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Activities 1939 1945 Internal War Finance 2nd ed. Edition
Keynes Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Keynes, John Maynard
ISBN(s): 9781139520157, 1139520156
Edition: 2nd ed.
File Details: PDF, 24.46 MB
Year: 2012
Language: english
the collected writings of
J O H N M AY NA R D K E Y N E S
Managing Editors:
Professor Austin Robinson and Professor Donald Moggridge

John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was without doubt one of the most influ-
ential thinkers of the twentieth century. His work revolutionised the theory
and practice of modern economics. It has had a profound impact on the
way economics is taught and written, and on economic policy, around the
world. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, published in full in
electronic and paperback format for the first time, makes available in thirty
volumes all of Keynes’s published books and articles. This includes writings
from his time in the India Office and Treasury, correspondence in which he
developed his ideas in discussion with fellow economists and correspondence
relating to public affairs. Arguments about Keynes’s work have continued
long beyond his lifetime, but his ideas remain central to any understanding of
modern economics, and a point of departure from which each new generation
of economists draws inspiration.

Between the outbreak of war in 1939 and his death in 1946 Keynes was closely
involved in the management of Britain’s war economy and the planning of
the post-war world. This volume, the first of several dealing with this period,
focuses on two aspects of his activities during the war: his efforts as a private
citizen to influence opinion of the tasks ahead prior to July 1940, and his
contributions within the Treasury to Britain’s internal financial management
thereafter. It contains the correspondence and memoranda surrounding How
to Pay for the War, perhaps his most successful essay in persuasion; the 1941
Budget, the first explicitly Keynesian Budget in Britain; the development of
the associated national income estimates; and his later attempts to influence
other areas of financial policy. This is a necessary companion to How to Pay
for the War, which appears in Volume IX of this series.

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THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES

VO LU M E X X I I

ACTIVITIES 1939–1945
I N T E R NA L WA R F I NA N C E

edited by
DONALD MOGGRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

for the
ROYAL ECONOMIC SOCIETY

All rights reserved. No part of this publication

may be reproduced or transmitted, in any
form or by any means, without permission

Published for the Royal Economic Society

throughout the world by
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru, UK

Published in the United States of America by

Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107696648

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

This edition published 2013

Printed and bound in the United Kingdom
by the MPG Books Group

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

isbn 978-1-107-69664-8 Paperback

30-volume set isbn 978-1-107-67772-2

General introduction page vii

Editorial note xiii

Part I. Shaping Opinion

1 THE BEGINNING 3

2 HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR 40

3 OPERATIONS ON OTHER FRONTS - FEBRUARY

TO JUNE I94O 150

Part JI. At the Treasury - Domestic War Finance

4 THE 1 9 4 1 BUDGET r
95
5 THE LATER BUDGETS 355
6 FINANCIAL MARKET POLICY 393
7 MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES 432
List of Documents Reproduced 487
Acknowledgements 492
Index 493

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This new standard edition of The Collected Writings of John
Maynard Keynes forms the memorial to him of the Royal
Economic Society. He devoted a very large share of his busy
life to the Society. In 1911, at the age of twenty-eight, he
became editor of the Economic Journal in succession to Edge-
worth; two years later he was made secretary as well. He held
these offices without intermittence until almost the end of his
life. Edgeworth, it is true, returned to help him with the
editorship from 1919 to 1925; Macgregor took Edgeworth's
place until 1934, when Austin Robinson succeeded him and
continued to assist Keynes down to 1945. But through all these
years Keynes himself carried the major responsibility and
made the principal decisions about the articles that were to
appear in the Economic Journal, without any break save for
one or two issues when he was seriously ill in 1937. It was only
a few months before his death at Easter 1946 that he was
elected president and handed over his editorship to Roy
Harrod and the secretaryship to Austin Robinson.
In his dual capacity of editor and secretary Keynes played
a major part in framing the policies of the Royal Economic
Society. It was very largely due to him that some of the
major publishing activities of the Society—Sraffa's edition
of Ricardo, Stark's edition of the economic writings of
Bentham, and Guillebaud's edition of Marshall, as well as a
number of earlier publications in the 1930s—were initiated.
When Keynes died in 1946 it was natural that the Royal
Economic Society should wish to commemorate him. It was
perhaps equally natural that the Society chose to commem-
orate him by producing an edition of his collected works.
Keynes himself had always taken a joy in fine printing, and
the Society, with the help of Messrs Macmillan as publishers
vii

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
and the Cambridge University Press as printers, has been
anxious to give Keynes's writings a permanent form that is
wholly worthy of him.
The present edition will publish as much as is possible of
his work in the field of economics. It will not include any
private and personal correspondence or publish letters in the
possession of his family. The edition is concerned, that is to
say, with Keynes as an economist.
Keynes's writings fall into five broad categories. First there
are the books which he wrote and published as books. Second
there are collections of articles and pamphlets which he
himself made during his lifetime (Essays in Persuasion and
Essays in Biography). Third, there is a very considerable
volume of published but uncollected writings—articles
written for newspapers, letters to newspapers, articles in
journals that have not been included in his two volumes of
collections, and various pamphlets. Fourth, there are a few
hitherto unpublished writings. Fifth, there is correspondence
with economists and concerned with economics or public
affairs.
This series will attempt to publish a complete record of
Keynes's serious writing as an economist. It is the intention
to publish almost completely the whole of the first four
categories listed above. The only exceptions are a few syndi-
cated articles where Keynes wrote almost the same material
for publication in different newspapers or in different coun-
tries, with minor and unimportant variations. In these cases,
this series will publish one only of the variations, choosing the
most interesting.
The publication of Keynes's economic correspondence
must inevitably be selective. In the day of the typewriter and
the filing cabinet and particularly in the case of so active and
busy a man, to publish every scrap of paper that he may have
dictated about some unimportant or ephemeral matter is
impossible. We are aiming to collect and publish as much as
Vlll

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
possible, however, of the correspondence in which Keynes
developed his own ideas in argument with his fellow econ-
omists, as well as the more significant correspondence at
times when Keynes was in the middle of public affairs.
Apart from his published books, the main sources available
to those preparing this series have been two. First, Keynes in
his will made Richard Kahn his executor and responsible for
his economic papers. They have been placed in the Marshall
Library of the University of Cambridge and have been avail-
able for this edition. Until 1914 Keynes did not have a
secretary and his earliest papers are in the main limited to
drafts of important letters that he made in his own handwrit-
ing and retained. At that stage most of the correspondence
that we possess is represented by what he received rather than
by what he wrote. During the war years of 1914-18 Keynes
was serving in the Treasury. With the opening in 1968 of the
records under the thirty-year rule, many of the papers that
he wrote then and later have become available. From 1919
onwards, throughout the rest of his life, Keynes had the help
of a secretary—for many years Mrs Stevens. Thus for the last
twenty-five years of his working life we have in most cases
the carbon copies of his own letters as well as the originals of
the letters that he received.
There were, of course, occasions during this period on
which Keynes wrote himself in his own handwriting. In some
of these cases, with the help of his correspondents, we have
been able to collect the whole of both sides of some important
interchange and we have been anxious, in justice to both
correspondents, to see that both sides of the correspondence
are published in full.
The second main source of information has been a group
of scrapbooks kept over a very long period of years by
Keynes's mother, Florence Keynes, wife of Neville Keynes.
From 1919 onwards these scrapbooks contain almost the
whole of Maynard Keynes's more ephemeral writing, his
IX

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
letters to newspapers and a great deal of material which
enables one to see not only what he wrote but the reaction
of others to his writing. Without these very carefully kept
scrapbooks the task of any editor or biographer of Keynes
would have been immensely more difficult.
The plan of the edition, as at present intended, is this. It
will total twenty-nine volumes. Of these the first eight are
Keynes's published books from Indian Currency and Finance,
in 1913, to the General Theory in 1936, with the addition of his
Treatise on Probability. There next follow, as vols. ix and x,
Essays in Persuasion and Essays in Biography, representing
Keynes's own collections of articles. Essays in Persuasion differs
from the original printing in two respects: it contains the full
texts of the articles or pamphlets included in it and not (as
in the original printing) abbreviated versions of these articles,
and it also contains one or two later articles which are of
exactly the same character as those included by Keynes in his
original collection. In Essays in Biography there have been
added a number of biographical studies that Keynes wrote
both before and after 1933.
There will follow two volumes, xi-xn, of economic articles
and correspondence and a further two volumes, already
published, xm-xiv, covering the development of his thinking
as he moved towards the General Theory. There are included
in these volumes such part of Keynes's economic correspon-
dence as is closely associated with the articles that are printed
in them.
The next thirteen volumes, as we estimate at present, deal
with Keynes's Activities during the years from the beginning
of his public life in 1905 until his death. In each of the
periods into which we divide this material, the volume con-
cerned publishes his more ephemeral writings, all of it
hitherto uncollected, his correspondence relating to these
activities, and such other material and correspondence as is
necessary to the understanding of Keynes's activities. These

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
volumes are edited by Elizabeth Johnson and Donald Mog-
gridge, and it is their task to trace and interpret Keynes's
activities sufficiently to make the material fully intelligible to
a later generation. There will be a further volume printing
his social, political and literary writings and a final volume of
bibliography and index.
Those responsible for this edition have been: Lord Kahn,
both as Lord Keynes's executor and as a long and intimate
friend of Lord Keynes, able to help in the interpreting of
much that would be otherwise misunderstood; Sir Roy
Harrod as the author of his biography; Austin Robinson as
Keynes's co-editor on the Economic Journal and successor as
Secretary of the Royal Economic Society, who has acted
throughout as Managing Editor.
Elizabeth Johnson has been responsible for the Activities
volumes xv-xvm covering Keynes's early life, the Versailles
Conference and his early post-1918 concern with reparations
and international finance. Donald Moggridge has been res-
ponsible for the two volumes covering the origins of the
General Theory and for all the Activities volumes from 1924 to
the end of his life in 1946.
The work of Elizabeth Johnson and Donald Moggridge has
been assisted at different times by Jane Thistlethwaite, Mrs
McDonald, who was originally responsible for the systematic
ordering of the files of the Keynes papers and Judith Master-
man, who for many years worked with Mrs Johnson on the
papers. More recently Susan Wilsher, Margaret Butler and
Leonora Woollam have continued the secretarial work. Bar-
bara Lowe has been responsible for the indexing. Susan
Howson undertook much of the important final editorial
work on these volumes.

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EDITORIAL NOTE
In this volume, the first of three concerning Keynes's involve-
ment in the problems of financing Britain's war effort after
1939, the concentration is on internal financial policies. Later
volumes will deal with the external aspects of Britain's war
finance including lend lease. A further three volumes will
be devoted to Keynes's efforts to shape the post-war world.
For Keynes's efforts to shape opinion through contribu-
tions to the Press, the main source is the series of scrapbooks
which, as explained in the General Introduction, his mother
carefully maintained (with Keynes's assistance) throughout
his working life. For correspondence and memoranda, we are
dependent on his surviving papers, materials available in
the Public Record Office and the papers of colleagues and
friends, in particular Professor J. R. N. Stone, to whom
Keynes passed his working files concerning the national
income exercise that accompanied the 1941 Budget. Where
the material used has come from the Public Record Office,
the call numbers for the relevant files appear in the List of
Documents Reproduced following page 487.
In this and the succeeding wartime volumes, to aid the
reader in keeping track of the various personalities who pass
through the pages that follow, we have included brief
biographical notes on the first occasion on which they appear.
These notes are designed to be cumulative over the whole run
of wartime volumes.
In this, as in all the similar volumes, in general all of
Keynes's own writings are printed in larger type. All intro-
ductory matter and all writings by others than Keynes are
printed in smaller type. The only exception to this general
rule is that occasional short quotations from a letter from
Keynes to his parents or to a friend, used in introductory

passages to clarify a situation, are treated as introductory

matter and are printed in the smaller type.
Most of Keynes's letters included in this and other volumes
are reprinted from the carbon copies that remain among his
papers. In most cases he has added his initials to the carbon
in the familiar fashion in which he signed to all his friends.
We have no certain means of knowing whether the top copy,
sent to the recipient of the letter, carried a more formal
signature.

xiv

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Chapter i
THE BEGINNING
On 15 August 1939 Keynes left England for a fortnight's holiday at Royat.
He expected an international crisis in the next month, but as he told
Richard Kahn1 on 14 August:
I shall be most surprised if it ends in war. It seems to me that Hitler's
argument is unanswerable that he must get Danzig, because it matters
so little to him or to anyone else. They willfixup some formula by which
Danzig becomes part of the Reich, with no substantial change in the actual
situation, e.g. by making it a demilitarised zone. So do not break your
holiday, whatever you read in the papers until the last extremity.
He expressed similar views on 25 August.
The outbreak of war on 3 September saw him back in England. At the
time he expected that he would 'come up here [to King's] to run a good
part of the bursary of the College, the Economic Journal, and teaching in
the Economics Faculty, which... [would] in due course release more active
people' (Letter to R. F. Harrod, 7 September 1939). He told Lord Stamp
on 15 September that' Committee work, which would involve quiet drafting
in my own room and occasional visits to London, would be the sort of thing
I might befitfor'.
However, by that time he had already turned his mind to the economic
problems of the war. On 14 September, talks in London had led him to
his first contribution, which he sent to Lord Stamp,2 H. D. Henderson,3
R. F. Kahn and the Treasury a day later.
1
Richard Ferdinand Kahn (b. 1905), Life Peer 1965; Fellow of King's College,
Cambridge; temporary civil servant in various government departments, 1939-46;
Professor of Economics, University of Cambridge, 1951-72.
2
Josiah Stamp (1880-1941), K.B.E. 1920, 1st Baron 1938; Inland Revenue Depart-
ment, 1896—1919; Chairman, L.M.S. Railway, 1926-41; Director, Bank of England,
1928-41; member. Economic Advisory Council, 1930-9; Chairman, Committee on
Economic Information, 1931-g; Chairman, Survey of Financial and Economic
Plans (attached to Cabinet Office), 1939-41.
3
Hubert Douglas Henderson (1890-1952), Kt. 1942; Editor, The Nation and
Athenaeum, 1923-30; Joint Secretary, Economic Advisory Council, 1930-4; Econ-
omic Adviser, Treasury, 1939-44; member, Survey of Financial and Economic
Plans, 1939-41; Drummond Professor of Political Economy, Oxford, 1945-52;
Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1934-52.

