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The European Union
and the Challenges
of the New Global
Context
The European Union
and the Challenges
of the New Global
Context
Edited by

Ileana Tache
The European Union and the Challenges of the New Global Context

Edited by Ileana Tache

This book first published 2015

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2015 by Ileana Tache and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-7835-9

ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7835-7
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ............................................................................................. vii

List of Figures........................................................................................... viii

List of Boxes ............................................................................................... x

Foreword .................................................................................................... xi

Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1

Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Rapidly
Changing World
Ileana Tache

Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 26

EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Competitive Emerging
Donors
Ileana Tache

Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 52

EU Sanctions in the Post-Soviet Space
Dirk Lehmkuhl and Mariia Shagina

Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 86

Importance of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA’s) for the EU
and its Partners: The Case of the DCFTA with Georgia
Elzbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska

Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109

Reconfiguration of External Relations of the European Union
Nicolae Marinescu
vi Table of Contents

Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 133

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank during
the International Crisis
Vicente Esteve and Maria A. Prats

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 177

Capital Flows and Boom-Bust Cycle in Emerging Europe:
Responses to the Volatile Financial Global Context
Jean-Pierre Allegret and Audrey Sallenave

Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 208

Macroeconomic Linkages in the European Union
Oscar Bajo-Rubio and Carmen Diaz-Roldan

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................... 234

Bibliography ............................................................................................ 238

List of Contributors ................................................................................. 261

Index ........................................................................................................ 262

 LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1: EU member states Institutions and Agencies for development

Table 2-2: Ranking of the EU member states and EU donor institutions in
2013 ATI
Table 2-3: The ACP countries
Table 2-4: Number of EIB operations by region in 2013
Table 2-5: Top Official Development Assistance (ODA) donors in the
world (in percentage) – Year 2012
Table 2-6: DAC members
Table 2-7: Imports and Exports of the EC from AAS (1953–1975)
Table 2-8: LDC share of EU imports (%)
Table 3-1: EU – Belarus
Table 3-2: EU – Moldova (Transnistria)
Table 3-3: EU – Uzbekistan
Table 3- 4: EU – Ukraine/Russia
Table 4-1: Main agreements on free trade areas, and association,
concluded and still negotiated by the EU (as of the middle of 2014)
Table 5.1: Top merchandise traders in the world, $ bn (2013)
Table 5.2: Bilateral trade of the EU with selected partners, $ bn (2013)
Table 5.3: Shifting positions in world merchandise exports, $ bn
Table 6-1: Phases of the international crisis
Table 6-2: Countries and territories with exchange rate regimes linked to
the Euro
Table 6-3: The share of the Euro in the currency composition of foreign
exchange reserves for selected countries
Table 7-1: Foreign bank assets among total bank assets, in %
Table 7-2: Output gap from 2004 to 2008
Table 7-3: Variance Decomposition of the Real Exchange Rate: Ratio of
NEER Shocks to REER Variations 2004M1-2010M12, in %
Table 7-4: Variance Decomposition of the Real Exchange Rate: The Ratio
of price shocks to REER Variations 2004M1-2010M12
Table 8-1: A macroeconomic model of a monetary union
Table 8-2: Effects of shocks on endogenous variables in the model of the
monetary union
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 6-1: Systemic Stress Composite Indicator, Index

Figure 6-2: Central Banks interest rates
Figure 6-3: Central Banks balance sheet
Figure 6-4: Liquidity providing operations: MRO and LTRO
Figure 6-5: Securities Market Programme
Figure 6-6: Long term interest rate
Figure 6-7: Main ECB rates and EONIA rate
Figure 6-8: ECB balance sheet projection
Figure 6-9: Euro money market
Figure 6-10: Main ECB rates and EONIA rate (left) Spreads
Figure 6-11: Central Bank’s loans to credit institutions
Figure 6-12: Deposit facility and excess reserves
Figure 6-13: TARGET 2 BALANCES
Figure 6-14: Lending margins of MFI’S
Figure 6-15: Exchange rate EUR/USD
Figure 6-16: The Euros’ share as an invoicing/settlement currency in
extra-Euro area transactions of Euro area countries
Figure 6-17: Currency composition of global foreign exchange reserves
Figure 6-18: Currency composition of global foreign exchange reserves
Figure 7-1: Composition of external liabilities, stock, in % of GDP
Figure 7-2: External positions of reporting banks vis-à-vis all sectors,
March 2007 = 100
Figure 7-3: Capital flows and credit expansion
Figure 7-4: Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money in several emerging
countries*, in %
Figure 7-5: Growth differentials between credit and GDP, percentage
points
Figure 7-6: Changes in deposit and credit to GDP, 2002-2007, in
percentage points
Figure 7-7: Inflation rates in fixed and floating exchange rate regimes
Figure 7-8: Output gap from 2007 to 2013 in fixed and floating exchange
rate regimes
Figure 7-9: Indicators of sovereign risk in emerging countries
Figure 7-10: Tensions on interbank funding markets
 The European Union and the Challenges of the New Global Context ix

Figure 7-11: Changes in external positions of reporting banks vis-à-vis all

sectors, in terms of 2013 GDP in fixed and floating exchange rate
regimes
Figure 7-12: Changes in the ratio domestic credit to the private sector /
GDP, year on year change
Figure 7-13: Short-term real interest rates in fixed and floating exchange
rate regimes
Figure 7-14: Nominal effective exchange rates in fixed and floating
exchange rate regimes, 100 = 2010
Figure 7-15: Real effective exchange rates in fixed and floating exchange
rate regimes, 2010 = 100
Figure 7-16: Nominal effective exchange rates and core inflation
Figure 7-17: Unemployment rates in fixed and floating exchange rate
regimes
Figure 8-1: A country-specific decrease in the risk premium in the model
of the monetary union
Figure 8-2: A country-specific expansionary shock in the model of the
monetary union
Figure 8-3: A country-specific supply shock that lowers the inflation rate
premium in the model of the monetary union
 LIST OF BOXES

Box 1-1: Maastricht Treaty’s objectives of CFSP

Box 1-2: Policy instruments of the Amsterdam Treaty for CFSP
Box 1-3: Chronology of a Common EU Foreign, Security and Defense
Policy
Box 1-4: The Main “Euroforces” acknowledged by the Treaty of Lisbon
Box 2-1: Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement – adaptation to the
new global context
Box 2-2: European Development Fund
Box 2-3: The five pillars of Paris Declaration (2005) and their
fundamental principles
 FOREWORD

The book investigates the new challenges confronted by the EU as an

international actor in the context of the latest economic and political
developments, with particular attention to common foreign and security
policy; development-aid policy; EU sanctions in the post-Soviet space;
preferential trade agreements; external relations of the EU; international
aspects of the monetary policy of the ECB; capital flows and the boom-
bust cycle in the emerging Europe; and macroeconomic modeling of the
relationship between the EU and the rest of the world.
To the existing literature in the field of the EU’s foreign and security
policy - now at the top of the EU’s agenda - the book intends to add a
thorough up-to-dateness to include all the recent tense evolutions. The
respective chapter offers an historical survey of the main stages of the
construction of a foreign and security policy and of the developments of
the ESDP and then of the CSDP, showing the EU’s efforts to assert its role
and identity on the international scene. The same chapter intends an
attentive analysis of the EU’s response to recent security challenges: the
popular revolt in Tunisia; Egypt’s political turbulences; crises in Libya;
the Syria civil war; Iran’s nuclear program; and the Ukraine crisis, as the
greatest test for the EU’s common foreign and security policy.
As regards the development-aid policy, besides providing a synthetic
chronology of this policy and an appraisal of the EU development
cooperation effectiveness, the allocated chapter shows how globalization
has brought opportunities but also threats that transcend frontiers; it
presents an aspect not fully considered in relevant literature – that of the
new global competitive context in which emergent donors like China,
India, and Brazil, challenge the traditional Western donors.
The chapter “EU sanctions in the post-Soviet space” analyzes
thoroughly the harder instruments that complement the toolbox of the EU
“soft power” polity, including a specific typology of restrictive and
coercive measures.
Keeping the post-Soviet region as a focus point, preferential trade
agreements - as a key element of the EU external trade policy - are
analyzed in the next chapter, using the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreement (DCFTA), with Georgia as a case study and
emphasizing not only its benefits but also its costs.
xii Foreword

The reconfiguration of external relations of the EU is also seen in our

book in the light of the following current events: the last waves of the EU
enlargement and potential enlargement in the near future; shifts in
transatlantic negotiations in the post-crisis period; and responses to the
uprising in Arab countries and to the Ukrainian conflict.
The EU responses to the new global context are also examined through
a detailed description of the non-standard monetary policy measures,
adopted by the ECB, in the context of the financial and sovereign debt
crisis, along with the associated international use of the Euro.
The penultimate chapter of the book investigates monetary policy
responses in a volatile financial global context, and in respect of the
massive capital inflows and outflows in emerging Europe over the period
2000-2013, paying a special attention to the exchange rate regimes
adopted in these countries.
Our approach is concluded by proposing a macroeconomic model in
which the EU constitutes a block “against” the rest of the world, but also
creates a two country model by itself, made up of Eurozone and non-
Eurozone members. Thus far, there are no macroeconomic models
describing such a situation.
This book was realized with the collaborative scholarly effort of
researchers from five European countries (Romania, Switzerland, Poland,
Spain and France), and is a publication included in the Ad Personam Jean
Monnet Chair Project (EACEA Decision n. 2012-2825/001-001),
coordinated by the book editor Ileana Tache.
Vicente Esteve acknowledges the financial support from the
Generalitat Valenciana (Project PROMETEOII/2014/053). Vicente Esteve
and Maria Prats acknowledge also the financial support from the MINECO
(Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad), through the projects
ECO2011-30260-CO3-01 (Vicente Esteve), and ECO2012-36685 (Maria
A. Prats). Finally, the above authors acknowledge the financial support
received from the government of the Región de Murcia, through the
project 15363/PHCS/10.
 CHAPTER ONE

CHALLENGES OF EU’S FOREIGN

AND SECURITY POLICY IN A RAPIDLY
CHANGING WORLD

ILEANA TACHE

Summary
This chapter examines a field of external EU policies which, unlike
other areas such as trade, enlargement, neighborhood policy, development
assistance, and humanitarian aid, is not yet a deeply integrated process.
Through an explorative policy analysis of the main stages of the
construction of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
and of the recent developments of European Security and the Defense
Policy (ESDP) as an integrant part of CFSP, the chapter aims at
identifying the shortcomings in reaching entire consensus among the
member states and the reasons for the limited global impact of this policy.
The EU’s priorities, instruments, partnerships and strategies - linked to
security and defense - are scrutinized, highlighting some of the key issues
raised in contemporary literature. The emerging security issues are also
analyzed with a perspective on their intractability and challenges for the
relevance of the pacifist principles promoted by the EU. The EU’s efforts
to adapt to the fluid, evolving security agenda of recent years, and the
mixed record in confronting the Arab Spring, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and
the Ukrainian crisis, will be attentively considered.

Introduction: The main stages of the construction

of a European foreign and security policy
The founding Treaty of Rome of the European Community does not
mention the idea of a common foreign and security policy, and makes no
2 Chapter One

reference to a military dimension. The beginnings of the European

integration took place under the Marshall Plan and US sponsorship, so that
consultations on foreign and security policy developed under NATO’s
larger framework. The Marshall Plan shaped the future of Europe, even if
the economic recovery was already under way; it contributed to impeding
the spread of communism in Western Europe, and the stabilizing of the
international order, to favor development of political democracies and free
market economies. NATO offered a solid structure for opposing the
Warsaw Pact, signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and East Germany.
Even the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community – the
greatest gesture toward French-German rapprochement - was launched in
1950 as a response to the US insistence, in order to assure a supranational
umbrella for resources used in the arms production.
At almost the same time, a plan for the European Defense Community
(EDC) was proposed by the French Prime Minister René Pleven,
following the American call for the rearmament of West Germany. The
EDC was to include West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux
countries, but it never came into effect, failing to obtain ratification in the
French Parliament. The Gaullists opposed the plan - considering the EDC
as a threat to France’s national sovereignty, and the Communists as well -
because of the tying of France to the capitalist US. Meanwhile, the death
of Joseph Stalin, and the end of Korean War, faded the concerns about a
potential conflict.
The foreign policy cooperation went on under President de Gaulle’s
challenges both to the US hegemony and to the supranational ambitions of
the EEC. The Fouchet Plan, proposed by de Gaulle in 1961, was
conceived by Christian Fouchet - France’s ambassador to Denmark - and
was intended to create an intergovernmental alternative to the European
Communities. This attempt to keep a balance of power in France’s favor
was never implemented, being received with a lack of enthusiasm from the
other Community states. In the context of the British application to joining
the EEC, and the Atlantic partnership called by President Kennedy, the
Fouchet plan was undoubtedly a challenge to the US leadership and was
an attempt to subvert NATO’s power.
In the Hague summit of 1969, the European leaders decided to look
more closely at foreign policy and in 1970 agreed to promote European
political cooperation (EPC) for coordinating foreign policy stances.
However, no laws were adopted on foreign policy; each country acting
independently, and the voting rule for most decisions being unanimity.
The EPC had a strictly intergovernmental character and was overseen by
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 3

foreign ministers within the Council of Ministers. It was to receive formal

recognition much later, in 1986, with the Single European Act.
After de Gaulle’s departure in 1969, foreign policy consultations
among EEC members (organized separately from NATO’s framework)
represented a concession to the French, who wanted a more autonomous
European foreign policy.
The creation of the European Council in 1974 helped coordination in
the field of foreign policies. But policy cooperation was marked by
divergent reactions of the Western European states, such as in the case of
the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, escalating into a new Franco-
American confrontation. Cooperation in the field of foreign and security
policy was very often spurred by external events, which revealed
shortcomings and inadequacies. The most suggestive examples are indeed
the Middle East problems; always a subject for transatlantic dispute.
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a Western Europe of “civilian power”.
According to Duchêne (1973) - one of the most famous scholars of
civilian power in Europe - the EEC should continue to remain as a civilian
group, long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces. This
idea corresponds to the general orientation of the early 1970’s, when the
significance of military power was diminishing at the same pace as
economics were growing. Twitchett (1976) also argued that the European
Community impact on the international arena had been via diplomatic
influence and trade, rather than via military power. This is the reason why
security and defense issues could not be put on the European agenda,
Western Europe emphasizing diplomatic, rather than coercive, instruments
during this period.
However, some external events renewed efforts to promote cooperation
in the field of foreign policy. The Iranian revolution of 1979 caused
ripples well beyond the Middle East as the new regime began alienating
once close Western allies. In the Khomeini era, the US foreign policy
toward Iran would shift from one of total commitment to one on the
defense, embedded in Iran’s rampant anti-Americanism (Pauwels, 2011).
Then, the Polish crisis of 1980-1981, associated with the emergence of the
Solidarity mass movement, created a drift of the US foreign policy and
caused serious European concerns. During the same period there was the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a watershed event of the Cold War,
marking the only time the Soviet Union had a military intervention outside
the Eastern bloc. The Soviet move determined a sharp US and Western
Europe criticism, accompanied by numerous measures to compel Moscow
to withdraw.
4 Chapter One

