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A Critical Theory of Counterterrorism Ontology
Epistemology and Normativity 1st Edition Sondre Lindahl
Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Sondre Lindahl
ISBN(s): 9780815359234, 0815359233
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 1.44 MB
Year: 2018
Language: english
A Critical Theory of
Counterterrorism

This book offers a theory and model of counterterrorism based on emancipation

and non-­violence.
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars have produced wide-­ranging and
rich critiques of terrorism-­related research, as well as state counterterrorism pol-
icies and practices. This work aims to fill in a gap in the current literature by
constructing an original and specifically CTS model of counterterrorism. The
model outlines the basic assumptions, priorities, principles, strategies and tactics,
measures and evaluation of counterterrorism. It challenges prevalent models of
counterterrorism through a radical rethinking of the ontology, epistemology and
the agenda of counterterrorism. The model aims to prevent future acts of
terrorism by (1) reconceptualising how we study and understand terrorism, and;
(2) suggesting that our efforts to counter and prevent terrorism must commensu-
rate with the goals we want to achieve. Essentially, this involves a commitment
to emancipation, and a rejection of violence as a tool. The second part of the
book is a case study of Norwegian counterterrorism, which shows how the
theory and model developed in the book can be used. This is the first substantial
analysis of Norwegian counterterrorism in almost ten years, and produces
encouraging findings that support the potential for non-­violent solutions to
terrorism.
This book will be of particular interest to students of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, Critical Security Studies and International Relations in general.

Sondre Lindahl holds a PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from the National
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand.
Series: Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies
Series Editor: Richard Jackson
University of Otago, New Zealand

This book series will publish rigorous and innovative studies on all aspects of ter-
rorism, counter-­terrorism and state terror. It seeks to advance a new generation of
thinking on traditional subjects and investigate topics frequently overlooked in
orthodox accounts of terrorism. Books in this series will typically adopt approaches
informed by critical-­normative theory, post-­positivist methodologies and non-­
Western perspectives, as well as rigorous and reflective orthodox terrorism studies.

Ending ETA’s Armed Campaign

How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence
Imanol Murua

De-­Radicalisation in the UK Prevent Strategy

Security, Identity, and Religion
M. S. Elshimi

Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy

Reinterpreting Resistance in Palestine
Tristan Dunning

Terrorism, Talking and Transformation

A Critical Approach
Harmonie Toros

Russia’s Securitization of Chechnya

How War Became Acceptable
Julie Wilhelmsen

A Critical Theory of Counterterrorism

Ontology, Epistemology and Normativity
Sondre Lindahl

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

Routledge-­Critical-Terrorism-­Studies/book-­series/RCTS
A Critical Theory of
Counterterrorism
Ontology, Epistemology and Normativity

Sondre Lindahl
First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 Sondre Lindahl
The right of Sondre Lindahl to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data
Names: Lindahl, Sondre, author.
Title: A critical theory of counterterrorism : ontology, epistemology and
normativity / Sondre Lindahl.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. |
Series: Routledge critical terrorism studies | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018009647| ISBN 9780815359234 (hardback : alk.
paper) | ISBN 9781351121279 (e-book : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Terrorism–Prevention–Philosophy. |
Terrorism–Philosophy.
Classification: LCC HV6431 .L558 2018 | DDC 363.325/17–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018009647

ISBN: 978-0-8153-5923-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-351-12127-9 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents

List of illustrations vi
Preface vii
Acknowledgements viii

Introduction: terrorism, counterterrorism and war on

terror 1

1 The Global War on Terror 8

2 Ontology, epistemology and the ideal-­type 33

3 Normativity 50

4 Violence 67

5 A CTS model 87

6 A genealogy of Norwegian counterterrorism 111

7 An analysis of Norwegian counterterrorism 136

8 Conclusion 164

Appendix: primary policy documents analysed 174

Index 176
Illustrations

Boxes
5.1 The CTS model of counterterrorism 107
7.1 The Norwegian model of international counterterrorism 156
7.2 The Norwegian model of domestic counterterrorism 157

Table
6.1 Implementation of counterterrorism legislation 124

Figure
7.1 Guide for overall risk evaluation 151
Preface

This book is a revised, updated, and if I may add, an improved edition of my

doctoral thesis. There were several reasons why I wanted to do a PhD and write
this book about terrorism and counterterrorism. As a scholar, I wanted to explore
new and alternative ways to counter terrorism that could replace the brutal viol-
ence of the current counterterrorism paradigm. Observing the violence on
display with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, torture and abuse at Guan-
tanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, extra-­judicial killings, massive state surveillance
and the increase of terrorism and political violence, my impression has always
been that this cannot be the best ways to counter and prevent terrorism. Not only
do these actions and policies impose more violence on more people, but if the
goal is to prevent future acts of terrorism, they are surely counter-­productive.
Thus, I was motivated to write this book to address the actions and policies that
produce social injustice through a violent counterterrorism paradigm. Writing
this book was therefore not purely an academic endeavour, but an attempt at pro-
ducing knowledge that can influence and promote change.
Acknowledgements

We are as we are because we got that way.

This book, however, would never have been written if I had not signed up for
Richard Jackson’s last course on Critical Terrorism Studies at Aberystwyth
University in 2011. It focused my scholarly attention on terrorism, and eventu-
ally led me to do a PhD at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, at
the University of Otago, New Zealand, with Richard as supervisor. Needless to
say, the long journey was worth it. Richard showed me what a real scholar
should be – meticulous, intellectually honest and politically responsible – and I
count myself incredibly privileged to have him as a mentor, colleague and friend.
Not least, he is an inspiration to keep fighting social injustice.
None of this would have been possible, however, without the support of my
family. Interest in politics was always encouraged, and political discussions
were, and still are, daily occurrences. It is from them, and especially my mother,
that I developed a passionate dislike for social injustice. So much so that it is the
driving force in my academic work. My father and brother have an insatiable
appetite for history, in particular political history, and I have benefited greatly
from their discussions, knowledge and insight. Their unwavering support of my
academic career means the world. So did my uncle, who passed away in the final
months of my PhD. He is missed every day.
As usual, all mistakes, misconceptions, omissions and opinions expressed in
this work are solely my own, and I apologise to anyone I may have forgotten to
thank.
Introduction
Terrorism, counterterrorism and war
on terror

We seem to be living in the age of terrorism. In the news, on TV, on the internet,
at the airport, in schools, in academia – terrorism seems omnipresent. Indeed,
since 9/11 2001 the threat of terrorism has come to be seen as the most serious
threat to international security, and vast resources have been invested into ways
of countering it. These efforts, in a broad sense, are most commonly known col-
lectively as the Global War on Terror, and it has been defined by overwhelming
and brutal violence. Central in this violence are the military campaigns in Afghan-
istan and Iraq, with images of torture and abuse of prisoners from Guantanamo
Bay and Abu Ghraib as stark examples of a failed counterterrorism paradigm.
The Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004 was central to the development of Critical Ter-
rorism Studies (CTS), and Richard Jackson wrote in his book from 2005 that the
threat of political violence in all its forms, be it terrorism, counterterrorism, war,
insurgency, revolution, ethnic cleansing, is real and pervasive. Therefore ‘we
need to discover genuine solutions that go beyond the reflexive application of
massive counter-­violence’ (Jackson 2005, 4). Thus, terrorism and counterterror-
ism have never been just objects of academic study for CTS. Instead there is a
dose of activism involved, and the cause is to prevent avoidable human suffering
by producing knowledge that not only can lead to better understanding of how
come some people perpetrate acts of terrorism, but also why counterterrorism-­
violence helps create and perpetuate the cycles of violence. This book is anchored
in this approach, and Jackson described it well when he wrote that:

unless we acquire a proper understanding of the nature of terrorism, the

reasons why people are willing to kill themselves and others in pursuit of
political goals, and the dangers of and consequences of violent forms of
counter-­terrorism (such as the moral hazard of becoming terrorists ourselves
through the abuse of suspects and prisoners), there is a genuine risk that we
will end up worse off than when we started; that through misplaced and mis-
guided policies we will make the world a more violet and unjust place,
instead of making it safer and more stable. Terrorism is complex problem; it
will require a complex solution based on clear thinking, informed analysis
and realistic assessment.
(Ibid.)
2   Introduction
This book is an attempt to formulate a Critical theory of counterterrorism that
has the tools to produce better understandings of why some people perpetrate
acts of terrorism, and how efforts to counter and prevent it should be constructed
so as to not impose more violence on innocent people, and thereby create more
terrorism and violence. It should therefore be noted that the focus is not on coun-
tering terrorism understood in a narrow sense, but that this theory of counterter-
rorism takes into consideration the dialectic relationship between terrorist
violence and counterterrorist violence. The primary aim of the book is to reduce
and prevent both kinds of violence.
The use of ‘Critical’ in the title is because of the major uptake of Frankfurt
School Critical Theory, but also due to the assumption that all academic theory
is political anyway. As such, Marx’ sentiment that philosophers should not
merely interpret the world, but work to change it (Marx 2000, 173), is central to
this theory. This attitude was at the core of the scholarship that guided members
of the Frankfurt School in Germany after the First World War, namely that
philosophy should not just describe or affirm the world, but criticise it. In that
sense, failure was much more important than success because it stimulated crit-
ical thinking about one’s own society. For members of the Frankfurt School the
failure of the proletariat in Europe to rise up and follow the Soviet example after
the First World War provided an important philosophical stimulant. Likewise,
the failure of contemporary counterterrorism to reduce and prevent terrorism
is the philosophical stimulant that drives this book. How come, that despite the
vast resources that have been allocated to counter terrorism, we seem to be living
in an age of increased violence and terrorism? More specifically, how come
Western countries seem to have become trapped in a violent counterterrorism
paradigm that makes terrorism a self-­fulfilling prophecy – a recurrent
Groundhog Day?
The entire project turns on the observation that states are engaged in different
efforts to counter a problem, or security threat, that is identified as terrorism.
There is much debate as to what terrorism really is, and whether it exists as a
thing-­in-itself or merely as a discursive and social construct. This discussion will
be elaborated in the subsequent chapters, but for now I would like to follow
Stump and Dixit in that ‘whether or not terrorism exits is less important than
how terrorism and terrorists are constructed in practice’ (Stump and Dixit 2012,
212). CTS has for over a decade now produced research that examines how ter-
rorism and terrorists are constructed in practice, and used this research to cri-
tique counterterrorism practices that are the results of the specific constructions,
such as torture, drone killings, mass surveillance and renditions. One could argue
that this research has been mainly deconstructive, meaning critique and analysis
but little in the way of constructive systematic alternatives. This is not to say that
CTS has to offer alternatives by rule, but so far, I would like to argue, the recon-
structive potential in CTS has largely remained untapped. This book, therefore,
seeks to build on various elements of Critical scholarship, including CTS, CSS
and Critical Theory, to delineate a Critical theory of counterterrorism, of which
the proposed CTS model is the tangible representation of the theory.
 Introduction    3
The reader will notice the considerable presence of Max Weber, particularly
in the third chapter. This book will make great use of Weber’s work to construct
a theory of counterterrorism that aims to reconceptualise counterterrorism. It is
admittedly an ambitious aim, but guiding the project is an optimism that it is
possible to reconceptualise counterterrorism, not only for heuristic and exposi-
tory purposes, but because there is potential to prevent acts of terrorism by
enhancing human security and emancipatory space. Thus, a key objective is to
inform and guide actual counterterrorism policies and practice. I have previously
made the case for why reconstructive efforts are important for CTS, and that
there is potential for emancipatory counterterrorism within states (Lindahl 2017).
This position is potentially problematic, and some might question whether such
an approach serves to reinforce the statist bias in the terrorism/counterterrorism
literature by constructing a model that seeks to reconstruct how states counter
and prevent terrorism. Is it therefore not part of the problem, essentially co-­opted
by a pervasive and intrusive neo-­liberal statist system?
This issue, of whether the state can be truly emancipatory, or if it is an inher-
ently violent social construction that never can be emancipatory, is at the heart
of a current debate within Critical Terrorism Studies (Jackson 2016; Toros
2016). I can only note here that states are social and dynamic structures, and
they vary a great deal. They can be machines of violence, but they can also be
used to redistribute resources in a society to provide free health care and educa-
tion. Basically, this question is a great deal more complex than the space I can
offer it here. Nonetheless, to render impossible any attempts to explore the
potential for emancipatory counterterrorism within states – especially when
counterterrorism currently impacts the real security of a vast number of people –
would seem to be a contradictory and defeatist position. In the words of one
prominent Frankfurt School scholar: ‘to give voice to what one knows and
thereby perhaps to avert new terror remain the right of a man who is still really
alive’ (Horkheimer 1972, viii). It could very well be that a Critical theory of
counterterrorism, with its commitment to emancipation, is incompatible with the
state structure. However, the possibility and potential for it cannot be dismissed
a priori.

