POLICY BRIEF

Land Tenure in Post FTLRP

Zimbabwe: Key Strategic Policy
Development Issues

Brian Maguranyanga This policy brief aims to

and Sam Moyo inform and influence policy
April 2006 development in addressing
land tenure issues in
Zimbabwe in the wake of the
Fast Track Land Reform
Programme (FTLRP). The
brief provides an overview of
key political economic and
strategic policy development
options for the consolidation
of land tenure policies, and
strengthened property rights
and tenure security in
Zimbabwe following land
reform.

Prepared on behalf of the African Institute for Agrarian Studies

19 Bodle Avenue, Eastlea, Harare, ZIMBABWE
INTRODUCTION 1
OVERVIEW OF LAND REFORM AND TENURE AFTER 2000 1
POLICY ISSUES 2
Clarifying Land Tenure Ambiguities 2
Land Tenure as a Governance and Empowerment Issue 3
Mainstreaming Gender in Land Rights Allocation 3
Rights to Infrastructure 4
Land Sharing, Subletting and Rental Tenure Arrangements 5
Land Tenure Administration 6
Farm Workers 6
BUTTRESSING SECURITY OF TENURE 7
STRATEGIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT 8
Incentive Structure and Tenure Security 8
Efficient Land Tenure Administration 9
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 9

References 10
INTRODUCTION
This policy brief explores the dynamics of tenure reform in the context of the post-Fast
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) era in Zimbabwe. It examines the political,
economic and legal issues of land and tenure reforms, and highlights the importance of
developing and consolidating a solid and flexible legal institutional framework that
strengthens security of tenure and legal transfer of land. It treats the development of
tenure systems in the post FTLRP era as an experimental and ongoing process which
requires learning and change to suit evolving conditions.

OVERVIEW OF LAND REFORM AND TENURE AFTER 2000

Land and tenure reforms in Zimbabwe are highly emotive and complex political issues,
and closely linked to anti-colonial ideologies that focus on black empowerment and
socioeconomic justice. Inevitably, one needs to understand the political nature of this
issue and the historical context within which racially skewed land and tenure
arrangements developed. What emerged from the colonial land policies was a dual land
tenure system, socially engineered to create and distribute opportunities to whites. Such
racially based ‘land grabs’ served to entrench white political and economic interests,
while depriving Africans of socioeconomic opportunities.

Therefore, at the time of independence, Zimbabwe inherited a racially divided, dual,

unequal and hierarchical land tenure system that gave whites freehold and leaseholds, the
rights and duties pertaining to which were provided for and protected by law. The black
indigenous population occupied ‘tribal lands’ and their rights to such lands were not
protected by law but recognised administratively and subject to customary land tenure
(with inferior forms of rights) (Moyo 2006, working document).

It is against this backdrop of dual, unequal and racially biased land tenure systems that
the post-independence government of Zimbabwe sought to redress and address injustices
and systemic problems in land allocation and distribution. Both land and tenure reforms
have focused on conferring land rights to the previously marginalised black population. A
detailed discussion of the FTLRP is not necessary in this policy brief because a
considerable amount of literature on the subject already exists (Moyo 2003, 2006;
Sachikonye, 2005). Relevant narratives on the FTLRP will be applied only in instances
where these directly contribute to arguments on land tenure.

The FTLRP dramatically shifted land rights, tenure and administration in Zimbabwe. It
brought to the fore contestations over land ownership, rights, and tenure security, among
former landowners, those allocated land, land seekers, farm workers and other land
claimants. The process created A1 and A2 farms, and official policy allowed prescribed
farm sizes for A2 allocations to vary according to agroecological zones. It is suggested
that over 15 000 new A2 farm rights and about 140 000 A1 farm rights have been
allocated (Moyo 2006, working document). The land reform exercise has given the
government an opportunity to revisit land tenure.