The foreign and security policy restated again its importance, with the
German unification and the anti-communist revolutions in Central and
Eastern Europe in 1989, and other international developments. The EU
enlargement became then one of the most significant and difficult
challenges facing Europe in the post-cold war interval. Not only did
enlargement threaten to disturb the internal order of the EU, but the newly
resulted external borders might create new divisions on the European
continent. This was to be followed by a radical transformation of the EU
strategic priorities. At almost the same period, in 1990-1991, Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait revealed quite different positions of the European
Community members. France and the UK largely contributed with troops
and warplanes; Germany kept its stance in rejecting “power politics”;
other states like Spain, Portugal and Belgium had small military
contributions; while Ireland stayed neutral. It was precisely on that
occasion that Belgium’s foreign minister, Mark Eyskens, famously stated
that the European Union is “an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a
military worm”1. Even though this depiction fails to acknowledge the
EU’s structural power, and the more subtle ways in which it exerts power
in the international realm (Bossuyt, 2007), it stressed once again - and
recognized the need - to formulate a common foreign and security policy.
Additionally, the European responses were at odds with one another
during the prolonged Yugoslavian crisis (1990-1998).
A key development in the EU efforts - to realize its own defense
capability and peace-making operations - is represented by the “Petersberg
Declaration”, adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European
Union in June 1992. On that occasion, the Western member states
expressed their readiness to make available to the EU, and NATO, military
units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces. The
Petersberg tasks were designed to avoid any confusion between the
defense roles of individual EU states, NATO, and the EU acting as a
single entity. They cover humanitarian and rescue operations,
peacekeeping operations, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking. This spectrum was to be expanded by the
European Security Strategy in 2003. The remit of the EU’s fledging rapid
reaction is based on the Petersberg tasks.
The Maastricht Treaty (signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into
force on 1 November 1993) finally established the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) as a replacement for the EPC. Unlike the EPC, the
CFSP brings for the first time an explicit political and military-defense

1
The New York Times, 25 January 1991.
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 5

component of the European project. The CFSP became one of the three
pillars of the EU, the other two being the European Community and
Justice and Home Affairs. Of course, this pillar was a shared competence
with the member states, but the mere re-affirmation of the broken initiative
of the EDC is much more significant than its inter-governmental character.
The main objectives of the CFSP, as set out by the Maastricht Treaty,
are presented in Box 1-1.
The two new instruments introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, in order
to implement the CFSP, were:

- common positions to establish systematic cooperation on a day-to-

day basis and,
- joint actions to allow member states to act together in concrete
ways based on a Council decision as to the specific scope of such
actions; the EU’s objectives in carrying them out; and (if
necessary) the duration, means, and procedures, for their
implementation.

Box 1-1: Maastricht Treaty’s objectives of the CFSP

x To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and

independence of the European Union;
x To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states
x To preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance
with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Act
(which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
a forum for all the nations of Europe as well as the United States and
Canada)
x To promote international cooperation
x To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The EU achievements of the CFSP in the early 1990s are obvious, as

emphasized by Ginsberg (1997) and Holland (1995), but given that the
CFSP represented an intergovernmental pillar, there was no way of
enforcing member state compliance with these provisions.
The European Commission’s Opinion (1996) “Reinforcing Political
Union and Preparing for Enlargement” recognized that, unlike other areas
such as trade policy, economic assistance, development aid and
humanitarian action - where there is already a coherent single policy
toward the outside world - the CFSP is still at an early stage in its
6 Chapter One

development. The objective of a clearer identity on the world scene was

formulated and meant to be achieved through:

- bringing together the various strands comprising foreign relations

into a single effective whole, with structures and procedures
designed to enhance consistency and continuity;
- improving the common foreign and security policy at all stages of
its operation;
- establishing a proper European identity with regard to security and
defense, as a constitutive part of the EU common foreign and
security policy.

The Maastricht Treaty’s provisions in the field of the CFSP failed

during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, with its terrible massacre of
Srebrenica in 1995. Since then, European leaders realized the necessity of
sometimes using military force while promoting a pacifist system of
international relations.
However, in the words of Dinan (2005), the lessons of the Yugoslav
debacle were not sufficient to weaken the ramparts of national sovereignty in
the foreign policy field, nor did member states interpret them uniformly.
Bradford (2000) even speaks about Europe’s failure to devise and implement
collective security measures during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and
concludes that the Western EU is not a realistic alternative to NATO in the
“post-post-Cold War era”. The same author states that the Dayton Agreement
on Bosnia-Herzegovina (considered a “dishonorable peace”) illustrated that
the Western European ability to formulate and implement a CFSP still was
far too meager in the absence of the American leadership.
As a consequence, the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 2 October 1997
and entered into force on 1 May 1999, identified four policy instruments
for improving the CFSP (see Box 1-2).

Box 1-2: Policy instruments of the Amsterdam Treaty for the CFSP

x Principles and guidelines (adopted by the European Council) to

provide general political direction;
x Common strategies (adopted by the European Council) to provide an
umbrella under which the Council could adopt joint actions and
common positions by qualified majority voting (except those with
military and defense implications). Common strategies would set out
“the objectives, duration, and the means to be made available by the
Union and the member states” in areas of mutual interest;
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 7

x Joint actions (adopted by the Council) were refined to address specific

situations requiring “operational action”, including a revised list of
their possible contents. The Council could request that the Commission
submit proposals to ensure the proper implementation of joint actions.
x Common positions (adopted by the Council) were also refined to
“define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a
geographical or thematic nature”

A distinctive feature of the Amsterdam Treaty was the introduction of

the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy, which was occupied by Javier Solana for ten years - given his
experience as secretary-general of NATO and Spain foreign minister.
The Treaty of Nice signed in 2001 also significantly enhanced the
importance of CFSP as a pillar of support for future European Union
development.
The European Security Strategy (ESS), entitled “A Secure Europe in a
Better World” - adopted by the European Council of 12-13 December
2003 - provides the conceptual framework for the CFSP. The split
between EU countries over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003
highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal
cohesion at the Community level. The five key threats identified by the
ESS are: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional
conflicts, state failure and organized crime. The ESS, which is the first
ever declaration by EU member states of their strategic goals, also calls for
preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts or crises, a priority being
the security in the EU’s neighborhood – the Balkans, Southern Caucasus
and the Mediterranean.
When, in early 1999, the Serbian president Slobodan Miloševiü placed
his forces in Kosovo, EU leaders realized the necessity to stop another
humanitarian disaster. In June 1999, the European Council - held in
Cologne, Germany - decided to give the EU the means and capabilities to
assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security
and defense. So the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was
born, as a “sui generis” security concept, distinguishing itself by two
specific characteristics: a) a comprehensive understanding of security
policy in reference to its available tools, and b) a comparatively narrowly
defined political mandate focusing on international crisis and conflict
management.
The UK and France were the leaders of the ESDP implementation;
being the only countries prepared to send military forces beyond Europe
for more than United Nations’ peace keeping interventions.
8 Chapter One

The ESDP is actually an integral part of the CFSP, consisting mainly

of a 60,000 member rapid Reaction Force that could be deployed at 60
days’ notice and sustained for at least one year. This force was conceived
to complement, rather than compete, with NATO and could only act when
NATO had decided not to be involved in a crisis.
The EU enlargement with the Central and Eastern post-communist
countries brought greater diversity and limited capabilities on the agenda
of the CFSP. Undoubtedly, the enlargement contributed to a more stable
situation on the European continent and was a significant achievement in
the field of the CFSP (as thoroughly described by Keukeleire and
MacNaughten, 2008), but the foreign policy priorities of the CEEC’s were
still determined by their immediate neighborhood; these countries being
less interested in global affairs.
Two examples illustrate quite different positions of some CEEC’s. In
the Iraq crisis of 20032, which undermined the credibility of the EU as an
international actor, the EU showed three points of view: 1) supporters of
the US (the UK, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the CEEC’s);
2) opponents of the US intervention (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
and Greece); and 3) countries with a neutral position (Finland, Ireland,
Portugal and Sweden). The CEEC’s attitude in this regard – with the
support of a US led intervention - contributed to strengthening the tension
between European integration and Atlantic solidarity (Maracz, 2008).
Another example is the Kosovo conflict, when Romania3 and Slovakia did
not agree with Kosovo’s independence4; probably to avoid a precedent for
separatist tendencies among their Hungarian minorities.
For the whole Union, the above examples even made some authors like
Chari and Cavatorta (2003) to wonder if the Iraq war was killing the
dreams of a united EU, while Gordon and Shapiro (2004) - after a detailed
dissection of the rift between the US and Europe - demonstrated that a new
transatlantic partnership is both necessary and possible for the common
security. In recognizing Kosovo’s independence some weaknesses of the

2
Iraq war was provoked by the concern at the ambitions of Saddam Hussein and at
the possibility that Iraq was concealing aspects of its weapons mass destruction
program from UN inspection teams.
3
In Romania’s case, a mention has to be made: in April 2013, following a
resolution of the EP which urged all EU members that had not recognized Kosovo
to do so, Romania’s Prime Minister Victor Ponta stated that his country must
follow the EU’s lead.
4
Kosovo’s independence was not recognized by Cyprus, Greece and Spain as well,
in the latter case due to concerns about perceived implications regarding the own
issues with independence movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia.
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 9

EU were revealed; one of the greatest strengths of the EU, that should not
be forgotten, is its historical role in exorcising the demons of nationalism
in Europe.
Trying to emphasize the implications of enlargement for the wider
European periphery, the European Commission advanced proposals for a
broader European neighborhood policy, which materialized in a
framework of cooperation for the states around the EU’s Eastern borders.
As expressed by Giegerich and Wallace (2010), this was in effect a
common foreign policy, but defined and managed through civilian
instruments.
The Treaty of Lisbon had important implications for the CFSP/ESPD.
A key innovation was the replacement of the “Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs” by a new “High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy”, who will be double-hatted as a Vice-President of the European
Commission, and will be supported by a European External Action
Service. In the institutional setting, a further novelty is created by the new
permanent President of the Council who will chair the European Council
and ensure the external representation of the Union in issues concerning its
common and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Another notable change is the introduction of a mutual assistance
article which reads like a mutual defense clause, in that it states “if a
Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by
all the means in their power”. There is also a mutual solidarity clause
introduced, following the terrorist attack in Madrid.
The above historical survey can be completed with the synthetic
chronology of the EU Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy
supplied by Box 1-3.

Box 1-3: Chronology of a Common EU Foreign, Security and Defense

Policy

March 1948: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK

sign the Brussels Treaty of mutual defense.
April 1949: The US, Canada and ten West European countries sign the
North Atlantic Treaty.
May 1952: The European Defense Community Treaty is agreed by the six
ECSC member states. It would have created a common European army,
and permitted West Germany’s rearmament. In August 1954, the French
National Assembly rejects the Treaty.
10 Chapter One

October 1954: The Western European Union (WEU) is created on the

basis of the Brussels Treaty, and expands to include Italy and West
Germany. West Germany joins NATO.
October 1981: Measures approved in the London Report include the crisis
consultation mechanism: any three foreign ministers can convene an
emergency EPC meeting within 48 hours. In meetings with third country
representatives, the presidency can be accompanied by the preceding and
succeeding presidencies (the troika).
October 1984: The WEU is reactivated, as WEU foreign and defense
ministers agree to meet regularly.
February 1986: The Single European Act (SEA) is signed, and contains
Title III on the EPC. The EPC can discuss the “political and economic
aspects of security”.
February 1992: The Maastricht Treaty is signed, replacing the EPC with
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Council of foreign ministers
will decide Common Positions and Joint Actions, and the QMV can be
used to implement the latter.
June 1992: The Petersberg Declaration states that the WEU will engage in
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management
tasks, including peacemaking (“Petersberg Tasks”).
January 1994: The NATO summit agrees that the NATO assets can be
used by the WEU and endorses the concept of “Combined Joint Task
Forces”.
October 1997: The Amsterdam Treaty is signed, and contains several
reforms of the CFSP pillar. QMV is to be used to implement the European
Council Strategies, and member states can abstain from decisions. A high
Representative for the CFSP is created.
December 1998: Franco-British declaration on EU military capability at
St. Malo.
June 1999: The Cologne European Council agrees that the EU should be
able to undertake the Petersberg Tasks, replacing the WEU.
December 1999: The Helsinki European Council sets the headline goal
for the common European security and defense policy.
July 2001: European Union Satellite Centre is established, in order to
support early warning and crisis monitoring functions of the CFSP and the
CSDP. The Centre becomes operational on 1 January 2002.
March 2002 – June 2003: Convention on the Future of Europe drafts a
constitutional Treaty creating a European foreign minister; a European
external action service (EEAS); a European armaments, research and
military capabilities agency.
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 11

November 2003: EU foreign ministers reach agreement on permanent

structured cooperation in defense (battle groups); a mutual assistance
clause; creation of an EU civil and military planning cell within the EU
military staff.
June 2004: The provisions agreed since 2002 are incorporated in the draft
constitutional Treaty, and many are implemented without Treaty
ratification (excepting the foreign minister and the EEAS).
June 2007: The European Council agrees a negotiating mandate for a
new reform Treaty, which retains the constitutional Treaty’s provisions on
foreign relations (the post of foreign minister being renamed High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
December 2009: The Lisbon Treaty enters into force.
March 2012: For the first time, the Foreign Affairs Council activates the
EU Operations Centre to coordinate the on-going CSDP missions in the
Horn of Africa.

