AFRICA’S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT:

PERSPECTIVES FROM EMERGING COUNTRIES

Africa’s Engagement
with the Responsibility
to Protect in
the 21st Century
Edited by
Nicholas Idris Erameh
Victor Ojakorotu
 Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from
Emerging Countries

Series Editor
Ajay Dubey, African Studies Association of India (ASA India), Centre for
African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
The 21st century has been characterized by a global rush to engage
African countries. Unlike in the past, globalization has given African
countries options to select and diversify their engagements. Though tradi-
tional powers are still trying to reinforce their links, African countries have
generally found it more empowering to reduce their traditional depen-
dence and develop more equitable relations with counties of the South,
especially with emerging economies. Different regions and countries of
the world find different opportunities and challenges in their attempts
to engage the African region. Similarly, African countries, along with the
African Union and other regional organizations, find different advantages
in diversifying their traditional dependence. However, the new engage-
ments have neither replaced the traditional engagement of Africa, nor are
they wholly unproblematic from African perspectives. In this context, it is
essential to understand and analyse emerging Africa’s global engagements.
To that end, this series will cover important countries and regions,
including traditional powers, that engage African countries, the African
Union and African regional organisations. The book series will also
address global and regional issues that exclusively affect African countries.
Books in the series can be either monographs or edited works.
Expected Content:
The series will focus on the following aspects, among others:

. In its current global engagement, is Africa still a “helpless” player?

Who dictates the terms of Africa’s new engagement, and how it
impacts various African countries?
. In the current competition between traditional powers and emerging
economies to engage Africa, is Africa’s global engagement merely
undergoing a geographical shift, or is it moving toward increasingly
equitable international relations? How traditional powers have re-
strategised themselves to retain their influence on Africa and how
Africa is responding to them?

How is Africa involved in the issues of global governance and how it

negotiates and navigates its positions on issues of global concerns? Multi-
disciplinary perspectives connecting African countries with other parts of
the world through culture, literature, music, and art.
 Nicholas Idris Erameh · Victor Ojakorotu
Editors

Africa’s Engagement
with the Responsibility
to Protect in the 21st
Century
Editors
Nicholas Idris Erameh Victor Ojakorotu
Department of Research & Studies Department of Political Studies &
Nigerian Institute of International International Relations
Affairs (NIIA) Northwest University
Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria Mafikeng, South Africa

ISSN 2662-7825 ISSN 2662-7833 (electronic)

Africa’s Global Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries
ISBN 978-981-99-8162-5 ISBN 978-981-99-8163-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2

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 Contents

Philosophical, Theoretical and Historical Overview of The

Responsibility to Protect
Africa’s Engagement with the Responsibility to Protect
in the Twenty-First Century 3
Nicholas Idris Erameh and Victor Ojakorotu
Responsibility-to-Protect and a Tri-dimensional
Methodology: Exploring the Epistemic-Morality
of an Interventionist Principle 17
Ronald Olufemi Badru and Temitope Oluwaseun Oluyemi
From Peacekeeping to Responsibility to Protect:
Unpacking the Genealogy and History of the RtoP
Doctrine in the International Humanitarian System 41
Peter Inalegwu Awodi and Sharkdam Wapmuk

Theory and Pratice of The Responsibility to Protect in

Africa
Responsibility to Protect in Libya or Regime Change?
What We Have Learned? 63
Emmanuel Chijindu Anabiri and Pfano Mashau

v
vi CONTENTS

Horizontal Inequality and Violence in Cote d’Ivoire: The

Complexity of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Doctrine 79
Omosefe Oyekanmi
On Responsibility for the Security of Others:
An Ethnographic Case Study of Civilian Joint Task Force
Insurgent Peace in Borno State, North-Eastern Region
of Nigeria 93
Oluwaseun Bamidele
Conflict-Proofing Civilian Protection Rules in the Sahel:
The Challenge of the Responsibility to Protect 113
Kalilou Sidibé
The Anglophone Cameroon Conflict and the Responsibility
to Protect 127
Richard U. Gbemudia and Derrick Teneng Cho
The Responsibility to Protect and International
Community Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency
in Nigeria 147
Oladiran Afolabi and Phemelo Olifile Marumo
From Regionalization of Peacekeeping to the Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP) in Africa: The Gambia Experience 163
Ishaya Umaru Tanimu-Saminaka
and Fatima Favour-Tamar Tanimu
The Responsibility to Protect in American Foreign Policy
Towards Africa 173
Christophe Dongmo

Emerging and Contending Issues from The Pratice of The

Responsibility to Protect in Africa
The African Union, Responsibility to Protect
and the Mantra of African Solutions to Africa Problems 197
Samuel Osagie Odobo, Ikenna Mike Alumona,
and Nicholas Idris Erameh
 CONTENTS vii

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP):

Coordinating Approaches Between the United Nations
Security Council and the International Criminal Court 219
Natalie Zähringer
Peace Enforcement in the Face of International Military
Intervention 235
Micheal Oluwasegun Aregbesola and Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa
The Media, Armed Conflict, and the Responsibility to Protect 251
Nureni Aremu Bakenne and Israel Ayinla Fadipe
The Legal Discourse on the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) in Africa 269
Dodeye Uduak Williams
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the Avoidance
of Responsibility: Ending Atrocity Crimes in Northern
Nigeria 287
Uzezi Ologe and Ernest Toochi Aniche
Environmental Challenges, Climate Change
and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Africa 313
Deborah Odu Obor and Joseph Peter Ochogwu

Institutionalzation, Consolidation and Prospects of The

Responsibility to Protect in Africa
From the Sustainable Development Goal 16 to the African
Union Silencing the Guns Agenda: Why It Is So Difficult
to Achieve Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa? 339
Patrick Ateah Yeboah and John Peter Okoro
Can the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Act
as Deterrence Against Mass Atrocity and Human Rights
Infringement in Africa? 357
Nicholas Idris Erameh, Victor Ojakorotu,
and Ambassador Robert Adebiyi
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP): Norm
Institutionalisation, Issues and Challenges 379
Enemaku Umar Idachaba
viii CONTENTS

Responsibility to Protect: From Contestation

to Internationalization 401
Victor Ojakorotu, Nicholas Idris Erameh, and Sheriff Folarin
 Notes on Contributors

Ambassador Robert Adebiyi had a Bachelor of Science in Political

Science & International Relations, University of Liberia and Master’s
(M.Sc.) Degree in International Relations from Obafemi Awolowo
University, Ile Ife, Nigeria. Adebiyi also holds another M.Sc. degree in
European Studies, Integration Policy of the European Union, Global
Management, and Development from the Universities of Leuven and
Antwerp, Belgium, respectively. Adebiyi later joined the United Nations
(UN) and worked for several UN agencies and field missions across
regions of the world. Upon retirement from the UN, he joined the
Africa Progressive Group, which is a think tank initiative to support
the plans and goals of President Olusegun Obasanjo. He is currently
engaged as the deputy secretary to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC)-Nigeria Business Council.
Dr. Oladiran Afolabi is an Assistant Professor and presently the
Programme Coordinator of the Politics and Law programme, College
of Management and Social Sciences, Bowen University, Iwo, Nigeria.
He had previously served as the Programme coordinator of Political
Science and International Relations. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He was formerly a senior
lecturer and Head of Department of Political science, Kwame Nkrumah
School of International Affairs, Political Science and Public Administra-
tion, Houdegbe North American University, Benin Republic. He has
published learned articles in local and International journals.

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Ikenna Mike Alumona is a Professor of Comparative Politics and

Security Studies in the Department of Political Science, Chukwuemeka
Odumegwu Ojukwu University, Igbariam, Anambra State. He is presently
the Head Department of Research and Linkages, Centre for Intelli-
gence and Security Analysis, Department of State Services, Abuja. He
received his Ph.D. from Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria, with
specialty in Comparative Government and Politics. He is a recipient of
several travel grants, including that of Tertiary Education Trust Fund
Abuja, with which he attended the Professional Grant Writer Training
on EU Research Grant organized by the University of Turku, Finland
in 2022. His research interests are in the areas of Security and Gover-
nance Strategy, Peace and Conflict management, party and pressure
group politics and electoral studies. His recent essays on these and other
related themes have been published in reputable outlets. He has also
written and co-edited books among which includes Internal Security
Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons (Singapore:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), Regionalism, Security and Development in
Africa (London: Routledge, 2021), Anonymous Power: Parties, Interest
Groups and the Politics of Decision Making in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
(Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
Emmanuel Chijindu Anabiri holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from
the iconic and premier University of Ibadan. He has a multidisciplinary
perspective to issues and ideas and that informs why his research interest
is multidimensional. His research interest cuts across different areas in
political science such as Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Interna-
tional Relations, Strategic and Defense Studies, Witchcraft and Politics to
mention but a few. His critical mind and disposition to ideas has gained
him some credit in the academia. Dr. Anabiri is married and has two
children.
Ernest Toochi Aniche earned B.Sc., M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees of
the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria with bias
in International Relations. He is the Head, Department of Political
Science, Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Dr. Aniche
has published prolifically in impact factor journals indexed/abstracted
in Web of Science and Scopus. He has also co-edited books, authored
and co-authored book chapters published by reputable publishers like
Routledge, Palgrave Macmillan, Rowman & Littlefield International, and
Oxford University Press. He is on the editorial board of journals and
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

publishers particularly Springer Nature (SN) Social Sciences, Ubuntu

and Cambridge Scholars Publishing. He has presented papers in various
international conferences in USA, Canada, Germany, Finland, South
Africa, and Ghana. Dr. Aniche is a postgraduate external examiner at
University of Pretoria and University of Zululand both in South Africa.
He is a recipient of several travel grants from UNESCO-EU and Jean
Monnet-ERASMUS.
Michael Oluwasegun Aregbesola graduated from the University of
Ibadan with a bachelor’s degree in Political Science in 2015, and the
same institution also awarded him his first master’s degree in Political
Science (International Relations) in 2017. In 2021, the University of
Bristol awarded Micheal another master’s degree in Development and
Security. Micheal is a 2020 Commonwealth Shared Scholar, a 2017 Teach
For Nigeria Fellow and a 2016 President Barack Obama Young African
Leadership Initiative (YALI) fellow. Michael’s research interests lie at the
nexus of Conflict, Security, Governance, and Development. In the spring
of 2024, Michael will begin his doctoral studies at Kent State University
in Political Science with a focus on Conflict Analysis and Management.
Peter Inalegwu Awodi is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Polit-
ical Science in the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, where he also obtained
an M.Sc. degree. His doctoral dissertation focuses on the identity and
security dynamics of the Anglophone-crisis in Cameroon. As a Political
Scientist and a researcher in International Relations, his wider research
interests covers human security, terrorism and counterterrorism, Respon-
sibility to Protect, Resource-based Conflicts and Indigenous Conflict
Resolutions. Peter is a multiple research grants winner with the Social
Science Research Council (SSRC) and the Minerva Centre for the Rule
of Law under Extreme Conditions in the University of Haifa, Israel. He is
a member of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research
in Africa (CODESRIA) and African Studies Association of Africa (ASAA),
and an alumnus of the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany.
Peter has presented research papers at numerous international academic
conferences and seminars.
Ronald Olufemi Badru is an Associate Professor in Political Philosophy
and Development Ethics, Department of Politics & International Rela-
tions, Lead City University, Ibadan, Nigeria. He also teaches Introduction
to Logical Argument and Legal Epistemology, Faculty of Law, Lead City
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

University, Ibadan, Nigeria. A basic area of recent scholarly research is the

Philosophy of Peace and Conflict Management. He has published in some
high-impact, scopus-indexed journals as well as also written some quality
chapters in scholarly edited books.
Nureni Aremu Bakenne is a Doctoral Research Fellow in the Depart-
ment of Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent
University, Belgium. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Mass Communica-
tion from Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago Iwoye and Master of Science
in Mass Communication from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. His
major research interests include Journalism and Media Studies, Indige-
nous Language Media, African Studies, Cultural Communication and
Community Broadcasting. He has published articles and chapters in
both local and international journals and publishers such as Palgrave
Macmillan, Springer International, Taylor and Francis Ltd, Contempo-
rary and Lifestyle Journalism, The Journal of Society and Media, Journal
of Education Research, Journal of Human Rights and Gender Educa-
tion, Journal of Association of Communication Scholars and Professionals of
Nigeria and Indigenous African Popular Music, Volume 2 among others.
The recent is a chapter contribution in African Language Media, 1st
Edition (2023).
Dr. Oluwaseun Bamidele, Ph.D. is a lecturer at Department of Peace
and Conflict Studies, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria. He holds a
first D.Phil. in Peace and Security Studies (Nigeria) and a second D.Phil.
in Development Studies (South Africa) and teaches various courses
including Security, Conflict and Development Studies. He held schol-
arships in institutions such as Gerda Henkel Stiftung, Germany; Next
Generation Social Sciences in Africa Program, Social Science Research
Council and Carnegie Corporation of New York; CODESRIA College
of Academic Mentors Institute, Council for the Development of Social
Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal and Carnegie
Corporation of New York, USA. He is currently with the Centre for Legal
Integration in Africa, Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape, South
Africa.
Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa Ph.D., is the Head; Division of Secu-
rity and Strategic Studies; Research and Studies Department, Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos, Nigeria. He teaches
International Relations, Strategic Studies, Peace Studies and Conflict
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

Resolution at the University of Lagos (UNILAG), Lagos State University

(LASU) and Babcock University (as a Visiting Lecturer) respectively. He
is a Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany) and International Peace Academy
(U.S.A) scholar. He is a visiting scholar to the University of Calgary,
Calgary, Canada. He has attended several National and International
Conferences, Seminars and Workshops. His research interests include
Security, Strategic and War Studies, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Post-
conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building, Internally Displaced Persons,
Refugee Studies, Migration, Multilateralism and Development Studies
among others. He has many publications to his credit, both local and
international in reputable and high-profile journals, book chapters and
books. He is a Consultant to the Economic Community of West African
States. He has also been part of several Nigerian delegations to the
Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and the
United Nations. He was Editor, Nigerian Forum (An Opinion Journal of
the Institute), 2011–2016; the Book Review Editor (2011–2019), and the
current Editor of the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs (NJIA),
since 2019 till date. He is a member of Editorial Board of Adeboye Insti-
tute for Peace and Good Governance (AIPGG), Journal of Humanities
and Peace Studies, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Nigeria.
Dr. Derrick Teneng Cho is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the NRF
South African Research Chair: Cities, Law and Environmental Sustain-
ability (CLES) at the Faculty of Law, North-West University (NWU).
He had his Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) from the University of Buea
(Cameroon) in 2013 with Second Class Honours. Having developed an
interest in legal research, he proceeded to enroll for a Master of Laws
(LL.M.) in English Law at the University of Yaoundé II (Cameroon) and
completed same in 2015. In 2019, he gained admission and enrolled
for his Doctor of Laws (LL.D.) in Public Law and Legal Philosophy
at the NWU, Mafikeng Campus, where he completed and graduated
in December 2021. Dr. Derrick’s research interests gravitate toward
the fields of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, Interna-
tional Criminal law, Transitional Justice, and Environmental and Urban
Sustainability.
Christophe Dongmo is a Senior Research Associate (non-resident),
Leiden University African Studies Centre; and Fellow of the Law and
Development Research Network. Previously, he served as Senior Regional
Executive Officer at the International Committee of the Red Cross;
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Country Representative (Cameroon), Denis & Lenora Foretia Founda-

tion; and Senior Research Fellow, The Hague Academy of International
Law, The Netherlands. His areas of expertise are Political Economy of
the Developing World, International Human Rights Law, and Amer-
ican Diplomacy. He holds advanced degrees in International Law of
Human Rights, University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa), African-
American History (Vanderbilt University, USA) and Political Science
(Johns Hopkins University, USA).
Dr. Nicholas Idris Erameh possess a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.), Masters
of Science (M.Sc.) and Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Political Science
with specialization in International Relations, from Department of Polit-
ical Science, University of Ibadan. Erameh is currently a Senior Research
Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and a
post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Political Studies and Inter-
national Relations, North-West University (NWU), South Africa. Before
joining NIIA, Erameh taught at the Department of Political Science
and International Relations at Chrisland University, Abeokuta, Ogun
State, where he rose to the position of Acting Coordinating Head of
Department (Political Science & International Relations). Erameh is
a recipient of several grants, awards, and scholarship prizes and also
published several articles in well referenced international journals with the
Consequentialism- Deontology Theorizing, Armed Humanitarian Inter-
vention and the 2012 Central African Republic Crisis, published in the
Journal of Global Responsibility to Protect as most recent. He has also
attended and presented academic papers at several local and international
conferences within Africa and across the globe.
Israel Ayinla Fadipe is lecturer at Ajayi Crowther University, Faculty
of Communication and Media Studies, Oyo, Nigeria. He specializes in
communication, cultural and gender studies, and has published arti-
cles, chapters and books in both local and international journals and
publishers such as Palgrave Macmillan, Springer International, Taylor
and Francis Ltd, Malthouse Press Limited, Ibadan Journal of Humanistic
Studies, Journal of Communication and Media Research, International
Journal of Communication, Muziki-Journal of Music Research in Africa,
Africology: Journal of Pan-African Study, Journal of Culture and Envi-
ronment, Journal of Communication and Language Arts, EJOTMAS and
The Journal of Society and Media, Catalan Journal of Communication
and Cultural Studies, Gender and Behaviour, Journal of African Films
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

and Diaspora Studies, Performance Arts and Communication Studies in

these areas. He graduated from the Department of Communication and
Language Arts, University of Ibadan, with B.A. in Creative Writing, M.A.
in Popular Music and Ph.D. in Applied and Gender Communication.
Sheriff Folarin has a PhD in International Relations, a Master’s in Polit-
ical Science, a Bachelor’s in History and with over 23 years university
teaching and research. Sheriff Folarin became a full professor of interna-
tional relations at Covenant University in 2017 and has since served in
notable universities in Africa and the United States. His areas of research
interest include foreign policies of world powers; foreign policies and soft
power of African states; governance, politics and public policy in Africa;
peace, conflict and security (strategic) studies; and international and
comparative public administration. He has over 90 publications, including
Rwanda’s Radical Transformation since the end of the 1994 Genocide
(Springer/Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), United Nations and Sustainable
Development Goals (Springer/Palgrave-Macmillan, 2022); Religion and
Global Politics: Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond (Rowman and Little-
field/Lexington Books); Visibility and Relevance in International Politics:
National Role Conceptions and Nigeria’s Policy in Africa (MEI, 2014);
and Readings in Peace and Conflict Studies (Covenant University Press-
2013)
Richard U. Gbemudia is a doctoral candidate at the Department of
Political Science, University of Ibadan. Ibadan. His primary research
interests are African intellectual history, Political Theory, security issues
broadly, terrorism, and conflicts. He is a research fellow at the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos, working on The Role of
the United States of America in Nigeria’s Fight against Terrorism. He
co-developed and wrote course material on the Politics of Intervention,
Conflict Resolution, and Management for the National Open University
of Nigeria (NOUN). And he is currently co-writing a course material on
Strategic Analysis and Defense Policies for the same institution.
Dr. Enemaku Umar Idachaba received his Ph.D. in International Rela-
tions from the University of Ibadan, where he is currently a senior
lecturer. He has published widely in international journals and chapters
in book. Among others he has written on Counterinsurgency Strategies
and the Approach to the Peace in Somalia: An Appraisal of the African
Union. He is a recipient of the prestigious academic fellowship and grants
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

for thesis writing Dakar, Senegal and members of several professional

academic societies.
Prof. Phemelo Olifile Marumo is currently a Senior Lecturer in the
school of philosophy, the faculty of humanities, North West University,
South Africa. He specializes in African philosophy, which he blends with
missiology and African developments to bring out a better understanding
of Africanism. He independent research, especially on African history,
can be attributed to his contribution during Covid-19, wherein his arti-
cles highlighted new knowledge that linked African thought and Western
ideology. He has served as a key note speaker in International Confer-
ence and presented papers in different conferences. Most of his articles
have been peer-reviewed to guarantee quality and new knowledge. He
can be contacted on the research gate, linked for further information and
details.
With a Ph.D. in International Relations, a Master’s in Political Science,
a Bachelor’s in History and with over 23 years university teaching and
research, Sheriff Folarin became a full professor of international rela-
tions at Covenant University in 2017 and has since served in notable
universities in Africa and the United States. His areas of research interest
include foreign policies of world powers; foreign policies and soft power
of African states; governance, politics and public policy in Africa; peace,
conflict and security (strategic) studies; and international and comparative
public administration. He has over 90 publications, including Rwanda’s
Radical Transformation since the end of the 1994 Genocide (Springer/
Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), United Nations and Sustainable Development
Goals (Springer/Palgrave Macmillan, 2022); Religion and Global Politics:
Soft Power in Nigeria and Beyond (Rowman and Littlefield/Lexington
Books); Visibility and Relevance in International Politics: National Role
Conceptions and Nigeria’s Policy in Africa (MEI, 2014); and Readings
in Peace and Conflict Studies (Covenant University Press, 2013).
Professor Pfano Mashau is an academic at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, School of Entrepreneurship and Management. He holds a Ph.D. in
Management. He also has various non-degree career development certifi-
cates acquired from short programmes (Locally and internationally). As
an academic, he is involved in lecturing at the undergraduate and post-
graduate levels. His research focus is on Small Business Development,
Innovation, Business Management, Entrepreneurship and Agglomeration
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii

Economies. Prior to working as an academic, he worked for JET Educa-

tion Services, BioRegional and a few small businesses. Prof. Mashau has
published over 40 research articles, supervised eight doctoral theses to
completion, and over 20 Masters Dissertations. Some of the research
work has been presented at international conferences. He has been an
editor for journals and books. He is a Pan African Research Council
member and the Institute of Business Advisors. He was briefly appointed
as eThekwini Municipality City Planning Commissioner.
Dr. Deborah Odu Obor is a research fellow at the Institute for Peace and
Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria.
Her work at the Institute focuses on research, training and capacity
building, interventions, and policy writing. Her research interest is in the
areas of climate change, food security, women, peacebuilding, security
and conflict analysis, and mediation. She holds a Doctor of Philosophy
(Ph.D.) in Sociology from the University of Ibadan. Deborah is a United
States Institute of Peace (USIP) Generation Change Fellow, a Member
Young African Leadership Initiative (YALI-RLC), and a Rotary Peace
Activator. Recently, she was awarded as a Rotary Peace Fellow.
Dr. Joseph Peter Ochogwu is currently the Director General of the Insti-
tute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). He possesses over 20 years
of expertise and multi-disciplinary peace and conflict experience in social
integration and sector-specific skills in policy formulation, diagnostic
and prognostic analytical research—explicitly relating to peacebuilding,
conflict transformation, resolution, parliamentary reforms, leadership and
organizational development, policy analysis, and social development. He
takes leadership in promoting methodological approaches to Conflict
mitigation activities and Programme Management strategies. He special-
izes in using political economy analysis tools and approaches to deliver
clients’ evidence-based reports.
Samuel Osagie Odobo holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Strategic Studies from
University of Ibadan. His professional experience is concentrated in crisis
management, conflict resolution policy analysis, peace research, and facili-
tation of alternative dispute resolution processes. He also teaches conflicts
and wars, philosophies of peace, and concepts and practices of peace-
building. He is a member of the Society for Peace Studies and Practice
(SPSP).
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Prof. Victor Ojakorotu, who currently Deputy Director, School of

Government Studies, Mafikeng at North West University, Mafikeng,
South Africa. His research interests are African Politics, Nigeria, Conflict
and Peace, Environmental Politics and Security. He is widely published in
internationally accredited academic journals on the vexing subject of the
Niger Delta. Some of the books he has published on the Niger Delta are
Contending Issues in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Fresh Dimensions on the
Niger Delta Crisis of Nigeria, Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence
in the Niger Delta of Nigeria and Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crisis:
Causes, Consequences and Opportunities for Peace.
John Peter Okoro is currently a Ph.D. Candidate (researching environ-
mental conflict) at the Department of Environment and Sustainability
Sciences, University for Development Studies, Tamale Ghana. He is a
recipient of the West African Center for Water, Irrigation and Sustain-
able Agriculture (WACWISA) Ph.D. scholarship. He is an alumnus of the
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Among others, John Peter
Okoro holds a Master of Philosophy in Development Management from
the University for Development Studies, Ghana, a Master of Science in
Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution from the National Open University
of Nigeria, an M.B.A. in Financial Innovation for Economic Develop-
ment from the Jerusalem Business School Israel, Bachelor of Science in
Criminology and Security Studies from the National Open University of
Nigeria. He is well-published in reputable journals in the area of security,
conflict, peacebuilding, crime, and policing.
Uzezi Ologe is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Political Science,
University of Ibadan, and a Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. An early career researcher,
his research interest is increasingly coalescing around issues of conflict,
conflict resolution and management within democratic political systems
and their intersection with international politics and security. He can be
reached at +2348156736219.
Temitope Oluwaseun Oluyemi is a Ph.D. Candidate and also a Lecturer,
Department of Politics & International Relations, Lead City University,
Ibadan, Nigeria. Her research focus straddles International Relations and
Gender studies.
Omosefe Oyekanmi is a research fellow in the Political and Gover-
nance Policy Department, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix

Research, Ibadan, Nigeria. She is also an academic facilitator at the

University of Ibadan Distance learning center. Omosefe is a laureate of
the British Academy funded program, Writing and Researching the Polit-
ical Economy of Inequality in Africa (WARIA) cohort 2021. She is a
prestigious scholar of the CODESRIA College of Mentors and Mentees
(2019), and a Research Fellow at Ibadan School of Government and
Public Policy (ISGPP). She is a peace building practitioner and has
published articles, cutting across humanitarianism, development, public
policy, gender issues, and international peace building.
Kalilou Sidibé est docteur en droit public. Il est chargé d’enseignement
(science politique et relations internationales; droit international public et
droit international humanitaire et droits de l’homme) à l’Université des
Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako au Mali. Depuis 2017, il est
expert juridique national du Centre des Ressources en Droit International
Humanitaire de Diakonia au Mali. Il occupe le poste de Coordinateur
National de African Security Sector Network (ASSN) au Mali pour le
compte du Projet « Alliance Just Future » mis en œuvre au Mali, Niger,
RDC, Soudan du Sud et Afghanistan. Ses domaines de recherche sont la
réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest, les conflits, l’inté-
gration régionale et les réformes politiques et institutionnelles. Il a publié
plusieurs articles sur les conflits au Mali et au Sahel.
Fatima Favour-Tamar Tanimu Ph.D. is a Senior Fellow and Reistar at
Zinta Institute, the Gambia who holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree
(Ph.D. ) in Multicultural Education in Africa from the International
University Bamenda, Cameroon, Central Africa. She is an adjunct lecturer
in the sociology of education at the International University Bamenda.
She is a Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of the Gambia,
West Africa.
Ishaya Umaru Tanimu-Saminaka Ph.D. is a former Dean, American
International University of West Africa (AIUWA). He earned a Doctor
of Philosophy degree—Ph.D. in Transformational Development Studies
at the International University Bamenda Cameroon, Central Africa. He’s
an interdisciplinary scholar with expertise in public policy, education and
strategic leadership. He is the author of Translating Human Dinity, Work
and Labour. He is a prolific teacher and lecturer in International Relations
and Diplomacy, Business Communications, and Project Management at
the University of the Gambia, West Africa and Supdeco Business School,
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dakar, Senegal. He is a Senior Fellow at the Zinta Institute, in the

Gambia.
Sharkdam Wapmuk (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor at the Depart-
ment of Defence and Security Studies (DSS), Nigerian Defence Academy
(NDA). He was the Acting Director of Research and Studies and Head,
Division of African Politics and Integration, the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. He is the author of several
publications including Nigeria-India Relations in a Changing World
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021). He is the current Editor, Arts and
Social Science Research (ASSR), Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, NDA
Kaduna. He is a Member of the Nigerian Political Science Association
(NPSA), the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) and the
Society for Peace and Practice (SPSP).
Dodeye Uduak Williams is an Associate Professor in the Department
of Political Science, University of Calabar, Nigeria with over twenty
(20) years of academic work experience. Dr. Williams is a former
Commonwealth Scholar with the Center for African Studies (2008–
2009), University of Edinburgh, UK. She teaches strategic studies, peace
and conflict studies, and other related courses at undergraduate and
postgraduate levels. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science
(Nigeria), Master of Science in International Relations (Nigeria), a Master
of Arts in Contemporary Global Security (Sheffield, United Kingdom),
and a Doctorate degree in International Relations (Nigeria). Her current
research interests tend to interrogate the complexities of the phenomena
of politics, terrorism, and violent extremism, and counterterrorism,
particularly religious terrorism within the context of contemporary armed
conflicts in Africa. She is also currently a Research Fellow at the Insti-
tute for Gender Studies, College of Human Sciences, University of South
Africa, and UNISA.
Patrick Ateah Yeboah is a development practitioner who currently works
as a Regional Advisor at GIZ, Ghana in the framework of the Gover-
nance for Inclusive Development program. He has been a Pan-African
Youth Advocate where he contributed to the pan-African youth empow-
erment work of Project Pakati under the African Leadership Institute.
Patrick again held the positive of a Research Analyst for the International
Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS) which is a global-level
representation of political science students recognized by the United
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxi

Nations. Patrick is an alumnus of the German Academic Exchange Service

(DAAD) under the West African Centre for Sustainable Rural Trans-
formation (WAC-SRT). Among others, Patrick Ateah Yeboah holds a
Master of Philosophy in Development Management and a Bachelor of
Science in Planning from the University for Development Studies, Ghana.
His general research areas are governance, sustainable livelihoods, Plan-
ning, climate change, and decentralization. His hobbies include travelling,
sports, and music.
Dr. Natalie Zähringer is a lecturer in the Department of Interna-
tional Relations at Wits University since 2002. She received a Ph.D. by
publication with the title: “Moving beyond international norm emer-
gence—Diffusion, contestation and adaptation of an international norm:
The case of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)”. Her research and
teaching interests span the fields of international law and international
organizations, focusing on the nature of international law as well as the
evolution of international norms and intergovernmental organizations.
 Abbreviations

AAI African Adaptation Initiative

ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of
Disputes
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AfDB African Development Bank
AHI Armed Humanitarian Intervention
ANSARUL ISLAM Groupe soutien à Islam
APPHRs Argument From the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
AQMI Al qu’aida au Maghreb islamique
ARC African Risk Capacity
ASAP African Solution to African Problem
ASF African Standby Force
ASS Argument From State Sovereignty
AU African Union
AU STG African Union’s Silencing the Guns
AUMR African Union Master Roadmap
AUPSC African Union Peace and Security Council
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BNC Binational Commission
CAR Central African Republic
CAT Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

xxiii
xxiv ABBREVIATIONS

CBD Convention on Biological Diversity

CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEWS Continental Early Warning Systems
ClimDev-Africa Climate for Development in Africa
COI Commission of Inquiry
CP+HI Citizens’ Perspective of Humanitarian Intervention
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
DAN BANGA Milice d’autodéfense-Niger
DANA AMBASSAGOU Milice d’autodéfense dogon-Mali
DOS Department of State
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EID Engins explosifs improvisés
EIGS Groupe état islamique au Grand Sahara
ETR Ecological Threat Report
EU European Union
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FIDH Fédération Internationale des Droits Humains
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organisation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDP Gross Domestic Production
HHSC House Homeland Security Committee
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HRC Human Right Commission
HRW Human Rights Watch
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty
IEOM International Election Observation Mission
IEP Institute for Economics and Peace
IGD Inter-generational Dialogues
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IHRL International Human Rights Law
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOs International Governmental Organisations
ISS Institute for Security Studies
 ABBREVIATIONS xxv

ISWAP Islamic West Africa Province

JNIM Jaât Nasroul islam wal Muslimine
JTF Joint Task Force
JWT Just war theory
KOGLWEOGO Milice d’autodéfense- Burkina Faso
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MGI Moral Grounds for Intervention
MMI Moral Methodology for Intervention
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPCI Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire/ Mouvement
Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire
MSEI Moral Scope and Ends of Intervention
NAPs National Action Programmes
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBI Nile Basin Initiative
NBSAPs National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NEMA Nigeria Emergency Management Agency
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NPI Nairobi Peace Initiative
NTA Nigerian Television Authority
OAU Organization of African Unity
OGBC Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation
ONUC UN operation in Congo
OYE Office of the Youth Envoy
PoC Protection of Civilians
PSC Peace and Security Committee
R2P/RtoP Responsibility to Protect
RECs Regional Economic Communities
RSICC Rome Status of International Criminal Court
RwP Responsibility while Protecting
SADC South African Development Commission
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC Security Council
SCNC Southern Cameroon National Council
SDF Social Democratic Front
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorists
SP+HI Statist Perspective of Humanitarian Intervention
TPS Temporary protected status
TVC Television Continental
UHI Unarmed Humanitarian Intervention
xxvi ABBREVIATIONS

UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change
UNOIC United Nations Office in Cote d’Ivoire
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States
VEGs Violent Extremist Groups
WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WASCAL West African Science Service Centre on Climate
Change and Adapted Land Use
WFP World Food Programme
WSOD World Summit Outcome Document
 List of Tables

The Anglophone Cameroon Conflict and the

Responsibility to Protect
Table 1 Selected events that contributed to the escalation
of the crisis in 2016 133
Table 2 Selected cases of abuses by Cameroon’s government forces
in 2021 134
Table 3 Conflict incidents by category according to ACLED
November 2022 135

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the Avoidance

of Responsibility: Ending Atrocity Crimes in Northern
Nigeria
Table 1 VEG killings and abductions across Northcentral
and Northwest Nigeria 298

xxvii
Philosophical, Theoretical and Historical
Overview of The Responsibility to Protect
Africa’s Engagement with the Responsibility
to Protect in the Twenty-First Century

Nicholas Idris Erameh and Victor Ojakorotu

Introduction
Armed conflict, which has resulted in incalculable losses of lives and prop-
erty, has remained a distinguishing feature of most developing countries,
particularly Africa (De Coning et al., 2016; Ojakorotu & Erameh, 2022).
Despite the valiant efforts of world leaders to resolve these conflicts,
the majority of African countries have remained embroiled in a series of
protracted conflicts with no end in sight (Cilliers & Schunemann, 2013;
Williams & Boutellis, 2014). Regardless of increased United Nations
(UN) involvement in Africa, the continent remains mired in obstinate and
protracted conflict. The end of the Cold War, which saw former Western

N. I. Erameh (B)
Department of Research & Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
(NIIA), Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
Present Address:
N. I. Erameh · V. Ojakorotu
Department of Political Studies and International Relations, Northwest
University, Mafikeng, South Africa

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_1
4 N. I. ERAMEH AND V. OJAKOROTU

alliance’s withdraw support from most African nations, exacerbated the

problem, as most countries witnessed more deadly intrastate conflicts
manifested in the form of new wars (Kaldor, 2012, 2013). Thus, there
have been concerns within as well as outside Africa about these new forms
of armed conflict, which have grave regional and global implications.
Given that several of these conflicts occurred during periods when the
UN principle of “non-interference” as stipulated in Article 2(4) and (7)
of its charter was in effect, efforts to intervene in some of these conflicts
were thwarted due to the problem of state sovereignty (Erameh, 2017,
2019). Other cases where the UN and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) were partially allowed to mediate saw little
success (Annan, 2014). Indeed, scholars acknowledge that these interven-
tions were hampered by a variety of challenges, including a lack of political
will, finance, institutional lapses, and operational challenges for ECOWAS
(Adetula et al., 2021; Erameh, 2021) and growing fatigue on the part
of the UN due to its long involvement (Boulden, 2013; Wyss & Tardy,
2014). Even in places where interventions were successful in reducing
tensions, several of these countries witnessed a relapse into more lethal
conflict, with grave consequences for Africa’s quest for peace, security,
and development.
Despite these daunting challenges, the need to respond to mass atroc-
ities in Africa has remained unwavering. Given that these obstinate
conflicts have far-reaching security implications for Africa and the rest of
the world, world leaders have been pressed to redouble their efforts to
reduce armed conflict in Africa (Erameh, 2019, 2021). Considering its
pledge and commitment, the UN doubled its efforts in Africa by calling
for the hybridization of peacekeeping and peace building, while African
leaders reiterated the importance of moving beyond non-intervention to
non-indifference, as this ensures that sovereignty is not used as a shield
for leaders who commit mass atrocities against their citizens.
Because of this awareness, hegemonic powers such as Nigeria, Libya,
South Africa, and a number of others called for the dissolution of the
Organization for the African Union (OAU) in favor of a more robust
and peace-focused organization. As a result, the ECOWAS was even-
tually dissolved in favor of the African Union (AU) through the Sirte
Declaration of 2001, which resulted in the adoption of the Constitu-
tive Act. While the AU principle calls for the territorial integrity of
member states to be respected, it also promises not to tolerate any form
 AFRICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY … 5

of armed violence against civilians, which its members frequently perpet-

uate (Erameh, 2018). Thus, Articles 4 g and h of the AU Act specifically
authorize the union the authority to intervene in the affairs of member
states based on the resolution of its Assembly in cases of mass atroci-
ties ranging from war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity (AU
Constitutive Act, 2001), and even ethnic cleansing. Unlike ECOWAS, the
mandate and guiding philosophy of the AU empowered African leaders
to respond to a series of armed conflicts, but these efforts have equally
ended albeit with limited success (Kuwali, 2022; Williams et al., 2018).
Several other conflicts, in particular the Rwanda genocide, were notable
examples of in which the imperative to respond was overwhelming, but
the AU and UN were slow to respond, resulting in the deaths of several
people.
As a consequence, the genocide in Rwanda and the killings in Kosovo
became two significant events that shocked the international community’s
conscience and challenged world leaders on how they could most effec-
tively reconcile the long-standing dilemma between state sovereignty and
human rights protection. As a result, the concept of the Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP) developed. Prior to the adoption of the RtoP, a series
of contentions and counter-arguments dominated discourse regarding its
legality, taking into account state claims to sovereignty as enshrined in
the UN Charter. Regardless, the international community established the
International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
in 2001 with the task of devising acceptable responses to these obstinate
and protracted conflicts.
The RtoP is guided by three fundamental principles: states must
protect their citizens from mass atrocities such as war crimes, geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and the international
community must assist the state in accomplishing this goal. When a state
is unable or unwilling to protect its civilian population from the afore-
mentioned crimes, the international community may intervene through
the RtoP, which may include the use of force (ICISS, 2001). Since its
adoption in 2005 through the World Summit Outcome Document, the
doctrine has remained an ongoing debate among security experts, heads
of state, diplomats, and even academics.
While some scholars argue that the RtoP is a watershed moment in
the post-cold war response to mass atrocities against civilians (Orford,
2013), others are concerned about its implications for state sovereignty
(Mamdani, 2010; Morris, 2015). Some argue that the doctrine is nothing
6 N. I. ERAMEH AND V. OJAKOROTU

more than a continuation of Western imperialism (Branch, 2011; Paris,

2014; Wai, 2014). Despite this ongoing debate, the 2011 Libyan crisis, a
direct result of the Arab Spring, became the RtoP’s first litmus test. While
reactions to the Libyan intervention’s method and outcome have been
mixed, the need to authorize the RtoP remains consistently compelling.
Aside from the Libya crisis, the RtoP has been mobilized through a
series of UN Security Council Resolutions around the world, including
in Africa. Various emerging and contending issues have undoubtedly
followed these RtoP interventions deployed by the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) since the 2011 Libyan crisis. Mali, Cote d’Ivoire,
South Sudan, and the Central African Republic are examples of RtoP
intervention. Despite this, several ongoing armed conflicts in Ethiopia,
Cameroon, Guinea, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Chad, Somalia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Angola,
among others, have been allowed to fester. As a result, the consequences
of these interventions and ‘non-interventions’ have sparked controversies
that have complicated the RtoP’s emerging and contending issues.
The combination of these issues, gaps, and contestations suggests that
RtoP has yet to reach the stage of norm internationalization proposed by
Finnemore and Sikkink in their Norm Life Cycle Model. As a result, the
need for broader engagement with the evolving discourse surrounding
RtoP practice in Africa is appropriate. Thus, this book, “Africa’s Engage-
ment with the Responsibility to Protect in the Twenty-First Century”
seeks to shed more light on the RtoP’s practice, challenges, and prospects
in the midst of widespread contestation, backlash, operational challenges,
and expectation gaps associated with RtoP theory and practice. It achieves
this goal by departing from previous works to provide a fresh perspective
and alternatives for future RtoP deployment. Apart from resolving the
emerging and contending issues that have bewildered the theory, prac-
tice, and mobilization of the RtoP, it will provide readers with critical
insights on how to further support, consolidate, and institutionalize the
RtoP.
For systematic and analytical purposes, this book has been divided into
four parts in tandem with the various stages of the Norm Life Cycle
Model. The four parts are shown below;
Part I—Philosophical, Theoretical & Historical Overview of the
Responsibility to Protect. This part’s topics focus on the philosophical
 AFRICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY … 7

underpinnings and history of the RtoP’s emergence. In chapter “Respon-

sibility-to-Protect and a Tri-dimensional Methodology: Exploring the
Epistemic-Morality of an Interventionist Principle”, for example, Badru
and Oluyemi investigate the origins and subsequent adoption of the RtoP
from the philosophical ethical standpoint of morality and the Just War
theory. They contribute to the evolving debate and attempt to advance a
tri-dimensional methodology of the RtoP doctrine by investigating the
historical philosophical ideas that led to the adoption of the RtoP, as
well as the motives and intentions of the actors who invoke the prin-
ciple in a given context. Others are the interventionist-actors’ motives
and intentions; (ii) the interventionist-actors’ means and methods; and
(iii) the interventionist-actors’ limits and results/outcomes. Finally, Badru
and Oluyemi propose a methodology that, if followed, yields a reliable
evaluative framework, guiding against any uncritical condemnation or
commendation of the RtoP internationally.
Then, in chapter “From Peacekeeping to Responsibility to Protect:
Unpacking the Genealogy and History of the RtoP Doctrine in the
International Humanitarian System”, Awodi and Wapmuk examined the
emergence and development of the RtoP by delving into the doctrine’s
genealogy and history, which is based on the notion of a “never again”
approach to reducing mass atrocities around the world. They presented an
in-depth analysis of the RtoP doctrine as an international statute through
the lens of Africa, tracing the origins of peacekeeping and the history of
its metamorphosis into the RtoP doctrine. They go on to look at how
the RtoP norms that submerge the concept of peacekeeping. Finally, this
chapter examines the RtoP debates and forecasts the new directions that
the doctrine may take in light of the criticisms that followed its 2011
publication.
Part II—Theory & Pratice of the Responsibility to Protect in
Africa. This part’s topics reflect on the theory and practice of the RtoP
in a variety of armed conflicts across Africa. As a result, in chapter
“Responsibility to Protect in Libya or Regime Change? What We Have
Learned?”, Emmanuel Chinjindu Anabiri and Pfano Mashau, concen-
trated on NATO’s RtoP intervention in Libya. They examined the
evolving discourse surrounding the RtoP prior to and following NATO’s
intervention in Libya through the lens of scholarly works that supported
or opposed the action. They claimed that other better options were
not seriously considered because Western powers had an internal motive
that could only be achieved under the guise of protecting civilians.
8 N. I. ERAMEH AND V. OJAKOROTU

The authors conclude that the outcome of RtoP intervention was not
unexpected. Oyekanmi Omosefe examined the legitimacy and implemen-
tation of RtoP in Cote d’Ivoire through the lens of horizontal inequality
in chapter “Horizontal Inequality and Violence in Cote d’Ivoire: The
Complexity of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Doctrine”. Focusing
tangentially on pre-conflict eras while paying close attention to the 2010
general elections in Cote d’ Ivoire and subsequent civil wars. She revealed
that the social and political history of Cote d’Ivoire was not adequately
considered in the application of the RtoP, resulting in a complication in
the interpretation of the RtoP. While acknowledging the need to reduce
human casualties, Omosefe advised that the preconditions for militarism
in RtoP be exhausted and RtoP implementation be context-specific.
Furthermore, in chapter “On Responsibility for the Security of Others:
An Ethnographic Case Study ofCivilian Joint TaskForce Insurgent Peace
in Borno State, North-Eastern Region of Nigeria”, Oluwaseun Bamidele
examines a critical aspect of the RtoP that has largely been overlooked
in contemporary protection discourse: the context of responding to
insurgency in Africa, particularly Nigeria. It examines how the RtoP is
displacing local protection and its interaction with the Civilian Joint Task-
force Force (CJTF) in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts. The chapter
concludes that the RtoP impedes the counter-insurgency strategy’s forms
of local protection, is at odds with the ‘insurgency peace’ agenda, and
risks jeopardizing the CJTF’s counter-insurgency’s notable local security
potential. In chapter “Conflict-Proofing Civilian Protection Rules in the
Sahel: The Challenge of the Responsibility to Protect”, Kalilou Sidibe
questioned the RtoP’s mobilization for civilian protection in Africa’s Sahel
region. The chapter contends that, in the current context of the Sahel,
the concept of “humanitarian intervention,” which mobilizes military
intervention by the international community to end attacks on civilians,
does not appear to be the appropriate legal framework. However, in
response to the Sahel states’ failure to protect civilians, civil society in
the Sahel is mobilizing to ensure that these states include civilian protec-
tion through the RtoP in the definition of military strategies in the fight
against terrorism.
In chapter “The Anglophone: Cameroon Conflict and the Responsi-
bility to Protect”, Richard Gbemudia and Derrick Cho-cho examined the
nature of violence and mass atrocities perpetrated by Paul Biya against
civilians in the Anglophone - Cameroon crisis in the context of global
inaction. They argue that evidence abounds to suggest that ongoing
 AFRICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY … 9

crimes in the country meet the threshold for mobilizing the RtoP, yet
the conflict has been allowed to fester. As a result, they conclude that
the international community must urgently refocus its attention on inter-
vening through the RtoP to prevent further attacks on civilians. Similarly,
in chapter “The Responsibility to Protect and International Community
Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria”, Afolabi Oladiran
and Phemelo Olifile Marumo reflected on the Boko Haram crisis and the
Nigerian government’s apparent inability to effectively protect its citizens,
particularly in areas where insurgent activity has persisted. Given that the
RtoP’s guiding principle justifies the international community intervening
in such scenarios, the authors advocated for its mobilization to protect
citizens, particularly those in the North East region, from further attacks
and mass atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram.
In chapter “From Regionalization of Peacekeeping to the Respon-
sibility to Protect (RtoP) in Africa: The Gambia Experience”, Ishaya
Umaru Tanimu-Saminaka, PhD, and Favour-Tamar Tanimu explored the
nature of the Gambia’s post-election violence, regional efforts to address
the conflict, and the implications for the regionalization of African peace-
keeping. This study was based on the theory of collective security and
used a qualitative approach, as well as secondary and primary data from
key officials from the United Nations (UN), Africa Union (AU), and
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) missions in the
Gambia. According to the study, regional bodies such as the AU and
ECOWAS must maintain this pace in response to potential armed conflict
in Africa. In addition, member states must commit to avoiding structural
problems that lead to violence. In addition, African nations must continue
to support the Panel of the Wise, the Peace and Security Council, and
the Standby Force, as well as pay attention to early warning signs of
impending conflict. Finally, in chapter “The Responsibility to Protect in
American Foreign Policy Towards Africa”, Christophe Domgo critically
examined the role of the United States in the adoption, mobilization, and
implementation of the RtoP since its inception. The chapter examined
the various RtoP interventions in Africa mobilized or sanctioned by the
US using secondary and primary sources. Domgo concludes that, despite
the challenges that greeted the US-led intervention in Libya, the country
has remained steadfast in condemning mass atrocities and mobilizing the
RtoP to protect African civilians.
Part III—Emerging & Contending Issues from the Practice of
the Responsibility to Protect in Africa. Topics in this part depart
10 N. I. ERAMEH AND V. OJAKOROTU

beyond the practice of the RtoP to investigate some of the emerging

and contending bottlenecks that have affected the doctrine’s lifespan. In
chapter “The African Union, Responsibility to Protect and the Mantra
of African Solutions to Africa Problems”, for example, Samuel Odobo,
Ikenna Alumona, and Nicholas Idris Erameh investigated the extent to
which the African Union (AU) was able to mobilize the African Solu-
tion to African Problem (ASAP) in support of the RtoP in mass armed
conflict scenarios such as Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. The authors contend
that, despite the growing prominence of the RtoP and the pursuit of
ASAP, the AU, at critical junctures in African conflicts, particularly in
the aforementioned cases, was unable to provide an appropriate response
under the mantra of ASAP. According to the authors, this quandary stems
primarily from internal divisions, a preference for sovereignty protection, a
lack of genuine commitment by its leaders to implement regional conflict
resolution initiatives, and the absence of an effective sanction regime for
noncompliance with AU decisions.
Natalie Zähringer also examined the respective clauses in the UN
Charter and the Rome Statute in chapter “Implementing the Respon-
sibility to Protect (RtoP): Coordinating Approaches Between the United
Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court”, high-
lighting the existing basis for coordination between the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and how these may be improved in an effort to strengthen RtoP.
Zähringer argued that, to date, the only international organizations with
a global reach and mandated to respond to atrocity crimes such as war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are the United Nations
and the International Criminal Court. Despite their overlapping areas of
interest, very few mechanisms have been put in place to coordinate their
approaches, one of which is the UNSC referral of cases to the ICC. With
both organizations pursuing different outcomes, protecting civilians on
the one hand and pursuing retributive justice on the other, Zähringer
concluded that the optimization of RtoP is limited.
In the fourteenth “Peace Enforcement in the Face of Interna-
tional Military Intervention”, Micheal Aregbesola and Joshua Bolarinwa
attempted to answer a fundamental question: Can international military
interventions truly enforce peace across the globe, particularly in Africa?
Reflecting on the RtoP interventions in Dafur and Sudan, they argued
that, more often than not, peacekeepers have only worked to protect
civilians at the surface/operational level, rather than addressing the root
 AFRICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY … 11

causes of violence against civilians, which has exacerbated political and

social instability in the majority of the affected countries. Bakenne and
Fadipe investigated the critical role of the media in crisis situations in
chapter “The Media, Armed Conflict, and the Responsibility to Protect”,
specifically how they monitor Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
international organizations, and voluntary agencies in implementing RtoP
in relation to vulnerable people, children, the elderly, and communities.,
and conflict-affected communities; how journalists tailor their reporting
to the welfare of the defenseless citizenry in particular; and how they fulfill
their watchdog role in general—all in the hope of making society a better
place.
Furthermore, in chapter “The Media, Armed Conflict, and the
Responsibility to Protect”, Arinze Nwgube examined the challenges of
peace building in the context of the RtoP’s central responsibility to
rebuild. Despite a series of RtoP interventions in Africa, Nwgube argued
that the inability of intervening forces, international and regional organi-
zations to carry out post-conflict peace building has resulted in a relapse
of these conflicts. This issue has resulted in the loss of lives and prop-
erty, as well as political instability and human insecurity. Dodoye Williams
investigated the legal discourse on RtoP in Africa in chapter “The Legal
Discourse on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Africa”. It delves
deeper, with a focus on the African context, into the legal dimensions
of the RtoP’s three (3) major pillars and the challenges of implementa-
tion against them. Then, in chapter “The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
and the Avoidance of Responsibility: Ending Atrocity Crimes in Northern
Nigeria”, Ologe Uzezi and Ernest Aniche observed that, since 2010,
Violent Extremist Groups (VEGs), notably Boko Haram and Fulani mili-
tants, have committed acts whose intent and methods meet the criteria
for the crime of atrocity crimes under international law across Nigeria’s
North-east, North Central, and Middle Belt regions. The inability of
successive Nigerian governments to eradicate these VEGs positions the
Nigerian case for RtoP intervention, which has yet to occur. Though
there have been studies that make the case for RtoP authorisation in
Nigeria, Ologe and Aniche deviate by combining historical and oper-
ational RtoP evidence with pragmatic analysis to explain why the UN
(Security Council), the only recognized RtoP authorizing body, fails to
do so.
Finally, Deborah Odu Obor examined the potential of RtoP as a
framework for guiding and facilitating effective responses to climate
12 N. I. ERAMEH AND V. OJAKOROTU

change-related environmental crises in Africa in chapter “Environmental

Challenges, Climate Change and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) In
Africa”. This chapter argues for the significance of applying the ‘envi-
ronmental RtoP’ principle to the traditional understanding of RtoP in
order to include environmental protection as a critical component of
ensuring human well-being and sustainable development in Africa. Obor
focused specifically on the need to investigate the practical application of
RtoP in addressing climate change-induced environmental challenges in
Africa, the role of African regional organizations, national governments,
and international actors in integrating RtoP principles into environmental
policies, strategies, and interventions, and the challenges and oppor-
tunities associated with aligning RtoP with climate change adaptation
and mitigation efforts, taking into account African countries’ distinct
social, economic, and political contexts. Furthermore, the chapter inves-
tigated the synergies between RtoP and other global environmental
governance frameworks operating in Africa, as well as the effectiveness
of the frameworks in protecting vulnerable populations.
Part IV—Institutionalization, Consolidation & Prospects of the
Responsibility to Protect in Africa. This part’s topics focus on how
the RtoP can be best consolidated and institutionalized in tandem with
the final stage of the Norm Life Cycle (i.e. Norm Internalization). In
chapter “From the Sustainable Development Goal 16 to the African
Union Silencing the Guns Agenda: Why It Is so Difficult to Achieve
Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa?”, for example, Patrick Ateah
Yeboah and John Peter Okoro questioned the extent to which the
African continent is working to actualize Agenda 16 of the SDGs (Peace,
Justice, and Strong Institutions) and, by extension, the Silencing the Guns
Agenda. According to Yeboah and Okoro, despite the importance of
these frameworks, African nations have had a difficult time implementing
them. As a result, the causes of insecurity in Africa must be regionalized.
Address the issue of misgovernance, implement citizen-centered policies,
and demonstrate a commitment to ending human insecurity.
Nicholas Idris Erameh, Victor Ojakorotu and Leke Adebiyi raised
an important question in chapter “Can the Responsibility to Protect
Doctrine Act as Deterrence Against Mass Atrocity and Human Rights
Infringement in Africa?” about the extent to which the RtoP acts as a
deterrent against mass atrocities and human rights violations in Africa.
This chapter used secondary sources to reflect on previous interventions
in Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, South Sudan, and Central African Republic,
 AFRICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY … 13

as well as the post-intervention period in Africa. Erameh and Ojakorotu

came to the conclusion that, while the RtoP appears incapable of dealing
with the numerous cases of mass atrocities, its readiness to mobilize
deters African leaders from committing such massive human rights viola-
tions against their citizens. Furthermore, in chapter “The Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP): Norm Institutionalisation, Issues and Challenges”,
Enemaku Idachaba and Eneye Okpanachi investigated the extent to which
the RtoP has been internalized as a result of the various interventions
that have occurred since its adoption. The chapter argued that the RtoP’s
challenges stem from its moralistic but ultimately dangerous attempt to
re-define traditional notions of sovereignty from a sacrosanct and invio-
lable right of states as agreed upon in international law to a responsibility
and privilege sustained only by the capacity and willingness of so-called
sovereign states to protect their citizens from egregious events, the failure
of which circumvents sovereignty and exposes the state to absurdity.
Finally, after an in-depth examination of the evolution, theory, prac-
tice, emerging, and contending issues surrounding the mobilization of
the RtoP in Africa, Victor Ojakorotu, Nicholas Idris Erameh, and Sheriff
Folarin conclude in chapter “Responsibility to Protect: From Contesta-
tion to Internationalization” by considering the extent to which the RtoP
may advance from the stage of contestation to internationalization. The
authors concluded that, while the practice of the RtoP in Africa continues
to spark controversy, turning a blind eye to atrocities against civilians is
not an option. As a result, there is an urgent need to critically examine the
RtoP intervention process in terms of “When, Why, and How the RtoP
is mobilized,” as well as the question of “Who” carries out these inter-
ventions. Most importantly, the issue of “responsibility to rebuild” must
be prioritized in order to support the peace-building process and avoid a
relapse into deadly conflict, as seen in a number of countries where RtoP
interventions have previously occurred.

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 Responsibility-to-Protect
and a Tri-dimensional Methodology:
Exploring the Epistemic-Morality
of an Interventionist Principle

Ronald Olufemi Badru and Temitope Oluwaseun Oluyemi

For centuries, right up to the beginning of our own, mass atrocity crimes
perpetrated behind state borders were seen primarily as nobody’s business.
Now, at least in principle, they are regarded as everyone’s business’.
(Cited in Putra & Cangara, 2018: 57)

R. O. Badru (B) · T. O. Oluyemi

Department of Politics and International Relations, Lead City University,
Ibadan, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
T. O. Oluyemi
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_2
18 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

Introduction and the Problem Statement

A major area of scholarly discussion in international ethics is the prin-
ciple of the responsibility-to-protect (RtoP). This principle, if it is properly
captured, is usually advanced within the context of armed humanitarian
intervention, when a powerful state (or a coalition of states) is justifiably
convinced and authorized that military intervention is highly imperative
in the internal affairs of another sovereign state, given the fact of the
substantive failure of the latter to confront and address egregious human
rights violations (genocide, for instance,) against some group of people
within its territorial boundaries. This is technically taken here as a citi-
zens’ perspective to humanitarian intervention (shortened, CP +HI ). It
could also occur to support a (weak) state when it is being unjustifiably
aggressed against by (a more powerful) state. This is technically rendered
here as a statist perspective to humanitarian intervention (shortened,
SP +HI ). Critically researched, the RtoP from the citizens’ perspective has
occasioned different scholarly arguments internationally. Some scholars
have supported the principle, taking it to be a great leap in the process of
promoting human rights across state borders. Presently, we shall take this
position as argument from the promotion and protection of human rights
(APPHRs ). However, some other scholars have contrarily contended,
taking the R2P principle as a roll-back on the international promotion
of the sovereignty of the modern state. We shall take this position as
argument from state sovereignty (ASS).
Given the above, this chapter also makes an attempt to contribute to
the scholarly discussion; though, in two specific senses: (i) it normatively
attempts to examine and interrogate the RtoP principle; though, it still
pays some attention to certain relevant descriptive cases and details, and
(ii) it advances a tri-dimensional methodology of deeper evaluation for
the RtoP principle. It evaluates: (a) the motives and the intentions of the
interventionist-actors, invoking the principle, within a given context; (b)
the means that are deployed, and the ways they are deployed, by the
interventionist-actors to contextually actualize the goal(s) of the principle,
and (c) the limits and the results (or outcomes ) of an international invoca-
tion of the principle, by the interventionist-actors. The argument is that
this methodology, if followed, outcrops into an easy and reliable evaluative
framework, guiding against any uncritical condemnation or commenda-
tion of the RtoP within the international system. This methodology may
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 19

be free-standing from the popular just war theory (JWT); though, the
proposed framework still derives some structural insights from the JWT.
Pursuing the present task, the chapter has been divided into six
sections. Apart from section ‘Introduction and the Problem Statement’,
introducing the work and giving the problem statement, section ‘The
Conceptual Framework and Analysis’ focuses on the conceptual frame-
work of the exercise; section ‘The Principle of the Responsibility-to-Pro-
tect (RtoP) at the International Level: A Brevity of the Evolution’ briefly
examines the motivation for the evolution of the RtoP principle within the
international system; section ‘Some Arguments For and Against the RtoP
Principle in Contemporary Period’ critically looks at some arguments for
and some arguments against the RtoP principle internationally; section
‘A Tri-dimensional Methodology of Evaluation, the R2P Principle, and
Justification’ focuses on and also justifies the proposed tri-dimensional
framework, advanced for a reliable evaluation of the RtoP principle, and
section ‘Summary and Conclusion’ summarizes and concludes the work.

The Conceptual Framework and Analysis

Three basic concepts/conceptual phrases frame the present discursive
exercise, which need clarification: Responsibility-to-protect, Intervention
and tri-dimensional methodology, and Epistemic-Morality.
Responsibility-to-protect: Expansively understood, the philosophy
underpinning the concept of the responsibility-to-protect (RtoP), or the
duty to protect (see Tan, 2006),1 expresses a commitment to the belief
that the human person has an ontological worth, which generates some
basic rights in respect of the human person (as officially documented in

1 The responsibility to protect or the duty to protect could also be regarded as a prin-
ciple, given that, all things considered, it is meant to be a guide to action in the relevant
sense. And, the three senses are conceptually interwoven. Any assumed responsibility to
protect flows out of the duty to do so in the first instance. For example, if the Security
Council of the UN passes a resolution, calling on a powerful state X to intervene in the
internal affairs of state Y because of the government-sponsored genocidal incidence in
the latter state, then state X has both duty and responsibility to intervene to ensure the
large-scale atrocities are addressed: duty in the sense that state X is a subscriber to the
legitimacy of the institution and the resolution of the Security Council; responsibility in
the sense that state X fully understands that this responsibility to act as mandated is a
necessary corollary of the duty. Moreover, state X fully understands that, if it is not to
breach the philosophy underpinning the duty and, therefore, the responsibility to protect
in the present case, then it should act strictly within the dictates of the duty. If it should
20 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights), which ought to be

promoted and protected, nationally and internationally. Nationally, the
government of a sovereign state, through its constitutional framework
and specific constitutionally-empowered state institutions and agencies,
is allotted the moral and legal responsibility to promote and protect the
basic rights of its citizens, vertically (between the citizen and the state)
and horizontally (among the associating and interacting citizens). This
position has been captured as ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (see Deng
et al., 1996; also, Cohen & Deng, 2016). However, if the sovereign
state should fail in this responsibility, then it behooves the international
community to elect, forcefully promoting and protecting the basic rights
of the affected citizens, within the territorial boundaries of the sovereign
state. More would be historically said of this later on but, presently, one
could still analytically examine the RtoP thus:

(i) Morally viewed, the RtoP essentially promotes the moral dignity
and the ontological worth of the human person;
(ii) It externally promotes and protects the basic rights of the human
person against the rights-infringing other;
(iii) It recognizes occasions when popular sovereignty trumps territo-
rial sovereignty;
(iv) It is a teleological, forceful encounter; it involves a deployment of
soldiers and arms for some moral ends;
(v) It is consent-neutral; the consent of the sovereign state involved
may not be sought and obtained by the interventionist party;
(vi) It is a positive moral duty, a duty to take a specific action/step to
secure vitiated human rights;
(vii) It may also be interpreted as a negative moral duty; it withdraws
support to any state action that may negate human rights of a
given people.

Analytically, the RtoP may also be connected to other moral duties,

such as the duty to respect and the duty to provide. First, Pogge (2016:
23) makes a distinction (as well as indirectly draws a parallel) between the
duty to protect and the duty to provide:

do this, it logically means that the duty serves as a guide to action in the relevant inter-
vention. Given this, in the present work, the three understandings may be reasonably used
interchangeably.
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 21

Duties to protect require agents to take preventive action when the fulfill-
ment of human rights is endangered by social threats: by other agents
who are, perhaps inadvertently, disposed to act in ways that render such
access insecure. The duty requires that one render the objects of human
rights secure by preventing either the potentially harmful actions or their
potentially harmful effects. Duties to provide require not a blocking of
the threat but a neutralizing of its harmful effects...Duties to respond to
natural disasters that threaten the fulfillment of human rights are generally
classified as duties to provide.* (Italics in the original)

More clearly, Pogge’s point is that the RtoP or the duty to protect
is supposed to prevent potentially harmful actions against human rights
or prevent potentially harmful effects of the actions on human rights.
However, the duty to provide is only (authors’ emphasis) a duty to take
an action, abating the impact of the harmful effects of any unpalatable
action on human rights. Therefore, it could be deduced that, despite their
noted difference, the duty to protect also shades into the duty to provide
in the area of taking care of the harmful effects of any injurious action on
human rights.
Moreover, though, Pogge does not state this specifically, one could
further show the connection between the RtoP and the duty to respect,
on the one hand, and directly with the duty to provide, on the other hand.
Pogge (2016: 23) notes that…duties to respect …are…duties ‘not to take
any measures that result in preventing’ a human being from having secure
access to the object of a human right…If we agree with Pogge on this,
then the duty to respect is implied in the duty to protect: it is the respect
for the ontological worth of the human person, promoted by the basic
human rights, which are now to be grossly violated, that the duty to
protect sets out to secure. By securing the basic human rights against
gross violations, the duty to protect is complementary to the duty to
respect on the subject of the ontological worth of the human person.
Moreover, when the duty to protect is duly performed, it forms part of
the actual performance to take some steps, for example, supplying food,
clothing, and medicine to a target population of a state, who have hitherto
been deprived of the access to these essential items, either by the political
authorities of the state or those supported by the political authorities of
the state. In this sense, the duty to protect directly goes with the duty to
provide, as defined by Pogge (2016).
22 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

Intervention and tri-dimensional methodology: Presently, intervention

is a concept ethically taken to be the output of the duty to protect, which
in turn, grows out of the moral sense and duty to promote the onto-
logical worth of the human person, as analyzed earlier. Descriptively, the
concept is used to refer to an urgent situation in which a powerful state
(or a coalition of states) is justifiably authorized that military intervention
is imperative relative to the internal affairs of another sovereign state. If
the military intervention results from the latter’s substantive failure to
confront and address egregious human rights violations (for example,
genocide) against some group of people within its territorial bound-
aries, then it is understood as a citizens’ or people’s perspective of the
RtoP principle. But, if the military intervention is a calculated attempt to
support/assist a (weak) state if it is being unjustifiably aggressed against
by (a more powerful) state, then this is to be understood as a statist
perspective of the RtoP principle.2 An example of the latter was the 1991
Gulf War between the Allied Forces (the interventionist group) and Iraq
(the aggressor), over the latter’s annexation of Kuwait, a small, oil-rich
Arab state (the aggressed against). However, an instance of the former
was the US military incursion into Somalia in December, 1992.
Moreover, for any scheme of intervention to be normatively sufficient,
it ought to embrace and address, among others, three morally relevant
interrogatives: (i) when is it morally justified to intervene in the internal
affairs of another sovereign state? (say, the moral grounds for interven-
tion); (ii) how is the intervention to be morally conducted? (say, the
moral methodology for intervention), and (iii) what are the morally-
inclined operational limits and ends of the intervention? (say, the moral
scope and ends of intervention). The first is morally significant to guide
against immoral interventionist exercise on the part of powerful states
within the international system; the second ensures that the intervention,
even if preliminarily morally right, is also conducted within a sound moral
framework of action, and the third is to ensure that the intervention, even
if morally right ab initio, and morally executed, is also morally terminated
as soon as administratively feasible, all things considered. Fundamentally,
intervention may be termed as ‘armed humanitarian intervention’ (AHI)
or ‘unarmed humanitarian intervention’ (UHI). An instance of AHI is

2 The distinction between the citizens’ or people’s perspective of the R2P principle and
the statist perspective of the principle is attributed to the reflections of the authors of this
article, but not an established convention in the scholarship on the principle.
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 23

when a powerful state (or a coalition of states) employ(s) force and arms
to enter in order to protect, defend and rescue some group of people, who
are victims of massive human rights violations (e.g. genocidal attacks) in
another sovereign state. However, an instance of UHI is when a sovereign
state non-militarily intervenes in the internal affairs of another sovereign
state in order to render some assistance to, or to help address the suffering
of, the people in the recipient state (or a segment of the people therein),
due to natural disasters, such as large-scale flooding, famine and hunger,
volcanic eruption, earthquake, etc.3
In the present context, the interventionist methodology of evalua-
tion is said to be tri-dimensional (in evaluation) because it enframes:
(i) the motive(s) and the intentions of the intervention (derived from
the speeches and the behavioural patterns of the interventionist party/
parties), (ii) the means deployed and the ways they are deployed (which
are clearly inseparable) to carry out the goal(s) of the intervention, and
(iii) the limits and outcome(s)/result(s) of the intervention.
Epistemic-Morality: Presently used, epistemic morality should be
conceptually distinguished and separated from moral epistemology. The
former captures a systematic harmonisation of the cognitive elements
of meta-ethics with both deontological and teleological elements of
normative ethics, while the latter focuses on, the cognitive elements of
meta-ethics, a sub-set of the discourse of ethics.

3 The distinction between the phrase, ‘armed humanitarian intervention’ (AHI) and the
other, ‘unarmed humanitarian intervention’ (UHI) is attributed to the reflection of the
first author of this chapter in the course of researching on and teaching a postgraduate
course, Philosophy and Principles of Peace and Conflict Studies, but not an established
convention of scholarship in the area of discourse. A contrary position to this distinction is
given by Robert Hoag (2015: par. 1), who states that, ‘Humanitarian intervention is a use
of military force to address extraordinary suffering of people, such as genocide or similar,
large-scale violation of basic of human rights, where people’s suffering results from their
own government’s actions or failures to act. These interventions are also called “armed
interventions,” or “armed humanitarian interventions,” or “humanitarian wars. They are
interventions to protect, defend, or rescue other people from gross abuse attributable to
their own government’. Daniel Zolo (2010) also regards it as ‘humanitarian militarism’.
Here, one could see that Hoag equates AHI with humanitarian intervention generally. But,
the conviction of the present authors is that equating AHI with UHI may be confusing,
given that the methods of operation of the two are basically dissimilar; though, both are
still under the umbrella concept of humanitarian intervention.
24 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

The Principle of the Responsibility-to-Protect

(RtoP) at the International
Level: A Brevity of the Evolution
Historically, the discussion of the RtoP principle in international ethics4
has had two dimensions of entry and analysis: theoretical and experien-
tial. Theoretically, the principle of the RtoP could be traced, reflecting
on Anthony Lang (2009: 135), to the philosophical reflections and
expositions of some thinkers/theorists of war and peace, such as Fran-
cisco Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, John Stuart Mill, etc. Citing Lang (2009:
135), the fifteenth century theologian Francisco Vitoria made the argu-
ment that kings might use military force in order to punish other kings
who had violated the rights of their subjects. This, doubtless, provides
some theoretical underpinning to the RtoP principle as we understand it
operationally within the contemporary global society.
In the work, On the Law of War and Peace (2001: 247; 247–248),
Hugo Grotius also advances another theoretical impetus to the RtoP thus:

The last and most extensive motive is the common tie of Common Nature,
which is alone is sufficient to oblige men to assist each other... It is a
question, whether one man is bound to protect another, or one people
another people from injury and aggression. Plato thinks that the indi-
vidual or state not defending another from intended violence is deserving
of punishment...it is a rule established by the laws of nature and of
social order...confirmed by all the records of history, that every sovereign
is supreme judge in his own kingdom and over his own subjects, in
whose disputes no foreign power can justly interfere. Yet where a Busiris,
a Phalaris or a Thracian Diomede provoke their people to despair and
resistance by unheard of cruelties...they lose the rights of independent
sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of nation-
s…Thus, Constantine took up arms against Maxentius and Licinius, and
other Roman emperors either took, or threatened to take them against the
Persians, if they did not desist from persecuting the Christians...Admitting
that it would be fraught with the greatest dangers if subjects were allowed

4 Actually, Doyle (2011) affirms the familiarity of liberal international ethics with the
RtoP principle, though he acknowledges that it is at odds with international law (see
Doyle, 2011: 73).
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 25

to redress grievances by force of arms, it does not necessarily follow that

other powers are prohibited from giving them assistance when labouring
under grievous oppressions.

From Grotius, one could see the belief that sovereignty of the state is
primarily grounded in the natural law theory, among others. But, despite
this belief in the sovereignty principle, he avers that the tie of Common
Nature obligates a powerful state to intervene in the affairs of another
state to protect and promote the welfare of the people therein that are
subjected to the oppression and suppression of their rulers, citing the
Greek Philosopher, Plato, to this effect.
Experientially, for Bellamy (2022: 37), the occurrences of the 1990s
contributed to the evolution of the RtoP principle, noting that:

During the 1990s...the gap between...international legal responsibilities

and realities on the ground became glaringly obvious. Genocide in Rwanda
and Srebrenica; mass killing and ethnic cleansing in Angola, Bosnia,
Burundi, Croatia, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire/DRC;
state repression in northern and southern Iraq; and acute state fragility and
civil war leading to mass human suffering in Somalia exposed the hollow-
ness of legal responsibilities in the face of governments and armed groups
willing and able to use mass civilian suffering to achieve their objectives...

Furthermore, Bellamy (2022: 38) states that:

A number of regional organizations established their own initiatives that

contributed to the emergence of of RtoP. Most notably, Article 4(H) of
the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), adopted in 2000, gave
the organization a right to intervene in the affairs of its Member States
in matters relating to genocide and crimes against humanity. The AU
also developed its own peacekeeping capacities and adopted a protection
mandate in Darfur (2003)….

All the adumbrated and the such-like motivated the emergence of the
RtoP principle, which was further impelled by the 1999 Kosovo conflict
(1998–1999), causing an unauthorized and highly contested interven-
tion, conducted by NATO forces (see Newman, 2009: 93, 94). It was
this NATO’s intervention regarded as illegal (unauthorized by the Secu-
rity Council, empowered by the UN’s Charter, to decide on such matters)
that impelled Kofi Annan, the Sec-Gen. of the UN, according to Keranen
26 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

(2016), to call for consensus on the new parameters of humanitarian inter-

vention and sovereignty, the call that the Canadian government heeded
by establishing the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS). In 2001, the Commission published its report,
The Responsibility to Protect (see Keranen, 2016: 334).5 According to
Keranen,

The central contention of the report was that, in cases where states failed
to protect their citizens from atrocities and crimes against humanity, the
international community has the ultimate duty to protect and, in doing so,
to use military intervention as a last resort. (Keranen, 2016: 334)

To cleverly reconcile the sovereignty principle with the RtoP principle

in international politics, the ICISS suggests that sovereignty should now
be re-thought as the ‘duty to protect’, and when this duty is not fulfilled
by the state, then the international community assumes the status of ‘the
responsibility to protect’. Moreover, the body statutorily charged with
the invocation of the R2P when it deems it necessary is the Security
Council of the United Nations (SCUN).6 The proposal of the (SCUN)
as the authorizing body for military intervention, notedly, cleverly rules
out occasions of any unilateral decision by a powerful state (or a coali-
tion of them) to engage in military intervention, relative to another state,
within the international system. According to James Pattison (2018: 302),
‘A key moment was the adoption, at the 2005 UN World Summit, with
over 150 heads of state in attendance, of the “Responsibility to Protect”
(RtoP) doctrine’. On 28 April 2006, the Security Council adopted reso-
lution 1674, which its articles 4 and 26 confirmed the doctrine of the
‘Responsibility to Protect’, empowering the Security Council to initiate
appropriate measures when there is a case of serious violation of human
rights and international humanitarian law (see Zolo, 2010: 562–563).
Practically, for Bellamy (2022: 35), the principle was employed by the
United Nations Security Council in response to crises in Darfur, Cote
d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, Syria
and, most controversially in Libya. It has also been employed by the
United Nations Secretary-General, other senior UN officials and several

5 For a similar but more detailed information on the evolution of the RtoP principle,
see also Amstutz (2013: 129–133).
6 See ICISS Responsibility to Protect, pp. 30, 31, 32.
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 27

member states in relation to these crises and those in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Guinea.

Some Arguments For and Against the RtoP

Principle in Contemporary Period
Literature search reveals that there are many arguments that have been
advanced, both for and against the RtoP principle in international rela-
tions. Analytic discussion them comes next.

Against
Argument from state sovereignty: This centrally claims that the RtoP prin-
ciple ostensibly counteracts the sovereignty principle (SP). The SP, as
we argue here, essentially articulates and supports two interrelated statist
ideals: (i) that a state should have a legal and moral right (the former,
given that it so recognized in the body of principles and rules understood
as international law, which almost all the states of the world are signato-
ries to; the latter, given that the state is ultimately a collectivity of moral
agents, who are essentially autonomous agents) to self-control its territo-
rial boundaries, and self-manage the affairs therein (call this, the Statist
Principle of Territorial Self-Control and Self-Management ), and (ii) that
no other state should interfere in the afore-mentioned process of terri-
torial self-control and self-management (call this, the Statist Principle of
Non-Interference). Analytically, the first statist ideal is internalist, given
that any state ought to exercise it from within. The second is externalist,
given that it ought to be exercised from without, by other states in rela-
tion to the state that exercises the first from within. Moreover, the two
principles are not necessarily reducible to each other, given that it is logi-
cally conceivable for Z to give X a right of control over Y , the right Z
may occasionally intervene (and thus interfere) to ensure it (the right) is
being effectively exercised, or to correctively act, if the right is not being
effectively exercised by X in relation to Y. Holding constant the noted
two ideals in inter-state relations, we could advance that the RtoP prin-
ciple ostensibly inverts a state’s sovereignty if the principle is invoked and
implemented against the state under any guise. Doyle (2011: 74) affirms
this:
28 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

Intervention is dictatorial interference in the political independence and

territorial integrity of a sovereign state. The principles underlying this
prohibition have been justified by scholars, by politicians, and by citizens;
all of whom have sought to provide good ethical reasons why one should
abide by all the conventional principles of nonintervention...

Similarly, Kant (1970) supports the sovereignty argument, noting that

nonintervention gives a people the opportunity to freely work out the
way of life to choose and pursue.
Granting the popularity merit of the sovereignty argument, one may
unquestionably accept it. But, a truly rational person ought not to always
unquestionably accept claims or positions. Critically, the sovereignty argu-
ment is somewhat suspect. The point is that most of the states in the
world today are (ethnically, racially, or religiously) plural. In an ethnically
(Nigeria, for instance) or racially (South Africa, for instance) plural state,
all the diverse ethnic or racial groups within the state should be morally
equal. Given this, it is highly immoral, apart form being illogical, for an
ethnic or racial group to dominate, oppress, or suppress another ethnic
or racial group, to the extent of likely decimation, within the same state,
and the international community would unconcernedly stand, unless we
are to subscribe (implicitly or explicitly) to ethnocentrism or racism.7 But,
most rational human beings alive today strongly cavil at both ethnocen-
trism and racism. Thus, the logic is that the international community
should find a way to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state
where egregious atrocities are being perpetrated. The point here is that
the promotion of the moral worth of the human person (either indi-
vidually or collectively understood), should trump any claim of statist
sovereignty, sometimes invoked to support an unmeddled perpetration of
the heinous crime against humanity. The late former Secretary-General
of the UNO, Perez de Cuellar, concludes similarly, noting that: ‘We
are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public atti-
tudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name

7 Both ethnocentrism and racism are usually condemned because they individually
subscribe, deeply analyzed, to rationally and morally indefensible beliefs of hierarchicaliza-
tion and essentialization. They individually hierarchicalize to the extent that they divide
ethnic and racial groups into evaluative group and evaluated group; they individually essen-
tialize to the extent that they make it compulsory for the evaluated group to always see
the evaluative group as the standard to be followed at all times.
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 29

of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents (Perez de

Cuellar, 1991).
Argument from gradual de-emphasis of the responsibility to rebuild from
the responsibility to protect: The point here is that the interventionist
dimension of the RtoP principle is largely couched in an internation-
alist language: a sovereign state (or a coalition of them) assumes the
responsibility to militarily intervene in the affairs of another sovereign
state to address gross violations of human rights in the beleaguered state.
But, the aspect of the responsibility to rebuild is gradually less being
emphasized, in the internationalist language: the structural rebuilding
of the state in the post-intervention period is becoming less interna-
tionalist, but largely statist, as the government of the victim state is
being expected to rebuild after the intervention. Thus, any internation-
alist assistance expected should be capacity building, but not structural
rebuilding (see Keranen, 2016; also, Pattison, 2015). Therefore, concerns
are raised that the RtoP principle should be properly revisited, and the
responsibility to rebuild clearly re-articulated in this regard. This critique,
doubtless, is impactful especially in cases where the military intervention
has inverted the economic basis of the victim state, substantially trun-
cating the state’s efforts, in successfully and solely ensuring post-conflict
structural rebuilding.
Argument from fact-scepticism and fact-misrepresentation: This argu-
ment comes from Franck’s work (2010).8 Explanatorily, fact-scepticism
occurs when people are uncertain or unsure of the relevant facts about an
issue on focus, while fact misrepresentation is an occasion of distortion
of the facts relative to an issue under consideration. According to Franck
(2010: 536, 536–537),

In 1860, the five European Powers intervened with the Ottomon Porte to
secure protection and local self-government for the Maronite Christians of
Mount Lebanon, after 5,500 of them had been reported killed by Druse
forces. Yet, according to Lord Dufferin, the British High Commissioner
in Syria, ‘the original provocation proceeded from the Christians, who had
been for months beforehand preparing an onslaught on the Druses, which
their leaders confidently expected would terminate, if not in the extermi-
nation, at all events in the expulsion, of that race...’ In the case of the
Mount Lebanon intervention, for example, it ultimately proved impossible

8 Thomas M. Franck (2010). ‘Humanitarian Intervention’…, pp. 531–548.

30 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

to establish, convincingly, either the facts of the ultimate responsibility for

the alleged atrocities against which the powers claimed to be intervening.