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Tenure reforms introduced new tenure regimes, with lease documents for A2 farms and
the ‘Permit’ for A1 farms. The lease agreements are legally binding tenure documents
that state leasehold rights and obligations. The lease defines provisions on duration,
property size, succession, use of natural resources, subletting, lease termination,
developments, rentals, etc. The strengths of the lease agreement (A2) lie in its ability to
meet universal characteristics of a lease contract. However, it has some weaknesses in
terms of its vagueness in defining the following issues:
• Tenure security in duration of contract is relative despite it stating that the lease is
99 years. The question this begs is whether both good and poor farmers alike are
guaranteed 99 years. Are the tenure rights of a poor farmer secure for the entire
duration of the lease or they can be revoked? What appeal procedures exist in the
event that the state cancels or wants to terminate the lease, and what is the level of
compensation in the event of such termination? Or, if the leaseholder wants to
surrender the lease to the state, what economic benefits will accrue to the
leaseholder?
• Termination of the lease seems not to carry any penalties. Neither does the lease
state the degree of state compensation. This gap creates potential disincentives for
investment and sustainable land use.
• The lease is silent on incentives for sustainable use of natural resources and
ambiguous about the sustainability of agricultural operations on the farms. For
example, the statement that agricultural operations should be carried out in a
“sustainable manner to the satisfaction of the lessor” is highly subjective and open
to the personal interpretation of different government officials and/or other relevant
parties.
• The conditions for subletting, cession and partnerships are ill defined. Given the
current economic hardships in Zimbabwe, failure to create viable partnerships or
innovative lease transfer or subletting may result in poor utilisation of land.

POLICY ISSUES
Seven key policy issues in land tenure and agricultural development are discussed below.

Clarifying Land Tenure Ambiguities

The A1 and A2 farm tenure regimes under leasehold are still characterised by unclear
claims to land rights because of the delays in awarding leases. In some instances, the
remaining white LSCF farmers who have been granted formal or informal permission to
farm also experience ambiguous and unclear rights to land arising from political
uncertainties. With the passing of Amendment No. 17 of the Zimbabwe Constitution,
which removed the right to contest land acquisitions per se, the security of tenure of
remaining LSCF farmers (about 1 332) remains highly questionable and the opportunities
available to other former LSCF farmers to apply for land under the A2 scheme are not
clarified. What are the tenure implications of the state taking over former LSCF areas,
and converting them to state leasehold land? Will the remaining LSCF farmers retain

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their freehold status? Are the procedures to deal with these issues transparent and well
enough articulated to facilitate conversion and compensation? Without clarifying the
conversion procedure and creating confidence in the conversion process, the provisions
of legally binding tenure instruments (leases) may not be sufficient to guarantee security
of tenure. Therefore, land tenure principles need to be clarified and operationalised. We
recommend that the government address the information gaps with regard to land rights
and access, clarify tenure issues for both A1 and A2 farmers, and communicate procedure
so that there is perceived commitment, sincerity and interest in building trust among all
stakeholders.

To date, A1 settlers have not secured formal documentation and A2 farmers are still
awaiting lease agreements, while some settlers have not received their offer letters from
Government. Such delays in legal transfer of land create insecurity of tenure for farmers
under both the A1 and the A2 models (Sachikonye, 2005). Such uncertainty and
insecurity reduce the new settlers’ confidence and investment commitment on farms.
Unless these issues are addressed, investment in farming by new settlers will be marginal.

It is important that policy makers explore redress opportunities for both A1 and A2
farmers who feel that they received undersized farms compared to the policy
prescriptions, otherwise these variations may create conflict and insecurity. The
clarification of such variations in land demarcation and distribution needs to be done in a
transparent manner in order to contain ongoing land rights allocation struggles. Land
rights allocations must be informed by objectives of political, social and economic
sustainability that recognise the imperatives of food and livelihood security and
socioeconomic development.

Land Tenure as a Governance and Empowerment Issue

Land tenure is a key ingredient in agricultural production and management of resources
within specified lands. However, developing appropriate land tenure systems is a
complex process, with crosscutting social, political, economic and environmental
implications. Consequently, land tenure development is intimately linked to the broader
political economic issues of democracy, governance, social justice, empowerment, equity
and development. Until the historical issues and political challenges of redistributing
resources are recognised, any solutions to land and tenure questions will lack context and
will fail to fulfill the important objective of transforming property relations and creating
social change. It is, therefore, imperative to envisage appropriate tenure systems and
support them with long term policy solutions. There is a need to shift from the current
inclination for short term laws for the here and now towards looking for long term
solutions that do not change according to social and political whims.