Overview of the chapters

In Chapter 1, ‘The Global War on Terror’, I begin first providing a brief overview
of the primary narratives in the construction of terrorism as a threat, and subse-
quently the need for a global war to fight it. Second, these narratives are con-
nected with an empirical evaluation of the consequences of the war on terrorism
– the number of civilian casualties, drone killings, torture, political instability,
mass-­surveillance – which all constitute avoidable human suffering. Thus, the
primary aim of this chapter is to delineate the existence of avoidable human suf-
fering as a consequence of violent counterterrorism, why it is bad, and why it
necessitates counter-­action. The core of the book, however, lies in Chapters 2
through 5 where I discuss and construct a Critical theory of counterterrorism.
4   Introduction
Chapter 2, ‘Ontology, epistemology and the ideal-­type’ is concerned with
how we produce knowledge about terrorism, or what is called the content of
knowledge. This chapter engages with Weber’s work on methodology, and in
particular ontological monism and dualism. This sets up the introduction of
ideal-­types of conceptual constructions, and the book’s adherence to ontological
monism. The main argument is that ontological monism, and the use of ideal-­
types, can sharpen analytical clarity and make clear the unique individual char-
acter of ‘terrorism’ as a phenomenon. Importantly, this discussion marks a point
of departure with common aspects of CTS scholarship, namely the adherence to
minimal foundationalism. It is argued that using ideal-­types is better suited to
conceptualise terrorism, and it is used as a meaningful term for understanding
and recognising a specific form of violence.
Chapter 3, ‘Normativity’, focuses on the function of knowledge, or from
where the theory obtains the necessary justificatory force to assert its normative
claims. A central assumption in this book is that all academic theory is political,
and thus for someone, and for some purpose, value-­judgements, therefore, are
essential to any inquiry into social and cultural life, and this chapter explicates
how the concept of emancipation is the ultimate value-­axiom in this book.
Emancipation, although notoriously difficult to pin down, is key to Critical
scholarship, and this chapter traces the development of Critical Theory and
emancipation through the Frankfurt School, Critical Security Studies, Critical
Terrorism Studies, finally conceptualised through Weber’s approach to value-­
judgements. Together, Chapters 2 and 3 aim to articulate (1) the approach to
knowledge production, i.e. the use of ideal-­types, and (2) delineate the under­
pinning value-­orientation or axiom, what we might call the function of know-
ledge. While it can be illustrated how presuppositionless research is an
impossibility, it is still incumbent on us to show how we would like to propound
the views on terrorism and counterterrorism proposed here. Emancipation has
been discussed as the irreducible value-­axiom in this book, and it is what gives
the theory coherence. Policies and actions to counter terrorism will therefore
ultimately be evaluated against the concept of emancipation.
Chapter 4, ‘Violence’ begins to address the specifics of the theory by discuss-
ing and constructing an ideal-­type of violence. An act of terrorism is, in essence,
an act of violence, but this term can be used across a great many different con-
texts and situations. The purpose of constructing an ideal-­type of violence is to
draw out elements from various conceptualisations of violence, and synthesise
them in a way that refines and sharpens the analytical constructions of terrorism
and counterterrorism. In this regard, the argument that violence is always a
double-­act between human subjects whose experience of violence interpolates
them in a repetition effect from which they cannot free themselves, is key to the
formulations of terrorism and counterterrorism. Indeed, it suggests a sort of dia-
lectic relationship between the two where the use of violence will only interpo-
late more people in this violent repetition effect.
In Chapter 5, ‘A CTS model’, the theoretical discussions are brought together
and synthesised in a CTS model of counterterrorism. This chapter begins by
 Introduction    5
providing the ideal-­typical construct of terrorism, which says something about
what terrorist violence is (a symbolically communicative act that is part of a
history), the intentions of the terrorist act (to communicate a message, intimidate
an audience and produce a psychological effect of fear within a specific context)
and the broader aims of terrorist violence (the achievement of narrow or broad
political goals). The ideal-­type of counterterrorism is more ambitious in the
sense that the model itself is the ideal-­type. On the basis of the one-­sided accen-
tuation of a Critical conceptualisation of security and terrorism, the utopia of a
CTS approach, in which the governing principle is ‘emancipation’, is delineated.
This model can be: (1) applied to examine, understand and classify potential acts
of terrorism; (2) construct and implement actions and policies to enhance eman-
cipatory space; and (3) to assess and evaluate a country’s counterterrorism pol-
icies and see whether it approximates to, or diverges from, the CTS ideal-­type.
Thus, it can tell us something about different counterterrorism practices that can
be useful for international cooperation on counterterrorism
Chapter 6, ‘A genealogy of Norwegian counterterrorism’, marks the end of
the theoretical part of the book, and forms, together with Chapter 7, an analysis
of Norwegian counterterrorism. There are many ways one could try and apply
and use the CTS model of counterterrorism, but the reason Norway is chosen as
the object of analysis can be separated into two categories: (1) expository and
heuristic purposes as they pertain to questions for the potential for emancipation
and realising concrete utopias in counterterrorism; and (2) a lacuna in the liter-
ature on Norwegian counterterrorism in general. This chapter begins this ana-
lysis by providing a genealogy of Norwegian counterterrorism. Of particular
interest is the role that peace diplomacy has played in shaping Norway’s inter-
national approach to counterterrorism. This has, among other things, led Norway
to facilitate dialogue with proscribed terrorist organisations at times when dia-
logue was seen to acquiesce with terrorist demands.
Chapter 7, ‘An analysis of Norwegian counterterrorism’, is a step-­by-step
analysis of Norwegian counterterrorism examining key assumptions, basic prin-
ciples, strategies and tactics, priorities, and finally, evaluation. There are three
main outcomes of this chapter. It is the first analysis of Norwegian counterterror-
ism of this kind, and it will show that CTS knowledge and arguments are already
existent to a certain degree in Norway’s international approach to counterterror-
ism. Most importantly, it will be concluded that CTS counterterrorism is a defi-
nite concrete utopia. CTS has often been criticised for not offering an alternative,
only a critique of orthodox or current counterterrorism. This chapter aims to
show that a CTS model of counterterrorism is not merely a theoretical construct
and an obscure critical endeavour. Instead, the core elements of the CTS model
are practically feasible.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I explore the potential ways that the Critical theory
of counterterrorism can be applied, not only for expository and heuristic pur-
poses, but also to inform praxis. Underlying it all is a hope that we can do better
when it comes to countering and preventing terrorism. This means, among other
things, dispensing with the myth that ‘good’ violence can be used by ‘good’
6   Introduction
people for the right causes. In order to prevent future acts of terrorism we need
to rethink our approach, and construct policies that respect the principle of
means/ends consistency, and which do not advance the security of some at the
cost of others. Only then can we stop the violent repetition effect that in the end
is detrimental to any hopes of preventing acts of (counter) terrorism. My aim
with this book is to advance the search for genuine, long-­lasting solutions to the
problem of political violence.

A note on interviews
As part of my initial analysis of Norwegian counterterrorism in my doctoral
study, I went to Norway to interview four central figures in Norwegian people
diplomacy since the 1990s. Erik Solheim, Vidar Helgesen, Tore Hattrem and Jon
Hanssen-­Bauer have experience in negotiating with so-­called terrorists, and the
aim with the interviews was to gather primary accounts of (1) how Norwegian
counterterrorism has been shaped by its engagement in peace diplomacy, and
(2) experiences and opinions of the prospects of dialogue and negotiation with
terrorists. The interviews took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo,
except for Erik Solheim who was interviewed in his office in Paris. The inter-
views were conducted between April and May 2015, and each lasted between 30
and 40 minutes. Naturally, they were recorded and transcribed in Norwegian,
made available to the interviewees, and will be retained at the University of
Otago for five years.
The interviews were semi-­structured, meaning that the interviewees were
asked the same core questions, but with several open-­ended queries. This open-­
ended approach allows both the researcher and respondent to explore topics
more freely, and avoids forcing answers into predefined templates (Brounéus
2011; Rubin and Rubin 2012). This approach was well-­suited for the task,
because the goal of the interviews was to invite the interviewees to share their
experiences and knowledge of Norwegian peace diplomacy. That way, a broader
picture of how Norway has dealt with international terrorism could be drawn.
There were no ethical concerns related to the in-­depth interviews; as the particip-
ants hold official positions, their participation was voluntary, and they were
invited to share their own experiences to complement knowledge that is already
existent. No aspect of the interviews thus required anonymity, and they were free
to include as much information as they saw fit.