PRICE POLICY
A large number, but not all, of the raw material controls
have, as a temporary measure, fixed prices substantially at the
pre-war figure. For a preliminary period of, say, a month this
may do no harm. But before the separate controls can develop
a more permanent price policy, it is evident that general
decisions must be taken governing price policy as a whole. It
is out of the question for the different controls to be settling
the matter in isolation and without reference to a general
principle of policy.
To establish a general principle of price policy, applicable
at any rate for the rest of this year, is therefore one of the
most urgent and important matters for the Home Cabinet.
The following notes are intended to indicate some of the
relevant points. The suggestions thrown out are mere pos-
sibilities, and it does not follow that the writer himself is in
favour of all of them.
i. The sterling exchange has fallen nearly 15 per cent in
relation to the dollar; to which has to be added the increased
costs of freight and war risk. Thus if the international prices
of raw commodities were unchanged, the delivered cost in
sterling would probably rise by not less than 20 per cent on
the average.
In fact international prices have risen sharply. Some of
these rises seem to be beyond all reason and must be due to
a wave of speculation or a hasty stocking up by manufacturers.
Thus some reaction is to be expected; indeed it has already
begun in the case of some commodities compared with the
highest point reached last week. On the other hand, many
pre-war prices were unduly low both in relation to the level
of activity already reached and to the cost of production. For
example, it would require a rise of nearly 15 per cent to bring
the Board of Trade wholesale index for July 1939 up to the
level of July 1937; and the same was true of the United States

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THE BEGINNING
index. Thus a fairly substantial rise of a more permanent
character is to be expected. At any rate for some months;—
a more considerable reaction is possible after there has been
time for new productive capacity to be set in motion.
At the present time (Sept. 13) Moody's daily index of staple
commodity prices in the U.S.A. is 22 per cent above what it
was a month ago. It follows that the average sterling costs in
the United Kingdom of goods imported from U.S.A. is now
about 46 per cent higher than a month ago.
Thus it is fanciful to suppose that the prices of imported
goods can be maintained much longer in the neighbourhood
of pre-war levels. To do so would throw most private im-
porters out of business. The Government would have to take
over the importation of almost everything and then sell the
stuff at a stupendous loss to the Treasury.
Of course it does not follow that the delivered U.K. prices
of commodities produced within the Empire have risen, or
need rise, nearly so much. (See § 7 below.)
2. Apart from the increased cost of imported goods, it is
actually desirable that the British price of such goods should
rise relatively to the price of home-produced goods. We want
to divert consumption away from imported goods. If they
remain as cheap as before, it would require an extremely
complicated and complete system of rationing to effect this
object.
3. The previous paragraph aims at influencing the direc-
tion of domestic consumption. But what about the domestic
producer? We want him, in the case of essential commodities,
to increase his output considerably in conditions of some diffi-
culty where his costs are likely to rise quite apart from the
cost of imported material. Will he do this if he is limited to
a pre-war selling price which will very probably involve him
in a loss?
The most obvious example is that of agriculture. In the case
of livestock there is probably a high elasticity of supply in

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SHAPING OPINION
response to a wholesale price rise of say 15-20 per cent. But
pre-war prices were already unsatisfactory to the farmer, and
the recent announcement fixing the prices of sheep and pigs
at the pre-war level is already having a disastrous effect on
his policy. One might have hoped that he would now set out
to increase his breeding stock. But at a sale of young breeding
sows held in my neighbourhood yesterday the prices were
disastrous and below the pre-war level. The farmers were
simply not buying. They say, with reason, that the price fixed
for bacon is one at which they cannot afford to produce. Yet
we are told that bacon is one of the very few foodstuffs which
may have to be rationed very shortly owing to shortage. It
is a sad waste of time to discourage farmers from breeding.
I believe that the market for store cattle is also weak.
4. The aspect of higher prices as an instrument of revenue
is not to be overlooked. Direct taxation can scarcely do all that
is wanted. A tax on consumption will be required in some
shape or form. The policy of a somewhat higher price level
combined with provisions for diverting to the Treasury
directly or indirectly a large proportion of any resulting
profits deserves to be considered.
In those cases where the Government itself undertakes
importation, it would be better to make a substantial profit
on selling than to make a substantial loss. Let me take what
is very likely a bad example. It may be that the state of stocks
of petrol absolutely requires the stringent rationing recently
announced. If so, the Treasury will have to face a heavy loss
of revenue from motor and petrol taxes. If not, the necessity
to economise petrol should be harmonised as far as possible
with the interests of the Treasury. For example, the existing
small ration might be supplied at 15 6d and moderate, but
more substantial amounts obtainable at, say, 25 6d. This might
be more efficient administratively and more productive to the
Treasury than the endless wangling now in prospect to get
additional rations at is6don more or less plausible pretexts,

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THE BEGINNING
the real validity of which there will be no time to examine.
It might be sounder in every way to make motoring expensive
than to make it the subject of wangling;—it might even save
more petrol. I mention this because of its particular interest
to the Treasury (with the present ration the cost per mile
including car-tax and insurance is prohibitive). But it is easy
to think of less controversial examples.
5. If a higher price level is inevitable, it will be better to
bring it about by a deliberate act of policy at an early date
than to allow prices to drift gradually upwards as a result of
the necessities of individual control bodies.
6. The above relates to wholesale prices. The primary
object of price control is presumably to prevent retail prices
from rising to a level which will make a movement for higher
wages irresistible. Thus we have to think how best to adjust
the necessities of the situation to this primary object.
There is no reason why retail prices should rise nearly as
much as wholesale prices. We must be prepared to simplify
enormously the machinery of distribution, with a consequent
reduction of costs. There should be a drastic curtailment in
variety and in consumer's choice and all the frills of distribu-
tion, advertising, expensive systems of delivery and so forth,
should be dispensed with. There is no reason why the costs
of distribution, instead of going up should not be substantially
reduced. (We may even learn a good deal which may be useful
when peace returns.)
Some such price scheme as the following might be prac-
ticable. Let the wholesale price level rise on the average
by about 25 per cent, imports prices rising as a rule by more
than this, home produce by less. With a proper system of
distribution this should be compatible with a rise in the cost
of living (which includes rents) of 10 per cent at the outside
and it might well be less. Even a rise of 10 per cent would
make the cost of living only 7 per cent above the level of the
autumn of 1937 when wages (Oct. 1937) were 3K2 per cent

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SHAPING OPINION
below what they are now; so that the reduction in the hourly
real wage below what it was in 1937 would be only 3 ^ percent.
It is absurd to suppose that a war can be waged without any
reduction in anyone's standard of life. Yet allowing for an
increase in employment and in the length of the working
week, the rise suggested above might involve virtually no
reduction below the 1937 level. If the working week is in-
creased by 31/2 per cent with hourly wage rates unchanged, i.e.
if men work on the average a quarter of an hour more a day,
their real weekly wages would remain at the 1937 level.
All these figures are, of course, not much more than for
purposes of illustration. But they show that a rise in the
wholesale price-level of the order of 25 per cent could be
allowed without creating any reasonable claim for a rise in
the hourly rate of wages.
7. The task of keeping the price-rise of imported goods
within narrow limits is closely bound up with arrangements
with the Dominion and Colonial Administrations for the
limitation of prices and the maximum degree of self-sufficiency
within the Empire.
There are many substantial groups of imported goods
where the supply available within the Empire would be wholly
or almost sufficient for our needs. It might be advisable
for the Government to enter into arrangements with the
Dominion Administrators to purchase all we require of their
surplus output at a fixed price in sterling for the period of
a year.
It would not be advisable, any more than in the case of home
producers, that this fixed price should be the pre-war price.
As a general average I suggest that home and Empire pro-
ducers of staple raw commodities should alike receive a
price about 20 per cent above the pre-war level; which,
allowing for freights and war-risk, would mean a greater
c.i.f. cost for Empire than for home goods.
A plan on these lines would be immensely helpful in solving
8

the exchange problem. It would also facilitate orderly trans-

port arrangements.
The following are some prominent examples of commodi-
ties which could be covered by this scheme:
Wheat, meat, butter, cheese, sugar, tea, oilseeds, copra,
wool, jute, rubber, copper, lead, zinc, tin, nickel.
8. To sum up: the task of preventing any price rise is
impracticable. To attempt it will lead to chaos, delay and
waste. A 20 per cent rise in wholesale prices is the least-we can
expect. A prudent policy will aim at a deliberately considered
price-level within the limits which are practicable.
14 September iggg J. M. KEYNES

His price policy memorandum led him into discussions with Sir Richard
Hopkins and Sir Frederick Phillips4 and a request from Phillips for his ideas
on exchange control, which he sent to Phillips and H. D. Henderson on
24 and 25 September respectively.5

NOTES ON EXCHANGE CONTROL

1. In the last war there was no exchange control as such, apart

from import licences, restrictions on foreign investment etc.
The procedure adopted was analogous to that of the Ex-
change Equalisation Fund just before the war. That is to say,
there were free dealings over the exchange at a rate which
was 'pegged' by the Treasury, unlimited dollars being sup-
plied at this rate. The only difference was that the pegging
was done in New York and not in London, the dollars being
4
Sir Richard Hopkins (1880-1955); member, Board of Inland Revenue, 1916;
Chairman, Board of Inland Revenue, 1922; Controller of Finance and Supply
Services, Treasury, 1927-32, Second Secretary, 1932-42, Permanent Secretary,
'942-5-
Sir Frederick Phillips (1884-1943); entered Treasury 1908, Under-Secretary,
1932; represented Treasury in U.S.A., 1940-3.
5
He followed this up on 27 September with a letter to Phillips suggesting that
payments for interest and sinking fund due in terms of sterling might prove a
useful source of black sterling. This idea had resulted from a note by P. Einzig
in The Financial News. Paul Einzig (1897-1973); financial and political journalist
and prolific author; Political Correspondent for The Financial News, 1937-45.

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SHAPING OPINION
supplied by Morgans as our agents. E. C. Grenfell would
come round to the Treasury each morning with a pink cable
in his hand, showing what had been paid out on the previous
day.
Complete control was so much against the spirit of the age
that I doubt if it ever occurred to any of us that it was
possible. But the absence of it made my task of preparing a
monthly budget of the dollar position very precarious. I used
to obtain each month an estimate from the various depart-
ments and from the allies both of their total outstanding
dollar commitments and of the amounts which they expected
to mature in each month. To this, if I remember rightly, I
added my own estimate of the probable requirements of the
'free exchange'. On the other side, our dollar assets, actual
and prospective, were set out in the shape of gold and securi-
ties and the proceeds of loans. But the requirements of the
'free exchange' would come irregularly in great rushes, just
like the demands on the Equalisation Fund, largely depend-
ing on the nature of the war and political news. I remember
in particular a terrific run at the end of 1916, when the daily
requirements (if my memory is correct) ran for a short time
in excess of $5 million, which in those days we considered
simply terrific. Chalmers and Bradbury never fully confessed
to Ministers the extent of our extremity when it was actually
upon us, though of course they had warned them, fully but
unavailingly, months beforehand of what was coming. This
was because they feared that, if they emphasised the real
position, the policy of the peg might be abandoned, which,
they thought, would be disastrous. They had been brought
up in the doctrine that in a run one must pay out one's gold
reserve to the last bean. I thought then, and I still think, that
in the circumstances they were right. To have abandoned the
peg would have destroyed our credit and brought chaos to
business; and would have done no real good. I recall an
historic occasion a day or two after the formation of the
10

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THE BEGINNING
second coalition Government at the end of 1916. The position
was very bad. We in the Treasury were all convinced that the
only hope was to pay out and trust that the drain would
suddenly dry up as it had on previous occasions. But we had
no confidence in the understanding of Ministers. Chalmers
went over to Carson's room (my memory tells me that it was
in the War Office; but was it?) to report to the newly formed
War Cabinet. 'Well, Chalmers, what is the news?' said the
goat.' Splendid,' Chalmers replied in his high quaveringvoice,
'two days ago we had to pay out $20 million; the next day
it was $10 million; and yesterday only $5 million.' He did not
add that a continuance at this rate for a week would clean
us out completely, and that we considered an average of $2
million very heavy. I waited nervously in his room, until the
old fox came back triumphant. In fact the drain did dry up
almost immediately and we dragged along with a week or
two's cash in hand until March 1917 when U.S.A. came in and
that problem was over. So far as I know, the Germans were
totally unaware of our financial difficulties. But the American
Government, of course, knew them. It has been an important
part of the case of the recent Nye Committee for denying
credits to belligerents that Mr Page cabled to his government
as follows on 5 March 1917: 'I think that the pressure of this
approaching crisis has gone beyond the ability of the Morgan
financial agency for the British and French Governments.
Perhaps our going to war is the only way in which our
present prominent trade position can be maintained and
panic averted.'
On the other hand, my monthly estimates were saved by
the fact that, as a result of delays in deliveries, the depart-
ments and the Allies never succeeded anywhere near in
spending up to their forecasts. At the end of the war quite
a significant part of the orders placed by LI. G. and Russia in
the summer of 1915, were still undelivered; and there were
still hundreds of millions of dollars of these old orders out-
11

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SHAPING OPINION
standing when we were cleaned out in March 1917 and the
American Treasury had to foot the bill 6
2. These reminiscences are not meant to be wholly irrele-
vant. It is true that in one important respect our problem then
was different. Foreign balances in London were insignificant
and were greatly outweighed by what foreigners owed us on
acceptance credits. The financial crisis of 1914 was due, not
to our being unable to pay what we owed abroad, but to
foreigners being unable to pay us. It was not sterling which
crashed in that month, but the dollar (which went temporarily
over 6 to the £). But by 1916 the difference between the
position then and the position now was not so fundamental.
It is, therefore, well to remember that we did get through
after a fashion without blocking the exchanges; and this policy
was not without considerable advantages of simplicity and
efficiency.
Our international position is so totally different from Ger-
many's that their technique does not offer a good model for
us. I have not reached a decided opinion on the point. But
there is much to be said against blocking up all the loopholes
and crevices. Not all the money which slips through is 'lost'.
There is a good deal of business which does us no harm and
is better allowed which, nevertheless, one cannot make into
a precedent by giving it official approval. There is a case for
controls which those in charge know to be imperfect and
incomplete and deliberately leave so; especially in England.
It is far more trouble than it is worth to be too logical about
controls. (I remember how the day after I had established
the principle that the Russian credits should be for munitions
only, M. Routkowsky came round for my initials to a Bond
Street bill for a Grand Duchess's underclothing; and there was
the case of the beeswax for the Little Fathers.)
I am therefore, doubtful if it is practicable or advisable to
close down too completely the black exchange. It has its uses
6
I have depended wholly on my memory unrefreshed by documents in writing
the above, and it is probably inaccurate in detail.

