TABLE OF CASES
RYLANDS V FLETCHER
THERE ARE NO SUBTOPICS FOR THIS CHAPTER
CASE NAME SUMMARY/PRINCIPLE OF LAW
Rylands v Fletcher The creation of the rule; a defendant will be liable if a
thing that he accumulates on his land (a non-natural
use of the land) escapes and causes harm to the
claimant
Rickards v Lothian Non-natural use: “Some special use bringing with it
increased danger to others, and must not merely by
the ordinary use of land or such use as is proper for
the general benefit of the community
British v Celenese Hunt The industrial use of the land as natural, if it benefits
the community
Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Whether the activity is of community benefit is no
Leather longer relevant in determining liability under Rylands;
Rylands no longer strict liability as foreseeability and
fault-based element introduced.
Transco plc v Stockport Non-natural use means extraordinary use. The Tort will
continue to exist separately from nuisance and
negligence.
Read v Lyons For the tort to operate, the thing must escape the
defendant's land.
Crown River Cruises Ltd v Kimbolton Rylands could be extended to cover intentional
Fireworks Ltd releases of dangerous things.
Stannard v Gore It must be the dangerous thing itself that escapes and
causes damage.
Peters v Prince of Wales Theatre Ltd Implied consent of the claimant will act as a successful
defence against the tort
Green v Chelsea Water Works Statutory Authority successfully raised as a defence in
a claim under Rylands
Charing Cross Electric Supply Co v Statutory Authority unsuccessfully raised as a defence
Hydraulic Power Co in a claim under Rylands
Dunn v Birmingham Coal Navigation The default of the claimant was successfully raised as a
defence.
NOTE: For Full Facts of each case, please consult your textbook.
CHAPTER: RYLANDS V FLETCHER
Rylands v Fletcher introduced the principle that would be used to protect individuals from
damage caused by ‘things’ that escaped from the defendant’s land during the time of the
Industrial Revolution in the UK.
In the case, the defendant had paid independent contractors to make a reservoir on his land.
While working on the reservoir, the contractors discovered the shafts and passages of an old
coal mine on the land which joined up with a mine on the claimant’s neighbouring land. The
contractors did not block the shafts and when the reservoir was filled, the water burst through
the shafts and flooded the claimant’s mine, causing damage.
The defendant had not been negligent as he did not know about the shafts, and he could not be
vicariously liable as the contractors were not employees. There could be no claim in trespass to
land because the damage was not direct and immediate. Also, at the time, nuisance did not
apply to a one-off incident.
The decision: the defendant was still liable in tort. The court took the opportunity to create a
new legal principle and the HOL established that to succeed in the Tort, the claimant must show
the following:
1. The defendant must control the land from which the mischief has come.
2. The defendant must have brought and accumulated something in the course of some
non-natural use of the land
3. The thing accumulated must be likely to do damage if it escapes.
4. The dangerous thing must escape
5. There must be damage because of the escape.
CONDITIONS OF LIABILITY
THINGS BROUGHT ONTO THE LAND
The dangerous thing must have been accumulated or brought onto the defendant’s land in the
course of some ‘unnatural’ use of the land; Lord Cairns in the HOL in Rylands interpreted non-
natural as being something ‘not naturally there’. This means that the rule does not apply to
things that are naturally found on a particular area of land such as trees, naturally present
water etc.
What amounts to non-natural will depend on a case-to-case basis and has changed over time.
In Rickards v Lothian, non-natural use was defined as “some special use bringing with it
increased danger to others, and must not merely by the ordinary use of land or such use as is
proper for the general benefit of the community”.
This definition was broad. Factors such as the quantity of the accumulated combustible
material, abnormal risk, how it was stored, the character of the neighbourhood and whether
the use of the land is for the general benefit of the community were taken into account, and it
is on this basis that the courts in Rickards and British Celenese Hunt had regarded the
industrial use of the land as natural.
However later on there was a shift from this approach and in Cambridge Water v Eastern
Counties Leather, the court said that the fact that the defendant’s factory benefited the local
community was not enough to make the use of the land natural.