References
Brounéus, K. 2011. ‘In-­depth Interviewing: The Process, Skill and Ethics of Interviews in
Peace Research’. In Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges, edited
by K. Höglund and M. Öberg, 130–145. New York: Routledge.
Horkheimer, M. 1972. Critical Theory: Selected Essays (M. J. O’Connell, Ed.). New
York: Continuum.
Jackson, R. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
 Introduction    7
Jackson, R. (2016). ‘To Be or Not to Be Policy Relevant? Power, Emancipation and
Resistance in CTS Research’. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9(1), 120–125. ttps://doi.o
rg/10.1080/17539153.2016.1147771
Lindahl, S. 2017. ‘A CTS Model of Counterterrorism’. Critical Studies on Terrorism,
10(3), 523–541. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2017.1336289
Marx, K. 2000. ‘Theses on Feuerbach’. In Selected Writings (2nd edn), edited by D.
McLellan, 171–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rubin, H. J., and Rubin, I. S. 2012. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data
(3rd edn). London: SAGE Publications.
Stump, J. L., and Dixit, P. 2012. ‘Toward a Completely Constructivist Critical Terrorism
Studies’. International Relations, 26(2), 199–217. https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178
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Toros, H. 2016. ‘Dialogue, Praxis and the State: A Response to Richard Jackson’. Critical
Studies on Terrorism, 9(1), 126–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1147775
1 The Global War on Terror

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is still the most extensive counterterrorism
campaign in history, and some might argue it is a counterterrorism paradigm. It
commands vast resources, and it has had a profound influence on people’s lives
since 2001. The most conspicuous aspects of the GWOT are the military cam-
paigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, institutionalised torture and abuse in Guantanamo
Bay and Abu Ghraib, the media’s insatiable appetite for all things related to ISIS,
and the Snowden revelations of widespread and pervasive government surveillance
and bulk data collection. In other words, the 17 years that have passed since the
9/11 attacks in 2001 have been saturated with violence and counter-­violence, and
the trend is continuing. Jackson has described the war on terrorism as ‘simultan-
eously a set of actual practices ‒ wars, covert operations, agencies and institutions
– and an accompanying series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications and narratives
– it is an entire language or discourse’ (Jackson 2005, 8). In other words:

Countering terrorism is intimately related to understanding the nature of the

terrorist phenomenon and how it fits into the wider security environment.
How we conceive of terrorism determines to a great extent how we go about
countering it and what resources – money, manpower, institutional frame-
work time horizon – we devote to the effort.
(Crelinsten 2009, 39)

This quote from Crelinsten illustrates the relationship between the language and
practice of counterterrorism, and this chapter begins by describing how the threat
of terrorism was constructed as an existential evil that wiped the slate clean of
all that we thought we knew about terrorism. It marked a ‘ground zero’ for ter-
rorism research, and turned it into a growth industry. While it is, by no means,
meant to be an exhaustive account of the discourse on terrorism, it adds
important context to the second aspect of this chapter, which looks at the empiri-
cal consequences of the GWOT. Now, almost 17 years after the 9/11 attacks, we
are in a position where we can really observe and evaluate the consequences of
the GWOT. This discussion is particularly important because it delineates vast
avoidable human suffering due to the war on terrorism, and thus why a Critical
theory of counterterrorism is needed.
 The Global War on Terror   9
In this chapter, I establish the foundation for the overall study by first provid-
ing a brief overview of the primary narratives in the construction of terrorism as
a threat. Second, these narratives are connected with an empirical evaluation of
the consequences of the war on terrorism – the number of civilian casualties,
drone killings, torture, political instability, mass-­surveillance – which all consti-
tute avoidable human suffering. This examination is crucial to later discussions
on normativity, and from where the theory obtains the necessary justificatory
force to assert its normative claim. Thus, the primary aim of this chapter is to
delineate the existence of avoidable human suffering as a consequence of violent
counterterrorism, why it is bad, and why it necessitates counter-­action.

Constructing the threat

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 terrorism has been near the top of the list of
security threats against Western countries. Trillions of dollars have been spent
on various measures to counter terrorism, including a large-­scale drone
program, extensive surveillance and data gathering of millions of people, and
military invasions of two countries. These efforts are often referred to as the
GWOT, and the attention has largely been on the Middle East. However, over
the last few years the world has seen ISIS become a major regional player in
Syria and Iraq, a rise in the number of terrorist attacks on European soil, and
the election of President Trump in the USA who campaigned hard on the need
to protect against extreme Islamism and terrorism. There is little to indicate
that, whatever efforts the West have applied since 2001 to countering terrorism,
they have succeeded in countering or reducing the threat of terrorism. The
GWOT has arguably been incredibly violent, replete with nefarious practices,
and largely counterproductive. In his extensive study of counterterrorism since
2001, Gomis concludes that

there is extensive evidence that the war on terror has often led to oversim-
plifications of challenges that were in fact much more complex and multi-
faceted. This flawed analysis has repeatedly given way to inadequate,
disproportionate, and ineffective policies, often supporting dictatorial and
repressive regimes in the name of countering international terrorism.
(Gomis 2015, 116)

The 9/11 attacks were quickly construed by the Bush administration as an act of
war, an extraordinary attack on civilisation itself. It was understood as some-
thing ‘deeply evil’, which diabolical, a-­political Islamists did in order to bring
down Western civilization (Johnson 2003, 225; Kegley 2003, 4). The Bush
administration was not alone in framing terrorism this way. The influential
magazine, The Economist, declared that:

the appalling atrocities of September 11th – acts that must be seen as a

declaration of war not just on America but on all civilised people – were
10   The Global War on Terror
crueller in conception and even more shocking than what happened in
Hawaii. […] This week has changed America, and with it the world, once
again.
(The Economist 2001)

Bruce Hoffman, one of the most prominent terrorism experts, claimed that, ‘on
9/11, of course, Bin Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional wisdom on
terrorists and terrorism, and, by doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict – as
well as a new discourse about it’ (Hoffman 2004, xvii). While this is certainly
true to some extent, US officials, scholars and the media drew on past events to
help explain the attacks. In his analysis Writing the War on Terror Jackson iden-
tified four key narratives that were employed to explain the attacks: World
War II and the attack on Pearl Harbor, The Cold War, civilisation versus
barbarism, and globalisation (Jackson 2005, 40–58). Importantly, these meta-­
narratives established an understanding of the attacks as part of a long and heroic
struggle by the US against totalitarian and murderous ideologies. Terrorists were
‘endlessly demonised and vilified as being evil, barbaric and inhuman’, and in
direct opposition to narratives of Americans as generous, kind, resourceful and
brave (ibid., 59).
Ignatieff, a well-­known international relations scholar, asserted that ‘what we
are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of their means – the indiffer-
ence to human costs – take their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but
even out of the realm of war itself ’ (Ignatieff 2001). Other scholars saw the 9/11
attacks as a new form of terrorism, namely, ‘superterrorism’ (Freedman 2002, 1;
Gearson 2002, 7). As such, 9/11 was narrated as an attack on the US because of
its values and success, by ruthless and sophisticated terrorists, hell-­bent on
causing maximum casualties and chaos. Government officials, like former Sec-
retary of Defense William Cohen, claimed that it was only a question of when,
not if, terrorists would utilise weapons of mass destruction (Intriligator and
Toukan 2006, 75). Indeed, the ultimate representation of superterrorism, or
apocalyptic nihilism, is the use of WMDs. Graham Allison’s assessment of the
threat of WMD-­terrorism was fairly straightforward:

So the question is, is this [WMD-­terrorism] possible? So the questions

ensue. One, did the Soviet Union have 10-kiloton weapons? Answer: Yes.
Are all these weapons accounted for? Answer: No. Could al Qaeda have
acquired one of these weapons? Answer: Yes. Could al Qaeda have brought
such a weapon to New York City without our otherwise knowing about it?
Answer: Yes.
(Allison 2004)

Allison was not alone in this creative and extreme extrapolation. For example, in
2008 Defense Secretary Robert Gates informed a congressional committee that
the thought of a terrorist ending up with a WMD kept every senior government
leader awake at night (Mueller and Stewart 2016, 29). In the case of former head
 The Global War on Terror   11
of CIA’s counterterrorism centre, Cofer Black, the alarm and fear of another ter-
rorist attack made him, according to his wife, ‘turn of the lights and sit in the
dark with a drink and a cigar, sunk in an apocalyptic gloom’ (Mayer 2008,
179–180). Fortunately, the world has not yet experienced any form of WMD-­
terrorism, in part because it is very expensive, and difficult to maintain and use.
Furthermore, if the seizure of an Al-­Qaeda computer in Afghanistan in 2001 is
any indication of how tempting WMDs are to a terrorist organisation, the group’s
budget for research on WMDs was between $2,000 and $4,000 (Mueller 2011).
That was at the apex of Al-­Qaeda’s time as the number one security threat in the
world. Since then, an assessment of information that was obtained from bin
Laden’s computers in the raid that killed him in 2011 revealed that the group
was primarily engaged in dodging airstrikes, complaining about the lack of
resources, and apparently watching a fair bit of pornography.
The example of WMD-­terrorism illustrates what Mueller and Stewart identify
as an ‘institutional paranoia’ in counterterrorism (Mueller and Stewart 2016).
This paranoia, however, was not limited to ‘superterrorism’. In 2002, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security welcomed every visitor to its website with a state-
ment that read: ‘Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with
virtually any weapon’ (Mueller 2006), and in his State of the Union speech in
2002, President Bush declared that

[t]housands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often

supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like
ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning […]. Thanks to the work
of our law enforcement officials and coalition partners, hundreds of terror-
ists have been arrested. Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at
large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must
pursue them wherever they are.
(Bush 2002)

The post-­9/11 understanding of terrorism, therefore, was shaped by the view that
it represented an unprecedented evil that could only be eradicated with force. As
such, the exceptional was adopted as a norm (Wolfendale 2016). Former general
and National Security Advisor to President Trump, Michael Flynn, argued in
2015 that the terrorist enemy was ‘committed to the destruction of freedom and
the American way of life’ and aiming at ‘world domination, achieved through
violence and bloodshed’ (Dozier 2015). Former Homeland Security Secretary,
Michael Chertoff, proclaimed the struggle against terrorism to be ‘a significant
existential’ one (Harris and Taylor 2008), in contrast to the various insignificant
existential struggles that the US has faced. As such, Zulaika’s description of
counterterrorism as a summary seems apt:

It takes for granted that terrorist violence is unlike any other; that the immo-
rality of its actions is an unredeemable atrocity; that it is a form of madness
with no possible political legitimacy; that its methods defy rules and order;
12   The Global War on Terror
that the only civilized responses to such aberration are total annihilation
(war without quarter) and taboo.
(Zulaika 2009, 30)

In essence, 9/11 was seen to represent ‘new’ terrorism: ‘it changed everything’,
as it were (Townshend 2011, 122). The ‘new’ terrorism was marked by its reli-
gious and apocalyptic nature, and the view that this form of terrorism not only
had lethality as its ultimate goal, but it also eschewed political goals (Stohl 2012,
36). Indeed, the ‘new’ terrorism was perceived to be different from ‘old’ ter-
rorism, mostly because ‘new’ terrorists sought maximum destruction through
extreme violence, as opposed to ‘old’ terrorists, or the ‘mainstream’ terrorists,
who were more restrained in their efforts to reach a political goal (Chandler and
Gunaratna 2007; Davis and Jenkins 2002; Ganor 2012; Jenkins 2006b). Brian
Jenkins, who famously stated in the 1970s that ‘terrorists want a lot of people
watching not a lot of people dead’ (Jenkins 1974, 4) revised his statement in
2006, and wrote:

They [‘old’ terrorists] were limited not only by access to weapons but by
self-­constraint. Mayhem as such was seldom an objective. Terrorists had a
sense of morality, a self-­image, operational codes, and practical concerns –
they wanted to maintain group cohesion, avoid alienating perceived constit-
uents, and avoid provoking public outrage, which could lead to crackdowns.
But these constraints gave way to large-­scale indiscriminate violence as ter-
rorists engaged in protracted, brutal conflicts; as the more squeamish
dropped out; as terrorism became commonplace and the need for headlines
demanded higher body counts; and as ethnic hatred and religious fanaticism
replaced political agendas.
(Jenkins 2006b, 118)

