could
be extremely helpful in untangling the imagistic language of the Repub-
lic. The unit auto to is also prominent in the Republic, and its treatment
there offers us an example of how dramatization of language is achieved.
Plato exploits this word. As I shall show in the next section, the term
appears in different linguistic combinations and serves various philo-
sophical needs depending on its place in the dialogue. Thus it is indeed
given a heavy metaphysical load to bear, but only when set in specific
linguistic environments. This is indeed the case with its use in Book
92 Section One: The Theory

5 but not with its initial appearance in Book 2.75 Thus Plato’s strategy
confirms scholars’ observation that Platonic philosophic terminology
undergoes constant moulding, shaping, and re-formulation, depending
on the contexts whence it emerges before becoming fixed in established
formulas.76 As a result, the mere occurrence of a phrase consisting of
such words as auto to in a specific environment does not always signal
a transition from the visible and sense-perceptive sphere to that of the
non-physical or meta-physical, let alone from the realm of Becoming
to the realm of Being, although a kernel of such authorial deliberation
may indeed be present.77 More often than not, in the versatile texture of
the Republic, the adaptation of this term is designed to highlight the con-
trast between the two spheres, the physical and the metaphysical. It does
this by drawing on its connotations of identity and singularity and by
contrasting those with multiplicity and variety (ta polla poikila vs. auto
to hen). The deployment of the term in such contexts also draws atten-
tion to the philosophic and linguistic tension that is created from juxta-
posing it or blending it with heavily pictorial or poetic language, since it
negates stylistic variety of any kind. In other words, the auto to cannot
proliferate into a variety of images, and cannot accommodate the
poets’ diverse manifestations of poikilia. From this perspective, it can

75 See detailed discussion below, Section Two, Chapter Two.

76 See discussion by Benardette (1965: 285 – 298); cf. Kahn (1981: 105 – 134) and
(1988: 237 – 261).
77 Commenting on Symposium 211d – 212a, Hartland-Swann claims (1951: 1 – 19,
at 18): “here we have no mere science of Becoming, as in the Timaean cosmol-
ogy; we are in the very realm of Being itself, the object of certain knowledge
(Epistẽmẽ as opposed to Doxa)”. The method Hartland-Swann has adopted in
his analysis is described thus: “I shall attempt to make the issue more precise
by considering certain passages in the dialogues where poetic elements are, so
to speak, more tangibly manifested” (12, emphasis added). The specific section
from Diotima’s speech is judged by Hartland-Swann to fulfill his proposed cri-
teria (figures of speech, allegories, the myths, 12) for selection. The observation
that he makes is indeed verifiable to a certain extent. The inclusion of the auto
to phrase, along with the entire description of the Real fashioned by Diotima at
this point, is designed to distance the intra-dramatic characters from the realm
of the physical. Thayer is right to stress the dramatic power of the selected lan-
guage and language arrangement of the passage. Yet, in my view, the interloc-
utors of the Symposium have not ‘left’ the realm of the visible (or, in Hartland-
Swann’s words, that of Becoming) to enter a different sphere identified with
that of the Real or Being. On Plato’s marked repetition of pronouns see also
Pender (2000: 180) on the Phaedo.
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 93

help us monitor the philosophic ramifications of Plato’s imagistic lan-

guage to which it is almost always in the Republic markedly contrasted.
To return to Thayer’s reading of the Symposium’s language, his de-
scription of how dramatic immediacy is achieved in a text is illuminat-
ing and I cite it verbatim (1993: 51 – 2):
I have a suggestion and a hypothesis about the language. One of the fea-
tures of the language in the dialogues is what I have called elsewhere reflex-
ive reference. Put simply, reflexive reference occurs when a referring expression
exemplifies properties of its referent. The word ‘red’ referring to red things
and printed in red ink is an example. There are non-linguistic forms of re-
flexive reference. A pen and ink drawing of a pen and ink drawing is one such
case. The performance of a mime is another.[…] I offer the hypothesis that
the auto to expressions in the above passages in Diotima’s speech are reflex-
ive references. It might be more accurate to say that within the dramatic
performance of Diotima’s speech the uttering of the phrase “auto to
kalon” simulates a reflexive reference.
As for the auto to, Thayer explains that “in its dramatic occurrence the
phrase is not so much a way of referring to the beautiful as it is the crys-
tallizing of the beautiful in the spoken action of the dialogue”. What we
thus have here is a specifically dramatic operation of speech: the invo-
cation and exemplification of properties or qualities of a subject matter.
The metaphors of sight and seeing add a dramatic force to the sense of
“the presence of beauty vivified in the reflexive reference” (1993: 52).
Thayer admits that “there is something strange” in arguing for the idea
that “auto to (kalon) is present in the saying of auto to kalon – in the full
context, that is, and unfolding of Diotima’s speech”. He explains
away the phenomenon as an indication of Plato’s unique authorial pow-
ers, which have been repeatedly recognized and commented upon since
antiquity. “We are on the trail of what is often acknowledged to be an
ineffable and mysterious power of dramatic language and language of
poetry. We are also getting at the main principle of onomatopoeic lan-
guage” (1993: 52). Thayer’s reading of the linguistic and syntactic dy-
namics of the auto to expression in the Symposium reveal the dramatic
vividness of his language deployed in such a way as not only to describe
or narrate the object, but to create it, portray it, and reproduce it in
speech (1993: 52). His analysis is particularly helpful for both monitor-
ing and explaining Plato’s mixing of different types of wording in the
same linguistic environment and can be extremely helpful in dealing
with matters of metaphorical discourse, since what we would call meta-
phors appear to pervade the works of Plato, sometimes in thick clusters,
94 Section One: The Theory

sometimes scattered through the discourse, and sometimes completely

disappearing altogether.

5.3 Metaphoric language

Plato’s imagery is often the starting point for discussion regarding the
use of metaphors, similes, or other figures of speech and their philo-
sophical implications.78 In his writings, Plato does not employ the
term metaphora to identify metaphor usage.79 In ancient times, the
term was first examined by Aristotle. In modern times, consideration
of the term has yielded interesting findings in the fields of philosophy,
linguistics, theology, psychology, and cognitive science, raising an as-
sortment of questions regarding its role in shaping thought-patterns. I
should make clear in advance that in this work I will not deploy retro-
spectively modern readings on metaphor to elucidate the Republic’s im-
agistic language. This is obviously not to argue that metaphor did not
exist in speech and in Platonic discourse before Aristotle ‘discovered’
and analysed it. I mean merely to point out that by employing Aristo-
telian and other post-platonic analyses of metaphor in order to explain
Plato’s highly versatile and polished language, we may lose sight of its
subtlety and philosophical nuances. Nonetheless, the distinction be-
tween metaphor, simile, and analogy will prove useful to approaching
Platonic imagery in the Republic.
I have already discussed above Isocrates’ contribution to discussions
regarding metaphor in the first part of the fourth century B.C. and
drawn attention to that fact that significantly he classifies metaphora
among the linguistic paraphernalia that embroider poems, but not
prose compositions. However, it is in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics
that the use of metaphora is systematically analysed. According to Poetics
1457b, letavoq± d] 1stim am|lator !kkotq_ou 1pivoq± C !p¹ toO c]mour

78 There is a very comprehensive literature on the concept of metaphor and on its

relation to the philosophy of language: see the compilation of articles in Gibbs
(2008); Lakoff and Johnson (1999); and Lang (1999). See also van Noppen’s
painstaking compilation of secondary literature (1985). In addition, see Berg
(1904); Stanford ([1936] 1972); Burke (1955: 503 – 517); MacCormac
(1976); Sacks (1979); Johnson (ed.) (1981); Zemach (1983: 259 – 273);
Lloyd (1987: 172 – 187); Houser (1990: 75 – 85); Ben-Porat (1992: 737 –
769); Ortony (1993); Boys-Stones (ed.) (2003); Brittan (2003).
79 See above n. 33.
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 95

1p· eWdor C !p¹ toO eUdour 1p· t¹ c]mor C !p¹ toO eUdour 1p· eWdor C jat±
t¹ !m\kocom (“Metaphor is the application of a strange term either
transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from the species
and applied to the genus” (trans. Fyfe). The definition of metaphora
forms part of Aristotle’s discussion of onoma (1457b): ûpam d³ emola
5stim C j}qiom C ck_tta C letavoq± C j|slor C pepoigl]mom C 1pejte-
tal]mom C rvgqgl]mom C 1ngkkacl]mom (“every noun is either ordinary or
rare or metaphorical or ornamental or invented or lengthened or cur-
tailed or altered”, trans. Fyfe). Within this framework of the Aristotelian
lexis,80 the philosopher finds that language can be dignified (semnẽ) and
outside the common usage (exallattousa) if the composer employs the
unfamiliar (xenikon). Under the heading xenikon Aristotle classes the glot-
ta (rare word), the metaphora (metaphor), and the epektasis (lengthen-
ing).81 Aristotle is fond of this mode of diction (note his use of semnon),
but at the same time he also draws attention to the idiosyncratic charac-
ter of this type of language: “If someone implements those features and
composes exclusively in this form, his productions will be either ainig-
mata (riddles) or barbarismoi (barbarisms)”.82 He thus proposes a combi-
nation (krasis) of the two components, the xenikon and the kyrion (ordi-
nary word).83 The first imparts an extraordinary character, whilst the lat-
ter establishes clarity.84
Aristotle’s conceptualisation and systematisation of diction on these
lines had a great impact on the formation of future theories regarding
metaphor.85 In particular, it influenced discussions that questioned the

80 Poetics 1450b 12 – 15: lexis is the expression (hermeneia) of a thought through

words (dia tẽs onomasias). Parts of the lexis are: stoicheion, syllabẽ, sundesmos,
onoma, rhẽma, arthron, ptsis, logos (1456b 20 – 21).
81 Poetics 1458a.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Saphẽnia: from an Aristotelian perspective, a highly-valued characteristic of dic-
tion. The term is equally important, albeit from a different conceptual view-
point, in the Republic as well.
85 Paul Ricoeur has explored issues of metaphor as a distinctive characteristic of
living language assessing at the same time ancient treatments of the term as
launched by Aristotle (1975: 24ff). Drawing on Richards (1936: 96 ff.), Ric-
oeur adopts the distinction between ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ with the tenor
being the principal subject and the vehicle the subsidiary (106). This leads to
his most influential contribution to the analysis of metaphor. He transfers the
metaphor-concept from the level of word to that of discourse and therefore
speaks of metaphor as a ‘figure’ and not as a ‘trope’ (63 – 72 and 175 – 176).
96 Section One: The Theory

distinction between content (to legomenon) and verbal form (lexis). As a

result, the case was often made that metaphor falls entirely within the
sphere of lexis and that the transferred meaning per se is not affected by
the xenikon. In other words, the message remains unaffected and it is
only the linguistic cover in which the message is neatly contained that
undergoes transformation. The linguistic difficulties, both meta-philo-
sophical and meta-linguistic,86 which result from this approach to meta-
phor are obvious: can the meaning conveyed in metaphor be separated
from its wording? Is it possible that the content (legomenon or dianoia)
remains entirely unaffected by the linguistic means that its composer
opts for? And, most importantly, if metaphora is 1pivoq± !kkotq_ou
am|lator,87 as Aristotle stated, with whom most subsequent ancient the-
oreticians appear to concur, then a new, foreign word is introduced to
‘clothe’ a meaning which can, nonetheless, be phrased otherwise, but
which for various reasons is not. But what caused the linguistic transfer
in the first place? Furthermore, how can one deny the new shades and
nuances that the allotrion wording will impart upon meaning? To cite
Max Black’s well-known example, to call a man a wolf is to transfer
onto the human wolflike characteristics and, of course, vice versa. It
is to assume a different viewpoint in considering human nature and
its characteristics, and it is to anthropomorphize a species of animal.88
The questions raised above have preoccupied modern linguists as
much as they have tantalized theoreticians of metaphor as a trope (or
figure). Over the past few decades, discussion on metaphor has taken
various significant turns. I cannot offer here an exhaustive analysis of
these approaches to metaphor. Nonetheless, a number of issues relating
to the concept of metaphor as discussed and outlined in the theoretical

On the concept of ‘deviation’, see Ricoeur (at 26 and 232). Cf. Henle’s notion
of ‘clash’ (ed. 1958: 173 – 195) and Cohen’s suggestions concerning ‘imperti-
nence’ as a violation of fixed linguistic/semantic codes (in Ortony, A. [ed.]
1993: 58 – 70).
86 On my use of metaphilosophy here, see Griswold, in Griswold, C. L. (ed.)
(1988: 143 – 167) and Gonzalez, in Gonzalez, F. (ed.) (1995: 155 – 187,
esp. 158 with n. 6). Griswold’s metaphilosophy involves the attempt to ‘justify
philosophy’. Gonzalez uses the same term to name his investigation into “the
nature of philosophy”.
87 See also Stanford (1972 [1936]: 9).
88 See Black (1962: 39 ff.), with further suggestions about the metaphorical word
being the ‘focus’ and the entire phrase constituting the broader ‘framework’.
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 97

tradition after Plato can be of great value in my discussion of imagery in

the Republic.
To recapitulate: the most important cognitive and linguistic charac-
teristic of metaphor is its inherent freedom to bring together in language
themes that appear foreign to each other. In the view of Lakoff and
Johnson (1984: 5), the very essence of metaphor lies in our “under-
standing and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”. To
take the idea further, if one took literally the conveyed meaning, the
phrase would sound illogical in accordance with our social codes of
communicating and understanding.89 How can a man be a wolf ? How
can Being shine (katalampei)? Nonetheless, from my perspective, these
two examples cited here are not entirely the same. Semiotic theories
of language aside which maintain that it is in its entirety metaphoric
(such an approach would argue that both man and wolf are the signifiers
for an arbitrary and ill-defined signified),90 the difference between the
two examples is to be found in the point that the second example (t¹
em jatak\lpei), in contrast to the first, brings together two terms (t¹
em and jatak\lpei) whose denotations are not specified in the same
way. In other words, the two linguistic components of the metaphor
‘man is a wolf’ can be grasped more readily, since the recipient can iden-
tify both by means of sense-perception. Yet this is not the case with the
second example. The light imagery is indeed a recurrent motif in tradi-
tional poetic and Presocratic compositions (Tarrant 1960: 181 – 187).
Plato’s mingling it with concepts such as Being or Truth, whose nature
in the dialogue is elusive and highly debatable, is intended to generate
several questions. In the eikn of the Sun, Socrates draws parallels be-
tween two concepts, the Sun and the on, or aletheia, and transfers char-
acteristics of the former to the latter. By adopting this technique, the
speaker assigns to the on and to aletheia a property which only visible
and material beings can possess, thereby bringing both of them closer
to the cognitive and sense-perceptive capabilities of human nature.
The linguistic mixture in this analogy endows Socrates’ wording with
vigorous pictorial characteristics that are obviously difficult to accom-

89 From this perspective, the boundaries between the metaphorical and the literal
are ‘disturbed’ in the Republic from the start. “True” philosophers are “guard-
ians” and their nature must be “dog-like” if this type of guardianship is to be
crowned with success. See discussion below, Section Two, Chapter One and
Three.
90 See Steiner on Saussure and modern criticism (1986: 4 with n. 7); cf. also dis-
cussion by Hesse, in van Noppen, J. P. (ed.) (1983: 29).
98 Section One: The Theory

modate in a philosophic environment that condemns, as we saw earlier,

the eikones and that seeks to approach as much as possible the real, with-
out, it should be stressed again, resorting to dialectic. Nonetheless, Plato
creates strong imagery here for his metaphysics in accordance with the
methodology that he has announced in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic. In
doing so, he makes full use of the motif of light (Sun) and illumination
whose origins are lost in the long tradition of Greek literature, pre-Pla-
tonic philosophic thought and religion.
It thus becomes evident that several tensions arise from this authorial
strategy. In employing motifs and images from poetry and Presocratic
thought, Socrates’ diction becomes vividly visual, heavily poetic and,
on some views, constantly metaphoric (Tarrant 1946: 27 – 34). Three
alternatives emerge: a) language as it is, is inadequate to express and
communicate the Platonic agathon, and has to be stretched to its limits;
it cannot but be metaphoric;91 b) there is another form of language
which, nevertheless, both Plato and Socrates withhold in favour of a
more poeticized one which will enrapture the audience (intra- and
extra-dramatic) and lure it into the realm of philosophical thinking.
The alternative form of language may be too pedantic and too tedious;
or c) the form of language that Socrates employs, syntactically structured
on visual associations, has a distinctive philosophical value, constitutes
and regulates the Platonic/Socratic methodology that permeates the Re-
public and interacts strictly with the intra-dramatic characters (the Soc-
ratic interlocutors).
In other words, the manner in which Plato chooses to construct his
philosophy – and by philosophy I mean here the ‘journey’ in Parmeni-
dean terms rather than the elaboration of sets of doctrines and dogmas –
is entirely dependent upon the characteristics of those philosophising
and their cognitive status, and it requires imagery construction to stim-
ulate and regulate cognitive processes.92 It is this third interpretative sug-

91 The term employed as defined and classified by Aristotle in the Poetics. I do not
endorse here, in relation to the Republic, Aristotle’s placement of metaphora
under the lexis only.
92 Category (b) outlined here postulates the existence or possibility of a ‘fully phil-
osophical’ language which some people might learn to speak. This, however, is
not a line of enquiry I wish to pursue in this study. It is possibly not incidental
that the Platonic Parmenides, a dialogue whose language and conceptualisation
have proven tantalising for modern scholarship, is reported to have taken
place between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. However, I do not suggest
here that the language that characters of the Parmenides’ use is an ideal philo-
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 99

gestion that I believe may account for the poetic character of the Repub-
lic’s language. This philosophic language is thus configured step-by-step
from a type of language that was predominately poetic, imagistic, and
metaphoric in post-Platonic terms, a type of language that the intra-dra-
matic characters can stay abreast of, a familiar type of language.
This is the case, I argue, with the example above of the Sun, light,
and illumination. In its new Platonic environment, the motif of light
and of the power of the Sun acquires significant philosophical nuances
if we compare this context, the eikn of the Sun, in which Socrates
broaches his most significant Form, with other environments in the Re-
public, which also utilize the traditional motifs of light and darkness,
thereby turning them into new philosophical themes. A characteristic
example of this authorial strategy is, for instance, the katabasis of the an-
cestor of Gyges, in order to find the ring that will bestow upon him a
Thrasymachean omnipotence and, from a Platonic perspective, unsur-
passable injustice. This katabasis is strikingly opposed to another type
of katabasis in the text, that is, to our (intellectual) descent to the
Cave of deception and ignorance. In the image of the Cave, Plato com-
bines several motifs – in the cave light is weak because of its mixture with
darkness – to put across the idea that justice becomes weak because of its
mixture with injustice. In contrast to Gyges’ all-powerful ancestor, the
Cave’s prisoners are powerless, both physically and cognitively. This au-
thorial strategy is put into practice elsewhere in the Republic outside the
eikones, for instance, in Socrates’ comparison of the soul’s ignorance to
darkness, sleep, or blindness: ftam d³ eQr t¹ t` sj|t\ jejqal]mom, t¹
cicm|lem|m te ja· !pokk}lemom, don\fei ja· !lbku~ttei %my ja· j\ty
t±r d|nar letab\kkom, ja· 5oijem aw moOm oqj 5womti. (“But when [the
soul] focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be
and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, and changes its opinions
that way and that, and seems bereft of understanding”, 508d4 – 9).93
In this study I have adopted a panoramic interpretative viewpoint
that brings together the Republic’s various environments that employ
common wording. Thus, on my interpretation, Plato’s image of the

sophical one, or the ‘language of the Real’ (although it could be argued that it is
closer to the Real). In fact, I see the language employed in the latter part of the
Parmenides as constituting some form of ‘dialect’ which suits best their conver-
sation.
93 The light-night motif becomes a pervasive theme throughout the Republic. See
also 508b12 – c2.
100 Section One: The Theory

Sun as an analogon of the Form of Good on earth shifts and remixes tra-
ditional images and motifs to convey to the interlocutors the idea that an
all-shining Being is a type of Being all-powerful and un-mixed, pure
(katharos) in its quality or essence and free from poikilia. The image is
also intended to instruct Socrates’ company in how specific terminology
should be redirected towards a philosophical usage that will amend pre-
vious wrong-held beliefs. The image then strikingly contrasts with both
the Cave and the myth of Gyges’ ancestor and changes the traditional
motifs of katabasis, light and darkness into watchwords for intellectual
confusion or ignorance. The prisoners’ is a life of a representation par
excellence of mixture and ethical-dianoetic contamination (see also
535e: !kk’ eqweq_r ¦speq hgq_om veiom 1m !lah_ô lok}mgtai). On this
interpretation in understanding the Sun image, we should pay equal at-
tention to both Being and light, for it is through light, its comparison to
darkness, and its broader treatment in the work’s motifs and imagery,
that Socrates’ interlocutors touch upon the intrinsic qualities of Being,
of Agathon and of Justice.94
In my discussion thus far, I have considered the concept of meta-
phor as theorized and discussed by thinkers after Plato. In my attempt
to investigate Plato’s imagery I have not drawn a strict distinction be-
tween the various forms of comparison that fall under the broader
class of imagery. I have thus refrained from applying in my analysis
terms such as metaphor, simile, or analogy, since Plato in his treatment
of eikn also appears to reject such neat differentiations or divisions.95
Nonetheless, these terms may be used retrospectively to monitor Plato’s
orchestration of imagery and instruct us on the philosophical reasons
that may require that its forms vary. I should make clear that I am
not arguing here in favour of the Aristotelian concepts of metaphor

94 From this point of view, I find particularly useful Max Black’s (above n. 88)
view of metaphor as a means of bringing together two different thematic envi-
ronments and of investigating one by means of the other. Black’s understanding
of metaphor may be particularly helpful in understanding Plato’s linguistic and
conceptual clashes, as these in the Republic attempt to throw new light not only
on how mortals may perceive the transcendental reality, but also on how they
think anew about their own nature and the sense-perceptual world that envel-
ops them. See the detailed discussion on how this is achieved by way of eikones
and imagistic language below, Section Two, Chapters Three and Four.
95 On the methodological problems that arise from this distinction in Plato, see
Pender (2000: 3 – 14); cf. McCall (1969: 15 – 18). See also Lloyd (1987:
179 – 183).
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 101

that classify metaphor as a stylistic trope that works primarily at the level
of lexis, rather than at that of dianoia. From my interpretative point of
view, this cannot offer a satisfactory explanation of Plato’s incorporation
of imagery, or of the poetical nature of his dialogues.96 I argue instead,
along with Aristides Quintilianus and some modern thinkers, that im-
agery can be philosophically important for shaping meaning in the lin-
guistic environments in which it is embedded.97 Along these lines, alter-
nation between different forms of imagery, for example, involving
moving from analogy to simile and metaphor in speech produces stylis-
tic effects that are philosophically significant for the manner in which
the Republic’s intra-dramatic speakers deploy their language. As has
been mentioned above, one of the most notable characteristics of Pla-
tonic imagery (eikones and imagistic/pictorial language) is its variety in
intensity. In Platonic eikones, imagery is at its most dynamic. There
are other moments, however, where image-building becomes less in-
tense, more latent, but nevertheless, equally striking. Distinctions be-
tween metaphor, simile and analogy can help us explain variations of
this sort.
The main difference between metaphor and simile (which are oth-
erwise closely related) lies in the linguistic markers used to announce the
simile.98 The comparison that simile pursues between two different ideas
is readily recognisable in words such as ¦r, ¦speq, or fmpeq. Modern
theorists still debate the question of whether this syntactical variation
can also give rise to differences in semantics.99 Metaphor, however,

96 On the distinction between metaphor as a “trope” rather than “figure” in Ar-

istotle’s definition, see Steiner 1986: 6.
97 A notable exception to this tradition is Aristides Quintilianus’ treatment of the
term in Book 2 of the De Musica: see the illuminating discussion in Barker
(1999: 1 – 16); Aristides Quintilianus’ departs from the Aristotelian position
that metaphor alters only the verbal form rather than the meaning of what is
said, and in 70.20 – 1 says that “different ways of referring to the same thing
have different effects on their hearers because they present different conceptions
of it”, see Barker (1999: 5 emphasis added). For the text, see Winnington-In-
gram’s Teubner edition (Leipzig 1963) and for a translation of the text, see
Barker (1989). A detailed examination of Aristides Quintilianus’ innovative
stance falls outside the scope of this study.
98 So Pender (2000: 6 – 10 and 12 – 14). See also Innes, in Boys-Stones, G. R.
(ed.) (2003: 7 – 29).
99 See discussions by Davidson (1978) and Cooper (1986). Sockise (1985: 58 ff.)
has advanced his theory about the “illustrative simile” which provides a step-
wise comparison, and significantly stretches the comparative dynamics of the
102 Section One: The Theory

can be easily distinguished from analogy or myth100 for it belongs to the

level of the sentence or phrase in contrast to analogy, which is situated at
the level of text or narrative.101 Analogy also simultaneously forms a
larger unit of discourse that is intended to create a tension with the con-
text in which it is embedded (Pender 2000: 7). From this point of view,
analogy resembles metaphor, which also creates an unsettling clash of
meaning at the level of sentence.
How do these distinctions relate to Platonic imagery? So far I have
used the term imagery to refer to both Plato’s eikones and to other forms
of verbal comparison (imagistic or pictorial language). In modern no-
menclature, the dialogue’s eikones can be identified as analogies or ex-
tended similes, but metaphors’ and similes operate most dynamically
in other contexts of the dialogue as well that have been identified
here simply as vividly imagistic and pictorial – the act of comparison
being equally prominent in these environments too. The distinction
drawn between metaphor, simile, and analogy can be employed in
my interpretation to test Socrates’ methodology in the dialogue regard-
ing matters of language. It can likewise be employed to bring out the
philosophical implications of Plato’s intensifying of pictorial and poetic
language in certain contexts and of his avoidance of this kind of vocabu-
lary in other contexts. This fluctuation depends upon the intellectual ca-
pacities of the intra-dramatic speakers (or broader internal audience) that
Socrates happens to be addressing. Thus, both simile and metaphor cre-
ate comparisons by mingling a wording that is easily grasped thanks to its
sense-perceptive bearings (for example, night and light) with more ab-
stract or less easily sense-perceptively identifiable terms whose meaning
is being investigated in the dialogue.
However, simile resembles analogy (the eikn of the Sun, for exam-
ple, in Plato’s text) in ways that metaphor does not. In the simile, mark-
ers such as hs or hsper notify the speakers that language is about to be-
come overtly imagistic at this stage and that comparison between con-
cepts will be pursued. The tension created by metaphor in speech, how-
ever, is of a different character. Metaphor is not marked in the text as

simile. Cf. Kittay (1987: 17, 31, 152 and 187 ff.); for further bibliography, see
Pender (2000: 9 with n. 25).
100 On analogy see Lloyd (1966: 175). Pender (2000: 12).
101 On the relation between myth, reason and metaphoric phrases, see Pender
(2000: 82 – 86). On the difference between images and myth-sections, see
also Morgan (1990: 151ff).
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 103

simile is, and thus both its comparative function and the tension meta-
phor creates in its linguistic environment strike a different note. And this
is a significant point in our treatment of metaphor in ancient Greek lit-
erature.
From this perspective, metaphoric phrases, that is, poetic motifs and
diction, are almost the norm in various environments of the Republic.
They are so common that they tend to be Socrates’ standard way of phi-
losophising with his interlocutors on the soul and polities. This cannot
be explained away by arguing that Plato is a great poet or dramatist who
shapes his writings in this mode. As I suggested in the beginning of my
discussion in this section, to fathom the poetic character and colour of
Plato’s language in the Republic requires that we shift our perspective on
the metaphoric aspect of his imagery.102 As a result, Plato’s language is

102 As both Lloyd (1966) and Silk (1974: 28 ff.) have shown in their insightful stud-
ies of these complex issues, to identify what might be metaphorical for Greeks
in a literature that goes back centuries before our times is not an easy task, firstly
because a large amount of literature has not reached us and secondly because we
cannot always be certain of how Greeks understood their metaphoric language.
So one should always allow for the possibility that what is metaphor for us today
was not necessarily received in the same way by the Greeks of that era. There is
one question in relation to the heavy metaphoric language used in Platonic
writings that cannot pass unobserved. G. R. Lloyd, in his magisterial study
on antithetical modes of argumentation, broaches the problem (210 – 303):
“But the question that concerns us here is whether or in what sense the Preso-
cratics recognized the political and social notions which they used in their cos-
mologies as images” (211). Lloyd connects the issue with Plato as well acknowl-
edging that “his language is ‘metaphorical’ in that he often consciously applies
terms beyond their primary sphere of reference (human society)” (226, empha-
sis added). The scholar makes the point – repeatedly stated here – that “for Plato
clearly these metaphors are not empty figures of speech” and he justifies this in
the affinities shared between Platonic ideas concerning ethics and metaphysics:
“For he (Plato) believes that order or justice in the human sphere is a part of the
wider, cosmic order” (226 – 227) and that would allow for a shared vocabulary
in both environments. Lloyd has here in mind mainly images such as those of
law and justice fully explored initially by the Presocratics (224). The problem
highlighted here is not an easily solved one and cannot be seen separately
from modern debates about what may constitute literal/normal language
usage as opposed to a metaphoric/abnormal one. In relation to Platonic and
pre-Platonic (and Presocratic) employment of imagery a distinction could be
drawn on the one hand between motifs which have been long established as
‘standardized’ linguistic stock, such as those of hodos, the chariot or the contrast
between states of dreaming and being awake (to be found in Parmenides, Pin-
dar, Heraclitus and Plato) and thus considered traditional and crystallized. On
the other hand, however, there is an alternative type of imagery-configuration
104 Section One: The Theory

metaphoric because words, themes, motifs, and imageries have been

transferred to a philosophic environment whose expressed epistemology
seeks simultaneously to ban them, creating thus a tension in our text
that cannot be easily resolved. To tackle issues of metaphor or imagery
in the Republic, then, is not to question whether Plato wishes to be po-
etically artistic, when he could have composed philosophy otherwise,
but to tease out the philosophical reasons that led him to adopt this po-
eticized vernacular in particular places that create stark contrasts with the
way in which language is treated in other thematic environments in our
text. This type of imagistic language serves philosophical needs in the
Republic and, as was suggested above, is necessitated by the intellectual
(and linguistic) dynamics of the Socratic interlocutors. By means of an
eikn, Socrates distinguishes the different stages of cognition. The
Line, which broaches the epistemological problems created between
copy and original, is itself embedded within a broader linguistic envi-
ronment in which images predominate, so promoting comparisons
that establish differences and similarities (Lloyd 1987: 182 – 183).
To recapitulate: my discussion in this section is organized around
the commonly-held view that Plato’s works are heavily poeticized.
Nonetheless, to accommodate this poeticity has not been easy for
Plato studies, which, of course, is due to Plato himself to an extent,
since his writings promote distinctions between the poetic and the phil-
osophical. Different interpretative paths have been laid down in an at-
tempt to explain the unsettling incorporation of poetic techniques in
the dialogues, the most pervasive being that of a doctrinal/dogmatist in-
terpretation that focuses on the argumentative parts of the dialogue and
dismisses other parts as poetic or ornamental.103 Other interpretative ap-
proaches, however, have brought into focus the philosophical signifi-

and re-arrangement which deviates from traditional ways of incorporating mo-

tifs. In Plato, one can recognize both types. The author breaks down set motifs
and restructures components in innovative ways. An indicative example in this
direction is the image of the phylakes as watchdogs in the Republic whose signif-
icant philosophical impact will be discussed in the following Section. Along the
same interpretative lines see also discussion by Thayer (1967/70: 247 – 262,
esp. 269 ff.). For modern discussions about the literal/metaphorical division,
see Ricoeur (1975: 369); Hesse, in van Noppen, J. P. (ed.) (1983: 29); see
also Barker, in Tuplin, C. and Fox, N. (eds.) (2002: 22 – 35, esp. 26); see
also Pender (2000: 17 – 18, 76); and extensive discussion in Silk (1974: 27 – 55).
103 See, for example, Irwin (1995: viii and 13 – 15); see also Kahn (1996: 354 –
355).
 5. Imagistic language, the dramatization of language and metaphoric language 105

cance of these poetic features (Press, in Press, G. A. (ed.) 2000: 1 – 15).

Plato’s works have been regarded as the products of an idiosyncratic
epoch that hovered between oral and literate modes of thought and
communication or as vigorous dramas of philosophic enunciation. At-
tention has also been drawn to Plato’s adoption of certain features of po-
etic origin, such as myth or traditional poetic utterances, and their adap-
tation to the new philosophical environment. Yet most importantly, the
Platonic dialogues have also been received as writings that “criticized
traditional genres of discourse and introduced and defined a radically
different discursive practice”. It is this new form of literary practice
that the Platonic works present us as ‘philosophy’.104
My aim in this work is to define and analyse the poetical qualities of
the Republic’s prose that lie at the core of philosophical argumentation in
the Republic. In undertaking this, I have focused on the pictorial charac-
ter of the language employed in the Republic and its connection with
Plato’s literary past. Our examination, however, has led us from an anal-
ysis of poetic motifs and imagery to an assessment of the work’s philo-
sophic language as such. In the following section I offer a close reading
of the Republic that monitors the manifold nature of Plato’s discursive
modes and their philosophical relevance to the promotion of argumen-
tation. As I have already mentioned, it is through this alternation of
philosophic styles that Socrates seeks to educate his interlocutors in eth-
ics, politics, metaphysics, and ontology.

104 See Nightingale (1995: 5): Her observations bring into focus a fundamental
problem that the dialogues in their entirety treat in different ways: “What is
‘philosophy?’ From our own (modern) perspective the question needs to be re-
phrased in order to be appreciated: What is ‘philosophy’ for the 4th century B.C.
Athenian? The importance of the issue is highlighted by Plato himself in the Re-
public 475d – e9 where the definition of the true philosopher is not treated as a
straightforward task”. On Isocrates’ deployment of philosophia to name his writ-
ings, see Nightingale (1995: 13 – 59). In addition, see Morgan (2000: 15):
“Specifying the function of myth in early Greek philosophy is a perilous enter-
prise. What is myth? What is philosophy? […] These categories are retrospec-
tive impositions on the competitive world of the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.”
In addition see Crotty (2009: 7 – 8).
Section Two: The Republic
 1. Human nature and philosophical style
in the Republic Book 5
1.1 Introduction
Book 5 is significant for my analysis of the poetics of Plato’s philosoph-
ical language mainly in two ways. Firstly, Plato exploits in an insightful
manner the motif of mixture in his presentation of the socio-political
regulations that govern the guardians’ way of life. He does this by link-
ing the motif with the imagery centred around dogs that was first intro-
duced in Book 2 to portray the nature of the guardians, and by elabo-
rating the imagery with yet more language relating to animals, so that it
now describes the entirely communal life of a human herd.1 At the same
time, in the same context, that of his discussion of the guardians’ public
way of life, Plato has Socrates build the Republic’s simplest and least ver-
bally adorned image of the polis as ‘a single human body’, in order to
adumbrate the unified psychological disposition and essential character-
istics of the citizen of the ideal state. Plato’s practice of imagery con-
struction remains prominent throughout the Book, albeit in a more sub-
tle and less colourful way, especially when set beside other well-known
images elsewhere in the work, such as those of the tyrant’s soul as a
many-headed beast in Book 9, or of society as an ill-governed ship in
Book 7. In both these contexts, Socrates employs pictorial language
to draw attention to his mixing together of different elements in a man-
ner similar to that of painters. The content of these images, at the same
time, ties the concept of mixture to lack of homogeneity, the incon-
gruity and lack of mutual compatibility of the elements that make up

1 Socrates compares the guardians to pedigree dogs in several passages in the Re-
public: 375d, 416a – b, 422d, 451d, 459a – d. In 537a7, the guardians’ children
are named skylakes. The prescriptions in the Book 5 refer to the class of the aux-
iliaries (epikouroi) and the guardians (phylakes) which Socrates has distinguished
in Book 3, 414d1 – 417b9. Socrates’ refers there for the first time to the guard-
ians’ idiosyncratic lifestyle and in Book 5 is made to expand on these ideas: see
Annas (1981: 79 – 82). The guardians’ duties in the polis are twofold, to defend
it against external enemies and to hold in check the unnecessary appetites
which, as is maintained in Book 5, lead to internal strife and division
(367a3 – 4 and 465a – b). See also Reeve (1988: 178 – 183).
110 Section Two: The Republic

the whole, and also links it to conflict, so as to present a negative view of

such a concept.2 Book 5, although it presents the ideal state as one in
which conflict and division are absent (because banned), does not dis-
card, however, the concept of mixture, an indispensable step towards
the creation of diversity. In fact, it adopts it as the basis that will ensure
the preservation and continuity of the ideal state.
In this chapter, I examine Plato’s treatment of the mixis motif in the
socio-political regulations presented in the so-called first “two waves of
argumentation” of Book 5. As I hope to show, Plato’s treatment of
mixture, which is explored alongside his banning of poikilia in the
guardian class of the ideal state, should be understood in the light of
his attempt in the whole work to portray, by way of verbal imagery,
“simple” (haploun) human ẽthos. Seen thus, the eikones in Book 5 are in-
tended to offer a striking contrast with the images of social disorder and
unjust souls and polities presented in Books 7, 8, and 9. Plato, then, in
Book 5 makes a further attack against poetry and its portrayal of humans
and society by portraying in his own philosophical discourse how im-
agery should be deployed, so that it represents as faithfully as possible
the homogeneity and purity of the Forms on earth.
The Republic’s central Book, however, poses further questions about
the poetic nature of Plato’s philosophical language. The latter part of the
Book forms one of the three passages in the Republic in which the ker-
nels of Plato’s much-discussed theory of Forms are embedded.3 The on-

2 I discuss both images in Chapter Four below: In relation to Plato’s pictorial lan-
guage see, for example, 487e-488a: di’ eQj|mym k]ceim, ¢r ckiswq_r eQj\fy,
!kk± de? 1j pokk_m aqt¹ sumacace?m eQj\fomta… oXom oR cqav/r tqacek\vour
ja· t± toiaOta leicm}mter cq\vousim (“to speaking in images; how strained my
images are; I must construct it from many sources, just as painters paint goat-stags
by mixing the features of different things”). Similar is the craft terminology in the
tyrant-image: eQj|ma pk\samter t/r xuw/r t` k|c\, Vma eQd0 b 1je?ma k]cym
oXa 5kecem (“fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the person
who says this sort of thing will know what he is saying”), eqpkast|teqom
jgqoO ja· t_m toio}tym k|cor, pepk\shy (“since words are more malleable
than wax and the like, consider it done.”)
3 In her analysis of the Republic, Julia Annas says: “Books on Plato often refer to
Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms’, but this has to be handled with caution. Plato not
only has no word for theory; he nowhere in the dialogues has an extended dis-
cussion of Forms in which he pulls together the different lines of thought about
them… The Republic is often treated as a major source for the ‘Theory of
Forms’, but even here there is no open treatment of what they contribute to
the argument. Explicit discussion of them is not very prominent: there are
only three passages where we find it…” Annas (1981: 217). See also Kahn
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 111

tological, metaphysical, and epistemological ideas introduced here are

particularly significant, since they also pave the way for the metaphysical
digression in Books 6 and 7 and for Plato’s most well-known eikones of
the Sun, the Line, and the Cave to which I shall turn in Chapters Three
and Four below. Nonetheless, in the latter part of the Book, Socrates
does not use the mode of verbal eikones to present his epistemology
and metaphysics as his does later, for example, in relation to the Form
of the Good in Book 6, or in his portrayal of the different levels of dis-
tortion of reality in the image of the Cave. Instead, the imagistic or pic-
torial type of language analysed above surfaces here and there in the lat-
ter part of Book 5 (479a – 480a), receding and intensifying at various
points during Socrates’ speech. As a result, these Stephanus pages are
the most appropriate linguistic environment in which to test my sugges-
tions articulated in Section One regarding Plato’s use of an imagistic and
poeticized style in purely argumentative contexts. It is thus also the most
appropriate environment in which to examine the philosophical signif-
icance of employing against a background of strict philosophical reason-
ing a distinctive linguistic mode whose origins are deeply-rooted in the
realm of poetry.

1.2 The “two waves” of the argument

The greater part of the discussion in Book 5 centres on Socrates’ explan-
ation of his earlier proposals that some women should also be guardians
of the polis, on the grounds that they too possess the nature of a guardian
(vukajijµ v}sir), and on his ensuing thesis that female and male guard-
ians will perforce lead a communal and public life. Socrates’ political
suggestions in Book 5 are certainly provocative, albeit perhaps not as
radical as his final thesis that in the ideal polis philosophy and politics
are to be completely identified with each other. In the context of his
distinction between true philosophers (gnẽsios) and sight-lovers, Socra-
tes, expanding for the first time on the ontology and epistemology he

(1996: 329 – 340, esp. 320 – 330). The other two places, as identified by Annas,
are Books 7. 521 – 525 and 10. 596a-597e. For a detailed analysis of the rela-
tionship of the three passages, see Annas (1981: 218 – 233); for a discussion
of the problem whether there is a theory of Forms, see also Annas (233 –
238); and Kahn (1996: 359 – 363).
112 Section Two: The Republic

is using here, draws some philosophically important distinctions be-

tween Being and Becoming, Knowledge and Belief.
There are several reasons that the fifth Book of the Republic has been
the subject of such a wide range of analyses and generated so little con-
sensus among scholars. As most commentators have noted, the book sig-
nals a striking change of theme in terms of the Republic. At this point
Plato turns somewhat abruptly from dealing with the psychology, ethics,
and definition of justice to considering politics and ontology, instead of
dealing with the nature of unjust souls, polities, and citizens, which is
the topic that he has previously announced.4 However, in addition to
setting the tone for the Republic’s unexpected ontological and metaphys-
ical digression, which is not be completed until the end of Book 7, it
also presents a thematic discontinuity in itself which cannot be easily ac-
counted for, or reconciled.5 In the same Book, Socrates turns somewhat
abruptly from his description of politics and organisation of the guard-
ians’ way of life to metaphysics and epistemology. This discontinuity in
themes creates a tension at a linguistic and stylistic level, too. Such a
change of style and theme has been tellingly described by Stephen Hal-
liwell as “a move between the mundane and the eternal”. He also notes:
“Book five begins with some typically Platonic touches of dramatic de-
tail – a tug on the shoulder of Adeimantus’s cloak, and some whispered
words between him and Polemarchus. It ends with Socrates speaking of
the realms of ‘pure’, immutable and (it seems) transcendent reality”.6
In this chapter, rather than follow a line of interpretation that stresses
the Book’s discontinuity, I argue instead that its architecture follows a
continuous and coherent progression, despite the surface shifts in sub-

4 See Strauss’ influential reading of Book 5 (1964: 61 and 116), also endorsed by
Bloom (1968: 380). Both argue that Plato’s views regarding women’s equality
echo Aristophanes’ Assemblywomen, thus drawing the readers’ attention to the
utopian character of the theoretical city. This interpretation was also endorsed
by Saxonshouse (1976: 195 – 212); and (1985: 45 – 52). See also Rosen (2005:
171 – 197); but cf. Bluestone (1987: 41 – 50); see also Hall (1977: 293 – 313). In
addition see Barker (1964 [1918]: 242); Burnyeat, in Hopkins, J. and Savile, A.
(eds.) (1992: 175 – 187) reprinted in Fine G. (ed.) (1999: 297 – 308) and Scho-
field (2006). Plato’s political ideas in the fifth Book of the Republic were severe-
ly criticized in Popper (1945); On Popper’s reception of Platonic politics, see
also Vlastos (1995); and Bambrough (ed.) (1967).
5 See detailed discussion in Penner, in Cairns D., Herrmann, F-G. and Penner,
T. (eds.) (2007: 15 – 41).
6 Halliwell (1993: 3 ff.)
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 113

ject-matter.7 Supportive of such a reading, I believe, is the interpretation

I offer of the intertwined images of the three waves and of swimming. If
we follow Plato’s use of this imagery in Book 5 closely, this apparent
thematic discontinuity dissolves and is in fact replaced, in my view,
by a subtle and nuanced drawing together of the ethical, political, and
ontological aspects of Socrates’ proposals. Thus, here in this chapter, I
argue that Socrates’ discussion of politics and ethics in this Book can
neither be seen separately, nor be fully understood, if it is dissociated
from the metaphysics that appear at the end of the Book.8 My interpre-
tation also rests on the thesis that all three arguments which Socrates
deals with here, that is, his definition of the guardians’ phusis, his de-
scription of their lifestyle, and his exposition of the Forms, are to be in-
terpreted in the light of the fact that at this point Socrates is constantly
training his interlocutors in Platonic philosophical thought and lan-
guage. Monitoring Socrates’ techniques and language selection through-
out the Book will therefore help us grasp the way in which linguistic
style and argumentation is dependent on the subject under discussion
at the time and on Socrates’ internal audience and interlocutors.
Halliwell’s “Platonic touches of dramatic detail” are launched in the
opening scene. At the beginning of the Book, Plato re-uses a common
dramatic technique to set the dialogue off in a new direction.9 Polem-
archus and Adeimantus insist that Socrates expand on his proposals con-
cerning the children and the women of the guardians (450a – b). As
Dorter (2006: 137 – 139) has shown, the scene evokes the Republic’s
opening lines, where Socrates is compelled to join Polemarchus’
group of friends at Cephalus’ house. The scene also establishes the im-
portance of Glaucon as Socrates’ most helpful interlocutor in the dia-

7 On this issue, see Schofield (2006).

8 See also Reeve (1988: 170)
9 See 449b1 – 9: b d³ Pok´laqwor – slijq¹m c±q !pyt´qy toO )deil²mtou jah/-
sto – 1jte¸mar tµm we?qa ja· kabºlemor toO Rlat¸ou %myhem aqtoO paq± t¹m
§lom, 1je?mºm te pqosgc²ceto ja· pqote¸mar 2aut¹m 5kecem %tta pqosjejuv¾r,
¨m %kko l³m oqd³m jatgjo¼salem, tºde d´7 )v¶solem owm, 5vg, C t¸ dq²solem ;
Njista ce, 5vg b )de¸lamtor l´ca Edg k´cym. [“But Polemarchus, who was sit-
ting a little further away than Adeimantus, extended his hand and took hold of
the latter’s cloak by the shoulder from above. He drew Adeimantus towards
him, while he himself leaned forward and said something to him. We overheard
nothing of what he said except the words ‘Shall we let it go, or what’? We cer-
tainly won’t let it go, Adeimantus said, now speaking aloud.”]
114 Section Two: The Republic

logue.10 In both scenes, Socrates initially refuses to accept his friends’ in-
vitation to remain in the Piraeus and visit Polemarchus’ house, and, in
the scene at Cephalus’ house in Book 5, likewise refuses to expand on
his views regarding the communal life of the guardians. On both occa-
sions, Glaucon’s intervention is crucial for the development of the dia-
logue.
In Book 1, Glaucon’s exchange with Polemarchus, Adeimantus and
Socrates foreshadows in a smooth and inconspicuous manner several of
the issues that receive fuller treatment later in the discussion on justice,
namely the importance of argumentation and persuasion in effectively
communicating an idea, as opposed to the employment of coercion
and violence which stems from the possession of excessive power.
Thus Polemarchus’ insistence on detaining Socrates and Glaucon,
since Polemarchus and his companions now outnumber them (bqør
owm Bl÷r fsoi 1sl]m and jqe_ttour c]meshe C l]met’ aqtoO, 327c7/9),
foreshadows the idea of overpowering, which later in the dialogue
will turn into unjust pleonexia. Glaucon and Socrates are differentiated
from the rest of the company, as these two alone suggest persuasion
as an alternative means to violence (327c10 – 14). Plato underscores
Glaucon’s distinctive qualities most tellingly in Book 5. Not long
after Adeimantus and Polemarchus’ initial remarks, he has Glaucon re-
place them as Socrates’ single interlocutor in the discussion regarding
the ideal state. He also has Glaucon repeatedly mention his alliance
with Socrates in regard to the radical ideas that Socrates is now encour-
aged to present.11
I shall return to the importance of Glaucon’s persona in greater detail
later.12 It is enough at this point to stress the nature of the alliance that
Glaucon promises Socrates. Adeimantus’ challenge in 449c – d has raised
serious objections to Socrates’ failure to expand on women’s role in the
guardian class and the guardians’ common possession of women and

10 The two scenes share common vocabulary: “the boy caught my cloak from be-
hind: Polemarchus wants you to wait, he said” (ja¸ lou epishem b pa?r kab|le-
mor toO Rlat_ou, Jeke}ei, rl÷r, 5vg, Pok]laqwor peqile?mai 327b4 – 5).
11 See detailed discussion below, Chapter Two. Plato has invented several techni-
ques in order to emphasize the importance of Glaucon’s contribution to the de-
velopment of the Republic’s dialogue. Note that in Book 1, Glaucon and Soc-
rates have gone down to Piraeus together and they are preparing to take the
road back to Athens when they are stopped by Polemarchus and the others.
12 See discussion in Chapter Two below.
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 115

children.13 The participants rightly claim that a thorough exposition of

the guardians’ reproduction and organisation of life is absolutely essen-
tial to judging the correctness of the Socratic polis (l]ca c\q ti oQ|leha
v]qeim ja· fkom eQr pokite_am aqh_r C lµ aqh_r cicm|lemom, 449d5 – 6). A
“swarm of arguments” is now stirred up by the determination on the
part of these interlocutors to investigate more deeply matters capable
of shaking the foundations of the theoretical polis that have been laid
up to this point.14 Socrates’ repeatedly expressed lack of confidence in
his own abilities to speak knowledgeably on matters of the greatest im-
portance is a well-documented motif in Plato’s writings.15 Socrates’ con-
cerns expressed here, however, have the effect of highlighting the pow-
erful alliance that Glaucon emphasizes to Socrates throughout Book 5.
As we will see, this support is fundamental for the development of the
argumentation. It also accords with the philosophical reasons that lie be-
hind Plato’s choice of the dialogue form in which to set down his writ-
ings, for the dialogue form allows the cognitive and ethical qualities of
Socrates’ co-speakers to contribute to the definition of the shape and
progress of the philosophical thought (Rowe 2007: 7 – 12). These qual-
ities also play a central role in the linguistic mode used in the dialogue.
With regard to Glaucon, it is evident that certain Socratic character-
istics have rubbed off on him: thus, according to Glaucon, people with
understanding (moOm 5wousim) should devote their entire life to philo-
sophical thought (L´tqom d´ c’, 5vg, § S¾jqater, b Cka¼jym, toio¼tym
kºcym !jo¼eim fkor b b¸or moOm 5wousim [“It is within reason, Socrates,
Glaucon said, for people with any understanding to listen to an argu-
ment of this kind their whole life long.”], 450b6 – 7). His reply to Soc-
rates marks him out as a tireless and dedicated advocate of the logos:
!kk± t¹ l³m Bl´teqom 5a7 s» d³ peq· ¨m 1qyt_lem lgdal_r !poj²l,r
Ø soi doje? dieni¾m… (“So don’t mind about us, and don’t get tired
yourself […]”). However, his unquestioning support of Socrates culmi-
nates a few narratological moments later, when he states: “You need not

13 In 449c2 – 3, Socrates is accused of “cheating the company out of a whole im-

portant section of the discussion”.
14 See 450a10-b2: $ mOm rle?r paqajakoOmter oqj Uste fsom 2sl¹m kºcym
1pece¸qete7 dm bq_m 1c½ paq/ja tºte, lµ paq²swoi pok»m ewkom (“You
don’t realize what a swarm of arguments you’ve stirred up by calling me to ac-
count now. I saw the swarm and passed the topic by in order to save us a lot of
trouble”).
15 See 450b5, where Socrates comments that “arguments should be handled with
moderation”; see also Rep. 450d8 – 451a4.
116 Section Two: The Republic

hesitate… This is not an unsympathetic (agnmones) audience; we are

neither incredulous (apistoi) nor hostile (dysnoi)” (450d3 – 4). Glaucon’s
use of the word apistoi is heavily stressed later in the context of Socrates’
exposition of the Forms, since the sight-lovers (philotheamones), who
cannot be persuaded of the existence of the Forms, are explicitly char-
acterized by Socrates as apistoi. After Glaucon’s encouragement, Plato
has Socrates face the three waves of logos. Socrates’ prescriptions regard-
ing the organisation of the life of the guardians and the philosopher-
kings in Book 5 lead the dialogue to the metaphysics and epistemology
of Books 6 and 7. Despite Socrates’ intentions, his friends’ request serves
to draw the conversation out longer than he might have liked.

