THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(CIVIL DIVISION)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 89 OF 2018
(ARISING FROM GENERAL APPLICATION NO. 372 OF 2017)
STANBIC BANK (U) LIMITED :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT
VERSUS
ODORO SUSAN ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT

BEFORE: HON. JUSTICE BONIFACE WAMALA

RULING

Introduction
[1] The Appellant being dissatisfied with the ruling and orders of Her Worship
Patience Lorna Tukundane, Magistrate Grade One, delivered on the 16th day
of August 2018 at Mengo Chief Magistrates Court, brought this appeal seeking
orders that the appeal be allowed, the ruling and orders of the learned trial
Magistrate be set aside and the costs of the appeal and in the lower court be
provided for.

Brief Background to the Appeal

[2] The Respondent filed General Application No. 372 of 2017 in the Chief
Magistrates Court of Mengo for enforcement of a claim arising out of an
assessment and computation made by the labour officer under the Workers
Compensation Act. It was the Respondent’s case that she had been an
employee of the Appellant for an uninterrupted period of 31 years until 2014
when she applied for and was granted early retirement based on a medical
condition she believed to have been sustained from work. The Respondent filed
a complaint to a labour officer who referred her to a general medical doctor who
assessed the Respondents permanent incapacity at 40%. The Appellant
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challenged the findings and the matter was referred to the Medical Arbitration
Board which also made an assessment of permanent incapacity on the
Respondent at the rate of 40%. The labour officer made a statutory calculation
of the compensation at a sum of UGX 197,486,872/= (One Hundred Ninety-
Seven Million Four Hundred Eighty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Two
Shillings). The said computation and award was served upon the Appellant who
did not respond within the prescribed period. The Respondent thus filed the
application for enforcement of the said award before the Magistrates Court
leading to the impugned ruling and orders.

Representation and Hearing

[3] At the hearing, the Appellant was represented by Ms. Josephine Muhaise
from S&L Chambers while the Respondent was represented by Mr. Aloysius
Onyait from M/s BAOBAB Advocates. Counsel agreed to proceed by way of
written submissions which were duly filed by both counsel and have been
considered in the determination of the matter before the Court.

The Grounds of Appeal

[4] The Appellant raised four grounds of appeal in the memorandum of appeal,
namely;
a) The learned trial Magistrate erred in law in holding that the Chief
Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of
disability.
b) The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that in
determining causal link, the applicant was not required to produce
affirmative medical evidence establishing that the working condition
caused the alleged harm.
c) The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the
Respondent had not produced legally sufficient evidence to support the
contention that the Applicant’s condition was not work related.

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 d) The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in upholding the order
of the labour officer.

Duty of the Court on Appeal

[5] The duty of a first appellate court is to scrutinize and re-evaluate the
evidence on record and come to its own conclusion and to a fair decision upon
the evidence that was adduced in a lower court. See: Section 80 of the Civil
Procedure Act Cap 71. This position has also been re-stated in a number of
decided cases including Fredrick Zaabwe v Orient Bank Ltd CACA No. 4 of
2006; Kifamunte Henry v Uganda SC CR. Appeal No. 10 of 1997; and Baguma
Fred v Uganda SC Crim. App. No. 7 of 2004. In the latter case, Oder, JSC stated
thus:
“First, it is trite law that the duty of a first appellate court is to reconsider all
material evidence that was before the trial court, and while making
allowance for the fact that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses, to
come to its own conclusion on that evidence. Secondly, in so doing it must
consider the evidence on any issue in its totality and not any piece in
isolation. It is only through such re-evaluation that it can reach its own
conclusion, as distinct from merely endorsing the conclusion of the trial
court”.

Consideration of the Grounds of Appeal

Ground 1: That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law in holding that
the Chief Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the
assessment of disability?