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THE BEGINNING
within limits. One could see to it that it did not cost too much
net. I can even imagine occasions when it might be worth the
while of the Treasury to give it covert support. It is probably
on a relatively small scale and is a useful safety valve. It is not
advisable to render literally impossible all those transactions
which the Treasury cannot afford formally and publicly to
approve.
I suggest therefore, that the main transactions should be
canalised and that the rest should be left to themselves. My
main criticism of the measures put into force too quickly by
the Board of Trade etc. is that they seem to flow from the
belief that there is no middle course between complete laissez-
faire and complete totalitarianism. I feel that it would be more
in accordance with the traditions of the Treasury to be
cautious and cagey with its control-system, and to cultivate
turning a blind eye with the other one wide open. It looks,
indeed, as if wisdom of this kind has been already at work.
I return to the details later.
3. If we were to attempt complete exchange control on the
German model, the position of the Dominions would offer
to us an additional complication. It would be very undesirable
to treat their bank accounts as blocked foreign balances.
Canada is establishing an exchange control, and other
Dominion Governments are likely to follow suit. But the
details of management are not likely to be the same in each
case.
4. For complete exchange control, it would be necessary
that each individual foreign account should be blocked and
only made available for specific approved purposes. This
would not increase our popularity with neutrals and would
involve an enormous amount of red-tape over London's
international relations. It is undesirable if it can be avoided.
5. It is arguable, therefore, that a moderate development
on the lines of what we are doing already would be best. The
following is an outline of what might be necessary:
(1) The most important step forward is to require that

British exporters should hand over the foreign currency they

earn.7 Apart from deliberate evasions, the machinery for this
should not be difficult. This is obvious and does not need
emphasising.
(2) It is also desirable for the Treasury to acquire the cash
equivalent of as much as possible of our invisible exports.
These fall mainly under the following heads:-
(i) dividends and interest;
(ii) unearned income from foreign trusts, real estate etc.
(American heiresses);
(iii) net shipping earnings;
(iv) insurance earnings;
(v) royalties, copyright, films etc.;
(vi) tourists;
(vii) income of resident aliens, and expenses of foreign
businesses domiciled here which are received from abroad.
Some people believe that there is already a regulation
relating to (i) but not relating to (ii). I am not aware of any
present regulations affecting the other items, (iii) and (iv)
present no difficulties because only a limited number of large
well-known concerns are involved, (i), (ii) and (v) could be
dealt with by requiring all foreign income to be turned over
for official exchange into sterling. Some existing contracts
under (v) are expressed in sterling. Perhaps it is enough to
say that all further contracts should be expressed in foreign
currency, (vi) and (vii) might be left unregulated, sterling for
such purposes being purchased over the free exchange if so
desired.
6. This would mean that the free exchange would be
mainly concerned with capital transactions in sterling between
foreigners, supplemented by leakages and permitted receipts
under (vi) and (vii) above; though it would also cover all sorts
of oddments which one cannot think of beforehand.
It will save a world of red-tape and trouble to allow such
7
Contracts can still be made in terms of sterling, provided actual payment is
made in foreign currency.

Also, from 20 September, Keynes, in the course of his few days a week
in London, began to act as host to the 'Old Dogs'—First World War
officials not (with the exception of H. D. Henderson at the Treasury) as yet
involved officially in the war effort—H. D. Henderson, Sir Arthur Salter,
Sir William Beveridge and Sir Walter Layton.8 Inevitably, they discussed
8
Sir Arthur Salter (1881-1975), K.C.B. 1922, 1st Baron of Kidlington, 1953; Inde-
pendent M.P. for Oxford University, 1937-50; Conservative M.P. for Ormskirk,
1951-3; entered Admiralty, Transport Department, 1904; Director of Ship

l
5

their attempts to influence the management of the war—air raid precau-

tions (A.R.P. to contemporaries), dispersion, blockade policy, war aims.
From the discussions of this group—and, inevitably, discussions with
others—came several memoranda. First, there was one memorandum on
blockade policy, which he sent to Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.9 This led to a
meeting with Leith-Ross on 26 October, but the suggestions did not affect
official policy.10

THE FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE BLOCKADE

The proposal for a limitation of the blockade, so as to free
certain classes of food, would fit in well with a certain broad
conclusion as to the best technique for our economic warfare.
It will be most useful, perhaps, that I should elaborate this
conclusion in general and not merely with reference to the
above conclusion.
Requisitioning, 1917; Secretary of Allied Marine Transport Council, 1918;
member. Supreme Economic Council, igig; General Secretary, Reparations
Commission, 1920-2; Director, Economic and Financial Section of League of
Nations, 1922-31; Chairman, Railway Staff National Tribunal, 1936-9; Parliamen-
tary Secretary to Ministry of Shipping. 1939-41; Joint Parliamentary Secretary
to Ministry of War Transport, ig4i; Head of British Merchant Shipping Mission,
Washington, 1941—3; Senior Deputy Director-General, UNRRA, 1944; Gladstone
Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, Oxford, 1934-44.
Sir William Beveridge (1879-1963), 1st Baron 1946; Liberal M.P. for Berwick,
1944-5; 1st Chairman of Employment Exchanges Committee, 1905-8; Board of
Trade, 1908-16; Director of Labour Exchanges, 1909-16; Assistant General
Secretary, Ministry of Munitions, 1915-16, Ministry of Food, 1916—19; Director,
London School of Economics, 1919-37; Vice-Chancellor, London University,
1926-8; Master of University College, Oxford, 1937-45; member, Royal Commis-
sion on Coal Industry, 1925; Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Statutory
Committee, 1934-44, Imperial Defence Committee on Food Rationing, 1937,
Committee on Skilled Men in Services, 1941-2; member, Fuel Rationing Enquiry,
1942.
Sir Walter Layton (1884-1966); Lecturer in Economics, Cambridge, 1912-19;
Member of the Munitions Council responsible for Requirements and Statistics,
Ministry of Munitions, 1916-18; Editor, The Economist, 1922-8; Director-General
of Programmes, Ministry of Supply, 1940-2, Chairman of Executive Committee,
Ministry of Supply, 1941-1; Chief Adviser, Programmes and Planning,
Ministry of Production, 1942-3; Head of Joint War Production Staff, 1942-3.
9
Sir Frederick Leith-Ross (1887-1968); entered Treasury, 1909; Deputy Controller
of Finance, 1925-32; British representative on Finance Board of Reparation
42;Commission, 1920-25; Chief Economic Adviser to Government, 1932-46;
Director-General, Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1939-42; Chairman, Inter-
Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, 1941—3; Deputy Director-General,
UNRRA, 1944-5; Chairman, European Committee of Council, UNRRA, 1945-6.
10
W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, vol. 1 (London, 1952), 39, 250 ff.

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THE BEGINNING
In the last war, both sides made the mistake of concentrat-
ing too much on specific goods and too little on money, which
is generalised purchasing power and available for any goods.
Germany started her unrestricted U-boat campaign within a
few weeks of the date of the exhaustion of our finances in
U.S.A. and without any reference to that vital fact (and,
probably, without any knowledge of it). Our blockade was
carried on to the grave impairment of our own financial
resources and was apparently based on the assumption that
the purchasing power of the enemy in the countries of the
neighbouring neutrals was inexhaustible.
I lay down the following proposition as being, at the least,
highly probable. Germany will succeed in spending all the
foreign purchasing power she can acquire, and will not end
the war with substantial foreign cash in hand. If this proposi-
tion is accepted, three important conclusions follow from it.
I. It should be our principal object to guide as much as
possible of Germany's purchasing power towards goods
which are not of absolutely the first order of necessity for
winning the war. This is what in the last war I used to call
'the temptation policy', though I was never successful in
persuading the Blockade Ministry of its importance.
If Germany's controls were to work with perfect coordina-
tion, efficacy and wisdom and with complete freedom from
departmental jealousy, they would be able to resist the
temptation policy. In fact we can hope that departmental zeal
in the provision of particular commodities will often cause
them to succumb to temptation, just as it would here. Every
mark which we can induce Germany to spend on what is not
absolutely essential is so much stolen from what is required
for the most efficient prosecution of a long war.
We should, therefore, take the utmost pains to distinguish
between what is essential to the German machine and what
is merely useful, and concentrate all our blockade efforts on
the former.
Let us now apply this principle to the important case of
l
7

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SHAPING OPINION
food. Can Germany affordto buy any material quantity of food
in excess of the amount with which in any case we have no
power to interfere? Are we not, perhaps, wasting our effort
and our money if, on this occasion, we attempt a complete
blockade of food?
Is there not some reason to think that the scale of rationing
already enforced in Berlin is stricter than is required by the
blockade we have enforced or are likely to be able to enforce,
and that the German authorities are deliberately economising
on food purchases in order to keep their resources for still
more essential purposes? Are we blockading (e.g.) sugar? Yet
I have read that Germany is actually trying to export sugar
to Holland in exchange for zinc.
If so, we are allowing them to put on our blockade the
odium of restrictions which they would think it prudent to
enforce in any case.
Moreover, if we were to remove from the contraband list
selected foodstuffs, our relations with neutrals would be made
much easier and we could effectively concentrate larger re-
sources on hindering really essential imports.
II. It is almost as useful to force Germany to pay a high
price for her imports as to prevent her from getting them.
Thus it is desirable to force up the prices of what she wants
in the neighbouring neutrals, even when we allow her to make
the final successful bid. In the last war we signally failed to
use this tactic and insisted on never being the under-bidder
even when we had forced up the price to an uneconomic
figure.
It is a tactic which needs much skill and finesse. But if one
is taking a long view, nothing is cleverer than to allow her to
buy very dear.
The great danger in a Ministry of Economic Warfare is
excessive zeal on the part of officials who are dealing ex-
clusively with particular commodities. It is safe to assume that
Germany will manage to use her purchasing power somehow,
18

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THE BEGINNING
that one cannot prevent this, and that one's prime object,
therefore, is to make her use it inefficiently and to the least
possible advantage.
III. It is just as important to interfere with Germany's
export trade as with her imports. Perhaps more important.
Since she will know how best to use her foreign purchasing
power, it is more important to curtail her purchasing power
than to impede her in the exercise of it in particular
directions.
Thus, corresponding to the policy of forcing her to buy her
imports dear, there should be a policy of forcing her to sell
her exports cheap by methods of cut-throat competition.
This requires exact knowledge of what she is exporting and
at what prices and a careful organisation of our own
exporters. We should flood the neighbouring neutrals with
cheap exports of the same general character as the German
exports. A convenient way of helping our own exporters in
this direction might be to buy from them the foreign currency
proceeds of their sales at a very favourable rate of exchange.
The fact that we shall need such currency to pay for our own
official purchases offers a sufficient excuse for this.
Money will be better spent in flooding the neighbouring
neutrals with our own exports at bargain prices than in buying
from them at very high prices commodities which the
Germans are quite likely better off without. For example, if
it turns out that Germany can spare any material quantity of
coal for export, we should not seek to prevent her, which is
probably impossible, but should ourselves offer coal to Scan-
dinavia on terms which would reduce the Scandinavian price
for that commodity to a very unremunerative level. On the
same principle we should be more concerned to raise the price
of Swedish ore than to attempt the impracticable task of
entirely preventing its shipment. If we can double the price
of Swedish ore in terms of German coal, we shall be at the
same time very popular in Scandinavia and highly efficient

The second memorandum, also on food blockade, arose from conversations

with Sir William Beveridge, to whom Keynes sent the memorandum on
15 October. He also sent it to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Economic Warfare.11

WHEAT AS CONTRABAND

It is suggested that the following arguments for choosing a

suitable moment to remove wheat from the list of contraband
deserve consideration:-
1. It would be a genuine step, similar to the decision to
refrain from bombing the civilian population except in re-
prisal as a last resort, to do a little towards the humanising of
war; and is, therefore, desirable for its own sake unless there
are clearly sufficient arguments to the contrary.
2. For this reason, its effect on neutral opinion would be
favourable, and a regular item of German propaganda would
be deprived of its sting.
3. In so far as starvation and short rations continue to
11
Keynes also tried it on Churchill in conversation but met with great
discouragement.
Winston Spencer Churchill (1874—1965); Conservative M.P. for Oldham 1900-4;
Liberal M.P. for Oldham, 1904-6, for N.W. Manchester, 1906-8, for Dundee,
1908-22; Conservative M.P. for Epping, 1924-45, for Woodford, 1945-64; Parlia-
mentary Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, 1906-8; President, Board of
Trade, 1908-10; Home Secretary, 1910-11; First Lord of Admiralty, 1911-15;
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 1915; Minister of Munitions, 1917-19; Secretary
of State for War, 1919-21, for Air, 1919-21, for the Colonies, 1921-2; Chancellor
of the Exchequer, 1924-9; First Lord of Admiralty, 1939-40; Prime Minister,
1940-5, 1951-5.

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THE BEGINNING
prevail in Germany, the odium of this state of affairs in the
eyes of the German population would be removed, in part
at least, from ourselves to where it properly belongs, namely
the German Government. The decision to starve the part of
the civilian population which has no military value would be
seen clearly as their decision and not ours.
4. For the odium which we are at present bringing on
ourselves in the eyes of the German public and before some
sections of neutral opinion may be serving a very negligible
military purpose. It is unlikely that German supplies of food,
actual and potential, are so short as to justify so low a civilian
ration as that which is already enforced. It is probable that
a better supply of food is already available, but that the
German authorities prefer to use their limited resources for
more essential military purposes. If this is true, we are
allowing them to throw on us an odium which belongs else-
where. It is for us to expose this situation; which we can do
by removing wheat, and wheat only, from the contraband list.
For no one need starve if abundant wheat is available.
5. It is a fallacy to conduct our blockade policy as though
the enemy's purchasing power were unlimited. We need to
concentrate on depriving him of first essentials, and even
to tempt him to purchase what is not a first essential. A
concentration of the blockade on a limited range of articles
will render it more effective, financially cheaper to us and
financially more exhausting to the enemy, than if we spread
ourselves ineffectually and expensively, with the maximum of
machinery and friction, over every conceivable thing; and
it will greatly ease our relations with the neighbouring
neutrals.
6. It is true that wheat can be turned into alcohol or
acetone and can be used, either directly or by substitution,
or by exchange, as a feeding stuff for animals. But it is
expensive and relatively inefficient for these purposes. There
should be better ways in which Germany is free to spend her
21