Current developments of the ESDP

The expansion of the EU policies, in the security and defense aspects,
have so far had limited impact on global security, but the EU’s potential to
respond to crises anywhere in the world shows an increasing tendency.
The evolution of the ESDP was spurred on by the Kosovo conflict in
1999, which starkly demonstrated that European governments still lacked
the military wherewithal to provide security in their own region (Payne,
2003).
The military operations of 2003, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (CONCORDIA Mission), marked the effective beginning of
the ESDP. The core aim of CONCORDIA was, at the explicit request of
FYROM government, to contribute to a stable and secure environment.
Under the framework of the ESDP, the EU supported the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC)5 in its security sector reform and thus
contributed to the promotion of peace and stability in Africa. One of the
main drivers of conflict in the DRC was its plethora of valuable minerals
and resources; the Congolese government being unable to control the
entirety of its territory. The EU’s military operations in the Congo
(developed in 2003 and 2006) contributed indeed to putting an end to the
escalation of conflict, but some cleavages appeared between France and

5
The underlying acts of this mission were Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of
2 May 2005 (EUSEC DR Congo) and Council Joint Action CFSP of 12 June 2007
(EUPOL DR Congo).
12 Chapter One

Germany. While France was willing to deploy its military forces in 2003,
for Germany it was difficult to adopt this unequivocal position in 2006, as
it was always constrained by its past and was responsive to a public
extremely critical about military actions. The German-led operation in the
Congo was successfully conducted, but it provoked a clash and sharp
exchanges between Javier Solana and the German Minister of Defense
Franz Josef Jung, so that the Franco-German engine looked ill-suited to
carry on with the EDSP. Brummer (2006) identifies a similar gap between
France and the UK: France emphasizes a strategic approach whereas the
UK pursues a more tactical/pragmatic approach, which stresses best value
for money - not to mention the differences between the two countries
concerning the role of the US and NATO. All these different views
continued to throw-up barriers for the satisfactory function of the ESDP.
Nevertheless, the intervention in 2003, in the Congo (ARTEMIS), was
the EU’s first ESDP operation to be deployed outside Europe and was
carried out without NATO assistance. As described by Giegerich and
Wallace (2004), the EU participation in the military operations of the
Congo and Macedonia showed that the EU was “not such a soft power”.
In the Lebanon war of 2006, between Israel and Hezbollah, the EU
took the decision to decline a military operation; on this occasion it was a
commonly agreed position. There were two determining factors leading to
this stance. The first one was the unwillingness of France, the UK, or
Germany to act as a lead nation, and the second consisted of the potential
for the mission to escalate into open hostility. While in the Congo the EU
peacekeepers were kept away from the most violent areas, however the
Lebanon mission called for the deployment of the EU peacekeepers to the
most violent areas, but no EU country had the political capital to support
such a high-risk military operation. Even though the EU missed an
opportunity to enhance its credibility as a security provider, the EU
governments created this time an interesting and unprecedented
mechanism for control (Gowan, 2007). A special strategic cell was created
at the UN headquarters to direct the operation. This cell ultimately reports
to the US Secretary-General, but nineteen of the twenty seven officers in
the cell were initially seconded from member states of the EU, allowing
thus significant control to the respective European governments.
The evolution of the ESDP was indeed accompanied by cooperation
with the UN. Gowan (2009) illustrates a close relationship with some
examples. Of the 23 ESDP missions launched between 2003 and 2009, 15
have been deployed in countries where the UN has a peace-keeping or
peace-building mission. All EU missions in Africa have involved direct or
indirect cooperation with the UN - ranging from military support (as in the
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 13

Democratic Republic of the Congo) to parallel efforts to sustain the

African Union (AU) in Darfur. The EU naval operation off the coast of
Somalia (Atalanta) has taken place in parallel with the UN support to the
AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu, and has protected the UN aid shipments.
The EU-UN cooperation has also taken on unexpectedly complex forms in
Kosovo and Georgia.
A novel aspect of the ESDP and the EU’s role, in conflict resolution,
was brought about by the Russia-Georgian war of August 2008. With the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and the associated extension
of the EU’s borders to the Black Sea, stability in Georgia became
extremely important for the Union’s interests. Georgia’s disputed
territoriality mirrored major risks for European security.
The EU failed to impede the outbreak of the conflict, but its role in
conflict resolution in Georgia has been paradoxically enhanced in the
aftermath of this event. As Bardakçi (2010) observes, the pullout of the
OSCE monitors from South Ossetia on December 31, 2008 and the UN
Observation Mission (UNOMIG) from Abkhazia on July 15, 2009 - due to
the veto exercised by Russia on the grounds of the refusal of these
organizations to recognize the breakaway regions - resulted in the EU
becoming the only international body, with observers, in Georgia. This
was indeed a positive development in the EU’s role in conflict resolution.
However, an increasingly confident Russia and the lack of a coherent
strategy for the Eastern Neighborhood was a barrier on the way to
promoting solid EU visibility in the region. In general lines, the Georgian
case demonstrates, once again, that the ESDP development was realized
through various exogenous shocks.
The ESDP was replaced by the CSDP (Common Security and Defense
Policy) - a name change introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon - which
represents a cornerstone in the development of this policy field, bringing
both continuity and innovation. Dedicating a new section in the founding
Treaties to this policy, the Treaty of Lisbon emphasizes the specific nature
of the CSDP, which still forms an integral part of the CFSP. Under the
CSDP framework, the following new tasks were added to those that
already existed6:

ƒ joint disarmament operations

ƒ military advice and assistance tasks
ƒ tasks in post-conflict stabilization.

6
Humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management.
14 Chapter One

In the CSDP implementation, the Treaty of Lisbon acknowledges the

potential intervention of multinational forces, which are the result of the
military alliance between certain EU member states and their decision to
combine capacities, equipment, and personal strength. The main
“Euroforces” are presented in Box 1-4.

Box 1-4: The main “Euroforces” acknowledged by the Treaty of

Lisbon

x Eurofor, regrouping land forces between Spain, France, Italy and

Portugal
x Eurocorps, regrouping land forces between Germany, Belgium, Spain,
France and Luxembourg
x Euromarfor, regrouping maritime forces between Spain, France, Italy
and Portugal
x The European Air Group, regrouping air forces between Germany,
Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.

The Treaty of Lisbon extends the Petersberg tasks and introduces the
new concept of a collective defense obligation. The establishment of a
Permanent Structured Cooperation, and of the European Defense Agency,
strengthens the EU’s capacity as a military actor. In addition, the so-called
“group of the willing clause” removes the possibility of a veto because,
according to this clause, if some member states intend to participate in a
mission they may be tasked by the Council with the protection of the
Union’s values and interests.
Despite all these innovations, which aim to gradually establish a
common European defense, the CSDP remains a fundamentally
intergovernmental issue, and the financial means for external missions are
provided by the EU member states. Defense still remains a national, rather
than a European, undertaking. The relative ineffectiveness of the CSDP
lingers in the reluctance of the EU member states to give up control over
national defense issues. The voting system in the CSDP is unanimity,
meaning that the agreement of all the states is necessary for the launching
of a mission. The EU military missions have been limited in scope, and the
failure of the EU to compensate for the increasing national incapacity
(coupled with the austerity of recent crisis context) constitutes a “defense
deficit” for the European security interests.
Solutions exist for all these weaknesses, as suggested by Menon
(2013). In his opinion, what will be required is a willingness to submit
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 15

national defense policies to European authority more increasingly than

ever before. Depriving member states of the veto, right in the military
interventions area, would accelerate defense decision-making. European
level procurement would ensure interoperability and foster economies of
the scale and creation of a common European Defense Equipment Market.
So the most efficient way to solve the “defense deficit” would be the
communitarisation of armaments, with national agencies replaced by
supranational institutions.
A window of opportunity can also be brought forward by the
institutional decisions made in 2014; with the European Parliament
elections; the establishment of a new European Commission; and a new
EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The EU response to some recent security challenges

This section deals with the latest security issues - analyzed from a
policy perspective - and discusses feasible interventions. Each case
requires, not only reexamining current EU strategy, but also identifying
alternative strategies for assuring European security.

Popular revolt in Tunisia

Tunisia displayed an illusionary stability until the 2010 events. The
popular revolt goal was in ending the authoritarian rule and in the
overthrowing of President Ben Ali, which was achieved on 14 January
2011. Events in Tunisia triggered all the Arab unrest across North Africa
and the Middle East.
The viability of the present Tunisian government is questioned by the
opposition because reform processes are slow, and the general feeling of
uncertainty remains high. As regards security, there is little trust in the
Police Force, because it has a bad reputation linked to its previous loyalty
to President Ben Ali. Security issues have in some circumstances become
a matter for religious communities; in that religious activists are being
called on to maintain security (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013).
While the large and spontaneous mobilization of Tunisians has
achieved success in ending Ben Ali reign, it remains unclear whether the
near future will bring genuine political reforms essential for stability, or
whether continuing instability will affect other countries in the region.
A radical rethinking of EU policies towards the region is called for; the
bottom line of which should be to halt lenient EU policies towards
countries that are not implementing serious political reform, despite their
16 Chapter One

proven willingness to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, illegal

migration and broader geostrategic objectives (Ayadi et al., 2011).
The EU moved swiftly to support the transition in Tunisia. Political
support is illustrated through regular visits, Council Conclusions, and High
Representative Declarations. An EU-Tunisia Task Force meeting was held
in September 2011 and produced an impressive list of assistance projects.
The “EU’s response to the Arab Spring: The State-of-Play after Two
Years”7 reaffirms that EU-Tunisia relations are based on three interrelated
“M’s”: money, market and mobility. Mobility is especially problematic
due to its interrelatedness with justice, security and defense issues. With
the increasing violence in many other North African countries, the EU is
not expected to take quick steps towards easing the entry to the EU of
Tunisian residents and those in transit. Discussions with a view to a
“Partnership for Mobility” on migration and security are ongoing.

Egypt’s political turbulences

Inspired by the popular revolt in Tunisia, massive protests erupted in
Egypt in early 2011. The social, economic and political situation in Egypt
produced a significant impact on neighboring countries. The revolution in
Egypt had indeed a broad spillover in the Arab countries. In terms of
regional security, Egypt remains a pivotal state in the Middle East and
North Africa, enjoying good relations with Israel and close collaboration
with the United States.
The euphoria which emerged from the Arab spring, and the collapse of
the Hosni Mubarak regime on 11 February 2011, has been replaced with a
period of political and social polarization; increasing violence and
economic stagnation.
The stability in Egypt is part of the comprehensive EU security
strategy in its immediate neighborhood. The Southern Mediterranean
region is an area that the EU sees as essential for its security and
prosperity. In the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011, the EU re-launched its
ENP to express its solidarity with those calling for democracy. An EU-
Egypt Task Force was launched in November 20128.
This crisis revealed some challenges confronted by the EU. In Egypt’s
highly debated situation it was the US that played a central role, while
there was a lack of independent European policy. The fall of Mohammed

7
See www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_13134_en.htm
8
This is similar with the EU-Tunisia Task Force, which is in place to coordinate
European and international support intended to help Tunisia as it makes the
transition to democracy and restarts its economy.
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 17

Morsi in July 2013 was a development strongly supported by the US, and
President Barack Obama. Referring to Egypt’s unsustainable crackdown,
Dworkin and Michou (2014) emphasize a long-term vision for European
policy. In this sense, the temptation for the EU to accept Egyptian
authorities’ actions at face value should be avoided, because they are not
likely to lead to stable politics or an improvement in security. In the Egypt
situation, the EU also faces competition from other outside powers. While
the European countries are eager to continue cooperation with Egypt on
security and other areas, the Gulf States, and Russia, stand ready to
provide alternative sources of financial and diplomatic support, as well as
security cooperation and the export of weapons. Another problem is that
the political groups that best represent the vision that Europe would like to
advance are too weak to play a major role in the near future.