Submissions by Counsel for the Appellant

[6] Counsel for the Appellant faulted the trial Magistrate’s finding to the effect
that Section 14(2) of the Workers Compensation Act does not vest the court
with jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of disability. Counsel argued

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that this finding is contradictory to the court’s own ruling dated 1st November
2017 where the court found that it had jurisdiction. Counsel drew the attention
of Court to Section 13(3) of the Workers Compensation Act which provides that
a decision of the Medical Arbitration Board shall be final except if an aggrieved
party goes to court; which court is defined in Section 1(1) of the Act to mean a
magistrate’s court established under the Magistrates Courts Act, presided over
by a chief magistrate or a magistrate grade one, having jurisdiction in the area
where the accident to the worker has occurred. Counsel argued that the import
of the above provisions of the law is that matters of worker’s compensation
shall not be handled by any other court than the magistrates court within the
area. Counsel further argued that the court will not only have the jurisdiction
but also the mandate to hear the opposition to an assessment and to overturn
the assessment upon a finding that the same was improperly reached or
reached under the wrong principles.

[7] Counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the Appellant’s opposition
to the application challenged the assessment of the Medical Arbitration Board
and the court had jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of disability
which the trial magistrate failed to correctly take advantage of even after
allowing the testimony of Dr. Denis Otto Odokonyero. Counsel prayed to the
Court to find that the trial Magistrate erred in holding that the Chief
Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of
disability.

Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent

[8] In response, it was submitted by Counsel for the Respondent that the
learned trial Magistrate is being unfairly criticized for stating that the Chief
Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of
disability on account that the issue of jurisdiction to interfere with the
assessment of the disability was not one of the issues framed for

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determination. Counsel cited the case of Fang Min v Belex Tours & Travel Ltd,
SCCA No. 06 of 2013 to the effect that on appeal, matters that were not raised
and decided upon in the trial court cannot be brought up as fresh matters.
Counsel argued that the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court was not one of
the issues raised by the parties. Counsel submitted that the part of the trial
Magistrate’s ruling under challenge were merely comments made in
interpreting the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Workers Compensation Act.

[9] Counsel also argued that Section 13(3) of the Worker’s Compensation Act
which was reproduced at page 3 of the trial Magistrate’s ruling supports the
trial Magistrate’s comment that the court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with
the assessment of disability. Counsel stated that the provision is to the effect
that the decision of the Medical Arbitration Board is final unless a party
aggrieved by the decision goes to court. Counsel submitted that there is no
evidence on record to show that the Appellant was ever aggrieved by the
decision of the Medical Arbitration Board. Counsel submitted that although
court has jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the Medical Arbitration
Board, the same is only possible by the aggrieved party going to court which is
distinguishable from the present appeal where the aggrieved party was instead
dragged to court in the process of enforcing the compensation claim as
computed by the labour officer. Counsel concluded that the Appellant’s
conduct of not challenging the decision of the Medical Arbitration Board made
it final and it could not be interfered with by the trial court.

Determination by the Court

[10] It is pertinent to set out the provisions under Sections 13 and 14 of the
Workers Compensation Act. The relevant provisions of Section 13 of the
Workers Compensation Act are sub-sections 1, 2 and 3, provides as follows;

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 “Computed assessment of disability.
(1) If the final assessment of disability made by a medical practitioner after a
medical examination made in accordance with section 11, is disputed by
the employer or the worker, the employer or the worker may apply to the
labour officer to request that the dispute be referred to the medical
arbitration board.
(2) The application for referral shall be made within a reasonable time from
the date of receipt of the notice of final assessment.
(3) The decision of the medical arbitration board on the matter shall be final
unless a party aggrieved by the decision goes to court.” [Emphasis added]

[11] On the other hand, Section 14(1) and (2) of the Workers Compensation Act
provides as follows;
“Determination of claims.
1) If any employer on whom notice of the accident has been served under
section 9 does not, within twenty-one days after the receipt of the notice,
agree in writing with the worker as to the amount of compensation to be paid,
the worker may, in the prescribed form and manner, make an application for
enforcing a claim to compensation to the court having jurisdiction in the
district in which the accident giving rise to the claim occurred.
2) All claims for compensation under this Act, unless determined by agreement,
and any matter, except disputes as to the assessment of disability under
Section 13, arising out of proceedings under this Act shall be determined by
the court, whatever may be the amount involved.” [Emphasis added]

[12] The statement in the ruling of the trial Magistrate that is subject of the
first ground of appeal is found in the first paragraph of the last page of the
ruling at page 280 of the record of appeal. It states thus;

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“Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the GATIOD system was used in reaching
the permanent disability rate. Be as it may, this court has no jurisdiction to
interfere with the assessment of disability as provided for under Section 14(2) of
WCA”.