1.2.1 The first wave of argument: women in the guardians’ agelẽ

The continuity of themes that underlies Socrates’ discussion in Book 5

becomes obvious if we shift the perspective from which we view his
discussion of the guardians’ phusis (the first wave) and the treatment
of the guardians’ sexual mixture (second wave). Thus, the thematic
gap between the first two waves and the third can be bridged if we fol-
low Socrates’ imagery and language closely in the contexts in question.
In my view, the outline of the Forms is to be discerned, albeit faintly,
behind the argumentation as early as the first wave of Book 5.
The first argument to be examined in the conversation at this point
pertains to the place of women in the city’s guardian class. Socrates’
broader thesis is that certain women should be trained as guardians,
for, from a philosophical perspective, they too may share the vukajijµ
v}sir of the men.16 In the first part of the discussion on women,

16 Plato’s view of women in Book 5 of the Republic has been analyzed from var-
ious viewpoints and produced a comprehensive and full literature, especially
since his treatment of women is not consistent throughout his writings. On Pla-
to’s inconsistency in regarding female guardians as equal to male guardians, see
Grote (1865: 68); Bloom (1968: 383); Barker (1964 [1918]: 256). See also dis-
cussion in Calvert (1975: 231 – 243), who explains away these contradictions by
arguing that “Plato operates on two levels at the same time in Book 5, and that
these levels are subconsciously mingled together”. Thus Plato’s contradictory
view of women reveals the tension that arises from intertwining traditional
and novel views (242 – 3). In addition, see Lodge (1970: 239); Wender
(1973: 75 – 90); Allen (1975: 131 – 138); Annas (1976: 307 – 321) and (1981:
181 – 189); Okin (1976/7: 345 – 369); Brown (1988: 594 – 616); Waterfield
(1993: 408 – 409); Spelman, in Tuana N. (ed.) (1994: 89 – 107). Buchan
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 117

Plato has Socrates follow the ramifications of a deeply-rooted tradition

that distinguished men from women (jewyqisl]mg v}sir), only to sub-
vert and redefine this distinction in his new approach to the term phusis.
Socrates then argues, as a consequence of his line of reasoning, against
the need for traditional male/female polarities in the guardians’ socio-
political life in the hope of liberating his intra-dramatic audience from
familiar and well-established thought-patterns.17
In expanding on his suggestions regarding the women and children
of the guardian class, Socrates builds on previous ideas, thus reintroduc-
ing the analogy of guardians to pedigree dogs and of the guardian class
to an agelẽ. Given the validity of such a comparison, says Socrates, there
is no reason for rejecting the idea that members of the guardians may
possess women and children in common (451c4 – d).18 Socrates’ reuse
of the dog eikn in this context is philosophically significant in terms
of his pursuit of the ideas of gender equality and the communal life
of the guardians, but this initial justification for his prescriptions regard-
ing the organisation of the polis is somewhat hasty and poorly argued.19
From this linguistic environment, we should note the term phusis is ab-
sent:
t±r hgke¸ar t_m vuk²jym jum_m pºteqa sulvuk²tteim oQºleha de?m ûpeq #m
oR %qqemer vuk²ttysi ja· sumhgqe¼eim ja· tükka joim0 pq²tteim, C t±r l³m
oQjouqe?m 5mdom ¢r !dum²tour di± t¹m t_m sjuk²jym tºjom te ja· tqov¶m,
to»r d³ pome?m te ja· p÷sam 1pil´keiam 5weim peq· t± po¸lmia ; (451d4 – e).
Should the females guard the flock and hunt with the males and take a share
in all they do, or should they be kept within doors as fit for no more than

(1999); Hobbs (2000: 246 – 247); Kochin (2002: 81 – 82) and Dorter (2006:
139 – 143); Schofield (2006: 227 – 234).
17 On Socrates’ approach to male and female nature here, see also Rosen (2005:
174 – 175). Lloyd’s (1966) investigation of polarity in ancient Greek thought
draws on Cornford’s (1912) interpretation of binary opposition, which identi-
fies “the prototype of all opposition” in the bipolarity of gender.
18 See 451c4-d: )mhq¾poir c±q vOsi ja· paideuhe?sim ¢r Ble?r di¶kholem, jat’
1lµm dºnam oqj 5st’ %kkg aqhµ pa¸dym te ja· cumaij_m jt/s¸r te ja· wqe¸a C
jat’ 1je¸mgm tµm bqlµm QoOsim, Fmpeq t¹ pq_tom ¢ql¶salem7 1peweiq¶salem d´
pou ¢r !c´kgr v¼kajar to»r %mdqar jahist²mai t` kºc\. (“In my judgement,
then, the question under what conditions people born and educated as we have
described should possess wives and children, and how they should treat them,
can be rightly settled only by keeping to the course on which we started them at
the outset.” [trans. Cornford])
19 On the dog imagery in the Republic, see Pender (2000: 142 – 144) with further
bibliography.
118 Section Two: The Republic

bearing and feeding their puppies, while all the hard work of looking after
the flock is left to the males? (trans. Cornford)
In these lines, Socrates enhances his dog eikn with further animal im-
agery in order to expand on the life of the guardians (sumhgqe¼eim ja·
tükka joim0 pq²tteim, ¢r !dum²tour di± t¹m t_m sjuk²jym tºjom te
ja· tqov¶m). Glaucon, accepting this analogy, agrees with Socrates
that everything should be held in common among the guardians, but
still notes that women are weaker in comparison to men (pkµm ¢r !she-
mest]qair wq~leha, to?r d³ ¢r Qswuqot]qoir, 451e1 – 2). This dialogue,
on the equality of men and women guardians, does not progress in
the direction that Socrates might wish, primarily thanks to Glaucon’s in-
ability to free himself of well-established ideas regarding women’s edu-
cation and military training. As a result, Glaucon’s participation at this
point in the argument lessens in narratological terms. He is both trapped
in Socrates’ initial line of reasoning, in which equality rests on the dog
analogy, yet still trapped in traditional socio-political ideas and patterns
of thought and so is apparently satisfied with certain observations on the
part of Socrates when he clearly should not be. In order, then, for the
dialogue to progress, Plato has Socrates assume a different narratological
persona, that of an imaginative speaker, who is willing to put to the test
(elenchein) the interlocutors’ provocative beliefs (452e4 – 453b). The
question posed at this point highlights the need to approach anew,
from a political and philosophical point of view, the term phusis:
K´cylem dµ rp³q aqt_m fti ¯ S¾jqat´r te ja· Cka¼jym, oqd³m de? rl?m
%kkour !lvisbgte?m7 aqto· c±q 1m !qw0 t/r jatoij¸seyr, Dm áj¸fete
pºkim, ¢lokoce?te de?m jat± v¼sim 6jastom 6ma 4m t¹ artoO pq²tteim.
(453b2 – 5)
Let us state his case for him. ‘Socrates and Glaucon’, he will say, ‘there is no
need for others to dispute your position; you yourselves, at the very outset
of founding your city, agreed that everyone should do the one work for which
nature fits him’. (trans. Cornford)
The definition offered in Book 4 of justice in the soul is built on this
fundamental principle. The imaginative speaker is re-deploying it
now to question Socrates’ innovative uniting of male and female physeis:
=stim owm fpyr oq p²lpoku diav´qei cumµ !mdq¹r tµm v¼sim ; (453b7 – 8)…
P_r owm oqw "laqt²mete mum· ja· t!mamt¸a rl?m aqto?r k´cete v²sjomter aw
to»r %mdqar ja· t±r cuma?jar de?m t± aqt± pq²tteim, pke?stom jewyqisl´mgm
v¼sim 5womtar ; (453c2 – 5)
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 119

And isn’t there a very great difference in nature between man and woman?
… But if so, surely you must be mistaken now and contradicting yourselves
when you say that men and women, having such widely divergent natures,
should do the same things. (trans. Cornford)
If female nature differs so greatly from male nature, then one cannot
possibly assign the same duties to both. Socrates points out that pursuit
of this line of argument will not pay any philosophical dividends. As the
discussion runs the risk of ending in a quasi-aporia (453c10 – d11), Plato’s
readers now brace themselves to take the new path that Socrates is about
to indicate (v]qe d^, Gm d’ 1c~, 1\m p, evqylem tµm 5nodom, 453 e1).
Nonetheless, before examining the problem anew, Socrates adds in an
enigmatic fashion: !kk± dµ ¨d’ 5wei· %mte tir eQr jokulb¶hqam lijq±m
1lp´s, %mte eQr t¹ l´cistom p´kacor l´som, flyr ce me? oqd³m Httom
([“but whether a man tumbles into a swimming-pool or into mid-
ocean, he has to swim all the same”] 453d5 – 7). This parenthetic remark
often passes undetected in the literature.20 Is the parallel that is made
here between the problem in question and a small swimming pool or
between the problem and the ocean? And, furthermore, in any case,
why is such a parallel made in the first place? Socrates in the end con-
cedes that knowledge of swimming is what counts in both situations.
The image is obviously analogical. Yet what is Socrates really trying
to convey? If he is indeed comparing one thing to something else,
how can this remark contribute to our understanding and interpretation
of the Socratic methodology expounded throughout Book 5? I will re-
turn to this question after we have dealt with Socrates’ treatment of the
three waves of argument.
In his examination of the first wave, Socrates acknowledges that the
conversation has almost reached deadlock and promises an alternative
path of enquiry. The ensuing discussion highlights Socrates and Glau-
con’s methodological mistakes thus far. The company has failed to ob-
serve the rules for conducting a dialogue and, as a result, the progress of
the dialogue has been blocked by unnecessary divisions and polarities.
Socrates’ amusing suggestion that the nature of bald men should, on
the same basis, also differ from that of the long-haired ones underscores
this point (454c1 – 5; cf. Glaucon’s geloion in 454c6). Most men, says
Socrates, fail to identify the point at which a dialogue turns from con-
structive conversation into a mere quarrel (454a4 – 11):

20 But see Howland (1998: 633 – 657). Roochnik (2003: 57 – 69) links this image-
ry with Plato’s treatment of the perils of eros in Book 5.
120 Section Two: The Republic

nti, eWpom, dojoOs_ loi eQr aqtµm ja· %jomter pokko· 1lp_pteim ja· oUeshai
oqj 1q_feim !kk± diak]ceshai, di± t¹ lµ d}mashai jat’ eUdg diaiqo}lemoi t¹
kec|lemom 1pisjope?m, !kk± jat’ aqt¹ t¹ emola di~jeim toO kewh]mtor tµm
1mamt_ysim, 5qidi, oq diak]jt\ pq¹r !kk^kour wq~lemoi.
Because they often seem to fall unconsciously into mere disputes which
they mistake for reasonable argument, through being unable to draw the distinc-
tions proper to their subject; and so, instead of philosophical exchange of ideas,
they go off in chase of contradictions which are purely verbal. (trans. Corn-
ford)
The practice of disputation (antilogikẽ) is based on the formation of lin-
guistic contradictions. Yet these are often only cursory and superficial.21
From a Platonic perspective, the advocates of antilogic are accused of
promoting the proliferation of unnecessary polarities and contradictions,
thereby introducing confusion into language. These people are con-
demned, and condemn others, too, to a life of fruitless planẽ, or, in
the Republic’s epistemological language, to a life at the level of eikasia. 22
In Plato’s view, mortals cannot avoid polarities, and yet the guardian
class of the ideal polis must be organized in such a way as to diminish
any polarities as much as possible. The first barrier to fall in the theoret-
ical organisation of the guardian class is the erroneous division of one’s
own nature on the basis of gender as regards politics. Plato thus attacks
those who exercise the art of disputation (antilogikẽ) on the grounds
that such persons have deliberately chosen to amplify the antithesis
and confusion that abound in our world, even when this is not necessa-
ry:23
T¹ <lµ> tµm aqtµm v}sim fti oq t_m aqt_m de? 1pitgdeul\tym tucw\meim
p\mu !mdqe_yr te ja· 1qistij_r jat± t¹ emola di~jolem, 1pesjex\leha d³
oqd’ bp,oOm t_ eWdor t¹ t/r 2t]qar te ja· t/r aqt/r v}seyr ja· pq¹r t_ te?-
mom ¢qif|leha t|te, fte t± 1pitgde}lata %kk, v}sei %kka, t0 d³ aqt0 t±
aqt± !ped_dolem. (454b4 – 9)
We have been strenuously insisting on the letter of our principle that dif-
ferent natures should not have the same occupations, as if we were scoring
a point in a debate; but we have altogether neglected to consider what sort

21 On Plato’s deployment of antilogic and dialectic here, see Rosen (2005: 174 –
178). On antilogic in the Platonic corpus, see Nehamas (1990: 3 – 16); Kerferd
(1981: 59 – 67). On dialectic, see also Robinson (1953: chapters 6, 7, and 10);
see also Annas (1981: 276 – 293); and Roochnik (2003: 133 – 151); Pemok_dgr,
in J\kvar, B. (ed.) (2004: 117 – 170, esp. 120 – 124).
22 See Petraki (2009: 27 – 67).
23 See also Bruce (1993: 233 – 246).
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 121

of sameness or difference we meant and in what respect these natures and

occupations were to be defined as different or the same. (trans. Cornford)
The process to which Socrates now turns is that of correct division and
synthesis (454c1 – 455d5).24 His ensuing treatment of the term phusis
breaks down one of the most traditional polarities in the history of
Greek thought. As a result, in Book 5, male and female nature are unit-
ed and subsumed under the phusis of the guardian. The distinction be-
tween male and female, in the form that it has been promoted and
passed from one generation to the other, is now radically subverted in
this context. What is important for the polis that the interlocutors are
constructing is to identify and find the means of preserving what Socrates
calls the phusis of the guardian. From this perspective, the traditional di-
vision of genders which is based on the concept of “females bearing
children and males begetting them” offers no proof that “women are
different from men” with regard to the issue now being discussed
(454d7 – e4).25 Taking doctors as a typical example, Socrates claims
that the ability to practice the craft of medicine lies in one’s intellectual
capabilities and is independent of gender.26 Similarly, the vukajijµ
v}sir depends on the bodily and intellectual qualities that distinguish
one. The city’s guardians are to be distinguished from others on the
basis of such criteria and not on the basis of their gender (455e –
456b). Socrates’ subversive promotion of gender equality in this envi-
ronment demonstrates how certain well-established polarities may be
detrimental to innovative socio-political formulations.27
The turning point in the assessment of female guardianship is Soc-
rates’ assumption of the persona of an imaginative speaker in order to
test the results of the argumentation that has preceded this moment
(453b1 – c6 and 455b – e2). Socrates’ ensuing successful defeat of the

24 On diairesis, see Rosen (2005: 177 – 178).

25 But see Rosen (2005: 174).
26 See 454c7-d3: /qa jat’ %kko ti, eWpom 1c~, ceko?om, C fti t|te oq p\mtyr tµm
aqtµm ja· tµm 2t]qam v}sim 1tih]leha, !kk’ 1je?mo t¹ eWdor t/r !kkoi~se~r te ja·
bloi~seyr l|mom 1vuk\ttolem t¹ pq¹r aqt± te?mom t± 1pitgde}lata ; oXom Qatqi-
j¹m l³m ja· Qatqijµm tµm xuwµm [emta] tµm aqtµm v}sim 5weim 1k]colem. (“And
aren’t we in this ridiculous position because at that time we did not introduce
every form of difference and sameness in nature, but focused on the one form of
sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life them-
selves? We meant, for example, that a male and female doctor have souls of
the same nature.”)
27 So Halliwell (1993: 9 and 14).
122 Section Two: The Republic

traps lurking in antilogikẽ is also marked by an alteration in his linguistic

style.28 Within only a few Stephanus pages, Socrates has employed lan-
guage drawn from the world of animals to argue against well-established
ideas of familial bonds and traditional patriarchic oikoi. He has also swift-
ly abandoned this mode of speech for a new one, divested of strong pic-
torial impressions in order to argue that exceptional examples of human
nature are to be found in both men and women (455b8 – 9). In
Rep. 451b cited above the vocabulary selected by Plato’s main speaker
is strikingly animal-oriented, since there the pedigree dog imagery is en-
hanced so as to describe life in a group of human guardians (t±r hgke_ar
t_m vuk\jym jum_m, sulvuk\tteim, sumhgqe}eim, oQjouqe?m 5mdom and di±
t¹m t_m sjuk\jym t|jom, 451c7 – 8). As we noted above, the term phusis
is absent from this context. It resurfaces a few moments later in the in-
vestigation when Socrates modifies his method and sets off to draw up
correct divisions. In his second attempt in 453a – e to prove the com-
mon phusis of certain men and women, Socrates uses vocabulary relating
to animals significantly less. The use of guardian pedigree-dogs, the little
dogs, and the packs (451d4 – 9) gives way to phrases such as dumatµ
v}sir p|teqom B !mhq~pimg B h^keia t0 toO %qqemor c]mour joimym/sai
eQr ûpamta t± 5qca C oqd’ eQr 6m… (“Whether female human nature can
share all the tasks of that of the male, or none of them…” 453a1). To-
wards the end of the first wave, in 456b1 – 3, the diction that Socrates
amasses to summarize their findings in relation to female guardian nature
is totally devoid of animal-oriented imagery:

28 Socrates’ explanation of antilogic introduces terminology devoid of vivid picto-

rial impressions into the dialogue. Dialectic is contrasted with eristic and atten-
tion is drawn to the pursuit of definitions (jat’ eUdg diaiqo}lemoi t¹ kec|lemom),
rather than on the basis of superficial linguistic divisions (jat’ aqt¹ t¹ emola
di~jeim toO kewh]mtor tµm 1mamt_ysim, 454b6 and b8). Note that the term dia-
lectic appears here for the first time in the Republic. Rosen too notes the “sud-
den eruption of technical terminology” in 454a1 – 9, but follows a different line
of interpretation in his reading of Socrates’ alternation of linguistic styles (2005:
175 – 178). He rightly observes, nonetheless, that Socrates’ technical language
here builds on the interlocutors’ knowledge of the art of disputation as practiced
in Athenian law courts, which involved one’s establishing of contradiction in
the opponent’s view. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Socrates’
interlocutors are familiar with terms such as philosophical diairesis and dialectic
(Rosen 175). In alternating technical terminology and imagistic language in
his various styles, Socrates has already started to instruct his internal audience
in the multiple use of language to pursue philosophical argumentation.
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 123

Oqd³m %qa 1st¸m, § v¸ke, 1pit¶deula t_m pºkim dioijo¼mtym cumaij¹r diºti
cum¶, oqd’ !mdq¹r diºti !m¶q, !kk’ blo¸yr diespaql´mai aR v¼seir 1m !lvo?m
to?m f]oim, ja· p²mtym l³m let´wei cumµ 1pitgdeul²tym jat± v¼sim, p²m-
tym d³ !m¶q, 1p· p÷si d³ !shem´steqom cumµ !mdqºr. P²mu ce
(455d6 – e)… Ja· cuma?jer %qa aR toiaOtai to?r toio¼toir !mdq²sim 1jke-
jt´ai sumoije?m te ja· sulvuk²tteim, 1pe¸peq eQs·m Rjama· ja· succeme?r
aqto?r tµm v¼sim (456b1 – 3).
To conclude, then, there is no occupation concerned with the manage-
ment of social affairs which belongs either to woman or to man, as such.
But natures are distributed in the same way in both men and women… It follows
that women of this type must be selected to share the life and duties of
Guardians with men of the same type, since they are competent and of a
like nature, and the same natures must be allowed the same pursuits.
(trans. Cornford)
At this point the conversation has successfully reached an initial level of
quasi-abstraction. The vukajijµ v}sir has now been successfully de-
fined. Women may be weaker than men, but this is an insignificant dif-
ference from the philosophical perspective of the interlocutors. Particu-
larly important factors in determining one’s place in Socrates’ classifica-
tion of the guardians in his polis are exceptional intellectual and physical
capacities for assimilating knowledge and undertaking laborious military
training (455b4 – c2) (Rosen [2005: 177]). Socrates’ pedigree dog im-
agery, which is initially used in 451d4 – 9, to describe the animal-like
features of the type of communal life to be lived by the guardian
class, now gives way to a different stylistic mode which avoids ani-
mal-oriented imagery and seeks to promote a certain level of abstraction
that later proves particularly useful to the group when they reach the
third and most dangerous wave (455d6 – e2). As we will see below in
Plato’s third wave of argument, familiar language is re-defined and re-
organized to present the transcendental Forms and describe different
levels of mortal cognition. However, in instructing his interlocutors
on guardian nature and on the organisation of the guardians’ civic
way of life, Socrates has already started to employ, albeit inconspicuous-
ly, wording that will be re-deployed later within the context of Platonic
metaphysics. “Natures of the same quality”, says Socrates, “are distrib-
uted in men and women of the guardian class correlating them irrespec-
tive of gender” (blo¸yr diespaql´mai aR v¼seir 1m !lvo?m to?m f]oim and
succeme?r aqto?r tµm v¼sim, 455d8).29

29 See 456a7 – 8: 5stim %qa ja· vukajijµ cum^, B d’ ou. C oq toia}tgm ja· t_m
!mdq_m t_m vukajij_m v}sim 1neken\leha ; (“So one woman may have a guard-
124 Section Two: The Republic

When viewed in retrospect, Plato’s description of the guardian na-

ture in 455b6 – e1 has already started to prefigure not only the language
of the Forms, but also to foreshadow in pictorial terms the relation of
the Forms to the mundane world. In his treatment of the third wave,
Socrates argues that it is by means of their “association” with the beau-
tiful that beautiful things “partake in” beauty: aqt¹ l³m 4m 6jastom eWmai,
t0 d³ t_m pq\neym ja· syl\tym ja· !kk^kym joimym_ô pamtawoO vam-
taf|lema pokk± va_meshai 6jastom (“each in itself is one; but they man-
ifest themselves in a great variety of combinations, with actions, with
material things, and with one another, and so each seems to be
many”, 476a5 – 7). The same idea is stated in 476d1 – 3: ja· dum\lemor
jahoq÷m ja· aqt¹ ja· t± 1je_mou let]womta, ja· oute t± let]womta
aqt¹ oute aqt¹ t± let]womta Bco}lemor (“[…] and can discern that es-
sence as well as the things that partake of its character, without ever con-
fusing the one with the other”). In arguing in the first wave for the sim-
ilarity between male and female guardian nature, Plato has subtly created
imagery that foreshadows the metaphysics and ontology of the third
wave of argument. Thus, in a similar way, the exceptional guardian phu-
sis is channelled to each (male or female) guardian, and it is by partaking
in this nature (suggeneis, 456b3) that people may become guardians in
the ideal state and share the same tasks (koinnẽsai, 453a1). Plato’s inter-
play of the concrete and the abstract has been already put to work, but it
does not reach its climax until his exposition of the Forms at the end of
Book 5.

1.2.2 The second wave of argument:

the guardians’ mixis and class purity

In defeating the first wave of argument (457b7 – c5), Socrates has suc-
cessfully shown that women, too, can be guardians in the theoretical
state, in so far as they possess the qualities of this remarkable nature.
To ignore Socrates’ point in the theoretical construction of the Socratic
polis is also to ignore the semantics that the argumentation to this point
has assigned to the word guardian-phusis, namely the excellent physical
and intellectual competence that is unrelated to gender divisions. The
second wave of argument, to which Plato’s main speaker now turns, in-

ian nature and another not, for wasn’t it qualities of this sort that we looked for
in the natures of the men we selected as guardians?”)
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 125

volves the ground-breaking suggestion that male and female guardians

should have everything in common, including sexual partners and off-
spring (457c10 – d3).30
The argument on which this prescription hinges pertains to the Soc-
ratic thesis that divisions within society lead to disagreement, strife and
competition, eventually to generate chaos and disarray (462a – b).31
Thus, behind Socrates’ insistence that fragmentations in the guardian
class in the form of familial oikoi should be avoided at all costs lies Plato’s
broader objective of securing homogeneity and unison, which can be
attained through the cultivation of harmony and balance.32 Plato’s pre-
scriptions regarding the guardians’ erotic mingling and breeding (mixis)
build on the first wave’s definition of the guardian phusis and are intend-
ed to preserve the purity of this class (457c7 – 8). However, in the fol-
lowing pages I will argue that when viewed together the three waves of
argument, in sharing common imagery and vocabulary, highlight Plato’s
intention of organising the guardian class in the ideal city so that it dis-
plays certain characteristics that one can find only at the transcendental
level of the Forms, the most prominent of these being unchangingness,
purity, uniformity, and homogeneity. This is the only way, according to
Socrates, to preserve the ideal polis (460a). Thus, in attaining the truth of
the transcendent Forms, the philosopher-kings’ task on earth will also be
to maintain the hold that the seal (tupos) of the Forms has on society by
regulating erotic mixture and keeping any diversity and multiplicity
(poikilia) under close control.33

30 See also detailed discussion by Halliwell (1993: 16 – 21).

31 For a detailed discussion and criticism of Socrates’ proposals here, see Rosen
(2005: 185 – 191).
32 See Vlastos (1969: 516 – 520).
33 See 459b10-e4, where the rulers emerge from the guardian class of the state in
Book 5. That the theoretical city will need rulers has been insinuated at 389b – c
and 390a. The rulers, who will later develop into the Republic’s philosophers-
kings, stem from the guardian class which has been ethically educated in accord
with Socrates’ prescriptions in Book 3. Note that their first task in Book 5 is to
use lies and deception, so that the guardians do not deviate from the strict mar-
riage and breeding regulations (pseudos and apatẽ, 459c8 – 9; see also 382a – d;
and 535e). On the rulers’ lying in the Republic, see Rosen (2005: 186 – 188);
cf. Schofield (2006: Ch. 7) and Schofield, in Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.) (2007:
138 – 164). In the “noble lie” of 414b-415a, Plato linked the Guardians’
lying with the use of myth. The citizens thus learn that they all are siblings
who share the same mother, earth, and that they harbour metals in their
souls, gold, silver and bronze, which they must not “mix”. Socrates returns
126 Section Two: The Republic

Socrates announces to the company that the second wave of argu-

ment will be far more demanding and difficult to handle than the first
(457b7 – c5). The problem is that he will have to prove that his sugges-
tions are not only most beneficial for the polis, but also feasible
(457d4 – 9). Already anticipating his encounter with the third wave,
Socrates hopes that the beneficial character of his suggestions will not
be doubted so much, but he expresses concern about his ability to con-
vince of their feasibility (457d6 – 9). Glaucon replies that Socrates will
need to prove both (457e1 – 6).34 His intervention is crucial, as the real-
isation of the proposed socio-political regulations lead the conversation
to the biggest wave of all arguments and, as a result, to the work’s met-
aphysical and epistemological digression in Books 6 and 7 (457d9). For
the moment, nonetheless, Socrates asks permission to deal with the reg-
ulations per se regarding the guardians’ communal life and to postpone
discussion of their feasibility for later (458a – b).
The prescriptions regarding the guardians’ sexual relations and com-
munal lifestyle draw on the conclusions that arose from the first wave of
argument. The polis will be best organized, says Socrates, only if certain
criteria are strictly met as regards the guardians’ breeding:
S» l³m to_mum, Gm d’ 1c~, b moloh]tgr aqto?r, ¦speq to»r %mdqar 1n]kenar,
ovty ja· t± cuma_jar 1jk]nar paqad~seir jah’ fsom oX|m te blovue?r7 oR d] ,
ûte oQj_ar te ja· suss_tia joim± 5womter, Qd_ô d³ oqdem¹r oqd³m toioOtom
jejtgl]mou, bloO dµ 5somtai, bloO d³ !maleleicl´mym ja· 1m culmas_oir
ja· 1m t0 %kk, tqov0 rp’ !m²cjgr oWlai t/r 1lv¼tou %nomtai pq¹r tµm
!kk¶kym le?nim (458c6 – d3).
Then you, as their lawgiver, will select women just as you did men, with
natures as similar to theirs as possible, and hand them over to the men.
And since they have common dwellings and meals, rather than private
ones, and live together and mix together both in physical training and in the
rest of their upbringing, they will I suppose, be driven by innate necessity to
have sex with one another. Or don’t you think we’re talking about neces-
sities here?

to the problem of “mixture” as regards the guardians in Book 5. On Plato’s as-

sociation of myth with lying in the Republic, see discussion in Lear (in Santas, G.
[ed.] [2006: 26 – 43]), who interprets the dialogue in its entirety as a mythic-
philosophical pharmakon against the deceptive charms of poetry.
34 See 457e5 – 6: )kk’ oqj 5kaher, G d’ fr, !podidq²sjym, !kk’ !lvot´qym p´qi
d¸dou kºcom. (“No, we have seen through that manoeuvre. You will have to
defend both positions.”)
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 127

Throughout his discussion of the second wave of argument, Socrates re-

deploys the first wave’s animal-oriented linguistic colouring, and, in
specific terms, the eikn of the guardians as pedigree watch-dogs, en-
twining it this time with vocabulary cognate with meignumi. 35 Socrates’
deployment of the word meignymi and its derivatives is not surprising in
this context, since this is well-established vocabulary for referring to sex-
ual intercourse, and, prima facie, it is sexual intercourse that Socrates dis-
cusses here.36 Thus Socrates’ thesis here that sexual relationships must be
strictly controlled, so as to take place within the guardian class only,
builds and expands on the inferences drawn in the first wave, both the-
matically and linguistically. From this perspective, the male and female
guardian phusis, even when “mixed”, must not lose its essential and dis-
tinctive qualities. To adopt the Socratic parlance of the first wave “the
dissemination of the same nature” must be strictly regulated so that the
various constituent parts (note Socrates’ use of physeis in plural in
455d8), even when dispersed, are in essence re-assembled and reunited
to generate a new guardian of the same kind. The distinctive qualities of
the guardian nature remain thus “pure” and uncontaminated in this
class. The aim of Socrates’ restrictions on guardians’ breeding is to pre-
serve both the quality of the guardian genos intact and to hold their
quantity in check. It is in this way alone that this genos can be preserved
katharon (EUpeq l´kkei, 5vg, jahaq¹m t¹ c´mor t_m vuk²jym 5seshai,
460c6 – 7; cf. 535e4 – 5: B xuwµ eqweq_r ¦speq hgq_om veiom 1m !lah_ô
lok}mgtai).37

35 See 459a1 – 5: P_r owm dµ ¡vekil¾tatoi 5somtai ; tºde loi k´ce, § Cka¼jym7
bq_ c²q sou 1m t0 oQj¸ô ja· j¼mar hgqeutijo»r ja· t_m cemma¸ym aqm¸hym
l²ka suwmo¼r7 üq’ owm, § pq¹r Diºr, pqos´swgj²r ti to?r to¼tym c²loir te
ja· paidopoi¸ô; (“How, then, will they be most beneficial? Tell me this, Glau-
con: I see that you have hunting dogs and quite a flock of noble fighting birds at
home. Have you noticed anything about their mating and breeding?”) The ar-
gumentation regarding unrestrained sexual relations, because it employs analo-
gy, works successfully on Glaucon, who agrees that free sexual mingling among
pedigree species may hold for humans, too (see 459b – c). Wording of mixis is
deployed sporadically throughout the second wave: see 458d9; 461b10-c1.
36 See LSJ s.v.
37 The word katharos has strong religious overtones, at which Plato here hints in a
somewhat subtle manner, when he has Glaucon, in a playful exchange at the
beginning of Book 5, promise Socrates that he “will absolve him of any guilt
arising from lying to his friends, as in a homicide case”. Socrates’ hands will
be “clean” (katharos, 451b3 – 4). Note, however, religious connotations apart,
katharos, too, is a pictorial term, as is the motif of “mixing (of pigments)”,
128 Section Two: The Republic

Nevertheless, in the Republic’s thickly woven linguistic texture the

mixis motif, which on a surface level here refers to sexual intercourse,
assumes multiple connotations that permeate the text’s manifold levels
of meaning in highly nuanced ways.38 Thus Plato’s treatment of the
mixture motif here is cast in a new light and becomes philosophically
significant when seen in relation to the Republic’s broader exploration
of this rich motif. On this interpretation, the prescriptions regarding
the preservation of the guardians’ purity and homogeneity of essence
becomes part of one of the most prominent polarities that run through
the Republic, namely the contrast among mixture (mixis), contamination
(mollunetai), or incongruent variety (poikilia) to the attainment of purity,
homogeneity, and balanced harmony on earth. Socrates’ insistence that
the class of guardians should not be contaminated by inappropriate sex-
ual mingling underlines the importance of moulding the sense-percep-
tible and the corporeal in accordance with the metaphysical. To bring
transcendental and eidetic purity down to our sense-perceptible and
corporeal world is a highly demanding task, never to be fully achieved
in our incongruent world of Becoming, for Becoming is defined by mix-
ture of all kinds. Plato, nonetheless, embarks on this task in his Republic,
attempting to annihilate incongruent mixture as much as possible, both
in his civic regulations in the ideal state and in his discussion of the con-
dition of the soul. In the case of the guardian class of Book 5, the con-

used in the context of painting and the dyeing of wool (see 399e5; 501a1 – 4;
501b – c). In his Republic, Plato makes the most of these multiple nuances in his
treatment of painting as a strategy well adapted to the philosopher’s task of tack-
ling matters of methodology and language usage. The pictorially-oriented lan-
guage used throughout the dialogue, is particularly useful in conveying the phi-
losopher’s ‘mixture’ of words on a “clear canvas” (katharos) in his depiction of
human nature, soul and society and in people’s education in ethical matters. See
here Socrates’ reference to the dyer’s craft in 429d – e as an analogy for the
guardians’ education. Dyers “pick out from the many colours of wool the
one that is naturally white… so that it will absorb the colour as well as possible
and only then do they apply the dye” (ejk]comtai 1j toso}tym wqyl\tym l_am
v}sim tµm t_m keuj_m, 429d5 – 6). On the religious semantics of the term ka-
tharos, see the Introduction, n. 31; see also below, Chapter Three. I discuss
the term katharos in relation to Plato’s verbal painting in the Republic in Chapter
Four below.
38 See discussion in the Introduction above. See also extensive discussion in Chap-
ters Three and Four below. The multiple connotations that I read in the mixis
motif of Book 5 often pass unobserved in the literature: see, for example,
Annas’ criticism of Plato’s treatment of women’s (1981: 181 – 185). For criti-
cism of Plato’s so-called metaphors here, see also Annas (1981: 184 – 185).
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 129

trol of mixture is achieved by subduing diversity (poikilia), since the dif-

ferent ingredients or constituent parts mixed are all of the same quality.39
Failure to preserve the purity of the class, says Socrates, will result in the
generation of “baseborn” and “counterfeit” offspring (notha) and this
cross-breeding will eventually spoil the cast’s homogeneity and purity
(461b4 – 7).40
I have suggested above that Socrates’ language throughout the sec-
ond wave is heavily animal-oriented and his mode of argumentation an-
alogical. How does Plato’s choice of this type of diction square with the
suggestions I made above regarding how Socrates, in the first two
waves, paves the way to the Forms and how he trains his co-speakers
in this direction both thematically and linguistically? Have we, Plato’s
readers, made no methodological or linguistic progress after moving
from the first wave to the second? The question is in fact somewhat
ill-conceived. Plato’s move from the mundane to the abstract in the
first two waves is steady and subtle rather than dramatic, and is promot-
ed both by his introduction of more technical terminology and by way
of the building of imagery.
At the same time, the Republic’s readers are narratologically privi-
leged by being granted a panoramic viewpoint that allows one to mon-
itor Socrates’ different stylistic modes, their incongruence and their sim-

39 See 459d7-e4: De? l´m, eWpom, 1j t_m ¢lokocgl´mym to»r !q¸stour ta?r !q¸stair
succ¸cmeshai ¢r pkeist²jir, to»r d³ vaukot²tour ta?r vaukot²tair toqmamt¸om,
ja· t_m l³m t± 5jcoma tq´veim, t_m d³ l¶, eQ l´kkei t¹ po¸lmiom fti !jqºtatom
eWmai, ja· taOta p²mta cicmºlema kamh²meim pkµm aqto»r to»r %qwomtar, eQ aw
B !c´kg t_m vuk²jym fti l²kista !stas¸astor 5stai. (“It follows from our
previous agreements, first, that the best men must have sex with the best
women as frequently as possible, while the opposite is true of the most inferior
men and women, and second, that if our herd is to be of the highest possible quality,
the former’s offspring must be reared but not the latter’s. And this must all be brought
about without being noticed by anyone except the rulers, so that our herd of
guardians remains as free from dissension as possible”.)
40 See LSJ sv nothos. The same idea of inappropriate “cross-breeding” is restated in
relation to the preservation of the soul’s virtues in Rep. 536a2 – 7. There Soc-
rates refers to the illegitimate offspring of philosophy, which is visualized in
the text in anthropomorphic form. This offspring is the result of philosophy’s
sexual relations with an undeserving suitor-philosopher (535c5 – 8). These
lines couple the words nothoi with chloi (students of philosophy) and contrast
them with gnẽsioi, artimeleis and artiphrones philosophers. See also 587c, where
the nothai pleasures are those of inappropriate sexual relations, contrasted
with the gnẽsiai hẽdonai. On the mixture of pleasures, see discussion in Chapter
Four below.
130 Section Two: The Republic

ilarities. The animal-oriented and overtly pictorial language that Plato

exploits in the first two waves is part of Socrates’ broader task in the Re-
public of educating his interlocutors in the use of philosophical linguistic
styles and the formulation of ideas. Thus the interplay of the concrete
and the abstract becomes philosophically important. For reasons we
will investigate in the following chapter, even after the epistemological
division of different levels of cognition in the latter part of Book 5, the
language again becomes notably imagistic and poetical. The same holds
for Plato’s use of eikones in the exposition of his epistemology and on-
tology in Books 6 and 7. This authorial stance, however, does not at all
imply that no philosophical progress is being made towards the interloc-
utors’ education in matters of philosophical linguistic style and method-
ology. In fact, it highlights the educational and cognitive value that
stems from comparing and contrasting the manifold nature of philo-
sophical stylistic modes in order to drive home ideas about ethics and
metaphysics. As we mentioned above, it is this dramatization of philo-
sophical discourse that educates both the intra-dramatic audience and
the readers of the dialogue in Platonic philosophy.41
To grasp Plato’s scheme in Book 5 on the basis of these observations
we should try to follow the complex connotations that his various mo-
tifs and images assume when they become interwoven in the Republic’s
thick texture. His exploitation of the dog analogy, in particular, should
be viewed within the dialogue’s broader context of discussion of souls
and polities in animal-oriented language that is at work in Books 2, 5,
8, and 9. In Book 5, in particular, Plato brings together a number of im-
ages in order to discuss how the purity and stability of the guardian class
is the only means of preserving the ideal state. If, then, there is any lin-
guistic progress in the first two waves of Book 5, this is to be located in
the development of Socrates’ configuration of imagery to portray civic
harmony and homogeneity: Plato’s main speaker thus re-introduces the
pedigree dogs as an eikn to aid in describing the guardians, and enriches
it in his imagery drawn from life in a homogeneous pedigree herd (agelẽ)
in order to argue for a communal type of life that promotes strong bonds
of friendship. The imagery he creates, however, culminates in
462c10 – e3, where the animal-oriented eikones are exchanged for the
image of a well-attuned and perfectly harmonized human body, the
aim of which is to portray the haploun and homogeneous ẽthos of a so-

41 See also Baracchi (2002: 63) who argues that Socrates’ creation of an image of
justice in Book 5 is “a pedagogically indispensable one”.
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 131

ciety which reacts unanimously, consistently, and harmoniously to both

pleasure and pain:42
Ja· Ftir dµ 1cc}tata 2m¹r !mhq~pou 5wei ; OXom ftam pou Bl_m d\jtuk|r
tou pkgc0, p÷sa B joimym_a B jat± t¹ s_la pq¹r tµm xuwµm tetal]mg
eQr l_am s}mtanim tµm toO %qwomtor 1m aqt0 Õshet| te ja· p÷sa ûla sum¶k-
cgsem l]qour pom^samtor fkg, ja· ovty dµ k]colem fti b %mhqypor t¹m
d\jtukom !kce?7 ja· peq· %kkou btouoOm t_m toO !mhq~pou b aqt¹r
k|cor, peq_ te k}pgr pomoOmtor l]qour ja· peq· Bdom/r Na@fomtor ;
j aqt¹r c\q, 5vg. Ja· toOto d 1qytør, toO toio}tou 1cc}tata B %qi-
sta pokiteuol]mg p|kir oQje?.
:m¹r dµ oWlai p\swomtor t_m pokit_m btioOm C !cah¹m C jaj¹m B
toia}tg p|kir l\kist\ te v^sei 2aut/r eWmai t¹ p\swom, ja· C sumgsh^se-
tai ûpasa C sukkgp^setai. (462c10 – e2)
And what about the city that is most like a single person? For example,
when one of us hurts his finger, the entire organism that binds body and soul
together into a single system under the ruling part within it is aware of this,
and the whole feels the pain together with the part that suffers. That’s
why we say that the man has a pain in his finger. And the same can be
said about any part of a man, with regard either to the pain it suffers or
to the pleasure it experiences when it finds relief.
Certainly. And, as for your question, the city with the best government
is most like such a person.
Then, whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens,
such a city above all others will say that the affected part is its own and will
share in the pleasure or pain as a whole.
In 464b1 – 3, Plato makes Socrates explicitly state that his representation
of the harmonious ideal state as a single human body is an eikn (…!pei-
j\fomter ew oQjoul]mgm p|kim s~lati pq¹r l]qor artoO k}pgr te p]qi ja·
Bdom/r ¢r 5wei [“…and we presented by means of an image a well-gov-
erned city in terms of the body’s reaction to pain or pleasure in anyone
of its parts.”]) Socrates’ argumentation regarding the homogeneity of
the guardian class was based on the principle of restricting any factors
likely to create division and conflict of any sort, endangering this homo-
geneity. Thus private property and multiple patriarchic oikoi are exclud-
ed on the grounds that guardians and philosophers are to function as an
extended and comprehensive ‘I’. Yet Plato’s philosophical task in rela-
tion to “drawing a human society on a clear canvas” presupposes the

42 Cf. however Rosen (2005: 172), who sees no development in Platonic eikones:
“The theme of the male drama was to produce guardians of the herd (451c8).
This metaphor reduces the status of the moneymaking class to that of brutes and
of the guardians to dogs. The only fully human beings in the just city are the
rulers”.
132 Section Two: The Republic

creation of a state that reacts harmoniously in psychological terms. The

image of the ideal polis as a human body, each of whose parts experien-
ces the pain or pleasure felt by any other part, is a representation par ex-
cellence of a wholly unified society that cannot afford to lose any of its
parts without feeling the effect of such a loss. Soul and body, the one
and the many, are strikingly unified in this eikn in a homogeneity
that is reflected even on a syntactic and linguistic level (p÷sa B joimy-
m_a B jat± t¹ s_la pq¹r tµm xuwµm tetal]mg eQr l_am s}mtanim tµm toO
%qwomtor 1m aqt0, 462c11 – d1).43
Plato’s presentation of the harmony of the polis as the harmony that
reigns in a human body has generated a number of issues that scholars
have debated diversely and extensively. These primarily involve the dif-
ference between justice in an individual and in a state. These issues also
include the relation between the transcendent Form of Justice and its
manifestation in the multiple just instances evident to our earthly
world of sense-perception.44 The scope of this chapter does not allow
me to deal with these intricate issues here. What primarily interests
me at this point is Plato’s opting for this particular stylistic mode,
which employs a verbal eikn to describe in pictorial terms the desired
characteristics of the guardian class. Thus, in my view, the philosophical
impact of Plato’s image of humans as a single human body enlarges the
limits of Book 5, and thereby engages in a dialogue with both the
Forms’ relation to our earthly world, as described in the end of Book

43 Note that the first occurrence of word phulax in the Republic points in this di-
rection. The word is employed by Adeimantus in 367a3 to describe one’s in-
ternal psychological harmony as a result of being just: …!kk’ aqt¹r artoO Gm
6jastor %qistor v}kan, dedi½r lµ !dij_m t` lec_st\ jaj` s}moijor × (“but
each would be his own best guardian, afraid that by doing injustice he’d be living
with the worst thing possible.”) The same idea of the internal guardian is restated in
465a – b, where shame and fear (aids and deos) are also called “guardians” that
promote one’s friendship for the others and respect to the parents. See also
above n. 1.
44 This raises questions regarding Plato’s tripartite division of the soul and the Re-
public’s isomorphism between city and soul. This is an intricate issue, which has
been discussed extensively in the literature. An examination of this lies outside
the scope of this work (but see discussion on Plato’s treatment of skiagraphia in
Chapter Four below). See discussions in Schofield (2006: 253 – 264); Annas
(1981: Ch. 5); Cooper (1984: 12 – 17); Reeve (1988: 43 – 50); Irwin (1995:
Ch. 13); Hobbs (2000: 30 – 37); see also Lear (1992: 184 – 215). Williams, in
Lee, E. N., Mourelatos, A.P.D., Rorty, R.M. (eds.) (1973: 196 – 206) (reprint-
ed in G. Fine [ed.] [1999: 255 – 264]). See also Kosman, in Ferrari, G. R. F.
(ed.) (2007: 116 – 137) and Kosman (2004: 153 – 168).
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 133

5, and with the image of the tyrant’s soul as a multi-headed beast, pre-
sented in Book 9.45
I shall examine in detail Plato’s imagery with regard to the tyrant in
Chapter Four, but it is important to stress here the striking interplay be-
tween these two Platonic eikones. 46 In the Introduction, I called atten-
tion to the vehement criticism of poetry in Book 10, on the grounds
that it does not correctly portray the simple ẽthos of humans. In
604e – 605a, Socrates links the psychologically excitable (aganaktẽtikon)
character with “multicoloured (poikilia) imitation (mimesis)” and con-
trasts it with “the rational and quiet character which is not easy to imitate
nor easy to understand when imitated”, especially not by a crowd which has
been culturally trained in theatre festivals to experience and internalize
the various staged pathẽ’’ (604e1 – 6). The mutability of psychological
disposition is associated with colourful diversity (poikilia) several times
throughout the dialogue and is intended to conflict with the unchang-
ing human character, which we should note, in linguistic terms, shares
the terminology of the Platonic Forms (paqapk^siom cm !e· aqt¹ art`,
604e2 – 3).47 In his attempt to investigate human nature and adumbrate
the haploun ẽthos of humans in his philosophical work, Plato, I submit,
working like a visual artist, in this dialogue draws a variety of verbal im-
ages, ‘mixing’ words and motifs in a manner similar to a painter’s mixing
of colours or a poet’s ‘mixing’ of motifs. He thus starts from the animal-
oriented image of the dog in Book 2 (375d – e) in order to convey the
intrinsic qualities of his guardians48. His ensuing argumentation in Book
5 leads him to configure the image of the ‘single-human body-polis’ that
identifies the one (human) with the many (humans). Plato’s human in
the central Book of the dialogue represents a significant change in the
Republic’s pictorial rendering of human nature.
Not only are we offered an image of human nature and society qua
human, rather than in animal-oriented language, but this is also a truly
simple (haploun) verbal depiction, since Socrates restricts any diversity in
this image to the minimum and makes his point by stressing that the

45 On Socrates’ ‘Unity Principle’ here, see Schofield (2006: 214 – 227).

46 On the Forms, see discussion in Chapter Two. On the tyrant’s soul and Plato’s
use of animal imagery, see discussion in Chapter Four.
47 In Book 9, in particular, the appetitive part is presented as the manifestation par
excellence of diversity (poikilia) and multifariousness (polyeidia): 580e: di± poku-
eid_am 2m· oqj 5swolem am|lati Qd_\ aqtoO, 588e5: pamtodap¹m hgq_om, 589b1:
pokujev\kou hq]llator, 590a7: pokueid³r hq]lla).
48 See detailed discussion in Chapter Three.
134 Section Two: The Republic

harmony and the integrity of this soul is mirrored in the harmonious

unification and consistency of the psychological reactions of the many
human souls.49 In pictorial terms, what we ‘see’ is an andreikelon (al-
though, strictly speaking, the term is used inappropriately here, as this
is a corporeal image of both male and female citizens). Yet at the same
time, this is a verbal image which has the ability to unveil the psycholog-
ically internal, invisible, and concealed and render it visible, external,
and open.50 Although Socrates has now moved from discussion of the
guardian class to discussion of the polis as a whole, certain inferences re-
garding the guardians’ way of life in respect to their civic duties and to
their psychological condition involve the polis as a whole as a conse-
quence of Plato’s use of the image of the polis as a single body. The na-
ture of the guardians’ public life means that within this class which, like
all else, is subject to the scrutiny of the rulers’ vigilant eye, everything is
open, visible, and communicable (koinnein).51 Plato’s imagery of the
polis as a single body has similar implications for the other members of
the city in that all its members are harmoniously linked to each other.
This verbal andreikelon is one of Plato’s simplest and least adorned images
in the whole work. Nonetheless, it unites society, body and soul in a
most economical and transparent manner.
This eikn then contrasts strikingly with the souls that have disinte-
grated in Book 9, and in particular, with the image of the soul of the
tyrant, where Plato has Socrates perform the reverse procedure in
terms of imagery, this time to unveil, as if it were a sculpture, to his in-
terlocutors the beast-like and incongruent traits of the tyrant (t¹ poij_-
kom Ghor). These pass for human characteristics to the untrained human

49 See again 604e. Not only does diversity of the excitable character invites mim-
esis, but the members of the dramatic audience at the theatres are also of various
sorts (pantodapoi), a term that Socrates deploys elsewhere interchangeably with
poikilia.
50 So Baracchi (2002: 62 – 87) who links vision and openness with the guardians’
public lifestyle but follows a different line of interpretation from mine.
51 Plato’s guardians communicate and mingle in all possible ways. Openness and
visibility is also underscored in Socrates’ insistence that all guardians, irrespec-
tive of gender and age, should exercise naked. The word koinnia is deployed
throughout Socrates’ discussion of the guardians’ civic organization to bring
this idea home. See also 461e5; 462b4; 464a4, a5, a6, a9; 464b6; 466a6;
466d1 – 2, d4, d8. See also 466b – c. Those guardians who will not share the
class’ common feelings will be expelled. On koinnia, see also Calvert (1975:
242 – 243). Note also that Plato’s selection and adaptation of the Hesiodic
line is not fortuitous in this context: (pk]om eWma_ pyr Flisu pamt|r, WD 40).
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 135

eye because they are concealed behind a misleading façade of flesh and
blood, but such traits are in reality mere beasts. The insatiable hedonistic
demands of these powerful beasts lodged in the tyrant’s soul consume
him from within.52 Note that the image of the tyrant’s soul stands
also in stark contrast to the Platonic Forms at the end of Book 5. Plato’s
watchword for the Forms, the term ideai, is employed also in Book 9 to
describe the multiple forms of the tyrant’s many heads (poij_kou ja·
pokujev\kou). In contrast to the philia and koinnia that Socrates’ pre-
scriptions promote in Book 5, a perverse type of unity is depicted in
Book 9 as the “multiple ideai which grow together” in the tyrant seek
to “become one out of many”, but in vain (sulpevuju?ai Qd]ai pokka·
eQr 4m cem]shai, 588c2 – 5; s}mapte to_mum aqt± eQr tq_a emta, 588d7).
Plato’s vivid verbal image makes the tyrant the unhappiest creature
alive, and as far removed from the integrity of the Platonic Ideas as
one can possibly be.
Furthermore, Plato’s versatile ability to create imagery and his in-
sightful exploration of multi-layered semantics, evident, for example,
in the exploration of the mixis motif in Book 5, are clearly well-de-
signed authorial techniques that become fully meaningful when seen
as part of the philosopher’s more general intention in the Republic of in-
vestigating and adumbrating human nature and society and its relation to
the transcendental Forms.53 In specific terms, the presentation of the
Forms’ relation to the sense-perceptible is constructed from vocabulary
and phraseology that is variously deployed throughout the first two
waves of argument for discussion regarding the guardians’ communal

52 See 588b-589a. This image also picks up Adeimantus’ remark in 365c that,
since society is hypocritical about being just and promotes in reality injustice,
he will “create a façade of illusory virtue around me to deceive those who
come near, but keep behind it the greedy and crafty fox of the wise Archilo-
chus” (peq· 1laut¹m sjiacqav_am !qet/r peqicqapt]om, tµm d³ toO sovyt\tou
)qwik|wou !k~peja 2kjt]om 1n|pishem jeqdak]am ja· poij_kgm, 365c3 – 6). The
philosophical significance of the Republic’s references to the pictorial technique
of skiagraphia is discussed below in Chapter Four.
53 See also 472c4-d2, where Socrates, returning to the concept of justice, calls the
ideal just city and human a paradeigma. On paradeigma and its distinction from
eikn and idea, see Pender (2000); see also Rosen (2005: 201 – 209). Rosen
also draws attention to Plato’s reference to the painter’s work in this context
(472d4 – 7). When compared to Rep. 500c – d, I take this reference to painting
in Book 5 to be a self-referential remark that seeks to compare, if not equate,
Socrates’ founding of the theoretical, ideal just city with the philosopher’s task
of ‘painting’ people’s ethics with the transcendental eidetic qualities as a model.
136 Section Two: The Republic

life and the bonds that should bind both members of this class to each
other and, likewise, citizens of the polis at large (koinnia).54 His prescrip-
tions regarding the guardians’ social intercourse and sexual relations on
earth should be seen in the same light. Such mixture is retained in the
guardians’ earthly world. Yet, rather than giving rise to diversity, incon-
gruence and conflict, it is held in check, so that it approaches and repro-
duces a sort of ethical harmony, purity and homogeneity, which arche-
typally, as Socrates will explain in the third wave, can only be found on
a metaphysical level rather than on earth.
I now turn to the third wave of argument. I have not offered yet an
interpretation of Plato’s imageries in the three waves of argument and of
swimming in a small pool or an ocean, which I suggested above should
be taken together and understood as analogies for Socrates’ methodolo-
gy in Book 5. More will be said on these images after our discussion of
the third wave.