Finally, there was a memorandum intended for President Roosevelt

drafted for discussion with Sir George Schuster12. Mr Leonard Elmshirst13
and Schuster had been encouraging Keynes to write the note three or
four weeks previously, as well as to go to America to present the ideas
directly to Roosevelt. Keynes expressed some interest in going to America
in the late spring of 1940.
Elmshirst and Schuster also discussed similar ideas with Hoare, Halifax,
Waley and Ashton-Gwatkin,14 but Keynes urged delay until conditions
12
Sir George Schuster (b. 1881); National Liberal M.P. for Walsall, 1938-45;
member, Advisory Committee to Treasury, 1921-2; Financial Secretary to
Sudanese Government, 1922-7; Economic and Financial Adviser to Colonial
Office, 1927-8; Finance Member, Executive Council of Viceroy of India, 1928-34;
member, Select Committee on National Expenditure, 1939-45.
13
Leonard Elmshirst (1893-1974); Founder and Chairman, Dartington Hall Trust,
1925; Director, Institute of Rural Reconstruction, Bengal, 1921-4; President,
International Conference of Agricultural Economists, 1930-61; Chairman, Political
and Economic Planning, 1939-53; Agricultural Adviser, Government of Bengal,
1944-5-
14
Samuel Hoare (1880-1959), 2nd Baronet, Viscount Templewood, 1944; Conserva-
tive M.P. for Chelsea, 1910-44; Secretary of State for Air, 1922-4,1924-9; Secretary
of State for India, 1931-5; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1935, resigned
over the Hoare-Laval Plan designed to solve the Italo-Abyssinian crisis; First Lord

NOTES ON THE WAR FOR THE PRESIDENT

These notes are based on the assumptions
that the United States really intends to remain entirely aloof
from the hostilities of the war by land, sea and air;
that there is a predominant, and even a passionate, desire
that the Anglo-French cause should be victorious; and that
the slippery path of giving this cause as much practical assis-
tance as possible, compatibly with the above, will be cautiously
explored.
Their object is to make suggestions about practical assis-
tance. But I should like to preface that with a few words on
the larger problem.
of the Admiralty, 1936; Home Secretary, 1937; Lord Privy Seal and member of
War Cabinet, 1939; Secretary of State for Air, 1940; Ambassador to Spain, 1940-4.
Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (1881-1959), 1st Baron Irwin, 1925, 3rd
Viscount Halifax, 1st Earl, 1944; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Colonies, 1921-2; Viceroy of India, 1926-31; President, Board of Education,
1932—5; Secretary of State for War, 1935; Lord Privy Seal, 1935-7; Lord President
of the Council, 1937-8, 1940; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938-40;
British Ambassador, Washington, 1941-6.
Sigismund David Waley (1887-1962), K.C.M.G. 1943; as Sigismund Schloss
(until 1914) entered Treasury, 1910; Assistant Secretary, 1924; Principal Assistant
Secretary, 1931; Third Secretary, 1946-7; European Recovery Department,
Foreign Office, 1948.
Frank Trelawney Arthur Ashton-Gwatkin (b. 1889); Second Secretary, Foreign
Office, 1921; First Secretary, 1924; Acting Counsellor, British Embassy, Moscow,
1929; First Secretary, Foreign Office, 1930, Counsellor, 1934; Policy Adviser,
Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1939; Assistant Under-Secretary, Foreign Office,
1940; Senior Inspector of Diplomatic Missions (with rank of Minister), 1944.
Ashton-Gwatkin passed the memorandum to Sir Horace Wilson (1882-1972),
K.C.B. 1924; entered Civil Service, 1900; Principal Assistant Secretary, Ministry,
of Labour, 1919-21, Permanent Secretary, 1921-30; Chief Industrial Adviser to
Government, 1930-9; seconded to Treasury for service with the Prime Minister,
1935; Permanent Secretary of Treasury and Head of the Civil Service, 1939-42.
15
Some time after drafting the memorandum, Keynes made some pencil altera-
tions to passages on page 27. These changes are reproduced in footnotes.

There is great confusion of mind everywhere about this war.

The muddled and tortuous diplomacy which introduced it,
the superficial but deeply misleading resemblance to the last
war, and the tendency to think of peace aims in terms of
avoiding last time's mistakes prevents much of what is being
said and written to-day by sensible and well-intentioned per-
sons from striking deeply. What our hearts know is but slowly
penetrating our brains. It is still too soon for most Englishmen
to know in clear cut shape what they think and feel. Perhaps
it is easier for Americans to see the case objectively. The
deepest reflections on the war which I have read anywhere
have been written by two American journalists, Walter Lipp-
mann and Dorothy Thompson16. It is not necessary, there-
fore, that we should try to explain ourselves to you. You can
explain us much better than we can. I will, therefore, make
one comment only, and I will make that for the sake of its
corollary.
Of all the wars which have ever been waged there never
was one more purely a war of religion. Our most genuine
object, our deepest wish is not to conquer Germany, but to
convert her. We seek nothing but her return into the bosom
of western civilisation. We should do almost anything for her
if we were convinced of her change of heart. Her lapse is
partly our fault. For twenty years we have behaved like asses.
But today our consciences are clear and our motives
honourable. There never was a plainer case of war with
genuine, universal reluctance, without the slightest hope of
getting anything out of it. This war is, as has been well said,
nearer in spirit to the American Civil War than to the
imperialist wars of the past.
16
Walter Lippmann (1889-1974); journalist and author; specialist writer for the New
York Herald Tribune, 1931-62, for the Washington Post and other newspapers,
'963-74-
Dorothy Thompson (1894-1961); newspaper columnist, New York Herald
Tribune, 1936-41, Bell Syndicate, 1941-58.

II
Except in case of circumstances which cannot be foreseen and
do not now seem likely, the first assumption—that America
will not join in the war—is not questioned in what follows.
But in these days there are several kinds of neutrality, just
as there are several degrees of being at war. 'Neutrality'
(modern style) is inconsistent with joining in hostilities, but
it is not inconsistent with taking sides. If my fundamental
assumptions are right, it is fair to ask America deliberately
and in set terms to take sides. My proposals may be far-
reaching but they are simple.
(i) The United States should break off diplomatic relations
with Germany and declare a state of non-intercourse. This
25

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SHAPING OPINION
step should not be taken immediately, but Germany should
be informed now that it will be taken if Germany breaks any
of the undertakings she has given for the humanisation of
war, in particular her recent promise to the President about
the bombing of civilians from the air, and her undertaking
about the use of poison gas. Non-intercourse would include
the prohibition of imports of German origin. This threat is
a real one because there is at present no blockade or other
interference with the export of German goods to America in
neutral ships. It would be still better if the United States could
form a bloc for this purpose of all American countries. The
main importance of this measure would be of course, psy-
chological. Done at the right moment, its effect in this kind
might be crushing.
(2) Unless the war is a short one, financial assistance from
the United States is sooner or later indispensable. Never
before has this been considered inconsistent with neutrality.
Our default on last time's war debts is presumably the real
reason why the present law prohibits credits. The other
ostensible grounds are not convincing. Nevertheless it cannot
be reasonably defended except by those who reject the fun-
damental assumptions set forth above. The moral to be drawn
from last time's experience (and as one who was particularly
intimate with the details of that occasion this, and no other,
is the moral which with untroubled conscience I draw) is that
the arrangements for the credits should be quite different,
and should take the following form.
(a) All credit transactions should be from the outset be-
tween governments alone (private credit transactions remain-
ing prohibited) and, so far as munitions are concerned,
should be expended by a joint purchasing board for the
proper regulation of prices and profits.
(b) The credits should carry no interest.
(c) They should be repayable by annual instalments over
a short period of years, but they should not be repayable to
26

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THE BEGINNING
the United States. They should constitute a part of the
contribution of the United States to the post-war reconstruc-
tion of Europe. The instalments of repayment should be
allocated, that is to say, to the countries which have to be
reconstituted after the war17, to Poland, Bohemia and
Slovakia, to Germany herself and Austria. (This time it must
be clear from the beginning that the indemnity is paid by
the victor to the vanquished.)
These instalments should make up a part, but not the
whole, of America's contribution to the Reconstruction Fund.
On the assumption that the war lasts a year and a half to two
years, let us suppose that the United States Government
advances $2,000 million to the British and French Govern-
ments, repayable in ten annual instalments without interest.
On the conclusion of the war the United States Government
would allocate to the Reconstruction Fund the benefit of these
instalments (which would be collectible, not in cash, but only
in the exports of the countries discharging the debt), and in
addition a further $2,500 million18 in gold out of its lunatic
and redundant stock to provide the bank reserves in the
countries to be reconstructed. The detailed allocation of these
funds between the recipients would be settled by the United
States herself.
(3) This participation by the United States in the task of
reconstruction makes essential, what would be desirable
without it, namely some measure of responsibility by the
United States for the terms of peace. The nature of this
17
After completing the first draft Keynes changed the words: 'To Poland,
Bohemia.. .annual instalments without interest', in the following manner: 'That
is to say, to all the countries which have to be reconstituted after the war. That
is to say, they should be paid to the credit of a Reconstruction Board which would
be concerned with the financial side of the reparation of damage and the
rehabilitation of financial credit in all the allied and associated countries.
(d) These instalments should make up part, but not whole, of America's
contribution to the Reconstruction Fund. Let us suppose that the United States
Government advances $5,000 million to the British and French Governments,
repayable in annual instalments without interest.'
18
Keynes changed the figure $2,500 million to $5,000 million and the word 'lunatic',
in the same line, to 'useless', after completing the original draft.
27

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SHAPING OPINION
responsibility and of these terms lies outside the scope of these
notes. I find it difficult myself to concentrate at this stage on
the political and constitutional issues, on frontiers and
disarmament and the future government of Europe, not
because these issues are not of the first importance but be-
cause there are too many unknowns yet to be disclosed. I am
more exercised over a preliminary anxiety. If this war is
fought to a finish, nothing is more likely than that it will end
in a Communist revolution in Germany. What will happen
then to the plans of us liberals and federalists?
The important thing—and this is my last plea to the
President—is that, the minute after the Hitler gang seems ripe
for disappearance, the President should instantly intervene
with a view to the offer of peace terms of unprecedented
generosity (in which the Reconstruction Fund would play a
prominent part).
This leads up to a word about timing. It is evident that the
time for American financial assistance on these lines is not yet.
British and French financial resources are still largely intact;
there are no present difficulties and the true character of the
war itself is not yet disclosed; and public opinion in the United
States has not yet had time to settle down after the bitterness
of the recent debate. What is important to the conduct of the
war is that the British Treasury should have some assurance
that they will not have to depend indefinitely on their own
resources. I am afraid, however, that there is no possibility
of giving them such an assurance at present and they must
be asked to budget on faith. When will the time come? Only
events can show. But I suggest that the order of events may
perhaps turn out roughly as follows. First of all, on the
assumption that all goes fairly well: (i) It is useless to discuss
peace until the balance of forces has disclosed itself more
clearly than at present. (2) It is useless to discuss peace until
the prestige of the Hitler regime is suffering eclipse in
Germany itself. (3) As soon as these two conditions are satis-
factorily settled, generous peace terms should be offered on

However, all of Keynes's early war activities were not as 'private' as those
already outlined. Thus Keynes wrote to The Times on the first war budget.
To the Editor o/The Times, 28 September iggg
Sir,
That part of the cost of the war which we meet by parting
with gold and foreign assets, by borrowing abroad, by using
up stocks of materials, and by failing to make good physical
deterioration in houses and other capital goods at home, must
necessarily fall on posterity. The nation will emerge from the
war that much poorer, and the loss can only be made good
by future efforts. In the aggregate these items will amount
to a very large sum. This part of the cost of war it is clearly
right to borrow.
The remaining part of the cost can only be met by increased

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SHAPING OPINION
current effort and diminished current consumption, and,
taking the nation as a whole, must necessarily fall on us here
and now. But the Treasury have the choice between bringing
the contributions to account against individual taxpayers
either forthwith or by instalments.
The following figures show that the level of the rate of
interest is overwhelmingly important in deciding between
these alternatives. The Chancellor proposes this year to raise
£107 million extra by taxation and to borrow £938 million.
Next year the heavier taxes, apart from the excess profits tax,
will yield £226 million, and substantially more than £1,000
million is likely to be borrowed. The effect of these loans on
future Budgets, taking the annual sinking fund at, say, x/% per
cent compound, will depend on the rate of interest payable.
Thus the future burden of £1,500 million borrowed at 2V1 per
cent will be the same as the burden of £1,280 million
borrowed at 3 per cent and of £1,000 million borrowed at 4
per cent, since in each case the annual service of the loan
including sinking fund will be £45 million per annum. That
is to say, the gain of borrowing at 3 per cent rather than 4
per cent is greater than the whole of the proceeds of the new
rates of taxation in a full year; and the gain of borrowing at
2lA per cent rather than 3 per cent would help the Treasury
as much as would doubling all the increases announced
yesterday.
I suggest that it will cause less disturbance, injustice, and
suffering to find methods of borrowing during the war at an
average rate of interest not exceeding 2V2 per cent, than will
be caused by any other fiscal expedient open to us which is
of equal financial efficacy. Indeed to restrict the rate of
interest on current savings to 2V2 per cent will cause no
disturbance, injustice, or suffering worth mention.
The reader should not infer that I consider the new
burdens excessive. Quite the contrary What strikes me about
this Budget is the utter futility of the old imposts to solve
the problem, even when pushed almost to the limits of

3°
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THE BEGINNING
endurance. Apart from the excess profits tax, the increased
taxation comes to less than 5 per cent of our pre-war income.
But our national income should increase in due course,
through greater employment, longer hours, and the bringing
in of women and others not previously available for employ-
ment, by some 10 per cent-20 per cent, at pre-war wages and
prices. Thus the purchasing power left in the hands of the
public after deducting the new taxation will be considerably
more than before.
In these circumstances the idea apparently prevalent in
government circles that prices can be kept more or less at
pre-war levels is fanciful and highly unrealistic. The sterling
exchange has depreciated about 15 per cent; world prices
have risen, and so have the costs of shipping goods here;
purchasing power is certain to increase, while supplies will be
diminishing. In a free community a deliberate price rise on
a reasonable scale, which leaves the consumers' choice as much
unimpeded as possible, is the right solution. An average
increase of 20 per cent at least in wholesale prices, which
would mean a much smaller increase in the cost of living, is
necessary and desirable; and would greatly facilitate the
Treasury's task. This brings us to the excess profits tax, which
in the long run is the most interesting and important of the
Chancellor's proposals. The rest, however appalling it may
seem to individuals, is chicken-feed to the dragons of war.
Yours, etc.,
J. M. KEYNES

This led to a letter from Professor J. R. Hicks19 suggesting that Keynes was
unfair to Sir John Simon20 in his emphasis on the problems of voluntary
19
John Richard Hicks (b. 1904), Kt. 1964; Lecturer, London School of Economics,
1926-35, Cambridge, 1935-8; Professor of Political Economy, Manchester, 1938-46;
Official Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1946-52; Drummond Professor of
Political Economy, Oxford, 1952-65.
20
Sir John Simon (1873-1954), 1st Viscount 1940; Liberal M.P. for Walthamstow,
igo6-i8, for Spen Valley, 1922-3, as Liberal National, 1931-40; Solicitor-General,
1910-13; Attorney-General, 1913-15; Home Secretary, 1915-16; Foreign Secre-
tary, 1931—5; Home Secretary and leader of the House, 1935-7; Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 1937-40; Lord Chancellor, 1940-5.