Concerning fact misrepresentation for intervention purposes, Franck

(2010: 537) notes the cases of imperial Japan’s attack of Manchuria in
1931 and Adolf Hitler’s German attack on Sudenteland in 1938, both of
which were claimed on humanitarian grounds, the claims that were later
discovered to be both false claims. Considering these, Franck (2010: 537)
concludes that, ‘…a legal principle that lends itself to frequent abuse- as
humanitarian intervention has done- may not state a desirable rule, or
may state it badly’.
Argument from the juridical equality of states, inconsistency and
hypocrisy: The argument goes thus: (i) International law recognizes and
articulates the idea of juridical equality of all states; (ii), given (i), No
state should be privileged to intervene in the affairs of another state; (iii)
But, on some justificatory grounds, if state X is privileged to intervene
in the affairs of state Y , then state Y , should also, on some justificatory
grounds, be so privileged to intervene in the affairs of state X: this is
reciprocity of foreign intervention; (iv) However, experience has shown
that the idea of reciprocity of foreign intervention does not hold true in
international relations: while Western states are always eager to uphold
the idea of foreign intervention against non-Western states, the former
are negatively vehement against the idea of foreign intervention from the
latter9 ; (v) if we accept (iv), then the conclusion is that the whole idea of
reciprocity of foreign intervention, which is implied in the RtoP principle,
ultimately reduces to sheer hypocrisy and gross inconsistency. Objectively
appraised, this argument is strong, the reason being that ‘the source for
the goose is the source for the gander’; if the RtoP principle is invoked
against weak states but not against strong states, then the principle is
nothing but an instrument of imperialism. By the way, why is it that the
R2P principle (in the statist sense) has not been fully invoked in the on-
going Russo-Ukrainian war, defending the Ukrainian territory against the
Russian aggression?
Argument from pacifism: The pacifist central submission could be
summarized in the argument form thus:

9 According to Amstutz (2013: 124), ‘…while powerful states may intervene peri-
odically in weaker states, the strong are adamant defenders of their own territorial
integrity’.
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 31

(i) Violence is evil

(ii) It is morally wrong to do evil
(iii) Given that violence is evil, it is morally wrong to engage in violence
(iv) War is at the apex of violence; it logically follows that it is morally
wrong to engage in war.10

Now, given the pacifist commitment to non-violence, it logically

follows that a pacifist would never support or subscribe to, according to
Narveson (1965: 259), ‘force to resist, punish, or prevent violence’, which
the whole process/programme of humanitarian militarism is all about.11

For
Arguments from the promotion and protection of human rights: The most
potent argument for the RtoP principle in inter-state relations is that it
is promotive and protective of the human rights of people, whenever
their government(s) which has (have) the primary responsibility to do so
grossly fails (or is/are unable) to do so. The position of Perez de Cuellar
(1991) cited above fits into this frame of argument. The logic is that the
promotion and protection of the fundamental human rights of human
persons precede any claim of sovereignty of states.
Argument from curbing the excesses of states in domestic affairs: The
point of this argument is that states can no longer hide under the protec-
tive guise of the sovereignty principle to do just about anything to their
people. In fact, according to this argument, the sovereignty principle
is now to be properly re-understood and re-articulated as the ‘duty to
protect’ (as noted above in the ICISS, Responsibility to Protect ). There-
fore, whenever a state fails or becomes unable (by whatever reasons) to
fulfill the dictates of the re-interpreted understanding of the sovereignty
principle, then it by the same token temporarily loses right of absolute
claim to the sovereignty principle.
Before, moving on, we should note that the two arguments offered in
support of the RtoP principle, critically examined, are still differentiable;
though, they are related. They are related to the extent that they are both

10 See, for example, Jan Narveson (1965), for a philosophical analysis of pacifism.
11 See Putra and Cangara (2018: 60–63), for further objections against the RtoP
principle.
32 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

working towards the good of the human person at the domestic level of
any given state. However, they are still differentiable to the extent that
the first argument is people’s rights-inclined (thus, becoming a bottom-
up argument), and the second is state-excesses-repellant (thus becoming
a top-down argument).

A Tri-dimensional Methodology of Evaluation,

the R2P Principle, and Justification
A further look at the two poles of arguments advanced shows that neither
is concerned with developing an elaborate methodological approach, eval-
uative of a case-by-case rightness or wrongness of the invocation as well
as the implementation of the RtoP principle internationally. This task
becomes imperative next.
First, it is noteworthy that the RtoP principle derives some theo-
retical insights from the popular just war theory, largely formulated
and developed in the Mediaeval Era of theologian-philosophers. Thus,
contemporary scholars usually deploy the just war mechanism to eval-
uate the moral rightness or wrongness of the invocation of the RtoP
principle within any given context.12 But, the challenge is that the just
war theory (as it stands) has been critiqued for not being theoretically
applicable to new generation warfare, within which we could defensibly
include armed humanitarian intervention, supported by the RtoP prin-
ciple (see, for example, Berkebile, 2018). Therefore, an attempt would
now be made to develop a tri-dimensional methodology of evaluation
for a case-by-case analysis of, and pronouncement on, the rightness or
wrongness of the invocation as well as the implementation of the RtoP
principle, which may not necessarily derive from the just war theory as
traditionally understood. As noted and explained earlier in the work, the
tri-dimensional methodology would provide for: (i) the moral grounds
for intervention; (ii) the moral methodology for intervention, and (iii)
the moral scope and ends of intervention.

12 See, for example, Robert Hoag (2015), C.A.J. Coady (2002).

 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 33

The Moral Grounds for Intervention (MGI): This centres on the motives
and the intentions behind the intervention. Thus, it is deontologically-
based. Moreover, it corresponds with what we could term as ‘pre-
intervention ethics’, given that it foregrounds some ethical considera-
tion(s) that must be duly factored in, before any armed intervention is
commenced. Now, the rightness or wrongness of any invocation of the
RtoP principle, to begin with, is to be evaluated within the proposed
ethical framework.
On the present task, there are two preliminary notices: one is clari-
ficatory and the other is corrective. Although, the two would be used,
the concept of motive should still be carefully distinguished from that
of intention with which it is normally conceptually conflated. Both in
the philosophy of social action of the human person (which critically
and systematically examines and interrogates human relational action in
society), and moral philosophy (which critically examines the rightness or
wrongness of human conduct in society), the concept of motive is used to
capture ‘that which drives into action’, while the concept of intention is
used to refer to ‘that which is to be achieved’. Nardin and William (2006:
10) also agree on this, stating that:

The intention of an act is the state of affairs it seeks to bring about. A

motive, in contrast, is the frame of mind in which the agent acts - the
desires and other passions that propel him. Motives are a necessary element
in judgments of responsibility, or praise and blame, culpability and excuse,
but are often incidental to judgments of the justification, the objective
rightness or wrongness, or an act.

From this conceptual clarification, motive is a mental make-up that

impels to engage in specific action, in a specific way. Thus, a moral motive
is one that evolves from the environment of normative considerations,
such as sound moral principles, values, virtues, etc. Moreover, motive is
mentally-inclined. However, given that intention focuses on a probable
effect or series of effects, then one could state that it is outcomes-
conscious. The distinction, nevertheless, both motive and intention may
sometimes conceptually merge: this informs their relevance in this work.
Differently put, ‘that which drives into action’ may also shade into ‘that
which is to be achieved’ in practice. For example, a rich X might have a
moral motive, a belief that alms-giving is morally right, X being further
34 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

convinced that it would actually contribute to the well being of the recip-
ient, the belief that could also be taken as a moral intention, given that
‘that which is to be achieved’ is altruistic in nature. Moreover, this moral
motive motivates X to give alms to a poor Y , begging him for alms,
the alms that Y later uses to buy food and drink to assuage his hunger
and thirst, the assuaging that brings about his well being (he is able to
relieve himself of the pangs of hunger and thirst) in the specific instance,
as envisaged by the richX.
Second, it might be claimed that the issue of motive is somewhat
shrouded, given its internality to an actor, making it impossible of easy
external access. Thus, it is not a good yardstick for assessment of some-
thing basic as intervention militarism. This claim can be dismissed by
noting that the content of a person’s motive could be decipherable
from the speeches and the behavioural patterns of the person. Therefore,
human motives could not be strictly said to be entirely secretive.
The above duly noted, the claim is that the motive(s) of the interven-
tionist party, as discoverable from their speeches and other behavioural
patterns beforehand, may determine whether or not their proposed inter-
vention is morally attuned to be taken as humanitarian. If the motive(s)
derive(s) from sound moral principles of beneficence, justice, equity,
etc., then the intervention is taken as humanitarian. However, if the
motive(s) derive(s) from the promotion of the national interest of the
interventionist party (for example, if the proposed intervention is based
on the favourable ideological leaning—ethnic, racial, religious, etc.—of
the affected people), then it is not morally attuned to be regarded as
humanitarian.
Similarly, the intention(s) of the interventionist party is (are) also
morally germane presently. If the intention(s) also align(s) with the
motive, which derives from sound moral principles of beneficence, justice,
equity, etc., then the intervention is generally taken as humanitarian. For
example, if X, Y , and Z have been duly authorized by a resolution of the
Security Council of the UN to militarily intervene in the internal affairs
of W , given the mass atrocities against the humanity of an ethnic or racial
group in W , which the W government has either failed or is unable to
domestically address, and X, Y , and Z are willing to undertake this inter-
vention on the bases of beneficence (doing good to the affected ethnic or
racial group in W ), and justice (trying to arrest the injustices against the
affected ethnic or racial group in W ), then this is a moral motive. More-
over, if X, Y , and Z jointly design and deploy an effective strategy to
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 35

achieve these moral principles of beneficence and justice in practice, rela-

tive to the affected ethnic or racial group in W , this is a moral intention.
If the moral motive and moral intention are thus harmonised to engage
in the military intervention, then the intervention is humanitarian; if not,
it is not humanitarian.
The Moral Methodology for Intervention (MMI): This concerns the
means deployed in carrying about the intervention, and the ways they
are deployed. This, in short, makes it pragmatically-based. This aligns
with what we could here take as ‘in-conflict intervention ethics’, consid-
ering that it morally guides and monitors how the intervention process/
programme is being practically conducted by the interventionist. There
are certain moral considerations here.
First, the violence to be expended in the military intervention, if it
must be such at all, ought to be measured: the military hardware deployed
in the intervention process/programme ought not to be devastatingly
impactful, that is, capable of causing more damage than absolutely neces-
sary, relative to the human persons in the war theatre; infrastructural
facilities, and the environment. In sum, the military force ought to be
both human-friendly and environmentally-friendly. This environmental
consideration in the present methodology improves upon the theoretical
contents of the jus-in-bello in the traditional just war theory, which makes
no provision for non-human considerations in the moral conduct of war.
Second, the actual intervention process ought not to be exploited as an
opportunity to test-drive some newly developed military hardware by the
interventionist party, as this would reveal that the interventionist party
has some hidden selfish interest of war-mongering in future, making the
conduct of the intervention to be morally suspect, given that it goes
against the criterion of moral motive and intention, stipulated earlier.
Third, the interventionist party ought to ensure that the human worth
of the people, whose rights are being protected, is not inverted or vitiated
at any point throughout the period of intervention. The human worth of
the affected people could be inverted or vitiated through incessant verbal
abuse (ethnic or racial name-calling), physical abuse (rape, for instance),
body shaming, etc.
The Moral Scope and Ends of Intervention (MSEI): This jointly empha-
sizes the operational (physical and ideological) limits and the outcomes/
results of the intervention. First, concerning the scope aspect, there are
two relevant claims:
36 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

(i) There is a moral claim that the interventionist party ought not to
stay beyond the time, which is justifiably needed to restore order,
justice, and reaffirm the human integrity of the people on behalf of
whom the intervention has been conducted, if the intervention is
of the citizens’ type (call this, limitation of the physical presence of
the interventionist party), and
(ii) There is a moral claim that the interventionist party ought not
to implicitly or explicitly imbue the people, on behalf of whom
the intervention has been conducted, with its political ideology,
if the intervention is of the citizens’ type (call this, prevention
of the ideological presence of the interventionist party). This may
occur in either of two ways: the interventionist party is directly and
systematically schoolling the people in its political ideology, or the
interventionist party is indirectly selling its political ideology to the
people by encouraging them to reject the political ideology, which
they have hitherto subscribed to.

The ends aspect makes it teleologically-based. Thus, it could be taken

as ‘post-intervention ethics’, given that it is a moral evaluation of the
ends of the whole intervention process/programme. This is three-sided
in nature: (i) the ends in relation to the interventionist party, (ii) the
ends in relation to the state intervened in, and (iii) the ends in relation
to the people on behalf of whom the intervention has been conducted.
First, the interventionist party ought not to have satisfied some inter-
ests (economic, political, cultural, etc.) in the course of the military
intervention, such as secreting the resources of the victim state away or
flooding the victim state with the businessmen and women of the inter-
ventionist party. Second, the victim state ought to be assisted, as much as
administratively and financially possible, in the infrastructure-rebuilding
process/programme as well as institutional repositioning. For clarity
sake, infrastructural rebuilding entails the reconstructioning of damaged
or totally destroyed public/social facilities/utilities, such as hospitals,
schools, recreational centres, roads, fly-overs, bridges, air-ports, etc. that
were directly impacted by the concluded conflict. However, institutional
repositioning involves, among others, encouraging the meta-institutions
of the victim state (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary) to be
more functionally responsible and responsive to the citizens of the victim
state in concrete ways that would promote their fundamental human
rights, such as freedom of expression, movement, association, as well as
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 37

security, which is basic to the realization of the human rights mentioned

and the suchlike. Notedly, an important aspect of this citizenry security
is what Jessica Wolfendale (2017: 238–255) regards as moral security.
According to Wolfendale (2017: 238),

...a person possesses subjective moral security when she believes that her
basic interests and welfare will be accorded moral recognition by others in
her community and by social, political, and legal institutions in her society.
She possesses objective moral security if, as a matter of fact, her interests
and welfare are regarded by her society as morally important—for example,
when violent crimes against her are taken to warrant the same punishment
and condemnation as equivalent crimes against others.13

As explained by Wolfendale (2017), one could not substantively talk

about citizenry security in the post-conflict life of the victim state, if this
moral dimension of security is grossly lacking.
Third, the atrocities (and, in some cases, the grievances) of the people
on behalf of whom the intervention has been conducted ought to be
properly tabled, carefully considered and morally and legally addressed as
much as administratively possible, within the confines of international law
and international ethics.
Justifying the tri-dimensional methodology: There are, at least, three
basic reasons that could be deployed to show the reasonability of the
proposed tri-dimensionl methodology in this work.
First, although, the proposed tri-dimensional methodology resembles
the traditional just war theory (JWT) in structure (being also tripartite as
the JWT), it nonetheless improves upon the JWT, as traditionally under-
stood. In the traditional account of the JWT, there is no provision for
non-human entities in its jus ad bellum, jus-in-bello, and jus post bellum.
However, the second stage of the proposed tri-dimensional methodology
makes provision for the safety of non-human entities in the environment
in the process of military intervention. This makes it environmentally
conscious, but not solely anthropocentric. Given the noted, the proposed
tri-dimensional methodology could theoretically complement the tradi-
tional account of the JWT in evaluating whether or not a given military
intervention is truly humanitarian.

13 Emphases in the original.

38 R. O. BADRU AND T. O. OLUYEMI

Second, although the normative role of intention figures in the jus ad

bellum of the traditional account of the JWT, the point is that motives
are clearly absent. This seems to be a theoretical gap in the JWT, given
that intentions, combined with motives, could help in better evaluating
whether or not a military intervention is truly humanitarian.
Third, the emphasis in the third part of the proposed methodology,
that the victim state ought to be assisted, as much as administratively
possible, in the infrastructure-rebuilding process/programme as well as
institutional-repositioning, is fundamentally significant. Pointedly, this
could substantially assist the victim state in returning to a status that
would make it more institutionally functional, protective of the basic
rights of the people, the failure of which led to the military intervention
in the first instance.

Summary and Conclusion

In this work, we have attempted to delve into the discourse of
the responsibility-to-protect from a normative perspective, using a tri-
dimensional methodology, which is founded on a harmonisation of the
epistemic aspect of the deontological theory of moral obligation and
some aspects of the teleological theory of moral obligation. In the first
section of the work, we introduced the discussion; in the second section,
we dealt with three conceptual phrases at the core of the discussion,
looking critically at their meanings and how these definitions are rele-
vant to the present work. The third section focused on understanding
the RtoP principle as well as its operation at the international level. The
fourth section dwelt on the arguments for and against the application
of RtoP in the contemporary international system, noting that argu-
ments against the RtoP principle see the principle as being capable of
eroding states’ sovereignty, among others, whereas an argument in favour
of RtoP sees it as a means towards safeguarding the basic rights of the
citizens of the affected states. In the fifth section, we attempted to x-ray
the tri-dimensional methodology which we proposed and evaluated the
RtoP principle based on the model. Before we concluded the section, we
attempted to provide some justifications for the proposed tri-dimensional
methodology of evaluation.
 RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT AND A TRI-DIMENSIONAL … 39

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 From Peacekeeping to Responsibility
to Protect: Unpacking the Genealogy
and History of the RtoP Doctrine
in the International Humanitarian System

Peter Inalegwu Awodi and Sharkdam Wapmuk

Introduction
As the responsibility to protect (RtoP) doctrine gained traction and popu-
larity as a lexicon in international humanitarian system with the last
decade, a growing body of studies have examined the RtoP so as to
unpack its origins, development and dynamics. While the debates around
the RtoP doctrine and its implementation have bourgeoned with the
United Nations system, there have been an appreciable consensus on
the need to protect civilians in the face of mass atrocities. However, the

P. I. Awodi (B)
Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
S. Wapmuk
Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy,
Kaduna, Nigeria

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 41

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_3
42 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

RtoP have also birthed controversy as regards the nature of its imple-
mentation especially after the use of the doctrine in Libya and Cote
D’Ivoire was termed an ‘overreach’ by critical scholars and observers
(Francis et al., 2012; Sihvo, 2012). The criticisms levelled against the
RtoP notwithstanding, the doctrine evidently signposts a significant leap
towards ensuring that the international community—spearheaded by the
UN—would no longer fail to act to protect the sanctity of human lives
and prevent the mass perpetuation of heinous crimes as witnessed during
the 1994 Rwandan and the 1995 Srebrenica genocides. To this end,
the famous ‘never again’ phrase have been engrained into the annals of
the R2P doctrine (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001). This inherent mandate to
‘never again’ allow the perpetuation of mass atrocities therefore shows
the genealogical interface between the idea of peacekeeping which was
popular for over three decades within the UN system, and the respon-
sibility to protect (RtoP) which has gained popularity in contemporary
times (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001).
For almost eight decades since the rebirth of the United Nations (UN)
from the ruins of the defunct League of Nations and over seventy-four
years since the first peacekeeping force was deployed, the scourge of mass
atrocities that continuous to stain the conscience of the international
community have not be fully curtailed. Numerous experts have attributed
this failure to the often passive and largely restricted mandate of the peace-
keeping missions. There is no gainsaying therefore that the whole essence
of deploying UN peacekeepers was called to question in the wake of
the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the Srebrenica genocide of 1995 as
UN the peacekeepers stood idly by as both genocides was perpetuated
(Boisson de Chazournes & Condorelli, 2006). The subsequent mili-
tary intervention of NATO in the Bosnia-Hercegovina on humanitarian
grounds birthed a new line of thought within international humanitarian
system culminating with the emergence of the RtoP.
This chapter therefore examines the emergence and development of
the RtoP by interrogating the genealogy and history of the doctrine that
is hinged on the notion of a ‘never again’ approach to curtailing mass
atrocities in the world. Drawing on Africa’s long history with the notion
of peacekeeping and the continent been pivotal to the debates around
the RtoP, this study would therefore examine the shift of emphasis from
peacekeeping to RtoP through the prism of the African continent. Suffice
it to aver that Africa was the epicentre of the ideological and operational
shift from peacekeeping to RtoP, and the continent have provided a litmus
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 43

test for the implementation of the RtoP doctrine as evident by the back-
lash that followed NATO’S overreach in Libya in 2011 (Francis et al.,
2012). This chapter is divided into four segments: The first examines
the concept of peacekeeping and its origins; the second, examines the
origins and contending views of the RtoP doctrine; the third, unearths
the ideational shift from peacekeeping to the RtoP; and lastly, the fourth,
presents a prognosis on the new directions to which the doctrine may
take in light of criticisms that followed its 2011 implementation Libya.

Peacekeeping: Unpacking Its

Origin, Development and Contexts
Conceptualizing Peacekeeping
A study by Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009) defines the concept of
peacekeeping as:

The physical protection of humanitarian personnel, as well as responsibili-

ties such as facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance, preventing
sexual and gender-based violence, assisting in the creation of conditions
conductive to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and
addressing the special protection and assistance needs of children. (Holt
et al., 2009)

Peacekeeping basically connotes activities that are designed with the

intent of creating circumstances that enable the institutionalization of
lasting peace (Fortna, 2008). Differently put, peacekeeping entails the
deployment of forces—either national or multinational in nature—with
the aim assisting in the resolution or control of violent conflicts or forestall
its outbreak between or within nation-states. Most peacekeeping opera-
tions in conflict area around the world are spearheaded and funded by
the United Nations (UN), however, many regional organizations have
also undertook peacekeeping operations in various regions of the world.

Origins and Development of Peacekeeping

The concept of peacekeeping entered the lexicon of international human-
itarian system as an invention that was advanced following the acceptance
of the UN Charter as a reaction to the shortcoming of the perma-
nent five member states of the United Nations Security council to arrive
44 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

at a consensus on unanimous strategies on the deployment of force in

the course of the Cold War. Orthodoxly, the protection of civilians was
not at the epicentre of the notion of peacekeeping as the objective was
hinged on—as the names implies—keeping the existing peace. Advanced
in the Cold War era, peacekeeping operations were basically deployed in
response to conflicts that are inter-state in nature. Peacekeeping opera-
tions were mandated to enforce ceasefires agreements between conflicting
parties and monitor buffer zones. Thus, the original motion of peace-
keeping is tailored to guarantee the implementation of consensus conflict
settlements (Sihvo, 2012).
In this light, it is explicit that peacekeeping missions—in their tradi-
tional form—played a pivotal role in the termination of armed conflicts
and therefore has been viewed as advancing the goal of protecting the
civilian population (Smith et al., 2011). Taking into cognizance this tradi-
tional standpoint on which the notion of peacekeeping was hinged, it was
inconceivable that an orthodox peacekeeping operation would entail the
protection of civilians, let alone partaking in the defence of the human
rights of such civilian population (Frederic, 2012). Sihvo (2012) argues
in this light that one of the fundamental factors that shaped the post-Cold
War modification of peacekeeping operations is hinged on the rethinking
of international security and peace as being intrinsically intertwined with
the protection of the civilian population (UNSC, 1994). An earliest
example that standout to depict this shift in direction of peacekeeping
was when the UNSC recognized the suppression of Iraqi civilians by the
Saddam Hussein dictatorship as a threat to regional peace and security.
Further to the immediate foregone, the war that ravaged Bosnia was also
viewed as a fundamental threat to peace due to the devastating impacts of
the war on civilians—particularly the ethnic cleansing that led to the death
of over 8000 Bosniak Muslim boys and men (UNSC, 1995). In addition,
the Rwandan genocide and further broad scale and coordinated abuses of
international humanitarian law were later perceived as major disruptions
of security and peace.

The Contexts of Peacekeeping

The concept of peacekeeping have overtime expanded to touch on
issues concerning peace-building, monitoring, reporting, risks assessment,
vigorous peace enforcement operations and, debatably, the deployment of
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 45

force for civilian protection, among others (Brahimi, 2000). It is there-

fore pertinent to reiterate that the concept of peacekeeping is no longer
confined to the ideas of traditional peace operations, rather it encompasses
wide range of multifaceted peacekeeping missions deployed in extremely
volatile situations where there may even be absolutely no peace to keep.
This view is further reiterated by the Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
ations (DPKO) which posits that impartiality on the part of peacekeeping
forces deployed to conflict areas does not equate to inaction on their part.
Hence, the DPKO directed peacekeeping forces deployed to conflict areas
to vigorously and actively advance the implementation of the mandate of
the mission even if by so doing, the mission is contrary to the desires
of one or more of the conflicting sides. This, in essence, is a directive
that seeks to avert a situation where a peacekeeping mission deployed to
a conflict region would stand idly by and watch the massacre of civilians
as was the cases in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995 respectively
(Frederic, 2012; Hamann, 2013).
In this context, the protection of civilians was enshrined and elevated
in the UN doctrine as a salient responsibility expected to be fulfilled by
peacekeepers even in a situation where it is not included in the mission’s
original mandate. However, expanding the powers of peacekeepers and
making their mandate flexible has generated counter arguments. Critiques
have raised concerns about the use of protection of civilians as a pretext
by imperialist forces deployed as peacekeepers to pursue ulterior motives
such as regime change as was the case in Cote D’Ivoire in 2011 when UN
peacekeeping and French forces aided rebels to oust then Ivorian Presi-
dent Laurent Gbagbo from power during a postelection crisis (Amneus,
2013; Francis et al., 2012; Sihvo, 2012). Normally, the operations of
peacekeepers are controlled by a plethora of frameworks such as Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law
(IHRL), the local laws of troop contributing states, laws of the host state
and UN values of the United Nations Charter (Bellamy, 2009).
Pertinently, the salient normative mechanism on which the notion
of peacekeeping is grounded includes the United Nations, indepen-
dent Reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda, as well as the Brahimi Report
(Brahimi, 2000; UNSG, 1999). Also, subsequent reports that were
released building on the Brahimi report such as the UN’s ‘Capstone
Doctrine’ for peacekeeping were pivotal to shaping the development of
peacekeeping over the past few decades. While the UN clearly makes the
partaking of states in peacekeeping operations as conditionally obligatory,
46 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

it however urges states already involved in peacekeeping operations to

pursue them in line laid down standards. For example, a peacekeeping
mission deployed with the primary mandate to protect civilians ought
to guarantee that the civilian populations gets a certain level of security.
Clearly, there is some degree of consensus among member states of the
UN and Western powers on the notion that nation-states or supranational
organizations that interfere on the basis of humanitarianism in other states
do have the responsibilities to do so. This has been aptly described as
a ‘conditional duty’ by other commentator and analysts alike (Ryniker,
2001).
To align peacekeeping missions with the regulations highlighted in the
immediate foregoing, there are three-pronged considerations of certain
minimum requirements of protection which are prescribed to be met by
peacekeeping missions: First, the peacekeeping mission as a protective
organ must ensure that it meets its mandate of protecting the civil-
ians during armed conflicts. Second, the mission must take cognizance
of the natural anticipations of the local populations pertaining to what
constitutes adequate level of protection for them. Third, to outline the
constructive obligations of protection that is incumbent on states and
actors who wield influence over another state or territory. Therefore,
if any peacekeeping operation seeks to fulfil its stated mandate, these
three-dimensioned basic criteria outlined by the principles that guides
peacekeeping must be met (Sihvo, 2012).

Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)

Doctrine: Origin and Contending Views
What Is the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)?
The failures of the international community—which the UN and its
founding principles signposts—to protect vulnerable civilians from falling
victims of wide scale heinous crimes as evidenced by the Rwandan and
Srebrenica genocides in the 1990s birthed the emergence of the RtoP
(Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2018; Hamann, 2013).
The RtoP signifies a new political and operational reaction towards
ensuring that the world does not stand idly by and allow another geno-
cide as witnessed in Rwanda and Srebrenica to be perpetuated. To this
end, the RtoP doctrine is premeditated on accomplishing the idea of
“Never Again”—the notion that the world should never again fail to act
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 47

to protect populations from genocides (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001). At the

epicentre of the RtoP doctrine is the notion that it is pertinent to have a
foremost innovative humanitarian international initiative that is premised
on the idea of ameliorating human misery from widespread violence
(Francis et al., 2012; Sihvo, 2012; Thakur, 2006). The responsibility to
protect (RtoP) as captured in Foley (2013), is succinctly described as:

an emerging international norm, which sets forth that states have the
primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, but that when the
state fails to protect its populations, the responsibility falls to the inter-
national community. (International Coalition for the Responsibility to
Protect)

The R2P emerged as a panacea to the prolonged debates about the

nature, character and rationale of intervening on the grounds of humani-
tarianism. Thus, the R2P doctrine resonates with the need for an overhaul
of the normative framework of the UN due to the changed reality of
threats and victims in the post-Cold War era (Thakur, 2006). To simply
put, the R2P signifies a fundamental re-conceptualization and reconstruc-
tion of the relationship between the sovereignty exercised by the state,
on one hand, and human rights of the population on the other hand
(Sarkin & Paterson, 2010). In much the same vein, Omorogbe (2012)
opines that R2P entrusts the sovereign states with the primary responsi-
bility of protecting its population but permits the deployment of collective
external intervention as a last resort if the territorial state fails to protect
its own population (Bellamy, 2009; Omorogbe, 2012).
Suffice it to posit that the viewpoint captured by Omorogbe (2012)
above, resonates with the idea of the re-construction and reframing of
the notion of sovereignty from its traditional static understanding into
a more fluid conceptualization of the term. According to Francis et al.
(2012), the focus of the R2P doctrine is the curtailment of the exten-
sive and organized proliferation of violence targeted at vulnerable civilians
during times of wars as well as peace. The R2P doctrine therefore outlines
these large-scale violence to include crimes against humanity, war crimes,
genocide and ethnic cleansing.
48 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

Origin and Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Extant literature on the responsibility to protect (R2P) depicts a stag-
gered origin and evolution. That notwithstanding, there is a consensus
among scholars that the first mention of the R2P is in the 2001 report
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) led by Gareth Evans and Mohammad Sahnoun,—an organization
comprised of representatives of both the global political north and south
divide. However, there is a school of thought that posits that the R2P
was first introduced into the lexicon of global governance by the former
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during a speech he delivered in 1999
on the need for the international system to articulate a cogent response
to mass atrocities that violate human rights (Omorogbe, 2012; Sarkin &
Paterson, 2010). Thus, the ICISS report released in 2001 is seen as a
response to questions raised by Kofi Annan’s in his 1999 speech calling
for coordinated global efforts to end large-scale mass atrocities against
populations. In September 2000, the Canadian government established
the ICISS to help proffer solutions that would help the global commu-
nity in arriving at a consensus on the pertinent, yet controversial subject
of humanitarian intervention (ICISS Report, 2001).
In specific terms, the ICISS report established the need for the inter-
national community to use force in the curtailment of mass atrocities.
Fundamentally, the report labeled as a just cause such an internationally
coordinated armed intervention

to halt or avert […] large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended […]
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or
inability to act, or a failed state situation, or large scale ethnic cleansing,
actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion,
acts of terror or rape. (Omorogbe, 2012)

The ICISS report is premised on advancing an ideological and opera-

tional shift from a ‘right to intervene’ towards a ‘responsibility to protect’,
to define international responses to crisis within sovereign states. As such,
the report therefore sought to balance the inherent sovereignty exercised
by states and the imperative of the international community intervening
to protect the populations. This position advanced in the ICCIS report
is on one hand, an express recognition that territorial states holds the
primary responsibility to protect its civilian populace, and on the other
hand recognizing that the international community holds a responsibility
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 49

to step in and protect the population where the ‘the state fails to protect
all or part of the population, or the state itself is the source of the threat
to them’ (Bellamy, 2009; Stahn, 2007).
On his part (Gierycz, 2008) presents an origin of the R2P that predates
the reports of the ICISS. According to Gierycz, the earlier roots of what
is known as the R2P doctrine today can be traced to the 1948 Genocide
Convention. As an international statute, the 1948 Genocide Conven-
tion signposts an instrument that places on states, a duty to “prevent
and punish” (Francioni & Bakker, 2013). This duty has been inter-
preted by numerous scholars and observers as to mean a mode of R2P
given that it requires that states take needed steps to protect populations
against possible genocide and exert appropriate punishment on genocidal
perpetrators. It is in this regard that Article 8 of the convention further
grants states the powers to call upon the UN to take appropriate action
in situations of impending genocides. By inference from the provisions
of the convention therefore, the curtailment of genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity qualify as jus cogens [peremptory norms].
Thus, it implies that the R2P doctrine can and should be utilized in the
prevention of the above-mentioned heinous crimes and mass atrocities
(Francioni & Bakker, 2013).
On the salient issue of procedural mechanism needed for the imple-
mentation of the R2P doctrine, the report by the ICISS identifies the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the appropriate body with
powers to authorize intervention on the grounds of R2P. Although, the
report asserts that actions can be taken in two further circumstances;
first, in a situation where the UNSC failed to act in an dangerous and
extraordinary case, second, when a two-third of the General Assembly
of the UN have made a recommendation for intervention in line with
the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution procedure (Omorogbe, 2012). In
addition, the report provides a second route towards the authorization of
R2P outside the UN. This is a case where a supranational organizations
requested post facto approval from the UNSC for an R2P intervention
which had already begun. This have been identified as the basis for the
armed intervention in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in 1998 by
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Outside
Africa, the intervention by the UK and France to protect the Kurds in
northern Iraq from Iraqi government forces in 1991 have been cited
another example (Franck, 2006; Simma, 1999).
50 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

The R2P doctrine was further strengthened by the convening of a

High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change by the former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 4 November 2003. Like the ICISS,
the report published in 2004 by this UN panel lend credence to the
emerging norm of collective action by the international community to
prevent mass atrocities and further recognized that the exercise of such
an obligation by the global community is only consequent upon the
failure of territorial state to perform the responsibility of protecting its
own population (Hamann, 2013). Taking into cognizance the widespread
acceptance of the R2P doctrine, the UN General Assembly on 24 October
2005 overwhelmingly approved Resolution 60/1, known as the World
Summit Outcome Document, which promoted doctrine of ‘responsibility
to protect’ (Foley, 2013).
Evidently, another salient milestone in the origin and development of
the R2P was the formation of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect—an initiative birthed by major international non-governmental
agencies such as Oxfam International, Human Rights Watch (HRW),
Refugees International, the International Crisis Group and the Institute
for Global Policy (Brosig, 2012).

Pillars of the R2P Doctrine

The responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine is premised on three equally
important and non-sequential pillars which were outlined in outcome
documents of the 2005 United Nations General Assembly World Summit.
Prior to the release of the outcome documents, the report of the Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) on the
responsibility to protect (R2P) unbundled the R2P doctrine into the three
fundamental pillars. These so-called “three R2P pillars” includes: firstly, a
state’s responsibility to protect its population; secondly, the commitment
of international community to help states in protecting its population;
and, thirdly, member states’ responsibility to respond whenever a state
is failing in its responsibility to protect its population (Evans, 2008;
Raymond, 2013).

The First Pillar

The provisions of the first pillar tends to reiterate or reinforce existing
international laws and it is premised on interpreting the salient obligation
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 51

of states to act in the curtailment of mass atrocity crimes (Rosenberg,

2009; Sihvo 2012). Gierycz (2008) argues in the line that the first pillar of
R2P draws from institutionalized and universally binding bodies of princi-
ples of customary and treaty international human rights law (IHRL) and
international humanitarian law (IHL) (Gierycz, 2008). In this light, it has
been advanced that the provisions contained in the outcome documents
of the world summit of 2005 depicts the reflection of the assembly, as
against being a source of the obligation.
Extant human rights frameworks, from which the R2P emanates,
presents an in-depth comprehension of the nature and nuances of the
R2P doctrine as an instrument designed for guaranteeing human rights
protection in line with universal human rights standards. Obviously, the
R2P doctrine resonates with the notion of ‘duty to protect’ which is a
concept embedded in the IHRL. Rosenberg (2009) opines that the duty
to protect, in essence, obligates states to act to ‘avert, penalize, probe
and redress abuses of human rights’ (Rosenberg, 2009). International
Human Rights Law is grounded on the notion that nation-states which
constitutes the primary actors in the international system and guardians
of human rights responsibilities as provided for under international law—
bears the responsibility to prevent mass atrocities against the population.
This responsibility applies during times of wars as well as peace (Sihvo,
2012; Security Council Report, 2014).

The Second Pillar

The second pillar of the R2P doctrine touches on assisting the state
to accomplish its primary responsibility of the protection of the popu-
lation from genocides, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic
cleansing (Evans, 2008). This pillar mirrors the idea that a state’s respon-
sibility to protect the population from heinous mass atrocities may have
extraterritorial application. That is, other states can step in to protect the
population if the state is unable or unwilling to abide by its responsi-
bility providing such protection. This extraterritorial application of the
R2P draws from extant international rights protection regimes such Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
52 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

The case law and other authoritative interpretations of the above-

mentioned treaties obligates that states, may in under extraordinary
circumstances apply extraterritoriality (Gierycz, 2008; Sihvo 2012). This
notions reflects the provisions of the Genocide Convention and inter-
national humanitarian law (IHL) which obligates states to help others
towards complying with the law. While the provisions of the Genocide
Convention and IHL signposts significant achievement in this regards,
it is the Genocide Convention of 1948 that noticeably articulated the
legal obligation of states to take steps to prevent the perpetuation of
mass atrocities beyond its own jurisdiction or territory. This position was
further reiterated in the Bosnia v. Serbia ruling which establish that Article
1 of the Genocide Convention requires that states “employ all means
which are reasonably available to them” (Sihvo, 2012).

The Third Pillar

The third pillar of the R2P is at the epicentre of the ongoing debates
about the doctrine. The third pillar is the most controversial and
contested component of R2P as it pertains to the resort to the use of
military action by the global community in the event of the failure of
a nation-state to live up to its responsibility of protecting its population
from mass atrocities. Amidst concerns and protest, mainly emanating from
the global south that the third pillar of the R2P may be used as a justifica-
tion by the Liberal West for military intervention, Bellamy (2009) warns
that the R2P doctrine fails stretch the powers of nation-states to militarily
interfere in other states’ internal matters (Bellamy, 2009). This therefore
raises a pertinent question of whether the R2P doctrine places a legal
obligation on the UNSC as the authority empowered to take such mili-
tary actions. Although, numerous strands of traditional legal scholarship
vehemently argues that no such obligation rests with UNSC, recent devel-
opments such as the UNSC resolution 1970 over Libya in 2011 suggests
otherwise (Sihvo, 2012).

From Peacekeeping to Responsibility to Protect

(RtoP): A Metamorphosis of Mandate?
The raging debate among scholars and analysts about the connection and
distinction between peacekeeping and responsibility to protect (RtoP)
have continued to shape contemporary literature on the subject matter. As
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 53

stated earlier, Africa have been at the epicentre of both peacekeeping and
RtoP doctrines as the continent have been the proverbial ‘testing ground’
for the implementation of both peacekeeping and RtoP. United Nations
(UN) statistics on peacekeeping reveals that there have been more peace-
keeping deployment and operations in Africa than in any other continent
of the world (Malan, 1998). On the other hand, Libya proved a litmus
test not just for the implementation of the RtoP but also the viability,
acceptability and future utilization of the doctrine (Sihvo, 2012). It is
therefore expedient that an analysis of the ideational shift from peace-
keeping to RtoP be advanced via the prism of Africa (Sarkin, 2009; Smith
2015).
Unpacking the dynamics of the ideational and policy shift from peace-
keeping to RtoP can be advanced on a three-pronged basis: First, the
civilian protection dimension of the peacekeeping is relatively weak. The
traditional perception of peacekeeping is not the protection of civilians,
but rather to protect an ‘existing peace’. A classic case of peacekeepers
perfuming this orthodox role was seen in the decision of the peacekeeping
missions to stick to their mandates even while the Rwandan genocide of
1994 and the Srebrenica genocide of 1995 were perpetrated (UNSC,
1995). RtoP as a doctrine therefore is hinged on the idea of ‘never
again’ should the world fail to stop mass atrocities against civilians. It
can therefore be deduced that the failure to enshrine a civilian protection
caveat within the peacekeeping mandates necessitated the emergence of
the RtoP.
The second basis for a shift from peacekeeping to RtoP is the notion
of the use of force. The mandates of peacekeeping operations does not
provide for peace enforcement against sovereign states without consent
(Williams, 2011). Tardy (2012) reiterates the above position by opining
that ‘While ultimately RtoP implies the possibility of waging wars, peace-
keeping does not.’ In actuality, the difference here lies in the fact that
RtoP’s implementation may entail waging war against a sovereign state
without seeking its consent—as was the case in Libya in 2011. Further-
more, peacekeepers have engaged in wars, albeit not against states, but
against relatively small armed non-state actors as was the case when UN
peacekeepers waged a military campaign against an armed group led by
renegade Somali General Aideed in Somalia in the 1990s and against the
M-23 rebel group in DR Congo in 2013 (Tardy, 2012; Williams, 2011).
The third basis for a shift from peacekeeping to the RtoP principle
is the increasing call from mainly African states for UN peacekeepers to
54 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

play a more robust role in while carrying out their missions in Africa.
Williams (2011) posits that the African Union (AU) have in recent years
demanded that the UNSC sanction and fund peacekeeping troops to carry
out vigorous, ‘peace imposition’ operations in crisis-plagued African states
like the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, DR Congo and Somali.
This call by the AU marks a fundamental shift from traditional peace-
keeping to some form of RtoP role as it blurs the line that demarcates
the two doctrines (Williams, 2011). This ideational and operational shift
from the peacekeeping to RtoP doctrine and mandates is further reflected
in the warning issued to the UNSC by the commander of the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo popularly known as MONUSCO’s Force:

Deterrence by presence is not always effective. Only an active force with

a proactive, robust posture can neutralize and defeat threats to the civilian
population….A robust posture is indeed safer for all. (Williams, 2011)

The above warning was a clear call for an operational level shift from
peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The implication of such a shift
towards peace enforcement is that peacekeeper would be implored to
use force to protect civilians against threats. This arguably signposts a
tilt towards the ideas on which the RtoP is premised.

A Prognosis on the RtoP and the Rise

of Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)
Ominously, NATO’s ‘overreach’ in Libya in 2011 depicted the ease to
which the idea that was conceived to protect civilians against mass atroc-
ities can very easily be hijacked and politicized. The decision of NATO
to arm and fund anti-Ghaddafi rebels while also serving as the group’s
‘air force’ to ultimately bring about regime change in Libya did not only
spark debates but also birthed a clamour for a shift from the RtoP doctrine
(Kelly, 2013; Muggah, 2013). This clamour spearheaded by Brazil with
backing of many other developing states birthed the doctrine of respon-
sibility while protecting (RwP). Central to the RwP doctrine proposed
by Brazil is the idea that while states are obliged to intervene to protect
civilian population, primary emphasis should be placed on the nature of
such intervention and who intervenes. Obviously, the backdrop to the
RwP doctrine is the fallout of NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 that
 FROM PEACEKEEPING TO RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 55

have been criticized for advancing a neoliberal agenda of regime change.

In principle therefore, the Brazilian RwP proposal significantly speaks
to an extended commitment to non-interventionism and multilateralism
(Muggah, 2013; Stockburger, 2010).
Undoubtedly, there is a consensus among advocates that the preven-
tion of mass atrocities is at the core of the RtoP and RwP, however,
the point of divergence is on the nature of such intervention and by
whom (Stuenkel, 2013). This therefore brings to the fore, the under-
lying moral, ethical and legal dimensions of such interventions to protect
civilians. Although there are objection to the RwP by Western govern-
ments and powers, the RwP is being perceived by some developing states
as the future of humanitarian intervention which is devoid of Western
imperial agenda and embraces multilateralism. While both RtoP and RwP
doctrines are evolving and defining the international humanitarian system,
the latter is fast gaining traction and has been perceived as the future of
intervention.

Conclusion
This chapter examined the ideational and policy shift from peacekeeping
to the responsibility to protect (RtoP) principles that currently holds
sway as a popular lexicon within the international humanitarian system.
Given that Africa—with its numerous fragile states and high volatility—
have witnessed the highest deployment of peacekeepers and also the most
controversial implementation of the RtoP just yet, this chapter examined
the metamorphosis from peacekeeping to the RtoP principle through the
prism of Africa. Africa have been at the crux of both peacekeeping and
RtoP doctrines as it posed a litmus test for the implementation of both
doctrines. This chapter therefore argues that the failure of peacekeeping
missions to prevent the perpetuation of mass atrocities against civilian
population necessitated the emergence of the RtoP that is premised on the
idea of preventing the reoccurrence of such heinous crimes. This accounts
for why the RtoP doctrine is designed to prevent crimes against humanity,
war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing. The fact that deployed peace-
keepers stood idly by and watched the unfolding of the Rwandan and
Srebrenica genocides in 1994 and 1995 respectively due to a lack of
operational mandate to protect civilians have raised questions about the
essence of peacekeeping. Therefore, the RtoP is perceived as a panacea to
this shortcoming.
56 P. I. AWODI AND S. WAPMUK

To put the ideational and policy shift from peacekeeping to RtoP

in context, this chapter conceptualized peacekeeping, traced its origins
and the contexts of the principle. This was followed by the analysis of
the origins, pillars and contending views of the responsibility to protect
(RtoP) doctrine. Furthermore, this chapter presents analysis of the shift
from peacekeeping to RtoP which is marked by a metamorphosis in
mandate. The chapter identified three factors that necessitated the shift
from peacekeeping to RtoP. First, the civilian protection dimension of the
peacekeeping is relatively weak as traditionally, peacekeepers are mandated
to keep an existing peace as against enforcing peace. Second, RtoP as
a doctrine makes permissible the use of force if necessary to ensure
the protection of civilians even without the consent of states. Third,
the shift from peacekeeping to the RtoP principle is influenced by the
increasing call from mainly African states for UN peacekeepers to play a
more robust role while carrying out their missions in Africa. The chapter
concludes by arguing that the controversial implementation of the RtoP
doctrine by NATO which culminated with regime change in Libya in
2011 have damaged the global credibility of the doctrine and undermined
its future acceptability. As such, the author predicts that the responsibility
while protecting (RwP) doctrine proposed by Brazil—with the backing of
some developing states—would take the centre stage in the international
humanitarian system in the nearest future.

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Theory and Pratice of The Responsibility
to Protect in Africa
Responsibility to Protect in Libya or Regime
Change? What We Have Learned?

Emmanuel Chijindu Anabiri and Pfano Mashau

Introduction
The international system was characterized by the principle of non-
interventionism after the World War 11 because according to the United
Nations charter, state intervention in the internal affairs of other state is
an afront to the principle of sovereignty which is the foundation stone
of modern states. However, international experience during and after
the cold war changed the global perception of sovereignty. The human
right crisis and the heinous crimes committed around the world shocked
the consciousness of man and the need to react to save the interna-
tional community from extinction became the conscious responsibility of
the international community. Thus, Erameh (2018) argues that although

E. C. Anabiri (B)
African Center for Economic Research and Policy Analysis, Owerri, Imo,
Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
P. Mashau
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 63

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_4
64 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

non-intervention has continued to be a distinguishing feature of Cold War

state relations, the waning competition between the superpowers and the
intensification of violent conflicts across and within Africa have in fact
sparked greater concerns for the preservation of human rights (Erameh,
2018: 383).
Scholars have vehemently contended that contemporary problems to
international security have not only intensified worries about human
rights breaches, but also given citizenship and human rights issues a global
dimension. Hence, when nations fail to defend its citizens from such
crimes that shocks the consciousness of man, state sovereignty may be
lost (Brock, 2006: 289; Brown, 2002: 40; Chandler, 2012: 213; Gallaroi,
2010: 3; Held, 2010; Robbins, 2012: 30; Wheeler, 2000). Political theo-
rists like Hobe (Forsyth, 1979), Lock (Simmons, 1989) and Rousseau
(Steinberger, 2008) all agree to the notion that the primary essence of
the state is the provision of security and when it fails in that responsibility,
it matters little what else it does.
Against this backdrop, the modern conception of sovereignty is hinged
on the ability of the state to protect its citizens from human right abuse,
war crimes and other crimes that shocks the consciousness of man such
as genocide and crimes against humanity. When the state cannot protect
its citizen or seen to lack the capacity of protecting its citizens from these
hitherto stated crimes, the state loses its sovereignty, and it becomes the
responsibility of the international community to protect.
The experiences of Rwanda, Bosnia, and former Yugoslavia where
genocide and other crimes that shocked the consciousness of man
took place made the international community to pass the slogan of
“Never Again” and in the UN World Summit of 2005 the Responsi-
bility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly (A/RES/63/308) and was reaffirmed in 2006 by the
United Nations Security Council (Resolution 1674) (Bellamy, 2008). The
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) was developed as a machinery of the
international community to address international crimes and to make such
the experience of Rwanda, Bosnia and former Yugoslavia did not occur
again.
Although most scholars particularly from the African states where the
Responsibility to Protect Principle has been implemented see it as a form
of military intervention (humanitarian intervention) but the Responsi-
bility to Protect duffers from humanitarian intervention in different sense.
First, RtoP is primarily a preventative concept that stresses a range of
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA OR REGIME … 65

actions to halt the possibility of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,

or crimes against humanity before the crimes are committed. Human-
itarian intervention exclusively applies to the use of armed force. After
all other non-coercive methods have attempted, only the final alterna-
tive of using force is permitted, and then only with UN Security Council
approval (p. 621).
The notion of “humanitarian intervention,” in contrast, contends that
using force to achieve a humanitarian goal is permissible without the Secu-
rity Council’s approval. Second, the duty to Protect is a fundamental tenet
of current international law, particularly the law governing sovereignty,
stability and security, human rights, and violent conflict. Again, the four
major atrocity crimes genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing are the only ones which RtoP concentrates, even though
humanitarian interventions have historically been permitted in a variety of
contexts.
Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
treaty that founded the International Criminal Court, the first three
offences are expressly specified in international law. The UN has described
ethnic cleansing as “a premeditated strategy devised by one ethnic or
religious group to eliminate by violent and conflict measures the civilian
population of another ethnic or religious group from specified geograph-
ical locations,” even though it is not a crime under international law
and finally, whereas RtoP is predicated on a “duty to protect,” human-
itarian intervention presupposes a “right to intervene.” The RtoP and
humanitarian intervention both acknowledge that sovereignty is not
unconditional. The RtoP concept, on the other hand, focuses less on the
right of governments to interfere and more on a responsibility to protect
vulnerable populations, moving away from state-centered objectives and
toward the interests of victims. Moreover, it presents a fresh perspec-
tive on the fundamentals of sovereignty, shifting the focus from concerns
about “control” to emphasize “responsibility” toward one’s own people
and the broader international community (Evans et al., 2013).
Beginning in February 2011, the uprising against the Ghaddafi govern-
ment closely followed the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. As a result,
the deteriorating situation in Libya triggered several responses on the
part of the international community, which finally resulted in the adop-
tion of resolutions 1970 and 1973, respectively. Notwithstanding the fact
that resolution 1970 was well received due to the wording “all neces-
sary measures,” and the actions that followed that. Libya continues to
66 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

be the first actual instance to which the RtoP will be used after its
adoption. What started out as a peaceful demonstration against Colonel
Ghaddafi’s “autocracy” developed into a full-fledged uprising. Ghaddafi
allegedly engaged (Erameh, 2016) in a house to house “cleansing of the
city of opposition groups, calling them “narcotic addicts,” “rats and cock-
roaches,” who were inspired by the West and Al-Qaeda, and pledging to
die instead of ending up leaving Libya”. He was incensed by the acts
of the opposition, who had started to get international legitimacy from
France as well as other nations (Erameh, 2016: 230).
The United Nations Security Council issued a resolution 1970, which
subjected the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC), sanctioned
an arms embargo, and implemented a visa ban and equity freeze on
specific members of the Ghaddafi government, citing grave and persis-
tent abuses of human rights, including unlawful detention and arrest. The
UNSC approved resolution 1973, which requests the “prompt implemen-
tation of a cease-fire,” after being “unsatisfied” with resolution 1970. It
emphasizes that the parties to armed conflicts have the fundamental obli-
gation to take all practical steps to guarantee the security of civilians and
reinforces “the responsibility of the Libyan government to safeguard the
Libyan population.” Moreover, the resolution gave member states of the
UN permission to “take every step necessary to safeguard people and the
civilian inhabited areas” (pp. 230–231).

Background to NATO Invasion of Libya

On February 15, 2011, antigovernmental demonstrations began in Beng-
hazi, Libya’s second-largest town, shortly thereafter spread to the nation’s
major cities. These demonstrations took place during the Arab spring
and in response to the mass demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia. In
accordance with Libyan and international NGOs and the majority of
the media, the armed forces retaliated with ruthless violence, assaulting
peaceful protesters with deadly force and even using helicopter gunships
to put an end to the widespread antigovernment protests that cried out
for democracy. According to Kvernmo (2016), armed with the UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1973 approval, French aircraft bombed Libyan
army troops advancing on Benghazi on March 19, 2011, averting the
impending massacre that hundreds of thousands of civilians who protested
against the authoritarian government of Moammar Gaddafi were about to
experience (Kvernmo, 2016: 6).
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA OR REGIME … 67

Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council (UNSCR) was approved

on March 17, 2011, with 10 votes in favor and 5 against. The resolution
called for a quick end to hostilities and gave member states the green light
to take all appropriate strategies to safeguard civilians and civilian popu-
lated areas under imminent attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, such as
Benghazi, while removing a foreign occupation force of any form on any
part of Libyan territory,” according to a summary of the resolution. Many
celebrated UNSCR 1973 as the first UN Security Council resolution that
officially acknowledged the principle of the global communities’ responsi-
bility to protect. The International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), on the other hand, was the organization that initially
developed the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) standard. RtoP’s central
tenet is that states have a duty to defend their citizens from mass atrocity
crimes and human rights violations, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing,
and war crimes. It also states that “when they are incapable of or unwilling
to do so, that responsibility must be carried by others”.
The RtoP norm, which advocates for the duties to prevent, respond
to, and rebuild, went beyond the conventional interpretation of the
sovereignty and non-intervention principles of the UN Charter when it
stated that states failing to uphold a level of protection towards their
citizens give up their right to sovereignty. However, the UN Charter
only takes into consideration the following two circumstances where an
exception to the use of force might be considered:

1. If a Member of the United Nations is subject to an armed attack,

they have the inherent right to defend themselves individually or
collectively (article 51).
2. The UNSC has the authority to act in situations that pose “a danger
to global security and peace” (art. 42).

The member nations of the UN were primarily preoccupied with stop-

ping reacting to state-on-state aggressions, such as those used by the axis
powers during World War II, at the time the UN Charter was signed.
The RtoP, on the other hand, was developed in response to post-cold
war threat scenarios in which massive crime or displaced people in one
country often spread to surrounding nations, disrupting regional peace
and security. The ICISS assessment deemed the possibility of military
involvement an unprecedented and extreme step that obviously required
68 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

prior authorization from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The following essential principles were proposed by ICISS in order
to direct the decision-making process: just cause, right intention, last
resort, proportional means, and realistic prospects. The essential principles
described above were not included in the summit’s final report, despite
the 2005 World Summit endorsing the RtoP standard.

The Principle of Just Cause

and Libyan Intervention
According to the just cause theory, there are some circumstances in which
it is ethically acceptable to wage war (jus ad bellum), as well as certain
behaviors that are acceptable during combat (jus in bello). The ICISS
report focused on the former and proposed that in order to launch a
military intervention, the following conditions needed to be satisfied;
largescale death toll, actual or suspected, with genocidal purpose or not,
caused by either intentional state action, state negligence or inaction,
or a failed state situation; largescale “ethnic cleansing,” whether it was
done intentionally or was discovered, and whether it involved murder,
forced eviction, fear, or rape. According to the commission, the “just
cause aspect of the decision to intervene is adequately satisfied” if one
or all of these elements are met. Assessing the claims against the Gaddafi
government that supported the NATO military action on 19 March 2011
provides a brief overview of the Libyan situation and determines if the just
cause standard was satisfied.
After the widespread revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab Spring
began on March 15 and continued as the days, weeks and months
progressed. In February 2011, antigovernmental demonstrations started
in Benghazi, the second-largest town in Libya, and swiftly expanded to
the main towns around the nation. NGOs and international media stated
that the government forces retaliated by deploying ruthless brutality to
target peaceful protestors. Mercenaries and even helicopter gunships to
put an end to the uprising while undertaking ethnic cleansing of lawfully
admitted immigrants. Based on these claims, the UN Human Rights
Council (HRC) agreed to conduct a special session, during which it was
resolved to suspend Libya’s participation.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navy Pillay, stated in
her opening remarks that “the repression in Libya on peaceful protesters
is rising at frightening rates with documented mass executions, arbitrary
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA OR REGIME … 69

imprisonment, arrest, and abuse of demonstrators”. In the statement she

issued, she is cited as stressing, “It is believed that tanks, helicopters, and
military aircraft have been used arbitrarily to strike the demonstrators.”
There may have been thousands of deaths or injuries as well, according to
some accounts. She concluded by saying that “killings were also allegedly
carried out by foreign fighters who have entered into Libya for this
purpose and are believed to still be doing so, and who have been given
small arms and light weapons by the Libyan government to put down the
demonstration.”
The HRC agreed to create an international Commission of Inquiry
(COI) “to examine all claimed infringements of international human
rights law in Libya” after accusing the Libyan government of perpetrating
“crimes against humanity.” Two days later, the UN Security Council had
a special meeting to discuss the issue in Libya and endorsed a resolu-
tion that was put up by France, Germany, and the UK. and the United
States. A “stop to the violence” was sought in the resolution, which also
made reference to the Libyan crisis. It also expressed worry about the
safeguarding of civilian populations and continuous displacement.

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)

Implementation in Libya, How Far Did
NATO Prevent, React, and Rebuilt Libya?
In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1973, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) started a military intervention in Libya in 2011.
Libya is a nation in North Africa on the Coastline that borders Egypt,
Tunisia, and Algeria. A civil war broke out between Muammar Gaddafi’s
supporters and his adversaries in Libya. The UNSC authorized a “no-fly
zone” over Libyan airspace in March 2011. The United States (US) then
took command of Operation Unified Protector, a NATO military assault.
The goal of the operation was to uphold Resolution 1973 and safeguard
civilians (Zambakari, 2016: 44). Although controversies have trailed the
RtoP intervention in Libya as regards to its legality, double standard and
selective engagement, the focus of this paper is to ascertain if RtoP was
able to achieve its three elements of responsibility to prevent, react and
rebuild.
Thus, the international community have the responsibility to help the
state to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity and other crimes that
70 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

shocks the consciousness of man from being committed especially when

the state is implicated in human right violations (Malito, 2017). The
international community can also react by approving the use of military
force to stop atrocities against the civilian population (intervention) and
after the violent use of force to stop atrocities, more importantly, the
international community have the responsibility of rebuilding the state
and making sure that justice is offered to both the oppressed and the
oppressor.
Malito (2017: 290) emphatically maintains that what matters is that
the acceptable use of force is constrained by a just war standard. Conse-
quently, the non-interference and inviolability of internal order funda-
mentals of sovereignty can no more shield sovereign nations from external
intervention especially when the sovereign nation cannot protect its citi-
zens or when the state is complicit of committing atrocities against its
own people. When the incumbent must be replaced to fulfill the duty
of humanitarian protection, regime change is acceptable and justified
(p. 300).
The implementation of the pillar of responsibility to prevent in Libya
have been a subject of contestation pre and post military intervention
in Libya under the RtoP doctrine. While the United States, France and
United Kingdom argue that the military action in Libya was necessary
to stop Gadhafi and his supporters from unleashing more atrocities to
the people of Libya. They argue that regime change is necessary so that
the international community will not witness the experience of Rwanda,
Bosnia, and former Yugoslavia. But it is important to interrogate if the
responsibility to prevent pillar which was implemented in Libya followed
all the rules and process and if actually, there was a clear evidence that
the civilian population is really in danger of war crimes, crime against
humanity and genocide. First, the principle of responsibility to prevent
which approves the use of military force will only be applicable as the
last resort, that is, if all other diplomatic means fails to take care of the
situation.
However, according to Malito (2017), the United Nations empha-
sized the idea of prevention as a driving factor for deploying force as a
last resort in Libya. Yet in doing so, the international community disre-
garded the just war doctrine of last resort, which states that all peaceful
means must be tried before using force, by preemptively dismissing and
marginalizing any alternatives to the militarization of the issue (such as
the African Union roadmap) (p. 291).
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA OR REGIME … 71

Arguably, NATO invasion of Libya portrays a western ploy and foreign

policy objective of the United States, France and United Kingdom of
regime change in Libya because both Cameron, Obama and Sarkozy
vowed that Gadhafi must go by all means. Malito (2017) reinforced the
above point and argues that regime change in Libya was not just the
consequence of NATO’s overwhelming enthusiasm, especially since the
focus was placed on prevention and protection. A policy decision existed.
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who were pushing
for a military option, engaged in Libya with the explicit, stated, and
repeated goal of toppling Qaddafi regime because of its anti-west poli-
cies in his government over a long period of time (Malito, 2017: 295).
Again, the policy choice of NATO on the use of military action in Libya
did not receive a normative consensus, neither did it result in a universally
accepted political concept of “obligation.”
Most of the non-permanent members of the Security Council
disagreed on whether it was possible to impose a regime replacement.
Members of the Security Council approved a weapons embargo, a travel
restriction, and a financial restriction on all foreign assets belonging to
Libya at the Security Council meeting on Resolution 1970. France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States refused to acknowledge the fact
that the insurrection in Libya was armed and singled out Gaddafi for
blame. Both Russian and Brazilian representatives asserted, during the
debate of Resolution 1973, that the proposal submitted by Lebanon
and the P3 (the three veto-wielding member states, France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) considered actions that did not fulfill
the emergency ceasefire. Germany, India, Brazil, China, and the Russian
Federation did not participate in the vote on Resolution 1973 (Binder,
2015; Bruce, 2007; Davidson, 2013; Malito, 2017; Prashad, 2012).
Furthermore, the use of military action in Libya was not to implement
in its realistic sense the pillar of responsibility to prevent but rather to
promote the economic and political interest of the United States, France
and Britain in the gulf region. For instance, British corporations were not
yet engaged in the oil business in Libya but following protracted negoti-
ations over political tensions between the two nations, British Petroleum
negotiated two significant drilling and exploitation deals with Tripoli in
2007 and 2009. After the civil war broke out, the company’s plans to
begin exploring the Gulf of Sidra were postponed until 2012. In addi-
tion to making significant attempts to secure fresh oil deposits, the UK
Foreign Office had the strategic desire to safeguard existing British assets
72 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

in the nation, not only before the civil war. When NATO was conducting
operations, small Western oil corporations continued to supply fuel to the
rebels as NATO bombings attacked oil facilities with the justification of
defending people.
Minor oil dealers like Vitol (Malito, 2017: 293) provided gasoline to
Libyan rebels in return for crude oil, and in numerous ways, the US
Treasury and UK Foreign Departments helped to arrange these deals.
Alan Duncan, the UK’s minister for international development, facili-
tated the agreement with Vitol oil. The U.S. Treasury Department then
provided a license allowing U.S. corporations to buy Libyan crude from
Vitol (otherwise subject to the UN penalties placed by Resolution 1970)
while releasing some of the Libyan holdings to the NTC for the purchase
of gasoline.
Accordingly, liberal democracies use cooptation or extension to protect
liberal norms and practices. The removal of barriers to a seamless inte-
gration of institutional change from dictatorship and neoliberalism was
a political motive supported by NATO in Libya, even though develop-
ments have shown that there was no unified strategy or determination
to political reform on the ground. There are several ways to support or
influence liberal changes, including regime change, civil society efforts,
and structural adjustment measures. Hanieh (2015) notes in “Lineages
of Revolt” that after the Arab Spring, several liberal organizations, like
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
the European Investment Bank, broadened their strategic goals to include
North Africa. Political forces, however, might not have been sufficient in
Libya. Gaddafi would never have consented to resign; hence a military
option was required.
The international community reaction (responsibility to react) in Libya
through military action lacks credibility and was not done in good faith
as the argument above suggest. Other diplomatic actions would have
helped to settle the Libyan issue, but Gadhafi was already condemned
to die and regime change in Libya was inevitable. Thus, Malito (2017)
emphasize that the international reaction through NATO military inter-
vention in Libya was carried out to support European nations that had
long-standing, now-embarrassing links with “Middle Eastern autocrats,”
regime transition also offered a means of political renewal. The support
for regime change turned into an advantageous strategy to renew different
patterns of authority and coalitions, without challenging the international
political economy and political order that sparked the wave of public
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA OR REGIME … 73

uprisings, by presenting the Arab Spring as a simple response against

authoritarian leaders (Malito, 2017: 295).
Furthermore, Brookings (2011) stress that the responsibility to react
was orchestrated to protect western interest which is closely linked to
the intervention (Brookings, 2011). Binder (2015) argue that the West
supported the rebels instead of Gadhafi because the defense of Western
interests was inextricably linked to the rebels’ success. The need to arm
the rebels in Libya was already addressed by David Cameron, the prime
minister of the United Kingdom, on February 28, 2011. Five days after it
was established in Benghazi, on March 5, 2011, France acknowledged the
National Transition Council. Obama announced a sizable cash package of
$25 million “in non -deadly weapons” to the militants on April 18, 2011.
In the first week of March, as the Libyan Army reclaimed some rebel
locations, Western nations were also concerned about potential reprisals
after Gaddafi’s triumph (Binder, 2015: 718).
The implementation of RtoP in Libya did not comply with the third
pillar responsibility to rebuild. Thus, Keranen (2016) ask, what about the
connected notion of the responsibility to rebuild if the obligation to react
to crimes in other states has grown to be a popular idea? he notes, if
it is agreed that stopping crimes is not enough to fulfill the protection
obligations, then asking this question is crucial. Due to the contentious-
ness of the reactive pillar, the preventative and rebuilding pillars of RtoP
maybe have drawn less attention (Keranen, 2016: 332). The process of
rebuilding Libya as the third pillar of the RtoP suggests have achieved
little or no success. As Keranen (2016) pointed out, Libya has struggled
toward peace and stability or solidified sovereignty many years into the
rebuilding process.
The various militant forces that emerged during the anti-Qaddafi
uprising have little confidence in the government’s institutions and the
people in charge of them, and those in positions of power in the new
governing bodies support integrating the militant forces into the govern-
ment’s official security forces, fueling conflict in the new Libyan state. The
militants have refused to disarm because of the engagement of Ghaddafi
men in the new Libyan government, thus, making it difficult for postinter-
vention administration to establish control over a variety of armed groups
that are worried about former Ghaddafi regime members infiltrating the
new governmental structures.
McKay (2011) pointed the important aspect of responsibility to rebuild
and argued that it is the most important aspect of the RtoP because
74 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

it expects interventionists must develop a precise and efficient post-

intervention plan (ICISS, 2001: 39). Thus, the intervention forces are
required to ensure that everyone living in the state where intervention is
taking place is given the bare minimum of security and protection. Addi-
tionally, this means that if the main goals of interventions are achieved,
intervening armed forces must avoid retaliatory deaths and even “reverse
ethnic genocide” (ICISS, 2001: 40–41).
Although the international community may have stopped a massacre
in Libya, there are still post-Gaddafi scenarios that might result in the
mass murder of Libyan citizens in future. For instance, the quantity
of weapons in a post-Gaddafi Libya may make it simple for Gaddafi
supporters to launch assassination campaigns. Additionally, a number of
killings of Gaddafi supporters might occur as part of efforts to consoli-
date control. The most sensible course of action for intervention troops
would be to make sure that local security personnel are disarmed and
demobilized. In post-conflict Libya, an atmosphere of dread could prevail,
making it difficult for militant groups to give up their weapons (McKay,
2011).
Bringing about justice and peace amongst those involved in the conflict
is the second responsibility of the intervention forces. The RtoP provides
that “external assistance to reconciliation initiatives should be informed
of the necessity to promote cooperation, and continuously connected
to collaborative initiatives for development amongst former adversaries”
(ICISS, 2001: 39). Accountability for war crimes and crimes against
humanity perpetrated during the civil conflict in Libya ought to be an
issue of discussion. The biggest problem in this area is that brutally
penalizing previous violence could actually encourage an increase in
it. Punishment can cause individuals who undergo punishment to feel
resentful and hateful, and these emotions may be expressed via reprisal
behavior.
Once it becomes imperative for justice to be served in Libya, restora-
tive justice a theory that aims to foster healing and restore injustice
caused between parties ought to be thoroughly investigated. It would
be fascinating to observe how justice work done in post-conflict Libya
has focused on bringing parties together because the UN and the inter-
vention forces have committed to engage with the National Transitional
Council on this problem. Regrettably, justice has prevailed over reconcil-
iation in favor of punishing top war criminals, whether through the ICC
or Libya’s national tribunals (McKay, 2011).
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA OR REGIME … 75

Responsibility to rebuild also has the duty to promote long-term devel-

opment and growth. It is required that intervention forces stop using any
aggressive economic tactics against the nation prior to or throughout the
intervention and refrain from extending harsh punishments (ICISS, 2001:
42–43). For instance, the EU eased sanctions on Libyan banks, oil compa-
nies, and ports. Before the intervention, the Libyan government and a
few selected corporations have been subject to sanctions from the UN,
the US, and the EU. These sanctions are said to have caused the freeze
of $120 billion worth of Libyan assets belonging to the state (McKay,
2011). But lifting these sanctions have not fundamentally changed the
reality that Libya’s economic turnaround did not happen many years after
the regime change.

Conclusion
The implementation of RtoP in Libya has sparked significant debate
and contestation especially on the application of the three pillars of the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine (Responsibilities to prevent, react and
rebuild). While the Libya interventionist-based views have justified the
intervention, some scholars who see selective justice in the implementa-
tion of the doctrine of RtoP in Libya argue that the Libyan example have
failed to give credence to the three pillars of the responsibility to protect
doctrine. This paper has painstakingly examined the implementation of
the principle of RtoP in Libya as regards to its three pillars of prevent,
react, and rebuild.
It argues that the Libyan intervention have only succeeded in eroding
the significance of the doctrine as espoused in the document establishing
it by its founding fathers. Thus, the interventionist only broke the laws
that established the principle as the whole issue of prevent, react and
rebuild in Libya was a farce. What actually happened was that the inter-
ventionist who may have created the simulation conditions that created
the need to apply RtoP was looking for justification to implement regime
change in Libya since Gadhafi has been in the enemy list for a long time
because of his anti-western position and policies in Libya. It concludes
that the RtoP doctrine has been transformed as one of the political and
military tools deployed by the West to achieve its political, economic, and
strategic interest particularly in Africa.
76 E. C. ANABIRI AND P. MASHAU

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 Horizontal Inequality and Violence in Cote
d’Ivoire: The Complexity
of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Doctrine

Omosefe Oyekanmi

Introduction
Following a series of armed violence triggered by horizontal inequality
which ravaged the once oasis of economic prosperity and political stability
in West Africa, Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General stated that the
international community had a responsibility to protect citizens in Cote
d’Ivoire (Ipinyomi, 2012). Armed violence in Cote d’Ivoire, deepened by
horizontal inequality between the Christian South and the Muslim North,
informed several intervention initiatives including the Responsibility to
Protect principle (RtoP). Despite over 30 years’ of relative stability, Cote
d’Ivoire like some other countries in Africa with multi-ethnic composition
experienced ethnic inequality leading to several cases of armed violence,
with devastating humanitarian consequences.

O. Oyekanmi (B)
Political and Governance Policy Department, Nigerian Institute of Social and
Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 79

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_5
80 O. OYEKANMI

Institutionalizing the “Never again Mantra” as a global appeal to

protect vulnerable civilian populations, especially during conflict, the
RtoP framework was formed in 2001 under the auspices of the Inter-
national Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
(Erameh & Ologe, 2021). The concept was unanimously ratified by UN
member states in 2005 at the 2005 global summit. The RtoP principle,
states that, states must protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; that the international
society must help states fulfill their RtoP; and that if a state “manifestly
fails” to do so, the international society will take timely and decisive
action through the various provisions set out in the UN Charter (Bellamy,
2009; Evans, 2008). By 2000, the AU enshrined the RtoP mandate in its
charter. This was particularly significant, considering that most humani-
tarian crises in Africa are usually acts of violence perpetrated by incumbent
governments against citizens. Again, sovereignty as an attribute of the
state now presents a safe haven from continued oppression by abusive
governments in most third world countries (Luck, 2009).
The Ivorian crisis which culminated into two civil wars was a reflec-
tion of a deeply divided country orchestrated by political elites. These
political elites such as Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bedie and Alassane
Ouattara etc. represented separate sections of the country, who galvanized
their supporters and kinsmen against their perceived political opponents.
Political contraptions like ‘Ivorite’ and later ‘Rattrapage’ became neolo-
gisms for garnering political power and economic wealth. These concepts
redefined Ivorian identity by promoting ethnic superiority and inequality
between the south and the north, depending on who was in power at
that point in time. With the 2010 elections largely between Gbagbo
(South) and Ouattara (North), both contestants simultaneously claimed
victory. Gbagbo’s claim to the presidency was based on the Constitu-
tional Council’s declaration that he received a revised 51% vote, while
Ouattara’s basis for victory was the pronouncement of a 54% majority
by the Electoral Commission (Ipinyomi, 2012). Although a significant
number of Ouattara’s votes from northern support were nullified, the
United Nations and most international observers nonetheless supported
the Electoral Commission and Ouattara, while Gbagbo relied on technical
constitutionalism for support.
Following the then-President’s (Laurent Gbagbo) refusal to relinquish
power, security forces and opposing militias loyal to either Gbagbo or
Ouattara killed an estimated 3000 people, with many internally displaced.
 HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN COTE … 81

Based on the mandate to prevent, react, and rebuild in other to fore-

stall mass atrocities (Weiss, 2011), Resolution 1975 established by the
UN Security Council in March 2011 approved an international military
intervention programmed to end the crimes against humanity (GCR2P,
2020). Considering that widespread atrocities were committed by both
sides, efforts to protect civilians became sacrosanct. The United Nations
Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOIC), established in 2004 was assigned
under Chapter VII’s clause which codified the authority to defend people
under the imminent threat of physical harm, and within its capabilities
and areas of deployment.
Given the dimension of conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, horizontal inequality
a subset of social cohesion (OECD, 2014), is the unit of analysis for
assessing the inequality between northern and southern Cote d’Ivoire.
Essentially, this is to establish the basis for examining the RtoP doctrine
in Cote d’Ivoire. Particularly since peacekeepers in certain contexts like
Burundi, Haiti, and Cote d’Ivoire were authorized to exhaust all chan-
nels to secure civilian citizens regardless of their ethnic origins and or
religious background (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Utilizing a qualitative
approach, with a focus on the 2010 general elections, this chapter analyzes
the legitimacy of RtoP to human protection and its implementation in an
ethnically polarized country.