1.2.3 The third wave of argument

Socrates has successfully persuaded the interlocutors that his prescrip-

tions regarding the guardians are correct and beneficial. They thus ac-
cept that men and women guardians of the kallipolis enjoy the greatest
possible happiness, even greater than that enjoyed by victors of the
Olympic Games.55 Having successfully dealt with the two waves of ar-

54 See 476a5 – 7: aqt¹ l³m 4m 6jastom eWmai, t0 d³ t_m pq\neym ja· syl\tym ja·
!kk^kym joimym_ô pamtawoO vamtaf|lema pokk± va_meshai 6jastom.
Cp. 461b4 – 6 and 462c10 – 5. See Ketchum (1994: 1 – 21).
55 See 465d2 – 6 and d9-e2. The passage evokes the odes of Pindar and also pur-
sues a comparison with Pindar’s eulogistic odes. According to Plato’s Socrates,
Olympic victors are considered happy on account of what is only a small part of
happiness compared to that of the guardians of the kallipolis. In his odes, Pindar
often highlights the briefness of the moment of victory, when Zeus’ “godsend
light” illuminates (diosdotos aigla) them and the poet’s eulogy transforms their
mortal life and confers upon them a godlike ‘eternity’. For Pindar, humans
look up to and strive for this godsend illuminatory moment, brief though it
may be. Socrates’ dia smikron eudaimonizontai attempts to surpass Pindaric eulogy
here. These Pindaric resonances are also noted by Bacon (2001: 347 – 348) who
draws attention to the theme of competition, prominent in the Republic, and
manifested in several forms, such as the hunt, as quest, as rescue, as heroic ordeal
and as artistic competition. In her conclusion, Bacon draws parallels between
Plato and Pindar: “as in a Pindaric ode, what happens within the dialogue is
secondary to its impact on the audience of reader of the dialogue. It is designed
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 137

gument, Socrates now faces the possibility of being engulfed by the third
and biggest wave of all. He is challenged to demonstrate to the interloc-
utors the feasibility of actually realising the polis (471c4 – 7 and e). Soc-
rates’ preceding argumentation regarding the guardians’ happiness will
not suffice for Glaucon, who now wants to be shown (!kk± toOto
aqt¹ Edg peiq~leha Bl÷r aqto»r pe_heim, 471e3) how these prescriptions
can be realized (¢r dumat¹m ja· Ø dumat|m, 471e4). Plato presents Soc-
rates as having feared this last wave of argument all along (Usyr c±q oqj
oWsha fti lºcir loi t½ d¼o j¼late 1jvucºmti mOm t¹ l´cistom ja· wake-
p¾tatom t/r tqijul¸ar 1p²ceir [“Perhaps you don’t realize that, just as I
have barely escaped from the first two waves of objections, you are
bringing the third – the biggest and most difficult one – down upon
me” 472a3 – 4)]. His argumentation from this point onwards will be
strenuous and demanding for Socrates, as he himself admits, and intel-
lectually overwhelming for the interlocutors.56 Thus Plato holds back
from starting upon the criterion by which the polis may be realized
not merely because he wants to increase the dramatic tension.
The concluding part of Book 5 (473d – 480), which is one of the
few passages in Plato where the Ideas are presented in some detail, is
heavily laden with dense philosophical argumentation. Socrates’ most
radical socio-political proposal in the Republic constitutes the third
wave, which has been “building up” (ku) throughout the discussion
in Book 5. His ground-breaking political propositions, however, rest
firmly on an ontological and metaphysical basis, and so also raise prob-
lems of epistemology. Not all people, according to Socrates, may accept
these suggestions, which will require a radical shift in our grasp of real-
ity. In one of the Republic’s most ironic moments, Plato has Glaucon
emphasize the dangers that will result from introducing a political thesis
of this sort (473e6 – 474a4). Nonetheless, the third wave cannot be
avoided any more, for the Republic’s scheme of realising the just city
is completely dependent on it. The logos requires its exposition.
Socrates’ thesis in 473c11 – e2 that their city-state “will not see the
light of day” or grow in accordance with their previous prescriptions,

to inspire the audience to emulation, by illuminating the meaning of that victory;

and, I feel fairly certain, it also resembles a Pindaric ode in being designed to
win recognition for the poet who does this with such faithfulness to both art
and truth” (352, emphasis added).
56 See some of Glaucon’s relevant comments: Rep. 508c1 – 2; 531d5 – 6;
533a1 – 5.
138 Section Two: The Republic

unless politics and philosophy meet together in one and the same human
nature consisting of certain features, signals a new phase in the course of
the dialogue:
9±m l¶, Gm d’ 1c¾, C oR vikºsovoi basike¼sysim 1m ta?r pºkesim C oR basi-
k/r te mOm kecºlemoi ja· dum²stai vikosov¶sysi cmgs¸yr te ja· Rjam_r, ja·
toOto eQr taqt¹m sulp´s,, d¼mal¸r te pokitijµ ja· vikosov¸a, t_m d³ mOm
poqeuol´mym wyq·r 1v’ 2j²teqom aR pokka· v¼seir 1n !m²cjgr
!pojkeish_sim, oqj 5sti jaj_m paOka, § v¸ke Cka¼jym, ta?r pºkesi,
doj_ d’ oqd³ t` !mhqyp¸m\ c´mei, oqd³ avtg B pokite¸a l¶ pote pqºteqom
vu0 te eQr t¹ dumat¹m ja· v_r Bk¸ou Ud,, Dm mOm kºc\ diekgk¼halem.
Unless either philosophers become kings in their countries or those who
are now called kings and rulers come to be sufficiently inspired with a gen-
uine desire for wisdom; unless, that is to say, political power and philosophy
meet together, while the many natures who now go their several ways in the
one or the other direction are forcibly debarred from doing so, there can be no
rest from troubles, my dear Glaucon, for states, nor yet, as I believe, for all
mankind; nor can this city which we have imagined ever till then see the
light of day and grow to its full stature. (trans. Cornford)
These lines are well-known for their statement that the fundamental re-
quirement for the organisation of the Platonic ideal state is that politi-
cians should be philosophers. In this context, however, Socrates rede-
ploys and develops the complex and varied nuances of human phusis.
Thus he informs us, firstly, that not all human physeis are suitable for en-
gaging in politics (C oR basik/r te mOm kecºlemoi ja· dum²stai vikosov¶-
sysi cmgs¸yr te ja· Rjam_r) and, secondly, that the two powers (d¼mal¸r
te pokitijµ ja· vikosov¸a) should identify and meet in the same right
nature. Plato’s suggestions here open a whole new discussion in the dia-
logue which takes us through Books 6 and 7. The company’s investiga-
tion into the intricacies of human nature is now coupled with the new
topic now at hand, namely the definition of the true philosopher, since
Socrates now proclaims that what the company understands by the term
philosophers is wrong. In his view now, to grasp the qualities of the true
philosopher amounts to identifying the most caring and appropriate pol-
itician.
Consequently, Plato’s condition in the third wave that political and
philosophical natures must meet in order to create the best possible state
leads to a unification of phuseis. In this, it resembles his treatment in the
first wave of female and male guardians, whose natures together form
the one guardian nature. It also resembles his ensuing prescriptions in
the second wave regarding the organization of the guardians in civic
terms, the goal of which is the maintenance of the integrity of the
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 139

guardian class. In a similar vein, Socrates now proposes that the separate
(and correct) phuseis, who at present wander around to no purpose,
should be re-assembled and unified as members of the class of philoso-
pher-kings. Socrates has already presented some of the distinctive qual-
ities that define this ruling class as part of his analysis of the guardian na-
ture. More is said later by Socrates by way of definition of the true phi-
losopher in Books 6 and 7. Within the context of Book 5, however, the
emergence of the term philosophy, not strictly defined at the time, gives
rise to far more complex and contested issues, namely the subject-matter
of philosophical investigation that distinguishes the true philosopher
from the many counterfeit. The group’s attention is thus directed to
the concept of Truth and, as a result, to the philosophers’ relation to
the Platonic Forms.
I have already cited above the lines where reference is made to the
association of the Forms with the earthly world of sense-perception and
ethics. Thus, in 476a4 – 7, Socrates explains that there is one form (eidos)
for justice and injustice, and for goodness and vice, which, however,
“because they manifest themselves everywhere in association with ac-
tions, bodies, and one other, each of them appears to be many” (t0
d³ t_m pq\neym ja· syl\tym ja· !kk^kym joimym_ô pamtawoO vamta-
f|lema pokk± va_meshai 6jastom).57 As mentioned above, these lines in-
vest with metaphysical semantics the word koinnia (one of Plato’s
watchwords in the Republic for the Forms’ relation to our world),
which from a sociopolitical point of view has already been dealt with
in an innovative manner throughout Socrates’ fight with the first two
waves. Plato’s description of metaphysics here, however, problematic
though it may be, makes one thing plain. While in the course of his ar-
gumentation throughout Book 5 Socrates appears to have tackled three
diverse issues in relation to his organisation of the polis, such thematic
disjointedness is located at the level of the surface of the text alone. Plato’s
main speaker has tried to build a theoretical, ideal polis by following a
metaphysical pattern of which the Republic itself reveals little. Book 5,

57 As regards the vexed issue whether Plato implies here the existence of Forms of
Badness, Injustice, or Ugliness, I concur with Rowe (2007: 200 – 213) who has
rightly stressed that the Forms (eidẽ) stand in the background of Socrates’ discus-
sion with Glaucon, but that we should not interpret the word eidos in this con-
text to refer to the transcendent Forms. Following also Adam (1963 [1902]
vol. 1: 168), the relevant term may here be translated as ‘form’ or ‘kind’. See
also Kahn (1993: 41); Ross (1951: 229). See also discussion in Chapter Two
below.
140 Section Two: The Republic

nonetheless, informs us that, in the mundane sphere of sense-percep-

tion, the Forms’ koinnia becomes an incongruent mixture (mixis) and
variety (poikilia) as goodness and its cognates now mingle with various
types of badness.
On the interpretation I have argued in this chapter, Plato’s task in
Book 5 is not then an easy one, since, in effect, it requires the reduction
of the participation of vice and its cognates (kakon) in the creation of the
ideal polis in order to constrain or contain this mixture. Plato instead
promotes a different type of mixture or association, which seeks to re-
produce the Forms’ essential ethical and ontological qualities, goodness,
and integrity. Thus the polloi of the polis will reproduce an ethical net-
work that approaches as much as possible the unity of the Forms. This is
the philosophers’ task in relation to their own selves, according to Book
6. 500b8 – c7, and this is their political task in ruling the city as Socrates
proposes it. In Book 5, Plato, in his capacity as visual artist working with
words, has tried to show that it is possible, and completely desirable, that
the Forms ‘seal’ (typos) humans with their goodness and bind all together
in a harmonized whole (Petraki [2008: 147 – 170]). As we will see in
Chapter Four, this stands in stark contrast to his portrayal of the political
and psychological state of the many unjust.
We are now in a better position to understand Plato’s use of the im-
ageries in the three waves of argument and of swimming in a small pool
or an ocean: Plato’s main speaker has shown to his interlocutors that,
when one knows how to argue correctly, one can successfully apply
one’s methodology to defend ideas that are prima facie unrelated to
each other, some being more complicated and demanding than others.
In each wave of argument, Socrates has tried to tackle and defeat various
types of conflicting incongruence and lack of homogeneity and to show
how unity can be attained even in our world of mixture. Its disastrous
effects when unconstrained are presented most vividly and in deeply po-
etical prose in Book 8 and 9. However, the argumentation in the third
wave of argument is indeed an ‘ocean’ that may easily overwhelm both
Socrates and Glaucon.
As we will see in the next chapter, this prerequisite necessary for the
mere possibility of creating the polis cannot be put across or argued per-
suasively by way of language hitherto familiar to Socrates’ audience. As a
result, a large part of Socrates’ explanation of this thesis involves address-
ing issues of language usage and of definitions. In the concluding lines of
Book 5, Socrates draws a number of ontological and epistemological
distinctions. However, his first distinction between true philosophers
 1. Human nature and philosophical style in Republic Book 5 141

and sight-lovers is fundamental for the presentation of Platonic Ideas

and forms the background against which some difficult argumentation
is constructed.
As I have had occasion to suggest in Section One of this study, Soc-
rates’ internal audience has a defining effect on the stylistic mode that
he, Plato’s main speaker, deploys in order to construct his arguments.
The truth of this observation becomes more than evident in the stren-
uous exposition of the Forms of the concluding part of Book 5 and in
the equally demanding argumentation on pleasure of Book 9. In these
two contexts, Plato stretches the complex and profound dynamics of
Glaucon’s persona in the Republic to its limits to demonstrate how strict
philosophical reasoning, thought, and linguistic style are all dependent
on the ethical and cognitive characteristics of the speakers, or, to use
the Republic’s language, conditional on whether one converses with a
sight-lover, a pleasure-lover, or with someone who possesses the char-
acteristics of Glaucon.
As I have discussed at length, in the first two waves, Plato has fash-
ioned a number of images in order to depict the guardian class and to
prescribe its purity. He has also depicted in a most economical manner
the unity that he desires for the whole polis. In the third wave, however,
Plato’s language changes. Rather than constructing images (eikones), he
employs diverse linguistic styles, which consist of an imagistic type of
language and of a colourless register. In the next chapter, I examine
the reasons behind this alternation of linguistic styles in the concluding
pages of Book 5. However, before dealing with the poetics of Socrates’
philosophical language and the stylistic variety he displays in the episte-
mology and ontology of the third wave, we must first examine the per-
sona of Socrates’ interlocutor and his contribution to the philosophic
dialogue thus far. This will throw light on both the Republic’s education-
al aspects and on its diverse styles.58

58 So Coventry, in Pelling, C. (ed.) (1990: 174 – 184), who contrasts Glaucon’s

eagerness to contribute to the dialogue with Callicles’ failure to avoid depend-
ence on common belief in the Gorgias 447a1 – 2.
2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument
in Book 5
2.1 Glaucon
In this chapter, I shall investigate Plato’s construction of Glaucon’s per-
sona in the Republic and examine his contribution to the shaping of the
philosophical style of Books 2 and 5. My discussion will touch upon the
usage of the dialogue form as an appropriate vehicle for Platonic philos-
ophy, and its treatment here will be suggestive but not exhaustive.
To account for the importance of Glaucon’s persona in this dialogue
we need to revisit Books 1 and 2 of the Republic. At the end of Book 1
we are left at a loss, puzzled, and confused.59 The dialogue does not
reach a definition of justice and Socrates also fails to convince Thrasy-
machus that justice brings only happiness and that the unjust are the
most wretched and unhappy (354a1 – 11).60 The opening of Book 2,

59 My interpretation is not affected by the hypothesis that the Book was composed
separately, or earlier than the rest of the work. On the so-called ‘unity problem’
of the Republic, see Hermann (1839: 538 – 540). In fact, Friedländer named the
first Book “Thrasymachus” (vol. II, 45, vol. III, 55). More recent scholarship has
cast new light on the matter. See Guthrie (1975: 437). In the transition from
Book 1 to 2, Annas sees a change in Plato’s methodology (1981: 57). For a sim-
ilar approach see also, White (1979: 3 and 61) and Reeve (1988: xi-xii and 22 –
23). Charles Kahn (1993) and (1996) has given the most comprehensive treat-
ment of the matter. In Kahn (1993: 135 – 136), he rightly shows how Book 1 is
deliberately composed so that it resembles the early Platonic dialogues and
speaks of the method of “proleptic composition”, according to which the
Book anticipates and foreshadows many of the themes and ideas that are fully
developed in the ensuing Books. For a similar reading, see Blondell (2002:
165 and 187 – 189). See also Aune (1997: 291 – 308). On the way in which
Rep. Books 2 – 10 cast a critical eye on the method employed throughout
Book 1, see Giannantoni (1957: 138 – 141); Sesonske (1961); Reeve (1988:
Ch. 1); Beversluis (2000: 379 – 383). Cf., however, Nehamas (1990: 12 – 14)
and Vlastos (1991: Ch. 4).
60 The Book ends with an extended feast metaphor whereby Thrasymachus in-
vites Socrates to “enjoy his banquet at the feast of Bendis” (354a10 – 11).
These lines are heavily imagistic and introduce subtly for the first time in the
dialogue the imagery of arguments as food (354a12-c1). As I will show in
Chapters Three and Four below, Thrasymachus’ concluding remarks in
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 143

however, signals a striking change in the dialogue, both methodologi-

cally and linguistically.61 The person who saves the dialogue from end-
ing in real deadlock at the beginning of Book 2 is Glaucon.
In Book 1 Glaucon speaks only once, but what he says immediately
makes him Socrates’ ally in ethics. To Socrates’ question in Rep. 347e2 –
348a6, as to whether he is persuaded by Thrasymachus’ arguments about
the superiority of injustice, Glaucon replies immediately that he is not,
that he would choose the life of the just, and that he considers this life
more profitable than the unjust life (347e1-348-a6).62 Nonetheless, his
ethical views aside, at the beginning of Book 2 Glaucon displays a cer-
tain philosophical competence that again differentiates him from the rest
of the company:
9c½ l³m owm taOta eQp½m ålgm k|cou !pgkk\whai· t¹ d’ Gm %qa, ¢r 5oije,
pqoo_liom. j c±q Cka}jym !e_ te dµ !mdqei|tator £m tucw\mei pq¹r
ûpamta, ja· dµ ja· t|te toO Hqasul\wou tµm !p|qqgsim oqj !ped]nato…
(357a1 – 4)
When I said this, I thought that I had done with the discussion, but it
turned out to have been only a prelude. Glaucon showed his characteristic cour-
age on this occasion too and refused to accept Thrasymachus’ abandonment of
the argument.
In these introductory lines, Plato causes Socrates to focus on the distinc-
tive characteristics that make Glaucon a skilled interlocutor in philo-
sophical dialogue. The first feature that the narrator highlights in this

Book 1 are part of the dialogue’s broader imagistic network that treats food as
an integral aspect of human nature and links its luxuriousness and variety with
imbalance and disease. The food imagery as we shall see becomes particularly
prominent in the discussion of their first city (the so-called ‘city of pigs’), as
well as in Books 8 and 9, where Socrates’ portrayal of the unjust will rest on
animal imagery to present them as subhuman. But at the same time, the Repub-
lic’s parlance allows this imagery to stand for logos and the way different people
put it into practice. In the food imagery Plato combines two ideas: variety in
food can harm the body’s health in the same way that inappropriate use of lan-
guage can harm our intellectual health and progress in philosophy; excessive di-
versity in both can make us turn to something less than human. See my detailed
discussion in Chapters Three and Four below.
61 So Blondell (2000: 127 – 146) and Blondell (2002: 199 – 228).
62 Rep. 347e1-348-a6: s» owm pot]qyr, Gm d’ 1c~, § Cka}jym, aRq0 ; ja· p|teqom
!kghest]qyr doje? soi k]ceshai ; T¹m toO dija_ou 5cyce kusitek]steqom b_om
eWmai. (“Which life would you choose, Glaucon? And which of our views do
you consider truer? I certainly think that the life of a just person is more profit-
able.”)
144 Section Two: The Republic

context is Glaucon’s “courageous spirit” (!e_ te dµ !mdqei|tator). This

piece of information regarding this co-speaker, whom Socrates appears
to know well, becomes significant when seen in connection with the
interlocutors’ reaction to Thrasymachus’ interception of the argument
in Book 1, 336b – e. There, to highlight Thrasymachus’ uncontrollable
spirit (thymos) and its overwhelming impact on him and Polemarchus
(de_samter diepto^hglem), Socrates employs animal language (¦speq
hgq_om, 336b5) and resorts to a traditional proverb that relates Thrasy-
machus to a wolf (336d5 – 7). Thrasymachus’ usurpation of the logos
stems from his disruptive and unruly behaviour, and the same features
of character also lead the investigation into the nature of justice to a
deadlock. Glaucon’s balanced matching of courageous temperament
and dianoetic sobriety is intended to contrast with Thrasymachus’ en-
gagement with philosophical dialogue and to dramatize an alternative,
more fruitful way of handling argumentation. Both his courage and in-
tellectual vigilance become particularly marked in the way he refuses to
be intimidated by Thrasymachus’ aggressive behaviour or to be “en-
chanted by Socrates as if by a snake,” and accept as proven ideas that
have not been satisfactorily argued through or demonstrated (358b3).63
Instead, his intervention seeks to re-open the dialogue and revive
the argument about justice in new, more challenging ways.64 Firstly,
in inviting Socrates to make a greater effort to define justice, Glaucon
draws, for the first time in the course of the discussion, the distinction
between seeming and truly being persuaded (357a5 – b1).
¯ S~jqater, p|teqom Bl÷r bo}kei doje?m pepeij]mai C ¢r !kgh_r pe?sai fti
pamt· tq|p\ %leim|m 1stim d_jaiom eWmai C %dijom ;
ªr !kgh_r, eWpom, 5cyc’ #m 2ko_lgm, eQ 1p’ 1lo· eUg.
Oq to_mum, 5vg, poie?r d bo}kei. k]ce c\q loi· (357a4 – b4)
Socrates, he said, do you want to seem to have persuaded us that it is better in
every way to be just than unjust, or do you want truly to convince us of this?

63 See 358b1 – 4: ]hi d^, 5vg, %jousom ja· 1loO, 1\m soi 5ti taqt± doj0. Hqas}la-
wor c\q loi va_metai pq\a_teqom toO d]omtor rp¹ soO ¦speq evir jgkgh/mai,
1lo· d³ oupy jat± moOm B !p|deinir c]comem peq· 2jat]qou [“Come then and lis-
ten to me as well, and see whether you still have that problem, for I think that
Thrasymachus gave up before he had to, charmed by you as if he were a snake.
But I am not yet satisfied by the argument on either side.”] On the taming of Thra-
symachus, see Blondell (2002: 194ff); Patterson (1987: 341 – 342). Miller
(1980: 80); cf. Bruns ([1896] 1961: 326 – 327); and Bloom (1968: 400 – 401).
64 See Blundell (2002: 199 – 203).
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 145

I want truly to convince you, I said, if it depends on me.

Well, then, you certainly aren’t doing what you want. Tell me…
This important distinction is introduced rather smoothly and inconspic-
uously in the first few lines of Book 2, but there is nothing innocent or
fortuitous in Glaucon’s remarks, for these terms will be of fundamental
use to Socrates when he later tries to explain his complex ontological
and epistemological ideas.65 This same distinction between appearance
and true reality will become even more pronounced in Glaucon’s ensu-
ing description of the majority’s views regarding justice and injustice
(360e1 – 361d3). In fact, the correct distinction (jq_sir, 360e1, 361d5)
between “truly being” and only “appearing to be” just will form the
point on which Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates will hinge: Glaucon re-
quests Socrates to discount most people’s perception of justice and injus-
tice and cast new light in his treatment of just and unjust men on the
way such persons appear from the outside (Doxa) and the way they
truly are inside. Philosophical methodological clarity demands that com-
mon opinion (Doxa) be reinterpreted in new ways. If justice and injus-
tice are to be fruitfully revisited in their discussion, the two must be de-
ciphered somehow and be kept well apart from each other (360e1 – 3).66
As a result, in order to reveal the essence of justice, Glaucon asks Soc-
rates to address himself to the matter of its common appearance. The
just person should be stripped of any rewards that may lure him to jus-
tice, and he should be made to be perceived by others as unjust in the
extreme (!vaiqet]om dµ t¹ doje?m, 361b8). If he is truly just, he can re-
main so only internally (doj_m l³m eWmai %dijor di± b_ou, £m d³ d_jaior,
361d1). The opposite should be so in the case of a hypothetical unjust
person. For such a one, appearing just is vital, because, firstly, this is what
amounts to successful injustice (namely being unjust and appearing to be
just), and, secondly, this is the only way he may find safety in a society
which, according to Thrasymachus and others, is only hypocritically just

65 In Book 5, 478a1 – 7, Socrates will pick up this same terminology that Glaucon
introduced in Book 2 and re-designate it semantically so that he explains how
the world of true Being and true Knowledge (9pist^lg) must be differentiated
from the world of Opinion (D|na). Not surprisingly, Plato has Socrates present
this important epistemological and ontological thesis to Glaucon, rather than to
Adeimantus.
66 On Glaucon’s krisis here, see also the discussion in Petraki (2009: 55 – 60).
146 Section Two: The Republic

by way of some sort of unspoken contract (361a4 – 5 and 358e3 –

359a2).67
Glaucon’s use of terminology here is philosophically significant.68
By stripping justice of its rewards and outer appearance, Glaucon
paves the way for Socrates’ suggestion later in the dialogue that justice
and injustice dwell inside the person, in his very soul.69 As a matter of
fact, Glaucon raises this fundamental requirement explicitly at
Rep. 358b4 – 7, at the beginning of his challenge to Socrates:
1pihul_ c±q !joOsai t_ t’ 5stim 2j\teqom ja_ t_ma 5wei d}malim aqt¹ jah’
art¹ 1m¹m 1m t0 xuw0, to»r d³ lisho»r ja· t± cicm|lema !p’ aqt_m 1÷sai
wa_qeim.
I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself
has when it’s by itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account their rewards
and what comes from each of them.
In contrast to Thrasymachus, who in Book 1 argued that injustice is a
form of good, Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates in these lines builds on
his previous thesis that justice should be considered a kind of good
(eWdor !cahoO, 357c5), thus foreshadowing Socrates’ presentation of
the most important Form in Book 6 (506d – e; Cp. Rep. 357d4). In as-
sociating justice with the good in 357b – d, Glaucon offers a tripartite

67 Note that sight and vision is also the prominent motif in Glaucon’s myth of
Gyges’ ancestor in 359c6 – 360c3. Once invisible, he can be his true self, namely
unjust (!vam/ aqt¹m cem]shai, 360a1, vameq¹m cem]shai, 360a4).
68 Two short, but philosophically significant, alliterative phrases are used here: dia
doxan epitedeuteuon and auto de di’ auto pheukteon (358a4 – 6). According to Glau-
con, people are just because of doxa (reputation). At the end of Book 5 Socrates
will show that these people dwell in the realm of Doxa. Plato’s philosophical
terminology appears to be fluid and moulded as the dialogue progresses. In
Book 5, Socrates will re-address and adapt the language Glaucon introduced
to bring home his ontological and epistemological ideas. In line with the inter-
pretation I follow in this work, the two words (doxa and auto) can be seen as
short linguistic blocks which, when transplanted into different contexts, can
lead argumentation to radically new directions.
69 See Rep. 443c9-d5: “And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort.
However, it isn’t concerned with someone’s doing his own externally (!kk’ oq
peq· tµm 5ny pq÷nim t_m artoO) but with what is inside him (!kk± peq· tµm
1mt|r), with what is truly himself and his own (¢r !kgh_r peq· 2aut¹m ja· t± 2au-
toO). One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of an-
other part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other.
He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in
order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself (sumaq-
l|samta tq_a emta)…”
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 147

division of human goods (agatha), inviting Socrates to choose the cate-

gory under which justice should be placed (357b4 – d4). The three cat-
egories are the kinds of good that humans welcome “for its own sake”
(aqt¹ artoO 6meja !spaf|lemoi), without any desire for its consequen-
ces; goods “we like for its own sake and also for the sake of what comes
from it (aqt| te artoO w\qim !cap_lem ja· t_m !p’ aqtoO cicmo-
l]mym)”; and, finally, forms of good which, being onerous but benefi-
cial, we pursue not “for their own sake” (aqt± l³m 2aut_m 6meja oqj
#m dena_leha 5weim), but “for the sake of the rewards and other things
that come from them”. Glaucon’s distinction prima facie seems to have
no ground-breaking philosophical implications, as his division of
goods is still tied to the realm of the mundane, the material, and the
sense-perceptive, and so is obviously far from Socrates’ position in
Book 6 that the Agathon is “beyond essence”, known only cognitively
and not sense-perceptively.70
Nonetheless, it is in the context of this surprisingly analytic distinc-
tion, which Glaucon draws on the basis of well-clarified sets of criteria,
that the Republic’s readership encounters for the first time in the text Pla-
to’s watchword for the Forms, namely the philosophically significant
linguistic unit of aqt¹ artoO 6meja (“the thing itself, for its own
sake”).71 The only meaning that Plato has Glaucon assign to this short
phrase at this stage in the dialogue is that of fully sense-perceptive joy
that requires no effort to be attained and has no consequences when
complete (357b6). However, this combination of self-reflexive and def-
inite pronouns constitutes Socrates’ fundamental terminology in Repub-
lic Book 5 for discussion of the Forms, these latter being characterized
by fixity and homogeneity, whilst eschewing all change and ambiguity.
In specific terms, in 476c2 – d3, Socrates proposes a new and unusual
way of understanding reality. What is traditionally called Plato’s ‘theory
of Forms’ in this dialogue is heavily reliant on wording that Glaucon has
introduced in Book 2. This speaker’s non-technical use of certain terms
now becomes philosophical terminology:
j owm jak± l³m pq\clata mol_fym, aqt¹ d³ j\kkor l^te mol_fym l^te, %m
tir Bc/tai 1p· tµm cm_sim aqtoO, dum\lemor 6peshai […]

70 On the philosophical significance of Glaucon’s tripartite classification of goods,

see White (1984: 393 – 421) and Irwin, in Fine, G. (ed.) (1999: Ch. 6); but cf.
Heinaman (2002: 309 – 335); see also Reeve (1988: 24 – 25); Dorter (2006:
57 – 59); and Shields in Santas (ed.) (2006: 66 – 70).
71 So Blondell (2000: 135 – 140); but cf. Ferrari (2003: 16).
148 Section Two: The Republic

T_ d] ; b t!mamt_a to}tym Bco}lem|r t] ti aqt¹ jak¹m ja· dum\lemor

jahoq÷m ja· aqt¹ ja· t± 1je_mou let]womta, ja· oute t± let]womta aqt¹
oute aqt¹ t± let]womta Bco}lemor…
What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn’t believe
in the beautiful itself and isn’t able to follow anyone who could lead him to
the knowledge of it?…
But someone, who to take the opposite case, believes in the beautiful it-
self, can see both it (auto) and the things that participate in it and doesn’t
believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the participants…
Glaucon, unaware of the philosophical gravity that his language and
methodology bears at this stage of the discussion, has started to herald
as early as Book 2 the language of metaphysics and ontology presented
in the middle Books of the Republic. 72
Plato’s construction of Glaucon’s persona can thus be seen as a well-
designed authorial technique that serves a range of objectives in the Re-
public: it demonstrates the importance of the dialogical mode in doing
philosophy and it also makes plain the criteria required for having a con-
structive philosophical dialogue, namely energetic participants with cer-
tain ethical and cognitive characteristics.73 Glaucon is one such a partic-
ipant. He a priori believes that justice pays more and deems that a suc-
cessful definition of justice must dispense with humans’ multi-faceted
and diverse judgments or qualifications (358c6 – d3).74 As we saw
above, a superficial praise of the superiority of justice will not be
good enough for this interlocutor, who expressly states that he will
not be “enchanted by Socrates”, or be scared off by Thrasymachus,
and who demands a demonstration (apodeixis) that will be satisfactory

72 In Book 5. 478a1 – 7, Socrates will pick up this same terminology that Glaucon
introduced in Book 2 and re-designate it semantically so that he explains how
the world of true Being and true knowledge (Epistẽmẽ) must be differentiated
from the world of Opinion (Doxa). Not surprisingly, Plato has Socrates present
this important epistemological and ontological thesis to Glaucon and not to
Adeimantus, on whom, see the discussion in Chapters Three and Four below.
73 Socrates’ contribution to the philosophic dialogue is not always a guarantee of
success. See Vlastos (1985: 1 – 31).
74 This is a challenge of quasi-Parmenidean type: see Fr. 8, 27 – 9: 1pe· c]mesir ja·
ekehqor/ t/ke l\k’ 1pk\whgsam, !p_se d³ p_stir !kgh^r./taqt|m t’ 1m taqt`
te l]mom jah’ 2aut| te je?tai /wovtyr 5lpedom axhi l´mei. Palmer (1999) has
treated in detail the relation between Parmenides On Nature and the concluding
pages of Rep. Book 5.
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 149

to his intellect (noos) (358b1 – 7).75 His not easily deceived noos, his will-
ingness to accept his own aporetic state (358c6 – d3), and his quasi-phil-
osophical skills will make him Socrates’ most appropriate interlocutor
throughout Books 5 – 7. Glaucon seems even to fit Socrates’ description
of the true philosopher in Book 5 as being “the one who readily and
willingly tries all kinds of learning, who turns gladly to learning and is
insatiable for it” (475c6 – 7; Cp. 450b6 – c5).
However, his intellectual skills and ethical views aside, Glaucon’s
most important trait is his active and vigorous willingness to help Soc-
rates argue difficult ideas.76 His commitment to reinforcing the develop-
ment of the dialogue in ground-breaking directions is emphasized
throughout Book 5. Although in 449b – c it is Polemarchus and Adei-
mantus who raise the issue of female guardianship and communal life
in the ideal state, Plato sees that they soon give way to Glaucon, who
now resurfaces as Socrates’ sole interlocutor in the discussion. Glaucon’s
rhetoric in this context reveals an idiosyncratic amalgamation of force-
fulness and unquestionable willingness to help Socrates successfully face
the three waves of the logos (450b5 – c5). Socrates admits that the ideas
brought up in relation to the polis are not easy to argue and most people
are unable to accept these social innovations, thus refusing to be per-

75 Thrasymachus was as “enchanted as a snake” by Socrates and thus failed to de-

fend his thesis. For Glaucon, though, the apodeixis given in Book 1 was inad-
equate. Glaucon’s comments here evoke poetry’s kẽlẽsis. But it is Socrates
now who is accused of enchanting the interlocutors. Note that this is the
sort of influence that the rhapsode Ion wishes to have on his audience as
Plato has him admit to Socrates in the Ion 535e1 – 6. Glaucon’s remarks here
are thus self-referential: if Thrasymachus was spell-bound by Socrates to intel-
lectual numbness, the dialogue failed to perform its philosophic function. On
Glaucon see also O’Connor, in Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.) (2007: 55 – 89). On
Thrasymachus, see Irwin (1995: Chapters 11 and 12); Kerferd (1964: 12 –
16); Nicholson (1974: 210 – 232); and Cooke (1999: 40). See also Beversluis
(2000: 221 – 244). Note that Glaucon does not accuse Socrates for the dia-
logue’s aporia. He quickly points out that he believes Socrates to be the only
one capable of producing an acceptable account of justice (358d 1 – 3). See
also Blondell (2002: 218 – 219, 165 – 189 and 193 – 199), who also discusses
Socrates’ change of approach after Glaucon and Adeimantus have issued their
challenge in Book 2 (when the dialogue becomes ‘constructive’ and, from a
dramatic perspective, less-colourful); see also Schofield (1993: 184 – 186) and
Annas (1981: 39).
76 See, for example, 451b2 – 5. Because of this, some scholars have viewed him as
a “yes-man”: see, for example, Arieti (1991); but cf. Blondell (2002: 204 – 205)
and Rowe (2007: 93 – 95).
150 Section Two: The Republic

suaded that they are both feasible and effective (450c – d). These are the
so-called non-believers whom, after Glaucon’s encouragement and re-
assurance of committed support, Socrates will have to find the means to
persuade. In 450b6 – 7, Glaucon states that “it is within reason for peo-
ple with any understanding to listen to an argument of this kind their
whole life long” and, in the face of Socrates’ further reservations about
his own ability to argue these ideas knowledgeably, Glaucon promises
that the members of this audience are not inconsiderate (!cm~lomer), in-
credulous (%pistoi) or hostile (d}smoi), and will support him through-
out this difficult argumentative venture (450d3 – 4).77 This short ex-
change of promised allegiances and alliances is rendered in language
heavily laden with combative and judicial terminology:
Ja· b Cka}jym cek\sar, )kk’, § S~jqater, 5vg, 1\m ti p\hylem pkgllek³r
rp¹ toO k|cou, !v_el]m se ¦speq v|mou ja· jahaq¹m eWmai ja· lµ !pate_ma
Bl_m. !kk± haqq^sar k]ce. (451b2 – 5)
Glaucon laughed and said: Well, Socrates, if we suffer from any false note
you strike in the argument, we’ll release you and absolve you of any guilt as
in a homicide case: your hands are clean, and you have not deceived us. So
take courage and speak.
Glaucon’s interference with the course of the argument has drawn Soc-
rates onto philosophically perilous ground. His language here anticipates
and foreshadows the aggressive and martial language he will later utilize
to express people’s reaction to Socrates’ broaching of the fundamental
prerequisite for the creation of the ideal state, namely the thesis that phi-
losophers should become kings. Glaucon’s most celebrated commitment
to the argument is expressed in this context, in the concluding section of
Book 5, where Socrates appears reluctant to handle the third wave of
the argument (473c11 – e5). The lines in question make the most
again of the vocabulary of war, highlighting thus the repercussions of
Plato’s socio-political ideas:
Ja· fr, ¯ S~jqater, 5vg, toioOtom 1jb]bkgjar N/l\ te ja· k|com, dm eQp½m
BcoO 1p· s³ p\mu pokko}r te ja· oq va}kour mOm ovtyr, oXom N_xamter t±
Rl\tia, culmo»r kab|mtar fti 2j\st\ paq]tuwem fpkom, he?m diatetal]mour
¢r haul\sia 1qcasol]mour· otr eQ lµ !lum0 t` k|c\ ja· 1jve}n,, t` emti
tyhaf|lemor d~seir d_jgm. (473e6 – 474a4)
Socrates, after hurling a speech and statement like that at us, you must ex-
pect that a great many people (and not undistinguished ones either) will cast
off their cloaks and, stripped for action, snatch any available weapon, and

77 See also Glaucon’s similar exchange with Socrates in 457e2 – 6.

 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 151

make a determined rush at you, ready to do terrible things. So, unless you
can hold them off by argument and escape, you really will pay the penalty of
general derision.
According to Glaucon, Socrates has now joined “a war of arguments”
against those who will reject his association of metaphysics and political
theory (to?r !pistoOsim, 474b2). The ideas from this point onwards will
be particularly provocative and intellectually strenuous, and Socrates
himself admits that he cannot bring his thesis home unless he has a
co-speaker willing to follow him along this path of argumentation;
someone who will reinforce rather than block his intellectual venture.
Glaucon promptly promises to be such an interlocutor, and thus takes
on the role of a cooperative respondent to assist Socrates in this philo-
sophical battle:
!kk\ to_ se oq pqod~sy, !kk’ !lum_ oXr d}malai· d}malai d³ eqmo_ô te ja·
t` paqajeke}eshai, ja· Usyr #m %kkou tou 1llek]steq|m soi !pojqimo_lgm.
!kk’ ¢r 5wym toioOtom bogh¹m peiq_ to?r !pistoOsim 1mde_nashai fti 5wei Ø
s» k]ceir. (474a6 – b2)
I won’t betray you, but rather defend you in any way I can – by goodwill,
by urging you on, and perhaps by being able to give you more appropriate
answers than someone else. So, with the promise of this assistance, try to
show the unbelievers that things are as you say they are.
As a result, Socrates is persuaded to present the Forms: “I must try it,
then, especially since you agree to be so great an ally” (lec\kgm sulla-
w_am, 474b3 – 4). It appears then that this path of enquiry into the meta-
physics and ontology of Books 5, 6, and 7 has been trodden as a result of
Glaucon and Socrates’ joining forces. Glaucon’s most important contri-
bution to the argument at this stage of the dialogue in Book 5 is his
complete and unquestioning acceptance of the existence of the Forms.
The Republic, I wish to argue, promotes the idea that certain linguis-
tic and conceptual resources already lie at hand for certain interlocutors
to use as they become trained in Platonic philosophy, although the suc-
cessful employment of such resources is determined by the interlocutors’
own ability to cooperate with Socrates in redirecting familiar language
and thought patterns towards new paths of cognition.78 Thus, using
Glaucon as a characteristic case in this direction, the dialogue demon-

78 Glaucon’s ‘philosophic’language: doje?m pepeij]mai, !kgh_r pe?sai (357a5),

toi|mde ti eWmai (357b5), aqt¹ artoO 6meja (357b6), di± d|nam (358a6), B jat±
moOm !p|deinir (358b3 – 4), t_ t’ 5stim 2j\teqom ja· t_ma 5wei d}malim
(358b4 – 5), aqt¹ jah’ art¹ (358d2), 1m¹m 1m t0 xuw0 (358b5 – 6).
152 Section Two: The Republic

strates how one’s non-technical deployment of certain terms in current

use at the time may be transformed into a particular form of philosophic
dialect, thereby bridging linguistic gaps when communicating with a
philosophically unsophisticated audience, in order to facilitate the intro-
duction of such an audience to Platonic philosophy, ethics, and episte-
mology.79 This is a significant point regarding the way language is de-
ployed in the Republic. Glaucon’s challenge to Socrates in the opening
of Book 2 introduces a type of wording in our text which, when appro-
priated by Socrates in Book 5, will put across epistemological classifica-
tions that not even Glaucon will be able to follow easily.
In my view, this on-going philosophical training is seen as an in-
stance of the Platonic education (paideia) as this is defined in Book 7.
It is here that Socrates contradicts the commonly-held idea about edu-
cation according to which “knowledge is put into the souls that lack it”,
in the same way that “sight is put into blind eyes” (vas· d´ pou oqj 1mo}-
sgr 1m t0 xuw0 1pist^lgr sve?r 1mtih]mai, oXom tuvko?r avhaklo?r exim
1mtih]mter, 518b8 – c2). He argues instead that “education takes for
granted that sight is there but it isn’t turned the right way or looking
where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately” (diamẽ-
chanẽsasthai, 518d3 – 7).80 To turn the “eye of the soul towards the Sun”
is to lead someone from one level of the understanding of reality to an-
other.81 For Socrates’ interlocutors in the dialogue, who, we should

79 For a similar line of enquiry, see also Blondell (2002: 199 – 228, and in Press
(ed.) (2000: 127 – 46). Glaucon’s persona in the Republic has received diverse
criticism. For an interpretation which directly contradicts mine, see Strauss
(1964); and Arieti (1991: 231 – 47). But cf. Ausland, in Michelini, A. N.
(ed.) (2003: 124 – 33). See also discussion in the Introduction above n. 48.
80 Rep. 518d3 – 7: To}tou to_mum, Gm d’ 1c~, aqtoO t]wmg #m eUg, t/r peqiacyc/r,
t_ma tq|pom ¢r Nøst\ te ja· !musil~tata letastqav^setai, oq toO 1lpoi/sai
aqt` t¹ bq÷m, !kk’ ¢r 5womti l³m aqt|, oqj aqh_r d³ tetqall]m\ oqd³ bk]pomti
oX 5dei, toOto dialgwam^sashai. (“Then education is the craft concerned with
doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can most easi-
ly and effectively be made to do it. It isn’t the craft of putting sight into the soul.
Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn’t turned the right
way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately.”)
Note that the language in 7. 518c – d exploits the imagery of light and darkness
that Plato deploys for the first time in his epistemological distinction at the end
of Book 5 and out of which his images of the Sun, the Line and the Cave are
constructed in Books 6 and 7. This is discussed further in this chapter and in
Chapter Three below.
81 A number of scholars have interpreted the Republic as depicting the conversion
(peqiacyc^) that Socrates speaks of in his images of the Lines and the Cave: see
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 153

stress again, have not been exposed to the type of education in poetry
and music that Socrates recommends for his guardians in Books 2 and
3, or to the intellectually strenuous mathematical and scientific educa-
tion of the philosopher-kings presented in Book 7, epistemological con-
version (peqiacyc^) may be achieved on a first level by re-channelling
the dynamics of familiar language in order to debate new ideas. Plato’s
treatment of Glaucon’s persona, then, demonstrates how even these, as it
were, ‘culturally contaminated’ citizens can be trained in Platonic phi-
losophy, provided that they are willing to be exposed to this type of ed-
ucation. Glaucon, in particular, stands out in the group for he seems to
bear all the ethical and intellectual features that would allow such a con-
version.82 He is adamant that Socrates should present highly difficult
ideas, not easily developed or followed by everyone, and he cooperates
with Socrates in this direction.83 Even so, his promising intellectual dy-
namics cannot support him all the way, and so he still needs to be turned
‘away from darkness’ towards the ‘light’ in a manner similar, but none-
theless not identical, with others present in the dialogue.84
Glaucon then presents a challenge to Socrates who must now em-
bark on the actual task of educating this promising interlocutor by de-
ploying the appropriate methods (diamẽchanẽsasthai 518d7). The use of
this term in the context of the definition of Platonic paideia is significant
for understanding the way that Plato’s philosophical dialogue works.
Participants can only be treated as individual cases, each requiring Soc-

Blondell (2002: 217 with n. 180); Gallop (1964/65: 113 – 131); Brumbaugh
(1989: 49); Cooper (1966: 65 – 69) and Tanner (1970: 81 – 91). This is a highly
intricate issue that is beyond the scope of this book. I have discussed certain as-
pects of this complex issue in Petraki (2009: 27 – 67).
82 According to Plato, exposure to the type of education in Mousikẽ that Socrates
condemns in Books 2 and 3 results in ethical confusion. So Reeve (1988: 220 –
231); and Blondell (2002).
83 Note that Adeimantus’ contribution to the dialogue is also significant (see, for
example, Rep. 366d-367a), but in my view in a different way, as Plato con-
structs his persona to serve different aims in the dialogue. For an extensive dis-
cussion of this see Chapters Three and Four below. The difference between the
two brothers is also discussed by Blondell (2002: 219 – 228). See also Allen and
Stokes, in Panagiotou, S. (ed.) (1987: 63 – 96 and 97 – 104).
84 Note that unlike the Parmenidean youth, Glaucon’s encounter with the Form
of the Good is blocked in Book 7. 533a. He is offered instead the image of the
Sun. See my discussion below in Chapter Three.
154 Section Two: The Republic

rates’ discovery of the appropriate mẽchanai (method).85 Socrates’s edu-

cation of Glaucon in this section of the Republic involves his ‘awakening’
in matters of philosophical language and argumentation (see
358c6 – d3).86
Consequently, Glaucon, and through him the others present at
Cephalus’ house, are shown that the language people use and under-
stand in a specific way to argue for injustice (words such as doxa, psychẽ,
agathon, and alẽtheia) must be shifted to express different thought pat-
terns and present unsuspected truths about reality. Plato’s dialogue
form is thus the most appropriate mode to serve these purposes.87
The above has been a necessary overview of the distinctive features
of Glaucon’s persona in the Republic in order to explain Plato’s choice of
Glaucon as Socrates’ main interlocutor not only in Book 5, but in all the
Republic’s dramatic moments where intricate issues are discussed and ar-
gumentation becomes particularly strenuous and demanding.88 At these

85 The Socratic elenchus is also a method of conversion. See the detailed discus-
sion in Vlastos (1983a/b: 27 – 58, esp. 57 and 71 – 74); cf. Polansky’s examina-
tion of Vlastos’ analysis (1985: 247 – 259); see also Gordon (1996b: 131 – 137)
and Kahn (1996: Ch. 1).
86 Note that Glaucon does not need to be persuaded on ethical matters or about
the superiority of justice. He agrees with Socrates but, without his help, he can-
not defend his thesis.
87 Plato’s use of the dialogue form has been discussed extensively in the literature.
See Rowe (2007: 7 – 25); von Reden and Goldhill, in Goldhill, S. and Os-
borne, R. (eds.) (1999: 257 – 289); Sinaiko (1965); Haslam (1972: 17 – 38);
Guthrie IV (1975); Moors (1978: 77 – 93); Hyland (1968: 38 – 50); Gadamer
(1980); Tejera (1984); Griswold, in Griswold, C. L. (ed.) (1988: 143 – 167);
Sayre, in Griswold, C. L. (ed.) (1988: 93 – 109); Kahn (1996); Mittelstrass, in
Griswold, C. L. (ed.) (1988: 126 – 142); Desjardins, in Griswold, C. L. (ed.)
(1988: 110 – 125); Thesleff, in Press, G. A. (ed.) (1993: 259 – 266); Frede’s ex-
amination of the dialogue form is essential reading (in Klagge, J. C. and Smith,
N. D. [eds.] [1992: 201 – 219]); Clay, in Dunn, F. M. and Cole, T. (eds.)
(1992: 113 – 129); Johnson (1998: 577 – 598). See also the Introduction n. 14.
88 Socrates discusses with Glaucon his ontology, metaphysics and epistemology, as
well as the construction of the ideal polis, the condition of the just and the ideal
soul (Books 4 and 10), as well as the difficult subjects that the philosopher-kings
will need to undertake in order to grasp the Forms. With Adeimantus, he dis-
cusses poetry in Books 2 and 3, the nature of the genuine and counterfeit phi-
losophers in Book 6 and the unjust polities and souls. In his dialogue with Adei-
mantus, Socrates changes his linguistic style. The technique parallels that used
with Glaucon. With Adeimantus, Socrates re-addresses and re-directs the
poets’ parlance to serve the needs of his own philosophic argumentation.
Note also that Plato replaces Adeimantus with Glaucon in Book 9 when Soc-
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 155

philosophically crucial moments the dialogue requires participants de-

termined to make positive efforts and Plato has found a number of
ways to underscore this trait in Glaucon.89 I shall now turn to the con-
cluding pages of Book 5 to investigate how Glaucon’s persona affects
Socrates’ difficult argumentation about Knowledge and Opinion. My
examination will also cast new light on the poetics of Socrates’ philo-
sophical style in this context.

2.2 The third wave again

The latter part of Book 5 is laden with problems related to Socrates’ on-
tological and epistemological ideas.90 These have been discussed and an-
alysed by scholars vigorously over the years, and yet there is more to be
said about the relation of Socrates’ linguistic style to his co-speakers.
This issue will take up the rest of my examination of Book 5.
In the background of Socrates’ distinction between Knowledge
(Epistẽmẽ) and Opinion (Doxa) stand the Platonic Forms. Not all inter-
locutors would ascribe to their existence, or to the epistemology that
these generate, but, as we saw previously, Glaucon does. This facilitates
not only Socrates’ exchange with the sight-lovers in 476e – 480a, but
also the presentation of Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology to his
readership, whose members may find themselves being in greater sym-
pathy with Glaucon than with the sight-lovers (philotheamones). The in-
troduction of the Forms in the context of the creation of the just polis is
intended to offer to Glaucon a more comprehensive view of human un-
derstanding of true reality, and thus explain the reason why politics
should be conducted by philosophers.91 In effect, Socrates casts new

rates discusses pleasure (hẽdonẽ) in a long stretch of difficult argumentation. See

my detailed discussion in Chapters Three and Four below.
89 See 474a5 – 474a6. See also 474a8.
90 The relevant literature is vast. See Robinson (1953); Ross (1951); Allen (ed.)
(1965); Gallop (1965: 113 – 131); Tanner (1970: 81 – 91); Guthrie (1975 IV:
487 – 498); Cross, R. C. and Woozley, A. D. (ed.) (1964: 170); Vlastos, in
Bambrough, R (ed.) (1965: 1 – 19); Wilson (1976: 117 – 127); Davies (1977:
23 – 28); Annas (1981: Ch. 8); Karasmanis (1988: 147 – 171); Kraut (1993:
43 – 62); Lidz (1993/94: 115 – 134) and Bestor (1996: 33 – 82); Fine, in Ever-
son, S. (ed.) (1990: 85 – 115) and Fine, G. (ed.) (1999).
91 See 476c – d and 479a. Socrates offers to Glaucon a truly panoramic vision of
reality in Book 6, in the images of the Sun and the Line.
156 Section Two: The Republic

light on human cognition, as he ascribes reduced epistemological status

to a perspectival or relativistic approach to concepts such as beauty or
justice, when these are viewed by people only as qualities attached to
various objects, actions, or persons, and not in themselves. 92 In the course
of this epistemological exposition, the participants in the dialogue wit-
ness a transformation, as it were, of the diction that Glaucon introduced
in Book 2, as well as of the use of language with which they think they
are well familiar with.93 Thus Glaucon is encouraged to take a taste of an
alternative type of language usage which promotes the idea that cogni-
tive confusion results from one’s inability to handle conflicting sense-
perceptive impressions, variety, and multiplicity. The language that Soc-
rates employs to argue these difficult ideas in Book 5 is not only devoid
of poetic quotations, but also stylistically ‘cleansed’ from any vivid im-
agistic bearings. In my view, Socrates tries to thus present the intellect’s
struggle against the deception which results from blindly trusting our
sense-perception alone. As we will see shortly, Plato dramatizes most ar-
tistically this tension in Socrates’ alternation of linguistic styles.94
These observations are made clear in Socrates’ comments about col-
ours and shapes in 477c6 – d5. In this respect, Socrates bases his explan-
ation of dynamis on our inability to perceive it by way of colour or
shape. This is key for understanding Socrates’ distinction between Epis-
tẽmẽ and Doxa. As Rowe has rightly observed, Glaucon makes a crucial
concession to Socrates on behalf of the sight-lovers when he allows him
to argue that knowledge and belief are two different dynameis. This is a
concession that the sight-lovers, had they been truly conversing with
Socrates, might not have made, especially because of their apparent dif-
ficulties to think beyond colour and shape. Contrary to the sight-lovers,
who take great pleasure in performances consisting of beautiful colours,
shapes or songs (476b4 – 8), Glaucon in this part of the argumentation is

92 On this distinction, see the discussion further below. See also Gonzalez (1996:
245 – 275) and Gosling (1960: 116 – 128).
93 I mean here words such as doxa, auto to or kathauto and dynamis (in Book 2) and
koinnia (deployed in Book 5). Yet, striking in this context is also the idiosyn-
cratic usage of the verb ‘to be’ and its cognates, on which see the detailed dis-
cussion in Vlastos (1973: Ch. 2); see also Annas (1981: 195 – 200); Brown, in
Everson, S. (ed.) (1994: 212 – 228); Kahn (1966: 245 – 265) and Kahn (1973)
and (2003).
94 It is not incidental that in this context Socrates takes beauty as an example. We
see the many beautiful things and yet, in Socrates’ view, we may never grasp the
real beauty of Beauty itself.
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 157

ready to support a type of discourse which is rendered in a language di-

vested of colourfulness, a type of language one might be tempted to call
abstract, but which, for reasons I will explain shortly, I will label colour-
less.95
We should not lose sight of the fact that along with Glaucon the
others present in the dialogue also listen to Socrates’ epistemological
classification rendered here in this particular stylistic type of discourse.
As I suggested in the introduction, this is only a glimpse of an alternative
type of diction which is intended to match the philosophical impact of
Socrates’ discussion about sense-perception in Book 5. In Book 7, Soc-
rates will give a list of subjects in which the philosopher-kings will need
to train, in order to rise above the obstructive influence of sense-percep-
tion so that they finally ‘view’ the ultimate Form of the Good. As men-
tioned above, this is a type of education that the Republic’s intra-dramat-
ic audience has not undertaken, and probably could not follow anyway.
Yet, Plato’s Socrates applies a different method to educate the members
of this audience in ethics and ontology. His distinction between Epis-
tẽmẽ and Doxa in the third wave is rendered in a type of linguistic
style devoid of traditional imagery familiar to the philotheamones and po-
etic motifs. As we will see, language there becomes ‘uncoloured’ and is
thus a challenge for the sight-lovers, who cannot now easily engage in
the act of visualization.96 In the concluding lines of Book 5, however,
Socrates trades this style for an alternative imagistic one, recapitulating
now his epistemological thesis in pictorial terms and in the diction of
poetic origins. In this way, Socrates accommodates in his language the
sight-lovers’ most favourite sense, vision (since this type of discourse
supports visualisation), thus turning this sense into a stepping stone
that leads people closer to the Platonic Real.97

95 In my usage of the ‘tasting of language’ I follow Plato’s own wording in

Rep. 537a4 – 7 and 539b1 – 7 where the philosopher makes reference to the ed-
ucation of the guardians’ offspring. The relevant lines interweave the food im-
agery with the use of philosophical language. See a more detailed discussion in
Chapters Three and Four below.
96 In the Republic the sight-lovers’ love for theamata (sights) is substituted by the act
of visualization. Instead of viewing performances, the sight-lovers now visualize
the verbal images that Plato constructs for them.
97 I here refer to the epistemological and ethical ‘distance’ that separates the ma-
jority from ethical qualities and the Platonic Real. This image was first intro-
duced in our text by Thrasymachus in 343c – d. In the rest of the dialogue,
Plato will exploit this notion of distance in various ways. See discussion in
Chapters Three and Four below.
158 Section Two: The Republic

Turning now to the Republic’s narrative, now at the threshold of the

argument that will lead the dialogue to the metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy of Books 6 and 7, Glaucon offers further support to Socrates so that
the so-called unbelievers may become convinced of the proposed iden-
tification of politics with philosophy (to?r !pistoOsi, 474a6 – b4).98
Glaucon’s misinterpretation of philosophers here triggers Socrates’ im-
mediate response, and he now distinguishes between true philosophers
and sight-lovers (Oqdal_r, eWpom, !kk’ blo¸our l³m vikosºvoir. To»r d³
!kghimo¼r, 5vg, t¸mar k´ceir ; To»r t/r !kghe¸ar, Gm d’ 1c¾, vikohe²lo-
mar. [“No, but they are like philosophers. And who are the true philos-
ophers? Those who love the sight of truth”] 474b5 – c3). Two conflict-
ing perspectives meet in Socrates’ exchange with Glaucon here. The
ground is now new and Socrates has thus to turn to definitions.99 Ac-
cording to him, philosophers must be lovers of wisdom (475b8 – 10).
Glaucon fails to grasp this point and his misinterpretation of the term
philosopher leads to the introduction of the sight and sound lovers
(475e2 – 5).100 Despite his intellectual aptitude, Glaucon is a man of
his era, deeply ‘dyed’ in the culture of various poetic performances,
and of diverse sounds and images. He thus takes Socrates’ use of word
mathẽma in 475c6 to bear familiar connotations: because they love to
learn (manthanein), cultured people attend a vast range of dramatic and
musical performances.
One cannot stress enough that one of Plato’s most fundamental
problems is the discovery of the linguistic means that will enable Socra-
tes to communicate with his intra-dramatic audience and external read-
ership. In our text, this is enacted through Socrates’ linguistic negotia-
tions with Glaucon. Thus Glaucon’s short question – “what do you
mean by this?” in 475e5, which leads to the presentation of the
Forms in 476a – d, is indicative of the difficulties that Socrates will
have to face. Socrates’ reply is particularly important for the interpreta-
tion I propose here: ‘“It would not be easy to explain to someone else,
but I think that you will agree to this”’ (475e6 – 7). Socrates’ hesitation
here is making a point for the development of the conversation. It is a