[13] It is clear to me from a reading of the entire ruling of the learned trial
Magistrate that her above finding was based on the fact that she was dealing
with an application premised on Section 14 and not Section 13 of the Act.
Section 13(3) is in clear terms; “the decision of the medical arbitration board on
the matter shall be final unless a party aggrieved by the decision goes to court”.
While it is correct that the “court” referred to in both Sections 13 and 14 is the
same, the manner of going to the court is distinct in each. A party aggrieved
with the decision of the medical arbitration board within Section 13 of the Act
is directed to go to the court to contest the decision. In the present case, the
Appellant upon being served with the decision of the medical arbitration board
neither expressed any grievance nor went to court. Rather, as was the
submission of Counsel for the Respondent, the Appellant was dragged to court;
and within an arrangement different from that envisaged under Section 13(3) of
the Act. It is not legally viable for the Appellant to argue that because they went
to court after being taken there, they had thereby complied with the provision
under Section 13(3) of the Act.

[14] I am fortified in the above view by looking at both the relevant law and the
particular facts in issue. In terms of the law, if the Appellant had contemplated
bringing an action within the ambit of Section 13(3) of the Act, there was no
bar to them filing the application simply because the Respondent had also filed
one within the ambit of Section 14 of the Act. The Appellant would have filed
their application and if the court found it fitting, it would have consolidated the
application. The other option available would have been for the Appellant to file
a counter action. This procedure is however more common where the original

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action is brought by way of an ordinary suit, enabling the defendant to bring a
counter claim. In the present case, bringing a distinct separate action by the
Appellant was the more legally viable alternative which was well supported
under the law given the clear and distinct provisions of Sections 13 and 14 of
the Act.

[15] In terms of the facts of the case, the decision of the medical arbitration
board was communicated to the labour office on 8th November 2016 and the
labour office communicated the assessment to the Appellant on 14th November
2016. The Appellant was requested to communicate their agreement or not to
the assessment by 5th December 2016; failure of which the matter would be
placed before the court for determination in accordance with Section 14 of the
Workers Compensation Act. The application by the present Respondent was
instituted in the magistrate’s court on 4th May 2017, over six months from the
time the Appellant would have expressed their grievance towards the
assessment by lodging action before the court. As a matter of fact, therefore, it
is not correct as alleged by the Appellant’s Counsel that the reason the
Appellant did not file a separate action against the assessment was because
they found out that the Respondent had filed one. The Appellant had more
than sufficient time within which to lodge their action and they chose not to.

[16] As it stands, therefore, the Appellant neither commenced any action as

envisaged under the law nor did they bring a counter action. As I have already
indicated, I do not accept the argument by learned Counsel for the Appellant
that by replying to the application brought by the Respondent, they thereby
lodged their action in compliance with Section 13(3) of the Act. This argument
is not tenable in terms of the law and on the facts of the case. As clearly
appreciated by the learned trial Magistrate, Section 14(1) of the Act is for
purpose of “enforcing a claim to compensation” by the injured worker. Within
the strict premises of the application that was before the trial court, the trial

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Magistrate had no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of disability;
her role was that of enforcing the assessment and computation. The rationale
is not difficult to see. It is because if any party was aggrieved with the
assessment, they were expected to have already made use of the provision
under Section 13(3) to challenge the assessment. The learned trial Magistrate,
therefore, rightly declined to exercise jurisdiction over a portion of the matter
that had been cleverly smuggled into the proper proceeding before her. I have
therefore found no merit in the first ground of appeal and it fails.

Ground 2: The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding
that in determining causal link, the applicant was not required to produce
affirmative medical evidence establishing that the working condition
caused the alleged harm.