Mainstreaming Gender in Land Rights Allocation

Moyo (2003) argues that women were marginalised, as individuals, in land allocations
because of the predominant criteria that assumed households centred on a married couple
or that women would seek land within the family context. Only 10 to 16 percent of
beneficiaries of the land reform programme were women. What emerges from this

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‘gender blindness’ in land policy is the perpetuation of the marginal rights of women in
land allocation and their insecurity of tenure. The socioeconomic pattern of land
allocation in post-2000 Zimbabwe is embedded within wider sociocultural relationships,
and the succession and inheritance laws of Zimbabwe. For example, Clause 15 of the A2
lease contract outlines the succession and inheritance of the lease, and defines rights
according to customary law. Given that customary law (or tenure) is often perceived as
inferior to received law, the tensions attendant on customary law will also apply to the
inheritance of the lease. Consequently, the lease may entrench and perpetuate gender
inequalities, especially when subjected to cultural interpretations.

Gender sensitivity is required in meeting land tenure needs, as is the implementation of a

strategy to level opportunities for women to gain land rights as legally recognised
leaseholders. A bold policy approach that supports women’s empowerment and the
transfer of land rights to women is important.

Another tenure policy issue concerns security of tenure vis-à-vis inheritance, bearing in
mind that cultural practices in Zimbabwe have often failed to protect the children of
deceased parents. The proposed lease agreement does not adequately address the
inheritance issue and seems oblivious to the realities of conflict over inheritance.
Innovative share type ownership that recognises the rights of children of deceased parents
(with leasehold) should be developed to ensure tenure security and livelihood
opportunities. Measures that reduce insecurity of tenure and uncertainties in the event of
death of leaseholders need to be identified.

Rights to Infrastructure
Government policy on infrastructure allocation, use and management in A1 and A2 farms
varies. This lack of uniformity has both advantages and disadvantages. In A2 areas, the
social infrastructure is largely treated as state property to be used for the public good,
while productive properties, such as irrigation equipment and barns, are regarded as state
assets to be utilised on a shared basis. The policy recognises infrastructure shortages and
hence seeks to increase capacity utilisation through sharing mechanisms.

However, in A2 farms, the proposed lease agreements stipulate conditions underlying the
allocation and utilisation of infrastructure. The principle of custodianship is applied. It is
interesting to note that, without clear specification of obligations, asset ownership, access
and equity regarding A2 infrastructure, there is a potential problem of low reinvestment
in infrastructure development and inefficient maintenance of this infrastructure. It is
important that the A2 farmers’ sense of asset ownership and sustainable investment in
infrastructure development be crystallised through the provision of security of
infrastructure tenure on A2 farms.

Moyo (2006) argues that the A2 lease fails to grant plotholders without infrastructure on
their plots any right of control, access or use of any infrastructure not located on their
farms. In addition, allocation of farm compounds to A2 farmers has engendered unclear
rights and obligations on their use, particularly by neighboring A2 plotholders without

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compounds and farm workers. This problem has raised concerns about the residential
rights of farm workers on A2 farms.

Ambiguities and lack of clarity on infrastructure tenure (rights) potentially discourage

investment and increase the risks of farming investment. Therefore, from a political and
economic standpoint, it is necessary to re-examine the provisions of A1 and A2 leases to
address shortcomings that compromise opportunities for productivity and investment in
farms. Certainly, there is a dynamic link between security of tenure, and the economic
and agricultural productivity of A2 farms. It is important that strategic economic
perspectives inform tenure policy and provide an understanding of how leases interact
with the market in creating investment confidence. This interaction influences financing
of farming investment and the lease should be a viable form of collateral and security.

We argue that the principles of custodianship and the sharing of infrastructure are
important, given the transitional challenges of land and tenure reforms in Zimbabwe.
There is also a need to think of how the lease agreements could remove disincentives to
investment in sustainable infrastructure on farms, promote full cost recovery on
infrastructure, and reduce rent seeking behaviors among the newly settled farmers in the
long term. Transparent inventories of existing infrastructure on farms and the financing
of infrastructure development on farms without it should be carefully done to enhance
fairness in farm (lease) rental charges.

Land Sharing, Subletting and Rental Tenure Arrangements

The proposed leases exhibit a degree of tenure rigidity in that they permit subletting and
land sharing only with the permission of the lessor. The possible grounds for refusal of
subletting or ceding such land are not clearly articulated in the documents but left to the
discretion of government officials. Hence the process could be open to abuse by land
officials. To counteract these problems, clarification and transparency on the potential
grounds upon which permission for subletting and ceding will be allowed or denied is
needed. While it is perfectly understandable that the government, during this transitional
phase of tenure reform, needs to prevent re-concentration of land control, it has to be
creative in formulating strategies for promoting market sensitive land subletting and
sharing to allow optimal use of land in Zimbabwe. Moyo (2006) suggests that the
government needs to establish “benign land rental or leasing markets and/or off-loading
land to new aspirants”. In addition, Moyo (2006) calls on Government to broaden its
perspective on land tenure by developing progressive, legally secure land sharing
arrangements and regulated, flexible land exchange systems.