98 See above Chapter One.

99 See 475c6-d and 475e2 – 5.
100 475c6 – 8: T¹m d³ dµ eqweq_r 1h´komta pamt¹r lah¶lator ce¼eshai ja· "sl´myr
1p· t¹ lamh²meim Qºmta ja· !pk¶styr 5womta, toOtom d’ 1m d¸j, v¶solem
vikºsovom7 G c±q ; (“But the one who readily and willingly tries all kinds of
learning, who turns gladly to learning and is insatiable for it, is rightly called
a philosopher”).
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 159

thin line that Socrates will now have to tread, and balance can be pre-
served only if the conversation is supported by an able interlocutor. In-
deed, Socrates immediately gains Glaucon’s concession that there are
such concepts as Beauty or Justice which are one thing (476a – d) but ap-
pear in many (pokk± va_meshai 6jastom, 476a7; aqt¹ ja· t± 1je_mou
let]womta, 476d1 – 3). He then turns to demonstrate how the sight-lov-
ers’ inability to know aqt¹ t¹ jak|m prevents them from attaining true
knowledge and so, in 475d1 – 480a13, a further distinction is drawn this
time between Knowledge and Opinion (Epistẽmẽ and Doxa).
In order to understand the significance of Socrates’ division of these
two types of philosophers, we need to investigate the nature of the
sight/sound-lover. I should make clear that I do not intend to search
here for the nature of the sight lover in the abstract. I will argue instead
that those present in the theoretical construction of the kallipolis, albeit
to a different extent, share the characteristics that Glaucon indicates in
his description of the sight-lovers. If a sight-lover was asked what beauty
is, he would offer a list of the many beautiful things that surround him.
He would show, for example, “his lover, a Cathedral, a castle, or a sym-
phony concert”.101 If we also take into account how many things sur-
round us which one can find beautiful, then the list is endless indeed.102

101 See Stokes, in Barker, A. D., and Warner, M. (eds.) (1992: 103 – 132 here, at
106). On the importance of vision (theria, theama and theatẽs) in the 5th Century
Athens, see also Goldhill’s illuminating discussion in N. K. Rutter and B. A.
Sparkes (eds.) (2000: 165 – 175); on the Republic’s philotheamones see his com-
ments in 169.
102 If we substitute Beauty with Justice, then the sight-lovers’ approach to it is
dramatized in the unsuccessful attempts in Book 1 to define this concept.
There different speakers tried different ways and definitions. According to Soc-
rates, in each attempt justice was always defined in relation to something else
and, as result, it was never really ‘fixed’. In Rep. Book 2, it was Glaucon
who first commented on the dissatisfying method of approaching the concept
of justice in this way. See, in particular, his remarks in 358c6 – 23. Note also
that in his story of the Gyges’ ancestor, Glaucon employs the term adamantinos
(360b5) to characterize the committed relation that people should have with
justice. See also Plato’s usage of the word pac_yr (crystallized) in relation to
the definition of justice in Rep. 434d2 and 479c4. The significance of the
word is also noted by Cooper (1986: 238 – 239). Cooper observes that the
pac_yr mo/sai (479c4) is an unusual phrase. Apart from the Republic, the
word appears only two more times in the entire Platonic corpus, in Theaetetus
157a4 and Timaeus 49d2 (359 with n. 23). In the Theaetetus passage Plato re-
states the idea that it is impossible to have a firm notion (pac_yr mo/sai) of Be-
coming. In my view, Plato’s strict linguistic correlation of pac_yr with mo/sai
160 Section Two: The Republic

Beyond this the sight-lover would refuse to go and accept that there is
such a concept as beauty itself which is not a property attached to sense-
perceptible things or people (479a – b).103 As a result, a number of things
may be shown by the sight-lovers to be beautiful, but these would be as
various and diverse as the many different perspectives that people usually
hold on beauty. As mentioned above, Glaucon had already stressed this
group’s eagerness to acquire knowledge through vision (475d – e). Now
Socrates stresses anew that they love the beauty they see and identifies
these people as a distinctive group which must be differentiated from
the Platonic philosopher.104
But where does Glaucon stand in relation to the sight-lovers? This is
an issue infrequently treated by critics.105 However, Glaucon’s classifica-
tion has a significant influence on Socrates’ language in the third wave. I
adopt here a different approach. Plato constructs a dialogue between
Socrates and Glaucon, but he reserves in it a fundamental place for
the sight-lovers. Thus, when Plato deems it necessary, he makes Glau-
con take on the persona of the philotheamones as Socrates’ representative
and respondent in the dialogue (476e7 – 8). My interpretation will keep
Plato’s narratological distinctions between the two responding parties,
since, in my view, this is crucial for understanding Socrates’ discourse
and the alternation of stylistic modes in the Republic.

in these contexts turns the term into a formula whose aim is to strengthen the
distinctive semantics that Plato applies to the true knowledge of the immutable
Real.
103 See also Rowe (2007: 200 – 213) for an illuminating discussion of the compli-
cated aspects of this section of the dialogue. The interpretation of line 479a3 (ta
polla kala) is highly controversial. Scholars disagree on whether the phrase refers
to the many particular (beautiful) objects or to the many different kinds of prop-
erties of the particular objects. Neither of the two proposed readings affects my
interpretation here: see Rowe (2007: 207); Sedley (2004: 179); Gosling (1960:
116 – 128). In addition, see Allen (1961: 325 – 335) and Brentlinger (1972:
116 – 152); cf. Nehamas (1973: 461 – 491); (1975: 105 – 117) and (1979: 93 –
104).
104 In Book 5 Plato makes Glaucon and Socrates refer repeatedly to “those who
will not believe” the radical regulations about the organization of the ideal
polis. In the context of the third wave we learn that these people, who are
the majority, are also sight-lovers. On this, see Rowe (2007: 204 with n. 14).
105 In most analyses Glaucon’s role is treated as merely decorative – an almost un-
comprehending interlocutor who is persuaded all too easily by Socrates’ argu-
mentative manoeuvres. See Arieti (1991: 237 and 240 – 1); but cf. (Cooke
1999: 40) and Rowe (2007: 205).
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 161

One cannot easily decide on which camp Glaucon should be placed

and, in a way, it is this that makes him the ideal persona to bridge the
communicative gap that separates Socrates from the unbelievers and
the philotheamones. Glaucon has been educated in the traditional ways
that Socrates rejected in Books 2 and 3. But then so has Socrates. Ac-
cording to Socrates, he is “an erotically inclined man” who knows
about homoerotic love (475d1 – e1). But then, according to the Sympo-
sium, so is Socrates. I have already argued above that Plato provides us
with ample information why it is Glaucon who is Socrates’ interlocutor
in the dialogue’s most demanding philosophically moments. It is for the
same reasons that Glaucon should not be identified with the group of the
philotheamones and the unbelievers of Book 5 and should be placed in-
stead in Socrates’ camp. Glaucon’s way of thinking and speaking is com-
patible with Socrates’ after all. He believes that justice is better than in-
justice and he also accepts the existence of a single Form in which things
and concepts partake (476c – d). Nonetheless, he is not altogether free
from erroneous thought-patterns. Contrary to Socrates, he cannot
argue for the true value of justice in people’s lives. He is, however, will-
ing to be ‘turned away’ from ethical confusion. He is even willing to
follow Socrates all the way to the Form of the Good. He is then an
ally to the Socratic perspective and Plato exploits his dynamic and po-
tential on several occasions and in a number of ways in our text to reach
out to the non-believers, the sight-lovers, and the hedonists.106 This
group of people would probably recognize Glaucon as one of theirs
too, since he enjoys several aspects of the culture that Socrates has so
severely criticized in Books 2 and 3. But as it is not they who are
now directly confronted by Socrates, they may happily stay in this dia-
logue of Socrates with one of their representative. Yet for Plato’s Soc-
rates too, Glaucon is an ideal co-speaker, for he hovers on the border-
line between the two sides: his “divine phusis” has somehow saved him

106 See Glaucon’s answer to Socrates in 476b9. But cf. Annas (1981: 245): “Plato
produces no arguments against this position, one which is often simply taken
for granted in modern discussions. For him to have done so would have
been tantamount to arguing for the existence of the Form of the Good,
which is something he chooses not to do. So right at the start of the discussion
Plato parts company with someone who believes that for something to be
good is always for it to be good for X, from Y’s point of view, or a good Z”.
This could explain why here Glaucon immediately accepts the existence of
the Forms, but his acceptance still differentiates him from the sight-lovers.
See also Kahn (1996: 330 – 331).
162 Section Two: The Republic

from being fully immersed in the sight-lovers’ perspective (366c6 – 7

and 367e6 – 368a7). He can then both present this perspective and
allow Socrates to take the dialogue on justice further, up to a new
level.107 In other words, Glaucon’s persona is the bridge that links two
viewpoints which otherwise would not have been able to share a com-
mon dialogical ground.
This observation is significant for our examination of the section’s
stylistic modes. Glaucon may be the bridge that brings together, both
linguistically and narratologically, Socrates and the sight-lovers, but in
a way he also deepens the gap that divides the two irreconcilable per-
spectives, for it appears that is only through him that Plato’s Socrates
can hold a dialogue with the sight-lovers, and by extension with the
people present at Cephalus’ house.108 However, this is true only to a
certain extent: in the concluding lines of the Book, Plato’s Socrates
uses imagistic wording in the dialogue with which the philotheamones,
because of their cultural education, are most at ease, and it is out of
this wording that the Republic’s rich imagery is constructed in Book 6
and 7. As we will see in the next chapter, Socrates’ audience in the Re-
public has been brought up viewing products of all forms of art: poetic
and sophistic performances, paintings, and sculptures. Socrates adapts his
style to his audience’s needs, but at the same time, makes full use of the
vocabulary that Glaucon has provided him with to speak about Knowl-
edge and Opinion as distinct states of cognition, offering thus to his au-
dience the possibility to see an alternative type of philosophical style,
which they themselves would probably have had problems supporting
dialogically had Glaucon been absent.
In the concluding part of Book 5 the clash between different meth-
ods and linguistic styles is at its most dynamic. On the basis of the above,
I would like to argue that the third wave of argument can be divided
linguistically and narratologically into three parts: in part one (475d1 –
476e3) Socrates’ discussion with Glaucon is founded on their shared ac-

107 On Glaucon’s allegiance, see also Rep. 480a7 – 10. Have the philotheamones been
convinced by the entire venture? No answer can be deduced from the text, but
Glaucon makes a significant remark at the end: “Will they be angry with us if
we call them that (philodoxous)?” Socrates asks; “not if they take my advice, for
it isn’t right to be angry with those who speak the truth.”
108 Socrates never assumes the persona of the philotheamones in the text. When he
addresses them directly in the concluding lines of Book 5, they are a mute per-
sona and the short replies he elicits now come from Glaucon qua Glaucon and
not as a representative of the sight-lovers.
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 163

ceptance of the Forms. In part two (476e4 – 479a5) their dialogue opens
up to include the philotheamones. Glaucon is now asked to adopt their
persona and perspective and engage in a short exchange with Socrates
on their behalf. In this part Socrates undertakes to persuade the sight-
lovers not of the existence of the Forms, but of the level of cognition
that the sight-lovers inhabit (476a6). Socrates achieves this without re-
sorting to the Forms directly – the non-believers and sight-lovers would
a priori deny their existence anyway. Nonetheless, as it turns out, Socra-
tes’ argumentation is benefited in many ways from Glaucon’s responses
here, the most important being their agreement on the distinction be-
tween Knowledge and Opinion. This part concludes with the sight-lov-
ers’ placement in the Doxa which covers “what is and is not”. In part
three (479a5 – 480a13) Socrates dismisses Glaucon and appears to address
the philotheamones directly as though they were present in their discus-
sion.109 In this section of the exchange he mostly recapitulates the find-
ings of the previous part. Yet, it is in this short section that we witness a
striking change in Socrates’ linguistic style, since, contrary to part two,
pictorial language and poetic resonances suddenly surface in the text.

2.2.1 Part one: the mixed style

Language treatment in these lines is dependent on Socrates’ respondent,

that is, Glaucon qua Glaucon.110 In part one, where Socrates speaks with
Glaucon about the distinction between true philosophers and resem-
bling ones, the style employed is mixed or combined. The linguistic ne-
gotiations that take place in this part pave the way for the distinction be-
tween Knowledge and Opinion in part two, as well as to the Republic’s
central eikones of the Sun and Line. An imagistic or pictorial type of lan-
guage of poetic and Presocratic origins amalgamates with terminology
whose bearings evade verbal colourfulness which can stimulate the in-
volvement of sense-perception and thus lead to visualisation.
In this part, the mixed style surfaces in three places. In the first case,
Socrates, following Glaucon’s lead, says that the ill-defined term alẽtheia
can be ‘viewed’ by the true philosophers in a way similar to the sight-

109 In my view they are. They are the group at Cephalus’ house whom now Plato
keeps narratologically silent. See the discussion further below.
110 See also Warner (1989).
164 Section Two: The Republic

lovers’ viewing of poetic performances.111 When seen retrospectively,

Socrates’ broaching here of the notion of viewing the truth paves the
way for the eikn of the Sun in Book 6.112
A second instance of mixed/combined style is found in 476c2 – d3:
b owm jak± l³m pq\clata mol¸fym, aqt¹ d³ j\kkor l^te mol_fym l^te, %m tir
Bc/tai 1p· tµm cm_sim aqtoO, dum\lemor 6peshai, emaq C vpaq doje? soi
f/m ; sj|pei d] . t¹ ameiq~tteim üqa oq t|de 1st¸m, 1\mte 1m vpm\ tir 1\mt’
1cqgcoq½r t¹ floi|m t\ lµ floiom !kk’ aqt¹ Bc/tai eWmai è 5oijeim ;
(476c 2 – 7).
What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn’t believe
in the beautiful itself and isn’t able to follow anyone who could lead him to
the knowledge of it? Don’t you think he is living in a dream rather than a
wakened state? Isn’t this dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that a
likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like?
Socrates introduces here a sketchy first division of levels of cognition by
blending imagery with seeds of abstract terminology drawn from recog-
nized Presocratic and poetic origins (aqt¹ d³ j\kkor l^te mol_fym
l^te… dum\lemor 6peshai). Thus, the two states of dreaming and
being awake are presented as examples to highlight one’s intellectual
ability to distinguish the concepts of similarity and identity.113 The
point being made here is that to identify instances of similarity and to
distinguish those from instances of identity is of great philosophical im-
portance for one’s perception of reality (see Socrates’ diair and chris,
476a2 and b1).
According to Socrates, most people fail in that. Thus they spend
their entire lives in a state of intellectual passivity that can be easily com-

111 See Rep. 475e2 – 4 cited with discussion above.

112 See discussion in Chapter Three below. Note also that the nature of the true
philosopher will be Socrates’ main point of discussion with Adeimantus in
Books 6 and 7.
113 The concepts of similarity, identity and difference permeate the Republic
throughout in various ways. Socrates’ presentation of the Forms stems from
the tension between “(true) philosophers” and those “who resemble philoso-
phers” (475e 2 – 5). See my discussion in Chapter Three below. For an insight-
ful discussion of Plato’s imagery here, see Gallop (1971: 187 – 201). Gallop con-
nects the states of dreaming and waking in Book 5 with the image-original con-
trast that permeates the Divided Line. He argues that the two images can be also
linked to the realm of eikasia and connote mortal failure to distinguish image
from original (at 194 – 3). See also Morgan (1990: 130 – 131).
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 165

pared to sleeping.114 These lines can also be read in relation to the sub-
sequent description of the Line’s different epistemological levels. Our
inability to distinguish between similarity and identity prevents us
from drawing correct distinctions and classifications when we are bom-
barded with incongruent sense-perceptive impressions. If we consider
what Socrates says later in his discussion of the Line about the epistemo-
logical and methodological value of eikones as stepping stones that can
lead us upwards to the Forms (509d – 511a), then the inability to distin-
guish between similarity, difference, and identity prevents us from
changing our levels of cognition and comprehending reality in a less dis-
torted manner. Throughout part one, Socrates’ use of imagery makes his
style analogical, but language can be used thus to investigate new con-
cepts and bridge gaps in communication.
The use of this imagery pays dividends and wins over Glaucon who
chooses anew his dianoetic position and places himself among those
who spend their lives ‘awake’ and not ‘dreaming’. Socrates’ internal au-
dience is thus gradually introduced to innovative ideas through the use
of imagery and diction with which they are already familiar because of
their cultural, literary, philosophical, and poetic education.115
In addition, in part one (475d – e) Plato has Glaucon provide ample
information about the cultural profile of the sight and sound lovers in
language that echoes Parmenidean imagery. According to Glaucon,
these people put too much effort into collecting knowledge by attend-
ing various dramatic and musical performances (katamanthanein, 475d 2).
Their type of cultural education is thus directly contrasted to Socrates’

114 Socrates’ distinction in this part between those who accept the existence of the
auto to kallos and those who believe only in the many kala shares a common lan-
guage with Heraclitus’ reference to mortals’ inability to grasp the underlying,
connecting force of Logos. See Heraclitus’ Fr. 1. Sextus adv. math. VII, 132
(to»r d³ %kkour !mhq~pour kamh\mei bj|sa 1ceqh]mter poioOsim fjyspeq
bj|sa eudomter 1pikamh\momtai.) Both philosophers rely on two distinct states
of consciousness, sleeping and being awake, to draw their audience’s attention
to their compromising of their cognitive dynamics. Thus all states, being fully
awake, asleep, blind, or dead, are treated as steps on an epistemological ladder,
as it were, paving the way to the distinction between Epistẽmẽ and Doxa to
which Socrates will soon turn. See Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield,
M. (eds.) (1983: 205). See also Brown (1986: 243 – 5) and Gallop, in Anton
J. P. and Kustas G. L. (eds.) (1971: 187 – 201).
115 Along the same interpretative lines see also the discussion above of the nature of
the agathon where vocabulary relevant to the function of the Sun is transplanted
and transformed to serve the Good’s linguistic/thematic environment.
166 Section Two: The Republic

notion of Epistẽmẽ as this will be defined in Book 5, and to the manner

in which one must be philosophically educated in order to acquire
knowledge of the Forms as described later in Book 7. The description
of the sight-lovers at 475d1 – e1, rendered now in vivid imagistic terms,
makes full use of Parmenides’ account of humans’ deep cognitive con-
fusion:
aqt±q 5peit’ !p¹ t/r, Dm dµ bqoto· eQd|ter oqd³m
pk\ttomtai, d_jqamoi7 !lgwam_g c²q 1m aqt_m
st^hesim Qh}mei pkajt¹m m|om7 oR d³ voqoOmtai
jyvo· bl_r tuvko_ te, tehgp|ter, %jqita vOka,
oXr t¹ p]keim te ja· oqj eWmai taqt¹m mem|listai
joq taqt|m, p\mtym d³ pak_mtqopºr 1sti j]keuhor.
(Fr. 6. 4 – 9)
[B]ut then from that [way] on which mortals wander,
knowing nothing, two-headed; for helplessness guides
their wandering thought in their breasts, and they are carried along,
deaf and blind at once, dazed, undiscriminating hordes,
who believe that to be and not to be are the same
and not the same; and the path taken by them all is backward-turning.
(Trans. Kirk, Raven and Schofield)
In Parmenidean terms, the Republic’s philotheamones are located in the
world of Doxa. 116 Parmenides does not bridge the gap that separates
the enlightened youth from the other mortals who perpetually struggle
in vain in the Doxa realm. Plato makes full use of the Parmenidean im-
agery (and classification) but appropriates it towards his own ends. In a
heavily imagistic type of language, Glaucon transforms the futile intel-
lectual journey described by the Parmenidean Goddess into a literal
one. The sight and sound lovers spend their lives following choruses
from one place to another, indulging their senses in performances of dif-
ferent variety and quality, deluding thus themselves that they achieve
knowledge. Their never-ending enchantment, caused by the stimula-
tion of their senses, leads to an unremitting desire for pleasure, and be-
comes a process without end. It becomes a backward-turning path
(pak_mtqopor j]keuhor) on which sight and sound lovers continuously
travel: ¦speq d³ !polelishyjºter t± §ta 1pajoOsai p²mtym woq_m
peqih´ousi to?r Diomus¸oir oute t_m jat± pºkeir oute t_m jat± j¾lar
!pokeipºlemoi (“they run round at all the Dionysiac festivals in town or

116 See also Crystal (1997: 351 – 363).

 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 167

country as if they were under contract to listen to every company of perform-

ers without fail”, 475d5 – 8).117
Yet in Plato’s view, things are not as clear-cut as that in the Doxa
realm. Plato has saved for Glaucon a special place in the Republic by por-
traying him as someone who, although not having successfully escaped
the confusion of Doxa, is about to be offered a glimpse of the Knowl-
edge that relates to the Forms and a taste of a different type of language
that supports this exposition.

2.2.2 Part two: the cleansed style

This linguistic ‘glimpse’ takes place in the section I distinguished above

in part two (476e4 – 479a5) where the discursive mode changes. The
section where divisions and definitions are delineated by Socrates is
laden with numerous problems that scholars have considered in various
ways. I shall not turn here to an analysis of these problematic aspects.118
What interests me, however, in this section is the way in which its lin-
guistic style contrasts with parts one (475d1 – 476e3) and three (479a5 –
480a13). It should be borne in mind that throughout part two Socrates
engages in an exchange with Glaucon qua a sight-lover; as someone,
that is, who does not believe that there is one single Form due to
which all the many things bear their individual attributes or qualities.
In this stretch of the argument, the imagistic/pictorial type of language

117 Glaucon’s reference to poleis and kmai here picks up the first lines of Parme-
nindes’ proem, where the youth’s futile wanderings around several astẽ are
put to an end due to his encounter with the daughters of the Sun who
know the successful route to Truth and Knowledge. See the proem to Parme-
nides on Nature, lines 1 – 3.
118 On the distinction between Knowledge and Belief, see Bolton (1975: 66 – 95);
Baltzly (1997: 239 – 272); White (1984: 339 – 354); Cooper (1986: 229 – 242);
Ketchum (1987: 291 – 305); Fine (1978: 121 – 139) and in Everson (ed.) (1990:
85 – 114); cf. Vlastos, in Bambrough (ed.) (1979: 1 – 19), who also comments
on the language employed by Plato to drive the argument home: “In getting
results such as these, while working with the crudest of tools against formidable ob-
stacles of ingrained linguistic habits, Plato must be rated one of the great explorers
in the world of thought” (18, emphasis added). On Plato’s conception of Truth
in Book 5, see also Hestir (2000: 311 – 332).
168 Section Two: The Republic

is markedly reduced.119 The mixed linguistic style, which was promi-

nent in part one, is here traded for an alternative form of discourse,
which addresses key terms such as Epistẽmẽ, Doxa, gnsis, agnoia, to on,
to mẽ on, dynamis and anagkẽ, but makes a point in doing so by annihi-
lating linguistic colourfulness, vivid imagery, or any reference to easily
identified poetic diction.120 Several of these words were employed by
Glaucon in Book 2 in his challenge to Socrates, but Socrates now adapts
to his own philosophical ends this type of diction at work in contempo-
rary intellectual conversations in order to put across his epistemology to
the sight-lovers.
The aim of this exchange is to persuade the sight-lovers that what in
their view is knowledge is, in Socratic terms, Doxa. Little consensus has
been reached among scholars over the years on these intricate lines
which say a lot, but in a very elusive manner, about Plato’s epistemol-
ogy, his concepts of Being (t¹ em, t¹ eQkijqim_r em) and Not-Being (t¹
lµ em), as well as the sight-lovers’ understanding of the many ethical
qualities, properties, or the many things (t± pokk± jak\). This is a
type of understanding which according to the argument is limited,
and must thus be placed in the sphere of Doxa (t¹ !lvot]qym let]wom,
toO eWma_ te ja· lµ eWmai). Most of the problems that scholars treat in their
analysis of these lines stem from Plato’s unwillingness to say more by
way of definition of these key terms. Scholars have therefore raised
questions about Plato’s usage of the verb ‘to be’ in this context, and
about the importance of the Forms in the construction of this argument.
Because it is directed to the sight-lovers, he cannot rely on the use of the
Forms, or on the interpretation of the phrase “the many beautiful
things” (ta polla kala) as referring to particular things or to the qualities
and properties that the things bear.
In his treatment of these lines, Christopher Rowe has offered an il-
luminating synopsis of the Socratic argumentation here and of the dif-
ficult problems that arise from it. I will not relate his extensive descrip-
tion of the Socratic argument to the sight-lovers, but I will refer to some
of his points, since these are pertinent to my analysis of Socrates’ lan-

119 But not completely annihilated as elsewhere in the Republic. Germs of pictorial
effect that rest on the mundane and the sense-perceptual are kept: 1pist^lg
p]vujem 1p· t` emti (477b10).
120 On Plato’s use of dynamis in this context see the discussion by Gosling (1968:
119 – 130). On Plato’s use of eidos and ideai see Ross (1951: 13 – 16). He rightly
observes that “what was original was not the use of the words, but the status he
assigned to the things for which the words stood” (at 14).
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 169

guage in this part. Rowe (2007: 205 – 206) rightly stresses that even
though we learn a lot about Plato’s epistemology and ontology in gen-
eral here, this stretch of argument is primarily addressed to the sight-lov-
ers. This means that the Forms stand in the background of this episte-
mological classification for Socrates, Glaucon, and all those who believe
in their existence, but not for the sight-lovers, who believe only in the
existence of the many (properties), but not in the posing of one single
Form over them (like Beauty for example). Thus the relevant lines un-
dertake to demonstrate in an elenctic mode to the sight-lovers that there
is another cognitive capacity (dynamis) of assessing reality which is dis-
tinct from knowledge (Epistẽmẽ).
Yet, in my view, Socrates’ argumentation here would have posed
significant problems for the sight-lovers had it been they who were real-
ly conversing with Socrates and not Glaucon qua a sight-lover. Rowe
rightly argues that Glaucon’s key concession to the argument is his ac-
ceptance of the division between Knowledge and Belief. However, we
should not lose sight of the fact that Socrates introduces the term dyna-
mis (capacity) on which his distinction will hinge by emphasizing one’s
inability to perceive it through the senses and, in specific terms, through
vision. I take Socrates’ opening remark to Glaucon in part two to be
typical of the style that he will deploy in his presentation of Epistẽmẽ
and Doxa. Similarly to dynamis, the terms that Socrates will exploit
from this point onwards are also divested of colour and shape and
thus evade any act of visualization. Socrates’ language then about
Knowledge, Ignorance, and the in-between state of Opinion is a chal-
lenge to the sight-lovers who are now asked to think of three distinct
states of cognition and their objects without resorting to the senses
they trust so much in any possible way.
In my view, the rhetorical impact of this argument on the sight-lov-
ers is achieved by associating words in such a way as to form unbreak-
able thematic and linguistic units. Thus “the one, who opines, opines
something” (b don\fym don²fei 6m ti (478b10), but “not-Being is not
something but nothing” (t¹ lµ em oqw 6m ti !kk± lgd³m, 478b12 – c1).
As a result, Not-Being cannot share the same linguistic and thematic en-
vironment with the opinable (t¹ don\fom). But the same holds true for
the Knowledge of Being. On several points, Socrates interweaves epis-
tẽmẽ with to on and with gnsis, and thus creates an enclosed linguistic
and thematic environment from which both Doxa and agnoia are left
out (478a5: 1pist^lg l]m c] pou 1p· t` emti, t¹ cm cm_mai ¢r 5wei ;
170 Section Two: The Republic

and in 477b10 – 11: OqjoOm 1pist^lg l³m 1p· t` emti p´vuje, cm_mai ¢r
5sti t¹ em).121
Socrates’ line of argument about knowledge of Being is grounded
on the thesis that only “what is completely is completely knowable”
(t¹ pamtek_r cm pamtek_r cmystºm, 477a3). This type of knowledge
is not affected by the “several perspectives” we adopt to inspect Being
(j#m eQ pkeomaw0 sjopo?lem). Opinion, however, cannot be the same
as Knowledge, for the argument has shown that these are two distinct
capacities. In addition, the hen ti of Opinion (478b10) is different
from the ti of knowledge (476a9 – 10), for this ti of Knowledge refers
to Being (to on), which is knowable only completely and not in any per-
spectival way.
My description of Socrates’ argument here is intended to highlight
not only the great economy of the language in this context, but also the
way in which language is stretched to its limits in its description of the
characteristics of Being in particular (t¹ pamtek_r cm pamtek_r cmy-
stºm, 477a3), since more information will be provided by way of defi-
nition of Doxa in part three. This of course is not incidental, since in his
exposition of his epistemology to the sight-lovers, Socrates cannot rely
much on the on as he understands it or as Glaucon may have understood
it, for that would have led him to the Forms and this is a path that he
cannot take with the philotheamones. More will be said about the
Forms, and, in particular, about the Form of the Good, by way of an
eikn in Book 6, since, this is the type of linguistic style that the
sight-lovers can keep well abreast of. In this part, however, Socrates’
amassment of words and his arrangement and juxtaposition of them
may be compared to a linguistic puzzle whose pieces cannot produce
a coherent picture unless put in the right place. Thus true Knowledge
has been juxtaposed to Being (t¹ cm cm_mai) and has been strictly cor-
related both thematically and linguistically with it, whereas Opinion has
been identified as holding a place always “in between” (1mt¹r d’ !lvo?m
je?tai, 478d1; Letan» %qa #m eUg to}toim d|na, 478d3; t¹ toioOtom
letan» je?shai toO eQkijqim_r emtor te ja· toO p\mtyr lµ emtor,
478d6 – 7).

121 See 478a10 – 11: ja· 5stai cmyst|m te ja· donast¹m t¹ aqt|; C !d}matom ;
(“Does it opine the very thing that knowledge knows, so that the knowable
and the opinable are the same, or is this impossible”). See also 477a1: p_r
c±q #m lµ em c] ti cmyshe_g ; (“for how could something that is not be
known?”)
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 171

I suggested above that one may be tempted to call Socrates’ style in

this part abstract. This is not, however, a line of thought I would like to
pursue. To the extent that language in this part avoids involving sense-
perception, there is indeed some form of abstraction in Socrates’ refer-
ence to Being, or, even, to the many beautiful things of Doxa. As we
will see below, this linguistic style assumes marked significance when
seen in comparison to the third part of Socrates’ discussion about Opin-
ion and Knowledge (lines 479a – 480a). Yet, in line with the interpreta-
tion I follow in this study, there is something concrete in Socrates’ treat-
ment of these elusive terms. Socrates’ idiosyncratic deployment of gnsis,
Being, and Epistẽmẽ along these lines, and his arrangement of these terms
in distinct linguistic and thematic environments, has turned them into
concrete units with specific and unique signification which cannot be
confused with anything else. That is, there is something very concrete
called Being, which is the only “thing complete” and “completely
knowable”, and which exists and holds a specific place irrespective of
whether the sight-lovers can ‘see’ it or not. According to the line of ar-
gument which Glaucon has supported, it is only of this (Being) that one
can have true Knowledge. The philotheamones thus must only have
Doxa.
I now turn to my characterisation of this type of style as colourless
rather than abstract. In the epistemological exposition of this part, Soc-
rates sees that his diction is divested of any verbal coloured touches. In
477c – d, Socrates already drew our attention to our inability to see (or
visualize) dynamis. If we follow closely his language, we see that it is not
only dynamis that is not assigned any colours in his speech, but also
Being and non-Being. In fact, it is in his discussion of Opinion
(Doxa), still examined in the second part here, that Socrates re-introdu-
ces colours into the discussion in the form of the binary opposition of
light and darkness, an antithesis that from that point onwards will per-
meate the dialogue throughout (478c13 – 14). On this light-darkness
contrast will hinge some of Plato’s most famous eikones in the Republic,
namely those of the Sun and the Cave in Books 6 and 7.
Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that colours enter most
forcefully in Socrates’ speech in the third part of his discussion about
Doxa in Book 5. In presenting therefore the distinctive characteristics
of Doxa, the third part not only expands on the characteristics of the
cognitive level of the majority, but also assigns to this cognitive state
the type of language that describes it most faithfully. Even better, it re-
flects the language of coloured pictorial antithesis, of mixed colours and
172 Section Two: The Republic

instability (in this mixture). Most naturally it is in this stylistic mode in

relation to the level of cognition of Doxa that not only light and dark-
ness, but also poetry too that re-enters the dialogue in Book 5 in the
form of short words of poetic origins and animalistic language. From
a stylistic point of view, we are back at the level of the philotheamones.
The language now being used in Book 6 to fashion colourful images
will culminate in the description of the ultimate Form of the Good as
the Sun and of the cognitive level of Doxa (subdivided in pistis and ei-
kasia). It is, in fact, akin to looking at things in the most distorted man-
ner because of the mixture of light and darkness (as in the Line and the
Cave).
Nonetheless, before I turn to part three, a few more words are in
order here in relation to Socrates’ linguistic style in part two. These
few Stephanus lines, which present us with some information about Pla-
to’s epistemology, are addressed through Glaucon to the sight-lovers.
Plato makes Glaucon competent enough to support this line of argu-
ment and conduct a philosophical exchange in an uncoloured type of
language. This mode of exchange, however, is offered only as a glimpse
in the Republic and will not last long. Its aim is to persuade the sight-lov-
ers that they too possess a kind of knowledge, albeit not the one that the
true philosopher has. Yet, as shown above, the ideas presented in this
stretch of argumentation work as a challenge to the sight-lovers,
whose familiar way of thinking is interwoven with sense-perception
and, in particular, with their reliance on vision. By divesting his lan-
guage of colour then, Socrates intends this stylistic mode to enact lin-
guistically the ideas conveyed therein, namely the need to question
the senses’ credibility as the only means to access reality. The intricacy
of this argument about Knowledge and Opinion thus plays an integral
role in persuading the majority that they too have knowledge of a cer-
tain type. If they truly engage with this argument and try to follow it, as
Socrates has asked them to do, and if they are also persuaded that their
knowledge is Opinion, they have made a good start in identifying their
reduced state of cognition, and they have also caught a glimpse of an
alternative thought process rendered in another linguistic mode. They
have, in other words, shaken the fetters of Doxa even if they do not be-
lieve in the Forms as such.
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 173

2.2.3 Part three: the imagistic style

In part three Plato removes Glaucon qua a sight-lover from the scene
(479a) and Socrates now addresses the philotheamones directly.122 Glau-
con’s contribution to the concluding part of the discussion of the
three waves of argument is reduced to a few affirmative replies.123
This change, I argue, considerably affects the language of this section,
which now becomes fully pictorial. In this part, Plato’s watchword
for the Forms, the auto to, is used only twice to highlight the difference
between the philodoxoi and philosophoi: T_ d³ aw to»r aqt± 6jasta hey-
l]mour ja· !e· jat± taOt± ¢sa}tyr emta ; üq’ oq cicm~sjeim !kk’ oq
don\feim ; (479e7 – 8 and 480a3 – 4). The concluding lines of Book 5
are intended to drive home the point that there is something unstable
when trying to reach a firm assessment about things or people. The phil-
otheamones cannot deny the premise on which Socrates’ argument hing-
es, namely that some things are, and are not, beautiful depending on a
variety of criteria (479a5 – 8). And indeed, an endless list of examples
confirms that (479b1 – 10). Being thus entangled in a series of unstable
assessments of that sort, the sight-lovers are inevitably unable to establish
a firm ground for definitions:
to?r 1m ta?r 2sti\sesim, 5vg, 1palvoteq_fousim 5oijem, ja· t` t_m pa_dym
aQm_clati t` peq· toO eqmo}wou, t/r bok/r p]qi t/r mujteq_dor, è ja· 1vû
ox aqt¹m aqtµm aQm_ttomtai bake?m7 ja· c±q taOta 1palvoteq_feim, ja·
outû eWmai oute lµ eWmai oqd³m aqt_m dumat¹m pac_yr mo/sai, oute
!lv|teqa oute oqd]teqom. (479b11 – c5)
No they are like the ambiguities one is entertained with at dinner parties or
like the children’s riddle about the eunuch who threw something at a bat –
the one about what he threw at it and what it was in, for they are ambig-
uous, and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or fixedly not being
or as both or as neither.
In my view, Socrates’ stylistic mode changes strikingly in this part so that
it reflects the colourfulness on which the sight-lovers’ thought-patterns

122 Naratollogically this is made explicit in 479c6 – 7 where Socrates asks Glaucon
qua Glaucon: “Then do you know how to deal with them? Or can you find a
more appropriate place to put them than intermediate between Being and not
Being?”
123 Glaucon’s contribution to this section is considerably reduced. Note that his an-
swers are notably short (oqd]m, !kgh]stata, grq^jalem, ¢lokoc^jalem, !m\cjg,
!m\cjg ja· taOta, lelm^leha). The interlocutor now offers very little to the ex-
change indeed.
174 Section Two: The Republic

rest and the lifestyle which supports this imagistic thinking mode. Thus,
in the above passage, explicit reference is made to the games the sight-
lovers play at the symposia and, by extension, to the type of exchanges
held therein (aQm_clati, aQm_ttomtai). In this concluding part, beautiful
voices and colours also re-surface in Socrates’ speech, only this lifestyle
is now recognized as cognition along the pattern of what has been de-
fined above as Doxa that hovers between Being and not Being.124 In
order to convey the true characteristics of Doxa, Plato has Socrates
now expand on the significance of colours. The instability of Opinion
is now rendered in fully pictorial terms through the exploitation of
the motif of the mixture of light and darkness.125 For Plato’s Socrates
then, doxastic thought-patterns always “roll around” between these
two pictorial extremes, and the result of this “wandering” is the combi-
nation of both elements, of light and darkness. In this mixture it is very
difficult for the sight-lover to decide the proportion of each element or
to tell them apart, as it is equally difficult to identify true Beauty which
can never be mixed with ugliness, or which can never appear ugly even
when changing the viewing circumstances or the perspective that one
holds (phantazomena, phainesthai, 476a7):
5weir owm aqto?r, Gm dû 1c~, fti wq^s,, C fpoi h^seir jakk_y h]sim t/r
letan» oqs_ar te ja· toO lµ eWmai ; oute c\q pou sjotyd]steqa lµ emtor
pq¹r t¹ l÷kkom lµ eWmai vam^setai, oute vam|teqa emtor pq¹r t¹ l÷kkom
eWmai. )kgh]stata, 5vg. Grq^jalem %qa, ¢r 5oijem, fti t± t_m pokk_m
pokk± m|lila jakoO te p]qi ja· t_m %kkym letan} pou jukimde?tai toO
te lµ emtor ja· toO emtor eQkijqim_r. (479c6 – d5)
Then do you know how to deal with them? Or can you find a more ap-
propriate place to put them than intermediate between being and not
being? Surely, they can’t be more than what is or not be more than
what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer
than what is. Very true. We’ve now discovered, it seems that according
to the many conventions of the majority of people about beauty and the
others, they are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and
what purely is.

124 See 480a2 – 4: “Remember we said that the latter saw and loved beautiful sounds
and colors (vym\r te ja· wq|ar jak±r) and the like but wouldn’t allow the beau-
tiful itself to be anything (aqt¹ d³ t¹ jak¹m oqd’ !m]weshai ¦r ti em)?”
125 See Rep. 479d7 – 10: donast¹m aqt¹ !kk’ oq cmyst¹m de?m k]ceshai, t0 letan»
dum\lei t¹ letan» pkamgt¹m "kisj|lemom. The “opinable” is the “wandering in-
termediate grasped by the intermediate power”.
 2. Philosophical style in the third wave of argument in Book 5 175

Socrates does not add here any new points to the argumentation of part
two. In fact, he restates previous ideas in an alternative type of language
which now relies heavily on traditional poetic and Presocratic motifs.
This is the style that philotheamones are most at ease with, as it exploits
both the familiar pictorial motifs of light, darkness and night, and also
those of continuous travelling and wandering. This helps them to read-
ily grasp the unstable status of Doxa, only in this context the deployment
of these motifs become themes that build a reduced and compromised
level of cognition.126 The concluding lines of Book 5 are the most char-
acteristic example of Thayer’s ‘dramatic immediacy’.127 The sight-lov-
ers, their mode of thinking, and the opinions they reach, all share the
same characteristics and the same language. The Doxa, humans and
their opinions are entangled in a chain of continuous change: the
sight-lovers “run around” to all Dionysiac festivals to attain knowledge
in a manner similar to “the majority’s many opinions about the beautiful
things” which also “roll around between what is not and what truly is”.
Plato’s treatment here of the light-darkness antithesis – a well establish-
ed, traditional motif for intellectual vigilance and illumination – and his
adaptation of the word kulindeitai in this context, which has a long his-
tory of strictly negative connotations in various poetic environments,
drive home a thesis that the sight-lovers can now most easily grasp.128
For Socrates, it is intellectually torturous to think in a doxastic way,
for nothing truly true, fixed or certain can come out of it.
In his conclusion to the long stretch of argumentation in the third
wave, Socrates has coined for his audience colourful imagery and dic-
tion necessary for establishing channels of communication with the
sight-lovers. The style he employed to address them is thus distinguished
from the linguistic style of part two in that it weaves into the Republic’s

126 Darkness is a well-established motif for death and stupidity in ancient Greek po-
etry and in the Presocratics. See, for example, Emp. B84 where forethought “il-
luminates” the way. See further discussion in Chapter Three below. On the
motif of wandering (planẽ), see also Pender (2000: 153 – 4 with notes 250
and 251).
127 See above, Section One, pp. 86 – 90.
128 On the literary history of kulindoumai in Greek poetry, see the detailed discus-
sion in Pender (1999: 75 – 107); Pender (2000: 178 – 179) with further bibliog-
raphy; see also Silk (1974: 220). Plato draws on the negative connotations of
this term in poetry to speak about the various characteristics of the ever-chang-
ing world of Becoming. See, for example, the Phaedo 82d9-e5. Cp. Pindar
Ol. 12. 1 ff.
176 Section Two: The Republic

linguistic texture Presocratic and poetic motifs and diction (wandering,

light and darkness), which rest on the notion of colourfulness that cap-
tures the eye. Yet this type of colourless style will not last long. Socrates’
style and the techniques employed in Books 6 and 7 of the Republic are
again permeated by strong pictorial contrasts, comparisons, and images
with which these interlocutors are most at ease. The imagery brought
into play in the images of the Cave and the Sun draws upon the
same distinction into pairs of opposites that Socrates outlined in
475e9: 1peid¶ 1stim 1mamt_om jak¹m aQswq`, d¼o aqt½ eWmai. Darkness
is contrasted to light, images to their originals, humans to inanimate
statuettes, and secluded places to open space.
By exploiting this familiar, imagistic type of discourse, Socrates ven-
tures to draw attention to true Reality, which, as he explains in his ex-
position of the philosopher-kings’ subjects in Book 7, can only be grasp-
ed by liberating our intellectual powers from the “leaden weights that
draw the soul downwards”. This is a long and hard process. Nonethe-
less, Socrates’ epistemological exposition in Book 5 has offered us a
glimpse of this Reality by drawing a sharp distinction between auto
to, which is always in itself and eschews opposition and variety, and
our own epistemologically compromised way of interpreting the
world when relying on various sensual perceptions, qualifications or
caveats. In the concluding part of Book 5, Socrates suggests that cogni-
tive instability is directly associated with our inability to handle conflict-
ing appearance (cf. polla phantazomena) or untangle mixtures and com-
binations.129 To drive this argument home, he adopted the language
of the philotheamones who love striking impressions of diverse colourful
images. In the next chapter we will expand on the reasons that make
Socrates leave behind the colourless style of lines 476e4 – 479a5 to
speak mostly in eikones and in the imagistic type of discourse that the
concluding part of Book 5 introduced in the discussion of ontology
and epistemology.

129 In my use of appearance as a translation of phantazomena in Rep. 476a, I adopt

Kahn’s interpretation according to which the term denotes “all forms of per-
spectivism and relativism”; see discussion in Kahn (1996: 346 – 347). This per-
spectival judgment applies to the many beautiful or just things and values and is
different from their corresponding Forms which eschew a perspectival vision.
In Kahn’s wording, “the corresponding Form is wholly and purely F” (at
347). Note that the Sun as an image of the Good by definition eschews per-
spectival vision. See my discussion in Chapter Three below.
 3. Verbal Images in the Republic Books 2 and 6
3.1 The poets’ eikones in the Republic
In this chapter, I turn to Platonic imagery in Books 2 and 6. My aim in
this chapter is twofold: I examine the reasons why the various eikones
function as an appropriate investigatory method that best suits the phil-
osophical needs of the dialogue that Socrates holds on justice and on the
Forms with these particular interlocutors at Piraeus, and I also seek to
show the way in which Socrates’ eikones in these Books relate to his al-
ternation of linguistic styles in the context of the distinction between
Knowledge and Doxa that I examined in the previous chapter.
As mentioned in Section One above, Socrates introduces the notion
of a verbal eikn for investigating elusive ideas in Book 2 (368c – d)
shortly after Glaucon and Adeimantus have concluded their challenge
to him in 368a.130 However, the term under examination emerges
only after Socrates has announced his analogy of city and soul as an ap-
propriate method of investigating justice and injustice.131 The relevant
lines, which I cited and discussed above,132 exploit both human sight
as the medium par excellence to grasp reality and the idea of epistemolog-
ical distance from the subject-matter under investigation, namely the in-
terlocutors’ own dissociation from the ethical quality of justice.133 In this
passage, Socrates distinguishes two domains where justice and injustice
may be ‘seen’ to dwell—the human soul and the human city. He
then proposes to investigate one (the soul) by means of the other (the
city) and compare his findings (368e7 – 369a10). He immediately
turns to the construction of a theoretical city and tries to identify justice
in it. So far Socrates has refrained from employing the word eikn

130 See my discussion in Section One, pp. 85 – 90.

131 On the analogy of city and soul in the dialogue and Plato’s avoidance to offer
proof for this isomorphism, see Rosen (2005: 70). See also above Chapter One,
n. 44.
132 See Section One above, pp. 85 – 87.
133 On this idea of ‘distance’ from one’s inner ethical qualities that dwell in the
soul, see also Dorter (2006: 61 – 63).
178 Section Two: The Republic

which, we should note, will become most prominent a little later in the
discussion and reappear throughout the rest of the Republic. 134
Socrates’ construction of the first city in Book 2 is soon brought to a
halt by Glaucon, who cannot grasp the reasons why life in this com-
munity should be made as simple and basic as that. In 372b1 – c, Socrates
says:
Ja· oQjodolgs\lemoi oQj_ar, h]qour l³m t± pokk\ culmo_ te ja· !mup|dgtoi
1qc\somtai, toO d³ weil_mor Alviesl]moi te ja· rpodedel]moi Rjam_r7
Hq]xomtai d³ 1j l³m t_m jqih_m %kvita sjeuaf|lemoi, 1j d³ t_m puq_m
%keuqa, t± l³m p]xamter, t± d³ l\namter, l\far cemma_ar ja· %qtour 1p·
j\kal|m tima paqabakk|lemoi C vukk± jahaq\, jatajkim]mter 1p· stib\dym
1stqyl]mym l_kaj_ te ja· luqq_mair, eqyw^somtai aqto_ te ja· t± paid_a,
1pip_momter toO oUmou, 1stevamyl]moi ja· rlmoOmter to»r heo}r, Bd]yr
sum|mter !kk^koir, oqw rp³q tµm oqs_am poio}lemoi to»r pa?dar, eqkabo}-
lemoi pem_am C p|kelom.
They’ll build houses, work naked and barefoot in the summer, and wear
adequate clothing and shoes in the winter. For food, they’ll knead and
cook the flour and meal they’ve made from wheat and barley. They’ll
put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds or clean leaves, and, reclining
on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, they’ll feast with their children,
drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. They’ll
enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources
allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war.
Socrates’ prescriptions about people’s lives, in what will turn out to be
the first theoretical city in the dialogue, focus on the practicalities of ev-
eryday conduct, on people’s clothing and shoe-making, their consump-
tion of food, and their praising of the gods in a relaxed, tranquil and
blissful environment. There are few things in this simple description
of lifestyle that will be reiterated as such in Socrates’ second and more
complex city which will be an expansion of the first (ecjou 1lpkgst]a
ja· pk^hour, 373b3).135 Because of his cultural background and educa-
tional upbringing, Glaucon has already started to become uneasy with
this simple lifestyle which is as close to nature as can be: Ja· b Cka}jym
rpokab~m, -meu exou, 5vg, ¢r 5oijar, poie?r to»r %mdqar 2stiyl]mour
(“Here Glaucon interrupted me: You seem to expect your citizens to
feast on dry bread”, 372c2 – 3). Glaucon’s intervention at this point

134 See, however, Rep. 402b5 – 7, where the same methodological idea is reiterated
and amplified to include this time the word eikn.
135 However, Socrates’ ‘cleansing’ of the luxurious city will re-establish in Book 5
certain aspects of this type of life in his class of guardians. See also Bloom (1968:
348); and Annas (1981: 77).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 179

will initially lead to Socrates’ enhancement of the people’s variety of

food. Thus Socrates adds to their diet salt, olives and cheese, various
vegetables, fruits and wine (372c4 – d1), and emphasizes once more
the healthiness of simple life in this environment: “And so they’ll live
in peace and good health (ja· ovty di\comter t¹m b_om 1m eQq^m,, let±
rcie_ar), and when they die at a ripe old age, they’ll bequeath a similar
life to their children (%kkom toioOtom b_om to?r 1jc|moir paqad~sousim,
372d1 – 3)”.
Yet, Glaucon is not happy again with Socrates’ depiction of this
idyllic and healthy civic environment. A man of his era, Glaucon is a
true adherent of a more luxurious lifestyle, and intervenes once more,
this time to call this community “a city of pigs” (372d4). As a result,
Socrates’ line of reasoning is interrupted by this interlocutor who
deems it necessary that their (political) field of investigating justice
and injustice should culturally resemble their own polis. 136 His interven-
tion will give rise to the so-called tryphsa polis and, in my view, signals a
marked change in the course of their investigation into justice
(372e2 – 3). This authorial strategy that resurfaces at crucial dialogical
points is in full accord with Plato’s understanding of philosophy as
live speech, which is regulated by the various speaking parties. Socrates
accommodates the changes that Glaucon is now introducing to the dis-
cussion, but his comments are instructive for grasping the philosophical
repercussions of this change in the direction of the dialogue. They are
also significant for appreciating how Glaucon’s intervention causes Soc-
rates’ change of methodological approach, namely his deployment of
images (eikones), as the dialogue on civic justice will now have to
focus on a “luxurious” rather than a “simple” city; a “fevered” city
which is full of professionals who represent an external (naturalistic) re-
ality and who seek to depict the ethical qualities of human character in
pictorial and visual terms:
B l³m owm !kghimµ p|kir doje? loi eWmai Dm diekgk¼halem, ¦speq rci^r tir7 eQ
d’ aw bo}keshe, ja· vkecla_mousam p|kim heyq^sylem7 oqd³m !pojyk}ei.
TaOta c±q d^ tisim, ¢r doje? , oqj 1naqj]sei, oqd³ avtg B d_aita, !kk± jk?-
ma_ te pqos]somtai ja· tq\pefai ja· tükka sje}g, ja· exa dµ ja· l}qa ja·
huli\lata ja· 2ta?qai ja· p]llata, ja· 6jasta to}tym pamtodap\. Ja· dµ
ja· $ t¹ pq_tom 1k]colem oqj]ti t!macja?a het]om, oQj_ar te ja· Rl\tia ja·

136 That the introduction of mimẽsis in the second city causes a cultural ‘fever’
which brings easily to mind Athens has also been noted by Halliwell (2000b:
99 – 100). See also Glaucon’s comments in 372d6-e1.
180 Section Two: The Republic

rpod^lata, !kk± t^m te fycqav_am jimgt]om ja· tµm poijik_am, ja· wqus¹m
ja· 1k]vamta ja· p\mta t± toiaOta jtgt]om. G c\q ; Ma_, 5vg. (372e6 – a8)
Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we’ve described, the healthy
one, as it were. But let’s study a city with a fever, if that’s what you
want. There’s nothing to stop us. The things I mentioned earlier and the
way of life I described won’t satisfy some people, it seems, but couches, ta-
bles, and the other furniture will have to be added, and of course, all sorts
of delicacies, perfumed oils, incense, prostitutes, and pastries. We mustn’t
provide them only with the necessities we mentioned at first, such as hous-
es, clothes, and shoes, but painting and embroidery must be begun, and gold,
ivory, and the like acquired. Isn’t that so?
OqjoOm le_fom\ te aw tµm p|kim de? poie?m7 1je_mg c±q B rcieimµ oqj]ti Rjam^,
!kk’ Edg ecjou 1lpkgst]a ja· pk^hour, $ oqj]ti toO !macja_ou 6mej\ 1stim
1m ta?r p|kesim, oXom oV te hgqeuta· p\mter oV te lilgta_, pokko· l³m oR peq·
t± sw^lat\ te ja· wq~lata, pokko· d³ oR peq· lousij^m, poigta_ te ja·
to}tym rpgq]tai, Nax\do_, rpojqita_, woqeuta_, 1qcok\boi, sjeu_m te
pamtodap_m dgliouqco_, t_m te %kkym ja· t_m peq· t¹m cumaiue?om
j|slom… (373b2 – c1)
Then we must enlarge our city, for the healthy one is no longer adequate.
We must increase it in size and fill it with a multitude of things that go be-
yond what is necessary for a city – hunters, for example, and artists or imi-
tators, many of whom work with shapes and colours, many with music. And
there’ll be poets and their assistants, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and makers
of all kinds of devices, including, among other things, those needed for the adornment
of women… And we’ll also need many more cattle, won’t we, if the people
are going to eat meat?
In intercepting Socrates’ description of the first, healthy city, Glaucon
had probably wished to introduce to the discussion only variety in
food for the city’s inhabitants.137 Nonetheless, in Socratic terms, it ap-
pears that variety and diversity cannot receive a piecemeal treatment
and, as a result, they start to penetrate every aspect of people’s civic life-
style.138 Thus Glaucon’s variety of food causes sympotic luxuriousness
and is coupled with the emergence of various dẽmiourgoi whose products
are representations of “diversity”, “colorfulness”, and “multifarious-
ness”.139 Before investigating justice in Glaucon’s luxurious city, Socra-

137 On food in the first city, see also Rosen (2005: 75 – 76).
138 The argument here parallels Socrates’ comments in Book 5. 474c8 – 475c8. If
you “love” (philounta) something, you have to “love it on the whole” (alla
pan stergonta).
139 See Rep. 372d – e1: ja· !p¹ tqapef_m deipme?m, ja· exa ûpeq jai oR mOm 5wousi
ja· tqac^lata (“… dine at a table, and have the delicacies and desserts that
people have nowadays”). This type of food implies a sympotic context. On
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 181

tes observes that the city they have left behind in their speech is a truly
“real city” and a “healthy”, as it were, one (B !kghimµ p|kir, ¦speq
.
rci^r tir).140 Socrates revisits the character of the first city in the context
of his definition of the status of the just soul in Book 4.141 Thus it turns
out that justice had already surfaced in the first city, almost in full view
for his interlocutors to ‘see’. Only an eidlon of it to be sure, according to
Socrates, since it externalized in the polis the internal state of the just
soul, both city and soul being stamped by the seal of justice (t}por
dijaios}mgr), but all the same a satisfactory and accurate eidlon of it
to Socrates (443b7 – c7).142
In my view, Glaucon’s interception of Socrates’ building of a city in
speech and his introduction of poikilia in the lives of the inhabitants has
important methodological and stylistic effects on the development of
the discussion. Some of them are well known and frequently discussed

the tragẽmata in the symposia and the poetry performed in these contexts, see
Noussia (2001: 353 – 359). See also Murray (1990).
140 See 369c1 – 370d, esp. 370c3 – 5: 9j dµ to}tym pke_y te 6jasta c_cmetai ja·
j\kkiom ja· qøom, ftam eXr 4m jat± v}sim ja· 1m jaiq`, swokµm t_m %kkym
%cym, pq\tt, (“So the conclusion is that more things will be produced and
the work be more easily and better done, when every man is set free from
all other occupations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he is naturally
fitted.”) See also 374b – d. On Plato’s first city, see also Schofield (2006: 203 –
205); and Rosen (2005: 69 – 76 and 79 – 82). Both Rosen and Annas (1981:
76 – 79) in their respective analyses call attention to the fact that the establish-
ment of Plato’s first city in the Republic results from the need to satisfy people’s
needs and, from that point of view, this community both corresponds to, and
portrays, the appetitive (epithymẽtikon) psychic part. Both also comment on the
absence of the logistikon from this polis. They, nonetheless, refrain from observ-
ing that, if there is in the Republic a place where the appetitive part is presented
as fully and successfully tamed, this is in Plato’s first city, before, that is, the
process of ‘purification’ of the “luxurious and fevered” polis is instigated. But
cf. Reeve (1988: 171 – 172).
141 On justice in the soul, see Rep. 443b7-e6.
142 […] eQr !qw^m te ja· t}pom tim± t/r dijaios}mgr jimdume}olem 1lbebgj]mai. T¹ d]
ce Gm %qa, § Cka}jym –di’ d ja· ¡veke? – eUdyk|m ti t/r dijaios}mgr, t¹ t¹m l³m
sjutotolij¹m v}sei aqh_r 5weim sjutotole?m ja· %kko lgd³m pq\tteim, t¹m d³
tejtomij¹m tejta_meshai, ja· tükka dµ ovtyr (“we had hit upon the origin
and pattern of justice right at the beginning in founding our city. Indeed, Glau-
con, the principle that it is right for someone to practice cobbler and nothing
else, for the carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for the others is a
sort of image of justice – that’s why it’s beneficial’. On the Forms’ seal
(typos) on the human soul in the Republic, see Petraki (2008: 147 – 170,
esp. 158 – 161 with n. 41).
182 Section Two: The Republic

in the literature. The emergence of dẽmiourgoi and artists of all sorts in

Socrates’ tryphsa polis will lead to the long censorship of myths and po-
etry, since Plato’s main speaker will now have to start “purifying” his
city from the poikilia and luxuriousness which he had denied to it in
the first place (kek^hal]m ce diajaha_qomter p\kim Dm %qti tquv÷m 5va-
lem p|kim, 399e5 – 6).143 Yet, little attention has been paid to the way
Glaucon’s interference with the argument at this stage of the dialogue
signals a turn in terms of methodology on the part of Socrates. After va-
riety (poikilia) surrounds the inhabitants of the new polis by way of po-
etry, painting, and the other various visual arts, and becomes an integral
part of their nurturing environment, Socrates introduces to the discus-
sion of the term eikn and its various cognates.
As stated above, the word eikn initially appears in relation to the
city’s guardians in 375d5. It then re-emerges most prominently in Soc-
rates’ condemnation of the poets and myth-makers’ depiction of gods
and heroes in 377e1 – 3: ftam eQj\f, tir jaj_r [oqs_am] t` k|c\,
peq· he_m te ja· Bq~ym oXo_ eQsim, ¦speq cqave»r lgd³m 1oij|ta
cq\vym oXr #m floia boukgh0 cq\xai ([“The worst of all faults], espe-
cially if the story is ugly and immoral as well as false – misrepresenting
the nature of gods and heroes, like an artist whose picture is utterly un-
like the object he sets out to draw”). I will return shortly to Socrates’ use
of the term in relation to the city-guardians. For the moment, I would
like to dwell on the semantics of comparison and resemblance that this
term introduces to the dialogue.