The good old terrorists had morality, whereas the ‘new’ terrorists represented an
apolitical form of violence. Thus, while US officials drew on specific meta-­
narratives to explain the attacks, and to justify a militarised response, Hoffman
was certainly right that bin Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional
wisdom on terrorism. Both experts and academia scrambled to produce know-
ledge on terrorism and how to counter it. This rather frantic situation was well
documented by Silke, who found that by the mid-­2000s, a new book on terrorism
in English was published approximately every six hours (Silke 2009). The only
problem was that almost all of this literature were thought-­pieces, and only a
handful could be considered to be methodologically rigorous (Lum, Kennedy,
and Sherley 2006, 3). As such, claims about the nihilistic and diabolical nature
of the new ‘superterrorists’ were not grounded in methodologically sound
research. Zulaika describes the same crisis of knowledge, which begins ‘with the
placement of the entire phenomenon in a context of taboo and the wilful igno-
rance of the political subjectivities of the terrorists’ (Zulaika 2009, 2). One con-
sequence of this crisis is that the counterterrorist becomes preoccupied with
 The Global War on Terror   13
reacting against an utterly dangerous and sinister actor that she does not know.
In such a situation, what could happen weighs as much, if not more, than what is
actually the case.
In this setting, governments are inclined to focus on worst-­case scenarios, and
may very well find themselves looking for, and preparing for, the ‘unknown
unknowns’. Rumsfeld famously encapsulated this thinking in a NATO press
conference in 2002, when he was asked to follow up on a notion that the real
situation, regarding Saddam Hussein and WMDs, is worse than what is gener-
ally understood. Rumsfeld replied that in his experience over the years he had
come to realise that there are no ‘knowns’, but insisted that there are:

things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say
there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also
unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know […]
and each year we discover more and more of those unknowns.

Rumsfeld continued:

the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. It is basically saying the

same thing in a different way. Simply because you do not have evidence
that something exists does not mean that you have evidence that it doesn’t
exist.
(Rumsfeld 2002)

Schneier argues that this kind of worst-­case scenario thinking is dangerous

because it ‘involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it
were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk ana-
lysis, and fear for reason’ (Schneier 2003). Several scholars have voiced similar
concerns that this yearning ‘makes it difficult to appreciate the enormous distance
between what ‘cannot possibly happen’ and what ‘is likely to happen’ (Lustick
2012, 67). This overall fear-­driven approach to terrorism is encapsulated in the
‘One Percent Doctrine’, that the US government should act without respect to the
evidence of a threat, only its possibility or imaginability. Critics of this approach
are afraid this culture of fear results in too many resources being allocated to
combat a relatively minor threat based on a risk assessment that is not consistent
with the norm. Thus, the threat of terrorism is inflated out of all proportion, and the
result is a constant struggle against an invisible enemy, which drains countries of
scarce resources that could be put to good use in other areas of society.
Mueller and Stewart contend that in America, homeland security analyses
tend to neglect the necessary steps of risk assessment and the result is a selective
approach that fails to credibly assess the risk of terrorism. For instance, when
they applied a straightforward ‘break-­even analysis’ to calculate how many
otherwise successful attacks would have to take place to justify the risk-­reducing
investments on terrorism after 9/11, which total $75 billion, they calculated that
the authorities would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 333 very
14   The Global War on Terror
large otherwise successful attacks every year (Mueller and Stewart 2011, 107).
When we factor in that the probability of an American being killed in a terrorist
attack in America is 1 in 80,000 per year, which is the same probability as being
hit by an asteroid, it points to a situation where the threat of terrorism is hyper-­
inflated. In addition, since 9/11, Americans have been no more likely to die in
terrorist attacks than being crushed to death by unstable televisions and furniture
(Zenko 2012). Finally, the risk and death-­toll related to gun violence in the US
dwarfs that of terrorism (Mueller and Stewart 2015; Thomason 2016).
The US therefore initiated a global war on terror in which terrorism was
removed from the sphere of ordinary politics, to which Jenkins argued the ‘old’
terrorists belonged to, and into an existential fight between barbarism and civili-
sation, and between good and evil. Most crucially, the GWOT was initiated
based on the belief that violence was the key component to counter terrorism
successfully. It is therefore worth spending some time examining the con-
sequences of this particular component of the GWOT.

Counterterrorism as war
Conceptualising counterterrorism as war has been much discussed in the terrorism
literature, and the military, or the use of violence, enjoys prevalence in what is
known as the war model. As Rogers notes in regards to the use of military force in
responding to 9/11: ‘the strongest argument in favour of the use of military force
in responding to the 9/11 attacks is the requirement of a state to protect its own
people’ (Rogers 2012, 148). The main assumption is that eliminating a terrorist
group is first and foremost accomplished through the application of military force.
This assumption is illustrated by Fukuyama’s notion that: ‘German fascism didn’t
collapse because of internal moral contradictions; it died because Germany was
bombed to rubble and occupied by Allied armies’ (Fukuyama 2002, 34).
Duyvesteyn points out six ways which the available literature suggests the
military can be used to combat or counter terrorism (Duyvesteyn 2010). First,
military force can be used to support the civilian authorities confronted with ter-
rorist violence, for instance, through helping to restore law and order or in
hostage rescue operations. Second, armed force can be used to pre-­emptively
attack terrorists and their assets in order to curb subsequent terrorist campaigns.
Third, military force can deter future terrorists based on the assumption that
military force will be credibly used in case of a threat of, or an actual, attack.
Fourth, armed force can be used to retaliate after an attack. The war in Afghani-
stan is an obvious example of such a policy. Fifth, armed forces can be used to
take out the leadership of terrorist organisations through decapitation and
assassination. Sixth, armed forces can be used, if necessary, to fight a war in
order to eradicate the enemy (ibid., 78).
Crelinsten notes as supposed benefits of a military approach that military
action against terrorism will, first, boost morale at home. Second, unilateral action
is possible without having to cooperate with other nations. Third, military action
signals a nation’s resolve to tackle the problem, and, in this, maintain a tough
 The Global War on Terror   15
image in the international arena. Fourth, using military force is a good way of
utilising modern science and technology (Crelinsten 2009, 76–77). Thus, Crelin-
sten concludes: ‘the war model is considered quick, effective, and ideally suited
to the new kinds of threat posed by decentralised, ideologically driven terrorist
networks whose adherents are not deterred by traditional criminal justice or con-
tained by traditional military power’ (ibid., 77). Paul Wilkinson, a noted ter-
rorism expert, points out that the military warfare model offers some important
advantages: it answers inevitable public and media demands for action, and it
can deter terrorists from perpetrating future attacks by inflicting serious damage
on the terrorists, thus ‘raising the stakes’ (Wilkinson 2006, 91). Such an action
can be a psychologically damaging blow on the enemy leadership that might
undermine the group’s ability to strike, which could lead to the group disinte-
grating. Undermining a group’s ability to strike is regarded as an important area
where the use of military force is indispensable.
Michael Rubin argues that the key to an effective counterterrorism strategy is
to raise the price of engaging in terrorism so that the costs to terrorists and their
sponsors outweigh the benefits. Targeted killings, or assassinations of terrorists,
are particularly important, as he claims that they erode terrorist capabilities and
simultaneously enhance counterterrorism in two ways: ‘First, elimination of
recruiters and trainers degrades effectiveness and, second, in their desire for
revenge terrorists accelerate the dispatch of bombers. The result is easier detec-
tion’ (Rubin 2010, 225). Rubin’s arguments for the utility of force in combatting
terrorism are based on how Israel dealt with the second intifada, noting that even
though the international community condemned the use of violence, terrorist
attacks inside Israel declined by over 90 per cent. In addition, Rubin adds how
military force has succeeded where soft power has failed in Peru, Sri Lanka,
Colombia and Turkey (ibid., 228–229).
Gal Luft, another proponent of violent counterterrorism, argues for the value
of targeted assassinations:

Fighting terror is like fighting car accidents: one can count the casualties but
not those whose lives were spared by prevention. Hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of Israelis go about their lives without knowing that they are unhurt
because their murderers met their fate before they got the chance to carry
out their diabolical missions. This silent multitude is the testament to the
policy’s success.
(Luft 2003)

Boaz Ganor, one of the most prevalent proponents of a hard-­line approach to ter-
rorism argues that proactive offensive operations is a vital component in a coun-
terterrorism strategy, especially suited to deal with suicide attacks (Ganor 2005).
Similarly, Carvin argues that it is far too soon to say that the numbers on targeted
killing do not add up, and while it might be a strategy with flaws, it remains an
integral and legitimate tactic under the inherent right of self-­defence which is
enshrined in international law (Carvin 2012, 172). The arguments for utilising
16   The Global War on Terror
military power to fight terrorism therefore can be summed up in the words of
Michael Rubin: ‘Police investigate crimes; militaries pre-­empt and neutralize
threats’ (Rubin 2010, 231). The use of force as a response to terrorism is recog-
nised by most scholars as a possible trap for democratic states to use dispropor-
tionate force and thus risk breaching humanitarian laws. Indeed, Ganor notes
that although a state has a duty and a moral obligation to defend itself, it must do
so within the framework of humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions
(Ganor 2012, 142–143). The concerns for how democracies can fight terrorism
while upholding liberal principles and without breaking human rights have led
some scholars to argue for the applicability of ‘just war theory’ and counterter-
rorism (Imre, Mooney, and Clarke 2008; Johnson 2003). Elshtain, an authority
on just war theory, states that for a war to be just it first needs to be:

Openly declared or otherwise authorized by a legitimate authority, so as to

forestall random, private, and unlimited violence. Second, a war must be a
response to a specific instance of unjust aggression perpetrated against one’s
own people or an innocent third party, or fought for a just cause. Third, a
war must begin with the right intentions. Fourth, a war must be a last resort
after other possibilities for redress and defense of the values at stake have
been explored.
(Elshtain 2003, 57–58)

The just war tradition is perceived by Elshtain to be a way for democratic gov-
ernments to exercise the responsibility to protect civilians and bring justice to
the perpetrators of terrorism. An act of terrorism necessarily disrupts civic peace,
and preventing further harm and restoring the preconditions for civic tranquillity
is a justifiable casus belli (ibid., 59). As alluded to earlier, it is argued that states
have a moral obligation to defend their citizens, and a terrorist attack that wil-
fully attacks civilians is perceived to be such a gross violation of human rights
that the state can respond to terrorism with hard force. The use of force therefore
serves a higher purpose than terrorist violence which only seeks maximum
destruction. A state’s use of violence in order to bring justice to terrorists is thus
not an instrument of terror for terror’s sake. The US-­led invasion of Afghanistan
was set in motion to punish the wrongdoers and prevent them from doing further
harm. The war in Afghanistan thus met the just cause criterion, and the moment
both houses of the US Congress backed the war, the right authority criterion was
met. Responding morally to terrorism is thus perceived as possible, and Johnson
adds that with the new technologies of warfare it is much easier and straight-
forward to honour the moral requirements of a just war (Johnson 2003, 237).
Elshtain concludes that:

Terror must never be answered with terror; but war can only be answered with
war, and it is incumbent on us to devise a style of war more imaginative, more
decisive, and yet more humane than anything terrorists can contrive.
(Elshtain 2003, 67)
 The Global War on Terror   17
Terrorism as warfare pre-­9/11
There have been scholars who for a long time have argued that terrorism should
be seen as a form of warfare (Clutterbuck 1990; Creveld 1991; Moss 1972; Silke
1996; Taber 1969). Robert Taber argued in 1969 that terrorism is urban guerrilla-
­ism and thus a form of warfare. Furthermore, he argued that terrorism is one of
the most humane ways to wage war. Indeed, compared to blockbusting a city or
napalming a village, terrorism is far more humane than other forms of warfare
(Taber 1969, 90–91). Richard Clutterbuck shares the notion of terrorism as urban
guerrilla warfare. He traces the roots of terrorism to Che Guevara and the suc-
cessful establishment of an aggressive Foco in Cuba in 1957–1958. The central
idea of Focalism is that a small paramilitary group can provide a focus (in
Spanish, foco) for people to spontaneously rise against a ruling regime. The ori-
ginal approach was to mobilise and launch attacks from rural areas, but when
Guevara tried to export the Foco theory to other Latin American countries, the
rural guerrillas suffered defeat after defeat. The guerrillas therefore had to take
their Foco into more fertile ground, to the intellectuals and the proletariat in the
city. Thus Clutterbuck argues: ‘the urban guerrillas are simply the focos trans-
ferred to the city’ (Clutterbuck 1990, 22). Furthermore, Clutterbuck argues that
the cult of urban guerrilla warfare spread quickly to other parts of the world,
most notably to the Middle East where the Palestinians, due to their lack of
success against the Israelis with rural raids, started to emulate the Latin Amer­
ican urban guerrillas in the late 1960s (ibid., 23). Martin van Creveld, another
often-­quoted proponent of defining terrorism as a form of warfare, argues that
low-­intensity conflict (LIC) has the following characteristics:

First, they tend to unfold in ‘less developed’ parts of the world; the small-­
scale armed conflicts which do take place in ‘developed’ countries are
usually known under a variety of other names, such as ‘terrorism’, ‘police
work’, or in the case of Northern Ireland – ‘troubles’. Second, very rarely
do they involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of
regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists, and even civilians, includ-
ing women and children on the other. Third, most LICs do not rely prim-
arily on the high-­technology collective weapons that are the pride and joy of
any modern armed force. Excluded from them are the aircraft and the tanks,
the missiles and the heavy artillery, as well as many other devices so com-
plicated as to be known only by their acronyms.
(Creveld 1991, 20)

Terrorism is conceptualised as low-­intensity conflict which takes place in

‘developed’ countries, perpetrated by a range of different actors who do not have
the military means or capabilities to fight a conventional war in pursuit of diverse
goals. Van Creveld further asserts that if one assumes that politics is what wars are
all about, then LICs have been politically the most significant form of war waged
since 1945. To support his argument, van Creveld argues that LICs have been the
18   The Global War on Terror
dominant instrument for bringing about political change by challenging and defeat-
ing the colonial powers of Europe. In challenging the colonial powers, LICs have
been known as ‘wars of national liberation’. Moreover, these wars have been
recognised by the international community, adding to their political importance.
The great majority of wars since 1945 can thus been seen as LICs, and van Creveld
notes in a prescient tone that ‘in the future, war will not be waged by armies but by
groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will
undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves’ (ibid., 197). This
war will be characterised by a difficulty to separate belligerents from the rest of the
population; belligerents who are dissimilar at first will come to resemble each
other and leaders of war-­making entities will be regarded as criminals who will
richly deserve the worst fate that can be inflicted on them. In hindsight, this predic-
tion resembles the GWOT, but van Creveld makes one very important point which
sets this view of terrorism as war apart from the GWOT.

This is not to say that, as low-­intensity conflict replaces conventional war,

all restraints will go by the board. Previously I have argued that the conduct
of war without a war convention, in other words without a set of clear and
widely shared ideas as to what it is all about, is impossible in the long run.
Terrorists have the strongest possible motive to distinguish themselves from
mere murderers; after all, in the not unlikely case of capture, their fate
depends on it. Nor is it necessarily true that terrorists, or even criminals, are
less scrupulous than the rest of us.
(Ibid., 204)

Another argument for viewing terrorism as warfare comes from Silke, who
wonders why terrorism is seen as something so completely different and repul-
sive in comparison to other forms of warfare. Despite the fact that terrorism is
both less destructive and less indiscriminate than most other forms of warfare,
terrorism is viewed as breaking the rules and thus seen as a singularly pernicious
phenomenon. However, as Silke points out, the rules that are being broken are
those devised for Western conventional warfare, based on the medieval Euro-
pean code of chivalry. Facing adversaries who would fight in an unconventional
manner is something all colonial powers have faced in the past, and both Euro-
pean powers and the USA came to loathe this form of warfare. Echoing the
Romans who saw unconventional warfare as a form of banditry, guerrilla fighters
were seen to break the rules of war in the same way as terrorists are today (Silke
1996, 15). Nonetheless, Silke argues that terrorists are engaged in a form of
warfare and should thus be viewed as soldiers:

Terrorist tactics are merely a subset within the larger domain of guerrilla
tactics. Terrorism is not something distinctly separate. Severe limits in
resources and manpower often preclude groups from using anything but ter-
rorist tactics, thus leaving them isolated and identifiable.
(Ibid., 26)
 The Global War on Terror   19
When terrorists do commit crimes, or break the rules, they should be seen as
war criminals and treated accordingly. This is not an all too radical argument,
given that we already treat people responsible for genocide as war criminals and
bring them to trial for their crimes. Terrorism then has become dirty business in
equally dirty drapings, whereas warfare is dirty business in respectable drapings.
Viewing terrorism as a form of warfare, therefore, is, according to Silke
important because we will finally see ‘the elephant for what it really is, and until
we reach an acceptance of this, we will all remain groping in the dark’ (ibid.,
27). Nevertheless, none of these authors offer any specific ways of countering
terrorism, however defined. Clutterbuck does argue that the terrorist threat can
always be defeated by force majeure, but it must be applied with restraint (Clut-
terbuck 1990, 149). Martin van Creveld made the prediction in 1991 that future
war will be fought by terrorists, guerrillas bandits, and that the regular armed
forces in Western countries will shrink and be replaced by the booming security
industry (Creveld 1991, 207). The arguments put forward in the previous section
were all made before 9/11, and terrorism was conceived of as just another form
of warfare enjoying increased prevalence.

Post-­9/11: the global war on terrorism

This chapter began with an examination of how the war on terrorism is ‘simul-
taneously a set of actual practices – wars, covert operations, agencies and institu-
tions – and an accompanying series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications and
narratives – it is an entire language or discourse’ (Jackson 2005, 8). After 9/11,
the enemies were identified as extreme Islamists, like Al-­Qaeda and ISIS, and a
very specific discourse was constructed of the adversaries as people who tar-
geted the very values that underpin the free world. Successful elimination of the
terrorist threat was seen as possible because terrorists are an identifiable group of
enemies (Chandler and Gunaratna 2007; Davis and Jenkins 2002; Ganor 2012;
Jenkins 2006a; Johnson 2003; Shultz and Vogt 2003), and this discourse set the
table for heavily militarised counterterrorism to fight the ‘new terrorism’.
Elshtain argued that Islamists ‘loathe us because of who we are and what our
society represents’ (Elshtain 2003, 3), and that the USA should take a leading
role in the war on terrorism because ‘international civic peace vitally depends on
America’s ability to stay true to its own principles, for without American power
and resolve, the international civic stability necessary to forestall the spread of
terrorism can be neither attained nor sustained’ (ibid., 6). Without referring to a
specific definition, Elshtain concluded that terrorists are those who kill people no
matter what they may or may not have done as long as they are considered
enemies. Finally, she concluded with simplistic clarity: ‘Terrorists are not inter-
ested in the subtleties of diplomacy or in compromise solutions. They have taken
leave of politics’ (ibid., 19).
The RAND Corporation in the US is another actor heavily engaged in the
counterterrorism debate, and one which favours a force-­based approach to ter-
rorism. Indeed, Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, both prominent figures in the field
20   The Global War on Terror
of terrorism studies, have made it clear that the campaign to defeat Al-­Qaeda
must cut across all of the normal boundaries of war. This is because terrorism is
the: ‘ “very raison d’être” of terrorist organizations, so one cannot expect that
these organizations will moderate themselves’ (Davis and Jenkins 2002, 5). To
further support the use of force as the central component of a counterterrorism
approach, scholars within RAND set up an exercise where they distinguished
between two classes of terrorists, type A and type B. The former, which includes
Al-­Qaeda, is a self-­driven seeker of action, causes or religious commitment.
They make claim to political goals, but they are insatiable. To understand the
jihadist type of mind, and thus what kind of threat it poses to the US, the RAND
Corporation set up an exercise where participants were trying to view a conflict
from ‘the other side’. However, the participants found it difficult to get into a
jihadist mindset, and David Aaron lamented that, despite the fact that particip-
ants called each other ‘brother’ and ‘sister’, they still tended to analyse situations
as if they were a secular enemy (Aaron 2005, 13). Type B terrorist is the more
traditional pragmatic terrorist who will cease terrorism when it is no longer
needed, but the focus is on the more dangerous type A terrorists. The conclusion
was that terrorists ‘must be typically eradicated, deflected, or isolated’ (ibid.,
11). The United States should thus crush Al-­Qaeda while making sure they do
not make its members into heroes. The crushing of Al-­Qaeda will prepare the
ground for more long-­term solutions and deter future terrorists.
The example with the RAND exercise and their conclusion regarding how to
counter terrorism is emblematic of much of the discourse that surrounds and sup-
ports the GWOT. Terrorism is conceived of as something that diabolical,
a-­political Islamists do in order to bring down Western civilization (Kegley
2003, 4). Terrorism is, as Johnson succinctly put it, ‘deeply evil’ (Johnson 2003,
225). As terrorists operate within the extremes of either total victory or defeat,
there is no other choice than to crush them first and then help set up a democratic
society where moderate views prevail, which will prevent terrorism in the long
term. There is a stark difference between the conceptualisation of terrorism as
war prior to, and post, 9/11. The importance of the arguments put forward by
Taber, Moss, Clutterbuck, van Creveld and Silke earlier in this chapter is that
terrorism can be defined as a form of warfare, and that through this conceptuali-
sation, terrorism can be moved away from the nebulous area between crime,
warfare and politically accepted violence in which it currently resides. Defining
terrorism as warfare would separate terrorism from random murder and petty
crime, and thus make the term mean something other than a pejorative term of
violence. If we accept the Clausewitzian argument that politics is what war is all
about, viewing terrorism as warfare would open up the possibility for certain
organisations or actors, who adhere to the rules of war, to be seen as legitimate
actors with legitimate grievances. When terrorists attack civilians they should be
dealt with as war criminals, in the same way the international community has
dealt with Serb leaders who were responsible for massacres of civilians in the
Balkans. Terrorism may be transforming warfare, but it is still just another form
of it. This concept is not without flaws or gaps, and, emblematic of much of the
 The Global War on Terror   21
literature on terrorism, it is concerned with one side of a phenomenon that is
complex and heavily contested.
The attack on 9/11 was, as we have seen, quickly framed as an act of war, and
the Bush administration responded with military force. However, despite
viewing 9/11 as an act of war, the attackers were not viewed as soldiers. They
did not follow the rules of war, they purposely attacked civilians, or non-­
combatants, and they sought maximum destruction. As a result, 9/11 became the
symbol of ‘new’ terrorism. Scholars and experts alike concluded that a whole
new vocabulary was needed, or a new compass to travel through the new global
landscape, in order to grasp the new threat (Gunaratna 2010; Hoffman 2004;
Kegley 2003, 4). Although torture and assassinations were illegal and still are,
these practises have become institutionalised under the GWOT. Cloaked by
euphemisms like enhanced interrogation and targeted killings, alleged terrorists
have been chased down. Despite the fact that these measures ‒ and these are just
two examples of many ‒ resemble war, terrorists were not seen as soldiers and
the war on terror was not a war in a conventional sense. As Bell argued decades
prior to 9/11: ‘terrorism is a form of political violence that falls between war and
peace’ (Bell 1978, 3).
What should have been made clear so far in this chapter is that responding
with military force is perceived to be a key element in the counterterrorism strat-
egies of states, and has been especially important in the dominant GWOT led by
the USA. There is, however, one caveat to be raised, and that is that even though
the GWOT is constructed as a war, it is not in the conventional sense. Scholars
will often tend to treat a hard-­line based approach to terrorism as a war model, or
state that: ‘when terrorism is viewed as war, certain options are available com-
pared to an approach that views terrorism as crime’ (Crelinsten 2009; Jackson
2005; Jackson et al. 2011). The problem with this approach is that one at the
outset accepts the post-­9/11 understanding of terrorism as warfare, and thus per-
petuates this understanding of terrorism as war. Authors might critique the use
of ‘war on terror’, but they nevertheless discuss counterterrorism models and
measures based on a conceptualisation of war that accepts the exceptional nature
of the terrorist threat. It is true that other options are available if one conceives
of terrorism as war instead of crime, but the dichotomy is a false one. Terrorism
conceived of as warfare pre-­9/11 would indeed favour armed force as a means to
fight terrorism, but it would also lend legitimacy to the actors involved which
could open up room for diplomacy. Coming back to Clausewitz, this under-
standing of terrorism would recognise that politics is what war is all about, and
that through an effort to understand the enemy, one might learn the motivation
or grievances that are causing the conflict.
However, the GWOT has transcended traditional notions of counterterrorism
as war and morphed into an all-­encompassing approach that reaches into every
aspect of society. It was argued pre-­9/11 that terrorism was located in the nebu-
lous area between war and crime, and that a definition was needed to clarify and
make the term more applicable. It is safe to say that terrorism still very much
resides in this nebulous area. The current situation is one where no one knows if
22   The Global War on Terror
we are at war against terrorism, despite it being declared. The military cam-
paigns, and the frequent use of drones or military units and equipment to kill
suspected terrorists, might lead some people to infer that the situation very much
resembles that of war. However, it is argued that terrorists are not soldiers, they
are illegal combatants. The post-­9/11 conceptualisation of terrorism as war does
not grant terrorists any legitimacy, and talking with terrorists is therefore not an
option. This is exemplified by the case of the former Norwegian Foreign
Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who was accused of being an anti-­Semite after he
held talks with Hamas in an attempt to include an important party of the conflict
in the peace (‘Støre Snakket Direkte Med Hamas’ Leder’ 2011, ‘Støre Har Hatt
Hemmelige Samtaler Med Hamas’ 2011, ‘Constraints on Norway’s Middle East
Role?’ 2009). One could, of course, argue that perpetrators of terrorism do not
deserve any legitimacy, or to be treated as prisoners of war or war criminals,
based on the deeply evil nature of a terrorist attack. However, as Silke convinc-
ingly argues, despite having created and adhered to the laws of war for centuries,
soldiers from Western democratised states have committed atrocities on several
occasions that could be described as acts of terrorism (Silke 1996, 18). This
apparent confusion of terms obfuscates the debate concerning terrorism and
counterterrorism, thus cementing its position in the area between crime and war
where the law of the jungle pertains.
The use of military force has received a great deal of attention so far, and this
is simply because it has been so dominant over the last decade as a means to
fight terrorism. It should be noted however, that there is a large and ever-­growing
literature that points out the perils and shortcomings of the war model (Araj
2008; Crelinsten 2009; Duyvesteyn 2010, 80–82; English 2009; Eppright 1997;
Jones and Libicki 2008; Wilkinson 2006, 91). In addition, it is argued that a
strong focus on the military to fight terrorism can lead to a dangerous militarisa-
tion of a society (Giroux 2004). Crelinsten points out that:

in sum, the war model of counterterrorism carries a high risk of unintended

consequences that can escalate violence, undermine the legitimacy of gov-
ernments that use it, or pull governments along a dangerous path to anti-­
democratic governance. Military strikes or interventions do not tend to
reduce terrorism over the medium or long term. On the contrary, they tend
to exacerbate violence and to create an environment where resentment and
anger can be manipulated by terrorist ideologues to radicalize and mobilize
new recruits.
(Crelinsten 2009, 81)

As we shall see later, there are strong arguments for why violence creates more
violence, and interpolates subjects in a repetition of violence and counter-­
violence from which they cannot free themselves.
 The Global War on Terror   23
The consequences of violent counterterrorism
When describing the GWOT and its consequences, it is tempting to draw on
Machiavelli’s insight that ‘it is in the power of any man to begin a war, but he
cannot end it when he pleases’ (Machiavelli 1845, 138). For example, the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan were easily started and initially won. However, they also
created the conditions that allowed ISIS to thrive and spread its misery (Fuller
2014; Milne 2015), and it set the scene for a vicious cycle of violence between
extreme Islamist groups and Western countries like the US, Britain and France.
The war in Iraq was supposed to overthrow Saddam Hussein, who allegedly
sponsored terrorism, and to cleanse Iraq of WMDs. The prevalent notion, as
described above, was that it was only a question of when a WMD-­attack would
happen. A terrorist group could use such weapons in the future, supplied by
Saddam Hussein, and a preventive war was deemed necessary and justifiable. In
addition, the war would clear a path for democratic forces in Iraq to establish a
free-­market, liberal democracy.
It is of course difficult to ascertain the veracity of the provided numbers of total
casualties from the war in Iraq, given the chaos that the region is in. However, a
2016 report collected the available data from the available sources, and concluded
that the war had resulted in one million civilian casualties, and 4,800 coalition sol-
diers (‘Blood and Treasure: The Costs of the Iraq War’ 2016). Just as worrisome
and tragic is the displacement of approximately three million people as a result of
the war (Tirman 2017; UNHCR 2017). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could be
seen as attempts to increase the security of the US and its Western allies at the
expense of the security of the people in Afghanistan and Iraq. As such, Berki’s
conception of security seems to capture the essence of this line of thinking:

Seeking after security for oneself and being a cause of insecurity for others
are not just closely related; they are the same thing, with no chance of either
logical or existential separation … when the chips are down, and to a certain
degree, they are always down … it is my life, my freedom, my security
versus the rest of the human race.
(Berki 1986, 32–33)

The use of violence in the GWOT did not stop at military campaigns, however.
The GWOT has involved targeted killings, rendition, indefinite detention without
trial, and torture. Targeted killings, through a rampant drone program, has only
increased in extent under President Obama. Micah Zenko, a leading American
expert on drones, contends that George Bush authorised around 50 drone strikes
that killed 296 alleged terrorists and 195 civilians. Obama has, as of 2016,
authorised 506 strikes that have killed 3,040 alleged terrorists and 391 civilians
(Zenko 2016a). We have to say ‘alleged’ when it comes to claims about how
many terrorists are killed, because as Becker and Shane have noted,

Obama embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties that did
little to box him in. It in effect counts all military-­age males in a strike zone
24   The Global War on Terror
as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is
explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.
(Becker and Shane 2012)

In July 2016, the White House published a report that drone and other airstrikes
had killed between 64 and 116 civilians. However, the report came under heavy
fire as it left out the civilian death toll from drone strikes in Afghanistan, Syria
and Iraq, it did not distinguish between CIA and US military operations, nor did
it mention drones or unmanned aircrafts (Ackerman 2016). In addition, the
numbers presented differed substantially from previous statements from US offi-
cials (Zenko 2016b) and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which has the
range of civilian casualties as between 380 and 801 (Serle 2016).
The point here is that US officials are not quite sure how many civilians they
have killed with drone strikes. For example, Sen. Dianne Feinstein was asked in
2013, after she had stated that the number of civilian casualties each year was
typically in the single digits, how she could be so sure that the CIA did not
mislead officials and the public, as it had done regarding its rendition and torture
program. Feinstein’s reply was as simple as it was worrying: ‘that’s a good ques-
tion, actually. That’s a good question’ (Ackerman 2016). John Brennan, the
current CIA director, described in 2012 that targeted killings were to mitigate
threats to US persons’ lives, stating that ‘it is the option of last recourse’
(Brennan quoted in Becker and Shane 2012). With ever-­increasing numbers of
drone strikes, it is difficult to comprehend how each of the over 500 strikes were
the option of last recourse. How normalised the use of drones has become was
perhaps best encapsulated by President Obama’s comments at the White House
Correspondents’ Dinner in 2010: ‘The Jonas Brothers are here. They’re out there
somewhere. Sasha and Malia are huge fans. But, boys, don’t get any ideas. I
have two words for you – predator drones. You will never see it coming. You
think I’m joking’ (‘Remarks by the President at White House Correspondents’
Association Dinner’ 2010).
Torture and rendition have also been central components of the GWOT.
Under the label ‘enhanced interrogation’, at least 119 prisoners, between 2002
and 2007, were subjected to the most inhumane of conditions, for months and
even years (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). Blakely and
Raphael, responsible for the Rendition Project have also documented how Brit-
ain’s involvement in rendition and torture during the ‘war on terror’ was deep,
direct and multifaceted (Blakeley and Raphael 2016). Abu Ghraib in Iraq exem-
plified in the most horrifying way the inhuman treatment of war on terror
prisoners. Pictures emerged where prisoners were walked around like dogs, or
were forced to stand on a box for hours with the threat of being electrocuted if
they fell down. One soldier who partook in the abuse at Abu Ghraib, Chip Fred-
erick, wrote in a letter to his family:

I questioned some of the things that I saw … such things as leaving inmates
in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to
 The Global War on Terror   25
the door of their cell – and the answer I got was, ‘This is how military intel-
ligence (MI) wants it done.’ … MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner
in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no
ventilation or window, for as much as three days.
(Hersh 2004)