Build-up to Armed Violence in Côte d’Ivoire

Right from the 1960s, under the reign of Houphouet-Boigny (the
first President of Côte d’Ivoire), his philosophy of leadership centred
around globalization, with disproportionate attention on individualism
over citizenship, which Khodjo (1996: 82) labeled the “Houphouetian
vision”. With his emphasis on individualism, he was able to promote pro-
western liberal policies and expand infrastructural development. Thus,
the economic success and pragmatic course of the president sowed
the seeds of the Ivorian miracle of the 80s which attracted the influx
of immigrants in search of greener pastures across West Africa into
Côte d’Ivoire. Notably, without petroleum products, Côte d’Ivoire had
one of the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa, with an
average real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of seven
percent between 1960 and 1980. However, this track record was not
to be sustained, as the falling price of cash crops added to complex-
ities around the contentious liberal land ownership laws between the
82 O. OYEKANMI

allogenes (foreigners) and autochthones (indigenes) and destabilized the

pre-existing, taken-for-granted harmony.
The reduced demand for tropical products in the mid-70s resulted in
an economic growth-rate contraction of more than two-thirds by the
early 80s. This is reflected in the spiking rise in unemployment, heavy
debt burden, accrued in the lean years, and the offshoot of political chal-
lenges since independence. The government of Houphouet-Boigny was
compelled to adopt drastic measures in 1989 including the elimination
of the price guarantee scheme and a half of producer payments for cocoa
and coffee (the mainstay of the Ivorian economy). As soon as economic
growth dwindled, the skillful management of the country’s socio-political
balance became loose. With the price of cocoa decreasing, multiple cleav-
ages arose to degrade the unquestioned paternal authoritarianism that had
unified many tribes and groups for almost three decades.
According to Akindès (2003), the leadership of the first president
encompassed a ‘model of compromise’ which became open ended at
the event of his death in 1993. In effect Houphouet-Boigny’s demise,
revealed the fragility in the politics and administration of Côte d’Ivoire.
Hence, his death in 1993, cascaded the country into deep divisions along
ethnic and religious inequalities. With elections in sight, nationalism and
ethnic affiliation became legitimate instruments for political discourse.
The political contest between the main political actors (Alassane Quat-
tara of Northern extraction, Laurent Gbagbo, and Henry Konan Bedie
of Southern origin) created a series of identity crises which by different
accounts dichotomized the country into group inequalities. For instance,
‘Ivorite’ a neologism was used as an identity clause for rallying political
support among disenchanted southern citizens, who blamed foreigners
for taking their jobs away and worsening their living conditions. These
trajectories entrenched the divisions between the north and the south that
birthed the two violent conflicts, which ushered in the United Nations
Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOIC).
A clear plan for power transfer was absent, after the death of
Houphouet-Boigny. This heated up the polity in Cote d’Ivoire, breeding
political and economic strife. In accordance with article 11 of the consti-
tution, the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bedie,
became the interim head of state and subsequently led the country for
the next six years (N’Diaye, 2005). However, this new leadership became
the watershed for ethnic diversity and economic downturn. The global
fall in price of cocoa and coffee strained the economy and put pressure on
 HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN COTE … 83

Bedie’s administration. With the IMF structural adjustment programme

and the attendant hardship in living conditions, the narratives quickly
changed, focusing on the rights of Ivoirians. The debate then expanded
to focus on the definition of a true Ivorian in respect to land ownership
and civic duties like voting.
Consequently, the structural balancing of ethnic, religious, and urban–
rural interests systematically crafted by the erstwhile leader at indepen-
dence could no longer hold sway under Bedie (Vaisse, 2003). Thus,
identity became a major factor in politicking and mobilizing power and
consequently, heightened the north–south, religious and cultural split,
which exacerbated the civil war of 2002 and 2010. With the 1995 elec-
tion approaching and Bedie’s burgeoning political clout, ‘Ivorite,’ an
identity clause, became Bedie’s campaign mantra, dividing the country
into groups. As a result, ‘Ivorite’ served as a persuasive emotional story
for mobilizing political support among disgruntled southern people who
accused foreigners of robbing them of their jobs and deteriorating their
living conditions. Because of the aforementioned factors, as well as the
economic downturn and drop in foreign aid interventions in the late
1990s, a military coup was unavoidable, as it was in most African coun-
tries at the time. Despite the concept of Ivorite having negative influence,
it gained social acceptance, with ideological, economic, and political justi-
fications (Akindès, 2003). As a result, political parties and elites politicized
government along regional lines for electoral benefit, setting the stage for
future civil conflicts.
The election in October 2000 set off a chain reaction that exacer-
bated instability and war in Côte d’Ivoire. The main rebel group, MPCI,
rejected Gbagbo’s victory based on condemnations made by interna-
tional institutions and state actors like France and South Africa. The
declaration of Gbagbo as president, revealed the politicized dimension
of ‘Ivorite’ by political leaders, wherein, some political parties rejected
the elections, Alassane Ouattara called for fresh elections and Laurent
Gbagbo like his predecessors relied on the concept of Ivorite. The days
following the 2000 elections saw more violence, killings, and deepening
inequality, the conflict took on an ethnic coloration, such that southern-
dominated supporters of Gbagbo and northerners were embroiled in
intra-ethnic violence. The new forces (Patriotic Movement of Côte
d’Ivoire/Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI), from the
north, instigated armed insurgence, and took over the northern towns
of Korhogo and Bouake, hence the first civil war began on the 19th of
84 O. OYEKANMI

September, 2002 (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In 2003, the warring

parties met in France to agree on an end to the war. By July 2004,
with the signing of the peace deal between Gbagbo’s government and
new forces militias, the end of the war was declared. However, the peace
achieved was a fragile one in itself, as there were still skirmishes in most
part of the country.
The second civil war broke out following the failure of Gbagbo to
accept defeat in the November 2010 elections. The UN and other inter-
national observers jointly supported Ouattara’s victory over Gbagbo,
which led to conflict between forces loyal to Ouattara and Gbagbo. For
the next 5 months, Cote d’Ivoire witnessed several killings of Ivoirians.
On March 17, 2011, a rocket attack launched by the national govern-
ment on a Ouattara-supporting neighborhood in Abidjan resulted in the
deaths of roughly thirty individuals. More violence broke out between
March 21 and March 26, when 52 people were slain in Abidjan by Gbag-
bo’s supporters. To remove Gbagbo from office, the New Forces began
a military operation on March 28, 2011, over the whole nation. Both
sides claimed there had been atrocities as the combat went on. Most
of this violence took place in Duekoue town, where both Gbagbo- and
Ouattara-supporting forces are believed to have massacred 1000 civil-
ians. On April 7, 2011, further massacre was reported in the towns of
Blolequin and Guiglo, when an estimated 100 victims were discovered
(Momodu, 2018).
Following these events, the UN, the French government, and other
international organizations waded in to stop the civilian killings and
restore peace. Hence, confirming Ipinyomi’s (2012) claim, that the RtoP
principle is the ICISS’ response to settling the global South’s painful
rejection of humanitarianism with Northern commitment to preventing
atrocities.

Application of the Principle of Responsibility

to Protect (RtoP) in Côte d’Ivoire
On several violence-related issues, the RtoP doctrine has been imple-
mented by the international community in Cote d’Ivoire. Gbagbo
and Ouattara were were sworn in as Presidents even though Gbagbo
was asked to step down,he declined, resulting in tension and violence
(Boucher, 2020; Ipinyomi, 2012). To prevent international human rights
breaches, the principle of RtoP was invoked. Thus, the reactions of the
 HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN COTE … 85

UNOIC and France were instigated by the need to effectively protect

civilians from the unending acts of atrocity committed by forces loyal to
Gbagbo and Ouattara. Bearing in mind that the international community
threw its support for Ouattara, Gbagbo forces assumed that the interna-
tional community was biased in its peacekeeping operation, thereby tilting
the balance in favour of the north. In effect, given that the French Special
Forces were instrumental in assisting pro-Ouattara forces in capturing
Gbagbo and his wife, reaching a consensus on the RtoP approach in
Côte d’Ivoire became a complex matter (Bellamy & Williams, 2011;
Opusumah, 2018).
To resolve the crisis, ECOWAS first ensured a peaceful settlement
to the conflict, by revoking Côte d’Ivoire’s membership and calling on
Gbagbo to forfeit the seat of the President. Secondly, officials of the UN
discreetly followed through with the negotiations, ensuring that all parties
to the conflict followed through with the negotiations. This, however, was
difficult given that Gbagbo proved recalcitrant in abiding by the UN deal.
Given the expectation that the international peacekeepers are expected to
maintain neutrality, without supporting any party during an operation,
the Ivorian case was particularly different. The role of regional institu-
tions like the AU was also instrumental to the complex nature of the RtoP
principle in Cote d’Ivoire. Basically, the disunity in the AU on the Ivorian
crises further complicated the actualization of the RtoP. For instance, the
Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, and South Africa supported Gbagbo which
was against the AU’s support for Ouattara’s victory (Rupiya, 2012).With
the support of the international community and the Security Council’s
declaration of Ouattara as the authentic President, calls by Gbagbo for
the UNOIC’s withdrawal were ignored.
The joint force to oust Gbagbo’s government came when Ban Ki-
moon, the UN Sec-Gen at the time pleaded with him to resign, warning
that any efforts to harm Ouattara or UNOCI forces would be frowned
upon (Deen, 2011). Being a full-fledged military operation, the RtoP
approach in Côte d’Ivoire, did not comprehensively involve protecting
civilians. Hence, both combatants from Gbagbo and Ouattara committed
grievous crimes against humanity. The RtoP doctrine as implemented
in Côte d’Ivoire did not conform to the UN charter on humanitari-
anism since the United Nations and France were bombing Ivory Coast
in order to protect civilians from the onslaught of Gbagbo. However,
Gbagbo and his supporters were not the only parties committing crimes
86 O. OYEKANMI

against humanity, as pro-Ouattara forces also launched assaults on civil-

ians. According to some critics, the stance of the UN secretariat on the
announcement of the election, and the deployment of force in collabo-
ration with UN forces was a breach of the RtoP mandate (BBC News,
2011). Before the use of force could be authorized, certain conditions
must be met to justify military enforcement. Whether these conditions
were met in the Ivorian example is critical to the practice of RtoP in
future engagements.
Some fundamental prerequisites preceding the use of military action
are stated in the ICISS study on RtoP. First, there must be a legitimate
reason for it, such as when a state has failed to uphold its responsibility to
protect citizens from mass atrocity crimes. Additionally, the use of force
can be authorized with the right Security Council sanction. It should use
as little violence as possible, result in good than harm, and have a real-
istic likelihood of success, and it should only be employed when all other
nonviolent options have been explored (ICISS, 2001).
Of the pre-conditions justifying military force in protecting civilians
during conflict, not all conditions were justified. With Gbagbo’s refusal
to cede power to Ouattara and the discontent between the north and
the south, as per Ivorian political history, ethnic cleansing was inevitable.
Thus, there was a clear ineptitude on the part of Gbagbo’s government
to protect civilians, especially those of northern extraction. However, all
other conditions were not exhaustively met as issues on the appropriate-
ness of UN sanction remains in question, given the bias that Ouattara
was the preferred choice of the West. As Cohn (2011) posits, the actions
of the military in Cote d’Ivoire present a negative model of attacking
countries where the leadership is anti-West. Likewise, not all available
non-violent options were exhausted in the Ivorian example as the inter-
vention of the UN and French forces was rather swift. According to IRIN
(2013), the country was on the verge of a humanitarian calamity, and the
AU’s and international community’s actions saved lives. Although, the
swift action of the UN and French forces may be justified on grounds
of humanitarianism, but the interpretation of this action in an ethnically
divided country created difficulty in achieving social cohesion in the long
run.
Arguably, exhausting more options like engaging both sides of
the conflict with equal intensity, collaborating with the Constitutional
Council of Côte d’Ivoire to achieve a common front, and maintaining
 HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN COTE … 87

a neutral stance may have produced different outcomes. In the circum-

stance, the informal consultation by the Security Council on the killings
of civilians in May 2011, reveals the complexity of interpreting Resolu-
tions 1973 (the immediate establishment of a ceasefire) and 1975 (all
necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence) regarding the UN’s role in ousting Laurent Gbagbo (Bellamy &
Williams, 2011). The UN outrightly took sides with one party without
boldly condemning the actions of all armed groups in the conflict.
Though the military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire appears justified
for dealing with violence fueled by resistive governments (Erameh &
Ologe, 2021), the RtoP position established the bias of the UN. Benson
and Kathman (2014) state that in order to avoid situations in which
belligerents emerge victorious, the UN gives increased force levels to
conflicts in which its preferred combatant is suffering. As Opusumah
(2018) affirms, engaging military force to activate RtoP has increased
the likelihood of crimes of aggression. Cote d’Ivoire’s social and polit-
ical history was not adequately considered in the application of the RtoP.
Even after independence, the Ivorian state appeared more like a colo-
nial state more than any other pre-colonial West African state (Ipinyomi,
2012). The ethnic division between the south and the north has largely
been politicized by incumbent presidents who presumably have received
support from the West in ascending into power. It would appear that
from the first president till date, ascension into power in Ivory Coast has
always been influenced by the West who see to it that their sponsored
candidate always assumes power. For instance, President Ouattara haven
served in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and rose to become a
deputy managing director, was perceived by Gbagbo and most citizens of
southern extraction as a protege of Paris and Washington (Melly, 2011).
More so, the economic advantage of France and the bilateral rela-
tions between France and Ivory Coast are significant in the interpretation
of the RtoP approach. In light of the close ties between France and
Côte d’Ivoire, the RtoP style applied in Ivory Coast may be construed
as bias by a section of the country against the other, which ultimately
expands the existing horizontal inequality between the north and south
(Savaş-Cazala, 2022). The cocoa and coffee trades were dominated by
French commodity houses, and French experts were stationed in several
administrative departments as well as crucial economic sectors. Thus,
with France’s interest in Côte d’Ivoire, an Ivorian president must be a
88 O. OYEKANMI

candidate supported by France, which seemed unlikely with Gbagbo who

appeared less malleable in comparison to Quattara.
A cursory look at the 2010, 2015 and 2020 elections suggests that the
2015 general elections was deemed to be the most peaceful election albeit
with Ouattara as the only contestant out of the three political gladiators
in Cote d’Ivoire. With Gbagbo facing trials at the International Crim-
inal Court, his supporters and Kinsmen boycotted the 2015 elections,
thereby granting Ouattara an easy victory. Furthermore, the EISA-Carter
Center International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) found that
voter turnout varied widely across the country, with relatively high rates
in the north and lower rates in the center and west, and was variable in the
south (Carter Centre and EISA, 2020). Consequently, the international
community supported one candidate against the other without counting
the votes fairly, especially since there were some degree of irregulari-
ties in the voter’s registration and electoral process (Akande & Anuforo,
2011). The chapter submits that the hasty conclusion of the interna-
tional community without a detailed investigation of the electoral process
further reveals the bias in the RtoP approach in Côte d’Ivoire.
Following the reconciliation process and peacebuilding programs, the
UNOIC exited Côte d’Ivoire in June 2017. However, the horizontal
inequality exacerbated by political tensions since 1995 still lingers. As
stated earlier, the timely intervention of the RtoP doctrine was to curtail
mass atrocities, the approach nonetheless was flawed and had a semblance
of a prejudiced outlook. So far, there have been pockets of violence,
suggesting an enduring grievance between northerners and southerners,
with the propensity to destabilize the artificial peace in Cote d’Ivoire.
Most perpetrators of crimes against humanity in the 2010–2011 massacre
are yet to be prosecuted and the October 2020 elections, which ushered
in President Ouattara for the third term witnessed escalated violence. The
2020 election took place amid a hostile political and security environ-
ment, fueled by opposition rallies against President Alassane Ouattara’s
third-term bid, which was illegal under the 2016 constitution. In election-
related violence involving supporters of incumbent President Ouattara,
security forces, and opposition protestors, at least 85 people were killed,
with more than 3200 Ivorian refugees fleeing to Liberia, Ghana, and
Togo (UNGHR, 2020).
 HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN COTE … 89

Based on prevailing issues, Ouattara’s government is struggling to

uphold its responsibility to protect citizens (GCR2P, 2020). It is recom-
mended, therefore, that the implementation of RtoP must be context-
specific, by investigating issues thoroughly before taking a position. While
prioritising the necessity to reduce human casualty, the pre-conditions of
militarism in RtoP must be adequately exhausted. That aside, the Ivorian
case was made worse by the dysfunctionality between the UN, AU, and
ECOWAS, which allowed Gbagbo to take advantage of perceived differ-
ences between them. In sum, the international community should tap
into their synergies with more coordination for better RtoP outcomes.

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On Responsibility for the Security of Others:
An Ethnographic Case Study of Civilian
Joint Task Force Insurgent Peace in Borno
State, North-Eastern Region of Nigeria

Oluwaseun Bamidele

Introduction
In 2013, the responsibility to protect the Borno State, in the north-
eastern region of Nigeria was given to a group of volunteers who
eventually because the Civilian Joint Task Force (the CJTF), which is
called the Durza Ka in the Kanuri dialect and the ‘Kato da Gora’ group
in Hausa, the language of the largest ethnic group in the country. Insur-
gent peace is the goal of the CJTF, which refuses the violent Boko Haram
insurgency, thereby asserting their right to security and contributing to
the cessation of violence. While scholarly literature and research on the
responsibility to protect has focused on militarisation, its relationship
with local security in the context of the CJTF’s goal of insurgent peace
is underexplored. Therefore, in this chapter, the study interrogates this

O. Bamidele (B)
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 93

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_6
94 O. BAMIDELE

connection to illustrate how the politics involved in the responsibility to

protect is displacing local security in the context of the CJTF’s insurgent
peace plan.
This chapter presents the theoretical approaches to local security and
an orthodox approach to local security and development. In addition,
the chapter directs the attention of scholars to human security and devel-
opment involving the locals as this is critical in the construction of an
effective insurgent peace structure. Moreover, in the chapter, the study
discusses the emergence of responsibility to protect in the CJTF context,
the repeated, resurgent recognition of the significance of local secu-
rity functions in the CJTF’s policy and the resultant confusion whereby
the CJTF’s local security policy makes little mention of responsibility to
protect.
In the chapter, the study gives examples of the CJTF’s responsibility
to protect insurgent peace initiatives in Borno State. The purpose is to
illustrate how the arrival of responsibility to protect has led to conceptual
confusion in the field, the diversion of funds, technologies and human
resources intended for local security and a partnership with the military.
The chapter refers to the researcher’s interviews with CJTF members and
other key security experts in Borno States in June and August 2022, as
well as research at the CJTF headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State in
September and December 2022.
In the chapter, the study critically examines how the local politics
of responsibility to protect jeopardises the impartiality of operations,
resulting in a drastic decrease in the local potential for inclusive and
transformative local security. Furthermore, the study discusses how the
footprint of responsibility to protect operations increases the likelihood
that military operational approaches are unavoidably influenced by the
operation’s local politics. In the concluding section of the chapter, the
study takes a step back and reflects on what should constitute the stages
of the responsibility to protect. Here the study examines whether the
responsibility to protect should be considered within specific sequenced
arrangements or participations within operations or a systematic change
of CJTF interventions. Both point to potential local implications for the
future effectiveness of the CJTF in securing the locals and in building
sustainable models of insurgent peace.
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 95

Insurgent Peace and the Responsibility to Protect

The study uses the term “insurgent peace” that Macaspac (2019)
describes as a socio-spatial local initiative or struggle to counteract insur-
gency and restore peace and security in a region. Through insurgent peace
efforts, locals collectively refuse violent local insurgency, such as that of
Boko Haram in the context of this monograph, thereby asserting their
right to security and local governance. Thus, the CJTF’s operations have
contributed to the cessation of violence and the promotion of sustainable
forms of insurgent peace since the initial plan for local security, spanning
a range of operations in different theatres.
A new trend has begun to achieve policy traction in the insurgent
peace circles of the CJTF, namely the principle of responsibility to protect
(Bamidele, 2017a). However, the CJTF’s responsibility to protect the
region is like that of other insurgent peace groups, run by civilians or
the locals in partnership with the operations of the military. Nevertheless,
the CJTF was specially designed to have a role in the responsibility to
protect the country.
In this chapter, the study interrogates the connection between the
responsibility to protect in the context of the CJTF’s declared insurgent
peace goals and policies, which it realises through its deployments in mili-
tary operations (Bamidele, 2017b). Accordingly, the study examines the
origin, spread and implications of the CJTF’s responsibility to protect and
how the policy for this fits in with its insurgent peace plan. Equally, the
study provides a detailed account of how the CJTF’s policy and guid-
ance on local security as part of insurgent peace reflect the reality of
its responsibility to protect, which elected officials seek to manage and
implement through programmes incorporating elements of local security
and responsibility to protect. In other words, there is an interaction at
the mission level whereby tasks traditionally associated with local secu-
rity are rebranded as the responsibility to protect in the form of military
engagement.
The CJTF is currently undergoing a critical re-examination of its insur-
gent peace instruments and of the group’s capacity to respond to violent
local insurgency, which has led to the formulation of a local security
plan for insurgent peace. Moreover, the Nigerian military is leading a
substantial reform process to align the CJTF with future challenges in
maintaining insurgent peace.
96 O. BAMIDELE

Local Security and Insurgent Peace

At a time when there is increasing evidence that local engagement helps
to halt local insurgency violence, prevent the local insurgency from
diffusing, reduce military atrocities and create insurgent peace, impor-
tant questions are being asked about what sort of insurgent peace the
CJTF seeks to encourage once it has reduced the direct forms of local
insurgency violence (Bamidele, 2019). This indicates the pragmatic turn
of local security as evidenced in the works of Galula (1964), Orchard
(2014), Macaspac (2019), Kindersley and Rolandsen (2019), Philipsen
(2022), Bellamy and Williams (2011), and Mac Ginty and Richmond
(2013). These works introduced the adaptive local security concept,
which includes the concepts of complexity, local ownership, and resilience.
However, Bamidele (2016, 2017b), and Maignawa (2017), view local
security initiatives of groups such as the CJTF as a broader insurgent
peace initiative, whilst Paffenholz (2015), Mac Ginty and Richmond
(2013), and Mac Ginty (2010, 2015) advocate for the advancement of
the enforcement of local security through militarisation.
All these debates reflect the concept “liddism”, which is a term
borrowed from international politics and developed by renowned scholar,
Paul Rogers (2010) to explain the process of keeping the lid on dissent
and instability through the means of public order and military opera-
tions. Moreover, the responsibility to protect and maintain insurgency
peace might involve local security initiatives in a political space, which is
intended to replace and eliminate the social structures that caused violent
local insurgency in the first place (Bamidele, 2017a, 2017b, 2019). These
local security initiatives might include the rebuilding of neighbourhoods,
organisations, governments and public debate.
The CJTF with its insurgency peace plan and responsibility to protect
the region, which has been criticised as involving militarised approaches
and increased toughness or sturdiness, might seem incongruous in the
political space of local security. However, works, such as those of Galula
(1964) and Mac Ginty (2010) suggest how groups like the CJTF might
contribute to local security in a non-military way.
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 97

The CJTF’s Responsibility

to Protect Versus Local Security
There has been exponential growth in the use of the term “responsi-
bility to protect in the CJTF”. This has consequently been reflected in
the increasing will amongst its members to mandate the deployment of
holistic or comprehensive operations to contain aggressors and spoilers
during the violent local insurgency. These are linked to strategies of
humanitarianism and development activities to complement the military
gain.
At a policy level, there has been an introduction of responsibility to
protect predominantly from the locals to the CJTF’s practice while, at
the same time, the CJTF’s local security policy has continued to develop,
with an increasing focus on local engagement.

The Introduction of the Responsibility to Protect

The advancement of responsibility to protect over the past ten years
in Borno State has, for the most part, not been taken outside of the
local initiative (the CJTF), with a shared understanding of the concept
emerging amongst a range of scholars (International Crisis Group, 2014,
2017; Kolo, 2014). The primary feature of responsibility to protect is the
intervention to support the re-establishment of a non-State group (local
security group or unconventional group) in an inadequate State group
(State security group or conventional group). This includes the provi-
sion of legitimate non-State groups, institution-building and the delivery
of key basic security services (Bamidele, 2019). Appropriately, this is
supported by a partnership of local and military interventions. Military
operations, which support and establish control over an area, are predom-
inantly aimed against non-State groups, which challenge the State’s
monopoly over violent local insurgency (Galula, 1964). The approaches
of the locals seek to re-establish security and to prepare for long-term
recovery by building enabling visibility or an environment for structural
security and insurgent peace (Bamidele, 2017a). The trend of responsi-
bility to protect can be traced back to local operations in South Sudan
(the Zande Arrow Boys against the Lord’s Resistance Army led by Joseph
Kony), Uganda (the Zande Arrow Boys against the Lord’s Resistance
Army led by Joseph Kony), Sierra Leone (the Kamajors, which sprung
98 O. BAMIDELE

up from traditional societies in securing their locals against the Revolu-

tionary United Front [RUF]), and Afghanistan in the 90s, but has been
incorporated in Borno State in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. The
operations in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Uganda were,
however, significantly more supported by financial resources, with more
members deployed and budgeted for than in the CJTF activities.
Scholars (Hassan, 2015, 2016; Higazi, 2013; Idris et al., 2014) have
noted the gradual uploading of knowledge into the CJTF’s practice and
thus the responsibility to protect is a significant area of activity of the
group’s insurgent peace, whereas the word “robustness” is often used
to refer to the Nigerian military. It was stated, in an International Crisis
Group (2017) report, that a new generation of violent local insurgency
groups requires more mobility, a greater use of local intelligence for situ-
ational awareness, a tighter chain of local command and access to robust
military support when required from the locals. The increasing rhetoric
has been complemented by the CJTF members involved in the State. This
has led to the rotation of their commanders, who have received training
from the military to carry out their responsibility to protect operations.
This assignment is carried out through their committed insurgent peace
plan and the CJTF headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State.
The commanders are deployed to particular the CJTF insurgent peace
operations (Bamidele, 2017a, 2017b, 2019), with operational impacts on
the new category of the CJTF responsibility to protect the locals, the
government infrastructure, government officials and to destabilise anti-
state groups and aggressors during the violent local insurgency, while
being part of a larger process that seeks the political settlement of violent
insurgency. This creation of the CJTF’s responsibility to protect opera-
tions in partnership with military operations has led to the observation
that insurgent peace increasingly bears a resemblance to the responsibility
to protect operations in Borno State, the north-eastern region of Nigeria.
Backing this up is the belief that the CJTF’s responsibility to protect oper-
ations is deployed to empower the State (military) by helping it to defeat
the Boko Haram local insurgency group that is carrying out attacks on
the State and supporting the locals in their hope for insurgent peace.

The Direction of the CJTF Local Security

While aspects of responsibility to protect have been transferred to the
CJTF’s insurgent peace plan, the CJTF policy and guidelines on local
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 99

security have continued to develop almost independently. Reports from

the CJTF and military headquarters on joint insurgent peace operations
in the State go into detail about the local security aspects of operations,
including the significance of inclusive approaches, which account for the
needs of all segments of society (CJTF Report, 2018, 2019). The CJTF
report, which is specifically about local protectors of insurgent peace
as facilitators of early-stage local security, reflects this, emphasising the
comparative advantages of multidimensional insurgent peace operations
in early local security (CJTF Report, 2020, 2021).
The insurgent peace mirrors the conceptual work and undertakes early
local security responsibilities, including expanding and preserving local
political space. Most recently, this has been captured in the Local for
Insurgent Peace Initiative (L4INP), which is the result of the Borno State
Government’s efforts to obtain mutually agreed commitment and princi-
ples from affected locals to create an insurgent peace fit for the future
(the CJTF Report, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021). The L4INP comprises five
areas: the locals (people or civilians), performance, partnership (with the
military), local security, and local politics. Moreover, the L4INP initia-
tive stresses the need for coherence concerning local security at the local
or inhabitant level, and the continuity of local security responsibilities
during insurgent peace drawdowns and transitions. The L4INP also calls
for stronger linkages between local security and local political mandates.
This recognition of the significance of the CJTF members to local secu-
rity is increasingly based on a strong normative position that values the
significance of localised capacities for local security. Guided by the logic
that processes of local security cannot be externally imposed and must
be based on local engagement to be successful, the CJTF’s policy has
sought a better understanding of how to identify local partners and incor-
porate them into local initiatives at all levels for insurgent peace. The
current route is most clearly articulated through the Insurgency Peace
Plan, first outlined in the CJTF-INP Report on insurgent peace oper-
ations and the CJTF Local Security Mechanism (CJTF-LSM) Report.
These were formalised by the identical insurgent peace initiative of the
Nigerian military in 2018.
The joint partnership between the CJTF and the military indicates that
insurgent peace is a goal and a process undertaken throughout different
stages of local insurgency escalation and de-escalation. It is primarily
aimed at engaging the CJTF local structure to help build a common vision
of society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the local population
100 O. BAMIDELE

are taken into account. The CJTF report relates this vision to insurgent
peace through its overall commitment to the primacy of local politics
incorporating a local-centred approach by which operations should serve
and protect the locals they have been mandated to assist and support
(the CJTF Report, 2021). The report identifies local-level engagement
and participation as a way of understanding how locals feel the impact of
insurgent peace. This is to ensure that the operation does no harm and
to design better local security strategies and advocates. Through main-
taining the closest possible interaction with locals, military operations are
expected to facilitate insurgent peace and support local efforts to move
toward it.
This has implications for the resources of the operations, with the
report suggesting that each operation should be able to draw upon requi-
site resources and ensure regular and structured engagement with locals,
including the military. The language of the CJTF-INP report and insur-
gent peace dovetail with the existing operational guidance. This includes
guidance on local–military coordination and quick impact projects, the
CJTF paramilitary training that focuses on local security, and an instruc-
tion guide to deployed members. Significantly, the CJTF approaches are
differentiated from military-led operations, which work with the objec-
tive of engaging locals to achieve the commanders’ intent, whereas the
CJTF’s approach supports the broader insurgent peace process.

Local Security and the Responsibility to Protect: An Unstable Calm?

The variation and distinction between the CJTF and non-the CJTF
approaches are indicative of the broader trend in the CJTF’s principles
and reviews concerning insurgent peace operations whereby responsibility
to protect, if mentioned at all, it is often seen negatively. Responsibility to
protect is notably absent in policy documents intended to guide insurgent
peace beyond references to ensuring insurgent peace in post-violent insur-
gency environments through coordination with the locals and the military
to stabilise and improve the security situation and to help in economic and
development recovery (the CJTF Report, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021). In
the CJTF-INP report, the responsibility to protect is also only addressed
in one of the principles guiding insurgent peace in Nigeria (the CJTF
Report, 2018). The report acknowledges the use of the term “respon-
sibility to protect” in the CJTF headquarters for several operations that
support the extension or restoration of the military and, in at least one
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 101

case, during an ongoing violent local insurgency. Likewise, it notes that

the concept has a broad range of interpretations and that the use of this
concept by the CJTF requires clarification. This can be related to the crit-
icism that defining responsibility to protect is difficult and the term is
arguably open to interpretation when used in the context of the CJTF.
However, the follow-up 2013 establishment and formulation report of
the CJTF made no mention of the responsibility to protect in its insurgent
peace activities (the CJTF Report, 2013).
The CJTF-LPM review, which heavily influenced the local security
aspects of the insurgent peace plan barely made explicit mention of
the concept of responsibility to protect, thereby indicating its secondary
rating in the CJTF context. However, the study contends that peace
cannot simply be imposed by the military on local populations that do
not trust its leadership and ability to create insurgent peace. In addi-
tion, the review highlighted important challenges facing the partnership
between the CJTF and the military as well as State security authorities
in the insurgency-affected State. In particular, the connection between
local insurgency recidivism (particularly a relapse towards violence) and
the CJTF’s closeness to the strategies and interests of military operations
showed no conformity with local security. Thus, the report revealed that
the association depicted no sense of mutual purpose with wider society
beyond their proximity and local interests. Moreover, the report high-
lighted that attempts to extend and rebuild central authority may extend
violent local insurgency. This is because the attempts are likely to over-
look the local capacity to engage in early-stage local security. Therefore,
the efforts are only likely to strengthen the domains of local governance,
rather than address the primary issue, which is to re-establish a strong
central security authority.
A challenge did exist, however. For instance, while scrutinising the
practical level of operations, the study observed that the introduction
of the responsibility to protect the CJTF was largely through the CJTF
members in Borno State in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. There-
after, the introduction of the responsibility to protect given to the CJTF
(particularly in the Borno State) empowered it to mandate operations
and make the CJTF members important and significant in them. Mean-
while, the CJTF’s evolution in local security appears to ignore that the
responsibility to protect is an activity beyond the stage of insurgent peace
when the violent local insurgency has abated and the Borno State is
protectd. Moreover, the reports presented by the CJTF-INP and the
102 O. BAMIDELE

CJTF-LPM were all produced while the responsibility to protect oper-

ations was deployed, and the term became increasingly normalised in the
CJTF discourse.
The significance of the production of those reports when considered
in the two contexts points to a volitional ignorance of the term on the
part of the locals of the CJTF. Besides, that the CJTF is institutionally
divided may be a minor surprise to those who study it. Nevertheless, as
Fafowora’s (2012) study rightly points out, the use of force and the mili-
tarisation of the CJTF’s insurgent peace shows that a lack of clarity about
key normative aspects of its interventions might have ramifications for the
group’s activities. How this has manifested in the CJTF’s insurgent peace
operations will be explored in the next section.

Standpoints from Fieldwork in Borno State

This section uses examples from the CJTF’s insurgent peace initiative in
Borno State to illustrate how the disconnect between responsibility to
protect and local security presented above is playing out in the field.
It focuses on three core thematic areas: ideological misperceptions, the
conflation of local security mechanisms and the responsibility to protect
and the local politics of responsibility to protect.

Ideological Misperceptions
As debated above, the responsibility to protect in the CJTF context is ill-
defined at the insurgent peace operations strategic level. Subsequently,
this has led to differing interpretations of the operational and tactical
insurgent peace levels in the field, particularly in terms of how it relates
to local security. While a certain amount of ideological ambiguity can be
constructive for operational leadership, strategic vagueness appears to be
manifesting in unwitting confusion in the field of insurgent peace. Field-
work in Borno State confirmed that it is not unusual in the field for the
CJTF members to conflate responsibility to protect with local security
and insurgency peace. Many see the three as sharing the same objective
of tackling the root causes of the violent local insurgency of Boko Haram
and therefore either as mutually reinforcing or as entirely synonymous.
In Borno State, for instance, discussions with the CJTF commander
revealed this conflation. Moreover, members of the military command
unit termed “Operation Lafia Dole” maintained that the responsibility
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 103

to protect the mission was aimed at winning hearts and minds by

quickly bringing the dividends of peace to particular locals (Bamidele,
2020). These usually take the form of local/community-based security
mechanisms and programmes and the restoration of State authority for
the promotion of local security. Following the displacement of a local
insurgent group by the CJTF and the military, the ensuing local secu-
rity stimulated conditions for the development of basic infrastructure
and services rather than efforts to counteract the pace of violent local
insurgency pace.
In Borno State, the changing interpretation of responsibility to protect
during the lifetime of the CJTF’s insurgent peace demonstrates that it
has been difficult to achieve clarity about the concept. The transition
of the CJTF’s original operational activities to being a mission with
the responsibility to protect prioritised long-term strategies for consoli-
dating insurgent peace guided by the Local–Military Insurgent Peace and
Support Strategy (LMINSS). This first stage of the LMINSS was later
criticised for being too State-centric and for underplaying the destabil-
ising effects of local-level insurgent peace dynamics (the CJTF Report,
2020, 2021).
Attempts to recognise this reality in the different stages of the LMINSS
were quickly overmatched with the advent of the locals in the form of a
robust the CJTF attached to the military tasked to neutralise the local
Boko Haram insurgency group to create space for the responsibility to
protect the area. This novel form of the CJTF’s responsibility to protect
was largely driven by the CJTF protocols and experience in different
localities. Subsequently, the group engendered the Borno State insurgent
peace concept, which was predicated on a shape, clear, hold and build
approach (Bamidele, 2019, 2020). The concept received a barrage of
heavy criticism; hence, it only lasted about ten years before it was eventu-
ally and effectively killed by the office of military operations. The concept
was exterminated because the recognition of the CJTF by the Borno State
Government provoked debate among the public. This debate, however,
raised a few fundamental questions about engaging unconventional, non-
traditional, and localised civilians who had no training in combatant
warfare to participate in insurgent peace warfare, which could antithetical
to the overall objective of military operations.
The responsibility to protect part of the CJTF’s insurgent peace
approach consequently reverted to a less coercive approach, which
involved the disbursement of responsibility to funds for security and
104 O. BAMIDELE

development projects. The projects included humanitarian outreach,

customary authority disputes, land property problems, and the challenges
presented by legal pluralism. In Borno, these were directed towards major
hotspots to placate sites of resistance and the possible conflagration of
ongoing migration, displacement crises and many repeatedly postponed
activities. Moreover, the attempts to promote insurgent peace focussed
on particular locales and local military relations. However, the different
shades of responsibility to protect in Borno State skewed towards a State-
centric capacity-building plan at the expense of a more inclusive and
localised approach to local security.

The Conflation of Local Security Mechanisms and the Responsibility

to Protect
Although mandates given for the responsibility to protect operations
made zero mention of the term “local security”, it made use of the funds
and tools of the CJTF’s local security mechanism (Bamidele, 2017a). In
Borno State, the CJTF’s local security funds are disbursed through the
CJTF’s response unit of the State’s security department, which is account-
able for securing projects to support command sectors for the CJTF’s
combatants in different areas of the State. In Borno State, local security
funds have been used in the integrated CJTF’s effort to support respon-
sibility to protect efforts since 2013 (Bamidele, ). Moreover, several
Borno State vanguard projects formerly used to establish the CJTF were
approved for implementing local security. Thus, recently, local security
funds have been used to target major sites of vulnerability and included
projects in Borno State reflecting the CJTF’s responsibility to protect
(Bamidele, 2020).
The everyday business of insurgent peace deemed to contribute to local
security was relabelled as the responsibility to protect activities. Moreover,
the duty of increasing the local insurgency neutralisation projects, which
was previously a key local security mechanism, has been transformed by
rebranding. For example, in Borno State, civil affairs departments are
tasked with facilitating local insurgent peace, which is conceptualised as
part of the responsibility to protect efforts. However, access by local
combatants to the areas involved is severely restricted owing to local insur-
gency and the CJTF security regulations, which detracts from establishing
insurgent peace. In addition, in Borno, efforts to address local insurgency
due to disputes over land and farms have now been incorporated into the
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 105

programme of the responsibility to protect, which is strategically deliv-

ered to local populations in areas recently recovered from insurgency
attacks. Furthermore, the disbursement of funds to a range of imple-
menting partners, including paramilitary groups, makes it unavoidable
that development and local security is associated with the CJTF’s plan
for its responsibility to protect.
In Borno State, local security resources are now diverted to support
the responsibility to protect plan, which marks an end to insurgent
peace operations, historically aimed at local security. Moreover, as a way
of appealing to donor interests and gaining access to their funds, the
insurgent peace plan to ensure local security has been relabelled as the
responsibility to protect, as mentioned above. Thus, Gawthorpe (2017)
and Mac Ginty (2015) affirm that there is an uneasy marriage between
the local security responsibilities traditionally pursued under the auspices
of insurgent peace operations and the responsibility to protect operations.
This relationship is discussed and evaluated in the next section.

The Local Politics of the Responsibility to Protect

The CJTF’s responsibility to protect has been manifested in military oper-
ations supported by the Borno State Government. Thus, the CJRF has
effectively become the ally of the State government because of its zeal for
checking the ongoing local insurgency. Moreover, on several occasions,
the government security authorities have demonstrated their support for
the CJTF, which has been neutralising the violent local insurgency of
Boko Haram. This demonstrative support indicates the CJTF’s complicity
in local politics and limits its ability to act as an impartial third party or
middleman. Therefore, its responsibility to protect projects in Borno State
has been largely derived from dialogue with locals and authorities at the
local and State levels.
The support from the Borno State Government and the military has,
however, led to control by them as well in the form of severe restric-
tions on the local performance capability of the CJTF. Moreover, its
ability to implement the core transformational elements of its responsi-
bility to protect strategy, which would have threatened the status quo that
currently perpetuates the existing distribution of power, has been paral-
ysed. Intrinsically, this has turned the CJTF’s support for local security
almost entirely into strengthening the security institution, which is the
military, and extending State authority over their area. In addition, the
106 O. BAMIDELE

Borno State Government endorses military operations not involving the

CJTF and independently seeks to neutralise insurgency, which affects the
CJTF’s responsibility to protect operations.
In other words, the CJTF is expected to comply with the Govern-
ment’s decisions on military operations and disregard other insurgent
peace groups in the State, such as the En Banga (Hunters) group, who
are also fighting Boko Haram). This group is embedded in the area and
their inclusion in local politics would reinforce the local insurgency peace
effort, local security and the responsibility to protect. Moreover, this
would mean that the current predatory State power would have to be
more democratic.

Implications of the Responsibility

to Protect Mandate for the CJTF’s
Insurgent Peace Plan and Local Security
The study maintains the implementation of the CJTF’s responsibility to
protect the plan faces both political and practical challenges owing to
the Government’s authorisation of the CJTF insurgent peace plan. In
addition, the study maintains that the implementation of the CJTF’s
responsibility to protect plan is antithetical to local security because of
the Government’s militarised and state-centric vision of the concept of the
responsibility to protect, which has conflated with extended military and
State authority. This is problematic when political leaders, who are driven
by fear or greed, have little real interest in a stable, open and inclusive
political system.
In the works of Bonwick (2006), Campbell (2015), Mac Ginty (2010),
Holt and Taylor (2009), Addison (2009), Williams and Bellamy (2016)
and Stringham and Forney (2017), invariably weak and contested State
and military authorities are part of the challenge rather than the answer.
Therefore, by providing support to state-controlled military in the shape
of joint insurgent peace operations with varying levels of credibility
amongst the locals it represents, the CJTF compromises its ability to
achieve its local security goals.
While local security and responsibility to protect may have a shared
objective, which is insurgent peace and the end of military operations,
the CJTF’s partnership with the State military limits space for local initia-
tives that have the potential to foster insurgent peace. Thus, the CJTF’s
 ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHERS … 107

responsibility to protect approach prioritises military over transformative

operations and short-term local security and insurgent peace, thereby
limiting alternative medium- and long-term vision. This is in agreement
with the observations of Williams and Bellamy (2016), Stringham and
Forney (2017), Schutte (2016), and Ruggeri et al. (2016) on the CJTF’s
responsibility to protect efforts and their conclusion that extending the
military is not synonymous with local security in the long term.
The CJTF’s mandate of the responsibility to protect is at the behest
of the Government and dependent on the decisions of financial donors,
security agencies local and foreign stakeholders. Thus, what could be
termed “the politics of insurgent peace operations” determines the
CJTF’s responsibility to protect operations to a large extent. In the works
of Higazi (2013), Abdullahi (2015), Hassan (2015, 2016) and Bamidele
(2020), it is argued that these politics can lead to the CJTF’s sector
commanders having various responsibilities with which they are not well-
trained, prepared or placed instead of simply coordinating insurgent peace
initiatives, responsibility to protect strategies and local security endeav-
ours. Moreover, the CJTF members in the field are left to make sense
of competing plans and sometimes contradictory priorities. Subsequently,
strategies and initiatives are often ad hoc and guided by pragmatic choices
to make things work. This can reinforce the tendency to fall into lockstep
with the strategic logic of State-controlled insurgent peace approaches.
It is therefore imperative to ask what constitutes realistic expectations
of the CJTF insurgent peace operations before its deployed. On the
one hand, this may mean that the responsibility to protect operations
cannot hope to meet local security goals beyond basic reinforcement of
the government and military. On the other hand, it may mean that the
responsibility to protect operations are incompatible with a more ambi-
tious and holistic understanding of local security and insurgency peace as
the “quotidian work of civilian communities in carving alternative political
spaces and enacting peaceful futures during armed conflict” (Macaspac,
2019: 1). This definition contrasts with the view of insurgency peace as
“dynamic processes rooted upon a refusal and disruption of the spatial
logic of violence imposed by the competing structures of power of State
and non-State armed actors upon civilian communities” (Macaspac, 2019:
1), which focusses on the military dimension of the responsibility to
protect and local security.
108 O. BAMIDELE

Conclusion
After reviewing the responsibility to protect mandate given to the CJTF
in Borno State, former Governor Shettima claimed that only a balanced
approach can create the conditions for durable insurgent peace, which
would involve combining a militarised security response with develop-
ment and governance efforts (Bamidele, 2017a). Thus the CJTF’s respon-
sibility to protect need not be solely based on the Borno State Govern-
ment’s support and working in partnership with the military, which
indicates limited goals, a short-term outlook and a reactive approach to
security ensuring local security. In other words, as indicated by Kiras
(2010), Idris et al. (2014), Kolo (2014), Hassan (2016), Bamidele
(2017a, 2017b), Damina (2017), and Maignawa (2017), adopting a
long-term, local-centric responsibility to protect strategy will address the
root causes of insurgency challenges.
The capacity of the CJTF to aim for inclusive models of peace,
thereby moving away from the status quo, would mean that it could a
vehicle for non-violent socio-political engagement. However, the CJTF’s
responsibility to protect through anti-insurgency counter-attacks is mostly
supported by the government, which often suggests that other States
confronting banditry and insurgency consider the CJTF’s military insur-
gent peace approach to neutralising situations in places, such as the Mafa,
Gwoza, Chibok and Zamfara, where peace is fragile or absent and insur-
gency threats are high. As Bamidele (2020) explains, this is not a preferred
option but an option of last resort. Indeed, if the Borno State Govern-
ment perceives that the CJTF does not effectively fulfil its responsibility
to protect as part of its anti-insurgency toolkit, it may no longer consider
the Task Force relevant to the insurgency peace plan. This would jeop-
ardise its potential to ensure long-lasting insurgent peace and sustainable
local security, thereby fulfilling its responsibility to protect mandate.

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 Conflict-Proofing Civilian Protection Rules
in the Sahel: The Challenge
of the Responsibility to Protect

Kalilou Sidibé

Introduction
The three Sahelian countries are facing insecurity as a result of armed
groups claiming to be Islamists. In this environment of intertwined
conflicts, acts of murderous violence targeting civilians are a major chal-
lenge for the application of humanitarian law. The Sahel Coalition report
reveals that “between 2017 and 2020, attacks against civilians increased
fivefold, from 205 to 1096, and the number of unarmed civilians or suspects
killed, including women and children, rose from 356 to 2443”.1 In Burkina
Faso, since 2019, attacks targeting civilians have become recurrent: an
attack on a humanitarian convoy in the province of Sanmantenga caused
the death of 29 civilians in September 2019. In Yirgou in the north of
the country, 49 people from the Peuhl community were killed by militia

1 Voir le rapport de la Coalition au Sahel, avril 2021. https://www.sahelpeoplescoalit

ion.org.

K. Sidibé (B)
African Security Sector Network (ASSN), Accra, Ghana
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 113

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_7
114 K. SIDIBÉ

groups in January 2019. In Pansi, an attack on a Protestant church killed

24 people in February 2020; a mining company was targeted by attacks
that killed more than 38 people; 32 civilians were killed in a market
in Aggraogo in the north of the country.2 To these can be added the
massacres of more than 180 civilians in the attacks on Solhan (June 2021)
and Barga (Bouroum) (March 2022). The same macabre statistics are
recorded in Mali: massacre of 37 civilians in Koulongo (January 2019),
115 in Ogossago (March 2019), 95 in Sobané Da and 55 in Sangha (June
2019).3 In August 2019 in Assongo, in the Gao region, more than 60
civilians were killed, houses burnt down and livestock stolen. In Diabaly
(Ségou), 35 charred bodies, victims of acts of torture, were discovered in
March 2022. In Moura (Djenné), the Malian armed forces are suspected
of massacring 203 civilians.4 This spiral of violence does not spare civilians
in Niger. The attack in Chinagodrar killed more than 89 people (January
2020), 102 civilians were killed in Bakorat and Intazayene (March 2021),
and 8 civilians were abducted and executed in Gueskerou (November
2021).
In these three Sahelian countries, the belligerents are showing little
inclination to spare civilians during combat operations. Faced with the
surge in acts of violence against civilians, an international campaign is
being organised to ensure that civilians are protected.5 In armed conflicts,
armed actors must constantly observe the principles of distinction, precau-
tion and proportionality in order to avoid indiscriminate attacks. These
principles essentially concern the prohibition on targeting civilians and
civilian objects in the conduct of hostilities (art. 13.3 of Additional
Protocol 2).
This immunity from attack is an obligation of respect contained in
several international instruments and enshrined in international case law.

2 Cf., https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190113-massacre-yirgou-burkinabedefilent-contre-
violences-ethniques, dated 13 January 2019.
3 Source: Human Right Watch Report 2019: How Much Blood Must Be Shed! Atrocities
Committed against Civilians in Central Mali.
4 https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2022/04/05/mali-massacre-perpetre-par-larmee-et-
des-soldats-etrangers;
https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/mali/crimes-civils-moura-mali-enquete-ind
ependante.
5 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/9f0d5f1f-7e74-3880-b271-14c3b108f6e2/N22
29311.pdf.
 CONFLICT-PROOFING CIVILIAN PROTECTION RULES … 115

In the context of the conflicts in the central Sahel, the difficulties in

applying humanitarian law result from the hostility of the armed actors to
the rules of equality of belligerence and non-reciprocity. African states are
resistant to the principle of equality of belligerents, considering any attack
by armed groups against military bases or soldiers as illegal and terrorist
attacks. These states refute the rule of equality between belligerents and
the principle of non-reciprocity is undermined.
As can be seen, the protection of civilians is severely tested in these
conflicts. The lack of observance of humanitarian standards in these
conflicts is a matter of grave concern. In addition, the soldiers engaged
in the field to fight the armed “terrorist” groups have little inclination to
observe the rules of protection. The investigations announced to estab-
lish the circumstances of attacks on civilians have never been completed.
Military headquarters use the argument of the particular context of the
nature of the conflict and the context of military interventions to justify
certain breaches of the rules. In such a context, the army is deployed
in a hostile theatre and the enemy respects no rules. Consequently,
counter-insurgency military interventions are very different from conven-
tional warfare. This argument does not stand up to the obligations to
respect international commitments freely entered into (common art. 1)
and guided by the “imperative of protecting the human person”. In such
a context, how can the imperative of securing the territory against armed
groups be reconciled with scrupulous compliance with obligations to
respect humanitarian law and human rights?
This article looks at the protection of civilians in the Sahel, high-
lighting the lack of a protective environment. It also analyses the factors
eroding this protection and the impunity surrounding the notion of
counter-terrorism.
The methodology used is based on open documentation from interna-
tional organisations (Minusma, OCHA, OHCHR, etc.). Other comple-
mentary sources (books, academic works, press articles, official reports,
national and international legal instruments, etc.) were used for the
purposes of the study. The aim of the study is to identify the major
challenges to compliance with the rules on the protection of civilians.
The first part deals with the obligations to respect and ensure respect
for the rules on the protection of civilians in non-international conflicts.
The second part looks at the ineffectiveness of the approaches put
forward.
116 K. SIDIBÉ

The Right to Protect Civilians

in Non-international Armed Conflicts
Belligerents have an overriding obligation to spare civilians during mili-
tary operations. Indiscriminate attacks and other violations of rights
(physical violence, extrajudicial executions, rape, etc.) perpetrated by
parties to armed conflicts in the Sahel may constitute international crimes.
Obligations to protect civilians who are not, or are no longer, taking
part in hostilities derive from the 4th Geneva Convention and Additional
Protocol 2, as well as from other related international instruments. This
obligation is a categorical imperative.6

Obligations Not to Direct Attacks Against Civilians

The obligations of immunity of civilians from attack during armed conflict
are based on respect for the principle of distinction, which means that all
armed parties must respect the status of civilians and civilian objects. This
is the corollary of the precautionary principle, which consists of taking
all appropriate measures before launching attacks. These two principles
derive from Article 13§2 of Protocol 2 (prohibition of indiscriminate
attacks).7

Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks

The term “civilian” includes any individual with civilian status and prop-
erty not used for military purposes. The protection of these persons
is inclusive, with the exception of conflict situations in which civilians
have taken part in the fighting. They therefore lose this protection.8
This means that the belligerent who, during the assault, carries out the
attack without making this prior distinction commits a violation of Article
13§2 of Protocol 2. Any attack which is directed indiscriminately at
both combatants and non-combatants and the effects of which cannot
be limited is considered to be an indiscriminate attack.9 Non-civilian or
military objectives are “by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an

6 Art. 13 §2, Additional Protocol II (1977); Art. 8, 25 and 27 of the Rome Statute.
7 Op.cit.
8 Art.13.3 of Additional Protocol 2.
9 CICR, IHL Database, rule 12, Vol. II, Ch. 1, Sec. A, 2005.
 CONFLICT-PROOFING CIVILIAN PROTECTION RULES … 117

effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruc-

tion, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage in the
circumstances ”.10 Two cumulative criteria are therefore necessary in the
definition of military objectives: the attack provides a definite advantage
to military action. However, a civilian target can be transformed into a
military objective if it is used for military purposes.
Several indiscriminate attacks have been launched against civilians
accused of having links with the regular forces in Mali (Ménaka), Burkina
Faso (Soum Province) and Niger (in the Tahoua region). Incidents linked
to IEDs (improvised explosive devices) have also led to the deaths of inno-
cent people in Kidal, Menaka, Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti in Mali. In this
respect, “the launching of deliberate attacks against the civilian population
in general or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostili-
ties constitutes a war crime when committed in a non-international armed
conflict ”.11
Common Article 3 sets out the conditions for such participation.12
It is important to emphasise that civilians can lose this protection when
objective factors (threshold of damage, direct causality and belligerency)13
come into play. In the Sahel, several reports accuse regular forces
of constantly attacking civilians indiscriminately. What are described as
“blunders” are in fact violations of humanitarian standards? Their perpe-
trators must be held responsible. Several people have been massacred
or tortured by the regular forces under the pretext of being members
or accomplices of the groups, without however respecting the judicial
investigation procedures that are essential to establish this complicity.14

10 Cf. Robert Kolb, op. cit.

11 Cf. Art. 8§2.
12 The concept of “direct participation in hostilities” has been defined as “acts which,
by their nature or intent, are intended to cause actual damage to enemy personnel
and material”, See. Jean-Marie Henckaert, Louise Doswald-Beck, in Droit international
humanitaire coutumier, vol. 1 Règle, published by CICR-Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2006.
13 See Nils Melzer, « Guide interprétatif sur la notion de participation directe aux hostil-
ités », CICIR, Genève, Octobre 2010; https://www.icrc.org/fr/doc/assets/files/other/
icrc_001_0990.pdf.
14 Human Rights Watch; https://www.hrw.org/fr/report/2020/02/10/combien-de-
sang-doit-encore-couler/atrocites-commises-contre-des-civils-dans-le, rapport 2020.
118 K. SIDIBÉ

Prohibition of Attacks on Non-military Objects

The rules prohibiting attacks on non-military objects suffer from a
number of shortcomings in the context of these conflicts in the Sahel, as
can be seen from the destruction of places of worship (mausoleums) and
historic cultural sites, as in the case of the town of Timbuktu in 2012,
the extortion and abduction of livestock, and the destruction of homes
and crops. These attacks are accompanied by robberies, looting and the
kidnapping of humanitarian workers. During armed conflicts, all goods
essential to the survival of the population, as well as cultural objects and
places of worship, benefit from specific protection.15 In addition to viola-
tions of the rules of IHL, international human rights law prohibits other
acts of violence committed during armed conflicts.

Prohibitions Relating to Human Rights in Armed Conflict

Insecurity in the Sahel is characterised by serious human rights abuses.
Many people are victims of various forms of human rights abuse (murder,
assassination, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment). There has also
been an upsurge in crime (roadside robberies), kidnappings and cattle
rustling.

Prohibition of Serious Human Rights Violations

Legal instruments relating to human rights remain applicable to armed
conflicts. These instruments constitute fundamental guarantees of respect
for human rights. They prohibit all violations of the right to life and to
physical or mental well-being, in particular murder, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment (art.4§2 AP II; art.8 of the Rome Statute). In the Sahel,
human rights violations are common in the context of armed conflict.
They take the form of physical abuse and exactions, summary and extra-
judicial executions, torture and other acts of human rights violations. In
Mali, the irruption of armed “traditional hunters” (dozo) groups resulted
in almost 426 victims killed by Saran-Peul in Bankass, in the Mopti

15 Art. 16 PA II; art. 3 of the “Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property
in the event of armed conflict ”, 1954.
 CONFLICT-PROOFING CIVILIAN PROTECTION RULES … 119

region.16 On 18 and 19 June 2022, armed jihadist groups attacked Dial-

lassagou. According to the information available, this indiscriminate attack
killed more than 130 people.17 In Burkina Faso, in the Barsalogho area,
schools were set on fire in May 2018 in Bafina and Guembila by Islamist
groups. On 17 June 2022, jihadists attacked the village of Seytanga
in the north of the country. More than 79 people died and 16,000
were internally displaced.18 In addition, Islamist groups operate clandes-
tinely, sneaking up on populations to perpetrate various forms of guerrilla
warfare so as not to be identified. This puts civilians at greater risk. In a
report published in 2018, Amnesty International described these as extra-
judicial executions, following the discovery of six bodies in a mass grave
in Mopti, allegedly those of people arrested by Malian armed forces and
suspected of complicity with certain jihadist groups.19 There have also
been other similar acts, including arbitrary executions, kidnappings and
illegal detention.20 In Burkina Faso, there have been allegations of abuses
committed by members of the military.21 In the Barsalogho area, schools
were burnt down in May 2018 in Bafina and Guembila by armed Islamist
groups. The Peulh community was immediately suspected of complicity.
In 2019, a human rights civil society organisation reported that 60 people
were executed without trial and 74 others were tortured, including 2
deaths, in the province of Djibo. In the same vein, the Kogleweogo militia
is accused of committing acts of violence, in particular massacres of civil-
ians. In 2019 in Niger, Nigerien forces were accused of summary and
extrajudicial executions of civilians suspected of complicity with jihadist
groups.22

16 HW Report 2019, op. cit.

17 “Mali: UN to open enquiry into attacks in Bandiagara and Gao regions ”; https://
news.un.org/fr/story/2022/06/1122122.
18 “Burkina Faso: nearly 80 dead and more than 16,000 displaced in Seytenga attack”;
https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/06/1121972.
19 L’Indicateur du Renouveau du 03/04/2018.
20 L’Indicateur du Renouveau du 03/04/2018.
21 Tiga Cheick Sawadogo, « Droits humains et lutte antiterroriste: Le MBDHP révèle
des exécutions sommaires », Thursday, 14 March 2019; https://lefaso.net/spip.php?articl
e88525.
22 https://unowas.unmissions.org/fr/l%E2%80%99afrique-de-l%E2%80%99ouest-et-le-
sahel-entre-d%C3%A9fis-s%C3%A9curitaires-et-la-n%C3%A9cessit%C3%A9-de-consolider-
la-paix.
120 K. SIDIBÉ

Prohibition of Acts of Sexual Violence

The term “conflict-related sexual violence” covers “rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilisa-
tion, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly
or indirectly related to a conflict”.23 This list is not exhaustive. Sexual
violence should therefore be understood to mean any form of violence or
attempted violence involving a person’s sexuality, committed or threat-
ened against a person without their consent (e.g. sexual assault, sexual
harassment, indecent assault, sexual exploitation, etc.). They constitute
serious violations and infringements of human rights. The protection
of women and girls against sexual violence linked to armed conflict
aims to prevent, eliminate and, where necessary, punish this type of war
crime.24 Several United Nations resolutions classify such acts as interna-
tional crimes.25 They stress the need to protect women against violence
linked to armed conflict.26
In the Sahel context, women and children are subjected to serious
abuse. Available data from various sources on sexual violence linked to
armed conflict in the central Sahel show how jihadist armed groups
subject women to the worst forms of sexual violence under the pretext of
Islamic law (floggings, public stonings, forced marriages, unwanted preg-
nancies, etc.).27 In certain localities in the north of the country (Ansongo,
Ouatagouna), there are new forms of this type of sexual assault. They
consist of kidnapping women and girls because their families have not
been able to pay the zakat. Several cases of abduction and rape have been
reported in this context. In the centre of the country (Douentza and

23 See the 2018 UN report AR Reid-Cunningham, 2008, quoted by Jean de Dieu

Sikulibo, « Sexual Violence and Effective Redress for Victims in Post-Conflict Situations:
Emerging Research and Opportunities», Published January 25th 2019 by Information
Science Reference, 267 pages.
24 GIV art. 27; GPI art. 76; GPII art. 4; GI, GII, GIII, GIV art. 3.
25 https://undocs.org/fr/S/RES/1820%20(2008);
26 Security Council Resolutioni1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 “on women peace and
security”.
27 “Confilict-related sexual violence: The UN Seceretary General Special Representative
in Mopti”; 4 March 2019: https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/violences-sexuelles-li-es-aux-
conflits-la-repr-sentante-sp-cial-du-secr-taire-g-n-ral-de.
 CONFLICT-PROOFING CIVILIAN PROTECTION RULES … 121

Bankass Cercles), cases of forced marriage are commonplace.28 These

forced marriages are the quid pro quo for the protection afforded to
the community by these armed groups. In these localities, women have
been forbidden to go out alone and forced to wear the burqa. These
different types of sexual violence are common in several localities in
central and northern Mali. However, they are not sufficiently documented
or reported for fear of reprisals from Islamist armed groups.
In other places, children are victims of the crisis due to displacement,
violence and sexual abuse. Despite the existence of this legal framework,
armed groups continue to recruit children, and attacks on schools have
increased. Several schools have been attacked by armed jihadist groups
in the countries of the central Sahel. An estimated 85 schools were
attacked between January and June 2020.29 It is estimated that “in the
first quarter of 2019, 102 children, including 79 boys and 23 girls, aged
between 12 and 17 were recruited into the ranks of the actors in conflict
in Mali. Of these children, 47 were killed or mutilated in the regions of
Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, Segou and Bamako”.30 In Burkina Faso,
displaced women are subjected to sexual violence. An Oxfam report
entitled “Women in the crisis in Burkina Faso: survivors and heroines”
revealed that displaced women had been raped by armed groups in
Dori.31
In Niger, many women have been subjected to abduction, rape and
forced marriage. Others have been used as suicide bombers.32
As can be seen, and as in all violent conflicts, civilians are the main
victims of armed violence in the Sahel. These conflicts highlight the inef-
fectiveness of local approaches to conflict prevention and management.

28 Aurélien Tobie et Boukary Sangaré, op. cit.

29 AFRIKAJOM Center, « Sécurité et droits humains en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Sahel:
défis et perspectives Cas du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger», FES series on peace and
security in Africa, No. 40, 2020, 33 pages.
30 Cf. Le Républicain, National Daily of 02 mars 2021.
31 “Survivors and Heroines: Women in the crisis in Burkina Faso”, Oxfam, 25 mai 2020.
https://www.oxfam.org/fr/publications/survivantes-et-heroines-les-femmes-dans-la-
crise-au-burkina-faso.
32 Ndèye Amy NdiAye « Violences basées sur le genre en Afrique de l’Ouest: cas du
Sénégal, du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger», Séries FES sur la paix et la sécurité en
Afrique, N°42, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021, 70 pages.
122 K. SIDIBÉ

The Ineffectiveness of Local

Prevention and Protection Approaches
The security crisis has led to the collapse of these states, which explains the
massive presence of armed jihadist groups, highly concentrated in border
areas. In view of the deteriorating security situation, the countries of the
central Sahel have favoured the military approach as their main strategy
for containing “terrorism”. This prevalence of military responses has been
marked by excesses and abuses that have undermined civilian prevention
mechanisms.

Insufficient Civilian Means of Prevention

In an ongoing armed conflict, the prevention strategy aims to limit the
extension of the field of confrontation in order to minimise the impact
of the violence. Prevention mechanisms are based on an approach of
community dialogue and resilience in defining the political and social
framework for conflict resolution. However, in the Sahelian context,
the predominance of the military approach as the preferred means is
an obstacle to endogenous local dynamics. This is why each Sahelian
country is experimenting with crisis management and resolution poli-
cies. Burkina Faso has developed a 2021–2025 strategic framework for
conflict management. This strategic framework focuses on the manage-
ment of disputes relating to local conflicts (disputes over access to natural
resources), which exacerbate the situation of violence. In Mali, the secu-
rity situation is deteriorating in the shadow of a hypothetical 2015 peace
agreement to restore security. In Niger, the High Authority for Peace
building (HACP) has been set up to create an environment for inter-
community dialogue by cultivating peace, mutual trust and tolerance. Its
aim is to explore ways of managing conflict at local level. The communi-
ties are fully aware of their security problems. Their dynamic involvement
in the upstream process can be an important springboard for a return
to peace through the establishment of community and inter-community
dialogue. A number of local initiatives exist in areas plagued by violence to
manage the security and humanitarian crisis in conflict zones on a commu-
nity basis. These resilience initiatives are led by community and religious
leaders to promote peace and social cohesion. However, the commu-
nity dialogue approach has not been sufficiently mobilised. This has led
some communities to take responsibility for their own security by creating
 CONFLICT-PROOFING CIVILIAN PROTECTION RULES … 123

self-defence militias, thereby exacerbating inter-community violence and

undermining social cohesion (Dan Na Ambasagou in Mali, Koglweogos
and Rouga in Burkina Faso, Dan Banga in Niger, etc.).

Inadequate Protection Responses

The context of violence linked to armed conflict in the Sahel has deteri-
orated sharply as a result of various attacks leading to mass massacres.
The States of the central Sahel have gradually lost their capacity to
provide security for the territory and civilian populations in localities
plagued by armed violence. The erosion of the protective environment
has led to a number of population displacements. To reverse this trend of
growing insecurity, governments have favoured military responses aimed
at deploying forward security post detachments to meet the urgent needs
of securing territories and protecting civilians. The military option to
counter terrorism has involved self-defence groups or pro-government
paramilitaries such as the traditional hunters in Mali and the army’s “vol-
unteers for the defence of the homeland” (VDP). The complex working
relationship between the armed forces and these groups further exacer-
bates insecurity and fuels communal violence. The use of violence against
civilians by the armed forces has given rise to mistrust among the commu-
nities. This situation has severely tested the civil-military dimension in
favour of local populations. This breakdown in trust between the local
population and the armed forces is the result of the unsuitability and
ineffectiveness of military responses to insecurity.

Conclusion
In armed conflicts, the obligation to respect and ensure respect for inter-
national humanitarian law is binding on all parties to the conflict. The
imperative of protecting civilians and civilian populations remains at the
heart of this obligation. Consequently, belligerent parties must at all
times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian
objects and military objectives. The applicability of these conventional
and customary provisions is severely tested. None of the parties to the
conflict attach any importance to them. States in conflict do not prosecute
elements of the regular forces who commit violations of the rules of armed
conflict. As for the armed groups, they are indifferent to humanitarian
standards.
124 K. SIDIBÉ

This failure to comply with humanitarian standards protecting civil-

ians and civilian populations is due to the predominance of the mili-
tary approach to conflict management. Investigations into allegations of
abuses committed by these regular forces against civilians have never
been completed. Violence committed in this way could be prosecuted
by national and international courts as international crimes.

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 The Anglophone Cameroon Conflict
and the Responsibility to Protect

Richard U. Gbemudia and Derrick Teneng Cho

Introduction
The Anglophone Cameroon crisis, which started in 2016, has now
become one of Africa’s many protracted intra-state conflicts (Cho &
Agbor, 2022a, 2022b). Traceable as far back as the colonial era, the crisis
has led caused great harm to the population of the Anglophone regions
(North West and South West Regions [NW and SWRs]). According to
the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2023),1 the conflict has led to
over 6000 deaths and displaced hundreds of thousands, as well as deprived
more than half a million children of education. Hazbun and Opalo (2019)
reported that internally displaced persons (IDPs) caused by the conflict
were more than 500,000 in number, disrupting livelihood, with over 40%
of healthcare centers and up to 80% of schools still closed. More so, there

1 Since 2016 when the conflict started separatist fighters from English-speaking regions
of Cameroon (Anglophones) began to fight to break away from the country’s French-
speaking majority, in order to establish an independent country which they named
“Ambazonia”.

R. U. Gbemudia
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 127
Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_8
128 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

has also been the commission of human rights abuses, including, extraju-
dicial killings, arbitrary arrests and torture and other cruel inhumane acts
across Cameroon’s Anglophone regions (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
Despite several dialogue attempts, the crisis persisted and even esca-
lated into a civil conflict pitting government security forces and Anglo-
phone separatist groups, who fight with a secessionist agenda to establish
a nation of their own which they have named: the Republic of Ambazonia
(Awasom, 2020). In the circumstances, there have been the perpetration
of grave atrocities against the population in Anglophone regions.
While international law lays upon the states the responsibility to protect
their citizens from grave atrocities in times of conflict, it also requires the
international community to step in when states prove to be unwilling
or unable to do so. The Anglophone Cameroon crisis has demonstrated
elements of the lack of protection of the population in Anglophone
regions, raising the need for some form of humanitarian intervention to
protect the population.
This paper thus examines the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine
in the context of the Anglophone Cameroon crisis, looking especially
at the reasons why the international community has not invoked the
doctrine to intervene in the situation in Anglophone Cameroon. The
paper adopts a desktop research method, with the use of secondary data,
and an interpretive method. The paper begins with a review of litera-
ture on the different perspectives on the crisis; then proceeds to discuss
the history of the Anglophone Cameroon crisis; then the Anglophone-
Cameroon Crisis; discusses Anglophone Cameroon crisis and the RtoP.
The paper then discusses the challenges to the RtoP and then ends with
a concluding section.

D. T. Cho (B)
Northwest University, Potchefstroom, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 129

Perspectives on Anglophone
Cameroon Crisis: A Literature Review
The Anglophone Cameroon crisis is increasingly catching the attention
of academics. Scholars have engaged the crisis from different viewpoints.
Beseng et al. (2023) examined the historical origins and root causes of
the conflict; the trigger mechanism of rising protests and state repres-
sion in 2016; the emergence and evolution of the armed conflict over
the past five years; its impact on civilians; and hopes for peace. They
concluded that there is currently little prospect for conflict resolution as
the Cameroon government appears to ignore limited international pres-
sure, maintaining the charade that the “security crisis” is over and recon-
struction is underway while continuing its counter-insurgency strategy to
defeat the armed separatist groups. Chapman and Pratt (2019), from
a theological perspective examined, investigated how the ‘Anglophone
problem’ in Cameroon might be brought to bear upon the African
theological debate by examining issues of violence, marginalisation, and
fragmentation within the two English-speaking areas of Cameroon. Their
findings concluded that the creation of an Anglophone theology of liber-
ation—focused upon what the gospel of Christ means for oppressed
Anglophone men and women should be the focus at this particular time.
In their research, Cho and Agbor (2022a, 2022b) examined human
rights and humanitarian violations in the ongoing Anglophone Cameroon
crisis. Their findings concluded that given the widespread attack directed
against a civilian population, crimes against humanity, as defined in both
customary international law and international instruments, would have
been committed by both state and non-state parties. Based on this,
the paper recommends establishing concrete measures to prosecute and
punish perpetrators, institute reparation schemes to compensate victims
and their families, and put in place mechanisms to ensure the cessation
and non-repetition of violence.
Mateş (2019) analysed the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon due
to a perpetual political crisis, which has its foundation in the colonial
administration of the territory. The study concluded that the strategy
of the government to homogenise the various identities in Cameroon
only intensifies the need of the communities to accentuate their partic-
ular identities, thus, protracting the conflict. South African Institute of
International Affairs (2021) explored the complex background of the
130 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

Anglophone conflict in Cameroon and discussed the role of the increas-

ingly activist Anglophone Cameroonian diaspora in the conflict and the
prospects for peace. Their research concluded that it is unlikely that
pathways for peaceful dialogue and negotiations will emerge within the
highly weakened social and political forces within Cameroon. Annan
et al. (2021) focused on the current conflict in Anglophone Cameroon
and examined the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in conflict
resolution.

The Genesis of the Anglophone Cameroon

Crisis: A Historical Background
The Southwest and the Northwest (Anglophone regions) are two of the
10 regions of Cameroon. Of the 475,442 sq. km of total land area, it
covers 16,364 sq. km and is home to nearly 5 million of Cameroon’s
24 million people. It is home to the main opposition party the Social
Democratic Front (SDF), and it is significant to the economy, particu-
larly to the thriving commercial and agricultural industries as the majority
of Cameroon’s oil, which makes up one-twelfth of the country’s GDP,
is found off the coast of the Anglophone regions (International Crisis
Group, 2017). The dual colonial past of Cameroon, which finally gave
rise to its bilingual heritage (French and English official languages), lies
at the centre of the Anglophone problem. German Kamerun was forfeited
to be governed by Britain and France in 1919 during the Versailles Treaty,
which divided the territory into two parts, with France having the lion’s
share of 80% and Britain, 20% of the territory (Annan et al., 2021). As
La République du Cameroun, the French (Francophone) section became
independent on January 1, 1960. In contrast, its English-speaking coun-
terparts (present-day North West and South West Regions, who were
governed by the British as Southern Cameroons, had the choice to
federate with either Nigeria or La République du Cameroun (Fig. 1).
On February 11, 1961, Southern Cameroons, through a refer-
endum, voted massively to reunify with La Républic du Cameroon to
form the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which included the federated
states of East Cameroon (Francophone Cameroon) and West Cameroon
(Anglophone Cameroon) (Ngoh, 2001). Ahidjo, the first president of
Cameroon, replaced the federal system in favour of a unitary state known
as the United Republic of Cameroon in 1972. His predecessor and
current President, Paul Biya, changed the name of the country from
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 131

Fig. 1 Map of the Anglophone region showing the North West and South West
Regions and pockets of territory allegedly controlled by the separatists

the Federal Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon (La

Républic du Cameroon) on February 4, 1984, which is the name former
French Cameroon had at independence and before reunification with
British Southern Cameroon. This raised suspicions of a marginalisa-
tion agenda. Since the two Cameroons joined forces, the Anglophones,
currently comprising 14% of the population (World Bank, 2017), have
grown more vocal about their complaints of marginalisation (Konings &
Nyamnjoh, 1997). This was made worse by the name change, which was
perceived by many as an effort to obliterate the minority Anglophone
identity and force them into the dominant French system.
The Anglophones have organised various rallies since independence/
reunification against what they view to be unfair institutional and
economic discrimination, marginalisation, and inequality in the nomina-
tion of public officials. A violent outbreak has frequently resulted, espe-
cially when government troops try to suppress demonstrators (Chereji &
Lohkoko, 2012). The most recent phase of the Anglophone crisis began
as nonviolent street protests by teachers’ and lawyers’ unions in October
132 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

2016, who, among other things, was against the need that French
be spoken in the two English-speaking areas’ law courts and schools.
According to Njoh and Ayuk-Etang, Anglophone discontent with the
Paul Biya-led central government was a factor in the outbreak of the civil
conflict in 2017 (2021: 1540).

Many of Anglophone extraction expressed dissatisfaction with the highly

centralised government structure, and especially the fact that they had no
say in matters affecting their welfare. They expressed their dissatisfaction
in many peaceful ways until 2016 when some took to the streets but were
repelled by a heavy-handed crackdown on the part of government troops.
In response, a number of Anglophone groups took up arms and began
clamouring for complete independence for the Southern Cameroons or
what they fondly christen “Ambazonia”. This led to the breakout of the
country’s ongoing civil war which began in 2017.

The Cameroon government brutally reacted to nonviolent demonstra-

tions by imprisoning the protest organisers and launching a bloody crack-
down on demonstrators (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Lazar, 2019). In
response, armed secessionist organisations have reemerged since January
2017, calling for the independence of the Anglophone territories claiming
the name Ambazonia. Since then, the separatist organisations and the
security forces have engaged in brutal armed clashes, featuring the
commission of gross human rights violations against the Anglophone
population.
Another view of the conflict’s root causes is the marginalisation of
the Anglophone populations and the imposition of the French language
upon Anglophones (Africa Research Bulletin, 2018). Numerous signifi-
cant occurrences in Cameroon before the conflict aided in triggering the
crisis in 2016 (Table 1).

The Anglophone Cameroon Crisis

The Anglophone Cameroon crisis/civil conflict since 2016 has resulted
in many deaths and displacements. Also, education has been greatly
affected, with schools, teachers and students being attacked, kidnapped,
and killed (UNOCHA, 2023). According to Takambou (2021), the
English-speaking regions of Cameroon have turned into a conflict zone
resulting in over half a million children being deprived of education in
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 133

Table 1 Selected events that contributed to the escalation of the crisis in 2016

Year Events

2001 Government bans Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) which was
the largest grouping pushing for Anglophone region secession
2004 Southern Cameroon National Council leader (Patrick Mbuwe) is assassinated.
Government suspected. Security forces assault SDF leaders during protests.
Crowds estimated at 50,000 people demonstrate following the death of an
SDF member, John Khotem
2005 Over 100 members of the SCNC are arrested without charge. They were
gradually released through the rest of the year. 50 members of the SCNC are
arrested for purportedly holding an illegal meeting. Student-led protest for
better opportunities in education for Anglophones turns violent. 23 SCNC
members are arrested by police
2006 65 SCNC members are arrested during a meeting. SDF parliamentary
members walk out in protest of electoral bills for senators and councillors
proposed by the Constitutional Law Committee. They demand an
independent electoral commission. Two students are killed by police during
protests over inequalities in education
2008 A constitutional amendment is made to remove presidential term limits
2009 AU Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights dismisses a petition
by SCNC for independence
2010 The 64th president of the UN General Assembly, Ali Triki presents two maps
as gifts to Paul Biya showing the Republic of Cameroon (Francophone) and
the other representing Anglophone Cameroon. Secessionists perceived this
gesture as recognition of the independence of Southern Cameroon
2012 SCNC announces plans to issue currency, identification cards and treasury
bills in Anglophone regions. Plans are also announced for a petition against
Cameroon’s ‘illegal’ occupation in Southern Cameroon
2014 The Republic of Cameroon organises and celebrates the 50th anniversary of
the reunification. Anglophone Cameroonians detest this event and associate it
with a distortion of history
2015 All Anglophone Lawyers Conference themed around preserving Anglophone
identity

Source Agwanda and Asal (2021)

the North West and South West Regions. The International Crisis Group
(2023) stated that the conflict between these two parties has resulted
in the deaths of over 6000 people and displaced 765,000 people, of
whom over 70,000 are refugees in neighbouring Nigeria. Similarly, the
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)’s 2019 report
about the Anglophone-Cameroon Crisis 2019 stated that the crisis, as
134 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

Table 2 Selected cases of abuses by Cameroon’s government forces in 2021

Year Causality killed or abused by government forces

January 10 Soldiers killed at least nine civilians in Mautu village, South-West

region
June 8 Two soldiers broke into the house of the local traditional authority
and harassed eight people
June 9 Soldiers from the regular army looted at least 33 shops in Ndzeen
village and killed a 58-year-old man and raped a 53-year-old woman,
October 14 A gendarme killed a 4-year-old girl (Caroluise Enondiale) on her
way to school in Buea, South West region
November 10 An explosive device was thrown onto the roof of a lecture hall at the
University of Buea, South West region, wounding 11 students

Source Human Rights Watch (2022)

of December 14, 2019, resulted in 298 violent fatalities against civil-

ians. Human Rights Watch (2022) also detailed some of the casualties
witnessed in the conflict (Table 2).
Furthermore, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
(ACLED) report for 2019 stated that many civilians were deliberately
targeted by the government forces, most especially in Buea and Bamenda,
the capitals of the NW and SWRs. This resulted in the death of many.
Soldiers from the central government targeted civilians, including school
children in the Anglophone region (Table 3).

The Situation in Anglophone Cameroon

and the RtoP: Making a Case for the RtoP
The key element behind the doctrine of the RtoP is that states (sovereign
states) have the responsibility to protect their citizens and that where the
state becomes unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility devolves
to the international community, especially in instances of mass atroci-
ties, including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity (Hamilton, 2006). This depicts the non-absolute nature of the
principle of sovereignty.
In the context of the Anglophone Cameroon crisis, the RtoP entails
that the Cameroon government protects the affected population and
communities of the Anglophone regions from the violence and human
rights abuses perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. It thus
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 135

Table 3 Conflict incidents by category according to ACLED November 2022

Category Number of Number of incidents Number of fatalities

incidents with at least one
fatality

Violence against 115 72 189

civilians
Battles 78 50 166
Strategic 52 0 0
developments
Protests 32 1 1
Riots 25 9 13
Explosions/Remote
Violence 10 4 4
Total 312 136 373

Source ACLED (2019)

suffices, that a humanitarian intervention be carried out on the basis of

the doctrine of RtoP, to inquire whether the Cameroon government has
lived up to its responsibility to protect its citizens and, if the result of such
inquiry is negative, it becomes incumbent on the international community
to consider intervening to protect the affected population and prevent
further violence.
Undoubtedly, there have been several reports documenting instances
of human rights violations by both security forces and separatist fighters,
including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and incommunicado
detention, sexual violence, torture and other cruel inhumane acts. Civil-
ians, including women, children and even the disabled have been caught
in the crossfire, resulting in severe humanitarian implications (Bang
& Balgah, 2022).
Given the magnitude of the human rights violations, in terms of the
widespread nature and the scale of victimisation, they have been argued
to amount to crimes against humanity, constituting serious crimes against
the international community as a whole (Cho & Agbor, 2022a, 2022b).
More so, despite the overarching obligation under international, regional
and national law requiring Cameroon to protect its citizens in both
times of peace and conflict, there has been inaction from the Cameroon
government, proven by its lack of political will or inability to fulfill its
international obligation to protect its citizens. It is thus based on the
foregoing that this paper invokes the RtoP doctrine as a remedy, to
136 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

justify humanitarian intervention from the international community to

both protect civilians and prevent further violence in the situation in
Anglophone Cameroon.
However justifiable the RtoP intervention may be, the questions of—
“who, why, when, and how interventions should be carried out”, remains
a serious challenge (Erameh, 2017), This may partially account for why
it has not always been easy for a RtoP intervention to be carried out-
and also why this has not happened in the case of the Anglophone
Cameroon crisis, regardless of its protracted nature and even though there
are compelling grounds prompting such intervention.