143 It is Glaucon’s introduction of imitators of all sorts to the polis that will instigate
Socrates’ ensuing discussion about the perilous effects of mimẽsis on the forma-
tion of the guardians’ character. See discussion in Murray (1996: 3 – 6). See also
Annas (1981: 73 – 79), who contrary to the view I take here, argues that “the
first city adds nothing, except a context in which the Principle of Specialization
is introduced in a plausible way” (at 78 – 9). On this principle, see also Reeve
(1988: 172 – 176). From my point of view, it is indeed important that this Pla-
tonic principle emerges in the first city, but, only if seen retrospectively, that is,
after the establishment of the “fevered” city in the dialogue and the identifica-
tion of justice in it and in the human soul. Thus the principle of Specialization
in the first city re-affirms the harmonious and balanced psychic and civic state of
affairs. In other words, Plato’s most important principle was there from the start,
only the Socratic interlocutors were not trained to see it. From this point of
view, Rosen (2005: 80 – 81) is right to stress that philosophy is excluded
from Socrates’ first, natural city, since it has no role to play in this context. It
is the interlocutors’ inability to identify justice in it that generates the “luxuri-
ous” city and, with it, philosophy.
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 183

According to Socrates, Glaucon’s introduction of variety and diver-

sity (poikilia) in the polis is followed by various imitators (painters, poets
and sculptors) whose imitations, representations, or copies of reality are
not correct (this is made explicit in 377d8 – 9).144 In the next lines, Soc-
rates turns to the poets and myth-makers’ productions, the imitators par
excellence, and uses terms such as “diversity in colours” (cicamtolaw_ar te
luhokocgt]om aqto?r ja· poijikt]om) and “multifariousness” (%kkar
5whqar pokk±r ja· pamtodap±r he_m te ja· Bq~ym) to describe their
techniques and the characteristic features of their compositions and art
products (378b8 – 379a4). Note that in these lines, Socrates juxtaposes
the terms mythologẽteon and poikilteon (narrating in myth and weaving
coloured embroideries or producing multicoloured paintings) thus cou-
pling together the poets’ treatment of various themes (gods, heroes, and
humans) with the visual artists’ pictorial representation of similar sub-
jects.
According to Socrates, imitators of both artistic strands depict in
their visual mediums diverse representations of the most important con-
cepts in a wrong and unfaithful manner. Socrates’ use of poikilteon (di-
verse in colour) in this context is a most appropriate term to draw atten-
tion to the captivating effect that the combination of colours has on the
receiving audience. In these lines, Socrates also employs the term eikaz
(to compare or liken), etymologically cognate to the word eikn (image),
to argue that poets and visual artists aim to reproduce and represent vis-
ual impressions of subjects (gods and heroes) which lie in a sphere be-
yond our sense-perception. Thus, as Halliwell (2000b) has rightly point-
ed out, Socrates is not striking here an attack against poets’ naturalistic
artistic representations, but is primarily interested in emphasizing the
elusive character of the prototype (gods and heroes) of these represen-
tations. One who is ignorant of the distinctive qualities of these proto-
types cannot but fail to produce a truthful representation of them on
stage, in paintings, and in visual arts in general (see also 402b5 – c8).145

144 Halliwell (2000b: 99) rightly points out that the term ‘imitation’ as a translation
of mimẽsis hardly does justice to the wide scope of this concept. See also detailed
discussion in Halliwell 2002.
145 See Halliwell (2000b: 106 – 107). Halliwell rightly observes that as regards
painting Plato does not so much attack the artists’ graphic naturalistic reproduc-
tions of reality, but their inability to mimetically represent in their art objects
which need not exist independently in reality, namely ideal Beauty, or “mod-
els” and “exemplars” (the so-called paradeigmata in the Republic and the Cratylus’
discourse). Nonetheless, in this work I argue that in the Republic the represen-
184 Section Two: The Republic

Matters become even more complex and dangerous, according to

Socrates, if one considers the alluring effect of these colourful visual im-
pressions on the uneducated or the erroneously educated people. In Pla-
to’s view, the ethical qualities reproduced either by way of body move-
ment (schẽmata) and facial expressions, or depicted in the painter’s pic-
torial mimẽsis, are mixed and combined in such a way that one cannot
easily tell apart what is (ethically) good from what is bad in the repre-
sentations.146 This is stated most explicitly in Plato’s botanical image
in Book 3 (401b – 402a4), which I discussed in Section One of this
work.147 This image, which concludes Socrates’ severe censorship of ed-
ucation and psychaggia by means of mousikẽ, also offers a most forceful
treatment of the term eikn. According to Socrates, one’s ethical up-
bringing is greatly endangered by the poets’ imagistic spoon-feeding
(to?r poigta?r 1pistatgt]om jai pqosamacjast]om tµm toO !cahoO
eQj|ma poie?m… Vma lµ 1m jaj_ar eQj|si tqev|lemoi… ¦speq 1m jaj0
bot\m,… !p¹ pokk_m dqep|lemo_ te ja· mel|lemoi, 401b1 – d3). As
mentioned in Section One, Plato’s Socrates depicts in this image the
poets’ influence on the human soul in materialist terms and emphasizes
one’s automatic, almost subconscious, reception of “images” of badness.
The discussion on mousikẽ, mimẽsis, and mimetic human nature in
Book 3 weaves together into a unified whole a variety of ideas that
will not be untangled until later in the dialogue. Thus, in the same con-
text of the guardians’ upbringing, Socrates also makes reference to their
diet (404d11 – e5). The relevant passage brings together in a single lin-
guistic and thematic environment humans’ spoon-feeding of poetic im-
agery with eating unhealthy food. At the same time, Plato’s imagery in-
extricably associates coloured diversity (poikilia) and viciousness (akola-
sia) with unhealthy diet (Suqajos_am d] , § v_ke, tq\pefam ja· Sijekijµm
poijik_am exou, ¢r 5oijar, oqj aQme?r [“If you think that, then it seems
that you don’t approve of Syracusan cuisine or of Sicilian-style dishes”,
404d1 – 3]). As a result, Socrates strongly argues for a total ban on inap-
propriate food and on poetic images (eikones) of this type from the

tation of nature (or, in general, the sense-perceptive physical reality) in graphic

arts offers Plato a vehicle for reflecting on how humans should both model and
interpret reality, both sense-perceptive and invisible. On Plato’s use of painting
in the dialogues, see also Janaway (1995: Ch. 5); and Morgan (1990: 121 – 145).
See also my discussion in Chapter Four below.
146 On schẽmata as regards Plato’s concept of imitation, see Rabel (1996: 365 – 375).
147 See Section One pp. 85 – 90.
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 185

guardians’ nurturing environment.148 For Plato then, colourful diversity

(poikilia) in all its manifestations (in music, in poetry, in visual arts, and in
food) has disastrous effects on one’s intellectual and physical health:
fkgm c±q oWlai tµm toia}tgm s_tgsim ja· d_aitam t0 lekopoi_ô te ja· ád0
t0 1m t` pamaqlom_\ ja· 1m p÷si Nuhlo?r pepoigl]m, !peij\fomter aqh_r
#m !peij\foilem… OqjoOm 1je? l³m !jokas_am B poijik_a 1m]tijtem, 1mtaOha
d³ m|som, B d³ "pk|tgr jat± l³m lousijµm 1m xuwa?r syvqos}mgm, jat± d³
culmastijµm 1m s~lasim rc_eiam ; (404d11 – e5)
I believe that we’d be right to compare this diet and this entire life-style to
the kinds of lyric odes and songs that are composed in all sorts of modes and
rhythms… Just as embellishment in the one gives rise to licentiousness,
doesn’t it give rise to illness in the other? But simplicity in music and po-
etry makes for moderation in the soul, and in physical training it makes for
bodily health?
Glaucon’s intervention introduced diversity to the first polis and Socrates
must now draw a sharp distinction between the simplicity of the good
(agathon) and its representation in music, dance, and human actions,
which he links with physical health and vigorousness on the one
hand, and ethical badness on the other, which relates to multiplicity
and diversity and is associated with physical and psychological disease
(nosos).149 The associations drawn in these lines, I argue, establish one
of Plato’s most fundamental theses in the Republic as regards the perilous
effects of poetry and poetic imagery on the human soul, namely Plato’s
negative view of colourful variety, since it is through it that poetry and
the visual arts seek to entice human sight in order to reach and deceive
the soul. In line with the view I have taken in Chapter One above, Pla-
to’s condemnation of poikilia lies behind his prescriptions about the or-
ganization of the guardians’ lifestyle in the just polis of Book 5; that is,
their restrained sexual relations (mixis) in order to preserve the clan’s ho-
mogeneity. Poikilia can be held in check if the ‘mixture’ of various el-
ements, male and female guardians, good and bad ethical qualities, or
the various colours that define our visual perception of the natural en-

148 Socrates links again poikilia with viciousness (akolasia) in 404e3 – 5. On the im-
pact that the paradeigmata (models or paradigms) of bad characters have on the
souls of youths, see also Rep. 409a – b. On Plato’s use of the term paradeigma in
the Republic, see Halliwell (2000b: 106 – 108). See also Jowett II (1894: 338 –
339) and above Chapter One, n. 53.
149 On Plato’s use of well-established scientific terminology to speak about the
soul’s health, see Pender (2000: 183 – 185 with n. 296). See also Kenny
(1969: 229 – 253).
186 Section Two: The Republic

vironment, is understood for the confusion it can generate. This is ob-

viously no easy task and, as I suggest in this study, this is a task in which,
in Plato’s view, the poets’ treatment of ethical concepts have failed. In
the Republic, Plato’s Socrates undertakes to educate his interlocutors on
the disastrous effects of verbal diversity (poikilia). In Book 5 he con-
structed one of the least adorned verbal images to depict the homoge-
neity of the ideal polis. As we will see in this chapter, the image of the
Good as the Sun is another indicative example of how pictorial language
this time can be treated so as to portray the simple character (haplotẽs) of
the good in contrast to the mixed diversity of baseness.
For Socrates, the two cities, Glaucon’s luxurious and fevered city
and his own, stand in stark contrast to each other.150 Contrary to Glau-
con’s city, the first polis had enveloped its inhabitants in a simple, har-
monious, and tranquil environment. The health of the first city was
portrayed in a most naturalistic manner by way of simplicity in food.
This simplicity, though, was all pervasive, regulating every aspect of
their lifestyle: their interaction with nature, their clothing, their work,
their breeding, and their singing of hymns to the gods (372b – c).
In this community, people’s relation to their physical environment is
direct and the inhabitants are fully integrated in it. Their singing is also
unmediated: in the absence of trained professionals, people sing them-
selves their hymns to gods. By eliminating all forms of multiplicity and
variety, Socrates has also left out mimesis from this city.151 It is not sur-
prising then that in this context which seeks to identify civic justice, the
term eikn is also absent. This would immediately presuppose a division
between two domains or concepts and raise questions about their rela-
tion or resemblance. However, in the first city this distance or separa-
tion between external reality and its representation is redundant.
There is no gap between the world and its inhabitants that must be
bridged by drawing comparisons between the original and their repre-
sentations in eikones. In addition, in Socrates’ first city justice is present
in people doing the job for which they are best and naturally fitted. As
previously mentioned, according to Socrates this is only an eidlon of

150 Pappas (1995: 61 – 62) argues that Socrates thus constructs his first city in order
to offer an alternative and different account of the “birth of human society” to
the one that Glaucon provided in Book 2. 358e-359c. According to this inter-
pretation, Socrates’ description of this idyllic community is intended to contrast
people’s “skeptical use of history” to speak about the origins of society.
151 See also Bloom (1968: 344 – 348).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 187

justice, but a correct one which could have provided a satisfactory an-
swer to their investigation if only the interlocutors had eyes to ‘see’ it.
They did not.152
Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that the inhabitants’ lifestyle
in the first Socratic city (372a5 – d3) also contrasts strikingly with the de-
scription of life in the botanical imagery in 401b1 – 402a4. The botanical
image, as we saw in Section One above, is a vivid imagery in itself (an
eikn) which also makes reference to the guardians’ food consumption.
Socrates raises there the strong possibility that, unless verbal images are
held in check by the city’s founders, the guardians will inevitably run
the same danger as Plato’s contemporaries: they will be fed on poetic
images (eikones), whose representation of the world (sense-perceptual
and ethical – Plato’s language refrains from strictly separating the two
in Book 3), is wrong and contaminated by representations of badness,
for, as Socrates will explain in Book 10, it is not knowledgeable.
From Socrates’ point of view, the various imitators that Glaucon intro-
duced to the Socratic city offer in their productions multifarious repre-
sentations (eikones) that detach people from their physical environment
and alienate them both from their own souls and from the ethical qual-
ities that dwell in the soul, as these, being erroneously externalized in
poetry and painting, are automatically re-internalized, but now towards
(further) corruption:
Ja· 5ti ce to}tym, § )de_lamte, va_meta_ loi eQr slijq|teqa jatajejeqlat_-
shai B toO !mhq~pou v}sir, ¦ste !d}mator eWmai pokk± jak_r lile?shai C
aqt± 1je?ma pq\tteim ¨m dµ ja· t± lil^lat\ 1stim !voloi~lata.
(395b3 – 6)
And human nature, Adeimantus, seems to be minted in even smaller coins
than these, so that it can neither imitate many things well nor do the actions
themselves, of which those imitations are likenesses.
A vicious circle is thus generated, whereby confused people are fed on
ethical images by the ignorant. This circle, says Socrates in Book 3, must
be broken by restraining the diversity and multifariousness of the poets’
representations (pas_m "qlomi_m… p\mtym d³ Nuhl_m… di± t¹ pamto-

152 Socrates’ description of the first polis shares characteristic features with Hesiod’s
account of the life of the Golden Race in WD 109 – 19. On Plato’s reception of
Hesiod, see the compilation of articles in Boys-Stones, G. R. and Haubold,
J. H. (2010). On Plato’s adaptation of the Golden Race in the Politicus, see
El Murr, in the same volume (2010: 276 – 297).
188 Section Two: The Republic

dap±r loqv±r t_m letabok_m, 397b6 – c6).153 In Book 10, Plato will re-
visit his initial comments about poetry: in the end only (the “purified”)
hymns to the gods are allowed in the city. But this purification is no easy
task for poets, for, as Socrates claims there, they do not possess the true
knowledge of the good and simple character (ẽthos) and thus cannot pass
it to their audience. Thus purification becomes part of Plato’s agenda.

3.2 Plato’s eikones in the Republic

3.2.1 Images of human nature

In Section One I suggested that Plato’s eikones in the Republic draw at-
tention to methodological issues about the correct use of language to in-
vestigate and communicate reality. In this view, the emergence of the
term eikn in Book 2, after Glaucon’s intervention in the construction
of the first city, is not incidental. Plato makes Glaucon intercept Socra-
tes’ line of investigation into the nature of justice and, in response, Soc-
rates modifies his approach and starts building his own philosophical im-
agery to educate his interlocutors in matters of ethics and philosophical
thought. His deployment of the pedigree dog as an image for the city-
guardian is the first in a long series of Platonic eikones in our text. Yet
the image of the pedigree dog, in particular, becomes thickly woven in
the Republic’s text in manifold ways, since not only does it turn into a
watchword for the city’s guardian class throughout the dialogue on jus-
tice, but it also becomes enhanced with further animal vocabulary,
building thick clusters of imagery throughout the text. At the same
time, the significance of food in people’s life-style, which was intro-
duced in the first polis, is retained in Plato’s imagery of animal-like hu-

153 See 396d3-e2: ftam d³ c_cmgtai jat\ tima 2autoO !m\niom, oqj 1hek^seim
spoud0 !peij\feim 2aut¹m t` we_qomi, eQ lµ %qa jat± bqaw}, ftam ti wqgst¹m
poi0, !kk’ aQswume?shai, ûla l³m !c}lmastor £m toO lile:shai to»r toio}tour,
ûla d³ ja· dusweqa_mym art¹m 1jl\tteim te ja· 1mist\mai eQr to»r t_m jaji|mym
t}pour, !til\fym t0 diamo_a, fti lµ paidi÷r w\qim. (“When he comes upon a
character unworthy of himself, however, he’ll be unwilling to make himself se-
riously resemble that inferior character – except perhaps for a brief period in
which he’s doing something good. Rather he’ll be ashamed to do something
like that, both because he’s unpracticed in the imitation of such people and be-
cause he can’t stand to shape and mould himself according to a worse pattern.
He despises this in his mind, unless it’s just done in play”).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 189

mans, with food consumption now working as a vehicle through which

Socrates investigates the essential characteristics of human nature in
Books 8 and 9.
In my view, in these contexts of the Republic, food consumption also
works as a symbol for the treatment of philosophical language and public
speech. This idea is expressed in Book 7 where Socrates discusses the
education of the guardians’ children in philosophical argumentation:
/q’ owm oq l_a l³m eqk\beia avtg suwm^, t¹ lµ m]our emtar aqt_m ce}eshai ;
OWlai c\q se oq kekgh]mai fti oR leiqaj_sjoi, ftam t¹ pq_tom k|cym ce}-
ymtai, ¢r paidiø aqto?r jatawq_mtai, !e· !mtikoc_am wq~lemoi, ja· lilo}-
lemoi to»r 1nek]cwomtar aqto· %kkour 1k]cwousi, wa_qomter ¦speq sjuk\jia
t` 6kjeim te ja· spaq\tteim t` k|c\ to»r pkgs_om !e_. (539b1 – 7)
You must have seen how youngsters, when they get their first taste of it,
treat argument as a form of sport solely for purposes of contradiction.
When someone has proved them wrong, they copy his methods to confute
others, delighting like puppies in tugging and tearing at anyone who comes
near them. (trans. Cornford)
In Book 7, Socrates discusses the young guardians’ education in military
action in parallel with their theoretical education in philosophy. Part of
Socrates’ educational programme for the young guardians is that they
should campaign together with their parents during war (p|kelor) as ob-
servers (heyqo_) and be made to “taste blood” like little puppies. Socra-
tes then goes on to explain to Glaucon how young people usually fail to
engage in philosophical argumentation in a constructive manner. In the
lines cited above, Plato’s Socrates re-deploys the familiar watch-dog im-
agery and combines it with aggressive language to now discuss the dan-
gers latent in the young guardians’ education in philosophy. One should
be extremely careful about how he introduces them to arguments, since
the guardians’ young children have not yet fully developed a well-bal-
anced spirit. That is, they are not yet “both gentle and high-spirited at
the same time” (375c8 – 8).154 They are rather high-spirited, and not yet
as gentle and moderate as they should be. This imbalance, according to
Socrates, jeopardizes the young guardians’ exposure to philosophical
language and their treatment of argumentation.
In the lines cited above, Plato retains his dog imagery to refer to the
guardians’ offspring, but changes it in a significant way. The ill-treat-
ment of philosophical language, the practice, that is, of antilogic instead

154 Socrates has suggested in Book 2 that in ideal guardians, these two characteris-
tics must be harmoniously combined.
190 Section Two: The Republic

of dialectic, is rendered through the use of the imagery of tearing and

dragging (¦speq sjuk\jia t` 6kjeim te ja· spaq\tteim t` k|c\). Yet
this specific imagery of a dog dragging (6kjeim) and tasting flesh and
blood belongs to the stock language of blame and conjures up strong
connections with iambic poetry.155 In my view, Plato’s canine image
here, enhanced as it is with “eating flesh” and “tasting blood”, seeks
to incorporate in the Republic the distinctive features of iambic poetry
in particular, and relate this type of poetic language with the way the
disintegrated souls of Books 8 and 9 treat judicial and philosophical lan-
guage.156 The characteristics of iambic poetry, which in Book 7 are rath-
er subtle, will be fully accommodated and exploited in Book 9 of the
Republic to describe and depict the tyrant’s beast-like conduct.157

155 On the semantics of 2kj}sai as part of the language of invective, see Pindar
Nem. 7. 102 – 5 with discussion in Steiner (2001: 154 – 158, esp. 156).
156 Socrates states this clearly in his description of the tyrant’s civic behavior in
565d-566a and in his description of the tyrant’s psychic state in 589a – b. In
the first passage, the tyrant is severely criticized for bringing people to trial
on false charges or killing people and taking pleasure in tasting “kindred citizen
blood”. In the latter passage, the two parts of the tyrant’s soul, that is, “the mul-
ticoloured beast with a ring of many heads”, and “the lion” bite and kill one
another, allowing, at the same time, the third part, the “human being” to
“starve and weaken”. Contrary to the food that Socrates has prescribed for
the inhabitants of the first city in Book 2, the tyrant’s ‘food’ consists of
(human) flesh and blood that he enjoys in courts. Note that this abnormal
food is not even the prepared or cooked type of meal (to opson) that Glaucon
sought to introduce in Socrates’ first city. The absence of meat or flesh from
the first city’s cuisine is also noted by Rosen (2005: 75), who rightly stresses
that neither Glaucon nor Socrates make explicit reference to it, but does ob-
serve that such a reference is implied “by Glaucon’s distaste for Socrates’
own vegetarian interpretation of the term”. Note also that meat is introduced
in the “luxurious” and “fevered” city along with the swineherds (373c4 – 6).
Rosen, however, refrains from following in his interpretation the various ram-
ifications of this particular Platonic imagery. Influences from iambic poetry on
Plato’s prose here cannot pass undetected. These lines form strong connections
with Pindar’s portrayal of anti-heroes and arrogant humans whose hybristic at-
titude is exhibited in their inappropriate food consumption. On the psogeros Ar-
chilochus, who “feeds” (piain) on phthonos, see Pindar Pyth. II. 50 – 6; cf. also
Pindar’s treatment of Tantalus in Ol. I. 28 – 57. See discussion in Steiner (2002:
297 – 314). On Plato’s use of poetry to depict the base and the unjust, see also
my detailed discussion in Chapter Four below.
157 The animal imagery goes back to Homer, Archilochus and Semonides. It was
also integrated in the aristocratic symposia as a pastime game, whereby the par-
ticipants had to build animal-like images (eikones) of each other (apeikazein). See
the discussion in Lloyd (1966: 184 – 190). On the symposium game see, Stehle
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 191

Consequently, if we follow closely Plato’s animal imagery in the

text, strong contrasts are conjured up between the pedigree-dogs as
guardians in the first part of the dialogue, and several other images of
animal-like humans, which are intended to highlight the essential char-
acteristics of the disintegrated polities and souls in Books 8 and 9.158
Thick clusters of poetic language (poetic words, quotations, and image-
ry) are used to portray the oligarchic man as a “drone” (kẽphẽn) in 552c.
In 559d – e, the democratic man is lured to the “drones’ honey and var-
ious other beast-like pleasures” (pamtodap±r Bdom±r ja· poij_kar
[“every variety of multicoloured pleasure in every sort of way”]), caus-
ing the birth of democracy, whereby “animals” (thẽria) enjoy much
more freedom than elsewhere (563c3 – d1). In the democratic state,
dogs become like their masters, and horses and donkeys “are accus-
tomed to roam freely and proudly along the streets, bumping into any-
one who doesn’t get out of their way” (563c5 – 9).
Yet, it is the tyrant, in 565d – 566a, who tastes “with impious tongue
and lips kindred blood in courts” and, as a result, transforms himself into
a wolf (k}j\ 1n !mhq~pou cem]shai). Plato’s use of animal imagery cli-
maxes in this famous eikn of the tyrant’s unjust and diverse soul in Book
9 (588c1 – 589a4): this creature is camouflaged as a human being, with-
out truly being one. Images of this type hold a most prominent place in
the Republic’s discourse about human souls and politics, creating thus a
strong contrast with the image of the dog-guardian introduced in
Book 2. In what way then are the dog image and the subsequent animal
imagery of the Republic philosophically significant?
I have already proposed above that Socrates’ first city was set to
drive the argument in different directions, but the logos was diverted
by Glaucon who instantly made the lifestyle of the first city resemble
that of contemporary Athens by inserting arts and Mousikẽ in the dia-
logue. In Platonic discourse, Glaucon’s introduction of food variety in
the city brought about variety (poikilia) of all sorts that generated imbal-

(1997: Ch. 5); and Hunter (2004: 5 – 6). On the connection between animal
imagery and iambic poetry, see also Nagy (1979: Ch. 12 and 13). On iambic
poetry in Homer, see Martin (1989: 43 – 87).
158 Saxonhouse (1978: 888 – 901) discusses Plato’s animal imagery in the Republic
Book 5, but follows a different line of interpretation from the one I pursue
here. He takes a Straussian view of the dialogue and links the animal imagery
of Book 5 with Comedy and, more specifically, with Aristophanes’ Birds to in-
dicate the utopian character of the Platonic Kallipolis. On Plato’s use of the dog
imagery, see Annas (1981: 79 – 82); and Rosen (2005: 83 – 86).
192 Section Two: The Republic

ance (vkecla_mousam p|kim, 372e8).159 Physical health and harmony

achieved by way of food regulation and its unmediated relation to na-
ture is contrasted with the guardians’ unreformed education in poetry
and music, which, due to their poikilia and linguistic colourfulness, daz-
zle humans and overwhelm their perception of reality, thus endangering
their ethical development. Socrates cannot allow the two cities, the po-
tentially just and the phlegmainousa one, to intertwine or become iden-
tified, for that would result in their investigation ending once more in
deadlock.160 Thus, as the conversation on justice unfolds, he exploits
several techniques to keep their fundamental differences constantly in
the foreground.
As suggested previously in Chapters One and Two, the Platonic ei-
kones and imagistic language form an essential part of Socrates’ techni-
ques to contrast politics and ethics in contemporary cities to the Socratic
just city and soul; imagistic language also emphasizes the (epistemolog-
ical) distance that separates the Socratic interlocutors from the Platonic
Real. Imagistic language can do this, since, as we saw in Chapter Two,
it constitutes the type of language that the Socratic interlocutors are
most at ease with.161 Thus the Platonic eikones militate against the
poets’ images as described in 401b (1m jaj_ar eQj|si tqev|lemoi…
¦speq 1m jaj0 bot\m,, 401b8 – c1) and constitute a different type of
‘food’, a verbal pharmakon that seeks to restore (ethical and intellectual)
health in diseased and contaminated cities and souls (372e8).162

159 The word phlegmain (LSJ sv: to be heated, inflamed, to fester) implies disturb-
ance of balance and, from that point of view, it can also be linked with disease.
160 This was the case with Socrates’ discussion with Cephalus, Polemarchus and
Thrasymachus in Book 1. See Dorter (2006: 57 – 65); see also Petraki (2009:
27 – 67). Note that in Book 1 Thrasymachus is already likened to a wolf
(336d – e). Note also that the discussion about justice in Book 1 ends in a
heavy ironic tone with a vivid description which likens philosophical investiga-
tion to inappropriate and erratic food consumption (354a10-c3). See my discus-
sion above, Chapter Two, n. 60.
161 Glaucon’s intervention has shown how significant mousikẽ and the visual arts are
in general to the Republic’s interlocutors. This stresses the fact that Socrates’
philosophical discourse must investigate and argue highly debatable ethical
and political issues with ethically confused people, who have been raised in a
culture that bombards them with images of all sorts, both verbal and visual.
See also Socrates’ comment in Rep.515a5: “The prisoners are likes us.”
162 See Rep. 459c8 – 9; see also 382a – d. On Plato’s use of pharmakon in the dia-
logue, see the discussion above, Ch. One, n. 33.
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 193

I propose that Socrates’ building of philosophical eikones from Book

2 onwards is intended to dramatize the interlocutors’ dissociation and
distance from Plato’s true ethical and metaphysical reality. This process
culminates in the three well-known images of the dialogue’s middle
Books. Thus the Platonic images of the Sun and the Cave, in particular,
work to a great extent by exploiting humans’ perception of their sense-
perceptive environment and their relation to it, with a view to disrupt-
ing the interlocutors’ erroneous beliefs about the unity of the world as
they perceive it. As the golden era of the first polis, when humans en-
joyed a privileged relation with nature, is left behind in speech, Plato’s
humans become misplaced and totally disoriented.
Taking this view, to be at a loss in ethics is to be at a total loss in
every aspect of human nature both in the way humans ‘view’ and inter-
act with nature and use their language, as well as in the way they organ-
ize their states and politics. In Platonic terms, and in the Republic’s dis-
course specifically, to be ethically confused amounts to losing funda-
mental characteristics of one’s human nature. Once this happens it is
easy for humans to turn into animals and beasts of any sort. And the
more ethically corrupted one is, the worse their transformation into an-
imals and their disintegration into beasts.
With that said, the eikn of the city-guardian as a pedigree dog be-
comes Plato’s catchword that underscores Socrates’ difficulty in identi-
fying a human model for setting up his city. The emergence of the dog
analogy, then, is intended to pave the way for Socrates’ harmonized and
just human soul, and to bridge the gap between the way humans have
been erroneously portrayed in poetry so far, as well as in the way hu-
mans should become by way of Platonic philosophic education. In de-
ploying the dog-image, Socrates has already started to “cleanse his can-
vas” and to remix the (familiar poetic) verbal colours with a view to
portraying his political and ethical reality. This is, in essence, an educa-
tional process and Plato has Socrates drawing his interlocutors’ attention
to it by way of building a number of linguistic eikones (399d5 – 6). In
doing so, Socrates has already embarked on his grand scheme to depict
in his dialogue the haploun ẽthos, which poetry has failed to do. At the
same time, in introducing the eikones in his philosophical investigation,
Plato also dramatizes in speech the way in which the Socratic interloc-
utors differ from the inhabitants of his first city. They are not as integrat-
ed into their physical environment or to the polis as they believe, and
thus nature and the polis turn into an image for them to reflect upon
and re-think their confidence in their perceptive and intellectual capa-
194 Section Two: The Republic

bilities. This immediately engages them in questioning their approach to

various other abstract concepts or qualities, such as justice, temperance,
courage, or friendship, which may be thought of as invisible and ill-de-
fined, but are constantly materialized in real life and in art, albeit ‘mixed’
in the wrong way due to incorrect cultural education.163

3.2.2 The way to the Form of the Good

If the image of pedigree dogs underscores Plato’s difficulty in depicting

a balanced and harmonized human, paving the way for purifying con-
temporary education in mousikẽ so that a reformed one nurtures just
souls, then the three eikones in the middle, metaphysical Books of the
Republic portray most vigorously the distance that separates the Socratic
interlocutors from Plato’s true reality. Their relation to the Platonic
Ideas unfolds in the text through the exploration of motifs and imagery
that was introduced at the end of Book 5, in Socrates’ presentation of
the Doxa to the philotheamones. The imagistic type of language em-
ployed in Book 5 and, more specifically, the mixture of light and dark-
ness as the characteristic par excellence of the cognitive state of Opinion,
is coupled in the three images of Books 6 and 7 with the cognate motifs
of route and distance to emphasize the interlocutors’ dissociation from
their natural and sense-perceptive environment.164 The Socratic inter-
locutors, poorly educated in poetry as they are, must simultaneously re-
think an ‘invisible’ ethical and ontological reality, which is new to
them, and their own perception of their physical surroundings, for, in
Platonic terms, the process of coming to understand these modes of re-
ality cannot be broken into separate parts, one for each mode.165 The
ascent towards acquaintance with the Forms involves familiarization
with unsuspected truths about our own nature, intellect and senses. It

163 See, for example, Rep. 476a4 – 7.

164 On one’s ‘distance’ from justice, see Rep. 343c1-d1. On the motif of the route,
see, for example, Rep. 445c4 – 7. Note that Parmenides’ On Nature rests entirely
on the route-motif. See Mourelatos (1970: Chs. 1 and 2). Nightingale (2004:
94 – 138) links the motif of distance with philosophic theoria and casts new
light on the philosopher’s engagement with politics in the ideal polis and on
the problem of the reconciliation of contemplative and practical life. See in ad-
dition Goldhill, in N. K. Rutter and B. A. Sparkes (eds.) (2000: 166 – 169). See
also n. 133 in this Chapter.
165 Socrates states this explicitly in the image of the Line (509e-511e).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 195

is not surprising then that Plato’s images of the Sun, Line, and Cave ex-
ploit human sight and sense-perceptual and pictorial vocabulary to ed-
ucate the intra-dramatic audience.
Plato’s most important Form, the Good, is presented in the dialogue
by way of the eikn of the Sun.166 The image not only introduces a most
astounding “essence” (see, for example, Glaucon’s rather comical reac-
tion in 509c1 – 2: dailom_ar rpeqbok/r), but also investigates its relation
to the earthly world of mortals, and it thus rests on Socrates’ earlier dis-
cussion with Glaucon on Platonic Forms at the end of Book 5 (see
507b – c; cf. 476a – b and c – d). That said, in the light of my conclusions
as regards Socrates’ alternation of linguistic styles in his distinction be-
tween Knowledge and Opinion in Chapter Two above, it is instructive
to turn to the most prominent eikn in Book 6 and examine the poetics
of the stylistic mode in which Socrates presents an entirely elusive es-
sence (1p]jeima t/r oqs_ar, 509b6 – 10): the idea of the agathon. We
should not lose sight of the fact that Socrates himself in 507b2 – 7
links these two contexts, the Sun-image and the latter part of Book 5,
thus foregrounding his earlier argumentation. All three verbal images,
the Sun, the Line, and the Cave, are thus linked to the epistemological
and ontological ideas of Book 5. My analysis will mainly focus on the
diverse linguistic styles (in method and in diction) that Socrates adopts
in these two contexts, namely in Books 5 and 6, and seek to account
for their stylistic discrepancies.
In Section One of this work I suggested that the ethical and intel-
lectual dynamics of the personae of the Socratic interlocutors play an in-
tegral role in the dialogue’s alternation of stylistic modes on both the
macrocosmic and microcosmic plane. In Chapters One and Two
above I tested this observation in Plato’s treatment of Glaucon’s persona
in Book 5. Nonetheless, nowhere in the Republic is this authorial stance
as regards the influence of the Socratic interlocutors on the dialogue’s
development more prominent than in Socrates’ choice to present the
Form of the Good by means of an eikn.

166 On the image of the Sun, see Cherniss (1936: 445 – 456); (1962a: 211 ff.), and
(1962b: 5 ff.); Ross (1953); Whittaker (1968: 131 – 144); Guthrie (1975 IV:
506 – 518); Raven (1965); Moravcsik, in Werkmeister (ed.) (1976: 1 – 21);
Annas (1981: 217 – 242); Santas (1980: 374 – 403) (Reprinted in Santas, in
Fine, G. [ed.] [1999: 247 – 274]). See also Penner, in Cairns, D., Hermann,
F. G. and Penner, T. (eds.) (2007: 93 – 123); and Rowe in the same volume
(2007: 124 – 153).
196 Section Two: The Republic

The Idea of the Good surfaces in the dialogue in 504a, in the con-
text of Socrates’ discussion with Adeimantus about the nature of the
true philosopher (503b3 – c7) and the importance of education to pre-
serve the qualities of exceptional characters (mathẽmata, 503e – 504a),
but it is not fully established for investigation until 505a. Socrates’ intro-
ductory approach to the Form of the Good in 504a2 – 505b3 is philo-
sophically significant since it raises a number of crucial issues in relation
to the formulation of philosophical argumentation. In addition, it also
constitutes an important self-referential moment, for Plato has Socrates
make certain observations that cannot leave our reading of the Republic
unaffected.
Socrates’ comments about the true philosophers’ education in 503e
intrigue Adeimantus, who now wants to know more on the subjects
that these will have to undertake. Rather than giving a straightforward
answer, Socrates returns to his tripartite division of the soul and to his
definition of justice. He then raises issues of methodology and claims
that the method he had then adopted towards the definition of justice,
sphrosynẽ, andreia and sophia, will not take them far this time (Adam
1963 [1902] vol. 2: 50). Indeed, in 435d, Socrates settled for an ap-
proach to the four virtues of the soul and the city, which, satisfactory
as it was for his co-speakers, only looked as one that Socrates alone
had to settle with: EQr vaOk|m ce aw, Gm d’ 1c~, § haul\sie, sj]lla
1lpept~jalem peq· xuw/r, eUte 5wei t± tq_a eUdg taOta 1m art0 eUte
l^. Oq p\mu loi dojoOlem, 5vg, eQr vaOkom7 Usyr c±q, § S~jqater, t¹
kec|lemom !kgh]r, fti wakep± t± jak\. (“Then once again we’ve
come upon an easy question, namely does the soul have these three
parts in it or not? It doesn’t look easy to me. Perhaps, Socrates, there’s
some truth in the old saying that everything fine is difficult”, 435c4 – 8.)
Socrates deployed the well-established route-motif to explain that there
is an alternative method that could be used to investigate these issues
(435c7 – d6). This method would offer an accurate (akribs) answer to
their question, but is more complex (the route is longer) and above
the standards set by their discussion thus far (435d4 – 5). In Book 4,
Glaucon dismisses this alternative philosophical line of argumentation
and settles for the one they have already been treading on (435d6 – 9).
The case is similar in 505a, only this time Socrates is adamant in re-
fusing to settle for a methodology that will give anything less to the in-
vestigation than complete “accuracy” (t± t|te t/r !jqibe_ar, ¢r 1lo·
1va_meto, 504b5 – 6) of the “most important subject”, the Good. Socra-
tes’ interlocutor at this stage of the discussion is Adeimantus, but he will
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 197

soon be replaced by Glaucon, who will then be the main co-speaker for
the remainder of Book 6 and throughout the discussion on metaphysics,
epistemology, and ontology in Book 7. As regards the view I take in this
study, this change of interlocutors at this crucial point in the dialogue is
not fortuitous. Socrates discusses with Adeimantus the various meth-
odological problems that relate to the Form of the Good but Plato has
Glaucon take over the argument when the Sun analogy is fully launched
in the conversation.167
To explain their methodological difficulties at this stage, Socrates re-
sorts once more to his well-established comparison of philosophic
speech with painting (504d6 – e3). According to him, their previous dis-
cussion of virtues in the soul was an hypographẽ (rough outline) for the
group to “look at”, but one should not lose sight of the fact that what
they should truly be aiming at is a teletatẽ apergasia (a complete [verbal]
picture): “It’s ridiculous, isn’t it, to strain every nerve to attain the ut-
most exactness and clarity (fti !jqib]stata ja· jahaq~tata) about
other things of little value and not to consider the most important things
worthy of the greatest exactness?” (504d8 – e3)
Socrates’ methodological comments here raise significant issues of
an epistemological and philosophical/linguistic character about people’s
approach to the Form of the Good. In the Republic’s discourse, the
Good can only be approached in a “clear” (katharos) and “accurate” (ak-
ribẽs) manner. I have already suggested in the introduction to this work
that the philosophical ramifications of the word katharos permeate the
Republic’s thickly woven texture throughout. The word becomes Plato’s
catchword for purity and homogeneity that is only to be found at an ei-
detic level. Thus the notion of purity also regulates Socrates’ organiza-
tion of the ideal polis in Book 5, as the guardians’ class must remain pure
and unmixed in order to secure the city’s stability and preservation
(jahaq¹m t¹ c]mor t_m vuk\jym). In this view, Platonic eidetic purity
is heavily contrasted with the earthly concepts of mixture (of sense-per-
ceptive elements and ethical qualities), and of contamination and variety
(poikilia), and thus governs several of Plato’s prescriptions about the con-

167 Adeimantus replaces Glaucon in Book 8 (549b) and it is with him that Socrates
will discuss the unjust souls and polities in Book 8 and in the first part of Book
9. Glaucon reappears in 576b, at a crucially philosophical moment in the dia-
logue when Socrates is about to discuss the worst type of man, the tyrant,
and his relation to hẽdonẽ. Plato’s change of interlocutors is not incidental. I
will examine this important observation in the following pages.
198 Section Two: The Republic

struction of the ideal polis. (For example, his reformation or purification

of music and poetry in Books 2 and 3 of the dialogue).168
Yet, in my view in this study, the metaphysical connotations that
Plato assigns to this word cannot be seen separately from his philosoph-
ical concerns about how language should be used to express reality. In
other words, Socrates’ philosophical and stylistic approach to the Form
of the Good must also reflect (or re-enact) the Form’s purity, since a
‘mixed’ or ‘contaminated’ language will only confuse and disorient
the participants in the investigation and, what is most significant from
my point of view, it will not do justice to the matter at hand, namely
to the Form of the Good. As Socrates will explain later in the dialogue,
the interlocutors have not been trained in Dialectic (the ultimate math-
ẽma) that leads the philosopher to the ultimate Reality, and thus cannot
have a direct familiarization with the Good.169 On that basis, it is inter-
esting to follow Socrates’ approach to the Good and investigate the pic-
torial language he exploits to introduce this difficult concept to his in-
terlocutors. This will also pay rich dividends in our own analysis of the
reasons that motivate Plato’s alternation of philosophical styles (diction
and imagery) in his Republic or, what I have called above, his dramatiza-
tion of language.170

168 On the words katharos (pure) and katharmos (purification), see Introduction
above, n. 31. The notion of ‘contamination’ stands in stark contrast to ‘purity’
and ‘purification’. See also Rep. 364e where Socrates describes how begging
prophets and priests promise to absolve people from guilt through sacrifices
and prayers. In this broader context, contamination is also linked with blood
and killing; see Arist. Frogs 1033, Soph. O.T. 1227 ff.; Seven against Thebes
738. But see also Emp. Katharmoi Fr. 135 (Arist. Rhet. 1373b6), where the
time of human blissfulness and innocence ends when they commit the sin of
killing and eating animals. See the detailed discussion in Parker ([1983] 1985:
104 – 143, 281 – 307). As we will see in Chapter Four, Plato makes the most
of his Presocratic and poetic precedents in several of the Republic’s images,
but especially in Books 8 and 9, when he has Socrates describe in vivid colours
the tyrant delighting in tasting kindred blood. See also above n. 156 in this
Chapter.
169 See Robinson (1953: 61 – 92). On the ‘longer road’ that the conversation could
have followed, see Mitchell, in Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.) (2007) (310 – 344).
170 I concur with Nightingale that Plato’s imageries (his myths and metaphors)
“cannot be fully translated into analytic argument” without losing certain of
the implications conveyed in imagistic philosophical discourse (2004: 95,
n. 4). On this issue, see also McCabe, in Barker, A. and Warner, M. (eds.)
(1992: 47 – 67, esp. 59 – 61). In my view, Plato’s imagery of the Good as the
Sun in Book 6 becomes fully meaningful if seen in relation to the other images
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 199

But before we embark on this examination, a few observations are

in order here as regards Socrates’ interlocutor, Adeimantus. Contrary to
the commonly held view about Socrates’ two main interlocutors in the
Republic, I claimed in Chapter Two above that Plato’s choice of Glau-
con as Socrates’ interlocutor in the presentation of complex epistemo-
logical and ontological issues is not incidental. There is an authorial pat-
tern behind the change of Socrates’ two co-speakers which also influen-
ces the text’s linguistic style and produces a vivid dramatization of lan-
guage. The Republic informs us that both co-speakers are well acquaint-
ed with Socrates and that his philosophical ideas are not new to them.
However, Plato employs certain techniques to differentiate between
the two interlocutors, thus building into his Republic gradations of audi-
ence. Plato’s differentiation between the two brothers is indeed subtle
and has often passed unobserved, but it is indicative of his educational
aims in the dialogue (cf. Arieti [1991]; Strauss [1964]; and Bloom
[1968]). Through Plato’s treatment of the personae of Glaucon and Adei-
mantus the reader learns a lot about the ethical and intellectual criteria
that one should meet to engage in a philosophically constructive dia-
logue. One of these intellectual criteria often brought up in the discus-
sion is good memory and Adeimantus’ aptitude in this is questioned in
our text.
Such is the case in Book 6. In 504e7 – 505a6, Socrates mentions
twice that in the past Adeimantus has heard him referring to a most im-
portant philosophical subject, namely the Form of the Good. Adeiman-
tus’ then raising anew this topic in the dialogue on justice shows that
“he has either forgotten the Good or wants to put Socrates to trouble”
(p\mtyr aqt¹ oqj akic\jir !j^joar, mOm d³ C oqj 1mmoe?r C aw diamo0
1lo· pq\clata paq]weim !mtikalbam|lemor, 504e7 – 9). These remarks
obviously have several implications. Plato’s readership is informed that
Socrates has repeatedly questioned his confidence in examining the mat-
ter at hand as well as his knowledge of it. This creates a dramatic tension
in the dialogue, for we cannot be certain that the discussion of the Good
will not be dismissed as exceptionally difficult on that basis. Yet, these
remarks also highlight the philosophical significance of Socrates’ choice
of stylistic mode to speak about the Good to people who have not heard
of it before or have failed to register its value (as Adeimantus apparently
has here). Nevertheless, Socrates decides to speak about the Form of the

that Plato creates in the Republic as well as to the motifs of mixis and poikilia that
permeate the dialogue throughout.
200 Section Two: The Republic

Good, and not long afterwards Plato replaces the forgetful Adeimantus
with Glaucon.