The importance and presence of US military prisons, especially Guantanamo

Bay, for members of the Taliban were evident in interviews Bowe Bergdahl did
for Serial, an investigative podcast. US soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, was captured in
Afghanistan in 2009, and released in 2014. One of the interrogators from Paki-
stan had been sent to Guantanamo Bay, after Pakistani authorities had handed
him over to US forces, because he and his brother had written satirical material
about leading officials in Pakistan. Sarah Koenig, the host of Serial, knew one of
the brothers who had tortured and interrogated Bergdahl. She recalls that he was
not much of a terrorist when she spoke to him in 2005. His time at Guantanamo,
however, must have changed him, as he is now reported to work as a recruiter
for ISIS (‘Serial’ 2016, ep. 4). Still, when Bergdahl was being tortured and inter-
rogated, his captors would talk about how they treated him better than the US
treated their prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay – how they were
better than the Americans. Bergdahl notes how the torture inflicted on him was
mostly marked by revenge for being American – for the violence that the US had
inflicted on Iraqi people. In fact, revenge is the key word here – violent revenge
that interpolates the subjects in a repetition effect from which they cannot free
themselves.
After Salman Ramadan Abedi set off a bomb at an Ariana Grande concert in
the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing in the UK, which killed 23 people, a
picture surfaced of a bomb with the words ‘love from Manchester’ written on it.
The British Ministry of Defence confirmed it was an RAF bomb that was
presumably to be used to bomb ISIS targets in Syria in Iraq. However, as one
commentator from Manchester wrote: ‘I’m sickened by the RAF bomb with
“Love from Manchester” written on it – how dare you drop that in my city’s
name’ (Williamson 2017). This could of course be an isolated case of a few
RAF-­crew members making a mistake, but it could also have been the symptom
of a much more serious issue.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Jackson identified civilisation vs.
barbarism as a key metanarrative in the war on terrorism that ensued after 9/11.
A key argument in Jackson’s work is that language creates and constructs reality.
Importantly, language is never a neutral act, or to be used objectively. Thus,
when US officials chose to describe 9/11 as an attack on civilised societies and
all that is good, perpetrated by savages, murderers, barbarians and animals,
Jackson argues that these discourses will shape and inform counterterrorism
praxis in a very specific way (Jackson 2005, 47–58). In other words, one con-
sequence of constructing the attackers as animals and savages is the treatment of
suspected terrorists as just that, animals. The pictures and stories from Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, which revealed the use of torture and inhumane
26   The Global War on Terror
treatment, certainly seem to support this analysis. In relation to the RAF bomb,
then, one should ask whether it would be possible to drop a bomb on random
people in Iraq or Syria, with a message of love, without a narrative or culture
that supports or allows for these actions in the first place.

The surveillance state

Not only has the GWOT been incredibly violent, with means that undermine
democratic values and principles, but the GWOT has also contributed to an
expansive security state among Western countries. With the Snowden revela-
tions in 2013, the public got a solid glimpse of a vast and rampant mass-­
surveillance program. The US now spends $68 billion annually on 17 different
intelligence outfits. The National Security Agency (NSA), in one document
leaked by Edward Snowden, told New Zealand’s security services, and those of
the other Five Eyes nations,1 to ‘sniff it all, know it all, collect it all, process it
all and exploit it all’ (Greenwald 2014, 97). GCHQ, NSA’s British counterpart,
was in 2014 revealed to have worked on developing ways into encrypted traffic
on Hotmail, Google, Yahoo and Facebook. The encryption, which is invaluable
for these sites to provide and ensure that people’s data and information are stored
securely, is seen as an obstacle to the intelligence services’ mission of counter-
ing terrorism (Ball, Borger, and Greenwald 2013).
The NSA collects millions of text messages in untargeted global sweeps,
which they use to extract locations, contacts and financial transactions. As one
NSA presentation on the agency’s Dishfire program stated: ‘SMS Text Mes-
sages: A Goldmine to Exploit’ (Ball 2014). A final illustration of how expansive
and intrusive the NSA program has become is found in the documents leaked by
Snowden which show that one single unit of the NSA was capable of collecting
97 million emails and 124 billion phone calls from around the world in just 30
days (Greenwald 2014, 92). It is quite remarkable and worrisome, but perhaps a
result of gathering massive amount of data, that Snowden was able to download
and leave the country with millions of documents from the NSA servers without
the NSA even noticing it.
Despite these massive and ever-­expanding mass-­surveillance programs, there
is no record showing that use of these programs has been instrumental in
thwarting large terror attacks (McLaughlin 2016; Mueller and Stewart 2016,
169–198). In fact, there is reason to believe that the massive gathering of data
and information about people amounts to heaping more hay on to the haystack
in order to find the needle. Glenn Carle, a former CIA official, has described the
creation of the ‘threat matrix’, a top-­10 list of terrorists created in a hurry after
9/11, in which any squib of information that might lead to terrorism has to be
examined and put into the matrix. Since 9/11, the number of tips that the
FBI and other government agencies have received and followed up are close
to 10 million (Mueller and Stewart 2015). One such threat involved an email
from a person in the Philippines threatening to attack the United States unless
blackmail money was paid. The email read: ‘Dear America, I will attack you if
 The Global War on Terror   27
you don’t pay the 999999999 dollars. Mwah ha ha ha’ (Mueller and Stewart
2016, 19–20). Mueller has furthermore collected a number of elaborate case
studies in an online book of alleged Islamic terrorist threats in America. He
concludes that the common denominator seems to be that the FBI is involved as
provocateurs in most plots, and that the would-­be terrorists are quite inept
(Mueller 2016).
Furthermore, the FBI stated in 2016 that they had disrupted 440 terrorist
attacks in 2015, exceeding their target of 125 (U.S Department of Justice 2016).
It is astonishing that an agency has a stated goal of disrupting 125 attacks, as if
there is a constant stream of terrorists attacking the US. What is more aston-
ishing is that this claim goes largely unchallenged by the media, experts and
academia in the US. Similarly, the director general of MI5, Andrew Parker,
warned in October 2017 of unprecedented UK terror threat: ‘It’s at the highest
tempo I have seen in my 34-year career. Today there is more terrorist activity,
coming at us more quickly, and it can be harder to detect’ (Dodd 2017). Aside
from the obvious neglect of the history of IRA attacks in Britain, Parker gave a
similar impression as the FBI that there is constant stream of terrorists ready to
attack Western countries. Thus, despite a global war on terror for over 15 years,
the terrorists seem to be more active and more adaptable than ever. One might
indeed be tempted to close the curtains, sit down with a whiskey and cigar, and
let the apocalyptic gloom sink in.

Conclusion
Despite the enormous attention that terrorism has received, and the vast
resources allocated to counter it, there is reason to feel gloomy about con-
temporary counterterrorism. It has directly led, and still leads, to unnecessary
and avoidable massive human suffering for a vast number of people in Afghani-
stan and Iraq, but also in a score of other countries that have been affected by the
war on terror. As such, we return to Stump and Dixit’s remark earlier that
whether or not terrorism exits, is less important than how terrorism and terrorists
are constructed in practice. This chapter has traced both the construction of ter-
rorism as a security threat, and the consequences of the heavily militarised and
incredibly violent response to it. The point is that the GWOT, with its military
campaigns, torture and renditions, was not inevitable. Much of the suffering and
violence could have been avoided. For example, the Taliban was at one point in
2001 ready to hand bin Laden over to a third country (Guardian 2001), and the
war in Iraq was justified on false evidence pertaining to WMDs and the govern-
ment’s attachment to terrorist organisations. According to Ricks, a great many
high-­ranking military personnel opposed the invasion of Iraq, and thought it
would be a potentially disastrous distraction from the fight against Al-­Qaeda
(Ricks 2006). As such, no part of the GWOT was inevitable, and it is incumbent
on us to recognise that the human suffering it has brought about is a consequence
of how the threat of terrorism, and the response to it, was constructed and
operationalised.
28   The Global War on Terror
In sum, it is possible to attribute a massive amount of avoidable human suf-
fering to a failed counterterrorism framework. The question then becomes what
can be done to address these failures? It is the aim of the following chapters to
construct a theory of counterterrorism that will radically challenge current coun-
terterrorism by reconceptualising the ontology, epistemology and agenda of
counterterrorism.

Note
1 The Five Eyes refer to an intelligence alliance comprising of Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the UK and the United States of America.

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Elshtain, J. B. 2003. Just War Against Terror. New York: Basic Books.
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Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 Sash chains are made in the form illustrated in Fig. 72, and may
be had either in steel, red metal, or bronze. The sash chains in the
market are usually made in four sizes, being numbered from 0 to 3.
The makers, however, have no agreement regarding these
standards, so that the numbering is not uniform; one manufacturer’s
No. 0 chain may be his heaviest make, while a chain of the same
number furnished by another maker may be the lightest chain that he
manufactures. In order to provide against this discrepancy when
specifying, it is well to name the maker of the chain. The lightest
sash chain will support sashes weighing from 40 to 75 pounds, while
the heaviest will carry sashes that weigh from 150 to 250 pounds.

Fig. 73

Fig. 72

63. Sash Balances.—By the use of sash balances, one of

which is shown in Fig. 73, there is no necessity for weight boxes,
counterweights, etc. The contrivance illustrated has been
manufactured for many years, and the original intention was to have
it displace the sash pulley, cord, and weight for double-hung
windows. Installing spring sash pulleys costs more than the older
method of hanging by means of counterweights. They are
constructed with a long, spiral spring enclosed by a drum, on which
the tape a, Fig. 73, winds and thus raises the sash. The coil spring in
this balance is made of either light or heavy material, according to
the weight of the sash it is intended to counterbalance. They are
seldom used, however, except where there is insufficient room for
sash weights. The steel tape is liable to be twisted and broken by
jarring in operating the sash, and for general use it has been found
that the most positive action is secured by pulleys and weights.
64. Weight of Sash and Glass.—In estimating the weight of
window sash, in order that the size of the counterweights or of the
spring counterbalance may be determined, the weight of the glass
per square foot may be taken as follows: Plate glass, 3½ pounds;
double-thick glass, 1½ pounds; and single-thick glass, 1 pound. To
find the weight of the wooden sash, add together the height and the
width of the sash, in feet, and multiply by 2.1 for 2¼-inch sash, by
1.67 for 1¾-inch sash, and by 1.33 for 1⅜-inch sash. The several
sizes of sash given indicate the thickness of the sash frame. While
these data for determining the weight of sash are not exact, they are
sufficiently accurate to fix the size of the sash cords and pulleys and
to estimate the weight required to counterbalance them. The best
practice in counterbalance sashes, however, is to weigh the sash
after it has been glazed; in this manner the exact weight and size of
the counterweights required can be determined. The approximate
weights of ordinary glazed sash are usually given in the catalogs of
manufacturers of sash weights, pulleys, etc., and will be found
convenient in determining the approximate weight of sash weights
without making the calculations just described when estimating.
65. Sash Locks, or Fasts.—There are many different makes of
sash locks for double-hung sash in the market. In Fig. 74 are shown
several of the older type of sash locks that have been used
extensively. The lock shown at (a) is known as the Champion; that at
(b), as the Ives, and that at (c), as the Boston. This type of sash lock,
the construction of which is apparent from the illustration, has given
satisfaction for a number of years.
Fig. 74
 Fig. 75

Fig. 76

A newer type of sash lock is that illustrated in Figs. 75 and 76. In

Fig. 75 is shown a sash lock known as the Fitch. This lock is made
by several manufacturers, and can be procured in all finishes of iron
for the cheaper class of buildings, and also in bronze metal for high-
class work. It is composed of a helical cam, which is fastened to the
top of the meeting rail of the lower sash and engages with a hook, or
lug, that is secured to the bottom of the upper sash. The operation of
this fastener is rapid, and the rotary movement draws the two sashes
together horizontally and forces them in opposite directions vertically.
In this way, it holds the sash fast and prevents rattling and air leaks.
It also has an advantage in that it cannot be moved by inserting a
knife blade between the sashes from the outside. The Yale screw
sash fast illustrated in Fig. 76 is an excellent piece of hardware. It
accomplishes the same results as the Fitch lock; namely, drawing
the sash together by the tightening of a thumb nut on a fine-pitched
screw. This nut operates against a semicircular-shaped upright hook,
or lug, on the lower sash, thus developing great pressure in the
desired direction. While this sash fastener takes somewhat longer to
operate than the Fitch, it repays by providing greater security.
 66. Sash Lifts.—While sash lifts are not required for the
cheapest work, as the window can be raised by pushing against the
parting rail or against the mullions, nevertheless they are made to
sell at such reasonable prices that it would seem advisable to place
them on the lower sash of all buildings, no matter how unimportant.