The crisis in Libya

Libya’s armed conflict of 2011, between forces loyal to colonel Muammar
Gaddafi and those seeking to oust his government, offered a mixed picture
in which European countries (France and the UK) were at the head of
military actions; but Europe was not - due to a lack of member states will,
fear, and restrictions from the UNSC Resolution 19739. During the vote of
this Resolution, the noticeable German abstention (attributable either to
German reluctance to use force, or to the lack of political will from
northern member states to invest in the Mediterranean), emphasized a
division within the EU over a security issue.
The EU did not distinguish itself among the intervention leaders,
although Libya is one of the close neighbors, and Mediterranean and Arab
countries represent an important region for Europe’s stability. Libya’s
case, where only French and British leadership assumed action, demonstrates
once again that the EU is leaning less towards a body of coherent security
response and more towards a return to bilateral action.
The EU took indeed several measures to prevent an escalation in the
crisis, such as humanitarian effort and the opening of an EU office in
Benghazi, which brought more efficiency to EU actions and represented a
de facto recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC).
However, Libya’s crisis provides three key strategic lessons for Europe
(Biscop, 2011): 1. The EU’s challenge to carry out its own vital interests,

9
This Resolution formed the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan
civil war, demanding “an immediate ceasefire” and authorizing the international
community to establish a no-fly zone and to use all necessary means to protect
civilians.
18 Chapter One

because nobody else will protect them; 2. the necessity of thinking and
acting strategically, meaning to prioritize the regions where EU interests
are essential and act accordingly; and 3. achieving the right capabilities,
because - in the military realm - European capabilities remain deficient.
The Libyan conflict proved indeed that the EU might be required to
take military action if no other means can work, but of course this does not
mean a militarization of the relationship with the Arab Mediterranean
countries. It can be part of a comprehensive approach to the Mediterranean,
including: assistance; economic and technical cooperation; fair trade; and
trade access opportunities. All these measures can help North African
states to rebuild their economies, put them on a sustainable path, and
create more security in the region.

Civil war in Syria

One of the most pressing challenges in the EU immediate neighborhood
is Syrian civil war. In this particular country, over the past three years,
more than 100,000 Syrians have lost their lives in the escalating conflict
between forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, and those opposed to
his rule. The bloody internal fighting has destroyed whole neighborhoods
and has forced more than nine million people to abandon their homes.
What began as another event of the Arab Spring uprising against an
autocratic ruler, has mushroomed into a brutal proxy war that has drawn in
regional and world powers.
Since violence and repression broke out in Syria in March 2011, the
EU has not only called repeatedly for an end to attacks, but has also
suspended other agreements intended to forge a closer relationship with
Damascus. Following the EU sanctions in November 2011, the EIB
stopped all disbursements for loans and technical assistance contracts with
the Syrian state.
The regional crisis in Syria proved again, that in comparison with other
fields of European politics, the EU’s defense and security policy is highly
susceptible to differences among the member states. The EU opposed
sending arms to Syria, but the heads of the European states could not reach
an agreement on the revocation of the arms ban against the opposition.
France and the UK announced that they would consider a unilateral
abrogation of the agreement by sending arms to the Syrian rebels. On the
other hand, an unexpected consequence for Europe’s foreign policy was
highlighted. Major European states’ (like France and Germany) opposition
to the US-led Iraq war, of 2003, was replaced by the most explicit
European support to the US policy towards Damascus. François Hollande
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 19

and Angela Merkel’s positions were quite different from those of their
predecessors Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Shröder in 2003.
However, taking into account the rejection by the UK’s Parliament of a
military intervention - and the uncertain backing of the Assemblée
Nationale for France’s President and Germany’s cautious approach and
insistence for UN action - the Syrian civil war reflected the Europeans’
overwhelming preference for the EU to act as a world power but without
the military force that this entails.
In all uprisings that swept North Africa and the Middle East, which
radically changed the international and regional landscape,10 the citizen-
led spirit of reform and unity is now shadowed by polarization and
tensions between secular liberals and Islamists; different Islamic groups
and government and civil society. As Youngs (2014) notices, what
Western observers initially saw as a process in which reformist civil
society pitted itself against authoritarian regimes, today seems to be
primarily about managing myriad levels of polarization within societies. In
this context, the EU has increased the emphasis on consensus building in
its diplomatic efforts, and develops funding initiatives in the Middle East.
It also tries to balance conflict mediation and reform promotion in these
countries.

Iran nuclear program

Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950’s, when the Shah
began receiving assistance through the US Atoms for Peace program. Iran
signed the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-
nuclear weapon state in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, but the Shah’s nuclear
weapons ambitions did not cease. The expansion of the nuclear program
was stopped by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war, but
the 1990’s witnessed Iran beginning to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel
cycle capability.
In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran - an
opposition group established in Paris - revealed the existence of
undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, which provoked a diplomatic impasse
with the international community, and sanctions, which were aimed at
Iran’s nuclear-related investments.
The EU efforts to solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program began
under particular circumstances determined by the US-led invasion of Iraq

10
Prior to 2010, for the EU, the situation in its southern neighborhood represented
stability without democracy and the EU at no stage did call for regime change.
20 Chapter One

in 2003, which divided EU member states and damaged transatlantic

relations. In these conditions, the stakes for international security were
high. A nuclear armed Iran could have major consequences for regional
and global security.
On 14 June 2008, Javier Solana - the EU’s High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy - met in Tehran, with the Iranian
Foreign Minister, in order to freeze Iran’s enrichment of uranium efforts,
but Ayatollah Khamenei continued the path of nuclear development.
The EU recognizes Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, but these rights are conditional on compliance with the
obligation of not building nuclear weapons. Despite the EU’s best efforts,
Iran did not respect the requirements of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and there was no guarantee that the nuclear program is
dedicated to peaceful purposes.
The unresolved stalemate over Iranian nuclear ambitions is indicative
of the limitations of European diplomacy. Nonetheless, the participation in
the Geneva Interim Agreement11 (November 2013) constitutes a major
accomplishment of the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton. She
served as chair and spokesperson of the P5+1 group12 to implement a
strategy designed in Washington. Her ability in fulfilling this task
contributed to the interim agreement success.
With a remarkable constancy of engagement, the EU tries at present to
find a diplomatic solution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities. It
focuses on maximizing tactical advantages in direct negotiations with Iran.
As Meier (2013) shows, the EU should try to capitalize on new
opportunities to discover ways out of the stalemate over Iran’s nuclear
ambitions by defining what a final deadlock could look like and outlining
steps toward such an agreement. While the conflict remains unsolved thus
far, the coherence of European diplomatic efforts could have promising
chances of success.

11
Geneva Interim Agreement, officially titled the Joint Plan of Action, was signed
on 24 November 2013 and consists of a short-term freeze of portions of Iran’s
nuclear program in exchange of decreased economic sanctions on Iran, as the
countries work towards a long-term agreement.
12
P5+1 group is made up of the six world powers which in 2006 joined the
diplomatic efforts with Iran regarding to its nuclear program. The term refers to the
P5 or five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely United States,
Russia, China, United Kingdom and France, plus Germany
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 21

The Ukraine crisis as the greatest test for the EU’s

common foreign and security policy
A severe threat to European security is addressed by Ukraine facing,
undoubtedly, the most prolonged crisis since its post-Soviet independence.
The crisis unfolded as a result of the government dropping plans to sign
the EU Association Agreement, under pressure from Russia. The pro-
Russian president Yanukovich’s motivations were regarding concerns
about damage to Ukrainian industry because of harsh European competition.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine struggled to
solve its internal divisions; to implement economic reforms; and to fight
the increasing control of oligarchs over the economy. The Orange
Revolution of 2004 masked the divide between the European-oriented,
western, and central Ukraine and the Russian-oriented, southern and
eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine was included in the EU Eastern Partnership - established in
2009 - which was negatively perceived by Russia, taking into account its
proposed Eurasian Economic Union; a customs union that came into being
on 2nd January 2015 and whose likely members were Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Belarus and Armenia. Ukraine pulled out from this project and continued
unabated in its struggle against Russia. The EU’s project to expand
eastward to Ukraine through the association agreement is regarded as a
security threat by Russia, and as a possible stepping stone to NATO’s
membership. Actually, Russia has come to view the Eastern Partnership as
a zero-sum game and an infringement on its perceived regional sphere of
influence (Nichol, 2014).
In February 2014 the Crimean Peninsula overwhelmingly opted, in a
referendum, for union with Russia. The EU’s position in this regard is that
the referendum violates both Ukraine’s constitution and international
principles, and condemned Russia for its military intervention. As a
response to the developments in Crimea, the EU announced $15 billion of
financial aid over the next years, conditioned on a Ukraine agreement with
the IMF and an adoption of reforms, such as the ending of gas subsidies.
Along with the US, Japan and Canada, the EU imposed sanctions (travel
bans and the freezing of assets) on Russian and Ukrainian officials linked
to the escalation of tensions.
For the common EU foreign and security policy, Russia’s annexation
of Crimea has triggered a major reappraisal of the EU-Russia relationship.
While, in recent years, the EU has developed a strategic partnership with
Russia, the recent events made the European policy makers confront the
prospect of Russia as a potential adversary rather than as a partner. The
22 Chapter One

Europeans were convinced that they had entered a new “postmodern” era
where soft power replaced hard power. Now this assumption needs to be
questioned, because Russia’s attitude shows that the old-style power
politics are back. The EU conveniently delegated questions of hard power
and strategy to the US, but at present the Europeans must take a more
active role in transatlantic security and shoulder more of the burden of
their own security (Speck, 2014). The EU policy makers must rethink the
bloc’s allure as a soft power.
The Ukrainian crisis starkly reminded us all of the fragile status of
stability and peace on the European continent. The troubling relations
between the EU and Russia may affect all cooperation channels, calling
also for a reconfiguration of the European Neighborhood Policy. After
some hesitation, Europeans have finally put forward a common front and
have adopted credible sanctions towards Russia.
The recent pressures of the Ukrainian crisis, and turmoil in the Middle
East and North Africa, have placed the foreign and security policy at the
top of the EU’s agenda. The evolutions described above show that, at
present, the EU is unequipped to address all challenges and to develop an
effective external action. It seems that neither the European Neighborhood
Policy, nor the EU’s instruments of diplomatic, civilian and military crisis
management, is sufficient to allow the union to play a genuine and
sustainable stabilizing role in its surrounding regions (Lehne, 2014).
The developments in North Africa and the Middle East raise a major
challenge for the EU foreign policy, pressing the members to re-analyze
the overall concept of the future role of the EU in this region as a
constructive partner, and to decide whether it is able to provide assistance
in the creation of a stable democratic system and in the laying down of the
foundations of civil society and free media. An enhanced economic
cooperation will also be one of the main generators of stability in the
region.
In the security field, there are three key areas of the new EU attitude
towards the Southern neighbors: energy security, migration issues, and
countering international terrorism. As regards the energy security, the
relations were, in general, developed bilaterally between member states
and the Arab countries. A common approach aimed at the establishment of
an Energy Union in the Mediterranean region becomes necessary. Then,
migration issues, closely related to development policies, should be
included in a viable common strategy for combating illegal migration. The
growing cross-Mediterranean migration to the EU has, unfortunately,
scarcely been tackled in policy terms; the EU still lacking a clear approach
to migration across its southern flank. The joint fight against terrorism is
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 23

not effective and has limited results because of bilateral action plans. To
step up the efforts in combating terrorism, the EU must strengthen the
monitoring of counter terrorism policies, and must better tackle the root
causes of terrorism and improve dialogue with partners.

Conclusions
The historical survey of the construction of an EU common foreign
and security policy shows that, even if the European Union is an
increasingly important global actor - in the realm of security and peace - it
still fails to exert its influence. It cannot speak with a single voice on
international crises, and the difficulty to agree on joint interventions in
conflict zones is evident.
First of all, there are differences in member states approaches
depending on diverse defense priorities and national political cultures,
which are sometimes distinct from the EU stance as a global player.
Member states hesitate to give up issues of the mobilization of national
resources for defense; the inter-governmentalism remaining the
fundamental policy mode in this field. Then, the dependence on the USA
for hard security and leadership in managing international security threats
is obvious.
One of the reasons why the output did not measure up to the input of
activity - in the field of foreign and security policy - is the lack of
obligation for EU members to implement agreements made. All too often,
member governments have signed up to policies in Brussels that they have
neither reported back to their parliaments nor implemented (Giegerich and
Wallace, 2010). Even the creation of a High Representative did not alter
the situation in any meaningful way as long as the ultimate authority
rested with the member states; all of them having the veto right in making
decisions related to military forces.
The EU has indeed created institutional structures for developing a
common foreign and security policy and, gradually, the EU member states
have coordinated their foreign policies to a remarkable degree on many
aspects. These efforts have allowed the EU to assert its role on the
international scene and to add an important new layer to its identity. As
the institutions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon mature, the EU will
concentrate on developing and ‘fleshing out’ the substance of the common
foreign and security policy, and of the common security and defense
policy; confronting the great challenges that lie ahead in the new global
context.
24 Chapter One

However, the recent pressures of the Ukrainian crisis and the

diminished strategic partner Russia, and also the turmoil in the Middle
East and North Africa, require a deep reconsideration of the EU’s soft
power attitude (betraying too idealist points of view); a radical shift to a
more active role in the global arena; and a reassessment of the EU
strategic situation and security toolbox. The above events also highlight
that protecting European security often requires helping others countries
improve theirs.
The latest evolutions in the Middle East and North Africa call for a
paradigm shift: from the EU endlessly reiterating the responsibility it has
to help MENA reforms, to a more-headed look at how Europe needs to
reposition itself geo-strategically in light of changes in the region
(Youngs, 2011).
At the same time - by tackling the security threats represented by the
chaos of the ever-smoldering Middle East region - the EU cannot neglect
the very root causes that led to the destabilization in the first place
(authoritarian governance and lack of economic opportunities) and should
act accordingly, providing assistance and enhanced economic cooperation.
European armed forces are at present in a malaise, due to the reserved
approach to using military force and the constraints of the economic and
financial crisis. As Rogers (2013) points out, these failings call for a
conceptual reappraisal of the utility of European military power and a
better understanding of both the active and passive uses of armed force. Of
course, that is not an easy task for the EU; born as a project that replaced
war with peace on the European continent and even won the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2012. Military force becomes an option for the EU, of course
never desirable, but useful eventually and legitimized when respect of the
law should be imposed.
In an increasingly unstable neighborhood and at a time of growing
geopolitical stress across the world, the EU and its member states should
take into account the lessons offered by the past divergent positions and be
more engaged in a collective action; having a hard look at where they can
make a difference together - thus recognizing the interconnected nature of
all these global challenges. It seems that, at present, no member state can
insulate itself from the security woes of others.
In the tense and severe current international context, the simple
cooperation in military affairs is not sufficient. The EU has to consider, or
pursue, military integration with real moves to form a viable European
defense community, and become a single military actor capable of
asserting itself as a solid pole on the world arena.
 Challenges of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in a Changing World 25

Great expectations are now directed to the new European Parliament

and European Commission: taking office at a watershed moment for the
EU, with questions that span the whole spectrum of international politics,
the new leaders - especially the EU High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy - could be a pivot to Europe foreign
and security issues.
 CHAPTER TWO

EU DEVELOPMENT-AID POLICY AND THE RISE

OF COMPETITIVE EMERGING DONORS

ILEANA TACHE

“As a continent that went from devastation to become one of the world’s
strongest economies, with the most progressive social systems, being the
world’s largest aid donor, we have a special responsibility to millions of
people in need”.
—José Manuel Barroso, Address at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, 2012.