31
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Another Random Scribd Document
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minä sain vaihtokaupassa toisen kylän päämieheltä rautaisen veitsen
ja eilen luiskahti rautaveitsi kädestäni ja painui mereen. Kaikella on
lakinsa, ei ole mitään lakien ulkopuolella olevaa. Sen me tiedämme.
Ja sitäpaitsi me tiedämme, että samanlaatuisilla esineillä on sama
laki ja että kaikella raudalla on sama laki. Siis peruuta sanasi, Nam-
Bok, että me voisimme sinua vielä kunnioittaa."

"Niin se on", sanoi Nam-Bok itsepäisesti. "Höyrylaiva on kokonaan

raudasta eikä uppoa."

"Ei, se ei ole mahdollista."

"Minä näin sen omin silmin."

"Ei se ole luonnon mukaista."

"Mutta sano minulle Nam-Bok", keskeytti Koogah joka pelkäsi, että

jutut loppuisivat, "sano minulle kuinka nuo miehet löytävät tiensä
merellä, kun ei näy maata, jonka mukaan ohjattaisiin?"

"Aurinko näyttää tien."

"Mutta kuinka?"

"Keskipäivän aikaan ottaa kuunarin päämies esineen, jonka lävitse

hänen silmänsä katselee aurinkoa, ja sitten hän pakoittaa auringon
kiipeämään taivaalta alas maanäärelle."

"Ne ovat pahoja taikoja!" huudahti Opee-Kwan, kummastellen

sellaista jumalattomuutta. Miehet nostivat kauhistuneina kätensä
ilmaan ja naiset huokailivat. "Ne ovat pahoja taikoja. Ei ole hyvä
johtaa harhaan suurta aurinkoa, joka karkoittaa yön ja antaa meille
hylkeet, lohen ja lämpöiset ilmat."
"Mitä sitten, jos ne ovatkin pahoja taikoja?" kysyi Nam-Bok
uhkaavasti. "Olen minäkin katsellut tuon esineen lävitse aurinkoon ja
pakottanut sen kiipeämään taivaalta alas."

Ne, jotka olivat lähinnä, vetäytyivät äkkiä kauemmaksi hänestä ja

yksi naisista peitti lapsen kasvot, joka oli hänen rinnoillaan, ettei
Nam-Bokin katse sattuisi siihen.

"Mutta neljännen päivän aamuna, oi Nam-Bok", sanoi Koogah,

"neljännen päivän aamuna, kun kuunari tuli perässäsi?"

"Minulla oli vähän voimia jäljellä, enkä voinut soutaa tieheni. Siispä
minut otettiin laivaan ja kurkkuuni kaadettiin vettä ja minulle
annettiin hyvää ruokaa. Kahdesti, veljeni, olette te nähneet valkoisen
miehen, ja nämä miehet olivat kaikki valkoisia ja heitä oli niin monta,
kuin minulla on sormia ja varpaita. Ja kun minä huomasin, että he
olivat hyvin ystävällisiä, tulin rohkeammaksi ja päätin itsekseni
painaa mieleeni kaikki mitä näin. Ja he opettivat minut tekemään
mitä hekin tekivät, ja antoivat minulle hyvää ruokaa ja makuupaikan.
Ja päivän toisensa jälkeen kuljimme merellä ja joka päivä päämies
otti auringon taivaalta ja pani sen sanomaan, missä me olimme. Ja
kun aallot olivat hyvällä päällä, pyydystimme hylkeitä ja minä
ihmettelin kovin, sillä he heittivät aina pois lihan ja rasvan ja pitivät
ainoastaan nahan."

Opee-Kwanin suu värähteli kiivaasti ja hänen piti juuri ruveta

moittimaan tällaista tuhlausta, kun Koogah potkaisemalla sai hänet
vaikenemaan.

"Pitkän ajan päästä, kun aurinko oli kadonnut ja ilmaan oli tullut
purevaa pakkasta, käänsi päämies kuunarin keulan etelään. Päivän
toisensa jälkeen kuljimme kohti etelää ja itää, emmekä koskaan
nähneet maata ja olimme likellä sitä kylää, josta miehet olivat
kotoisin — —"

"Kuinka he tiesivät, että he olivat likellä?" kysyi Opee-Kwan, joka

ei enää voinut hillitä itseänsä. "Eihän maata ollut näkyvissä."

Nam-Bok katsoi häneen vihaisesti. "Enkö minä sanonut, että

päämies pakoitti auringon alas taivaalta?"

Koogah sovitteli ja Nam-Bok jatkoi.

"Niinkuin sanoin, ollessamme likellä sitä kylää puhkesi kova myrsky

ja yöllä olimme avuttomia, emmekä tienneet missä olimme — —"

"Juurihan sanoit, että päämies tiesi — —"

"Rauhoitu Opee-Kwan! Sinä olet typerä, etkä ymmärrä. Niinkuin

sanoin olimme yöllä avuttomina, kun myrskyn pauhinassa kuulin
yht'äkkiä aaltojen hyrskeen rantaa vasten. Ja sitten purjehdimme
kovalla ryskeellä päin rantaa ja minä jouduin veteen uimaan.
Rannikko oli kallioista ja monen peninkulman matkalla ei ollut kuin
kappale hietarantaa, ja siinä kaivoin käteni santaan, siten vetäen
itseni kuohuista. Toiset miehet olivat varmaankin murskaantuneet
kallioihin, sillä kukaan heistä, päämiestä lukuunottamatta, ei tullut
maihin ja hänetkin tunsin vain sormessaan olevasta sormuksesta.

"Kun päivä koitti, eikä kuunarista näkynyt jälkeäkään, käänsin

kasvoni sisämaahan päin ja lähdin vaeltamaan saadakseni ruokaa ja
nähdäkseni ihmiskasvoja. Ja tullessani erääseen taloon vietiin minut
sisään ja annettiin ruokaa, sillä minä olin oppinut heidän kielensä ja
valkoiset miehet ovat aina ystävällisiä. Ja se talo oli isompi kuin
kaikki meidän rakentamamme talot ja meidän isäimme ennen meitä
rakentamat talot yhteensä."

"Se oli mahdottoman suuri talo", sanoi Koogah, peittäen

epäilyksensä ihmettelevään äänensävyyn.

"Sellaisen talon tekemiseen tarvittiin paljon puita", lisäsi Opee-

Kwan ottaen opiksi.

"Se ei ole mitään." Nam-Bok kohautti halveksivasti olkapäitään.

"Niinkuin meidän talomme sen rinnalla, oli se talo niihin verrattuna
joita myöhemmin olin näkevä."

"Eivätkä ne miehet ole isoja?"

"Ei, sellaisia kun te ja minä", vastasi Nam-Bok. "Minä olin leikannut

itselleni kepin, jotta minun olisi kevyempi kävellä, ja muistaessani,
että minun tuli kertoa kaikki teille, veljeni, vedin keppiin viivan
merkitsemään jokaista siinä talossa asuvaa henkilöä. Minä olin siellä
monta päivää, tehden työtä, josta he minulle antoivat rahaa; — Sitä
te ette tunne, mutta se on erinomaisen hyvää olemassa.

"Ja eräänä päivänä lähdin siitä paikasta kauemmaksi sisämaahan.

Ja kulkiessani kohtasin paljon ihmisiä ja minä leikkasin pienempiä
merkkejä keppiin, että kaikki siihen mahtuisivat. Sitten näin
ihmeellisen asian. Maassa edessäni oli käsivarteni vahvuinen
rautatanko ja pitkän askeleen päässä siitä oli toinen rautatanko —
—"

"Silloin sinusta tuli rikas", selitti Opee-Kwan, "sillä rauta on

arvokkaampaa kuin mikään muu maailmassa. Siitä olisi saanut
monta veistä."
"Ei, ei se ollut minun."

"Se oli löydettyä ja löydetty tavara on laillista omaisuutta."

"Eipä niinkään. Valkoiset miehet olivat asettaneet ne siihen. Ja

sitäpaitsi olivat nämä kanget niin pitkiä, ettei yksikään mies olisi
voinut kuljettaa niitä pois — niin pitkiä että minä en voinut niiden
loppua nähdä."

"Nam-Bok, siinä oli paljon rautaa", varoitti Opee-Kwan.

"Niin, se oli vaikeata uskoa, vaikka sen omin silmin näin, mutta
enhän voinut kieltää silmieni todistusta. Ja katsellessani kuulin…"
Hän kääntyi äkkiä päällikköön päin. "Opee-Kwan, sinä olet kuullut
merileijonan vihoissaan karjuvan. Kuvittele mielessäsi, että löytyisi
yhtä monta merileijonaa, kuin meressä on aaltoja ja kuvittele, että
kaikki nämä merileijonat olisivat yksi merileijona ja tämä yksi
merileijona ärjyisi. Niin ärjyi kuulemani vehje."

Kalastajaväestö huudahteli suureen ääneen ja Opee-Kwan kuunteli

suu ammollaan.

"Ja kaukaa näin hirviön, joka oli niin suuri kuin tuhannen
valaskalaa. Sillä oli yksi silmä ja se sylki sauhua ja ähki suureen
ääneen. Minä pelkäsin ja juoksin vapisevin jaloin tietä pitkin, joka oli
kankien välissä. Mutta se tuli tuulen nopeudella, tuo hirviö, ja minä
hyppäsin rautakangen yli, tuntien sen kuuman hengityksen
kasvoissani…"

Opee-Kwan sai taas vihdoinkin sanan suustaan. "Ja — ja sitten, oi

Nam-Bok?"
"Sitten se kulki vierestäni pitkin kankia, eikä tehnyt minulle
mitään, ja kun jalkani taas kannattivat minua, oli se jo hävinnyt
näkyvistä. Ja se on hyvin tavallinen ilmestys siinä maassa. Eivät
naiset eivätkä lapsetkaan pelkää sitä. Miehet teettävät niillä hirviöillä
työtä."

"Niinkuin me teetämme koirillamme?" kysyi Koogah epäluuloinen

välke silmissään.

"Niin, aivan niinkuin me teetämme koirillamme."

"Ja kuinka he kasvattavat noita — vehkeitä?" kysyi Opee-Kwan.

"Eivät he kasvata niitä ollenkaan. Miehet tekevät ne osavasti

raudasta ja ruokkivat niitä kivillä ja antavat niiden juoda vettä.
Kivestä tulee tulta ja vedestä höyryä ja veden höyry on niiden
sieramien hengitys ja — —."

"No, no! oi Nam-Bok", keskeytti Opee-Kwan. "Kerro meille muista

ihmeistä. Me kyllästymme tähän, jota emme ymmärrä."

"Ettekö te ymmärrä?", kysyi Nam-Bok epätoivoissaan.

"Ei, me emme ymmärrä", valittivat miehet ja naiset. "Me emme voi

ymmärtää."

Nam-Bok ajatteli monimutkaista leikkuukonetta ja koneita, joissa

näki elävien ihmisten kuvia ja niitäkin koneita, joista kuului ihmisten
ääniä, ja hän tiesi ettei hänen kansansa koskaan ymmärtäisi näitä.

"Uskallanko minä sanoa, että kuljin tällä rautahirviöllä halki

maan?" kysyi hän katkeralla äänellä.
Opee-Kwan levitti kätensä näyttäen avoimesti epäuskonsa. "Puhu
pois, mitä hyvänsä. Me kuuntelemme."

"Siis kuljin rautaisella hirviöllä ja tästä annoin rahaa —"

"Sinä sanoit, että sitä ruokittiin kivillä."

"Ja samaten, sinä tyhmyri, sanoin minä, että raha oli jotakin, josta
te ette mitään tiedä. Niinkuin sanoin, kuljin hirviöllä halki maan ja
monen kylän kautta, kunnes tulin suolaisen merenlahden rannalla
olevaan suureen kylään. Ja talojen katot ulottuivat taivaan tähtiin ja
pilvet ympäröivät niitä ja jokapaikassa oli paljon sauhua. Ja tämän
kylän pauhina oli kuin meren pauhina myrskyssä ja ihmisiä oli niin
paljon, että minä heitin pois keppini, enkä enää muistanut siinä
olevia viiruja."

"Jos olisit tehnyt pieniä viiruja", nuhteli Koogah, "olisit voinut

kertoa meille…"

Nam-Bok kääntyi kiukkuisena häneen. "Jos minä olisin tehnyt

pieniä viiruja! Kuule Koogah, sinä luunveistäjä! Jos olisin tehnyt
pieniä viiruja ei sittenkään siihen keppiin, eikä kahteenkymmeneen
keppiin olisi ne viirut mahtuneet — ei, ei edes kaikkiin ajopuihin
tämän ja naapurikylän välillä. Ja jos teitä kaikkia, naisia ja lapsiakin,
olisi kaksikymmentä kertaa niin monta ja jokaisella teistä olisi
kaksikymmentä kättä ja jokaisessa kädessä olisi keppi ja veitsi, niin
kuitenkaan ei jokaista ihmistä kohti, jonka näin, voisi viirua veistää,
sillä niin monta heitä oli ja niin nopeasti he tulivat ja menivät."

"Koko maailmassa ei voi olla niin monta ihmistä", väitti Opee-

Kwan, joka oli aivan huumaantunut ja jonka järkeen ei mahtunut niin
suurta lukua.
"Mitä sinä tiedät koko maailmasta ja kuinka lavea se on?" kysyi
Nam-Bok.

"Mutta yhdellä paikalla ei voi olla niin paljon ihmisiä."

"Mikä sinä olet sanomaan, mitä voi olla tai ei voi olla?"

"Sehän on selväkin asia, että yhdessä paikassa ei voi olla niin

paljon ihmisiä. Heidän kanoottinsa täyttäisivät meren, kunnes siinä ei
olisi yhtään tilaa. Ja he tyhjentäisivät joka päivä meren, mutta
kuitenkaan eivät he kaikki saisi tarpeeksi kaloja syödäkseen."

"Siltä se voi näyttää", lopetti Nam-Bok, "mutta niin oli kuitenkin

asian laita. Ja näin sen omin silmin ja heitin keppini pois." Hän
haukotteli ja nousi seisomaan. "Olen soutanut pitkän matkan. Päivä
on ollut pitkä ja minä olen väsynyt. Nyt tahdon nukkua ja huomenna
juttelemme enemmän näkemistäni asioista."

Bask-Wah-Wan, joka liikkasi arasti edellä, ylpeänä, mutta kuitenkin

peläten ihmeteltävää poikaansa, vei hänet igloohonsa ja peitti hänet
rasvaisiin pahanhajuisiin nahkoihin. Mutta miehet jäivät nuotion
ääreen pitämään kokousta, jossa paljon kuiskailtiin ja kiisteltiin
matalalla äänellä.