Challenges to the RtoP in Anglophone

Cameroon: Reasons for Failure
Despite the demonstrated lack of political will and the Cameroon govern-
ment’s inability to protect the Anglophone regions’ population from
gross violation of human rights, there have been no RtoP interven-
tions from the international community to protect the civilian population
and prevent further violence. On the contrary, violence has persisted,
and atrocities are committed daily with impunity, as the security forces
continue to use force and high-handed repressive tactics (Annan et al.,
2021). Several factors account for the difficulty to adhere to the doctrine
of RtoP and the failure of its application in the Anglophone Cameroon
situation so far.
The Role of the Cameroon Government: Firstly, the Cameroon
government did not address the response to the grievances of the
Anglophones. The government was antagonistic towards the demands of
protesters, (Hazbun and Opalo, 2019) and often denied the existence of
the Anglophone grievances (Amin, 2021).2

2 Ministers such as Paul Atanga Nji, the current Minister of Territorial Administration
and the former Communication Minister Issa Tchiroma Bakary are noted for making
derogatory statements against the plight of Anglophones, including even referring to
protesters as terrorists and imposters.
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 137

The actions of the Cameroon government in handling the Anglophone

crisis go against the doctrines of the RtoP3 as laid down by the Inter-
national Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).4
According to the doctrine of the RtoP, states must protect their citizens
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing
(Erameh, 2017) but the Cameroon government violated this by failing to
protect the people of the Anglophone region. Instead, the government’s
security forces have perpetrated human rights violations against the very
population they are supposed to protect. Despite the failure to protect
on the part of the Cameroon government, the international community
has also failed to intervene (whether through diplomatic, humanitarian,
peacekeeping, or any means of that sought), to protect the Anglophone
population. This attitude portrays the inadequacies of the application of
the doctrine of the RtoP in conflict situations as indicated by Erameh
(2019: 58):

… the practice of the RtoP doctrine has not escaped seemingly persistent
questions of who, why, when, and how interventions should be carried out
in the affairs of another state by a state or group of states…

Similarly, scholars such as (Bellinger, 2020; Chesterman, 2011; Focarelli,

2008) have all questioned the RtoP doctrine, given that there have been
numerous instances of conflicts that resulted in the commission of grave
atrocities and crimes against humanity, but the international community
failed to intervene. According to the International Crisis Group (2023),
Anglophone Cameroon crisis has resulted in over 6000 deaths5 with
hundreds of thousands displaced. Also, the patterns of the killings and
attacks on Anglophone people by the Cameroon security forces may

3 Refers to an international law that gives the right to humanitarian intervention during
conflict situations in states. And this doctrine has been applied in conflict situations in
African states such as Kenya (during the violence that occurred in Kenya caused by a
disputed presidential election that resulted in the death of over 1000 persons), South
Sudan, Libya (the Rtop was in response to civilian attacks by the then ruling regime
of Gadhafi), Mali, and Cote d’Ivoire (violence occurring due to disputes over election
results).
4 This organisation which constated of members from the UN General Assembly was
formed in 2001 by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun under the authority of the
Canadian Government.
5 These deaths include school children, the aged, and the vulnerable.
138 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

well indicate a genocidal component. Despite all these, the international

community has failed to intervene actively. The Cameroon government,
certainly, has undermined the doctrine of RtoP and has continuously
violated the dignity and rights of the Anglophones.
France’s Interest: France played an important role in influencing the
Cameroon government’s response to the agitations of the Anglophones
before the outbreak of the crisis. France, directly and indirectly, influ-
enced Paul Biya in the actions he took toward the conflict. France viewed
the establishment of Ambazonia as a threat to its interest in Cameroon,
as well as demeaning of its authoritative position which it still holds in
its former African colonies. Of all the colonisers, France has emerged as
the overwhelmingly dominant power in “post-colonial” Africa (Andjembe
Etogho et al., 2022). France has been notably involved in the politics
and affairs of its former colonies in Africa. The involvement of France in
the political and internal affairs of its erstwhile colonies has resulted in
the installation of puppets governments in African states which in turn
resulted in conflicts6 (Blenda et al., 2023). Francophone African states
such as Mali, Central African Republic, (CAR), and Côte d’Ivoire have
all experienced conflicts that France had a direct or indirect role therein.
According to Collins (2022), in the past, France has imposed and
supported dubious African leaders as heads of state in order to maintain
exclusive access to natural resources and protect its economic interests.7
These leaders received authority, safety, and immunity from punishment
for any misbehavior, including violations of human rights. In addi-
tion, France supported disputed presidential elections in the Republic of
Cameroon in 2018, Togo in 2020, Congo in 2021, and Chad in 2021
as a result of France’s meddling in the francophone politics of African
republics. This may also account for why most of the countries in Franco-
phone Africa promote a centralised system of government where all power
is held and whirled by the heads of state, who often manipulate their way
to rule for several terms. This is certainly the situation in Cameroon with
President Paul Biya who has been in power for over 40 years (Ghosh,
2021).

6 Modern example of such conflict Mali.

7 For example, in Gabon France played many roles behind the scenes to support then-
incumbent Ali Bongo who claimed victory in the presidential election.
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 139

This was the case and role of France during the Anglophone Cameroon
crisis. During the outbreak of the conflict in 2016, France under the lead-
ership of President Macron was silent playing limited roles at the start of
the conflict (Mules, 2019). France indirectly saw the conflict between the
Anglophones and the Francophone-led government as an opportunity for
the majority of French-speaking Cameroonians to assimilate the minority
English-speaking population (Chimtom, 2017). This action of France was
an illustration and replica of France’s activities under the leadership of
President Macron8 since his inception as France’s president. This factor
contributed to the failure of RtoP in the Anglophone Cameroon crisis.
Problems of the African Union (AU): The African Union, the
regional organisation overseeing African affairs, has been found wanting
to provide concrete measures to end the Anglophone Cameroon crisis.
In May 2004, the African Union launched the new Peace and Security
Council (PSC) as a decision-making organ for preventing, managing, and
resolving conflicts in the continent (Williams, 2009). But the Peace and
Security Council (PSC) has been lazy in preventing and resolving conflicts
in Africa, including the Anglophone Cameroon crisis. According to Aning
(2008: 3–4), with the consent of the Chairperson of the African Union,
the Peace and Security Council can:

Undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions to resolve conflicts

where they have occurred, authorise the mounting and deployment of
peace support missions, recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government intervention within a member state in respect of severe
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,
institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government
takes place in a member state, implement the common defence policy
of the AU, follow-up the progress towards the promotion of democratic
practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, respect of the sanctity of human life and

8 There have been a series of questions about the roles of France in Francophone African
countries under President Macron. Most Francophone African countries are going through
internal conflicts in which France has been accused of taking sides and contributing to
the continuous protracting of those conflicts. An illustration was in Mali where France
came to help fight and curtail the spread of the jihadists from their strongholds in the
country’s north since 2013 the situation has become worse rather than getting better.
France also mingled with the late Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. And this
brought dissatisfaction with the Malina populace, resulting in the clamour for France to
leave the country as the conflict spread to neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger countries.
140 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

international humanitarian law by member states, and, support and facili-

tate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural
disasters

Further, Article 4 J of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security

Council of the African Union states:

the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a

decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article
4(h) of the Constitutive Act.

In addition to Article 4 J of the PSC Protocol, the African Union’s

Constitutive Act (Article 23(2) and Article 4(h) also grants the AU the
right to intervene in situations where there is “a serious threat to legit-
imate order to restore peace and stability in the Member State of the
Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council”.
The above provides the legal basis for the African Union to intervene
in the situation in Anglophone Cameroon, given the grave atroci-
ties committed therein and the scale of victimisation. The PSC, which
should serve as the institutional framework for preventing, managing,
and resolving conflicts on the African continent, comprises nations that
actively disobeyed AU directives or committed human rights abuses
within their borders yet were nonetheless permitted to become members
of the Council (The Conversation, 2020). African states such as Nigeria,
Uganda, and Cameroon that have questions over human rights abuses
are members of the PSC. For example, Cameroon has continuously been
a member of the PSC, elected by the AU Executive Council over the
years. Cameroon’s membership of the PSC makes AU interference in the
conflict political, biased, and problematic. The Republic of Cameroon
assumed the Chairmanship of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of
the African Union (AU) in May 2022 (African Union, 2022).
More so, the issue of state sovereignty, which form part of the strong
principles of the AU, great stand in the way of any form of humani-
tarian intervention by the AU in managing and resolving the Anglophone
 THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON CONFLICT … 141

Cameroon crisis. Articles e,9 f10 and i11 of the protocol establishing the
PSC of the African Union are illustrative of this.
These are some of the many technicalities that affected and stalled the
AU’s response to the Anglophone Cameroon crisis, resulting in the failure
of the RtoP.
International Politics: International politics played a major role in the
failure of the RtoP in the Anglophone Cameroon crisis. With few expec-
tations,12 the international community was uninterested and lackadaisical
towards the conflict. The superpowers and key players in the international
political stage were focused on other challenges and issues, neglecting the
Anglophone Cameroon crisis for the AU to solve.13 This was also the case
in the genocide in Rwanda whereby the conflict between the belligerents
was neglected until it turned into a genocide.

Conclusion
While the RtoP doctrine might seem beneficial in conflict situations in
order to protect civilian populations and prevent further violence, in many
instances, certain challenges have prevented it from being invoked by the
states and the international community as a whole. Issues such as state
sovereignty, the politics of interest, the lack of political will and the inter-
play of realpolitik have often acted as bottlenecks to the application of
the RtoP doctrine. This, certainly has been the case in the situation of
the Anglophone Cameroon crisis as discussed above. The international
community during the peak of the crisis failed to adequately implement
the RtoP doctrine in protecting the Anglophones from the atrocities
committed by the Cameroon security forces and separatist groups. The

9 Article e of the Peace and Security Council states that “respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Member States” (AU, 2004).
10 Article f reads “non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of
another” (AU, 2004).
11 Article i reads “respect of borders inherited on achievement of independence” (AU,
2004).
12 Such an exception is Switzerland which led a peace mediation initiative in 2019.
13 Some of the issues in the international political system during the time of the
outbreak of the Anglophone Cameroon Crisis included the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar,
Brexit, climate change, North Korea’s nuclear power activities, and Donald Trump’s
foreign policy Agenda.
142 R. U. GBEMUDIA AND D. T. CHO

failure of the doctrine in Cameroon reveals the inadequacies and politi-

cised nature of the doctrine. As Cunliffe (2017: 466) puts it: “Despite
the insistent language of responsibility in the doctrine, many could name
ongoing conflicts and crises that have seen mass atrocities resulting from
state neglect, predation or oppression and yet have seen no meaningful
international response”. Therefore, the failure of the RtoP in Cameroon
has shown that the RtoP as a doctrine, like most international principles in
International Relations and international law, is political and depends on
the interests, actions, and commitments of the international community
(superpowers) in intervening in conflict situations.
This paper thus recommends some form of RtoP intervention from the
international community, especially the UN, the AU and other nations
with bi-lateral or multi-lateral relations with Cameroon, in order to
both protect civilians and prevent further violence in the situation in
Anglophone Cameroon. Such intervention may involve diplomatic and
peaceful means, including facilitating dialogue, mediation, and negotia-
tion between the Cameroon government and separatist leaders, and where
such means prove unfruitful, more rigorous actions, such as political
and economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and even the deployment of
peacekeeping forces may be considered to protect civilians.
Although it might be challenging, there is need for a RtoP intervention
in the Anglophone Cameroon situation, else atrocities would continue to
be committed against the population with impunity. It would therefore
men that impunity has become the new way of politics. This thus begs the
question: what would have been the need for the international community
to put in place the RtoP doctrine, if its application was based on political
interests and realpolitik and not its original motive to protect populations
from atrocities? Reflecting on this question may well constitute a subject
for further research.

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90048
 The Responsibility to Protect
and International Community Response
to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Oladiran Afolabi and Phemelo Olifile Marumo

Introduction
The history and politics of Nigeria have often been characterized and
marred with violence. This violence ranges from political to religious,
ethnic, and electoral violence. Often it is practically challenging to discern
the root cause of this phenomenon of violence threatening the survival of
the federation. Over the past few years, violence due to political, reli-
gious, and ethnic crises has led to the death of millions of Nigerians
and the destruction of properties worth billions. While this new form
of violence stifles development, it equally leads to instability in the polity.
For Osaghae (2014) post -independence Nigeria has been ridden with
political turmoil. Both the first and Second Republic spanned for four

O. Afolabi (B)
Political Science and International Relations, Bowen University, Iwo, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
P. O. Marumo
School of Philosophy, North West University, Mafikeng, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 147

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_9
148 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

years respectively. There was a civilian cum military diarchy. The mili-
tary has the rein of power at the central level, while the civilian rein
power at both regional and sub- regional levels. These periods were
frequented with series of coups, unsuccessful and crisis. This string of
political upheaval stifled the reality of having institutional stability. Which
created the window of “names calling” by every successive government
of their undoing by previous government.
Nigeria has had its independence for four years, but the country is still
working hard to create conditions that encourage tolerance and harmony
among its citizens. Nigeria has been plagued by military coups and post-
independence ethnic and religious strife ever since it became a nation in
1960. A chance for Nigeria’s many groups to come together emerged
in the wake of the country’s civil war, which took place between 1967
and 1970. The civil war in Nigeria may have ended, but the country
still faces significant security threats, including militancy, insurgencies, and
periodic communal violence. Conflicts between different groups inside
the nation have arisen as a consequence of these problems. Significant
changes occurred in African countries in the 1990s and 2000s as a result
of the end of the ideological battle between Western and Eastern powers,
sometimes known as the Cold War. There was a spike in intrastate wars
throughout the continent at this time. Social and cultural groupings
inside the country’s boundaries are at the centre of these disputes, as are
the tensions between organisations that feel marginalised and ignored by
the present power structure and the central government (Egwu, 2007).
Nigeria has seen the rise of several paramilitary organisations with diverse
religious, cultural, ethnic, and other special interest orientations since the
return of democratic rule in 1999. The present situation has reached a
new level of tension and chaos reminiscent of the time of the Civil War.
Negative impacts on peace and harmony have resulted from the organi-
sation’s aggressive tactics, and the group continues to pose a danger to
Nigeria’s stability, security, and territorial sovereignty. According to the
findings from Bamidele’s, 2012 study.
Boko Haram is a recognised terrorist organisation that has garnered
significant attention both domestically within Nigeria and internation-
ally. A group of militant Islamists was established approximately ten years
ago in Maiduguri, consisting of unemployed youth who frequented the
Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque. In 2002, a certain faction of the
youth’s wing of the group, which was not yet identified as Boko Haram,
disapproved of the city and its Islamic sanctuary, citing their perceived
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL … 149

incorrigible corruption. The group initiated a hijra, which refers to a

retreat and migration similar to that of the Prophet Muhammad from
Mecca to Medina, with the aim of eliminating all impurities from the
world. As a reaction, the organisation proceeded to transfer its followers
to a village named Kanama situated in Yobe state, in close proximity to the
border of Niger. Subsequently, they established a society that advocates
for separatism and is founded on rigorous interpretations of the Islamic
faith. Mohammed Ali advocated for anti-state ideologies and mobilised
fellow Muslims to adhere to “authentic” Islamic principles and establish
Sharia law as a means of counteracting the governance of non-believers
(ibid).
In December 2003, a dispute arose between law enforcement officials
and individuals regarding the rightful access to a nearby body of water
for fishing purposes. The organization’s members, however, managed
to overpower and disarm a contingent of law enforcement personnel.
Subsequent to the aforementioned event, the military forces initiated a
blockade of the mosque and persisted in their efforts until the commence-
ment of the New Year. The majority of the seventy individuals involved
in the siege, among them Mohammed Ali, were fatally shot, ultimately
bringing the ordeal to a close. The notion that the Boko Haram sect
has been in existence prior to the tenure of President Goodluck runs
counter to the assertions of the majority of scholars who posit that
the group is a deliberate instrument wielded by the Northern Elites.
Simultaneously, the perpetrators escalated their assault on governmental
edifices, religious sanctuaries, commercial hubs, and military compounds,
among other vulnerable targets. Nigeria has successfully managed to miti-
gate several religious and ethnic disputes; however, the Boko Haram
insurgency remains a contentious issue for the government.
The Nigerian populace has suffered significant casualties due to the
gang’s consistent adaptation of tactics and utilisation of advanced arma-
ments, which have caught the government and military off guard. The
government promptly responded to the security breach instigated by the
cult; however, the group had already formulated alternative strategies to
perpetrate abhorrent acts. Ever since the onset of the Boko Haram insur-
gency in July 2009, the area has been persistently exposed to the menace
of the extremist organisation. The visible consequences of Boko Haram’s
actions include fatalities and destruction. Concerns among the Nigerian
populace regarding the potential disintegration of their country appear to
be escalating.
150 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

The actions perpetrated by Boko Haram elicited shock and horror from
individuals worldwide, extending beyond the borders of Nigeria. Never-
theless, the fundamental reasons behind the social and political turmoil
remain ambiguous. The presence of religious intolerance, economic
inequality, jealousy, exploitation of impoverished youth for personal gain,
and cutthroat competition for political positions cannot be disregarded,
as noted by Makinde (2009: 20). The magnitude of the Boko Haram
insurgency in Nigeria was unprecedented. The security infrastructure
in Nigeria proved inadequate in managing the situation. The Nigerian
government has been under the complete control of the junta. Notwith-
standing multiple assurances, the government has been unsuccessful in
facilitating the adoption of democratic principles and customs among its
populace.
The presence of a void can be anticipated in situations where state
institutions are weak, performance is low, and legitimacy is lacking.
Insufficient security and absence of law enforcement, coupled with
corrupt practises and partiality, are additional challenges (Agbu, 2004:
12; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 38). Consequently, the magnitude of Boko
Haram’s attacks has significantly decreased. In addition to its main area
of operation in the northeastern region of Nigeria, the group purportedly
claimed responsibility for a minimum of eight (8) significant attacks span-
ning from September 2010 to December 2011. According to a report by
the BBC in 2011, a number of cities such as Kano, Jos, Yobe, and Abuja
were subjected to attacks. According to Human Rights Watch, Boko
Haram has caused the death of a minimum of 935 individuals since 2009.
Reuters reports that over 250 of these fatalities occurred in the initial
weeks of 2012. Excluded from this record are the additional 800 individ-
uals who perished during the confrontation between the aforementioned
group and Nigerian law enforcement in 2009.
As per the report by the Associated Press, Boko Haram was account-
able for a minimum of 504 fatalities solely in the year 2011 (Al Jazeera,
2011). According to Reuters (2011), Boko Haram carried out 115
distinct attacks resulting in the death of 550 individuals during the spec-
ified period. The cyclical pattern of turbulence and restiveness in Nigeria
has entered a new stage, characterised by the emergence of a new dimen-
sion to the reign of Boko Haram terror. The Boko Haram insurgency
garnered significant attention due to the state’s apparent inability to
address the ongoing violence in various forms, despite repeated assur-
ances to the contrary. According to Abimbola (2011), the onset of the
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL … 151

Boko Haram crisis in July 2009 has resulted in the attribution of respon-
sibility to religious and political leaders as well as politicians. The Nigerian
populace is facing a precarious situation due to the prevalence of poverty,
corruption, and insecurity, which can be attributed to inadequate lead-
ership at the national level. The administration’s prioritisation of state
cohesiveness over human security persists in the face of challenges in the
North-East axis of the nation. According to Walker, the Nigerian govern-
ment’s reaction to Boko Haram has been both ineffectual and excessively
aggressive.
The present manifestation of Boko Haram has its origins in the Nige-
rian government’s prioritisation of extrajudicial killings as a means of
addressing various challenges, and this approach has contributed to the
group’s continued existence. The law enforcement’s techniques have
additionally posed challenges in capturing Boko Haram insurgents. The
local populace in Maiduguri and Kano express greater apprehension
towards the police and military personnel as opposed to the extremist
group Boko Haram. The aforementioned publication is titled “The
Walker” and was released in 2012. The deployment of security forces
at the centre of the Boko Haram insurgency has garnered significant
support. Given that the majority of JTF (Joint Task Force) members are
not indigenous to the region under protection, it is improbable that they
share any cultural or ethnic similarities with the local populace. The insen-
sitivity and continued abuses of the government have led to a heightened
sense of estrangement among many individuals residing in the northern
region, who feel as though they are being subjected to a state of siege
akin to that experienced during foreign military occupation (Solomon).
To conclude, the government’s inability to fulfil fundamental human
needs has undoubtedly played a role in the decline of security within
this region of Nigeria’s jurisdiction. The Boko Haram insurgency has
caused significant destruction, including bombings, raids on military sites,
assassinations of security officials, and the complete annihilation of entire
villages and their inhabitants. The group’s inability to be contained has
contributed to the severity of the situation. Additionally, schools have
been destroyed, and students have been taken captive. The abduction
of 200 schoolgirls from Chibok elicited widespread indignation both
domestically and internationally, leading to a response from the Nige-
rian government. The assault on the United Nations’ facility in Abuja
elicited a critical response from the global community regarding the
152 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

actions of Boko Haram. There have been appeals for comprehensive inter-
vention from the international community to safeguard non-combatant
civilians who have become embroiled in the conflict, and the United
States government has provided assistance by furnishing military arma-
ments and intelligence aid, and by instituting a bounty on Shekau, who
serves as the de facto head of Boko Haram.

Conceptual Clarification & Theoretical Discourse

Instead of undergoing a process of deradicalization aimed at altering the
fundamental tenets of the group, Boko Haram was a label ascribed to
the organisation by unsympathetic locals who had not enlisted in the
faction and were disinclined to engage with it. The individuals appeared
to be expressing the notion that those who persistently criticise Western
education as a sinful practise. According to Walker (2012), the source
in question can be found on page 7. Scholars both within and outside
Nigeria have produced a substantial body of literature on Boko Haram,
offering varying perspectives on the group’s history, underlying factors,
and motivations. Several academic scholars have posited that the political
landscape in Nigeria, which is marked by power struggles, a dearth of
accountability, social injustices, and a myriad of other societal issues faced
by its citizens, may provide the most cogent explanation for the insur-
gency in the northeastern region of the country. Isa (2010) posits that
the Nigerian authority bears responsibility for the insurgency. He argued
that the Nigerian state has been marked by a persistent pattern of author-
itarianism, erratic government policies, financial instability, a debt-laden
economy, disparities and unfairness, inadequate governance, widespread
corruption, fragmentation within the ruling elite, feeble political and
economic structures, and a near-total lack of protection for individuals
and their assets. The apparent nonchalant approach of the state towards
the emergence of militant Islamic groups highlights the ruling class’s
incapacity to effectively govern state affairs.
Salawu (2010) asserts that the unrest in Nigeria can be attributed
to various factors such as despotism, favouritism, unjust treatment,
nepotism, and the failure of Nigerian leaders to establish good gover-
nance. Additionally, the breakdown of traditional African social control
mechanisms and prolonged military intervention in politics have also
contributed to the current state of unrest in the country. Cooks argues
that the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria may be attributed to the
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL … 153

government’s failure to provide essential public services to its citizens.

This failure, according to Cooks, is characterised by the government’s
inability to combat corruption, create economic opportunities, establish
accountable security institutions, and foster a more inclusive national
polity that engages communities in both the North and South. Cooks
position can be viewed as a representation of the fragile structure of the
Nigerian state, as posited by Adibe (2012).
Danjibo argues that the rise of Boko Haram bears similarities to the
Maitaisine movement that occurred in the 1980s. Both movements were
motivated by a desire to promote and uphold Islamic beliefs and prac-
tises, and were able to gain momentum due to a perceived lack of action
and authority from the federal government. The author posits that Boko
Haram can be traced back to the “Maitatsine” ideology, which is a form of
Islamic fundamentalism and extremism that was introduced to northern
Nigeria in 1945. The uprisings of the Maitatsine and Boko Haram in
1980 and 2009 respectively were a consequence of the inadequate perfor-
mance of the Nigerian government. Danjibo (2010) conducted a study.
In brief, Boko Haram, previously a relatively unknown extremist Islamic
group in the northern region, is gradually transforming into a rebellion
that garners backing from the underprivileged and marginalised populace
in the same area (Campbell & Harwood, 2011)
Certain schools of thought have analysed the Boko Haram insurgency
through a religious lens, attributing the unrest in the North-Eastern
region of Nigeria to religious fanaticism and extremism.
Osaghae’s perspective on insurgency in Nigeria has become a widely
accepted viewpoint. According to his perspective, religious extremism and
zealotry can serve as powerful instruments of decolonization on a global
scale. In Nigeria, these forces have led to religious segregation, mobilisa-
tion, and agitation, ultimately resulting in the emergence of Boko Haram,
a terrorist organisation that opposes Western education. The impetus and
determination of extremist factions such as Al Qaeda and the Arab Spring,
which resulted in the displacement of fervent religious adherents from
North Africa to West Africa, the proliferation of arms in the strife-torn
West African area, the established historical connections between propo-
nents of ‘pure’ Islam who seek jihad in Nigeria and neighbouring Chad,
Niger, north Cameroun, and Mali are interrelated with Boko Haram.
However, the underlying reason for its emergence is not difficult to
discern.
154 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

The Northern elites in Nigeria have long expressed a persistent desire

to adopt Islamic principles and establish an Islamic caliphate, as evidenced
by their embrace of the Jihad of 1804. The Maitatsine sect uprising during
the 1980s, which would likely be classified as terrorism in contempo-
rary times, and the implementation of sharia law in numerous northern
states, particularly in the period immediately subsequent to the restora-
tion of civil democratic governance when it was utilised as a means of
affirming state autonomy, constitute noteworthy achievements. According
to Osaghae (2014), the reference in question can be found on pages 17–
18. The author arrives at the conclusion that Boko Haram does not
adhere to a separatist ideology. The objective of the group is to restruc-
ture the state in accordance with sharia and the principles of pure Islam.
Despite being mobilised against the Nigerian state, the group has thus far
limited its terrorist endeavours to the northern states of Borno, Yobe,
and Adamawa, all of which are currently under a state of emergency
and military operations. Nigeria’s unique experience reveals a causal rela-
tionship between religion and religious extremism in the pursuit of the
state-building process. However, the challenge at hand pertains to how to
restrain and mitigate the turbulent tendencies of religious predispositions.
According to Onuoha, the primary objective of Boko Haram is to estab-
lish a government that is based on religious principles by implementing
sharia law. According to Onuoha (2012). Aly posits that religious funda-
mentalists, exemplified by al-Qa’ida, are driven by the narratives found
in Koranic verses that mandate the performance of religious actions,
based on spiritual doctrines. This is corroborated by both the Qur’an
and robust Islamization efforts through the implementation of Sharia law
(Aly, 2011).
The correlation between poverty and terrorism is a prevailing perspec-
tive that has been disseminated among academics over an extended
period. The presence of alienation, inadequate education, and severe
poverty between the Northern and Southern regions serve as catalysts that
propel acts of terrorism, according to their perspective. As per Elegbe’s
assertion: The escalating poverty levels in Nigeria are concomitant with a
rise in unemployment rates.
The prevalence of unemployment is comparatively greater in the
northern regions as opposed to the southern regions. The confluence
of the aforementioned situation with radical Islam, which espouses the
notion of an improved existence for those who become martyrs, serves
to elucidate the escalating levels of aggression in the Northern region.
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL … 155

According to official government statistics, the northern states exhibit

the highest percentage of individuals lacking formal education. Assuming
a correlation between a dearth of educational resources and subsequent
limited prospects, in conjunction with a disproportionate representation
of male youth within a given population. Under such circumstances, it
can be postulated that certain regions serve as a conducive environment
for the proliferation of terrorist activities.
The study hints to a link between the identified causes and the rise
in violence in Nigeria’s North East. Domestic insurgency, from Piazza’s
(2011) point of view, may be traced back to the economic hardships that
the poor face. The author argues that terrorism is carried perpetrated by
politically marginalised persons with little backing since there is no gener-
ally understood reason for it. Subnational organisations’ financial stability
may also be an important predictor of the probability of such assaults.
The author continues by arguing that states that provide legal protections
for majorities yet discriminate economically against minorities significantly
increase their risk of being targeted by domestic terrorists.
The insurgency in Nigeria’s northeastern area has been linked in part
to external influences. Scholars working within this theoretical frame-
work have hypothesised that Boko Haram’s growing operations and
international and domestic condemnation have prompted other insur-
gent groups, such as Al Shabab, Al Qaeda, and the Janjaweed, to lend
their support. According to Ousman, the development of Boko Haram is
attributable to both the worldwide replication of Islamic fundamentalism
and revolution and the leadership disputes inside Nigeria. Following the
introduction of democratic pluralism in 1999, this research examines the
growth of liberal Islamic groups in Nigeria. This change from Muslim
juntas in the northern region to Christian civilian administration ithe
South is a major threat to the Islamic movements (Ousman, 2004).
Numerous theoretical frameworks have been utilised by scholars to
elucidate the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, including the Relative
Deprivation Theory, Islamization Theory, and Elite Conspiracy Theory.
Despite these efforts, the group’s actions have persisted in confounding
all attempts at theoretical comprehension. This research employs the
concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) framework, as it focuses
on the global community’s efforts to safeguard non-combatant civilians.
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) emerged as a normative framework
for intervention in response to the growing emphasis on human security
within the global security architecture. This shift in focus occurred prior
156 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Cold
War and the division between the Western and Eastern blocs. The conclu-
sion of the Cold War has unquestionably altered the trajectory of violent
conflict, shifting the focus from inter-state to intra-state incidents, which
poses significant challenges for the populace. The instances of the Rwanda
genocide and the Kosovo killings have drawn significant criticism towards
the international community for their delayed and insufficient responses.
These events have led to a global consensus on the need for a sustainable
resolution to the humanitarian crisis. The International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established as a means to
address this issue. According to the ICISS report:

States have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens. When they
are unable or unwilling to do so, or when they deliberately terrorize
their citizens the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect. (ICISS, 2001: xi)

Although consent and the military intervention aspect of RtoP, in the

case of Nigeria, the President had no other option other than conceding
to a third party intervention to halt the senseless loss of human lives at
all cost. Additionally, within the framework of RtoP lies the responsibility
to react to humanitarian catastrophe, action to prevent such crises, and
more importantly, the commitment to rejig weak and authoritarian states.
Therefore, within this framework, the US and the international commu-
nity pledged their support to the Nigerian government in combating
the Boko Haram crisis. With the intent of reducing the humanitarian
catastrophe in the short run while setting up institutions that deter such
violence in the first place in the long run.

The Ethology of International

Community Response to the Boko
Haram Insurgency in Nigeria.
In August 2011, the Boko Haram extremist group launched an attack on
a United Nations facility located in Abuja, Nigeria. The attack resulted
in the loss of life among the commission’s personnel and caused signifi-
cant damage to the buildings. This act of violence can be interpreted as
an attempt by the group to instill fear and anxiety in both the Nigerian
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL … 157

populace and the global community. The Act in question has undoubt-
edly garnered the attention of the United States, a nation that has been
actively engaged in counterterrorism efforts across the African conti-
nent. The United States perceives a noteworthy security threat from
the escalating insurgency in Nigeria. Given these apprehensions, the
House Homeland Security Committee (HHSC) was tasked with assessing
the potential security ramifications of the Boko Haram insurgency. The
research conducted by the authors served as a catalyst for numerous
correspondences addressed to the Obama administration, as well as the
enactment of legislation that designated the organisation in question as
a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). This designation was based on
the perceived danger that the organisation poses to Nigeria and the global
community.
Consequently, the Boko Haram insurgency garnered significant atten-
tion from the United States Congress, resulting in multiple recommen-
dations and appeals for governmental intervention. Following a particular
dialogue, Abubakar Shekau, who is believed to be the leader of Boko
Haram, was officially outlawed and a monetary reward was offered for his
capture. On June 21, 2012, the Department of State designated Abubakar
Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barnawi as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) from Nigeria, in accordance with
Executive Order 13224. According to the proclamation, individuals who
are foreign nationals and demonstrate support or affiliation with foreign
terrorists are also susceptible to being designated as SDGTs. Despite the
dissenting views of certain Congressional members, the Department of
State (DOS) upheld its position that the designations of Boko Haram as
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group were sufficient,
and that the designation of specific individuals enabled the United States
to concentrate its efforts on those primarily responsible for extremist
violence and threats. According to Poling (2013: 78).
Several nations such as Italy, Germany, and Israel have expressed their
opposition to Boko Haram and demonstrated their support for the Nige-
rian government following the group’s acts of terrorism and the ensuing
strife. The Italian government extended its offer of protective services
to the government of the United States. In a meeting with Nigeria’s
Deputy Senate President Ike Ekweremadu, a special envoy of Italy’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Margherita Boniver, expressed Italy’s
intention to strengthen bilateral relations with Nigeria with the aim of
158 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

addressing issues such as terrorism, human trafficking, and poverty. Pres-

ident Jonathan reached out to the German government to solicit the
utilisation of German technology in the pursuit of the terrorist group,
as reported by Agande and Shaibu in 2012. Israel has provided Nigeria
with a guarantee of assistance in combating the terrorist organisation. The
confirmation of the aforementioned statement was made by Moshe Ram,
who serves as the ambassador of Israel to Nigeria, as reported by Fagbemi
in 2012.
On February 28, 2012, an agreement was signed between the Federal
government and Cameroonian authorities to establish a Trans-border
security team. This initiative was undertaken as a regional strategy to
mitigate the increasing incidence of Boko Haram activity. Mr. Olusegun
Ashiru, who holds the position of Ambassador, is the subject of discus-
sion. The foreign minister of Nigeria expressed a complete commitment
to the agreement and its objectives of promoting prosperity, peace, and
security for the citizens of both countries. Cameroon is expected to
exhibit a similar level of commitment. Authored by Onwubiko (2012).
The treaty was commended by Alhaji Amadou Ali, an official from
Cameroon, who acknowledged that it served as a testament to the
restored confidence between his nation and the United States, which was
achieved through continued negotiations and enhanced cooperation.
An agreement has been signed between Nigeria and the Niger
Republic to commence collaborative border patrols along their shared
borders with immediate effect. This initiative is aimed at mitigating the
impact of Boko Haram in both nations. Niamey, capital of the Republic
of Niger, was the site of the signing ceremony. After the Abuja attack
on the United Nations (UN) headquarters, Nigeria and Britain signed a
bilateral agreement. British Foreign Secretary William Hague has offered
assistance to Nigeria in the fight against terrorism. According to his state-
ment, the United Kingdom expressed its willingness to provide assistance
to the United Nations and Nigerian authorities in any feasible manner.
Bamgbose (2013) is a scholarly reference. France has also taken action by
organising a summit of significant stakeholders, which included President
Goodluck Jonathan and other francophone country leaders, to devise
strategies for addressing the insurgency in a manner that prevents its
escalation.
Additionally, the Chibok incident, wherein more than 200 girls were
kidnapped in Borno, represents a distinct stage of intervention that has
transitioned from reactive measures to preventive ones. This development
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL … 159

coincides with the United Nations Security Council’s official designation

of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation, and the subsequent inclusion
of the group’s leaders on the list of wanted individuals. The decision of
the United Nations Security Council to impose UN Sanctions, including
an arms embargo, asset freeze, and travel ban, on the terrorist organi-
sation was met with approval from all participating nations. It has been
asserted that authorization has been granted by the United States govern-
ment for the dispatch of a contingent of military advisors to Nigeria to
provide support to the local administration. There has been a call for
Congressional intervention in the form of deploying US Special Forces
personnel to rescue the abducted girls.
The United States has implemented a productive approach in the Bina-
tional Commission (BNC) as a means of pursuing long-term objectives.
The BNC was established with the aim of fostering increased bilateral
cooperation on a diverse range of issues that are of mutual significance.
During a meeting of the BNC’s regional security working group on
August 15, 2013, Secretary of State Wendy Sherman expressed that
although security measures are imperative, it may be essential to establish
a fresh social agreement with Nigerian citizens that includes an economic
recuperation plan as a supplementary approach to the government’s secu-
rity strategy in order to overcome Boko Haram (ICG, 2014). The United
Kingdom has pledged its steadfast assistance, thereby ensuring that the
United States is not operating in isolation. The Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom aims to enhance its
direct aid to the underprivileged in the Northern region through one of
the most significant development programmes. The primary objectives of
this initiative are to ameliorate the conditions of girls and women and to
support the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. In accor-
dance with the collaborative accord established in 2011, appointed judges
and their British counterparts would convene on a frequent basis to delib-
erate on tactics for addressing acts of terrorism. Enhanced collaboration
is being reinforced in the domains of legal decision-making and fair treat-
ment in relation to the prevention and management of acts of terrorism
(Ibid). The European Union’s allocation of e98 has enabled its partici-
pation in the efforts to combat corruption and organised crime, as well
as address the imperative for reform in the judicial system.
160 O. AFOLABI AND P. O. MARUMO

Conclusion
The effects of Boko haram’s fear and horror on Nigeria were evaluated,
as were the efforts of the Nigerian government and the international
community to prevent insurgency. Sunni Islam is the basis of Boko
Haram’s ideology, and the group’s stated goals include the creation of an
Islamic state in Nigeria and the elimination of all Western influence in the
country. Violent responses to these problems—religion, unemployment,
poverty, a lack of institutions, ethnicity, and societal frustration—lead to
insurgencies. As a result of insurgency, the economy declines, lives and
property are lost, foreign investment is discouraged, national unity is at
risk, etc. The government of Nigeria and other groups across the world
have worked hard to reduce the number of terrorist attacks and insurrec-
tions in the country. These include the designation of the sect’s leader
on global terror lists, joint border patrols and intelligence sharing, and
an intensification of socioeconomic cooperation by regional governments
and multilateral institutions.
In light of the above, the following suggestions are made: the Nige-
rian government and the international community should prevent Boko
Haram from making contact with potential sources of religious radical-
ization. Equally important is the efficient rollout of a poverty alleviation
and human needs-focused empowerment programme. The lives and well-
being of young Nigerians would greatly benefit from this. The govern-
ment should establish a robust channel for resolving disputes between
warring groups before they escalate into a full-blown crisis. In addition,
the government should make sure that the counterinsurgents have a fair
share of the country’s power, military, land reforms, finances, foreign
alliances, and organisational hierarchy. Finally, every act of insurrection
has to be met with a heavy hand by the law authorities.

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 From Regionalization of Peacekeeping
to the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
in Africa: The Gambia Experience

Ishaya Umaru Tanimu-Saminaka

and Fatima Favour-Tamar Tanimu

Introduction
When it comes to maintaining peace across Africa, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been a crucial actor
for many years. That ECOWAS was the first regional actor on the conti-
nent to launch a peacekeeping mission is supported by Akih’s (2020)
MSc dissertation. This occurred on August 7, 1990, when the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) was deployed into Liberia at the request of the
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), which had been estab-
lished to find a diplomatic solution to the civil conflict that had erupted
in Liberia in 1989. Nigeria’s support to the operation was substantial and
unsubtle at the same time.

I. U. Tanimu-Saminaka (B) · F. F.-T. Tanimu

The University of The Gambia, Serekunda, The Gambia
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 163

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_10
164 I. U. TANIMU-SAMINAKA AND F. F.-T. TANIMU

Like many other countries in the West African sub-regional belt,

The Gambia has been affected by wars, crises, and various forms of
warfare. African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West Africa
(ECOWAS) assistance was required following the post-election unrest in
2016. As a direct consequence, military forces from Nigeria, Senegal, and
Ghana were deployed there. Since the end of European domination in the
early 1960s, every part of Africa has struggled with a wide range of secu-
rity issues, and West Africa is no exception. This is where the intervention
force and peacemaking monitoring group (ECOMIG) comes in. Since
the 1990s, when the Cold War ended, Africa has seen a rise in violent
confrontations because of a lack of strategic interest from the world’s
superpowers. The strategic environment of the world has shifted drasti-
cally since the end of the Cold War. Despite the decline in the likelihood
of major power and regional conflicts, political fragmentation began to
define the security landscape. Many wars have sprung out in the Third
World, especially in West Africa, because of factors including poor leader-
ship. As a result of the violence and destruction caused by these wars, as
well as the apathy of the “big powers,” many people began to believe that
the problem was primarily one that could only be solved on the continent
of Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
sent in its intervention force, the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), to nations like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory
Coast.
Since its first intervention in Liberal in the 1990s, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has created a sophisti-
cated conflict management strategy to address the difficulties facing its
sphere of influence. The ECOWAS conflict management framework and
its implementation have been plagued by a number of difficulties, despite
the fact that this is an admirable endeavour by an African institution
to solve troublesome circumstances in the area. A number of difficul-
ties, such as ECOWAS’s lack of UN Security Council authorisation to
enforce peace, its indecisiveness, Nigeria’s charges of hegemony, and so
on, have surrounded the organization’s operations. The evolving char-
acter of conflicts in the region also calls for a reevaluation of the current
structure so that it can adapt to new and different threats.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the causes of the violence
that followed the presidential election in The Gambia, the regional
response to the crisis, and the implications of these developments for the
regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. The current intervention and
 FROM REGIONALIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING … 165

engagement of ECOWAS in the Gambia are evaluated in this article. First,

the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture is examined, and then the
organization’s activities in the Gambia are discussed. After that, it’ll look
at the interventions’ unresolved problems. Then, it will suggest a further
step. The study, which uses a qualitative methodology but is grounded
in a review of the existing literature, will be conducted in The Gambia
from October 2022 to June 2023, and the researchers will be well-versed
in the local issues and security concerns because they will have lived here
before.

Review of Related Literature

This work’s literature review sheds light on academic perspectives on the
post-election positioning of international organisations in The Gambia, as
well as ECOWAS’s efforts as a sub-regional actor in calming the security
crisis there through military intervention. There have been a couple of
published debates. To better understand why ECOWAS and other inter-
national organisations decided to intervene in Gambia from the start, this
work will examine a number of reports, collections of testimonies, and
major academic works by research scholars.
By critically evaluating some main drivers of conflict and violence and
how they effect the countries of the sub-region, I’d want to take this
occasion to briefly wet into ECOWAS’s stand in conflict management
and to register the problem of peace and security in West Africa. The
challenges of sub-regional imbalances and extractives, the difficulties of
managing competition for power, the need to reform the security sector,
and the weakness of institutions in regards to land management and elec-
tion anomalies are all examples of these drivers. The study delves into
how the sub-region, governed by ECOWAS, has become a leader on the
African continent in resolving regional conflicts, like the one in Gambia.
According to Reimann (2005), the term “conflict settlement” encom-
passes all conflict solutions that try to put a stop to direct violence
but do not address the root causes of the conflict. Thus, at its core,
conflict resolution is an integrative strategy that allows for the use of
any and all methods that are believed to be effective in ending the issue
at hand. The strategy incorporates every account, every statement, and
every action taken to address the situation. Burton (1968) disagrees with
these experts who favour more peaceful methods of resolving conflicts.
Particularly, his human-needs theory and his approach to problem-solving
166 I. U. TANIMU-SAMINAKA AND F. F.-T. TANIMU

and conflict resolution reveal his perspective (Burton, 1990). He sepa-

rates requirements, which are more or less innate, from interests, which
can be influenced by external factors. For him, it is important to consider
the other person’s desire for safety, fair treatment, and acknowledgement.
These principles are held to be irreducible because they are universal and
should not be suppressed. After this, the goal of conflict resolution shifts
from ending the conflict to making it non-violent.
In a similar vein, Paul D. Williams (2013) investigates what sparks civil
conflicts in Africa and how peacekeeping forces function on the conti-
nent. He researched the UN’s backing and the military contributions
of African nations. Williams describes more than fifty operations aimed
at bringing about peace through measures such as civilian protection,
conflict aversion, ceasefire enforcement, and the actualization of peace
treaties. ECOWAS’s role in resolving the crisis in Gambia was captured
in ten of the fifty peace operations that took place or are taking place
in West Africa. In light of the foregoing, it was noted that Kelman and
Fisher (2003) and Kriesberg (1998) contributed significant new insights
to this conversation. They believe that ways to resolving conflicts can help
parties find a way out of the destructive cycle of fighting and achieve a
compromise that works for everyone. Burton (1968) is arguably the most
well-known contributor to this field of study.
Article 58 of the Revised Treaty states that ECOWAS will “employ,
where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, meditation, and other
methods of peaceful settlement of disputes.” Article 4 of the Mecha-
nism establishes the responsibilities of the Authority of Heads of State
and Government, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), and the
ECOWAS Commission for the prevention, management, and resolution
of conflicts in West Africa through mediation. Current UN programmes
include preventive initiatives to avert electoral violence that possibly can
lead to civil conflicts, in coordination with regional organisations such
as ECOWAS and the Economic and Monetary Union of West African
Countries (UEMOA in French). Voter registration and the creation of
the electoral map are just two examples of the crucial pre-election activi-
ties that have been audited. In addition, UN-ECOWAS observation and
monitoring of the elections are crucial tools for preventing a resurgence
in civil unrest. The United Nations and the Economic Community of
West African States both played significant roles in overseeing elections in
Liberia after the country’s two violent civil wars. Furthermore, the 2016
presidential election in The Gambia is the most recent example of violence
 FROM REGIONALIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING … 167

after an election that will be explored later in this thesis. As stated in a

2016 report by Amnesty International, “the UN, AU, and ECOWAS also
undertook a joint mission to Banjul in May 2016 to assess compliance
with regional and sub-regional standards on elections, democracy, human
rights, and governance in the Gambia.” According to Amnesty Interna-
tional (2016). The report’s findings prompted alarm over the May 14 and
16, 2016, arrests of civilians and opposition figures. The three groups
demanded that The Gambia ensure favourable conditions for impartial
and reliable probes.
Finally, the study demonstrates ECOWAS’s commitment to its role as
the preeminent regional entity in West Africa in addressing the problem.
The group asserts that it restored democracy by acting in accordance
with its policies and making use of various mechanisms (which the union
itself developed over time). The report suggests a possible link to regional
cooperation, given the group’s belief that concerted effort is required to
restore peace in the country. ECOWAS uses this remark to emphasise that
the goal of its “peace efforts” is to ensure the safety of civilians across the
region, not only in The Gambia. All of this points to ECOWAS’s growth
as a regional entity concerned with maintaining stability. It was established
in 1977 (ECOWAS, 2017a, 2017b).

Gambia’s 2016 Election Crisis: A Brief Overview

The Gambia is a narrow peninsula bounded on three sides by Senegal,
which has the potential to impose an economic embargo and cut off
most imports. Senegalese officials warn that some Senegalese polit-
ical parties and civilians oppose this idea because they believe it will
harm regular Gambians and, in the long run, Senegalese enterprises.
According to political scientists, a constitutional crisis was sparked by the
2016 Gambia presidential elections for which When opposition candi-
date Adama Barrow was declared the winner in the national elections,
he bridged the gap between the Western style of democracy and the
longtime president (dictator) Yahya Jammeh, creating an unpredictable
scenario. Jammeh fled to Equatorial Guinea despite efforts and mili-
tary intervention by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).
According to records, Ad conceded loss early on, but he later chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the results at the Supreme Court. Naturally,
it declined to make a decision on the subject. Then he sent troops to
168 I. U. TANIMU-SAMINAKA AND F. F.-T. TANIMU

the country’s two largest cities, Banjul and Serekunda. Jammeh’s Alliance
for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction had a supermajority in the
National Assembly, therefore they were able to deploy emergency powers
to keep him in power for another term. That’s ridiculous! He has been
urged to step down to give peace a chance by the United Nations and the
Economic Community of West African States. When he refused to step
down and persisted on staying in office, ECOWAS invoked emergency
powers in the organization’s charter to send a military coalition from
Senegal, Nigeria, and Ghana to intervene in The Gambia. On January
19th, Jammeh was scheduled to depart. There was no resistance from the
National Army or the National Guard as ECOWAS troops entered the
country at the invitation of freshly minted president Barrow. They offi-
cially acknowledged Barrow as President, the Navy said. Jammeh fled to
Equatorial Guinea after ECOWAS troops arrived in Banjul on January 21.
On January 26, Barrow assumed the presidency of The Gambia.

The Post-Election Crisis in the Gambia

and Regional Efforts to Maintain Peace
With the declaration of a state of emergency and the deployment of Sene-
galese troops to the Gambian border on January 18th, the ECOWAS
military response to the post-election conflict was launched. This was
followed shortly thereafter by the swearing-in of active duty by the Nige-
rian Air Force and a ship from the Nigerian Navy. The Gambian Army
Chief, Ousman Badjie, reportedly declared on the same day that his
troops would not fight in the event of international intervention against
Jammeh after observing what was going on.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mili-
tary intervention in The Gambia, also known as the ECOWAS Mission
in The Gambia (abbreviated ECOMIG), was initially code-named Oper-
ation Restore Democracy. Banjul city hosted Nigerian, Senegalese, and
Ghanaian contingents, with Senegalese troops manning the presidency;
the North Bank Region hosted Ghanaian troops; while Serekunda and
Brikama in the South hosted Nigerian forces.
It was reported not long after the military entry in January 2017 that
residents, especially civilians, showed strong animosity of the deployment
of the ECOWAS peace-keeping force. The outcry against what the popu-
lace saw as an invasion by an alien power ultimately led to the deaths
of some ordinary citizens. Vice President Isatou Njie-Saidy resigned on
 FROM REGIONALIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING … 169

January 18th, not long after. As a result of the crisis, eight cabinet
members had already resigned at that time. Barrow’s spokeswoman Halifa
Sallah said Barrow would be sworn in at a secret location, but the opposi-
tion insisted on holding the ceremony at Banjul Mini-Stadium. It was
later revealed that his swearing-in ceremony would take place at the
Gambian embassy in Dakar, Republic of Senegal. Mauritania’s President,
Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz, attempted to get Jammeh to resign during
all of these proceedings, but was unsuccessful. And on the evening of the
19th of January, ECOWAS gave Jammeh till midnight to resign. Thus,
ECOWAS forces from adjacent nations like Senegal and Nigeria have
amassed along the border with Senegal, waiting for an ECOWAS order
to enter Gambia. Residents reported seeing Nigerian Air Force planes in
the sky above The Gambia. On 19 January 2017, right before the date-
line expired, Senegalese forces invaded the Gambia. On January 19th,
Botswana became the first nation to no longer recognise Yahya Jammeh
as President of the Gambia.
Senegalese armed forces entered The Gambia to impose the presidency
of Mr. Adama Barrow when it became clear that Barrow had been sworn
in as president of The Gambia at a ceremony in the embassy of The
Gambia in Dakar, Senegal, on 19 January 2017. The United Nations
Security Council swiftly voted to support Barrow and demand Jammeh’s
resignation. It supported ECOWAS’s attempts to ensure the results of the
2016 presidential election are respected, but favoured “political means
first” over a call for military intervention. A final attempt at mediation
by Senegal was put on hold, and the invasion was scheduled to begin at
noon on 20 January if Jammeh still refused to step down from power.
According to the Gambian Radio and Television Services (GRTS), Yahya
Jammeh fired the rest of his cabinet and declared he would replace them
the next day.
When Jammeh still didn’t resign when the deadline expired at noon,
and then again when it was extended until 16:00 GMT, things got
really chaotic. Mauritania’s President Mohamed Abdul Aziz, Guinea’s
President Alpha Conde, and the UN’s regional leader Mohammed Ibn
Chambas all tried to convince him to resign in light of the situation
and to prevent potential bloodshed. The Gambian Army’s commander,
Lieutenant General Ousman Badjie, has publicly declared his support for
President Barrow and promised that his troops will not participate in any
conflict with ECOWAS. Jammeh reportedly decided to resign and depart
the country, as reported by Barrow and a Senegalese official. Aziz, the
170 I. U. TANIMU-SAMINAKA AND F. F.-T. TANIMU

president of Mauritania, announced his resignation and departure from

the country later on.
On the morning of January 21st, many people breathed a sigh of relief
after Jammeh stated on state television (GRTS) that he was resigning as
President. The former president and military leader finally left the nation
later that day, fulfilling a dream for many Gambians. Jammeh declared a
state of emergency on January 24; the National Assembly quickly lifted it.
To keep the calm and allow Mr. Adama Barrow to return and solidify his
administration, ECOWAS stationed exactly 4000 troops in the Gambia.
Five days later, President Adama Barrow returned to The Gambia, asking
the ECOWAS forces (now numbering around 2500) to stay for at least
six months to assist him firmly establish order in the little inland republic
of Africa with a population of fewer than.

ECOWAS’s Military Intervention,

the People’s Reaction and Its Implications
ECOWAS declared on 21 January that roughly 4000 of its troops will
stay stationed in the country even after Yya Jamme left and was exiled to
Equatorial Guinean. This was done to provide enough peace and security
of life and property. President Barrow has asked for the military to remain
at strategic sites including the port and airport as well as the main crossing
points to Senegal for an additional six months. The Gambian presi-
dency therefore announced the extension of the mission’s mandate by
three additional months on 8 February 2017. Midway through February,
however, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo said that the country’s
contingent of stabilisation troops in the Gambia will be reduced from
100 to 50 personnel.
When news spread that on April 21, 2017, ECOWAS forces had shot
and injured three Gambian soldiers loyal to former leader Yahya Jammeh
while they stood watch over his grave, the hatred against ECOWAS troops
or ECOMIG only grew. An investigation has been launched after it was
revealed that a representative for the Gambia Armed Forces claimed there
had been some sort of misunderstanding. On June 2nd, the Gambian
government reported that 22 people had been arrested and that one
civilian had been murdered and two others had been injured during a
protest in Kanilai against ECOWAS forces. One person was reportedly
killed and nine others were injured by Senegalese soldiers on June 2,
2017, in Kanilai, after soldiers opened fire on protesters sporadically in
 FROM REGIONALIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING … 171

what they claimed was “self-defence” during a protest in which thousands

of people gathered to demonstrate against the heavy military presence in
their community. The previous president is a native of the Kanilai people.
On June 5, 2017, the ECOWAS military mission’s mandate was extended
by a year, and it has been subsequently extended to the present day.
Over half of Gambian citizens want ECOWAS forces to leave the nation,
suggesting public opinion is divided on their presence. President Barrow
has maintained that the Gambian people incur no costs due to the deploy-
ment of foreign troops because those troops are there to train and support
the Gambian military. For over six years, the ECOMIG military interven-
tion has held firm. Their continued presence is viewed as essential to the
safety and stability of the Gambian government and population at this
time.

Conclusion & Recommendation

This research shows that ECOWAS can protect its member states from
external challenges to democracy and peace by using mediatory diplomacy
to maintain peaceful and prosperous governments in the face of external
coercion.
When people in the ECOWAS region no longer feared about their
safety or their possessions, the organisation had succeeded in its mission.
In addition, “the dignity, respect, security, and rights of former President
Jammeh” are protected by the most recent accord. In Africa, working
together for a common goal is a powerful force. When they insisted that
the democratically elected president be sworn in, the AU and ECOWAS
were on the correct track. Barrow’s continued rule required a combina-
tion of military strength and strategic diplomacy. Even if marbles were
used, it would be hard to discredit the results of the just ended general
elections in The Gambia. Obviously, Gambians voted in December 2016
using real marbles, and Jammeh still lost.
This reflected the people’s desire to pursue democratisation through
peaceful means. Mr. Barrow himself was propelled to power by populist
rhetoric, promising to uphold the rule of law and protect the rights of
the individual, the press, civil society, and the press. Let’s watch and see
what happens. According to the findings, the ECOMIG needs to stay in
place until there is lasting peace and stability in the country. All member
states must meet their financial commitments.
172 I. U. TANIMU-SAMINAKA AND F. F.-T. TANIMU

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 The Responsibility to Protect in American
Foreign Policy Towards Africa

Christophe Dongmo

Introduction
The Responsbility to Protect (R2P) refers to the set of principles that
the United Nations General Assembly endorsed unanimously in 2005. It
describes how the international community should react to the horror
of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes.1
This scheme represents a solemn commitment to protect civilians and
includes legitimate expectations of a world free of international crimes.
The principe rests upon three interlocking pillars: the responsibility of
foreign states to assist others in protecting their populations; the respon-
sibility of the international community to protect civilians when a State

1 Evans, G. (2019). The Responsibility to Protect in Africa. Address to Mark Africa Day
2019. Australian National University. Retrieved from https://www.gevans.org/speeches/
Speech695.html. Accessed 20 May 2023.

C. Dongmo (B)
Leiden University African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 173

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_11
174 C. DONGMO

fails manifestly to protect its populations; and the responsibility of each

State to protect its populations.2
The current range and intensity of humanitarian crises in Africa
justify further research on American foreign relations with regard to the
Responsbility to Protect. Across Africa, the besieging of civilian commu-
nities and the denial of humanitarian relief are common. There has been
a widespread disregard for human rights and international law of armed
conflicts. In many of the past and ongoing wars (CAR, Cameroon,
Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Sudan), parties to the conflict are
consciously violating international humanitarian law. How has the U.S.
balanced its national and strategic interests in this part of the globe in the
face of human rights violations and the protection of civilians?
Referring to American foreign relations, the starting assumptions of
this paper are that the protection of civilians must be identified as a key
priority in any peacekeeping mission from the very earliest stage; and that
states that disregard their responsibility to protect their populations repre-
sent one of the greatest threats to human rights. Likewise, for generations,
the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of
global security and as an advocate for human rights. Mindful of the risks
and costs of military action, the country is naturally reluctant to use force
to solve the world’s many challenges. However, when its interests and
values are at stake, it has a responsibility to act.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that American intervention
in Africa presented U.S. diplomacy with a variety of difficult operational
challenges as it tried to bring peace to a continent ravaged by political
decay, socio-economic disintegration, natural, and man-made disasters. In
other words, the U.S. intervention provides an informed opinion on the
Right to Protect (R2P) Doctrine and the influence of U.S. foreign policy
in the post-Cold War world.
As for methodology, it is primarily descriptive. By analysing American
foreign policy in Africa, the essay gives way to an empirical perspec-
tive on recent trends on the treatment of the Responsibility to Protect.
Content analyses also derive from international relations scholarship,
international humanitarian law and international human rights agencies’
reports. Through non-probability or purposive sampling, primary and
secondary sources are selected based on their analytic importance and

2 Šimonović, I. (2016). The Responsibility to Protect. Human Rights. 4 (LIII).

 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 175

relevance for the development of concepts on R2P and humanitrarian

interventions.
The paper argues that the implementation of R2P in U.S. foreign
policy translates the commitment to eliminating terrorism and the threat
it poses to the protection of civilians across Africa. Broadly speaking, the
R2P scheme reflects America’s recognition of its common humanity and
a new clarity in its collective conscience that certain actions could not be
allowed to stand. While aspects of the R2P would need to be elaborated
further, the U.S. has embraced a principle of protection anchored in four
pillars: America’s obligations to the world, States responsibility to protect
their own citizens, its shared responsibility to take appropriate steps to
assist States in human rights promotion and protection, and its prepared-
ness to take decisive action where national authorities manifestly failed to
do so.
To map out my arguments, I present my argument into two parts.
The first provides a literature review on American foreign policy towards
Africa. Second, I analyse R2P and the making of U.S. foreign policy
in Africa. Here, I refer to the temporary protected status to Cameroon
citizens, the NATO-led military intervention in Libya during the 2011
Arab Spring, and the strategic relevance of U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM).

Literature Review on U.S.

Foreign Policy Towards Africa
An insight into American foreign policy ideology informs our under-
standing of that country’s use of the Responsibility to Protect towards
Africa. At the outset, from the eighteenth century down to the present
day, iIdeology has always shaped American foreign policy. That ideology
is based on artifacts such as the hostility towards social revolutions, the
conception of national mission, and the racial classification of peoples.
In Ideology in US foreign policy (1987), Michael Hunt discusses the
genesis of ideology in American diplomacy. He demonstrates that it
emerged from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this seminal
work, critique and analysis on the relationship between ideology and
the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, Hunt describes three basic compo-
nents thereof: America’s vision of national greatness; its propensity to
view the world’s population in a hierarchy of race (and later culture as
176 C. DONGMO

its substitute); and the country’s disappointment against the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries failed revolutions (Gaddis, 1972; Holm, 2013).
Africa received less attention from the United States until after World
War II. It was still what Henry M. Stanley (1878) described as the “dark
continent.” By the time the Marshall Plan was unveiled in June 05,
1947, most people were still unaware of the Continent and it’s rapidly
changing political, economic, and social conditions. As the post-World
War II president (1945–1953), Harry S. Truman’s powerful rhetoric,
however, ignored the situation of “forgotten” areas such as Africa that
were under European domination. The Truman Doctrine did not contain
any commitment to assist Africa either economically or politically.
In the aftermath of World War II, new elements provide grounds for
the consideration of American position vis-à-vis the pursuit of colonial
imperialism in Africa: an active involvement with international organisa-
tions, the fight against international Communism, the contribution of
slavery to the agricultural, industrial and economic development of the
United States, the civil rights movements and the legacy of the Black
continent, as well as American expanding strategic and economic inter-
ests in colonial territories. Put differently, Africa’s future was a matter of
vital concern to the United States.
Social sciences scholarship has examined the evidence surrounding
the rise and fall of the Responsbility to Protect policies during the first
Bill Clinton Administration, 1993–1997. The striking issue coalesces
around the abandonment of its previously favoured policy platform
of humanitarian multilateralism. Leonie Murray’s Clinton, peacekeeping
and humanitarian interventionism (2008) fills a literature gap on the
1990s events about humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping policy, the
Rwandan genocide, U.S. policy in Africa, and the global peacekeeping
debates in American diplomacy. Muray’s conclusions about the passivity
of the United States and of the international community during Rwandan
Genocide are of particular note in America’s departure from the accepted
wisdom on the subject.
Over the years, U.S. policy towards Africa has been affected by
America’s relations with the Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East,
and China. Herman J. Cohen, former U.S. ambassador to Senegal/The
Gambia and Assistant Secretary of State for Africa under George H. W.
Bush, provides a comprehensive analysis of several decades of American
diplomacy towards Africa across successive presidencies, from Franklin
D. Roosevelt (1933–1945) to Donald Trump (2017–2021). Beginning
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 177

with Roosevelt’s third term in office, Cohen traces, in U.S. Policy toward
Africa: eight decades of realpolitik, how this policy has evolved across
successive administrations since 1942. His narrative reveals the influ-
ences of personalities, ideology, circumstances, and the reliance of Western
economic interests on the continent’s natural resources in the formulation
and implementation of US foreign policy towards Africa.
Race has always been a social determinant for the analysis of Amer-
ican foreign policy towards Africa. In Holding the line, George White,
Jr. (2005) explores the malleability of race in American culture and
diplomacy. Referring to the Eisenhower administration, he reviews the
impacts of America’s racialised orientations, fears, and desires, and how
they turned the Cold War into a global sanctuary for the rehabilita-
tion of Whiteness. Based on America’s relations with Ghana, Ethiopia,
the Congo, and South Africa, White (2005) shows that race had the
power to influence perception and to severely limit the parameters and
possibilities of humanitrian interventions. As such, White (2005) uses
“whiteness” to demonstrate the extent to which these rules undercut
racial equality in the United States and the fight for political and economic
independence in Africa. In African Americans in U.S. foreign policy, Linda
Heywood et al’s. (2015) arrived at similar conclusions through an anal-
ysis of historical archives, memoirs of policymakers, letters, speeches, and
diaries.3
International relations scholars have analysed America’s Responsibility
to Protect in Africa through the origins and foundational logic of Amer-
ica’s post-war order-building project—advancing ideas about “liberal
hegemony” and “constitutional order.” Further, they have reflected on
its evolving character in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the post-9/
2011 threat of the war against terrorism. In Liberal order and impe-
rial ambition, John Ikenberry (2006) explored the theoretical, historical,
and foreign policy implications of American power and postwar order.
During the past 60 years, Ikenberry argues, “the United States has
constructed a distinctive and remarkably durable international order orga-
nized around open markets, international institutions, and cooperative
security.”Multilateral institutions played a relevant role in this process.

3 See also Skinner, E. P. (1992). African Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Africa,
1850–1924: In Defense of Black Nationality. Howard University Press; Ledwidge, M.
(2012). Race and US Foreign Policy: The African-American foreign Affairs Network.
Routledge.
178 C. DONGMO

That gave other states a stake in its success and to the U.S.’s willingness
to play by common rules. Following the evolution of liberal interna-
tionalism, Ikenbery (2006) drew a distinction between Wilsonianism and
successive foreign policies, including Cold War globalism and the Bush’s
administration policies.4
Whenever crimes against humanity are committed, the U.S. has a moral
obligation to intervene and protect civilians. This entails that victims’
human rights outweigh the sovereignty claims of states that engage in
or allow gross human rights abuses against civilians. In International
responses to mass atrocities in Africa, Kurt Mills (2015) critically discusses
the possibilities for the international community to respond to human-
itarian crises and develops a cartography of humanitarian responses—in
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Darfur—.
Mills investigates the limitations of America’s humanitarian interventions,
and calls for a timely and thoughtful implementation of these atrocities.
Referring to the application of the Responsibility to Protect in Africa,
the core question is whether international actors like the U.S. meet their
objectives in a mutually supportive way—and what the trade-offs in using
one or more of these responses are.
Social sciences scholarship has analysed the moral complexity of Amer-
ica’s statecraft when confronted with situations of gross human rights
violations against civilians. Cathinka Vik (2020) uses comparative case
studies of American foreign relations to this effect: Bill Clinton and
the failure to intervene in the Rwanda genocide (1994), George W.
Bush administration’s counterproductive response to the Darfur atrocities
(2003–2007), and Barack Obama administration’s leadership behind the
U.N. intervention in Libya (2011). In Moral responsibility, statecraft and
humanitarian intervention, Vik (2020) discusses the moral complexity of
statecraft in the context of decision-making on humanitarian interventions
in the post-Cold War era and explores the domestic and international
factors that influence decision-making about the Responsibility to Protect
in U.S. foreign relations. The Gjovik University College (Norway) scholar
demonstrates that international moral concerns balance different moral
responsibilities and compete with interest-based and domestic concerns;

4 Finnemore, M. (2006, November/December). Book Review of Liberal Order and

Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and International Order by G. John
Ikenberry. Foreign Affairs.
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 179

and that policy-makers are often confronted by competing moral impera-

tives.
The Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Erythrea, Somalia) is an area
where American policy makers have regurlaly tested the Responsibility
to Protect doctrine. The ongoing conflicts in the area may ignite a
larger regional war because Islamists in Somalia and Tigray separatists
in Ethiopia may harbour terrorists. In the Horn of Africa, insecurity
and state fragility both create opportunities to increase conflict between
warring forces to the detriment of civilians. Regional conflicts have fed
authoritarian regimes and failed states. In Ethiopia, there is an ongoing
war between the government and Tigray’s rebels. Likewise, Eritrea is
more despotic. Using Ethiopia and Somalia as case studies, Donna R.
Jackson (2017) situates the particularities of the Horn of Africa within
the broader dimensions of colonialism, Cold War, and terrorism to discuss
American foreign relations towards that region between 1945 and 1991.
She evaluates the decision-making process during the Cold War, and the
impacts of these decisions upon subsequent developments.
In the same line of thought, Terrence Lyons (2006) offers, in Avoiding
conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea,
a comprehensive review of what he describes as as “a neglected part
of the world” and suggests what the United States can do to address
the multiple challenges to stability and peace. He proposes that “[T]he
United States should vigorously support both increased aid and a regional
military presence to promote order in Somalia, which has suffered nearly
two decades of anarchy.” On these grounds, Lyons (2006) suggests
that “The United States will need to move quickly to implement a new
strategy for resolving, or at least reducing, the Ethiopia-Eritrea tension”
and reinvigorate multi-lateral diplomatic peacemaking efforts across the
Horn of Africa. In other words, Lyons concludes, to the extent that this
is a struggle between different groups within Somalia for political power,
the U.S. “should try to disentangle some of the regional and external
dimensions from the internal Somali dimensions.”5

5 See also Strategy for Peace Conference. (1991, October 24). Changing Realities in the
Horn of Africa: Implications for Africa and US Policy: Report of the Thirty-Second Strategy
for Peace, US Foreign Policy Conference. 32 (Warrenton). Nomsa Daniels (rapporteur).
Stanley Foundation; Woodward, P. (2006). US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa.
Ashgate.
180 C. DONGMO

Literature on U.S. foreign relations to Africa is abundant. They cover a

wide range of issues such as the role of ideology, the dilemma of powerful
states pertaining to the divide between sovereignty and nonintervention,
the pursuit of colonial imperialism in Africa after World War II, and the
abandonment of its previously favoured policy platform of humanitarian
multilateralism (especially in the early 1990s during Bill Clinton). Other
core issues that scholarship on U.S. policy towards Africa covers refer
to the influence of America’s relations with the Soviet Union, Europe,
the Middle East, and China, the impact of race as a social determinant,
the origins and foundational logic of America’s post-war order-building
project—advancing ideas about “liberal hegemony” and “constitutional
order,” and the moral complexity of America’s statecraft when confronted
with situations of gross human rights violations against civilians. However,
studies that specifically analyse the critical impacts of the Responsbility to
Protect with specific reference to recent initiatives dictated by the growth
of American interests in Africa dictated- are rather limited. This essay aims
at covering that gap in social sciences scholarship.

Responsibility to Protect and the Making

of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa
In the aftermath of the coming to force of the Responsibility to protect
in 2005, the U.S. took some steps to promote the doctrine in its African
foreign policy as a means of protecting civilians against international
crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. Without being
exhaustive, the most prominent thereof are the temporary protected
status to Cameroon citizens; the military intervention in Libya during
the Arab Spring; and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Temporary Protected Status to Cameroon Nationals

American foreign relations towards Africa has long used the “Tempo-
rary protected status” (TPS) as a humanitarian solution for migrants who
are unable to return home safely. As part of the Immigration Act of
1990, Congress established TPS to provide humanitarian relief to citi-
zens whose countries were suffering from natural disasters, protracted
unrest, or conflict. Since 1990, TPS has allowed migrants from countries
with unsafe conditions to reside and work legally in the United States.
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 181

Today, nearly 355,000 TPS holders live in the country (Roy & Klobucista,
2023).
Generally, the U.S. grants Temporary Protected Status in three circum-
stances: environmental disasters, extraordinary and temporary conditions.
The deteriorating conditions in Cameroon made return dangerous and
warranted immediate humanitarian protection for Cameroon nationals
residing in the United States. Cameroon, especially, was grappling
with multiple humanitarian crises—including an armed conflict—that
have increased insecurity, destabilized the nation, and caused its people
immense suffering (OCHA, 2021). Reports indicated that current U.S.
asylum policies have failed to provide Cameroonians with due process
when seeking asylum. In the past, several Cameroonians have suffered
ill treatment and abuse in immigration detention centres. They faced
discrimination because of their race, forcing many to return to a country
where they faced grave harm and persecution. In march 2022, the Center
for American Progress estimated that there were up to 40,000 noncit-
izen Cameroonians living in the United States—32,700 adults and 7300
children—who could be made eligible for protection by a TPS designa-
tion (Mathema & Zefitret Abera Molla, 2022). For Cameroon nationals
residing in the U.S., there was a growing evidence that returning home
meant risking persecution, detention, torture, mass displacement.
In April 2022, the United States Department of Homeland Security
extended the TPS to Cameroon nationals. This provision benefited those
residing in the U.S. at the time and who could not safely return to their
home country due to the ongoing violence from government forces and
armed groups—the “Ambazonia” armed conflict. Valid for 18 months,
that special status offered the possibility to Cameroonian nationals, who
have continuously resided in the United States since April 14, 2022 and
with a continuous physical presence since June 7, 2022, to apply for polit-
ical asylum. The TPS was extended through December 7, 2023; and the
registration period set from June 7, 2022 to December 7, 2023. Further,
for Washington, granting TPS protection to Cameroon nationals was a
recognition of the seriousness of the security situation prevailing in that
country.
America’s protection of Cameroon citizens endorsed the Responsibility
to Protect doctrine, as the Temporary protected status offered a statu-
tory protection to civilians affected by an internal conflict that erupted
in November 2016. In a statement, Alejandro Mayorkas, Homeland
Security Secretary, referred to the various types of “extreme violence”
182 C. DONGMO

that Cameroonians were currently experiencing at the helms of armed

separatist groups, Boko Haram terrorists, and the government army
(Department of Homeland Security, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).
Deported Cameroonian citizens/asylum seekers faced post-return
harm and torture once rapatriated to their home country. It transpires
from the HRW report that “Cameroonian authorities have, between
2019 and 2021, subjected returned deportees and members of their fami-
lies to serious human rights violations including rape, torture and other
physical abuse, arbitrary arrest and detention, inhuman and degrading
treatment in detention, extortion, and threats. Perpetrators included
police, gendarmes, and military personnel, among other officials and state
agents”; that “[A]rmed separatists also beat at least one deported person
and threatened the relatives of others”; and that “government forces
detained or imprisoned at least 39 deported people after return.”
Despite the deteriorating security situation in Cameroon during the
Donald Trump administration, U.S. courts have steadily reduced the
number of asylums granted to Cameroonian applicants, which fell by 24
per cent between 2019 and 2020 (RFI, 2022). In the end, the April 2022
temporary protection will protect thousands of Cameroonians in the U.S.
Even if they are not granted asylum, they will not be sent back to their
country of origin.
In February 2021, at the start of President Joe Biden’s presidency,
the U.S took urgent action to protect Cameroonian civilians. Following
an outcry by human rights activists, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement halted a planned deportation flight to Cameroon and rights
groups in order “to cancel the flight to allow any potential victims or
witnesses an opportunity to be interviewed” and “conduct an agency
review of recent use-of-force reports related to individuals”, and “issue
any additional guidance or training as deemed necessary.” In spite of this
positive step, deportations to Cameroon resumed in October 2021.

Military Intervention in Libya’s Arab Spring

As a global power, the United States made use of the Responsibility
to Protect during the 2011 power change in Libya. On February 23,
2011, Barack Obama clearly announced that the United States “strongly
supports the universal rights of the Libyan people.” These non nego-
tiable rights included “the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 183

the ability of the Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are
human rights.”
Of the four foreign states conducting strikes in Libya, the United
States was the most transparent about its operations. The U.S. was drawn
into the NATO intervention in 2011 by international pressure to protect
civilians in Libya. Its armed forces participated in an aggressive aerial
campaign against the Gaddafi regime. America’s involvement in estab-
lishing a no-fly zone in Libya was a political decision against an African
state. On March 10, 2011, the UN Security Council authorised member
states to take the necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya from
attacks by forces loyal to Muammar Qaddafi, including the establishment
of a no-fly zone. Resolution 1973 (2011) formed the legal basis for the
intervention of foreign forces into Libya. Ten countries adopted the reso-
lution and five abstained (China, Russia, Brazil, Germany and India). The
resolution complied with Article 42, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The
purpose of the no fly zone was to control access and monitor Libya’s
airspace (Droz, 2011).
There were allegations of the involvement of American drones against
Libya’s strikes and Qaddafi’s assassination in 2011. The U.S. carried out
a total of 145 “Predator strikes.” (Griffin/The Associated Press, 2015).
An American official reported that the drone, along with a French fighter
jet, fired on the “large convoy” leaving Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte.
Ealier, a French defence official declared that “about 80 vehicles were
in the convoy” and that “the strike did not destroy the convoy but
that fighters on the ground afterward intercepted the vehicle carrying
Qaddafi.” (Mardell, 2011). However, Obama and other officials did not
elaborate further on the circumstances of Qaddafi’s death. Jay Carney,
White House Press Secretary, simply argued that the U.S. and NATO
actions helped Libyans reach this point (Griffin/The Associated Press,
2015).
On March 28, 2011, during his “Address to the Nation on Libya,”
Barack Obama declared that he authorized military action to enforce
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973:

Confronted by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis,

I ordered warships into the Mediterranean. European allies declared their
willingness to commit resources to stop the killing. The Libyan opposition
and the Arab League appealed to the world to save lives in Libya. And
so at my direction, America led an effort with our allies at the United
184 C. DONGMO

Nations Security Council to pass a historic resolution that authorized a no-

fly zone to stop the regime’s attacks from the air, and further authorized
all necessary measures to protect the Libyan people… It was not in our
national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen. And so
nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I
authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1973...To summarize, then: In just one month, the
United States has worked with our international partners to mobilize a
broad coalition, secure an international mandate to protect civilians, stop
an advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a no-fly zone with our
allies and partners. To lend some perspective on how rapidly this military
and diplomatic response came together, when people were being brutalized
in Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community more than a
year to intervene with air power to protect civilians. It took us 31 days.6
Moreover, America has an important strategic interest in preventing
Qaddafi from overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would have
driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting
enormous strains on the peaceful—yet fragile—transitions in Egypt and
Tunisia. The democratic impulses that are dawning across the region
would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders
concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power. The writ of
the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little
more than empty words, crippling that institution’s future credibility to
uphold global peace and security. So while I will never minimize the costs
involved in military action, I am convinced that a failure to act in Libya
would have carried a far greater price for America. The task that I assigned
our forces—to protect the Libyan people from immediate danger, and to
establish a no-fly zone—carries with it a U.N. mandate and international
support. It’s also what the Libyan opposition asked us to do. If we tried
to overthrow Qaddafi by force, our coalition would splinter. We would
likely have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish that mission,
or risk killing many civilians from the air. The dangers faced by our men
and women in uniform would be far greater. So would the costs and our
share of the responsibility for what comes next.

In a nutshell, Gaddafi’s death was a relief to Obama’s administration.