Summary
Development is at the heart of the EU’s external action, along with
foreign, security and trade policies. The EU and its member states are the
biggest donors of official development assistance (ODA). Together, in
2013, they provided aid to the tune of €56.5 billion, which amounted to
52% of the total global ODA donated during the year.1 But the EU is the
world largest donor not only by the mere amount of its commitments, but
also by its comprehensive development policy and its position of
international agenda setter.
The primary objective of the EU development policy is the eradication
of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the
achievement of the eight Millennium Development Goals (1. Eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger; 2. Achieve universal primary education; 3.
Promote gender equality and empower women; 4. Reduce child mortality;
5. Improve maternal health; 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other
diseases; 7. Ensure environmental sustainability and 8. Global partnership
for development). Even though there is an on-going debate on the
relevance and validity of these goals (see Sumner and Melamed, 2010),

1
According to European Commission (2014).
 EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Emerging Donors 27

they have provided recently the guidance for the prioritization of

investments in the area of poverty reduction.
The foundations of development cooperation are laid down in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Title III). The EU
development policy was concerned at the outset with only the overseas
countries and territories associated with the European Community - taking
into account the long colonial history of some member states – and it was
then extended to all developing countries of the world.
This chapter intends first to offer a synthetic historical overview of the
EU development-aid policy and of the key moments of the associated
conventions and partnerships (Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, Cotonou
Agreement); to describe the institutional architecture of this policy, both at
European and state level; and to assess the EU development-cooperation
effectiveness and its contribution to the structural transformation of the
less developed economies – stressing some barriers encountered in
improving the development-cooperation results. Eventually, the major
challenge of some emerging aid donors (Brazil, China, and India) will be
discussed; helping to understand the changing context for a new global
development framework, along with its implications for a rethinking and
adjustment of the EU development-aid policies.

Introduction: Brief historical overview of the EU

development-aid policy
The beginnings of the EU development policy are marked by the
Treaty of Rome signature in 1957; the first beneficiaries being the
overseas countries and territories of the member states. The evolution of
aid-development measures were then accompanied by Europe’s political
concerns.
The colonial history of some EU countries had a significant influence
on the relationship between the EU and the developing world. During
negotiation of the Treaty of Rome, France insisted on special treatment of
its former colonies like Tunisia and Morocco; Italy asked concessions for
Libya2. The long European colonialism left behind both a heritage of close
economic and political ties with the poorer countries and a moral concern
about their poverty, hunger and underdevelopment.
As the overseas territories of the EEC member states became
independent some years after the Treaty of Rome, a formal institutional

2
Libya, along with Eritrea, Somalia and the Dodecanese Islands had been annexed
by Italy in the World War I.
28 Chapter Two

framework for their participation was necessary and this was created by
the Yaoundé3 Conventions.
The first Yaoundé Convention was signed in July 1963 and lasted till
1969. The Yaoundé II Convention marks the following period of 1970-
1975. These two conventions allowed the participating countries (eighteen
associated African states and Madagascar - AASM) to export the small
amount of industrial goods they manufactured, usually duty free, into the
EEC, but with much less preference for exports of agricultural products.
These would have undermined the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in
protecting the European farmers and their high food prices. In return for
the preferential treatment for limited industrial exports to the EEC, the
AASM countries had to accept comparable European exports.
The Yaoundé Conventions, which mainly benefited the former French
colonies, were replaced by the Lomé4 Convention, which was a response
to the UK’s accession to the EEC and to its interests in preserving the
British Commonwealth LDC trade preferences.
The new agreement included the UK’s African territories but excluded
Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Indonesia). There have been four Lomé Conventions between 1975 and
1999, the first being signed in 1975. The last one, Lomé IV, offered duty-
free access for ACP exports of primary products and manufactures and
most non-CAP agricultural products. It also tried to push the EU policy in
a new direction by adding a structural adjustment to ACP aid: an
encouragement of economic diversification in the ACP countries instead
of simply aid providing.
A General System of Preferences (GSP) offered to non ACP LDCs
similar preferences to Lomé but on a narrower range of products.
The Lomé Conventions were replaced during 2000 by the Cotonou5
Agreement, covering a period of twenty years and offering a more flexible
structure, based on a series of interregional free trade agreements between
groups of ACP countries and the EU; it also transferred accountability for
development actions to the ACP countries.
The Cotonou Agreement is the most comprehensive partnership
agreement between the EU and the LDC (79 ACP countries). Its first
revision was operated in 2001 and the second in 2010, when the
partnership was adapted to the new challenges of climate change, food
security, regional integration, state fragility and aid effectiveness. The
main changes, which have taken place in the decade 2000-2010 (as an

3
Capital of Cameroon
4
Capital of Togo
5
Capital of Benin
 EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Emerging Donors 29

adaptation to the new global context) and which were incorporated in the
second revision of the Cotonou Agreement, are summarised in Box 2-1.

Box 2-1: Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement – adaptation to

the new global context
- The growing importance of regional integration in the ACP countries and
in the ACP-EU cooperation is reflected.
- Security and fragility: no development can take place without a secure
environment. The new agreement highlights the interdependence between
security and development, and tackles security threats jointly.
- Our ACP partners face major challenges if they are to meet the
Millennium Development Goals, food security, HIV-AIDS and
sustainability of fisheries. The importance of each of these areas for
sustainable development, growth, and poverty reduction is underlined.
- For the first time, the EU and the ACP recognize the global challenge of
climate change as a major subject for their partnership.
- The trade chapter of the Agreement reflects the new trade relationship
and the expiry of preferences at the end of 2007. It reaffirms the role of the
Economic Partnership Agreements to boost economic development and
integration into the world economy. The revised Agreement highlights the
challenges the ACP countries are facing to integrate better into the world
economy; in particular the effects of preference erosion.
- More actors in the partnership: the EU has been promoting a broad and
inclusive partnership with ACP partners. The new agreement clearly
recognizes the role of national parliaments, local authorities, civil society
and the private sector.
- More impact, more value for money: This second revision is
instrumental in putting into practice the internationally agreed aid
effectiveness principles; in particular donor coordination. It will also untie
the EU aid to the ACP countries to reduce transaction costs. For the first
time, the role of other EU policies for the development of the ACP
countries is recognized, and the EU commits to enhance the coherence of
those policies to this end.

Despite all the trade concessions and aid supplied through different
Conventions, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 that
development-cooperation became a shared European responsibility,
offering a new explicit competence for the EU in initiating new policies
and programmes and in elaborating strategies.
30 Chapter Two

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009,

requires that the EU foreign policy does no harm to development
objectives, while calling for development-cooperation to be conducted
within the broader framework of external action. The Treaty entrenches
development policy as a” shared competence” under the mandate of both
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and
Development Commissioner.
The EU’s contribution to global development is marked by the search
of greater policy coherence. Since the mid-2000, the European Consensus
on Development6 has continuously stressed the necessity for greater policy
coherence for development (PCD); the EU tries in this sense to better take
into consideration what the development world needs in the five global
challenges areas of the PCD programme: trade and finance, climate
change, global food security, migration and security. Along with the
OECD, the EU is at present a key promoter of the PCD on the global
stage.
Recently, the Horizon 2020 research projects launched by the European
Commission include the topic “The European Union’s contribution to
global development in search of greater policy coherence”. Research on
the PCD is thus highly encouraged and expected to advance the
understanding of the bases for the effective EU development policy and of
the successful integration of development concerns into other EU policy
areas. This research initiative could also bring a comprehensive
perspective on the EU policies impact on developing countries.
A notable fresh initiative of the European Commission, unanimously
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, was the launching of
the European Year for Development 2015 (EYD 2015), dedicated to
raising awareness, engaging Europeans everywhere in the EU’s
development-cooperation and sparking debate around the motto “Our
world, our dignity, our future”. As a year that promises to be hugely
significant for development, with a vast array of stakeholders involved in
crucial decision-making in development, environmental, and climate
policies, 2015 represents also the target date for achieving the Millennium
Development Goals.

6
European Consensus on Development 2005 is a policy statement that reflects the
EU’s willingness to eradicate poverty and build a more stable and equitable world.
It identifies shared values, goals, principles and commitments which the European
Commission and EU member states will implement in their development policies.
 EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Emerging Donors 31

Institutional architecture of development-aid policy

The development-aid policy, as a policy area where the EU can really
make a difference as an international actor, is supported by a rich
institutional system. The Lisbon Treaty marks a milestone in creating
clearer institutional safeguards for the EU development policy. It
entrenches development policy as a shared competence under the mandate
of both the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy
and the Development Commissioner.
The EU aid architecture comprises the 28 member states institutions;
the European Commission (with a coordinating role, monitoring function
and a high aid dimension); the European External Action Service
(functionally autonomous from other EU bodies, which highly facilitates
development policy coherence); and the European Investment Bank
(acting as a lending institution).
Member states and EU level institutions will be discussed separately,
given that development policy within the European Union is a shared
competence between each member state and the European Commission.
Bilateral development policies co-exist with Community policies managed
by the EC, each with its own agencies, administrations and institutions
(Kitt, 2010).

EU member states institutions

EU member states and agencies for development are provided by Table
2-1. Besides their Foreign Ministries, the majority of EU countries have
more than one institution devoted to development-aid policy
implementation. Table 2-1 refers only to top-level national organizations,
but countries like Spain or Belgium, with a relatively high degree of
decentralization, often are active at regional levels too, increasing thus the
total number of donor agencies. On the other side, new EU countries from
Central and Eastern Europe like Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Estonia,
Romania and Slovenia, do not have a separate implementation of the
development policy; the only involved institution being their Foreign
Ministry.
An important issue of development-aid policies and institutions of the
EU member states is related to the aid transparency, and is considered a
key pillar of development – a necessary condition to enable effectiveness
and accountability. Despite recent progress, in making their aid more
transparent, the EU countries perform poorly, scoring an average of only
23%, compared to the average score of 31% for non EU-bilaterals. Only
32 Chapter Two

Table 2-1: EU member states Institutions and Agencies for Development

EU member state Development policy Separate implementation

Austria Foreign Ministry Austrian Development
Agency (ADA)
Belgium Development Cooperation Belgian Development
(DGDC) Agency (BTC)
Bulgaria Foreign Ministry
Croatia Foreign Ministry
Cyprus Foreign Ministry Yes
Czech Republic Foreign Ministry Czech Development Agency
Denmark Foreign Ministry
(DANIDA)
Estonia Foreign Ministry
Finland Foreign Ministry
France Foreign Ministry Agence Française de
Développement (AFD)
Germany Development Ministry Deutsche Gesellshaft für
Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Greece Foreign Ministry Hellenic Aid
Hungary Foreign Ministry Yes
Ireland Foreign Ministry Irish Aid
Italy Foreign Ministry
Latvia Foreign Ministry
Lithuania Foreign Ministry Yes
Luxembourg Foreign Ministry Lux Development
Malta Foreign Ministry
Netherlands Foreign Ministry
Poland Foreign Ministry Polish Aid
Portugal Foreign Ministry Portuguese Institute for
Development Support
Romania Foreign Ministry
Slovakia Foreign Ministry Slovak Aid
Slovenia Foreign Ministry
Spain Foreign Ministry Spanish Agency for
International Development
Cooperation (AECID)
Sweden Foreign Ministry Swedish International
Development Cooperation
Agency (Sida)
United Kingdom Department for
International
Development (DFID)
 EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Emerging Donors 33

five member states – the UK (DFID), Sweden (Sida), Denmark, the

Netherlands and Germany received places in the top three categories (very
good, good or fair) of the Aid Transparency Index (see Table 2-2). Brazil,
which does not consider itself a donor country, ranks 56th; higher than 10
of the EU’s bilateral agencies7.
In 2013, the net official development assistance (ODA) by the 28 EU
member states was USD 71.2 billion, or 0.41% of their combined GNI,
while net disbursements by EU institutions to developing countries and
multilateral organizations were USD 15.9 billion8. The same year, the
largest EU donors were Germany, France, Denmark, Luxemburg, Sweden,
the UK and the Netherlands. While Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden
continued to exceed the 0.7% ODA/GNI target, the UK met it for the first
time. The Netherlands fell below 0.7% for the first time since 1974.

Table 2-2: Ranking of the EU member states and EU donor

institutions in 2013 ATI

Very good Good Fair

(scores of 80-100%) (scores of 60-79%) (scores of 40-59%)
3. UK, DFID 9. Sweden, Sida 12. European Commission,
(83.5%) (60.4%) ECHO (54.2%)
13. European Commission,
DEVCO (52.1%)
14. European Commission, FPI
(51.1%)
15. Denmark, MFA (50.7%)
16. Netherlands, MFA (49.4%)
17. European Commission,
Enlargement (48.1%)
20. Germany, BMZ-GIZ (45.9%)
23. Germany, BMZ-KfW
(43.7%)
Notes: 1. The number denotes place in overall ranking of 67 donor organizations;
2. EC – European Commission.
Source: Extracted and adapted from http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/2013-EU-ATI-brief.pdf, p. 2.