Meni tunti ja toinenkin ja Nam-Bok nukkui ja keskustelua

jatkettiin. Ilta-aurinko painui luoteeseen ja kello yksitoista oli se
melkein pohjoisessa. Silloin päällikkö ja luunveistäjä erosivat
neuvottelukunnasta ja herättivät Nam-Bokin. Hän katseli silmiään
räpytellen heitä kasvoihin ja käänsi kylkeään nukkuakseen uudelleen.
Opee-Kwan kävi häntä käsivarteen ja ravisti hänet ystävällisesti
mutta päättävästi hereille.
"Tule, Nam-Bok, nouse ylös!" komensi hän. "On aika."

"Onko teillä uusi juhla?" huudahti Nam-Bok. "Ei, ei minun ole

nälkä.
Menkää te syömään ja antakaa minun nukkua."

"Sinun on aika lähteä!" jyrisi Koogah.

Mutta Opee-Kwan puhui lauhkeammin. "Sinä olit minun bidarka

toverini, kun me olimme poikia", sanoi hän. "Yhdessä pyydystimme
hylkeitä ja koimme lohia padoista. Ja sinä pelastit minun elämäni,
Nam-Bok, kun meri minut peitti ja olin vajoamaisillani mustiin
kalliokuiluihin. Yhdessä näimme nälkää ja kärsimme vilua ja yhdessä
ryömimme nahkapeiton alle ja makasimme toisiimme painautuneina.
Tämän takia ja sen ystävyyden takia, jota kohtaasi tunsin, surettaa
minua, että olet tullut takaisin niin tavattomana valehtelijana. Me
emme voi ymmärtää ja meidän päätämme pyörryttää kaikki
kertomasi asiat. Se ei ole hyvä ja paljon on puhuttu
neuvottelukunnassa. Me lähetämme sinut pois, jotta päämme
pysyisivät selvinä ja vahvoina, eivätkä menisi järjettömyyksiesi takia
sekaisin."

"Ne asiat mistä olet puhunut ovat varjoja", jatkoi Koogah

puolestaan. "Varjojen maailmasta olet sinä puheesi tuonut ja
varjojen maailmaan sinun tulee viedä ne takaisin. Sinun bidarkasi on
valmiina ja heimolaiset odottavat. He eivät nuku ennenkuin olet
lähtenyt."

Nam-Bok oli hämmästynyt, mutta kuunteli päällikön puhetta.

"Jos sinä olet Nam-Bok", sanoi Opee-Kwan, "olet sinä kauhea ja

ihmeellinen valehtelija. Jos sinä olet Nam-Bokin varjo, niin puhuit
sinä varjoista, joista elävien ihmisten ei ole hyvä mitään tietää. Sitä
isoa kylää, mistä puhuit, pidämme me varjojen kylänä. Siellä
liitelevät kuolleitten sielut, sillä kuolleita on paljon ja eläviä vähän.
Kuolleet eivät tule takaisin. Kuolleet eivät koskaan ole tulleet takasin
— paitsi sinua, ihmeellisine juttuinesi. Ei ole koskaan vielä
tapahtunut, että kuolleet ovat tulleet takaisin ja jos me sen
sallisimme, kohtaisi meitä vakavat vastoinkäymiset."

Nam-Bok tunsi hyvin kansansa ja tiesi, että neuvottelukokouksen

päätös oli horjumaton. Hän antoi siis taluttaa itsensä veden
partaalle, jossa hänet sovitettiin bidarkaansa ja hänelle annettiin airo
käteen. Parvi villihanhia lensi eteläänpäin ja mainingit murtuivat
pehmeästi ja kumeasti santaan. Hämärä peitti maan ja meren, ja
pohjoisessa hehkui aurinko epäselvänä veripunaisessa sumussa.
Lokit lensivät alhaalla. Maatuuli puhalsi purevasti ja kylmästi ja
kasaantuvat mustat pilvet ennustivat rajuilmaa.

"Merestä sinä tulit", messusi Opee-Kwan ennustajan äänellä, "ja

mereen takaisin on sinun mentävä. Niin on tasapaino palautettu ja
lakia noudatettu."

Bask-Wah-Wan liikkasi alas vaahdon rajaan ja huusi: "Siunaan

sinua
Nam-Bok, ettäs minua muistit."

Mutta Koogah työnsi Nam-Bokin ulos rannasta, kiskaisi huivin

Bask-Wah-Wanin hartioilta ja heitti sen bidarkaan.

"Pitkinä öinä on kylmä", valitteli vanha vaimo, "ja pakkanen puree

vanhoja luita."
"Tuo kappale on varjo", vastasi luunveistäjä, "eivätkä varjot voi
sinua lämmittää."

Nam-Bok nousi seisomaan saadakseen äänensä kuuluville. "Oi

Bask-Wah-Wan, äiti, jokas minut synnytit!" huusi hän. "Kuule poikasi
Nam-Bokin sanoja. Hänen bidarkassaan on tilaa kahdelle ja hän
tahtoisi, että sinä tulisit hänen kanssaan. Sillä hänen tiensä johtaa
sinne, missä on kaloja ja öljyä yllin kyllin. Sinne ei pakkanen tule ja
elämä on helppoa ja rautaiset vehkeet tekevät ihmisten työn.
Tahdotko tulla, oi Bask-Wah-Wan."

Vanha vaimo epäröi hetken, bidarkan nopeasti loitotessa, sitten

hän korotti äänensä värisevästi valittaen. "Minä olen vanha, Nam-
Bok, ja pian minun on lähdettävä alas varjojen joukkoon. Mutta
minua ei haluta joutua sinne ennen aikojani. Minä olen vanha, Nam-
Bok, ja minä pelkään."

Valojuova välähti yli tummuneen meren ja kietoi veneen ja miehen

kullanpunaiseen sädekehään. Sitten kalastajaväki vaikeni, ja kuului
ainoastaan maatuulen humina ja matalalla lentävien lokkien kirkuna.

Keesh, Keesh'in poika.

"Siis tahdon antaa kuusi peitettä, lämpöistä ja kaksinkertaista;

kuusi viilaa, pitkää ja kovaa; kuusi Hudson Bay-veistä, terävää ja
pitkää; kaksi kanoottia, Mogum'in tekoa, joka on taitava tekijä;
kymmenen koiraa, leveäharteista ja väkevää; ja kolme pyssyä, —
yhden on liipasin rikki, mutta se on hyvä pyssy ja epäilemättä
korjattavissa."
Keesh vaikeni ja silmäili tarkkaavien kasvojen piiriä. Oli Ison
Kalanpyynnin aika ja hän oli pyytämässä Gnob'ilta tämän tytärtä Su-
su'a. Paikka oli Yukon'in varrella oleva St. George Mission, ja heimot
olivat kokoontuneet satojen penikulmien alalta. Pohjoisesta, etelästä,
idästä ja lännestä olivat ne tulleet, Tozikakat'ista ja kaukaisesta
Tana-naw'stakin.

"Ja sitäpaitsi, oi Gnob, olet sinä Tana-naw'ein päämies; ja minä,

Keesh, Keesh'in poika, olen Thlunglet-heitnon päämies. Siksi, koska
minun siemeneni sikiää sinun tyttäresi kohdussa, vallitkoon myöskin
ystävyys heimojen kesken, suuri ystävyys, ja Tana-naw ja Thlunglet
olkoot valaveljeksiä tulevina aikoina. Mitä minä sanoin tekeväni, sen
teenkin. Ja mitä teet sinä, Gnob, asiaa auttaaksesi?"

Gnob nyökkäsi vakavasti. Hänen kyhmyinen ja

vanhuudenryppyinen naamansa peitti täydelleen sielun, joka sen
takana oli. Hänen pienet silmänsä paloivat kuin tuliset kekäleet
hänen kimeästi kirkuessaan: "Mutta eihän tämä ole kaikki."

"Mitä sitten vielä?" kysyi Keesh. "Enkö minä ole tarjonnut sinulle
täyttä hintaa? Onko kestään Tana-naw-tytöstä koskaan maksettu niin
paljon? Sano siinä tapauksessa hänen nimensä!"

Piirissä naurahdeltiin ääneen ja Keesh ymmärsi, että nämä ihmiset

pilkkasivat häntä.

"Ei niin, Keesh hyvä, et sinä ymmärrä?" Gnob teki

anteeksipyytävän kädenliikkeen. "Hinta on kohtuullinen. Hinta on
hyväkin. Enkä myöskään välitä rikkinäisestä liipasimesta. Mutta ei
siinä kaikki. Kuinkahan on miehen laita?"

"Niin, — miehen laita?" ilkkui joukko.

"Sanotaan", piipitti Gnob kimeästi, "sanotaan, että Keesh ei kulje
isäinsä teitä. Sanotaan, että hän on vaeltanut pimeydessä, palvellen
vieraita jumalia ja että hänestä on tullut pelkuri."

Keesh'in muoto synkistyi. "Se on valhe", huusi hän. "Keesh ei

pelkää yhtäkään ihmistä."

"Sanotaan", inisi Gnob edelleen, "että hän on suostunut valkoisen

miehen puheisiin siinä Suuressa Talossa ja että hän kumartaa
valkoisen miehen jumalaa ja sitäpaitsi, että valkoisen miehen
jumalaa ei veri miellytä."

Keesh painoi silmänsä maahan ja puristi kätensä intohimoisesti

nyrkkiin. Raakalaisjoukko nauroi härnäävästi ja shamaani, heimon
ylipappi ja noita, kuiskutteli Gnob'in korvaan.

Shamaani meni valopiirin äärillä istuvien hahmojen joukkoon ja toi

sieltä esiin hintelän nuorukaisen, jonka hän työnsi Keesh'in eteen,
samalla antaen Keesh'in käteen veitsen.

Gnob kumartui eteenpäin. "Keesh! Oi Keesh! Uskallatko sinä

tappaa ihmisen? Katso! Tämä on Kitz-noo, orja. Iske! Oi Keesh, iske
käsivartesi täydellä voimalla!"

Poika vapisi, odottaen iskua. Keesh katsoi häneen, hänen

mieleensä muistui Mr. Brown'in korkeampi moraali ja hän näki
silmäinsä edessä Mr. Brown'in kummallisen, palavan helvetin
loimuavat liekit. Veitsi putosi maahan ja poika huokasi, lähtien
huojuvin jaloin valopiirin taka. Gnob'in jaloissa makasi susikoira, joka
paljasti hohtavat hampaansa, hyökätäkseen pojan kimppuun. Mutta
shamaani potkaisi petoa ja siitä Gnob sai uuden ajatuksen.
"Entäs, oi Keesh, mitä sinä tekisit, jos sinulle tehtäisi näin?" Gnob
tarjosi puhuessaan lohenpalasta Valkohampaalle, ja kun eläimen piti
tarttua palaseen, löi hän sitä kipeästi kepillä kuonoon. "Ja sitten
Keesh, tekisitkö senjälkeen noin?" — Valkohammas ryömi vatsallaan
takaisin, heiluttaen Gnobllle häntäänsä.

"Kuulkaa!" Madwan'in käsivarteen nojaten oli Gnob noussut

seisaalleen. "Minä olen hyvin vanha ja juuri sen takia, että olen
vanha, kerron sinulle asioita. Sinun isäsi, Keesh, oli mahtava mies.
Hän ihaili jousenjänteen soinnahdusta taistelussa ja omin silmin olen
nähnyt hänen heittävän keihäänsä niin, että se lävisti miehen
ruumiin. Mutta sinä olet toisenlainen. Siitä pitäen kun jätit Korpin,
palvellaksesi Sutta, olet sinä peljännyt verta ja opettanut kansasikin
sitä pelkäämään. Se ei ole hyvä. Katsos, kun minä olin Kitz-noo'n
kokoinen poika, ei koko maassa ollut ainoatakaan valkoista miestä,
mutta he tulivat, yksitellen, nämä valkoiset miehet ja nyt heitä on
paljon. Ja he ovat levotonta sukua, jotka eivät koskaan malta levätä
kylläisinä nuotion ääressä, antaen huomispäivän pitää huolta omasta
ruo'astansa. Näyttää siltä, kuin heitä painaisi kirous, joka heidän on
karkoitettava työllä ja raadannalla."

Keesh hämmästyi. Hän muisti hämärästi Mr. Brown'in kertoneen

jostakin
Adamista ennen vanhaan, ja Mr. Brown oli siis puhunut totta.

"Niin ottavat nämä valkoiset miehet kaiken mitä näkevät ja käyvät

kaikki paikat ja katselevat kaikkea. Ja yhä uusia tulee heidän
jäljissään ja ellei mitään tehdä, valloittavat he kaiken maan, ja
Korpin heimoille ei jää mitään sijaa. Sentähden on paras, että
taistelemme heitä vastaan, kunnes heistä ei ole yhtään jäljellä.
Silloin meillä on käsissämme tiet ja maat, ja ehkä lapsemme ja
lastemme lapset kukoistavat ja tulevat lihaviksi. On syttyvä uusi sota,
kun Susi ja Korppi ryhtyvät taisteluun, mutta Keesh ei taistele, eikä
anna väkensäkään taistella. Siksi ei ole hyvä, että hän ottaisi
tyttäreni luokseen. Minä olen puhunut, minä, Gnob, Tana-naw'n
päämies."

"Mutta valkoiset miehet ovat hyviä ja suuria", vastasi Keesh.

"Valkoiset miehet ovat opettaneet meille paljon. Valkoiset miehet
ovat antaneet meille peitteitä ja veitsiä ja pyssyjä sellaisia, joita
emme me koskaan ole tehneet, emmekä taitaisikaan tehdä. Minä
muistan kuinka me elimme ennen heidän tuloaan. En ollut silloin
vielä syntynyt, mutta olen sen isältäni kuullut. Kun kävimme
metsällä, täytyi meidän hiipiä niin likelle hirveä, että keihäämme
siihen kannatti. Nyt käytämme valkoisen miehen kivääriä, joka
kantaa kauemmaksi kuin pienen lapsen parkuna kuuluu. Me söimme
kalaa ja lihaa ja marjoja — ei ollut mitään muuta syötävää — ja me
söimme ilman suolaa. Kuinka moni teistä tahtoisi jälleen syödä kalaa
ja lihaa ilman suolaa?"

Tämä puhe olisi vaikuttanut, ellei Madwan olisi hypähtänyt

pystyyn, ennenkuin oli tullut hiljaisuus.