Despite a brief rehabilitation when he chose to be on America’s side

6 U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2011, March 28). Remarks by the
President in Address to the Nation on Libya. UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011)
UN Doc S/PV/6531, 15. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya. Accessed 16 May 2023.
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 185

during George W. Bush’s war on terror in the early 2000s, most U.S.
foreign relations stakeholders associated him with the 1986 Lockerbie
bomb (Mardell, 2011). Referring to a special mission that started in
March 2011, Obama described the fall of the Qaddafi power structure
as the conclusion of a “long and painful chapter” for Libyans: “Today we
can definitively say that the Qaddafi regime has come to an end…This is a
momentous day in the history of Libya.” Praising the merits of collective
action in American foreign relations, Obama contended that the country
achieved its objectives without putting any single service member on the
ground.
The U.S. kept a strategic presence in Libya even in the the aftermath of
Qaddaffi, theoretically to support Libya in forming a civilian-led unified
military capable of protecting their sovereignty and stability. General
Michael Langley, AFRICOM commander since August 9, 2022, made
such commitments when he met with joint Libyan military consortium
of General Nadhuri during the African Chiefs of Defense Conference in
Italy on March 2, 2023. The deteriorating regional security situation in
Libya lent more importance than ever to diplomacy, defense, and devel-
opment. Likewise, during Operation Odyssey Lightning in December
2016, AFRICOM and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),
based in North Carolina, carried out precision air strikes to support the
Libyan government aligned forces against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) targets in Sirte in their successful effort to drive ISIS out
of Libya. Barack Obama authorised the operation, which was launched
with the support of Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)—the
current U.N.- and U.S.-backed government that came into existence after
extensive political negotiations in December 2015.
The U.S. military operation in Libya liberated Sirte from ISIS in an
operation that lasted from August 1, 2016 until December 19, 2016.
Like “Operation Inherent Resolve,” “Odyssey Lightning” demonstrates
the commitment of the U.S. and regional partner nations to eliminating
terrorism and the threat it poses to the protection of civilians and the
international community (Snow, 2017). The United States was among
the nations that continued to conduct airstrikes in Libya against ISIS
and al-Qaeda. According to other reliable sources, the United States
has conducted 524 strikes on militant targets in Libya since the NATO
intervention, primarily at Sirte during 2016, which according to Libyan
reports resulted in 10–20 civilian fatalities, based on the minimum and
maximum estimates (Bergen & Sims, 2018).
186 C. DONGMO

The Strategic Relevance of the U.S. Africa Command

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) plays a strategic role in the
implementation of America’s Responsibility to Protect. It is responsible
for all U.S. military operations as well as security cooperation and crisis
response in Africa. The US-Africa relations have accelerated with the acti-
vation of this framework. George W. Bush initially established AFRICOM
on February 6, 2007. However, in October 2008, the scheme took shape
and officially became a separate combatant command within America’s
defence apparatus. AFRICOM reawakened the historical memory of the
role of the armed forces in Africa during the colonial era as well as under
post-colonial military regimes (Munson, 2010: 6).
Prior to the formal establishment of the AFRICOM, there was
a controversy over the true American intentions to establish military
bases in Africa. For others, the command structure aimed at strategi-
cally strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities, which have been
underway since 1996. The official American explanations contend that
AFRICOM serves African interests in order to better defend those of the
United States on the continent (Fogue Tedom, 2011). The establishment
of AFRICOM followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a US-led coalition
and the expansion of the global war on terror in the Sahel, East Africa,
Horn of Africa, and the Middle East.
Considered to be a breeding ground for international terrorism,
AFRICOM is the object of particular attention in American foreign
relations towards Africa. Insofar as it was born in a particular strategic
environment, this structure is framed by a new doctrine that puts more
emphasis on conflict prevention and the protection of civilians during
armed conflicts. Therefore, in its regular activities, AFRICOM focuses
on building the capacity of African armies. The official objective of this
effort is to enable African states to ensure their own security in the face
of new threats (Foumane, 2012).
American foreign policy also intervenes in Africa’s military and security
assistance. Through the United States Africa Command (USA FRICOM)
and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the United
States provides security assistance to allies and partners in Africa in the
areas of military equipment, materiel and training. These actions and
programmes include human rights; women, peace and security (WPS);
maritime security; intelligence capabilities; health security; and logistics
and maintenance capabilities. The Department of Defense also works with
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 187

African partners to improve cybersecurity and secure the exchange of

cyber information through pan-African, multilateral and bilateral engage-
ments. Under the Biden-Harris administration, USAFRICOM invested
nearly $250 million in security assistance resources across the continent
(U.S. White House, 2022).
Across Africa, AFRICOM contributes to the eradication of terrorism
and cross-border crime in all its forms. The U.S. implements primarily this
strategic vision for the countries of the Sahel-Saharan zone, Maghreb, the
Horn of Africa, and their closest neighbours. In May 2010, around 1200
American, European and African soldiers took part in a joint exercise in
the Sahara. Labelled “Flintlock 10”, the aim thereof was to strengthen
the capabilities of the armies involved in the fight against Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (Naudé, 2010; U.S. White House, 2022).
AFRICOM is the result of an internal reorganisation of U.S. command
structures that the growth of American interests in Africa dictated. The
increase of U.S. priorities on the continent stems from several factors.
The first is the development of a U.S.- Africa policy with a predominantly
economic focus, that the Bill Clinton administration initiated in 1993
(Fogue Tedom, 2011). In January 2001, the G. W. Bush administration
actively nurtured the said policy. The second concerns the attacks of 11
September 2001, which brought to the fore America’s dependence on
other countries. The second concerns the attacks of 11 September 2001,
which revealed to the United States its high degree of energy dependence
on a hostile Middle East. The third concerns the re-examination of Amer-
ican energy policy. It led Washington to make “Black Africa” its reverse
ally in its relationship with the Middle East. With this transformation,
Africa is gaining strategic importance in the security of the United States.
Indeed, part of its security is now at stake (Fogue Tedom, 2011).

Concluding thoughts
The United States claims to be a strong supporter of the Responsi-
bility to Protect doctrine. The Presidential Study Directive 10 (PSD-10)
is a relevant instrument in America’s Responsibility to Protect archi-
tecture. Obama issued this scheme on August 2011. Barack Obama’s
policy indicated that the prevention of political violence would be a
key focus of American foreign policy: “We are making sure that the
United States government has the structures, the mechanisms to better
188 C. DONGMO

prevent and respond to mass atrocities.”7 As such, American diplomacy

pledged “to be committed to working with international partners at the
Human Rights Council to focus on pillar two, prevention and capacity
building, in order to develop more effective strategies to protect popu-
lations from atrocities.”8 In August 2012, President Barrack Obama
affirmed that “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national
security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.” He
directed a government-wide review of U.S. ability to prevent and respond
to mass atrocities and mandated the creation of an Atrocity Prevention
Board (APB), a White House-led initiative that would make the deter-
rence of genocide and mass atrocities “a core national security interest
and core moral responsibility.” It was officially formed on April 23, 2012
(Abrams, 2015; Claes, 2012; Finkel, 2014; Wolf, 2014).
Since the beginning of the Biden-Harris administration, the United
States has taken steps in support of peace, security, democracy, human
rights and governance in Africa. Under this scheme, the U.S. expects
to build the military capacity of African partners; advance the goals of
women, peace and security; increase African institutional capacity; support
democratic transitions and institutions; support peacekeeping efforts;
promote gender quality, human rights, and the rule of law; empower civil
society; and strengthen accountability mechanisms (U.S. White House,
2022). Biden has strengthened its Responsibility to Protect through the
“U.S. Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities.” In this
first-ever Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities, the
U.S. committed to applying government-wide tools to identify, prevent,
and respond to early warning signs of atrocities as part of core national
security interests. It also expanded American actions with international
partners and civil society, including through preventive diplomacy to deter
violence, foreign assistance programmes that help address underlying
grievances and advance reconciliation and transitional justice. The scheme
extended to defence assistance and security cooperation to strengthen

7 Malknecht, A., & Norris, J. (2013, June 13). Atrocities Prevention Board. Background,
Performance, and Options. Centre for American Progress; Feinstein, L., & Lindberg, T.
(2015, September 11). Arresting Atrocity. Foreign Affairs.
8 U.S. Mission to International Organisations in Geneva. (2012, June 19). The
U.S. Strongly Supports the Concept of Responsbility to Protect (R2P). Retrieved
at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/06/19/the-u-s-strong-supporter-of-the-concept-
of-responsibility-to-protect-r2p/. Accessed 20 May 2023.
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN … 189

institutions and promote democracy, transparency and respect for human

rights (U.S. White House, 2022).
In the final analysis, America stands as a strong Responsibility to
Protect supporter. The county is committed to working with interna-
tional partners to focus on prevention and capacity building, in order to
develop more effective strategies to protect civilians from atrocities. For
instance, in August 2011, President Barack Obama affirmed that “pre-
venting mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest
and a core moral responsibility of the United States.” In so doing, Obama
directed a government-wide review of U.S. ability to prevent and respond
to mass atrocities and mandated creation of a new Atrocity Prevention
Board to coordinate America’s internal efforts pertaining thereto. The
Obama’s initiative underscored the importance of international collabora-
tion to develop more effective strategies for prevention and preparedness,
so that planning and diplomacy became tools to prevent atrocities, not
just to respond to them.9
In American diplomacy, and for other global powers, implementing
R2P faces political, institutional, and operational challenges. Prevailing
challenges include expanding the set of tools for policymakers, supporting
justice and accountability mechanisms, and narrowing the gap between
warning and responses. Evolving U.S. and global institutions present
new but uncertain opportunities for addressing mass atrocities. Madeleine
Albright and Richard Williamson (2013) examine the R2P, the emerging
political norm that aims to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity by preventing them from
taking place or taking remedial action when necessary. They recommend
a number of steps to strengthen R2P: articulating a clear vision of U.S.
support for all pillars of R2P, diplomatically engaging key like-minded
states, pursuing a policy of positive engagement with the International
Criminal Court, continuing to institutionalise steps to prevent atrocities,
and developing additional uses for modern technologies to advance R2P
objectives. In other words, “[T]he intent of these recommendations is
to enhance U.S. ability to provide global leadership for the prevention
of mass atrocities and to advance the collective capacity and will of the

9 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. (2012). The Role of the

Human Rights Council in Supporting the Practical Implementation of the Responsibility
to Protect. Side Event. Statement by the Delegation of the United States of America Human
Rights Council 20th Session, Geneva, June 19, 2012. U.S. Mission.
190 C. DONGMO

international community to fulfill its obligations under R2P” (Albright &

Williamson, 2013).
In Africa, as elsewhere in the world, America’s implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect faces political, institutional, and opera-
tional challenges. Prevailing challenges include expanding the set of tools
for policymakers, supporting justice and accountability mechanisms, and
narrowing the gap between warning and responses. Evolving U.S. and
global institutions present new but uncertain opportunities for addressing
mass atrocities. Madeleine Albright and Richard Williamson (2013) have
examined this scheme, the emerging political norm that aims to protect
civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity by preventing them from taking place or taking remedial action
when necessary.10 They recommend a number of steps: articulating a clear
vision of U.S. support for all pillars of the Responsibility to Protect, diplo-
matically engaging key like-minded states, pursuing a policy of positive
engagement with the International Criminal Court, continuing to insti-
tutionalise steps to prevent atrocities, and developing additional uses for
modern technologies to advance the objectives. In other words, “[T]he
intent of these recommendations is to enhance U.S. ability to provide
global leadership for the prevention of mass atrocities and to advance the
collective capacity and will of the international community to fulfill its
obligations under R2P.”

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Emerging and Contending Issues from The
Pratice of The Responsibility to Protect
in Africa
The African Union, Responsibility to Protect
and the Mantra of African Solutions
to Africa Problems

Samuel Osagie Odobo, Ikenna Mike Alumona,

and Nicholas Idris Erameh

Introduction
The failure of the international community to respond appropriately and
decisively to political instability and civil wars that befell Africa in the
1990s accentuated an evolving security thinking that Africa must break
away from historical dependence on foreign governments and institutions
for its security. State failure in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda were
the catalyst in the emergent security discourse that Africa must find its

S. O. Odobo (B)
Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
I. M. Alumona
Department of Political Science, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University,
Anambra, Nigeria
N. I. Erameh
Department of Research & Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
(NIIA), Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 197

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_12
198 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

own solutions to African problems. From this political discourse emerged

the notion of “African solutions to African problems” (ASAP) which
would later become an important principle upon which the African Union
(AU) was founded. The organization it (AU) replaced—Organization of
African Unity (OAU)—was widely criticized for its non-intervention prin-
ciple and lack of capacity to respond to severe humanitarian challenges
and human rights abuses. Article III of the OAU Charter (1963) stipu-
lated respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in
the affairs of Member States—a provision that became widely interpreted
as a non-interference/non-intervention norm. The birthing of the AU in
2000 heralded a policy shift in African security thinking: the rigid notion
of sovereignty and non-interference was jettisoned with greater emphasis
on non-indifference and intervention on humanitarian and human rights
grounds.
Established primarily to promote “local” solutions to Africa’s secu-
rity problems, the AU has enshrined responsibility to protect (R2P)
principle in its Constitutive Act, thus affirming the Union’s right to inter-
vene in a Member State where there exist dire humanitarian and human
rights issues. While these objectives may be construed by some as mere
aspiration, the AU has been establishing a number of instruments and
mechanisms to respond effectively to conflict outbreaks and complex
humanitarian challenges. Though myriads of conflict and crisis continue
to beset Africa, the continental body has made some significant impact
on conflict outcomes in Africa, especially through the establishment of
conflict prevention and management tools and mechanisms. Nonetheless,
gaps still exist between the extent of Africa’s security challenges and the
AU’s capacity to respond with “African solutions to African problems”.
A major obstacle to AU’s commitment to R2P and ability to respond
appropriately with ASAP relates to its institutional weakness, continuous
lack of resources and the political will to act as a responsive and effective
conflict prevention/management actor (Freire et al., 2016).
Crucially, the formalization of R2P principles within the African
Union’s institutional framework does not necessarily imply its operational-
ization. In spite of the increasing prominence of R2P and unrelenting

Department of Political Studies & International Relations, North–West

University, Mafikeng, South Africa
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 199

quest for local solutions to African problems, the AU, at critical junc-
tures in many conflicts in Africa (such as Sudan, Cote D’Ivoire, Libya
and others), has not taken a strong, united stance nor responded deci-
sively even when war crimes and crime against humanity appeared to
be involved (Apuuli, 2012; Lobakeng, 2017). This calls to question the
AU’s ASAP credentials and commitment to the R2P agenda. With this
in mind, this chapter examines the Africa Union’s role as the foremost
security organization in Africa. Drawing from the development of, and
debate on R2P principles, the study critically analyses the AU’s response
to conflicts, particularly the challenges facing the institution in imple-
menting its commitment to R2P in Africa. This analysis is crucial to better
appreciate exactly where the notion of “African solutions to African prob-
lems” fits in the discourse of the AU and African capacity to respond to
peace and security challenges in Africa and protect civilian populations at
risk of “grave circumstances”.

The Responsibility to Protect

The responsibility to protect (R2P) basically implies the legal and moral
obligation of the international community to protect civilian populations
from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing
primarily through the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations.
The principles undergirding the concept were first established in 2001
by the International Community for Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS). According to ICISS (2001), R2P is founded on three funda-
mental pillars: first, that states have a moral duty to protect their citizens
from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleaning, and crimes against humanity.
Second, the international community has an obligation to support the
states in achieving the task, and third, should the state fail in its duty, the
international community can intervene, including through the application
of force to protect the civilian population (ICISS, 2001).
In essence, unlike humanitarian intervention, the R2P doctrine
imposes obligations on the state to protect its citizens while emphasizing
the inevitable role of external armed intervention should the state fail
in its duty. Paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome document
(WSO, 2005) notes that states have an obligation to protect their citizens
from mass atrocities ranging from ethnic cleaning to genocide, war crime,
and crimes against humanity. The next paragraph (139) imposes on the
international community the duty of ensuring mass atrocities are avoided
200 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

through the use of diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful, means

in tandem with Chapters VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter.
It is important to emphasize, as ICISS (2001) argued, that the idea of
R2P goes beyond the responsibility to react promptly in cases of estab-
lished or imminent mass atrocity against the civilian population. It also
involves the responsibility to prevent against mass atrocity as well as a
commitment to rebuild states intervened upon. In other words, states
have an obligation to undertake actions to prevent the occurrence of gross
human rights abuses to prevent the actual act of protecting. Where the
responsibility of actual protection is carried out, the state and the inter-
national community have a duty to rebuild the affected states (Cilliers
et al., 2009). However, it is the obligation to “react,” especially through
armed intervention that has dominated the discourse of R2P. This partic-
ular view of R2P contrasts the conventional notion of state sovereignty by
recognizing the right of the international community to intervene coer-
cively in circumstances of gross human rights breaches. Though the use
of force is a vital component of R2P, it should only be utilized as a last
resort after other peaceful measures have been exhausted as stipulated in
the UN Charter.
In a bid to reconcile the state claim to sovereignty, its obligations
towards upholding basic rights of its citizens and the international
community’s right to engage where such serious rights abuses exists,
the Kofi Annan’s High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes of
2004, suggested that the international community has the powers to
intervene through the use of force where mass atrocity has been estab-
lished but must do so proportionately and after every other option has
been exhausted (Annan, 2014). What this implies is that the state has the
primary responsibility to protect the civilian population. Where the state
fails or is reluctant to perform this function, the international commu-
nity can assume such responsibility of civilian protection. In which case,
the doctrine of state sovereignty cannot impede the operationalization of
R2P at the regional or international level (Cilliers et al., 2009). To avoid
the potential for abuse of the R2P principles, the World Summit Outcome
report (WSO, 2005) recommended that such intervention must be autho-
rized by the UN Security Council in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations.
To further provide clarity to the operationalization of R2P, the 2005
United Nations Secretary General Report, entitled “Larger Freedom,”
expressly stated five criteria upon which an R2P intervention could be
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 201

justified, and the question who has the authority to intervene and in what
manner. These criteria include:

. Intervention should be contemplated in cases where mass atrocity

against civilian population has been established or imminent, and this
must be authorized by the United Nations Security Council (Right
Authority).
. Intervention must be executed with the sole aim of protecting the
civilian population (Right Intention)
. Armed intervention can only be justified, when every other necessary
means have been exhausted (Last Resort)
. The means to be used by intervening states must be such that
commensurate the intended goal (Proportional Use of Force)
. The inevitable need of assessing the situations, and projecting the
prospects of success of such intervention (Reasonable prospect).

The implication of the above is that while state sovereignty remains a

time-honoured principle in international law, the international commu-
nity also has a responsibility to maintain international peace and security
and protect the welfare of civilian populations in states experiencing
armed conflict. Like the UN at the global level, the AU is confronted
with this dilemma: just as the AU has a mandate to defend the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of its member states, it also has an obligation to
promote peace and security in Africa and intervene in situations of grave
circumstances. Such roles potentially entail a violation of the principle
of state sovereignty (Cilliers et al., 2009). AU member states voluntarily
subscribed to the organization, and this involves some form of sovereignty
transfer to the supranational body with associated obligations as members.
Within the context of sovereignty as responsibility, this implies that
political authorities in the member states have responsibilities towards
their citizens locally and to the international community through the AU
and the UN. It also implies that state actors are responsible and account-
able for their actions and it is the duty of the international community
to hold them accountable for their acts of omission and commission
(ICISS, 2001). As Cilliers et al. (2009: 59) rightly argued, the “principle
of accountability, especially on the part of state agents, is important, as
any acts of commission or omission that seriously violate human rights
automatically attract international criminal responsibility.” Accordingly,
202 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

commitment to international human rights principles cannot be sacri-

ficed on the altar of sovereignty; and it cannot be a justification for the
non-implementation of the R2P agenda.

The Mantra of African

Solutions to African Problems
The mantra of African solutions to African problems became popular in
the aftermath of the Cold War. The notion itself is not new to Africa.
African nationalists in the past recognized the need for an African-type
security framework that would empower Africans to deal with African
problems. Kwame Nkrumah (1961) once spoke that Africa must find an
indigenous solution to its problems by uniting and establishing an African
body to cater to its security and development needs. Thus, Africans have
always preferred to solve their own problems and minimize external influ-
ence in Africa’s affairs. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War facilitated
ASAP thinking in Africa’s security discourse. Having lost the geopolit-
ical and strategic importance that made it the darling of the Cold War
gladiators, Africa was left stranded by the international community as
conflicts broke out across the continent. African leaders had to take the
initiative of conflict management, especially after the Western nations’
indifference to the humanitarian disasters in Somalia and Rwanda. The
emergence of African “sub-imperials” such as Nigeria, South Africa and
Egypt provided a further boost in terms of sub-regional organizations
orchestrating conflict intervention and peace operations.
The notion of African solutions to African problems has become
increasingly problematic to define since its popularization in the 1990s.
A fluid understanding of ASAP relates to the idea that Africa must be
ready to deal with its own problems and reduce its propensity to seek
foreign solutions to its crisis. Ayittey (2010) advocates African ownership
of such solutions as foreign solutions, over the years, have proved to be
dictated, less reliable, financially costly, and unsuitable to Africa’s polit-
ical and sociocultural features. The question of ownership raises further
scrutiny about Ayittey’s conception of ASAP. In a way, it does imply that
all challenges in Africa are Africa’s alone and only Africa must deal with
them. The neighbourhood and mirror effects of Africa’s problems make
them important to the global community as well. Furthermore, the UN
Charter mandates the global body to maintain international peace and
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 203

security, including in Africa. Thus, the international community shares a

burden of responsibility in managing Africa’s problems.
The notion that Africa must totally own the solutions to African prob-
lems raises the risk of Africa’s marginalization and isolation at the global
level. It could hinder Africa’s access to the huge political, security and
economic resources available at the global level that could boost Africa’s
efforts to deal with its problems. More so, there are concerns about Africa
and the AU’s capability to mobilize its own resources to address its chal-
lenges. Accordingly, ASAP should involve seeking “appropriate solutions”
to African problems, in which Africa and African are fully engaged in
its operationalization. There are several parts to what constitute solu-
tions, including ideas, practical actions and funding. As suggested by the
Institute for Security Studies (2008), an African solution may involve an
African content and ideas with external assistance, particularly in the area
funding—an area where the AU has shown considerable weaknesses.
Another point to highlight is the conceptualization of African solu-
tions to African problems by a number of African leaders—past and
present. Their notion of African solution has often appeared self-serving.
The most obvious is the opposition to external interference in how they
manage their internal conflicts, even though many of them have time and
again been complicit in the causes and course of such conflicts (Albert,
2011). The chant of “African solutions” and undue external interference
in their internal affairs became the swansong of African dictators such
as Omar al Bashir, Muammar Gadhafi and Robert Mugabe when faced
with international criticisms for alleged human rights abuses and other
crimes against humanity. No less than 10 African countries have faced
the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations since 2002 over
cases involving war crimes and horrendous acts against humanity (Jalloh,
2019). It has become commonplace for many African leaders, some of
whom are themselves subject of ICC investigations, to vehemently attack
the ICC work in Africa, claiming undue interference and the need to
respect their sovereign independence in managing their domestic issues.
The most vociferous attacks against the ICC have been from those leaders
under ICC investigation and those who feel embarrassed by their own
internal behavior and human rights records which they seek to hide.
What is more puzzling is the AU’s role in the seeming “formaliza-
tion” of this contrived notion of “African solutions” which runs contrary
to the principle of R2P that undergirds the AU founding. Interestingly,
African heads of states occupy the highest decision making body of the
204 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

AU—The Assembly. Thus, in many ways, the AU’s position on any matter
often reflects their collective wishes. As Cilliers et al. (2009) suggested,
it somewhat explains why the institution has shown little enthusiasm
in responding to the calls to bring to justice some former and serving
African leaders who have been accused of committing atrocious acts
against humanity. When the ICC issued a warrant for Omar al Bashir’s
arrest for war crimes and crime against humanity in 2009, the AU fiercely
opposed the moved, labelling the ICC investigations as prejudicial to
peace in Sudan, biased and anti-African (Nantulya, 2017). Yet the crimes
for which Bashir was being charged (torture, rape murder, extermination
and forcible transfer, pillaging and authorization of violence against civil-
ians) met the threshold of what constituted war crimes and crimes against
humanity. While criticizing the ICC investigations as biased, the AU did
little to investigate and ensure that alleged perpetrators of war crimes and
crimes against humanity in Darfur, including President Bashir, were held
accountable for their actions, thus making a mockery of its mantra of
African solutions and its commitment to responsibility to protect. It is
within this context that the mantra of African solutions has become an
African problem particularly in relation to how African leaders readily hide
behind the catchphrase in an attempt to prevent external inquisition into
their contributions to the challenges on the continent.

AU and R2P in Africa

Undoubtedly, the lessons of Somalia and Rwanda, coupled with the
increasing nature of insecurity in many African states propelled the insti-
tutionalization of the African Union as Africa’s foremost organization
for the promotion of continental peace, security, development and unity.
Though, not discarding the efforts of Western countries, it had become
clear that Africa needed to take a more active role in its conflict resolution
process (Abass, 2010). Thus, African states affirmed their commitment to
responsibility to protect and the promotion of local solutions to African
problems through the establishment of the African Union. The AU
Constitutive Act (2000) calls for a more proactive response in terms of
preventing, responding and resolving conflict within the continent.
While the AU places a high importance on the sovereignty of its
member states as enshrined in Articles 3(b) and 4(f) of its Constitutive
Act, Article 4(g & h) of the Act equally demonstrates the union’s commit-
ment to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state in the case of
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 205

mass atrocity situations like genocide, crime against humanity and war
crimes. Unlike the traditional peacekeeping which emphasizes consent of
the host nation, the AU Act expressly empowers the AU to respond to
armed conflict through all means necessary, including the use of force
(African Union, Constitutive act of the African Union, 2001).
The AU, at its Executive Council Seventh Extra Ordinary Session in
Addis Ababa in 2005, reiterated its commitment to R2P through a report
known as the “Ezulwini Consensus.” The report, which outlined the
common African position to the proposed reforms of the UN, affirmed
the AU’s backing for R2P principles. It also recognized the authority
of the UN Security Council to invoke R2P intervention, including the
use of force in circumstances of crimes against humanity, war crimes and
genocide (AU, 2005). The ratification of the protocol for the estab-
lishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU and the
subsequent establishment of its subsidiary entities such as the Panel of
the Wise (PoW), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African
Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund validate the AU’s support for
the R2P agenda in Africa. Most especially, it shows the organization’s
drive to establish a continental peace and security framework that incorpo-
rates all the vital components of R2P which include prevention, reaction
and rebuilding.
The Fifteen-member PSC of the AU bares semblance to the United
Nations Security Council and serves as the highest decision-making body
on interventions in Africa. It is saddled with the responsibility of main-
taining peace and security by using every available option to prevent,
manage and resolve conflict (Bah et al., 2014). Through the creation of
the PSC and its associated bodies such as the CEWS and the ASF, coupled
with its focus on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD),
the AU has established the groundwork for operationalizing the three
dimensions of the R2P principle on the continent (Cilliers et al., 2009).
A critical examination of the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
would suggest that the continental organization has designed its APSA
framework to ensure that R2P is operationalized at the continental level.
Just as the UN has a global responsibility to protect, the AU recognizes
its continental responsibility to prevent and protect Africans from mass
atrocities and human rights abuses and to promote peace, security and
development on the continent.
Thus, the AU, through its peace and security framework, seems deter-
mined to promote the guiding principles of responsibility to protect as
206 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

contained in the ICISS report (2001). This is appropriate because the

AU, as a legitimate regional entity, must operate in line with the principles
of respect for human rights as contained in Article 4(m) of its Constitutive
Act. As ICISS (2001) suggested, though states have the primary responsi-
bility to keep their citizens safe from gross human rights violations, where
such states become violators themselves or prove reluctant to perform
such role, the international community must assume that role regardless
of political considerations. Relating this to the AU, its Constitutive Act,
particularly Article 4(h), unequivocally imbues it with the right to inter-
vene in member states in respect of grave circumstances such as genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Article 4(j) of the protocol estab-
lishing the PSC further confirms “the right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,
in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act” (PSC Protocol,
2002). This provision in the PSC protocol places further importance on
the R2P.
Despite the AU’s commitment to R2P and promoting African solu-
tions to African problems, its implementation remains problematic.
Cilliers et al. (2009) believe, among other things that the problem of
implementation relates to the lack of clarity in terms of what the idea of
intervention truly implies as contained in the AU Constitutive Act: is it
limited to the use of force or includes other approaches such as media-
tion, sanctions and peacekeeping mission? There is also the question of
what constitutes “grave circumstances” that should warrant AU interven-
tion. The AU Constitutive Act does not clearly define acts that qualify as
“grave circumstances” beyond identifying those that fall under the defi-
nition of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide provided in
the 1998 Rome Statute. The lack of definitional details as to the meaning
of grave circumstances, according to Cilliers et al. (2009), leaves room
for doubt and ambiguity that ultimately puts the AU in a quandary in
making a decision to intervene in a member state.
The AU was confronted with this dilemma in both the Ivoirian and
Libyan crises. As demonstrated by Apuuli (2012), the AU’s diplomacy
and implementation of the responsibility to protect in both conflict situ-
ations encountered significant challenges as a result of fissures within
its member states relating to the mode of intervention that should be
adopted. For example, in the case of Cote D’Ivoire, while the AU gener-
ally backed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 207

position that Laurent Gbagbo be removed from power, even by force, a

number of AU member states such as Liberia, Mali, Angola, Uganda and
the Gambia expressed dissention against the use of force. Not only did the
AU, in the face of such dissention, fail to mount a united, effective inter-
vention in the conflict, it also failed to adopt a common position on the
future of Gbagbo and Muammar Gadhafi. As suggested by Cilliers et al.
(2009) and Jalloh (2019), the lack of consensus regarding the content
and extent of the right to intervention, coupled with inadequate commit-
ment to R2P by AU member states, place before the AU an uphill task in
terms of effective operationalization of the R2P agenda in Africa.

AU and the Operationalization

of African Solutions to African Problems
Since the adoption of its Constitutive Act, the AU has intervened in a
number of conflicts in Africa, including interventions in Burundi, Sudan,
Somalia, Mali, Cote D’Ivoire, Libya and Central African Republic. These
interventions entail diplomatic missions, monitoring and enforcing peace
deals, election monitoring and a series of peacebuilding initiatives. In fact,
as at 2000 when the AU was being put together, African troops involved
in UN peacekeeping missions amounted to a paltry 10,000. By 2017,
fifteen years later, this number had blown up to 48,000 accounting for
50% of all UN peacekeepers (De Coning, 2017). According to Desmidt
and Hauck (2017), the AU through diplomatic interventions, mediations
or peace support operations (PSOs) or a combination of these have been
in the thick of 97% of violent conflicts between 2013 and 2015.This indi-
cates that the AU, since its official launch in 2002, has been involved in
several peacekeeping efforts as well as assuming increasing responsibility
towards peacekeeping on the continent.
However, AU interventions on the continent have historically been
constrained by a lack of fund, overdependence on Western donors,
contested ownership of peacekeeping missions, operational challenges,
and a general lack of the political will to enforce regional conflict preven-
tion and management mechanisms (Apuuli, 2012; Bah et al., 2014).
These challenges have not only slowed down implementation of the
R2P agenda in Africa, they have also undesirably affected Africa’s quest
for effective institutionalization of African solutions to Africa problems.
Perhaps, Libya and Cote D’Ivoire provide the best conflict examples
in recent years that demonstrate the AU’s inability to validate its R2P
208 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

credential and prove its capacity to rise up to the occasion in dealing with
an African conflict using African solutions.
In Cote D’Ivoire, the lack of a clear winner in the October 31, 2010
elections pitted the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo against his
major opponent, Alassane Ouattara. The run-off election to determine
the winner was fixed for November 28, 2010. The results of the rerun
election as announced by the Ivoirian Independent Electoral Commis-
sion (IEC) showed that Ouattara won the election with 54.1%, defeating
the incumbent, Gbagbo who scored 45.9%. While regional actors and the
international community endorsed the poll result, Gbagbo rejected same
and vowed to remain in power (Lobakeng, 2017). In a curious judgment,
the Constitutional Council of Cote D’Ivoire cancelled over 660,000 votes
in polling areas largely considered to be Ouattara’s political stronghold
and declared Gbagbo the winner of the elections (Apuuli, 2012). What
followed was a political crisis that turned extremely violent claiming as
casualty, over 3000 lives and displacing over half a million people, with a
further 187, 266 people fleeing the country by June 2011 (UNGA, 2012:
5).
The competing claims to power, clashes among supporters of Ouatt-
tara and Gbagbo, displacements and deaths, and a potential return to civil
war led to concerns both within and outside Africa (Cook, 2011). The
AUPSC, in December 2010, adopted a firm decision on the Ivorian post-
election crisis by endorsing the official results announced by the IEC that
returned Ouattara as the duly elected president. It also imposed sanctions
on Gbagbo and Cote D’Ivoire in line with Article 4(p) of its Constitutive
Act (AU PSC, 2011a). Furthermore, the High Level Panel for the Reso-
lution of the Cote D’Ivoire Crisis, established by the PSC on January 28,
2011, reiterated the AU’s support for Ouattara. It advocated a political
solution to the crisis that involved securing a safe exit for Gbagbo and
the establishment of a government of national unity headed by Ouat-
tara (AU PSC 2011b). Gbagbo rejected the Panel’s recommendation
and refused to give up power. The AU forged ahead with implementa-
tion of the Panel’s recommendation and appointed Jose Bitro to lead the
implementation process. In a complicated twist, Ouattara rejected Bitro’s
appointment as AU’s High Representative citing the latter’s sympathy for
Gbagbo (Abatan & Spies, 2016).
The AU found itself unable to navigate the overwhelming challenges
that the political gridlock created. As violence, killings and human rights
violations escalated, the UN Security Council, on May 30, 2011, invoked
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 209

its global responsibility to protect civilians. Through Resolution 1975, it

imposed sanctions on Gbagbo and some of his associates and mandated
United Nations Operations in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French-
backed forces to use all necessary means “to protect civilians under
imminent threat to physical violence…and to prevent the use of heavy
weapons against the civilian population” (UNSC, 2011a). The Resolution
was endorsed by both the AU and the West African sub-regional eco-
security organization, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African
States). Gbagbo was captured on April 11, 2011 by the UN/French-
backed forces, thus bringing an end to the political stalemate as Ouattara
was subsequently sworn in as President of Cote D’Ivoire.
It can be argued that the AU failed its first real opportunity to demon-
strate its African solutions capability and by extension, its commitment
to the R2P. Despite endorsing Ouattara’s electoral victory and raising
concerns about the humanitarian crisis in Cote D’Ivoire, it did not
take the decisive step to address the unfolding human rights violations
or uphold the AU’s R2P commitment as contained in its Constitutive
Act and the Ezulwini Consensus. Even in the face of Gbagbo’s blatant
non-compliance with the PSC decisions, the AU continued to display a
lackluster posturing and remained reticent to operationalize the R2P in
Cote D’Ivoire.
Abatan and Spies (2016) conclude that the Ivorian case is symptomatic
of the AU’s standing in Africa where many of its member states (despite
endorsing the R2P on the continent through the Ezulwini Consensus)
are often reluctant to respect the Union’s principles on the promotion of
human rights and protection of civilians. Meanwhile, the AU continues
to lack an effective monitoring and sanction mechanism to address such
chronic non-compliance with its rules (Cilliers, 2010). Furthermore, the
inability of the AU to take a firm position on the Ivorian crisis and the
future of Gbagbo suggested that the Union was more favorably disposed
to a political settlement as against invoking the R2P even when there
was a glaring case of humanitarian challenges and human rights abuses
(Apuuli, 2012). The resolve to adopt half-hearted measures ultimately
connotes that the AU has yet to match actions with words in terms of its
professed commitment to R2P and African solutions to African problems.
In essence, the AU’s reluctance to intervene decisively in Cote D’Ivoire
constituted a blow to the R2P agenda in Africa.
210 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

The AU had yet another opportunity to profess ASAP in Libya. The

Libyan crisis was an upshot of the Africa Spring—a series of violent upris-
ings that started in Tunisia in 2010 and immediately spread towards many
parts of the Arab world. Beginning from February 2011, widespread
protest and violence among Libyans sparked a lethal response from
the Gadhafi government which threatened to snuff them out house by
house (ISS, 2011a). Gadhafi’s determination to retain power and the
use of brute force in reclaiming key rebel held towns like Benghazi,
leading to the death of thousands of civilians provoked both regional and
international criticisms and subsequent actions (ISS, 2011a, 2011b).
The AU PSC met shortly after the crisis broke out to try and find
a political solution to the rebellion. On February 23, 2011, the PSC
condemned in strong terms “indiscriminate and excessive use of force and
lethal weapons against peaceful protesters, in violation of human rights
and international humanitarian law” (Kedze, 2015: not paged). While
foot-dragging on what appropriate measures to adopt in response to
Gadhafi’s threat of bloodbath in key rebel-controlled territories like Beng-
hazi, the UN Security Council, on March 17, 2011, passed Resolution
1973 imposing an arms embargo and a no-fly zone on Libya. Resolution
1973 also authorized the use of force to end the violence and protect the
civilian population. UNSC Resolution 1973 effectively took the initiative
of resolving the Libyan crisis away from the AU with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) implementing the Resolution in a problem-
atic way that would lead to not only the murder of Muammar Gadhafi but
a number of Libyans who got caught in the vicious NATO airstrikes that
followed (see ISS, 2011b: 7).
Meanwhile, the AU’s most visible attempt to resolve the Libyan
crisis occurred in March 2011 when the PSC-established AU High-level
Ad Hoc Committee on Libya recommended to the warring parties a
“roadmap” for resolving the crisis (see Apuuli, 2012). The AU roadmap
acknowledged that the situation in Libya called for an urgent African
action in order to restore peace and stability. The objectives of the peace
plan included: protection of the civilian population from mass atrocity,
and an end to all forms of hostility; provision of humanitarian assistance
and support to distressed citizens of both Africa and non–Africans; the
need to effectively engage the Libyan government and the key officials of
the National Transition Council (NTC) on how best to resolve the wors-
ening situation; the setting up and supporting of the political transition
period expected to usher in a new government in Libya, and Institutional
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 211

support for the Libyan initiated political reforms, to ensure this leads to
inclusiveness, and the aspiration of the citizenry (Kedze, 2015).
For all its political and diplomatic maneuverings, the AU roadmap did
little to stem the tide of the Libyan crisis. In fact, the NTC rejected
outright the AU plan arguing that not only was it late, it did not capture
the most important demand of the Libyan people which what the effec-
tive removal of Gadhafi from power (Aljazeera, 2011). Subsequent efforts
by the AU to show its relevance in the management of the Libyan crisis
appeared futile particularly with the involvement of the UNSC which had
taken the initiative to restore peace in Libya. Thus, when on March 19,
2011, the AU Ad Hoc Committee members met in Nouakchott and
decided to visit Libya the next day to engage with the warring parties,
their request to enter Libya was denied by the UNSC. In fact, the UNSC
effectively confirmed the AU’s marginalization in Libya through its Reso-
lution 1973 which gave explicit recognition to the role of the Arab
League states in the efforts to restore peace and security in Libya (see
UNSC, 2011b: para. 5).
Abass (2014) has argued that the AU failings in Libya, though not
surprising, once again, demonstrated the incompetence of the continental
body in maintaining peace and security in Africa. Despite having the legal
backing to deploy enforcement action against an errant member state as in
the case of Libya, the AU lacked the resources and particularly, the polit-
ical will to undertake such measures. The AU Libya experience further
validated the notion that African organizations often display a patholog-
ical proclivity to prioritize politics over human lives and peer solidarity
over effective response to blatant human rights violations. The resort to
more benign measures even when a humanitarian situation clearly existed
in Libya raises the question as Cilliers et al. (2009) suggested, whether
the AU leaders felt the need to defend their colleague (Gadhafi) and save
his regime.
Nonetheless, one might argue in defence of the AU that its Libya
roadmap was doomed to fail from the beginning owing to the actions of
external forces. The support the Libyan rebels enjoyed particularly from
the Western nations gave them an advantage over Gadhafi and was largely
responsible for their unwillingness to dialogue with the Gadhafi regime.
However, this arguably would not have been the case had the AU acted
decisively at the early stages of the crisis. The decision to foot-drag in
212 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

terms of intervening authoritatively, established the grounds upon which

it came to be marginalized by external intervening forces. Apuuli (2012)
rightly argued that had the PSC immediately set up a fact-finding mission
to Libya, it would have been very difficult for the UNSC to overlook it,
considering the fact that the UN Charter recognizes the role that regional
institutions can play in the maintenance of peace and security within their
regional jurisdiction in line with the principles of the UN. Hence, the
reticence of the PSC to immediately stamp its authority in Libya gave the
opportunity to the UNSC and the other external actors to sideline the
AU in the Libya crisis.

Problems Associated with AU Operationalization

of African Solutions to African Problems
The AU’s poor record of African solutions to African problems in Cote
D’Ivoire and Libya reemphasizes the fact that the Union is burdened with
a series challenges. One of such challenges that has affected Africa’s quest
for actualizing the Africa solutions to African problems is the perennial
problem of lack of respect for regional laws, treaties and constitutional
authority. For instance, despite Gadhafi’s role in the initiation and adop-
tion of the AU Constitutive Act, he initially rebuffed the AU’s position
on the Libyan crisis. The decision to eventually respect the AU peace plan
was more of a ploy aimed at discouraging external intervention. Laurent
Gbagbo, equally exhibited similar disrespect for both the ECOWAS and
AU calls to cede power to the democratically elected candidate. In
essence, the seeming failure of the AU to authorize an R2P intervention
in these cases not only suggests that the AU is far from actualizing its
commitment to institutionalizing the R2P, but also waters down its pref-
erence for an African solution to an African problem (Abatan & Spies,
2016).
Furthermore, there remains the problem of inconsistency in applying
the regional laws, protocols and even treaties in conflict scenarios. Whilst
there are existing laws and protocols that are expected to guide the AU on
how to deal with certain issues, experiences have suggested deep incon-
sistency in responding to armed conflict. A careful analysis of the Libya,
Cote D’Ivoire and other armed conflicts which have occurred within
the continent shows that the AU interventions have often exposed the
deep inconsistency in terms of the organization’s conflict responses. More
problematic is the view that majority of AU leaders have, over time, used
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 213

the instrumentality of the AU to shield or prepare soft landing for their

colleagues as against holding such leaders accountable for their actions
(Cilliers et al., 2009). In essence, the AU response to conflict and mass
atrocities has remained largely inconsistent partly due to invisible power
play politics among members of the Union. For Lobakeng (2017), the
fear of being isolated or punished has made the African heads of states
not able to take firm decisions on issues pertaining to the continent. A
critical reflection on the build up to the AU peace plan in Libya reflects
this position. Many countries within the African continent, at least implic-
itly, feared Gadhafi and were scared of his capabilities should he survive
the calls for him stepping down.
There has also been the question of lack of unity among AU member
states occasioned by colonial and ideological sentiments. While members
of the AU openly admit that there is the need for a strong and vibrant
Union, their commitment to this aspiration has been seriously hampered
by the disunity that exists amongst them. Such disunity has often played
out in the deliberations on AU’s mode of intervention in African conflicts.
For instance, the Libyan crisis exposed not only the disunity between
the AU and ECOWAS (Abatan & Spies, 2016), but also, the deep divi-
sions among the AU member states resulted in different positions. Thus,
while countries such as Ethiopia, Gabon, Rwanda and Senegal threw their
weight behind the NATO intervention, South Africa, Uganda and Kenya
equally supported but were critical of the end product of liberal western
interventionism. Furthermore, as against their early support, Nigeria,
Algeria and Zimbabwe opposed the NATO intervention on the premise
that it could serve as a fig leaf for western imperialists to invade Libya and
effect regime change (Apuuli, 2012; Kedze, 2015).
Similar trends were equally noticed in the regional response to the
Ivorian crisis (Abatan & Spies, 2016). Gbagbo’s refusal to accept regional
solutions and the fear that the country could slide into another round of
civil war prompted Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso to
call for maximum military force. This was, however, rejected by Angola,
Uganda, DRC, Chad, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mali and
South Africa (Akande, 2011). Thus, while the AU has over time achieved
significant milestones in adopting region peace architectures, the high
level of mistrust, lack of unity, the absence of common values, identi-
ties and regime style have greatly affected its chances of actualizing its
set goals (Nathan, 2012). There is little to suggest that this perceived
disunity amongst the AU member states would fade off any time soon.
214 S. O. ODOBO ET AL.

Additionally, the lack of adequate funding and political will which have
always served as a problem to the African continent mostly manifested
in Libya and Cote D’Ivoire, as in the case of Gambia, Central African
Republic and Sudan. While the AU has persistently touted its commit-
ment to resolving conflicts within the continent using local solutions,
majority of the peacekeeping missions in Africa where the AU has been
involved have been heavily funded and technically supported by Western
countries (Freire et al., 2016). While the lack adequate funding remains a
major problem, the absence of genuine political will amongst AU leaders
constitutes a crucial stumbling block to actualizing the goal of African
solutions to African problems. In Libya and Cote D’Ivoire where the AU
expressed a readiness to intervene in accordance with the basic princi-
ples of the R2P and African solutions to Africa problems, the absence of
genuine political will greatly impacted on its response. Certainly, if the AU
had maintained the tempo it initially approached the crisis in Libya and
Cote D’Ivoire, it might not have been sidelined by the United Nations
and the western allies. Hence, the need for an affirmative decision making
and enforcement process remains a sine qua non to the AU in actualizing
its set ASAP goals.

Conclusion
There is less contention that the AU has developed as a stronger version
of the OAU, and remains the foremost regional organization established
to provide African solutions to African problems. By adopting a much
more interventionist stance, and incorporating the principles of R2P into
its peace and security architecture, it has, in principle, positively responded
to the bad experiences of political instability, civil wars and the attendant
humanitarian consequences that have plagued Africa, particularly since the
1990s. In particular, the establishment of the AU PSC and its subsidiary
bodies demonstrate a willingness by the AU members to develop insti-
tutional and normative capacities that would help to actualize the R2P
principles in Africa. So too, the decision to undertake a considerable
number of intervention missions on the continent reflects the organiza-
tion’s intention to put into practice the mantra of African solutions to
African problems.
Nonetheless, its experience in Libya and Cote D’Ivoire shows that
the AU has yet to convince that it is the solution to the myriads of
conflicts besetting Africa. In both instances, the AU failed to adequately
 THE AFRICAN UNION, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 215

operationalize R2P in preventing human rights abuses, defending the

vulnerable civilian populations and holding the concerned countries’ lead-
ership accountable for the serious rights abuses. Its uninspiring role in the
case of Libya ultimately led to the AU being marginalized and totally side-
lined by the UNSC and other intervening forces in Libya. Yet, the AU
seemed to have been the architect of its own misfortune in Libya and Cote
D’Ivoire. Internal dissensions, preference for sovereignty protection, lack
of real commitment to implement regional conflict resolution initiatives
and the absence of an effective sanction regime against non-compliance
with AU decisions largely undergirded its poor outing in both cases, thus
watering down the AU’s claim to African solutions to African problems.
The “responsibility to protect” and the mantra of African solutions to
African problems can only be effective if there is political will by African
leaders to properly energize both concepts. While improving on the AU
peace and security architecture and other key instruments in propelling
R2P and ASAP forward, there is also the need for greater unity among
AU member states, a push-back on states claim to sovereignty and a will-
ingness to deal with violators of human rights and perpetrators of war
crimes on the continent. Indeed, the AU needs to frontally address the
widespread view that it continues to promote an unhealthy tradition of
solidarity and uses the notion of ASAP as a convenient shield to protect its
members accused of promoting dictatorship and human rights violations.

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 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
(RtoP): Coordinating Approaches Between
the United Nations Security Council
and the International Criminal Court

Natalie Zähringer

Introduction
To date, there are only two international governmental organisations
(IOs) with a global reach that are tasked with responding to atrocity
crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. These
IOs are the United Nations (UN), in particular the UN Security Council
(UNSC), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, despite
their overlapping area of interest and complementary nature, very few
mechanisms have been put in place to coordinate their approaches. Even
with this very limited coordination, African states through the African
Union (AU), have contested aspects of the RtoP by highlighting the
controversial nature of a linkage between the UNSC and ICC, in partic-
ular in cases where sitting heads of states are targeted. The cases that

N. Zähringer (B)
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 219

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_13
220 N. ZÄHRINGER

stand out here are Libya and Sudan, which both saw UNSC referrals to
the ICC.
By examining the critiques of African members of the ICC, short-
comings of this arrangement are highlighted. With the UNSC and the
ICC pursuing different outcomes, protecting civilians on the one hand
while pursuing retributive justice on the other, the achievement of the
protection of civilians under the RtoP is restricted. It is imperative that
those pursuing mediation and peace negotiations with oppressive regimes
should have in their tool kit the possibility of offering immunity from
prosecution to encourage leaders to step down, while simultaneously
maintaining the deterring effect of the ICC. This chapter will examine the
respective clauses in the UN Charter and the Rome Statute to highlight
the existing basis for coordination (or lack thereof) between the UNSC
and the ICC, highlighting shortcomings as raised by members of the AU,
and followed by an analysis of how mechanisms of cooperation may be
improved upon in an effort to strengthen the RtoP.

Unpacking the Atrocity Crimes

Underpinning the RtoP
At the heart of the Responsibility to Protect is a desire to eliminate the
occurrence of so-called atrocity crimes, a collective term that encompasses
the most heinous of all international crimes which generally result in large
scale human rights violations and civilian casualties. These include geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The aim
of the RtoP is to prevent, respond and rebuild societies within the context
of atrocity crimes, placing a responsibility on both the state itself and the
international community. This chapter investigates existing mechanisms
which deal with the latter.
An important first step is to define each of these crimes under interna-
tional law before proceeding to the question of how best to facilitate the
institutionalisation of the RtoP within existing IOs. The famous Nurem-
burg and Tokyo Trials took place after World War 2 and saw prosecutions
primarily for war crimes. Surprisingly, at the time prosecuting genocide
posed a challenge as it had not been defined as a crime under international
law. Thereafter, for many years no international individual prosecutions
were able to take place. Only after the end of the Cold War and with a
less divided UNSC, two UN ad hoc tribunals were created, this time with
a much broader scope. The first was the International Criminal Tribunal
 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 221

for the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and the second was the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994. These two UN Tribunals focused
on war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and were influential
in defining these crimes. In setting up these tribunals, the UNSC set an
important precedent that made the creation of the ICC possible. Most
importantly, the tribunals reinforced the idea of international criminal
accountability for individuals who committed atrocity crimes. As such,
the foundation for negotiations around an international court was laid
which culminated in the Rome Statute in 1998.
Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute the list of atrocity crimes
remained rather vague and in the cases of the two tribunals, these were
often defined differently. The International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which coined the term the Responsibility
to Protect, in essence even took a step back by limiting its definition of
atrocity crimes to “large scale loss of life, … with genocidal intent or
not … and large-scale ethnic cleansing” (ICISS, 2001: 11). The ICISS
quantified the loss of life as defining, but also placed a strong emphasis
on an ethnic cause. After this somewhat confusing evolution in terms of
defining these crimes, the first comprehensive list of atrocity crimes is
found in the ICC’s Rome Statute, which lists war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and aggression. It also defines each crime in detail.
Hence the Rome Statute is deemed the current legal authority on global
atrocity crimes.
War crimes is the oldest of these crimes and pertains to breaches of
international humanitarian law, which started to emerge in the late nine-
teenth century. Today it is summarised in and represented by the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Protocols of 1977, which
prescribe what is permissible in times of war, both at the inter- and
intrastate level. The Fourth Geneva Convention places an emphasis on
the protection of civilians and requires parties to limit as much as possible
civilian casualties. One important criterion to note here is that war crimes
can only occur in times of war, raising the question, at which point a
violent conflict would meet the categorisation of ‘war’. Genocide, in turn,
is defined by the Genocide Convention of 1948, which defines this crime
as “acts with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.” Noticeable here is that it is based on more
than just an ethnic identity. Furthermore, proving the criterion of intent
could be a stumbling block for prosecutions. The Genocide Convention,
similarly to the RtoP, also calls on the international community to act.
222 N. ZÄHRINGER

Meanwhile, crimes against humanity were first internationally codified by

the ICC’s Rome Statute but are based on customary principles which
emerged in the Cold War era and through the precedents of the UN
ad hoc Tribunals. This crime is intended to close the loopholes in the
other two crimes, such as the criteria of ‘war’ or ‘intent’. Crimes against
humanity include crimes such as ethnic cleansing and Apartheid.

Unpacking the UNSC Mandate

It is not surprising that there is no reference in the UN Charter to the
ICC as the Charter predates the Rome Statute by more than 60 years.
There is also no reference in the Charter to atrocity crimes. In 2005, the
UN General Assembly adopted in its Outcome Document paragraphs 138
and 139, which was a first attempt to institutionalise the RtoP at the UN
and sets out possible UN action. It should be noted that the Outcome
Document is not the equivalent of an international treaty. As a General
Assembly resolution it remains non-binding on UN member states. It is,
however, interpreted as a re-envisioning of relevant sections of the UN
Charter, which can be activated should atrocity crimes occur. The UN
Charter in Article 24 grants the UNSC primary responsibility to maintain
international peace and security. Today the UNSC interprets peace and
security as quite broad, extended from protecting states from external
aggression to managing internal security risks as well. Under Chapter 7
of the UN Charter, the UNSC can take decisive action in the event of an
existing threat to international peace and security. Action can include the
use of sanctions under Article 41 and the use of force under Article 42.
Any such action is binding on all member states under Article 25.
Interestingly, the 2005 Outcome Document in its RtoP paragraphs
makes no reference to the ICC, despite the latter’s existence by that time.
Even though Article 139 outlines the responsibilities of the international
community, it restricts this to the United Nations. Although regional
organisations are mentioned in terms of collective action, this is expressly
linked to cooperation with the UNSC. This, in conjunction with Article
53 in Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, has led to the legal interpretation
that only the UNSC may approve military action, a standpoint challenged
by the AU, which claims this right within its own member states under
Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act.
 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 223

Unpacking the ICC Mandate

At first glance, the ICC’s mandate to prosecute perpetrators of atrocity
crimes forms part of the element of “responding” under the RtoP.
However, given its intended deterrence effect and by granting justice, it
also contributes to the elements of prevention and rebuilding. In brief, the
ICC is tasked to prosecute only four crimes, crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and aggression (Rome Statute Article 5).
Any one of three mechanisms can be used to initiate an investigation as
per Article 13. Firstly, a state party to the ICC may refer a situation,
secondly, the UNSC may refer a situation under Chapter 7 of the UN
Charter and thirdly, the ICC prosecutor may initiate an investigation in
a state party. With the exception of a UNSC referral, the court only has
jurisdiction within the territories and regarding citizens of state parties to
the Rome Statute. No matter the route that is taken to initiate an inves-
tigation, the final decision on whether to issue indictments remains with
the ICC, where the prosecutor ultimately presents the case to the Pre-
Trial Chamber, and which grants permission to proceed (Rome Statute
Article 15). Of note is the “complementary” and “subsidiarity” nature of
the ICC’s relationship with domestic courts (Majinge, 2009: 154). Article
17 stipulates that the ICC is a court of last resort as cases are only admis-
sible if a national process is not initiated. Furthermore, under Article 18,
the ICC is required to inform the state of their intent to prosecute, and
the state subsequently has one month to initiate its own process. The ICC
has the right to review this process after six months to see if it is genuine.
The most contested issue faced by the ICC is that of immunity for
persons holding high-ranking public office. Article 27 sets aside any
immunities by stipulating the irrelevance of official capacity, with Article
27(1) specifically mentioning heads of states and heads of government.
In turn, Article 27(2) sets aside any immunities or procedures under
international law, which would bar the Court’s jurisdiction. To many this
is in contravention of international law as the Rome Statute sets aside
existing and still valid legal principles such as the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic and Consular Relations of 1961 and 1963. This is especially
noteworthy given the Rome Statute’s Article 21(1), which states: “The
Court shall apply … where appropriate, applicable treaties and the prin-
ciples and rules of international law.” However, precedents have paved
the way for setting aside such immunities, especially in cases where the
224 N. ZÄHRINGER

person is no longer holding office. Examples of international prosecu-

tions of former heads of state include Slobodan Milosevic by the Yugoslav
Tribunal, Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
Augusto Pinochet’s House of Lords extradition case (Cacciatori, 2018:
389).
In contrast, the ICC has indicted four sitting heads of state. Al Bashir
of Sudan and Ghaddafi of Libya were long-time presidents, while in
Kenya, Kenyatta’s investigation was initiated before he became president
(ibid.: 387). More recently, in March 2023, Vladimir Putin of Russia
became the first non-African president to be indicted. In theory, the
question of immunity is less of an issue in cases of state parties to the
Rome Statute as they are deemed to have consented to the suspension
of immunity. This could be argued in the case of Kenya. Consent is also
implied in Article 98, which stipulates that third parties can refuse to
surrender a person with diplomatic immunity to the ICC if the state
of which that person is a national does not agree to the waiver of that
immunity. Nevertheless, if applied to non-state parties through a UNSC
referral, as was the case in Sudan and Libya, the removal of immunities
is at its most contested as state consent was never obtained. Similarly, the
indictment of Putin via a Ukrainian self-referral occurred without Russian
consent, although the crimes in question are deemed to have occurred
on Ukrainian territory. In practice, working without government consent
is often difficult as the ICC relies heavily on state cooperation to gather
evidence. This will always be the case when prosecuting sitting heads of
state.

Linkages Between the UNSC and ICC

From a UN perspective, it is surprising that the 2005 Outcome Docu-
ment makes no reference to the ICC, despite the latter already existing at
the time. However, there are clear links implied, most notably through the
focus on atrocity crimes. In paragraph 138, UN members clearly outlined
the RtoP as limited to instances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity. In turn, the ICC is tasked to prosecute the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression
(Rome Statute Article 5). The main deviations here are ethnic cleansing
and aggression. It could be argued that ethnic cleansing is covered by
the ICC’s definition of crimes against humanity in its Article 7, while
the ICC’s crime of aggression in effect is a breach of the UN Charter,
 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 225

which prohibits the use of force in Article 2(4). Hence, there is clearly
a large overlap in defining atrocity crimes as well as the jurisdiction of
these two international organisations. To differentiate between the role
played by the two organisations, it is necessary to examine the second
RtoP paragraph of the Outcome Document, i.e. paragraph 139. This clar-
ifies that the focus of the international community’s responsibility to act is
in instances where a state is unable or unwilling to act, again mirroring the
ICC’s subsidiary nature. This paragraph also outlines that collective action
and the use of force is a last resort, applied on a “case-by-case basis”, after
“appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” have
been pursued. By involving the ICC, the UN is pursuing the latter in the
hope of avoiding military action. Therefore, there is no doubt that the
UN and the ICC were created to complement each other in their action
on atrocity crimes.
From the perspective of the ICC, the link is more explicit, although
the level of interconnectedness was a major point of contention during
the negotiations of the Rome Statute. On the one hand there were those
who hoped to create an institution which complemented the work of the
UNSC, but remained independent to avoid political interference, while
on the other hand some wanted to grant the UNSC oversight (Arbour,
2014: 196). In the end, Article 13 allows the UNSC to refer any situation
to the ICC, whether it concerns an ICC member or not. Consequently,
it extends the ICC’s jurisdiction beyond contracting parties. The 1990s
UN tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda set the precedent
in this regard. Inclusion into the ICC Statute recognises this and places
these investigations and prosecutions under one single umbrella organ-
isation rather than having the UNSC establish their own tribunals. So
far there have been two UNSC referrals, one on Sudan/Darfur and one
on Libya. Here again, the ICC is merely instructed to investigate, but
any prosecution is still dependent on Pre-Trial Chamber approval. For
the UNSC, an ICC referral is an easy way to avoid having to take more
serious action (Sudan) or alternatively a precursory warning, intended
to scare offenders into ceasing any major human rights violations, and
backed with a clear threat of more serious action (Libya). Once a case is
referred, the UNSC is not deemed to have handed over all responsibility.
Instead under Article 87 of the Rome Statute, the UNSC is expected to
follow up when states do not cooperate with the ICC in such instances
(Knottnerus, 2014: 196).
226 N. ZÄHRINGER

In addition to the power of referral, the UNSC also has the power to
defer a case according to Article 16 of the Rome Statute. It can do so
for 12 months at a time, with the possibility of indefinite renewal. The
Statute implies that this deferral can be applied to any case before the
court, not just UNSC referrals. Any USNC deferral would result in the
case being paused. While the UNSC cannot removed a case completely,
the UNSC is not required to specify the cause for a deferral. In a Rela-
tionship Agreement which was reached in 2004 between the UN and the
ICC, it was clarified that UNSC deferral requests need to be adopted as
a resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which implies deferrals
can only occur if they serve the “maintenance of international peace and
security” (Knottnerus, 2014: 198, 205). Deferrals are generally seen as
legitimate if they serve the cause of peace. To date no cases have been
deferred, despite the AU calling for deferrals in Libya, Kenya and Sudan.
Surprisingly, the ICC itself has no scope to defer cases, reinforcing the
fact that its aim is accountability, not peace.

Problems Underpinning
the UNSC-ICC Relationship
On examining the interconnectedness of these two IOs, several prob-
lematic issues can be observed which place strain on their relationship.
The first concern is the one-sided nature of the relationship. It seems the
UNSC is holding all the cards. It has the power to refer a non-party state
for investigation and can defer any current ICC investigation. Referrals of
sitting heads of state in effect remove their immunity, while deferrals are
only a temporary pause. With no option to subsequently dismiss a case
based on successful peace negotiations, a deferral is likely to encourage
the accused to tamper with evidence by intimidating witnesses and having
evidence disappear. In the case of Sudan, the ICC warrant of arrest is seen
to have increased Al Bashir’s drive to stay in power, while in Kenya the
ICC gradually lost public support with the indictments of Kenyatta and
Ruto as both gained in popularity (Cacciatori, 2018: 396, 399). These
futile prosecutions leave the ICC looking ineffective. Libya was the closest
the UNSC came to finding the correct balance between referring and
deferring a case. UNSC Resolution 1970, which referred the Libyan situ-
ation to the ICC also recalled the UNSC’s right to defer the case, if this
were to become necessary (Arbour, 2014: 199). However, to date the
ICC has failed to complete any prosecution of a head of state, whether
 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 227

former or sitting (Cacciatori, 2018: 391). Gaddafi was killed before he

could be arrested, Kenyatta’s case had to be dropped due to lack of
evidence, Sudan has yet to hand over or prosecute Al Bashir and Putin
maintains strong international support outside of the West.
The second concern is that these two IOs do not have an overlap-
ping membership (unlike the International Court of Justice, which all
UN members are required to sign up to). Most importantly, three of the
five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC have not yet joined the ICC,
namely the United States, Russia and China. While the ICC relies on
the support of all its members, the UNSC is driven by the P5 and the
geopolitical dynamics which exist. This has twofold implications. On the
on hand, it allows for non-ICC members to influence who is prosecuted,
while on the other hand it also enables political interference in judicial
processes. This is highlighted by both the referral and deferral processes.
The UNSC also has failed to act against its member states that are seen
to be obstructing an ICC investigation, especially in instances of UNSC
referrals (Knottnerus, 2014: 196). Meanwhile, Article 16 on deferrals
has been abused by the UNSC to grant blanket immunity to non-ICC
member states in instances such as peacekeeping operations (ibid.: 203),
again defeating the ends of justice.
This raises the question of what exactly is meant by justice. The concept
of justice can be differentiated into two distinct forms: Retributive justice
and restorative justice. The former focuses on prosecuting perpetrators
for crimes committed, while the latter intends to help the victims in
overcoming the consequences of crimes. Retributive justice is a unilateral
imposition of punishment, while restorative justice is a bi-lateral process
(Wenzel et al., 2008: 375). The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) is an example of restorative justice. It highlighted
the importance of truth and moving out of a period of conflict into
a period of peace. This is particularly important for countries emerging
from conflict (Majinge, 2009: 154). However, it does beg the question
as to which is the most important: truth, peace or punishment. With the
focus of the ICC being squarely on retributive justice, it remains unclear
who is tasked with restorative justice and how this can be pursued. Ulti-
mately, the question remains as to the true nature of the relationship
between the UNSC and the ICC. Is it based on coordination, comple-
mentarity or do both organisations largely act in isolation? Furthermore,
do their objectives overlap or do they act in pursuit of separate, yet
distinct goals? Shilaho (2018: 120) argues that there should not have
228 N. ZÄHRINGER

to be a choice between justice and peace as the two reinforce each other,
while allowing impunity to continue will only contribute to instability.
The AU has recognised this with its shift to non-indifference, away from
its predecessor’s non-interference approach.

African Contestation of the ICC

The African group is the second largest in the ICC’s Assembly of State
Parties (ASP). However, it remains under-represented in the UNSC,
occupying only three of the 15 seats. One of the main criticisms against
the ICC is that up until recently all indictments have targeted Africans.
This is not helped by perceptions of the UNSC, where between 2001
and 2014, 58% of all geopolitical UNSC resolutions were on Africa
(Deplano, 2015: 57). Many view these facts as indicating a selection bias
by both the ICC and the UNSC towards Africa. It should, however, be
noted that many of these ICC cases occurred as self-referrals by African
states (see Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central
African Republic, Mali). In truth, African objections only appeared after
the ICC started indicting sitting heads of state (Werle et al., 2014). In
2017 an AU Assembly resolution called on its members to stop cooper-
ating with the ICC and to withdraw en mass. By 2018 this response was
toned down with the AU deciding to rather pursue legal avenues such
as seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice
and an interpretive declaration from the ICC’s management oversight
and legislative body on the question of immunities for heads of states
(Bachmann & Sowatey-Adjei, 2020: 248–250). On the home front, the
Malabo Protocol which proposes a merger of the African Court of Justice
and Human and People’s rights with the Court of Justice of the African
Union, reflects an immunity clause for sitting heads of states while in
office (Arnould, 2017: 6).
However, given that two of the heads of state indictments came as a
result of a UNSC referral, the question should be asked whether African
states are directing their criticisms at the correct IO. The evidence tends
to point to the UNSC as the culprit rather than the ICC. It should,
however, be noted that Resolution 1593 which referred the Darfur situa-
tion to the ICC received consenting votes from Benin and Tanzania with
only Algeria abstaining as an African representative. In the case of Reso-
lution 1970 on Libya, all African states on the UNSC at the time, namely
Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa voted in favour (Shilaho, 2018: 132).
 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 229

Undoubtedly, the subsequent African outcry has influenced the UNSC as

no referrals have occurred since 2011.
In effect, African states can be identified as norm antipreneurs, actors
who are challenging the emergence of a new normative structure, in this
case anti-impunity, with preference for the status quo (Mills & Bloom-
field, 2018: 1). The African stance highlights tension with the removal of
diplomatic immunity. In essence, it could be argued that African states are
applying Article 98 of the Rome Statute that protects third parties from
breaking their obligations under international law (Tladi, 2014: 392).
Nevertheless, at its most extreme the accusation brought by African states
is one of regime change through legal means (Mills & Bloomfield, 2018:
26, 31) which would equate to judicial imperialism (Werle et al., 2014:
190). If true, then these antipreneurs have every reason to be concerned.
As new norms evolve, they often have unintended consequences and
antipreneurs have an important role to play to ensure that norm evolution
indeed serves the goal of progress. Surprisingly and despite all the criti-
cism, the ICC’s involvement in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya and Uganda showed
some positive consequences in that the ICC’s investigations and likely
resulted in greater national enactment of laws of accountability in these
countries (Malu, 2019: 190). This is an indication that norm contestation
in itself is not always negative, but rather it often leads to further norm
evolution and consolidation as outlined by Wiener (2014).
Chipaike et al., (2019: 334) find that despite the threat of mass with-
drawal from the ICC, only Burundi has so far taken this step. The Gambia
has reversed their position on leaving the ICC (Mills & Bloomfield, 2018:
35). Originally South Africa did likewise, however with the indictment of
Putin, new calls for an exit have been heard (Fabricius, 2023). It seems
that many African states have realised that despite not being a perfect
institution, it is the only court of last resort to address atrocity crimes.
Leaving the ICC at this point in time may well tarnish their reputation.
This is especially the case as the Malabo Protocol, intended to create an
African equivalent, has not yet received the required number of ratifica-
tions. Meanwhile, Tladi (2014: 381) argues that “all three entities [the
UN, ICC and AU] … are culpable in the use and abuse of coopera-
tion against each other in the pursuit of narrow interests.” However, the
ICC cannot succeed without effective state cooperation (ibid.: 387) and it
seems most of the AU’s quarrel with the ICC should instead be directed
towards the UNSC (ibid.: 392). There is therefore no good reason to
leave and instead there are many good reasons to stay.
230 N. ZÄHRINGER

Moving Forward
In light of the above, the following steps remain available in re-
envisioning the coordination between the ICC and the UNSC in an
effort to better institutionalise the RtoP within the UN and the ICC.
Firstly, a greater emphasis should be placed on Article 17 of the Rome
Statute. The ICC has no admissibility if national prosecutions are taking
place. The ICC only has jurisdiction if a state is unable or unwilling to
act. Here it is imperative to assist states to be able to act, even if this
includes alternative approaches to justice, as long as these meet accept-
able international standards. The entry into force of the Malabo Protocol
would be a step in this direction, despite being a regional, rather than
domestic mechanism. Either mechanism, in effect, would be based on
state consent. This reinforces state sovereignty and the subsidiary nature
of the ICC (Majinge, 2009). Secondly, the ICC can make greater use of
Article 53(2c). Nothing stops the prosecutor to determine that a prosecu-
tion is not in the interest of justice, given the circumstances and interests
of the victims. Furthermore, a new international treaty is needed that
deals with accountability versus immunity and amnesty. This would fill
an important gap in international law. Such a treaty could also focus
on the use of transitional justice and hybrid courts by finding a balance
between retributive and restorative justice, between peace and truth, while
combining national with international law. Once such a treaty is in place,
the ICC could then activate the Rome Statute’s Article 31(3): “At trial,
the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility
… where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in
article 21.” While it is yet unclear to what extent an ICC investigation
or indictment may interfere with reconciliation processes, it is clear that
international criminal justice must form part of a broader process if peace
is to be maintained in post-conflict situations (Malu, 2019: 198, 200).
Next, there is also scope for better coordination between the ICC and
the UNSC. The ICC, especially its ASP, should have a say in UNSC refer-
rals. UN referrals and deferrals are selective and inconsistent. Syria is an
obvious case where atrocities occurred and which was never referred to
the ICC. The emergence of the RtoP and its growing institutionalisa-
tion at the UN should be interpreted as an obligation by the UNSC
to act. To this end, there are also increasing voices that in instances of
atrocity crimes, the P5 should refrain from using their vetoes (Trahan,
2013: 469). Ideally, a UN referral to the ICC should be underpinned by
 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT … 231

a greater range of consensus, such as a two-thirds UN General Assembly

vote which excludes the possibility of a P5 veto. This would counter any
selectivity and inconsistency. With the P5 unlikely to approve any changes
to the UN Charter, the alternative is to revise the Rome Statute in this
regard.
Furthermore, any threat of leaving by African states is effective in
exerting pressure on the ICC to change as the latter wants to be seen
as widely accepted. However, leaving is ultimately counterproductive for
all parties. African states have the power to change the ICC from the
inside. Until a better solution is found, the referral and deferral mecha-
nism granted to the UNSC should be put on hold. Instead, the option
of adding an ICC deferral and even a suspension of a case in the interest
of restorative justice should be considered. All of this can be achieved by
a revision of the Rome Statute, which can be undertaken by the ICC’s
ASP. These may be short-term solutions, as ultimately it does not resolve
the long-term question of how to structure what should be an essential
relationship between the two global IOs which focus on atrocity crimes.
As to the question of immunity for heads of state and government,
there is unlikely to be a majority amongst the ICC’s ASP in favour of
granting such immunity. Nevertheless, one suggestion may be that on
application by a regional organisation such as the AU, of which the state
affected is a member, immunity should be upheld. This brings in some
flexibility and shifts some power to regional organisations such as the AU,
without making it seem that atrocity committing autocrats should always
go free.

Conclusion
Both the ICC and the UNSC have at their disposal the tools that would
help eliminate atrocity crimes. In line with the RtoP, both IOs place the
primary responsibility on national governments and will only act if the
latter is unable or unwilling to act. The ICC’s focus is on retributive
justice, holding perpetrators of atrocity crimes accountable under inter-
national law. Meanwhile the UNSC has the authority under Chapter 7 to
respond to any threat to international peace and security, which is deemed
to include the occurrence of atrocity crimes. The problem here is that the
UNSC is often paralysed by geopolitical concerns and vetoes by the P5.
It is often forgotten that international law is not an effective legal
system as it lacks an overarching legislative authority as well as strong
232 N. ZÄHRINGER

enforcement mechanisms that hold all actors equally accountable. There-

fore, relationships in the international arena are and will remain political
in their essence. The relationship between the UNSC and the ICC is
no exception. This chapter has outlined relevant legal principles from
the Rome Statute, the UN Charter, and the 2005 Outcome Document,
which underpin this relationship. Yet even in pursuit of the above legal
analysis, the political nature of the UNSC becomes apparent. The analysis
also highlights an imbalance in the relationship. If atrocity crimes are to
be eliminated under the RtoP, then these principles need to be improved
upon. Yet any changes depend by and large on political will. African
states under the auspices of the AU have shown that they have some
political power in the ICC if this is not discarded by leaving. However,
the big question which remains is whether the challenge from Africa
will strengthen or weaken the ICC and the important role it plays in
addressing atrocity crimes.
More uncertain is how this will impact the UNSC. To effectively imple-
ment the RtoP across the board, the UN must come on board as the ICC
is only one peg in the larger structure. The UN has the sole authority to
intervene, to end atrocities and to apprehend perpetrators and hand them
over to the ICC. It is also best placed to facilitate peace negotiations.
Without the UN’s backing, the ICC remains restricted in its jurisdiction
and effectiveness. However, without the backing (or at least abstention)
by all P5 members of relevant UNSC resolutions, there is little cause for
optimism. This begs the question of whether alternative mechanisms at
the regional level would not ultimately be the best option to help insti-
tutionalise the RtoP. Here the AU stands out as the only IO which has
to date given legal effect and institutionalised the full scope of the RtoP
through its Constitutive Act, Peace and Security Council Protocol and
Malabo Protocol.

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 Peace Enforcement in the Face
of International Military Intervention

Micheal Oluwasegun Aregbesola

and Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa

Introduction
From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until now, the history of the
modern state system has placed great emphasis on state sovereignty and
the inviolability of national borders against foreign interference (Donmez,
2018). However, since the end of the Cold War, the traditional under-
standing of state sovereignty has undergone a shift (Donmez, 2018).
The issue of failed or failing states has necessitated a response from
the international community, often in the form of military interven-
tion, to prevent humanitarian disasters caused by political instability and
increased insecurity in these states. Clausen (2019) defines failed states
as ungoverned spaces that become safe havens for terrorists. Therefore,

M. O. Aregbesola (B)
University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
J. O. Bolarinwa
Research and Studies Department, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
(NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 235

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_14
236 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

armed intervention in failed states becomes necessary to protect both

domestic populations and global peace.
According to Donmez (2018), military intervention has become a
means of international community intervention to restore a safe and
secure environment, with a focus on creating institutions to ensure the
survival of the state, regardless of the sovereign rights of nations. Building
upon this perspective, Sixpence and Chilunjika (2020) argue that mili-
tary intervention is a crucial tool for “compelling nation states to adhere
to the principles of international law.” Similarly, the United Nations has
authorized the use of force as a legitimate method for resolving inter-
national disputes in Chapter VII of its Charter. Consequently, discourses
surrounding military interventions continue to hold a prominent place
in the current international agenda, drawing lessons from interventions
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the unsuccessful UN and AU intervention in
Darfur (Cottey, 2008: 429).
It is understandable that the need for international military interven-
tion arises from the UN’s mandate to keep peace and promote inter-
national security. However, this peace and security cannot be achieved
if the safety of civilians is compromised. Since 1999, civilian protection
has become a common objective in United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ations (Williams, 2010: 287). The UN Security Council has addressed
civilian protection as a thematic issue since 1999, recognizing its impor-
tance (Williams, 2010: 288). It can be argued that the growing emphasis
on civilian protection stems from the realization that local populations
often assess the effectiveness of a mission based on the level of civilian
protection provided, among other factors (UN Security Council Report,
1999).
Furthermore, successful peace operations must prioritize what the
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) referred to
as “the primacy of politics,” as stated in their 2015 report titled “Uniting
Our Strength for Peace: Politics, Partnership, and People” (HIPPO) (UN
General Assemby and Security Council, 2015). Peace operations are
designed as political instruments, occasionally utilizing military means for
security purposes (Williams, 2021: 25). This implies that peace opera-
tions must be an integral part of a viable process to achieve a political
settlement. The HIPPO report asserts that sustainable peace can only be
achieved and maintained through political solutions, rather than military
or technical interventions. The research argues that the real catalysts for
peacekeepers are not military power, but political solutions.
 PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL … 237

However, considering the historical failures of most military interven-

tions, such as the Yugoslav Wars, the Rwandan Genocide, Darfur, recent
interventions in Libya and Syria, and the ongoing unrest in these nations,
it is worth questioning whether such military actions can genuinely
enforce peace. The main argument of this essay, driven by the quest
for answers to this question, posits that peacekeepers often focus solely
on surface-level protection of civilians without addressing the under-
lying structural issues that give rise to violence against civilians, thereby
exacerbating political and social instability in the most affected countries.
In this context, the essay advocates for initiatives that promote local
resilience building and empowerment as vital political solutions and
effective steps towards achieving peace, as opposed to relying solely on
international military intervention, which is merely a temporary measure
and cannot sustain lasting peace. This argument is situated within the
framework of Galtung’s (1996) Conflict Triangle Model, which views
conflict as a three-dimensional construct comprising attitude, behaviour,
and contradiction, thereby strengthening the analysis. Within this frame-
work, peace-building targets the fundamental factors that contribute to
conflicts, while peacekeeping operations primarily address behaviour. The
study contends that resilient and empowered local populations can be
real agents in establishing peace in conflict-ridden regions of the world,
whereas international military intervention falls short as it merely focuses
on de-escalating conflicts.
The essay consists of six sections. The introduction provides an
overview, followed by a section defining key terminology. The third
section delves into the theoretical foundations of the study. The fourth
section examines the success of military interventions. The fifth section
highlights the significance of community resilience and empowerment
as genuine political solutions that foster sustainable peace. Finally, the
conclusion reflects on the key points discussed.