Fig. 78
Fig. 77

Fig. 79
The common type of sash lift illustrated in Fig. 77 is known as the
hook sash lift. This lift is extensively used, and can be procured in
any grade or weight, in either cast-iron, steel, or bronze metal, and in
any finish desired.
 The flush sash lift, the general type of which is shown in Fig. 78,
makes a better appearance than the hook lift, and is considerably
stronger, from the fact that the casing forming the grip is let into the
lower rail of the sash, and the strain is taken by this, rather than by
the screws. These lifts are made in either steel or bronze, and in all
finishes; they can also be had ornamented to correspond with the
lock trim.
For heavy sashes, such as those in public and commercial
buildings, the bar sash lift illustrated in Fig. 79 is the best. This type
of lift should always be used for heavy sash. A sash lift similar to the
type shown at (a) is sometimes fastened to the under side of the
meeting rail of the upper sash for the purpose of lowering the sash.

Fig. 80

Fig. 81

67. Sash Sockets and Pole Hooks.—In buildings having high

ceilings, where the top sash is some distance from the floor, as is
likely to occur in institutions, schools, and factories, it is necessary to
provide “pull-down” poles for the purpose of raising and lowering the
upper sash. The hooks used on the ends of such poles, which are
made of some tough wood, are as illustrated in Fig. 80. Unless the
upper sash is furnished with metal plates that have a hole, or
aperture, the pole will be used against the mullion or upper rail of the
window sash and thus mar the woodwork. The plates, or metal
sockets, to engage the sash and pull-down poles, are illustrated in
Fig. 81. They may be had in all metals and finishes and in several
sizes.
68. Stop-Screws.—The stop-bead
screws, or washers, or, as they are more
commonly known, the window-stop, or
bead, adjusters, types of which are
illustrated in Figs. 82 and 83, are necessary
hardware adjuncts to the window trim for
buildings of the better class. In ordinary
work, these stops are secured to the frame
by nailing, but when they are fastened in
this manner, the stop-beads are disfigured if
Fig. 82 it is necessary to remove them. A cheap
and good way of fastening these stop-
beads is to use ordinary round-headed
screws. While these adjusters answer the purpose very well, they do
not allow for the adjustment of the stop-bead sidewise, so as to take
up any shrinkage that might occur in the sash and prevent it from
rattling, as well as making it air-tight.
 Fig. 83
To overcome this deficiency, a surface washer, as illustrated in
Fig. 82, was originated. The surface washer was ordinarily made
about ⅝ inch in diameter, and was provided with one large hole
about ⅜ inch in diameter or with two smaller holes placed side by
side horizontally across the stop. By this means, the proper adjusting
of the stop-bead was provided for, the washer covering the opening,
or hole, through the stop. However, the defect in this method
consisted in the marring of the finished stop when adjustment was
required, for the washer left its imprint on the woodwork, and, when
shifted, this would show.
The best form of stop-bead washer is illustrated in Fig. 83, and is
known as the Taplin adjusting screw and countersunk cup washer.
This device is composed of a sunken, or cup, washer with a slotted
or horizontal hole in its base frame, so as to allow about a ³/₁₆-inch
adjustment. This adjustment, as can be clearly seen from the figure,
is made without marring, or disfiguring, the stop-bead in any way.
These countersunk washers may be had in bronze or steel, those
made of steel being finished to match the hardware, as desired.
 Fig. 84

TRIMMINGS FOR PIVOTED AND CASEMENT SASH

69. Sash Centers.—When a transom sash is hung at the top or

the bottom, regular hinge butts may be used; but where a sash is
pivoted at the center, either on the sides or at the top and bottom, a
pivoted arrangement, termed a sash center, is needed. For large
sash or heavy transoms, and especially for those that are exterior
sash, the rabbeted center should be used. This type of center is
illustrated in Fig. 84; its construction gives great strength and
completely closes the joint against light and water.
An excellent type of center, known as the Howarth sash center, is
illustrated in Fig. 85, the method by which it is attached to the frame
and sash being clearly indicated. By this arrangement, the two parts
of the center fold, or butt, against each other and form a tight joint,
the stop-bead for the sash at the top and bottom being arranged as
indicated at a a.
 Fig. 85
There is a sash center, known as the Tabor, that is constructed
as shown in Fig. 86. This center is used for very large sash that are
vertically pivoted; that is, arranged with a center at the top and
bottom. Such sash as these are used extensively in office buildings,
because, by their use, the entire window may be thrown open at one
time. The Tabor device consists of a special sub-sill, which engages
with a ribbed joint strip placed on the bottom of the sash. By this
means, a weather-tight joint is secured, and the sash is firmly locked
in a closed position. By throwing a lever, the sash is raised above the
astragal, or sub-sill, and can then be operated. The top rail is
supplied with a filling strip having an irregular joint at the intersection
with the sash, and is held firmly by a coil spring encircling the top
pivot.
In Fig. 87 are shown several sash centers of the common type.
These possess no particular merit, but are much used for common
work.

Fig. 86
 Fig. 87

70. Transom Lifts.—The transom lift illustrated in Fig. 88 is

distinctly an American device for operating and fastening the
transom lights over doors. This device is used extensively in hotel
and office buildings. It is made in various styles and sizes necessary
to meet the several requirements. The transom lift consists of a
vertical sliding rod that is placed on the door jambs, as at a, with an
arm at the top connecting it with the sash, as at b. Near the bottom is
a clamp, or grip, that holds the bar a in any desired position. By a
vertical movement of the rod, the sash is caused to swing. Transom
lifts may be had for transom sashes that are pivoted at the center or
for those which are hinged at the top or the bottom. At (a) and (b) in
Fig. 88 are shown the types of transom lifts for center-pivoted sash;
the former arranged so that the sash pitches outwards, while in the
latter the sash pitches inwards. At (c), the device is shown where the
sash is hinged at the top, while at (d) the sash is hinged at the
bottom. The several kinds of transom lifts made by the various
manufacturers are practically alike, except for variations in the form
of the grip, or clamp. The range of sizes and quality of transom lifts is
large. The commercial article may be obtained in steel, copper or
bronze plated, or in bronze or brass. They are made in ¼-, ⁵/₁₆-, ⅜-,
and ½-inch sizes, the size being determined by the weight of the
sash and the degree of rigidity and solidity desired to be obtained
and expressed. For good work, the ⅜" and ½" diameters are used.
The rods may be obtained in lengths of from 3 to 12 feet. In
specifying or ordering transom lifts, the rod should always be
sufficiently long to reach within 5 feet of the floor.
Fig. 88
 Fig. 89
71. Transom Catches.—In Fig. 89 are illustrated types of
transom spring catches, or bolts. These devices are provided in
the several forms shown to meet various conditions. Those shown at
(a), (b), and (c) have a ring, or eye, in the handle, to which an
operating cord may be suspended, or into which a pull-down hook
may be inserted, to operate the sash. The transom catch at (d) is
made expressly for operation by means of a pull-down hook. In very
wide windows, for the purpose of limiting the opening of the sash,
these catches should be used in conjunction with chains instead of
with transom lifts.
72. Transom Chains.—In Fig. 90 are illustrated several types of
transom chains. The chains shown at (a) and (b) are suitable for
sashes weighing not more than 25 pounds, while that at (c) is
sufficiently strong for sashes weighing over 25 pounds. These chains
are fastened to cleats furnished with countersunk screw holes for
securing readily to the frame and sash. When the sash is hinged at
the bottom, these chains are used to limit the opening of the sash.
They are sometimes employed as an additional guard, to prevent the
sash from falling in case the sash lifter becomes broken. The
ordinary lengths of sash chains range from 8 to 24 inches, the latter
length being sufficient for the opening of the largest sash.

Fig. 90
 73. Casement Trim.—The term casement applies properly to
any hinged sash. It is, however, usually limited to windows that have
a sill set some distance above the floor. Where the casement sash
extends to the floor, the term French window is generally applied,
although frequently the terms are confused. In designing casement
windows, the details of the hardware should be such that the
casements can be made weather-tight; and in laying out the full-
sized details for the mill work for a casement sash and frame, the
available hardware should be studied, so that the woodwork may be
arranged to conform to it.
74. Casement Bolts and Fasts.—Casement sash may be
provided with any good form of top and bottom bolts or hinged sash
fasteners, but these should be supplemented by a good latch or
cupboard catch at the center. Special turnbuckles, or casement
fasts, constructed as shown in Fig. 91, are on the market. All of the
catches shown will securely fasten the sash, but the types shown at
(a) and (d), Fig. 91, will draw the sash tightly against the frame when
the buckle, or fast, is drawn in place. In countries where casement
sash are in general use, the necessary fastenings, including the top
and bottom bolts, are embodied in one structure, as described in the
following article.
 Fig. 91
75. Cremorne Bolts.—In the best work, the Cremorne bolt is
used for casement windows. This device consists of a vertical rod
divided at or about the middle of its length, thus making two pieces,
and is operated by a knob, or handle, at that point. Types of
ornamental Cremorne bolts are illustrated in Fig. 92. As shown, the
upper and lower ends of the rods, or bolts, slide vertically and in
opposite directions, being operated by the turning of the knob, or
handle. These bolts are furnished with suitable strikes, either of the
plate or the box form, which are attached to the window at the top or
the bottom. Since the ends of the bolts are beveled, they press the
two sashes tightly together and against the sash frame when they
are thrown in. A single movement of the knob, or lever handle, is
sufficient to release both bolts.

Fig. 92
76. Espagnolette Bolts.—In Fig. 93 is shown the Espagnolette
bolt, which is similar in construction to the Cremorne bolt. This bolt
consists of a vertical rod, but instead of being in two pieces, as in the
Cremorne bolt, it is in one piece. This rod has hooks at each end,
and, by a rotary motion, engages pins, or plates, in the window
frame and thus draws the sashes together and against the frame.
These bolts are usually operated by a pendant handle, which, when
lifted to a horizontal position, will release the rod so that it may be
rotated to fasten or to release the sash. For very high sash, a
supplemental design may be used by providing a tapered hook on
the opposite sash for the pendant. The Espagnolette bolt is usually
heavier than the Cremorne and exerts more power in forcing the
sashes against the frame; it is also more expensive. Both bolts,
however, are available for use on doors as well as on windows, and
lend themselves admirably to decorative treatment, as shown in the
illustrations.
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