"Ensin kysymys sinulle, Keesh. Valkoinen mies Isossa Talossa

sanoo sinulle, että on väärin tappaa. Mutta emmekö me tiedä, että
valkoiset miehet tappavat? Olemmeko me unohtaneet Koyokuk'in
suurta taistelua, taikka Nuklukyeto'n taistelua, jossa kolme valkoista
miestä tappoi kaksikymmentä Tozikaka miestä? Luuletko sinä, että
me emme enää muistaisi niitä kolmea Tana naw'n miestä, jotka
valkoinen mies Macklewrath tappoi? Sano minulle, oi Keesb, miksi
shamaani Brown opettaa sinulle, että on väärin tapella, kun kaikki
hänen veljensä kerran tappelevat?"
"Ei, ei siihen kaivata vastausta", inisi Gnob, Keesh'in selvitellessä
näennäisiä vastakohtia. "Asia on vallan yksinkertainen. Hyvä Mies
Brown tahtoisi pidellä Korppia, hänen veljiensä kyniessä siltä
höyhenet." Hän korotti ääntään. "Mutta niin kauan kuin yksikään
Tana-naw jaksaa iskun antaa, tahi tyttö synnyttää poikalapsen, ei
Korppia kynitä."

Gnob kääntyi nuotion takana istuvan tumman, nuoren miehen

puoleen. "Ja mitä sanot sinä, Makamuk, joka olet Su-Su'n veli?"

Makamuk nousi seisomaan. Hänen naamassaan oleva pitkä arpi

piti hänen huultaan alinomaisessa irvistyksessä, joka ei sopinut
yhteen silmien hurjan loisteen kanssa. "Tänään", alkoi hän poiketen
tahallaan aiheesta, "kuljin kauppamies Macklewrath'in majan ohitse.
Ja ovessa näin lapsen, joka nauroi auringonpaisteessa. Ja lapsi
katsoi minuun kauppamies Macklewrath'in silmillä ja peljästyi. Äiti
juoksi sen luokse ja lohdutteli sitä. Äiti oli Ziska, Thlunglet-nainen."

Hänen äänensä hukkui raivoisaan ulvontaan, mutta hän sai sen

vaikenemaan kääntymällä mahtavalla eleellä Keesh'iin päin ja hän
nosti kätensä, uhkaavasti osoittaen sormellaan:

"Vai niin, te Thlunglet'in miehet? Te annatte pois naisenne ja

tulette sitten Tana-naw'laisilta pyytämään uusia? Mutta me
tarvitsemme itse naisemme, Keesh, sillä meidän on siitettävä miehiä,
paljon miehiä, sen päivän varalle, jona Korppi taistelee Sutta
vastaan."

Hyväksymismyrskyn läpi tunki Gnobin kimakka ääni: "Entäs sinä,

Nossabok, joka olet hänen rakkain veljensä?"
Nuori mies oli notkea ja sorjavartaloinen. Hänellä oli tyyppinsä
voimakas kotkamainen nenä ja korkea otsa, ja jonkin hermovian
takia hän silloin tällöin räpäytti toista silmäänsä omituisen
miettiväisesti. Nytkin, hänen noustessaan, painui hänen toinen
silmänluomensa hetkiseksi alas. Mutta sille ei naurettu niinkuin
tavallisesti. Jokainen naama oli totinen. "Minäkin kuljin kauppamies
Macklewrath'in majan ohi", alkoi hän pehmeällä tyttömäisellä
äänellä, joka oli hyvin nuorekas ja muistutti hänen sisarensa ääntä.
"Ja minä näin indianeja, joiden hiki valui silmiin ja joiden polvet
vapisivat väsymyksestä, — minä näin indianien ähkivän kaataessaan
tukkeja aitan rakennukselle, jonka Macklewrath aikoo teettää. Ja
omin silmin näin heidän hakkaavan puita, että shamaani Brown'in
Iso Talo pysyisi lämpöisenä pitkien öiden pakkasilla. Tämä on naisten
työtä. Koskaan ei Tana-naw tekisi sellaista. Me olemme miesten
veriveljiä, emmekä naisten, ja Thlunglet-miehet ovat naisia."

Syntyi syvä hiljaisuus ja kaikkien silmät kääntyivät Keesh'iin. Tämä

katseli tarkasti ja kylmästi ympärilleen, katsoen jokaista
täysikasvuista miestä suoraan silmiin. "Vai niin", sanoi hän tyynesti.
Ja toisti, "vai niin." Sitten hän sen enempää sanomatta kääntyi ja
poistui pimeyteen.

Konttaavien pikkulasten ja takkuisten susikoirien lomitse kulki hän

ison leirin läpi sen ulkolaitaan, jossa hän tapasi naisen, joka
nuotiotulen ääressä teki työtä. Köynnöskasvien juurista revityistä
kaistaleista punoi hän siimoja kalastusta varten. Hetkisen katseli
mies hiljaa, kuinka tytön taitavat kädet selvittelivät sotkeuntuneita
kuorensyitä. Kaunis oli hän katsella työhönsä kumartuneena,
vahvarakenteinen, korkeapovinen ja lanteilta leveä, äidiksi luotu. Ja
loimuava valkea kultasi hänen vaskenväriset kasvonsa, hänen
tukkansa oli sinisen musta ja hänen silmänsä kuin musta meripihka.
"Oi, Su-Su", sanoi hän lopulta, "sinä olet menneinä aikoina minua
ystävällisesti silmäillyt ja myöskin päivinä, jotka vielä ovat nuoria."

"Minä silmäilin sinua ystävällisesti siksi, että olit Thlunglet'in

päällikkö", vastasi tyttö nopeasti, "ja senkin tähden, että olit iso ja
väkevä."

"Niin —"

"Mutta se tapahtui vanhana kalastusaikana", kiiruhti hän

lisäämään, "ennenkuin shamaani Brown tuli opettaakseen sinulle
pahoja asioita ja ennenkuin hän johti jalkasi oudoille teille."

"Mutta minä tahtoisin sanoa sinulle —"

Tyttö nosti kätensä liikkeellä, joka muistutti hänen isäänsä. "Ei,

minä tiedän jo mitä sinä aijot sanoa, oi Keesh, ja tahdon nyt siihen
vastata. On säädetty, että veden kalat ja metsän pedot synnyttävät
jälkeläisiä, kukin lajinsa mukaan. Ja se on oikein. Sama on naisten
laita. Heidän tulee jatkaa lajiansa ja tyttö, impenäkin ollessaan
aavistaa lastensynnytyksen tuskat ja kivun rinnoissaan ja tuntee
pienet kätöset kaulansa ympärillä. Ja kun tämä tunne on voimakas,
hakee jokainen tyttö salasilmäyksin itselleen miestä, joka kelpaisi
hänen lastensa isäksi. Näin tunsin, kun katsoin sinuun ja huomasin,
että sinä olit iso ja väkevä, metsämies ja petojen ja miesten voittaja,
joka voisi hankkia ruokaa silloin kun minun tulisi syödä kahden
puolesta, joka voisi suojella minua vaaroilta avuttomuuteni
lähetessä. Mutta tämä oli ennen sitä päivää, jona shamaani Brown
tuli maahan opettaakseen sinua —"

"Mutta, se ei ole oikein, Su-Su. Sen minä tiedän varmasti —"

"Ei ole oikein tappaa. Minä tiedän mitä sinä tahdot sanoa. Siitä siis
lapsesi mielesi mukaan, siitä sellaisia, jotka eivät tapa; mutta älä
vaadi että Tana-naw't sen tekisivät. Sillä sanotaan ajan tulevan,
jolloin Korppi ja Susi taistelevat keskenään. Siitä en tiedä, sillä se on
miesten asia, mutta tiedän, että minun on sitä aikaa varten
synnytettävä miehiä."

"Su-Su", keskeytti Keesh, "sinun täytyy minua kuulla —"

"Mies löisi minua kepillä ja pakottaisi minut kuulemaan", vastasi

hän halveksien. "Mutta sinä — — kas tässä!" Hän antoi tukun kuituja
miehen käteen. "Minä en voi sinulle antaa itseäni, mutta nämä kyllä.
Sinun käsiisi ne sopivat parhaiten. Se on naisten työtä. — Ala siis."

Mies heitti ne luotaan ja hänen verensä kiehui vihaisesti

vaskenvärisen ihon alla.

"Ja vielä vähän", jatkoi nainen. "Löytyy vanha tapa, jonka sekä
sinun että minun isäni tunsivat. Jos mies kaatuu taistelussa, viedään
hänen päänahkansa voiton merkiksi. Hyvä on. Mutta sinun, joka olet
Korpin jättänyt, on tehtävä enemmän. Sinun tulee tuoda minulle, ei
päänahkoja vaan pääkalloja, kaksi pääkalloa, ja tuotuasi ne, en anna
sinulle kuituja, vaan koristellun vyön tuppineen ja pitkän venäläisen
veitsen. Silloin silmäilen sinua taas ystävällisesti, ja silloin on kaikki
taas hyvin."

"Vai niin", sanoi mies tyynesti. "Vai niin." Sitten hän kääntyi ja
poistui valon piiristä.

"Ei, oi Keesh." huusi tyttö hänen jälkeensä. "Ei kahta päätä, vaan
vähintäin kolme!"
Mutta Keesh oli uudelle uskolleen kuuliainen, eli vanhurskaasti ja
vaati heimonsa kansan tottelemaan pastori Jackson Brownin käskyjä.
Koko kalastusaikana hän ei välittänyt Tana-naw'sta eikä huolinut
heidän pilkastaan, eikä eri heimojen naisten nauruista. Kalastuksen
jälkeen lähti Gnob ja hänen kansansa, mukanaan suuret varastot
sekä auringossa kuivattua että savustettua lohta, metsästämään
Tana-naw heimon sydänmaille. Keesh näki heidän lähtevän, mutta
kävi siitä huolimatta Lähetyksen jumalanpalveluksissa, joissa hän
säännöllisesti rukoili ja johti laulua syvällä bassoäänellään.

Pastori Jackson Brown nautti tästä syvästä bassoäänestä ja

katsoen hänen eteviin ominaisuuksiinsa, piti hän Keeshiä etevimpänä
oppilaanaan. Siihen ei Macklewrath luottanut. Hän ei uskonut
pakanoiden kääntymisen pysyväisyyteen, eikä peitellyt
mielipidettään. Mutta Mr Brown oli tavallansa suuripiirteinen mies, ja
hän todisti eräänä pitkänä syysiltana kauppamiehelle kaiken tämän
niin vakuuttavasti, että kauppamies, jonka oli täytynyt luopua
näkökohdasta toisensa jälkeen tuskaantuneena sanoi lopulta: "Piru
vieköön, Brown, käännyn itsekin, jos Keesh pitää sekoittamattomana
värinsä kaksi vuotta!" Mr. Brown ei koskaan päästänyt tilaisuutta
käsistään, siis löi hän vetoa yksinkertaisesti lyömällä kättä, ja tämän
jälkeen oli Keeshin käyttäytymisen ratkaistavissa, mihinkä
Macklewrathin sielu lopulta joutuisi.

Mutta eräänä päivänä kun talven tullen lumi oli niin tarpeeksi
kattanut maan että päästiin kulkemaan, kuultiin uutisia. Tana naw-
mies tuli St. George Missioniin ostamaan ampumavaroja ja kertoi,
että Su-Su oli luonut silmänsä Nee-Koo'hon joka oli mainio, nuori
metsästäjä ja oli hänestä vanhan Gnobin nuotiolla tarjonnut
suurenmoisen hinnan. Jotenkin samaan aikaan tapasi pastori
Jackson Brown Keesh'in joelle vievällä metsätiellä. Keeshin parhaat
koirat olivat valjastettuina hänen rekensä eteen, johonka hän oli
sitonut parhaimman lumikenkäparinsa.

"Mihinkä olet matkalla, oi Keesh? Metsästämäänkö?" kysyi Mr

Brown indianien tapaan.

Keesh katsoi häntä minuutin verran kiinteästi silmiin, sitten hän

käski koiransa liikkeelle. Sen jälkeen sanoi hän miettiväisesti katsoen
lähetyssaarnaajaan: "En! Suoraa päätä helvettiin."

*****

Aukeamalla oli kolme yksinäistä, matalaa telttaa, jotka ikäänkuin

tahtoivat kaivautua lumen sisään, synkkää yksinäisyyttä pakoon.
Tusinan askeleen päässä oli jylhä metsä. Ylläkään ei nähnyt taivaan
puhdasta sineä, ainoastaan muodottoman, sumuisen lumitäytteisen
pilvistön. Ei tuulta, ei ääntä, ei mitään muuta kuin lunta ja hiljaisuus.
Ei myöskään leirin vilkasta elämää, sillä metsämiehet olivat
yllättäneet peuralauman sivultapäin ja saalis oli ollut suuri. Nyt oli
paastoamisen jälkeen vietetty suuret juhlat, ja sentähden
makasivatkin kaikki syvässä unessa peurannahkaisten kattojensa
alla, vaikka olikin keskipäivä.

Erään teltan ulkopuolella palavan tulen ääressä oli viisi paria

lumikenkiä ja nuotion vieressä istui Su-Su. Hänen päänsä, tukkansa
ja kaulansa olivat oravannahkaisen kaavun peitossa, mutta paljain
käsin piteli hän näppärästi neulaa ja suonilankaa, valmistellen
purppuranpunaisella vaatteella vuoratun nahkavyön viimeisiä
koristeita. Jossakin, jonkin teltan takana, haukahti koira terävästi.
Kerran tytön isä äännähteli unissaan hänen takanaan olevassa
teltassa. "Pahoja unia", hymyili hän itsekseen. "Hän vanhenee jo ja
viimenen liha-annos oli liian suuri."
Hän kiinnitti viimeisen helmen, solmisi langan ja kohensi tulta.
Katsottuaan kauan tuleen, nosti hän päätään ja kuunteli lumen
narskumista mokkasiineihin puettujen jalkojen alla. Keesh seisoi
hänen vieressään hiukan etukumarassa taakan tähden, jota hän
kantoi selässään. Se oli peitetty pehmeäksi parkittuun hirven
nahkaan ja Keesh heitti sen huolimattomasti lumeen ja istuutui. He
katsoivat kauan toisiaan puhumatta sanaakaan.

"Pitkä matka, oi Keesh", sanoi tyttö viimein, "pitkä matka on S:t.

Georg Missionista Yukonin varrella, tänne."

"Niin on", vastasi hän hajamielisesti, silmät tiukasti tähdättyinä

vyöhön, jonka suuruuden hän pani merkille. "Mutta missä on veitsi?"
kysyi hän.

"Tässä." Su-Su otti sen esiin parkastaan ja välähytteli sen

paljastettua terää tulen loimussa. "Se on hyvä veitsi."

"Anna se minulle!" komensi Keesh.

"En, Keesh", nauroi hän. "Ehkä et sinä ole syntynyt kantamaan

sitä."

"Anna se minulle", toisti mies muuttamatta ääntään. "Olen siihen

syntynyt."