Definition of Terms
In order to provide a solid analytical framework for the central thesis of
this paper, the terms peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and international
military intervention were defined to establish their proper contextual
understanding.
238 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

. Peacekeeping

The United Nations was established with the aim of “saving succeeding
generations from the scourge of war” (Tshiband, 2010). Peacekeeping is
closely associated with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which addresses
peaceful resolution of disputes (Karlsrud, 2015 as cited in Coning, 2017:
3). According to Carrière (2010), peacekeeping refers to actions under-
taken to prevent war, stabilize the environment, and facilitate the peace
process during fragile ceasefires. The official definition of peacekeeping
from The Blue Helmet, the United Nations’ official account, is as follows:

A peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as a United Nations

operation involving military personnel but without enforcement powers,
undertaken to help maintain or restore international peace and security in
conflict zones. (United Nations, 1996)

This definition clearly emphasizes the concept of the Holy Trinity

as a central principle. Over time, peacekeeping has evolved from being
primarily military-focused to encompass multidimensional operations
involving military, police, and civilian components, based on practical
experiences in the field (Tshiband, 2010: 2). Thus, within this expanded
framework, the 2008 United Nations Report on Peacekeeping Oper-
ations, Principles, and Guidelines defines peacekeeping as follows: “a
technique designed to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has
ceased, and to assist in the implementation of agreements reached by the
peacemakers.” Peacekeeping has moved from a predominantly military
model of observing ceasefires and separating forces after interstate wars
to a complex model involving multiple elements—military, police, and
civilian—working together to help establish the foundations for long-term
peace”.
Based on the above, the scope of peacekeeping has broadened to
include creating conducive conditions for addressing the root causes of
conflicts, such as providing humanitarian assistance, restoring the rule
of law, and protecting civilians. The concept of multidimensional peace-
keeping, which encompasses military, civilian, and police cooperation to
achieve peace and stability in conflict zones, has become essential due to
these new dimensions.
 PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL … 239

. Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement refers to the imposition of a settlement by a

powerful third party (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000 as cited in Tshiband,
2010: 2). If parties involved in a conflict fail to adhere to the imposed
or agreed-upon path, peace enforcement, utilizing force or the threat of
force, can be authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Only the
Security Council has the authority to authorize such operations within the
United Nations, and the first operation of this kind was known as ONUC
in Congo in 1960.
The concept of peace enforcement is defined in UN peacekeeping
doctrine as the non-consensual intervention of external forces in an
ongoing conflict. The consent of the host country or other parties to the
conflict is not required before intervening. According to the 2008 United
Nations Report on Peacekeeping Operations, Principles, and Guidelines,
peace enforcement is defined as: “the use of a range of coercive measures,
including the use of military force, authorized by the Security Council.
Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security
when the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to
peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression. Where appropriate, the Secu-
rity Council may use regional organizations and agencies to carry out
enforcement actions under its authority”.
Coning (2017) succinctly states that “peace enforcement typically
assumes that an aggressor(s) has been identified by the UN Security
Council, and that the use of force has been authorized to impose the will
of the Council on the aggressor(s).” Coning concludes that “an impor-
tant distinction is that while peacekeeping is primarily defensive in nature,
peace enforcement allows for offensive action.” Thus, while peacekeeping
is characterized by a passive approach, peace enforcement involves active
measures. It is worth noting that peacekeeping and peace enforcement
can both be categorized as peace operations or peace support operations.

. International Military Intervention

The concept of international military intervention can be defined as

the deployment or movement of troops or forces from one country
into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or the mili-
tary actions conducted by troops already stationed in one country within
240 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

another, with the objective of addressing a political issue or dispute

(Pearson & Baumann, 1988). Similarly, Pearson and Baumann (1993)
define International Military Intervention (IMI) as the deployment of
regular troops or forces, including airborne, seaborne, and shelling oper-
ations, from one country to another in the context of a political issue
or dispute. IMI specifically excludes paramilitary groups, private security
forces, government-backed militias, and non-regular military units. They
also emphasize that the intervention must be planned and intentional,
rather than occurring by chance. According to this definition, interna-
tional military intervention refers to discrete events or a series of events
that involve military actions carried out by officially designated armed
forces to influence domestic disputes or political conditions in a target
state.
These definitions highlight the understanding that international mili-
tary intervention aligns with the criteria of traditional peacekeeping, in
the sense that it is a purposeful action conducted within a given mandate,
aiming to address a political issue or dispute while keeping the peace
with limited use of force. However, within the context of this study,
international military intervention alone is deemed insufficient to enforce
lasting peace, as it fails to address the underlying structural imbalances
that require political solutions. The following section delves into the theo-
retical basis for the argument that international military intervention is
inadequate in maintaining peace.

Theoretical Underpinnings
The Conflict Triangle
According to Johan Galtung, conflict is a threefold construct consisting of
attitudes/assumptions, behaviour, and contradiction/content (Galtung,
1996: 71). Galtung describes conflict as a dialectic relationship between
the manifest and latent dimensions. The manifest dimension encompasses
observable and conscious behaviours such as communication, actions, and
physical violence, while the latent dimension involves attitudes, assump-
tions, emotions, and contradictions (desired goals and their attainment)
(Galtung, 1996: 72).
Applying Galtung’s Conflict Triangle to support my argument in this
paper, international military intervention within the framework of peace-
keeping operations can effectively address the behavioural aspects of a
 PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL … 241

conflict. Its purpose is to de-escalate violence, protect civilians, and restore

immediate peace in the aftermath of a violent conflict. However, solely
addressing the behavioural dimension of a violent conflict is insufficient
to achieve lasting peace.
To address the root causes of a conflict and pave the way for sustain-
able peace, it is crucial to critically examine the latent dimension of the
conflict. This involves understanding the underlying conditions that fuel
the violent conflict and devising strategic actions in collaboration with the
civilian population of the target state to foster enduring peace. There-
fore, peace-building focuses on addressing the fundamental causes of
the conflict. Thus, my argument in this paper emphasizes the signifi-
cance of civilian protection, local resilience building, and empowering the
local populace as essential factors derived from genuine political solutions
that can effectively enforce peace, as opposed to international military
intervention’s limited focus on the manifest aspects of the conflict.

Liberal Democratic Peace and Peacekeeping Operations

The concept of liberal democratic peace is characterized by two concep-
tual divisions that shape perspectives on the role of peace operations in
global politics. These divisions are known as the “Westphalian” and “post-
Westphalian” conceptions of peacekeeping. The Westphalian conception
reflects a commitment to liberalism and democracy, which forms the basis
of the democratic peace theory. It emphasizes preserving the internal
integrity and political independence of sovereign states. The League
of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter, both products
of negotiations in 1944 and 1945, respectively, promoted the idea of
peace through liberal democracy while respecting the primacy of state
sovereignty and imperial interests (Claude, 1984; Walters, 1952).
While achieving a world composed entirely of democratic states may
not be feasible, diplomacy should follow liberal principles, advocating for
the avoidance of war, open diplomacy, termination of secret alliances, and
the pursuit of international arbitration when desired by potential belliger-
ents (Bellamy & Williams, 2004: 3). In line with this, the UN applied the
Westphalian logic to conflict resolution from the 1950s onward, estab-
lishing traditional peacekeeping. This approach is based on the “holy
trinity” of consent, impartiality, and minimal use of force, with the
primary objective of creating conditions conducive to long-term conflict
resolution by the involved parties.
242 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

The post-Westphalian concept of peace operations emerged from the

belief that, just as liberalism and democracy brought peace and pros-
perity to Western countries, promoting democracy and market economics
through a new aid paradigm would be the most effective way to
achieve stability in conflict-prone states (Duffield, 1999 in Bellamy &
Williams, 2004: 4). This evolution led to the post-Westphalian approach
to peacekeeping, predominantly supported by Western states. Boutrous-
BoutrousGhali succinctly summarized this approach, stating that demo-
cratic governments’ accountability and transparency to their citizens help
restrain military conflicts between states. The legitimacy conferred on
democratically elected governments garners respect from the people of
other democratic states and fosters expectations of negotiation, compro-
mise, and the rule of law (Ghali, 1996).
According to the post-Westphalian perspective, for long-term peace to
be established in the international system, all governments should practice
liberal democracy. This implies that democratic states form relationships
based on mutually beneficial cooperation, free trade, and peaceful trans-
formation. Conversely, areas lacking a liberal culture are predicted to
experience more frequent conflicts (Bellamy & Williams, 2004: 4). When
peace operations are justified from this standpoint, their primary objective
is not merely to facilitate negotiated conflict resolution between states
but to contribute to the establishment and promotion of liberal poli-
ties, economies, and communities. In essence, post-Westphalian peace
operations aim to disseminate and defend liberal democratic governance.
Therefore, it is worth examining whether international military operations
have been successful in spreading democracy and establishing enduring
peace within this framework, as detailed in the following section.

Has International Military

Interventions Ever Worked?
Before 1990, most UN peacekeeping missions, with the exception of the
UN operation in Congo (ONUC) in 1960, primarily consisted of small
observer forces deployed to monitor ceasefires and establish neutral zones
between rival parties (UN Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, 2010).
However, significant developments in peacekeeping operations occurred
with the end of the Cold War. The United Nations authorized robust
and diverse tasks for peacekeeping operations in countries like Cambodia
 PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL … 243

(UNTAC), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Angola (UNAVEM II), and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
According to the 2014 Clingendael Report, some of these operations
were initially perceived as effective. The UN-mandated operation Desert
Storm in Iraq in 1991, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, was
considered successful and supported the notion of effectiveness. However,
subsequent operations faced challenges due to emerging humanitarian
issues and the belief that action was necessary under the authority of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia and the United Nations Operation in
Somalia II (UNOSOM II) were unable to maintain or enforce peace due
to resource limitations (Clingendael Report, 2014).
In addition to political and humanitarian challenges, military concerns
have significantly hindered the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions (Athambawa & Mohammed, 2019). Athambawa and Mohammed
(2019) highlighted the inadequate capacity of peacekeeping forces as a
major drawback that impairs successful interventions. Examples such as
Rwanda and Somalia come to mind. Despite the presence of UN peace-
keeping forces in Rwanda, approximately 800,000 people were massacred
by armed groups in just one month in 1994. Similarly, under the observa-
tion of UN soldiers, 8000 Muslims were slaughtered when Bosnian Serb
militias surrounded the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia (Miall et al., 2006).
In the case of Rwanda, the authorization for troop deployment came
months after the need for action arose. This highlights the issue of
limited capacity to respond promptly and control violence and human
rights abuses during operations. Hansen (2004) emphasized that internal
coordination issues among multinational forces often hinder effective
communication and logistics. The lack of credibility among the local
population and police, as well as a poor understanding of local culture and
geography, further diminishes the effectiveness of interventions. There-
fore, it is crucial to explore alternatives to armed action as genuine
political solutions for establishing peace.
244 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

International Military Interventions:

Making Case for Communal
Resilience and Empowerment Agenda
Scholars such as Wills (2009), Williams (2010), and Williams (2010:
288) have observed a significant shift in the UN Security Council’s
focus on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) as a thematic issue since
1999. PoC mandates have been assigned to 12 UN-led peacekeeping
operations in countries such as the Central African Republic, Burundi,
Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Lebanon, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and
South Sudan. The 2008 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and
Department of Field Support (DPKO and DFS) Principle and Guideline
statement emphasized PoC as a crucial responsibility of UN peace-
keeping, calling for coordination among various actors, including UN
humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and the promotion of international
humanitarian law.
This shift towards PoC in UN peacekeeping operations is driven by
the need to advance democracy, good governance, and prevent violence
against civilians during times of war, ultimately reducing the long-term
risk of new conflicts. Williams (2010: 288) argues that peacekeeping
efforts should support conflict resolution by creating opportunities for
the development of democratic government institutions. Carrière (2010),
building upon Galtung’s perspective (1996: 112), asserts that addressing
the root causes and contradictions underlying a conflict is essential for
transforming it. Hence, peace-building addresses structural issues and
long-term relationships among conflicting parties (Ramsbotham et al.,
2005 in Tshiband, 2010: 2). As stated earlier, “UN peacekeeping will
continue to struggle with the difficult task of protecting civilians at
the operational level without having the means to address some of the
fundamental structural elements that give rise to violence against civil-
ians” (Williams, 2010: 288). The resilience of local communities and
the empowerment of individuals within those communities are addressed
as tactical approaches for genuine peace enforcement in the following
sections.

Communal Resilience
The concept of resilience emphasizes the actions taken by local communi-
ties and their inherent defences to protect themselves, rather than relying
 PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL … 245

solely on foreign forces. Williams (2010: 291) argues for the impor-
tance of community resilience, highlighting two factors that contribute
to enhancing the resilience of at-risk local communities.
In most cases, local actors are the ones primarily responsible for
physical protection. For foreign policies to be effective in the medium
and long term, they must integrate with local knowledge systems and
networks. Bonwick (2006) supports this argument, stating that civilian
populations often take effective action to protect themselves in emergency
situations, even in the absence of external peacekeepers. For example,
when the crisis in Darfur began in 2003, there were few external orga-
nizations present, and no peacekeepers or military monitors. It took
18 months for the first foreign agency to arrive (Keen, 2008). Cobett
and Harragin’s (2011) studies confirm that “much of the responsibility
for providing protection will always lie with vulnerable civilians” and that
civilians must take steps to ensure their own safety while awaiting outside
assistance, if it arrives at all.
Bellamy and Williams (2009) identified three self-defense strategies:
in situ self-defense, fleeing from danger, and armed resistance. Baines
and Paddon (2011) added three in-place strategies: attempts at neutrality,
avoidance, and accommodation of armed actors. Based on this classifi-
cation, Baines and Paddon (2011) concluded that “civilian self-defense
should be the starting point for building on-ground protection methods.”
Williams (2010: 293) concludes that promoting local information flow,
supporting local preparedness, and fostering communal cohesion are
three crucial dimensions that can enhance the resilience of vulnerable local
communities. As a Sudanese father of four from Nuba stated, “we escaped
(from government attacks) because of three things: the mountains, the
trees, and the togetherness of the people” (Corbett, 2011). This state-
ment emphasizes the importance of social unity in fulfilling the needs of
both the minds and physical bodies of the people, including sociability,
information, belongingness, courage, hope, culture, fun, spirit, and the
will to endure (Corbett, 2011).
Based on the above, Williams (2010: 294) suggests that since external
assistance often arrives late, the best approach to protecting civilian
populations is to improve communal resilience and empower locals to
adapt and develop tools for rapid recovery. From this perspective, peace
enforcement in conflict areas goes beyond traditional foreign military
intervention and deeply involves the strength of societal resilience and
coping mechanisms during and after the conflict.
246 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

Empowerment Agenda
The empowerment agenda posits that solely providing physical security
while fostering resilient local communities is insufficient, as it fails to
address the underlying structural issues that make civilians vulnerable to
violence (Harff, 2003). According to Gizelis (2009), the best way to
prevent violence against civilians is to empower them and encourage their
participation in governance. Kent and McIntyre (2004) further clarify this
theory, stating that civilian protection must evolve into civilian empower-
ment, aligning with peace processes that are accountable to the people
rather than solely to violent actors. Therefore, Protection of Civilians
(PoC) initiatives should focus on methods that simultaneously resolve
conflicts and establish lasting peace (Williams, 2010: 295).
It is important to emphasize women’s empowerment as a critical step
within this agenda, as it aligns with the goal of societal resilience. Interest-
ingly, Corbett’s study in Nuba, Sudan, concluded that “good governance
enhances self-help and communal resilience, and the more distant and
unaccountable the authorities, the less likely they are to respond to the
protection of civilians” (Corbett, 2011: 51).
Furthermore, empowering civilians is crucial as it makes the popu-
lation resilient against authoritarian states and enables them to defend
themselves against the oppressive institutions of their own government.
However, when there are governance issues, only a few local communities
in conflict-affected states can withstand violent attacks from oppres-
sive state apparatuses (Williams, 2010: 295). Corbett’s research in the
Sudanese Nuba Mountains supports this claim, as it reveals that “immense
suffering in the face of conflict is inevitable without proper empowerment
of local communities against aggressive governmental machinery.”
As a result, “the political empowerment of civilians is the most effec-
tive way to prevent mass atrocities during war” (Williams, 2010: 295).
Although it is a noble agenda, invading state sovereignty is a delicate
issue in this context, and the UN cannot pursue it. As demonstrated in
Sudan (Johnstone, 2011), host regimes may decide to cease agreeing to
the presence of UN peacekeepers due to their fear of losing control and
their aversion to foreign interference in internal affairs. To advance the
governance agenda and empower civilians, Williams (2010: 296) advo-
cates for diplomats and peacemakers to work alongside peacekeepers. I
agree with this viewpoint because, rather than military intervention, the
key to achieving lasting peace lies in the international community assisting
 PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL … 247

local populations within their national governance structures, enabling

inclusive participation, access to resources, and increased power to pursue
lasting peace autonomously.

Final Reflections
While the importance of physically protecting people is commendable,
this study concludes that without community resilience and citizen
empowerment, it is insufficient to ensure lasting peace. These two aspects
deserve attention because resilient communities can help prevent crises
and expedite recovery if they occur. In times of conflict, communal
resilience is crucial for sustaining livelihoods. Similarly, empowering the
local population is vital, as strong communities under authoritarian
regimes are unlikely to achieve sustainable peace. The more capable civil-
ians are, the greater their potential to influence government decisions
affecting them, prevent crises, and access necessary resources.
This leads to the realization that international military intervention can
only partially resolve humanitarian crises in conflict zones. The effective-
ness of such interventions, detached from concurrent conflict resolution
processes that encompass governance reforms, is debatable. They may
protect civilians on the surface without addressing the underlying struc-
tural issues that contributed to the escalation of conflict. Thus, they are
insufficient to maintain peace effectively.
On the other hand, when an empowered local population is involved in
the governance structures of a country, home-grown efforts to build and
sustain peace over the long term become possible. However, well-trained,
well-equipped, and dedicated peacekeeping forces, in coordination with
other relevant stakeholders, can play a vital role in reducing violence
against civilians during war. Locals possess valuable knowledge of the
context, and when they receive support from the international community
to exert political influence within national institutions, underlying factors
driving violence can be addressed promptly. Instead of relying solely on
military and technological means to wage war, when the root political
issues are resolved, peace can truly be established.
248 M. O. AREGBESOLA AND J. O. BOLARINWA

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 The Media, Armed Conflict,
and the Responsibility to Protect

Nureni Aremu Bakenne and Israel Ayinla Fadipe

Background to the Study

Dubbed as the fourth estate of the realm in the mould of legislative, exec-
utive and judiciary arms of governance, the mass media is a collective
force that surveys and reports the activities of various strata and polit-
ical and socio-economic institutions that make up a nation. The Nigerian
media industry’s significance is laid bare through the arduous political
struggles, right from pre-independent to post-independent periods, the
nation has experienced. More so, many Nigerian media practitioners alive
or dead have borne the scars of too many conflicts political actors have
used to forge the polity. The bottom line is that the Nigerian media

N. A. Bakenne (B)
Department of Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent
University, Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]
I. A. Fadipe
Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Faculty of Communication and
Media Studies, Ajayi Crowther University, Oyo, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 251

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_15
252 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

practitioners have a social responsibility to support and protect the voice-

less and marginalized in the society. This observation is entrenched in
the social responsibility paradigm that media practitioners should go
beyond the normal call of duty to serve the people in the margins in
the society, to encourage and nurture the plurality of opinions, and
ensure the elite does not oppress the masses in any guise. Conflicts are
inevitable in human societies because of differences in languages, races,
tribe, interests, opinions, religions, skin colours and so on (Dunu et al.,
2018). In Nigerian case, we have witnessed different forms of conflicts,
ranging from banditry, kidnapping, religious conflicts to agitations for
self-determination by some tribal nationalities.
It has been a recurring feature of our nation ever since independence.
Conflicts are so consequential that they have shaped many people’s future,
especially the vulnerable, and even the future of society in the way humans
may or may not want it to go. Unfortunately, in many cases in Nigeria,
conflicts have resulted in the disruption of our societies and death to
too many human lives. Very many reasons can be ascribed to occur-
rence of conflicts. Different societal actors, knowingly or knowingly, have
contributed to conflicts’ happening in our societies. Considering the enig-
matic role of the media in human societies worldwide, Nigerian media
practitioners representing the various mass media institutions constitute
one of such actors. Thus, there is a need to examine their role in conflict
situations in the country, particularly with the drive towards carrying out
their social responsibility to protect the weak during conflicts. Previous
studies have explored the different shades of the mass media practition-
ers’ functions in crisis communication and management of conflicts in the
polity. For instance, Olorede and Olorode (2013) believe that Nigerian
journalists possess the capacity to escalate or diffuse conflicts depending
on how they employ languages to frame conflict issues and characters.
For instance, Udoakah and Alemoh (2015) discovered that Nigerian
media de-escalated the Bakassi Peninsula conflict between Nigeria and
Cameroon.
They argued that Nigerian newspapers were conscious of their social
responsibility that guarantees sustainable development. However, Uzueg-
bunam and Omenugha (2018) reckoned that information diffusion of
conflict issues through ICTs can help reduce the spate of violence during
conflicts in Nigeria. Also, Odiegwu-Enwerem et al. (2021) advocate the
deployment of peace journalism in conflict resolution. Taking cognizance
of the studies above, the Nigerian media practitioners are no strangers to
 THE MEDIA, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY … 253

defusing tensions during conflict situations. Since there is no mention

in the studies how Nigerian journalists carry out their duty during
conflict situations to protect vulnerable people-women, children, aged
and communities, this paper focuses on how the Nigerian media prac-
titioners tailor their reportage towards the welfare of the defenseless
citizenry in particular and how they fulfill their watchdog role at large
to make the country a better place to live and thrive.

News Reportage of Conflicts in Nigeria

Media coverage of conflicts in Nigeria often reflects the inherent diversity
and divisions engendered by tribal, religious and political considera-
tions in the nation. It means that media conflict coverage is often done
from a parochial lens. Nwankwo (2021: 136) supports the assertion
that ‘the media discourse of farmer-pastoralist conflict’s dichotomous and
conflictive between ecological reasoning and ethnic-regional and religious
imaginations.’ Usigbe and Ilo (2019) further attested to this fact by
testing how through people’s perceptions of media reportage of killings
of the two Catholic priests attributed to Fulani herdsmen in Benue State.
They argued that people had the notion that the media usually under-
represented them in conflict coverage no matter how objective the media
might be. Nevertheless, Okocha and Okejiri (2021) conclude that media
accorded much importance to herders-farmers’ conflicts as the watchdog
of society. Odiegwu-Enwerem et al. (2020) further affirm the parochial
tendencies in media conflict coverage, as they found that the north–south
media dichotomy reflected in the Nigerian media covered herders-farmers
clashes.
This fact particularly shows in primary sources of news, prominence
given to conflict news and themes focused about the conflicts. Simi-
larly, Olabode and Sunmonu (2018) reasoned that the pastoralist-farmer
conflicts’ framing in the Nigerian media landscape could result in further
conflicts along ethnic lines. Their findings buttressed this argument in
that too much focus and space was devoted to calamity/killing theme and
ethnic slants in the coverage. Demarest and Langer (2021) investigated
the extent to which Nigerian newspapers practiced peace journalism by
focusing on real causes rather than stressing religious and ethnic divisions.
Though they discovered that Nigerian media practitioners did not clearly
use divisive language when writing about conflicts, they hardly stressed
254 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

the real root and structural causes of Nigeria. These findings are in conso-
nance with their argument that Nigerian conflicts are essentially caused by
economic marginalization and political competition which the media and
Nigerian politicians scarcely mentioned.
Gever and Essien (2019) also examined farmers and herders’ conflicts
in central Tiv land in Benue State Nigeria. They wanted to know the text
format, frequency, prominence, depth of coverage, language of coverage
and audience assessment of the conflicts. While the media used straight
news format, the researchers found that journalists paid little attention
to the victims of conflicts though they covered the conflicts as they
happened. Also, the prominence given to conflict stories was insignif-
icant. Ofem (2018) examined Ijaw youths’ perceptions of newspapers’
reportage of Niger Delta conflicts between 2006 and 2007. He discov-
ered that while majority of the youths closely followed Niger-Delta
through the media, nearly all the youth perceived the media coverage
as inconsistent and bias towards Niger Delta conflicts. This prejudice
showed in lack of concise language, and propaganda in the reportage.
Although Hamid and Baba (2014) state that the Nigerian media have
been blamed on different occasions for escalating Boko Haram insur-
gency, they wondered if Nigerian media can still be part of its solution.
They believe that Nigerian journalists are not sensitive to the cultural
realities that brought about Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern
Nigeria.
On the other hand, Ndinojuo (2021) and Adebayo (2016) found that
little prominence was given to the women’s role in the fight against Boko
Haram insurgency. Instead, most analysed stories portrayed women as
kidnapped or rescued victims. Therefore, it attributes women’s misrepre-
sentation and underrepresentation to the male-dominated journalism field
that gives male sources preference over issues affecting women. Similarly,
Kente and Sheyigari (2021) discovered that Nigerian media used peace
neutral and mixed frames for reportage of Boko Haram activities, blaming
the media for escalating the conflict. Okeke et al. (2019) discovered that
Nigerian media paid less attention to Indigenous People of Biafra’s agita-
tion causes and solutions. Also, they also realized the Nigerian media
relied too much on official sources of information to the detriment of
plural voices in the conflicts.
 THE MEDIA, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY … 255

Social Responsibility of the Media

vs. Responsibility to Protect
The power and influence of the media in any society is incredible. With
the advent of the internet and social media networks, they dictate how
millions of people live their lives. People’s perceptions, beliefs, faiths and
decisions have been shaped by the media, and this influence affects how
they see the world. Unfortunately, nearly all the media institutions in
human societies are exclusive preserve of the rich and elite who control
what and how masses utilize media contents. This attitude reflects in how
people perceive so many things including conflicts. Despite this reality,
media organisations and practitioners are constrained by their professional
ethics to be fair, objective, truthful and responsible in their duties to
people and society. This notion is encapsulated in the social responsibility
theory of the media. Social responsibility theory of the media is one of the
normative theories which specify the role of the media and practitioners
in any society. The media are expected to conform to a set of ideal social
values.
It shows that this concept confers on media professionals to serve
humanity to engender tolerant society, which McQuail (1987) further
supports.
The application of media principles by journalists is germane for the
survival and unity of any society. However, conflict situations have often
exposed the failure of media practitioners to adhere to the principles that
will ensure and preserve democratic dividends. In crisis situations, jour-
nalists are more than before compelled to apply these principles. One
of the conflict studies’ concepts which bring these poignant realities to
media practitioners has to do with Responsibility to protect (RtoP). The
concept seeks that all member nations of UN should protect their citizen-
ries during conflict situations such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing. Also, the responsibility to protect concept
empowers the UN to act through sanctions or the use of military forces
should a member nation fails in protecting its citizens during conflict situ-
ations Bellamy (2011). According to Bellamy (2010), the basic principles
of responsibility to protect concepts revolve around the following:

. The responsibility to prevent: addressing root causes of internal

conflict. The ICISS considered this to be the most important
obligation.
256 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

. The responsibility to react: responding to situations of compelling

human need with appropriate measures that could include sanctions,
prosecutions or military intervention.
. The responsibility to rebuild: providing full assistance with
recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation.

Therefore, both social responsibility of the media and responsibility to

protect concept are frameworks for preserving human rights and dignities
in the face of conflicts. While social responsibility theory charges media
practitioners and institutions to be obligated to people and society by
avoiding whatever might lead to crime, violence, or civil disorder or give
offence to minority groups, among other responsibilities, responsibility
to protect concept demands that governments should protect their citi-
zens during conflict situations. Studies have shown why Nigeria’s media
practitioners and government need to align their various duties to deesca-
late conflict situations and provide succour to those who have been badly
affected by internal crises such as Boko Haram insurgency, farmer-herder
perennial crises and Niger-Delta agitations in Nigeria. In any conflict,
the real casualties are the people, especial women, children and the aged
who most cultures have been rendered dependent on male-dominated
societies. For instance, Erameh and Obor (2020) while harping on the
challenges facing the entrenchment of responsibility to protect concept in
conflict situations worldwide, lament the atrocities in Syria with civilian
carnage.
The concept is instituted to protect people by their government.
Human rights during conflict situations should not be construed as polit-
ical games, not only by respective nations’ governments but also by the
superpowers that should intervene when people are being made pawns
and casualties in conflict situations (Erameh, 2017). In juxtaposition with
social responsibility of the media, the media practitioners and organisa-
tions are to ensure justice in society by promoting plurality of ideas and
cultures in a fair, accurate and objective manner. Erameh et al. (2021)
indirectly buttress the need for social responsibility of the media in their
analysis of Tuareg Rebellion in Mali. They surmise that among other
factors the myopic (media) reportage of the crisis in Mali aggravated
the conflict situation, which further confirms the media’s disposition in
conflict situations in Africa generally.
 THE MEDIA, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY … 257

Methodology
This study examined how Nigerian media practitioners have adopted the
principles of social responsibility theory of the media and responsibility
to protect of conflict studies in conflicts’ coverage in the country. Partic-
ularly, it focused on how they applied fairness, accuracy and objectivity
and rules of engagement in covering both the conflict actors and victims.
Also, it investigated how they, as prominent members of the Nigerian
community, employed their media to address the root causes of internal
conflicts, human rights issues and proffer lasting solutions to conflicts,
as well as the challenges they face. Consequently, qualitative research
method was adopted, with the use of in-depth interview data gathering
method. Therefore, the paper relied on intensive interviews purposively
conducted for 9 Nigerian journalists. These interview sessions were gath-
ered among journalists in both public and private media organisations-
print, broadcast and online media practitioners. From this list of jour-
nalists interviewed, 4 were affiliated to broadcast media outfits with 2
each from private and public media organisations. Similarly, 5 others were
from the private print media; with 3 from the mainstream print while the
remaining 2 were from online media.
The interviews involved one-on-one engagement with some of the
participants while some were conducted via zoom due to their busy
schedule. This crop of journalists was asked to share their experiences
in the area of conflict reporting as well as the roles they have played to
protect the vulnerable people in the course of their journalistic duties,
and of course, their efforts in calling on those in authority to be alive
to their constitutional duties through their reportage. Their interviews
add up to the findings of the work while excerpts from the data were
presented through thematic analysis along with the results to clarify their
submissions further.

Journalists’ Views of the Responsibility to Protect and Importance

of the Concept to the Vulnerable
Journalist agreed that they contribute stupendously in enhancing RtoP
in order to expose human rights violation. They do this by mediating
between those in zones of safety and zones of suffering (Anderson and
Brakstad, 2016). Also, the Responsibility to Protect provides a norma-
tive framework for bystander states with regards to responses to mass
258 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

atrocities. (See Anderson and Brakstad, 2016; Breakey, 2011; Evans,

2008)). For instance, a journalist with the BBC World Service, Damilola
Oduolowu states that “we, as journalists have key role to play in conflict
and being partial in conflict reportage could increase violence in the soci-
ety”. The above submission aligns with Singer’s (2007) submission on
the fact that the media interfaces among major stakeholders during crisis.
This agrees with Forsyth’s et al. (2012) position that the primary role of
journalist is to educate the public such that their reporting is balanced
and the protect the vulnerable.
Reporting reliable and unbiased information to the public in a time of
conflict requires additional journalism skills and a deeper understanding
of what causes conflict; how it develops and ends (Ishaku, 2021). Simi-
larly, The Punch Correspondent in Ogun State, Nigeria, Daud Olatunji
concurs that it is good to protect the vulnerable by “giving them voice
with a view to exposing the injustice against them and listen to their
complaints”.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that media practitioners escalate
conflicts rather than helping the vulnerable. Asogwa et al. (2012: 180)
argues that “the more the Nigerian media report their (actors in conflict)
activities, the more they perpetrate their evil acts”. Similarly, Yadav (2011:
8) says “the entry of the electronic media had changed the dimensions
of news coverage and presentation of news. As a result, the coverage
has become either sensationalized or commercialized.” But Omenugha
and Oji (2008: 4) note that “how Nigerian media institutions and jour-
nalists are to be judged in the area of responsibility to protect depends
on how much they are seen as credible before the eyes of the public”.
These submissions align with the opinion of a journalist with the Ogun
State Broadcasting Corporation, Nigeria, Waheed Ogunjobi who submits
that “most journalists cause panic in the society through controversial
headlines or inciting pictures that will further escalate the problem”.
On the need to report conflict with professionalism and ethical
consideration, Kazeem Olowe of the Television Continental (TVC) says
“Reporting conflict demands a bit of professionalism. While one is trying
to report what has happened in an environment, there is need for us to
protect people who are mostly affected”. His position aligns with Hassan’s
(2020) who admonishes media men to stay within the ethics of the profes-
sion and also to know how conflict and crisis situation story should be
written accordingly. Similarly, Pate (2009) posits that the media should
always cover conflicts because they are newsworthy. To fully discharge
 THE MEDIA, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY … 259

this responsibility as expected, Pate and Dauda (2015: 223) note that the
media are expected to strengthen their role as mediating agents by inter-
acting with concerned stakeholders. Furthermore, Adeyemi Dalemo of
the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), shares similar experiences with
those of his colleagues by submitting that “during the time of crisis, the
media are critical in contributing objectively on how to respond positively
to life-saving information”.
Above position agrees with Pate and Dauda’s (2015: 10) that “The
mass media, as an integral part of civil society and political structure of
society, needs to reengineer and reposition itself to discharge its consti-
tutional duties by promoting and sustaining peace in Nigeria”. Dahlgren
and Sparks (1992: 5) also have a similar concern that, “Journalists must
become sensitive to the crisis they are reporting, and must acknowledge
such aspect as the multiple subjectivities of every life”. In achieving this,
Kayode (2011) stresses that the press has a moral duty and awesome
responsibilities to reposition itself in discharging its constitutional duties
to the society.
Meanwhile, another broadcast journalist with Oodua 90.9 FM, Ile
Ife, Nigeria, Emmanuel Oke, chastised some of his colleagues for
acting unprofessionally during crisis reportage. He submits: “Rather than
dousing tension by engaging in reportage that fosters peace and develop-
ment, they indulge in the act that escalates crisis”. Also, Adeola Yusuf of
the Platform Africa, Lagos noted that the primary duty of a journalist is to
serve as an arbiter during crisis rather than reporting oddities alone at all
times”. In his submission, a reporter with Platform Times Newspaper in
Ogun State, Sodiq Ojurongbe, simply describes the role of a journalist
during conflict as “soul-saving and nothing else!”. Moreover, Earnest
Nwokolo of The Nation newspaper whose experience on also focused
on herdsmen-farmers’ incessant crises in Yewa area of Ogun State, opines
that “as a matter of fact, my reportage has never been prejudicial, rather,
it has helped the government in shaping its decisions during and after the
crisis”. Another journalist with The Nation newspaper in Lagos, Tajudeen
Adebanjo agrees with other interviewees by submitting that “It is good
to carry out one’s duties as a journalist without prejudice whatsoever”.
260 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

Journalists’ Strategies of Reporting to Achieve Responsibility to Protect

in Conflicts
On the strategy of reporting during conflict in order to achieve Responsi-
bility to Protect, Tajudeen Adebanjo of The Nation Newspaper, surmised
that “there are different people with different strategy of reporting them.
To me, the vulnerable should be protected while we must not forget the
tenets of responsible journalism”.
However, unlike professional journalists in the traditional media who
restrain from exposing the vulnerable, especially children during crisis
situation, the so called citizen journalists or bloggers splash same story
on the internet without considering the vulnerable. Dyikuk (2018: 28)
laments that “Whether professional or amateur, journalists, they have a
portent tool for social and behavioural change in society. This is why their
silence in reporting children in conflict is both saddening and shameful”.
To McKenna (2011), lack of legal knowledge and uncertainty about what
is reportable also constitutes a big challenge during crisis.
For the strategy adopted, the TVC Correspondent, Kazeem Olowe
affirms that “in reporting crisis, a journalist must wear his thinking cap
and must ensure that the conflict is accurately reported without hurting
the vulnerable in any form”. Yemi Dalemo of the NTA also adds that
“the best strategy to adopt in reporting conflict is to, first and foremost,
protect the vulnerable, most especially, the children, women and the aged.
According to Emmanuel Oke of O’odua FM, “the best form of strategy is
to report without prejudice and seek to understand the background infor-
mation. Ideological differences and root cause is an important strategy
for a professional journalist in a conflict situation”. Adeola Yusuf of
the platform Africa Newspaper in Lagos said the best strategy a profes-
sional reporter should adopt during crisis is “to adequately protect the
vulnerable; promotes the weak in the society during conflict reporting”.
Most interviewees seemed to have adopted similar strategies but with
different experiences. Sodiq Ojurongbe of the Platform Time Community
Newspaper tersely presents his experience as follows “I tell the story from
human angle and let the world know what the vulnerable go through”.
On the other hand, Earnest Nwokolo of The Nation Newspaper submits
that “one should approach conflicts with high level of objectivity, fairness
and ethical consideration by recognising the place of truth and as well
expose the root cause of the crisis”.
 THE MEDIA, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY … 261

The trio of Damilola Oduolowu of the BBC World Service, Waheed

Ogunjobi of the Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation and Daud
Olatunji, The Punch Correspondent in Ogun State unanimously agreed
that the primary duty of journalists is to adequately protect the vulner-
able during conflict but their opinions are wrapped in Waheed Ogunjobi’s
submission “on the course of the reportage of a communal crisis, the
minors and women should duly be protected during conflict. This is the
best form of strategy for a responsible journalist”.

Challenges Faced by Journalists in Reporting Conflicts

This research uncovered various challenges and hazards being faced by
journalists because their tasks involve various forms gadgets like camera
and other electronic devices which make their activities to be conspic-
uous. A journalists, with O’odua 90.9 FM, Ile Ife, Nigeria, Emmanuel
Oke laments that “The moment you choose to hide the victim’s identity
becomes very difficult to draw attention to their plight. Hence, the choice
of many organisations to under report victims and capitalize on the hard
angle of the perpetrators in a typical conflict contributes to the problem”.
On this note, Kajuru (2015) alleges that the media is being recruited in
conflict situations to blow trumpets, ignite or precipitate violence among
peace loving people or communities and most times these types of accu-
sations come from the conflict parties who think and expect the media to
be their mouthpiece. Although, Adisa (2012) maintains that these allega-
tions are not peculiar to Nigeria alone because the media across the globe
have been used as tools to inflame grievances during conflicts. Ishaku
(2021: 91) affirms that the media, particularly newspapers, are seen to
be sentimental in their conflict reportage through their choice of words,
placement of stories and sensational headlines and the general way stories
are being portrayed.
According to Kazeem Olowe, a journalist with the TVC laments that
“journalists are often times at the receiving end during conflict. This
results from various degrees of assault on them by perpetrators of crime
are unexplainable. Most of us have been attacked several times on the
course of our duties while our gadgets have equally been destroyed
by perpetrator of crimes”. Adeyemi Dalemo of the NTA submits that
“perpetrators of crime try to shield justice by attacking reporters in the
field”.
262 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

Several journalists have lamented maltreatment in the hands of perpe-

trators of conflict. This is the position of Adeola Yusuf, who is a journalist
with Platform Africa, Nigeria. He narrates “My crew was assaulted during
a protest by the sacked workers of Exxon Mobil at their headquarters in
Lekki, Lagos. While we were trying to unravel the circumstances behind
the protest, I was seriously maltreated by the security personnel of the
organisation. Sodiq Ojurongbe of the Platform Times Newspaper, also
narrates that “I got the beating of my life in the hands of some touts
when I went to cover a clash between transport union and the police
in Ogun State”. Journalists covering conflicts need adequate insurance
from their employers because of the risks attached to their job. This is the
position of Earnest Nwokolo, Correspondent of The Nation Newspaper
“The sensitive nature of our jobs demands adequate protection from our
employers”. Tajudeen Adebanjo of The Nation Newspaper accused the
police of not helping journalists in carrying out their constitutional duties,
rather they complicate it. This does not help us”.
Those in position of authority seem not to help journalists to surmount
various hazards they encounter while carrying out their duties. Waheed
Ogunjobi of the Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation, Nigeria narrates
a terrible experience in the hand of a political office holder in Ogun State
“I was seriously harassed by his boys when I went to interview him”.
Damilola Oduolowu of the BBC World Service advocates for a public
education on the important role of journalists in Nigeria. His experience
on the job is not totally different from others. “Despite the fact that I
work with an international media organisation for that matter, yet I was
attacked by a group of miscreants in Lagos during a crucial assignment”.

Conclusion and Recommendations

RtoP is a veritable tool for journalistic and responsible media which has
been identified as the only panacea to conflict in the society. The number
of people living under constant threat of armed conflict, monumental
human rights abuses and colossal loss of property in Nigeria is alarming,
therefore, needs stakeholders’ urgent attention. Most communities in
Northern Nigeria dangle between the deadly Boko Haram insurgents
(who strike on a daily basis) while those in the Southern part of the
country suffer in the hands of kidnappers who have turned the zone to
haven of criminality—this scenario needs to be curbed through respon-
sible journalism and up-to-date reportage of series of conflicts. This is,
 THE MEDIA, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY … 263

therefore, the focus of this research. However, it is not enough for

governments and policymakers to put an end to conflicts but the onus
lies on media practitioners to do the needful by following the tenets of
RtoP to the letter in order to prevent mass barbarity and protect the
vulnerable from violence through professional reportage. To achieve this,
Sodipo and Pinto (2021) opine that this requires collective efforts and
actions of governments, civil society groups, and international organisa-
tions—all have a role to play in defusing potentially catastrophic situations
from happening.
According to the United Nations, the RtoP focuses on four cardinal
areas: crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and
war crimes. Sodipo and Pinto (2021) also submit that agreement by
member States of the UN on RtoP rests on three pillars—the first is to
use appropriate and necessary means to protect its own population from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; the
second pillar calls on the international community to provide assistance
and capacity building to States that are under stress and unable to protect
their civilian population from mass atrocity crimes while the third refers
to the international responsibility to respond through the United Nations
in a timely and decisive manner when national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their population from the four crimes identified above.
However, the power of the media in conflict resolution proves stronger
to the extent that it has taken the front burner of international discourse.
The intervention of the media, therefore, during conflict has provided
another arena for conflict resolution, thereby giving media coverage of
the vulnerable a constructive role in resolving conflicts. Hence, media
practitioners should see themselves as crusaders and partners-in-progress,
especially to the downtrodden. Suffice to say that the role of the media
in conflict situation is sine qua non to a peaceful co-existence.

Personal Interviews
. Broadcast journalist with the BBC World Service, Damilola
Oduolowu.
. The Punch Correspondent, Ogun State, Nigeria, Daud Olatunji.
. Ogun State Correspondent, Television Continental (TVC), Lagos,
Nigeria (Kazeem Olowe).
. Reporter with the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Abeokuta,
Nigeria (Adeyemi Oluwaseun).
264 N. A. BAKENNE AND I. A. FADIPE

. Correspondent with The Nation Newspaper, Lagos, Nigeria

(Tajudeen Adebanjo).
. Journalist, Oodua 90.9 FM, Ile Ife, Osun State, Nigeria (Emmanuel
Oke).
. Journalist with Platform Africa, Nigeria (Adeola Yusuf).
. Reporter, Platform Times Online Newspaper in Ogun State, Nigeria
(Sodiq Ojurongbe).
. Ogun State Correspondent of The Nation Newspaper, Nigeria
(Earnest Nwokolo).
. Journalist with the Ogun State Broadcasting Corporation, Nigeria
(Waheed Ogunjobi).

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 The Legal Discourse on the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) in Africa

Dodeye Uduak Williams

Introduction
Prompted by the failure to prevent mass atrocities against civilians in
Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, the rhetoric of humanitarian interven-
tion and the right to intervene dominated the debates in the international
community on ways to prevent future crises in the early 2000s. With an
emphasis on prevention, to curb these mass atrocities even before they
happen, R2P was conceived from a need to impel political will and provide
a basis for international collective action to deal with protecting popula-
tions at the risk of widespread and systematic mass atrocities taking place
within sovereign states. R2P rests upon three (3) main pillars: first, the
responsibility of each state to protect its population; second, the respon-
sibility of the international community to assist states in protecting their

D. U. Williams (B)
Department of Political Science, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
College of Human Sciences, Institute of Gender Studies, University of South
Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 269

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_16
270 D. U. WILLIAMS

populations; and finally, the responsibility of the international commu-

nity to protect when a state is manifestly failing to protect its population
(AU Constitutive Act, 2000). The application of the R2P is expected
to be limited to definite human rights violations specifically—crimes of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
As Albright and Cohen (2008: 98) posit, the concept has been inter-
preted as “potentially the most important normative advance in relation
to the threat of mass atrocities since the 1948 adoption of the Genocide
Convention”.
Although described as a comprehensive framework for the prevention
and containment of gross human rights violations and mass atrocities
against populations, the R2P makes provision for consensual and coer-
cive measures for intervention. On one hand, the consensual measures
include preventive diplomacy, mediation, fact-finding commissions, and
peacekeeping; while the coercive measures include targeted economic
sanctions, arms embargoes, threats of international criminal justice, and
as a last resort, military intervention. However, despite the promising
potentials of the R2P, as Renshaw (2021) succinctly captures, it appears
to be “an idea whose time never comes” given the reluctance of states
and international organizations to apply it in some cases, and the crit-
icisms faced when it is applied. Renshaw (2021) argues that in many
cases R2P is applied for reasons other than humanitarian considerations
making its application fraught with inconsistency and hypocrisy. Other
critics query the lack of conceptual clarity (Stoll, 2008), the opaque
descriptions of obligations it entails (Tan, 2006), and the lack of clarity
regarding who has the legitimate authority to decide what type of actions
are required, whether coercive or consensual (Thibault, 2007). Others
like Pattison (2008) raise questions about agency—which agent should be
assigned the responsibility to protect, while Ki-moon (2007) is concerned
with how the rhetoric can be translated into more concrete action. Most
importantly, the perception of being an assault on sovereignty is one of
the major critiques of the R2P. However, as Cohen and Deng (1996)
argue, the concept was developed as a means of engaging strong adher-
ents of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-interference. Regardless
of the numerous criticisms and challenges the R2P faces, its proponents
still maintain that it stands for “more than intervention” as states are
reminded that they have a responsibility, not to kill their populations, but
to protect them; and the international community is also reminded of
their responsibility to help states fulfill this obligation (Renshaw, 2021).
 THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY … 271

Shaped by global politics, the R2P debate can be described as having

political, moral, and legal categories which focus on unique issues but
are also interrelated. The political category focuses on the issues of state
sovereignty, military intervention for humanitarian purposes, and the
rights of states to defend themselves against foreign intervention, whether
unilateral or collective. The moral category focuses on the questions of
human rights, how much force is too much force, and questions of the
degree of humanitarianism in humanitarian interventions involving the
military. The legal category concerns all of the above, the legality and
legitimacy of the R2P, and whether or not it is legally binding on states.
The focus of this chapter is the legal category which touches on the other
two but mostly questions concerning the legality and legitimacy debates
around the R2P in Africa.

International Law and the Fundamental

International Norms Impacting the R2P
The R2P norm, as de Waal (2009) explains connects three (3) well-
established concepts namely—crisis prevention, military intervention for
humanitarian reasons, and post-crisis recovery. In order to understand
the questions surrounding the legal basis and validity of the R2P it will
be helpful to first articulate some fundamental international norms and
principles at the center of the intervention discourse in order to be able
to situate their meanings and/or interpretation in international law. While
there are certain aspects of the R2P that have origins in international law
it is misleading to argue that in its entirety, the whole concept is firmly
established in international law as not all the components are domiciled in
a single source of law but in multiple sources (Subramanian, 2022). These
fundamental norms include the principles of the sovereign equality of
states, sovereignty and non-intervention, and the prohibition or non-use
of force. These norms impact the debates on humanitarian intervention
and the principle of the R2P as what they stand for in theory and practice
has changed over time, particularly in response to obligations in relation
to international human rights law.

Sovereign Equality of States

The principle of equality of states is a fundamental principle of the inter-
national legal order that emphasizes that regardless of “asymmetries of
272 D. U. WILLIAMS

inequality,” all states are equal before international law regardless of differ-
ences in the size of state territory, population, economy, military strength,
or levels of industrialization (Ansong, 2016: 14). Sovereign equality as
Cassese, 2005: 48) posits, “constitutes the linchpin of the whole body
of international legal standards and the fundamental premise on which
all international relations rest”.This presupposes that all states should be
able to participate in international decision-making, rule formulation, and
interpretation, as well as have an influence on international treaties on an
equal basis. The reality is far from the case. The development of interna-
tional human rights law has increasingly challenged the formal equality of
states with the increasing political and legal value placed on global human
equality.

Sovereignty and Non-Intervention

Sovereignty, legally speaking, in its external manifestation, is a follow-up
to the principle of equality of states, discussed above, and refers to the
independence and external autonomy of a state in how it conducts its
foreign affairs. This means that states are legally protected from external
interference. The principle of sovereignty and non-interference represent
the defense of states “against any external scrutiny of their human rights
and records, and serves as a barrier to external intervention in matters
within the exclusive jurisdiction of states” (Iyi, 2016: 66). This principle
is the legal basis for granting or withholding consent to external inter-
vention. However, developments in international relations, particularly
international human rights law, have challenged the unbridled sovereignty
of states that emphasizes unchallenged supremacy of states where states
themselves violate the rights and liberties of their citizens in the name of
national interests. The idea of sovereignty has evolved since 1648 (Deng,
2010). Other developments, “the democratic entitlement, the right to
humanitarian assistance, and the protection of civilians in armed conflicts”
as Teitt (2017: 325) succinctly captures, link states international legiti-
macy to the will and well-being of their people. We find from the 2000s,
the consolidation of the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and
‘R2P’ norms (Teitt, 2017: 325).
 THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY … 273

Prohibition of the Threat of or Use of Force

The prohibition of the use of force, or its threat, is a fundamental norm
that challenges any treaty arrangement amongst states that rely on the
use of force as a means of settlement of international disputes (Iyi, 2016:
70). The UN Charter, Article 2(4) clearly forbids member states from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state. However, while this provision refers to inter-state
use of force, the context of humanitarian intervention refers sometimes to
intra-state use of force (Dinstein, 2011: 85). The extent to which states
obey this rule and allow it to guide their behavior, by the very nature of
the international system, depends largely on national interests rather than
“any normative restraint by international law” as Iyi (2016: 75) rightly
posits. The moral imperative to protect victims of mass atrocities, espe-
cially at the hands of their own government, while respecting this norm
is at the center of the debates on humanitarian intervention which may
sometimes require the use of force even if in a preventative capacity. The
presence of criteria to justify intervention, as presented by the ICISS—just
cause, right intentions, right authority, last resort, proportional means,
and reasonable prospects—presupposes that where these conditions are
fulfilled force can be used (ICISS, 2001).
Changes in international realities, and the developments in interna-
tional human rights law amongst others, led to the emergence of the
R2P principle as a means of dealing with the extremes of defending state
sovereignty and non-intervention on one hand and the moral duty to
protect human rights of citizens on the other. Efforts to prevent geno-
cides and mass atrocities produced the R2P principle at a global level
and intervention regimes at regional levels (Iyi, 2016: 83). In all, the
R2P contains two sets of legal responsibilities, first, the responsibility
of states toward their own population—sovereignty as responsibility and
upholding human rights; and second, the responsibility of states toward
populations of other states—the complementary responsibility of the
international community as the basis for collective responsibility (Wester,
2020: 19).
274 D. U. WILLIAMS

The R2P and Africa: An Overview

R2P provides a political framework based on fundamental principles of
international law for preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (Ki-Moon, 2007). The
principles contained in Article 4 of the 2000 AU Constitutive Act reflect
a commitment and an endorsement of the R2P by African States. The
following provisions:
Article 4(a)—Sovereign Equality of Member States.
Article 4(e)—Peaceful settlement of disputes.
Article 4(g)—Non-Interference by any Member State in the internal
affairs of another state.
Article 4(h)—The right of the AU to intervene in a Member State
in response to “grave circumstances” namely war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity.
Article 4(j)—The right of Member States to request interventions from
the AU in order to restore peace and security.
Article 4(m)—Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the
rule of law, and good governance.
Article 4(o)—Respect for the sanctity of life; all clearly fit in with the
provisions of international law, as captured in the UN Charter. Article
4(h), arguably provides for the AU, the legal basis for interference and
intervention. They show that this commitment predates the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document (WSOD).
African states have, even before the World Summit, recognized the
need to ditch the apathy toward states who refuse to perform or are
incapable of performing their duties to their populations in the name of
non-interference, for more collective responsibility encapsulated in the
AU policy of non-indifference (Cohen & Deng, 1996). It is clear to see
from this, as Cohen and Deng (1996) rightly observe, why many accept
and promote the narrative of Africa as the ‘birthplace’ of the R2P. The
AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), Continental Early Warning
System (CEWS), Council of the Wise, and the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, are some of the institutions set up to promote the
AU’s goals of non-indifference and by extension, the goals of the R2P. In
comparison to other continents, Africa has had almost the highest number
of violent armed conflicts and has witnessed most of the world’s complex
humanitarian emergencies (Cilliers et al., 2009: 55). The discourse of R2P
in Africa is therefore colored by a mosaic of issues that cut across the
 THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY … 275

continent’s history and experience with mass atrocities that have claimed
millions in armed conflicts as well as the efforts to prevent mass atrocities,
protect populations, and punish perpetrators.
While the dominant position often seems to be that all three pillars of
the R2P always apply to all states regardless of contextual realities, the
fact remains that the manner of interpretation and implementation differs
from state to state based on the particular risk and capacity (Bellamy,
2010: 158). Hence, in trying to make sense of the position of African
states on R2P, it is necessary to situate the discourse against the context
of the continent’s colonial history, struggle for sovereignty and indepen-
dence, the complex nature of armed conflicts, as well as the International
Criminal Court (ICC) ‘Africa problem’. Any skepticism for the R2P
stems largely from these historical and geopolitical realities. In general
terms, the R2P discourse in Africa can be grouped into at least five broad
categories of debates.
First, is the R2P as a ‘Trojan Horse for Neo-Colonial Control’
debate. This view argues that R2P is a front for Western neo-imperialism
(Chomsky, 2016). Against the background of the continent’s colonial
and neo-colonial history, the skepticism about an altruistic intervention
is justified. The failure of the UNSC to be consistent in the timely
authorization of interventions, and the selective application of the R2P
principle, emboldens this view. However, as Bellamy (2014: 112) rightly
argues, this view underrepresents the contribution of African practice to
the development of the R2P.
Second, is the R2P ‘Privileging the Intervenor’ debate. Critics argue
that the R2P is an excuse for armed intervention in the affairs of another
state that only satisfies the interests of the intervener. On this Mamdani
(2009) writes that the R2P is “a right to punish but without being
held accountable”. They argue that humanitarian intervention under this
guise is just a political activity that is disconnected from reality to satisfy
the interest of the intervener (Evans et al., 2013: 199). However, while
humanitarian intervention has been smeared in practice by neo-imperialist
tendencies, there tends to be a general consensus within the international
community that it is morally unjustifiable to allow crimes of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity to take place without intervention
(Chung, 2015).
Third, we have the R2P ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ debate cham-
pioned by Deng (2010) which emphasizes that sovereignty can no longer
be seen by states as protection from interference but rather a call to
276 D. U. WILLIAMS

responsibility both on the domestic and external front. It promotes

the idea that “domestic authority is no longer absolute but limited by
human rights and the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens”
(Chung, 2015: 22). It is the failure to fulfill this responsibility that neces-
sitates the external intervention states see as threatening their sovereignty.
Sovereignty is therefore conditional and contingent on the protection of
fundamental human rights.
Fourth, is the ‘Unrealistic Expectations’ of the R2P debate. The argu-
ment here as Hao (2015: 1) clearly explains is that “the rhetoric about
the communal, global nature of the R2P creates unrealistic expectations
of a false emancipatory friend who does not materialize”. This situation
Kennedy (2004: 22) argues, is damaging for those whom R2P is expected
to protect. Here R2P is merely a slogan for actions of self-interest (Gaitlin,
2012: 15). While the R2P might seem ambitious, and often throws up
challenges of interpretation and expectation management as Deng (2010)
rightly asserts, it is not completely an unrealistic expectation and the
challenges though real are not insurmountable.
Fifth, is the ‘Legitimate Authority’ debate that raises questions of legit-
imacy and legality. Here the question of who has the legal authority to
authorize intervention dominates the discourse. Under international law,
there are certain requirements that must be fulfilled to justify armed inter-
vention in the affairs of another state. Among these requirements is the
question of legitimate authority. At the global level, this authority lies with
the UN Security Council (UNSC) whose permanent members are often
criticized for using their veto power in a way that undermines the essence
of the R2P principle (Subramanian, 2022). Raising legal questions, Article
4(h) of the Constitutive Act bypasses the requirement for UNSC approval
for any intervention. Hence, in Africa, legitimate authority lies with the
AU and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Regardless of its
legal status, the R2P can strengthen the prevention of gross human rights
violations in practice by supporting the process of systematizing preven-
tive efforts and increasing the focus on human rights in potential mass
atrocity situations (Rosenberg, 2009: 459).
 THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY … 277

The African Union (AU), Regional

Economic Communities (RECs),
and the Legal Questions of R2P in Africa
The AU since its emergence in 2000 has taken concrete steps to operate
differently from the OAU, particularly in relation to collaborative efforts
targeted at delivering peace, stability, and security to the continent. As
scholars like Kwesi-Aning (2009: 1) rightly observe, the AU, before the
2005 WSOD, had already set up norms and principles of non-indifference
that “mirror the tenets of the R2P”. Cilliers et al., (2009: 55) rightly
asserts that the work of the AU is a good prism through which to
view the implementation of the R2P agenda in Africa. The creation
of the AU, or rather its transformation from the OAU, was intended
to signal “a turning point in African perspectives on sovereignty and
non-intervention” (Dembinski & Reinold, 2011: 8), and the reconcili-
ation of the principles of sovereignty and fundamental human rights was
institutionalized through international norm-setting initiatives eventually
reflected in African frameworks (Lwabukuna, 2021: 76). R2P norms
within the AU frameworks are more than an organizing political prin-
ciple as they generate collective legal obligations for AU member states to
respond to mass atrocities and crimes against humanity where they occur
or threaten to occur, because they are embedded in the Constitutive Act
signed by all member states (Lwabukuna, 2021: 76).
The inclusion of the principle of non-indifference in Article 4(h) of the
AU Constitutive Act, the APSA, the CEWS, the creation of the African
Standby Force (ASF) in 2003, increased collaboration between the AU,
other RECs, and the UN (Kwesi-Aning, 2009), the 2005 Ezulwini
Consensus, all these show the AU’s willingness and commitment to the
tenets of the R2P. Africa’s experience in interpreting and implementing
the R2P though has been inconsistent and has not really been a smooth
ride. Despite these provisions, from its inception, the AU’s response
to the security challenges in Sudan’s Darfur, Somalia, and Zimbabwe
crises, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Central African Republic, Libya, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire to mention
a few, have rather reflected the “lack of consistent implementation of
the AU’s legal and policy provisions” (Woldemichael, 2021). The chal-
lenges of implementation for the AU have largely been attributed to the
restrictions imposed by the principles of sovereignty within the context
of its intergovernmental structure and the challenge of member states
278 D. U. WILLIAMS

heading its decision-making organs; and the principles of subsidiarity

which emphasize the primacy of regional organizations leading interven-
tions in member states (Woldemichael, 2021). The legal discourse of the
R2P revolves around these questions of state sovereignty, humanitarian
interventions, the principle of subsidiarity, and the scope of interventions.
We examine these questions with a focus on Africa.

State Sovereignty and R2P in Africa

The UN Charter, Article 2(1), (4), and (7), guarantees the territo-
rial sovereignty of all member states and prohibits the threat or use
of force in international law. As a result, intervening in the affairs of
another state is seen as breaching state sovereignty. However, develop-
ments in the international system and international humanitarian law have
ensured that sovereignty is no longer unconditional but implies respon-
sibility. For the AU, sovereignty as responsibility was embraced as soon
as it changed its language from non-intervention to non-indifference. As
Kuwali (2015: 249) posits, the agreement among AU member states to
“open the possibility of limiting their own traditional rights of absolute
sovereignty following the adoption of Article 4(h) was a radical depar-
ture from their strict form of non-intervention in the affairs of other
member states as required by Article 4(g) of the AU Constitutive Act”.
In addition, to also protect the states, the AU in Article 4(j) makes provi-
sion for consent-based intervention which allows a state to ask for help
when needed. However, in practice, despite the provisions, member states
continue to struggle with negotiating sovereignty (Wachira, 2007). While
the endorsement of the notion of responsible sovereignty provides moral
obligations in line with the R2P (Geldenhuys, 2014), there are challenges
to how this is implemented.
The APSA through which the R2P finds expression in the continent
is designed to ensure peace and security through prevention, manage-
ment, and resolution of conflicts. The PSC is the political decision-making
body that rests on four (4) pillars—the CEWS, the Panel of the Wise, the
ASF, and the African Peace Facility Fund, to employ preventive, reactive,
and reconstructive measures to respond to conflicts in the continent. It
is the member states of the AU that function within these arrangements
and whatever success or failure produced is an indication of the commit-
ment or its lack thereof to the principles they are supposed to uphold. Yet
 THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY … 279

inadequate funding, lack of institutional capacity, poor policy interpreta-

tion, lack of domestic commitment to the rule of law and democracy, and
poor management of peacekeeping operations show a disconnection of
member states from the commitment to the legal provisions of responsible
sovereignty (Fafore, 2020). The 2010 post-election humanitarian crisis in
Cote d’Ivoire reflected the inability of the AU to institutionalize its R2P
mechanisms as a result of these challenges (Abatan & Spies, 2016).

Intervention, Treaty-based Multilateral Actions, and R2P in Africa

Prompted by the dismal failure of the UN Security Council to act effec-
tively and in a timely manner on conflicts in Africa, the AU purports to
have the right to intervene in its member states in grave situations where
there have been crimes against humanity and mass atrocities (Wyse, 2018:
295). Within the AU security architecture, military intervention is led
by the AU or its sub-regional institutions. This provision stands in stark
contrast with the collective security system established by the UN Charter
under which neither states nor regional organizations may use force in
the territory of another country in almost all circumstances. Bypassing
the need for UNSC authorization, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive
Act provides for the AU the legal basis for forcible intervention, using
coercive measures, within its own collective security framework within the
continent (Wyse, 2018: 297).
This tension is a legal issue. It is also important to note that interven-
tion within the AU is not necessarily humanitarian intervention and it is
different from intervention with consent or invitation as stated in Article
4(j) (Kuwali, 2015). The conflicts and legal ambiguities between the
ECOWAS and the AU are examples of the nuances of intervention. As Iyi
(2016: 159) explains, “the normative conflict between the AU-ECOWAS
regional military intervention legal framework and the UN charter is the
question of who should authorize the use of force in Africa”. Based on
their legal frameworks, neither the AU nor ECOWAS is under obliga-
tion to obtain authorization from the UNSC and this raises questions,
as Iyi (2016: 161) asserts, about “the legal validity of such provisions
under the UN Charter”. Even when the AU intends to concede and seek
UNSC approval, the Ezulwini Consensus provides that this can happen
only when the UN accepts to finance the operation (see the Ezulwini
Consensus, 2005).
280 D. U. WILLIAMS

The Principle of Subsidiarity and R2P in Africa

Beyond the justification for humanitarian intervention is the question
of who should lead the campaign in the event of such interventions.
Subsidiarity is “a political concept that prioritizes the role of local actors
over those further removed from the situation at hand” (Djilo, 2021: 1).
While the practical and legal aspects of this principle are still ambiguous,
it is still used to justify which regional bodies should take the lead in
responding to conflicts in their areas of jurisdiction (Djilo, 2021: 1).
In Africa, the AU claims that it is a “subsidiary actor that has made
subsidiary norms to retain autonomy and defend Africa’s vital security
interests in international politics” (Ifediora, 2021: 1). At the interna-
tional level, as Reinold (2019: 1337) observes, the AU’s norms and
policies contest global norms and institutions, however, within the conti-
nent, the legal tensions between the jurisdiction of the APSA and the
regional bodies is a reality. The 2007 Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) on cooperation between the AU and its regional mechanisms
emphasized the AU’s primary responsibility but also called for adher-
ence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative
advantage (Fafore, 2020). However, rather than a clear-cut strategy of
cooperation, subsidiarity reflects the immediate interests of competing
organizations even though the AU is legally and politically an organiza-
tion for cooperation. The AUs legal framework entertains this ambiguity
as it recognizes the importance of both continental and regional levels of
peace and security. The Mozambique example where the AU was side-
lined by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and
acted without the AU PSC endorsement is a case in point (PSC Report,
2022).

The Scope, Nature of Intervention, and R2P in Africa

While R2P is a political commitment, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive
Act is a legal obligation of member states (Kuwali, 2009a, 2009b: 1).
Yet questions about what type and extent of intervention is necessary
or needed to achieve the aims of the intervention constitute both polit-
ical and legal questions. Within international law, the legal framework
governing intervention outlines the criteria and justification for inter-
vention. Article 4(h) entails military force triggered when a target state
 THE LEGAL DISCOURSE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY … 281

fails to discharge its duty to protect its population from mass atroci-
ties (Kuwali, 2015: 248). However, “the conditions that trigger Article
4(h) interventions—war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity
are amorphous, difficult to determine, and clouded with political consid-
erations with legal implications (Kuwali, 2015: 249). Interventions as
spelled out in Article 4(h) are not necessarily humanitarian interventions
but rather treaty-based multilateral actions in response to mass atrocities.
These interventions which are to be largely preventive, are justified largely
in terms of saving lives (Kuwali, 2009b). One of the legal hurdles here
however is that the conditionality of ‘grave circumstances’ is difficult to
ascertain before intervention especially where intervention is expected to
prevent them from happening. The implication is that any actions taken
outside this or before this assessment is made are to be considered legally
deficient. As Scheffer (2007: 319) succinctly posits, the complexity in
determining whether a crime is actually being committed and that it needs
intervention cannot be undermined.

Conclusion
International law thinking has been extremely affected by the develop-
ment of the R2P principle. While the principle enjoys global acceptance,
the twin commitments of the international legal system—state sovereignty
and responsible sovereignty—remain a source of legal and normative
tension as states try to navigate their international relations. The legal
obligation to protect civilians still lies with their national governments,
hence the emphasis on state responsibility and R2P only facilitates
meeting such responsibility. Notwithstanding these legal hurdles, the AU
within its Constitutive Act does have a legal basis to act in the face of
mass atrocities, and this establishes a normative commitment to protect
populations when a member state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this
responsibility but in a way that addresses the root causes and conditions
of the conflict and supports peacebuilding without making things worse.
Regardless of the legal challenges, the R2P principle places an inherent
duty to protect civilians irrespective of geopolitics or agreements between
states as it supports the rule of law as well as multilateral and democratic
institutions. While it appears more of a moral obligation it has its legal
roots in international humanitarian law which applies to African states
and African realities as well.
282 D. U. WILLIAMS

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 The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
and the Avoidance of Responsibility: Ending
Atrocity Crimes in Northern Nigeria

Uzezi Ologe and Ernest Toochi Aniche

Introduction
Boko Haram was recognised a national crisis in 2010 though, its origins
date further back (Onapajo, 2020). Spanning several administrations,
state efforts combining hard (Meagher, 2014; Njoku, 2020; Omenma &
Hendricks, 2018) and soft measures (Ike et al., 2020; Njoku, 2021), have
not effectively resolved the crisis (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020; Ugwueze
et al., 2021). The abiding capacity (Clubb & Tapley, 2018), persistence
and consistency of Boko Haram to perpetrate terror (Wilson, 2018),
points to the group’s resilience and counters official claims of “techni-
cally” winning the war on terror (Elusoji, 2021; ICG, 2016; Toromade,
2018). The exacerbation of the conflict beyond significant damage to

U. Ologe (B)
Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
E. T. Aniche
Department of Political Science, Federal University, Otuoke, Bayelsa, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 287

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_17
288 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

physical infrastructure has enabled unchecked human rights violations by

Boko Haram and state security forces unleashing a humanitarian crisis
directly causing at least 35,000 (GCR2P, 2022), and indirectly around
350,000 deaths in Nigeria’s Northeast (CFR, 2022), where Boko Haram
was largely located.
A consequence of the state’s inability to end Boko Haram in the
Northeast is the permeation of insecurity throughout the wider Northern
region evident in the proliferation of banditry and Fulani militancy perpe-
trating criminality (Onapajo, 2020; Onwuzuruigbo, 2020), and egregious
human rights violations. The implication is an increase in the number of
civilian deaths (De Montclos, 2016), and human right violations describ-
able as atrocity crimes. The ineffectiveness of state counterterrorism
efforts to end the humanitarian crisis accompanied by wanton atrocities
opens up a pathway for international intervention as a drastic option for
protecting vulnerable civilians and ending the crisis through the doctrine
of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).
The idea of the RtoP is to empower the international community to
intervene using military force in protection of civilian populations within
sovereign states from atrocities where the perpetrator of such atrocities is
the state or nob-state actors with the complicity, unwillingness or inability
of the state to protect its citizens (Evans, 2008). Though the situation in
Northern Nigeria meets the threshold for RtoP intervention, the inter-
national community demonstrates an unwillingness to intervene. This
chapter attempts two things. First establish that the human right viola-
tions in the North of Nigeria are atrocity crimes by assessing them against
legal international parameters for determining atrocity crimes. Secondly
account for why the international community has not authorised RtoP
intervention in Nigeria. The study applies a desk review utilizing prag-
matic analysis reliant on historical and operational evidence emerging
from RtoP discourse.

Overview of the Responsibility to Protect RtoP

RtoP emerged from moralist and cosmopolitan discourse emphasising
a collective responsibility for the protection of the world’s people.
The notion of distributive justice for instance highlights government
responsibility to guarantee the rights due to their citizens (Nussbaum,
2001). Yet historical evidence demonstrates how often governments fail
in this responsibility. International efforts to protect vulnerable civilian
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 289

populations within sovereign borders produced treaties like the Geneva

Conventions that detail modes of state interaction with citizens and civil-
ians under specific conditions. Cosmopolitanism while arguing for the
prioritisation of citizens’ welfare also charge sovereign states to act in line
with international laws (Kant, 2002). International arguments for inter-
national civilian protection thus channel notions of shared humanity, and
a moral obligation that indebts the comity of nations to act in protec-
tion of human beings across the world from atrocities regardless of their
location (Pattinson, 2010).
The RtoP as a product of such moralist and cosmopolitan positions
was born of the work of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Using the specific term ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ in its 2001 draft report, the ICISS made argued for a new inter-
national legal framework that works around the hurdle of sovereignty as
expedience for protecting civilian populations from large-scale suffering
(Breau, 2016). The rationale for this argument in seeming contraven-
tion of the international norm of sovereignty made sacrosanct by Article
2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter, was informed by the prolif-
eration of intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era with attendant
large-scale human suffering including killings (Bellamy & Williams, 2011)
and displacement (Martin, 2010).
Such events included the mass atrocities in Somalia (1992), Rwanda
(1994), Srebenica (1995) and Kosovo (1999). While armed humani-
tarian intervention before RtoP was perceived as a ‘no-go-area’ (ICISS,
2001), the role of international inaction in enabling the above cases
(Pattison, 2010), taken with the gains of western military interventionism
in Kosovo in 1999 marked a turning point for armed humanitarian inter-
vention (Chomsky, 2012). Consequently, while resistance of the idea
remains ardent, the international community is increasingly receptive of
armed humanitarian intervention (Breau, 2016), as a justifiable and effec-
tive instrument for addressing exceptional cases of mass human suffering
(Pattison, 2010).
The RtoP as product of this shift in international disposition is the
deliberate effort to move state sovereignty from the realm of unmerited
and inviolable state right into the realm of state privilege (Malavarapu,
2015), guaranteed and sustained only by its readiness and demonstrated
capacity to safeguard all its citizens from mass atrocities defined as geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Gareth,
2008). RtoP requires the international community to assist states to
290 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

uphold the responsibility to protect its citizens from large scale human
suffering (Ramesh & Maley, 2015), and intervene militarily where state
(in)action exposes or subjects its citizens to mass atrocities (ICISS, 2001).
RtoP by mere fact that it tries to circumvent state sovereignty
emerged as and, remains a highly controversial subject in international
humanitarian discourse. The controversies emanate from concerns held
by less powerful states over RtoP’s possible abuse by more powerful
western states (Bellamy, 2010). This informed the incorporation of pillars,
elements and principles that not only outline specific thresholds that must
be proven for RtoP to be authorised but also guide the intervention
upon authorisation. These in general aim to win support for RtoP as
not merely an instrument of coercive military force but one focused on
prevention, holds armed intervention as a last resort and supportive of
post-intervention rebuilding for sustainable peace (Stahn, 2007). RtoP
thus embodies a self-consciousness in its many elements, of possible resis-
tance to the idea it aims to institute in an international system that exalts
national interest and state actors interact on the basis of mutual suspicion
that transforms sovereignty into a tool for defending national interest.

Overview of Atrocity Crimes:

Types and What They Are
Fully aware of resistance to any effort to diminish state sovereignty in an
international system where states constantly engage in strategic maneu-
vering to gain strategic advantage, the ICISS stated a core principle and
criteria for RtoP authorisation to be ‘just cause’. The ICISS defining just
cause argued there are situations that may justify military intervention
as necessary for the prevention or suppression of large scale loss of life
being perpetrated through acts of genocide or large sale ethnic cleansing
whether actual or apprehended, as a product of either deliberate state
action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation (ICISS,
2001). Just cause in essence requires that armed intervention can only be
authorised when it is established beyond doubt that a situation within
a sovereign state constitutes a threat or the perpetration of large scale
human suffering permitted by the actions or inaction of the state (Gagro,
2014).
Large scale loss of human life essentially points to mass atrocity crimes
defined as calculated acts of extreme violence carried out against civil-
ians either by state or non-state actors (Khalfaoui, 2020). These crimes
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 291

because they erode human dignity are described by the UN as the most
egregious crimes against humanity (United Nations, 2014). The atrocity
crimes from which the RtoP draws are defined by several international
protocols including the Geneva Conventions and the 1998 Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court. Atrocities outlined by the ICISS are
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Genocide
Genocide is any act of violence implemented against a specific civilian
population on the basis of predetermined characteristics, real or perceived
that may include nationality, ethnicity, race or religion (United Nations,
2014). Genocide is the implementation of intentions to exterminate this
population either in whole or in part (Verdeja, 2018), through system-
atic actions that profile and dehumanise the population (Stanton, 2016).
Central to establishing occurrence of genocide is intent discernible as
systematic action designed to exterminate with the goal of destroying a
population as opposed to random acts of violence (GCR2P, 2018), or
mere repression (Verdeja, 2018). The methods of genocide may range
from physical violence designed to kill, cause grievous bodily or mental
harm to institutional violence manifest as rules designed to prevent the
realisation of full potentials or structural violence including denial of
access to resources essential for survival and group development (United
Nations, 1948; Verdeja, 2018).

War Crimes
These are actions recognised by international law as egregious human
rights violations in war time (Verdeja, 2018), or situations of armed
conflict (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2022). Acts that
constitute war crimes distinguished by their context which is periods
of armed conflict (GCR2P, 2018). Unlike genocide where victims are
civilians, victims of war crimes encompass combatants (United Nations,
2014). The persons protected from war crimes by the 1949 Geneva
Convention and the 1977 Additional protocols include civilians, medical
and religious personnel, civil defense staff and aid workers (United
Nations, 2014). The methods of war crimes as outlined in the Rome
Statute include wilful killing, causing serious health or bodily harm,
torture/inhuman treatment of non-combatants, wanton and unlawful
292 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military neces-

sity, violence to life and person through murder of all kinds, mutilations,
cruel treatments and torture of persons not taking active part in hostilities,
and intentionally directing attacks against civilian populations and build-
ings of no military objectives including places of worship, education, art,
science, charity, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick
and wounded are collected (GCR2P, 2018).

Crimes Against Humanity

These are a range of actions that are widespread, systematic and directed
against a civilian population (United Nations, 2014). The actors may
range from civilians to non-civilians but the main targets and victims are
always civilian populations. Acts that may be classified here according to
the Rome Statute include murder, extermination, deportation of forcible
transfer of population, torture, sexual violence including rape, enslave-
ment, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or
gender based sex crimes, apartheid, enslavement, enforced disappearances,
imprisonment, persecution on the bases of identity or affiliation and such
other inhumane acts designed to cause great suffering or serious injury to
body, mind or physical health of civilian populations (United States Holo-
caust Memorial Museum, 2022; Verdeja, 2018). Crimes against humanity
must be systematic and exclude violence that is random, accidental or
isolated (GCR2P, 2018).

Ethnic Cleansing
Ethnic cleansing is to the forceful removal of civilian populations defined
by their ethnicity from a given geographic area using different forms of
violence (Riga, 2015). A UN Commission of Experts framed it as “ren-
dering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation
to remove persons of given groups from the area” or as “a purposeful
policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent
and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or
religious group from certain geographic areas” (GCR2P, 2018).
Unlike genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity that are
codified under international treaties ethnic cleansing does not have an
international status. However, the acts classified under it are encompassed
under the codified three (Verdeja, 2018), and include murder, torture,
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 293

arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual

assaults, severe physical injury to civilians, forcible removal, displace-
ment and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or
threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, use of civilians as human
shield, destruction of property, robbery of personal property and attacks
on hospitals, medical personnel, and locations with the Red Cross/Red
Crescent emblem (GCR2P, 2018). The emergence of ethnic cleansing is
likely due to increasing incidences of intra-state violence in developing
regions notably Africa.

Mass Killing
From the above it is observable that the four atrocity crimes overlap in
terms of method. They are only distinguishable by their intent, context
and target/victims. Though RtoP is meant to be authorised in cases of
“large scale” suffering, the ICISS does not define what qualifies as “large
scale” (Gagro, 2014). There are as such categories that aim to quantify
“large scale”. Mass killing is useful for determining when cases of atrocity
crimes become mass atrocity crimes. While schemas vary, some scholars
identify mass killing by the intentional killing of at least 50,000 civilians
(Esteban et al., 2015). We however, adopt the parameters of the Early
Warning Project which assumes mass killing to have occurred or occurring
“when the deliberate actions of armed groups – including but not limited
to state security forces, rebel armies, and other militias – result in the
deaths of at least 1,000 noncombatant civilians who are part of a specific
group, over a period of one year or less” (Early Warning Project, 2022).
The Project determines a mass killing to have ended when fewer than 100
civilians as part of a target group are killed for three consecutive years.