The flexibility in land exchange would help address the problem of underutilisation of
land as well as increase farm productivity. Field and anecdotal evidence reveals the
persistence of land underutilisation and allocation of oversized farms to farmers without
the capacity to effectively utilise them. Hence, flexible land exchanges based on
utilisation capacity could assist the country’s efforts to promote land use optimisation.
However, this proposed system of flexible land exchange in land tenure policy requires
an effective land administration system.

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Land Tenure Administration
Land and tenure reforms are complex political, emotive and legally challenging
processes. Land reform, allocation of land rights and granting of leases in Zimbabwe are
essentially political processes and, therefore, the construction of ‘exclusive’ rights
remains contested terrain. We argue that rights in the A2 leases, while legally
constructed, cannot be separated from the political processes of land reform that gave
birth to them. In order to make the lease an attractive instrument of tenure security, there
is a need to move from the domain of politics to independent judiciary and transparent
land tenure administration systems.

Tenure security is enhanced when the land tenure administration system is perceived to
be fair and transparent, and Government demonstrates a commitment to respecting the
independent decisions of the system. In addition, the capacity of the land administration
system to manage land and farm records effectively, execute evictions, promote land
rentals or subletting in a just and fair manner, and mediate land conflicts is a critical
ingredient in tenure policy administration. The issue of compliance with land policy and
lease agreements raises important questions about regulations on land utilisation,
infrastructure utilisation and access to land.

If Zimbabwe is to gain maximum mileage out of the land and tenure reforms, land policy
needs to pay serious attention to land tenure administration and ensure resources are
committed to its effective operation. Without farmer confidence in the land tenure
administration system, insecurities will persist, to the detriment of productivity and
investment in farms. It is important that the land administration jurisdictions of Rural
District Councils, traditional leaders, government ministries and the National Land Board
be clarified, with due recognition of capacity, technical efficiencies and political
sensitivities. A clear institutional framework for tenure reforms must provide the
structure and direction of tenure reform processes. The ideal situation would be one in
which the National Land Board delegates power to local authorities while it focuses
primarily on providing technical support and strategic direction. Sachikonye (2005:43)
suggests that a Land Commission “be established to simplify decision-making and to
delegate more power to local authorities” and that it concentrate on settler identification
and technical aspects. The general thrust of this is the necessity of striking a balance
between centralisation and decentralisation.

Farm Workers
Sachikonye (2005:37) states that the land and tenure reforms have paid “little attention to
the 200,000 farm worker households that have been displaced by the process”. The
failure to set land allocation quotas for former farm workers has undermined
opportunities for them to gain access to resettlement land.

In some cases, newly settled A2 farmers resist mandatory granting of residency rights to
former farm workers in their farm compounds, preferring only those workers whom they
employ on their farms (Chambati and Moyo, 2005). Consequently, the farm workers do
not have defined and secure rights, or access to residential land. We propose that the

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Government of Zimbabwe develop a policy which addresses the concerns of farm
workers, particularly former LSCF farm workers. The policy needs to create access to
adequate land for residential purposes as well as for subsistence farming.

BUTTRESSING SECURITY OF TENURE

The development and implementation of appropriate tenure policies is critical in
promoting and strengthening security of tenure. Creating an enabling environment that
stimulates confidence and security should be the primary social, political and economic
objective of the land tenure policy. While the context of land reform has been
characterised by political conflict and social and economic contestation, the tenure
reforms should aim for decisiveness in guaranteeing the rights of newly settled farmers
and ensure that the rights are legally protected against social and political whims. It is
imperative that land tenure and legal transfer of land in Zimbabwe, despite initially being
entangled in the politics of land reform, be legally constituted in the rule of law and
crystallise the rights of new farmers as well as strengthening their tenure security.