3.2.3 Plato’s eikones: The Image of the Sun

In the introductory part of the section under investigation (504d4 –

508a7 – 8), Socrates lists two problematic definitions of the Good.
Most people fail, says Socrates, to come up with a definition which
fully renders the significance of the explicandum: “some think (to?r
l³m pokko?r, 505 b5) that the good is pleasure, those more cultured
(or refined) think that the good is phronesis (505 b6)”. A crucial obser-
vation is made immediately afterwards: Ja· fti ce, § v_ke, oR toOto
Bco}lemoi oqj 5wousi de?nai Ftir vq|mgsir, !kk’ !macj\fomtai tekeut_m-
ter tµm toO !cahoO v\mai [“Those who believe this can’t tell us what
sort of knowledge it is, however, but in the end are forced to say that
it is knowledge of the good”, 505b8 – 10]. Their attempt to define
the Good fails, since the proponents of this definition can establish nei-
ther the semantics of phronesis nor of agathon. Their language is empty
and their argumentation fruitless. For Socrates, language as a means to
understanding and establishing the truth does not always bear fruit,
and empty language can be as confusing as a highly versatile and colour-
ful one, for both can lead to futile wandering (planẽ).
Glaucon and Socrates first dismiss the definition of Good as pleas-
ure. According to Socrates, those who take this view find themselves
in no less confusion than those who identify it with knowledge (505
c6).171 Yet, the truth is that every soul spends its time pursuing this
very thing and gets involved in actions whose aim is the attainment
of true goodness (!cah± d³ oqdem· 5ti !qje? t± dojoOmta jt÷shai,
!kk± t± emta fgtoOsim, tµm d³ d|nam 1mtaOha Edg p÷r !til\fei [“No-

171 This evokes the circuitous and futile journey of the Parmenidean youth, as pre-
sented in the proem to Parmenides’ On Nature, before the youth, due to divine
intervention, is landed on the cognitive illumination of fragment 8. Mortal
“wandering” can be highly complicated and diverse: it can stem from the di-
versity that lies in the multiplicity, as it can emanate from nothingness. The is-
sues touched upon here have strong philosophical (and linguistic) bearings
which cannot be fully analyzed within the scope of the present project. See ex-
tensive treatment by Denyer (1990: 46 – 67); cf. Bett (1993: 192 – 193). On the
Good as pleasure, see the discussion in (Penner, n. 166 in this Chapter, 117 –
124).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 201

body is satisfied to acquire things he merely believes to be good, how-

ever, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains
those that are merely believed to be so”], 505d8 – 9). “Fixed belief”
about the Good, (p_stei lom_l\, 505d11 – 506), cannot be easily ach-
ieved and the soul’s pursuit usually ends in aporia. The city guardians,
says Socrates, cannot be allowed to spend their entire lives in such an
intellectual “darkness” (eskotsthai, 506a1). As I suggested above, Socra-
tes’ epistemology and ontology is founded here on the traditional polar-
ity of darkness and light. The images of the Sun and the Cave that will
follow also rest on an imagistic and pictorial type of language that ex-
ploits these motifs.
Socrates chooses to expand on the Form of Good by means of an
analogy (eikn): he associates the Good with the Sun, and in doing so
he amasses wording directly related to sense-perception (506e1 – 5).172
Glaucon’s intervention in 506d1 – 6 is philosophically interesting for
our interpretation of Socrates’ stylistic modes in investigating human
virtues and transcendental Forms: !qj]sei c±q Bl?m, j#m ¦speq dijaio-
s}mgr p]qi ja· syvqos}mgr ja· t_m %kkym di/kher. ovty ja· peq· toO
!cahoO di]kh,r (“We should be quite content with an account of the
Good like the one you gave us of justice and temperance and the
other virtue”, 506d1 – 6). But Glaucon’s challenge here is not without
problems; in a final attempt to elicit Socrates’ participation in their cog-
nitive quest of the Good, Glaucon asks him to lower their standards
(cf. 506c4 – 5). Socrates is adamant that the idea of the Good as such
cannot be tackled in their present discussion. He is willing, though,
to offer an indirect approach to the Agathon by assigning to it character-
istics that belong to the physical environment and relate directly to
human nature.
This is critical for our evaluation of the eikn: Socrates’ concerns
with methodology and language suggest that the idea of the Good as
such is all-pervasive for humans but, at the same time, distant and foreign
to the interlocutors’ familiar thought patterns. The motifs of light, dark-
ness, colour, and mixture are thus re-introduced to the discussion and
linked with the faculty of sight to convey a sketchy and indirect account
of the intellect’s cognition of the Good, and this is done through the

172 See Robinson (1953: 180 – 222); Gulley (1962: 53 – 67); Gosling (1973: 120 –
139); Wheeler (1997: 171 – 188); Ferguson (1963: 188 – 193); and Raven
(1953: 22 ff.)
202 Section Two: The Republic

depiction of the Good’s “offspring”.173 Within this context, the Platonic

image also confirms blindness as a disease of the eye: the light of the Sun
illuminates the objects of sight, but, if humans cannot perceive it, this is
due to their own impaired vision. By exploiting in the eikn a type of
language that rests on sense-perception to investigate the Good, Socrates
dramatizes the cognitive limitations of his interlocutors and the limits of
their conversation thus far, which seems to have never left behind the
sphere of the human, the visible, and the corporeal.174 In the same con-
text though, Socrates makes certain linguistic associations and exploits
the terminology of Book 5 as regards the Doxa that will allow him to
shift customary thought patterns towards new directions.
Socrates’ choice of an eikn to approach the Good contrasts with his
discussion about the virtues of the human soul. Glaucon asks Socrates to
speak about the Good in the same way he talked about justice and s-
phrosynẽ (in 432a – b), but Socrates refuses:
ja· c±q 1lo_, Gm dû 1c~, § 2ta?qe, ja· l\ka !qj]sei7 !kkû fpyr lµ oqw oX|r tû
5solai, pqohulo}lemor d³ !swglom_m c]kyta avk^sy. !kkû, § laj\qioi,
aqt¹ l³m t_ potû 1st· t!cah¹m 1\sylem t¹ mOm eWmai—pk]om c\q loi
va_metai C jat± tµm paqoOsam bqlµm 1vij]shai toO ce dojoOmtor 1lo· t±
mOm—dr d³ 5jcom|r te toO !cahoO va_metai ja· bloi|tator 1je_m\, k]ceim
1h]ky, eQ ja· rl?m v_kom, eQ d³ l^, 1÷m. (506d6 – e5)
That, my friend, I said, would satisfy me too, but I’m afraid that I won’t be
up to it and that I’ll disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying. So let’s
abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time being, for even to
arrive at my own view about it is too big a topic for the discussion we are
now started on. But I am willing to tell you about what is apparently an
offspring of the good and most like it. Is it agreeable to you, or would
you rather we let the whole matter drop?
How then has Socrates spoken about the virtues of the soul? Why is he
not complying with Glaucon’s request here? Our attention needs to be
drawn to Book 4 of the Republic where the relevant definitions took
place. I shall not pursue here an examination of Plato’s division of
the soul. Nonetheless, if we choose to follow Glaucon’s request and re-
view the definition of sphrosynẽ, we come across some interesting find-
ings. Socrates’ definition is not embedded in the context of an eikn, but
it does share certain features with his verbal images. Towards the end of
Book 4, the elusive concepts of justice and sphrosynẽ are defined (Glau-

173 See also Hyland (1973: 26 – 27).

174 The latter part of Book 5 is an exception. See my discussion in Chapter Two
above.
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 203

con is again the co-speaker at that crucial stage of the discussion). Di-
kaiosynẽ is defined as t¹ t± artoO pq\tteim (433b4), on the principle
of civic class divisions (6ma 6jastom 4m d]oi 1pitgde}eim, 433a5). The
two short phrases, configured so as to be notably alliterative and easily
memorable, signal the climax of the discussion on justice. Socrates tack-
les sphrosynẽ first and turns to justice afterwards. Relying once more on
the soul and polis analogy, Socrates defines sphrosynẽ as the harmonized
mixture between the rulers and the ruled (431e4 – 6). Sphrosynẽ and
(musical) harmony (harmonia) are brought together in this definition:
jqør owm, Gm d’ 1c~, fti 1pieij_r 1lamteu|leha %qti ¢r "qlom_ô tim· B
syvqos}mg ¢lo_ytai ; (431e7 – 8).
In his explanation of how sphrosynẽ resembles some sort of harmo-
nia, Socrates transfers terms from the field of music and musical instru-
ments to refer to the sphrn psychological state.175 His definition is then
built on the use of a term that is prominent in the Platonic eikones (ho-
moitai, 431e8) and in the dialogue’s imagistic language in general (¢r
and ¦speq). Several significant issues emerge here in relation to Socra-
tes’ mode of speech. Firstly, in using common language to speak about
music and sphrosynẽ, Socrates assigns to the latter significant features of
the former. I have shown elsewhere that Plato’s use of musical terms to
talk about the human soul in the Republic links psychẽ and music in an
indissoluble way and brings out their common relation to the Platonic
Forms. Thus in deploying common vocabulary in both environments,
Plato’s language is not metaphoric, but reflects the intrinsic relationship
of soul and music (both are sealed [typoutai-typos] in the same way by the
Forms) and also accounts for the reasons why music has, and once pu-
rified should have, such an emotional sway on the human soul.176
Thus in purifying sonorous music from incongruent variety and
mixture (poikilia and mixis) in Book 3, Socrates does not reject mixture
altogether, for this cannot happen in our sense-perceptive world, but
trades poets and musicians’ ‘bad’ poikilia in music for a Platonic ‘good’
one (symphnia/harmonia).177 This new mixture or coordination of mu-

175 Rep. 432a – b: see the employment of tetatai, sunadontas, asthenestatous, ischurota-
tous and mesous, as well as the use of sumphnia which, in the present context,
evokes coordination and harmony in music. For an extensive treatment of
this, see Barker (1984: 127 – 140).
176 See Barker (1984: 137 with n. 45); and Barker, in Wright (ed.) (2000: 94); Pet-
raki (2008: 147 – 170).
177 Only the Dorian and the Phrygian harmoniai are allowed in the ideal state
(399a3 – 4). Within Plato’s framework of various harmoniai, the Dorian holds
204 Section Two: The Republic

sical modes is based on certain mathematical principles that Socrates ex-

plores in Book 7.178 In Platonic terms then, Socrates’ definition of s-
phrosynẽ as some form of harmonia seeks to ascribe to this virtue and,
in effect, to the sphrn human soul characteristics of unity and homo-
geneity that are to be found in pure terms on Plato’s metaphysical level
alone. The balance attained in the city and soul due to sphrosynẽ is the
result of a perfect mixture or harmony that strives to approach the ho-
mogeneity and purity of the Platonic Forms.
Socrates’ definition of justice though differs from that of sphrosynẽ,
as in his short definition Plato has done away with notions of similarity
and resemblance (homoitai). This is crucial for the interpretative view-
point I have adopted in this work. The Republic’s definition of justice as
“doing one’s own job” (433a5 and b4) has been much discussed in the
literature. What particularly interests me here is Socrates’ refusal in Book
6 to present the Good in the same mode as he spoke about sphrosynẽ
and justice earlier. Yet, we should also note, Socrates’ stylistic mode
of approaching the two virtues is not exactly the same either as, contrary
to sphrosynẽ, Socrates draws no comparisons in his definition of jus-
tice.179 This is a highly complex issue whose detailed discussion falls out-
side the scope of this work, but, nevertheless, attention needs to be
drawn here to Socrates’ deployment of the pronoun hautou in the def-
inition. The word introduces to the definition of justice the connota-
tion of self and, thus, within Plato’s philosophy, raises important ques-

a most prominent place. Note that in Timaeus (35a – c) Plato has the Demiurge
construct the World Soul on what comes out as a musical structure of compo-
sition. The first segment of this composition can be recognized as the Dorian
musical scale of the diatonic genus. See Burkert (1972: 354 – 355); Barker
(1984); and West (1992: 174 – 175 and 179 – 181).
178 In the Republic’s concluding myth of Er this aspired unity and homogeneity
may be seen depicted in the Sirens’ prototype performance (617b4 – 7): 1p· d³
t_m j}jkym aqtoO %myhem 1v’ 2j\stou bebgj]mai Seiq/ma sulpeqiveqol]mgm,
vymµm l_am Re?sam, 6ma t|mom7 1j pas_m d³ ajt½ oqs_m l_am "qlom_am sulvyme?m
(“Upon each of its circles stood a Siren, who was carried round with its move-
ment, uttering a single sound on one note, so that all the eight made up the concords of a
single scale”). However, Rep. 530a-531c argues that the true nature of harmonia/
sumphonia can be discovered at nothing less than the mathematical level. See
discussion in Barker (1978: 337 – 342) and (1994: 132 – 135); Huffman
(2005: 63 – 64 and 423 – 425).
179 On sphrosyne, see Annas, in O’ Meara, D. J. (ed.) (1985: 111 – 138); North
(1966); and Verene (1997: 75 – 76).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 205

tions about the person’s coherence, unity, or identity of self.180 From

this perspective, the definition of justice also contrasts with Socrates’ de-
scription of human nature in 395b3 – 6, where “human nature is chop-
ped up” (katakekermatisthai) in even smaller parts due to its exposure to
mousikẽ and mimẽsis. Nonetheless, Plato’s use of hautou in Book 4 is
broad enough to refer to the harmony of a tripartite soul, in which
each part does its own work, and does not interfere with that of the
other (443c9 – 444a2), and also implies an entirely unified soul which
approaches homogeneity.181
Thus, Glaucon’s request in Book 6 is laden with a number of phil-
osophical complications. In inviting Socrates to return to his usual
methodology and mode of discourse in defining the Good, Glaucon
has not grasped that their conversation has touched upon the pinnacle
of ontological hierarchy (higher than the virtues, Knowledge or
Truth), which cannot be approached by means of an imagistic or picto-
rial kind of language which rests entirely on familiar colorful polarities,
and neither can it be examined in the same manner as sphrosynẽ or jus-
tice. This is due to the Republic’s intra-dramatic audience and to the na-

180 This is a highly intricate issue that relates to Plato’s soul-division. In particular,
Plato has been accused in the literature for making the mind consist of homunculi
(little minds) with their own goals and desires, which leaves little space for a
cohesive I. I, however, do not agree that Plato’s methodology or aim in the Re-
public points in this direction. On the contrary, one should always keep in mind
that Plato exploits a variety of techniques in the dialogue in order to keep the
distinction between just and unjust cities, souls and unity, and multiplicity in
the foreground. On Plato’s tripartite division of the soul, see Chapter One,
n. 44 and n. 131 in this chapter. See also Price (1995: Ch. 2); cf. Bobonich
(2002: Chs. 3 and 4); Robinson (1970: 34 – 58); and Cooper (1977: 151 – 157).
181 Yet, what interests me here in particular is the fact that the language of similar-
ity and resemblance, or mixture and versatility (poikilia) is completely left out
from Socrates’ definition of justice. Note, however, that the most significant
difference between the virtues of sphrosynẽ and dikaiosynẽ in the Republic is
that sphorynẽ unites the human soul (harmonia), whereas justice keeps the
three parts divided, so that each part performs its own task [emphasis added].
Yet, according to this view too, Socrates again cannot speak of the Form of
the Good in the same manner as he has spoken about justice. On the interpre-
tation of justice ‘dividing’ the soul, see an excellent discussion in Bourloyanni
(Unity and Complexity in Plato’s Conception of the Soul, unpublished PhD Thesis,
Durham 2009); see also above, n. 131. Kenneth Dorter (2006: Ch. 10) has also
touched upon this complicated aspect of justice in an insightful reading of how
psychological justice may be related and reconciled with cosmic justice in the
Republic’s myth of Er. On the cosmological ramifications of the myth of Er,
see also Kalfas (2004: 181 – 214). See also n. 178 in this Chapter.
206 Section Two: The Republic

ture of the subject as such, and Socrates dismisses Glaucon’s suggestion

on both criteria. His interlocutors, he claims, have not been trained in
dialectic (the longer road). They thus lack the means to approach the
Good.182 As we will see below, his choice of the Sun image not only
brings out certain characteristics about the use of Platonic eikones as a
distinctive mode of philosophical discourse in the Republic, but also
highlights the affinities that these two types of language, eikones and im-
agistic language, have at a methodological level. Both are found inade-
quate to define the Good, yet both are used by Socrates. It is interesting
to see towards what end.
In the eikn Socrates tells a story about how significant the Good is in
our lives, drawing on language and imagery that is strictly related to
human nature (begetting, mixing, light, and vision). The interlocutors
agree not to deal with the “father” (this is Glaucon’s wording in the dia-
logue) but “the offspring” (ekgonos and tokos) that resembles the “father”
(homoiotatos ekein, 506e3 – 4). In what follows Socrates draws parallels
between the Sun and the Good: the Good has “given birth” to a
child as an analogon to itself (508 b 13) to rule over our physical
world. The offspring is omnipotent in the visible domain; it regulates
birth and death, light, illumination, and darkness. The same wording
is also deployed by Socrates in his explanation of how the soul interacts
with the Good. Instead of defining the nature of the Good then, Plato’s
speaker exploits a type of language that is directly linked to sense-per-
ception and human nature. Platonic language has been accused of turn-
ing extremely impressionistic in this context, and being full of “empty
metaphors”,183 since Socrates draws comparisons between two environ-
ments, Sun, light, and vision on the one hand, and the Good, Being,
Knowledge, and Truth on the other, and uses the eye’s relation to
the Sun to explain the influence on the soul by the Good.184 Thus,
even when discussing the Good and its relation to truth, knowledge,
and the soul, Socrates’ discourse is again notably imagistic and rests on
the motif of mixis (or krasis) of light and darkness.

182 See above n. 169 in this Chapter.

183 Aristotle, Metaphysics 13.5, 1079b25.
184 Note that through the image of the Good as the “father” of the Sun Plato also
bridges the gap between the visible and the intelligible spheres, since “genera-
tion” cultivates a sense of continuum and a succession of some sort from one
sphere to the other. On Plato’s imagery of the “father” and its poetic overtones,
see Baracchi (2001: 151 – 176). See also Pender (2000: 91 – 96).
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 207

In his sketchy account of the Good in this eikn, Socrates settles a

number of methodological and philosophical issues that he raised in
the first part of the Republic. Firstly, the hyperbolic description of the
Sun’s omnipotence is designed to impress on Adeimantus and the others
the importance of the Good. After Socrates finishes with this image no
one is likely to forget this impression. Secondly, the analogy drawn be-
tween the Sun and the Good by means of imagistic language is intended
to instruct the interlocutors on the methodology and the (philosophical)
terminology that Socrates has employed thus far in his treatment of the
various subjects in the dialogue.185 By mixing the vocabulary of two dif-
ferent linguistic strands (sense-perceptual and philosophical), Socrates
draws specific associations in his speech (between, for example, light,
Truth and Being on the one hand, and mixis, Becoming and darkness
on the other). This throws new light on the language and the ideas
he had promoted thus far in his prescriptions about poetry and music
in Books 2 and 3, and on his distinction between knowledge, belief
(Doxa) and ignorance, or Being and Becoming in Book 5. It also casts
light on the manner in which Socrates had talked to Adeimantus at
the beginning of Book 6 about the dangers that can jeopardize the de-
velopment of the true philosopher’s nature. Against this type of imag-
istic discourse, Socrates’ choice of the Sun as an analogon of the Good
holds the most prominent place in the Republic.
In my view, the pictorial effects that the image of the Sun introduces
in the dialogue help us shift the way we interpret Plato’s eikones and im-
agistic language in this context. The Sun’s light, that is, becomes the
binding force that holds together and elucidates Socrates’ mixture of im-
agistic language with more elusive philosophical terms, such as truth,

185 Note that methodological errors are vividly dramatized within the context of
the eikn. When Socrates observes that the Good is even more beautiful and
superior to both Knowledge and Truth (508e-509a), Glaucon replies: )l^wa-
mom j\kkor… k]ceir… oq c±q d^pou s} ce Bdomµm aqt¹ k]ceir (“This is an in-
conceivably beautiful thing you’re talking about… You surely don’t think that
a thing like that could be pleasure”, 509a7 – 8). Socrates’ response is weighted:
Eqv^lei, Gm d’ 1c~. !kk’ ¨de l÷kkom tµm eQj|ma aqtoO 5ti 1pisj|pei (“Hush!
Let’s examine its image in more details as follows”, 509a9 – 10). In re-launching
here the Good’s association with pleasure, Glaucon’s intervention jeopardizes
the conversation which had been hitherto placed on a correct methodological
path. The Socratic euphẽmei is probably a humorous reprimand which, nonethe-
less, bears strong religious connotations. The educational aspect of the verbal
image then becomes manifest in Socrates drawing Glaucon’s attention to his en-
dangering of the discussion.
208 Section Two: The Republic

Knowledge (Epistẽmẽ) and Being, as well as Book’s 5 prescriptions about

the organization of the ideal polis. In the rest of this chapter I will ex-
pand on these suggestions.
Setting out to approach the Good, Socrates first draws Glaucon’s at-
tention to “things they have said before on many other occasions and
earlier in this conversation” (507a7 – 9) and recapitulates:
Pokk± jak\, Gm d’ 1c~, ja· pokk\ !cah± ja· 6jasta ovtyr eWma_ val]m te
ja· dioq_folem t` k|c\. […] Ja· aqt¹ dµ jak¹m ja· aqt¹ !cah|m, ja· ovty
peq· p\mtym $ t|te ¢r pokk± 1t_helem, p\kim aw jat’ Qd]am l_am 2j\stou ¢r
li÷r ousgr tih]mter, “d 5stim” 6jastom pqosacoqe}olem. (507b2 – 7)
We have often drawn a distinction between the multiplicity of things that
we call good or beautiful or whatever it may be and, on the other hand,
Goodness itself or Beauty itself and so on. Corresponding to each of these sets of
many things, we postulate a single Form or real essence, we call it. (trans. Corn-
ford)
Hence Socrates re-launches the discussion of the Forms. The style in
which he arranges linguistically his thesis here is interesting for we
come across a rather rare moment in the Republic’s text where sense-per-
ceptual terminology is carefully removed and words are amassed which
stress singularity, essence, and a clear methodological approach to these
elusive concepts (diorizomen, etithemen, tithentes). Socrates’ distinction re-
fers back to the discussion at the end of Book 5. The thesis that was then
reached by means of logos (507b3) will now become a stepping stone to
their ensuing examination of the Good.186 Immediately afterwards, in
507b9 – 10, Socrates turns to the division of two spheres: the visible
and the intelligible (noẽta, horomena and aisthẽta). His approach to the
Good by way of the image of the Sun rests on this fundamental distinc-
tion and is expressed in diction that relates to sight. In specific terms,
Socrates transplants in the sphere of the intelligible (noẽta), which is gov-
erned by the Good, sense-perceptual and imagistic vocabulary. This lin-
guistic ‘uprooting’ and ‘transplanting’ that Plato also employs in other
epistemologically crucial instances in the dialogue gives birth to the idi-

186 I have already suggested that the language of these lines is not one we come
across regularly in the text of the Republic. This type of language is sporadic
in the dialogue, exclusively used by Socrates, and rarely followed by the Soc-
ratic interlocutors. Glaucon, we should note in passing, is the only other speak-
er whose language exhibits vague seeds of linguistic trends of that sort. Socrates
will deploy similar type of language a few lines later in the text, in a short pas-
sage that builds the Good’s supremacy on the repetition of different types of the
verb to be.
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 209

osyncratic imagistic type of language analyzed in the methodological

section above:
ivhaklo_, Gm d’ 1c~, oWsh’ fti, ftam lgj]ti 1p’ 1je?m\ tir aqto»r tq]p, ¨m
#m t±r wq|ar t¹ Bleqim¹m v_r 1p]w,, !kk± ¨m mujteqim± v]ccg, !lbku~t-
tous_ te ja· 1cc»r va_momtai tuvk_m, ¦speq oqj 1mo}sgr jahaq÷r exeyr ;
… ntam d´ c’ oWlai ¨m b Fkior jatak\lpei, sav_r bq_si, ja· to?r
aqto?r to}toir ellasim 1moOsa va_metai (508c4 – d2).
You know what happens when the colours of things are no longer irradi-
ated by the daylight, but only by the fainter luminaries of the night; when
you look at them, the eyes are dim and seem almost blind, as if there were
no unclouded vision in them. But when you look at things on which the
Sun is shining, the same eyes see distinctly and it becomes evident that they
do contain the power of vision. (trans. Cornford)
Language is employed in a customary way when Socrates explains how
human sight “sees” with accuracy (saphẽneia).187 The same diction, how-
ever, is not used in its familiar environment when Socrates immediately
afterwards adds:
Ovty to_mum ja· t¹ t/r xuw/r ¨de m|ei· ftam l³m ox jatak\lpei !k^hei\ te
ja· t¹ em, eQr toOto !peqe_sgtai, 1m|gs]m te ja· 5cmy aqt¹ ja· moOm 5weim
va_metai· ftam d³ eQr t¹ t` sj|t\ jejqal]mom, t¹ cicm|lem|m te ja· !pok-
k}lemom, don\fei te ja· !lbku~ttei %my ja· j\ty t±r d|nar letab\kkom,
ja· 5oijem aw moOm oqj 5womti. (508d4 – 9)
Apply this comparison to the soul. When its gaze is fixed upon an object irradiated
by truth and reality, the soul gains understanding and knowledge and is man-
ifestly in possession of intelligence. But when it looks towards that twilight
world of things that come into existence and pass away, its sight is dim and it
has only opinions and beliefs which shift to and fro, and now it seems like a
thing that has no intelligence. (trans. Cornford)
Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s relation to the spheres of Becoming
and Being is based on the employment of the motifs of light and dark-
ness/mixture. The passage of course lies at the heart of a Platonic anal-
ogy; one is not surprised with the ascription of sense-perceptive charac-
teristics to the elusive and invisible concepts of Truth and Being. They

187 On Plato’s use here of the words pheggẽ and phs and their poetic and philo-
sophical ramifications, see Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 59). Adam draws a dis-
tinction between the two, as pheggẽ contrary to phs “denotes an artificial or de-
rivative light”. This distinction goes back to both Aristophanes’ Knights 1319
and to Parmenides’ famous lines of the “moon irradiating light borrowed
from the Sun (allotrion phs)”. The motif is also found in Pindar in Pythian 8.
95 – 7: 1p\leqoi. T_ d] tir ; t_ d’ ou tir ; sji÷r emaq/ %mhqypor. !kk’ ftam
aUcka di|sdotor 5kh,,/ kalpq¹m v]ccor 5pestim !mdq_m ja· le_kiwor aQ~m.
210 Section Two: The Republic

“illuminate our surrounding particulars and empower our soul’s under-

standing and knowledge of them”. On the other hand, the soul that
“looks towards” what is “mixed” (kekramenon) with “darkness” (to
skot)” has only opinions (doxazei) and becomes dim-sighted (ambluttei)
and shifts the “beliefs” (doxas) in this and that direction. Socrates’ de-
scription rests on the interlocutors’ natural familiarity with feelings of
disorientation and sense-perceptive bewilderment. Yet, the use of pic-
torial diction in 508d4 – 9 re-directs these familiar sentiments to new di-
rections.188
These few lines do not state explicitly in what way the soul is con-
fused, nor do they mention the concepts about which confusion may be
generated – although qualities such as justice, courage or sphrosynẽ easi-
ly come to mind.189 The passage speaks in strong imagistic terms and
draws the interlocutors’ attention to the state of aporia. If we are thus
bedazzled when light mixes with night throwing dim radiance upon ob-
jects, Socrates argues, imagine what the case will be when the intellect is
invited to untangle far more complicated matters which a priori evade
the easy clarity (saphẽneia) which, according to the many, sense-percep-
tion can provide.190 In this passage about the soul’s response to Being
and Becoming (508d4 – 9), Socrates is relating Truth and Being with
the verb apereisetai which denotes fixity, firmness and stability. All
three words are then linked in a single sentence with the verbs enoẽsen,
gignsk and noon echein that look back to Socrates’ diction in Book 5 as
regards epistẽme and also foreshadow the Line’s epistemological classifi-
cation that will follow immediately afterwards.
Conversely, intellectual perplexity and confusion are linked with the
motif of mixture and disoriented, erratic movement. Thayer’s dramatic
immediacy is at its most dynamic here; the lost and double-minded

188 As darkness often numbs the senses, in poetry it is often used to express stupid-
ity and death. It is thus contrasted to “light” and to “illumination” which de-
notes intelligence and acute perception. At the same time, the human eye is
viewed as the mortal counterpart to Helios, the source of Light that regulates
intelligence (see Emp. B.84); these nuanced relationships are traced in the ety-
mological relation of leuss (to look at) and leukos (white light). See Tarrant
(1960: 181 – 187); Treu (1965: 84); and Vermeul (1979: 24 – 28).
189 In this context Socrates shows how by identifying the Good with the notions of
hẽdonẽ or knowledge, when these are not firmly fixed and defined, the soul can-
not really progress to grasping the reality. Instead, on Parmenidean terms, we
are again resolved to fruitless wandering.
190 See also the Politicus, 285d10 – 186b1.
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 211

(Parmenidean) humans have been replaced with doxai that “move” con-
fusedly and for no reason upward and downward, re-enacting and per-
forming instability, uncertainty, vagueness and indecision.191 In addi-
tion, the lines where the Good is brought linguistically as close as pos-
sible to the Sun (508e1 – 509a5) present us with the moulding of new
words (agathoeidẽ and helioeidẽ) that intertwine as inextricably as possible
knowledge and truth with goodness and sunlight. From this textual en-
vironment, which highlights the supremacy of the Good and its distinc-
tion from both epistẽmẽ and alẽtheia, the motifs of darkness and mixture
are completely absent:
1pist^lgm d³ ja· !k^heiam, ¦speq 1je? v_r te ja· exim Bkioeid/ l³m mol_feim
aqh|m, Fkiom d’ Bce?shai oqj aqh_r 5wei, ovty ja· 1mtaOha !cahoeid/ l³m
mol_feim taOt’ !lv|teqa aqh|m, !cah¹m d³ Bce?shai bp|teqom aqt_m oqj
aqh|m, !kk’ 5ti leif|myr tilgt]om tµm toO !cahoO 6nim. (509a1 – 5)
In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is
wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge
and truth as goodlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good – for the
good is yet more prized.
In these lines, the Sun and the Good have been thus intertwined to sup-
port each other linguistically and thematically. Keeping his analogy in
the foreground, Socrates also distinguishes the Good from Knowledge
and Truth, in the same way that the Sun differs from light (phs) and
sight (opsin). Thus so far in his narrative Socrates has approached the
Good only pictorially and by means of an eikn. Nonetheless, against
this pictorial background, Plato’s main speaker abruptly switches lin-
guistic modes and turns to a rather different linguistic type.
Ja· to?r cicmysjol]moir to_mum lµ l|mom t¹ cicm~sjeshai v\mai rp¹ toO
!cahoO paqe?mai, !kk± ja· t¹ eWma_ te ja· tµm oqs_am rp’ 1je_mou aqto?r
pqose?mai, oqj oqs_ar emtor toO !cahoO, !kk’ 5ti 1p]jeima t/r oqs_ar pqe-
sbe_ô ja· dum\lei rpeq]womtor (509b6 – 10).
Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge
owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, al-
though the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.

191 It is not difficult for the interlocutors to draw certain inferences about the rea-
sons why their own dialogue on justice initially failed. The Socratic elenchus in
Book 1 has dramatized most vividly the devastating results of diversity of opin-
ions – the doxai about justice were too many and too unstable to be accepted
and Glaucon’s intervention at the beginning of Book 2 was designed to address
this problem.
212 Section Two: The Republic

Plato’s technique here, this alternation of style and the diction intro-
duced to this context to talk about the Form of the Good, is similar
to his change of linguistic mode to talk about Epistẽmẽ and Doxa in
the concluding lines of Book 5 examined above. In this passage in
Book 6, Socrates departs from his customary mode of speech and offers
us a glimpse of an alternative linguistic style to talk about the Good. Its
relation to Knowledge (gnsis) – note the reiteration of gignoskomenois
and gignoskesthai in the same line – is given through the juxtaposition
of different forms of einai (pareinai, einai, proseinai, ouk ousias ontos) that
create strong alliterative effects. Socrates dramatizes as vividly as possible
the superiority of the Good when he argues that it is beyond essence and,
although it defines essence, it cannot be identified with it. It is difficult
to think what may lie “beyond essence” and, on the basis of the Repub-
lic’s imagistic discourse thus far, it is equally difficult to think of, or con-
jure up, an alternative linguistic mode that could lead us there. It is thus
not surprising that Glaucon is awestruck (dailom_ar rpeqbok/r, 509c1).
In my view, Glaucon’s comment here is directed at the content and
the linguistic mode that has dramatized it. No matter then what func-
tion we assign to einai (predicative, veridical or existential),192 one
thing becomes manifest in this context: the interlocutors’ ‘tasting’ of
the idea of the Good once untangled from its analogy with the Sun is
built on an ‘uncoloured’ type of language which rests heavily on the
verb to be and cannot be easily depicted in imagistic terms. Socrates’ re-
fusal to approach the Good directly, and his use of an eikn and imagistic
language instead, seems to point toward the assumption that a direct ex-
amination of the Good would require an alternative type of language,
one that connotes stability, singularity and firmness most faithfully.
This would be a cleansed, or colourless, type of language that the mem-
bers of this audience, who, with the possible exception of Glaucon, may
be identified with the sight-lovers of Book 5, cannot easily follow. Soc-
rates’ passionate description of the Good has stretched language to the
limits and has also shaken its customary usage. Plato is quick to dismiss
it.193

192 See Kahn (1981: 105 – 134); and (1988: 237 – 261). See also n. 93 to Chapter
Two above.
193 On the language of Rep. 509b – c, see Burkert (1985: 325): “Plato’s philosophy
seems to touch the boundaries of the unsayable. In the Republic the most impor-
tant statement hides under the mask of the ridiculous.”
 3. Verbal Images in Republic Books 2 and 6 213

However, it is by means of imagistic language that Socrates has as-

sociated thus far in the discussion the Good with firmness and stability.
Even if we know nothing else of the Good, we know that it relates to
Knowledge and Truth, but that it differs from them both, and that it is
also identified with firmness and does away with mixture, confusion,
and instability.194 In this context, to understand the importance of the
Good is to fully grasp the omnipotence of the Sun in the physical do-
main. In Plato’s analogy, the Sun holds the most prominent place, since
it not only opposes twilight and darkness, but it also differs from light
and sight.195 In this image, the Sun turns into a symbol not only of en-
lightenment and life, but, most importantly, of purity, eternity and ho-
mogeneity.196 The Sun as such represents purity par excellence in our
physical world for it dismisses mixture, and it is only the light it releases
that can be mixed. The eyes that view it can be dazzled or blinded giv-
ing into the confusion of light’s mixture (krasis) with night, but the Sun
as such is beyond mixture or ‘contamination’.
Plato’s analogy of the Good as the Sun pays rich philosophical div-
idends in explaining both the unique characteristics of the most signifi-
cant Platonic Form and the confusing effects of mixture in a stylistic
mode that best fits the needs of those particular interlocutors who
have been accustomed to thinking in pictorial terms. Socrates’ interloc-
utors should now understand that their world of becoming and genesis is
one of mixture, contamination, and poikilia, and that in this world the
purity of the Sun is often lost on them.197 In effect, Socrates’ eikn
has also revealed something new about the use of philosophic language.
One is allowed to talk about the world of Becoming by employing po-
larities and heavily pictorial and imagistic parlance without informing the
audience that an exceptional type of discourse is adopted, because this
type of language comes almost naturally to our earthly world of anti-
thesis, Becoming and perishing. When it comes to the ultimate Form,

194 The motif of mixture cannot be seen separately from those of purity and puri-
fication: in the Republic, purification is a process by means of which purity may
be attained in our earthly world. In the dialogue we witness Socrates’ approach
to this process, but not its realization. For an extensive treatment see Chapter
Four below.
195 On the various interpretations of light in Plato’s image of the Sun and its reli-
gious associations, see also Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 60).
196 See, in particular, Adam’s discussion of 508d1 (b Bkior jatak\lpei).
197 For an interpretation of the Form of the Good as “benefit and advantage pure
and simple”, see Penner, n. 166 in this Chapter [emphasis added].
214 Section Two: The Republic

though, language cannot be imagistic without attention being drawn to

this idiosyncratic usage: the (linguistic) distance between the Good and
our world of Becoming is emphasized through the adoption of a verbal
image; of a well-wrought analogy that presents in strong pictorial terms
the purity and homogeneity which, as Socrates showed in Book 5, the
founders’ of a just city must struggle with in order to reproduce on
earth.
In pictorial terms, as regards to the image of the Sun as such, the
Socratic interlocutors are invited to visualize a verbal painting, as it
were, from which diverse landscapes (as those depicted immediately af-
terwards in the Line and the Cave) have been wiped out. What the Re-
public’s sight-lovers now ‘look at’ is clear and pure white colour, namely
the light of the Sun (see Jowett II [1894: 307]). In the literature, this
imagery has created complex problems about the manner in which phi-
losophers come to grasp the Platonic Forms. Is Plato’s reference to direct
vision of the Good to be taken literally? This interpretation suggests
one’s acquaintance with the Forms is intuitive and also carries religious
overtones,198 and has been opposed by scholars who argue that for Plato
knowledge of the Forms can be achieved through Dialectic only and in
a fully discursive rather than in a mystical manner.199 In this chapter, I
have refrained from entering these discussions about Plato’s epistemol-
ogy. In line with the view that I have taken in this study, I have tried
to show instead that Plato’s use of the imagery of the Light and the
Sun should not be read in isolation but that it forms strong connections
with the Republic’s creation of imagery at large. These images are also to
be seen in connection with the distinctive characteristics of Socrates’ in-
terlocutors in this work, most of whom resemble, or are, sight-lovers. It
is for this reason, in my view, that as soon as Socrates turns to the perils
that endanger and destroy (the true philosophical) human nature, as well
as to the depiction of the unjust souls and polities, that his creation of
verbal images (eikones and imagistic language) becomes of a completely
different sort. Human nature can hardly achieve this type of unity and
homogeneity, and Plato’s language is thus moulded to depict this inter-
nal tension and conflict.

198 See, for example, Cornford (1965: 94); Cherniss (1965); but cf. Annas (1981:
282 – 284).
199 So Kahn (1996: 354 – 355). See also Crombie (1964: 112 – 113) and Cross
(1965: 27 – 28).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and
the unjust in the Republic

In this chapter I first turn to the early part of Book 6 in order to analyse
the stylistic mode that Socrates employs in his discussion of philosophic
and non-philosophic human nature. I will then move on to Books 8 and
9, with a view to examining the poetics of Plato’s philosophical prose in
his depiction of the unjust. Book 9, in particular, also presents us with
another moment when the internal audience is divided. In his discussion
of pleasure Plato makes a narratological manoeuvre similar to that which
we examined at the end of Book 5. He removes Adeimantus from the
conversation with Socrates and re-introduces Glaucon in order to dis-
cuss the complex concept of pleasure. This change of Socratic interloc-
utors is also followed by a modification to the stylistic mode.

4.1 Adeimantus’ philosophers

In Book 6, Socrates sets out to examine the characteristics of true phil-
osophic nature. Socrates has been led to deal with this subject by Adei-
mantus, who replaces Glaucon in the conversation after Socrates con-
cludes his epistemological and ontological exposition at the end of
Book 5. In the first part of Book 6, Socrates creates a further verbal
image (eikn), the analogy of the state to a badly-sailed ship, in order
to explain to his co-speakers why philosophers in contemporary cities
are not highly esteemed (487e – 489a).200 The image is significant for
the development of the conversation. It instigates Socrates’ ensuing dis-
cussion of the distinctive characteristics of true philosophic nature and,
secondly, it is a notable moment of authorial self-reference, since within
its context Plato offers us information on the importance of the creation
of imagery in philosophical discourse.

200 On the poetic origins of the ship/city analogy in Alcaeus, see discussion in
Gentili (1988: 197 – 215). The allegory is adopted by Theognis and Aeschylus
and is also employed by Archilochus in the maritime image of a storm at sea
(Fr. 91 T). See also Soph. Antigone, 582 – 592.
216 Section Two: The Republic

At the beginning of Book 6, Adeimantus objects to Socrates’ de-

scription of philosophers: “This is not the way things are in reality (ale-
ths). Those called philosophers nowadays are either allokotoi, corrupted
or useless” (487d2). In order to meet Adeimantus’ challenge at this point
in the dialogue, Socrates announces that he will use a verbal eikon: 9qy-
tør, Gm d’ 1c¾, 1q~tgla de|lemom !pojq_seyr di’ eQj|mor kecol´mgr
(“The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image
or simile”, 487e4 – 5). Adeimantus’ ironical comment in response em-
phasizes his dissatisfaction with this particular type of philosophical dis-
course: S» d] ce, 5vg, oWlai oqj eUyhar di’ eQj|mym k]ceim (“And you, of
course, aren’t used to speaking in similes”, 487e6). Nonetheless, Socra-
tes refuses to dismiss this discursive mode and goes on to narrate the
story of a state as a badly steered ship. In concluding his story, Socrates
stresses once more that the interlocutors have been listening all this time
to an image (eikn, 489a4 – 6; Cp. 488a – b). He then encourages Adei-
mantus to use this image himself to reply to those who wonder why
philosophers are not respected in contemporary cities (1je?mom t¹m hau-
l\fomta fti oR vik|sovoi oq til_mtai 1m ta?r p|kesi, says Socrates, d_da-
sj] te tµm eQj|ma ja· peiq_ pe_heim fti pok» #m haulast|teqom Gm eQ 1ti-
l_mto, [“Then first tell this simile to anyone who wonders why philos-
ophers aren’t honoured in the cities, and try to persuade him that there
would be far more cause for wonder if they were honoured”], 489a8 –
10). The verb used in this context is “to teach” (note Adeimantus alla
didax in 489b1).
Socrates’ remarks here on his use of images in philosophic speech
are significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, after Socrates’ deploy-
ment of an eikn of readily recognisable poetic origins, Adeimantus is
convinced of the reasons why philosophers in contemporary cities are
not respected or honoured and seem useless. Thus Socrates’ image has
the rhetorical force of an ‘argument’ on Adeimantus at this particular
stage of the dialogue.201 Nonetheless, what is more important from
my perspective is Socrates’ advice to Adeimantus to teach the image.
An image, then, may function independently as a coherent unit that
can be taken from its original dialogical environment – this being the
conversation that Socrates holds in the Piraeus – and re-used elsewhere.

201 Gordon (1999: 13 ff.) argues that this might indeed be the case. Nightingale
rightly stresses that to try to substitute a Platonic image for an argument is meth-
odologically ill-conceived (2004, Ch. 3 with n. 4). See also Tecusan (1992: 73 –
82) and McCabe (1992: 59 – 61).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 217

If the same question is asked of Adeimantus, he is advised to re-deploy

this image. Does this instance in the dialogue then imply that when cer-
tain philosophical issues are raised in a conversation, images are the most
appropriate method to persuade? Or could it be that there is another
reason that differentiates Socrates’ creation of this particular image
from the other verbal images in the Republic? If the latter is the case,
then certain further characteristics regarding the function of the eikones
as a mode of philosophical speech become apparent.
Socrates’ employment of an image here highlights the restrictions
that characterise Adeimantus as an interlocutor at this stage of the dia-
logue. In opposing Socrates’ earlier description of philosophical nature,
Adeimantus re-introduces into the discussion the cultural situation in
contemporary cities. The Republic’s two levels, the corrupt city-states
and souls, and the ideal state and soul, are once more about to inter-
twine with each other in conversation. In drawing an image in speech
at this stage of the dialogue, almost immediately after Socrates’ presen-
tation of the Forms and his epistemological division of Epistẽmẽ and
Doxa at the end of Book 5, Plato draws our attention to Adeimantus’
inability to grasp the importance of the innovative philosophical ideas
proposed only a few narratological moments ago in the conversation.202
Socrates bases the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion in Book
5 on his initial distinction between true philosophers and sight-lovers.203
This has led him to a redefinition of the concepts of Truth and Knowl-
edge which became correlated with the ontological status of the Forms.
In posing the question in Book 6 regarding the importance of philoso-
phers in a polis, Plato has Adeimantus demonstrate that the innovative
proposals of Book 5 can be grasped only with difficulty by the majority
of people. In the question he puts to Socrates, Adeimantus confuses the
contemporary cities with the ideal city, thus re-introducing into the dis-
cussion those who do not believe in the Forms (the apistoi and the phil-
otheamones).204

202 See Socrates and Glaucon’s exchange in the opening lines of Book 6. Socrates
recapitulates the conclusions of their earlier discussion: “‘So at last, Glaucon,
after this long and weary way we have come to see who are the philosophers
and who are not.’ ‘I doubt if the way could have been shortened’”.
203 See my discussion above in Chapter Two.
204 Socrates makes this explicit in 493e: “Now, with all this in mind, recall that
distinction we drew earlier, between Beauty itself and the multiplicity of beau-
tiful things. Is it conceivable that the multitude should ever believe in the ex-
218 Section Two: The Republic

Socrates has already suggested at the end of Book 5 that the episte-
mological distance that separates such people from Truth and Knowl-
edge is great and, most probably, unbridgeable. Socrates’ ontological
distinction in Book 5 then threw light on how philosophy is practised
in contemporary cities. Not all philosophers are true philosophers (gnẽ-
sios) according to Plato’s standards in Book 5, and thus the many ambi-
tious and cognitively reduced sight-lovers, or, in Socrates’ imagistic lan-
guage in Book 6, the ship’s crew, interfere in public affairs and in the
practice of philosophy. The result is that they practise both philosophy
and politics badly. Adeimantus fails to make the connection between
true philosophy in the ideal city and ‘contaminated’ philosophy in con-
temporary states, an error which Socrates uses an eikn to emphasize.
This image, however, which depicts civic life on the ship of state in
striking colours, is intended to be different from other philosophical im-
ages employed in the Republic. In specific terms, a distinction can be
drawn here between Platonic imagery which represents contemporary
cities and the non-philosophical citizens, and images which are em-
ployed to portray the just society and its members examined in Chapter
One above. In 488a, Socrates draws our attention to the technique that
he uses as a verbal painter: “What the most decent people experience in
relation to their city is so hard to bear that there’s no other single expe-
rience like it. Hence to find an image of it and a defence for them, I
must construct it from many sources (!kk± de? 1j pokk_m aqt¹ suma-
cace?m eQj\fomta), just as painters paint goat-stags by combining the fea-
tures of different things (oXom oR cqav/r tqacek\vour ja· t± toiaOta lei-
cm}mter cq\vousim)”. The pictorial mixture of different colours in the
painters’ creation of images of this sort is deployed in linguistic terms
in Socrates’ ensuing narrative about civic and philosophical life on a
badly run ship. This story, whose poetic precedent, as I have already
suggested is readily recognizable, is in my view intended to reproduce
in imagistic terms the diversity, conflict and antithesis, or alternatively,
the mixture of various and incongruent elements.
The result is strikingly pictorial: Socrates speaks of turmoil and er-
ratic movement aboard a ship; a captain who is physically ill and people
stupefied with drags and wine; sailors who only pretend to know how
to navigate the ship, but who ignore the seasons of the year, the sky, the
stars, the winds and anything of relevance to the craft of steering ships.

istence of any real essence, as distinct from its many manifestations, or listen to
anyone who asserts such a reality?”
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 219

The image, in other words, is verbally as colourful as the painting (tqa-

cek\vour ja· t± toiaOta) with which Socrates opened his narration of it
(see 601a – b). As a result, this image stands in contrast to Socrates’ earlier
description in Book 5 of the citizens of the ideal polis as a well-attuned
human body, and with his employment of the colourless auto to to refer
to true Being at the end of the same Book. Yet this image of human
conduct in Book 6, as regards its colour diversity (poikilia), also contrasts
with the epistemological images of the Sun and the Line, which rest pri-
marily on the exploitation of the dynamics of light and darkness, and on
their mixture and their separation in order to speak about the different
levels of cognizance of reality. Nevertheless, it is not fortuitous that Pla-
to’s image of the ship of state shares common characteristics in terms of
its vivid pictorial effect with Socrates’ description of the Cave (O’Con-
nor 2007: 55 – 89), or the unjust and the base in democracy and tyranny
presented in Books 8 and 9.
At the same time, Plato’s use of an eikon here also saves narratolog-
ical time. It means that Socrates does not have to restate the criteria on
the basis of which a person is to be characterized as a true philosopher,
since these have been already presented to Glaucon and to the rest of the
group in 475c – e (Tecusan 1992: 69 – 87; Cp. 489a4 – 490a, 490c – e).
Nonetheless, Socrates’ imagery offered to Adeimantus is philosophically
crucial for the development of the dialogue. Plato employs Adeimantus’
intervention here in order to embark on a detailed discussion of human
nature. The image also leads the discussion to the topic of the long and
strenuous education that philosophers will need to undertake in order to
grasp the Forms. What, however, is far more important for my line of
interpretation here, is that the image brings out the tension that under-
lies the dialogue all along, namely the contrast between true philosoph-
ical nature and non-philosophical nature, or “contaminated” nature
(490e – 491b).
As we will see below, in the first part of Book 6 the difference be-
tween the two is rendered in vivid, imagistic language. Book 6, then,
starts with Socrates discussing the distinctive qualities of true philosoph-
ic nature, moves on to a vivid depiction of “contaminated” (nothoi) phi-
losophers in contemporary cities, and culminates with the two eikones of
the Sun and the Line. After the image of the Cave has also been added
to the dialogue, Plato will have presented most vividly both the various
cognitive levels that humans must ascend in order to attain knowledge
of the Forms and the distance that separates those completely lost to
philosophical thinking and education from true Reality (Petraki
220 Section Two: The Republic

[2009: 27 – 67]). The procedure by which one becomes a true philoso-

pher is lengthy, laborious and highly demanding. After Socrates’ sketchy
account of the Good as the Sun, Adeimantus and the rest offer far fewer
objections as to what becoming a gnẽsios philosopher involves in any
city, be it Socrates’ ideal one or contemporary Athens (see 494c – d).

4.2 Human nature, “true” philosophers and

“false” philosophers

Before Adeimantus’ interruption in 487b1, Socrates has already started

to offer an account of the distinctive features of true philosophers.
First in his list comes the power of acute vision. Philosophers should
be “keen-sighted” rather than “blind” (484c3 – 4), for, in line with
the description of Opinion (Doxa) in Book 5, to lack knowledge of
true Being is to be intellectually blind to true Reality. Plato invests a
lot in the power of the intellect as discerning vision when he has Soc-
rates use the pictorial language of painting to describe how the Forms
should stand as a paradigm, a prototype par excellence (paradeigmata), for
the philosophers to draw on the canvas of their own souls and on
state constitutions:
O owm dojoOs_ ti tuvk_m diav]qeim oR t` emti toO emtor 2j\stou 1steqg-
l]moi t/r cm~seyr, ja· lgd³m 1maqc³r 1m t0 xuw0 5womter paq\deicla,
lgd³ dum\lemoi ¦speq cqav/r eQr t¹ !kgh]statom !pobk]pomter j!je?se
!e· !mav]qomt]r te ja· he~lemoi ¢r oX|m te !jqib]stata, ovty dµ ja· t±
1mh\de m|lila jak_m te p]qi ja· dija_ym ja· !cah_m t_hesha_ te, 1±m d],
t_heshai, ja· t± je_lema vuk\ttomter s\feim ; (484c6 – d3)
Do you think, then, that there’s any difference between the blind and those
who are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is? The latter
have no clear model in their souls, so they cannot – in the manner of paint-
ers – look to what is most true, make constant reference to it, and study it as
exactly as possible. Hence they cannot establish here on earth conventions
about what is fine or just or good, when they need to be established, or
guard and preserve them, once they have been established.
Plato’s language is analogical here, but before we proceed to explore the
philosophical value of his reference to painting, we should first turn to
his list of the distinctive qualities that a philosophical nature should dis-
play and maintain through its cognitive association with the Forms.
Non-philosophic human nature will inevitably be lacking in such qual-
ities. With the Platonic Forms as their prototype, true philosophers will
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 221

be the most appropriate rulers, says Socrates, because they will love (er-
sin) this subject that reveals to them the “essence (ousia) that always re-
mains fixed (t/r !e· ousgr) and never wanders due to becoming (ja· lµ
pkamyl]mgr rp¹ cem]seyr ja· vhoq÷r, 485a10 – b3)”. Socrates reiterates
here terminology that he uses in his epistemological distinction between
Knowledge and Belief in Book 5. While so doing, almost in the same
breath, he also draws a linguistic contrast between the less colourful sty-
listic mode of Being and the pictorial and traditional (or poeticized) lan-
guage that belongs to the world of becoming. These few lines lead to a
whole list of divisions and distinctions. In emulating the Forms, the true
philosophers will hate lying and love the truth; be moderate and orderly
(sphrones) and not money-loving (philochrẽmatoi); be fast-learners (euma-
theis) and not slow-learners, labouring in vain (dusmatheis); possess a
good memory (mnẽmones) and be not forgetful (epilẽsmones);205 be meas-
ured (emmetroi) and not unmusical (ametroi 486a – e). The list is summar-
ized in 487a1 – 5:
5stim owm fp, l]lx, toioOtom 1pit^deula, d l^ potû %m tir oX|r te c]moito
Rjam_r 1pitgdeOsai, eQ lµ v}sei eUg lm^lym, eqlah^r, lecakopqep^r,
euwaqir, v_kor te ja· succemµr !kghe_ar, dijaios}mgr, !mdqe_ar,
syvqos}mgr ; Oqdû #m b L_lor, 5vg, t| ce toioOtom l]lxaito.
Is there any objection you can find, then, to a way of life that no one can
adequately follow unless he’s by nature good at remembering (v}sei eUg
lm^lym), quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative
of truth, justice, courage, and moderation? Not even Momus could find
one.
In his description of the true philosophic nature, Socrates has selected
one from each pair of opposites and has ignored their corresponding
polar opposite. Immediately after this rather hyperbolic exposition of
an ethically completely good human, Adeimantus breaks in to contra-
dict Socrates. Adeimantus’ intervention leads to two more Platonic ei-
kones: the ship of state discussed above (in which, we should note in
passing, Plato presents the philosopher as being deaf but not blind) 206
and the image of Philosophy, who is led to a marriage unworthy of
her because those whom she deserves have deserted her as a result of

205 See my discussion of Adeimantus above, in Chapter Three.

206 Note that the details of Plato’s eikn here engage in a dialogue and also display a
stark contrast with his description of people’s affairs in courts, assemblies and
theaters in 492b – d.
222 Section Two: The Republic

their bad upbringing and poor education (495c – d).207 Her ill-matched
intercourse (495c5) will generate illegitimate (notha) offspring and so
counterfeit (nothoi) philosophers will inevitably hold sway. Note that
this type of breeding (Becoming) is only the beginning of a disintegra-
tion (ekehq|r te ja· diavhoq\, 495a10) which inevitably leads to intel-
lectual death:
oxtoi l³m dµ ovtyr 1jp_ptomter, oXr l\kista pqos^jei, 5qglom ja· !tek/
vikosov_am ke_pomter aqto_ te b_om oq pqos^jomta oqdû !kgh/ f_sim,
tµm d] , ¦speq aqvamµm succem_m, %kkoi 1peisekh|mter !m\nioi Õswum\m
te ja· ame_dg peqi/xam, oXa ja· s» v+r ameid_feim to»r ameid_fomtar, ¢r oR
sum|mter aqt0 oR l³m oqdem|r, oR d³ pokko· pokk_m jaj_m %nio_ eQsim.
(495c – d)
And when men, for whom philosophy is most appropriate, fall away from
her, they leave her desolate and unwed, and they themselves lead lives that
are inappropriate and untrue. Then others, who are unworthy of her, come
to her as to an orphan deprived of the protection of kinsmen and disgrace
her. These are the one who are responsible for the reproaches that you say
are cast upon philosophy by those who revile her, namely that some of
those who consort with her are useless, while the majority deserve to suffer
many bad things.
Socrates adds the final touches to this image when he says a few mo-
ments later (496a2 – 9):
po?û %tta owm eQj¹r cemm÷m to»r toio}tour ; oq m|ha ja· vaOka ;
t_ d] ; to»r !man_our paide}seyr, ftam aqt0 pkgsi\fomter blik_si lµ
jatû !n_am, po?û %tta v_lem cemm÷m diamo^lat\ te ja· d|nar ; üqû oqw ¢r
!kgh_r pqos^jomta !joOsai sov_slata, ja· oqd³m cm^siom oqd³
vqom^seyr [%niom] !kghim/r 1w|lemom ; (496a2 – 9)
And what kind of children will that marriage produce? Won’t they be il-
legitimate and inferior? What about when men who are unworthy of ed-
ucation approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily? What kinds
of thoughts and opinions are we to say they beget? Won’t they truly be
what are properly called sophisms, things that have nothing genuine
about them or worthy of being called true wisdom?
Plato’s imagery here is powerful and pregnant with numerous philo-
sophical nuances. It enhances Socrates’ language of Doxa in Book 5
(cf. planomenẽs) and builds a stylistically distinctive type of language
that best fits the contaminated and cognitively diminished intellectual

207 See 491a – d. The same virtues and characteristics that render one a gnẽsios phi-
losopher may also work in the opposite direction in a world of relativism and
disorder.
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 223

life of the so-called illegitimate (nothoi) philosophers in contemporary

cities. Thus Adeimantus’ change of subject in the discussion also signals
a change in Socrates’ stylistic mode. Plato’s main speaker turns again to
the use of powerful images (eikones) that the philotheamones are most at
ease with, but the basic pictorial motifs on which the discussion has
been thus far woven are maintained, only now approached in a different
manner. The discussion is still regulated by the motif of mixture that op-
poses purity. However, since Plato during the discussion has already
outlined the harmony and homogeneity of the just soul and city, and
shown the difference between Being and Becoming in Books 4 and
5, a strong contrast can now be drawn between the images of the
polis as a single body (Book 5) and the highly coloured and imagistic lan-
guage used in order to illustrate the disintegrating aspects of the realm of
Doxa (Opinion and Becoming).
As regards Becoming, there are different types of ‘mixing’ that gen-
erate different offspring: Philosophy is left to consort with the unworthy
and beget illegitimate (nothoi) philosophers, who in their turn also breed
unstable doxai and dianoẽmata that are nothing more than sophismata. At
the other end of the spectrum stands the true philosophers who consort
with the truly Real:
Ja· oqj !lbk}moito oqd’ !pok^coi toO 5qytor, pq·m aqtoO d 5stim 2j\stou
t/r v}seyr ûxashai è pqos^jei xuw/r 1v\ptashai toO toio}tou – pqo-
s^jei d³ succeme? – è pkgsi\sar ja· lice·r t` emti emtyr, cemm^sar moOm
ja· !k^heiam, cmo_g te ja· !kgh_r f]g ja· tq]voito ja· ovty k^coi
¡d?mor, pq·m d’ ou ; (490b2 – 7)
He neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each
nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its
kinship with it, and that, once getting near what really is and having inter-
course with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly
lives, is nourished, and – at that point, but not before – is relieved from the
pains of giving birth?
It is easy to regard the language here as metaphorical (or mystical).208 Yet
the use of this particular imagery to talk about the philosopher’s relation
to Reality cannot be seen in isolation from the broader stylistic and lin-
guistic framework that Socrates has created in order to distinguish be-

208 The allusions to Diotima’s speech in the Symposium (206d3-e1) are striking. See
discussion in Hunter (2004: 88 – 90). The literature on the ‘mystical’ aspects of
the philosopher’s union with the Real is very large. As regards the Republic, see
above, Chapter Three, notes 198 and 199. As regards the Symposium, see Hunt-
er (88 with n. 13). See also Sheffield (2001: 1 – 33).
224 Section Two: The Republic

tween true and counterfeit philosophic nature in the Republic. In discus-

sing human nature, Plato adapts his linguistic style to meet the needs in-
volved in describing Becoming. Nothing is closer to this process than
sexual intercourse and generation, although creation and sexual min-
gling/mixing, argues Socrates, cannot be treated en bloc. We saw
above in Chapters One and Two that Plato constructs his theoretical
ideal state in Book 5 on this underlying principle. There he proposes
certain regulations to control and regulate the guardians’ sexual inter-
course with a view to promoting the homogeneity of the guardian
class, true friendship, and shared feelings.209 In such a philosophical-po-
litical endeavour the human body cannot be ignored.210 The physical is
strictly correlated to the metaphysical and the ontological, and is re-di-
rected to work in harmony with them.
In his description of counterfeit philosophers, Plato is following the
same thought-pattern, albeit in reverse. In his examination of human
nature in the early part of Book 6, Plato has already started to pave
the way for his portrayal of the unjust as representations of ethically
wrong diversity (poikilia) that give birth to sub-humans, that is animals.
In Books 8 and 9, Socrates argues that only true humans possess harmo-
nious souls. In Book 6, Socrates has already embarked on his depiction
of this loss of essential human qualities in his use of the diminutive an-
thrpiskoi to refer to the unworthy who consort with Philosophy
(495c9). This is but the beginning of Plato’s description of ethical de-
cline that reaches a climax in Books 8 and 9 of the dialogue.
To continue our treatment of the narrative in Book 6, according to
Socrates, true (gnesioi) philosophers differ from the counterfeit (peplasme-
noi and nothoi, 485d12, 496a2 – 3) philosophers in that the former have
embarked on the long and arduous task of eliminating the polarities and
conflicting features inherent in human nature. Here Socrates argues that
the true philosopher will need to refrain from indulging emotions of
envy and hatred. Instead he will “imitate” the Real:
Oqd³ c\q pou, § Ade_lamte, swokµ t` ce ¢r !kgh_r pq¹r to?r owsi tµm
di\moiam 5womti j\ty bk]peim eQr !mhq~pym pqaclate_ar, ja· law|lemom
aqto?r vh|mou te ja· dusleme_ar 1lp_pkashai, !kk’ eQr tetacl]ma %tta ja·
jat± taqt± !e· 5womta bq_mtar ja· heyl]mour out’ !dijoOmta out’ !dijo}-
lema rp’ !kk^kym, j|sl\ d³ p\mta ja· jat± k|com 5womta, taOta lile?sha_