Submissions by Counsel for the Appellant

[17] Counsel for the Appellant faulted the trial Magistrate for finding that the
Respondent was not required to lead affirmative medical evidence establishing
that the working condition caused the alleged harm basing on Section 3(7) of
the Workers Compensation Act which is to the effect that any accident arising
in the course of employment shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed
to arise out of employment. Counsel argued that the section merely creates a
rebuttable presumption in favour of the employee but does not absolve the
employee of the burden to provide affirmative evidence when the presumption
is challenged and neither did it repeal or limit the application of Section 101 of
the Evidence Act. Counsel argued that the worker is bound to lead evidence to
prove all the particulars of her claim. Counsel further argued that once the
presumption was challenged by the evidence of Dr. Denis Otto Odokonyero, the
Respondent was required to adduce evidence in support of the fact that the
ailment complained of was occupational in nature and resulted from duties
executed by her.

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Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent
[18] Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the application that gave rise
to this appeal was filed to enforce a compensation claim pursuant to Section 14
(1) of the Workers Compensation Act and did not envisage a full trial until the
Appellant sought leave of the court to produce an expert witness whose
objective was to controvert the Respondent’s evidence which was in form of
medical reports. Counsel argued that the learned trial Magistrate correctly
based on the material before her at the time to state that the Respondent was
not obliged to produce affirmative evidence establishing that her medical
condition was work related. Counsel submitted that what the Respondent had
filed on record had raised the presumption under the law and the Appellant
was then obliged to prove to the contrary; which is the reason as to why the
trial Magistrate granted the Appellant leave to file the expert evidence to
controvert the evidence already filed by the Respondent. Counsel concluded
that the Respondent complied with Section 101 of the Evidence Act when she
filed the five medical reports to prove that her condition was work related.

Determination by the Court

[19] The crux of this ground of appeal is whether the Respondent had an
obligation to adduce further evidence to rebut the expert evidence adduced by
the Appellant at the trial. The position of the law under Section101 of the
Evidence Act is that whoever desires any court to give judgement as to any
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he or she
asserts must prove that those facts exist. Section 103 of the Evidence Act
further provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that
person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by
law that the proof of the fact shall lie on any particular person. The law,
therefore, classifies between a legal burden and an evidential burden. When a
plaintiff has led evidence establishing his or her claim, he/she is said to have

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executed the legal burden. The evidential burden thus shifts to the defendant
to rebut the plaintiff’s claims.

[20] In the present case, the law makes a presumption in favour of the worker
(applicant in the trial court). This is termed as a legal presumption. According
to the Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 1057, a legal presumption is
defined as a legal assumption that a court is required to make if certain facts
are established and no contradictory evidence is produced. It is also referred to
as a rebuttable presumption; which according to the Black’s Law Dictionary,
9th Edition, page 1306 is defined as “an inference drawn from certain facts that
establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of
contrary evidence”.

[21] In terms of Section 103 of the Evidence Act, this kind of presumption
places the burden upon the respondent/ defendant as soon as certain facts are
established by the applicant/plaintiff. Nevertheless, as submitted by Counsel
for the Appellant, this legal position does not give a license to an applicant to
just throw their case before the court and wait for the respondent to labour
with proof; the applicant must present and establish certain facts that support
their case for the presumption to be triggered.

[22] In the present case, the applicant (now Respondent) adduced facts
showing the time she had worked with the Appellant, the history of her injury/
pain, the nature of the injury and the medical interpretation after examination.
The Respondent also presented an assessment by medical experts indicating a
percentage of disability suffered. In terms of the law on burden of proof, the
Respondent had established the relevant facts which if not contradicted by
other evidence ought to be believed by the court. As such, in terms of Section
3(7) of the Workers Compensation Act, as long as the worker established that
an accident or injury occurred to them in the course of employment, and the

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contrary was not proved, such accident or injury was presumed to arise out of
employment. It follows, therefore, that after triggering the legal presumption in
motion, the worker had no more burden to lead evidence to establish as a fact
that the working conditions caused the alleged harm. It remained the duty of
the employer to lead evidence proving the fact that the working conditions had
no causal link with the alleged injury; and thus rebutting the presumption.
Where the employer successfully rebuts the presumption, in absence of any
further evidence by the worker, the application by the worker would be
unsuccessful. On the other hand, where the employer fails to rebut the
presumption, the worker needs to do no more in that regard.