7
All data regarding aid transparency of EU member states are extracted from 2013
Aid Transparency Index (ATI), available at: ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/2013-Aid-Transparency-Index.pdf
8
According to OECD, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-
countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm
34 Chapter Two

European Commission
The European Commission administers aid to developing countries and
offers a number of advantages over national bilateral aid programmes, such as
administrative economies of scale, or coordination of EU aid-development
programmes and harmonization of their administrative requirements. The
development initiatives of the European Commission are also free of the
commercial and political reasons that often guide national aid policies.
The Commissioner in charge of International cooperation and
Development is directly responsible for:

x Ensuring the EU delivers on its commitments to the Millennium

Development Goals to reduce poverty;
x Setting out the Commission and EU positions for the negotiations
on the United Nations Millennium Development Goals agenda after
2015;
x Working with national governments to make the EU’s development
more effective;
x Launching negotiations on a revised Cotonou Agreement with the
ACP group of states.
In order to ensure that the EU development-aid policies are consistent
with, and support, EU goals and priorities, the Commissioner for
International Cooperation and Development has to work closely with the
Commissioners responsible for other cross-cutting policies and, in
particular for Migration and Home Affairs, Employment, Social Affairs,
Skills and Labour Mobility, Agriculture and Rural Development, Climate
Action and Energy, and Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.
At present, the Directorates General, which deal with the development-
aid issues, are DG for International Cooperation and Development
(DEVCO – EuropeAid), DG Enlargement, and DG ECHO – Humanitarian
Aid and Civil Protection.
DG DEVCO is responsible for designing EU development policies and
delivering aid through programmes and projects across the world; it is in
charge of development cooperation policy in a wider framework of
international cooperation, adapting to the evolving needs of partner
countries. It incorporates the former Development and EuropeAid DG’s.
Having only one DG simplifies communication in the development field
by acting as a "one stop shop" – providing a single contact point for
stakeholders inside and outside the EU to deal with. DG DEVCO defines
sectoral policies in the field of external aid in order to reduce poverty in
the world; to ensure sustainable economic, social and environmental
 EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Emerging Donors 35

development; and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance

and the respect of human rights. Its role consists also in coordinating the
actions of the EU institutions; the EU member states; and other EU actors
around the Union’s core values, objectives and common priorities.
Within the European Commission, DEVCO-EuropeAid assures
coherence between the EU’s development policy and its other internal and
external policies. It bears responsibility for implementing the EU’s
external aid instruments, which are financed by the European budget and
the European Development Fund (see Box 2-2).

Box 2-2: European Development Fund

EDF was created by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and was first launched in
1959. It is the main instrument for providing aid in the ACP countries and
OCTs.
EDF supports actions in the following key areas for cooperation:
- economic development
- social and human development
- regional cooperation and integration.
Each EDF is concluded for a period of around five/six years. Since the
conclusion of the first partnership convention in 1964, the EDF cycles
have generally followed that of the Partnership agreements/conventions.
• First EDF: 1959-1964
• Second EDF: 1964-1970 (Yaoundé I Convention)
• Third EDF: 1970-1975 (Yaoundé II Convention)
• Fourth EDF: 1975-1980 (Lomé I Convention)
• Fifth EDF: 1980-1985 (Lomé II Convention)
• Sixth EDF: 1985-1990 (Lomé III Convention)
• Seventh EDF: 1990-1995 (Lomé IV Convention)
• Eighth EDF: 1995-2000 (Lomé IV Convention and the revised Lomé IV)
• Ninth EDF: 2000-2007 (Cotonou Agreement)
• Tenth EDF: 2008-2013 (Cotonou Agreement)
• Eleventh EDF: 2014-2020 (Cotonou Agreement)
The 11th EDF has a budget of € 31589 million out of which € 29089
million has been allocated to the ACP countries. This amount for the ACP
is divided as follows:
- € 24365 million to the national and regional indicative programmes;
- € 3590 million to intra-regional cooperation;
- € 1134 million to Investment Facility.
Source: compiled from Europe, Summaries of EU legislation,
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/index_en.htm
36 Chapter Two

DG Enlargement administers the Instrument for Pre-accession

assistance (IPA), which supports reforms in the enlargement countries
with financial and technical help. The IPA funds build up the capacities of
the countries throughout the accession process, resulting in progressive,
positive developments in the respective region. The budget of the 2007-
2013 period was € 11.5 billion, increasing to € 11.7 billion for the 2014-
2020 multi-annual perspective9.
Funding and technical assistance is also monitored by DG
Enlargement, including the following instruments:

- TAIEX, helping partner countries become acquainted with, apply,

and enforce, EU law;
- Twinning, assuring cooperation between Public Administrations of
EU member states and of beneficiary countries;
- Grants supporting projects or organizations, which further the
interests of the EU or contribute to the implementation of an EU
programme or policy.

The EU enlargement, which always proved the thesis that the

European Union has a transformative power, does indeed have a great
influence on the geographical and strategic focus of the EU development
policy. Some authors like Rehbichler (2006) and Lightfoot (2008) even
evaluate - when the new EU members included former recipients of EU
financial assistance - to what extent they have been able to undertake the
mental reorientation from a “receiver country” to a “donor country”.
DG ECHO – Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection provides
humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity, neutrality
and independence. ECHO’s humanitarian aid is distributed without regard
for any political agendas, and without exception seeks to help those in the
greatest need, irrespective of their nationality, religion, gender, ethnic
origin or political affiliation.
With regard to its civil protection mandate, DG ECHO encourages and
facilitates the cooperation between the 31 states participating in the Civil
Protection Mechanism and Financial Instrument (the 28 EU member
states, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) in order to improve the
effectiveness of systems for the prevention and protection against natural,
technological or man-made disasters.
The Civil Protection Mechanism is operated by the Monitoring and
Information Centre (MIC), which has been part of ECHO since early 2010

9
See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm
 EU Development-Aid Policy and the Rise of Emerging Donors 37

- when the appointment of Kristalina Georgieva as the first European

Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis
Response reinforced the coherence of EU response operations. One of her
priorities was to develop a European Emergency Response Centre based
on the existing MIC, and the ECHO Crisis Room, for humanitarian crises.
The new Centre, which was created in 2013, will further strengthen the
EU disaster response capacity.
The European Commission spends annually more than 1 billion euro
on humanitarian assistance. Since 1992, it has financed and coordinated
humanitarian operations in more than 100 countries outside the EU.
However, institutionally, the European Commission’s task in the
development field is complicated by the fact that its staff is too small for
administering such a huge policy sector.

European External Action Service (EEAS)

The EEAS was established by decision of the Council of Ministers on
26 July 2010, based on a proposal by High Representative Catherine
Ashton. It was formally launched on 1 January 2011.
With the establishment of the EEAS, Europe’s stance in the world was
supposed to become more coherent, effective, and visible, finally leaving
behind the long-standing divide of the foreign and security policy and the
European Commission’s portfolios “development” and neighborhood”
(Tannous, 2013).
From a development perspective, the European External Action
Service (EEAS) was designed to play a role in shaping strategy and in
programming development-cooperation for all regions of the world. The
stated intention was to improve the links between development and
foreign policy and to combine the European Commission technical
expertise with the Council’s political weight, thereby enhancing the EU’s
global role (Faure, Gavas and Maxwell, 2013).
The EEAS brought the opportunity to add development to the “tool
box” of European foreign policy under a more comprehensive approach.
Working closely with the member states, the new diplomatic service
assured also more coherent links among diverging stances. Given that
member states are generally reticent to allow the EU to coordinate or
control their development policies, the EEAS assumed some strategic
competencies by placing itself nearer to the member states.
The first act of the external action service was the coordinated
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.
38 Chapter Two

European Investment Bank

The EIB, as the European Union’s long-term financing institution, is
active both inside and outside the EU. Outside the EU, the EIB lending is
governed by a series of mandates from the EU in support of development
and cooperation policies in partner countries. The current external
mandates of the EIB include:

ƒ Southern and Eastern Europe10

ƒ Neighborhood policy
- The Mediterranean neighborhood11
- Russia and Eastern neighborhood12
ƒ Development and cooperation countries
- ACP13 (and OCT)
- South Africa
- Asia and Latin America

The EIB financing facilities are complemented by technical assistance

provided by a team of expert economists, engineers and specialists. The
project-related technical assistance contributes to improving the quality of
lending operations throughout the project cycle and enhancing their
development impact.
Recently, the EIB had to significantly step up its lending in order to
address the economic and financial crisis in Europe, but it did not lose
sight of its role in supporting EU external policies and development-
cooperation objectives. The EIB continued indeed to work around the
world in supporting local private sector development; the formation of
critical social and economic infrastructure; climate changes mitigation;
and regional integration.
In 2013, the lending volume for non-EU countries was EUR 7.6 bn for
a total number of 102 projects.

10
EU candidate countries (FYROM, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey) and
potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo)
11
Algeria, Egypt, Gaza/West Bank, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria,
Tunisia, Libya
12
Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
13
Table 2-3 presents the 79 ACP countries.
Discovering Diverse Content Through
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—— al-Jallá. See Abú `Abdalláh Aḥmad b. Yaḥyá al-Jallá.
—— Khallikán, 92, 98, 125, 214, 358, 396.
—— Mas`úd, 396.
—— al-Mu`allá, 343, 344.
—— al-Qúṭí, 408.
—— `Umar. See `Abdalláh b. `Umar.
Ibráhím b. Adham. See Abú Isḥáq Ibráhím b. Adham b. Manṣúr.
—— b. Dáwud al-Raqqí, 408.
—— Khawwáṣ. See Abú Isḥáq Ibráhím b. Aḥmad al-Khawwáṣ.
—— Máristání, 149.
—— Nakha`í, 396.
—— Raqqí, 233.
—— b. Sa`d `Alawí, 374.
—— Samarqandí, 147.
—— b. Shaybán, 246.
—— Shaybáni, 147.
`Imrán, 179.
India, 243, 400, 407.
Indians, 263.
Iram, 224.
`Iráq, 110, 116, 126, 140, 172, 177, 249, 260, 345, 400.
Iṣfahán, 138.
Isḥáq of Mawṣil, 399.
Ishmael, 40, 74, 252, 353.
Ismá`íl al-Sháshí, 175.
Ismá`ílís, 263.
Israelites, 192.
—— desert of the, 229.

J.

Jabal al-Buttam, 408.

Jabarites, 75.
Jacob, 258, 310, 370.
Ja`far al-Khuldí. See Abú Muḥammad Ja`far b. Nuṣayr al-Khuldí.
—— Ṣádiq. See Abú Muḥammad Ja`far b. Muḥammad Ṣádiq.
Jáḥiẕ, 8.
Jerusalem, 101, 215.
Jesus, 40, 50, 232, 244, 262, 273, 371, 375, 376.
Jews, 261.
Jidda, 233.
Job, 24, 40, 251.
John the Baptist, 40, 371, 375, 376.
See Yaḥyá b. Zakariyyá.
Joseph, 32, 258, 262, 310, 335, 365, 395.
Junayd. See Abu ´l-Qásim Junayd.
Junaydís, 130, 185-9, 195.
Jurayj, 232.
Jurayrí. See Abú Muḥammad Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Jurayrí.
Jurjání, 373.
 K.

Ka`ba, the, 12, 121, 141, 239, 240, 258, 300, 326, 327, 329, 337,
397.
Kamand (Kumand), 335.
Karbalá, 76.
Karkh, 356, 378.
Kattání, 325.
Khabbáb b. al-Aratt, 81.
Khaḍir. See Khiḍr.
Khafífís, 130, 247-51.
Khálid b. Walíd, 232.
Khalíl, 73, 91, 317.
See Abraham.
Khárijites, 286.
Kharráz. See Abú Sa`íd Aḥmad b. `Ísá al-Kharráz.
Kharrázís, 130, 241-6.
Khayr al-Nassáj. See Abu ´l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Ismá`íl Khayr al-
Nassáj.
Khazá´iní, Imám, 227.
Khiḍr, 103, 141, 142, 153, 290, 342.
Khubayb, 221.
Khurásán, 69, 115, 121, 123, 126, 134, 140, 146, 151, 159, 173,
174, 177, 236, 335, 400.
Khurqán, 163.
Khurqání. See Abu ´l-Ḥasan `Alí b. Aḥmad al-Khurqání.
Khusraw. See Núshírwán.
al-Khuttalí. See Abu ´l-Faḍl Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Khuttalí.
Khúzistán, 151.
Kirmán, 51, 123, 132, 133, 173.
Kish, 173.
Korah, 347.
Kúfa, 46, 75, 84, 98, 104, 118, 145, 205, 339, 360, 396.
Kumish, 173.

L.

Labíd, 397.
Laháwur, 91.
Laylá, 258, 353.
Lukám, Mount, 166.
Luqmán of Sarakhs, 188.

M.

Magians, 280, 404.