This approach was confirmed in the later case of Transco plc v Stockport, where the court while
holding that a large water pipe serving flats was not a non-natural use of the land stated that
Rylands v Fletcher should only offer cause of action where the defendant’s use of the land was
‘extraordinary and unusual’ and the question of whether the defendant’s use of land was of
benefit to the community was not relevant.
Thus ‘non-natural’ is now taken to be ‘non-ordinary’ use. This is a narrower definition than the
original one. What is ‘ordinary’ will depend on the time, place and context of the use of the
land in question.
This definition begins to make the test like negligence and has allowed the courts to decide that
various industrial activities are ‘natural’ uses of land.
LIKELY TO DO MISCHIEF
The word ‘ dangerous’ is not interpreted literally and there is no requirement that the thing
must be dangerous, but it must be likely to do damage if it escapes.
The rule has been applied to a wide variety of things including gas (Batchelor v Tunbridge Wells
Gas) electricity fire, explosions, vibrations, fumes, flagpoles(Shiffman v Order of St. John),
swings (Hale v Jennings) and people.
In Transco, Lord Bingham explained that the test for deciding if something was dangerous was
a strict one. The claimant would have to show that there would be an exceptionally high risk of
danger or ‘mischief’ if the thing accumulated by the defendant escaped. If the requirement was
fulfilled, it did not matter that the risk of an escape occurring was low.
ESCAPE
In Rylands, ‘escape’ is taken to mean an escape from a place where the defendant is in
occupation or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control.
The application of this definition can be seen in Read v Lyons, where the claimant, an inspector
of ammunitions who was injured by an explosive while inspecting the defendant’s factory had
her claim under Rylands denied because even though explosives were highly dangerous, there
had been no escape as they had not left the defendant’s property.
Traditionally, the term ‘escape’ meant that the release of the dangerous thing had to be
accidental. However, in Crown River Cruises Ltd v Kimbolton Fireworks Ltd, it was suggested
that Rylands could be extended to cover intentional releases of dangerous things.
In Stannard v Gore, the CA stated that it must be the dangerous thing itself that escapes and
causes damage. In this case, the defendant had accumulated tyres which caught fire and the
fire then spread to the claimant's land. Since it was the fire that escaped and not the tyre, the
claim failed. This would seem to suggest that Rylands will not now be available for cases where
the thing brought onto land causes a fire that spreads to neighbouring land.
DAMAGE
The escape must have caused the damage. The damage for which recovery can be made is
generally to land or other property, and under Transco, personal injuries will not be
recoverable.
WHO CAN SUE?
A claimant under Rylands must have some kind of interest in the land affected by the escape of
the dangerous thing.
WHO CAN BE SUED
The tort will only apply where the land onto which the dangerous thing is brought is in the
control of the defendant. Whether ‘control’ amounts to proprietary interest or being a licensee
is however unclear.
STRICT OR FAULT-BASED LIABILITY
Originally, Rylands was a strict liability tort. This means that a defendant could be liable for
damage even though they did not know that there was a risk of damage or could not have
prevented the damage. More recently, an element of fault has been introduced based on the
type of harm being reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
In Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather, the defendants were not held liable under
Rylands, when a chemical used in their work seeped (after frequent spillages) through the floor
and then soil to contaminate a nearby water supply as they could not have foreseen the
seepage.
Further in Transco plc v Stockport, the ‘likely to do mischief’ test was changed into a
foreseeability test and a defendant will not incur liability if they could not have foreseen a high
risk of danger if the thing escaped from their land.
This introduction of foreseeability has also led to an increase in the number of defences that
can be used by the defendant against an action brought in Rylands.
DEFENCES (ONLY CONSIDER THEM IN DETAIL FOR PROPOSITION QUESTIONS, NOT NECESSARY
IN ESSAY QS, WHERE YOU MENTION THEM IN PASSING)
CONSENT
If the claimant gives express or implied consent to the presence of the dangerous thing, this is a
defence unless the defendant is negligent. Consent can be implied where a thing has been
brought onto the land for the common benefit of the claimant and the defendant or where a
tenant takes the property as he/she finds it.
In Peters v Prince of Wales Theatre Ltd, The tenant of a shop in the defendant’s theatre found
his shop flooded by the theatre’s sprinkler system. The claimant was held to have consented to
the presence of the system as it was kept in the theatre in case of fire. The claim failed.