Mutta tytön silmät, jotka olivat kiemailevasti tähdättyinä

hirvennahkaan hänen takanaan, huomasivat sen alla olevan lumen
vähitellen punertuvan. "Onko se verta, Keesh?" kysyi hän.

"On, se on verta. Mutta anna minulle tuo vyö ja pitkä venäläinen

puukko."
Tyttö tunsi äkkiä pelkoa, mutta häntä vavistutti, kun mies raa'asti
riuhtaisi häneltä vyön, mutta tämä raakuus vavistutti häntä
miellyttävästi. Hän katsoi mieheen hellästi ja tunsi kaipausta
rinnassaan ja pienet lapsenkädet kaulansa ympärillä.

"Tämä on tehty pienemmälle miehelle", huomautti mies yrmeästi,

vetäen sisäänpäin suolivyötään ja kiinnittäen soljen ensimäiseen
läpeen.

Su-Su hymyili, ja hänen silmänsä tulivat vielä hellemmiksi. Taas

tunsi hän nuo pehmoiset kätöset kaulansa ympärillä. Mies oli kaunis
katsella, vyö tosin oli pieni, tehty pienemmälle miehelle, mutta mitä
siitä? Voihan hän tehdä uusia vöitä.

"Mutta veri?" kysyi hän uuden kasvavan toivon elähdyttämänä.

"Veri,
Keesh? Onko se… onko ne… päitä?"

"Ovat."

"Ne ovat varmaan ihan tuoreita, sillä muuten olisi veri jäätynyt."

"Niin, nyt ei ole kylmä ja ne ovat tuoreita, aivan tuoreita."

"Oi Keesh!" Hänen kasvonsa olivat lämpöiset ja kirkkaat. "Ja ne

ovat minulle?"

"Niin, sinulle."

Hän tarttui hirvennahan kulmaan, repäisi sen auki ja päät vierivät

tytön eteen.

"Kolme", kuiskasi Keesh hurjasti, "ei, vähintäin neljä."

Mutta Su-Su istui jäykistyneenä. Siinä ne nyt olivat, —
pehmeäpiirteinen Nee-Koo, Gnob'in vanha kyhmyinen naama,
Mahamuk, joka irvisti hänelle halkinaisella huulellaan, ja vihdoin
Nossabok tyttömäisine poskineen ja toinen silmäluomi vanhaan
tapaan omituisen miettiväisesti roikuksissa. Siinä ne makasivat
tulenloimun valaistessa niitä ja leikkiessä niiden kanssa ja jokaisesta
päästä levisi punainen piiri lumeen.

Tulen sulattama lumi painui Gnobin pään alta ja se vieri kuin olisi
se ollut elävä olento, pysähtyen tytön jalkojen juureen. Mutta hän ei
liikahtanutkaan. Keesh istui myöskin liikkumatta, hän ei räpäyttänyt
silmiään, katsoi vaan taukoamatta tyttöön.

Metsässä pudotti honka liian raskaan lumitaakkansa ja jymähdys

kaikui kumeana solassa, mutta kumpikaan ei liikahtanut. Lyhyt päivä
oli äkkiä mennyt mailleen ja pimeys peitti leirin, kun Valkohammas
juoksi nuotiolle. Se pysähtyi tunnustellakseen maaperää, mutta kun
sitä ei ajettu pois, tuli se likemmäksi. Se käänsi äkkiä kuononsa
sivullepäin, sen sieramet värisivät ja niskakarvat nousivat pystyyn;
sitten se seurasi vainuaan suoraan isäntänsä pään luokse. Ensin se
haisteli sitä varovasti ja nuoli sen otsaa punaisella roikkuvalla
kielellään. Sitten se äkkiä istui, nosti kuononsa kohti ensimäistä
himmeätä tähteä ja päästi pitkän sudenulvonnan.

Tämä herätti Su-Sun'in. Hän katsoi Keesh'iin, joka oli paljastanut

venäläisen veitsen ja katseli häntä tarkkaavaisesti. Miehen kasvot
olivat lujat ja järkähtämättömät ja hän luki niistä tuomionsa. Hän
heitti yltään parkansa pääkappaleen, paljasti kaulansa ja nousi
seisomaan. Hän seisoi hiljaa, pitkällä katseella katsellen ympärilleen
lumettunutta metsää, himmeitä tähtiä, leiriä, lumessa olevia
lumikenkiä — viimeisellä, koko elämää käsittävällä katseella. Kevyt
tuulahdus puhalsi hänen tukkansa sivullepäin ja hengenvedon ajaksi
käänsi hän päänsä tuulta vasten.

Hän ajatteli lapsiaan, jotka eivät koskaan syntyisi, meni sitten

Keesh'in luo ja sanoi: "Minä olen valmis."

Kaunis Li-Wan.

"Aurinko laskee, Canim, ja päivän kuumuus on ohitse!"

Näin huusi Li-Wan miehelle, jonka pää oli oravannahkaisen vällyn

peitossa, mutta hän huusi matalalla äänellä, ikäänkuin olisi hänen
vaikea valita. Toisella puolella oli velvollisuus herättää hänet ja
toisella pelko nähdä hänet hereillä. Sillä hän pelkäsi isoa miestään,
joka ei muistuttanut keitään niistä miehistä, joita hän oli tuntenut.

Hirvenpaisti kärisi levottomasti ja hän siirsi paistinpannun

hiilloksen sivuun. Samalla hän piti tarkalla kahta Hudsonbay-koiraa,
jotka kuola tippuen punaisista kielistään, seurasivat hänen jokaista
liikettään. Ne olivat isoja, pörröisiä retkaleita, jotka olivat ryömineet
nuotin viereen, tuulen alle, siten ohuessa savussa ollen, ollakseen
rauhassa tuhansittain parveilevilta hyttysiltä. Li-Wanin katsoessa alas
jyrkännettä, jonka juurella Klondyken paisuneet vedet vyöryivät
vuorien lomitse, ryömi yksi koirista vatsallaan kuin käärme esiin ja
taitavalla, kissamaisella käpäläniskulla repäisi se palasen kuumaa
lihaa pannusta maahan. Mutta Li-Wan oli pitänyt tätä silmällä ja se
hypähti takasinpäin muristen ja koettaen purra, kun hän löi sitä
kuonoon tulikekäleellä.
"Ehei, Olo", nauroi hän ja otti lihan maasta, päästämättä koiraa
silmistään. "Sinun on aina nälkä, ja sen takia sinun kuonosi johtaa
sinut loppumattomiin ikävyyksiin."

Mutta Olon toveri liittyi siihen ja yhdessä uhmasivat ne naista.

Niiden niskakarvat nousivat kiukkuisesti pystyyn ja ne nostivat
ohkoisia huuliansa pahaa-ennustaviin ryppyihin, paljastaen kamalat
ja uhkaavat torahampaansa. Niiden kuono rypistyi ja värisi ja ne
murisivat kuin sudet, ja koko niiden suvun viha ja pahuus yllytti niitä
käymään naisen kimppuun, vetääkseen hänet nurin.

"Ja sinäkin, Bash, joka olet yhtä villi kuin isäntäsi, etkä tahdo elää
sovussa sen käden kanssa joka sinua ruokkii! Tämä riita ei kuulu
sinuun, niin että tästä saat! ja tästä!"

Näin huutaessaan ahdisti hän niitä kekäleellä, mutta ne välttivät

iskut, eivätkä väistyneet. Ne erosivat toisistaan ja lähestyivät häntä
ryömimällä ja muristen eripuolilta. Li-Wan oli tapellut vallasta
susikoirien kanssa aina siitä asti kun hän tepasteli nahkakimppujen
joukossa teltassa, ja hän tiesi että ratkaiseva hetki oli käsissä. Bash
oli pysähtynyt lihakset jännitettyinä ja valmiina hyppäämään; Olo
ryömi vielä eteenpäin, sopivalle välimatkalle päästäkseen.

Li-Wan tarttui kahteen kekäleeseen pidellen niitä hiiltyneistä päistä

ja katsoi eläimiä silmiin. Toinen pysyi poissa, mutta Bash ryntäsi päin
ja hän otti sen ilmassa vastaan palavalla aseellaan. Kuului
tuskanulvontaa ja tuntui väkevää palaneen lihan ja karvojen katkua,
kun se kiereskeli liassa ja nainen pisti hehkuvan halon sen suuhun.
Purren hurjasti ympärilleen heittäytyi se sivullepäin ettei hän siihen
ulottuisi ja lähti kauhusta suunniltaan pakoon. Olo oli toiselta
puolelta perääntynyt, kun Li-Wan huomautti sille paremmuudestaan
heittämällä sitä halolla, joka sattui sen kylkiluihin. Sitten pari vetäytyi
kekälesateessa pois ja leirin ulkolaidassa ne nuolivat haavojaan,
murisivat ja vinkuivat.

Li-Wan puhalsi tuhan pois lihasta ja istuutui uudestaan. Hänen

sydämensä ei sykkinyt yhtään kiivaammin ja asia olikin jo vanha,
sillä tällainen kuului elämän menoon. Canim ei ollut liikahtanutkaan
temmellyksen aikana, ainoastaan kuorsannut.

"Tule Canim!" huusi hän, "päivän kuumuus on mennyt ja tie

odottaa jalkojamme."

Oravannahkavällyt liikahtivat ja ruskea käsivarsi heitti ne syrjään.

Mies räpäytti silmiänsä ja sulki ne taas.

Hänen kantamuksensa on painava, ajatteli nainen, ja hän on

väsynyt aamupäivän työstä.

Hyttynen pisti häntä niskaan ja hän hieroi peittämättömään

paikkaan märkää savea, jota hän otti saapuvilla olevasta
möhkäleestä. Koko aamun kiivetessään vuoria ylös, kokonaisten
hyttyspilvien heitä ympäröidessä, olivat mies ja nainen hieroneet
itseensä tuota sitkeää savea, joka auringossa kuivattuaan peitti
heidän kasvonsa naamiolla. Näitä naamioita, jotka kasvojen lihaksien
liikkeestä olivat toisin paikoin halkeilleet, täytyi yhtämittaa paikkailla,
niin että savikerros oli eripaksuista ja merkillisen näköistä.

Li-Wan ravisteli Canimia varovasti, mutta itsepintaisesti, kunnes

hän heräsi ja nousi istumaan. Ensimäiseksi katsoi hän aurinkoa ja
saatuaan tältä taivaankellolta tiedon, laahusti hän valkean viereen ja
rupesi ahneesti syömään. Hän oli kookas indiani, runsaasti kuuden
jalan mittainen, leveärintainen ja vahvalihaksinen ja hänen silmänsä
olivat eloisammat ja todistivat suurempia henkisiä lahjoja kuin hänen
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

All rights reserved. No part of this publication

Published for the Royal Economic Society

Published in the United States of America by

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

This edition published 2013

isbn 978-1-107-69664-8 Paperback

General introduction page vii

Editorial note xiii

Part I. Shaping Opinion

2 HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR 40

3 OPERATIONS ON OTHER FRONTS - FEBRUARY

Part JI. At the Treasury - Domestic War Finance

passages to clarify a situation, are treated as introductory

the exchange problem. It would also facilitate orderly trans-

NOTES ON EXCHANGE CONTROL

1. In the last war there was no exchange control as such, apart

British exporters should hand over the foreign currency they

their attempts to influence the management of the war—air raid precau-

THE FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE BLOCKADE

The second memorandum, also on food blockade, arose from conversations

It is suggested that the following arguments for choosing a

Finally, there was a memorandum intended for President Roosevelt

NOTES ON THE WAR FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is great confusion of mind everywhere about this war.

"Niin se on", sanoi Nam-Bok itsepäisesti. "Höyrylaiva on kokonaan

"Ei, se ei ole mahdollista."

"Minä näin sen omin silmin."

"Ei se ole luonnon mukaista."

"Mutta sano minulle Nam-Bok", keskeytti Koogah joka pelkäsi, että

"Aurinko näyttää tien."

"Keskipäivän aikaan ottaa kuunarin päämies esineen, jonka lävitse

"Ne ovat pahoja taikoja!" huudahti Opee-Kwan, kummastellen

Ne, jotka olivat lähinnä, vetäytyivät äkkiä kauemmaksi hänestä ja

"Mutta neljännen päivän aamuna, oi Nam-Bok", sanoi Koogah,

Opee-Kwanin suu värähteli kiivaasti ja hänen piti juuri ruveta

"Kuinka he tiesivät, että he olivat likellä?" kysyi Opee-Kwan, joka

Nam-Bok katsoi häneen vihaisesti. "Enkö minä sanonut, että

Koogah sovitteli ja Nam-Bok jatkoi.

"Niinkuin sanoin, ollessamme likellä sitä kylää puhkesi kova myrsky

"Juurihan sanoit, että päämies tiesi — —"

"Rauhoitu Opee-Kwan! Sinä olet typerä, etkä ymmärrä. Niinkuin

"Kun päivä koitti, eikä kuunarista näkynyt jälkeäkään, käänsin

"Se oli mahdottoman suuri talo", sanoi Koogah, peittäen

"Sellaisen talon tekemiseen tarvittiin paljon puita", lisäsi Opee-

"Se ei ole mitään." Nam-Bok kohautti halveksivasti olkapäitään.

"Eivätkä ne miehet ole isoja?"

"Ei, sellaisia kun te ja minä", vastasi Nam-Bok. "Minä olin leikannut

"Ja eräänä päivänä lähdin siitä paikasta kauemmaksi sisämaahan.

"Silloin sinusta tuli rikas", selitti Opee-Kwan, "sillä rauta on

"Se oli löydettyä ja löydetty tavara on laillista omaisuutta."

"Eipä niinkään. Valkoiset miehet olivat asettaneet ne siihen. Ja

"Nam-Bok, siinä oli paljon rautaa", varoitti Opee-Kwan.

Kalastajaväestö huudahteli suureen ääneen ja Opee-Kwan kuunteli

Opee-Kwan sai taas vihdoinkin sanan suustaan. "Ja — ja sitten, oi

"Niinkuin me teetämme koirillamme?" kysyi Koogah epäluuloinen

"Niin, aivan niinkuin me teetämme koirillamme."

"Ja kuinka he kasvattavat noita — vehkeitä?" kysyi Opee-Kwan.

"Eivät he kasvata niitä ollenkaan. Miehet tekevät ne osavasti

"No, no! oi Nam-Bok", keskeytti Opee-Kwan. "Kerro meille muista

"Ettekö te ymmärrä?", kysyi Nam-Bok epätoivoissaan.

"Ei, me emme ymmärrä", valittivat miehet ja naiset. "Me emme voi

Nam-Bok ajatteli monimutkaista leikkuukonetta ja koneita, joissa

"Uskallanko minä sanoa, että kuljin tällä rautahirviöllä halki

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