Overview of Human Right Violations

and Atrocity Crimes in Nigeria
A myriad of non-state actors have engaged in a widespread acts of human
right violations in Nigeria’s northern region. These groups include Boko
Haram and amorphous Violent Extremist Groups (VEGs) known locally
as bandits and Fulani Herdsmen or Militants. The crucial question is
whether the human right violations by these groups constitute (mass)
atrocity crimes. This section of this chapter attempts this by highlighting
these human rights violations and analysing them against the parameters
of the atrocity crimes discussed in the preceding section.
294 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

Boko Haram’s Actions in Nigeria’s North-East

Our analysis here commences with Boko Haram the terrorist organisation
prominent in Nigeria’s Northeast. Though having a history of funda-
mentalism dating back to the 1990s (Omenma & Hendricks, 2018),
and violence to at least 2003 (Omenma et al., 2020; Onuoha, 2010),
it was not handled as a national security threat until 2009/2010 (de
Montclos, 2014; Meagher, 2014), when its operations upgraded from
attacking police stations in the North (Eji, 2016), into an insurgency
capturing and imposing control over continuous swathes of land in three
of Nigeria’s state—Borno, Yobe and Adamawa (Kyari, 2014). The aim of
which was the creation of an Islamic State (Brechenmacher, 2019; Walker,
2012), confirmed by the group’s adoption of end goals similar to that of
the Islamic State in Iraq (Agbigboa, 2020), and pledging allegiance to
that group in March 2015 renaming itself ISWAP—Islamic State in West
Africa Province (BBC, 2015). A bombing of the United Nations Office
in Abuja in 2011 thrust the group into international limelight. In 2015,
the international community to recognise it as the fifth deadliest terrorist
organisation in the world (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015).
Since 2009 Boko Haram attacks have directly killed at least 35,000
Nigerians (GCR2P, 2022), and over 350,000 indirectly; with another 3
million displaced in the Northeast and around 300,000 made refugees in
neighbouring Lake Chad countries (CFR, 2022). Methods used by the
group have included attacks on civilians in markets, schools, churches,
internally displaced people’s camps and security posts. These attacks
employ methods including bombings using Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs), drive-by shootings on motorcycles, shootings using high-calibre
weapons and arson (United Nations Security Council, 2017).
These have, resulted in the mass murder of many Nigerians in
the Northeast including women and children. Boko Haram has also
carried out many abductions of children (Amnesty International, 2021).
Young boys are radicalised and conscripted into its fighting force. Males
including young boys who reject its indoctrination have been killed.
Abducted females including young girls suffer sexual abuse including
sexual exploitation and enslavement. Abducted children have been used
as human shield with the girls used as suicide bombers (Onapajo, 2020).
While a significant number of abducted Nigerians remain unaccounted
for, young girls rescued from Boko Haram camps were pregnant or
already nursing mothers. Testimonies suggest a rampart practice of sexual
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 295

and gender-based violence including rape of women and underage girls

and boys (Njoku, 2022).
Boko Haram has also engaged in inhuman treatment of civilians.
Evidence exist showing beheadings, drowning, stoning to death, burning
and using landmines to kill civilians (United Nations Security Council,
2017). There is also evidence of dehumanisation carried out through
torture, decapitation and starvation (United Nations Security Council,
2017). It has also attacked and destroyed institutions and structures
protected under international law including schools, centres of worship,
prisons and markets as well as willfully contaminating sources of water for
civilian use. Accounting from 2014, around 40% of Boko Haram activities
have been registered as violence targeting civilians, 8% remote violence
and 52% open conventional warfare with security forces (Matfess, 2019).
From such conventional attacks, Boko Haram is responsible for the death
of thousands of Nigerian soldiers (Ajala, 2022).
While Nigerian soldiers have been victims of Boko Haram atrocities,
evidence also implicate these soldiers as perpetrators of human rights
violations (Brechenmacher, 2019). They have been indicted of failing to
act in defense of vulnerable civilian populations even with advance knowl-
edge of attacks (Agbiboa, 2020). They have also been accused of enforced
disappearances, arrests, detention, torture, summary executions and arson
of whole villages (Amnesty International, 2015). Many of these actions
have been described as reprisals on communities suspected to have aided
Boko Haram in killing soldiers (Hansen, 2020). A prominent actor in the
campaign against Boko Haram have been local vigilante groups argued to
have emerged as a response by civilians to take ownership of their security
and as expedience to prevent abuse by soldiers by proactively fishing out
Boko Haram members and delivering them to soldiers to forestall reprisal
attacks (Agbiboa, 2020).
These acts enumerated above mirror the actions described by the
Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols as war crimes already
discussed in the preceding section. As this study has acknowledged that
mass atrocity crimes overlap in their manifestation while intent, context
and victims represent the thin demarcating lines, on this basis Boko
Haram actions against civilians and personnel of the Nigerian Army, can
also be argued to constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While the evidence confirm that these actions certainly constitute atrocity
crimes, matching the average number per year of civilians killed by Boko
Haram since 2009 which is in excess of 35,000, against the definition of
296 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

mass killing provided in the preceding section lends weight to their cate-
gorisation as mass atrocities defined as systematic acts of extreme violence
perpetrated against civilians by state or non-state actors (Khalfaoui, 2020).
The Nigerian Government declared in 2015 it had ‘technically’ won
the war on terror (Elusoji, 2021), and emphatically in 2018 that it had
defeated Boko Haram in the Northeast (Toromade, 2018). The basis of
this claim was the drastic reduction following military offensive, in the
intensity of Boko Haram activities and recorded civilian casualties. Nige-
ria’s ranking on the GTI dropped from number one to only the third
most terrorised country in the world (Ukpong, 2018). Available statis-
tics show a fall in year-on-year civilian casualties with 34% in 2015 with
910 deaths from 127 attacks, 63% in 2016 from around 150 attacks, 967
deaths from 90 attacks and 59 suicide bombings in 2017 (Wilson, 2018),
and 77% with 69 deaths in 2021 (Ukpong, 2018).
This drop in action does not eliminate the consistency and adapt-
ability of Boko Haram in the heat of full scale military offensive. The
continued capacity of the group to carry out deadly attacks demonstrates
remarkable resilience (Brechenmacher, 2019), and evidence suggest the
spread of their activities beyond the Northeast (Human Rights Watch,
2022). There are arguments of the transmutation of the group into the
more amorphous VEGs locally known as ‘bandits’ (Kperogi, 2022; Punch
News, 2022). The drop in Boko Haram activity has been offset by the
rise in the activities of these VEGs who have taken advantage of the inse-
curity to occupy ungoverned spaces throughout the North (Ojo, 2020;
Onwuzuruigbo, 2020), from which they perpetrate unchecked acts of
criminality (Olaniyi, 2017), and perpetration of human right abuses.

Bandits/Fulani Militants’ Activities

in the North central and Northwest Regions
Bandits and militant herdsmen have proliferated in Nigeria’s wider
northern region. These groups armed with military grade weapons to
perpetrate acts describable as terrorism (Inemugha, 2018). States in
the Northcentral like Zamfara and Kaduna have become hotbeds for
crimes against humanity by bandits while communities in the North-
central like Benue and Plateau are ravaged by human rights abuses by
Fulani herdsmen. Bandits specialise in abductions for ransom. In 2021
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 297

bandits killed 2600 people representing a 250% increase in civilian casu-

alties from 2020 (GCR2P, 2022). In Zamfara, between 4 and 6 January
2022, bandits killed more than 250 people.
In the first quarter of 2022, the estimated combined civilian kill of
Boko Haram and bandits was 1743 coming to a daily average of 19
deaths in 269 violent attacks (Akpan, 2022). Besides killing of civilians,
an estimate of around 100 bandit groups comprised of an average of
30 members operating with military grade weapons engage in kidnap-
ping for ransom, rape and looting across the Northwest (Human Rights
Watch, 2022). The intensity and severity of their actions led the Nige-
rian government to declare these groups as terrorists in January 2022
(GCR2P, 2023).
The accurate figures for the number of Nigerians killed by these VEGs
are unavailable and tend to vary based on reporting source. What is
certain is their consistency and severity. In Benue following the February
2023 Presidential elections, bandits killed no less than 200 people in one
month (The Guardian, 2023). The state government claim that between
2015 and May 2023, VEG killed at least 5138 civilians in the state.
Figures provided 1177 deaths in 2015, 809 in 2016, 43 in 2017, 440
in 2018, 174 in 2019, 88 in 2020, 2131 in 2021, 172 in 2022 and at
least 104 between January to March 2023 with over 2 million internally
displaced (The Sun, 2023). Similar figures have been submitted in other
northcentral states like Plateau and Nasarawa. In Kaduna state alone, the
first quarter of 2023 recorded 214 killings and at least 746 abductions
(The Cable, 2023). Table 1 outlines the widespread killings and abduc-
tions by bandits in the northcentral and northwestern within a one week
period in June, 2023.
The driver for these killings are often linked to competition for grazing
and arable land between nomadic Fulani herdsmen and sedentary farmers
(Okoli & Ogayi, 2018; Olumba, 2023). These killings have therefore
been framed as a self-pertuating cycle of violent attacks and reprisal attacks
among Fulani herders and farmers (Imo, 2017; SBM Intelligence, 2017).
The killings by Fulani herdsmen particularly in places like Benue and
Plateau state, have however been described by some as genocide. This
position is built on the fact that the main culprits are Fulani Herdsmen
and the victims mostly rural Christians though rural Muslims are increas-
ingly victims. Additionally, the means via the herdsmen operate call to
mind crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
298 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

Table 1 VEG killings and abductions across Northcentral and Northwest

Nigeria

Date Incident Location

No. Killed No. Abducted

June 3, 2023 40 – Katsina-Ala, Benue state

June 3, 2023 18 – Gwadabawa LG, Sokoto state
June 3, 2023 37 – Tangazara LG, Sokoto state
June 3, 2023 31 30 Maradun, Zamfara state
June 3, 2023 – 4 Bwari, FCT Abuja
June 5, 2023 2 30 Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna state
June 6, 2023 – 4 Asa, Kwara state
June 6, 2023 1 55 Shiroro, Niger state
June 8, 2023 2 3 Faskari, Katsina
June 7–10, 2023 50 30 Rafi LGA, Niger state

Source Nigeria Security Tracker (https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerian-conundrum)

In Plateau state, there are reports of rural communities wiped out

or displaced using various forms of violence including murder, arson,
sexual violence and forced displacement and repopulated with Fulani and
given Fulani names (Vanguard, 2018). The tendency is for such repopu-
lated villages to be former Christian communities (Bernard-Henri, 2021).
Its been argued that these Fulani groups harbour extremist ideologies,
demonstrate intent to target Christians as well as “potent symbols of
Christian identity” like churches and adopt strategies similar to Boko
Haram (APPG, 2020: 5). This is a call back to atrocity crimes partic-
ularly genocide and ethnic cleansing. Both of these crimes as explained
previously are distinguished by the systematic extermination of a group of
people; for the former based on a range of identified characterisitics that
may include tribe, languge or religion (Stanton, 2016), and the latter
from a given geographical area based on the specific characterisitic of
ethnicity (Riga, 2015).
Therefore, the systematic targetting of Christians by radical Islamist
groups whether Fulani Herdsmen or Boko Haram has been described as
genocide (International Committee on Nigeria, 2020). A “slow-motion
genocide”, that since 2015 has been directly responsible for the death
of more than 12,000 Christians (Gilbert, 2021). This has led to asser-
tions that Nigeria is the most unsafe place in the world to be a Christian
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 299

(Lyons & Blight, 2015). The methods including murder, forced displace-
ment and sexual violence like rape adopted by these Fulani militants
against Northern Christians particularly in Plateau and other cultural
groups including Muslims are typical of those named under crimes against
humanity.
The rampancy of the banditry and Fulani militancy in Northern
Nigeria is worsened by the inability or even, the tendency of the Nigerian
government to ignore or unwillingness to properly name the problem.
This leads to its exacerbation and the exposure of more civilians in the
region to human rights violations. What the above establishes is that
these human rights violations by their intent, context, process and scale
of civilian deaths meet the threshold of mass atrocity crimes. This leads
to the next phase of discussion on the response of the international
community.

Atrocity Crimes, the International Community

and Non-Authorisation of RtoP in Nigeria
The scale of civilian casualty and range of atrocity crimes backed by
evidence nonetheless, the international community has refrained from
RtoP intervention in Nigeria. A calculation of the average of civilians
killed since 2015 exceed a thousand yearly strengthening their descrip-
tions as mass killings. It is somewhat perplexing that in the face of this
number, the international community remains unwilling to consider RtoP
intervention for Nigeria where in Libya it took less than 1000 deaths by
the Gaddafi regime to authorise intervention in 2011 (Kuperman, 2013).
In this section, three plausible and intersecting arguments are suggested
to explain the reticence of the international community to intervene
militarily in Nigeria.

First Argument: RtoP

and Controversies of Norm Status
RtoP by the very fact that it seeks to redefine the meaning of sovereignty
in an international system where states interact on the basis of mutual
suspicion, was controversial and faced resistance from inception (Bellamy,
2010). This has retarded its development into an international norm.
These controversies include legitimate concerns over misuse by powerful
300 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

states. Concerns over misuse encompass issues of definition and boundary

setting and how they enable interference in domestic affairs of less
powerful states by western powers (Mamdani, 2010). This ties closely to
concerns over exactly what RtoP aims to do and in what specific events
can it do these things. This is because RtoP has been applied to diverse
events including post-election violence in Africa (Erameh & Ologe, 2021;
Junk, 2016), facilitating regime change to prevent mass atrocity in Libya
(Gifkins, 2016), and even for humanitarian relief following the natural
disaster of cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (da Costa, 2018).
The diversity of situations in which RtoP has been used, for some
demonstrates its versatility while others counter it an ambiguity that
allow powerful states to interpret and determine when and where to
deploy RtoP (Bellamy, 2010), for the purpose of seeking national interests
(Kuperman, 2013). From these concerns flow arguments from countries
like China and Russia that RtoP be demand-driven. This position has
advanced the argument that only cases of proven genocide and crimes
against humanity defined in a narrow sense excluding death or displace-
ment of citizens from causes that are not deliberate be grounds for
RtoP intervention. It also seeks to enable regions share the role of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Welsh, 2019), as the only legal
body that can authorise body RtoP (Hehir, 2015). In sum, this position
attempts to relocate ownership of RtoP from the international to national
spaces where national governments and regional leadership can exercise
more control over its definition, development and application in line with
national and regional interests.
The resistance to RtoP reduced following the “narrow but deep” defi-
nition contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which
acknowledges the role assigned to the international community, stresses
focus on diplomatic solutions and allows states to determine how RtoP
should be used in their regions (Bellamy, 2010). Consequently, existing
resistance to RtoP is directed mostly at Pillar III which prescribes military
action (Welsh, 2019), compared to Pillar I and II which do not necessarily
try to redefine as much as reaffirm traditional international relations prin-
ciples like non-interference on the basis of sovereignty (Pupparo, 2015).
Coupled with the fact that RtoP is not the product of any international
treaty, prevents it from achieving status of international norm (Bloom-
field, 2016). By implication, any push for RtoP Pillar III continually face
resistance (Erameh, 2016). That China and Russia two powers opposed
to Pillar III are permanent members of the UNSC ensures that getting
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 301

unanimous votes for RtoP authorisation is nearly impossible forcing other

members to act unilaterally or in coalition thus violating the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document thereby re-enforcing resistance to RtoP.

Second Argument: RtoP as Smokescreen

for Advancing Western Interests
Other issues arising from intent and operational outcomes also generate
criticism and opposition of RtoP. One such criticism has been that of
‘selective implementation (Eskiduman, 2022). Cases like the interven-
tion in Libya where RtoP was authorised with less than a thousand
deaths (Kuperman, 2013), but ignoring others of proven atrocities crimes
(Rodriguez-Merino, 2019), like in Bahrain (Hehir, 2015), or ongoing
atrocities against Uyghurs and Turkic Muslims in China (Holdstock,
2019), substantiate this position. Selective implementation is arguably
rooted in the utilization of RtoP by powerful western states as a vehicle
for pursuing national interest. The Libyan intervention led by France and
NATO has been criticised for overstepping its ‘Resolution 1973’ mandate
to protect civilians using all measures necessary (Gifkins, 2016), when it
effected regime change in the country (Kuperman, 2013). Interpreting
Resolution 1973 to include regime change has been linked to France’
desire to gain access to Libya’s billion dollar energy industry from which
Ghaddafi had prevented them (Pradella & Taghdisi, 2017).
Many have argued that the France’s leading role in the intervention
cannot be separated and was indeed driven by need for unhindered access
to the Libya’s oil (Bucher et al., 2013). This all the more so as France
did not press for military intervention to address similar events across
the Middle East and North Africa in Algeria, Egypt and Syria (Nuruz-
zaman, 2013). The motivation for RtoP and regime change in Libya was
not so much to protect civilians but condiserations of national interest
by France (Davidson, 2013) and the support of other western powers
like the United States was informed by protection of strategic interest
(Chesterman, 2011). Evidence have emerged to support positions that
western countries were already striking oil deals with the rebels even
before the intervention (Nuruzzaman, 2013), and enboldened the rebels
under the National Transition Committee to reject calls by the African
Union for ceasefire and negotiations with Ghaddafi (Kuperman, 2013).
Though RtoP norm entrepreneurs deny arguments supporting notions
of north–south hegemonic dichotomy, many countries no less continue to
302 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

perceive RtoP as an instrument for perpetuating this dichotomy (Acharya,

2015). This perception is increasingly dominant in the literature on RtoP
with many concluding that the five permanent members of the UNSC
prioritise national interest over human right violations (Hehir, 2013). So
long as states where RtoP ought to apply, implement certain policies that
align with the national interests and frames them as allies of the permanent
members of the UNSC, it is almost certain they would refrain from or
support authorisation of RtoP in such states (Hehir, 2015). For emphasis
the UNSC was unable to agree on how to proceed during the Syrian crisis
where Russia and China continually vetoed proposed measures consid-
ering military action with the intent of preventing another intervention
like the one in Libya (Almustafa et al., 2013) Conclusions drawn from this
is that RtoP is only championed by powerful western state when national
objectives of maintaining power and resources coincide with intervention
leading to contentions that if RtoP will not be implemented properly, it
should not be considered an option for civilian protection (Clark, 2019).

Third Argument: RtoP, Divisive

Intervention Outcomes
Lastly, the limited cases where RtoP has been deployed for humanitarian
purposes have tended towards divisive outcomes. This is fact gleamed
from Myanmar following cyclone Nargis where it has been argued to
have added no value to disaster management (da Costa, 2018); Cote
d’Ivoire which continue to face post-intervention upheavals (Erameh &
Ologe, 2021), or Libya which devolved from one of the most pros-
perous societies in North Africa with living standards comparable to
the European Union (EU) (Mamdani, 2011), into anarchy and site for
international terrorism and criminality with far reaching implications for
security in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as worsening migrant concerns in
Europe (Kuperman, 2019). The intensification of a migratory wave of
displaced civilians towards Europe contributed to the 2015 refugee crisis
that destabilised the EU (Garcia-Zamor, 2017).
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP) … 303

The International Community

and Non-Authorisation of RtoP in Nigeria
As mentioned already, the arguments presented above connect intricately
and viewing the Nigerian situation through the lens they have created,
especially in the context of resistance and divisive outcome of RtoP inter-
vention and Nigeria’s role in West Africa and the wider Sub-Saharan
African region, explanations for why the international community is reluc-
tant to recommend RtoP Pillar III as a measure of ending wide spread
atrocity crimes in Northern Nigeria begin to emerge. The hegemonic
status of Nigeria in Africa is a subject of debate. While the political
footprints of the country across the continent suggest existing poten-
tial (Aleyomi, 2022), and indeed a self-perception as regional hegemon
(Warner, 2017), others categorically deny it that status (Ogunnubi,
2017). Yet it cannot be overlooked, that the economic and political
contributions of Nigeria on the continent have been pivotal to stability
of its immediate West and wider Sub-Saharan region (Ogunnubi &
Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).
Since 2010 Western nations particularly Europe and the United States
have witnessed increased migrations from SSA (Pew Research Center,
2018). Evidence show the bulk of such immigrations originate from
countries in conflict and limited economic opportunities (ACSS, 2022).
The possibility that intervention could destabilise and trigger a crisis
similar to Libya are real considerations for the international community
particularly Europe. Consequently while the international community in
efforts to avoid the RtoP Pillar III have tended to focus on Pillar 2 which
mandates the international community to assist states to achieve Pillar 1
which is the protection of citizens from atrocity crimes (ICISS, 2001).
This is obvious in the rendering of economic aid to Nigeria as a means
of alleviating extreme poverty conditions and economic marginalisation
in the country which has been identified as a key driver of terrorism and
fundamentalism that fuel insecurity (Egunjobi, 2021; Agudiegwu et al.,
2019; Meagher, 2014).
In addition, the self-perception of Nigeria as a regional hegemon
(Warner, 2017) and denial of the severity of the extent of human rights
violation in the North as well as refusal to properly name the ongoing
atrocities across its territory, it will resist any attempt to broach RtoP
intervention in its domain. Additionally, considering the close economic
ties between Nigeria and China (a permanent member of the UNSC
304 U. OLOGE AND E. T. ANICHE

opposed to the RtoP Pillar III), it would be difficult to get the unanimous
UNSC votes that the ICISS prescribed for the authorisation of RtoP.
These combined with the fact that RtoP and the international community
have faced significant challenges ensuring sustainable peace building and
developing in post-intervention as well as the spectre of intervention for
national interest (Ajigboye, 2014), combine to forestall RtoP intervention
as an extreme measure to end mass atrocity crimes in Northern Nigeria.

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 Environmental Challenges, Climate Change
and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
in Africa

Deborah Odu Obor and Joseph Peter Ochogwu

Introduction
Climate change is one of the significant threats of the twenty-first century
and poses a global challenge not only to the environment but also to
social conditions and human life (Abbass et al. 2022, Sambo & Sule,
2023). Furthermore, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
(2019) noted that climate change is a threat multiplier for conflict and
mass atrocities. For instance, as global temperatures continue to rise,
extreme weather episodes proliferate, and desertification and resource
scarcity increase, the risks and challenges of global hunger, poverty and
conflict intensifies. According to the Global Centre for RtoP (2023), such
challenges directly threaten some vulnerable societies, creating an envi-
ronment conducive to committing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,

D. O. Obor (B) · J. P. Ochogwu

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja,
Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 313

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_18
314 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

and crimes against humanity and forming an essential aspect of ‘common

concern’.
The principle of common concern is a fundamental concept in inter-
national environmental law and governance which recognises that specific
environmental issues and challenges are of global importance and require
collective action by the international community (Cottier et al., 2014).
Under this principle, all states share a common interest and responsibility
in addressing these environmental and climate change issues, regardless of
their size, level of development, or geographical location. Hickel (2020)
noted that the principle also implies the need for equity and fairness
in addressing global environmental challenges. It recognises that devel-
oped countries, which historically have been significant contributors to
environmental degradation, have a greater responsibility to take action
and provide support to developing countries in their sustainable develop-
ment and climate change adaptation efforts. Although climate change and
the environment are a common concern globally, Fishel (2018) argues
that the significant challenges with climate change are that environmental
concerns are rarely “factored into security, development or humanitarian
strategies” and that there is no “coherence in environmental protection
efforts at the global level”.
While climate change, with its attendant environmental challenge,
has consequences and is fuelling the risk, according to Kremer (2022),
Schefer and Cottier (2021) opined that the principle of responsibility
to protect was born in response to a particular type of problem of
preventing, reacting, and rebuilding mass atrocities, the principle can be
adaptable to a much wide range of problems as climate change. Climate
change issues have brought about emerging atrocities found in many
African countries. For instance, farmer-herder clashes result from rising
climatic changes (Cabot, 2017). Despite the far-reaching issues associ-
ated with climate change and environmental concerns, Bertamini (2021)
argues that there is a need to revisit RtoP in considering the increasing
environmental challenges, the need to take action on a global scale and its
ability to proffer solutions within the scope of its application. Addition-
ally, the UN climate change framework suggests that there is an increasing
need to have a global policy on climate change because of the triggering
factors, which include environmental changes that drastically affect entire
societies, including severe drought or natural disasters, and motives or
incentives could potentially include a dramatic widening of inequality
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 315

because of climate change, including food and water scarcity, environ-

mental degradation, and the political manipulation of access to precious
resources.
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) emerged as a global normative
framework to address the responsibility of states and the international
community to protect populations from mass atrocities (Global Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect, 2022). However, the concept of RtoP
can be expanded to encompass environmental protection as an essential
component of safeguarding human well-being and sustainable develop-
ment (O’Brien & Barnett, 2013). Applying environmental RtoP’ in Africa
means recognising the responsibility to protect populations from climate
change-related environmental crises, which threaten human security and
exacerbate existing vulnerabilities.
The significance of addressing environmental challenges, climate
change, and RTOP in Africa lies in the urgent need to protect vulner-
able populations and ensure sustainable development. Hence, integrating
RTOP principles into environmental policies, strategies, and interventions
can help mobilise collective action, strengthen governance frameworks,
and promote resilience in the face of climate change impacts. This
approach acknowledges the interconnections between human security,
environmental protection, and sustainable development, laying the foun-
dation for more holistic and effective responses to the complex challenges
faced by African countries.
Thus, this chapter explores the potential of the Responsibility to
Protect (RtoP) framework as a comprehensive and effective tool for
addressing climate change-related environmental crises in Africa. By
applying ‘environmental RtoP,’ which incorporates the protection of the
environment as a critical component of safeguarding human well-being
and sustainable development, we can enhance resilience, promote sustain-
able practises, and ensure the protection of vulnerable populations in
the face of climate change impacts. By examining the practical imple-
mentation of RtoP, analysing the role of African regional organisations
and national governments, and exploring the synergies between RtoP
and other global environmental governance frameworks, this research
contributes to the advancement of strategies that safeguard the well-
being of African populations, promote environmental sustainability, and
strengthen resilience in the face of climate change.
316 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

Background to Environmental Challenges and Climate Change

in Africa
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA, 2022), Africa is highly vulnerable to climate change. Africa’s
susceptibility and vulnerability are primarily attributed to the continent’s
heavy dependence on climate-related activities and products, coupled with
its limited adaptive capacity. African Development Bank (AfDB, 2023)
further noted that Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is exacerbated
by the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa relies on rain-fed agriculture signif-
icantly, accounting for 95% of such agricultural practices globally. The
substantial reliance on agriculture, which constitutes a significant portion
of the region’s GDP and employment, further increases its vulnera-
bility. Weather-sensitive sectors like herding and fishing also contribute
to income losses and heightened regional food insecurity.
Although Africa’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is rela-
tively low, it is the most susceptible and endures some of the world’s
harshest consequences of climate change (Trisos et al., 2022). The
continent’s most impoverished communities often find themselves power-
less in extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and, more
recently, conflict. The resulting famines and widespread livelihood inse-
curity frequently lead to catastrophic outcomes. This situation poses
significant challenges, particularly for the continent’s most vulnerable
communities.
According to the findings of International Rescue (2023a), a signif-
icant proportion of seven out of the ten most vulnerable countries to
climate change are in Africa. These countries include Chad, Somalia,
South Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Climate change has emerged as a signifi-
cant catalyst for humanitarian crises, exacerbating existing challenges and
giving rise to new ones in vulnerable communities across the globe.
The IEP, 2022 Ecological Threat Report (ETR) shows that Sub-
Saharan Africa has the worst ETR score, with approximately 206 million
people at extreme risk of water insecurity. By 2050, sub-Saharan Africa’s
population is predicted to rise to 2.1 billion, an increase of over 95
per cent, dramatically increasing pressure on existing food and water
supplies. Among the 27 hotspot countries, eight countries recorded catas-
trophic scores on all four (food security, natural disaster, population
growth and water risk) ETR domains. These eight countries are Burundi,
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 317

Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South

Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. An estimated 146 million people live in these
countries.
Climate change has profoundly impacted Somalia, intensifying the
severity of droughts and exacerbating extreme food insecurity. Unfortu-
nately, addressing these climate-related issues and safeguarding vulnerable
populations has proven formidable due to the country’s political insta-
bility. Disturbingly, it is projected that by mid-2023, an estimated eight
million Somalis, roughly half of the nation’s population, will face food
insecurity categorised as a crisis or worse (Said & Bashir, 2023).
The Democratic Republic of Congo ranked as the third most vulner-
able country (IEP, 2022), is currently contending with persistent conflict,
economic hardships, and outbreaks of diseases (International Rescue,
2023). Over 100 armed groups vie for control in eastern Congo,
frequently targeting innocent civilians. It shows the nexus between
climate change and conflict. Furthermore, the (Tarif, 2022) and (IEP,
2022) report shows that climate change accelerates ecological degrada-
tion, raising many security implications at the micro and macro levels.
Major disease outbreaks, such as measles, malaria, and Ebola, further
compound the threats an already weakened healthcare system faces,
imperilling countless lives. Consequently, these factors have eroded the
country’s preparedness for climate disasters while disrupting humanitarian
aid, leaving its citizens vulnerable to floods and escalating food insecurity.
Chad, which tops the Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Initiative Index
(2023) as the most climate-vulnerable country globally, has grappled
with the aftermath of severe flooding that affected over one million
people in late 2022. Moreover, an ongoing economic crisis has led
to widespread food insecurity. The country’s climate resilience-building
efforts have been hampered by growing conflict and tensions surrounding
its Transitional Military Council.
South Sudan, characterised by high fragility and limited climate readi-
ness, is increasingly vulnerable to climate-related disasters. Although the
civil war officially ended in 2018, localised conflicts continue to plague
the nation. Enhancing climate resilience is imperative to safeguard the
South Sudanese population from severe shocks, including the devastating
floods that impacted over 900,000 individuals in late 2022 (International
Rescue, 2023; Relief Web, 2021).
The Central African Republic (CAR) has been destabilised by intense
competition for political power and control over natural resources. Severe
318 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

flooding poses a severe threat to the safety and well-being of CAR resi-
dents, particularly those residing in internally displaced people camps,
as it contributes to the spread of water-borne illnesses such as cholera.
Furthermore, CAR’s weakened healthcare system struggles to combat
diseases like malaria, meningitis, and monkeypox, further exacerbating the
country’s vulnerabilities (Relief Web, 2023).
According to the Nigeria Emergency Management Agency (Durodola,
2022), Nigeria encountered a significant flooding event in late 2022,
affecting approximately 2.5 million individuals and causing substantial
devastation to agricultural lands. Consequently, an estimated 25 million
Nigerians are expected to face heightened levels of food insecurity by mid-
2023. The country’s already fragile state has been further aggravated by
political tensions and widespread conflict, impeding its ability to respond
to climate-related disasters adequately. Notably, recent studies conducted
in Nigeria (2023) have highlighted the existence of various intercon-
nections between climate change and other critical aspects. Specifically,
research has examined the climate-conflict nexus (Omoyajowo et al.,
2022), the climate-food security nexus (Ani et al., 2022; Sambo & Sule,
2023), and the climate-gender nexus (Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2022).
Satellite estimates provided by the World Food Programme (WFP, 2022)
indicate that, as of mid-October, more than 3.6 million hectares of land,
including approximately 750,000 hectares of cropland, were subjected to
flooding across Nigeria. These figures represent roughly eight per cent
of the total cropped hectares dedicated to major staple crops such as
cereals, legumes, and tubers nationwide. The Ministry of Humanitarian
Affairs and Social Development also reported that over 70,556 hectares
of farmland were washed away due to the flood.
Ethiopia is grappling with the adverse effects of drought, which
have impacted over 24 million individuals. Alarming trends indicate the
country is heading into its sixth consecutive failed rainy season, further
exacerbating the situation. Numerous regional conflicts and political
instability have disrupted humanitarian aid efforts, making it challenging
for authorities to adequately address the consequences of climate change
in Ethiopia. According to Relief Web (2022), the Humanitarian drought
statistics in Ethiopia show that 24 million people are currently living in
drought-affected areas, 11 million are estimated to be food insecure, and
there have been about 6.85 million livestock deaths since late 2021.
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 319

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC, 2022) asserts that climate change in Africa is intrinsi-
cally linked to the continent’s susceptibility to its consequences. This
vulnerability is manifested through various factors, including water stress
resulting from altered rainfall patterns and increasingly severe droughts.
Moreover, population growth, unsustainable land use practices, and agri-
cultural and urban expansion contribute significantly to deforestation and
desertification, exacerbating African nations’ challenges. Additionally, the
loss of biodiversity poses a grave concern. Furthermore, limited access to
modern energy services remains a persistent obstacle across many African
countries, leading to continued reliance on fossil fuels. These intercon-
nected issues underscore the multifaceted nature of the climate change
challenge in Africa.

The Concept of Environmental Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)

The pillars of Responsibility to protect, according to Global Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect (2023), notes that every state has the
Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes:
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
The second pillar states that the wider international community has the
responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that
responsibility. a state is manifestly failing to protect its population, the
international community must be prepared to take appropriate collec-
tive action in a timely and decisive manner and accordance with the UN
Charter.
Fishel (2018) argues against applying the responsibility to protect
universally, as it may result in inadequate protection for everyone.
However, he noted that “the responsibility to protect” is valuable because
it allows for a consensus-based response to extreme and morally appalling
situations, which the previous “right to intervene” language could not
achieve. Preserving the rallying power of “the responsibility to protect”
is crucial. Secondly, there is a legitimate worry, often voiced by devel-
oping and postcolonial countries, that expanding the ability to intervene
could lead to a situation where powerful nations from the North use it
as an excuse to engage in neo-colonial missions (Evans, 2009: 29; Fishel,
2018).
Throughout history, various paradigms have been employed to protect
the environment. These include the Westphalian system of sovereign
320 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

states, emphasising national sovereignty and territoriality. Under this

system, each state has exclusive jurisdiction over resources within its phys-
ical boundaries, extending no further than the recognised borders of other
states. However, Oji and Ozioko (2011) noted that sovereignty is still
very attractive to weaker states whose domestic structures have been influ-
enced by outside actors and whose leaders have little control over activities
within their own country. Furthermore, the limitations of Westphalian
sovereignty became apparent when states exploited resources within their
territories Osiander (2001).
To address abuses of resources, several principles were established.
The “no harm principle” prohibits states from using their territory in
a way that damages the resources of other sovereigns. The concept of
the “Common Heritage of Mankind”, according to Schefer and Cottier
(2012) and Szwedo (2018), aims to counteract the “tragedy of the
commons” by establishing mechanisms to share the benefits of non-
sovereign resources. For example, the mineral deposits in the seabed
below the High Seas, known as the Area, and lunar resources are avail-
able for private extraction. However, profits or advancements from such
activities must be shared with the international community.
The global recognition of environmental harms as interconnected
systems of biological resources and physical forces gained significant atten-
tion in the second half of the twentieth century Chu and Karr (2017).
Furthermore, human rights and the rights of humanitarian intervention
marked critical legal steps in challenging states’ claims of sovereignty-as-
control. The imposition of rules on how states should treat their citizens,
as embodied by human rights, represented a significant advancement in
international law. The concept of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) further
extended this by establishing a duty to intervene beyond a state’s territory
to prevent, halt, or address abuses.
These developments depart from traditional notions of sovereignty and
recognise the need for international action to address environmental and
human rights issues. The concept of RtoP represents a ground-breaking
shift towards a broader understanding of sovereignty, acknowledging
the responsibility to act in the face of abuses, regardless of territorial
boundaries.
Thirteen years prior to the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect
(RtoP) concept, the notion of addressing extraterritorial environmental
issues as matters of “Common Concern” to humanity was explicitly artic-
ulated in UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 on climate change
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 321

(Cottier & Salehyan, 2020: 29). Considering the escalating global prob-
lems affecting the entire international community, it becomes imperative
to re-examine the conventional understanding of joint state action as
the sole political framework for addressing issues of common concern
to humanity. In this context, the ‘Environmental RtoP’ concept expands
upon the traditional RtoP framework by encompassing the protection of
the environment as a fundamental aspect of preserving human well-being
and achieving sustainable development.
Environmental RtoP recognises the significant threats posed by climate
change and environmental crises to populations, particularly in vulner-
able regions like Africa. It emphasises the need for a comprehensive
approach to tackle these challenges effectively. Incorporating environ-
mental protection into the RtoP framework underscores the intercon-
nectedness between environmental degradation, human security, and the
overall stability of societies. Therefore, Environmental RtoP is a compre-
hensive approach that acknowledges the link between environmental
protection and human well-being, sustainable development, environ-
mental responsibility, resilience and adaptation, and international coop-
eration and adaptation (Eriksen et al., 2021). Therefore, by embracing
the concept of Environmental RtoP, African countries, regional organisa-
tions, and the international community can work together to develop and
implement effective strategies that safeguard the environment, protect
vulnerable populations, and ensure sustainable development in the face
of climate change challenges.

Role of African Regional Organisations in Integrating RtoP

Principles into Environmental Policies and Strategies—A Case Study
of African Union Agenda 2063
Several African regional organisations focus on climate change, resilience
and sustainability and address environmental challenges, for instance,
African Union Agenda 2063, ECOWAS, African Union Commission
Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture, African Adaptation
Initiative (AAI), African Risk Capacity (ARC), West African Science
Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL),
Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa), and Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI) among others.
A report of the Africa Union Agenda 2063 serves as a blueprint for
African countries to work collectively towards achieving a prosperous,
322 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

integrated, and sustainable Africa by 2063, reflecting its commitment to

Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. However, while environmental
challenges and climate change are not explicitly highlighted as standalone
aspirations in African Union Agenda 2063, they have been integrated into
several key agenda areas. For instance, Aspiration One, which focuses
on ‘prosperous Africa’, recognises the importance of sustainable devel-
opment and inclusive economic growth to address climate change and
build resilience to achieve prosperity in Africa. Aspiration focuses on
‘An Integrated Continent’. This goal addresses transboundary climate
change impacts that require a collaborative and integrated approach.
Achieving integration and connectivity across Africa involves addressing
climate change and building resilience through regional cooperation and
coordination. Furthermore, Aspiration 5 address ‘An Environmentally
Sustainable Africa,’ which pays attention to the need for sustainable
management of natural resources, biodiversity conservation, and climate
resilience, and Aspiration Seven, ‘A Peaceful and Secure Africa,’ focus
on climate change and its impacts can exacerbate conflicts and security
challenges. Building resilience to climate change, promoting sustainable
natural resource management, and addressing climate-related conflicts are
essential to achieving peace and security in Africa.
While African Union Agenda 2063 is a comprehensive framework for
Africa’s development, there are some fundamental challenges with how
it situates climate change and environmental challenges in its agenda.
For instance, Agenda 2063 has no dedicated aspiration solely focused on
climate change. While environmental sustainability is mentioned within
Aspiration 5, a specific and separate aspiration dedicated to climate change
and environmental sustainability would have significantly emphasised the
urgent need to address this global challenge.
While Agenda 2063 identifies priority areas such as infrastructure
development, agriculture, and industrialisation, the integration of climate
change and environmental considerations within these sectors could
be further emphasised, which includes incorporating climate resilience,
sustainable practices, and low-carbon solutions into the implementation
strategies. Agenda 2063 acknowledges the need for financial resources to
implement its goals, including climate change and environmental chal-
lenges. However, critics argue that the framework needs more explicit
and effective financing mechanisms to mobilise the required resources.
Enhancing financial instruments and partnerships for climate action would
strengthen the implementation of environmental priorities. Although
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 323

Agenda 2063 sets out a long-term vision, it needs robust enforce-

ment mechanisms to ensure its implementation by member states. Clear
accountability measures may help integrate climate change and environ-
mental goals effectively into national policies and strategies (Ndizera &
Muzee, 2018). While Agenda 2063 recognises the importance of climate
resilience, critics argue that it places relatively more emphasis on miti-
gation efforts than adaptation and resilience. Given the vulnerability
of African countries to climate change impacts, there is a need for a
stronger emphasis on adaptation strategies, including building resilience
and adaptive capacity.
Despite the downsides of Agenda 2063, African regional organisations
play a crucial role in integrating the principles of Responsibility to protect
into environmental policies and strategies (Denters & Gazzini, 2017).
These organisations provide a platform for collaboration, coordination,
and exchanging knowledge and best practices among African countries.
Their role encompasses various aspects that contribute to effectively
integrating RtoP principles into environmental governance frameworks.

1. Policy Development and Advocacy: African regional organisations,

such as the African Union (AU), can develop and advocate for
regional policies integrating RtoP principles into environmental
policies and strategies. They can facilitate dialogue among member
states to identify shared priorities and challenges and develop
policy frameworks that emphasise the importance of environmental
protection and the prevention of mass atrocities. Through policy
development and advocacy, regional organisations can influence the
integration of RtoP principles into national policies and strategies.
2. Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance: Regional organisations
can support member states in building their capacity to integrate
RtoP principles into environmental policies and strategies. They can
provide technical assistance, training programmes, and knowledge-
sharing platforms to enhance their understanding of RtoP principles
and their application in environmental protection. Capacity-building
initiatives can focus on conflict prevention, early warning systems,
and promoting sustainable practices. By strengthening the capacity
of member states, regional organisations contribute to the effective
implementation of RtoP in addressing environmental challenges.
3. Coordination and Collaboration: African regional organisations
serve as platforms for coordination and collaboration among
324 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

member states. They facilitate dialogue and information sharing on

environmental policies, strategies, and best practices. By fostering
collaboration, regional organisations promote the exchange of expe-
riences and lessons learned in integrating RtoP principles into envi-
ronmental governance frameworks. This coordination helps avoid
duplication of efforts and encourages the adoption of harmonised
approaches to address environmental challenges.
4. Early Warning Systems and Conflict Prevention: Integrating RtoP
principles into environmental policies and strategies involves estab-
lishing early warning systems and conflict prevention mechanisms.
Regional organisations can support member states in developing
and implementing effective early warning systems that identify envi-
ronmental risks and potential conflicts. By providing timely infor-
mation and analysis, regional organisations contribute to preventive
measures and mitigating environmental challenges before they esca-
late into mass atrocities. These efforts align with the core principles
of RtoP, emphasising the prevention of harm to populations.
5. Monitoring and Accountability: Regional organisations play a role in
monitoring the implementation of RtoP principles in environmental
policies and strategies. They can establish mechanisms to track
progress, evaluate effectiveness, and hold member states account-
able for their commitments. Monitoring ensures that environmental
policies are implemented in a manner that respects human rights,
safeguards vulnerable populations, and contributes to sustainable
development. By promoting accountability, regional organisations
reinforce the integration of RtoP principles into environmental
governance frameworks.
6. Collaboration with International Partners: African regional organ-
isations collaborate with international partners, including interna-
tional organisations and donor agencies, to support the integra-
tion of RtoP principles into environmental policies and strategies.
Such collaboration facilitates mobilising financial resources, technical
expertise, and capacity-building initiatives. International partners
can support regional organisations’ efforts to promote environ-
mental protection, conflict prevention, and sustainable develop-
ment. Collaboration with international partners strengthens the
implementation of RtoP principles in addressing environmental
challenges.
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 325

This study advocates and recognises the expansion of the Responsibility

to Protect framework because there is an intrinsic link between the envi-
ronment and well being of the population. This expansion acknowledges
that environmental degradation, climate change, and associated crises
pose significant threats to human security and necessitate a comprehensive
approach to safeguarding vulnerable populations. Incorporating environ-
mental protection into the RtoP framework can foster a more holistic and
proactive response to climate change-related challenges. Expanding the
RtoP framework to include environmental protection acknowledges the
critical role of the environment in ensuring human well-being and secu-
rity. By considering environmental challenges and climate change impacts
within the RtoP framework, a comprehensive and proactive approach
can be fostered, promoting preventive measures, addressing root causes,
and protecting vulnerable populations. This expansion aligns with the
principles of environmental justice, sustainable development, and inter-
national cooperation, providing a platform for collective action to address
the complex environmental challenges of the twenty-first century. The
following are some suggested areas of expansion:

1. Preventing Environmental Harm: Expanding RtoP to include envi-

ronmental protection underscores the need for preventive measures
to mitigate environmental harm. This approach emphasises the
importance of addressing the root causes of environmental crises,
such as unsustainable resource exploitation, deforestation, and
pollution. By focusing on prevention, the RtoP framework can
contribute to early warning systems, capacity building, and sustain-
able practices that reduce the risk of environmental crises.
2. Addressing Climate Change Impacts: The expansion of RtoP recog-
nises the urgent need to address the impacts of climate change on
vulnerable populations. Climate change exacerbates socio-economic
vulnerabilities, leading to displacement, food insecurity, and resource
conflicts. By incorporating climate change adaptation and mitigation
measures into the RtoP framework, efforts can be made to enhance
resilience, protect livelihoods, and ensure the well-being of affected
populations.
3. Promoting Environmental Justice: The inclusion of environ-
mental protection within RtoP promotes environmental justice by
acknowledging the disproportionate impact of environmental crises
on marginalised communities. Vulnerable populations, including
326 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

indigenous peoples, rural communities, and low-income groups,

often bear the brunt of environmental degradation and climate
change. By considering environmental justice in the RtoP frame-
work, equitable responses can be developed that address the needs
and rights of these marginalised communities.
4. Strengthening regional and International Cooperation: Expanding
RtoP to include environmental protection emphasises the need for
regional and international cooperation and collaboration. Environ-
mental challenges and climate change are global, requiring coor-
dinated efforts among nations, regional organisations, and interna-
tional institutions. By integrating environmental concerns into the
RtoP framework, opportunities for sharing knowledge, mobilising
resources, and fostering partnerships can be enhanced to address
transboundary environmental issues.
5. Enhancing Sustainable Development: The expansion of RtoP
to include environmental protection aligns with the principles
of sustainable development. By recognising the interdependence
between environmental sustainability and human well-being, the
RtoP framework can contribute to achieving the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs). This integration enables the promotion of
sustainable practices, the conservation of natural resources, and the
pursuit of inclusive and resilient development pathways.

Global Environmental Governance Frameworks, Synergies with RtoP

and Limitations
Global environmental governance frameworks are designed to address
environmental challenges at the global level and promote sustainable
development. While these frameworks may not explicitly incorporate
the “Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP), they share common objectives
and synergies with RtoP principles. For example, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a global envi-
ronmental governance framework that aims to stabilise greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere and mitigate the impacts of climate
change. In Africa, the UNFCCC provides a platform for countries to
engage in climate change negotiations, develop adaptation and mitigation
strategies, access climate finance, and enhance capacity-building efforts.
African countries actively participate in the Conference of the Parties
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 327

(COP) meetings and contribute to the global climate change discourse.

The framework recognises the importance of equity and common but
differentiated responsibilities, acknowledging the vulnerabilities of devel-
oping countries, including those in Africa.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an international
treaty that addresses the conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use of
its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived
from genetic resources (UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 2023).
In Africa, the CBD plays a crucial role in biodiversity conservation
efforts. African countries have developed National Biodiversity Strate-
gies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) to implement the CBD’s objectives at
the national level. The CBD provides a framework for African countries
to address biodiversity loss, protect ecosystems, and promote sustainable
development. RtoP and the CBD recognise the importance of protecting
biodiversity and ecosystems for the well-being of populations.
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
(UNCCD) focuses on combating desertification, land degradation,
and drought, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions (UNCCD, 2022).
In Africa, the UNCCD provides a platform for countries to address
land degradation and desertification challenges, which have significant
environmental, social, and economic impacts. African countries develop
National Action Programmes (NAPs) to implement the UNCCD’s
objectives, emphasising sustainable land management, restoration, and
resilience-building. RtoP and the UNCCD aim to address environmental
challenges that can lead to human suffering and vulnerabilities (UNCCD,
2022).
The Ramsar Convention on Wetland is an international treaty
promoting wetland conservation and sustainable use. In Africa, the
Ramsar Convention is critical in protecting wetland ecosystems, which
provide vital services such as water purification, flood control, and
habitat for diverse species (Suman, 2019). African countries have desig-
nated Ramsar sites and developed management plans to conserve and
sustainably utilise these wetland areas. RtoP and the Ramsar Convention
recognise the importance of wetland ecosystems in supporting human
well-being and resilience.
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal is another convention. The
primary objective of the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal is to
328 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

reduce the generation of hazardous wastes, encourage their environmen-

tally responsible handling, and oversee their cross-border transportation
(UNEP, 2023). Within the African context, the Basel Convention plays
a significant role in addressing the complexities of hazardous waste
management, mitigating pollution, and advancing circular economy prac-
tices. African nations are actively striving to implement the provisions
outlined in the Convention, which encompass establishing appropriate
regulatory frameworks and developing waste management infrastruc-
ture. The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the Basel Convention
share a common goal of safeguarding populations from harm, including
mitigating the risks associated with hazardous waste management.
The World Heritage Convention represents a comprehensive interna-
tional framework designed to identify, safeguard, and conserve cultural
and natural heritage sites of exceptional universal significance (UNESCO,
2023). In the African context, the Convention serves as a crucial mech-
anism for ensuring the protection and preservation of iconic sites,
including national parks, wildlife reserves, cultural landscapes, and histor-
ical monuments. These sites play a vital role in the conservation of
biodiversity, the promotion of sustainable tourism, and the preservation of
Africa’s rich heritage. The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the World
Heritage Convention share a fundamental objective of safeguarding
cultural and natural heritage, ultimately benefiting populations.
More generally, the synergies between the global environmental frame-
work and the principle of responsibility to protect include:

1. Protection of Vulnerable Populations: Both global environ-

mental governance frameworks and RtoP emphasise the protec-
tion of vulnerable populations. Environmental challenges, such as
climate change and pollution, disproportionately affect marginalised
communities, and addressing these challenges contributes to safe-
guarding their rights and well-being.
2. Prevention of Harm: Both frameworks promote preventive measures
to avoid or mitigate the negative impacts of environmental degrada-
tion, which includes addressing the root causes of environmental
problems and implementing policies and actions to prevent harm to
populations and ecosystems.
3. International Cooperation and Solidarity: Both frameworks recog-
nise the importance of international cooperation and solidarity in
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 329

addressing global challenges. They emphasise the need for collabora-

tion among nations, sharing knowledge and resources, and assisting
countries with limited capacities in managing environmental risks
and protecting populations.
4. Sustainable Development: Global environmental governance frame-
works and RtoP share a common objective of promoting sustainable
development. They recognise the interlinkages between environ-
mental, social, and economic dimensions and seek to address
environmental challenges to support long-term well-being and pros-
perity for all.
5. Lack of Coherence and Fragmentation: Global environmental
governance frameworks often need more coherence due to multiple
institutions, agreements, and initiatives, which can lead to challenges
in coordination and implementation, hindering effective responses
to environmental challenges.
6. Limited Enforcement Mechanisms: Many global environmental
governance frameworks rely on voluntary compliance and need
robust enforcement mechanisms, which can result in a gap between
commitments and actual implementation, reducing the effective-
ness of these frameworks in addressing environmental problems and
protecting populations.
7. Insufficient Integration of Human Rights: While some global envi-
ronmental governance frameworks recognise the linkages between
environmental challenges and human rights, there often needs to be
more direct integration of human rights principles and mechanisms,
which limits the potential for a comprehensive and rights-based
approach to addressing environmental issues.
8. Power Imbalances and Inequities: Global environmental governance
frameworks may need to address power imbalances and inequities
in decision-making processes adequately, which can result in the
interests and priorities of marginalised communities and developing
countries being overshadowed by those of more powerful actors,
undermining the effectiveness and fairness of these frameworks.
330 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

Conclusion
The ‘environmental RtoP’ concept holds significant potential for
addressing climate change-related environmental crises in Africa. By
expanding the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) framework to include
environmental protection, African populations’ well-being and sustain-
able development can be safeguarded more effectively. Integrating RtoP
principles into environmental policies and strategies at various levels,
including regional organisations, national governments, and international
actors, is crucial for implementing practical measures to address climate
change-induced environmental challenges.
African regional organisations play a vital role in integrating the
principles of RtoP into environmental governance frameworks. Their
involvement in promoting cooperation, knowledge sharing, and capacity
building is essential for effective implementation. Furthermore, national
governments in Africa are responsible for aligning RtoP with climate
change adaptation and mitigation efforts. Additionally, this requires
integrating RtoP principles into national policies, strategies, and interven-
tions to address African countries’ unique social, economic, and political
contexts.
The involvement of international actors is crucial to supporting RtoP
implementation in Africa. Financial assistance, technology transfer, and
knowledge exchange can enhance the capacity of African countries to
protect vulnerable populations and ecosystems. Collaboration with global
environmental governance frameworks, such as the UNFCCC, CBD,
UNCCD, Ramsar Convention, Basel Convention, and World Heritage
Convention, presents opportunities for synergies. Integrating RtoP prin-
ciples into these frameworks can strengthen the focus on human protec-
tion, ensuring that the needs and rights of vulnerable populations are
considered in environmental decision-making processes.
However, challenges exist in aligning RtoP with climate change efforts.
These challenges include limited resources, conflicting national inter-
ests, and the complexity of addressing environmental and humanitarian
dimensions. Balancing these challenges requires comprehensive and inte-
grated approaches that recognise the interlinkages between environmental
protection, human well-being, and sustainable development.
African countries’ social, economic, and political contexts are among
the factors that influence the implementation of RtoP. Poverty, polit-
ical instability, and weak governance can exacerbate vulnerability to
 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, CLIMATE CHANGE … 331

climate change impacts. Addressing these contextual factors is essen-

tial for effectively implementing RtoP and protecting vulnerable African
populations.
Despite challenges, opportunities exist for synergies between RtoP
and climate change efforts in Africa. A comprehensive and coordinated
approach can be achieved by integrating RtoP principles into global
environmental governance frameworks. This approach can enhance the
effectiveness of these frameworks in protecting vulnerable populations and
ecosystems, promoting sustainable development, and fostering resilience
in the face of climate change-induced environmental challenges.
In conclusion, expanding RtoP to include environmental protection
provides a framework for addressing climate change-related environ-
mental crises in Africa. By integrating RtoP principles into existing global
environmental governance frameworks and aligning them with national
and regional efforts, protecting vulnerable populations, preserving ecosys-
tems, and achieving sustainable development can be pursued more
effectively in Africa.

Recommendations
The integration of RtoP principles into environmental policies and strate-
gies in Africa is an area that requires further research, deliberateness,
and concerted action. While there is growing recognition of the need
to address climate change-related environmental challenges and protect
vulnerable populations, more efforts are needed to operationalise RtoP
practically.
It is crucial to conduct in-depth research on the potential appli-
cations of RtoP within the context of environmental protection. This
research should explore how RtoP can be integrated into existing environ-
mental governance frameworks, national policies, and regional initiatives.
It should also analyse the challenges and opportunities of aligning RtoP
with climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts.
There is a need for action at various levels. National governments
should prioritise integrating RtoP principles into their environmental
policies and strategies. They should establish precise mechanisms for
monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of RtoP implementation,
ensuring that it leads to tangible outcomes in terms of environmental
protection and the well-being of vulnerable populations.
332 D. O. OBOR AND J. P. OCHOGWU

Regional organisations in Africa should proactively promote the inte-

gration of RtoP principles into their environmental governance frame-
works. They should provide guidance, technical assistance, and capacity-
building support to member states, facilitating the implementation of
RtoP in the regional context.
Internationally, there should be increased collaboration and support
for African countries in their efforts to integrate RtoP principles into
environmental policies and strategies. Financial resources, technology
transfer, and knowledge exchange should be available to enable effective
implementation and protect vulnerable populations.
Overall, there is a pressing need for further research and action to
integrate RtoP principles into African environmental policies and strate-
gies fully. By conducting rigorous research, fostering collaboration, and
implementing targeted actions, we can harness the potential of RtoP to
address climate change-related environmental challenges and safeguard
the well-being of vulnerable populations on the continent.

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 Institutionalzation, Consolidation
and Prospects of The Responsibility
to Protect in Africa
From the Sustainable Development Goal 16
to the African Union Silencing the Guns
Agenda: Why It Is So Difficult to Achieve
Sustainable Peace and Stability in Africa?

Patrick Ateah Yeboah and John Peter Okoro

Acronyms
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of
Disputes
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
AU STG African Union’s Silencing the Guns
AUMR African Union Master Roadmap
CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution

P. A. Yeboah (B)
Department of Governance and Development Management,
Simon Diedong Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development
Studies, Wa, Ghana
e-mail: [email protected]
J. P. Okoro
Department of Environment and Sustainability Sciences & West African Center
for Water Irrigation and Sustainable Agriculture (WACWISA), University for
Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 339

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_19
340 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
IGD Inter-generational Dialogues
ISS Institute for Security Studies
ISWAP Islamic West Africa Province
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NPI Nairobi Peace Initiative
OAU Organization of African Unity
OYE Office of the Youth Envoy
PSC Peace and Security Committee
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nation
WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

Introduction
Ethnically, Africa is said to be the most diverse region globally. African
nations are artificial products of colonialism—apart from Ethiopia and
the island states, of which the major consequence is the pervasiveness
of ethnic strife throughout the continent (Nhema & Zeleza, 2008).
There is a conspicuous mark of this reality all over the continent. This
is exemplified by the Biafra/Nigeria war in the 1960s, the oil wars
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, the north–south Sudanese civil war and the
Darfur enigma, the Rwandan killing of 1994, the 2008 post-election
ethnic violence in Kenya, the unending Boko Haram, ISWAP, and Fulani
herdsmen terrorism in Nigeria, the currently renewed violence in Sudan,
just to mention a few. The Rwandan killing stands out of all the ethnic
conflict situations in Africa, as the conflagration whose geographic scope,
the ferocity of violence, and level of civilian mobilisation were over-
whelming. Approximately one million people were killed within hundred
days—April–July 1994.
The idea of peace is viewed as having many facets and being chal-
lenging to describe and quantify (Feyzabadi et al., 2015). While everyone
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 341

deserves “peace”, it is easier to understand the topic of peace in Africa

when it is connected to current global discussions. The two major world
faiths, Islam and Christianity, both make significant use of the phrase. For
instance, the Christian and Jewish greeting “Shalom” is just as common
among them as the Muslim greeting “Asalaam Alaikum”. Both words
imply “peace be unto you”. The paradox, however, is that there is now no
agreement on what peace looks like around the globe, not even among
followers of the major religions. The discussion about how to achieve
peace is more heated. However, according to Anderson (2004), peace is
mostly related to the absence of violence and all forms of conflict.
In both the Western world and Africa, the meaning of peace is rooted
in the philosophical and political beliefs of the people, which are manifest
in their “traditional religions”. Although the African conception of peace
is founded in the people’s history and traditions, as represented in their
now-vilified old faiths (traditional religion). Peace in the Western world
has its root in the following; the Ancient Judaic concept of shalom, the
Greek concept of Eirene focusing on prosperity and order, and the Roman
concept of pax. The three Western concepts are based on prosperity and
order. The ‘order’ is about the rule of law (Rinehart, 2005). According
to this line of reasoning, violence, conflict, and war, all serve to impede
prosperity, and the only way to increase prosperity is to strengthen the
application of the law. Keeping law and order, pursuing stability, and a
generally safe social and political order are all seen to be aspects of peace
when viewed from this angle. Africans hold the same view as the West
on the relationship between peace and wealth. For instance, the Basotho
in Southern Africa has a proverb that says ‘Peace is prosperity’ (Khotso
ken ala) (Mokitimi & Mbiti, 1997). A popular Hausa proverb also says
‘salaam maganin zama duniya’ (peace is the forerunner of healthy human
existence). The understanding here is that it is only when there is peace in
a society that it can experience prosperity in terms of having the freedom
to plant and harvest crops. In other words, the Western conception of
peace is based on prosperity and order, whereas Africans’ perspective of
peace is centered on morality and order. Order is upheld in both cases,
but morality most important factor for consideration in Africa.
Concerned about the necessity to create a “global” definition of peace,
Fogarty (2000) listed four key qualities that a description of the idea
must include. The first is that the definition should be generally applicable
and not culturally particular. He argued that ‘the peaceability of a society
342 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

should not be generalised but it should be able to incorporate a demo-

cratic political system, a monarchy, or a tribal council. It should, without a
doubt, be free of the teachings of any specific religion or region. Another
attribute is the avoidance of reductionism. In other words, peace should
be understood as the property of communities and civilisations rather than
individuals. The third major consideration is that the definition must go
beyond simply avoiding conflict. It must include a wide variety of needs
for maintaining an equitable level of living, such as the absence of human
suffering in its physical, psychological, and structural aspects. The current
state of the world does not make room for the functional application
of the three inclusive peace concerns that Fogarty sought. Safety from
diseases and the like should be adopted in the definition as well. Thus,
the positives and negatives of peace should be clearly stated. The defi-
nition should be consistent with major sociological theories, especially
liberty and freedom.
Despite significant efforts in liberal peacebuilding, there has been little
success in securing long-term peace in Africa’s conflict-affected nations
(Olonisakin et al., 2021). When compared to other developed regions,
Africa has a low degree of peace. Peace may exist or not exist as a
result of a variety of circumstances. One example is a country’s political
system, which determines whether the country is democratic or author-
itarian. According to Cortright et al. (2017), peace is quite possible to
achieve through democracy provided it incorporates fully matured and
established institutions that fulfil the canons of all-inclusiveness, engage-
ment, and culpability. Okolie et al. (2021) argue that the type of political
party formation and ideology, the conduct of political party primary
elections, the elections themselves, and post-election issues all play impor-
tant roles in African democracy, peacebuilding, and regional stability.
Unluckily, elections in Africa are a fading shadow of democracy, with acts
of brigandage, arson, politically motivated homicides, political suppres-
sion, collusion with the election monitoring body in rigging, lack of
internal democracy in political parties, lack of ideology, and militarisation
of elections using state security apparatus, among other things. Iheonu
et al. (2021) discovered a positive significant relationship between democ-
racy and peace in Africa in their study. Also, deteriorating economic
conditions continue to pose a danger to stability and peace wherever
they persist. The absence of conflict does not always imply the provision
of basic requirements such as food, housing, clothes, and health care if
significant measures are not done to meet such needs.
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 343

Through a qualitative content analysis, the paper interrogates the

intricacies of violence in Africa and the continent’s efforts towards actual-
ising SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and the Silencing
the Guns Agenda. Data were sourced from published academic articles,
institutional documents, web pages, and news articles.

Armed Conflicts in African

States and Peacebuilding Efforts
Since the end of the cold war, Africa has suffered its fair share of violent
wars and armed violent conflicts. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola
emerged from armed violent conflicts, whilst Chad, Kenya, Somalia,
and Sudan were embroiled in internal armed conflicts (Karbo, 2008).
Notably, Nigeria, the most populous country and one of the biggest
economies in Africa has been engulfed with what seems to be endless
insecurity since its independence. Aside from the popular Biafra Civil
War (1960–1970) that consumed millions of lives and created incur-
able psychological havoc, Maitatsine Riot (the 1980s) which consumed
over 4 thousand lives, the ongoing Boko Haram and Islamic West Africa
Province (ISWAP) terrorism, the Fulani Hersmen terrorism, and Bandits
combined have not only created unprecedented hardship but have pushed
Nigeria to number 15th among the most failed states (Okoro, 2018).
While there have been frantic efforts by African States and regional
institutions through peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and
peacebuilding programmes, sustainable peace seems to be no way in
sight. In the era of COVID-19, however, conflict resolution processes
and peacekeeping were deprioritised amid travel bans and budget cuts,
opening space for militia groups in Libya, South Sudan, Nigeria, and
Central African Republic as those who lost their lives as a result of insur-
gency in the countries were more than those that were consumed by
COVID-19 (Olaniyi et al., 2021).
It would be a mistake to assume, based on the numerous ongoing
conflicts, that a culture of violence is the norm throughout Africa.
However, it would also be a mistake to overlook the fact that such a
culture exists in parts of the continent. The pursuit for land, already
enormous, will continue unabated. As family plots become smaller with
each subsequent generation, pressures build for additional property, either
through deforestation or by taking that which belongs to someone else. It
is perhaps no coincidence that the 1994 genocide occurred in the African
344 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

country most densely populated—Rwanda. With arable land growing

increasingly scarce, conflicts will continue to arise. This and many other
reasons goads Feldman (2009) to assert that “the unfortunate truth is
that some parts of Africa may never be at peace”. There is money to be
made from the conflicts in Africa, vast sums of money. Consider Victor
Bout, the Russian arms dealer nicknamed the “Merchant of Death”, who
has been accused of selling large amounts of weapons to various African
factions, sometimes even opposing ones (Doyle, 2007). His profits from
fuelling ongoing conflicts have been immense, and even when Interpol
issued a warrant for his arrest, it is alleged he still did business on the
African continent through intermediaries, while he remained in Russia,
well protected from Interpol’s reach. Letting his guard down, he was
arrested in Thailand in March 2008 but remains perhaps the most promi-
nent example that the profit for creating or supporting misery in Africa
can often be quite handsome. It is not just outsiders who benefit from
the eternal chaos in Africa, many African leaders have a significant stake
in creating new conflicts or sustaining old ones, even if that means their
innocent people suffer. Sudanese leaders not only allow the killing in
Darfur to go on but have been implicated in perpetuating it, apparently
with the hope of erasing the agriculturalists forever from that region, thus
allowing their tribes to benefit from using the land for pasture (Feldman,
2009).
At some point in the conflict in Rwanda, for three decades, Tutsi
refugees in Uganda acquired military training and weapons from their
strong supporters in the UK (Jacquemin, 2015). The long prevalence
of the Somali conflict can be linked to the availability of weapons. Reli-
gion plays a major role in most conflicts in Africa such as that of Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia. The religious demography in
Africa is diverse, which is often considered a risk, and religion plays a
more pronounced role (Basedau et al., 2011). Certain religious structures
such as parallel ethnic and religious identities or changing religious demo-
graphics are prone to mobilisation in politics; once politicised, violent
conflict becomes likelier.
Despite the variant nature of the wars and armed conflicts in Africa,
a critical retrospection of Africa’s history shows that Africa is the cradle
of humanity, an assertion that suggests the existence of rich and diverse
indigenous resources and institutions of conflict resolution and peace-
building dating back centuries (Karbo, 2008). What is new is the
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 345

exportation and ‘imposition’ of peace-building and development inter-

ventions based on Western ideologies. However, early mechanisms of
indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in pre-colonial Africa had
a significant degree of success in maintaining order and ensuring the
peaceful coexistence of groups. In most African societies ‘the resolu-
tion of the conflict was guided by the principle of consensus, collective
responsibility, and communal solidarity’. The term ‘peacebuilding’ was
popularised after 1992, when Boutros Boutros Ghali, then UN Secretary-
General, presented the report ‘An Agenda for Peace’. He defined
peacebuilding as a range of activities meant to ‘identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a
relapse into conflict’ (ibid.). Before Boutros-Ghali’s report, peacebuilding
was restricted to activities designed to consolidate peace in post-conflict
countries to avoid a relapse into conflict. Since then, ‘peacebuilding’
has become an expansive term. In Agenda for Development (2004),
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said peacebuilding required ‘sus-
tained, cooperative work on the underlying economic, social, cultural and
humanitarian problems’ (Annan, 2004).
Africa has witnessed the proliferation of NGOs renowned for their
involvement in peacebuilding. Such well-known NGOs include the
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD),
the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Institute for Security
Studies (ISS), and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), and the West Africa
Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) among others. The sheer diver-
sity and number of NGOs involved in peace-building reflect the growing
continental and global concerns on issues affecting peace, such as the
proliferation of small arms, an increase in child soldiers, trauma, and
poverty (Karbo, 2008). Some of these NGOs are more effective than
others because they make use of networking as a peacebuilding model,
apart from taking a continent-wide approach. WANEP, using its network
partners, was able to bring attention to the Liberian dilemma by mobil-
ising women and other citizens’ groups in the peace talks that culminated
in the Accra peace agreement between the Liberian government and two
rebel forces, namely the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)
and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in
August 2003.
NGOs have also been criticised for their inability to coordinate their
efforts with governmental institutions in post-conflict societies. Moreover,
the continued burgeoning of NGOs at the peacebuilding frontier has led
346 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

to duplication, commercialisation of peacebuilding, and reduced efficacy

of the work of these players, a process resulting from what Orjuela (2004)
terms ‘NGOization’. In many cases, NGOs are the preferred outlet for
donor funds and support, and they end up ‘competing’ with the govern-
ment, a situation that exacerbates the adversarial relations between civil
society and the state. Such a gap needs to be bridged to promote sustain-
able peacebuilding. Governments are also required to invest more in peace
education whiles engaging the learners in entrepreneurial skills, especially
the youth to prevent them from being targeted for insurgent/terrorist
recruitments (Alimba, 2013; Okoro, 2020).

The [Neo]Colonialism as the Main Root

and Sustenance of Conflict in Africa
In their view, Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012), defined colonialism as the
overall and direct dominance of one nation by another—the nation’s
power is in the custody of an alien nation. A similar scenario can be cited
in the overall direct dominance of Nigeria by the English from 1900 to
1960. The foremost aim of colonisation is to have political dominance
and then exploit the colony. Colonisation in Africa spanned from 1800
to the 1960s. In an actual sense, scholars refer to colonisation as a direct
subsidiary of a broader phenomenon known as imperialism. This is what
makes some scholars allude that “all colonialism is imperialism, but not
all imperialism is colonialism” (Ejimofor, 1987).
Although the genesis of African colonisation can be linked to several
factors, key among such factors was the industrial revolution which led to
a quick socio-economic and technological status change in Europe. With
the revolution, there was a need for the modification of production style.
The changes and turnaround in the industrial sectors led to novel means
of production, to replace the use of slaves for most of the tedious tasks.
The revolution in industrial processes was the turning point in the trajec-
tory of the human race. The conundrum of lubricating machinery was one
of the ramifications of the revolution, and slavery had been able to meet
its seemly expedient function. There was the need to invest the accrued
capital and get raw materials to feed industries. This led to the colonisa-
tion of almost all African states. An increase in production was witnessed
with the revolution in the industrial sector. Industrial growth was quicker
than agricultural development. Unfortunately, the output from agricul-
tural production in the Western world could not mash up with the
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 347

demand of their industries, and this necessitated the exploration of other

areas to find raw materials for the industries. Moreover, production could
not keep at par with population growth in Britain. There was a demand–
supply mismatch in that Britain was finding it very difficult to produce
adequate food for the expanding urban population (Ocheni & Nwankwo,
2012). Then also, new technology and products were quickly produced,
and could not be quickly disposed of by the Western world. With Africa’s
appreciable population, they foresaw a potential ready market for their
products and goods (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012). The independence of
most African states was partial, in that most nations still depended on the
colonial lords for economic and socio-cultural well-being which has been
found to destroy the peace, stability, and socioeconomic development of
African states (Rahaman et al., 2017). This indirect way of managing the
affairs of a colony led to the concept of “neo-colonialism.” Being the
riskiest type of imperialism, it is a portrayal of irresponsibility shown by
people who seize power from other nations, and for nations that suffer
such a phenomenon, it is unlawful exploitation (Douglas, 2012). More-
over, there is no single agreed-on definition of neo-colonialism, although
some continent-specific definitions exist. In her view, Halperin (2020)
defined “neo-colonialism” as the “control of less-developed countries by
developed countries through indirect means.” For Halperin (2020), the
‘indirect means’ used by developed nations in exercising dominance over
developing nations is colonial exploitation stratagems. The indirect rule
of less developed African countries by some Latin American nations is a
typical scenario. Neo-colonialism was originally used in European policies
formulated to continue controlling Africa. In essence, neo-colonialism
is a means through which colonial masters expose exploiting schemes,
regulations, and rules to continue ruling their former colonial nations.
Unfortunately, after a very long time of oppressive rule by the Euro-
peans, they left behind them ill spirits. Although Africa had for long
wished for freedom, its acquisitions from oppressors’ rule could not still
lift us out of our old state. This turned out to be true when most people
who took over from the oppressor’s rule demonstrated sycophantic atti-
tudes. They took over and became tax and task agents, as well as court
errand boys. As such, they dealt with their followers with no sympathy
because their powers and positions had come from elsewhere outside
the clan, not from within it. Being sponsored by the West for polit-
ical, cultural, and economic undertakings, they ruled with a Eurocentric
mindset. For instance, western ruling elites needed to deny, bend, or
348 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

blatantly misrepresent black history to validate their misguided belief in

cultural imperialism and African economic and cultural marginalization
(Olatunji, 2010). To date, African leaders are more loyal to the hegemony
of the West and America than their African society.
The conflict in south-north Sudan, which lasted from 1983 to 2005,
is known as the longest civil war recorded in Africa. The ramification
of northern-southern disparity which was initiated by the British while
colonising the country can be traced as the grievance which precipi-
tated a lot of disturbance some years on (Nasong’o, 2015). It can be
learned from this case that the grievances of mobilised ethnic groups
should be duly noted and resolved in the shortest possible time to main-
tain peace and stability in the context of multinational states. Whilst
appraising the reports of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
on conflicts, Gluhbegovic (2016) cautions that “a simplistic division of
conflicts into intra- and inter-state can result in the loss of the nuances
needed to understand conflict.” One of the major drivers of inter-state
conflict is how colonial boundaries were boundaries north-western part
of South Africa and Botswana are occupied by families currently divided
by artificial borders. Malawi and Tanzania are disputing over a border,
and Somalia and Ethiopia have struggled over boundaries. At least seven
African countries have been drawn into the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The conflict between Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo spikes regularly. Acknowledging that
the contributing factors of African conflicts are, among many other things,
“made in the past” (Bundy, 2019), because of the politics of neglecting
and inspired by the preferences of colonizers, Africa is unable to react
appropriately to find peace.

Sustainable Development Goal 16

and Its Achievability in Africa
The aftermaths of the two world wars are poverty alleviation, the
democratisation of most nations, and a drastic decrease in conflict accom-
panied by violence. Unfortunately, such good outcomes seem to reverse
in the few decades past. Currently, there is a new trajectory of worldwide
pandemics, civil wars, historic refugees and migrant levels, and spikes in
extreme violence that are influencing global chaos and disorder (Lind-
borg & Hewitt, 2018). There is a strong linkage between higher levels
of conflict violence, violence, poverty extremism, susceptibility to the
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 349

victimization of international and regional powers, and fragility of states

(ibid.). In a world known as a global village, state fragility presents a high
threat to security and the national and international levels, as well as a
conundrum of morality (ibid.).
In September 2015, there was an agreement amongst 193 countries
to some set of goals aimed at protecting the earth, ending poverty, and
ensuring prosperity for all by 2030. These goals were 17 in number and
were named Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which fell in the
corridors of Agenda 2030. In effect, these SDGs were to take the place
of the Millennium Development Goals on 1 January 2016 (Wamsler &
Restoy, 2020). As an expansion of the Millennium Development Goals,
it focused on real measures for sustainable development in both devel-
oping and developed nations. These measurements include human rights
commitment, equity, social justice, environmental sustainability, vulner-
ability and the marginalisation of certain groups, and good governance
(Ibietan & Okafor, 2019). Out of the 17 SDGs, goal 16 calls on leaders
to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclu-
sive institutions at all levels”. The target is to ensure inclusive, responsive,
representative, and participatory decision-making across levels. Wamsler
and Restoy (2020), perceive SDG 16 as a foundation of Agenda 2030.
SDG 16 can be considered a cut-across goal which connotes its dual func-
tion; a means to achieving the other SDGs, and an end. Agenda 2030
acknowledges that inclusive and peaceful societies are both facilitators and
outcomes of sustainable development.
One outstanding feature of the SDGs as remarked by analysts and poli-
cymakers is its global perspective, in that these goals are to be achieved
by both developed and developing countries. However, much work is
required of developing countries in realising the SDGs by 2030 (Hope
Sr., 2020). SDG 16 is seen to be innovative in the development blueprint
since it focuses on building trust, enhancing government accountability,
and sustaining peace (Hope Sr., 2020). The 12 targets of SDG 16 with its
23 associated official indicators cannot be realised with a usual approach.
The politically controversial nature of SDG 16 makes it necessary to
acknowledge that ‘crime, injustice, social harm, and environmental degra-
dation are not entirely problems of the South but global conundrums
that can be seen sometimes in Global North, although there is a non-
proportional, severe effect on the inhabitants of the South’ (Blaustein
et al., 2018).
350 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

The African Union Silencing the Gun

Agenda and the Contentious Proliferation
of Small Arms in the African States
African Member Countries have led the African Union’s (AU) Silencing
the Guns (STG) action in Africa. When the OAU/AU held their 50th
Anniversary Forum in May 2013, the AU Government and Heads
of State signed a Heartfelt Pledge promising not to “bequeath the
burden of conflict to the next generation of Africans” and committing
to ending all violence by 2020. They took up Agenda 2063 in 2013
for an inclusive, flourishing, and serene Africa, with one of its flagship
initiatives being “Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020”. Furthermore,
in 2017, the AU Peace and Security Committee (PSC) endorsed the
Master Roadmap (AUMR) of Practical Steps to Silencing Guns by 2020,
making the Solemn Declaration operational. Approved by the Heads of
State Assembly, the AUMR acknowledges that, in addition to ongoing
military and political efforts, systemic initiatives in socioeconomic devel-
opment are required to allow governance issues, women and youth,
education and employment, climate change, and other relevant factors
to be considered in Africa’s attempts to censor the guns.
The AU PSC created a set of thorough goals to help Member States
achieve the STG goal. The AUMR highlighted instructions for dealing
with a wide range of socio-economic, political, environmental, and legal
factors that have been identified as contributing factors to dispute or
obstacles to action, generally ranging from poverty and ecological degra-
dation to illicit weapons smuggling, cyberattacks, and threats, and the
deterioration of democracy. The AU asserts that if the AUMR is imple-
mented effectively, one of the major outcomes must be that youth are
economically and socially empowered. To that end, the blueprint calls on
Africa’s private industry to contribute to the creation of job opportunities,
especially for African youth.
The AU Office of the Youth Envoy (OYE) operations have capital-
ized on the consideration of 2020 as a crucial year for the realization of
“Silence the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Develop-
ment” to advance the ‘Youth Silencing the Guns Campaign,’ which has
been initiated by the AU on July 24, 2020 with Commissioner of Peace
and Security. The campaign’s main goal is to provide a framework for
youth to develop and support key actions that must be undertaken to
accelerate the implementation of the STG Agenda in Africa.
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 351

The ‘Youth Silencing the Guns Inter-Generational Dialogues’ were

initiated online on August 27, 2020, as part of this campaign. Six online
geographical Inter-generational Dialogues (IGD) (Central, North, South,
and West Africa regions, and the Diaspora) were held. The goal of such
IGDs was to gather viewpoints from youth on the issues they face, in
addition to their ambitions for STG in Africa. Each Discourse included
a consultation aspect to guarantee a bottom-up method for collecting
young people’s perspectives, with five breakout sessions with an average
of 20 participants per session in a focused group discussion: Conflict-free
zone Africa, Silencing, Silencing of Youth Unemployment, Poverty, and
Hunger Violence Against Women Silencing Corruption Means Silencing
Climate Change. Various frameworks implemented on the continent
point to pre-emptively shifting the narrative about youth and their role in
Africa from “avengers and perpetrators of violence” to “partners, leaders,
and benefactors of peace and security.”
A “generational gap/crisis” marked by misunderstanding has resulted
from a lack of collaboration between different generations of leaders and
the youth. IGDs can help address this crisis by providing a platform
for youth to interact with their leaders, ultimately leading to policy co-
creation and intergenerational co-leadership. Furthermore, social inclu-
sion is critical for the success of peace processes and peacebuilding plans.
This is especially crucial in countries where most of the population is
young and prone to conflict. Involving African and diaspora youth in
these discussions can also help to bring in new viewpoints. Rural Africa
is adversely impacted by violent conflict and other natural and/or man-
made disasters. Nevertheless, youth participation in policymaking in these
rural communities is lower than in urban areas. Government youth-
centred guidelines also tend to favour urban youth as beneficiaries. This
inequity must be addressed immediately to ensure long-term holistic
development.
While appealing youth-centred policies may persist in some African
countries, not all youth, particularly those in rural and conflict-affected
regions, are aware of them. This inhibits them from reaping the impor-
tance, and, as a result, diminishes the whole effectiveness of the policies,
even if they are well designed and implemented. Furthermore, many
young people, particularly those in rural and conflict-affected areas,
possess the necessary talent, expertise, and enthusiasm to contribute
to the prevention and resolution of violence. However, they lack access
352 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

to the necessary information and resources about the STG agenda, which
could motivate them to act.
A Pan-African platform networking aimed at reinvigorating youth-led
action plans will go a long way toward tackling two major problems.
Initially, youth-led plans face challenges in locating well-established insti-
tutions (both civil society and government) willing to partner and coop-
erate with them. This is mainly due to institutions’ mistrust of youth-led
efforts because of their lack of expertise and potential misunderstandings
regarding their true motivations. Secondly, numerous African youth-led
initiatives could profit from cross-regional partnering in terms of assets
and sharing of knowledge. The AUMR stresses the significance of youth
involvement in social, political, economic, and legal policy use and envi-
ronment. The steps outlined in the strategy for youth integration must be
faithfully carried out, with the clear goal of putting youth at the frontline
of this campaign’s leadership.
In the past decade, Africa has seen a few failures and successes in terms
of the ‘Silence the Guns’ agenda. Integrating the lessons learned from
this encounter effectually can benefit greatly future interventions.