Maḥmúd, Khwája, 174.
Majnún, 258, 353.
Malámatís, 50, 62-9.
Málik, the Imám, 116, 286.
Málik b. Dínár, 46, 89-90, 337.
Mání (Manes), 407.
Manichæans, 31.
Manṣúr, the Caliph, 93.
—— b. `Ammár. See Abu ´l-Sarí Manṣúr b. `Ammár.
Maqám-i Ibráhím, 326.
Maqdisí, 260.
Ma`rúf Karkhí. See Abú Maḥfúẕ Ma`rúf b. Fírúz al-Karkhí.
Márút, 364.
Marv al-Rúd, 50.
Marwa, 326, 328.
Marwán b. Mu`áwiya, 118.
Mary, the Virgin, 230, 244.
Mash`ar al-Ḥarám, 326.
Mas`úd, spiritual director, 323.
—— b. Rabí` al-Fárisí, 81.
Mayhana, 164, 235.
Mecca, 77, 83, 84, 87, 91, 94, 96, 98, 107, 145, 158, 186, 192, 215,
221, 258, 290, 292, 326, 327, 329, 339, 340, 372, 378.
Medína, 116, 221.
Merv, 52, 96, 97, 154, 158, 174, 205, 209, 251, 323, 401.
Michael, 241.
Mihna. See Mayhana.
Miná, 326, 328, 329, 340.
Miqdád b. al-Aswad, 81.
Mis`ar b. Kidám, 93.
Misṭaḥ b. Uthátha b. `Abbád, 82.
Moses, 40, 41, 74, 76, 90, 101, 167, 179, 230, 262, 296, 297, 324,
332, 371, 372, 380, 381.
Mu`ádh b. al-Ḥárith, 82.
Mu`áwiya, the Caliph, 411.
Mu´ayyad, 53.
Muḍar, 83.
Mughíra b. Shu`ba, 337.
Muhájirín, 19, 396.
Muḥammad, the Prophet, 1, 4, 8, 11, 15, 19, 31, 32, 33, 36, 40, 41,
42, 44, 45, 46, 52, 53, 62, 70, 72, 76, 79, 80, 81,82, 83, 90, 91,
92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 116, 117, 127, 129, 140, 141,
158, 185, 186, 192, 200, 202, 209, 211, 213, 215, 221, 222, 223,
225, 229, 230, 231, 232, 236, 238, 254, 255, 258, 259, 261, 269,
283, 287, 312, 315, 317, 318, 319, 324, 330, 331, 332, 333, 336,
344, 346, 348, 353, 358, 365, 371, 372, 373, 380, 381, 394, 396,
397, 401, 408, 411.
See Traditions of the Prophet.
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Muqrí, 41.
—— b. `Alí Ḥakím. See Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. `Alí al-
Tirmidhí.
—— b. `Alí b. al-Ḥusayn b. `Alí b. Abí Ṭálib, 38.
—— b. Faḍl al-Balkhí. See Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. al-Faḍl al-
Balkhí.
—— Ḥakím. See Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. `Alí al-Tirmidhí.
—— b. al-Ḥasan, 110, 116, 286.
—— b. al-Ḥusayn al-`Alawí, 205.
—— b. Ka`b al-Quraẕí, 99.
—— b. Khafíf. See Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. Khafíf.
—— Ma`shúq, 174.
—— b. Masrúq, 415.
—— b. Salama, 173.
—— b. Sírín, 92.
—— b. `Ulyán, 206.
—— b. Wási`, 91-2, 276, 330.
—— b. Zakariyyá, 51.
See Abú Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyá al-Rází.
Muḥásibís, 130, 176-83, 371.
Mujassima, 236.
Múltán, 91.
Muqaddasí, 260.
Muríd, 175.
Murjites, 66, 67.
Murta`ish. See Abú Muḥammad Murta`ish.
Mushabbiha, 236.
Muslim Maghribí, 233, 234.
Muṣṭafá, 99, 368.
See Muḥammad, the Prophet.
Mutanabbí, 8.
Mu`tazilites, 6, 106, 117, 118, 213, 215, 239, 253, 268, 280, 286,
295, 393.
Muẕaffar, Khwája. See Abú Aḥmad al-Muẕaffar b. Aḥmad b. Ḥamdán.
—— Kirmánsháhí Qarmíní, 43.
Muzayyin the Elder, 257.
Muzdalifa, 326, 328.

N.

Naḍr b. al-Ḥárith, 261, 394.

Náfi`, 191.
Najd, 83.
Nasá, 206, 251.
Nestorians, 244.
Nibájí, 138.
Nile, the river, 101, 211, 212.
Nimrod, 73, 224, 327.
Níshápúr, 16, 41, 120, 123, 124, 125, 133, 134, 159, 165, 170, 174,
183, 272, 318, 365.
Noah, 371.
Núḥ, a brigand, 183.
Núrí. See Abu ´l-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Núrí.
Núrís, 130, 189-95.
Núshírwán, 401.

O.

Oxus, the river, 142, 235.

P.

Pádisháh-i Tá´ib, 173.

Pharaoh, 76, 102, 223, 224, 347.
Prophet, the House of the, 75.
Purg, 51.

Q.

Qadarites, 6, 66, 67, 75.

Qarámiṭa, 383. See Carmathians.
Qaran, 83, 84.
Qárún, 347.
Qaṣṣárís, 130, 183-4.
See Ḥamdúnís and Malámatís.
Qays of the Banú `Ámir, 353.
Quhistán, 173.
Quraysh, 261, 394.
Qushayrí. See Abu ´l-Qásim `Abd al-Karím b. Hawázin al-Qushayrí.

R.

Rabí`a, 83.
Rábi`a `Adawiyya, 358.
Ráfiḍís, 152.
Rajá b. Ḥayát, 99.
Ramla, 343.
Raqqám, 190.
Raqqí, 408.
Rayy, 65, 120, 123, 133, 293.
Riḍwán, 232.
Rúm, 207, 222, 244, 407.
Ruṣáfa mosque, 154.
Ruwaym. See Abú Muḥammad Ruwaym b. Aḥmad.

S.

Ṣábians, 222.
Ṣafá, 326, 328.
Ṣafwán b. Bayḍá, 81.
Sahl b. `Abdalláh al-Tustarí. See Abú Muḥammad Sahl b. `Abdalláh
al-Tustarí.
Sahlagí, Shaykh, 164, 173.
Sahlís, 130, 195-210, 296.
Sá´ib b. Khallád, 82.
Sa`íd b. Abí Sa`íd al-`Ayyár, 175.
—— b. al-Musayyib, 87.
Sálár-i Ṭabarí, 175.
Ṣáliḥ Murrí, 396.
Sálim, 81.
—— b. `Abdalláh, 99.
—— b. `Umayr b. Thábit, 82.
Sálimís, 131.
Salmán al-Fárisí, 45, 81, 90, 232, 344.
Samarcand, 140, 408.
Sámarrá, 145, 359.
Sarah, 365.
Sarakhs, 164, 165, 174, 193, 227, 364.
Sarí al-Saqaṭí. See Abu ´l-Ḥasan Sarí Mughallis al-Saqaṭí.
Sayyárís, 130, 251-60.
Shaddád, 224.
al-Sháfi`í, 116, 125, 286, 347.
Sháh b. Shujá`. See Abu ´l-Fawáris Sháh b. Shujá` al-Kirmání.
Shahristání, 131, 295.
Shaqíq of Balkh. See Abú `Alí Shaqíq b. Ibráhím al-Azdí.
Sha`rání, 396.
Shiblí. See Abú Bakr Dulaf b. Jaḥdar al-Shiblí.
Shí`ites, 152, 263, 383, 404.
Shíráz, 247.
Shírín, 411.
Shu`ayb, 74.
Shúníziyya mosque, 123, 323.
Shurayḥ, 93, 94.
Ṣiffín, 84.
Sinai, Mount, 230, 372, 381.
Ṣiráṭ, 18, 107, 199.
Sírawání, 166.
Solomon, 24, 230.
Sophists, 15.
Súfisṭá´iyán, 15.
Sufyán Thawrí, 46, 93, 103, 128, 293.
—— b. `Uyayna, 98, 118.
Ṣuhayb b. Sinán, 81.
Sulaymán Rá`í, 116.
Sumnún al-Muḥibb. See Abu ´l-Ḥasan Sumnún b. `Abdalláh al-
Khawwáṣ.
Syria, 94, 118, 172.

T.

Ṭábarání, 227.
Ṭabaristán, 161, 163, 173.
al-Tábi`ún, 83, 88.
Ṭayfúrís, 130, 184-8, 189.
Thábit b. Wadí`at, 82.
Tha`laba, 348.
Thawbán, 82.
—— name of Dhu ´l-Nún, 100.
Tibetans, 263.
Tigris, 180, 408.
Tíh-i Baní Isrá´íl, 229.
Tirmidh, 17, 141, 229.
Transoxania, 50, 67, 161, 174, 288, 364.
Turkistán, 407.
Ṭús, 49, 165, 166, 234.
Tustar, 195, 225, 233.

U.

Ubulla, 408.
Uḥud, 192.
`Ukkásha b. Miḥṣan, 81.
`Umar b. `Abd al-`Azíz, 99.
—— b. al-Khaṭṭáb, the Caliph, 31, 45, 70, 72-3, 76, 81, 83, 208,
211, 212, 232, 254, 304, 361, 394, 401, 411.
Umayya b. Abi ´l-Ṣalt, 397.
Umm Kulthúm, 361.
`Utba b. Ghazwán, 81.
—— al-Ghulám, 180.
—— b. Mas`úd, 81.
—— b. Rabí`a, 394.
`Uthmán, the Caliph, 65, 73-4.
Uways al-Qaraní, 45, 83-4.
Uzkand, 234.

W.

Wahb b. Ma`qal, 82.

Y.

Yaḥyá b. Mu`ádh al-Rází. See Abú Zakariyyá Yaḥyá b. Mu`ádh al-

Rází.
Yaḥyá b. Zakariyyá, 122.
See John the Baptist.
Yazdán, 280.
Yazíd b. Mu`áwiya, 76.
Yúsuf, 32, 136.
See Joseph.
—— b. al-Ḥusayn. See Abú Ya`qúb Yúsuf b. al-Ḥusayn al-Rází.

Z.

Zacharias, 40, 230.

Ẓáhirite school of law, 135.
Zá´ida, 232.
Zakariyyá al-Anṣárí, 408.
Zakí b. al-`Alá, 172.
Zayd b. al-Khaṭṭáb, 81.
Zayn al-`Ábidín, 76.
Zuhrí, 71.
Zulaykhá, 136, 310, 335, 365.
Zurára b. Abí Awfá, 396.
 II.
Subjects, Oriental Words, and Technical Terms.
Arabic and Persian words are printed in italics. In their
arrangement no account is taken of the definite article al.
A.

`abá, 48, 52, 133.

abad, 386.
Abdál, 214.
Abrár, 214.
Actions, the Divine, 14.
adab, ádáb, 334, 341.
ádáb-i ẕáhir, 292.
`adam, 28, 168, 253, 373.
ádamiyyat, 246, 254.
`adl, 387.
áfát, 281.
aghyár, 31.
aḥdáth, 416.
ahl-i dargáh, 169.
—— ḥaqá´iq, 225.
—— ḥaqíqat, 25.
—— ḥaqq, 62, 402.
—— ḥashw, 316, 416.
—— himmat, 167.
—— `ibárat, 59.
ahl al-`ilm, 253.
ahl-i ma`ní, 403.
—— maqámát, 61.
—— minan, 265.
—— mu`ámalat, 225.
—— rusúm, 172.
—— wafá, 265.
aḥrár, 43.
aḥwál, 33, 110, 157, 177.
See ḥál and States of Mystics.
á´ib, 391.
`ajz, 276.
akhláq, 42.
Akhyár, 214.
`alá´iq, 165, 384.
`álam, 385, 386.
álat-i mawsúm, 199.
`álim, 382, 383.
`álim-i rabbání, 151.
Alms, 314-17.
amír, 388.
amn, 216.
anfás, 164.
angalyún, 407.
Angels, 239-41, 302, 303, 351.
Annihilation, 20, 23, 25, 28, 36, 37, 40, 48, 58-60, 95, 170, 171,
205, 241-6.
See faná.
`aql, 309.
`araḍ, 261, 264, 386.
arbáb-i aḥwál, 302.
—— ḥál, 32.
—— laṭá´if, 353.
—— ma`ání, 38, 59.
`árif, 79, 100, 265, 267, 382-3, 414.
`arsh, 33.
Ascension of Báyazíd, 238.
—— of Muḥammad, 186, 215, 240, 259, 262, 277, 283, 302, 330,
331, 336, 368.
—— of Prophets and Saints, 238.
Asceticism, 17, 37, 86.
See Mortification and zuhd.
Asking, rules in, 357-60.
asrár, 255.
Association. See Companionship.
—— with the wicked, 86.
Attributes, the Divine, 12, 14, 21, 36, 252, 253, 279, 288.
awbat, 295.
awliyá, 210, 211, 212, 215, 295.
See Saints.
awrád, 303.
Awtád, 146, 214, 228, 234.
awwáb, 295.
áyát, 373.
`ayyár, 100.
`ayn, 149, 171, 196, 206.
`ayn al-yaqín, 381-2.
azal, 386.
azaliyyat, 238.

B.

Báb, a title given to Ṣúfí Shaykhs, 234.

badhl-i rúḥ, 194.
balá, 388, 389.
baqá, 23, 58, 59, 73, 143, 170, 171, 185, 205, 241-6, 253, 266,
373, 377, 380.
báqí, 26, 32, 85, 311.
bashariyyat, 32, 159, 217, 226, 237.
basṭ, 181, 374-6.
bayán, 356, 373.
bégána, 200, 222.
bégánagí, 24, 333, 377.
Begging, 105.
—— rules in, 357, 360.
birsám, 167.
Blame, the doctrine of, 62-9, 183-4.
See malámat, Malámatís, Qaṣṣárís.
Blue garments, worn by Ṣúfís, 53.

C.

Cave, story of the, 231.

Celibacy, 360-6.
chigúnagí, 374.
chilla, 51, 324.
Companionship, 189, 190, 334-45.
See ṣuḥbat.
Contemplation, 70, 91, 92, 105, 165, 171, 201-5, 300, 327, 329-
33, 346.
See musháhadat.
Covetousness, 128, 136, 217.