Below, we examine the implications of the A2 lease as an instrument for creating and
strengthening security of tenure for A2 farmers, noting that it is designed as an
instrument for economic transformation as well as a political tool for social change. By
legal standards, the proposed A2 lease meets the accepted universal characteristics of a
lease, raising questions as to why critics of the land reform have demonised it. It specifies
the rights of both the lessor and lessee, and gives a favorable leasing period of 99 years.
Among many other important protections and rights that it accords in the provision of
security of tenure, it addresses the following areas:
• TRANSFERABILITY Clause 14.3.1 spells out that consent of a lease transfer must be
sought from the Minister. Unfortunately, it does not specify the possible conditions of
transfer or restrictions, including those for changing land use. Without clarifying the
boundaries of transferability, the lease could easily leave individual leaseholders
subject to political whims as well as potentially alienating important investors (e.g.,
financial sector and joint venture capitalists) from recognising the lease as solid
collateral. However, the limitations on the right to transfer reflect legitimate concerns
in the transitional context and are aimed at reducing the likelihood of the land
becoming concentrated in the hands of the few who are able to buy out leases. It also
reduces speculative activities in the land market and hence limits the re-entry of
former settlers (LSCF farmers). While the fears of concentrating land in the hands of
white former farmers and speculators are pertinent, failure to think creatively of ways
to promote a flexible land market, might mean that Zimbabwe experiences poor land
utilisation and reduced agricultural productivity. We argue that it is necessary to
address the competing political and economic objectives of land and tenure reforms.
• EXCLUSIVITY referring to the determination of who to include or exclude from
rights. The A2 lease confers exclusive possession of the title for 99 years in terms
of agricultural land (Clauses 2 and 5) and 25 years for wildlife farms. While the
lease is attractive in this regard, it needs to be understood within the political
context that gave birth to it. Political factors play a key role in influencing A2 leases

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 and seem to shape who defines and guarantees exclusive rights. While the Minister
of Lands is the administrator of the leases, in reality, several interests influence the
administration and application of exclusive rights on the lease. Sociologically, land
reform and allocation of land (A2 farms) and the granting of leases cannot easily be
divorced from the political processes that ultimately construct ‘exclusive rights’.
This problematic area could be addressed by moving tenure administration from the
political domain to independent technical land administration and judiciary systems.
The systems have to safeguard enforcement rights. In other words, there have to be
institutional, legal and administrative provisions and systems to guarantee rights
spelt out in the lease as well as constitutionally.
• INHERITABILITY refers to issues of succession and inheritance of the lease (Clause
15), which is subject to the succession and inheritance laws of Zimbabwe.
Particular attention needs to be paid to lease inheritance, given the disturbing wider
sociocultural dynamics and relationships associated with customary practice in
Zimbabwe. Provisions must be put in place to mitigate gender inequalities, family
abuses and disregard for laws governing inheritance and succession when cultural
interpretations are applied. We are aware of the tensions and social problems
attendant on customary law, especially when narrowly applied or interpreted in
given sociocultural contexts.

STRATEGIC POLICY DEVELOPMENT

This policy brief has deliberately addressed the issue of security of tenure beyond formal
title and identified ways in which security of tenure could be strengthened in a manner
that will promote sustainable land use, agricultural productivity and investment in
Zimbabwe. The land tenure policy should clearly delineate the rights of leaseholders,
particularly the right to exclude others from using and benefiting from the land and
resources on the allocated farms, and also grant the leaseholder enforcement rights (to
enforce exclusionary rights). All these guarantees or rights serve as incentives for
custodianship or ‘ownership’ over the farms or land given by Government. Means of
developing strategic land tenure policy are discussed below, based on the belief that
policy thinking and development must demonstrate political and economic maturity, and
stimulate renewed interest in farming.

Incentive Structure and Tenure Security

In the search for sustainable land use, agricultural productivity and investment, it is
necessary to formulate appropriate incentive structures that translate leaseholding into
secure tenure and confidence among investors that investments made on the farms will
allow benefits or guaranteed returns. People largely invest when they know that there will
be returns on investment or that the lease allows the investing farmer to optimise benefits
from the farm. Consequently, perceived security of tenure influences the level of
investment and strategies for sustainability on A1 and A2 farms. Lack of clarity and the
existence of ambiguities in tenure rights discourage investment. It is important, therefore,
that serious attention be paid to the development of appropriate incentive structures, while

8
removing distortions in the current land allocations and the current de facto incentives for
speculation, corruption and rent seeking behavior among the newly settled farmers.

The 99 year lease for agricultural farming and 25 year lease for wildlife farming should be
given to farmers on condition that they have demonstrated commitment and capacity for
farming within the initial five to ten years of farm occupation. This should serve as an
incentive for farmers to commit resources to farming. Related to farming commitment,
certain developments, production activities, and environmental management and
conservation measures should have been put in place in the initial phase of occupation.