[23] The foregoing, in my considered view, is the context in which the trial
Magistrate made the statement that is subject of the second ground of appeal.
Before the trial court, the Appellant had not, by the expert evidence adduced,
rebutted the presumption. The trial Magistrate was therefore right to conclude
that in the circumstances before her, the applicant was not required to produce
affirmative medical evidence establishing that the working conditions had
caused the alleged harm. The trial Magistrate was right in this finding for the
simple reason that the applicant (now Respondent) was covered by a legal
presumption that had not been rebutted by the then respondent (now
Appellant). The 2nd ground of appeal is also devoid of merit and it fails.

Ground 3: The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in holding
that the respondent had not produced legally sufficient evidence to
support the contention that the applicant’s condition was not work
related.

Submissions by Counsel for the Appellant

[24] Counsel for the Appellant faulted the trial Magistrate for failing to give the
evidence of Dr. Dennis Otto Odokonyero the correct evidential value it deserved

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because of the predisposition arising from the error of interpreting the import
of Section 3(7) of the Workers Compensation Act. Counsel argued that the said
predisposition affected her finding on grounds that the Doctor did not
investigate the chores the Respondent was doing and could not accurately
attribute the Respondent’s condition to sitting at home and doing chores.
Counsel also stated that the trial Magistrate wrongly faulted the expert’s
finding that the Respondent’s condition could have been caused by her age
ruling that the same was unsupported by empirical evidence. Counsel argued
that the Appellant adduced credible evidence that exposed the various short
comings in the evidence adduced by the Respondent in support of her case.
Counsel prayed that the Court finds that the learned trial Magistrate erred in
law and fact in holding that the Respondent had not produced legally sufficient
evidence to support the contention that the applicant’s condition was work
related.

Submissions by Counsel for the Respondent

[25] In response, Counsel for the Respondent argued that the expert witness
procured by the Appellant led evidence that left the Respondent’s evidence on
record unchallenged and his testimony was totally destroyed in cross
examination. Counsel argued that the evidence failed to dispel the five medical
reports filed by the Respondent pointing to the fact that the Respondent’s
medical condition was work related. Counsel submitted that Dr. Odokonyero
did not support his findings with any empirical epidemiological evidence to
justify that the Respondent’s medical condition was attributed to her age which
led to the trial Magistrate finding that it was without basis and was an
educated guess. Counsel stated that the five medical reports all linked the
Respondent’s condition to sitting for long hours at the work place and that
although the Appellant’s expert witness attributed the same injury to the
performance of house chores, the assertion was not based on any evidence and
was just a mere conjecture. Counsel also argued that ¾ of the medical reports

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reviewed by Dr. Odokonyero were by his senior colleagues for which he had
high regard but he did not provide any valuable reasons for departing from
their findings. Counsel concluded that the trial Magistrate was right to state in
her ruling that the Appellant had failed to provide legally sufficient evidence to
impeach and or discredit the evidence that had been filed by the Respondent.

Determination by the Court

[26] This ground of appeal is an extension of the argument regarding the
manner in which the trial court conceived and applied the burden of proof as
opposed to the perception by Counsel for the Appellant. As I have noted above,
under the second ground, the Respondent (then applicant) was covered by a
legal presumption which, if not rebutted, left her case proved after she had
established certain relevant facts. Once such facts were not contradicted or
disproved by other evidence, they would be believed by the court. In respect to
the case before the Court, once the Respondent established through medical
evidence that an injury of a particular nature occurred to her in the course of
her employment, and the contrary was not proved or this assertion was not
disproved, the injury would be presumed to have arisen out of the said
employment. It would then remain a burden of the Appellant (the respondent in
the original action) to lead evidence establishing as a fact that the said injury
was not occasioned by the working conditions or that there was no causal link
between the working conditions and the injury. It is in that context that the
trial Magistrate evaluated the evidence adduced by Dr. Dennis Otto
Odokonyero, who was produced by the Appellant as an expert in the area of
disability medical assessment and analysis.