D.

dahr, 244.
dahriyán, 281.
Daily bread, 106, 157.
Dancing, 416.
dánishmand, 382.
ḍarúrí, 261, 271.
da`wá, 274.
dawá al-misk, 8.
Dervishes, 142, 143, 146, 165.
See faqír and fuqará.
—— resident, 340-5.
—— travelling, 340, 345-7.
dhát, 5, 386.
dhawq, 58, 392.
dhikr, 87, 126, 128, 154, 155, 242, 254, 300, 301, 307, 371, 376.
dídár, 175.
ḍiddán, 386.
dil, 33, 144, 309.
Directors, spiritual, 55-7, 128, 129, 133, 134, 166, 169, 301, 353,
354, 357, 387, 408, 418, 419.
Divines, 116, 142, 143, 213.
See `ulamá.
—— disagreement of the, 106, 176.
Dreams, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 116, 129, 138, 145, 218, 282, 321,
358, 359.
Dualism, 259, 273, 280.
dústán, 265, 382.

E.

Eating, rules in, 347-9.

Ecstasy, 138, 152, 167.
See Intoxication and samá` and wajd.
Essence, the Divine, 14.

F.

faḍl, 201.
fá`il, 237.
Faith, 225, 286-90.
falakiyán, 280.
faná, 28, 37, 58, 73, 143, 168, 170, 185, 205, 241-6, 253, 266,
373, 377, 380.
See Annihilation.
faná-yi `ayn, 244.
—— kullí, 37.
—— kulliyyat, 243.
fání, 26, 32, 33, 311.
fáqa, 325.
faqd, 368.
faqír, 20, 59, 60, 165, 309.
See Dervishes.
faqr, 36, 60, 109, 189, 309, 364.
See Poverty.
farághat, 109.
fardániyyat, 281.
Fasting, 36, 52, 201, 320-5.
fawá´id, 384, 385.
Fear, 112, 113, 122, 128.
fikrat, 239.
fi`l, 237, 256.
Free will, 17, 288.
See Predestination.
Frocks, patched, worn by Ṣúfís, 45-57.
See muraqqa`át.
fuqará, 19, 110, 126, 142, 165.
furqat, 26.
futúḥ, 355.
 G.

Garments, the rending of, 56, 57, 417-18.

Generosity, 114, 123, 124, 183, 184, 317-19.
ghaflat, 17, 155, 187, 242.
ghalabat, 184, 226.
ghaná. See ghiná.
gharíb, 146.
Ghawth, 214.
ghaybat, 155, 178, 248-51, 256, 301, 370, 380, 405.
ghayn, 5, 391.
ghayr, 62, 105, 237, 274.
ghayrán, 386.
ghayrat, 156.
ghiná, 21, 22, 23, 74.
ghusl, 293.
gilím, 32, 45.
girawish, 289.
Gnosis, 16, 100, 134, 140, 267-77, 325, 392.
See ma`rifat.
Grace. See faḍl, `ináyat, karámat.

H.

ḥadath, 293.
hadhayán, 167.
ḥáḍir, 373.
ḥaḍrat, 256.
ḥajj, 326.
See Pilgrimage.
ḥál, 49, 50, 112, 177, 180-3, 236, 242, 243, 258, 267, 309, 367-
70, 371, 372, 382, 415.
See States of mystics and aḥwál.
ḥálí, 267.
ḥáll, 244, 254, 279.
ḥaqá´iq, 117.
ḥaqíqat, 14, 51, 149, 383-4.
See Truth, the.
ḥaqq, 384, 404.
See Truth, the.
ḥaqq al-yaqín, 381, 382.
ḥashw, 167.
hastí, 374.
hawá, 196, 207, 208.
haybat, 376, 377.
ḥayrat, 275.
ḥazan, 413.
Hell, the result of God’s anger, 199.
hidáyat, 95, 203, 204.
ḥijáb, 22, 149, 236, 325, 374, 414.
See Veils, spiritual.
ḥijáb-i ghayní, 5.
ḥijáb-i rayní, 4, 5.
himmat, 155, 235.
Hope, 112, 113, 122, 133.
ḥubb, 305, 306.
ḥuḍúr, 33, 129, 144, 155, 178, 248-51, 301, 373, 380.
ḥudúth, 280.
ḥulúl, 131, 260.
Hunger, 324, 325.
ḥurmat, 334.
ḥurqat, 47.
ḥusn, 386.
huwiyyat, 238.
ḥuzn, 371.
Hypocrisy, 87, 89, 291, 292, 304.
 I.

ibáḥí, 131.
`ibádat, 79.
`ibárat, 203, 276, 385.
ibtidá, 119, 169.
`idda, 11.
i`jáz, 219, 221, 223, 255.
ijmá`, 14, 225.
ikhláṣ, 103, 117, 246.
ikhtiyár, 171, 297, 316, 388.
iláhiyyat, 245.
ilhám, 166, 271.
ilhámiyán, 271.
`ilm, 103, 267, 381, 382-3, 415.
See Knowledge.
`ilm-i ma`rifat, 16.
—— mu`ámalat, 86, 115.
—— sharí`at, 16.
—— waqt, 13, 112.
`ilm al-yaqín, 381, 382.
`ilmí, 267.
ímá, 385.
ímán, 225, 286-90.
imtiḥán, 388, 389, 390.
imtizáj, 131, 152, 254, 260.
inábat, 181, 295, 371.
`ináyat, 203, 268.
inbisáṭ, 380.
Incarnation, 92, 236, 260-6.
See ḥulúl.
Indulgences, 116.
insán, 197.
insániyyat, 197.
Inspiration, 271.
Intention, the power of, 4.
intibáh, 385.
intiqál, 236.
Intoxication, spiritual, 226-9, 248, 352.
See sukr.
inzi`áj, 385.
irádat, 199, 307.
ishárat, 56, 129, 155, 385, 404.
`ishq, 310.
ishtibáh, 385.
ism, 386.
istidlál, 268.
istidlálí, 330.
istidráj, 221, 224.
iṣṭifá, 265, 390.
istighráq, 381, 385.
istikhárat, 3.
iṣṭilám, 390.
iṣṭiná`, 390.
istiqámat, 104, 177, 301, 377.
istiṭá`at, 75.
istiwá, 307.
íthár, 189-95.
ithbát, 379, 380, 386.
ittiḥád, 152, 198, 254.
ittiṣál, 415.
`iyán, 356, 370, 373.

J.

jabr, 17, 272, 288, 324.

See Predestination.
jadhb, 195.
jadhbat, 248.
jadhbí, 330.
jalál, 177, 288, 376.
jam`, 237, 238, 251-60, 266, 285, 380.
See Union with God.
jam`-i himmat (himam), 258, 282.
jam` al-jam`, 39, 259.
jam`-i salámat, 257.
jam`-i taksír, 257, 258.
jamál, 177, 288, 376.
ján, 197, 199, 309.
janábat, 293.
jawáb, 386.
jawhar, 386.
jihád, 364.
al-jihád al-akbar, 200.
jism, 386.
jubba, 50, 102.
júd, 317.

K.

kabíra, 225, 295.

kabúdí, 17.
kadar, 30, 32.
kafsh, 345.
kalám, 17, 307.
kamál, 288.
kámil, 85, 407.
karámat, karámát, 109, 177, 213, 214, 218-35, 255, 282, 291, 323,
324, 377, 379.
See Miracles.
kasb, 28, 195, 225, 254.
kashf, 4, 47, 59, 111, 226, 265, 374, 380, 414.
khánaqáh, 69.
kharq, 57, 417.
khashíshí, 94.
kháṣṣ al-kháṣṣ, 382.
khaṭar, 5, 149.
khaṭarát, 144, 384.
kháṭir, 387, 388.
khatm, 5.
khawáṭir, 149.
khawf, 371.
khidmat, 191, 218, 271.
khirqat, 47.
khiṭáb, 415.
khullat, 73, 326.
khuṣúṣiyyat, 257.
kibrít-i aḥmar, 7.
kitmán-i sirr, 380.
Knowledge, 11-18, 108.
See `ilm.
—— of God. See Gnosis and ma`rifat.
kulliyyat, 26, 379, 385.

L.

laḥq, 373.
laṭá´if, 385.
Law, the, 14, 15, 139, 140.
See sharí`at.
lawá´iḥ, 385.
lawámi`, 385.
Liberality, 317-19.
lisán al-ḥál, 356.
Love, Divine, 23, 24, 32, 33, 34, 38, 67, 102, 103, 107, 136, 137,
138, 156, 157, 180, 187, 211, 258, 288, 297, 304-13, 330, 331,
376, 377, 390, 405.
See maḥabbat.
Lust, 115, 128, 208, 209, 240.
luṭf, 377-9.

M.

madhhab-i Thawrí, 125.

mafqúd, 164.
maghlúb, 246, 312.
—— al-qulúb, 85.
Magic, 151, 152.
maḥabbat, 26, 117, 157, 178, 187, 211, 297, 305, 306, 310.
maḥall, 244.
maḥfúz, 225, 239, 241.
maḥq, 373.
maḥram, 349.
maḥw, 59, 373, 379.
makásib, 254.
malámat, 62-9, 94, 100, 119, 175, 183-4.
malik, 387.
malja´, 384.
Man, the constitution of, 198, 199.
maní, 238.
ma`ní, 35.
manjá, 385.
maqám, maqámát, 7, 33, 58, 110, 157, 177, 180-3, 236, 258, 265,
291, 301, 370-3.
See Stations of the Mystic Path.
maqhúr, 368.
mardán, 327.
ma`rifat, 16, 79, 152, 178, 194, 225, 267-77, 326, 382-3, 390.
See Gnosis.
Marriage, 360-6.
mashárib, 301.
mashrab, 414.
maskanat, 60.
ma`ṣúm, 225, 241, 298.
ma`túh, 312.
mawaddat, 187.
mawáhib, 254.
mawjúd, 164.
miḥnat, 26.
Miracles, 152, 168, 213, 214, 215, 218-35, 323, 324.
See karámat.
mi`ráj, 238.
miskín, 60.
mizaj, 281.
Mortification, 195-210, 256, 257, 346.
See mujáhadat.
mu`ámalát, 30, 38, 41.
mu´ánasat, 382.
mu`áyanat, 331.
mubtadí, 167, 407.
muḍtarr, 316.
mufarrid, 362.
muftariq, 255.
muḥáḍarat, 373, 374.
muḥádathat, 380, 381.
muḥawwil-i aḥwál, 41.
muḥdath, 92, 263, 270, 293, 386.
muḥibb, 26.
mujáhadat, 35, 36, 47, 50, 70, 85, 95, 113, 127, 170, 176, 182, 184,
195-210, 292, 296, 325, 329, 382.
See Mortification.
mujálasat, 159.
mujarrad, 61.
mu`jizat, 219-26, 230, 324, 394.
mujtami`, 255, 367.
mukáshafat, 4, 22, 373-4.
mukhlaṣ, 85.
mukhliṣ, 85, 265.
mukḥula, 345.
munáját, 344, 380.
muníb, 295.
muntahí, 168.
muqarrabán, 4, 295.
múqin, 144.
muraqqa`át, 45-57, 69, 73, 94.
muríd, 85, 107, 157, 211, 265, 370, 414.
murshid, 172.
muruwwat, 328, 334.
musabbib, 327.
musáfirán, 340.
musámarat, 380, 381.
musháhadat, 37, 50, 70, 85, 95, 113, 127, 129, 155, 165, 170, 176,
184, 201, 237, 275, 280, 296, 325, 329, 373, 382.
See Contemplation.
mushtáq, 265.
Music, 399-413.
mustaghriq, 373.
mustahlik, 308.
mustami`, 174, 402.
mustaqím, 184, 369.
mustaṣwif, 35.
muta´ahhil, 349.
mutakallim, 131, 154.
mutakawwin, 369.
mutamakkin, 119, 152, 168, 369, 372.
mutaraddid, 372.
mutaṣawwif, 34, 35, 172.
mutaṣawwifa, 16.
mutawassiṭ, 407.
muwaḥḥid, 270, 278.
 N.

nabí, 129.
nadam, 294.
nadámat, 295, 296, 297.
nafs, 149, 154, 182, 196-210, 240, 277, 303, 404.
See Soul, the lower.
nafs-i lawwáma, 62.
nafy, 379, 380, 386.
najwá, 352, 385.
nakirat, 79, 178.
na`layn, 345.
namáz, 300.
Name, the great, of God, 105.
Names of God, 317, 382.
naskh-i arwáḥ, 260.
nifáq, 89, 291.
Novices, discipline of, 54, 195, 301, 302, 338, 354.
numúd, 167.
Nuqabá, 214.

O.

Obedience, 85, 90, 287, 288, 311, 312.

P.

palás, 51.
Pantheism, 243, 246.
 See ḥulúl, ittiḥád, imtizáj, faná, tawḥíd, Union with God.
Paradise, of no account, 107, 111;
the effect of God’s satisfaction, 199.
pársá-mardán, 265.
Passion, 207-10.
See hawá.
Patience, 86.
Persecution of Ṣúfís, 137, 140, 154, 190, 191.
Pilgrimage, the, 107, 326-9.
pindásht, 150, 155.
pír, 17, 55.
Poetry, the hearing of, 397, 398.
Poets, the pre-Islamic, 372.
Polytheism, 38, 113, 132.
See shirk.
Poverty, practical, 60;
spiritual, 19-29, 49, 58-61, 121, 127, 349;
voluntary and compulsory, 71, 316.
See faqr.
Praise of God. See dhikr.
Prayer, 11, 300-4.
Predestination, 17, 104, 203, 209, 210, 273.
See jabr.
Prophets, miracles of the, 219-26.
See mu`jizat.
—— the, superior to the Saints, 129, 219, 235-9.
—— and Saints, the, superior to the Angels, 239-41.
Purgation, 70.
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