The government should take bold measures beyond mere political rhetoric to eliminate
sporadic land invasions that serve to undermine the security of tenure of newly settled
farmers. It is important that the law takes its course in restoring the sanctity of freehold
and leasehold tenure, and evictions of illegal land occupiers should be swift and in
accordance with the law of the country.

Efficient Land Tenure Administration

While the country is experimenting with land tenure reforms, in the context of very limited
support from the donor community and the models they promote, the government needs to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of line ministries and departments tasked with
land and tenure reforms. Clarification on coordination and oversight of land tenure policy
as well as implementation responsibilities is an important aspect of land tenure
administration. The institutional arrangements and context of land tenure administration
have to be linked to the strategic goals of land reform and ensure that tenure rights are
upheld. Without an efficient land administration system, Zimbabwe will continue to
experience administrative and capacity problems in land allocation, tenure, and transfers. It
is our conviction that an efficient land administration system would play a key role in
tenure system design, communication of issues of tenure security and creation of dialogue
among various landholders. Unfortunately, the slow pace of allocating formal lease
contracts in A2 areas, the persistence of multiple farm ownership, and administrative
problems in the issuance of offer letters can be attributed to the lack of efficient land
administration systems in the country. What Zimbabwe needs is a robust administrative
system to implement and monitor land tenure administration, and re-examine the
provisions of leases to engender fairness, investment and productivity. A question requiring
broader reflection is how Zimbabwe could create favorable political conditions for tenure
reforms and effective land tenure administration (Gomera and Maguranyanga, 2006).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are drawn from the above discussion:
1 Create a conducive legal and institutional environment for land tenure reforms and
policy implementation;
2 Provide stronger incentives for farm investments and sustainable land utilisation;
3 Develop flexible tenure rules or legally secure land sharing arrangements through a
regulated land exchange system (see reference to Moyo, page5);

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4 Create an efficient land tenure administration system and structure that would
oversee the implementation of land tenure policy and allocation of land rights;
5 Ensure transparency and open dialogue in dealing with land tenure issues;
6 Create independent land administration systems and dispute resolution mechanisms
that enjoy the confidence of all stakeholders; and
7 Develop a unified land tenure system that accords equal rights to land to both
communal land dwellers and those in freehold and leasehold areas.

References
Chambati, W. and S. Moyo (2006) ‘Agricultural Labour Markets and Farm Worker
Support in the Post FTLRP Period’, Policy Brief Harare: AIAS.
Chambati, W. and S. Moyo (2004) ‘Impact of Land Reform on Farm Workers and Farm
Labour Processes’, AIAS Mimeo.
Gomera, M. and B. Maguranyanga (2006) ‘Strategic Considerations in Implementing A2
Leases: Enhancing Security of Tenure’, Paper presented at the workshop, Policy
Review Dialogue, Harare, 16 February 2006.
GoZ 1996 Land Acquisition Act (amended 2002) (for land designation and compulsory
land acquisition with compensation)
GoZ 2001 Rural Land Occupiers Act (‘legalised’ occupations prior to March 2001 and
gave legal protection to occupiers)
GoZ 2005 Constitution Amendment Act No. 17 (nationalised the acquired land and
removed opportunities for legal recourse against acquisition of land by Government)
Moyo, S. (2003) ‘The Land Question in Africa: Research Perspectives and Questions’,
Draft Paper presented at CODESRIA Conference on Land Reform, The Agrarian
Question and Nationalism, Gaborone, Botswana (18-19 October 2003) and Dakar,
Senegal (8-11 December 2003).
Moyo, S. (2006) ‘Emerging Land Reform and Tenure Issues’, AIAS Draft Paper.
Sachikonye, L (2005) ‘The Land is the Economy: Revisiting the Land Question’, African
Security Review 14(3): 31-44.

Brian Maguranyanga is a doctoral candidate in Resource Policy and

Behavior at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He holds an MA Sociology ,
BSc (Hons) in Sociology and Diploma in Social Work. His Research interests
include environmental policy, rural development, socioeconomic empowerment in
protected area management, and organisational transformation of conservation
bureaucracies.
Sam Moyo is the Director of AIAS and the Chairperson of ZERO, a regional
environmental NGO based in Harare, Zimbabwe. He is the author of several
books and numerous papers in referred journals on land and agrarian reform
issues.

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