209 See also discussion in Ludwig, in Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.) (2007: 217 – 222).
210 Note that in the image of the Sun, the Sun is an analogon of the Good on our
world: the Good does not beget.
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 225

te ja· fti l\kista !voloioOshai. C oUei tim± lgwamµm eWmai, ft\ tir blike?
!c\lemor, lµ lile?shai 1je?mo ; (500c2 – 5)
No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are,
Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled
with envy and hatred by competing with people. Instead, as he looks at
and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice
to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates them and tries to
become as like them as he can. Or do you think that someone can consort with
things he admires without imitating them?
I will not consider the matter of Platonic mimẽsis here, since this has
been thoroughly and articulately analysed in the literature.211 What pri-
marily interests me here is the distinction that Socrates draws among the
prototypes that humans imitate. Humans inevitably imitate things they
consort with. Thus the true philosopher, as a result of consorting
with what is divine and ordered, will “himself become as divine and or-
dered as a human being can” (500c9 – d2).212
The implications here are manifold. According to Plato’s view of
mimẽsis, humans will always fall short of the “divine and the ordered”,
however much they try to approach it, because they imitate it. However,
Socrates’ description of the true philosopher helps us also draw certain
inferences regarding the manner in which the philosophically unsophis-
ticated humans spend their lives. The image used by Socrates is partic-
ularly instructive in this respect. The true philosopher will be a valuable
public figure as, having already successfully eliminated in his own soul
the vice that arises from opposition and contrariety (500c1 – 2), he
will know how to effect the same in both public and in private spheres,
and how to mould the characters and the souls of the others in accord
with this paradigm (500d5 – 6). In this context, Plato once again em-
ploys his colourless auto pronoun, in striking contrast to the earthly con-
flict and antithesis. The philosopher will come to view “these (things)

211 The literature on Platonic mimẽsis is extensive. Greene (1918: 1 – 75); Tate
(1928: 16 – 23) and (1932: 161 – 169); Cherniss (1932: 233 – 242); Verdenius
(1949); Koller (1954); Else (1958: 73 – 90); Cross and Woozley (1964:
271 ff.); Golden (1975: 118 – 131); Murdoch (1977); Annas (1981); Grube
(1981); Belfiore (1983: 39 – 62) and (1984: 121 – 146); Elias (1984); Babut
(1985: 72 – 92); Osborne (1987: 53 – 73); Janaway (1995: 106 – 132); Farness,
in Michelini, A. N. (ed.) (2003: 99 – 121). Moss, in Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.)
(2007: 415 – 443).
212 This issue is discussed informatively by Cooke (1999: 37 – 44). For a detailed
analysis of the characteristics of the true philosopher as described by Socrates,
see also Patterson (1987: 325 – 350).
226 Section Two: The Republic

that are ordered and always the same that neither do injustice to each
other nor suffer injustice” (500c2 – 3). Having such a Reality as his
model and prototype, the philosopher, as a kind of painter, will
“wipe” his sketching slate and paint anew on a “clean” one:
kab|mter, Gm dû 1c~, ¦speq p_maja p|kim te ja· Ehg !mhq~pym, pq_tom
l³m jahaq±m poi^seiam %m, d oq p\mu Nõdiom7 !kkû owm oWshû fti to}t\
#m eqh»r t_m %kkym diem]cjoiem, t` l^te Qdi~tou l^te p|keyr 1hek/sai
#m ûxashai lgd³ cq\veim m|lour, pq·m C paqakabe?m jahaq±m C aqto·
poi/sai. oqjoOm let± taOta oUei rpocq\xashai #m t¹ sw/la t/r
pokite_ar ; 5peita oWlai !peqcaf|lemoi pujm± #m 2jat]qysû !pobk]poiem,
pq|r te t¹ v}sei d_jaiom ja· jak¹m ja· s_vqom ja· p\mta t± toiaOta, ja·
pq¹r 1je?mû aw t¹ 1m to?r !mhq~poir 1lpoio?em, sulleicm}mter te ja·
jeqamm}mter 1j t_m 1pitgdeul\tym t¹ !mdqe_jekom, !pû 1je_mou
tejlaiq|lemoi, d dµ ja· nlgqor 1j\kesem 1m to?r !mhq~poir 1ccicm|lemom
heoeid]r te ja· heoe_jekom. (501a2 – c2)
They’d take the city and the characters of human beings as their sketching
slate, but first they’d wipe it clean – which isn’t at all an easy thing to do.
And you should know that this is the plain difference between them and
others, namely, that they refuse to take either an individual or a city in
hand or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to
clean it themselves… And I suppose that, as they work, they’d look
often in each direction, towards the natures of justice, beauty, moderation
and the like, on the one hand, and towards those they’re trying to put into
human beings, on the other. And in this way they’d mix and blend the var-
ious ways of life in the city until they produced a human image based on
what Homer too called “the divine form and image” when it occurred
among human beings.
In their use of an analogy with painting, these lines also raise the prob-
lem of the feasibility of realising the ideal state and then moulding the
ideal souls in it.213 In this passage, Socrates broaches discussion of the
ethical qualities of justice, beauty, moderation and the like, on the
basis of which true philosophers and humanity at large must be mould-
ed. In Book 7 (535a9 – b9), Socrates claims that the exceptional ethical
and intellectual qualities of the true philosophic nature cannot be pre-
served, unless they are coupled with a long and hard training in higher
subjects, such as number theory, geometry, stereometry, astronomy,

213 Plato has Socrates admit that the philosophers’ task is not an easy one. As regards
this difficulty, see Conford (1941 205), for example, who draws attention to
Rep. 540e where Plato proposes “to rusticate the whole population above the
age of ten”. But cf. Reeve (1988: 83 – 95). In addition see Rorty (1998:
167 – 171).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 227

harmonics, and dialectic. The struggle against the conflicting aspects of

our own nature can win over even the most gifted people.
At Republic 535d1 – 3, Socrates returns to his distinction between
true and nothoi philosophers and clarifies his definition of the former
further: Pq_tom l]m, eWpom, vikopom_ô oq wyk¹m de? eWmai t¹m "x|lemom,
t± l³m Bl_sea vik|pomom emta, t± d’ Bl_sea %pomom (“No student should
be lame in his love of hard work, really loving one half of it, and hating
the other half”). Socrates’ proposals will not allow the simultaneous co-
existence of a pair of opposites within the person who is to become a
gnesios philosopher. The same holds for the philosophers’ relation to
truth (535d9 – e5). The human soul becomes somatised and is given
bodily features: OqjoOm ja· pq¹r !k^heiam, Gm d’ 1c~, taqt¹m toOto
!m\pgqom xuwµm h^solem (“Similarly with regard to truth, won’t we
say that a soul is maimed […]”, 535d9 – e). The distinction drawn in
the latter case is not between truth and falsehood, but between “volun-
tary” and “involuntary” falsehoods (2jo}siom xeOdor and !jo}siom xeO-
dor, 535e), and between the philosopher’s capacity to resist the former
and not to be deceived by the latter. The soul which fails in this again
suffers diminution: !kk’ eqweq_r ¦speq hgq_om veiom 1m !lah_ô lok}mg-
tai (“[The soul] wallows in ignorance like a pig, 535e4 – 5).214 In this
context the motif of “mixture” is intertwined with the motif of intellec-
tual “contamination” (molunsis) and both are further linked with conflict
and antithesis. A true philosopher cannot be both philo-ponos and a-
ponos. Socrates thus concludes his portrait here of the true philosophic
nature that he starts at the beginning of Book 6. Antithesis must be
erased completely.215

214 Plato again employs the diminutive, this time for the soul of the calculating and
cunning (ponẽroi) in Rep. 519a3: C oupy 1mmem|gjar, t_m kecol]mym pomgq_m
l]m, sov_m d] , ¢r dqil» l³m bk]pei t¹ xuw\qiom (“Or have you ever noticed
this about people who are said to be vicious but clever, how keen the vision
of their little souls is…”)
215 The notion of completeness that human nature must achieve is linguistically
given in Socrates’ terms !qtileke?r and !qt_vqomar in 536b. The adjective
%qtior is etymologically connected to "qaq_sjy, thus evoking again the Platon-
ic notion of harmony and harmonisation. See LSJ v I and II. See also Socrates’
poignant remarks in Rep. 536c: “I forgot we were only playing, and so I spoke
too vehemently. But I looked upon philosophy as I spoke, and seeing her un-
deservedly besmirched, I seem to have lost my temper and said what I said too ear-
nestly, as if I were angry with those responsible for it” (emphasis added).
228 Section Two: The Republic

Nonetheless, true philosophers cannot escape the world of Becom-

ing and antithesis completely (Cornford 1941: 148).216 This entangle-
ment is dramatized in Plato’s description of the philosophers’ task in so-
ciety in 519d1 – 5. The rhetoric of these lines is powerful.217 Socrates
employs a vocabulary that brings out artistically the tension arising
from conflict that defines the innermost depths of human nature:
ja· !mab/mai 1je_mgm tµm !m\basim, ja· 1peid±m !mab\mter Rjam_r Udysi, lµ
1pitq]peim aqto?r d mOm 1pitq´petai. T¹ po?om d¶; T¹ aqtoO, Gm d’ 1c¾,
jatal]meim ja· lµ 1h´keim p²kim jataba_meim paq’ 1je¸mour…. (519d1 – 5)
[It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the
study we said before is the most important, namely,] to make the ascent
and see the good. But when they’ve made it and looked sufficiently, we
mustn’t allow them to do what they’re allowed to do today. What is
that? To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave…
Plato’s reiteration of different forms of the same words emphasizes every
stage of humans’ philosophical progress: the struggle towards intellectual
ascent, the desire for stability and permanence, and the inability to enjoy
for ever the vision of the fixed and unchanging Reality. In a way, then,
true philosophers cannot transcend their nature; they must always re-
main tied to the earth-bound mundane. They must continuously de-
scend (katabainein), for their philosophical task is to educate others. In
this sense, the philosopher becomes the hermeneus, the channel through
which humanity may be introduced to the Platonic Reality.218

216 In Book 10. 609d6 – 7, the ‘simplicity’ of the human soul is linked to disem-
bodiment. See discussion in Reeve (1988: 159 – 162); Rowe (2007: 166 –
176). See also Bourloyanni (Unpiblished Phd Thesis 2009).
217 In a sense, Socrates, despite his constant disavowal of knowledge, resembles a
true Platonic philosopher who keeps returning to the ‘cave’ of Athens. Scholars
have interpreted the Republic’s opening sentence as Socrates’ katabasis. See, for
example, Pappas (1995: 17 – 20). The literature on the philosophers’ obligation
to return in order to educate and organize the city is vast. See discussion in
Nightingale (2004: Ch. 3).
218 Cp. Plato’s language in 486d10: =lletqom %qa ja· euwaqim fgt_lem pq¹r to?r
%kkoir di\moiam v}sei, Dm 1p· tµm toO emtor Qd]am 2j\stou t¹ aqtovu³r eq\cy-
com paq]nei. (“Then in addition to those other things, let’s look for someone
whose thought is by nature measured and graceful and is easily led to the form of
each thing that is”.) Blondell (2002: 247 – 250) discusses the reasons why Glau-
con cannot be transformed into a “Socratic-like philosophical” figure.
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 229

4.3 The poetics of the unjust in Books 8 and 9

The analysis above of Books 6 and 7 has shown that the conflicting
qualities of human nature form a prominent theme in the Republic. In
lines 501a2 – c2 cited above, Plato focuses on the philosopher-kings’ or-
ganisation and education of society on the model of the Forms. The pas-
sage employs terminology drawn from painting to describe the new type
of mixture that the philosophers will seek to promote in moulding eth-
ics and politics. The procedure described through the analogy of paint-
ing is thus similar to that which Socrates practises in his construction of
the ideal city in Book 5. Plato’s Socrates does not seek to ban mixture
from his just city or soul. Instead, he attempts to keep it under control
by restraining sexual intercourse within the guardian class. As long as the
mixed elements are qualitatively identical, their mixture does not gen-
erate incongruent diversity (poikilia) but leads to civic homogeneity.
In resorting to analogies drawn from painting, Plato theorizes on
such a process. Thus, in my view, if we follow his analogy in
501a2 – c2 and seek to grasp the parallels, then “colours” are to be equa-
ted to virtues and the fundamental characteristics of this new mixture
are thus revealed: the ethical qualities that relate to the Forms must
be ‘mixed’ by means of correct education in the ethics of the city and
of the soul (501a1). According to Plato’s Socrates, this is capable of cre-
ating a new humanity (andreikelon) that resembles the divine as much as
possible (theoeides, theoeikelon).219 What must be then wiped off this can-
vas is vice as the polar opposite of the good (agathon) in all its diverse
manifestations. The philosophers’ canvas when complete will be the
representation par excellence of the good, the just, the temperate, and
the courageous.
Such an analysis pertains to the philosophers’ moulding of the ideal
polis and souls on the basis of the Forms. However, in the introduction
to this work I suggested that Plato also attempts a task similar to that of
the philosopher-kings’. This is the education of Socrates’ interlocutors
in philosophy, ethics, and ontology in an attempt to rectify the ethical
damage caused by poetry and rhetoric.220 From my interpretative point
of view here in this work, then, lines 501a2 – c2 also raise interesting is-
sues regarding Plato’s task in the dialogue of demonstrating to Socrates’

219 The painting of the andreikelon was based on mixing pigments that produced the
carnation colour. See Keuls (1997: 115 – 116).
220 Plato does not always distinguish the two: See Rep. 492b5-c8 and 493a6-d9.
230 Section Two: The Republic

interlocutors how true Reality truly is. As I will explain in the following
pages, his use of the analogy with painting proves particularly illuminat-
ing in untangling the complex narratological levels of the dialogue on
justice and injustice, since Plato’s use in our text of the language of
painting is twofold. Plato, I argue, cannot eliminate mixture from the
ethical environment of Socrates’ interlocutors since they are culturally
fully immersed in it and the “colours” of vice (kakias) have inevitably
rubbed off on them. What he can do, however, is to restrain the mix-
ture by drawing the interlocutors’ attention to its perils – as he repeat-
edly does in the work – and analyse or separate its conflicting constitu-
ents so as to reveal that what seems true to them is only the result of a
false and ignorant construction (see 377d – e: platt, syntithentes). The er-
roneous reception of this fabrication as real rests on the interlocutors’
intellectual distance from true Reality and on their weak and feeble in-
tellectual eye-sight (368d).
If we adopt this interpretative viewpoint then we are in a better po-
sition to understand the rich philosophical potential that lies in Plato’s
constant references to painting in his dialogue. In particular, we are in
a better position to comprehend Plato’s references to skiagraphia and
to describe the philosophical task that Socrates undertakes when he em-
barks on a joint investigation into justice and injustice with Glaucon and
Adeimantus, and to describe the reasons that dictate Socrates’ manifold-
ness of stylistic modes in the Republic’s discourse.221 Thus Socrates’ ed-
ucational venture in the Republic differs at crucial points from the phi-
losopher-kings’ “painting and moulding of ethics in the ideal city and
souls”. From this perspective, it is not coincidental that in 501a – c
cited above Plato has refrained from mentioning the technique of skia-
graphia in the context of his description of the philosopher-kings’ task in
the polis. Skiagraphia carries the meaning of shadow or of a mixture of
light and darkness and, from this point of view, it is an inappropriate
term for rendering the clarity of the good that the philosopher-kings
will have to draw on their “clean slate” in order to organise the earthly
ethics and constitutions.

221 On Plato’s use of the metaphor of painting, see Halliwell (2002: 119 – 147).
Halliwell focuses on Plato’s discussion of painting in Rep. Book 10 (at 120),
but his suggestion regarding the philosopher’s use of the metaphor throughout
his writings accords with the reading I propose here: “the analogies and meta-
phors of philosophers can be revealing, indeed partly constitutive, of their pat-
terns of thoughts” (at 124, emphasis added).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 231

However, before we examine the way in which Plato’s references to

the technique of skiagraphia is revealing as to how his thought-patterns
and linguistic styles are arranged in the Republic, it is instructive to turn
to Books 8 and 9 and review his description of the increasing corruption
and decline of souls and polities. Socrates’ description of ethical disinte-
gration in the dialogue’s two penultimate Books has received extensive
treatment in the literature.222 In this section my aim is to draw attention
to Socrates’ distinctive linguistic style in his description of corrupted
souls and polities, rather than examine the political and psychological re-
percussions of his proposed divisions of souls and constitutions. Howev-
er, a review of these ideas is in order here.
At the beginning of Book 8 Socrates returns to the argument inter-
rupted at the start of Book 5. Plato’s main speaker has already outlined
the character of his kallipolis and of the man or woman that resembles it,
and has argued for the existence of a single type of justice, but of multi-
ple forms of injustice, unjust souls and, as he will explain further in
Books 8 and 9, of characters. At the beginning of Book 8 Plato has Soc-
rates invoke the Muses to narrate the reasons for the ethico-political
corruption. Plato’s Muses adopt unusual language and explain by
means of difficult mathematics that the disintegration will start when
the leaders of the ideal city fail to control their reproduction and
“beget children when they ought not to do so”. In their innovative
song, Plato’s Muses deploy the “noble lie” that Socrates had ready for
the kallipolis’ guardians and trace the origins of ethical and civic corrup-
tion in the erotic intercourse of the city’s two upper classes.223 As a re-
sult, disintegration lies in incorrect and inharmonious ‘mixtures’:
1j d³ to}tym %qwomter oq p\mu vukajijo· jatast^somtai pq¹r t¹ doji-
l\feim t± Jsi|dou te ja· t± paq’ rl?m c]mg, wqusoOm te ja· !qcuqoOm
ja· wakjoOm ja· sidgqoOm7 bloO d³ lic]mtor sidgqoO !qcuq` ja· wakjoO
wqus` !moloi|tgr 1ccem^setai ja· !mylak_a !m\qlostor, $ cem|lema, ox
#m 1cc]mgtai, !e· t_jtei p|kelom ja· 5whqam. ta}tgr toi ceme/r wqµ v\mai
eWmai st\sim, fpou #m c_cmgtai !e_. (546e – 547a)

222 See Bloom (1968: 413 – 426); Annas (1981: 295 – 305); Rosen (2005: 305 –
332); and Parry (2007: 386 – 414).
223 On the Muses’ difficult mathematics here see Brumbaugh (1949: 197 – 199);
and Adam (1963 [1902] vol.2). On the Hesiodic resonance of these lines see
Solmsen (1960: 171 – 211). In addition see the compilation of articles in
Boys-Stones and Haubold (eds.) (2010) and O’ Connor, in Ferrari, G. R. F.
(ed.) (2007: 55 – 89).
232 Section Two: The Republic

Hence, rulers chosen from among them won’t be able to guard well the
testing of the golden, silver, bronze and iron races, which are Hesiod’s
and your own. The intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with gold that re-
sults will engender lack of likeness and unharmonious inequality, and these always
breed war and hostility wherever they arise. Civil war, we declare, is always
and everywhere ‘of this lineage’.
The Muses’ language in 546a – 547a is a well-wrought amalgamation of
traditional poetic language and ideas, and Platonic mathematical lan-
guage. This amalgamation emphasizes further people’s inability to ad-
here to Socrates’ rules regarding purity and erotic mixture prescribed
for the ideal city. Thus the guardians will neglect the “noble lie” on
which the city’s organisation was initially founded and the philoso-
pher-kings will at some point inevitably fail to practise “calculation
with sense perception” (546b1 – 2).224 The result of this miscalculation
is the generation of the four corrupt polities. Human souls disintegrate
as internal psychic divisions give rise to new varieties of mixtures and
imbalances, which then generate conflict, division, and polymorphy.
The first step, of course, in the direction of internal (psychological)
and external (civic) corruption is the guardians’ disregard for the music
and poetry which was designed to strengthen and consolidate their dis-
tinctive natural qualities. Throughout Book 8 Plato’s Socrates builds on
his initial isomorphism of city and soul to show how psychological insta-
bility, division and strife causes civic tension and is reflected in the organ-
isation of various societies. In his outline of the four corrupt polities,
namely timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, Socrates also allows
for the emergence of other constitutions, such as dynasties and purchased
kingships, which lie at some intermediate point between these four
(544c – d). He thus makes clear that the forms of vice and injustice are nu-
merous and evade strict classification and complete accuracy thanks to
their polymorphy (polueidia) and diversity (poikilia) (548c – d).
In their discussion of Book 8, scholars have rightly drawn attention
to its relation to the division of the soul described in Book 4 (Parry
2007: 386 – 414). Indeed, Plato here engages in a dialogue with his ear-
lier thesis regarding the just soul and city in Books 4 and 5, and intends
Books 8 and 9 to stand in a stark contrast to the books in which he ex-
presses his earlier ideas. Less attention has been paid, however, to the
gradual alteration of Socrates’ stylistic modes as he moves from the dis-
cussion of timocracy and oligarchy to consideration of democracy and

224 On the Republic’s Noble Lie, see Schofield (2006: 284 – 309).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 233

tyranny. The further Socrates moves towards his description of corrup-

tion, the more Plato has him exploit images, wording, and poetic quo-
tations to depict the true nature of the unjust. Plato’s imagistic language
culminates in Book 9 in the context of his discussion of pleasure, in his
unveiling of the appalling polymorphy of the tyrant’s soul and, in par-
ticular, of the beast-like appetitive part in him.
In my view, in utilising the language of poets and vivid animal im-
agery in the presentation of the different forms of vice in Books 8 and 9,
Plato meets Adeimantus’ challenge to Socrates regarding justice and in-
justice that he makes back in Book 2. In Book 2, Adeimantus makes the
most of poetic quotations and ideas, thickly weaving them in abundance
into the linguistic texture of his argument that a similitude of justice is
better that being truly just. In his speech, quotations from Homer, Hes-
iod, Pindar, Simonides, and Archilochus are employed to formulate the
thesis that injustice pays more, that justice is more difficult, that the gods
may not exist and so do not punish the perpetrators of unjust acts and,
even if they do exist, they can be easily bribed to avoid inflicting pun-
ishment on the guilty as long as the unjust can afford the sacrifice
(364a – b, 365d – e).225 Adeimantus’ speech is the occasion for Socrates’
long condemnation of poetry and music and for his prescriptions regard-
ing the guardians’ education in Books 2 and 3, but Plato’s answer to
Adeimantus’ challenge is not to be completed until we reach Books 8
and 9 of the dialogue (cf. Bloom 1968: 413).
In these Books, Socrates meets Adeimantus’ challenge. At the be-
ginning of his speech in 363a, Adeimantus introduces into the discus-
sion the matter of the ethical influence of filial relations:
k]cousi d] pou ja· paqajeke}omtai pat]qer te r]sim, ja· p\mter oR tim_m
jgd|lemoi, ¢r wqµ d_jaiom eWmai, oqj aqt¹ dijaios}mgm 1paimoOmter !kk±
t±r !pû aqt/r eqdojil^seir, Vma dojoOmti dija_\ eWmai c_cmgtai !p¹ t/r
d|ngr !qwa_ te ja· c\loi ja· fsapeq Cka}jym di/khem %qti, !p¹ toO
eqdojile?m emta t` dija_\. 1p· pk]om d³ oxtoi t± t_m don_m k]cousim.
t±r c±q paq± he_m eqdojil^seir 1lb\kkomter %vhoma 5wousi k]ceim
!cah\, to?r bs_oir û vasi heo»r did|mai7 ¦speq b cemma?or Js_od|r te ja·
nlgq|r vasim… (362e4 – 363a5)
When fathers speak to their sons, they say that one must be just, as do all
the others who have charge of anyone. But they don’t praise justice itself,
only the high reputations it leads to and the consequences of being thought

225 See also Ford (2002: 215), who rightly observes that “Adeimantus in fact is a
speaking anthology of the kind that Hippias composed with Orpheus, Musaeus,
Hesiod, Homer and many prose writers (B 6DK)” (emphasis added).
234 Section Two: The Republic

to be just, such as public offices, marriages, and other things Glaucon listed.
But they elaborate even further on the consequences of reputation. By
bringing in the esteem of the gods, they are able to talk about the abundant
good things that they themselves and the noble Hesiod and Homer say that
the gods give to the pious…
Integral to this paternal advice is Adeimantus’ idea of building a “façade”
or “false appearance” of justice. The idea is first introduced into the dis-
cussion by his brother Glaucon only a few moments earlier, but Adei-
mantus enhances it with colourful poetic imagery and language to make
the most of it:
K]coi c±q #m 1j t_m eQj|tym pq¹r art¹m jat± P_mdaqom 1je?mo t¹ P|teqom
d_jô te?wor vxiom C sjokia?r !p\tair !mab±r ja· 1laut¹m ovty peqivq\nar
diabi_; T± l³m c±q kec|lema dija_\ l³m emti loi, 1±m lµ ja· doj_ evekor
oqd³m vasim eWmai, p|mour d³ ja· fgl_ar vameq\r7 !d_j\ d³ d|nam dijaios}mgr
paqesjeuasl]m\ hesp]sior b_or k]cetai. OqjoOm, 1peidµ t¹ doje?m, ¢r
dgkoOs_ loi oR sovo_, ja· tµm !k\heiam bi÷tai ja· j}qiom eqdailom_ar, 1p·
toOto dµ tqept]om fkyr7 pq|huqa l³m ja· sw/la j}jk\ peq· 1laut¹m sjia-
cqav_am !qet/r peqicqapt]om, tµm d³ toO sovyt\tou )qwik|wou !k~peja
2kjt]om 1n|pishem jeqdak]am ja· poij_kgm. ‘)kk± c\q, vgs_ tir, oq Nõdiom
!e· kamh\meim jaj¹m emta.’ Oqd³ c±q %kko oqd³m eqpet]r, v^solem, t_m
lec\kym7 !kk’ flyr, eQ l]kkolem eqdailom^seim, ta}t, Qt]om, ¢r t± Uwmg
t_m k|cym v]qei. (365b1 – c6)
He would surely ask himself Pindar’s question: ‘Should I by justice or by
crooked deceit scale this high wall and live my life guarded and secure?’
And he’ll answer: ‘The various sayings suggest that there is no advantage in
my being just if I’m not also thought just, while the troubles and penalties of
being just are apparent. But they tell me that an unjust person, who has se-
cured for himself a reputation for justice, lives the life of a god. Since, then,
‘opinion forcibly overcomes truth’ and ‘controls happiness,’ as the wise
men say, I must surely turn entirely to it. I should create a faÅade of illusory
virtue around me to deceive those who come near, but keep behind it the greedy
and crafty fox of the wise Archilochus. ‘But surely,’ someone will object, ‘it
isn’t easy for vice to remain always hidden.’ We’ll reply that nothing
great is easy.
In the these lines, Adeimantus introduces for the first time in the Repub-
lic poetic animal imagery in order to discuss deceit and he associates it
with the word skiagraphia, which disappears as the discussion on justice
and injustice develops in the central books of the dialogue, only to re-
appear much later in Books 7, 9, and 10.226 Adeimantus argues his case

226 The word skiagraphia occurs ten times in the Platonic corpus, five of them in
the Republic, the others in the late dialogues (with the exception of the Phaedo).
See discussion in this chapter further below.
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 235

to the effect that injustice is better than justice by focusing on the ability
possessed by man to create around himself a façade of justice that will
allow him the social benefits that one enjoys in a hypocritical society
from ‘appearing’ just and the ‘true’ rewards of injustice that the unjust
person enjoys throughout his life (hesp]sior b_or k]cetai). This presen-
tation of the idea of a pretence of justice is achieved by means of an elu-
sive metaphor that also introduces to the text the notion of “diversity”
(poikilia) through the image of the versatile fox. Plato has Adeimantus
adapt Archilochus’ imagery to describe in animal-like terms what is usu-
ally concealed behind a façade of deceitful virtue. Adeimantus, then,
suggests that there is a distance between one’s internal condition and ex-
ternal appearance, and employs embellished poetic language to do so,
for the image of the fox traditionally identifies deception with resource-
fulness and cunning.
In his depiction of unjust polities and souls in Books 8 and 9, Soc-
rates addresses Adeimantus’ points and subverts them. However, the Re-
public is so organised that the discussion of the various forms of injustice
follows the description of the just city and soul and the exposition of
Platonic ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics in Books 5, 6, and
7. Thus Plato intends Books 8 and 9 to contrast with the ideas presented
in the earlier books as regards the ideal city and the harmonious and just
soul. One point of contrast relates to the notion of distance that separates
human from intrinsic ethical qualities, and from the Platonic Ideas. As
we saw in Chapter One above, the distance evident in Book’s 5 descrip-
tion of the just city is in fact almost annihilated. The guardians, who,
according to Book 5, constitute the pool from which the city’s rulers
are to be selected, share everything, their life being thus organized to
combat both division and concealment. In Books 4 and 5, Socrates
does his best to show his interlocutors how a soul may become harmon-
ized and how a whole class and a whole city may be integrated into a
whole so that it functions harmoniously as a single human body. In
terms of Socrates’ imagery in Book 5, in the ideal polis internal psycho-
logical harmony is reflected in the external harmonious unification of
the many humans who function as one body.
The case with the various unjust individuals, however, is radically
different. In Book 2, Plato has Adeimantus use poetic language to de-
scribe the views of the majority on individual and civic ethics. Yet, as
the argumentation of the dialogue progresses, Plato demonstrates how
the poets’ representation of versatile (poikilẽ) reality completely misrep-
resents true Reality. In doing so, he simultaneously shows how the
236 Section Two: The Republic

poets’ language is also to be dismissed, along with their false representa-

tion of reality, since their use of colourfulness, diversity, and multiplicity
cannot be separated from the ideas they seek to convey in their compo-
sitions.227 By Books 8 and 9, however, Plato’s theme has changed, for
Plato’s Socrates now employs the language and motifs which he severely
criticises back in Book 3. In amassing poetic imagery and diction in
these two Books, Socrates demonstrates to his interlocutors that the var-
ious forms of injustice have their own language which expresses their
polymorphy and variety most faithfully.
This is the “colourful” and “diverse” language of poetry (601a – b),
and one is allowed to employ it when speaking of the unjust and the bad
only. From this point of view, Adeimantus is right to describe the unjust
as being entrenched behind a façade and correctly transforms the unjust
into an animal, although he is completely unaware of the true repercus-
sions of this description in relation to the unjust person’s true psycho-
logical condition and happiness. Plato then resorts to the familiar motifs
of mixis and poikilia and uses poetic language and imagery to demon-
strate how things truly are in the camp of the bad: “In this way, we
can complete our investigation into how pure justice and pure injustice
stand (B %jqator dijaios}mg pq¹r tµm !dij_am tµm %jqatom 5wei), with
regard to the happiness or wretchedness of those who possess them
(eqdailom_ar te p]qi toO 5womtor ja· !hki|tgtor)…” (545a5-8).
Plato’s unjust and base cities are the result of various combinations
or mixtures of different ruling elements in the soul and in society. Psy-
chological and civic harmony is disturbed in various ways once we
abandon the aristocracy of the philosopher-kings. The first city in the
list is based on timocracy, in which rule people in whose soul the spir-
ited part predominates. This, according to Socrates, is the second best
city, in which people organize their civic life around the desire for hon-
our, victories, and good reputation. Plato’s description of different gra-
dations of injustice in Book 8 hinges on the various psychological ten-
sions which underlie familial relationships. Thus the timocratic man is
presented as the son of a good father who lives in an ill-governed
city. The bonds between father and son are gradually broken as society

227 Ford (2002: 215) observes that Adeimantus’ use of epiptomenoi for the young
“winging their way” among such [poetic] sayings, links the image of bees gath-
ering nectar with anthologies (florilegia)’. See discussion below on how Plato’s
language turns this nuanced imagery into “the stinged and stingless kẽphẽnes”
in Book 8.
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 237

nourishes his spirited and appetitive parts, which runs counter to his fa-
ther’s attempts to strengthen the rational part of the son’s soul (549c –
550c). The case of the oligarchic man is similar. In oligarchy, the
third best type of city, the people have forgotten that true gold is to
be found only in their souls and devote themselves to their appetitive
parts. As timocracy transforms into oligarchy, the rich usurp authority
and relieve the poor of any share in ruling. Socrates is now only one
step before his description of democracy and, as he outlines the charac-
teristics of oligarchy and oligarchic man, his stylistic mode starts to
change. Several images are now introduced to this new thematic envi-
ronment and strikingly pictorial language and poetic diction become
more frequent. In the greedy oligarchic man’s soul, the appetitive and
money-making part predominate, thereby making him detest his fa-
ther’s attitude which has left him poor. These forces drive him to
amass property:228
ja· tapeimyhe·r rp¹ pem_ar pq¹r wqglatisl¹m tqap|lemor ck_swqyr ja·
jat± slijq¹m veid|lemor ja· 1qcaf|lemor wq^lata sukk]cetai. üq’ oqj oUei
t¹m toioOtom t|te eQr l³m t¹m hq|mom 1je?mom t¹ 1pihulgtij|m te ja·
vikowq^latom 1cjah_feim ja· l]cam basik]a poie?m 1m 2aut`, ti\qar te ja·
stqepto»r ja· !jim\jar paqafymm}mta ; t¹ d] ce oWlai kocistij|m te ja·
huloeid³r wala· 5mhem ja· 5mhem paqajah_sar rpû 1je_m\ ja·
jatadoukys\lemor… (553c – d)
Humbled by poverty, he turns greedily to making money, and, little by lit-
tle, saving and working, he amasses property. Don’t you think that this per-
son would establish his appetitive and money-making part on the throne,
setting it up as a great king within himself, adorning it with golden tiaras
and collars and girding it with Persian swords? He makes the rational
and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, one on either side,
reducing them to slaves.
Socrates is careful to preserve his analogy between city and soul.229
However, as his magnifying lens closes in, the different parts of the
soul become magnified and simultaneously turn into humans so that
they very vividly dramatize the appetite’s overpowering of reason and

228 On 553a 11, see Aesch. Ag. 1006 and Eud. 554 – 565. Note also that the oligar-
chic man neglects education and chooses instead “the blind” Plutus, the god of
wealth, “as the leader or his chorus” (tuvk¹m Bcel|ma toO woqoO 1st^samto,
554b5 – 6). This is a clear reference to Aristophanes’ Plutus. See Adam (1963
[1902] vol. 2: 228). A link can also be drawn here with Plato’s portrayal of
Cephalus in Book 1. 328c1 – 4.
229 See Schofield (2006: 253 – 270); see also discussion by Lear (1992: 184 – 215).
238 Section Two: The Republic

the “chopping up” (katakekermatisthai) of the soul into diverse and mul-
tiple pieces that cannot live harmoniously or become integrated in a
unified whole (551e; Cp. 395b3 – 4). In the same context of Socrates’
presentation of the oligarchic city which relies on property and wealth,
the image of the state as a ship is re-deployed to demonstrate how dan-
gerous and foolish it is to entrust authority to the rich but ignorant
(551c1 – 6). In the same breath, Socrates employs his animal imagery
once again to discuss the residents of this city: the “drones” (jgv/mer)
which lead the oligarchic city to democracy and who now make their
first appearance.230
In the oligarchic city the “drones” are those who have lost or sold
their property to the rich. As this city is divided into two factions, the
poor and the rich, almost everyone, except the rich, says Socrates, is a
drone-beggar. Their miserable condition transforms them into evildo-
ers, and it is these people who eventually revolt and transform oligarchy
into democracy (552d3 – 4). When turning to the oligarchic man’s psy-
chological condition, we learn more about these drone-like qualities of
character (554d6 – 7). In the oligarchic man, evil appetites transform one
into a drone. These are checked by the better money-loving part in him
although they bring turmoil to the soul, which is, as a result, divided
into two:
oqj %q’ #m eUg !stas_astor b toioOtor 1m 2aut`, oqd³ eXr !kk± dipkoOr tir,
1pihul_ar d³ 1pihuli_m ¢r t¹ pok» jqato}sar #m 5woi bekt_our weiq|mym.
di± taOta dµ oWlai eqswglom]steqor #m pokk_m b toioOtor eUg7
blomogtij/r d³ ja· Bqlosl]mgr t/r xuw/r !kghµr !qetµ p|qqy poi
1jve}coi #m aqt|m.
Then someone like that wouldn’t be entirely free from internal civil war
and wouldn’t be one but in some way two, though generally his better de-
sires are in control of his worse. For this reason, he’d be more respectable
than many, but the true virtue of a single minded and harmonious soul far
escapes him (554d9 – e1).
The drone-like characteristics of the oligarchic man, constrained though
they may be by his better appetites (554d10), are only a small step from
the polymorphic (poikilẽ) democratic polis, in which both psychological

230 See 552c2 – 4: Bo}kei owm, Gm d’ 1c~, v_lem aqt|m, ¢r 1m jgq_\ jgvµm 1cc_cme-
tai, sl^mour m|sgla, ovty ja· t¹m toioOtom 1m oQj_ô jgv/ma 1cc_cmeshai,
m|sgla p|keyr ; (“His house might be compared to one of those cells in the
honeycomb where a drone is bred to be the plague of the hive.”) The image is
laden with poetic resonance: see Hesiod WD 304 ff.; Ar. Wasps 1114; see
also Aristotle, Hist. Anim. ix. 40. See also Cornford (1941: 270).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 239

appetites and city residents transform into various animals. For his de-
scription of the democratic city and the democratic man Plato has re-
served his most pictorial, imagistic, and poeticized prose. Ethical disin-
tegration is thus reflected in the gradual and well-designed change of
stylistic mode. True to the methodology practised in the Republic, Soc-
rates lifts the veil and presents the true face of this city and of the soul to
his interlocutors. In a city of diverse appetites and incongruent needs
men are in reality animal-like, as are their ‘invisible’ souls.

4.4 The Language of Democracy and Tyranny

4.4.1 Democracy

Plato’s watchwords in the Republic in his description of the essential

characteristics of democracy and of democratic man is diversity and di-
verse (poikilia and poikilẽ). As Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 235) rightly ob-
serves, the word and its cognates (pepoikilmenẽ) should not be under-
stood only in its narrow sense of embroidery, “for poikilein means no
‘more than to diversify with colours’ and implies nothing whatever as
to the process”.231
According to Plato’s Socrates, the democratic city is characterized
by freedom of speech, license, and equality among all desires, both nec-
essary and unnecessary. In fact, democracy is born of oligarchy and of
oligarchic men who have succumbed to their own appetites and have
failed to educate their sons correctly or refrain from taking advantage
of the poor. According to Socrates, the poor, the drones, initially “settle
down in idleness, some of them burdened with debt, some disenfran-
chised, some both at once”. They are armed and can “sting” (jejemtqy-
l]moi te ja· 1nypkisl]moi, 555d8). They hate the men who have ac-
quired their property and they long for a revolution.232 Their usurpation

231 See his comments on 557c: “the word [poikilon] is in every MS and thoroughly
harmonizes with Plato’s characteristic fullness of style”. See also Adam’s (1963
[1902] vol. 2) note on the use of anthesi in 561e, which should not be under-
stood as “flowers”, but as “dyes” or “colours”. Note also the verbal interplay in
anthesi-ẽthesi in Rep. 406b. I will discuss the stylistic and philosophic repercus-
sions of the ‘colourfulness’ of Plato’s poikilia in this chapter below.
232 The tension between the rich and the poor that finally leads to the revolt of the
later and the dissolution of the oligarchic city is described in rich pictorial lan-
guage that invests in the human body in 555d-557a. See esp. 556d2-e1: […]
240 Section Two: The Republic

of power leads to democracy, and it is under this constitution that one

finds people of “all types” (pantodapoi, 557c1 – 2), who have given into
various different kinds of appetites. Democracy and democratic man are
as “beautiful”, “manifold”, and “colourful” to look at as an embroidered
and variegated “coat” (himation):233
jimdume}ei, Gm dû 1c~, jakk_stg avtg t_m pokitei_m eWmai : ¦speq Rl\tiom
poij_kom p÷sim %mhesi pepoijikl]mom, ovty ja· avtg p÷sim Ehesim
pepoijikl]mg jakk_stg #m va_moito. ja· Usyr l]m, Gm dû 1c~, ja· ta}tgm,
¦speq oR pa?d]r te ja· aR cuma?jer t± poij_ka he~lemoi, jakk_stgm #m
pokko· jq_meiam. (557c4 – 9)
Then it looks as though this is the finest or most beautiful of the constitu-
tions, for, like a coat embroidered with every kind of ornament, the city, embroi-
dered with every kind of character type, would seem to be the most beautiful.
And many people would probably judge it to be so, as women and children
do when they see something multicolored.
In these lines, Socrates draws explicit parallels between characters (ẽthesi)
and colours (anthesi) and places emphasis on the striking visual impact of
beautiful appearance (kallistẽ). I shall return to this crucial passage in my
discussion of Plato’s references to painting in the following section. I
now turn to Socrates’ description of democracy, tyranny, and of their
people.
According to Socrates, the beauty of democracy and of the demo-
cratic man lies only in the eyes of the ignorant beholders for, when Pla-
to’s main speaker addresses the essential characteristics of this polity and
its corresponding character, this beauty is transformed into ugliness. In
the following lines, Socrates examines each typical feature of democracy

!kk± pokk\jir Qswm¹r !mµq p]mgr, Bkiyl]mor, paqatawhe·r 1m l\w, pkous_\

1sjiatqovgj|ti, pokk±r 5womti s\qjar !kkotq_ar, Ud, %shlat|r te ja· !poq_ar
lest|m, üq’ oUei aqt¹m oqw Bce?shai jaj_ô t0 svet]qô pkoute?m to»r toio}tour,
ja· %kkom %kk\ paqacc]kkeim, ftam Qd_ô nucc_cmymtai, fti “0mdqer Bl]teqoi7
eQs· c±q oqd]m ; […] (“On the contrary, the poor man, lean and sunburnt,
may find himself posted in battle beside one who, thanks to his wealth and in-
door life, is panting under his burden of fat and showing every mark of distress.
‘Such men’, he will think, ‘are rich because we are cowards’; and when he and
his friends meet in private, the word will go around: ‘These men are no good:
they are at our mercy’”. On the poetic resonance of Socrates’ description of the
rich, see Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 232).
233 In the following lines, Socrates characterizes democracy a pantoplion (“super-
market”) of constitutions, which contains a sample of every kind. It is an
ideal place for one to visit to choose the constitutional model he prefers best.
See also 557d4 – 9.
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 241

with a view to reversing the interlocutors’ positive ideas regarding the

nature of each of these features. The city is grounded on an ill-con-
ceived freedom of speech and on the lack of true and competent rulers.
It distributes equality to “equals” and “unequals” alike. It fails to pros-
ecute condemned criminals. It fails to educate its citizens correctly. Ac-
cording to Socrates, the poikilẽ demokratia fails to distinguish between
those who are equal to each other and those who are not:
TaOt\ te d^, 5vgm, 5woi #m ja· to}tym %kka !dekv± dglojqat_a, ja· eUg, ¢r
5oijem, Bde?a pokite_a ja· %maqwor ja· poij_kg, Qs|tgt\ tima blo_yr Usoir te
ja· !m_soir diam]lousa. (558c3 – 6)
And then these and others like them are the characteristics of democracy.
And it would seem to be a pleasant constitution, which lacks rulers but not
variety and which distributes a sort of equality to both equals and unequals alike.
In democracy people become themselves representations of bad appe-
tites (ẽthẽ kakias). In his portrayal of the democratic man (560c –
561a), Socrates describes this disastrous reversal of ethical qualities in
strong pictorial and poeticized language. The young man of uncultivat-
ed oligarchic origins is lured to the “drones’ honey” and gives in to the
influence of these dangerous and cunning creatures. Plato’s language
here does not distinguish between unnecessary appetites and evil citi-
zens. In most cases, paternal guidance has no influence on the appetitive
forces of the youth. As a result, “the drones seize the citadel of the
young man’s soul”, since “knowledge”, “right principles” and “true
thoughts” are not at their post. The boy turns completely to “the
lotus-eaters” and rejects parental guidance, “shutting the gates of the
royal fortress upon them”. The drones take over the youth’s soul com-
pletely. They call his reverence foolishness, his moderation cowardice.
They then “sweep it clean” and “purify” it of all the positive qualities
that may have been left and re-install insolence, anarchy, extravagance,
and shamelessness, which have been called back from exile, assigning to
them fine names. Insolence is called “good breeding”, anarchy “free-
dom”, extravagance “magnificence”, and shamelessness “courage”
(560c – d). The youth’s life from this point onwards becomes fully driv-
en by unnecessary corporeal pleasures which he cannot distinguish from
those that belong to fine and good desires:
F0 dµ oWlai let± taOta b toioOtor oqd³m l÷kkom eQr !macja_our C lµ !mac-
ja_our Bdom±r !mak_sjym ja· wq^lata ja· p|mour ja· diatqib\r7 !kk’ 1±m
eqtuwµr × ja· lµ p]qa 1jbawe}hg, !kk\ ti ja· pqesb}teqor cem|lemor toO
242 Section Two: The Republic

pokkoO hoq}bou paqekh|mtor l]qg te jatad]ngtai t_m 1jpes|mtym ja· to?r

1peisekhoOsi lµ fkom 2aut¹m 1md`… (561a6 – b2)
And I suppose that after that he spends as much money, effort, and time on
unnecessary pleasures as on necessary ones. If he’s lucky, and his bacchic fren-
zy doesn’t go too far, when he grows older, and the great tumult within him
has spent itself, he welcomes back some of the exiles, ceases to surrender
himself completely to the newcomers…
OqjoOm, Gm d’ 1c~, ja· diaf0 t¹ jah’ Bl]qam ovty waqif|lemor t0 pqospi-
pto}s, 1pihul_ô, t|te l³m leh}ym ja· jatauko}lemor, awhir d³ rdqopot_m
ja· jatiswmaim|lemor, t|te d’ aw culmaf|lemor, 5stim d’ fte !qc_m ja· p\m-
tym !lek_m, tot³ d’ ¢r 1m vikosov_ô diatq_bym. (561c6 – d2)
And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he
drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water
and is on diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times,
he’s idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself
with what he takes to be philosophy.
The democratic man is as diverse (poikilos and pantodapos) as the city that
nurtures him and as the incongruent and conflicting necessary and un-
necessary desires that dwell in his soul: OWlai d] ce, Gm d’ 1c~, ja· pam-
todap|m te ja· pke_stym Ah_m lest|m, ja· t¹m jak|m te ja· poij_kom,
¦speq 1je_mgm tµm p|kim, toOtom t¹m %mdqa eWmai. (“And I suppose
he’s a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, fine and multicoloured,
just like the democratic city…” 561e3 – 5). He gives a striking impres-
sion of beauty (kalos) but this, according to Socrates, is only a false ap-
pearance, because if one takes a better look at his characteristic qualities,
as Socrates has tried to do, then he discovers an unending conflict of de-
sires, inconsistent and mixed lifestyle, and utter confusion of ethical
qualities. As a matter of fact, ethical qualities in this constitution and
character appear the opposite of what in fact they are, and are assigned
names which do not express their true identity. The democratic city
and soul, although multi-coloured and variegated, is not at all beautiful
or pleasurable when analyzed in its constituent elements.
Plato has here Socrates use a highly poeticized and strikingly picto-
rial type of discourse in order to subvert this false beauty. More specif-
ically, he appropriates the familiar language of drama and adapts it to a
new environment in order to untangle the variegated, multi-coloured,
and base character of democracy. Socrates’ description shows how in
democracy vision and external appearance deceives the intellect because
vision has been so deeply entangled in this colourful diversity that it can-
not function as a stepping stone to an in-depth understanding of this
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 243

constitution’s true characteristics. Thus intellect is deceived by false po-

larities (as the good has a small share, if any, in the man’s life-conduct) in
the same way that human vision is deceived by mixed and variegated
colours. Against this incongruent background, Plato’s linguistic style
ventures to untangle this confusing and complicating synthesis by
means of colourful and poetically resonant language. Traditional poetic
imagery and motifs are amassed to bring to life the true character of de-
mocracy in order to reject it. Plato’s use of the word poikilos in this con-
text is not incidental. Nor is his construction of imagery, which rests
heavily on corporeality and colourfulness to depict democracy. As I
will show in the next section, both his methodology and his diverse lin-
guistic styles can be grasped better if we relate them to his reference to
painting, for in his work both ẽthẽ and words can be linked with colours.
Plato has constructed a grand verbal picture of reality and of the world at
large in this dialogue and he is demonstrating to Socrates’ interlocutors
the correct way to view it. However, although a vividly colourful and
pictorial type of language is required to expose the true qualities of de-
mocracy and democratic man, similar linguistic style is stretched to its
limits in order to explain the true nature of tyranny and of the tyrant’s
soul.