ACT OF STRANGER
The defendant will not be liable if the escape is the result of an unforeseeable act of a third
party over whom the defendant has no control or who is not acting under the defendant’s
instructions. [Rickards v Lothian, in which the defendant was found not liable for flooding
caused by the turning on of a water tap as it was done by a stranger)
About this defence, a trespasser is regarded as a stranger but employees acting in the course of
their employment are not.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The defendant may avoid liability if a relevant statute authorizes the defendant’s actions.
However, some acts that allow the carrying out of dangerous activities do not specify whether
the rule should apply, so it is entirely up to the court to interpret the Act.
In Green v Chelsea Water Works, A watermain burst, causing damage to the claimant’s land:
any escape of water would inevitably cause damage. As there was an obligation to maintain
high pressure, there was no liability for the damage because the defendant had the defence of
statutory authority.
In Charing Cross Electric Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co, the defence failed. The facts were
similar to Green but the relevant statute gave a power to the defendant to keep the water main
at high pressure so there was no obligation to do so. (An obligation in an Act means that the
company must do something, but if there is a power, it gives only a discretion to do something.)
ACT OF GOD
This defence may be used when the escape is caused by natural forces only in circumstances
that the defendant could not have been expected to foresee or guard against. In Carstairs v.
Taylor, A rat gnawed through a roof, causing rice to be damaged when there was heavy rain.
The defendant successfully relied on the defence of the Act of God.
DEFAULT OF THE CLAIMANT
If the claimant’s act or omission causes the whole of the damage, there will not be a successful
claim.
In Dunn v Birmingham Coal Navigation, the claimant knowingly built a mine below the
defendant’s canal. When water from the canal flooded the mine, it was held that since he knew
of the danger of building beneath the canal but he still went ahead liability could not be
imposed on the defendant. The claim failed.
If the claimant is partly to blame, the defence of contributory negligence will apply.
RELATIONSHIP WITH NUISANCE (ONLY CONSIDER WHEN Q ASKS YOU TO DO A COMPARISON
WITH NUISANCE)
The rule in Rylands has its origins in nuisance, but because the damage was not caused
intentionally, the tort was not appropriate.
It has been argued that Rylands v Fletcher is used in a much more restrictive way because of
the specific requirements of accumulation and of a thing likely to cause harm if it escaped. The
requirement of non-natural use, although similar to unreasonable use of land in nuisance,
usually involves some degree of exceptional risk but unreasonable use does not. Rylands is
primarily concerned with one-off incidents, but in nuisance, the claimant has to prove the
element of duration; nuisance generally tends to take place over some time. In addition,
Rylands is concerned with escapes from the land rather than interference with the land. Also, in
an action in Rylands, the emphasis appears to be on the ownership of or interest in land unlike
in nuisance, where the emphasis is on the individual’s use or enjoyment of the land.
In Transco, the HOL stated that Rylands should not be incorporated into either the tort of
negligence or the tort of nuisance. Certainly, they wanted to keep the tort alive as there are
instances where it should be used to provide the claimant with a remedy.
EVALUATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO RYLANDS V FLETCHER
The tort was intended to be a strict liability tort but it was quickly limited by Lord Cairns in the
HOL as the claimant had to prove a non-natural use of land. This can limit the tort’s
effectiveness, as a thing may be dangerous but not a non-natural use of land. The term ‘non-
natural’ has a shifting nature as time passes, which can mean that the tort can adapt to changes
in society and technology.
ESCAPE FROM LAND
The definition of escape has expanded. This allows the tort to be more effective as it increases
the pool of potential claimants.
COMPLEXITY
The tort itself is complex. There are many requirements and equally a relatively large number of
available defences. Negligence or Nuisance may be easier to prove in comparison.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
This tort was initially introduced to deal with environmental issues. Now, environmental
protection is dealt with by European legislation, UK legislation and the torts of nuisance and
negligence. This suggests that the tort is less effective.
Transco indicates the court regarded the rule as a specific type of nuisance that should be
retained to provide compensation for environmental damage and that it will not be merged
with nuisance or negligence.