Emerging Challenges
The peace-building terrain in Africa is characterised by a significant
number of challenges. Sadly, a sizeable number of armed conflicts relapse
to war, resulting in renewed violence and ‘new’ wars, as proven by greater
violence in Angola and Rwanda in 1992 and 1994 respectively, after
the failure of peace processes. First, the conflicts in Africa are seemingly
intractable and protracted. Most peacemaking agreements do not last, and
a lot of countries have demonstrated a relapse into violence. Although the
number of violent conflicts has decreased since the beginning of the new
millennium, there is strong evidence of recidivism in many post-conflict
countries, as witnessed in Eritrea-Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Liberia.
Another challenge with peace-building in Africa is that external players
often attempt to engage in peacebuilding activities without seeking
sustainable solutions at the grassroots level. Very often, peace-building is
managed by international NGOs and diplomats, who have no intimate
acquaintance with the local environment. Peace-building programmes
are designed by NGOs with specific strategies for implementation. This
approach has problems in the sense that designers and implementers are
not accountable to members of communities where such programmes
 FROM THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 16 … 353

are implemented. Communities have no ownership of peace-building

processes designed, minimizing the possibilities of anyone having to
account to members of local communities. Against this background,
peace-building operations should help countries emerging from conflict
by building their capacity for good governance and effective public sector
management.

Conclusion and Way Forward

Many parts of the African continent have a record of failed peace treaties,
unsustainable truces, and ineffectual counter-violent extremism tech-
niques (e.g. Somalia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic).
This has instilled scepticism, suspicion, and dread of impending disputes
in societies (particularly among youth), undermining the effectiveness of
ongoing peace efforts. This occurrence must be researched and remedied.
The burden of implementing the blueprint and numerous agreements
signed under the ‘Silence the Guns’ action plan falls primarily on the
governments of member states. The failures and successes to honour these
obligations must be researched to develop and/or intensify strategies to
track and assess implementations.
The most basic and expedient task is to be alert to early indica-
tions of internal conflict. Whereas intervening in nations before open
disputes occur may be politically untenable, it is a necessary stage in
the peacebuilding process. For such involvement to be welcomed by
parties in the host nation, strong friendships of trust and respect are
required. Nevertheless, disregarding indications of inner political unrest
has a much higher cost. Cameroon is an example. If the early warning
signs of upheaving had been addressed, the death of people would have
been prevented. The issue is if any of the AU’s frameworks should and
can come to terms with such internal murmurings before they developed
into major problems. If so, what framework or technique is it?
The underlying antecedents of violence on the African continent are far
more complicated than unemployment, poverty, and climate change, and
include identity crisis, marginalisation, historical legacies, and perceptions
of unfairness. Understanding the situation-specific and place-specific root
causes that influence the youth to engage in conflict is vital. Based on the
findings of these studies, initiatives can be developed.
There exists a lot of unutilised potential for African nations to form
long-term alliances with non-state and state institutions to resolve health,
354 P. A. YEBOAH AND J. P. OKORO

education, livelihood, and other developmental issues. The best approach

to these plans would be a well-planned branding campaign that highlights
Africa’s strengths and prospects to be a peaceful and stable continent. The
African diaspora plays a critical role in this stage. Despite the adoption of
the ECOWAS General Assembly on SALW and its techniques, effectually
lowering the propagation of light weapons and small arms is getting diffi-
cult, especially in West Africa. The challenges of weak national borders
and the difficulty of monitoring the unlawful mobility of small arms and
non-state entities involved in such activities are among the hurdles. Small
Arms proliferation must be reduced to “Silence the Guns” in Africa. In
the region, human rights abuses, police misconduct, and other state-
sanctioned rebel forces are frequently reported. The ‘Silence the Gun’
agenda cannot be fully realised unless abuses are efficiently and success-
fully monitored and curtailed, even as youth privileges to nonviolent
demonstration and civil liberties are protected.

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 Can the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine
Act as Deterrence Against Mass Atrocity
and Human Rights Infringement in Africa?

Nicholas Idris Erameh, Victor Ojakorotu,

and Ambassador Robert Adebiyi

Introduction
The protection of the civilian population from human rights violations
and horrendous crimes has remained one of the most difficult tasks the
international community has struggled with since the end of the major
world wars (Cilliers, 2018). This problem of upholding basic rights of
citizens has remained prevalent in developing nations, especially in Africa
(Kaldor, 2013; Samantha, 2002). Despite concerted efforts to address this
dilemma, human rights violations remain a regular occurrence in most
African nations, with no end in sight. Though human rights violations
are not a recent phenomenon in Africa, the end of the cold war, which

N. I. Erameh (B)
Department of Research & Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
(NIIA), Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]
N. I. Erameh · V. Ojakorotu
Department of Political Studies & International Relations, North–West
University, Mafikeng, South Africa
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 357
Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_20
358 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

led to an alternation in the nature of conflict—interstate—intrastate,

has further witnessed an exacerbation of human rights violations occa-
sioned by the activities of African authoritarian leaders (Cilliers, 2018;
Erameh, 2017; Kaldor, 2013). Thus, calls for political pluralism, the sit
tight syndrome, the absence of rule of law, weak political institutions,
the secession crisis, and even intolerance of dissenting voices, which have
remained distinguishing characteristics of most African states, have exacer-
bated the nature of the state-citizen relationship (Ani & Ojakorotu, 2021;
Solomon, 2015), and in most cases have contributed to the continuation
of massive human rights violations.
Several institutional and legislative frameworks have been adopted
at the global level to acknowledge the grave consequences of these
protracted human rights violations on the civilian population. Also, at the
regional level, human rights frameworks have been adopted to comple-
ment global frameworks. Nonetheless, the continent continued to witness
an unprecedented level of human rights violations, especially in the late
1990s. This problem has been further complicated by state claims to
sovereignty, which have been used by many authoritarian regimes to frus-
trate global and regional efforts to mitigate the unchecked perpetuation
of human rights violations (Annan, 1999; Thakur, 2016). Though the
international community had hitherto called for the compelling need to
reconcile the long-age Westphalia treaty with current realities, it was the
Rwanda genocide and the Kosovo killings that eventually paved the way
for a time-honoured framework for the protection of the civilian popula-
tion (Ki-Moon, 2012; Kurtz & Rotman, 2016; Robert, 2012). Coming
against the background of the shameless inaction in these cases, the inter-
national community made a commitment to “Never Again”, and this
subsequently led to the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
doctrine.
Unlike its predecessor, humanitarian intervention, the RtoP tied the
duty to protect civilians to state governments or leaders and empowered
the international community to act in cases where massive human rights
violations and horrendous crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes have been committed against
civilians, the international community reserves the right to intervene,

A. R. Adebiyi
African Progressive Group, Ogun State, Nigeria
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 359

including through the use of force. Since its adoption, the RtoP has been
mobilized in a series of armed violence against the civilian population
across Africa, with Libya as its litmus test. Though these interventions
have been met with mixed outcomes and expectation gaps, the need to
deploy the RtoP in Africa has remained consistently compelling.
Beyond these mixed outcomes, this chapter attempts to explore the
extent to which the RtoP has been mobilized as a response to human
rights violations, its successes and challenges thereof. Though recent RtoP
interventions in a number of African countries have presented insur-
mountable challenges in terms of upholding fundamental rights, the
need to protect civilians from mass atrocities has remained consistently
compelling in Africa. Hence, beyond the state culpability defenses, insti-
tutional, operational, and conceptual challenges, the RtoP no doubt still
holds a strong moral appeal for deterring human rights violations in state
relations with their citizens among African nations where these atrocious
crimes and massive human rights violations have persisted with no end in
sight.

From the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights to the Responsibility
to Protect: Theoretical Consideration
Apart from the philosophical and theoretical positions, the fallout of the
major world wars and the collapse of the League of Nations led to the
formation of the United Nations (UN) on October 24, 1945. Central to
the formation of the UN was the emphasis on securing world peace, secu-
rity through peacekeeping, and protecting citizens across the globe from
human rights violations and horrendous crimes.1 Accordingly, the task
of averting human rights violations was grounded in Article 1(3) of the
UN Charter, which expressly stated that “To achieve international coop-
eration in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural,
or humanitarian character, and to promote an encouraging respect for

1 See United Nations (n.d), Peace, Dignity and Equality on a Healthy Planet, https://
www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un.
360 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to

race, sex, language, or religion”.2
Furthermore, Article 55 (c) authorizes the UN to promote universal
respect for and observance of human rights, as well as absolute freedom
for all, regardless of race, gender, religion, or language3 .While Article 564
further affirms the global community’s commitment pledge to take joint
and separate actions in collaboration with the UN towards achieving the
purpose of Article 55, Apart from the aforementioned, Articles 67 and
68 equally support the UN’s commitment to addressing human rights
violations. Specifically, Article 68 empowers the Economic and Social
Council to set up relevant commissions in the economic and social fields
for the sole protection and enforcement of fundamental human rights.5
Since 1945, the UN has continually put in several efforts to address
human rights violations across the globe. For instance, the UN War
Crimes Commission was instrumental in the trial and indictment of about
36,000 people owing to their various roles in the Nuremberg and Tokyo
mass atrocities (Weiss, 2015). The UN has equally played similar roles
across developing nations, especially in Africa, with cases such as Rwanda,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and a lot more.
A further boost for the UN regarding its commitment to addressing
human rights violations came in October 1948 when it established the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). To show its serious-
ness regarding protection of human rights, the preamble of the UDHR
states, alia, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” “Whereas a common
understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance
for the full realization of this pledge.”6

2 See Article 1(3) United Nations (n.d), Peace, Dignity and Equality on a Healthy
Planet, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un.
3 See Article 55, United Nations (n.d), Peace, Dignity and Equality on a Healthy
Planet, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un.
4 See Article 56, United Nations (n.d), Peace, Dignity and Equality on a Healthy
Planet, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un.
5 See Article 68, United Nations (n.d), United Nations Charter, https://www.un.org/
en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
6 See UDHR Preamble; UN (n.d), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, https://
www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 361

Then came the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1949. Though the idea of the
Genocide Convention (GC) was muted in 1946 by the UN as a way of
responding to the worrying nature of human rights violations, the GC
was eventually adopted in 1948. Accordingly, the GC states that acts of
genocide must be seen as crimes under international law and that the UN
must do everything within its reach to avert such crimes (United Nations,
1948). Accordingly, Article 1 of the Convention states that parties to
the convention strongly affirm that acts of genocide and human rights
violations, whether they are perpetuated in peace or wartime, constitute
grave crimes under international law and are punishable.7 While Article
IV states that persons, public officials, or private individuals who commit
genocide, human rights violations, or other heinous crimes against civil-
ians will face appropriate punishment,8 Undoubtedly, the GC marked
the first human rights treaty that was initiated and adopted by the UN
General Assembly, marked the international community’s commitment to
“Never Againa” and was a watershed development in the identification
and sanctioning of human rights violations after the conscience-shocking
scenarios of the major world wars (United Nations Office on Genocide
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d).
Subsequently, the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) via Reso-
lution 2200 A (XXI) on December 16, 1966. These two resolutions
further reflect the international community’s commitment to avoiding the
humanitarian catastrophes of the world wars and the continuous human
rights violations, especially in the post-cold war era. Also, by virtue of
their enactment, they create an expectation to be binding legally among
contracting parties (UN, 1996; ESCR-Net, n.d). Apart from the fact
that the ICESCR and ICCPR formed the basis of the “International
Bill of Rights”, the ICCPR was specifically concerned about addressing

7 Article 1, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(n.d), https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_
Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%
20of%20Genocide.pdf.
8 Article IV, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(n.d), https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_
Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%
20of%20Genocide.pdf.
362 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

human rights issues ranging from the right to life, freedom of speech, reli-
gion, and voting. While the ICESR emphasizes rights issues pertaining to
education, food, health, and shelter (United for Human Rights, n.d).
As a way of pressing home its commitment, the UN further adopted
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR) via Resolution A/RES/63/
117 on the 10th of December 2008. The optional protocol remains
insignificant as it established the individual and interstate framework for
reporting human rights abuses to the UN Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (LSE, 2016). Some other landmark milestones
regarding the international community’s commitment to responding to
human rights violations include the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1979), the Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1984), the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, and
the African Charter on Human Rights, which is often referred to as the
Banjul Charter (1981). The inability of these human rights frameworks to
address mass atrocities against the civilian population led to some ardent
efforts leading to the adoption of the RtoP.
From the late 1990s, which equally coincided with the end of the cold
war, we witnessed further development in the international community’s
commitment to ending human rights violations and mass atrocities across
the globe. Instances like the Rwanda genocide where the international
community was accused of intervening “too late” and the Kosovo killings
of “too little” led to the adoption of the doctrine of the RtoP. Before the
final adoption of the RtoP in 2009, there were a series of developmental
stages which continually progressed with the compelling need for the
protection of human rights and mass atrocities against the civilian popu-
lation. First, reflecting on the problems persistently faced by internally
displaced persons (IDP), the UN Secretary General, Boutrous Boutrous-
Ghali, nominated Francis Deng with a mandate to propose ways to
address these human rights abuses faced by IDPs (Deng, 2004). Second,
was the UN Secretary-General’s 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges, and Change. The main task was to recommend the best ways
for the UN to improve its capacity to protect civilians from human
rights violations while also maintaining global peace and security. After
much deliberation, the panel eventually endorsed the 2001 International
Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of 2001,
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 363

which laid the template for the RtoP. Thus, the panel admitted that the
international community reserved the right to intervene in the affairs
of a sovereign nation in a situation whereby such a country is carrying
out mass atrocities including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity.9
Third was the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan’s 2005 Report enti-
tled “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human
Rights for All.” In this, Annan reiterated that the nature of mass atrocities
that have been witnessed in the post-cold war period demands a shift from
the Westphalia conception of state sovereignty from a right to a respon-
sibility. Furthermore, Annan called for the international community to
make prompt interventions, including the use of force, in nations where
mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity are carried out on a large scale.10 Fourth is the World
Summit Outcome Document (WSOD), which was adopted by the UN
General Assembly in 2005, marking another significant milestone in the
international community’s commitment to protecting the civilian popu-
lation from human rights abuses. In what could be seen as a unanimous
agreement, a total of one hundred and ninety-one UN members endorsed
the ICISS report of 2001 and further emphasized Paragraphs 138 and
139 of the report. The WSOD acknowledges that states have a duty to
protect their citizens from four crimes; war crimes, ethnic cleansing, geno-
cide, and crimes against humanity; the international need to support the
countries in this role; and the empowerment of the international commu-
nity to intervene should the state fail in its duty to protect its citizens.11
Fifth, is the final adoption of the RtoP in 2009 by the UNSC, which
built upon previous positions and campaigns about the urgent need to
protect the civilian population from conscience-shocking situations like
those witnessed in Rwanda and Kosovo.

9 See High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, https://www.un.org/

ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-secretary-generals-high-level-panel-report-on-threats-challe
nges-and-change-a-more-secure-world-our-shared-responsibility/.
10 See Kofi Annan’s 2005 Report entitled “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All”, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/follow
upreport.pdf.
11 See Paragraph 138 & 139, International Commission for Intervention & State
Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Commission-Report.pdf.
364 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

Has the Responsibility to Protect

Being Able to Act as a Deterrent
to Human Rights Violations in Africa?
Since the adoption of the RtoP in 2009, the doctrine has been mobilized
as a way of responding to severe and unprecedented mass atrocities and
human rights violations across several countries in Africa, with Libya as its
litmus test. The Libya crisis, which had its roots in the Arab spring which
started in Tunisia, started as a protest by some citizens who had called for
a better, improved standard of living, respect for human rights, and toler-
ance for dissenting voices (Zifcak, 2012), and gradually metamorphosed
into a full-blown crisis and led to the formation of rebel groups who
engaged in armed violence against the Ghaddaffi regime. Though the
regime had hitherto played down the possibility of a revolution in Libya,
the movement suddenly began to attract support both within and outside
Libya and this led to a series of state-sponsored terror in Libya, leading to
massive human rights violations and the deaths of several people (Erameh,
2018). This massive human rights abuse, the apparent impunity displayed
by the Ghaddaffi regime, and the fear of more imminent attacks led to
a series of condemnations and warnings from the UN about impeding
genocide against the civilian population (Pillay, 2011).
Regardless of these warnings, the regime continued its onslaught
against the civilian population, leading to the adoption of Resolution
1970 on February 26, 2011 by the UNSC. Accordingly, Resolution 1970
reminded the Libyan authorities of their role in protecting the citizens
and further placed some strong-arm measures such as an arms embargo,
freezing of assets, a travel ban, and the threat of a referral of those culpable
of human rights abuses to the International Criminal Court as a way of
deterring the regime (Adams, 2012). Nonetheless, the regime proceeded
with massive human rights violations and further referred to the protesters
as “rats and cockroaches” that must be crushed. Hence, it was at the verge
of tacking back Benghazi, which had hitherto fallen to rebel forces, that
the UNSC again authorized Resolution 1973 (Erameh, 2018). Among
other things, Resolution 1973 called for a “No-fly Zone” and authorized
the use of all necessary means to protect the civilian population (Zifcak,
2012). One unique thing about the resolution is that it is in tandem
with the African Union (AU) Article 4 (h) of its Constitutive Act, whose
central ideal is transcending beyond non-intervention to non-indifference
(Adams, 2012) to situations of human rights abuses.
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 365

Though the outcome of NATO’s intervention in Libya has generated

a heated debate among protagonists and antagonists of the RtoP, the
importance of these resolutions cannot be over emphasized. Regardless
of the emerging and contending challenges which came about as a result
of the NATO intervention in Libya, scholars have argued that the mere
fact that the RtoP was mobilized demonstrates the global commitment to
averting mass atrocities and including human rights violations (Thakur,
2013) as witnessed in Rwanda and Kosovo.
Apart from the Libyan RtoP intervention, the worsening human rights
violations in Cote d’Ivoire following violence that erupted after elections
became another reference point in the international community’s zeal to
end mass atrocities. In what could be referred to as a keenly contested
election between Laurent Gbagbo and Alhassan Quattarra, the election
ended up without a clear winner and this led to a run off which eventually
saw the emergence of Quattara as the president elect (Cook, 2011). The
election outcome was, however, challenged by the incumbent, Laurent
Gbagbo, who claimed to have won the election, and this resulted in
competing claims by both contestants. In his usual style, Gbagbo ordered
the military against Gbagbo supporters, and this led to massive human
rights violations and the deaths of several people (Bellamy & Williams,
2011; Erameh & Ologe, 2021). The international community wasted no
time in condemning the violence perpetuated by the Gbagbo regime and
threatened to deploy “all means necessary” to include the use of force
to halt the atrocities against the civilian population should the violence
persist.
True to its commitment, the UNSC, in collaboration with the AU
and the Economic Community for West Africa States (ECOWAS), moved
to halt further human rights violations and mass atrocities via the
deployment of Resolution 1975 on 30th March 2011. Accordingly, Reso-
lution 1975 recognized Alhassan Quattara as the duly elected president,
condemned Gbagbo’s continuous claim to power, and authorized the
United Nations Operation Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to deploy “all neces-
sary means” to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities. It also
imposed a travel ban and frozen assets on five government officials who
have been identified as obstacles to the peace and reconciliation process
(Erameh & Ologe, 2021). Indeed, scholars have argued that the RtoP
intervention was significant in that it went a long way towards ensuring
that ongoing and imminent mass atrocities and human rights violations
were halted (Bellamy & Williams, 2011), regardless of its outcome.
366 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

Another interesting scenario in Africa was in Mali following the

violence that erupted after a series of attacks by the Tuareg rebels against
civilians in a bid to overthrow the central government. The ousting and
eventual killing of Ghaddaffi by NATO forces led to the mass migration
of several Tuarag fighters who had hitherto been funded by the regime
back to Mali, and this worsened the level of human insecurity (Lecocq
et al., 2013). The return of these Tuareg rebels from Libya energized
other Tureg rebels in neighboring countries, resulting in the formation of
a formidable force to press home their long-held grievances ranging from
political, economic, and social exclusion melted out successive regimes
in Mali (Arieff, 2013; Lecocq & Klute, 2013).In what could be seen
as a show of force, the reenergized Tuareg rebels unleashed mayhem
across Mali, ransacking several towns, imposing sharia laws, and were on
the verge of taking over the capital city (Kone, 2017; Strazzari, 2015).
This show of force impressed on the Malian government the need to
seek regional and global support to end the further perpetuation of mass
atrocities and human rights violations against the citizens and the need to
equally protect the regime from being dislodged from power.
Consequently, the Malian junta first called on the AU to intervene
in the conflict that has led to a worsening humanitarian catastrophe. On
June 12, 2012, the AU Peace and Security Council relied on the previous
move by ECOWAS and authorized in paragraphs 14 and 16 that it use all
necessary means to assist the Malian government in restoring peace and
preventing further human rights violations (AU, 2012).Not satisfied with
the human rights situation in Mali amidst the continuous activities of the
Tuareg rebels, the AU approached the UNSC and this led to the autho-
rization of Resolution 2085. Specifically, on December 20th, 2012, the
UNSC adopted Resolution 2085, authorizing and further energizing a
hybrid mission with the AU leading the operation in Mali to stop further
mass atrocities (Welz, 2022). Undoubtedly, Resolution 2085 remains
significant in Mali in that it went a long way in halting the activities of
the Tuaregs, which led to a reduction in human rights violations.
A similar pattern of human rights violations and consequent response
by the international community was equally witnessed following the
Seleka and Anti-Balaka violence in the Central African Republic (CAR)
in 2013. Though the conflict predates the history of the country and
has persisted given the social dynamics that have characterized the nature
of relationships among the people, the violence in 2013, however, led
to an unprecedented number of deaths and destruction of properties
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 367

amidst sustained massive human rights between the Seleka and Anti-
Balaka (Lombard, 2016). According to a UN inquiry report, as of 2014,
over 6000 people had been killed (Nichols, 2015), with several thou-
sand people displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance. Just like
in the Malian scenario, the CAR government had to call for external
intervention to halt further killings and human rights violations.
These calls and the worsening human rights situation forced the UNSC
into authorizing Resolutions 2127 and 2149. Accordingly, these resolu-
tions called for the deployment of an AU-led Mission Internationale de
Soutien a la Centrafique (MISCA) to be supported by French troops
under “Operation Sangaris” to protect the civilian population, restore
peace and human security (UN, 2013). Though the Resolution became
contradictory regarding the proper authority to intervene in the crisis,
it should be noted that the UN Security Council’s prompt intervention
saved the country from a worsening humanitarian crisis, human rights
violations, and imminent genocide caused by the activities of an energized
Anti-Balaka.

South Sudan
South Sudan has been a country that has been emerging from a protected
conflict since its creation. Central to this obstinate conflict is the struggle
for political power. It was therefore not surprising that such a struggle
between President Salva Kiir and former vice president Riek Machar
suddenly erupted into a full-blown crisis in 2013, leading to the death of
several people and continuous human rights violations (Koos & Gutschke,
2014). Though the number of deaths in the South Sudan crisis has varied,
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2014) has been able
to peg it at a staggering figure of 10,000 people, many displaced amidst
worsening mass atrocities. Due to the multifaceted nature of the conflict
in South Sudan, the UN and the AU struggled to respond, and it took the
worsening human rights situation for them to admit that the situation was
rapidly devolving into the Rwanda scenario (Pinaud, 2021), necessitating
an urgent intervention.
The AU was the first to condemn the worsening atrocities in South
Sudan and subsequently set up a Commission of Inquiry on 7th March
2014, but nothing tangible came from the direction of the AU. Almost a
year after it complemented its work and six months after the Commission
of Inquiry submitted its report to the African Union Peace and Security
368 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

Council (AUPSC), there is a deafening silence (Deng, 2015: 2). Such

a lackluster disposition among African leaders led to the taking over of
the intervention process through a series of resolutions by the UN. For
instance, the UNSC placed eight people on possible sanctions in 2015
and further imposed an arms embargo between Western countries and
South Sudan in 2018. Not satisfied with these actions, the UNSC on
March 15, 2018 extended the mandate of the UN Mission in South
Sudan (UNMISS) via Resolution 2625 to ensure that the civilian popula-
tion is protected from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2022).
It equally adopted Resolution 2567 on March 12, 2021, which out
rightly condemned various forms of human rights abuses carried out by
government officials and other non-state actors and called for a prompt
international response.12 This is in addition to the empowering of the
Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan to monitor and report
about human right abuses, calling for the initiation and support of transi-
tional justice and the adoption of two resolutions extending the mandate
of the CHRSS until March 2023.

Discussing the RtoP Challenges

to Enforcing Human Rights in Africa
Despite ardent efforts by Western countries to halt human rights viola-
tions across Africa, recent experiences point to the fact that many of these
countries are currently fatigued due to either the cost involved (Adebajo,
2014; Cilliers, 2018) or the obstinate nature of these conflicts. While
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and averting human
rights held sway in the 1990s, western countries have now been forced to
shift the burden of regional organization via hybrid missions. However,
while regional organizations have continued to project a zeal to stand
in, the absence of funds, and lack of strong political issues, poverty,
and protracted armed conflict have polluted regional efforts (Ani &
Ojakorotu, 2021; Solomon, 2015).

12 See Res 2567; Security Council (2021), Resolution 2567, S/RES/2567, https://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96
FF9%7D/s_res_2567.pdf.
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 369

Not even the introduction and consequent adoption of the RtoP have
been able to address this problem. Though the RtoP resonated as a time-
honored framework for responding to the unprecedented human rights
abuses that pervaded the political space in Africa, the RtoP struggled in
this role (Erameh & Ologe, 2021). For instance, while the RtoP has been
hailed in Libya and Mali, Amongst others, it has been found wanting
in cases of mass atrocities against the civilian population in Cameroun,
Ethiopia, Central African Republic, South Sudan and a lot more.

Sovereignty:
Prior to the adoption of the RtoP, many countries, especially in Africa,
have protested any form of liberal western interventionism in their terri-
tory, regardless of the issues that call for such action. In most cases,
nations have relied on the Westphalia World Treaty and Article 2 (4)
and (7) of the United Nations Charter as grounds to emphasize their
sovereignty. Specifically, Article 2 (4) expressly states that “All Members
shall refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations”.13 While 2 (7) states that “Nothing contained in the present
charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state….14 It also
stated that (T) his principle shall not preclude the application of Chapter
VII enforcement measures.
Despite these assurances, Africa experienced a lot of external interven-
tions in the early 1990s, albeit with some form of resistance. It is therefore
not surprising that many countries in Africa have continued to cite the
UN charter in rebuffing calls for external intervention in cases of massive
human rights abuses and horrendous crimes. For instance, in the build
up to the RtoP intervention in Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, and their
respective governments initially resisted the RtoP based on the notion that
such a move violates their sovereign rights. Though the United Nations
Security Council eventually succeeded in mobilizing the RtoP to address
the worsening human rights situations in these countries, scholars have
admitted that such powers could empower western countries with the

13 See Article 2 (4) UN Charter.

14 See Article 2 (7) UN Charter.
370 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

perpetual right to violate the sovereignty of African countries (Mahdani

2009; Branch, 2011; Wai, 2014). While sovereignty continues to pose an
obstacle to the RtoP regarding protecting human rights, it is not unlikely
that Africa will not witness more RtoP interventions in the near future.

Legality versus Illegality Debate:

Next to the issue of sovereignty is the legal status of the RtoP, which has
remained problematic since its adoption in 2009. Despite the fact that the
RtoP is a demand-driven norm, its legality has thrown up emerging and
contending issues among scholars, experts, and even academics. For some
scholars, regardless of the fact that the RtoP has been able to be mobilized
in conscience-shocking human rights violations, this does not invalidate
the question of its illegality (Kurtz & Rottmann, 2016). This hardline
stance has been maintained in mobilizing against the RtoP, owing to
the fact that the RtoP, as it currently stands, is not based on interna-
tional law, but rather on customary law, which can be misinterpreted or
abused without consequence. Though the legality versus illegality debate
has remained prevalent in the discourse about the protection of human
rights in Africa, armed conflict scenarios leading to massive crimes against
the civilian population have persisted. In essence, it is becoming apparent
that there might be a need to extend the legality versus illegality debate
towards looking at the necessity of such RtoP intervention in the first
instance.

Ineffectiveness of the International Criminal Court (ICC):

Since the early 1990s, the international community has demonstrated
zeal to commence judicial persecution against leaders culpable of mass
atrocities in developing nations and especially in Africa (Bassiouni, 1997;
Thomas, 2013). Though this process has generated heated concerns
among scholars and even African leaders who have called for a withdrawal
(Cole, 2013/2014; Du Plessis, 2017), world leaders have continually
called on the ICC to remain proactive. Regardless, the ICC has strug-
gled to supplement the RtoP’s efforts in this role, which has hampered its
operations. Apart from Omar Bashir, who has been effectively tried and
convicted by the ICC for war crimes and massive human rights abuse,
the way and manner in which the ICC has gone with other established
cases has left much to be desired. This brings to bear this point that has
impeded the RtoP’s zeal to halt human rights violations, and this is the
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 371

problematic issue of the politics of identifying and punishing violations of

human rights.
Since the early days of humanitarian intervention, it has been observed
that divorcing liberal western interventions from economic interests has
remained very difficult (Fiott, 2013; Vincent, 2015), and it is within
this context that relationships between intervening countries and nations
intervened upon have lingered. This problem further exposes the selec-
tivity of cases to be condemned and intervened in and vice versa in
many developing nations, especially in Africa. For instance, in the wake of
the Arab spring, which quickly spread across North Africa, responses to
human rights violations were met with mixed understanding and compre-
hension among western countries. Given that the power to mobilize
the RtoP lies mainly with western countries, such selectivity has been
witnessed across the years in potential cases like Cameroun, Ethiopia, and
Gambia, among others.
Though this problem is not a recent phenomenon, the operational
challenges occasioned by the RtoP intervention in Libya and the expec-
tation gaps as evident in the post-RtoP intervention in Libya have
continued to remain a talking point about its potency in addressing
human rights violations. For instance, Kuperman (2011) has argued that
the use of bombs to enforce human rights violations became the greatest
misgiving of the RtoP intervention in Libya. He further argued that it was
after the UNSC authorized the RtoP intervention and the consequent
activities of NATO that the issue became messier to deal with in Libya.
While expectations have remained high regarding averting massive human
rights violations, African countries have continued to make references to
the sad developments associated with the RtoP.

Ineffective Regional Framework & Lack of Consensus among African

Countries:
Since the late 1990s, no other continent has expressed more concern
about the worsening human rights situation than Africa. These concerns
have led to a series of regional frameworks such as the Banjul Charter,
African Solutions to African Problems, and the African Court of Justice
up until the African Union Constitutive Act. Nonetheless, the conti-
nent has continued to witness a plethora of armed conflicts, leading
to massive human rights abuses with no end in sight (Cilliers, 2018;
Straus, 2012). This problem has been made worse by the apparent lack
372 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

of consensus among African nations. Despite the wide acceptance among

African nations that such horrendous crimes and human rights violations
impress the need to move beyond non-intervention to non-indifference,
recent experiences suggest that reaching a consensus on how best to
respond remains challenging, if not tricky. For instance, in the build up
to the Libyan and Cote d’Ivoire interventions, the AU members were
largely divided regarding mobilizing the AU framework in addressing
the lingering crisis (Abass, 2014), and this led to the bypassing of the
AU road map for adopting the UNSC Resolution 1973. Apart from the
Libyan crisis, there was a similar lack of consensus and dissenting views
in the run-up to the RtoP interventions in Cote d’Ivoire, Central African
Republic, and Gambia.
Despite the seemingly accepted status of democracy in Africa and the
centrality of elections and democratic pluralism, the continent seems to
be witnessing a democratic reversal (Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Omotola,
2021), and this problem has led to the rise of authoritarianism and
dictatorship among African leaders. Most of these leaders have therefore
continued to rely on the use of force regarding state–citizen relationships,
leading to massive human rights violations while hiding or shielding under
sovereignty rights. These leaders, at most times, go all out in contesting
and rejecting any form of liberal western interventionism, including the
RtoP, with grave consequences for the civilian population. While attempts
have been made to address this problem, some of these despotic leaders
have found comfort in their relationship and subsequent backing from
Western collaborators such as China and Russia, and this acts as an
impediment to the deployment of the RtoP.

Proliferation of Small Arms, Terrorism, and Insurgency:

The proliferation of arms across Africa has contributed to the exacerbation
of protracted conflict with no end in sight (Cilliers, 2018). This problem
has greatly impacted on the workings of the RtoP, particularly regarding
its response to human rights violations across the globe and especially
in Africa. Given that the nature of conflict has alternated from inter-to
intra with the civilian populations as the worst hit, several groups have
risen in defense of their survival, and this has contributed to an unprece-
dented level of proliferation in small arms, insurgency, and even terrorism
(Williams, 2016). While these armed conflicts have led to massive human
 CAN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ACT … 373

rights violations, the RtoP has been unable to respond effectively due to
the involvement of non-state actors.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter explores the extent to which the RtoP can serve as a
deterrent to human rights violations in Africa by looking at the cases
where the doctrine has been mobilized and the outcomes. It is inter-
esting to note that since the international community’s made a pledge to
“Never Again”, which came about as a result of the conscience-shocking
experiences of human rights violations in Rwanda and Kosovo, there
have been concerted efforts to ensure such scenarios are avoided by
all means. This commitment has seen the mobilization of the RtoP in
Libya, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, and South Sudan,
amongst others. Some of these RtoP interventions have been met with
emerging and contending issues. There appears to be a more widespread
recognition that such human rights violations necessitate a shift from
non-inference to non-indifference. This position is even more reiter-
ated among African leaders who feel the direct consequences of these
intractable and protracted conflicts.
This global and regional commitment has further led to an under-
standing of the concept of sovereignty as a right to responsibility
which can be withdrawn when states embark on human rights violations
and mass atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes against the civilian population. Significantly,
despite the outcome of the Libyan intervention, the UNSC has been
able to mobilize the RtoP via a series of resolutions regarding the need
to protect the civilian population from the aforementioned four crimes.
While these resolutions have been met with mixed outcomes, expecta-
tions, and even criticism, it is not very unlikely that Africa will not witness
more and more resolutions given the increasing level of human insecurity
and obstinate conflicts.
This understanding and the previous RtoP experiences in Africa have
contributed to acting as a deterrent to African leaders who might be
nursing the intention of carrying out such actions against their citizens
all in the name of “state security”. Hence, beyond the state culpability
defenses and institutional, operational, and conceptual challenges asso-
ciated with the RtoP, the doctrine no doubt still holds a strong basis
374 N. I. ERAMEH ET AL.

within the international community for deterring human rights violations

in state relations with their citizens, particularly among African nations
where these atrocious crimes and massive human rights violations have
continued to persist with no end in sight.

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The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP): Norm
Institutionalisation, Issues and Challenges

Enemaku Umar Idachaba

Background
It has been established that conflict is a natural part of all human soci-
eties. Managed properly, conflict is beneficial for progress (Coser, 1956),
but often they are allowed to escalate and turn violent, bringing suffering
to people in the society. Sometimes this violence is directed at a partic-
ular group of people resulting in what has been described as (mass)
atrocity crimes. These atrocity crimes by consensus are deliberate and
calculated acts of extreme violence carried out against civilian popula-
tions or non- combatants by state or non-state actors (Khalfaoui, 2021).
The United Nations (UN) perceive these crimes to be the “most serious
crimes against humankind” because they aim to strip away the funda-
mental things that give human beings dignity (United Nations, 2014:
1). To prevent atrocity crimes, the international community have cooked
up several accords designed to protect vulnerable populations. The most
common of these accords include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their

E. U. Idachaba (B)
Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 379

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_21
380 E. U. IDACHABA

1977 Additional Protocols (ICRC, 2022), and perhaps the 1999 Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
The atrocity crimes accounted for by these international statutes have
been grouped into three categories namely, Genocide, War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity. These categories have distinct features that
distinguish them. These features generally consider for example the
context of the attack (whether in wartime or peace time), victims of
the attack and intent of the attack (United Nations Office on Genocide
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2023), Nonetheless, they
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They encompass a wide range of
violent acts that often straddle more than one category or even all three.
A fourth category, yet to gain the status of international law but increas-
ingly visible in the lexicon of international humanitarianism is Ethnic
Cleansing. Many of the violent activities by which it is executed are also
common to the other atrocity crimes. The prominence of this fourth cate-
gory is linked to the proliferation of intra-state conflicts manifest often
as civil wars and insurgencies in the developing regions of the world
(Verdeja, 2019), and particularly endemic to Africa since the early 1990s
(Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). These violent conflicts have cause huge
number of civilian deaths (Bellamy & Williams, 2011), and displace large
civilian populations (Martin, 2011).
Though the international community has for long recognised the need
to protect vulnerable populations, actually coming to their aid in dire
times when atrocity crimes are taking place has proven to be more contro-
versial than plausible as demonstrated by its inadequate response to such
atrocious events as the Wars in the former Yugoslavia throughout the
1990s, the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre and
the egregious crimes of the 1998–1999 Kosovo War. One critical factor
that has hampered and made controversial international intervention to
stop atrocity crimes, is the challenge of state sovereignty. Sovereignty,
a right of state recognised and protected by Article 2 (1) of the UN
Charter, basically empower states, to within their national territories act
and rule as they see fit without fear as stated in Article 2(4), of interfer-
ence from other states (Purposes and Principles of the UN (chapter I of
UN Charter) | United Nations Security Council, 2023). That sovereignty
is framed as inviolable and sacrosanct, creates an international moral
dilemma where on one hand, intervention to halt or prevent atrocity
crimes violates the UN principle of sovereign equality of all member
nations yet non-intervention in deference for international law on the
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 381

other: hand violates the very moral foundations (emphasizing the dignity
of the human person), to which the UN subscribes.
Reconciling this moral dilemma resulted in the ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ (R2P) doctrine attempting to reconceptualised the idea of
sovereignty in such a way that it on the one hand eliminates the need for
International intervention and on the other legitimize armed interven-
tion upon the meeting of defined thresholds and criteria. Regardless of
its arguably noble and chivalric intent, the R2P entered the international
theatre as a highly polarising and divisive idea arguably with advocates and
critics in equal measure. It is framed by its advocates as a seminal doctrine
laden with the potential to improve good governance, enhance state
responsibility, end mass atrocity and foster growth and development. Its
critic harbour concerns for its potential for abuse and perpetuation of an
international order asymmetrically tilted in favour of the more powerful
states in the international system. These positions all have merits and have
interacted to prevent the R2P from reaching maturity and coming into
its own as an institutionalised international norm. This chapter discusses
these intervening issues under three headings built around (i) definition
of the R2P doctrine (ii) fear of abuse and misuse and (iii) emerging and
contending issues as consequences of its use in theatres of conflict.

R2P: What It Wants to, Can Do, Should Do

The RtoP emergence can be traced to the global call by then UN
Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan in September of 1999, for the
international community to rise up to the task of preventing the kind
of mass atrocities that had characterised the 1990s. His call framed the
dilemma of humanitarian intervention questioning whether armed inter-
vention without UN authorization to prevent the incidences like the
genocide in Rwanda could be justified. His call threw open a challenge to
the international community to look yonder present international law and
engineer a new structure that at once respected the sovereignty of states
and also prioritised humanitarian concern and action for the prevention
of mass atrocity crimes. The International Commission on intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 came presented the doctrine of
the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Evans, 2008). The R2P in essence states
the primary responsibility of protecting citizens of any given state from
atrocity crimes lay with the given state who failing in this responsibility left
itself regardless of sovereign transferred that obligation to the UN, which
382 E. U. IDACHABA

may take any measure as necessary, including military intervention, to

protect civilian populations from suffering or halt ongoing atrocity crimes.
The R2P thus aimed to reconceptualise the age-old idea of sovereignty as
a natural and inviolable right of states to a privilege qualified by respon-
sibility and sustained only by effective discharge of this responsibility
framed in terms of their willingness and capacity to protect their citizens
from atrocity crimes (Abomo, 2016). Tied to this was the global respon-
sibility of the international community to assist states in performing this
duty (Ramesh & Maley, 2015).
Naturally, in an international system defined largely by realpolitik and
rational actors, the notion of legitimizing the violation of state sovereignty
for whatever reason polarized the international community. This does not
come as a shock when it is considered that the unilateral military actions
taken by the US in Kosovo in 1999 had drawn loud condemnations
from members of the international community. Nonetheless, the R2P was
adopted at the 2005 World Summit. The adoption though fractious was
possible following a broad-base negotiated agreement requiring unani-
mous authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the doctrine to
apply in any situation. Regardless, reservations continued to trail the R2P
as a result of several factors.
For one, the original conception and definition of the R2P by the
ICISS drew from natural values. including those of human dignity, rule
of law and universal obligation to safeguard these values (Gagro, 2014).
This gave the R2P a particularly broad mandate that could apply in a wide
range of situations stipulated by the international community. There were
thus legitimate fears by weak states, of exploitation of the doctrine by
powerful states in the international system to instrumentalise the doctrine
for their own benefits. To allay these fears, in his 2009 report UNSG
Ban Ki Moon promoted the “narrow but deep” definition which upholds
the moral obligation of the international community to prevent atrocity
crimes but interprets the R2P in the strict terms of the 2003 World
Summit Outcome Document (Bellamy, 2010). Under these terms, the
international community could act to prevent/halt atrocity using human-
itarian and such other peaceful means as outlined in the Chapter I and
VIII of the UN Charter (Pupparo, 2015a, 2015b).
The approach of allowing states and regions to determine the applica-
tion of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine has been effective in
dismantling reservations, but it has also faced criticism from RtoP advo-
cates. These advocates argue that this approach undermines efforts to
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 383

establish universal operational standards, and undermines the core value

of the RtoP doctrine, which is to secure the backing of national govern-
ments for armed intervention (Gagro, 2014). This debate between a
broad and narrow definition of the RtoP doctrine highlights the chal-
lenge of striking a balance between institutionalization and preserving
its integrity as a mechanism for civilian protection, while also addressing
concerns of sovereign states. Despite these challenges, the RtoP doctrine
remains a critical tool for promoting global peace and security.
The dialogue surrounding atrocity deterrence and reaction within the
United Nations (UN) is often confined to a restricted and biased historic
setting. Typically, arguments commence with the formal adoption of
responsibility to protect (R2P) in 2005 at the World Summit, occa-
sionally alluding to the mass atrocities that took place in Rwanda and
Srebrenica during the 1990s, as well as the international community’s
lack of response. Deliberations that are country-specific only reflect the
past decade, with selective historical references. This is partially due to
an intentional endeavor to differentiate R2P from prior forms of human-
itarian intervention, which has been necessary to promote the principle’s
adoption and support by all nations. However, this has had the unin-
tended consequence of isolating R2P from its historical counterparts,
resulting in discussions that focus almost exclusively on Western inac-
tion, framing concerns about intervening on humanitarian grounds as a
Western concept. While this may serve certain states’ political aspirations,
it stifles the vital contributions of individuals, organizations, and nations
from the global South in the field of atrocity prevention and response.
Moreover, it disregards the fact that the responsibility to protect is based
on centuries of contemplation and practice regarding the obligation of
political leaders to their constituents, as well as a long-standing history
of interventions based on what we would now describe as humanitarian
considerations in disparate regions worldwide (Smith, 2022).

R2P: Concerns for Abuse and Misuse

The relevance of R2P when it was embraced at a World Conference in
2005 organised by the United Nations cannot be overemphasised and
it remains valid today as it was during its adoption considering contin-
uous cases of atrocity crimes being committed across the world including
targeted killings, rape, torture and forced displacement of population.
R2P places the responsibility of protection of population irrespective
384 E. U. IDACHABA

of their political affiliation, identity, or citizenship status on the states.

The principle also extends beyond the primary responsibility of indi-
vidual states There is the responsibility of all states to support each other
in ensuring that this primary task is fulfilled, failure which places the
responsibility of protecting populations on the international community,
specifically the UN Security Council. According to R. C. Thakur (2011),
“the UN’s adoption of R2P at the United Nations World Summit in
2005 is the most significant advancement in international human rights
norms since the founding of the UN after WWII. R2P extends existing
international human rights norms and obliges states to deliver positive
economic and political good for their citizens as well as protect them from
mass atrocity. When states fail or are incapable of protecting their citizens
from atrocity crimes due to internal crisis or violence, the responsibility
shifts to other states and the international community. The introduction
of R2P is a challenge to the arrangement of global natural order of the
international system by introducing responsibility and accountability to
the concept of sovereignty. Krasner (2009) opines that since the adop-
tion of non-intervention norm, responsibility has remained an important
element of the concept of sovereignty, He argues that in contrast with the
misconceived idea of sovereignty as absolute, it has always carried with it
responsibility. Sovereignty which is an IR traditional concept is challenged
by R21 which proposes that states have responsibility to protect people,
failure which shifts the responsibility to the international community. R2P
nudge states to consider sovereignty not as a principle which shields them
from core issues of international concerns, but a form of responsibility
shared by state and the international community.
The dominance of the international political system by realist descrip-
tion of the state as pursuing national interests (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014)
has created suspicions among governments who see R2P as an alter-
native way for state to pursue national interest and struggle for power
in the international system. Evans (2015) argue that the concept of
sovereignty and national interest have evolved to accommodate the prin-
ciple of ‘actionable norm’ which means that state sovereignty entails rights
and responsibilities and that there is a global responsibility to ensure
that populations are protected from mass atrocity crimes. Based on this
premise, R2P creates tension between ethics and power which continues
to divide state actors in the international political environment ques-
tioning their values, interests, intentions, and capabilities in intervention.
One of the weaknesses of the conventional realist framework is its failure
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 385

to locate the use of norms and other ideational obligations within the
traditional security framework. R2P challenges traditional realist power-
fixated perspective which strips the state of the ability to achieve moral
progress in an anarchic and warlike international system which continu-
ally threatens national security. This bleak assumption of the international
system has made it easy for realist scholars to support power over ethics in
explaining global political realities thereby considering global governance
an entirely dubious! and self-serving of the interests of powerful states.
The politics of global interactionism is projected by realism through a
tragic lens (Mearsheimer, 2001). The perception of global politics as
conflictual and competitive makes realists see the world from a nega-
tive perspective of international instability as against international order
(Gallagher, 2012). Realists therefore see no reason for considering ethical
or normative strategies in international relations which can be seen from
the argument of Carr (1946) that every ethical and normative concern can
be subjected to political judgement. This means that the political agenda
of hegemon confers normative power on norm such as R2P.
In IR, the state plays a central role, particularly in realist and neo-realist
approaches. The state is both a unit and object of analysis. It is also funda-
mental to institutionalism (Keohane, 1984), neorealism (Waltz, 1979),
English School and constructivist theories (Wendt, 1999). It represents
society’s core structure- the medium through which human association
and existence is validated. State in IR has for a long time remained an
unchallengeable dominion from realist lens of pessimistic power maximi-
sation and achievement of national interest (Mastanduno et al., 1989).
From the Weberian conception, the state is an instrument of coercion
but norms like R2P seek to modify this conception of state to an instru-
ment for the protection of the weak by the strong and sovereignty an
obligation rather than coercive instrument. The conception of sovereignty
as an absolutists control makes conflict difficult to resolve. According to
Krasner (1999) in its early stage, sovereignty was not intended to be as
vibrant, and absolutists as contemporary observers imagine. If at all it was
designed to mean a kind of ‘final authority’ it does not anymore.“ When
the notion was misconstrue by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes around
the sixteen and seventeen centuries, the philosophers were writing in a
world fragmented by strife and they were concerned with establishing
legitimate unilateral domestic authority. Bodin and Hobbes argued that
the utterances of the Sovereign was ‘law’ and the ruled had no right
to challenge the authority of the Sovereign, but they also realised that
386 E. U. IDACHABA

the overwhelming power with which the sovereign was imbued was an
invitation to tyranny but were preoccupied with their desires to main-
tain domestic order which for them was precursor for justice (Krasner,
1999). Jean Bodin for instance only marginally escaped being killed in
a religious riot in France in 1572 while Thomas Hobbes’ seminal work
on sovereignty, The Leviathan was published briefly after the execution
of Charles I by the parliament in a civil war that challenged the right of
the monarchy to control state power. Although the idea of a supreme
power can be compelling, but it was out rightly) irrelevant in practice
(Krasner, 1999). In Britain for instance, there was the division of polit-
ical authority between the Parliament and the King in the seventeenth
century while modern democracy is based on constitutional structure
which provides for checks and balances. The principle of order and justice
which Bodin and Hobbes sought to achieve in their idea of the ‘sovereign’
is best represented in modern democratic structure which is an antithesis
to uncontrolled an absolute domestic power. The Westphalian idea of
modern sovereignty has been misrepresented, misunderstood, and misap-
plied in politics (Krasner, 1999). Even before the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, there have been continuous struggles to establish inter-
national rules that will compel state leaders to treat their citizens fairly.
Sovereignty is contingent upon the ability of state to fulfil responsibilities
to its citizens.
Those who commit atrocity crimes hide behind the walls of a
‘sovereign’ state, considered as the highest form of political life to avoid
accountability for egregious crimes. Sovereignty is canonical in IR but
what R2P theorist and the United Nation seek to achieve by its adoption
is to help states uphold their sovereignty and slightly tilt the idea of state-
hood from a ‘licence to kill’ to ‘an obligation to protect citizens’. Today,
there is more than ever, a global shared responsibility to act in situations
where a member state fails to protect its citizens from atrocity crimes.
In practice, R2P ensure that state boundaries which acts as barriers and
divide states to collective shared responsibility is deemphasised and build
a global obligation to protect ‘others’ irrespective of their religion, race,
ethnicity, or nationality.
Due to this complacent and non-intervention habit of the interna-
tional community, countless lives were lost in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda
in 1994 and more than 8000 people in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herze-
govina were also murdered in 1995 while Kosovo witnessed ethnic,
cleansing in 1999. The history of international law on the prevention
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 387

of mas atrocities shows collective failure despite resolutions contained

in the 1948 Genocide Convention, the world has consistently stood
by, watching defenceless civilians targeted and mindlessly slaughtered.
Despite the resolve and declaration that Never Again-a term which Aidan
Hehir describes as an ironic shibboleth without any significant change in
the occurrence of mass atrocity (Hehir, 2011). One major contribution
of R2P to IR is the reconceptualization of sovereignty which hitherto
has given leaders absolutist supremacy over their citizens and territory.
It has been extended and redefined beyond state borders to capture the
obligation of state and international community to protect civilians from
atrocity crimes.

R2P: Divisive and Controversial

Operational Outcomes
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provides an opportunity for Inter-
national Relations to shed its Western bias through the involvement of
non-Western actors in its development. Although many human rights
norms were established prior to the decolonization of many states, R2P
has been championed by a range of middle-power states and has received
significant contributions from the Global South, including Tanzania,
Rwanda, and South Africa, who played a key role in its adoption. The
African Union was also one of the first regional organizations to include
the right to intervene in its constitutive act.
The theoretical basis of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be
traced back to scholars like Francis Deng, who formulated the concept of
‘sovereignty as responsibility’. Despite criticisms that the R2P is rooted
in the Western liberal order, it has received significant international
contributions from non-Western states, norms entrepreneurs, scholars,
and diplomats, including the doctrine of Responsibility while Protecting
(RwP) as advocated by the former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff
(Tourinho et al., 2016). Qatar has contributed to advancing the R2P,
working with other states such as Switzerland, Peru, Liechtenstein, Costa
Rica and Morocco in drafting resolutions adopted by the Human Rights
Council (Deng et al., 2010).
Jennifer Welsh (2016) argues that the demand for R2P to demon-
strate its success since its adoption in 2005 is unwarranted, as it takes
time for norms to become established. The international human rights
388 E. U. IDACHABA

regime received support in 1945 but took three decades to record signif-
icant success, such as the awarding of Amnesty International the Nobel
Prize in 1977 and the Helsinki Accord of 1975, which had considerable
effects on the Cold War. The three pillars of R2P have forged a political
consensus and built a new institution that can respond to atrocity crimes,
and therefore, the norm deserves credit.
The adoption of resolution 1973 by the United Nations Security
Council in response to the crisis and civil war in Libya in 2011 was a
test of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm. The subsequent military
intervention by NATO has been both praised as a successful application of
R2P and criticized for its appropriateness, highlighting ongoing debates
about the role of military intervention in preventing atrocities. Scholars
(Axworthy, 2011; Gerber, 2011; Heinbecker, 2011) describe the Libyan
intervention as a ‘new dawn’ while Gareth Evans, one of the proponents
of R2P described it as “a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly
as it was supposed to” (Evans, 2011). For Evans who with Mohamed
Sahnoun was appointed by the government of Canada co-chair the CC
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
an organisation founded by the Canadian government in response to the
appeal by its foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, R2P has become a deeply
relevant norm as it offers the international community a chance to truly
say “never again and without looking back to wonder why it was allowed
to repeatedly happen again” (Evans, 2011).
Aidan Hehir is critical of R2P in Libya by describing it with a
reductionist phrase ‘irresponsibility to protect’ He argued that a major
weakness of the R2P is that its implementation is based on the interest
and support of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council
and that these countries do not honour the responsibility which Article
24.1 of the Charter places on the Security Council. He noted that their
actions are determined less by moral or legal principles than their respec-
tive national interest leading to its inconsistent application (Hehir, 2011).
Thakur disagrees with the critics of the Libya intervention arguing that
the United Nations remains a fundamental institution for attaining collec-
tive security. He opines that R2P is a norm for the shaping of military
humanitarian intervention while asking the circumstance under which the
justification for the use of force which has become necessary, justified, and
required for the protection of people at risk can be attained. For Thakur,
military force as ‘option of last resort is required for R2P to have a mean-
ing’ (Thakur, 2011). Thakur’s view is sharply critiqued by Mary-Ellen
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 389

O’Connell who argued that in the case of the intervention in Libya, the
use of military force was not adopted as an option of last resort as other
peaceful measures such as negotiation and sanctions were barely explored
before the international community killed tens of thousands of civilians
it sought to protect during the intervention. For O’Connell, the death
of the civilians in Libya obscures the main objective of the R2P norm
(O’Connell, 2011).
R2P provides conflict prevention pillars which seeks to nip conflict
in the bud before it escalates to a level where atrocity crimes are being
committed. It therefore requires the support of the international commu-
nity, policy makers, norm entrepreneurs, international organisations, and
scholars to develop effective frameworks for early warning signals of
possible escalation of conflicts which can respond to diplomatic and other
less coercive instruments. R2P may have exposed itself to criticism due to
its seemingly selective and inconsistent applications leading to its being
dubbed a ‘reinvented form of western intervention’ but Like Jennifer
Welsh argues, norms do not mature overnight. R2P is in its infancy and as
it continues to grow and reinvent itself with global supports, it will even-
tually prosper, do away with its practical limitations and emerge as a new
norm with the claim of global ownership. Unlike military intervention
which was primarily a coercive tool of preventing human rights abuse,
R2P has both coercive and non-coercive tools to prevent the occurrence
of atrocities. R2P has created tools like targeted development assistance
which could help in building resilient and inclusive societies which make
it difficult for crisis to degenerate into violence that can seriously impact
civilians. Targeted sanctions against states and individuals can also be used
to dissuade states from engaging in a particular act of violence. These
tools insulate states from the means that make these kinds of crime easy
to commit.
The clear reality is that political crisis will continue to be a part of
the everyday life of most countries, strengthening the R2P norm helps
states build capacity for societies to confront political crisis without ethnic
and intercommunal crisis degenerating into outright and abysmal level of
human rights violation or ethnic cleansing. Unlike military intervention,
R2P provides six criteria that must be met for military intervention to
be used in prevention of the crime of genocide or ethnic cleansing the
just cause, just intention, last resort, proportionality, reasonable chance
of success and right authority. These criteria ensures that there is possi-
bility of occurrence of imminent likelihood of a large-scale loss of lives or
390 E. U. IDACHABA

ethnic cleaning. The intention of the international community must also

be strictly humanitarian, and all prevention methods must be exhausted
before military intervention. It must also be conducted at a propor-
tional means with reasonable chance of success to prevent the suffering
of civilians and conducted by the UNSC which is the right authority.
The contributions of critics of R2P are invaluable, nudging us towards
its weaknesses and strategies for strengthening it towards building a more
acceptable and effective framework for the international community to
respond to crisis. Although, ongoing crisis across the world in places Syria,
Yemen, Myanmar, Sri Lanka etc. validates the points of cynical voices
that today is not very different from Srebrenica, Rwanda and Cambodia
but looking back to the few achievements of the R2P, there is clearly
something to celebrate. R2P holds great hopes for IR, peace and conflict
resolutions and global governance. The erstwhile ‘right to intervene’
is a more abrasive language than R2P and this responsibility has been
shared among multiple players and actors in the new doctrine rather than
solely the militarily powerful nations. The creation of multiple layers of
responses and not primarily military power nations and the setting of the
bar of military intervention very high including achieving proportionality
are part of the strengths of R2P which makes it more acceptable. The
recognition of atrocity crimes as a matter of international concern even
when they occur within the borders of sovereign states is a major triumph
for human rights protection mechanism.
From a normative standpoint, R2P has almost displaced the right of
humanitarian intervention and gained more global acceptance as a new
political norm with great hopes that it will emerge to a legal norm.
The reference of R2P Resolutions in the UN Resolutions and Presiden-
tial Statements in the Security Council up till recently in March and
May 2022 on the crisis in South Sudan laying emphasis on holding
those who violated international laws and gross abuse of human rights
accountable are major contributions to IR practice. In 2021 alone, R2P
was referenced five times in the Security Council (on conflict in Central
African Republic, South Sudan and the protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflicts). The readiness of the UNSC to promote human rights through
R2P is both important and commendable. However, there is more to be
done regarding the intense debates on the source and uncertain applica-
tion of the doctrine which have become contentious due to the inaction
of the UNSC. If R2P doctrine must become a robust and effective tool in
the protection of human rights, the security council must gain the trust
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 391

of both powerful and weak states for legitimacy. It must also operate on
the principle of respect and build confidence among member states and
people of the UN in both approach and methods of its use. There is
also a need for increased emphasis on universal human rights protection
and education while the implementation of human rights treaties in all
countries should be advocated across member states.
As the worst fears of the international community come true with
evidence emerging from Ukraine that war crimes have been committed
by Russia as over 30 civilian targets were hit in Ukraine including
Kindergartens and children’s hospitals with several casualties including
children who are literally on the frontline with many of them suffering
from shooting, shelling, and psychological trauma as a result of the war
(Cincurovaara, 2022; Graham-Harrison, 2022), it calls for IR to rein-
vent itself and extend it concern beyond the ‘international’ which has
remained the limiting boundary of the discipline when it was founded,
into a limitless and unconstrained global governance. Although, due to
its underlying weaknesses in Libya, R2P has been described as a political
catchword (Pupparo, 2015a, 2015b), but like Sikkink (1998) argues that
the power of norms is embedded in the action of people. I agree with
Welsh (2019) that it is misleading to equate norm decay to death and its
adoption and recognition as a political and thereafter legal norm will give
it greater acceptance as a customary rule. In an anarchic global political
environment R2P has made huge contributions to IR by raising leader-
ship consciousness to a form of global governance which speaks and act to
protect vulnerable people from atrocities considering the repeated cases
of conscience-shocking atrocities globally. In a world which according to
Knight (2022) is ‘in transition’, marked by flux, violence and uncertain-
ties as a result of moving away from the hitherto Cold War bipolarism
with vestiges of ‘global disorder’ symptomatic of states desires for rele-
vance and power in a rebellious ‘international community’ making the
new world order disorderly, there is a need for a reminder that sovereignty
is not a license to kill. Despite its weakness of what critics call inconsis-
tence application, I argue that environment of conflict is unpredictable
and every conflict are different in form, origin, parties, and degree and
therefore require different strategies which leads to inconsistence appli-
cation as seen in R2P. The old international relations regime excused
itself and turned a blind eye to atrocity crimes and deaf ears to the
cries of women and children massacred close to state borders, vener-
ating sovereignty above righteousness and the yelling of their conscience
392 E. U. IDACHABA

allowing inhumanity to humanity to continue. R2P however has provided

a framework which allows those who are willing to act in defence of
humanity to do so.
The international community is often confronted with the safety of
humanitarian workers and peacekeepers in its application of R2P. In some
cases (like Darfur) the number of humanitarian workers and peacekeepers
were about the same which creates a problem about their safety should
state militia decide to retaliate. At the same time, their presence should
not be a ground for inaction creating a dilemma. My view is that in addi-
tion to conflict, R2P also needs to consider strategies and approaches
to respond in humanitarian situation in case of natural disasters where
there are crimes against humanity as seen in Cyclone Nargis in Burma,
the non-politization of humanitarian operations by ensuring that there is
a clear distinction between humanitarian aid and security concerns so that
workers are not exposed to harm by parties in conflict.

Conclusion
The traditional understanding of sovereignty in International Relations
(IR) has been misapplied, leading to the protection of autocrats who
commit atrocities. This understanding has also resulted in the catego-
rization of people into those who deserve protection from the state and
those who do not. Core IR theories such as realism and neorealism
have reinforced these distinctions, while norms such as Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) offer a rethinking of sovereignty, extending beyond
national borders and providing protection to all people. While R2P is
not a fully developed norm, it has achieved the status of a new polit-
ical norm in IR and has made significant contributions to scholarship
and practice through UNSC resolutions and the creation of the Global
Network of R2P Focal Points. However, it remains a work in progress,
and its future depends on the commitment of states, policymakers, NGOs,
intergovernmental organizations, and citizens to its survival.
The concept of R2P requires adjustments in both its theorization
and practice to ensure that weaker states’ views and opinions are taken
into account. This will allow for a deeper understanding of its flaws and
provide access to uncharted depths. R2P should serve as a reminder that
we all bear the responsibility to protect it. Despite appalling crimes against
humanity remaining unpunished for decades, the phrase “Never Again”
has been a hollow cry. However, the advent of R2P could offer a chance
 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (RTOP): NORM … 393

to strengthen and uphold the sovereignty of states threatened by atrocity

crimes. R2P has been successful in stopping violence in countries such
as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, the Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, and
Kyrgyzstan, but it has failed in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Syria, and twice
in Myanmar. Factors contributing to R2P’s inconsistent application or
failure include the veto by some permanent members leading to difficulty
in achieving a consensus of the Security Council, prevention of large-scale
violence, and the potential for more people to be killed than saved, as seen
in Myanmar. Nevertheless, R2P has provided effective civilian protection
and a strong toolbox for preventing atrocity crimes, with both short- and
long-term strategies, including diplomatic persuasion, sanctions, criminal
prosecutions, and intervention. The moral responsibility to intervene is
essential in preventing and resolving ethnic cleansing and atrocity crimes
when states fail to act.

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Responsibility to Protect: From Contestation
to Internationalization

Victor Ojakorotu, Nicholas Idris Erameh, and Sheriff Folarin

Introduction
The question of why, when, how, and who should take on the responsi-
bility of protecting civilians when faced with mass atrocities or imminent
attacks by their own government has long been a source of contention in
international relations (Thakur, 2016; Welsh, 2016). As a result, scholars
have acknowledged that mobilizing the RtoP for civilian protection in
mass atrocity scenarios has remained problematic, both when it occurs
and when it does not (Gözen Ercan, 2016; Hehir, 2010; Morris, 2016;
Newman, 2013). This is especially true in Africa, where the shift in Cold
War politics has shifted the nature of conflict from interstate to intrastate,
with civilians suffering the most (Erameh, 2021). Apart from the shift
in the nature of conflict, most African countries have been caught in

V. Ojakorotu · N. I. Erameh (B)

Department of Political Studies and International Relations, Northwest
University, Mafikeng, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
S. Folarin
Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, USA
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 401
Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
N. I. Erameh and V. Ojakorotu (eds.), Africa’s Engagement with the
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century, Africa’s Global
Engagement: Perspectives from Emerging Countries,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8163-2_22
402 V. OJAKOROTU ET AL.

a vicious circle of armed conflict caused by non-state actors, which has

persisted with no end in sight.
Unlike in other regions, the unresolved question of acceptable means
of protecting civilian populations from further attacks amid nations’
claims to sovereignty as enshrined in Articles 2(4) and (7) of the United
Nations charter is central to these incessant conflicts in Africa. Given this
scenario, several instances of mass atrocities flourished in Africa with little
or no intervention. Regardless, the public perception is that mass atroci-
ties against civilians must not be tolerated, even if the details are unclear.
As a result, Kersavage argued that “civil crises in the 1990s brought the
applicability of the use of force to protect civilians back into the center of
international debate” (2014: 26).
This awareness prompted a reconsideration of the possibility of recon-
ciling the age-old conflict between sovereign and human rights. Given
that this period coincided with African leaders reconsidering the idea
of moving beyond nonintervention to non-interference, as well as the
shameless global inaction in the Rwanda and Kosovo killings, prominent
international diplomats began to call for a re-interpretation of the concept
of sovereignty from a right to responsibility. To this end, Annan argued
that;

States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their

peoples and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty –by
which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual enshrined in
the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties –has been
enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.
When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its
aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse
them.

Without a doubt, Annan’s speech, as well as other brilliant contribu-

tions from world leaders and international organizations, paved the way
for responding to mass atrocities in Africa through the RtoP. Some of the

N. I. Erameh
Department of Research & Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
(NIIA), Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM CONTESTATION … 403

RtoP interventions, as well as the emerging and contending issues that

have heralded their mobilization, are extensively discussed in the book.

A Critical Analysis of the Theory

and Practice of RtoP in Africa
Smoke Screen for Western Imperialism: Despite Africa’s contribution to
the RtoP’s adoption, the notion that the doctrine is nothing more than
a smoke screen for Western countries has remained dominant. Indeed,
scholars have argued that, however noble the idea of protecting civilians
from mass atrocities may appear, the long-term goal remains the exten-
sion and expansion of their economic dominance, as well as asserting
control over nations intervened upon (Mamdani, 2010; Morris, 2013;
Wai, 2014). Though some other scholars have debunked such claims or
positions, recent experiences from the Libyan intervention and others
discussed in the book indicate that several of these interventions have
been mostly executed based on perceived “economic” gains, either on a
short- or long-term basis. However, Africa’s nations are still unsure what
to do about these allegations, owing to the doctrine’s ongoing trust and
mistrust in the face of potential armed conflict and mass atrocity scenarios
that overwhelm many of these nations.
Right to Intervention: An unresolved issue in the RtoP mobilization is
who has the authority to authorize intervention. Given that the majority
of RtoP interventions have occurred in Africa, the notion that these
interventions should be authorized by African nations has dominated the
discourse on civilian protection. However, the experiences described in
some chapters of this book indicate that mobilizing R2P interventions in
Africa is the responsibility of Western powers and the UN. Although the
RtoP doctrine allows regional organizations such as the AU to intervene
and report back to the UN in cases of emergency, regional organizations
have not used this power effectively. This is not due to a lack of willing-
ness on the part of regional organizations, but rather to a combination of
factors, particularly a lack of political will and the resources to carry out
these interventions (Erameh, 2021; United Nations, 2023). As a result,
the issue of right authority is likely to continue to vex the RtoP discourse
in Africa.
Operational Difficulties: Prior to the RtoP’s adoption, there were
several concerns that the doctrine would devolve into humanitarian inter-
vention. Though scholars struggled to distinguish the RtoP from its
404 V. OJAKOROTU ET AL.

predecessor in that it “puts the needs and interests of the victims of

atrocities ahead of those of the intervening powers, It is victim-and
people-centered” (Thakur, 2013: 65), the opposite is true. Clearly, the
mobilization of the RtoP has been hampered by unexpected operational
challenges, as seen in Libya, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, and other cases. In
particular, in Chapter “Responsibility to Protect in Libya or Regime
Change? What We Have Learned?”, Anabiri and Mashau elaborated on
the operational challenges of the RtoP intervention, which ultimately
resulted in Ghaddaffi’s ouster and assassination. This viewpoint is consis-
tent with that of prominent RtoP scholars, who have previously argued
that NATO’s decision to use aerial bombardment to protect civilians
amounted to a crime against humanity. Furthermore, NATO overreached
its mandate with the assassination of Ghaddaffi, which has remained a
source of concern in potential RtoP cases (Erameh, 2018). In Chapter
“Horizontal Inequality and Violence in Cote d’Ivoire: The Complexity of
the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Doctrine”, Omosefe also discussed
the operational challenges that the RtoP intervention in Cote dIvoire
faced, as well as the implications for future interventions. The misuse
of military power, which leads to operational hiccups, is undoubtedly a
central theme in these chapters.
Overconcentration on the Use of Force: Aside from the operational
challenges that have characterized the deployment of the RtoP, several
chapters in this book have identified an overconcentration on the use of
force. In Chapter “Horizontal Inequality and Violence in Cote d’Ivoire:
The Complexity of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Doctrine”, for
example, Omosefe argued that intervening forces in Cote dIvoire were
unwilling to use other means than force. The issue of the use of force or
the overconcentration on the use of force remains a challenging problem
surrounding the deployment of the RtoP, and this has continued to leave
a negative impact on the doctrine’s future mobilization even when the
need remains consistently compelling.
The Unanswered Quandary of When and How In addition to the
issue of the proper authority, the question of when and how the RtoP
should be deployed in Africa remains unresolved. This issue has remained
central to the RtoP debate around the world, particularly in Africa. For
example, in Chapter “Environmental Challenges, Climate Change and the
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Africa”, Ologe and Aniche thoroughly
examined this issue by examining the various dynamics that have charac-
terized RtoP discourse in terms of civilian population protection. This is
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM CONTESTATION … 405

in addition to the conceptual ambiguity that has persisted since the RtoP’s
adoption and subsequent mobilization. Furthermore, the RtoP practice
has been heavily criticized for not being precise about the crimes it seeks
to punish and the issue of threshold. The fact that the mobilization and
authorization of the RtoP are primarily carried out by Western powers
indicates that the issue of conceptual ambiguity is unlikely to be resolved
anytime soon. Scholars argue that “much will depend on who interprets
what protection or safety of the people means in a particular time and
place, and who decides whether and how it will be achieved” (Orford,
2011: 137).
Inconsistency: Since 2009, when the RtoP was mobilized in Libya in
response to Resolutions 1970 and 1973, future calls, support, and mobi-
lization of the doctrine for civilian protection have been hampered by the
issue of inconsistency. For example, mass atrocity scenarios in a number of
African countries, including Sudan, the Central African Republic, Somalia,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon, have either
received little or no intervention. Furthermore, our research shows that,
while African countries have made attempts to respond to these conflicts
through the AU Constitutive Act, the political will and resources to carry
out these interventions lie with Western countries, leaving the doctrine
vulnerable to selectivity politics and inconsistency. Regarding the problem
of inconsistency, Bellamy argued that;

Translating the principle into consistent practice has proven difficult,

however and the practical record is mixed. That is primarily because R2P
does not sit apart from world politics, but is a part of world politics. Even
when actors agree on the substance of R2P as a principle, they may still
disagree radically on the best way of achieving its ambitions or on whether
doing so is more or less, important than achieving other goals, such as
protecting allies, maintaining international stability and order and pursuing
geopolitical ambitions. (Bellamy, 2022: 15)

Without a doubt, the problem of inconsistency observed in the RtoP

interventions in Africa examined in this book, as well as the potential
cases where the doctrine was not deployed, demonstrate that the issue of
inconsistency will continue to be a defining moment in the doctrine’s
application or non-application in Africa. Furthermore, this problem is
not limited to Western powers; experiences have shown that African
leaders, too, have a proclivity for mass atrocity scenarios, and this has been
406 V. OJAKOROTU ET AL.

identified as a catalyst that energizes dictators or tyrants to perpetuate

state-sponsored violence against civilians without being held account-
able. More recent examples include mass atrocities against civilians in
Cameroon, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, among others.
Expectation Gaps: The most troubling aspect of RtoP practice in
Africa since its adoption has been the issue of expectation gaps between
interveners, nations, and those intervened upon. Aside from the Libyan
scenario, cases discussed in this book in Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia,
and even Cameroon have highlighted the problematic issue of expectation
gaps, which frequently increase disdain and criticism against supporters of
the RtoP. To that end, Paris (2014) asserted that one of the primary chal-
lenges confronting the RtoP in its mobilization in Africa is determining
how to best measure the success of an intervention. Given that mobi-
lization and support for the RtoP in Africa remain issues entwined with
power and political dynamics, Paris concludes that the chances that these
issues will be resolved are slim.
Given that the majority of RtoP interventions took place in Africa,
this book investigates whether the series of criticisms and contestations
surrounding the doctrine indicate the doctrine’s demise. Though critics
of the doctrine have written it off since the disastrous outcome of the
Libyan intervention, it appears that several instances have warranted its
mobilization, even if the details and outcomes have thrown up new and
contending issues for the doctrine. The fact that African nations tactically
supported these RtoP interventions following the Libyan crisis in 2011,
combined with the African Union’s readiness to invoke Articles 4g and
h of its constitutive act, which bear so much resemblance to the RtoP,
indicates to the fact that the doctrine’s entire concept resonated in the
context of a “demand-driven” consciousness to avoid the heinous events
of Rwanda and maintain the commitment to “Never Again”.
Furthermore, using the Finnemore and Sikkink Norm Life Cycle
Model stages (Norm Emergence, Cascade, and Internationalization) to
understand the RtoP’s adoption, growth, and expectations, it is clear that
the practice and outcome require more nuanced analysis, which is what
this book did. For example, the chapters in this book’s first section (Philo-
sophical and Theoretical Overview) deal with the first stage of the RtoP
norm life cycle, Norm Emergence. The chapters, in particular, conducted
a comprehensive and detailed examination of the RtoP’s emergence and
eventual adoption. Though the RtoP appears to have been conceived
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM CONTESTATION … 407

and adopted solely by Westerners, our understanding indicates that Africa

played a significant and incalculable role in its conception and adoption.
Articles 4g and h of the African Union Constitution expressly grant the
African Union the authority to intervene in the affairs of member nations
without consent in situations where the government is committing mass
atrocities against civilians. This demonstrates that Africa’s disposition,
mobilization, and subsequent support for doctrine are still required for
its continued growth.
Norm Casade then delves deeply into several topics covered in the
second and third sessions of this book, including the theory, practice,
expectation gaps, and consequences of various RtoP interventions mobi-
lized or authorized in Africa. This section delves into the various dynamics
and complexities that have characterized these RtoP interventions, with
some focusing on the expected role of political institutions such as the
UN, African Union, and International Criminal Court, among others, in
responding to the challenges militating against the RtoP. We observed
that the significance of this stage in the RtoP discourse cannot be over-
stated, because, while intervening countries acknowledge the challenges
of previous interventions, new and contending issues have emerged in
subsequent interventions. But does this imply that, in light of these new
challenges and ongoing criticisms, the RtoP will be unable to achieve the
norm cascade and progress to the final stage?
This question and other bothersome issues form the basis of this book
because, according to our analysis, the series of contestations and criti-
cisms against the various RtoP interventions discussed in several chapters
in this book point to the fact that the doctrine is heavily burdened and
may lack the will to transform or actualize the final stage as postulated by
Finnemore and Sikkink in their Norm Life Cycle Model stages.
Nonetheless, “Africa’s Engagement with the Responsibility to Protect
in the Twenty-First Century” has been able to contribute to the evolving
discourse and the possibility of the RtoP actualizing the final stage by
first shedding more light on the practice, challenges, and prospects of the
RtoP amidst widespread contestation, backlash, operational challenges,
and expectation gaps associated with RtoP theory and practice. It achieves
this goal by departing from previous works to provide a fresh perspective
and alternatives for future RtoP deployment. Aside from resolving the
emerging and contending issues that have befuddled RtoP theory, prac-
tice, and mobilization, it will provide critical insights to readers on how
408 V. OJAKOROTU ET AL.

to further support, consolidate, and institutionalize the RtoP that can be

best achieved in Africa.

Conclusion and Recommendation

In view of the following discussion and analysis, this book proffer the
following recommendations;

. Western countries and international institutions legally charged with

the responsibility of intervention must be wary of the challenges that
have accompanied RtoP interventions. They must ensure that future
interventions are guided by a strict sense of responsible protection
as proposed by Brazil.
. Events on the African continent suggest high possibility of future
RtoP interventions. Though this may be a herculean task considering
the challenges confronting the AU, political leaders must invest in
capacity building and muster the political will necessary to meet the
demands for RtoP intervention on the continent.
. Given the prevalence of armed conflict and other security threats that
expose civilians to atrocity crimes but are not addressed in the letters
of the RtoP, it is proposed that the RtoP mandate be expanded to
include these security challenges in the context of the responsibility
to respond.
. Recognizing that Africa remains at the centre of international peace-
keeping and humanitarian protection, the goal of consolidating and
institutionalising the RtoP as a global framework for civilian protec-
tion will rely heavily on the willingness of African nations and
their leaders to exercise agency, demonstrate support for and, build
capacity in the implementation of all RtoP’s elements (react, prevent
and rebuild) and pillars.
. Acknowledging the immense value of early intervention to reducing
human casualty, armed intervention must no less be last resort. This
exposes the need to develop greater capacity in the area of and,
effectiveness of non-military measures for civilian protection.
. Where use of force is inevitable, it must be applied in a manner that
is contextually appropriate and proportional.
. The African Union must demonstrate that it prioritises human rights
and display willingness to address violations swiftly and promptly.
It must therefore dissociate itself from the established perception
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM CONTESTATION … 409

that it maintains an unhealthy tradition of solidarity and merely uses

concepts like ASAP to shield its members indicted for human rights
violations from justice.
. Even as it is recommended that African leaders must support the
actions of international bodies like the ICC and the African Court
of Justice, there must be equal emphasis and the active pursuit of
reforms in the UN Security Council as well as the ICC to build
trust and enhance support from African nations.

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