[27] Let me first deal with the law regarding the manner in which the court
deals with the evidence adduced by experts. Under Section 43 of the Evidence
Act, when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of
science or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the

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opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in that subject, are
relevant facts and such persons are called experts. It is a settled position of the
law that opinions of experts are not binding on courts of law and are to be
considered along with all the other evidence available before the court. The
court may choose to reject such evidence if it is, in the view of the court, not
hinged on a sound basis. See: Kimani v Republic [2002] 2 EA 417 and Dr.
Kamanyiro Kakembo v Roko Construction Limited, CA Civil Appeal No. 05 of
2005. In the case of Davie v Magistrates of Edinburg (1953) CS 34, it was held
that expert witnesses cannot usurp the functions of a judge any more than a
technical assessor can substitute his advice for the court’s judgment. Experts
must furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria, for testing the
accuracy of their conclusions, to enable the judge to form their independent
judgment by applying the criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The above
constitutes a restatement of the old adage that, even in the presence of expert
evidence, the court remains the expert of experts.

[28] In the instant case, it was the evidence of the Respondent that she worked
for the Appellant for a period of 31 years and her work involved sitting for long
hours. She adduced evidence of four medical reports, namely; one from the
treating doctor – Dr. Nyati Mallon (at page 11 of the record of appeal); the
second by the Case Clinic Occupation Health Team (at page 14 of the record of
appeal); the third by Dr. Okullo Robert on the LD Form 31 (page 36 of the
record of appeal); and lastly by the Medical Arbitration Board (at pages 33 – 35
of the record of appeal). It was the case for the Respondent that the said
medical reports pointed to the fact that her medical condition was work related.
On the other hand, the evidence by Dr. Odokonyero (the Appellant’s expert
witness) who reviewed the above cited medical reports produced by the
Respondent was that the Respondent’s medical condition could be attributed to
other factors like sitting at home, doing house chores and her age.

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[29] The learned trial Magistrate in her ruling considered the evidence of the
expert witness (Dr. Odokonyero) and she did not find it as one that was hinged
on a sound basis. Regarding the finding by the expert witness that the
Respondent’s medical condition was attributed to her age, the trial Magistrate
held thus;
“Under cross examination, Dr. Otto Denis admitted that he did not know the age
of the applicant, he also stated that he had not done any epidemiological
research on the subject of age as the only factor and neither did he bring any
proven scientific theory. In my opinion, it would be illogical to state that once a
person reaches that age bracket, she is predisposed to Labour Spondylosis and
any other cause is ruled out without any scientific backing brought. I can
therefore safely state that the conclusion reached by Dr. Otto Denis Odokonyero
which is not supported by any empirical data is an educated guess.”

[30] I have given consideration to the contention by Counsel for the Appellant
that Dr. Odokonyero arrived at his conclusion by elimination after reviewing
the Respondent’s medical reports and work environment; and came to a
conclusion that the Respondent’s condition was a function of her age because
she had no history of past trauma and her work environment was not capable
of making her contract the said condition. I find that the trial Magistrate
correctly ignored this consideration in view of the fact that there was evidence
before the court that the Respondent had earlier on in 2007 suffered from the
said medical condition, which had improved after treatment. Secondly, the
learned trial Magistrate was alive to the fact that although Dr. Odokonyero had
introduced the hypothesis based on age, the expert had in cross examination
conceded that he had not taken note of the Respondent’s age and/or could not
recall it.

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[31] Regarding the finding by the expert witness that other factors like sitting at
home and doing house chores could be responsible for the Respondent’s injury,
the learned trial Magistrate held thus;
“Dr. Denis Otto Odokonyero attributes the cause of the injury of the applicant to
other factors such as sitting at home, doing house chores and age, to have
aggravated the applicant’s medical condition. In the reports the expert witness
reviewed above, there is no evidence that the previous medical reports recorded
such history about the patient. It is not known how Dr. Odokonyero reached the
conclusion that other chores not work related or sitting at home were the cause of
the injury. In my opinion under normal circumstances a person who ordinarily
works from Monday to Saturday has less time at home as compared to the work
place. Therefore, a conclusion that other chores which chores he did not
investigate or sitting at home as the cause of injury is not supported by any
evidence at all.”