4.4.2 Tyranny

Plato’s catchword for democracy’s indiscrimination between equals and

unequal citizens, and necessary and unnecessary desires, was poikilia. In
the animal imagery of the Republic, the democratic citizens have devel-
oped from oligarchy’s drones (kẽphẽnes). It is the ‘drones’ that take con-
trol of the polis and the soul’s citadel. When turning, however, to de-
scribe the birth of tyranny, Socrates weaves into the same language he
employed to talk about democracy thicker clusters of imagery and po-
etic diction. Tyranny is listed fourth in Socrates’ classification of cor-
rupted constitutions and it is considered the worse and most unhappy
type of government. The tyrant of the polis is someone whose soul is
ruled by lawless and unnecessary appetites, and, in Platonic language,
can only be rendered through the adoption of an eikn.
In the polis tyranny stems from democracy and, in order to bridge
the political transition, Plato expands further on the characteristics of
the democratic city that eventually gives birth to it. The democratic
city was founded on freedom, but both the conception and practice
244 Section Two: The Republic

of this principle gives way to disarray and multifariousness, and soon

dictatorship is required as the only means to consolidate the incongruent
underlying upheaval and tension. The citizens of the democratic consti-
tution cannot get enough of their ill-conceived freedom and become
accustomed to considering moderation as a restraint and form of slavery.
To depict this civic state of affairs, Socrates exploits an image that cou-
ples bad leadership with citizens’ indulging in the consumption of “un-
mixed wine”. This metaphor builds a verbal and thematic interplay with
Plato’s motif of mixis in the dialogue and in Book 8 in particular. It is the
“wine of freedom” that must be drunk mixed and in a manner similar to
the proper consumption of Greek wine:
ftam oWlai dglojqatoul]mg p|kir 1keuheq_ar dix^sasa jaj_m oQmow|ym
pqostato}mtym t}w,, ja· poqqyt]qy toO d]omtor !jq\tou aqt/r
lehush0, to»r %qwomtar d^, #m lµ p\mu pqøoi §si ja· pokkµm paq]wysi
tµm 1keuheq_am, jok\fei aQtiyl]mg ¢r liaqo}r te ja· akicaqwijo}r.
(562c8 – d4)
I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get
bad cupbearers for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it
should of the unmixed wine of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very
pliable and provide plenty of that freedom, they are punished by the city
and accused of being oligarchs.
This loss of perspective in moderation and proportion will generate a
series of further abnormalities in the organization of the democratic
polis and of the oikos. Several reversals take place: fathers accustom
themselves to behave like children; sons behave like fathers; foreign vis-
itors and alien citizens are made equal to proper citizens; teachers are
afraid of their students; the students become disrespectful of teachers;
the young imitate (apeikazontai) and compete with the elders in word
and deed; the old imitate the young and their manners (mimoumenoi)
so as not to appear (doksin) disagreeable and despotic (562e6 –
563b2).234 Socrates’ description of ethical abnormality and reversal cul-
minates in 563c1 – d1 in his verbal ‘transformation’ of the citizens of this
city-state into animals. The relevant lines are introduced with an Ae-
schylean line (563c1 – 2) and, when integrated in the broader contextual
environment, they are intended to reveal much more than merely ach-
ieve a rhetorical impact by way of a poetical metaphor. Socrates’ linguis-
tic style is arranged in a crescendo manner that climaxes only when it
has achieved a faithful depiction of these people’s true nature: the multi-

234 References to Aristophanes’ Clouds underlie Plato’s text here.

 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 245

fariousness (polueidia) and imbalance of the democratic state is depicted

in the people’s transformation into animals; the proverb then has serious
bearing (563c3 – d1):
ja· 5cyce ovty k]cy7 t¹ l³m c±q t_m hgq_ym t_m rp¹ to?r !mhq~poir fs\
1keuheq~teq\ 1stim 1mtaOha C 1m %kk,, oqj %m tir pe_hoito %peiqor. !tewm_r
c±q aV te j}mer jat± tµm paqoil_am oXa_peq aR d]spoimai c_cmomta_ te dµ ja·
Vppoi ja· emoi, p\mu 1keuh]qyr ja· selm_r eQhisl]moi poqe}eshai, jat± t±r
bdo»r 1lb\kkomter t` !e· !pamt_mti, 1±m lµ 1n_stgtai, ja· tükka p\mta
ovty lest± 1keuheq_ar c_cmetai. (563c3 – d1)
I put it this way: No one who hasn’t experienced it would believe how
much freer domestic animals are in a democratic city than anywhere else.
As the proverb says, dogs become like their mistresses; horses and donkeys
are accustomed to roam freely and proudly along the streets, bumping into
anyone who doesn’t get out of their way; and all the rest are equally full of
freedom.
It is citizens of this sort, who cannot get enough of freedom and detest
slavery, that welcome the tyrant as a warranty of utmost liberty. Never-
theless, what they eventually get is quite different from what they ini-
tially sought, since the desire for freedom gives birth to its polar oppo-
site, dictatorship.235 Socrates’ description of the tyrant in Book 8 is built
on animal imagery and contrasts strikingly with the Republic’s earlier im-
ages in Book 5. Thus the tyrant’s characteristics and ruling conduct are
depicted as the extreme opposite of the Republic’s pedigree dogs, which
produced the city’s guardians, the well-attuned and homogeneous pack
(agelẽ) which rules and protects the citizens. Plato’s strong imagery in
Books 8 and 9 is intended to subvert the interlocutors’ perception of de-
mocracy and tyranny which are perceived as opposite constitutions but,
from a Platonic perspective, when meticulously examined are found to
be closely associated (572c – 573a). Socrates’ strong imagery then re-ad-

235 See Rep. 564a-565c, where Socrates explains how the tensions between the
divided citizens of the democratic polis lead to the emergence of the tyrant.
The passage makes again the most of animal vocabulary (the “stinged and sting-
less drones” resurface) and also draws on people’s desire for food consumption,
but soon the “honey” they want to get hold of (kẽphẽsi meli and kẽphẽnn botanẽ,
564e9 – 10 and e13), turns into their own “flesh and blood” in the tyrant’s “im-
pious tongue and lips” (565e5 – 566a4). As Lear (1992: 210 – 211) rightly ob-
serves, pleonactic civic behaviour in Books 8 and 9 is linked with the poets’
common representations of the gods which have been presented and criticized
in Books 2 and Book 3. He rightly points out that “it is precisely by those acts
that the tyrant is born”. On the image of the tyrant as a wolf in Greek political
vocabulary, see Kunstler (1991: 189 – 205).
246 Section Two: The Republic

dresses well-established polarities on multiple levels with a view to

bridging the distance that divides external appearance and seeming
(doxa) from true nature (571b3 – c1; Cp. 573c7 – 9).
This distance, as Socrates suggested in his introduction of the soul-
city analogy in Book 2, can deceive both human sight and the intellect,
since both must cooperate to attain true knowledge. Socrates’ interloc-
utors had been ‘viewing’ their world and their own (ethical) place in it
from afar, and in his Republic Plato has undertaken to redirect the “eye
of their soul” so that it adopts a correct perspective. This primarily
means that the sense-perceptible must be put into the service of true
Reality and the Good. If one adopts this viewpoint, then our unneces-
sary appetites break human nature down into multiple pieces and trans-
form us into animals. In the case of the tyrant, whom Thrasymachus had
so much praised in Book 1, things are even worse (573a4 – b4; 574d1 –
575a7 and 575b6 – 9; 579d10). In Socratic terms, he is a “wolf” who
cannot get enough of the flesh and blood of his people.236 In his case,
as Socrates reveals in the famous image of the tyrant’s soul in Book 9,
reality is utterly reversed since the tyrant’s human body is only a façade
and flesh is put on to dress the beast-like and incongruent character of
his soul.237
The relevant passage appears in Book 9, in the context of Socrates’
discussion with Glaucon about the pleasure (hẽdonẽ) and true happiness
(eudiamonia) of the just. Glaucon replaces Adeimantus and this change of
interlocutor again signals a change in the topic discussed and in the lin-
guistic style employed.238 In 588b, Socrates re-introduces Thrasyma-
chus’ initial thesis in the discussion, namely that injustice profits a com-
pletely unjust and powerful person. In this context, Glaucon and Socra-
tes create a verbal image of the tyrant’s soul:

236 See Socrates’ imagery in 565e-566a. Note that Plato’s language here does not
make use of any comparative linguistic markers such as hs or hsper. In linguis-
tic terms, the transformation into a wolf is not a comparison but a smooth, al-
most natural, development.
237 This is Socrates’ long overdue answer to Adeimantus’ remark in 365c. See also
his reference to Euripides and to tragedy in general in 568a – b.
238 Socrates employs difficult mathematics in order to calculate the philosopher and
tyrant’s happiness and unhappiness. The mathematics is difficult to follow and,
in line with the view I have taken in this study, it is far from incidental that
Plato has Glaucon as Socrates’ respondent at this stage in the dialogue. On
this complex passage, see the detailed discussion in Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 247

MOm d^, 5vgm, aqt` diakec~leha, 1peidµ diylokocgs\leha t| te !dije?m

ja· t¹ d_jaia pq\tteim Dm 2j\teqom 5wei d}malim. P_r ; 5vg.
EQj|ma pk\samter t/r xuw/r k|c\, Vma eQd0 b 1je?ma k]cym oXa 5kecem.
Po_am tim\; G d’ fr.
T_m toio}tym tim\, Gm d’ 1c~, oXai luhokocoOmtai pakaia· cem]shai
v}seir, F te Wila_qar ja· B Sj}kkgr ja· Jeqb]qou, ja· %kkai tim³r suwma·
k]comtai sulpevuju?ai Qd]ai pokka· eQr 4m cem]shai. K]comtai c\q, 5vg.
Pk\tte to_mum l_am Qd]am hgq_ou poij_kou ja· pokujev\kou, Bl]qym d³
hgq_ym 5womtor jevak±r j}jk\ ja· !cq_ym, ja· dumatoO letab\kkeim ja·
v}eim 1n aqtoO p\mta taOta.
DeimoO pk\stou, 5vg, t¹ 5qcom7 flyr d] , 1peidµ eqpkast|teqom jgqoO
ja? t_m toio}tym b k|cor, pepk\shy.
L_am dµ to_mum %kkgm Qd]am k]omtor, l_am d³ !mhq~pou7 pok» l]cistom
5sty t¹ pq_tom ja· de}teqom t¹ de}teqom. TaOta, 5vg, Nõy, ja· p]pka-
stai.
S}mapte to_mum aqt± eQr 4m tq_a emta, ¦ste p, sulpevuj]mai !kk^koir.
Sum/ptai, 5vg.
Peq_pkasom dµ aqto?r 5nyhem 2m¹r eQj|ma, tµm toO !mhq~pou, ¦ste t`
lµ dumal]m\ t± 1mt¹r bq÷m, !kk± t¹ 5ny l|mom 5kutqom bq_mti, 4m f`om
va_meshai, %mhqypom. (588b6 – e2)
Now let’s discuss this with him, since we’ve agreed on the respective powers
that injustice and justice have. How?
By fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the person who says this
sort of thing will know what he is saying. What sort of image?
One like those creatures that legends tell us used to come into being in
ancient times, such the Chimera, Scylla, Cerberus, or any of the multitude
of others in which many different kinds of things are said to have grown
together naturally into one. Yes, the legends do tell us of such things.
Well, then, fashion a single kind of multicoloured beast with a ring of
many heads that it can grow and change at will – some from gentle, some
from savage animals.
That’s work for a clever artist. However, since words are more malle-
able than wax and the like, consider it done. Then fashion one other kind,
that of a lion, and another of a human being. But make the first much the
largest and the other second to it in size. That’s easier – the sculpting is
done.
Now join the three of them into one, so that that they somehow grow
together naturally. They’re joined.
Then, fashion around them the image of one of them, that of a human
being so that anyone who sees only the outer covering and not what’s in-
side will think it is a single creature, a human being. It’s done.
In these lines Socrates returns to the idea of the soul’s unity and internal
harmony. The imagery he fashions here, however, to speak about the
tyrant’s soul rests on combining well-established poetic and mythical
material with terminology that Socrates used in Book 5 to refer to
248 Section Two: The Republic

the Forms. Yet, the “forms” (ideai) that Socrates employs in his speech
now carry a totally different meaning, since they have become represen-
tations of multiplicity and diversity ( Jowett II [1894: 301 – 305]). These
“forms” are now dissociated from the conflictual and unstable world of
Becoming and they are deployed to dramatize and enact in speech the
tyrant’s disintegration into a wild and incongruent beast. In effect, Plato
has Socrates argue here that in reality the tyrant deceives people’s eye-
sight by passing for human, when in fact whatever he has internally
has a small share in human nature.239 Socrates concludes the image by
insinuating that human vision cannot penetrate the tyrant’s external
cover, the “human flesh-coat”, and takes a good look at the intrinsic
characteristics (¦ste t` lµ dumal]m\ t± 1mt¹r bq÷m, !kk± t¹ 5ny
l|mom 5kutqom bq_mti, 4m f`om va_meshai, %mhqypom). However, there
is much more to this observation than people’s mere inability to
‘view’ the ‘internal’ (see also 577b1: l\kista culm¹r [b t}qammor] #m
avhe_g t/r tqacij/r sjeu/r [“when he is stripped of his theatrical fa-
çade.”]).
Prima facie, one could argue there is nothing surprising in Socrates’
highlighting the difficulties that result from our inability to assess ethical
qualities as these require much more than mere reliance on sense-per-
ception. Yet, people do lay bare their inner selves through their actions
and choices in life. (Both Thrasymachus and Glaucon’s argumentation
about justice and injustice in Books 1 and 2 confirm this point.) Thus
Plato’s Socrates makes the point here that people have serious problems
in judging and deciphering (krisis: 360e1 and 361d4 – 6) as well as mak-
ing correct inferences about one’s ethical behavior. His imagery of the
tyrant demonstrates how our criteria for defining the essentials of
human nature and its potential and dynamics should be reassessed on
the basis of the ontological and ethical characteristics of the Platonic
Forms. These characteristics are unity, homogeneity, and stability,
which in our earthly world become harmony and concordance (harmo-
nia/symphnia). The discussion in Book 1 on justice and injustice dem-
onstrated that the majority lacks the criteria to assess these ethical con-
cepts. In the course of the dialogue, Socrates addressed this vexed prob-
lem of understanding human nature and its relation to Platonic Reality.
As I have argued in this study, Platonic philosophy aims to educate
people about the transcendent and immutable Forms, but this is not a

239 For an insightful discussion of the political and psychological aspects of the eco-
nomic class, see Schofield (2006: 270 – 275).
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 249

process separate from understanding our own qualities and capabilities,

or what is truly essential to human nature. Socrates’ eikn of the tyrant’s
polymorphic, appetitive part addresses this problem. To be truly human
is not to ‘look’ human, but rather to bear the characteristics integral to
human nature. In the image of the tyrant, Plato has exploited stock po-
etic resources to reveal the incongruence of the beast that consumes the
tyrant little by little from within.240 Only a small part of human nature is
left in this ‘cave-like’ soul (Cp. 579b3 – c2). This “little human” strives
to be set free, but is constantly weakened by the other “beasts” and thus
remains powerless and entangled (Cp. 579b6 – 7). In this image we even
leave behind Plato’s familiar polarities, for according to Socrates there is
too little good in the tyrant’s soul when compared to the bad (ẽthẽ ka-
kias).
Plato’s eikn of the tyrant’s soul is rhetorically powerful indeed. Yet,
against the Republic’s broader linguistic background, this type of lan-
guage is the most appropriate stylistic mode to communicate to the un-
believers and the sight-lovers of the Republic the true nature of baseness
and injustice. These people take great pleasure in sights of any sort and
Plato here adapts diction and motifs that they have long enjoyed and
thus can readily grasp. From this Platonic perspective, Socrates’ language
best fits the topic at hand. Diversity (poikilia) has its own vivid and mul-
tifarious pictorial discourse that best brings out the characteristics of in-
justice (polueidia). The force of the eikn of the soul of the tyrant rests on
Plato’s exploitation of the pictorial effect of the art of sculpture. Plato
employs for the first time in his text the term “statue” (andrias) in
Book 2 (361d4 – 5). Here, Glaucon challenged Socrates to distinguish
the just from the unjust in his defense of justice and also proposed
how this should happen (360e1 – 361d3). At the end of his long speech
Socrates employs the term andrias and links it with the correct judgment
of people’s ethical behavior: ¢r 1qqyl]myr 2j\teqom ¦speq !mdqi\mta eQr
tµm jq_sim 1jjaha_qeir to?m !mdqo?m (“… how vigorously you’ve scoured
each of the men for our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for
an art competition” 361d4 – 6).
In Book 9 Plato returns to Glaucon’s challenge and has Socrates
fashion a statue, as it were, in his speech of injustice, with a view to
showing that there is more than meets the eye when it comes to assess-
ing people’s power, pleasure, and ethical behaviour. To provide a clear

240 The reference to Hesiod’s Typhon is most obvious here. See the Introduction
above with n. 16.
250 Section Two: The Republic

view of injustice, however, Plato must penetrate the external appear-

ance of the idiosyncratic ‘statue’ which has levels of depth. Earlier in
Book 9 Socrates had drawn Glaucon’s attention to the importance of
this approach to the unjust man:
ja· lµ 1jpkgtt~leha pq¹r t¹m t}qammom 6ma emta bk]pomter, lgd’eU timer
ak_coi peq· 1je?mom, !kk’ ¢r wqµ fkgm tµm p|kim eQsekh|mtar he\sashai,
jatad}mter eQr ûpasam ja· Qd|mter, ovty d|nam !povaim~leha. (576d8 – e2)
And let’s not be dazzled by looking at one man – a tyrant – or at the few
who surround him, but since it is essential to go into the city and study the
whole of it, let’s not give our opinion, till we’ve gone down and looked
into every corner.
/q’ owm, Gm d’ 1c~, ja· peq· t_m !mdq_m t± aqt± taOta pqojako}lemor
aqh_r #m pqojako_lgm, !ni_m jq_meim peq· aqt_m 1je?mom, dr d}matai t0 dia-
mo_ô eQr !mdq¹r Ghor 1md»r diide?m ja· lµ jah\peq pa?r 5nyhem bq_m 1jpk^t-
tetai rp¹ t/r t_m tuqammij_m pqost\seyr Dm pq¹r to»r 5ny swglat_fom-
tai, !kk’ Rjam_r dioqø; (576e6 – 577a5)
Would I be right, then, to make the same challenge about the individuals,
assuming, first, that the person who is fit to judge them is someone who in
thought can go down into a person’s character and examine it thoroughly,
someone who doesn’t judge from outside, the way a child does, who is
dazzled by the façade that tyrants adopt for the outside world to see, but
is able to see right through that sort of thing?
For this reason in his verbal image of Book 9, he links the ‘statue of in-
justice’ with the pictorial forcefulness of diversity (poikilia) and con-
structs his verbal image out of manifestly poetic language. The ‘statue’
of the unjust soul that Socrates has fashioned in speech to compete
with the just man is at the same time the representation par excellence
of ugliness and unhappiness (576d2 – e2). The “simple” and “the homo-
geneous” (akraton and haploun) human ẽthos in the Republic, on the other
hand, cannot be rendered in this type of imagistic or poetic language.
And if we venture to portray its ontological status – as was the case
with the Form of the Good in Book 6 – its colouring would have to
be completely unified, with no levels of depth and no colour alterna-
tions, just pure and unmixed white of the Sun.
Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that the image of the ty-
rant’s soul comes immediately after Socrates’ difficult discussion with
Glaucon on pleasure. In the concluding part of this section I turn to
the linguistic style of this exchange. Socrates’ change of styles in this
context of Book 9 is striking and similar to the one we examined in
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 251

the concluding lines of Book 5 in Chapter Two above. As I will show,

so are the reasons that necessitate this technique.
Plato replaces Adeimantus with Glaucon in Book 9 (576b10), and it
is with Glaucon not Adeimantus that Socrates discusses the complex
concept of pleasure and builds the verbal image of the tyrant’s beast-
like soul. Glaucon re-emerges in the discussion of Book 9 as a judge
(kritẽs, 576d7) who announces (krineis) that the ideal city of Book 5
and the soul of Book 4 is the “best” and “happiest” possible (aristẽ
and eudaimonestera), contrary to tyranny and the tyrant’s soul which
are the “worst” and “unhappiest” (kakistẽ and athlitera): )kk± Nôd_a B
jq_sir. jah\peq c±q eQs/khom 5cyce ¦speq woqo»r jq_my !qet0 ja·
jaj_ô ja· eqdailom_ô ja· t` 1mamt_\ (“That’s easy. I rank them in virtue
and vice, in happiness and its opposite, in the order of their appearance,
as I might judge choruses,” 580b5 – 7; cf. 577a1, 577b7, 578b2 and
580a – b). In other words, Glaucon has remained a Socratic ally through-
out the conversation which Socrates held with Adeimantus in Book 8
and the first half of Book 9. His resurfacing in the discussion, however,
signals a change both as regards the topic and the linguistic style used to
approach this particular topic, namely true and pure pleasure (kathara hẽ-
donẽ).
Plato dismisses Adeimantus and brings back Glaucon as Socrates’ co-
speaker for two main reasons (576b10). Firstly, Glaucon immediately
passes the verdict (krisis, 579b8 – c4) that the just life is the happiest. Sec-
ondly, the discussion on justice has so far shown that he alone can sup-
port Socrates’ argumentation about the “pure” (katharẽ) pleasure of the
philosopher in ways that the other interlocutors cannot. The discussion
on the pleasure comes right before Plato’s construction of the beast-like
image of the tyrant’s soul. The two passages are connected as Plato’s
Socrates fashions this verbal ‘statue’ in order to depict the colourfulness
and diversity of the tyrant’s appetitive part, which in pictorial terms is
identified with a wild and multiheaded beast. The stretch of the argu-
mentation of the three types of pleasure shares common linguistic char-
acteristics with the concluding part of Book 5 where Socrates drew sev-
eral distinctions: firstly, between true philosophers and sight-lovers; sec-
ondly, between Knowledge and Belief; finally, between the Forms and
the many particulars.
As regards the concept of psychic pleasure, Socrates distinguishes
three kinds of it on the basis of his tripartite division of the human
soul (580d3 – 5). These three types of souls are: the appetitive (1pihulg-
tij|m .. di± tµm pokueid_am.. ja· vikowq^latom, 580d10 – e5), the spirit-
252 Section Two: The Republic

ed (huloeid]r, vik|mijom aqt¹ ja· vik|tilom, 581a9 – b3), and the rational
([kocistij|m] vikolah³r dµ ja· vik|sovom). Each type of soul is assigned
its own kind of pleasure, yet in the ensuing discussion Socrates shows to
Glaucon that true and pure pleasure (panalẽthẽs and kathara hẽdonẽ) can
be enjoyed only by the philosopher (ho phronimos), as only he has a ra-
tional soul (583b – c). In addition, Socrates shows that only the phronimos
can judge the best type of pleasure for he possesses the means (organon)
and the experience (empeiria) of all three types of pleasure (582a5 – 6 and
d1 – 14).
There are three main points to which I wish to draw attention as
regards Plato’s discussion of true pleasure here. Firstly, in the relevant
lines (582a – 585e4), Socrates changes his linguistic style and removes
from his speech motifs and diction that relate to poetry. In this stretch
of argumentation, he employs instead terms such as logoi (582d11,
582d13), organon (582d13), kinẽsis (583e10), and hẽsuchia (583e2) to ex-
amine true pleasure. Secondly, in the same environment, Plato has Soc-
rates also sporadically deploy what I have defined as a ‘colourless’ type of
language. This linguistic style consists mainly of pronouns, adjectives,
and abstract nouns and, according to Adam (1963 [1902] vol. 2: 354),
these sentences (585c1 – 5) are “among the most perplexing in the
whole of the Republic, or indeed in the whole of Plato’s writings”. It
is remarkable, nonetheless, that Glaucon, who in Book 5 we should
note had difficulties following a similar stylistic mode, can now compe-
tently grasp Socrates’ linguistic style. Thirdly, in his attempt to define
true and pure pleasure, Socrates employs the analogy with painting
and, in specific terms, the elusive technique of skiagraphia, in order to
explain the way in which “pure” pleasure differs from the “mixed”
pleasure that the majority of people enjoy.
I believe that in order to understand Plato’s stylistic alternation and
its philosophical effect on the Socratic audience we need to pay close
attention to the painting analogy. I argue that Plato’s use of skiagraphia
(shadow-painting) in this context is a well adapted technique whose
aim is not only to address the difficult issue of mixed pleasure as com-
monly understood (and experienced) by the philosophically unsophisti-
cated people, but also to draw attention to the vexed issue of how phil-
osophical language should be employed as regards the pleasure of the
senses. Plato brings together shadow-painting and mixed pleasure in
the following manner:
 4. Philosophers, non-philosophers and the unjust in the Republic 253

%hqei fti oqd³ pamakgh^r 1stim B t_m %kkym Bdomµ pkµm t/r toO vqom_lou
oqd³ jahaq\, !kk’ 1sjiacqavgl]mg tir, ¢r 1c½ doj_ loi t_m sov_m timor
!jgjo]mai. (583b3 – 6)
Observe then that, apart from those of a knowledgeable person, the other
pleasures are neither entirely true nor pure but are like a shadow-painting,
as I have heard some wise person say.
And a little later he adds:
/q’owm oqj !m\cjg ja· Bdoma?r sume?mai leleicl]mair k}pair, eQd~koir t/r
!kghoOr Bdom/r ja· 1sjiacqavgl]mair, rp¹ t/r paq’!kk^kar h]seyr !po-
wqaimol]mair, ¦ste svodqo»r 2jat]qar va_meshai, ja· 5qytar 2aut_m kut-
t_mtar to?r %vqosim 1mt_jteim ja· peqil\wgtour eWmai, ¦speq t¹ t/r
:k]mgr eUdykom rp¹ t_m 1m Tqo_ô Stgs_woq|r vgsi cem]shai peqil\wgtom
!cmo_ô toO !kghoOr ; (586b7 – c5)
Then isn’t it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed
with pains, mere images and shadow-paintings of true pleasures? And
doesn’t the juxtaposition of these pleasures and pains make them appear in-
tense, so that they give rise to mad erotic passions in the foolish, and are
fought over in just the way that Stesichorus tells us the phantom of
Helen was fought over at Troy by men ignorant of the truth?
In the Republic the term skiagraphia occurs five times. It is initially intro-
duced by Adeimantus in his speech to Socrates in Book 2 (365c4) dis-
cussed above, and it reappears much later: once in Book 7 (523b), twice
in Book 9 (583b and 586b – c) and, finally, once in Book 10 (602d).241

241 Demand (1975: 11 – 17) also notes the term’s absence in the dialogue’s central
Books: she links the word’s sporadic distribution with the chronological dating
of Plato’s composition of the Republic and considers the possibility tempting “to
see these passages which demonstrate awareness of the dangers of skiagraphic
painting as being later than the passages which do not demonstrate such aware-
ness” (11). She thus argues for “a major split” in Plato’s view of painting in the
dialogues, which is also manifested in the way that “pre-skiagraphic” passages
on painting differ from “the skiagraphic” passages. Thus Plato seems to hold
two distinct positions in relation to painting: he favours “good painting”
which aims at a realistic presentation of its subject, in colour, shape and arrange-
ment of part, and dismisses skiagraphia whose optical illusion promotes decep-
tion. This is not a line of interpretation I follow as regards the use of skiagraphia
in the Republic. Plato makes Adeimantus initially employ the term in Book 2
and re-launches it later in the text to refer to people’s ethically and epistemo-
logically confused and reduced lifestyles. The subjects treated in the middle
Books of the dialogue could not allow references to this illusionary and deceit-
ful technique.
254 Section Two: The Republic

The same term surfaces five more times in later dialogues.242 A close
reading of these ten occurrences demonstrates that Plato has found in
this pictorial technique a technical vocabulary that best addresses the
challenge of correctly untangling mixed pairs of opposites. In the two
passages cited above, shadow painting is used to explain how people
lack knowledge of “true pleasure” (kathara hẽdonẽ), which is unregulated
and free from conflicting sentiments, and experience only “mixed pleas-
ure”, which is always reliant upon the continuous rapid change of feel-
ings of pleasure and pain. In the above passages Plato, then, depends on
the mixis integral to this pictorial technique in order to explain that in
our earthly world conflict and antithesis can be deceptively interwoven
in an integrated and meaningful whole. If we choose to follow the anal-
ogy of skiagraphia in its details, Plato is mounting here an attack against
the visual illusion of this technique, since it requires distant viewing to
make sense to the viewers. When seen in relation to the mixed kind of
pleasure, this ‘illusion’ amounts to sheer ignorance. For Plato’s Socrates,
the majority view their psychic pleasure from afar; they do not enjoy
“pure” and “un-mixed” pleasure, nor do they enjoy it truly.
However, the nuances of lines 586b7 – c5 are far richer than this
since Socrates employs pictorial terminology to describe also the manner
in which the various pairs of opposites (for example, pleasure and pain)
become fully meaningful because of their constant alternation (rp¹ t/r
paq’!kk^kar h]seyr !powqaimol]mair). This change of emotions is
rapid. In most people, these sentiments are placed side by side, so
close to each other in fact that they require each other in order to be-
come meaningful (Bdoma?r sume?mai leleicl]mair k}pair). Plato identifies
the eskiagraphemenai pleasures with the “mixed” pleasures (memeigmenais)
and, what is most important, associates both with the effect of poetry
(see Stesichorous and Helen).243 At the same time, in 586a – b Plato
has Socrates state in heavily pictorial language, which rests on traditional
poetic images and myths, that most people spend their entire lives in this
way, namely experiencing ‘mixtures’ of sentiments.

242 Phd. 69b is an exception. See also Prm. 165c – d, Tht. 208e, Laws 663b – c,
Crit. 107c – d.
243 The same line of thought is also followed in Book 10 where Socrates again links
the illusionary character of skiagraphia with poetry.
 5. Conclusion
‘Viewing’ the skiagraphia
I dealt above with the reasons that lie behind Plato’s choice of skiagraphia
as an analogy for mixed pleasure. However, I also proposed above that
we can use this analogy in order to understand the philosophical impor-
tance of Plato’s employment of an imageless type of language in the dia-
logue. I will now turn to this suggestion.
In my view, the diversity of Plato’s stylistic modes and the poetics of
his philosophical language in the dialogue are integrated into a unified
whole. This becomes evident if we also pursue the philosopher’s various
references to painting in this work. Several studies have drawn attention
to Plato’s recurrent references to painting and to his exploitation of the
quasi-technical language of images in the dialogues. As has been rightly
stressed in the literature, Plato’ stance towards painting and painters is far
from uniform or consistent. Plato often refers to painting in a derogato-
ry manner, condemning its imitative character. On these occasions,
painting becomes an analogy for the poets and sophists’ deception of
their audience. Thus in the same breath, painting, poetic, and sophistic
speech are all dismissed as misrepresentations of reality.
Yet, there are times when painting and painters are also employed as
an analogy for the philosopher’s task. Plato appears to have found in
painting and in its techniques, with which he appears to be familiar,
an analogy for the various perspectives one may hold on the earthly
world and on Reality. I shall not venture here a wholesale evaluation
of Plato’s references to painting nor will I discuss its imitative charac-
ter.244 What will primarily interest me here is to unearth the rich poten-
tial that may lie in Plato’s references to the technique of skiagraphia in
the Republic and investigate their possible relation to the diversity of
the dialogue’s linguistic styles and discursive modes.245

244 On this, see Halliwell’s insightful interpretation (2002: 1 – 33, 37 – 71 and 118 –
47). In addition, see Morgan (1990: 121 – 145).
245 See Keuls (1974:126). In her discussion of Plato’s references to painting in his
writings, Eva Keuls draws particular attention to the dialogues’ various referen-
ces to the technique of skiagraphia. Keuls expands on the distinctive character-
256 Section Two: The Republic

I believe that Plato’s versatile imagistic treatment of the notion of

mixture of polar opposites is better understood if we view the Republic
as a grand verbal picture whereupon Socrates mixes and analyses his
own verbal colours to rectify and represent correctly those themes
and motifs that the interlocutors so far had been viewing erroneously
because they were looking at skiagraphic poetic images from afar
(601a – b).
To argue that the Republic may be seen in terms of verbal images is
in accord with what Plato’s Socrates says in the Timaeus 19b – c when he
refers to his previous conversation about the just city. However, to
argue that Plato exploits the visual technique of skiagraphia in order to
shape his philosophical language and his method of educating Socrates’
interlocutors is to bring together into a unified whole the dialogue’s in-
teraction of the stylistic modes I outlined in Section One of this work. I
refer of course to the Platonic eikones, the vividly pictorial and poeti-
cized language, and those few linguistic moments in the text in which
Plato’s style is built out of pronouns and other terminology. In this
study I have used the terms colourless and imageless to refer to this lin-
guistic style.
In his treatment of painting references in Plato, Stephen Halliwell
has rightly argued against the common-held belief that the philosopher’s
approach to visual arts and painting in particular, is unitary throughout
the dialogues and pejorative in character. Halliwell rightly (2002:
120 – 124) argues “that Plato’s attitude to the visual arts is more explor-
atory and fluid than is usually realized”, and he emphasizes the philo-
sophical value that lies in Plato’s use of painting analogies to broach
the idea that “philosophers are painters in another medium, in the
sense that they endeavour to give vivid realization or embodiment to
ideals conceived in and held before their minds”.246 But the point

istics of skiagraphia, but she refrains from establishing any conclusions that may
throw light on the philosophical reasons that may lie behind Plato’s references
to this pictorial technique and to his use of language of images and quasi-tech-
nical details in his Republic. In relation to skiagraphia in particular, Keuls argues
that the philosopher “is playing a word game”, whereby he “uses a word in an
idiomatic or technical meaning but plays on its literal or etymological sense”.
Skiagraphia, then, whose literal meaning is “shadow-painting”, becomes Plato’s
watchword for the rejected world of appearances and deception.
246 Plato’s abundant references to painting in his dialogues corroborate the point
that the fifth century Greeks were interested in interpreting the products of
the visual arts. See Xenophon’s Mem. 3.10.1 – 8. See also the Ion 532e – 533b.
 5. Conclusion 257

should be made that in painting Plato has found rich metaphorical po-
tential to bring home the idea that philosophical language too is ar-
ranged to realize and communicate ideals. However, contrary to poetic
language and techniques, it does so in a correct manner, for the philos-
opher, unlike the poet, is knowledgeable.247 Plato’s various references to
painting then cannot be fully integrated into a unified doctrine because
the dynamics that the philosopher has found in painting and visual art
are too rich and versatile to be thus narrowed.248
Yet, as we have seen, there is one visual technique in particular of
which Plato does not think highly – that of “shadow-painting” (skiagra-
phia), but little consensus has been reached over the establishment of its
distinctive characteristics.249 Evidence for skiagraphia has been scarce, as
the technique, which flourished in the fifth century B.C., was eventu-
ally abandoned or forgotten.250 As a result, Plato and Aristotle’s few ref-
erences to skiagraphia are our main 4th century B.C. sources for inferring
the characteristics distinctive to this type of painting technique. This is
perilous ground on which we tread because, as is so often the case with
Plato, the philosopher is much more interested in coupling or mixing
current ideas with his own philosophic concerns and adapting them
to his own needs than providing a clear, historical account of pictorial
modes in current use at the time. Nonetheless, it is Plato’s reception

247 This seems to be the general idea argued in the Laws 2.668e-669b: the judge of
the beauty of eikones must know three things: the identity of the depicted ob-
ject, the correctness (orthotẽs) of its representation, and, lastly, how well (eu) it
has been depicted. Halliwell rightly observes that Plato’s posing and combina-
tion of all three criteria demonstrate how “mimetic imaging turns from a tech-
nical into an ethical activity” (2002: 131). Interpretations that argue for a com-
prehensive Platonic derogatory view of painting are usually derived from Plato’s
association of painting with poetry and primarily rest on his arguments in Book
10 of the Republic that these two arts are merely imitative. See also Halliwell
(1988).
248 Plato does not view painting in a uniform or consistent way throughout his
writings. Thus he is also hardly consistent in his view of painting and painters
in the Republic. But it must be stressed that it is the technique of skiagraphia, in
particular, in the Republic, and in the later dialogues, which is viewed in a whol-
ly derogatory manner. See also Demand (1975: 1 – 20).
249 See the detailed discussion in Keuls (1997: 108 – 144); Demand (1975: 1 – 20);
and Rouveret (1989: 24 – 26 and 50 – 59). For analyses of Plato’s references to
painting in their historical context, see Steven (1933: 149 – 155) and Rouveret
(1989: 22) with n. 29.
250 Pliny (N.H.) becomes interested in skiagraphia, yet his definition of it must also
be treated with caution. See N.H. 35, 29.
258 Section Two: The Republic

of skiagraphia that interests me here and I shall venture to follow his lead
in his philosophical treatment of this pictorial mode.
Plato mentions the word ten times in the entire corpus, five of
which occur in the Republic and the rest are sporadically distributed in
the other dialogues.251 A close reading of the relevant passages demon-
strates that the technique was based on distant viewing and relied on the
mixing of colours to depict what we would see from afar as a ‘faithful’ or
‘cohesive’ representation, usually of nature or landscapes. This is made
clear in Critias 107c – d and Theaetetus 208e.252 Despite the differences
in the ideas argued in these two dialogues, both passages suggest that
this particular mode of painting is suitable for distant viewing and that
its pictorial coherence breaks down once one attempts to take a closer
look at the painting. In my view, in his writings Plato uses the rich dy-
namics of this particular characteristic of skiagraphia to draw attention to
the poets’ deception of their audience. He then fashions certain verbal
images to attack this deception.253
Thus the term skiagraphia is employed in the dialogues to show how
the cohesiveness of certain ethical concepts treated by poetry resembles
the artistic mixture of contrasting colours which, when viewed from
afar, give the impression of unity and integration (601a – b, 605a8 –
605b2; Cp. 373a6 – 7, 373b2 – c1). However, this is an illusion only,
since if one changes the perspective and chooses to examine the
image closely, the incongruence of its mixing elements becomes striking
and the artistic integration is lost. And this is the crucial point in Plato’s
pejorative references to this technique. Plato exploits it to talk about the
dangerous and confusing consequences of bringing together (“mixing”)

251 See Chapter Four above, n. 226.

252 See the Tht. 208e7 – 10: “Now all of a sudden, Theaetetus, I don’t understand
anything at all, not even a little, since I’ve got too near to what is being said, just as if
it were a shadow-painting (1peidµ 1cc»r ¦speq sjiacqav^lator c]coma toO
kecol]mou). For as long as I stood way off from it, it appeared to me that some-
thing was being said.” (Trans. Seth Benardete [1984]). In the Critias 107c – d,
Plato connects the technique of shadow-painting with the representation of
landscapes and stresses its inadequacy for representing human bodies of which
people have knowledge and experience.
253 In the Sophist, Plato has connected optical illusion to verbal illusion and inves-
tigated how this is also achieved in sophistic speech. The Eleatic Stranger dis-
tinguishes between eikastikẽ and phantastikẽ visual art on the basis of the visual
illusion they generate on the viewers. See the detailed discussion in Notomi
(1999). See also Nightingale, in Annas, J. and Rowe, C. (eds.) (2002b: 227 –
248).
 5. Conclusion 259

into what only appears to be a unified and coherent whole of pairs of

irreconcilable opposites. It is in this sense that skiagraphia becomes Pla-
to’s watchword for the poets’ deception of the audience. In this techni-
que, which makes the most of mixing colour and perspective to achieve
coherence, Plato has found a versatile analogy to speak about the dy-
namics of poetry to portray ethical reality (365c, 583b and 586c – c).
The poetic skiagraphiai are built out of an artistic mixture of verbal
‘colours’ and ethical characters to misrepresent what is most important
for humans, namely, ethical qualities embodied in all sorts of different
characters and dramatized in their poetic performances. Socrates had
previously brought together “colours”, “diversity”, and human “charac-
ters” (ẽthẽ) in his description of democracy in 557c4 – 9: ¦speq Rl\tiom
poij_kom p÷sim %mhesi pepoijikl]mom, ovty ja· avtg p÷sim Ehesim
pepoijikl]mg jakk_stg #m va_moito (“like a coat embroidered with
every kind of colour, this city, embroidered with every kind of character
type, would seem to be the most beautiful”.) As we saw in the previous
section, Socrates’ language to describe the characteristics of this state and
its citizens was heavily poeticized, forming an amalgamation of poetic
quotations, diction, and motifs.
In his Republic Plato exploits diverse linguistic styles with a view to
distinguishing justice from injustice, and goodness from badness. This is
essentially a philosophical attempt to rectify poetry’s misrepresentation
of ethical values. In the Republic’s pictorial language, Socrates’ interloc-
utors (the sight-lovers of Book 5) have spent their lives ‘viewing’ poetic
skiagraphiai, with some more than others constantly experiencing the
inner psychic conflicts that inappropriate education in Mousikẽ has im-
printed on them.254 The Republic mounts multiple attacks on poetry by
appropriating some of its techniques and inventing others with a view to
untangling the poets’ ethically wrong and confusing mixtures of oppo-
sites. Plato cannot undertake the philosopher-king’s task described in
the quasi-technical language of painting in 500c – 501b, for he does
not have a clear canvas to work on. In our earthly world of conflict
and continuous change (Becoming) it is difficult to erase the ‘mixture’
or even the ‘co-existence’ of opposites. It is also difficult to make hu-

254 Note that in the image of the Cave the terms skies, eidla and reflections appear
to describe the reduced epistemological status of the prisoners and the various
levels of distortion of the objects-ethical values perceived. In Petraki (2009:
27 – 67), I argued that the distortion of the various forms of reflections involves
again the interplay and confusion of pairs of ethical opposites.
260 Section Two: The Republic

mans possess only good ethical values. Elsewhere Plato argues that this
amounts to approaching the divine.255 Nevertheless, he does meet an
equally demanding challenge in this dialogue, which is to demonstrate
how philosophy is the only way to bridge the distance that separates
people from their own psychic harmony (symphnia and harmonia) and
from the Platonic Forms.
This is a long educational process which according to the philoso-
pher-kings’ education described in Book 7, requires hard practical train-
ing and painstaking education in higher subjects. In his dialogue, Plato
opts for an alternative, shorter route which requires that ethically wrong
‘mixtures’ are revisited to be analysed in their basic elements. The Re-
public’s mixis-motif opens up new possibilities, and Plato makes full
use of them in his text. He has Socrates condemn and reject the various
illusionary poetic skiagraphiai by creating various philosophic verbal im-
ages in the dialogue and bringing the interlocutors closer to inspect
them.
In pictorial terms, Plato’s attack on the poetic skiagraphiai is illustrat-
ed most forcefully in his building of the image of the Sun to present the
Form of the Good. The Sun’s homogeneity and purity of light will not
allow for any form of colour mixture, shading, or optical fusion. What is
similar, although not identical in its pictorial effect, is also Socrates’
image of the citizens of the ideal city as being united in one single
body in Book 5. According to my discussion in Chapter One, Socrates’
prescriptions as regards the guardians’ life-style and the citizens’ koinnia
and philia in Book 5 aimed to fashion a homogeneous society. In visual
terms this was rendered in the creation of a simple eikn: an andreikelon.
However, at the other end of the spectrum stands Plato’s diverse and
strikingly poeticized language describing the constitutions and souls of
the unjust. This linguistic style is in full accord with the conflicting
and incongruent characteristics that Plato’s Socrates identifies in these
constitutions and souls. By using this linguistic style in this thematic en-
vironment, Plato also demonstrates how the ẽthẽ of the bad should use
their own language – that of colourfulness and diversity (poikilia,
601a – b). Socrates’ interlocutors have been accustomed to thinking of
these cities and psychic states as forming a coherent, consistent, and

255 See Rep. 500b – d and 613a – b. See also the Tim. 90 b – d; and Tht. 176a – c. See
discussion by Annas (1999: 13 – 14 and 52 – 71). See also Armostrong (2004:
171 – 183); Pradeau (2003: 11 – 24); and Sedley, in Calvo, T. and Brisson, L.
(eds.) (1997: 327 – 340).
 5. Conclusion 261

well-functioning unifying whole. However, once they view anew Pla-

to’s verbal depiction of these their view is about to change. The poikilia
of the unjust is colourful but ugly; the pleasure they enjoy is mixed, tor-
turous, and false, and their actions make them subhuman.
I believe that in his Republic Plato has found in the technique of
shadow-painting a helpful analogy to draw our attention to the philo-
sophical value of his own images and of his colourless linguistic style.
Even the image of the Good as the Sun in Book 6 is rendered in the
colourful terms of pure ‘whiteness’. At the same time, Plato has also de-
scribed the pure quality of true pleasure (kathara hẽdonẽ) as being repre-
sented by the colour “white”:
haul\foir #m owm eQ ja· oR %peiqoi !kghe_ar peq· pokk_m te %kkym lµ rcie?r
d|nar 5wousim, pq|r te Bdomµm ja· k}pgm ja· t¹ letan» to}tym ovty
di\jeimtai, ¦ste, ftam l³m 1p· t¹ kupgq¹m v]qymtai, !kgh/ te oUomtai
ja· t` emti kupoOmtai, ftam d³ !p¹ k}pgr 1p· t¹ letan}, sv|dqa l³m
oUomtai pq¹r pkgq~sei te ja· Bdom0 c_cmeshai, ¦speq pq¹r l]kam vai¹m
!posjopoOmter !peiq_ô keujoO, ja· pq¹r t¹ %kupom ovty k}pgm
!voq_mter !peiq_ô Bdom/r !pat_mtai ; (584e7 – 585a5)
Is it any surprise, then, if those inexperienced in the truth have unsound
opinions about lots of other things as well, or that they are so disposed
to pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state that, when they descend to
the painful, they believe truly and are really in pain, but that, when they
ascend from the painful to the intermediate state, they firmly believe that
they have reached fulfilment and pleasure? They are inexperienced in
pleasure and so are deceived when they compare pain to painlessness, just
as they would be if they compared black to grey without having experienced white.
On the other hand, Plato allows the interplay of light and darkness as
regards the shadows and reflections they generate, thus distorting reality,
in his epistemological images of the Line and the Cave. In the Cave, in
particular, he has invented insightful imagistic methods to analyse the
mixture of these two opposites. However, he does not allow this mix-
ture (or diversity) to penetrate his own language as regards true Being
in Book 5. Thus it is not by chance that in the context of his discussion
of Being in Book 5, and of pure pleasure in Book 9, he has Socrates
employ an imageless type of language. In my view, this is an attempt
in the Republic to make his text ‘dramatize’ or ‘reflect’ the immaterial
characteristics of the concepts he tries to communicate to the audience.
In Book 9, his use of imageless or colourless language demonstrates his
effort to transfer some of the characteristics of Being to the way philos-
ophers experience pure pleasure. Thus he deploys a similar, highly elu-
sive and difficult type of language:
262 Section Two: The Republic

P|teqa owm Bc0 t± c]mg l÷kkom jahaq÷r oqs_ar let]weim, t± oXom s_tou te
ja· potoO ja· exou ja· sulp\sgr tqov/r, C t¹ d|ngr te !kghoOr eWdor ja·
1pist^lgr ja· moO ja· sukk^bdgm aw p\sgr !qet/r ; ¨de jq?me7 t¹ toO !e·
blo_ou 1w|lemom ja· !ham\tou ja· !kghe_ar, ja· aqt¹ toioOtom cm ja· 1m
toio}t\ cicm|lemom, l÷kkom eWmai soi doje?, C t¹ lgd]pote blo_ou ja· hmg-
toO, ja· aqt¹ toioOtom ja· 1m toio}t\ cicm|lemom ;
Pok}, 5vg, diav]qei t¹ toO !e· blo_ou. (585b12 – c5; Cp. 585d1 – 10)
And which kinds partake more of pure being? Kinds of filling up such as
filling up with bread or drink or delicacies or food in general? Or the
kind of filling up that is with true belief, knowledge, understanding and,
in sum, with all virtue? Judge it this way: That which is related to what is al-
ways the same, immortal, and true, is itself of that kind, and comes to be in some-
thing of that kind – this is more, don’t you think, than that which is related to what
is never the same and mortal, is itself of that kind, and comes to be in something of
that kind?
That which is related to what is always the same is far more.
Socrates links in difficult language here the concept of human pleasure
with true Knowledge and Being. From a pedagogical point of view,
what is particularly interesting is Glaucon’s response to this philosoph-
ical style. Unlike Book 5, Glaucon can competently follow Socrates’
thought rendered here in an ‘imageless’ type of language. Through
Glaucon, then, Plato gives us a glimpse of an alternative type of philo-
sophical dialect. Yet, this is again only a glimpse since in order to address
the Republic’s sight-lovers a few moments later, Plato deploys the same
narratological technique of Book 5. The image of the tyrant’s appetitive
psychic part is explicitly announced in 588b1 – 9 as addressed to those
who have argued in Book 1 for the prevalence of injustice over justice.
In human terms, injustice was linked with profit, pleasure and happi-
ness. Socrates attacks this ethical stance by subverting in vivid poetic lan-
guage people’s commonly held ideas about pleasure, and happiness. The
image of the tyrant, whose soul eats itself internally, is a representation
par excellence of dreadful pain. Thus the language of poetry, which has
been customarily associated with the generation of sentiments of pleas-
ure (hẽdusmenẽn mousan, 607a5), is appropriated by Plato so that it now
causes pain and terror.
Concluding, I should say a few words about Plato’s imageless stylis-
tic mode and its place in the Republic’s text where, as I have shown, im-
ages of one kind or another predominate. I believe that Plato’s referen-
ces to skiagraphia could also help us untangle, as it were, this linguistic
tension too. The ‘whiteness’ and ‘clarity’ which I read in these rare lin-
guistic moments do not become meaningful in our text unless they are
 5. Conclusion 263

somehow linguistically juxtaposed with, and contrasted to, the imagistic

type of language. The Socratic interlocutors in the Republic cannot fol-
low a discussion that rests completely on this type of colourless philo-
sophical discourse. From this point of view, and if we adopt a panoram-
ic view of the Republic’s pictorial effect, Plato has brought Socrates’ in-
terlocutors close to his verbal ‘paintings’ and has tried to analyze the
mixed constituents of mundane human nature and transcendent knowl-
edge. Yet, binary oppositions have not been rubbed off his various ver-
bal ‘paintings’ either.

***

In this study I focused on Plato’s creation of verbal eikones in the Republic

and argued that Plato exploits them to address epistemological problems
in his dialogue in his attempt to draw the interlocutors’ attention to the
complex methodological problems that arise from trying to investigate
ethics and ontology through the ‘visible’. Plato’s use of philosophical
images stems from his reformation of the guardians’ education in
Books 2 and 3. In specific terms, the guardians of the theoretical polis
cannot be ‘fed’ versatile or incongruent poetic imagery similar to that
which has educated Socrates’ interlocutors in Piraeus. The Socratic
city would then not differ from contemporary Athens and Plato
would seek to found the ideal polis on a completely different basis.
Thus I also suggested that Socrates’ discussion of justice and injustice
is built on two narratological levels in the text, since, in founding his
ideal polis and expanding on the education of its guardians and philos-
opher-kings, Socrates seeks simultaneously to educate his co-speakers
in important ethical and ontological matters. This process is realized
in our text through Socrates’ incorporating and adapting to his speech
poetic techniques (traditional motifs, imagery, and poetic diction) that
configures a type of philosophic dialect with which his interlocutors
are most at ease.
Nonetheless, Socrates’ philosophic discourse, far from being uni-
form, exploits manifold stylistic modes in the dialogue and it is these sty-
listic and linguistic alternations that become the pivot on which his ed-
ucation of the interlocutors hinge. Socrates ventures to investigate the
invisible and the ontological by promoting his interlocutors’ re-familiar-
ization with the visible and the sense-perceptible. Thus in approaching
the Republic’s various linguistic modes in this work, I refrained from
264 Section Two: The Republic

drawing strict stylistic divisions between the mythical or imagistic tex-

tual environments and the so-called argumentative parts of the dialogue.
I argued instead that Plato’s stylistic variety in our text disrupts clear-cut
linguistic divisions of that sort, as his adaptation of poetic motifs and dic-
tion permeates the dialogue throughout.
I proposed instead an alternative reading of the Republic’s discourse
according to which Socrates’ choice of philosophical style is dependent
on the subject he tackles in the dialogue and on the interlocutor he ad-
dresses when examining a subject. Thus my methodology has given rise
to a new distinction between a poeticized or highly imagistic type of
language that is easily grasped by the members of Socrates’ audience
and a novel mode of language, and thus experimental for the members
of this particular audience. In this study, I followed a close reading of
the dialogue to examine the interaction of these two stylistic modes
in places where Socrates promotes complex ontological and epistemo-
logical ideas by way of argumentation. In the latter part of Book 5,
Plato has Socrates adopt three different linguistic styles to present his
epistemological distinction between Being and Becoming to two differ-
ent types of internal audience, namely, to Glaucon and the sight-lovers.
This process aims at educating the interlocutors in the use of philo-
sophical language and reasoning. Yet, alongside the presentation of phil-
osophical terminology, Plato also exploits imagistic and heavily pictorial
language in his discussion of human nature in Books 6 and 7. Plato’s im-
agery in these contexts is laden with important philosophical ramifica-
tions, as vividly coloured and pictorial language creates in our text var-
ious polarities that contrast the simplicity, unity, and homogeneity of
Plato’s true Being with “diversity” and “polymorphy” (poikilia and po-
lueidia).
From this interpretative point of view, the stylistic distinction pro-
posed in this work could also be rendered in terms of a highly versatile
(poikilẽ) language, which is inextricably intertwined with ‘contaminated’
human nature and a purified type of discourse which strives to eschew
colourfulness and poikilia when approaching the homogeneity of the
Platonic Real or the simplicity of the just soul and city. Nowhere is
this stylistic distinction more explicitly dramatized than in Plato’s treat-
ment of the unjust souls and polities in Books 8 and 9. Plato’s discourse
in these two Books identifies the multiple forms of injustice with incon-
gruence and variety (poikilia) and exploits vivid imagery, animal lan-
guage, easily identifiable poetic diction, several poetic extracts, and po-
 5. Conclusion 265

etic motifs in order to depict the contaminated unjust souls and their
corresponding political systems.
The ethical and political ideas of Books 8 and 9 stand in stark con-
trast to Plato’s description of the just city and the Forms in Book 5. The
guardians’ communal life in Book 5 sought to reproduce the homoge-
neity of the Forms. It is not surprising, then, that these three Books dif-
fer in their linguistic styles too, and that in Book 5 poetic quotations al-
most disappear from Socrates’ language. At the same time, the descrip-
tion of the dynamics of human nature in Book 7 focuses on the elim-
ination of ethical contradiction and conflict. As a result, Book 7 dem-
onstrates how the poets’ parlance, criticized in Books 2 and 3, is the rep-
resentation par excellence of mixture, polymorphy, and variety which de-
ceive the senses, confuses the soul and moulds (plattein) incongruent and
conflicting moral prototypes. As Socrates reveals in Book 7, to the other
end of this type of poeticized language stand mathematics, in which the
philosopher-kings must be strenuously trained for several years before
they take on Dialectic, the subject that will lead them to the Forms. Pla-
to’s practical and intellectual educational curriculum for the philoso-
pher-kings of the ideal state is lengthy and highly demanding. Yet,
this is not the type of education performed in the Republic.
In this study I argued that in the Republic Plato creates modes of
philosophical language with a view to educating Socrates’ interlocutors
in matters of philosophical discourse. Under the first category falls lan-
guage designed to serve argumentation in a ‘poeticized’ mode, the reg-
ister being ‘concrete’ and heavily imagistic. The second category was
defined as a mixed/combined register which interweaves in the same
context imagistic language with seeds of an ‘abstract’ type of speech.
In the third category language is entirely stripped of poetic motifs and
is defined by a higher level of abstraction. This type of language eschews
easily drawn associations based on information provided by our senses.
In the Republic, this stylistic mode is employed infrequently, since
Socrates’ interlocutors cannot keep abreast of it. The contexts in
which this style emerges are rare in the text and difficult to grasp.
Plato has Socrates experiment with this type of philosophical discourse,
thus raising complex questions about whether there exists a philosoph-
ical type of language that can be totally stripped of images. Whether,
that is, language can be dissociated from our senses in order to approach
and express the transcendent Real. In the Republic, Plato, in the same
breath, castigates poetic images and creates memorable philosophical im-
agery of prominent poetic influence. He thus raises a significant linguis-
266 Section Two: The Republic

tic problem in relation to the use of imagery in philosophical discourse

but refrains from solving it. In my view, the problem is raised anew in
his Sophist or in the Parmenides. What he does solve, however, is ques-
tions about the poets’ ability to portray the Real and mounts his final
attack against poetry by appropriating its features. Traditional diction,
themes, and motifs which promote polymorphy of all sorts become in
Plato’s prose the language of the ignorant and the confused, the base
and the unjust.
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 Index

Aeschylus, 215 n200 Hesiod (and Hesiodic), 11, 42, 231

– Agamemnon, Eumenides 237 n228 n223, 232, 233, 233 n225, 234,
– Seven against Thebes 198 n168 249 n240
Alcaeus, 215 n200 – Works and Days, 134 n51, 187 n152,
Anaxagoras, 17 n30 238 n230
Archilochus, 135 n52, 190 n156 n157, Hippias, 233 n225
215 n200, 233 - 235 Homer (and Homeric), 13, 16 n29, 20
Aristides Quintilianus, 101, 101 n97 n37, 42, 44, 47, 52 n24, 190 n157,
Aristophanes 226, 233, 233 n225, 234
– Assemblywomen 112 n4 – Iliad 5 n4, 47, 63
– Birds 15 n28, 191 n158 – Odyssey 5 n4
– Clouds 244 n234 Hymn, Hymnos, 49 n18, 186, 188
– Frogs 198 n168
– Knights 209 n187 Isocrates, 94, 105 n104
– Plutus 237 n228 – Evagoras 55-56
– Thesmophoriazousai 15 n28
Aristotle, 16 n29, 43, 55, 72, 78, 94- Longinus, On the Sublime, 37 n1
96, 95 n85, 101 n96, 257
– Metaphysics, 55 n33, 76 n54, 206 Parmenides, 2 n1, 3-4, 8 n11, 16 n30,
n183 26, 58, 62-63, 64 n40, 76, 98 n92,
– Physics 17 n30 103 n102, 148 n74, 166, 167 n117,
– Poetics, Rhetoric, 31, 94, 98 n91, 198 194 n164, 200 n171, 209 n187
n168 Pindar (and Pindaric), 11 n16, 15 n28,
– Hist. Anim., 238 n230 59 n37, 63, 64 n40, 103 n102, 136
– (Pseudo-Aristotle) De Coloribus, 16 n55, 175 n128, 190 n155 n156,
n29 209 n187, 233-234
Philosophy of language, 31, 94 n78
Democritus, 68, 87, 88 Platonic dialogues
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 6 n7 – Charmides, 88 n74
– Cratylus, 16 n29, 18-19 n33, 20 n35,
Empedocles, 8 n11, 16 n29 n30, 175 78 n56, 79, 183 n145
n126, 198 n168, 210 n188 – Critias, 1, 254 n242, 258, 258 n252
Euripides, 246 n237 – Ion, 52 n24, 256 n246
– Laws, 15 n28, 78, 79 n61, 254 n242,
Gorgias, 5, 6 n6, 87, 88, 141 n58 257 n247
– Helen 16 n29, 49, 54 n29, 65-69 – Parmenides, 25, 26, 32, 98 n92, 254
– On Not-Being, 5 n3 n242, 266
– Phaedo, 14 n23, 17 n31, 79 n57, 92
Heraclitus, 3, 8 n11, 43 n12, 103 n102, n77, 175 n128, 234 n226, 254
165 n114 n242
292 Index

– Phaedrus, 19 n33, 25 n46, 32 n58, – Timaeus, 18 n33, 29 n52, 60 n38, 79

44, 52-55, 53 n26 n27 n28, 63, 75 n58, 159 n102, 204 n177, 256, 260
n52 n255
– Philebus, 78 Presocratics, 5, 15, 42 n10, 103 n102,
– Politicus, 40 n8, 187 n152, 210 n190 175 n126
– Protagoras, 50, 60 n38
– Seventh Letter (Epistle), 19n33, 25, 24 Simonides, 233
n46, 32 n58 Sophocles, 5 n4
– Sophist, 19 n33, 25, 26, 29 n52, 32, – O.T., 198 n168
32 n57, 79 n59, 258 n253, 266 – Antigone, 215 n200
– Symposium, 38 n2, 91-93, 92 n77,
161, 190 n157, 223 n208 Theognis, 215 n200
– Theaetetus, 19 n33, 55 n33, 159 Thucydides, 5 n4
n102, 254 n242, 258, 258 n252,
260 n255 Xenophon
– Symposium, 20 n37
– Memorabilia, 256 n246