[32] The trial Magistrate then concluded by disregarding the evidence of the
Appellant (then Respondent) as being of no probative value to the court and
upheld the evidence in the reports adduced by the Respondent. I find that the
trial Magistrate based on correct premises when rejecting the expert evidence
adduced by the Appellant. I have also taken note of the fact that although Dr.
Odokonyero was an expert in the area of disability medicine/assessment, he
himself told the court that he had no specialty in the area of spinal surgery. He
also conceded in cross examination that he neither personally carried out any
examination on the Respondent nor did he establish the exact work the
Respondent was doing in the Appellant bank; yet this would have been a more
paramount consideration for purpose of causal link than the aspects of age and
house chores that the expert delved in. It is pertinent to note that all the
medical expert did was an evaluation and analysis of the reports of
examination of the Respondent produced by other medical specialists.

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[33] That being the case, it is not as obvious as it is being painted by Counsel
for the Appellant that the conclusions reached by Dr. Odokonyero were hinged
on a sound basis. The said conclusions are heavily limited by the factors
pointed out in the immediately foregoing paragraph. In my view, the
conclusions by the said expert witness are more of a technical evaluation of
available medical reports than an exposition of substantive reality of the
Respondent’s condition. If the court were to choose between the expert reports
produced by the Respondent on the one hand, and the one produced by the
Appellant on the other hand, I am of the considered view that the former
reports were more in sync with reality than the merely technical and possibly
assumptive latter report. I am therefore in agreement with the learned trial
Magistrate in her refusal to be persuaded by the expert report of Dr.
Odokonyero and I find no reason to fault her finding in that regard.

[34] Counsel for the Appellant challenged the medical reports relied on by the
Respondent on the further ground that they were written by experts who had
not visited the Respondent’s working environment which Dr. Odokonyero had
done. In my view, upon evidence that the Respondent was examined by the
said medical specialists, who took her medical history, including the nature of
work she was doing and how long, I do not find that the failure to visit her
work place had any substantial effect on their findings. Given the nature of the
alleged injury and the nature of work, I am unable to see what the medical
specialists could see on the ground that could not be established through
description. No such facts were pointed out by the Appellant either. In
agreement with the learned trial Magistrate, I find that the expert evidence
adduced by the Appellant failed to rebut the presumption that there was a
causal link between the Respondent’s injury and her work place.

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[35] It was further argued by Counsel for Appellant that the evidence in the
reports adduced by the Respondent was riddled with inconsistencies. In my
opinion, contrary to the submission by the Appellant’s Counsel, it was not
shown how the inconsistencies in the said reports were material to the casual
link between the injury suffered by the Respondent and the work place. While I
agree that such inconsistencies could have been material to the determination
of the percentage of disability, it has already been established hereinbefore that
the case before the trial court was not an application challenging the
assessment. Rather it was an application for enforcement of the compensation
claim upon failure by the employer to do what they were obliged to do under
the law. The trial Magistrate, in my view, correctly ignored the alleged
inconsistencies which were apparently irrelevant to the question of causal link
between the injury and the work place.

[36] It follows, therefore, that the learned trial Magistrate was correct in her
finding that the Appellant had not produced legally sufficient evidence to
support the contention that the Respondent’s condition was not work-related.
This conclusion was properly premised on the law and the facts of the case
that was before the trial court. This ground of appeal therefore also fails.

Ground 4: The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in upholding
the order of the labour officer.

[37] I have considered the submissions of both counsel on this ground. It is not
in dispute that the proceedings at the trial court arose out of an application to
enforce an award of a labour officer made upon an assessment of permanent
disability. The Appellant sought to challenge the enforcement of the said award
by adducing evidence of an expert, Dr. Denis Otto Odokonyero, who had
reviewed the available medical reports on record and come up with his

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independent findings; the gist of which was that the Respondent’s injury was
not work related and the rate of disability assessment had been wrongly
reached. The learned trial Magistrate did not believe his evidence and upheld
the decision of the labour officer. The premises upon which the learned trial
Magistrate upheld the order of the labour officer have been the subject of
consideration under the first three issues discussed above. In light of my
findings herein above, it is clear that the learned trial Magistrate was not at
fault in upholding the order of the labour officer. This ground of appeal also
fails.

Decision by the Court

[38] In all, therefore, all the grounds of appeal have been found to be without
merit and have failed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. The
ruling of the lower court is upheld and shall be enforced. The costs of the
appeal both in this Court and in the lower court shall be borne by the
Appellant.

It is so ordered.

Dated, signed and delivered by email this 29th day of July, 2024.

Boniface Wamala
JUDGE

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